

**Working the Multiple Economies:
Children's Work and Economic Agency in a Developed
Capitalist Economy**


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Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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November, 2012

Statement of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Tobia Fattore', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Tobia Fattore

November, 2012

Abstract:

This thesis examines children's work on the formal, informal and family based labour markets in a developed capitalist economy. Using a unique dataset of approximately 11,000 young people aged between 12 and 16 years, this thesis argues that structural factors are determinative of specific experiences of work, which reflect the nature of social relations within each labour market. This argument is a response to two prevailing themes in the child work literature. First that age based development has been the overarching 'structure' that determines experiences of work. Second, that the effect of structural position and the institutions of 'work' hinder children's agency and 'free will'. It is shown that these structural factors not only delimit children's capacity to assert their agency, but enable action by providing the social environment that make possible certain types of activities to be understood as work. In so doing the thesis contributes to understanding children's economic agency through an analysis of children's work, and consequently children as economic agents.

The data set provides a robust statistical outline of the fields of children's work (formal, informal and family based) and an assessment of the quality of work children perform, applying ILO measures of decent work standards to evaluate children's work conditions. The analytical framework adopted involves a synthesis of child work literature with aspects of economic sociology and the sociology of work that emphasise the embeddedness of social action and institutions within systems of social relations. These analytic tools assist identify the specific 'fields' or labour markets of children's work (i.e. the formal, informal and family based labour markets) and sensitise us to what the relevant structural transformations in each field are. In so doing the thesis draws upon work used in understanding the 'adult world of work' to aid our understanding of children's labour markets. The thesis finds that skill utilisation on the formal labour market, the strength and particularity of labour relations on the informal labour market, and whether work is oriented towards use or exchange value on the family based labour market are in large part determinative of the distribution of material and social rewards for children who work. Furthermore economic agency is embedded and expressed through the structural and relational factors specific to each labour market.

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Chapter One: Introduction – the multiple contexts of children's work

1.1. Introduction

In developed economies children's work is treated as a special social category, unlike the adult world of work and often as a cause for concern. Children's rightful place is as students and as dependants. When children work this is often seen as a transgression of the proper role of children and a proper childhood. More sympathetic voices argue that working is beneficial for children – it develops character, independence and teaches young people the value of money. In fact children should be encouraged to work, not only so they can earn money, but more importantly because work contributes to turning young people into future productive adults. While on face appearance these two positions seem almost diametrically opposed, what is common to both is the individualisation of work and work experience for children. While the adult world of work is the sphere of labour movements, economics and industrial relations, the world of children's work is about individual cognitive, social and behavioural development, or more recently about the ability of children to exercise choice and autonomy. The adult world of work is a world of structures and social relations, children's world of work about everyday experience and personal relations. Yet, what role do social and economic structures play in understanding children's paid and unpaid work, and children's experience of such work, given that children, like adults are social actors and their activities are socially constituted even if individually experienced?

The central argument of this thesis is that social and economic structures are important in determining how work is experienced, what activities count as work, and the social allocation of different types of work. These social and economic structures have significantly transformed over the past two centuries evidenced in profound changes in the world of work. The fundamental transformations in the world of work also create different opportunities for social integration according to social group membership, including according to gender, class, cultural identity and age. Furthermore these structures define the different 'economies' that children work in: the formal, informal and family based economies. This argument is a response to two prevailing themes in the child work literature. First is that age based development has been the overarching 'structure' that determines experiences of work. Second is that children's agency and 'free will' is stymied by the effect of structural position and the institutions of 'work'. While the argument presented in this

thesis does not necessarily oppose these two premises, it shows that structural factors are important in determining specific experiences of work and that these structures do not reflect a strict age-based developmentalism but instead reflect the specific nature of social relations within each economy; and that experiences of work can only be made sense of when other social categories are considered, such as class and gender, as well as age. These structural factors not only delimit children's capacity to assert their agency, but enable action by providing the social environment that make possible certain types of activities, and through interactions with other social actors in these specific social environments make these activities meaningful as work. This thesis establishes these arguments through an empirical analysis and reconceptualisation of children's economic activities.

The aims of the thesis are to:

- a) Provide a detailed analysis of the characteristics of children's work in modern capitalist economies, using children's work in New South Wales as a representative case study of a modern capitalist economy. This includes examining the quality and conditions of work and the social distribution of work across the economies children work in.
- b) Assess how the social relations that children work within shape the conditions, meaning and experience of work for the individual actor, in this case the child. This includes how socio-structural factors determine and allocate work conditions and experiences within each economy.
- c) Contribute to understanding whether the different economies children work in are associated with different logics of social action, and if so examine the relationship between these different logics, the types of work activities children are engaged in, and the conditions young people obtain from that work.
- d) Contribute to understanding children's economic agency through an analysis of children's work, and consequently children as economic agents.

The analytic tools used are drawn from three separate literatures or areas of research, child labour and child work research; aspects of economic sociology; and the sociology of adult work. Critical evaluation of the child labour/work research provides some specific theoretical and methodological insights that shape the analysis in the remainder of this thesis. This critical evaluation is developed in the second part of this chapter, but includes the problem of children's economic agency; the

conceptual objectification of children, the opposition between quantitative and qualitative approaches and the importance of a systematic analysis and comparison of young people's work conditions. Insights from economic sociology and the sociology of work are utilised to respond to these issues.

Economic sociology emphasises the embeddedness of social action and institutions within systems of social relations, social structures that enable certain activities to be understood as work, and with the developments in the child work literature, the need to recognise the different 'fields' of work or economies of children's work (i.e. the formal, informal and family based economies). We also draw upon this work for a theory of economic agency that does not oppose structure to economic action, but shows that the actions of individual agents occur within economic structures, which in turn enable the possibilities for action. This analytic framework is developed in Chapter Two, which outlines the conceptual approach used in this thesis. Insights from recent analysis of the adult world of work aid our understanding of children's economies, especially by identifying the structural transformations that have had a marked impact on the nature of social interactions within each specific economy. From this analysis specific hypotheses are derived in which the insights drawn from the child work and economic sociology literatures are applied. For the formal economy, we show how the application of skill, as a result of the evolution of dual labour markets and the rise of the service economy, are relevant to understanding children's work. For the informal economy we show how the specific type of relationship between employee and employer are relevant in prescribing rules of conduct given the absence of formal regulations. For the family economy, we examine how the extent to which work is oriented to either use by households or exchange on the formal economy affects the distribution of conditions on the family economy. These specific hypotheses are introduced at the beginning of the relevant empirical chapters. However the work literature also provides a set of measures of decent work standards, extrinsic and intrinsic orientations that are applied empirically across the three economies.

The empirical data used was obtained from a questionnaire-based survey of approximately 11,000 young people aged 12 to 16 years in New South Wales, Australia, undertaken in 2005. This survey obtained data on the prevalence of young people's work, whether paid or unpaid and their work conditions. The data provides a statistical outline of the fields of children's work and an assessment of aspects of work satisfaction, determined by children's assessments of the quality of work they

perform. The thesis uses this specific dataset to draw more general conclusions about children's work and what this means for the concept of children's economic agency, drawing upon theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two.

Empirically the capacity to generalise is also possible because in several respects New South Wales is similar to other developed capitalist economies. New South Wales has recorded sustained but small economic growth over the last decade. In 2008–09 NSW recorded economic growth of 1.1% in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), part of only a shallow decline in economic growth nationally as a result of the 2009 financial crisis. Yet, transitions evident across developed economies are also evident in New South Wales. Like other economies NSW has been characterized by disproportionate increases in service sector employment and a large increase in female labour force participation. The number of people in paid employment in NSW has grown steadily over the last decade, the biggest quantum of which (one-third; 137,00) being among females working part-time, reflecting growth in the service economy. The labour force participation rate increased from 62.1% in 2001–02 to 63.3% in 2009–10. These factors also reflect an increase in precarious forms of employment and a decline in the standard full-time employment arrangement. Between 2001-02 and 2009-10, the proportion of employed persons who worked full-time decreased from 73.5% to 70.5%. The service economy constitutes a significant portion of economic activity in New South Wales. Of the 3.5 million people employed in NSW in 2010, the Health Care and Social Assistance and Retail industries were the two largest in terms of persons employed, together employing approximately 750,000 people, or 21.5 percent of the NSW labour force. The shift from manufacturing to a service economy has also driven changes in education levels. Relatively New South Wales shares a similar education profile with many other post-industrial societies. In 2009 there were 1.1 million full-time school students in NSW, with relatively high retention rates to the end of secondary school (71%). Beyond secondary education, in 2009 over half of all persons in NSW aged 15-64 years (57%) held a non-school qualification with approximately 1.1 million people (25% of 15-64 year olds) holding a Bachelor's degree or higher qualification and a further 700,000 (15% of 15-64 year olds) holding a Certificate III or IV qualification, which are trade-based qualifications (ABS, 2011). Further details regarding the representativeness of the sample are outlined in Chapter Three.

Chapters Four, Five and Six provide a detailed analysis of the formal, informal and family based economies respectively. Each chapter begins by examining structural features of each economy of

importance to young people's work. In so doing specific hypotheses for each economy are identified. For example, in Chapter Four we hypothesise whether skills polarisation in the formal economy leads to a correlating skills polarisation in work conditions for young people who work in the formal economy; in Chapter Five we hypothesise whether, because the informal economy occurs outside of formal regulations, the particularity of the relationship between 'buyer' and 'seller' normatively regulates conditions and orientations towards work; in Chapter Six we examine how changes in the family mode of production have resulted in family work being oriented to use-value within the household or exchange value on external economies, and consequently hypothesise whether these orientations result in different work experiences for young people who work in the family economy. Each chapter proceeds by profiling the range of work undertaken within the economy being investigated, the social distribution of work within each economy and whether work arrangements differ for different groups of workers. We therefore analyse whether social group membership, such as class background, gender, age or cultural background, has any relationship with the extent of participation and the performance of work tasks within each economy. Each chapter then examines work conditions within each economy adapting the International Labor Organisation's decent work standards to analyse conditions. This is then complemented by an assessment of intrinsic orientations that provide us with a sense of how economic action is experienced by children within each economy. While each chapter uses identical data items and statistical techniques, the analysis for each is specific to each economy, addressing the hypotheses generated from examining the structural changes in each economy. The final chapter returns to the key questions and aims identified in this chapter and draws linkages across the labour markets, to identify the structural factors that delimit and enable economic agency across each economy, including what structures work experiences across children's economies; the social distribution of different forms of work, the meanings given to productive activities and what this tells us about the nature of economic agency across the three economies.

The remainder of this chapter explores gaps and developments within some of the main approaches within child labour research that assist in delineating the approach taken in the thesis and the implications of these problems and developments for this thesis. The next section therefore assesses the literature for the express purpose of developing the framework for the remainder of the thesis. Four key approaches are identified, the welfare economics approach; sociological and anthropological studies of child labour; enumeration studies of children's labour market activities in

developed economies; and studies of children's work in developed economies informed by the 'new sociology of childhood'. Chapter Two outlines how this thesis attempts to conceptually address some of the problems identified in the existing literature, by outlining the analytical approach used to identify and examine children's economies. Chapter Three outlines how we operationalise this theoretical framework methodologically in a way that takes seriously children's own perspectives on their work but also systematically compares work conditions across the economies children work in.

1.2. Rethinking Children's Work: Developments in Child Work Research

1.2.1. Explaining global child labour: The ILO, welfare economics and children's work in the majority world

In the political economies of the South, children's economic activities are largely viewed as 'child labour', understood not only as a form of exploitation of children, but also as a sign of social and economic underdevelopment. This view drives the agenda of powerful international organisations, including the International Labor Organisation (ILO), which is mandated to eliminate child labour, ILO Convention No. 182 commits countries to take immediate action to prohibit and eliminate the worst forms of child labour. ILO Convention No. 138 sets forth a larger framework for the longer-term objective of the effective abolition of child labour. In pursuing this mandate the ILO has in significant part driven the child labour research agenda. Since 1979 the ILO has had its own program of child labour research and a significant amount, if not most, research on children's work in developing economies has been published or sponsored by the ILO. However two streams can be discerned within the work of the ILO and studies sponsored by the ILO, the welfare economics and the child development approaches. These approaches have not only characterised the work of the ILO, but also influenced the research agenda more generally. These approaches are discussed in turn.

The welfare economics analysis of child labour

Welfare economists consider child labour as the consequence of a rational family strategy to maximise family income, where the marginal benefit of child labour (measured in earnings and saved costs of schooling) is higher than the marginal cost of foregone returns to human capital investment from schooling (Majumdar 2001, 282). The more advanced models point out the existence of two points of equilibrium in the child labour market - 'good equilibrium' where adult wages are high and there is no child labour and 'bad equilibrium' where adult wages are low and there is a large amount

of child labour. This model is based on two axioms or more precisely assumptions - the 'luxury' axiom (children work only when required because of poverty) and the 'substitution' axiom (children only work where adult work does not meet subsistence levels, child and adult labour being substitutable) (Basu and Tzannatos 2003; Boockmann 2010; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). Welfare economic models have had a significant impact on policy making at the international and national level, with the aim to shift the child labour market from 'bad' to 'good' equilibrium, including trade sanctions and bans on goods involving the use of child labour. These policies have achieved mixed results, however, for example product bans on imports have had the perverse effect of forcing children into more hazardous situations and encouraged governments to underplay the level of child labour in their own economies, pushing effective regulations further out of political reality (Bourdillon et al. 2009; ILO 2006; Bequle and Boyden 1988; Lopez-Calva, 2003; Lindbeck, Nyberg, Weibull, 1999, White 1996).

While welfare economists provide an elegant model of the micro-level dynamics of child labour and the likely conditions under which children may be required to work, there is nothing within the model itself that suggests that one point of equilibrium is preferable to another. This leaves the model open to the immanent critiques of other economists who distance themselves from explicit normative criteria. Scoville (2002), for example, in his *laissez-faire* critique, takes advantage of this normative absence to justify a free market in children's work. In so doing his conclusions serve as a justification for children to work in the lowest paid, least productive and most derogatory types of activities, because there is a market for children to provide that sort of labour.

Welfare economists' emphasis on individual utility appears to provide some scope for children's autonomy, however vacuous that autonomy may be (as rationally calculative market players). However this approach does not prescribe the role of 'rational strategist' to children, but focuses on household decision-making, that is parental decision making, over children's time. Because households are treated as firms in this analysis, households are not only the sites of consumption, as usually portrayed in general equilibrium theory, but also produce a marketable good, the labour of family members, including that of children. Whether a child sells their labour or not is therefore a function of the utility parents gain from selling their children's labour. This is never attributed to any active behaviour on the part of children. Children themselves are not capable of making independent

decisions and parent-child relations are explained through strategies aimed at maximising utility at the household level (Becker 1981).

Contextualising global child labour: Child labour studies in developing economies

Early research efforts undertaken by international non-government organisations, such as the International Confederation of Trade Unions, Save the Children and Anti-Slavery International drew on the experiences of activists and the children they were working with, to document the conditions of working children and the adverse effects of working for children. These studies sometimes brought to the attention of governments and the international community the experiences of working children. However they were criticised for the methodology they employed, relying on journalistic reports indiscriminately or lacking transparency on the methods used. Because of these methodological problems, it was difficult to use these reports to develop a systematic response to the issues raised by the research. More than anything, these studies reinforced the prevailing view that there was a need for 'hard statistics' on the problem of child labour¹.

Much of the work of the ILO focuses on understanding the causal mechanisms for child labour and developing statistical collections to inform and support national programs for its elimination. However the first studies conducted under the auspices of the ILO were more diverse in scope. In particular the collection edited by Rodgers and Standing in 1981, attempted to classify the broad range of economic activities undertaken by children and in so doing challenged the problem discourse associated with child labour promoted by non-government organisations and the ILO's own program. Many of the contributions pointed out the benefits of work for children and their families and traced the adverse consequences of the socio-economic conditions under which children worked rather than the work itself.

Liebel (unpublished) points out that the exploitation of children is almost always seen in connection to child labour. To this we could add the related point that exploitative child labour is often associated with children being forced to work because of their vulnerability to, for example, parental duress or poverty. However, children's work involves a broader range of work experiences including slave-like forms of work (e.g. bondage through debt), wage labour and work that is self-determined.

¹ More recent studies commissioned by international agencies have been quite innovative, largely involving systematic field-based situation analyses and ethnographic studies involving working children and working children's movements (eg. Bessell 2009; Woodhead 2005, Liebel et al. 2001).

The ILO has been influential in this respect in differentiating exploitative 'child labour' from tolerable 'child work' on the basis of whether work meets certain standards, such as whether the work involves excessively long hours, is excessively hard, or involves the withholding of rest periods.

While this makes it possible to define criteria for exploitation, Liebel argues that these criteria are arbitrary. Rather exploitation is a specific social relationship "in which one person profits from another or gains advantages at his (sic) expense, and which clearly presupposes and helps to reproduce certain social structures and power relations." (Liebel, unpublished, p2). Within this view of exploitation, we can locate children's work within broader socio-economic processes (for example, within capitalist societies all labour is exploited, and therefore children's labour is also exploited). However this general treatment is not enough to differentiate between levels of exploitation. For Liebel, the most exploitative work is that which "reduce(s) their scope for action almost completely – which is the case above all in conditions of exploitation that are based on immediate personal dependence and in which the working subjects are socially isolated." (Liebel, unpublished, p8). Here the emphasis is not so much on this or that scenario, but how systems of social relations create forms of absolute dependence through restricting agency and creating social isolation.

The ILO soon realised that the program to eliminate all forms of child labour could only be a long term goal. The mounting weight of empirical evidence presented in the Rodgers and Standing collection resulted in a shift towards research that has been described as 'differentiated analyses of work' (Liebel 2004). Reflecting developments in the ILO's own policy, this research increasingly focussed on differentiating between work that was harmful to children and work that could benefit or improve children's living conditions or even be beneficial to their development. In the 1990's the ILO took up the distinction between 'child labour' and 'child work', and this distinction gradually evolved to the adoption of 'continuum' and 'balance' models of work (Hobbs and McKechnie 2007). Key debates revolved around what is the best way to differentiate between positive and negative forms of work and the balance of beneficial and harmful aspects of work in a given situation. This has had some effect in shifting the emphasis away from calls for prohibition, but has underscored a focus on child development as an arbiter of what is harmful and what is beneficial (Bourdillon 2006, 2005, 2000; Chakraborty and Lieten 2004; Gamlin and Pastor 2009; Guarcello et al. 2005; Hanson and Vandaele 2003; Hazarika and Bedi 2003; Kabeer 2003; Ravallion and Wodon 2000).

This reliance on child development as the core of assessment has not been without its critics. The models have been criticised for adopting a modern western European concept of childhood, and more pertinently a yardstick of culturally specific adulthood. Vocal in these criticisms were working children's movements such as Bhima Sangha in Karnataka, India and MANTHOC in Peru, which have argued for a subject-oriented understanding of working children. Representatives of these groups argued that by failing to take into account specific cultural contexts and the importance of work for children and their families, much research fails to consider how work can provide opportunities for social engagement, which has productive outcomes for children and their families (see also World Movement of Working Children 2004).

Liebel (forthcoming) also distinguishes between decent work adopted by the ILO and 'work in dignity' or 'dignified work' adopted by working children's movements. The idea of 'dignified work' is used by working children's movements, as a platform to advocate for improved work conditions in both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Liebel argues that the claim for 'dignified work' by working children's movements is a common point of reference to challenge the position that children should be limited to 'child-friendly' activities. Rather, working conditions should be improved and sustainable employment created. Furthermore, the right to work is seen as a prerequisite to be able to exercise other rights, including rights to protection and participation at work. For example, the declarations of working children's movements emphasise that work must be 'adequate according to capabilities'. Liebel argues that from the context in which the demands are made, human dignity and not age is the criterion for adequacy. This is contrasted with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and ILO Conventions for the eradication of child labour. According to Liebel, legislation and policy devised to protect children who work rarely improves conditions of exploitation. Moreover where such Conventions have been implemented through concrete measures, the situation has often been made more complicated for children who work. These criticisms have prompted important shifts in the research.

1.2.2. Putting Child Work on the Research Map – Efforts in Developed Economies

The last two decades has also seen a renewed interest in research on children's work in developed economies. The view that child employment has been abolished in developed economies has been challenged by social scientists who, attempting to question how marginal children's work is, have focused on the extent of children's paid employment on the formal economy. Large-scale survey studies of children's work in Europe and the United Kingdom, especially those undertaken by the Paisley Group, have not only enumerated the extent of children's participation on the formal economy but shown that large proportions of children are in paid employment (Hobbs, Anderson and McKechnie, 2009; Hobbs et al. 2007; Lavalette, Hobbs, Lindsay, and McKechnie 1995, Hobbs, Lindsay, and McKechnie, 1996; Hobbs and McKechnie, 1997. See also Pond and Searle, 1991). These studies have tended, however, to replicate the 'children's work as problem' motif, by highlighting children's exploitation on the formal economy. According to Liebel (2004) the problem has been that this research has uncritically adopted a particular view of gainful employment, associated historically with the exploitation of children in capitalist production. Furthermore, the restriction of work to paid employment on the formal economy, in the interest of easy enumeration, has meant that the level of children's involvement in work beyond paid employment is not well known.

While European studies were preoccupied with rediscovering the extent of children's work, research in the United States has long started from the premise that paid work is a common aspect of 'adolescence'. The main theme in these studies has been instead to examine the developmental consequences of paid work, either positive or negative, for children (Cunnie et al. 2009; Mortimer 2003; United States Department of Labor, 2000; Balding, 1997; Schoenhals, Tienda and Schneider, 1998). In the 1980's this research was oriented towards whether early work experiences were associated with negative educational or behavioural outcomes (Greenberger and Steinberg 1986; Steinberg, Greenberger, Garduque and McAuliffe 1982). In the 1990's the negative evaluations were increasingly called into question, and a focus on job conditions occurred. However the focus was not on the quality of work conditions themselves, but how work conditions were associated with behavioural outcomes or transition into adult employment, for young people, or impeded the effective transition into adult employment (Mortimer and Finch, 1996; Schoenhals, Tienda and Schneider 1998).

While the United States tradition differs from many of the European studies by viewing work as a normal part of youth experience, a number of criticisms can be levelled against both bodies of research. Despite the increasing sophistication of these studies, including a shift from evaluating whether work is positive or negative to whether conditions are beneficial, harmful or inconsequential, these studies remained wedded to a developmental and psychologistic framework which held children up to a yardstick of apparently normal development and adulthood (Woodhead 2009). This focus, on what Hansen, Mortimer and Krüger (2001) call 'anticipatory socialisation', has diverted attention from the quality of the work children do, focusing on a narrow range of outcomes, rather than the meaning and experience of work for children themselves. Children's experience of work is therefore of limited importance. The definition of work used reinforces a marked boundary between economic and non-economic activities, which in turn reinforces that modern childhood is in part defined by the exclusion of children from direct economic activity. Because adult economic activity is defined as the norm, children's economic activity undertaken outside of the dominant definitions of adult competence is trivialised, and the work undertaken by children that falls within that dominant definition is understood as outside the proper realms of what is appropriate for children (Qvortrup 1994). Hence, while using more sophisticated standards of evaluation, the underlying reliance on developmental models objectifies children as passive recipients of economic socialisation. Another criticism of these studies is that they rely on a restrictive definition of labour for the purpose of conceptual and operational clarity. This provides a single estimate of how many children work which is misleading for several reasons. The definition of labour used fails to take account of other work that is, for example not paid or outside the formal labour market. Furthermore it also combines work that may be quite different in terms of the work tasks involved, job design and employment arrangements, for example whether work is full-time and part-time or seasonal and sporadic.

1.2.3. Child Workers as Social Subjects – New Childhood Studies and the multiple contexts of children's work

Studies focussing on child development have increasingly been challenged, with research in both developed and developing economies applying a child-centred approach to the work children undertake, prioritising how children experience their work and how children understand their work as a social contribution. These studies include renewed ethnographic studies of children's work (Bessell, 2009a, 2009b; Bøås and Hatløy, 2008; Bourdillon 2006, 2005, 2000; Leibel 2004; Levine,

2011, 1999; Mayblin, 2010; Morrow 2010; Woodhead 2004; Zelizer 2002). This shift towards a child-centred scholarship is part of a broader disciplinary approach referred to as the 'new childhood studies' or the 'new sociology of childhood'. The view that emerges is one where children are articulate, competent to make sense of their situation and the world around them. One of the main aims of this approach is to highlight the gaps in existing knowledge because of its 'adultist' epistemological biases and distortions (Alanen 2005, Qvortrup, Corsaro and Honig 2009, Thorne 1987). Methodologically children are treated as agents and co-constructors of knowledge. Obtaining children's standpoint is a critical feature of the methodological and epistemological stance in these approaches. Inspired by the feminist critique of 'malestream' scientific knowledge, this scholarship also highlights the very real political implications of taking certain methodological positions. One of the key political contestations about methodological choice centres on how work is conceptualized². In practice this has meant a proliferation of studies involving qualitative methods.

Several interrelated consequences of this scholarship are evident in research on children's work. This research has challenged developmental views of childhood by emphasizing children's subjectivity and competence and questions whether working is in fact detrimental to children. Greater emphasis is given to children's perspectives and assessments about their work. For instance Levine (1999) found that child vineyard workers in South Africa claimed the right to work with their parents, not the simple economic right to work. In Norway, Solberg acquired a sense of the various kinds of work children do and discovered forms of work that were far removed from the usual perception of children's work as exploitation (Solberg 1997, 2001). Similar studies have been undertaken by for example by Leonard (1999, 2004) of children's paid and unpaid work in Northern Ireland, Song (1999) of young people's work in family businesses in the United States, Abebe and Kjørholt (2009) of domestic, entrepreneurial and mobility work in Ethiopia, Morrow (1994) of children's work outside of school in the United Kingdom, Faulstich Orellana (2001) and Valenzuela (1999) of Mexican and Central American immigrant children's work as 'family brokers' in the United States,

² In developing economies, a sizeable literature reports on the conceptual and practical difficulties of measuring work traditionally done by young women (Anker, Khan and Gupta 1988). Because much of the work undertaken by women is outside the formal economy, the literature emphasizes the under-reporting of women's labour force activities and the failure to appreciate women's economic contributions. Anker, Khan and Gupta suggests that similar difficulties in measurement are likely to exist in the measurement of children's work activities, especially where children predominate in family based unpaid work. For example household work and childcare are not considered labour force activities according to the international definition adopted by the ILO, and are thus not included in counts of child labour. This is despite the significant amounts of time many children, particularly girls, are required to spend undertaking these activities, which may compromise their participation in other activities.

Nieuwenhuys (2000) of the interface between the household economy and the commercialisation of children's labour in Kerala and Frederiksen (1999) of young people's perspectives of work on the formal economy in Denmark. These studies less often adopt adult definitions of economic activity, and more often observe social interaction as it occurs. A range of non-market and non-school activities are considered productive. By 'conceptually stretching' work (Alanen, 2005) these studies emphasise the multiple sites that children work in, including the private sphere (such as domestic labour) and other informal economies (for example Green, 1990; Levey 2009; Leonard 2003, 1999; Liebel, 2004, 2003; Morrow, 1994; Solberg, 2001; Song, 1999; Haavind 2005; Zelizer, 2002). These approaches therefore recognise that the work children are involved in represents a broad spectrum of experiences and that children's engagement in productive activities is widespread, but hidden or not socially recognised.

The new childhood studies has driven some important developments in the study of children's work. However, within the new childhood studies, the translation, epistemologically, of standpoint theory into, methodologically, a preference for certain methods and an underlying disavowal of other methods, particularly quantitative methods, has left some unfortunate gaps in our knowledge. Four issues are of particular importance for this study - the absence of systematic categorisation of children's work; the lack of comparison across work contexts; promotion of a false opposition between agency and structure and the capacity of research to facilitate children's expression of free will.

While emphasising the multiple contexts in which children work, this research provides only limited knowledge of the prevalence and social distribution of different sorts of work, beyond the formal economy, although we are told that children's work in the informal economy, for example, appears widespread. For example Solberg states that she sees children work everywhere, now that she has broadened her conception of work. Such casual observations are not uncommon amongst social scientists who otherwise undertake careful analysis and these assessments seem inadequate given that the wide variety of work is used as the basis by which such authors argue that children are commonly engaged in production. A related issue is that children's work is not examined across contexts using some common standard of evaluation, such as the presence of particular conditions like remuneration or hours worked. One could argue that to do so would be insensitive to diversity of context. But by systematically comparing different contexts of work we can assess the quality of

conditions across work contexts. By not doing so, differences between types of work, work experiences and conditions are obscured.

The agency-structure opposition relates to the question of the effects of social and economic structures on individual autonomy and expression of free will. One of the key features of sociological enquiry is the investigation of how social outcomes are shaped by social context, institutions, and social actions. Central to new childhood studies approaches are how certain structural factors effect work conditions, especially how 'cultures of childhood' generated through complex interactions between factors such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, age and so on. Reacting to the objectification of children in dominant approaches to child labour research, new childhood scholars have emphasised the individual as social subject. This is a particular adoption of standpoint concepts that highlight how individualised experiences are a function of social position. However it is not the failure to consider structural factors, but the voluntaristic conceptualisation of structures as applied to working children, which is problematic.

Manfred Liebel (2004) has been particularly strident in this respect in his analysis of working children as social subjects. At the core of this position is a view of working children as individual rights bearers who make claims for social recognition. What is critical Liebel argues, is to what extent and under what conditions work can become a 'free expression of life' (9), such that children can take part in work as a freely chosen activity and are able to influence their living conditions. Children's agency or subjectivity, is therefore situated in broader structural factors which are more or less limitations to children's agency that need to be confronted. The subject, with a will of her own, is constructed in opposition to social, economic and political constraints that need to be overcome. The limitations Liebel lists include the inability of children to decide what work they wish to do, and that children work under conditions that offer little scope for personal development. These limitations may be caused by economic factors, like extreme poverty, or cultural factors, like hierarchies of age or gender. These issues are critically important and Liebel reminds us that as researchers we have a responsibility to enquire into the sources of oppression experienced by children who work. However, by viewing structure as something that undermines the capacity of working children to express their free will confuses forms of domination, which Liebel rightly opposes, with structural factors that constitute the very conditions and possibilities for work to occur. To understand how individual children come to identify as social subjects, and why other

children do not, methodologically we must locate the concept of the social subject (as conceptualised by Liebel) into the realm of sociological relations. From this view cultural, social, economic and political factors are instead constitutive of, as well as limit, agency. Using Liebel's terms a strong sense of subjectivity (individuals as rights bearer deserving recognition and respect), which is a precondition for the types of identity-formation which Liebel advocates, is in fact socially constituted through the operation of social structures.

Proponents of subject-oriented approaches might argue that to understand structural factors in this way inevitably risks objectifying children and denies the claims of many children to be able to act independently. However this assumes that structural factors are not concrete social realities. The operation of and constitution of these factors, may be outside the view of individual actors (Bourdieu 1998). At the level of cognitive dispositions, norms and attitudes towards work, the issue of work as a 'free expression of life' may never explicitly be brought into question because work is experienced as a type of embodied knowledge and perception, competence and mastery over the world (Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962).³

When a fuller conception of sociological subjectivity is applied to the practice of research, other limits in the social subject approach become evident. At a pragmatic and definitional level, children's own perceptions about what counts as work are likely to reflect dominant discourses about what counts as work. Children may not count their activities as work because children may also believe that childhood is a time of non-work. Hence the limits of self-definition are evident here, and indeed many children considered as working children, using an expansive definition of work, may not define their activities as such. All research designs impose particular and partial constructions for participants and those undertaking the research. That is research is an intersubjective process influenced by the respective social position and background of the researcher and participant; the transformative effects of participation in research; and the personal relationship between the researcher and participant. All of these factors mediate the apparently uninhibited and independent

³ Or in Bourdieu's own terms: "In order to capture the gist of social action, we must recognize the *ontological complicity*, ... between the agent (who is neither a subject or a consciousness, nor the mere executant of a role or the *Trager* of a function) and the social world (which is never a mere 'thing' even if it must be constructed as such in the objectivist phase of research). Social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it finds itself 'as fish in water,' it does not feel the weight of the water and takes the world about itself for granted.

expression of children's will. What perhaps is better taken from the new childhood studies tradition is the need for a conceptual openness and a reflexive research practice. It is thus more important that we pay heed to how concepts are translated into particular methods, than argue about the choice of method itself. Both qualitative and quantitative methods can be used in research to either objectify or promote a subject-oriented view of children and childhood, and which more or less promotes children's participation.

1.3. Applying Developments in the Field: Implications for this study

The gaps and developments in this literature sensitise us to some of the salient conceptual and methodological strengths and weaknesses in the child work literature that can inform the rationale and guide the approach taken in this study. The insights and gaps in each approach are summarised in Table 1.2. How these developments and gaps contribute to the approach taken in this thesis, including the broad purpose of each chapter, are also summarised.

Table 1.1: Implications of existing approaches to the study of children's work

Research Approach⁴	Developments and Insights	Gaps in Approach	Thesis Contribution
ILO - Welfare Economics	Sensitises analysis to the importance of relational and socio-economic structures as partly determining whether children work or not.	Lacks theory of child agency. Can be used to support exploitative labour practices.	Chapter Two proposes a concept of economic agency that takes children as agents seriously, respects their capacity to act, but theorises agential capacity in the context of relational and socio-economic structures.
ILO - Child Labour Studies	Highlight the importance of analysing children's work systematically, and in so doing differentiating work that meets certain standards from work that does not.	Remain based in problem and normative child development discourses. Hence objectification occurs at two levels, in understanding work as being disruptive of proper socialization and objectifying children within the research process.	Chapter Two draws attention to broader economic processes that are relevant to children's economies without theorising socialisation in a deterministic way. Chapter Three outlines a methodology for analysing children's work systematically without objectifying children in the research process.
US/UK Enumeration studies	Highlight the importance of assessing conditions and also the importance of sophisticated enumeration.	Limited to paid employment on the formal labour market. Subjugates children's experience of work to processes of economic socialisation and therefore promotes a productivist view of early work experiences.	Chapter Two outlines the variety of fields in which economic activity is undertaken. Chapter Three outlines measures of decent work standards and intrinsic orientations / motivations, broadening assessment of children's work to include a range of 'objective' conditions and 'subjective' experiences. These form the foundation of the empirical case studies presented in Chapters Four to Six.
New childhood studies	Emphasises the multiple contexts and diversity of children's work, challenges the assumption that children are unproductive and focuses on the standpoint of children who work. In so doing provides an avenue through which children's own assessments of work are prioritised.	Do not systematically assess types of work across multiple contexts. Constructs agency and structure in opposition.	Chapter Two applies insights from the new childhood studies and economic sociology that identifies the multiple economies of children's work. Chapter Three outlines the measures that allow identification of the presence or absence of certain conditions across work contexts. Chapter Four to Six empirically assess children's economies in a systematic way to assess the prevalence and social distribution of children's work across different economies.

⁴ These assessments are based on the review undertaken in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. Please refer to these sections for reference to specific studies.

In summary, from the welfare economic approach we find models that can help explain the causes of child labour. However an emphasis on elimination means these approaches rely on criteria generated unreflexively from external 'taken-for-granted' norms, such as that *prima facie*, work is harmful to children. This also opens these approaches to contradictory interpretations, such as that households should be able to dispose of children's labour according to their own preferences. Undoubtedly where children work to ameliorate poverty, they are likely to have fewer opportunities to engage in work that is of interest or advantage to them, or to limit their work time to engage in other activities. However, children who work to ameliorate their poverty are not necessarily working in exploitative conditions, even in poor societies that are dependent on children's work. Often, great value is placed on the work that children do and children receive significant esteem from their work contributions. The work, moreover, may have other significant benefits to the children or young people involved. However it is too simple to suggest that because children work out of economic necessity they are either exploited or in contrast their work forms part of a 'natural' system of family support. Instead, careful analysis of the nature of appropriation is required to determine whether work relations are exploitative or not. This thesis contributes to the analysis of this appropriation by obtaining a population based sample robust enough to make confident conclusions regarding the distribution of work participation and opportunities across the socio-economic structure.

This leads to another problem in this research, that it denies agential capacity to children. The focus on households as agents means that children are constructed as deployable resources that can be sold onto the labour market. Children's own capacity to contribute to and influence family decisions including whether they work or not, is rarely considered. Yet at the same time these approaches foreground the role of structures, both relational (for instance, internal family dynamics) and broader structures (such as national economic development, and poverty) in influencing whether children work or not.

Child labour studies highlight the importance of analysing children's work systematically and in so doing differentiate between work that meets certain standards from work that does not. However, these approaches remain rooted in a problem discourse about work more generally, which betrays a more fundamental issue of relevance to this study. The reliance on child socialization as the basis for differentiating between good and bad forms of work treats children as the objects of socialisation

processes that are disrupted by their involvement in work. Methodologically children are objectified in the research process, rather than being participants in subject centred research.

Survey based research in the United Kingdom and the United States have provided evidence that many children remain engaged in productive economic activities in developed economies, even though these productive activities are not as central to children's own identities, household coping strategies and broader economic processes, as they once were. In particular the United States studies indicate the importance of systematically assessing conditions of work, rather than whether work per se is good or bad and therefore expand on the knowledge provided by studies that employ more generic assessments of work. However these studies, in attempting to show that children's work is not marginal, focus on a narrow range of work activities and have ignored economic activities undertaken by children outside the formal economy. This reliance on orthodox categories of labour also suggests a broader normative position about what are the appropriate boundaries of childhood. This also promotes an overly productivist view of labour – where the primary concern is whether and how early work experiences are related to labour market outcomes in adulthood. Children's own experiences are subjugated to these concerns and has diverted attention from the quality of the work children do.

Studies based in new childhood scholarship provide a basis for a child-centred theory of work. By emphasising children's subjectivity and competence, this research argues that children are subjects in economic processes and consequently do not start from a position that work is harmful. This body of work also challenges orthodox definitions of work as paid employment on the formal economy to include a broader range of activities that children may be engaged in. However, although these studies identify that children work across multiple contexts, they do not systematically assess types of work across those multiple contexts. Furthermore there may be a different distribution of different types of work among different sub-populations of children. By not systematically assessing conditions across children's economies, new childhood studies approaches provide little context specific knowledge about whether children experience different labour markets in different ways and whether different social rewards associated with work, such as pay, work security and social esteem, are available across different economies. Furthermore, the agential subject is constructed in opposition to social, economic and political constraints that need to be overcome.

Having identified some of the developments and gaps in the research, the implications for this thesis are several. The thesis empirically assesses children's economies in a systematic manner to assess the prevalence and social distribution of children's work across different economies, the formal, informal and family based economies. We identify these economies through an assessment and application of the economic sociology literature relating to labour markets. This is undertaken in Chapter Two, which outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted in this thesis. In assessing these economies, the thesis applies consistent standards of evaluation, adapting the ILO's decent work standards, or work securities, to examine work conditions across these different children's economies. Chapter Three outlines measures of decent work standards and intrinsic orientations that form the foundation of the empirical case studies presented in Chapters Four to Six.

An important theoretical problem addressed is that structural factors constitute the possibilities for work to occur. Claims to acting independently neither negate the existence of such structural factors nor assist understanding of how these factors create the condition for independent action and self-understanding. Chapter Two, which specifies the theoretical framework and conceptual tools used in this thesis, draws upon the sociology of work and economic sociology literature to reconceptualise the problems arising from the subject oriented approach. Rather than opposing agency and structure, social structures enable the possibilities through which work processes and activities are enacted by individuals. These issues, in light of the findings are returned to in the conclusion.

Chapter 2: Developing a Framework for Analysis - Forms of Economic Action and the Limits of Agency as Autonomy

Chapter One has sensitised us to several issues. Children's work occurs within a larger social context constituted historically, economically and politically. Furthermore, children work across multiple contexts, including the formal economy, at home, at school and in the informal economy. Despite these insights no systematic assessment of children's work across these multiple economies has been undertaken and identifying these fields clearly remains an important endeavour. Chapter One also discussed the need for a systematic comparison of fields of work using a common standard of evaluation, such as the presence of particular conditions such as remuneration or hours involved. In terms of understanding children's agency, children have been objectified in many existing analyses of children's work, or in contrast assessments of children's subjectivity through work have emphasised agency in opposition to structure. Both positions, either objectifying children or promoting an overly voluntaristic concept of agency are problematic.

The analytical framework adopted in this thesis takes account of the specific contexts of children's work, but assesses work across these contexts in a systematic way. This includes how economic and social structures influence work experiences and work conditions; and whether different forms of economic agency are specific to economic contexts. This chapter moves from the general to the specific by first outlining the broad concepts of 'relational' and 'structural embeddedness' and how relational and structural embeddedness influence economic agency. We finally examine how forms of relational embeddedness, structural embeddedness and consequent forms of economic agency can be conceptualised as specific fields of action, in this case specific 'economies', that are empirically examined in Chapters Four through Six.

The next two sections show that 'fields of work' are characterised by individual interactions (or forms of relational embeddedness) that occur within broader economic and social factors (structural embeddedness). Drawing upon the work of Karl Polanyi, in particular, we show that relational and structural embeddedness have a conceptual relationship, and that forms of structural embeddedness in part set the parameters for the type of interactions between individuals. This sensitises us to the importance of broader economic and social processes at one level, but also to the importance of how work is experienced by individuals in terms of motivation and orientations. Drawing upon the work of Mark Granovetter and Pierre Bourdieu,


we show that structural and relational embeddedness simultaneously constitute, enable and limit expressions of action that can be understood as forms of agency, and furthermore enable activities to be understood by social actors as work in the first instance. Hence a conception of economic agency is proposed - as action constituted intersubjectively, that occurs within the parameters set by and enabled through structures of social space.

The insights gained from these sections and from Chapter One, are conceptually applied in the section 'Identifying the multiple contexts of children's work', which outlines some of the defining characteristics of specific economic fields, and therefore the multiple contexts of children's work (i.e. the formal, informal and family based economies). These analytic tools also assist in identifying the structural transformations that have had a marked impact on the nature of social interactions within each specific economy and the relevant structural and relational factors in each field, factors that are empirically examined in Chapters Four to Six. The chapter concludes by outlining how the framework is applied in these chapters.

2.1. Systems of social relations and the motivations to work

Economic sociology emphasises that economic contexts reflect and are embedded in social and cultural contexts; and actor preferences and actions are less intact, calculated and about maximising utility, than socially derived cognitive strategies, substantive rationality, feelings, roles, norms, myths and expectations (Guillen et al. 2002). The work of Karl Polanyi is a classical reference in this study of economic embeddedness. Polanyi illustrates the reliance of markets upon social relations and that the formal market is only one institution in which economic exchange can occur. According to Polanyi (1944) rational self-interest is too unstable a foundation for the functioning of economic life. Economic life is integrated with social life through other organising principles, which stabilise the economy and allow for sustained relationships between economy and society.

Polanyi (1957) identifies three ways which the economy is organised; reciprocity, occurring within symmetrical groups such as families, neighbourhoods and kinship groups; redistribution involving the allocation of goods from a centre in the community, for example the state; and exchange involving the distribution of goods via markets. In each economy there is a mix of these three forms and their corresponding institutions, the family, the state and the market. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1: Three Forms of Economic Organisation

As a form of economic action, work is not only motivated by instrumental rationality, including the attainment of money, goods or services, but also for less tangible motivations such as respect, obligation, duty or moral obligation. Various extensions and alternative framings of this central argument have been elaborated, all of which in some respect build upon the work of Polanyi (for example Korczynski, Hodson and Edwards 2006, Boltanski and Thévenot 1999 and Folbre 1995). What all these typologies have in common is that multiple logics of motivation exist and are associated with specific fields of action, whether that be the existence or non-existence of one or other coordinating base, or whether in any particular field, different forms of justification co-exist. Therefore modes of motivation for social action and the meaning of that social action will depend upon the specific field involved.

2.2. Levels of embeddedness: relating the relational and the structural in determining economic agency

Economic action is motivated by a range of orientations instituted through different forms of economic organisation. However different types of social relations are evident: those that form the immediate interpersonal and organisational context of work, and the socio-structural context, which shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors. Drawing upon the work of Polanyi, Mark Granovetter (1985) specifically addresses this issue through his concepts of relational and structural embeddedness.

Granovetter describes relational embeddedness as the immediate interpersonal and organisational context of work, which can be analysed in terms of forms of motivation, justification and understandings/meanings of action. These form the 'rules' or characteristics of the 'field' in which work occurs. Questions around how actors define their interests (constitutive effects) and regulate their behaviour (regulatory effects) are also relevant here (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). The particular modes of social action, such as instrumentality, altruism, reciprocity and

obligation, are an expression of economic agency as it is enacted through interpersonal interactions with others in their work environment. However Granovetter argues that the possibilities for action are coordinated by the second level, the socio-structural context that shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors. He describes this as structural embeddedness. What these factors include is specific to political and economic contexts, but include structural transformations in the world of work; the social distribution of different forms of work according to organising structures of class and gender (which in turn reflect significant cultural and political transformations that have been described under the rubric of the 'politics of recognition' and the 'politics of redistribution' – (see Fraser and Honneth (2003), Outhwaite and Honneth (2009); and welfare state configurations (Esping-Andersen 1990; 2009). To this we can add the historical and cultural transformation of childhood, from a period productivity to one of non-productivity subsumed within the family and school (Zelizer 1985). Feminist scholars of children's work also point to the important role of patriarchal structures in defining work roles, conditions and the broader organisation and access to work for children (Nieuwenhuys 1996, Levison 2000). In all fields of work it is likely that gender norms, obligations and constraints provide a substantive basis for different experiences of work between young men and women.

While Granovetter develops the concepts of structural and relational embeddedness, his work has been criticised for not developing how structural and relational embeddedness are related in his framework. Pierre Bourdieu's work (1990; 2005) relates individual action and social structure in ways complementary to the embeddedness thesis, through his concepts of field, capital and habitus. While Granovetter emphasises the interactions, networks and norms required for choice to take effect, Bourdieu emphasises the structure of the field, or relations of power, as orienting action. According to Bourdieu, the economy or specific economic phenomena, can be conceptualised as a field, defined as a structure of actual and potential relations with its own logic. The structure of a field can be understood in terms of the distribution of different forms of capital, particularly social, cultural and symbolic capital (to which Bourdieu adds, specifically with reference to the economic field, financial capital, technological capital, and commercial capital and juridical/ organisational capital (2005). Depending on the specific nature of the field, certain forms of capital are more highly valued than others.

The structure of the field, or as Bourdieu puts it, 'the structure of relations of force' determine the conditions of action. The individual acts of agents are meaningful within the structure of relations that comprise the field (2005, p. 77). The structural delimits the space of possible actions and these actions are oriented towards and in turn reconstitute the 'rules' of the field.

However habitus, understood as a structure of the mind characterized by a set of acquired dispositions, (such as those orientations described in the previous section), is “an intelligent response to an actively selected aspect of the real” which takes into account history and likely trajectory into the future, and hence is “both determined and spontaneous” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 85)⁵. The issue of choice, constituted as free action in liberal theories of agency, does not account for the sociality of action. Rather, the actor is always an individual and social actor and individual acts are both an expression of individual and social action.

Bourdieu's work points to the operation of different modes of rationality in different spheres, constrained by conventions and social relations. While the thesis does not specifically apply these concepts to analyse children's work, on the basis of these concepts we can potentially hypothesise that the various fields of action in which children work are constituted by different rules and logics of action that form the environment in which interactions take place. Furthermore the rewards obtained through these interactions reflect what forms of capital are most highly valued within each field. Applying the work of Granovetter and Polanyi, at an ideal-typical level each field is constituted through forms of structural embeddedness that in turn establish the parameters of the work habitus of child workers in each field and those they interact with in the performance of the productive activities which constitute work. However, determining the precise nature of the actors in a field and their influence over the logic of action (what Bourdieu calls the prevailing relation of force) is a matter of empirical investigation. The work of Polanyi (reciprocity/exchange), Korczynski et al (power/ norm/ exchange) or Boltanski and Thevenot (passion /trust /solidarity/ recognition/ exchange/ function), provide pointers to the possible logics of action that exist across fields. For example work may be regulated through obligation in the family, reciprocity on the informal economy and exchange on the formal economy. A fuller exploration of the possible fields are examined in the next section.

