

Representations of Muslims and Australian Federal Elections 2004-2007

*Media reporting as a social artefact of political
discourse*

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
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Statement of Originality

This thesis is my own work and does not incorporate, without acknowledgement, any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. It does not contain any material previously published or written where due reference is not made in the text. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.



.....
Signed by author

Abstract

Previous studies have highlighted links between rising levels of ‘Islamophobic’ attitudes, increases in direct and structural violence towards Muslim individuals and communities, and the electoral success of the Howard Government in Australia. This thesis seeks to extend existing research by exploring how and why the wedge politics which the Government utilised so effectively during the 2004 election campaign, at the expense of Australian Muslims, failed to achieve the same endorsement from the media during the 2007 election campaign.

Divergences in media representations of Muslims between 2004 and 2007 point to a crucial shift, when the Howard Government suddenly found its political currency devalued as support among key players in the media fell away. This study investigates this shift through an analysis of manifest content from one influential media genre – news reporting and commentary published in two broadsheet newspapers, *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*. The implications of my analysis are explored by drawing on a suite of conceptual frames including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

This study found that Islam and issues related to Muslims were more likely to be represented through essentialist, ‘Islamophobic’ stereotypes, and were more frequently presented as a significant ‘problem’, in *The Australian* than in *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Whilst the two different publications often framed their selected stories with different emphases, the agenda-setting function of the different papers nevertheless showed a substantial overlap. For both publications, however, 2007 election reporting was characterised by increased contestation of essentialist discourses and a more adversarial stance towards the incumbent government. An analysis of this shift is utilised to suggest potential strategies for disrupting or contesting negative representational patterns in future reporting on Muslims and Islam.

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And to my wonderful partner Tony Bozdogci – sana minnetdarım aşkım.

Acronyms

AFP – Australian Federal Police

ASIO – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

DPP – Director of Public Prosecutions

SIEV – Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel

SIT – Social Identity Theory

The SMH – The Sydney Morning Herald

TPV – Temporary Protection Visa

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Conditions within nations and races change with the change of periods and the passage of time.

– *Ibn Khaldun*

This famous line from the *Muqaddimah* shows why its author, the fourteenth-century Muslim scholar, Ibn Khaldun, is known as the ‘father of social science’.¹ Conditions both shape, and are shaped by, attitudes and beliefs. The accumulated stock of attitudes and beliefs (often in a defined community, such as a nation) is what contemporary social scientists denote by the word ‘discourse’, albeit with different emphases in different analytic traditions. Discourses limit what people can think, write, or speak about a social object or practice.² Discourses govern social processes of ‘meaning-making’, defining how people interpret what is ‘true’, ‘factual’, ‘right’, or ‘real’.³ For example, the way people speak and write about globalisation, violent conflict, ‘terrorism’ or poverty constitutes those issues as social knowledge and makes it difficult to speak outside those terms of reference.

How does an object or practice, a process of meaning-making or a form of knowledge become ‘social’? It is impossible to imagine how this question can be answered in modern societies without reference to the media. In particular, mediated discourses are key arenas for, and catalysts and determinants of, accounts of the spectrum of social issues that are considered as ‘political’. As Manuel Castells has observed:

What does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind, even if it could have a fragmented presence in individual minds. Therefore, a political message is necessarily a media message. And whenever a politically related message is conveyed through the media, it must be couched in the specific language of the media.⁴

Data for this thesis is drawn from analysis of the manifest content of one influential media genre – news reporting and commentary in the print media – and its implications are explored by drawing on a suite of conceptual frames including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

¹ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, ed. N. J. Dawood, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 24.

² Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995), p. 31.

³ Norman Fairclough, "A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in Social Research," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2009), p. 162.

⁴ Manuel Castells, "Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society," *International Journal of Communication* 1(2007): p. 241.

From this perspective, discourse is seen as both ‘socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned’; that is, discourses are shaped by events, social interactions and institutions, but will also shape them in turn. This means that understanding the social and historical context of discursive formations is paramount to CDA.⁵

As a leading proponent of CDA, Ruth Wodak, has emphasised, ‘the relationships between media, politics (all genres) and ‘people’ are very complex...only interdisciplinary research will be able to make such complex relationships more transparent’.⁶ This thesis therefore adopts research practices outlined by Wodak for a ‘Discourse Historical Approach’ to CDA: the study is interdisciplinary in nature, employs multitheoretical and multimethodological lenses; and is abductive (moves back and forth between theory and empirical data). The approach employs detailed analysis and consideration of the socio-historical context of discourses and texts, and ‘grand theories’ serve as a foundation for analysis and interpretation. Ultimately, ‘practice is the target’ of the ‘Discourse Historical Approach’ to research: the end goal of the project is ‘changing discursive and social practices’.⁷ This goal is common to most CDA practitioners. Although the field of CDA contains several distinct strands, according to Garrett and Bell, they share ‘an explicit socio-political agenda’ dedicated to ‘focusing on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance’.⁸ Exponents of CDA are engaged in an ‘unabashedly normative’ quest to create opportunities for ‘change through critical understanding’.⁹

This makes CDA a close match and a natural partner for the normative approach of Peace and Conflict Studies, the ‘home’ scholarly context of this thesis. Peace and Conflict Studies can be contrasted with traditional disciplines such as International Relations. Carolyn Stephenson notes that whilst these two disciplines are apparently concerned with much of the same issue content, they are clearly differentiated by their approach to their subject matter: ‘Peace Studies is value-explicit, with both a positive valuation of peace itself and a commitment to

⁵ Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," in *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, ed. Teun van Dijk (London: SAGE, 1997), p. 258.

⁶ Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 64.

⁷ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," pp. 70-71.

⁸ Peter Garrett and Allan Bell, "Media and Discourse: A Critical Overview," in *Approaches to Media Discourse: A Critical Overview*, eds. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 6.

⁹ Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse and Society* 4, no. 2 (1993): pp. 251-53.

examine trade-offs between values, while values tend to be more hidden in much International Relations research'.¹⁰

As such, a brief explanation of the specific political context in which the ideas for this thesis took shape is warranted. Australia at the turn of the new Millennium was a country still coming to terms with economic and social upheavals unprecedented, in pace and scope, in its modern history. Industries were opened to international competition, barriers to financial flows removed and key public services corporatised and/or privatised, all of which were presented as necessary adjustments to 'globalisation'. The newly vulnerable economy was particularly hard hit by the global recession of the early 1990s; unemployment for instance, surged to its highest levels in Australia since the Great Depression.¹¹ The fiscal pattern shifted appreciably from progressive, direct taxation to regressive indirect taxation, with the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) after the 1998 Federal Election. Furthermore, high immigration in the closing decades of the twentieth century from geographical regions such as Asia and the Middle East had considerably altered the ethnic and cultural demographics of a formerly more homogenous country, and was accompanied by a controversial move from policies of assimilation to multiculturalism as the basis for integration of immigrants.¹²

Among those most directly affected by these changes, and the insecurity they brought with them, were many traditional voters for Australia's Labor Party. These rapid developments in Australian society gave rise to a volatile 'politics of anger',¹³ the articulation of which enabled a former fish-and-chip shop owner, Pauline Hanson, to snatch a safe Labor seat and enter the Federal House of Representatives as an Independent in 1996. In her maiden Parliamentary speech, Hanson proposed a range of anti-immigration and economic protectionist policies which strongly tapped into popular resentment at the unprecedented effects of globalisation. Among Hanson's controversial statements was her notable claim that 'if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who

¹⁰ Carolyn Stephenson, "Peace Studies: Overview," in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, ed. Lester Kurtz (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), pp. 810-11.

¹¹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *A Century of Change in the Australian Labour Market* (Canberra: ABS, 2001).

¹² Andrew Markus, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), pp. 44-5.

¹³ Keith Suter, "Australia, the Media and the Politics of Anger," *Media Development* 45, no. 3 (1998): pp. 38-40.

comes into my country'.¹⁴ Hanson subsequently founded One Nation, an anti-immigration party that rose to prominence in the Queensland state election of 1998, then became a significant factor at the Federal level. One Nation continued to draw votes from Labor heartlands, but soon began to strongly challenge the National Party (the junior member of the Coalition government) and eventually also the Liberal Party (the senior member of the Coalition government) across NSW and Queensland.

By mid-2001, the governing Liberal/National Coalition was languishing in the polls, just months away from the next election, when two significant events happened to change its fortunes. One was the course towards Australian coastal waters set by the MV *Tampa*, a Norwegian freighter that had picked up over 400 Afghan refugees from a sinking ship. A later biography of Prime Minister John Howard notes that Howard was urged at the time by one of his ministers, Jackie Kelly, to use the incident to send a signal to swing voters in electorates like her own marginal seat of Lindsay, in Sydney's west, where immigration issues were boosting support for One Nation.¹⁵ Australia denied entry to the *Tampa*, and within days the Coalition had passed a new Border Protection Bill. Howard used the issue to drive a 'wedge' into Labor support and recover voters from One Nation, launching his 2001 election campaign with words very similar to Hanson's: 'We will decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances in which they come'.¹⁶

Less than a fortnight after this speech came the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11. Howard happened to be in Washington at the time, and his hotel was so close to the Pentagon that he could see the rising smoke from his hotel room window. His personal experience strongly impressed upon him the significance of the event not just for the US, but for global politics.¹⁷ He and his party subsequently capitalised upon the new fear of 'terrorism' to place still more emphasis on 'border protection' and 'national security' as the key issue of the election – and were returned to Federal Government by a landslide. Through this period and the following few years, the two separate phenomena – asylum seekers and 'terrorism' – came to be conflated in political and media accounts, as 'threats' to Australia, to be turned away at the border lest they add to the insecurities borne by the

¹⁴ Pauline Hanson, "Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives (1996)," AustralianPolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/1996/09/10/pauline-hanson- maiden-speech.html>.

¹⁵ Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen, *John Winston Howard: The Definitive Biography* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007), p. 301.

¹⁶ John Howard, "2001 Election Policy Speech," AustralianPolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/2001/10/28/john-howard-election-policy-speech.html>.

¹⁷ Richard Fidler, "John Howard on 9/11," *ABC*, 9 September 2011.

economic tides of globalisation.

Social psychological research during the past ten years has repeatedly demonstrated strong correlative relationships between negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, fear of terrorism, and prejudice against Muslims. In some studies these traits were also strongly related to low levels of personal experiences with asylum seekers or Muslims, leading researchers to contend that political and media accounts were playing a significant role in the dissemination and legitimisation of ‘false beliefs’ concerning asylum seekers.¹⁸ Pedersen et al., for example, highlighted strong similarities between the responses to open-ended survey questions asking study participants to explain their attitudes towards asylum seekers and the public statements of political figures such as Prime Minister Howard.¹⁹ Media content analytical studies have similarly demonstrated the forging of linkages between asylum seekers, terrorism and Muslims. Peter Manning’s research has shown that in newspaper articles published in Sydney between 2000 and 2002 which referred to refugees or asylum-seekers, fully 37% also contained references to ‘terrorism’; furthermore, he found that ‘threat concepts’ such as fundamentalist terrorism were strongly associated with Muslims.²⁰

Numerous studies during the past decade have supported and extended Manning’s findings. Representations of Muslims in the Australian media have been routinely stereotyped, failed to reflect the diversity of origin, outlook and aspiration of Muslim Australians, and have had significant negative impacts upon the perception of Islam and treatment of Muslims by non-Muslim Australians.²¹ In 2004, Australia’s Human Rights Commission conducted extensive research on anti-Muslim discrimination, during the course of which they asked Australian Muslims to discuss examples of racism they had experienced. ‘I think the media is the main

¹⁸ For an overview, see Anne Pedersen, Susan Watt, and Brian Griffiths, "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers and the Fear of Terrorism: The Importance of Context," in *Settling in Australia: The Social Inclusion of Refugees*, eds. Val Colic-Peisker and Farida Tilbury (Perth: Centre for Social and Community Research, 2007).

¹⁹ Pedersen, Watt, and Griffiths, "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers," p. 49-50.

²⁰ Peter Manning, *Dog Whistle Politics and Journalism: Reporting Arabic and Muslim People in Sydney Newspapers 2000-2002* (Sydney: Australian Center for Independent Journalism, 2004), p. 12.

²¹ Shahram Akbarzadeh and Bianca Smith, *The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media* (Melbourne: Monash University, 2005); Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, *Race for the Headlines: Racism and Media Discourse* (Sydney: Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, 2003); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaʿ Listen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians* (Sydney: HREOC, 2004); Sharon Pickering, Jude McCulloch, David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini, *Counter-Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities: Final Report 2007* (Melbourne: Australian Research Council Linkage Project, 2007); Scott Poynting and Barbara Perry, "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11," *Current Issues in Criminal Justice* 19, no. 2 (2007); Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla, *Islam and the Australian News Media* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010).

cause', one respondent said, 'because kids are picking on Muslims at school and these kids get it from their parents and their parents get it from the media'.²² After reviewing the responses of the study's participants, Mykonos and Watmough concluded that 'the media, collectively, represents for many Muslims and people of Middle Eastern background an important site of racism'.²³ Based upon both community consultations and incidence of reported discrimination and prejudice in the wake of September 11 and the Bali Bombing of 2002, Tanja Dreher's research has similarly highlighted that the media is repeatedly identified by Australian Muslims as 'a central social institution contributing to experiences of fear and exclusion among targeted communities'.²⁴

This phenomenon is of course not limited to Australia. Indeed, as Dunn et al. have observed, 'the unreasonableness and defamatory effect of media portrayals of Islam [have become] a recurring theme of any contemporary ethnographic work with Muslims in western countries'.²⁵ There are, however, particularly clear connections between the political agenda and fortunes of the Howard Government and the rise of mediatised anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic discourses in Australia.

These developments fit neatly into the pattern described by Murray Edelman as 'political spectacle'. This allows political control to be exerted through the creation of 'mediated dramas' that both invoke and reinforce syndromes of 'psychological distancing'. These can produce an 'aroused response', based on fear and anxiety, to issues expedient to the author(s) of the drama, while distracting public attention from other issues less likely to build political support for their cause. This strategy can be successful because 'to personify an issue by identifying it with an enemy wins support for a political stand while masking the material advantages the perception provides'.²⁶ The Liberal/National Coalition enjoys traditionally strong support from the corporate sector of the business community, which prospered greatly from the economic changes introduced in Australia under the guise of 'adjusting to globalisation'. These gains were effectively allowed to carry on quietly accruing, away from the spotlight, even as voters for whom the changes were, perhaps, a more mixed blessing,

²² Cited in George Mykonos and Simon Watmough, *Perceptions of Islamic and Middle Eastern People in Australian Media: Scope for Improvement* (Melbourne: Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, 2007), p. 9.

²³ Mykonos and Watmough, *Perceptions of Islamic and Middle Eastern People*, p. 7.

²⁴ Tanya Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001," *UTS Shopfront Monograph Series No. 2* (2006): p. 36.

²⁵ Kevin Dunn, Natascha Klocker, and Tanya Salabay, "Contemporary Racism and Islamophobia in Australia: Racialising Religion," *Ethnicities* 7, no. 4 (2007): p. 582.

²⁶ Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), p. 68.

were being addressed on the need to secure Australia's borders. Under the mandate granted the Howard Government by its successful leveraging of 'threat concepts', a range of far-reaching policies were implemented which further benefited the business community and deepened the disproportionate effects of Australia's economic transformation. These policies included further corporatisation and privatisation of public services and assets; significant reductions in barriers to trade; the relaxation of cross-media ownership laws; the reduction of upper bracket income tax and introduction of a range of 'middle class welfare' schemes; the deregulation of the industrial relations market; and significant attacks upon the self-determination of Indigenous peoples.²⁷

At some point during the middle of the last decade, however, the pattern shifted. Howard lost not only the Federal Election of 2007, but even his own seat, as a Labor government took office with apparent commitments to unravel some of the certitudes of its predecessor. The incoming government pledged that child asylum seekers would no longer be kept locked up in detention centres. Australian troops in Iraq were brought home from a theatre of war Labor said they should never have entered in the first place. For a while, under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Australia even appeared to be moving towards a more even-handed approach on a totemic issue to some in the Muslim community, namely the Israel-Palestine conflict.²⁸

The political space for these initiatives opened under manifold influences – some home-grown, others originating overseas. They were mediated and socialised in various different forms, and they took effect by altering the discourse: the terms in which issues like asylum and 'terrorism' were written and talked about. The core research question of this thesis is to investigate the ways in which this change was manifested, concentrating on the content of news reporting as a social artefact and comparing two key periods – the build-up to the Federal elections of 2004 and 2007 respectively. By expanding our understanding of *how* the pattern of representing Muslims shifted between these two key periods I will be adding a significant new dimension to the existing literature on this subject area, as well as generating

²⁷ The scope and pace of these reforms were particularly accentuated during the Howard Government's fourth term (2004-2007), when the Coalition had control of both the Upper and the Lower House.

²⁸ Jake Lynch, "Can the Centre Hold? Prospects for Mobilising Media Activism around Public Service Broadcasting Using Peace Journalism," in *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*, eds. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011).

valuable insights into strategies which successfully disrupt or contest negative reporting patterns.

More specifically, this thesis compares the representation of Muslims and Islam in two broadsheet publications, *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, during the month prior to the 2004 and the 2007 Australian Federal Elections. The sample of articles analysed in this study includes both ‘hard’ news stories, such as reporting on events of significance, as well as ‘soft’ news stories, including commentary and letters. Although some studies on representation of Islam in the media have discussed significant ‘soft’ news such as opinion columns, selection of articles has generally been predicated upon investigation of particularly emblematic or inflammatory articles, rather than a systematic investigation of representational patterns. Traditional content analytical studies of the media which have undertaken such systematic investigations, in contrast, have generally focussed on ‘hard’ news stories. When studies of ‘soft’ news stories *have* been conducted, they have ‘have pinpointed a range of issues, including how the inclusion of this ‘subjective’ or ‘interpretative’ material ‘helps to underwrite the proclaimed “objectivity” of “hard” news stories’.²⁹ My decision to conduct systematic content and discourse analysis on a large sample of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news stories is therefore a significant point of divergence from the existing literature and should enable consideration of a number of issues which are not rendered possible when just one type of content in mainstream newspapers is considered.

On the basis of previous comparative studies of the Australian broadsheet press, I expected that there would be significant divergences between the two publications with respect to the representation of Muslims.³⁰ I anticipated that more generally, in the pre-election period of 2004, Muslims and Islam would tend to be represented in both publications largely through essentialist stereotypes, and more frequently be presented as a significant threat and ‘problem’. In contrast, in the pre-election period of 2007, I hypothesised that the representation of Muslims or Islam as ‘problematic’ may be interrogated more frequently, with an alternative target, frequently the incumbent government, being represented as ‘the problem’. It is anticipated that utilisation of some ‘Islamophobic’ stereotypes may persist in this period, although there may be evidence of increased contestation of essentialist discourses.

²⁹ Stuart Allan, *News Culture*, 2nd. ed. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004), p. 86.

³⁰ Jake Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2008), p. 169; Inez Mahony, "Diverging Frames: A Comparison of Indonesian and Australian Press Portrayals of Terrorism and Islamic Groups in Indonesia," *International Communication Gazette* 72, no. 8 (2010).

Divergences in the representation of Muslims and Islam between the 2004 and the 2007 pre-election periods point to a crucial shift, when the Howard Government, ascendant for a decade, suddenly found its political currency devalued and its moral authority rapidly unravelling as support among key players in the media fell away. This analysis seeks to illuminate how and why the wedge politics which the Howard Government utilised so effectively in the 2004 election (and earlier, in the 2001 elections),³¹ at the expense of Australian Muslims, failed to achieve the same endorsement from broadsheet media in the 2007 election.

The overarching purpose of this thesis is to contest the threat concepts built into the political spectacle that gave rise to discriminatory and violent treatment meted out to Muslims by the Australian state and some non-Muslim Australians, from the everyday racism encountered in such settings as schools and on the streets, through harsh responses to asylum seekers and draconian ‘anti-terrorism’ laws that restrict civil liberties, to war and the preparations for war. These are inimical to human needs and the fulfilment of human potential, which makes them violent in themselves according to two complementary definitions coined by Johan Galtung, which are highly influential in Peace and Conflict Studies. According to Galtung, violence is that which causes ‘human beings [to be] influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential’.³² It can also be understood as ‘an insult to human needs’.³³

As a social scientist, therefore, I am interested not merely in how the violence implicit in patterns of media coverage came to be there, and how and why it proved effective in a particular locus of time and place. I am also interested in how, why and to what extent it shifted, and with what effect. To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun: how did conditions within the Australian nation, and between different sections of the community, change with the change of periods and the passage of time? From the answers to those questions, what possibilities exist to transform the discourse around issues pertaining to ‘border protection’ and relations with Islam, to reduce violence and promote mutual understanding and acceptance?

³¹ Ian Ward, "The Tampa, Wedge Politics, and a Lesson for Political Journalism," *Australian Journalism Review* 24, no. 1 (2002): pp. 29-31; Shaun Wilson and Nick Turnbull, "Wedge Politics and Welfare Reform in Australia," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 47, no. 3 (2001): pp. 385-86.

³² Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): p. 168.

³³ Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): p. 9.

Overview of chapters

This thesis utilises an array of theoretical and methodological apparatus to explore a complex of issues. My first chapter, therefore, has summarised in brief the overall positioning and argument of my thesis. Subsequent chapters go on to explore the theoretical, historical and methodological underpinnings of this thesis before moving on to discussion and consideration of my data and finally, my conclusion.

Chapter 2, *A ‘millennial enemy’?: representations of Muslims and the construction of ‘Islamophobia’*, examines the phenomenon of ‘Islamophobia’ from a variety of perspectives. Considering that ‘Islamophobia’ is a relatively recent and highly contested term for what is arguably a very longstanding phenomenon, I discuss the history and evolution of the term ‘Islamophobia’ as a label for the rising incidence of hostility and prejudice towards Muslims which could not be comprehensively defined or explained solely through recourse to the terminology of either ‘racism’ or ‘religious intolerance’. I consider the merits but ultimate shortcomings of viewing Islamophobia primarily as a psychological construct. The activation and reinforcement of Islamophobia serves distinctive ideological purposes, and its operationalisation is guided by discourses which establish guidelines for what may be discussed in regards to Muslims and Islam and rules out other topics or approaches to the issue. I therefore consider the development of some of the ‘master-narratives’ or discourses which feed into contemporary Islamophobia, in particular the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and its role in the formulation of the ‘War on Terror’. In closing, I highlight the significance of the media in the exportation and application of the ‘War on Terror’ framework and its implications for the rise of Islamophobia.

Chapter 3, *‘Media messages’: The role of the media in contemporary political communication*, considers the role of the media as a particularly effective site for the development and dissemination of discourses of Islamophobia, with particular attention to one influential media genre: news journalism. I highlight the significant role the media plays in contemporary society in the transmission and reinforcement of stereotypes and the delineation of social norms, and then outline a theory of media effects. This issue is explored through reference to the tension between the political economy of the media tradition, which conceives of the media as essentially an hegemonic practice, and the social responsibility of journalism tradition, which sees the media as being in an essentially adversarial relationship with power. It is during election campaigns, I contend, that the tension between these two

perspectives on the role of journalism are most apparent; whilst consensus on key issues may shift rapidly at this time through the exercise of the press's adversarial role, the complicity of the media in the exercise of power may also paradoxically be more apparent during election campaigns than at other times.

Chapter 4, *A national history of racism*, marks a shift away from explorations of the theoretical grounding of this thesis and is the first of four chapters which detail the specific socio-historical background and context in which my primary sources, news stories from broadsheet newspapers during 2004 and 2007, are sited. Chapter 4 expands upon the Discourse Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis and then explores the specific history of exclusionary hierarchies based upon race in Australian history.

Chapter 5, *Towards a multicultural Australia*, follows on directly from Chapter 3, detailing the continued history of racism in the Australian context in the twentieth century. It focuses upon the shift from policies of overt racial discrimination to assimilation, and finally to the institution of the policy of 'multiculturalism' and the disavowal of state discrimination on the basis of race in the 1970s. I then consider the rise of a 'backlash' against these changes in Australian society and a shift towards discrimination and prejudice being articulated in terms of 'cultural incompatibility' rather than on the basis of biological race or phenotypical markers. Finally, I discuss the contribution that legitimisation of this 'new racism' played in the popularity and electoral success of the Howard Government, which came to power in 1996.

Chapter 6, *'People like that': Muslims in Australia and the rise of Islamophobia*, begins with an overview of the history of Muslim settlement in Australia. Whilst Muslim fisherman from Indonesia were trading and seasonally settling in northern Australia during the eighteenth century, and small numbers of Muslims arrived in the British colonies of Australia throughout the nineteenth century, it was not until the late nineteenth century that significant permanent Muslim communities were established in Australia. In the early twentieth century, the introduction of racially discriminatory immigration and labour laws led to a reduction in the size of existing Muslim communities in Australia and hampered the establishment of new ones. From the 1960s, following the repeal of such legislation, the size and diversity of Muslim communities in Australia expanded significantly. However, these developments were accompanied by rising prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims in Australia, particularly exacerbated by international events such as the first Gulf War, spikes in the

number of (predominantly Muslim) asylum seekers in the early 2000s, and the September 11 attacks in New York. I consider how firm linkages between asylum seekers, criminality, terrorism and Islam were constructed in political and media discourse over the course of this period and were then successfully leveraged for political capital by the Howard Government during the 2001 election campaign.

Chapter 7, *'Better safe than sorry': The 'War on Terror' in the Australian context*, continues on from Chapter 6, discussing the rising tide of Islamophobia during the mid-2000s as the 'War on Terror' reached its height of support and highest levels of impact upon Muslim communities around the world. This chapter focuses on detailing key developments during the third and fourth terms of the Howard Government (2001-2004 and 2004-2007) respectively, as these form the immediate background to and context for the individual newspaper articles within my data sample.

Chapter 8, *Research Methodology*, is the first chapter in the final part of my thesis. The research methodology is positioned at this point in the thesis because the five chapters within the final part of my thesis are best understood when read together, and subsequent to reading the second part of my thesis, which provided the context and background against which the methodology, results, and discussion chapters of this thesis are to be read. Chapter 8 therefore expands upon the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis as they pertain to data analysis, and sets out the main characteristics of my research methodology. I detail the reasoning behind the selection of the publications analysed in this study and then the parameters for the selection of articles within those publications, before highlighting some potential limitations and issues with the design of my study. I then discuss the methodology by which I organised or 'coded' my data. This involved a three-step process; I first read all articles within the sample and generated general guidelines for coding of the data, and then I conducted a 'pilot-study' on a small sample of twenty articles, after which I further refined and amended my code book and approach to analysis of the articles. I then conducted a full and systematic analysis of the 373 articles within my full sample according to the resultant codebook. Chapter 8 concludes with an outline of the categories of analysis for both the Pilot Study and the full sample analysis.

Chapter 9, *Pilot study*, details the analysis of 20 articles from my sample according to parameters which were set out in Chapter 6. These twenty articles included five articles from the final week of the election campaign from each of the four subsets within my full sample;

that is, *The Australian* in 2004 and 2007, and *The Sydney Morning Herald* in 2004 and 2007. The Pilot Study represented not only a chance to evaluate and improve the coding criterion and identify any issues within my methodology, but also to illustrate in detail the process by which I evaluated and coded each article. Although the Pilot Study evaluated only a small number of articles, I found clear trends towards higher levels of Islamophobic discourse and towards representing Islam as a problem in *The Australian* than in *The Sydney Morning Herald*, and in 2004 as compared to 2007. I further found that the propensity towards negative reporting of Muslims was particularly marked in articles reporting on violent conflict or ‘terrorist’ violence, for both publications and both time periods.

Chapter 10, *Results and main findings*, is constituted by two distinct parts. In the first half of this chapter, I discuss the overall results for the coding of the physical features of the full sample. This included aspects of the sample including the proportion of hard and soft news per data subset, the attribution of sources, and the proportion of local versus international news. Some speculative conclusions are drawn considering the patterns of characteristics of these different features of the four data subsets before I move to the second part of this chapter, the consideration of the content analysis results for the full data sets. I found that the representational patterns suggested by the Pilot Study were largely borne out in the analysis of the full data sets. The highest levels of Islamophobic discourse and of representation of Muslims or Islam as a ‘problem’ were found in *The Australian* in 2004; whilst the lowest levels of Islamophobic discourse and of representation of Muslims or Islam as a ‘problem’ were found in *The Sydney Morning Herald* in 2007. Reporting in *The Australian* in 2007 was on most indicators either more negative or equivalent to reporting in *The Sydney Morning Herald* in 2004. The distribution of ‘extreme’ articles was somewhat surprising. Despite its tendency towards negative representations of Islam and Muslims, in both 2004 and 2007 *The Australian* printed articles which were characterised by extremely open views of Islam and Muslims, whilst *The Sydney Morning Herald* printed articles which were characterised by extremely closed views of Islam despite its overall lower incidence of negative reporting of matters relating to Islam and Muslims.

Chapter 11, *Discussion*, moves beyond the discussion of data patterns to consider the representational shifts in particular sets of articles between the different time periods and the two different newspapers. The first section of this chapter considers the characteristics and shifts over time and publication of representing links between Islam and violent conflict. The second section of this chapter considers the media coverage of racist campaigning in

marginal Sydney seats between the 2004 and 2007 election. The third section of Chapter 11 explores the relationships between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news by focussing in particular on a set of interrelated and self-referential articles published in *The Australian* in 2004. The final section of Chapter 11 explores the relationships between news articles and broader, international discourses on Islam by focussing on one article from *The Australian* in 2007 and the way that this article was commented upon and reproduced by bloggers and international journalists.

Chapter 12, *Conclusions and looking forward*, is the final chapter of my thesis. I begin with a summary of the main findings of my thesis, before moving into a consideration of the changes in the media and political terrain which have taken place since the 2007 election. From this contextualised point of reference, I then explore how some of the evidence drawn from this thesis regarding the contestation and delegitimisation of Islamophobic frames in election reporting in 2007 might be applied in the contemporary media and political landscape.

Chapter 2 – A ‘millennial enemy’?: representations of Muslims and the construction of ‘Islamophobia’

The 9/11 attacks, the launch of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the invasion of Iraq exacerbated tensions, in Australia and elsewhere, which exposed Muslims to increased levels of everyday racism, as indicated in Chapter 1. One response to this phenomenon was the establishment of organisations like the Affinity Intercultural Foundation, based in the Western Sydney suburb of Auburn. Founded by a group of young Muslims in the early 2000s, its mission statement, set out on its website, commits it to work together with non-Muslim partner organisations – which include the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Sydney – to ‘remove bigotry and establish peace and harmony in Australia’. Affinity’s incorporation coincided with ‘negative world events’, the statement says, demanding a ‘constructive response... to promote education in the face of misinformation and misunderstanding’.³⁴

The ‘negative world events’ highlighted by Affinity, along with the way they were represented and mediated, and responses to them by Australia at an institutional as well as a quotidian level, exerted their effect in communities by providing a series of ‘activation tags for memory-based information processing’.³⁵ They evoked (and strengthened) much more pervasive ideas, attitudes and beliefs, embedded in a densely woven web of relationships, procedures, expectations and assumptions established over a *longue durée*.

These factors transmit into the present day as a latent hostility towards or fear of Islam, and prejudice against Muslims, giving rise to forms of discrimination that have been variously described as religious intolerance; racism; ‘new racism’; xeno-racism; xenophobia; as a manifestation of Orientalism; or as a by-product of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ ideology. All of these may be regarded as forms of an overarching discourse of ‘Islamophobia’. Use of that term comes with inbuilt objections and caveats, which will be explored in further detail below. Its use in this thesis is intended to capture the multi-dimensional antecedents and manifestations, operating simultaneously on multiple levels, which bear upon acts and experiences of meaning-making in response to current events.

³⁴ Affinity Intercultural Foundation, "Who We Are," Affinity Intercultural Foundation Website, http://affinity.org.au/?page_id=2

³⁵ Dietram A. Scheufele, "Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication," *Mass Communication and Society* 3, no. 2-3 (2000): p. 299.

Neither the events nor the way they were represented just ‘happen’, of course. Dominant constructions of meaning attain and maintain their position of dominance through ongoing contestation, and it is in this contestation that Affinity and others seek to engage, through the peaceful means of fostering dialogue and understanding. Their purpose in doing so is clearly set out on their website: to enable ‘Australian Muslims [to contribute] to the positive development of the cultural and religious landscape of Australia’. It begs the question of what purposes and interests are served on the other side(s) of the same contestation, by activating and reinforcing Islamophobia? This question will be considered in this chapter, partially from the perspective of the psychology of the individual or the group, but more crucially, at a national or international level. The question here becomes: how is hostility towards or fear of Islam and Muslims triggered or exacerbated, and who benefits from Islamophobia?

Defining Islamophobia

Competing claims exist as to the origin of the term ‘Islamophobia’. The phrases ‘*islamophobe*’ and ‘*islamophobie*’ had been used from the Second World War in several French-language publications by Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim in regards to French colonial policies. While the phrases do not appear to have been widely adopted, they did happen to be employed by Hichem Djait in a 1975 French-language critique of Edward Said’s work on Orientalism. In 1985, possibly due to the translation and wider availability of Djait’s work at this time, Said began to use the term ‘Islamophobia’ in his published writings, and during the same period, this English-language term began to appear in a variety of academic and activist settings in the UK. The term gained somewhat wider currency from 1991 after the magazine *Insight* published an article during the Gulf War which referred to ‘Islamophobia’. In 1996, the Runnymede Trust, a prominent British race equality think-tank, founded a Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia and initiated a series of community consultations with key Muslim individuals, communities and organisations across Britain.³⁶ The Commission’s Report, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, reflected the assessment of the Commission that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’. Although it is clear that

³⁶ Chris Allen, *Islamophobia* (London: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 5-7; Nasir Meer and Tariq Modood, "The Racialisation of Muslims," in *Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, eds. S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), pp. 72-3; AbdoolKarim Vakil, "Is the Islam in Islamophobia the Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; or, When Is It Islamophobia Time?," in *Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, eds. S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), pp. 33-34, 38-41.

the term ‘Islamophobia’ was not actually coined by the Commission, the Report did provide the first attempt at a definition of Islamophobia and established the term in international public policy parlance through the wide publicity generated by the Report.³⁷

The Report defined Islamophobia as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’. The Report further characterised ‘Islamophobia’ as a constellation of eight dimensions of ‘closed’ views towards Islam, including the perception of Islam as a monolithic, static bloc; as separate and ‘other’; as inferior to ‘the West’; as violent and engaged in a ‘clash of civilisations’ with the West; and as primarily a political ideology rather than a religious faith. The final three dimensions were the dismissal of criticisms of ‘the West’ made by Muslims; the justification of discriminatory treatment of Muslims, and the normalisation of anti-Muslim hostility.³⁸ The Report’s labelling, definition and conceptualisation of a phenomenon of growing prejudice against Muslims took on particular significance after September 11 2001, when ‘global events had elevated the issue to a prominence previously only hinted at’.³⁹

In the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent high visibility of anti-Muslim attitudes, behaviours and practices, the Runnymede Trust’s definition of Islamophobia was seized upon in an effort to document and explain the phenomenon. ‘Without doubt,’ Chris Allen commented, ‘the Runnymede report and the model of Islamophobia established through this by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, is the seminal source from which the most common and widespread definitions and conceptualisations about Islamophobia have evolved’.⁴⁰ Although the Commission’s definition and characterisation of ‘hostility towards Islam’ and ‘fear or dislike of Muslims’ drew criticism from an early stage, the complexity and adaptive flexibility of the phenomenon has defied attempts to replace the moniker ‘Islamophobia’ or to create a universally accepted, contemporary definition of the term; the Runnymede Trust’s definition and labelling of has thus become somewhat paradigmatic. Despite the proliferation of academic and popular works on the topic, no single conceptualisation of Islamophobia has been able to definitively displace the term

³⁷ Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997), p. 4.

³⁸ Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, *Islamophobia*, p. 4.

³⁹ Meer and Modood, "The Racialisation of Muslims," p. 73.

⁴⁰ Chris Allen, "Islamophobia: From K.I.S.S. To R.I.P.," in *Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, eds. S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), p. 63.

‘Islamophobia’ or the description and definition set out in the Runnymede Report, which has persisted as the ‘default’ definition of Islamophobia.⁴¹

Particularly problematic in the definition and characterisation of Islamophobia (and with the very employment of the term ‘Islamophobia’) is the failure of the phenomenon to fit comfortably within the boundaries of terminology which would normally be employed to describe hostility or prejudice based on, for example, race or religion. The phenomenon of Islamophobia encompasses personal attacks on people who are judged to be Muslim through a combination of cultural, phenotypical and religious markers. For example, Muslims might experience prejudice and discrimination triggered by their ‘foreign’ names, their skin colour, or their attire; non-religious Muslims might become the targets of prejudice and discrimination on the basis of their cultural heritage and imputed ‘Muslimness’; and non-Muslims may become the targets of prejudice and discrimination as a result of incorrect identification as Muslims due to a misreading of cultural, phenotypical or religious markers. Not just individuals, but Muslim institutions and whole Muslim communities, at both a local and international level, have borne the brunt of Islamophobic attitudes and attacks. There is therefore a lack of discrimination between potential targets and a high degree of ‘confusion’ concerning the typification of Islamophobia. As Meer and Modood have observed, ‘neat and categorical delineations within terminology are made implausible by variations in the social phenomena they seek to describe and understand, so that a more nimble and absorbent nomenclature is preferred’.⁴² These issues explain the general acceptance of the term ‘Islamophobia’ and the Runnymede Trust’s characterisation despite its limitations; its very imprecision has bestowed it with the ‘nimbleness’ and ‘absorbency’ described by Meer and Modood and given the term its surprising longevity.

On this basis, despite the deficiencies of the term ‘Islamophobia’, it will be employed in this thesis as a shorthand for the wide variety of discursive strategies which it captures, including discourses rooted in racism, culturalism, and xenophobia. Whilst employing this term, I will

⁴¹ Allen, *Islamophobia*; Alice Aslan, *Islamophobia in Australia* (Glebe, N.S.W.: Agora Press, 2009); John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, eds., *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008); Nathan Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims* (London: Pluto Press, 2012); George Morgan and Scott Poynting, eds., *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012); Salman Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil, *Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives* (London: Hurst and Company, 2010); Stephen Sheehi, *Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims* (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2011).

⁴² Meer and Modood, "The Racialisation of Muslims," p. 79.

seek to keep uppermost the complexity of the phenomenon by accepting as a working description of Islamophobia the following outline by Meer and Modood:

Anti-Muslim sentiment simultaneously draws upon signs of race, culture and belonging in a way that compels us to consider how religion has a new sociological relevance because of the ways it is tied up with issues of community identity, stereotyping, socio-economic location, political conflict and so forth...chief among the concepts we identify are those of racialization and cultural racism, for these can explain how religious discrimination in most Western societies does not proceed on the basis of belief but perceived membership of an ethno-religious group...[Islamophobia particularly] employs a form of cultural racism which trades on pejorative characteristics of religious groups and communities, as opposed to beliefs and opposition to beliefs, and so it is not a pure ‘religious discrimination’ but one which traffics in stereotypes about foreignness, phenotypes and culture.⁴³

Given this outline of Islamophobia, I now proceed to explore the shape of Islamophobia as a psychological construct; as an ideological construct; and finally, as a discursive structure.

Islamophobia as a psychological construct

In the midst of the Vietnam War, the political scientist Murray Edelman published his seminal work *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, in which he advanced the theory that:

Politics is a spectacle, reported by the media and witnessed by parts of the public. It attracts attention because, as an ambiguous text, it becomes infused with meanings that reassure or threaten. The construction of diverse meanings for described political events shapes support for causes and legitimises value allocation.⁴⁴

Edelman stated that it was a constellation of ‘common social psychological mechanisms’ that bound the forms of political symbols and their political functions together.⁴⁵ In particular, Edelman claimed that ‘it is characteristic of large numbers of people in our society that they see and think in terms of stereotypes, personalization, and oversimplifications, that they cannot recognise or tolerate ambiguous or complex situations, and that they accordingly respond chiefly to symbols’. These forms of behaviour are ‘especially likely to occur where there is insecurity occasioned by failure to adjust to real or perceived problems’, a situation

⁴³ Meer and Modood, "The Racialisation of Muslims," p. 83.

⁴⁴ Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1985), p. 195.

⁴⁵ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 188.

which was characteristic of Australia at the turn of the millennium, as highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis.⁴⁶

Edelman had based this component of his argument on then contemporary social psychological research. In the past fifty years, research in this area has developed and grown considerably, yet has continued to broadly support Edelman’s conclusions. The tendency to make generalisations, to use ‘abstract knowledge structures’ such as schemas and stereotypes as mental shorthands to enable us to organise and categorise vast amounts of information is considered a natural and fundamental characteristic of human cognitive function by social psychologists. Stereotypes are acquired at an early age, and can be activated very quickly and even without the full awareness or intention of the person who has made the categorisation. However, contrary to early conceptualisations of stereotypes and schemas, it is now understood that stereotypes about individuals or groups of people are not necessarily negative, or even inaccurate.⁴⁷ In fact, they are best defined quite neutrally as ‘the traits that we view as characteristic of social groups, or of individual members of those groups, and particularly those that differentiate groups from each other’.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, as close to a century of psychological investigation in this area has demonstrated, stereotypes are more likely to be negative, are usually overgeneralisations, and can be highly resistant to contradictory information.⁴⁹

As foregrounded by Edelman, the impetus behind categorisation processes is simplicity. To this end, we tend to emphasise the distinctiveness of different categories of people, and to simultaneously emphasise the similarity of people within any one category. Unfortunately, these tendencies may also result in distortions of perception and the creation of bias, particularly when the categorisation involves differentiation of ingroup members from outgroup members. According to Social Identity Theory, being able to identify with a group and to evaluate the value of this group by differentiating it from other groups serves a key role in building a sense of self-worth and esteem. People therefore tend to hold positive views of their own group, and to denigrate members of outgroups or view them as a threat to their

⁴⁶ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 31.

⁴⁷ Janet B. Ruscher, *Prejudiced Communication: A Social Psychological Perspective* (New York: The Guildford Press, 2001), p. 6; David Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping* (New York: The Guildford Press, 2004), pp. 8-9, 17-18; Charles Stangor, "The Study of Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination within Social Psychology: A Quick History of Theory and Research," in *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*, ed. Todd D. Nelson (New York: Psychology Press, 2009), pp. 2, 9.

⁴⁸ Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 2.

⁴⁹ Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 30; Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," pp. 2-3, 10-11.

own group. They may be able to appreciate diversity within their own group, but will frequently overestimate the similarity of outgroup members and find it difficult to distinguish between them. Perceiving outgroup members as ‘all alike’ enables members of the ingroup to generate a comforting sense of the predictability of the behaviour of outgroup members. This perception is also reflected in the preponderance of ‘group epithets’ which emphasise outgroup homogeneity.⁵⁰

Stereotypes become particularly problematic when they are used to guide expectations of or justify behaviour towards individuals. Basing judgements of individuals on category level knowledge is unfair, and frequently inaccurate, particularly when categorisations are bound up with questions of social identity. Categorisation of this kind frequently forms the foundation or rationalisation for prejudice:⁵¹ a ‘set of affective reactions we have toward people as a function of their category memberships’.⁵² Discrimination occurs when affective reactions based on categorisations guide behaviour, resulting in disadvantageous treatment of individuals as a result of their perceived group membership.⁵³ The emerging consensus in social psychological research is that social identity is probably the fundamental underlying motivation behind prejudice and discrimination.⁵⁴ According to Social Identity Theory, considering one’s social identity to be insecure increases the likelihood that people will behaviourally express negative attitudes towards outgroups. A cornerstone of Social Identity Theory, advanced by Tajfel from the late 1960s onwards, is it is rare to find examples of groups in which there is a completely ‘secure’ identity, even for dominant groups: ‘a dominant social position must not only be attained, it must be preserved’. Particularly when there are ‘conditions of instability’ which threaten to change or weaken status hierarchies, members of dominant groups may feel their group identity is strongly threatened.⁵⁵ Under such conditions, intergroup attitudes which condone discriminatory behaviour may be reinforced, and members of dominant groups become ‘more likely to behaviourally express

⁵⁰ Ruscher, *Prejudiced Communication*, pp. 18-21; Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 3.

⁵¹ Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 30; Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 2.

⁵² Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 27.

⁵³ Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 29.

⁵⁴ Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 3.

⁵⁵ Cited in Deborah J. Terry, Michael A. Hogg, and Leda Blackwood, "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour," in *Understanding Prejudice, Racism and Social Conflict*, eds. Martha Augoustinos and Katherine J. Reynolds (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 148.

ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes if such attitudes are normative for a self-inclusive and contextually salient or important ingroup’.⁵⁶

Islamophobia as an ideological construct

It is tempting to characterise Islamophobia in social psychological terms, that is, as a psychological complexus consisting of cognitive components (stereotypes about Muslims and Islam); affective components (prejudice towards Muslims); and behavioural components (discriminatory practices towards Muslims), with attitudes becoming more likely to be expressed behaviourally when social identity is perceived to be under threat.⁵⁷ This view has its merits. However, the notion that Islamophobia may be understood *solely* as a psychological construct has been contested in recent scholarship on Islamophobia.⁵⁸ The thrust of these criticisms is that Islamophobia is not simply a form or variation of prejudice but also an ideology, that is, an interrelated system of ideas which form the basis for political policies. As Stephen Sheehi states, ‘rather than understanding Islamophobia as a series of actions and beliefs that target Muslims and arise from a general misunderstanding of who Muslims are and what Islam is’, Islamophobia can additionally be conceptualised as ‘an ideological phenomenon which exists to promote political and economic goals, both domestically and abroad’.⁵⁹ These are, in Edelman’s terms, the ‘material advantages’ masked by the contrivance of mediated dramas to provide political spectacle (see Chapter 1).

In underscoring the *ideological* thrust of Islamophobia, I do not mean to discount other aspects of the phenomenon, in particular the serious effects of Islamophobia upon Muslim nations, communities and individuals. Since 2001 in particular, these effects have ranged from acts of international war, legitimisation of torture, lengthy incarceration without due process of law, and intensive surveillance and intimidation, as well as impacting on the daily lives of Muslims through harassment and hate speech, institutional discrimination, the uncontested airing of virulently anti-Muslim rhetoric by public figures and media outlets, and hate acts such as mosque bombings. What must be emphasised, however, is that

⁵⁶ Terry, Hogg, and Blackwood, "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour," p. 148.

⁵⁷ Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 27 ; Stangor, "Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 4.

⁵⁸ Allen, *Islamophobia*; Sheehi, *Islamophobia*.

⁵⁹ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 32.

These effects...will only be understood as scattered, albeit tangentially related acts, if they are not seen to be located in a complete paradigm or discourse of Islamophobia.⁶⁰

What is particularly of note in this regard is the fact that there has been a diffusion of the ideology of Islamophobia across multiple sites and through the actions of multiple actors, involving shared stereotypes of Islam, evocation of negative feelings, and a range of discriminatory practices (which constitute the psychological complexus mentioned above). These could, in Johan Galtung’s terms, constitute examples of ‘cultural violence’, which ‘legitimise[s] and render[s] acceptable’ other forms of violence – direct and structural’.⁶¹ Galtung posits a ‘causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence’, but does not specify how this flow is instantiated and continued. To supplement Galtung’s conceptual schema, I will therefore now return to the idea of discourse – introduced in Chapter 1 – with particular reference to the work of Michel Foucault.

Islamophobia as a discursive structure

A discourse will always consist of multiple statements, texts and sources. This association of statements and ideas ‘provide a language for talking about – i.e. *representing* – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic’.⁶² The discourse establishes guidelines for the construction of knowledge about the topic, or in other words, lays down what can be discussed and rule out other topics or approaches to the issue.⁶³ Because of this function in defining the limits or boundaries of knowledge about a particular topic, ‘the same discourse, characteristic of the way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any one time will appear across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within society’.⁶⁴

Foucault analysed a variety of historical issues through this lens, including the treatment of the mentally ill; the suppression of infantile sexuality; and the regulation and punishment of criminals. What he emphasised as crucial in understanding any of these issues was not so much the fact that, for example, the bourgeoisie suppressed infant sexuality in the nineteenth century, but rather that in this period there were particular mechanisms which were developed

⁶⁰ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 32.

⁶¹ Galtung, "Cultural Violence," p. 292.

⁶² Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," in *Race and Racialization: Essential Readings*, eds. Tania das Gupta, Carl E. James, Roger C. A. Maaka, Grace-Edward Galabuzi, and Chris Andersen (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2007), p. 56.

⁶³ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1980), p. 131.

⁶⁴ Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage, 1997), p. 44.

to achieve these ends for specific political or economical purposes, and that analysis of specific techniques can illuminate the conception or ‘knowledge’ of sexuality which was being forged at that time. Foucault labelled such mechanisms as ‘techniques of power’, and emphasised that in order to ‘understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole’, it was necessary to ‘demonstrate the economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons’.⁶⁵ ‘Techniques of power’ are developed through knowledge and understanding of a particular subject, knowledge which can be operationalised and applied in the real world to the regulation and control of social conduct and practice. In this sense, knowledge is always inextricably implicated in the operations of power, and power relations are necessarily predicated upon the basis of a field of knowledge, or discourse, about the issue at hand.⁶⁶ As Stuart Hall emphasises, ‘knowledge does not operate in a void...it is put to work, through certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional regimes’.⁶⁷

This is the crucial aspect of Islamophobia which we must investigate and interrogate: we must uncover, as Foucault argued, ‘how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, in a precise conjecture and by means of a certain number of transformations, have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful’.⁶⁸ We must consider how the combination of discourse and power – power/knowledge – has produced a certain conception of Islam and of Muslims, has had certain real effects for both Muslims and non-Muslims, and how these have been enacted in a variety of ways, such as the securitisation of Islam or the dehumanisation of asylum seekers.⁶⁹ When we see the effects of Islamophobia manifesting in society, we are detecting the operation of ‘techniques of power’ which are characteristic of a specific discourse, a particular way of understanding and knowing, which is inextricably enmeshed with questions of power and control. It is this sense that Edward Said drew upon Foucault’s notion of discourse in his seminal work *Orientalism*:

Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient...it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct,

⁶⁵ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 101.

⁶⁶ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 27; Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 93; Hall, *Representation*, p. 47.

⁶⁷ Hall, *Representation*, p. 47.

⁶⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 110.

⁶⁹ Hall, *Representation*, p. 47.

corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power...Orientalism is – and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world’.⁷⁰

As Said demonstrated, Orientalism served a specific purpose within the context of the colonial expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century, that of legitimating and enacting ‘Occidental’ hegemony over the ‘Orient’. In the current epoch, Islamophobia serves the specific purpose of legitimating and enacting ‘Western’ hegemony, both on a global and a local level.

In emphasising the instrumentalisation of Islamophobia, Sheehi and Allen, among others, are going beyond analysing Islamophobia as a psychological construct, to a form of political analysis, as defined by Edelman:

Political analysis...must examine how political actions get some groups the tangible things they want from government and at the same time it must explore what these same actions mean to the mass public and how it is placated or aroused by them.⁷¹

What is crucial to emphasise, however, is that this hegemony does not operate exclusively as a coercive, top-down application of power. Relations of power are not *solely* engendered from the top downwards; for power to be exercised from above there must also exist ways in which power is exercised in the opposite direction, in which discourses are diffused upwards and outwards as well as imposed from above. Power can also be productive, rather than simply repressive.⁷² As Foucault emphasises,

Power must be analysed as something that circulates...it is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.⁷³

Although much discussion in this chapter has focussed upon the purposes of the discursive formation of Islamophobia, and the interests it serves, individual actors (‘President Bush’) or even large blocs (‘the United States’) should not be regarded uncritically as units of analysis. As Sheehi emphasises, it is necessary to resist the claim that an ‘explicit conspiratorial

⁷⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 12.

⁷¹ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 12.

⁷² Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 200.

⁷³ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 98.

relationship exists’ between members of influential ‘networks’ of political, academic, media, and economic actors:

The amorphous network is not a conspiracy. Rather, it is an ideological class of actors that do not share common political beliefs but do share common interests and goals, most notably, extending the longevity of global capitalism and the United States’ predominance of it. In other language, the term “elites” could simply replace the word network.⁷⁴

Galtung’s ‘exculpatory perspective’ emphasises that identifiable individuals and groups assume roles created by a ‘deficient structure’ or ‘deficient culture’,⁷⁵ leading to conflict and potentially (direct) violence. There is, Foucault allows, such a thing as the ‘local cynicism of power’, but that should not be mistaken for a ‘headquarters that presides over its rationality’.⁷⁶ Edelman explains that, while initiatives in political communication promote some interests over others, ‘there is no implication here that elites *consciously* mould political myths and rituals to serve their ends. Attempts at such manipulation usually become known for what they are and fail. What we find is social role taking, not deception’ (emphasis added).⁷⁷

One of the most significant ways in which power/knowledge are diffused throughout modern societies is through the operation of the media. Understanding the relationship between the media and other sources of this discourse, and understanding what effects media representations may play in the reproduction and perpetuation of Islamophobia, of forming attitudes and shaping behaviour in the general populace, will form the basis for the next chapter in this thesis. However, in the following sections, I seek to unpack more fully what Islamophobia *is*, and to seek to understand some of the dominant strands (or ‘master-narratives’ as Sheehi refers to them) within this discourse, before moving on to understand the role of the media in this process.

Surveying all the strands in this ideological construct would be impossible; even selecting a point at which to commence the investigation is difficult. Hostility towards and fear of Muslims did not begin with September 11; nor does it necessarily arise from an unbroken lineage tracing back to the era of the Crusades. Furthermore, some of the ‘master-narratives’

⁷⁴ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 43.

⁷⁵ Johan Galtung, *After Violence: 3r, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution* (Princeton, N.J.: TRANSCEND, 1998), p. 66.

⁷⁶ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 95.

⁷⁷ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 18.

or discourses which feed into Islamophobia are themselves contradictory. In this sense, Islamophobia serves as a ‘discursive formation’ rather than simply a discourse: it draws down and enacts the discursive practices of other discourses and sustains a ‘regime of truth’.⁷⁸

The ‘truth’ of knowledge from a Foucauldian perspective lies not in any absolute sense of truth, but in the notion that the discursive formation in itself imposes a politics of truth: it ‘will become ‘true’ in terms of its real effects even if in some absolute sense it has never been conclusively proven’.⁷⁹ Thus, we may observe that some of the effects of the discursive regime of Islamophobia included the radicalisation of Muslim youth in the West, the sharpening of distinctions between ‘Islam’ and the ‘the West’, and the proliferation of ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East. In this way, the discursive formation can be upheld as truth and its discursive practices sustained. Given this complexity, I therefore choose to consider one prominent strand of this discursive formation in detail, and then investigate some of its pertinent aspects. I begin with a consideration of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, and an analysis of how this discourse becomes implicated in the broader discursive formation of Islamophobia.

The Clash of Civilisations

In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provoked much debate about the future of forces dominating world politics. Within the ranks of certain policy-making theorists, the competition to define a new paradigm for global hegemony was on. Initially, the perspective in the ascendant was that of Francis Fukuyama, who had speculated on ‘the end of history’ as the foundation for future political contestation. In Fukuyama’s formulation, the possibility that wars would continue to be fought over ideology was seen to have greatly diminished, as the ideology of capitalist liberal democracy had emerged victorious from the cold war and was unlikely to be successfully challenged in the future.⁸⁰ However, among the plethora of alternative voices, one view gained the upper hand.

⁷⁸ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 131.

⁷⁹ Hall, *Representation*, p. 49.

⁸⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Mujeeb R. Khan, "The Islamic and Western Worlds: 'End of History' or the 'Clash of Civilisations'?", in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 170-1; Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Definitions," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 69-70; John Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of Post-Cold War World Order," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 90-91.

In a *Foreign Affairs* article published in 1993, Harvard-based political theorist Samuel Huntington popularised what would later come to be referred to as the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future.⁸¹

Huntington went on to describe a number of ‘civilisations’ and to discuss the historical conflicts along their ‘faultlines’, a discussion in which violent conflict between various Islamic polities and other ‘civilisational entities’ receives significant emphasis. This emphasis led Huntington to declare that ‘Islam has bloody borders’,⁸² and to claim that the next great civilisational conflict would be between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.⁸³

Despite the fuzzy definitions of civilisations apparent in Huntington’s article, as well as many other errors and inconsistencies within his argument, the intense interest in ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ led Huntington to publish a book length expansion of his article.⁸⁴ Huntington’s book does not noticeably clarify many of the issues of definition or historical accuracy, but did maintain the emphasis on ‘Islamic civilisation’ as an imminent threat to ‘Western civilisation’.⁸⁵ As Edward Said notes, although Huntington outlines at least seven world civilisations, ‘the conflict between two of them, Islam and the West, gets the lion’s share of his attention’.⁸⁶ Indeed, not only is the preoccupation with Islam that characterised his *Foreign Affairs* article sustained, it is even extended. ‘Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam’, Huntington claimed, ‘Muslims have problems living peaceably with their

⁸¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): p. 22.

⁸² Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," p. 35.

⁸³ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," p. 32.

⁸⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

⁸⁵ For refutations of some of Huntington’s arguments in regards to the role of Muslims in ‘intercivilisational’ conflict and to Islam more generally, see Jonathon Fox, "Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilisations Prediction into the 21st Century," *International Politics* 42(2005); Errol A. Henderson, "Not Letting Evidence Get in the Way of Assumptions: Testing the Clash of Civilisations Thesis with More Recent Data," *International Politics* 42(2005); Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Clash of Civilisations: An Islamicist's Critique," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 132-36; Said, "The Clash of Definitions," pp. 71, 78-9; Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," pp. 101-02.

⁸⁶ Said, "The Clash of Definitions."

neighbours’.⁸⁷ He then goes on to argue that ‘the Muslim propensity toward violent conflict’ is responsible for two-thirds to three-quarters of ‘inter-civilisational’ conflict: ‘Islam’s borders *are* bloody, and so are its innards’.⁸⁸

Huntington’s preoccupation with ‘civilisational conflict’ between the West and the Islamic world, and many of the supposed inherent characteristics of Muslims, Islam and Islamic civilisation which he adduces as the foundations for the Muslim predisposition to violence, are consonant with, and in some cases directly derived from the work of Bernard Lewis, Professor of Near-Eastern Studies at Princeton.⁸⁹ Even the phrase ‘clash of civilisations’ itself was inspired by Lewis. In an article published in 1990 in *The Atlantic Monthly*, Lewis had warned of an impending storm:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.⁹⁰

Dismissing the notion that Muslims and Muslim nations might have ‘specific grievances’ which could explain their ‘irrational’ rage towards the West, Lewis argues that the ‘roots of Muslim rage’ must be sought within the Islamic faith itself: ‘clearly, something deeper is involved...something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every problem insoluble’.⁹¹

The aspects of Islam which Lewis identified as providing the foundation for ‘Muslim rage’ include the claim that there can be no separation between state and religion in Islamic theology; that Muslims view hierarchical relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in which Muslims are dominant as normal, and are incapable of accepting inferiority to non-Muslims; that the binary division of the world and all mankind into the *dar al-harb* and the *dar al-Islam* is central to Islam and that ‘the obligation of holy war therefore begins at home and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy’.⁹² Despite some individual impulses towards mannered and modulated behaviour, ‘there is something in the religious culture of

⁸⁷ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations*, p. 256.

⁸⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations*, p. 258.

⁸⁹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations*, pp. 263-65.

⁹⁰ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (1990): p. 60.

⁹¹ Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 53.

⁹² Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 49.

Islam’, Lewis argued, which means that Muslims are unable to control their responses when excited: even educated public figures may be taken over by an irrational ‘explosive mixture of rage and hatred’ directed against the ‘infidel enemy’, the Westerner.⁹³

In ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, Lewis was not articulating a new set of ideas: he had been proclaiming the ‘clash of civilisations’ as an explanatory framework for relations between the Middle East and the West as early as 1964.⁹⁴ The great contest between what which Lewis describes as ‘millennial’ or ancient enemies ‘began with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has continued virtually to the present day’.⁹⁵ For Lewis, the Christian character of the medieval Westerner morphed unproblematically into the secular character of the contemporary Westerner, whilst the character of the Islamic enemy remained eternally the same.

Lewis’s notion of static and unchanging cultures, as with his characterisations of Islamic culture, was picked up and expanded by Huntington. Civilisational conflict, Huntington argued, was fundamentally different from conflict over political or economic difference, in which the contenders may be amenable to compromise and eventual resolution: ‘in conflicts between civilisations, the question is “what are you?” That is a given that cannot be changed’.⁹⁶ It is on the immutability of identity that Huntington plays his trump card against Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis: ‘the Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line’.⁹⁷

There are therefore three principal components of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, as set out by Lewis and popularised by Huntington, which are relevant to this enquiry. The first is the notion of the essential differences between cultures and their necessarily antagonistic relations with each other; the second is a particular constellation of characteristics attributed to Islamic civilisation and Muslims; and the third is the emphasis upon the irreconcilability of ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ cultures, through which Islam can be cast as the ‘millennial enemy’ of the West. As Stephen Sheehi argues, the importance of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis lies not in the originality of its content. Rather,

⁹³ Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 59.

⁹⁴ Bernard Lewis, 'The Middle East and the West', pp. 135, 137, cited in Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 93.

⁹⁵ Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 49.

⁹⁶ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," p. 27.

⁹⁷ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," p. 31.

Its force lies in its ability to recast old Orientalist tropes into new Islamophobic paradigms appropriate for the global era and US power in it. Lewis integrated Islamophobia into the political vision of the neoconservative movement in the 1990s while also explaining to policymakers the necessities of using unipolar power in the Middle East. Furthermore, Lewis’s cultural argument would resonate with the racist unconscious of white America, playing on fears that a brown, Muslim world could never be integrated into the global order.⁹⁸

The applicability of the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory to policy and foreign relations demonstrates its utility, in terms of instilling, reinforcing and defending patterns of socio-economic dominance, within and between nations, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The content of this discourse gives rise to the techniques of power and disciplinary technologies which create its ‘regimes of truth’. The three key components in this discourse, and the relationship of each component to the discursive formation of Islamophobia in a global context will now be analysed individually.

Culturalism and the new racism

One of the most significant impacts of the clash of civilisations thesis in its legitimisation of Islamophobia was its strengthening of the trend towards reintroducing culture as a significant factor in political debate.⁹⁹ The Islamophobic aspects of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis could be easily adopted by key political figures, policymakers and media outlets because the thesis deployed racist stereotypes and analysis which resonated with many historical discourses of privilege and exclusion, yet did not in any way refer to ‘race’ in the sense of biological determinism. The crucial word in the emphasis of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis on ‘the velvet curtain of culture’ is *culture*.¹⁰⁰ As Martin Barker and others have emphasised, since World War II, conservative arguments against immigration or various social policies have increasingly been based upon culturalism, because they are perceived to have been freer of the taint of racism than arguments based upon biological difference.¹⁰¹

As a result of both the entrenchment of cultural intolerance towards racism and the proliferation of legislative strictures prohibiting racial discrimination, participants in psychological experiments have become increasingly reluctant to divulge their prejudices or

⁹⁸ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 71.

⁹⁹ Mottahedeh, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 131.

¹⁰⁰ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?," p. 31.

¹⁰¹ Martin Barker, *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe* (London: Junction Books, 1981); Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 110.

to reveal stereotypes which they hold. It is for this reasons that measures of *implicit* prejudice have become so significant within social psychological research in the past decade.¹⁰² Public figures, no matter how conservative, have become similarly savvy to the *bête noire* of racism. From the late 1970s, a shifting focus has been observable in political discourses, ‘one that moved away from more traditional markers of race to newer and less legislatively protected markers based on cultural and religious difference’.¹⁰³ This tendency to argue for a ‘pseudo-biological culturalism’ which is founded on immutable characteristics of different peoples can be categorised in two ways: in one sense, culturalism can be used as a strategy for cloaking expressions of ‘old racism’. In the other sense, it represents a distinct form of prejudice, which emphasises the *threat* posed by some groups to others, rather than making clear biological distinctions between groups. These two different forms of prejudice are generally referred without differentiation as forms of ‘new racism’, although the latter sense is the one defined and researched by Martin Barker, who is credited with coining the phrase ‘new racism’.¹⁰⁴ What these types of arguments have in common is the positing of *essential* differences inhering in particular groups, but with the locus situated in cultural difference rather than racial difference. Trumpbour, for instance, links the arguments of Dinesh D’Souza about the basic cultural differences between blacks and whites in America to the basic civilisational differences posited by Huntington.¹⁰⁵ The vague notion of ‘civilisations’ which is central to the Clash of Civilisations thesis builds upon a type of categorisation process which is inherently flawed: ‘the personification of enormous entities called ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’ is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world...certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilisation’.¹⁰⁶

As an example of how such ideas play out in contemporary politics, the British Nationalist Party (BNP) leader, Nick Griffin, explained the political rationale behind the use of culturalist arguments as opposed to explicitly racist arguments to supporters at a branch meeting in March 2006:

¹⁰² Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 2.

¹⁰³ Allen, *Islamophobia*, p. 10.

¹⁰⁴ Barker strongly urges the distinction be retained, although in practice the effects of both forms are similar. Martin Barker, "Reflections on 'the Problems with Racism'," in *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context*, eds. Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 471.

¹⁰⁵ Trumpbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 107.

¹⁰⁶ Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* 273, no. 12 (2001): p. 11.

We bang on about Islam. Why? Because to the ordinary public out there it’s the thing they can understand. It’s the thing the newspaper editors sell newspapers with. If we were to attack some other ethnic group – some people say we should attack the Jews...if that was an issue we chose to bang on about when the press don’t talk about it...the public would just think we were barking mad...and we wouldn’t get to power.¹⁰⁷

Here, the BNP is clearly singling out the fact that since attacks on Muslims may be founded in culturalist rather than less socially acceptable ‘racist’ arguments, as attacks on Jews could be defined, it is possible to advance such arguments for the sake of political gain without alienating the media and other significant players in British society. Griffin’s comments also highlight the key role of the media in legitimising and promulgating discriminatory discourses.

This type of cynical manipulation of antagonism towards outgroups is not only a topdown process, however, but also reflects developments within other aspects of society. In tracing the development of anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain during the late 1980s and 1990s, Chris Allen found the shift towards prejudice and discrimination based on cultural and religious grounds as opposed to ethnic or racial prejudice was increasingly prominent:

Whilst acknowledging some overlap with traditional racism clearly existed, a clear shift in markers of identification that exacerbated Muslim-ness was becomingly increasingly apparent in the discrimination and hostility that was being identified at the grassroots level.¹⁰⁸

Although Allen is referring here to the specifically British context of rising anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment, his observations ring true for developments in other parts of the Western world. An in-depth analysis of comparative developments within the specifically Australian context will be considered in chapters 4-7 of this thesis; in this chapter, however, I will continue to outline the shape and functions of Islamophobic discourses more generally.

Representing Muslims and Islam

In constructing a characterisation of Islam, writers such as Lewis and Huntington could draw on a long and dubious heritage of negative portrayals of Muslims and Islamic culture in European history. The formation of many persistent, stereotypical images of Islam during the

¹⁰⁷ Nick Griffen speaking at Burnley Branch Meeting, March 2006 (BNPtv Films), cited in Allen, *Islamophobia*, p. 92.

¹⁰⁸ Allen, *Islamophobia*, pp. 10-11.

early medieval period has been documented in detail, in particular by John Tolan,¹⁰⁹ whilst Tomas Mastnak has traced the diffusion of such tropes and stereotypes through the later middle ages and early modern period.¹¹⁰ During the Enlightenment, great change may have taken place within European society and European thought, yet the essential European attitude towards the Muslim world remained that of the ‘permanent crusade’, in Mastnak’s phrase: active promulgation of the need to expulse Muslims from ‘European’ territories and curb their influence in adjacent regions. Key Enlightenment thinkers, such as Voltaire, whilst laying the foundations for Western modernity and its perspectives on freedom, democracy and equality, continued to nurture this dream.¹¹¹ Finally, as Mastnak notes:

It was the European world shaped by the revolution that finally executed some very old ideas, like the conquest of Egypt...a first major step in the process that, in about a century, brought three-quarters of the world Muslim population under European domination.¹¹²

Mastnak and the noted crusade historian Carole Hillenbrand both note the continued preoccupation of Europeans with interpreting modern developments in light of crusading rhetoric, particularly the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt but above all the crowning achievement of Lord Allenby’s ‘reoccupation’ of Jerusalem in 1917: it was within the context of these developments that the ideology of Orientalism was nurtured and developed.¹¹³ The application of crusading rhetoric to more recent developments in Europe, in particular the Bosnian genocide, have been lamented by Mastnak and Michael Sells, and the valorisation of the Crusades occupied a prominent position in the edifice of Orientalism.¹¹⁴ George Bush’s references to the War on Terror as a ‘crusade’ can therefore be seen to have a long lineage in terms of their framing of relations between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’;¹¹⁵ it was this type of rhetoric that led the late Alexander Cockburn to label the War on Terror as the ‘Tenth

¹⁰⁹ John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

¹¹⁰ Tomaz Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims: The Permanent Crusade?," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

¹¹¹ Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims," p. 229.

¹¹² Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims," p. 230.

¹¹³ Carole Hillenbrand, "The Legacy of the Crusades," in *Crusades: The Illustrated History*, ed. Thomas F. Madden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 202-04; Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims," p. 230.

¹¹⁴ Mastnak, "Europe and the Muslims," p. 231-2; Michael A. Sells, "Christ Killer, Kremlin, Contagion," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 329-34.

¹¹⁵ See for example: George Bush, *Today We Mourn, and Tomorrow We Go Back to Work (2001)* (Washington: The White House, 2001); George Bush, "President Rallies the Troops in Alaska (2002)," The White House, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020216-1.html>.

Crusade’, implying that this war followed seamlessly from the nine major crusades to the Holy Land during the medieval period.¹¹⁶

Orientalism deserves particular attention when considering characterisations of Muslims and Islam in contemporary Islamophobic discourses. The continuity of many of the dogmas of Orientalism into the current era have been amply demonstrated by Edward Said, who observed that they ‘exist in their purest form today in studies of Arabs and Islam’. The four central Orientalist dogmas identified by Said included:

The absolute and systematic difference between the West which is rational, developed, humane, superior; and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient...are always preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself...a fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominion) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).¹¹⁷

The conformity of crucial cornerstones of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis with these key Orientalist dogmas is clear. Anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment have a highly elaborated and well-established place in Western society. In an interview with Ania Loomba in 1997, Edward Said pointed out the extent to which Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis ‘re-appropriated’ and repackaged Orientalism for the contemporary era. Said argued that such discursive formations are not homogenous across time and place, but are ‘able to multiply and proliferate in all kinds of ways’. Nevertheless, they share a ‘deep structure’, in the sense that ‘they all depart from the same premise, that there is a line separating “us” from “them”...and it keeps recurring’.¹¹⁸ This ‘deep structure’ is ‘the basic premise of ontologised difference’ central to *Orientalism*, which has in the contemporary era become transferred onto the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and thence into contemporary forms of ‘Islamophobia’.¹¹⁹

It is in this sense that Chris Allen postulates that anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments are ‘endemic’ in Western culture. By endemic, Allen does not imply that the form of such antagonism remains static or unchanging, in the sense that Bernard Lewis implied the

¹¹⁶ Alexander Cockburn, "The Tenth Crusade," *Counterpunch*, 6 May 2002.

¹¹⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 300-01.

¹¹⁸ Edward Said, Interview with Ania Loomba in 1997, cited in Ania Loomba, "Remembering Said," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 23, no. 1-2 (2003): p. 13.

¹¹⁹ Vakil, "When Is It Islamophobia Time?," p. 28.

‘millennial’ conflict between Islam and the West was constant in its nature. Instead, Allen argues that ‘by endemic it is meant that such views and understandings are a condition of a particular setting or people: something that can be drawn upon and expressed in different ways and at different times as well as being rejected and replaced also’.¹²⁰ The contemporary manifestation of anti-Islamic sentiment would be unintelligible without the historical context of bellicose relations between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’. To trace the lineage of specific anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic attitudes and beliefs and to note that they may become more or less salient at different periods of time is not to suggest that the phenomenon remains the same across time, or that the recurrences of such tropes are completely discontinuous but rather, as Halliday emphasised, signifies that ‘the past provides a reserve of reference and symbol for the present: it does not explain it’.¹²¹ This same insight could also be expressed by noting that discourses are not ‘closed systems’:

A discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings...traces of past discourses remain embedded in more recent discourses.¹²²

The discourse of contemporary Islamophobia clearly draws extensively upon historic fears and conceits concerning Islam. However, it also exhibits novel features and has been ‘put to work’, in the words of Stuart Hall, in ways which are clearly a product of the contemporary context.

The ‘millennial enemy’

As the discussion above has emphasised, the notion of Islam as a particular enemy of ‘the West’ is not simply limited to American policy or thought or to the latter part of the twentieth century. However, it is within the limited sphere of American foreign policy in the past two decades that the notion of Islam and ‘the West’ being ‘millennial enemies’ attained something of a paradigmatical status. As demonstrated in research by Jonathon Fox, Errol Henderson and others, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is not defensible as a sociological or historical reality;¹²³ nevertheless, the thesis is very useful as a means of unifying, simplifying

¹²⁰ Allen, *Islamophobia*, p. 34.

¹²¹ Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: IB Tauris, 1999), p. 125.

¹²² Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power," p. 56.

¹²³ For refutations of some of Huntington’s arguments in regards to the role of Muslims in ‘intercivilisational’ conflict and to Islam more generally, see Fox, "Paradigm Lost."; Henderson, "Testing the Clash of

and making intelligible various complex global political and economic problems. In this regard, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis serves very well as an exercise in ‘maintaining a wartime status in the minds of Americans and Others’.¹²⁴ As the historian Mottahedeh notes, with the Clash of Civilisations thesis, Huntington had developed an exceptionally useful concept which gave its proponents a ‘principle with which to make order of the post-cold war era, and a sense of purpose’.¹²⁵

The usefulness of the approaches to ‘the Middle East problem’ espoused by Huntington and other public intellectuals sympathetic to his work led to them becoming highly influential upon the Bush Administration in the aftermath of September 11. Both Lewis and Huntington, for instance, were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, an elite foreign policy fraternity, and Lewis was reputed to be the Administration’s favoured academic expert on the Middle East, boasting of having visited Washington in an advisory capacity six times in just a few weeks immediately following September 11. Through such mechanisms, ‘experts’ such as Huntington, Lewis, Fareed Zakaria and Fouad Ajami have ‘sought to supply the intellectual ballast and conceptual universe for the geopolitics of the twenty-first century’.¹²⁶ Through such strategies, these ‘experts’ introduced their perspectives on Islam ‘deep into both liberal and conservative political communities under the guise of scholarly, informed, political analysis and cultural explanations’.¹²⁷

Following the September 11 attacks, public figures in the United States, in particular within the Bush Administration, drew heavily and explicitly on the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse as an explanatory framework and as an agenda for reaction. As Sheehi notes though,

The mainstream discourses on Islam and Muslims would not be readily available to be deployed by the mainstream public if they had not already been effectively disseminated and used as political justifications and cultural explanations by the network of journalists, pundits, commentators, “native informants”, and academics over the past two decades.¹²⁸

In this way, many key assumptions regarding Islam were introduced into contemporary public parlance, and have come subsequently to form the core of contemporary

Civilisations Thesis.”; Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilisations,” p. 132-36; Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” pp. 71, 78-9; Trumpbour, “The Clash of Civilisations,” pp. 101-02.

¹²⁴ Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” p. 70.

¹²⁵ Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilisations,” p. 131.

¹²⁶ Trumpbour, “The Clash of Civilisations,” p. 92.

¹²⁷ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 43.

¹²⁸ Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 43.

