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**Three Phases of Chinese Political Translation after 1949:  
Similarities and Differences**

**BY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study aims to explore the changes in translation of political discourse after P.R. China was established in 1949. It also explores the possible factors that had the most impact on these changes. To that end, official political discourse after the establishment of China is divided into 3 phases in terms of political leadership: under Mao Zedong (1949-1976), under Deng Xiaoping (1978-1991) and under Jiang Zemin (1991- 2008). The official translation of selected works of these three political leaders is examined in detail accordingly.

As the major theoretic framework in researching political discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis is drawn on to analyse the translation and translation practices in these three phases. Political documents in different genres by these leaders and their translations are analysed in relation to the political and social-cultural background and the major influential translation theories in each historical phase.

The analysis of political discourse translation for these three phases reveals that the translation of Mao's work is endowed with Mao's personal cult and class struggle so the translation is very faithful to the original, whereas the translation of Deng's works are more flexible and target culture-oriented due to the political ideology of the time. The political ideology of Jiang's time also influenced the translation of Jiang's work. While it is still target culture and target language oriented, it becomes more flexible in its form and still serves the political ideology of Jiang's time. It is concluded that although the translation of political discourse is very much bound to the political ideology and the sociocultural context of each phase, the translation and translation practice in each phase differ significantly due to other factors such as the translators and the translation theories influential in each historical phase.

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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

### **1.1 Background of this study**

Chinese translation theories and practice have experienced great changes in the wake of social changes in China and development of Western translation studies. Consequently, Chinese scholars have been producing many translation studies investigating the development and transformation of translation research and practice in China. However, although many translation studies have been conducted at various levels of analysis taking into account many factors, few studies have been done on the comparison of translation theories and practices across different historical phases.

As a result, this study focuses on Chinese official political discourse and its translation, to explore its changes and to attempt to explain these changes using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The study aims to investigate such aspects as social cultural ideology; the purpose of translation; domain translation theories; the subjectivity of the translator after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (P.R. China) in 1949. Due to socio-political differences in each historical phase, translation practices in China have experienced significant changes during the past 60 years. In my research, these 60 years have been divided into three phases according to the changes of leadership, namely: 1) the Mao phase (1949-1976); 2) the Deng Phase (1978-1991); and 3) the Jiang Phase (1989-2008).

The product of translation is a synthesis which is influenced by various factors. It can be influenced by the political and social ideologies of a certain historical phase, the purpose of the translation, the target audience, the media through which it is translated and published, the translator and the ideology of the target language, and even by the import of other translation theories and ideologies (Schaffner and Bassnett, 2010). Therefore, this study will first examine the translation of Chinese official political discourse in each of the three phases, analysing some typical translation features in the works of Mao, Deng, and Jiang. Then, it will explore the main factors that have impacted on the translation production. Social-cultural, linguistic and ideological factors as well as some influential Chinese and western translation theories during each period will be taken into consideration. The translated texts under examination have been selected from officially published political documents. Comparisons between the original documents and their official translations will be made, as the official translation of political documents is often regarded as the most authentic and



reliable translation (Xu and Mu, 2009). As argued by Munday (2001), the official translation of political documents often reflects the most advanced and leading translation theories applied during the process of translation.

From each of the Mao, Deng, and Jiang phases, political documents with their respective translations will be selected as sample texts for detailed analysis in this study. First, a comparison between the source text in Chinese and the target text in English will be made. Therefore, conclusions made after the analysis in this research only refer to translation in English language, but not other languages. Thus, it requires readers of this thesis fluent in written Chinese in order to understand the discourse analysis between Chinese and English in Chapter 5. Then, changes in political translation strategies in China will be examined in light of the most influential and dominant translation theories in each phase. The political and historical background, the translators and the target audience in each phase, the purpose of translation and dominant ideology will also be taken into consideration in analysing the key factors that have made an impact on the translation process.

## **1.2 The purpose of this study**

The purpose of this study is to identify changes in the translation of political discourse after P.R. China was established in 1949 and to consider the possible factors which have had the most impact on these changes. During this process, I will explore not only changes in Chinese political translation but also the factors that caused the changes.

As we know, due to the changing of political leadership after 1949, each of the Mao, Deng, and Jiang phases had its own specific characteristics of political discourse. Political discourse of each different period is imprinted with the characteristics of the time. From the founding of the People's Republic (1949) to 1978 the dominant ideology was characterised by class struggle. Since the start of the economic reform and "opening up" (1978) the discourse has become much more open and multifarious, with the socialist market economy as the central theme. Especially recently, against the context of growing social contradictions and international division, contemporary Chinese political discourse is markedly concerned with social (in)equality and global (in)security and responds to these problems swiftly and explicitly with notions of *hexie shehui* (harmonious society). Therefore, the hypothesis in this study might be that, the difference in translation of Chinese political discourse is influenced by the political, historical characteristics and other factors. In order to explore and examine the factors that influenced translation and the changes that occurred in the production of

translation in each different phase, this study will compare and contrast the translations of Chinese political discourse in each of the three phases.

### **1.3 The Significance of this study**

Although many studies have been conducted on the translation of Chinese political discourse, they have generally been confined to the research of translation theories of a certain period; few comparisons have been made across different political phases and investigation of the factors that influence political translation is rare. In this study, translations of political discourse in each historical period of China with their particular characteristics will be examined and compared. By the analysis of selected political discourse, conclusions will be made on the differences between the translations of political discourse in each political phase and about the main factors behind the changes. To do this, the process of analysis will take into consideration the political and historical backgrounds of each of the three phases, the mainstream translation theories, the translators and target readers, the purpose of translation, and the dominant ideology in each phase.

### **1.4 Research Questions and Theoretical Foundation**

#### **1.4.1 Research Questions**

Based on the relevant literature and collected data, this study will focus on the following research questions:

1. What are the key changes in translation of political discourse in China after 1949?
2. What are the main factors that influence the process of translation and impact on the production of translation?


Supplementary questions to be examined:

1. What does “political translation” refer to in this study?
2. What are the key features of political translation in each period under which the documents selected for this study are produced?
3. What are the mainstream translation theories of each phase which have had the most impact on political translations?
4. Who are the translators and what roles did they play in the process of translation?

#### **1.4.2 Theoretical foundation**

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a critical approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced in text and talk (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995). It was proposed by Norman Fairclough in 1989 and henceforward deployed as a method of multidisciplinary analysis throughout the humanities and social sciences.

It does not confine itself only to method; the overriding assumption shared by CDA practitioners is that language and power are linked. In this study, Critical Discourse Analysis is used as the fundamental methodology to analyse the changes of official political discourse and the reasons which caused these changes. This methodology is explained in detail in Chapter 3.



**Table 1.1: Theoretical Foundation**

The above diagram (Table 1.1) illustrates the theoretical foundation of this study. According to Fairclough's three dimensional framework (Fairclough, 1989), political discourses and their translations are examined by Critical Discourse Analysis from three different dimensions of discourse. These dimensions are: analyses of linguistic features; discourse practice; and social practice. In the diagram, different factors to be examined at each level are also listed. At the linguistic analysis level, lexical choice, syntax structure, tone and styles in

the source text and target text, accuracy in terms of expressions, and translation strategies are analysed. At the discourse practice level, mainstream translation theories in Mao, Deng and Jiang phases, the translator, the target reader, and the purpose of translation are examined. At the third level, which is social practice, the social, cultural, political background and dominant ideology of each of the three phases are examined. Conclusions can be then drawn after applying this three dimensional framework to the translation process, and comparisons are then made to find out the changes and the factors which caused these changes.

### **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the background of this study, as well as setting out the purpose and the significance of this study. The research design is illustrated by Table 1.1, and it shows all related parts of this study. It is a hybrid of how each chapter is related to each other and provides an explanation of how each chapter will cooperate to achieve the purpose of this study.

Chapter 2 is a literature review of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is the main methodology applied in this study, and of influential translation theories of each phase in China. The translation theories reviewed in this chapter will be drawn on along with Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the link between linguistic and social practice in the translation process.

Chapter 3 is an examination of previous studies of Chinese political translation and the political ideology in China during each of the three phases. The mainstream political and social ideology in each phase is analysed. These factors will be used in examination of the social practice in the analysis.

Chapter 4 explains how Critical Discourse Analysis is employed to examine the political documents and how the theories examined in Chapters 2 and 3 are used in the data analysis in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 is a detailed analysis of Chinese political discourse and its translation as performed by the Party Literature Translation Department of the CPC Central Committee, selected from the Mao, Deng and Jiang phases. Political discourses of different genres are selected according to the political features of each phase, and they are examined by Critical Discourse Analysis based on the abovementioned factors. Findings of the features from each phase are

presented and comparisons are made between topics in different political leadership phases to further analyse their differences.

Chapter 6 is a discussion and conclusion of the above findings, including comparisons of the changes in political documents and their translation. Further discussion identifies key factors which have the most impact on the changes of political translation during these three phases.

## **Chapter 2 Theoretical Literature Review**

This chapter will review relevant theories in translation studies with a view to establishing a theoretical framework to address the research questions in this study. First, political discourse and political discourse analysis (PDA) will be reviewed. Secondly, critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be reviewed as a key methodology in this study to examine the translation process at three progressive levels: linguistic analysis, discourse practice, and social practice. Finally, mainstream translation theories originating both from China and abroad in each of the three periods will be reviewed.

### **2.1 Political discourse and political discourse analysis**

As we know, political discourse can be described as the pronouncements of politicians, via such avenues as political speeches, slogans, manifestos, debates, political press briefings, announcements and political writings by party leaders. The organisation and textual structure of a variety of discourse types are determined by the specific political situation and process. Burkhardt (1996) classified communication about politics into two main categories: political discourse in mass media and political discourse communication. Political discourse in mass media refers to the political events reported by the mass media, and political discourse communication refers to discourse originating in political institutions. Political discourse communication can be subdivided into genres that are instrumental in policy-making and thus produced by and addressed to politicians, and genres that communicate, explain, and justify political decisions, produced by politicians and addressed to the general public. The political discourse analysed in this study falls into the latter category.

Political discourse analysis (PDA) aims to relate the fine grain of linguistic behaviour to politics, or political behaviour. According to Schaffner (2004), the functions of political discourse are: coercion; resistance; opposition; protest; dissimulation; legitimation; and delegitimation. PDA is usually used to explore the links between linguistic behaviour and political behaviour. Through the process of translation, a recontextualisation happens across the linguistic, cultural and ideological aspects. This occurs by transformations in such aspects as information selection, addition, omission, wording, syntax and reformulation. Thus, during the process of translation, the ideology of the source text or the target text can be added into the translation to make it serve certain political purposes (Schaffner, 2004). In this study, PDA serves as a guide to find the political trace in the linguistic behaviour at the discourse

practice level by following Fairclough's three-layer framework of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1989).

When the selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were translated into foreign languages, the purpose of the translations was determined even before the translation activities began. The translation serves a certain purpose for a certain power and is manipulated by the ideology of the power and the dominant literary conventions of the time (Munday, 2001). The selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were translated and published to impose political beliefs and perspectives on the target readers, who are supposed to be political discourse readers in English speaking countries. They all conveyed certain ideologies which were possibly different in each specific phase. They would be exported to the target language by the mass media, which might be the publication authority of the official political discourse. The mass media serves as a mediator during the process of translation to further decide the output of the source text ideology into the target text. These are all political behaviours from the point of view of PDA and their traces can be found during the process of linguistic analysis. Non-linguistic features mentioned above will also be further analysed by CDA in discourse practice and social cultural practice.

As politics cannot occur without language, language use or discourse can largely reflect or is even determined by the social, cultural, historical, ideological and institutional conditions of a certain nation. Furthermore, in the process of translation, linguistic choices including the genre and structure of translation can have a large impact on political behaviour. Apart from linguistic behaviour, textual, cultural, legal, and ideological factors are also important elements in the process of translation production as they are all basic factors in determining language use in a certain nation. In this study, CDA is used as a key methodology to examine linguistic and non-linguistic features in the process of political discourse translation.

## **2.2 Critical discourse analysis**


Critical discourse analysis is applied as the key methodology to analyse the process of translation. In this study, CDA will provide a methodology to examine discourse from a tridimensional point of view – which uses linguistic, social interaction and social cultural perspectives.

In his conceptualisation of discourse, Fairclough (1989) developed three different levels of analysis, namely analysis of (spoken or written) language texts (textual analysis), analysis of discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution and consumption), and analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice (social practice). According to Fairclough, “It is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced in text”. (Fairclough, 1989, p.20). Accordingly, all texts should be examined in three progressive steps. First is the linguistic description of the text, including analysis of syntax, metaphoric structure, and certain rhetorical devices. Second is an explanation and interpretation of the process in which the text is produced – that is, the text's production and consumption and how power relations are enacted. The third step is the explanation of relationships between sociocultural practice and the production of text.

According to Fairclough (1995), text is a product rather than a process. He uses the term “discourse” to refer to the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part. This process includes, in addition to the text, the process of production, of which the text is a product, and the process of interpretation, for which the text is a resource. Text analysis is correspondingly only a part of discourse analysis, which also includes analysis of productive and interpretative processes. The language knowledge of the translator, the representation of the natural and social worlds that the translator inhabits, the values, beliefs, and assumptions, together with the social condition of a particular time, all work as key factors which have an impact on the productive and interpretative process of translation.

The linguistic and non-linguistic factors mentioned above shape the social conditions of production, which relate to three different levels of social organization: 1) the level of social situation, or the immediate social environment in which the discourse occurs; 2) the level of the social institution which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse; and 3) the level of the society as a whole (Fairclough, 1989). The following diagram (Figure 2.1) sets out the framework of tridimensional critical discourse analysis, which is designed for analysing the relationship between texts, processes, and their social conditions, and both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social structures.





**Figure 2.1: Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework (Fairclough, 1989, p. 25)**

Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework identified description of text, interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context as the links between text, discourse practice and social cultural practice (Fairclough, 1989). Fairclough then presented a procedure for this process, which he conceived as description, interpretation and explanation.

As for description of text, Fairclough mentioned concepts such as experiential, relational, and expressive values. Experiential value is to do with contents and knowledge and beliefs; it is a trace of, and a cue to, the way in which the text producers’ experience of the natural or social world is represented. Relational value is to do with relations and social relationships. It is a trace of, and a cue to, the social relationships which are enacted via the text in the discourse. Expressive value is to do with subjects and social identities; it is a trace of, and a cue to, the producers’ evaluation of the part of reality it relates to.

Fairclough (1989) then raised ten questions in this procedure via which to analyse the text. These can be organised into three different categories:

A. Vocabulary: 1) What experiential values do words have? 2) What relational values do words have? 3) What expressive values do words have? 4) What metaphors are used?

B. Grammar: 5) What experiential values do grammatical features have? 6) What relational values do grammatical features have? 7) What expressive values do grammatical features have? 8) How are (simple) sentences linked together?

C. Textual structures: 9) What interactional conventions are used? 10) What larger-scale structures does the text have?

The next step in the procedure is interpretation. According to Fairclough (1992), interpretation is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction – with seeing the text as the product of a process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation. In this procedure, interpretation is further divided into text interpretation and context interpretation, which are then subdivided again into: situational context, intertextual context, surface of utterance, meaning of utterance, local coherence, and text structure and point.

The last step in the procedure is explanation which refers to “the relationship between interaction and social context – with the social determination of the process of production and interpretation, and their social effect” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26). In this part, explanation refers to two dimensions: discourse treated as a part of social struggles, while at the same time power relations can also determine discourse. Both social effects of discourse and social determinants of discourse can be investigated at three different levels: the societal level, the institutional level, and the situational level.

### **2.3 Influential translation theories in China**

In this section, translation theories which have had a great influence on Chinese translation studies will be elaborated on. These will be used to help the analysis of political documents in China during the Mao, Deng, and Jiang phases.

#### **2.3.1 Chinese traditional translation theories.**

In Mao's phase and in the early Deng phase, Chinese traditional translation theories still occupied a dominant position in the field of Chinese translation studies and practices. But Western translation theories, especially the linguistic-oriented translation theories of Eugene Nida and Peter Newmark, had started to be introduced into Chinese translation studies. Although these two different kinds of translation theories existed at the same time, Chinese traditional translation still operated as the mainstream translation theory during Mao's phase (Xu and Mu, 2009).

The following is an introduction to Chinese traditional translation theories which worked as the dominant translation principles in the Mao and early Deng phases.

Chinese traditional translation can be traced back to the first three waves of translation activities in ancient times:

In China the first wave of translation activities began with the spread of Buddhism. It can be divided into three periods: Eastern Han Dynasty and the period of Three Kingdoms, from c. 148-265; Jin Dynasties from c. 265-589; and subsequent the Sui Dynasty, Tang Dynasty and Northern Song Dynasty.

The second wave of translation activities in China began in the Ming Dynasty, from c. (1368-1644). In order to facilitate their missionary work, foreign missionaries, in particular Jesuit missionaries who arrived in China in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century translated a large number of scientific works into Chinese to cultivate China's educated class in order to spread gospels.

The third wave of translation activities in China was objectively due to the Opium War (1840) and the subsequent consequences. Chinese intellectuals started to look for ways to save the nation and thus began to learn from the West. The first official team of Chinese translators working in China started their translation activities with the purpose of "controlling the foreigners by mastering their arts". Lin Zexu was a representative of the early translators. Excerpts from the local foreign press were translated and also various English pamphlets on Chinese matters and international law were also being translated into Chinese. The most famous translation of the period was "Geography of the Maritime Nations" (Hai Guo Tu Zhi, 海国图志, Geography of the Maritime Nations). Although Lin Zexu's attempts ended up in failure, many translations of advanced Western knowledge were introduced into China and translation bureaus were established.

In the 1890s, another mode of translation of Western works emerged. It was brought in by native intellectuals such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, who sought self-improvement by learning from the West. During this period, translation works of Western thoughts were introduced into China in various fields, covering political, economic, social, philosophical, ethical and religious subjects. Yan Fu's translation of Thomas Huxley's "Evolution and Ethics" was published in 1897, and named "Tian Yan Lun" (On Evolution). From the translation of this book, Yan Fu put forward his three desiderata for translation which were Faithfulness, Communicability and Elegance (Known in Chinese as *Xin, Da, Ya* 信, 达, 雅):

Faithfulness means accuracy: the translation of the text must be faithful to the original, and convey the exact and complete meaning of the original text, with neither distortion nor omission, nor increase or decrease of its original meaning.

Communicability means expressiveness, readability and fluency: a translator should have a comprehensive understanding of the original text in terms of its meaning and implications but not be confined to the form of the source text.

Elegance refers to the propriety in lexical choice to make the translation elegant and tasteful. This elegance is a pursuit of the traditional grammatical features of classical Chinese, which was considered a refined language. Although this theory had its defects, Yan Fu's *Xin, Da, Ya* were regarded as the standard of translation for many years, and Yan Fu is thus described as the first person who had put forward clear criteria for Chinese translation.

Other translators, like Lin Shu (林纾), Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培), Lu Xun (鲁迅), Mao Dun (茅盾), Guo Moruo (郭沫若), Lin Yutang (林语堂), and Fu Lei (傅雷) had also developed their own thinking and criteria on translation, but the translation theories of the time were confined to specific translation criteria and standard.

Among them, Qian Zhongshu and Wang Zuoliang's translation theories will be examined in detail as they also worked as the main translators of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Their translation theories will be closely examined in Chapter 4 where the major translators of Mao's work and their translation theories are reviewed.

The fourth wave of translation activities in China started from the 1980s when China opened herself up to the outside world, and Chinese translation studies experienced great development. With the opening up to the outside world, more translation activities for communication purposes took place, and Western translation theories were also introduced into China. Thus, translation became a cultural exchange, collision and integration, rather than a simple transformation of information. Chinese traditional translation theories and Western translation theories contradict, supplement and also transform each other. Translation standards became more flexible, with the coexistence of Chinese traditional translation theories and Western translation theories.

### 2.3.2 Western translation theories


Western translation theories were introduced into China and started to influence Chinese translation academia from Deng's phase after the opening up to the outside world. Translation theories within different schools of thought are brought to China one after another and they are studied critically by Chinese translation scholars. This section will list translation theories which have had a major influence on Chinese translation theories.

#### A. Linguistic-oriented translation theories.

The most widely held linguistic theories are by Nida and Newmark. Nida's equivalence translation theories and Newmark's theories were first introduced into China in the 1980s, in Deng's era, and were almost the first Western theories to greatly influence the Chinese translation industry, especially Nida's dynamic equivalence theory.

##### a. Nida's Formal Equivalence and Dynamic Equivalence

Nida (1964, p.60) declared that "the surface structure of the source text is analysed into the basic elements of the deep structure; these are transferred in the translation process and then restructured semantically and stylistically into the surface structure of the target text". This process can be illustrated with the following diagram:



**Figure 2.2: Nida’s surface structure transfer in the translation process. (Nida, 1964, p. 63)**

Nida developed his theories from Chomsky and divided his equivalence theory in translation into formal equivalence and dynamic equivalence. “Formal equivalence focuses attention on the message itself, in both form and content...One is concerned that the message in the receptor language should match as closely as possible the different elements in the source language.” (Nida, 1964, p. 159)

Formal equivalence focuses on reproduction of form and content of the source text and source language and so is also called gloss translation. Footnotes and explanations are applied in this kind of translation for students to gain a closer comprehension of the language and customs of the source culture.

Nida calls dynamic equivalence “the principle of equivalent effect, where the relationship between receptor and message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original receptor and the message” (Nida, 1964, p. 159)

The key to dynamic equivalence can be generalized as “naturalness”. In fact, Nida defines the goal of dynamic equivalence as: “Seeking the closest natural equivalent to the source language message”. It is a comprehensive equivalence to what the source text delivers, including semantic, text type, stylistic, lexicon and cultural references, psychological effect and even the response.

In general, Nida’s “equivalence” process involves a restructuring of the source text after a dynamic analysis of the source text and this analysis is what Nida referred to as “semantic structure analysis”.

As in formal equivalence, attention is given to the source text to reveal the form and content of the original information. So, in formal equivalence, the syntactical unit, the consistency of wording, and the significance of context of the source text are described as principles of formal translation.

As naturalness is the key point in Nida's dynamic translation, so a "dynamic translation" will have to meet the need of the target language and culture as a whole; it will have to meet the context, and also meet the need for translation of the target readers.

Nida also gives four basic requirements of a translation, namely making sense; conveying the spirit and manner of the original; having a natural and easy form of expression; and producing a similar response as the original. Nida also suggested solutions to the contradictions of formal and dynamic equivalence when both principles are applied in a translation.

In the latter phase of Nida's translation theory development, Nida had criticised the formal equivalence and no longer mention it.

#### b. Newmark's semantic and communicative translation

Newmark (1981) defined the functions of language as expressive, informative and vocative, and different principles should be applied to the translation of articles with different functions.

Of articles with expressive functions, more consideration should be placed on the "advocator", who expresses their feelings through writing. Therefore the writer is the most important factor in articles of expressive functions, such as imaginative literature, authoritative statements, autobiography, essays and personal letters.

Informative articles take information and the reality outside the language into consideration. These kinds of articles include textbooks, technical reports, newspaper articles, scientific papers, conference proceedings, etc.

Vocative articles include statements, instructions, promotional text, persuasive articles, etc.

As few articles belong to only one category, but have all three functions, with different focuses, Newmark then settled on different translation principles, with different focuses as a guide to the translation approach.

Newmarks' semantic and communicative translation departs from Nida's theories and narrows the gap between source and target language by replacing the old terms with those of semantic and communicative translation. (Newmark, 1981)

Communicative translation attempts to produce in its readers and its effects as close as possible a response to that obtained in the reader of the original. Semantic translation attempts to render; as closely as the semantic and syntactic structures of the second language allow, the exact contextual meaning of the original. (p. 39)

Although Newmark's semantic translation and communicative translation are similar to Nida's dynamic equivalence, semantic translation attempts more to reveal the semantic structure and meaning of the source text. It focuses on the thought processes of the transmitter as an individual and helps the target text reader with connotations if they are a crucial part of the message, and it also remains within the source language culture.

On the other hand, communicative translation pays more attention to the effect it could achieve on its target reader. It is more subjective and oriented towards a specific language and culture and transfers foreign elements into the target language culture.

## B. Cultural-Oriented translation theories

a. Polysystem theory by Itamar Even-Zohar is another important theory extant during Deng's phase. Even-Zohar (1978/2000) described that:

A translation literary work should not be studied in isolation but as a part of literary system which is then defined as a system of functions of the literary order which are in continual interrelationship with other orders, and literature is thus part of the social, cultural, literary and historical framework. (p. 192-7).

As well, the literary system itself is dynamic and struggles for a primary position in the literary system.



In a polysystem of literature, if the highest position is occupied by an innovative literary type, then the lower strata are likely to be occupied by increasingly conservative types, and this is a dynamic system with the relations between innovative and conservative systems always switching and competing. Also, the position of translated literature in this system is not fixed either. If the translated literature is innovative and related to major literature events of the era, it means the translated literature is taking a primary position in the system. Even-Zohar then stated the cases when translated literature takes the primary position. In this case, the role of a translator is not to follow the target literature models but to break conventions of the target language, thus the translator often produces a target text which matches the source text more closely in terms of adequacy.

More often, however, translated literature occupies a second position in the system, and then it represents a peripheral system in the polysystem. It represents a conservative factor of the target system and target text, and thus has no major effects over the central position in the system.

Therefore, polysystem theory can be applied when research is carried out on the introduction of foreign translation theories into Chinese during the Mao, Deng and Jiang's phase. By locating the translated literature within the strata of the system, translation approaches of each different period can then be analysed to position the characteristics of the literature system of the time.

#### b. Mary Snell-Hornby and translation as a cross-culture transfer.

After various translation theories had ruled for 50 years, Snell-Hornby proposed that translation is a cross-cultural transfer rather than an interlingual transfer. According to Chen and Zhang (2000), culture is not only a physical phenomenon; it's a combination of human substance, behaviour and emotions. Culture is a habit of how we arrange and organize the relations of the above. It includes our reactions to a variety of issues, our method of dealing with issues, and how to build up and interpret their relationships. In short, it is a composition of knowledge, skill and impression. It is directly related to any kind of behaviour and appearance, and it relies on social behavioural norms and social lingual norms.

The translatability of a certain text from a certain language depends on how tightly the cultural background of the source language and the target language are connected, and how

close are the source cultural background and target readers. Thus the key point lies in how meaningful the target text is to the target readers. The translator therefore plays an active and creative role in the translation. The translator should thus regard the source text as a medium through which source culture is revealed, and which, at the same time, is restricted by the source's sociocultural background. The translation process is a cultural transfer into the target culture expressed by the target text, and how to translate the text depends on the purpose of the target text. The text, both source text and target text, is described as a carrier of a certain culture and translation is a transfer of the carrier; therefore the purpose of translation is crucial when the carrier changes, so as to make sure that communication can go beyond the cultural barrier.

c. Andre Lefevere defines the process of translation as a "rewriting" process. According to Lefevere (1992), translation is a rewriting of the original text, and no matter what the intentions are, all writings reflect a certain ideology, and a culture's poetics manipulate literature to function in a given society in a given way. In this case, rewriting is a manipulation, a reflection of ideology and the power of the ruling class.

He also pointed to three main factors in translation: 1) professionals within the literary system; 2) patronage outside the literary system (as determined by three elements: the ideological component, the economic component, and the status component); and 3) the dominant poetic-contemporary literary view, which is known as "poetics". (Munday, 2001, p. 128).

According to Lefevere (1992, p. 39): "On every level of the translation process, it can be shown that if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological and/or poetological nature, the latter tends to win out"

Translation is influenced by the dominant class of a society. During the process of translation, the translator's ideology or the ideology imposed upon the translator by the ruling class determines the translation strategy applied in the process of translation. "The poetological consideration refers to the dominant poetics in the target language culture. Together these dictate the translation strategy and the solution to specific problems" (Munday, 2001, p. 130).

It is also a culturally related factor which operates and imperceptibly influences the process of a translation. Also, the style of translation is restricted by the contemporary literary view

of a society, which also participates in creating the style of a translation. In the comparison of the political translations of each phase, this study will also keep an eye on whether there are ideological factors and literary factors that take part in shaping the translation of each phase.

d. Functional theories of translation.

Hans J. Vermeer and Christiane Nord are the representatives of functional theories. In Vermeer's Skopos theory (Vermeer, 1989/2000), he defined translation as an "action" and all actions have their own purpose. Thus, a translation activity is restricted by its own purpose, and the purpose is the guideline of a translation activity in terms of what kind of translation strategy needs to be applied during the translation process so as to produce a functionally adequate result. In this process, the source text is a component of the task, and the role the source text plays in the translation activity depends on what status the translator gives the source text. As the source text is source-culture oriented, it will also be restricted by the source culture, meanwhile the target text is target-culture oriented and its adaptability will be virtually analysed by the target culture. In this theory, the source text is viewed from a different angle, although the source text is a basic element which will participate in deterring the target text. The target text will also be influenced by many other elements, especially the purpose of its translation. According to Vermeer, the adequacy of a translation is also purpose-based, that is to say, if the target text fulfils the purpose of a task, it is functionally and communicatively adequate.

e. The (in) visibility of translation

Venuti's invisibility theory also plays an important part in cultural theories. Venuti considered words with two different levels of meanings. They first carry a linguistic or literary meaning, and secondly convey "a diverse range of domestic values, beliefs, and social representations which carry ideological force in serving the interests of specific groups" (Venuti, 1998, p. 29). He also discussed other possible influencing factors which have an impact on the translation, such as publishers, editors, literary agents, marketing and sales teams and reviewers. "Each of these players has a particular position and role within the dominant cultural and political agendas of their time and place." (Munday, 2001, p. 145).

According to Venuti, translators are also involved as part of the target culture, which they can accept or oppose. Their role in the translation can then be either invisible or visible. At the

same time, Venuti brings up two types of translation strategies: domestication and foreignization.

Domestication refers to a transparent, fluent, invisible translating style to minimize the foreignness of the target text; while foreignization intends to bring out the linguistic and cultural gap between the two languages.

Moreover, Venuti refers to the subjectivity of the translator. This encompasses the subjective initiative displayed by the translator towards the subject of translation in order to fulfil the translation's purpose under the prerequisite of respecting the translation objective. Cultural awareness, character and style, and the aesthetic creativity of the translator can all influence the subjectivity of a translation and these can be used as a standard criterion to measure the (in) visibility of the translator in the translation process in terms of how far a translator can manipulate the translation. At the textual level, the more authoritative the text is, the less subjectivity the translator tends to exercise in its translation. At the contextual level, the more politically sensitive the context is, the more pressure the translator will feel and the more constraints there will be in the translation and the less likely the translator is to bring his subjectivity into play. This point will be further addressed in Chapter 6.

## **2.4 Summary**

Chapter 2 is a summary of theories in the fields of discourse analysis and translation studies which contribute to the construction of the analytical framework used in this study. It also provides an analysis of the mainstream translation theories applied in political discourse translation in the Mao, Deng and Jiang phases with a view to finding out how Chinese political translation was influenced by traditional translation theories in China and western translation theories introduced into China.

## **Chapter 3 Methodology**

### **3.1 Research Background**

This study is designed to identify the differences in political translation in China occurring over a time frame of approximately 60 years and the possible factors which caused these differences. In this chapter, the CDA methodology applied in this study is discussed to explain how, and with which methods this study, is carried out.

The first methodological step involved collecting and analysing materials related to the translation of the selected works of Mao, Deng, and Jiang.

A broad selection of historical documents was reviewed to understand the political environments of the Mao, Deng and Jiang phases in which the official political translation occurred. The dominant political ideology in each different political period may have influenced the orientation and purpose of translation as these are important elements which can have an impact on strategies applied in the translation process. Such historical and political factors are taken into account while employing Fairclough's three dimensional framework to examine the social practice which focuses on the institutional context and wider context relating to this translation. A detailed examination of these phases is presented in Chapter 4.

The situation of translation studies in China after 1949 was then reviewed and provides this study with details of translation theories developed both in China and abroad. It includes studies on translation theories and research development on translation studies. A detailed examination of translation studies in the Mao, Deng and Jiang phases can be found in Chapter 4, illustrating the overall situation of political translations, the dominant translation theories and strategies in each phase.

### **3.2 Selection of the texts**

After the comprehensive review of the works of Mao, Deng and Jiang and the survey of translation activities (detailed in chapter 4) the following is a list of the political documents selected for detailed textual analysis.

Articles from each of these three phases on similar fields or topics were selected as a source of comparison for the translation production. The examples of political discourse listed above were selected in accordance with the following criteria:

The Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 4 mainly covered 70 articles by Mao Zedong from the end of China's Anti-Japanese War to the establishment of New China in 1949.

First, this volume contains most of Mao's important works and the translation was conducted as a big event during the 1950s.

Secondly, Volumes 1 to 4 were compiled by Mao Zedong himself, and Volume 4 contains the largest amount of important work that Mao wrote himself during the civil war in China. The selection of articles for this study is made from this volume.

Thirdly, the focus of the articles will be on politics and diplomacy because, during the whole Mao phase, politics was always the main issue of the country, and was closely connected to military topics. Articles about diplomatic relationships, economy, science and education were very limited in number, with science and education topics the least.

The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2 and Volume 3 mainly include articles of Deng Xiaoping from 1975-1992.

First, Volume 3 is described as the most important part of Deng Xiaoping's work as it covers important articles about building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Secondly, as shown in Table 4.1, articles on political topics were still the dominant part of the whole content, amounting to 120 in total, which is just fewer than the total number in Mao's phase. Articles on other topics such as diplomatic relationships, economic construction, science and education were increasingly comprehensive, while articles on military and special events decreased in number. This is due to the reforming policy and opening up to the outside world after the Mao phase, as more diplomatic requirements were brought up, the economy was recovering, and more attention was paid to scientific and educational fields. Articles selected from this period cover politics, diplomacy, and economy. Articles about political reform, the socialist market economy and the issue of Hong Kong are selected as the major concerns of the phase.

The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume 1 covers 81 major writings of Jiang Zemin from August 21, 1980 to August 5, 1997.


First, it is also a record of the formation and the development of the thoughts of "Three Representatives", under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng

Xiaoping Theory by Jiang Zemin, which is also officially declared to be his most important theoretical contribution.

Secondly, as in the Mao and Deng phases, articles on political issues in this phase were the most numerous. Articles on diplomatic issues experienced an increase as a result of deepening reform and opening up policy. Articles on other topics were similar in amount compared to the Deng phase with a slight decrease in their number. Articles selected for this period cover politics, diplomacy, and the economy; however the content changed somewhat in each different field.

### 3.3. Research Design

Next, in this study, political discourse will be examined and analysed in light of critical discourse analysis described in Chapter 2. The political situation of a period contains a specific social identity, and the ideology it conveys can be reflected in the political discourse of the time. The following diagram illustrates the research method of this study:



**Figure 3.1: Research Design**

As shown in Figure 3.1, political discourse analysis (PDA) informed by critical discourse analysis (CDA) and dominant translation theories will all be taken into account in the examination of the translation of political articles written by the key leaders in different historical periods in China. PDA helps us to depart from the linguistic level, to “relate the fine grain of linguistic behaviour to politics, or political behaviour”. (Schaffner, 2004, p 119). It can be traced from lexical choices, restructure of text such as selection reproduction, summarization, local transformation (addition, deletion, permutation, substitution), and genre selection such as stylistic and rhetorical formulation of the text production. The translation strategy can thus be examined and concluded from this linguistic analysis, which fits into the textual analysis level of CDA. On the next level, which is discourse practice, the link between textual analysis and social practice will be explored. At this level, the purpose of translation is examined, the (in) visibility of translator, publications, and dominant translation theories of the time are taken into account to further contribute and support the next level. The third level of analysis includes political background and dominant political ideology of each of the three phases, which is also the social practice level in the three dimensional framework.

In this framework, NATTI (National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters) criteria will be used as the unique standard of textual analysis, and is illustrated in detail in the following section.

Overall, backgrounds of publication of selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin are examined, as well as their translations. The translation process and situations, their major translators and their translation styles and strategies are also examined in the following chapters to support the textual analysis of the translation.

Then, the most influential translation theories originating from both China and abroad are studied to help analyse the production of the translation. Thus, Chinese traditional translation theories, the formal and dynamic equivalence theories of Nida, semantic and communicative translation theories of Newmark, cultural theories, functional theories, and deconstructionist theory are reviewed.

After that, the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Volume 1 to Volume 5), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 1 to Volume 3) and Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (Volume 1 and Volume 2) are all reviewed to get an overall picture of the political discourse in each three different phases in terms of the subdivision of the genre of the text. This can be found in



Table 4.1, Chapter 4. It also works as circumstantial evidence of the political environment in each of the three phases.

In Chapter 5, articles from each of the three phases were selected for detailed textual analysis to examine the characteristic of political translation in each phase. Through the textual analysis of the linguistic features of the translation, the above practice analysis and social practice analysis are recollected altogether as a whole by drawing on Fairclough's three dimensional framework which will help to find out the major changes and factors influencing the production of translation.

### **3.4 Analytical frameworks**

In this study, three major frameworks are integrated into the analysis of the above political discourse translations. These are: political discourse analysis (PDA) informed by critical discourse analysis (CDA), (as per the relationship illustrated in the study design section), and the dominant translation theories of each period. In addition, NATTI translation criteria are also used as the textual standard for the translation analysis in the linguistic level of examination.

#### **3.4.1 Political Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis**

PDA relates the fine grain of linguistic behaviour to politics, or political behaviour. Political situations and processes can be linked to discourse types and levels of discourse organisation by way of four strategic functions: coercion; resistance, opposition and protest; dissimulation; and legitimation and delegitimation (Schaffner, 2004). In this study, the political ideology in each of the three periods, the translators, and the purpose of the translation are examined by analysing the translation strategy, cultural and political factors involved in the strategy, target reader, visibility of the translator, and the patronage and the style of translation. All of these political-oriented factors are treated and analysed with a political point of view to find further clues to support critical discourse analysis.

CDA is used as the dominant methodology of analysis in this study. It examines the text in three progressive steps: 1) the linguistic description of the text, that is to say, the text's syntax, metaphoric structure and certain rhetorical devices; 2) an explanation and interpretation of the process in which the text is produced, which means the text's production and consumption, and how power relations are enacted; and 3) an explanation of the relationships between

sociocultural practice and the production of the text. Therefore, during the examination of political articles in this study, discourse is analyzed lexically, and according to social cultural background, then through a combination of these. The social, cultural and political background to the political discourse is examined to provide evidence in social cultural analysis of text production. The knowledge of the language of the translator, representation of the natural and social worlds the translator inhabits, values, beliefs, assumption, together with social condition of a particular time all work as key factors which constitute the productive and interpretative process of the translation.

In this study, critical discourse analysis will be applied as the key approach in the analysis of political discourse translation at three different levels. At the first level which is the textual analysis level, political discourse in the three different political phases will be compared linguistically to find out: 1) the genre of translation; 2) language style, tone, accuracy (addition and omission), and lexical choice; and 3) translation techniques such as domain theories and strategy applied. Then at the second level, discourse practice, the purpose of translation, domain translation strategy and the (in) visibility of translators will be examined. At the third level, social practice, the social political background and dominant political ideology in each phase are reviewed with the support of analysis conducted at level 1 and 2 to examine the translation of political discourse from the point of view of social cultural aspects.

#### 3.4.2. Dominant translation theories

During the examination process, translation will also be examined by the translation theories which the translator adopted, together with another major method at the same time. As seen in Table 3.1, translation strategies are examined at the linguistic level of text analysis, and then the dominant translation theories of each phase are reviewed to find out the link between linguistic level and social practice level. After this, the translation strategies applied can be concluded to reflect the social-cultural practice of each phase.

#### 3.4.3. Textual analysis framework for translation

This study draws on the Australian-based NATTI (National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters) marking criteria as a textual analysis framework to examine the translation of these political documents. NAATI is the national standards and accreditation body for translators and interpreters in Australia. It is designed to assist in meeting diverse and changing communication needs and expectations. It sets, maintains and promotes high

national standards in translating and interpreting, and implements a national quality-assurance system for accreditation of practitioners who meet those standards. In this study, NATTI criteria are applied as the standards in the textual analysis of political discourse.

Although NATTI is not a standard designed especially to examine official political discourse translation, it does provide a reference for how the translation of political documents varies with different political and social backgrounds. The following sets out the NATTI marking criteria; the four major points will be applied in our textual analysis to measure the difference in text production. Only the criteria in bold will be used to examine the translation.

- **Accuracy**
  - **Significant omissions**
  - Significant mistranslation
  - Significant unjustified insertions
  - Failure to complete passage
- **Resource of Language—Comprehension of original**
  - Misunderstanding
  - Misunderstanding grammatical features
  - Misunderstanding sentences structures
- **Resource of Language—Expression of translation**
  - **Inappropriate/ inexact word choices**
  - Grammatical errors
  - Inappropriate/ awkward sentence structures
  - **Non-idiomatic usage**
  - Spelling errors
  - Errors of punctuation/capital letters
- **Technique**
  - **Translated too literally in some segments**
  - **Translated too freely/paraphrased in some segments**

Using the above-listed methodologies, all political texts will be examined in Chapter 5 according to the three dimensional framework of critical discourse analysis to justify the hypotheses and identify the major changes in the political discourse and factors which cause

these changes. After the textual analysis, the dominant factors of political discourse changes can be assessed to illuminate political discourse translation for each of the three phases.

### **3.5. Summary**

This chapter presented the data to be used in the detailed textual analysis of Chinese political translation and the criteria for selecting these data. It then described the process of how the translations of political discourse in this study will be analysed. It also illustrated a framework of how CDA can be applied to the detailed analysis of political discourse translation.

## **Chapter 4 Translation activities for the Selected Works of Mao, Deng, and Jiang**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, a broad selection of the works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin will be examined in terms of their social and political backgrounds. This will include an analysis of the translation activities, the translators involved and their translational theories, the process of translation, and the publication of the relevant works. It will provide detailed accounts of social cultural practice and discourse practice in the three dimensional frameworks of Critical Discourse Analysis as advocated by Fairclough (1989).

### **4.1. Translation of the official political discourse in China**

“Politics cannot be conducted without language” (Schaffner and Bassnet, 2010, p.2). In other words, political behaviour is represented and realised in language behaviour. “Specific political situations and processes determine discourse organization and textual structure of a variety of discourse types (or genres) in which political discourse as a complex form of human activity is realized” (Schaffner and Bassnet, 2010, p.2). Politics integrally involves discursive practices that create or efface opportunities for action. (Schaffner and Bassnet, 2010). Political discourse practices convey the official ideology of the ruling political party.

A government tends to communicate its political aims and decisions to the outside world by translating political discourse into the language used by the outside world and the translation is, therefore, very much based on their own political purpose and ideology. “Although the translation is often invisible in the field of politics, it is actually an integral part of political activity” and “which texts get translated, from and into which languages, is itself already a political decision” (Schaffner and Bassnet, 2010, p. 13). Therefore, from the study of the translation of selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the political purposes and ideologies can be examined. The translation strategies applied and the differences in translation can then be investigated. As the translators are inherently involved in the production of the translation, translators will also be taken into consideration in this study.

The official documents reviewed are the Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volumes 1 to 5 (first edition), the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volumes 1 to 3 (first edition), and the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Volumes 1 and 2. The review will explore how the translations in each phase are different in terms of: the political background of each phase;

the dominant translation theories; and the translators and the factors that influenced them. The articles in each volume have been divided into six categories, which are: political; diplomatic; economic; science and education; military; and special events. Articles falling into the different categories of each phase will then be examined in this chapter in light of the research questions.

Author	Volume	Political	Diplomatic	Economic	Science and Education	Military	Special Events	Total
Mao	Vol. 1	14	0	2	0	1	1	18
Mao	Vol. 2	23	6	0	1	6	4	40
Mao	Vol. 3	22	1	3	2	1	2	31
Mao	Vol. 4	33	5	2	0	19	11	70
Mao	Vol. 5	39	0	12	3	2	14	70
	<b>Total</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>229</b>
Deng	Vol. 1	29	0	5	3	3	2	42
Deng	Vol. 2	24	1	5	6	9	2	47
Deng	Vol.3	67	14	15	7	4	12	119
	<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>208</b>
Jiang	Vol. 1	37	9	12	7	6	10	81
Jiang	Vol. 2	20	9	7	6	5	12	59
	<b>Total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>140</b>

**Table 4.1: Genre Division in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin**

The above table shows that although the number of articles from each phase varies, articles on political themes occupy the largest amount of the total. This peaks in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol.3, with a total number of 67. Although there are only 3 volumes of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, the number of articles on political themes is almost equal to the amount in Mao’s phase. These cover political writings of the phase, such as opening up to the outside world as communications with the outside world became more necessary and more frequent. Articles on the diplomatic theme increased gradually from the Mao to the Jiang phases, and the number of economic related articles also peaked in Deng’s phase. More attention was paid to education and science in Deng’s phase, while on the contrary, military articles seemed to decrease.

## **4.2 Translation and politics/ideology of Chinese political discourse**

### **4.2.1. The Mao phase, 1949-1976.**

The Thoughts of Mao Zedong was first confirmed as the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party in the 7th Congress of the party in 1945. Since then, several different

editions of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong had been published in many areas of China to publicize the Thoughts of Mao Zedong before the establishment of China in 1949. These editions hadn't been examined by Mao himself and the contents were not coherent (Yin, 2009). After the Liberation War of China, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee decided to publish an edition under the direction of Mao Zedong and the first edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Volume 1) was finally published in October, 1951. It included 17 articles that Mao wrote during the Great Revolution in China (1924-1927). Volume 2 was published in April, 1952, and included 40 articles of Mao from the early stages of the Anti-Japanese War. One year later, Volume 3 was published and included 31 articles from the latter stage of the Anti-Japanese War. Volume 4 was then published in September, 1960, and it included 70 articles written during the period of the Liberation War of China. The fifth volume of Mao's works, covering the period 1949-1957 was published in April, 1977 and was edited mainly under the direction of Hua Guofeng.

The second edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volumes 1 to 4 was revised in the 1980s and published in 1991. However, the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong is all based on the first edition and so original articles examined in this study are all selected from the first edition.

The first four volumes of Selected Works of Mao Zedong were published under the direction of Mao Zedong himself and represent a collection of Mao's most important works. They constitute a concentrated reflection of the Thoughts of Mao Zedong. The content reveals a development of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics such as: a new democratic revolution; socialist revolution and development; the building of a revolutionary army and military strategy; ideological, political and cultural works; and diplomatic and party construction work.

#### A. Translation activities in this phase

During the first 17 years after communist China was established in 1949 (i.e., from 1949-1966), the translation industry was becoming highly developed both as a requirement of the diplomatic method and also as a requirement of disciplinary development. Translational institutions were established, academic journals were appearing, and translation research was carried out, such as studies on translation theories and translation practice, applied translation, and the history of translation (Xu and Mu, 2009). However theoretical translation research was still at a primary stage as the amount of empirical translation research work and

research papers was scarce according to the statistics (Xu and Mu, 2009) The focus on translation studies was still limited to translation practice and strategies. Statistics of translation works and translation papers shows that, during this phase, among a total number of 91 translation works, research on translation practices takes up 25.3% of the total figure. Research papers on translation practices make up 39.3% of the total figure. Introduction of foreign translation theories was also very limited, with a total number of 7, including one from Japan and six from Russia.

The development of translation studies was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution from the summer of 1966 and the break-up of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations. Most of the translation activities were discontinued and the introduction of translation theories from abroad suddenly stopped. The translation industry in China came to a standstill.

In this phase, there were no systematic translation theories to guide translation activities. Literature creation and translation activities were a result of inspiration and wit, as classical literature and traditional aesthetics were considered the dominant way in the thirty years from 1950. As a result, little attention was paid to the development of translation theories.

Translators translated according to their own preferences, while readers evaluated their translations according to their own tastes. This aesthetics-oriented principle was prevalent in translation during the first thirty years. The most typical theories in this period are Hua Jing Lun, (Hua Jing Lun, 化境论, Hua Jing Theory) and Shen Si Lun (Shen Si Lun, 神似论, Shen Si Theory) by Qian Zhongshu and Fu Lei. Their translation theories will be illustrated in detail later.

#### B. The translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong

The translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong was started in the 1950s. It was first initiated by Stalin when Mao was on a political visit to Russia in 1950. At the same time, Chinese official political translation and publication also follow the Soviet Union way, in which works of chief politician are published and translated home and abroad. (Dougall, 2011) Then the Government decided to translate Mao's work into different languages. Before that, Chinese political discourses had seldom been translated into foreign languages.

#### C. Major translators and their theories



The Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volumes 1, 2, and 3 were first translated in the 1950s and published by Lawrence & Wishart Publications. Qian Zhongshu and Wang Zuoliang were known as its major translators. Although the Chinese Communist Party retained the publishing right and this version was not published in the UK and the United States, it was still used as a template in the 1960s when they were re-published. The Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 4 was published in 1960, and the Government decided to translate all Mao's works into various languages. The department in charge of this project was the Translation Department for Selected Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东著作翻译室), which was founded in 1961. The people who participated in this translation project, were all elite in English and translation studies, such as Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书), Wu Xiuquan (伍修权), Cheng Zhenqiu (程镇球), Yang Chengfang (杨承芳), Chen Long(陈龙), Wu Jingrong (吴景荣), Fang Jucheng (方距成), Wang Zuoliang (王佐良), and Jin Yuelin (金岳林). Some foreign experts also participated in order to embellish the translation.

When they gathered together in Zhong Zhi Hotel on 25<sup>th</sup> October, 1960, the first translation of Chinese political discourse started. The translation was conducted secretly and the translation they produced was considered to be the most outstanding, unimpeachable translation work. The translation process followed more than 10 strict procedures such as: first translation, modifying translation, examining translation, finalizing translation in group discussion, second modifying and embellishment by foreign experts, finalizing translation with foreign experts, unifying edition, third finalizing with group discussion, read through by the finalizers, discussion of puzzling questions by experts in China and abroad, last finalizing, typing, and proofreading. It was so delicately translated that it even took hours to reach a decision about which article should be used, and the translation of a single proper noun could take a few days before a decision was reached. "It was considered as a great honour participating in the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, and everyone else admires you so much," recalls Yin Chengdong (尹程东), one of the translators. "Everyone was cautious and conscientious and seeks for greater perfection. Translators lived in the hotel and they seldom went home. We normally started from 7 in the morning till 11 in the evening. . . . There were no complaints or grumbles in this workshop; all what people think is how to make our work better." (Yin, 2009, p.7)

Among these translators, Qian Zhongshu and Wang Zuoliang were the most renowned scholars in Chinese translation. They were the main translators of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong and the following are the translation theories they held.

Qian Zhongshu was a Chinese literary scholar and writer whose literary work had influenced a whole generation. His broad knowledge of Chinese classics and Western literary traditions made him not only a nationally famous scholar in literature but also a master in translation. A member of the translation committee of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, he participated in the Chinese to English translation, refereeing, and finalizing. As a cultural master and translation expert, he also expressed his primary theory of translation standards. First, he critically reviewed Yan Fu's translation theory in his article "A Chapter in the History of Chinese Translation", in which he mentioned "three difficulties in Translation", discussed Yan Fu's faithfulness, expressiveness and elegance, and added his own opinion. He described translation as an art and as non-estrangement, which means "no estrangement between the styles of the text and the relative translation" (Zheng, 2010, p.74).

The theory of Hua Jing Lun (Hua Jing Lun, 化境论, Hua Jing Theory) was advocated by Qian Zhongshu (Chinese 钱钟书). Hua Jing (化境) is the central meaning of this theory. "Hua" (化) means a conversion and adaptation – conversion means a translation from the source language into a target language, while adaptation means the expression of a source text by a target language. In this process, the translator needs to retain the style of the original while at the same time transferring the original into the target language smoothly, which makes the translation read like the original. The second character "jing" (境) refers to the thought, emotion, style and charm of the source text. When "jing" has been completely converted and adapted into the target language, the highest level of translation is achieved.

Shen Si Lun (Shen Si Lun, 神似论, Shen Si Theory) is another important translation theory in traditional Chinese translation theories. It is the major translation theory proposed by Fu Lei. Shen Si (神似) means similarity in spirit. This includes two aspects: first, a good translation needs to convey the meaning and lingering charm between the lines of the original. Second, a good translation needs to reveal the style and spirit of the original. This means translation can only focus on the similarity in spirit but not the similarity in shape. Similarity in shape means the format of the original, such as the type of literature, syntactic structure, grammar and rhetoric. He draws the analogy of translation to the imitation of a

painting, which has to convey both the artistic conception and the mood of the original. Last but not least, a translation should reach a stage of harmony between spirit and shape.

Wang Zuoliang was also a Chinese scholar who enjoyed a high reputation in education, literary criticism, translation, translation theory and linguistics. He believed a suitable translation is everything (Li, 2009). He described genre as an important element to be taken into consideration in the process of translation. Different genres should be translated in different ways, and register also needs to be considered in the process of translation, as it needs to be adaptable according to different social occasions. He also thought that translation needed to be culturally based. That is, translators need to understand the culture of both the source language and the target language, and this includes their history, changes, traditions and customs, their relations of productions, emotional life, philosophy, scientific achievements, political system and social compositions. Translation is a dynamic process in which two different cultures need to be compared to find the most suitable solution. “When a translator is looking for an equivalent word, he is actually facing two different cultures”. Thus, the equivalence is more than skin-deep because it should be equivalent in various aspects such as cultural meaning, functions, range, emotional colouring, influence, and what it has been associated with.

#### D. Publications

The translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 4 was accomplished in 1964. In the same year, the first Chinese-English translation organisation in communist China was established and named the Translation Departments of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东著作翻译室). It would then be responsible for the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volumes 1-3. This translation was accomplished by 1969.

The translation work came to a standstill during 1970-1975 due to the Cultural Revolution and hence the translation of Volume 5 didn't begin until 1975. The Chinese Communist Party decided to translate Volume 5, which remained unpublished. The translation was conducted secretly and Deng Xiaoping took a personal interest in it. (Liu, 2009) Apart from all the translators of the Translation Departments of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东著作翻译室), elite translators from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Xinhua news agency, International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee, China International

Publishing Group, Beijing University, and the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages also participated in the translation. By the end of 1977, the translation was finally accomplished.

The Translation Departments of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东著作翻译室) was renamed the Party Literature Translation Office of the CPC Central Committee (中央文献翻译室) in 1982, and was renamed again in 1995 as the Party Literature Translation Department of the CPC Central Committee (中央文献翻译部). Its mission had switched from translating only Mao's work to translating all the political discourse of the leaders of the Communist Party. Thus, the translations of political discourse in China were subsequently all translated by this organization. The political discourses and the selected works of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin that I will examine in this study were also translated by the Translation Department of the CPC Central Committee.

#### 4.2.2. The Deng Phase, 1978-1991

Compared to the translations of Mao's work, the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping were produced under totally different political conditions. The former were produced in the hypersensitive period of the Cultural Revolution, whereas the latter in a comparatively relaxed political environment due to the Reform and Opening Up policy.

Deng was the core of the Chinese Communist Party's second generation of central collective leadership. His policies during this period have been known as "Dengism" or "Theory of Deng Xiaoping". He brought forwards policies which were aimed at building socialism with Chinese characteristics, focusing on both material progress and cultural and ethical progress. His major theories include his "opening up to the outside world policy", the establishment of a "market-oriented economy as the primary stage of socialism", "one country, two political systems", and so on. From this time, China experienced a dramatic change from a more closed and planned economy period to a more open state with a booming economy. His theories were entrenched into the national constitution as a basic and guiding ideology of the Party and as cultural and intellectual support for the Chinese Nation. It was officially declared to be Marxism for present day China, which is a development of Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism.