2.3. Identifying the multiple contexts of children's work

The framework thus far draws on the insights from existing literature on children's work and, using ideas drawn from economic sociology, suggests the existence of multiple fields of work with associated logics of action. These are however general concepts that frame analysis. Which fields, or specific work contexts, children work in remains an open question. Part of the answer

⁵ This is in some ways similar to, and accommodates the insights of, cultural approaches to economic sociology that emphasise how different 'cultures' are associated with and predict different modes of exchange and market logics.

comes from studies of children's labour, which has examined the work children undertake across various social contexts, including, but not limited to the formal economy. However, this research has made little use of the more general concepts provided by the sociology of work. Studies on precarious work on the formal economy, non-standard work, and work on the informal economy are relevant to making sense of children's work in a systematic way. At the same time these literatures have rarely, if ever, considered children. By synthesising the embedded agency framework discussed so far with insights drawn from the sociology of work, we can attempt to identify the fields, or economies, that children work in.

Beamish and Biggart identify a limited number of systems of exchange that influence how work is arranged – what they refer to as the 'worlds of work'. Only some of these systems of exchange have been fully 'marketised' (Beamish and Biggart 2006, pp 242-243)⁶. They identify four ideal-type systems of exchange, which provide a useful set of categories to map children's work – market systems, associative systems, communal systems and moral systems. The main features of each system are summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. The 'Worlds of Work'

	Market	Systems Associative	Communal	Moral
Structure	Market	Network	Collective	Substantive
Alignment	Instrumental-universalistic	Instrumental-particularistic	Substantive-particularistic	Substantive-universalistic
Meaning	'You pay and I'll work'	'I'll work for your benefit, if you'll work for my benefit'	'I work out of obligation to the group'	'I work for a higher purpose'
Remuneration	Wages	Payment	Privilege	Honor
Differentiation	Individualistic	Relational	In/out group	Ethical
Relation	Contractual	Extended/partnership	Obligatory	Normative
Exit	Final	Breach	Elder status	None

(Source: Beamish and Biggart 2006, p. 243)

⁶ As discussed in Section 2.1, a range of conceptual schema have been elaborated that typify forms of economic exchange and associated economic logics of action. For example Korczynski, Hodson and Edwards (2006) identify three fundamental bases of social action across the economy - power (including hierarchy and claims for social recognition), market (particularly exchange) and social norms (operating within groups of association, such as trust and loyalty). Each form of social action, at an ideal-typical level, tends towards different forms of social integration and consensus, or potentials for conflict. Another example is provided by Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), whose 'worlds of justification' can be interpreted as forms of motivation, largely determined by the context in which the work is performed. A person working for a firm can justify their behaviour (or be motivated to act or understand their actions) on the basis of instrumental efficiency (the market) or loyalty (the domestic world), for example. These modes of justification in turn can become conventions of social action and lead to very different expectations and outcomes. Another example is provided by Nancy Folbre's (1995) identification of the three motives for 'caring labor': altruism, long-run reciprocity, and fulfilment of obligation or responsibility, to which Levison adds, specifically for children, coercion – the ability of adult's to dictate children's behaviour (2000, 130). However the work of Beamish and Biggart's typology is possibly the most systemic in discussing various characteristics of each system of exchange that are amenable to operationalising empirically, which are summarised in Table 2.1.

This schema provides a bridge between work fields or economies (market, network, collective and moral) and work motivations or logics of action associated with each field. At this ideal typical level two major continuums differentiate the logic of each system of exchange- whether it is aligned according to instrumental or substantive-rational modes of action; and whether the social relations are universalistic or particularistic, which in turn give work 'field specific' social meaning. Specific structures and logics of alignment are associated with particular conditions, conceptualised by Beamish and Biggart as remuneration, differentiation, relation and exit. The 'Market world of work' refers to the formal economy (Chapter Four); the 'Systems-Associative' most closely aligns with the informal economy (Chapter Five), with aspects of the 'Moral world of work' also evident (see associative forms of work – Chapter Five); and the 'Communal world of work' most closely aligns with the family economy (Chapter Six). The links between these elements for each system of exchange are more fully described below. Each section briefly describes the characteristics of each economic field derived from the work of Beamish and Biggart (2006) and a synthesis of the theoretical material presented in this chapter thus far. They therefore provide ideal-type descriptions for the empirical analyses presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Specific hypotheses generated from the theoretical synthesis are foreshadowed in the Conclusion to this Chapter and, with the examination of structural transformations within each economy, are detailed within the empirical chapters.

2.3.1. The formal economy: exchange and self-interest logic

Work on the formal economy is the prevailing system of work in developed economies. The formal economy is prescribed and legitimated through law, including laws that constitute the industrial relations system, including arbitration and wage setting, laws that constitute corporations, and the law of employment (including common law employment contracts, awards and agreements). These systems underpin the main organising structure of the formal economy, the employment contract. These systems vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Orthodox economic theory assumes that transactions between employers and employees on the formal economy involve utilitarian reasoning as the basis of action. This ultimately conditions the expectations and motivations of workers, especially around modes of remuneration. Accordingly the perfect market for labour involves the free exchange of actors buying and selling their labour, who strategise their actions based on price signals (reflecting supply and demand) within the market (Becker 1976). Therefore exchange is characterised by strict forms of instrumental rationality geared towards obtaining tangible benefits such as money and skills from selling one's labour. Given this, children are likely to occupy only a marginal position in the formal labour market, in low-skill and low-pay jobs.

Sociological accounts of markets complicate these assumptions by showing that market systems of exchange are neither universal nor free from other logics of action. As social and cultural constructions, formal markets are constituted through forms of social action other than those ascribed to market actors by orthodox economic theory – instrumental behaviour is modified by other social norms within a social and relational context (Abolafia 1996, Polanyi 1957, Lie 1997 1996)⁷. These accounts also emphasise how monetary exchange can also be a means of conferring other less tangible but socially recognised rewards, such as status, power and social esteem. Behaviour on the formal market is characterised by affiliations, culture and institutions, as well as instrumental rationality (Beamish and Biggart 2006).

2.3.2. *Associative systems of work: alliance logic*

Associative systems of work are based upon strong and weak ties between co-exchangers. Work is arranged through networks of relations and exchange, and rather than being formal and universal is particular and preferential. Studies of associative systems of work indicate that preference for exchange is given to those who are members of the network of relations over those who are not (Castells and Portes 1989; Leonard 1998; Portes, 1994; Slack 2007; Williams and Windebank, 1998 Williams and Windebank 2001). Work is, nonetheless, instrumental in character, organised around achieving a particular end, such as completing a specific work task for money. The successful conduct of work is reliant upon, in an organisational context, the success of the association, and in more informal terms, the ongoing success of the relationship, with successful relations between economic actors characterised by ongoing cooperation, mutual support and reciprocity achieving mutual gain for the parties involved (Beamish and Biggart 2006, p. 255). Put differently, the main logic of action is based around alliance and partnership. Informal economies operate on the absence of legal means to enforce contractual obligations. The success of transactions relies instead on 'socially monitored transactions' between networks of actors (Portes and Haller 2005: 407). Examples of associative systems of work include work guilds, cottage industries and professional associations (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984; Wenger and Snyder, 2000). This also includes what has been called the informal economy (Portes and Haller 2005), which encompasses productive activities that are not regulated by the state (Fiege 1990).

⁷ Several studies have found that the proper functioning of formal markets require some elements configured along associative (Granovetter 1973, Child and Faulkner 1998) or communal (Dore 1973, Kondo 1990) modes of organisation. Especially for communal modes, the metaphor of the 'family' is sometimes used to enforce compliance and obligation among workers.

For children, examples most likely correspond to work on the informal open market, semi-entrepreneurial activities (where children offer their services through known networks), work undertaken for friends or known persons outside of kinship groups and work organised through associative organisations, including schools, religious groups, sport and community groups (Gullestad 1992). One of the important insights from studies of the informal economy for our understanding of associative systems of work, is a focus on the characteristics of the relationships and process of exchange, rather than what is produced. The same sorts of commodities or services could be produced and sold either on the formal or informal market. This 'process' orientation is extended through a functional classification of activities according to their goals – of survival (of the individual or household through direct subsistence); or dependant exploitation (increased flexibility and reduced labour costs for employers through off-the book arrangements); or growth.

2.3.3. *Communal Systems of Work: obligation logic*

Communal systems of work are based on logics of collectivity and obligation. This work is undertaken between actors linked through highly particular relationships, such as family and kin, ethnic identity or communal order. The nature of the relationship takes priority over other factors and thus determines the nature of the work, the conditions of work and the understanding of the activity as part of the life of the group. It is the substantive nature of the binding relationships that makes this form of work different to associative systems of work. Work and the benefits from working may be organised through rules operating within the group, rather than external systems of regulation (for instance the law) or ethics (for instance rights) (Beamish and Biggart 2006, 256-257). This system of work is often associated with pre-modern social systems or highly closed groups, such as organised crime circles (Gambetta 1993). However household production, including caring and domestic labour are also examples of work organised along lines of obligation (Folbre 1995, Himmelweit 1995, 2002; Meagher 2003). Pahl (1984) also includes the self-provisioning of goods and services by households. Activities like home repair and gardening are types of direct subsistence production that represent an attempt to maximise household resources by limiting reliance on the market. Another example are family businesses, which potentially blur the line between family based obligation and formal labour market instrumentality.

Family-based work can also be the site of coercive practices involving family members. Several scholars have highlighted how family based work can be characterised by duress against, in particular, women and children. In addressing the involvement of children in family based work,

they point out that the prohibition of formal child labour has made licit work in the informal and family-based economy. However this has had a 'paradox' effect (Nieuwenhuys 1996) of promoting children's involvement in unregulated work –domestic and informal work - and discouraging their involvement in work most likely to be regulated – paid work on the formal economy. The hidden nature of exploitation in informal and family based work, may mean that it is difficult to assign value to labour, especially monetary remuneration (White and Wyn 2004). Group membership determines who is able to do the work, and for this reason children are likely to be involved in a wide variety of family based work, depending on the needs of the family. Because work is organised around obligation, personal benefit may not be emphasised in these work environments. However whether family based work is harmful to children because it is unregulated remains an open question (Boyden, Ling and Myers 1998).⁸

2.3.4. Moral systems of work: higher purpose logic

Moral work is organised around substantive beliefs and principles – such as an ethical system or purpose. Hence, moral systems of work are oriented towards substantive rather than instrumental ends, and work conditions and tasks are organised around this ethical or moral system. For example recognition and the articulation of one's beliefs through the work may be the form of compensation (Beamish and Biggart 2006, 258-259). Examples of this work include religious work (Sibler 1993), domestic work as moral commitment to family (Devault 1991, Ahlander and Bahr 1995), work in communes (Simons and Ingram 1997) and political activism. Beamish and Biggart cite Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as the most prominent example of this logic of action.

For children, moral systems of work are likely to involve volunteer work for community groups, schools or religious groups (such as teaching at Sunday school). Here children's agency is expressed in terms of social responsibility and moral obligation. While not a specific chapter in this thesis, because the number of young people performing this work is too small to analyse separately, this work is examined in Chapter Five: The Informal Economy, as a sub-category of associative work.

2.4. Conclusion to Chapter Two

Our discussion highlights that economic agency as expressed through children's work can be understood through the concepts of structural and relational embeddedness. These concepts

⁸ Himmelweit's (1995) thesis about the treatment of care work is relevant, except here the model of formal paid work is used to denigrate other forms of work on an a priori basis.

provide a framework for analysing children's work. Polanyi, and those that build on his insights, allow us to see that children's work is embedded in concrete systems of social relations.

Economic agency is therefore an expression of relational embeddedness, which in turn, is in part determined by forms of structural embeddedness. The work of Bourdieu provides a conceptual bridge between structural and relational embeddedness by showing that individual dispositions (*habitus*) and interpersonal interactions are reflected in rules of behaviour (the 'field') that are constituted through broader relations of power and social transformations. What these theoretical insights also alert us to is that economic transactions, in this case work, do not merely evidence exchange rationales. Different orientations or modes of motivation are also present and include obligation, altruism and reciprocity. These orientations represent types of economic agency embedded in different social environments, and thus agency is the expression of a mix of these socially embedded orientations, rather than merely the expression of free will.

In the proceeding chapters we show that the specific nature of these social relations are associated with the conditions, meaning and experience of work for children. Children undertake their work within (or embedded in) various institutions which shape the nature and exercise of agency, the definition of their activity as productive or not, and the immediate conditions (including rewards) of these activities. The concepts of exchange instituted in markets, reciprocity instituted in symmetrical groups and obligation instituted in groups of identity correspond with the formal (Chapter Four), informal (Chapter Five) and family based (Chapter Six) economies respectively.

These empirical chapters, proceed initially by examining forms of 'structural embeddedness' relevant to each field of work. By examining the broader social and economic characteristics and transitions within each economy, we identify key hypotheses that guide analysis of the social distribution and conditions within each economy. Each chapter then proceeds to examine relational embeddedness within each economy. While examining the same measures in each chapter, the discussion of relational embeddedness follows on from the hypotheses identified in the discussions of structural embeddedness. This allows an examination of the links between forms of structural and relational embeddedness. The analysis therefore moves from broader economic and social processes to how work is experienced by individuals in terms of motivation and orientations. The implicit argument in this method is that structural and relational embeddedness simultaneously constitute, enable and limit agency, which is expressed through interactions with others.

For the formal economy we focus on the development of primary and secondary labour markets and service economy with a consequent skills polarization in labour market. The hypotheses examined are whether this skills polarization is associated with labour market segmentation according to class and other social position characteristics, such as age and gender; and whether skill level is associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. While participation in the formal economy for young people has increasingly involved low pay, employment insecurity and working-time insecurity (Mills 2004, Campbell 1997), for children who combine school and work, the impacts are unclear, with the trend both increasing flexibility but also undermining reliability of work. We assess the role of instrumental orientations in conferring rewards, hypothesise if young people primarily identify as consumers rather than producers, whether consumption is a primary rationale for young people to work, and whether the act of monetary exchange is also associated with intrinsic orientations.

For the informal economy, we discuss how contention around whether the informal economy is marginal to economic development, or is an alternative source of economic development has been framed as a debate about whether workers on the informal economy are 'disguised workers' or 'informal entrepreneurs'. We explore the implications of this debate for children's involvement in the informal economy, by hypothesising that more marginal groups of children and young people are more likely to participate in the informal economy. As discussed in the previous section, the absence of formal laws and regulations means that work conditions are determined through the strength and nature of the ties between the actors. This raises two issues. The lack of formal regulation may mean that conditions on the informal economy are poor. Secondly, given that conditions are mediated through the strength of associative relationships, the quality of conditions may also be reliant upon the strength and particularity of the relationship between the worker and the purchaser of the goods or services. We develop a set of hypotheses to examine these issues including whether the strength and specificity of the association between worker and purchaser affects work conditions. Furthermore, because individuals are motivated to engage in economic activities by a variety of goals, including communal and reciprocal goals, the nature of the relationship between worker and purchaser may influence the sorts of orientations associated with the work. We therefore also test the hypothesis that work predicated upon strong particularistic ties is more likely to associated with intrinsic orientations; and conversely work predicated upon weak universal ties associated with higher levels of instrumental orientations.

For the family based economy we show that household productive activities can be understood in terms of a continuum from use-value (products consumed by the household) to exchange-

value (products sold on informal or formal market). We also discuss how children's contributions to family life raise issues of the balance between obligation and responsibility within the domestic sphere. Given that some of this work may be consumed by the household (e.g. domestic labour) and other family based work may be sold onto the informal or formal market (e.g. family businesses) it remains an empirical question whether work oriented to the market obtains more formal conditions. Greater demarcation between 'work-life' and 'family-life' may also be more evident for production for the formal market and less where work is for use within the household. We analyse whether the use-value/exchange-value continuum can explain the social distribution of types of work within the family economy, and hypothesis that the more work is oriented to the market, the more formal the conditions. We also test the hypothesis that instrumental orientations are more likely for work geared to exchange value; and therefore whether greater levels of intrinsic and altruistic orientations are evident for work that involves production of goods for use-value. This shifts analysis away from assessments about whether obligation rationales consolidate intimate relations or whether work represents a commodification of intimate relations, by differentiating between types of work that occur within the family.

Having developed the analytical framework, Chapter Three outlines the methodology employed, including how the concepts outlined in this chapter have been operationalised, as well as the details of the fieldwork, methods used and profile of the participants in the study.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1. Introduction

Chapter Two has outlined the analytical tools used to understand children's work. This chapter outlines the methodology employed to obtain data on children's work, and how the concepts outlined in Chapter Two are operationalised to obtain children's perspectives on their work and to compare work conditions across economies. A questionnaire based survey of approximately 11,000 young people aged 12 to 16 years was undertaken that obtained data on the prevalence and type of young people's work, their work conditions, job satisfaction and the quality of the work they perform. This methodology provides a statistical outline of the fields or economies of children's work, an assessment of the social distribution of work across these fields, an examination of the quality of conditions and an analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations from working. The data is analysed in what can be described as a multiple case study approach (Yin, 2009), in that the same data items are analysed identically for mutually exclusive subsets of data utilising the analytical framework identified in Chapter Two. Each subset is specific to an economy; namely, the formal (Chapter Four), informal (Chapter Five) and family-based economies (Chapter Six). The remainder of the chapter provides a rationale for the methodology employed, and outlines some technical aspects of the conduct of the research. This includes details of the instrument and measures used, and details of the fieldwork administration such as sampling method and strategy, piloting, fieldwork practice, data entry and data management.

3.2. Rationale for the Research Design

Chapter One traced how prevailing approaches in the child work literature have inadvertently promoted oppositions in the research on children's work, such as structure and action and objective and subjective modes of knowledge, operationalised as an incompatibility between quantitative and qualitative methods. Despite an increasing recognition within the social sciences of the value of mixed-methods or multi-methodology research (Creswell 2004, Brannen 2005, Flyvbjerg 2001, Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010), dominant methodological approaches in the child work area seem to have left us with a difficult choice between ethnographic, small scale studies that document the

diverse forms of work children undertake and large scale, quantitative studies that provide robust and externally generalisable findings but are limited by a commonsense concept of work.

Reflecting post-positivist developments in epistemology, it is with reference to qualitative approaches that commentators discuss the shift to subject-oriented studies of children's work that unsettle the dominant discourse about child labour. For example, Liebel identifies "two contrary paradigms" – one where "research is oriented towards a picture of childhood that arose with bourgeois society in Europe and sees the work of children as a relic of past times, and therefore hostile to children. This research is above all interested in data and documentation that underline the harmful and negative consequences for children". The counter trend involves research that considers childhood and work "as an open relationship that needs to be examined ... above all taking into account the viewpoint of children" (2004, p50). However opposing paradigms in this way confuses form with substance.

Liebel's real concern with quantitative approaches is their positivist, Eurocentric and developmentalist tendencies, rather than the method itself. Yet for those professing a subject oriented philosophy, a general mistrust of quantitative research abounds. The opposition of quantitative and qualitative approaches has confused the method with the epistemological approach used in applying these methods. In consequence the research suffers from not utilising the full range of tools that the social sciences offer. What is more important is that techniques are mobilised which are relevant and practically useful for the problem being investigated.

The research design used in this study attempts to bring together the interpretive insights of new childhood studies approaches with an empirical base that allows systematic analysis of work across the formal, informal and family based economies. It does this by obtaining children's descriptions of the work they undertake guided by a broad definition of work. By documenting children's perspectives, orthodox definitions of work as paid employment on the formal labour market are broadened to include other activities that children may be engaged in. Children's own assessments of work conditions and rewards from work are also obtained, including extrinsic and intrinsic orientations. However, by systematically obtaining data from a large number of participants on the prevalence of different types of work and conditions across economies, we can also assess whether inequality in work prevalence, type and conditions is linked to the social position of children. While complementary qualitative methods would be ideal to explore in greater depth some of the issues

raised in this thesis, especially findings related to the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic orientations, use of such methods was beyond the time and financial resources of this study.

3.3. Instrumentation

3.3.1. Defining the Field: Questions about jobs and work

The methodological opposition between qualitative and quantitative approaches has, as outlined in Chapter One, also involved contestation over the definition of work. In most studies of children's work a 'common sense' concept of work has been uncritically adopted into the 'scientific language' used. However reliance upon this definition reflects, adopts and reproduces a common social understanding of work, legitimated by social science, which has come to dominate other possible understandings. In order to adequately evaluate children's work, a more wide-ranging and rigorous consideration of the possible forms of work that children undertake is required.

New childhood studies scholarship has challenged the common sense concept of work by documenting how children perform a variety of work activities that cannot strictly be defined as wage labour, but possess some kind of economic value. However in broadening the range of activities that potentially constitute work, conceptual clarity is compromised. For instance Kirchhofer (1998: 67) provides a useful definition of work as an activity aimed at the alteration of objective states of affairs and with which the individual satisfies his own needs or those of others, and thus creates usefulness (Kirchhofer 1998: 67). Kirchhofer's definition emphasises how work can be multi-faceted, having elements of what are conventionally considered 'work' and 'play'. However what Kirchhofer does not specify is how the setting in which the activity is undertaken defines an activity as work. For example juggling (an example Kirchhofer uses) takes on meaning as work or amusement depending on the specific environment in which it is performed. This definition thus broadens out the concept of work to the point that work and leisure become indistinguishable. Other exponents of new childhood studies approaches suggest that the concepts should be built up from participants' own experiences. Morrow, for example, argues that in the case of direct questions about working, children might not relate their informal activity to the question because the concept 'work' tends to be constructed as formal wage labour (Morrow 1994: 129). Morrow is right to point

out these concerns, but what appears to be at issue is whether using a standard question limits or excludes a proper conceptualisation of work, which confuses how work is conceptualised with the method employed. A balance is therefore needed between obtaining children's perspectives on work using a definition that is sensitive to the multiple contexts of work and being able to differentiate between work and non-work activities.

As specified in Chapter Two, work is not defined purely in relation to the activities of individuals, but is defined through social relations. At a concrete level, the social relations of work can be operationalised by determining who appropriates the labour of the young person, and in so doing work can be distinguished from other activities that children perform. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, embedding work as an activity that occurs in specific economic spheres avoids the conceptual error of including any kind of activity as work, such as play or schoolwork, an error to which Kirchhofer falls prey.

Taking account of these considerations, in this study participants were asked to provide details of work they had most recently done and who they worked for. They were asked to state the work or work-type activity and describe the tasks they would normally undertake as part of that work. Participants were asked to include any job or work, as they understood that to mean, with the exception of basic self-care and schoolwork. Open-ended questions were used to allow for diversity of responses. However guidelines were included in the instrument about the parameters of the question and examples provided to stimulate reflection on the young person's own experience. Additional guidance was provided by the fieldworker where required. Where there was any doubt, the young person was asked to include their experience as work. Jobs or work could include:

- activities that are paid, unpaid or rewarded some other way,
- regular work (approximating formal part-time work), casual work (activities that are undertaken as needed or on a sporadic basis) and one-off jobs (activities that are done once and that's all).

No restrictions were placed on the setting in which the activities were undertaken. Work could therefore include:

- work undertaken for family (with the exception of routine self-care) including helping out in a family business or family farm or helping parents do their work from home;
- looking after a sibling while parents are at work;
- work undertaken for neighbours or 'community based' work. This covers work that may be part of informal markets, including unpaid or 'volunteer' activities;
- 'conventional' paid employment.

The questionnaire instrument was therefore designed to capture the diversity of work activities children undertake, ranging from paid employment on the formal labour market, to work at home and for family business, work undertaken for cash or other reward for extended family, friends and neighbours and work that may be sporadic, seasonal or one-off.

Other studies have started from the premise that there are special classes of children's jobs, such as baby-sitting and delivery work. The assumption behind this is that there are specific types of work children are suited to perform because they do not require high levels of skill. This premise creates a conceptual barrier to identifying the full range of work children may be involved in, including work involving technical skills or knowledge of a particular content area. The open-ended responses were coded using the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) (ABS 1997), a skill-based classification of occupations that distinguishes jobs by occupation and competency level. The ASCO system defines a job as the set of tasks performed by an individual. An occupation is a set of jobs with similar sets of tasks. Occupations are classified according to two criteria — skill level (the range and complexity of the tasks involved) and skill specialisation (the field of knowledge required, equipment used, materials worked on, and goods or services produced). Responses were coded according to ASCO classifications using a combination of the description of the work, the activities involved, whether tools and equipment were used in the work and the goods and services produced from the work. Generally from this information the level of skill required in the work, the work sector of and the variety of tasks involved could be identified. This information was sufficient to

code responses to the most specific coding level (the occupation level). Where the information was insufficient to code the response to the most specific level it was coded to the second most specific level (the unit group level).

Information provided by participants was also used to code the type of work performed and the nature of appropriation that characterised the work, that is the relationship between the employee (the participant) and who they undertook the work for. For the formal economy skill level in combination with the description of the enterprise was sufficient to identify work undertaken by young people on the formal economy. For the informal and family based economies an empirical typology was also developed from the responses provided firstly to identify the economy that the work was undertaken within, and secondly to classify the relationship between 'employer' and 'employee'. These classification systems, which describe relations of appropriation in the informal and family based economies, are more fully described in Chapter Five, for the informal economy and Chapter Six for the family based economy.

This study did not explicitly obtain data on the worst forms of child labour. Under International Labor Organisation Convention 182 the worst forms of child labour include all forms of slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, forced or compulsory labour, the use of children in armed conflict, child prostitution and pornography, and the use of children in illicit activities, particularly drug trafficking (International Labor Organisation, 1999). Undoubtedly some of these activities occur in the Australian context. However it would be expected that the incidence of this type of labour would be relatively small compared to the other work children do. Furthermore it is unlikely that children involved in such activities would openly admit to their involvement and it would be impossible to verify these situations through a questionnaire. This is not to suggest that such activities do not require careful consideration or response, and in fact considerable efforts are made by the Australian Federal Police to police child trafficking and prostitution in Australia. Indeed it is extremely important that children are protected from these forms of exploitation. A different type of study would be required to sensitively examine the worst forms of child labour in the Australian context.

3.3.2. *Measuring the social distribution of work*

As discussed in Chapters One and Two, one consequence of different forms of structural embeddedness may be that specific economies are characterised by social inequalities. For example the destandardisation of the labour contract on the formal economy may lead to 'winners' and 'losers', with the rewards of good jobs being unevenly distributed, or young people from less wealthy backgrounds may be more likely to work on the informal economy as an alternate form of subsistence, or there may be a highly gendered division of labour evident in the family economy. To explore these issues each chapter analyses whether social group membership, such as class background, gender, age or cultural background, has any relationship with the extent of participation in the relevant economy and whether, gendered, classed and age-based ideologies, expectations and practices influence the conditions obtained and attitudes towards work within each economy. To measure social group membership, participants were asked to provide information on their demographic characteristics.

Two measures were used to determine participants' cultural background: country of birth and languages spoken at home. These measures were obtained using the short version of the standard Australian Bureau of Statistics questions for obtaining data on cultural and linguistic diversity (ABS 1999). If a young person was born overseas or spoke a language other than English at home a young person was classified as belonging to a minority cultural and linguistic group. Children and young people of 'Anglo-Australian' origin were those born in Australia and who speak only English at home. This indicator is limited in two ways. First, it does not account for children and young people born in what are classified as 'English Proficiency Group One countries' (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 1999), namely the United Kingdom, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, United States of America and Canada. Children and young people born in these countries would be included as belonging to a cultural and linguistic minority group. Second, the questionnaire did not obtain information on parental country of birth or language use, both of which are reliable measures of cultural and linguistic background. Children and young people who were born in Australia and only speak English but whose parents were born overseas and speak English at home, even if their language of origin is not English, would be counted as being 'Anglo-Australian'.

Socio-economic status was measured by matching the postcode of the young person's residence with an Australian Bureau of Statistics index that measures relative disadvantage (ABS 2004). The measure used, the Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD), is calculated from aggregate household attributes within a postcode such as low income, low educational attainment, high unemployment and proportion of the labour force employed in unskilled occupations. High scores on the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage occur when the area has few families of low income and few people with little training and in unskilled occupations. The lower the score, the greater the proportion of families with low household incomes, people with little training and people in unskilled occupations and is thus a measure of relative disadvantage rather than advantage. While these scores are generated from an aggregation of individual household characteristics within a postal area, using this index in this analysis involves generalising postal area level characteristics onto individual households. The measure is more accurately a measure of local area level, rather than household level, disadvantage. However this was seen as a more robust measure than relying on participant's approximating household income.

3.3.3. *Work conditions*

As discussed in Chapter One, child labour studies evaluation of work standards focuses on whether work conditions are hazardous to children, more particularly whether working impedes or promotes positive child development. Conceptualising work conditions in this way treats children as objects of developmental processes and does little to explore the quality of conditions, such as wage adequacy or working time flexibility and predictability. This has diverted attention from the quality of the material conditions of work, such as pay and work hours; and experiential assessments of the quality of work, such as whether work provides feelings of control and autonomy, whether the people children work with provide a supportive and friendly environment and whether the workplace allows children to have a say.

Work conditions in this study are operationalised through an adaptation of the ILO's (2002) decent work standards or work securities, developed as part of its program for promoting decent work standards globally⁹. While we do not have data on all securities, or facets of securities, four labour

⁹ The ILO characterises decent work in terms of seven essential securities: Labour market security (adequate employment opportunities through high levels of employment); employment security (protection against arbitrary

market securities are analysed in this study that are particularly relevant for young workers - ‘income security’, ‘work security’, ‘representation security’ and ‘skill reproduction security’. By applying these standards to evaluate work conditions across different economies, a systematic comparison of different work contexts is possible. Furthermore, by considering the quality of work in this way, this more closely resembles research on work undertaken by adults, which is primarily concerned with the conditions and qualities of work¹⁰. The concepts and measures used for each work security are presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Work Securities- Concepts and Measures

Work Security	Condition	Data Item
Income Security	Likelihood of pay	Paid; Non-monetary reward; Not paid
	Level of Pay	Weekly pay (dollars)
Work-time Security	Work hours	Hours worked per week
	Work regularity	Regular; Casual/as-needed; One-off
Representation Security	Workplace Participation	‘I have a fair say about things at work’ – SA to SD*
	Task autonomy	‘I can do things my own way in my work’ – SA to SD
	Control over work time	‘I can take a break when I want to’ – SA to SD
		‘I am free to decide when I take days off’ – SA to SD
Skill Reproduction Security	Task instruction	‘The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me’ and I get the training I need to do my job’ – SA to SD
		‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job’ – SA to SD
	Supervision/feedback	‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do’ – SA to SD
		‘I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it’ – SA to SD
	Workplace support	‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work’ – SA to SD
		‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’ – SA to SD
	Skill development	‘The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future’ – SA to SD

Income security is measured through the likelihood of being paid, rewarded or not paid at all, and for those who are paid, the level of remuneration. This information was used to calculate approximate

dismissal, regulation on hiring and firing, employment stability); job security (the opportunity to develop a sense of occupation through enhancing competencies); work security (protection against accidents and illness at work, through safety and health regulations, limits on working time and so on); skill reproduction security (opportunities to gain and retain skills); income security (provision of adequate income); and representation security (protection of collective voice in the labour market through independent trade unions and employers’ organizations).

¹⁰ Use of decent work standards by the ILO is applied explicitly and only by the ILO to those aged 15 years and older. The application of decent work standards to workers aged 16 years and under in this study is inconsistent with the ILO’s official position.

hourly rate of pay. Average pay per week was divided by the mid-point of the approximate hours worked per week for each job, deriving an approximate hourly rate for each job. If the work they had undertaken was one-off they were asked to provide the total amount they were paid and this was divided by the total number of hours worked unless the work occurred for more than a week, as might be the case for one-off holiday jobs. For these jobs, participants were asked to provide an average approximation for hours and pay for one week. Work security is measured through number of hours worked and also work regularity - the degree work is one-off, casual (as-needed) or regular. Representation security is measured by the ability of young workers to have a fair say in their workplace, exercise task autonomy and assert some control over breaks and when they work. Several measures are used to examine skill reproduction security; the level of task instruction and training, levels of ongoing support and measures of skill development.

3.3.4. Relational Embeddedness: Measuring intrinsic orientations and motivations

The assessment of intrinsic orientations provides a sense of how economic action is experienced by children within each economy. As discussed in Chapter Two, work not only involves obtaining extrinsic rewards but also intrinsic orientations, such as obligation, duty or moral obligation. Individuals work on the formal economy, for example, not only for money, but often to contribute to broader social goals and for a sense of self-worth. Work on the informal economy may be for money, but can also assist in developing and consolidating a sense of community. Work within the household may not only be based on shared reciprocity and obligation, but also for personal gain, whether that is through concrete exchanges of money or longer term expectations of returned care. As noted in the previous chapters, therefore, while the same measures of relational embeddedness are used in each chapter, they may take on a different significance because of the specific context in which the work is undertaken and we may expect that the specific economy that the work activity is embedded within will influence the orientations towards work. Instrumental, altruistic and other intrinsic non-instrumental orientations are measured, with specific items taken and modified from the Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS) (Spector, 1997) and the Job Descriptive Index (JDI) (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969). These are summarised in Table 3.2:

Table 3.2: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientations: Concepts and Measures

Orientation	Aspect	Data Item (5-point scale SA – SD)
Instrumental	Income control	'Working means I have control over my own income'
	Income adequacy- self expenses	'Working means I can cover my own expenses'
	Personal use of income	'Working means I can buy what I want'
Altruistic		'Working means I can help at home financially'
Non-instrumental	Responsibility	'Work gives me a sense of responsibility'
	Connectedness	'Work gives me opportunities to build relationships'
	Social Utility	'Working makes me feel I am doing something useful'
	Self-reliance	'Working means I can rely on myself more'
	Enjoyment	'I like the things I do at work'

Three variables are used to measure 'instrumental', 'exchange-use' or 'materialistic' orientations. These are whether working provides control over income, allows the young person to cover their expenses or allows them to buy what they want. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations associated with individual payment and conform to a utilitarian economic perspective that income generates well-being (Frey, 2002). The variable 'Working means I can help out at home financially' is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct from the utilitarian uses of income because it measures contribution to household, rather than personal, income. In this sense it is a measure of altruism because, although a young person may expect specific modes of reciprocity from other household members in return for their work, financial contributions to the household are likely to contribute to generalized modes of reciprocity, with no expectation of immediate benefits from work. Instead work is part of a sequence of exchanges that are ongoing and ambiguous. Five other measures are used to operationalise non-instrumental orientations. These variables include whether work provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections, sense of social utility (which is also a potential measure of altruistic orientations), self-reliance and enjoyment. These five aspects are measures of intrinsic orientations towards work (Frey, 2002).

All these measures are, strictly speaking, measures of rewards that may be epiphenomenal to the concept of an 'orientation'. However, if structural relations partly determine personal dispositions towards work, (as discussed in Chapter Two) then disentangling the benefits of working from the reasons for working, which more closely resemble an orientation towards work, is not how work is experienced. The personal gains from working and the reasons to work are integrated experiences rather than disparate phenomenon that individuals can differentiate at different stages of the labour experience. Frey (2002) also argues in support of a non- linear relationship between rewards and

orientations. Drawing upon diverse sources as game theory and the work of T.H. Marshall, Frey argues that subjective orientations or intrinsic motivations are the subjective counterpart of objective rewards. For example, whether a young person feels their work provides them with a sense of responsibility not only indicates that work affords opportunities to exercise responsibility (the intrinsic orientation obtained from working), but that the inter-subjective basis of the work experience is indicative of a relationship of obligation (what we can call the 'orientation' aspect of the relationship) - that is, it is a structural characteristic of the field expressed through a particular type of expectation played out through the relationship of economic exchange.

3.4. Main Study: Fieldwork Administration

The questionnaire was distributed to students in years 7 to 10 in selected secondary schools, between May and July, 2005. Years 7 to 10 are the years of compulsory secondary schooling in New South Wales. Students are generally aged between 12 and 15 years in these years and at the end of Year 10 students can decide not to continue onto Year 12. The age of 15 years is also the age from which the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the organisation tasked to collect official statistics for Australia, includes persons in the collection of labour force statistics. The combination of there being no formal routine statistical collection of children and young people's employment under the age of 15 years, and that from the end of Year 10 young people are not obliged by law to attend school, were pivotal in the decision to include only children and young people in compulsory secondary school in this study.

The procedure for administering the questionnaire varied according to school preference. Generally the questionnaire was administered with a year group at a time but other methods included schools allowing students to break off into small friendship groups or administering the questionnaire in class groups. At all research sites process notes were used to guide students through the questionnaire. A number of strategies were employed so that the research process and instrument were accessible to students with learning difficulties or physical disabilities. This included the questionnaire being administered by a specialist teacher with students, students completing the questionnaire as a group activity over a prolonged period of time and technical adjustments being made for students with vision and hearing impairments.

Passive consent was required from parents and carers for participation in the study. Information regarding the study was communicated to parents and carers through letters sent home to parents and through short articles about the study included in several newsletters. This information outlined parent/carer's and students ethical rights, including the right not to participate in the study, and encouraged parents-carers to discuss participation with their children. Parents and carers were also encouraged to discuss the study with the school Principal and/or the researcher. Parents and carers could indicate whether they did not want their child to participate in the study. Passive consent was adopted for several reasons. Firstly, this allowed a representative sample to be obtained efficiently. Secondly, in view of the potentially sensitive nature of some of the questions, active consent may have skewed the sample by excluding groups of children of particular interest to the study, such as children performing out-work. A number of measures were used to compensate for this process and minimize the possibility of coercion:

- anonymity and privacy of participants was guaranteed;
- assurance was provided to primary caregivers that participation was voluntary and that non-participation would not negatively prejudice their child or their family;
- schools informed students of the study either in class or in assembly several weeks in advance of the fieldwork;
- an information sheet was provided to all primary caregivers and children explaining in detail all aspects of the research including the right to not participate – this was translated into school community languages;
- information about the study was circulated in school newsletters; and
- the fieldwork was administered by the researcher, not school staff.

Participation in the survey was deemed as consent from students, however under certain conditions. To achieve informed consent from students additional measures were used to ensure students were informed about the study. In the lead up to the study, teachers were provided resource sheets about the study to discuss with students. This included discussion points regarding the purpose of the study, who was undertaking the study, what would be required of students, the content of the survey and their ethical rights. The latter included that the survey responses were entirely anonymous and confidential, that students could choose not to participate and that they could withdraw from participating at any point. In terms of consent processes, this included deciding not to participate and withdrawing from participating in the study even where parents or carers had provided passive consent. A small number of students chose not to participate on the day of the survey even though

their parents or carers had passively consented. Additionally a small number of students, having completed the survey, withdrew their consent at the end of the survey by informing the researcher that they did not want to be included in the study. These questionnaires were destroyed.

Approximately forty students either withdrew on the day of administration or withdrew consent having completed the survey. Information about students' ethical rights and information about the study were again communicated to students, by the researcher, at the time of administration. The process of administration varied considerably depending on the method most convenient for the school. This included whole year groups undertaking the survey assembled in the school hall, the survey being administered in small class groups and students breaking into friendship groups to complete the survey. In three schools the survey was completed as part of a lesson plan about practical economics.

Approximately 90 percent of participants approached to participate in the study did so. No data was collected about those students who chose not to participate.

3.4.1. Sampling method and strategy

A stratified random cluster sample of children and young people in Years 7 to 10 across New South Wales was obtained. The major strata consisted of children and young people in school grades years 7 through 10 and the sampling frame was all co-educational, comprehensive schools in New South Wales. The primary sampling unit was the school¹¹. In addition, four additional sampling criteria were employed in designing the sampling strategy.

- i. *Socio-economic status*: The sample aimed to be representative of socio-economic characteristics of the broader population of New South Wales. Schools were allocated to low, mid-range and high socio-economic bandings and the catchment postcodes of schools, where possible, matched against IRSD quantile bands. (Respondents were also asked to provide the postcode of their residence and this was used to analyse socio-economic status.)

¹¹ The sampling strategy and selection of schools was undertaken with the cooperation and assistance of the Strategic Research Directorate of the NSW Department of Education and Training.

- ii. *Rurality*: The sample aimed to include an appropriate ratio of metropolitan, rural and remote communities. Rurality was allocated according to school district. Schools were then selected in similar proportions on the basis of whether the school was located in Sydney (the capital and most populous city of NSW), other large metropolitan areas, rural/regional coastal areas and rural/regional inland areas. Measures of remoteness (for instance the Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia, ARIA¹²) were of limited use for sampling because the main sampling unit was schools. In many rural areas children and young people from vast geographical regions attend a particular school, making it difficult to code for the rurality of the young person's place of residence.
- iii. *Cultural and linguistic background*: the sample had to include representative proportions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people and children and young people from culturally and linguistically diverse communities. Department of Education and Training data was used to allocate schools according to the proportion of students of Aboriginal and diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds at the school.
- iv. *School sector*: In New South Wales three sectors comprise the primary and secondary education systems, the government, catholic and independent sectors. Each sector represents approximately 70 percent, 20 percent and 10 percent of school students in NSW respectively and schools were selected to reflect this overall proportion of the sample. The representative authorities for each sector, the Department of Education and Training, Catholic Education Commission and Association of Independent Schools agreed for the schools within their ambit of responsibility to participate in the study.

These criteria were used to select schools for sampling. It was estimated that between 200 and 600 children and young people from each school would participate in the study. On the basis of this estimation a short-list of 22 schools were randomly selected according to the sampling criteria giving an approximate sample size of between 4400 and 13200 students. This range of participants would provide a robust number of participants to examine the extent of children and young people's work. Principals were then contacted to seek permission for their school to participate in the study. Only

¹² ARIA calculates remoteness as accessibility to service centres, such as medical facilities and centres of commerce based on road distances. The index ranges from Highly Accessible characterized as relatively unrestricted access to a wide range of goods and services and opportunities for social interaction, to Very Remote characterized as very little accessibility to goods, services and opportunities for social interaction. (Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, 2001).

one school declined to participate in the study and a replacement school was recruited into the study. All students in Years 7 to 10, excluding those not wishing to participate or absent from school on the day the survey was administered, took part in the survey. The final sample included 22 schools and 10,999 participants.¹³

3.4.2. Sample and population characteristics

The comparison between the sample and population characteristics is presented in the tables and figures below.

Table 3.3: Sample and population characteristics: age and gender

Age	Male		Female		Total	
	Popn (%)	Sample (%)	Popn (%)	Sample (%)	Popn (%)	Sample (%)
Twelve	20.2	17.0	20.3	18.7	20.3	17.7
Thirteen	19.8	25.6	19.9	25.2	19.8	25.4
Fourteen	19.7	25.8	19.8	26.1	19.7	25.9
Fifteen	20.2	24.6	20.0	23.9	20.1	24.3
Sixteen	20.2	6.3	20.1	5.2	20.1	5.8
<i>All aged 12-16</i>	51.3	55.7	48.7	44.3		

Source ABS census 2001 NSW Basic community profile

The sample age distribution approximates the overall population distribution with some differences. The sample over-represents young people aged 13-15 years, slightly under represents young people twelve-years of age and significantly under represents participants aged sixteen-years. This is a result of the sampling strategy being designed around year at school rather than age of participant and reflects that a sizeable number of sixteen-year-olds are not in Year 10. While this does not affect the overall research aims, as the sixteen year olds in the sample were in compulsory schooling at the time of the study, caution needs to be used when generalising the results of this study to the population of sixteen year olds in New South Wales. There was also a slight over representation of males in the study. The effect of this is that the percentage difference between males and females in the sample (11.4%) is exaggerated when compared to the percentage difference between males and females in the population (2.6%).

¹³ This figure excludes respondents who were eliminated from the study on criteria of validity. See section 3.4.4: Measures employed to avoid error.


Table 3.4: Sample and population characteristics: cultural and linguistic background

	Population (%) ^a	Sample (%)
ATSI	3.3	3.0
Language other than English	16.8	28.6
Born overseas	10.7	13.7

Source: 2001 census of population and housing ABS
 a Percentage of children, NSW, 10-17 years.

The proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and young people and children and young people born overseas is similar to the proportion of children and young people from these groups in the population. There is an overrepresentation of children and young people who speak a language other than English in the sample compared to the proportion of children and young people who speak a language other than English in the population. This is due to the different operationalisation of ‘main language spoken at home’ between the ABS collection method and the instrument employed in this study, which asked if any language other than English was spoken at home, to capture children and young people who are bi-lingual and speak English and another language relatively equally. This is often the case in multi-generation CALD households.

Figure 3.1: Sample and population characteristics: relative social disadvantage



Source: SEIFA 2001

Socio-economic status was measured using the Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD) (ABS 2001)¹⁴. The respondent postcode was matched with the corresponding IRSD score and then allocated to the equivalent quantile according to the population distribution of scores. Figure 3.1 illustrates that the sample distribution is very similar to the population distribution of scores, with a slight overrepresentation of participants who fall within the 51-75th quantile, a middle-class quantile. This indicates that the socio-economic distribution of the sample is representative of the population.

Taken together the characteristics of the sample are generally representative of the population of children and young people in New South Wales in compulsory secondary school. However certain disparities are evident which need to be taken into account when interpreting the findings, even though the size of the sample assists in accommodating for these discrepancies. In particular the over-representation of children and young people who speak a language other than English and the under-representation of sixteen-year-olds and females represent the greatest disparities between the sample and population characteristics. Specific explanations have already been provided to account for these differences. While being administratively necessary, this sampling strategy reduced the level of researcher control over the characteristics of the sample. Nonetheless with these minor precautions in mind the sample size and characteristics provide external reliability to the results. However most of the analysis involves between group comparisons using regression models, which does not rely on saying something about the sample as a whole and its relation to the broader population. These factors reduce the problems of sample bias.

3.4.3. Pilot study and pre-test

To test the suitability of the research method and instrument a pilot study was undertaken with three co-educational secondary schools. Of particular concern was how children and young people would respond to the instrument, what processes would be required to administer the instrument and how long the instrument would take to complete. The pilot schools were chosen according to school sector, size and rurality. One government, one Catholic and one independent school was involved in the study. Two of the schools were located in metropolitan areas and one in a moderately remote rural area. The characteristics of the three schools are presented in Table 3.5.

¹⁴ See section 3.3.2 for further discussion of the Index of Relative Disadvantage.

Table 3.5: Selected characteristics of pilot schools

School	Participating students	Sector	Rurality
School One	401	Independent	Sydney
School Two	657	Catholic	Moderately remote rural
School Three	881	Government	Sydney
Total	1939		

All students in Years 7 through 10 attending school on the day of the survey participated in the pilot, with the exception of students whose parent/carer indicated they did not wish their child or children to participate. In total 1939 students participated in the pilot study. Observations were made during the fieldwork and notes made of questions asked throughout to determine whether particular questions or aspects of the instrument created difficulties for the participants. In addition focus group discussions were held with approximately 6-8 students from each year group from each school. Participants were asked to comment on the following areas:

- Difficulties encountered in understanding and answering questions.
- The clarity of the instructions provided to complete the questionnaire.
- Whether the purpose of the questionnaire was clear.
- Whether the length of the questionnaire was suitable.
- Whether the questionnaire was presented and composed in a way that was easy to follow.
- Any other modifications required to the questionnaire.

Responses were further analysed to determine content validity and sequence logic of the instrument. As a result of this analysis, observations during the pilot and focus group discussions with respondents, a small number of modifications were made to the questionnaire regarding question wording, inclusion of additional categories for some concepts and amendments to the process for administering the questionnaire.

3.4.4. Measures employed to reduce error

A number of measures were used to identify and eliminate error at the data entry and data management stages.

Data entry: All data entry was verified via a random audit of questionnaires carried out using a second keying method, to identify the existence of any patterns of data entry error.

Data editing: A number of strategies were also used to identify and filter out invalid data:

- Suspect, discordant and outlier values were identified using a combination of scatter plots, histograms and frequency tables. This included identifying high variances in responses on income. Using these validation checks, responses outside the permissible range for closed questions were identified. Extreme income outliers on open questions were removed unless they could be logically explained by the pattern of other responses.
- Where a participant provided a sequence of missing, suspect or discordant values the paper questionnaire was reviewed and a decision made as to whether to remove the case from analysis. Cases were removed where the response lacked critical information or the sequence of suspect and discordant values was such to make the pattern of responses invalid.
- Sequence checks were used to identify illogical sequences of responses to questions. In particular this was used to determine if a participant answered questions on work if they had not worked and on pay and reward if they had not received pay or reward.