Islamophobia.¹²⁹ Writing in 2003, Edward Said noted that there had been a ‘notable de-escalation’ in the public use of the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse. Yet he also observed that ‘to judge from the steady amount of hate speech and actions, plus reports of law enforcement efforts directed against Arabs, Muslims and Indians all over the country, the paradigm stays on’.¹³⁰ Said emphasised that ‘the basic paradigm of West versus the rest (the cold war opposition reformulated) remains untouched, and this is what has persisted, often insidiously and implicitly, in discussion since the terrible events of September 11’.¹³¹

Laying aside the possibility of cynical political manipulation of fear of an enemy for political or other gain, military and political advisors, among others, find the simplicity of the thesis, with its vast reductions of complex problems, inherently attractive.¹³² Indeed, in the post September 11 world of the Bush Administration, the thesis was to evolve into an even more reductive schemata for understanding and formulating responses to complex events. In the years following September 11, the language of the administration more carefully defined the ‘enemy’ as adherents of a ‘perverted vision of Islam’ rather than Islam per se, although this fine distinction may have been lost upon many of its audience.¹³³ As Bush goes on to describe:

The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century and the calling of our generation. Our nation is being tested in a way that we have not been since the start of the Cold War... This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization.¹³⁴

Under this formulation, civilisation is seen as an attribute inhering in dominant accounts of Western (American) culture alone, whilst their enemy cannot even be said to hold the status of a ‘civilisation’ in its own right: it is instead an ‘evil’ Islamic ‘totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent’. In this sense, the ideology of what was to become the ‘War on Terror’ can be seen to be merging the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis with the older colonial theses of *la mission civilisatrice* and ‘Manifest Destiny’, the

¹²⁹ Allen, *Islamophobia*, pp. 46-7; Michael Dunn, "The 'Clash of Civilisations' and the 'War on Terror'," *49th Parallel* 20(2007): p. 3-4; Sheehi, *Islamophobia*, p. 42.

¹³⁰ Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," p. 12.

¹³¹ Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," p. 11.

¹³² Said, "The Clash of Definitions," p. 72.

¹³³ Ken MacNab, "Implications of the War on Terrorism" (paper presented at the Blurred Boundaries: Australians and Globalisation (ISAA Annual Conference), Canberra, 2002).

¹³⁴ George Bush, "September 11 Memorial Address to the Nation (2006)," *The Washington Post* 2006.

notion of a ‘civilised’ Western identity (respectively, French and American), in conflict with an inherently inferior, barbarous enemy.

The role of Orientalist tropes in such colonial projects leads us to return to the central argument of Edward Said in *Orientalism*: the particular set of stereotypes, prejudices and assumptions which interlace to form an Orientalist perspective on the people and cultures of the Middle East are not merely descriptive and neither are they benign. They are established and sustained as means of exerting dominance and control: they are *useful* and *purposeful* and they benefit one group of people at the expense of others. ‘There is no power that is exercised without a set of aims and objectives’, Foucault notes. Even if ‘no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them’, there are still ‘comprehensive systems’ by which power pursues these discernible aims and objectives: ‘the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable’.¹³⁵

The concept that the creation of an ‘enemy’ and the predication of an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy is essential to the definition of self-identity became a cornerstone of neoconservative political theory through the work of Irving Kristol, himself heavily influenced by ideas appropriated from the political philosophers Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt.¹³⁶ Huntington’s assimilation of this perspective and preoccupation with identifying an appropriate enemy following the end of the Cold War has been traced in detail by John Trumbour.¹³⁷ As noted in the abstract for an article published in the 75th anniversary edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Huntington was convinced during the 1990s that:

Without an enemy to define itself against, America’s identity has disintegrated...The United States should scale back its involvement in the world until a threat reinvigorates our national purpose.¹³⁸

In the absence of a legitimate external ‘enemy’ or threat, the need to fabricate an appropriate threat was considered a political necessity by Schmitt; this emphasis can be seen to have been adopted by Huntington.¹³⁹ Huntington’s endorsement of misleading the public in regards to the reality of external threats can be seen in his advocacy of the creation of ‘misimpressions’

¹³⁵ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, p. 95.

¹³⁶ Mary Kaldor, "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror," *International Politics* 42(2005): p. 492; Khan, "Islamic and Western Worlds," pp. 190-1, 96; Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," pp. 89-93, 114-15.

¹³⁷ Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," pp. 105-7, 14-15.

¹³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997): p. 1.

¹³⁹ Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 114.

about Soviet involvement in Vietnam to bolster public support for military action.¹⁴⁰ He had argued somewhat disturbingly in 1981 that ‘the architects of power must create a force that can be felt but not seen. Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to the sunlight it begins to evaporate’.¹⁴¹

In this search for an appropriate enemy in the post- Cold War world, ‘the millennial war against Islam is one sufficiently protracted to supply the West with a renewal of self-identity and purpose’.¹⁴² The identification of Islam as the threat which could ‘reinvigorate’ the United States (and implicitly, the West) can be seen in the increasing focus upon the inherent bellicosity of Muslims and Islamic states and the impending sense of a collision course between Islam and the West in Lewis and Huntington’s work through the 1990s.

Huntington’s ambitions towards the creation of a ‘legitimate enemy’ can be seen as representative of the type of process underlying Mary Kaldor’s characterisation of the Cold War as an ‘imaginary war’. Despite some theatres of limited direct conflict, the two inimical sides in the Cold War were, paradoxically, at peace. To justify the state of hyper-vigilance, the suppression of civil liberties, the production of huge amounts of munitions, and employment of vast numbers of soldiers and spies, people in both the East and the West were conditioned to ‘live with the permanent anxiety of war, with many of the forms of organisations and control that are characteristic of war’. The need for the ‘imaginary war’ was therefore justified through the exaggeration of the threat posed by the ‘enemy’. Kaldor interpreted the ‘imaginary war’ as exemplifying a ‘disciplinary technology’, using Foucault’s terminology: ‘it is a discourse which expresses and legitimises power relationships in modern society’.¹⁴³

What emerged from the application of the clash of civilisations thesis and its place within the discursive formation of Islamophobia was a new form of ‘disciplinary technology’, akin to that of the ‘imaginary war’, but having distinct features of its own: the ‘War on Terror’.

¹⁴⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Vietnam appraised’, cited in Trumbour, ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ p. 92.

¹⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981, p. 75), cited in Trumbour, ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ p. 105.

¹⁴² Trumbour, ‘The Clash of Civilisations,’ p. 107.

¹⁴³ Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 4.

The War on Terror, like the Cold War, is viewed as a powerful crusade...the problem is of course, that whereas the Cold War was imaginary, the War on Terror is very real, especially if you live in Iraq.¹⁴⁴

The 'War on Terror' has become an extremely potent tool in the exportation and homogenisation of the discourse of Islamophobia and its 'techniques of power' globally. In the process, journalism, 'the textual system of modernity',¹⁴⁵ has played a crucial role not only in disseminating dominant accounts of ambiguous causal scenarios, but also in concealing the relations of dominance that give rise to them, and which are reinforced by them. It is to the role of media, then, that I turn next.

¹⁴⁴ Kaldor, "The War on Terror," p. 491.

¹⁴⁵ John Hartley, "Journalism and Popular Culture," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, eds. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 312.

Chapter 3 – ‘Media messages’: The role of the media in contemporary political communication

As presaged in Chapter 2, I will consider, in this chapter, the role of media as a particularly effective site for the development and operation of ‘techniques of power’, with particular attention to one particularly influential media genre: news journalism.

Over the past decade or so – the period under scrutiny in this study – both the production and consumption of news have undergone rapid changes, driven by developments in technology. The horizons of news available to the ordinary reader, listener or viewer need no longer be limited by physical proximity, whether to a broadcast transmitter or the distribution network of a newspaper. But there is an enduring paradox. As Brian McNair puts it:

The relevance of political borders has been substantially weakened by the expansion of new information and communication technologies . . . [however] most of what we consume as media is still national in origin and orientation.¹⁴⁶

As he goes on to add, ‘the technology-driven dissolution of boundaries does not end national identity...[but does] force it to engage with other, perhaps conflicting identities’.¹⁴⁷ This process has been superimposed on a longer-established pattern of ‘news flow’, in which a dwindling number of ever-larger corporate news sources, mostly from the US, dominate the agenda for global news, the criteria on which it is selected and the manner in which it is reported.¹⁴⁸ The proliferation of media has complicated the picture, allowing for lateral and ‘contra-flows’ in what Simon Cottle calls a ‘world news ecology’,¹⁴⁹ but the underlying pattern is still visible. News is, therefore, a domain in which discursive formations incubated within elite political and corporate networks in the US, with a global perspective, are likely to ‘come true’: to attain worldwide status as a ‘regime of truth’ in the Foucauldian sense, as discussed in the previous chapter.

¹⁴⁶ Brian McNair, *Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ McNair, *Cultural Chaos*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁸ Dennis H. Wu, "The World's Windows to the World: An Overview of 44 Nations' International News Coverage," in *International News in the 21st Century*, eds. Chris A. Paterson and Annabelle Sreberny (Eastleigh: John Libbey Publishing, 2004).

¹⁴⁹ Simon Cottle, "Global Crisis and World News Ecology," in *The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism*, ed. Stuart Allan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 476.

A theory like the ‘clash of civilisations’ can be spread explicitly by its exponents, such as Fareed Zakaria, who has occupied a string of highly influential positions as a journalist, including Foreign Editor of *Newsweek* magazine and is now a senior presenter at CNN. It is perhaps still more influential, however, in its implicit effect across a much broader canvas of representation.

Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional model of power was assembled from different theoretical components, and in a different tradition, from Foucault’s writings, quoted earlier, but came to similar conclusions. The first dimension of power, according to Lukes, is behavioural, evident in the overt words and deeds of identifiable actors, and their covert interests and agendas constitute a second dimension. In the third dimension, ‘the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals’ choices’.¹⁵⁰ One prime example of a domain in which such biases can be mobilised is media, he says, and news can be seen as offering a particularly receptive milieu, because of Lukes’ other well-known observation: ‘power is at its most effective when least observable’.¹⁵¹ This echoes the judgement of Samuel Huntington cited in the previous chapter, that ‘power remains strong when it remains in the dark’.¹⁵²

All representation is conventional, but it is in news that ‘representational conventions’ are regarded as markers of ‘facticity’, thus rendering ‘reality vulnerable to manipulation’.¹⁵³ Political accounts from privileged sources can attain the appearance of facticity, or ‘truth’, on being remitted into the domain of news journalism, because of its conventions, thus rendering them less observable. These conventions are especially prominent in US journalism, as I shall discuss below, and they impose their own shape and structure on the nature and content of the political accounts that attain global circulation and spread, in patterns of news flow. One of the most prevalent conventions in news journalism, Lynch and Galtung emphasise, is the ‘trivialisation of conflict into two parties fighting over one issue...from this dualism the step

¹⁵⁰ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974/2005), p. 25.

¹⁵¹ Lukes, *Power*, p. 1.

¹⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981, p. 75), cited in Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilisations," p. 105.

¹⁵³ Gaye Tuchman, *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 109.

to Manicheism, with one party certified as good and the other not only as other but as evil, is but a short one’.¹⁵⁴

This mode of representation emerged, and attained the status of a convention, because of the commercial interests of news industries in ‘objectivity’ as a marketing tool: ‘a decision to frame a conflict as consisting of two parties...is a good way of insulating the journalist against complaints of bias’, or taking sides.¹⁵⁵ The promotion of ‘objectivity’ also serves to formalise a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between the news media and political elites:

Politicians gain access to media audiences and an opportunity to shape the public definition of political issues; conversely, so long as they follow the rules of objectivity, working journalists gain relatively stable access to senior officials and politicians, without sacrificing their public image of political independence and neutrality.¹⁵⁶

In commercial and non-commercial systems alike, Tehranian argued, the political and economic interests embedded in media give rise to representational conventions that tend to ‘exacerbate international tensions by dichotomizing, dramatizing, and demonizing “them” against “us”’.¹⁵⁷ As I discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Manuel Castells has emphasised that political messages are now necessarily media messages, and they must therefore ‘be couched in the specific language of the media’.¹⁵⁸ News coverage therefore offers a propitious milieu in which to plant and cultivate dyadic meaning structures such as those that construct and promulgate Islamophobia.

Processes of news production offer a set of differentiated arrangements, enabling power to take effect through social bodies, and the effect it takes is all the more powerful in this case for being imbricated with dyadic psychological mechanisms – instilled from our insertion into the symbolic order in early childhood – which give rise to stereotyping and prejudice. I will return to the discussion of news reporting conventions, and their role in the discursive formation of Islamophobia, later in this chapter. For now, I concentrate on these two interconnected psychological phenomena: how they are constructed and activated, and how

¹⁵⁴ Jake Lynch and Johan Galtung, *Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism* (St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 2010), p. 14.

¹⁵⁵ Lynch and Galtung, *Reporting Conflict*, p. 192.

¹⁵⁶ Robert A. Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism: Alternative Media and Communication Rights," in *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*, eds. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011), p. 38.

¹⁵⁷ Majid Tehranian, "Peace Journalism: Negotiating Media Ethics," *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 7, no. 2 (2002): p. 58.

¹⁵⁸ Castells, "Communication, Power and Counter-Power," p. 241.

they influence the meanings made by readers and audiences in response to political – that is to say, media – messages.

Prejudiced communication

Stereotypes and prejudice can have serious negative effects upon the physical and mental health of those who experience them, as indicated in the previous chapter. When stereotypical thinking and prejudicial attitudes underpin discriminatory practices, they may have even more far ranging consequences upon members of the outgroup, potentially preventing members of the targeted outgroup from accessing or exercising basic rights such as education, health services, employment, justice or personal security.¹⁵⁹ Stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are complex psychological phenomena and may be examined from a variety of different perspectives. This thesis, however, focuses on prejudiced communication:

Prejudiced communication is...a unique blend of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination. It explicitly or implicitly conveys stereotypic beliefs, prejudiced attitudes, or discriminatory intentions and may be inherently discriminatory itself; the mode of communication may be oral, written, or nonverbal, as well as apparent in visual media (e.g. film).¹⁶⁰

Understanding prejudiced communication is significant for the purposes of this study because stereotypes and prejudice are notoriously difficult to disrupt or neutralise directly.¹⁶¹ Understanding how they are communicated may enable us to formulate strategies for prejudice reduction, by disrupting the transmission and reinforcement of negative schemas via modes such as the media.

Young children rapidly acquire schemas from their parents and other role models and may show rigid and surprisingly robust adherence to stereotypes about outgroups until around the age of ten, when their thinking generally becomes more flexible and independent.¹⁶² From this time onwards, the factors which interact to provide people with the content of stereotypes, rationalisations of prejudice, and a grasp of socially condoned discriminatory practices are less clearcut. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, in recent decades

¹⁵⁹ Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," pp. 7-8.

¹⁶⁰ Ruscher, *Prejudiced Communication*, p. 5.

¹⁶¹ Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 10.

¹⁶² Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," pp. 7-8.

people have become increasingly aware of social and legal sanctions against expressing stereotypes and prejudice, so that ‘many types of prejudiced communication are less obvious than hate speech and explicit discriminatory policies’.¹⁶³ Stereotypes and prejudice are therefore fundamentally anchored in social norms: ‘people hold and express stereotypes and prejudice to the extent that they see it as appropriate, within their social contexts, to do so’.¹⁶⁴ Guidance on the boundaries between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ stereotyping and prejudice can be obtained through a wide array of social interactions, but it is clear that within modern, developed societies, the media have a significant role not only in creating, reinforcing, and transmitting stereotypes, but also in the delineation of the social norms governing attitudes and behaviour towards specific outgroups.¹⁶⁵

Although the broad category of ‘media’ could cover areas as diverse as reality television, social networking sites, and talkback radio, for reasons signalled above this study will focus on news journalism, and in particular, upon the broadsheet press in Australia, which habitually ‘index’ contestation of important social debates and ideas to ‘elite discord’. By this, I mean that the range of viewpoints and perspectives on any given issue which are reported on will generally be limited to the narrow range of alternative views which are under contestation among mainstream political elites and will rarely canvass contestation of subjects upon which these elites have reached consensus. Political elites, of course, have traditionally played a significant role in the definition of appropriate attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups. The ‘psychological distancing’ identified by Edelman as an essential component of control by political spectacle, depends on the interactions between the news media and political discourse, which thus provides a highly salient area for the investigation of prejudiced communication. This chapter will start to consider the interrelationships between political elites and the media, and to articulate a theory of media effects through which their role in fostering or challenging stereotypes and prejudice may be considered.

The news media and political processes

Theories of the role of news in political process can be divided into two broad categories. The accounts cited in the brief discussion at the opening of this chapter belong to the political-economy-of-media tradition, which sees journalism as essentially a hegemonic practice,

¹⁶³ Ruscher, *Prejudiced Communication*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 4.

¹⁶⁵ Schneider, *The Psychology of Sterotyping*, p. 27; Stangor, "Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination," p. 9.

‘inculcat[ing] and defend[ing] the economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state’.¹⁶⁶ I have suggested that the conventions of news make it receptive to the characteristic discursive structure of Islamophobia, and in Chapter 2 I linked that structure, in turn, to the ‘aims and objectives’ inscribed in existing relations of dominance that are reproduced along multiple axes in global society, often by activating stereotypes and prejudice.

But there is a second tradition, evident in American scholarship, which emphasises the social responsibility of journalism. Exponents of this approach see the ‘free press’ in an adversarial relationship with power, at least in Lukes’ first, and often second dimensions, and as one of the essential enabling conditions of a liberal democracy.¹⁶⁷ The ‘freedom’ of the media consists principally of two aspects: firstly, the independence of media organisations from the governing institutions, permitting them to exercise a critical function in respect to those institutions, and their status as privately-owned commodities capable of being bought or sold.¹⁶⁸ The most optimistic accounts of the role of a ‘free press’ in democratic societies evolve out of John Stuart Mill’s argument that the ‘liberty of the press’ could be a bulwark against ‘corrupt or tyrannical government’.¹⁶⁹

In this tradition, the ‘free press’ or independent media is perceived to act as a ‘watchdog’ upon government, and is often ascribed the title of the ‘Fourth Estate’.¹⁷⁰ The etymology of this term refers to the early modern division of the legislative assemblies of France, England and Scotland into Three Estates, a development itself based upon medieval conceptions of the division of society into three estates or classes: the clergy, the nobility and commoners. The label of a ‘fourth estate’ has historically been applied rather arbitrarily to categories of people, such as lawyers, intellectuals or women, which were seen in some manner to be

¹⁶⁶ Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 2002), p. 298.

¹⁶⁷ Nicholas Economou and Stephen J. Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia* (Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson Education Australia, 2008), pp. 1-3; Julianne Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 15-16; Paul Starr, "Democratic Theory and the History of Communications," in *Explorations in Communications and History*, ed. Barbie Zelizer (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 9-10.

¹⁶⁸ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, pp. xiii-xiv.

¹⁶⁹ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859), Chapter 2.

¹⁷⁰ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, p. 2; Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate*, p. 17.

outside of the existing estates, and potentially destabilising the hierarchical relationships between the existing Estates, or threatening their hegemonic position.¹⁷¹

The identification of the media as *the* Fourth Estate, and a powerful Estate at that, is generally traced back to Sir Thomas Carlyle’s observation following the admission of reporters to proceedings of the House of Commons:

There were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.¹⁷²

The Fourth Estate’s clout rests in its ability to expose corruption, malpractice and dishonesty among those who exercise real power.¹⁷³ The other, more positive contribution to democratic society envisaged from the idealised Fourth Estate, however, is the facilitation of a strong civic culture and informed political debate by providing citizens with an accurate flow of information and a diverse range of opinions on matters of policy.¹⁷⁴

Among modern representative democratic systems, the Fourth Estate may assume even more responsibility. Lacking the ability to participate directly in governance, or even to interact directly with representative candidates, ‘the citizenry depend on the intermediaries of the electoral process – the political parties, who run election campaigns, and the media, who report on election campaigns – to interact with the political process’.¹⁷⁵ In this sense, the role of the Fourth Estate is often represented as that of a strategically significant conduit or link between the populace and the actual process of decision-making and enactment of policy through their elected representatives, facilitating engaged citizenship.¹⁷⁶

As a result of these high expectations of the media in modern liberal democracies, Jürgen Habermas identified the media as the public sphere’s ‘pre-eminent institution’.¹⁷⁷ Commenting on Habermas’s emphasis, Julianne Schultz notes that ‘despite profound changes to society, communications and political life, the modern news media, and those engaged in

¹⁷¹ See for example, Shulamith Shahar, *The Fourth Estate: A History of Women in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 11-13.

¹⁷² Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes and Hero Worship* (1841), Chapter 5.

¹⁷³ Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate*, p. 2.

¹⁷⁴ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷⁵ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, p. 207.

¹⁷⁶ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, pp. 6-7; Sally Young, *How Australia Decides: Election Reporting and the Media* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 257.

¹⁷⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1962/1989), p. 181.

its production, continue to embrace this institutional role’.¹⁷⁸ As Schultz underscores though, the *legitimacy* of the media in persisting in claiming this role has become increasingly problematised:

The ideal of the news media successfully fulfilling a political role that transcends its commercial obligations has been seriously battered. Its power, commercial ambitions and ethical weakness have undermined its institutional standing. There is now a widespread, and reasonable doubt that the contemporary news media can any longer adequately fulfil the historic role the press created for itself several hundred years ago.¹⁷⁹

It is in the coverage of conflicts that the institutional standing of mass media, with its attendant compromises between historic role expectations and its imbrication with power structures and networks, has been brought most conspicuously into disrepute over the last decade. ‘Key claims’ used to justify the invasion of Iraq, in particular, ‘were shown to be unfounded’, leaving ‘journalists [to] reflect ruefully on the yawning gap between the way the case was reported in advance, and the actual out-turn of events, especially the failure to find “weapons of mass destruction”’.¹⁸⁰ The *Washington Post* and *New York Times* issued front-page apologies, after publishing large quantities of ‘garbage that powered the Bush Administration’s propaganda drive towards invasion’.¹⁸¹ As noted by a chagrined *New York Times* in 2004, ‘information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged’.¹⁸²

Such episodes show the problems with conceiving of mainstream, mass media journalism as being in an adversarial relationship with power. In the previous war on Iraq, in 1991, Robert Entman pointed out that the extent of elite discord in the US was restricted to a debate between the case for ‘war soon versus more time for sanctions’.¹⁸³ Other options, such as negotiation between Iraq and Kuwait, were ignored by ‘tacit consensus among US elites’.¹⁸⁴ When they did crop up in debate, therefore – from anti-war activists – such proposals ‘breached the bounds of acceptable discourse’, and were therefore judged ‘unlikely to influence policy’. By ‘conventional’ journalistic standards, therefore, ‘such views were not

¹⁷⁸ Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate*, p. 15.

¹⁷⁹ Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁰ Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, *Peace Journalism* (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 2005), pp. 2-3.

¹⁸¹ Alexander Cockburn, "Judy Miller's War," *Counterpunch*, 18 August 2003.

¹⁸² Editorial, "The Times and Iraq," *The New York Times*, 26 May 2004.

¹⁸³ Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): p. 55.

¹⁸⁴ Dietram A. Scheufele, "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects," *Journal of Communication* 49, no. 1 (1999).

newsworthy’. Reporting of the war and debates around it therefore served to reinforce the elite consensus:

Unpublicised, the views could gain few adherents and generate little perceived or actual effect on public opinion, which meant elites felt no pressure to expand the frame so it included other treatments for Iraqi aggression, such as negotiation.¹⁸⁵

Daniel Hallin raised comparable issues based upon his analysis of the coverage of the Vietnam War. Hallin argued that in recent decades, Americans have frequently exaggerated the challenge posed by media coverage, especially to a government conducting a war, because of a belief that critical reporting cost the US a military victory in Vietnam. Experience of defeat ‘has focused the nation’s historical memory on...divisions...between the media and the Administration’. However, Hallin’s study found that critical reporting of the war did not commence until after the Tet Offensive, and remained limited in its scope. Fundamental assumptions behind America’s involvement in Vietnam in the first place were left largely unquestioned, Hallin argued, owing to the ‘enormous strength of the Cold War consensus in the early 1960s, shared by journalists and policymakers alike’. In Lukes’ terms, these were biases of the system, and the media offered a choice field in which they could be mobilised, ‘to control the agenda and the framing of foreign affairs reporting’.¹⁸⁶ We may say the same about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the erosion of civil liberties, the rising incidences of Islamophobia and collective violence against Muslims, including in allied countries such as Australia. If you substitute ‘the enormous strength of the War on Terror consensus in the early 2000s’ for ‘the enormous strength of the Cold War consensus in the early 1960s’, the parallel becomes clear.

The ideology of the ‘War on Terror’ depends on ‘collapsing the distinction between understanding political violence and justifying it’, which is ‘a pre-condition of the view that “terrorism” is a phenomenon on which it is possible successfully to wage “war” in the first place’.¹⁸⁷ Its successful promulgation therefore depends on the presentation of a series of events, with little or no contextualising explanation. In this sense, ‘the war on terrorism [was a] media strategy as well as [a] military one’¹⁸⁸ – lending itself to being couched in the specific language of the media and meeting its conventions.

¹⁸⁵ Entman, "Framing," p. 55.

¹⁸⁶ Daniel Hallin, *The Uncensored War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), p. 9.

¹⁸⁷ Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, p. 144.

¹⁸⁸ Lynch and McGoldrick, *Peace Journalism*, p. xvi.

The journalistic convention of ‘frequency’ works to instill a bias in favour of reporting events whose beginning, middle and end occurs to match the daily or hourly deadlines of news. Galtung and Ruge define the ‘frequency’ of an event as ‘the time-span needed for the event to unfold itself and acquire meaning’. The death of a soldier in a conflict, for example, takes place in a very short time-span which is well-suited to the exigencies of daily news reporting; but the process of development or peacebuilding in a nation is very long and is therefore difficult to represent within the confines of news reporting conventions.¹⁸⁹

The resultant pattern is of a series of apparently unconnected shocks – depending for their audience connection not on ‘making sense of the world’ but on manipulating fear and sensation, thus enabling political spectacle. Australia is one of many countries where journalistic assumption – backed, to a greater or lesser extent, by survey evidence – suggests that screening overseas and political news causes TV audiences to switch off (or switch channels), thus leading to a perceived need to simplify things into ‘black and white’ and make reporting more ‘entertaining’ in order to retain audiences.¹⁹⁰

Hallin noted in regards to coverage of the Vietnam War that the ideology of the Cold War was ‘ideally suited’ to complexity reduction, to addressing the journalist’s need to report on multi-dimensional issues, with which the audience probably had no personal connection, in a very short story:

It related every crisis to a single, familiar axis of conflict; it enabled the journalist to explain to the news audience (and to him or herself), with minimum effort, and at least in appearance, great clarity, “what it all meant” – why South Vietnam, or Laos, or the Congo was worth reading about’.¹⁹¹

In the same way, the ideology of the War on Terror is exceptionally well suited to the journalist’s purposes in relating to an audience what complex conflicts were all about and why they were worth reading about – whether the context was Iraq, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, The Philippines, or Israel.

¹⁸⁹ Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 1 (1965): p. 66.

¹⁹⁰ Margaret Simons, *The Content Makers: Understanding the Media in Australia* (Camberwell, VIC: Penguin, 2007), pp. 102-3; Lindsay Tanner, *Sideshow: Dumbing Down Democracy* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2011), pp. 15-20; Young, *How Australia Decides*, pp. 260-66.

¹⁹¹ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 50.

It must be emphasised at this point that there are highly limited circumstances under which news about Muslims has been considered ‘newsworthy’ in Australia – and this is the case not only for international news but also for domestic news. The main exceptions to this truism are stories related to ‘terrorism’, or otherwise so-called ‘wally’ stories; that is stories about Australians doing something newsworthy – even if foolish – whilst in a Muslim country. The combination of the two factors initially made the detention of the Australian convert David Hicks in Guantanamo Bay an unusually ‘newsworthy’ story about a Muslim in the Australian context.¹⁹² Wilson and Gutiérrez’s classic exploration of race and the media in the United States found that ‘newsworthiness’ was predominantly predicated upon the relevance of a story or its participants to the dominant majority (i.e. white middle-class people). People of minority backgrounds appeared in the news only to the extent that their presence could be considered to be of consequence to that majority. For Wilson and Gutiérrez, this is not only an important issue of accuracy and equity, but it also sends a powerful social psychological message about the irrelevance and unimportance of minority points of view and of issues which were relevant to minority groups, but not the dominant majority.¹⁹³ An investigation of such patterns of marginalisation and stereotyping will be returned to in the discussion section of this thesis.

The role of the media during election campaigns

The mass media’s adversarial role is seen to best advantage in situations of elite discord, while at the same time validating shared background assumptions by concealing contestable claims under a mantle of facticity. During elections, elite factions emphasise discordant issues at the expense of shared assumptions, so it is, arguably, in the coverage of elections that explanations of media content arising from both the political-economy-of-media and the social-responsibility-of-journalism models may cast the sharpest light on each other, often in the context of the same themes and stories. The assumption that the media is the primary conduit between citizens and the institutions of government means that the role of the media during election campaigns is generally perceived as particularly significant. This perspective

¹⁹² The standout case here, however, is the conviction of Australian woman Schapelle Corby for drug smuggling in Indonesia; commercial television coverage of her case produced exceptionally high ratings in comparison to most international news stories. Simons, *The Content Makers*, p. 102-3; Sara Smiles Persinger, "Reporting on Islam for the Australian Media," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010).

¹⁹³ Clint C. Wilson and Félix Gutiérrez, *Race, Multiculturalism and the Media: From Mass to Class Communication*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 151.

on the interrelationship between reporting and elections led then Chairman of the Australian Press Council, Dennis Pearce, to comment in 1999 that election coverage ‘represents the point at which the press probably has its greatest impact on the democratic process’,¹⁹⁴ a traditional ‘social-responsibility-of-journalism’ perspective on the role and value of the news media which continues to inform much election reporting in Australia.¹⁹⁵

The notion that elections are the key institution through which the government is chosen by ‘the people’ and imbued with authority in the name of ‘popular sovereignty’ is central to the conception of modern representative democracies, and a tacitly shared assumption even in the most apparently partisan reporting of episodes from the hustings. The periodic occurrences of elections are undoubtedly important events in the life of liberal democracies, and it is therefore understandable why elections generate such intense media interest and activity.¹⁹⁶ The particular significance of media coverage during Australian election campaigns, however, may be explained not only by general reference to the perceived role of the media as a ‘Fourth Estate’ in ‘liberal’ societies, but also by the specific context of extremely high levels of citizen electoral enrolment and voting rates in Australia. Despite global trends towards declining voter participation, voter turnout in Australia is generally the highest in the world,¹⁹⁷ never less than 90% in the past century, and on average 95%.¹⁹⁸ This high turnout is largely as a result of Australia’s compulsory voting system, which is systematically enforced through fines.¹⁹⁹ Only 32 countries in the world had some form of compulsory voting at the time of this study, and of these only 19 nominally enforced voting through fines or other punishment; the number of countries where the practice is effectively supported and enforced is even less.²⁰⁰

Despite the coercive means used to ensure high levels of Australian electoral participation, there is a surprising lack of government facilitation of ‘informed citizenship’, resulting in low

¹⁹⁴ Dennis Pearce, *General Elections and the Media* (Sydney: Australian Press Council, 1999).

¹⁹⁵ Young, *How Australia Decides*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹⁶ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, p. 206; Starr, "Democratic Theory."

¹⁹⁷ Rafael López Pintor, Maria Gratschew, and Kate Sullivan, "Voter Turnout Rates from a Comparative Perspective," in *Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report*, eds. Rafael López Pintor and Maria Gratschew (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002), pp. 77-80.

¹⁹⁸ Over 90% of eligible Australians are enrolled to vote; the turnout figures are a proportion of enrolled voters. AEC, *Voter Turnout for Referendums and Elections (1901 - Present)* (Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2009).

¹⁹⁹ \$110 for failure to enrol and \$20 for failure to vote during the period of this study. AEC, *Electoral Offences* (Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2007); Jonathon Louth and Lisa Hill, "Compulsory Voting in Australia: Turnout with and without It," *Australian Review of Public Affairs* 6, no. 1 (2005): pp. 26-27.

²⁰⁰ Tim Evans, *Compulsory Voting* (Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2006/2011).

levels of interest in politics and high levels of poor political knowledge among the Australian population. Poor political knowledge is strongly correlated with reliance upon the media as the primary source of political information. In a revealing study based on the 2007 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes, Pusey and Jones found that more than half of the respondents relied upon commercial television as their primary source of political information; reliance on this source exceeded even class and education as a predictor for incorrect responses to two ‘political knowledge’ questions.²⁰¹ Such findings, Jones and Pusey argue, support claims by the political communication theorist Pippa Norris that the media are often ‘behaving as a de facto grade-school teacher’ in order to supplement poor political knowledge.²⁰² Those who answered both political knowledge questions correctly were more likely to be older, male, better educated, with a higher income and social class. They were more likely to favour the Public Service Broadcasters (ABC and SBS) over commercial sources, broadsheet newspapers over tabloids, and to have an ongoing engagement with politics.²⁰³

Pusey and Jones’ findings are supported by research surveyed by Sally Young. Young points out that outside of election campaigns, political coverage has limited appeal for audience segments including women, the young, and the socially or economically disadvantaged, ‘the citizens who would seem to be most in need of the benefits that greater political participation can bring’.²⁰⁴ Election reporting appears to have the greatest influence upon voters who have limited ongoing political engagement and decide who they are voting for during the period of the election campaign. The proportion of ‘late-deciding’ voters has risen steeply over the past two decades and at the 2007 Federal election constituted about 40% of voters.²⁰⁵

These factors make Australian election campaigns ‘highly mediated events’.²⁰⁶ Rhetoric by rival political leaders assumes even more hyperbolic proportions during election campaigns, and tonally they can present as intensified periods of contestation over the meaning of particular social scenarios. There are occasional glimpses, round the side of the official agendas, of what Des Freedman, considering the continuing relevance of Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in predicting media content, called ‘cracks and tensions’ in

²⁰¹ Paul K. Jones and Michael Pusey, "Political Communication and 'Media System': The Australian Canary," *Media, culture and society* 32, no. 3 (2010): p. 463.

²⁰² Jones and Pusey, "Political Communication," p. 464-5.

²⁰³ Jones and Pusey, "Political Communication," p. 463; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 59-60.

²⁰⁴ Jones and Pusey, "Political Communication," p. 463; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 59-60.

²⁰⁵ Ian McAllister, "Calculating or Capricious? The New Politics of Late Deciding Voters," in *Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums*, eds. David M. Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 24-25; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 4.

²⁰⁶ Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 3.

media representations of key issues that grow in size and importance ‘at moments of political crisis and elite disagreement’.²⁰⁷ That is, it is *possible* at this time for the consensus on particular key issues to be shifted quite rapidly and radically; as Stuart Hall emphasised, these are the ‘political moments...when events which are normally signified and decoded in a negotiated way begin to be given an oppositional reading’.²⁰⁸

At the same time, the ‘sound and fury’ of the election spectacle can concentrate attention on behavioural interpretations of the exercise of power, whilst masking Lukes’s third dimension, the form that is most effective because least observable. Edelman argues that this very mismatch, between the attention devoted at election times to the different forms of power, can exert a misdirectional effect on audience perceptions:

Voting is the only form in which most citizens ever participate directly in government and is also the political behaviour that has been most widely and most rigorously studied. School teachers, good government groups like the League of Women Voters, and candidates themselves never tire of repeating that voting gives the people control over their officials and policies, that the citizen who fails to vote should not complain if he gets poor government, and that elections are fundamental to democracy.²⁰⁹

Despite this received wisdom regarding the significance of voting, political research in successive decades has shown rather paradoxically that issues have a negligible effect on voting, and furthermore that the post-election legislative and administrative behaviour of governments does not relate directly to the preceding election outcomes. ‘It does not follow that election campaigns are unimportant or serve no purpose’, Edelman observed, but ‘it is rather that the functions they serve are different and more varied than the ones we conventionally assume and teach’. Elections *do* serve an important ‘ritual’ purpose, which acts to ‘reinforce beliefs in the reality of citizen participation in government and in the rational basis of governmental decisions’.²¹⁰ If the most ‘cherished’ forms of participation in public policy formation are therefore predominantly symbolic, what is crucial, in Edelman’s view, is to interrogate ‘just how people’s values do enter into the decisions of public organs

²⁰⁷ Des Freedman, "'Smooth Operator?': The Propaganda Model and Moments of Crisis," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 6, no. 2 (2009): p. 59.

²⁰⁸ Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decoding," in *Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works*, eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980/2006), p. 173.

²⁰⁹ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 2.

²¹⁰ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 12.

and of the extent to which particular procedures make some groups’ values carry more weight than others’.²¹¹

Distance from power

Analysis from both of the two main ‘camps’ of journalism scholarship can therefore have salient and illuminating things to say to us at different times and in different circumstances – or at the same time during significant ‘moments’. This has both theoretical and methodological implications for this study. The theoretical implications are for the status of media reports, which will be used as a source of data and treated as a social artefact of changes in conditions which occur with the passage of time.

Both of the two broadly defined approaches to journalism scholarship can lead to such artefacts being regarded as secondary effects: expressing or reflecting primary generative forces that are instantiated and brought to bear above or behind them. These can be the interests of elites, in the political economy model; or the first three estates, over which journalism keeps watch, in the social responsibility model. Instead, manifest content from the highly encoded discursive practice of news journalism will be viewed here as ‘socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned’.²¹² Implicit in the view of power put forward by Foucault (and, I have suggested in this chapter, in some respects by Steven Lukes) is that media should be seen as ‘a relatively autonomous institutional sphere’, one which ‘articulates with relations of power, knowledge and production more broadly, but which also has a certain logic of its own’.²¹³

That degree of autonomy, Hackett writes, must leave some allowance, at least, for journalistic agency and creativity to exert influence on conduct in adjacent fields – notably politics, to stay with the example of reporting from election campaigns and hustings. The methodological implications of this situation include, therefore, the need to take account of journalistic role constructions, by including, in the suite of analytical factors used to theme and code the data, ways to gauge ‘power distance’.

²¹¹ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 4.

²¹² Fairclough and Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," p. 258.

²¹³ Robert A. Hackett, "Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media," *Conflict and Communication Online* 5, no. 2 (2006): p. 7.

In the interests of developing a theoretical foundation upon which large-scale comparative analyses of journalism culture could be based (for the ‘Worlds of Journalism’ research project),²¹⁴ the media theorist Thomas Hanitzsch proposed a conceptualisation of journalistic culture in which ‘institutional roles’ was central.²¹⁵ This encompasses both the institutional roles of journalism in society as well as the role perceptions of journalists, in terms of both ‘normative responsibilities and...functional contribution to society’.²¹⁶ One of the three dimensions of institutional roles in this model was the journalist’s ‘position towards loci of power in society’. In Hanitzsch’s formulation, one end of the power distance dimension is represented by the ‘adversary’ pole (high distance from power); the other end of the pole is termed ‘loyal’ (low distance from power).²¹⁷

As a subsequent part of the ‘Worlds of Journalism’ project, Folker Hanusch conducted survey-based research on Australian journalistic culture. Australian journalists overwhelmingly considered themselves to have a ‘high’ distance from power; they perceived their role as strongly adversarial and celebrated their positioning as a ‘watchdog’ or ‘fourth estate’. Journalists were also predominantly left-leaning in political orientation.²¹⁸ These findings echoed the results of earlier studies on Australian journalistic culture.²¹⁹

These findings, congruent with research in other countries with roots in the Anglo-American journalistic tradition,²²⁰ have in the past provided fuel for the thesis of a ‘liberal media bias’; that is, that due to the characteristics of individual journalists as revealed in such surveys, the news media are predisposed to be critical of and hostile towards conservative politicians, administrations and agendas. However, there is little research evidence to support this thesis; in fact, the literature actually suggests ‘a net advantage for conservatives across a range of

²¹⁴ See for example, Thomas Hanitzsch, "Worlds of Journalism Project," <http://www.worldsofjournalisms.org/>.

²¹⁵ Thomas Hanitzsch, "Deconstructing Journalism Culture: Toward a Universal Theory," *Communication Theory* 17, no. 4 (2007): p. 367.

²¹⁶ Hanitzsch, "Deconstructing Journalism Culture," p. 371.

²¹⁷ Hanitzsch, "Deconstructing Journalism Culture," p. 373.

²¹⁸ Folker Hanusch, "Mapping Australian Journalism Culture: Results from a Survey of Journalist's Role Perceptions," *Australian Journalism Review* 30, no. 2 (2008): pp. 103-04.

²¹⁹ For an overview of the research literature, see Jeffrey E. Brand and Mark Pearson, "The Newsroom Vs. The Loungeroom: Journalists' and Audiences' Views on News," *Australian Journalism Review* 23, no. 2 (2001): pp. 85-86; John Henningham, "Australian Journalists," in *The Global Journalist: Journalists around the World*, eds. David Weaver and Wei Wu (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1998), p. 105; Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate*, p. 263.

²²⁰ See Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

issues and groups’.²²¹ It is likely that the political leanings of journalists are eclipsed by a range of features inherent in specific media and political systems, such as the influence of corporate advertisers and media proprietors over media production.²²²

However, it is unusual to find instances of proprietors, political figures or representatives of commercial interests explicitly intervening in the processes of news production. When such instances do occur, they generally provoke controversy, indignation and at times outright mutiny within the media outlet.²²³ As Hallin emphasises:

Power is exercised indirectly, through the manipulation of symbols and routines of working life that those subject to it accept as their own.²²⁴

The outcome of a ‘net advantage’ within the news media for conservatism, as a result of either the indirect or (less rarely) direct influence of power upon news production leads to a disconnect between journalists’ perceptions of what they do, versus what the results of their work actually are.

On the basis of their comparative work on media systems around the world, Hallin and Mancini suggested that this disconnect arises initially as a result of the normative character of the educative process for journalists, ‘where it is more important to reflect on what journalism *should be* than to analyse in detail what and why it *is*’. The ‘normative ideal of the neutral independent watchdog’, they argue, then leads to blind spots in the self-perception of journalists and obscuration of many of the actual functions they perform, in particular that of ‘celebrating consensus values that fall outside the normative model’.²²⁵ This means that it is not only factors such as the political economy of news production that lead to an underlying slant towards maintenance of the status quo, but also factors inherent within journalistic norms that mitigate the personal characteristics and convictions of journalists. Whilst some of these norms have been alluded to already in the course of this chapter, in the concluding sections of this chapter I will discuss in further detail the overarching journalistic norms of objectivity and of celebrating consensus values, which have considerable bearing upon my

²²¹ Robert M. Entman, "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power," *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 1 (2007): p. 170.

²²² Entman, "Framing Bias."; Young, *How Australia Decides*, ch. 11.

²²³ The classic example in Australian press history is the large-scale strikes by staff at The Australian as a result of Rupert Murdoch’s assumption of direct editorial control in the mid-1970s. Bridget Griffen-Foley, *Party Games: Australian Politicians and the Media from War to Dismissal* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2003), ch. 8.

²²⁴ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 24.

²²⁵ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*, p. 13.

study and elements of which I will return to in the outlining of the methodology of this study and in the discussion of my data.

The ‘regime of objectivity’

The valorisation of ‘objectivity’ is central to the normative notion of the ‘neutral independent watchdog’ highlighted by Hallin and Mancini. Robert Hackett has described objectivity as ‘a paradigm or a regime, a metaphor that calls attention to the interlinkage of practices, norms, epistemology and structures in journalism’.²²⁶ The key conventions of the ‘regime of objectivity’, Hackett writes, provide bulwarks against sensationalism or propaganda, ‘yet they also have predictable consequences that are highly problematic for informing public opinion, or incentivising remedial action, in relation to global crises of conflict, ecology and poverty’. Hackett singles out the principle of ‘balance’, as particularly problematic. IN attempting to adhere to this principle, journalists attempt to give equal coverage to authoritative representatives of dissenting viewpoints in ‘legitimate’ controversies, which frequently constructs and naturalises the representation of conflicts or controversies as ‘two-sided zero-sum contests’. It also favours the adoption of complexity-reduction representational strategies and gives excessive weight to both extreme, polarising perspectives and to ‘official’ sources, such as the leaders or representatives of political parties.²²⁷ Given experience of the conventions of ‘objective’ journalism, ‘official’ sources become practised at preparing and creating ‘facts’ or media messages which ‘they anticipate will be reported and framed in particular ways...[and] every time journalists re-create those frames, they influence future actions by sources’.²²⁸ Media effects can therefore be seen as a non-linear process: Lynch et al. describe a ‘feedback loop’ in which ‘previous patterns of news reportage influence the expectations and strategies of political actors as sources, who shape reportable news events in conflict situations’.²²⁹

The privileging of credentialised, ‘official’ sources therefore represents a significant ‘blindspot’ for the normative model of journalism. Press articles are largely predicated on the basis on many source discourses; that is, media stories rely upon the use of direct and indirect quotes from various participants in or commentators upon the story to construct the

²²⁶ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 37.

²²⁷ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 39.

²²⁸ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 42.

²²⁹ Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 14.

appearance of ‘authenticity’, or ‘facticity’.²³⁰ Striving to maximise the authenticity of a story predisposes the journalist to select sources which are already imbued with an aura of legitimacy, such as public figures and in particular, bureaucratic sources. Inez Mahony’s study of coverage of Indonesia in the Australian press, for example, found that Australian government officials and authorities were by far the most cited sources in her large sample of articles. Former Sydney Morning Herald foreign desk editor Peter Kerr defended this convention to Mahony by emphasising the ‘credibility and authority’ of such sources.²³¹ However, as has been observed in numerous studies of the media, the conventional journalistic reliance on legitimised sources ‘results in a predominantly establishment view of the world, in which lay people are only entitled to their experience but not their opinions’.²³²

This is even more critical in reporting of political news (and during an election campaign, almost all news has some political import). Journalists are enjoined to adhere to the norm of objectivity and report ‘just the facts’, yet political conflicts are largely oriented around the contestation of ‘the facts’. Journalism resolves the dilemma, Hallin argues, ‘by taking its facts from official sources’. However, ‘the decision to weight equally conflicting accounts of political reality is no less a political act than the decision to report only one’.²³³ In this regard, quotation patterns can be seen as a form of ‘gate-keeping’, which maintain the prominence of elite attitudes and opinions, whilst excluding the views of other segments of society. Such elite views, as Elissa Tivona has highlighted in a study on the ‘backgrounding’ of women’s peacebuilding initiatives and creativity around the world, ‘can easily hijack the media to serve underlying agendas and many [elite sources] have a vested interest in sustaining conflict and inflammatory realities’.²³⁴

Unsurprisingly, a range of studies of quotation patterns of different disempowered social groups have found that women, ethnic minorities, or other minority groups are quoted less frequently in the media, and are only quoted in particular contexts, which as Teun van Dijk emphasises, may more frequently confirm the views of elites on these topics rather than

²³⁰ For an overview, see Peter Teo, "Racism in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reporting in Two Australian Newspapers," *Discourse & Society* 11, no. 1 (2000): p. 18.

²³¹ Mahony, "Diverging Frames," pp. 746-7.

²³² See Teo, "Racism in the News," p. 18.

²³³ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, pp. 71-2.

²³⁴ Elissa Tivona, "Globalisation of Compassion: Women's Narratives as Models for Peace Journalism," in *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*, eds. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011), p. 341.

interrogate general attitudes about the group in question.²³⁵ For the purposes of this study, it is important to emphasise that if stereotypical and negative representations of Islam are reproduced in the media, but conventional patterns of quotation exclude challenges to these representations, then over time the stereotypical representations will become increasingly normalised and therefore resistant to future change.²³⁶ Considering the quotation patterns of the articles in this study, and the extent to which they are dominated by elite sources, feature Muslim voices, and call into question the ‘consensus values’ impacting upon Muslims and Muslims communities, will therefore constitute part of the methodology of this study.

Celebrating consensus values

The notion of celebrating consensus values is one established and explored in detail in Hallin’s earlier work, *The Uncensored War*. As mentioned above, Hallin argued that despite a powerful popular myth that the news media played a consistent and heroic adversarial role during the course of the Vietnam War, most news coverage was initially highly supportive of American policy. Whilst journalists were committed to reporting the ‘story’, despite periodic opposition from the military and government representatives, they also remained deeply committed to the national security consensus which underpinned operations in Vietnam, and in the early years of the war confined themselves mostly to reliance on bureaucratic sources.²³⁷

It was only in the later stages of the war, Hallin argues, that the media assumed a more critical stance:

As the war ground on...and as political divisions increased in the United States, journalists shifted along the continuum from a more cooperative or deferential to a more “adversarial” stance towards officials and their policies.²³⁸

However, Hallin argues that we should not overemphasise the significance of this shift: the Nixon administration retained a strong ability to ‘manage’ the news media. Journalists remained broadly ‘patriotic’ in their depiction of American actions in Vietnam throughout the course of the war, and although news coverage in the later years of the conflict was much less

²³⁵ Teun A. van Dijk, "New(S) Racism: A Discourse Analytical Approach," in *Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries*, ed. Simon Cottle (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), p. 39.

²³⁶ Allen, "Islamophobia," p. 64; Teo, "Racism in the News," p. 20.

²³⁷ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, pp. 8-9.

²³⁸ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 9.

positive than in the earlier years, it was by no means consistently negative. Therefore, whilst the media might claim some credit for the decline in public support for the war, it could also be seen to be responsible ‘for the fact that the public came to see the war as a “mistake” or “tragedy”, rather than the crime the more radical opposition believed it to be’.²³⁹

Hallin’s formulation is echoed by Entman, who argues that debate and slanting within the American media occur ‘within the boundaries for public discourse on most government policies’. This means that there is little evidence of the challenging of ‘deeply entrenched values that...help allocate power in American society’, and little movement beyond interrogation of the ‘day-to-day contests to control government power *within* the snug ideological confines of mainstream American politics’.²⁴⁰ In other words, conflict coverage has historically been characterised by low levels of ‘distance from power’; a situation which as already highlighted has strong parallels with the coverage of issues pertaining to Islam and Muslims during the early 2000s in Australia.

By evaluating the ‘distance from power’ in articles in the critical political periods covered by my study, I will seek to interrogate potential gaps between journalist’s *perceived* and *actual* ‘position towards loci of power in society’. The two overlapping consensus frameworks which are most likely to meet and predominate in the articles surveyed within this study are the consensus of Islamophobia, within which Muslims are conceived of as inherently violent, incompatible with Western society, and incontrovertibly ‘other’; and the ‘War on Terror’ consensus: that terrorism is a threat to Western civilisation which must be combated, and that the ends justify (any) means. During the period of my study, the promulgation and extension of the dominance of these consensus frameworks fed fairly directly into party political conflict. The Coalition Government benefited significantly from the promotion and exploitation of these frameworks, which enabled the furtherance of their political agenda: increasingly unfettered pursuit of greater opportunity for enterprise and entrenchment of the privileges of dominant social groups, as opposed to greater opportunity for social justice. Murray Goot, summarising polling data from 2003-2004, noted that ‘the period from the invasion [of Iraq] to the defeat of Saddam Hussein boosted the level of satisfaction with the Prime Minister, worked against the Leader of the Opposition in the head-to-head polling with

²³⁹ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, pp. 10-11.

²⁴⁰ Entman, "Framing Bias," p. 170.

the Prime Minister, and lifted the Coalition’s electoral support’.²⁴¹ The mainstream media to a large degree served the needs of the Howard Government, to the extent that the consensual frameworks were contested and dissenting viewpoints were being neutralised. This was particularly the case for the News Ltd. media, as David McKnight has demonstrated in regards to their promotion of Australia’s participation in the invasion of Iraq.²⁴²

Although there was fierce debate within Australian politics and within the pages of the two newspapers surveyed in this study regarding the specifics of certain issues, such as national security or migration, on the broad outlines of the consensual frames outlined above there was bipartisan political support, media endorsement and mainstream public agreement. When alternative views ‘breached the bounds of acceptable discourse’, in Entman’s phrase, they were either sidelined as being ‘unnewsworthy’ or were lampooned and ridiculed. Attempts by the Labor leader Mark Latham to challenge the consensus on the War on Terror during the 2004 election campaign resulted in extremely critical media coverage and public opinion polling; subsequently, representatives of the party became reticent to provoke robust debate on the topic in the fear of fostering a perception that they were ‘weak on security’.²⁴³ These issues will be explored in further detail in relation to the articles in my study in a later chapter; a brief further example though is the coverage of the case of Ahmed Ali al-Kateb. Al-Kateb, a Kuwaiti-born Palestinian, arrived by boat to Australia in 2000 with no papers. His application for refugee-status failed; by 2004, he had exhausted all appeals within the Australian legal system, yet no country could be found which would accept him. In the case of al-Kateb vs Godwin, the High Court found that al-Kateb could be held indefinitely in mandatory immigration detention.²⁴⁴

Journalist and media commentator David Marr writes of his expectation that ‘battles would rage’ in the press given the weighty issues which were inherent in the case; yet to his surprise, ‘the story proved, essentially, to have no traction’ and the timid, perfunctory

²⁴¹ Murray Goot, "Questions of Deception: Contested Understandings of the Polls on Wmd, Political Leaders and Governments in Australia, Britain and the United States," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (2007): p. 48.

²⁴² See David McKnight, *Rupert Murdoch: An Investigation of Political Power* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), ch. 8.

²⁴³ Goot, "Questions of Deception," p. 41.

²⁴⁴ The subsequent Immigration Minister Amanda Vanstone eventually issued a bridging visa for al-Kateb and he was released into the community. In 2007 he was issued a permanent visa just prior to the Federal Election, and became an Australian citizen in 2009. Michael Kirby, "Dinner Address," University of Sydney, <http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=3089>.

treatment of the story by the Australian media amounted at most to a ‘muted thunder’.²⁴⁵ ‘Why did the story die?’, Marr asked, ‘Why has this case not excited fear, anger and public debate?’.²⁴⁶ Perhaps a part of the answer to Marr’s demand lies in the continuing consensual solidarity of the Australian press with the Coalition Government. At a time when the ‘War on Terror’ consensus was being eroded in Britain and America by the increasingly evident failures of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the confirmation of the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ deception, and emergent scandals such as the outrages at Abu Ghraib prison, the popularity of John Howard and his Coalition Government were comparatively high in Australia and the framework of the War on Terror remained more consensually endorsed.

Further parallels may be drawn with some of the issues canvassed by Hallin in his study of Vietnam War coverage. An example is the fierce debate over appropriate policies towards the puppet Diem regime in South Vietnam. As Hallin noted:

As furious as these battles seemed to those involved, however, they all took place within the narrow confines of a tight consensus on the nature of world politics and the American role in it; none brought into question the premise that the preservation of an anti-Communist Vietnam was indeed a legitimate goal of American policy.²⁴⁷

The model that Hallin developed to explain this type of situation portrays the world of the journalist as a tripartite structure, into which topics and issues to be addressed can be slotted. The model, which Hallin conceives of as a series of concentric circles, has at its heart the ‘Sphere of Consensus’. Issues or topics which fall within this sphere would be those regarded by the majority of society as uncontroversial; as given. In this sphere, Hallin argues, journalists will not feel constrained by the principles of objective journalism, but will openly advocate for or celebrate the consensus values they may invoke. Thus, in the example above, Hallin is pointing out the national security consensus that dictated American involvement in Vietnam, which was not interrogated by journalists until towards the end of the war.²⁴⁸

Beyond the Sphere of Consensus, according to Hallin, lies the ‘Sphere of Legitimate Controversy’, which is the realm within which most mainstream political debate takes place. Issues falling within this sphere land squarely within the province of the norms of objective journalism and balanced reporting:

²⁴⁵ David Marr, *Panic: Terror! Invasion! Disorder! Drugs! Kids! Blacks! Boats!* (Collingwood, VIC: Black Inc., 2011), p. 54-55.

²⁴⁶ Marr, *Panic*, p. 56.

²⁴⁷ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 48.

²⁴⁸ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, pp. 116-17.

This is the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as such by the major established actors of the American political process. The limits of this sphere are defined primarily by the two-party system – by the parameters of debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties – as well as by the decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch.²⁴⁹

The ‘furious debate’ over the details of American policy towards the Diem regime, mentioned above, would be an example of an issue falling within the sphere of legitimate controversy. Both within and between the two major political parties, there was significant and polarising debate, which was reported upon cautiously by journalists intent to uphold the principles of objectivity and neutrality. Within the storm of controversy over such issues of *policy*, the underlying frameworks will not be addressed or interrogated.

Beyond the zone of legitimate controversy, in Hallin’s model, lies the ‘Sphere of Deviance’. Within this realm are located the perspectives and views of political actors outside the mainstream, which may range from simply eccentric to the abhorrent and heretical. Within this zone, the principles of neutrality and balance are again de-emphasised, and the journalism ‘plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political conflict’.²⁵⁰ Within the early years of the Vietnam War, any voices questioning the national security consensus that the United States should not be fighting in Vietnam were sidelined in this manner. It was only in the later stages of the war that the perspectives of anti-war advocates became considered part of a legitimate controversy. As noted above, however, the most radical perspective on the war, that it was not simply a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘mistake’, but actually a criminal venture, never gained a place within the sphere of legitimate controversy; it remained in the borders of the sphere of deviancy.

As Hallin’s book illustrates, the extent to which a particular viewpoint, issue or perspective may be considered a consensus value to be championed, a point under debate which required careful coverage of several perspectives, or a notion to be dismissed out of hand, can change over time.²⁵¹ A general contemporary example might be seen in the increasing consensus around climate change. The views of ‘greenies’ and ‘tree huggers’ were routinely ridiculed and placed firmly within the sphere of deviancy until recent years, when gradual shifts within

²⁴⁹ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 117.

²⁵⁰ The role of the news media in mediating the position of debate on certain issues can be seen in the persistence of *The Australian* in maintaining its unofficial position of ‘climate skepticism’ despite the fact that the mainstream is clearly pushing towards consensus on this issue.

²⁵¹ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, p. 117.

mainstream public and political opinion opened up the issue as a ground for legitimate controversy.²⁵² Currently, the issue is moving slowly towards the sphere of consensus, with the most vehement climate change deniers in some cases beginning to be consigned to the sphere of deviance and labelled as ‘crackpots’.²⁵³

In the case at hand, it was only from the mid-2000s that the consensus on the ‘Islamic threat’ and the consensus of the War on Terror began to be more effectively contested in Australian political discourse and within the Australian media. Thus, during the lead up to the 2007 election, it is possible to see evidence of certain issues and perspectives entering the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’, whilst if they appeared in the coverage of the 2004 election campaign at all, it was generally in the interests of presenting such perspectives as ‘deviant’. Examples are the argument that Australian participation in the ‘War on Terror’ made us less safe, rather than more safe; the view that the stirring up of communal antagonism towards Muslims was harmful to the Australian community as a whole; or the view that all terrorism suspects deserved due process of law. The investigation of these issues constitutes a core component of the primary research for this thesis. I now move to Part 2 of my thesis, which will provide an overview of the political and historical context of my research, before turning to Part 3, which includes the methodology and discussion sections of the thesis, in order to further expand on many of the points raised during this chapter.

²⁵² The slow movement of climate change into the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ has, as Hackett points out, been partly due to the undue weighting given to the opinions of climate change deniers by the mainstream media in the interests of ‘balance’, ‘resulting in inaccurate reporting at odds with the scientific consensus’. Hackett, “New Vistas for Peace Journalism,” p. 39.

²⁵³ As seen for example in the characterisation of Independent Federal MP Bob Katter as a loose cannon on the basis of his denial of climate change. The implied instability of Katter was a major feature of coverage on the potential role of independents in a minority government during the first week following the 2010 Federal Election. Francis Whiting, “Is He Really the Mad Katter?,” *The Courier-Mail*, 17 March 2012.

Chapter 4 – A national history of racism

The new global hegemony has its racisms, which confirm ideologically its fitness to rule and the inferiority of those peoples and cultures that it subjugates in doing so...[yet] the echoes of these racisms are complex: they resonate differentially within distinct local and national cultures, conditioned by their disparate but intertwined histories. For example, 'Islamophobia' might be taken to mean much the same thing in the USA, the UK and Australia, but as lived and practised in each of these nation-states, it has been created out of different national histories of racism.

- *Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason*²⁵⁴

Although this thesis is concerned with media representations of Islam and Muslims in contemporary Australia, the salient characteristics and sites of contestation within and around these representations cannot be appreciated without taking into account the historical construction of difference, and in particular, racial difference, in Australia. My consideration of the specific 'national history of racism' in Australia, is guided, in general terms, by the Discourse-Historical Method of Critical Discourse Analysis, proposed by Ruth Wodak,²⁵⁵ which enables influences on meaning-making in the present day to be traced through their development within multiple contexts, categorised as operating on four levels:

1. The immediate, language or text-internal co-text;
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
3. The extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation' (middle range theories);
4. The broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to ('grand' theories).²⁵⁶

In considering the influences that may, at any moment, bear on and emanate from the publication of a single newspaper story – the basic unit of data in the empirical portion of the present study – clearly, the most immediate ones belong on Wodak's Level 1, namely, conventions governing the everyday practice of journalistic work. One of the most pressing is the need for concision – choosing words carefully, albeit against tight deadlines, to fit in the

²⁵⁴ Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Racism in the U.K. And Australia before September 11," *Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 1 (2007): pp. 62-3.

²⁵⁵ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach."

²⁵⁶ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," p. 67.

maximum factual information in the smallest possible space. But key words in a story about Muslims or Islam in today's Australia will have acquired their significance, and therefore commend themselves for selection and inclusion in such a story, only by virtue of other usages (including in historical texts) in multiple contexts. The meanings assigned to them will have been constructed by their implication in extra-linguistic social domains, and overarching all such symbolic production are historically transmitted 'grand narratives' such as those inscribed in the contemporary discourse of Islamophobia (as outlined in Chapter 2). The four chapters in Part 2, of which this is the first, therefore utilise what Wodak calls 'an abductive approach', one that ranges freely 'back and forth' between analysis of factors pertinent to her four levels.²⁵⁷

In tracing the development of patterns of representing the Other in historical Australian contexts, I have consciously adopted a genealogical and postcolonial stance towards Australian history. Following Vakil, I consider that it is necessary to 'eschew linear readings and the logics of contained periodisations in [my] approach to problematics such as racism and Islamophobia'. This means that I do not 'merely extend back to a consideration of articulations of the exercise of power, categorisation and exclusion...but [I] also read them sideways, as a "contrapuntal co-presence" to reading the contemporary'.²⁵⁸ I am, therefore, adopting a mode of 'socio-diagnostic critique', according to Wodak's prescription, making use of 'background and contextual knowledge and embed[ding] the communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances'.²⁵⁹

Construction of Difference in Australian History

The promulgation of discourses of legitimation predicated upon ontologised categories of human difference have been a fundamental characteristic of Australian history since the British invasion and settlement of the continent in the late 18th century. The legitimisation of colonisation and the subsequent formation of a distinct 'Australian' national identity were indelibly linked to the emergence of a 'white' racial identity, which was constructed through the 'European monopolisation of "civilised humanity" and a parallel monopolisation of

²⁵⁷ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," p. 70.

²⁵⁸ Vakil, "When Is It Islamophobia Time?," p. 29.

²⁵⁹ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," p. 65.

Whiteness as its marker'.²⁶⁰ The hegemony of white settlers of British origin over both the Indigenous inhabitants of the continent and subsequent non-British, non-European and non-white migrants was established through the creation and reproduction of 'racial projects', that is, 'structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race'. These 'racial projects' were enacted through the linkage of structural inequity, injustice and representational practices, which have continuing ramifications upon Australian society.²⁶¹ Characteristic of such racial projects, however, is that whilst the racial categories that they are based upon are presented as timeless and rational, they are actually unstable and frequently illogical. The boundaries and definitions of what was 'white', and of what was considered 'non-white', changed over time and considerable slippage between the different categories is visible at different times and in different places. They are, as Sneja Gunew has highlighted, 'floating signifiers'.²⁶²

The formative years of Australia as a nation-state and the development of Australian identity and consciousness were therefore profoundly marked by the conceptions of race that became prevalent during this period. The discourse of a 'civilising mission' dominated British official attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples of Australia during the early years of colonisation. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, earlier forms of racial thought had largely been superseded by the emergence of 'scientific' theories of race, based on the assumption that the culture of a people was a 'function of biology':

The character of a people changed as a consequence of racial admixture which altered the gene pool, not as a result of social change. Where genetic stock was kept 'pure' the character of the 'race' remained constant from one generation to the next; where it was 'tainted' the race and its way of life died out.²⁶³

In the late nineteenth century, a variant of this type of racial thought also became widespread, which can be referred to as 'culturalism', which, whilst emphasising the permanence and insurmountability of cultural difference rather than biological heredity, was nonetheless congruent with biological racial thought as a result of the core preoccupation of both forms of racial thought with essentialism and determinism:

²⁶⁰ Ghassan Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 50.

²⁶¹ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the Sixties to the Nineties* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1999), p. 64.

²⁶² Sneja Gunew, *Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalisms* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 34-5.

²⁶³ Markus, *Race*, p. 4.

There was a necessary or invariable relationship between inherited characteristics and behaviour...there was no scope for individuals born into a distinctive racial or cultural group to cross boundaries – to change categories – and become full members of another racial or cultural group.²⁶⁴

Although these differing forms of racial thought may appear to merely emphasise the *distinctiveness* of different groups of humans, they are frequently operationalised as *hierarchical* notions of superiority and inferiority between different racial and cultural groups. The ‘science of race’ particularly lent itself to operationalisation and mobilisation for the purposes of ‘racial projects’ based on racial hierarchies. In the Australian context, this was expressed particularly through the endeavour to create a ‘White Australia’, both in the national imagination and in fact.

Having given a brief outline of the dominant forms of racial thought, this chapter will proceed to considering the evolution of these discourses of racial exclusion and privilege and the enactment of ‘racial projects’ during the course of Australian history subsequent to the British colonisation of the continent in 1788. These may be divided into two separate, albeit interconnected narratives, one focused on the dispossession of the Indigenous people of Australia, and the second focused on the exclusion of non-white peoples from privilege and even settlement in Australia. Up until the Second World War, these racial projects could be pursued relatively openly; from the mid-twentieth century, however, expression of ‘old-fashioned’ racism, defined as the belief in the innate, biological inferiority of certain races, was increasingly taboo. This chapter therefore moves from consideration of the more explicitly racist attitudes and policies so pervasive in Australian pre-war history, to consider the rise of new forms of ‘racism’. Whilst exhibiting continuities with older discourses of exclusion and privilege, expressions of racism have evolved considerably in recent decades and have come to exert considerable force upon political developments in Australia, particularly since the mid nineties, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.

Acknowledging the impact of this ‘legacy racism’ is a crucial exercise for understanding meaning-making in the present. The framing of Australian national history as ‘legacy racism’ enables the acknowledgement that ‘examples and effects of co-called ‘old-racism’ continue to be reproduced in contemporary discourse and social relations’ and that such legacy

²⁶⁴ Markus, *Race*, p. 5.

frameworks and practices continue to impact upon ‘present realities and future possibilities’.²⁶⁵

The colonial legacy

Although this thesis focuses on issues which pertain to Muslims and therefore is largely preoccupied with migrant and international issues, it is crucial that any consideration of race in Australia also consider the complex of attitudes towards Indigenous people which have characterised the history of white settlement in Australia. The colonial context of white Australian history has a significant impact on later discourses of privilege and exclusion and the marked employment of legitimating narratives in Australian political history. The genocidal practices of colonisation in Australia, and the failure to enter into a post-colonial treaty or pact have left Australia with an uneasy history of guilt and a sense of ‘unfinished business’.²⁶⁶

Attitudes towards Indigenous people in Australia have changed over time, yet have consistently been predicated upon an assumption of the inferiority of Aboriginal peoples to white settlers. During the early decades of the colony, the prevailing discourse was that of a ‘civilising mission’. Settler accounts predominantly represented Indigenous peoples as ‘savages’, yet were also characterised by sympathy towards the plight of Indigenous people and an emphasis on hopeful attempts to ‘civilise’ them and assimilate them into the nascent colonial society. In this period, therefore, the notion of white superiority and privilege was predicated upon a binary division of people into ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’, rather than being articulated in a strictly ‘racial’ way.

When establishing the initial colony in Sydney, Governor Arthur Phillip was exhorted by King George III to maintain amicable relations with the Indigenous peoples, and was empowered to punish any British settlers who actively attacked or antagonised them, as they were considered British subjects, without sovereignty over their traditional lands.²⁶⁷ Successive Governors sponsored attempts at evangelisation or ‘civilisation’ of Indigenous

²⁶⁵ Peter A. Chow-White and Rob McMahon, "Examining the 'Dark Past' and 'Hopeful Future' in Representations of Race and Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission," in *Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches*, eds. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011), p. 351.

²⁶⁶ Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, p. 51.

²⁶⁷ King George III, "Governor Phillip's Instructions (1787)," Museum of Australian Democracy, <http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-35.html>.

communities and sporadically reiterated proclamations enjoining settlers to refrain from violent persecution or provocation of Indigenous peoples, but rarely pursued the legal prosecution of settlers for criminal actions (as in the case of the Myall Creek Massacre).²⁶⁸ The representation of Indigenous Australians as ‘noble savages’ who had no property rights but could be ‘civilised’ for their own benefit and the benefit of the colonisers was, however, rivalled by a popular discourse which characterised Aborigines as ‘pests’ that threatened the expansion and prosperity of the colonies and had to be eradicated. This dehumanising discourse became markedly more widespread and dominant during the early decades of the nineteenth century as settlements began to expand across the continent. When dispossessed and provoked Indigenous groups retaliated against settlers, they became subject to state-sponsored military actions, as in the devastating Tasmanian Black Wars of the 1820s-30s.²⁶⁹

Only through the dispossession of Indigenous peoples could the British Crown’s colonial imperatives and the hopes of white settlers could be realised; as a consequence, the legal denial of Indigenous property rights and the construction of Indigenous peoples as inferior – in fact, as less-than-human – served as a powerful legitimising discourse for their violent dispossession. The first Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, John Polding, lamented in the 1840s that the notion that the Indigenous peoples could be ‘civilised’ and assimilated into settler society held very little traction with the majority of the white settlers. Instead, he reported to a Parliamentary Committee that the prevalent view that among pastoralists was that ‘there was no more harm in shooting a native than in shooting a wild dog’.²⁷⁰

Just as the discourse of colonialism in the late eighteenth century had shifted from an emphasis on the binary division between ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’ to the dehumanisation of Aborigines as ‘pests’ to be exterminated, with the ultimate aim of legitimating the colonial occupation of the continent, throughout the nineteenth century the discourse shifted towards a biological and ‘scientific’ view of difference, yet retained its purpose of legitimisation. The ‘science’ of race was a powerful discourse, which effectively absolved the settlers of any lingering sense of guilt that may have been felt over the colonial process. Polding had noted

²⁶⁸ A. Dirk Moses, "Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History," in *Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), p. 7.

²⁶⁹ Anthony Moran, "White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal Assimilation," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 51, no. 2 (2005); Keith Smith, "Bennelong among His People," *Aboriginal History* 33(2009); Jean Woolmington, ed. *Aborigines in Colonial Society, 1788-1850: From 'Noble Savage' to 'Rural Pest'*, 2nd ed. (Armidale, N.S.W.: University of New England, 1988).

²⁷⁰ Archbishop Polding, Parliamentary Select Committee on the Condition of Aborigines (1845), cited in Osmund Thorpe, *First Catholic Mission to the Australian Aborigines* (Sydney: Pellegrini, 1950), p. 262.

in 1845 that it was a common view that ‘it was in the course of Providence that the blacks should disappear before the white, and *the sooner the process was carried out* the better for all parties’ (my emphasis).²⁷¹ This attitude still tacitly acknowledged settler complicity in the dispossession of the Indigenous peoples, despite serving a purpose in exonerating colonists of any blame for the decimation of the Indigenous people.

Scientific theories of race, in contrast, served to completely whitewash the role of settlers in their colonial project and to render the social and political processes of colonialism as ‘natural’:

Scientific race theory normalised social and biological theories of natural selection in scholarly and popular discourse, creating a classificatory system. This classificatory system formed the basis of the construction of an inferior other in colonising discourses, normalising the superiority of the dominant or colonizing culture.²⁷²

Accordingly, by the latter part of the 19th century, it was common to see views such as this widely circulated in the Australian press:

It seems a law of nature that where two races whose stages of progression differ greatly are brought into contact, the inferior race is doomed to wither and disappear ... The process seems to be in accordance with a natural law which, however it may clash with human benevolence, is clearly beneficial to mankind at large by providing for the survival of the fittest.²⁷³

In contrast to the views reported by Polding in the 1840s, by the late 19th century it is apparent that the dominant discourse had appropriated scientific language to represent colonialism not as an ‘act of imperialism’, but as ‘an inevitable act of nature’.²⁷⁴ This discourse had considerable utility and was employed well into the twentieth century to create disciplinary technologies which ‘controlled, excluded and marginalised the Indigenous “other” from Australian society’.²⁷⁵ It can be seen therefore that whilst the specific ways in which Indigenous people were represented shifted over time, the purpose remained one of legitimating and enacting hegemony of colonists on the Australian continent: ‘these images

²⁷¹ Archbishop Polding, Parliamentary Select Committee on the Condition of Aborigines (1845), cited in Thorpe, *First Catholic Mission to the Australian Aborigines*, p. 262.

²⁷² Deirdre Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference," *TASA/SAANZ Annual Conference Proceedings* (Auckland, N.Z.: 2007): p. 1.

²⁷³ Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 5.

²⁷⁴ Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 5.

²⁷⁵ Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 1.

were the reflection not of reality, but of the interests and assumptions of particular groups'.²⁷⁶ In Wodak's terms, these can be seen as 'strategies', by which 'we generally mean a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim'.²⁷⁷

Towards a 'White Australia'

As well as effectively legitimating the dispossession of Indigenous Australians, the 'science of race' was to prove an effective discourse for responding to the growth of non-white immigration to Australian colonies during the nineteenth century. Cassandra Pybus has demonstrated that contrary to the traditional emphasis on the British and white character of colonisers in Australian foundation myths, even the earliest colonial settlements in Australia were racially and culturally diverse in their composition.²⁷⁸ However, non-white immigrants to Australia remained small in number and generally low in profile during the early years of the colony; it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that larger numbers of non-white immigrants began to arrive in the colony and to begin to be considered a 'problem'. This was therefore a crucial period in the construction of a distinctly 'Australian' identity. In combination with the colonial context of this development, the positioning of 'whiteness' as a superior racial category consequently became central to conceptions of Australian identity, and white privilege became solidly entrenched in Australian national myths, public attitudes, and government institutions and policies.²⁷⁹

Significant non-white immigration to the Australian colonies began in 1840, when transportation of convicts to Australia ceased, and pastoralists began to seek indentured labourers from Asia (principally India and China). In 1851, when the Gold Rush began, many of these former indentured labourers moved to the goldfields, sparking public concern which led to prohibitions on the use of indentured labourers from China. However, these measures were insufficient to stem the rapid growth of Chinese migration; by 1861, close to 40,000 Chinese had migrated to the Australian colonies. The rapid growth and high visibility of

²⁷⁶ Richard White, *Inventing Australia* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 14.

²⁷⁷ Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," p. 73.

²⁷⁸ Catherine Pybus, *Black Founders: The Unknown Story of Australia's First Black Settlers* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006).

²⁷⁹ See for example, Warwick Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003); Jane Carey and Claire McLisky, "Creating White Australia: New Perspectives on Race, Whiteness and History," in *Creating White Australia*, eds. Jane Carey and Claire McLisky (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009); Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*.

Chinese immigration to Australia provoked considerable xenophobia and led to sustained efforts at curtailing Chinese immigration through legislative mechanisms. Limits were imposed on the number of Chinese immigrants which any one ship could legally disembark; residency taxes were applied selectively to Chinese immigrants; and Chinese immigrants were prevented from seeking naturalisation.²⁸⁰ The first anti-Chinese legislation act, passed in Victoria in 1855, was titled 'An Act to Make Provision for Certain Migrants', which as Ann Curthoys points out is a rather 'evasive' title for an explicitly discriminatory act.²⁸¹ Both the tendency to utilise legislative tools to limit and control non-white settlement in the Australian colonies and the habit of attempting to conceal the racial underpinnings of such policies have remained persistent features of Australian discourses relating to immigration.²⁸²

Despite the introduction of anti-Chinese immigration acts in other Australian colonies over the next ten years, prospective miners continued to arrive from China, by disembarking in colonies where such legislation had not yet been passed and travelling overland to the goldfields, thereby establishing an important push towards the idea of federating the disparate Australian colonies into one nation.²⁸³ As the Gold Rushes and attendant immigration slowed, however, anti-Chinese immigration laws were progressively repealed; during the late 1970s when Chinese immigration again surged, there was a reinvigoration of racial tensions and clashes and renewed pushes across the Australian colonies for legislative means to limit Chinese immigration. As Curthoys has noted, racism was inextricably entwined with relations of dominance during this period: attitudes towards the Chinese relaxed 'only when the colonial Australians' sense of European and particularly British political, social and economic dominance was unthreatened'.²⁸⁴

Recent research has demonstrated that in many regions of Australia, Chinese migrants lived and worked in close proximity to white settlers and relations could be amicable between the different parts of such communities. In other regions and at particular points in time,

²⁸⁰ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *The Chinese in Australia* (Canberra: ABS, 2012); Ann Curthoys, "'Men of All Nations, except Chinamen': Europeans and Chinese on the Goldfields of New South Wales," in *Gold: Forgotten Histories and Lost Objects of Australia*, eds. Iain McCalman, Alexander Cook, and Andrew Reeves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 104-5.