The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) was first published on the 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1983 by the People's Publishing House, and the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1928-1965)

was then published on 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1989. The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 3) was subsequently published on 2<sup>nd</sup> November, 1993. After that, the first two previous publications were renamed the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, (Volume 2) and (Volume 1) respectively in 1994 with supplements. Volume 1 includes 43 articles from before the Chinese Cultural Revolution; Volume 2 includes 47 articles before 1982. Volume 3 includes 119 articles and this volume is described as the most important part of Deng Xiaoping's work as it bears witness to the progress of forming Deng's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

#### A. Translation activities in Deng's phase

1978-1991 is the period when Deng took over. The Reform and Opening up policy restored the connection between China and the world. With more requirements for communication to the outside world, the Chinese translation industry recovered. The Translation Association of China was established in 1982, and China also became a member of the International Federation of Translators. Since then, academic activities regarding translation studies increased day by day and communication abroad became more and more frequent. Research areas expanded, with their influence deepening gradually. Many academic journals were resumed, and new ones were created. Western translation theories were introduced into China, especially Western linguistic theories, and the primacy of Russian translation theories gave way to Western translation theories. The number of research works and research papers in this period also increased, but most of the research focus was still on translation skills and practice, with an increasing number of research works on applied translation studies and the history of translation.

From 1979 to 1988, Chinese traditional translation theories were still in a leading position and researchers had only just started to consider the difference between Chinese and foreign translation theories. Western translation theories had now been introduced and started to influence Chinese traditional translation. During the decade after 1979, ten theories in translation studies were introduced into mainland China and Russian translation theories gave way to Western translation theories that later became the mainstream. Dr. Eugene Nida and Peter Newmark were the famous representatives in this field at the time and their theories were introduced into China in 1979 and 1981 respectively. Nida's dynamic equivalence and functional equivalence theories had great influence. Although Chinese traditional translation theories still occupied the main position, western translation theories started to bloom, but as

these theories were newly introduced into China and still lacked critical analysis, they were not fully developed.

There are 23 theses on Nida's translation theory, and 13 theses on Newmark's published during this period. Although their translation theories were still a hot topic in the field of translation, people's attitudes started to change. Chinese translators started to "explain", "apply", "compare" and "criticize" their theories, which meant they became more extensively developed and applied.

Introduction of western translation theories widened the vision of Chinese translation circles. It rescued the discipline from being a simple induction of the principles and skills of translation, and led it into the complexities of the internal structure of language. Now texts were analysed with linguistic analysis approaches, which had the discipline of language transformation and equivalence. Translation then focused on the social cultural context of a language, its ideology, etc.

#### B. The translation of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping

The policy of opening up to the outside world policy made translation a big issue and the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volumes 1 to 3 were translated into many languages including Japanese, English, Spanish, German, Russian, Italian, and Arabic. The first English translation was published in 1984 by Foreign Languages Press Beijing. It provided to the rest of the world the most reliable source of political, economic, and diplomatic information.

The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 1 to 3) were translated by The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. But according to Yin Chengdong (2009), the former deputy director general of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, due to the introduction of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, after the Third Plenary Session of the 11<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, China transferred from a planned economy to a market economy, and the requirement of communication in political, economic and cultural fields increased rapidly. This led to an increasing demand for translators and interpreters, so the intensive specialisation of translators working towards one unique aim as in the Mao phase was no longer as easy to achieve. Although the official political discourse translation still stood as the highest standard

of Chinese to English translation, it could hardly compare to the quality of translation in Mao's phase.

#### 4.2.3. The Jiang phase, 1991-2008

In this study, the Jiang phase has been defined as the phase when Jiang Zemin took over. It was a phase of deepening reform, consummating the socialist market economic system, and extending China's opening up to the outside world. Jiang Zemin, the core of the Chinese Communist Party's third generation of central collective leadership, had further developed his own thoughts with the hope of accelerating economic reform to build a socialist market economy in the primary stage of Socialism. He also wished to solve the existing social problems in ethical and cultural life such as moral deterioration under Deng Xiaoping's reform.

The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin Volumes 1 and 2 is a collection of works which provides profound insights into the historic process of the inception, formation and the development of the thoughts of "Three Represents", under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. The two volumes were published in 2006 by the People's Publishing House.

Volume 1 covers the major writings of Jiang Zemin from 21<sup>st</sup> August, 1980 to 5<sup>th</sup> August, 1997, and includes 81 of his works. It records the historic process, with Jiang Zemin as the core of the third generation of the central collective leadership of the Communist Party of China, of guiding the Party and its people in pushing forward socialism with Chinese characteristics.

##### A. Translation activities in Jiang's phase

This phase witnessed the bloom and development of western translation theories being introduced into China and the development of translation studies in China. First, along with the constant opening up to the outside world, academic exchange increased both in amount and in depth. More western translation theories from different schools were introduced, such as cultural studies, functional studies, deconstructionist theories, and feminism. But at the same time, such theories and propositions were no longer only adopted or worshiped but also critically analysed. Linguistic theories by Nida and Newmark were still given attention but researchers started to study them with a critical insight. During this phase, translation studies in China started to examine the history of western translation theories with a macroscopic

perspective. More attention was placed on the thread, research approaches and development direction. As various theories were introduced, more thought was also generated in terms of their background and development, together with the interactions between different theories.

In the latter half of the Jiang phase, various translation theories were introduced into China. According to (Xu and Mu, 2009) during 1999-2008, Chinese translators started to make detailed inquiry into the root of the philosophical principle of certain theories, and had a comprehensive understanding of the defects and shortcomings of them. Interactions between different translation theories were considered and more up-to-date translation theories introduced.

With the introduction of western translation theories, the core of Chinese translation studies changed accordingly. The major position of traditional Chinese translation theories was now seriously eroded and the linguistic approach to translation studies in China obtained a dominant position and the challenge of a cultural approach was taken up.

#### B. The translation of Selected Works of Jiang Zemin

The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (Volume 1) was published in 2010 by the Foreign Languages Press and Volume 2 is now under translation. It has also been translated by the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. During the translation of Jiang's work, the Deputy Director General of the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin pointed out the importance and uniqueness of the translation. The political ideology direction of the translation was pointed out, especially translations on important questions, new thoughts and concepts that occurred since the opening up policy.

### **4.3 Summary**

To illustrate the background of Chinese political discourse in general, this chapter examined the detailed background and publications of the selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin and their translations. It provided a general background to the subsequent chapters in which the details of the translations will be examined. This chapter also provided the background information of social cultural practice and discourse practice for further analysis of the translations on the basis of text analysis in Chapter 5.



## **Chapter 5 Data analysis**

### **5.1 Data collection**

After a preliminary comparison and analysis of all translated articles by Mao, Deng, and Jiang on different topics, 20 articles with their corresponding translation were selected for detailed textual analysis. From the Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 4, 8 texts on political topics were selected for detailed analysis. 6 articles concerning politics, economic reform and special events topics were selected from the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2 and Volume 3. In Deng's phase, economic and diplomatic topics began to appear due to the policy of "opening up" to the outside world. Therefore, documents with political and economic topics or about special events were selected for detailed analysis. In Jiang's phase, 6 texts on similar topics to those in the Deng phase were selected in order to make a parallel comparison of the translations.

It is noted that Wade-Giles and Hanyu pinyin can both be found in the cited discourse. Before 1980, Wade-Giles is used before 1980 and Hanyu pinyin is used after 1980. Therefore, In Mao's work, Wade-Giles appears in Mao's translation and Hanyu pinyin is used in Deng and Jiang's translation.

### **5.2 Translation of Selected Works of Mao Zedong**

As illustrated in Chapter 3, the detailed textual analysis follows the NAATI translation criteria to examine the accuracy and coherence of the translation. It is found that the translation of Mao's work was very strict and precise, with notes added on words with certain connotations or for historical background. The translation contained social and political overtones which indicate its obvious political orientations.

As most of Mao's articles feature a strong distinctive individual style, the translations also attempt to cater to Mao's writing style. The following examples of Mao's translated political documents were published in 1960, five years before the "Cultural Revolution", when the major ideology of the time was dominated by extreme "left" thinking. To build a socialist country and win the class struggle, anti-revisionism and anti-imperialism were dominant political ideologies of the time. The Cultural Revolution saw the personality cult of Mao

Zedong reach its peak. During such a specific political era, the idea of summarizing and publicizing the victorious experience of the Chinese revolution was proposed by Stalin during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union in 1950, after which the translation of Mao's work became one of the most serious and significant tasks of the time.

Selected Works of Mao Zedong were so delicately translated that sometimes it took hours to reach a decision on which article should be used, and the translation of a single proper noun could take a few days before a decision was reached. As a result, the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong is of high fidelity to the original but at the same time better translated compared to the translation of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's works (Yin, 2009),

The key findings of the analysis are summarized below.

5.2.1 In the translation of Mao's work, Mao's casual and spoken written style, incorporating his ironic and humorous flavour is reproduced as much as possible. The translation is very faithful to the original on both lexical and cultural levels. Formal equivalence here outweighed dynamic equivalence. The translation is very source-language and source-cultural oriented, and the target readers are placed in a secondary position. The translators' initiatives remain invisible in the translation.

In Mao's *On the Kuomintang's different answers to the question of responsibility for the war February 18, 1949*, which is an analysis of the statement from the Kuomintang about the responsibility of the civil war, his writing is of a casual and spoken style, while sometimes ironic and humorous. The translation does its best to reproduce these qualities to the target reader.

Example 1: (*From Appendix Article No.2*)

ST: 孙科比较蒋介石“公道”一点。你看，他不是如同蒋介石那样，将战争责任一塌括子推在共产党身上，而是采取了“平均地权”的办法，将责任平分给“各方”。这里也有国民党，也有共产党，也有民主同盟(1)，也有社会贤达。不宁唯是，而且有“全国人民”，四亿七千五百万同胞一个也逃不了责任。蒋介石是专打共产党的板子，孙科是给各党各派无党派全国同胞没人一板子，连蒋介石，也许还有孙科，也得挨上一板子。你看，两个国民党人，孙科和蒋介石，在这里打架。

TT: Sun Fo is a little bit more “fair” than Chiang Kai-shek. You see, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, he does not shift the responsibility for the war entirely onto the Communist Party, but divides the blame equally among “the various parties concerned” by the method of “equalization of landownership”(1). Those involved are the Kuomintang, also the Communist Party, also the Democratic League and also the public involved; not one of our 475 million fellow-countrymen can escape responsibility. While Chiang Kai-shek caned the Communist Party alone, Sun Fo canes all the parties, all the people without party affiliation, every one of his fellow-countrymen; even Chiang Kai-shek, and perhaps even Sun Fo himself, will get a caning. Here you see two Kuomintangites at loggerheads, Sun Fo and Chiang Kai-shek.

In this paragraph, the underlined term “你看”, which can be literally translated as “look”, has been translated directly into “you see” in order to maintain both the structure and the tone of the source text. The three occurrences of “也有”, which have each been translated as “also”, is another example of keeping the original style and tone of the source text. According to the NATTI criteria listed above, accuracy is precisely achieved in terms of keeping the original style, lexical and syntax choices, however, it is not an idiomatic usage examined from the perspective of the target readers. What’s more, in the source text, the term “平均地权” has been translated into “equalization of landownership” with a footnote in the English translation to further explain it to the target reader:

Footnote1. A famous slogan of Sun Yat-sen. (See “On New Democracy”, Section 6, Selected Works of Mao Zedong Vol. 2). Here it is used as a pun in ridicule of Sun Fo.

As we know, “equalization of landownership” was a formal program of the Kuomintang, which was written into the Three People’s Principles. Here, Mao uses the term as a metaphor when talking about responsibility of the Chinese civil war in ridicule of Sun Fo.

In the footnote, the rhetorical device has been specifically explained to the target readers. This is a method similar to a formal equivalent translation which leaves out the lexical connotation needed to create a pun for the source language readers. Instead, in order to keep the original style of the writer, only the term “equalization of landownership” was translated to the target readers, the effect of the pun the term is trying to create only being explained in the footnote. The specific political term “equalization of landownership” still does not make much sense without explanation of the rhetorical effect explained in the footnote, as the target

reader may not be familiar with the source of the word and the associative meaning it creates to the source readers. Although the target readers would realize at last what the sentence means, the historical background and cultural factors still remain hidden in the target text. Nevertheless, the ideology was clearly delivered into the target text anyway, as it indicates clearly the attitude that the Communist Party held at that time. According to Mary Snell-Hornby (1988, revised 1995) translation is a cross-cultural transfer; the translatability of a certain text from a certain language depends on how tightly the cultural background of the source language and the target language are connected and how close the source's cultural background and target readers are. In this translation, although it is difficult to cover the historical and social cultural background, the pun brings up an equivalent term and is then explained in the footnote to make the most of the original flavour.

Similar translation strategies can also be seen in the following examples. In Example 2, the term “脚盆” is translated into “tub”, and the “tub” contains fish and meat. This keeps Mao's graceless colloquial style of metaphor and writing. What's more the terms “针锋相对” and “寸土必争” are translated into “to give tit for tat” and to “fight for every inch of land”, respectively. In the following sentences, corresponding verbs are used to keep the style correlative.

In Example 3, although the first sentence can be rewritten with an English sentence structure, the word order is still kept precisely to Mao's original.

In Example 4, the term “宝塔” which is a feature of Buddhist architecture, is translated directly into “pagoda” with no other explanation or footnote. This piece of translation neglected the target readers who would not have appropriate background knowledge, and the concept itself hasn't been changed to other concepts which may be more familiar to western readers. Once again, the original flavour is kept, and target reader is placed in a secondary position.

Example 2: (*From Appendix Article No.4*)

ST: 现在有些地方的仗打得相当大，例如在山西的上党区。太行山、太岳山、中条山的中间，有一个脚盆，就是上党区。在那个脚盆里，有鱼有肉，阎锡山派了十三个师去抢。我们的方针也是老早定了的，就是针锋相对，寸土必争。这一回，我们“对”

了，“争”了，而且“对”得很好，“争”得很好。

TT: In places like the Shangtang area in Shansi Province there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangtang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyueh and Chungtiao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yen Hsi-shan sent thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago -- to give tit for tat, to fight for every inch of land. This time we gave tit for tat, fought and made a very good job of it.

Example 3: (*From Appendix Article No.7.*)

ST: 一九四九年将要召集没有反动分子参加的以完成人民革命任务为目标的政治协商会议，宣告中华人民共和国的成立，并组成共和国的中央政府。

TT: In 1949, the Political Consultative Conference, with no reactionaries participating and having as its aim the fulfilment of the tasks of the people's revolution, will be convened, the People's Republic of China will be proclaimed, and the Central Government of the Republic will be established.

Example 4: (*From Appendix Article No.8*)

ST: 国民党死硬派就是这样倒霉的，他们坚决地反对人民，站在人民的头上横行霸道，因而把自己孤立在宝塔的尖顶上，而且至死也不悔悟。

TT: The reason the Kuomintang die-hards are in trouble is this: they have stubbornly opposed the people, ridden roughshod over them and thus have isolated themselves on the pinnacle of a pagoda; moreover, they will not repent, even unto death.

From the above examples, it can be seen that, during the Mao period, translation is very source-text and source-culture oriented. Although the target readers are taken into consideration in the translation process, the translator seems to care more about how the source text is reproduced for the target readers. The wording, syntax, and style of the source text are reproduced precisely in the translation. The target readers are placed in a secondary position and the translators remain invisible in the translation. Evidence of this illustration can also be seen in examples 2, 3 and 8.

5.2.2 Although the Selected Works of Mao Zedong is a collective work of translation, the

main translators' positions are not reflected in the translation.

The translation theories that these translators hold do not seem to have been perfectly applied to Mao's translations. Neither the classic Chinese translation theories of Faithfulness, Communicability or Elegance described in Chapter 2, nor the translation positions of the major translators of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong examined in Chapter 4, are applied in depth in this translation. According to the theories of the major translators of selected works of Mao Zedong, "Shenshi", which means similarity in spirit, was not perfectly illustrated in Example 1. Based on Fu Lei's Shen Shi theory, a good translation needs to convey the meaning and lingering charm between the lines from the original; also, a good translation needs to reveal the style and spirit of the original. As from the above analysis, the similarity in style of Mao's work was perfectly translated, however, connotation and lexical meaning between the lines is put in a secondary position, as can be seen from the use of the solution of the footnote. There is also a gap with Wang Zuoliang's point of view, another important translator of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, which advocates equivalence in various aspects such as its cultural meaning, functions, range, emotional colouring, influence, and associations. This can be illustrated in examples 1, 5 and 6.

5.2.3 In the translation of Mao's work, although the translators did their best to reproduce the original, the translation is more like a "rewriting" process in accordance with Nida's Formal equivalence. According to Lefevere (1992), despite the intention, it is a manipulation, a rewriting of an original text, and a reflection of the ideology and power of the ruling class. The purpose of this translation and the ideology of the ruling class in Mao's period serve together to determine the strategy for the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, however, the latter seems to outweigh the former.

As mentioned above, although the purpose of the translation of Selected Works of Mao Zedong was to introduce to the outside world the successful establishment of socialism in China, the translation still manages to keep the coherent style of the original at a primary stage. According to Lefevere (1981, p. 52-9) "On every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological and/or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out". Here, the solution of the translation contradicts Lefevere's arguments, as the worship of Mao already seems to outweigh the purpose of the translation. This explains why the term "平均地权" is only

translated into “equalization of landownership” and a footnote is added.

There are other examples of changes given footnotes:

In the same paragraph, the note (1) of “民主同盟”, the name of a political party in China in the original text was removed, which directs the reader to further refer to the concept of Democratic League.

In the following paragraph:

Example 5: (*From Appendix Article No.2*)

ST: 死硬派的埋怨之所以只能是吞吞吐吐，而不敢名目张胆，是有原因的。当蒋介石还没有“引退”时，死硬派原来想批驳八条，后来蒋介石一想不妥，决定不驳，大概是认为驳了就绝了路了，这是一月十九日的事情。当着一月十九日早上，张君勱从南京回到上海，发表谈话……

一月二十一日蒋介石发表“引退”声明，并无只字批评八条，并且把他自己的五条(3)也取消了，改变为“使领土主权克臻完整，历史文化与社会秩序不受摧残，人民生活与自由权利确有保障，在此原则下，以致和平之功”。

TT: There are reasons why the die-hards can only mutter and dare not speak out openly. Before Chiang Kai-shek “retired”, the diehards had thought of rejecting our eight terms, but then Chiang Kai-shek on second thoughts decided not to do so, probably because he considered that to reject them would leave no way out; this was the state of affairs on January 19. On that morning, Chang Chun-mai 3, upon his return to Shanghai from Nanking said that ……

In the January 21 statement on his “retirement”, Chiang Kai-shek said not a single word in criticism of the eight terms and even revoked his own five terms, changing them into “attaining peace on the principle that the integrity of territory and sovereignty is maintained, that the historical culture and social order are not destroyed and that the people’s livelihood and right to freedom are safeguarded”.

In this paragraph, the original underlined text “并且把他自己的五条 (3) 也取消了”, was

translated into “even revoked his own five terms” and the footnote in the original text indicating the source of the reference was removed from the target text. Instead, one footnote was added into the target text referring to a person who was named in the source text, and it delivered the background information. This seems more target text oriented:

Footnote (3). A reactionary politician, the head of the small reactionary Democratic Socialist Party. See “Great the New high Tide of the Chinese Revolution”, Note 8, P.126 of this volume and “On New Democracy”, Note 9, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.2.

There are also clues which indicate traces of meditation during the translation process in the consideration of both culture and fidelity.

Example 6: (*From Appendix Article No.3*)

ST: 美国人在北平，在天津，在上海，都撒了些救济粉，看一看什么人愿意弯腰拾起来。太公钓鱼，愿者上钩。嗟来之食，吃下去肚子要痛的(6)。

TT: The Americans have sprinkled some relief flour in Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to see who will stoop to pick it up. Like Chiang Tai Kung fishing (6), they have cast the line for the fish who want to be caught. But he who swallows food handed out in contempt (7) will get a bellyache.

In the source text in example 6, footnote 6 explained the folklore of Chiang Tai Kung and footnote 7 explained the background of “嗟来之食”, which is translated into “food handed out in contempt”. But in the target text in example 6, footnote 6 is split into two different ones. With the attempt to further explain the connotation of these sentences via footnotes, the fidelity and style of the original is still kept as the main criterion of translation. Although the target reader is taken into account during the process of translation by using footnotes, the content is preserved as much as possible; and the text hasn’t been foreignized for its target readers due to the political ideology and worship of Mao at that time.

Here, the translators still remain invisible during the translation process as can be seen from the footnotes in examples 1, 6, 7, and 11, which are used as a major way to deal with cultural differences.

Example 7: (*From Appendix Article No.5*)



ST: 大观园里贾宝玉的命根是系在颈上的一块石头[4]，国民党的命根是它的军队，怎么好说不“保障”，或者虽有“保障”而不“确实”呢？

Footnote: [4] 贾宝玉是公元十八世纪中国著名小说《红楼梦》中的人物，大观园是贾宝玉家里的花园。据说贾宝玉出生时嘴里含着一块玉石，这玉石是他的命根，系在颈上一时也不能离开，如果丢了便会“失魂丧魄”。

TT: Just as the life of Chia Pao-yu of the Grand View Garden depended upon a piece of jade in his necklace,[4] the life of the Kuomintang depends upon its army, so how can one say that its army should not be "preserved", or should only be "preserved" but not "definitely" so?

Footnote 4. Chia Pao-yu was a character in The Dream of the Red Chamber, an 18th century Chinese novel, and the Grand View Garden was his family garden. It was said that Chia Pao-yu was born with a piece of jade in his mouth. This jade was "the root of his life" and had to be worn constantly around his neck. He was not to part with it. If he lost it, he would lose his wits.

5.2.4 There is also very interesting evidence of the selection of information based on the ideology of the ruling party:

For example, in *On the Kuomintang's different answers to the question of responsibility for the war*, a paragraph of Chiang Kai-shek's announcement was quoted:

Example 8: (*From Appendix Article No.2*)

ST: 这个论点，不是别人的，是第一元名战争罪犯蒋介石的。蒋介石在其元旦声明里说：“中正为三民主义的信徒，秉承国父的遗教，本不愿在对日作战之后再继之以剿匪的军事，来加重人民的痛苦。”

TT: It is the argument of none other than War Criminal No.1 Chiang Kai-shek. In this New Year's Day statement he said: As a devoted adherent of the Three People's Principles and the teachings of the Father of the Republic, **I** was reluctant to follow the conclusion of the war against Japan with the armed suppression of the bandits and thereby to aggravate the sufferings of the people.

Here, the quotation in the original text was made directly by Chiang Kai-shek. The modesty

and decent style of wording in a traditional way really impressed Chinese native speakers who were the source language readers – especially in the underlined sentence: “中正为三民主义的信徒”. Here, 中正 is the “zi” (name) of Chiang Kai-shek which follows an old Chinese tradition. In ancient times, people addressed each other or themselves with “zi” instead of “ming” (name) to show a sense of modesty and politeness. But this tradition was totally left out in the target text, replaced by just “I” instead, without any further declarations or explanations. Thus, the target text lacks the flavour of the original and sounds less genuine and modest - and it is this effect that the target text intended to remove from the source text. It is obviously not a fidelity translation of the original, nor a fully treated communicative translation according to Newmark’s definition. The cultural background is simply neglected as it has nothing to do with the purpose of the translation. In fact the purpose of the translation serves as the dominant factor which determined the way it was translated.

As the translatability of a certain text from a certain language depends on how tightly the culture background of the source language and the target language are connected, and how close the source’s cultural background and target readers are (Munday2001), the translator plays an active and creative role in the translation process. Translators thus should regard the source text as a medium through which source culture is revealed, and at the same time be restricted by the source’s social and cultural background. The translation process is a cultural transfer into the target culture expressed by the target text, and how to translate the text depends on the purpose of the target text.

Therefore, the neglect of the cultural aspect in this translation strategy is again a result of the purpose of the translation and the political ideology of the Mao period. Although there is a cultural gap at this point between Chinese and English, the translator can use footnotes, as in the above examples, to further explain what the translator chooses to hide. However, the translator seems to be visible in the translation this time; the original text is thus foreignized with the purpose of expressing the emotional colour, political attitude and stance. Accuracy in NATTI standards is once again neglected, instead the purpose of the translation and political ideology is put in the primary position. The translation positions of the major translators of Mao’s works, as introduced in Chapter 2, cannot be found in this translation. The translators are proven to be part of the social cultural and political ideology; they need to be either “visible” or “invisible” (as in previous examples) to fit the purpose of translation and the ideology it is designed to carry.

Other examples of such can be found in an article on diplomatic issues with the United States:

Example 9: (*From Appendix Article No.3*)

ST: “和平到来的时候，美国在中国碰到了三种可能的选择：（一）它可以一干二净地撤退；（二）它可以实行大规模的军事干涉，帮助国民党毁灭共产党；

TT: When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China: (1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists;

This is a paragraph from *Farewell, Leighton Stuart!*, a diplomatic article when the United States ambassador left China. The selected paragraph contains an original quotation from Acheson, rather than a translation of his words. Here, in the sentence: （二）它可以实行大规模的军事干涉，帮助国民党毁灭共产党 is translated into “(2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists”. It can be seen that the term “国民党” was called “Nationalist” and “共产党” called Communist, whereas in the same passage, in the translation of Mao’s words from Chinese source text, “国民党” was translated into “Kuomintang” in example 10:

Example 10: (*From Appendix Article No.3*)

ST: 国民党腐败无能，“意志消沉了，失去了民心”，还是要出钱出枪叫它打仗。

TT: Although the Kuomintang was corrupt and incompetent, “demoralized and unpopular”, the United States nevertheless supplied it with money and guns and made it fight.

ST: 我们中国人是有骨气的，许多曾经是自由主义者或者民主个人主义者的人们，在美国帝国主义者及其走狗国民党反动派面前站起来了。

TT: We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the Kuomintang reactionaries

Examples 8, 9 and 10 again show that from different standpoints, translation can also be different as it has to serve its purpose and express a political position. From the United

States' point of view, the Nationalist and Communists were two different parties in China and they needed to choose one to support. But the term Nationalist carries a sense of legitimacy, state and power, while Communist is just an ordinary term which represents its political orientation. Therefore that's why the United States used such a term while the Communists tried to avoid it. And the term "Kuomintang" is just a *Hanyu pinyin* spelling of the pronunciation of the "国民党", which the Communist Party of China liked to use to show its contempt and disapproval. Although the term is accurately translated according to NATTI criteria, the political ideology it carries is still a major point to which attention needs to be paid for lexical selection.

Here, the translators are visible again in terms of political ideology concerns, but it is the only point they serve in the translation process; their subjectivity still remains hidden as they are still constrained by the political ideology of Mao's time.

Example 11 as follows shows some cultural elements which also reflect how the ideology of the time was involved in the translation process.

Example 11: (*From Appendix Article No.3*)

ST: 我们中国人是有骨气的，许多曾经是自由主义者或者民主个人主义者的人们，在美国帝国主义者及其走狗国民党反动派面前站起来了。闻一多拍案而起，横眉怒对国民党的枪手，宁可倒下去，不愿屈服(7)。朱自清一身病重，宁可饿死，不领美国的“救济粮”(8)。唐朝的韩愈写过《伯夷颂》(9).....

TT: We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the Kuomintang reactionaries. Wen Yi-to rose to his full height and smote the table, angrily faced the Kuomintang pistols and died rather than submit. (8) Chu Tse-ching, though seriously ill, starved to death rather than accept U.S. "relief food" (9). Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty wrote a "Eulogy of Po Yi", (10) .....

In Example 11, "Running Dogs" is a very well-known term in translation with a Mao-period gloss. In Western culture, dogs do not have the same connotation as in Chinese culture, and a running dog just gives an impression of a dog which is on the move. But it delivers to the readers of the source text a disdainful feeling of a person who helps someone to do harm to

the general public. Although it can be translated into “hatchet man”, or “tool”, or even “flunky”, the original was still kept to cater to Mao’s original wording. Back in Example 5, the term “死硬派” was translated into “die-hards” which means obstinate. There can be many options when selecting the wording for the translation, but since it is used to describe the Kuomintang, Mao’s ironic and scolding flavour was maintained once again.

As can be seen from Example 8 and Example 2, there are no footnotes for the term “running dog” to illustrate its connotation and cultural meaning or the emotional colouring it conveys; which contradicts Wang Zuoliang’s “harmonious between a similar of spirit and shape”. We can then evaluate from the point of view of NATTI that it is too literally translated because target readers without a Chinese cultural background will totally be at a loss as to what exactly “running dog” implies. While on the other hand, when examined from a political ideological point of view, it can thus be explained as to keep the original style of Mao’s work. Here, the translator again remained “invisible” even though there is a cultural awareness of the different connotation of the term “running dogs”, and the translation text is foreignized due to ideological concerns.

In Example 1, in the underlined sentence “蒋介石是专打共产党的板子”, the term “打板子” also has a connotative meaning traced back to an Old Chinese punishment, which was to use a bamboo or timber plank to spank criminals. In the source text, it is used as a metaphor which means to blame or to criticize. Although “cane” is a precise and concise word, it’s still different to the connotation of the original term.

Referring back to Example 11, the footnotes 7 and 8 give additional information on folklore and the characters that are mentioned in the sentences:

Footnote 7:

ST: 7, 闻一多（一八九九—一九四六），湖北浠水人，著名的诗人，学者和教授。一九四三年以后，由于痛恨国民党政府的反动和腐败，积极参加争取民主的斗争。……

TT: 8, Wen Yi-to (1899-1946), famed Chinese poet, scholar and university professor. In 1943 he began to take an active part in the struggle for democracy out of bitter hatred for the reaction and corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek government. ……

Footnote 8:

ST: 8, 朱自清（一八九八—一九四八），原籍浙江绍兴，生于江苏东海，现代文学家，教授.....

TT: 9, Chu Tse-ching (1898-1948), Chinese man of letters and university professor.....

In the two footnotes, “湖北浠水人”，and “原籍浙江绍兴，生于江苏东海”，are the birthplaces of Wen Yi-to and Chu Tse-ching and were left out of the target text. This also happened in the footnote of John Leighton Stuart, where his nationality and birthplace are omitted. In the following source text and its translation, not only has John Leighton Stuart’s background been changed, but there is also one more sentence added into the translation which cannot be found in the source text: “John Leighton Stuart, who was born in China in 1876, was always a loyal agent of U.S. cultural aggression in China”. The second half of the sentence did not exist in the source text and was added into the target text. This can be explained in terms of the purpose of the translation and its target readers. The target readers of the translations are supposed to be westerners who pay respect to Chinese politics, especially political leaders, diplomats, statesmen, scholars, or even members of the general public who the Communist Party of China wanted to win over. Therefore, additional information such as the term “cultural aggression” has been added into the translation. It aimed to gain the compassion and support of the public who had no prior position on this issue:

ST: 1, 司徒雷登（一八七六—一九六二），美国人，生于中国杭州。一九零五年开始在中国传教，一九一九年起任美国在中国兴办的燕京大学的校长。.....

TT: 1, John Leighton Stuart, who was born in China in 1876, was always a loyal agent of U.S. cultural aggression in China. He started missionary work in China in 1905 and in 1919 became president of Yenching University, which was established by the United States in Peking. ....

Footnote 3 is also from *Farewell, Leighton Stuart!*, from a paragraph talking about how the United States army participated in the Chinese civil war:

ST: 陈纳德航空队曾经广泛地参战(3).

Footnote 3:

ST: 3, 陈纳德, 美国人。抗日战争时期, 曾任国民党政府空军顾问, 并组织“美国志愿航空队”(又称“飞虎队”, 后改为第十四航空队), 支持中国抗战。日本投降后, 他率领美国第十四航空队一部分人员, 组织空运队, 帮助国民党进行内战。

TT: Chennault's air fleet took an extensive part in the civil war (3).

Footnote 3:

TT: 3, Chaire Lee Chennault was at one time U.S. adviser to the Kuomintang government's air force. After the Japanese surrender, he organized a group of the U.S. 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force personnel into an air transport corps to help the Kuomintang fight the civil war. His air transport corps took a direct part in the criminal reconnoitring and bombing of the Liberated Areas.

Here it can be seen from the footnote and its translation that information was both added and omitted. In the source text, the U.S. 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force was called “飞虎队” in Chinese because it was a well-known name to most Chinese people in those days. However, only its full name was translated into the target text as the name might not be familiar to people abroad. Also in the last sentence of the target translation text, the sentence “His air transport corps took a direct part in the criminal reconnoitring and bombing of the Liberated Areas” cannot be found in the original source text. It is also to inform the target reader that the U.S. troops took part in a crime against China.

Example 12: (*From Appendix Article No.6*)

ST: 庆父不死, 鲁难未已[4]。战犯不除, 国无宁日。这个真理, 难道现在还不明白吗?

Footnote: [4] 事见《左传 闵公元年》。庆父是春秋时鲁国的公子, 曾经一再制造鲁国的内乱, 先后杀死两个国君。……

TT: "Until Ching Fu is done away with, the crisis in the state of Lu will not be over." [4]  
Until the war criminals are eliminated, there will be no peace in the country. Isn't this truth clear enough by now?

Footnote 4: According to Tso Chuan, an ancient Chinese historical work dealing with the important events of the Spring and Autumn Era (770-475 B.C.), Ching Fu, a noble in the state of Lu, repeatedly stirred up internal strife and murdered two reigning princes of that state. ....

Also in Example 12, the sentences with footnotes were directly translated without any explanations in the text, but were explained in the footnotes with more background information for the target reader. What's more, in example 13, the footnote (8) is omitted in the translation and the term “政府”, which means “government” is further explained as the “the Kuomintang Government”.

Example 13: (*From Appendix Article No.1*)

ST: 地方自治, 《双十协定》(8)上已有明文规定, 孙中山先生早主省长民选, 为什么还要政府派遣官吏呢?

Footnote 8: 见本卷《关于重庆谈判》注(1)。

TT: Local self-government is explicitly stipulated in the “October 10<sup>th</sup> Agreement”, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen long ago advocated the popular election of provincial governors; why does the Kuomintang Government still insist on dispatching local officials?

In the above examples, the translators become “visible” again, and the translation is again foreignized.

To sum up, according to the above analysis, the purpose of the translation of Mao's works was to introduce the experience of building socialism to the outside world. According to this purpose, the translation should have been target-reader oriented as it was designed to communicate to the outside world. According to Newmark: “communicative translation attempts to produce on its readers an effects as close as possible to that obtained on the reader of the original” (Newmark 1981, p.39). It is actually a dynamic equivalence that the target text tries to achieve; in other words, the target text should be “domesticized”. Instead, from



the above translation, it can be seen that the translation of Mao's works is actually "foreignized". From this point of view, it contradicts the purpose of the translation, but when we think from the social political point of view, all strategies applied in Mao's translation were to serve the political ideology that the ruling party intended to spread and the personal cult of Mao Zedong. Translators remained hidden in the translation process in general as their subjectivities in terms of cultural awareness and aesthetic creativity and their own translation character and style were not shown in the translation; but they come out to the readers when the political ideology of Mao period requires.

### **5.3 Translation of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping**

Due to the reform and "opening up" policy of China after Deng Xiaoping became the core of the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation of the central collective leadership of the Communist Part of China, more communications to the outside world were needed in various fields. Political ideology changed from the extreme "left" thinking to a comparatively relaxed one, emancipating minds and seeking truth from facts as well as encouraging discussion on the criterion of truth. The translation of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping was more flexible in its strategies within a more opened up and flexible political environment; also the introduction and acceptance of western translation theories influenced the production of the translation.

The key features in the translation of Deng's works have been identified as follows:

5.3.1 The restructuring of sentences was more flexible and ways of expression don't show as much fidelity as they did in Mao's phase. Translators were seeking an equivalent way to reproduce the source text and were more likely to adopt the sense of dynamic equivalence and semantic translation which sought "naturalness" in the translation, as according to Nida in "seeking the closest natural equivalent to the source language message" (Nida, 1964, p.166). The ideology of the Deng phase is more flexible and open, which allowed translators to bring their own subjectivity into play. In this phase, the criterion of "accuracy" is granted a different meaning from Mary Snell-Hornby's "translatability" point of view, as accuracy here is dynamic and meaning-based compared to the literal accuracy in Mao's phase.

In Deng Xiaoping's article about building the socialist economy, the title "全党讲大局，把国民经济搞上去" was translated into "The whole Party should take the overall interest into account and push the economy forward". This is an example of the dynamic equivalence that

the translator tried to achieve. “大局” in the source text means overall situation and present conditions, or the situation as a whole literally, and it is translated into the overall interest from which the whole country can benefit. In the translation, the word ‘interest’ can explain the situation better as it refers to the economic planning of the whole country. This fits the NATTI criterion of accuracy as literary translation here can better describe the meaning that the original text tries to convey, and it also fits the criterion which Chinese traditional translation theories claim. The translators here are more flexible and visible, as a literary translation strategy allows them to bring their own subjectivity into play without the constraints of keeping Deng’s personal written style.

Also, the word “搞” which appears in the title and elsewhere is worthy of attention:

Example 1: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 全党讲大局，把国民经济搞上去。

TT: The whole party should take the overall interest into account and push the economy forward.

Example 2: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 怎样才能把国民经济搞上去？

TT: How can we give a boost to the economy?

Example 3: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 一定要把铁路上搞派性活动的里外联系切断。

TT: it is imperative to cut the internal and external connections of individuals who engage in factional activities in the railway department.

Example 4: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 他们利益派性浑水摸鱼，破坏社会主义秩序，破坏国家经济建设，在混乱中搞投机倒把，升官发财。

TT: They fish in troubled waters by capitalizing on factionalism and undermining socialist public order and economic construction. They take advantage of the resulting confusion to speculate and profiteer, grabbing power and money.

Example 5: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 要从大局出发，解决问题不能拖。拖到哪一年呢？搞社会主义怎么能等呢？

TT: We should bear the overall interest of the country in mind and solve these problems without delay. How much longer can this task be put off? How can we afford to delay in advancing the cause of socialism?

In these examples, the character “搞” in the source text bears different meanings within different contexts. It appears five times and was translated into five different variations. In Example 1, “搞” means to work on, to propel, and to promote, and it was translated into “push” in the target text. In Example 2, the word “搞” actually has a very similar meaning to “搞” in the first example, but it was translated differently into “boost”. The difference in the wording is to avoid repetition and it emphasises the slight differences in its meaning due to the different contexts. Contrary to the first two examples, “搞” can also express negative meanings. In Examples 3 and 4, “搞” means misdoings and to speculate and profiteer. It was translated differently and flexibly so that the form of the original word was not taken that seriously; rather, its meaning and its connotations were more focused on a way to seek “naturalness” in the source text, and the casual style of Deng’s language is thus kept accordingly. Although the parallel effect of the original term “搞” cannot be achieved at the same time as formal equivalence, the term is accurately translated and manages a dynamic equivalence and similarity in spirit. The translation here is more target-reader focused and the target text is domesticized.

In Deng Xiaoping’s *Reform is the only way for China to develop its productive forces*, the word “搞” is imbued with even more meanings:

Example 6: (*From Appendix Article No.11*)

ST: 特别是从新民主主义革命转变到社会主义革命，搞了土改，搞了第一个五年计划

的大规模工业化建设，搞了对农业，手工业和资本主义工商业的社会主义改造，事情做得非常好。

一九五七年开始有一点问题了，问题住在一个“左”字上。反对资产阶级右派是必要的，但是搞过火了。

那时，我们党和毛泽东主席由于长期斗争历史形成的威望很高，我们把困难的情况如实告诉了人民，“大跃进”的口号不再喊了，并且采取了比较切合实际的政策，步骤和方法。

一九六五年又提出党内有走资本主义道路的当权派。以后就搞了“文化大革命”，走到了“左”的极端，极左思潮泛滥。

TT: We were particularly successful during the period of transition from new-democratic revolution to socialist revolution, in which we carried out agrarian reform and then, in the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), engaged in large-scale industrialization and completed the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce.

We began to experience some trouble in 1957, when “Left” ideology appeared. It was necessary for us to combat bourgeois Rightists, but we went too far.

At that time our Party and Chairman Mao Zedong enjoyed high prestige acquired through long years of struggle, and we explained to the people frankly why the situation was so difficult. We abandoned the slogan of the Great Leap Forward and adopted more realistic policies and measures instead.

In 1965 it was said that certain persons who were in power in the Party were taking the capitalist road. Then came the “Cultural Revolution”, in which the “Left” ideology was carried to its extreme and the ultra-Left trend of thought became rampant they who were made the targets of the “Cultural Revolution”

Example 7: *(From Appendix Article No.11)*

ST: 我们总结了几十年搞社会主义的经验。社会主义是什么，马克思主义是什么，过

去我们并没有完全搞清楚。马克思主义的另一个名词就是共产主义。我们多年奋斗就是为了共产主义，我们的信念理想就是要搞共产主义。

TT: We summed up our experience in building socialism over the past few decades. We had not been quite clear about what socialism is and what Marxism is. Another term for Marxism is communism. It is for the realization of communism that we have struggled for so many years. We believe in communism, and our ideal is to bring it into being.

In Examples 6 and 7, “搞” appeared ten times and each time was translated differently to be target-text and target-culture oriented. Some were not even translated in the target text, but the translation still precisely delivered all the information from the source text. As can be seen in the last sentence of Example 7, “我们的信念理想就是要搞共产主义”, although “搞” was not translated into a single verb as in its original form in the source text, nor was the form of the sentence maintained in the translation, the translation was more in accordance with the English way of expression.

Here, the translators seem to stand out more visibly and more actively domesticate the effect of the translation. The linguistic choice of the different versions of the term “搞” is also a representation of the ideology and social issues of the Deng period, which was of economic development. The personality cult of Mao Zedong, the “left” thinking, is abandoned; the society is now more open with a more flexible and relaxing approach. Reflected in translation, cultural gaps can be filled up in more flexible ways, and the translation is in turn more flexible and stylish. More words and concepts have been introduced and more western literature and academic theories brought in, and they are all actively influenced by the dominant and mainstream poetics of Deng’s period.

5.3.2 Western translation theories were introduced into China from the early Deng period. Nida’s equivalence and some cultural theories were widely spread and discussed. Although in the early stage of this period, the western theories were more accepted, in the latter stage, translators and language experts started to study them critically. The translation in this example follows the dynamic equivalence which Nida brought up; formal equivalence is not important at all. Although it is still not the closest natural equivalence to the source language, which needs a comprehensive equivalence to what the source text delivers, including semantic, text type, stylistic, lexicon and culture reference, psychological effect and response,

it gets rid of the restriction of the form in the lexicon and style of the source text.

In the translation of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, proverbs, proper nouns, fixed expressions and proper nouns with Chinese characteristics are also a clue to the ideology of the Deng period. The translation doesn't have to stay literal to the source text. Instead, in being translated literally and domesticized, it serves as a tool to export the ideology of the Deng period, and also serves the purpose of the political translation of this period, which is of opening up and mutual communication.

Table 5.1 lists some translation of proverbs, proper nouns, fixed expressions and proper nouns with Chinese characteristics, picked out from the translation of the above listed three articles:

Source text	Target text
大跃进	Great Leap Forward
文化大革命	Cultural Revolution
拨乱反正	set things to right
闹派性	Factionalism
一国两制	One country, two system
四项基本原则	the Four Cardinal Principles
四人帮	the Gang of Four
三资企业	such ventures
浑水摸鱼	Fish in troubled waters

**Table 5.1: Translation of Proper Nouns in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping.**

Example 8 shows how the term “三资企业” in Table 5.1 was translated; the context clearly shows the strategy applied to explain the term and how it is domesticized to meet the needs of the target text. In order to make the translation more understandable, the translator explained the connotation of the word in the context before the term showed up:

“We allow a small private sector to develop, we absorb foreign capital and introduce advanced technology, we encourage Chinese and foreign enterprises to establish joint and cooperative ventures and we even encourage foreigners to set up wholly owned factories in China.”

The term “三资企业” was then smoothly and naturally translated into “such ventures”

instead of being made a proper noun. This example also shows that, under Deng's period, translators started to participate and started to show their subjectivity during the process of translation; translations thus become more flexible. The term “三资企业” which is exclusive to Chinese society is thus transferred and explained to the target reader because the purpose of imposing Chinese ideology gives way to communicating to the outside world. So, the cultural gap is then filled and terms and phrases which are exclusive to Chinese ideology and culture are seldom imposed on to its target readers.

Example 8: *(From Appendix Article No.11)*

ST: 同时，发展一点个体经济，吸收外国的资金和技术，欢迎中外合资合作，甚至欢迎外国独资到中国办工厂，这些都是对社会主义经济的补充。一个三资企业办起来，工人可以拿到工资，国家可以得到税收，合资合作的企业收入还有一部分归社会主义所有。

TT: At the same time, we allow a small private sector to develop, we absorb foreign capital and introduce advanced technology, we encourage Chinese and foreign enterprises to establish joint and cooperative ventures and we even encourage foreigners to set up wholly owned factories in China. All that will serve as a supplement to the socialist economy. From such ventures workers get wages and the state collects taxes, and part of the income of the joint and cooperative ventures goes to the socialist sector.

Second, in the following examples, more flexible translations are apparent in the translation of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. In Example 9, the rate of growth of the productive forces was translated with a metaphor, as “a snail's pace”. A similar strategy is adopted by the translator in Examples 10, 11 and 12.

In the underlined sentence of Example 10, “现在人们议论最多的是” means literally: “the issue now under heated discussion”, but the translation of “main concern” is more natural and appropriate.

In Example 11, “我们不愿意考虑的一个问题”, “a question we are reluctant to consider” was translated into “something we would hate to see happen”. It is more target-oriented, and what's more, has more emotional colour.

In Example 12, “那样性质就变了” means “It puts a different hue on the matter”, which is more neutral in content. While in the target text, the word “crime” was used giving it a more negative meaning.

The functional theories of Hans J. Vermeer and Christiane Nord introduced in Chapter 2, focus on the choice of translation strategy that needs to be applied during the translation process so as to produce a functionally adequate result. The above three examples show that the translation strategy applied in these translations was a more dynamic equivalent rather than just a formal equivalent. Metaphors and idiomatic expressions were used to fulfil the need of the target readers, and the source text is domesticized to improve communication with the target readers. The expressions become more natural in terms of both semantic and lexicon concerns. What’s more, idiomatic expressions also cater to the responses of the target reader according to NATTI standard. Translators bring their subjectivity into full play. Again, according to Mary Snell-Hornby’s cross-culture transfer, the key point in translation relies on how meaningful the target text is to the target readers; the translator thus takes an active and creative role in the translation. Also, the translation process is a cultural transfer into the target culture expressed by the target text, and how to translate the text depends on the purpose of the target text. Thus, the purpose of the translation is further testified accordingly.

From the difference in translation strategies compared to Mao’s period we can conclude that the root of this change was due to the change in the purpose of translation. Cultural communication was given great attention in Deng’s period together with other communications and “opening up”; the cultural gap of the Chinese source text and English target text was filled up according to the ideology of the period and the purpose of translation.

Example 9: (*From Appendix Article No.11*)

ST: 我们在一个长时期里忽视了发展社会主义社会的生产力。从一九五七年起，我们生产力的发展非常缓慢。

TT: From 1957 on they grew at a snail's pace.

Example 10: (*From Appendix Article No.10.*)



ST: 现在人们议论最多的是，如果香港不能继续保持繁荣，就会影响中国的四化建设。

TT: The main concern of people today is that if prosperity is not maintained in Hong Kong, it might retard China's drive for modernization.

Example 11: (*From Appendix Article No.10.*)

ST: 我们还考虑了我们不愿意考虑的一个问题，就是如果在十五年的过渡时期内香港发生严重的波动，怎么办？

TT: We even considered the possibility of something we would hate to see happen -- that is, we considered what we should do if serious disturbances occurred in Hong Kong during the 15-year transition period.

Example 12: (*From Appendix Article No.9*)

ST: 我说，只等他一个月，到三月底。如果再不转变，顽固地同无产阶级对立，那样性质就变了。

TT: As I see it, we should only give him one month, that is, till the end of March, to mend his ways. If he fails to do so and stubbornly stands in opposition to the proletariat, then his misdeeds will be treated as crimes.

Example 13 provides much to discuss as it not only illustrates the strategy and style of translation in Deng Xiaoping's period, but also invites comparison to the different translation strategies applied in the Mao and Deng periods.

Example 13: (*From Appendix Article No.10.*)

ST: 如果中国在一九九七年，也就是中华人民共和国成立四十八年后还不把香港收回，任何一个中国领导人和政府都不能向中国人民交代，甚至也不能向世界人民交代。如果不收回，就意味着中国政府是晚清政府，中国领导人是李鸿章(3)!

TT: If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People's Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify

themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang 13.

Footnote:

ST: 3, 李鸿章（一八二三—一九零一），安徽合肥人。晚清军政重臣。一八七零年起任直隶总督兼北洋大臣。他曾代表清政府主持签订了中英《烟台条约》，《中法新约》，中日《马关条约》，《中俄密约》及辛丑条约一系列割地赔款，丧权辱国的不平等条约。

TT: 13, Li Hong Zhang (1823-1901), a native of Hefei, Anhui Province, was an important military and administrative official during the late Qing Dynasty. In 1870 he became Governor of Zhili (present-day Heibei) Province and Minister in Charge of the Northern Coastal Provinces. On behalf of the Qing government he presided over the signing of unequal treaties such as the Sino-British Yantai Treaty, the Sino-French New Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shinomoseki, the Sino-Russian Secret Pact, and the Peace Treaty of 1901 with 11 countries including Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany and Japan. Under the terms of these treaties China relinquished sovereignty, ceded territory and paid indemnities. P.23

In the sentence: “如果中国在一九九七年，也就是中华人民共和国成立四十八年后还不把香港收回，任何一个中国领导人和政府都不能向中国人民交代，甚至也不能向世界人民交代”，the word “不能交代” is an idiomatic expression which means “to disappoint someone by not accomplishing the task given”. The expression itself comes with a connotation that the subject of this verb is bearing responsibility and obligations. But the translation “no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world”, made it sound totally different. The sense of responsibility and obligation disappeared and the sentence sounds neutral in its content. Neither accuracy nor lexical connotation was achieved in this translation, and the translation sounds less harsh to the target reader and adapts more to the target readers’ code of language. Departing from the ideology of Deng’s time, it can be seen that although the translation of Deng’s works is more flexible and target-reader oriented, political ideology still wins out in the communicative purpose of translation of this time.

Also, at the end of that paragraph, the proper name “李鸿章” comes with a footnote different in both its source and corresponding target text from footnotes in the previous phase. When the footnote was introducing Li Hong Zhang, his birthplace was clearly set out in both source and target text as “李鸿章（一八二一—一九零一），安徽合肥人” and was translated as “Li Hong Zhang (1823-1901), a native of Hefei, Anhui Province”. It can be seen as just a faithful translation; but when we look back to similar translations in Mao’s period, the birthplaces were left out without exception (see Page 31, Example 1). Accuracy is better achieved in Deng’s translation compared to Mao’s. The reason for such a difference in choice still lies in the ideology of the ruling class. Although the translation of the two different periods are both purpose-oriented, the purpose of the translations were still different: in Mao’s time, the purpose of the translation was to pass on the wisdom of the construction of Socialism; while the purpose of translation in Deng Xiaoping’s time was for the world to know more about China and at the same time try to influence them. So, in Mao’s translation, information which doesn’t serve the purpose of the translation was more likely to be left out, while anything useful for the outside world to know more about China was kept in Deng’s time. Dynamic equivalence can be traced in the strategy applied in the translations from Deng’s time, but in Mao’s time the purpose of the translation and political ideology won against any other concerns.

This can also be seen in the following underlined sentence in the same footnote.

When Li Hongzhang signed unequal treaties on behalf of the Qing government, in the source text it says: “他曾代表清政府主持签订了中英《烟台条约》，《中法新约》，中日《马关条约》，《中俄密约》及辛丑条约一系列割地赔款，丧权辱国的不平等条约。”

While in the target text, the translation is: “On behalf of the Qing government he presided over the signing of unequal treaties such as the Sino-British Yantai Treaty, the Sino-French New Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shinomoseki, the Sino-Russian Secret Pact, and the Peace Treaty of 1901 with 11 countries including Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany and Japan. Under the terms of these treaties China relinquished sovereignty, ceded territory and paid indemnities.”

Some historical background was added to the target text for the purpose of enabling the target readers to know more about its historical background. But to Chinese native language

readers, this historical background was just common knowledge that most Chinese should know about. Again, it is proven to be a “rewriting” of Chinese source text to serve the communicative purpose of the time. The translator becomes “visible” again to domesticize the target text.

Examples 14 to 16 are all cases in which the translations were more flexible both in sentence structure and lexical choices. In Example 14, the original sentence was restructured to follow English expressions, and the term “压担子” is literally explained in the translation for the target reader.

Example 15 is another example in which colloquial Chinese “娃娃”, which means “kids” is translated into “children” for the target reader. Also in Example 16, the term “不信邪” is a term with the connotation of superstition when looking at the expression literally. In the translation, the colloquial expression totally disappeared and was simply translated as “will not be bullied”.

The author’s language habits and ways of expression were no longer put at the fore during the translation process. The translation cared more about the feelings of the target reader in the target culture.

Example 14: (*From Appendix Article No.12*)

ST: 把年轻干部放到第一线压担子，这个路子对，不能只靠人家扶着。他们受到了锻炼，提上来别人也会服气。

TT: It is right to place young cadres in the forefront of the modernization drive, giving them heavier responsibilities. They shouldn't simply lean on others. When you promote them after they have gained experience this way, other people will be convinced that it was the right thing to do.

Example 15: (*From Appendix Article No.13*)

ST: 现在小学一年级的娃娃，经过十几年的学校教育，将成为开创二十一世纪大业的生力军。

TT: If the children now in the first grade of elementary school receive ten or more years of

schooling, they will become a vital force for ushering in the 21st century.

Example 16: (*From Appendix Article No.14*)

ST: 事实表明, 那些要制裁我们的人也开始在总结经验了。总之, 中国人民不怕孤立, 不信邪。

TT: Facts show that those who have imposed sanctions on us have begun to rethink what they have done. In short, the Chinese people are not afraid of isolation and will not be bullied.

During this period of time, the translation was more culturally concerned and target-culture focused. The output of concepts exclusive to Chinese culture like “running dogs”, and “die-hards”, seemed to be decreasing, while at the same time, terms of this kind are translated with a different strategy to explain them.

On the other hand, more concepts such as idiomatic expressions borrowed from the target culture are used to fulfil the communicative purpose and opening up ideology of Deng Xiaoping’s period.

In summary, political discourse in Deng Xiaoping’s period was still in accordance with the specific political ideology of this period. As the political feature of this period was of “opening up to the outside world”, the political environment was not as strict and conservative compared to Mao’s period. The purpose of translation at this time was to promote mutual communication in numerous aspects. On the one hand, western ideologies were brought in, while on the other hand, China also tried to spread its influence around the world. Therefore, the purpose of translation at this time was to build up mutual communication to the outside world. As there were no political constraints as in Mao’s time, the political ideology cooperated well with the purpose of translation. Moreover, as western translation theories were brought in during the Deng period, traces of application of these theories can be found in the text production. The translations are more target-reader focused and translators started to bring their own subjectivities into play in terms of cultural awareness, character and style, and the aesthetic creativity of the translators. However, when the translation purpose contradicted the ideology in such an “opening up” era, the latter still tended to win out – as can be seen in Example 13.

## 5.4 Translation of Selected Works of Jiang Zemin

The Jiang phase shares the same basic political ideology of that in the Deng phase, but with deepened reform and opening up, and with China enjoying a better international standing. What's more, China entered into the international community with more and deeper communications in various aspects. At the same time, however, it also started to face the problems that the opening up policy had brought from Deng phase.