Open-ended answers were also reviewed to identify fraudulent responses. An initial screen was undertaken at data-entry to identify responses that were offensive or fraudulent in character. Any responses that were suspected of being fraudulent at data entry were also marked and reviewed. For the entire sample just over one-percent of all responses were removed from analysis after review. In ten schools less than 0.5 percent of responses were removed, including three schools where no responses were removed. In total 150 of 11,149 responses were removed after editing creating a final data set of 10,999 responses. In eight of the twenty-two schools one-percent or more of the responses were removed from final analysis. The highest removal was just over six percent.

3.5. Systems of work among Children: A brief reflection on our sample characteristics

What evidence do we have of different systems of work discussed in Chapter Two, within our study sample? This is elaborated in detail in Chapters Four through Six, however Appendix A outlines the sample characteristics of the study sample overall. The intention of this study is to examine distinct economies, rather than examine the population of child workers in aggregate form. It is also not the purpose of this thesis to examine in any detail the characteristics of children who work compared to those who do not. In large part the purpose of this thesis is to indicate that forms of work manifest in quite differentiated social spaces. However Table A1 in Appendix A indicates the following characteristics of our sample, which provides the context for the analysis in Chapters Four through Six:

- Approximately 55 percent (54.9%, n=6040) of all children and young people undertake some form of work.
- Three distinct economies of work are evident. Just under one-quarter of children and young people (24.4%, n=2686) work within the formal economy (examined in Chapter Four); approximately 13 percent (12.8%, n=1412) of participants work within the informal economy (Chapter Five) and approximately one-fifth (17.7%, n=1951) of children and young people work within the family economy (Chapter 6). The social and demographic characteristics of these groups of workers are assessed in detail in those respective chapters.

When we examine the differences between children and young people who work compared to those who do not work we find:

- An almost linear and positive relationship exists between working and age, with an increase in working from 42.2 percent (n=838) amongst 12 year olds compared to 71.2 percent (n=467) amongst 16 year olds. The proportion of children and young people who do not work declines as children and young people get older.
- Importantly, more children and young people from the most disadvantaged communities do not work. Furthermore, greater proportions of children work in wealthier communities than those who do not.

- Fewer children from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds work (44.6%, n=1547) compared to those of Anglo-Australian background (60.1%, n=4500).
- Similar proportions of females and males work (57.2%, n=2756 and 53.6%, n=3247 respectively) but, reflecting the overall distribution, more children and young people of both genders work than not. In later chapters we find however that significant gender differences exist in the types of work children perform
- Approximately two-thirds of children and young people in rural areas work, while approximately half the children and young people in metropolitan areas work. Again this distribution is assessed in greater detail in later chapters and we find this distribution is also differentiated across different economies.

These findings indicate that child work is a widespread social phenomenon. In developed economies in particular this social category is relatively unacknowledged by the community and is not well reflected in policy or law, kept invisible behind a conception of childhood that sees children as non-productive dependants maintained by the family unit. This social distribution also suggests that vulnerability and necessity are not sufficient explanations for why children work, as more children work in the least disadvantaged communities rather than the most disadvantaged. Children's participation in work may be more similar to the way that adult labour markets also function, where being in a paid job is a significant predictor of social status. This is explored in greater depth in the following chapters. Furthermore, while developmental and age-reductionist analyses of work have been critiqued, age remains an explanatory factor in determining whether children work or not. Starting work is a powerful symbol marking a young person's entry into 'adult life' and social activity. Analytically age remains an important social category.

3.6. Conclusion to Chapter Three

In detailing the methodological design and methods used in this thesis, this chapter has outlined how the questions raised in Chapter One are empirically addressed and the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Two operationalised. Some advantages of the methodology employed is that it sensitive to contextual relations but allows systemic comparison and enumeration of the social distribution and conditions of work. Furthermore it is also designed around a conceptual openness

around what constitutes work, and in so doing takes children's own perspectives on their work seriously, without being overly voluntaristic, thus avoiding the concept of work from becoming indistinct from other activities such as play. The operationalisation of social characteristics, measures of decent work standards and intrinsic motivations form the foundation of the empirical analysis presented in the next three chapters. These chapters empirically delineate children's economies to assess the prevalence and social distribution of children's work across different economies. It is to this we now turn.

Chapter Four: Flexible, Precarious or Both?

Work on the Formal Economy

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines young people's work on the formal labour market. As discussed in Chapter Two, the formal economy is the prevailing system of economic exchange in most nation states and globally prescribed through law and legally constituted institutions. As discussed in Chapter Two, formal labour markets have tended towards fragmentation in terms of work content and job quality (Callus and Lansbury, 2002; Standing 2011; Watson et al., 2003). The fragmented nature of modern labour markets raises important questions for the study of the youth labour market, particularly whether there is a fair distribution of good jobs for different groups of young people and whether the work young people perform is characterised by deep inequalities and fragmented in terms of skill and quality.


The following sections examine specific aspects of this issue. Section Two outlines some of the structural changes to the standard employment relationship in post-industrial economies, and specifies key hypotheses that guide the analysis for this Chapter. Section Three details the sorts of jobs young people do. Using skill level as an indicator of primary and secondary labour markets, Section Three measures the extent of labour market segmentation in the youth labour market and also examines whether there are typically 'young people's' jobs. Section Four examines whether markers of social division, such as class and gender, have any relationship with the prevalence and types of jobs young people perform. Two competing hypotheses, each making particular claims about the relationship between social position and work, are assessed. The first is that endemic insecurities that characterise post-industrial societies determine the distribution of employment and unemployment. The second is that markers of social position remain important explanatory categories – especially whether the likelihood of working in a good job varies by class background. Sections Five and Six examine the relationship between skill and job quality for young workers and the level and social distribution of decent work. Section Six examines young people's attitudes towards work on the formal economy, and the strength of extrinsic, altruistic and intrinsic attitudes towards work. In particular we examine the relationship between skill and attitudes towards work, for instance whether young people in low skill jobs are more likely to express utilitarian attitudes towards work – that is, it is 'just a job', and whether young people in higher skill jobs are more likely to be motivated by the interest they have in their work, or put another way are they less alienated from their work?

4.2. Structural embeddedness: Changes in Industry and the rise of dual labour markets

Labour markets within and across nations have been undergoing a sustained transformation. Of particular significance is the long-term increase in non-manual employment associated with the rise of the service economy. Analysis of industry composition of the Australian economy over the last 100 years shows the decline of agriculture and manufacturing, upon which the Australian economy was highly reliant at the beginning of the 20th century, with a massive rise in the service economy and most recently reliance upon commodities exports. From between 20% to 30% of GDP in the first half of the 20th century, the relative contribution of agriculture to GDP declined fairly consistently to between 4% and 5% of GDP from the 1980s onward (ABS, 2011). Similarly, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP peaked at just under 30% of GDP in the late-1950s and early-1960s, before a long period of decline to approximately 8% of GDP in 2011 (ABS, 2011). The output of other industries has grown more consistently since the early-1960s. Service industries¹⁵ contributed around 30% to GDP from 1900-01 to the early-1960s. Since then, its contribution has steadily increased to over 50% of GDP in 2011 (ABS, 2011)¹⁶. Of specific interest are more recent trends regarding employment by industry, presented in Figure 4.1.

¹⁵ Service industries include wholesale trade; retail trade; accommodation, cafes and restaurants; communication services; finance and insurance; property and business services; education; health and community services; cultural and recreational services; and personal and other services.

¹⁶ Changes in the combined contribution of other industries to GDP since the mid-1980s were chiefly driven by changes in communication services that increased from 2.4% of GDP in 1985-86, increasing to 3.3% in 1997-98 and 1998-99, before falling away slightly to 2.9% in 2002-03. Transport and storage services contributed 6.8% in 1985-86, falling to 5.3% in 2002-03. Electricity, water and gas increased its share from 1.9% in 1949-50 to 3.9% in the late-1980s, before falling to 2.5% of GDP in 2002-03. The value of Australia's mining output in 1900-01 (10% of GDP) was dominated by gold production. By 1930-31 the mining industry contributed only 2% of GDP but began to increase again in the late-1960s as the scale of iron ore and coal production increased. Production of iron ore and coal continued to grow through the 1980s, principally driven by export demand. Mining's contribution to GDP has generally been around 5% since the mid-1980s.

Figure 4.1: Percentage employed persons by Industry Sector, Seasonally adjusted: 1984-2011

Source: ABS (2011) Labour Force Australia, Detailed Cat. No 6291.0.55.003

Using proportion of persons employed by Industry as a measure¹⁷, Figure 5.1 indicates the continued decline of manufacturing and the continued rise of service industries. Together, service industries have increased from employing approximately 57 percent of the labour force in 1984 to approximately 65 percent of the labour force in 2010. This has largely been driven by an increase in human and consumer services. During the last 30 years we also see a dramatic decline in the proportion of people employed in manufacturing workers and also in agriculture. Between 1984 and 2010 the proportion of people employed in manufacturing almost halved (from 16.8 to 8.6 percent), with a similar decline occurring in agriculture (6.2 to 3.0 percent).


Changes in industry composition have had major consequences for the nature of work.

Throughout the twentieth century the standard employment relationship, defined as a stable, socially protected, full-time job, whose basic conditions are regulated by collective agreement or law (Bosch, 2004), was secured through national and international efforts to regulate work (Standing, 1999; Vosko et al., 2009). The standard employment relationship achieved a partial

¹⁷ The proportions cited are calculated from the proportion of the industries included in the analysis, not the total labour force. Excluded from the analysis are transport, postal and warehousing services; professional, scientific and technical services; administrative and support services and other services. To include these in the analysis would underscore the trend away from primary to tertiary sector industries, and with the exception of transport, postal and warehousing services, these industries employ only relatively small proportions of the labour force.

decommodification of labour for workers, encapsulated in full-time, permanent jobs that paid a family wage. In many countries, welfare provision, employment law and collective bargaining provisions centred around and shaped this standard employment relationship (Vosko et al., 2009). In Australia this was most famously proclaimed in the Harvester judgement of 1907 and legislated in various forms of industrial law at the State and Commonwealth levels. However employment relationships have fundamentally altered, partly as a result of structural changes to the economy and industry composition, leading to labour market fragmentation between standard and precarious work and an associated development of dual labour markets (Watson et al. 2003). Figure 4.2 illustrates trends in standard and non-standard forms of employment¹⁸ between 1992 and 2008.

Figure 4.2: Growth in non-standard forms of employment, 1992-2008 (base Index=100)



Source: Rafferty and Yu (2010)

Figure 4.2 illustrates that the growth in non-standard forms of employment has outstripped that of standard full time employment. The greatest growth has been experienced in full time casual and part time employment. While this underpins a level of labour flexibility allowing workers to move between work and non-work commitments, the growth in non-standard forms of work is a significant indicator of risk being borne by employees. Part-time and casual employment are

¹⁸ Part-time work is defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as those working less than 35 hours per week, and casuals are employees on temporary contracts who work on a shift to shift basis who are paid a casual rate with no other entitlements.

strategies used by employers to manage changes in labour demand. The use of part-time and casual employment is most marked during economic downturns, where the rate of part-time employment rises as the labour market adjusts to slower economic growth. For example, the prevalent use of part-time employment was evident in response to the global financial crisis in Australia, with unemployment levels kept in check in part through a reduction in hours worked.

Changes in industry composition and their effects on occupational structures and employment standards have been described as a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial or service economy (Clark, 2010; Edwards and Wajcman 2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; van der Waal and Burgers 2011). Dual labour markets develop as a result of employer strategies that involve dividing the workforce into core and periphery sectors with very different work conditions in order to handle the greater volatility of market conditions (Piore, 1970). These strategies include outsourcing or subcontracting arrangements and/or the use of flexible and individual employment contracts. This is coupled with the threat that capital is increasingly mobile and that firms and national economies must continuously adjust to become internationally competitive (Silver, 2003). The consequence is the labour market being divided into primary and secondary markets (Beck 2000). Jobs in the primary market are characterized by high wages, better working conditions, stability and upward mobility; whereas jobs in the secondary market are considerably more heterogeneous, yet still share certain common characteristics such as low pay, higher turnover rates, less stability, and little or no upward career mobility (Gaillie 2007).

The massive growth of services has been central to the emergence of the secondary labour market, however the breadth and diversity of the service economy means that a patchwork of high and low quality jobs are evident across the service economy. Generic skills involved in information processing and problem solving have come to the fore in high skill service jobs. However many unskilled jobs have been created as part of the growth of the service economy, especially non-routine jobs that are difficult to automate (Tilly 1996; Kalleberg et al. 2000; Lowe & Krahn 2000). This suggests that there is a polarization of skill taking place that Edwards and Wajcman describe as a polarization between 'MacJobs' (good service jobs for core workers that require advanced skills, provide higher wages, better hours and employer benefits, for example professional work) and 'McJobs' (poorer quality service jobs for periphery workers that have

lower skill demands and low wages, hours, prestige, benefits and future prospects, such as fast food preparation, retail and personal services)¹⁹.

The regulatory framework is another critical structure influencing children's employment, especially in the formal labour market. In Australia, the employment of children and young people is subject to general labour laws. Young workers derive entitlements or protection similar to adult workers from a range of industrial instruments that regulate employment. These include:

- industrial awards, workplace agreements and registered individual contracts;
- unfair dismissal laws;
- occupational health and safety laws;
- workers compensation laws; and
- anti-discrimination legislation.

In some instances instruments contain provisions that are of particular relevance to young workers. For example, most awards set 'junior' rates of pay, generally on a graduated scale that increases with age. Certain awards also regulate the age at which children can perform certain types of work.

At the Commonwealth level at the time the research was conducted, employment was regulated by the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Child specific provisions are almost entirely absent from this Act, whose jurisdiction covered employees not covered by a State Award, or those under individual workplace agreements. The few provisions in the Act that relate to child employment include that a parent or guardian must sign an individual workplace agreements for employees under 18, that minimum wage instruments in Awards can set junior pay scales and a provision making arrangements for school based apprenticeships.

Every State and Territory jurisdiction does, however, have more extensive sets of laws dealing with the employment of children. The only provision consistent across States and Territories is a restriction on employing school-age children during school hours. However this provision varies between states and territories.

In New South Wales, the jurisdiction in which the study was undertaken, child employment is regulated by the Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006, Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 and the Children and Young Persons (Care and

¹⁹ Some theorists, such as Beck and Giddens, argue that these shifts in employment structures are a key feature of late modernity, reflecting an individualisation of risk, creating new insecurities and inequalities to the extent that we are experiencing the transition from a class society to a risk society.

Protection Child Employment) Regulations 2005. These provisions are not systematic or comprehensive. The Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006 provides only very generic guidelines for the regulation of child employment generally. The Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 and the 2005 Regulations provide more specific regulations for a narrow range of jobs. This means that legal regulation of the majority of children's employment, fall within the provisions of general industrial instruments, [i.e. Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006]. This is with the exception of a few occupations, described below.

The Industrial Relations (Child Employment) Act 2006, applies where a child (defined in s 3(1) to mean anyone under the age of 18) is engaged to perform work under a relationship that would be regarded as one of employment under the terms of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). The key provision is Section 4 of Part 2 of the Act that specifies that children's conditions of employment are in accordance with any New South Wales award or industrial laws that are applicable to that work. In so doing the Act confirms the application of provisions within industrial instruments to children.

Chapter 13 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 provides a general statutory provision for the protection of children who are employed (s222). The Regulations require a person to hold an employer's authority for employees aged 15 years of age or under in the entertainment industry, exhibitions, still photography or door to door sales. The authority requires employers to meet a code of practice covering matters such as record keeping, hours of work, breaks, occupational health and safety coverage, payment of award rates and notification of parents in the case of injury or illness. This system is monitored by the Children's Guardian.

What are the implications of these structural changes for young people? Attempts to explore these relationships have produced an overly deterministic argument, in which young people's jobs are held to be unchanged for nearly one hundred years. These accounts emphasise how profound socio-economic changes during the 19th and 20th centuries have marginalised children from a central role in production, through a combination of technological change, compulsory education and the maturing of a liberal capitalist welfare regime (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999). Taken together, these developments are viewed as culminating in a particular pattern of young people's employment, that young people work in a limited range of jobs and primarily do so to support high levels of personal consumption. This narrative also suggests a profound shift in the

social role of childhood (and self-identification of children), from economically productive workers to students and consumers. While dual labour market theory pertains to economic structure more generally, the emphasis on labour market segmentation associated with skill at the core of dual labour market theory provides a useful framework for analysing young people's work. There may be considerable variety in the quality of jobs young people perform, beyond whether work is good or bad for child development, or a presumption that all young people's work is of poor quality. Furthermore if such variety exists, which young people get the good jobs and which young people jobs of poor quality?

The application of dual labour market theory to young people's work opens up several lines of enquiry. The first is whether labour market segmentation in young people's work exists. Is there some distribution in the quality of jobs according to skill, or are young people overwhelmingly concentrated in elementary skill jobs? If young people are largely in the secondary labour market, this would support an 'alternative role thesis', which suggests that young people tend to be found in the secondary labour market because an alternative role outside the labour market is available to them, that is as students. This is examined in Section Three, which examines the categories of young people's work in the formal economy.

Secondly whether the gains from growth in the knowledge economy are equitably shared across society is open to question. Is there a direct correlation between class position and skill level of work and are age and gender, also relevant? Two competing hypotheses will be assessed, the first suggesting that we have entered a 'post-class society', and in consequence that good and bad work is relatively evenly distributed across socio-economic strata. The second is that markers of social position remain important explanatory categories. These issues are examined in Section Four, which assesses the social distribution of categories of work identified in Section Three.

Thirdly, if a social distribution of skill is evident, do young people working in jobs with different skill levels also experience different working conditions, as dual labour market theory suggests? While the post-industrial society argument fits well with aggregate skill trends, it provides less satisfactory account of other aspects of work experience. The assumption that skill trends condition other aspects of work quality has not been entirely correct (Gaillie 2007). Assuming that young people will be concentrated in elementary skill jobs, to what extent do conditions vary within the secondary labour market for young people? Therefore we examine how skill levels in work map onto other measures of job quality in the youth labour market in Section Five, operationalising certain decent work standards to do this. These arguments are extended to

examine the association between skill, social position and orientations towards in Section Six. In particular if working is an alternative role to support central roles of being a student and dependant, we would expect that consumption motives are particularly evident for young workers.

4.3. Classifying young people's work on the Formal Economy

The previous section explored how changes in industry composition over the last 100 years have given rise to a dual labour market segmented into distinct sectors of good and bad jobs, between a primary sector of relatively skilled, highly paid and secure jobs, and a secondary sector of low-skill poorly paid, insecure and dead end jobs. It is perhaps unsurprising then that many theories of job quality have skill level as central. For Marxist scholars' the skill content of work is itself a major determinant of employee experience of, and capacity for, self-realisation through work²⁰. Research within a human resource management framework empirically identifies skill utilisation as a strong predictor of job satisfaction. Regardless of which theory, the exercise of skill is not only to how work is experienced, but also serves as a proxy for the structural location of occupations within the broader economy. Skill level of the work undertaken by young people was identified through coding job and task description using the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO). Associate professionals and advanced clerical and service workers were categorised together as high skill workers. Tradespersons, intermediate clerical and service workers and intermediate production and transport workers were categorised together as intermediate skill workers. Elementary clerical, sales and service workers and labourers and related workers were categorised together as elementary skill workers. Data for the adult labour force were taken from the 2006 Census of Population and Housing. These results are presented in Table 4.1.

²⁰ For both Marx and Weber the extent workers can influence their work duties, requirements and organization is central to experiences of alienation or instrumentally rationalised social relations. Braverman's *Labour and Monopoly Capital* was influential in this respect, applying a Marxist theory of alienation to job quality. Human self-realisation is reliant upon the capacity to both design and produce work, processes that are separated under capitalist economic systems, and modern forms of managerial practices that control labour processes more specifically. Psychological studies came to similar conclusions in a depoliticized sense. Job satisfaction and effective performance followed from the intrinsic qualities of the job, emphasizing both discretion and variety. Worker satisfaction could be enhanced by jobs that had a combination of responsibility and autonomy (Davis 1966). Influential in this respect was the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. Blauner (1964) argued that an alternative strategy of responsible autonomy responds to the contradictions of extreme direct control. This entailed giving workers leeway and coopting them to work in the interests of the firm, but in so doing satisfy their need for doing interesting and creative work.

Table 4.1: Occupation type by skill level – formal labour market.

Skill Level ASCO 1 digit	ASCO 6 digit modified	Study Sample		Adult Labour Force ^{a,b}			
		n	%	n	%		
High Skill	Professionals	Other work	30	1.1	591,466	20.7	
		Entertainment and Performance	24	0.9			
		<i>Sub-total</i>	54	2.0			
		Associate Professionals	Sports related work	6	0.2	345,197	12.1
			Other service work	2	0.1		
			<i>Sub-total</i>	8	0.3		
		Adv. clerical and service workers	Administrative & clerical work	5	0.2	100,084	3.5
			<i>Sub-total</i>	5	0.2		
		Managers and Administrators		0	0.0	274,184	9.6
			<i>Sub-total High skill level</i>	67	2.5	1,310,931	45.9
Intermediate Skill	Tradespersons and related workers	Labour, construction & labour trades	35	1.3	333,023	11.7	
		Food preparation	15	0.6			
		Non-labour trades	19	0.7			
		Agricultural & horticultural work	4	0.2			
		Entertainment & performance	1	0.0			
		<i>Sub-total</i>	74	2.8			
	Intermediate clerical and service work	Teaching & tutoring	51	1.9	492,653	17.3	
		Agricultural & horticultural work	28	1.1			
		Administrative & clerical work	26	1.0			
		Other food service	25	0.9			
		Care work	20	0.7			
		Other service work	15	0.6			
		<i>Sub-total</i>	165	6.2			
	Production and Transport workers		0	0.0	225,881	7.9	
		<i>Sub-total Intermediate skill level</i>	239	9.0	1,051,557	36.8	
Elementary Skill	Elementary clerical, sales and service	Sales work	1242	46.7	269,942	9.5	
		Delivery work	378	14.2			
		Other service work	162	6.1			
		Administrative & clerical work	37	1.4			
		Entertainment & performance	3	0.1			
		<i>Sub-total</i>	1822	68.5			
	Labourers and related workers	Food preparation	219	8.2	221,530	7.8	
		Agricultural & horticultural work	108	4.1			
		Labour, construction & labour trades	104	3.9			
		Cleaning work	101	3.8			
			<i>Sub-total</i>	532			20.0
		<i>Sub-total Elementary skill level</i>	2354	88.5	491,472	17.2	
		TOTAL	2660	100.0	2853,960^c	100	

a) Source: ABS (2011) 2006 Census of Population and Housing Tables Cat. No. 2068.0. Figures for NSW.

b) Data presented only at ASCO 1-digit level

c) Excludes responses inadequately described and not stated

Most young people employed in the formal economy (almost 90 percent) are concentrated in elementary skill work, with a minority undertaking more highly skilled jobs. Hence while there is evidence of labour market segmentation, most young people are employed in jobs at the lower end of the labour market. Reflecting broader shifts in the economy, most elementary skill work, and most work on the formal labour market is in the service economy. Approximately 70 percent of all young people in the formal labour market are employed in elementary clerical, sales and service work, with just under half of all young workers working in sales work, across a variety of service areas. The quintessential ‘children’s job’, delivery work, also comprises a large minority of jobs (n=378 14.2%), but is a much smaller category than other forms of retail service

work, which according to these results are more typical young people's jobs. Labourers and related workers also form a sizeable elementary skill occupation category (20%). Food preparation (such as fast food cooks and kitchen hands) is the single largest job-type within this category (n=219; 8.2%). Other jobs include agricultural and horticultural workers (n=108; 4.1%) such as general farm hands, fruit, vegetable and nut farm hands, stable hands and nursery assistants; and labourers (n=104; 3.9%), such as construction assistants, mechanics assistants, hand packers, plumbers assistants; and commercial cleaners (n=101; 3.8%). Some typical descriptions provided by participants doing this kind of work include:

'I work at a newsagency – retail cashier' (Female, 14 years)

'Working in Macdonalds cleaning dining hall and service' (Female, 16 years)

'I make the burgers, nuggets, chips, clean, sweep, mop and get ice' (Male, 15 years)

'Video shop attendant' (Male, 16 years)

'Work in a factory and build draws' (Male, 14 years)

Work involving more advanced skills form relatively small percentages of the work young people perform. Approximately nine percent of jobs involve intermediate levels of skill. The majority of these are in intermediate clerical and service work (n=165; 6.2%). A broad range of jobs are represented in this group, including teachers aides, animal attendants, administrative and clerical workers such as receptionists, library assistants and data entry operators. Intermediate food service positions include waiters and bar attendants. Care work is also represented in this classification level and includes a small number of young people who work as carers in child care centres and aged care facilities. The other occupation category represented in the intermediate skill category is a relatively small number of tradespersons. These include young people working as painter-decorators, cabinetmakers, panel beaters, and sign writers. Many, but not all, of these young people are involved in traineeships or apprenticeships. The handful of intermediate skill food preparation workers also includes apprentice chefs, butchers and bakers. Young people involved in non-labour trades, that is those trades that do not involve construction and manufacturing, include hairdressers, dressmakers, jewellers, florists, and performing arts support workers. Across the intermediate skill category classification we can observe that while only a small number of these young people have obtained or are working towards formal qualifications (technically possible through school-based traineeships and in evidence for our apprentices), most of these jobs are differentiated from elementary skill jobs in that they involve the application of a developed skill set, such as certain forms of vocational or technical knowledge. Some typical descriptions of this work include:

'Finishing tops of tables for fine arts and antiques' (Male, 16 years)
 'Educating horses for people' (Female, 13years)
 'Digital photographer/ enhancing photos' (Female, 16 years)
 'Wildlife park assistant' (Female, 16 years)
 Receptionist at a sports shop (Female, 15 years)
 Waitressing and kitchen hand at a local restaurant (Female, 14 years)
 Part host at a bowling alley (Male, 15 years)
 I work at a tutoring centre for school students (Male, 16 years)

Only 2.5 percent of young people in the formal economy work in jobs that could be considered as involving the application of high skill levels. Here we find a miscellany of specialist jobs. Significant proportions these young people work as professional actors, musicians, dancers and performers, computer technicians and programmers, but there is also a small numbers of photographers, professional sportspeople and umpires and desktop publishers. Much of this work has the characteristic of a vocation or a form of skilled hobby, in some ways similar to Florida's class of 'creative workers' (2002), involving the manipulation of and trade in symbols, ideas and other modes of complex communication. Some typical descriptions of this work include:

'Modelling' (Female, 16 years)
 'Singing and acting in chorus of Opera Australia' (Male, 16 years)
 'Architectural work, mostly using Autocad – smart architect' (Male, 16 years)
 'Website designer, I make websites and programs. Includes setting up a website for an accounting form and maintaining the site' (Male, 15 years)
 'Physio assistant' (Female, 14 years)
 'Youth consultant at Royal North Shore Hospital' (Female, 15 years)

In contrast, the distribution of work in the adult labour force is more evenly distributed across skill levels. While less than three percent of young people work in high skill jobs, just under half of adults (45.9 percent) are in high skill jobs While less than 10 percent of young people work in intermediate skill jobs, just over one-third (36.8 percent) of adults are in jobs involving intermediate skill levels. The contrast is especially evident for elementary skill jobs, with less than one-fifth of adults (17.2 percent) working in these jobs compared to approximately 90 percent of young people. This illustrates that young people, largely because of their alternative role as students, occupy jobs at the lower end of the labour market, which are a product of labour market segmentation, while adults, not surprisingly, are more evenly distributed across the skills spectrum of occupations. However while there are work categories that we found no evidence of young people working in (Managers and Intermediate Production and Transport workers), what is also apparent is that young people are engaged in jobs that adults also perform. Much has been made of the diversity of young people's work, largely as an argument to counter stereotypes of there being typical children's jobs. These results suggest that the reality of young people's work falls somewhere between these two extremes. Authors who have sought to give

recognition to the diversity of children's work are correct in pointing out that young people can be found performing a variety of jobs, some of which involve high levels of skill. Furthermore, the majority work in jobs not traditionally associated with children's work, namely baby-sitting and delivery work. However occupational differences between young people and adults highlight the overrepresentation of young people in elementary skill jobs compared to intermediate and advanced skill occupations. It is this skill distribution, and the tertiarisation of work, rather than the concentration of young people in specific jobs, which lies behind the distribution of work for young people.

4.4. The Social Distribution of Work within the Formal Economy

The previous section has shown that young people are concentrated in low skill jobs. However we also found that there are a small number of high and intermediate skill jobs undertaken by young people. Within the adult labour market debates have flourished as to whether and why certain social groups are disproportionately represented in secondary labour markets. In the previous section we saw a more even dispersion of adults across the labour market; however young people, by virtue of their age, are concentrated in low-end elementary skill jobs. Offe and Hinrichs (1985) offer the 'alternative role thesis' that can help explain this age based distribution of work. They suggest that migrants, youth, women and older people tend to be found in the secondary labour market because an alternative role of subsistence outside the labour market is supposed to be available to these groups. Because of the drive for continued accumulation and control of the labour market, employers will seek to balkanise the labour market, creating stratified clusters of jobs separated from each other. Such segmentation of jobs according to cultural background, age and sex are a means of increasing productivity by employing different types of workers at lower rates. For young people, the provision of low-end jobs are justified by employers and potentially accepted by young people because of their alternative roles as dependants within the family and as students, and contribute to their low level of identification with the job.

While this explains the overall position of young people in the labour market, it does not explain social differentiation within the labour market among groups of young workers, for instance by class, gender, age or cultural background. Therefore there are two issues, the first regarding the general occupational position of young workers (as we have seen, in elementary skill jobs), and the second, internal segmentation of occupations amongst young people. In relation to this second issue, Beck (2000) is informative in identifying hypotheses that can guide analysis. Beck has argued that we have entered a 'post-class society'. Most people, including the relatively

prosperous middle class, experience 'endemic insecurity'. If this is so, then we would expect that good and bad work is differentiated not by class background, but by other social characteristics, such as gender and cultural background, or that good and bad work is relatively evenly distributed across socio-economic strata. Another possibility is that the polarization of work reflects class differences and we would also expect to observe class-related inequalities among young workers. In this case rather than job disparity being a cause of social class position, we would anticipate that social class determines which young people get what jobs. This hypothesis would therefore anticipate class based labour market segmentation within the youth labour market both in terms of overall participation in the formal labour market and the quality of jobs available to young people from different class backgrounds.

Two analytical strategies are used to examine these hypotheses. The first examines the likelihood of working on the formal economy overall, compared to working in either the family or informal economy (examined in Chapters Six and Seven). To do this, a dummy variable was created (Formal economy = 1; Other economies = 0). The second analytic strategy examines the likelihood of undertaking high, intermediate and elementary skill work, by a range of social and demographic characteristics. To compare and contrast each category of work, three dummy variables were created, each coding a respective category as 1, and all other formal work as 0 (e.g. High skill work= 1, Other work =0 as one variable, Intermediate skill work=1, Other work=0 as another variable and so on). Each dummy variable was then treated as a dependent variable in logistic regression models with socio-economic background²¹, age, sex, cultural background and rurality included as independent factors for analysis²². The parameter estimates and model summary statistics for the likelihood of working in the formal economy are presented in Table 4.2.

²¹ Measured using the Index of Relative Social disadvantage. See section 3.3.2: Measuring the Social distribution of work, in Chapter Three, for details of this measure.

²² This method clearly delineates interrelationships that may be difficult to discern when using one category as a reference category in multinomial logistic models. For example, if associative work is used as a reference category, the odds between the other types of work and associative work are clear, but not between the non-reference categories.

Table 4.2: Likelihood of working on the formal economy and skill category by socio-demographic characteristics

		Model I Formal Economy ^a	Model II High Skill	Model III Interm. Skill	Model IV Elementary Skill
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	1.06 (0.14)	1.36 (0.78)	0.78 (0.33)	1.16 (0.31)
	26-50th quantile	1.24 (0.13)	2.30 (0.72)	0.84 (0.32)	0.97 (0.30)
	51-75 th quantile	1.22 (0.13)	2.20 (0.68)	0.71 (0.30)	1.12 (0.27)
	76-90th quantile	1.03 (0.14)	4.58 (0.64)*	1.23 (0.29)	0.59 (0.26)*
	91-100th quantile (least disadvantaged) 0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref	1.26 (0.14)	2.09 (0.69)	1.03 (0.31)	0.86 (0.29)
Age (years)		2.02 (0.03)***	0.84 (0.11)	1.05 (0.07)	1.01 (0.06)
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.73 (0.08)***	1.15 (0.31)	1.35 (0.18)	0.77 (0.16)
	Anglo-Australian=ref				
Rurality	Metropolitan	0.73 (0.10)**	0.44 (0.48)	1.23 (0.23)	1.03 (0.21)
	Rural coastal	0.66 (0.11)***	1.24 (0.47)	0.82 (0.30)	1.09 (0.25)
	Rural inland	0.50 (0.10)***	0.31 (0.66)	1.65 (0.25)*	0.80 (0.23)
	Sydney=ref				
Gender	Female	0.67 (0.06)***	0.70 (0.28)	1.51 (0.14)**	0.78 (0.13)*
	Male=ref				
	Constant	(0.42)***		(1.11)**	(0.97)***

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

^a The reference category is: working in other economies.

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Cultural background, gender, age and rurality have a significant relationship with the likelihood that a young person will work in the formal economy as opposed to other economies. Notably there is no significant class difference in whether young people work in the formal economy as opposed to other economies. The relationship between age and work is quite strong, with older young people more likely to participate in formal work than younger children. The likelihood of working in the formal economy more than doubles for a one unit increase in age. Although not shown in Table 4.2, when age is modelled as a categorical variable, using 12 year olds as the reference category, there is no significant difference between 12 and 13 year olds, but 14 year olds are 1.99 times as likely, 15 year olds, 6.38 times as likely and 16 year olds 9.16 times as likely to work in the formal economy as opposed to other economies. Rural location, cultural background and gender also have a differentiating effect. The likelihood of working in the formal economy is highest in city and other metropolitan areas, indicating both more formal labour market opportunities in urbanised areas and potentially more work in other economies, such as family based agricultural work, in non-urban areas (possibilities explored in Chapters Five and Six). Young people in rural inland areas are approximately half as likely as young people in the city to work in the formal economy, and children in rural coastal areas 0.66 times as likely. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are 0.78 times as likely as Anglo-

Australian young people to work in the formal economy. Females are also significantly less likely to work in the formal economy (0.67) compared to males.

There are some patterns of social distribution of skilled jobs also evident. For the majority of jobs performed by young people, that is elementary skill jobs, gender and socio-economic status have overall predictive effects in explaining who undertakes elementary skill jobs. Young people from upper middle-class backgrounds (i.e. young people from the second most advantaged neighbourhoods) are 0.59 times as likely to undertake elementary skill jobs, as young people from the poorest areas. Compared to all other areas, where between 88.1 percent and 90.5 percent of workers are in elementary skill jobs, 82.9% of young workers from upper middle-class areas work in elementary skill jobs. Young people from upper middle class neighbourhoods are also more than 4.5 times as likely as young people from the poorest neighbourhoods to work in high skill jobs. Females are slightly less likely (0.8 times) than males to work in elementary skill jobs. Females are 1.5 times as likely as males to undertake intermediate-skill work. This reflects the gendered nature of jobs in this skill tier, particularly administrative, clerical and care work positions. Young people from rural-inland areas are 1.7 times as likely as young workers from Sydney to undertake intermediate skill level work also. Apart from these differences, the parameter estimates are largely similar and non-significant.

In general the relatively undifferentiated distribution of elementary and intermediate skill jobs suggests the dominance of these jobs as a feature of the youth labour market, regardless of social position. Young people in general have access only to low-end jobs as their entrée into the formal labour market. These results also indicate that involvement in the formal economy is considerably more likely to be a 'teenage' experience, with the youngest participants in this study being less likely to work in the formal economy than older teenagers. The findings relating to geographical location suggest opportunities for young people to work are associated with regional differences in economic development, rather than a straightforward link between the relative poverty of an area and work opportunities. Formal economic development and opportunities to work have historically grown out of cities (Tönnies 1957), and economic development between city, regional and rural areas is uneven. Economic opportunities in large cities are sufficiently developed to provide work for young people across the class spectrum. Social exclusion reflected in forms of youth joblessness, clustered around pockets of inner city or urban poverty, such as is evident in some major cities in the United States, the United Kingdom

and France, are therefore not evident here. The more important differentiation is regional, between young people living in cities and those living in rural areas.

There are also some important divergences within the formal economy indicating class based labour market segmentation, especially involving high skill jobs, which are far more likely to be undertaken by young people from upper-middle class backgrounds. The small number of high skill jobs evident and the broad distribution of elementary skill jobs suggest there are limits to the degree that formal labour market segmentation is tightly associated with social class, in part because there are a limited number of young people in high and intermediate skill jobs. These findings tell us little, however, about the relative importance of work for young people from different social backgrounds. The pressure to look for alternative sources of revenue has become a more pervasive experience for young people, not just something confined to the very poor (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999). Most young people in elementary skill jobs are unlikely to be working in these jobs to pursue a hobby, or out of interest, which appears to characterise young people's involvement in high skill jobs. For young people from upper middle class backgrounds, it may be precisely those creative aspects they are able to pursue through their work, because relative to elementary skill work, high-skill jobs involve some degree of autonomy and are the types of jobs that can be undertaken for leisure.

4.5. Young people's Work Conditions in the Formal Economy

Assessments of young people's work conditions are normally drawn from more general sector based analyses of the adult labour market. In these studies, the model of the full-time career worker, and of the standard employment contract, is central to assessments of whether children's work is decent or not (Cunnie et al 2009, Frederiksen 1999, Green 1990, Hobbs and McKechnie 2007, White and Wyn 2004). Compared to this standard young people's position in the secondary labour market means they are likely to occupy jobs that are likely to be poorly paid, insecure and with few prospects for career progression. This section examines provides a detailed analysis of work conditions. Two hypotheses guide the analysis. The alternative role hypothesis holds that young people hold marginal jobs characterised by insecurity, low pay and lack of discretion. However, within the Australian context, employment law is supposed to guarantee certain employment standards, including award based minimum youth wages and some protections from unfair dismissal. Therefore legal institutions combined with young people's general status in the labour market would mean that fewer differences in work conditions should be evident. Alternatively labour market segmentation may be apparent on two

fronts. Differences in work conditions may be associated with skill level. As dual labour market theory suggests, skill level should be associated with differences in conditions. We consider whether a similar relationship between skill and work conditions is evident in the youth labour market. Further, building on the post-class hypothesis introduced in section four, this section examines whether work quality is fragmented by social position and whether labour market segmentation reflects underlying social fragmentation between different groups of young people.

Work conditions are operationalised using the ILO (2002) typology of decent work. The concepts and measures are presented in Section 3.3.3 in Chapter Three. In summary we examine work security through number of hours worked and work regularity - the degree work is one-off, casual (as-needed) or regular. We examine income security through measuring the likelihood of being paid, rewarded or not paid at all, and for those who are paid, pay rates. Representation security is examined by the ability of young workers to have a fair say in their workplace, exercise task autonomy and assert some control over breaks and when they work. Several measures are used to examine skill reproduction security; the level of task instruction and training, levels of ongoing support and measures of skill development.

Table 4.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions in the formal economy. It indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of structural transformations in the formal economy inform our hypotheses around work conditions, and how the work security measures map to these hypotheses. These conditions are assessed in the next sections.

Table 4.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the formal economy

Concept		Hypothesis	
<p>Fragmentation of standard employment contract.</p> <p>Development of primary and secondary labour markets and service economy lead to skills polarization in labour market</p> <p>Gains from growth in the knowledge economy have paradoxically also involved skills polarization, correlated with 'winners' and 'losers' in the labour market according class and other social position characteristics, such as age and gender.</p>		<p>Labour market segmentation in young people's work exists according to skill level. Alternative role hypothesis: young people work in the secondary labour market because an alternative role of subsistence outside the labour market is available to them.</p> <p>'Post-class society' hypothesis good and bad work is relatively evenly distributed across socio-economic strata (Alternatively markers of social position, remain important explanatory categories).</p>	
Decent Work Security			
<p><i>Work security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of hours worked; • work regularity <p>Skill level associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. High skill jobs associated with more regular work.</p> <p>Young people from more advantaged backgrounds more likely to have regular work.</p>	<p><i>Income security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • likelihood of being paid; • level of remuneration <p>Skill level associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. High skill jobs associated with higher pay.</p> <p>Young people from more advantaged backgrounds more likely to be paid and paid more.</p>	<p><i>Representation security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fair say at workplace; • task autonomy; • control over breaks; • control over when worked <p>Skill level associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. High skill jobs associated with greater control and autonomy.</p> <p>Young people from more advantaged backgrounds more likely to have greater control and autonomy.</p>	<p><i>Skill reproduction security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • task instruction; • training; • workplace support; • skill development <p>Skill level associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. High skill jobs associated with increased supervision and training.</p> <p>Young people from more advantaged backgrounds more likely to have better supervision and training</p>

4.5.1. Work Security in the Formal Economy

A wide range of research has shown that job security is a major aspect of decent work (Gaillie, 2007; Green, 2006). The use of non-standard contracts is a way employers can enhance 'labour flexibility' and reduce costs by shifting the risks of economic volatility onto employees. By making greater use of employees on a variety of non-standard contracts, employers seek to increase their own competitive advantage by being able to reduce their labour force in response to changes in market conditions. The use of precarious labour contracts has had an especially marked effect on the 'young adult' labour market, generally considered to be employees aged between 15 and 24 years of age (Presser 1998). Several studies have indicated that young workers are engaged on flexible labour contracts where employers adjust not only the amount of hours individuals work in accordance to cyclical or seasonal demands, but when labour is required

(Mills 2004, Regini 2000, White and Wyn 2004). While this temporal flexibility may allow young people to accommodate work with other non-work commitments, it is just as likely that temporal labour flexibility makes it difficult for young people to plan regular commitments. Whether this is the case for younger workers, is less well established.

Two variables are used to measure 'work security' - the number of hours worked per week and the regularity of work (whether the work was one-off, casual 'as-needed' or regular – involving set times). Some young people may be employed as permanent part-time employees, others as casuals with set shifts. For others, work times may be unpredictable, with no set times or shifts. This sort of irregularity may share some characteristics with sporadic work on the informal economy, in that aspects of the work evade normal regulation. To examine whether socio-demographic characteristics function as latent explanatory variables for work security, a logistic regression model was run for the likelihood of working long hours (relative to low hours) and a multinomial logistic regression model run to determine the likelihood of working casual or regular compared to one-off work. These models are presented in table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Hours worked (two category) and Regularity by skill category and demographic characteristics

		Work 11 hours + ^a	Casual ^b	Regular ^b
Skill level	High	1.53 (0.30)	0.26*** (0.35)	0.14*** (0.33)
	Intermediate	1.03 (0.17)	0.36*** (0.22)	0.27*** (0.20)
	Elementary = ref.			
Age	Twelve	0.14*** (0.30)	0.89 (0.33)	0.68 (0.31)
	Thirteen	0.24*** (0.20)	1.28 (0.30)	1.18 (0.28)
	Fourteen	0.41*** (0.16)	1.21 (0.26)	1.13 (0.25)
	Fifteen	0.86 (0.14)	1.18 (0.24)	1.58* (0.23)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.83 (0.21)	1.12 (0.33)	1.72 (0.32)
	26-50th quantile	0.98 (0.21)	1.25 (0.34)	2.06* (0.33)
	51-75th quantile	0.99 (0.19)	1.33 (0.31)	2.31** (0.29)
	76-90th quantile	0.52** (0.20)	0.76 (0.30)	1.79* (0.28)
	91-100th quantile	0.48** (0.22)	0.80 (0.31)	1.48 (0.29)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	1.17 (0.12)	0.74 (0.19)	0.51*** (0.18)
	Anglo-Australian=ref			
Gender	Female	0.96 (0.10)	0.97 (0.17)	1.29 (0.16)
	Male=ref.			
Rurality	Metropolitan	0.76 (0.16)	1.00 (0.27)	0.85 (0.25)
	Rural coastal	0.60** (0.18)	1.64 (0.34)	1.34 (0.32)
	Rrural inland	0.86 (0.17)	1.47 (0.32)	1.20 (0.31)
	Sydney=ref			
Intercept		(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.32)

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000; a) Reference category is: 1-10 hrs; b) Reference category is: one-off.

The casual and part-time nature of the work available and required by students is reflected in work regularity and work hours. Just under two-thirds (61.3%, n=1586) of young workers on the formal labour market work regular shifts, with a sizeable minority working casual/as-needed (29.4%, n=761). Most jobs do not involve long work hours. Just over 70 percent of jobs involve less than 10 hours per week (70.7%, n=1798), with 36.4 percent (n=926) involving work hours of 5 hours or less per week. Of these jobs, most are regular jobs, with just under two-thirds of 0-5 hour (59.2%, n=536) and 6-10 hour a week jobs (61.7%, n=526) involving regular shifts and just under one-third being undertaken as-needed (0-5 hours: 29.8%, n=270; 6-10 hours: 30.4%, n=259). Regular work is therefore the modal work arrangement for young workers, regardless of the number of hours they work per week, which suggests that work schedules may reflect employer demands but young people are limiting their work hours in accordance with their non-work priorities.

Young workers from middle class neighbourhoods are twice as likely as young workers from the poorest neighbourhoods to work regularly. Furthermore young workers from the most advantaged neighbourhoods are significantly less likely to work longer hours, being approximately half as likely as young people from the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods to work more than ten (as compared to less than 10) hours per week. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are approximately half as likely to work regularly as compared to Anglo-Australian young workers, but there is no observed difference in terms of work time. Gender has no effect on either indicator of work security. Age has a significant impact on work time, with the likelihood of working more than 10 hours increasing by 1.65 times for each one-year increase in age. When treated as a categorical variable, no significant difference is found between 15 and 16 year olds, but 16 year olds are 7 times more likely than 12 year olds, 4 times more likely than 13 year olds and 2.3 times more likely than 14 year olds to work longer hours.

Within the adult labour market employers are reluctant to casually hire and fire employees with higher-level skills because of the costs of developing advanced and often firm specific skill sets (Gaillie, 2007). As the peripheral work force was designed to bear the brunt of adjustment, the labour force is segmented into a protected core of skilled workers complemented by a vulnerable periphery of the lower skilled. However within the youth labour market we see different underlying structures evident. Both high and intermediate skill jobs are less likely to involve regular work compared to elementary skill jobs, being approximately one-fifth and one-third as likely to involve regular shifts as elementary skill jobs. Elementary skill jobs are highly regulated, the modal category involving regular shift work comprising less than 10 hours per week (85.2%, n=1857 of elementary skill jobs). A similar pattern is evident for intermediate skill workers, however these arrangements are not as encompassing as they are for elementary skill workers - these work-time arrangements comprising 57.5% (n=126) of intermediate skill jobs. For high skill jobs, the proportion involving precarious work-time arrangements, relative to elementary and intermediate skill jobs is much larger. Like elementary and intermediate skill jobs, the modal category is regular shift work comprising less than 10 hours per week. However just over 40 percent of high-skill jobs are one-off or casual/as-needed jobs (43.6%, n=27). These results suggest that as skill levels increase, the formality of work arrangements decreases.

4.5.2. *Income security: Likelihood and level of remuneration*

The likelihood of whether young workers are paid or rewarded by skill level and socio-demographic characteristics is presented in Table 4.5. Model I indicates the likelihood of being paid and rewarded by socio-demographic characteristics, whereas Model II introduces skill level

to determine the independent effects skill level may have on the likelihood of being paid or rewarded.