²⁸¹ Curthoys, "'Men of All Nations, except Chinamen'," p. 106.

²⁸² James Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 8.

²⁸³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *The Chinese in Australia*; Curthoys, "'Men of All Nations, except Chinamen'," p. 104-6.

²⁸⁴ Curthoys, "'Men of All Nations, except Chinamen'," p. 120.

however, racial tensions were extremely high and could spill over into violent conflict.²⁸⁵ Outbreaks of racial violence were frequently linked directly to political developments; the infamous ‘Lambing Flat Riots’ of 1861, for example, were sparked following the initial defeat of a bill to introduce legislation suppressing Chinese immigration in the colony of New South Wales;²⁸⁶ and the mass anti-Chinese strikes, rallies and riots of 1878 precipitated the resignation of the sitting Farnell government in New South Wales, as a consequence of its opposition to reintroducing anti-Chinese immigration legislation.²⁸⁷ In many instances, such tensions were exacerbated by hostile and inflammatory reporting in both local and metropolitan newspapers; the press thus served as an important site for the promulgation of stereotypes about the ‘barbarous race’ of the Chinese and heightened anxieties about the growth of Chinese immigration.²⁸⁸

The main thrust of the push towards a ‘White Australia’ was represented by the highly visible resistance towards Chinese immigration, which was usually predicated on the basis of their phenotypically distinctive ‘racial’ characteristics. However, forms of discrimination on the basis of cultural unassimilability of the Chinese and other groups of people, in particular the Irish and Jews, also persisted through the nineteenth century in Australia. These were often expressed in logically inconsistent ways, as has become a feature of ‘Islamophobia’ in the contemporary era. Catholic Irish and Jews were stigmatised because of their threatening and inferior religion, yet were frequently phenotypically indistinguishable from ‘white’ Australians. Nevertheless, these groups of people were often ranked at the same level as Africans in many racial hierarchies circulating during the nineteenth century (with the Irish sometimes referred to as ‘White Negroes’). Because of the supposed necessary connection between the outward form and inner level of civilisation possessed by a people, such illogical racial categorisations were justified through emphasising the ‘primitive’ anatomical features and social characteristics of non-white people; the Irish, for example, were described as being ‘low of stature, uncouth of feature, and intensely black of hair and eye’, and commonly

²⁸⁵ Curthoys, "Men of All Nations, except Chinamen," pp. 118-20; Phil Griffiths, "Racism: Whitewashing the Class Divide," in *Class and Struggle in Australia*, ed. Rick Kuhn (Frenchs Forest: Pearson Australia, 2005); Barry McGowan, "Reconsidering Race: The Chinese Experience on the Goldfields of Southern New South Wales," *Australian Historical Studies* 36, no. 124 (2004): p. 321.

²⁸⁶ Notably, the miners participating in the attack carried a banner depicting a variant of the Eureka Southern Cross flag framed by the words 'No Chinese', presaging the later prominence of the device at the Cronulla Riots. Curthoys, "Men of All Nations, except Chinamen," p. 112.

²⁸⁷ Phil Griffiths, "From Humiliation to Triumph: Sir Henry Parkes, the Squatters and the Anti-Chinese Movement, 1877-1878," *Journal of Australian Colonial History* 12(2010): pp. 150-53.

²⁸⁸ Curthoys, "Men of All Nations, except Chinamen," 108-09; Griffiths, "From Humiliation to Triumph," p. 151; McGowan, "Reconsidering Race," pp. 325, 28.

characterised as immoral, lazy, ignorant and combative.²⁸⁹ ‘Whiteness’ in this specific historical setting was therefore a category whose borders were not clearly defined, thus allowing continuing contestation and attempts to exploit the issue for political capital – which of course generated considerable anxiety for the people affected by them.

The widely divergent forms and expressions of prejudice and discrimination against particular groups of people in Australia were unified by an emergent focus on protecting the heritage and privileges of white people of British heritage in Australia. Not surprisingly, the hardening of discourses legitimating the privilege of white Europeans in Australia occurred during the late nineteenth century, at the same time that other well-established European colonies were beginning to move towards relative independence from their ‘mother countries’, and the British and other European colonial Empires were straining to consolidate their hold over the remainder of the uncolonised globe.²⁹⁰

This was also a period in which there was a massive surge of participation in popular labour and social movements whose goals threatened the interests of traditional elites. The way such developments influenced the utilisation of race in Australian politics can be illustrated through consideration of the career of Sir Henry Parkes, one of the pre-eminent Australian statesmen of the late nineteenth century and five-time Premier of New South Wales, who is considered the ‘Founding Father’ of Australian Federalism. Parkes’ strident opposition to land reform, trade unionism, infrastructure development, state provision of welfare and universal primary education had helped to cost him the Premiership in 1877.²⁹¹ However, Parkes was able to capitalise on anti-Chinese hysteria to oust the sitting government in 1879 by campaigning strongly for limitations and controls on immigrants ‘who were alien to us in language, blood and culture’, and promoting the formerly unpopular policy of assisted immigration for British settlers as a defensive measure against alien takeover, necessary for the protection and preservation of the ‘British character of this land’.²⁹² Parkes was also strongly opposed to Irish immigration, lobbying consistently for limitations on Irish Catholic migration and whilst Premier, making dispersal of non-British migrants to New South Wales

²⁸⁹ Raeleen Frances, "Green Demons: Irish-Catholics and Muslims in Australian History," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 22, no. 4 (2011): p. 444; Griffiths, "Racism."

²⁹⁰ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2008).

²⁹¹ Griffiths, "From Humiliation to Triumph," p. 163.

²⁹² Sir Henry Parkes (1878), cited in Griffiths, "From Humiliation to Triumph," p. 168.

a condition of settlement aid.²⁹³ Parkes was able to leverage and exacerbate hostility towards rising non-British immigration to regain his Premiership and to pursue his conservative political agenda despite the public's earlier antipathy towards him – strongly reminiscent of John Howard's reinvigoration of his political fortunes in 2001.

During the decades immediately prior to Federation in 1901, therefore, the six Australian colonies were increasingly characterised by a dynamic of racial antagonism expressed through a diverse variety of structural, cultural and direct forms of violence, though in particular through the development and application of discriminatory practices aimed at the dispossession of Indigenous peoples and the limitation of migration and settlement of non-white peoples. One of the most significant factors promoted as uniting Australia's disparate colonies was their shared white, British heritage, which advocates of Federation claimed could best be protected through becoming one nation: 'Australian' national identity was therefore predicated explicitly upon commitment to a 'White Australia'.

This push towards consolidation of the racial hegemony of a select, privileged minority can be seen to be part of broader international developments at the time, as the United States, South Africa and other former European colonies attempted to control and limit the migration and settlement of non-white or non-European peoples into their borders. Through the formation of what has come to be known as the 'White Australia Policy', the nascent Australian state proved to be eminently successful at crafting and maintaining disciplinary practices which enabled the establishment of one of the most racially and culturally homogenous societies in the world. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have demonstrated, during this period white nationalist movements across the globe drew inspiration from the successes of other 'white men's nations' in limiting and controlling undesirable immigration. Some practices in Australia therefore drew upon practices current in other nations, and in their turn came to inspire developments across the globe when the success of Australia's 'White Australia Policy' became apparent.²⁹⁴

Federation and the White Australia Policy

From the turn of the twentieth century, when the disparate Australian colonies became Federated into one nation and began to exercise more independence from the British Empire,

²⁹³ Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, *Race for the Headlines*, p. 19; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 21.

²⁹⁴ Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line*.

questions of race, privilege and exclusion continued to be pertinent issues for the new nation. One of the first pieces of legislation passed by parliament subsequent to Australia's Federation was the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*. An understanding of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* and of the White Australia Policy which it ushered in (or perhaps merely formalised) is central to an understanding of racial thought in Australia, and by extension, of Australian history, identity and contemporary politics. This assumption is not, however, universally accepted: from the 1990s, debates over the significance and legacy of the *Immigration Restriction Act* emerged as an important frontier in the 'History Wars' over the interpretation of Australian history. The most vehement critic of the idea that understanding the *Immigration Restriction Act* as an expression of racist thought which has had significant ramifications for Australia history, culture and identity was, unsurprisingly, the conservative stalwart Keith Windschuttle. On the cover of his 2004 book *The White Australia Policy*, Windschuttle set forth the thesis that 'Australia is not, and never has been, the racist country its academic historians have condemned'.²⁹⁵

However, it is difficult to view the debate over the introduction of the *Immigration Restriction Act* without coming to the conclusion that the motivations for introducing the policy were racist in origin. Windschuttle's argument was that the inspiration behind the White Australia Policy was economic and cultural rather than racial, and based on fears that non-white immigration was a threat to jobs and to working conditions for white Australians and that an influx of peoples of different racial appearance and cultural backgrounds would foster communal conflict. Windschuttle correctly points out that in contrast to the common perception that Australian politicians were unified on the issue of immigration restriction, there were members of Parliament and spokesmen for the different political parties who decried the proposed Immigration Restriction Act as racist and deplorable.²⁹⁶ However, it is difficult to see Windschuttle's claim that those who argued for immigration restriction were motivated not by racism but by so-called 'economic' or 'cultural' issues, as anything except a circular argument. Many non-white people in Australia *were* working for much lower wages and in worse labour conditions than white Australians and their presence in Australia clearly created some conflict. However, if the debate were not ultimately based on racism, and the belief that one subsection of the population, 'White Australians', was entitled to a privileged

²⁹⁵ Keith Windschuttle, *The White Australia Policy* (Paddington, N.S.W.: Macleay Press, 2004).

²⁹⁶ Keith Windschuttle, "The White Australia Policy," in *Address to the Sydney Institute* (Sydney: Quadrant Online, 2005).

position, then the debate would have focused on how to integrate non-white people more effectively into civil and public society rather than on how to exclude them.

Britain, as the centre of a global empire which included vast numbers of non-white subjects, was understandably reluctant to endorse the discriminatory immigration policies which the newly federated nation wished to implement. As Prime Minister Edmund Barton noted:

I candidly admit that if we had the power, and if the British Government give us the power...I would go to any extreme of prohibition to prevent a large number of these coloured people from settling in the waste lands of the tropical parts of Australia.²⁹⁷

Vaiben Solomon, who had argued vociferously in Parliament for the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act, based most of his arguments on the type of ‘economic’ reasoning which Windschuttle highlights. Yet the core of his argument rests upon the type of racist thought Windschuttle has tried to downplay:

Australia has decided that this country shall not be over-run by Asiatics, but kept, as far as possible, for the white races. I feel sure that when the authorities in Great Britain really understand the importance of this question, and the strength of feeling of the people of Australia, they will yield to our desires. They will realize that if we have in Australia a white population increasing year by year, the Empire will have a stronger arm to help her in time of trouble than if we developed a hybrid population.²⁹⁸

The racist character of Solomon’s arguments is revealed not only in his culturalist assumptions but also his references to that hallmark of biological racism, the abhorrence of racial mixtures or ‘hybridity’, which Solomon implies would necessarily create an inferior population.²⁹⁹ Solomon was one of the key advocates for the introduction of a ‘dictation test’ to potential immigrants as a means to make the proposed Immigration Restriction Act less overtly racially discriminatory and thus more palatable to the British Government. Once passed, the now infamous ‘dictation test’ enabled the Government to effectively screen immigrants to the country; coupled with additional legislation which enabled the deportation of illegal immigrants, restricted the rights of coloured aliens, and established a variety of

²⁹⁷ Edmund Barton, "House of Representatives Hansard: Immigration Restriction Bill (26 September 1901)," Parliament of Australia, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1901-09-26%2F0023%22>.

²⁹⁸ V. Solomon, "House of Representatives Hansard: Immigration Restriction Bill (26 September 1901)," Parliament of Australia, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1901-09-26%2F0023%22>.

²⁹⁹ Markus, *Race*, p. 4.

‘white labour’ restrictions, non-white settlement in Australia was effectively suppressed until after the Second World War.³⁰⁰ Many communities in Australia were negatively affected by this shift in policy, which wilfully paid no heed to the fact that many migrants and their families were, contrary to arguments about the incompatibility of ‘alien’ cultures and Australian culture, becoming embedded within this culture and this country and were already making significant contributions to the prosperity and development of the new nation.³⁰¹

Populate or perish

Between Federation and the Second World War, the legislative suite which constituted the ‘White Australia Policy’ was effective at limiting and regulating non-white immigration and settlement in Australia. However, throughout this period the notion of a ‘threat from the North’, of immigration or invasion from Asia which could swamp this far outpost of the British Empire, was a recurrent source of anxiety in the public imagination. Anxiety over this threat persisted and was recurrently reinvigorated by politicians and the media, although its expression shifted and changed with time. During the mid-twentieth century, for example, the fear of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia superseded the nineteenth century fears of a ‘demographic conquest’ by the Chinese.³⁰² Fixated by the looming spectre of the Second World War during the 1930s, former Prime Minister Billy Hughes coined the now famous phrase ‘populate or perish’ to articulate the longstanding disquiet regarding Australia’s distance from the ‘mother country’ and proximity to Asia. Following the Second World War, ‘populate or perish’ became the catchcry of an ambitious large-scale planned immigration scheme, far exceeding any earlier immigration schemes.³⁰³

Arthur Calwell, Immigration Minister from 1945 to 1949, was unabashed about his desire to retain Australia’s whiteness despite the large planned intakes, though he repeatedly insisted that the motivation behind maintaining the White Australia Policy had been to protect Australian working conditions. Nevertheless, in attempting to explain how the Policy was

³⁰⁰ For example, The Posts and Telegraphs Act 1901 required that only white labour could be employed in the carriage of mail; The Excise Tariff Act 1902 ensured that rebates for sugar cane and beet growers was on the provision that ‘white labour only has been employed’. The Sugar Bounty Act 1903 legislated that payment of a bounty to growers of sugar cane and beet would only be paid if the sugar cane and beet had been grown on land that had been cultivated by ‘white’ labour. Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 7.

³⁰¹ John Fitzgerald, *Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007); Nahid Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia': Colour or Religion?," *Immigrants and Minorities* 24, no. 2 (2006).

³⁰² Griffiths, "Racism."; Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, p. 52.

³⁰³ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 11.

based on economic rather than racial grounds, Calwell was unable to avoid utilising the language of racial essentialism:

The thoughtful Australian realises that his nation's immigration policy is not based on any arrogant claim of superiority, but simply on a recognition of racial differences; on the wise desire to avoid internecine strife and the problems of miscegenation, which such differences have caused in all countries, throughout history, where races with different characteristics have lived side by side.³⁰⁴

This is indeed distinct from the clear avowals of white racial superiority adduced by Australians politicians at the time of Federation; Sir Edmund Barton had openly proclaimed that 'there is no racial equality...the doctrine of the equality of man was never intended to apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman'.³⁰⁵ Calwell's emphasis on the *incompatibility* rather than *inequality* of different races indicated a significant shift in the contemporary discourse and expression of racism, but did not alter the fact that racial discrimination remained a pertinent feature of immigration policy.

Calwell was still an ardent champion of White Australia more than two decades later, at a time when open racism was even less accepted than during his ministry. In his 1972 biography, Calwell referred disparagingly to many Asian and African nations, asking 'Do we want or need any of these people here? I am one red-blooded Australian who says no and who speaks for 90% of Australians'.³⁰⁶ He further commented 'that no red-blooded Australian wanted to see a chocolate-coloured Australia [by] the 1980s' – and apparently in 1996 his words were still resonating with many of those 'red-blooded' Australians, for he was quoted on this topic by Pauline Hanson in her 1996 parliamentary maiden speech.³⁰⁷

Despite the passion of Calwell and doubtless many other Australians at this time for retaining the cultural and racial homogeneity of Australia (though perhaps not the 90% he claimed), British migration to Australia declined during the mid-twentieth century, creating tension between the perceived need to 'populate or perish' and the desire to maintain a 'White Australia'. The system of assisted passages had formerly excelled as 'a means of populating Australia whilst retaining its British character', and remained central to Australia's

³⁰⁴ Arthur Calwell, 'That "White Australia" Slogan. Picturesque Phrase, but Populer Misnomer' (1947), cited in David Dutton, *One of Us? A Century of Australian Citizenship* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), p. 65.

³⁰⁵ Barton, "House of Representatives Hansard: Immigration Restriction Bill (26 September 1901)".

³⁰⁶ Arthur Calwell, *Be Just and Fear Not* (Melbourne: Rigby, 1972), ch. 14.

³⁰⁷ Hanson, "Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives (1996)".

immigration schemes until 1982.³⁰⁸ However, during the post-war boom, even offering assisted passages failed to attract sufficient numbers of immigrants from ‘preferred’ regions of origin like Britain or from northern Europe. Calwell eventually selected around 170,000 Displaced Persons seeking to emigrate from Europe following the war, but these immigrants were primarily from Eastern and Southern Europe. These were ‘less desirable’ regions as people from these areas were considered to be culturally and phenotypically distinct from Australians, the British and northern Europeans, but the perceived need to recruit workers and grow the population in the post-war period was seen to outweigh the desire to maintain Australia’s homogeneity.³⁰⁹ In subsequent years, the Australian Government negotiated several intergovernmental agreements for the transportation and resettlement of further intakes of immigrants from southern Europe, and eventually from the Middle East. Accepting such migrants meant accepting heterogenisation of the Australian populace, as well as requiring the progressive dismantling of the immigration and labour laws that formed the foundations of the White Australia Policy.³¹⁰ At the same time, criticisms of the White Australia Policy as morally indefensible, and also damaging to Australia’s trade and diplomatic relations with other nations, were gaining more traction with some political and business elites and with the Australian public, contributing to a movement for gradual reform and repeal of racially discriminatory practices, legislation and institutions.³¹¹

Even as semantic and legislative changes took place which began to address the racially discriminatory components of Australian immigration policy, skin colour and other physiological characteristics can be identified into the early 1970s as the basis for refusals of migrant applicants ‘otherwise deemed assimilable, whose fellow nationals, and often close relatives were accepted’.³¹² An Immigration Officer pointed out in 1955 that although reference to racial categories such as ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ had been replaced in official usage by geographic, national or ethnic labels, such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Italian’, the policy for admission of immigrants continued to insist that:

A person who, whether by cast of feature or by colour of his skin or by mode of living, is not readily ‘assimilable’ here, should not be admitted for permanent residence. The implicit assumption is that Australians would regard a very dark-

³⁰⁸ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 17.

³⁰⁹ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 13.

³¹⁰ Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 58-59; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, pp. 13, 18.

³¹¹ Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 84-85; Markus, *Race*, pp. 16-17.

³¹² Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 60.

skinned person [e.g. many southern Europeans] as being ‘Non-European’ just as much as they would a person who has the cast of features of a negro or Chinese.³¹³

In 1958, the Revised Migration Act abolished the dictation test, and the Migration Act 1966 significantly expanded the opportunities for non-white and non-Europeans to immigrate to Australia and achieve naturalisation – in theory. In practice, government policy continued to stolidly affirm the necessity of cultural and racial homogeneity in Australia, and the decisions of the Department of Immigration continued to be based at least in part upon racial preferences. A government press release in 1972 asserted that:

The aim of immigration policy remains the preservation in Australia of an essentially homogenous society...we want one Australian people, one Australian nation. This is no racist policy based on bigotry or prejudice. On the contrary it is a policy having the valid social objective of preventing the frictions and tensions which can come from permanent enclaves and a divided nation.³¹⁴

Referring to the constant denial of racism by Australian politicians and officials, and their repeated claims that discriminatory legislation, policies and institutions were actually agents for social cohesiveness, David Dutton has observed that in effect, this meant by their definitions that ‘Australia relied on racial discrimination to avoid becoming racist’.³¹⁵ The ‘White Australia Policy’ was only completely dismantled in 1973, when the incoming Whitlam Government removed all discrimination on the basis of race from immigration policy and legislation. Some aspects of selective immigration policy were, however, retained until the late 1980s, with British nationals continuing to receive preference in immigration.

Contrary to Windschuttle’s claims that Australians defined their identity in terms of ‘civic patriotism rather than racial nationalism’, and that the White Australia Policy could therefore ‘be readily discarded during the first half of the twentieth century’, the Policy’s significance to Australian identity and its clear racial character was reaffirmed fervently right up until the final dissolution of the policy in 1973.³¹⁶ The legacy of the Policy was firstly the successful creation of the ‘most British’ society in the world outside the United Kingdom and one of the ‘whitest’ countries in the world, with the non-European population of Australia (excluding Indigenous peoples) less than 0.25 per cent of the total population by 1947.³¹⁷ Secondly, the

³¹³ A. Nutt, Acting Secretary to Minister for Immigration, 'Memorandum' (c. 1955) Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 60.

³¹⁴ William McMahon, Prime Minister, Immigration Press Release (1972), cited in Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 77.

³¹⁵ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 78.

³¹⁶ Windschuttle, "The White Australia Policy."

³¹⁷ Graeme Hugo, *A Century of Population Change in Australia* (Canberra: ABS, 2001); Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, pp. 5, 17.

Policy's legacy involved the establishment of clear precedents for the use of state instruments such as immigration legislation to pursue 'racial projects' in Australian politics and a tendency for the racist components of such policies to be denied and 'obfuscated', for example, through the avoidance of explicitly racist language in legislation and the use of objectively non-racist techniques such as the dictation test.³¹⁸ Having given an overview of the 'national history of racism' in Australia's colonial and twentieth century history, I now turn to looking at the development of efforts to reform and abolish Australia's racially discriminatory policies and institutions and to move towards the redefinition of Australian national identity as 'multicultural' as opposed to 'white'.

³¹⁸ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 8.

Chapter 5 – Towards a multicultural Australia

In this chapter, I explore the profound changes in Australian society which took place as a result of the abandonment of the ‘White Australia Policy’ and the transition to a policy of ‘multiculturalism’. I then consider the emergence of a range of ‘dissenting’ voices in Australian public discourse, who questioned the bi-partisan political consensus on multiculturalism. I focus in particular on the re-emergence of ‘race’ as a significant feature of political debates in Australia, albeit with the discourse being framed through the lens of ‘new racism’ or ‘culturalism’ as opposed to ‘old racism’ based upon biological differences between different groups of people. I close the chapter with a consideration of how the Coalition Government under John Howard’s leadership adopted the rhetoric and policies of more marginal political voices such as Pauline Hanson and began to extract political capital from the deployment of wedge tactics based on race.

The heterogenisation of Australian society

The effects of abolishing the White Australia Policy were initially muted. Discriminatory administrative practices persisted within the Department of Immigration and growing unemployment and economic depression during the early to mid 1970s led to drastic cuts in overall immigration levels. The real impact of the Policy’s demise did not hit until the late 1970s, when the Department of Immigration had been rebuilt from scratch and immigration intake rose again, featuring a much more diverse cross-section of migrants.³¹⁹ This was to be a period of massive transformation of the nation’s demographics. At Federation the percentage of overseas born had been 22.6%. This dropped to around 15% for the next seventy years as a result of Australia’s restrictive immigration practices, but from 1971 until 2006, the proportion of overseas born in Australia was on average 21%.³²⁰ As well as returning to pre-Federation proportions of the population, the composition of the overseas-born changed dramatically from the 1970s onwards.

³¹⁹ Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 81-82; Markus, *Race*, p. 24.

³²⁰ As of the 2011 census this figure has climbed above a quarter of the population, with the overseas born constituting 26% of the population. Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Cultural Diversity in Australia: Reflecting a Nation," in *Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 Census* (Canberra: ABS, 2012); Janet Phillips, Michael Klapdor, and Joanne Simon-Davies, *Migration to Australia since Federation: A Guide to the Statistics* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010), pp. 22-24.

The overall patterns of immigration to Australia since 1971 have been declining annual intakes and overall proportion of migrants from Britain and Europe, and increases in the number of migrants from areas formerly proscribed by the White Australia Policy. For example, in the early 1970s, the British-born constituted 40% of all overseas-born and still accounted for almost half of all incoming migrants; during 1975-1985, the British-born component of the overseas population had dropped to 35% and constituted just a quarter of incoming migrants. By 2001, the proportion of the overseas born who were British in origin had declined to 25% and the number of British-born migrants had dropped to almost 10%.³²¹ British and European immigration together accounted for 85% of the overseas born population in 1971, and non-European immigration just 15%; by 2001, the non-European component of the overseas-born had reached 49%.³²²

The increase in the non-European migrant intake was characterised particularly by increases in the number of people arriving from Asia and the Middle East. In 1971, the top ten countries of origin of the overseas born were in Europe, with the exception of New Zealand; in 1981, Lebanon became the first non-European country to enter the top ten in nearly fifty years, and by 1991, Vietnam, China and The Philippines were represented among the top ten.³²³ Immigration from Asia increased particularly rapidly; from constituting just 0.8% of the total population of Australia in 1971, the Asian-born proportion of the population had reached 5.3% by 1999.³²⁴ One of the most significant factors in the rapid rise in non-European migration was not just the abolition of the White Australia Policy, but also the subsequent creation of a specific and uniform policy addressing the needs of refugees and asylum seekers. The Humanitarian Program, devised in response to the large numbers of people seeking asylum in the wake of the Vietnam War, commenced in 1977 and at its peak in the early 1980s was resettling 20,000 refugees per year, mostly from South-East Asia.³²⁵

Concurrent with the Whitlam Government's removal of all overtly racial discrimination from immigration policy, legislation and institutions, was the introduction of an official policy of

³²¹ 2001 was the first point in the history of the Australian nation that the largest single group of immigrants to Australia was not British; they were edged out by New Zealand. Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, *Immigration: Federation to Century's End 1901-2000* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), pp. 26-27; Phillips, Klapdor, and Simon-Davies, *Migration to Australia since Federation*, pp. 23-24.

³²² Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Overseas Born Population* (Canberra: ABS, 2010); James Jupp, *Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Australia* (Canberra: ABS, 1995).

³²³ Phillips, Klapdor, and Simon-Davies, *Migration to Australia since Federation*, p. 24.

³²⁴ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Overseas Born Population*; Jupp, *Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Australia*.

³²⁵ Prior to this, Australia's settlement of refugees had been purely on a discretionary, ad hoc basis in response to international crises. Phillips, Klapdor, and Simon-Davies, *Migration to Australia since Federation*, p. 4-5.

multiculturalism. During the 1950s and 1960s, the progressive relaxation of racially discriminatory legislation which had previously excluded non-white, non-European, and non-British people from either entry to Australia or full participation in social and civic life was counterbalanced by emphasising the need for ‘outsider’ groups to conform to the dominant monoculture of ‘White Australia’ and relinquish any characteristics, languages or cultural practices which differentiated them from this norm. The move to a culturally pluralistic vision for the nation was therefore a significant shift; one that was to have substantial impacts upon Indigenous peoples as well as migrants. In parallel with post-war developments in immigration policy, racially discriminatory legislation towards Indigenous people had been successively repealed through the 1950s and 1960s, yet assimilation into ‘white’ Australia remained the official government policy and little scope was permitted for the maintenance of Indigenous cultures or languages.³²⁶

Under the policy of assimilation, both migrants and Indigenous peoples had been subjected to ‘unrealistic, unjust and unnecessary expectations for the disappearance of their culture’.³²⁷ By the late 1960s, however, some concessions were already beginning to be made. Bi-lateral diplomatic agreements came to include concessions to cultural maintenance in order to attract desirable immigrants; under the pressure of the car manufacturing industry, for example, the Australian government began to accept large numbers of Turkish workers, and in 1967 committed to an agreement with the Turkish government that the children of Turkish migrants would receive Turkish language education and that employers would be advised of the need to respect Muslim religious holidays.³²⁸ On the whole however, maintenance of Indigenous and immigrant cultures and languages was not encouraged or supported by official government policy, and in many cases was officially discouraged.³²⁹

The shift to an official policy of multiculturalism, and concurrent moves towards a limited endorsement of Indigenous self-determination and land rights were therefore significant developments which served to augment immigration reforms in their effect upon the expansion of Australia’s demographic and cultural diversity. The Whitlam Government’s policy of multiculturalism was championed by its high-profile Minister for Immigration, Al Grassby, but the policy’s implementation was stymied in 1974 when Grassby lost his seat,

³²⁶ Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, *The 1967 Referendum: Race, Power and the Australian Constitution*, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2007), ch. 1; Markus, *Race*, pp. 19-20.

³²⁷ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 151.

³²⁸ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 18; Markus, *Race*, p. 17-18.

³²⁹ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, pp. 21-23; Markus, *Race*, pp. 14-17.

partially as a result of racist campaigning against him and his policies. The resultant hiatus in the implementation of the policy of multiculturalism was compounded by the dismissal of the Whitlam Government the following year.³³⁰ Nevertheless, the political climate had changed significantly enough during these years that the incoming Liberal Government of Malcolm Fraser maintained the policy of multiculturalism and the disavowal of the White Australia Policy; the creation of the Humanitarian Program by the Fraser Government is highly emblematic of this shift.

The Galbally Report on multiculturalism, commissioned by the Whitlam Government, was finalised in 1978, and its recommendations were adopted in full by the Fraser government. This report concluded that:

Migrants have the right to maintain their cultural and racial identity and...it is clearly in the best interests of our nation that they should be encouraged and assisted to do so if they wish. Provided that ethnic identity is not stressed at the expense of society at large, but is interwoven into the fabric of our nationhood by the process of multicultural interaction, then the community as a whole will benefit substantially and its democratic nature will be reinforced.³³¹

Among a raft of policies to facilitate the shift to a ‘multi-cultural society’, support and services for newly-arrived migrants were expanded, English language courses were improved, cultural and linguistic maintenance were funded, and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) began to broadcast non-English language programs on radio and television.³³²

Not only, therefore, had Australia’s demographics altered substantially in an exceptionally short period of time, but the divergent languages, cultures and physical appearance of these ‘new Australians’ were more visible. These new arrivals were less subject to forcible submergence into the dominant Anglo-Australian culture in the way that earlier migrants had been under the policy of assimilation; instead, cultural differences were being positively recognised and in some cases actively promoted. The data coded in the Australian census gives some indication of the extent of this cultural shift:

The 1966 Census did not have a question on language spoken at home; in the 2001 Census, it was possible to code up to 238 different languages. In 1966, 20 religious categories, 15 of which were Christian denominations, were specified in census

³³⁰ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 41.

³³¹ Galbally Report (1978), cited in Markus, *Race*, p. 26-7.

³³² Markus, *Race*, p. 27.

publications, with Hebrew (*sic*) the only specified non-Christian religion. In the 2001 Census there was provision to list 123 religions and religious denominations.³³³

In an effort ‘to adapt Australian national identity to the effects of a diverse migration program and to adapt social policy to a diverse society’, the Labour governments of Hawke and Keating, which followed the Fraser Government, continued to further develop and promote the policy of multiculturalism.³³⁴ Although Keating was less fervent about multiculturalism and the Humanitarian Program than his predecessors, he was passionate about furthering the Indigenous rights and reconciliation agenda, and became known for his insistence on the need for Australia to embrace a new national identity predicated upon a deep political, economic and cultural engagement with Asia.³³⁵

Dissenting voices

Despite the support of successive governments for this new vision for Australian society, ‘periodic controversies provoked by prominent dissenters to official policy disturbed Australia’s new self-conscious image during the 1980s and 1990s by revealing discontent with the principles and workings of multiculturalism’.³³⁶ Some commentators pointed out the problematic limitations of the policy of multiculturalism as it was conceived of and implemented in Australia, and argued that the policy did not go far enough towards supporting true cultural plurality and equality in Australia; some of these views shall be considered in more detail in the next chapter. The more prominent and ultimately influential voices of dissent, however, argued that multiculturalism had gone too far in undermining the privileged position of the Anglo-Australian heritage and culture. The emergence of such dissenters, who claimed to represent ‘mainstream’ or ‘ordinary Australians’, was exacerbated by the wide coverage of their ideas in the ‘national news media, [which] thriving on conflict, provided the conduits for these exchanges’.³³⁷ The most prominent of these critics of multiculturalism was Pauline Hanson, who was initially elected to Federal Parliament as an Independent in 1996, but subsequently founded her own political party, One Nation.

³³³ Siew-Ean Khoo, "A Greater Diversity of Origins," in *The Transformation of Australia's Population 1970-2030*, eds. Siew-Ean Khoo and Peter McDonald (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2003), p. 168.

³³⁴ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 152; Markus, *Race*, p. 27.

³³⁵ Markus, *Race*, pp. 37-9.

³³⁶ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 154-5.

³³⁷ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 88.

In her infamous maiden speech, Hanson criticised the high rate of Asian immigration, because they ‘have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate’; expressed her outrage at the ‘privileges Aboriginals enjoy over other Australians’; and attacked both the policy of multiculturalism and its supposed impacts upon ‘ordinary Australians’:

We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to mainstream Australians by those who promote political correctness and those who control the various taxpayer funded ‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups...abolishing the policy of multiculturalism will save billions of dollars and allow those from ethnic backgrounds to join mainstream Australia, paving the way to a strong, united country.³³⁸

The use of the word ‘mainstream’ to denote the supposed ‘core’ Australian culture is significant; this term began to be utilised as a synonym for ‘core’, ‘authentic’, ‘old’, or ‘white’ Australian culture in conservative populist politics during the early 1990s, and had been a central component of John Howard’s denigration of the Labor government’s supposed privileging of minority groups and ‘special interests’ over ‘mainstream Australia’.³³⁹

When Australia’s historical record of racial discrimination is considered, it rapidly becomes apparent that the ideas of Hanson and other opponents of Australia’s new direction were not really that new. David Dutton points out that such arguments can generally be reduced to two variants. The first argument was that admitting people who were ‘different’ from ‘Australians’ was harmful to social cohesion and encouraged the formation of unassimilated ‘ghettoes’; the second argument held that Australian identity was diminished by the mixing of different racial/ethnic/cultural influences, and supposed privileging of minority groups over the ‘mainstream’. Both arguments essentially reiterate earlier arguments that had been used to justify racially discriminatory and assimilationist policies, legislation and institutions, which were based on an assumption that ‘national culture and identity was unitary and provided the basis of social cohesion and allegiance’. What distinguishes the arguments of Hanson and her ilk from earlier opponents of non-white immigration is that they are founded on a discourse in which explicit reference to *race* has largely been replaced by reference to

³³⁸ Hanson, "Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives (1996)".

³³⁹ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 155.

culture: meaning a particular ‘notion of culture in which difference was largely fixed and immutable’ and therefore in many ways analogous to ‘old-fashioned’ conceptions of race.³⁴⁰

Voting for Hanson’s resurgent One Nation remained a minority pursuit, and the party’s momentum at the ballot box, in Australia’s Alternative Vote electoral system, soon fizzled out. But its influence was more enduring. Lynch draws attention to similarities with the rhetoric adopted by Prime Minister John Howard, to turn the subsequent Federal Election, in 2001, in favour of his ruling Liberal-National Coalition:

The government rushed a new Border Protection Bill through parliament, and Howard made an election address, which promised, ‘We will decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances in which they come’. It carried an echo—no doubt unconscious—of Hanson’s maiden speech in the House, five years earlier: ‘If I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country’.³⁴¹

Other effects were transmitted less directly, but proved arguably no less influential, on Australia’s political culture. In particular, the subtle endorsement of Hanson’s rhetoric by the Prime Minister had a considerable impact upon the re-legitimisation of racism in Australian public discourse.

Based upon social psychological research, Terry et al. have argued that the wide publicisation of the views of Hanson and other One Nation members in the media, and the lack of explicit identification and condemnation of the racist implications of their views by leading public figures such as the Prime Minister, ‘generated a change in people’s perceptions of the wider community norms relating to multiculturalism and racial tolerance’. As discussed in Chapter 1, members of an ingroup become ‘more likely to behaviourally express ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes if such attitudes are normative for a self-inclusive and contextually salient or important ingroup’ and in particular, if there is a perceived threat to the group.³⁴² That is, for people who self-identified as part of Hanson’s ‘mainstream’ ingroup, and saw that social identity as both salient and under threat, Hanson’s ability to publicly articulate views which were largely excluded from the public domain between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s served to convince people of the appropriateness and social acceptability of such views and reinforce those attitudes. It can be further argued that ‘by legitimising ethnocentric

³⁴⁰ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 153.

³⁴¹ Jake Lynch, *A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 57.

³⁴² Terry, Hogg, and Blackwood, "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour," p. 148.

attitudes through a change in the broader normative climate, a critical condition for the translation of prejudiced attitudes into discriminatory actions was met'.³⁴³

If Hanson's impact on Australian politics and public discourse was played out through the repositioning of the Coalition government, then her rise to prominence must be understood as a phenomenon of the distinctive political conjuncture to which the Right under Howard gained ascendancy. It seems unlikely that either her victory in the seat of Oxley and her meteoric rise to notoriety could have occurred at any other point during the previous quarter century. As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Hanson's surprising victory in a formerly safe Labor seat took place against a background of profound economic and social upheaval in Australia.

Entering this period of change, there had been broad bipartisan support for ending racial discrimination in Australian policies, legislation, and institutions; for some level of Indigenous self-determination and land rights; and for the policy of multiculturalism. There was also bipartisan support for some degree of economic liberalism, which was reflected in the comprehensive restructuring of the Australian economy during the 1980s. Over almost a quarter of century, the leaders of three successive governments and all but one of the Opposition Leaders (John Howard) were committed to the transformation of Australian society implicit in the adoption of these policies. As their consequences unfolded, however, in the working lives of lower and middle-class white Australians, they brought a backlash against sustained and profound changes to the Australian economy and society – which saw Hanson join the House of Representatives, as well as the replacement of Keating's Labor Government by Howard's Coalition Government.³⁴⁴

The rise of John Howard

John Winston Howard had been in parliament for twenty-two years at the time that he was elected Prime Minister, and had formerly been Opposition Leader for four years during the late 1980s. Howard championed a variety of radical neo-liberal economic reforms during his time in Opposition and in Government, yet was staunchly conservative on social issues. During his time as Leader of the Opposition, Howard lost the 1987 Federal election by

³⁴³ Terry, Hogg, and Blackwood, "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour," p. 140.

³⁴⁴ Robert Manne, *Making Trouble: Essays against the New Australian Complacency* (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2011), pp. 65-66; Markus, *Race*, pp. 222-3; Guy Rundle, "The Rise of the Right," in *Do Not Disturb: Is the Media Failing Australia?*, ed. Robert Manne (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2005), pp. 30-33.

campaigning heavily on taxation issues. The difficulty of selling free market economics to a public already anxious about the rate and extent of social and economic change in their country led Howard to shift focus, instead promoting an agenda of social conservatism and family values as a means of differentiating his party from the incumbent Labor Government.³⁴⁵ His first attempt to utilise the politics of race for political currency was markedly unsuccessful. In early 1988, Howard began to articulate his vision for ‘One Australia’, a campaign characterised by increasingly strident criticism of multiculturalism, the Indigenous rights and reconciliation movement, and immigration policy, which edged towards explicit acknowledgement that Howard favoured cuts in Asian immigration. The media’s reception was unfavourable, and existing tensions and dissatisfaction with Howard’s leadership were exacerbated by discord over the abandonment of bipartisanship on issues pertaining to race. Support for Howard’s leadership rapidly unravelled, leading to his ousting as Opposition Leader within the year.³⁴⁶

In 1993, the Liberal Opposition once again tried and failed to win an election by campaigning on an explicit platform of radical neoliberal economic reform. By 1995, Howard was reinstated as Opposition Leader. In the lead up to the 1996 election, Howard campaigned under the slogan ‘For All of Us’, and took a soft approach both to racialised issues such as immigration and to issues of economic reform, avoiding clear formulations of policy and election commitments as much as possible and making general statements about his party’s approach to issues rather than detailing specific policies.³⁴⁷ Learning from the lessons of 1988, Howard used much more ‘cautious, coded and ambiguous language to articulate his point of view’.³⁴⁸ His rhetoric was strongly coloured by its emphasis on the need to jettison ‘political correctness’ and refocus attention upon the struggles of ‘mainstream’ Australians:

There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant regard for the national interest...many Australians in the mainstream feel utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who seem to have the ear completely of the government on major issues.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ Griffiths, "Racism," p. 169; Markus, *Race*, pp. 82-86.

³⁴⁶ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, pp. 110-11; Markus, *Race*, p. 90.

³⁴⁷ Errington and van Onselen, *John Winston Howard: The Definitive Biography*, pp. 192-93; Markus, *Race*, pp. 94-95.

³⁴⁸ Ien Ang and John Stratton, "Multiculturalism in Crisis: The New Politics of Race and National Identity in Australia," *Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies* 2(1998): pp. 35-36.

³⁴⁹ John Howard, "The Role of Government (1995 Headland Speech)," AustralianPolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/1995/06/06/john-howard-headland-speech-role-of-govt.html>.

As noted above, these were important ideas picked up by Hanson in her maiden speech, yet they had not been originated by Hanson or Howard, but instead were prominent features of conservative discourses which had developed over the past decade. The promoters of this ‘new right’ or ‘neoconservative’ rhetoric included academics such as Geoffrey Blainey and Keith Windschuttle; industry leaders such as Hugh Morgan; think tanks such as the Centre for Independent Studies, the Institute of Public Affairs, and the Australian Institute for Public Policy; and conservative media figures, such as Frank Devine and Alan Jones.³⁵⁰

As Guy Rundle has argued, ‘the forces that were transforming the lives of the mass of people living in suburban and regional Australia were those of neo-liberal globalisation’, but to divert attention from those who promoted and benefited from these developments it was necessary to identify ‘threats’ and scapegoats, both within and without Australia.³⁵¹ This process was heavily promoted by proprietors of the mainstream media in Australia, both through the direct financial support of think tanks and through the promotion of the ideas of such think tanks and prominent public figures within their media outlets. The principal target of such attacks were the ‘liberal elites’ (also referred to as the ‘new class’, ‘cultural producers’, ‘chattering classes’, ‘vested interests’, ‘chardonnay socialists’ and ‘latte liberals’) who supposedly wielded vast, unmerited social power, and increasingly, those who were presumed to have benefited from the liberal elite’s manipulation of society at the expense of the ‘mainstream’ – that is, groups of people who had been marginalised and excluded from mainstream society until the sweeping social changes of the 1960s and 70s.

In stigmatising such marginalised groups – in 1990s Australia, principally Indigenous peoples and migrants of Asian or other non-European origin – commentators and politicians turned increasingly to arguments based upon ‘new racism’ or cultural essentialism and upon ‘coded’ and ‘ambiguous’ language, as noted above in reference to Howard’s discursive shift between the late 1980s and his rise to government in 1996. The need to negotiate between conforming to ‘the standards commonly observed in public discourse’, that is, to avoid being perceived as racist, yet to appeal to ‘mainstream’ Australians, resulted in a marked increase of the employment of ‘new racist’ logic in Australian politics.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, ch. 6; Markus, *Race*, ch. 3; Rundle, "The Rise of the Right."

³⁵¹ Rundle, "The Rise of the Right," p. 40.

³⁵² Josh Fear, *Under the Radar: Dog-Whistle Politics in Australia* (Canberra: The Australia Institute, 2007), pp. 22-23.

The *New Racism* wants to be democratic and respectable, and hence first off denies that it is racism. Real Racism, in this framework of thought, exists only among the Extreme Right. In the New Racism, minorities are not biologically inferior, but different. They have a different culture, although in many respects there are ‘deficiencies’.³⁵³

Framed in this way, the label of ‘racism’ could only be applied to acts of direct physical violence. As a discursive strategy, the denial of racism was therefore to become a prominent feature of the rise of discrimination and prejudice based on culturalism rather than biological difference, as observed by van Dijk in 1992.³⁵⁴ Van Dijk emphasised that in such a context, accusations of racism were increasingly being characterised as attempts to ‘impose taboos, prevent free speech and a “true” and “honest” assessment of the ethnic situation’.³⁵⁵

John Howard’s response to the rise of Hansonism can be seen to have conformed in textbook fashion to van Dijk’s conclusions, even though van Dijk’s research was based in Europe, not Australia, underscoring the global reach of the discourse of ‘new racism’. Pauline Hanson had initially stood for election in Oxley as a Liberal Party candidate, but was dumped for her unacceptably racist comments; yet following her maiden speech in Parliament, which featured similarly racist elements, neither the Liberal Party nor the Prime Minister denounced her views. Instead, speaking at a Queensland Liberal Party convention, Howard announced that he ‘welcome[d] the fact that people can now talk about certain things without living in fear of being branded as a bigot or as a racist’.³⁵⁶ When Howard was called upon in parliament by the Opposition Leader Kim Beazley to affirm that Hanson’s views were racist and were damaging to social cohesion, Howard framed his response by emphasising that ‘I will always denounce racial intolerance...I will always defend the non-discriminatory character of Australia’s immigration policy’; and rather than directly responding to Beazley’s question, stated that ‘people are entitled to attack the present immigration levels without being branded as bigots or racists...if someone disagrees with the prevailing orthodoxy of the day, that person should not be denigrated as a narrow-minded bigot. That is basically what has been happening in this country over a very long period of time’.³⁵⁷

³⁵³ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 87.

³⁵⁴ Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse and the Denial of Racism," *Discourse & Society* 3, no. 1 (1992).

³⁵⁵ van Dijk, "Discourse and the Denial of Racism," p. 90.

³⁵⁶ John Howard, Speech to Queensland Liberal Party Convention (22 September 1996), cited in Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, *Race for the Headlines*.

³⁵⁷ John Howard, "House of Representatives Hansard (8 October 1996)," Parliament of Australia, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1996-10-08%2F0006;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1996-10-08%2F0000%22>.

By this strategy, Howard shifted the terms of reference of the debate to free speech rather than racism, and exonerated not only himself, but also implicitly Hanson, of being racist. This semantic/labelling approach ‘avoids consideration of essential elements at the heart of the racial value system, including emphasis on the “one truth”, “instinctive” and “innate” human characteristics, a wilful blindness to other cultures and intolerance of diversity’.³⁵⁸ Similar to earlier attempts to naturalise and legitimate racism on the basis of ‘natural laws’, culturalism or new racism was justified on the basis of ‘natural’ and immutable human characteristics, or ‘the genuine feelings of the common man’: ‘it is only natural, in this view, to be xenophobic, protective of your way of life, of your job, your family’.³⁵⁹

In such a context, ‘coded and other forms of indirect denigration take the place of overt racial references’.³⁶⁰ Howard had won the 1996 election under the slogan of ‘For All of Us’. However, as Mungo MacCallum has argued, during the Howard years, ‘For All of Us’ came to mean ‘not the rest of you’.³⁶¹ ‘All of us’ can be made to deliberately exclude many groups or segments of society, including Indigenous peoples or migrants: ‘such messages were designed to foment anxiety about racial and cultural difference, but they were couched in the language of “unity” and “inclusion”’, leading commentators to accuse the Howard government of ‘dog-whistling’.³⁶² Josh Fear writes that ‘practitioners of dog-whistle politics often attempt to legitimise feelings of persecution among their target audience’, thus playing upon the basic psychological foundations of outgroup construction and discrimination highlighted in Chapter 2.³⁶³ By the turn of the millennium, ‘the most influential voters in Australia were those who most resented the economic revolution of the 1980s and 1990s and lived on the margins of the nation’s new prosperity...[Howard] was deaf to them on economic issues, but honoured their outlook everywhere else he could’.³⁶⁴

Howard saw his mission as prime minister not to guide the Australian public in adapting to the exigencies of globalism, including increased diversity in the population, but to disavow the transformations of Australian society that had been created by the bipartisan accord during the Fraser and Hawke-Keating governments, and to hark back to the supposed ‘golden age’ of the Menzies era. Menzies’ long tenure as Prime Minister had ended in 1966, and it is

³⁵⁸ Markus, *Race*, p. 9.

³⁵⁹ Fear, *Under the Radar*, p. 25.

³⁶⁰ Markus, *Race*, p. 8.

³⁶¹ Fear, *Under the Radar*, pp. 22-23.

³⁶² Cited in Fear, *Under the Radar*, p. 24.

³⁶³ Cited in Fear, *Under the Radar*, p. 24; See also Manning, *Dog Whistle Politics*.

³⁶⁴ David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, *Dark Victory* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), p. 175.

worth quoting Howard's seminal Menzies Lecture from 1996 at length, since his position vis-à-vis these societal transformations is so clearly expressed in this speech:

I have spoken tonight of the need to guard against the re-writing of Australian political history and, in particular, to ensure that the contribution of Robert Menzies and the Liberal tradition are accorded their proper place in it. There is, of course, a related and broader challenge involved. And that is to ensure that our history as a nation is not written definitively by those who take the view that Australians should apologise for most of it. This 'black arm band' view of our past reflects a belief that most Australian history since 1788 has been little more than a disgraceful story of imperialism, exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination. I take a very different view. I believe that the balance sheet of our history is one of heroic achievement and that we have achieved much more as a nation of which we can be proud than of which we should be ashamed.³⁶⁵

Prominent in this quote is Howard's utilisation of the phrase 'black armband view of history', which had first been coined by conservative historian and culture warrior Geoffrey Blainey in 1993. Howard was openly promoting this argument of Blainey's within months, though it was not to receive widespread attention and notoriety until Howard was in power and used Blainey's phrase in the 1996 speech quoted above.³⁶⁶

It can be seen therefore that Howard systematically and carefully cultivated a culture which denied racism and injustice in both contemporary Australia and in Australia's past. By pursuing and promoting this 'culture wars' agenda, Howard created a context in which many of the social reforms of the post-Menzies era could effectively be rolled back.³⁶⁷ As van Dijk has argued,

When the dominant consensus is that there is no racism, minority groups and their protests or other forms of resistance have a very hard time to be taken seriously...the white consensus that denies the prevalence of racism thus is a very powerful element in its reproduction, especially since successful resistance requires public attention, media coverage and at least partial acknowledgement of grievances. If leading politicians and the media refuse to acknowledge that there is a serious problem, there

³⁶⁵ John Howard, "The Liberal Tradition: Sir Robert Menzies Lecture (1996)," Menzies Lecture Trust, <http://menzieslecture.org/1996.html>.

³⁶⁶ Markus, *Race*, p. 93.

³⁶⁷ Of course, this culture war agenda also included attacks on fronts other than race, as suggested in the quote from Howard's Menzies Lecture, but this chapter focuses on the issues of race as being most pertinent to this thesis and also the most prominent of the culture war fronts in Australia. For a fuller discussion of the culture wars, see Jim George and Kim Huynh, *The Culture Wars: Australian and American Politics in the 21st Century* (South Yarra: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

will be no public debate, no change of public opinion and hence no change in the system of power relations.³⁶⁸

After taking office, therefore, Howard was able to move swiftly to institute sweeping changes in the areas of multiculturalism, immigration policy and Indigenous rights and reconciliation. Overall immigration intake was significantly reduced, from 97,000 in 1995/6 to 79,000 in 1997/1998, and the emphasis of the immigration program was shifted markedly from family reunion to skilled workers.³⁶⁹ Support for migrant settlement and rights to benefits were cut drastically; the policy of multiculturalism was deemphasised and the Office of Multicultural Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research were abolished. In Indigenous affairs, budgets of Indigenous government departments and programs were slashed; the need for an apology to the Stolen Generations was dismissed; and the Native Title Amendment Bill was bulled through Parliament, which all but ruled out hopes of further land rights advances.³⁷⁰

In 1998, when Howard appeared on the radio show of conservative ‘shock jock’ Stan Zemanek, he was to refer to many of these specific developments as reasons why One Nation voters should give their second preferences to the Coalition at the impending Queensland state election.³⁷¹ Howard did not denounce Hanson, because her message was consistent with his own, yet ‘the extreme statements of Hanson – and her popularity – served to maximise damage to their common opponents, without the need for the prime minister himself to adopt an overtly extremist stance’.³⁷² Indeed, her rearticulation of many of the themes and much of the terminology which Howard and other conservative elites had been promulgating confirms the findings of van Dijk that ‘many of the more ‘subtle’, ‘modern’, ‘everyday’ or ‘new’ forms of cultural racism, or ethnicism...are taken from elite discourse’ and that ‘elites in many respects ‘preformulate’ the kind of ethnic beliefs of which, sometimes more blatant versions may then get popular currency’.³⁷³

Marr and Wilkinson have observed that Howard ‘came to office playing on his country’s fear of difference and change, yet when he reached the top he proved the most radical leader his

³⁶⁸ van Dijk, "Discourse and the Denial of Racism," p. 96.

³⁶⁹ Markus, *Race*, p. 40.

³⁷⁰ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 153; Markus, *Race*, pp. 40-44.

³⁷¹ Cited in Markus, *Race*, p. 105.

³⁷² Markus, *Race*, p. 104.

³⁷³ van Dijk, "Discourse and the Denial of Racism," p. 88.

party had known for half a century'.³⁷⁴ At the same time, therefore, that the Howard Government was attempting radical roll backs of the social changes of the prior quarter century, it was also implementing a range of neoliberal economic policies including major industrial relations reforms, privatisation of Telstra and the Commonwealth Employment Service and downsizing of the public service. Then came the shock announcement that despite promises to the contrary during the 1996 election campaign, Howard planned to introduce a Goods and Services Tax (GST) after the 1998 election. Dogged by ministerial scandals and popular disgruntlement at the unforeseen and unpopular economic reforms, Howard barely managed to retain office in the 1998 election. Labor actually garnered more of the primary vote and two-party preferred vote, but the Coalition managed to cling to power through its knack of bringing off narrow victories in marginal seats, albeit with a greatly reduced majority. Howard's failure to delegitimise Pauline Hanson was a factor in the Coalition's precarious retention of power, because although Hanson herself failed to win a seat in Parliament and her party did not perform as well as had been expected, they still won a million votes and significantly split the vote for the Coalition's junior partner, the National Party. As the GST was rolled out, dissatisfaction with the government rose and polling indicated the Howard government would lose office. Howard had achieved a great deal towards realising his vision for Australia, yet by mid-2001 he looked set to lose Government to the resurgent Labor party.³⁷⁵

The threat from the north

The other emergent crisis impacting on the Howard government was the sharp increase in refugee arrivals by boat from Indonesia from late 1999. Although this issue was initially a sore point for the government, time and chance converged to provide deliverance to the Howard Government with the arrival of the *Tampa* in Australian waters in August 2001. Even prior to the rise of the 'new racism' and xenophobic nationalism which was coming to characterise the Howard era, the arrival of boatloads of people from Asia was capable of triggering extremely negative reactions from an Australian public nurtured on the myth of the 'threat from the north'. The arrival of comparatively small numbers of 'boatpeople' in the late 1970s and the early 1990s had created disproportionately extreme reactions; the arrival of

³⁷⁴ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 50.

³⁷⁵ AustralianPolitics.com, "1998 Election," AustralianPolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/elections/1998/>.

some 10,000 asylum seekers by boat in two years sparked a national furore. The flow of asylum seekers in the late 1970s was largely stemmed by the Fraser Government's reluctant acceptance of large numbers of South East Asia refugees directly from camps; the Keating government quietly offered amnesty to many Cambodian 'boat people', permitting them to remain in the country, but also took steps to deter any further asylum seekers by making detention mandatory for all people who arrived without visas after 1991. Lengthy detentions and high rates of repatriation of asylum seekers who arrived by boat, combined with changing political circumstances in South East Asia, meant that numbers of arrivals by boat dropped in Keating's second term and remained low during the first term of the Howard government.³⁷⁶

Mandatory detention remained in force under the Howard government but was clearly failing to act as a deterrent; the government therefore attempted to slow the influx of asylum seekers by introducing a policy whereby even if found to be genuine refugees, 'boatpeople' would only be eligible for a three-year 'Temporary Protection Visa' (TPV). The TPV granted some access to medical and welfare services but denied visa holders access to settlement services, family reunion applications and travel rights.³⁷⁷ The introduction of TPVs did not, however, slow down asylum seekers arriving by boat; instead, it had the inadvertent consequence of dramatically increasing the proportion of women and children arriving by boat and entering mandatory detention, as individuals who had received TPVs could neither return to their families nor bring their families to them via the family reunion program.³⁷⁸

Emblematic of the Howard Government's ambitions to recapture the votes lost to One Nation is their implementation of policies initially suggested by Hanson's party. Temporary refugee visas had been a One Nation policy proposal at the 1998 Federal Election: One Nation advocated that the current humanitarian program should be replaced with a 'programme of temporary refuge for those who meet the UNHCR definition of a refugee, with repatriation

³⁷⁶ Katharine Betts, "Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia," *People and Place* 9, no. 4 (2001): pp. 34-37; Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, pp. 187-89; Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, *Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2013), pp. 6-7, 22.

³⁷⁷ For an insightful discussion of how the TPV was modelled upon the Howard Government's 'Safe Haven' program for temporary resettlement of Kosovar and East Timorese refugees, see Robert Carr, "The Safe Haven Visa Policy: A Compassionate Intervention with Cruel Intentions," *Australian Policy and History* October(2012).

³⁷⁸ Phillips and Spinks, *Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976*, p. 19.

when the situation resolves'.³⁷⁹ Ironically, although the Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock had lambasted the policy at the time it was proposed, when the Coalition implemented TPVs as a policy they actually made them more draconian than One Nation had proposed. One Nation's position on accepting refugees was that for those limited number of refugees who were accepted, it was a given that 'we must grant their wife or husband and dependent children residency also'.³⁸⁰ The Howard Government's dual policies of mandatory detention and temporary protection visas meant that between 1999 and 2003, thousands of refugees remained separated from their immediate family for many years and over 2000 children were held in Australian detention centres, with the average length of time spent by children in detention exceeding eighteen months.³⁸¹

Most asylum seekers arriving during this period were sent not to the longstanding urban detention centres, but to newer, remote detention camps such as Port Hedland in Western Australia or Woomera in the South Australian desert, where communication with relatives, other refugees, and advocacy organisations was limited and access to legal and other services was more difficult, considerably slowing down visa processing. In addition, the management of detention centres had been privatised by the Howard Government in 1997, and they were administered by a private US prison corporation, thus reducing public access and accountability.³⁸² As a result, although the vast majority of asylum seekers were found to be 'genuine' refugees and received either permanent or temporary visas, and 90% of those who received TPVs eventually received permanent Australian visas, many were detained for months and sometimes years in poorly administered and drastically overcrowded detention centres.³⁸³ From the middle of 2000, breakouts, rioting and hunger strikes became widespread in the camps, and incidence of self-harm and mental illness rose alarmingly.³⁸⁴

Given Howard's stance on tougher immigration policy, the bleeding of Coalition voters away to One Nation, and the intense public and media scrutiny of all matters pertaining to

³⁷⁹ Pauline Hanson's One Nation, Policy Document (1998), cited in Fethi Mansouri and Michael Leach, "The Evolution of the Temporary Protection Visa Regime in Australia," *International Migration* 47, no. 2 (2008): p. 103.

³⁸⁰ Mansouri and Leach, "Temporary Protection Visas," p. 105.

³⁸¹ Australian Human Rights Commission, *Nation Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention* (Sydney: AHRC, 2004).

³⁸² Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 189.

³⁸³ Brendan O'Connor, *Liberals Bereft of Immigration Policy (Ministerial Press Release)* (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2009); Janet Phillips, *Asylum Seekers and Refugees: What Are the Facts?* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2011).

³⁸⁴ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 198; Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, pp. 44-47.

‘boatpeople’, the government was unlikely to succeed in the type of sleight of hand that Fraser and Keating had resorted to in order to ‘stop the boats’. The Indonesian government was assisting the Australian Federal Police in people smuggling disruption schemes of limited effectiveness, but adamantly resisted Australian government pressure to intern asylum seekers in Indonesia.³⁸⁵ Increasingly harsh treatment of asylum seekers was failing to deter arrivals, and Pauline Hanson was getting media attention all over the country for her strident calls to use force to physically turn boats back to Indonesia.³⁸⁶

On August 23, the *Palapa* left Indonesia carrying 438 asylum seekers, only to become stranded the following day in international waters north of Christmas Island, one of a handful of far-flung reefs and islands in the Indian Ocean which are Australian territories. Australian border security monitored the wallowing fishing vessel over the next two days before finally transmitting a distress call which requested any ships in the area to go to the aid of the *Palapa*. At this point, the Department of Immigration and Multiculturalism controversially requested search and rescue authorities to urge any vessel answering the distress call to tow the *Palapa* to Indonesia.³⁸⁷ When Norwegian ship the *Tampa* answered the distress call, the *Palapa* was judged unseaworthy and its passengers were taken on board the ship. In the meantime, the Australian government had engineered the consent of the Indonesian government for the ship to disembark its passengers in Indonesia; however, the asylum seekers became distressed and given the overcrowding of his vessel the captain of the *Tampa* agreed to take them to the closer port of Christmas Island, which is within Australian territorial waters.³⁸⁸

The lengths which the Howard Government would go to to deter ‘suspected illegal entry vessels’ (SIEVs) entered unprecedented territory at this point; Howard warned that ‘we have decided in relation to this particular vessel to take a stand’.³⁸⁹ The government threatened the *Tampa*’s captain with prosecution as a people smuggler, and flatly refused permission for the *Tampa* to land its passengers on Christmas Island. Following days of standoff and a hunger strike on the *Tampa*, a detachment of the army’s elite division, the Special Air Service (SAS), boarded the ship and eventually transferred the asylum seekers to a navy vessel. After failing to pass a retroactive Bill which would have enabled the government to remove the ship and its passengers from Australian waters by force, the government eventually brokered a deal

³⁸⁵ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, pp. 31-33.

³⁸⁶ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 45.

³⁸⁷ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, pp. 8-12.

³⁸⁸ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, pp. 21-24.

³⁸⁹ John Howard, A Current Affair (28 August, 2001), cited in Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 64.

with the small South Pacific island nation of Nauru to receive the *Tampa*'s passengers and detain them in an 'offshore' immigration processing centre on Australia's behalf. This so-called 'Pacific Solution' also featured the 'excision' of offshore reefs and islands from Australia's 'migration zone', and the commencement of Operation Relex, a military operation in which SIEVs were to be intercepted by the Australian Defence Forces before they could enter the newly defined 'Australian migration zone'.³⁹⁰ The prospect of long periods of detention in a third country and slim likelihood of resettlement in Australia, the highly publicised sinking of an asylum seeker vessel with the loss of 353 lives in October 2001, and in particular, regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq following political upheavals after September 11 eventually 'stopped the boats'.³⁹¹

During the crisis, approval for the government skyrocketed. In the first few days of the *Tampa* affair, the Opposition Labor government provided strong support for the government's actions; in blocking the initial Border Protection Bill, however, which Howard had pitched as a clear solution to the problem of the *Tampa* and any future illegal entry vessels, the Opposition had raised the ire of those members of the public who were most concerned with the issue of asylum seekers. The Howard government looked set to claw back its majority at the impending election. Things were coming together for Howard; the mood of xenophobia and normalisation of racism which had been cultivated during the previous five years by certain politicians and segments of the media had created a climate ripe for extracting political capital through the deployment of wedge politics.³⁹² The influential voters in marginal and swing seats, who most resented and suffered from the rapid economic developments of the previous two decades, could be successfully appealed to through their sense of fear and anxiety over race issues. Introduced to Australian politics by the pollster Mark Textor, who managed Howard's 2001 election campaign, wedge politics relied upon finding contentious issues which would fracture the traditional support base of the opponent, and 'there is no more effective wedge than race'.³⁹³ The problem of asylum seekers was a perfect area in which to deploy wedge tactics because it married xenophobia and racism with the more 'legitimate' problem of security; racial ploys could therefore be invoked in a coded and subtle way, whilst still acting as clear 'dog-whistles' to their target audience.

³⁹⁰ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, p. 195; Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," p. 79.

³⁹¹ Tony Kevin, *A Certain Maritime Incident: The Sinking of Siev X* (North Carlton, VIC: Scribe Publications, 2004), ch. 20; Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*.

³⁹² Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*.

³⁹³ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 175.

In July 2001, the annual 'Mind and Mood' report of social researcher Hugh Mackay had foregrounded the crucial significance of racialised resistance to asylum seekers arriving by boat in the lead up to the 2001 election: 'some of the most ugly and vicious outpourings of hatred occurred in discussion of boat people/illegal immigrants...so strong are the passions aroused by fear of illegal immigrants and of Australia being 'swamped by Asians' that such matters have the potential to overwhelm factors like the GST in the coming federal election'. The government's consistent misrepresentation of asylum seekers as 'illegal immigrants' had been uniformly adopted among the parts of the public most antagonistic towards non-white immigration, and furthermore, the 'Mind and Mood' report found there was 'a widespread view that people who have arrived illegally...are likely to *behave* illegally once here'. In sum, the report concluded, 'just below the surface, there is a high degree of anxiety about Asian immigration, about the idea that Australia's culture is being changed in unexpected ways, and that recent immigrants are associated with unacceptable increases in crime and violence'.³⁹⁴

Even at this point, as hysteria and anxiety about 'boatpeople' and 'illegal immigrants' reached new highs, the extent to which the racial and cultural identity of asylum seekers was specifically attacked had been limited. Although departing from Indonesia, and therefore invoking traditional Australian paranoias about invasion from southern Asia, the great majority of asylum seekers arriving in the late 1990s and early 2000s were Muslims of Middle Eastern or Central Asian origin, predominantly fleeing the oppressive regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the furore over 'Asian' immigration provoked by Pauline Hanson, the specific origin and religion of the majority of asylum seekers initially drew limited attention. As an example, in early 2001, the social scientist Sharon Pickering, who has recently done considerable work on the impact of anti-Muslim prejudice upon Muslim communities, particularly in regards to policing matters, published an article on news discourses and asylum seekers in the *Journal of Refugee Studies*. In this article she discusses the expectation that large numbers of Afghan and Iraqi refugees would shortly be attempting to enter Australia via Indonesia.³⁹⁵ Despite the discussion of the impending attempts of high numbers of (Muslim) refugees to enter Australia, and lengthy discussion of antagonism towards Bosnian (Muslim) refugees at the time, Pickering does not

³⁹⁴ 'The Mackay Report: Mind and Mood (July 2001)', cited in Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, pp. 92-93, 176.

³⁹⁵ Sharon Pickering, "Common Sense and Original Deviancy: News Discourses and Asylum Seekers in Australia," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 14, no. 2 (2001): pp. 61-2.

mention the religion of these asylum seekers, and presumably neither did the news articles which she was analysing. Despite a wealth of negative presumptions and representations of refugees discussed by Pickering, the Muslim identity of these refugees does not appear to have been on the radar until mid to late 2001. As can be seen from the ‘Mind and Mood’ summary from June 2001, ‘Asians’ persisted as a focus of racial antagonism for most Australians.

During mid-2001, however, the Middle Eastern/Central Asian origin and Islamic identity of ‘illegal immigrants’ began to draw more attention, and to be linked by influential political and media commentators to other incidents involving Middle Eastern and Muslim migrants in Australia, in particular with several high-profile crimes involving people of Middle Eastern and/or Muslim background. Ghassan Hage savoured the irony that ‘amazingly, the names of the prominent people and journalists now expressing expert opinions on Lebanese and Arab culture in the pages of the newspapers are the same ones who thrilled us with their expertise on the Asian threat’.³⁹⁶ In such an environment, ‘the carefully nurtured public mood was fertile ground for a seemingly automatic association between ‘Muslim’, ‘Middle-Eastern’ and ‘criminal’’.³⁹⁷ The circle was to become complete with the World Trade Centre attacks on September 11, 2001, when Muslims were to be cemented as the principal ‘other’ in contemporary Australian society and the demonisation and scapegoating of this particular group of people became augmented by the global rise of Islamophobia. Before considering these post-September 11 developments in detail, it is necessary to first discuss the history and characteristics of Muslim communities in Australia and to track the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia, which I turn to in the next chapter.

³⁹⁶ Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, p. 68.

³⁹⁷ Marion Maddox, "People Like That," in *God under Howard: The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005), p. 167.

Chapter 6 – ‘People like that’: Muslims in Australia and the rise of Islamophobia

The way in which Muslims and Islam are represented in the present day in Australia necessarily draws upon and reiterates aspects of the specific ‘national history of racism’ in Australia which was explored in the previous two chapters. Despite erosion in the notion of hierarchies of race as a biological given from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, it is clear that ‘race’ and ‘racism’ nevertheless continued to have particular potency in Australian political and public discourses throughout the second half of the twentieth century, in particular through the shift towards expression of racialised hostility through the lens of culturalism, or ‘new racism’. As Omi and Winant have demonstrated in their account of the rise of new racism in the United States, ‘the transcendence of biologicistic conceptions of race does not provide any reprieve from the dilemmas of racial injustice and conflict, nor from controversies over the significance of race in the present...views of race as socially constructed simply recognise the fact that these conflicts and controversies are now more properly framed in the terrain of politics’. For this reason, Omi and Winant concluded that ‘race is now a pre-eminently political phenomenon’.³⁹⁸

The cultural essentialism embodied in new racism dovetails neatly with conventional nationalism. Rather than justifying prejudice towards a group of people on the basis of racialised physical characteristics such as skin colour or appearance, it becomes possible to justify prejudice on the basis of a perceived innate cultural incompatibility between one group and another - between ‘us’ and the ‘Other’, between ‘Australian’ and ‘un-Australian’. Characteristic of manifestations of new racism is that they are constructed primarily on the basis of the belief that outgroups (frequently racialised, but in the case of Islamophobia, based on a complex combination of cultural and racial factors, as highlighted in Chapter 2) violate traditional values and ethics. This chapter therefore briefly considers the history of Muslim immigration to Australia, and the shifting attitudes towards ‘Muslims’; in particular, the fact that historically, the Islamic faith of most Muslim immigrants has been of less concern than other aspects of their (usually) racialised difference. However, the promotion of

³⁹⁸ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York; London: Routledge, 1994), p. 65.

‘Australian values’ as the values supposedly inherited by a white ‘mainstream’ through their British and Christian heritage, and the dissemination of the belief that ‘Muslims’ held incompatible ethics and values and therefore could not effectively be part of ‘Australia’ was to become a characteristic feature of the Howard era. This chapter therefore goes on to consider key developments in the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia, focussing in particular on events during the lead up to the 2001 Federal Election in Australia.

Muslims in Australia

The history of Muslims in Australia dates back to approximately the mid-eighteenth century, though large-scale permanent settlement of Muslims did not take place until after the abolition of the White Australia Policy after World War II. Although Australia’s supposed great isolation and distance from ‘civilisation’ have become central to national foundation myths, at the time that British colonisation commenced, parts of northern Australia were actually involved in complex and longstanding trade and fishing relationships with parts of modern-day Indonesia. From at least the mid-1750s, Muslim trepang fisherman had a sustained and extensive presence along the northern coastline, impacting significantly upon the language and customs of the Indigenous peoples they engaged with and sometimes intermarrying with them. Upon encountering the trepangers, British authorities initially aspired to founding trade outposts and facilitating this northern connection, but as settlement of the continent proceeded, the colonies instead opted for the imposition of prohibitive fees and duties which made the trade increasingly unviable.³⁹⁹

In the southern parts of the continent, a scattering of Muslims arrived during the early decades of British colonisation, as sailors, labourers or convicts, but larger, more lasting settlement in Australia by Muslims began only from about the 1840s, with the commencement of a camel transport industry which relied upon the labour of several thousand camel drivers, predominantly from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, but known collectively as ‘Afghans’. These camel drivers played a significant but largely unrecognised role in the exploration and settlement of inland Australia. Although many eventually returned to their country of origin, some remained permanently in Australia. The first mosques in Australia were built by members of these ‘Afghan’ communities, beginning with the Marree Mosque in South Australia in 1881; some of the urban mosques subsequently built by

³⁹⁹ Bilal Cleland, *The Muslims in Australia: A Brief History* (Melbourne: Islamic Council of Victoria, 2002), ch. 1; Abdullah Saeed, *Islam in Australia* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2003), ch. 1.

‘Afghan’ communities are still in use today. In contrast to Christian groups, who could apply to colonial administrations for land and other grants to assist in the building of churches, these groups had to raise the substantial funds for mosque construction by themselves. An additional wave of Muslim immigration to Australia occurred from the 1870s, when a few thousand Muslim Malay and Javanese indentured labourers were recruited to work on pearling grounds and plantations in northern Australia.⁴⁰⁰ The relatively small numbers, remote location and vital economic importance of these workers to pastoralists, mining companies and other business interests hampered the efforts of white Australians to introduce legislation on the model of the anti-Chinese laws which could specifically exclude ‘Afghans’ and other Muslim labourers from Australia.⁴⁰¹

The advent of the White Australia Policy (in particular the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*, the *Naturalisation Act 1903* and the white-labour laws enacted in the early 1900s) significantly impacted upon Muslim communities in Australia. These communities were largely composed of young, single male workers; it was very difficult for non-British women to emigrate to Australia during the colonial period, and almost impossible after Federation. After 1901, many men who had worked in Australia and periodically visited their wives in their birth country were no longer able to come and go freely and were unable to be naturalised, but had to decide between their livelihood in Australia and their families overseas. Some intermarriage between ‘Afghans’ and Indigenous women occurred, but this practice was strongly discouraged by government authorities, and eventually criminalised in some states from the early 1900s, with the introduction of legislation to prevent mixed race marriages. The dwindling trepang trade was crippled by the closing of many Australian ports and ceased in 1907. The sourcing of indentured labour from Asia largely ceased, although some Javanese families remained in Queensland and the pearling industry received an exemption from the white labour laws which meant small numbers of Malays were employed as divers until the 1970s. A small mosque was constructed for the Malay community in Broome in the 1930s, but the community never regained its pre-Federation size. Some ‘Afghans’ managed to maintain their communities and businesses, despite the legal and other obstacles to settlement posed by the White Australia Policy and the accompanying intensification of racial prejudice and discrimination, but the expansion of rail and rise of

⁴⁰⁰ Cleland, *The Muslims in Australia*, ch. 1; Philip Jones and Anna Kenny, *Australia's Muslim Cameleers: Pioneers of the Inland 1860s-1930s*, 2nd ed. (Kent Town, SA: Wakefield Press, 2010), chs. 1-2; Nahid Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), chs. 1-2; Saeed, *Islam in Australia*, ch. 1.

⁴⁰¹ Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'," p. 208.

trucking made camel transport redundant by the 1920s and the 'Ghantowns' of central Australia eventually disappeared. As the Australian Muslim population shrank and Islamic cultural practices became increasingly circumscribed, eventually few communities were able to sustain the practice of Islam, creating significant breaks in the continuity of Muslim settlement and practice in Australia.⁴⁰²

Some insight into the situations facing these beleaguered communities is offered by consideration of the events leading up to what is known as the 'Battle of Bourke' in January 1915. This incident involved two members of the 'Afghan' community attacking an open train at a community picnic event; four people died as a result of the attack and the two instigators were killed in the ensuing gun battle with police. One of the assailants, Mullah Abdullah, prepared halal meat for the Muslim community, but discriminatory white-only labour practices meant that he could not work in the abattoir but had to conduct butchering at his home. This led to repeated confrontations with the Sanitations Inspector, one of which precipitated the attack on the train. The pair were also allegedly motivated by Australia's state of war with Turkey, whose Caliph was seen as the leader of the *umma* by many Muslims at the time. However, it is possible that the Ottoman flag the pair supposedly brandished and their suicide notes linking their attack to the current state of war between Australia and Turkey were faked after their deaths in order to drum up antagonism towards 'enemy aliens'. Interestingly, although an angry mob had to be prevented from attacking the Afghan camp in Broken Hill that night, violence and official sanctions were quickly deflected from the Afghans to the Germans, who were cast as instigators of the event. The local German club was burnt to the ground and the local mines fired all 'enemy aliens' in their employ, forcing six Austrians, four Germans and one Turk from the town. Shortly thereafter, the Australian government ordered the internment of all 'enemy aliens' for the duration of the war, and instituted a variety of control mechanisms over suspected sympathisers of the Ottoman Caliph.⁴⁰³

The First World War was to instil a propensity towards securitisation and surveillance of both 'suspect' citizens and 'aliens' in Australian governance and institutions which have had long-lasting impacts upon migrant communities. Much tighter controls on exit and entry to the country were applied across the board, making visas mandatory for most travellers, and a number of internal surveillance and security organisations were established: 'endowed with

⁴⁰² Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'," pp. 208-13.