According to Shi-Xu (Shi, 2012, p. 97), “Especially recently, against the context of growing social contradictions and international division, contemporary Chinese political discourse is markedly concerned with social (in)equality and global (in)security and responds to these problems swiftly and explicitly with notions of *hexie shehui* (harmonious society)”.

With more western translation theories introduced into China, Chinese translation studies reached maturity as not only was a different stream of translation theories such as cultural studies brought into China, but also translators and scholars in this field started to treat such theories critically with the specific language feature of Chinese, instead of just worshipping and following the theories as in the Deng phase.

5.4.1 The political translation of this period is even more flexible than the Deng phase.

Translators became more “visible” in domesticizing the target text according to the purpose of translation.

The first example is selected from *Speech at the ceremony to mark the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China*.

In Example 1, Emperor Daoguang's reign in the Qing Dynasty was supplemented with a time range, as was also the Treaty of Nanking and the Convention of Peking. Example 2 also provides evidence of a flexible translation, with “a wealth of experience” instead of “a lot of new experience”.

Examples 3 and 4 were even more flexibly dealt with in that the term: “中华人民共和国香港特别行政区” and “SOE reform” were only given their abbreviations. This specific use had never happened in translations from the Mao and Deng periods:

Example 1: *(From Appendix Article No.17)*

ST: 自古以来，我们的先人就在香港这块土地上劳动，生活和繁衍。从秦代到清代道光年间，中国一直对香港实行管辖，行使主权。十九世纪中叶，英国两次发动鸦片战争，迫使腐败无能的清政府签订《南京条约》和《北京条约》。

TT: Our forefathers have worked, lived and raised families here in Hong Kong for millennia. From the Qin Dynasty (221-206BC) to Emperor Daoguang's reign in the Qing Dynasty (1820-50), China always exercised jurisdiction and sovereignty over Hong Kong. Following the two Opium Wars waged by Britain in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the British government forced the corrupt and incompetent Qing government to first sign the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and then the Convention of Peking in 1860.

Example 2: *(From Appendix Article No.16)*

ST: 十多年来，我们遵循邓小平同志的指示，大力推进社会主义民主法治建设，取得了重大成就，积累了不少新的经验，为我们继续推进民主法制建设奠定了良好的基础。

TT: Following these instructions, we have been strongly promoting socialist democracy and the socialist legal system for more than a decade, and have garnered great success and accumulated a wealth of experience. This provides a good foundation for us to continue improving democracy and the legal system.

Example 3: *(From Appendix Article No.17)*

ST: 今天，中英两国政府举行了香港交接仪式，庄严宣告中国政府对香港恢复行使主权。中华人民共和国香港特别行政区正式成立。

TT: Today the Chinese and British governments held the handover ceremony for Hong Kong to solemnly proclaim that the Chinese government has now resumed its exercise of sovereignty over the region. The HKSAR of the People's Republic of China has now been formally established.

Example 4: *(From Appendix Article No.15)*

ST: 完善公有制为主体，多种所有制经济共同法制的基本经济制度，深化国有企业改革，是经济体制改革的中心环节，关系到社会主义市场经济的成败。

TT: Improving the basic economic system whereby public ownership is dominant and economic entities under diverse ownership forms develop side by side and deepening SOE reform are key tasks in economic restructuring and have a vital bearing on the success or failure of the socialist market economy.

Example 5: (*From Appendix Article No.18*)

ST: 我们要承认世界社会主义处在低潮，但我们要顶住，硬着头皮顶住，同时要把我们的社会主义事业发展好。

TT: We must admit that world socialism is at a low ebb, but we need to persevere, steel ourselves and keep persevering, and at the same time develop our socialist cause well.

The above examples show that translation of the post Deng Xiaoping period seems to be more flexible compared with the translations during Deng Xiaoping's time, using NATTI criteria as the unique measuring standard. As can be seen from Example 1, extra information is added into the target text which doesn't exist in the source text to help the target reader gain more background information for the Hong Kong issue. Accuracy here is neglected as communication output is more important. In Example 2, the term “新的经验” which can be translated literally into “new experience” has actually been translated into “wealth of experience”. Again, from an “accuracy” point of view, it is not a perfect match, although it caters more to the target readers' language habits and translators here demonstrate their subjectivity, it is not a good dynamic equivalent translation as the second level of word meaning is still not dynamically transferred into the target text. Examples 3 and 4 are examples of over flexible translation as the term HKSAR was translated only as an abbreviation in such a formal political speech without footnotes. Although the translation of the source text still has a communicative purpose, the abbreviations of the proper names in the translation seem not able to meet this purpose. As the term “Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” had never appeared in a previous context, the target reader wouldn't know what HKSAR stands for if they missed the original speech. Thus, as in the example above the translator seems to be so “visible” that the translation can cause confusion for the target readers. Example 4 is similar, again without footnotes the target reader cannot



understand what “SOE reform” refers to. In Example 5, the original text, “硬着头皮顶住” is also literally translated into “steel ourselves and keep persevering”; although the original flavour is lost in the translation process, it is more natural for the target reader.

Example 6: (*From Appendix Article No.19*)

ST: 在这次会上，七省一市的同志都提出了积极建议，表达了大联合的强烈愿望。上海的同志在发言中提到了要打“中华牌”、“世界牌”，走联合开发的路子。

TT: At this meeting, representatives of the seven provinces and Shanghai offered some constructive suggestions and showed a willingness to cooperate. In their speeches, representatives of Shanghai proposed creating Chinese brands and world brands and working for development through cooperation.

Example 6 is an example of an interesting change in the translation. In the source text “打中国牌，世界牌” means to develop domestically and internationally, and the phrase, “打牌” means literally to play cards. But in the target text, it’s treated as “creating Chinese brands and world brands”.

Example 7: (*From Appendix Article No.20*)

ST: 孙中山先生“致力国民革命凡四十年”，任何外来威胁、内部分裂和暂时失败，都不能动摇他的革命意志。

TT: Dr. Sun remained “Devoted to the national revolution for 40 years,” (8) and no external threat, internal division or temporary failures could shake his revolutionary will.

Footnote (8): “Last Testament,” Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen, op, cit.,p.994.

Example 7 also shows that the target reader is being paid much more attention to during the translation process. Although in the first sentence, “致力国民革命凡四十年”，which means “Devoted to the national revolution for 40 years,” can be easily understood by the target reader, a footnote is attached to give the background of this sentence only in the target text. This phrase is a quotation of a very famous sentence by Sun Yat-sen; therefore, instead of being only a literary translation, the cultural background is also delivered to achieve

equivalence both literally and literarily.

5.4.2 The translation of political discourse in the Jiang phase also changed its focus on sensitive subjects due to the side effects of the opening up policy.

Example 8: (*From Appendix Article No.17*)

ST: 中英两国通过谈判解决了香港问题，为国际社会提供了一个和平解决国家之间的历史遗留问题的范例。在这里，我要向所有为香港平稳过渡作出贡献的英国朝野人士表示感谢。相信我们，香港问题的成功解决，将使中英两国人民的友谊进一步得到发展。

TT: By achieving a negotiated settlement of the Hong Kong question, the Chinese and British governments have provided the international community with a model of countries being able to achieve a peaceful settlement of a historical problem. Here, I would like to express my thanks to the British nationals, both within and without the government, who have contributed to the smooth transition of Hong Kong.

Example 8 is a very typical purpose-oriented and cultural-based translation; it also reflects the political ideology of this era, which aimed at minimizing political and social differences and problems. The term “英国朝野人士” was translated as “to the British nationals, both within and without the government”. As we all know, China and Britain are countries with totally different political systems. Britain adopts a constitutional monarchy, with either the Labour Party or the Conservative Party forming government. The party which wins a majority of seats in the House of Commons forms the government as the ruling party, while the other takes the role of the Opposition. However, China is a one-party state. The word “英国朝野人士” is actually a concept from a foreign culture. The translation doesn't pay attention to the foreignisation or domestication of the concept in the source or target culture. Although it should be clearly translated domestically into the ruling party and the opposition, it is only translated as an obscure term. This translation is due to the concern of patronage. Here, cultural difference is no longer a concern during the translation process. The language and cultural gap is thus dealt with according to the purpose of translation and the ideology of the ruling class; although the term is still translatable through the cultural language gap, the purpose of the translation still directed the translator to serve the ideology of this period. The

target readers' feelings were not important in terms of their cultural difference. The purpose of the translation and political sensitivity were the dominant factors which determined the target text. "Equivalent" or "communicative translation" or the NATTI accuracy standard seems not to be the suitable strategy according to the purpose of the translation. The cultural difference is minimized due to political concerns.

With deepened reforms and opening up, China started to face the problem caused by the reforms and the political sensitivity of articles was given more attention. On the other hand, to obscure such information was still important as the target audience were not only Mainland Chinese and British, but also the inhabitants of Hong Kong.

Although it has been proven in the previous example that the translators in Jiang's phase were more flexible to bring their own subjectivity into the translations, Example 5 again shows that ideology and political concerns still functioned as a major and dominant point.

Example 9: (*From Appendix Article No.16*)

ST: 比如，这些年来，在一些地方和部门中，官僚主义，形式主义和衙门作风有所滋长。一些领导干部不倾听群众呼声，不关心群众疾苦；有的领导干部满脑子个人名利思想，拉关系，找门路，跑官要官，把人们利益完全抛在脑后；

TT: For instance, in recent years the problem of bureaucracy, formalism and an imperious bureaucratic style of work has arisen in some localities and departments. Some leading cadres ignore the voice of the masses and lack concern for their problems. Some think only about their personal fame and wealth, social connections and promotion, and totally dismiss the people's interests from their minds.

Examples 9 and 10 both deal with cultural factors. In Example 9, the terms "衙门作风", "个人名利思想", "拉关系", "找门路", and "跑官要官" are all typical terms within Chinese culture, "衙门作风" can be literally explained as a bureaucratic style of work; although the translations of "personal fame and wealth, social connections and promotion" have lost their original flavour during the translation. Although the target reader can't have the same impression as the source reader, the translation is still target-reader focused.

Example 10: (*From Appendix Article No.16*)

ST: 我国历史上历来就有德刑相辅，儒法并用的思想，从中可以得到有益的启发。总之，法是他律，德是自律，需要二者并用。

TT: The ideas of complementing morality with punishment and ensuring proper behaviour through a combination of Confucian and legal means have a long history in China, and they can positively inspire us. In general, laws work through punishment, while morality works through self-discipline, and we need to use both in combination.

In Example 10 “德刑相辅，儒法并用的思想” has been partly translated as: “The ideas of complementing morality with punishment and ensuring proper behaviour through a combination of Confucian and legal means”.

In Chinese culture, “儒” and “法” are two opposite ideologies in the Spring and Autumn Period. Confucianism is an “ethical-sociopolitical” teaching, which became the official state ideology of China, while Legalism emphasised to rule the country with discipline, or legal ideas. In the translation, the ideology of Confucianism has been translated with a proper noun, but Legalism was only explained in the text. This is because Confucianism was an official political ideology of the entire ancient Chinese society and it still has a profound influence today. It is also a very well-known term in English, whereas the term “Legalism” is not as familiar to English target readers. What’s more, it’s also the ideology that the translation wanted to export. As a result, only the term “Confucianism” was kept in the translation. It is also a domestication of the original Chinese source text and the strategy applied here seems to reveal again that there are some terms which are so politically sensitive that the Communist Party is trying to avoid and obscure them.

The term: “法是他律，德是自律” was also flexibly and literarily translated to bring the source text closer to the target readers.

In the last sentence of Example 8, the term “拔苗助长” was semantically explained and the folklore behind it remained hidden. The translation here is very target-reader oriented and the cultural gap between the source and target languages is diminished in the process of translation. No footnotes or other explanations of the idiom in the source text can be found in the translation. Thus, it shows that the production of translation is even more target-cultural and target-reader concerned as no trace of the source language culture can be found in the

translation.

Example 11 shows flexibility in both lexical selection and the organization of sentence structures. In the first point, the “experience” was accumulated from long practice, and this “experience” was translated into “lesson” in the target text. And in point 3, 6, 7 and 8, the same sentence structure “we need to...” was adopted in the translation to maintain the top-down tone to the reader.

Example 11: (*From Appendix Article No.15*)

ST: 坚持公有制为主体，多种所有制经济共同发展，是党通过长期实践总结出来的基本经验，应该确立为我国社会主义初级阶段的一项基本经济制度，任何情况下也不能动摇。

TT: One basic lesson that the Party has learned through long experience is the importance of keeping public ownership in the dominant position while allowing economic entities under diverse ownership forms to develop side by side.

.....

3.在新形势下，要全面认识公有制经济的含义。.....

We need to fully understand what the public sector of the economy includes in the new circumstances.

.....

6.要从战略上解决国有经济布局问题。.....

We need to work out a strategic solution for the distribution of the state sector of the economy.

7.公有制经济要寻找能够极大促进生产力发展的现实形式。

We need to seek out different forms of public ownership that can greatly promote the growth of the productive forces.

8.不能笼统地把股份制归结为私有或公有。

We cannot make a blanket statement that all joint stock enterprises are either public or private.

9.同时，改革的进行要遵循客观经济规律，发挥市场机制作用，通过结构改组来实现，避免用行政办法拔苗助长。

In addition, we need to implement reform in conformity with the objective laws of economics, making using of market forces and restructuring rather than seeking quick but counterproductive results through administrative measures.

In total, with the deepening reform and opening up after the Deng phase, China gained more international standing and reputation. Over the long term, although China gained deeper mutual understanding by the outside world, the side effect of the opening up policy also brought China profound social problems. Therefore, the harvest of the reforms at the same time as dealing with many social problems became the key feature of the Jiang phase. Political translation thus needed to serve these purposes. It can be seen from the above analysis that political translations tended to become much more flexible or even over-flexible in this period of time. However, the phase still put the ideology in the primary position when there were contradictions with other factors. The contradictions between the purpose of translations and political ideology are again revealed in Examples 5 and 7.

Translations in Jiang's era were influenced by western culture and the translators here became more "visible" in order to produce an idiomatic and readable translation. Cultural differences were diminished during this phase, either because the ruling class intended to weaken concepts with political sensitivity or cater for the target readers. Therefore, the strategies were still purpose-driven and the ideology of the ruling class was also the basis on which strategies were applied.

## **Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusion**

With the aim of exploring the differences in official Chinese political translations and factors that caused these changes since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, this study categorised the translations of political discourse into three phases since 1949 according to the different political features of political leaders, i.e. the phases of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin respectively. The political features such as the ideology under different leadership and the purpose of the translation, together with the visibility of translators, dominant translation theories, translation strategies, and target readers were examined as a whole to identify how the official political documents were translated and what major factors influenced the production of translation in each phase.

This study drew on Critical Discourse Analysis as the underpinning methodology to examine selected political discourse by applying Fairclough's three-dimensional framework, including analyses of text, discourse practice and social practice. In each dimension, different factors were analyzed and comparisons were made among these factors in the three historical phases. Finally, the questions brought forward from the beginning of this thesis are addressed to further elaborate the key findings of this research.

### **6.1 Key Findings of this study**

In these three phases, political ideology had a great influence on the production of translation. In Mao's phase, as the purpose of translation of Selected Works of Mao Zedong was to introduce and disseminate the experience of Socialist Construction in China (at the suggestion of Stalin), the target readers of works were designated to be other countries taking the road of socialism. Communication with the target readers was not the first concern of the translation. Thus, the translation of this phase was more source-culture oriented. The translators might be either "visible" or "invisible" due to the different strategies applied in the process of translation. The target text was sometimes "Domesticized" and sometimes "Foreignized" as cultural communication was not at all considered to be the main point of translation. Although there are traces of cultural outputs, they appeared more often in the footnotes rather than in the main translation. This might be due to the "Left" thinking of the Mao's phase and the personality cult of Mao Zedong, rather than a subjective output of culture. As we can see in the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, most of the

cultural elements were explained with footnotes and the source text was well kept and literally translated.

In Mao's phase, the Chinese traditional translation theories were dominant and the major translators of Mao's works also developed their own translation theories on the basis of the Chinese traditional translation theories. As indicated in Chapter 5, neither the Hua Jing Lun (Hua Jing Lun, 化境论, Hua Jing Theory) of Qian Zhongshu nor the theory of Wang Zuoliang was well applied in the translation of Selected Works of Mao Zedong as the political ideology and political purposes won over other factors in determining the translation strategies. Thus, it can be seen in the translation of Mao's work that it is very precisely translated to replicate the wording and Mao's personal writing style, and theories such as Hua Jing (化境) and such have all given way to achieve this result.

So in the translation of Mao's work, Mao's casual and coarse writing style and his ironical and humorous flavor were reproduced exactly as in the original text. The translation is very faithful to the original on both lexical and cultural levels. Formal equivalence here has outweighed dynamic equivalence. The translation is very source-language and source-culture oriented, and the target readers are placed in a secondary position. Also, the translators' initiatives remain invisible in the translation. Although the Selected Works of Mao Zedong is a collective work of translation, the main translators' positions are not reflected in the translation. At the textual level, as it is a translation of political documents written by Mao himself, most of which point out political directions of the entire country, the translation becomes less subjective to the translators, not only because they have to be very faithful to the original, but because Mao's personal cult makes the text more authoritative. At a contextual level, many constraints in the process of translation are also there due to the political ideology of Mao's phase.

What's more, in the translation of Mao's work, although the translators did their best to reproduce the original at lexical level, the translation was more of a "rewriting" process as the purpose of this translation and the ideology of the ruling class in Mao's phase served as a whole to determine the strategies of the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. However, the latter still outweigh the former.

In Deng Xiaoping's phase, the translation of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping is more flexible due to the major changes in the dominant political ideology of the time. The



translators started to act subjectively in the process of translation. The purpose of translation was to meet the needs of the reform and opening up policy, and to learn from the outside world, while at the same time, to gain mutual understanding with the outside world. The target readers of the time were designed to be the international community, and the ideology is reflected by the stances that the translation created. The translation of this phase then became more natural and flexible. This can be seen from the strategies of translation adopted and the lexical choices. What's more, creative words and expressions with the characteristics of the time were also adopted into the translation, thus, the translator's subjectivity is brought into play.

In Deng's phase, although Chinese traditional translation theories still take the dominant position, Western translation theories began to be introduced into China. Nida's dynamic equivalence is the most well-known theory which was studied by the Chinese scholars. Without the restriction of Mao's political ideology, Chinese traditional translation theories could be brought into play and Western translation theories could also offer Chinese translation scholars a positive influence on the strategies applied in the process of translation. As a result, the translation of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping is very different from the translation of Mao's works in terms of translation strategies. It is more target-culture and target-reader oriented; meanwhile, some expressions with Chinese characteristics are nicely translated and reproduced without losing the flavour of the source text.

In the translation of Deng Xiaoping's work, the restructuring of sentences was more flexible and ways of expression don't show the same fidelity as in Mao's phase. From early in Deng's phase, Western translation theories such as Nida's equivalence and some cultural theories became widely spread and discussed. In Deng's phase, Western theories were more uncritically accepted, while in Jiang's phase, translators and language experts started to study them critically. The translation of Deng's work follows the dynamic equivalence which Nida raised, while formal equivalence is not so important in the translation of Deng's work. Although the translation of Deng's work is still not the closest natural equivalence to the source language, it has a comprehensive equivalence to elements the source text delivers, including semantic, text type, stylistic, lexicon and culture reference, psychological effect and response. The translation of Deng's work gets rid of the restriction of the form in the lexicon and stylistic of the source text as in Mao's phase.

In Jiang's phase, the translation of political discourse became more flexible and purpose

oriented. This phase shares the basic political ideology of the Deng phase, with deepened reform and opening up. Translation of Jiang's work also started to face problems that emerged from the opening up policy. So, in the translation of this specific era, the production of translation is also politically sensitive and target-text oriented. Accuracy became less important; instead, the translation serving the purpose of conveying the ideology became the dominant point. Cultural differences were diminished during this period, and the target text was even more domesticized either because the ruling class intended to weaken politically sensitive concepts or through catering to the target readers. Therefore, the strategy was still purpose driven and the ideology of the ruling class was again the basis on which strategies were applied. In this case, the subjectivity of translator becomes very dominant in the translation of Jiang's work. Political translations in this phase are even more flexible than in Deng's phase. Translators became more "visible" in domesticizing the target text according to the purpose of the translation.

During Jiang's phase, Chinese traditional translation theories gave way to Western translation theories. More Western translation theories from different schools were introduced into China and Chinese translation scholars started to treat these more critically. Therefore, together with the influence of political ideology of Jiang's phase, the translation of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin appears even more flexible in terms of the strategies applied. Although political translation of this phase seems more flexible in its form, political ideology still directed the process of translation such as through using distortions to avoid politically sensitive concepts from appearing.

## **6.2 Discussions of Similarities and Differences**

Although Yin Chengdong, (2009, p.7) claims that "the translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong is regarded as the best translation ever compared to the other two since 1949 because it is a collective work of many most outstanding translators and language experts", from the perspective of cultural oriented translation theories, I would argue that it is representative of the ideology of the period and a purpose driven translation which neglected many other elements which should also have been taken into consideration. In Mao's translation, lexical choice and sentence structures in the translation, target readers and their culture should be given more attention to achieve a dynamic equivalence in the translation. Although the lexicon and style are more delicate in the translation of the Selected Works of

Mao Zedong, a dynamic equivalent and cultural oriented translation is not achieved because the translation is too much influenced by the ideology of Mao's phase.

After the comparison and findings made in Chapter 5, the translations from Deng Xiaoping's phase seem more compatible as they are more in accordance with both Chinese traditional translation criteria and Western cultural translation theories.

Translation of political discourse in Jiang's phase was treated more roughly and blunderingly translated compared to those in the other two phases. Although the major ideology of this time can be described as "harmonious", the social problems emanating from Deng's phase had already started to influence the translation of Jiang's phase.

Departing from a textual analysis point of view, all the political documents examined in this study are measured by a unique standard – the NATTI criteria. Accuracy was best achieved in Deng's political translations compared to Mao and Jiang's. This is because dynamic equivalence was best achieved in the translations of Deng's phase. The translations of Mao are more formal equivalent as they are confined by Mao's personal cult and "left" thinking; while the translations of Jiang's work don't hold equivalence as a primary consideration and are more careful with political concerns. As to syntactic choice, the translation of Mao's works tried best to keep the target text in accordance with Mao's syntactical style and structure. It also imitated the tone of speaking as most of Mao's works were written by himself. However, the translations of Deng and Jiang's works were more flexible in both syntactic style and tone, more idiomatic expressions were used, translators were more subjective with the style and the target text was more target-reader focused.

From a discourse practice and social practice point of view, the purpose of the translation of Mao's works was to introduce the experience of building socialism in China to the outside world, but the translation of Mao's works was still not target-reader focused as the translators were also constrained by the social cultural ideology of Mao's time. Mao's personality cult and the "left" thinking of the society had a great influence on the text production and that's why it is the only era when social political ideology contradicts the purpose of translation. In Deng and Jiang's translations, the purpose cooperates and serves the ideology of the time.

Due to the above listed factors, the translators were more invisible in Mao's phase, but traces of them can be found when amendments were needed if the translation contradicted its

political ideology. In the translation of Deng's work, the translators had more room to bring their subjectivity into play; which is why idiomatic translations started appearing and translations cater more to target-readers' language habits. However, in the translations of Jiang's work, the translations seem over flexible either due to inappropriate translation or because of the political sensitivities they had to avoid.


As to translation theories, neither Chinese classical translation criteria nor theories brought up by major translation of Mao's work are well demonstrated in the translation of his work as political ideology won out over other concerns in translation. Meanwhile in the translation of Deng's work, the dynamic equivalence proposed by Nida is finely applied. In the translation of Jiang's work, as Chinese scholars started to apply translation theories such as cultural theories and functional theories more critically, the purpose of the translation which served the political ideology was put in a primary position, and translations of this phase were therefore even more flexible compared to translations of Deng's work.

To sum up, the following diagram can best describe the most influential factors in each of the three phases under the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis. Six factors are listed as influential elements according to CDA framework, namely Social, cultural, political background and ideology; the purpose of translation; target reader; translator's subjectivity; and mainstream translation theories. In Figure 6.1, balloons are divided into three different colours according to CDA framework. Yellow balloon represents lexical practice, blue balloons represent discourse practice and red balloon represents social cultural practice. Factors that influence the translation in each different phase are ticked out for a comparison.

A conclusion can be drawn from Figure 6.1 that the more focus is placed on political ideology, the less other objective factors such as mainstream translation theories, target reader, translators subjectivities are taken into consideration. This conclusion can be drawn for each of the three phases according to the specific features of each phase. Thus, each phase is given a name corresponding to the major feature of their political translations. The names and their justifications are given below.

As keeping Mao's personal writing style is a typical characteristic under the political ideology of his time, political translation in Mao's phase is named the Loyalty Model. Political translation of Deng's phase takes all features into consideration, so translation of his works is named the Balancing Model. In Jiang's translation, the ruling class intended to

weaken politically sensitive concepts while also catering to the target readers, what's more, translators started to tend to be overly dominant and dynamic equivalence is still not ideally achieved. Thus, the translation of this phase is named the Reforming Model.



**Figure 6.1: Different models of political translation under CDA framework**

It can be seen from Figure 6.1 that, in Mao's phase, sociocultural, political background and ideology, together with the purpose of translation are the two main factors that dominate translation strategies in Mao's phase. Other factors indicated in Figure 6.1 are placed in a secondary position. Although Chinese traditional translation theories still occupy the main position, translation theories claimed by the main translators of Mao's work cannot be brought into full play due to the requirement of restoring Mao's personal writing style. Therefore, translators are totally invisible in the process of translation as translators' subjectivity is fully determined by the political ideology of Mao's phase, and the target reader is in turn placed into a secondary position.

However, in Deng's phase, each of the six factors is taken into consideration respectively. As China's stance and the purpose of translation is to open-up to the outside world and to

communicate with the outside world, the political ideology of Deng's phase is more tempered which is reflected in the translation of Deng's work. Translation of Deng's works is more dynamic equivalent, attempting to balance both source reader and target reader. Chinese traditional theories still take the dominant position, while in the meantime, Western translation theories started to be introduced into China. Translators started to become visible as their subjectivities started to show in the translation. Traces of translation strategies applied can also be found in the process of translation as the influence of both Chinese traditional and Western translation theories.

In Jiang's phase, due to the changes of political ideology compared to Deng's phase, the translation of Jiang's work serves the purpose of deep opening-up and diminishing the social problems that occurred, so the translation is even more flexible, as can be seen from examples given in Chapter 5. There are even mistranslations to avoid politically sensitive concepts. Although more different streams of Western translation theories are brought into China in this phase and Chinese scholars also start to use them critically, traces of corresponding strategies can barely be found in Jiang's translation. Translators are very visible in the translation as some of the translation are either overly translated or casually translated. That's why two ticks are given to the translators' visibility in Jiang's work. Although in previous examples, some flexible translations aiming to cater more to the target readers, with over translation, the target reader will still be unable to obtain the meaning and flavour of the original text. As it can be seen from example 6,9 and 10, although linguistic level of word meaning can be achieved, a deeper level of meaning with domestic values, beliefs and social representations which carry ideological force might still not be delivered (Venuti, 1998). Target readers again, are placed in a secondary position as Jiang's work is neither formal equivalently nor dynamic equivalently translated.

### **6.3 Limitation of this study and Direction of Future Research**

First, due to the limited amount of data examined in this research, this study did not cover all of the political documents from the selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Only a sample of political documents and their translation in different genres were selected for detailed analysis from the Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 4, and the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 2 and Volume 3. Furthermore, only the first volume of the translation of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin had been published when data were collected for this research. Therefore, in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis

of Jiang's work particularly, more analysis could be carried out when more of his translated works are published. What's more, a greater number of data in more genres could be collated and analysed to make the analysis more convincing.

Secondly, during the deep reform and opening up phase, only the political documents of Jiang Zemin are covered in this research. Political documents and their translation after Jiang Zemin could be also reviewed and analysed for future studies and comparison.

Thirdly, more methodologies such as corpus linguistics and ethnography could be applied in future research as the background of the translators of Jiang's work particularly still needs more detailed study due to the limitation of information and the anonymity of major translators.

Fourthly, the social-cultural backgrounds of the target readers may also vary from country to country, and the purpose of translation will also change in terms of political ideology. Thus, a detailed study can also be carried out on the target readers in different countries. What's more, mainstream translation theories can also be different in different target texts, research on translation in languages other than English can also be conducted to find out the differences and similarities in translation of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin in a similar way.

#### **6.4 Final remarks**

A conclusion can be drawn out from the above analysis that the translations of Chinese political discourse of the Mao, Deng and Jiang eras were all determined primarily by the different ideological states of the Communist Party of China during each different historical period. Although factors such as sociocultural differences, the purpose of translation, the visibility of translators, and different translation theories and strategies all have an impact on the production of text, political ideology is the factor that is put in the primary position, and which all other factors need to serve.

Mao's Loyalty Model is more likely to be produced in a highly centralized political ideology due to personal cult of its political leader. Although the source text is precisely translated and formal equivalence is achieved at the extreme, it does not contribute much to the

development of Chinese translation theories and its practice, nor does it help to fulfil the basic task a translation is supposed to undertake—to communicate (Newmark, 1981).

The translation of Deng's work is generated from a tempered political ideology. It also attempts to balance the six factors shown in Figure 6.1. Deng's Balancing Model is very close to the definition that Nida gave of his dynamic equivalence. As the translation of Deng's work is also an attempt to seek the "closest natural equivalent to the source-language message; and it also fulfils the "Hua Jing Lun"(化境论) advocated by Qian Zhongshu: "the translation retains the style of the original while at the same time transfers the original into the target language smoothly, which makes the translation read like the original". Creative expressions of proper nouns appear frequently in the target text. Moreover, only in this Balancing Model is the target reader placed in the primary position, and the translation reached the highest level in terms of dynamic equivalence and further development of Chinese translation theories and practice.

In Jiang's Amending Model, socialcultural and political background and ideology are still the determining factors in the process of translation. Although the purpose of translation in Jiang's work is still to communicate to the outside world and to gain mutual understanding with the world, the vague translation strategy of politically-sensitive concepts shows that political ideology overlaid the purpose of translation in Jiang's phase. In Jiang's phase, more western translation theories are brought into China and they are studied critically, but seldom are traces of the development of Chinese translation theories found in the translation of Jiang's work. On the contrary, over-translations and equivocal translations in Jiang's work show that translators' subjectivity is brought into full play and translators are very visible in the process of translation. The visibility and political ideology of translation of Jiang's work together placed the target reader in a secondary position. As a result, the entire translation seems rough and unbalanced in terms of the six factors shown in Figure 6.1. It corresponds with the fickleness of contemporary Chinese society. As a result, if further development of Chinese translation theories occurs, all factors shown in Figure 6.1, namely: sociocultural and political background and ideology; the purpose of translation; translators' visibility; target reader and translation strategy have to be addressed with a balance among them.



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## **APPENDIX:**

### **Selected Works of Mao Zedong Volume 4, published by Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1976**

1. The truth about the Kuomintang attacks. November 5, 1945. (Political)
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15. Establish a sound basic economic system whereby public ownership is dominant and economic entities under diverse ownership forms develop side by side. January, 17, 1997.  
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16. Improve socialist democracy and the socialist legal system. February, 27, 1997.  
(Political)
17. Speech at the ceremony to mark the establishment of the Hong Kong special administrative region of the People's Republic of China. July, 1, 1997. (Hong Kong)
18. Develop Our Socialist Cause Well September 11, 1990 (Political)
19. Accelerate Economic Development of the Yangtze River Delta and Valley. June 27, 1992 (Economical)
20. In commemoration of Sun Yat-Sen. November 12, 1996 (Political)

## Appendix Article 1

### 国民党进攻的真相

(一九四五年十一月五日)

合众社重庆三日电报道，国民党中央宣传部长吴国桢宣称，“政府在此次战争中全居守势”，并提出所谓恢复交通的办法(1)。新华社记者为此询问中共方面发言人。

中共发言人告记者称：吴氏所说“守势”云云，全系撒谎。除我军已撤退的浙东、苏南、皖中、皖南、湖南五个解放区全被国民党军队进占、大肆蹂躏人民外，其他大多数解放区，例如广东、湖北、河南、苏北、皖北、山东、河北等省，国民党正规军已有七十余师开到我解放区及其附近，压迫人民，进攻我军，或准备进攻。正在向我解放区开进者，尚有数十师。这难道是取守势吗？其中由彰德(2)北进一路，攻至邯郸地区之八个师，两个师反对内战，主张和平，六个师（其中有三个美械师）在我解放区军民举行自卫的反击之后，始被迫放下武器。这一路国民党军的许多军官，其中有副长官、军长、副军长多人，现在都在解放区(3)，他们都可以证明他们是从何处开来、如何奉命进攻的全部真情。这难道也是取守势吗？我豫鄂两省解放区军队，现被国民党第一、第五、第六等三个战区的军队共二十几个师四面包围，刘峙任该区“剿共”总指挥。我豫西、豫中、鄂南、鄂东、鄂中等处解放区都被国民党军队侵占，大肆烧杀，迫得我李先念、王树声等部无处存身，不得不向豫鄂交界地区觅一驻地，以求生存，但又被国民党军队紧紧追击(4)。这难道也是取守势吗？在晋绥察三省，也是如此。十月上旬，阎锡山指挥十三个师，攻入我上党解放区襄垣、屯留区域，被当地军民在自卫战斗中全部缴械，被俘人员中亦有军长师长多人。他们现在我太行解放区，一个个活着，足以证明他们是从何处开来、如何奉命进攻的全部真情。最近阎锡山在重庆报道他如何被攻，而他则仅取“守势”，说了种种谎话。他大概忘记了他的十九军军长史泽波，暂四十六师师长郭溶，暂四十九师师长张宏，六十六师师长李佩膺，六十八师师长郭天兴，暂三十七师师长杨文彩等位将军(5)，现正住在我解放区，足以驳斥吴国桢氏、阎锡山氏和一切挑拨内战的反动派的任何谎话。傅作义将军奉命进攻我绥远、察哈尔、热河三省解放区，已两个多月，曾打到张家口的门口，占领我整个绥远解放区和察哈尔西部。难道这也是取守势和未放“第一枪”吗？我察绥两省军民起而自卫，在反攻战斗中亦俘虏大批官兵，他们都可以证明他们是从何处开来、如何进攻等等(6)。在各次自卫战斗中，我方缴获大批“剿匪”和反共文件，其中有国民党最高当局所颁发而被吴国桢氏称为不过是“笑话”的《剿匪手本》、“剿匪”命令(7)和其他反共文件，正在向延安解送中。这些反共文件，都是国民党军队进攻解放区的铁证。

记者又问中共发言人，吴国桢氏所提恢复交通办法，你的意见如何？该发言人答道：这不过是缓兵之计而已。国民党当局正在大举调兵，像洪水一样，想要淹没我整个解放区。他们在九、十两月几个进攻失败之后，正在布置新的更大规模的进攻。而阻碍这种进攻，亦即有效地制止内战的武器之一，就是不许他们在铁路上运兵。我们和旁人一样，主张交通线迅速恢复，但是必须在受降、处置伪军和实行解放区自治三项问题获得解决之后，才能恢复。先解决交通问题，后解决三项问题呢，还是先解决三项问题，后解决交通问题呢？解放区军队艰苦抗日八年，为什么没有受降资格，而劳其他军队从远远的地方开去受降呢？伪军人人得而诛之，为什么一律编为“国军”，并且指挥他们进攻解放区呢？地方自治，《双十协定》(8)上已有明文规定，孙中山先生早主省长民选，为什么还要政府派遣官吏呢？交通问题应该迅速解决，这三大问题尤其应该迅速解决。三大问题不解决而言恢复交通，只是使内战扩大延长，达到内战发动者们淹没解放区的目的。为着迅速制止已经普及全国的反人民反民主的内战，我们主张：

(一) 已经进入华北、苏北、皖北、华中各解放区及其附近的政府受降军队和进攻军队，立即撤返原防，由解放区军队去接受敌人投降和驻防各城市与交通线，恢复被侵占的解放区；

(二) 全部伪军立即缴械遣散，在华北、苏北、皖北者，由解放区负责缴械遣散；(三) 承认一切解放区的人民民主自治，中央政府不得委派官吏，实现《双十协定》的规定。发言人说：只有如此，才能制止内战；否则是完全没有保障的。绥远、上党、邯郸三次自卫战斗中所缴获的文件以及大举调兵和大举进攻的实际行动，已充分证明国民党当局所谓恢复交通是为着人民，不是为着内战，乃是毫不足信的。中国人民被欺骗得已经够了，现在再不能被欺骗。现在的中心问题，是全国人民动员起来，用一切方法制止内战。

## 注 释

(1) 抗日战争结束时，中国的大部分铁路交通线都在解放区军民的控制或包围之中。国民党反动派在所谓“恢复交通”的借口下，企图利用这些交通线分割解放区，并且把它的几百万军队运往东北、华北、华东、华中，进攻解放区，抢占大城市。

(2) 彰德，今河南省安阳市。

(3) 一九四五年九月，国民党军队自郑州、新乡一带沿平汉路进攻晋冀鲁豫解放区。十月下旬，其先头三个军，侵入磁县、邯郸地区。解放区军民奋起自卫，经一周激战，国民党第十一战区副司令长官兼新八军军长高树勋率新编第八军等部一万余人，在邯郸地区起义，其余的两个军，在溃退中被人民解放军围歼，放下武器。当时被迫放下武器的高级军官有：国民党第十一战区副司令长官兼第四十军军长马法五，第四十军副军长刘世荣、军参谋长李旭东、副师长刘树森等多人。

(4) 日本投降以后，国民党调集了三个战区的二十多个师的兵力大举进犯豫、鄂两省解放区。国民党第一战区司令长官胡宗南分兵一部，自西北方向，沿陇海路两侧东犯豫西解放区；第五战区司令长官刘峙所部，沿平汉路两侧，自北向南进犯豫中、鄂中、鄂东解放区；第六战区的部队自鄂南北犯加以配合。以上的国民党军队大都归刘峙指挥。豫鄂解放区的人民军队，对进犯军作了坚决的斗争，保存了实力，于一九四五年十月下旬，转移至豫、鄂交界之大洪山、桐柏山、枣阳地区，后因国民党军队继续追逼，又转移至平汉路东之宣化店地区。

(5) 这里所列举的一些军官，都是上党战役中被人民解放军俘虏的阎锡山部队的高级将领。关于上党战役，见本卷《关于重庆谈判》注〔2〕。

(6) 绥远，一九五四年撤销，原辖地区划归内蒙古自治区。察哈尔，一九五二年撤销，原辖地区划归河北、山西两省。热河，一九五五年撤销，原辖地区划归河北、辽宁两省及内蒙古自治区。傅作义当时担任国民党第十二战区的司令长官。他的部队，抗日战争时期驻扎在绥远西部的五原、临河一带。日本投降后，他奉命进攻绥远、热河、察哈尔三省解放区。一九四五年八月攻占归绥（今呼和浩特市）、集宁、丰镇。九月初攻占兴和、尚义、武川、陶林、新堂、凉城，大举向察哈尔解放区进攻，逼近张家口。人民解放军起而自卫，将其击退，并俘虏其大批官兵。

(7) 《剿匪手本》，是一九三三年蒋介石编的专门讲述进攻中国人民军队和革命根据地的方法的反革命小册子。一九四五年抗日战争结束以后，蒋介石重印这个小册子发给国民党军官，并下达密令称：“此次剿匪为人民幸福之所系，务本以往抗战之精神，遵照中正所订《剿匪手本》，督励所属，努力进剿，迅速完成任务。其功于国家者必得膺赏，其迟滞贻误者当必执法以罪。希转饬所属剿匪部队官兵一体悉遵为要。”

(8) 见本卷《关于重庆谈判》注〔1〕。

#### **Appendix Article 1 (English translation)**

#### **THE TRUTH ABOUT THE KUOMINTANG ATTACKS**

November 5, 1945

In a dispatch from Chungking, dated November 3, the United Press reported that Wu Kuo-chen, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, had declared that "the government is entirely on the defensive in this war" and had proposed measures for



"restoring communications".[1] A Hsinhua News Agency reporter asked the spokesman for the Communist Party of China about this.

The spokesman for the Communist Party of China replied to the reporter as follows: What Wu Kuo-chen said about being "on the defensive" is a complete lie. The Kuomintang, besides occupying the five Liberated Areas evacuated by our troops in eastern Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, central and southern Anhwei and Hunan and trampling on the people there, has moved more than seventy divisions of its regular troops into or close to most of the other Liberated Areas for example, those in Kwangtung, Hupeh, Honan, northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei, Shantung and Hopei -- and has been oppressing the people there and attacking or preparing to attack our troops. Furthermore, scores of other Kuomintang divisions are heading for the Liberated Areas. Can this be described as being on the defensive? Of the eight Kuomintang divisions which reached the Hantan area in their drive northward from Changteh, two opposed civil war and favoured peace, while the other six (including three U.S.-equipped divisions) were compelled to lay down their arms after the troops and people of the Liberated Areas counter-attacked in self-defence. Many officers of these Kuomintang troops, including war-zone deputy commanders' corps commanders and deputy corps commanders, are now in the Liberated Areas[2] and can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive? Our troops in the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh Provinces are now completely encircled by more than twenty Kuomintang divisions from the 1st, 5th and 6th War Zones, with Liu Chih as field commander in charge of the "suppression of Communists". Our Liberated Areas in western and central Honan and southern, eastern and central Hupeh have all been invaded and occupied by the Kuomintang forces, which burned and killed so wantonly that our troops commanded by Li Hsien-nien and Wang Shu-sheng could find no shelter and had to seek quarters on the Honan-Hupeh border in order to survive. But there again they have been closely pursued and attacked by Kuomintang troops.[3] Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive? It is the same in the three provinces of Shansi, Suiyuan and Chahar. In early October, Yen Hsi-shan ordered thirteen divisions to attack the Hsiangyuan-Tunliu sector in the Shangtang Liberated Area. Fighting in self-defence, our troops and the people there disarmed them all, and several commanders of corps and divisions were among the captured. They are now in the Taihang Liberated Area, every one alive, and can confirm the whole truth about where they came from and how they were ordered to attack. In Chungking recently, Yen Hsi-shan told all sorts of lies about how he had been attacked and how he had merely been "on the defensive". Probably he had forgotten all about his generals: Shih Tse-po, Commander of the 19th Corps; Kuo Jung, Commander of the Provisional 46th Division; Chang Hung, Commander of the Provisional 48th Division; Li Pei-ying, Commander of the 66th Division; Kuo Tien-hsing, Commander of the 68th Division and Yang Wen-tsai, Commander of the Provisional 37th Division.[4] They are now living in our Liberated Areas and can refute any lies told by Wu Kuo-chen, Yen Hsi-shan and all the other

reactionary instigators of civil war. General Fu Tso-yi, under orders, has been attacking our Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol for over two months and on one occasion pushed right to the gates of Changchiakou and occupied our entire Suiyuan Liberated Area and western Chahar. Can this, too, be described as being on the defensive and not firing "the first shot"? Our troops and people in Chahar and Suiyuan rose in self-defence and in their counter-attacks also captured large numbers of officers and men who can all testify where they came from, how they attacked, and so on.[5] In various battles of self-defence we have captured piles of "bandit suppression" and anti-Communist documents, among which are the Handbook on Bandit Suppression, orders for "bandit suppression"[6] and other anti-Communist documents issued by the highest Kuomintang authorities but dismissed as a "joke" by Wu Kuo-chen; these are now being forwarded to Yen-an. All these documents are iron-clad proofs that Kuomintang troops have attacked the Liberated Areas.

The Hsinhua News Agency reporter went on to ask the spokesman for the Communist Party of China about his views on the measures proposed by Wu Kuo-chen for restoring communications. The spokesman replied: These are nothing but stalling tactics. The Kuomintang authorities are mustering large forces and are trying to swamp all the Liberated Areas as in a great flood. Following the failure of several attacks in September and October, they are preparing new attacks on an even larger scale. And one way to obstruct these attacks and effectively check the civil war is not to let them transport their troops by rail. Like everybody else, we advocate speedy restoration of the lines of communication, but this can be done only after the settlement of the three problems of accepting the Japanese surrender, disposing of the puppet troops and realizing self-government in the Liberated Areas. Which should be settled first, the problem of communications or these three problems? Why are the troops of the Liberated Areas, which fought strenuously and bitterly against Japan for eight years, not qualified to accept the Japanese surrender? And why should other troops be put to the trouble of coming from afar to accept it? Every citizen has the right to punish the puppet troops; why are they all being incorporated into the "national army" and ordered to attack the Liberated Areas? Local self-government is explicitly stipulated in the "October 10th Agreement", and Dr. Sun Yat-sen long ago advocated the popular election of provincial governors; why does the Kuomintang government still insist on dispatching local officials? The problem of communications should be speedily settled, but even more so, the three major problems should be speedily settled. To talk of restoring communications without first settling the three major problems can only serve to spread and prolong the civil war and help its instigators achieve their purpose of swamping the Liberated Areas. In order quickly to stop the anti-popular and anti-democratic civil war which has now spread all over the country, we advocate the following:

- (1) All the Kuomintang government forces that have entered the Liberated Areas in northern China, northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei, central China and nearby regions to accept the Japanese surrender and to attack us should be withdrawn immediately to their original positions; the troops of

the Liberated Areas should accept the Japanese surrender and garrison the cities and lines of communication; and the Liberated Areas which have been invaded and occupied should be restored.

(2) All puppet troops should be immediately disarmed and disbanded, and in northern China, northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei the Liberated Areas should take charge of such disarming and disbanding.

(3) The people's democratic self-government in all the Liberated Areas should be recognized; the Central Government should not appoint and send out local officials; the provisions of the "October 10th Agreement" should be carried out.

The spokesman said: Only in this way can civil war be averted; otherwise there is absolutely no safeguard against it. The documents captured during the three battles we fought in self-defence in Suiyuan, Shangtang and Hantan and such concrete actions as massive troop movements and attacks all give the lie to the claim of the Kuomintang authorities that the so-called restoration of communications is for the sake of the people and not of civil war. The Chinese people have been fooled long enough and can be fooled no longer. At present, the central problem is for the people of the whole country to mobilize to stop the civil war by every means.

#### NOTES

1. At the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, most of China's railways were either under the control of the army and people of the Liberated Areas or surrounded by them. Under the pretext of "restoring communications", the Kuomintang reactionaries tried to utilize these railways to cut the Liberated Areas apart, transport millions of Kuomintang troops to northeastern, northern, eastern and central China, attack the Liberated Areas and grab the big cities.

2. In September 1945, Kuomintang troops from the region of Chengchow and Hsinhsiung advanced along the Peiping-Hankow Railway to attack the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. In late October their vanguard, comprising three corps, invaded the region of Tsehsien and Hantan. The army and people of the Liberated Area rose bravely in self-defence, and after a week's bitter fighting General Kao Shu-hsun, Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone and concurrently Commander of the New 8th Corps, revolted against the Kuomintang at Hantan and came over to us with the New 8th Corps and one column, totalling over ten thousand men. The other two corps retreated in confusion but were surrounded and disarmed. Many high-ranking officers were compelled to surrender, including Ma Fa-wu, another Deputy Commander of the Kuomintang's 11th War Zone concurrently Commander of the 40th Corps, Liu Shih-jung, its Deputy Commander, Li Hsu-tung, its Chief of Staff, Liu Shu-sen, a Deputy Division Commander.

3. After Japan's surrender the Kuomintang gathered more than twenty divisions from three war zones to launch large-scale attacks on the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh Provinces. Part of the forces of Hu Tsung-nan, Commander of the Kuomintang's 1st War Zone, advanced from the northwest to the east along both sides of the Lunghai Railway to invade the Liberated Areas in western Honan; the forces of Liu Chih, Commander of the 5th War Zone, advanced from the north to the south along both sides of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to invade the Liberated Areas in central Honan and central and eastern Hupeh; the forces of the 6th War Zone advanced from southern Hupeh to the north in concert. Most of these Kuomintang forces were under the command of Liu Chih. The people's army of the Liberated Areas in Honan and Hupeh put up a stubborn fight against the invaders, conserved its strength and moved in late October 1945 to an area on the Honan-Hupeh border in the Tahung and the Tungpai Mountains and around Tsaoyang. The army later shifted to Hsuanhuatien, east of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, because the Kuomintang continued to pursue and attack.

4. About the Shangtang battle, see "On the Chungking Negotiations", Note 2, p. 63 of this volume. The captured Kuomintang officers here mentioned were all high-ranking generals in Yen Hsi-shan's army.

5. The province of Suiyuan was abolished on March 6, 1954, and became part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. General Fu Tso-yi was in 1945 Commander of the Kuomintang's 12th War Zone. His troops had been stationed at and around Wuyuan and Linho in western Suiyuan during the War of Resistance Against Japan. After Japan's surrender he was ordered to attack the Liberated Areas in Suiyuan, Jehol and Chahar Provinces. In August 1945 he occupied Kueisui (now Huhehot), Chining and Fengchen. In early September he occupied Hsingho, Shangyi, Wuchuan, Taolin, Hsintang and Liangcheng, launched massive attacks on the Liberated Areas in Chahar and pushed to the neighbourhood of Changchiakou. In self-defence our army repulsed these attacks and captured large numbers of his officers and men.

6. The Handbook on Bandit Suppression was a counter-revolutionary pamphlet compiled by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933 dealing exclusively with methods of attacking the Chinese people's forces and the revolutionary bases. In 1945, after the conclusion of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek had it reprinted and issued to Kuomintang officers together with a confidential order, saying: "The present campaign for the suppression of the bandits, on which the happiness of the people depends, must be speedily completed. You should urge your officers and men to do their utmost to suppress the bandits in the spirit of the resistance against Japanese aggression and in accordance with the Handbook on Bandit Suppression which I have compiled. Any meritorious action in the service of the state shall be richly rewarded, and those responsible for delays or mistakes shall be court-martialled. This order should be made known to and obeyed by all officers and suppressing the bandits."