Table 4.5: Likelihood of pay by skill level and Socio-demographic characteristics – Formal Economy

		Monetary		Reward Only	
		Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II
Skill level	High		0.64 (0.62)		2.84 (0.70)
	Intermediate		0.15*** (0.23)		0.63 (0.31)
	Elementary = ref.				
Age (years)		0.70*** (0.10)	0.74** (0.10)	0.57*** (0.12)	0.60*** (0.12)
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.84 (0.32)	0.97 (0.34)	0.54 (0.53)	0.67 (0.55)
	26-50th quantile	1.73 (0.40)	1.95 (0.41)	1.42 (0.56)	1.57 (0.57)
	51-75th quantile	2.39* (0.36)	2.38* (0.37)	1.69 (0.542)	1.75 (0.53)
	76-90th quantile	1.05 (0.32)	1.16 (0.34)	0.88 (0.49)	0.83 (0.51)
	91-100th quantile	0.84 (0.33)	0.99 (0.34)	0.88 (0.50)	1.06 (0.51)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref				
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.30*** (0.22)	0.30*** (0.23)	0.51* (0.31)	0.50* (0.32)
	Anglo-Australian=ref				
Gender	Female	0.56** (0.19)	0.62* (0.20)	0.67 (0.27)	0.68 (0.27)
	Male=ref.				
Rurality	Metropolitan	2.91* (0.46)	3.24* (0.47)	3.15 (0.56)	3.53* (0.57)
	Rural coastal	1.76 (0.45)	1.55 (0.46)	2.29 (0.57)	2.08 (0.57)
	Rural inland	0.84 (0.39)	0.85 (0.40)	1.18 (0.51)	1.11 (0.52)
	Sydney=ref				
Intercept		(1.84)	(1.47)	(1.84)	(1.84)

a The reference category is: Neither pay nor reward.

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

The majority of jobs on the formal labour market are paid (90%, n=2369). We would expect that all of these jobs should be paid, but just under 5 percent of jobs (4.9%, n=130) are rewarded non-monetarily (a gift in lieu of money), and a further 5 percent (5.0% n= 132) are done for no pay or reward²³. Elementary skill jobs are paid with the greatest frequency. Almost 93 percent (n=2137) of elementary skill jobs are paid, compared to 82 percent (n=54) of high-skill jobs and just under 70 percent (n=162) of intermediate-skill jobs. Almost 20 percent (n=44) of intermediate skill jobs are neither paid nor rewarded compared to fewer than 5 percent and 4 percent of high and elementary skill jobs respectively. The frequency of obtaining non-monetary reward is similar for high and intermediate skill jobs but much lower for elementary skill jobs.

²³ While it is unclear why this is the case, many may be undertaking voluntary work in the formal economy, the reasons for thus explored later in the chapter. In some instances this may also be a result of unpaid work trials. Within NSW it is legal to engage workers for trial periods, but it is illegal for an employer to make employees or prospective employees undertake an unpaid work trial, even if it is just for a few hours.

This is confirmed when likelihood of remuneration is modelled (Model II in Table 5.4). Intermediate skill jobs are 0.15 times as likely to be paid compared to elementary skill jobs.

There is an evident social distribution of pay and reward independent of skill level. Young workers from upper-middle class neighbourhoods (51-75th SEIFA quantile) are more than twice as likely as young people from the poorest neighbourhoods to be paid. Young workers from non-English speaking backgrounds are significantly less likely to receive monetary and non-monetary remuneration compared to young workers of Anglo-Australian background regardless of skill level, indicating a gift economy for some young workers from non-English speaking backgrounds in the formal economy. Young people from metropolitan areas are also more likely to be paid monetarily compared to young people from rural and regional areas. The prevailing parameter estimates associated with these socio-demographic characteristics are largely unaffected by the introduction of skill level, but skill level maintains its own independent effect despite the introduction of other terms into the model. Females are almost half as likely to be paid as males. This also holds when skill level is included, but the parameter is reduced from 0.56 to 0.61, indicating that skill has a slight moderating impact.

These results do not confirm a typical segmented labour market narrative, of high skill jobs securing income protections and elementary skill jobs being on the fringe of the labour market. Rather elementary skill jobs are more likely to be regulated and paid. This is perhaps unsurprising given the nature of skills exercised in high and intermediate as opposed to elementary skill jobs within the youth labour market. The high and intermediate skill jobs comprise a small segment of what we could describe as 'fringe specialists' (actors, musicians, IT programmers, photographers etc.). The exercise of specialised and unusual skills, especially for young workers, means that they may elude regulation, working in unusual and unexpected segments of the labour market. This can potentially result in working for non-monetary forms of remuneration or for experience, even though the work is located in the formal economy. This also points to a different self-identity, which these young people have as workers, and in consequence a different expectation of conditions- it is the exercise of particular competencies that may be the rewarding aspect of the work²⁴. Elementary skill jobs represent youth-intensive segments of the labour market (retail sales, fast food service, labouring) and routine and regulated conditions of employment are a matter of course in these sectors. Because they form the bulk of labour market participation for young people formal modes of payment are institutionalised through law and in

²⁴ Whether, for these fringe specialists, this manifests as a different self-understanding about the role and benefits of work, compared to their colleagues in more mainstream jobs, will be examined in section six

the expectations of economic actors – the employers and employees. Furthermore the use of skill does not act as a compensating differential for elementary skill jobs, as it does for high and intermediate skill jobs.

The level and distribution of pay rates is presented in Table 4.6. Hourly pay rate is used as the dependent variable. By controlling for hours and forms of work (i.e. whether work is one-off, casual or regular) this also controls for the relationship between labour market security (how many hours young people work) and income security.

Table 4.6: Approximate hourly pay by skill level – Formal Economy

Statistic	High Skill	Intermediate Skill	Elementary Skill	Formal Economy
Mean (S.E. mean)	48.00 (25.84)	15.36 (1.72)	11.21 (0.23)	12.32 (0.60)
95% CI mean (L-U)	4.05-100.05	11.96-18.76	10.75-11.67	11.15-13.49
5% Trimmed Mean	20.77	12.41	10.00	10.33
Median	13.94	10.00	8.40	8.57

Pay rates in the formal economy for young people are skewed towards the low end and are quite dispersed, indicating that most young people are paid relatively poorly and that wage rates in the youth labour market are marked by inequality. The mean pay rate is \$12.32 per hour (only including those who are paid), however just under one-fifth of workers (n= 405, 18.5%) are paid less than \$5.00 per hour, and approximately two-thirds of young workers are paid \$10.00 per hour or less (n=1400, 64.1%). At the high end of pay rates, the top 10% of workers are paid \$24.00 per hour or more, and the top 5%, \$30.00 or more. This means that young people at the 95th percentile of wages are paid \$7.50 for every \$1.00 received by young people at the 10th percentile of wages. While the likelihood of being paid is greater for elementary skill work, high skill workers, when paid, obtain higher levels of pay compared to workers in intermediate and elementary skilled jobs. We see a general tendency for pay rates to be less dispersed and decrease in amount as skill level decreases. The small number of high skill jobs, plus the likelihood that these jobs are not covered by legal employment awards or covered by collective or enterprise agreements, mean that pay rates for high skill jobs are highly dispersed (S.E.=25.84). In contrast the dispersion of pay rates is comparatively small for intermediate skill jobs (S.E= 1.72) and pay rates for elementary skill jobs relatively concentrated around the mean rate (S.E=0.23). Using measures that control for this variance, the 5% trimmed mean and median, we also observe that skill level and hourly pay is positively correlated. While intermediate and elementary skill jobs are paid at similar rates, (a \$2.40 per hour trimmed mean and \$1.60 per hour median difference between intermediate and elementary skill jobs) the difference between high skill and other jobs is larger. Using the trimmed mean, high skill jobs are paid more than twice the hourly rate of elementary skill jobs and \$8.36 per hour more than intermediate skill jobs. Similarly the median

pay rate for high skill jobs is approximately \$5.50 per hour more than elementary skill jobs and almost \$4.00 per hour more than intermediate skill jobs.

At the time the data was collected, there was no single junior or minimum pay rate against which the pay rates presented here could be benchmarked²⁵. Instead industry and occupation specific youth or junior pay rates are specified in industrial Awards. In New South Wales, the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission supervises the operation of these Awards, setting wages based on the industry standards, skills, qualifications, training and experience required for the job. In most agreements, youth wage rates are determined as a percentage of the adult wage applying to workers aged between 15 and 21 years, the percentage increasing with age. However, there is no uniformity across awards between a child's age and the relevant percentage of the adult wage that applies. For example young people aged 16 years and under receive 50 percent, and sometimes 40 percent, of the full wage rate. Furthermore, different Awards, depending on the industry that the work is undertaken in, may cover the same type of work. This is further complicated by whether the work falls within the Commonwealth or State (i.e. in this case New South Wales) jurisdiction.

Given that the best comparator is the aggregate mean weekly earnings for 15 to 19 year olds in full-time employment²⁶. At the time of writing this was approximately \$388.00, which is approximately \$10.21 per hour for a 38-hour week (ABS, 2003). This is slightly less than the mean pay rate found here overall, indicating the influence of the high mean pay rate for high skill workers. However it is similar to the mean rate for elementary skill workers in this study who appear to be paid around Award rates and at similar levels to young adult workers.

To determine whether different sub-populations of young workers are more likely to receive different levels of pay, the inter-quartile range of hourly pay rates was calculated and bracketed into four categories, from the lowest quartile of pay (\$1.00 - \$6.00 per hour) to the highest quartile (\$13.67 or more). Using the lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as the reference group, multinomial logistic regression analysis was undertaken to determine whether the likelihood of

²⁵ This system has been rationalised by the introduction of the Fair Work Act, which commenced on July 1, 2009. One of the effects of the Act is the rationalisation of the thousands of federal and state-based awards by less than 200 modern Awards. The Fair Work Act also sets a national minimum wages for trainees, apprentices and juniors who are not covered by any other award or agreement. These are not the prevailing rate but act as a floor, or safety net, below which it is illegal to pay workers. As of 1 July 2012, this rate for employees under 16 years of age is \$5.87 per hour.

²⁶ Given the age-specific youth rates, this aggregation is not particularly helpful. However this is the most specific disaggregation provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Therefore this figures masks what are likely to be considerable differences in weekly earnings between 15 and 19 year olds.

receiving moderate and high pay rates were associated with skill level and socio-demographic characteristics of young workers. The results are presented in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Pay rates (inter-quartile range) by formal economy category and demographic characteristics

		26-50th percentile (\$6.01-8.57)	51-75th percentile (\$8.58-13.66)	76-100th (\$13.67- highest)
Skill Level	High	1.28 (0.48)	1.03 (0.50)	3.12** (0.39)
	Intermediate	0.37*** (0.27)	0.59* (0.21)	0.86 (0.20)
	Elementary. = ref.			
Age	Twelve	0.65 (0.27)	0.42 ** (0.29)	0.86 (0.27)
	Thirteen	0.76 (0.23)	0.50** (0.24)	1.38 (0.16)
	Fourteen	0.87 (0.21)	0.75 (0.20)	1.26 (0.21)
	Fifteen	0.91 (0.20)	0.75 (0.18)	0.85 (0.20)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.32)	1.00 (0.26)
	26-50th quantile	1.11 (0.28)	0.75 (0.31)	0.53* (0.26)
	51-75th quantile	1.49 (0.27)	1.01 (0.29)	0.66 (0.24)
	76-90th quantile	1.82* (0.26)	1.09 (0.26)	0.97 (0.24)
	91-100th quantile	1.34 (0.27)	0.78 (0.28)	0.74 (0.25)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.73 (0.17)	0.60** (0.16)	0.91 (0.15)
	Anglo-Australian=ref			
Gender	Female	1.15 (0.30)	1.08 (0.13)	0.72** (0.12)
	Male=ref.			
Rurality	Metropolitan	0.75 (0.19)	0.74 (0.21)	0.87 (0.20)
	Rural coastal	1.06 (0.22)	0.99 (0.23)	0.92 (0.23)
	Rural inland	0.74 (0.21)	1.02 (0.22)	0.88 (0.22)
	Sydney=ref			
Intercept		(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.27)

The results indicate that high skill jobs are differentiated from other work, in being able to obtain the highest quartile of pay rates, but are similar to elementary skill jobs in obtaining middle percentile pay rates. Intermediate skill jobs are less likely than elementary skill jobs to obtain middle tier pay rates. This indicates a clustering of pay for the majority of jobs within the middle of the distribution with pay differentiation at the high end, associated with skill. In terms of labour market segmentation, a small group of high skill workers are paid extremely well, with the majority of other workers paid at lower rates. Age is another important determinant of wage stratification in the youth labour market. Twelve and thirteen year olds share a similar pay profile, but are differentiated from older workers by being less likely to obtain pay in the moderately high level of pay rates. However the absence of extensive age-based stratification of pay rates indicates that the formal system of youth wages within the award system is working to level out some pay differences. A gendered division in pay is also evident at the high-end scale of pay rates, with females being less likely to earn the highest rates (0.72) as males. Apart from the

skill, age and gender determinants of pay, pay rates are largely undifferentiated. Young people from lower middle class backgrounds are approximately half as likely to obtain the highest wage rates compared to other young people and those from upper middle class backgrounds almost twice as likely to obtain moderate pay rates. Young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are 0.6 times as likely to obtain pay rates in the 51-75th quartile, but no other differences are apparent.

The age-based determination of income indicates the importance of alternative role ideologies in suppressing young people's pay. Ideologically low pay rates are defended through appeals to notions of specific and lesser youth needs, the presumed economic roles of parents in supporting young people and the idea that teenagers, possessing relatively low skills and having little formal training, are worth less than other workers (White and Wyn 2004). Institutionally, this is reflected in award specified pay rates for young people. However among young workers we see the importance of skill in influencing pay rates. If the exercise of skill is understood as a compensating differential (Green, 2006), then jobs that afford more opportunities for the exercise of skill, should, all else being equal, be able to attract workers at lower wage rates. This certainly holds in terms of the likelihood of pay, with young people in high skill jobs more likely to volunteer their time. However skill utilisation does not act as a compensating differential for pay rates, but rather young people who can exercise those skills demand higher wages because they offer niche or specialised skills. Beyond that, institutional factors are also important in determining wages. Jobs in 'youth intensive' (i.e. elementary skill jobs) sectors attract average pay rates. Wage dispersion is limited across elementary and intermediate skill jobs, labour market regulation of these jobs providing some degree of wage equity. In contrast high skill jobs appear to be subject to less stringent forms of regulation. The results here suggest that pay for high skill jobs may be negotiated between individual employers and employees. As a result skill deployment is tempered by the prevailing award determined wage rates in youth intensive sectors of the labour market and the labour market is segmented into non-competing groups, between different grades of workers. The relationship between skill and income is therefore not straightforward. While those who provide niche or technical services are paid well, the effect of broader labour market regulations around pay also appears to have an effect.

4.5.3. *Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy*

Workplace participation and job autonomy have a central place in discussions of job quality.

Thinkers from a broad range of perspectives have argued for the importance of worker autonomy as a measure of job quality, dignified work and also broader conceptions of citizenship (Honneth 1996, Marshall 1964, Green 2006). Furthermore, task autonomy is usually seen as linked to skill; the more skilled the work, the greater the knowledge of the work process held by the employee rather than by management (Gaillie 2007). Blauner (1964) for example highlighted the importance of unifying the conception and execution of work, and neo-Marxists have argued that individual control over work tasks is an essential condition for self-realisation (Braverman 1974). Hence job autonomy and workplace participation are contested areas between employers and employees. Taylorist systems of work premised on the separation of the design and performance of work have also been extended to non-manual work. This is particularly significant to young workers because of their overrepresentation in the service economy. Because service workers are brought into contact with the product at the point of consumption, employees need to be controlled in their relations with customers (Braverman 1974, Edwards and Wajcman 2005). Therefore the corresponding requirement is for workers to attend to consumer generated demands, and rules for display of feeling are routinised through training and surveillance (Green, 2006, Hochschild 1983, Frederiksen 1999). However engaging with customers may also be a source of satisfaction and service workers may find standardised scripts useful to manage customer expectations and maintain some control about their degree of engagement. The question then becomes whether we can identify under what social conditions autonomy and control at work is promoted.

This section examines the capacity young workers have to determine their work conditions and to represent their views at work. Three facets of control and autonomy were measured—workplace participation ('I have a fair say about things at work?'); task autonomy ('I can do things my own way in my work?'); and control over work-time ('I can take a break when I want to'; 'I am free to decide when I take days off'; and 'If I need to do something important the person I work for let's me change my work hours?'). Logistic regression models were run using these measures as dependent variables, with skill level, socio-demographic characteristics and work characteristics as the independent variables. The significant results are presented in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by skill level, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

	Model I Fair Say	Model II Do things on way	Model III Take break	Model IV Take days off	Model V Change work hours
Skill level					
High	2.34 (0.39)*	2.55 (0.31)**	2.42 (0.39)*	1.44 (0.29)	1.00 (0.40)
Intermediate	2.28 (0.20)**	1.61 (0.16)**	1.63 (0.20)*	0.88 (0.16)	0.90 (0.23)
Elementary = ref					
Work regularity					
Casual	0.84 (0.19)	0.96 (0.17)	0.89 (0.22)	1.87 (0.17)***	1.45 (0.25)
Regular	0.70 (0.18)*	1.06 (0.16)	0.69 (0.21)	1.58 (0.16)**	1.35 (0.24)
One-off=ref					
Hours worked					
6-10 hours a week	0.81 (0.11)*	0.67 (0.10)**	0.47 (0.13)***	0.79 (0.10)*	1.12 (0.16)
11-15 hours a week	0.64 (0.17)*	0.50 (0.13)**	0.33 (0.18)***	0.83 (0.13)	0.84 (0.19)
16 hours plus a week	0.81 (0.18)	0.69 (0.13)***	0.52 (0.17)***	0.91 (0.13)	1.03 (0.20)
1-5 hours a week=ref					
Age (years)	0.82 (0.05)**	0.89 (0.05)*	0.75 (0.06)***		
Socio-economic status					
11-25th quantile	0.64 (0.24)	1.11 (0.22)			
26-50th quantile	0.62 (0.24)*	1.55 (0.22)*			
51-75th quantile	0.68 (0.22)	1.46 (0.20)			
76-90th quantile	0.51 (0.22)**	1.24 (0.20)			
91-100th quantile	0.45 (0.24)**	1.43 (0.22)			
0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref					
Gender					
Female	0.72 (0.10)**	0.69 (0.10)***	0.64 (0.10)***	0.79 (0.10)*	
Male=ref					
CALD					
Non-Anglo Australian	1.31 (0.13)*				
Anglo-Australian=ref					
Rurality					
Metropolitan					0.83 (0.23)
Rural coastal					1.08 (0.26)
Rural inland					2.01 (0.28)*
Sydney=ref					
Pay rate					
26-50 th (\$6.01-8.57)	1.00 (0.14)	0.84 (0.13)	0.84 (0.13)		
51-75 th (\$8.58-13.66)	1.10 (0.16)	0.97(0.12)	0.99 (0.12)		
76-100 th (\$13.67-highest)	1.56 (0.17)**	1.49 (0.12)**	1.56(0.12)**		
0-25 th (lowest-\$6.00) =ref					
Intercept	0.78***	0.73**	0.75***	0.71	1.10

Disagree=ref

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I - I have a fair say about things that happen at work

Model II - I can do things my own way in my job

Model III - I can take a break when I want to in my job

Model IV - I am free to decide when I can take days off work

Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

We found in the previous section that within the secondary labour market, most young people have relatively predictable work times. However being able to exert control over work time is a minority experience. Just over 50 percent (51.2%, n=1241) of young workers are not able to take a break when they want to, just under half are unable to determine when they work, with 46.3 percent (n=1080) not free to decide when they can take days off. However greater latitude is evident in terms of being able to change work hours in response to important non-work needs, with just over 85 percent (85.3%, n=1766) of young workers being able to change their work hours if they need to do something important. The supposed benefits of casualisation, of being able to work when you want, are not evident for young workers, suggesting that flexible employment arrangements benefit employers rather than young workers.

Compared to elementary skill workers, high skill workers are 2.4 times and intermediate skill workers 1.6 times more likely to be able to take breaks when they want to, indicating greater flexibility and control over work-day practices and the pace of work. As far as control over work hours, when young people work and whether they can change their shifts, no difference is associated with skill level. We would anticipate that regular jobs may involve less flexibility in the form of control over work hours, however compared to one-off jobs, casual and regular workers are 1.9 and 1.6 times as likely to be able to take days off than one-off workers. As it is hard to take days off for one-off jobs, the more meaningful difference is between casual and regular workers, with casual workers being slightly more likely (1.21 times) to take days off than regular workers. However no significant difference is observed for control over time at work ('take break when I want to'), or young worker's ability to alter their work in response to non-work needs. However the number of hours worked does have a significant relationship with control over work time. Compared to short hour workers, those who work moderate or long hours are less able to take a break when they want to, indicating that either break times are scheduled into long work shifts or not at all. These young workers are approximately one-third (for 11-15 hours workers) or one-half (for 6-10 hours and 16 plus hours workers) as likely to take a break when they want to. Again, in terms of flexibility over work schedules, the differences become less marked. Young people who work 6-10 hours a week are less likely to be able to take days off, but no differences are apparent for young workers' ability to change their work hours in response to an important non-work event. Perhaps reflecting skill differences, workers obtaining the highest pay rates are also 1.6 times more likely take breaks when they want to.

Like control over work-time, there is a relatively even split between young workers who are able and those who cannot exercise task autonomy in their work. Just over 46 percent (46.6%, n=1075) of young workers are able to exercise autonomy in their work. In part this split is associated with skill. Workers in high and intermediate skill jobs are able to set the daily pace of their work to exercise task autonomy ("I can do things my own way in my job"). Compared to elementary skill workers, high skill workers are 2.6 times and intermediate skill workers 1.6 times more likely to be able exert task autonomy in their work. Again skill differences may be implicated in pay rate differences associated with task autonomy, with those who receive the highest pay rates being 1.5 times more likely to exercise task autonomy than workers receiving lower pay rates. Compared to low hour workers, other workers are approximately one-half (11-15 hours) and two-thirds as likely to be able to exercise task autonomy, indicating that the greater the work security and the lower the skill level, the more likely work processes are dictated by the employer. Work regularity does not appear to have an effect.

Slightly more young workers are able to participate in workplace decision-making, with just under two-thirds of young workers contributing to workplace decisions. Just over 60 percent (62.2%, n=1482) of young workers either agree or strongly agree with the statement that they are able to have a fair say about things that happen at work. Workers in high and intermediate skill jobs also have greater opportunities to participate in workplace decisions compared to elementary skill workers. Not only are higher skill workers able to control the pace of their work and how they do their work, high skill workers are 2.6 times and intermediate skill workers are 2.1 times more likely to be able to have a fair say about things at work. Again high skill and high pay rates have a positive correlation with workplace participation, with workers receiving the highest pay rates being 1.6 times as likely than other workers to contribute to workplace decisions.

Task discretion, capacity to influence workplace decisions and control work time, decreases with age, with younger workers able to exercise greater autonomy than older workers. For example, when age is treated as a categorical variable, compared to sixteen year olds, twelve year olds are 2.6 times more likely to have a fair say about things that happen at work and twelve to fourteen year olds are between 1.9 and 3.3 times more likely to be able to take breaks when they want to. Older workers are therefore more likely to be in jobs that allow less control over task performance, for example most sales and food preparation jobs. These aspects of control and autonomy are also gendered. Females are less likely to be able to exercise task autonomy, less

likely to be able to participate in workplace decisions and less likely to exercise control over work time both in terms of taking a break and taking days off.

These findings indicate that a sizeable minority of young people have little control over their work and feel they have no opportunity to participate in day-to-day decisions. Most work is likely to be closely supervised and participation limited²⁷. The picture that emerges is of regulated elementary skill work for the majority and a much smaller group of creative specialists who obtain benefits and some disadvantages from working outside more regulated work environments. Young people in higher skill jobs and those paid at higher rates disproportionately obtain the benefits of task autonomy and work-time control. This is because the exercise of more complex skills favours the devolution of decision-making to employees. Skilled employees work in ways that are costly for managers to monitor and difficult to explicate contractually. Skill and autonomy are likely to be closely related, as more complex tasks are less likely to be able to be automated and reliant on the discretion of the worker for their effective performance (Gaillie, 2003). Therefore control over workplace decisions is more equally shared between employers and employees and unilateral control over decisions is less efficient than consensus based approaches to decision making (Gaillie, 2007). Furthermore young people who are in higher skill jobs are able to exercise greater control over scheduling of work and the ability to vary work hours. Therefore we would anticipate that one of the benefits of high skilled work for young people is greater ability to cope with competing demands, as a high level of discretion over work time reduces the negative effects of work hours on work-life balance. Less skilled jobs are more closely controlled by rules or close supervision. Tasks are made routine and shifts are set. It is in the interests of management to limit discretion, capacity to influence workplace decisions, how work is done and the pace at which work is done. Most young workers in the formal economy are in such jobs.

4.5.4. *Skill Reproduction Security: Support and Skill Development at Work*

Employee supervision and support are important aspects of job quality generally and job based training and skill development more specifically (Misko, 2008; Noelker et al. 2009). For young people early work experiences can provide an important foundation for ongoing skill

²⁷ For those with an optimistic view, there is a steady increase in skills in a more complex and technologically sophisticated economy, leading to improvements in job quality and greater say for individual employees over the work process (Blauener 1964; Zuboff 1988). This makes young people's work discontinuous with the adult labour market, where changes in task discretion are thought to reflect trends in the development of skills. Neo-Marxists envisage a long term decline in job control, especially for those in lower skilled jobs, leading to polarisation between classes in job quality (Friedmann 1955; Braverman 1974; Wright and Singelmann 1982).

development and can enhance future employability (Lunt and Furnham 1996). Hungerland et al. (2007) argue that the knowledge gained from holding a job can have a higher value for young people than the extrinsic rewards of work, such as income. According to Hungerland et al. (2007) parents and young people associate work principally with the possibility of learning and see in this an investment for the future. This would suggest that the link between skill used and developed in work and the ongoing benefit gained from work may be related. However support at work is important not only because it results in better trained workers. Work quality is also influenced by the extent meaningful interaction is possible in a job. Congenial peer relations and solidarity are essential elements of a positive work experience that indicate a culture of support (Hodson and Sullivan 2002; Vogl 2009).

Six questions were used to measure levels of support. 'The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me' and 'I get the training I need to do my job' measure task instruction and training; 'When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job' and 'The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do' measure feedback and supervision; and 'I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it' and 'I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work' measure levels of ongoing support provided to young workers in doing their work. These variables provide some measure of the level of formal support and collegial relationships at work. In addition two variables are used to measure skill gained from work and whether work contributes to future career prospects - 'I am gaining skills from the work I do' and 'The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future'. These aspects of skill reproduction security were modelled against skill development, other work characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics of the young workers. The results are presented in Table 4.9. Only statistically significant results are reported.

Table 4.9: Support at work by skill level, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

	Model I: Tasks Explained	Model II: Training to do job	Model III: Get told do good job	Model IV: Employer Interest	Model V: Get help if ask	Model VI: Advice good/bad	Model VII: Gaining Skills	Model VIII: Future advantage
Socio-economic status								
11-25th quantile		0.57* (0.29)	0.56 (0.32)	0.73 (0.28)	0.91 (0.42)	0.83 (0.28)	0.68 (0.48)	0.62 (0.48)
26-50th quantile		0.59 (0.29)	0.38 *(0.31)	0.53* (0.27)	0.67 (0.40)	0.74 (0.27)	0.37* (0.44)	0.35* (0.45)
51-75th quantile		0.71 (0.27)	0.50* (0.30)	0.52* (0.25)	0.82 (0.38)	1.01 (0.26)	0.52 (0.43)	0.51 (0.43)
76-90th quantile		0.44* (0.26)	0.42* (0.30)	0.43* (0.25)	1.07 (0.39)	0.73 (0.25)	0.32* (0.41)	0.29* (0.42)
91-100th quantile		0.37*(0.27)	0.34**(0.30)	0.38*(0.27)	0.40* (0.37)	0.55* (0.26)	0.02*(0.41)	0.21**(0.42)
0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref								
Gender								
Female	0.72* (0.14)	1.35* (0.12)			1.87*(0.19)		1.94*(0.17)	1.85* (0.18)
Male=ref								
Rurality*								
Metropolitan	0.72 (0.23)				0.63 (0.28)			
Rural coastal	0.58* (0.26)				0.82 (0.32)			
Rural inland Sydney=ref	1.25 (0.28)				1.70 (0.37)			
Age	0.76* (0.78)	1.14* (0.05)	0.88* (0.06)	0.85* (0.05)				0.82* (0.08)
CALD								
Non-Anglo					0.64* (0.21)			
Anglo-Australian=ref								
Skill level								
High		2.33 (0.43)	3.69* (0.61)	3.64* (0.48)		4.56* (0.61)	2.09 (0.55)	2.08 (0.56)
Intermediate		2.25 (0.25)	1.98* (0.25)	2.21* (0.23)		1.66* (0.24)	5.56*(0.52)	2.48* (0.41)
Elementary=ref								
Remuneration type								
Monetary				1.70 (0.31)				
Reward only				3.81* (0.67)				
No pay or reward=ref								
Hours								
6-10 hours a week	0.65* (0.20)	1.45* (0.14)			2.10* (0.23)	1.31 (0.14)	1.56* (0.19)	1.93* (0.20)
11-15 hours a week	0.49*(0.24)	2.19* (0.22)			1.42 (0.30)	1.76* (0.21)	1.59 (0.28)	2.17* (0.31)
15 hours plus a week	0.63 (0.27)	1.45 (0.21)			1.47 (0.30)	1.84* (0.22)	1.38 (0.29)	1.78 (0.31)
1-5 hours =ref								
Regularity								
Casual		1.73* (0.22)					1.96* (0.27)	1.85* (0.29)
Regular		1.62 (0.21)*					2.32* (0.27)	2.13* (0.28)
One-off=ref								
Constant	7.56 (1.22)	0.32 (0.84)	9.43* (0.92)	4.31*(0.84)	1.50* (1.29)	6.34* (0.87)	9.76* (1.16)	5.83* (1.30)

Model I: The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me; Model II: I get the training I need to do my job

Model III: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job; Model IV: The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do; Model V: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it

Model VI: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work; Model VII: I am gaining skills from the work I do; Model VIII: The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

These results indicate that jobs involving greater levels of skill afford greater opportunities for formal training, informal support and feedback and ultimately an emphasis on obtaining skill for the future. Intermediate skill workers are more than five times and high skill workers more than twice as likely as elementary skill workers to work in jobs that afford opportunities for skill development ('I am gaining skills from the work I do'); and more than twice as likely to obtain the training they need. Despite being able to exercise greater discretion as to how the task should be done, young people in high skill jobs are also more likely to receive instruction and supervision as to how to perform the work. For these young people decision latitude is supported, rather than negated, through forms of employer supervision and training. High skill jobs are 4.5 times more likely to obtain informal feedback about work progress than elementary skill jobs and intermediate skill jobs are 1.7 times as likely to obtain this sort of advice. Workers in both high and intermediate skill jobs are more than twice as likely to perceive their work as providing future advantages than young workers in elementary skill jobs. The results in terms of future advantage indicate that career development opportunities are skewed towards high skill jobs. Workers in high and intermediate skill jobs identify that the skills they are using will potentially provide them with future occupational advantage above and beyond the skills obtained from 'just having a job'. The sorts of content skills developed and deployed on the job therefore matter to young people. This is also buttressed through the distribution of forms of positive recognition and support obtained by young workers. Young workers in high and intermediate skill jobs are approximately 3.7 and 2.0 times, respectively, as likely as elementary skill workers to receive positive recognition from work ('When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job'), 3.6 times and 2.2 times respectively for their employer to take an interest in the work they do.

Work regularity and hours also have some association with skill development. Workers in regular jobs and those who work moderate hours are most likely to also be in jobs that provide opportunities for skill development, formal and informal training and informal feedback about task performance. Young people in casual and regular jobs are also approximately twice as likely to perceive that their work will provide them with future advantage. These results suggest that employers are most likely to have institutionalised systems for training and supervision for jobs involving ongoing commitment, and are also more likely to invest some resources in jobs that involve regular commitment. This may be associated with occupation specific practices. Work in the service economy structured around routine shifts, such as retail service and food preparation, all involve some level of training and for many large food service franchises significant resources

are invested in training to regulate task discretion. Here we see how training diminishes control through quality control measures, a finding discussed in our previous section.

Skill development is associated with gender, class background and to a certain extent age. Females and those from less wealthy backgrounds are more likely to emphasise that their work provides opportunities for skill development, obtain the training they need to do their work and, for young workers from the least wealthy neighbourhoods, obtain advice as to task performance. Females and those from the least wealthy neighbourhoods are also most likely to emphasise future benefits from their current work. Given that females and young people from working class neighbourhoods are less likely to work in jobs that offer greater skill development opportunities, these young people appear to place greater relative value on the opportunities that work provides, compared to males and young people from wealthier backgrounds. Differences in future aspiration may be relevant here. Young workers from wealthier backgrounds may see their current work experience as discontinuous with their future work experience. For example working in retail has benefit in earning money now, but is less relevant for their future career that is more likely to involve work in professional jobs that require tertiary level qualifications. Hence current work experiences have less importance than educational qualifications. For working class young people, the value of current work may be highly valued for both its current and future advantage. Potentially having fewer occupational career prospects, they may see their current work as providing advantage in a tight labour market. For these working class young people their work careers have already started, for wealthier young people, the job is just a stop gap way to earn some money.

4.6. Relational embeddedness in the formal economy

As discussed in the previous chapters, assessment of intrinsic and extrinsic attitudes towards work provides a sense of how economic action is experienced by children within each economy. For the formal economy, it is the exchange of labour for money that is central to work based attitudes, so much so that employees can withdraw their labour if they are not paid and it is the free exchange of labour for pay that is central to the capitalist production process and defines the capitalist economic system (Kolakowski 1978). Money wages are both incentive and reward – they are an incentive to supply labour and the reward for productivity. Extrinsic rewards include pay, fringe benefits and job security (Hodson and Sullivan 2002). However pay is also a basis for conferring intrinsic orientations because pay acts as a ranking device and therefore a form of valuation of individual and occupational status. Intrinsic orientations are realised on the job and include things like the freedom to plan one's own work, chance to use and enhance abilities,

absence of close supervision and positive relations with co-workers. Getting a job not only provides income, but also is important in terms of social status, self-esteem, personal development and existential security. Therefore the market, through the medium of money, has some role in designating value and status (Towse, 2001). Hungerland et al. (2007) also found that a similar process applies to children who work. They found that the principal attraction of work for young people lies in payment, yet young people's judgement of the adequacy of their pay centres on the concept of whether the pay was 'appropriate', in the respect that the level of pay matches the task being performed. In this sense, it is also understood as social recognition of their own performance.

Most studies emphasise that that consumption motivations are a primary rationale for young people to work (Green 1990, Hobbs and McKechnie 1997, Lavalette 1994). Mizen, Bolton and Pole (1999) suggest that these studies emphasise how young people's motivations to work are most appropriately conceptualised around creating and supporting particular 'styles of life'. If this is the case then we should find that these instrumental, or exchange-use attitudes prevail among young people working in the formal economy. Green's work on secondary school students and part-time work highlights that rather than working purely for the money, work involves a complexity of motives and intrinsic orientations (Green 1990). Drawing upon young workers reflections about the value of work, Green (1990) concludes that employment may serve one or more of three major roles for school aged young people facilitating the transition from school to work – (i) employment being part of a highly structured adolescence, where work offers a source of discipline and responsibility; (ii) work being a basis for social exploration beyond the boundaries of home and school; and (iii) work providing social skills opportunities and material benefits. For Green, none of these 'roles' represents a pure-type of motivation or rationality, but a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and instrumental and altruistic motives (Green 1990). In a study of young worker motivation, Hobbs et al. (2007) found that many young people discuss the human capital developing elements of their work. 'Dealing with customers', 'handling money', 'time management' were cited as the main benefits. These motives do not rely on affective relationships, but are endogenous to the formal employer-employee relationship, reflecting the exchange relationship on the market. However motivations may also include the desire for self-actualising outcomes that are both non-instrumental and particular. Frey (1997) develops a general theory of economic motivation that includes extrinsic rewards (defined as response to pecuniary incentives) and the satisfaction of inner intrinsic motivations. Frey suggests that inappropriate rewards can displace incentives, for example monetary payment,

an extrinsic reward, may crowd out intrinsic motivations and become a disincentive for acts that are intrinsically motivated. Table 4.10 maps out the concepts and hypotheses around instrumental and intrinsic attitudes that guide the analysis in the following sections, and how the variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to the hypotheses.

Table 4.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic attitudes on the formal economy

Concept	Hypothesis
Formal economy is associated with instrumental behaviour. Money wages act as both incentive and reward.	Instrumental, or exchange-use attitudes prevail within the work that young people do on the formal labour market.
Act of monetary exchange also related to intrinsic orientations.	Given young people's primary identification as consumers rather than producers, consumption motivations are a primary rationale for young people to work.
Work Orientation	
<p><i>Instrumental Attitudes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • control over income; • cover expenses; • covers discretionary wants <p>Instrumental attitudes more evident in elementary skill work, for those who are paid the highest. Instrumental attitudes highest among the most disadvantaged young people, as reliance upon personal income is more important for these groups of young people.</p>	<p><i>Intrinsic Attitudes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • altruism; • responsibility; • build relationships; • social utility; • self-reliance; • enjoyment <p>Intrinsic attitudes higher for more skilled work, as these types of jobs create more 'self-actualising' opportunities.</p>

The following sections assess whether non-instrumental as well as instrumental attitudes are evident among young workers on the formal labour market, and the extent to which they have mixed attitudes. We first examine instrumental attitudes, then intrinsic and altruistic attitudes.

The measures used are detailed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.4.

4.6.1. Instrumental Orientations –Pay

Three variables are used to measure 'instrumental' or, 'exchange-use' orientations. These are whether working provides control over income, allows the young worker to cover their expenses and allows them to buy what they want. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations from work associated with being paid (Frey, 1997). For each variable responses were aggregated into those who agreed or strongly agreed and those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with each statement to form a dummy variable of disagree=0 and agree=1, for each extrinsic attitude. These were used in logistic regression models to examine the likelihood of instrumental orientations across skill category, socio-demographic characteristics and other work characteristics. These are reported in Table 4.11. Again, only significant or select results are reported.

Table 4.11: Instrumental orientations by Formal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I: Control income	Model II: Cover expenses	Model III: Buy what I want
Skill level	High	0.51 (0.47)	2.03 (0.75)	0.49* (0.35)
	Intermediate	1.18 (0.32)	0.96 (0.30)	0.92 (0.22)
	Elementary = ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	1.02 (0.39)	1.88 (0.36)	1.11 (0.29)
	26-50th quantile	0.99 (0.38)	2.14* (0.377)	1.38 (0.29)
	51-75th quantile	1.17 (0.37)	2.54* (0.34)	1.20 (0.27)
	76-90th quantile	1.49 (0.38)	1.87 (0.33)	0.89 (0.26)
	91-100th quantile	0.92 (0.37)	1.76 (0.34)	0.70 (0.27)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref			
Age (years)		1.14 (0.07)	1.09 (0.08)	0.96 (0.06)
Rurality	Other metropolitan	1.01 (0.30)	0.68 (0.28)	1.05 (0.21)
	Rural coastal	1.27 (0.32)	0.76 (0.32)	0.89 (0.24)
	Rural inland	0.87 (0.30)	0.96 (0.33)	0.79 (0.23)
	Sydney = ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	1.13 (0.23)	1.22 (0.23)	0.89 (0.16)
	Anglo-Australian=ref			
Gender	Female	1.03 (0.17)	1.65** (0.18)	1.09 (0.13)
	Male = ref			
Remuneration type	Monetary	3.68*** (0.32)	3.79*** (0.31)	2.07* (0.26)
	Reward only	1.22 (1.23)	0.89 (1.22)	0.98 (1.29)
	Neither pay or reward = ref			
Pay rate	26-50 th (\$6.01-8.57)	1.77* (0.25)	1.59* (0.23)	1.40* (0.17)
	51-75 th (\$8.58-13.66)	1.66* (0.22)	2.01** (0.23)	1.47* (0.17)
	76-100 th (\$13.67-highest)	1.34 (0.21)	1.41 (0.21)	1.32 (0.16)
	0-25 th (lowest - \$6.00)=ref			
Intercept		(1.19)	(1.17)	(0.91)

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income.

Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses

Model III - Working means I can buy what I want

The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

High levels of exchange or instrumental orientations are evident amongst young workers in the formal economy. Less than four percent indicate either disagreement or strong disagreement with all three items (n=87, 3.8% indicating non-instrumental orientations or uses for income) and less than 18 percent indicated disagreement or strong disagreement with at least one item (n=403, 17.6%). Just under 80 percent of young people indicated either agreement or strong agreement with the single items (n=1892, 82.4%) and over one-quarter of workers indicated the highest possible level of instrumental orientation (n=599, 26.1%).

In earlier sections we found that skill level has an important relationship with various work conditions. However work conditions are fore-grounded in the results for instrumental motivations. Exchange orientations map, perhaps unsurprisingly, onto objective conditions. The most marked difference is evident for pay, with young people who are paid being between two and four times more likely to indicate exchange-use orientations compared to young people who are remunerated some other way or who are unpaid. Furthermore, differences are evident for pay rate. Compared to workers who are paid the lowest rates, instrumental orientations are more likely as pay rates increase, with the exception of the highest pay rates. Workers who receive the highest pay rates are moderately more likely to exhibit instrumental orientations, but this result is not statistically significant. Taken together, the close relationship between pay and instrumental orientations confirms theories of extrinsic orientations that emphasise how instrumental orientations are a response to pecuniary incentives. Young workers view pay as a pragmatic resource – those who are paid more have a greater capacity to purchase goods for themselves than those who don't. Skill level has only a minor bearing on instrumental orientations, with young people in high skill jobs half as likely as other young people to indicate that working means they can buy what they want. Young people from lower middle-class and middle class backgrounds are approximately twice as likely for their work to cover expenses as other young people. Females are 1.65 times more likely to indicate similar orientations. Notably age has no association with exchange use orientations.

The income available to any young person depends upon household circumstances and therefore for many young people the opportunity to engage in recreation and leisure activities, amongst other things, often requires that they seek an income beyond that available from their family. In this respect it is unsurprising that extrinsic motivations are more apparent for young workers from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The social distribution of motivations therefore complicates explanations that focus on work being motivated by self-centred consumer aspirations, as discussed in Section Two. This is because patterns of consumption and leisure are not merely expressions of choice, but are situated in tensions around 'freedom and constraints, opportunities and costs' that define childhood in developed economies (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999). Leisure has been reconstituted into increasingly commodified forms constituted according to the dictates of the market. On the one hand, because few households rely on children's income, young people are freed from the necessity of having to work, which in part defines adulthood (Blatterer 2009). Instead working, including working to support consumption is an

explicit expression of autonomy. Therefore working is not only a vehicle for consumption but also a necessary act on the part of many young people to participate in the 'normal' routines of being a young person (Mizen, Bolton and Pole 1999).

4.6.2. *Intrinsic Work Orientations*

Six variables were used to assess intrinsic orientations to work. The variable, 'Working means I can help out at home financially' is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct from the utilitarian uses of income examined in the previous section because it measures contribution to household, rather than personal, income. The five other variables measure whether work provides a sense of responsibility ('Working gives me a sense of responsibility'), opportunity to build social connections ('Work gives me opportunities to build relationships') sense of social utility ('Working makes me feel I am doing something useful'), self-reliance ('Working means I can rely on myself more') and enjoyment ('I like the things I do at work'). As for previous sections, logistic regression modelling was undertaken by aggregating for each variable those who agreed or strongly agreed and those who disagreed or strongly disagreed to form a dummy variable of disagree=0 and agree=1. These intrinsic motivations were assessed against skill development, other work characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics of the young workers. Statistically significant results are presented in Table 4.12 below.

Table 4.12: Intrinsic work motivations and altruistic orientation by skill level, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

	Model I: Help at home (altruism)	Model II: Responsibility	Model III: Build relationships	Model IV: Something Useful	Model V: Self-reliance	Model VI: Like work
Socio-economic background						
11-25th quantile	0.54* (0.23)		0.88 (0.40)		0.30* (0.43)	
26-50th quantile	0.47** (0.23)		0.55 (0.38)		0.43 (0.45)	
51-75th quantile	0.52** (0.21)		0.80 (0.36)		0.41* (0.42)	
76-90th quantile	0.31*** (0.22)		0.49* (0.35)		0.32* (0.42)	
91-100th quantile	0.32** (0.23)		0.36** (0.35)		0.25** (0.43)	
0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)=ref						
Age (years)	0.90* (0.05)		1.18* (0.07)	0.79** (0.08)	0.73* (0.16)	0.85** (0.05)
Gender						
Female	0.94 (0.10)		2.06** (0.17)			
Male = ref						
CALD						
Non-Anglo Australian	1.49** (0.13)					
Anglo-Australian=ref						
Skill level						
High	0.95 (0.31)	1.13 (0.98)	1.24 (0.46)		2.26 (0.61)	6.86** (0.72)
Intermediate	1.59* (0.18)	3.71* (0.62)	3.64** (0.44)		2.87* (0.39)	2.57** (0.25)
Elementary = ref						
Remuneration type						
Monetary	1.50 (0.28)	2.57*				
Reward only	2.08 (0.46)	1.04 (0.87)				
Neither pay or reward = ref						
Pay rate						
26-50th (\$6.01-8.57)	0.82 (0.13)	1.69 (0.31)	1.16 (0.20)	1.19 (0.20)	0.79 (0.20)	0.80 (0.14)
51-75th (\$8.58-13.66)	0.96 (0.12)	1.58 (0.28)	1.57* (0.20)	1.53* (0.20)	1.15 (0.20)	0.85 (0.14)
76-100th (\$13.67-highest)	1.03 (0.12)	1.37 (0.26)	0.82 (0.17)	1.25 (0.19)	1.03 (0.20)	1.18 (0.14)
0-25 th (lowest - \$6.00)=ref						
Hours						
6-10 hours a week	1.20 (0.12)		1.60* (0.18)			
11-15 hours a week	1.27 (0.17)		2.13* (0.30)			
15 hours plus a week	1.49* (0.18)		2.45* (0.32)			
0-5 hours a week = ref						
Regularity						
Casual	0.82 (0.20)	1.46 (0.40)	0.77 (0.29)			
Regular	0.87 (0.19)	2.27* (0.39)	1.132			
one-off = ref						
Constant	5.25* (0.74)	14.66	0.36 (1.08)	22.04* (1.23)	18.18* (1.19)	

Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially

Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility

Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships

Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing something useful

Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more

Model VI: I like the things I do at work

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

While extrinsic orientations are primarily a response to pecuniary incentives, intrinsic orientations are associated with other factors, especially class background, age and job skill level. The largest parameter estimates relate to socio-economic background. Compared to young people from the poorest neighbourhoods, other young people are between one-third and one-half as likely for the income they earn from work to contribute to household income. Furthermore the necessity to contribute to household income also appears to buttress other orientations. Compared to young people from the poorest backgrounds, other young people are between one-third and one-quarter as likely to feel that working provides them with a sense of self-reliance. We can surmise that the income contribution that young people make in economically disadvantaged households also valorises a sense of larger purpose, expressed as self-reliance here. This finding is important because much literature on young people's work in developed economies suggest that young people, if they contribute at all, only contribute indirectly to the overall household economy (Morrow 1996). While it is unlikely that most children work out of necessity, this does appear more likely for young people from the most disadvantaged backgrounds. Young workers from non-English speaking backgrounds are also 1.5 times as likely to contribute to family income.

In general intrinsic orientations decrease with age. Older workers are less likely to see their work as contributing something useful compared to younger workers. However opportunities for sociability are emphasised by older workers more than younger workers. The intrinsic enjoyment that work provides also decreases with age. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that older workers are less likely than younger workers to be in jobs where they can exercise initiative and autonomy over how they do their work (See Section 5.3). For the youngest workers it may be the first time that they are undertaking an activity that is not supervised by parents. According to Hungerland (2007) young workers are likely to take pride in their work, since they are aware that they are carrying a level of responsibility that is not normally expected of them. Through working, they experience themselves as 'older' and more 'adult-like'. However, for older workers, the novelty of the work wears off, but the independent availability of money means young people will stick with the work until they find a better position. The findings here suggest another dimension to this explanation by showing that the value of responsibility and autonomy is mitigated by a reduction in control at work. The majority of older workers, especially those in elementary skill jobs, are in jobs characterised by low autonomy. Younger workers appear therefore to emphasise work as an avenue for the expression of autonomy. Older workers are more likely to view work sceptically.