⁴⁰³ Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'," p. 196-200.

responsibilities for monitoring and suppressing people whose conduct was deemed subversive', these agencies quickly acquired influence over immigration and naturalisation procedures and policies.⁴⁰⁴ As a result, 'the needs of national security dictated that allegiance become a criteria of eligibility for immigration and citizenship', and the nation's new security agencies gradually expanded upon and developed their capacity for investigating the political sympathies and propensities of potential immigrants and monitoring 'aliens'.⁴⁰⁵ Detainment, deportation, surveillance and suspicion became permanent features of Australian policy towards 'suspect' individuals and groups of 'aliens'.⁴⁰⁶ As Nahid Kabir has documented, this preoccupation has impacted upon Muslims in Australia from the First World War right through to the present day, even during periods when there were very few Muslims in the country and government surveillance and suspicion were motivated by their national, racial or ethnic backgrounds, as opposed to their religious faith.⁴⁰⁷

As a result of the White Australia Policy and tightened controls over movement into and out of the country, for fifty years the well-established Muslim communities remained small or dwindled and the immigration of Muslims was strongly circumscribed, with the exception of small numbers of Albanian Muslims arriving from the 1920s onwards, who were accepted as migrants to Australia since they were considered 'white' by immigration officials.⁴⁰⁸ In 1956, a group of these Albanian Muslims entered the Adelaide Mosque and found there seven extremely elderly men who still clung to the practice of their Islamic faith; these former camel drivers were the last representatives of the once thriving 'Afghan' communities of South Australia.⁴⁰⁹ The 'Afghan' community of Brisbane is one of the few that managed to maintain an Islamic identity throughout the difficult White Australia period, with descendants of the founders of the Holland Park mosque celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2008.⁴¹⁰ As discussed in Chapter 4, the drive to recruit immigrants to Australia following the Second World War led to increasing relaxation of the strictures of the White Australia Policy, and eventually resulted a significant increase in the number of Muslims in Australia. Between 1947 and 1971 the Muslim population grew from 2,704 to 22,311, over half of whom came to

⁴⁰⁴ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 105.

⁴⁰⁵ Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 106-7.

⁴⁰⁶ Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 116-46.

⁴⁰⁷ Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'," pp. 195-202.

⁴⁰⁸ Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'," pp. 213-4.

⁴⁰⁹ Jones and Kenny, *Australia's Muslim Cameleers*, p. 10.

⁴¹⁰ Mustafa Ally, *Holland Park Mosque* (Brisbane: Holland Park Mosque, 2008).

Australia in the late 1960s as the result of a single bi-lateral agreement between the Australian and Turkish governments.⁴¹¹

Once racial discrimination was formally removed from Australian immigration policy, the Muslim population began to increase steadily, through further immigration as well as high migrant birth rates. By 2001, Muslims constituted 1.5% of the Australian population, originating from over seventy different nations, making Muslim-Australians the most ethnically diverse religious group in Australia. Nevertheless, chain migration, in particular through the family reunion immigration category (before this was slashed by the Howard Government) has been an important factor in Muslim immigration to Australia, facilitating an extremely high concentration of Muslim settlement: almost 50% of Australian Muslims live within a 50km radius in Sydney.⁴¹² Whilst there are high proportions of Muslims in many Asian nations from which there has been high immigration to Australia, such as India and Indonesia, the majority of Muslims in Australia are of Middle Eastern origin, with Lebanon, Turkey and Afghanistan the most significant countries of birth for Australian Muslims who were born overseas.⁴¹³ The high concentration of Muslim settlement, strong familial networks between migrant groups, and extremely high diversity in terms of ethnicity, country of origin and religious practices have fostered a propensity for different Muslim groups to cluster together geographically and to develop their own community and civic centres and organisations, such as mosques and cooperatives.⁴¹⁴

Muslim communities in Australia have persistently been characterised by markedly high levels of economic and social marginalisation.⁴¹⁵ The majority of Muslim immigrants to Australia have come from poor rural or urban backgrounds in underdeveloped countries, often against a background of widespread conflict and/or persecution; those immigrants who had higher education or training have continually found their qualifications were not recognised in Australia or faced other forms of workplace discrimination which prevented them from working at appropriate levels to their qualification and ability. As a result, Australian Muslims have historically been concentrated in low skilled, low paid labour and

⁴¹¹ Amanda Wise and Jan Ali, "Muslims in Australia," in *Muslim-Australians and Local Government: Grassroots Strategies to Improve Relations between Muslim and Non-Muslim Australians* (Sydney: Centre for Research on Social Inclusion, 2008), p. 12.

⁴¹² Wise and Ali, "Muslims in Australia," pp. 12-14.

⁴¹³ Phillips, Klapdor, and Simon-Davies, *Migration to Australia since Federation*, pp. 26-27.

⁴¹⁴ Wise and Ali, "Muslims in Australia," pp. 14-15.

⁴¹⁵ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaç*, p. 26; Nahid Kabir and Raymond Evans, "Muslims and the Australian Labour Market, 1980-2001," *Immigrants and Minorities* 21, no. 3 (2002); Wise and Ali, "Muslims in Australia," pp. 18-19.

subject to extremely high rates of unemployment. In a comprehensive study of Muslim labour force participation between 1980 and 2001, Kabir and Evans found that the average skill level and unemployment of Australian-born, English-born, and Irish-born people were closely comparable to the national averages during this period, indicating the persistent relationship between white, Anglo-Celtic identity and economic privilege. In contrast, unemployment was consistently three times the national average over this period for Muslims, despite the fact that the average skill level and participation in tertiary education was higher for Muslims than the national average.⁴¹⁶

Kabir and Evans noted that ethnic difference was a major factor in this wide gap, as can be seen by the fact that ‘Asian-born’ people also experienced significantly higher unemployment levels than the national average. However, religion also played a part in the economic marginalisation of Muslims in Australia: overseas-born Christians fared much better in the Australian labour market than did overseas-born Muslims from the same ethnic background. For example, unemployment of Lebanese-born Muslims was over 30% in 1996, which was double the unemployment rate of Lebanese-born Christians and four times higher than the national average.⁴¹⁷ This bias towards Christian migrants may seem surprising considering Australia is an avowedly secular nation in terms of its constitution and institutions. Yet as Marion Maddox has observed:

Christianity is the historically dominant religious tradition, [although] now practised actively by only a minority of the population. Yet its political and cultural importance far outweighs its demographic standing. Politically, the fact that a large part of the population today respects Christianity as a source of ‘traditional values’, even if having only a vague idea of what those might be, has proved both an advantage to politicians and parties seeking to align themselves with a ‘values agenda’.⁴¹⁸

These factors have led to Muslims being strongly ‘Othered’ in Australian society; not only racially distinct from the majority ‘Anglo-Celtic’ population, but also distinct in cultural and religious terms.

The doubling of racial/ethnic and religious difference has made Muslims a highly conspicuous if initially small minority, who have not fitted easily within the allotted category of ‘ethnic difference’ in multicultural Australia. Following the ending of the White Australia

⁴¹⁶ Kabir and Evans, "Muslims and the Australian Labour Market," p. 76.

⁴¹⁷ Kabir and Evans, "Muslims and the Australian Labour Market," p. 78.

⁴¹⁸ Marion Maddox, "Christianity in Australia and New Zealand: Faith and Politics in Secular Soil," in *Introducing World Christianity*, ed. Charles E. Farhadian (Chichester: Blackwell, 2012), p. 204.

Policy, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it became increasingly unacceptable to voice racist beliefs in public forums; overt discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic difference was removed from government policy, institutions and legislation; and furthermore, Australia's *Racial Discrimination Act 1975* enabled individuals and organisations to address racism 'either by making complaints of racism, or by negotiating policy changes based on the broader principles of racial equality'.⁴¹⁹

As has been highlighted, however, discrimination on the basis of cultural difference remained permissible in public discourse and sometimes acted as a method of promulgating 'old' racist views in a more palatable and less overt form. These forms of discrimination were harder to document and 'prove' than old racism, and were furthermore not a focus of the Australian legal system or political establishment. Reflective of the emphasis in Australian legislation upon prohibiting racial but not cultural discrimination, there is no protection from religious discrimination in Australian federal law and only limited protections under some state laws. The ethnic diversity of the Australian Muslim community means that, unlike members of Jewish or Sikh communities, who are considered under Australian law to constitute distinct 'ethnic groups' because of their shared cultural history, a Muslim who is subjected to religious vilification or who is discriminated against on the basis of their religion is unlikely to have recourse to legal protection or redress in Australia.⁴²⁰ As a result, markers of religious difference, such as the wearing of the veil, restriction of physical contact between people of different genders, or prayers during work hours, have been significant in the economic and social marginalisation of Muslim people in Australia, yet discrimination on these grounds has not been amenable to legal redress in the way that discrimination on purely racial grounds has been.⁴²¹

The religious faith of Australian Muslims therefore appears to have been a significant factor in their marginalisation, compounding the disadvantages already imposed by racial or ethnic difference in a society which privileges white racial identity so highly and revealing faultlines in Australia's multiculturalism model. It has been argued, in particular by Ghassan Hage and David Dutton, that there were constraints on multicultural policy in Australia which limited

⁴¹⁹ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *An International Comparison of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975* (Sydney: HREOC, 2008), p. 1.

⁴²⁰ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *An International Comparison of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975*.

⁴²¹ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaʿ*, pp. 60-64; Kabir and Evans, "Muslims and the Australian Labour Market," pp. 80-86.

its effectiveness and prevented the development of a truly culturally pluralistic nation. Firstly, multiculturalism in Australia became characterised by a model in which the ‘old’ Australian culture of largely British, white origins came to constitute the ‘core’ or ‘authentic’ Australian identity (later labelled the ‘mainstream’), surrounded by what came to be called ‘ethnic’ cultures, such as ‘Italian-Australian’ or ‘Chinese-Australian’, which were ‘managed’ through the policy of multiculturalism. ‘Authentic’ Australians were ascribed with the quality of ‘tolerating’ difference, of accepting and accommodating outsiders.⁴²² As Dutton emphasises, tolerance is ‘a negative virtue, a matter of putting up with rather than liking one’s different neighbours and feeling able to approve or disapprove, tolerate or not’.⁴²³

The second constraint on Australian multiculturalism was the utilisation of a narrow definition of ‘culture’, in which only a highly restricted selection of ‘cultural markers’ would be ‘tolerated’ by or permitted to contribute to ‘authentic’ Australian society. Aspects of ‘culture’ which could be ‘tolerated’ more easily included ethnic food, music and dance. Discreet maintenance of other aspects of cultural heritage were permitted, so long as these were confined to the private sphere. It was far less acceptable to publicly proclaim one’s difference through distinctive forms of dress, public usage of languages other than English, public displays of religious faith, and commentary on ethics and other social issues. Therefore, Australian multiculturalism ‘did not open political and economic institutions and values to pluralism; the ‘core’ was no more contestable in multicultural Australia than it had been during the period of assimilation...the boundaries of the Australian citizenry were extended while an internal boundary was created to preserve the power and national character of the core, mainstream, tolerant culture’.⁴²⁴ The highly visible markers of Islamic identity make Muslims less ‘tolerable’ and theoretically less ‘assimilable’ than other groups of people. At the same time such overt expressions of ‘cultural’ difference enabled ‘authentic’ Australians to discriminate against Muslims not through recourse to ‘racism’, but through more acceptable strategies based on the supposed ‘incompatibility’ of Muslim religion/culture and the ‘Australian way of life’. The core argument here was based on cultural essentialism, with Islam being assumed to permeate the life of Muslims in a profoundly different manner than the way that the ethnicity or culture of other migrants shapes them.

⁴²² Dutton, *One of Us?*, pp. 153-54; Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, pp. 58-64.

⁴²³ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 88.

⁴²⁴ Dutton, *One of Us?*, p. 154; See also, Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*.

Concerns that Muslims are inherently incapable of living peacefully as minorities within ‘Western’ societies regularly stem from the type of Orientalist theses outlined in Chapter 2, which posit a unitary ‘Islam’ which is incompatible not only with the Western way of life, but more particularly, with the Western political system of democracy. As Esposito and Voll emphasise, this assumption ignores not only the evidence for a theoretical compatibility between Islam and democracy, and the existence of a range of different models of accommodation between these supposedly incompatible monolithic constructions, but elides the presence of considerable diversity of opinion within Western nations, and within the West as a whole, as to how ‘democracy’ may be defined.⁴²⁵ Tariq Ramadan is a pertinent example of a ‘Western’ Muslim who explores the compatibility of Islam with core characteristics of democracy, and by extension, attacks the thesis that Muslims are fundamentally incapable of participating in and contributing in a significant sense to civil society and government in Western democratic nations. The public intellectual Waleed Aly is an Australian Muslim whose writing has similarly focussed on dismantling many of these key Orientalist myths.⁴²⁶ These alternative views, however, have historically had very little traction in Australia. Instead, Orientalising views have had significant influence upon Australian public discourse, and have impacted considerably upon general perspectives on Islam and attitudes towards Muslims in Australia.

Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam prior to September 11

From the late nineteenth century onwards, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination has been directed at Muslims in Australia, and undoubtedly had negative impacts upon individual Muslims and their communities, but until the 1980s, the visibility and impact of such discourses in the public sphere was limited. There is evidence of common Orientalist tropes being deployed in Australian newspapers at the turn of the last century, particularly in the regional press of central Australia. There is also evidence of state, media and interpersonal anti-Muslim prejudice during World War I, when Muslims in Australia were suspected of sympathising with or actively supporting the Ottoman Caliph. However, on the whole, religion was a not a highly salient criterion of interest or discrimination during the colonial and ‘White Australia’ periods, when the *race* of Muslims living in Australia was on the

⁴²⁵ John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁴²⁶ Waleed Aly, *People Like Us: How Arrogance Is Dividing Islam and the West* (Sydney: Pan MacMillan, 2007), chs. 8-9; Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 7.

whole considered far more salient than their religious faith.⁴²⁷ In Europe and in the United States, interest in and concern over Muslims and Arabs began to surface within the academy and in public policy discussions from the end of World War II, yet there was a relative lack of public and academic concern with or interest in Islam and Muslims in Australian political and public discourse until the 1980s. The negligible size and relative isolation of Muslim communities in Australia between the First World War and the 1970s goes a long way to explain this paucity of interest.

Muslims and Islam became more prominent in public discourse from the early 1980s as a result of both the continued growth of the Muslim population in Australia, and a burst of interest in Islam and Muslims among Western journalists, politicians and the public, largely as a response to key international events such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987.⁴²⁸ In the early 1990s, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the US-led retaliatory war on Iraq, and to a lesser extent later events such as the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing in New York resulted in a backlash against Australian Muslims, including public harassment and religious vilification of Muslims and people of 'Middle Eastern Appearance', attacks on mosques, and communal opposition to the construction of mosques and Islamic schools. Indeed, despite the still negligible size of the Australian Muslim community, they were among the four most discriminated against minority groups in Australia by 1991.⁴²⁹ Illustrative of the broader securitisation implications of prejudice towards Muslims, Muslims began to be closely surveilled and selectively harassed by security forces during the 1990s, as detailed, for example, by former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mamdouh Habib. Australian Muslims such as Habib (who had immigrated to Australia from Egypt in 1980) were targeted by security agencies for their supposed affiliation with or support for political Islam in other countries.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁷ Kevin Dunn, "Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 92, no. 3 (2001); Benjamin Isakhan, "Orientalism and the Australian News Media: Origins and Questions," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010); Kabir, "Muslims in a 'White Australia'."

⁴²⁸ John Esposito, "Introduction," in *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*, eds. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 1997).

⁴²⁹ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Enquiry into Racist Violence* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991).

⁴³⁰ Mamdouh Habib, *My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn't* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2008), p. 70; See also, Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia."

The media was an important player in the repackaging of Orientalist stereotypes into what is now called 'Islamophobia', and the dissemination of this discourse in Australia. As early as 1991, an investigation by HREOC (Australia's statutory Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) of racist violence in Australia had highlighted the key role of the media in legitimising and promulgating racist attitudes, and almost a third of the recommendations of the report related to the media. Of these, there were five specific recommendations which underline the key issues in media reporting on Muslims at the time, in particular the recommendation that use be curtailed of the widespread media terms 'Muslim extremists' and 'Muslim fanatics', and that 'authoritative leaders of representative groups be consulted' when reporting on Islamic beliefs and practice, 'particularly on controversial issues like calls for a *jihad*'.⁴³¹ Through much of the 1980s and the 1990s, Australia media reporting on issues related to Muslims was predominantly about international incidents and conflicts. In doing so, however, they typically adopted racialised stereotypes about Muslims, and Orientalist frames, thus promoting an essentialising view of Islam.⁴³² As the affairs of Australia's own Muslim communities rose up news agendas subsequently, this view allowed the imputed attributes of 'Muslims' and 'Islam' elsewhere in the world to be projected onto Australian Muslims, and instilled a sense that they should somehow be held partially responsible for the actions of Muslims elsewhere.

Kevin Dunn's retrospective research has illustrated this transferral process through analysis of newspaper reporting on one international conflict involving Muslims (Algeria) during the early 1990s and analysis of opposition to mosque construction during the same period. Over 80% of articles surveyed by Dunn portrayed Islam negatively; they predominantly framed Muslims as militant, fundamentalist, fanatical, oppressive towards women and associated with criminality. Direct juxtapositions of negative terms like 'fanatic', 'extremist' and 'terrorist' with Muslim or Islam were ubiquitous.⁴³³ These same constructions of Islam and Muslim dominated opposition to mosque construction, with frequent allusions to media coverage of international events to justify opposition. For example, one letter to Liverpool City Council argued that 'to trust these non-Christians, who have already shown themselves

⁴³¹ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Enquiry into Racist Violence*.

⁴³² For examples of some of these early studies on representation of Islam in the Australian media, see Heather Goodall, Andrew Jakubowicz, Jeannie Martin, Tony Mitchell, Lois Randall, and Kalinga Seneviratne, *Racism, Ethnicity and the Media* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994); Ahmad Shboul, "Islam and the Australian Media: The Implications of Distorting Mirrors," *Australian Religious Studies Review* 1, no. 2 (1988).

⁴³³ Dunn, "Mosque Development in Sydney," pp. 297-8.

to be aggressive and violent as is evident from the recent news...would be to disrupt the lives of the families in the Green Valley/Hinchinbrook area',⁴³⁴ other opposition centered on accounts that 'we have read about child mutilation...abduction and rape, in the name of Islam'.⁴³⁵ A Councillor for Cambelltown City Council published his opposition to a mosque in the local paper, pleading that 'with Iraq declaring holy war against the West, please don't dismiss the Minto people who are genuinely frightened of the prospect of a mosque next door'.⁴³⁶

Some of the strident opposition to mosque construction documented by Dunn was accompanied by admissions by letter-writers that their opposition to mosques was based on limited experience with Muslim people, revealing that mosques were being opposed on the basis of prejudice rather than direct negative experiences. One resident of Sydney's North Shore complained that 'I don't know of any [Muslims] living in this area [but] I strongly object to a Mosque'.⁴³⁷ In the colonial and White Australia periods, there had been limited resistance to the construction of mosques, presumably because the Muslim communities during those periods were not considered to be a threat in the way that they increasingly were during the 1990s, when the Muslim population was growing rapidly and there was such consistent and persistent negative media reporting on international incidents and conflicts involving Muslims.

Although religious adherence was therefore becoming a greater driver of antagonism towards Muslim people and communities, and thus constituting 'Islamophobia' more precisely than had been true during most of the twentieth century, it is important to note that in both the ideology and the practice of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia, 'categorical confusions between "race" (e.g. 'Middle Eastern Appearance'), ethnicity (e.g. Arab), nationality of origin or background (e.g. Lebanese), and religion (e.g. Muslim) are common, and distinction in practice between racism directed on "racial", ethnic, or national grounds [was] not always possible or valid'.⁴³⁸ Thus, HREOC's 1991 report on racial violence had highlighted that anti-Islamic vilification and violence were frequently (mis)directed at non-

⁴³⁴ Letter to Liverpool City Council, 13th January 1989, cited in Dunn, "Mosque Development in Sydney," p. 299.

⁴³⁵ Review Pictorial, 8th February 1986, cited in Dunn, "Mosque Development in Sydney," p. 299.

⁴³⁶ Councillor Regan, Campbelltown City Council, 22nd August 1990, cited in Dunn, "Mosque Development in Sydney," p. 299.

⁴³⁷ Letter to Warringah Council, 17th May 1994, cited in Dunn, "Mosque Development in Sydney."

⁴³⁸ Scott Poynting and Greg Noble, *Living with Racism: The Experience and Reporting by Arab and Muslim Australians of Discrimination, Abuse and Violence since 11 September 2001* (Sydney: Centre for Cultural Research, 2004), p. 4.

Muslim people, organisations and religious buildings, whilst Muslim Australians frequently experienced discrimination and violence not on the basis of their religion but due to their perceived 'race', 'ethnicity', or national heritage.⁴³⁹

As an example, during 1998 and 1999, Lebanese Australians became the targets of particularly virulent everyday and state racism as a result of the murder of an Asian-Australian teenage boy by a group of youths of Muslim Lebanese background. During the two years it took police to build their case and arrest the perpetrators, the neighbourhood in which they lived and young men of 'Middle Eastern Appearance' across western Sydney were subjected to protracted, intensive and invasive policing, creating significant strain in the community and leading to several clashes between community members and police. In both the media reporting of the incident and the police handling of the case, the extension of blame for violent, criminal acts by individuals were projected as impugning Lebanese Australians as a whole, giving rise to a sustained 'moral panic' about 'ghettoisation' and 'ethnic gangs'. Most of the hysteria, however, centered not on the religion of the perpetrators, but on their ethnic origins.⁴⁴⁰

By 2001, therefore, there was an established, though intermittent pattern of 'Islamophobia' in Australia, frequently precipitated by international events and characterised by incidents of personal vilification and violence, media demonisation, and increasing levels of institutional discrimination towards and securitisation of Muslims. In the months leading up to September 11, antagonism towards Muslims had been fired up by a series of rapes by a group of young men of Lebanese Muslim background. Although the crimes had occurred in mid 2000, the identity and background of the perpetrators only became a 'story' during mid 2001, when several conservative columnists and talk-back radio hosts began to frame the rapes as racially motivated attacks by Muslim men against white Australian women. Many of these stories contained gross inaccuracies and misrepresentations of sources, which their publishers or broadcasters later had to retract.⁴⁴¹ Talkback radio host Alan Jones referred to the case as the

⁴³⁹ A pattern which was to be replicated during the surge of racist attacks directed at Muslims or supposed Muslims after September 11. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Enquiry into Racist Violence*; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaξ*.

⁴⁴⁰ Greg Noble, Scott Poynting, and Paul Tabar, *Kebabs, Kids, Cops and Crime: Youth, Ethnicity and Crime* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2000); Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," pp. 66-67.

⁴⁴¹ Including for example, claims that 70 rapes of Australian women were now occurring each month (in fact, the incidence of rape had remained stable, but there was one month during 1999 in which Bankstown Polic recorded 70 cases of indecent exposure, by one (white) man); the claim that 'gang rapes' of white women by young men of Muslim background were a global phenomenon, considered a 'rite of passage' in France as well as Australia (which grossly misrepresented a French report on sexual violence); and furthermore, the

‘first signs of Islamic hate against a community which has welcomed them’.⁴⁴² Pauline Hanson was quick to link the cases to her own agenda, and proclaimed that ‘a lot of these people are Muslims, and they have no respect for the Christian way of life that this country’s based on’; ‘white women’, she claimed, ‘are worth absolutely nothing to them, to their race, their cultural background’.⁴⁴³ Calls by organisations such as the New South Wales Rape Crisis Centre to recognise that violence against women was on the rise across Australia and was perpetrated by men of all racial, ethnic, religious and class backgrounds were ignored; instead, threatened retributive sexual violence and cases of racialised sexual assault against Muslim women increased sharply.⁴⁴⁴ During this period, therefore, there was a distinctive propensity towards virulent anti-Muslim prejudice in Australian public discourse, indicating a shift away from prejudice and discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity, though the two discourses continued to be mixed to a certain extent.

Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam after September 11

The attacks on September 11 in New York strengthened existing negative associations with Islam not just in the United States but around the world. The following month in Australia, the Howard Government seized the opportunity to even more firmly cement purported links between Muslims and Islam, criminality, moral depravity, and ‘unassimilability’. On October 6, an Australian naval vessel serving as part of Operation Relex intercepted yet another floundering asylum seeker vessel. Efforts to tow the boat out of Australian waters resulted in the vessel sinking, and 223 predominantly Iraqi asylum seekers, including numerous children, had to be rescued from the water. In a deliberately deceitful manoeuvre, the government released specially edited footage of the children from the boat in the water, and proclaimed that the adult asylum seekers deliberately threw their children into the water in an effort to prevent their boat being turned back to Indonesia.⁴⁴⁵ During an interview with journalist John Hamilton two days later, Howard told him that ‘I don’t want people like that in Australia. Genuine refugees don’t do that...they hang on to their children. People say they are desperate;

victims were not all 'white' but were from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, *Race for the Headlines*, ch. 3; Kiran Grewal, "The 'Young Muslim Man' in Australian Public Discourse," *Transforming Cultures eJournal* 2, no. 1 (2007): pp. 118-19; Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," pp. 77-78.

⁴⁴² Alan Jones, 2GB, July 2001, cited in Grewal, "The 'Young Muslim Man'," p. 119.

⁴⁴³ Pauline Hanson, *Insight*, 23rd August 2001, cited in Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," p. 77.

⁴⁴⁴ Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," p. 78.

⁴⁴⁵ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, chs. 14-15.

well, you don't get desperate with the lives of your own children'.⁴⁴⁶ Howard's characterisation of 'people like that' was rapidly deployed in Australian public discourse to justify the exclusion of supposedly 'unassimilable' people, the type of people who could commit horrendous crimes like infanticide, multiple perpetrator sexual assaults, and mass murder.

The 'children overboard' affair was to have a deep and lasting impact on attitudes towards asylum seekers in Australia, despite the fact that a subsequent senate inquiry found that the 'children overboard' claims were manifestly untrue. The inquiry also found that the government knew the evidence to have been fabricated, and yet maintained the claims for electoral advantage:

The peculiar sensitivity associated with the claim that children had been thrown overboard was that it was made at the beginning of and sustained throughout a Federal election campaign, during which 'border protection' and national security were key issues. That asylum seekers trying to enter Australia by boat were the kinds of people who would throw their children overboard was used by the Government to demonise them as part of the argument for the need for a 'tough' stand against external threats.⁴⁴⁷

John Howard and senior members of his government campaigned hard in marginal seats such as Lindsay in Sydney's west, adroitly linking the issues of asylum seekers, 'ethnic' criminality, and the 'War on Terror', which became a military engagement the same week as the 'Children Overboard' affair with the invasion of Afghanistan. Members of the Government inferred direct links between asylum seekers and the threat of terrorism, with one member of parliament even going so far as to assert that the Taliban could be sending terrorists to Australia disguised as asylum seekers.⁴⁴⁸ Marr and Wilkinson discuss an incident where after giving the *Courier-Mail's* political editor Dennis Atkins an interview on November 6, Atkins showed Howard the mockup of the story on the front page of the paper for the following day. The story began: 'Australia had no way to be certain terrorists, or people with terrorist links, were not among the asylum seekers trying to enter the country by boat from Indonesia'. Howard indicated strong approval of the mockup to Atkins.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁶ Cited in Gerard Henderson, "It's Time to Put Away the Big Stick," *The Age*, May 25 2004.

⁴⁴⁷ Select Senate Committee, *Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident Report* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), p. xxi.

⁴⁴⁸ MP Peter Slipper, cited in Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay, "Contemporary Racism and Islamophobia in Australia," p. 578; see also Pedersen, Watt, and Griffiths, "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers."

⁴⁴⁹ Cited in Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 280-1.

Some sectors of the media had remained sceptical about Howard's 'children overboard' claims, and of his scaremongering election campaign in general. However, as a whole, the mainstream media were supportive of the government during this period. The general public overwhelmingly supported Howard's stance against asylum seekers, and media proprietors had strong commercial reasons for pushing for Howard's re-election. During the middle of the *Tampa* crisis, Senator Richard Allston made a surprise announcement that if re-elected the Government would dismantle Australia's cross-media ownership laws.⁴⁵⁰ On the last day of the election campaign, unfavourable lead stories ran in most of the major papers, extensively quoting navy sources and confirming that the 'children overboard' story was not true. Nevertheless, the *editorials* of every major paper except *The Age* officially endorsed the re-election of the Coalition that morning.⁴⁵¹ Howard's 'resolute leadership' on the fused issues of defence and immigration contributed significantly to rises in the Prime Minister's poor polling of early 2001 and despite the Children Overboard scandal breaking in the days just prior to the election, the Coalition won the 2001 Election handily. Labour recorded its lowest primary vote since 1934, the support for One Nation was halved, and the Government went into its third term with an increased majority in the House of Representatives.⁴⁵²

Given the political and social circumstances of the second half of 2001, it is little surprise that during this period 93% of respondents to a national consultative study by the Australian Human Rights Commission reported an increase in racism, abuse and violence directed against Arab and Muslim communities in Australia, as well as attacks being recorded against non-Muslims such as Sikhs, who were sometimes mistakenly identified as Muslims.⁴⁵³ The findings of this study were echoed by other reports. The Australian Arabic Council recorded a twenty-fold rise in reports of discrimination in the month after September 11; a hotline setup by the Community Relations Commission for a Multicultural NSW after September 11 was inundated with several hundred reports of racial attacks and abuse.⁴⁵⁴ The Human Rights Commission's comprehensive analysis of these experiences identified three key themes: the first, 'that Australian Arabs and Muslims share responsibility for terrorism or are potential terrorists'; the second, 'that there is no place in Australia for Arabs and Muslims'; and thirdly, that Muslims 'should assimilate and discard their 'foreign' dress codes, languages

⁴⁵⁰ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 253.

⁴⁵¹ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 272; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 238.

⁴⁵² AustralianPolitics.com, "2001 Election," AustralianPolitics.com, <http://australianpolitics.com/elections/2001/>.

⁴⁵³ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaξ*, p. 47.

⁴⁵⁴ Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001".

and cultural practices'.⁴⁵⁵ As with reports on prejudice towards Muslims in the wake of the Gulf War, a wide variety of studies indicated that the increased prejudice, discrimination and violence directed against Muslims were linked to negative media portrayals – with stereotypical images particularly perpetuated through commercial television, talkback radio and the tabloid press.⁴⁵⁶

In their study of the criminalisation of the 'Arab Other' in Australian society during this period, Poynting et al. observed that:

It is one bizarre leap of the imagination to assume a link between the criminal activity of some Australian citizens of Middle Eastern ancestry and the terrorist activities of extreme Islamic fundamentalists in different parts of the world; it is another to link this to the attempts to seek asylum by refugees; and it is yet another to link these actions with the different cultural traditions of Arab and especially Muslim Australians, and *yet this link is made naturally* [emphasis added].⁴⁵⁷

In was in the process of naturalising these links between 'a fictitious Islamic homogeneity and a cultural pathology of violence and conflict' that the media's role was particularly pronounced.⁴⁵⁸ As Poynting et al. have demonstrated, 'once the criminal behaviour of a minority is pathologised as the tendency of a culture, then other acts of difference become imbued with criminality'.⁴⁵⁹

For an example of how the Muslim community as a whole was being pathologised and criminalised during this period, as early as late September 2001 the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), accompanied by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and local NSW police began raiding households and workplaces in Sydney. On several occasions, they publicised the raids and brought the media with them. All those raided were Muslims. The logic of these raids was furnished by influential opinion columnist Miranda Devine: 'The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. Bin Laden's followers are young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. So it is young men of Middle-Eastern Muslim background who will be targeted in Sydney'. Devine remarked that she appreciated the forbearance of Muslims in 'having to contend with their homes being invaded

⁴⁵⁵ Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 35; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaξ*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁵⁶ See Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 36; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Ismaξ*, p. 144.

⁴⁵⁷ Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar, and Jock Collins, *Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other* (Sydney: Sydney Institutue of Criminology, 2004), p. 45.

⁴⁵⁸ Poynting et al., *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*, p. 46.

⁴⁵⁹ Poynting et al., *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*, p. 45.

at dawn by armed police’, since it ‘helps make us all a little safer’.⁴⁶⁰ Devine’s article clearly serves as a normalisation and rationalisation of the extension of responsibility for international acts of terrorism onto Australian Muslims and ‘pathologisation’ of the community as a whole.

Poynting et al. argue that this process of ‘pathologisation’ was so easily adopted by segments of the media and the general public because it reduced ‘complex social, political and economic phenomena to a simple moral framework of right and wrong, and essentialise[d] that wrongdoing as pathological’. They further argue that this complex of representations of Muslims and Islam ‘functions...as a condensation symbol, simplifying and making intelligible what might otherwise remain unsettling in the social and moral order’.⁴⁶¹ The operation of ‘condensation symbols’ in political discourse was a central pillar of Edelman’s exploration of ‘symbolic politics’: Edelman argued that condensation symbols ‘evoke...emotions [and] condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness...or all of them’.⁴⁶² Edelman emphasised that when ‘condensation symbols’ are operationalised around controversial and often intangible issues for which ‘there is no necessity, and often no possibility, of continuously checking...convictions against real conditions’, a powerful quiescent or aroused mass response can be evoked ‘because it symbolises a threat or reassurance’.⁴⁶³

The apparently tenuous connections between the ‘fictitious Islamic homogeneity and a cultural pathology of violence and conflict’ could be adopted so wholeheartedly within Australian mediatised political discourses because they made complex events explicable. They created solidarity among some sections of the community in the face of ‘threats’, purportedly both internal and external to Australian society’; and they reassured and validated ‘mainstream Australians’ about the value and even superiority of their ‘way of life’.

Edelman pointed out that ‘the governments which most often outrage their citizens or force unwelcome changes in their behaviour plainly have the greatest need for reassuring symbols’.⁴⁶⁴ The Howard Government had been responsible for forcing an unrelenting

⁴⁶⁰ Miranda Devine, "Triumph of Evil in Dancing on American Graves," *Sun-Herald*, 11 November 2001.

⁴⁶¹ Poynting et al., *Bin Laden in the Suburbs*, p. 45.

⁴⁶² Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 6.

⁴⁶³ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, p. 9.

barrage of ‘unwelcome change’ upon an electorate exhausted and alienated by Australia’s social and economic transformation during the 1990s. Yet through operationalising the condensation symbols of ‘Australian values’ and national security, Howard had found a powerful way to reassure crucial segments of the electorate and redirect their outrage towards the threat concept of Islam. As has been demonstrated, the specific history of politicised racialisation in Australia created a propitious environment in which the Howard Government could exploit fears and anxieties about race to their electoral advantage, whilst simultaneously deflecting attention from their neoliberal economic policies. I now turn to an exploration of the Howard Government’s third and fourth terms, during which the Government attempted to continue to employ wedge tactics on the issue of race with varying levels of success.

Chapter 7 – ‘Better safe than sorry’: The ‘War on Terror’ in the Australian context

This chapter leads on directly from the previous chapter and discusses the rising levels of Islamophobia during the mid-2000s as the ‘War on Terror’ reached its height of support and highest levels of impact upon Muslim communities around the world. It focuses on detailing key developments during the third and fourth terms of the Howard Government (2001-2004 and 2004-2007) respectively, as these form the immediate background to and context for the individual newspaper articles within my data sample.

During its final two terms of office, the Howard Government continued to pursue the same agenda of social conservatism and radical economic change, somewhat hampered during the third term by the absence of a majority in the Upper House. Despite these procedural setbacks and the continued unpopularity of many of the policies of the Government, and numerous scandals which imputed the credibility and honesty of the Prime Minister and many key Government officials and departments, support for the Prime Minister and for the Government remained strong. The government’s high levels of support were largely the dividends created by Howard’s adroit exploitation of fear and anxiety over issues of defence and national security during this peak period of the ‘War on Terror’.

In the 2004 Federal Election, the Labor Party under the leadership of Mark Latham was resoundingly defeated and the Coalition was returned to Government with a much increased majority in the Lower House and a clear majority in the Upper House. During the Government’s fourth term in office, therefore, significant reforms and controversial policies could be implemented more rapidly and with less need for amendment and negotiation than had been possible in Australian politics for almost a quarter of a century. Despite this position of security, in the months leading up to the 2007 Federal Election, support for the Government plummeted, whilst the popularity of the new Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd surged. For the first time since the early 2000s, some of the certitudes of the Howard Era were being openly questioned and critiqued, among them the consensus on the War on Terror and on the place of Muslims in Australian society – leading to the eventual victory of the Rudd-led Labor Party at the 2007 Federal Election, during which John Howard lost his own seat, as well as government.

The following sections of this chapter therefore give an overview of key events and developments pertinent to this thesis between 2001 and 2007. As media coverage during the 2004 and 2007 Federal Election campaigns is the subject of the primary research of this thesis, discussion of specific issues from this period will be limited, as many of the pertinent events will be returned to in more detail in the Discussion chapter.

As early as three days after the September 11 attacks in New York, John Howard flagged the possibility of Australian military support for the United States in its response to the attacks. When the US invaded Afghanistan a month later, a small number of Australian Special Forces troops were among the invading forces.⁴⁶⁵ As the ‘War on Terror’ progressed, Australia was to become one of the United States’ staunchest and most vocal allies. Despite mass protest movements and the casting of doubt upon the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ narrative by the security analyst-turned-whistleblower Andrew Wilkie, John Howard successfully committed Australia to a second theatre of the ‘War on Terror’, in Iraq, in 2003.⁴⁶⁶ Australia’s participation in the ‘War on Terror’ is crucial to the linkage between issues of ‘border security’, national defence and anti-terrorism measures, which, as has been a recurring theme in this thesis, were a significant factor in both the electoral popularity of the Howard Government and in the growing levels of Islamophobia in Australia.

The rhetoric of the world leaders of the ‘War on Terror’, who rapidly declared ‘victory’ in Afghanistan and Iraq and proclaimed that the global offensive against ‘terror’ was making the world ‘safer’, was belied by the proliferation of violence in the devastated direct theatres of war, and a subsequent wave of terrorist attacks upon ‘Western’ targets. In September 2002, eighty-eight Australians were among the two hundred victims of a bombing attack in Bali by the organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Despite hints of the growth of JI in the region and of a backlash against Australia for joining the ‘war on terror’, the Australian intelligence focus in Indonesia remained on people smugglers: just three days before the Bali bombings, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer saw ‘no specific threat to Australia or Australian interests’.⁴⁶⁷ A bombing attack on a train in Madrid in 2004, attributed to a group of young Muslim men, prompted Australia Federal and State police chiefs to acknowledge that the involvement of

⁴⁶⁵ Although the numbers of Australian troops have remained small in comparison to the commitments of the US, there has been a continuous Australian military presence in the Middle East in various operations associated with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq ever since October 2001. Nicole Brangwin and Ann Rann, *Australia's Military Involvement in Afghanistan since 2001: A Chronology* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010).

⁴⁶⁶ Andrew Wilkie, *Axis of Deceit* (Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2004).

⁴⁶⁷ Alexander Downer, Lateline, cited in Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 281.

Spain, Australia and other nations in the ‘War on Terror’ increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks against their nationals and on their territory. The Prime Minister and senior government officials nonetheless continued to deny that such a link existed. Instead, they framed such attacks as demonstrating the necessity for stronger defensive and legislative measures against terrorism.⁴⁶⁸ In early 2003, the Government even distributed fridge magnets and an information kit across the country instructing people of what to do in the event of a terrorist attack and encouraging them to report any suspicious behaviour which could be indicative of terrorist activity; actions which inflamed panic about the likelihood of a terrorist attack and raised support for Australian participation in the ‘war on terror’, both internationally and domestically.⁴⁶⁹ In the following sections, I will therefore consider the domestic ramifications of the ‘moral panic’ over terrorism which emerged out of this situation and which was to have such significant impacts upon Muslim communities in Australia.

Anti-terrorism legislation and the threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorism

Australia, like most other nations which participated in the ‘War on Terror’, quickly acted in the domestic sphere to introduce laws bearing directly upon terrorism and initiate ‘counter-terrorism’ government programs and policy shifts. These actions were to have a predictably disproportionate effect upon Muslim Australians. Prior to September 11, 2001 Australia did not have any criminal offences related to terrorism, but between 2001 and 2007, major international terrorist attacks were repeatedly followed by the passing of additional anti-terrorism legislation in Australia. On March 31, 2004 the Attorney-General Philip Ruddock introduced a new anti-terrorism bill before the Australian parliament. He described it as ‘a bill to strengthen Australia's counter-terrorism laws in a number of respects - a task made more urgent following the recent tragic terrorist bombings in Spain’.⁴⁷⁰ This bill was the first of two more anti-terrorism bills passed in Australian parliament during 2004. After the London Bombings in July 2005, the Australian Government convened a terrorism summit to discuss the possibility of introducing even more extensive legislation, and subsequently succeeded in formulating and passing further anti-terrorist measures. In conjunction with the

⁴⁶⁸ Brendan Nicholson, "Police and Pm at Odds on Terror," *The Age*, March 16 2004; Wilkie, *Axis of Deceit*, pp. 126-7.

⁴⁶⁹ Maddox, "People Like That," pp. 181-2.

⁴⁷⁰ Phillip Ruddock, *Anti-Terrorism Bill, Second Reading (Hansard, 31 March, 2004)* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2004).

creation or expansion of legislation to cope with terrorism, security agencies received massive boosts in their jurisdiction, funding and staffing; the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), for example, had an increase in staffing levels of 80% between 2001-2007. Many of these developments came under fire immediately or soon after their inception, yet were largely pushed through both houses in rapid succession with little parliamentary or other oversight, owing to the supradominance of the Howard government during this period.⁴⁷¹

The atmosphere of panic in which Australia’s anti-terrorism laws were enacted and the political clout held by the Howard Government during these critical years created an extensive suite of anti-terrorism legislation which was overly complex, ill-thought out in many cases, eroded key rights of Australians and extended the Commonwealth’s power over criminal matters far further than any preceding legislation. The suite was widely labelled as draconian and heavily criticised by sectors of government, the judicial system, non-government organisations and the media. Even a judicial report commissioned by the Howard Government itself recommended dramatic reforms to the legislation, and expressed strong reservations about the means by which ‘terrorist organisations’ were identified. The anti-terrorism legislative suite eventually included ‘control orders’ for up to 12 months, extensive detention powers (under which people as young as fourteen could be held incommunicado for up to two weeks), banning of select ‘terrorist organisations’, and the introduction of controversial ‘sedition’ laws.⁴⁷² Crucial to evaluating the success of this invasive and far-reaching ‘hyper-legislation’, relatively few charges have been laid under the extensive suite, and even fewer convictions have been achieved.⁴⁷³

Initial fears that Muslims might be targeted by this new suite of legislation were borne out in many cases. All convictions under anti-terrorism charges have applied to Muslim men, and all but one of the organisations listed by the Australian government as terrorist organisations

⁴⁷¹ Melissa Bull and Mark Craig, "The Problem of Terrorism: Balancing Risk between State and Civic Responsibility," *Current Issues in Criminal Justice* 18, no. 2 (2006): p. 210; Andrew Lynch and George Williams, *What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia's Anti-Terror Laws*, Briefings (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006).

⁴⁷² Bull and Craig, "The Problem of Terrorism," p. 210; Lynch and Williams, *What Price Security*; Maddox, "People Like That."

⁴⁷³ To date only 26 convictions have been achieved and many of the laws have never been utilised; others have been misused or have significant potential for misuse. Expectations of major repeals and amendments to this legislative suite after the ousting of the Howard Government were not borne out – even major reviews such as the Clarke Enquiry ended up recommending only minor amendments and tweaks to Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation. Chris Michaelsen, "Terrorism in Australia: An Inflated Threat," *Security Challenges* 6, no. 2 (2010); George Williams, "Some of Our Anti-Terrorism Laws Are Past Their Use-by Date," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 August 2012.

are explicitly Islamic.⁴⁷⁴ This latter fact is particularly remarkable considering that in other countries which have such lists of ‘proscribed organisations’, the listed organisations typically include a wide range of groups including numerous non-Muslim groups. Prior to 2009, for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were listed by many countries as a ‘terrorist organisation’, yet they were not listed as such in Australia. This was as a result of campaigning by community-based organisations in Australia on the grounds that because of deep and ongoing connections within the global Tamil diaspora, listing the LTTE under the Criminal Code was likely to have a significant and adverse impact on normal social, economic and political activities for Tamils in Australia. The Parliamentary Joint Inquiry into the proscription of ‘terrorist organisations’ adamantly dismissed claims by the Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission that the selection of organisations reflected any anti-Muslim bias, though it tacitly admitted that it could be perceived to be so.⁴⁷⁵

It is clear that in terms of the impact of the anti-terrorism legislation, the burden was unfairly borne by Australian Muslims. In addition to the prosecution of individuals under anti-terrorism legislation and the proscription of certain organisations, many individual Muslims and Muslim communities became subject to intensive policing as a result of the increasing securitisation of Muslims. Expanded police and intelligence powers were reportedly being used coercively, to intimidate people into cooperating with authorities where they had no legal obligation to do so. Officers in the September 2001 raids, mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as later well-publicised large-scale raids on Muslim homes in Australia following the Bali bombings and London bombings, are reported to have used unnecessary force, and to have threatened people directly (or indirectly through their family members) with detention or imprisonment.⁴⁷⁶ Through the discussion of comparative examples, Waleed Aly has highlighted how counter-productive these type of counter-terrorism strategies have been historically. Not only did such tactics increase alienation among Australian Muslims, but they also indirectly fostered radicalisation. This process reveals the major flaws in the logic espoused by Miranda Devine, quoted in the previous chapter: rather than making us

⁴⁷⁴ The exclusion being the PKK, a Kurdish separatist movement based in Turkey. Australian National Security, *Listing of Terrorist Organisations* (Canberra: Australian Government 2008).

⁴⁷⁵ Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, "Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995," (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2007), Ch. 3.

⁴⁷⁶ Waleed Aly, "Axioms of Aggression: Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Productivity in Australia," *Alternative Law Journal* 33, no. 1 (2008): p. 21; David Dixon, "Interrogating Terrorist Suspects: Criminal Justice and Control Process in Three Australian Cases," *UNSW Faculty of Law Research Series*, no. 24 (2008); Poynting and Perry, "Climates of Hate," p. 165.

safer, unjust targeting of Muslim communities and individuals was likely to increase the risk of ‘homegrown’ terrorism, just as the involvement of Australia in the ‘War on Terror’ increased the risk of terrorist attacks on Australian targets in the international sphere.⁴⁷⁷

The revelation that several Australian Muslims had allegedly acted as combatants against the US-led forces in Afghanistan, and that two had been captured and were eventually transferred to detention in Guantanamo Bay, served to further inflame fears and anxieties about ‘homegrown’ terrorism and of Australian Muslims acting as a ‘fifth column’. The Howard Government did little to support either of these detainees, Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian-born Australian citizen, and David Hicks, a convert to Islam of Anglo-Australian heritage, and much to malign them in the eyes of the public. The fact that Australian consular staff, intelligence agents, and Federal Police agents attended interrogation sessions with Australians detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay and at other sites where they were rendered meant that Australian government officials were well aware of the abuses being carried out within such jails and detention centres.⁴⁷⁸

An illustrative example of the Howard Government’s indifference to the fate of these Australian citizens is the differential treatment accorded to Mamdouh Habib and two German nationals who were captured at the same time as him in Pakistan. Since this was in early October 2001, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, these prisoners were never technically considered ‘enemy combatants’, but were nevertheless detained by Pakistani authorities for ‘questioning’ and then turned over to US forces. Under pressure from their government, the two Germans were repatriated to Germany within weeks, but in the absence of strong advocacy on the behalf of the Australian government, Habib was transferred to detention in Egypt in a case of ‘extraordinary rendition’ under the auspices of the US. Habib subsequently obtained copies of Australian government documents from late 2001 which detailed the

⁴⁷⁷ Farhad Khosrokhavar, the Iranian-born French sociologist, has written extensively on the motivations of jihadists, that is, Muslims who believe that violence and perpetual warfare are an obligation and an individual duty enjoined upon all believers. As well as surveying comparative studies of jihadists, Khosrokhavar has personally interviewed a number of jihadists imprisoned in France. He characterises jihadists based in the West as less immersed in Islamic culture, predominantly of lower middle class origins, and more likely to be motivated by abstract concepts of the plight of other Muslims, a mechanism Khosrokhavar describes as ‘humiliation by proxy’. Therefore, the individual does not need to experience firsthand poverty, discrimination or violence in order to be deeply affected by the perceived humiliation of Muslims by the West. What is crucial here is the emphasis on perception: countering recruitment to jihadist ideologies is therefore reliant not only upon removing the root causes of injustice, but also addressing the perception that Muslims are humiliated, discriminated against, or oppressed. Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).

⁴⁷⁸ Habib, *My Story*; David Hicks, *Guantanamo: My Journey* (North Sydney: Random House, 2010); Leigh Sales, *Detainee 002: The Case of David Hicks* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007).

attempts of consular staff to gain access to him in Islamabad and Cairo, and recorded reports that he had been mistreated.⁴⁷⁹ Within three or four days of Habib’s arrival in Guantanamo Bay in May 2002, he was interviewed by two AFP agents, a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and an ASIO agent. At this stage, Habib was so ill from his internment and treatment in Egypt that he had to be wheeled on a gurney to his interview, yet the Australian Government failed to intervene with the US government to release him; he was finally released from Guantanamo more than two years later without charge.⁴⁸⁰

The turning point

Marion Maddox has reflected that when taken together, the Howard Government’s counter-terrorism policies ‘painted a “Them” so dangerous (even when they are children) that normal civil liberties should not apply’; the result of this campaign of ‘fear-augmentation’, was, however, not to create increased security but to instill a ‘heightened sense of a half-visible menace’.⁴⁸¹ The menacing ‘Them’ were supposedly ‘driven by the frightening values of strange religion’, which was increasingly being painted as besieging the embattled ‘Us’ (mainstream Anglo-Australians) who featured so strongly in the rhetoric of the Howard Government.⁴⁸² Launching the 2004 Counter-terrorism White Paper, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer proclaimed that Australia was locked in a ‘struggle to the death over values’ against ‘Islamofascists’ who were determined to ‘overshadow the democratic West’ and ‘destroy our society by waging a version of total war’.⁴⁸³

Combined with the well-established patterns of media stereotyping and victimisation of Muslims and the creeping normalisation of xenophobic and racist attitudes towards minority groups discussed earlier in this thesis, the rise of state-led victimisation of Muslims became a significant catalysing factor leading to an increasingly volatile environment. As Poynting and Perry have emphasised, ‘hate-motivated vilification and violence can only flourish in an enabling environment’;⁴⁸⁴ that is, ‘if the state assaults, harasses and vilifies Muslims as the enemy in the war on terror and thereby terrorises whole communities, then perhaps white-thinking citizens feel justified in personally attacking this enemy wherever they might

⁴⁷⁹ Habib, *My Story*, p. 239.

⁴⁸⁰ Habib, *My Story*, p. 150.

⁴⁸¹ Maddox, "People Like That," p. 182.

⁴⁸² Maddox, "People Like That," p. 184.

⁴⁸³ Cited in Michaelson, "Terrorism in Australia," p. 19.

⁴⁸⁴ Poynting and Perry, "Climates of Hate," pp. 161, 67.

encounter it’.⁴⁸⁵ The seething fear and anger towards Muslims which had been expressed through a variety of forms of interpersonal, media and state victimisation at different levels during the early 2000s erupted into undeniable public view in December 2005, during the Cronulla Riots.

The Cronulla Riots were triggered by an incident in which several young men of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ became involved in an altercation with lifeguards at Cronulla Beach, a southern suburb of Sydney. The iconic status of lifeguards and the beach in Australian society served to translate the altercation into a representation of the supposed broader ‘cosmic’ conflict between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, between mainstream Australians and their value systems and the value systems of the Middle Eastern/Muslim minority. Fuelled by the incitement of shock jock Alan Jones and other figures in the media, over five thousand people gathered at Cronulla on December 11th, 2005, for what was referred to as ‘Leb and wog bashing day’ in the text messages circulating prior to the event. Chanting racist and anti-Muslim slogans, many people who were in attendance were involved in violent assaults on people of non-Anglo appearance, yet the Prime Minister, the NSW Premier and other key public figures refused to acknowledge that the event revealed a deep-seated racist and anti-Muslim underbelly to Australian society.⁴⁸⁶

Despite this persistent official denial of racism, subsequent to the considerable shock of the Cronulla Riots the first cracks in the edifice of support for the Howard Government’s implicit fostering of anti-Muslim prejudice began to appear. The injustice of many of the policies which could be linked to such virulent outbreaks of racist violence became more publicised in the media, as some of the key foundations of the consensus on the War on Terror began to move into the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ and to be challenged. This was initially evident in the softening of attitudes towards asylum seekers. The inflammatory government claims of linkages between asylum seekers and ‘terrorists’ eventuated to nothing. A 2005 inquiry documented numerous cases of wrongful and inappropriate detention and other actions by the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, as a result of recurrent and unaddressed problems in the administration and culture of the Department, and the harmful effects of lengthy mandatory detention on the physical and mental health of asylum seekers became more widely known, as did the tragic consequences of forced

⁴⁸⁵ Scott Poynting, "What Caused the Cronulla Riot?," *Race & Class* 48, no. 1 (2006): p. 88.

⁴⁸⁶ Grewal, "The 'Young Muslim Man'.": Greg Noble, ed. *Lines in the Sand: The Cronulla Riots, Multiculturalism and Nation Belonging* (Sydney: Institute of Criminology Press, 2009); Poynting, "What Caused the Cronulla Riot?."

repatriation.⁴⁸⁷ The publicisation of these findings, combined with the lack of arrivals of ‘boat people’ during the last two terms of the Howard Government, led to a de-escalation of fear and anxiety over ‘boatpeople’. Polling in the mid-2000s indicated increases in the belief that detention was too harsh and also an increase in opposition to offshore detention.⁴⁸⁸

The flaws in the anti-terrorism regime were also becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Perhaps partially as a consequence of the exposure of Australian intelligence and policing agents to the extreme interrogative procedures and lack of due process evident in Guantanamo Bay and prisons in Egypt and Pakistan during the early phases of the ‘War on Terror’, or as a result of political pressure to secure arrests and convictions, over-zealous and inappropriate actions by intelligence and policing agents in Australia contributed to a series of widely-publicised bungles of terrorism cases. The very first conviction made under Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation was overturned in 2006, because the evidence on which the conviction was based had been obtained under duress whilst the defendant, Joseph ‘Jihad Jack’ Thomas, was being held in a Pakistani prison in 2003. Australian Federal Police (AFP) agents had attended these ‘interrogation’ sessions and were therefore aware that the circumstances under which Thomas had been interrogated created significant difficulties for successful prosecution in the Australian court system.⁴⁸⁹ Another AFP officer, Ramzi Jabbour, was among the Australian officials present at an interrogation of Mamdouh Habib in Guantanamo Bay.⁴⁹⁰ The same officer was involved in a later case in which a doctor, Mohammed Haneef, was arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences, then cleared as the evidence against him unravelled. The official Clarke Inquiry into the affair blamed the mishandling of the case on Ramzi Jabbour’s loss of objectivity, making him ‘unable to see that the evidence he regarded as highly incriminating in fact amounted to very little’.⁴⁹¹ Because of the totemic significance of this case for the course of the 2007 election campaign, it is worth considering the ‘Haneef Affair’ in some further detail, before making concluding remarks in this chapter.

⁴⁸⁷ Australian Human Rights Commission, *Nation Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention*; Mick Palmer, *Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Cornelia Rau: Report* (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005); Jewel Topsfield, "The Asylum Seeker We Sent Home to His Death," *The Age*, April 3 2009.

⁴⁸⁸ Marr, *Panic*, p. 236.

⁴⁸⁹ Dixon, "Interrogating Terrorist Suspects," pp. 12-15.

⁴⁹⁰ Habib, *My Story*, p. 150.

⁴⁹¹ Michael J. Clarke, *Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: Volume One* (Canberra: Clarke Inquiry, 2008), p. x.

The Haneef Affair

The ‘Haneef Affair’ began shortly after 3pm, on Saturday 30th June 2007, when a jeep loaded with propane canisters was crashed through the glass doors of the main terminal at Glasgow Airport. The vehicle was set on fire by its occupants, and several bystanders suffered injuries, though the most serious injuries were suffered by the driver of the jeep, Kafeel Ahmed, and his passenger, Bilal Abdullah. Mr. Ahmed was to die of his severe burns on 2nd August. During the next forty-eight hours, a number of arrests were made by British police in connection with the bombing attempt. Those taken into custody included Mr. Ahmed’s brother, Dr. Sabeel Ahmed. On the 2nd July, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were informed by the UK police that Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian national working as a registrar in a Gold Coast Hospital, was of interest to the case. Dr Haneef was the second cousin of Kafeel and Sabeel Ahmed, and preliminary questioning of Sabeel Ahmed indicated that Dr Haneef had given him a mobile phone and SIM card which were potentially linked to the attacks. Dr Haneef was quickly located and placed under 24-hour surveillance.⁴⁹²

A few hours after commencing surveillance, Dr Haneef was followed from his home to Brisbane Airport, where he was found to be intending to board a plane home to India with a one-way ticket. Dr. Haneef subsequently maintained that his intent in leaving Australia was to visit his wife and six-day-old daughter, following a difficult birth and health complications. It was intended that return tickets and visas for his wife and daughter could be arranged once back in India. However, given the context of heightened anxiety over terrorist attacks, the Queensland Police officer and AFP officer who were on the scene took Dr Haneef into custody. Even at this stage of the investigation, however, there was some concern that there were not sufficient grounds for arresting Dr Haneef. The UK police had already notified Australian authorities that they had ‘downgraded’ their assessment of the direct threat posed by Dr Haneef, though they still considered him a person of interest in the case. Although the Queensland Police Officer on site considered there to be insufficient evidence for detaining Dr Haneef, the AFP adamantly pushed for his detention and eventually prevailed over their state counterparts.⁴⁹³

⁴⁹² Clarke, *Clarke Inquiry Report*, p. 45; Jacqui Ewart, *Haneef: A Question of Character* (Canberra: Halstead Press, 2009), ch. 2.

⁴⁹³ Clarke, *Clarke Inquiry Report*, pp. 45-8; Ewart, *Haneef*, ch. 2.

Before coming to work in Australia, Dr Haneef had worked in Cheshire, England. When Dr Haneef left England, he gave his cousin Sabeel Ahmed a SIM card and the balance of a two year mobile phone contract to use and pay off, in order to save the money of having the contract terminated. The supply of the SIM card was the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case, and Haneef was held under the terms of the *Anti-Terrorism Act 2005*. According to this legislation, Haneef was denied contact with representatives of the Indian government, his family and other inmates. This meant that he was held in solitary confinement for up to 23 out of every 24 hours, except for interrogations and one hour of supervised exercise each day. Haneef was the first person detained and arrested under this specific aspect of the anti-terrorism legislation, and the first to have his detention extended under the *Act*. He was eventually detained for a total of twelve days (2nd-14th July) before being charged with a crime – the longest detainment without charge in Australia’s recent history.⁴⁹⁴

After being charged, however, the court granted Dr. Haneef bail. Before bail could be made, then Minister for Immigration Kevin Andrews cancelled Dr. Haneef’s work visa and ordered him to be remanded into immigration detention. The unusual step by the magistrate of granting bail to a terrorism suspect, which indicated severe doubt already as to the strength of the prosecution’s case, was therefore overridden by Federal Government intervention – a further erosion of the separation of powers that had been a major concern with the new anti-terrorism legislation from the start. By the 27th July, the Director for Public Prosecutions (DPP) had come to the view that there was no prospect of making out an offence against Dr Haneef, either in respect to the charge that had already been brought against him, or any other information which might emerge from further investigation. Twenty-four hours later, the Minister for Immigration permitted Dr Haneef to return home to Bangalore. Dr Haneef has not returned to Australia since the affair. This was not, however, the end of the case. The DPP’s investigation had found that there were two key flaws in the case against Dr Haneef. The first was the prosecutor’s claim that his SIM card was found inside the jeep used in the Glasgow attack. This claim later proved to be entirely false – British police maintain that the SIM card was found on the person of Dr. Sabeel Ahmed in Liverpool, and that the AFP were never informed otherwise. Secondly, in an AFP affidavit submitted to the court, the AFP made a number of claims which were not supported by the interview record.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁴ Clarke, *Clarke Inquiry Report*, p. 48; Ewart, *Haneef*, ch. 2.

⁴⁹⁵ Stephen Keim, "Reflections Upon the Trial of Dr Haneef," *Precedent*, no. 82 (2007): pp. 38-9.

A British court found on 11 April 2008 that Sabeel Ahmed had no knowledge of his brother’s activities prior to the event. The main piece of evidence in this finding was email correspondence between the two brothers, which was available to the AFP from at least the 5th July 2007, when British police officers were in situ in Brisbane assisting the investigation and vice versa. This evidence was not shared with Dr Haneef’s lawyers during the period of the trial, yet it decisively removed any putative connection between Dr Haneef and the Glasgow attack, since it was on the basis of the SIM card given to Sabeel Ahmed that Dr Haneef was arrested in the first place. The Minister’s decision to revoke Dr. Haneef’s visa proved to be just as controversial as the criminal case against him. In August 2007, the Federal Court set aside the ministerial decision to cancel Dr. Haneef’s visa. The Minister in turn appealed this decision, but a full federal court dismissed the appeal in December 2007.

Both aspects of the case demonstrated that the ethical and practical implication of the essentialisation of Islam as inherently violent was the enablement and normalisation of acts of discrimination against Muslims, such as the trying investigation ordeal endured by Dr Haneef. At a conference in New Delhi in 2008, Haneef told the audience that:

I am a living example of how the menace of terrorism has affected innocent lives and the phenomenon of how Muslims are stereotyped as being terrorists or sympathisers of terrorists whether they are guilty or not.⁴⁹⁶

Stephen Keim, Haneef’s barrister, argued that the crucial significance of the case was the extent to which ‘politics intruded into the law-enforcement process’.⁴⁹⁷ During 2008, Keim secured the release of over 250 documents which had formerly been withheld by the Department of Immigration. An additional 15-20 documents remained undisclosed, with the Department arguing that these documents were not covered by freedom of information laws. Among these documents was a list of attendees at a meeting between senior members of the Immigration and Foreign Affairs Departments with counterparts in the Department of the Prime Minister on July 4 2007, just 36 hours after the arrest of Mr. Haneef. Also among the suppressed documents was an options paper drawn up as a result of this meeting. Mr. Howard had previously denied any involvement in the Haneef investigation.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁶ Matt Wade, "We Are Typecast, Haneef Tells Muslims," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 June 2008.

⁴⁹⁷ Cited in Dylan Welch, "Barrister Admits Haneef Leak," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 July 2007.

⁴⁹⁸ Chris Hammer, "Papers Link Howard's Department to Haneef," *The Age*, 18 June 2008; Stephen Keim, "Whither Now? Pondering the Mohamed Haneef Case," *Bulletin (Law Society of South Australia)* 30, no. 3 (2008).

Whether or not the Prime Minister played a direct role in encouraging the AFP or the Minister for Immigration in their witch hunt, he certainly failed to denounce their actions even as it became increasingly clear that the investigation was hopelessly compromised, instead falling back again on the tried-and-trusted rhetoric of security and threat. ‘When you are dealing with terrorism’, Howard declared, ‘it's better to be safe than sorry’.⁴⁹⁹ As a consequence, David Dixon argues,

With at least tacit encouragement from a government facing a general election which had previously exploited security scares for political advantage, sections of the media treated Haneef as a prize capture.

The tabloid media published a range of unsupported and patently untrue claims, most of which were never formally retracted, including that Haneef had been plotting to blow up a Gold Coast skyscraper and that he was one of a number of doctors of Muslim Indian origin in Queensland who had made enquiries or arrangements regarding learning to fly a plane.⁵⁰⁰

As with other cases that were seen to have ‘gone bad’ as their legal ramifications unfolded, assumptions that the Haneef case would be an asset, helping the Coalition to set the agenda for the election on issues of ‘security’, were confounded as the story became rapidly polluted. The story began to unravel when two journalists at *The Australian* exposed the flaws in the police case, listed above, and the charges against Haneef were consequently dropped. As the first wave of media coverage had apparently been inspired by what Geoffrey Robertson QC called ‘smears and leaks [from] police and politicians’, the role of the Australian Federal Police in particular now came under scrutiny.⁵⁰¹ Commissioner Mick Keelty took the unusual step of issuing a statement claiming the AFP was not responsible for any of the claimed leaks.⁵⁰²

Some media and political reactions even picked up on the apparent emergence of a pattern, of difficulty in making charges ‘stick’ against high-profile defendants on charges brought under anti-terrorism laws, caused in some cases by attempts to use the media to manipulate the case in question for political gain. In an earlier case, that of Joseph Thomas, prosecutors turned to

⁴⁹⁹ Ben Packham and Gerard McManus, "Howard Defends Haneef Case," *Herald Sun*, 31 July 31 2007.

⁵⁰⁰ Dixon, "Interrogating Terrorist Suspects," p. 16; For a full discussion of the media coverage of the Haneef Affair, see Jacqui Ewart, "Media and Myth: Dr Haneef and the Fourth Estate," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010).

⁵⁰¹ Geoffrey Robertson, "Introduction," in *Haneef: A Question of Character*, ed. Jacqui Ewart (Canberra: Halstead Press, 2009), p. 7.

⁵⁰² Australian Federal Police, *Media Statement* (Canberra: AFP, 2007).

admissions made in a media interview which had not been published at the time of the initial trial as evidence to support a retrial.⁵⁰³ Against this backdrop, the *démarche* by Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews, of withdrawing Dr Haneef’s working visa and obliging him, therefore, to enter detention even though he had won bail through the court system, was seen to have backfired, and the Minister was criticised for overturning the presumption of innocence in an active criminal case.

Contesting the ‘war on terror’ consensus

At the same time that increased scrutiny was being applied to the mishandling and inappropriate intervention of government representatives in anti-terrorism cases, developments in the so-called ‘war on terrorism’ far away from Australia were also, arguably, diminishing in value as a political asset for a government intent on campaigning on ‘security’ issues. Howard never enjoyed the same level of political ‘cover’, for Australia’s participation in the US-led invasion of Iraq, as the governments of other troop-supplying countries including the US itself, and the UK – namely, bipartisan legislative and majority public support. The Labor Opposition attempted to reject the argument that participation was vital to Australia’s own security, as either misconceived or fraudulent. Instead, Howard was argued to have followed Washington’s lead regardless, with ministers criticised in memorable terms by the then Labor leader, Mark Latham, as ‘a conga-line of suckholes’.⁵⁰⁴

Despite the voicing of opposition to towards Australia’s participation in the invasion of Iraq by the Opposition Leader and other public figures, such views continued to be discounted and lampooned in the mainstream media, which continued to favour the Howard Government’s stance on ‘security’ issues through the mid-2000s. In 2004, Latham’s opposition was cited, in an election-eve editorial in the mass-circulation Sydney newspaper the *Daily Telegraph*, as justifying the paper’s recommendation to its readers of a vote for the Coalition. Latham’s promise ‘to pull Australian troops from Iraq by Christmas raises questions about Labor’s relationship with our most important ally’, the paper said, ‘and betrays a dangerous lack of understanding of the global nature of the terrorist threat’.⁵⁰⁵ The following years – the period separating that from Howard’s last election as leader in 2007 – were filled with unremittingly

⁵⁰³ Michaelsen, "Terrorism in Australia," p. 21.

⁵⁰⁴ Alex Ramsey, "Howard's Team Are Not the Only Suckholes," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 October 2003.

⁵⁰⁵ Cited in Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, pp. 166-67.

bad news from Iraq. A self-proclaimedly civilising mission had encouraged high hopes for political and security gains – backed by ministerial rhetoric – and focused attention on the conduct of occupying troops. Not only did the country lapse into a destructive civil war, with regular reports of large-scale civilian deaths, but claims of misconduct by US forces began to emerge on a regular basis. And in the UK, the extent of duplicity by politicians planning the invasion was confirmed with the much-reported leak of a memo from the head of MI6, the British secret service, commenting that ‘the intelligence and facts’ (on Iraq’s so-called weapons of mass destruction) ‘were being fixed around the policy’ – as publics were given the opposite impression.⁵⁰⁶

At a local level, the cynical promotion of Islam and Muslims as a threat concept for electoral gain was exemplified by the evidence that members of local branches of the Liberal Party in marginal Western Sydney seats had employed tactics such as anti-Muslim smear campaigns against a Labor candidate in 2004 and the distribution of fake, patently Islamophobic election materials during the 2004 and 2007 election campaigns. In 2004, such ‘dirty tricks’ remained little more than whispered allegations and received limited attention in the mainstream media; in fact, as shall be discussed later in this thesis, *The SMH*’s columnist Paul Sheehan was instrumental in facilitating the smear campaign against the aforementioned Labor candidate. Yet in 2007, when the perpetrators were caught and documented in the act of distributing their fake flyers, what became known as the ‘Lindsay leaflet scandal’ became one of the biggest stories of the final days of the election campaign. John Howard’s attempts to downplay the significance of the act and to deny its racist characteristics, as he had successfully managed to do for so many other key developments during his tenure as Prime Minister, were a signal failure.⁵⁰⁷

For the first time, the tried and trusted methods of the Howard government and its media supporters, for setting an agenda conducive to electoral success, were now beginning to show substantial cracks. In so far as these methods gave rise to, and drew strength from, the essentialisation and demonisation of Australia’s Muslim communities, could these phenomena, too, now be in abeyance, or at least occurring in attenuated form, as manifest in the social artefact of media reporting? That is the central question to be investigated in Part 3

⁵⁰⁶ Richard Norton-Taylor, "Memo to Mendacity," *The Guardian*, 19 April 2007.

⁵⁰⁷ Kevin Dunn and Alana Kemp, "A Failed Political Attempt to Use Global Islamophobia in Western Sydney: The 'Lindsay Leaflet Scandal'," in *Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West*, eds. George Morgan and Scott Poynting (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012); Peter Manning, "Transmitting Meanings: Defining 'Muslim' in the Federal Election Seat of Greenway," *Social Alternatives* 24, no. 1 (2005).

of this thesis, which is composed of the methodological, data analysis, and discussion sections of this thesis, and to which I now turn.

Chapter 8 – Research Methodology

This chapter presents a summary of the analytical methodology employed in this thesis on a selection of press articles published during the lead up to the 2004 and 2007 Australian Federal Elections. During this chapter I give a brief overview of content and discourse analytical approaches to data analysis before going on to consider the characteristics of the publications which I focus on in this study and the parameters guiding the sample selection. I then outline the methodology of a Pilot Study, undertaken with the purpose of evaluating and refining the methodological approach for the study, before turning to a consideration of the preliminary research results.

Content and discourse analysis

In order to compensate for any possible bias and to increase analytical validity, methodological triangulation is employed in this study. ‘Between-method’ triangulation will be achieved by using a combination of content and discourse analytical techniques to interrogate press representations of Muslims; and ‘within-method’ triangulation will be achieved through the use of multiple evaluative strategies within research modes.⁵⁰⁸

I employ both qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analysis. Content analysis includes the systematic and replicable analysis and categorisation of data from a set of specified texts in order to infer answers to particular research questions. This definition of content analysis therefore ‘makes the drawing of inferences the centrepiece of this research technique’, yet also suggests that the inferences of the content analyst ‘are merely more systematic, explicitly informed and (ideally) verifiable than what ordinary readers do with texts’.⁵⁰⁹

Historically, studies of representation in the media were largely content analytical.⁵¹⁰ Despite the value of such studies in calling attention to issues such as the incidence of particular

⁵⁰⁸ Bruce L. Berg, *Qualitative Methods for the Social Sciences* (New York: Pearson, 2007), pp. 115-6; Norman K. Denzin, *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp. 301-02; Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," p. 65.

⁵⁰⁹ Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004), p. 25.

⁵¹⁰ Paul Hartmann and Charles Husband, *Racism and the Mass Media: A Study of the Role of the Mass Media in the Formation of White Beliefs and Attitudes in Britain* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1974).

stereotypical phrases, much of the sensitive information that researchers seek to extract from this type of data is implicit rather than explicit. In other words, it is embedded within a discourse:

Much of the information in discourse, and hence also in news reports, is implicit, and supplied by the recipients on the basis of their knowledge of the context and of the world... because of social norms, and for reasons of impression management, for instance, many negative things about minorities may not be stated explicitly and thus are conveyed 'between the lines'.⁵¹¹

In addition, as Entman has suggested, focusing simply on whether terms or phrases are negative or positive, and yet without considering the *salience* of particular elements of the text would 'fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient clusters of messages – the frames – to the audience's schemata'.⁵¹² It is necessary to go beyond the study of isolated words or surface features of the texts, and study 'the meanings of sentences or sequences of sentences and their role in the text as a whole'.⁵¹³

This study will therefore undertake the analysis of texts in the sample not simply from a content analytical approach, but also from a discourse analytical approach. Discourse analytical approaches systematically describe the various strategies of text and talk, and relate these to the social or political context.⁵¹⁴ More specifically, a critical discourse analytical approach will be employed, following in particular the work of Norman Fairclough and Teun van Dijk.⁵¹⁵

Critical discourse analysis is not, as is sometimes suggested, a particular 'method' of discourse analysis. A wide variety of methodologies may be and are employed by researchers working within a critical discourse analysis framework. What distinguishes CDA from other discourse analytical approaches is its emphasis upon the fundamental relationships between language and power. Moreover, CDA 'is not merely interested in any kind of power but it specifically focuses on *abuse* of power, in other words, on forms of domination that result in

⁵¹¹ van Dijk, "New(S) Racism," p. 40.

⁵¹² Entman, "Framing," p. 57.

⁵¹³ van Dijk, "New(S) Racism," p. 40.

⁵¹⁴ van Dijk, "New(S) Racism," p. 34.

⁵¹⁵ See in particular, Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London; New York: Routledge, 2003); Teun A. van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

social inequality and injustice'.⁵¹⁶ CDA is therefore based on normative assumptions about power and its operations, as highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis.

Characteristics of the chosen publications

This study focuses upon articles published by the broadsheet daily newspapers *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian*. Broadsheets are targeted at a readership which is cosmopolitan in outlook, tertiary-educated, clustered in metropolitan centres, white-collar, and has an above-average income – in other words, societal elites. The broadsheet press are also traditionally assumed to place a high value upon political analysis, in contrast to the mass-circulation, 'sensationalist' tabloid press, particularly since the larger size of the broadsheet format (historically with spreads of A1 size) permitted such papers to provide more detailed, in-depth and analytical coverage of issues.⁵¹⁷

The orientation of the broadsheet press towards the reproduction or interrogation of political discourses, and the gearing of their production towards elites are the primary basis for the decision to conduct this analysis upon broadsheet and not tabloid press. A crucial segment of the educated, urban audience which are the targets of the broadsheet press are journalists working for other media outlets. Whilst readership in the general public may not be large, the broadsheet press remains a leading source of information for journalists, and thus has traditionally played a leading role in agenda-setting and the definition of 'news-worthiness' for the Australian media in general.⁵¹⁸ This function of the 'quality' press may be in contemporary decline as the size of newsrooms and resources for journalism are cut back, but for the period covered by this study, *The Australian* and *The SMH* still held considerable influence in the creation of the national news agenda – particularly in regards to the coverage of politics and election reporting.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁶ van Dijk, *Discourse and Power*, p. 56.

⁵¹⁷ David Conley and Stephen Lambie, *The Daily Miracle: An Introduction to Journalism* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 39; Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, pp. 22-23; Simons, *The Content Makers*, p. 29, 103; Young, *How Australia Decides*, pp. 27-29.

⁵¹⁸ Alan Knight, "Australian Based Foreign Correspondents and Their Sources," *eJournalist* 7, no. 1 (2007): p. 16; Mark Pearson, Jeffrey E. Brand, Deborah Archbold, and Halim Rane, *Sources of News and Current Affairs* (Robina, QLD: Bond University, 2001), p. 337; Young, *How Australia Decides*, pp. 168-9.

⁵¹⁹ In a series of interviews with editors and participant observation of news rooms during 2006-2007, Margaret Simons found that commercial free-to-air news programs and the tabloid press are explicitly pushing for a more independent approach and declining to follow the lead set by the broadsheet papers. In the words of Chris Willis, then Director of News at Channel Seven: 'We don't particularly care what's in the newspapers any more'. The traditional role of newspapers has been further eroded by massive job cuts at both News Ltd.