## Appendix Article 2

### 评国民党对战争责任问题的几种答案

（一九四九年二月十八日）

“政府自抗战结束以后，即以和平建国方针力谋中共问题之和平解决。经过一年半之时间，一切协议皆为中共所破坏，故中共应负破坏和平之责任。今日中共反而提出所谓战犯名单，将政府负责人士尽皆列入，更要求政府先行逮捕，其蛮横无理，显而易见。中共如不改变此种作风，则和平商谈之途径，势难寻觅。”以上是一九四九年二月十三日国民党中央宣传部所发《特别宣传指示》中关于战争责任问题的全部论点。

这个论点，不是别人的，是第一名战争罪犯蒋介石的。蒋介石在其元旦声明里说：“中正为三民主义的信徒，秉承国父的遗教，本不愿在对日作战之后再继之以剿匪的军事，来加重人民的痛苦。所以抗日战事甫告结束，我们政府立即揭举和平建国的方针，更进而以政治商谈、军事调处的方法解决共党问题。不意经过了一年有半的时间，共党对于一切协议和方案都横加梗阻，使其不能依预期的步骤见诸实施。而最后更发动其全面武装叛乱，危害国家的生存。我政府迫不得已，乃忍痛动员，从事戡乱。”

在蒋介石发表这个声明的前七天，即一九四八年十二月二十五日，即有中共权威人士提出了四十三个战犯名单，赫然列在第一名的，就是这个蒋介石。战犯们又要求和，又要逃避责任，只有将责任推在共产党身上一个法子。可是这是不调和的。共产党既然应负发动战争的责任，那末，就应当惩办共产党。既然是“匪”，就应当“剿匪”。既然“发动其全面武装叛乱”，就应当“戡乱”。“剿匪”，“戡乱”，是百分之百的对，为什么可以不剿不戡了呢？为什么从一九四九年一月一日以后，一切国民党的公开文件一律将“共匪”改成了“共党”呢？

孙科觉得有些不妥，他在蒋介石发表元旦声明的同一天的晚上，发表广播演说，关于战争责任问题，提出了一个不同的论点。孙科说：“回忆三年前，当抗战胜利的初期，由于人民需要休养生息，由于国家需要积极建设，由于各党派对国家和人民的需要尚有共同的认识，我们曾经集合各方代表和社会贤达于一堂，举行过政治协商会议。经过三星期的努力，更多谢杜鲁门总统的特使马歇尔先生的善意调协，我们也曾经商定了一个和平建国纲领和解决各种争端的具体方案。假如当时我们能将各种方案及时实行，试问今日的中国应该是如何的繁荣，今天的中国人民应该是如何的幸福啊！可惜当时各方既未能完全放弃小我的利害，全国人民亦未能用最大的努力去促进这个和平运动的成功，遂致战祸复发，生灵涂炭。”

孙科比较蒋介石“公道”一点。你看，他不是如同蒋介石那样，将战争责任一塌括子推在共产党身上，而是采取了“平均地权”的办法，将责任平分给“各方”。这里也有国民党，也有共产党，也有民主同盟(1)，也有社会贤达。不宁唯是，而且有“全国人民”，四亿七千五百万同胞一个也逃不了责任。蒋介石是专打共产党的板子，孙科是给各党各派无党无派全国同胞每人一板子，连蒋介石，也许还有孙科，也得挨上一板子。你看，两个国民党人，孙科和蒋介石，在这里打架。

第三个国民党人跑上来说：不然，照我的意见，责任应全归国民党。这个人的名字叫做李宗仁。一九四九年一月二十二日，李宗仁以“代总统”的身份，发表了一个声明。关于战争责任问题，他说：“在八年抗战之后，继之以三年之内战，不仅将抗战胜利后国家可能复兴之一线生机毁灭无遗，而战祸遍及黄河南北，田园庐舍悉遭摧毁荒废，无辜人民之死伤成千累万，妻离子散啼饥号寒者到处皆是。此一惨绝人寰之浩劫，实为我国内战史上空前未有。”

李宗仁在这里出的是无头告示，他也没有说国民党应负责任，也没有说共产党或者别的方面应负责任，但是他说出了一个事实，这个“惨绝人寰的浩劫”，不是出在别的地方，而是出在“黄河南北”。查黄河以南直至长江，黄河以北直至松花江，谁在这里造成这个“惨绝人寰的浩劫”呢？难道是这里的人民和人民的军队自己打自己造成的吗？李宗仁是做过北平行营主任的，桂系的军队是和蒋系军队一道打到过山东省的沂蒙山区的(2)，所以他有确实的情报，知道这种“浩劫”的地点和情况。如果说，李宗仁别的什么都不好，那末，他说出了这句老实话，总算是好的。而且他对这场战争起的名称，不叫“戡乱”或“剿匪”，而叫“内战”，这在国民党方面来说，也算得颇为别致。

根据李宗仁自己的逻辑，在同一个声明里，他说：“中共方面所提八条件，政府愿即开始商谈。”李宗仁知道八条的第一条，就是惩办战犯，而且也有他自己的大名在内。战犯的应当惩办，是“浩劫”的逻辑的结论。为了这一点，至今国民党死硬派还在吞吞吐吐地埋怨李宗仁，即所谓“毛泽东一月十四日声明所提八点为亡国条件，政府原不应接受”。

死硬派的埋怨之所以只能是吞吞吐吐，而不敢明目张胆，是有原因的。当蒋介石还没有“引退”时，死硬派原来想批驳八条，后来蒋介石一想不妥，决定不驳，大概是认为驳了就绝了路了，这是一月十九日的事情。当着一月十九日早上，张君勱从南京回到上海，发表谈话，说了“关于中共所提八项条件，政府不久即可能发布另一文告，提出答复”这句话的时候，中央社即于晚间发出通报说：“顷播沪电张君勱谈话一稿，请于电文末加注按语如下：张氏谈话中所说政府不久即发布另一文告一点，中央社记者顷自有关方面探悉，政府并无发布另一文告之拟议。”一月二十一日蒋介石发表“引退”声明，并无只字批评八条，并且把他自己的五条(3)也取消了，改变为“使领土主权克臻完整，历史文化与社会秩序不受摧残，人民生活与自由

权利确有保障，在此原则之下，以致和平之功”。宪法、法统、军队等项都不敢再提了。因此，李宗仁在一月二十二日敢于承认以中共的八条为谈判基础，国民党死硬派也不敢明目张胆地出面反对，只能吞吞吐吐地说一声“政府原不应接受”。

孙科的“平均地权”政策是否坚持不变呢？也不。一九四九年二月五日孙科“迁政府于广州”以后，二月七日发表演说，关于战争责任问题，他说：“半年以来，因战祸蔓延，大局发生严重变化，人民痛苦万状。凡此种种，均系过去所犯错误、失败及不合理现象种下前因，以致有今日局势严重之后果。吾人深知中国需要三民主义。三民主义一日不能实现，则中国之问题始终不能解决。追忆本党总理二十年以前以三民主义亲自遗交本党，冀其逐步得以实行。苟获实行，绝不致演至今日不可收拾之局面。”人们请看，国民党政府的行政院长在这里，不是平分责任给一切党派和全国同胞，而是由国民党自己担负起来了。孙科将一切板子都打在国民党的屁股上，使人们觉得甚为痛快。至于共产党呢？孙院长说：“吾人试观中共能以诱惑及麻醉人民，亦无非仅以实行三民主义之民生主义一部分，即平均地权一节为号召。吾人实应深感惭愧，而加强警惕，重新检讨过去之错误。”谢谢亲爱的院长，共产党虽然尚有“诱惑及麻醉人民”的罪名，总算没有别的滔天大罪，致邀免打，获保首领及屁股而归。

孙院长的可爱，还不止此。他在同一演说里又说：“今日共党势力之蔓延，亦即系因吾人信仰之主义未能实行之故。本党在过去最大之错误，即系党内若干人士过分迷信武力，对内则争权倾轧，坐贻敌人分化离间之机会。及至八年抗战结束，本为实现和平统一千载难逢之时机，政府方面亦原有以政治方式解决国内纠纷之计划，不幸未能贯彻实施。人民于连年战乱之后，已亟待休养生息。刀兵再起，民不聊生，痛苦殊深，亦影响士气之消沉，以致军事步步失利。蒋总统俯顺民情，鉴于军事方法之未能解决问题，乃于元旦发表文告，号召和平。”好了，孙科这一名战争罪犯，没有被捕，也没有被打，即自动招供，而且忠实无误。谁是迷信武力，发动战争，及至军事方法未能解决问题，方始求和的呢？就是国民党，就是蒋介石。孙院长用字造句也很正确，他说过分迷信武力的是他们党内的“若干人士”。这一点，对于中共仅仅要求惩办若干国民党人，把他们称之为战争罪犯，而不要求惩办更多的更不是全体的国民党人，是互相一致的。

我们和孙科之间，在这个数目字上并无争论。不同的是在结论上。我们认为，对于这些“迷信武力”，使得“刀兵再起，民不聊生”的国民党的“若干人士”，必须当作战犯加以惩办。孙科则不同意这样做。他说：“现共方之迟迟不行指派代表，一味拖延，显示共方亦正迷信武力，自以为目前业已羽毛丰满，可以凭借武力征服全国，故拒绝先行停战，其用心亦极显然。余兹须郑重提出者，即为求获得永久之和平，双方必须以平等资格进行商谈，条件则应公平合理，为全国人所能够接受者。”这样看来，孙院长又有些不可爱了。他似乎认为惩办战争罪

犯一项条件不算公平合理。他的这些话，和二月十三日国民党宣传部的《特别宣传指示》对于战犯问题所表示的态度，是一样地吞吞吐吐，不敢明目张胆地提出反对，较之李宗仁敢于承认以惩办战犯为谈判的基础条件之一，大不相同。

但是孙院长仍旧有可爱的地方，这即是他说共产党“亦正迷信武力”，是表现在“迟迟不行指派代表”和“拒绝先行停战”这两点上，而不是如同国民党那样在一九四六年就迷信武力发动惨绝人寰的战争。夫“迟迟不行指派代表”者，是因为确定战犯名单是一件大事，要是“为全国人所能接受者”，少了，多了，都不合实际，“全国人”（但不包括战犯及其帮凶）不能接受，故须和各民主党派人民团体互相商量，以此“拖延”了一段时间，并且未能迅速指派代表，引起了孙科之流颇为不快。但是这也不能一口断定即为“亦正迷信武力”。大约不要很久，战犯名单就可公布，代表就可指派，谈判就可开始，孙院长就不能说我们“迷信武力”了。

至于“拒绝先行停战”，这是服从蒋总统元旦文告而采取的正确态度。蒋总统元旦文告说：“只要共党一有和平的诚意，能作确切的表示，政府必开诚相见，愿与商讨停止战事、恢复和平的具体方法。”孙科的行政院，于一月十九日，做出了一个违反蒋介石上述文告的决议，说什么“立即先行无条件停战，并各指定代表进行和平商谈”。中共发言人曾于一月二十一日给了这个不通的决议以严正的批评<sup>(4)</sup>。不料该院长充耳不闻，又于二月七日乱说什么中共“拒绝先行停战”，就是表示中共“亦正迷信武力”。连蒋介石那样的战争罪犯，也知道停止战争，恢复和平，没有商谈是不可能的，孙科在这点上比蒋介石差远了。

人们知道孙科之所以成为战犯，是因为他一向赞助蒋介石发动战争，并坚持战争。直到一九四七年六月二十二日他还说：“在军事方面，只要打到底，终归可以解决。”“目前已无和谈可言，政府必须打垮共党，否则即是共党推翻国民政府。”<sup>(5)</sup>他就是国民党内迷信武力的“若干人士”之一。现在他站在一旁说风凉话，好像他并没有迷信过武力，三民主义没有实行他也不负责任。这是不忠实的。无论正国法，或者在国民党内正党法，孙科都逃不了挨板子。

## 注 释

(1) 见本书第三卷《论联合政府》注〔16〕。

(2) 沂蒙山区，指山东省的沂山、蒙山一带地区。曾经和蒋系军队一道进攻这一地区的桂系军队是第四十六军。该军于一九四六年十月从海南岛由海上输送到青岛登陆，一九四七年二月在山东省的莱芜地区全部被歼灭。



(3) 见本卷《中共发言人关于命令国民党反动政府重新逮捕前日本侵华军总司令冈村宁次和逮捕国民党内战罪犯的谈话》注(6)。

(4) 见本卷《中共发言人评南京行政院的决议》。

(5) 这是孙科一九四七年六月二十二日在南京接见美联社、国民党中央日报和新民报的记者时发表的谈话中说的，当时孙科任国民党政府副主席。

## **Appendix Article 2 (English translation)**

### **ON THE KUOMINTANG'S DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR**

February 18, 1949

"After the conclusion of the War of Resistance, the Government, following a policy of peace and national reconstruction, endeavoured to solve peacefully the problem of the Communist Party of China. For a period of a year and a half the Communist Party of China broke every agreement and therefore it should bear the responsibility for wrecking peace. Instead, it has now drawn up a list of so-called war criminals which includes all the Government leaders and has even demanded that the Government first arrest them; this clearly shows how truculent and unreasonable the Communist Party is. Unless the Communist Party of China changes this behaviour, it will indeed be difficult to find a way to peace negotiations."

The above is the entire argument on the question of the responsibility for the war which the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang advanced in a "Special Directive for Propaganda", issued on February 13, 1949.

It is the argument of none other than War Criminal No. 1, Chiang Kai-shek. In his New Year's Day statement he said:

As a devoted adherent of the Three People's Principles and the teachings of the Father of the Republic, I was reluctant to follow the conclusion of the war against Japan with the armed suppression of the bandits and thereby to aggravate the sufferings of the people. Therefore, as soon as the War of Resistance came to an end, our Government proclaimed its policy of peace and national reconstruction and moreover sought to solve the Communist problem by means of political consultation and military mediation. But contrary to our expectations, the Communist Party for a period of a year and a half wilfully obstructed all agreements and proposals and made it impossible to carry them out by the measures which were originally intended. Finally, it even started an all-out

armed rebellion which threatened the very existence of the state. This Government was thus driven to the painful necessity of mobilization to put down the rebellion.

On December 25, 1948, seven days before Chiang Kai-shek made this statement, an authoritative person in the Communist Party of China put forward a list of forty-three war criminals and illustrious at the head of the list was none other than this same Chiang Kai-shek. The war criminals, who want both to sue for peace and to shirk their responsibility, have no alternative but to shift the blame onto the Communist Party. But the two are irreconcilable. Since the Communist Party should bear the responsibility for launching the war, then the Communist Party should be punished. Since the Communists are "bandits", then the "bandits" should be "suppressed". Since they "started an all-out armed rebellion", then the "rebellion" should be "put down". "Bandit suppression" and "the putting down of rebellion" are a hundred per cent right, so why should they be abandoned? Why has the term "Communist bandits" been changed into "Communist Party" in all Kuomintang public documents issued since January 1, 1949?

Sun Fo, feeling that something was amiss, put forward a different argument about the responsibility for the war in a speech broadcast on the evening of the same day Chiang Kai-shek issued his New Year's Day statement. Sun Fo said:

We remember that in the early period following the victory of the War of Resistance, three years ago, because the people needed rehabilitation, the country needed active reconstruction and there was still common understanding of these needs among the various parties, we called together representatives from various quarters and public personages for a Political Consultative Conference. After three weeks' effort and thanks especially to the kind mediation of Mr. Marshall, President Truman's special envoy, we agreed upon a programme for peace and national reconstruction and upon specific measures for settling various disputes. If we had then carried out all these measures in good time, just think how prosperous China would be today, and how happy her people would be! Unfortunately, at the time none of the various parties concerned would entirely forgo its selfish interests, the people throughout the country did not exert themselves to the utmost to promote the success of the peace movement, and so the disaster of war again occurred, plunging the people into misery and suffering.

Sun Fo is a little bit more "fair" than Chiang Kai-shek. You see, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, he does not shift the responsibility for the war entirely onto the Communist Party, but divides the blame equally among "the various parties concerned" by the method of "equalization of landownership".[1] Those involved are the Kuomintang, also the Communist Party, also the Democratic League and also the public personages. That isn't all; "the people throughout the country" are also involved; not one of our 475 million fellow-countrymen can escape responsibility. While Chiang Kai-shek caned the Communist Party alone, Sun Fo canes all the parties, all the people without party affiliation, every one

of his fellow-countrymen; even Chiang Kai-shek, and perhaps even Sun Fo himself, will get a caning. Here you see two Kuomintangites at loggerheads, Sun Fo and Chiang Kai-shek.

A third Kuomintangite has come forward, saying, "No, in my opinion, the responsibility should be borne entirely by the Kuomintang." His name is Li Tsung-jen. On January 22, 1949, Li Tsung-jen issued a statement in his capacity as "acting president". Regarding the responsibility for the war, he said:

The three years' civil war that followed the eight years' War of Resistance has not only completely destroyed the country's last hope of recovery after the victory in the War of Resistance but has also spread ruin everywhere north and south of the Yellow River, devastating innumerable farmsteads and houses, killing and wounding thousands upon thousands of innocent people, breaking up countless families and causing people everywhere to lament in hunger and cold. Such a terrible holocaust is really without parallel in the history of civil wars in our country.

Here Li Tsung-jen makes a statement but names no names; he fixes the responsibility neither on the Kuomintang, nor on the Communist Party, nor on any other quarter; yet he has stated one fact, that this "terrible holocaust" has occurred in no other place than "north and south of the Yellow River". Wherefore, let us examine who caused this "terrible holocaust" in the area from the Yellow River south to the Yangtse River and north to the Sungari River. Could it have been caused by the people and the people's army there, fighting among themselves? Since Li Tsung-jen was once Chief of Chiang Kai-shek's Peiping Headquarters and since the troops of his Kwangsi clique together with Chiang's troops once fought into the Yi-Meng mountain area in Shantung Province,[2] he has reliable information about where and how this "holocaust" took place. If there is nothing else good about Li Tsung-jen, at least it is good that he has made this one honest statement. What is more, instead of speaking about "putting down the rebellion" or "suppressing the bandits", he calls the war a "civil war", and this, for the Kuomintang, may be said to be quite novel.

Following his own logic, Li Tsung-jen declared in the same statement that "the Government is willing to start negotiations immediately on the basis of the eight terms proposed by the Communist Party of China". Li Tsung-jen knows that the first of the eight terms is the punishment of war criminals and that his own honourable name is among them. That the war criminals should be punished is a logical conclusion from the "holocaust". For this reason the Kuomintang die-hards are even now muttering complaints against Li Tsung-jen, saying that "the eight terms Mao Tse-tung put forward in his January 14 statement would ruin the nation, and the Government should not have accepted them".

There are reasons why the die-hards can only mutter and dare not speak out openly. Before Chiang Kai-shek "retired", the diehards had thought of rejecting our eight terms, but then Chiang Kai-shek on second thoughts decided not to do so, probably because he considered that to reject them would leave

no way out; this was the state of affairs on January 19. On that morning, Chang Chun-mai [3] upon his return to Shanghai from Nanking said that "the Government may issue another statement soon in reply to the eight terms put forward by the Communist Party of China", whereupon the Central News Agency sent a service message the same evening, saying:

Add the following note to the Shanghai dispatch on Chang Chun-mai's statement that has just come through. As regards his assertion that the Government will soon issue another statement, a Central News Agency correspondent has just learned from the quarters concerned that the Government has no intention of making another statement.

In the January 21 statement on his "retirement", Chiang Kai-shek said not a single word in criticism of the eight terms and even revoked his own five terms, changing them into "attaining peace on the principle that the integrity of territory and sovereignty is maintained, that the historic culture and social order are not destroyed and that the people's livelihood and right to freedom are safeguarded". He no longer dared raise such matters as the constitution, the legally constituted authority or the army. That is why on January 22 Li Tsung-jen dared to accept the eight terms of the Communist Party of China as the basis for negotiations and why the Kuomintang die-hards dared not openly reject them, but could only mutter that "the Government should not have accepted them".

Did Sun Fo consistently maintain his policy of "equalization of landownership"? No. After he "moved the Government to Canton" on February 5, 1949, he made a speech on February 7 about the question of war responsibility, saying:

In the last six months the spread of the disaster of war has brought about serious changes in the situation and inflicted untold suffering on the people. All this has its origin in past mistakes, failures and unreasonableness, and today's grave situation is the consequence. We are all convinced that China needs the Three People's Principles. So long as the Three People's Principles are not put into effect, China's problems can never be solved. It may be recalled that twenty years ago the Tsungli of our party personally entrusted the Three People's Principles to our party as his legacy in the hope that they would be put into effect step by step. If they had been put into effect, the situation would never have developed into such a hopeless mess.

People will please note that here the president of the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government is not apportioning responsibility for the war equally among the various parties and all his fellow-countrymen but is putting it on the Kuomintang itself. It makes people feel exceedingly good to see Sun Fo applying the cane to the backside of the Kuomintang alone. What about the Communist Party? President Sun says:

We can see that the Communist Party of China has been able to lure and dupe the people merely by appealing for the equalization of landownership, which is one part of the Three People's Principles, the Principle of the People's Livelihood. We ought to feel deeply ashamed, sharpen our vigilance and examine afresh our past mistakes.

Thank you, dear President! Although the Communist Party is still charged with the crime of "luring and duping the people", at least it is innocent of other horrible crimes and hence escapes a caning and is let off with its head and its backside unscathed.

Nor is President Sun lovable for this reason alone. In the same speech, he says:

The spread of Communist influence today is a result of our failure to put into effect the principles we believe in. Our party's greatest mistake in the past was that certain members worshipped force too much and scrambled for power among themselves, thus giving the enemy opportunities to sow dissension in our ranks. The conclusion of the eight years' War of Resistance should have been the occasion for realizing the country's peaceful unification, an opportunity of a thousand years, and originally the Government had a plan of settling domestic disputes by political means, but unfortunately it was not carried out. After years of war and chaos the people urgently needed rehabilitation. The renewal of armed conflict made life impossible for the people, and the suffering was great, it also lowered the morale of the troops and caused repeated military setbacks. In deference to the feelings of the people and because he realized that military means had failed to solve the problem, President Chiang issued a New Year's Day message calling for peace.

Good! Here this war criminal Sun Fo has made a voluntary confession, and a frank and truthful one too, although he has not been arrested or caned. Who was it who worshipped force, launched the war and sued for peace only after military means had failed to solve the problem? None other than the Kuomintang, none other than Chiang Kai-shek himself. President Sun is very precise in his choice of words when he says that "certain members" of his party worshipped force too much. This conforms with the demand of the Communist Party of China that only a certain number of Kuomintang members be punished and branded as war criminals, but no more than this number, and of course not its entire membership.

So we have no dispute with Sun Fo over the number. We differ with him as to the conclusion to be drawn. We hold that "certain members" of the Kuomintang must be punished as war criminals because they "worshipped force" and caused the "renewal of armed conflict", which "made life impossible for the people". But Sun Fo does not agree. He says:

In delaying the appointment of its delegation and constantly stalling for time, the Communist Party has shown that it also worships force, believes it has now become full-fledged and can conquer the

whole country by force, it therefore refuses to cease hostilities as a first step. Its motive is all too clear. I hereby propose in all seriousness that in order to obtain lasting peace negotiations should be conducted by the two parties on an equal footing and that the terms should be fair and reasonable and acceptable to the people of the whole country.

From this you can see that President Sun is not quite so lovable. He seems to think that the punishment of war criminals is not a fair and reasonable term. On the question of war criminals, his words reveal an attitude similar to that of the "Special Directive for Propaganda" issued by the Kuomintang Propaganda Department on February 13, and similarly he only mutters and dares not openly object. He differs sharply from Li Tsung-jen who dares to accept the punishment of war criminals as one of the basic terms for negotiations.

But there is still something lovable about President Sun, for he says that although the Communist Party "also worships force", as shown by two points, "delaying the appointment of its delegation" and "refusing to cease hostilities as a first step", yet it is not like the Kuomintang, which worshipped force as early as 1946 and unleashed a most cruel war. Well, the Communist Party has "delayed the appointment of its delegation" because making a list of war criminals is an important matter, it must be "acceptable to the people of the whole country" and a list that is too long or too short would be unrealistic and unacceptable to "the people of the whole country" (whose ranks do not include the war criminals and their accomplices). This requires consultation with the democratic parties and people's organizations; it has therefore caused some "stalling", and we were not able to appoint our delegates quickly, thus arousing the displeasure of Sun Fo and his like. But from this, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the Communist Party "also worships force". It is probable that before long the list of war criminals will be published, our delegates named and the negotiations started; and then President Sun will not be able to say that we "worship force".

As for "refusing to cease hostilities as a first step", this is a correct attitude adopted in obedience to President Chiang's New Year's Day message. In that message President Chiang said:

As soon as the Communist Party has a sincere desire for peace and can give definite indications of this, the Government will certainly meet it in all sincerity and be willing to discuss concrete measures for ending hostilities and restoring peace.

On January 19 Sun Fo's Executive Yuan passed a resolution in violation of Chiang Kai-shek's message, saying "first, effect an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities, and then, appoint delegates to enter into peace negotiations". On January 21 a Chinese Communist Party spokesman sternly criticized this absurd resolution.[4] Curiously enough, the president of the Executive Yuan turned a deaf ear to the criticism and on February 7 again nonsensically said that the Communist Party's "refusal to cease hostilities as a first step" was proof that it "also worships force".

Even such a war criminal as Chiang Kai-shek knows that without negotiations it is impossible to cease hostilities and restore peace; on this point Sun Fo is far behind Chiang Kai-shek.

As is generally known, Sun Fo is listed as a war criminal because he has all along supported Chiang Kai-shek in launching and continuing the war. As late as June 22, 1947, he was still saying that a "settlement will finally come, provided militarily we fight to the end" and that "at present peace negotiations are out of the question, and the Government must crush the Communist Party of China or be overthrown by it".[5] Sun Fo himself is one of those "certain members" of the Kuomintang who worshipped force. But now he is making irresponsible and carping comments from the side-lines, as if he himself had never worshipped force and bore no responsibility for the failure to carry out the Three People's Principles. This is dishonest. Whether tried according to the law of the state or judged according to the party discipline of the Kuomintang, Sun Fo cannot escape the caning he deserves.

#### NOTES

1. A famous slogan of Sun Yat-sen. (See "On New Democracy" Section 6, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II.) Here it is used as a pun in ridicule of Sun Fo.

2. This refers to the region of the Yi and Meng Mountains in Shantung Province. It was the 46th Army of the Kwangsi clique which attacked this region jointly with Chiang Kai-shek's troops. This army had been brought from Hainan Island by sea and landed at Tsingtao in October 1946. It was completely wiped out in February 1947 in the Laiwu region of Shantung Province.

3. A reactionary politician, the head of the small reactionary Democratic Socialist Party. See "Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution", Note 8, p. 126 of this volume and "On New Democracy", Note 9, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II.

4. See "Comment by the Spokesman for the Communist Party of China on the Resolution of the Nanking Executive Yuan", pp. 321-23 of this volume.

5. This refers to the remarks made in Nanking on June 22, 1947 by Sun Fo, then vice-president of the Kuomintang government, when he received reporters of the Associated Press, the Kuomintang Central Daily News and the Hsin Min Pao.

## Appendix Article 3

### 别了，司徒雷登

（一九四九年八月十八日）

美国的白皮书，选择在司徒雷登<sup>(1)</sup>业已离开南京、快到华盛顿、但是尚未到达的日子——八月五日发表，是可以理解的，因为他是美国侵略政策彻底失败的象征。司徒雷登是一个在中国出生的美国人，在中国有相当广泛的社会联系，在中国办过多年的教会学校，在抗日时期坐过日本人的监狱，平素装着爱美国也爱中国，颇能迷惑一部分中国人，因此被马歇尔看中，做了驻华大使，成为马歇尔系统中的风云人物之一。在马歇尔系统看来，他只有一个缺点，就是在他代表马歇尔系统的政策在中国当大使的整个时期，恰恰就是这个政策彻底地被中国人民打败了的时期，这个责任可不小。以脱卸责任为目的的白皮书，当然应该在司徒雷登将到未到的日子发表为适宜。

美国出钱出枪，蒋介石出人，替美国打仗杀中国人，借以变中国为美国殖民地的战争，组成了美国帝国主义在第二次世界大战以后的世界侵略政策的一个重大的部分。美国侵略政策的对象有好几个部分。欧洲部分，亚洲部分，美洲部分，这三个是主要的部分。中国是亚洲的重心，是一个具有四亿七千五百万人口的大国，夺取了中国，整个亚洲都是它的了。美帝国主义的亚洲战线巩固了，它就可以集中力量向欧洲进攻。美帝国主义在美洲的战线，它是认为比较地巩固的。这些就是美国侵略者的整个如意算盘。

可是，一则美国的和全世界的人民都不要战争；二则欧洲人民的觉悟，东欧各人民民主国家的兴起，特别是苏联这个空前强大的和平堡垒耸立在欧亚两洲之间，顽强地抵抗着美国的侵略政策，使美国的注意力大部分被吸引住了；三则，这是主要的，中国人民的觉悟，中国共产党领导的武装力量和民众组织力量已经空前地强大起来了。这样，就迫使美帝国主义的当权集团不能采取大规模地直接地武装进攻中国的政策，而采取了帮助蒋介石打内战的政策。

美国的海陆空军已经在中国参加了战争。青岛、上海和台湾，有美国的海军基地。北平、天津、唐山、秦皇岛、青岛、上海、南京都驻过美国的军队。美国的空军控制了全中国，并从空中拍摄了全中国战略要地的军用地图。在北平附近的安平镇，在长春附近的九台，在唐山，在胶东半岛，美国的军队或军事人员曾经和人民解放军接触过，被人民解放军俘虏过多次<sup>(2)</sup>。陈纳德航空队曾经广泛地参战<sup>(3)</sup>。美国的空军除替蒋介石运兵外，又炸沉了起义的重庆号巡洋舰<sup>(4)</sup>。所有这些，都是直接参战的行动，只是还没有公开宣布作战，并且规模还不算大，而以大规模地出钱出枪出顾问人员帮助蒋介石打内战为主要的侵略方式。



美国之所以采取这种方式，是被中国和全世界的客观形势所决定的，并不是美帝国主义的当权派——杜鲁门、马歇尔系统不想直接侵略中国。在助蒋作战的开头，又曾演过一出美国出面调处国共两党争端的文明戏，企图软化中国共产党和欺骗中国人民，不战而控制全中国。和谈失败了，欺骗不行了，战争揭幕了。

对于美国怀着幻想的善忘的自由主义者或所谓“民主个人主义”者们，请你们看一看艾奇逊的话：“和平来的时候，美国在中国碰到了三种可能的选择：（一）它可以一干二净地撤退；（二）它可以实行大规模的军事干涉，帮助国民党毁灭共产党；（三）它可以帮助国民党把他们的权力在中国最大可能的地区里面建立起来，同时却努力促成双方的妥协来避免内战。”

为什么不采取第一个政策呢？艾奇逊说：“我相信当时的美国民意认为，第一种选择等于叫我们不要坚决努力地先做一番补救工作，就把我们的国际责任，把我们对华友好的传统政策，统统放弃。”原来美国的所谓“国际责任”和“对华友好的传统政策”，就是干涉中国。干涉就叫做担负国际责任，干涉就叫做对华友好，不干涉是不行的。艾奇逊在这里强奸了美国的民意，这是华尔街的“民意”，不是美国的民意。

为什么不采取第二个政策呢？艾奇逊说：“第二种供选择的政策，从理论上来看，以及回顾起来，虽然都似乎是令人神往，却是完全行不通的。战前的十年里，国民党已经毁灭不了共产党。现在是战后了，国民党是削弱了，意志消沉了，失去了民心，这在前文已经有了说明。在那些从日本手里收复过来的地区里，国民党文武官员的行为一下子就断送了人民对国民党的支持，断送了它的威信。可是共产党却比以往无论什么时候都强盛，整个华北差不多都被他们控制了。从国民党军队后来所表现的不中用的惨况看来，也许只有靠美国的武力才可以把共产党打跑。对于这样庞大的责任，无论是叫我们的军队在一九四五年来承担，或者是在以后来承担，美国人民显然都不会批准。我们因此采取了第三种供选择的政策……”

好办法，美国出钱出枪，蒋介石出人，替美国打仗杀中国人，“毁灭共产党”，变中国为美国的殖民地，完成美国的“国际责任”，实现“对华友好的传统政策”。

国民党腐败无能，“意志消沉了，失去了民心”，还是要出钱出枪叫它打仗。直接出兵干涉，在“理论上”是妥当的。单就美国统治者来说，“回顾起来”，也是妥当的。因为这样做起来实在有兴趣，“似乎是令人神往”。但是在事实上是不行的，“美国人民显然都不会批准”。不是我们——杜鲁门、马歇尔、艾奇逊等人的帝国主义系统——不想干，干是很想的，只是因为中国的形势，美国的形势，还有整个国际的形势（这点艾奇逊没有说）不许可，不得已而求其次，采取了第三条路。

那些认为“不要国际援助也可以胜利”的中国人听着，艾奇逊在给你们上课了。艾奇逊是不拿薪水上义务课的好教员，他是如此诲人不倦地毫无隐讳地说出了全篇的真理。美国之所以没有大量出兵进攻中国，不是因为美国政府不愿意，而是因为美国政府有顾虑。第一顾虑中国人民反对它，它怕陷在泥潭里拔不出去。第二顾虑美国人民反对它，因此不敢下动员令。第三顾虑苏联和欧洲的人民以及各国的人民反对它，它将冒天下之大不韪。艾奇逊的可爱的坦白性是有限度的，这第三个顾虑他不愿意说。这是因为他怕在苏联面前丢脸，他怕已经失败了但是还要装做好像没有失败的样子的欧洲马歇尔计划(5)陷入全盘崩溃的惨境。

那些近视的思想糊涂的自由主义或民主个人主义的中国人听着，艾奇逊在给你们上课了，艾奇逊是你们的好教员。你们所设想的美国的仁义道德，已被艾奇逊一扫而空。不是吗？你们能在白皮书和艾奇逊信件里找到一丝一毫的仁义道德吗？

美国确实有科学，有技术，可惜抓在资本家手里，不抓在人民手里，其用处就是对内剥削和压迫，对外侵略和杀人。美国也有“民主政治”，可惜只是资产阶级一个阶级的独裁统治的别名。美国有很多钱，可惜只愿意送给极端腐败的蒋介石反动派。现在和将来据说很愿意送些给它在中国的第五纵队，但是不愿意送给一般的书生气十足的不识抬举的自由主义者，或民主个人主义者，当然更加不愿意送给共产党。送是可以的，要有条件。什么条件呢？就是跟我走。美国人在北平，在天津，在上海，都洒了些救济粉，看一看什么人愿意弯腰拾起来。太公钓鱼，愿者上钩。嗟来之食，吃下去肚子要痛的(6)。

我们中国人是有骨气的。许多曾经是自由主义者或民主个人主义者的人们，在美国帝国主义者及其走狗国民党反动派面前站起来了。闻一多拍案而起，横眉怒对国民党的手枪，宁可倒下去，不愿屈服(7)。朱自清一身重病，宁可饿死，不领美国的“救济粮”(8)。唐朝的韩愈写过《伯夷颂》(9)，颂的是一个对自己国家的人民不负责任、开小差逃跑、又反对武王领导的当时的人民解放战争、颇有些“民主个人主义”思想的伯夷，那是颂错了。我们应当写闻一多颂，写朱自清颂，他们表现了我们民族的英雄气概。

多少一点困难怕什么。封锁吧，封锁十年八年，中国的一切问题都解决了。中国人死都不怕，还怕困难吗？老子说过：“民不畏死，奈何以死惧之。”(10)美帝国主义及其走狗蒋介石反动派，对于我们，不但“以死惧之”，而且实行叫我们死。闻一多等人之外，还在过去的三年内，用美国的卡宾枪、机关枪、迫击炮、火箭炮、榴弹炮、坦克和飞机炸弹，杀死了数百万中国人。现在这种情况已近尾声了，他们打了败仗了，不是他们杀过来而是我们杀过去了，他们快要完蛋了。留给我们多少一点困难，封锁、失业、灾荒、通货膨胀、物价上升之类，确实是困难，但是比起过去三年来已经松了一口气了。过去三年的一关也闯过了，难道不能克服现在这点困难吗？没有美国就不能活命吗？

人民解放军横渡长江，南京的美国殖民政府如鸟兽散。司徒雷登大使老爷却坐着不动，睁开眼睛看着，希望开设新店，捞一把。司徒雷登看见了什么呢？除了看见人民解放军一队一队地走过，工人、农民、学生一群一群地起来之外，他还看见了一种现象，就是中国的自由主义者或民主个人主义者们也大群地和工农兵学生等人一道喊口号，讲革命。总之是没有人去理他，使得他“茕茕孑立，形影相吊”<sup>(1)</sup>，没有什么事做了，只好挟起皮包走路。

中国还有一部分知识分子和其他人等存有糊涂思想，对美国存有幻想，因此应当对他们进行说服、争取、教育和团结的工作，使他们站到人民方面来，不上帝国主义的当。但是整个美帝国主义在中国人民中的威信已经破产了，美国的白皮书，就是一部破产的记录。先进的人们，应当很好地利用白皮书对中国人民进行教育工作。

司徒雷登走了，白皮书来了，很好，很好。这两件事都是值得庆祝的。

#### 注 释

(1) 司徒雷登（一八七六一—一九六二），美国人，生于中国杭州。一九〇五年开始在中国传教，一九一九年起任美国在中国兴办的燕京大学的校长。一九四六年七月十一日，出任美国驻中国大使，积极支持国民党反动政府进行反人民内战。一九四九年四月南京解放后，司徒雷登留在南京观望。同年八月二日，由于美帝国主义阻挠中国人民革命胜利的一切努力都已彻底失败，司徒雷登不得不悄然离开中国。

(2) 一九四五年日本投降以后，以侵略中国领土主权和干涉中国内政为目的的美国军队即在中国登陆，侵驻北平、上海、南京、天津、唐山、开平、秦皇岛、静海、青岛等地区，并不断地向解放区进犯。本文中所举的安平镇事件，是一九四六年七月二十九日驻天津美军配合国民党军队进攻河北省香河县安平镇的事件。九台事件，是一九四七年三月一日美军向长春和九台间的和气堡人民解放军阵地进行军事侦察的事件。唐山事件，是指一九四六年六月十六日驻唐山美军向宋家营等地侵扰，和同年七月间，在唐山附近的滦县三河庄子、昌黎县西河南村的侵扰。美军对胶东半岛的侵犯，前后发生多次，著名的有两次，一次是一九四七年八月二十八日美国的飞机和军舰向牟平县浪暖口、小里岛侵犯；一次是同年十二月二十五日美军配合国民党军队进攻即墨县北的王疃院。对于上述美军进犯解放区的侵略行为，中国人民解放军或地方人民武装，都曾采取了严正的自卫行动。

(3) 陈纳德，美国人。抗日战争时期，曾任国民党政府空军顾问，并组织“美国志愿航空队”（又称“飞虎队”，后改为第十四航空队），支持中国抗战。日本投降后，他率领美国第十四航空队一部分人员，组织空运队，帮助国民党进行内战。

(4) 见本卷《中国人民解放军总部发言人为英国军舰暴行发表的声明》注(4)。

(5) 第二次世界大战结束后，西欧由于战争破坏和自然灾害的影响，政治动荡，经济衰退。为了控制西欧和扩大国外市场，美国国务卿马歇尔在一九四七年六月五日的一次演说中，建议欧洲国家共同拟订一个“复兴”计划，由美国予以“援助”。七月，英、法、意等十六国在巴黎开会，决定接受马歇尔建议，成立欧洲经济合作委员会（后改为欧洲经济合作组织），提出“欧洲复兴方案”。由于这个方案是根据马歇尔的建议制订的，故又被称为马歇尔计划。一九四八年四月杜鲁门总统签署美国《一九四八年经济合作法》（即“一九四八年对外援助法”）后，马歇尔计划正式执行。一九五一年底，美国宣布提前结束执行这个计划。

(6) “太公钓鱼，愿者上钩”，是一个民间传说。据传周朝姜太公曾在渭水河边用无饵的直钩在水面三尺上钓鱼，说：“负命者上钩来！”（见《武王伐纣平话》卷中）“嗟来之食”，是指一种带侮辱性的施舍。齐国的一个饥民因为不吃嗟来之食而饿死的故事，见《礼记·檀弓下》。

(7) 闻一多（一八九九—一九四六），湖北浠水人，著名的诗人、学者和教授。一九四三年以后，由于痛恨国民党政府的反动和腐败，积极参加争取民主的斗争。抗日战争结束后，积极地反对国民党勾结美帝国主义发动反人民的内战。一九四六年七月十五日在昆明被国民党特务暗杀。

(8) 朱自清（一八九八—一九四八），原籍浙江绍兴，生于江苏东海，现代文学家、教授。抗日战争结束后，他积极支持反对蒋介石统治的学生运动。一九四八年六月签名于抗议美国扶植日本和拒绝领取“美援”面粉的宣言。当时他的生活非常困苦，这年八月十二日终因贫病在北平逝世。在他逝世以前，还嘱咐家人不要买国民党政府配售的平价美援面粉。

(9) 韩愈（七六八—一八二四），中国唐代著名的大作家。《伯夷颂》是韩愈所写的一篇散文。伯夷，殷末人，周武王进军讨伐殷王朝，他曾经表示反对；武王灭殷后，他逃避到首阳山，不食周粟而死。

(10) 见《老子》第七十四章。

(11) 见李密《陈情表》。

### **Appendix Article 3 (English translation)**

### **FAREWELL, LEIGHTON STUART!**

August 18, 1949

It is understandable that the date chosen for the publication of the U.S. White Paper was August 5, a time when Leighton Stuart [1] had departed from Nanking for Washington but had not yet arrived there, since Leighton Stuart is a symbol of the complete defeat of the U.S. policy of aggression. Leighton Stuart is an American born in China; he has fairly wide social connections and spent many years running missionary schools in China, he once sat in a Japanese gaol during the War of Resistance; he used to pretend to love both the United States and China and was able to deceive quite a number of Chinese. Hence, he was picked out by George C. Marshall, was made U.S. ambassador to China and became a celebrity in the Marshall group. In the eyes of the Marshall group he had only one fault, namely, that the whole period when he was ambassador to China as an exponent of their policy was the very period in which that policy was utterly defeated by the Chinese people; that was no small responsibility. It is only natural that the White Paper, which is designed to evade this responsibility, should have been published at a time when Leighton Stuart was on his way to Washington but had not yet arrived.

The war to turn China into a U.S. colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the U.S. imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The U.S. policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, U.S. imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. U.S. imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug over-all calculations of the U.S. aggressors.

But in the first place, the American people and the peoples of the world do not want war. Secondly, the attention of the United States has largely been absorbed by the awakening of the peoples of Europe, by the rise of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly by the towering presence of the Soviet Union, this unprecedentedly powerful bulwark of peace bestriding Europe and Asia, and by its strong resistance to the U.S. policy of aggression. Thirdly, and this is most important, the Chinese people have awakened, and the armed forces and the organized strength of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China have become more powerful than ever before. Consequently, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism has been prevented from adopting a policy of direct, large-scale armed attacks on China and instead has adopted a policy of helping Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

U.S. naval, ground and air forces did participate in the war in China. There were U.S. naval bases in Tsingtao, Shanghai and Taiwan. U.S. troops were stationed in Peiping, Tientsin, Tangshan,

Chinwangtao, Tsingtao, Shanghai and Nanking. The U.S. air force controlled all of China's air space and took aerial photographs of all China's strategic areas for military maps. At the town of Anping near Peiping, at Chiutai near Changchun, at Tangshan and in the Eastern Shantung Peninsula, U.S. troops and other military personnel clashed with the People's Liberation Army and on several occasions were captured.[2] Chennault's air fleet took an extensive part in the civil war.[3] Besides transporting troops for Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. air force bombed and sank the cruiser Chungking, which had mutinied against the Kuomintang.[4] All these were acts of direct participation in the war, although they fell short of an open declaration of war and were not large in scale, and although the principal method of U.S. aggression was the large-scale supply of money, munitions and advisers to help Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

The use of this method by the United States was determined by the objective situation in China and the rest of the world, and not by any lack of desire on the part of the Truman-Marshall group, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism, to launch direct aggression against China. Moreover, at the outset of its help to Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the civil war, a crude farce was staged in which the United States appeared as mediator in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; this was an attempt to soften up the Communist Party of China, deceive the Chinese people and thus gain control of all China without fighting. The peace negotiations failed, the deception fell through and the curtain rose on the war.

Liberals or "democratic individualists" who cherish illusions about the United States and have short memories! Please look at Acheson's own words:

When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China: (1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists, (3) it could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Why didn't the United States adopt the first of these policies? Acheson says:

The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

So that's how things stand: the "international responsibilities" of the United States and its "traditional policy of friendship for China" are nothing but intervention against China. Intervention is called assuming international responsibilities and showing friendship for China; as to non-intervention, it

simply won't do. Here Acheson defiles U.S. public opinion; his is the "public opinion" of Wall Street, not the public opinion of the American people.

Why didn't the United States adopt the second of these policies? Acheson says:

The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now after the war the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials. The Communists on the other hand were much stronger than they had ever been and were in control of most of North China. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy. . . .

What a splendid idea! The United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, to "destroy the Communists" and turn China into a U.S. colony, so that the United States may fulfil its "international responsibilities" and carry out its "traditional policy of friendship for China".

Although the Kuomintang was corrupt and incompetent, "demoralized and unpopular", the United States nevertheless supplied it with money and guns and made it fight. Direct armed intervention was all right, "theoretically". It also seems all right "in retrospect" to the rulers of the United States. For direct armed intervention would really have been interesting and it might "look attractive". But it would not have worked in practice, for "it is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned" it. Not that the imperialist group of Truman, Marshall, Acheson and their like did not desire it -- they very much desired it -- but the situation in China, in the United States and in the world as a whole (a point Acheson does not mention) did not permit it; they had to give up their preference and take the third way.

Let those Chinese who believe that "victory is possible even without international help" listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson. Acheson is a good teacher, giving lessons free of charge, and he is telling the whole truth with tireless zeal and great candour. The United States refrained from dispatching large forces to attack China, not because the U.S. government didn't want to, but because it had worries. First worry: the Chinese people would oppose it, and the U.S. government was afraid of getting hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire. Second worry: the American people would oppose it, and so the U.S. government dared not order mobilization. Third worry: the people of the Soviet Union, of Europe and of the rest of the world would oppose it, and the U.S. government would face

universal condemnation. Acheson's charming candour has its limits and he is unwilling to mention the third worry. The reason is he is afraid of losing face before the Soviet Union, he is afraid that the Marshall Plan in Europe, [5] which is already a failure despite pretences to the contrary, may end dismally in total collapse.

Let those Chinese who are short-sighted, muddle-headed liberals or democratic individualists listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson; he is a good teacher for you. He has made a clean sweep of your fancied U.S. humanity, justice and virtue. Isn't that so? Can you find a trace of humanity, justice or virtue in the White Paper or in Acheson's Letter of Transmittal?

True, the United States has science and technology. But unfortunately they are in the grip of the capitalists, not in the hands of the people, and are used to exploit and oppress the people at home and to perpetrate aggression and to slaughter people abroad. There is also "democracy" in the United States. But unfortunately it is only another name for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by itself. The United States has plenty of money. But unfortunately it is willing to give money only to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who are rotten to the core. The United States, it is said, is and will be quite willing to give money to its fifth column in China, but is unwilling to give it to the ordinary run of liberals or democratic individualists, who are much too bookish and do not know how to appreciate favours, and naturally it is even more unwilling to give money to the Communists. Money may be given, but only conditionally. What is the condition? Follow the United States. The Americans have sprinkled some relief flour in Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to see who will stoop to pick it up. Like Chiang Tai Kung fishing, [6] they have cast the line for the fish who want to be caught. But he who swallows food handed out in contempt [7] will get a bellyache.

We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the Kuomintang reactionaries. Wen Yi-to rose to his full height and smote the table, angrily faced the Kuomintang pistols and died rather than submit.[8] Chu Tse-ching, though seriously ill, starved to death rather than accept U.S. "relief food".[9] Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty wrote a "Eulogy of Po Yi", [10] praising a man with quite a few "democratic individualist" ideas, who shirked his duty towards the people of his own country, deserted his post and opposed the people's war of liberation of that time, led by King Wu. He lauded the wrong man. We should write eulogies of Wen Yi-to and Chu Tse-ching who demonstrated the heroic spirit of our nation.

What matter if we have to face some difficulties? Let them blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years! By that time all of China's problems will have been solved. Will the Chinese cower before difficulties when they are not afraid even of death? Lao Tzu said, "The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?" [11] U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, have not only "threatened" us with death but actually put many of us to death. Besides



people like Wen Yi-to, they have killed millions of Chinese in the last three years with U.S. carbines, machine-guns, mortars, bazookas, howitzers, tanks and bombs dropped from aeroplanes. This situation is now coming to an end. They have been defeated. It is we who are going in to attack them, not they who are coming out to attack us. They will soon be finished. True, the few problems left to us, such as blockade, unemployment, famine, inflation and rising prices, are difficulties, but we have already begun to breathe more easily than in the past three years. We have come triumphantly through the ordeal of the last three years, why can't we overcome these few difficulties of today? Why can't we live without the United States?

When the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtse River, the U.S. colonial government at Nanking fled helter-skelter. Yet His Excellency Ambassador Stuart sat tight, watching wide-eyed, hoping to set up shop under a new signboard and to reap some profit. But what did he see? Apart from the People's Liberation Army marching past, column after column, and the workers, peasants and students rising in hosts, he saw something else -- the Chinese liberals or democratic individualists turning out in force, shouting slogans and talking revolution together with the workers, peasants, soldiers and students. In short, he was left out in the cold, "standing all alone, body and shadow comforting each other". [12] There was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, his briefcase under his arm.

There are still some intellectuals and other people in China who have muddled ideas and illusions about the United States. Therefore we should explain things to them, win them over, educate them and unite with them, so they will come over to the side of the people and not fall into the snares set by imperialism. But the prestige of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese people is completely bankrupt, and the White Paper is a record of its bankruptcy. Progressives should make good use of the White Paper to educate the Chinese people.

Leighton Stuart has departed and the White Paper has arrived. Very good. Very good. Both events are worth celebrating.

## NOTES

1. John Leighton Stuart, who was born in China in 1876, was always a loyal agent of U.S. cultural aggression in China. He started missionary work in China in 1905 and in 1919 became president of Yenching University, which was established by the United States in Peking. On July 11, 1946, he was appointed U.S. ambassador to China. He actively supported the Kuomintang reactionaries in prosecuting the civil war and carried out various political intrigues against the Chinese people. On August 2, 1949, because all the efforts of U.S. imperialism to obstruct the victory of the Chinese people's revolution had completely failed, Leighton Stuart had to leave China quietly.

2. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the armed forces of the United States, with the purpose of aggression against China's territory and sovereignty and of interference in her domestic affairs, landed in China and stationed themselves at Peiping, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Tangshan, Kaiping, Chinwangtao, Chinghai, Tsingtao and other places. In addition, they repeatedly invaded the Liberated Areas. On July 29, 1946, U.S. troops in Tientsin, in co-ordination with Chiang Kai-shek's bandit troops, assaulted the town of Anping, Hsiangho County, Hopei Province; this is the Anping Incident referred to in the text. On March 1, 1947, U.S. troops made a military reconnaissance of the position of the People's Liberation Army at Hohsipao, situated between Changchun and Chintai in northeastern China. On June 16, 1946, U.S. troops at Tangshan, Hopei Province, raided Sungchiaying and other places; in July they raided Sanho Village, Luanhsien County, and Hsihonan Village, Changli County, both near Tangshan. Of the numerous attacks on the Eastern Shantung Peninsula, the most widely-known were two, one by U.S. aircraft and warships on Langnuankou and Hsiaoli Island, Mouping County, on August 28, 1947, and the other by U.S. forces on Wanglintao Village, north of Chimo County, on December 25, 1947 in co-ordination with Chiang Kai-shek's bandit troops. In all these cases in which the U.S. forces committed acts of aggression by invading the Liberated Areas, the Chinese People's Liberation Army or the local people's armed forces took just action in self-defence.

3. Claire Lee Chennault was at one time U.S. adviser to the Kuomintang government's air force. After the Japanese surrender, he organized a group of the U.S. 14th Air Force personnel into an air transport corps to help the Kuomintang fight the civil war. His air transport corps took a direct part in the criminal reconnoitring and bombing of the Liberated Areas.

4. See "On the Outrages by British Warships -- Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", Note 4, p. 403 of this volume.

5. On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall made a speech at Harvard University, putting forward a plan for so-called U.S. "aid" to rehabilitate Europe. The "European Recovery Programme" subsequently drawn up by the U.S. government on the basis of the speech was known as the "Marshall Plan".

6. Chiang Tai Kung lived in the Chou Dynasty. According to a legend, he once fished in the Weishui River, holding a rod without hook or bait three feet above the water, and saying, "The fish that is destined to be caught will come up." (From Stories About King Wu's Expedition Against the Yin Dynasty.)

7. "Food handed out in contempt" refers to alms handed out as an insult. It is an allusion to a story in the Book of Rites, which tells of a hungry man in the State of Chi, who would rather starve to death than accept food given him insultingly.

8. Wen Yi-to (1899-1946), famed Chinese poet, scholar and university professor. In 1943 he began to take an active part in the struggle for democracy out of bitter hatred for the reaction and corruption of the Chiang Kai-shek government. After the War of Resistance Against Japan, he vigorously opposed the Kuomintang's conspiracy with U.S. imperialism to start civil war against the people. On July 15, 1946, he was assassinated in Kunming by Kuomintang thugs.

9. Chu Tse-ching (1898-1948) Chinese man of letters and university professor. After the War of Resistance, he actively supported the student movement against the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In June 1948 he signed a declaration protesting against the revival of Japanese militarism, which was being fostered by the United States, and rejecting "U.S. relief" flour. He was then living in great poverty. He died in Peiping on August 12, 1948, from poverty and illness, but even on his death-bed he enjoined his family not to buy the U.S. flour rationed by the Kuomintang government.

10. Han Yu (768-824) was a famous writer of the Tang Dynasty. "Eulogy of Po Yi" was a prose piece written by him. Po Yi, who lived towards the end of the Yin Dynasty, opposed the expedition of King Wu of Chou against the House of Yin. After the downfall of the House of Yin, he fled to the Shouyang Mountain and starved to death rather than eat of Chou grain.