Skill level is also associated with almost all intrinsic work orientations. Higher skilled jobs provide a greater sense of responsibility, greater opportunities for sociability, emphasise self-reliance and provide far greater enjoyment compared to elementary skill jobs. Young people in high and intermediate skill jobs are approximately seven and three times respectively more likely to enjoy their work compared to young people in elementary skill jobs. For young people in intermediate skill jobs similar differences are evident for work providing a sense of self-reliance, responsibility and opportunities to build relationships. Therefore while elementary skill jobs provide some degree of regularity in conditions, less precariousness and some semblance of regular income, it is higher skill jobs associated with intrinsic orientations.

Whereas pay maps onto utilitarian uses of income, neither the likelihood nor amount of pay relates to altruistic use of income. We could expect that the more a young worker earns the greater their capacity to contribute to household income. However we do not find this. Instead young people who are paid are more likely to feel responsible and those who are paid reasonably high pay rates more likely to build relationships and feel though they are doing something useful at work. The strong relationship between application of skill and intrinsic orientations and the weak relationship between pay and intrinsic orientations suggests that, for young workers, incentives to work, such as the exercise of creativity, aptitude and technical capacity, diverge from extrinsic orientations, that is income. Incentives to work cannot entirely be replaced by money; high and intermediate skill workers are in part motivated by an intrinsic drive which is not necessarily substitutable by extrinsic financial payment²⁸.

Females are twice as likely to emphasise the importance of work providing opportunities to build relationships with other people. However females are less likely than males to indicate that work means they can be more self-reliant. Gender differences are therefore apparent-females emphasising and valuing work qualities that promote social connection. Furthermore the longer the work hours the more likely work will provide opportunities to build relationships. The discipline of a regular job is also associated with an increased sense of responsibility.

²⁸ Towse (2001) in critiquing the neo-classical model of wages also found a similar pattern of incentive structures for artists. Within the artistic community the capacity to exercise creativity freely could not be entirely substituted by money wages.

4.7. Conclusion to Chapter Four

This chapter has shown that young people are typically engaged in work that is part of the broader but secondary labour market. Most of the work young people perform are elementary skill jobs in the secondary labour market, such as retail, food preparation and labouring jobs. These jobs are characterised by low-wages, casual, part-time and insecure work with few chances of advancement. The debates in the children's work literature that centre on whether there are structurally speaking 'children's jobs', that is jobs which are more or less the exclusive preserve of children, or whether young people are involved in work more generally available on the labour market, overlooks the issue of where young people are structurally located in the labour market. While some young people are performing work that has traditionally been associated with children's jobs, such as baby-sitting and delivery work, young people are in fact engaged in a far more diverse range of work. More importantly the common characteristic of most of the jobs young people are employed in is that they are elementary skill jobs on the secondary labour market.

There are structural reasons for this deriving from transformations to the economy as a whole, which have had fundamental affects on the standard labour contract. The need to tie skilled workers into firms and reduce labour turnover among groups of workers with scarce skills (i.e. the primary labour market) is reliant upon the presence of a group of workers who are prepared to accept inferior pay, job insecurity and lower status, largely because they have an alternative role beyond that of being an employee. While the alternative role thesis has been applied to women, young people, who are primarily students and in most cases rely on their parents to have their basic needs met, are also considered 'suited' to provide labour to the secondary labour market. Young people's work-time arrangements are an example of this. However the degree that flexible work-time arrangements suit young people is contested (Willis 1998). For most young people in NSW, labour market regulations provide some protection in terms of work-time regulation and, unlike the adult labour market, exposure to contingent and precarious work arrangements is more likely for high skill workers, again emphasising the significance of this work as a type of alternative role. Yet when we consider the overall conditions experienced by young people in the formal economy, work time arrangements provide a general advantage to employers. Productivity is maximised by having young workers available when it suits the business, such as peak trading times, weekends and special events.

The gradual shift of children and young people from being important sources of labour on the formal labour market, to work being an alternative role for children and young people, has had

major consequences economically and culturally on how young people are perceived in relation to dependency, responsibility and material needs, and continues to play a major role in how young workers are subsumed ideologically into age-specific rather than production specific categories. The system of youth wages, whereby, employees are paid a proportion of the adult wage, illustrates this, by officially sanctioning low wages. Young people remain a group who are paid on the basis of personal characteristics, that is age, and on this basis are also perceived as less productive than adult workers, and can also be paid less than adult workers. Low pay may be justified by reference to the productivity of the workers and skill requirements of the work. Yet we have shown that most young people work in elementary skill jobs in the service sector where the productivity of the employee is only loosely related to their age, if at all. Furthermore, age related factors, such as educational qualifications, have little relationship with productivity in these jobs. The emphasis, especially in retail work, is on the presentation of the self, general competence and basic social skills, rather than specific technical knowledge and skill. Furthermore, White and Wyn (2004) suggest that the quantity of goods and services produced is not age divided, but set by external factors such as training and adherence to standards of productivity. Therefore the productivity of young workers in these areas is likely to be similar to other workers.

We have also found some degree of labour market segmentation within the youth labour market itself. The skills distribution is not as dispersed as in the adult labour market, where levels of education and increased specialisation produce a more evenly dispersed skill differentiation of occupations. While most young people's work involves elementary skill level jobs, small numbers of young people are employed in intermediate and high skill work. Furthermore there is some association between skill level and work conditions and skill level and work orientations, some of which confirm traditional understandings of the role that skill plays in determining work conditions, and others that do not. In summary there is evidence of a minority of high skill workers whose conditions are less formal but whose work provides opportunities for existential fulfilment and some opportunity for social rewards, and a majority of young people in elementary skill jobs that provide fewer opportunities for autonomy and fulfilment but provides greater income security and work regularity.

High skill workers are afforded discretion over how they do their work, greater opportunities to set the pace of their work and to actively participate in workplace decisions. Consequently they are more likely to enjoy their work. However the discretion and autonomy in work also acts to

structure the contract for labour and we see that work conditions are far less regulated in high skill jobs compared to elementary skill jobs. For young workers the freedom to control work tasks and work time (i.e. the labour process), is intertwined with an openness around employment conditions. The focus in many high skill jobs is the creation of some form of output, that is the work is task rather than time oriented and work processes reflect this. Therefore how much work and of what type can rarely be delineated in advance, resulting in a certain amount of latitude over planning and execution of work. For elementary skill jobs the performance of the work is far more controlled. Elementary skill workers work in jobs with less capacity to control work processes, whether that be how long to cook the burger or the appropriate manner in which to engage with customers, and less capacity to contribute to workplace decisions and consequently to do work that they are less likely to enjoy. The focus here is on doing the time rather than creating a certain output and therefore the performance of work can be specified in advance. Consequently work time is more controlled and work hours more regulated.

Therefore, while the range of possible material rewards is relatively limited for young people, for a minority of young people in high skill jobs, the exercise of skill appears to compensate for limited income and lack of work regularity. Furthermore, the exercise of skill not only compensates for the lack of some rewards but reinforces others. As well as pay rates, labour market segmentation is also evident in terms of investment in human capital, with young people in higher skill jobs having greater opportunities to develop the sorts of skills that will potentially lead to ongoing careers. Towse's (2001) discussion of creativity as a resource that can command scarcity rents is relevant here. Creativity, talent and skill are aspects of human capital in relatively short supply. These skills are most likely to be used (and in fact define) high-skill jobs. Consequently young people in higher skill jobs are more likely through their work, to experience themselves as competent and to be perceived as such by others. This suggests that the precarious nature of high skill jobs may be experienced as creative and autonomous opportunities to develop and exercise skill.

The different capacity to exercise autonomy and control associated with skill level is also reflected in the different value orientations towards work. The mix of motivations identified within the formal economy indicates the multi-dimensional nature of young people's economic activity. The importance of extrinsic motivations indicates the importance of consumption motives to young people. However our results suggest that the stereotype of the young

consumer is not justified. The consumption-centred position underestimates the extent that extrinsic motivations also indicate a need for exercising autonomy because children's social position offers few opportunities to do so. It also underestimates the capacity for altruistic behaviour, as evidenced by their work. Whereas objective work conditions, such as pay, are associated with instrumental orientations, the social characteristics of young workers are significantly associated with non-instrumental uses of income in the formal economy, indicating that latent characteristics of young people have some role to play. Furthermore skill level has an important relationship with several intrinsic work motivations. Work upholds a variety of interpretations for young people that not only centre on consumption, but also development of collegiality and self-reliance. Moreover for some young people, especially those from the least wealthy backgrounds, financial responsibility also involves contributing income to the household economy. Hence the purpose and meaning of this work varies according to class.

Having examined the formal economy we now turn to the informal economy. The discussion now shifts from the importance of regulation and skill, to the proximity and specificity of social relations.

Chapter Five: Enterprise and Network - Work on the Informal Economy

5.1. Introduction

The informal economy involves the production of, or trade in, goods and services that occur outside the purview of the state but are otherwise legal (Commission for the European Communities, 1998; Feige, 1990; Portes, 1994; Thomas, 1992; Williams and Windebank, 1998 Williams and Windebank 2001)²⁹. Occurring outside the formal, regulated economy, informal economic activities, whether remunerated directly or indirectly, cover a residual category of economic activities (Kesteloot and Meert 1999).

This chapter examines young people's involvement in the informal economy. It examines the extent of their participation in the informal economy, the types of work they perform, under what conditions they work and their work orientations.

We initially examine the regulatory deficit definition the informal economy in Section Two and discuss some of the structural changes that have resulted in the development of the informal economy in developed economies. In so doing two key hypotheses are identified that inform the analysis for the remaining chapter, the 'marginality' and 'worse conditions' hypotheses. The first pertains to whether informal work is a coping strategy employed by marginal groups, the latter whether, because outside of regulation, informal work is characterised by poor conditions.

Section Three profiles the range of work undertaken by young people within the informal economy. For the formal economy the use of existing coding frameworks assists in identifying similarities and differences with adult labour market. However for work undertaken on the informal economy an empirical typology from the 'ground up' is developed, guided by the International Labor Organisation's (ILO) enterprise-worker matrix. Three categories of informal work performed by young people on the informal economy are identified, enterprise workers, informal employees and associative workers. Each category of work is embedded in different social relations between 'worker' and 'employer' and form the analytical categories used to test the 'marginality' and 'worse conditions' hypotheses.

²⁹ It is not my intention to contribute to debates about what constitutes the informal economy, but to draw from general consensus within the literature to provide a foundation for the analysis in the chapter.

Section Four examines the social distribution of work within the informal economy and whether work arrangements differ for different groups of workers. In so doing we test the 'marginality' hypothesis and thus the level and characteristics of work-based inequality on the informal economy. We examine whether the likelihood of working on the informal economy varies by class background, gender, cultural background and geographically. However because social ties are especially critical to facilitating participation in the informal economy, then differences in participation between social groups tell us not only about which groups work on the informal economy but may also the social distribution of these social ties.

Section Five examines work conditions on the informal economy and assesses whether the lack of formal regulation translates into poor conditions for young workers on the informal economy. We examine whether work conditions are differentiated for informal workers depending on the social relations within which work is embedded. As in Chapter Four, several labour market conditions or 'securities' are analysed, income security, work security, representation and skill reproduction security.

Section Six then examines some of the orientations evident in work on the informal economy. Because informal economic activities are based in community and neighborhood relations, they are part of a system of reciprocal exchange (Polanyi 1944). This implies that a social network with symmetric links between members exists that generates the rules upon which such a system of exchange relies upon. Economic exchange on the informal economy is therefore reliant upon trust between the members of the network. We assess whether network solidarity, and particularly reciprocity, are evident normative structures for the operation of the informal economy for young people. Replicating the analysis in Chapter Four, we examine the degree of instrumentality, altruism and reciprocity on the informal economy.

5.2. Structural Embeddedness: Trends Underlying Informalisation in Developed Economies

5.2.1. *Defining the Informal Economy*³⁰

The notion of the informal economy has its origins in Hart's study of urban labour markets and informal entrepreneurs in Ghana (Hart 1973). In its original formulation, the distinction between the formal and informal economies was that between regulated wage employment and the unregulated work of self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. For Hart, the urban unemployed and underemployed were not a passive exploited majority but instead exercise strategies to obtain a livelihood. Hart's work instigated debate between those who view the informal economy as marginal and peripheral to economic development and those who argue that activities within the informal economy are an alternative dynamic source of development. This debate has resolved into a dialogue around whether workers on the informal economy are 'informal entrepreneurs' or 'disguised workers' (Barrett, Jones and McEvoy 1996; Cichocki and Tyrowicz 2010; Cross 1997; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989; Kloosterman Van der Leun and Rath 1998). While initially the informal economy was synonymous with capitalist underdevelopment in majority world countries, analysts began to recognize that the informal economy was an increasingly salient feature of developed economies (Castells and Portes 1989; Pahl 1984; Sassen 1991; Williams 2009).

Work by Pahl (1984, 1988), Mingione (1983, 1985, 1991) and Gershuny (1979, 1983) was pivotal in demonstrating that Hart's analysis had wider application. Pahl (1984), in his study of informal economic activities on the Isle of Sheppey, argued for the need to conceptualise work beyond formal employment, showing that individuals combine a broader range of activities to generate income (see also Castells and Portes 1989; Leonard 1998; Slack 2007a; Williams and Windebank 2005; Williams 2011). These scholars pointed out that informal work coexists alongside formal employment in societies with highly commoditized labour and consumption markets (Pahl 1984; Slavnic

³⁰ Contributing family workers, including self-provisioning for family, which are often included in the informal economy, will be examined in Chapter Six: The Family Economy. This is because work for family, which overlaps with both the formal as well as informal economy are mediated through kinship relationships rather than through relationships with other known persons. Within the framework of this thesis this introduces a distinct social dynamic into the meaning of work and the conditions that might be expected from work. In this thesis the informal and family economies are differentiated as associative and communal systems of work respectively. See Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework.

2010). While formal labour market participation is the principal means by which most people support themselves economically in industrial and post-industrial societies, a great deal of work is undertaken outside the regulatory confines of the formal labour market including through kinship, friendship and community ties such as household self-provisioning and interhousehold exchange of goods and services (Leonard 1998; 2000; Pahl 1984, Pahl and Wallace 1985; Slack 2007a).

The distinction between the formal and informal economy hinges on the presence or absence of state regulation, (Kus, 2010; Slack 2007b). We can refer to this as the 'regulatory deficit' definition of the informal economy. Sassen (1991) points out that we can only specify an informal economy because there is an institutional framework for economic activity largely determined by the state, which explicitly regulates the process and outcomes of income-generating activities through enforceable legal rules. Since state intervention is socially defined and varies across time and space, the boundaries of the informal economy also vary substantially according to the same dynamics (Castells and Portes 1989). The activity may be entirely licit, but because of the context in which it is done (for instance at home) is part of the informal economy. Similarly an activity may be in breach of existing codes of practice (for example occupational health or zoning) or licensing requirements (for example unlicensed 'gypsy' cabs), and also constitute the informal economy (Sassen 1991). The informal economy therefore encompasses activities such as tax evasion, welfare evasion, voluntary work, self-provisioning, some forms of self-employment, domestic labour and criminal activity (Leonard 1998). It is not therefore, the intrinsic characteristics of activities that determine informalization, but rather the boundaries of state regulation.

5.2.2. *Structural Trends in the Informal Economy*

Within a framework of postwar economic development, studies of the relation between the formal and informal economies have revealed an increase in informal activity, not necessarily accompanied by a compensating decline in formal activities (ILO 2002; Kesteloot and Meert 1999).³¹ Processes of globalization, economic restructuring, and market deregulation have served to increase the prevalence of informal work in advanced capitalist nations (Castells and Portes 1989; Cornea and Danziger 1997; Portes and

³¹ See also Williams and Windebank (2002). According to these authors, more time is spent on the informal economy than in formal employment. Citing figures from the United Kingdom, United States and various European states, informal work activities take up approximately 60 percent of total work time.

Sassen-Koob 1987). Strategies aimed at increasing competitiveness, cutting production costs, maximising flexibility in labour use and spatial destandardisation (home working), have facilitated informalisation of labour markets³². This trend has run counter to more conventional readings of capitalist development that markets for labour, goods, and services would be increasingly absorbed within the formal economy and that the informal economy would diminish (Slack 2007b).

Several theorists have explicitly conceptualized the interrelationship between the formal and informal economies from which we can take several leads for analysis. Gershuny (1979, 1983), reflecting on patterns of economic development in the late 1970's, argued that the consequence of capital-intensive "jobless growth" was an increase in the proportion of the population required to work on the informal economy, augmenting their low incomes through household self-provisioning or providing services on the informal economy. Gershuny argued that most people enter the informal economy because of unemployment or underemployment, and the low incomes that such jobs yield create a vicious cycle of poverty. Sassen has argued that informalisation processes support, rather than replace, formal economic activities. Sassen identifies two sets of mediating processes that promote the informalization of work. These are firstly, increased earnings inequality and associated restructuring of consumption patterns of those with high and low incomes; and secondly the inability of some providers of goods and services to compete for the necessary resources in urban contexts where leading sectors have sharply bid up the prices of commercial space, labour, auxiliary services, and other basic business costs (Sassen, 1989, 1991, 2010).

The first process is linked to polarization in the labour market; where consumption patterns among high and low income groups have a feedback effect on the organisation of work. Sassen argues that high income gentrification in inner cities requires a supply of low-wage workers. High income gentrification is labour intensive (hired cleaners, carers and drivers) and generates a demand for customised goods and services produced

³² Shifting production to the informal economy is one way of accomplishing cost cutting and flexibility aims because informal production is less costly (no taxes, lower wages, less compliance costs with workplace and environmental standards), particularly through the use of de-unionised labour.

through small runs and sold through small outlets³³. Subcontracting part of this production to low-cost operators, including sweatshops or households, is common, thus increasing informalisation. In another set of informal market establishments and labour markets, this time within low-income populations, consumption needs are met by manufacturing and retail establishments that can compete with cheap imports, those that are small, rely on family labour, and often fall below minimum labour and product standards. Low-income groups are therefore performing the work for their own communities and also for wealthy communities either through producing cheap customised goods or by travelling to wealthy neighbourhoods and providing services. Furthermore, the informal economy caters both to high and low income groups possibly involving distinct groups of workers and manufacturers.

The second mediating process Sassen describes involves inequality in the bidding power of firms for space (resulting from the dominance of high-profit industries, such as finance and specialized services in major urban economies, raising the price of commercial space). This creates inducements for informalization in a broad range of activities and spheres of the economy. Small low-profit firms can hardly afford to compete for space. The existence of an informal economy in turn emerges as a mechanism for reducing costs, because one way of solving the problem of high rents is to use spaces not zoned for commercial or manufacturing uses, such as basements in residential areas, or to use a space that does not meet safety standards.

Two hypotheses arise out of these discussions. Firstly, interpretations of the informal economy that emphasise unemployment or the informal economy as comprising niche labour would suggest that poorer and jobless households are more likely participants in the informal economy. We will refer to this as the marginality, or coping strategy, hypothesis. If this hypothesis is true, then more marginal groups, either economically or socially will be more likely to participate in the informal economy. We would therefore expect higher proportions of young people from low socio-economic backgrounds to participate in the informal economy. We will investigate this in Section Four.

³³ Middle class gentrification relies on capital-intensive development such as shopping malls, private vehicles, household appliances and equipment.

The second hypothesis arises out of the important defining characteristic of the informal economy, as occurring outside of legal and regulatory frameworks. The lack of formal regulation and structural trends towards destandardisation of labour suggest that conditions on the informal economy are poor such as low wages, arduous conditions, unpredictable hours and work in dangerous environments. We will refer to this as the 'worse conditions hypothesis',³⁴ examined in Section Five. The more nuanced hypothesis, however, is that work conditions are differentiated for informal workers depending on the type of work performed, drawing from Hart's research on whether those who engage in informal economic activities are 'informal entrepreneurs' or 'disguised workers'. The range of work on the informal economy is varied, and includes informal entrepreneurs, sweatshop production and casual industrial outworkers. Consequently conditions may also vary. We now turn to developing an empirical typology to guide the analysis.

5.3. Classifying Young people's work on the Informal Economy

Typologies of work that constitute the informal economy are prevalent perhaps because of the broad nature of regulatory deficit definitions. Generally these typologies conceptualise activities along a continuum. At one end are more 'organized' forms of informal work, often low-paid and undertaken by employees for a business that conducts some or all of its activity informally. At the other end are more 'individual' types of informality, covering work conducted by the self-employed concealing a proportion, or all, of their earnings, as well as casual one-off jobs. Many of these activities take place between friends, neighbours and relatives and may be legal, quasi-legal or illegal; involve cash or in-kind exchange (Gershuny 1979; Jordan, 1998; Jordan and Redley, 1994; Leonard, 1994; 1998; MacDonald, 1994; Williams and Windebank, 1999).

Perhaps the most comprehensive is that developed by the ILO (2002) that takes account of both the enterprise (type of production unit) and employment characteristics (type of job) to form an 'enterprise-worker' matrix of work on the informal economy.

³⁴ For child labour in developing economies, these hypotheses have been forcefully advanced by the ILO (2002). They argue that children work on the informal economy as a survival or coping strategy to meet the subsistence needs of their families. The most visible licit forms include washing cars, shoe shining, hawking, goods delivery and other 'street jobs'. Other forms of children's work on the informal economy include family or home based work (domestic work, subcontracted piecework); manufacturing; brick-making, stone carving, weaving; scavenging, construction and commercial agriculture. Rural children, particularly girls, tend to begin economic activity at an early age, some as young as five years.

Enterprises or 'production units' are distinguished between formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises and households. Jobs are distinguished according to their employment status and include own-account workers, employers, employees, contributing family workers, and members of productive cooperatives.

Through this process the ILO identifies several categories of informal employment, 'employees who have informal jobs'; 'own-account workers'; 'employers who have their own informal enterprises' and 'members of informal producers' cooperatives'. 'Employees who have informal jobs', whether employed by formal enterprises, informal enterprises or by households are considered to have informal jobs if their employment relationship is not subject to labour law, taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits (such as paid annual or sick leave). 'Own-account workers', 'employers who have their own informal enterprises' and 'members of informal producers' cooperatives' form three other informal employment categories. The informal nature of their jobs follows directly from the characteristics of the enterprises that they own or the cooperative of which they are members³⁵. While the correlation between conditions and categories of informal work remains an empirical question, the ILO typology is informed by the 'entrepreneur-disguised worker' continuum, with own-account workers and informal enterprise workers most clearly fitting into the entrepreneur model, (owning small scale means of production; having some degree of autonomy over work conditions; potentially hiring other workers) and informal employees fitting the disguised worker model (employed by other informal operators and potentially less autonomy to determine work conditions).

In this study, informal economy workers were identified where young people, in describing their work, stipulated that they worked for some form of informal employer (for example, family friend or neighbour), that they produced their own good or service or worked for some other organisation that was not a corporation or business, such as a community organisation. The ILO matrix was used as a guide to code the responses

³⁵ Households as production units include households producing goods for their own final use (e.g. subsistence farming, do-it-yourself construction of own dwellings), and those employing paid domestic workers. At the category level, the ILO also includes in their matrix 'contributing family workers', who work either in formal or informal enterprises, and 'own-account workers' producing goods for their own final use by their household, (for example, subsistence farmers and households engaged in do-it-yourself construction of their own dwellings form another category). These categories are examined in the Family Economy chapter.

provided by young people into informal work categories. These responses were classified into informal employment categories including informal employees, enterprise workers, and employees of informal cooperatives³⁶. The results are presented in Table 5.1, which presents occupation type (coded using the Australian Classification of Occupations) by informal employment category.

Table 5.1: Occupation type by Informal employment type

Occupation Type	Enterprise		Informal Employees		Associative		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Child care/other care work	55	34.4%	543	68.8%	0	0.0%	598	48.8%
Sports related work	2	1.3%	0	0.0%	224	87.8%	226	18.4%
Agricultural & horticultural work	40	25.0%	155	19.2%	4	1.6%	199	16.2%
Cleaning work	19	11.9%	64	7.9%	2	0.8%	85	6.9%
Teaching & tutoring	19	11.9%	3	0.4%	6	2.3%	28	2.3%
Labour, construction & labour trades	5	3.1%	22	2.7%	0	0.0%	27	2.2%
Sales work	8	5.0%	1	0.1%	12	4.7%	21	1.7%
Other service work	2	1.3%	12	1.5%	3	1.2%	17	1.4%
Administrative & clerical work	0	0.0%	4	0.5%	3	1.2%	7	0.6%
Entertainment & performance	4	2.5%	1	0.1%	2	0.8%	7	0.6%
Food preparation	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.4%	1	0.1%
Delivery work	0	0.0%	1	0.1%	0	0.0%	1	0.1%
Other food service	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.4%	1	0.1%
Non-labour trades	0	0.0%	1	0.1%	0	0.0%	1	0.1%
Other work	6	3.8%	1	0.1%	0	0.0%	7	0.6%
Total	160	13.1%	808	65.9%	258	21.0%	1226	100.0%

Three informal work contexts are evident, informal work for known persons (herein referred to as informal employees), 'own-account' enterprise workers and work undertaken for associative organisations. Informal employee work involves the production of goods or services where the 'employee' and 'employer' are known to each other, for example a young person hired by friends or neighbours, to provide a good or service. Enterprise work involves the production of goods and services by a young person running a small scale (mainly one-person) enterprise on the open informal market. Associative work includes work for third sector organisations, such as non-profit, community organisations and sports clubs, which fall between the formal

³⁶ For some responses it was difficult to determine who the work was undertaken for, especially where short responses were provided. This is critical to differentiate whether workers are own-account entrepreneurs or obtain their work through known informal networks – the latter having more particularistic relationships with those to whom they provide their services. This was particularly the case for care work. Unless otherwise specified it is assumed that care work was undertaken for known persons. Where a respondent specified that they offer care services, then they were coded as an own-account enterprise worker. The same rule is applied for cleaning and gardening jobs. Unless otherwise specified, tutoring or teaching is coded as own-account/enterprise worker. Where tutoring is specified within an organisational context ('School', 'Dad's martial arts class', 'Tennis club') then the response is coded as associative work.

economy and the household. Informal employees make up the largest category of informal employment for young people accounting for approximately two-thirds of work on the informal economy (n=808; 65.9%); work for associative organisations account for approximately one-fifth of work on the informal economy (n=258; 21.0%) and just over 13 percent of is enterprise work (n=160; 13.1%).

These categories emphasise the relationship between young worker and 'employer', rather than the type of work undertaken. If we consider these categories in the context of our broader theoretical framework, informal employee' relations are predicated upon strong ties ('particularistic' social relations) with their employers because these interactions involve work between persons with pre-existing social ties. Enterprise work is predicated upon weak ties (closer to 'universal' relations similar to the formal economy) because such work involves offering services to anyone who is willing to purchase the service. Associative work is organised through more formalised rules, mediated through third sector organisations. These characteristics will be more closely examined in the following sections.

Care work is the most prevalent type of work on the informal economy. Because care work is sporadic and reliant upon particularistic social relations it is an activity particularly likely to escape regulation. The second largest group of young people in the informal economy do sports-related work, as sports coaches or umpires. Almost all of this work takes place for associative organisations generally local sports organisations. Just over 16 percent of young people working on the informal economy do agricultural and horticultural work. Outside these three main occupation types, a range of other work is evident. This includes labour work such as renovations, alterations, and small scale construction (often project based work for neighbours). Other jobs include cleaning (mainly washing neighbourhood cars and houses, but sometimes offering car washing services), teaching (informal music teaching and school-work tutoring), sales work (selling goods at markets or on-selling to other distributors), entertainment work (mainly busking), and administrative work (largely helping out friends businesses by performing routine administrative tasks).

The diversity of work canvasses an unusual range of activities, which may be a result of the inadequate provision of goods and services by the formal sector and low-skill work

capitalising from lower end opportunity structures, such as those provided by friends and neighbours (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). The following examples are illustrative:

'Cutting fire wood for people in town.' (Male, 11 years)

'Demolition with a friend. Unbolting beams and stacking them.' (Male, 15 years)

'A person paid me to keep her house clean, payed weekly, washing cleaning vacuuming.' (Female, 13 years)

'Tutoring primary school children (years 3 and 5). Checking homework, teaching how to tell the time, spelling, multiplication, sentence structure etc.' (Female, 15 years)

'Teaching mums friend how to use a computer and the software. Teach how to use software, how to type and the features of a software/computer.' (Female, 14 years)

'I go to the shop for my neighbour and get rewarded.' (Female, 13 years)

We now turn to a more detailed examination of the three categories.

5.3.1. *Informal Employees*

Informal employee work is reliant on existing social networks, such as friendship and kinship ties, which are utilised to obtain and provide work. The work is carried out on an individual basis and the product is sold or provided to the user without intermediaries. According to Gershuny (1979) this means that the use value of goods and services is central, not their exchange value. Williams and Windebank suggest that this work involves non-market oriented production or exchange of goods and services between people who do not live in the same household (Williams and Windebank 2000. See also Burns and Taylor, 1998). Demand for informal activities is generated from within the communities where the activities are performed, that is the neighbourhood or community based economy provides the market. According to MacDonald (1994) some jobs would be no more than reciprocal friendship based activities: a form of localised, embryonic self-provisioning, such as doing handy work for a neighbour for a small amount or in return for a favour. Other jobs might involve longer term commitments which could last for months. These may be more lucrative but the work would more often be infrequent and irregular.

Most care, agricultural, cleaning, labour, other service and administrative jobs on the informal economy are held by informal employees. Care work (accounting for 68.8% of jobs for informal employees) and agricultural and horticultural work (accounting for 19.2% of jobs for informal employees) are the two largest occupational categories. Just over 90 percent (90.8%, n=543) of care work jobs take the form of informal

employment, largely because care work is reliant upon trust based relationships, such as for family friends and neighbours³⁷.

Most agricultural and horticultural jobs are organised through local and particular social networks also. In the urban context this involves work such as mowing and watering neighbour's gardens and taking care of neighbour's pets.

'Walking the neighbour's dog and looking after it. Walking, feeding and playing with the dog.' (Female, 12 years)

'Cut lawn around the street and get paid. The neighbours know me and I cut the lawn and they pay me.' (Male, 13 years)

'Helping an elderly person (my Grandmother's friend) around her garden i.e., garden work, digging, moving woodchips, dirt and mulch. And helping her with her computer.' (Male, 14 years)

In a rural context the tasks are more involved, that are more likely to contribute to reciprocal obligations within the local rural economy.

'Helping out on a friend's property. Check out the cows, rug horses, feed dogs, horses, just helping out.' (Female, 13 years)

'Breaking in horses for mum's friend.' (Female, 14 years)

The work of informal employees covers the ground between domestic work (i.e. unpaid work conducted by household members for themselves or other members of their household) and more formal institutions such as private, public and 'third sector' organizations charged with delivering goods and services either on a paid, statutory or volunteer basis. Williams and Windebank (2000) describe this work as a type of micro-level exchange that arises out of, and helps constitute, social networks and norms from which trust develops. Because the focus is on the provision of a good or service within a particularistic relationship, several interconnected hypotheses arise. We would expect that workers would not necessarily demand higher payment for their service, and may do work unpaid or as part of a pattern of gift exchange. We may also hypothesise that they would experience lesser levels of autonomy and control in their work and anticipate that the orientations of workers are more likely to emphasise reciprocity more so than instrumental attitudes. These will be examined in Sections Five and Six.

³⁷ No care work is offered via associative organisations (institutions) indicating the importance of direct interaction in the provision of care work and the irregularity in which it is supplied.

5.3.2. *Enterprise Workers*

Enterprise work involves the production of goods and services by a young person operating a small-scale enterprise on the open informal market. They are informal because the enterprise workers are unregistered and receive little or no legal protection. Consequently, most provide goods and services to households rather than selling into the formal economy. The provision of the good or service is not reliant upon pre-existing relationships although it may be provided to neighbours relatives and friends. Similar to the overall occupational profile of the informal economy, care work and agricultural work comprise over half the jobs undertaken as enterprise work by young people in the informal economy. Enterprise care work involves young people offering care work as a service to an open informal market. While inevitably these are small scale and localised, potentially anyone can take up the service.

'I babysit children under 5 for anyone that asks. I put the children to bed, clean the dirty nappies and I feed them.' (Female, 13 years)

Enterprise agricultural and horticultural work is similar to enterprise care work. It involves young people offering gardening and landscaping work within localised but non-particular markets. Some work involves highly particular skills. For example:

'Training and raising greyhounds, building their kennels, walking, feeding, raking yards.' (Male, 14 years).
'Training horses for people and get paid money for riding horse every afternoon. I feed and wash them before they take it away to somewhere' (Female, 13 years)

Although care and agricultural work dominate, a diverse range of other types of enterprise activity is also apparent, including production of consumer goods such as clothes and food; and traders who operate market stalls or produce goods such as jewellery or art to on sell. Some young people produce goods (sometimes quite specialized) that feed into the formal economy but in this study's sample, production of goods and services bought directly by consumers is typical. They produce and distribute goods and services generally within their community with very little capital or technology and generally at a low level of productivity.

'I sell jewellery. Making jewellery then selling it at markets.' (Female, 14 years)
'Selling bait to shop.' (Male, 14 years)
'Running a neighbourhood carwash business. We washed cars, inside, outside, dried etc. different prices for different tasks.' (Male, 13 years)
'Teaching violin to young students. Preparing work like music for my students to learn, photocopy music for homework, order new music book etc...' (Female, 15 years)
'Busking. I juggle for roughly an hour to 2 hours.' (Male, 13 years)

'Artist, I sell works. I do works of art and sell them to galleries.' (Male, 14 years)

'Collect golf balls and sell the golf balls.' (Male, 13 years)

This work exists in the interstices of the formal economy, consisting largely of economic activities also undertaken in the formal economy (Kawecka Nenga and Baccam 2010; Gershuny 1979). These jobs are therefore similar to MacDonald's (1994) 'fiddly jobs' obtained on the basis of reputation and facilitated by the falling cost of capital which makes it easier for individuals to own their own tools and therefore engage in enterprise work. Again, several hypotheses follow from the nature of the relationship between enterprise worker and consumer. Because the focus is on the delivery of the enterprise, relationships are expected to be more formal and universal and less particularistic. We would hypothesise then that they would demand higher payment for their service, experience greater levels of control over their work and that the orientations of workers would be income-oriented.

5.3.3. *Work for associative organisations.*

This category includes work for third sector organisations or associations such as non-profit or community organisations and sports clubs. While informal employees are locally hired by known persons and enterprise workers offer goods or services for an open market, associative workers are hired informally by associative organisations.

Organisational rules and affiliations structure this work, however even though the work takes place within an institutional environment it is informal in the sense that few or no regulations pertain as to employment conditions. Work-related practices and conditions are instead likely to be developed from agreed to and localized customs of practice. Such associations are on the verge of the formal production system because they operate on the basis of a quasi-money exchange, tokens or credits. For Gershuny (1979), this raises the possibility that relationships will break down if equal values are not exchanged within a relatively short period. Like informal employees, and in contrast to enterprise workers, the provision of the good or service relies upon existing relationships. However this does not arise out of neighbourhood or friendship based interpersonal relationships, but by virtue of engagement with the associative organisation.

Almost all young people doing associative work are in sports related occupations (n=224, 87.8%), but some undertake work for other organisations such as schools, religious groups and other community organisations. Sports-related associative organisations are not strictly formal labour market institutions, but nonetheless employ young people to

carry out important tasks that relate directly to the activities of the organisation, particularly coaching and refereeing.

'I teach karate in my karate club as an assistant teacher. Helping children with their uniforms, helping children with fitness & teaching the techniques.' (Male, 13 years)
'Netball Umpiring. Umpiring 3-4 games of netball on a Saturday morning.' (Female, 15 years)
'I coach a basketball team. Teach them skills and drills. Explain tactics and formations.' (Male, 15 years)

While no data was collected on the pathways into this work, because of the expertise required to umpire or coach, it is likely that young people become involved in this work through membership ties, becoming involved initially as a junior player and then over time progressing to umpiring or coaching. In this way the tasks are a mix of work and leisure, similar to volunteering in the moral economy. Therefore the forms of work carried on by actors are most likely to resemble volunteers, in the sense that the products are directed towards meeting the goals of the associative organisation and therefore related to use-value, rather than exchange value.

Because the focus is on the provision of a good or service for the association, is network-oriented and less particularistic, we would expect that work conditions are more formal for most conditions than work done by informal employees. However, because the reasons for involvement are for leisure or ethical commitment for instance, we can hypothesise that only a rudimentary system of exchange exists for this work and remuneration may even be in the form of symbolic rewards unpaid or as part of a pattern of gift exchange (Gershuny 1979; Taylor and Warburton 2011). We would hypothesise they would experience lesser levels of control in their work because work practices are regulated by organisational rules and procedures and that the orientations of workers would be altruistic.

Having established the types and categories of work young people are involved in on the informal economy, including that different categories of work are embedded in different social relations, we now turn to examining the social distribution of work on the informal economy overall and different categories of informal work more specifically.

5.4. The Social Distribution of Work within the Informal Economy

As discussed in Section Two, expansion of the informal economy has in part been driven by the demand for specialist services from niche markets and by the internal needs of low-income communities incapable of buying goods and services in the mainstream

economy. Among young workers in the informal economy we see some evidence of a service orientation in work with high levels of care work, cleaning and a diversity of specialised, production of goods and services for local use (Section Three). However we have also found high levels of associative work which are more closely related to third sector activities than informalisation processes more generally.

The implications of this analysis for the social distribution of work are whether informal work is primarily a strategy of the poor or an economic strategy of a broader segment of society. The 'marginality' or 'coping strategy' hypothesis holds that more marginal groups, either economically or socially will be more likely to participate in the informal economy, with the informal work providing goods and services to meet the needs of low-income households (Blair and Endres, 1994; Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Button, 1984; Castells and Portes, 1989; Elkin and McLaren, 1991; Gutmann, 1978; Kesteloot and Meert, 1999; Matthews, 1983; Mingione, 1983, 1991; Portes, 1994; Slack 2007b). If this hypothesis is correct, then informal economic activities will not only be more prevalent in poorer communities, but because such activities are a survival strategy, we would anticipate that these communities might also have more work organised through existing social networks, that is informal employees (Blair and Endres, 1994; Button, 1984; Elkin and McLaren, 1991; Haughton, Johnson, Murphy and Thomas, 1993; Robson, 1988; Williams and Windebank 2000).

The counter argument is that young people from wealthier households are more likely to participate in the informal economy because these households have greater human capital and social network resources, which are required for successful conduct in the informal economy. Pahl (1988) for instance has shown informal activities demand not only time but also the means of production, specialized knowledge, systems of information and exchange and a location where production can take place. Activities, such as gardening and do-it-yourself renovation and repairs, require tools and knowledge. Therefore it is middle class and wealthier neighbourhoods where informal economic activities are most likely to occur, especially small-scale localized activities that young people are involved in. Informal work is also associated with the needs of these households to purchase this work, providing a willing market that informal entrepreneurs may be able to capitalizing on, using their skills. Therefore we would not only expect a higher rate of participation in the informal economy in middle class and wealthier

neighbourhoods, but also a higher rate of participation in enterprise work. We now examine the social distribution of work on the informal economy.

As per the analysis of the formal labour market, two analytical strategies are used. The first examines the likelihood of working on the informal economy overall, compared to working in either the family or formal economy. The second examines the likelihood of undertaking enterprise work, being an informal employee or associative work, that is the social distribution of categories of work within the informal economy, using three dummy variables, each coding a respective category as 1, and all other informal work as 0 (e.g. Enterprise work= 1, Other work =0 as one variable, Informal employees=1, Other work=0 as another variable and so on). Each dummy variable was then treated as a dependent variable in logistic regression models with socio-economic background, age, sex, cultural background and rurality included as independent factors for analysis. The parameter estimates and model summary statistics for the likelihood of working on the informal economy and different sectors of the informal economy are presented in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Likelihood of working on the informal economy and informal work category by socio-demographic characteristics

		Model I Informal Economy ^a	Model II Informal Employees	Model III Enterprise work	Model IV Associative work
Socio-economic Status	11-25th quantile	1.10 (0.19)	0.66 (0.44)	1.20 (0.65)	1.45(0.53)
	26-50th quantile	0.97 (0.19)	0.32**(0.40)	1.83 (0.59)	2.90*(0.47)
	51-75 th quantile	1.20 (0.18)	0.32**(0.39)	1.28 (0.59)	3.83**(0.46)
	76-90th quantile	2.06***(0.17)	0.24***(0.38)	2.87 (0.57)	3.14*(0.45)
	91-100th quantile (least disadvantaged) 0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref	2.48***(0.18)	0.64 (0.40)	3.04 (0.58)	0.87 (0.49)
Age	Twelve	3.32***(0.19)	1.55 (0.39)	0.41 (0.48)	1.16 (0.47)
	Thirteen	3.67***(0.19)	1.19 (0.37)	0.66 (0.44)	1.19 (0.46)
	Fourteen	3.44***(0.19)	1.50 (0.37)	0.45 (0.44)	1.14 (0.46)
	Fifteen	1.61*(0.19)	0.90 (0.38)	0.84 (0.44)	1.44 (0.47)
	Sixteen=ref				
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.63***(0.10)	1.43 (0.20)	1.29 (0.26)	0.51**(0.24)
	Anglo-Australian=ref				
Rurality	Metropolitan	1.54***(0.12)	1.99**(0.21)	0.98 (0.31)	0.43***(0.23)
	Rural coastal	1.89***(0.13)	1.81*(0.23)	2.00*(0.34)	0.29***(0.28)
	Rural inland	1.82***(0.12)	2.52***(0.23)	1.37 (0.34)	0.26***(0.27)
	Sydney=ref				
Gender	Female	1.67***(0.07)	2.15***(0.13)	0.69*(0.18)	0.46***(0.15)
	Male=ref				
Constant		5.81***(0.43)	11.93*(0.92)	0.01***(1.29)	0.18 (1.07)

a) Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

The reference category is: Work in other economies *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Socio-economic status, cultural background, gender, age and rurality have a significant relationship with the likelihood that a young person will work on the informal economy as opposed to other economies. Younger workers, those from rural and regional areas, females, young people of Anglo-Australian background and young people from more advantaged communities are more likely to work on the informal economy.

Compared to sixteen year olds (the oldest in this study), young people of all other ages are more likely to work on the informal economy. However the parameter estimates are particularly large for 12 to 14 year olds, who are more than three times as likely to work on the informal economy as other economies compared to 16 year olds. Taken with the findings presented in Chapters Four and Six, this suggests a pathway of youth participation in the economy, from participation in the family and informal economies, which have fewer barriers to participation and which are likely to be embedded in day to day practices, to working on the formal economy, which is a progression into more adult and formally institutionalised economic practices. Older workers, who in other spheres of life are seeking greater autonomy and independence, undertake work requiring greater autonomy, initiative and enterprise. This provides an interesting contrast to the formal economy, where older workers are more likely to be involved in less autonomous work. Younger workers are undertaking work that takes place as part of particularistic and therefore potentially protective work environments. Underlying these concrete economic conditions, therefore, are social dynamics relating to transitions from childhood to adulthood.

Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are approximately two-thirds as likely as other young people to work on the informal economy reflecting the greater likelihood of young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds to work on the family economy (see Chapter Six). Females are almost twice as likely to work on the informal economy as males, reflecting the large amount of care work that is undertaken on the informal economy. Gender, a conventional predictor of formal labour market stratification, is also an important consideration in shaping the dynamics of informal work. One-quarter (n=686; 24.9%) of females work on the informal economy compared to 16.5 percent of males (n=535). Gender stereotyping effects modes of work undertaken by females, but is less evident for males. More than 70 percent (n=492;

71.9%) of the work performed by young women in the informal economy is care work. In terms of relative proportion in different types of work across gender, females dominate sales work and care work on the informal economy. Males are involved in a more diverse range of informal activities. Agricultural and horticultural work is most dominant, accounting for less than one-third of the work males perform on the informal economy (n=161; 30.2%). Males dominate agricultural and horticultural work, labour work, administrative work, other service work, cleaning, entertainment work and other work not elsewhere classified. Work such as labour and labour trades have been found to be highly represented in 'off the book' enterprise work. The tradeable skills required for this sort of work have been traditionally associated with male dominated forms of labour (Hoyman 1987; MacDonald 1994).

Young people from the most advantaged communities are most likely to work on the informal economy compared other young people. Compared to young people in the least wealthy neighbourhoods, those in the richest are almost 2.5 times as likely and young people from the second most advantaged communities are more than twice as likely to work on the informal economy. Working on the informal economy is also more likely in rural and regional areas than in urban areas, potentially indicating the vibrancy of local networks in these areas that underpin the ties necessary for the informal economy to exist. Compared to young people in Sydney, young people in rural areas, both coastal and rural, are 1.8 times as likely to work on the informal economy, and young people in regional metropolitan areas are 1.5 times as likely to work on the informal economy.

Socio-economic status, gender and rurality are significant factors predicting the likelihood of working as an informal employee. Similar to enterprise work, young workers from rural areas are approximately 2.0 to 2.5 times as likely to work as informal employees. A U-shaped distribution is evident, with poorer and wealthier young people being more likely than middle class young people to work for known persons. Compared to the most disadvantaged young people, middle class young people are between 0.24 and 0.32 times as likely to be informal employees. While females are less likely to undertake enterprise work, they are approximately twice as likely to work as informal employees.

Socio-economic status, rurality and gender are also significant factors in predicting the likelihood of enterprise work on the informal economy. The largest parameter effects are for rurality, with enterprise work being more likely in rural areas than metropolitan and city areas. In particular young people from rural coastal areas are twice as likely as young people in Sydney to be involved in enterprise work. Individual parameter estimates for class are non-significant, however the parameter estimates indicate that, compared to young workers from the poorest neighbourhoods, those from the wealthiest neighbourhoods are approximately three times as likely to undertake enterprise work. Females are less likely than males to undertake enterprise work. The results for age are also non-significant but indicate that younger people (12 to 14 years) are approximately half as likely to undertake enterprise work compared to 15 and 16 year olds.

Socio-economic status, gender, cultural and linguistic background and rurality are also significant factors predicting the likelihood of associative work. In terms of socio-economic status, an A-shaped distribution of likelihood is evident, inverse to that of informal employees. The poorest and wealthiest young people are least likely to undertake associative work, with young people from middle class neighbourhoods being between 2.9 and 3.8 times as likely to undertake associative work. Whereas young people from metropolitan and rural areas are more likely to be involved in enterprise work and as informal employees, they are less likely to be associative workers. Workers outside of Sydney are between 0.25 and 0.43 times as likely to undertake associative work. The differences are particularly large for rural workers who are about one-quarter as likely to undertake associative work. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds and females are approximately half as likely to undertake associative work.

In sum, informal work, taken as a whole, appears to reinforce socioeconomic inequalities with informal work most likely to be undertaken within wealthier neighbourhoods. While informal work may be more important to the ability of low-income households to make ends meet, young people from the most advantaged communities are more likely to work on the informal economy compared to young people from middle-class and poor neighbourhoods. This result is therefore consistent with studies that find that informal work is more prevalent in higher than lower income areas (Jensen Cornwell and Findeis, 1995; Laguerre, 1994; Pahl, 1984; Renooy, 1990; Waldinger and Lapp, 1993; Williams and Windebank, 1998). However the class distribution of different types of informal work

provides a more complex picture of the relationship between class and informal work. Young people from wealthier neighbourhoods are more likely to undertake enterprise work. This is consistent with the 'informal entrepreneur' hypothesis that suggests that informal entrepreneurial activities are reliant upon consumers with greater purchasing capacity to buy in services offered by enterprising young people. However, for informal employees, work most likely to be mediated by reciprocal relationships within existing social networks, poorer and wealthier young people are more likely than middle class young people to undertake this sort of work. This suggests that within poor neighbourhoods, there is some evidence of mutual aid or work performed by young people as a 'survival strategy' in the face of limits of other alternative economic opportunities. Greater unemployment and greater challenges in finding formal employment provide strong incentives to participate in interhousehold exchange (Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Campbell, Spencer and Amonker, 1993; Duncan, 1992). If we extend this to comment on community characteristics, the findings suggest at least some level of solidaristic relations within lower income neighbourhoods to support informal employment among working class young people (Young and Wilmott 1975). This is counter to narratives that depict these areas as characterised by fear, lack of trust, urban decline and alienation (see Williams and Windebank 2002 for a discussion of these issues in relation to the informal economy).