The major papers printed in the broadsheet format during the period of this study were the national newspaper *The Australian*, and the metropolitan dailies *The Sydney Morning Herald* (henceforth referred to as *The SMH*) and *The Age*.⁵²⁰ Despite the nominal metropolitan status of *The SMH*, its extensive coverage of national politics and international news means that it is frequently considered to hold the status of a national daily.⁵²¹ *The Australian* is owned by Rupert Murdoch's media conglomerate, News Ltd., whilst Fairfax Media publishes the other major broadsheets. Most other newspapers in Australia are owned by these proprietors, with News Ltd. dominant in metropolitan areas and Fairfax dominant among the regional and rural press. The two corporations together currently account for 86% of newspaper sales in Australia.⁵²²

The decision to focus this study upon *The Australian* and *The SMH* was based upon characteristics of circulation outlined below, but also due to their differing proprietors and political stances. As noted by Elizabeth Poole in her comparable study of British broadsheets, whilst neither of the two newspapers selected can be said to be consistently 'politically partisan' as such, they routinely endorse one party in electoral contests, and are demarcated in terms of ideological and cultural orientation.⁵²³

Since the 1970s, *The Australian* has been considered right of centre, and *The SMH* has regularly been accused of a pro-Labor bias. These generalisations are complicated by the fact that *The Australian* has editorialised in favour of Labor at some points in Australian political history (most notably the 1972 and 2007 federal elections), whilst *The SMH* has editorialised in favour of the Liberal party in numerous elections.⁵²⁴ Nevertheless, the current duopolistic

And Fairfax in recent years; nevertheless, the major newspapers still have large newsrooms, established networks and reach key readership demographics so their influence has persisted despite these setbacks, as demonstrated in a recent report by O'Donnell et al. Penny O'Donnell, David McKnight, and Jonathan Este, *Journalism at the Speed of Bytes: Australian Newspapers in the 21st Century* (Sydney: The Walkley Foundation, 2012), p. 4; see also, Simons, *The Content Makers*, pp. 101-02, 58-60.

⁵²⁰ *The Financial Review*, whilst printed in 'compact' or tabloid format, is regarded as a national broadsheet daily as a result of its subject matter, approach and target demographic. As of March 2013, *The SMH* and *The Age* have also moved to a 'compact' format, meaning that *The Australian* is the only major newspaper still published in Australia in the broadsheet format. Andrew Crook, "Fairfax Cuts Deep: Papers to Tabloid, 1900 Staff Axed," *Crikey* (2012).

⁵²¹ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, p. 22.

⁵²² Terry Flew and Ben Goldsmith, "Factcheck: Does Murdoch Own 70% of Newspapers in Australia?," *The Conversation* August 8th 2013.

⁵²³ Elizabeth Poole, "Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the British Press," in *Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalising World*, ed. Kai Hafez (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 2000), p. 160.

⁵²⁴ In fact, in its early years, *The Australian* was widely considered markedly left-of-centre, whilst in contrast, *The SMH* had traditionally assumed an arch-conservative stance. Don Aitkin, "Perceptions of Bias in the Australian Mass Media," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 7, no. 2 (1972); Economou and Tanner,

division of the print media in Australia between the Murdoch and Fairfax stables generally means that their coverage of political issues is somewhat divergent.

During the period of this study, *The Australian's* Monday-Friday circulation decreased slightly from 133,711 (2004) to 133,000 (2007), with Saturday circulation declining from 300,360 (2004) to 299,500 (2007). *The SMH* had the largest circulation of the three broadsheet papers in Australia, with Monday-Friday circulation dropping from 216,827 (2004) to 212,700 (2007), and Saturday circulation from 372,750 (2004) to 364,000 (2007).⁵²⁵ *The SMH's* large Saturday circulation is exceeded in Australia only by two of the major metropolitan tabloids. *The Australian's* Saturday circulation brings its to a par with the second highest circulating weekday broadsheet, *The Age* (which is from the same publishing stable as *The SMH*).⁵²⁶

Despite concerns that 'the digital revolution' would result in the demise of the press media, Australian broadsheet newspapers weathered the growth of online news media relatively well during the early to mid-2000s. Following decades of steady decline, Australian newspaper circulation and readership appeared to stabilise somewhat during the mid-2000s, especially when compared against the US or the UK.⁵²⁷ However, within this overall stability, there were shifts in patterns of both readership and circulation. According to some measures, the broadsheet papers actually demonstrated slight increases in circulation and readership between the early and mid 2000s, whilst the circulation and readership of the tabloid newspapers dropped more dramatically.⁵²⁸ The broadsheet press developed a particularly strong market share of online news readership during this period, with *The SMH* consistently recording the highest readership among the online news sites, and *The Australian* ranked fifth (behind *The Age*, news.com.au and *The SMH Sun*).⁵²⁹

Part of the stability of Australian broadsheets during the early to mid-2000s may therefore be attributable to their success in developing online news sites that supplemented hard-copy

Media, Power and Politics in Australia, p. 23; Editorial, "It's Time for a Vote of Greater Independence," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 October 2004; Griffen-Foley, *Party Games*, Chapter 7.

⁵²⁵ Australian Press Council, *State of the News: Print Media in Australia 2008 Report* (Sydney: Australian Press Council, 2008), section 2:10.

⁵²⁶ Australian Press Council, *State of the News 2008*, section 2:10.

⁵²⁷ Australian Press Council, *State of the News 2008*, section 2:8; Jacqui Ewart, "What's New in Newspapers? Reconnecting with Readers" (paper presented at the Journalism Education Australia Annual Conference, Griffith University, November 29th - December 2nd 2005), p. 4; O'Donnell, McKnight, and Este, *Journalism at the Speed of Bytes*, pp. 9-15; Simons, *The Content Makers*, pp. 29-30.

⁵²⁸ Australian Press Council, *State of the News 2008*, section 2:7.

⁵²⁹ Australian Press Council, *State of the News 2008*, section 2:15.

publications. Significantly, the development of electronic editions of traditional papers gave them an opportunity to compete with radio and television in the timely production and dissemination of news, addressing one of the major weaknesses of the print media in comparison with their electronic counterparts. The significance of ‘geographical reach’ as a limiting characteristic of the print media was eroded, at the same time that the main strength of the broadsheet press, the ability to provide detailed background and analysis rather than simply ‘sound bites’, came to the fore. Online publishing of news stories theoretically enables viewers to access more information, simply by clicking hyperlinks to access video footage, supporting documentation, interview transcripts, or additional stories on the topic.⁵³⁰

The claims of stability of the newspaper market must, however, be taken with a grain of salt: the newspaper industry, after all, had a vested interest in convincing advertisers that despite declines in circulation, they still reached significant audiences.⁵³¹ The struggle to measure the readership of newspapers in opposed to their circulation, in addition to ongoing difficulties in quantifying the proportion of readers accessing print versions versus web-only versions of papers led to cynical manipulation of circulation figures by newspapers as well as bitter disputes during the mid-2000s between industry group The Newspaper Works and pollsters Roy Morgan.⁵³² During the past five years, following the clean-up of auditing and the massive growth of online news readership, circulation, readership, and revenue for the Australian newspaper sector can be seen to have fallen dramatically across the board.⁵³³ That said, the ‘quality’ broadsheet press do appear to have had an edge over the tabloids in weathering the growth of online news provision in the mid-to-late 2000s, underscoring the utility of focussing upon broadsheet publications for studies of representations of Muslims and Islam in Australia during the period of this study.

Characteristics of the sample

The material for analysis was selected through Factiva online archive searches on articles published in *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian*, during a time period of one month prior to each of the 2004 and the 2007 Federal Elections. The exact time frames of the study were 12th September – 9th October 2004 and 28th October – 24th November 2007

⁵³⁰ Economou and Tanner, *Media, Power and Politics in Australia*, pp. 230-1, 40.

⁵³¹ See for example, Jane Schulze, "Newspaper Readership Figures Strong," *The Australian*, 20 February 2009.

⁵³² For more details, see Simons, *The Content Makers*, pp. 151-55.

⁵³³ Glenn Dyer, "Newspaper Circulation Carnage - Biggest March Fall on Record," *Crikey*, 11 May 2012.

respectively. The search criteria used were the date range of twenty-eight days (four weeks) prior to the elections, coupled with the keywords 'Islam OR Islamist OR Islamism OR Muslim OR Muslims'.

Articles were considered for analysis if they could be determined as being at least partially *about* Islam or Muslims (e.g. Islam as a religion, or a Muslim person, organisation or country). To this end, articles were only included if they referred to Islam or Muslims within the headline or first two paragraphs, or otherwise the whole of a later paragraph. It was hoped that this strategy would therefore exclude passing references to Muslims and Islam, following John Richardson's conventions for sample selection in analysis of representations of Muslims in the media.⁵³⁴

The near synonym 'Islamic' was not included in the search. Informal sampling indicated that adding this term to the search greatly expanded the number of articles in the data set (for example, it resulted in an additional 70 raw stories in the 2007 period for *The Australian*). However, the majority of these additional articles contained only passing references to Muslims or Islam, could not be considered to be *about* Islam or Muslims, and were therefore largely excluded from the study given the sample selection criteria outlined above. In particular, the word 'Islamic' often appeared in an article solely in the context of the name of an organisation, such as the 'al-Ghazzali Centre for Islamic Sciences and Human Development'. It was determined that the amount of time required to sift the additional, mostly peripheral items could be better spent in analysis.

It must be noted that the terms 'Islamist' and 'Islamism' are terms which are generally employed in the mainstream media with pejorative connotations. These terms are inextricably linked to the notion of 'Political Islam', and therefore articles which used these terms would be highly likely to be conflating Islam as a faith with the notion of Islam as a political system.⁵³⁵ This would mean that such articles would frequently be coded as presenting 'closed' views of Islam, unless they also made a clear distinction between 'Political Islam' and the practice of Islam as a religious faith, according to the coding categories outlined below. In view of these considerations I recorded variations in the utilisation and definition of these terms for further analysis.

⁵³⁴ John E. Richardson, "Who Gets to Speak? A Study of Sources in the Broadsheet Press," in *Muslims and the News Media*, eds. Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 104.

⁵³⁵ Andrea Teti and Andrea Mura, "Islam and Islamism," in *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 92-3.

When an article was reproduced in more than one edition of the paper on the same day (e.g. in the early or late editions, or the regional vs. country-wide editions), with minor changes made to the content or length of the original article, the article with the widest distribution or deriving from the latest edition was selected and the other variants discarded. In the event that the changes included different patterns of quotation, however, both versions were analysed separately.

Articles from all sections of the paper, including features, local, world, letters and reviews were included in the analysis. Each discernible ‘story’ which contained the keywords was numbered as a separate unit of analysis. For example, multiple letters on the same day were treated as separate ‘stories’, even though Factiva reproduces and counts all letters from the same edition as one article. In this sample, there were no discrepancies between the stories published in the hardcopy format of the paper versus its online counterpart (i.e. no web-only stories). These processes of sample selection and refinement resulted in a sum total of 373 stories which were subjected to further analysis according to the criteria outlined below.

Considerations and limitations

This study has a number of limitations which must be considered from the outset. Firstly, by using the explicit terms ‘Muslim(s)’ and ‘Islam’ and near cognates to investigate stereotypical representations of Muslims, it is probable that more subtle forms of stereotypical reporting about Muslims and Islam are missed. That is, articles which employed coded terms for Muslims or Islam, the existence of which are well documented in the literature on ‘dog-whistling’ in Australian politics, would not be pinpointed by this study.⁵³⁶

On the other hand, as Chris Allen has pointed out, the very *normalisation* of Islamophobia/anti-Muslim sentiments means that in the past decade, certain stereotypical presentations of Muslims became commonplace, acceptable and even entrenched.⁵³⁷ It is therefore posited that only investigating those articles which explicitly refer to Islam or Muslims will still be worthwhile in terms of illuminating the dominant types of stereotypes employed in referring to Muslims, and shifts in strategies of representation over the period of the study.

⁵³⁶ Fear, *Under the Radar*; Manning, *Dog Whistle Politics*.

⁵³⁷ Allen, "Islamophobia," p. 64.

Secondly, as these stories were downloaded from online archives, there is no way to evaluate the positioning or prominence of these articles in their respective editions, aside from which page the story appeared on, as this data is routinely stored by Factiva. As noted by Lee and Maslog in their analysis of Asian reporting of conflicts,⁵³⁸ the creation of coding categories from evaluative criteria initially developed as a method of prepublication screening creates issues for this type of content analysis.⁵³⁹

Thirdly, there has been no attempt to analyse images, be it photos or cartoons, which accompanied these articles. Visual analysis of accompanying images would be a key area for future development of this study.

Fourthly, the decision to analyse articles regardless of which section of the paper they appeared in creates some difficulties for the study. It results in substantial variation between many of the physical features of the story. For instance, opinion articles are frequently written not in a journalistic style but in a personalised style which does not necessarily conform to the norms of mainstream news journalism. Therefore, it was often impossible to collect data about patterns of quotation from this style of article, for example, as sources were frequently absent from such articles.

Another example is that the inclusion of Letters to the Editor and other non-‘news’ stories (referred to henceforth as ‘soft news’ stories) means that in many stories in the sample standard physical characteristics of news stories, such as a clearly defined headline, subheader and byline, were missing. For example, the percentage of stories with a subheader ranged from as much as 26.8% (*The Australian*, 2007) to as low as 18% (*The Australian*, 2004). The ‘inverted pyramid’ structure common to traditional news stories means that classical studies such as Hartmann and Husband devoted special attention to analysis of headlines, since the headline would commonly provide a brief summary of the whole article, influences the interpretation of the rest of the article and is more likely to be read than the whole story. This type of analysis is not well suited to my data sets, considering the lack of uniformity in story format.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁸ Seow Ting Lee and Crispin C. Maslog, "War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverage of Conflicts," *Journal of Communication* 55, no. 3 (2005): p. 325.

⁵³⁹ Johan Galtung, "On the Role of the Media in Worldwide Security and Peace," in *Peace and Communication*, ed. T. Varis (San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad para La Paz, 1986).

⁵⁴⁰ Hartmann and Husband, *Racism and the Mass Media*, p. 141-42.

However, some interesting patterns emerged early on in the process of analysis which meant that it seemed pertinent not to exclude these non-standard articles but to analyse them alongside traditional ‘hard news’ stories. For example, first impressions upon reading all the stories suggested that within the 2004 data sets, there were often reviews, letters and other ‘soft-news’ stories which seemed to feature surprisingly open views towards Islam, in contrast to the predominance of closed views towards Islam in the ‘hard news’ stories. In the 2007 period, by comparison, whilst it seemed that the dominance of closed views towards Islam had waned among the ‘hard news’ stories, it appeared to me that a greater number of soft news stories featured extremely or very closed views towards Islam.

Finally, the time frame selected for this study was four calendar weeks, or twenty-eight days, inclusive of the actual day of the respective elections. However, the formal 2004 and 2007 Election Campaigns were both forty days long and ended on the day *prior* to the respective elections (commencing on 29th August 2004 and the 14th October 2007 respectively).⁵⁴¹ It must also be noted that the 2004 data collection period commences the day *after* the third anniversary of September 11, and just three days after the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. My data collection therefore excludes several extremely critical days in terms of coverage of issues related to Islam during the 2004 election campaign. I considered though that the coverage during the final month before the election and on election day was of most significance to the political process: as noted in Chapter 3, late-deciding voters, who are particularly influenced by media coverage during the election campaign, have risen significantly in Australia over the past two decades, with as high as 20% of voters delaying their decision until the actual election day.⁵⁴²

Data analysis methodology: developing the codebook

To determine the most productive mode of analysis for the diverse articles in the four data sets, I carefully read and then entered into a preliminary codebook the physical features of the full 373 articles in the sample, taking note of significant patterns which I observed as characteristic of the sample and worthy of detailed investigation. I then conducted a Pilot Study on a small selection of these articles prior to beginning more detailed coding and

⁵⁴¹ The campaign begins when the Governor-General consents to dissolve the House of Representatives and issue writs for the election, and ends the day before the election. The campaign period is set by the Prime Minister of the day, and may be between 33 and 68 days. Parliament of Australia, "The Electoral System," *Parliamentary Handbook* (2008).

⁵⁴² McAllister, "The New Politics of Late Deciding Voters," p. 24-25; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 4.

analysis. The Pilot Study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of my proposed coding categories and methodology, and as such included analysis of both content and discourse in the selected articles. During the process of coding the articles in the Pilot Study I kept detailed notes on the reasoning behind the process of coding each article and modified the methodology of my study where required to make it more consistent and workable.

As well as seeking to refine the content analysis categories, I analysed the articles in the Pilot Study through a more detailed critical discourse analysis approach following methodologies and techniques demonstrated by Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and Peter Teo.⁵⁴³ I posited that detailed analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study might reveal significant themes or features of the data set which my planned coding categories failed to account for; for example, it was through the process of coding the physical features of the full sample and then evaluating and selecting the articles for my Pilot Study that I perceived the importance of including both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news stories in the sample. In this way, and through the development of the study’s methodology via systematic processes of evaluation and amendment on the basis of the data I had collected, an element of grounded theory was introduced into the evolution of the methodology for this project.⁵⁴⁴

When selecting articles for the Pilot Study, I wanted to avoid choosing articles that represented particular viewpoints, such as the most negative articles from each period. I therefore created a relatively neutral selection criterion based on the characteristics and subject matter of the article. This is because the purpose of the Pilot Study was more to work through any potential issues in the application of my content and discourse analysis approach, rather than to necessarily draw any significant conclusions from this very small set of data. I selected five articles from each of the four key sets of data, that is, twenty articles in total. The five articles per data set were chosen from the five weekdays immediately preceding each election, so the time frames of the Pilot Study were 4-8th September 2004 and 19-23th November 2007.

I initially intended to include one article from each weekday of the week preceding each Election, but my ability to choose a representative sample of articles was hampered by variation in the number and type of articles fitting the search criteria for each different data

⁵⁴³ Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse*; Teo, "Racism in the News."; van Dijk, "New(S) Racism."

⁵⁴⁴ Melanie Birks and Jane Mills, *Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE Publications, 2011), pp. 9-10.

set. For example, there were no articles matching the search criterion in *The SMH* on the 20th-21st November 2007. I therefore included three articles from the 22nd November in the Pilot Study. On the preceding day, 19th November 2007, there was just one article matching the search criterion in *The SMH*, a Feature article written by Justice Michael Kirby. I had initially intended to analyse only straight ‘news’ articles in the Pilot Study, but these features of the data set led me to decide to try and include one Feature article, one article from the World section and one from the Local news section for each data set, and then to try and select the final two stories by choosing ones which did not overlap significantly with the subject matter for the other units of analysis from that specific data set.

Where possible, I tried to select articles for the Pilot Study which addressed similar subject matter in different papers in the same election period. For example, I included one article on the EU’s reservations towards accepting Turkey as a member state from each of the two papers in the 2004 period, and one article on the Lindsay leafleting scandal from the 2007 data sets, in order to permit some preliminary comparative comments to be made on the representation of the same issue in the different papers. As a result of this process, I was able to select the twenty articles which were most appropriate for the Pilot Study.

Categories of analysis – summary

Content analysis of the articles in my sample was recorded through the use of a codebook which included over thirty variables, analysing the following types of aspects: physical characteristics (e.g. newspaper, size, date, etc.); topics and themes; citation and/or quotation of actors; the tone of the article; and the presence of certain words and phrases. I anticipated that some of these categories would require a second phase of reorganisation or streamlining as a result of my experiences during the Pilot Study.

The five principal categories for analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study were:

- a) Physical features
- b) Islamophobic index
- c) Problem
- d) Language features
- e) Quotation patterns

The first three coding criteria enable the identification, quantification and comparison of Islamophobic discourses within the four data sets; the final two represent analytical techniques which can enable an exploration of *how* these discourses are evoked, enacted, and enunciated within any given article.

Following the Pilot Study, I determined that the full 373 articles should be consistently coded on just the first three ‘core’ categories of analysis (physical features, Islamophobic index, and Problem). In addition to this structured analysis of all 373 articles, certain articles or sets of articles will be analysed in a more personalised and subjective manner, sometimes including analysis according to the language features or quotation patterns of the articles in addition to the core categories of analysis. Which articles should be separated out and analysed in more detail in this manner will generally be guided by distinctive features of the article or articles detected during the content analysis. This could include an article with a particularly high Islamophobic index, or an article featuring particularly emotive and/or demonising language. It could also include constellations of articles featuring the same primary theme to reveal variations in treatment of similar subject matter; a key example here would be the large number of articles from the 2007 period relating to the Lindsay leafletting scandal.

Categories of analysis – coding

In the following section of my thesis, I will discuss in order the five principal categories for analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study.

a) Physical features

Before selecting the articles for the Pilot Study, every single article in the sample was given a unique alphanumeric code (e.g. A04_01 – indicating the first article from the 2004 data set from *The Australian*), and the details were entered into a codebook and categorised according to the following physical characteristics:

- i. Title and Subheader
- ii. Date of Issue and page number
- iii. ‘Hard News’ (World + Local sections)/ ‘Soft News’ (all sections except World & Local)
- iv. Section & Subsection (e.g. World/General)
- v. Source (e.g. staff reporter, wire service)

- vi. Attribution (e.g. named journalist, editorial)
- vii. Subject

The coding of the physical features of articles according to these components of the codebook proceeded without any issues. However, some aspects of the physical features were not considered worth further detailed analysis. As mentioned above, for example, the title and subheader of articles were not analysed in their own right, nor was the location of the article (indicated by the page number of the article), as preliminary assessment of the sample did not indicate any significant patterns worthy of detailed attention in regard to these features. The principal physical features of the articles which were subject to further physical analysis were the final five characteristics listed above. The list of articles in the Pilot Study, and their coding results, can be seen in *Appendix B*.

b) Islamophobic index

The definition of Islamophobia set forth by the Runnymede Trust in 1997,⁵⁴⁵ as discussed in Chapter 2, has become widely accepted and utilised not only in the UK but internationally in a variety of contexts.⁵⁴⁶ Despite criticisms and difficulties in operationalising this definition of Islamophobia, the Runnymede Trust's formulation of Islamophobia encompasses a variety of typical essentialist, new-racism and Orientalist aspects of anti-Muslim sentiment and is acknowledged as providing a useful baseline for assessing the presence of 'Islamophobic' aspects of media discourse.⁵⁴⁷ Abdalla et al. note that 'any genuine attempt by the media or journalists to challenge and eliminate prejudice in reporting against Islam and Muslims would require an appreciation of these identifiers [of Islamophobia]'.⁵⁴⁸

The eight indicators of 'closed' views of Islam and eight indicators of 'open' views of Islam shown in Figure, which are derived from the Runnymede Trust's characterisation of Islamophobia, are therefore used as the basis for coding categories for Islamophobic frames.

⁵⁴⁵ Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, *Islamophobia*.

⁵⁴⁶ See for example, Aslan, *Islamophobia in Australia*; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia* (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia); Runnymede Trust, *Runnymede Trust Activities Report 2005-2006* (London: Runnymede Trust, 2007); Vakil, "When Is It Islamophobia Time?," pp. 36-38.

⁵⁴⁷ Allen, "Islamophobia," pp. 52-54.

⁵⁴⁸ Mohamad Abdalla, Jacqui Ewart, and Halim Rane, "A Way Forward?," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010), p. 235.

<i>Frame Descriptor/ Dimension</i>	<i>Closed views of Islam</i>	<i>Open views of Islam</i>
<i>1. Monolithic / diverse</i>	Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.	Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.
<i>2. Separate / interacting</i>	Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.	Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them.
<i>3. Inferior / different</i>	Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.	Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect.
<i>4. Enemy / partner</i>	Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in ‘a clash of civilisations’.	Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.
<i>5. Manipulative / sincere</i>	Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.	Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents.
<i>6. Criticism of West rejected / considered</i>	Criticisms made by Islam and Muslims of ‘the West’ rejected out of hand.	Criticisms of ‘the West’ and other cultures are considered and debated.
<i>7. Discrimination defended / criticised</i>	Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.	Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion.
<i>8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic</i>	Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and ‘normal’.	Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.

Figure 1: Content analysis categories - Islamophobic Frames

Following the methodology outlined by Lee and Maslog in their intensive comparison of peace or war journalism frames in Asian reporting of conflicts,⁵⁴⁹ these eight indicators will be used to elicit from the article which frame – open or closed views of Islam – dominated the narrative in each article. I intended to determine which frame was employed in any given story through scoring stories as Open, Closed, or Neutral on each of the eight frame descriptor dimensions.

During the process of conducting my Pilot Study, it became clear that simply describing each article as ‘open’ or closed for each dimension did not sufficiently capture the nuances within each unit of analysis. I considered that reverse scoring the results for ‘closed’ framing of Islam would facilitate more incisive differentiation between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ frames. Once I began experimenting with reverse scoring, I realised that I had the makings of a bipolar scale, running from one extreme through to the opposite extreme. These features of the coding lent themselves towards creation of a Likert-type scale through which I could assemble a quantitative measure to evaluate the ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of any particular story. Since the score on each of the eight frame descriptor dimensions was three-point (i.e., could be positive, negative or neutral), then it was possible that an article could be scored as neutral on every dimension/item. Adding a neutral point resulted in the following nine-point rating scale:

<i>Score</i>	-7-8	-5-6	-3-4	-1-2	0	1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8
<i>Descriptor</i>	Extremely closed	Very closed	Closed	Somewhat closed	Neither closed nor open	Somewhat open	Open	Very open	Extremely open

Figure 2: Open/Closed views of Islam - rating scale

For each article in my sample, therefore, I allocated a score of -1 (closed), 0 (neutral) or +1 (open) for each of the eight frame descriptor dimensions. I then added up the overall scores for the eight dimensions, and based on this ‘summed score’, coded the article according to the rating scale which I devised. If an article’s sum total score was 3, it was coded as being characterised by ‘Open’ views towards Islam. This rating scale therefore aggregated the

⁵⁴⁹ Lee and Maslog, "War or Peace Journalism?," p. 316.

scores of open or closed views on eight different dimensions, in effect creating an ‘Islamophobia Index’, which therefore enabled comparison of large numbers of articles.

c) *Problem*

Studies of racism in the media have frequently found that ethnic or racial minorities appear in a relatively small proportion of press articles, and when they are present, they are largely represented in negative ways.⁵⁵⁰ Following the classic study of racism in the media by Hartmann and Husband,⁵⁵¹ many studies analysing stereotypes or negative representatives of ethnic minorities have focused on investigating the issue of minority or other outgroups being frequently represented as a ‘problem’ in the news media.⁵⁵² This method of analysing representations of minorities dovetails with Galtung’s observations that ‘news’ is traditionally focussed upon problems rather than solutions.⁵⁵³

Articles were therefore coded according to whether they represent Muslims or Islam as a ‘problem’ (Positive, Negative or Neutral). Following the Pilot Study, I added a category of coding to this component of the study: I listed a category for the target identified by each article as a ‘problem’ (there were very few articles which did not identify a problem at all).

d) *Language features*

Following Seow Ting Lee, three related criteria were focussed on evaluating the features of the language, in particular, determining whether language was a) victimising; b) demonising and c) emotive. The three indicators of ‘negative’ language features, and three indicators of ‘positive’ language features indicated in Figure 3 (opposite) are therefore used as the basis for the features of language coding categories.⁵⁵⁴

Articles will be coded according to whether they use Victimising, Demonising or Emotive language (Positive, Negative or Neutral). Since these are three of the thirteen indicators of a peace journalism approach according to the criteria developed by Lee and Maslog, the results for this section of coding will lend themselves to interpretation through the lens of peace

⁵⁵⁰ For an overview, see Teo, "Racism in the News."; van Dijk, *Discourse and Power*; Wilson and Gutiérrez, *Race, Multiculturalism and the Media*.

⁵⁵¹ Hartmann and Husband, *Racism and the Mass Media*.

⁵⁵² See in particular, Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, Ch. 8.

⁵⁵³ Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," in *Essays in Peace Research*, ed. Johan Galtung (Copenhagen: Eljers, 1965).

⁵⁵⁴ Seow Ting Lee, "Peace Journalism," in *Handbook of Ethics in Mass Media*, eds. Lee Wilkins and Clifford G. Christians (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 271.

journalism theory. In keeping with CDA, this is a value explicit definition where peace is considered not merely the absence of violent conflict, or negative peace, but also the presence of social justice, that is, positive peace.

<i>Negative language features</i>	<i>Positive language features</i>
Uses victimising language (e.g. destitute, devastated, defenceless, pathetic, tragic, demoralised) which only tells what has been done to people.	Avoids victimising language, reports what has been done and could be done by people, and how they are coping.
Uses demonising language (e.g. vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, fundamentalist).	Avoids demonising language and uses more neutral and precise descriptions, titles or names.
Uses emotive words (e.g. genocide, assassination, massacre and systematic).	Objective and moderate (avoids emotive words, reserves the strongest language only for the gravest situation, and does not exaggerate).

Figure 3: Content analysis categories - language features

e) *Quotation Patterns*

The significance of quotation patterns in ‘gate-keeping’ have been outlined in Chapter 3. Therefore, for a selection of articles within the sample, sources quoted will be coded on the following three criteria:

- i) direct or indirect;
- ii) Muslim or non-Muslim;
- iii) Bureaucratic or non-Bureaucratic.

The development of these coding criteria derives largely from Richardson’s large-scale analysis of representations of Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers in the late nineties.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵⁵ Richardson, "Who Gets to Speak?," pp. 104-10.

It is hoped that the data drawn from this analysis of quotation patterns will enable correlative studies both within this dimension (e.g. the extent to which Muslim sources are quoted directly or indirectly), as well as across other aspects of the content and discourse analysis (e.g. the extent to which Muslim sources are quoted directly in articles which feature either open or closed views of Islam).

In articles which are coded for quotation patterns, all sources will also be recorded by the descriptor used in the article of that source (e.g. ‘a male youth’ or ‘Detective Inspector Johnson’) for possible detailed analysis of particular articles in terms of actor roles and grammatical features such as over-lexicalisation in reference to Muslim sources.

This chapter has set out the methodological rationale and approach which guides my analysis of the individual units of data in this research project – that is, the social artefact of news stories from the broadsheet newspapers *The Australian* and *The SMH* in the month prior to the 2004 and 2007 Federal Elections. In the next chapter, I will describe how I applied, to the smaller sample in the Pilot Study, the evaluative criteria which I devised to produce a comparative analysis of the extent of Islamophobia in the two periods. The capacity of this approach to reveal ideational differences, in response to a change of periods and the passage of time, will be evaluated and considered, before moving on to apply it to the rest of the articles from my sample.

Chapter 9 – Pilot Study

In this chapter, I report upon the results of my ‘Pilot Study’ and discuss a range of features of the twenty articles selected for the Pilot Study. The Pilot Study represented not only a chance to evaluate and improve the coding criterion and identify any issues within my methodology, but also through the discussion in this chapter, I am able to illustrate in detail the process by which I evaluated and coded each article. I begin with an overview of the overall scores for articles on the ‘Islamophobic Index’ which I had developed based upon the Runnymede Trust’s characterisation of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views towards Islam. I then examine in detail the coding process and key results for the eight individual dimensions of the Index, discuss the extent to which Islam was represented as a ‘problem’ in articles within the Pilot Study, and finally, consider the quotation patterns and features of language in these twenty articles. The full results of coding for the Pilot Study can be seen in *Appendix B*.

Islamophobic Index – overview

Although the Pilot Study focused on a very small sample of the larger data sets, patterns nevertheless emerged from my analysis. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, the basic findings of the Pilot Study were replicated in the results of the full study, and the results of the Pilot Study were therefore validated as indicators of the potential for the methodology outlined in the previous chapter to accurately identify divergences between different groups of texts. Overall, half of the articles in the Pilot Study (ten articles) had negative *total* scores when their scores on each of the eight dimensions of the Islamophobic Index were summed, indicating a preponderance of ‘Closed’ views of Islam. Two articles were neutral, or had a summed score of 0, whilst eight articles received positive *total* summed scores, indicating a preponderance of ‘Open’ views of Islam. ‘Closed’ articles, which had negative summed scores, ranged from -1 (or ‘Somewhat Closed’) to -8 (‘Extremely Closed’); ‘Open’ articles, which had positive summed scores, ranged from +1 (‘Somewhat Open’) to +7 (‘Extremely Open’). Among the articles selected, one article each from *The SMH* and from *The Australian* were ranked with the lowest possible score of -8; notably, these were both ‘soft news’ opinion pieces and both appeared in 2004.

Notable differences between the two election periods and between the two newspapers were visible even with this small sample. In 2004, all five articles from *The Australian* and two articles from *The SMH* were scored negatively; in 2007, this dropped to three articles scored negatively from *The Australian* and zero articles from *The SMH*. In 2004, articles in *The Australian* ranged from -8 to -3; in 2007, the range had shifted upwards from -5 to +7. In *The SMH*, in 2004 articles ranged from -8 to +5; in 2007, the range had contracted slightly but still shifted upwards significantly, with the summed score of articles ranging between 0 and +3.

Within the same time period, treatment of the same issue in the different newspapers also revealed divergences. During the 2004 period, for example, the Pilot Study included one article from *The Australian* and one from *The SMH* on Turkey's European Union bid. 'EU puts Turkey on 10-year timeline' (A04_12) was rated as 'very closed' with a score of -5, whilst 'Europe cautious in talking Turkey' (SMH04_10) was rated as 'very open', with a score of +5. This is a quite substantial difference between two articles on the same subject which were published just one day apart. How could the two articles be scored so differently? In order to address this question, I describe in some detail below the reason behind the differential scores in the two articles. This enables the illustration of the coding method and approach of my study as well explaining some of the distinctive features of 'open' versus 'closed' approaches to the same news 'story'.

'EU puts Turkey on 10-year timeline', written by *The Australian's* Middle East correspondent Nicholas Rothwell, is on the surface a fairly balanced, neutrally worded article. Rothwell faithfully records a range of objections to Turkey's EU membership without using heated, inflammatory language; he also notes dispassionately that 'there are some strong pro-Turkey EU members', namely the UK. But at no point does Rothwell question the Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes which underpinned much of the antagonism to Turkey's membership. Rothwell justly mentions Turkey's poor human rights record and continued abuses in the policing system as obstacles to EU membership. However when he describes 'widespread concern' over 'the growing Islamic minorities [in Europe] and the threat of terrorism', as well as the potential for 'a vast flow of migrant workers into western Europe', Rothwell does not provide any critical analysis of whether such concerns are well-founded. By not critiquing objections to Turkey's membership in the EU on the grounds of anti-Muslim fears, Rothwell subtly gives the impression that such concerns are legitimate. Rothwell also records the unprecedented provision of permitting the EU to close its borders

to Turkey at any time, if Turkey's bid was successful, without critically reflecting upon the xenophobia and double standards underlying such a proposal. Rothwell himself refers to Turkey as 'the Muslim nation', reinforcing the idea that Islam is monolithic and unchanging, and potentially primitive and aggressive. His listing of objections to the membership of Turkey also reinforces this idea, by implying that Muslim terrorists, Muslim minorities in Europe, and Muslim nations are all one within this monolithic entity. Rothwell signally fails to critique the role of Islamophobia in the furore; by tacitly accepting the assumption that there is some kind of unbridgeable gap between 'the West' and Turkey, opposition to Turkey's EU membership on the basis of its 'Muslimness' is legitimised and normalised.

By contrast, 'Europe cautious in talking Turkey', penned by *The SMH's* London correspondent Peter Fray, openly acknowledges and challenges some of the *attitudes* underlying opposition to the EU's bid. Fray writes that 'fears are widespread across Europe and run the gamut from blatant Islamophobia to legitimate issues about human rights'. Fray discusses objections to Turkey's membership under four headings: financial, human rights, employment, and religious. Fray goes through these objections in turn and weighs up to what extent the concerns are valid, concluding that the financial and human rights objections are significant and justified and that these concerns will be able to be addressed during the ten-year time-frame set for managing Turkey's bid. Fray noted in regards to 'employment', however, that the EU's suggested provision for blocking migration from Turkey raised concerns that Turkey was only being offered 'second-class membership', and moreover, that the proposal appeared to 'breach the EU's own principle of free movement of labour'. On the topic of religion, Fray noted 'growing fears that Europe, especially France, is being overrun by what many consider an alien culture'. Nevertheless, Fray emphasised, 'the prospect of Turkey joining the EU one day remains a potentially powerful symbol. The country's geographical location, history and culture make it the perfect bridge between East and West'. This vision of the symbolic value of admitting Turkey to the EU, if the Turkish government could address the *legitimate* objections to its admission, is a long way from Rothwell's mechanical and unchallenging recitation of both legitimate and more problematic objections to Turkey's membership bid.

There are not any other sets of articles covering the exact same topic from 2004, although there is one article from *The Australian* and one from *The SMH* on the same general topic – terrorist violence in south Asia. '39 Sunnis killed in "revenge" blasts' (A04_11) is a story based on wire feeds from Pakistan which covers a bomb blast in the city of Multan which

killed 29 people; in ‘North Indian Violence’ (SMH04_18), Sydney-based journalist Ben Cubby summarises international media coverage of bomb blasts in northern India which killed more than 50 people. Both these articles received the exact same score (-5), and both had the exact same pattern of scoring on the eight dimensions of the study: -1, indicating ‘closed’ views of Islam, for the first five dimensions, and 0 for the final three, indicating ‘neutral’ views of Islam on these dimensions. The ‘sameness’ of these two articles suggests considerable constraints for journalists in the reporting of ‘terrorist attacks’, which encourages them to fall back onto formulaic depictions of ‘tit-for-tat’ violence, devoid of context, which activate the first five dimensions of Islamophobia, according to the Index used in this study, and singularly fail to critique or problematise such constructions (the final three dimensions of the Index).

This can be compared to articles on the same broad topic in 2007, where the closest comparisons are ‘PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis’ from *The Australian*, which includes reference to a bomb blast in Pakistan (A07_32), and ‘Honour for journalist hostage’, which described in detail the kidnapping of an Australian-trained journalist by a militant group in Iraq (SMH07_20). The article from *The Australian* scored -4 (indicating a Closed view of Islam), whilst the article from *The SMH* scored 0 (neither Open nor Closed); A07_32 in many respects continued the patterns of reporting on violent conflict which were found in the two articles from 2004 discussed above. The particular details of this article will not be discussed in detail in this chapter, however, as I will return to this article in depth in Chapter 11.

‘Honour for journalist hostage’ will be discussed here in some detail though. This an interesting article because although many of the same stereotypes and problematic language regarding ‘terrorists’ persist in this article (particularly the repetition of phrases such as ‘hardline Islamic groups’ and ‘Islamic extremists’), the article takes a ‘human interest’ angle on the kidnapping of a journalist which had occurred three years previously whilst she was covering the war in Iraq. The article focuses on the fact that the journalist herself was a Muslim (of Indonesian origin), who became a campaigner for the safety of journalists covering the war in Iraq as a result of her experiences. Her work there led to her receiving a prestigious journalism award in Sydney; hence why the story was being covered in *The SMH* in 2007. The sympathetic portrayal of the journalist and emphasis upon her faith enabled the article to draw away from the representations of Muslims as monolithic and universally violent and barbaric which were common to many other articles covering ‘terrorist attacks’.

In terms of the coding for this article, positive scores on Dimensions 1 and 2 balanced out the negative scores on Dimensions 4 and 5, resulting in the final score of 0 for this article. Within the Pilot Study articles, there was therefore a clear decrease between 2004 and 2007 in the prevalence of closed views of Islam in the reporting of ‘terrorist attacks’ – which were demonstrably one of the most central issues to representations of Islam in this period – though this decrease was more marked in *The SMH* than in *The Australian*.

During the 2007 period the Pilot Study included two sets of paired articles, that is, where I analysed articles reporting on the same event from both papers. The first of these events was the ‘Annapolis’ summit on Israel-Palestine brokered by President Bush; both newspapers reported on rumours that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia would pull out of talks, with *The Australian*’s article which I included in the Pilot Study scoring -1 overall (A07_37), and *The SMH*’s article on the topic scoring 0 (SMH07_19). The second of these ‘paired events’ was the Lindsay leafleting scandal: in this case, within my Pilot Study there was one article on the topic from *The Australian*, which scored +7 (A07_22), and two from *The SMH*, which scored +3 and +1 respectively (SMH07_17, SMH07_18). During 2007, the reporting on paired issues was much closer between the two newspapers than reporting on paired issues in 2004, and articles were much more likely to feature open views in 2007 than in 2004. In contrast to the other trends observed for articles in the Pilot Study, it was an article from *The Australian* which actually demonstrated the most ‘open’ views of Islam out of the whole collection of articles in the Pilot Study. Overall, however, the trend was for articles in *The SMH* to feature more open views than comparable articles in *The Australian*.

Islamophobic Index – results for individual dimensions

When I compared the number of articles which were coded as either ‘closed’, ‘neutral’ or ‘open’ on each of the individual dimensions of the Index, some interesting patterns also emerged, as represented in Figure 4. The dominant feature of the distribution of open and closed articles by dimension was that there were distinctive, similar patterns for scoring of the first five dimensions (where ‘closed’ views outweighed neutral and ‘open’ views) as opposed to the final three (where neutral views outweighed either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ views). Rather than going through each dimension in turn, I will consider in detail the patterns of scoring for Dimensions 5 and 3, which were characterised by the highest and second highest

incidence of ‘closed’ views and then briefly consider the scoring for Dimension 4, before moving on to discuss the scoring for Dimensions 6-8 of the index.

Closed/ Open	1. Monolithic/ Diverse	2. Separate/ Interacting	3. Inferior/ Different	4. Enemy/ Partner	5. Manipulative/ Sincere	6. Rejected/ Considered	7. Defended/ Criticised	8. Natural/ Problematic
<i>Closed</i>	9	8	9	7	10	2	3	4
<i>Neutral</i>	7	4	9	8	10	13	13	9
<i>Open</i>	4	8	2	5	0	5	4	7

Figure 4: Pilot Study - Islamophobic Index results for Individual Dimensions (number of total articles in Pilot Study which were coded as closed, neutral or open on the eight individual dimensions)

As mentioned above, the highest number of articles coded as ‘closed’ for any individual dimension was Dimension 5. Dimension 5 concerns the perception of Islam as ‘manipulative’ rather than ‘sincere’, that is, ‘as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage’, rather than ‘a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents’. On dimension 5, there were no ‘positive’ scores recorded within this sample; articles were split evenly between negative and neutral, indicating strong support for closed views of Islam on this dimension. Negative scores on this dimension were particularly common in articles about terrorist attacks, which were liberally peppered with phrases such as ‘radical Sunni Muslim groups’ combating ‘rival Shi’ite minority’ (A04_11), ‘Islamic fundamentalist groups’ (SMH04_18) or ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘hardline Islamic groups’ (SMH07_20), and did not include points which would indicate that Islam was a genuine religious faith. ‘39 Sunnis killed in ‘revenge’ blasts’ (A04_11), for example, described an attack upon a prayer meeting in Multan, Pakistan, which could potentially have provided an opportunity for consideration of Islam as a genuine religious faith. Instead, the article actively constructed even this prayer meeting as primarily political in nature: ‘two bombs’, the correspondent wrote, ‘ripped through a gathering of Sunni Muslim radicals’ and ‘hit the most radical of Pakistan’s hardline Sunni militant organisations’. Discussions of peace talks and regional instability similarly made frequent references to political/military confrontations between different Muslim states or groups, such as referring to ‘Sunni Muslim Arab States’ being against ‘Shiite Muslim Iran’ (SMH07_19). Such constructions reinforced the idea of Islam as a ‘political ideology, used

for political or military gain' and eclipsed any consideration of Islam as a genuine religious faith.

Constructions of Islam as a political ideology rather than a genuine religious faith appear to have been the most difficult 'closed' view of Islam for journalists and commentators to contest or to deconstruct, even if they may have tried to. One of the most promising articles in terms of potential for representing Islam as a genuine religious faith was an advertorial article appearing in *The Australian* in 2007, as part of a promotional campaign for the annual Multicultural Marketing Awards (A07_34). The winner of the grand prize at the Awards ceremony was the National Interfaith Festival on Queensland's Sunshine Coast. The festival was held, the organisers said, 'to combat what they called the rising level of tension and fear within Australia, arising from parts of the major religions', and included a variety of activities 'aiming to counter negative messages and polarisation emerging along faith lines in our society'. Yet even in this article, with such honourable aims clearly articulated, the author seems to struggle with the idea that Islam can be a genuine religious faith. Listing the activities during the weekend, which include information and seminars on a variety of faiths. The faiths represented at the festival are then listed, and at the end of the list appears 'Aboriginal spirituality' and 'the nature of Islamic prayers'. These two items on the list alone are marked with quotation marks. It seems curious that only these two forms of religious practice needed to be marked in this way. It suggests that they can be differentiated from other forms of religious worship or practice; that they are somehow different from the practice of Sikhism, Seventh Day Adventism or Progressive Judaism, which were some of the other faiths represented at the festival and included in the list. It is almost as if the author is calling the authenticity of Aboriginal spirituality and Islamic prayers into question; they cannot be taken as givens, as genuine expressions of religious faith, but must be marked as quotes from a secondary source.

Similarly to the patterns seen for Dimension 5, only two articles could be seen to exhibit 'open' views on Dimension 3, and the other eighteen articles were evenly split between 'closed' and 'neutral' views of Islam on this dimension. Open views towards Islam on this dimension were marked by representations of Islam as 'distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect', in contrast to closed views on this dimension, which represented Islam as 'inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist'. Notably, for most articles the reason that they were coded negatively on this scale was not so much because of the language of the author of the article, but because of the content of key

quotes within the article, which were not challenged but were given prominent positioning. In ‘Northern Indian Violence’ (SMH04_18), for example, which described a series of bombing attacks in North India, The communities affected by the blasts are emphasised as being Christian and the negative effects upon their community and their solidarity in the aftermath of the attack are described, humanising them and building empathy for their plight: ‘We are numbed by the explosions and are yet to come to terms. So the best way to heal the wounds is to pray for the departed souls and wellbeing of those wounded’. The perpetrators, in contrast, are labelled as ‘barbaric’ by a quoted [Christian] community leader and are speculated by Cubby to have been ‘Islamic fundamentalist groups’. The juxtaposition of the humanity of the Christian community and the ‘barbarity’ of the (speculated) Muslim attackers positions the latter as inferior. Other comments within the article indicate a context to the attacks which is not really explored in this article: the attacks may have been in response to violent repression and expulsion of Muslims from the region. Furthermore, other articles within the sample indicated that no organisation had claimed responsibility, but that it could have been perpetrated by a non-Muslim militant group active in northern India – see for example A04_05).

A more subtle example of the positioning of the *Christian* ‘West’ as superior to Islam is found in an opinion piece by columnist Paul Sheehan, ‘Spreading the word of intolerance: Labor’s zealots have a scheme which will put religion in the dock’ (SMH04_19). Sheehan is one of Australia’s most prominent (and prolific) mainstream conservative voices. In this article, Sheehan quotes then Deputy Prime Minister Peter Costello at length, on the topic of the intrinsic centrality of the introduction of Christianity to Australia as the ‘critical and decisive event that shaped our country’. Had Australia been Islamised via Indonesia, Costello argued, ‘our country today would be vastly different. Our laws, our institutions, our economy would all be vastly different’. By valorising Australia’s culture and institutions, and contrasting its ‘Judeo-Christian-Western’ heritage against that of Islam, Costello (and by extension, Sheehan), concretely positions Islam as inferior.

A more difficult case is seen in ‘White House aghast at Saudi rape victim’s sentence for “using media”’ (A07_29), which described a legal case in Saudi Arabia in which a woman who was raped was sentenced to 90 lashes for being in a car with an unrelated male; the sentence was subsequently stiffened to 200 lashes and six months in jail when the woman appealed to the media on the case. The critical views of the case by US and Canadian government officials were extensively quoted in the article, including depictions of the

sentence as ‘barbaric’. The treatment of this woman should by rights be criticised; yet the uncomfortable selection of quotes by the author implicitly supported an essentialist characterisation of Islam and Muslims as barbaric, sexist and inferior to the ‘West’. No Muslim source which was critical of the sentence was quoted; the particular quotation patterns in this article are worthy of in depth discussion though and will be addressed later in this chapter.

A different approach to criticising Islamic legal systems can be seen in an opinion piece by Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Selective tolerance is not tolerance at all’ (SMH07_21). Kirby discusses a legal case in Malaysia where a woman who was born a Muslim converted to Christianity as an adult and wished to marry a Christian man. However, under Malaysian law she would be unable to do so unless she could have her new status as a Christian also recognised under Malaysian law, which required having her identification card amended to reflect her change of religion. After successive appeals, the case was finally heard by Malaysia’s highest judicial body, the Federal Court. Her appeal failed when two of the three judges found against her; the two majority judges were Muslims and the minority judge was a non-Muslim. Kirby’s response allows for the possibility of reform within Islam, as in Christianity; ‘in earlier times, Christianity had a very similar approach to renouncing religion... we have overcome this sectarian divide’. Kirby then goes on to describe how he was impressed by the criticism of the case by a member of the Malaysian Parliament, Dr Thio Li-Ann. Kirby records his subsequent ‘disappointment’ at finding that Dr Li-Ann had campaigned to prevent the repeal of anti-homosexuality laws on the basis of her Christian convictions, claiming that ‘you cannot make a human wrong a human right’. Kirby firmly denounced Dr Li-Ann’s actions: ‘It is not good enough for Christians or people of the Christian tradition, to be selective about tolerance and acceptance. We cannot selectively denounce Islam for its views on apostasy but then do equally nasty and cruel things to each other by invoking imperfect understandings of our own religious tradition’. Kirby’s nuanced critique which calls for self-introspection on the part of would-be critics of other cultures and religions marks a departure from the type of unreflexive criticism of A07_29.

The most notable article in terms of featuring open views of Islam was an article from *The Australian* on the 2007 Lindsay election leafleting scandal, ‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ (A07_22). This article was the highest scored article from this sample; the only dimension on which it was not coded with a positive score was Dimension 5. I scored it with a neutral ‘zero’ on this dimension because whilst not directly espousing the view that Islam

was reducible to a political ideology, it did not *actively* challenge this notion. This was a particularly interesting article; further discussion of this article will be conducted below, in the section on quotation patterns in the Pilot Study articles, as well as in the next chapter, in the course of a broader comparison of the whole cohort of articles discussing the Lindsay leafletting scandal, but some preliminary notes are called for at this point.

In many points this article is a particularly clear example of the core journalistic norms at work. It strenuously avoids ‘taking sides’ and adheres to the principles of ‘objectivity’, carefully balancing quotes and counter-quotes from representatives of the Liberal Party and of the Labor party. It dispassionately recounts the ‘facts’ of the case; including the attempts of Liberal member for Lindsay, Jackie Kelly, to cast the scandal as a ‘joke’ or a ‘Chaser-style prank’, and Prime Minister John Howard’s frustration with the repeated questions concerning this issue and his adamant denial that the scandal reflected racism within the Liberal Party. However, the article also prominently features Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd’s response, in which he rejected the denial of racism which had characterised Howard’s era and ‘challenged Mr Howard to take a strong stance against the racist campaigning’. The space given to views which contradict the Howard Government’s denial of racism and the seriousness of inciting anti-Muslim prejudice is a notable departure from other articles on this same topic within this sample.

‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ further diverges from other articles in this sample concerning anti-Muslim prejudice by going on to report the views of two Muslim community leaders and clearly stating that the scandal ‘threatens to further divide the Islamic community from mainstream Australia’, thereby lending legitimacy to the idea that there *was* a problem with racism/attitudes towards Muslims in Australia and that they had been alienated from the ‘mainstream’ through the actions of people like the Liberal Party members who distributed the fake leaflets. Ameer Ali, ‘the former chairman of Mr Howard’s Muslim reference group’, described the flyers as ‘vicious... and disrupting our communal harmony’. Aziza Abdel-Halim, ‘the nation’s most prominent female leader’, was quoted as saying that ‘the smear campaign exploited the Muslim community and showed disrespect to its beliefs in the interest of achieving a political goal’. These two quotes, in particular the second quote, were the main reason why this article received the status of ‘Extremely Open’. As very few other articles in this sample were able to do, in an oblique manner made necessary by journalistic norms, the quotes in the latter part of this article served to challenge the Prime Minister’s assertion that the scandal did not reflect racism in Australian politics, and to

interrogate the normalisation of Islamophobia. The article's serious consideration of Muslim criticisms of Australian politicians and the political process in this country was highly unusual in articles within the sample.

The coding results for one further dimension are worth discussing in detail: Dimension 4, in which 'closed' views of Islam were characterised by a representation of Islam and Muslims as 'the enemy', and Islam was portrayed as 'violent, aggressive threatening, supportive of terrorism', engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'. Although the patterns of distribution for open and closed views for Dimension 4 were not particularly marked, closed views of Islam on this dimension were particularly concerning in terms of the vitriol of their language. In 'Howard seen as safe bet', an opinion piece in *The Australian* in 2004 (A04_19), former Liberal Party federal minister Neil Brown opined that we were at 'a point in the cycle of history where our civilisation is at risk'. Clearly invoking the 'Clash of Civilisations' frame with this language, Brown asked 'how will we stop the Muslim fanatics who hate our way of life and want to kill us'? Lambasting what he referred to as the 'bedtime story' of addressing the root causes of terrorism through peaceful negotiation and regional strategies, Brown argued forcefully that voters should look favourably upon Howard's government because they 'would take them ['terrorists'] out in a pre-emptive strike as soon as look at them'.

In *The SMH* in the same year, Paul Sheehan's opinion piece attacked the introduction of religious discrimination laws in Victoria (SMH04_19). The first case brought under the new laws involved accusations of religious vilification of Muslims by an evangelical Christian organisation, Catch the Fire Ministries. Sheehan avoids using the inflammatory language which Brown employs, but through careful and sympathetic framing, manages to let Pastor Danny Nalliah, a representative of Catch the Fire Ministries, articulate much the same point: 'I have lived in Saudi Arabia and learned the real nature of Islam', Nalliah is quoted as saying, 'it is to dominate other religions and other cultures. The Koran speaks of world domination... if peaceful methods fail, the Koran says you can use violence'. Alarmist claims of this kind about Islam and Muslims are particularly employed in order to justify and normalise attacks and upon and discrimination towards Muslims. This can be seen, for example, in Neil Brown's legitimisation of pre-emptive strikes, whilst Sheehan's aim in airing Nalliah's views was to excuse and justify the religious vilification employed by Catch the Fire Ministries and to discredit the introduction of religious vilification laws in Australia; a 'very bad law', as Sheehan labels it. The dismissal of the value of religious vilification laws is particularly problematic, given that this gap in the legal system in Australia impacts

disproportionately upon Muslims, as was noted in Chapter 6. Movements towards remedying this gap would significantly improve the ability of Muslims to seek redress for discrimination and to collectively delegitimise Islamophobia in Australia.

Justification or denial of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and the normalisation of Islamophobia are particularly highlighted by Dimensions 6-8 of the scale. As can be seen from the table above, although it was rare for articles to openly dismiss criticisms of actions by the 'West' or explicitly defend and normalise discrimination against Muslims, there were also relatively few articles which scored positive scores for presenting open views on these dimensions; by far the most common score for articles on these three dimensions was 'neutral'. The few articles which were scored with 'open' views on this scale were those which seriously considered or foregrounded criticisms of Western actions, and accurately identified and problematised discrimination against Muslims. Most prominent in this case were the articles dealing with 'dirty' politics which inflamed anti-Muslim prejudice in marginal seats (SMH04_17, A07_22, SMH07_17). The most strident denial of the reality of discrimination against Muslims emanated from Paul Sheehan, mentioned above, who claimed in 2004 that there was an 'absence of evidence' for claims by Muslim community groups and the Anti-Discrimination Board that there had been an increase in attacks and prejudice against Muslims (SMH04_19). His misrepresentation of the evidence of anti-Muslim hostility and violence and complete denial of the ugly role that racism had played in political debate in Australia from the 1990s was a clear 'out of hand' rejection of criticism of the 'West' (Dimension 6). As shall be discussed below his rejection of the reality of anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia was strongly linked to his defence of 'discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society', (Dimension 7) and his normalisation of anti-Muslim hostility (Dimension 8).

A shift on these three dimensions is discernible between 2004 and 2007. In 2004, none of the articles in this sample from *The Australian* received a positive score on these three dimensions (in fact, only one article from this subset of the sample received a positive score on *any* of the dimensions), and in *The SMH*, just two articles received positive scores on any of these dimensions. In 2007, by contrast, only one article in *The Australian* had negative scores on any of these three dimensions, and in *The SMH* there were no negative scores recorded, just positive and neutral scores.

Taken together, analysis of the scoring on the Islamophobic Index for the articles in the Pilot Study indicated that there were strong patterns of higher levels of ‘closed’ views of Islam in 2004 than in 2007, and overall, higher levels of ‘closed’ views of Islam in *The Australian* than in *The SMH*. Neither paper had a monopoly on either open or closed views though; both *The Australian* and *The SMH* had the dubious distinction of printing opinion pieces in 2004 which received the lowest possible score of -8; yet in 2007 it was *The Australian* which printed the article with the highest score in this sample. The ‘soft news’ stories from the 2007 period, in contrast to the distinctly low scores of the ‘soft news’ stories from the 2004 period, received scores of 4 (Open) in *The Australian* and 2 (Somewhat Open) in *The SMH*. This pattern is actually contrary to what I expected from the sample as a whole – I anticipated from my initial reading of the articles in the whole data sample that open views of Islam would be more common in soft news than in hard news in 2004, and that closed views of Islam would be more common in soft news than in hard news in 2007, yet the trend in the limited number of articles in this Pilot Study actually showed the opposite pattern. This issue will therefore need to be revisited when discussing the analysis of the data as a whole.

Framing Islam as a ‘Problem’

Half of the articles in the Pilot Study (ten articles) framed Islam as a ‘problem’, with four articles coded as neutral and six articles coded as having either framed something other than Muslims as a ‘problem’ or did not identify any target as a ‘problem’. Differences between the two election periods and between the two newspapers were once again noticeable. In 2004, four articles from *The Australian* and just two articles from *The SMH* framed Islam as a ‘problem’; there was one article from each newspaper which was coded as ‘neutral’, and two articles from *The SMH* which were coded as either identifying no target or an alternative target as a ‘problem’. In 2007, this dropped to three articles framing Islam as a problem in *The Australian* (with two articles either identifying an alternative target or none at all) and just one article from *The SMH* framing Islam as a problem (with two coded as ‘neutral’ and two coded as identifying an alternative target or no problem). In 2004, articles in *The Australian* ranged from -8 to -3; in 2007, the range had shifted upwards from -5 to +7. In *The SMH*, in 2004 articles ranged from -8 to +5; in 2007, the range had contracted slightly but still shifted upwards significantly, from 0 to +3. Of the soft news articles, three were coded as representing Islam as a problem (A04_19; SMH04_19; SMH07_21); the exception was the advertorial on the Multicultural Advertising Awards in *The Australian* in 2007 (A07_34).

There was a strong relationship between the Islamophobic Index rating and whether articles represented Muslims as a ‘problem’ or not. All articles which had a negative sum total (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Closed’ views of Islam) were found to either present Islam as a problem or were coded as neutral on this measure. The two articles which received a summed score of 0 (‘neither open or closed’) were also coded as neutral in regards to presenting Islam as a problem. Only one of the articles which had a positive summed score (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Open’ views of Islam) could be said to have presented Islam as a ‘problem’; this was the opinion piece by Justice Michael Kirby in *The SMH* in 2007 (SMH07_21). Justice Kirby’s comments, discussed above, led to an overall score of 2, which can be construed as presenting ‘Somewhat Open’ views of Islam, according to the scale I presented in the previous chapter. The distinctive feature of his article was his urging of recognition that it was ‘not good enough for Christians... to be selective about tolerance and acceptance’. However, whilst this was an important point, and his critical approach to a contentious issue clearly demonstrated some ‘Open’ views towards Islam, overall, the article retained a sense that religious faith in and of itself could be problematic. In addition, because Kirby does not distinguish clearly between ‘Islam’ as a monolith and the actual diversity of Islam and Muslims, his claim that we cannot ‘selectively denounce Islam’ for ‘nasty and cruel’ practices, nevertheless frames ‘Islam’ as a problem – albeit one on the same level as ‘Christianity’.

After conducting this Pilot Study I felt that my analysis of this dimension did not go far enough. I had metrics on whether Islam was represented as a problem, but I felt that I needed more information about alternative targets identified as the ‘problem’ in order to make more illuminating conclusions about this factor of analysis. I therefore determined that during the analysis of the full data set I would not merely record whether Islam was represented as a problem or not, but also code any alternative or secondary targets identified as ‘problems’. I hoped in particular to be able to interpret this information in regards to the ‘distance from power’ exemplified by different articles.

Features of language

As can be seen in Figure 5 below, over half the articles in the study did *not* use victimising, demonising or emotive language. There were discernible differences between the two

newspapers and the two different time periods, but not as heavily marked as for other indicators. In 2004, two of the five articles from *The Australian* were coded as having used all three negative language features, with two articles neutral in regards to victimising language but still employing demonising and emotive language, and the fifth article neutral on all three measures. In contrast, in the *The SMH* during 2004, four of the five articles did not employ any of the negative language features, with one article using some demonising and some emotive language. In 2007, just one article from *The Australian* employed all three negative language features, with one article employing some demonising language but neutral in terms of victimising and emotive language, one neutral on all three dimensions and two articles using positive language features on all three dimensions. In *The SMH*, four articles employed positive language in regards to all three dimensions and one article avoided the use of victimising language but did employ demonising and emotive language. The trends therefore suggest similar outcomes to other measures considered above: an overall decrease in use of negative features of language in 2007 as compared to 2004, and in *The SMH* as compared to *The Australian* (for full data see *Appendix A*).

Negative language features	1. Victimising	2. Demonising	3. Emotive
<i>Yes</i>	9	8	9
<i>Neutral</i>	7	4	9
<i>No</i>	4	8	2

Figure 5: Pilot Study - Summary of scores for features of language (number of total articles in Pilot Study featuring negative language features)

I thought that comparing the *features* of the language of articles which I classified as *closed* would give me valuable insight into the characteristics of negative or positive representations of Muslims and perhaps suggest strategies for countering the dominance of closed views towards Islam. There was a clear relationship between the Islamophobic Index rating and whether articles contained negative features of language. All articles which had a negative summed score on the Index (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Closed’ views of Islam) were found to have utilised at least one form of negative language, whilst every article which had a positive sum total (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Open’ views of Islam) included *no* negative features of language at all. Of the two articles which received a sum total of 0 (‘neither open

or closed'), one article was coded as including no negative language features whilst the other included some demonising and emotive language but no victimising language.

Another strong pattern discernible in regards to the usage of negative features of language was the subject of the article. Every article on the subject of either 'terrorist violence' or 'counter-terrorism' either received negative summed scores on the Islamophobic Index (closed views of Islam) or zero (neither open or closed), and every single one of these articles contained some negative language features. With one exception, articles from the Pilot Study on subjects other than 'terrorist violence' or 'counter-terrorism' did not contain *any* negative language features at all: negative language features were therefore highly linked to the subject matter of violent conflict and terrorism. The exception was the article 'White House aghast at Saudi rape victim's sentence for "using media"' (A07_29), which was on a Saudi Arabian court case now known as the Qatif rape case, in which a woman received a jail sentence for appealing to the media following her sentencing to 90 lashes for being in a car with an unrelated male (a circumstance which indirectly led to her rape by multiple assailants). The article, which was sourced from Australian Associated Press, is written in a dispassionate style which largely avoids the use of negative language features. However, the article repeatedly refers to the woman as the 'Saudi rape victim' or 'victim', including in the title to the article. Although there is not a clear consensus in media reporting guidelines regarding the use of the term 'rape victim' as opposed to 'rape survivor' or another alternative term which avoids victimisation, the repetition of the term 'victim' in this article is quite problematical. At other points in the article the woman is referred to by more neutral phrases such as 'the 19-year-old woman' and 'the woman'.

The article also uses the term 'gang rape' to refer to the sexual assault suffered by the woman; current Australian Government guidelines for best practice for media reporting of sexual assault emphasise that:

Cases of sexual assault with more than one perpetrator should be referred to as *multiple perpetrator rape/sexual assault*. Avoid using terms like "gang" or "pack" rape, as these obscure the responsibility and choice of each individual perpetrator.⁵⁵⁶

Other than these instances of problematic labelling, the article largely avoids negative language: it 'reports what has been done and could be done by people' (for example, 'she was

⁵⁵⁶ Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault, *Reporting on Sexual Assault: Media Backgrounder* (Canberra: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2013), section 5.

raped there by seven men, three of whom also attacked her friend'), uses 'neutral and precise descriptions' ('a court source', 'Saudi Arabia's Higher Judicial Council', 'her assailants'), and uses 'objective and moderate' language ('Saudi Arabia enforces a strict form of Sunni Islam called Wahhabism'). However, some of the *quotations* from Western government representatives which are used in the article use some demonising language, such as 'barbaric'. It is clear that in reporting on subjects which are particularly emotionally loaded, such as sexual assault cases and cases involving terrorism, it may be difficult for journalists to completely avoid the inclusion of negative language in their articles, but also underscores that when writing about such highly emotive subjects it is vitally important for journalists to make particular efforts as to the choice of words, selection of quotations and style of writing.

Use of negative features of language in articles concerning terrorist attacks or anti-terrorism were more pervasive in *The Australian* than in *The SMH*, and in 2004 in particular. In *The SMH*, the two articles which contained negative language features in regards to the representation of Islam both used demonising and emotive language but avoided the use of victimising language. In Ben Cubby's 'North Indian Violence' (SMH04_18), Cubby quotes international newspapers as referring to the 'carnage' of 'barbaric blasts' blamed on 'Islamic fundamentalist groups', but avoids the utilisation of negative language features in his own framing text. Louise Williams' 'Honour for journalist hostage' (SMH07_18) is written in a more emotive tone, describing in detail the kidnapping of journalist Meutya Hafid in Iraq by 'Islamic extremists'. Williams recounts that Hafid was 'imprisoned in a desert cave' after being 'snatched on the notorious road from Baghdad', and described the 'lifetime of memories flashing before [Hafid]' as she was 'faced with beheading, and the knowledge that even Muslim journalists were dying at the hands of hardline Islamic groups'.

The utilisation of negative language features in those two articles from *The SMH* is relatively innocuous in comparison to some of the language used in comparable articles from *The Australian* in 2004. In '39 Sunnis killed in "revenge" blasts' (A04_11), a correspondent from Multan, Pakistan reports on an attack in which 'two bombs ripped through a gathering of Sunni Muslim radicals'. The article describes a series of 'bloody sectarian attacks' by 'fanatics from Pakistan's Sunni majority and Shi'ite minority', in a city referred to as 'a hotbed of extremism'. After the attacks, the site was said to be 'littered with body parts and bloodstains' whilst 'splinters, debris and chattered glass from nearby windows carpeted the ground'. In 'Terrorist's wife now suspect' (A04_23), Sian Powell and Olivia Mellisa speculate on whether Munfiatun, the wife of 'notorious Jemaah Islamiah mastermind Noordin

Mohammed Top' and possibly linked to other 'Jemaah Islamiah militants' would face terrorism charges in regards to 'terrorist bombings that have plagued Indonesia', including the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta.⁵⁵⁷ Munfiatun's sister and mother, interviewed by journalists from *The Australian*, are described as 'desolate', 'sad and shocked', and 'distraught'.

In summary, I therefore found that in 'hard' news articles dealing with emotive subjects such as violent conflict or sexual assault, levels of negative language features were particularly elevated. By far the most common negative language feature was the use of demonising labels such as Islamic or Muslim 'extremists', 'fanatics', 'militants', and 'radicals'. A full half of the articles analysed as part of the Pilot Study either actively used demonising language or were neutral on this dimension; every article in this subset of the full sample which referred to 'terrorism' also utilised demonising language). However, I also found that the tone of the journalist and their choice of phrasing sometimes indicated that they had attempted to employ neutral language, yet the quotations which they selected and inserted without qualification into their articles often featured strongly inflammatory negative language features (e.g. SMH04_18, 'Northern Indian Violence'). This is an important point which underscores the limitations of the norm of objectivity and neutrality in reporting: even if the journalist themselves adheres broadly to the norms, the inclusion of source discourses which are not bound by the same conventions can mitigate the intention of the journalist.

In contrast to these patterns in the 'hard' news stories analysed in the Pilot Study, no clear relationship was discernible between whether articles were soft or hard news and their tendency to employ negative language features. If we take the example of the two articles with the lowest scores on the Islamophobic index, Neil Brown's opinion piece advocating re-election of the Howard Government (A04_19) and Paul Sheehan's column opposing the introduction of racial vilification laws in Victoria (SMH04_19), the patterns of language features are diametrically opposed. Brown's article hits the trifecta, employing victimising, demonising and emotive language; yet Sheehan's article manages to articulate closed views towards Islam on all eight of the dimensions of the Index and to represent Islam as a distinct problem, without employing any of these negative language features.

⁵⁵⁷ Mufiatun was later found to have been innocent of involvement in any attacks, though she did receive a jail sentence for concealing her husband's whereabouts from the police.

Brown, a former Liberal politician, paints people as helpless victims, vulnerable to attacks from 'terrorists' in a variety of unlikely situations, constantly 'at risk' from 'Muslim fanatics who hate our way of life and want to kill us'. Sheehan, by contrast, comes from a journalistic background. His writing adheres to many of the conventions of journalism, for example in his avoidance of emotive language and construction of neutrally worded, apparently balanced stories. Sheehan constructs the impression that he has done careful, measured investigative research into the incidence of attacks on Muslims, and 'reports' that it has been overestimated by organisations such as the Victorian Equal Opportunity Commission and the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board; he frames his arguments not through emotive and demonising language but by using 'objective and moderate language'. He uses 'neutral and precise descriptions, titles and names' for those he attacks, such as Chris Puplick, 'president of the Anti-Discrimination Board' and May Helou, 'of the Islamic Council of Victoria'. When he discusses the case brought against Catch the Fire Ministries, he 'avoids victimising language, reports what has been done and could be done'. For example, Sheehan details in neutral language the exact cost of the legal case, the exact length of the mediation session ('seven hours and forty minutes') and the hearings ('forty days, spread over nine months'), and the exact steps in the case ('hearings began in the Administrative Tribunal in October...').

The two people Sheehan quotes in this article, Peter Costello and Pastor Danny Nalliah, also avoid the use of emotive, victimising and demising language, appearing as rational and moderate. Nalliah, for example, is quoted as saying 'Even Christians believe that everyone should know about Christ and want people to follow Christ. But the worry is with Islam, it goes one step further'. Nalliah seems relatively balanced and fair in this selected quote. Sheehan neglects to mention in his article that Nalliah was actually a candidate at the 2004 Federal Election for the ultra-conservative evangelical Christian political party Family First, and that Nalliah is not exactly as temperate in his views as Sheehan portrayed him. Nalliah was forced to resign from Family First immediately after the election, when it was found that he had been calling on his supporters to 'tear down Satan's strongholds', which included mosques and Buddhist temples as well as brothels and gambling places.⁵⁵⁸ Nalliah

⁵⁵⁸ Nalliah first gained notoriety in Australia with this case, but has drawn considerable negative attention for his extreme beliefs several times since that time. Even Peter Costello, former Deputy Prime Minister, who was quoted along with Nalliah in this article and subsequently met with Nalliah to receive Nalliah's 'blessing' prior to the 2007 election, eventually disavowed Nalliah, after he claimed to have had a revelatory dream in which he was informed that the devastating Victorian bushfires of 2009 were divine retribution for the decriminalisation of abortion; subsequently, Nalliah claimed that the Queensland floods of 2011 were divine retribution against Kevin Rudd after he 'spoke against Israel' in December 2010. AAP, "Pastor Says Kevin Rudd to Blame for Floods," *news.com.au*, January 11 2011; Tony Jones, "Family First Close to

subsequently founded his own political party, Rise Up Australia, which campaigned on an explicitly anti-Muslim and anti-multiculturalism platform at the Federal Election in 2013.⁵⁵⁹

The fact that the articles by Sheehan and Brown employ such different linguistic techniques yet nevertheless convey extremely closed views of Islam is interesting. The article by Sheehan is much more difficult to dismiss than that of Brown's. Sheehan's journalistic credentials insulate him to some degree from accusations of bias or partisanship, even though he is writing an opinion column and not 'reporting the news'. The tone of his article is so seemingly reasonable, and its arguments are more subtly expressed that it becomes difficult to rebut, at least within the limited confines of the news media. To address his claims about the lack of evidence of Islamophobia in Australia for example, a range of evidence collected by many different sources about the rising incidence and impact of anti-Muslim hostility in Australia could be presented. Yet such a text would not conform to dominant news values and would be more likely to appear in academic contexts than in the mass media, as Sheehan's polarising but popular columns do. Brown's article, in contrast, is clearly identified as a former Liberal party minister, and his partisanship is clearly apparent. He is therefore not protected by the mantle of 'neutrality', and his bombastic and extreme language can be more easily dismissed and his extravagant claims rebutted. In the long term, the type of article which has a much more damaging effect in terms of its normalisation and rationalisation of anti-Muslim hostility is likely to be Sheehan's more insidious justification of Islamophobia.

Quotation patterns

Because of the number of variables involved, quotation patterns proved to be one of the most difficult aspects of the study in terms of coding and of interpretation. The bare quantitative data are complex and require substantial 'unpacking' in order to illustrate trends and relationships between the different variables and levels of coding (Figure 6, opposite).

Gaining Pivotal Senate Role," *Lateline*, 11 October 2004; Christian Kerr, "Peter Costello Slams Cult's Victorian Bushfire Retribution Claims," *The Australian*, February 11 2009; Marion Maddox, "A Secular Cancellation of the Secularist Truce: Religion and Political Legitimation in Australia," *Annual review of the Sociology of Religion: Religion and Politics* 2(2011): p. 304.

⁵⁵⁹ Both Labor and The Coalition ranked Nalliah's party highly in their how-to-vote materials for many electorates. Bianca Hall, "Labor Gives Preferences to Extremists," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 September 2013.

Data set	Direct Quotations	Indirect Quotations	Muslims Quoted	Non-Muslims Quoted	Non-Bureaucratic Sources	Bureaucratic Sources
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	9	3	9	3	3	9
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	20	3	12	11	9	14
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	4	6	1	9	5	5
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	9	2	2	9	5	6
<i>Total</i>	42	14	24	32	22	34

Figure 6: Pilot Study - Quotation patterns per data set

Overall, from the fifty-six separate sources quoted in the twenty articles from the Pilot Study, there were more direct than indirect quotes, more non-Muslim than Muslim sources, and far more bureaucratic than non-bureaucratic sources. In both 2004 and 2007, the articles from *The Australian* featured more Muslim than non-Muslim sources than articles from *The SMH* (twenty-one separate Muslim sources in the ten articles from *The Australian*, compared to just three Muslim sources in the ten articles from *The Sydney Morning Herald*). However, *The Australian* featured far more bureaucratic than non-bureaucratic sources (twenty-three separate bureaucratic sources in the ten articles from *The Australian*, compared to just eleven non-bureaucratic sources in the ten articles from *The Sydney Morning Herald*). Correspondingly, in many cases, although particular articles from *The Australian* contained numerous Muslim voices, quite frequently they were *bureaucratic* voices which exhibited extremely low distance from power and did not serve a particularly productive role in deconstructing either the consensus on Islamophobia or the consensus on the ‘War on Terror’. As an example, in the article concerning the bomb blasts in Multan, Pakistan (A04_11), there are five sources in total, of which all five are ostensibly Muslims. Just one of these sources is non-bureaucratic (a witness to the bomb blast); the other four are

bureaucratic sources such as the District police chief, Pakistan security officers and the Pakistani Information Minister, who predictably labelled the attack as ‘an act of brutal terrorism aimed at creating instability’ and did not attempt to offer a more nuanced explanation for the violence in Multan. Many elements in the Pakistani government, as in other nations to which the ‘War on Terror’ was successfully exported during this period, benefitted from the ‘complexity reducing’ rhetoric of the ‘War’ as well as the ability to garner military, financial and other support from the US and its allies for their extension of the ‘war’ onto their own internal dissidents and thus had little investment in contesting this consensus.