11. A quotation from Lao Tzu Chapter LXXIV.

12. A quotation from Li Mi's "Memorial to the Emperor".

## Appendix Article 4

### 关于重庆谈判

(一九四五年十月十七日)

讲一讲目前的时局问题。这是同志们所关心的问题。这一次，国共两党在重庆谈判，谈了四十三天。谈判的结果，已经在报上公布了(1)。现在两党的代表，还在继续谈判。这次谈判是有收获的。国民党承认了和平团结的方针和人民的某些民主权利，承认了避免内战，两党和平合作建设新中国。这是达成了协议的。还有没有达成协议的。解放区的问题没有解决，军队的问题实际上也没有解决。已经达成的协议，还只是纸上的东西。纸上的东西并不等于现实的东西。事实证明，要把它变成现实的东西，还要经过很大的努力。

国民党一方面同我们谈判，另一方面又在积极进攻解放区。包围陕甘宁边区的军队不算，直接进攻解放区的国民党军队已经有八十万人。现在一切有解放区的地方，都在打仗，或者在准备打仗。《双十协定》上第一条就是“和平建国”，写在纸上的话和事实岂不矛盾？是的，是矛盾的。所以说，要把纸上的东西变成实际，还要靠我们的努力。为什么国民党要动员那么多的军队向我们进攻呢？因为它的主意老早定了，就是要消灭人民的力量，消灭我们。最好是很快消灭；纵然不能很快消灭，也要使我们的形势更不利，它的形势更有利一些。和平这一条写在协定上面，但是事实上并没有实现。现在有些地方的仗打得相当大，例如在山西的上党区。太行山、太岳山、中条山的中间，有一个脚盆，就是上党区。在那个脚盆里，有鱼有肉，阎锡山派了十三个师去抢。我们的方针也是老早定了的，就是针锋相对，寸土必争。这一回，我们“对”了，“争”了，而且“对”得很好，“争”得很好。就是说，把他们的十三个师全部消灭。他们进攻的军队共计三万八千人，我们出动三万一千人。他们的三万八千被消灭了三万五千，逃掉两千，散掉一千(2)。这样的仗，还要打下去。我们解放区的地方，他们要拚命来争。这个问题好像不可解释。他们为什么要这样地争呢？在我们手里，在人民手里，不是很好吗？这是我们的想法，人民的想法。要是他们也是这样想，那就统一了，都是“同志”了。可是，他们不会这样想，他们要坚决反对我们。不反对我们，他们想不开。他们来进攻，是很自然的。我们解放区的地方让他们抢了去，我们也想不开。我们反击，也是很自然的。两个想不开，合在一块，就要打仗。既然是两个想不开，为什么又谈判，又成立《双十协定》呢？世界上的事情是复杂的，是由各方面的因素决定的。看问题要从各方面去看，不能只从单方面看。在重庆，有些人认为，蒋介石是靠不住的，是骗人的，要同他谈判出什么结果是不可能的。我遇到许多人都给我这样说过，其中也有国民党员。我向他们说，你们说的是有理由的，有根据的，积十八年之经验(3)，深知是这么一回事。国共两党一定谈判不好，一定要打仗，一定要破裂，但是这只是事情的一个方面。事情还有另外一个方面，还有许多因素，使得蒋介石还不能

不有很多顾忌。这里主要有三个因素：解放区的强大，大后方(4)人民的反对内战和国际形势。我们解放区有一万万人民、一百万军队、两百万民兵，这个力量，任何人也不敢小视。我们党在国内政治生活中所处的地位，已经不是一九二七年时候的情况了，也不是一九三七年时候的情况了。国民党从来不肯承认共产党的平等地位，现在也只好承认了。我们解放区的工作，已经影响到全中国、全世界了。大后方的人民都希望和平，需要民主。我这次在重庆，就深深地感到广大的人民热烈地支持我们，他们不满意国民党政府，把希望寄托在我们方面。我又看到许多外国人，其中也有美国人，对我们很同情。广大的外国人民不满意中国的反动势力，同情中国人民的力量。他们也不赞成蒋介石的政策。我们在全中国、全世界有很多朋友，我们不是孤立的。反对中国内战，主张和平、民主的，不只是我们解放区的人民，还有大后方的广大人民和全世界的广大人民。蒋介石的主观愿望是要坚持独裁和消灭共产党，但是要实现他的愿望，客观上有很多困难。这样，使他不能不讲现实主义。人家讲现实主义，我们也讲现实主义。人家讲现实主义来邀请，我们讲现实主义去谈判。我们八月二十八日到达重庆，二十九日晚上，我就向国民党的代表说：从九一八事变以后，就产生了和平团结的需要。我们要求了，但是没有实现。到西安事变以后、“七七”抗战以前，才实现了。抗战八年，大家一致打日本。但是内战是没有断的，不断的大大小小的磨擦。要说没有内战，是欺骗，是不符合实际的。八年中，我们一再表示愿意谈判。我们在党的七次代表大会上也这样声明：只要国民党当局“一旦愿意放弃其错误的现行政策，同意民主改革，我们是愿意和他们恢复谈判的”(5)。在谈判中间，我们提出，第一条中国要和平，第二条中国要民主，蒋介石没有理由反对，只好赞成。

《会谈纪要》上所发表的和平方针和若干民主协议，一方面是写在纸上的，还不是现实的东西；另一方面也是由各方面力量决定的。解放区人民的力量，大后方人民的力量，国际形势，大势所趋，使得国民党不得不承认这些东西。

“针锋相对”，要看形势。有时候不去谈，是针锋相对；有时候去谈，也是针锋相对。从前不去是对的，这次去也是对的，都是针锋相对。这一次我们去得好，击破了国民党说共产党不要和平、不要团结的谣言。他们连发三封电报邀请我们，我们去了，可是他们毫无准备，一切提案都要由我们提出。谈判的结果，国民党承认了和平团结的方针。这样很好。国民党再发动内战，他们就在全国和全世界面前输了理，我们就更有理由采取自卫战争，粉碎他们的进攻。成立了《双十协定》以后，我们的任务就是坚持这个协定，要国民党兑现，继续争取和平。如果他们要打，就把他们彻底消灭。事情就是这样，他来进攻，我们把他消灭了，他就舒服了。消灭一点，舒服一点；消灭得多，舒服得多；彻底消灭，彻底舒服。中国的问题是复杂的，我们的脑子也要复杂一点。人家打来了，我们就打，打是为了争取和平。不给敢于进攻解放区的反动派很大的打击，和平是不会来的。

有些同志问，为什么要让出八个解放区(6)？让出这八块地方非常可惜，但是以让出为好。为什么可惜？因为这是人民用血汗创造出来的、艰苦地建设起来的解放区。所以在让出的地方，必须和当地的人民解释清楚，要作妥善的处置。为什么要让出呢？因为国民党不安心。人家要回南京，南方的一些解放区，在他的床旁边，或者在他的过道上，我们在那里，人家就是不能安心睡觉，所以无论如何也要来争。在这一点上我们采取让步，就有利于击破国民党的内战阴谋，取得国内外广大中间分子的同情。现在全国所有的宣传机关，除了新华社，都控制在国民党手里。它们都是谣言制造厂。这一次谈判，它们造谣说：共产党就是要地盘，不肯让步。我们的方针是保护人民的基本利益。在不损害人民基本利益的原则下，容许作一些让步，用这些让步去换得全国人民需要的和平和民主。我们过去和蒋介石办交涉，也作过让步，并且比现在的还大。在一九三七年，为了实现全国抗战，我们自动取消了工农革命政府的名称，红军也改名为国民革命军，还把没收地主土地改为减租减息。这一次，我们在南方让出若干地区，就在全国人民和全世界人民面前，使国民党的谣言完全破产。军队的问题也是这样。国民党宣传说，共产党就是争枪杆子。我们说，准备让步。我们先提出把我们的军队由现在的数目缩编成四十八个师。国民党的军队是二百六十三个师，我们占六分之一。后来我们又提出缩编到四十三个师，占七分之一。国民党说，他们的军队要缩编到一百二十个师。我们说，照比例减下来，我们的军队可以缩编到二十四个师，还可以少到二十个师，还是占七分之一。国民党军队官多兵少，一个师不到六千人。照他们的编法，我们一百二十万人的军队，就可以编二百个师。但是我们不这样做。这样一来，他们无话可说，一切谣言都破产了。是不是要把我们的枪交给他们呢？那也不是。交给他们，他们岂不又多了！人民的武装，一枝枪、一粒子弹，都要保存，不能交出去。

上面就是我向同志们讲的时局问题。目前时局的发展，有许多矛盾现象。为什么国共谈判中有些问题可以达成协议，有些问题又不能达成协议？为什么《会谈纪要》上说要和平团结，而实际上又在打仗？这种矛盾现象，有些同志想不开。我的讲话就是答复这些问题。有的同志不能了解，蒋介石历来反共反人民，为什么我们又愿意同他谈判呢？我党七次代表大会决定，只要国民党的政策有所转变，我们就愿意同他们谈判，这对不对呢？这是完全对的。中国的革命是长期的，胜利的取得是逐步的。中国的前途如何，靠我们大家的努力如何来决定。在半年左右的时间内，局势还会是动荡不定的。我们要加倍地努力，争取局势的发展有利于全国人民。

还讲一点我们的工作。在座的有些同志要往前方去。许多同志满腔热忱，争着出去工作，这种积极性和热情，是很可贵的。但是也有个别的同志抱着错误的想法，不是想到那里有许多困难需要解决，而是认为那里的一切都很顺利，比延安舒服。有没有人这样想呢？我看是有的。我劝这些同志改正自己的想法。去，是为了工作去的。什么叫工作，工作就是斗争。那些

地方有困难、有问题，需要我们去解决。我们是为着解决困难去工作、去斗争的。越是困难的地方越是要去，这才是好同志。那些地方的工作是很艰苦的。艰苦的工作就像担子，摆在我们的面前，看我们敢不敢承担。担子有轻有重。有的人拈轻怕重，把重担子推给人家，自己拣轻的挑。这就不是好的态度。有的同志不是这样，享受让给人家，担子拣重的挑，吃苦在别人前头，享受在别人后头。这样的同志就是好同志。这种共产主义者的精神，我们都要学习。

有许多本地的干部，现在要离乡背井，到前方去。还有许多出生在南方的干部，从前从南方到了延安，现在也要到前方去。所有到前方去的同志，都应当做好精神准备，准备到了那里，就要生根、开花、结果。我们共产党人好比种子，人民好比土地。我们到了一个地方，就要同那里的人民结合起来，在人民中间生根、开花。我们的同志不论到什么地方，都要把和群众的关系搞好，要关心群众，帮助他们解决困难。团结广大人民，团结得越多越好。放手发动群众，壮大人民力量，在我们党的领导下，打败侵略者，建设新中国。这是党的七次代表大会的方针，我们要为这个方针奋斗。中国的事情，要靠共产党办，靠人民办。我们有决心、有办法实现和平，实现民主。只要我们同全体人民更好地团结起来了，中国的事情就好办了。

第二次世界大战以后的世界，前途是光明的。这是总的趋势。伦敦五国外长会议失败了(7)，是不是就要打第三次世界大战呢？不会的。试想第二次世界大战刚刚打完，怎么就可能打第三次世界大战呢？资本主义国家和社会主义国家在许多国际事务上，还是会妥协的，因为妥协有好处(8)。反苏反共的战争，全世界的无产阶级和人民都坚决反对。在最近的三十年内，打过两次世界大战。在第一次大战和第二次大战之间，间隔了二十几年。人类历史五十万年，只有在这三十年内才打过世界战争。第一次大战以后，世界有很大进步。这一次大战以后，世界一定会进步得更快。第一次大战以后，产生了苏联，全世界产生了几十个共产党，这是从前没有过的。第二次世界大战以后，苏联更强盛了，欧洲的面貌改观了，全世界无产阶级和人民的政治觉悟更提高了，全世界的进步力量更团结了。我们中国也处在急剧的变动中间。中国发展的总趋势，也必定要变好，不能变坏。世界是在进步的，前途是光明的，这个历史的总趋势任何人也改变不了。我们应当把世界进步的情况和光明的前途，常常向人民宣传，使人民建立起胜利的信心。同时，我们还要告诉人民，告诉同志们，道路是曲折的。在革命的道路上还有许多障碍物，还有许多困难。我们党的七次代表大会设想过许多困难，我们宁肯把困难想得更多一些。有些同志不愿意多想困难。但是困难是事实，有多少就得承认多少，不能采取“不承认主义”。我们要承认困难，分析困难，向困难作斗争。世界上没有直路，要准备走曲折的路，不要贪便宜。不能设想，哪一天早上，一切反动派会统统自己跪在地下。总之，前途是光明的，道路是曲折的。我们面前困难还多，不可忽视。我们和全体人民团结起来，共同努力，一定能够排除万难，达到胜利的目的。

## 注 释

(1) 这里是指一九四五年十月十日国共双方代表签订的会谈纪要，即《双十协定》。在这个纪要中，国民党表面上不得不同意中国共产党提出的和平建国的基本方针，承认“以和平、民主、团结、统一为基础，……长期合作，坚决避免内战，建设独立、自由和富强的新中国”，“政治民主化、军队国家化及党派平等合法，为达到和平建国必由之途径”；也不得不同意迅速结束国民党的训政，召开政治协商会议，“保证人民享受一切民主国家人民在平时应享受的身体、信仰、言论、出版、集会、结社之自由，现行法令当依此原则，分别予以废止或修正”，取消特务机关，“严禁司法和警察以外机关有拘捕、审讯和处罚人民之权”，“释放政治犯”，“积极推行地方自治，实行由下而上的普选”等。同时，国民党却顽固地拒绝承认人民军队和解放区民主政权的合法地位，并妄图在“统一军令”和“统一政令”的借口下，根本取消中国共产党领导的人民军队和解放区，以致无法就这个问题达成协议。下面是《会谈纪要》上关于解放区的军队和政权问题谈判经过的记载，里面的所谓“政府方面”是说国民政府。

“关于军队国家化问题，中共方面提出：政府应公平合理地整编全国军队，确定分期实施计划，并重划军区，确定征补制度，以谋军令之统一。在此计划下，中共愿将其所领导的抗日军队由现有数目缩编至二十四师至少二十个师的数目，并表示可迅速将其所领导而散布在广东、浙江、苏南、皖南、皖中、湖南、湖北、河南（豫北不在内）八个地区的抗日军队着手复员，并从上述地区逐步撤退应整编的部队至陇海路以北及苏北、皖北的解放区集中。政府方面表示：全国整编计划正在进行，此次提出商谈之各项问题，果能全盘解决，则中共所领导的抗日军队缩编至二十个师的数目，可以考虑。关于驻地问题，可由中共方面提出方案，讨论决定。中共方面提出：中共及地方军事人员应参加军事委员会及其各部的工作，政府应保障人事制度，任用原部队人员为整编后的部队的各级官佐，编余官佐，应实行分区训练，设立公平合理的补给制度，并确定政治教育计划。政府方面表示：所提各项，均无问题，亦愿商谈详细办法。中共方面提出：解放区民兵应一律编为地方自卫队。政府方面表示：只能视地方情势有必要与可能时，酌量编置。为具体计划本项所述各问题起见，双方同意组织三人小组（军令部、军政部及第十八集团军各派一人）进行之。”

“关于解放区地方政府问题，中共方面提出：政府应承认解放区各级民选政府的合法地位。政府方面表示：解放区名词在日本投降以后，应成为过去，全国政令必须统一。中共方面开始提出的方案为：依照现有十八个解放区的情形，重划省区和行政区，并即以原由民选之各级地方政府名单呈请中央加委，以谋政令之统一。政府方面表示：依据蒋主席曾向毛先生表示：在全国军令政令统一以后，中央可考虑中共所荐之行政人选。收复区内原任抗战行政工作



人员，政府可依其工作能力与成绩，酌量使其继续为地方服务，不因党派关系而有所差别。于是中共方面提出第二种解决方案，请中央于陕甘宁边区及热河、察哈尔、河北、山东、山西五省委任中共推选之人员为省府主席及委员，于绥远、河南、江苏、安徽、湖北、广东六省委任中共推选之人为省府副主席及委员（因以上十一省或有广大解放区或有部分解放区），于北平、天津、青岛、上海四特别市委任中共推选之人为副市长，于东北各省容许中共推选之人参加行政。此事讨论多次，后中共方面对上述提议，有所修改，请委任省府主席及委员者改为陕甘宁边区及热、察、冀、鲁四省，请委省府副主席及委员者，改为晋、绥两省，请委副市长者改为北平、天津、青岛三特别市。政府方面对此表示：中共对于其抗战卓著勤劳，且在政治上具有能力之同志，可提请政府决定任用，倘要由中共推荐某某省主席及委员，某某省副主席等，则即非真诚做到军令政令之统一。于是中共方面表示可放弃第二种主张，改提第三种解决方案：由解放区各级民选政府重新举行人民普选，在政治协商会议派员监督之下，欢迎各党派、各界人士还乡参加选举。凡一县有过半数区乡已实行民选者，即举行县级民选。凡一省或一行政区有过半数县已实行民选者，即举行省级或行政区民选。选出之省区县政府，一律呈请中央加委，以谋政令之统一。政府方面表示：此种省区加委方式，乃非谋政令之统一，惟县级民选可以考虑，省级民选须待宪法颁布，省的地位确定以后方可实施。目前只能由中央任命之省政府前往各地接管行政，俾即恢复常态。至此，中共方面提出第四种解决方案：各解放区暂维持现状不变，留待宪法规定民选省级政府实施后再行解决，而目前则规定临时办法，以保证和平秩序之恢复。同时，中共方面认为：可将此项问题，提交政治协商会议解决。政府方面则以政令统一必须提前实现，此项问题久悬不决，虑为和平建设之障碍，仍亟盼能商得具体解决方案。中共方面亦同意继续商谈。”

（2）上党区，指山西省东南部以长治为中心的山区，古属上党郡。这一带的山区在抗日战争时期是八路军一二九师的根据地，属于晋冀鲁豫解放区。一九四五年八月中旬，国民党军阎锡山部集中十三个师的兵力，在日伪军的配合下，先后自临汾、浮山、翼城和太原、榆次出发，侵入晋东南解放区的襄垣、屯留、长治、潞城等地。九月十日至十月十二日，解放区军民展开自卫反击，举行了上党战役。这次战役，共歼灭国民党军十一个师及一个挺进纵队三万五千余人，生俘军长史泽波和师长多名。

（3）“积十八年之经验”，指自一九二七年国民党背叛革命起到一九四五年止中国共产党同它作斗争的经验。

（4）见本书第二卷《和中央社、扫荡报、新民报三记者的谈话》注（3）。

（5）见《论联合政府》（本书第3卷第1069页）。

(6) 指分布在广东、浙江、苏南、皖南、皖中、湖南、湖北、河南（豫北不在内）等八个省区内的人民军队在抗日战争时期所建立的根据地。

(7) 苏、中、美、英、法五国外长会议是根据一九四五年八月波茨坦协定而设立的，自一九四五年至一九四九年共举行六次会议。这里所说的伦敦五国外长会议是指一九四五年九月十一日至十月二日在伦敦举行的第一次五国外长会议。会议讨论了同曾参与法西斯德国侵略战争的意大利、罗马尼亚、保加利亚、匈牙利、芬兰签订和平条约以及处理意大利的殖民地等问题。在讨论对罗、保、匈三国和约草案时，美英无理要求罗、保、匈三国民主政府辞职或改组；美英还违背波茨坦协定，给予法国参加讨论和约的权利，遭到苏联拒绝；苏联提议讨论成立对日本的管制委员会问题这一合理主张，也被美国拒绝。由于上述分歧，这次会议没有达成协议。

(8) 参见本卷《关于目前国际形势的几点估计》。

#### **Appendix Article 4 (English translation)**

#### **ON THE CHUNGKING NEGOTIATIONS**

October 17, 1945

Let us talk about the present situation. That is what our comrades are interested in. This time the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at Chungking have lasted forty-three days. The results have already been published in the newspapers.[1] The representatives of the two parties are continuing to negotiate. The negotiations have borne fruit. The Kuomintang has accepted the principles of peace and unity, recognized certain democratic rights of the people and agreed that civil war should be averted and that the two parties should co-operate in peace to build a new China. On these points agreement has been reached. There are other points on which there is no agreement. The question of the Liberated Areas has not been solved, and that of the armed forces has not really been solved either. The agreements reached are still only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. Facts have shown that a very great effort must still be made before they can be turned into reality.

The Kuomintang is negotiating with us on the one hand, and is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas on the other hand. Not counting the forces surrounding the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, 800,000 Kuomintang troops are already directly engaged in these attacks. Wherever there are Liberated Areas, fighting is going on or being prepared. The very first article of the "October 10th Agreement" is on "peace and national reconstruction"; don't these words on paper contradict reality?

Yes, they do. That is why we say it still requires effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. Why does the Kuomintang mobilize so many troops to attack us? Because long ago it made up its mind to wipe out the people's forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, it would like to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, to worsen our situation and improve its own. Peace, though written into the agreement, has not in fact been realized. In places like the Shangtang area in Shansi Province there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangtang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyueh and Chungtiao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yen Hsi-shan sent thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago -- to give tit for tat, to fight for every inch of land. This time we gave tit for tat, fought and made a very good job of it. In other words, we wiped out all thirteen divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men, and we employed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 men, 35,000 were destroyed, 2,000 fled and 1,000 scattered.[2] Such fighting will continue. They want desperately to grab our Liberated Areas. This seems hard to explain. Why are they so anxious to grab? Isn't it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands, in the hands of the people? Yes, but that is only what we think, what the people think. If they thought so too, there would be unity and we would all be "comrades". But they won't think this way; they will oppose us stubbornly. They can't see why they shouldn't oppose us. It is quite natural that they should attack us. For our part, we can't see why we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. It is also quite natural that we should counter-attack. When two "can't-see-whys" come together, they fight. Since there are two can't-see-whys, why have they negotiated? And why have they concluded the "October 10th Agreement"? In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not from just one. In Chungking, some people think that Chiang Kai-shek is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere. So I was told by many people I met, including some members of the Kuomintang. I told them that what they said was justified and well-founded and that we were firmly convinced by eighteen years of experience [3] that this would be the case. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many other factors are bound to make Chiang Kai-shek have misgivings. Among these factors, the three main ones are the might of the Liberated Areas, the opposition to civil war by the people in the Great Rear Area and the international situation. In our Liberated Areas there are 100 million people, one million troops and two million people's militia, a force no one dares to belittle. Our Party's place in the nation's political life is no longer what it was in 1927, nor what it was in 1937. The Kuomintang, which has always refused to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, is now forced to do so. Our work in the Liberated Areas has already influenced all China and the whole world. The people in the Great Rear Area desire peace and need democracy. When in Chungking, I had a profound sense of the warm support given us by the broad masses of the people. They are dissatisfied with the Kuomintang government and place their hopes on us. I also met many foreigners, including Americans, who sympathize with us. The broad masses of the people in foreign countries are

dissatisfied with the reactionary forces in China and sympathize with the Chinese people's forces. They also disapprove of Chiang Kai-shek's policies. We have many friends in all parts of the country and of the world; we are not isolated. Those who oppose civil war in China and stand for peace and democracy include not only the people in our Liberated Areas but also the masses in the Great Rear Area and throughout the world. The subjective desire of Chiang Kai-shek is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. He is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chungking on August 28. On the evening of the 28th, I told the Kuomintang representatives that the country had needed peace and unity ever since the September 18th Incident in 1931.[4] We had asked for peace and unity, but they had not materialized. Peace and unity materialized only after the Sian Incident of 1936[5] before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on July 7, 1937. During the eight years of that war we fought together against Japan. But civil war never stopped; there were continuous frictions, big and small. To say that there was no civil war is deception and does not square with facts. In the past eight years we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate. At the Seventh Congress of our Party we declared that "we are willing to resume negotiations with the Kuomintang authorities as soon as they are willing to renounce their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms".[6] In the negotiations we declared that, first, China needs peace and, second, China needs democracy. Chiang Kai-shek could find no reason to object and had to agree. On the one hand, the policy of peace and the agreements on democracy published in the "Summary of Conversations" are words on paper and not yet reality; on the other hand, they have been determined by a variety of forces. The forces of the people in the Liberated Areas, the forces of the people in the Great Rear Area, the international situation -- the general trend has forced the Kuomintang to accept these things.

How to give "tit for tat" depends on the situation. Sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before, and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit for tat. We did well to go this time, for we exploded the rumour spread by the Kuomintang that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity. They sent three successive telegrams to invite us, and we went. But they were totally unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. As a result of the negotiations, the Kuomintang has accepted the general policy of peace and unity. That's fine. If the Kuomintang launches civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks by a war of self-defence. Now that the "October 10th Agreement" has been concluded, our task is to uphold the agreement, to demand that the Kuomintang honour it and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: if they attack and we wipe them out, they will have that satisfaction; wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction. China's

problems are complicated, and our brains must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries who dare to attack the Liberated Areas.

Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas.[7] It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built up by the people, with sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas we are going to concede. Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel easy. They are going back to Nanking, but some Liberated Areas in the south are right by their beds or in their corridor. So long as we are there, they will not be able to sleep easily and will therefore fight for those places at all costs. Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's plot for civil war and win us the sympathy of the numerous middle elements at home and abroad. All the means of propaganda in China, except the Hsinhua News Agency, are now controlled by the Kuomintang. They are all rumour factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the rumour that the Communist Party just wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace and democracy, which the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Chiang Kai-shek we also made concessions, and even larger ones. In 1937, to bring about the nation-wide War of Resistance, we voluntarily dropped the name, "Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government", changed the name of our Red Army to "National Revolutionary Army" and altered our policy of confiscating the land of the landlords to one of reducing rent and interest. This time, by conceding certain areas in the south, we have completely exploded the Kuomintang's rumours before the people of all China and the whole world. It is the same with the problem of armed forces. Kuomintang propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. But we have said we are ready to make concessions. First, we proposed cutting our present armed strength to 48 divisions. As the Kuomintang has 263 divisions, this means our strength would be about a sixth of the total. Later, we proposed a further reduction to 43 divisions, about a seventh of the total. The Kuomintang then said they would reduce to 120 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to 24 or even 20 divisions, which would still be only a seventh of the total. In the Kuomintang army the proportion of officers as compared to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is under 6,000. By their standard, we could form 200 divisions out of our 1,200,000 men. But we are not going to do so. Therefore the Kuomintang can say nothing more and all their rumours are bankrupt. Does this mean that we are going to hand over our guns to the Kuomintang? Not that either. If we hand over our guns, won't the Kuomintang have too many? The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over.

The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation. Its development shows many contradictions. In the negotiations between the Kuomintang and our Party, why is there agreement on some questions and not on others? Why does the "Summary of Conversations" speak of peace and unity, while fighting is actually going on? Some comrades just can't understand such contradictions. What I have said is meant to answer these questions. Some comrades can't understand why we should be willing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, who has always been anti-Communist and against the people. Was our Party right or wrong in deciding at its Seventh Congress that we were willing to negotiate with the Kuomintang, provided they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolution is a long one and victory can only be won step by step. China's future depends on our exertions. The situation will remain in flux for six months or so. We must redouble our efforts to make it develop in a direction favourable to the people of the whole country.

Now, a few more words about our work. Some comrades present will be leaving for the front. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with each other for the opportunity to go to work there, and this active and fervent spirit is very valuable. But there are also a few comrades who have mistaken ideas, who don't think of the many difficulties to be overcome, but believe that everything will be plain sailing at the front and that they will have an easier time than in Yen-an. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes, it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. There are difficulties and problems in those places for us to overcome and solve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is hard. Hard work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Some loads are light, some heavy. Some people prefer the light to the heavy; they pick the light and leave the heavy to others. That is not a good attitude. Some comrades are different; they leave ease and comfort to others and carry the heavy loads themselves; they are the first to bear hardships, the last to enjoy comforts. They are good comrades. We should all learn from their communist spirit.

Many local cadres will be leaving their native places for the front. And many southern-born cadres who came to Yen-an are also going to the front. All comrades going to the front should be mentally prepared, once there, to take root, blossom and bear fruit. We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people, take root and blossom among them. Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more of the masses we unite with, the better. We must go all out to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the aggressor and build a new China. This is the policy laid down by the Party's Seventh Congress.[8] We must strive to carry it out. China depends on the Communist Party and the people to run her affairs. We have the will and the way to achieve peace

and democracy. Provided we unite even more closely with the whole people, China's affairs can be run well.

The world after World War II has a bright future. This is the general trend. Does the failure of the Five Power Conference of Foreign Ministers in London[9] mean that a third world war is about to break out? No. Just think, how is it possible for a third world war to break out right after the end of World War II? The capitalist and the socialist countries will yet reach compromises on a number of international matters, because compromise will be advantageous.[10] The proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist war. In the past thirty years two world wars have been fought. Between World Wars I and II there was an interval of more than twenty years. In the half million years of human history, it is only in the last thirty years that world wars have been fought. After World War I the world made great progress. After World War II the world is sure to make even faster progress. Following World War I the Soviet Union was born and scores of Communist Parties were founded -- they did not exist before. After the end of World War II the Soviet Union is much stronger, the face of Europe is changed, the political consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the world is much higher and the progressive forces throughout the world are more closely united. Our China is also undergoing rapid and drastic change. The general trend of China's development is certainly for the better, not the worse. The world is progressing, the future is bright and no one can change this general trend of history. We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead so that they will build their confidence in victory. At the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there will be twists and turns in our road. There are still many obstacles and difficulties along the road of revolution. The Seventh Congress of our Party assumed that the difficulties would be many, for we preferred to assume there would be more difficulties rather than less. Some comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts; we must recognize as many difficulties as there are and should not adopt a "policy of non-recognition". We must recognize difficulties, analyse them and combat them. There are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road which twists and turns and not try to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. In a word, while the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns. There are still many difficulties ahead which we must not overlook. By uniting with the entire people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory.

## NOTES

1. This refers to the "Summary of Conversations", also known as the "October 10th Agreement", which was signed by representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China on October 10, 1945. In the summary, Chiang Kai-shek had to feign agreement with the "basic policy of

peace and national reconstruction" put forward by the Communist Party of China and accept "long-term co-operation on the basis of peace, democracy, solidarity and unity . . . resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of a new China, independent, free, prosperous and powerful" and "democratization of political life, nationalization of troops and equality and legality of political parties as ways and means absolutely essential for achieving peace and national reconstruction". He also had to agree to bring the Kuomintang's political tutelage to a speedy conclusion, convene a political consultative conference, "guarantee the freedoms of person, belief, speech, the press, assembly and association as enjoyed by the people in all democratic countries in peacetime, and abolish or amend existing laws and decrees according to this principle", abolish the secret services, "strictly prohibit all organs other than those of the judiciary and police from making arrests, conducting trials and imposing punishment", "release political prisoners", "actively carry out local self-government and conduct general elections from the lower level upward" etc. The Chiang Kai-shek government, however, stubbornly refused to recognize the legal status of the people's army and the democratic governments in the Liberated Areas and, on the pretexts of "unifying the military command" and "unifying government administration", insolently tried to eliminate altogether the people's army and the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party of China; consequently no agreement could be reached on this question. The following are excerpts from the "Summary of Conversations" concerning the negotiations on the problem of the armed forces and political power in the Liberated Areas; in the "Summary" the so-called "Government" refers to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government.

"On the nationalization of troops. The Communist Party of China proposed that with a view to unifying the military command the Government should effect an equitable and rational reorganization of the armed forces of the whole country, draw up a programme for carrying it out in stages, make a fresh delimitation of the military zones and establish a conscription and replenishment system. The Communist Party of China stated that, given such a programme, it was ready to reduce the anti-Japanese troops under its command to twenty-four divisions or to a minimum of twenty divisions and to take prompt action to demobilize its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas of Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan (not including northern Honan). The troops to be reorganized would be gradually withdrawn from the above areas to assemble in the Liberated Areas north of the Lunghai Railway and in northern Kiangsu and northern Anhwei. The Government stated that the programme for the reorganization of troops on a country-wide basis was under way and that the Government was willing to consider the reorganization of the anti-Japanese troops led by the Communist Party of China into twenty divisions, if the issues coming up in the present negotiations could all be settled. As to the question of the stationing of these troops, it stated further that the Communist Party of China could submit plans for discussion and decision. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Communist Party and its



local military personnel should participate in the work of the National Military Council and its various departments, that the Government should preserve the existing personnel system and commission the existing personnel as officers of various ranks in the reorganized units, that officers not receiving appointment after reorganization should be assigned to different areas for training and that a fair and reasonable system for filling vacancies and a plan for political education should be adopted. The Government indicated that it had no objection to these proposals and was willing to discuss details. The Communist Party of China proposed that all the militiamen in the Liberated Areas should be organized into local self-defence corps. The Government indicated that such organization could be considered only where local conditions would so require or permit. In order to formulate concrete plans in regard to all the questions mentioned in this section, both sides agreed that a sub-committee of three be formed, with one representative each from the Board of Military Operations of the National Military Council, the Ministry of War and the Eighteenth Group Army."

"On local governments in the Liberated Areas. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Government should recognize the legal status of the popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas. The Government indicated that, since Japan had surrendered, the term 'Liberated Area' should have become obsolete and that government administration throughout the country should be unified. The initial formula advanced by the Communist Party of China was that the provincial and administrative areas were to be delimited afresh in the light of the existence of eighteen Liberated Areas and that, for the sake of unifying government administration, it would submit a list of all the popularly elected government personnel at various levels for reappointment by the Government. The Government indicated that, as Chairman Chiang had stated to Mr. Mao, the Central Government, after the unification of the military command and government administration throughout the country, would give consideration to the administrative personnel nominated by the Communist Party of China. The Government would consider retaining a due proportion of the administrative personnel who had served in the areas recovered during the War of Resistance, taking account of their record of ability and service, irrespective of party affiliation. Thereupon, a second formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, asking the Central Government to appoint nominees of the Communist Party of China as chairmen and members of the provincial governments of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the five provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Hopei, Shantung and Shansi, and to appoint the Communist Party's nominees as deputy chairmen and members of the six provincial governments of Suiyuan, Honan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and Kwangtung (because in the aforesaid eleven provinces there were extensive Liberated Areas or sections thereof). The Communist Party of China also requested the appointment of its nominees as deputy mayors of the four special municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Shanghai and the participation of its nominees in the administration of the northeastern provinces. After many discussions on this matter, the Communist Party of China modified the aforesaid proposals by requesting the appointment of its nominees as chairmen and

members of the provincial governments of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Hopei and Shantung, as deputy chairmen and members of the two provincial governments of Shansi and Suiyuan and as deputy mayors of the three special municipalities of Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao. In reply the Government stated that while the Communist Party of China might nominate those of its members who had rendered distinguished service during the War of Resistance and who possessed administrative ability to the Government for appointment, the Communist Party would not be sincerely endeavouring to achieve unity of military command and government administration if it should insist upon nominating a chairman or deputy chairman or members of any specific provincial government. The Communist Party of China then said it would withdraw its second suggestion and proposed a third formula. It suggested that general elections be held under the existing popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas, and members of all other political parties as well as people in different walks of life would be welcome to return to their native places to take part in the elections to be held under the supervision of persons designated by the Political Consultative Conference. A popular election was to be held in any county where more than half the districts and townships had already held popular elections. Likewise, a popular election was to be held in any province or administrative area where more than half the counties had already held popular elections. In the interest of unity of government administration, the names of all the officials so elected in the provincial, administrative area and county governments should be submitted to the Central Government for appointment by confirmation. The Government replied that this formula of government confirmation of appointments in provinces and areas was not in the interest of unity of government administration. The Government might, however, consider holding popular elections for county officials, but popular elections for the provincial governments could be held only after the promulgation of a national constitution, when the status of the province would have been defined. For the time being, only those provincial government officials who had been appointed by the Central Government should proceed to take up their posts so that conditions in the recovered areas might be restored to normal at the earliest possible moment. At this point, a fourth formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, namely, that the status quo in all the Liberated Areas should temporarily be maintained until the constitutional provision for the popular election of provincial governments had been adopted and put into effect and that, for the time being, an interim arrangement be worked out in order to guarantee the restoration of peace and order. The Communist Party of China stated that meanwhile this particular problem might be submitted to the Political Consultative Conference for settlement. The Government insisted that unity of government administration must be carried out first, because this problem, if left unsolved, might become an obstacle to peace and reconstruction, and it expressed the hope that a concrete formula with regard to this matter could be agreed upon soon. The Communist Party of China agreed to hold further discussions."

2. Shangtang was an ancient name for the southeastern part of Shansi Province with Changchih as its centre. Its mountainous sections were the base of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance Against Japan and formed part of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Liberated Area. In September 1945 the Kuomintang warlord, Yen Hsi-shan, mustered thirteen divisions and, in co-ordination with Japanese and puppet troops, moved in successively from Linfen, Fushan and Yicheng and from Taiyuan and Yutse to invade Hsiangyuan, Tunliu and Lucheng in the Southeastern Shansi Liberated Area. In October the army and people of this Liberated Area counter-attacked this invading force, wiped out 35,000 men and captured several high-ranking officers, including corps and division commanders.

3. This refers to the experience gained by the Communist Party of China in its struggles with the Kuomintang from 1927, when the Kuomintang betrayed the revolution, to 1945.

4. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese "Kwantung Army" quartered in northeastern China seized Shenyang. Under Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) withdrew to the south of the Great Wall, and consequently the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. The Chinese people called this act of aggression committed by the Japanese invaders the "September 18th Incident".

5. See "On a Statement by Chiang Kai-shek's Spokesman", Note 5. p. 45 of this volume.

6. Quoted from "On Coalition Government", Part IV, Section "Our Specific Programme", Item 2, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. III.

7. This refers to the bases of the people's army scattered over Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan (not including northern Honan).

8. See "China's Two Possible Destinies" and "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. III.

9. From September 11 to October 2, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Britain and France met in London to discuss peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, countries which had taken part in the war of aggression started by fascist Germany, and to discuss the disposal of the Italian colonies. No agreement was reached because the United States, Britain and France rejected the reasonable proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and persisted in their imperialist policy of aggression aiming at overthrowing the people's governments set up in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria after victory in the anti-fascist war.

10. See "Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation", pp. 87-88 of this volume.

## Appendix Article 5

### 评战犯求和

（一九四九年一月五日）

为了保存中国反动势力和美国在华侵略势力，中国第一号战争罪犯国民党匪帮首领蒋介石在今年元旦发表了一篇求和的声明。战犯蒋介石宣称：“只要和议无害于国家的独立完整，而有助于人民的休养生息，只要神圣的宪法不由我而违反，民主宪政不因此而破坏，中华民国的国体能够确保，中华民国的法统不致中断，军队有确实的保障，人民能够维持其自由的生活方式与目前最低生活水准，则我个人更无复他求。”“只要和平果能实现，则个人的进退出处，绝不萦怀，而一惟国民的公意是从。”人们不要以为战犯求和未免滑稽，也不要以为这样的求和声明实在可恶。须知由第一号战犯国民党匪首出面求和，并且发表这样的声明，对于中国人民认识国民党匪帮和美国帝国主义的阴谋计划，有一种显然的利益。中国人民可以由此知道：原来现在喧嚷着的所谓“和平”，就是蒋介石这一伙杀人凶犯及其美国主子所迫切地需要的东西。

蒋介石供认了匪帮们的整个计划。这个计划的要点如下：

“无害于国家的独立完整”——这是首先重要的。“和平”可以，“和平”而有害于四大家族和买办地主阶级的国家的“独立完整”，那就万万不可以。“和平”而有害于中美友好通商航海条约[1]、中美空中运输协定[2]、中美双边协定[3]等项条约，有害于美国在华驻扎海陆空军，建立军事基地，开发矿产和独占贸易等项特权，有害于将中国作为美国殖民地的地位，一句话，“和平”而有害于这一切保护蒋介石反动国家的“独立完整”的办法，那就一概不可以。

“有助于人民的休养生息”——“和平”必须有助于已被击败但尚未消灭的中国反动派的休养生息，以便在休养好了之后，卷土重来，扑灭革命。“和平”就是为了这个。打了两年半了，“走狗不走”，美国人在生气，就是稍为休养一会儿也好。

“神圣的宪法不由我而违反，民主宪政不因此而破坏，中华民国的国体能够确保，中华民国的法统不致中断”——确保中国反动阶级和反动政府的统治地位，确保这个阶级和这个政府的“法统不致中断”。这个“法统”是万万“中断”不得的，倘若“中断”了，那是很危险的，整个买办地主阶级将被消灭，国民党匪帮将告灭亡，一切大中小战争罪犯将被捉拿治罪。

“军队有确实的保障”——这是买办地主阶级的命根，虽然已被可恶的人民解放军歼灭了几百万，但是现在还剩下一百几十万，务须“保障”而且“确实”。倘若“保障”而不“确

实”，买办地主阶级就没有了本钱，“法统”还是要“中断”，国民党匪帮还是要灭亡，一切大中小战犯还是要被捉拿治罪。大观园里贾宝玉的命根是系在颈上的一块石头[4]，国民党的命根是它的军队，怎么好说不“保障”，或者虽有“保障”而不“确实”呢？

“人民能够维持其自由的生活方式与目前最低生活水准”——中国买办地主阶级必须维持其向全国人民实行压迫剥削的自由和他们目前的骄奢淫逸的生活水准，中国劳动人民则必须维持其被人压迫剥削的自由和他们目前的饥寒交迫的生活水准。这是战犯求和的终极目的。倘若战犯们及其阶级不能维持其实行压迫剥削的自由和骄奢淫逸的生活水准，和平有什么用呢？而要这个，当然就要维持工人、农民、知识分子、公教人员目前这样饥寒交迫的“自由生活方式与最低生活水准”。这个条件一经我们的可爱的蒋总统提了出来，几千万的工人、手工工人和自由职业者，几万万农民，几百万的知识分子和公教人员，惟有一齐拍掌，五体投地，口称万岁。倘若共产党还不许和，不能维持这样美好的生活方式和生活水准，那就罪该万死，“今后一切责任皆由共党负之”。

上述一切，还没有包括一月一日战犯求和声明中的一切宝贝。还有另一个宝贝，这就是蒋介石在其新年致词中所说的“京沪决战”。哪里有这种“决战”的力量呢？蒋介石说：“要知道政府今天在军事、政治、经济无论哪一方面的力量，都要超过共党几倍乃至几十倍。”哎呀呀，这么大的力量怎样会不叫人们吓得要死呢？姑且把政治、经济两方面的力量放在一边不去说它们，单就“军事力量”一方面来说，人民解放军现在有三百多万人，“超过”这个数目一倍就是六百多万人，十倍就是三千多万人，“几十倍”是多少呢？姑且算作二十倍吧，就有六千多万人，无怪乎蒋总统要说“有决胜的把握”了。为什么求和呢？完全不是不能打，拿六千多万人压下去，世界上还有什么共产党或者什么别的党可以侥幸存在的呢？当然一概成了粉末。由此可见，求和决不是为了别的，完全是“为民请命”。

难道万事皆好，一个缺点也没有吗？据说缺点是有的。什么缺点呢？蒋总统说：“现在所遗憾的，是我们政府里面一部分人员受了共党恶意宣传，因之心理动摇，几乎失了自信。因为他们在精神上受了共党的威胁，所以只看见敌人的力量，而就看不见自己还有比敌人超过几十倍的大力量存在。”新闻年年皆有，今年特别不同。拥有六千多万名军官和兵士的国民党人看不见自己的六千多万，倒看见了人民解放军的三百多万，这难道还不是一条特别新闻吗？

要问：这样的新闻是否在市场上还有销路？是否还值得人们看上一眼？根据我们所得的北平城内的消息是：“元旦物价上午略跌，下午复原。”外国通讯社说：“上海对于蒋介石新年致词的反映是冷淡的。”这就答复了战犯蒋介石的销路问题。我们早就说过，蒋介石已经失了灵魂，只是一具僵尸，什么人也不相信他了。

## 注释

[1] 见本卷《迎接中国革命的新高潮》注（5）。

[2] 国民党政府和美国政府的《中美空中运输协定》，于一九四六年十二月二十日在南京签订。蒋介石在这个协定里拍卖了中国的全部领空权。按照这个协定的规定，美国飞机可以在中国到处飞行、装卸和运转，完全控制中国的空运事业。美国飞机并在中国领土内享有“非营业性降落之权”，即军事着陆权。

[3] 《中美双边协定》即所谓《中美关于经济援助之协定》，一九四八年七月三日由国民党政府和美国政府双方的代表在南京签订。这个协定规定：美国政府承允援助国民党政府，向国民党政府提供它所申请及美国政府所核准的援助；执行该协议的美方人员在中国享有与美驻华大使馆同等职员一样的优待及豁免；美国可以在中国取得它所需要的任何战略物资，国民党政府必须按时供给有关这些物资的情报；国民党政府保证美国的商品来华倾销。

[4] 贾宝玉是公元十八世纪中国著名小说《红楼梦》中的人物，大观园是贾宝玉家里的花园。据说贾宝玉出生时嘴里含着一块玉石，这玉石是他的命根，系在颈上一时也不能离开，如果丢了便会“失魂丧魄”。

## **Appendix Article 5 (English translation)**

### **ON THE WAR CRIMINAL'S SUING FOR PEACE**

January 5, 1949

In order to preserve the forces of Chinese reaction and U.S. aggression in China, Chiang Kai-shek, China's No. 1 war criminal and chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang, issued a statement on New Year's Day suing for peace. The war criminal Chiang Kai-shek says:

I have no desire of my own other than that the peace negotiations should not impair the country's independence and integrity but instead should help the rehabilitation of the people; that the sacred constitution should not be violated by my action and that democratic constitutionalism should not be thereby undermined; that the form of government of the Republic of China should be guaranteed and the legally constituted authority of the Republic of China should not be interrupted; that the armed forces should be definitely preserved and that the people should be allowed to continue their free way of life and maintain their present minimum standard of living.

. . . If only peace can be realized, I certainly do not care whether I remain in office or retire, but will abide by the common will of the people.

People should not think that there is something ridiculous about a war criminal suing for peace, nor should they think that such a bid for peace is really disgusting. It should be understood that for the No. 1 war criminal and chieftain of the Kuomintang bandit gang to sue personally for peace and issue such a statement is obviously of some benefit to the Chinese people, because it enables them to see through the plots of the Kuomintang bandit gang and the U.S. imperialists. For the Chinese people can tell from this that the "peace" about which there has lately been so much clamour is exactly what this Chiang Kai-shek gang of murderers and their U.S. master urgently need.

Chiang Kai-shek has confessed the gang's whole plot. The main points of this plot are as follows:

"The peace negotiations should not impair the country's independence and integrity" -- this is first in importance. "Peace" is all right, but "peace" is a million times wrong if it impairs the "independence and integrity" of the state of the four big families and the comprador and landlord classes. "Peace" is absolutely all wrong if it impairs such treaties as the Sino-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the Sino-U.S. Air Transport Agreement [1] and the Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement, [2] or if it impairs such prerogatives enjoyed by the United States in China as the stationing of ground, naval and air forces, the building of military bases, the exploitation of mines and the monopoly of trade, or if it interferes with China's becoming a U.S. colony -- in short, if it impairs any such measures as protect the "independence and integrity" of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary state.

"Help the rehabilitation of the people" -- that is, "peace" must help the rehabilitation of the Chinese reactionaries, who have been defeated but not yet wiped out, so that, once rehabilitated, they can stage a comeback and extinguish the revolution. This is exactly what "peace" is for. The war has been going on for two and a half years, "the running dog can no longer run" and the Americans are angry; a rest-cure, however brief, is better than none.

"The sacred constitution should not be violated by my action and democratic constitutionalism should not be thereby undermined; the form of government of the Republic of China should be guaranteed and the legally constituted authority of the Republic of China should not be interrupted" -- all this means guaranteeing the ruling position of China's reactionary classes and reactionary government and guaranteeing that the "legally constituted authority" of these classes and their government will not be "interrupted". This "legally constituted authority" certainly must not be "interrupted", for to "interrupt" it would be very dangerous -- it would mean the finish of the whole of the comprador and landlord classes, the end of the Kuomintang gang of bandits and the arrest and punishment of all the war criminals, big, medium and small.



"The armed forces should be definitely preserved" -- they are the lifeline of the comprador and landlord classes, and although several millions have been wiped out by the detested People's Liberation Army, there still remain one million several hundred thousand troops which must be "preserved", and "definitely" so. If they were "preserved", but not "definitely", the comprador and landlord classes would lose their capital, their "legally constituted authority" would still be "interrupted", the Kuomintang bandit gang would still be finished, all the war criminals, big, medium and small, would still be arrested and punished. Just as the life of Chia Pao-yu of the Grand View Garden depended upon a piece of jade in his necklace,[3] the life of the Kuomintang depends upon its army, so how can one say that its army should not be "preserved", or should only be "preserved" but not "definitely" so?

"The people should be allowed to continue their free way of life and maintain their present minimum standard of living" -- this means the Chinese comprador and landlord classes must preserve their freedom to oppress and exploit the people of the whole country and their freedom to maintain their present standard of lordly, luxurious, loose and idle living, while the Chinese working people must preserve their freedom to be oppressed and exploited and maintain their present standard of living, a life of cold and hunger. That is the ultimate aim of the war criminals in suing for peace. What is the use of peace, if the war criminals and the classes to which they belong cannot preserve their freedom to oppress and exploit and cannot maintain their standard of lordly, luxurious, loose and idle living? To preserve all this, it is of course necessary for the workers, peasants, intellectuals, government employees and teachers to maintain their present "free way of life and minimum standard of living", a life of cold and hunger. Once our beloved President Chiang puts forward this condition, the tens of millions of workers, handicraftsmen and professionals, the hundreds of millions of peasants, and the millions of intellectuals, government employees and teachers can only clap their hands in unison, prostrate themselves and shout, "Long live the President!" If the Communist Party still refuses peace, so that this wonderful way of life and standard of living cannot be maintained, then it will be guilty of a crime for which it deserves to die ten thousand deaths, and "the Communist Party will be held responsible for all the consequences".

In saying all this, however, we have not exhausted the whole treasury of wonderful ideas in the war criminal's statement of January 1 suing for peace. Here is another gem -- what Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year message calls "a decisive battle in the Nanking-Shanghai sector". Where is the strength for such a "decisive battle"? Chiang Kai-shek says, "It must be understood that today the strength of the government in the military, political, economic or any other field is several times or even tens of times greater than that of the Communist Party." Oh! Ho! How can people not be scared to death by such immense strength? Leaving political and economic strength aside and taking only military strength, one sees that the People's Liberation Army now has over three million men, that two times "greater" than this number is over six million and that ten times "greater" is over thirty million. And how many

will "tens of times" be? All right, let's take twenty times, which gives over sixty million men; no wonder President Chiang says he has "full confidence in winning the decisive battle". Why then should he beg for peace? Certainly not because he can no longer fight. For if he were to bring the pressure of over sixty million troops to bear, could there be any chance of survival for the Communist Party or any other party in the world? All of course would be crushed to powder. It is clear then that when he begs for peace, it is certainly for no other reason than "to plead for the life of the people".

But is everything going well, without any hitch? There is a hitch, it is said. What is the hitch? President Chiang says:

It is regrettable that there are people in our government who have come under the influence of malicious Communist propaganda and are consequently in a wavering state of mind, having almost lost their self-confidence. Spiritually menaced by the Communists, they see only the enemy's strength but not our own huge strength, which is tens of times greater than the enemy's.

Well, every year brings its crop of news, but this year's is something very special. Isn't it an extra-special piece of news that members of the Kuomintang, with their sixty million odd officers and men, see only the People's Liberation Army of three million odd men but not their own army of over sixty million?

One may ask, "Is there a market for such news?" and "Is it worth even a glance?" According to information received from inside the city of Peiping, "On New Year's Day prices dropped slightly in the morning but recovered in the afternoon." And a foreign news agency reports, "Shanghai's response to Chiang Kai-shek's New Year message is cold." This answers the question as to whether the war criminal Chiang Kai-shek has any market. As we said long ago, Chiang Kai-shek has lost his soul, is merely a corpse, and no one believes him any more.

## NOTES

1. The "Sino-U.S. Air Transport Agreement" between the Chiang Kai-shek government and U.S. imperialism was signed on December 20, 1946. In this agreement, Chiang Kai-shek completely sold out China's sovereignty over her air space. According to its provisions, U.S. aircraft were allowed to fly, load and unload or trans-ship anywhere within China, and the United States gained complete control of the country's air transport. U.S. aircraft were also accorded the right of "non-traffic stop", that is, of military landings on Chinese territory.

2. The "Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement" was the so-called Sino-U.S. Economic Aid Agreement signed at Nanking on July 3, 1948 between the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government and U.S. imperialism. It stipulated that U.S. imperialism was to have supreme authority to supervise and decide the financial and economic affairs of the Chiang Kai-shek government, that U.S. personnel exercising

direct control in China were to enjoy "extraterritorial rights", and that U.S. imperialism could obtain from China any strategic materials it needed and was to be kept informed regularly by the Chiang Kai-shek government about their availability. In this agreement the Chiang Kai-shek government also guaranteed that U.S. goods could be dumped in China.

3. Chia Pao-yu was a character in *The Dream of the Red Chamber*, an 18th century Chinese novel, and the Grand View Garden was his family garden. It was said that Chia Pao-yu was born with a piece of jade in his mouth. This jade was "the root of his life" and had to be worn constantly around his neck. He was not to part with it. If he lost it, he would lose his wits.

## Appendix Article 6

### 南京政府向何处去？

（一九四九年四月四日）

两条路摆在南京国民党政府及其军政人员的面前：一条是向蒋介石战犯集团及其主人美国帝国主义靠拢，这就是继续与人民为敌，而在人民解放战争中和蒋介石战犯集团同归于尽；一条是向人民靠拢，这就是与蒋介石战犯集团和美国帝国主义决裂，而在人民解放战争中立功赎罪，以求得人民的宽恕和谅解。第三条路是没有的。

在南京的李宗仁何应钦政府[1]中，存在着三部分人。一部分人坚持地走第一条路。无论他们在口头上怎样说得好听，在行动上他们是继续备战，继续卖国，继续压迫和屠杀要求真和平的人民。他们是蒋介石的死党。一部分人愿意走第二条路，但是他们还不能作出有决定性的行动。第三部分是一些徘徊歧路、动向不明的人们。他们既不想得罪蒋介石和美国政府，又想得到人民民主阵营的谅解和容纳。但这是幻想，是不可能的。

南京的李宗仁何应钦政府，基本上是第一部分人和第三部分人的混合物，第二部分人为数甚少。这个政府到今天为止，仍然是蒋介石和美国政府的工具。

四月一日发生于南京的惨案[2]，不是什么偶然的事件。这是李宗仁何应钦政府保护蒋介石、保护蒋介石死党、保护美国侵略势力的必然结果。这是李宗仁何应钦政府和蒋介石死党一同荒谬地鼓吹所谓“平等的光荣的和平”，借以抵抗中共八项和平条件[3]，特别是抵抗惩办战争罪犯的结果。李宗仁何应钦政府既然派出和谈代表团前来北平同中国共产党谈判和平，并表示愿意接受中国共产党的八项条件以为谈判的基础，那末，如果这个政府是有最低限度的诚意，就应当以处理南京惨案为起点，逮捕并严惩主凶蒋介石、汤恩伯、张耀明，逮捕并严惩在南京上海的特务暴徒，逮捕并严惩那些坚决反对和平、积极破坏和谈、积极准备抵抗人民解放军向长江以南推进的反革命首要。庆父不死，鲁难未已[4]。战犯不除，国无宁日。这个真理，难道现在还不明白吗？

我们愿意正告南京政府：如果你们没有能力办这件事，那末，你们也应协助即将渡江南进的人民解放军去办这件事。时至今日，一切空话不必说了，还是做件切实的工作，借以立功自赎为好。免得逃难，免得再受蒋介石死党的气，免得永远被人民所唾弃。只有这一次机会了，不要失掉这个机会。人民解放军就要向江南进军了。这不是拿空话吓你们，无论你们签订接受八项条件的协定也好，不签这个协定也好，人民解放军总是要前进的。签一个协定而后前进，对几方面都有利——对人民有利，对人民解放军有利，对国民党政府系统中一切愿意立功

自赎的人们有利，对国民党军队的广大官兵有利，只对蒋介石，对蒋介石死党，对帝国主义者不利。不签这个协定，情况也差不多，可以用局部谈判的方法去解决。可能还有些战斗，但是不会有很多的战斗了。从新疆到台湾这样广大的地区内和漫长的战线上，国民党只有一百一十左右的作战部队了，没有很多的仗可打了。无论签订一个全面性的协定也好，不签这个协定而签许多局部性的协定也好，对于蒋介石，对于蒋介石死党，对于美国帝国主义，一句话，对于一切至死不变的反动派，情况都是一样的，他们将决定地要灭亡。也许签订一个全面性协定对于南京方面和我们方面，都比较不签这个协定，来得稍微有利一些，所以我们还是争取签订这个协定。但是签订这个全面性协定，我们须得准备应付许多拖泥带水的事情。不签这个协定而去签订许多局部协定，对于我们要爽快得多。虽然如此，我们还是准备签订这个协定。南京政府及其代表团如果也愿意这样做，那末，就得在这几天下决心，一切幻想和一切空话都应当抛弃了。我们并不强迫你们下这个决心。南京政府及其代表团是否下这个决心，有你们自己的自由。就是说，你们或者听蒋介石和司徒雷登[5]的话，并和他们永远站在一起，或者听我们的话，和我们站在一起，对于这二者的选择，有你们自己的自由。但是选择的时间没有很多了，人民解放军就要进军了，一点游移的余地也没有了。

注释

[1] 一九四九年三月十二日，李宗仁在孙科辞职后，任命何应钦继任行政院长。

[2] 一九四九年四月一日，南京十一个专科以上学校的学生六千余人举行游行示威，要求国民党反动政府接受中国共产党的八项和平谈判条件。国民党南京卫戍总司令张耀明在蒋介石授意下，指使军警特务凶殴示威学生，死学生二人，伤一百余人。

[3] 见本卷《中共中央毛泽东主席关于时局的声明》。

[4] 事见《左传·闵公元年》。庆父是春秋时鲁国的公子，曾经一再制造鲁国的内乱，先后杀死两个国君。当时的人有“不去庆父，鲁难未已”的说法。后人常常把制造内乱的人比之为庆父。

[5] 见本卷《别了，司徒雷登》注〔1〕。

## **Appendix Article 6 (English translation)**

### **WHITHER THE NANKING GOVERNMENT?**

April 4, 1949

Two roads are open to the Nanking Kuomintang government and its military and administrative personnel. Either they cling to the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and its master, U.S. imperialism, that is, continue to be the enemy of the people and so perish together with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals in the People's War of Liberation. Or they come over to the people, that is, break with the Chiang Kai-shek clique of war criminals and U.S. imperialism, perform meritorious service in the People's War of Liberation to atone for their crimes and so obtain clemency and understanding from the people. There is no third road.

There are three different groups of people in the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin at Nanking.[1] One group stubbornly persist in following the first road. No matter how plausible they are in words, in deeds they are continuing to prepare for war, to betray the nation and to oppress and massacre the people who are demanding genuine peace. They are Chiang Kai-shek's followers even unto death. Another group want to follow the second road but have not yet been able to take any decisive action. The third group are hesitating at the crossroads, and it is uncertain which way they will go. They do not want to offend Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. government, yet they hope that they will be understood and admitted by the camp of people's democracy. But this is an illusion and is impossible.

The Nanking government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin is mainly a mixture of people from the first and third groups, with only a handful from the second. To this day, this government remains a tool of Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. government.

The massacre which occurred in Nanking on April 1,[2] was no accident. It was the inevitable result of the actions taken by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin to protect Chiang Kai-shek, his sworn followers and the forces of U.S. aggression. It was the result of the absurd trumpeting about "honourable peace on an equal footing" by the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin and by the sworn followers of Chiang Kai-shek, which had the purpose of countering the Chinese Communist Party's eight terms for peace, and particularly the punishment of war criminals. Now that the government of Li Tsung-jen and Ho Ying-chin has sent its delegation to Peiping to negotiate peace with the Communist Party of China and has indicated its willingness to accept the Communist Party's eight terms as the basis for negotiations, it should, if it has the slightest good faith, start by dealing with the Nanking Massacre, arrest and severely punish the chief criminals, Chiang Kai-shek, Tang En-po and Chang Yao-ming, arrest and severely punish the thugs of the secret police in Nanking and Shanghai and arrest and severely punish the chief counter-revolutionaries, who are obstinately opposing peace, actively disrupting the peace negotiations and actively preparing to resist the advance of the People's Liberation Army to the south of the Yangtse River. "Until Ching Fu is done away with, the crisis in the state of Lu will not be over." [3] Until the war criminals are eliminated, there will be no peace in the country. Isn't this truth clear enough by now?

We should like to speak plainly to the Nanking government. If you are unequal to this job, you should at least help the People's Liberation Army do it, as our army will soon cross the Yangtse River and advance south. At this late hour, you should not indulge in idle talk and had better do some real work to atone for your crimes. In that case you will not have to flee for your lives, you will not have to submit to the bullying of Chiang Kai-shek's sworn followers, and you will not be spurned for ever by the people. This is your last chance. Don't lose it. The People's Liberation Army will soon advance south of the Yangtse River. We are not bluffing. The People's Liberation Army will advance, whether or not you sign the agreement accepting the eight terms. An agreement signed before our army advances, will be advantageous to many -- to the people, to the People's Liberation Army, to all those in the Kuomintang government who wish to atone for their crimes by performing meritorious service, and to the broad ranks of officers and men in the Kuomintang army; it will be disadvantageous only to Chiang Kai-shek, his sworn followers and the imperialists. If the agreement is not signed, the situation will be about the same; solutions can be achieved by local negotiations. There may yet be some fighting, but not much. Over the vast area and long front extending from Sinkiang to Taiwan, the Kuomintang has only about 1,100,000 combat troops left, and so there will not be much fighting. Whether a general agreement is signed, or whether no such agreement is signed but instead many local agreements are signed, it will be all the same for Chiang Kai-shek, for his sworn followers and for U.S. imperialism, in a word, for all those reactionaries who will not change even unto death; they are irrevocably doomed. Perhaps it will be slightly more advantageous to Nanking, as well as to ourselves, to sign rather than not to sign a general agreement, and that is why we are still striving to conclude it. But if a general agreement is to be signed, we must be prepared as a consequence to deal with many messy matters. It would be very much neater for us not to sign a general agreement but instead to sign many local agreements. Nevertheless, we are still ready to sign a general agreement. If the Nanking government and its delegation are also willing to do so, they must make up their minds in the next few days; all illusions and all empty talk should be discarded. We are not forcing you to make up your minds. The Nanking government and its delegation are free to make up their minds or not to. That is to say, you may either listen to Chiang Kai-shek and Leighton Stuart and side with them irrevocably, or listen to us and side with us; you are free to choose. But there is not much time for you to make your choice. The People's Liberation Army will soon start its march, and there is no opportunity left for hesitation.