At the same time the hypothesis that informal economic activities are most likely to be undertaken by those who have the available resources is also evident in these results (see also Jensen Cornwell and Findeis, 1995; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998). Young people from wealthier neighbourhoods are more likely to be able to mobilise resources, such as tools and transport to undertake enterprise work (Pahl, 1984; Smith, 1986; Thomas, 1992). Poorer young people are more likely to trade in work involving low levels of capital, such as care work, which as we have noted, is also embedded in local social networks because it relies on high levels of trust. The smaller volume of money in poorer neighbourhoods potentially forces greater reliance upon friends and neighbours, on a voluntary, reward or nominal pay amount (Kesteloot and Meert 1999). This will be examined in Section Five. While social networks seem most pertinent in developing informal economic opportunities among the least and most wealthy young people, the inverse relationship is found with associative work. It is middle class young people who are most likely to engage in work opportunities provided by associative organisations. While poor and

wealthy young people appear to engage in work driven by instrumental or informal reciprocal orientations, middle class young people are engaged in work oriented towards leisure or value identities embodied in their participation in associations. This type of economic activity appears therefore to be related to middle-class leisure and lifestyle practices.

Informal work is an important aspect of the livelihood strategies of rural communities and factors prominently as an economic activity among young people from rural areas. One of the characteristics of rural life is the ability to maintain economic self-sufficiency by engaging in a range of livelihood strategies, including participation in informal economic activities (Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Brown, Xu and Toth, 1998; Campbell, Spencer and Amonker, 1993; Duncan, 1992; Edgecomb and Thetford, 2004; Fitchen 1981; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Jensen, Cornwell and Findeis, 1995; Levitan and Feldman 1991; Nelson, 1999a; Nelson and Smith, 1999; Pickering, 2000; Slack, 2007a; Tickamyer and Wood, 1998, 2003; Ziebarth and Tigges, 2003). A number of theoretically compelling reasons have been advanced to indicate why informal economic activities are an important economic strategy in rural areas. Low population density, the small size and geographical isolation of some rural communities can limit the size of the formal market, necessitating the development and reliance on informal alternatives (Levitan and Feldman 1991); the availability of natural resources in rural areas often forms the basic inputs for food, crafts and other goods produced for household self-provisioning and interhousehold exchange and allows opportunities for forms of informal work not available in urban areas (Brown and Kulcar 2001; Jensen, Cornwell and Findeis 1995, Nelson and Smith 1999). Furthermore because such activities depend on strong social networks, *gemeinschaft* relations thought to be more typical in rural communities might make rural life more conducive to participation in the informal economy (Levitan and Feldman 1991, Slack 2007a). Several of these reasons are plausible here. The development of informal alternatives to the formal market explains the increased likelihood of enterprise work which potentially is a low cost, low capital and local alternative that provides niche goods and products. Furthermore greater prevalence of associative work in large urban areas most likely reflects the greater number of third sector organisations in these areas. The availability of natural resources not only translates into small scale cottage industries that young people may be involved in with other members of their households, but is indicated in the moderately high proportion of

agricultural and horticultural work undertaken by young workers in the informal economy generally. The importance of strong social networks is directly indicated by the greater likelihood of working as an informal employee, but is also likely to increase word-of-mouth opportunities for young rural enterprise workers.

The increased likelihood of informal economic activities in rural areas, especially enterprise work and informal employee work, in combination with the findings on class, indicate that at least for young people, informal economic activities are not primarily a survival strategy utilized by the urban or inner-city poor, as suggested by Sassen. Sydney is characterized by large scale geographical suburban sprawl. Most young people, and especially the poorest young people live in the outer south-western suburbs of Sydney, and are consequently 30 or 40 kilometres away from wealthy neighbourhoods whose residents might utilize the sort of niche informal activities that Sassen discusses.

Therefore the spatial proximity between poor and wealthy neighbourhoods that links inner-city gentrification with informal economic activities, which characterizes cities like New York, does not exist to any great extent in Sydney, at least for young people. This is further exacerbated by the limited access that young people from the poorer areas of Sydney have to independent modes of transport, limiting their capacity to seek out informal economic activities outside their local communities. The social mix more evident in Sydney is between poor and middle-class localities. Sassen points out, middle class consumption patterns are reliant upon capital intensive rather than labour intensive infrastructure. This also decreases the informal economic opportunities for young workers from poor areas and also middle class areas. In this data this is shown in the lower likelihood of informal employee and enterprise work among middle class young people. Therefore the spatial patterns identified here interplay with the class dimensions discussed earlier.

Sociological studies of the urban economy suggest that immigrant communities have provided much of the requisite labor, sites for the development of, and entrepreneurial drive to initiate informal economic activities (Kloosterman, Van der Leun and Rath, 1998; Portes, 1995, 1998; Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). However, young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are less likely than young people of Anglo-Australian background to work on the informal economy. However, within the informal economy, significant differences are only apparent for associative work, with young people from

non-English speaking backgrounds less likely to undertake associative work. This may reflect the specific patterns of migration evident in Australia, where 'ethnic enclaves' which provide informal market opportunities are not as concentrated amongst single cultural groups as they may be in other countries. For example Kloosterman, Van Der Leun and Rath (1998) show that immigrant entrepreneurship is heavily skewed towards economic activities with low barriers of entry in terms of capital outlays and education.

5.5. Young People's Work Conditions in the Informal Economy

As discussed in Section Two, work conditions on the informal economy have generally been characterized as poor. Low wages, unpredictable hours, work in dangerous environments and the lack of effective representation, are seen as a consequence of being outside formal regulation and intrinsic to processes of informalisation - what we have referred to as the 'worse conditions hypothesis'. However in the absence of formal regularity and institutional boundaries, other normative structures may operate to regulate conditions. Because much informal work is based upon relationships within social networks, enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in group membership may instead exert influence over conditions. Conditions may be determined by informal or group rules, arrangements, institutions and structures which serve to build consensus around remuneration, hours and regularity, autonomy over performance of work and support in performing work. Compliance with negotiated agreements about conditions can be backed by group norms of trust and reciprocity and the ability to apply informal penalties for malfeasance (Portes, 1994).

From the previous sections we have also found segmentation of the informal labour market according to category of work. Building upon the 'informal entrepreneur-disguised worker' thesis we can develop some hypotheses regarding whether work conditions are differentiated depending on the type of work performed. For informal employees because work is organised through known social networks (and thereby potentially based in reciprocity), we would anticipate that informal employees are more likely to perform unremunerated work, more likely to receive lower levels of remuneration, less able to exercise control and autonomy in their work and potentially less able to determine when they work. Because enterprise workers are more 'market' and therefore income-oriented, we would expect that they are more likely to perform remunerated work, more likely to receive higher levels of remuneration and are able to exercise greater levels of control and autonomy in their work. For associative workers,

because the reasons for involvement are symbolic, for leisure, ethical or other intangible reasons, we would predict only be a rudimentary system of exchange and that returns for work might be largely in terms of symbolic rewards. Because of the rule-based and regular nature of the work, we would anticipate associative workers would experience less autonomy and control in their work. At the same time the quasi-organisational basis might offset poor pay and lack of autonomy through predictable and non-precarious work commitments, offer other conditions aimed at maintaining commitment or which reflect the ethical basis of the organisation, such as skill development opportunities.

In examining whether work conditions are systematically associated with different work categories, premised as they are on different social relations, we can gain some insight as to whether normative, as opposed to legal, structures regulate young people's work on the informal economy. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions in the informal economy. It indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of structural transformations earlier in this chapter inform our hypotheses around work conditions, and how the work security measures map to these hypotheses.

Table 5.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the informal economy

Concept		Hypothesis	
<p>Globalization, economic restructuring, and market deregulation have increased the prevalence of informal work</p> <p>The distinction between formal and informal labour markets hinges on the presence or absence of state regulation - regulatory deficit' definition of the informal labour market.</p> <p>Two arguments regarding the structural role of the informal economy. Informal economy as marginal and peripheral to economic development; and informal economy as an alternative dynamic source of economic development. This debate has resolved into a dialogue around whether workers on the informal economy are 'informal entrepreneurs' or 'disguised workers.'</p> <p>In the absence of formal regularity and institutional boundaries other normative structures operate, based upon weak or strong ties within social networks. Conditions are largely determined through enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in group membership.</p>		<p>Worse conditions hypothesis: The lack of formal regulation and structural trends towards destandardisation of labour mean that conditions on the informal economy are poor, experienced as low wages, unpredictable hours, lack of support, control and effective representation.</p> <p>Work conditions differentiated for informal workers depending on the type of work performed.</p>	
Decent Work Security			
<p><i>Work security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of hours worked; • work regularity <p>Informal employees less able to determine when they work. Enterprise workers less likely to determine when they work and have less regular work. Associative workers more regular hours of work.</p>	<p><i>Income security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • likelihood of being paid; • level of remuneration <p>Informal employees are more likely to perform unremunerated work, more likely to receive lower levels of remuneration. Enterprise workers more likely to perform remunerated work, more likely to demand higher levels of remuneration. Associative workers may be remunerated through symbolic rewards.</p>	<p><i>Representation security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fair say at workplace; • task autonomy; • control over breaks; • control over when worked <p>Informal employees less able to exercise control and autonomy. Enterprise workers more likely to exercise greater levels of control and autonomy in their work. Associative workers have little control over how they do their work.</p>	<p><i>Skill reproduction security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • task instruction; • training; • workplace support; • skill development <p>Skill reproduction opportunities available for associative workers and to a lesser extent enterprise workers. Support evident for informal employees, but skill development not evident.</p>

Following the analysis undertaken in Chapter Four: The Formal Economy, several types of work conditions are operationalised adapting the ILO (2002) measures of work securities. For details of these measures, see Chapter Three.

5.5.1. Work Security and Commitment in the Informal Economy

As discussed in Chapter Four, limits on working time are a fundamental condition of work. However for the informal economy, working hours are regulated through the expectations of the worker and employer/purchaser, rather than formal regulations that set work times. The time commitments on the informal economy are instead embedded in the nature of the social relationship between the parties to the economic transaction, and therefore are likely to be task rather than time-oriented. We hypothesised that informal employees, whose work is determined through needs arising within local social networks, are potentially less able to determine when they work. Similarly, enterprise workers, responding to demands for service, may be able to exert minimal amounts of control over when they work. For associative workers, we anticipate that because work performance is determined by agreed rules, much like the formal labour market, they will have predictable and non-precarious work commitments.

Consistent with the analysis in Chapter Four, two variables are used to measure 'work commitment' - the number of hours worked per week and work regularity (whether the work was one-off, casual 'as-needed' or regular – involving set times). Informal work category and socio-demographic variables are included as independent variables, the latter to determine whether these factors function as latent explanatory variables for work commitment. These models are presented in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Hours worked (two category) and regularity by informal economy category and demographic characteristics

		Work 11 hours + ^a	Casual ^b	Regular ^b
Informal Employment	Enterprise	5.43**(0.54)	1.40 (0.49)	0.31*(0.48)
	Informal Employees	3.99**(0.49)	0.98 (0.38)	0.10*** (0.36)
Associative org. = ref.				
Age	Twelve	0.39 (0.60)	0.67 (0.82)	0.39 (0.85)
	Thirteen	0.53 (0.54)	0.46 (0.80)	0.44 (0.82)
	Fourteen	0.42 (0.55)	0.79 (0.80)	0.50 (0.83)
	Fifteen	0.48 (0.57)	0.43 (0.81)	0.33 (0.83)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic Status	11-25th quantile	0.47 (0.71)	1.52 (0.63)	2.50 (0.70)
	26-50th quantile	0.77 (0.62)	0.82 (0.56)	1.30 (0.63)
	51-75th quantile	0.78 (0.59)	0.86 (0.53)	1.58 (0.60)
	76-90th quantile	0.60 (0.61)	1.20 (0.55)	2.06 (0.61)
	91-100th quantile	0.73 (0.63)	1.44 (0.57)	1.32 (0.65)
0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref				
CALD	Yes	1.12 (0.36)	0.97 (0.33)	0.90 (0.35)
	No=ref.			
Gender	Female	0.90 (0.25)	2.14*** (0.22)	1.67* (0.24)
	Male=ref.			
Rurality	Metropolitan	0.97 (0.42)	0.92 (0.37)	0.78 (0.39)
	Rural coastal	0.83 (0.46)	1.28 (0.40)	1.07 (0.43)
	Rural inland	1.51 (0.43)	1.04 (0.39)	0.90 (0.41)
	Sydney=ref			
Intercept		0.84**	0.96	1.00

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

a The reference category is: 1-10 hrs.

b The reference category is: one-off.

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

The unregulated nature of work on the informal economy is borne out in the high levels of casual, as-needed work. Over half of the jobs performed (n=614, 54.1%) are casual and approximately one-third (n=410, 36.1%) are regular. Fewer than 10 percent are one-off (n=112, 9.9%) and fewer than 7 percent of workers on the informal economy work more than 11 hours per week (n=79; 7.0%). Work commitment for enterprise and informal employees is similar, the modal category for both being casual and involving low hours (1-10 hours) work, accounting for half of enterprise jobs and approximately 60 percent of informal employee jobs. The work commitments of associative workers are different than enterprise workers and informal employees, with approximately three-quarters (n=181, 73.0%) of associative workers working regular, low-hours work.

When hours of work are modelled we find that enterprise workers and informal employees are 5.4 and 4.0 times respectively more likely to work longer hours than

associative workers. Despite the inclusion of socio-demographic characteristics, no other parameter estimates are significant, indicating the strong underlying relationship between the category of informal work, and thus the social relations that these different types of work are embedded in, and hours worked³⁸. When work regularity is considered, the descriptive frequencies are confirmed. Enterprise workers and informal employees are less likely to work regularly than associative workers, with no difference in casual work. The differences in likelihood are quite stark. Enterprise workers are 0.3 times and informal employees 0.1 times as likely as associative workers to work regularly. Females are also more likely than males to work regularly (1.7 times) and as-needed (2.2 times).

In terms of work commitment therefore, few differences can be observed between enterprise workers and informal employees, with the work commitment profiles for both groups of workers characterised by sporadic and irregular times. This pattern is characteristic of the informal economy experience of young workers regardless of socio-demographic characteristics, indicating that contingent work commitments are a characteristic the informal economy generally. There are two exceptions to this. Females work more regularly, possibly related to ongoing care jobs they are involved in. However the more marked contrast is for associative work which is both regular and involves less hours compared to enterprise and informal employee work. Rather than being reliant upon the fluctuations of demand generated from social networks or the open informal market, associative work is generated through the operation of associative organisations whose schedules are generally fixed and regular, the times set often months in advance. In fact the existence of these associations is reliant upon the ongoing and regular labour of its members.

³⁸ When hours of work are further disaggregated and modelled against informal work category, compared to associative workers, enterprise workers are 6.5 times more likely to work 16 hours or more, 4.9 times to work 11 to 15 hours and 2.3 times as likely to work 6-10 hours. Informal employees are 4.6 times to work 16 hours or more, 4.1 times to work 11 to 15 hours a week and 2.3 times as likely to work 6-10 hours.

5.5.2. *Income security: Likelihood and level of remuneration*

The likelihood of pay by informal employment category and socio-demographic characteristics of workers is presented in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Likelihood of pay by informal employment category and Socio-demographic characteristics

		Monetary	Reward Only
Informal Employment	Enterprise	0.63 (0.78)	0.17*(0.91)
	Informal employee	0.38 (0.60)	0.18*(0.65)
	Associative = ref.		
Age (years)		1.30 (0.16)	0.95 (0.19)
Socio-economic Status	11-25th quantile	1.20 (0.85)	1.66 (0.98)
	26-50th quantile	0.55 (0.74)	0.55 (0.89)
	51-75th quantile	0.54 (0.72)	0.59 (0.86)
	76-90th quantile	1.84 (0.84)	0.40 (1.06)
	91-100th quantile	3.68 (1.00)	1.23 (1.18)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref		
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.26**(0.43)	0.61 (0.52)
	Anglo Australian =ref.		
Gender	Female	0.71 (0.36)	0.73 (0.42)
	Male=ref.		
Rurality	Metropolitan	3.17 (0.69)	1.88 (0.82)
	Rural coastal	1.94 (0.56)	2.30 (0.65)
	Rural inland	0.91 (0.52)	0.73 (0.65)
	Sydney=ref		
Intercept		(2.33)	(2.77)

a The reference category is: Neither pay nor reward.

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

While modes of remuneration on the informal economy encompass a broad range of social relations, from cash for work, to barter exchanges and gift exchanges, almost 90 percent (n=1052; 87.5%) of young people working on the informal economy are paid monetarily. Non-monetary remuneration (a gift in lieu of money) is less frequent, with only 8 percent of young people (n=94; 7.8% of remuneration type) remunerated this way on the informal economy. Less than five percent of work is done for no remuneration at all (n=56; 4.7%). The cash economy is most prevalent for enterprise workers (although this is the most common form of exchange for all categories) where transactions are embedded in the least particular relations between buyer and seller, with 92.3 percent of enterprise workers paid for their work compared to 87.1 percent of informal employees and 86.0 percent of associative workers. The barter or reward economy is most prevalent for associative workers. Almost 12 percent of associative workers are remunerated non-monetarily, compared to 7.3 percent of informal employees and only 3.9 percent of

enterprise workers. The gift (unpaid) economy is most prevalent for informal employees, with exchanges occurring in highly particular social relations. Informal employees have the greatest proportion of non-remunerated work, with 5.6 percent of these workers being unpaid, compared to 3.9 percent of enterprise workers and 2.3 percent of associative workers. While no significant differences are associated with monetary reward and type of informal employment work, the likelihood of being rewarded is higher for associative work than enterprise workers or informal employees. Enterprise workers and informal employees are less than one-fifth as likely as those who work for associative organisations to be rewarded non-monetarily for their work.

The extent and character of remuneration also differs demographically, spatially and socio-economically. Cultural and linguistic background has a significant relationship with likelihood of monetary remuneration. Significantly, young workers from non-English speaking backgrounds are approximately one-third as likely to be paid monetarily for their work as other young people. Socio-economic status also has an effect on the model overall, but no significant differences are apparent at the parameter estimate level.

However young people from the most advantaged communities are more than 3.5 times as likely to be paid monetarily and those from metropolitan areas approximately 3 times more likely to be paid. The greater likelihood of being paid in wealthier neighbourhoods further suggests that households in wealthier neighbourhoods are more able to pay for informal work than households in less wealthy communities, which potentially translates into greater instrumentality in wealthier neighbourhoods and greater reciprocity in poorer neighbourhoods (Williams and Windebank, 2002).

There is, therefore, some evidence that network characteristics have some effect on remuneration for particular demographic communities. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds in particular are least likely to be paid and there are tentative results to suggest the barter and gift economies are more prevalent in the poorest communities and outer-metropolitan areas. In terms of our hypotheses we find some indication of high levels of instrumentality in the informal economy indicated by the high level of cash payment, at rates similar to the formal economy. Furthermore, aspects of the enterprise-worker hypothesis appear to be confirmed – informal employees are most likely to perform unremunerated work (what Williams and Windebank (2002) refer to as 'unpaid mutual aid'), enterprise workers are most likely to be remunerated for their work

and associative workers most likely to be rewarded for their work relative to other categories of work. These findings are in line with the theoretical expectations regarding the nature of social relations that embed different categories of work.

According to the hypotheses identified earlier in this chapter, we would anticipate that enterprise workers will receive the highest level of pay, informal employees the least, and associative workers, working in semi-regulated environments, have the least income dispersion. Isolating only young workers who are paid we can determine whether there are differences in pay rates that may compound the inequities in likelihood of pay. The level of pay across informal work types is presented in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6: Hourly pay rate by informal work category

Statistic	Enterprise	Informal employees	Associative	Informal Economy
Mean (S.E. mean)	\$12.56 (\$1.57)	\$8.78 (\$1.16)	\$9.09 (\$0.53)	\$9.37 (\$0.32)
95% CI mean (L-U)	\$9.44 - \$15.67	\$8.16 - \$9.40	\$8.05 - \$10.14	\$8.74 - \$10.01
5% Trimmed Mean	\$9.81	\$7.96	\$8.22	\$8.21
Median	\$8.00	\$8.00	\$8.00	\$8.00

Average incomes in the informal economy are much lower than in the formal economy. The median pay rate in the informal economy is \$8.00, with the mean being \$9.37, compared to a median of \$8.57 and a mean of \$12.32 in the formal economy. Not all jobs in the informal economy yield trivial incomes however. Many young workers in the informal economy, especially enterprise workers, are paid at similar or better rates than some young workers in the formal economy. At the low end of wages within the informal economy, one quarter of the distribution falls below \$4.00 or less. The top 10 percent of pay rates start at approximately \$16.00 per hour. The middle 50 percent of scores range from \$4.00 to \$12.00. The ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile scores is 10.00, indicating that those whose pay falls at the 90th percentile are paid ten times as much as those whose pay falls at the 10th percentile. This is larger than that found among young workers in the formal economy, indicating significant wage inequality within a compressed distribution of wages.

While no significant differences are apparent in the *likelihood* of pay, large differences in *level* of pay are apparent between enterprise workers and other workers in the informal economy. When comparing mean hourly pay rates, enterprise workers are paid \$3.78 more per hour on average than informal employees and \$3.47 more per hour on average than associative workers. The dispersion of pay is also much greater for enterprise workers, with the standard deviation for enterprise workers being over \$18.02, compared

to approximately \$7.88 for informal employees and \$7.46 for associative workers. Therefore some mechanism of 'wage discipline' is evident for associative workers and informal employees. As expected, wage dispersion is smallest for associative workers, but social norms based in neighbourhood relations also exercise some regulation for the range of pay received by informal employees. The influence of such norms is not as evident for enterprise workers, where pay rates are much more dispersed.

To explore further the distribution of payment among different groups of informal economy workers and to determine whether different sub-populations of young workers are more likely to receive different levels of pay, the inter-quartile range of hourly pay rates was calculated and income levels bracketed into four categories, from the lowest quartile of pay (\$4.00 per hour or less) to the highest quartile (\$12.01 or more). Using the lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as the reference group, multinomial logistic regression analysis was undertaken to determine whether the likelihood of receiving moderate and high pay rates were determined by informal employment category and socio-demographic characteristics of the young worker. The results are presented in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7: Pay rate by work category and demographic characteristics

		26-50th percentile (\$4.01-8.00)	51-75th percentile (\$8.01-12.00)	76-100th (\$12.01- highest)
Informal Employment	Enterprise	1.08 (0.33)	0.92 (0.40)	2.81** (0.35)
	Informal employee	1.55 (0.23)	1.39 (0.34)	1.39 (0.26)
	Associative = ref.			
Age	Twelve	0.28* (0.56)	0.31* (0.56)	0.18* (0.58)
	Thirteen	0.48 (0.54)	0.43 (0.71)	0.32 (0.54)
	Fourteen	0.59 (0.54)	0.47 (0.71)	0.72 (0.53)
	Fifteen	0.62 (0.55)	0.77 (0.72)	1.39 (0.55)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	2.20 (0.49)	0.95 (0.55)	2.68 (0.67)
	26-50th quantile	1.16 (0.45)	0.65 (0.49)	1.38 (0.63)
	51-75th quantile	1.42 (0.44)	0.85 (0.47)	1.84 (0.61)
	76-90th quantile	1.57 (0.43)	1.09 (0.47)	3.81* (0.59)
	91-100th quantile	2.18 (0.46)	1.55 (0.50)	2.80 (0.62)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.60 (0.26)	0.52* (0.29)	0.99 (0.29)
	Anglo Australian =ref.			
Gender	Female	0.66* (0.17)	0.50*** (0.18)	0.28*** (0.22)
	Male=ref.			
Rurality	Metropolitan	1.12 (0.27)	1.49 (0.30)	0.71 (0.33)
	Rural coastal	1.17 (0.30)	1.67 (0.34)	0.82 (0.39)
	Rural inland	0.66 (0.30)	0.87 (0.33)	0.46* (0.38)
	Sydney=ref			
Intercept		(0.67)	(1.07)	(0.69)

a The reference category is: 0-25th percentile (\$0-20.00).

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

The regression model, in general, confirms the descriptive analysis of rates. Enterprise workers are almost three times more likely to be paid the highest rates than other workers on the informal economy. However apart from this difference at the highest end of pay rates no other significant differences are evident. Age and gender are also important determinant of pay rates in the informal economy, reflecting particular age and gender-based norms around what is appropriate to pay older workers compared to younger workers, and male workers compared female workers. We see a general tendency for older workers to be more likely to be paid higher rates, however the only significant difference is that 12 year olds are less likely to be paid medium or high pay rates, ranging from 0.31 times for rates falling in the 51-75th percentile of rates, to 0.18 times as likely as 16 year olds to be paid rates falling in the highest quartile. A similar type of finding is evident for females, with females being less likely to be paid anything but the lowest pay rate compared to males. Furthermore, the higher the percentile of rates, the less likely females will be paid those rates – females working in the informal economy

are 0.66 times as likely to be paid rates falling in the 25-50th quartile, 0.50 times as likely to be paid rates falling in the 51-75th quartile, and only 0.28 times as likely to be paid the highest rates. Therefore, females are concentrated in the lower-income segments of the informal economy. We also find some differences associated with cultural and linguistic background (young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds being half as likely to be paid rates within the 51-75th quartile) and rurality (young people from rural inland areas being half as likely to be paid the highest pay rates). The class effects on pay rates are moderate and like category of work only appear to be statistically significant at the highest pay rates, with young people from upper-middle class backgrounds being almost four times as likely as young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods to be paid the highest rates. Apart from that patterns are varied, with some indication that young people from the least wealthy backgrounds are more likely to be paid the lowest rates. However this is only a suggestive finding as the results are not statistically significant. Therefore the results provide only tentative support for low levels of pay in the informal economy being a function of the work being undertaken by low-income people for low-income communities (Leonard 2000). While the financial returns from informal economy work appear to be more modest than those young workers obtain in the informal economy, this appears to hold across the class spectrum, not just for the least wealthy young people. Other factors, such as the type of work involved, age and gender dynamics, rather than the purchasing power of local communities (which could potentially result in different pay levels across socio-economic brackets), explain variation in pay levels.

5.5.3. *Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy*

In section 5.1 we found that patterns of work commitment for informal employees and enterprise workers are characterised by a certain degree of 'flexibility' – work is irregular, although work hours across the informal economy are not particularly high. Associative workers, in contrast, are more likely to work regular and shorter hours. The degree that these 'objective' conditions are experienced as flexibility or precariousness (an element of the 'informal entrepreneur-disguised worker' hypothesis) depends as much on the degree of control and autonomy young workers are able to exercise in their work as it does upon the predictability of their work time. As in the formal economy, flexibility may be used by 'employers' for their own needs to shift risks onto young workers, or flexibility may allow young people to organise their work around other commitments. In general we would expect that the level of control would relate to the social relationship in which the

economic transaction is embedded. Specifically, because informal employees work for people they know, expectations of reciprocity may limit their ability to exert control over the relationship, whereas the opposite is likely to characterise enterprise work, which is organised through an open and impersonal market. Associative workers, who work in rule bound organisations, are likely to have the least autonomy and control over their work. Data testing these hypotheses is presented in Table 5.8. Only the significant results are presented.

Table 5.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I Fair say	Model II Do things own way	Model III Take break	Model IV Take days off	Model V Change Work hours
Informal Economy	Enterprise	2.08 (0.38)	2.11*(0.31)	6.11***(0.29)		2.58*(0.47)
	Informal employees Associative = ref	1.95* (0.30)	1.84*(0.24)	4.85***(0.23)		2.17*(0.31)
Age	Twelve	4.76** (0.52)	1.57 (0.46)		3.45**(0.46)	
	Thirteen	4.70** (0.47)	2.44*(0.43)		3.29**(0.43)	
	Fourteen	3.45* (0.46)	1.65 (0.43)		2.89*(0.43)	
	Fifteen	2.37 (0.47)	1.62 (0.44)		2.39*(0.44)	
	Sixteen = ref					
Rurality	Other metropolitan					3.21*(0.45)
	Rural coastal					1.27(0.43)
	Rural inland					1.83(0.43)
	Sydney=ref					
Gender	Female			0.42***(0.17)		
	Male=ref					
Hourly rate	26-50th (\$4.01-8.00)	1.78* (0.27)				
	51-75th (\$8.01-12.00)	3.19***(0.33)				
	76-100th (\$12.01-highest)	2.01* (0.33)				
	0-25th percentile (lowest - \$4.00)=ref					
Hours	6-10 hours a week				1.08 (0.20)	
	11-15 hours a week				2.00 (0.45)	
	15 hours plus a week				5.41*(0.77)	
	0-5 hours a week =ref					
Constant		55.61*(1.49)	7.14(1.21)	23.37*(1.15)	11.70*(1.15)	13.38 (1.86)

Model I - I have a fair say about things that happen at work

Model II - I can do things my own way in my job

Model III - I can take a break when I want to in my job

Model IV - I am free to decide when I can take days off work

Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

A majority of young people are able to exercise some degree of workplace control in the informal economy. Eighty-six percent (n=931) of young workers on the informal economy are able to contribute to workplace decisions ('I have a fair say about things

that happen at work') which, in the informal economy, is likely to mean something closer to setting the overall parameters of how work is done and the conditions of work. Fewer young workers are able to exercise task autonomy ('I can do things my own way in my job': n=869; 78.1%), exercise control over work-day time ('I can take a break when I want to': n=682; 62.8%) and control when worked ('I am free to decide when I can take days off work': n=709; 69.4%). Apart from associative work, which is structured around institutional requirements, this is quite a significant proportion given that the normative and institutional leverage that exists in the formal economy (contracts of employment) is not evident in the informal economy. However just over 90 percent (n=894; 90.6%) are able to alter their work hours with their employer if they need to do something important.

Reflecting the rule-based functioning of their work environment, associative workers are least likely to be able to contribute to workplace decisions, exercise task autonomy and are less likely to be able to exercise control over work day time. Other workers are twice as likely as associative workers to be able to contribute to 'have a fair say about things at work', however this result is only statistically significant for informal employees.

Enterprise workers and informal employees also are approximately twice as likely to be able to exercise task autonomy (especially enterprise workers, who are 2.11 times more likely to 'do things their own way'). The institutional regularity of associative work also sets stricter parameters about when work can be done, with their particular tasks being highly structured. Enterprise workers and informal employees are respectively 6.11 and 4.85 times more likely to take a break when they want to compared to associative workers. Notably enterprise workers are most able to exercise work-time control within the informal economy. Enterprise workers and informal employees are also more than twice as likely to be able to renegotiate their work times in response to non-work needs (i.e. change work hours in response to something important).

Enterprise workers and informal employees appear to have some degree of autonomy and control over the work process. The majority have some degree of control over work-time, are able to exert task autonomy and have some degree of workplace participation. However the degree of autonomy experienced at work is potentially undermined by the highly contingent nature of work commitments for these groups of workers, as found in section 5.1. Yet, given their status as secondary workers, there is nothing to suggest that

this contingency is experienced as precariousness. The experience of associative workers is somewhat different, who, because of the organisational basis of their work, are less likely to experience all facets of autonomy and control in their work. However, the potential pay-off for this lack of control is greater certainty over when work happens and higher levels of social integration or identification with the work tasks.

As well as being embedded in different relational contexts, experiences of autonomy and control are also embedded in the experiences of different sub-populations of young people. Perhaps counter-intuitively, older workers have less autonomy and control in their work than younger workers. This is because we would expect that task autonomy should increase with age, for example because older workers are entrusted with greater responsibility over how they do their tasks than younger workers. Instead, the ability to contribute to workplace decisions, have task autonomy and exert control over work time decreases with age. This is similar to the pattern evident on the formal economy, where autonomy and control decreases with age. The parameter estimates are quite large for workplace participation (between 3.45 and 4.76 times) and ability to take days off (between 2.39 and 3.45 times) and generally increases the younger the worker. Young workers from outer metropolitan areas are also approximately three times as likely to be able to change their work hours for an important non-work commitment ('If I need to do something important, the person I work for lets me change work hours') and females are 0.42 times as likely to be able to take a break when they want as males.

Generally other work conditions, such as hours, regularity, pay type and pay amount, are not significantly associated with workplace participation, control or task autonomy. However long hour workers are more than 5 times more likely to take days off than other workers. Pay rate also has a significant relationship with ability to have a fair say at work, with young people who are paid in the lowest quartile least able to influence workplace decisions, which as mentioned earlier is likely to mean that the lowest paid workers are least able to influence or bargain the conditions under which they work. In comparison to the lowest paid workers, other workers are between 1.78 (for workers paid in the 26-50th quartile of pay rates) and 3.19 times as likely (for those paid in the 51-75th quartile of pay rates) to influence decisions regarding their work.

5.5.4. *Skill reproduction Security: Support and Skill development at Work*

Within the formal economy workplace training and supervision are integrated into institutional practices through policy and procedure. In the informal economy, skill development and support is not generally institutionalised. Instead the degree of supervision, support, feedback and training is an indicator of the nature of social relations in which informal work is embedded – in addition to remuneration; it is the employer side of the reciprocal informal work relationship. Normative expectations that guide conduct on the informal economy can, therefore, result in job ‘training’, feedback on work performance, support and encouragement. If the social relations between the worker and employer influence level of skill reproduction security, then we can hypothesise that support patterns will vary by the particularity of the relationship in which the economic transaction is embedded. This leads to the hypothesis that informal employees receive the highest levels of support because their work is embedded in known social networks. Associative workers would instead obtain higher levels of task instruction and training in how to do their work, because these sorts of support are easily institutionalised, but other forms of support will not be related either positively or negatively with associative work. Enterprise workers, however, would receive the least levels of training and support because the expectation in purchasing such services is that the provider can competently offer the service without needing any assistance, which is part of the premium for higher wages, greater flexibility and more control.

Consistent with Chapter Four, six questions were used to measure support in the informal economy ‘The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me’ and ‘I get the training I need to do my job’ measure task instruction; ‘When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job’ and ‘The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do’ measure levels of supervision and feedback; and ‘I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it’ and ‘I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work’ measure levels of support provided to young workers in doing their work. In addition two variables are used to measure skill development - ‘I am gaining skills from the work I do’ and ‘The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future’. These were modelled against the category of informal work, demographic characteristics and other work characteristics. The results are presented in Table 5.9. Only statistically significant results are reported.

Table 5.9: Support at work by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

	Model I: Get told do good job	Model II: Employer Interest	Model III: Get help if ask	Model IV: Tasks explained	Model V: Advice good/bad	Model VI: Training to do job	Model VII: Gaining Skills.	Model VIII: Future advantage
Informal Economy								
Enterprise			0.23**(0.49)		0.25**(0.38)	0.39**(0.33)	0.18*(0.70)	
Informal Employees			0.18**(0.44)		0.24**(0.34)	0.30**(0.28)	0.15**(0.65)	
Associative = ref								
Socio-economic status								
11-25th quantile					0.44 (0.57)			
26-50th quantile					0.52 (0.54)			
51-75th quantile					0.53 (0.52)			
76-90th quantile					0.74(0.53)			
91-100th quantile					0.27*(0.52)			
0-10th quantile (most disadv.) = ref								
Gender								
Female		1.82**(0.21)					2.41**(0.29)	
Male=ref								
Rurality								
Other metropolitan		1.94*(0.31)					3.83*(0.52)	2.58*(0.39)
Rural coastal		1.21 (0.34)					1.66(0.46)	2.99*(0.43)
Rural inland		3.11**(0.38)					2.90*(0.47)	5.26**(0.45)
Sydney=ref								
Age								
Twelve	6.67**(0.66)		2.12 (0.56)	3.64 (0.68)	2.88*(0.50)			
Thirteen	6.61**(0.58)		3.03*(0.53)	5.34**(0.63)	3.40*(0.47)			
Fourteen	4.56**(0.55)		2.05 (0.52)	3.52*(0.61)	2.07 (0.46)			
Fifteen	3.23*(0.56)		1.58 (0.53)	2.39 (0.62)	1.59 (0.47)			
Sixteen=ref								
Regularity								
Casual							2.27*(0.37)	
Regular							2.64*(0.44)	
One-off =ref								
Remuneration type								
Monetary		2.14*(0.37)	2.22* (0.37)				3.22**(0.48)	
Reward only		1.49 (0.46)	2.39 (0.50)				2.96 (0.56)	
No pay or reward=ref								
Constant	29.8**(2.16)	25.6*(1.39)	28.62*(1.61)	43.93*(2.42)	76.77*(1.40)	12.74*(1.17)	14.37 (1.97)	16.73 (1.71)

Model I: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job

Model II: The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do

Model III: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it

Model IV: The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me

Model V: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work

Model VI: I get the training I need to do my job

Model VII: I am gaining skills from the work I do

Model VIII: The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

The large majority of young people work in relationships characterised by support, suggesting that the economic transactions within the informal economy are, in general, characterised by reciprocity and trust. Almost 95 percent of young workers receive positive feedback for good performance ('When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job'; n=1057; 93.2%) and obtain clear task instruction ('The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me'; n=1080; 94.5%). A majority of young workers also obtain help with work when requested ('I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it'; n=964; 88.0%), other support ('The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do'; n=861; 83.6%), advice as to the quality of work ('I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work'; n=877; 81.1%), and agree that work provides opportunities for skill development (n=1039; 92.6%) and future advantage (n=985; 90.3%). However almost 30 percent indicate that they do not obtain the training they need to do the job ('I get the training I need to do my job' - in the case of the informal economy appropriate informal instruction).

While the high level of support suggests skill reproduction security is relatively common across the informal economy, organisational context of work is also significantly associated with support, confirming the hypotheses. The semi-institutional nature of associative work manifests in greater likelihood of support and working relationships that reflect cooperative organisational environments. Associative workers are most likely to get help from the people they work with if they ask for it; most likely to obtain ongoing feedback about how good or bad they are doing their work and are most likely to obtain the training they need to do their job. Enterprise workers are 0.23 times and informal employees 0.18 times as likely to obtain help if they ask for it compared to associative workers; are 0.25 and 0.24 times to obtain ongoing feedback as to work performance; and are 0.39 times and 0.30 times as likely to obtain the training they need to do their job. Therefore it is also not surprising that associative workers are also most likely to obtain skills from the work they do. Compared to associative workers, enterprise workers are 0.18 and informal employees are 0.15 to obtain skills from the work they do.

Age is also significant factors explaining support and skill development within the informal economy. Older workers are less likely to obtain support within the informal economy and the differences in levels of support received by younger workers are quite dramatic. In terms of positive feedback for the work they do; compared to sixteen year

olds, younger workers are between 3.23 and 6.67 times as likely to receive positive recognition for good work. This is a general tendency for most aspects of skill reproduction security. However for being able to obtain help, thirteen year olds are approximately three times more likely to get help if they ask for it, and for task instruction and advice, the level of support obtained appears to be quantitatively different for those aged thirteen and fourteen or younger compared to fifteen and sixteen year olds, the younger workers obtaining higher levels of advice and instruction. These differences do not translate into ongoing skill gains however, with no significant differences evident for skill gains and future development. Expectations of competence, as part of the transition from being a child at work to an adult at work, are reflected in these findings.

There are also geographical differences in the experience of support. Being able to obtain help when requested is more likely in other metropolitan and rural inland areas suggesting the existence of denser social networks in these areas that potentially impact on the experience of work on the informal economy. Young workers in rural inland areas are more than three times as likely and those from other metropolitan areas approximately twice as likely to obtain informal supervision from those they work for and are 3.8 times and 2.9 times more likely to develop skills from their work.

Furthermore workers outside of Sydney are also more likely to perceive that their work provides them with future advantages. Other metropolitan workers are 2.6 times, rural coastal workers 3.0 times and rural inland workers 5.3 times more likely to agree that the experience they get working to give them future advantages. In the rural context this is likely related to continuities in work careers provided through informal work. Given the prominence of the agricultural sector for rural economies, the skills developed through informal agricultural and horticultural work are directly related to running their own farm or finding other agricultural work on the formal labour market. Furthermore, given the importance of localised labour markets in rural settings, obtaining future work may be reliant upon developing good working relationships within particularistic and informal networks. With more limited employment prospects in these areas, young people may be building a reputation as diligent or skilled workers to obtain future work. If this is the case it is therefore unsurprising that young people from these areas are more likely to view that their current work will provide them with future advantage.

Females are also 1.8 times as likely to obtain informal supervision and 2.4 times as likely as males to develop skills from their work. However, this does not extend to agreement that work is contributing to future advantage. Both findings may again be related to the high levels of care work performed by females on the informal economy. In the absence of formal regulation, care work is reliant on trust. Parents, for example, are likely to want to know how the care of their children went, and therefore express interest in the work, but are unlikely to provide little other support. Within this context and the devaluation of care work generally, it is difficult to see how informal care work might translate into future career prospects, even though doing similar work in a child care organisation might. We also find that workers from the least wealthy neighbourhoods are most likely to obtain ongoing feedback as to task performance; however the only statistically significant difference is between workers from the poorest and wealthiest areas, with the latter being 0.27 times as likely to obtain ongoing feedback. In the formal economy, females and young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods were significantly more likely to view their work as providing future advantage, indicating that they were investing more in their current work for future aspiration than males or young people from wealthier backgrounds, who are more likely to see their work just as a job. However work undertaken on the informal economy for young women and young people who are disadvantaged does not provide the same advantages.

Remuneration is significantly associated with support, with those who are paid monetarily 2.2 times as likely to be able to obtain help when they ask for it and 2.1 times more likely for their employer to take an interest in the work they do. Those who are remunerated monetarily are also approximately 3.2 times as likely to develop skills from working. Regular and casual workers are, unsurprisingly, also more likely to develop skills from their work than one-off workers (respectively 2.6 and 2.3 times as likely to develop skills from work).

Aspects of the 'worse conditions' hypothesis are borne out in the findings on work securities. In terms of income security the cash economy prevails but the level of remuneration is generally quite low. The unregulated nature of work on the informal economy is also borne out in the high levels of contingent work arrangements on the informal economy. However, rather than poor conditions being endemic to the informal economy, they are systematically patterned by the social relations in which the work is

embedded, manifesting as trade-offs between different 'work-securities' depending on whether the work is enterprise work, undertaken as an informal employee or as an associative worker. This is especially highlighted in differences in skill reproduction security across the informal economy. Norms of reciprocity and trust operate in different ways to regulate work conditions depending on the closeness of the social relationship involved. We now turn to examine whether the different social relations, that have a marked impact on conditions, also translate into different orientations towards work.

5.6. Relational embeddedness in the informal economy

We saw in the previous section how the operation of informal group rules and arrangements regulate the interaction between worker and employer, systematically patterning remuneration, work commitment, support and skill development opportunities, participation and task autonomy. This section examines how these informal rules pattern some of the motivations and orientations evident in work on the informal economy, assessing the extent of instrumental and intrinsic orientations towards work, and whether different orientations are patterned by the social relations that organise work (i.e. informal work categories) and the social position of young people.

A well-established premise of economic sociology is that individuals may be motivated to engage in economic activities by a variety of goals, some utilitarian, others communal or reciprocal (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). Informal work may be motivated by a range of orientations, including reciprocity, self-help and more conventional modes of economic utility. In particular, because informal economic activity occurs outside of formal regulation, conventions associated with orthodox market relations are potentially more likely to be mixed with other motivations, (Cornuel and Duriez, 1985; Crewe and Gregson, 1998; Levitan and Feldman, 1991; Portes, Slack, 2007a; Soiffer and Herrmann, 1987; 1994; Tickamyer and Bohon, 2000; Thiel 2010; White and Williams 2010; Williams and Windebank, 2005). Because informal employee relations are predicated upon strong particularistic ties we would anticipate that the orientations of these workers are more likely to emphasise intrinsic rather than instrumental attitudes. For enterprise workers whose work relations are predicated upon weak universal ties similar to the formal economy we would anticipate that the orientations of workers would emphasise instrumental attitudes. For associative workers we would anticipate an emphasis on symbolic rewards and thus non-instrumental

orientations. Furthermore, the marginality hypothesis suggests that because informal work is a survival strategy of poorer households, then participation for economically instrumental reasons is more likely in poorer households than wealthier ones. Wealthier households might participate in informal economic activities for other reasons; because they find the work fulfilling for example. Alternatively, solidaristic social relations might be more prevalent in poorer communities as a result of shared identity borne out of struggle or through necessity. Non-instrumental attitudes developed through ongoing mutual aid or reciprocal relationships, such as work providing a sense of responsibility, may therefore be more prevalent among young people from the least wealthy communities. Analysis of instrumental and intrinsic orientations on the informal economy is presented in the following sections. Table 5.10 maps out the concepts and hypotheses around instrumental and intrinsic attitudes that guide the analysis in the following sections, and how the variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to the hypotheses.

Table 5.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic orientations on the informal economy

Concept	Hypothesis
Individuals motivated to engage in economic activities by a variety of goals, including utilitarian, communal and reciprocal goals. Conventions associated with orthodox market relations are either suspended or mixed with other motivations, and exchange is socially, culturally and geographically embedded	Marginality hypothesis - informal work is a survival strategy of poorer households, then participation for economic reasons is more likely in poorer households. Wealthier households participate in informal economic activities for other reasons; because they find the work fulfilling and enjoyable for example.
Work Orientation	
<p><i>Instrumental Orientations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • control over income; • cover expenses; • covers discretionary wants <p>Instrumental attitudes more evident among most and least disadvantaged young people, but for different reasons. Instrumental orientations more evident for enterprise workers, because of the marketisation of this work.</p>	<p><i>Intrinsic Orientations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • altruism; • responsibility; • build relationships; • social utility; • self-reliance; • enjoyment <p>Because informal employee relations are predicated upon strong particularistic ties hypothesise higher level of intrinsic orientations. For associative workers emphasis is on symbolic rewards and therefore non-instrumental orientations.</p>

As per the previous chapter, we first examine instrumental orientations, then intrinsic and altruistic orientations. The measures used are detailed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.4.

5.6.1. Instrumental Orientations –Pay

Three variables are used to measure ‘instrumental’, ‘exchange-use’ or ‘materialistic’ orientations in the informal economy. These are whether working provides control over income, allows the young worker to cover their expenses or allows them to buy what

they want. As discussed in previous chapters, these variables measure the extrinsic orientations associated with work and are the subjective counterpart to income-level as measures of extrinsic rewards from work (Frey, 1997). The likelihood of instrumental orientations across informal employee category, socio-demographic characteristics and other work characteristics are presented in Table 5.11. Again, only significant or select results are reported.

Table 5.11: Instrumental orientations by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I: Control income	Model II: Cover expenses	Model III: Buy what I want
Informal Economy	Enterprise		2.64* (0.53)	
	Informal employees		0.95 (0.37)	
	Associative = ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile			0.75 (0.52)
	26-50th quantile			0.79 (0.48)
	51-75th quantile			0.95 (0.47)
	76-90th quantile			0.39*(0.46)
	91-100th quantile			0.73 (0.48)
	0-10th quantile (most disadv.)= ref			
Age	Twelve		6.13*(0.71)	
	Thirteen		4.11*(0.63)	
	Fourteen		2.56 (0.61)	
	Fifteen		1.92 (0.62)	
	Sixteen=ref			
Rurality	Other metropolitan	2.56*(0.39)	3.51*(0.47)	
	Rural coastal	2.26*(0.39)	1.79 (0.42)	
	Rural inland	4.01**(0.42)	1.71 (0.42)	
	Sydney = ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian		0.53*(0.32)	0.59*(0.24)
	Anglo Australian =ref			
Remuneration type	Monetary	6.86*** (0.36)	3.39**(0.38)	5.07***(0.31)
	Reward only	4.09**(0.47)	1.01 (0.45)	2.36*(0.38)
	Neither = ref			
Hourly rate	26-50th (\$4.01-8.00)		2.54*(0.36)	1.31 (0.24)
	51-75th (\$8.01-12.00)		1.60 (0.37)	1.63 (0.27)
	76-100th (\$12.01-highest)		1.44 (0.39)	1.84*(0.30)
	0-25th (lowest to \$4.00)=ref.			
Constant		21.25 (1.69)	29.45**(1.77)	5.66(1.26)

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income.

Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses

Model III - Working means I can buy what I want

The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

The way that work is configured relationally has some effect on instrumental orientations towards work. Enterprise workers are most likely to indicate that working allows them to cover their expenses, being 2.6 times as likely to be able to cover some of their own expenses. However the ability to 'control income' and 'buy what I want', are not associated with informal work category. Therefore there is some modest evidence to support the hypothesis that enterprise workers are more likely to exhibit relatively instrumental orientations. Class effects are also quite marginal, with the only statistically significant difference evident for young workers from the second wealthiest backgrounds, who are 0.39 times as likely for work to mean 'they can buy what they want'. However although not statistically significant, the parameter estimates indicate that young people from wealthier neighbourhoods, compared to those from the least wealthy neighbourhoods, are less likely to exhibit instrumental attitudes. These results therefore do not entirely confirm the marginality thesis, that poorer workers are more likely to exhibit instrumental attitudes. Rather, economic motives are evident across the class spectrum, suggesting that instrumental orientations characterise informal economic exchange generally.

Work on the informal economy provides greater control over income in rural and regional areas than in Sydney. Young people from rural inland areas are four times from rural coastal areas 2.3 times and from other metropolitan areas 2.6 times more likely to agree that their work provides control over income. Young people in other metropolitan areas are also more than three times as likely as young people from Sydney to agree that their work covers some of their expenses. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds show less instrumental orientations than other young people, being approximately half as likely to agree that their work enables them to cover expenses and 0.59 times as likely to use their income to 'buy what they want'. Age is a factor also, with twelve and thirteen year olds being approximately six and four times more likely to agree that works covers their expenses than older workers. These orientations only loosely match actual differences in pay rates. Young people from non-English speaking backgrounds are least likely to be paid but older workers are also paid more highly than younger workers. A more general feature of the informal economy may underlie these findings, therefore: income earned from informal work is not particularly high, and exchange use orientations reflect differences in consumption patterns that may be spatially, culturally and age patterned.

Remuneration type and pay rates are also associated with instrumental orientations. The largest parameter estimates are associated with remuneration type indicating a straightforward link between being paid and showing instrumental attitudes towards income use. Those who are paid are almost seven times and those who are rewarded approximately four times more likely to indicate that working provides some control over their income; and 5.1 and 2.4 times more likely to be able to buy what they want. Young people who are paid are also 3.4 times as likely to be able to cover their own expenses. Furthermore, those who are paid the lowest quartile of rates are less likely to be able to cover their expenses and buy what they want. Monetization is therefore strongly linked with instrumental orientations. We see this not only in the direct relationship between pay and exchange orientations but also in the variation geographical, cultural and in terms of age discussed previously—sub-populations of young people who may have greater consumption demands are also the ones who are more instrumental in their orientations – older workers and those who live in the city for example. What these findings suggest is that, like the formal economy, the social patterning of consumption needs, rather than subsistence needs and marginalization, that has a latent relationship with instrumentality. This is only mediated in a minor way by the type of relationship that economic exchanges on the informal economy are embedded in. Whether these dynamics are evident for intrinsic orientations we discuss in the next section.

5.6.2. *Intrinsic Work Orientations*

The high prevalence of money payment evident in the informal economy would suggest that exchanges on the informal economy are in large part 'market-like' similar to formal economic exchange in advanced economies, more generally, and from an anthropological perspective less 'embedded' than those in pre-industrial societies, and so thinner, having less social meaning and being less symbolic (Crewe and Gregson, 1998; Davies, 1992; Mauss, 1966). However this market-based view of exchange may not capture the complexity of the exchange experience on the informal economy, including the desire to develop reciprocity and trust through paid informal exchange (Crewe and Gregson, 1998; Komter, 1996; Cornuel and Duriez, 1985; Deener 2009; Mingione, 1991; Pahl, 1984; Williams and Windebank, 1998). Given the importance of the type of relationship in which the work is embedded on work conditions and to some extent instrumental orientations, we would also expect that these relations would influence intrinsic

orientations. More specifically, that informal employee work, based on strong and particular ties between buyer and seller, would emphasise reciprocity and therefore intrinsic orientations; enterprise work predicated upon weak universal ties would not evidence high levels of intrinsic orientations; and associative work, being predicated on group membership, value solidarity and symbolic rewards would also emphasise intrinsic orientations. Intrinsic orientations might also be more prevalent in less wealthy communities if such orientations are developed through ongoing mutual aid or reciprocal relationships, which might arise out of a shared experience of economic adversity.

As in Chapter Four, the variable "Working means I can help out at home financially" is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. As discussed in previous chapters this variable measures contribution to household livelihood strategies, but also, within the context of the informal economy is also a measure of ongoing generalized reciprocity within the household. Five other measures are used to operationalise intrinsic orientations, which on the informal economy we would expect to result from exchange relationships that emphasise mutual aid and reciprocity. These are whether work provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections ("Work gives me opportunities to build relationships") sense of social utility ("Working makes me feel I am doing something useful"), self-reliance ("Working means I can rely on myself more") and enjoyment ("I like the things I do at work"). The results are presented in Table 5.12. Again, only statistically significant results are reported.

Table 5.12: Intrinsic work motivations and altruistic orientation by informal economy, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I: Help at home (altruism)	Model II: Responsibility	Model III: Build relationships	Model IV: Something Useful	Model V: Self-reliance	Model VI: Like work
Informal Economy	Enterprise		1.87*(0.77)			1.79*(0.45)	0.56 (0.50)
	Informal Employees		0.86 (0.56)			1.15 (0.34)	0.24*** (0.40)
Socio-economic status	Associative = ref						
	11-25th quantile	0.62 (0.45)			0.33*(0.90)		0.76 (0.66)
	26-50th quantile	0.58 (0.41)			0.41*(0.86)		0.73 (0.61)
	51-75th quantile	0.58 (0.40)			0.58*(0.87)		0.80(0.59)
	76-90th quantile	0.33*(0.40)			0.54*(0.86)		0.70*(0.59)
	91-100th quantile	0.32*(0.43)			0.53*(0.87)		0.50*(0.60)
Gender	0-10th quantile (most disadv.)=ref						
	Female		2.94*(0.41)	2.42*** (0.24)			2.01** (0.24)
CALD	Male=ref						
	Non-Anglo Australian					0.44** (0.28)	
Rurality	Anglo-Australian=ref						
	Other metropolitan		2.86 (0.71)	2.09 (0.39)	2.42** (0.55)	3.68** (0.39)	
	Rural coastal		1.15 (0.59)	1.82 (0.40)	1.17 (0.50)	1.62 (0.41)	
	Rural inland		7.32*(0.87)	2.23*(0.40)	3.00*(0.57)	1.70 (0.40)	
Remuneration type	Sydney=ref						
	Monetary		3.25*(0.50)		2.44*(0.46)		3.06** (0.35)
	Reward only		9.42*(1.11)		1.77 (0.61)		4.47*(0.54)
Hourly rate	Neither = ref						
	26-50th (\$4.01-8.00)	1.92** (0.21)					
	51-75th (\$8.01-12.00)	1.51 (0.22)					
	76-100th (\$12.01-high)	2.28** (0.26)					
Constant	0-25 th (lowest to \$4.00)=ref						
		11.35*(1.13)	9.69(2.56)	7.31(1.60)	67.97*(2.21)	15.54** (1.67)	64.39** (1.67)

Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially; Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility; Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships; Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing something useful; Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more; Model VI: I like the things I do at work; *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000; The reference category is: Disagree ; Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

While significant majorities of young people show instrumental orientations on the informal economy, only a minority show altruistic orientations, with fewer than half (n=449; 44.5%) indicating that working means they help out at home financially. While altruistic tendencies are evident, the greater prevalence of instrumental attitudes indicates the importance of utilitarian exchange on the informal economy. Furthermore, while informal work category is related to utilitarian attitudes, with enterprise workers having the most utilitarian attitudes, there is no significant association between altruism orientations and informal work category. All workers, regardless of the work relationship, show similar levels of altruistic orientation. The hypothesis that altruistic orientations are more prevalent where work occurs as part of existing social relationship is not supported. Altruistic orientations are similar across informal work category, regardless of whether it takes place within known social networks, as part of anonymous transactions or as part of the activities of an associative organisation.

This result suggests that monetary transactions are related to other social relations, especially socio-economic status does have a significant relationship with altruistic orientations. The previous section established that class has only a marginal relationship with instrumental orientations, challenging the marginality thesis that instrumental orientations are more evident in the least wealthy households, because informal work is an element in the coping strategies of households in lower income neighbourhoods (Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Komter, 1996; Portes, 1998; Williams 2009, 2011; Young and Wilmott, 1975). However young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods exhibit the greatest levels of altruistic orientations relative to young people from all other socio-economic backgrounds. In particular young people from the wealthiest neighbourhoods are 0.33 and 0.32 times as likely to exhibit altruistic orientations.

Pay rate also has a relationship with altruistic use of income, with young people who earn higher rates of pay rates more likely to contribute income to household use. In particular workers who receive the highest pay rates are 2.3 times and those who receive rates in the 26-50th quartile of rates are 1.9 times as likely to contribute income to their households. While class effects have some influence over the social distribution of altruistic orientations, these results suggest that, like consumption patterns, altruistic orientations are also influenced by the degree that young people have access to money more generally. As discussed in Chapter Four, this has some relationship with class, but

is also an endemic condition of childhood. Young people will not only use their income to maintain consumption needs, but contribute to broader household needs where they have the money to do so. That is, being paid more does not necessarily crowd out altruism, but to some extent facilitates it, by enabling the possibility of providing income to household needs. Furthermore, like instrumental orientations, this is only mediated in a minor way by the type of relationship that economic exchanges on the informal economy are embedded in, indicating that it is a general feature of exchange on the informal economy.

Unlike altruism, other intrinsic orientations are prevalent on the informal economy. Almost all young workers, feel work develops a sense of responsibility (n=1079; 96.4%), utility and social contribution ('Working makes me feel I am doing something useful' (n=1049; 94.0%); self-reliance (n=965; 89.2%) and opportunities to build relationships (n=989; 89.3%). A similar proportion enjoy the work they do (n=1004; 89.2%). The incidence of these orientations across informal work categories suggest that reciprocal relationships are a general feature of the informal economy, ranging from close ties in the case of informal employees, and the 'strength of weak ties' for enterprise workers. In the absence of institutional rules, reciprocity involving mutual obligation to give and to receive expresses and cements social relationships between giver and receiver. These exchanges contribute to the establishment and maintenance of social networks through reciprocal and solidary relationships (Brown and Kulcar, 2001; Leonard, 2000, Mingione, 1985; Thiel 2010). This is regardless of whether the work is performed through enterprise work arrangements, as an informal employee or for associations. This dynamic then translates into enhanced orientations of responsibility, social utility and enjoyment.

Despite this we do find some differentiation based on the nature of the exchange. Enterprise workers are 1.8 times as likely as other workers to indicate their work provides them with responsibility and self-reliance, both attitudes synonymous with enterprise work (Hart 1973). Informal employees are approximately one-quarter as likely as association workers to enjoy their work, indicating how work involves leisure or other interest pursuits for association workers. The incidence and distribution of intrinsic orientations indicate that reciprocal exchange is a general feature of the informal economy, representing a normative basis that regulates economic exchange. However intrinsic orientations are also embedded in specific relationships of exchange, as

indicated in the relationship between responsibility and reliance with enterprise work, and enjoyment with associative work.

Intrinsic orientations are also associated with demographic characteristics. Workers from the poorest neighbourhoods are most likely to feel useful and enjoy their work the most. Young workers from other socio-economic backgrounds are between 0.3 and 0.6 times as likely to feel useful because of their work and between 0.8 and 0.5 times to enjoy their work compared to young people from the most disadvantaged communities. For these young workers, reciprocity between neighbours, which provides much of their work, may be activated during times of social and economic uncertainty. The nature of the work takes on a different meaning because it is more likely to contribute to household coping strategies, not only for their own household, but for the household they are working for, translating into higher levels of social utility. This is also consistent with the findings on altruism. Females are between two and three times more likely for their work to provide a sense of responsibility, provide opportunities to build relationships and enjoy their work compared to males. A major difference is apparent between rural inland and Sydney, which indicate the persistence of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* dynamics within the informal economy. Workers from rural inland areas are 7.3 times as likely as young workers in Sydney for their work to provide a sense of responsibility, 2.2 times as likely to build relationships through work and 3.0 times more likely to feel useful because of their work. Workers from other metropolitan areas are also 2.4 times as likely to feel useful because of their work and 3.7 times as likely to feel work provides self-reliance. These findings suggest that the social networks that develop in rural communities not only create informal work opportunities because of local economic contexts (as discussed in section 5.4), but are reliant on relationships of reciprocity generated out of local community networks.

The prevalence of monetized social relations on the informal economy, does not 'crowd out' other intrinsic orientations. Instead young people who are paid are 3.2 times as likely as other workers for their work to provide a sense of responsibility; 2.4 times as likely to feel as though they are doing something useful and 3.1 times as likely to enjoy their work compared to those who are unpaid. No other work characteristics are associated with these intrinsic orientations, including pay rate. Those who are rewarded however are more than nine times to feel their work also provides a sense of responsibility and 4.5

times as likely to enjoy their work as those who do not. The reasons why money does not crowd out other intrinsic qualities suggests that the exchange of cash can, especially in the informal economy, function as a medium or 'social glue' to consolidate social relationships, especially where trust is not high. Where 'employers' want to avoid ongoing obligation or reciprocity, unpaid mutual exchange is replaced by paid exchange (Williams and Windebank, 2001; 2002). This is because the exchange of cash for goods and services diminishes the possibility for ambiguity around what is owing, especially in long-standing relationships, whereas the exchange of non-equivalents can make it unclear whether a favour has been repaid or not (Gouldner, 1960). In this way, other intrinsic motivations consolidate social relationships and regulate the conditions involved in economic exchange. Rather than crowding out intrinsic orientations, payment can maintain or create social relations through exchange. Reciprocity and trust are essential in regulating the exchange, helping avoid obligations arising from unpaid exchange.

5.7. Conclusion to Chapter Five

Young people are involved in a variety of economic transactions on the informal economy – those predicated upon strong and 'particularistic' ties; those predicated upon weak and universal ties; and those predicated upon quasi-formal rules. The predominance of service work involving specialised activities suggests some informal work supplies niche product markets. However many young workers are also capitalising from low-end opportunity structures, such as those provided by friends and neighbours. Three informal work contexts are evident, informal work for known persons ('informal employees'), 'own-account' enterprise workers, and work undertaken for associative organisations. These social relations that embed work transactions shape the nature of young people's work experience on the informal economy, including work conditions and orientations.

Two key hypotheses guided the analysis. The marginality/coping strategy hypothesis considered whether more marginal groups, either economically or socially were more likely to participate in the informal economy, or whether the resources required on the informal economy advantage young people from wealthier neighbourhoods. The other hypothesis, the 'worse conditions' hypothesis, considers whether the lack of formal regulations translate into poor conditions for young workers on the informal economy.

In terms of the marginality/coping strategy hypothesis, opportunity structures for work are in part determined by extant conditions found in different class neighbourhoods. Young people from poorer neighbourhoods are more likely to engage in work for people they know, sometimes unpaid and sometimes for a nominal fee or reward, as part of reciprocal exchanges within local social networks. Participation for exclusively economic reasons is to some extent more prevalent in the most economically disadvantaged areas, but is not dissimilar to other socio-economic areas, especially the wealthiest areas, where there is also some evidence that utilitarian attitudes, particularly around work providing control over income, are evident. Young people from relatively wealthy neighbourhoods are involved in relatively well-paid informal work, often undertaken on an enterprise basis, evidencing both instrumental and non-instrumental orientations. The prevalent nature of instrumental attitudes indicates that income is frequently used as to meet individual consumption needs.

However, differences do exist in terms of whether work contributes to household livelihood strategies. For poorer households, young people's work on the informal economy is more likely to contribute to household livelihood strategies. Work in the informal economy therefore provides an important resource for young people from the least wealthy neighbourhoods, especially work embedded within existing social networks. However to an even greater extent informal work is an opportunity for young people from wealthier neighbourhoods. This is particularly evident for enterprise work, reliant upon the self-mobilisation of skills to offer goods and services, but also applies for work embedded in existing social networks. Therefore within wealthier communities, we see a mix of work organised through known social networks and offered on an open market, whereas in less wealthy communities, particularistic organisation of work prevails.

Young people from middle-class neighbourhoods are more likely to engage in associative work as part of an interweaving of economic activities with leisure or value identities. Involvement in associative work appears reliant upon a match between individual modes of human capital (values, skills, interest, and knowledge) and organisational values and goals. These human capital resources link the young person with a broader community of interest represented by the associative organisation. For the young person, the economic activity is therefore also an extension of identity. For example to obtain work as a martial arts instructor, football coach or netball referee, not only must the young person have

the initial interest, but develop their expertise to the point where they can work in a more official capacity. This is unlikely to occur unless there is an extended period of involvement with the association and the young person not only has an interest in the activity, but aligns or has loyalty with, organisational values.

Other social distribution patterns are also evident. Gender segregation in types of work is evident, especially for females who are overrepresented in caring and service to others. Males appear to take advantage of the possibilities on the informal economy, being involved in more diverse range of work activities, some of which do not conform to orthodox masculinities, as well as work that more conventionally conforms to masculine stereotypes, such as manual labour. Informal work factors prominently as an economic activity among young people from rural areas indicating the importance of local networks in rural and regional areas that underpin the informal economy. Informal work opportunities evident in rural communities arise out of local economic contexts, and are also generated through strong social networks. For young people in rural and regional areas, their participation in the informal economy provides opportunities to develop skills that may be directly related to future career trajectories, and develop important networks that future economic activity may be reliant upon.

A clear pathway of economic participation related to age is also evident. Within the 'youth labour market' work on the informal economy appears to be a transition from work in the family economy, embedded as it is in close-knit kinship ties, and work on the formal economy, which is closest to the adult world of work. This is evident in a number of ways. Younger participants are more likely to work on the informal economy, but there is also internal age-related differentiation, with older participants being more likely to be enterprise workers and less likely to be informal employees. Or put another way, types of work that are more 'adult-oriented' because they are less embedded in existing relationships, are more likely to be undertaken by older workers. Patterns of informal work therefore seem in part driven by age-related processes, specifically transitions from dependence to independence; from particular to universal and informal to formal social relations. While these findings do not support strict developmentalism, there is certainly evidence of age-related transitions within the informal economy that reflect age-related expectations of young people, and therefore broader opportunity structures for older and younger workers.

Does the lack of formal regulation translate into poor conditions for young workers on the informal economy, in line with the 'worse conditions' hypothesis? While informal exchange encompasses a broad range of social relations, paid work is more common than unpaid exchange. Paid work on the informal economy is not only transacted between anonymous buyers and sellers (i.e. enterprise work) but embedded in close social relations (i.e. informal employees). However the reward economy is more prevalent for associative work, indicating the importance of symbolic rewards for that type of work. There is little evidence of unpaid mutual aid undertaken by young people within the informal economy. Monetary exchange is closely linked with intrinsic orientations on the informal economy that may avoid obligation that arise from ongoing reciprocity, but nonetheless creates closer relations through exchange. In this way money avoids some uncomfortable dynamics that may arise through the ongoing trade in favour and debt, but facilitates some form of sociability between non-related people. While average incomes in the informal economy are lower than on the formal economy, wage mechanisms are embedded in relations and contexts that reflect norms about what are appropriate levels of exchange for informal work. Particular and associative social ties constrain the amount paid but also the dispersion of pay. The specificity of social relationships that underpin informal employee work appears to suppress pay rates. Enterprise workers fare the best in terms of income but because they provide services on an open market pay rate fluctuation is greater.

In terms of work-time security, the worse conditions hypothesis is confirmed. Unlike the formal labour market, regularity of work cannot be guaranteed due to the absence of labour market institutions. The largely irregular nature of the work is a function of the sporadic generation of needs within social networks for informal employees, or the success or failure of obtaining work on an unpredictable informal market for enterprise workers. Despite, or perhaps because of the irregular nature of work on the informal economy, enterprise workers and informal employees have considerable autonomy and control over the work process. However associative work is generated through the operation of organisations whose schedules are fixed and regular, the times set often months in advance. Because of the organisational basis of their work, associative workers are less likely to experience all facets of autonomy and control in their work. However,

the potential pay-off for this lack of control is greater certainty over when work happens and higher levels of social integration, or identification, with the work tasks.

Work orientations evident in the informal economy are neither strictly instrumental nor intrinsic, but a combination of both. While altruistic tendencies are evident, the prevalence of instrumental attitudes over altruistic ones indicates the importance of utilitarian exchange as part of the transactions that occur on the informal economy. Yet the high degree of monetization and instrumental orientations evident potentially reinforce, and certainly do not crowd out, ongoing cooperation, mutual support and reciprocity between the parties involved, cementing social relations in ways over and above the instrumental value of the exchange. The high level of intrinsic work orientations developed through strong or weak ties (or a combination) evidence reciprocity as a general feature of the informal labour market. For young workers on the informal economy at least, monetary relations coexist or facilitate alternative logics that are beyond material gain, displaying that the relationship between monetary exchange and market relations is not hermetically sealed.

Chapter Six: It's not just work – Variety in the Family Economy

6.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the work undertaken by children with and for their families as part of a family mode of production. In Chapter Two, we described the family mode of production as a form of communally organised work. Communal systems of work are undertaken between actors linked through highly particular relationships, such as family, with the relationship strongly influencing what type of work is done and work conditions. Hence group generated rules, rather than external regulations, are important in regulating work activities. In terms of family activities the labour of family members is at the disposal of the family unit. Care work, domestic labour, household self-provisioning and family-owned and run businesses are types of activities that are potentially organised through kinship based relationships within the family economy (Folbre 1995, Himmelweit 1995, 2002; Meagher 2003, Pahl 1984). This does not necessarily mean that the products of work are used or consumed by the family, but rather that children's labour is available as part of a family mode of production. This chapter aims to assess empirically what the 'family mode of production' entails, and how young people's labour is utilised.

Section Two provides the broad context for the analysis by examining the transformation of the household from producing and consuming units in pre-industrial societies into consuming units in industrial and post-industrial societies. Consequently, cultural expectations around the economic value of children to family have also shifted, from children as economic contributors to children as economic dependants. Yet, we also highlight how family-based work encompasses a diverse range of productive activities, which can meaningfully be categorised by examining their relationship with the formal economy, from use-value within the household, to exchange-value on the formal market. Our analysis centres on an assessment of what we call the *formality hypothesis*, that calls attention to the relationship between formalised conditions and the degree work is oriented towards the formal market and whether a greater division between work and family spheres is evident the more work is oriented towards the formal market.

Section Three profiles the range of work undertaken within the family economy. Unlike work on the informal economy, where systematic typologies of categories of informal work exist, categories of work in the family economy are identified by the degree that

work is oriented towards the needs of the family or exchange on the formal economy. Four categories are identified, care work, household self-provisioning, consort work and family owned production.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds with a similar structure to the previous two. Section Four examines the social distribution of participation within the family economy. Section Five tests the formality hypothesis directly by examining work conditions on the family economy, especially whether more formal conditions are evident for certain types of work and groups of workers.

Section Six examines some of the motivations and attitudes evident in work for family. We examine the degree of instrumental and intrinsic attitudes in the family economy and whether such attitudes have any relationship with the degree of formality of work. Specifically we examine whether work for family is dominated by obligation and altruism, or whether, instrumental values more commonly associated with cash exchange in the formal economy are also evident for the family as a working unit.

6.2. Structural Embeddedness: Transitions in the Function of the Family-based Economy

6.2.1. The transformation of the productive role of households

The family as a producing unit has undergone fundamental change as part of transformations in capitalist production. Classical versions of economic development trace how modes of 'family capitalism' have been in decline as the range of spheres of life organised through the market has broadened. According to these accounts, pre-industrial households, that functioned as a basic economic unit for the production of goods and services, have been displaced through processes of industrialisation, the introduction of the factory system and its associated division of labour. These processes have necessitated the transfer of production to specialist sites away from the private efforts of individual families (Maynard, 1985; Silva and Thistle 2009).

This separation of work and home was fundamental in the construction of what is now considered the standard form of work, sharply dividing public and private spheres (Davidoff, 1995; Edgell 2006; Edwards and Wajcman 2005; Hall, 1992; Pahl, 1984; Polanyi 1944; Nicholson, 1995). As work and family became temporally and spatially

separate, work came to mean paid employment and people who worked unpaid at home were no longer considered workers. Family life became associated with personal fulfilment where women had particular responsibility for domestic well-being. Consequently the public sphere was defined as the site of economically productive industrial labour and as a specifically male domain, whilst the private domestic sphere came to be seen as non-economic – the site of family activities assigned to women³⁹. One legacy of this focus on male industrial labour is the notion that work and employment are synonymous (Beechey, 1987; Bradley, 1989; Davis, 1980; Glucksmann, 1995, 2000; Hakim, 1996; Pahl, 1988; Tancred, 1995).

The fundamental distinction between public and private spheres was, however, challenged by a revaluation of work undertaken within the home. Second wave feminists questioned assumptions that unpaid work in the private sphere was not work, recognising that domestic work was a form of work, thus countering the marginalization of women's domestic labour in the home (Beechey, 1987; Oakley, 1974). This new focus allowed an analysis of the economic value of domestic and reproductive labour to family and society (Becker, 1981; Fernandez-Aceves and Blum 2011; Glucksmann, 1995; Hartman, 1981; Maher, Lindsay and Franzway 2008; Maynard 1985; Stohs 2007). Empirically, the argument that industrialisation sharply divided men into the public sphere and women into the private sphere, has also been questioned. Tilly and Scott (1978) illustrated how industrialisation had a diverse effect on women's economic circumstances. Some women were unpaid domestic labourers; others produced commodities in the home, and some worked in the formal economy. Although industrialisation meant the productive capacity of households was reduced, the family structures continued to influence the economic roles members undertook.

Households remained highly productive via the privatisation of production and consumption, manifested in forms of household self-provisioning and home working. Gershuny and Pahl (1980) argue that even within 'post-industrial societies', self-service economies exist that involve people producing goods and services from their own unpaid work, in what Gershuny and Pahl describe as household self-provisioning. Households

³⁹ Maynard also points to a gradual unfolding of an ideology of domesticity that presented an ideal of family living based upon images of middle class living, which had become part of the dominant culture by the 1840's (Maynard 1985, Davidoff, 1976; Hall 1979).

produce goods for their own consumption, the surplus of which they can sell onto others. Others have pointed to the growth of home-business enterprises and other home-working arrangements as evidence that the formal economy is utilising the private sphere as a location for production. Technological innovations, changes in managerial practices and shifts to sub-contracting have made possible the spatial destandardisation of certain types of work and have increased the possibility for home-based work (Edgell, 2006; Wight and Raley 2009). These home working arrangements are in part a means by which employers can create more flexible production methods and employment relationships. Homework represents one way in which workers are often employed on an "as needed" basis (Finnegan, 1985; Hakim, 1988; Rovi, 1997).

The implications of this are several-fold. While family based production has historically declined, households have remained economically productive. However the terrain is varied, from work consumed by family members, such as care work, to work consumed by the formal market, where the divide between the market and family life is blurred, as in home-based enterprises. This blurring raises questions about who benefits from these arrangements. Do such arrangements favour employers by increasing their capacity to lay-off and take-on labour as a way to manage economic cycles, through the creation of a peripheral workforce, or are households advantaged via greater flexibility, control and convenience in their work environments? And what of children's involvement in these arrangements? We turn to the context of children's productive capacities next.

6.2.2. Transformations in cultural expectations of childhood

Paralleling the decline of the family as a producing unit, cultural expectations around the economic value of children, at least in developed economies, have also shifted, from children as economic contributors to children as economic dependants (Zelizer 1985, 2002). In the past, children were looked upon as a source of labour to the family, both inside and outside the home. Over the course of the 20th century, the position of children in the family economy has changed fundamentally. Adult males secured privileged access to the formal labour market, welfare state provision was expanded reducing the need for children to work, and compulsory education was legislated for, largely to develop the human capital necessary for a labour market requiring increasingly specialised knowledge. By the end of the 20th century, young people had lost much of their role as contributors to the family economy. As discussed in Chapter Four, employment came to be seen as an alternative role for young people (de Regt 2004). It is

now assumed that children's main contribution to the family economy is to household chores (Gager, Sanchez and Demaris 2009). Furthermore, this contribution is now primarily viewed as having a pedagogical function, rather than making a material contribution to the household. As Blair (1992) puts it, parental concerns about socialisation are the primary reason to use children in the home as a labour source, rather than to relieve parents. Corsaro (1997) further argues that whenever children figure in discussions on domestic labour they are seen as contributing to domestic labour burdens rather than sharing domestic labour responsibilities. Children's more substantial contributions to domestic labour and other contributions to the family economy are lost in these constructions. The social construction of childhood as a period of dependency prevents proper acknowledgment of the productive labour children contribute to their families.

Childhood sociologists have also questioned this depiction of childhood dependence (Mayall, 1996; Morrow 1992, 1996; Punch 2003; Solberg, 1997). These authors have argued that the construction of childhood dependency masks the extent children are capable, competent and have responsibility in their own lives. While children are dependent on their families, the few studies that have considered children's contributions to domestic labour have shown that children are not merely care burdens but undertake a range of household tasks (Brannen, 1995; Kibria, 1993; Morrow, 1996; Solberg, 1990; Valenzuela 1999). Several authors have also pointed out the increased reliance on children's domestic labour as a result of broader changes in the economy, especially longer work hours and increased female labour force participation (Berk, 1985; Blair and Lichter, 1990; Hedges and Barnett, 1972; Jensen, 2009; Propper, 1972; Rubin, 1983, Thrall, 1978, Wihstutz, 2007). The implication is that such changes have increased pressure on children to undertake care and domestic obligations in the home. However they also indicate that children and adults form interdependent relations rather than dependent ones (Faulstich Orellana, 2001; Morrow, 1996; Rogoff, 2003). At the heart of children's contributions to family life is the question therefore of the balance between obligation and personal gain. If children contribute to family productivity, then are they obliged to undertake this work as part of normal family practices – that is, are there productive activities embedded in family life – or do they get something out of it, is their scope for instrumentality in the family economy? We examine these issues in later

sections. However prior to this we examine what work young people undertake as part of the family economy.

6.3. Classifying Young People's work in the Family-based Economy

The previous section briefly canvassed broader issues relating to the family and the economy to question the degree that the family is not a productive unit, and within that the degree children are defined as dependants. These sections drew attention to transformations of the private sphere as a productive unit, but that nonetheless a range of productive activities occur within families that can be understood through their relationship with the formal market. As well as family-owned businesses, family production also includes a range of activities such as care work, household self-provisioning, children working in consort with other family members in their work, and home working.

Unlike the informal economy, where systematic typologies of informal work exist, these various forms of family-based work have largely been treated in a disparate fashion. However, work can be placed along a continuum defined by whether the 'products' are consumed by the producing group (the family), or made and sold for an external market. Work can be oriented towards the needs of the family on one end (use value- internal family-based production) to exchange on external formal markets at the other (exchange value - external family-mode of production). Using this logic, care work and household self-provisioning, are oriented towards family-use value, because production and consumption is by household members. On the other end of the continuum we would place consort work, home-based enterprises and family businesses, because, while the labour of family members is utilised, the products of this work are for sale or exchange on the formal or informal economy. This continuum is not reliant on the type of work performed, but the social relations that characterise the production and consumption of goods and services. For example agricultural work may be found across categories, depending on the nature of the production relations – from small-scale self-provisioning, to farms that produce goods for the market (either on a large or small scale). This continuum also makes provision for the fact that relations of paid labour may also occur in the context of familial relations.

Family economy workers were identified where young people, in describing their work, stated that they worked for immediate or extended family, including care work, household self-provisioning, working in consort with parents, home-working or whether

they worked in a family business (whether owned by immediate or extended family).

These responses were classified into family work categories. Coding identified 1951 young people working for their family. This group comprises the second largest economy of young workers, comprising 31.7 percent of all workers and 17.7 percent of the entire sample. Family work category by occupation is presented in Table 6.1:

Table 6.1: Occupation by Family work category

	Care work		Self-provisioning		Consort work		Family-owned production		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Child care/other care work	561	99.3			6	2.3	4	0.5	571	29.3
Agricultural & horticultural work			208	59.8	14	5.3	169	21.8	391	20.0
Sales work					29	11.0	319	41.2	348	17.8
Labour, construction & labour trades			30	8.6	93	35.2	65	8.4	188	9.6
Cleaning work			86	24.7	34	12.9	47	6.1	167	8.6
Administrative & clerical work			1	0.3	42	15.9	65	8.4	108	5.5
Other service work			4	1.1	14	5.3	34	4.4	52	2.7
Food preparation			6	1.7	4	1.5	24	3.1	34	1.7
Non-labour trades			1	0.3	2	0.8	9	1.2	12	0.6
Delivery work					5	1.9	5	0.6	10	0.5
Teaching & tutoring	4	0.7			3	1.1	1	0.1	8	0.4
Other food service			1	0.3			5	0.6	6	0.3
Other w					2	0.8	4	0.5	6	0.3
Entertainment & performance					1	0.4	3	0.4	4	0.2
Other not elsewhere classified			11	3.2	15	5.7	20	2.6	46	2.4
Total	565	100.0 (28.9)	348	100.0 (17.8)	264	100.0 (13.5)	774	100.0 (39.7)	1951	100.0 (100.0)

Four categories of work were identified: care work (n=565, 28.9%), household self-provisioning (n=348, 17.8%), consort work (n=264, 13.5%) and family owned production (n=774, 39.7%)⁴⁰. The work children perform includes work that children do within the private household, that enables parents to engage in the formal labour market, activities for which someone else would have to be paid, as well as activities undertaken for and with family members on the formal economy that directly generates income. In terms of 'occupation types' the variety of work undertaken on the family economy is not as varied as that performed in the formal and informal economies. Care work (n=571, 29.3%) and agricultural and horticultural work (n=391, 20.0%) comprise half of all work undertaken within the family economy. Sales work also comprises a sizeable type of work within the family economy (n=348, 17.8%), the majority of which is undertaken in family

⁴⁰ Only 16 children indicated working in a home-based enterprise (0.8%). On re-examination, these children were either involved in family-owned production (n=6) or were working in consort with parents (n=10). Evidence of classic 'sweatshop' or outwork arrangements were not found in this study therefore. This does not mean that outwork arrangements do not exist, but they are more likely to take institutional forms associated with precarious employment or sub-contracting arrangements.

owned production. Only three other forms of work comprise more than 5 percent of work within the family economy – labour and construction work (n=188, 9.6%), most of which is undertaken in consort with adult family members; cleaning work (n=167, 8.6%), most of which is undertaken as part of household self-provisioning activities; and administrative work (n=108, 5.5%) undertaken in family owned production and in consort with other family members. Family-owned production and consort work evidence the greatest diversity of work, reflecting the variety of products and services within the formal market. Whereas household self-provisioning is limited to nine occupation types, fourteen occupation types are evident for consort work and fifteen types evident in family owned production. Care work by definition is limited to the care of others in the family. Using participant's descriptions of what their work involves, these categories are examined in more detail below.

6.3.1. *Care Work*

Folbre has defined caring labour as work involving services based on sustained personal (usually face-to-face) interaction, and is motivated (at least in part) by concern about the recipient's welfare (Folbre 1995, Folbre & Weiskopf 1998). Children are generally not associated with being 'carers', but rather as the recipients of care⁴¹. Smyth and colleagues point out that that because intra-familial care giving often occurs in the context of intimate bonds of love and reciprocity, even high levels of care are often viewed as 'normal' family relationships. The lack of self-identification of care is complicated even further for young people, because societal expectations around care-giving are that adults are expected to provide care and young people are not expected to be care-givers (Smyth, Blaxland and Cass 2011. See also Smyth, Cass and Hill 2011). Yet many children in this study provided a significant amount of help to parents (n=358; 63.5%) and other relatives (n=205; 36.5%) by caring for their younger siblings or relatives. More exceptionally several children mentioned they care for or help their grandparents, such as undertaking domestic tasks for them.

⁴¹ There are many examples of care work undertaken by children that are an expected and integral aspect of social life in 'tribal' societies. These include examples of self-autonomous spaces of children that were critical in the overall division of labour, allowing adults to undertake other tasks required for the functioning of community. In our sample, care work is a far more privatised experience because of the disembedding of the family unit from broader community and kinship networks, which also means that many young people are caring for siblings in isolation.

As mentioned in Section 2.1 an important concern of feminist theory and practice has been to claim the importance of care work socially, institutionally and interpersonally. Discussions of the value of care work highlight the considerable contributions that carers make (and thus the social benefits and savings), the broad range of skills that are involved in care work and the difficulties and rewards experienced by carers (England & Folbre 2000; Folbre, 1994a, 2001). In addition to the devaluation of care work generally, care work undertaken by young people is also dismissed by virtue of it being undertaken by children. Wihstutz (2007) argues that at best children's care work is seen in terms of socialisation benefits for young people, especially preparation for the sexual division of labour in adulthood. Participant's descriptions from this study are typical of care work generally, involving both physical and emotional care, but also involving the exercise of responsibility and authority. Some described caring for infants and small children overnight, looking after large groups of children at once, administering medicine, 'conflict resolution' work, tutoring siblings and relatives and picking up and transporting children places. Many emphasised the job of keeping the children safe— making sure they don't get into trouble. The following responses help provide a picture of the work involved.

Putting two babies and a 7 year old to bed as well as changing diaper, getting them out of bed and feeding them breakfast (Female, 13 years)

Baby-sitting and picking up my little brother once a week. Give him food, give him a bath and make him take an afternoon nap. Plus changing him (Female, 12 years)

I cook meals (usually simple meals like noodles or pasta or party pies etc...), give them baths, play games, watch videos, read, help them with homework (Female, 15 years)

Three overlapping and related contexts of care work were identified from the descriptions provided - 'episodic/respite', 'collective' and 'social reproduction' care work. Respite care involved young people providing care so that adult family members (those who were the primary carers of the children) can enjoy some leisure time, undertake some task or attend some event. Although infrequent, the care work provided by young people contributes to the ongoing organisation of family life relied upon by adult family members to free them from care responsibilities.

'Collective' care work⁴² extends this dynamic beyond care-specific work to collective domestic labour (Warren 2011). Care of siblings is undertaken with other routine family tasks such as washing up, vacuuming, washing clothes, ironing, running errands, making meals and household shopping. These tasks are not self-care tasks, but are critical to general household functioning. This sort of care contributes to the overall domestic labour burden that would otherwise have to be undertaken by adult family members or outsourced. A special case of 'collective care work' can be labelled 'social reproduction care work'. This involves care work undertaken to allow parents or other relatives to work. Statements such as 'I look after my siblings when my parents work' are typical descriptions provided. This response was evident for just over one-fifth of participants in this category (n=128; 22.5%)⁴³. This care work is a critical contribution made by young people to allow their parents to engage in the formal economy.

What is evident is that many children provided a large amount of help to their families in the form of caretaking, and while it is unlikely that such work displaces women as the primary caregiver and organiser of care in most families, it is evident that children are also taking on responsibilities. Furthermore, as is the case with private care work more generally, the care provided by children significantly reduces the costs that parents would have to bear either in lost work-time or the expense of publicly provided care and is therefore a hidden component of the care economy. Adult family members benefit from the work young people provide to younger siblings and other relatives requiring care.

⁴² Both collective care work and household self-provisioning include forms of domestic labour that overlap with care work despite being conceptually distinct. Collective care work is distinguished in this analysis from household self-provisioning by whether a component of the activity is directly related to another person, including feeding, playing and other forms of care. Otherwise it is included in household self-provisioning.

⁴³ Whilst the number of children performing this care work forms a sizeable minority, this figure is also likely to be an underestimate because it relies on specific reference to providing care so that adults can work. Many children provided only a general description like 'I look after my brother', without reference to the context for providing that care are not included in the figure. However it is likely that some of these children are providing care in exactly these circumstances.

6.3.2 *Household Self-provisioning*⁴⁴

Household self-provisioning involves households buying goods and services from the formal economy and using the purchased goods as capital, in combination with household labour, to produce other goods and services for their own consumption. Household self-provisioning involves the provision within the domestic context of goods and services that might otherwise have been bought through the formal economy (Finnegan, 1985; Mingione, 1988; Nelson, 2004; Nelson and Smith, 1999). Common self-provisioning activities include house maintenance, gardening, car maintenance and clothes production. Two main forms of household self-provisioning are evident in the descriptions provided by participants: 'routine self-provisioning', largely involving domestic labour, and 'substantial self-provisioning' largely involving agricultural work and renovation and repair (see Nelson and Smith 1999).

Routine self-provisioning (n=167, 48.4%) includes household chores involved in the general upkeep of the family household, tasks which Nelson and Smith (1999: 10) define as "helping to guarantee the daily life of the household". These are distinct from routine self-care activities performed by young people, such as cleaning their room, making their bed or putting away their clothes. Typical descriptions in this study included:

Gardening and doing my aunt's lawns. Mowing my aunt's lawn, planting and watering plants and cutting down overhanging tree branches. (Male 13 years)

I wash my dad's car, clean up the house, cut the grass and hang up the laundry. (Female 15 years)

I do ironing for my family. Ironing all my dad's work shirts as well as any other clothes that need ironing. (Female 13 years)

⁴⁴ For some responses there was difficulty differentiating between whether the activities described were household self-provisioning or family-owned production involving agricultural work. Surplus of goods produced from household self-provisioning may be sold onto the formal market. Conversely, surplus goods produced in the course of family-owned production may be used for household self-provisioning. However the primary aims of the production process are conceptually distinct in both cases. This was because there was insufficient detail provided in the responses to determine who the work was done for. These two categories of work are practically related. In these cases, postal area codes were matched against Industry of employment, to identify which industry was the predominant employer in the locality (see Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001 Basic Community Profile catalogue No. 2001.0. and the 2001 Indigenous Profile catalogue No. 2002.0). Where the industry of employment was agriculture, then the work was coded as family-owned production; otherwise it was coded as household self-provisioning. The assumption used is that in localities where agriculture is the modal industry type, the participant is, on the balance of probabilities, working on a productive farm. If agriculture is not the modal industry type, then using the same logic, the work is not likely to be undertaken in the course business and therefore likely to involve household self-provisioning. Any productive output is likely to be secondary to participation in the non-agricultural labour market.

Pay the rent for my mum. Pay rent after school. (Female 12 years)

I do most of the housework. Clean my whole house, cooking. (Male 14 years)

All the tasks are oriented towards general upkeep of the immediate family home, or undertaken for extended family members. By providing their labour to collective household work young people substitute for either outsourced domestic labour, external provision of service (for example car washes) or parental domestic labour.

Substantial self-provisioning involves activities that “help to improve the family’s living conditions” (Nelson and Smith 1999: 10). Examples of substantial self-provisioning include servicing or repair of vehicles, growing vegetables and work done by households on the maintenance and improvement of their dwellings, such as renovation and repair (Pahl, 1984). Approximately 40 percent of household self-provisioning involved agricultural or horticultural work (n=139, 39.3%).

Helping my dad around the farm. Cleaning the horses, fixing the fence, clean the stables, wash all the animals. (Male 13 years)

I helped in my parents lemon orchard. Help pick the lemons with mum and dad. (Female 13 years)

Working on my uncle’s farm and my Nan and pops farm (they are separate properties). Pull fences down, lay concrete, saw wood, drive tractor (ploughing) round up cattle put up fences. (Male 15 years)

I help on my family property. Round up cattle, put out salt blocks, molasses and hay in cattle yard, help fix fences. (Female 14 years)

In these cases the goods produced more directly substitute for other goods that could be directly purchased on the market. Children are not only replacing a service (for example substituting other purchasable labour) but also directly contributing to the production of subsistence goods.

A smaller category of substantial self-provisioning involved renovation and repair work (n=39, 11.3%) involving construction labour or specialised repair work of houses and cars. Much of the work involves complicated tasks aimed at enhancing family assets such as the home or car. The scope of the work described is often large, rather than just minor repair work.

Floor sanding for mum and dad. Laying wood, sanding wood, varnish wood. (Female 15 years)

Renovating with my dad. Making a kitchen and painting walls. Renovate two rooms by taking down the ceiling and replacing it, tiling, painting and decorating. (Male 12 years)

Working for parents building a house (i.e. tiling, painting etc). Tiling, waterproofing, demolishing old walls, nailing up new plasterboard, cleaning away rubbish. (Male 14 years)

I helped my father sort of put a motor in a car. We built the motor from a half the old one. (Male 13 years)

Home mechanic helper to dad. Change oil, change tyres, build carburettor, change transmission oil and sand down paint. (Male 14 years)

Here young people are directly substituting for labour and services that would normally be purchased on the market, some of which might be quite specialised or technical. For both types of substantial self-provisioning, young people's work diminishes cash-outflow resulting in financial savings for the household. Hence young people's work contributes to offsetting the need to buy in services; and saving adult time from doing the activities otherwise done by young people.

6.3.3 *Working in Consort with family*

Working in consort with family involves young people working as employees with another adult family member. Critical to consort work is that a non-family member owns the means of production. The related family member is an employee or a sub-contractor. The young person is often engaged by this family member to assist in their work. The work relationship therefore represents a chain of employees, the young person working by virtue of their relative's employee status. Therefore the kinship relationship is an important mediating factor in obtaining the work and often in its organisation.

I work at my mothers work in an office. Answering phones, data entry, working in the mailroom, general office work. (Female 15 years)

I help out at where my mum works at a cosmetics factory. Pack up all the products in boxes. Working on the processing line (sometimes). (Male 15 years)

Putting vertical runners together for my mums work. Putting the runners together, packaging them. (Female 14 years)

I help my dad at work installing marble and granite onto kitchen bench tops. Installing bench tops and sinks in new houses. (Male 15 years)

As mentioned earlier the diversity of work reflects the myriad opportunities for work on the formal market. However labour jobs, cleaning and low-end administrative work are over-represented. These forms of engagement also reflect forms of contractual destandardisation in employment. Contractual arrangements in these situations may be vague, reflecting how many of these opportunities arise out of the casualisation of work surplus to the core functioning of the enterprise. Such 'scrap work' provides opportunities for young people to pick up a job and therefore to earn some income, but may not necessarily provide opportunities that are lasting. In this sense the work,

although done with and mediated by adult family members, is disembedded from family life both in the nature of the tasks done and the individualisation of the work arrangements, as the young person is an employee. The opportunistic nature of this work is also reliant upon the networks developed through adult employment– family members in employment identify opportunities for young people's employment.

6.3.4 *Family-owned production*

Family-owned production involves young people working in family owned and run business. Like consort work family-owned production is oriented towards provision of goods or services for the market. However, unlike consort work, the young person's immediate or extended family owns the means of production. Many of the descriptions indicated that the family business was a small enterprise, often involving service work, such as restaurants or corner stores. Here children embody a form of economic capital where family members' labour is pooled as part of a 'family strategy' used as part of the operating practices of the enterprise (Katila 2010; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Song, 1997).

For example:

I help my mum & uncle at a shop, serving customers, cleaning, sweeping, mopping and other things if needed. (Female, 12 years)

I work at my parent's restaurant, Serving customers, cleaning restaurant when closed, cashier, set plates. (Male, 15 years)

Some authors have argued that family labour is suited to small-scale enterprises that can be run by a single family rather than larger enterprises that require the employment of non-family labour. Family members may constitute the primary and sometimes sole labour source and their participation in family-owned production can be very stable over time (Light et al 1994). Being small scale and based on family units, these enterprises constitute relatively autonomous units of production. There may, therefore, be a great deal of pressure on family members, not only as an operational workforce, but also as a relatively self-sufficient social group (Faulstich Orellana et al., 2003; Light et al., 1994; Park 2000; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Song, 1999). The descriptions provided in this study also indicated other work arrangements and contexts. For some responses it was apparent that the 'family business' also employed non-family employees as well as family members. The responses varied for the pattern of employment also, young people being employed in flexible or stop-gap arrangements as well as in an ongoing way.