Furthermore, although there were far fewer indirect than direct quotations, indirect quotations were more likely to be from non-bureaucratic Muslim sources than from other sources. Although I did not specifically quantify gender data for quotation patterns, my informal sense was that gender also played a significant role in quotation patterns: the smallest subset within quotation patterns was therefore Muslim women who were not in bureaucratic roles and were quoted directly; this occurred in just three articles within the Pilot Study (A04_23, A07_22, SMH07_20). This finding strongly recalled to me the famous line from Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* which Edward Said employed as one of the epigraphs to *Orientalism*: ‘they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented’.⁵⁶⁰ The premier example of this trend towards marginalising the voices which were probably most important to a story was in the article on the Qatif rape case, ‘White House aghast at Saudi rape victim’s sentence for ‘using media’’ (A07_29). Six sources were quoted in this article, of which there were three non-Muslim and three Muslim sources. The three non-Muslim sources were US and Canadian bureaucratic sources, of which one was a woman. The Muslim sources were the woman who had been sexually assaulted, and subsequently received a prison sentence, and two representatives of the Saudi Arabian judiciary. All of these sources were quoted directly, *except* the woman who was the subject of the article, who was only quoted *indirectly* in the article.

The preponderance of bureaucratic sources and the lack of a direct quote from the woman who was at the centre of this story are deeply troubling. The article could have been framed in a completely different way if the correspondent had either included direct quotations from the woman who was at the centre of the case, or had in addition, sourced an opinion on the

⁵⁶⁰ Said, *Orientalism*.

case from, for example, a female Muslim activist for women's rights. Instead the article is dominated by the voices of Western bureaucratic figures damning the Saudi judicial system (which is emphasised as being Islamic/Muslim) and Saudi judicial sources defending the woman's sentence and responding to criticism of the case by calling for 'constructive criticism, away from emotions'. There were two other articles on this case in the broader sample, one of which, 'Victim of rape to fight sentence' (A07_15) was constructed very similarly to A07_29, took a very similar angle on the story, and had very similar quotation patterns. This article included a quote from one Saudi court source justifying the verdict (direct), and three quotes from 'Western' sources condemning the attack (one direct, two indirect). This article additionally quotes the woman's lawyer, who had his license suspended as a result of his work in the case and is described as 'a leading human rights activist'. He is quoted as saying that the case 'sums up the major problems the Saudi judiciary faces', but his comments are not expanded upon or explored by the journalist.

The third article from my full sample which addressed this case took a significantly different approach to the story. Titled 'Saudi rape stirs social revolution' (A07_6), this story focuses on the emergence of reformist movements in Saudi Arabia and emphasises the courage of the Saudis involved in challenging the case. The journalist, Martin Chulov, refers to 'the faint stirrings of a social revolution' as a result of the 'the bravery of the unnamed victim, the daring of her 24-year-old husband in attacking the establishment, and the derring-do of young activist lawyer Abdulrahman al-Lahim, who criticised the judiciary's stance on his client'. Chulov highlights the 'delicate position' that such cases put the US government in given their promotion of Saudi Arabia as a partner in the region and a 'model of moderate Islam', and does not quote any US or Saudi bureaucratic sources. Instead, the sole quotes in the lengthy article are reserved for the husband of the woman at the centre of the case and her lawyer, and focus on their consideration of how the case might have 'sparked a rethink of attitudes in the Kingdom'. Chulov quotes the woman's lawyer at length:

The kingdom is going through a reformist period and I believe what we're going through will lead to a more modern judicial system that all citizens can enjoy. I'm confident that this line of thought will vanish one day, and indeed the country will be reborn.

Chulov's highlighting of differences of opinion within the Muslim world, of the emergence of reformist movements, and of the problematic nature of 'Western' support for repressive regimes mark a significant shift in focus from the other two stories discussing this case.

Within this story, his selection and framing of sources constitutes a significant feature of the differential narrative articulated about the same case.

Differential narratives articulated about the same story are also articulated via quotation patterns in articles referring to the issue of ‘dirty tricks’ in election campaigns. The different quotation patterns in the three articles on this subject surveyed within the Pilot Study distinct differences between the different time periods and different newspapers. As was mentioned in Chapter 7, Labor candidates in Western Sydney were subjected to smear campaigns including Islamophobic fake leaflets in both the 2004 and 2007 campaigns. However, in 2004, the issue attracted very little media attention until after the election had taken place (and then the reaction was still quite muted). In 2007, by contrast, the distributors of a leaflet which alleged that Labor ‘supports our new Mosque construction’ and ‘support to forgive our Muslim brothers who have been unjustly sentenced to death for the Bali bombings’ were caught in the act of distributing the flyers and the incident became one of the most-reported matters in the days just prior to the election.⁵⁶¹

Within the Pilot Study, one article from *The SMH* referred to the smear campaign against Ed Husic, the Labor candidate for the marginal seat of Greenway in 2004. In the article, ‘Pure theatre: Latham takes stage with no script and wows 600’ (SMH04_17), senior political journalist Tom Allard reports on a ‘town-hall’ Q&A session held by Opposition Leader Mark Latham in Adelaide four days prior to the Federal election. Allard records that there was ‘an ugly attack on the race of Labor’s Muslim candidate’, but that Latham retorted that ‘Ed is a Bosnian Muslim. His parents came out here with nothing and built a life. It’s a great Australian story’. Although it is a very small component of the article, it sufficiently problematised the spread and normalisation of Islamophobia during the period, and managed to attack some of the conceptions of Islam as monolithic and ‘incompatible’ with ‘Australian values’, to receive a summed score of +5, or ‘Very Open’, on the Islamophobic Index. However, the article does not refer to the wider campaign against Husic, but limits itself to the discussions during the ‘town hall’ session and Latham is the only person quoted in the article.

There were three articles within the Pilot Study which addressed ‘dirty tricks’ in the 2007 election: two from *The SMH* (SMH07_17, SMH07_18) and one article from *The Australian*

⁵⁶¹ Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, *Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto: Events in the Division of Lindsay* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).

(A07_22). In ‘Playing dirty an artform in the west’ (SMH07_17), Andrew West, Jacob Saulwick and Paul Bibby surveyed voter opinions on the election fraud in the seat of Lindsay, with two residents directly quoted in the article on their disdain for the ‘pathetic’ leafleting ploy. The article also included one direct quote from a former Liberal party campaign worker who accused the retiring member for Lindsay, Jackie Kelly, of ‘dirty tricks’ at the 2004 election, stating that she had produced fake how-to-vote cards to fraudulently capture the preferences of a local activist group. The article also discusses the smear campaign against Ed Husic in 2004, referring to a leaflet which was distributed in Greenway during that election campaign which carried a picture of Husic, the ALP logo and campaign slogan, and stated that ‘Ed Husic is a devout Muslim. Ed is working hard to get a better deal for Islam in Greenway’. Husic was then *indirectly* quoted as saying that ‘the revelations prove race-baiting is an established Coalition technique’. The issue in the two cases of fraudulent leaflets was ‘not so much who produced the propaganda but who benefited from it’. This article could have made a much stronger statement on the racist angle of the leafleting scandal by *directly* quoting Husic and addressing in a more robust way the issue of ‘race-baiting’ in Liberal Party election campaigning. This article received a summed score of +4, or ‘Open’, on the Islamophobic Index.

In ‘Lib shame over fake pamphlet’ (SMH07_18), *The SMH*’s Chief Political Correspondent, Phillip Coorey, quoted five sources in total, all of which were non-Muslim bureaucratic sources (such as the ALP and Liberal party’s respective campaign spokespeople, and the Liberal Party NSW Director). Whilst clearly labelling the scandal as ‘a dirty tricks campaign involving race hate’, Coorey’s article does not delve any further into the problematic racial dimensions of the fake flyer. He does quote from the leaflet though, and refers to how the leaflet fallaciously portrayed Labor as ‘sympathisers of Islamic terrorists’ and ‘applauds the Labor Party for supporting Muslim terrorists’. In fact the leaflet, despite its deplorable content, never actually uses phrases like ‘Muslim terrorists’; Coorey himself actually brings these demonising negative terms into his article. This article received a summed score of 1, or ‘Somewhat Open’ on the Islamophobic index.

‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ (A07_22) was a complex article involving quotes from eight different sources; it was compiled by Patricia Karvelas and Matthew Franklin with ‘additional reporting’ from Richard Kerbaj, Sanna Trad and Cath Hart and includes four direct quotes from the usual bureaucratic sources: the Prime Minister, the Opposition Leader, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Jackie Kelly (whose husband was implicated in the leafleting

scandal). Two of the non-bureaucratic sources are nevertheless closely connected to the political party system; there is one direct quote from the husband of the Liberal candidate for Lindsay, Karen Chijoff, who was also implicated in the scandal, and an indirect quote from the same disaffected Liberal party campaign worker quoted in 'Playing dirty an artform in the west' (SMH07_17). In comparison to the two articles on this topic in *The SMH*, 'Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address' contains two direct quotes from Muslim community leaders, which were discussed earlier in this chapter, and played a large part in this article receiving a summed score of +7 – the highest score for any article in the Pilot Study.

Although the inclusion of Muslim voices in this article is a significant move, it is interesting to make some observations on the sources chosen. I postulate that the major part of the 'additional reporting' done by Richard Kerbaj and Sanna Trad was the sourcing of the Muslim quotes, which were tacked onto the end of a fairly run-of-the-mill political news story which is not drastically different from the stories on the same issue printed in *The SMH*. Kerbaj was one of the few Arabic-speaking journalists employed by the mainstream media at this time, who built his career upon his ability to report on unique angles in regards to 'Muslim matters'.⁵⁶² Trad was a cadet journalist at the time but is no longer working in the media; she is the daughter of socially conservative Muslim spokesman Keysar Trad and during her time at *The Australian* she too wrote several articles on Muslim community issues. Whilst it is certainly a positive that the voices of socially progressive Muslim community leaders are directly quoted in articles in *The Australian* by Kerbaj and Trad, they had a habit of quoting the exact same sources, introduced with very similar descriptions, in their other articles on 'Muslim matters', which is why I speculate that this part of the article was their work.⁵⁶³ Thus, whilst it is a positive thing to see more Muslim voices in the mainstream media, some scrutiny must also be paid to the diversity of views represented and the framing of such sources.

The repeated utilisation of the same voices to represent the Muslim community in Australia can, as Tanja Dreher argues, amount to a 'command performance'. Although the opportunities for Muslim Australians to be heard expanded through the focus placed upon

⁵⁶² Kerbaj has attracted considerable criticism for some of his inflammatory and poorly researched coverage of Muslim community news; see for example Media Watch, "The Australian's Sheik Swap," *ABC*, 31 July 2006.

⁵⁶³ See for example, Richard Kerbaj, "Muslim Leader Blames Women for Sex Attacks," *The Australian*, October 26 2006; Richard Kerbaj, "Andrews' Agenda Was "Anti-Islam"," *The Australian*, July 21 2008; Sanna Trad, "Muslim Leaders Back the Kilings, but Not Time Lag," *The Australia*, November 10 2008.

them by the War on Terror and other events of the past decade, Dreher observes that ‘the stage is set and the script is already determined’. The increased interest in Muslim women, in particular, has ‘provided some opportunities for a diversity of women’s voices and stories to appear, but primarily on the terms determined by standard news values...[which] reflect the perceived interests and prejudices of a non-Muslim audience rather than the issues of most importance or relevance to Australian Muslims themselves’. Therefore, Muslim voices remain of interest to the news media largely ‘in response to the agendas and misconceptions of the “mainstream”’.⁵⁶⁴ Such issues in the selection and promotion of the voices of particular Muslims over other Muslim voices will be further addressed in the next two chapters, which focus on the results for the full sample of my study and in-depth discussion of these results.

Overall, the Pilot Study suggested that an exercise in content analysis using, as the model for evaluative criteria, a Likert scale based on the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia, is capable of illuminating significant distinctions in the representation of a wide range of issues and stories pertaining to Islam and Muslims in the Australian press. To state them at their simplest, the findings from the mini-sample of 20 articles are, first, that the period leading up to the election of 2004 saw more Islamophobia than the equivalent period of 2007; and that *The Australian* is more Islamophobic than *The SMH* – albeit with important exceptions on individual stories. There was more media contestation of the signature method of the Howard government, of fomenting and exploiting xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment, in the later election campaign, than in the earlier. The next task was to determine how far these incipient patterns were borne out in the full sample, and to explore further some of the detailed characteristics of the reporting that may enable a more nuanced judgement of the extent and scope of change between the two date ranges.

⁵⁶⁴ Tanya Dreher, "Community Media Intervention," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010), p. 201.

Chapter 10 – Results and Main Findings

The purpose of this chapter of my thesis is to discuss the results for the coding exercises carried out on all articles across the four data sets, in order to determine the extent to which the patterns observed in the articles analysed as part of the Pilot Study were borne out in the full sample, and to build up a more detailed picture of the nature and extent of changes in coverage by the two newspapers between the two different time periods.

The full 373 articles were coded according a range of physical features which included descriptive features of the article as well as characteristics such as what section of the newspaper the story originally appeared in, whether the story was classified as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ news, and the authorial attribution of the story. Following this, the full sample of articles were coded according to their scores on the eight dimensions of the Islamophobic Index. These scores were summed to give an overall picture of the level of Islamophobia present in individual articles and to enable comparison between the four different data sets and specific groupings of articles. The full set of articles were also classified according to whether they represented Islam as ‘a problem’, and according to what type of alternative targets might have been defined as ‘problems’ in each article. I will therefore begin with a description of the physical characteristics and features of the articles in my full sample before proceeding to compare patterns for the scores on the Islamophobic Index between the four data sets and to consider to what extent Islam was represented as a ‘problem’ in these articles.

Physical Characteristics of the Sample

The full sample of articles analysed in this study included a total of 373 stories. The distribution across the four data sets was as follows:

- I. *The Australian* – 2004 Election (128 stories)
- II. *The Australian* – 2007 Election (127 stories)
- III. *The SMH* – 2004 Election (68 stories)
- IV. *The SMH* – 2007 Election (50 stories)

The differences in density of articles between the two newspapers and across the two different time periods clearly indicate that Islam and issues related to Muslims featured far

more strongly in *The Australian* in the lead-up to both the 2004 and 2007 elections, but still had a significant presence in *The SMH*. For both publications, the number of articles relating to Muslims or Islam was higher in 2004 than in 2007.

As discussed in the Chapter 8, to provide a snapshot of general characteristics of the sample and variations within and between the different data sets, all 373 articles were coded according to the following physical characteristics:

- a) ‘Hard News’ (World + Local sections)/ ‘Soft News’ (all sections except World & Local)
- b) Section & Subsection (e.g. World/General)
- c) Source (e.g. staff reporter, wire service etc)
- d) Attribution (e.g. named journalist, editorial etc)

In the following sections of this thesis, I present a summary of the results of the coding for these aspects of the physical characteristics of my sample and discuss some of the pertinent points raised by these results.

a) *Hard News/Soft News*

In Figure 7 (below), we can see that in three of the four data sets, ‘hard news’ stories outnumbered the ‘soft news’ stories, with the proportion of hard-to-soft news stories ranging between 53% (*The SMH*, 2007) and 62% (*The Australian*, 2004). The exception is *The SMH* in 2007, where only 42% of the stories could be classified as traditional, ‘hard news’ style articles.

Data Set	Hard	Soft
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	60%	40%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	62%	38%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	53%	47%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	42%	58%

Figure 7: Hard/soft news as a percentage of total stories per data set

Within the ‘hard news’ category, it can be seen that world/international stories outnumbered local news in all data sets, though clear increases in the proportion of local-to-international news stories are visible in both 2007 data sets (Figure 8). This reflects the strong focus by both papers upon the Lindsay election fraud scandal and the dismissal of a high profile counter-terrorism case in the weeks prior to the 2007 election.

Data Set	World	Local
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	79%	21%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	62%	38%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	72%	28%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	52%	48%

Figure 8: World/local news as a percentage of 'hard' news stories per data set

b) *Section and Subsection*

For both time periods in *The Australian*, the largest number of articles were from the World section, followed by Features and then Local, with these three sections including 94.5-96.5% of all stories. In *The SMH* during both time periods, the order of dominance was slightly different, with the highest number of articles in both periods coming from Features, followed by World, then Local. However, these three sections included 96% of all stories in 2004, thus being closely analogous to the distribution of articles in the two data sets from *The Australian*. Unusually, only 75% of all stories from 2007 fell within these three sections (See Figure 9 below).

This unusual distribution is probably due to the significantly lower number of stories from the World section in 2007 (just 22%). However, it is possible that the unusual distribution of articles in 2007 in *The Sydney Morning Herald* is more a result of the much lower number of stories overall than of any other factors: for this data set, only 50 articles fell within the parameters of the study, as opposed to the 68 articles available in the 2004 set and the 127/128 articles in *The Australian* data sets. The possibility that this much smaller data set may be unrepresentative must be considered in the interpretation of other potentially anomalous aspects of the data.

Data Set	World/ Internat.	Feature	Local	Review/ Spectrum	Finance	Misc.
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	48%	36%	12.5%	2%	0.8%	0.7%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	39%	32%	23.5%	4%	1.5%	0.0%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	38%	43%	15%	1.5%	0.0%	2.5%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	22%	33%	20%	12%	8%	5%

Figure 9: Newspaper section as a percentage of total articles per data set

The 5-15% of stories not falling within the three major categories were from a wide variety of sections within the two different newspapers, from Traveller, to Drive, to Sport. The two dominant categories from these were Review/Spectrum and Finance/Business & Investing, and have accordingly being listed separately. All other sections were subsumed within the heading of Miscellaneous.

Within the six dominant sections, the subsection in which a story fitted was also recorded. The specifics of this analysis are not reflected in the table above, as it was in large part too detailed and too disparate to reveal many clear trends. However, some aspects of this analysis are worth brief mention. In particular, for some but not all data sets, Letters formed a significant subsection within Features, ranging from 0% (SMH, 2007) to 14.7% (SMH, 2004).

Another significant finding was the presence in each paper in both time periods of a particular subsection or subheading within the Local section, titled ‘Election 2004’ and ‘Election 2007’ in *The Australian*, and slightly more imaginatively ‘The Choice 2004’ and ‘Decision ‘07’ in *The SMH*. These accounted for a range of 31% (*The Australian*, 2004) to 80% (*The SMH*, 2007) of the stories in the Local section.

In 2004, when the data collection period began within days of the Jakarta Embassy bombing, both *The Australian* and *The SMH* had subsections of the World/International news section dealing exclusively with terrorism in Indonesia, titled ‘Terror at our door’ and ‘Evil at our

gate' respectively. Stories in the 'Terror at our door' subsection only accounted for 2.3% of the total stories in the data set for *The Australian* in 2004, yet stories in the 'Evil at our gate' subsection accounted for 5.9% of the total stories in the data set for *The SMH* in 2004.

It is worth noting that the decision to commence the time period of this study on September 13, 2004 means that the data sets include only the tail end of the mass of stories generated the previous week under the subheadings 'Terror at our door' and 'Evil at our gate'; notably the Embassy bombing occurred the day prior to the third anniversary of September 11, highlighting the significance of this period for reporting of terrorist violence. Had the full six week period of the election campaign been considered, many more stories from these subcategories would have fallen within the purview of this study. The dominance of these sensationalist and alarmist section headings and preoccupations bears further investigation.

A key aspect of the table above worth noting is the jump in the percentage of articles in the Local section for both newspapers in the 2007 time period. As suggested above in relation to the proportion of hard/soft news between the 2004-2007 periods, the increase in numbers of articles from the Local section particularly reflects the high interest generated by the Lindsay election fraud scandal during the 2007 election campaign.

Overall, despite the much greater number of articles containing the keywords in the two data sets for *The Australian*, the proportions of articles in different sections and overall trends between 2004 and 2007 are actually quite similar for the two different newspapers. The creation of analogous subsections within the World and Local sections of the two papers to reflect contemporaneous developments such as election campaigns and terrorism in Indonesia is a particularly noteworthy similarity, and perhaps undermines some assumptions about the distinctiveness of the two papers and their approach to news. While they may often frame their selected stories with different emphases, their agenda-setting function shows a substantial overlap.

c) *Source*

When we consider the attribution of particular stories to specific authors or sources, it is important to note that the patterns discussed below refer only to the sample, and may not be representative of the papers in their entirety. However, the observed differences in attribution patterns between the two papers are quite striking and worth considering in some detail in regards to their relationship to the parameters of this study. The issue of sourcing of articles is

crucial given the consolidation of the majority of news media outlets into the hands of a diminishing number of powerful proprietors, as alluded to in the opening section of Chapter 3.

One reason that issues regarding sourcing and authorial attribution are significant to this study is in relation to the inclusion of articles from all sections within the paper, rather than just the traditional ‘hard’ news section. This means that a significant number of stories within any one data set are not even necessarily composed by journalists. Between 6-30% of stories in the different data sets were derived from non-journalistic sources, such as political commentators, prominent intellectual figures, letter writers, and columnists. This has implications for any conclusions about the production and presentation of ‘news’ and of media effects which may ultimately be drawn from this study. Although the editorial process which collates and assembles this diverse array of material may be assumed to be overseen by journalists, focusing exclusively upon journalistic culture and audience reception of ‘news’ may not give me the full picture I am seeking.

Despite media conventions regarding the separation of ‘news’ from ‘opinion’, and the printing of sub-bylines to indicate the affiliations of contributors, the boundaries between hard and soft news are not necessarily clear in a newspaper, and the strictest maintenance of journalistic ‘objectivity and neutrality’ in articles printed on one page may easily be eclipsed by the more partisan views printed in an opinion piece on the opposite page. Part of my study will therefore include comparative analysis regarding differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news stories with regards to contestation of Islamophobic frames or levels of distance from power.

My superficial sense of the data sets, prior to conducting full analysis of the articles, was that in 2004, articles showing higher levels of Islamophobia, and lower levels of distance from power were more likely to be those from non-journalistic sources, e.g. opinions expressed in Letters or Reviews. In 2007, I sensed a reversal of this trend, where the overall levels of distance from power were much higher and the Islamophobic levels were much lower in the articles produced by journalists. Interestingly, however, there were articles at both extremes in all data sets. The parameters of the discourse had therefore not shifted sufficiently to make extremely ‘open’ or ‘closed’ views towards Islam ‘unprintable’, though the level of endorsement of extreme perspectives did appear to shift between the two different newspapers and different time periods. Articles by the influential conservative commentator,

Paul Sheehan, for example, demonstrated high levels of Islamophobic discourse and low levels of distance from power in 2004 in *The SMH*. In contrast, in 2007, when the majority of the hard news stories from my sample in *The Australian* indicated high levels of Islamophobic discourse and low levels of distance from power, the paper ran a book review by the Australian Muslim academic Shakira Hussein, a feature article by Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji and a series of letters were printed over a week including a debate over the values of peace in Islam, which included a wide diversity of viewpoints on the issues. These stories will be considered in more detail in the next chapter.

These patterns may be taken to indicate two things. Firstly, they may indicate that although editorial policy or individual journalistic leanings may have supported a more Islamophobic perspective and less distance from power in 2004 and the reverse in 2007, this shift may to some extent have been mitigated by the accommodation of opposing views within the ‘soft’ sections of the paper. Thus, by careful editorial oversight, both papers could maintain an illusion of overall ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’, thus conforming to one of the dominant journalistic norms.

Secondly, the fact that the most ‘extreme’ views from either period were still able to be accommodated within the spectrum of views represented within the two papers indicates that in Hallin’s terms, whilst the boundaries of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ may have shifted, the shift may not have extended the debate significantly into territories which were previously ‘deviant’, or conversely, made extremely Islamophobic perspectives so ‘deviant’ that they could no longer be accommodated within the paper.

The influence on news content of editors’ observance of the principle of ‘balance’ may be illustrated by two examples. As part of the research for her book *The Content Makers*, an overview of media proprietors and issues facing news production in Australia, the journalist Margaret Simons was permitted to sit in on editorial meetings at her former paper, *The Age* in early 2007. At one of these meetings, she recalls two different stories about Muslims being pitched to the editor, one with a ‘hardline’ focus on issues related to terrorism, and the other on the success of an Islamic school. The editorial decision was to lead with the story on ‘Islamic terrorism’, but in order to be ‘balanced’ in their coverage, another story was cut so

that the positive story on Muslims could be run in the same edition, albeit buried within the middle of the paper.⁵⁶⁵

In another example, Tom Switzer, the editor of *The Australian's* opinion pages from September 2001 until February 2008, and therefore responsible for the selection of the opinion pieces within the paper over both periods of this study, affirmed that *The Australian* had a deliberate strategy of selecting pieces for the 'soft' news sections of the paper to balance coverage in other areas of the paper. In October 2006, his paper had broken a story on the inflammatory comments of controversial Lakemba-based cleric Sheikh Hilaly on women's responsibility for sexual abuse and adultery. This story then led the Australian news agenda for several days, and continued to dominate talkback radio and *The Australian's* opinion pages and letters for several weeks afterwards.⁵⁶⁶ Switzer responds to claims that racism and bigotry characterised *The Australian's* treatment of this story by emphasising that:

In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Hilaly story, the Australian commissioned several 'moderate, middle-class Muslims' to write the lead opinion-page articles, including Abdullah Saeed...Tanveer Ahmed...and Shakira Hussein.

In addition, Switzer notes, his paper had 'published a variety of moderate Muslim voices over the years to articulate concerns about the clash between conservative Islam and Western modernity', including articles by Waleed Aly and Irshad Manji. The publication of these articles, in Switzer's opinion, made it 'clear that *The Australian* presented a fair and balanced spread of opinion on this issue. Not much evidence here of 'racism and religious bigotry'.⁵⁶⁷

As noted above, the fact that some divergent opinions are presented in the 'soft news' sections of a newspaper does not necessarily outweigh the fact that the bulk of the coverage may be overwhelmingly one-sided, or that by the time that dissenting voices are raised in the opinion pages, the flurry of reporting which precedes it has already served to frame the debate to an extent that cannot be undone simply by commissioning articles for the inner pages of the newspaper from 'moderate, middle-class' Muslims. It is also evident from Switzer's account that the move to include more Muslim voices was a response to criticisms by journalist Mike Carlton and online commentator Irfan Yusuf rather than a desire to present alternative views from the outset; that is, that they were retroactive responses to claims that

⁵⁶⁵ Simons, *The Content Makers*.

⁵⁶⁶ Tom Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010), pp. 124-5.

⁵⁶⁷ Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines," p. 127.

The Australian had not maintained ‘the principle of balance’. In addition, the move to include ‘moderate, middle-class Muslim’ voices within the opinion pages of *The Australian* may be a step in the right direction, yet still falls into the trap of privileging a very select group of Muslim perspectives: those deemed by Switzer and his colleagues to be ‘good’ Muslims rather than ‘bad’ Muslims.

Switzer’s strategy can be considered to align with a Western global narrative justifying attitudes and policies towards Muslims and Muslim nations in which governments and other representatives of this hegemonic system are ‘selflessly assisting “good” Muslims to fight a narrow band of “bad” Muslims infected by a hateful anti-Western ideology’. In this narrative, according to Yan Islam, there is a ‘need to co-opt Muslim community leaders as necessary interlocutors in the battle of ideas’, a process which ‘along with the global narrative of a “good” Muslim/”bad” Muslim dichotomy – can paradoxically sustain Islamophobic sentiments’.⁵⁶⁸ It also amounts to a ‘command performance’, following the prescription of Tanja Dreher set out in the previous chapter: although the opportunities for Muslim Australians to be heard have expanded through the focus placed upon them by the War on Terror and other events of the past decade, Muslim voices are of interest to the news media largely ‘in response to the agendas and misconceptions of the “mainstream”’.⁵⁶⁹ Indicative of this issue is Switzer’s explanation of the motivation behind commissioning Muslim contributors for *The Australian*, which he frames in terms of the need to ‘articulate concerns about the clash between conservative Islam and Western modernity’. This framing reflects an Orientalist and conservative outlook, borrowing heavily as it does from the rhetoric of Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. This perspective on relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims and the place of Muslims in Australian and global society is clearly problematic. It could be construed that Switzer’s definition of “good” Muslims worthy of being printed in the *Australians* was limited to Muslim voices which did not contest the ‘clash of civilisations’ framework.

The other issue which Switzer rightly brings up though is the prominence of *The Australian* in breaking major news stories which impact upon the areas of interest to this story: ‘in the lead-up to the 2001 election it was *The Australian* that exposed the children-overboard story as a Howard government fabrication and... [later] torpedoed the government’s legal case

⁵⁶⁸ Yan Islam, "A Lapse of Reason or Islamophobia at Work?," in *Islam and the Australian News Media*, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010), p. 153.

⁵⁶⁹ Dreher, "Community Media Intervention," p. 201.

against Indian terror suspect Dr Mohamed Haneef.⁵⁷⁰ However, even in cases such as this, perspective needs to be maintained when valorising prominent examples of ‘adversarial’ reporting at the expense of shifting reporting conventions which on a day-to-day basis perpetuate Islamophobic frames. *The Australian*’s breaking of the ‘children overboard’ story, for example, occurred in the context of that same newspaper’s adoption of an extremely ‘loyal’ orientation towards the incumbent government. *The Australian* formally endorsed the Coalition at the 2001 election, despite the Government’s demonstrable deceit over the ‘children overboard’ case.⁵⁷¹ The case against Dr Haneef was ‘torpedoed’ when his lawyers leaked police interview transcripts to Hedley Thomas of *The Australian*. Thomas’ reporting was clearly significant as a catalyst towards reframing the discussion on counter-terrorism in Australia. However, Thomas himself admitted that until this point, ‘most journalists working on the Haneef case, myself included, swallowed the official line’.⁵⁷² Jacqui Ewart concludes that much of the ‘good’ journalistic practice around the reporting of this case ‘was not initially driven by the deliberate attempts of journalists to expose the problematic nature of the case, but rather largely by dint of circumstances and the lawyers’ handling of the case’.⁵⁷³

Returning to the data, in sum, excluding the articles with no authorial attribution at all, there was a fairly high variation between the two papers and between the two different years regarding the proportion of stories that were derived from journalistic or non-journalistic sources (see *Figure 10* below).

When we consider the detailed patterns of authorship or sourcing for stories in the study, however, more distinctive patterns emerge (see *Figure 11* below). The most noticeable disparity between *The Australian* and *The SMH* is the much higher reliance of *The Australian* upon wire services, reporters from other publications in the same stable, and unnamed sources. No articles in either the 2004 or 2007 data sets for *The SMH* recorded a wire service as the sole source of an article, though three articles in 2007 included both the name of a Herald correspondent *and* an accreditation to a wire service. By contrast, the reliance upon wire services ranged between 10.7-18.2% for stories from *The Australian*.

⁵⁷⁰ Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines," p. 127.

⁵⁷¹ Marr and Wilkinson, *Dark Victory*, p. 272; Young, *How Australia Decides*, p. 238.

⁵⁷² Ewart, "Media and Myth: Dr Haneef and the Fourth Estate," p. 218.

⁵⁷³ Ewart, "Media and Myth: Dr Haneef and the Fourth Estate," p. 226.

<i>Data Set</i>	<i>Total Journalistic Sources</i>
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	74.2%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	78.7%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	69.1%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	96%

Figure 10: Total journalistic sources as a percentage of total articles per data set

Two other issues to note regarding the significant difference in authorship patterns between the two newspapers is the verbatim reproduction of articles sourced from other papers in the same stable. As high as 10% of the articles in the 2004 data set for *The Australian* were sourced in this manner, in contrast to zero articles for either time period for *The SMH* appearing to have been sourced in this way. Similarly, not a single article from *The SMH* considered in this study lacked any attribution to a named individual as the author of the story. In contrast, between 10-15% of articles in *The Australian* had no attribution to any author or source at all.

Data Set	Paper's Journalist	Stable Journalist	Non-Stable Journalist	Personality	Letters	Wire	Other	No Author
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	40%	10%	2.3%	4.6%	4.6%	19.5%	3.9% (leader)	15.1%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	63%	1.5%	0.0%	6.2%	7.8%	10.2%	1.5% (staff)	9.8%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	63.2%	0.0%	1.5%	16.2%	14.7%	3 mixed	4.4% (editorial)	0.0%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	86%	0.0%	6%	4%	2%	0.0%	2% (leader)	0.0%

Figure 11: Attribution sources as percentage of total stories per data set

Whilst the figures above tend to favour optimistic assessments of the level of original content in *The SMH* as opposed to *The Australian*, it should be noted that the percentage of stories based upon wire copy in both publications may be much higher than the formal accreditation figures suggest. As noted by Johnston and Forde in a study on the usage of wire copy by the major Australian media proprietors, Australian newspapers routinely employ a variety of practices which obscure the heavy reliance upon stories produced by news agencies such as the Australian Associated Press (AAP). These include ‘cannibalising’ of wire copy (minimal additional reporting or fact-checking, but just enough tweaking of copy to legitimise the use of the staff reporter’s byline); printing the name of the wire service journalist as if they were a staff reporter; and eliding the origin of a story in wire copy through crediting stories drawn from other papers in the same stable to that newspaper, not the wire service as in the original accreditation.⁵⁷⁴

The incidence of these types of practices within the sample analysed in this study is difficult to assess. It is possible to determine that reassuringly, the Australian journalists who are credited with a byline in the samples analysed for this study were all bona fide staff reporters. Determining the percentage of stories which were not credited to a news agency, but were reproduced with minor tweaks under the bylines of staff reporters is even more difficult to assess, and is beyond the scope of this study.⁵⁷⁵

Some general conclusions may still be drawn regarding the significance of a heavy reliance upon wire copy. Wire copy appears to be being used increasingly to fill the ‘news hole’ created by 24/7 publishing. Reliance upon wire copy for breaking news in an online context then tends to produce a situation where stories covered by the wire services set the daily news agenda for the hard copy edition of newspapers.⁵⁷⁶ For example, in a significant study on media sources conducted for the ABC, Pearson et al. found that wire services were a highly trusted and the most heavily utilised source for the 100 journalists interviewed, with 78% of subjects using wire services as a news source most days.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁴ Jane Johnston and Susan Forde, "Not Wrong for Long': The Role and Penetration of News Wire Agencies in the 24/7 News Landscape," *Global Media Journal: Australian Edition* 3, no. 2 (2009): pp. 10-11.

⁵⁷⁵ For an example of this type of analysis, see: Chris Paterson, "News Agency Dominance in International News on the Internet," in *Converging Media, Diverging Politics: A Political Economy of News Media in the United States and Canada*, eds. David Skinner and James Robert Compton (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), p. 158.

⁵⁷⁶ Johnston and Forde, "News Wire Agencies," p. 11; Paterson, "News Agency Dominance," p. 152.

⁵⁷⁷ Pearson et al., *Sources of News and Current Affairs*, p. 337.

The implications for news diversity are clear, and taken together with increasing concentration of media ownership, it is increasingly apparent that ‘fewer major news producers are informing more people and...doing so from fewer sources’.⁵⁷⁸ It also has implications for accuracy, with a high potential for errors in wire copy being reproduced without question by many different Australian media outlets, as recent job cuts in Australian newsrooms have particularly impacted upon editorial oversight and ‘fact-checking’ procedures.⁵⁷⁹ Although retractions and corrections will *usually* be printed, these often appear days later and buried within subsequent editions, whilst the inaccuracies have already been widely publicised, as in the case of the inaccurate reporting in regards to the Haneef case.⁵⁸⁰ The entrenchment of ‘churnalism’ (tweaking wire copy or press releases to generate a constant flow of news) is therefore a particularly troubling development in modern news production.⁵⁸¹

Another aspect of reliance upon wire copy is that in the interests of making their copy a useful resource for a wide spectrum of secondary media outlets, news agencies adhere to a particularly strict form of the journalistic norms of ‘objectivity and neutrality’, which may or may not be conformed to by their clients. As emphasised by Chris Paterson in his study of the dominance of news agencies in the reporting of international news, ‘in so doing, they manufacture an ideologically distinctive and homogenous view of the world’.⁵⁸² Characteristic of this approach, agencies generally have little motivation in challenging the ‘ideological positions’ of dominant international actors such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

On the other hand, the emphasis on traditional journalistic norms can also prompt more radical approaches to reporting, as exemplified by Reuters’ policy regarding the use of the words ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ in their copy. This policy rests on the basis that the description of acts of violence is a sensitive issue which generates widely divergent opinions about how the perpetrators should be portrayed, and Reuters journalists should therefore aim to use ‘dispassionate’ and specific terms such as ‘bomber’ or ‘hijacking’ rather than ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ (except where directly or indirectly quoting a source). This is noted as part of ‘a

⁵⁷⁸ Paterson, "News Agency Dominance," p. 147.

⁵⁷⁹ Tim Dwyer, Fiona Martin, and Gerard Goggin, "News Diversity and Broadband Applications: Challenges for Content and Distribution," *Telecommunications Journal of Australia* 61, no. 4 (2011).

⁵⁸⁰ Ewart, "Media and Myth: Dr Haneef and the Fourth Estate."

⁵⁸¹ Johnston and Forde, "News Wire Agencies," p.11. See also Nick Davies, *Flat Earth News* (London: Chatto & Windis, 2008).

⁵⁸² Paterson, "News Agency Dominance," p. 152.

wider and long-standing policy of avoiding the use of emotive terms': Reuters advises journalists not to 'label' the subjects of news stories, but 'to report objectively their actions, identity and background'.⁵⁸³

Such strict application of the norms of ideological and/or linguistic objectivity and neutrality are not necessarily followed by the media outlets which utilise agency copy. In a study of the types of changes to online stories by CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera, Kutz and Herring found that the second most common form of revision was what they termed 'ideological'; that is, the addition of the outlet's own particular ideological 'spin' and the insertion of the type of 'emotionally manipulative' language that the agencies explicitly avoid.⁵⁸⁴ An example of this is the controversial back-substitution of 'terrorist' for neutral terms like 'insurgents' and 'rebels' by the Canadian publishing giant, CanWest, which led to a surprising development in which Reuters requested newspapers from the stable to *not* to credit them in the bylines of stories which had been altered in such a manner.⁵⁸⁵

Kutz and Herring posit that such changes might not simply be driven by the agendas and worldviews of the editorial staff or the publisher, but may reflect an attempt to increase circulation by shifting to more provocative language. In either case, these types of changes, Kutz and Herring emphasise, are 'typically superfluous to the events of the story' and 'are of no news values to the reader'. Instead, their value lies in the 'persuasive impact' that they might create upon readers.⁵⁸⁶

The use of emotive, victimising and demonising language was an explicit category within my content analysis, and higher proportions of these types of language are strongly associated with a 'war journalism' approach, with its concomitant psychological effects upon the audience. When undertaking my content and discourse analysis, I will need to keep in mind the two characteristics of wire copy and its use outlined above: that the 'objectivity and neutrality' espoused by the major news agencies may on the one hand through its 'homogenising' approach foster a lack of critical engagement with hegemonic global forces, or may alternatively reveal a site at which the ideological bent or framing preferences of particular news outlets are projected upon the 'facts' of a story.

⁵⁸³ Sean Maguire, "When Does Reuters Use the Word Terrorist or Terrorism?," Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/reuters-editors/2007/06/13/when-does-reuters-use-the-word-terrorist-or-terrorism/>.

⁵⁸⁴ Daniel O. Kutz and Susan C. Herring, "Micro-Longitudinal Analysis of Web News Updates," in *Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on System Sciences* (Hawaii2005), p. 6.

⁵⁸⁵ Ian Austen, "Reuters Asks a Chain to Remove Its Bylines," *New York Times*, September 20th, 2004.

⁵⁸⁶ Kutz and Herring, "Micro-Longitudinal Analysis of Web News Updates."

Dispatches from Reuters or the Associated Press, for example, from newsworthy conflicts such as in the Middle East are intended for use by clients worldwide, including in many countries that lack Australia's specific discursive framework, evolved through the historical processes outlined in earlier chapters, in which Islam and Muslims have been thoroughly essentialised and demonised for political purposes. The sample of news stories for the present study would, therefore, most likely contain examples of agency copy having been significantly tweaked on its insertion into an Australian mediascape.

These issues may be less apparent in my analysis of articles in *The SMH*, for as outlined above, the majority of stories based on journalistic sources are attributed to staff reporters and correspondents. With regards to *The Australian*, however, at least 29% of the stories from the 2004 data set, for example, were reproduced content generated by journalists working for wire services or other branches of News Corp., rather than staff reporters. This has important implications for considering the origin and impact of dominant discourses discernible in the paper, especially given the reputation of *The Australian* as a 'quality' broadsheet paper. Traditionally, such a paper could be expected to perform much of its own research and development of stories, as well as having a distinctive 'voice'.

The relatively low quotient of original content in *The Australian*, as opposed to *The SMH* reveals an interesting divergence in the political economy of news production. It can be assumed that the high use of unoriginal content would substantially reduce the cost of production, which can then potentially foster the sidelining of staff reporters. Such developments are therefore a significant feature of the contemporary media landscape.

d) Attribution

The previous section contains numerous, largely speculative references to the balance of structure and agency in supplying factors influencing the content of news. While early studies in content analysis attributed significant, even primary influence to the individual journalist, as a 'gatekeeper',⁵⁸⁷ an evolving scholarly consensus has since tended to downplay such factors, instead typically modelling a more complex array of domains of influence. A much-cited study by Reese and Shoemaker suggests organising news influences into five hierarchically nested levels: the individual, media routines, and organisational imperatives –

⁵⁸⁷ David Manning White, "The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News," *Journalism Quarterly* 27(1950).

all tangible in day-to-day journalistic work – as well as the tacit operation of extra-media and ideological levels.⁵⁸⁸

One of the key arenas in which journalists may exert some degree of agency over what they write is the byline. The byline is a signal to readers that a named reporter's personal credibility is invested in the story, over and above the reputation of the news organisation itself. The presence or absence of bylines, as a convention observed to a greater or lesser extent in different publications, can therefore carry its own ideological significance, as a bulwark against the erosion of journalistic values by narrowly conceived corporate objectives. That, in turn, could have implications for the potential in Australian media for contestation of dominant representations of Islam and Muslims. News managements may exhibit 'subservien[ce]...because in wartime [the media] considers its commercial and political interests lie with supporting the government of the day',⁵⁸⁹ but this may come into implicit tension with what Mark Deuze found were 'ideal-typical traits or values', shared among journalists worldwide, including 'public service... objectivity [and] autonomy' in their working practices, guided by some sense of 'ethics, validity and legitimacy'.⁵⁹⁰ Deuze's work resonates with the evidence presented in Chapter 3 of the *perceived* 'distance from power' of the majority of Australian journalists.

The Economist has steadfastly retained a policy of no personal attributions for its journalists up until the present day, maintaining that 'what is written is more important than who wrote it', and that prohibiting bylines enables the paper to speak with a unified voice. This is, however, by no means the standard within the news media milieu.⁵⁹¹ Whilst the norm of authorial attribution in the media was slow to develop and remains inconsistent among many news outlets, the overall trend during the twentieth century was towards less arbitrary and more transparent attribution regimes, such that in some publications, such as *The New York*

⁵⁸⁸ Pamela Shoemaker and Steven Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on Mass Media Content*, 2nd ed. (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman Publishers, 1996).

⁵⁸⁹ Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo* (London: Prion Books, 2000), p. 526.

⁵⁹⁰ Mark Deuze, "'What Is Journalism? Professional Identity and Ideology of Journalists Re-Considered'," *Journalism: Theory, Criticism and Practice* 6, no. 4 (2005): pp. 446-47.

⁵⁹¹ Catherine Fisk, "The Law and Norms of Attribution," *The Georgetown Law Journal* 95, no. 49 (2008): p. 68; Zvi Reich, "Constrained Authors: Bylines and Authorship in American News Reporting," in *Proceedings of the International Communication Association Annual Conference* (Montreal2008), p. 16.

Times, all contributors to an article will receive some form of public recognition of their contribution in the form of a byline, whether ‘star’ writers, wire agencies or ‘stringers’.⁵⁹²

This more inclusive type of attribution regime is evident in *The SMH*, where all articles in my samples had authorial attributions, with multiple attributions present in a number of cases, and the use of significant amounts of wire copy was explicitly acknowledged. In contrast, the attribution regime that this study indicates as prevailing at *The Australian* during 2004 and 2007 is characterised by its arbitrariness. When the lack of personal attributions on stories sourced from agencies like AFP or AAP is taken into account, between 19% and 32% of articles from the two samples drawn from *The Australian* do not have a *personal* authorial attribution.⁵⁹³

<i>Data Set</i>	<i>Named Journalist</i>	<i>Named Non-Journalist</i>	<i>Editorial</i>	<i>Total Attributed</i>	<i>Total Unattributed</i>
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	54.7%	9%	3.9%	67.6%	32.4%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	64.5%	15%	.7%	80.2%	19.8%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	64.7%	30.9%	4.4%	100%	-
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	92%	6%	2%	100%	-

Figure 12: Authorial attribution as a percentage of total articles per data set

⁵⁹² Fisk, "Attribution," pp. 102-3; Reich, "Constrained Authors: Bylines and Authorship in American News Reporting," p. 6.

⁵⁹³ This arbitrariness in attribution appears to have been eroded in recent years. In informal surveys, I have noticed a much more consistent attribution regime in *The Australian* in recent years, with very few stories lacking explicit authorial attribution. However, the verbatim printing of stories sourced from other News Corp papers and from news agencies remains a dominant feature of *The Australian* hard news sections to this day. The attribution patterns noted for *The SMH* appear to still pertain to current editions, though a higher proportion of stories appear to be sourced from news agencies or other newspapers than the results from my 2004 and 2007 samples indicated.

It is probable that the arbitrariness of this attribution system could contribute to alienating writers from the implications of their work. If journalists are required to produce copy without a byline, they may not truly feel accountable for their writing, in particular for any stereotypes they may perpetuate. Authorial attribution is crucial to a real and metaphysical sense of ownership over what is produced:

Reporters' bylines are a focal point of some of the most fundamental issues in journalism theory. These ostensibly frivolous honours may convey the extent to which news constitutes an institutional or individual enterprise, reflecting its creativity or objectivity and echoing the power relations between the people at the front of the journalistic stage and those who pull the strings behind it.⁵⁹⁴

A potential further reason for the significance of bylines was suggested by the website/blog *Things Journalists Like*. The site suggests that 'that one line of ink means the world to journalists' because in an environment of cutbacks and hiring freezes, the byline provides a measure of productivity:

Who cares if a journalist won a Pulitzer in 2006 for an amazing investigative piece...how many bylines have they had in the past three days? That's what editors care about, and if the answer isn't 35 look out.

The bottom line, according to this blog, is that 'bylines equal job security for journalists'.⁵⁹⁵

This popular culture analysis of the significance of bylines is supported by a study into the significance of authorial attribution by Duke Professor of Law, Catherine Fisk. Fisk locates the significance of attribution in four key functions: 'a reward and incentive for future creativity'; 'a form of discipline that punishes unacceptable work'; creation of a brand; and humanisation, by 'linking the products of work to the reality of human endeavour'.⁵⁹⁶ The extension of bylines to most, if not all of the contributors to a news story, fulfils the first two functions in a practical sense: it recognises and makes explicit the contributions of all participants in the process of creating a story, and it serves corporate self-interest, so that 'fault for journalistic scandals can be attributed to individuals rather than to the paper as a whole'.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁴ Reich, "Constrained Authors: Bylines and Authorship in American News Reporting," p. 21.

⁵⁹⁵ Christopher Ortiz and David Young, "#14 - Bylines," *Stuff Journalists Like*, <http://www.stuffjournalistslike.com/2008/12/14-bylines.html>.

⁵⁹⁶ Fisk, "Attribution," pp. 56.

⁵⁹⁷ Fisk, "Attribution," p. 62.

In addition to what bylines signal to journalists and their employers, bylines also provide signals to the audience. In this sense, bylines function as a ‘brand’, indicating the reliability of the journalists attached to a particular media outlet or humanising their work, such that the audience can connect with and approach news from a level of personal engagement: ‘Attribution is a type of signal, and it operates in labour and other markets plagued by information asymmetries in which reliable signals are important’.⁵⁹⁸ I would argue that journalism operates in exactly one of those types of markets.

Finally, it is interesting to note variations between the proportion of articles between different data sets which contained the description of the author as a correspondent or editor from a particular region or speciality (Figure 13). In *The Australian*, attributions such as ‘Jakarta correspondent’ or ‘correspondents in Baghdad’ were frequent but often in the absence of a journalists’ name – perhaps indicating utilisation of wire copy rather than staff correspondents. In this sense they are more of a dateline than a byline as such.

Data Set	Geographical/Speciality Byline
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	18%
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	25.9%
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	23.5%
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	32%

Figure 13: Geographical/speciality byline as a percentage of total articles per data set

I see the inclusion of such sub-bylines as a strategy akin to providing clear authorial attribution to named journalists: they lend weight and authority to the paper, and affirm their commitment to traditional news values. The consistent use of bylines combined with datelines for *Herald* correspondents, for example, gives the impression that the correspondent is close to the source of news and is ‘breaking’ the story to the audience at home. I suspect it may also reflect differences in journalistic culture between the two papers: the more frequent inclusion of titles such as ‘Chief Political Correspondent’ or ‘Asia-Pacific Editor’ for articles

⁵⁹⁸ Fisk, "Attribution," p. 54.

within *The SMH* may indicate prestige markers within the organisation, as well as signalling status and authoritativeness to the audience.

These factors impact upon my study because they reveal the nature of the relationship between journalists, or other contributors, to newspapers. Whilst much research on media effects and the relationship between politics and the media focuses specifically on journalists and journalistic culture, by analysing articles from all areas of the paper in my study I have been required to go beyond these factors and consider the composition of the paper as a whole. In terms of representations of Islam, it is clearly apparent from my study of the physical features of my data that a significant proportion of content is derived from sources other than journalists, or by sources which are not even named. Nevertheless, the *selection* of these opinion or feature articles, as discussed above, is still dictated by journalistic conventions such as the norms of balance and objectivity.

It also helps to explain some of the potential discrepancies between high levels of distance from power reported by Australian journalists, and the low levels of distance from power sometimes manifested in content. Perhaps in situations such as those that appear to pertain at *The Australian*, where bylines were not consistently granted, and status markers such as editorial position were not routinely recorded, the influence of journalists over their content is reduced.

If this chapter has concentrated on the physical characteristics of articles included in the present study – and their potential significance regarding more substantive issues of ideology in representation – I now move on to apply to the full sample of my articles, the evaluative criteria which I devised to produce a comparative analysis of the extent of Islamophobia in the two periods, as evident in the social artefact of news.

Islamophobic Index – Overview

Many of the patterns which I observed in the Pilot Study held true for the patterns observed in the full data sets: in short, ‘closed’ views of Islam were more prevalent in 2004 than in 2007, and in *The Australian* than in *The SMH* (see Appendix x for the full results for this section of the study). The results for the proportion of articles in each data set which were coded as characterised on the whole by either ‘open’, ‘neutral’ or ‘closed’ views of Islam can be seen in Figure 14:




Figure 14: Islamophobic Index - Summed Scores as a percentage of total articles per data set

As can be seen from this chart, the Summed Scores for ratings on the eight dimensions of the Islamophobic Index reveal clear differences between the two different time periods and the two different newspapers. Overall, the highest proportion of articles with negative sum totals, that is, articles which were classified as ‘closed’, were found in *The Australian* in 2004 (66%), followed by *The Australian* in 2007 (48%), then *The SMH* in 2004 (38%) and *The SMH* in 2007 (24%). The highest proportion of articles with positive summed scores, that is, articles which were classified as ‘open’, were found in reverse order, with *The SMH* in 2007 (64%) and 2004 (50%) followed by *The Australian* in 2007 (47%) and *The Australian* in 2004 (25%). In fact, the proportions of closed to open articles in *The Australian* in 2004 (66% closed, 25% open) are almost exactly the inverse of the proportions of open to closed articles in *The SMH* in 2007 (64% open, 24% closed). The proportion of stories which were coded as ‘neutral’ was quite similar across the four data sets, ranging from 9% to 13% in *The Australian*, and being exactly 12% in both 2004 and 2007 for *The SMH*.

Although this is the type of pattern I anticipated from analysis of the full four data sets based on my preliminary reading of the full set of articles and the patterns indicated in the Pilot

Study, I was not expecting the distinction between the two newspapers to be quite so stark. In particular, I was struck by the fact that although I did find that there were fewer articles from *The SMH* in 2007 which were classified as ‘closed’ and more which were classified as ‘open’ in 2004 than was found for articles from *The Australian* from 2004, there were still more closed articles and fewer open articles in *The Australian* in 2007 than in *The SMH* in 2004. In other words, although there was a significant decrease in the levels of ‘Islamophobic’ representations of Islam and Muslims in *The Australian* between 2004 and 2007, the levels of Islamophobia identified in this study were still higher in *The Australian* in 2007 than they were in *The SMH* in 2004. Despite the significant increase in ‘open’ views towards Islam and decrease in ‘closed’ views towards Islam and Muslims, it is notable that even in the data set with the highest levels of ‘open’ articles, *The SMH* in 2007, almost a quarter of the articles were still classified as ‘closed’.

Distribution of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam and Muslims

When I considered the distribution of articles along the spectrum of closed and open views, I found that in both time periods and both publications the range of scores was quite high (Figure 15).




Figure 15: *Islamophobic Index Summed Scores - range per data set*

The greatest range was found in *The Australian* in 2004, when there were articles within my data set which received the lowest possible score, -8, but also one article which received the highest possible score of +8, denoting ‘extremely open’ views towards Islam. The range of summed scores for articles from *The Australian* in 2007 and *The SMH* in 2004 was identical, with both data sets containing articles receiving the lowest possible score of -8, extending through to an upper limit of +7. The most restricted range was found in *The SMH* in 2007, where the lower limit was -4 and the upper limit remained at +7. Restriction of the *range* of scores indicates a shifting of the boundaries which define ‘legitimate controversy’. In articles analysed from *The SMH* in 2007, there were no articles classified as ‘extremely closed’ or ‘very closed’; this suggests that such views were no longer endorsed as acceptable or legitimate; in fact, they may have been in the process of becoming consigned to the zone of ‘deviancy’. That such extreme views continued to be printed in *The Australian* even in 2007, however, suggests that the boundaries of discussion had not shifted so far in this publication (and potentially in wider public discourse).

In order to further elucidate the distribution of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ articles within the four data sets, I then compared the most extreme articles from the four data sets. Detailed analysis of the more extreme articles is particularly valuable because it further delineates shifts in the parameters of debate over Islam and Muslims. Such articles reveal the most extreme viewpoints on the subject which were considered within the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ by the different publications and to what extent the definitions of what it was acceptable to say in public discourse shifted between the different time periods and across the two different publications. I defined the ‘most extreme’ articles from the four data sets as articles which received a rating of either ‘Extremely Closed’ or ‘Extremely Open’. The rating of ‘Extremely Closed’ was applied to articles which received a summed score on the Islamophobic Index of either -8 or -7; the rating of ‘Extremely Open’ was applied to articles which received summed scores of +7 or +8. I found a similar pattern of distribution of the most extreme articles to that observed for the overall proportions of open and closed articles.

As can be seen from Figure 16, the number of articles which were classified as being ‘Extremely Closed’ was highest for *The Australian* in 2004 (11 articles). There was a significant difference between the number of ‘Extremely Closed’ articles recorded for this data set and for the other three data sets; *The SMH* in 2004 had the next highest number at 4 articles, which was comparable to the results for *The Australian* in 2007. In 2007, there were no articles classified as ‘Extremely Closed’ from *The SMH*. The number of articles which

were classified as ‘Extremely Open’ was comparable across the four data sets, with no significant variation between the sets.

<i>Data set</i>	No. 'Extremely Closed' articles	No. 'Extremely Open' articles
<i>The Australian</i> (2004)	11	1
<i>The Australian</i> (2007)	3	2
<i>The SMH</i> (2004)	4	2
<i>The SMH</i> (2007)	0	1

Figure 16: Number of 'Extremely Closed' and 'Extremely Open' articles per data set

On balance, therefore, extreme articles were predominantly those articles which featured closed views towards Islam rather than more open views. The *range* of articles highlighted in the previous paragraph suggests that in all data sets except that of *The SMH* in 2007 there was a large variety of viewpoints on Islam and Muslims articulated with each newspaper, perhaps indicating an attempt at satisfying the principle of ‘balance’ in printing both extremely negative and extremely positive articles on matters pertaining to Islam and Muslims. However, comparison of the *number* of extreme articles reveals that in *The Australian* in 2004 and 2007 and in *The SMH* in 2004, there were numerically more ‘extremely closed’ articles on Islam than there were ‘extremely open’ ones. *The Australian* in 2004 demonstrated the greatest disparity between extreme articles, with 11 articles classified as ‘extremely closed’ and just one article classified as ‘extremely open’. It is particularly pertinent to note that only one article received the score of +8 out of all four data sets, and this article was in *The Australian* in 2004 (A04_111), even though this was the data set which was most dominated by closed views of Islam and Muslims. As will be discussed in the next chapter, *The Australian* made clearly discernible efforts to try and ‘balance’ the extremely negative coverage of issues related to Islam and Muslims in both time periods, and the inclusion of this ‘extremely open’ article in 2004 was highly likely to have been a deliberate editorial decision to counteract claims (or potential accusations) of a lack of ‘balance and fairness’ on the part of the paper.

Islamophobic Index - average summed scores

As well as considering the extreme cases, it is worth analysing the averages of the scores across the different data sets to see whether this information supports the picture which is emerging so far of differences between the two publications across the two different time periods. Figure 17 presents the average score for all summed scores per data set as well as the average of the closed and open scores.




Figure 17: Average Score for Summed Scores, 'Closed' Scores, and 'Open' Scores per data set

The averages of the summed scores cluster around zero, which is not particularly surprising given the large range of scores in the four data sets, as discussed above. The pattern of difference between the four data sets mimics the pattern noted for the overall incidence of closed versus open views, that is, the lowest average of summed scores was found for *The Australian* in 2004 (-0.8), with the average of summed scores for *The Australian* in 2007 slightly higher (-0.2). The average for summed scores in *The SMH* in 2004 was a perfect zero, and reached 0.9 in *The SMH* in 2007. The incidence of closed articles for the different data sets were more strongly associated with the year rather than the publication, with the lowest average negative scores actually found in *The SMH* in 2004 (-4.2), but with the

average getting closer to zero for both publications in 2007. Another surprising result is that the lowest average positive score across all four sets was actually for *The SMH* in 2007. In 2004, the average summed score for ‘closed’ articles in both publications is more extreme than the average of ‘open’ articles, but this pattern is reversed in 2007. Taken together, these averages suggest a pattern of an aggregate movement towards more open views towards Islam and Muslims between 2004 and 2007 and overall more open representational patterns of Muslims in *The SMH* than in *The Australian*, though with some minor exceptions to this pattern.

Islamophobic Index – results for individual dimensions

As with the overall results, the results for individual dimensions on the Islamophobic Index demonstrated very similar patterns to those that were observed in the Pilot Study and for the overall summed scores for the whole sample. For every single dimension of the Index, the highest level of negative scores (indicating ‘closed’ views of Islam on that particular dimension) were for articles from *The Australian* in 2004, and the lowest level of positive scores (indicating ‘open’ views of Islam on that particular dimension) were for articles from *The SMH* in 2007. For five out of the eight dimensions, articles from *The Australian* in 2007 were less likely to be coded as ‘closed’ than articles from *The SMH* in 2004; therefore the year of publication more strongly influenced the reduction of closed views on individual dimensions of the Index than did the publication. The lowest level of ‘open’ scores was for articles from *The Australian* in 2004, and the second lowest level of ‘open’ scores were for articles from *The Australian* in 2007, which had a lower percentage of open scores than articles from *The SMH* in either 2004 or 2007 on six out of the eight dimensions. The distinction between *The SMH* in 2004 and 2007 on open views was not as clearcut; on many dimensions the percentage of ‘open’ views were very close and on two dimensions the percentage of ‘open’ stories was actually higher in *The SMH* in 2004 than in 2007.

When considering patterns within the scoring for the different dimensions, a distinct divide was visible between the first five dimensions of the Index (Figure 18), which pertained to representations of Islam and Muslims, and the final three dimensions of the Index (Figure 19), which related more directly to the justification or condemnation of hostility, discrimination and prejudice directed towards Islam and Muslims. ‘Closed’ views of Islam were generally much more prevalent on the first five dimensions than on the final three; it

seems apparent from this study that even though negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslim were routinely endorsed and promulgated in many of the articles surveyed, to go the next step and actively *defend* or *advocate* repressive or discriminatory actions towards Muslims was far less acceptable.




Figure 18: Articles defined as 'open' or 'closed' on each of the first five dimensions of the Islamophobic Index (as a percentage of total articles per data set)

In each of the four data sets, the dimension with the highest percentage of 'closed' scores and among the lowest percentage of 'open' scores was Dimension 4, Enemy/Partner. In *The Australian* in 2004, 55% of articles were coded as negative/closed on this dimension, which means that Islam and Muslims were predominantly represented as 'violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in a "clash of civilisations"', rather than being presented as 'an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems'. Even in *The SMH* in 2004, which had the lowest percentage of articles coded as negative on this dimension, fully 30% of articles still represented Muslims and Islam as the 'enemy' and just 6% of articles represented Islam as a 'potential partner'. Dimension 5 followed a similar pattern as Dimension 4, with the second highest percentage of articles coded as closed on this dimension in every data set. As was foregrounded in the Pilot Study, scoring of articles on this dimension was characterised by the lowest proportion of 'open' views towards Islam. The range of articles which presented Islam as 'a genuine

religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents’ was only 6-9% (highest in *The Australian* in 2007).

As noted in the previous chapter, the justification or denial of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and the normalisation of Islamophobia are particularly highlighted by Dimensions 6-8 of the scale, and slightly different patterns of response were recorded for these three dimensions than for the first five dimensions of the Index, with an overall tendency on these three dimensions towards neutral scores and markedly lower proportions of negative scores on these dimensions. As can be seen from the table above, although it was rare for articles to openly dismiss criticisms of actions by the ‘West’ or explicitly defend and normalise discrimination against Muslims, there were also relatively few articles which were coded with positive scores for presenting open views on these dimensions; by far the most common score for articles on these three dimensions was ‘neutral’. The effect of the year was particularly pronounced upon these three dimensions. In 2007, for both publications the highest proportion of open articles and the lowest proportion of closed articles were in these three categories: in fact, in 2007 in *The SMH* not a single article was coded as negative on Dimensions 6, 7 and 8. That means that not a single article dismissed criticisms of the ‘West’ ‘out of hand’; used ‘hostility towards Islam’ to ‘justify discriminatory practices and exclusion of Muslims’, or normalised anti-Muslim hostility. This is a quite significant finding.




Figure 19: Articles defined as 'open' or 'closed' on each of the first five dimensions of the Islamophobic Index (as a percentage of total articles per data set)

Hard vs Soft news

Although my initial reading of the articles in the full data set had led me to suspect that there might be strong patterns distinguishing the representations of Islam and Muslims in ‘hard’ as opposed to ‘soft’ news, the data analysis did not strongly support these initial assumptions. No clear patterns emerged from the data, aside from general indications of the shift towards more open views of Islam in 2007 than in 2004 and in *The SMH* than in *The Australian*, which were already evident from the other aspects of this study.

As can be seen from Figure 20, for three of the four data sets, the average Summed Score for soft news articles was higher for the soft news items than for the hard news items, with the average summed score for hard news items always in the negative (indicating a predominance of ‘closed’ views towards Islam in the article). The sole exception was for *The SMH* in 2007, where the hard news average Summed Score slightly exceeded the soft news average Summed Score, and both were positive, indicating considerably more open views towards Islam and Muslim than was true for the other three data sets. The incidence of ‘extremely closed’ and ‘extremely open’ articles shows only weak patterns: in most cases, for example, articles at the extremes are roughly balanced within the same data set. This is seen most clearly in *The SMH*: in 2004 there are two ‘extremely closed’ soft news stories, and two ‘extremely open’ soft news stories; in 2007, there are no ‘extremely open’ or ‘extremely closed’ soft news stories.




Figure 20: Average Summed Scores for Hard and Soft News per data set

The range limits for summed scores show similarly weak patterns (Figure 21). In 2004, for example, there are no hard news stories which were classified as ‘extremely open’ for either newspaper, and the range for hard news stories in this period was identical for both newspapers (-8 to +5). I suspect this is due to the fact that hard news stories which contained reference to Muslims and Islam in this period were dominated by accounts of terrorist attacks and the War in Iraq, and that this subject set numerous reporting constraints which favoured the inclusion of more ‘closed’ views of Islam and limited the inclusion of more ‘open’ views of Islam. In contrast, in 2007 when the most reported subjects in hard news stories were the Lindsay leafleting scandal and the dismissal of a prominent counter-terrorism case, the possibilities for presenting more open views of Islam and for circumventing conventions which favoured closed representations of Islam were greatly expanded. Correspondingly, there were no hard news stories scored as ‘extremely closed’ for either newspaper in 2007. Despite the lack of clear numerical patterns regarding the distribution, incidence and range of hard versus soft news, there were nevertheless interesting interactions between particular story threads which are worth detailed consideration, and will be considered in the next chapter. First though, I will summarise the findings of my study regarding the representation of Muslims as a ‘problem’ before moving to more detailed discussion of particular clusters of articles in Chapter 11.




Figure 21: Range of Summed Scores for Hard and Soft news per data set

Representing Islam as a ‘problem’

The numerical data for the proportion of articles which either did or did not identify Islam as a problem were generally in line with the results for other aspects of this study (Figure 22). The highest percentage of articles identifying Islam as a problem, and the lowest percentage of articles which specifically identified an alternative problem or no problem at all were from *The Australian* in 2004. In contrast, the lowest percentage of articles identifying Islam as a problem, and the highest percentage of articles which specifically identified an alternative problem or no problem at all were from *The SMH* in 2007. There were proportionally fewer articles identifying Islam as a problem from *The Australian* in 2007 than there were from *The SMH* in 2004, yet *The SMH* in 2004 nevertheless identified an alternative problem in proportionally more articles than in *The Australian* in 2007. The proportion of articles which were coded as ‘neutral’ on this measure was much higher in 2007 for both publications, and in all data sets, a considerable minority of articles were coded as ‘neutral’ on the issue of whether ‘Islam’ was a problem. Reductions in framing Islam as a ‘problem’ therefore frequently translated into a more neutral framing of the ‘problem’, rather than a clear-cut transition towards framing alternative targets as a problem.




Figure 22: Percentage of articles per data set which identified Islam as a problem

Some clarification is necessary at this point regarding how I coded articles on this dimension. If an article explicitly represented ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslims’, as a generic monolith and as

undeniably a problem, I coded it as having framed Islam/Muslims as a ‘problem’. I coded articles as neutral if they did not *specifically* identify Islam or Muslims as a problem in a generalising and essentialising manner. Finally, I coded articles as having identified an alternative problem if they framed, for example, a specific Islamic practice, or a specific Muslim person or organisation as a ‘problem’, but explicitly distinguished between Islam as a religion or Muslims as a whole and the specified ‘problem’. Many articles which were not classified as framing ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslims *per se* as a problem identified a joint problem: Muslim extremists, for example, *and* the US Government and its allies in the War on Terror.

A significant issue which I found in coding on this dimension was that the majority of articles which I coded as neutral, and many of the articles I coded as identifying an alternative target, specifically identified as a problem targets which may have been clearly differentiated from ‘Islam’ as a religion and ‘Muslims’ as whole in that specific article, but were not necessarily distinguished in this way in other articles from the sample. The list of predominant alternative targets in this case included Islamism, Islamists, and terrorists, militants, extremists, fundamentalists, insurgents, fanatics or radicals, with the latter terms almost invariably paired with ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’. These are the exact type of terms which the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission had singled out as early as 1991 as harmful, demonising labels which should be avoided in media coverage of conflicts, as highlighted in Chapter 6, and contemporary analysis has identified as a continuing problem in the representations of Muslims and Islam.⁵⁹⁹

Even in cases where the author of a story carefully defined or explained their use of such labels, the definition of terms varied widely across the wider sample and therefore even clear distinctions between minority views within Islam and broader consensus between Muslims worldwide, or careful, neutral definitions of, for example, ‘Islamism’ could be negated by the less discriminate writing in other articles within the same newspaper, or even within the same article. An example worth considering is ‘Credo of the Knife’, by *The Australian’s* Middle East Correspondent, Nicholas Rothwell (A04_56). Rothwell’s story is predominantly a profile of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of the Iraqi militant group Tawhid al-Jihad, who had claimed responsibility for several executions of hostages during

⁵⁹⁹ Tanja Dreher, "News Media Responsibilities in Reporting on Terrorism," in *Law and Liberty in the War on Terror*, eds. Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald, and George Williams (Annandale: Federation Press, 2007); Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Report of the National Enquiry into Racist Violence*.

2004. Rothwell clearly distinguishes between the ‘creed’ of Zarqawi and the beliefs and practices of the majority of Muslims:

He [Zarqawi] believes his killings of bound victims are sanctioned by sharia, or Islamic law, and that the men he holds are not hostages but spies or captives of war. Zarqawi, then, is a clear, consistent enemy of the Western armies in Iraq and of all who support them. He speaks for a tiny minority within Islam and the 400 million inhabitants of the Middle East. Moderate governments abhor him and his methods; few devout Muslims would endorse his aims.

This, then, is promising: clear references to the diversity of viewpoints within the Islamic world and emphasis on the fact that the ideology of Zarqawi is that of a ‘tiny minority’. Yet the article as a whole is framed as a story about the ‘clash of civilisations’; the article begins with this chilling image:

When the blade wielded by master terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi first broke the frail skin of American hostage Eugene Armstrong’s neck this week, two worlds on collision course met in blood. One of those worlds, the narrow domain of militant Islam, is full of grievance, anger and certainty; the other, the amorphous, sentimental, economically potent West, is a vulnerable target.

In his story of a ‘clash of opposites’, as Rothwell terms it, it is difficult for Rothwell to sustain an emphasis on the diversity within Islam. On the same day in *The Australian*, moreover, the majority of articles referring to Muslims or Islam detailed terrorist attacks, military insurgencies and repressive laws in Muslim countries including Sudan, Chechnya, Indonesia, Iraq, and Turkey (A04_49; A04_50; A04_57; A04_58; A04_60). Another article discussed how ‘economically backward Muslims’ were the fastest growing demographic in India, with concerns raised over the fact that ‘Muslims had the highest fertility rates [yet] they had the lowest overall literacy and employment rates’ (A04_55). *The Australian* printed one short story that same day criticising the War on Terror (A04_55), but not a single story about Muslims or Islam which was positive. In the face of such a weight of evidence of the essential *similarity* and association with negativity of Muslims across the globe, maintaining a clear sense that the views and actions of individuals like Zarqawi were *not* representative of the majority of Muslims or definitive of Islam as a whole would therefore be difficult for readers of *The Australian*.

The definition of terms used to describe Muslim actors also varies widely within different articles, so the careful definition of a particular label in one article in order to explain why that term is being chosen or applied is easily counteracted by the prevailing usage of terms.

This is particularly true of the term 'Islamist'. Use of this term is problematic because although it is used offhand as a descriptor in multiple articles, there is no universally agreed definition for 'Islamism' or 'Islamist'. An academic definition of 'Islamism' would acknowledge the distinction between 'Islamism' and 'Islam', and emphasise the wide diversity of movements, organisations and political parties which could be labelled 'Islamist', as in this definition by Teti and Mura:

'Islamism' is simply a set of political and social movements aiming to "bring Islam back" into politics and society. Islamists aim for some kind of "Islamisation" of the state and/or of society, meaning essentially the return to a more socially and morally just life.

Teti and Mura further emphasise that although some groups which can be seen as having 'Islamising' aims endorse violent means to achieve such ends, 'most Muslims and most Islamist politics remain non-violent and desirous of more, not less, democracy'.⁶⁰⁰

The term 'Islamist' is used in a relatively neutral sense in some articles within my sample which accords relatively well with the definition given by Teti and Mura. Turkey's government is referred to in several articles as 'Islamist', for example, which if given the definition above is certainly true (A04_58; A04_84; A04_122). However, this type of understanding of Islamism is extremely rare within articles in my sample, where the term is applied almost universally as a negative label, and is frequently paired with terms such as 'extremist', 'terrorism', 'militants' or 'fanatics'. If given the definition of 'Islamism' expanded upon in some of the articles in my sample, it is clear that the casual and frequent usage of this term in newspaper articles is highly problematic. In an article which originally appeared in *The Times*, for example, Richard Beeston and Stephen Farrell define Islamists as:

Religious fanatics with aims that include establishing sharia law across the Muslim world, toppling secular Arab regimes and removing US, Israeli and "infidel" forces from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Palestine (A04_98).

In another article which originally appeared in *The Times*, journalist-turned-politician Michael Gove used even more inflammatory language to define Islamists as 'barbarians' who 'shed infidel blood in pursuit of a medieval ideology of death' (A04_39). Using the term 'Islamist' indiscriminately to refer to specific political groups, governing parties, and in polemical attacks serves to collapse distinctions between different political movements and

⁶⁰⁰ Teti and Mura, "Islam and Islamism."

groups across the world, to foster the notion of Islam as monolithic, unchanging, and unreservedly ‘barbaric’ and aggressive. There are, therefore, some issues with my categorisation of some articles within my sample on the question of whether they represented Islam as a problem, because the care taken by some authors in definition of terms and clarification of the ‘problem’ was not always consonant with the more common patterns of labelling and usage of terms within other articles in the sample.

For those articles which identified an alternative target as ‘the problem’, or identified no target at all, the leading alternatives were considerably similar between the two publications. In 2004, articles in *The Australian* which clearly did not identify Islam as a ‘problem’ most frequently identified Islamophobia/anti-Muslim discrimination, the War on Terror, and religious intolerance as alternative ‘problems’; in 2004 in *The SMH*, some articles identified the ‘War on Terror’, ‘terrorism/terrorists’, and ‘Islamic militants’ as problems. As has already been noted, the distinction between ‘terrorists’ or ‘Islamic militants’ and Islam and Muslims as a whole may have been observed in some articles, which were therefore coded as *not* representing Islam generically as a problem, yet given the broader context in which such articles are situated the overwhelming picture remains one in which ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ are problematised and associated strongly with violence.

In 2007, the two main alternative targets identified as problems in both publications were ‘dirty tricks’ in election campaigns and ‘counter-terrorism’ policing and legislative issues. The third most common alternative target in *The Australian* in 2007 was ‘Islamophobia/anti-Muslim discrimination’, and in *The SMH* was the ‘War on Terror’. ‘Dirty tricks’ was the most common alternative target, with thirteen articles framing dirty election tricks as a problem in 2007 (six articles from *The SMH* and seven from *The Australian*). No other alternative target was identified even nearly as frequently. The appearance of articles which represented the ‘War on Terror’ as a problem in all four data sets is therefore noteworthy, but the extremely low numbers of articles challenging this consensus must be emphasised: in both *The Australian* in 2004 and *The SMH* in 2007 there were just three articles per publication which explicitly challenged the ‘War on Terror’ consensus and represented the war as a ‘problem’.

This chapter has highlighted the dominant features and characteristics of the patterns in the full sample of articles considered in this study which were revealed through my coding exercises. In the next chapter, I now move beyond the discussion of data analytical patterns to

consider the representational shifts in particular sets of articles between the different time periods and the two different newspapers.

Chapter 11 – Discussion

This chapter will focus upon in-depth discussion of specific clusters of articles and individual articles which are deserving of more detailed discussion. The first section of this chapter considers the characteristics and shifts over time of the representation of links between Islam and violent conflict. The second section of this chapter considers the media coverage of racist campaigning in marginal Sydney seats between the 2004 and 2007 election. The third section of Chapter 11 explores the intertextual relationships between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news by focussing in particular on a set of interrelated and self-referential articles published in *The Australian* in 2004. The final section of Chapter 11 expands my analytical framework by exploring the intertextual relationships between news articles and broader, international discourses on Islam.

Islam and Violence

As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there is considerable difficulty in distinguishing between articles which *explicitly* identified Islam and Muslims as a ‘problem’ and those which may have *implicitly* characterised Islam and Muslim as a problem. A strong relationship between Islam and violence is frequently fostered by patterns of reporting on issues related to Islam even if particular articles contain evidence of *individual* journalists/commentators attempting to avoid the utilisation or activation of negative stereotypes and prejudices towards Islam and Muslims. As has been established in much of the literature on Islam and the Media, canvassed in earlier chapters of this thesis, the linkage between Islam and violence is particularly widespread, with the majority of this emphasis in the past decade being characterised by a conflation of terrorism and Islam. I therefore wanted to investigate what proportion of articles from each sample were broadly concerned with the linkage between Islam and violent conflict. In order to do so I compared the proportion of articles which focussed on the subjects of counter terrorism and national security, terrorist violence, and violent conflict in Islamic countries between the four different data sets. The results are represented in Figure 23 (opposite).