## NOTES

1. After Sun Fo's resignation, Li Tsung-jen appointed Ho Ying-chin to succeed him as president of the bogus Executive Yuan on March 12, 1949.
2. On April 1, 1949, over six thousand students from eleven colleges and universities in Nanking demonstrated, demanding that the reactionary Kuomintang government should accept the eight peace

terms of the Chinese Communist Party. On the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Yao-ming, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang garrison forces at Nanking, ordered soldiers, policemen and secret agents to beat the students brutally; two were killed and more than a hundred wounded.

3. According to Tso Chuan, an ancient Chinese historical work dealing with the important events of the Spring and Autumn Era (770-475 B.C.), Ching Fu, a noble in the state of Lu, repeatedly stirred up internal strife and murdered two reigning princes of that state. The saying in the text was then current among the people of Lu, and Ching Fu's name has since become a byword for those who stir up internal strife.



## Appendix Article 7

### 将革命进行到底

（一九四八年十二月三十日）

中国人民将要在伟大的解放战争中获得最后胜利，这一点，现在甚至我们的敌人也不怀疑了。

战争走过了曲折的道路。国民党反动政府在发动反革命战争的时候，他们军队的数量约等于人民解放军的三倍半，他们军队的装备和人力物力的资源，更是远远地超过了人民解放军，他们拥有人民解放军所缺乏的现代工业和现代交通工具，他们获得美国帝国主义在军事上、经济上的大量援助，并且他们是经过了长期的准备的。就是因为这样，战争的第一年（一九四六年七月至一九四七年六月）表现为国民党的进攻和人民解放军的防御。国民党在一九四六年，在东北占领了沈阳、四平、长春、吉林、安东等城市和辽宁、辽北、安东等省[1]的大部，在黄河以南占领了淮阴、菏泽等城市和鄂豫皖、苏皖、豫皖苏、鲁西南等解放区的大部，在长城以北占领了承德、集宁、张家口等城市和热河、绥远、察哈尔[2]的大部，声势汹汹，不可一世。人民解放军采取了以歼灭国民党有生力量为主而不是以保守地方为主的正确的战略方针，每个月平均歼灭国民党正规军的数目约为八个旅（等于现在的师），终于迫使国民党放弃其全面进攻计划，而于一九四七年上半年将进攻的重点限制在南线的两翼，即山东和陕北。战争在第二年（一九四七年七月至一九四八年六月）发生了一个根本的变化。已经消灭了大量国民党正规军的人民解放军，在南线和北线都由防御转入了进攻，国民党方面则不得不由进攻转入防御。人民解放军不但在东北、山东和陕北都恢复了绝大部分的失地，而且把战线伸到了长江和渭水以北的国民党统治区。同时，在攻克石家庄、运城、四平、洛阳、宜川、宝鸡、潍县、临汾、开封等城市的作战中学会了攻坚战术[3]。人民解放军组成了自己的炮兵和工兵。不要忘记，人民解放军是没有飞机和坦克的，但是自从人民解放军形成了超过国民党军的炮兵和工兵以后，国民党的防御体系，连同他的飞机和坦克就显得渺小了。人民解放军已经不但能打运动战，而且能打阵地战。战争第三年的头半年（一九四八年七月至十二月）发生了另一个根本的变化。人民解放军在数量上由长期的劣势转入了优势。人民解放军不但已经能够攻克国民党坚固设防的城市，而且能够一次包围和歼灭成十万人甚至几十万人的国民党的强大精锐兵团。人民解放军歼灭国民党兵力的速度大为增加了。试看歼敌营以上正规军的统计（包括起义的敌军在内）：第一年，九十七个旅，内有四十六个整旅；第二年，九十四个旅，内有五十个整旅；第三年的头半年，根据不完整的统计，一百四十七个师，内有一百一十一个整师[4]。半年歼敌整师的数目比过去两年歼敌整师的总数多了十五个。敌人的战略上的战线已经全部瓦解。东北的敌人已经完全消灭，华北的敌人即将完全消灭，华东和中原的敌人只剩下少数。国

民党的主力在长江以北被消灭的结果，大大地便利了人民解放军今后渡江南进解放全中国的作战。同军事战线上的胜利同时，中国人民在政治战线上和经济战线上也取得了伟大的胜利。因为这样，中国人民解放战争在全国范围内的胜利，现在在全世界的舆论界，包括一切帝国主义的报纸，都完全没有争论了。

敌人是不会自行消灭的。无论是中国的反动派，或是美国帝国主义在中国的侵略势力，都不会自行退出历史舞台。正是因为他们看到了中国人民解放战争在全国范围内的胜利，已经不能用单纯的军事斗争的方法加以阻止，他们就一天比一天地重视政治斗争的方法。中国反动派和美国侵略者现在一方面正在利用现存的国民党政府来进行“和平”阴谋，另一方面则正在设计使用某些既同中国反动派和美国侵略者有联系，又同革命阵营有联系的人们，向他们进行挑拨和策动，叫他们好生工作，力求混入革命阵营，构成革命阵营中的所谓反对派，以便保存反动势力，破坏革命势力。根据确实的情报，美国政府已经决定了这样一项阴谋计划，并且已经开始在中国进行这项工作。美国政府的政策，已经由单纯地支持国民党的反革命战争转变为两种方式的斗争：第一种，组织国民党残余军事力量和所谓地方势力在长江以南和边远省份继续抵抗人民解放军；第二种，在革命阵营内部组织反对派，极力使革命就此止步；如果再要前进，则应带上温和的色彩，务必不要太多地侵犯帝国主义及其走狗的利益。英国和法国的帝国主义者，则是美国这一政策的拥护者。这种情形，现在许多人还没有看清楚，但是大约不要很久，人们就可以看得清楚了。

现在摆在中国人民、各民主党派、各人民团体面前的问题，是将革命进行到底呢，还是使革命半途而废呢？如果要使革命进行到底，那就是用革命的方法，坚决彻底干净全部地消灭一切反动势力，不动摇地坚持打倒帝国主义，打倒封建主义，打倒官僚资本主义，在全国范围内推翻国民党的反动统治，在全国范围内建立无产阶级领导的以工农联盟为主体的人民民主专政的共和国。这样，就可以使中华民族来一个大翻身，由半殖民地变为真正的独立国，使中国人民来一个大解放，将自己头上的封建的压迫和官僚资本（即中国的垄断资本）的压迫一起掀掉，并由此造成统一的民主的和平局面，造成由农业国变为工业国的先决条件，造成由人剥削人的社会向着社会主义社会发展的可能性。如果要使革命半途而废，那就是违背人民的意志，接受外国侵略者和中国反动派的意志，使国民党赢得养好创伤的机会，然后在一个早上猛扑过来，将革命扼死，使全国回到黑暗世界。现在的问题就是一个这样明白地这样尖锐地摆着的问题。两条路究竟选择哪一条呢？中国每一个民主党派，每一个人民团体，都必须考虑这个问题，都必须选择自己要走的路，都必须表明自己的态度。中国各民主党派、各人民团体是否能够真诚地合作，而不致半途拆伙，就是要看它们在这个问题上是否采取一致的意见，是否能够为了着推翻中国人民的共同敌人而采取一致的步骤。这里是要一致，要合作，而不是建立什么“反对派”，也不是走什么“中间路线”[5]。

以蒋介石等人为首的中国反动派，自一九二七年四月十二日反革命政变至现在的二十多年的漫长岁月中，难道还没有证明他们是一伙满身鲜血的杀人不眨眼的刽子手吗？难道还没有证明他们是一伙职业的帝国主义走狗和卖国贼吗？请大家想一想，从一九三六年十二月西安事变以来，从一九四五年十月重庆谈判和一九四六年一月政治协商会议以来，中国人民对于这伙盗匪曾经做得何等仁至义尽，希望同他们建立国内的和平。但是一切善良的愿望改变了他们的阶级本性的一分一厘一毫一丝没有呢？这些盗匪的历史，没有哪一个是可以和美国帝国主义分得开的。他们依靠美国帝国主义把四亿七千五百万同胞投入了空前残酷的大内战，他们用美国帝国主义所供给的轰炸机、战斗机、大炮、坦克、火箭筒、自动步枪、汽油弹、毒气弹等等杀人武器屠杀了成百万的男女老少，而美国帝国主义则依靠他们掠夺中国的领土权、领海权、领空权、内河航行权、商业特权、内政外交特权，直至打死人、压死人、强奸妇女而不受任何处罚的特权。难道被迫进行了如此长期血战的中国人民，还应该对于这些穷凶极恶的敌人表示亲爱温柔，而不加以彻底的消灭和驱逐吗？只有彻底地消灭了中国反动派，驱逐了美国帝国主义的侵略势力出中国，中国才能有独立，才能有民主，才能有和平，这个真理难道还不明白吗？

值得注意的是，现在中国人民的敌人忽然竭力装作无害而且可怜的样子了（请读者记着，这种可怜相，今后还要装的）。最近做了国民党行政院长的孙科，在去年六月间，不是曾经宣布“在军事方面，只要打到底，终归可以解决”的吗？这次一上台却大谈其“光荣的和平”，说什么“政府曾努力追求和平，由于和平不能实现，不得已而用兵，用兵的最后目的仍在求得和平的恢复”。合众社上海十二月二十一日的电讯，马上就预料孙科的声明“在美国官方人士及国民党自由主义人士中，将遇到最广泛的赞扬”。美国官方人士现在不但热心于中国的“和平”，而且一再表示，从一九四五年十二月莫斯科苏美英三国外长会议以来，美国就遵守着“不干涉中国内政的政策”。应该怎样来对付这些君子国的先生们呢？这里用得着古代希腊的一段寓言：“一个农夫在冬天看见一条蛇冻僵着。他很可怜它，便拿来放在自己的胸口上。那蛇受了暖气就苏醒了，等到回复了它的天性，便把它的恩人咬了一口，使他受了致命的伤。农夫临死的时候说：我怜惜恶人，应该受这个恶报！”[6]外国和中国的毒蛇们希望中国人民还像这个农夫一样地死去，希望中国共产党，中国的一切革命民主派，都像这个农夫一样地怀有对于毒蛇的好心肠。但是中国人民、中国共产党和中国真正的革命民主派，却听见了并且记住了这个劳动者的遗嘱。况且盘踞在大部分中国土地上的大蛇和小蛇，黑蛇和白蛇，露出毒牙的蛇和化成美女的蛇，虽然它们已经感觉到冬天的威胁，但是还没有冻僵呢！

中国人民决不怜惜蛇一样的恶人，而且老老实实在地认为：凡是要着花腔，说什么要怜惜一下这类恶人呀，不然就不合国情、也不够伟大呀等等的人们，决不是中国人民的忠实朋友。像蛇一样的恶人为什么要怜惜呢？究竟是哪一个人、哪一个农民、哪一个兵士主张怜惜这类恶人呢？确是有这么一种“国民党的自由主义人士”或非国民党的“自由主义人士”，他们劝

告中国人民应该接受美国和国民党的“和平”，就是说，应该把帝国主义、封建主义和官僚资本主义的残余当作神物供养起来，以免这几种宝贝在世界上绝了种。但是他们决不是工人、农民、兵士，也不是工人、农民、兵士的朋友。

我们认为中国人民革命阵营必须扩大，必须容纳一切愿意参加目前的革命事业的人们。中国人民的革命事业需要有主力军，也需要有同盟军，没有同盟军的军队是打不胜敌人的。正处在革命高潮中的中国人民需要有自己的朋友，应当记住自己的朋友，而不要忘记他们。忠实于人民革命事业的朋友，努力保护人民利益而反对保护敌人利益的朋友，在中国无疑是不少，无疑是一个也不应被忘记和被冷淡的。我们又认为中国人民革命阵营必须巩固，必须不容许坏人侵入，必须不容许错误的主张获得胜利。处在革命高潮中的中国人民除了记住自己的朋友以外，还应当牢牢地记住自己的敌人和敌人的朋友。如上所说，既然敌人正在阴谋地用“和平”的方法和混入革命阵营的方法以求保存和加强自己的阵地，而人民的根本利益则要求彻底消灭一切反动势力并驱逐美国帝国主义的侵略势力出中国，那末，凡是劝说人民怜惜敌人、保存反动势力的人们，就不是人民的朋友，而是敌人的朋友了。

中国革命的怒潮正在迫使各社会阶层决定自己的态度。中国阶级力量的对比正在发生着新的变化。大群大群的人民正在脱离国民党的影响和控制而站到革命阵营一方面来，中国反动派完全陷入孤立无援的绝境。人民解放战争愈接近于最后胜利，一切革命的人民和一切人民的朋友将愈加巩固地团结一致，在中国共产党的领导之下，坚决地主张彻底消灭反动势力，彻底发展革命势力，一直达到在全中国范围内建立人民民主共和国，实现统一的民主的和平。与此相反，美国帝国主义者、中国反动派和他们的朋友，虽然不能够巩固地团结一致，虽然会发生无穷的互相争吵，互相恶骂，互相埋怨，互相抛弃，但是在有一点上却会互相合作，这就是用各种方法力图破坏革命势力而保存反动势力。他们将要用各种方法：公开的和秘密的，直接的和迂回的。但是可以断定，他们的政治阴谋将要和他们的军事进攻遭遇到同样的失败。已经有了充分经验的中国人民及其总参谋部中国共产党，一定会像粉碎敌人的军事进攻一样，粉碎敌人的政治阴谋，把伟大的人民解放战争进行到底。

一九四九年中国人民解放军将向长江以南进军，将要获得比一九四八年更加伟大的胜利。

一九四九年我们在经济战线上将获得比一九四八年更加伟大的成就。我们的农业生产和工业生产将要比过去提高一步，铁路公路交通将要全部恢复。人民解放军主力兵团的作战将要摆脱现在还存在的某些游击性，进入更高程度的正规化。

一九四九年将要召集没有反动分子参加的以完成人民革命任务为目标的政治协商会议，宣告中华人民共和国的成立，并组成共和国的中央政府。这个政府将是一个在中国共产党领导之下的、有各民主党派各人民团体的适当的代表人物参加的民主联合政府。

这些就是中国人民、中国共产党、中国一切民主党派和人民团体在一九四九年所应努力求其实现的主要的具体的任务。我们将不怕任何困难团结一致地去实现这些任务。

几千年以来的封建压迫，一百年以来的帝国主义压迫，将在我们的奋斗中彻底地推翻掉。一九四九年是极其重要的一年，我们应当加紧努力。

#### 注释

[1] 一九四五年日本投降后，国民党政府曾将原东北三省（辽宁、吉林、黑龙江）划分为辽宁、辽北、安东、吉林、合江、松江、黑龙江、嫩江、兴安等九个省。一九四九年中国共产党领导下的东北行政委员会曾将东北三省行政区划调整为辽东、辽西、吉林、黑龙江、松江五个省，加上热河，统称为东北六省。一九五四年中央人民政府委员会决定将辽东省、辽西省合并改称辽宁省，松江省和黑龙江省合并为黑龙江省，吉林省仍照旧。一九五五年撤销了热河省，原辖地区分别划归河北、辽宁两省和内蒙古自治区。

[2] 参见本卷《国民党进攻的真相》注〔6〕。

[3] 石家庄于一九四七年十一月十二日攻克，运城于一九四七年十二月二十八日攻克，四平于一九四八年三月十三日攻克，洛阳于一九四八年三月十四日和四月五日两次攻克，宜川于一九四八年三月三日攻克，宝鸡于一九四八年四月二十六日攻克，潍县于一九四八年四月二十七日攻克，临汾于一九四八年五月十七日攻克，开封于一九四八年六月二十二日攻克。这些城市，都有大量的碉堡群或兼有高大的城墙，并设有多层外壕、铁丝网、鹿砦等副防御设备。人民解放军在当时既无飞机又无坦克，没有或仅有少量炮兵。在攻克上述城市中，人民解放军学会了一套攻坚战术。这些战术是：（1）连续爆破——以炸药对敌人各种防御设施进行连续爆破；（2）坑道作业——秘密掘进到敌人碉堡或城墙底下，用炸药炸开，随即发起猛烈突击；（3）对壕作业，亦即近迫作业——对着敌人的坚固工事，挖掘壕沟，荫蔽接近敌人，突然发起冲击；（4）抛射炸药包——利用抛射筒或迫击炮发射炸药包，破坏敌人防御工事；（5）集中兵力、火力突破一点，实行穿插分割等“尖刀战法”。

[4] 这里所说的“整旅”和“整师”，是说国民党军被整个歼灭了的旅和师。这里所说的旅，是指国民党军队整编以后的旅，相当于整编以前的师；所说的师，指整编以前的师。

[5] “中间路线”，即所谓第三条道路，见本卷《目前形势和我们的任务》注〔12〕。

[6] 见《伊索寓言》中的《农夫与蛇》。

#### **Appendix Article 7 (English translation)**

### **CARRY THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TO THE END**

December 30, 1948

The Chinese people will win final victory in the great War of Liberation. Even our enemy no longer doubts the outcome.

The war has followed a tortuous course. When the reactionary Kuomintang government started the counter-revolutionary war, it had approximately three and a half times as many troops as the People's Liberation Army; the equipment, manpower and material resources of its army were far superior to those of the People's Liberation Army; it had modern industries and modern means of communication, which the People's Liberation Army lacked; it had received large-scale military and economic aid from U.S. imperialism and had made long preparations. Therefore, during the first year of the war (July 1946 -- June 1947) the Kuomintang was on the offensive and the People's Liberation Army on the defensive. In 1946 in the Northeast, the Kuomintang occupied Shenyang, Szepingkai, Changchun, Kirin, Antung and other cities and most of Liaoning, Liaopei and Antung Provinces; [1] south of the Yellow River, it occupied the cities of Huaiyin and Hotse and most of the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, Kiangsu-Anhwei, Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu and Southwestern Shantung Liberated Areas; and north of the Great Wall, it occupied the cities of Chengteh, Chining and Changchiakou and most of Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar Provinces. The Kuomintang blustered and swaggered like a conquering hero. The People's Liberation Army adopted the correct strategy, which had as its main objective to wipe out the Kuomintang's effective strength rather than to hold territory, and in each month destroyed an average of some eight brigades of the Kuomintang regular troops (the equivalent of eight present-day divisions). As a result, the Kuomintang was finally compelled to abandon its plan for the over-all offensive and by the first half of 1947 it had to limit the major targets of its attack to the two wings of the southern front, i.e., Shantung and northern Shensi. In the second year (July 1947 -- June 1948) a fundamental change took place in the war. Having wiped out large numbers of Kuomintang regulars, the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive on the southern and northern fronts, while the Kuomintang had to turn from the offensive to the defensive. The People's Liberation Army not only recovered most of the territories lost in northeastern China, Shantung and northern Shensi but also extended the battle front into the Kuomintang areas north of the Yangtse and Weishui Rivers. Moreover, in the course of attacking and capturing Shihchiachuang, Yuncheng, Szepingkai, Loyang, Yichuan, Paoki, Weihsien, Linfen and Kaifeng, our army mastered

the tactics of storming heavily fortified points. [2] The People's Liberation Army formed its own artillery and engineer corps. Don't forget that the People's Liberation Army had neither aircraft nor tanks, but once it had formed an artillery and an engineer corps superior to those of the Kuomintang army, the defensive system of the Kuomintang, with all its aircraft and tanks, appeared negligible by contrast. The People's Liberation Army was already able to conduct not only mobile warfare but positional warfare as well. In the first half of the third year of the war (July-December 1948), another fundamental change has occurred. The People's Liberation Army, so long outnumbered, has gained numerical superiority. It has been able not only to capture the Kuomintang's heavily fortified cities but also to surround and destroy strong formations of Kuomintang crack troops, a hundred thousand or several hundred thousand at a time. The rate at which the People's Liberation Army is wiping out Kuomintang troops has become much faster. Look at the statistics on the number of Kuomintang regular units of battalion level and above which we have destroyed (including enemy troops who have revolted and come over to our side). In the first year, 97 brigades, including 46 brigades entirely wiped out; in the second year, 94 brigades, including 50 brigades entirely wiped out; and in the first half of the third year, according to incomplete figures, 147 divisions, including 111 divisions entirely wiped out.[3] In these six months, the number of enemy divisions entirely wiped out was 15 more than the grand total for the previous two years. The enemy front as a whole has completely crumbled. The enemy troops in the Northeast have been entirely wiped out, those in northern China will soon be entirely wiped out, and in eastern China and the Central Plains only a few enemy forces are left. The annihilation of the Kuomintang's main forces north of the Yangtse River greatly facilitates the forthcoming crossing of the Yangtse by the People's Liberation Army and its southward drive to liberate all China. Simultaneously with victory on the military front, the Chinese people have scored tremendous victories on the political and economic fronts. For this reason public opinion the world over, including the entire imperialist press, no longer disputes the certainty of the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation.

The enemy will not perish of himself. Neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism in China will step down from the stage of history of their own accord. Precisely because they realize that the country-wide victory of the Chinese People's War of Liberation can no longer be prevented by purely military struggle, they are placing more and more importance each day on political struggle. On the one hand, the Chinese reactionaries and the U.S. aggressors are using the existing Kuomintang government for their "peace" plot; on the other hand, they are scheming to use certain persons who have connections both with them and with the revolutionary camp, inciting and instigating these persons to work artfully, strive to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and form a so-called opposition faction within it. The purpose is to preserve the reactionary forces and undermine the revolutionary forces. According to reliable information, the U.S. government has decided on this

scheme and begun to carry it out in China. The U.S. government has changed its policy of simply backing the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary war to a policy embracing two forms of struggle:

1. Organizing the remnants of the Kuomintang's armed forces and the so-called local forces to continue to resist the People's Liberation Army south of the Yangtse River and in the remote border provinces, and
2. Organizing an opposition faction within the revolutionary camp to strive with might and main to halt the revolution where it is or, if it must advance, to moderate it and prevent it from encroaching too far on the interests of the imperialists and their running dogs.

The British and French imperialists support this U.S. policy. Many people do not yet see this situation clearly, but it probably will not be long before they do.

The question now facing the Chinese people, all democratic parties and all people's organizations is whether to carry the revolution through to the end or to abandon it half-way. If the revolution is to be carried through to the end, we must use the revolutionary method to wipe out all the forces of reaction resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely; we must unswervingly persist in overthrowing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism; and we must overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang on a country-wide scale and set up a republic that is a people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat and with the worker-peasant alliance as its main body. In this way, the Chinese nation will completely throw off the oppressor; the country will be transformed from a semi-colony into a genuinely independent state; the Chinese people will be fully emancipated, overthrowing once and for all both feudal oppression and oppression by bureaucrat-capital (Chinese monopoly capital) and will thus achieve unity, democracy and peace, create the prerequisites for transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country and make it possible for her to develop from a society with exploitation of man by man into a socialist society. If the revolution is abandoned half-way, it will mean going against the will of the people, bowing to the will of the foreign aggressors and Chinese reactionaries and giving the Kuomintang a chance to heal its wounds, so that one day it may pounce suddenly to strangle the revolution and again plunge the whole country into darkness. That is how clearly and sharply the question is now posed. Which of these two roads to choose? Every democratic party, every people's organization in China must consider this question, must choose its road and clarify its stand. Whether China's democratic parties and people's organizations can sincerely co-operate without parting company half-way depends on whether they are agreed on this question and take unanimous action to overthrow the common enemy of the Chinese people. What is needed here is unanimity and co-operation, not the setting up of any "opposition faction" or the pursuit of any "middle road".[4]



In the long period of more than twenty years from the counterrevolutionary coup d' état of April 12, 1927 [5] to this day, have the Chinese reactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek and his ilk not given proof enough that they are a gang of blood-stained executioners, who slaughter people without blinking? Have they not given proof enough that they are a band of professional traitors and the running dogs of imperialism? Think it over, everybody! How magnanimous the Chinese people have been towards this gang of bandits in the hope of achieving internal peace with them, since the Sian Incident of December 1936, since the Chungking negotiations of October 1945 and since the Political Consultative Conference of January 1946! But has all this goodwill changed their class nature by one jot or little? In their history not a single one of these bandits can be separated from U.S. imperialism. Relying on U.S. imperialism, they have plunged 475 million of our compatriots into a huge civil war of unprecedented brutality and slaughtered millions upon millions of men and women, young and old, with bombers, fighter planes, guns, tanks, rocket-launchers, automatic rifles, gasoline bombs, gas projectiles and other weapons, all supplied by U.S. imperialism. And relying on these criminals, U.S. imperialism on its part has seized China's sovereign rights over her own territory, waters and air space, seized inland navigation rights and special commercial privileges, seized special privileges in China's domestic and foreign affairs and even seized the privilege of killing people, beating them up, driving cars over them and raping women, all with impunity. Can it be said that the Chinese people, who have been compelled to fight such a long and bloody war, should still show affection and tenderness towards these most vicious enemies and should not completely destroy or expel them? Only by completely destroying the Chinese reactionaries and expelling the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism can China gain independence, democracy and peace. Isn't this truth clear enough by now?

What deserves attention is that all of a sudden the enemies of the Chinese people are doing their best to assume a harmless and even a pitiable look (readers, please remember that in the future they will try to look pitiable again). Didn't Sun Fo, who has now become president of the Kuomintang's Executive Yuan, state in June last year that a "settlement will finally come, provided militarily we fight to the end"? But this time, the moment he took office he talked glibly about an "honourable peace" and said that "the Government has been striving for peace and only resorted to fighting because peace could not be realized, but the ultimate objective of fighting is still to restore peace". Immediately afterwards, on December 21, a United Press dispatch from Shanghai predicted that Sun Fo's statement would meet with widespread approval in U.S. official quarters and among the Kuomintang liberals. At present, U.S. officials have not only become deeply interested in "peace" in China but also repeatedly assert that ever since the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain in December 1945, the United States has adhered to a "policy of non-interference in China's internal affairs". How are we to deal with these worthies from the "Land of Gentlemen"? Here, it is fitting to quote an ancient Greek fable. One winter's day, a farmhand found a snake frozen by the cold. Moved by compassion, he picked it up and put it in his

bosom. The snake was revived by the warmth, its natural instincts returned, and it gave its benefactor a fatal bite. The dying farmhand said, "I've got what I deserve for taking pity on an evil creature." [6] Venomous snakes, foreign and Chinese, hope that the Chinese people will die like the farmhand, that like him the Chinese Communist Party and all Chinese revolutionary democrats will be kind-hearted to them. But the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the genuine revolutionary democrats of China have heard the labourer's dying words and will well remember them. Moreover, the serpents infesting most of China, big or small, black or white, baring their poisonous fangs or assuming the guise of beautiful girls, are not yet frozen by the cold, although they already sense the threat of winter.

The Chinese people will never take pity on snake-like scoundrels, and they honestly believe that no one is their true friend who guilefully says that pity should be shown these scoundrels and says that anything else would be out of keeping with China's traditions, fall short of greatness, etc. Why should one take pity on snake-like scoundrels? What worker, what peasant, what soldier, says that such scoundrels should be pitied? True, there are "Kuomintang liberals" or non-Kuomintang "liberals" who advise the Chinese people to accept the "peace" offered by the United States and the Kuomintang, that is, to enshrine and worship the remnants of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism so that these treasures shall not become extinct on earth. But they are decidedly not workers, peasants or soldiers, nor are they the friends of workers, peasants and soldiers.

We hold that the Chinese people's revolutionary camp must be expanded and must embrace all who are willing to join the revolutionary cause at the present stage. The Chinese people's revolution needs a main force and also needs allies, for an army without allies cannot defeat the enemy. The Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, need friends and they should remember their friends and not forget them. In China there are undoubtedly many friends faithful to the people's revolutionary cause, who try to protect the people's interests and are opposed to protecting the enemy's interests, and undoubtedly none of these friends should be forgotten or cold-shouldered. Also, we hold that we must consolidate the Chinese people's revolutionary camp and not allow bad elements to sneak in or wrong views to prevail. Besides keeping their friends in mind, the Chinese people, now at the high tide of revolution, should also keep their enemies and the friends of their enemies firmly in mind. As we said above, since the enemy is cunningly using the method of "peace" and the method of sneaking into the revolutionary camp to preserve and strengthen his position, whereas the fundamental interests of the people demand that all reactionary forces be destroyed thoroughly and that the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism be driven out of China, those who advise the people to take pity on the enemy and preserve the forces of reaction are not friends of the people, but friends of the enemy.

The raging tide of China's revolution is forcing all social strata to decide their attitude. A new change is taking place in the balance of class forces in China. Multitudes of people are breaking away from Kuomintang influence and control and coming over to the revolutionary camp; and the Chinese reactionaries have fallen into hopeless straits, isolated and abandoned. As the People's War of Liberation draws closer and closer to final victory, all the revolutionary people and all friends of the people will unite more solidly and, led by the Communist Party of China, resolutely demand the complete destruction of the reactionary forces and the thoroughgoing development of the revolutionary forces until a people's democratic republic on a countrywide scale is founded and a peace based on unity and democracy is achieved. The U.S. imperialists, the Chinese reactionaries and their friends, on the contrary, are incapable of uniting solidly and will indulge in endless squabbles, mutual abuse, recrimination and betrayal. On one point, however, they will co-operate -- in striving by every means to undermine the revolutionary forces and preserve the reactionary forces. They will use every means, open and secret, direct and indirect. But it can definitely be stated that their political intrigues will meet with the same defeats as their military attacks. Having had plenty of experience, the Chinese people and their general staff, the Communist Party of China, are certain to smash the enemy's political intrigues, just as they have shattered his military attacks, and to carry the great People's War of Liberation through to the end.

In 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army will advance south of the Yangtse River and will win even greater victories than in 1948.

In 1949, on the economic front we shall achieve even greater successes than in 1948. Our agricultural and industrial production will rise to a higher level than before, and rail and highway traffic will be completely restored. In their operations the main formations of the People's Liberation Army will discard certain survivals of guerrilla habits and reach a higher level of regularization.

In 1949, the Political Consultative Conference, with no reactionaries participating and having as its aim the fulfilment of the tasks of the people's revolution, will be convened, the People's Republic of China will be proclaimed, and the Central Government of the Republic will be established. This government will be a democratic coalition government under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, with the participation of appropriate persons representing the democratic parties and people's organizations.

These are the main concrete tasks which the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China and all the democratic parties and people's organizations in China should strive to fulfil in 1949. We shall brave all difficulties and unite as one to fulfil these tasks.

In our struggle we shall overthrow once and for all the feudal oppression of thousands of years and the imperialist oppression of a hundred years. The year 1949 will be a year of tremendous importance. We should redouble our efforts.

## NOTES

1. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Kuomintang government divided the three northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang into nine provinces, Liaoning, Liaopei, Antung, Kirin, Hokiang, Sungkiang, Heilungkiang, Nunkiang and Hsingan. In 1949 our Northeast Administrative Commission redivided the area into five provinces, Liaotung, Liaohsi, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Sungkiang. Together with Jehol, these provinces were then referred to as the six northeastern provinces. In 1954 the Central People's Government Council merged the two provinces of Liaotung and Liaohsi into the one province of Liaoning and the two provinces of Sungkiang and Heilungkiang into the one province of Heilungkiang, while Kirin remained unchanged. In 1955 Jehol Province was abolished and the area previously under its jurisdiction was divided and incorporated into the provinces of Hopei and Liaoning and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

2. The dates of the taking of these key points were: Shihchiachuang, November 12, 1947; Yuncheng, December 28, 1947; Szeping kai, March 13, 1948; Loyang, first on March 14, 1948, and again on April 5, 1948; Yichuan, March 3, 1948; Paoki, April 26, 1948; Weihsien, April 27, 1948; Linfen, May 17, 1948; and Kaifeng, June 22, 1948. All these cities were fortified with many groups of blockhouses, and some had high, thick city walls; also, they all had auxiliary defence works, including multiple lines of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements and abatis. Our army at the time had neither planes nor tanks, and little or no artillery. In attacking and taking these cities, our army learned a complete set of tactics for taking strong fortifications. These tactics were:

(1) successive demolition -- using explosives to demolish the enemy's different defence installations in succession;

(2) tunnel operations -- secretly digging tunnels to and under the enemy's blockhouses or city walls, then blowing them up with explosives and following up with fierce attacks;

(3) approach trench operations -- digging trenches towards the enemy's fortifications, then approaching under cover to make sudden attacks;

(4) explosive package projectors -- shooting packages of explosives from missile-projectors or mortars to destroy the enemy's defences;

(5) "sharp knife" tactics -- concentrating manpower and firepower to effect a breakthrough and to cut up the enemy forces.

3. The brigades mentioned here were those designated as brigades after the reorganization of the Kuomintang army, while the divisions were pre-reorganization divisions (which were practically the same as the reorganized brigades).
4. The "middle road" was also called the "third road". See "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", Note 9, p. 176 of this volume.
5. See "The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan", Note 8, p. 23 of this volume.
6. "Evil for Good" in Aesop's Fables.

## Appendix Article 8

### 国民党反动派由“呼吁和平”变为呼吁战争

（一九四九年二月十六日）

自从一月一日蒋匪介石发动和平攻势以后，曾经连篇累牍地表示自己是愿意“缩短战争时间”，“减轻人民痛苦”，“以拯救人民为前提”的国民党反动派的英雄好汉们，一到二月上旬，和平的调子就突然低落下去，“和共党周旋到底”的老调忽又高弹起来。最近数日，更是如此。二月十三日，国民党中央宣传部发给“各党部各党报”的《特别宣传指示》上说：

“叶剑英向我后方宣传中共对和平有诚意，而指责政府军事布置为无诚意谋和。各报对此，必须依据下列各点从正面与侧面力加驳斥。”这个《特别宣传指示》一连列举了好几点应当“驳斥”的理由。“政府与其无条件投降，不如作战到底。”“毛泽东一月十四日声明所提八点为亡国条件，政府原不应接受。”“中共应负破坏和平之责任。今日中共反而提出所谓战犯名单，将政府负责人士尽皆列入，更要求政府先行逮捕，其蛮横无理，显而易见。中共如不改变此种作风，则和平商谈之途径，势难寻觅。”两星期以前那种如丧考妣地急着要谈判的神气，再也不见了。所谓“缩短战争时间”，“减轻人民痛苦”，“以拯救人民为前提”这些传遍人间、沁人心脾的名句，再也不提了。假如中共不愿意改变自己的“作风”，一定要惩办战争罪犯，那就不能谈和平了。究竟是以拯救人民为前提呢，还是以拯救战争罪犯为前提呢？按照国民党英雄好汉的《特别宣传指示》，是选择了后者。战争罪犯的名单，中共方面尚在向各民主党派人民团体征求意见中，现在已经收到了好几方面的意见。根据这些已经收到的意见，都是不赞成去年十二月二十五日中共权威人士所提的那个名单。他们认为那个名单所列战犯只有四十三个，为数太少；他们认为要负发动反革命战争屠杀数百万人民的责任的人决不止四十三人，而应当是一百几十个。现在姑且假定战犯将确定为一百几十个。那末，请问国民党的英雄好汉们，你们为什么要反对惩办战犯呢？你们不是愿意“缩短战争时间”“减轻人民痛苦”的吗？假如因为你们这一反对，使得战争还要打下去，岂非拖延时间，延长战祸？“拖延时间，延长战祸”这八个字的罪名是你们在一九四九年一月二十六日以南京政府发言人的名义发出声明，加在共产党身上的，现在难道你们想收回去，写上招贴，挂在你们自己身上，以为荣耀吗？你们是“以拯救人民为前提”的大慈大悲的人们，为什么一下子又改成以拯救战犯为前提了呢？根据你们政府内政部的统计，中国人民的数目，不是四亿五千万，而是四亿七千五百万，这和一百几十个战犯相比，究竟大小如何呢？英雄们是学过算术的，请你们按照算术教科书好好地算一下再作结论吧。倘若你们不去算清楚就将你们那个原来很好、我们也同意、全国人民也同意的提法——“以拯救人民为前提”，急急忙忙地改成“以拯救一百几十个战犯为前提”，那你们可要仔细，你们就一定站不住脚。这些口口声声“以拯救人民为前提”的人们，

在自己“呼吁和平”几个星期之后，又不再是“呼吁和平”，而是呼吁战争了。国民党死硬派就是这样倒霉的，他们坚决地反对人民，站在人民的头上横行霸道，因而把自己孤立宝塔的尖顶上，而且至死也不悔悟。长江流域和南方的人民大众，包括工人，农民，知识分子，城市小资产阶级，民族资产阶级，开明绅士，有良心的国民党人，都请听着：站在你们头上横行霸道的国民党死硬派，没有几天活命的时间了，我们和你们是站在一个方面的，一小撮死硬派不要几天就会从宝塔尖上跌下去，一个人民的中国就要出现了。

#### **Appendix Article 8 (English translation)**

### **THE KUOMINTANG REACTIONARIES TURN FROM AN "APPEAL FOR PEACE" TO AN APPEAL FOR WAR**

February 16, 1949

From the time the bandit Chiang Kai-shek launched his peace offensive on January 1, the heroes of the reactionary Kuomintang clique kept on repeating at great length their willingness to "shorten the duration of the war", "alleviate the sufferings of the people" and "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration". But early in February they suddenly began to play down their peace tune and strike up the old tune of "fighting the Communists to the bitter end". This has been especially so in the last few days. On February 13 the Propaganda Department of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee issued a "Special Directive for Propaganda" to "all party headquarters and party papers" which stated:

Yeh Chien-ying has been spreading propaganda over our rear areas about the Chinese Communist Party's good faith in seeking peace, while condemning the Government's military moves as showing a lack of good faith in seeking peace. All our papers must emphatically refute this, directly and indirectly, in accordance with the following points.

The "Special Directive" gives quite a number of reasons why this "refutation" should be made:

Rather than surrender unconditionally, the Government should fight to the bitter end.

The eight terms Mao Tse-tung put forward in his January 14 statement would ruin the nation, and the Government should not have accepted them.

The Communist Party of China should bear the responsibility for wrecking peace. Instead, it has now drawn up a list of so-called war criminals which includes all the Government leaders and has even demanded that the Government first arrest them; this clearly shows how truculent and unreasonable

the Communist Party is. Unless the Communist Party of China changes this behaviour, it will indeed be difficult to find a way to peace negotiations.

There is no more of the pathetic anxiety for peace negotiations of two weeks ago. There is no further mention of those famous phrases, "shorten the duration of the war", "alleviate the sufferings of the people" and "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration", phrases which gladdened the heart and spread everywhere. If the Communist Party of China is unwilling to change its "behaviour" and insists on the punishment of the war criminals, then peace talks will be impossible. Which, then, is the primary consideration -- the salvation of the people or the salvation of the war criminals? According to the "Special Directive for Propaganda" issued by these heroes of the Kuomintang, they prefer the latter. The Communist Party of China is still consulting the democratic parties and people's organizations about the list of war criminals, and opinions have now been received from several quarters. Judging by the opinions so far received, they all disapprove of the list put forward on December 25 last year by an authoritative person in the Communist Party of China. They consider that a list containing the names of only forty-three war criminals is too short; they consider that those to be held responsible for launching the counter-revolutionary war and butchering several million people should certainly not be limited to forty-three, but should be well over a hundred. For the time being, let us suppose that the number of war criminals will be set at well over a hundred. Then we should like to ask the heroes of the Kuomintang, why do you oppose the punishment of war criminals? Aren't you willing to "shorten the duration of the war" and "alleviate the sufferings of the people"? If the war continues because of this opposition of yours, won't that be stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war? "Stalling for time and prolonging the disaster of war" was the very accusation you made against the Communist Party of China in the statement issued in the name of the Nanking government spokesman on January 26, 1949; can it be that now you want to take it back, write it on a placard and hang it on yourselves as a badge of honour? You are men of infinite compassion and mercy, who profess to "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration". Then why do you suddenly change and treat the salvation of the war criminals as the primary consideration? According to the statistics of your government's Ministry of the Interior, the number of the Chinese people is not 450 million, but 475 million; compare that with 100 odd war criminals -- which number is bigger? You heroes have studied arithmetic; please do a careful sum in accordance with your arithmetic textbook and then draw your conclusion. If, without doing this sum, you hastily change your original formula of "treating the salvation of the people as the primary consideration" -- a good formula with which we agree and the people of the whole country agree -- into the formula of "treating the salvation of more than a hundred war criminals as the primary consideration", then be careful, for you certainly will not be able to maintain your ground. After having "appealed for peace" over several weeks, those individuals who have repeatedly mouthed the phrase, "treat the salvation of the people as the primary consideration", are no longer "appealing for



peace" but are appealing for war. The reason the Kuomintang die-herds are in trouble is this: they have stubbornly opposed the people, ridden roughshod over them and thus have isolated themselves on the pinnacle of a pagoda; moreover, they will not repent, even unto death. All you broad masses of the people of the Yangtse valley and the south -- workers, peasants, intellectuals, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry and Kuomintang members with a conscience -- your attention, please! The days of the Kuomintang die-hards who have been riding roughshod over you are numbered. You and we are on the same side. The handful of die-herds will soon topple from their pinnacle, and a people's China will soon emerge.

## Appendix Article 9

### 全党讲大局，把国民经济搞上去

（一九七五年三月五日）

现在有一个大局，全党要多讲。大局是什么？三届人大一次会议和四届人大一次会议的政府工作报告，都讲了发展我国国民经济的两步设想：第一步到一九八〇年，建成一个独立的比较完整的工业体系和国民经济体系；第二步到二十世纪末，也就是说，从现在算起还有二十五年时间，把我国建设成为具有现代农业、现代工业、现代国防和现代科学技术的社会主义强国。全党全国都要为实现这个伟大目标而奋斗。这就是大局。

毛主席讲，要抓革命，促生产，促工作，促战备。听说现在有的同志只敢抓革命，不敢抓生产，说什么“抓革命保险，抓生产危险”。这是大错特错的。目前生产的形势怎么样？农业还比较好一点，但是，粮食产量按全国人口平均每人只有六百零九斤，储备粮也不多，农民的收入就那么一点。工业方面，那就确实值得引起严重注意。现有的生产能力没有发挥出来。去年一年，工业生产情况是不好的。今年是第四个五年计划的最后一年，生产再搞不好，势必影响第五个五年计划的实行。我们必须预见到这种形势，认真抓这个问题。

怎样才能把国民经济搞上去？分析的结果，当前的薄弱环节是铁路。铁路运输的问题不解决，生产部署统统打乱，整个计划都会落空。所以中央下决心要解决这个问题，今天就要发出《中共中央关于加强铁路工作的决定》。

解决铁路问题的办法，还是要加强集中统一。对铁路工作，中央从来是强调集中统一的，但是近几年这方面实际上大大削弱了。这些年铁路职工和机车、车辆、线路等装备都有增加，可是由于削弱了集中统一领导，铁路运输总是上不去。现在每天只装四万多车。据有的同志讲，按现有的实际能力装五万五千车是没有问题的。所以中央的决定是根据铁路的特性，重申集中统一。当然，地方的责任并没有减轻。铁道部门的工作没有各地的支持是做不好的。因此铁道部门与地方之间应当加强协作，采取一致的步调。

建立必要的规章制度，增强组织性纪律性，这也是中央的决定上讲的。现在铁路事故惊人，去年一年发生行车重大事故和重大事故七百五十五件，比事故最少的一九六四年的八十八件增加好多倍。这中间有许多是责任事故，包括机车车辆维修方面的责任事故。这说明没有章程了，也没有纪律了。现在有些规章制度要重申。火车司机不能下车吃饭，要带饭盒在车上吃，这是老章程，是有道理的。现在随便下车吃饭，经常误点。值班不准喝酒，这是历来的规矩，现在也不严格执行了。喝醉了酒扳错道岔，就会造成火车相撞的重大事故。所以必要的规章制

度一定要恢复和健全，组织性纪律性一定要加强。这个问题不光是铁道部门存在，其他地方和部门也同样存在。

中央的决定还讲到反对派性。现在闹派性已经严重地妨害我们的大局。要把这个问题摆到全体职工面前，要讲清楚这是大是大非问题。这个问题不解决，光解决具体问题不行。对闹派性的人要再教育，要反对闹派性的头头。大概有这样两种情况：一种是被派性迷了心窍的人，打几年派仗打昏了头，马克思主义不见了，毛泽东思想不见了，共产党也不见了。要对他们进行教育，教育过来，既往不咎，再不转变，严肃处理。另外一种是少数坏人，各行各业、各个省市都有那么一些，他们利用派性混水摸鱼，破坏社会主义秩序，破坏国家经济建设，在混乱中搞投机倒把，升官发财。对这样的人，不处理不行。比如，徐州那个闹事的头头“本事”可大啦，实际上是他在那个地方专政。对这种人不及时处理，等到哪一年呀？我说，只等他一个月，等到三月底。如果再不转变，顽固地同无产阶级对立，那样性质就变了。

铁路系统里闹派性的人同地方上闹派性的人是有联系的，反对派性，要把他们之间的联系切断。他们这些人懂得抓要害，把铁路一堵，事情就闹到北京来了。南昌铁路局的问题，省里就有人支持。一定要把铁路上搞派性活动的里外联系割断。这次确定，铁道部门的人事调动，还是由铁道部统一管理。铁道部有这个权。铁路上的派性问题，地方解决不了的，由铁道部解决。要把闹派性的人从原单位调开。当然是调头头。调动后又钻出个新的头头怎么办？钻出来再调。调两次、三次，总可以解决了吧。我们也不捉人，当然反革命的除外。闹派性的头头不服从调动怎么办？不服从调动不发工资。你的“行业”是闹派性，何必到我们这里来拿工资？总之，解决问题要有一点办法。

对中央的决定是赞成的多还是反对的多？请大家估计一下。有百分之八十的人拥护，中央的决定就能行得通。我想绝大多数人是拥护这个决定的。中国铁路工人是中国工人阶级最先进、最有组织的一部分。集中统一赞成不赞成？组织性纪律性赞成不赞成？必要的规章制度赞成不赞成？闹派性要不要反对？对闹派性的头头要不要调开？把这些问题讲清楚，理所当然地会得到绝大多数铁路职工的拥护。所以，三月份的动员要很深入，包括对职工家属、铁路沿线农民，都要做到家喻户晓。

解决铁路问题的经验，对其他工业部门会有帮助。对于当前存在的问题，要有明确的政策。要从大局出发，解决问题不能拖。拖到哪一年呢？搞社会主义怎么能等呢？

**THE WHOLE PARTY SHOULD TAKE THE OVERALL INTEREST INTO ACCOUNT AND  
PUSH THE ECONOMY FORWARD**

March 5, 1975

The whole Party must now give serious thought to our country's overall interest. What is that interest? The Reports on the Work of the Government at the First Sessions of the Third and Fourth National People's Congresses both envisaged a two-stage development of our economy: The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system by 1980. The second will be to turn China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of this century, that is, within the next 25 years. The entire Party and nation must strive for the attainment of this great objective. This constitutes the overall national interest.

Chairman Mao has said that it is necessary to make revolution, promote production and other work and ensure preparedness in the event of war. I am told that some comrades nowadays only dare to make revolution but not to promote production. They say that the former is safe but the latter dangerous. This is utterly wrong. What is the actual situation in production? Agriculture appears to be doing comparatively well, but the per-capita grain yield is only 304.5 kilogrammes, grain reserves are small and the income of the peasants is pretty low. As for industry, it deserves our serious attention. Its existing capacity is not fully utilized, and its output last year was inadequate. This is the final year of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, and if production doesn't increase, we are sure to have difficulties in carrying out the Fifth Five-Year Plan. We must foresee that possibility and earnestly address this problem.

How can we give a boost to the economy? Analysis shows that the weak link at the moment is the railways. If the problems in railway transport are not solved, our production schedules will be disrupted and the entire plan will be nullified. So the Central Committee is determined to solve this problem; today we shall issue a "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Improving Railway Work".

To solve the problems of the railways, it is essential to strengthen centralized and unified leadership. The Central Committee has always stressed the importance of such leadership in railway work, but in recent years it has been weakened. Although over these years there has been an increase in the number of railway personnel, and in rolling stock, track and other equipment, yet because centralized and unified leadership has been weakened, railway transport has consistently failed to improve. Only a little more than 40,000 freight cars are loaded per day. According to some comrades, however, given our actual loading capacity, we should be able to handle 55,000 cars per day. Therefore the Central Committee has decided to reaffirm centralized and unified leadership in accordance with the special characteristics of railway work. Of course, this will not reduce the responsibility of the localities. The central and regional railway departments cannot perform their task well without support from them. So both sides must try to co-ordinate their efforts more closely.

The decision of the Central Committee also covers the formulation of essential rules and regulations, and a strengthening of the sense of organization and discipline. The present number of railway accidents is alarming. There were 755 major ones last year, some of them extremely serious. This is many times greater than the figure of 88 accidents for 1964, the year with the lowest rate. Many of the accidents were caused by negligence, including negligence in maintaining rolling stock. This indicates that there are no proper rules and that discipline is poor. It is now time to reimpose some rules and regulations. One of the old rules was that engine drivers had to bring their lunch boxes to their locomotives and were not allowed to leave the train for meals. There were good reasons for this. But now engine drivers go off to eat whenever they like, and this means the trains frequently run behind schedule. The long-standing rule prohibiting the consumption of alcohol while on duty is not strictly observed now either. If someone gets drunk and pulls the wrong switch, he can cause a collision. For these reasons, essential rules and regulations must be restored and improved and the sense of organization and discipline enhanced. This problem concerns not only the railway departments, but the localities and other departments as well.

The decision of the Central Committee also includes instructions on combating factionalism. Factionalism now seriously jeopardizes our overall interest. This question must be brought before all personnel and explained to them clearly as a major issue of right and wrong. It is no use tackling specific problems unless we have first settled this general issue. Persons engaging in factional activities should be re-educated and their leaders opposed. Generally speaking, such leaders can be divided into two categories. One category consists of persons who are obsessed by factionalism, have engaged in factional activities for several years and have lost their sense of right and wrong. For them, Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought and the Communist Party have all disappeared. They should be educated. If they correct their mistakes, then we will let bygones be bygones, but if they refuse to mend their ways, they will be sternly dealt with. The second category consists of a few bad elements. They can be found in all lines of work in every province and city. They fish in troubled waters by capitalizing on factionalism and undermining socialist public order and economic construction. They take advantage of the resulting confusion to speculate and profiteer, grabbing power and money. Something must be done about such people. Take for instance that ringleader in Xuzhou who has been creating disturbances. He is so “capable” that he exercises a virtual dictatorship over the place. If we don’t take action against this sort of person now, how much longer are we going to wait? As I see it, we should only give him one month, that is, till the end of March, to mend his ways. If he fails to do so and stubbornly stands in opposition to the proletariat, then his misdeeds will be treated as crimes.

Factionalists in the railway departments have ties with those in the localities. We must cut these ties. Such people know how to seek out vital spots. They obstructed railway transport, and this soon came to the attention of Beijing. The trouble that occurred along the line under the jurisdiction of the Nanchang Railway Bureau was partly attributable to some of the Jiangxi provincial authorities. It is

imperative to cut the internal and external connections of individuals who engage in factional activities in the railway departments. This meeting has decided that the transfer of personnel in these departments will be conducted under the unified administration of the Ministry of Railways. The power rests with the Ministry. Factional problems in the railways that the local governments are unable to handle will be dealt with by the Ministry. Active factionalists must be transferred to other posts. Of course, I am referring to the ringleaders. What if a new ringleader emerges following the transfer of the previous one? Transfer him too. Do it two or three times and the problem will ultimately be solved. And we won't arrest anyone, except, of course, counter-revolutionaries. What if a factional ringleader refuses to be transferred? Stop paying his wages until he submits. Since his trade is factionalism, why should we keep him on our payroll? In short, we need to devise methods for solving this problem.

Which do you think there are more of, people who are in favour of the Central Committee's decision or people who are against it? The decision will be carried out effectively if it enjoys the support of 80 per cent of the people concerned. I think the overwhelming majority supports this decision. The Chinese railway workers are among the most advanced and best organized sections of the Chinese working class. Will they favour centralized and unified leadership or not? Will they favour organization and discipline or not? Will they favour the essential rules and regulations or not? Will they oppose factionalism or not? Will they support the transfer of factional ringleaders or not? If the pros and cons are clearly explained to them, the overwhelming majority of railway personnel will naturally give their support. So the mobilization drive in March should be thorough, with the issues made clear to everyone, including the family members of railway personnel and the peasants living along the railway lines.

The experience gained in handling the problems in railway work will be useful to the other industrial units. Clear-cut policies should be worked out for tackling existing problems. We should bear the overall interest of the country in mind and solve these problems without delay. How much longer can this task be put off? How can we afford to delay in advancing the cause of socialism?

## Appendix Article 10

### 我们对香港问题的基本立场

(一九八二年九月二十四日)

我们对香港问题(1)的基本立场是明确的，这里主要有三个问题。一个是主权问题；再一个问题，是一九九七年后中国采取什么方式来管理香港，继续保持香港繁荣；第三个问题，是中国和英国两国政府要妥善商谈如何使香港从现在到一九九七年的十五年中不出现大的波动。

关于主权问题，中国在这个问题上没有回旋余地。坦率地讲，主权问题不是一个可以讨论的问题。现在时机已经成熟了，应该明确肯定：一九九七年中国将收回香港。就是说，中国要收回的不仅是新界，而且包括香港岛、九龙(2)。中国和英国就是在这个前提下来进行谈判，商讨解决香港问题的方式和办法。如果中国在一九九七年，也就是中华人民共和国成立四十八年后还不把香港收回，任何一个中国领导人和政府都不能向中国人民交代，甚至也不能向世界人民交代。如果不收回，就意味着中国政府是晚清政府，中国领导人是李鸿章(3)！我们等待了三十二年，再加上十五年，就是四十八年，我们是在人民充分信赖的基础上才能如此长期等待的。如果十五年后还不收回，人民就没有理由信任我们，任何中国政府都应该下野，自动退出政治舞台，没有别的选择。所以，现在，当然不是今天，但也不迟于一、二年的时间，中国就要正式宣布收回香港这个决策。我们可以再等一、二年宣布，但肯定不能拖延更长的时间了。

中国宣布这个决策，从大的方面来讲，对英国也是有利的，因为这意味着届时英国将彻底地结束殖民统治时代，在世界公论面前会得到好评。所以英国政府应该赞成中国的这个决策。中英两国应该合作，共同来处理香港问题。

保持香港的繁荣，我们希望取得英国的合作，但这不是说，香港继续保持繁荣必须在英国的管辖之下才能实现。香港继续保持繁荣，根本上取决于中国收回香港后，在中国的管辖之下，实行适合于香港的政策。香港现行的政治、经济制度，甚至大部分法律都可以保留，当然，有些要加以改革。香港仍将实行资本主义，现行的许多适合的制度要保持。我们要同香港各界人士广泛交换意见，制定我们在十五年中的方针政策以及十五年后的方针政策。这些方针政策应该不仅是香港人民可以接受的，而且在香港的其他投资者首先是英国也能够接受，因为他们也有好处。我们希望中英两国政府就此进行友好的磋商，我们将非常高兴地听取英国政府对我们提出的建议。这些都需要时间。为什么还要等一、二年才正式宣布收回香港呢？就是希望在这段时间里同各方面进行磋商。

现在人们议论最多的是，如果香港不能继续保持繁荣，就会影响中国的四化建设。我认为，影响不能说没有，但说会在很大程度上影响中国的建设，这个估计不正确。如果中国把四化建设能否实现放在香港是否繁荣上，那末这个决策本身就是不正确的。人们还议论香港外资撤走的问题。只要我们的政策适当，走了还会回来的。所以，我们在宣布一九九七年收回香港的同时，还要宣布一九九七年后香港所实行的制度和政策。

至于说一旦中国宣布一九九七年要收回香港，香港就可能发生波动，我的看法是小波动不可避免，如果中英两国抱着合作的态度来解决这个问题，就能避免大的波动。我还要告诉夫人，中国政府在做出这个决策的时候，各种可能都估计到了。我们还考虑了我们不愿意考虑的一个问题，就是如果在十五年的过渡时期内香港发生严重的波动，怎么办？那时，中国政府将被迫不得不对收回的时间和方式另作考虑。如果说宣布要收回香港就会像夫人说的“带来灾难性的影响”，那我们要勇敢地面对这个灾难，做出决策。希望从夫人这次访问开始，两国政府官员通过外交途径进行很好的磋商，讨论如何避免这种灾难。我相信我们会制定出收回香港后应该实行的、能为各方面所接受的政策。我不担心这一点。我担心的是今后十五年过渡时期如何过渡好，担心在这个时期中会出现很大的混乱，而且这些混乱是人为的。这当中不光有外国人，也有中国人，而主要的是英国人。制造混乱是很容易的。我们进行磋商就是要解决这个问题。不单单是两国政府，而且包括政府要约束厂商及各行各业，不要做妨碍香港繁荣的事。不仅在这十五年的过渡时期内香港不要发生大的波动，一九九七年中国接管以后还要管理得更好。

我们建议达成这样一个协议，即双方同意通过外交途径开始进行香港问题的磋商。前提是一九九七年中国收回香港，在这个基础上磋商解决今后十五年怎样过渡得好以及十五年以后香港怎么办的问题。

注释：

(3)李鸿章（一八二三——一九〇一），安徽合肥人。晚清军政重臣。一八七〇年起任直隶总督兼北洋大臣。他曾代表清政府主持签订了中英《烟台条约》、《中法新约》、中日《马关条约》、《中俄密约》及《辛丑条约》等一系列割地赔款、丧权辱国的不平等条约。

## **Appendix Article 10 (English translation)**

### **Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong**

September 24, 1982



Our basic position on the question of Hong Kong is clear. There are three major issues involved. One is sovereignty. Another is the way in which China will administer Hong Kong so as to maintain its prosperity after 1997. And still another is the need for the Chinese and British governments to hold appropriate discussions on ways to avoid major disturbances in Hong Kong during the 15 years between now and 1997.

On the question of sovereignty, China has no room for manoeuvre. To be frank, the question is not open to discussion. The time is ripe for making it unequivocally clear that China will recover Hong Kong in 1997. That is to say, China will recover not only the New Territories but also Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. It must be on that understanding that China and the United Kingdom hold talks on the ways and means of settling the Hong Kong question.

If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when the People's Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese leaders were just like Li Hongzhang! (13)

We have waited for 33 years, and if we add another 15 years, that will make 48. We are able to wait for such a long time because we enjoy the full confidence of the people. But if we failed to recover Hong Kong in 15 years, the people would no longer have reason to trust us, and any Chinese government would have no alternative but to step down and voluntarily leave the political stage. Therefore, at this time -- I don't mean today, of course, but in no more than one or two years -- China will officially announce its decision to recover Hong Kong. We can wait another year or two, but definitely not longer.

In a broad sense, China's announcement of this policy decision will be beneficial to Britain too, because it will mean that 1997 will mark the end of the era of British colonial rule, and that will be welcomed by world public opinion. So the British government should support this policy decision. The Chinese and British governments should work together to handle the question of Hong Kong in a satisfactory manner.

We hope to have Britain's cooperation in maintaining prosperity in Hong Kong, but this does not mean that continued prosperity can only be ensured under British administration. It depends fundamentally on applying policies suitable to Hong Kong, under Chinese administration after the recovery. Hong Kong's current political and economic systems and even most of its laws can remain in force. Of course, some of them will be modified. Hong Kong will continue under capitalism, and many systems currently in use that are suitable will be maintained. Before formulating the principles and policies for the next 15 years and beyond, we shall have an extensive exchange of views with

Hong Kong people from all walks of life. These principles and policies should be acceptable not only to the people of Hong Kong but also to foreign investors, and first of all to Britain, because they will benefit them too. We hope that the Chinese and British governments will engage in friendly consultations on this question, and we shall be glad to listen to suggestions put forward by the British government. All this will take time. Why must we wait one or two years before announcing our decision to recover Hong Kong? Because during that period we hope to consult with all sorts of people.

The main concern of people today is that if prosperity is not maintained in Hong Kong, it might retard China's drive for modernization. In my opinion, while we cannot say it would have no effect whatever on China's modernization, it would be a mistake to say the effect would be very great. If China had decided to base the success of its modernization drive on prosperity in Hong Kong, that policy decision would have been wrong. People are also concerned about the possible withdrawal of foreign capital from Hong Kong. But so long as our policies are appropriate, capital that leaves Hong Kong will return. Therefore, when we announce our decision to recover Hong Kong in 1997, we should at the same time announce the systems and policies that will be applied there after that date.

As to the assertion that once China declares its decision to recover Hong Kong in 1997 there will be disturbances there, I believe that while minor disturbances are inevitable, major ones can be avoided if China and Britain approach the question in a cooperative spirit. I also want to tell Madam that when the Chinese government made this policy decision, it took all eventualities into account. We even considered the possibility of something we would hate to see happen -- that is, we considered what we should do if serious disturbances occurred in Hong Kong during the 15-year transition period. The Chinese government would then be compelled to reconsider the timing and manner of the recovery. If the announcement of the recovery of Hong Kong has, as Madam put it, "a disastrous effect", we shall face that disaster squarely and make a new policy decision. I hope that beginning from Madam's current visit, government officials of the two countries will conduct earnest consultations through diplomatic channels to find ways of avoiding any disasters.

I am convinced that we can work out policies that should be applied after the recovery of Hong Kong and that will be acceptable to all quarters. I have no concern on that score. What I am concerned about is how to make a smooth transition over the next 15 years. I am concerned that there may be major disturbances in this period, man-made disturbances. These could be created not just by foreigners but also by Chinese -- but chiefly by Britons. It is very easy to create disturbances. This is precisely the problem our consultations will be designed to solve. The governments of the two countries should not only refrain from doing anything that would impair the prosperity of Hong Kong, but they should also ensure that entrepreneurs and people in all other lines of work refrain as well. There must be no major

disturbances in Hong Kong during the 15-year transition period, and affairs there must be administered even better after the Chinese recovery in 1997.

We suggest that an agreement be reached that the two sides will begin consultations on the question of Hong Kong through diplomatic channels. The prerequisite is the understanding that China will recover Hong Kong in 1997. On this basis we should discuss how to carry out the transition successfully in the next 15 years and what to do in Hong Kong after the end of that period.

#### NOTES

13, Li Hong Zhang (1823-1901), a native of Hefei, Anhui Province, was an important military and administrative official during the late Qing Dynasty. In 1870 he became Governor of Zhili (present-day Hebei) Province and Minister in Charge of the Northern Coastal Provinces. On behalf of the Qing government he presided over the signing of unequal treaties such as the Sino-British Yantai Treaty, the Sino-French New Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shinomoseki, the Sino-Russian Secret Pact, and the Peace Treaty of 1901 with 11 countries including Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany and Japan. Under the terms of these treaties China relinquished sovereignty, ceded territory and paid indemnities. P.23

## Appendix Article 11

### 改革是中国发展生产力的必由之路

（一九八五年八月二十八日）

从中华人民共和国成立到毛泽东主席逝世这段时间，我们做了大量的工作，特别是从新民主主义革命转变到社会主义革命，搞了土改，对农业、手工业和资本主义工商业进行了社会主义改造，事情做得非常好。一九五七年开始有一点问题了，问题出在一个“左”字上。我们反对资产阶级右派是必要的，但是搞过分了。“左”的思想发展导致了一九五八年的“大跃进”，这是比较大的错误，在不具备条件的情况下大炼钢铁，再加上一系列具体的“左”的作法，结果使我们受到惩罚。一九五九年到一九六一年三年困难时期，工农业减产，市场上的商品很少，人民群众吃不饱饭，积极性受到严重挫伤。那时，我们党的威信、毛泽东主席的威望很高，我们把困难的情况如实告诉了人民，“大跃进”的口号不再喊了，并且采取了比较切实的步骤和比较合理的方法，三年时间就从困难的境况中恢复过来。但是“左”的指导思想并没有根除。一九六二年刚刚恢复，一九六三年、一九六四年情况比较好，这时又出现了“左”的思想，一九六五年提出党内有走资本主义道路的当权派。以后就搞了“文化大革命”，走到了“左”的极端。“文化大革命”实际上从一九六五年就开始了，一九六六年正式宣布。从一九六六年到一九七六年搞了整整十年，党内的骨干差不多都被打倒了。这场“革命”的对象就是这些老干部。我们把这种思想叫作极左思潮。

粉碎“四人帮”以后，我们拨乱反正，就是要纠正极左思潮。同时我们提出还是要坚持马列主义、毛泽东思想。我们一九八一年见面时谈过“四个坚持”。所谓“四个坚持”，就是坚持社会主义道路、坚持人民民主专政、坚持共产党的领导、坚持马列主义毛泽东思想。这是四项基本原则。如果不坚持这四项基本原则，纠正极左就会变成“纠正”马列主义，“纠正”社会主义。

我们总结了几十年搞社会主义的经验。社会主义是什么，我们并没有完全搞清楚。马克思主义的核心是什么？马克思主义的另一个名词就是共产主义。我们多年奋斗就是为了共产主义。我们的信念理想就是要搞共产主义。在我们最困难的时期，共产主义的理想是我们的精神支柱，多少人牺牲就是为了实现这个理想。共产主义是什么？就是没有人剥削人的制度，产品极大丰富，各尽所能，按需分配。按需分配，没有极大丰富的物质条件是不可能的。要实现共产主义，一定要完成社会主义阶段的任务。社会主义的任务很多，但根本一条就是发展生产力，为共产主义创造物质基础。它要在发展生产力的基础上体现出优于资本主义，最终是为了实现共产主义。我们在一个长时期里忽视了发展社会主义的生产力。从一九五七年起，我们生产力

的发展非常缓慢。一九五七年的时候，农民年平均纯收入七十几元人民币，那是很穷的了。七十几元的年纯收入大约相当于工厂工人的月工资。到一九六六年发动“文化大革命”那一年，农民的平均纯收入没有增长多少。虽然有一些地区的农民比较宽裕，但是多数地区的农民只能勉强解决温饱问题。当然这是旧中国所没有的，也是一个进步了。但是，要按照社会主义的标准来说，这是很不够的。“文化大革命”时期，情况更加困难。

我们拨乱反正，就是要在坚持四项基本原则的基础上发展生产力。为了发展生产力，必须对我国的经济体制进行改革，实行对外开放的政策。我们吸收资本主义国家的资金、技术，为的是发展社会主义的生产力。党的十一届三中全会以来，我们逐步进行改革。改革首先从农村开始。农村改革已经见效了，农村面貌发生明显变化。有了农村改革的经验，现在我们转到城市经济改革。城市经济改革就是全面的改革，从去年下半年开始到现在有一年时间了。城市经济改革比农村经济改革复杂得多，难免出差错，冒风险。我们意识到了这一点。但是，我们要发展生产力，对经济体制进行改革是必由之路。我们有充分的信心。不过，要证实我们城市经济改革的路子走得对不对，还需要三五年的时间。

在改革中坚持社会主义方向，这是一个很重要的问题。我们要实现工业、农业、国防和科技现代化，但在四个现代化前面有“社会主义”四个字，叫“社会主义四个现代化”。我们现在讲的对内搞活经济、对外开放是在坚持社会主义原则下开展的。社会主义本身有两个非常重要的方面。第一，要坚持以公有制为主体的经济。公有制包括全民所有制和集体所有制。我们现在公有制经济占整个经济的百分之九十以上。与此同时，我们发展一点个体经济，吸收外国资金、技术，甚至欢迎外国企业到中国办工厂。这些都是对社会主义经济的补充。这样做不会也不可能破坏以公有制为基础的社会主义经济。合资经营，外国资本占一半，另一半是我们社会主义公有的，至少发展了一半社会主义经济。一个企业办起来，企业的一半收入归社会主义所有，国家还可以从企业中得到税收。更重要的是，从这些合资经营的企业中，我们可以学到一些好的管理经验和先进的技术，用于发展社会主义经济。我们还欢迎外国独资经营，我们从中得到税收，学到技术和管理经验，这对社会主义所有制没有什么损害。现在外国投资有限。我们倒是觉得这种投资太少，还不能满足我们的需要。第二，决不能导致贫富两极分化。如果导致两极分化，改革就算失败了。我们在制定和执行政策时注意到了这一点。会不会产生新的资产阶级？个别资产阶级分子可能会出现，但不会形成一个资产阶级。如果我们的改革一方面坚持社会主义公有制为主体，另一方面又注意不导致两极分化，这就没有什么坏处。过去四年我们就是朝这个方向走的。总的一句话，就是坚持社会主义。

我还要说，讲开放问题，不要忽视国家机器的作用。我们社会主义的国家机器是强有力的。一旦发现偏离社会主义方向的情况，国家机器就会出面干预，纠正过来。开放政策会给我们带

来一些风险，一些资本主义的腐朽东西会被带进来。但是，我们的社会主义政策和国家机器有力量去克服这些东西。所以事情并不可怕。我们的同志编辑出版了一本小册子《建设有中国特色的社会主义》，里面是我的一些讲话，有十二大的开幕词，不知你读过没有？

中国的革命取得了成功，就是因为将马列主义的普遍原则用于自己的实际中去。在社会主义建设方面，我们的经验有正面的，也有反面的，正反两方面的经验都有用。要特别注意我们“左”的错误。“左”的错误带来的损失，历史已经作出结论。我们都是搞革命的，我们搞革命的人最容易犯急性病。我们的用心是好的，是想早一点进入共产主义。这往往使我们不能冷静地分析主客观方面的情况，从而违反客观世界发展的规律。中国过去就是犯了性急的错误。我们特别希望你们注意中国不成功的经验。外国的经验可以借鉴，但是绝对不能照搬。

#### **Appendix Article 11 (English translation)**

#### **REFORM IS THE ONLY WAY FOR CHINA TO DEVELOP ITS PRODUCTIVE FORCES**

August 28, 1985

We did a great deal of work between 1949, when the People's Republic of China was founded, and 1976, when Chairman Mao Zedong passed away. We were particularly successful during the period of transition from new-democratic revolution to socialist revolution, in which we carried out agrarian reform and then, in the period of the First Five-Year Plan [1953-1957], engaged in large-scale industrialization and completed the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce.

We began to experience some trouble in 1957, when ``Left" ideology appeared. It was necessary for us to combat bourgeois Rightists, but we went too far. In 1958 the spread of ``Left" thinking led to the Great Leap Forward and the movement to establish people's communes. That was a serious mistake, and we suffered because of it. During the three years of economic difficulty from 1959 through 1961, industrial and agricultural output dropped, so that commodities were in short supply. The people didn't have enough to eat, and their enthusiasm was greatly dampened. At that time our Party and Chairman Mao Zedong enjoyed high prestige acquired through long years of struggle, and we explained to the people frankly why the situation was so difficult. We abandoned the slogan of the Great Leap Forward and adopted more realistic policies and measures instead. The year 1962 saw the beginning of recovery, and in 1963 and 1964 things were looking up, but our guiding ideology still contained remnants of ``Left" thinking.

In 1965 it was said that certain persons who were in power in the Party were taking the capitalist road. Then came the "Cultural Revolution", in which the "Left" ideology was carried to its extreme and the ultra-Left trend of thought became rampant. The "Cultural Revolution" actually began in 1965, but it was officially declared only a year later. It lasted a whole decade, from 1966 through 1976, during which time almost all the veteran cadres who formed the backbone of the Party were brought down. It was they who were made the targets of the "Cultural Revolution".

After the downfall of the Gang of Four, we began to set things to rights, that is, to correct the ultra-Left trend of thought. But we still maintained that it was necessary to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. When we met in 1981, I talked about keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Now we call these the Four Cardinal Principles. If we do not uphold them in our effort to correct ultra-Left thinking, we shall end up "correcting" Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

We summed up our experience in building socialism over the past few decades. We had not been quite clear about what socialism is and what Marxism is. Another term for Marxism is communism. It is for the realization of communism that we have struggled for so many years. We believe in communism, and our ideal is to bring it into being. In our darkest days we were sustained by the ideal of communism. It was for the realization of this ideal that countless people laid down their lives. A Communist society is one in which there is no exploitation of man by man, there is great material abundance and the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs is applied. It is impossible to apply that principle without overwhelming material wealth. In order to realize communism, we have to accomplish the tasks set in the socialist stage. They are legion, but the fundamental one is to develop the productive forces so as to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism and provide the material basis for communism. For a long time we neglected the development of the productive forces of the socialist society. From 1957 on they grew at a snail's pace. In the countryside, after ten years -- that is, in 1966 -- the peasants' income had risen only very slightly. Although peasants in some areas were better off, those in many other areas still lived in poverty. Of course, even that was progress, compared with the old days. Still, it was far from a socialist standard of living. During the "Cultural Revolution" things went from bad to worse.

By setting things to rights, we mean developing the productive forces while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles. To develop the productive forces, we have to reform the economic structure and open to the outside world. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee we began our reform step by step, starting with the countryside. The rural reform has achieved good results, and there has been a noticeable change in the countryside. Drawing on our successful experience in rural reform, we embarked on urban reform. Urban reform, a comprehensive

undertaking involving all sectors, has been going on for a year now, ever since the second half of last year. Since it is much more complicated than rural economic reform, mistakes and risks are unavoidable, and that's something we are quite aware of. But economic reform is the only way to develop the productive forces. We have full confidence in urban reform, although it will take three to five years to demonstrate the correctness of our policies.

In the course of reform it is very important for us to maintain our socialist orientation. We are trying to achieve modernization in industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology. But in front of the word "modernization" is a modifier, "socialist", making it the "four socialist modernizations". The policies of invigorating our domestic economy and opening to the outside world are being carried out in accordance with the principles of socialism. Socialism has two major requirements. First, its economy must be dominated by public ownership, and second, there must be no polarization.

Public ownership may consist of both ownership by the entire people and ownership by the collective. The publicly owned sector of our economy accounts for more than 90 per cent of the total. At the same time, we allow a small private sector to develop, we absorb foreign capital and introduce advanced technology, we encourage Chinese and foreign enterprises to establish joint and cooperative ventures and we even encourage foreigners to set up wholly owned factories in China. All that will serve as a supplement to the socialist economy.

From such ventures workers get wages and the state collects taxes, and part of the income of the joint and cooperative ventures goes to the socialist sector. An even more important aspect of all these ventures is that from them we can learn managerial skills and advanced technology that will help us develop our socialist economy. This cannot and will not undermine the socialist economy. As of now, there has been only limited foreign investment, far less than we feel we need.

As to the requirement that there must be no polarization, we have given much thought to this question in the course of formulating and implementing our policies. If there is polarization, the reform will have been a failure. Is it possible that a new bourgeoisie will emerge? A handful of bourgeois elements may appear, but they will not form a class.

In short, our reform requires that we keep public ownership predominant and guard against polarization. In the last four years we have been proceeding along these lines. That is, we have been keeping to socialism.

Let me add that our socialist state apparatus is so powerful that it can intervene to correct any deviations. To be sure, the open policy entails risks and may bring into China some decadent



bourgeois things. But with our socialist policies and state apparatus, we shall be able to cope with them. So there is nothing to fear.

Our comrades have published a collection of some of my speeches, entitled Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, which includes, for instance, my opening speech at the Twelfth National Party Congress. I don't know if you have read it. What, after all, is socialism? The Soviet Union has been building socialism for so many years and yet is still not quite clear what it is. Perhaps Lenin had a good idea when he adopted the New Economic Policy. But as time went on, the Soviet pattern became ossified. We were victorious in the Chinese revolution precisely because we applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to our own realities.

In building socialism we have had both positive and negative experiences, and they are equally useful to us. I hope you will particularly study our "Left" errors. History bears witness to the losses we have suffered on account of those errors. Being totally dedicated to the revolution, we are liable to be too impetuous. It is true that we have good intentions, that we are eager to see the realization of communism at an early date. But often our very eagerness has prevented us from making a sober analysis of subjective and objective conditions, and we have therefore acted in contradiction to the laws governing the development of the objective world. In the past China made the mistake of trying to plunge ahead too fast. We hope you will give special consideration to our negative experiences. Of course one can learn from the experience of other countries, but one must never copy everything they have done.

## Appendix Article 12

### 视察天津时的谈话

（1986年8月19日——21日）

我这次来天津，要看看你们的开发区，看看市容，还要到港口看一看。

对外开放还是要放，不放就不活，不存在收的问题。天津开发区很好嘛，已经创出了牌子，投资环境有所改善，外国人到这里投资就比较放心了。

你们在港口和市区之间有这么多荒地，这是个很大的优势，我看你们潜力很大。可以胆子大点，发展快点。你们这里有些基础设施比上海好，有些事情办起来可能容易些。你们准备向外国借一百亿美元，有没有对象？可以多找一些国家。人家借给我们钱都不怕，我们怕什么？我向来不怕。十年时间，有一两个地方，借百把亿美元，只要讲效益，有什么危险？两百亿也没有什么了不起！

要研究投资方向问题。日本人说搞现代化要从交通、通讯上入手，我看有道理。我们在这方面老是舍不得花钱。

天津港下放两年来经济效益显著提高。人还是这些人，地还是这块地，一改革，效益就上来了。无非是给了他们权，其中最重要的是用人权。

中环线搞得这么快，是不是搞了承包？就是要搞改革，搞承包，分段、分级承包，实行责任制。中山门蝶式立交桥的设计者干得好，破格批准他为工程师，应该，这是谁也不应反对的，这也叫改革。

改革，现代化科学技术，加上我们讲政治，威力就大多了。到什么时候都得讲政治，外国人就是不理解后面这一条。你们经常搞义务劳动，这也是政治嘛。

我的一贯主张是，让一部分人、一部分地区先富起来，大原则是共同富裕。一部分地区发展快一点，带动大部分地区，这是加速发展、达到共同富裕的捷径。

把年轻干部放到第一线压担子，这个路子对，不能只靠人家扶着。他们受到了锻炼，提上来别人也会服气。

建设居民小区，人民群众有了好的环境，看到了变化，就有信心，就高兴，事情也就好办了。

## **Appendix Article 12 (English translation)**

### **REMARKS DURING AN INSPECTION TOUR OF TIANJIN**

August 19-21, 1986

During this visit to Tianjin, I should like to see your development district and have a look around the city. I'd like to see the harbour as well.

We must continue to open to the outside world. Otherwise, we shall not be able to invigorate the economy. We must never close our doors. The Development District here is very good, indeed. Since it has earned a high reputation and improved the environment for investment, foreign investors should feel confident.

You have so much wasteland between the harbour and the city proper. This is a major advantage. It seems to me that you have great potentialities. You should be more daring and work for faster development. Since some of your infrastructure here is better than that in Shanghai, you can probably do certain things more easily.

I have heard that you are ready to borrow US\$10 billion from other countries. Do you have any source of loans in mind? You can contact more countries. If other people are not afraid to lend money to us, why should we be afraid to borrow it? I am not afraid of borrowing. What danger is there if one or two places borrow \$10 billion over a period of ten years and make effective use of the money? There will be no trouble even if it is \$20 billion!

You should study ways of channeling investment into the proper areas. The Japanese say that modernization should start with transport and telecommunications. That sounds quite sensible to me. We used to begrudge money for projects in those areas.

Since the power to administer Tianjin harbour was delegated to the local authorities two years ago, its economic efficiency has greatly improved. The people haven't changed, and neither has the land. But the reform has brought increased efficiency. This is only because the local authorities have been given power, especially the power to hire and fire personnel.

The Zhonghuanxian Road has been built so quickly! Is it because you had a contract signed for the project? Yes, you should go on with the reform and the contract system, including contracts for whole projects, for different parts of a project and for different levels of management. You should practise the responsibility system. The designer of the Zhongshanmen cloverleaf flyover did a good job. He

deserves to be promoted to the rank of engineer, as an exception. Nobody should object to that. This kind of promotion is also a reform.

We attach importance not only to reform and to modern science and technology but also to politics. This makes us much stronger. We have to lay great stress on politics at all times. This is a point many foreigners don't seem to understand. From time to time you encourage volunteer labour -- that too is politics.

I have consistently maintained that some people and some regions should be allowed to prosper before others, always with the goal of common prosperity. If a few regions develop a little faster, they will spur the others to catch up. This is a shortcut we can take to speed up development and attain common prosperity.

It is right to place young cadres in the forefront of the modernization drive, giving them heavier responsibilities. They shouldn't simply lean on others. When you promote them after they have gained experience this way, other people will be convinced that it was the right thing to do.

When you have built more apartment houses, the people will have a better environment. When they see the changes, they will be filled with joy and confidence, and that will make it easier for you to get things done.

## Appendix Article 13

### 把教育工作认真抓起来

（一九八五年五月十九日）

今天，我来参加这个会议，主要是表示对教育工作的支持，并且向你们，向全国教育工作者表示慰问。

教育体制改革的决定草案，我看是个好文件。现在，纲领有了，蓝图有了，关键是要真正重视，扎扎实实地抓，组织好施工。

我们多次说过，我国的经济，到建国一百周年时，可能接近发达国家的水平。我们这样说，根据之一，就是在这段时间里，我们完全有能力把教育搞上去，提高我国的科学技术水平，培养出数以亿计的各级各类人才。我们国家，国力的强弱，经济发展后劲的大小，越来越取决于劳动者的素质，取决于知识分子的数量和质量。一个十亿人口的大国，教育搞上去了，人才资源的巨大优势是任何国家比不了的。有了人才优势，再加上先进的社会主义制度，我们的目标就有把握达到。现在小学一年级的娃娃，经过十几年的学校教育，将成为开创二十一世纪大业的生力军。中央提出要以极大的努力抓教育，并且从中小学抓起，这是有战略眼光的一着。如果现在不向全党提出这样的任务，就会误大事，就要负历史的责任。

近几年来，从中央到地方，到农村党支部，有越来越多的同志，懂得知识和人才的重要，懂得教育的重要。这是我们党的一大进步。另一方面，还有相当一部分同志，包括一些高级干部，对于发展和改革教育的必要性，认识不足，缺乏紧迫感，或者口头上承认教育重要，到了实际问题时又变得不那么重要了。我们不是已经实现了全党全国工作重点的转移吗？这个重点，本来就应当包括教育。一个地区，一个部门，如果只抓经济，不抓教育，那里的工作重点就是没有转移好，或者说转移得不完全。忽视教育的领导者，是缺乏远见的、不成熟的领导者，就领导不了现代化建设。各级领导要像抓好经济工作那样抓好教育工作。

各级党委和政府，对教育工作不仅要抓，并且要抓紧、抓好，严格要求，少讲空话，多干实事。比如说，改革的决定，在你那个地区、那个部门，怎样贯彻落实？校舍和教学设备不够，怎样解决？学校经费不足，怎样筹集？师生的伙食，怎样办得好一点？师资培训，怎样组织？学校的思想政治工作，怎样改进？等等。各级党政负责同志，要经常深入学校，倾听广大师生的意见和呼声，为他们排忧解难。什么叫领导？领导就是服务。几年前，我曾说过，愿意给教育、科技部门的同志当后勤部长。今天，我还是这个态度。领导者必须多干实事。那种只

靠发指示、说空话过日子的坏作风，一定要转变过来。各个部门和地方，特别是主要负责同志，都要注意这个问题。

对我国教育的发展，我是乐观的。困难是有，但要看到有利条件。不管怎么说，这几年经济发展是快的。经济是基础。经济的发展必然会带动教育的发展。我国城乡和社会各界，蕴藏着极大的办学热情，不少爱国侨胞也热心捐资办学。现在我们又有了一个正确的纲领。在这样的条件下，只要各级领导认真抓，我看教育的事情好办，悲观是没有根据的。扎扎实实抓它几年，中华民族教育事业空前繁荣的新局面，一定会到来。

我很高兴，从去年十月以来，中央相继作出了三项改革决定（56）。这些改革的总目标是一致的，都是为了使我国消灭贫穷，走向富强，消灭落后，走向现代化，建设有中国特色的社会主义。在七个月的时间里，办了过去多年想办而未办成的事。这一事实，表明我们党的认识能力有了新的提高，表明我们党已经能够创造性地运用马克思主义的基本原理，来解决当代中国社会主义建设中的许多新问题。当前，全世界都在关注着我国的改革。希望全党同志和全国各族人民，按照中央已经确定的目标继续前进，努力把各项改革搞成功！

#### **Appendix Article 13 (English translation)**

#### **DEVOTE SPECIAL EFFORT TO EDUCATION**

May 19, 1985

My purpose in attending this conference today is primarily to show my support for education and to salute you and the other workers in education throughout the country.

I think the draft decision on reforming the educational structure is a good document. Now that we have the guiding principle and a plan, the main thing is to recognize their importance, take practical steps to implement them and to organize the work well.

We have stated on many occasions that China's economy may approach the level of the developed countries by the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic. One of the reasons we can say so is that in the meantime, we shall be able to develop education, raise the scientific and technological level of the country and train hundreds of millions of people in all disciplines and at all levels. Our national strength and sustained economic development depend more and more on the educational qualifications of the working people and on the quantity and quality of intellectuals. When China, a vast country with a billion people, has developed its education, it will enjoy an enormous superiority in intellectual resources that no other country can match. There is no doubt that when we have that

superiority, together with an advanced socialist system, we shall be able to attain our goals. If the children now in the first grade of elementary school receive ten or more years of schooling, they will become a vital force for ushering in the 21st century. The Central Committee has called upon us to do our utmost to develop education, beginning with elementary and secondary education. This is a strategic move. If the Central Committee did not set this task for the Party now, major undertakings would be delayed and history would hold it responsible.

During recent years more and more comrades, from the central authorities down to local authorities and rural Party branches, have come to realize the importance of knowledge, trained people and education. This shows that our Party has made great progress in this respect. However, there are still a good many comrades, including some senior cadres, who do not fully understand the need to develop and reform education. They have no sense of urgency about it; they agree in words that education is important, but when it comes to solving practical problems, they don't act as if it were important. Haven't we shifted the focus of the work of the Party and the country to economic development? It goes without saying that the focus should also be on education. If a locality or a department pays attention only to the economy and not to education, it has failed to shift the focus of its work completely. Leaders who neglect education are neither far-sighted nor mature, and they are therefore unable to lead the drive for modernization. Leaders at all levels should try to make educational work a success just as they do economic work.

Party committees and governments at all levels should take educational work seriously and do it well. You should be strict with yourselves and spend less time on idle talk and more on real work. For example, how are you going to implement the decision on reform in your area or department? If there are not enough school buildings and teaching facilities, how are you going to solve the problem? If the schools are short of funds, how are you going to raise them? How are you going to improve the meals for teachers and students? How are you going to organize the training of teachers? How can you improve the ideological and political work in schools? And so on and so forth. Leading comrades of Party committees and governments at all levels should often visit schools, listen to what all the teachers and students have to say and help them overcome their difficulties. What is leadership? Leadership means service. I said a few years ago that I would like to be director of support services for the comrades working in the departments of education and science and technology. I still feel that way. Leaders must do more real work. The bad habit of doing nothing but issuing instructions and indulging in empty talk must be broken. People in all departments and localities, especially the chief leading comrades, should pay attention to this problem.

I am optimistic about the development of education in our country. We do face difficulties, but we should recognize that we have favourable conditions. In any event, the economy has developed rapidly in the last few years. The economy is the foundation. Economic development will inevitably

promote educational development. In both urban and rural areas and in all sectors of society people are enthusiastic about running schools. Quite a number of patriotic overseas Chinese are eager to donate money for the purpose. Now we also have a correct guiding principle. Under these circumstances, I think that as long as the leaders at all levels work conscientiously, it will be easy to develop education. There is no reason for us to be pessimistic. If we do solid work for a few years, we shall surely create a new situation in which education flourishes as never before.

I am very pleased that since last October the Central Committee has made three decisions on reform. The general objectives of these measures are the same -- they are all designed to enable our country to eliminate poverty, become strong and prosperous, overcome backwardness, modernize and build a socialism suited to Chinese conditions. In the past seven months, we have done some things that we had wanted to do for many years. This shows that our Party now has a better understanding of what needs to be done and that it can creatively use the basic tenets of Marxism to solve many new problems that arise in the course of building socialism in present-day China. The whole world is watching the reforms in our country. I hope that all Party comrades and the people of all our nationalities will march towards the goals set by the Central Committee and try to make a success of every reform!



## Appendix Article 14

### 社会主义的中国谁也动摇不了

（一九八九年十月二十六日）

我们两国的关系是不同社会制度国家发展友好关系的典范。最近一个时期，我多次向国际上的朋友们说，应该建立国际经济新秩序，解决南北问题〔16〕，还应该建立国际政治新秩序，使它同国际经济新秩序相适应。我特别推荐五十年代由我们亚洲人提出的和平共处五项原则〔14〕，作为今后国际政治新秩序的准则。我们两国自七十年代建立外交关系以来，可以说真正遵循了这个原则。

我们两国之间没有什么问题，如果说有，就是要加深合作和交往，特别是在经济建设方面。政治上，我们共同为世界的和平、首先是亚洲的和平而努力。中国搞社会主义，是谁也动摇不了的。我们搞的是有中国特色的社会主义，是不断发展社会生产力的社会主义，是主张和平的社会主义。只有不断发展社会生产力，国家才能一步步富强起来，人民生活才能一步步改善。只有争取到和平的环境，才能比较顺利地发展。中国要维护自己国家的利益、主权和领土完整，中国同样认为，社会主义国家不能侵犯别国的利益、主权和领土。

过去两个超级大国主宰世界，现在情况变了。但是，强权政治在升级，少数几个西方发达国家想垄断世界，这点我们看得很清楚。巴黎七国首脑会议〔125〕就体现出来了，就是在这个会上决定制裁中国，他们使用经济手段，也使用政治手段，如高级官员不接触。这个东西对中国有什么影响？美国也好，法国也好，他们的决策人至少有两点对中国认识不清。第一，中华人民共和国是打了二十二年仗建立起来的，建国后又进行了三年抗美援朝战争〔106〕。没有广泛的群众基础，不可能取得胜利。这样一个国家随便就能打倒了？不可能。不但国内没有人有这个本领，国际上也没有人有这个本领，超级大国、富国都没有这个本领。第二，世界上最不怕孤立、最不怕封锁、最不怕制裁的就是中国。建国以后，我们处于被孤立、被封锁、被制裁的地位有几十年之久。但归根结底，没有损害我们多少。为什么？因为中国块头这么大，人口这么多，中国共产党有志气，中国人民有志气。还可以加上一点，外国的侵略、威胁，会激发起中国人民团结、爱国、爱社会主义、爱共产党的热情，同时也使我们更清醒。所以，外国的侵略、威胁这一套，在我们看来并不高明，而且使我们可以从中得到益处。事实表明，那些要制裁我们的人也开始在总结经验了。总之，中国人民不怕孤立，不信邪。不管国际风云怎么变幻，中国都是站得住的。这是我讲的怎样真正认识中国的话。

## **Appendix Article 14 (English translation)**

### **NO ONE CAN SHAKE SOCIALIST CHINA**

October 26, 1989

The relations between our two countries are a model of friendship between countries with different social systems. Recently I have said to foreign friends on many occasions that a new international economic order should be established, so as to settle the North-South question. A new international political order should also be established that would be in conformity with the new international economic order. I have especially recommended that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which we Asians put forward in the 1950s, be made norms governing the future international political order. It can be said that ever since our two countries established diplomatic relations in the 1970s, we have followed those principles to the letter.

There are no problems between our two countries. Or if there are, they are only the need to increase our cooperation and contacts, especially in economic development. Politically, we are working together for world peace and, first of all, for peace in Asia. No one can shake China's determination to build socialism. The socialism we are building is a socialism that is adapted to our own conditions, a socialism that helps to constantly develop the productive forces and that favours peace. Only by constantly developing the productive forces can a country gradually become strong and prosperous, with a rising standard of living. Only in a peaceful environment can we develop smoothly. China will safeguard its own interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also maintains that a socialist country should not infringe upon other countries' interests, sovereignty or territory.

The world used to be dominated by two superpowers. Now things have changed. Nevertheless, power politics is escalating, and a few Western developed countries wish to monopolize the world. This is something of which we are very aware. It can be seen from the Paris summit of leaders of the Group of Seven. It was at that meeting that they decided to impose both economic and political sanctions on China, such as the ban on contacts between high-ranking officials. Will the sanctions have any effect? The decision-makers of both the United States and France have failed to understand at least two aspects of China. First, the People's Republic was established after 22 years of war. After its founding, it fought for three more years in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Without popular support, we would not have won those wars. Is it possible that a country like this will be brought down so easily? No, it is not. Neither people in China nor those in other countries, such as the superpowers and the rich countries, have the ability to bring China down. Second, the last country in the world to be afraid of isolation, blockade or sanctions is China. For several decades after the founding of the People's Republic, we were isolated and subjected to blockades and sanctions. But in the final analysis, that did not do us much damage. Why? Because China is so huge and so populous,

and the Communist Party and the people have such high aspirations. In addition, foreign aggression and threats arouse the Chinese people's sense of unity, their patriotism and their love for socialism and the Communist Party and only make us clearer in our thinking.

So we think it is not wise for foreigners to resort to aggression and threats; that only works to our advantage. Facts show that those who have imposed sanctions on us have begun to rethink what they have done. In short, the Chinese people are not afraid of isolation and will not be bullied. No matter what changes take place in the international situation, China will be able to hold its ground. I think this is the true way to understand China.

## Appendix Article 15

### 确立和完善公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度

（一九九七年一月十七日）

公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展，是我国社会主义初级阶段的一项基本经济制度。通过改革不断完善和发展这项制度，是经济体制改革的一项重大任务。

（一）坚持公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展，是党通过长期实践总结出来的基本经验，应该确立为我国社会主义初级阶段的一项基本经济制度，任何情况下也不能动摇。确立这项基本经济制度是由两个方面决定的：一是我国实行社会主义制度，必须坚持公有制为主体；二是我国处在社会主义初级阶段，必须发展多种所有制经济。在坚持公有制为主体的前提下，一切符合“三个有利于”的所有制形式都应当用来为社会主义服务。

（二）改革是社会主义制度的自我完善和发展。改革就是改变那些不利于生产力解放、不适应生产力发展的生产关系和上层建筑。完善公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度，深化国有企业改革，是经济体制改革的中心环节，关系到社会主义市场经济的成败。

（三）在新形势下，要全面认识公有制经济的含义。从资产总量上看，公有制经济不仅包括传统意义上的国有经济和集体经济，同时应该包括混合经济中的国有成分和集体所有制成分。从资产形态上看，公有制不仅包括单一形态的国有经济和集体经济，同时应该包括国有成分和集体所有制成分可以对其资产进行控制的股份制经济和股份合作制经济。改革开放以来，不仅国有经济和集体经济有了明显的壮大和发展，混合经济中的公有制经济同样有了明显的壮大和发展。这是改革取得的成果。

（四）建国以后很长一段时间，由于政策的偏差，我们曾几次在所有制结构关系问题上出现冒进、而后又作政策调整的情况。实践证明，这种调整，看起来是“退”，实际上是一种“进”，是必要的，是发展生产力的需要。党的十一届三中全会以来，我们党全面总结研究所有制结构关系，制定以公有制为主体、多种经济成分共同发展的方针，真正走出了一条正确的路子，消除了由于所有制结构关系不合理造成的生产力羁绊，大大解放和发展了生产力。全党应该深刻认识和汲取这个重大经验教训。

（五）对公有制的主体作用，党的十四届三中全会通过的《关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》提出了三点要求、一点灵活。三点要求，即：第一，国家和集体所有的资产在社会总资产中占优势；第二，国有经济控制国民经济命脉；第三，国有经济对经济发展起主导作用。一点灵活，即：有的地方、有的产业在上述三点要求上，可以有所差别，有一定灵活性。国家和集体所有的资产占优势，在现阶段就是不仅要保持量的优势，更应注重质的影响，国有经济主导作用主要应该体现在控制力上。

(六) 要从战略上解决国有经济布局问题。涉及国民经济命脉和具有全局影响的行业和企业，国有经济必须成为主体。这既是国家经济稳定发展的需要，也是国家经济安全的需要。但是，对非国民经济命脉和不具有全局影响的方面，通过资产重组和结构调整，国有经济可以适当收缩，把国有资产和资金转移到国家更需要、更重要的方面去，有的还可以投入到与其他经济成分的联合经营中去。

(七) 公有制经济要寻找能够极大促进生产力发展的实现形式。公有制的实现形式可以多样化，这是中央早已明确的。在这个问题上，目前的认识 and 理论障碍主要是两个：一是搞股份制是不是搞私有化，一是股份合作制是公有制还是私有制。

(八) 不能笼统地把股份制归结为私有或公有。马克思、恩格斯、列宁有三个理论观点值得我们重视：一是股份制是社会化大生产发展的需要；二是股份制是与私人资本相对立的，是对私人资本的扬弃，是一种社会资本；三是垄断资本的金融寡头可以通过金融手段，利用股份制控制比自身大几倍、几十倍的股份资本。

因此，可以认为：第一，股份制是一种现代经济发展的企业组织形式或资本组织形式，资本主义可以用，社会主义同样可以用；第二，股份制形式有利于所有权和经营权的分离，有利于提高企业的或资本运作的效率和竞争水平；第三，股份公司的所有制性质，关键看控股权掌握在谁手中。在社会主义条件下，在公有制为主体的基础上，国家可以通过金融等手段以及公股掺入，控制股份公司。

(九) 股份合作制是一种新的公有性所有制。目前，我国城乡广泛出现了劳动者的劳动联合和资本联合为主的股份合作制经济，这是我国经济发展实践中出现的新事物，应该以积极态度予以支持。股份合作制不是私有制，是一种新出现的所有制形式，具有明显的社会性、公有性。要鼓励个别资本通过股份合作制实现投资社会化。这对整个生产力的发展是有利的。

(十) 完善所有制结构是一个重大而又敏感的涉及经济制度的变革，要有领导有步骤地进行，既要积极又要稳妥，避免一哄而起。要鼓励试验，随时总结经验，注意引导，重点是抓好规范。同时，改革的进行要遵循客观经济规律，发挥市场机制作用，通过结构改组来实现，避免用行政办法拔苗助长。

#### 注 释

(1) 见本卷《走出一条具有中国特色的国有企业改革道路》注(2)。

#### **Appendix Article 15 (English translation)**

**ESTABLISH A SOUND BASIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHEREBY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IS DOMINANT AND ECONOMIC ENTITIES UNDER DIVERSE OWNERSHIP FORMS DEVELOP SIDE BY SIDE**

*January 17, 1997*

Our country's basic economic system for the primary' stage of socialism is one whereby public ownership is dominant and economic entities under diverse ownership forms develop side by side. A major task of economic restructuring is to constantly improve and develop this system through reform.

1. One basic lesson that the Party has learned through long experience is the importance of keeping public ownership in the dominant position while allowing economic entities under diverse ownership forms to develop side by side. Therefore we must establish this as the basic economic system during the primary stage of socialism, and we cannot vacillate on this under any circumstances. Two considerations prompted the decision to establish this system. First, as a socialist country, China must keep public ownership in the dominant position. Second, because China is in the primary stage of socialism, it must allow economic entities under diverse ownership forms to develop side by side. As long as public ownership remains dominant, any form of ownership compatible with the "three favorables"<sup>1</sup> should be employed to serve socialism.

2. Reform means the self-improvement and self-development of the socialist system. It also means adjusting relations of production and aspects of the superstructure that hinder the liberation and development of the productive forces. Improving the basic economic system whereby public ownership is dominant and economic entities under diverse ownership forms develop side by side and deepening SOB reform are key tasks in economic restructuring and have a vital bearing on the success or failure of the socialist market economy.

3. We need to fully understand what the public sector of the economy includes in the new circumstances. In terms of total assets, the public sector includes both the conventional state and collective sectors of the economy, as well as state- and collectively-owned portions of mixed ownership enterprises. In terms of the form of assets, the public sector includes both pure state and collective sectors, as well as joint stock companies and joint stock partnerships in which the state or collective party holds the controlling stake. The state and collective sectors have expanded and developed significantly since the introduction of the reform and opening up policy. In addition, publicly owned elements of mixed ownership enterprises have also significantly expanded and developed as a result of reform.

4. For a long period of time after the founding of the People's Republic, due to our policy mistakes, we made premature moves in ownership restructuring on several occasions after which we had to adjust our policies. Experience has shown that making these changes was actually a step forward, not backward, and was necessary to develop the productive forces. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, the Party comprehensively studied the ownership structure and formulated the principle of keeping public ownership in the dominant position while letting diverse economic sectors develop side by side. This allowed us to follow the correct path and remove the factors resulting from an incongruous mix of ownership types that restrained the liberation and

development of the productive forces. The whole Party should fully grasp and absorb this important lesson.

5. The Decision on Certain Questions Concerning Establishing a Socialist Market Economy, passed at the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee, contains three requirements and one condition for flexibility concerning the dominant role of the public sector of the economy. The first requirement is that state and collective assets must account for the majority of the total assets held by all of society. The second is that the state sector must control the country's economic lifeblood. The third is that the state sector must play the leading role in economic development. The condition for flexibility is that different localities and different industries may fulfill these requirements in different ways, so that some leeway exists in implementing them. During this primary stage of socialism, state and collective assets should not only account for the majority of total assets, but even more importantly, they should be of the highest quality. The dominant role of the state sector mainly manifests itself in its ability to regulate the economy.

6. We need to work out a strategic solution for the distribution of the state sector of the economy. In industries and types of enterprises that affect the economic lifeblood and have an overall impact, the state sector must be dominant. This is necessary to ensure the stable development and security of the economy. For other industries and types of enterprises that are less crucial to the economy, the scale of the state sector may be appropriately reduced through asset reorganization and restructuring, allowing state assets and funds to be transferred to areas that are more important or where they are more needed. Some of these assets and funds may be invested in cooperative ventures with partners from other sectors of the economy.

7. We need to seek out different forms of public ownership that can greatly promote the growth of the productive forces. The central leadership made it clear long ago that public ownership could assume a variety of forms. There are two questions that make proper understanding and theoretical investigation of this issue difficult. First, does introducing the stock system mean we are promoting privatization? Second, should a joint stock partnership be considered a form of public or private ownership?

8. We cannot make a blanket statement that all joint stock enterprises are either public or private. Three theoretical points made by Marx, Engels and Lenin are worth noting here. First, the joint stock system is necessary for the development of socialized mass production. Second, the joint stock system stands in contrast to capital held by individuals, tends to reduce its impact and is a form of capital held by society. And third, a financial oligarch with monopoly capital can exercise financial control over an amount of capital shares several times or even many times larger than what he or she owns directly by making use of the joint stock system. From this reasoning we can reach several conclusions. First, as a form of corporate organization or capital organization in the development of a modern economy, the joint stock system can exist under socialism just as well as under capitalism. Second, the joint stock system serves to separate ownership from management and tends to improve the

competitiveness and performance of enterprises and their capital operations. Third, whether a joint stock company should be considered publicly or privately owned is determined by the sector that holds the controlling share. Under socialism, the government can exercise control of joint stock companies by holding enough shares or other financial means while keeping public ownership in the dominant position.

9. The joint stock partnership system is a new public type of ownership. A joint stock economic sector that relies primarily on pooling the labor and capital of workers has emerged in both urban and rural areas of the country. This new phenomenon, which has emerged during the country's economic development, deserves active support. The joint stock partnership system is a new type of ownership that clearly has a social and public character, and is thus not a type of private ownership. We should encourage the socialization of individual capital through joint stock partnerships. This would also benefit development of the productive forces.

10. Improving the ownership structure is a major but sensitive reform affecting the economic system. It must be well led and carried out in a step-by-step, active yet careful manner, so we cannot simply rush into action. We should encourage experimentation, constantly learn from our experience, provide effective guidance and focus on standardization. In addition, we need to implement reform in conformity with the objective laws of economics, making use of market forces and restructuring rather than seeking quick but counterproductive results through administrative measures.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Reform State-Owned Enterprises the Chinese Way," note 2, p. 443, this volume.



## Appendix Article 16

### 加强社会主义民主法制建设

（一九九七年二月二十七日）

发展社会主义民主，健全社会主义法制，对于发挥人民群众的积极性和创造性，保护广大人民群众的利益，保证改革开放和现代化建设顺利进行，保证国家长治久安，具有重大意义。加强社会主义民主法制建设，是我们建设有中国特色社会主义理论和实践的重要组成部分。邓小平同志对此十分重视，曾作过一系列重要指示。十多年来，我们遵循邓小平同志的指示，大力推进社会主义民主法制建设，取得了重大成就，积累了不少新的经验，为我们继续推进民主法制建设奠定了良好的基础。这里，我想着重就三个问题谈点意见。

第一，发展社会主义民主，同坚持党的群众观点和群众路线在本质上是一致的。人民群众是历史的创造者，是我们国家的主人。共产党执政，就是要领导和支持广大人民群众当家作主。离开一切为了群众、一切依靠群众的群众观点和群众路线，也就谈不上社会主义民主。我们在发展社会主义民主、坚持在各项工作中贯彻党的群众观点和群众路线方面，总是做得好的。但是，必须看到，在一些领导干部中，还存在着一些同社会主义民主的要求、同党的群众观点和群众路线的要求不相符合的东西，需要认真加以克服。比如，这些年来，在一些地方和部门中，官僚主义、形式主义和衙门作风有所滋长。一些领导干部不倾听群众呼声，不关心群众疾苦；有的领导干部满脑子个人名利思想，拉关系，找门路，跑官要官，把人民利益完全抛在脑后；有的领导干部作风霸道，独断专行，什么事都要一个人说了算，别人的意见根本听不进去；等等。这些都是同社会主义民主的要求、同党的群众观点和群众路线的要求背道而驰的。我们发展社会主义民主，必须始终着眼于把人民群众管理国家事务、管理经济和文化事业、管理社会事务的权利努力落到实处，必须始终着眼于一切为了群众、一切依靠群众，最大限度地调动和发挥人民群众的积极性和创造性。从基层来说，很重要的一条，就是要扩大基层民主，确保群众参与基层政权和经济、文化、社会事务的民主管理、民主监督。邓小平同志把扩大基层民主、充分调动基层和人民群众的积极性作为政治体制改革的一项重要任务。这对于我们做好基层的各项工作是非常重要的。改革开放以后，我们实行厂长、经理负责制，这是企业管理体制的一项重要改革。许多企业在实行厂长、经理负责制后，既充分发挥了厂长、经理在企业经营管理和生产指挥中的职能，又很重视发挥职工代表大会和职工群众参与民主管理、民主监督的作用。但是，也有一些企业忽视职工代表大会的作用，忽视广大职工的民主权利。要通过改革，按照现代企业制度的要求，建立科学的企业领导体制和组织管理制度，以保证企业经营者依法行使职权，保障职工的合法权益。总之，我们要继续探索更多新途径新办法，以利更好地贯彻党的群众路线，更充分有效地调动和发挥人民群众的积极性和创造性，增强人民群众的主人翁

精神，推动社会主义民主不断向前发展。

第二，加强社会主义法制建设，要同加强思想道德文化建设紧密结合起来。法律规范人们的行为，可以强制性地惩罚违法行为，但不能代替解决人们思想、道德的问题。人们思想上、道德上存在的问题，要通过深入细致的思想教育、道德教育和文化教育来解决。法制建设包括立法工作、执法工作、司法工作和法制教育工作，这几个方面的工作是相辅相成的，都很重要，缺一不可。只有把它们都搞好了，法制建设才算搞好了。无论立法、执法、司法和守法，都是通过人来做的。因此，人们的思想道德文化素质如何，对于法制建设的成效是至关重要的。如果人们的思想道德文化素质差，再好的法律法规制定出来了，也会因为得不到正确的执行和遵守而变成发挥不了作用的一纸空文。这个道理，邓小平同志早就阐述得很清楚了。他说：“法制观念与人们的文化素质有关。现在这么多青年人犯罪，无法无天，没有顾忌，一个原因是文化素质太低。所以，加强法制重要的是要进行教育，根本问题是教育人。”一个社会治理得好不好，既同法制完备程度有很大关系，也同人们的思想道德文化素质有很大关系。我国历史上历来就有德刑相辅、儒法并用的思想，从中可以得到有益的启发。总之，法是他律，德是自律，需要二者并用。在社会秩序的维系、社会风气的治理中，法制建设是很重要的一手，思想道德文化建设也是很重要的一手。这两手也必须同时抓、两手都要硬，而不可偏废。这两手都抓好了，社会秩序、社会风气的治理水平就会大大提高，社会上的歪风邪气和消极现象就会大大减少。

第三，要始终注意维护国家法制的统一性和严肃性。这个问题，无论在立法工作还是在执法工作、司法工作中都要加以注意。依法治国是新的历史条件下党领导人民建设和治理国家的基本方略。在我们这样大的国家进行改革和建设，只有各地区各部门都严格按照国家法律法规办事，我们才能步调一致地前进。如果各行其是，对国家法律法规，符合自己利益的就执行，不符合的就不执行，或者打折扣，甚至加以曲解，那就会贻误和损害党和国家的工作，就会干扰正常的经济、政治、社会生活秩序，就可能出乱子。应该肯定，各级领导机关和领导干部的法律意识在不断提高，依法办事能力也在不断增强，这是各方面工作取得成绩的一个重要原因。但是，在法制建设中还存在一些问题，尤其是对执法、司法中出现的地区保护主义、部门保护主义现象，必须高度重视。全党同志都应该明确，维护宪法尊严和保证宪法实施，维护国家政令和法制统一，是一个重大政治原则问题。国家法律，是党的主张和人民意志相统一的体现，一经制定并付诸实施，各地区各部门必须一律遵照执行。在制定本地区本部门的法规规章时，必须与宪法和法律相符合，而不得相抵触、相违背。任何地方任何部门都没有超越宪法和法律的特权。任何人都不得借口维护本地区本部门的利益而推卸应承担的义务和责任，规避应受的约束和监督。各级干部特别是领导干部都要从自身做起，带头维护国家的政令和法制统一，自觉反对和防止地区保护主义、部门保护主义。

## 注 释

(1) 见邓小平《在全体人民中树立法制观念》(《邓小平文选》第3卷, 人民出版社1993年版, 第163页)。

### **Appendix Article 16 (English translation)**

#### **IMPROVE SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM\***

*February 27, 1997*

Developing socialist democracy and improving the socialist legal system are of great importance for giving full rein to the people's initiative and creativity, protecting their rights and interests, guaranteeing the success of reform, opening up and modernization, and ensuring long-term peace and stability. Improving socialist democracy and the socialist legal system is an important component of the theory and practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave this high priority and issued a series of important instructions on this issue. Following these instructions, we have been strongly promoting socialist democracy and the socialist legal system for more than a decade, and have garnered great success and accumulated a wealth of experience. This provides a good foundation for us to continue improving democracy and the legal system. At this point, I would like to focus my comments on three points.