Figure 23: Articles on the subject of Islam and Violent Conflict (as a percentage of the total number of articles per data set)

As can be seen from this chart, there was a stronger relationship between the proportion of articles on subjects which linked Islam with violence and the newspaper than there was with the year of publication, with over half of all articles in *The Australian* in both 2004 and 2007 on these subjects. The proportion of articles on the three subjects of counter terrorism and national security, terrorist violence, and violent conflict in Islamic countries was highest for *The Australian* in 2007 and lowest for *The SMH* in 2007. Within the category of ‘violence and Islam’, the proportion of articles on the different subjects within this broader category of Islam and violent conflict differed significantly. In *The Australian* in 2004, for example, ‘terrorist violence’ was the subject of a full 23% of the stories; in 2007, by contrast, ‘terrorist violence’ was the subject of just 2% of the stories – exactly the same proportion as for *The SMH* in the same year (Figure 24).

Significantly, the proportionally high number of stories on ‘terrorist violence’ in 2004 did not necessarily reflect an extremely high number of individual terrorist attacks or incidences of violence. Instead, it reflects an overwhelming number of articles reporting on slightly different aspects or developments of a limited number of actual incidents, in particular the aftermath of the Jakarta Embassy bombing which occurred a few days before the start of the period under analysis in this study. As was mentioned in Chapter 8, both publications created special sections of the newspaper in every edition for over a week after the Embassy bombing, which featured exhaustive coverage of every speculative detail of the case as it

emerged. These sections were titled ‘Evil at our Gate’ in *The SMH* and ‘Terror at our Door’ in *The Australian*.



Figure 24: Percentage of articles from each data set on the subjects of either 'counter-terrorism' or 'terrorist violence'

Another issue which generated significant levels of coverage was hostage-taking in Iraq, with sixteen stories dedicated to this issue in the *The Australian* in 2004, and four in *The SMH*. The proportion of articles referring to the spate of hostage-taking and executions of foreigners taking place in Iraq at that time, however, far exceeded this number. The conventions of ‘newsworthiness’ in Australia mentioned in Chapter 3, which predispose Australian editors to choose stories focusing on Australians involved in overseas incidents, meant that the majority of these stories focused on a case in which two Australians were said to have been kidnapped and held to ransom. Although the claim was later found to have no substance, it gave scope for many articles to be written detailing the numerous other cases of executions of hostages and fuelled speculation on the potential fate of the supposed Australian captives (see for example, A04_104, A04_118, A04_119).

The claims that two Australians were being held hostage in Iraq also fuelled speculation about how the Australian Government should react were the claims to be confirmed. In ‘World that brooks no compromise’ *The Australian*’s Foreign Editor Greg Sheridan, explored the dilemmas raised for countries whose nationals had been kidnapped:

At the time of writing we still don't know whether two Australians have been kidnapped in Baghdad. But whether they have or not, the issue should force us to think through what an Australian government should do in such a circumstance, who it should negotiate with, or whether it should negotiate at all (A04_104).

Sheridan's conclusion is that it is not only wrong to negotiate with 'terrorists', but moreover impossible; unlike historical figures such as Irish resistance leader Michael Collins, Sheridan argued, the adage that 'today's terrorist is tomorrow's national leader' could not be applied to contemporary Islamic 'terrorists':

The demands of JI [Jemaat Islamiah] and al-Qa'ida are literally absolutist and totalitarian. To say you can't negotiate with them is not only to make a moral judgment but simply to describe reality (A04_104).

Never mind that the hostage scenarios Sheridan is referring to did not involve either of the two organisations he names: the principle, it seems is what matters most to Sheridan. Islamic terrorists, Sheridan argued, 'represent a completely new type and level of threat', who could not be negotiated with but only combated by force. Sheridan closed his article by inflaming anxiety over the threat of terrorist attack by citing a claim from a US expert negotiator invited to Australia by the Lowy Institute that 'nuclear terrorism was "more likely than not" in the next five to 10 years'.

The dilemmas of the tension between the resolve of non-negotiation for the lives of hostages and the emotions evoked by the spectacle of suffering involved in the hostage crisis were also explored in several stories by Nicholas Rothwell. Rothwell focused on how kidnapers are seeking to 'barbarise the conflict' and portrays the hostage-takings as a calculated strategy to manipulate public opinion and elections in Western countries. In such a situation, Rothwell maintains, maintaining resolve was paramount (A04_46; A04_56; A04_64):

How can the watching heart not melt, as the 11-minute-long ordeal by video of British hostage Kenneth Bigley unfolds? And how can Western leaders escape the trap laid by the terrorists, as reasons of state hang in the balance against compassion and fellow feeling...What sort of society are we in the West, who have come up against the sword of militant Islam so uncompromisingly raised? What do we stand for? One life? Or the higher good of nations and the abstract war on terror? (A04_64)

Paul Sheehan represents the dilemma of the West over hostage negotiations in very similar terms in *The SMH* in the same year in 'There's nothing overboard about public resentment of moral blackmail' (SMH04_66). Sheehan describes the execution of two French journalists in Iraq earlier that month (later broadcast on Al-Jazeera, which Sheehan refers to as 'the

megaphone of pan-Islamic fascism’). He attributes their death to the weakness of the French government in the face of global terrorism: ‘This is exactly why two French journalists were left to die by the same nation that led opposition to the invasion of Iraq.’ Sheehan then lists a series of violent acts associated with Muslims that had occurred over the course of that month:

Ten murders in Israel gave way to a dozen ritual executions in Iraq, this time Nepalese civilians working there who were kidnapped and then butchered in the cause of what their killers called "Islam and its holy warriors"...the normalisation of murder and blackmail in the Middle East was then eclipsed by the killing of hundreds of Russian children in the city of Beslan, murdered by Islamic terrorists from Chechnya. The impact was universal revulsion, including disgust and introspection through much of the Muslim world at the increasing depravity of those who invoke the name of Islam when murdering civilians. Last Thursday, it was our turn. But the massive blast outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta succeeded in killing only Indonesians, most of them Muslims, drew Australia and Indonesia closer together against a common enemy, and hardened the Australian public further against Islamic medievalism.

All such acts, Sheehan claimed, represented attempts at ‘moral blackmail’ of the US and its allies in the War on Terror, but in Australia would have little purchase, since ‘John Howard remains politically strong on the issue of national security’. Sheehan thus exemplifies the low levels of ‘distance from power’ which were strongly characteristic of articles on the subject of violent conflict in 2004.

Neither Sheehan nor Rothwell engages with the underlying causes of the violence they chronicle, nor do they feature any Muslim voices: a trend that is echoed in the majority of the rest of the coverage of violent conflict in Muslim countries. On rare occasions, as in Sheridan’s article cited above (A04_104), or another of Rothwell’s articles (A04_56), there are quotations from extreme clerics or militants which are used to bolster their arguments – but in very few articles do reporters from either publication cite the views and perspectives of Muslims other than extremists, nor do they provide any contextualising information which would make the violence that is being reported explicable in any way.

Two prominent exceptions to this trend are an article from *The Australian* in 2004 which was originally published in *The Sunday Times*, and a series of articles in *The SMH* in 2004 by senior correspondent Paul McGeough. In ‘Innocents die in “precision” US attack’, Lebanese-British journalist Hala Jaber narrates a story which is very different from the prevailing type of coverage of the war in Iraq in articles from my sample. Jaber details the aftermath of a US

attack on a compound near Fallujah, which the US military described as ‘a successful precision strike on a confirmed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi terrorist meeting site’. Yet, as Jaber records, ‘many women and children were also killed and injured in the attack’. Jaber discusses the case of one young girl, injured and in great pain in Fallujah general hospital, who did not yet know that most of her immediate and extended family had been killed in the attack, including her father. Her mother and little sister were in a coma. Jaber quotes a relative of the girl, who had driven her to the hospital, asking how the Iraqi Prime Minister ‘can claim to love Iraqis and to represent the Iraqi people and their interests, and then permit the Americans to do this?’. ‘Such comments’, Jaber wrote, ‘reflect the anguish of many of Fallujah’s inhabitants over the large number of civilians caught up in the US operations against supporters of Zarqawi’. Jaber then goes on to discuss the antagonism of Fallujah inhabitants towards Zarqawi’s forces, divergences within the different groups involved in insurgency actions, including disputes over the practice of hostage-taking, and the efforts of civilians to conduct their lives in the midst of the war. These topics are notably absent from most other articles reporting on the war in Iraq within my sample.

Paul McGeough’s reporting from the war in Iraq and in Afghanistan (SMH04_06; SMH04_16; SMH04_34; SMH04_59) similarly contextualises the conflict and includes the voices of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan who are being affected by the wars, rather than simply listing acts of violence absent of context, or utilising the ‘War on Terror’ frame as a ‘complexity-reducing’ device. He writes about complex matters in detailed feature articles with multiple, varied sources and provides some explanation of the background and real situation in the conflict zones he writes about. His articles on Afghanistan are particularly significant, since these are the only articles in my sample which discuss the progress of the war in Afghanistan. McGeough strongly contradicts the official line that the war in Afghanistan is a *fait accompli*: he concludes that ‘Afghanistan is not the success that George Bush claims it to be; and it certainly is not a mission accomplished’ (SMH04_06). A full feature article on the 6th October was devoted to the situation of women in Afghanistan, in which he concludes that since the US-led invasion, ‘little has changed for rural women and the country’s war widows’ (SMH04_16). McGeough interviews two female Afghani activists in the country and discusses different strategies they are utilising to try and work for women’s rights in their own way:

Activists like Dr Jalal believe their best argument in a very conservative, religious society is that all the reforms they demand are in the Koran – if it is read properly.

Shukria Barakai, who carried the torch for women as a member of the committee that drafted the new Afghan constitution, agrees. “The constitution gives us equal rights and Islam gives us rights in work, business and marriage. But Afghan tradition closes all these doors.”

The acknowledgement of the failures of the ‘war on terror’, the distinction between Islamic and cultural traditions, and the inclusion of Muslim women’s voices are also significant departures from the majority of reporting on violent conflict in articles within my sample.

The effect of the high levels of negative reporting of Muslims and strong association with violence in much news reporting in this period was summed up in a feature article from *The SMH* in 2004 by Joseph Wakim, former Multicultural Affairs Commissioner on the impact of anti-Muslim and anti-prejudice (SMH04_32). Titled ‘Any Tom, Dick or Harry can beat prejudice’, the article refers to the common prejudice directed against people with Muslim or Arab names and the resultant pressure upon members of these communities to Anglicise their names in order to achieve parity in the job market and escape constant attacks on the basis of their ethno-religious background:

Many are fed up with having to constantly fend off knee-jerk reactions, prejudices, phobias and pregnant pauses from some who immediately associate recognisable Arabic and Islamic names with the terrorism that dominates our news. The pre-emptive defence becomes a mantra. No, I am not a terrorist. No, I was not born overseas. No, I do not support al-Qaeda...As each terrorist attack and hostage beheading adds another layer to the entrenched Arabic and Islamic stereotype, those bearing the names and thus bearing the brunt feel more entrenched in their fear that they will never have a fair go.

Wakim’s article is an important example of the way that the weight of negative reporting combines to create an atmosphere in which Australian Muslims are marginalised and excluded, and that events overseas come to impact upon and be attributed collectively to all Muslims.

My personal experience of reading through the high volume of predominantly negative stories regarding violent conflict Iraq, Indonesia, Chechnya, Pakistan and other places in the Muslim world was rising despair and anxiety. Even though I knew that these articles were about events that occurred years ago it was emotionally draining and exhausting to read these stories. For all the emphasis on ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ in news journalism, it was impossible for me as a consumer of news to feel detached, when reading story after story about such tragic events, especially when the violence they depicted was predominantly

framed as irrational, unrelenting and unstoppable. In 2004 in particular, the suggestion that there were potential causes, or any solutions other than warfare, for this ‘cycle of violence’ was frequently lampooned and demonised. The potential for hopeful responses to conflict narratives, or to empathy for the people involved in them, were therefore not simply absent from many of the articles I read as part of this study, but in fact were frequently *actively* (and sometimes aggressively) shut down.

Tom Allard and Cynthia Banham’s ‘Terrorism’s causes need exploring’ is a rare example of an article which seriously engaged with the need to understand potential causes of terrorism (SMH04_39). The difficulty of pursuing the argument that there were real causes for terrorism which needed to be understood and acknowledged in order to form cogent foreign policy responses was highlighted by reference to the Federal Government’s strident opposition to such a perspective. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted by Allard and Banham as claiming that:

It’s not what we’ve done but what we are that inflames the terrorists’ unassuageable sense of grievance... it misconceives the problem to think there are root causes like poverty or hopelessly entrenched political impasses.

By contradicting this perspective on terrorist violence, Allard and Banham were adopting an ‘adversarial’ position towards the incumbent government, represented in this case by Downer. Hamish McDonald, *The SMH*’s Beijing correspondent and a former al-Jazeera anchor in south-east Asia, similarly attempted to encourage consideration of the causes of terrorism in ‘Sifting through the web of motives behind the Jakarta bombing’ (SMH04_63). McDonald adopted an even more adversarial stance than Allard and Banham, strongly criticising the Howard Government’s ‘efforts to demolish cultural bridges into Asia’ and the ‘rapid erosion of respect for civil rights and legal protection’ in Australia. McDonald particularly singles out ‘the disgraceful David Hicks case’ and ‘the even more disturbing’ case of Mamdouh Habib: surprisingly this is the only article from my sample in 2004 that referred to either of these cases. Finally, McDonald concludes that Australia ‘need[s] to employ less khaki...and more police blue’.

McDonald’s article was printed on the page opposite letters responding to Paul Sheehan’s article ‘There’s nothing overboard about public resentment of moral blackmail’, discussed above (SMH04_66). One of these letters comments that ‘Paul Sheehan makes a good case for not cuddling up to terrorists’, whilst a second provides a response to another reader’s letter in

which an argument similar to that of McDonald and Allard is lampooned:

John Hill (Letters, September 13) feels we should analyse the terrorists' problems before deciding upon a solution. The analysis is complete: the problem is militant Islam as propagated around the world. Quick John, what's your solution? (SMH04_62).

Other attempts at contextualising terrorist violence or proposing non-violent solutions to international conflict are ridiculed in *The SMH* in 'Green on the outside, empty inside', in which Ted Lapin (Associate Editor of pro-Israel publication *The Review*) attacked the foreign policy position of the Australian Greens:

Instead of maintaining a highly trained, well-armed military, the Greens would defend Australia through "a comprehensive strategy of non-violent conflict management". Nettle would sooner dispatch the Love Boat to deal with a terrorist threat than an RAN frigate. The Greens do not appear to comprehend that there is no such thing as Santa Claus in international affairs (SMH04_15).

This type of ridicule is comparable to the views espoused by Neil Brown in *The Australian* that same year, discussed in detail in Chapter 9, in which he compared the validity of regional meetings and non-violent responses to terrorism as a 'bedtime story' akin to Harry Potter (A04_19). In another article in the same data set, 'It'll pay to stay right', Brown condemned Latham's policies in regards to the War on Terror given the 'rampant terrorism and all of the extremist Muslim hatred and jealousy that gives rise to it'. 'In increasingly dangerous times', Brown opined, 'it is only natural that people will go for a safe pair of hands – and the more conservative the better'. Brown confidently predicted that Howard would win the election – as he did.

It was a changed landscape during the lead up to the 2007 election. The proliferation of opinion pieces, leaders and letters ridiculing and refuting any criticism of the War on Terror, so apparent in both newspapers in 2004, was notably absent in *The SMH* in 2007, and there were very few stories of this ilk in *The Australian* in 2007. In one of these stories, 'The US is missing the point', by former US Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, the need to continue to combat the growth of terrorism is portrayed as being so important that almost any means was justifiable, including the support of repressive dictatorships: 'military men willing to intervene to prevent their countries from falling to Islamism are surely preferable to elected Islamists such as Ahmadinejad' (A07_31). In another of these articles, conservative commentator Noel Pearson attacked arguments published in the paper by Hal

Wooten, Q.C. that terrorism could be countered by attempts to understand and ameliorate the causes of violence:

I fully support bridge-building policies for peace and justice, but I disagree with progressive opinion that this is a solution to terrorism and Islamist extremism. If Western policy were radically reoriented, I do not think that extremism would be significantly reduced because Islamist extremism feeds off an irrational attribution of real and imagined grievances to Western and Zionist conspiracy.

Pearson's response to Wooten was echoed a few days later by a reader's letter in which they too argue that there is only a 'single narrative' in regards to 'Islamists': they don't tolerate religious or political diversity and they believe the whole world should be ruled under Islam, Sharia-style. Those who don't conform to this extreme form of Islam get killed... any other excuse or "narrative" for Islamic terrorism just doesn't wash' (A07_117). On the whole though, the incidence and extremity of reporting and commentary on Islam in regards to violent conflict was significantly reduced in *The Australian* in 2007.

As I discussed above, one of the major shifts in reporting on Islam and violent conflict between 2004 and 2007 was that the number of articles specifically covering terrorist violence or attacks was greatly reduced in 2007, yet the number of articles on issues related to counter terrorism and national security increased. Within the subset of articles reporting on counter terrorism, however, there was a further significant shift: many of these articles do not simply report upon the introduction of anti-terrorist measures in different countries or on the proceedings of counter terrorism legal cases, but a significant subset of the articles reflected critically upon the suite of anti-terrorism legislation in Australia and its effects upon Muslim individuals and communities. Overall, there were three such articles in *The SMH* in 2007 (9% of the data set) and nine such articles in *The Australian* in that same year (7% of the data set). Although the overall context remained negative, in that the linkage between Muslims and violence was maintained in such stories, the more critical approach to the War on Terror and its impacts upon all countries involved is notable.

The spate of stories on problems with Australia's anti-terrorism legislation and policing was triggered by the dismissal of a high profile Commonwealth case against a young former medical student named Izhar ul-Haque in mid-November 2013. In the discussion of the case in articles from my sample, strong linkages were generally drawn between the failure of this case and of other anti-terrorism cases. Most also emphasised not simply the 'bungling' aspects of the case but also the erosion of due process and legal protections:

The collapse of the case follows a series of flawed terror prosecutions including the bungled charges brought against Gold Coast doctor Mohamed Haneef in July and the decision last year by the Victorian Court of Appeal to overturn the conviction of Jack Thomas. In a damning judgement, NSW Supreme Court judge Michael Adams said key interviews...were inadmissible because of gross misconduct by ASIO agents and Australian Federal Police officers (A07_67).

Many of the articles constructed ul-Haque sympathetically, referring to his ‘trauma’, his hard work at school and university and his ‘brilliance’ (for example, A07_67; A07_66; A07_73). Tom Allard’s article ‘Spies in the eyes of others’ centres the whole article around the personal story of ul-Haque and sites it within the post-9/11 context of rising antagonism towards Muslims in Australia:

When Izhar ul-Haque went back to Pakistan for his older brother's wedding, he was a bitter young man. It was early 2003 and the Bali bombers had wrought their carnage only a few months earlier, creating deep suspicions in the Australian community about those of Islamic faith. It was a difficult time for all Muslims and ul-Haque's family was under great strain. They had never really settled into Sydney's western suburbs after migrating three years earlier and ul-Haque's father could not find work. To compound matters, ul-Haque, a brilliant student at North Sydney Boys High, had failed his second-year medical exams. "I'm fed up with Westerners," he wrote to his father. "Western patients look at me as if I'm a frog. They don't wish to speak English to me. How can I spend five to six years with them?" (SMH07_25)

In addition to humanising ul-Haque and others formerly demonised as ‘terrorists’, some articles even included references to and quotations from Muslim community members documenting their hounding and intimidation by intelligence officers (A06_66), as well as some references to the political impetus behind misuses of the anti-terrorism legislation (A07_67; A07_65).

The changes between 2004 and 2007 in regards to reporting on Muslims and terrorism are encapsulated by an article in *The Australian* in 2007 titled ‘The tragedy of extremism reveals a hero in Hicks’ (A07_8). The article reviews a play inspired by the case of David Hicks. In conclusion, the article notes the following:

This is the second play in the past 18 months to tackle the Hicks story. Nigel Jamieson's 2006 dance and multimedia spectacular, Honour Bound, looked at it in its Guantanamo Bay context, and is an examination of the erosion of humanity and legality in the so-called war on terror. It will be interesting to see what the next treatment will be, for, as a lightning-rod figure for the post-September 11 era, it seems very likely that the leitmotif of David Hicks as tragic hero will run and run.

It seems highly unlikely that an article framing Hicks as a ‘tragic hero’ or referring to the ‘so-called’ war on terror could possibly have been published in *The Australian* in 2004. This article perhaps more than any others shows just how far the parameters of the debate had shifted between 2004 and 2007.

Racist election campaigning: the cases of Greenway and Lindsay

As was mentioned in Chapter 7, and then alluded to again in Chapter 8, a key subject which I intended to investigate as part of my research was the differential reporting of anti-Muslim ‘racist’ campaigning in marginal Sydney seats at the 2004 and the 2007 elections. At the 2004 election, the Labor candidate for the seat of Greenway, Ed Husic, was the target of a smear campaign based on his Muslim heritage, yet this story received limited attention from the press prior to the 2004 election. In contrast, one of the biggest stories of the final days prior to the 2007 election broke when Liberal Party members were caught distributing a fake election leaflet in the neighbouring electorate of Lindsay which was intended to foment and exploit anti-Muslim hostility for electoral gain. Although the drama of catching the perpetrators in the act certainly accentuated the ‘newsworthiness’ of the Lindsay leafletting scandal, the differential treatment accorded to the two cases more specifically highlights shifting attitudes towards the acceptability of anti-Muslim hostility in public discourse between the two periods.

The reporting of the election campaign in Greenway in 2004 also reveals some key aspects concerning the dynamics of representation of Muslims in Australia. In 2004, there were three articles from *The Australian* and five from *The SMH* which discussed the electorate of Greenway and mentioned the Muslim identity of Ed Husic. In six of these eight articles, the ‘Muslimness’ of Husic was emphasised by way of contrasting his ‘difference’ from the evangelical Christian identification of his principal opponent, the Liberal Party’s Louise Markus (A04_16; A04_108; SMH04_07; SMH04_09; SMH04_13; SMH04_31). In several cases, stories from both newspapers verged on presenting the contest as a ‘clash of civilisations’ style conflict:

Religion is shaping as a factor in several close contests around the country as the major parties grapple for power before the election....in the western Sydney seat of Greenway, social worker Louise Markus, from the Hillsong community – one of Australia's largest congregations – is challenging Ed Husic, a Muslim (A04_108).

The Labor candidate, Ed Husic, is the former public affairs spokesman for Integral Energy and a non-practising Muslim. The Liberal candidate, Louise Markus, is a social worker and a member of the Hillsong church, the largest Pentacostal (sic) church in Australia. It has been a long time since religion has played a part in Australian politics, but Greenway may change this (SMH04_13).

As Peter Manning has demonstrated, the representation of the contest between Husic and Markus as a religious one was led by the national media, not the local media, who had focussed instead on reporting policy differences and local funding commitments by the neck-and-neck contenders. As Manning also noted, the decision of the national press to frame the story in this manner impacted negatively upon Husic and upon Labor, because ‘in Australia, being a Christian is a plus, particularly if the federal Treasurer dances at your Church. Being a Muslim is a very intense negative’.⁶⁰¹

The negativity associated with having a Muslim candidate had impacts far from western Sydney. Both *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald* reported on an incident at a Labor Party ‘town hall’ session with Labor Leader Mark Latham in Adelaide:

A man stood to question why Labor had chosen a Muslim candidate, Ed Husic, to run in the Sydney seat of Greenway with its high – and increasing – proportion of Christian constituents. Latham bristled with discomfort and his heartfelt lecture on tolerance and selecting people on their merits brought the house down (A04_16).

There was also an ugly attack on the race of Labor's Muslim candidate for the Sydney seat of Greenway, Ed Husic. "Ed is a Bosnian Muslim. His parents came out here with nothing and built a life. It's a great Australian story," Latham retorted (SMH04_17).

These mentions of the ‘ugly’ racist/anti-Muslim undercurrents stirred by the selection of a Muslim parliamentary candidate are relatively cursory and do not go any deeper into the issues raised by the incident. In fact, as the election date drew closer, the racist/anti-Muslim aspects of campaigning against Husic in Greenway intensified, with Labor election officials maintaining that phone calls were being made to Greenway constituents warning voters that Husic was a Muslim, triggering a ‘whispering campaign’ against Husic. Finally, in the days just prior to the election, a flyer was distributed throughout the electorate, stating that ‘Ed Husic is a devout Muslim. Ed is working hard to get a better deal for Islam’. The flyer was

⁶⁰¹ Manning, "Transmitting Meanings," p. 29.

purportedly issued by the Labor party but was in fact, a fake, intended to arouse suspicion and hostility towards Husic and Labor.⁶⁰²

Husic attempted to raise awareness of the ‘whispering campaign’ against him, and the story was reported upon by local media prior to the election. It was not until over a month following the election that the ‘whispering campaign’ and fake leaflets were more widely reported upon by the national media; by this time, Markus had won the seat of Greenway with a margin of less than 1% and the Liberal Government had been returned to office. Within my sample, that is, in the crucial period *prior* to the election, just one article from these two newspapers referred to the underground campaign against Husic, and this article actually dismissed Husic’s claims and instead strongly cast aspersions upon Husic himself:

Husic also recently used the Labor-friendly Blacktown City Sun to float a story about a "whisper campaign about his religious affiliations". As far as I can deduce, while every story about the Greenway contest has mentioned that his Liberal opponent is a member of the Hillsong Church, the largest evangelical congregation in the country, Husic believes there is something sinister about discussing his religious practices. Why? Because his parents, Hasib and Hasiba, are Muslims who emigrated from the former Yugoslavia. "I am not a practising Muslim," he told The Blacktown City Sun "[but] I can't dishonour my parents by disavowing their religion." Nobody has asked him to. Strange behaviour for the front-runner in a must-win marginal seat’ (SMH04_31).

The author of this article was the columnist Paul Sheehan. Sheehan dismisses out of hand Husic’s concerns regarding the ‘whispering campaign’ conducted against him. He demonstrates no sensitivity as to why this was problematic for Husic, despite himself having being instrumental in the dissemination and promulgation of extreme fears and anxiety regarding Muslim Australians. As Peter Manning observed, ‘in this atmosphere of public prejudice, it would not be surprising if 34 year-old Husic was anxious to avoid his religion becoming an issue in his first campaign to hold the seat of Greenway for Labor’.⁶⁰³

Sheehan went on to characterise Husic as dishonest and evasive for not doing an interview with him and implies he had been involved in ‘union warfare’, before lavishing praise upon the Liberal candidate, Louise Markus, ‘a social worker’, who was eager to meet him and detail her plans for the electorate. Considering Sheehan’s stance towards Muslims and the Labor party in his columns, and his dismissal of the significance of the anti-Muslim

⁶⁰² Manning, "Transmitting Meanings," p. 29.

⁶⁰³ Manning, "Transmitting Meanings," p. 28.

components of the campaign in Greenway, it is understandable that Husic was not eager to meet with him. This was the only story about ‘dirty tricks’ in either Greenway in 2004 or Lindsay in 2007 which received a negative summed score on the Islamophobic Index (-6, or ‘very closed’).

Compared to the limited and contradictory treatment of anti-Muslim/racist campaigning in the seat of Greenway at the 2004 election, the attention given to very similar tactics in the neighbouring seat of Lindsay at the 2007 election is quite remarkable. In 2007, there were thirteen articles from *The Australian* and eleven from *The SMH* which discussed the electorate of Lindsay and mentioned the anti-Muslim/racist leaflets distributed there by Liberal Party members. This is more than triple the number of articles which referred to anti-Muslim campaigning in Greenway in 2004. None of the articles on the ‘Lindsay leaflet scandal’ were rated in this study as framing Muslims or Islam as a problem and none of them received a negative summed score on the Islamophobic Index. The range of scores varied from 0 (neither open or closed) to 3 (open) for *The SMH*, and from 0 to +7 (extremely open) in *The Australian*. The article which scored +7 was ‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ (A07_22), which was one of the articles in the Pilot Study and was discussed in detail in the previous chapter. This article proved to have the most strident condemnation of the anti-Muslim character of the stunt, and was the only article of the twenty-four articles on this subject which included the voices of any Muslim community representatives. There was, however, one story from the sample of articles, ‘Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals switch sides’ (A07_19), in which a Muslim community member was directly quoted, and another, ‘Playing dirty an artform in the West’ (SMH07_17) in which Ed Husic was *indirectly* quoted. These were the only Muslim voices cited on this contentious issue across twenty-three articles; the majority of sources were bureaucratic sources with a couple of articles investigating the attitudes of (non-Muslim) Lindsay constituents towards the incident.

In terms of the identification of a ‘problem’, there were similar patterns between articles from *The SMH* and articles from *The Australian*, with the majority of articles identifying the problem as ‘dirty tricks’ and a substantial minority defining the problem as racist or prejudiced campaigning or as socially divisive electoral tactics. As Dunn and Kemp have highlighted, the flyers were distributed in an area which was predominantly white and working class, with a rising proportion of Christian constituents and a lower percentage of Muslims than is the national average:

The leaflet developers gambled that readers of the pamphlet assumed that Australia was a Christian country and were fearful that Christian hegemony was being threatened by an emergent and deviant Muslim presence. The leaflet cultivated the impression that a cultural takeover was in train, that Muslims were seeking to convert all Christians to Islam, that mosques were being built in every suburb, and that key institutions had become prisoners to Muslim demands. The latter included the argument that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) supported the cultural take-over if Australia by Muslims, were sympathetic to Muslim terrorists, and supportive of controversial Muslim clerics.⁶⁰⁴

These are deeply important matters and the limited number of articles highlighting the seriousness of the affair is deeply concerning. In *The SMH* in particular, there was a strong undercurrent of lampooning the activities of the distributors of the flyer. Such articles emphasised the overall ridiculousness of the campaign and the depths that Australian politics had plunged to (see for example, SMH07_04, SMH07_05, SMH07_13), rather than emphasising the seriousness of the act of inciting anti-Muslim hostility and fear for electoral advantage. Such articles were characterised by mocking spelling errors in the fake leaflet (SMH07_13, SMH07_14), and references to the ‘Lindsay Jihadists’ (SMH07_14) and ‘Jihad Jackie’ – one of the group responsible for the flyer was the husband of outgoing Member for Lindsay, Jackie Kelly (SMH07_07).

Whilst attempting to be satirical and humorous, in downplaying the seriousness of the affair, such articles potentially played into justifications by Kelly that the leaflet creation and distribution was ‘just a bit of a Chaser-style prank’ (SMH07_07). Among the articles from *The SMH*, several made passing reference to the intent of exploiting or fomenting ‘race hate’ (e.g. SMH07_16; SMH07_18). Yet in few cases was this the *focus* of the story. The far more common angle was of portraying the scandal as an example of ‘dirty tricks’ or ‘dirty campaign tactics’ (e.g. SMH07_16; SMH07_17; SMH07_18). ‘Playing dirty an artform in the West’ (SMH07_17) focused on the issue of dirty election tricks, drawing comparisons with accusations of fake leaflets being distributed in other electorates by the anti-abortion activist group Right to Life Australia. This article also made reference to accusations that Kelly had distributed fake how-to-vote cards at the 2001 election in order to falsely capture voters’ preferences, and also indirectly quoted Ed Husic at length on the Greenway leaflets in 2004:

Ed Husic, a Labor candidate for the seat of Greenway in the 2004 election who was

⁶⁰⁴ Dunn and Kemp, "The 'Lindsay Leaflet Scandal'."

the subject of a racist letterboxing campaign, said the revelations prove race-baiting is an established Coalition technique. Mr Husic, a Muslim who lost to the Liberals' Louise Markus by about 800 votes, said the only difference between the 2004 and 2007 incidents is that this time the perpetrators have been caught.

Despite the interesting connection made by Husic between the two campaigns, the authors of this article do not pursue this angle but remain neutral in tone. They make no assertions regarding any possible links between the different cases of 'dirty campaign tactics'.

The angle of 'dirty tricks' was also prominent in *The Australian*; on the day prior to the election there was a double-page spread in the paper devoted to coverage of the story, under the heading 'DIRTY TRICKS'. To develop the theme even further, *The Australian* even republished an article from *The Times* detailing the 'dirty tricks' being employed in the lead up to the US elections (A07_14; for examples of this focus in articles on the Lindsay leafleting scandal see in particular A07_09 and A07_12). However, as a whole, reporters in *The Australian* took a serious approach to the scandal and rather than satirising the event published a number of articles which dealt head-on with the issue of racism and Islamophobia inherent in the incident and sought comment from a much wider array of voices than was the case for articles on the subject in *The SMH*.

The significance and impact of the incident was particularly highlighted by stories in which the perspective of views other than that of federal politicians were highlighted. The article discussed at length in my Pilot Study, for example, included the views of Muslim community representatives (A07_22), whilst other articles referred to the outrage provoked over the incident in the wider community, referring, for example, to bloggers and Muslim community forums which 'slammed the leaflet drop as racially inflammatory' (A07_20). 'Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals switch sides' (A07_19) featured numerous interviews with half a dozen locals from the area. One recipient of the flyer details his reaction upon receiving the flyer:

The 54-year-old spray painter, who had been "leaning" towards voting for Labor tomorrow, said yesterday he was horrified by the false claim that the ALP supported forgiveness for the Bali bombers. "That would have changed my vote (back to the Coalition) for sure".

The man was reportedly "shocked" by the revelation that the flyer was bogus and claimed he would definitely be voting for the Labor party on election day as a result. Another woman from the same area "said the tactics were indefensible":

I don't think it was a joke...I think this scandal will affect everyone a lot as to how they vote. I think it will do the Government a lot of harm...they have degraded the Muslim community.

The article also quotes a Muslim woman who works in the area as referring to the flyer as “very wrong” and “prejudiced”, as well as discussing a number of residents who claimed to have decided to vote for Labor, many for the first time, as a result of the scandal. The repetition of this aspect of the narrative is particularly interesting; it normalises the decision to vote for Labor, and equates it with the high moral ground, while by contrast in the 2004 period the majority of articles from *The Australian* from my sample assumed a highly ‘loyal’ orientation towards the Coalition and characterised voting for any other party as a deviant, irresponsible decision.

One article from *The Australian*, by senior reporter Brad Norrington, adopted an even more stridently adversarial perspective on the scandal and linked the fake flyer tactic to the pattern of exploiting anti-Muslim sentiment for electoral advantage at the national level:

What if there was a broader strategy behind the document, intended to help a racist undercurrent that still exists across much of western-oriented Australia to bubble to the surface? It is not long since the Cronulla riots in Sydney's south in December 2005 incited Muslim hatred. The Howard Government won the 2001 election in the wake of the Osama Bin Laden-inspired US terrorist attacks on September 11, but an anti-Muslim sentiment was already stirred by the Tampa affair that preceded it. Some senior Labor figures believe *The Australian's* exposure of the so-called “children overboard” affair as a fraud just days before the election did not help Labor's standing with voters; rather it harmed it. Why? Because, bizarrely, it brought to the surface once more the fear of invading boatpeople (A07_20).

It is quite remarkable, considering the anti-Muslim and anti-Labor focus of *The Australian* in 2004, to then read an article such as this, which not only acknowledges the significant role played by Islamophobia in Australian politics during the early 2000s but also champions the role of *The Australian* as watchdog and groundbreaker in investigative journalism. Considering the tendency towards denial of racism/Islamophobia so pervasive in articles for both newspapers in the lead up to 2004 this is a quite striking article, which in many ways contradicts the long-term trends evident in *The Australian*. In 2010, for example, features editor Tom Switzer still adamantly maintained that *The Australian* did *not* accept that the Cronulla Riots revealed ‘a racist underbelly’ and ‘a widespread tendency to demonise Muslims’ led by John Howard and the media. Instead, ‘we believed that as racist as white

Australia was 40 years ago and as imperfect as she maintains today, Australian is one of the most tolerant nations in the world by almost any criterion'.⁶⁰⁵

Taken together, the reporting of the Lindsay leafleting scandal in *The Australian* reveals a multifaceted approach towards repositioning the paper in support of the Labor government, assuaging voter anxieties about the ethics of voting for Labor, and positioning itself as a champion of investigative reporting and 'Fourth Estate' values. Although in many ways the coverage of the scandal in *The Australian* is much more nuanced and complex than that of *The SMH*, the about-face of the newspaper was quite disconcerting for me to read when I was directly contrasting its election coverage in 2004 with that of 2007. What had changed? One factor was the changed political landscape. The new Labor Leader, Kevin Rudd, was at the time a close personal friend of the editor-in-chief of *The Australian*, Chris Mitchell. Mitchell claims credit for persuading Murdoch to permit the flagship broadsheet to endorse Rudd for election in 2007:

He [Murdoch] was in my office and I spoke to him about it [and] said it was time for a change of government. It seemed to me the man who had the agenda for the next three years was Kevin Rudd.⁶⁰⁶

Perhaps under Mitchell's influence, perhaps as a result of a sense that the Labor Party's win was a foregone conclusion and that it was prudent to be on the side of the 'winners',⁶⁰⁷ the allegiance of *The Australian* had clearly and dramatically shifted between 2004 and 2007.

Intertextual relationships between different articles: principle of balance

Overall, my data suggests a strong sense of an artificial 'balancing' of extreme viewpoints, particularly in regards to soft news stories. Given the anecdotes discussed in Chapter 8 of editorial interventions to achieve 'balance' in reporting of issues related to Muslims and Islam, it is fair to assume that some effort may have been made by the newspapers in these periods to actively seek out and publish stories which promoted 'extremely open' views of Islam in order to provide 'balance' to the 'extremely closed' stories which they were publishing, particularly in 2004. In order to explore these issues, I will discuss in detail a collection of articles published over the course of a week in mid-September 2004 in *The*

⁶⁰⁵ Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines," p. 129.

⁶⁰⁶ Cited in Sally Neighbour, "The United States of Chris Mitchell," *The Monthly*, July 2011.

⁶⁰⁷ For a critique of the commonly held view that 'Murdoch backs winners', see McKnight, *Rupert Murdoch*, pp. 28-9.

Australian. On the 13th September 2004, *The Australian* published two opinion pieces which I classified as ‘extremely closed’, with scores of -8; one of these was the Leader (A04_126) and the other was an opinion feature by anti-Muslim columnist Mark Steyn, who is based in the US but writes for News Corp. publications in several countries (A04_125). On the same day, *The Australian* published an opinion piece by controversial Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji, provocatively titled ‘For God’s sake, rescue Islam from killers’. Over the next week *The Australian* then published a series of letters responding to these three opinion pieces. These articles are worth discussing in detail, to seek to demonstrate how the principle of ‘balance’ can play out in the pages of a newspaper over the course of a week, and also to consider how ‘soft’ news stories might interact with and influence the interpretation of ‘hard’ news stories. Studies of ‘soft news’, including leaders, feature articles, opinion columns and entertainment news ‘have pinpointed a range of issues, including how the inclusion of this “subjective”, “interpretative” material helps to underwrite the proclaimed “objectivity” of “hard” news stories’.⁶⁰⁸

‘No negotiating with ideology of unreason’ (A04_126) discusses the Jakarta embassy bombing which had taken place four days previously. This editorial piece, with no attributed author, dismisses the notion that the actions of the US and its allies in the War on Terror have any relationship to the bombing, and clearly sets out the position of *The Australian* on issues related to Islam and Muslims at this point in time:

The Australian maintains a constant view that it is our values – who we are – that make us a target for Islamist terror... while the idea the war on terror is a clash of civilisations does not figure in the strategic thinking of either Western or Muslim nations, it clearly looms large in the delusions of the Islamists. Which is one reason that, contrary to another suggestion emerging on the Left, there can be no negotiation with the terrorists... such fanciful talks would quickly reach the bedrock of our values. So would it be allowing women to show their faces in public, gays to follow their own lifestyle, or children to read literature other than the Koran that we bargained away next?

The first line of this quote is strikingly similar to the comment from Foreign Minister Alexander Downer cited above, that ‘it’s not what we’ve done but what we are that inflames the terrorists’ unassuageable sense of grievance’ (SMH04_39), underscoring the high level of agreement between the Federal Government and *The Australian* on the War on Terror framework in 2004. This leader, therefore, can be said to exhibiting extremely low levels of

⁶⁰⁸ Allan, *News Culture*, p. 86.

‘distance from power’, in contrast to the much more critical reporting on the actions of the Government and higher levels of ‘distance from power’ which were evident in 2007.

The leader then goes on to describe how the pro-US government of Jose Maria Aznar in Spain was ousted after the Madrid train bombings. The Spanish electorate, the author argued, ‘presumably hoped it had bought security from terror’, yet a few weeks later apparently another attempt was foiled: ‘so much’, the writer of the article argues, ‘for trying to understand the intentions of murderous unreason’. As with other articles discussed above in the section on reporting on terrorism, any attempt to explore the possible causes of terrorism or non-violent responses to violent conflict are dismissed out of hand in this article: opponents of the ‘war on terror’ are dismissed as a ‘coalition of the whining’ and ‘some supposedly responsible Australian Muslim leaders’ are denounced for advancing the idea that there are real reasons behind the attacks. The article concludes that ‘only tighter security at home and united action against terror abroad can make life safer for all of us in the West’. It is interesting that the author of this article so strongly identifies with ‘the West’, despite having dismissed earlier the notion that the ‘war on terror’ was influenced by the notion of the ‘clash of civilisations’, which of course turned upon the essentialisation of a variety of Anglophone and European nations as an entity Huntington referred to as ‘The West’.

The opinion piece by Mark Steyn also dismisses the arguments of Australian Muslim leaders that consideration must be paid to potential causes and explanations for the Jakarta bombing – these views are, Steyn argues, flatly ‘wrong’:

Last week’s bombing would still have happened...with or without Bush, Australians would have opened their morning papers these past three years and found themselves looking at pictures of carnage and slaughter in Jakarta... All that Bush has done is provide a context (A04_125).

The ‘context’ that Bush provides is one for explaining apparently unconnected events across the globe:

9/11 gave these events a unifying narrative. We understand now that Jakarta and Madrid and Istanbul and Beslan and lower Manhattan are all part of the same story. The terrorists act locally, and we think globally.

This is exactly the type of ‘complexity-reducing’ function of the ‘war on terror’ consensus which was described in Chapter 3. Not just these cases, Steyn argues, but also ‘unassimilated Muslim immigrants in Europe, disaffected black Muslims in British and American jails – and

one day, Kim Jong-Il's nuclear bargain basement in north Korea', were all threats and tools for use by 'Islamists' which could be explained by the 'unifying narrative' of 9/11. For these reasons, according to Steyn, local Australian Muslim leaders have 'got it wrong' in seeking to explore the causes of terrorism: 'throughout the '90s, the Islamists threw stones at the West, and the West threw nothing back. And with each stoning, the enemy grew emboldened'. During a period when Muslim voices were notably absent from much of the 'hard' news reporting on the war in Iraq, it is notable that in opinion pieces like this the pleas of Muslim community leaders for peace and reason *are* given attention – but only in order to stridently denounce them.

On the same page as this highly inflammatory article by Steyn, and on the page immediately following the leader 'No negotiating with ideology of unreason', was Irshad Manji's article 'For God's sake, rescue Islam from killers' (A04_124). Manji was a popular featured writer in *The Australian* during the mid-2000s, despite her views on Islam being highly controversial and MediaWatch accusing her of repeated incidents of self-plagiarism and unattributed recycling of columns.⁶⁰⁹ The printing of articles by Manji was cited by Features Editor Tom Switzer as evidence of the newspaper's commitment to the presentation of a 'fair and balanced spread of opinion' on matters relating to Islam.⁶¹⁰ Although Switzer might have thought Manji's work to be very positive and to counter-balance the extremely negative views towards Islam which were concurrently being published in the pages of *The Australian*, Manji's articles are not ideal in terms of presenting 'fair and balanced' views of Islam. She contributes to the construction of Islam as monolithic and the consensus of the War on Terror by echoing points raised by Steyn and even mimicking some of the same rhetorical strategies, such as listing and linking recent acts of violence committed by Muslims around the world and divorcing them from any contextual meaning:

Given the last two weeks of Islamist terror – the murderous explosion at Australia's embassy in Jakarta, the slaying of 12 Nepalese cooks and cleaners in Iraq, the double suicide bombings in Israel, the kidnapping of two French journalists and, of course, the hijacking of a school in Russia... one thing seems clear: Muslims worldwide need new leadership.

Whilst Manji makes some excellent points about the opportunities for young Muslims in 'the West' to act as Islamic reformers, her extremely emotive writing and valorisation of the West

⁶⁰⁹ Manning, "Transmitting Meanings," p. 28.

⁶¹⁰ Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines," p. 127.

leaves a strong impression that all Muslims who are not young, reformist and living in the West are unreservedly backward, aggressive and sexist. It is difficult to see how this type of article can be justified as ‘balancing’ the type of anti-Muslim views espoused in the articles against which it was juxtaposed in *The Australian* on September 13, 2004.

As well as considering the arrangement of these three articles, it is worth further investigating the letters of readers which were published in response to these articles two days later. Readers’ letters are often considered to be ‘the last remaining area within a newspaper that provides opportunities for individual and amateur authors to contribute to public debate in a spontaneous and uncoordinated way’. However, research on the publication of reader’s letters in newspapers, particularly during the period of heightened political salience that characterises election campaign coverage, suggests instead that there is significant evidence of ‘growing professionalization by both journalists and letter writers in the co-construction of the letters page’.⁶¹¹ Richardson and Franklin argue that:

Letters editors are not merely gatekeepers who ratify letters in accordance with “newsworthiness” selection criteria. Rather, letters are selected and edited in accordance with the identity of the newspaper, the (often only perceived) preferences of the readership, and other more mundane requirements of space and balance. During this process, editorial teams regularly change the order of sentences and paragraphs, purposefully place readers’ letters in relation to other letters, and, by doing so, construct debates within and between letters and contiguously signal the pertinence of the included letters to the “debate,” thereby acknowledging and on occasion (depending on how the letter is being used) legitimating their contents.

As a result, the letters page reveals not the unmediated views of the readership, so much as ‘what is seen as justifiable, acceptable, or “normal” comment by a newspaper’s editorial team’.⁶¹² Allan similarly reinforces the idea that the criteria for selection and arrangement of readers’ letters ‘delimit the ideological boundaries of legitimate or fair comment’.⁶¹³

The boundaries that were set within *The Australian*’s letter pages were of a wide diversity of viewpoints on Islam, from extremely closed to extremely open. The first letter from the 15th September which was considered in my study was a close reiteration of the views put forward in the Leader in particular but also to a lesser extent the opinion piece by Mark Steyn:

⁶¹¹ John E. Richardson and Bob Franklin, "Letters of Intent: Election Campaigning and Orchestrated Public Debate in Local Newspapers' Letters to the Editor," *Political Communication* 21, no. 4 (2004): p. 476.

⁶¹² Richardson and Franklin, "Letters of Intent," p. 461.

⁶¹³ Allan, *News Culture*, p. 86.

Some hypotheticals for those who feel we should negotiate with the Islamic fundamentalists who follow the al-Qa’ida ideology of ‘jihadism’... sharia law would have to be implemented to protect women’s rights and homosexuals destroyed to prevent the spread of disease. Frivolities like television, music and cinema should be banned and public executions and amputations introduced. Everything else, of course, would be negotiable (A04_110).

The alarmist, ill-informed views in this letter are therefore an example of what was considered at one edge of the boundaries of ‘legitimate or fair comment’ by *The Australian* in 2004.

The other two letters printed that day which were within my sample were, however, more ‘fair and balanced’. Both articles criticised Manji’s article of 13th September. Under the title ‘Islam a haven of peace’, M. Tahir wrote that Manji’s article was:

...As devoid of scholarship as it is full of vitriol against Islam. Of course the heinous acts of terrorism in Bali, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere must be condemned by all civilised people of the world, including Muslims, irrespective of who the perpetrators are. But to hold Islam and its teachings responsible for the actions of some of its followers is grossly inaccurate and unfair to this great religion, which means “peace” and which has a proud history of tolerance (A04_111).

Tahir emphasises the need to examine and address the root causes of extremism and terrorism ‘rather than blaming everything on the religion these people claim to follow’. Tahir concludes by noting that ‘it would be a travesty of justice if we start blaming Christianity for the shameful acts of some US military personnel in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq’. This was the only article in this data set which was coded as ‘extremely open’, with the highest possible score of +8. The final article in this set was a short, succinct response to Manji’s article by Amal Awad of Vaocluse:

Herein lies the problem for moderate Muslims such as myself: with violent extremists on one side and unbending reformers on another, there exists an unfortunate imbalance in how Muslims are viewed – two radical sides, both hijacking their religion to promote a cause.

Finally, the ‘extremely open’ views of Islam which were contained in M. Tahir’s letter of 15th September were ‘balanced’ out by a letter from Andrew Murphy on 16th September:

M. Tahir promulgates the convenient half-truth that the word Islam means “peace”. Yes, Islam means “peace” but the word also defines a context for the achievement of “peace”. That context is submission to Allah. In other words, we’ll all be at “peace” when we all convert to Islam.

This letter clearly promotes key closed views of Islam whilst undermining the more open views of Islam presented by M. Tahir. This is of course just a small sampling of the type of interactions between articles within my sample, and with the wider public debate in Australia, but I think a significant one.

The comments of Amal Awad are particularly interesting for the light they throw upon the tactic of attempting to artificially construct ‘balance’ by counterposing extreme viewpoints. As David Knight has argued in his analysis of Fox News’ tactic of pursuing conservative agendas through the appearance of adhering to the norm of balance, ‘constructing a device of balance on some issues can strongly support a conservative view’. This is achieved, Knight argued, by moving the ‘centre’ of a debate by the choice of ‘extreme parameters’ and by creating ‘the perception of a public controversy’: in this way, legitimacy can be given to one side of the debate, because the notion of ‘balance presumes that both sides are equally legitimate’.⁶¹⁴ Given that this snapshot of the wider ‘debate’ on Islam took place in the context of a flood of hard news stories reporting on every possible detail and angle of the Jakarta embassy bombings and the role of Islam in the bombing, it is difficult to conceive how the artificial ‘balancing’ of extreme viewpoints in the opinion and letters pages really created an environment of true fairness, balance and objectivity in regards to reporting on issues related to Islam and Muslims.

Intertextual relationships between articles within the sample and wider discourse on Muslims and Islam

To illustrate the potential form that relationships between newspaper articles and broader societal discourses on Muslims can take, as well as some of the key responsibilities for journalists in reporting on sensitive issues, I will discuss in detail the claims put forward in one article from the sample, ‘PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis’ (A07_39). This article begins as a fairly innocuous discussion of Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s precarious position in the wake of the return of former President Benazir Bhutto. It claims that Musharraf was under pressure from his Saudi backers to entice back another former President, Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted in 1999, as a counterbalance to Bhutto. However, the final three paragraphs relate not to Musharraf’s problems but are devoted to relating ‘horrifying new details’ about the bomb blast which

⁶¹⁴ McKnight, *Rupert Murdoch*, p. 162.

killed 149 people and injured 402 on the day of Bhutto's return to Pakistan (18th October, 2007).⁶¹⁵

The new information about the attack, supplied by 'investigators from Ms Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party [the PPP]', alleged that the bomb was believed to have been 'strapped to a one-year-old child carried by its jihadist father'. The 'investigators' claimed that 'the suicide bomber tried repeatedly to carry the baby to Ms Bhutto's vehicle' but was blocked by guards who believed he was 'not behaving normally'. This highly distressing claim, and its segue from the first half of the story triggered my interest, and I attempted to find out more about the claims made in the story.

The identity of those responsible for the blast was still unknown in April 2010, when a UN Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of Bhutto's subsequent assassination was concluded. Although Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf did his best to cast the blame upon a range of outlawed extremist groups, none of them accepted responsibility for the attack. The Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, the largest intelligence agency in Pakistan, conducted its own investigation and may have arrested four suspects in October 2007. However, at the time of the UN Inquiry into Bhutto's assassination, these suspects could not be located and both their identity and their fate are uncertain.⁶¹⁶

Bhutto herself accused high-ranking members of the Pakistani government of orchestrating the attack. In her posthumously published memoir *Reconciliation*, Bhutto emphasises that 'this was meant to appear to be an Al Qaeda-style suicide attack... but in Pakistan things are almost never as they seem'. The 'sophistication of the plan', Bhutto claimed, 'suggested a larger conspiracy... I had identified those I suspected in my letter to the general before my return'.⁶¹⁷

In fact, the only corroboration of the claim that the attack was perpetrated by a jihadist using a baby as a decoy that I could find was in an excerpt from the Simon & Schuster edition of *Reconciliation* which was printed in *The Sunday Times* in early 2008.⁶¹⁸ Curiously, the two different published editions of *Reconciliation* which I consulted had slightly different

⁶¹⁵ United Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances of the Assassination of Former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto* (New York: United Nations, 2010), p. 13.

⁶¹⁶ United Nations Commission of Inquiry, *Report*, p. 13.

⁶¹⁷ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 14.

⁶¹⁸ Benazir Bhutto, "Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto's Last Testament," *The Sunday Times* February 3, 2008.

accounts of the Karachi bomb attack to that of *The Sunday Times*' excerpt, in which all mention of the baby as a vehicle for a bomb has been excised.⁶¹⁹

In the version of the story published by *The Sunday Times*, Bhutto retells the story of the man offering up the child, and that she and her party 'now suspect the baby's clothes were lined with plastic explosives'.⁶²⁰ However, she never states that he was the child's father, or claims that it was proven that this man was behind the attack, as is implied by the article in *The Australian*.

It seems possible that in the immediate aftermath of the motorcade attack that speculation among Bhutto's inner circle and members of the PPP who survived the attack threw up the possibility that a certain man behaving strangely with a baby could have been linked to the attack. However, the excision of this detail from Bhutto's own published account, and the failure of the story to be picked up by the media (with the major exception of *The Australian*), indicates that by the time of the publication of *Reconciliation*, key members of the PPP thought better of trying to use the story to stir up enmity towards their rivals.

The image conjured up by Bruce Loudon's story, however, quickly grew to have a life of its own, being rapidly reproduced and commented on by bloggers. One blogger, 'Girl from the Right', reproduced the section of Loudon's story describing the 'jihadist father' offering up the baby with the bomb strapped to it. She then commented that:

Islam for example is merely some kind of evil sex and death cult masquerading as a religion. Think I'm wrong? Religion of Peace, my fat white ass. There is no God in a cult(ure) that would goad its adherents to such acts.⁶²¹

Another blog, maintained by an Israel-based organisation named IRIS (Information Regarding Israel's Security), reproduced the same chunk of text, noting that 'this horrific story (which will be ignored by the mainstream media) should remind us that our Islamist enemy is evil'.⁶²² Unsurprisingly, the blog does not cite the source of the story as *The Australian*, a fact which would somewhat undermine their claim that the story was unlikely to appear in the mainstream media. This separation of the essence of the story from its original

⁶¹⁹ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), pp. 1-16; Bhutto, *Reconciliation*, pp. 1-16.

⁶²⁰ Benazir Bhutto, "Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto's Last Testament," *The Sunday Times*, February 3, 2008.

⁶²¹ Wendy Sullivan, "Not All Religions Are Equal," Girl on the Right, <http://girlontheright.com/category/jihad/>.

⁶²² IRIS, "Baby Used as Suicide Bomber," Information Regarding Israel's Security, <http://www.iris.org.il/blog/archives/2603-Baby-Used-as-Suicide-Bomber.html>.

context indicates that the image of the ‘baby bomb’ had become an internet meme in its own right.⁶²³

At least ten other blogs reproduced the ‘baby bomb’ section of the original news story. Each post provoked numerous comments echoing the revulsion and outrage towards Islam exemplified by the two blogs above. Only one article which I came across questioned Loudon’s story. This critique was from the conservative electronic newspaper, Canada Free Press:

Given the unbridled ambitions of Benazir Bhutto to reclaim power in Pakistan, do investigators in Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party have any credibility in their statement that the bomb intended to kill their leader was strapped to a one-year-old child?⁶²⁴

The article noted that the ‘wily’ Bhutto might have degrees from Oxford and Harvard, but ‘her degrees are in philosophy, politics, economics and government, not sleuthing’.

Similar issues of credibility were addressed in a review of *Reconciliation* in the UK’s The Sunday Times just a few months later:

Benazir was, by all accounts, a devoted patriot, a loyal friend and a loving mother...[but] Benazir was duplicitous to the point of being delusional, playing a constant multiple game, saying one thing to her supporters, another to the Pakistani army, another to the intelligence services, another to London and Washington, and something else again to the western media.⁶²⁵

Fareed Zakaria, in his review of *Reconciliation*, mirrors many of the same points, praising Bhutto’s courageous and intellectually brilliant analysis of Islam and of global politics, yet at the same time noting that ‘the idea of Benazir Bhutto has always been more powerful than the reality’. Zakaria emphasises that her treatment of her own presidency and that of her father is ‘neither fresh nor frank’, marked particularly by ‘little introspection and much spin’.⁶²⁶

My investigation into the permutations of this story highlights a number of issues in both my subject matter and my methodology. Firstly, it highlights the difficulty of assessing the *effects* of news stories in a study, such as the present one, which is based on the use of hypothetical

⁶²³ Need a ref on meme theory/internet memes?

⁶²⁴ Judi McLeod, "Benazir Bhutto Can Identify Jihadist Carrying Bomb-Strapped Baby?," *Canada Free Press*, November 23 2007.

⁶²⁵ Patrick French, review of *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* by Benazir Bhutto, *The Sunday Times* February 17, 2008.

⁶²⁶ Fareed Zakaria, "Bhutto and the Future of Pakistan," *New York Times*, April 6 2008.

evaluative criteria to analyse the manifest content of news articles. The meanings made in response to such stories are richly layered, and sometimes far exceed the degree of nuance and variation that can be conveyed from the content analysis itself.

My ad hoc follow up on my own personal, visceral reaction to this story is a highly impressionistic and personal method of investigation. Yet the surprise of finding that this unusual passage had similarly caught the attention of bloggers and commentators internationally actually revealed with particular clarity the emotional reaction which may be unleashed by this type of emotive and uncritical journalism.

The issues with the credibility of the story are a separate but equally concerning aspect. Despite the credulity with which the story was received by some in the blogosphere, professional journalists and commentators from varied backgrounds, including those quoted above (Judi MacLeod, Patrick French and Fareed Zakaria) all treated the most disturbing claims of Bhutto and the PPP with considerable caution. It seems all the more surprising therefore that Loudon, or his editor, did not themselves apply this level of caution toward the claims of an organisation with a strong reputation for ‘spin’, to use Zakaria’s phrasing. It appears that the grotesqueness and the sensationalism inherent in the PPP’s claims may have outweighed any caution that might be expected regarding such serious allegations.

It is reminiscent of the type of credulity applied by journalists in the United States to the testimony of Ahmed Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles, and the significant role that their claims assumed in the playing out of the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ saga. As noted by a chagrined *New York Times* in 2004, ‘information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged’.⁶²⁷ As the *Times* admitted, the common feature shared by many of the ‘problematic articles’ was a heavy and uncritical dependence upon ‘information from a circle of Iraqi informants, defectors and exiles bent on “regime change” in Iraq, people whose credibility has come under increasing public debate in recent weeks’, which was compounded by the uncritical support given to such claims by ‘United States officials convinced of the need to intervene in Iraq’, who ‘now acknowledge that they sometimes fell for misinformation from these exile sources’. The parallels between the ‘misinformation’ of Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles and the claims of the PPP faithfully reproduced in Bruce Loudon’s article are clear.

⁶²⁷ Editorial, "The Times and Iraq."

The frank *Times* editorial goes on to discuss a number of the ‘problematic’ articles which appeared in its pages between late 2001 and mid 2003. The possible explanations for the unverified or questionable claims which the *Times* provide include:

Editors at several levels who should have been challenging reporters and pressing for more scepticism were perhaps too intent on rushing scoops into the paper. Accounts of Iraqi defectors were not always weighed against their strong desire to have Saddam Hussein ousted. Articles based on dire claims about Iraq tended to get prominent display, while follow-up articles that called the original ones into question were sometimes buried. In some cases, there was no follow-up at all.⁶²⁸

The lack of editorial oversight, emphasis on ‘dire claims’ and lack of follow-up are all features of the Bruce Loudon article which concern me, particularly as one of the characteristics of the current media landscape is a tendency towards *less* editorial oversight and *less* fact-checking, as was highlighted in the previous chapter. The failure of journalistic conventions had clearly discernible consequences in the case of the WMD scandal; in the case of the claimed infanticide by a Pakistani jihadi in the story in question, the impact is more difficult to quantify, but perhaps no less significant.

In terms of the specific relationship which this story has with representations of Islam, I was particularly alarmed by the linking of jihadism with infanticide. In his influential work on justifications for collective violence through the creation of ‘scapegoats’, René Girard wrote that casting potential scapegoats as perpetrators of ‘primeval’ crimes such as parricide, sexual violence and infanticide characteristically preceded acts of collective violence upon designated victims.⁶²⁹ As seen by examples such as the ‘Children Overboard’ incident and the ‘gang rape’ controversy, these are the specific type of taboo crimes that Muslims were increasingly portrayed as committing during the early 2000s. Essentialising these type of accusations involves promulgating the notion that any Muslim, simply by virtue of their faith, is a potential rapist, perpetrators of infanticide, or terrorist. Sensationalist crimes generated some of the most emotive and inflammatory writing in articles in my sample; the death of over a hundred children in the Beslan school hostage crisis, for example, was one of the major stories of the week prior to commencement of my 2004 data sets and was still being commented on in articles in my sample as an example of the type of crimes that Muslims as a whole might be expected to commit (for example, A04_60; A04_99; A04_125).

⁶²⁸ Editorial, "The Times and Iraq."

⁶²⁹ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 80; Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*.

Girard wrote that the second necessary condition for the creation of scapegoats was the designation of an appropriate category of people for scapegoating. As well as being accused of primeval crimes, potential victims must be members of a ‘sacrificial category’, that is, a category of people who could be subjected to communal violence without threat of reprisals:

All our sacrificial victims...are invariably distinguishable from the nonsacrificeable beings by one essential characteristic: between the victims and the community a crucial social link is missing, so they can be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal. Their death does not automatically entail an act of vengeance.⁶³⁰

The condoning of the lies of the Howard government, represented in their re-election at the 2001, represents a crucial link between the successful pinning of taboo crimes upon innocent victims, and the creation of a category of scapegoat which may be subjected to violence without threat of vengeance or condemnation.

Essentialist stereotyping of Muslims as inherently violent and incapable of living within the Western world were promulgated by leading Australian politicians, sections of the Australian media, and influential talk-back radio hosts, and filtered into the general population. Deliberate malice was not necessarily the motivation for these actions – indeed, self-interest, a desire to exploit wedge politics, and intellectual laziness can account for much of this development. However, the consequence was that as these stereotypes continued to be reinforced, without censor or alternative views gaining any purchase in either Australian politics or the media, it became increasingly apparent that Muslims had become a target for violence which could go uncriticised and unavenged.

It is in this context that numerous examples of hate crimes against Australian Muslims occurred in the wake of the September 11 attacks, that harsh laws against terrorism were introduced which were used to terrorise Muslim communities and individuals, and that the Australian nationals apprehended overseas during the War on Terror were able to end up in Guantanamo Bay. It is also in this context that the Cronulla Riots occur; the Riots can be seen as the expression of acts of communal violence against a section of the community who fulfilled both of Girard’s preconditions for scapegoating: they could be accused of ‘primeval’ crimes, and they could be attacked without fear of reprisals or condemnation. By 2007, fortunately, these trends were starting to be reversed in Australia: the 2007 election campaign constituted a ‘political moment’ in which significant shifts in the political landscape

⁶³⁰ Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 13.

occurred. The more open criticism of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and of the ‘War on Terror’ and its consequences, both in Australia and internationally, are clear trends illuminated through the data in this chapter. Yet even in 2007, as has been outlined in this chapter, the voicing of extremely Islamophobic attitudes was still acceptable in *The Australian*, and publication of ‘somewhat closed’ views of Islam and Muslims were still commonplace in *The SMH*. As has also been highlighted in this chapter, there were still many features of reporting on issues related to Muslims and Islam which were problematic. In order to summarise and draw some conclusions from the evidence of shifting attitudes towards Muslims and Islam visible in 2007, I now turn to the final chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 12 – Conclusions and Looking Forward

In this chapter, the concluding chapter of my thesis, I summarise my research findings, before turning to consider the contemporary Australian political and media landscapes. Since the Federal Election of 24 November 2007, which was the end point of data-collection for this thesis, both the Australian media and political landscapes have seemingly undergone radical transformations; yet in many ways the same issues encountered during the process of researching and writing this thesis have re-emerged to characterise public debates over recent months as Australia moved towards the 2013 Federal Election. Against this background, I then move to a consideration of potential strategies for reduction of negative reporting patterns before closing with some remarks on the necessity of and prospects for combating prejudice and discrimination in Australian society.

Summary of research findings

The principal finding from my research was evidence of a significant reduction in the levels of closed views towards Muslims and Islam and an increase in open views of Muslims and Islam in reporting in two broadsheet newspapers during the 2007 Australian Federal Election campaign as compared to the 2004 campaign. There was also a reduction in the proportion of articles representing Islam as a ‘problem’ from the first to the second of these two time periods, and based on the slight reduction in density of articles between the different periods, there were some indications that ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ held less salience as a ‘newsworthy’ topic in 2007 than in 2004. These same patterns broadly illustrated the differences in reporting between *The Australian* and *The SMH*: in both time periods, articles in *The Australian* on issues related to Islam and Muslims were more likely to be characterised by closed views towards Islam and to represent Islam as a problem. The density of articles on subjects related to Muslims and Islam from *The Australian* was also significantly higher than for *The SMH*.

Between the different time periods and newspapers, it was notable that the incidence of stereotypical views of Islam as monolithic, violent, and a manipulative ideology rather than a true religion (characteristic of ‘closed’ views of Islam on the first five dimensions of the Islamophobic Index) utilised for the study did not decrease as markedly as the incidence of

denial and normalisation of Islamophobia and justification of discrimination and prejudice towards Muslims ('closed' views of Islam on the final three dimensions of the Index). That is, one of the most significant factors in changes to the overall levels of Islamophobia between the two different time periods and publications was that whilst core representational stereotypes concerning Muslims retained salience in 2007, there were higher levels of recognition and acknowledgement of the existence of and serious negative impacts of Islamophobia upon Muslim people and communities. Further development in these areas was, however, still clearly required. Overall, the results of my research indicated that an exercise in content analysis using, as the model for evaluative criteria, a Likert scale based on the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia, was capable of illustrating significant distinctions in the representation of a wide range of issues and stories pertaining to Islam and Muslims in the Australian press.

The validity of considering a full range of 'soft' and 'hard' news sources in studies of representational patterns in the media was also ratified by my study. The characteristics of soft versus hard news for each publication in the different time periods largely mirrored the overall patterns for the different data sets. However, surveying both hard and soft stories also enabled the illumination of practices of apparent efforts to artificially construct the *appearance* of 'fair and balanced' reporting, through the commissioning and juxtapositioning of opinion articles and letters which represented (generally extreme) viewpoints on particular issues. Furthermore, consideration of the relationship between different articles printed within the same edition of the newspaper, and of how hard news stories were frequently framed and 'explained' through opinion articles, letters and feature articles, underscores the importance of considering intertextuality when designing media analytical studies.

The potential for investigating the wider impact of particular news stories was also indicated by my research into the commentary and dissemination through online blogs of one particular story, 'PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis' (A07_39), by *The Australian's* Bruce Loudon. The global context of Islamophobia should not be underestimated when conducting research on this phenomenon; proponents of Islamophobia draw inspiration from other anti-Muslim individuals and movements around the world. The manifesto of Norwegian Anders Breivik, which described his motivation for attacks which claimed the lives of over 90 people, included praise for the anti-Islamic or anti- 'political correctness' policies and statements of four Australian public figures: former Prime Minister John Howard, Former Treasurer Peter Costello, Archbishop George Pell, and historian Keith

Windschuttle. Breivik also described his links to or admiration for numerous individuals and organisations across Europe, including the Dutch anti-Muslim campaigner Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom and the far-right English Defence League.⁶³¹ Australia now has its own Party for Freedom and Australian Defence League, patterned on these European-based organisations:

Ralph Cerminara [President of the Australian Defence League] says his group is fighting the same cause as the English Defence League, which is to stop Muslim immigration. With a federal election ahead...the Australian Defence League wants to work with any political group willing to oppose Muslim immigration. He supports the ideas of the Rise Up Australia Party and politician Pauline Hanson, as well as the new Australian Party for Freedom.⁶³²

The global, online networks between such organisations are underscored by the fact that the English Defence League, the Irish Defence League and the Finnish Defence League all 'liked' the Australian Defence League's Facebook page. As well as connecting via social media, Liz Fekete emphasises the plethora of anti-Muslim online discussion forums and blogs as crucial to the dissemination of Islamophobic ideologies, particularly through the reproduction and circulation of news stories from around the world which provide support for the maintenance and strengthening of closed views towards Islam.⁶³³

As with analysis of the full range of articles in my sample, in-depth consideration of particular subsets of articles revealed trends towards more Islamophobic reporting in 2004 than in 2007, and in *The Australian* as compared to *The SMH*, but with significant exceptions for particular articles. In my analysis of the representation of Islam and violence, I found that discussing or reporting on issues related to terrorist violence or conflict situations in Islamic countries were characterised by negative language features (such as emotive and demonising language) and as a rule perpetuated stereotyped views of Islam and Muslims, as has been highlighted in numerous studies of Islam and the media. The persistent widespread use of demonising terms such as 'Islamic terrorism' or 'Muslim extremists' is deeply problematic, given significant evidence of the negative impact of such language and longstanding calls from bodies such as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Anti-

⁶³¹ Liz Fekete, "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre," *Race Class* 53, no. 30 (2012): p. 32; Leo Shanahan, "John Howard, George Pell Cited in Breivik Diatribe," *The Australian*, 26 July 2011.

⁶³² Ron Sutton, "Anti-Islam Group Seeks to Expand," *SBS*, 1 July 2013.

⁶³³ Fekete, "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre," p. 32; Shanahan, "John Howard, George Pell Cited in Breivik Diatribe."

Discrimination Board to abstain from using such terms. This advice had clearly failed to be implemented by mainstream media sources at the time of data collection for this study.

A lack of diversity of sources was also a strong feature of articles dealing with conflict situations, and with hard news stories in my sample in general. Particularly in 2004, articles in both newspapers were dominated by bureaucratic sources and showed a significant dearth of Muslim sources. When Muslim sources were quoted, they were frequently either representatives of governments in Islamic countries or represented extreme, inflammatory views held by a small minority within Muslim communities. Of the few articles dealing with conflict which received positive scores on the Islamophobic Index, articles by Hala Jaber and Paul McGeough stood out, as did articles on people negatively affected by anti-Muslim discrimination, such as Izhar ul-Haque. Such articles featured the voices of 'ordinary' Muslim men and women and humanised them, contextualised the conflict situations they referred to, eschewed the use of simplistic 'complexity-reducing' frameworks such as good vs evil or the 'War on Terror', and contained reference to positive efforts by individuals and groups to resist and collectively respond to oppression and conflict. The 'newsworthiness' of stories related to Islam and violent conflict and the concentration of negative reporting patterns in such stories make reform of conflict reporting standards a key area for future development.

Analysis of depictions of 'dirty tricks' in the 2004 and 2007 campaign also highlighted interesting divergences and distinctions between the two time periods and newspapers. Evidence of 'racist campaigning' against Muslim Labor candidate Ed Husic in 2004 was not a significant news story at all, and in the one article which did deal with the issue at length, Husic's claims were dismissed out of hand. In 2007, in contrast, coverage of deceitful racist campaigning in the seat of Lindsay was extensive and diverse, with many articles strongly emphasising the problematic and serious issue of attempting to use Islamophobia for electoral gain. Articles on this subject in particular highlighted the considerably higher levels of 'distance from power' displayed in 2007 than in 2004; that is, there was increased media contestation of the Coalition Government's strategy of fomenting and exploiting xenophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment, in the later election campaign, than in the earlier period. It also highlighted an unusual pattern in which some reporting in *The Australian* more stringently adhered to an idealised model of 'adversarial' reporting than articles in *The SMH*, and correspondingly received high positive scores on the Islamophobic Index. Such articles were

characterised by extensive investigative reporting, contextualisation of stories, and high source diversity, including Muslim community representatives and community members.

Even in 2007, however, the voicing of extremely Islamophobic attitudes was still acceptable in *The Australian*, and publication of ‘somewhat closed’ views of Islam and Muslims were still commonplace in *The SMH*. The fact that ‘extreme’ views were still able to be accommodated within the spectrum of views represented in *The Australian* in 2007 indicates that in Daniel Hallin’s terms, whilst the boundaries of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ on the subject of Islam and Muslims may have shifted somewhat between the two periods, the shift did not make extremely Islamophobic perspectives so ‘deviant’ that they could no longer be printed within the paper. It should also be noted that the most extreme closed views of Islam from *The SMH* were found in articles by the columnist Paul Sheehan in 2004. No columns from Sheehan appeared in my sample in 2007; however, to the present day Sheehan writes regular columns for *The SMH* which continue to contain extremely inflammatory anti-Muslim views. Therefore, just because no such articles appeared in my sample does not mean that *The SMH* does not consider such extreme views within the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ to this day.

Sheehan’s continued presence at *The SMH* may enable the newspaper to defend itself against claims of ‘bias’ and ‘lack of balance’ but reveals the problematic nature of such valorisation of the principle of ‘balance’: it can legitimise extreme views which on their own merits are demonstrably harmful to social cohesion, and under no real pressure to justify themselves against evidentiary criteria. In addition, the incidence of ‘very open’ or ‘extremely open’ views of Islam did not substantially increase for either publication in 2007; such views therefore remained on the far edges of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’. Nevertheless, there is a clear overall shift for both newspapers in 2007 towards less Islamophobic representations of Islam and Muslims, increased contestation of the ‘War on Terror’ consensus, and a significantly more adversarial stance towards the Howard Government.

What might account for the shifts in representational patterns between the two periods and the two newspapers? The effect of shifts in the wider political context, referenced in previous chapters, may have been accentuated by the newspapers coming under implicit pressure to respond to well-attested criticisms of their unfair, unbalanced and inflammatory reporting on issues related to Islam and Muslims in the mid-2000s. One of the responsive strategies of *The Australian* was to commission features from prominent Muslims in order to address these

accusations, as discussed in the previous two chapters. *The Australian* also strongly celebrated its record for adversarial journalism, exemplified by ‘breaking’ major news stories such as the manufacturing of the Children Overboard affair and the bungling of the Haneef case.⁶³⁴ However, Abdalla et al. argue in relation to the latter case that ‘the “good” work that was done’ by two journalists from *The Australian* ‘does not counter the fact that several aspects of the media coverage during the case were problematic [and] that the media lacks self-reflexivity’. The reporting of the case, they argue, ‘points to the need for the media to be critical of government spin, and to deal with such reporting in a more critical and analytical manner’.⁶³⁵ In regards to the commissioning of features, the commitment to the principle of ‘balance’ meant that printing extremely positive stories about Islam made the continued printing of extremely negative stories about Islam justifiable. The printing of ‘soft news’ articles which included more open views towards Islam and Muslims and the celebration of *individual* hard news stories which exemplified ‘Fourth Estate’ values therefore did not seem to be matched by any commitment to address the entrenched patterns of Islamophobic representations which I found strongly characteristic of articles from *The Australian* surveyed in this study.

In contrast, *The SMH* responded to criticisms of its coverage of issues related to Islam and Muslims by initiating a project called ‘Faces of Islam’ in early 2007. The paper commissioned and ran a series of special articles which according to senior reporter Hamish McDonald was explicitly aimed at ‘reader education’ and required journalists to ‘get back to basics’. The commissioned articles considered ‘how the Muslim community arrived in Australia, what kind of lifestyles and beliefs, [and] ethnic flavours are represented here’, and reportedly acted as ‘quite an education for the staff who worked on it’.⁶³⁶ This project, which developed journalistic understanding of the diversity of Muslim communities in Australia and emphasised critical reflection on the part of journalists, may be assumed to have played a role in the patterns of representation which I found in articles in my sample from this paper in 2007. In reference to this project, Lynch argued that ‘it is when journalists and news organisations question [representational] conventions – go “back to basics”, in McDonald’s words – that exertions of definitional power are more likely to be supplemented with a greater openness and plurality’.⁶³⁷ This project therefore had arguably far-reaching and

⁶³⁴ Switzer, "Why Muslims Make Headlines."

⁶³⁵ Abdalla, Ewart, and Rane, "A Way Forward?," p. 232.

⁶³⁶ Hamish McDonald, cited in Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, p. 172.

⁶³⁷ Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, p. 173.

holistic impacts upon the orientation of the newspaper towards reporting on Islam and Muslims. In contrast, the strategies of *The Australian* were in the end superficial and limited in their impact: the excellence of occasional individual feature articles or exposés stands in stark contrast to the conformity to traditional news values and an unchallenged overall tendency towards negative reporting on Islam and Muslims.

Finally, consideration of the physical features of my articles raised a number of speculative points which have resonance in the current era of considerable change and uncertainty for the newspaper market. The patterns I highlighted were the high incidence of shared copy between newspapers from the same publishing stable, heavy reliance on wire copy, large proportions of content produced by non-journalists, and for *The Australian*, lack of authorial attribution. These are all trends which have become exacerbated and entrenched even further in the past few years, in the face of shrinking newsrooms and the rise of 24-hour news cycles. Such developments in the media landscape will be considered in more detail below, following a summary of the current political landscape in Australia, before I turn to discussion of potential strategies for challenging Islamophobic representation in the media based upon my research.

The contemporary political landscape

The Rudd Labor Government came to power in 2007 on a wave of renewed public optimism about the potentialities for bringing about substantive change in Australian politics, and bestowed upon the incoming government a strong mandate for change and for unravelling some of the certitudes of the Howard Era. Rapid policy shifts and actions by the Rudd Government included dismantling of some of the more unpalatable neo-liberal reforms of the Howard Government, including its industrial relations reform package, known as ‘WorkChoices’. Serious engagement with the threat of anthropogenic climate change was presaged by adding Australia to the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol to limit greenhouse gas emissions. A shift towards a more humane and compassionate policy towards asylum seekers was signalled by ending the ‘Temporary Protection Visa’ scheme and offshore processing. A reorientation towards facing rather than denying the painful, racist policies which formed part of Australia’s colonial legacy was signalled by Rudd’s Apology to the Stolen Generations. The Clarke Review was established to review Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation, with a

mandate to both explain how the mishandling of the Haneef case could have occurred, and to recommend reforms to prevent such incidents occurring in the future.⁶³⁸

Many of these shifts, however, were to prove either illusory or transitory. After strong statements attacking the denial of racism by the Coalition Government in the wake of the Lindsay leafleting scandal, as discussed in this thesis, Rudd responded to a spate of attacks upon Indian students in Melbourne and Sydney by claiming that he did 'not believe that racism is at work in Australia on these matters at all'.⁶³⁹ The Department of Public Prosecutions took former Guantanamo Bay detainee David Hicks to court in 2011 to try and prevent him from receiving any remuneration from the sales of his memoir which it called, in a highly politically inflammatory attack, 'proceeds from crime'.⁶⁴⁰ Despite symbolic actions such as the Apology, real action and rollbacks of Howard Government policies which impacted disproportionately upon minorities were lacking; Howard's widely decried 'Intervention' in Northern Territory Indigenous communities was maintained by the Rudd Government, and the much hyped Clarke Inquiry led to only minor, cosmetic alterations to Howard's anti-terrorism legislation. When asylum seeker arrivals by boat began to once again climb and were providing the Opposition with plentiful fodder with which to attack the Government and reignite the anxieties of the public over this issue, the Labor government began to implement 'deterrent' tactics which mimicked those of the Howard Government, including moratoriums on processing of refugees and eventually, under Rudd's successor Julia Gillard, the reopening of offshore detention centres and resumption of practices such as mandatory detention of children. The intimations that the Rudd Government was moving towards a more measured attitude towards the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict were abruptly scuttled by the Gillard Government following the ousting of Rudd as Labor party leader and Prime Minister in 2010.⁶⁴¹

The Gillard Government clung to office at the 2010 election only by managing to secure the support of key Independent Members of Parliament and the Greens Party and form a minority

⁶³⁸ Clarke, *Clarke Inquiry Report*; Marr, *Panic*, ch. 24.

⁶³⁹ Kevin Rudd, 21st January 2010, cited in Nick O'Malley and Matt Wade, "In Denial over a Deep Vein of Hate," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 February 2010.

⁶⁴⁰ The Director of Public Prosecutions had to drop its case in 2012 and pay Hick's court costs because of a lack of admissible evidence. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, *Statement in the Matter of David Hicks (Media Release)* (Canberra: DPP, 2012).

⁶⁴¹ Michael Head, "The Haneef Inquiry: Some Unanswered Questions," *Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association* 14(2009); Lynch, "Can the Centre Hold?," p. 296; Marr, *Panic*, ch. 24; Nicole Watson, "Northern Territory Emergency Response: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same," *Alberta Law Review* 48, no. 4 (2011).

government. Public support for the Labor party continued to seep away well into the final months before the election; polling suggested the Coalition would attain a significant majority in the Lower House, and make significant gains in the Senate, at Labor's expense.⁶⁴² Part of the collapse of support for Labor lay in the dissatisfaction and disaffection of the public due to its perceived failings, fuelled by merciless hounding of the Prime Minister by the mainstream media and endless speculation about whether Rudd would be able to make a comeback. Yet it was also partly due to the Coalition's attempts to leverage the same issues that had maintained its power under Howard, methods by which it attained significant mileage from the climbing numbers of asylum seekers.

Just before Christmas 2010, however, an asylum seeker boat foundered on the rocks of Christmas Island, and over fifty people drowned. When the Government paid for family members settled in Australia to fly to the funerals, Opposition Leader Tony Abbott and his Shadow Immigration Minister, Scott Morrison, seized the opportunity to lambast the government. Their approach created serious contention even within the Coalition, with members of the party such as Shadow Treasurer Joe Hockey publicly rebuking their leader. Soon after, concerned senior members of the party leaked to journalists at the *Sydney Morning Herald* that at a recent shadow cabinet meeting, Morrison had urged the Coalition to 'capitalise on the electorate's growing concerns about 'Muslim immigration' and Muslims' "inability" to integrate'. The controversy almost led to the termination of Abbott's leadership; however, he managed to maintain his position as he and Morrison toughed it out through accusations of inciting Islamophobia; it seemed they had overplayed their hand in this instance and that the boundaries of 'legitimate controversy' had not shifted as far back towards the certainties of the Howard era as Abbott and Morrison may have supposed.⁶⁴³

In the aftermath of this affair, Abbott and Morrison were more circumspect and careful to 'code' any references that could be construed as racist or Islamophobic. Yet as the 2013 federal election drew closer, 'immigration issues' re-emerged as a definitive election issue, with Morrison taking a prominent role in the Coalition's campaign. In July, Morrison addressed the Affinity Intercultural Foundation in Sydney – the interfaith organisation discussed in the introduction to Chapter 2. Political sociologist Alana Lentin argued that at the event, Morrison's 'combination of tough talk on refugees and softer talk on migrant

⁶⁴² Antony Green, *Federal Election 2013: Opinion Poll Results* (Sydney: ABC, 2013).

⁶⁴³ Marr, *Panic*, p. 243; Lenore Taylor, "Morrison Sees Votes in Anti-Muslim Strategy," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 February 2011.

integration to an organisation initiated by young Muslims sends the message that those Australia accepts must play by “our” rules’. Lentin also highlighted as problematic Morrison’s emphasis on a shift away from ‘multiculturalism’ towards an emphasis on ‘integration’ of minorities.⁶⁴⁴ In the same marginal seats which the Howard Government had won through hard campaigning on ‘threat concepts’ such as Muslim asylum seekers, Morrison was particularly visible during the election campaign, appearing, for example, as the keynote speaker at a Liberal Party ‘Immigration Forum’ in the NSW outer–metropolitan electorate of Robertson in June.⁶⁴⁵ Robertson was Australia’s fourth most marginal seat at the 2010 election – sandwiched in terms of its marginality between those two key electorates which have featured so heavily in this thesis, Greenway and Lindsay.⁶⁴⁶

Morrison’s address at this forum was strongly characterised by nostalgia for the days of the Howard Government. He emphasised the Coalition’s desire to ‘turn back to the clock’ to before 2007, and to restore immigration policy to an assimilatory ‘join it, not change it’ stance. Morrison outlined the Coalition’s intent to ‘stop the boats’, by whatever means necessary, including military action to turn back boats entering Australian waters, the resurrection of TPVs, mandatory offshore processing, and even forced repatriation for some asylum seekers.⁶⁴⁷ The local Liberal candidate, Lucy Wicks, emphasised that the money which was being spent on asylum seekers could be better spent on infrastructure such as roads and the health system, yet neglected to mention that funding for these categories actually declined under Howard.⁶⁴⁸ Morrison’s address was heavily ‘on-message’, and clearly patterned upon phrases and keywords drawn from the rhetoric of the Howard era. Examples included an emphasis on the ‘criminality’ of people smugglers and asylum seekers and repeated description of Labor as a ‘soft-touch’ on border protection, specific rhetorical tactics documented by Poynting and Mason as effective for the Coalition in its 2001 election

⁶⁴⁴ Alana Lentin, "Why Scott Morrison Is Wrong on Immigration," *The Guardian*, 19 July 2013.

⁶⁴⁵ Scott Morrison, "Robertson Immigration Forum, 21st June 2013," Liberal Party of Australia.

⁶⁴⁶ Antony Green, "Electoral Pendulum," ABC, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/federal-election-2013/guide/pendulum/>.

⁶⁴⁷ In particular, Morrison singled out Sri Lanka, claiming that asylum seekers arriving from Sri Lanka were simply ‘economic refugees’ and had no need to come to Australia. Morrison justified this statement by claiming that he ‘couldn’t give enough Nobel Peace Prizes out’ to the Sri Lankan Government for the work they have achieved in the past five years.

⁶⁴⁸ Over subsequent weeks, the electorate was bombarded with mail from the local candidate and from the Coalition Leader, Tony Abbott, including the distribution of postcards about the cost of asylum seekers: ‘\$10+Billion of your taxes wasted on illegal boat arrival cost blow-outs. That’s money that should have gone to improving hospitals, schools and roads’. Liberal Party of Australia, "Labor's Illegal Boat Arrivals (Postcard)," (Wetherill Park: LPA, 2013); See also, Stephen Koukoulas, "Simple Formula to Cut Debt Served Us Badly," *The Age*, August 14 2013.

campaign.⁶⁴⁹ The addresses of Morrison and Wicks drew enthusiastic applause from the packed auditorium of several hundred people.

Perhaps learning from the lessons of 2010, Morrison was extremely careful to avoid any openly racist or Islamophobic statements at the 'forum', as he has been of late in the media. Yet there were instances of phrasing in his address which seemed to be invoking these notions through dog-whistling. As one particularly pertinent example, he mentioned the tens of thousands of refugees from the conflict now either living in refugee camps or attempting to leave Syria. He implied that if Australia didn't have a 'problem' with 'boat-people', we would be able to selectively resettle some refugees from this conflict, many of whom he emphasised were *Christian* Syrians fleeing persecution (although the majority of Syrian refugees are Sunni Muslims). An appreciative murmur sprang up through the crowd at this, and a later audience question specifically referred to the hope that once Australia had dealt appropriately with the asylum seeker issue, we would be able to assist those *Christian* Syrian refugees. Further questions included a query as to how the Coalition would 'screen for religious fundamentalists' if it won the election, and a question on how the Coalition would help prevent immigrants from eroding the British character of Australian society.

Following the forum, which I attended myself, one audience member was sympathetic to the suggestion, made in personal conversation, that through such forums and rhetoric the Coalition was stoking people's anxieties and fears about immigrants and asylum seekers. She recalled a recent story on the news about 'young Brotherhood men' killing people with axes in Egypt. After seeing stories like that, she said, it's understandable that people 'don't want those kind of people here'. Her statement strongly echoed John Howard's assertion that 'I don't want people like that in Australia', when referring to Muslim asylum seekers in 2001.⁶⁵⁰ The linkage between immigration anxieties and mediated representations of Muslims overseas is clearly still at work in Australia, at least for some people. In August 2013, the Essential Report's pre-election polling indicated that 71% of respondents considered asylum seekers as one of or the most important election issue.⁶⁵¹

Kevin Rudd's resumption of the leadership of the Labor Party in June 2013 initially boosted Labor's performance in the polls and suggested that a Coalition victory was not necessarily a

⁶⁴⁹ Poynting and Mason, "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia," pp. 78-79.

⁶⁵⁰ Cited in Henderson, "It's Time to Put Away the Big Stick."

⁶⁵¹ Essential Report, *Approval of Asylum Seeker Policy* (Sydney: Essential Media Corporation, 2013).

fait accompli. The sense of hope that had mobilised support in 2007 was strongly invoked by Rudd in his early days back in office, as he emphasised his optimism for Australia's future, and excoriated the Opposition Leader for his unrelenting negativity:

Mr Abbott...is the nation's most formidable exponent of negative politics, and negative politics above all is designed to induce feelings of worry, of anxiety and fear in the community. He and the Liberal Party have concluded that fear is a far better political bet than engaging in a debate on the facts.⁶⁵²

Rudd's firm dismissal of the Coalition's 'turn back the boats' policy on asylum seekers and his denunciation of the type of 'politics of fear' which were the trademark of Abbott's mentor, John Howard, was echoed by his presiding over other symbolic acts in his early days in office, such as the swearing-in of Australia's first Muslim frontbencher, Ed Husic, member for Chifley.

Husic's appointment potentially indicated a substantive move away from the divisive, reactionary politics in which Islamophobic attitudes took such a strong hold in Australian political and social discourses over the past decade. The impact of the tacit support for such views under the Howard Government have not yet relinquished their hold on sections of the Australian public, and open expression of Islamophobia could seethe to the surface again given re-legitimisation. Emblematic of this lingering threat is the torrent of abuse directed at Ed Husic after he took oath on the Quran. Reactions to Husic's swearing in were characterised by hysteria over Muslims 'infiltrating' and invading 'our country',⁶⁵³ and near the end of the campaign his sister was verbally abused and threatened by a Liberal staffer with a knife.⁶⁵⁴ Husic was not new to such blatant prejudice and hostility, having been the recipient of Islamophobic abuse and campaigning during his first effort to run for public office, in Greenway at the 2004 Federal Election (as discussed in detail in the previous chapter).

Despite these early indications of a more compassionate and progressive approach to the totemic issues of asylum seekers and social cohesion, Rudd consequently announced a hardline strategy towards asylum seekers, included the ruling out of any resettlement in

⁶⁵² Kevin Rudd, "National Press Club Address (11th July, 2013)," ABC, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-11/national-press-club-kevin-rudd/4814514>.

⁶⁵³ Rachel Olding, "'Shame, Shame, Shame': Australia's First Muslim Frontbencher Abused for Taking Oath on Koran," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 July 2013.

⁶⁵⁴ Simon Benson, "Police Investigating Claims Liberal Staffer Threatened Labor M.P. Ed Husic's Sister with a Knife" *The Daily Telegraph*, September 6 2013.

Australia of asylum seekers arriving by boat.⁶⁵⁵ His policy received an approval rating of 61% in Essential Report polling in August 2013.⁶⁵⁶ Rudd's endorsement of policies which were in large part consonant with those of the Coalition on this matter recalled the lack of substantive change by the Labor Government in other matters pertaining to asylum seekers, counter-terrorism and social cohesion, as outlined above.

George and Huynh have argued that progressive Australians 'significantly misunderstood' Rudd's agenda subsequent to the 2007 Election, perceiving his symbolic acts such as the Apology as signalling a return to the Keating era of 'big picture reform and a progressivist social agenda'. Even if Rudd had *intended* to radically change the policy framework of the Howard Government, George and Huynh have conjectured that he could not feasibly create real change because the Rudd Government was 'effectively beholden to the same constituencies which gave Howard electoral support after 1996'.⁶⁵⁷ George and Huynh's argument is consistent with the justification given by Greg Sheridan for *The Australian's* endorsement of Kevin Rudd at the 2007 election in a key article from my sample, 'Liberal future lies in Tony Abbott's ideas':

Much has been made of Rudd's policy me-tooism. He earns no criticism from me on that score. It means that Rudd has embraced mainstream, moderate policies and as a result Labor is doing extremely well... The Left... will argue that the Howard defeat marks the repudiation of the Howard Government's lies on Iraq, racism on Aborigines, hostility to multiculturalism, construction of a national security state, un-Australian subservience to Washington, hostility to Muslims and so on. In fact, this is almost wholly untrue, as Rudd's embrace of the Government's position on almost all of this stuff indicates (A07_28).

Sheridan's analysis also accords with David McKnight's observation that in many cases when News Ltd. publications have shifted their allegiance away from conservative governments, it was not necessarily because they were embracing a more progressive stance, but because opposition parties had shifted *their* positions significantly and become markedly more conservative. 'Indeed', McKnight argued, 'Murdoch's newspapers helped to create this

⁶⁵⁵ ABC, "Asylum Seekers Arriving in Australia by Boat to Be Resettled in Papua New Guinea," *ABC Online*, 19th July 2013.

⁶⁵⁶ Essential Report, *Approval of Asylum Seeker Policy*.

⁶⁵⁷ George and Huynh, *The Culture Wars*, p. 2.

shift in the nation's political consensus, which underlay the convergence of its political parties'.⁶⁵⁸

Although writing in 2009, George and Huynh's observations ring true for the current political situation in Australia. They write that the optimistic 'misunderstanding' of Rudd's agenda represented a 'dangerous complacency' in the face of the conservative resurgence of the past two decades, which 'has clawed back much of the progressive ground won during the heady days of the Vietnam War era and the New Left cultural revolution'. They argue that despite a perception that the 'culture wars' were ended in the mid-2000s with the defeat of conservatively-inspired governments like the Howard Government in Australia, and the Bush Administration in the US, the war is far from over: in fact, the significance of the culture wars 'for governance and everyday life in these societies' has increased.⁶⁵⁹ The resources at the disposal of proponents of this 'conservative resurgence' are considerable. Just months ago, for example, the 70th birthday gala dinner of right-wing think-tank the Institute of Public Affairs featured a 'who's-who' of leading conservatives in Australian politics, business, society and the media, including then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott, Archbishop George Pell, Rupert Murdoch, Gina Rinehart, and Andrew Bolt. A fundraising auction at the dinner sold prizes such as a tour of the Reagan ranch in Santa Barbara (bought by Rinehart for \$25,000), behind-the-scenes visits to Andrew Bolt's controversial television program *The Bolt Report*, morning tea with News Ltd. columnist Janet Albrechtsen, and a tour of the Fox News Studio in New York (each selling for \$20,000). The IPA is generously supported by Rinehart, Murdoch and other business figures, and its views are frequently promoted through the Murdoch media.⁶⁶⁰

This 'conservative resurgence' has fuelled the September 7 return to government of the Coalition, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The Coalition's election slogan of 'stop the boats' proved a powerful message in the election, particularly in marginal seats. The key seats of Greenway and Lindsay once again drew national media coverage, as Liberal candidates made major gaffes in their attempts to promote their fiercely anti-asylum stances.⁶⁶¹ The conservative social agenda of many of the new Liberal members of parliament, of Abbott and of senior members of the Coalition – particularly Scott Morrison –

⁶⁵⁸ McKnight, *Rupert Murdoch*, p. 29.

⁶⁵⁹ George and Huynh, *The Culture Wars*, p. 5.

⁶⁶⁰ John Van Tiggelen, "June 2013 Editor's Note," *The Monthly*, 1st June 2013.

⁶⁶¹ Rick Feneley, "Plenty of Voter Appeal in Fiona Scott's Tilt for Lindsay," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 September 2013.

will have a distinct impact upon discourses of belonging and social inclusion in Australia over the next government term. In addition, as I write, the balance of power in the Upper House has not yet been determined but may rest upon representatives of far-right anti-immigration and anti-Muslim parties. These developments herald the beginning of a new chapter in the ‘culture wars’ in Australia, in which the fanning of anti-Muslim prejudice has potential to once again become a significant factor in political and public discourse.

The contemporary media landscape

The recent election campaign has been emblematic of the changes not only in the Australian political landscape but in the media landscape. Rudd’s high media profile and his party’s willingness to return him to leadership of the party in a last-ditch effort to prevent electoral defeat is representative of a shift towards a politics of personality and an emphasis on ‘entertainment’ to make political news more palatable to mainstream audiences.⁶⁶² The campaign was also marked by extremely hostile coverage of the campaign by the News Ltd. press; reporting in *The Australian* and Sydney’s *The Daily Telegraph* were particularly vitriolic. Their support for Rudd at the 2007 election proved a particularly short-lived phenomenon and the relaxation of media ownership and regulation following the 2001 election has enabled the further concentration of the News Ltd. market share in Australia and maximised the influence of Murdoch’s newspapers. As an indication of the colonisation of social media by political figures, Murdoch and Rudd subsequently flamed each other via Twitter. Rudd then proved unsuccessful in his attempt to focus attention on the claim that Murdoch’s attacks on Labor being based on the potential threat the party’s National Broadband Network represented to Murdoch’s cable channel, Foxtel.⁶⁶³ Thus, several long-term trends of political reporting in general – and election coverage in particular – can be seen to have accelerated and converged during the recent election campaign.

Over the past decade, the ‘digital revolution’ has gained greater momentum year-by-year; as it did so, circulation, readership, and advertising revenues for newspapers declined and the rate of newspaper and bureau closure, and job cuts among journalists, accelerated – not just in Australia but throughout much of the world. The Global Financial Crisis compounded the effects of this long-term trend, facilitating what has been heralded as the end of the

⁶⁶² Tanner, *Sideshow*; Young, *How Australia Decides*.

⁶⁶³ Media Watch, "Rupert Tweets, the Tele Repeats," *ABC*, 26th August 2013; Lenore Taylor, "Kevin Rudd Turns up Heat in Row with Rupert Murdoch," *The Guardian*, 6 August 2013.

newspaper business model. At the same time, the reputation of the ‘mainstream media’ (MSM) took a major buffeting in recent years as a result of scandals such as the complicity of prominent journalists in the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ fiasco and the News International phone hacking scandal. Despite understandable anxiety over the future of ‘quality’ journalism occasioned by these developments, optimism about the future of the media has in some areas been raised by the belief that in becoming a networked society, we are potentially entering a hopeful new era of media and communications.⁶⁶⁴

This optimism has been fuelled by the emergence of alternative forms of media, such as online alternative media, blogging, open source journalism, citizen journalism, and WikiLeaks. In many cases in recent years, the traditional functions imputed to the ‘Fourth Estate’ under the social responsibility of journalism model have been fulfilled more ably by bloggers and other alternative forms of media (particularly WikiLeaks) than by the mainstream media. Arianna Huffington, founder of the *Huffington Post*, emphasised this point in regards to the coverage of the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ case:

In the run-up to the Iraq war, many in the mainstream media, including the *New York Times*, lost their veneer of unassailable trustworthiness for many readers and viewers, and it became clear that new media sources could be trusted—and indeed are often much quicker at correcting mistakes than old media sources.⁶⁶⁵

Such developments have led to claims for some forms of alternative and social media reporting to be considered as a ‘Fifth Estate’.⁶⁶⁶

Despite such claims, there is strong evidence for a continuing role of ‘legacy’ media such as the ‘quality’ broadsheet press, as in many cases alternative media are constrained to acting as adjuncts to the mainstream media. In other cases, alternative media, or ‘challenger paradigms’, exist in ‘parallel’ to but not connecting with the mainstream media, thus limiting their reach and impact.⁶⁶⁷ Bridging this gap can sometimes be done through the formation of partnerships between mainstream and alternative media sources in order to engage with broader audiences and maximise credibility. An example of such accommodations are the

⁶⁶⁴ Dwyer, Martin, and Goggin, "News Diversity and Broadband Applications."; O'Donnell, McKnight, and Este, *Journalism at the Speed of Bytes*; Young, *How Australia Decides*.

⁶⁶⁵ Arianna Huffington, cited in Eric Alterman, "The News Business: Out of Print," *The New Yorker*, March 31 2008.

⁶⁶⁶ William Dutton, "Through the Network (of Networks): The Fifth Estate," *University of Oxford*, 15th October 2007; Greg Jericho, *The Rise of the Fifth Estate: Social Media and Blogging in Australian Politics* (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2012).

⁶⁶⁷ Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 32.

‘formal arrangements with professional news organisations’ which WikiLeaks entered into in order to publicise significant information from leaked diplomatic cables. The mainstream media were essential to this endeavour because, as Lynch et al. highlight, they have ‘traditional safeguards – trained observers, edited copy – [and] had built up reputational resources to support them’.⁶⁶⁸ Despite the optimism occasioned by the rise of alternative media sources, therefore, the more limited reach of media outside the mainstream and the persistence of dependence of the ‘fifth estate’ upon an unreformed ‘fourth estate’ continues to set limitations upon the potential of alternative media sources.

Reducing Islamophobia in the media

The current media landscape is one in which there exists considerable opportunity for transformation of existing mainstream and alternative media, as well as potentially altering the relationships between the two, as emphasised by Elissa Tivona:

I argue that the timing for a new journalistic framework could not be better. Established news agencies and global networks are hungry to reinvent themselves, especially given intense pressure created by the internet’s ease of alternative information delivery.

Tivona advocates wider adoption of a ‘peace journalism’ model for reform of existing mainstream media outlets, encouraging journalists to move away from representations of ‘intractable conflict’ and instead ‘push for the strong amplification of healing and revealing news: stories of peace and reconciliation between former warriors and perceived enemies’.⁶⁶⁹ Given the significant impact of articles related to narratives of violent conflict in the escalation and entrenchment of Islamophobic representations in my sample, strategies which are specifically targeted towards combating the stereotypes and negativity characteristic of such articles and negating the feelings of despair and hopelessness which they can evoke will likely have strong concomitant effects on reducing the preponderance and impact of ‘closed’ views of Islam in ‘hard’ news reporting.

Peace journalism advocates the ‘iteration and exploration of backgrounds and contexts’, in order to support ‘the provision of cues to form negotiated and/or oppositional readings of war propaganda, and the coverage of suggestions and initiatives for peace, from whatever

⁶⁶⁸ Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 26.

⁶⁶⁹ Tivona, "Globalisation of Compassion," p. 341.

quarter'.⁶⁷⁰ Peace journalism promotes the contextualisation of conflict narratives, directs attention to the challenging of dominant news conventions such as the focus on elite, bureaucratic sources and interrogates the assumptions of the 'regime of objectivity'. Finally, peace journalism aims to supply 'opportunities for readers and audiences to activate their empathic capacities', through the humanisation of actors in conflict narratives.⁶⁷¹ Many of these features were highlighted in my research as characteristics of articles with lower levels of Islamophobic representational patterns and higher levels of contestation of war propaganda such as the 'War on Terror' consensus. As Lynch et al. have observed, sometimes journalists are already adopting a 'peace journalism' approach to reporting – even if they don't know it.⁶⁷² Strategies which support and encourage such approaches to conflict reporting would be positive steps towards combating Islamophobic representations in the mainstream media. A fruitful avenue for exploration here would be adoption of standards for conflict reporting, such as are set out in Jake Lynch's latest work, *A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict*.⁶⁷³

Peace journalism may serve as a significant common thread in the reform and expansion of both the mainstream media and the alternative media, and could conceivably serve as a shared framework bridging current gaps between the two. According to Robert Hackett, peace journalism shares 'profound complementarities' with alternative media: they share a commitment to social justice, social critique, and the combating of structural and cultural violence; reject the 'regime of objectivity', emphasising instead the social embeddedness of journalists; and seek to challenge war propaganda.⁶⁷⁴ Moreover, the two paradigms have shared interests in campaigning on media reform; this has significant implications for many of the issues raised in this study as increased media reform and regulation in the areas of content diversity, media ownership and reporting standards. Reforms in these areas would have significant benefits in terms of increased contestation of hegemonic discourses which have negative impacts upon the representation of Muslims and Islam.⁶⁷⁵ Nevertheless, peace journalism 'has relatively well-defined institutional locations – journalism education and established news organisations – albeit to date it generally operates in the margins of

⁶⁷⁰ Lynch, *Debates in Peace Journalism*, p. 143.

⁶⁷¹ Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 18-9.

⁶⁷² Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 13.

⁶⁷³ Lynch, *A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict*.

⁶⁷⁴ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 51.

⁶⁷⁵ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 51.

these'.⁶⁷⁶ Increased opportunities for 'penetrating and transforming the category of mainstream news – its values, practices, and definitions – to give peace more of a chance' therefore remains a goal for many peace journalism advocates.⁶⁷⁷

As was highlighted by the comparison between the differential strategies adopted by the two publications in this study to redressing complaints about problematic coverage of Muslims and Islam, programs which encourage reflexivity and 'back to basics' approaches for journalists may be more effective at reducing overall levels of Islamophobic reporting than artificial attempts to construct 'balance'. Other programs which have had positive impacts upon reporting practices in regards to Muslims and Islam have included the institution of new practices by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) aimed at 'deepening journalistic practice [and] moving beyond superficial reporting' in order to reduce stereotyping and prejudice in news bulletin stories.⁶⁷⁸ Abdalla et al. also highlight practical programs for journalist training such as the *Journalism in Multicultural Australia* project and the *Reporting Diversity Project*, which emphasise strategies such as promoting 'the inclusion of multicultural content in pre-employment journalist education and training'. These programs were once again particularly associated with SBS.⁶⁷⁹ Given the continued agenda setting function of *The Australian* and *The SMH* in mediatised political discourse in Australia, it is imperative that strategies for reform move beyond the public broadcasters, alternative media, and the fringes of the mainstream media, and are targeted as well at these bastions of the 'legacy', mainstream media.

Concluding thoughts

As was indicated by the quote from ibn Khaldun with which I opened this thesis, 'conditions within nations and races change with the change of periods and the passage of time'.⁶⁸⁰ The construction of Muslims as a 'threat' and as a 'problem' and their representation through an Islamophobic lens declined between the two election periods of 2004 and 2007, as I have demonstrated in content analysis of the coverage offered by two broadsheet newspapers during these two key periods. The climate of political and media discourse during the past six years has continued the trends set during the lead up to the 2007 election, and the open and

⁶⁷⁶ Hackett, "New Vistas for Peace Journalism," p. 48.

⁶⁷⁷ Lynch, Hackett, and Shaw, "Expanding Peace Journalism," p. 25.

⁶⁷⁸ Abdalla, Ewart, and Rane, "A Way Forward?," pp. 233-4.

⁶⁷⁹ Abdalla, Ewart, and Rane, "A Way Forward?," p. 236.

⁶⁸⁰ Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, p. 24.

uncontested expression of Islamophobic sentiments and practices has been relatively limited, compared with some of the examples I have highlighted from the early and mid-2000s. Nevertheless, anti-Muslim prejudice remains a strong undercurrent in Australian society, which finds expression through incidents such as the attacks on Muslim politician Ed Husic and the emergence of new anti-Muslim political parties such as Pastor Danny Nalliah's Rise Up Australia. Without vigilance and continued delegitimisation, there is potential for Islamophobia to once again become a prominent feature of public discourse and to have re-escalating negative impacts upon Australian Muslim communities.

Tanja Dreher noted in regards to the impact of Islamophobic attitudes and practices under the Howard Government that 'communities living in fear are unable to enjoy a sense of belonging or to fully exercise the rights and freedoms of citizenship'.⁶⁸¹ Muslim communities have experienced a relative reduction in the levels of such fear in recent years, enabling much needed healing and expanded opportunities for developing their sense of belonging and exploring their citizenship.⁶⁸² Yet it is a concerning development that the new Government of Australia includes senior members of parliament who have already demonstrated a willingness to resurrect the Howard era strategy of fomenting and exploiting anti-Muslim prejudice for electoral gain, as highlighted above. With Australia's economy slowing and unemployment rising,⁶⁸³ we may see the re-emergence of 'conditions of instability where the status hierarchy might change or be weakened', which as discussed in Chapter 2 have historically contributed to members of dominant groups in Australian society feeling strongly threatened. Under such conditions, intergroup attitudes which condone discriminatory behaviour towards outgroups are more likely to be reinforced, particularly if high profile public figures appear to condone or encourage them.⁶⁸⁴ To maintain power under such conditions, the Coalition may return to its tactics of contriving mediated dramas on issues related to Islam and Muslim in order to create 'political spectacles' which can be leveraged for their electoral benefit.

Although this thesis has largely concentrated on the specific phenomenon of Islamophobia, my findings have broader application. Whilst during the early to mid 2000s Muslims were a politically expedient 'scapegoat' given the conjunction of circumstances outlined in Part 2 of

⁶⁸¹ Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 36.

⁶⁸² Islam, "A Lapse of Reason or Islamophobia at Work?," p. 156.

⁶⁸³ Michael Janda, "'Decent' Economic Growth Not Enough to Stop Unemployment Rising," *ABC*, 4 September 2013.

⁶⁸⁴ Terry, Hogg, and Blackwood, "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour," p. 148.

this thesis, the processes by which one group of people was demonised, dehumanised and targeted can just as easily be applied to other groups in the future, as consideration of Australian history shows this to have been a recurrent pattern which has affected different groups at different times in the past. To combat and redress prejudice and discrimination in all its forms is essential to ensure that *all* Australians are enabled 'to enjoy a sense of belonging [and] to fully exercise the rights and freedoms of citizenship'.⁶⁸⁵ Any programmatic effort to extend this benison, in modern-day Australia, must attend to the need for reform in media, as well as in other areas such as legal and political domains.

⁶⁸⁵ Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 36.

Appendix A – News Article Summary Tables

THE AUSTRALIAN (2004)

No.	Date	Title	Author/Source	Source
1	9-Oct-04	<i>Unbridgeable divide</i>	William Maley	William Maley is director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University
2	9-Oct-04	<i>Counter to Islamic Extremism</i>	John Hughes	The Christian Science Monitor
3	9-Oct-04	<i>Reward for Robust Stance</i>	Stephen Robinson	The Daily Telegraph
4	9-Oct-04	<i>Turkish delight</i>		
5	9-Oct-04	<i>Insurgency redoubles in northeast</i>		
6	9-Oct-04	<i>A democratic Iraq will be worth the war</i>		
7	9-Oct-04	<i>Bomb suspect's wife tells police of life on the run</i>	Sian Powell	
8	9-Oct-04	<i>Jets hit rebel city in payback for hotel raid</i>		AFP
9	9-Oct-04	<i>Bombers strike Israeli tourists</i>	Abraham Rabinovich	Jerusalem
10	8-Oct-04	<i>Americans dig in to hold Samarra</i>		AP
11	8-Oct-04	<i>39 Sunnis killed in 'revenge' blasts</i>	A correspondent in Multan, Pakistan	AFP, AP
12	7-Oct-04	<i>EU puts Turks on 10-year time line</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	
13	7-Oct-04	<i>For Afghan voters, democracy's still a bit hard to believe</i>	Catherine Phipp	The Times, AFP
14	6-Oct-04	<i>Children suffer as Gaza war grinds on</i>	Correspondents in Gaza City and New York	AFP, AP, Reuters
15	6-Oct-04	<i>Shoe-bomber accomplice charged</i>		AFP
16	6-Oct-04	<i>Behind in the polls ...and loving it</i>	Matt Price	
17	6-Oct-04	<i>Twice the cash to fight Asian terror</i>	John Kerin	
18	5-Oct-04	<i>Indonesians freed in Iraq</i>		AFP, AP
19	5-Oct-04	<i>Howard seen as a safe bet</i>	Neil Brown	Neil Brown, a former Federal Minister and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, is a Melbourne QC who practises in mediation and arbitration
20	5-Oct-04	<i>Foreign policy battle is a matter of nuance</i>		
21	4-Oct-04	<i>Divided Iran swings to Right</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	
22	4-Oct-04	<i>Wave of violence sweeps northeastern India</i>		AFP, AP
23	4-Oct-04	<i>Terrorist's wife now suspect</i>	Sian Powell, Olivia Mellisa	
24	4-Oct-04	<i>Five suicide bombers awaiting orders, warns analyst</i>	Sian Powell	
25	4-Oct-04	<i>US says corner turned in Iraq</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	Middle East Correspondent
26	4-Oct-04	<i>Showbiz takes to the stage 'to end the lies'</i>	Rosalie Higson	

27	2-Oct-04	<i>Mother weeps for her suicide bomber son</i>	Sian Powell	
28	2-Oct-04	<i>A chronicle of dispossession</i>	Shakira Hussein	
29	2-Oct-04	<i>Troops storm militants in 'no-go zone'</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	Middle East Correspondent
30	2-Oct-04	<i>Still Smokin' - 'I handed out ass-whuppings in here like lollipops at the doctor's office'</i>	Brian Doogan	The Times, Sunday Times
31	2-Oct-04	<i>Throwaway line hits home</i>	Christopher Caldwell	The Weekly Standard
32	2-Oct-04	<i>Struggle within the Muslim world</i>		
33	2-Oct-04	<i>Crafty Musharraf a problem partner</i>		
34	1-Oct-04	<i>Out to lunch with Australia's chattering classes</i>	David Marr	
35	1-Oct-04	<i>Abductors apologised, say liberated Italians</i>	Richard Owen	
36	29-Sep-04	<i>Jakarta demands UN council seat</i>	Sian Powell	Jakarta correspondent
37	29-Sep-04	<i>Labor man looping the loopy</i>	Matt Price, Steve Lewis	
38	29-Sep-04	<i>Top 10 Reader's Poll</i>	Kerrie Murphy	
39	29-Sep-04	<i>Media sucked in to terrorist game</i>		The Times
40	28-Sep-04	<i>Swiss roll referendum</i>		The Times, AFP
41	28-Sep-04	<i>Turkey reforms penal code with eye on EU</i>		AFP
42	27-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono waits in the West Wings for his rainbow connection</i>	Sian Powell	
43	27-Sep-04	<i>Sudan leader in call after 'coup' bid</i>		AP
44	27-Sep-04	<i>Magazine lets no-fly Cat out of the bag</i>		AFP
45	27-Sep-04	<i>London tabloid foils 'dirty bombers'</i>		AFP
46	27-Sep-04	<i>Britons' mission to free Bigley</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	Middle East Correspondent
47	25-Sep-04	<i>Washington defends decision to put Cat out</i>		AFP
48	25-Sep-04	<i>Mum begs kidnap gang to spare son</i>		The Times, AFP
49	25-Sep-04	<i>New terror charges for Bashir</i>	Sian Powell, Cameron Stewart	Additional reporting: Trudy Harris
50	25-Sep-04	<i>All the president's thugs</i>	Cameron Stewart	
51	25-Sep-04	<i>Reforms stop at adultery</i>	Fareed Zakaria	The Washington Post
52	25-Sep-04	<i>In the news</i>		
53	25-Sep-04	<i>End to uncertainty</i>		
54	25-Sep-04	<i>Journals</i>		
55	25-Sep-04	<i>Journals</i>		
56	25-Sep-04	<i>Credo of the knife</i>	Paul Kelly, Nicolas Rothwell	
57	25-Sep-04	<i>Iraq is now the crucible of freedom</i>		
58	25-Sep-04	<i>Turkey still in race for entry to EU</i>	Anthony Browne	The Times
59	25-Sep-04	<i>SBY puts victory celebrations on ice</i>	Sian Powell	Jakarta correspondent
60	25-Sep-04	<i>Trial threat for warlord of Beslan</i>		AFP
61	24-Sep-04	<i>Banking & finance</i>		
62	24-Sep-04	<i>Washington puts Cat among pigeons</i>		The Times, AFP, AP

63	24-Sep-04	<i>Battle lines drawn as EU debates Turkey's entry</i>	Anthony Browne	The Times
64	24-Sep-04	<i>Leaders' grim dilemma</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	Middle East Correspondent
65	24-Sep-04	<i>PM blasts West over terrorism</i>		AFP
66	24-Sep-04	<i>Divining a conscience vote</i>	Daniel Hoare	
67	24-Sep-04	<i>Why me, asks grounded JI 'backer'</i>	Martin Chulov	
68	23-Sep-04	<i>City voice announces retirement</i>	Richard Sproull	
69	23-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono's tasks extend beyond Indonesia</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor
70	23-Sep-04	<i>UN's poll team face mission 'possible'</i>	Richard Beeston	The Times
71	23-Sep-04	<i>Cat gets kicked off the peace plane</i>	Robert Lusetich	Los Angeles correspondent
72	23-Sep-04	<i>Blast as hostage's family begs Blair</i>		Correspondents in Baghdad and London (AFP)
73	22-Sep-04	<i>Power behind Suharto's presidency</i>	Tim Scott	
74	22-Sep-04	<i>Indonesian hopes fly high with SBY</i>		
75	22-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono's call to arms</i>	Patrick Walters	
76	22-Sep-04	<i>Dr Germ' and 'Mrs Anthrax' the only jailed women</i>	Stephen Farrell	The Times
77	22-Sep-04	<i>Top 10 Reader's Poll</i>	Kerrie Murphy	
78	22-Sep-04	<i>Editor's fate no cause for despair</i>	Jim Nolan	
79	22-Sep-04	<i>It'll pay to stay Right</i>	Neil Brown	
80	22-Sep-04	<i>Macabre dance with the devil to stop slaughter in Sudan</i>	Cameron Stewart	
81	22-Sep-04	<i>Headscarves stay on</i>		
82	22-Sep-04	<i>Deadline passes for Iraq hostages</i>		Correspondents in Baghdad, AFP
83	22-Sep-04	<i>Region's terrorists in secret alliance</i>	Martin Chulov	
84	21-Sep-04	<i>Adultery law stops Turkey at EU gates</i>	Anthony Browne	The Times
85	21-Sep-04	<i>US spies play out strike on Iran</i>		AFP
86	20-Sep-04	<i>Hunger strike hopefuls</i>		AAP
87	20-Sep-04	<i>Innocents die in 'precision' US attack</i>	Hala Jaber	The Sunday Times
88	20-Sep-04	<i>Bin Laden's new butchers</i>	Martin Chulov	
89	18-Sep-04	<i>Desperately Seeking Paradise</i>	Tony Maniaty	
90	18-Sep-04	<i>Judge shot dead</i>		
91	18-Sep-04	<i>Logistics of democracy</i>	Geraldine Doogue	
92	18-Sep-04	<i>Lessons in militant ivy league</i>	Sian Powell, Kimina Lyall	Additional reporting by Olivia Melissa and Angela Tresnasari
93	18-Sep-04	<i>Uneasy marriage of East and West</i>		
94	18-Sep-04	<i>Global watch</i>		
95	18-Sep-04			
96	18-Sep-04	<i>The unenlightenment</i>		Chris Bond, West Perth WA
97	18-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono's to make grade as president</i>	Patrick Walters	Jakarta
98	18-Sep-04	<i>Kidnapping for ransom a fast-growing industry</i>	Richard Beeston, Stephen Farrell	The Times
99	18-Sep-04	<i>Chechen warlord admits to Beslan</i>		A correspondent in Moscow, AFP
100	17-Sep-04	<i>Muslim woman quits</i>		
101	17-Sep-04	<i>US puts Saudis on religious blacklist</i>		AFP

102	17-Sep-04	<i>Latham to gain seats, but not enough</i>	Dennis Shanahan	Political editor
103	17-Sep-04	<i>Embassy bombing: couple quizzed</i>	Kimina Lyall, Sian Powell	
104	16-Sep-04	<i>World that brooks no compromise</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor
105	16-Sep-04	<i>Reply to M. Tahir</i>		Andrew Murphy, Kangaroo Point, QLD
106	16-Sep-04	<i>Guerilla toll 59 as US strategy takes direct hit</i>		Correspondents in Baghdad, AP
107	16-Sep-04	<i>Police check 'curse' on Sharon</i>	Abraham Rabinovich	
108	16-Sep-04	<i>Lib likes to think God's on his side</i>	Sid Maher	
109	15-Sep-04	<i>Divisive 9/11 books damage children</i>	Louise Perry	
110	15-Sep-04	<i>Not negotiable</i>		Norman McGreevy, Malvern East, VIC
111	15-Sep-04	<i>Islam a haven of peace</i>		M. Tahir, Coopers Plains, QLD
112	15-Sep-04	<i>Herein lies the problem</i>		Amal Awad, Vaucluse, NSW
113	15-Sep-04	<i>I was a hostage - and survived</i>	Stephen Farrell	
114	15-Sep-04	<i>Targeted because of race</i>		AP
115	15-Sep-04	<i>Baghdad blast targets police recruits</i>		Correspondents in Baghdad, AFP, Reuters
116	14-Sep-04	<i>Zarqawi forces targeted in US 'payback raids'</i>		Correspondents in Baghdad (AP, AFP)
117	14-Sep-04	<i>Cold shoulder dish on menu for media</i>	Greg Roberts	
118	14-Sep-04	<i>SAS team flies into Iraq as hostage mystery deepens</i>	John Kerin, Brad Norington	
119	14-Sep-04	<i>Ultimatum to Howard: pull out within 24 hours or hostages die</i>		Correspondents in Samarra, AFP
120	14-Sep-04	<i>School silent on alumni's deeds</i>	Kimina Lyall	Solo, Indonesia
121	14-Sep-04	<i>Letters indicate at least two bombers</i>	Sian Powell	Jakarta correspondent
122	13-Sep-04	<i>Decision time as Turks wait anxiously at gates of the Continent</i>	Nicolas Rothwell	
123	13-Sep-04	<i>Abdullah rules Anwar out of UMNO</i>		AP, AFP
124	13-Sep-04	<i>For God's sake, rescue Islam from killers</i>	Irshad Manji	Irshad Manji is a novelist
125	13-Sep-04	<i>We are a target regardless</i>	Mark Steyn	Mark Steyn is a columnist for Britain's Telegraph Group and the Chicago Sun Times
126	13-Sep-04	<i>No negotiating with ideology of unreason</i>		Responsibility for election comment in this issue is taken by David Armstrong, 2 Holt Street, Surry Hills.
127	13-Sep-04	<i>High time for accurate debate</i>		Jimi Bostock, Curtin, ACT
128	13-Sep-04	<i>Little suburban cottage that housed evil</i>	Kimina Lyall	Southeast Asia correspondent in Solo, Indonesia

THE AUSTRALIAN (2007)

No.	Date	Title	Author	Author description/source
1	24-Nov-07	<i>Arabs' wilful neglect deepens Israeli misery</i>	Jeff Robbins	
2	24-Nov-07	<i>Ban no setback for Musharraf</i>	Bruce Loudon	South Asia Correspondent/Additional Reporting AFP
3	24-Nov-07	<i>Author secreted out of Kolkata</i>	Bruce Loudon	
4	24-Nov-07	<i>The multicultural gang's all here</i>	Justine Ettler	Justine Ettler is a novelist, academic and journalist who lives in Sydney
5	24-Nov-07	<i>Continental drift</i>	Michael Palin	
6	24-Nov-07	<i>Saudi rape stirs social revolution</i>	Martin Chulov	
7	24-Nov-07	<i>Flyer an isolated act</i>	Brad Norington, Nicola Berkovic	
8	23-Nov-07	<i>The tragedy of extremism reveals a hero in Hicks</i>	Fiona Gruber	
9	23-Nov-07	<i>Leader faces ire of Asian migrants</i>	George Megalogenis	
10	23-Nov-07	<i>Bomber urges on execution</i>		AAP
11	23-Nov-07	<i>Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals switch sides</i>		Staff Reporters
12	23-Nov-07	<i>Election '07</i>		Geoff Hinds, Merrylands
13	23-Nov-07	<i>Don't automatically blame a husband's error on his wife</i>	Daniel Hannan, Paul Keating	
14	23-Nov-07	<i>South Carolina contests swamped in dirty tricks</i>	Tim Reid	Columbia, South Carolina
15	23-Nov-07	<i>Victim of rape to fight sentence</i>		AFP
16	23-Nov-07	<i>Kolkata mobs hunt for anti-Islam author</i>	Bruce Loudon	
17	23-Nov-07	<i>Headscarf order</i>		
18	23-Nov-07	<i>Musharraf cleared to quit army</i>	Bruce Loudon	South Asia Correspondent
19	23-Nov-07	<i>Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals switch sides</i>		Staff Reporters
20	23-Nov-07	<i>Leaflet affair may play to Coalition's advantage</i>	Brad Norington	
21	23-Nov-07	<i>What in the beep-beep was she thinking?</i>	Christine Jackman	
22	23-Nov-07	<i>Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address</i>	Patricia Karvelas, Matthew Franklin	Additional reporting: Richard Kerbaj, Sanna Trad, Cath Hart
23	23-Nov-07	<i>Rudd to turn back boatpeople</i>	Paul Kelly, Dennis Shanahan	
24	23-Nov-07	<i>Tip-off that led to Howard's nightmare</i>	Brad Norington	
25	22-Nov-07	<i>Liberals' desperate dirt tactic exposed</i>	Nicola Berkovic, James Madden	Additional reporting: AAP
26	22-Nov-07	<i>Libs kicked out for Islamic ruse</i>	Nicola Berkovic, James Madden	
27	22-Nov-07	<i>Libs kicked out for Islamic ruse</i>	James Madden	Additional reporting: AAP
28	22-Nov-07	<i>Liberal future lies in Tony Abbott's ideas</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor

29	22-Nov-07	<i>White House aghast at Saudi rape victim's sentence for 'using media'</i>	AFP, AP	
30	21-Nov-07	<i>We don't have to ruin our planet</i>	Robert M. May	Robert McCredie, Lord May of Oxford, is the immediate past president of the Royal Society and holds a professorship jointly at Oxford University and Imperial College, London. He was chief scientific adviser to the British government. His career includes a personal chair in physics at the University of Sydney. This is an edited version of the Lowy institute's annual lecturer, Australia in the World, given in Sydney on Monday
31	21-Nov-07	<i>The US is missing the point</i>	Patrick Buchanan	Former US Republican presidential candidate and advisor, is a columnist with Creators Syndicate
32	21-Nov-07	<i>PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis</i>	Bruce Loudon	South Asia Correspondent
33	20-Nov-07	<i>Real lives become an open book</i>		
34	20-Nov-07	<i>Rock of ages puts faithful in harmony</i>		
35	20-Nov-07	<i>Stand-off after Kosovo poll</i>		Reuters
36	20-Nov-07	<i>Corruption threatens anti-terror bid in jails</i>	Stephen Fitzpatrick	Jakarta correspondent
37	19-Nov-07	<i>Saudi King set to pull out of Annapolis</i>	Martin Chulov	Middle East correspondent
38	19-Nov-07	<i>Israel puts up new obstacle for peace talks</i>	Martin Chulov	Middle East correspondent
39	19-Nov-07	<i>Sudan's leader readies for war, lashes West</i>		Correspondents in Khartoum, AP, AFP
40	17-Nov-07	<i>Bomb cleric faces extradition</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
41	17-Nov-07	<i>War on simplistic populism</i>	Roy Williams	
42	17-Nov-07	<i>To die for</i>	Graeme Blundell	
43	17-Nov-07	<i>Islam for Prophet and Tsar</i>		
44	17-Nov-07	<i>Quagmire of conspiracy theory</i>	Bret Stephens	
45	17-Nov-07	<i>Jakarta merits Mid-East role</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor
46	17-Nov-07	<i>Blind to the greatest threats</i>	Cameron Stewart	
47	17-Nov-07	<i>Muslim wedlock can be brief</i>		Ursula Konig, Marylands, WA
48	17-Nov-07	<i>As Iran's birthrate falls, a new modernity beckons</i>	Philip Jenkins	Philip Jenkins is the author of God's Continent: Christianity, Islam and Europe's Religious Crisis the New Republic
49	17-Nov-07	<i>Bomb cleric faces extradition</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
50	17-Nov-07	<i>Krekar taunts Norway on terror</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
51	17-Nov-07	<i>Get a grip or go, Musharraf told</i>	Bruce Loudon	South Asia Correspondent
52	16-Nov-07	<i>Manila's deal on Muslim homeland</i>		AP

53	16-Nov-07	<i>Radical cleric faces extradition to US</i>		Reuters
54	16-Nov-07	<i>Battle for hearts and minds</i>		Hal Wootten QC, Hawks Nest, NSW
55	16-Nov-07	<i>Norway to review ABC Krekar tape</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
56	16-Nov-07	<i>Iraq forces seize Sunni clerical group's HQ</i>		AP
57	16-Nov-07	<i>Think of Iraq war when you vote, Muslims told</i>	Richard Kerbaj	
58	15-Nov-07	<i>Danish PM in bloc talks with anti-Muslims</i>		Correspondents in Copenhagen
59	15-Nov-07	<i>Norway unable to gag Islamist</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
60	15-Nov-07	<i>Labor is more economically conservative than Howard</i>	Robert Manne	The Monthly
61	15-Nov-07	<i>Anwar ready to take rightful place on the world stage</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor
62	15-Nov-07	<i>Danish party needs Muslim's backing to rule</i>		Correspondents in Copenhagen, AP, AFP
63	15-Nov-07	<i>Congressman killed in Abu Sayyaf payback</i>	Emma-Kate Symons	Manila
64	15-Nov-07	<i>imran arrested at protest march</i>	Bruce Loudon	South Asia Correspondent, Additional reporting: agencies
65	14-Nov-07	<i>It's an offence against basic principles of justice</i>		Colin Mitchell, Parkville, VIC
66	14-Nov-07	<i>Spying on the spies</i>	Natalie O'Brien	
67	13-Nov-07	<i>ASIO under fire after case falls over</i>	David King	
68	13-Nov-07	<i>Unlucky or incompetent?</i>		John Pasquarelli, Newstead VIC
69	13-Nov-07	<i>Chinese support for death sentences</i>	Rowan Callick	China correspondent
70	13-Nov-07	<i>Private acts of kindness come to light</i>	Michael Davis	
71	13-Nov-07	<i>Terrorist leader targets Diggers</i>	Sally Neighbour	
72	13-Nov-07	<i>Charge as many as you can'</i>	Sally Neighbour	
73	13-Nov-07	<i>Terror laws on trial</i>	Editorial	
74	13-Nov-07	<i>Legal bungles will harm us</i>		
75	12-Nov-07	<i>Phillipines electoral commission chief gunned down in Manila</i>	Emma-Kate Symons	
76	12-Nov-07	<i>Family party prefers Pauline over 'extreme' Greens</i>	Ewin Hannan	
77	10-Nov-07	<i>Jihadis under the bed multiply in authoritarian's federation of fragility</i>	Francesca Beddie	
78	10-Nov-07	<i>Islam the Caliph's Ghost</i>		
79	10-Nov-07	<i>All enemies aren't equal</i>	Noel Pearson	Noel Pearson is director of the Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership
80	10-Nov-07	<i>The crumbling of one Muslim's American dream</i>	Simon Kearney	
81	10-Nov-07	<i>Radical longs for death penalty</i>		AP
82	10-Nov-07	<i>Ruddock faces Muslim ire with a solo voice of support</i>	Sian Powell	
83	10-Nov-07	<i>Musharraf rampant</i>		

84	10-Nov-07	<i>The worst is yet to come</i>	Greg Sheridan	
85	9-Nov-07	<i>The US has got to know its limitations</i>	Andrew Bacevich	
86	9-Nov-07	<i>Over their dead bodies</i>	Sally Neighbour	Sally Neighbour is a senior reporter with The Australian and the ABC's Four Corners
87	8-Nov-07	<i>Cynicism sees light at bottom of the barrel</i>	Imre Salusinszky	
88	8-Nov-07	<i>Questions about school</i>		Mervyn F. Bendle, Senior Lecturer, James Cook University, Townsville, QLD
89	8-Nov-07	<i>Tougher on Terror</i>		
90	8-Nov-07	<i>If only Pervez Musharraf were more like Suharto</i>	Greg Sheridan	Foreign Editor
91	7-Nov-07	<i>Police swoop on bomber recruiters</i>		Correspondents in Rome
92	7-Nov-07	<i>Sorry state of affairs</i>	Raymond Gaita	
93	7-Nov-07	<i>Police swoop on terror suspects</i>		Correspondents in Rome
94	7-Nov-07	<i>Muslim-Catholic research chair</i>	Sanna Trad	
95	7-Nov-07	<i>Good doctor googles up fresh challenges</i>	Sanna Trad	
96	7-Nov-07	<i>Democracy never flourished</i>		Farah Adeb, Cannington, WA
97	7-Nov-07	<i>Rudd would seize more power as PM</i>	Paul Kelly	Editor-at-large
98	7-Nov-07	<i>Candidate joins outcry over Muslim school</i>	Sian Powell	
99	6-Nov-07	<i>Military leader's last gasp</i>	Ramesh Thakur	
100	6-Nov-07	<i>Imam urges 'exile' for Howard</i>	Richard Kerbaj	
101	6-Nov-07	<i>Hunt for 'deviant' Muslim disciples</i>	Stephen Fitzpatrick	Jakarta correspondent
102	5-Nov-07	<i>Fact or fiction: the day nobody was killed in Iran</i>	Tom Baldwin, Deborah Haynes	The Times, AP
103	5-Nov-07	<i>It's hard to spy on Muslims: top cop</i>	Richard Kerbaj	
104	3-Nov-07	<i>Enemy in the mirror</i>	Frank Furedi	
105	3-Nov-07	<i>Faced with one more tricky knot to untangle</i>	Martin Chulov	Middle East correspondent
106	2-Nov-07	<i>Bali bomber says he cried for the Muslims he killed</i>	Stephen Fitzpatrick	Jakarta correspondent
107	2-Nov-07	<i>A view to transcend religious borders</i>	Miriam Cosic	
108	2-Nov-07	<i>Islamic council stripped of housing control</i>	Richard Kerbaj	
109	2-Nov-07	<i>Deterrence v pre-emption in collision over Tehran</i>	Fareed Zakaria, Norman Podhoretz	US Foreign Policy realist Fareed Zakaria clashes with Norman Podhoretz, a founding father of neo-conservatism
110	2-Nov-07	<i>No balm fr Spain's pain</i>	Peter Wilson	Peter Wilson is Europe correspondent for The Australian (BOTTOM)
111	2-Nov-07	<i>Blanchett film condemned as 'anti-papal travesty'</i>	Richard Owen	Rome
112	2-Nov-07	<i>Another key Bush adviser departs the White House</i>		AFP

113	2-Nov-07	<i>Women's fashion causes men sleepless nights, says Malaysian cleric</i>	Leo Lewis	The Times
114	1-Nov-07	<i>Terrorist link in Russian bus blast</i>		AFP
115	1-Nov-07	<i>Madrid bombing suspects guilty</i>	Peter Wilson	Europe correspondent
116	1-Nov-07	<i>Madrid bombing suspects guilty</i>		AFP
117	1-Nov-07	<i>It's a simple narrative</i>		S. Perry, Randwick NSW
118	1-Nov-07	<i>Japan pulls navy out of Afghan role</i>	Peter Alford	Tokyo correspondent
119	31-Oct-07	<i>An important relationship on the brink of maturity</i>	Jamie Mackie	
120	30-Oct-07	<i>No regrets as Bali bombers see families for last time</i>	Stephen Fitzpatrick	Jakarta correspondent
121	30-Oct-07	<i>Please, no more victimhood</i>		John Lang, Epping NSW
122	30-Oct-07	<i>Please, no more victimhood</i>		Kuranda Seyit, Strawberry Hills, NSW
123	29-Oct-07	<i>Nailing down Mid-East deal is the easy part</i>	Henry Kissinger	Edited extract from an article by the former US secretary of state
124	29-Oct-07	<i>Don't attack Kurds, Iran urges Turkey</i>	Martin Chulov	Middle East correspondent
125	29-Oct-07	<i>ASIO got its wires crossed</i>	Natalie O'Brien	
126	29-Oct-07	<i>Muslims must vote says sheik</i>	Sanna Trad	
127	29-Oct-07	<i>Islamic leader warns of terror strike</i>	John Lyons	

THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (2004)

No.	Date	Title	Author	Author description/source
1	9-Oct-04	<i>EU: Talking Turkey</i>	Editorial	Daily Telegraph, London
2	9-Oct-04	<i>EU: Talking Turkey</i>	Yusuf Kanli	Turkish Daily News
3	9-Oct-04	<i>Africa begins final push to beat polio</i>	Craig Timberg	In Johannesburg, Washington Post, Associated Press
4	9-Oct-04	<i>Faint echoes from afar</i>	Matthew Moore	
5	9-Oct-04	<i>Cambodia confronts its demons as trial of Khmer Rouge moves closer</i>	Connie Levett	Herald Correspondent in Phnom Penh
6	9-Oct-04	<i>America sought retribution on Afghanistan soon after September 11. Today a mire of poverty, corruption and tribal hatred hangs over the country as it goes to the polls</i>	Paul McGeough	
7	9-Oct-04	<i>Retirement of MPs heats up the competition in marginal seats</i>	Cosima Marriner	
8	9-Oct-04	<i>The people versus al-Qaeda</i>	Deborah Scroggins	
9	8-Oct-04	<i>Where vicious battles loom</i>	Anne Davies and Gerard Noonan	
10	8-Oct-04	<i>Europe cautious in talking Turkey</i>	Peter Fray	Herald Correspondent in London
11	7-Oct-04	<i>Maligned Greens are not so deluded on defense</i>	Fergus Hancock, Muswellbrook	
12	7-Oct-04	<i>Success at a price for Islamic college</i>	Linda Doherty	Education editor

13	7-Oct-04	<i>Parties stake their claims in front-line NSW</i>	Anne Davies	
14	6-Oct-04	<i>Abbott's behaviour invites scrutiny, not sectarianism</i>	Reverend Dr Vincent Zankin, Rivett (ACT)	
15	6-Oct-04	<i>Green on the outside, empty inside</i>	Ted Lapkin	Associate Editor of The Review (published by the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council'
16	6-Oct-04	<i>Their future at stake as Afghanistan votes</i>	Paul McGeough (from Kabul)	
17	6-Oct-04	<i>Pure theatre: Latham takes stage with no script and wows 600</i>	Tom Allard	
18	5-Oct-04	<i>North Indian Violence</i>	Ben Cubby	
19	4-Oct-04	<i>Descent into desperation a sideline to choice already made</i>	Robert Manne	Robert Manne is professor of politics at La Trobe University'
20	4-Oct-04	<i>Spreading the word of intolerance</i>	Paul Sheehan	
21	2-Oct-04	<i>Home-grown terrorism</i>	Connie Levett	
22	2-Oct-04	<i>Bomber came from new group</i>	Matthew Moore	Herald Correspondent in Jakarta
23	1-Oct-04	<i>Rushdie threat put cat among pigeons</i>	Laurie Strachan, Lapstone	
24	1-Oct-04	<i>Rushdie threat put cat among pigeons</i>	Nahid Kabur, Churchlands (WA)	
25	1-Oct-04	<i>Rushdie threat put cat among pigeons</i>	Scott Poynting, Newtown	
26	30-Sep-04	<i>Interpreter of Islam respected across the Muslim world</i>	Michael Smith	
27	30-Sep-04	<i>Did you hear the one about the dictator?</i>	John Birmingham	John Birmingham is the author of He Died with a Felafel in His Hand and Weapons of Choice'
28	29-Sep-04	<i>Hamas joins calls to release kidnapped CNN producer</i>	Ed O'Loughlin	Herald Correspondent in Jerusalem
29	29-Sep-04	<i>Ivan the Terrible</i>	Damien Murphy	
30	27-Sep-04	<i>PM's Fahrenheit 9/11 moment has arrived</i>	Gary Maddox	Film reporter
31	29-Sep-04	<i>Candidate's silence could speak volumes</i>	Paul Sheehan	
32	27-Sep-04	<i>Any Tom, Dick or Harry can beat prejudice</i>	Joseph Wakim	Joseph Wakim is founder of the Australian Arabic Council and a former multicultural affairs commissioner'
33	25-Sep-04	<i>Satire's guerilla makes a life whole</i>	Andrew Riemer	Chief book reviewer
34	25-Sep-04	<i>Security blanket</i>	Paul McGeough	
35	25-Sep-04	<i>More DNA taken in search for bombers</i>	Matthew Moore	Herald Correspondent in Jakarta
36	24-Sep-04	<i>Inevitable backlash</i>	Nick Kenny, North Ryde	
37	24-Sep-04	<i>FBI should pause for a good hard think</i>	B. Forde, Young	
38	23-Sep-04	<i>The awful rituals of terror in Iraq</i>	none given	

39	22-Sep-04	<i>Terrorism's causes need exploring</i>	Tom Allard and Cynthia Banham	
40	21-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono's win clear, but his policies aren't</i>	Matthew Moore	With agencies
41	21-Sep-04	<i>Why trials for war crimes collapse</i>	Michael Sexton	Michael Sexton is the NSW Solicitor-General'
42	21-Sep-04	<i>Regional terrorism, regional response</i>	none	
43	21-Sep-04	<i>Yudhoyono's victory is clear but not his policies</i>	Matthew Moore	Herald Correspondent in Indonesia
44	21-Sep-04	<i>More weight watchers</i>	Damien Murphy	
45	20-Sep-04	<i>God liberally involved</i>	Con Vaitsas, Ashbury	
46	20-Sep-04	<i>PM should convert, says Bashir</i>	Steve Pennells and Matthew Moore, In Jakarta	
47	18-Sep-04	<i>Credit to France's Muslims</i>	Alan Kennedy and Ben Cubby	
48	18-Sep-04	<i>One step ahead</i>	Mark Coultan, Catharine Munro, Craig Skehan	
49	17-Sep-04	<i>Brother says suspected bomber gave suicide note to family</i>	Matthew Moore	Herald Correspondent in Surabaya
50	17-Sep-04	<i>Reflections of lives at the crossroads</i>	Steve Meacham	
51	17-Sep-04	<i>There'll be quite a song and dance if Hazem gets 300 points, but not on the MTV stage</i>	Doug Anderson	
52	17-Sep-04	<i>Muslims just as outraged but are silenced by torn loyalties</i>	Shahram Akbarzadeh	Shahram Akbarzadeh is a senior lecturer in global politics at Monash University and co-editor of Islam and the West
53	17-Sep-04	<i>El Masri's political goal</i>	Edited by Ben Wyld and Bonnie Malkin	
54	17-Sep-04	<i>Released hostage grateful to be alive</i>	Ellen Connolly and AAP	
55	16-Sep-04	<i>Hostage drama politicised, says ALP</i>	Mike Seccombe and Tom Allard	
56	23-Sep-04	<i>Conspiracies abound, the only fact is Australia remains a scapegoat</i>	Damien Kingsbury	Dr Damian Kingsbury is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University and is author of the third edition of The Politics of Indonesia, Oxford'
57	16-Sep-04	<i>Certain defeat awaits Megawati, say polls</i>	Matthew Moore	Herald Correspondent in Jakarta
58	15-Sep-04	<i>When the President starts quoting Popeye, it's time to be articulate and make your voice heard</i>	Doug Anderson	
59	15-Sep-04	<i>Lottery of life down to backroom deals</i>	Paul McGeough	

60	15-Sep-04	<i>Bashir points finger at Australia and US</i>	Cynthia Banham	
61	14-Sep-04	<i>Ways and means to make candidates' debate truly great</i>	George Finlay, Byron Bay	
62	14-Sep-04	<i>Forget the moral blackmail, we need a real strategy</i>	Eric Bundock, Ottawa	
63	14-Sep-04	<i>Sifting through the web of motives behind the Jakarta bombing</i>	Hamish McDonald	Hamish McDonald is the Herald's Beijing correspondent and has worked most of his career in Asia, including Indonesia'
64	14-Sep-04	<i>Evidence not enough to ban JI: Indonesia</i>	Matthew Moore and Karuni Romple in Jakarta	
65	14-Sep-04	<i>Puritanical form of Islam puts brakes on terrorism</i>	Mark Coultan in Jakarta	
66	13-Sep-04	<i>There's nothing overboard about public resentment of moral blackmail</i>	Paul Sheehan	
67	13-Sep-04	<i>Many heads of jihad hard targets to hit</i>	Zachary Abuza	Zachary Abuza is a terrorism specialist with Simmons College, Boston'
68	13-Sep-04	<i>Backdown over text message warning</i>	Tom Allard and Matthew Moore	

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No.	Date	Title	Author	Author description/source
1	24-Nov-07	<i>Lebanon on brink of political calamity</i>	Ed O'Loughlin	Herald Correspondent in Jerusalem and agencies
2	24-Nov-07	<i>Odd couple in a war of words</i>	Sandra Hall	
3	24-Nov-07	<i>Sober, sensible, professional are survival tactics in a conservative's world</i>	Lisa Pryor	
4	24-Nov-07	<i>Jackie Kelly's husband makes Howard a battler</i>	The Chaser	
5	24-Nov-07	<i>White tracksuit bottoms flutter over the bunker</i>	Mike Carlton	
6	24-Nov-07	<i>Revenge of the betrayed battlers</i>	Mike Carlton	
7	24-Nov-07	<i>Jihad Jackie's on the nose</i>	Damian Murphy	
8	24-Nov-07	<i>Turkman Queen</i>	Peter Fish	
9	24-Nov-07	<i>Somalia descends into fresh hell</i>	Steve Bloomfield	
10	24-Nov-07	<i>Economic tigers may hang up on each other</i>	Eric Ellis	South-East Asia Correspondent for Fortune Magazine
11	23-Nov-07	<i>Taste the difference</i>	Peter Hartcher	
12	23-Nov-07	<i>Proton plans niche car for Islamic market</i>	Jaedene Hudson	
13	23-Nov-07	<i>Say 'aloha' to guerilla campaigning</i>	Chris Henning	
14	23-Nov-07	<i>Jihad Jackie's poor sense of humour blows up in her hapless boss's face</i>	Annabel Crabb	
15	23-Nov-07	<i>Howard needs a miracle</i>	Phillip Coorey	Chief Political Correspondent
16	23-Nov-07	<i>Husband behind race hate campaign</i>	Phillip Coorey	Chief Political Correspondent

17	23-Nov-07	<i>Playing dirty an artform in the west</i>	Andrew West, Jacob Saulwick and Paul Bibby	
18	22-Nov-07	<i>Lib shame over fake pamphlet</i>	Phillip Coorey	Chief Political Correspondent
19	22-Nov-07	<i>Saudi Arabia crucial to peace talks success</i>	Ed O'Loughlin	Herald Correspondent in Jerusalem
20	22-Nov-07	<i>Honour for journalist hostage</i>	Louise Williams	
21	19-Nov-07	<i>Selective tolerance is not tolerance at all</i>	Michael Kirby	Michael Kirby is a judge of the High Court of Australia'
22	17-Nov-07	<i>Jane Nicholls is the victim of some monkey business in Java</i>	Jane Nicholls	submission for prize
23	17-Nov-07	<i>Bully for you, ASIO - the dumb face of intelligence</i>	Mike Carlton	
24	17-Nov-07	<i>Iraqi influx putting Jordan to the test</i>	Ed O'Loughlin (in Amman)	
25	17-Nov-07	<i>Spies in the eyes of others</i>	Tom Allard	
26	16-Nov-07	<i>Ten years on</i>	David Dale	
27	15-Nov-07	<i>Deadly rivalry at rally for Arafat</i>	Ed O'Loughlin	Herald Correspondent in Jerusalem
28	14-Nov-07	<i>Puttnam urges studios to tell Muslim stories</i>	Garry Maddox	
29	14-Nov-07	<i>ASIO's credibility now on trial</i>	none given	
30	14-Nov-07	<i>If there was a coup on the go, he'd be in it</i>	Sophie Nicholson	Guardian News & Media
31	13-Nov-07	<i>Carmaker looks to God</i>	David Dale & Kerry Coleman	
32	13-Nov-07	<i>Democratic gong for Indonesia</i>	Mark Forbes	Herald Correspondent in Denpasar
33	12-Nov-07	<i>Holy war, on message</i>	Erik Jensen	
34	10-Nov-07	<i>Losing their religion</i>	Andrew Bain	Andrew Bain travelled courtesy of Peregrine Adventures
35	10-Nov-07	<i>Be careful of those you call friends</i>	Tom Allard	
36	10-Nov-07	<i>Europe still struggles to face up to reality</i>	James Button (in London)	
37	10-Nov-07	<i>Museum crosses borders as everyday objects tell the hard story</i>	Garry Maddox	
38	10-Nov-07	<i>A little cleaning springs to mind</i>	James Bone	
39	10-Nov-07	<i>Why Bhutto would be bad for business</i>	Eric Ellis	South-East Asia Correspondent for Fortune Magazine
40	10-Nov-07	<i>West's faith in Musharraf bears barren fruit</i>	Hamish McDonald	Asia-Pacific Editor
41	3-Nov-07	<i>Unimagined</i>	Bruce Elder	
42	3-Nov-07	<i>Catholic uni sets up chair of Islam</i>	Harriet Alexander	Higher Education Reporter
43	3-Nov-07	<i>Boxing clever: Jordan's women fight hard to keep their place in ring</i>	Ed O'Loughlin	Herald Correspondent in Amman
44	1-Nov-07	<i>A final fling but I'm not yesterday's hero</i>	Paul Bibby	
45	20-Oct-07	<i>Australian lives on the line - Indonesia rules on death penalty</i>	Mark Forbes	Herald Correspondent in Jakarta
46	30-Oct-07	<i>Closure for some folks, nascent beginnings for others</i>	Doug Anderson	

47	30-Oct-07	<i>Religious life a native species, Pell declares</i>	Linda Morris	
48	29-Oct-07	<i>Have a lend of us</i>	Jacqui Taffel	
49	29-Oct-07	<i>Why democracy?</i>	Judy Adamson	
50	29-Oct-07	<i>The Crusaders' lost fort</i>	Melissa Gaudron	

Appendix B – Pilot Study Coding Data

Data Set	No.	Title	Dimensions of Islamophobic Index								Summed Score	Article Status	Negative language features			Problem?		
			1 Monolithic/ Diverse	2. Separate/ Interacting	3. Inferior/ Different	4. Enemy/ Partner	5. Manipulative/ Sincere	6. Rejected/ Considered	7. Defended/ Criticised	8. Natural/ Problematic			Victimising	Demonsising	Emotive			
The Australian (2004)	11	39 Sunnis killed in 'revenge' blasts	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	12	EU puts Turks on 10-year time line	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
	17	Twice the cash to fight Asian terror	-1	1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	Neutral	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	19	Howard seen as safe bet	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	Extremely Closed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
The Australian (2004)	23	Terrorist's wife now suspect	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	Extremely Closed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	22	Bonus flyer stunt hijacks final address	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Extremely Open	No	No	No	No
	29	White House aghast at Saudi rape victim's sentence for 'using media'	1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	Very Closed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	32	PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Closed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
The SMH (2004)	34	Rock of ages puts faithful in harmony	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	Open	No	No	No	No
	37	Saudi King set to pull out of Annapolis	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	1	0	0	0	Somewhat Closed	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Yes
	10	Europe cautious in talking Turkey	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Very Open	No	No	No	Neutral
	12	Success at a price for Islamic college	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Somewhat Open	No	No	No	No
The SMH (2007)	17	Pure theatre: Latham takes stage with no script and wows 600	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	Very Open	No	No	No	No
	18	North Indian Violence	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	Very Closed	No	Yes	Neutral	Yes
	19	Spreading the word of intolerance	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	Extremely Closed	No	No	No	Yes
	17	Playing dirty an artform in the west	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	Open	No	No	No	No
The SMH (2007)	18	Lib shame over fake pamphlet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	Somewhat Open	No	No	No	No
	19	Saudi Arabia crucial to peace talks success	-1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Neither open or closed	No	No	No	Neutral
	20	Honour for journalist hostage	1	1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	Neither open or closed	No	Yes	Yes	Neutral
	21	Selective tolerance is not tolerance at all	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	1	1	1	1	Somewhat Open	No	No	No	Yes
			9	8	9	7	10	10	2	3	4	4	Yes	4	6	6	10	
			7	4	9	8	10	13	9	13	9	9	Neutral	4	4	4	4	
			4	8	2	5	0	5	5	4	7	7	No	12	10	10	6	

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