First, developing socialist democracy is intrinsically in accord with the Party's mass viewpoint and mass line. The people create history and are the masters of our country. The purpose of the Communist Party in exercising power is to lead and support the people as masters of their country. It would be impossible to speak of socialist democracy if we abandoned the mass viewpoint and mass line, that is, doing everything for the masses and relying on the masses in everything. Overall, we have done a good job developing socialist democracy and carrying out the mass viewpoint and mass line in all our work. However, we must also recognize that some leading cadres have been engaging in practices that do not conform with the requirements of socialist democracy and the mass viewpoint and mass line, and we need to conscientiously correct this situation without fail. For instance, in recent years the problem of bureaucracy, formalism and an imperious bureaucratic style of work has arisen in some localities and departments. Some leading cadres ignore the voice of the masses and lack concern for their problems. Some think only about their personal fame and wealth, social connections and promotion, and totally dismiss the people's interests from their minds. Some are overbearing and high-handed, act arbitrarily and make decisions without listening to others at all. All this runs counter to the requirements of socialist democracy and the mass viewpoint and mass line. Developing socialist democracy should always be based on enabling the people to exercise their rights to manage state affairs, economic and cultural activities, and social affairs. We must do everything for the benefit of the masses, rely on them in all our endeavors and get them to fully exercise their initiative and creativity. It is very important for lower-level government authorities to expand primary-level democracy and ensure that the masses can

participate in democratic management and oversight of lower-level government affairs and economic, cultural and social activities. Comrade Deng deemed strengthening primary-level democracy and fully arousing the initiative of lower-level government authorities and the masses major tasks in political restructuring. This is extremely important for all our work at that level. After the introduction of the reform and opening up policy, we instituted the factory director (manager) responsibility system, an important reform of the enterprise management system. After instituting this responsibility system, many enterprises let factory directors (managers) take charge of managing and operating their enterprises and directing production. They also allowed workers' congresses and ordinary employees to fully participate in democratic management and oversight. However, some enterprises neglected the role of the workers' congresses and the democratic rights of ordinary employees. We need to establish a scientific leadership system and scientific organization and management system through reform that meet the requirements of a modern corporate structure, to ensure that enterprise operators can exercise their functions and powers in accordance with the law and guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of workers. In short, we need to continue looking for new ways and means to better carry out the Party's mass line, further and more effectively arouse the people's initiative and creativity, heighten their sense of being masters of the country and keep socialist democracy constantly developing.

Second, improving the socialist legal system should mesh closely with raising people's ideological, moral and cultural standards. The law sets standards for people's actions and may compel punishment for illegal actions, but it cannot address problems related to ideology and morals. Such problems can be corrected only by thorough and painstaking education in ideology, morals and culture. Development of the legal system includes legislation, law enforcement, judicial work and legal education. These factors are complementary, and each one is very important and indispensable. We must do a good job in all these areas in order to truly improve the legal system. The people enact law and enforce, administer and obey it. Therefore, ensuring that the people have proper ideological, moral and cultural standards is crucial for success in improving the legal system. If these standards are low, laws and regulations, regardless of how good they are, will be as worthless as scraps of paper because it will be hard to enforce them and ensure their proper observance. Comrade Deng long ago stated this point quite clearly. He said, "People's understanding of the rule of law is related to their educational level. One reason for the high crime rate among young people who are simply lawless and have no scruples about committing crimes is that their level of general education is too low. To strengthen the rule of law, therefore, the most important thing is to educate people." How well a society is regulated is closely related to how comprehensive the legal system is, as well as how high people's ideological, moral and cultural standards are. The ideas of complementing morality with punishment and ensuring proper behavior through a combination of Confucian and legal means have a long history in China, and they can positively inspire us. In general, laws work through punishment, while morality works through self-discipline, and we need to use both in combination. Improving the legal system is an important way to maintain order in society and regulate its norms, and another key means is to improve ideological, moral

and educational standards. We need to work equally hard in both areas and, if we do well, we can greatly improve public order and the social atmosphere and reduce the number of unhealthy trends, evil deeds and negative phenomena in society.

Third, we need to always safeguard the uniformity and sanctity of the legal system. We need to pay close attention to this issue in our legislative work, as well as in our law enforcement and judicial work. Managing state affairs in accordance with the law is the Party's basic strategy for leading the people in developing and governing the country under the new historical conditions. We can coordinate progress in reform and development in a large country like ours only if all regions and departments act in strict accordance with the law. If everyone were to just go their own way and only enforce those laws favoring their interests while ignoring the rest, enforce them perfunctorily or even willfully misinterpret them, the Party and the country's work would be adversely affected and be ineffective, the normal economic, political and social order would be disrupted, and chaos could result. It should be affirmed that a major reason for the progress we have made in all areas of our work is that the understanding of law and the ability to act in accordance with it that leading bodies and leading cadres at all levels have are constantly improving. However, there are still some problems in our efforts to improve the legal system that require our close attention, in particular the problem of local and departmental protectionism in law enforcement and the administration of justice. All Party members should understand that safeguarding the inviolability of the Constitution and making sure it is followed, and ensuring the uniformity of government decrees and the legal system are major issues of political principle. The laws of the state are an expression of the unity of the Party's views and the people's will. All regions and departments without exception must obey laws that have been enacted and put into force. Laws and regulations formulated by regions and departments must accord with the Constitution and laws of the state and may not contain any contravening provisions. No locality or department has any authority that transcends the Constitution and laws of the state. No one may shirk his or her obligations and responsibilities or circumvent restrictions and oversight by citing protection of the interests of his or her region or department as an excuse. Cadres at all levels, especially leading cadres, should take the lead in safeguarding the uniformity of government decrees and the legal system and purposefully combat and prevent local and departmental protectionism.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Help the People Understand the Importance of the Rule of Law" *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Eng. ed.s FLP, Beijing, 1994, Vol. III, p. 166.

## Appendix Article 17

### 在中华人民共和国香港特别行政区成立庆典上的讲话

（一九九七年七月一日）

女士们，先生们，同胞们：

今天，中英两国政府举行了香港交接仪式，庄严宣告中国政府对香港恢复行使主权。中华人民共和国香港特别行政区正式成立。这是对香港、对全国以至对世界都具有重要意义和深远影响的重大事件。今天是香港同胞的盛大节日，也是全体中国人民和中华民族的盛大节日。

在这个庄严的历史时刻，我代表中央人民政府和全国各族人民，对香港回归祖国和香港特别行政区成立，表示热烈的祝贺！向回到祖国大家庭的六百多万香港同胞，表示亲切的问候！向为香港回归作出贡献的港澳台同胞、海外侨胞和一切拥护祖国统一的爱国人士，表示感谢！向所有关心和支持香港回归的国际朋友，表示谢意！我还要代表中国政府，向出席这次庆典的各国嘉宾和朋友们，表示欢迎！

香港回归祖国，是彪炳中华民族史册的千秋功业。香港同胞从此成为香港的真正主人，香港历史从此揭开了崭新的篇章。

自古以来，我们的先人就在香港这块土地上劳动、生活和繁衍。从秦代到清代道光年间，中国一直对香港实行管辖，行使主权。十九世纪中叶，英国两次发动鸦片战争，迫使腐败无能的清政府签订《南京条约》和《北京条约》，一八九八年又迫使清政府签订《展拓香港界址专条》，从而侵占了整个香港地区。香港虽然被长期同祖国割离开来，但祖国人民与香港同胞血肉相连的民族之情始终没有被割断，祖国人民与香港同胞同甘苦共命运的民族之义始终没有被割断。中国人民从来不承认一切不平等条约，从来没有忘记香港被侵占的这一国耻，也从来没有停止为维护国家主权和争取自身解放而进行的不屈不挠的斗争。

斗转星移，沧桑巨变。天安门广场升起的第一面五星红旗，宣告中国实现了民族独立和人民解放，走上了社会主义的发展道路。改革开放又带来了中华民族振兴的崭新局面，大大提高了中国的国际地位。正是在这样的历史条件和时代背景下，香港终于回到了祖国怀抱。在举国上下欢庆香港回归的日子里，我们以崇敬的心情深切怀念不久前辞世的邓小平先生。他以伟大政治家的非凡智慧提出“一个国家、两种制度”的创造性构想，为我们通过外交谈判解决香港问题和保持香港长期繁荣稳定，指明了正确的方向。

在我国政府对香港恢复行使主权后，在国家主体坚持实行社会主义制度的条件下，香港继续实行资本主义制度，保持原有的社会、经济制度不变，生活方式不变，法律基本不变。香港作为中华人民共和国的特别行政区，享有基本法赋予的高度自治权，包括行政管理权、立法权、独立的司法权和终审权。中央人民政府依法管理香港特别行政区的外交事务和防务。我们对今天宣誓就职的香港特别行政区行政长官董建华先生表示诚挚的祝贺，我们对他领导的特

别行政区政府充分信任和完全支持。香港特别行政区基本法，不仅香港要遵守，中央各部门和各省、自治区、直辖市也都要遵守。中央各部门和任何地方，都不会也不允许干预香港特别行政区依据基本法规定自行管理的事务。

香港回归祖国后，原有的法律绝大多数予以保留，香港居民依法享有各项权利和自由，在法律面前人人平等。《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》、《经济、社会及文化权利国际公约》和国际劳工公约适用于香港的有关规定继续有效，通过香港特别行政区法律予以实施。逐步完善适合香港实际情况的民主制度，是香港社会政治稳定的重要保障。香港将根据基本法的规定循序渐进地发展民主，最终达到特别行政区行政长官和立法会由普选产生的目标。

香港回归祖国后，将继续保持其自由港地位和国际金融、贸易、航运中心的地位，继续同世界各国各地区以及有关国际组织保持和发展经济文化关系，使这个国际经济大都市始终具有生机勃勃的发展活力。香港特别行政区依法保护私有财产权，依法自主制定经济、贸易、金融货币、教育、科技、文化和体育政策，保持财政独立，实行独立的税收制度，作为单独的关税地区。世界各国各地区在香港的经贸活动和投资利益都将受到法律保护。

这些方针政策，是中央人民政府为了维护香港同胞的切身利益和中华民族的根本利益而深思熟虑地提出来的。坚持这些方针政策，于香港有益，于全国有益，于世界有益，因而是没有任何理由去改变的。我在这里重申，“一国两制”、“港人治港”、高度自治，五十年不变，这是一项长期的基本方针。

香港今日的成就，归根到底是香港同胞创造出来的。香港同胞的开拓进取和艰苦创业精神深受世人钦佩。香港同胞一定会进一步发扬这种可贵的精神，创造香港的美好未来。邓小平先生说得好：“香港人是能治理好香港的，要有这个自信心。”〔1〕

香港今日的成就，是与祖国的发展和内地人民的支持分不开的。新中国成立后，中国政府一贯支持香港的社会稳定和经济发展。内地实行改革开放以来，香港从祖国得到更为强劲的支持和依托。香港作为我国同世界各国进行经济、科技、文化交流的重要桥梁而获得巨大利益。今后随着祖国现代化建设的不断推进，香港与内地的经济联系将更为密切，其桥梁作用将更为增强，从而为香港经济增长提供新的更大的动力。

香港今日的成就，也还有其他多种因素的作用。优越的地理位置，全面开放的自由港政策，比较完备的法制，素质较高的公务员队伍，有效的经济管理和市政管理，这些都为香港的经济的发展提供了有利条件。香港回归后，这些条件将会继续发挥积极作用。

香港同胞有着光荣的爱国主义传统。无论是在争取民族解放的斗争中，还是在实现祖国现代化的进程中，香港同胞都作出了重要贡献。香港同胞一定会进一步激发爱国爱港的热忱，把保持香港长期繁荣稳定，维护国家和民族的根本利益当作自己的最大光荣。

在香港生活着许多外国人，有些已经以香港为家，香港今后仍将是他们安居乐业的家园。

未来的香港，无分种族，无分肤色，人人都有平等竞争的机会，人人都享有法律保障的各种权利与自由。

中英两国政府通过谈判解决了香港问题，为国际社会提供了一个和平解决国家之间的历史遗留问题的范例。在这里，我要向所有为香港平稳过渡作出贡献的英国朝野人士表示感谢。我们相信，香港问题的成功解决，将使中英两国人民的友谊进一步得到发展。

改革开放和现代化建设的伟大实践，使我们国家的经济和社会生活发生巨大变化。这一切成就的取得，最根本的是由于我们成功地走上了建设有中国特色社会主义道路。我们将坚定不移地坚持以经济建设为中心，继续深化改革，扩大对外开放，推进社会全面进步。我们将坚定不移地按照“一国两制”方针继续推进祖国的和平统一，确保澳门顺利回归，并最终解决台湾问题。我们将坚定不移地坚持独立自主的和平外交政策，同各国人民一道，为维护世界和平、促进共同发展，为推动建立一个和平稳定、公正合理的国际新秩序而积极贡献力量。

二十一世纪的到来已经进入倒计时的进程。我们国家的发展正处在重要的历史时期。包括香港同胞、澳门同胞、台湾同胞和海外侨胞在内的全体中国人民团结起来，一切拥护祖国统一、关心祖国建设的爱国人士团结起来，齐心协力，只争朝夕，紧跟时代前进的步伐，为实现祖国的完全统一和中华民族的全面振兴而共同奋斗！

谢谢各位。

注释

(1) 见邓小平《一个国家，两种制度》（《邓小平文选》第3卷，人民出版社1993年版，第60页）。

## **Appendix Article 17 (English translation)**

### **SPEECH AT THE CEREMONY TO MARK THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

*July 1, 1997*

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My Compatriots,

Today the Chinese and British governments held the handover ceremony for Hong Kong to solemnly proclaim that the Chinese government has now resumed its exercise of sovereignty over the region. The HKSAR of the People's Republic of China has now been formally established. This is an event of great importance and far-reaching impact for Hong Kong, all of China and indeed the entire world. This is a festive occasion for our Hong Kong compatriots, all Chinese people and the entire Chinese nation.



On behalf of the Central People's Government of China and the people of all our ethnic groups, I would like to warmly congratulate all of you in this solemn historic moment of Hong Kong's return to the motherland and the establishment of the HKSAR, and express my cordial greetings to our more than six million Hong Kong compatriots who have now returned to our large family of the motherland. I would also like to express our gratitude to our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and overseas Chinese who have contributed to Hong Kong's return and all the patriots who have supported China's reunification, as well as to all of our foreign friends who have shown their concern and support for Hong Kong's return. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished guests and friends here at the ceremony on behalf of the Chinese government.

Hong Kong's return is a once-in-a-millennium event in the annals of the Chinese nation. Beginning today, our Hong Kong compatriots are the true masters here and a new chapter in the annals of Hong Kong is beginning.

Our forefathers have worked, lived and raised families here in Hong Kong for millennia. From the Qin Dynasty [221-206 BC] to Emperor Daoguang's reign in the Qing Dynasty [1820-50], China always exercised jurisdiction and sovereignty over Hong Kong. Following the two Opium Wars waged by Britain in the mid-19th century, the British government forced the corrupt and incompetent Qing government to first sign the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and then the Convention of Peking in 1860. In 1898, Britain forced the Qing government to sign the Convention of the Extension of Hong Kong, allowing Britain to occupy the entire Hong Kong region. In spite of Hong Kong's long separation from the motherland, the flesh-and-blood bond between people on the mainland and their Hong Kong compatriots has never weakened, nor has their shared concern for the wellbeing of the nation. The Chinese people have never recognized the unequal treaties imposed on them, never forgotten for a single day the humiliating occupation of Hong Kong, and never ceased in their relentless struggle to protect the sovereignty of the country and achieve their own liberation.

Time has passed and earthshaking changes have occurred. The raising of the first Five-Star Red Flag at Tiananmen Square heralded China's achievement of national independence and liberation of the people and its embarkation on the path of socialist development. The implementation of the reform and opening up policy infused fresh vigor into efforts to rejuvenate the Chinese nation and greatly raised China's international standing. It is under these historical conditions and against this background of recent events that Hong Kong has finally returned to the motherland.

On this day of national jubilation for the return of Hong Kong, we remember with great fondness and admiration the late Mr. Deng Xiaoping. With the exceptional wisdom of a great statesman, he introduced the creative concept of "one country, two systems," thus charting the correct course for us to follow in resolving the Hong Kong question through diplomatic negotiations and ensuring the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.

The HKSAR will continue to implement its capitalist system after the Chinese government resumes its exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, and it will retain its existing social and economic systems

and way of life without change and retain its current laws basically unchanged, while most of the country continues to adhere to the socialist system.

As a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, as provided for in the Basic Law of the HKSAR, encompassing executive, legislative and independent judicial powers, including the power of final adjudication. The Central People's Government will administer the foreign and defense affairs of the HKSAR in accordance with the law. We would like to extend our sincere congratulations to Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, whose swearing-in today will inaugurate him as the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government. We have full confidence in the HKSAR government under his leadership and will give it our full support. Not only Hong Kong, but also all departments of the central government, as well as the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government, shall observe the Basic Law. No central department or local government will interfere or will be allowed to interfere in any affairs subject to independent administration by the HKSAR in accordance with the Basic Law.

The overwhelming majority of Hong Kong's current laws will remain in force after the region returns to the motherland. Hong Kong residents will continue to enjoy their rights and freedoms in accordance with the law and will be equal before the law. The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labor conventions that apply to Hong Kong will remain in force and will be implemented through the laws of the HKSAR. Gradual improvement of the democratic system in line with conditions in Hong Kong is an important guarantee for its social and political stability. Hong Kong will develop democracy gradually in accordance with the Basic Law to ultimately achieve the aim of electing the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council through universal suffrage.

After its return, Hong Kong will retain its status as a free port and an international financial, trade and shipping center, and continue to maintain and develop economic and cultural relations with other countries, regions and international organizations; this international economic metropolis will thus remain a vigorous and dynamic region for a long time to come. The HKSAR will protect private property ownership and independently formulate economic, trade, financial, monetary, education, scientific and technological, cultural and athletic policies in accordance with the law. The region shall have an independent public finance system, implement an independent taxation system, and act as a separate customs territory. All the economic and trade activities and investment interests of other countries and regions in Hong Kong will be protected by law.

The Central People's Government formulated these principles and policies after carefully considering the need to safeguard both the immediate interests of our Hong Kong compatriots and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. Adhering to these principles and policies benefits Hong Kong, the country as a whole and the entire world. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to change them. Here, I would like to reaffirm that the principle of "one country, two systems," under which Hong Kong people administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy, will remain unchanged for 50 years.

This is a long-term basic principle.

In the final analysis, Hong Kong's current success is a result of the work of our Hong Kong compatriots. Their pioneering and enterprising spirit fills people around the world with deep admiration. Our Hong Kong compatriots will certainly carry forward this valuable spirit and bring about a better future for Hong Kong. Mr. Deng put it well when he said, "The Chinese in Hong Kong have the ability to run the affairs of Hong Kong well and they should be confident of that."<sup>1</sup>

Hong Kong's current success is inseparable from the development of the motherland and the support of the people on the mainland. Since the founding of New China, the Chinese government has consistently supported the social stability and economic development of Hong Kong. Since the mainland began to implement the reform and opening up policy, that support has become even stronger and more dependable. Hong Kong has benefited immensely from its status as an important bridge linking China and the rest of the world in economic, scientific and technological and cultural exchanges. As the motherland continues to modernize, Hong Kong's economic links with the mainland will become ever closer and its role as a bridge will become ever stronger. This will in turn give a stronger impetus to Hong Kong's economic growth.

Hong Kong's current success is also attributable to many other factors. Hong Kong's advantageous geographical location, free port policy of complete openness, well-developed legal system, highly efficient team of civil servants, and effective economic management and civic administration have all aided its economic development. These factors will continue to play a positive role after its return.

Our Hong Kong compatriots are known for their glorious tradition of patriotism. They have made important contributions to the struggle for national liberation and to the modernization of the motherland. Their love for the motherland and Hong Kong is sure to continue to grow, and they will regard it as their greatest honor to maintain the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and to safeguard the fundamental interests of the country and the nation.

Many foreigners live in Hong Kong, some of whom have made the region their home, and Hong Kong will remain a home for them where they can live and work in peace and contentment. Everyone in Hong Kong, regardless of their ethnic background or the color of their skin, will have the chance to compete on an equal footing and exercise the rights and freedoms guaranteed to them under the law.

By achieving a negotiated settlement of the Hong Kong question, the Chinese and British governments have provided the international community with a model of countries being able to achieve a peaceful settlement of a historical problem. Here, I would like to express my thanks to the British nationals, both within and without the government, who have contributed to the smooth transition of Hong Kong. We are confident that the successful solution of the Hong Kong question will help strengthen the friendship between the peoples of China and Britain.

The great undertakings of reform, opening up and modernization have brought about tremendous changes in China's economic and social life. The most fundamental reason for all our achievements is

our successful adherence to the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. We will unswervingly take economic development as our central task and continue to deepen reform, open wider to the outside world and work for all-round social progress. We will unswervingly continue to promote peaceful reunification of the motherland in accordance with the principle of “one country, two systems” in order to ensure the smooth return of Macao and eventually resolve the Taiwan question. We will unstintingly pursue our independent foreign policy of peace and join the people of other countries in actively contributing our efforts to safeguarding world peace, promoting development of all countries and regions, and establishing a just and equitable new international order of peace and stability.

The countdown to the 21st century has already begun. Our country is at an important historical juncture. All Chinese people, including our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and overseas Chinese, should unite, and all patriots who support China’s reunification and care about its development should unite so that we can work together with one mind, seize the opportunities of the day, keep abreast of the times, and strive for the complete reunification of the motherland and total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Thank you.

#### NOTES

1“One Country, Two Systems,” *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Eng. ed., FLP, Beijing, 1994, Vol. III, p. 70.

## Appendix Article 18

### 把我们的社会主义事业发展好

（一九九〇年九月十一日）

对国际形势如何发展还要观察。世界上各种力量在重新组合，一些基本矛盾没有解决，新的矛盾又不断产生。在美苏关系缓和、东欧局势发生剧变后，世界上确实有不少共产党人对社会主义前途产生怀疑，有的甚至失去信心。还有人看到美苏关系逐步缓和后，认为从此天下太平了。事实证明，这种看法太天真了。实际上，由于苏联地位和作用的削弱，美苏力量平衡被打破，世界更不稳定。伊拉克侵占科威特，美国和西欧一些国家向海湾地区调兵遣将，海湾局势紧张就是一个表现。目前，海湾局势十分复杂，多种矛盾交错。今后世界上还将发生什么事情，现在还难以预料。

当今世界，霸权主义和强权政治有新的表现。七国首脑会议〔1〕早期主要是协调他们之间的经济利益，后来开始向政治方面转化。去年，七国首脑会议讨论支持波兰、匈牙利局势的变化，采取所谓“制裁”中国的行动。今年七月，七国首脑会议发表的政治宣言以所谓“保障民主”为主题，鼓吹推动“世界民主化潮流”，力图扩大东欧演变成果，推动苏联继续变化，对社会主义国家、第三世界国家诱压兼施。一些西方国家正进一步打着“民主”的旗号干涉别国内政，企图将西方的政治经济模式强加给各国。前两天，我会见美国前国务卿基辛格时对他讲，今年是鸦片战争一百五十周年。七国首脑会议成员国有六个曾经参加侵略中国的八国联军。最近，我们在中国革命历史博物馆举办鸦片战争一百五十周年展览，目的就是要教育人民不要忘记这段历史。当今世界形势使大多数第三世界国家处境更加严峻。穷国越来越穷，富国越来越富，国际政治经济秩序中不合理的因素不是减少了，而是增多了。对国际形势的变化，要辩证地看，既要看到困难和严峻的一面，又要看到有利的一面。中国坚定不移地奉行独立自主的和平外交政策，同时根据形势的变化适时调整，采取一些灵活做法，以争取较长时期的和平国际环境，保证改革开放和现代化建设顺利进行。我们就是要以实际的最好的社会主义建设成果来回答人们对社会主义前途的忧虑。

目前，世界社会主义处于低潮，但并不像有的人说的那样——社会主义已经崩溃。《共产党宣言》发表已有一百四十二年，第一个社会主义国家诞生也有七十三年了。但是，这在人类发展的历史长河中只是很短暂的时间。从英国资产阶级革命算起，资本主义国家已有三百五十年的历史。资产阶级革命是一个剥削阶级取代另一个剥削阶级的统治，但西方资产阶级最终掌握政权也经历了若干次复辟和反复辟。迄今为止，欧洲一些国家还有封建主义的尾巴。社会主义是消灭剥削制度的新型社会制度，只有七十三年的历史，遇到一些挫折和困难，走一些弯路，也难以完全避免。当代世界的很多根本矛盾，在马克思、恩格斯、列宁以及后继者的著作中都

作过分析。资本主义并没有解决这些矛盾。只有社会主义才能解决当代世界的根本矛盾。只要社会主义国家集中精力加快经济发展，增强实力，充分显示出社会主义制度的优越性，最终一定能够取得胜利。

同西方国家发展关系，我们始终坚持和平共处五项原则。和平共处五项原则，其中一项就是互不干涉内政。我搞我的社会主义，你搞你的资本主义。我们并不想把我们的社会主义强加给别的国家，但别的国家也别想扭转我们的社会主义航向。我们始终坚持这样一项原则，就是意识形态领域的斗争同国与国的关系既有联系又有区别。我们共产党人在斗争中既要坚持原则又要留有余地。当然，我们决不能因为留有余地而丧失原则。西方某些人甚至想把社会主义在地球上消灭掉，这是绝对办不到的。西方国家不能忽视中国作为社会主义大国在国际上特别是在第三世界中的作用。我们共产党人要坚定信念，还要不断积累经验。我们要承认世界社会主义处在低潮，但我们要顶住，硬着头皮顶住，同时要把我们的社会主义事业发展好。

#### 注释

(1) 七国首脑会议，指美国、英国、法国、德国、意大利、日本、加拿大七国的首脑会议。一九七五年，为应付当时严重的世界经济危机，在法国倡议下，美国、英国、法国、联邦德国、意大利、日本六国首脑举行了第一次会议，一九七六年举行第二次会议时增加了加拿大，形成七国首脑定期会议制度。一九七七年起，欧洲共同体（后改为欧洲联盟）委员会主席也应邀参加会议。早期会议以讨论经济问题为主，一九八〇年起逐步增加了政治议题。一九九一年起，七国首脑会议邀请苏联（后为俄罗斯）总统同与会七国首脑在会后举行会晤。一九九四年起，俄罗斯总统开始参加七国首脑会议政治问题的讨论。一九九七年起，俄罗斯总统以正式与会者身份参加会议，七国首脑会议演变为八国首脑会议。

### **Appendix Article 18 (English translation)**

#### **DEVELOP OUR SOCIALIST CAUSE WELL**

*September 11, 1990*

We need to watch how the international situation develops. All kinds of forces in the world are regrouping, a number of basic conflicts in the world are still unresolved, and new conflicts are constantly arising. After the thawing of US-Soviet relations and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, many Communists throughout the world have come to have doubts about the future of socialism, and some have even lost their faith in it. Some have concluded from the progressive relaxing of US-Soviet relations that the world will now be at peace. Facts prove that this kind of thinking is naive. In fact, the weakening of the Soviet Union's position and role and the breakdown of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union make the world even more unstable. Since Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States and a number of Western European countries have been sending troops to the Persian Gulf, and the tension in that region is a manifestation of this

instability. At present, the situation in the Persian Gulf is very complex, many kinds of problems are interlinked, and it is very difficult to foresee what will happen in the world in the future.

In the contemporary world, there are new manifestations of hegemonism and power politics. The original purpose of the G7 Summit<sup>1</sup> was to coordinate the G7 countries' economic interests, but later it took a political turn. Last year, the G7 Summit discussed supporting changes taking place in Poland and Hungary and imposing so-called sanctions on China. In July this year, the G7 Summit issued a political declaration on the subject of "securing democracy," which advocated promoting the "world democratic trend," sought to expand the changes that took place in Eastern Europe, encouraged the continuation of changes in the Soviet Union, and adopted a carrot and stick approach to socialist and third world countries. Some Western countries are going a step further and interfering in other countries' internal affairs in the name of democracy and are trying to force them to adopt the Western political and economic model. When I met with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the other day, I told him that this year marks the 150th anniversary of the Opium War. Six of the seven G7 countries were members of the Eight-Power Allied Forces that invaded China. Recently, the Museum of Chinese Revolutionary History held an exhibition commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, the purpose of which was to teach people not to forget that period of history. The present world situation exacerbates the unfavorable situation prevailing in most third world countries. Poor countries are getting poorer; rich countries are getting richer; and the inequities in the international political and economic order are increasing, not decreasing.

We need to look at changes in the international situation dialectically, and see not only the difficulties and gravity, but also the benefits. China will unswervingly adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace, make timely adjustments as the situation changes, and adopt a number of flexible measures in order to keep the international environment peaceful for a considerable time to come and ensure the smooth progress of reform, opening up and modernization. We will respond to people's concerns about the future of socialism with the finest practical fruits of socialist construction.

At present, world socialism is at a low ebb, but the situation is not as bad as claimed by those who say that socialism has already collapsed. It has been 142 years since the publication of *The Communist Manifesto*, and the first socialist country was born 73 years ago. However, this is but a fleeting moment in the long course of human historical development. Capitalist countries already have a history spanning 350 years, counting from the English bourgeois revolution. Bourgeois revolutions simply replace one exploiting class with another, but, before the Western bourgeoisie took firm grasp of power, a number of restorations and counter-restorations took place. Even today, a number of European countries still retain vestiges of feudalism. Socialism is a new social system that eradicates the system of exploitation. It has a history of only 73 years, and it is difficult to entirely avoid encountering a few setbacks and difficulties and making a few detours. In their writings, Marx, Engels and Lenin analyzed many fundamental conflicts in today's world, as did their successors. Capitalism has definitely failed to resolve these conflicts. Only socialism can do so. If socialist countries

concentrate their efforts on accelerating economic development, become more powerful, and fully manifest the superiority of the socialist system, socialism will triumph in the end.

As we develop relations with Western countries, we will always adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. One of these principles is noninterference in each other's internal affairs. We practice socialism and they practice capitalism. We have no intention of forcing our socialism on other countries, and we will not allow other countries to try to deflect us from our socialist course. We have always adhered to the principle that ideological struggles have a bearing on state-to-state relations, but the two are distinct. In these struggles, we Communists need to uphold our principles, but also give ourselves room to maneuver. Of course, we cannot abandon our principles for the sake of mere leeway. Some Westerners want to wipe socialism off the map. This absolutely will not happen. Western countries should not overlook the role of China, a powerful socialist country, in the world, especially in the third world. We Communists need to reinforce our conviction and constantly accumulate experience. We must admit that world socialism is at a low ebb, but we need to persevere, steel ourselves and keep persevering, and at the same time develop our socialist cause well.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The G7 Summit is a summit meeting of the seven countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada. The first summit meeting - attended by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan — was held in 1975 at the suggestion of France, in order to deal with the serious worldwide economic crisis. Canada participated in the second summit meeting in 1976, and the G7 Summit framework was established then. Starting from 1977, the President of the Council of the European Community (later renamed the European Union) was invited to participate in the summit. Early on, the meetings mainly focused on economic matters but starting in 1980, political issues were progressively included on the agenda. Beginning in 1991, the President of the Soviet Union (later Russia) was invited to meet with the G7 leaders after the summit. In 1994, the Russian President began to participate in the political discussions of the G7 Summit. In 1997, he began to participate as a full member, and the G7 Summit became the G8 Summit.



## Appendix Article 19

### 加快长江三角洲和沿江地区的经济发展

(一九九二年六月二十七日)

邓小平同志在视察南方的重要谈话中指出，发展比较好的地区就应该比全国平均速度快，比如上海，在人才、技术和管理方面都有明显优势，完全有条件搞得更快一点。这次座谈会就是落实邓小平同志重要谈话和中央政治局全体会议精神的一个实际步骤。我们要充分认识开发开放长江三角洲和沿江地区的战略意义。长江三角洲和沿江地区，是我国经济、科技、文化发达的地区之一。这一地区涉及七省一市，基础设施好，水力资源丰富，农业经济比较发达，工业门类比较齐全，钢铁、汽车、电子、石化、机械等领域都有一大批一流的大型骨干企业，加上城市众多、人才密集、科技力量强等许多有利因素，使得这一地区在全国经济社会发展中占有举足轻重的地位。这一地区将成为继沿海开放地区之后一个开发潜力最大、有可能上得最快的经济发展的先行区。可以这样说，长江三角洲和沿江地区开发开放的快慢，将在很大程度上决定我国实现第二步战略目标乃至整个社会主义现代化的进程。现在，亚太地区经济发展势头强劲，国际市场竞争激烈。这对我们来说既是机遇，也是挑战，对于扩大我国对外贸易是有利的，当然也会面对更多竞争对手。在这样的国际形势下，我们要不落后于亚太地区其他国家的经济发展，并在增长速度方面超过他们，加快改革开放步伐，抓紧开发以浦东为龙头的长江三角洲和沿江地区，更是刻不容缓。应该认识到，党中央、国务院在继续抓好珠江三角洲开放开发的同时，决定以开发开放浦东为龙头，带动长江三角洲和沿江地区开发开放和经济发展，这是我国经济发展区域布局和扩大对外开放格局的一个重要战略决策。中央各部门和七省一市要齐心协力，确保这一战略决策得到贯彻实施。

加快长江三角洲和沿江地区经济发展，根本动力来自改革开放。这是珠江三角洲八十年代迅速崛起的一条成功经验。七省一市的同志要坚持以邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义的理论为指导，深入学习和领会他的重要谈话精神，坚持改革开放的基本方针，学习和借鉴珠江三角洲特别是深圳等经济特区开放开发的经验，进一步解放思想、实事求是，放开手脚，大胆试验。中央将赋予你们必要的权限。中央各个部门要切实转变职能，提高办事效率，努力为地方和基层服务。最近，国家计委正在制定扩大地方和企业的基本建设投资决策权、简化基本建设审批程序的具体规定。七省一市要正确运用中央赋予的权力和政策，从自己的实际出发，创造性地开展工作，加大改革开放的力度，加快新旧体制转换。对国际通用的做法，凡是对发展经济有利的，都可以结合实际大胆采用。转换企业经营机制的关键是落实企业自主权，不仅中央各个部门要放权，省市县也要放权。凡是国家赋予企业的权力，一定要真正落实到企业，切不可变成权力由中央部门向地方部门转移。要积极稳妥地搞好各项配套改革，为企业转换经营机

制创造良好的外部条件。深化科技体制改革也应该抓紧。通过改革，充分调动广大知识分子的积极性，加快培养人才，加速科技成果向商品化和现实生产力转化。

长江三角洲和沿江地区的经济开发不可能齐头并进，必须抓住重点，统筹兼顾，搞好联合，发挥整体优势。从整个区域的开发来说，既要始终抓住浦东和三峡工程这两个重点，又要注意充分发挥沿江各省的优势和特点。三峡工程的前期工作要抓紧抓好。当前，要下大气力搞好浦东开发开放，尽快使这个龙头活起来，发挥其对沿江各省的带动和辐射作用。从产业结构调整来说，上海和沿江各大城市要放手发展第三产业，调整提高第二产业，稳步发展第一产业。建设资金应该重点用于交通、能源、通信等基础设施和高新技术产业，努力改善投资环境，发展壮大主导产业和支柱产业，缓解交通、能源紧张的局面。要实行开发和集约并重的方针，走集约经营的路子。充分依靠现有基础，加快加工工业的技术改造，对重点基建和技改的项目一定要确保人力、物力、财力，精心组织，精心施工，以利尽快建成投产，发挥效益，切不可一拥而上。长江三角洲和沿江地区的开发，要作为一个整体统筹规划，联合协作。在这次会上，七省一市的同志都提出了积极建议，表达了大联合的强烈愿望。上海的同志在发言中提出了要打“中华牌”、“世界牌”，走联合开发的路子。江苏的同志在发言中表达了对开发浦东坚决支持、主动服务、迎接辐射、共同发展的态度。浙江的同志在发言中谈到，要本着主动配合、全面合作、优势互补、共同发展的方针，积极加强与沿江地区各省市的联合和合作。其他省市也都有这样的愿望和要求。我看，这是本次座谈会的一个重要收获。有了这样好的思想基础，再经过各方面共同努力，我相信，浦东开发、重点项目建设、跨地区企业集团的组建，以及涉及这一地区开发开放的各项工作，一定能够顺利地富有成效地向前发展。

注 释

[1]这里所说的七省一市，指江苏省、浙江省、安徽省、江西省、湖北省、湖南省、四川省和上海市。

## **Appendix Article 19 (English translation)**

### **ACCELERATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE YANGTZE RIVER DELTA AND VALLEY**

*June 27, 1992*

In his important talks during his inspection tour of the south, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out that in relatively developed areas, growth should be faster than the national average. For example, Shanghai enjoys obvious advantages in terms of skilled people, technology and management, so it has all the necessary conditions to make faster progress. This forum is a practical step toward implementing the guiding principles of Comrade Deng's talks and of the plenary session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. We need to fully recognize the strategic significance of developing and opening up the Yangtze River Delta and Valley. This region is one of the country's

economically, technologically and culturally developed regions and spans seven provinces and one municipality.<sup>1</sup> It has a number of favorable factors such as good infrastructure, abundant hydroelectric resources, a relatively well-developed agricultural economy, a wide range of industries, and many large first-rate enterprises in the steel-making, auto, electronics, petrochemical and machinery industries. In addition, it has a large urban population, a high concentration of skilled people and good technological capability, all of which give it an important position in the whole country's economic and social development. This region has development potential second only to the coastal development zones, and it will possibly become an advanced region with the fastest economic development in the country. It may be said that, to a great extent, the pace of development and opening up in this Yangtze River Delta and Valley will determine our progress in achieving the objectives for the second step of the country's strategic plan for economic and social development and in carrying out socialist modernization in general. At present, economic development in the Asia-Pacific region is robust, and there is fierce competition in the international market. This presents us with both opportunities and challenges. This will help us expand our foreign trade, although of course this means we will have to face more competitors. In this kind of international situation, we do not want our economic development to lag behind that of other Asia-Pacific countries, but rather want to develop faster than they do, so we urgently need to increase the pace of reform and opening up and develop the Yangtze River Delta and Valley, with Pudong in the lead. Everyone should understand that the decision of the Central Committee and the State Council to develop and open up Pudong and use it to stimulate the opening up and economic development of the whole region, while at the same time continuing to do a good job opening up and developing the Pearl River Delta, is an important strategic decision to optimize the geographical distribution of our country's economic development and open wider to the outside world. All departments under the central leadership, the seven provinces and Shanghai need to work together as one to ensure that this strategic decision is brought to fruition. The basic driving force for accelerating economic development in the Yangtze River Delta and Valley is reform and opening up. This is the successful experience of the abrupt rise of the Pearl River Delta in the 1980s. You people in the seven provinces and Shanghai should steadfastly take Comrade Deng's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics as your guide, thoroughly study and understand the guiding principles of his important talks, adhere to the basic principle of reform and opening up, and study and learn from the experience of developing and opening up the Pearl River Delta, especially Shenzhen and the other SRZs. You need to continue to emancipate your minds, seek truth from facts, and boldly experiment. The central leadership will give you the power you need. All departments under the central leadership need to effectively transform their functions, raise their productivity, and diligently serve local authorities and primary-level bodies. Recently, the State Planning Commission has been drawing up specific regulations for expanding the decision-making power of local authorities and enterprises over capital construction and simplifying approval procedures. The seven provinces and Shanghai need to use the powers and policies the central

leadership gives them properly, proceed based on their actual conditions, do their work creatively, intensify reform and opening up, and accelerate the transformation from the old system to a new one. As for internationally accepted practices, whatever is beneficial for our economic development, we may boldly use them in light of our situation. The key to transforming the way enterprises operate is to ensure they have the power to make their own decisions, which means that not only will departments under the central leadership have to give up their power over them, but so will provincial, municipal and county authorities. Whatever powers the state confers on enterprises must actually get to them; we cannot allow these powers to be shifted from central to local departments. We need to vigorously yet steadily carry out all related reforms in order to create favorable external conditions for transforming the way enterprises operate. We should also promptly deepen the reform of the system for managing science and technology. Through reform, we can fully arouse the enthusiasm of large numbers of intellectuals, more quickly nurture talented people, and speed up the processes of commercializing advances in science and technology and translating them into actual productive forces.

It is impossible to economically develop the whole of the Yangtze River Delta and Valley all at once; we must focus on key areas, take all factors into consideration, promote cooperation within the region, and make the most of the region's overall strengths. Regarding development of the entire region, we need to keep Pudong and the Three Gorges Project as our twin focal points, while making the most of the advantages and unique characteristics of all the provinces bordering the river. The preliminary work on the Three Gorges Project must be done quickly and well. At present, we need to strive to open and develop Pudong and invigorate this leading area as quickly as possible to take full advantage of its role in driving development in the Yangtze River Valley provinces. From the standpoint of adjusting the mix of industries, Shanghai and other cities along the Yangtze need to promote the development of tertiary industry, adjust and upgrade secondary industry, and steadily promote primary industry. Construction funds should be focused on infrastructure such as transportation, energy and communications, and on new- and high-technology industries. We need to energetically improve the investment environment, develop and strengthen leading industries and pillar industries, and alleviate shortages in transportation and energy. We need to follow a policy of giving equal weight to both exploitation and intensification and follow the route of intensive operations. We need to ground our activities on the present foundation; accelerate the technological upgrading of processing industries; ensure sufficient manpower, materials and funding for major capital construction and technological upgrading projects; and painstakingly organize and do the construction work on them so that facilities are quickly built, placed into production and start producing benefits. However, we must not try to do everything at once. The development of the Yangtze River Delta and Valley requires comprehensive planning and coordinated execution. At this meeting, representatives of the seven provinces and Shanghai offered some constructive suggestions and showed a willingness to cooperate. In their speeches, representatives of Shanghai proposed creating Chinese brands and world brands and working for development through cooperation. With regard to the development of Pudong, representatives of

Jiangsu expressed in their speeches an attitude of firm support, willingness to be of service, eagerness to accept the radiative effect emanating from Shanghai, and commitment to common development. In their speeches, the representatives from Zhejiang spoke of actively strengthening unity and cooperation with other provinces in the region and Shanghai, based on the principles of voluntary coordination, overall cooperation, complementary advantages, and common development. Representatives of other provinces all expressed similar sentiments. In my mind, this is an important accomplishment of this forum. With this kind of good ideological foundation, I am sure that if we all strive together, the development of Pudong, construction on key projects and the establishment of trans-regional enterprise groups, as well as all other work involved in developing and opening the region, can certainly progress smoothly and achieve outstanding results.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> These are Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Sichuan provinces, plus the municipality of Shanghai.

## Appendix Article 20

### 纪念孙中山

（一九九六年十一月十二日）

今天，我们在这里召开隆重的大会，纪念孙中山先生诞辰一百三十周年。

孙中山先生是杰出的爱国主义者和民族英雄，是中国民主革命的伟大先行者。他在我国各族人民和一切爱国人士中享有崇高的威望。

孙中山先生代表着一个时代。他生活在十九世纪后半叶和二十世纪初叶的中国。那个时候，在帝国主义列强的侵略欺凌和封建势力的腐朽统治之下，中国已沦为半殖民地半封建社会。从青年时代起，孙中山就怀着满腔悲愤，以炙热的爱国激情投身革命。他大声疾呼“亟拯斯民于水火，切扶大厦之将倾”，在人民大众中进行了艰苦的革命宣传和组织发动工作。他高举民主革命的旗帜，同资产阶级改良派、保皇派进行了不妥协的斗争。他广泛联合革命力量，发动多次武装起义，终于在辛亥革命时期，领导人民推翻清王朝，结束了在中国延续两千多年的封建帝制。这是孙中山先生的一个伟大历史功绩。

受俄国十月革命胜利的鼓舞和启发，在五四运动和中国共产党成立之后，孙中山先生认识到，中国共产党及其领导的声势浩大的工农运动是革命的坚定力量。他在我们党的帮助下，把旧三民主义发展为新三民主义，实行联俄、联共、扶助农工的三大政策，实现国共合作，把反帝反封建的民主革命推向前进。毛泽东同志称赞孙中山先生制定的新三民主义和统一战线政策，是他“对于中华民族最伟大的贡献”。

孙中山先生毕生为民族独立、国家富强、民主自由、人民幸福而奋斗。今天，缅怀孙中山先生为中国民主革命事业所建立的历史功勋，缅怀他为改造中国而鞠躬尽瘁的光辉一生，我们心中充满着深深的崇敬之情。

中国共产党人从来就是孙中山革命事业的坚定支持者、合作者和继承者。孙中山先生也把中国共产党人看作自己的好朋友。孙中山先生逝世后，中国共产党人继承他的遗志，团结和领导全国各族人民和一切爱国力量，进行了艰苦卓绝的斗争，付出了巨大牺牲，终于完成了他没有完成的民主革命，并把这个革命发展为社会主义革命，从根本上改变了中华民族的命运，使中国的面貌发生了翻天覆地的变化。我们可以告慰孙中山先生的是，他一生追求的振兴中华的目标，他所憧憬的一个现代化中国的美景，正在一步步地变成活生生的现实，而且在许多方面远远超出了他的设想。

孙中山先生给中华民族和中国人民留下许多宝贵的精神遗产，特别是他的爱国思想、革命意志和进取精神，值得我们永远学习、继承和发扬。

在中国处于内忧外患、贫困落后境地之时，孙中山第一个喊出了“振兴中华”的响亮口号。他明确提出“建设是革命的唯一目的”，并在《建国方略》等著作中擘画了建设现代工业、交通和农业的蓝图，显示了对未来中国发展的卓越见解和宏伟气魄。他认为，要赶超西方经济发达

国家，应该实行“开放主义”，“要学外国的长处”，同时强调“发展之权，操之在我则存，操之在人则亡”。他坚决主张维护国家主权和统一，反对一切分裂祖国的行为，指出：“‘统一’是中国全体国民的希望。能够统一，全国人民便享福；不能统一，便要受害。”孙中山先生这种伟大的爱国主义精神和思想，对正在为建设社会主义现代化国家而奋斗的中国人民，对一切有志于实现祖国富强、完成祖国统一的海内外同胞，仍然有着巨大的启迪、教育和鼓舞作用。

孙中山先生“致力国民革命凡四十年”，任何外来威胁、内部分裂和暂时失败，都不能动摇他的革命意志。他所说的“吾志所向，一往无前，愈挫愈奋，再接再厉”，正是他革命一生的真实写照。今天，我们要把祖国建设成为富强民主文明的社会主义现代化国家，同样需要继承和发扬孙中山先生这种不畏艰险、不屈不挠的革命精神。

孙中山先生一生追求真理，不断进步。任何伟大人物，都不可能不受到历史的局限，孙中山先生也有他的局限性。但他善于从实践中学习，包括从失败的教训中学习，从不停止探索前进的步伐，因而能够“合乎世界之潮流，合乎人群之需要”，成为中国民主革命的伟大先驱。在人类即将迈入新世纪的今天，在我们党领导全国人民从事改革开放和现代化建设的伟大事业中，尤其需要认真学习和大力提倡孙中山先生这种与时俱进的可贵精神。

七十二年前，孙中山先生曾经说过：“中国如果强盛起来，我们不但是要恢复民族的地位，还要对于世界负一个大责任。”四十年前，毛泽东同志在纪念孙中山先生诞辰九十周年时指出：“中国应当对于人类有较大的贡献。”改革开放以来，邓小平同志也指出，中国要为全人类作出更大的贡献。这充分表达了我们中华民族的远大志向和博大胸怀。

现在，我国各族人民在邓小平建设有中国特色社会主义理论和党的基本路线指引下，正在把社会主义现代化事业不断推向前进。我们的国家日益强盛，我们的社会日益进步。我们真诚希望，全国各族人民进一步团结起来，海峡两岸、海内外一切敬仰孙中山先生的爱国者进一步团结起来，为实现祖国的繁荣富强，为完成祖国统一大业，为维护世界和平、促进共同发展，为使中华民族对人类作出更大贡献而努力奋斗！

#### 注 释

〔1〕见孙中山《兴中会章程》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社1981年版，第14页）。

〔2〕见毛泽东《在纪念孙中山逝世十三周年及追悼抗敌阵亡将士大会上的讲话》（《毛泽东文集》第2卷，人民出版社1993年版，第111页）。

〔3〕一八九四年，孙中山在檀香山成立兴中会时制订的《兴中会章程》正式提出了“振兴中华”的口号。见孙中山《兴中会章程》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社1981年版，第14页）。

〔4〕见孙中山《在上海中华实业联合会欢迎会的演说》（《孙中山全集》第2卷，中华书局1982年版，第340页）。

[5]见孙中山《三民主义》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 690 页）。

[6]见孙中山《建国方略》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 212 页）。

[7]见孙中山《在神户与日本新闻记者的谈话》（《孙中山全集》第 11 卷，中华书局 1986 年版，第 373 页）。

[8]见孙中山《遗嘱》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 994 页）。

[9]见孙中山《建国方略》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 115 页）。

[10]见孙中山《建国方略》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 191 页）。

[11]见孙中山《三民主义》（《孙中山选集》，人民出版社 1981 年版，第 691 页）。

[12]见毛泽东《纪念孙中山先生》（《毛泽东文集》第 7 卷，人民出版社 1999 年版，第 157 页）。

## **Appendix Article 20 (English translation)**

### **IN COMMEMORATION OF SUN YAT-SEN**

*November 12, 1996*

We are gathered here today for a grand celebration commemorating the 130th anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's birth.

Dr. Sun was a great patriot and national hero and a great forerunner of the Chinese democratic revolution. He enjoys high prestige among the people of all China's ethnic groups and all Chinese patriots.

Dr. Sun was a representative of his age. He lived during the late 19th century and early 20th century, during which China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society subjected to aggression and bullying by imperialist powers and the corrupt rule of feudal forces. In his youth, Dr. Sun joined the revolution with deep grief and indignation in his heart over China's situation and with passionate patriotic fervor. With a strong voice, he called out to "save the people from misery and prop up our tottering country without delay"<sup>1</sup> and took pains to propagate his revolutionary position among the masses and organize them to join the revolution. Dr. Sun held high the banner of the democratic revolution, and waged an unyielding struggle against bourgeois reformists and royalists. He united revolutionary forces throughout China and launched a number of armed insurrections. Finally, during the Revolution of 1911, he led the people in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty, putting an end to the feudal empire that had lasted for more than 2,000 years in China. This was a signal contribution Dr. Sun made to history. Encouraged and inspired by the success of the Russian October Revolution, after the May 4th Movement and the founding of the CPC, Dr. Sun came to realize that the CPC and the influential worker-peasant movement under its leadership constituted a firm revolutionary force. With help from our Party, he transformed the old Three People's Principles into the new Three People's Principles and



implemented the Three Cardinal Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to peasants and workers. He got the KMT and the Communist Party to cooperate and pressed ahead with the democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. Comrade Mao Zedong hailed the new Three People's Principles and the united front policies formulated by Dr. Sun as his "greatest contribution to the Chinese nation."<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Sun fought all his life for national independence, for the prosperity and strength of the country, for democracy and freedom, and for the happiness of the people. Today when we recall the historical feats he performed for the Chinese democratic revolution and his glorious life during which he worked in utter devotion to transform China, our hearts are filled with a feeling of great reverence for him.

Chinese Communists have always been staunch supporters, cooperators and successors of Dr. Sun's revolutionary cause. In return, he regarded Communists as his good friends. After he passed away, the Communists carried out his behest, united with the people of all our ethnic groups and patriotic forces, and led them in an arduous struggle. After making tremendous sacrifices, we finally completed the democratic revolution he had left unfinished, and transformed it into a socialist revolution, thus fundamentally changing the destiny of the Chinese nation and completely altering the face of China. We are in a position to tell Dr. Sun that the goal of regenerating China, to which he dedicated his entire life, and the modernized China he yearned for are gradually becoming living realities, and we have far exceeded his expectations in many ways.

Dr. Sun has left a rich spiritual legacy to the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. It is particularly worthwhile for us to study, draw upon and carry forward his patriotism, revolutionary will and enterprising spirit in perpetuity.

When China was suffering from domestic turbulence, foreign invasion, poverty and backwardness, Dr. Sun was the first to give voice to the resounding slogan, "Regenerate China."<sup>3</sup> He unequivocally stated that "development is the sole aim of revolution," and he mapped out a blueprint for developing modern industry, communications and agriculture in such writings as the "Plans for National Reconstruction," which showed his brilliant ideas and bold vision for the future development of China. He believed that to catch up with and surpass economically developed Western countries, we should "open China to the outside world"<sup>4</sup> and "learn the strengths of foreign countries,"<sup>5</sup> while emphasizing that "if control over development is in our hands, China will survive; if it is in others' hands, China will perish."<sup>6</sup> He firmly advocated safeguarding our state sovereignty and national unity, opposed all acts designed to divide the motherland, and stated, "Unification is the hope of all Chinese people. If China can be unified, all Chinese will enjoy a happy life; if it cannot, they will suffer." Dr. Sun's great patriotic spirit and thinking still play an enormous role in enlightening, educating and inspiring the Chinese people who are building a modern socialist country and all our compatriots at home and abroad who are devoted to making the motherland prosperous and powerful and achieving national reunification.

Dr. Sun remained “devoted to the national revolution for 40 years,” and no external threat, internal division or temporary failures could shake his revolutionary will. He said, “I shall press forward with indomitable will; the more setbacks I experience, the more determined and persistent I will become.”<sup>9</sup> This is a true portrayal of his revolutionary life. As we build the motherland into a prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced modern socialist country today, we also need to draw upon and carry forward Dr. Sun’s indomitable revolutionary spirit of braving hardships and dangers.

Dr. Sun sought truth and progressed constantly throughout his life. No great figures of history can transcend the historical limitations of their times, and Dr. Sun likewise had his limitations. However, he was adept at learning from experience, including failures, and he persisted in his explorations, which enabled him to “adapt to world trends and meet the needs of the masses.”<sup>10</sup> This made him a great forerunner of the Chinese democratic revolution. Now as we are entering a new century and working for the great cause of reform, opening up and modernization under our Party’s leadership, it is all the more important for us to learn from and vigorously espouse Dr. Sun’s commendable spirit of keeping abreast with the times.

Dr. Sun said 72 years ago, “When China becomes powerful and prosperous, we should not only restore the nation to its rightful position but also assume greater responsibilities in the world.”<sup>11</sup> Forty years ago Comrade Mao Zedong stated in a speech commemorating the 90th anniversary of Dr. Sun’s birth, “China ought to make a greater contribution to humanity.”<sup>12</sup> After the reform and opening up policy was introduced, Comrade Deng Xiaoping also stated that China should contribute still more to humanity. These sentiments fully demonstrate the lofty aspirations and broadmindedness of the Chinese nation.

At present, the Chinese people of all ethnic groups are pressing ahead with socialist modernization under the guidance of Comrade Deng’s theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Party’s basic line. Our country is becoming increasingly powerful and prosperous and our society is progressing. We sincerely hope that the people of all our ethnic groups, patriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and patriots at home and abroad who hold Dr. Sun Yat-sen in high esteem will unite more closely and work hard to make our motherland prosperous and powerful, accomplish national reunification, safeguard world peace, promote common development and make still greater contributions to humankind.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> “Charter of the Revive China Society” *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 1981, p. 14.

“Speech at a Meeting Commemorating the 13th Anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s Death and Mourning the Deaths of Officers and Enlisted Personnel Killed in Action in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,” *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, Chin, ed., People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 1993, Vol. II, p. 111.

- 3 Sun Yat-sen officially coined the slogan “Regenerate China” in the Charter of the Revive China Society when he founded the society in Honolulu in the United States in 1894. “Charter of the Revive China Society,” *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen, op. cit.*
- 4 “Speech at a Reception of the Shanghai China Industrial Federation,” *The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen*, Chin, ed., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing, 1982, Vol. II, p. 340.
- 5 “The Three People’s Principles,” *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen, op. cit.*, p. 690.
- 6 “Plans for National Reconstruction,” *ibid.*, p. 212.
- 7 “A Talk with Japanese Reporters in Kobe,” *The Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, op. cit.*, 1986, Vol. XI, p. 373.
- “Last Testament,” *Selected Works of Sun Yat-sen, op. cit.*, p. 994.
- 9 “Plans for National Reconstruction,” *ibid.*, p. 115.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 191.
- 11 “The Three People’s Principles,” *ibid.*, p. 691.
- 12 “In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tune* Eng ed FLP Peking 1977, Vol. III, p. 331. ”