Work for my parents company, Packaging, setting up systems to complete work, setting up computer systems, salesman. (Male 15 years)

I work at my Aunties shoe shop when she doesn't have enough workers, I do stock take. (Female 12 years)

As discussed earlier, within the family economy the greatest diversity of occupation types is evident for family owned production. The variety of work involved is indicated in the responses below-

I worked for my dad's business at home sending faxes, phone calls, bookwork, typing, bank work, going on job inspections with dad and recording down information. (Female, 15 years)

Family business, DJ and Juke Box service, downloading Jukeboxes, DJ-ing, delivery, processing, loading jukeboxes, gathering music. (Male 15 years)

My Grandfathers stamp business. I handle stamps and envelopes. (Female 13 years)

I help my uncle get some lobsters pots back and pull up some as well, used diving equipment to retrieve lobster pots which were stuck. Also pull pots by hand out in the boat. (Male, 15 years)

Many young workers described work that involved technical or skilled labour:

Working at my dad's local gym, serving customers, cleaning helping people train - if the customers have any questions about an exercise I answer it. (Female, 14 years)

Editing my dad's website every month. I do get paid. Use dream-weaver and I edit it. I use photoshop to design the voucher. (Male 13 years)

Working at family business Saturday mornings (stonemason), polishing granite/marble, cutting and grinding granite/marble, installation of bench top. (Male 15 years)

Engine reconditioner with my dad. It's a family business, talk to customers, build engines, advertising for the shop. (Male 14 years)

The prevalence of young people's involvement in family owned production, the diverse characteristics of the family enterprises young people are employed in, the variety of work arrangements and types of work contributions young people make within these enterprises, all indicate that young people's contributions are part of complex relations of production rather than merely labour inputs whose commitment is simply taken for granted. But is there a social distribution of work in the family economy and do different groups of young people work in different types of family work arrangements. We now examine the social distribution of work on the family economy.

6.4. The Social Distribution of Work within the Family Economy

The previous section described how, within the context of transformations of the family unit and cultures of childhood that are implicated in the division between the public and private spheres, we can make sense of young people's work in the family economy by the degree work is oriented towards exchange-value on the formal market or use-value within the family. However, this public-private dichotomy of family work may also create different opportunities for different groups of young people. For example, the

feminisation of the private sphere is evident in women still taking primary responsibility for domestic labour and childcare. This section examines the overall distribution of family-based work across socio-economic groups and examines whether class position, gender, cultural background and other factors that define the social position of young people, influence participation in the family economy and in different forms of work within the family economy.

Researchers have debated the relationship between socio-economic status and involvement in family based work. These debates have developed in the context of the use of alternative household economic strategies to cope with economic decline, as discussed in Chapter Five. One thesis links household deprivation with greater reliance on family-based production (Boas and Hatloy, 2008; Mayblin 2010). Poorer households, unable to meet their consumption needs via the formal market are forced to reduce their demand for goods on the market and instead work for 'self-consumption'. The alternative thesis holds that a polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households exists, and it is households who have family members in formal employment that are more likely to have recourse to the family economy (Pahl, 1984). These households have more extensive networks created through paid employment, greater ownership of tools necessary for production and greater capacity to purchase manufactured goods that enable households to produce more goods for themselves; features that are all essential for family based work.

Although these debates centre on household self-provisioning, we can acquire more generally applicable insights for this study as to whether participation rates vary across category of work in the family economy. Care work may be more common in poorer households because using older siblings to care reduces expenditure on formal childcare (Faulstich Orellana, 2001). Household self-provisioning may be a counter-cyclical strategy used by poorer households to cope with economic fluctuations. In periods of economic growth people use increased earnings to buy durable goods to shorten time spent on labour in the domestic economy. In periods of economic decline more time and incentive exists for individuals to produce goods and services in the domestic economy to substitute for goods otherwise purchased in the official economy. This cyclical interpretation has been questioned most fervently by Pahl (1984). For the unemployed, turning to the domestic economy may be of limited help if they have no cash to buy the necessary resources that are required for household self-provisioning (Pahl 1984).

As noted earlier consort work is reliant upon an adult family member being in formal employment. We would expect, then, that consort work is more likely in areas of greatest employment, in middle class and wealthier neighbourhoods. For family-owned production, the use of young people's labour may reflect a survival strategy to reduce labour costs, especially for the 'enterprising poor'. However the capital intensity of starting up and operating most businesses require resources not generally available to poorer households. We would therefore anticipate that family owned production is more likely in wealthier households. Similar to the other chapters, two analytical strategies are used to analyse the social distribution of work in the family economy. The first examines the likelihood of working on the family economy overall, compared to working on either the informal or formal economies. The second examines the likelihood of undertaking different types of work in the family economy, again using dummy variables to increase the capacity to compare and contrast each category of work. Each dummy variable was then treated as a dependant variable in logistic regression models with a range of social and demographic variables to provide a sense of whether underlying social factors explain the likelihood of undertaking certain types of work within the family economy. The parameter estimates are presented in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Likelihood of working on the family economy and category by socio-demographic characteristics

		Model I Family Economy ^a	Model II Care work	Model III Self- provisioning	Model IV Consort work	Model V Family-owned production
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.90 (0.13)	0.95 (0.23)	0.90 (0.27)	0.93 (0.26)	1.12 (0.20)
	26-50th quantile	0.85 (0.13)	0.87 (0.24)	0.89 (0.28)	1.21 (0.28)	1.04 (0.21)
	51-75 th quantile	0.73 (0.12)*	1.28 (0.21)	0.60 (0.27)	0.92 (0.25)	1.10 (0.19)
	76-90th quantile	0.52 (0.13)***	1.05 (0.23)	0.55 (0.30)*	0.58 (0.29)	1.73 (0.21)**
	91-100th quant (least disadv) 0-10 th quant (most disadv)=ref	0.37 (0.15)***	1.24 (0.28)	0.79 (0.34)	0.50 (0.35)*	1.41 (0.25)
Age (years)		0.58 (0.03)***	0.87 (0.05)**	0.81 (0.06)**	0.99 (0.06)	1.26 (0.04)***
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	1.88 (0.08)***	0.62 (0.15)**	0.66 (0.19)*	0.83 (0.18)	2.03 (0.14)***
	Anglo-Australian=ref					
Rurality	Other metropolitan	1.07 (0.11)	0.90 (0.19)	1.13 (0.26)	0.91 (0.25)	1.06 (0.19)
	Rural coastal	1.03 (0.11)	0.56 (0.21)**	1.86 (0.24)**	0.31 (0.28)***	1.92 (0.19)**
	Rural inland	1.39 (0.11)**	0.56 (0.20)**	1.41 (0.23)	0.30 (0.27)***	2.35 (0.18)***
	Sydney=ref					
Gender	Female	0.99 (0.06)	4.57 (0.12)***	0.31 (0.14)***	0.36 (0.15)***	0.87 (0.10)
	Male=ref					
Constant		31.40 (0.38)	1.79 (0.70)	5.80 (0.83)*	0.49 (0.88)	0.02 (0.62)***

a) The reference category is: Work in other economies; Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate; *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig. at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Socio-economic status, cultural background, age and rurality have a significant explanatory relationship with the likelihood that a young person will work on the family economy as opposed to other economies. The likelihood of working in the family economy decreases as socio-economic advantage increases. Compared to young people in the most disadvantaged areas, young people in middle class, upper middle class and wealthiest areas are between 0.37 and 0.73 times as likely to work in the family economy, compared to young people in the most disadvantaged areas. Whereas 42.5 percent of young people in the most disadvantaged areas work in the family economy (n=232), this progressively decreases to less than one-fifth of young people in the least disadvantaged areas (n=107, 19.1%). This social gradient would suggest that household economic adversity may necessitate the use of children's labour in the family.

Despite hypothesising that care work may be more likely in poorer households, young people from wealthier and middle class areas are just as likely to undertake care work as young people from the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. We do, however, find class-related differences for household self-provisioning, consort work and family owned production. Young people from upper-middle class backgrounds are half as likely to undertake household self-provisioning and almost twice as likely to be involved in family owned production. Young people from the most advantaged areas are half as likely to be involved in consort work.

Differences in specific economic contexts appear to be implicated in the distribution of family based work. In terms of household self-provisioning the ability to acquire durable means of consumption, such as tools and freezers, has increased the capacity of households generally to engage in household self-provisioning. This is borne out here in the general distribution of this work across economic contexts, apart from upper middle-class communities. However the reasons for undertaking such work are likely to differ by socio-economic background. Williams and Windebank (2002) provide one possible explanation in their work on preference/necessity ratios. They suggest that households in lower income areas undertake tasks perceived most necessary or routine, which is likely to translate into ongoing forms of household self-provisioning. For higher income households a greater proportion of household self-provisioning is performed out of choice on major home improvement work, reflecting a desire to individualise the end product or the pleasure of doing the work. These more involved, large-scale forms of

self-provisioning depend on having enough resources to invest in equipment and supplies, which higher income households are more likely to have. Furthermore the greater ability to outsource other domestic tasks, such as cleaning, potentially creates more opportunity for these households to participate in household self-provisioning in a more voluntary way than in lower income areas.

As discussed in Section 3.4, consort work is mediated by opportunities identified by adult family members who are in employment. This might suggest that middle class and wealthier young people are more likely to be involved in consort work, as levels of labour market participation are highest in these communities. Young people from the least disadvantaged areas are less likely to be involved in consort work compared to other young people. Consort work is instead most prevalent in middle class and working class neighbourhoods. This appears linked to adult labour market structures that generate opportunities for young people. Professional and semi-professional occupations may not generate consort work opportunities for young people. However lower and middle-class occupations, such as labour jobs, and administrative work, are more likely to as these sorts of jobs may be more amenable for young people to work in. Many of the tasks involved, and skill demands required, involve elementary skill tasks and can be delegated with little training and supervision. The hypothesis linking the capital-intensity of family owned production with class effects is also supported. Family owned production is most likely in upper middle class areas that are more likely to have the necessary capital to invest in small business operations. These findings suggest a petit-bourgeois effect.

Children are entrusted with tasks that are of importance to the family from a very early age. However an age-division of labour is evident, with younger children being given responsibility for work centring on the home and older children broadening these responsibilities to family based work that engages with the formal market. In general terms the more work is oriented towards use-value (and therefore embedded in family life) the more likely that younger workers will undertake this sort of work. As age increases the likelihood of working in the family economy decreases. For every year increase in age the likelihood of working in the family economy is halved. Using sixteen year olds as a reference, 14 year olds are 2.8 times as likely to work in the family economy. The differences become more pronounced for younger workers, with 13 year olds 4.3 times as likely and 12 year olds 5.2 times as likely to work in the family economy

compared to other economies. Age-related patterns are also evident across categories of work. Twelve and thirteen year olds are twice as likely as 16 year olds to undertake care work than other kinds of work. A similar pattern is evident for household self-provisioning. Twelve year-olds are 1.8 and 13 year olds 1.4 times as likely as 16 year olds to undertake household self-provisioning. However families are more likely to rely on older children to work in family owned production with the likelihood of working in family-owned production increasing by 1.26 times with an increase in age. While no significant difference in likelihood is observable between 12 and 13 year olds, they are approximately half as likely as sixteen-year olds to work in family owned production. Fourteen year olds are 1.65 times, 15 year olds are 1.91 times and 16 year olds are 2.11 times more likely to work in family-owned production than 12 year olds.

This age-based division between public and private work appear to conform to parental understandings of age-related competence. The performance of tasks is adapted to the particular skills attributed to the child's age and in turn reinforces age-based assumptions about children's competence. Studies of children's domestic work also clearly indicate that being assigned tasks around the house is age-related (Brannen, 1995; White and Brinkerhoff, 1981b). Song's study of take-away businesses found a similar age-based progression of tasks within family-owned production. Young people started helping out in family take-away businesses from a relatively young age (under the age of ten), usually in the kitchen doing simple things, like washing dishes. The performance of these labour intensive tasks was productive for the business, but keeping children busy was also a means of managing childcare for parents. The availability and potential productivity of children's labour tended to increase as the children grew older. The findings presented in this study suggest that as well as age-based task differences within types of family work, there also appear to be age-based differences across types of family work.

Although males and females are equally as likely to work in the family economy, gender differentiates types of work undertaken within the family economy. The largest parameter estimates relate to care work and gender, with females being 4.6 times as likely as males to perform care work. Over 40 percent of females are involved in care work (n=403, 44.4%) compared to approximately 16 percent of males (n=164, 15.9%). Females are approximately one-third as likely as males to undertake household self-provisioning (females: n=85, 9.4%; males: n=255, 24.7%) and to work in consort with

family (females: n=74, 8.2%; males: n=187, 18.1%). Gendered occupational differences are also evident, suggesting that gender expectations exert a normative influence over work roles within the family economy. Approximately 60 percent (61.1%, n=66) of administrative work is done by females. Males dominate agricultural and labour work, with 73.4 percent (n=287) of agricultural work in the family economy done by males; who also predominate in cleaning work (63.5%, n=106). Gender parity is evident in sales work, with roughly similar proportions of males and females undertaking this sort of work (females 52.6%, n=183; males 47.4%, n=165).

Relying on family members as a source of labour appears to be critical for many businesses run by people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are approximately 1.8 times as likely to work in the family economy as Anglo-Australian young people. Approximately 40 percent of children from minority linguistic and cultural backgrounds work in the family economy (n=633, 39.4%), compared to fewer than 30 percent of Anglo-Australian young people (n=1318, 28.9%). This finding is largely accounted for by the increased likelihood that young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are twice as likely as Anglo-Australian children to be involved in family-owned production (n=281, 44.4% for children from minority linguistic and cultural backgrounds; n=493, 37.4% for Anglo-Australian children). Young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are also 0.6 times as likely to perform care work (n=168, 26.5% compared to Anglo-Australian children n=400, 30.3%); and are approximately two-thirds as likely as Anglo-Australian young people to be involved in household self-provisioning (n=81, 12.8%; n=264, 20.0% respectively). The literature on businesses set up by first and second wave immigrants has emphasised the importance of 'ethnic resources and strategies' for the success of ethnic business communities (Katila 2010; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Wilson and Portes, 1980; Zhou and Bankston, 1994). Song (1997; 1999) and Park (2000; 2002) elaborate on these strategies for children by showing that use of family labour is associated with aspects of the migration experience. Parents employ their children not only to reduce labour costs, especially during start-up or establishment phases of businesses, but also rely on their children to provide more intimate forms of labour, such as acting as mediators or translators with customers, clients and external agencies (see also Faulstich Orellana, 2003; Valenzuela, 1999). Song (1997) also suggests that for ethnic minorities, experiences of racism and discrimination intensify feelings of family solidarity.

Working within the family business and undertaking the more subtle forms of helping labour contributes to reinforcing a sense of family membership.

Young people from rural-inland areas are 1.4 times as likely as young people in Sydney to work in the family economy. Approximately 37 percent of young people in rural-inland areas work in the family economy (n=397, 36.5%) compared to just over 30 percent for children in all other areas (n=1554, 30.6%). Within the family economy, the results suggest that different economic structures exist in different regions. Young people from rural areas are approximately twice as likely to be involved in family-owned production (rural coastal n=154, 42.1%; rural inland n=184, 46.3% compared to Sydney, n=343, 38.2%) and young people from rural-coastal areas are 1.86 times as likely to be involved in household self-provisioning (n=96, 26.2% compared to n=128, 14.3%). This is likely to reflect both the relative lack of opportunities for formal economy work in these areas and the prevalence of family-based agricultural activities. Given the smaller scale of formal economies in rural areas, the importance of family-owned agricultural enterprises or family owned businesses that service rural communities appear to also provide employment opportunities for young people. Some forms of household self-provisioning are intricately linked to the land and impossible to replicate in an urban area. The availability of natural resources in rural areas is therefore a crucial basic input for many forms of household self-provisioning. However young people in Sydney are more likely to work in consort with adult family members (n=156, 17.4%) compared to children in both rural-coastal (n=30, 8.2%) and rural-inland areas (n=32, 8.1%) and are more likely to provide care work for their families (Exp (B) =0.6 for both rural coastal and rural inland). Consort work is reliant upon chains of employment through parents or other family members, and is more likely in the 'denser' urban local economies of Sydney.

In summary then we find mixed support for our hypotheses. Care work and household self-provisioning occurs across the class spectrum, supporting neither the economic coping strategy or polarisation hypotheses. However consort work appears reliant upon employment based networks, often in blue collar and semi-skilled white collar jobs. Furthermore, family owned production is more evident among the upper middle class, suggesting a petit bourgeoisie effect. We now turn to examine work conditions across the formal economy.

6.5. Young people's Work Conditions in the Family Economy

As we noted earlier, the historical shift in the self-understanding of the family's productive capacities have brought into relief the varied relationships between the household and the market. For some, this means that the family mode of production is reliant upon the loyalty of family members, which in terms of conditions translate into lower incomes, longer working hours and reduced labour turnover (Boissevain and Grotenberg, 1987; Taylor and Warburton 2011; Waldinger, 1986). To this may be added exploitation within the household, most significantly of men over women, who may control the pace and timing of work as an extension of patriarchal relations within the household (Tipple, 2006). However the effect of loyalty in diminishing conditions may be more evident for some family based work more than others, conceptualised here as the degree to which work is oriented to use-value or exchange value. Several related hypotheses flow from the family to formal market categorisation relevant to work conditions, that centre on whether different conditions are evident for family-based work oriented towards family use compared to family-based work oriented towards market exchange, what we can refer to as the extent of market formality. The extent of 'market-formality' leads to some hypotheses to guide our analysis.

What we can refer to as the formality hypothesis suggests that conditions will vary depending on the degree work is oriented towards satisfying the production of goods for the market or for the satisfaction of needs within the family. The more work is oriented to the formal market, the more formal the conditions in terms of regular work, level of pay and training received. Conversely the more work is oriented towards internal use by the family, the less formal the conditions, including less regular work, less likelihood of pay, lower levels of remuneration and less formal training. On this basis we would expect more 'formal' conditions to be evident for family-owned production and consort workers, and less formal conditions to be evident for young people involved in household self-provisioning and care work. At the heart of this hypothesis is whether, because young people have fewer formal conditions in the family economy they become cheap and reliable sources of labour.

Following the analysis used in Chapters Five and Six, decent work standards are operationalised using an adaptation of the ILO's (2002) work securities. The following sections assess whether the formality of different types of family-based work is related to differences in conditions, either exploitative (less security and control, less pay, less

support) or beneficial, (greater security and control, more pay and more support). Table 6.3 provides an overview of the analysis of work conditions in the family economy. It indicates how the concepts developed from the discussion of structural transformations in the family economy inform our hypotheses around work conditions, and how the work security measures map to these hypotheses.

Table 6.3: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing work conditions on the family economy

Concept		Hypothesis	
<p>Transformation of household from producing and consuming units in pre-industrial societies into consuming units in industrial and post-industrial societies. Household productive activities embedded in continuum from use-value (product consumed by household) to exchange-value (product sold on informal or formal market).</p> <p>Cultural expectations about economic value of children shifted, from children as economic contributors to children as economic dependants. Children's contributions to family life raise issue of the balance between obligation and responsibility within the domestic sphere.</p>		<p>Formality hypothesis: Young people have fewer formal conditions in the family economy compared to the formal economy, which translates into exploitation.</p> <p>The more work is oriented to the market the more formal the conditions. More 'formal' conditions for family-owned production and consort workers, less formal conditions for self-provisioning and care work. For work oriented to family-use, work time and family time seamless and pay via non- monetary goods. For production oriented externally family-based obligations tempered by pay and work-time distinct to family time.</p> <p>Relatedly, greater division between work and family is evident the more work is oriented towards the formal market. Greater demarcation between 'work-life' and 'family-life' evident for production for the formal market (family businesses and consort work), and less where work is for use-value for households (care work and household self-provisioning).</p>	
Decent Work Security			
<p><i>Work security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of hours worked; • work regularity <p>Longer working hours evident for work involving use-value by family because work-time and family-life more embedded. Time-based orientation of work for the market means regular work more likely for consort work and family-owned production.</p>	<p><i>Income security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • likelihood of being paid; • level of remuneration <p>Likelihood of being paid and level of remuneration highest in work oriented towards the formal market, replicating conditions on the formal market.</p>	<p><i>Representation security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fair say at workplace; • task autonomy; • control over breaks; • control over when worked <p>Less control over work time (including control over breaks and when worked) for work oriented towards exchange-use. Greater task autonomy for work oriented towards internal needs of the family because timelines and routines dictated by the internal needs of the family, rather than the requirements of the external market.</p>	<p><i>Skill reproduction security:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • task instruction; • training; • workplace support; • skill development <p>More formalised task instruction, training and skill development opportunities for work oriented to the market. However because work oriented towards family use is more closely embedded in family life, levels of support may arise out of everyday family interactions.</p>

6.5.1. Work Security and Commitment in the Family Economy

Our discussion in the previous section has indicated the young people's work in the family may be embedded in normal family activities, that work and family become blurred through the conduct of certain activities that we have marked out as having economic value to the household. Work may suffuse life so pervasively that children rarely have the time to get away from work, and young people may feel they may have to subordinate their own needs to collective family needs. Alternatively, family-based work may allow young people to set their own timeframes and control their own hours,

providing greater control and flexibility over hours worked (Appelbaum, 1984). For example, for household self-provisioning and care work, the time allocation of work revolves around the needs of family members rather than an external employer. Consequently, the focus may be on getting the task done, and breaking whenever needed, rather than doing the time or meeting externally set timetables. However we hypothesised that greater distinction between work-time and family time will be evident for work oriented towards exchange value. Where goods are produced for the market working schedules may be out of the household's control and work time determined by the volume of orders. Consistent with the analysis undertaken in Chapters Five and Six, two variables are examined to - the number of hours worked per week and the regularity of work (whether the work was one-off, as-needed or regular). The results are presented in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Hours worked (two category) and regularity by family work category and demographic characteristics

		Work 11 hours + ^a	Casual ^b	Regular ^b
Family Work Type	Self-provisioning	0.58 (0.34)	0.51* (0.27)	0.94 (0.30)
	Consort w parents	0.64 (0.33)	0.55* (0.28)	0.64 (0.32)
	Family owned production	1.56**(0.16)	0.89 (0.24)	1.61* (0.27)
	Care work=ref			
Age	Twelve	0.71 (0.34)	2.28 (0.46)	1.46 (0.47)
	Thirteen	0.76 (0.33)	2.04 (0.44)	1.41 (0.44)
	Fourteen	0.92 (0.33)	2.36 (0.44)	1.52 (0.46)
	Fifteen	1.34 (0.34)	1.68 (0.46)	1.21 (0.47)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.79 (0.35)	2.09*(0.34)	2.03 (0.37)
	26-50th quantile	1.23 (0.35)	1.85 (0.35)	1.70 (0.38)
	51-75th quantile	0.58 (0.34)	2.27* (0.32)	1.95 (0.35)
	76-90th quantile	0.38*(0.42)	1.56 (0.32)	1.48(0.36)
	91-100th quantile	0.58 (0.48)	4.43** (0.52)	4.10* (0.55)
CALD	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref			
	Non-Anglo Australian	1.11 (0.17)	1.27 (0.23)	1.33 (0.25)
Gender	Anglo-Australian=ref			
	Female	0.96 (0.14)	1.43 (0.19)	1.37 (0.20)
Rurality	Male=ref			
	Metropolitan	0.85 (0.25)	0.88 (0.30)	1.05 (0.33)
	Rural coastal	0.69 (0.25)	2.14* (0.36)	2.20* (0.39)
	Rural inland	1.07 (0.22)	1.54 (0.33)	2.19* (0.35)
Constant	Sydney=ref			
		0.43* (1.30)	(6.96)	(7.27)

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

a The reference category is: 1-10 hrs.

b The reference category is: one-off.

Young people's work commitments in the family economy are on-going, involve moderate hours but are relatively flexible. Overall approximately two-thirds of young people are involved in casual work (n=1096, 59.3%), one-third work regularly (n=583, 31.5%) and just under ten percent of work is one-off (n=170, 9.2%). Demands in terms of hours worked are relatively moderate. Approximately 80 percent (n=1509, 82.0%) of respondents work 10 hours or less per week, with over half working 5 hours or less per week (n=1096, 59.3%). Approximately 10 per cent of respondents work 15 hours or more per week (n=181, 9.8%).

Care work is most likely to involve casual, but relatively short hours commitment, with almost 80% working as needed or regularly and 10 hours or less per week (n=401, 77.3%). Care work commitments are therefore 'on-call'; the availability of young people is an essential feature that allows care work to be undertaken in response to a variety of family needs. Their time is flexibly available, normally for short to moderate periods of time.

The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort work suggest involvement in discrete tasks that can be differentiated from other household activities with both less likely to be casual than care work and less likely to be regular than family owned production. For consort workers this reflects time structured by standard workdays. Consort work is most strictly time-oriented in this sense, with clear start and finish times. For household self-provisioning the effect of substantive self-provisioning projects, involving discrete and distinctive projects from other aspects of domestic life, possibly explains these patterns. Yet neither are likely to involve regular working, suggesting they are opportunistic.

Like care work and unlike household self-provisioning and consort work, family-owned production involve generalised obligations, with no evident time-horizon. Over one-fifth of young people who work in family-owned production are involved in regular or casual work involving 11 hours or more per week (n=309, 21.9%, including n=90, 12.3 % who work more than 10 hours per week on a regular basis). Family-owned production is therefore more likely to involve longer hours from young people, but in more predictable ways, similar to regular shifts on the formal market. For small scale retail enterprises this is likely to reflect extended operating hours to maximise opportunities for trade. Many

young workers may have restricted time for social lives and schoolwork, especially during weekends when business may be busiest (Song, 1997). However, as Tipple (2006) points out, the time spent minding a small shop may allow young people to combine their work with other tasks such as school work and may be engaged only at busy times or called on to 'mind the shop' if a parent or adult family member cannot (Frost, 2000; Tipple, 2006).

Young people from wealthier backgrounds are less likely to work long hours, but more likely to work casually and regularly than other young people. Regular work commitments are also more likely in rural areas, independent of family work category, suggesting that work patterns may be linked to agricultural routines.

6.5.2. *Income Security – likelihood and level of remuneration*

The likelihood of pay by family work category and socio-demographic characteristics of workers is presented in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5: Likelihood of pay by family work category and Socio-demographic characteristics

Compensation type (a)		Monetary	Reward only
Family Work Type	Self-provisioning	1.66*(0.23)	1.30 (0.27)
	Consort w parents	2.63***(0.27)	0.96 (0.33)
	Family owned production	3.26***(0.19)	1.56*(0.22)
	Care work=ref		
Age		1.03 (0.29)	0.89 (0.23)
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.90 (0.31)	1.53 (0.36)
	26-50th quantile	0.72 (0.31)	0.94 (0.38)
	51-75th quantile	0.93 (0.29)	1.53 (0.35)
	76-90th quantile	0.55*(0.30)	0.65 (0.37)
	91-100th quantile	0.87 (0.38)	1.36 (0.45)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged) = ref	.	.
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.58*(0.20)	1.24 (0.24)
	Anglo-Australian=ref		
Gender	Female	0.68*(0.16)	1.02 (0.20)
	Male=ref	.	.
Rurality	Metropolitan	1.87 (0.30)	1.35 (0.36)
	Rural coastal	1.43 (0.30)	1.22 (0.36)
	Rural inland	0.93 (0.27)	1.45 (0.32)
	Sydney=ref	.	.
Intercept**		(0.17)**	(0.19)

a The reference category is: Neither pay or reward.

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

Overall the level of remunerated pay is far less than that observed in the informal and formal economies, suggesting some support for the formality hypothesis. Just over 70

percent of young people in the family economy are paid for the work they do (n=1326; 71.3%) and a further 16.8% (n=312) are provided non-monetary forms of remuneration. Approximately 12 percent (n=221; 11.9%) of young people are unpaid. The main differences within the family economy relate to likelihood of being paid monetarily. Young people working in self-provisioning are 1.7 times, consort workers 2.6 times and family owned production workers 3.3 times as likely to be paid as care workers. Males, young people from other metropolitan areas, young people from upper-middle class neighbourhoods and Anglo-Australian young people are more likely to be paid monetarily, but the effect is not as strong as for family work type. In percentage terms, approximately 80 percent of consort workers and those involved in family owned production are paid for their work, compared to 58 percent (n=313) and 70.9 percent (n=224) of care workers and household self-provisioning workers respectively. Approximately 20 percent of care workers are unpaid for their work (19.3%; n=104), compared to 11.4 percent, 9.1 percent and 7.7 percent for household self-provisioning, consort work and family owned production respectively. The reward economy is least prevalent for consort workers (n=26; 10.3%), but again most prevalent among care workers (n=123; 22.8%).

We find therefore that a significant number of young people work for no money or payment in kind. Monetisation of work is more likely to characterise work oriented towards production for the market rather than household use. This appears to explain the gendered pattern in these findings, as females are most likely to perform care work, which is also most likely to be unpaid,⁴⁵ as are young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds, who are more likely to be involved in family owned production.

The prevalence of unpaid work among young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds is consistent with Song's research on ethnic family businesses. Few young people received a real wage for helping out, but most pointed to other forms of give and take between themselves and their parents. We also find some parallel in studies of children's domestic labour. In Brannen's (1995) study of children's domestic work, parents from minority cultural backgrounds expressed opposition to monetary payment for household work. They drew upon collective household obligations and responsibilities to explain this opposition. In contrast parents of Anglo-Celtic

⁴⁵ Care work is also predominantly undertaken by females in the informal and formal economies, however it is generally paid in these economic contexts.

backgrounds offered payment as an incentive to do housework. According to authors such as Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010), Park (2000), Song (1999) Valenzuela (1999) and Faulstich Orellana (2001), these sorts of family-based obligations are more characteristic of minority cultural or immigrant households, who transfer cultural practices from their country of origin to their new homeland. However young people themselves may feel differently about the fairness and acceptability of such practices.

As shown in the previous section likelihood of pay can be understood by the degree work is oriented towards the market and the gender and cultural background of young people. Isolating only those young workers who are paid we can also determine whether there are differences in hourly pay rates. From our hypotheses we would expect that work oriented towards the market is more likely to be more highly paid than work oriented towards use-value by the household. Pay rates by family work types is presented in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6: Hourly pay rate by family work category

Statistic	Care Work	Household Self-provisioning	Consort with family.	Family owned production	Family Economy
Mean (S.E. mean)	\$6.65 (\$0.49)	\$9.44 (\$1.38)	\$13.02 (\$1.00)	\$11.31 (\$0.86)	\$10.14 (\$0.48)
95% CI mean (L-U)	\$5.68-\$7.61	\$6.72 - \$12.16	\$11.03 - \$15.00	\$9.63 - \$13.00	\$9.18-\$11.10
5% Trimmed Mean	\$5.71	\$7.01	\$11.82	\$8.92	\$8.11
Median	\$4.00	\$5.71	\$8.00	\$6.86	\$6.67

Mean pay rates in the family economy are approximately \$10.00 per hour. Despite the lower likelihood of being paid in the first instance compared to the other economies, the hourly pay rate is comparable to pay levels in the informal economy, largely attributable to the high hourly rates for consort work and family owned production. This is less than the mean pay rates in the formal economy [family economy workers being paid approximately \$2.00 per hour less on the mean and 5% trimmed mean (which minimises the influence of outlier and extreme values), than the formal economy]. Young people in family-owned production are also paid less compared to mean rates in the formal economy, although the differences are smaller (mean difference = \$1.01; 5% trimmed mean difference = \$1.41). Consort work, which in the family economy most closely resembles work on the formal labour market, is however, paid at comparable but slightly higher rates to young people who work in the formal economy (mean difference = \$0.70; 5% trimmed mean difference = \$1.49). So while we find that pay rates are lower for work oriented towards use-value, confirming the hypothesis that obligation acts to suppress pay, this is not evident for all work across the family economy.

Within the family economy significant differences in pay rates are evident. As well as being least likely to be paid, care work is also the lowest paid. Comparing the 5% trimmed mean household self-provisioning and care work, are paid at similar rates (\$1.30 difference between the means for these types of work). However the differences between care work and household self-provisioning on one hand, and consort work and family owned production on the other are larger. These differences range from \$1.91 (between household self-provisioning and family owned production) and \$6.11 (between care work and consort work). The level of dispersion is also markedly different across categories of work, with work oriented to the formal economy more dispersed than work oriented towards family-use.

As per the analysis presented in Chapters Four and Five, the inter-quartile range of hourly pay rates was calculated, from the lowest quartile of pay (\$1.00 - \$4.00 per hour) to the highest quartile (\$12.01 or more). Using the lowest quartile of hourly pay rates as the reference group, multinomial logistic regression analysis was undertaken to determine whether the likelihood of receiving moderate and high pay rates were associated with family work category and socio-demographic characteristics of young workers. The results are presented in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Pay rates (inter-quartile range) by family work category and demographic characteristics

		26-50th percentile (\$4.01-6.67)	51-75th percentile (\$6.68-12.00)	76-100th (\$12.01- highest)
Family work type	Self-provisioning	1.24 (0.35)	1.27 (0.28)	1.93 (0.36)
	Consort w parents	2.32*(0.36)	1.52 (0.32)	5.41*** (0.34)
	Family owned production	2.61**(0.28)	1.75*(0.23)	3.89*** (0.29)
	Care work = ref			
Age	Twelve	0.97 (0.85)	0.24**(0.55)	0.09*** (0.56)
	Thirteen	0.94 (0.84)	0.47 (0.54)	0.16**(0.53)
	Fourteen	1.65 (0.84)	0.50 (0.54)	0.34*(0.53)
	Fifteen	2.33 (0.87)	0.82 (0.57)	0.54 (0.56)
	Sixteen =ref			
Socio-economic status	11-25th quantile	0.84 (0.44)	0.62 (0.39)	0.77 (0.37)
	26-50th quantile	1.04 (0.44)	1.10 (0.38)	0.51 (0.40)
	51-75th quantile	0.81 (0.40)	0.76 (0.35)	0.55 (0.36)
	76-90th quantile	0.39*(0.44)	0.49 (0.38)	0.26**(0.40)
	91-100th quantile	0.46 (0.62)	1.13 (0.47)	0.68 (0.49)
	0-10 th quantile (most disadv.)=ref			
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	0.49*(0.29)	0.83 (0.25)	0.72 (0.26)
	Anglo-Australian=ref			
Gender	Female	0.53**(0.23)	1.08 (0.19)	0.78 (0.21)
	Male=ref			
Rurality	Metropolitan	0.97 (0.35)	0.89 (0.32)	0.80 (0.35)
	Rural coastal	0.43*(0.39)	0.59 (0.34)	0.58 (0.37)
	Rural inland	0.31**(0.38)	0.50*(0.32)	0.21*** (0.39)
	Sydney=ref			
Intercept		(0.93)	(0.64)	(0.65)

0-25th percentile (lowest to \$4.00) =ref

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000 Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

Across all pay rate quartiles, care work is least likely to be paid higher rates compared to family-owned production and consort work, with no significant differences between care work and household self-provisioning. These differences are, however, exaggerated at the high end of pay rates, with young people involved in consort work 5.41 and those involved in family owned production 3.89 times more likely than care workers to obtain the highest pay rates. The fact that young people involved in family owned production are paid at much higher rates indicates that the use of family labour to offset or reduce costs only partly explains differences in wage rates within the family economy. Rather the value of labour is set by the degree of embeddedness of work within the family. Work that more sharply differentiates between public and domestic spheres is paid more highly.

We also see age-based differences in pay rates for the highest pay rates. While no differences are evident between 15 and 16 year olds, younger workers are between 0.09

times (for 12 year olds) and 0.34 times (for 14 year olds) to be paid the highest pay rates. This is likely to also reflect that the youngest workers are more likely to be involved in care work and household self-provisioning, which are paid at the lowest rates, and older workers engaged in consort work and family-owned production, which are paid at the highest rates. We also find a geographical distribution of pay rates. Compared to young people from Sydney, young people in rural inland areas are most likely to be paid the lowest rates, indicated in that they are less likely to be paid any of the higher pay rates. This is also the case for rural coastal areas for the second lowest pay-rate quartile. However, young people from rural areas are more likely to work in family owned production and less likely to be involved in consort work. This suggests that pay rates in family-owned production, that normally attracts relatively high pay rates, are suppressed in rural areas. This further supports that different economic structures create substantively different opportunity structures for family based work between rural and urban areas.

6.5.3. *Representation Security: Participation and Task Autonomy*

Within the family economy, young people's ability to contribute to decisions about work, exert control over when they do the work, the pace at which they perform work and how they perform the work depends on the conditions which their parents (or adult family member) set them. Additionally, for consort workers and for family owned production external clients or employers also determine conditions. We suggested in previous sections, therefore, that work oriented towards internal needs of the family might provide greater levels of control because family members, rather than the requirements of the external market dictate timelines and routines. For work oriented towards the formal market the performance of work is likely to be dictated by the requirements of external timeframes, quality controls and outputs, which in turn may dictate how work is done and the timeframes in which the work is required to be performed.

As per Chapters Four and Five, three facets of control and autonomy are analysed – control over work-time ('I can take a break when I want to'; 'I am free to decide when I take days off'; and 'If I need to do something important the person I work for lets me change my work hours'); task autonomy which measures the extent children are independent in the overall division of labour, and thus have a specific niche in the family mode of production ('I can do things my own way in my work'); and workplace

participation ('I have a fair say about things at work'). The significant results are presented in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8: Workplace participation, task autonomy and control, by family work category, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I Fair say	Model II Do things own way	Model III Take break	Model IV Take days off	Model V Change Work hours
Family work type	Self-provisioning	0.35**(0.32)	0.74 (0.15)			2.36** (0.27)
	Consort w parents	0.18***(0.36)	0.35***(0.19)			1.83 (0.37)
	Family owned production	0.40**(0.32)	0.53* (0.19)			2.15* (0.36)
	Care work=ref					
Age	Twelve		0.24*(0.60)	2.87**(0.32)	2.47** (0.31)	
	Thirteen		0.26*(0.58)	2.98***(0.30)	2.56** (0.30)	
	Fourteen		0.21**(0.59)	2.12*(0.30)	2.13* (0.30)	
	Fifteen		0.22*(0.60)	2.29*(0.32)	1.97* (0.31)	
	Sixteen =ref					
Gender	Female		1.38*(0.12)		1.34* (0.13)	
	Male=ref					
Rurality	Other metropolitan				0.66 (0.22)	
	Rural coastal				0.51** (0.22)	
	Rural inland				0.47***(0.21)	
	Sydney=ref					
Hours	6-10 hours a week			0.80 (0.15)	0.77 (0.14)	
	11-15 hours a week			0.68 (0.22)	0.55** (0.21)	
	16 hours plus a week			0.60* (0.21)	0.74 (0.20)	
	0-5 hours a week =ref					
Constant		8.09***(0.50)	5.57*** (0.43)	2.08 (0.44)	1.04 (0.42)	3.46 (0.71)

Disagree=ref

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I - I have a fair say about things that happen at work

Model II - I can do things my own way in my job

Model III - I can take a break when I want to in my job

Model IV - I am free to decide when I can take days off work

Model V - Need to do something important, person I work for lets me change work hours

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

Hosmer and Lemeshow not significant for all models, indicating goodness-of fit

Family Typology: Care work = reference

Work-regularity: One-off = reference

Hours worked: 0-5 hours = reference

Work hours and regularity were analysed but not reported for 'Task autonomy' and 'Workplace participation' as they were largely non-contributory. See text below.

Over three-quarters of family workers (n=1302, 76.0%) are able to take a break when they want to and just over two-thirds are free to decide when they can take days off (n=1104, 68.0%). Approximately 70 percent of family workers have some degree of task

autonomy in their work and just over 80 percent feel as though they have a fair say about things that happen at work. However, over 90 percent of workers are able to modify their work patterns if something important occurs ('If I need to do something important, the person I work for lets me change my work hours'). This indicates that for most young workers and their 'employers' there is a clear differentiation between work and children's own commitments. Most young people are therefore able to negotiate the basis on which they provide their labour. In most cases family work obligations are not altogether binding and many young people report significant latitude to negotiate the terms of their work. However, sizeable minorities of young people are unable to exercise any substantial degree of autonomy or control, suggesting that binding family obligations exist for these young people.

Family economy category is clearly associated with different aspects of control and autonomy. What can be negotiated and controlled arises from the framework of everyday activities, related to the specific context in which work is undertaken. Young people in family owned production and household self-provisioning have greater ability to determine when they work, being 2.15 times and 2.36 times more likely to change their work hours compared to young people who undertake care work. The idea that these young people are a freely available labour source at the disposal of their parents is not entirely supported here. However, nor is our guiding hypothesis that control over work time is undermined by the dictates of the formal market. Instead, because the family owns the means of production, young people may be able to exert some control over when they work. A significant amount of latitude over task performance is particularly evident for care work. Care workers are able to exert the most task autonomy and contribute to workplace decisions, which in this context would approximate family decision-making in relation to the work tasks performed. While these young people are most expected to be available to provide their labour, they have the greatest autonomy in the way they use that labour. Care work contains an element of latitude over task performance that is generally not characteristic of formal labour market jobs because care work occurs outside of adult surveillance. However because the demand for care is driven entirely by adult requirements, has lower temporal autonomy.

Consort workers are least likely to be able to contribute to work related decisions or exercise autonomy. Young people in consort work are less than five times as likely to

have a fair say about things that happen at work and approximately one-third as likely to be able to do things their own way in their work. These young people are therefore experiencing the demands of the formal labour market, most likely having to work to set deadlines where discrete projects are involved, or to the pace set by the adult family member. It is quite likely that participating in this sort of work is a matter of choice in the first instance, unlike other categories of family-based work, where the work is part of the fabric of family life. However, the sources through which young people are able to exercise control and autonomy on the job are doubly curtailed by the authority of the adult they work with (usually their parents) and performance expectations that are part of work on the formal economy.

Longer working hours also diminish work control. Young people who work 16 hours or more per week are 0.6 times as likely to take a break when they want to compared to those who work less than 5 hours per week, and those who work 11-15 hours 0.6 times as likely to take days off when they need to. Younger workers are more likely to be able to exercise control over work time than older workers, who are less able to determine when they take a break and what days they can take off. This is likely to be related to older workers being involved in different types of work within the family economy but also, like the formal and informal economies, a reflection of age-related expectations mean that older workers are required to meet more exacting work standards with greater responsibilities. However these expectations are also matched by an increased ability to exercise responsibility through task autonomy. Sixteen year olds are between four and five times more likely to be able to do things their own way at work, compared to younger workers. Female workers and workers from urban areas are also able to exert certain forms of control and autonomy compared to male and rural workers. Young women are 1.34 times more likely than males to be able to determine when they work and 1.38 times more likely to perform tasks their own way. Young people from rural areas are less likely to take days off, which is consistent with our findings on work-time commitment. This may reflect the set and ongoing demands of agricultural work. Notably neither socio-economic status nor cultural and linguistic background has any relationship with aspects of control and autonomy in family work. The factors associated with control and autonomy are instead associated with age, and to a certain extent gender, rather than class or cultural background.

6.5.4. *Skill reproduction Security: Support and Skill development at Work*

Skill reproduction security within the family economy reflects, to a certain degree, the quality of interpersonal relationships within the family. This is because practices associated with skill development and supervision within the family economy are generated through intimate and affective relationships between family members. However such practices can be differentiated from other expressions of intimacy because the relations occur in the context of achieving an economic objective. The inclusion of children at a very early age in family work is central to the transmission of skills (Appelbaum, 1984). Hence the acquisition of skills is different to typical norms of socialisation because it has immediate concrete value and provides concrete returns.

As per Chapters Four and Five, six questions were used to measure work-related support in the family economy - 'The tasks I have to do are clearly explained to me' and 'I get the training I need to do my job' measure task instruction; 'When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job' and 'The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do' measure supervision and feedback; 'I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it' and 'I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work' measure support provided to young workers in doing their work. Two variables measure skill development from work 'I am gaining skills from the work I do' and 'The experience I get working will give me advantages in the future'. These variables measure young people's assessments of whether their current work will provide them with skills or other qualities that will be advantageous into the future. These were modelled against family work context, demographic characteristics and other work characteristics. The results are presented in Table 6.9. Only statistically significant results are reported.

Table 6.9: Support at work by family work category and socio-demographic characteristics

	Model I Training to do job	Model II Employer Interest	Model III Get help if ask	Model IV: Advice good/bad	Model V: Told do a good job	Model VI: Gaining Skills.	Model VII: Future advantage
Family work type							
Self-provisioning	1.55*(0.19)	1.84* (0.27)	1.63 (0.31)	1.71* (0.25)		2.47* (0.38)	
Consort work	1.77**(0.20)	1.34 (0.27)	1.80 (0.33)	1.30 (0.25)		3.29* (0.34)	
Family owned prodn	2.47***(0.16)	1.82** (0.20)	3.09***0.27)	1.66* (0.19)		2.16* (0.27)	
Care work=ref							
Age							
Twelve				3.04* (0.54)	9.59*(1.08)	4.74*(0.53)	4.94* (0.81)
Thirteen				2.44 (0.50)	2.50 (0.86)	3.92*(0.48)	3.73 (0.75)
Fourteen				0.98 (0.47)	0.82 (0.82)	2.71 (0.48)	2.29 (0.72)
Fifteen				0.97 (0.49)	1.20 (0.87)	1.85 (0.50)	1.31 (0.75)
Sixteen =ref							
Socio-economic status							
11-25th quantile			1.40 (0.39)				
26-50th quantile			1.16 (0.40)				
51-75th quantile			1.30 (0.38)				
76-90th quantile			3.63* (0.54)				
91-100th quantile			0.98 (0.47)				
0-10 th quantile (most disadv.)= ref							
CALD							
Non-Anglo Australian	0.69* (0.17)						
Anglo-Australian=ref							
Rurality							
Metropolitan		0.57 (0.39)		0.71 (0.28)	0.58 (0.62)		
Rural coastal		0.32*(0.44)		0.77 (0.29)	0.22*(0.62)		
Rural inland		0.49 (0.44)		0.56* (0.27)	0.60 (0.65)		
Sydney=ref							
Constant	1.44 (0.44)	10.33*(0.63)	2.52 (0.64)	3.45* (0.53)	1.68 (3.38)	2.67 (0.66)	2.95 (0.71)

Reference category= disagree *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I: I get the training I need to do my job;

Model II: The person I work for takes an interest in the work I do;

Model III: I can get help from the people I work with if I ask for it;

Model IV: I get advice about how good or bad I am doing my work;

Model V: When I do a good job, I get told I do a good job;

Model VI: I am gaining skills from the work I do;

Model VII: The experience I get working, will give me advantages in the future

a The reference category is for dependent variables is Disagree.; Intercept included in all models

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

Similar to representation security, family work category most consistently explains differences in skill reproduction security relative to other work conditions or the social position of young people. The more work is oriented towards the formal labour market, the more extensive employer interest and help seeking avenues are for young workers in the family economy. On most indicators, care workers are least likely to obtain support or training, while young people involved in household self-provisioning and family

owned production are most likely to feel they are obtaining various forms of support and useable skills through their work. Relative to care workers, all other workers are between 1.5 and 2.5 times more likely to report that they receive adequate training in how to do their work. Levels of ongoing support are also more likely to be reported by young people involved in household self-provisioning and family owned production. In particular young people in family owned production are more than three times as likely to obtain help from the people they work with if they ask for it. Young people in household self-provisioning are 1.7 times more likely to obtain feedback about how they are doing their work. Young people who undertake household self-provisioning and work in family owned production are also 1.8 times more likely to obtain ongoing supervision and feedback.

Similar findings are evident for skill acquisition. Young people involved in family-owned production are 2.16 times, self-provisioning workers 2.47 times and consort workers 3.29 times as likely as care workers to obtain skills from their work. However, no differences are evident for work providing long term benefits according to family work category, most socio-demographic characteristics or other work conditions, which most likely indicates that few young people see their work in the family context as providing tangible benefits for future educational or career prospects. The only exception to this is age, with 12 year olds being almost five times as likely to consider that their family work will provide future advantage. The lack of training and support for care workers reflects the taken-for-granted nature of care work in the family sphere. Care work, typically done while parents are absent, provides fewer opportunities to learn through cooperative work alongside adult family members. For household self-provisioning, consort work and family owned production, young people are in general provided with the training and supervision required because forms of mutual support are critical to the successful conduct of the work. Invernizzi (2003) points out that cooperative work of this nature also facilitates a transfer of responsibility within the household, giving young people an altered status because of their contribution. However this is largely denied for young people who provide care work because of the devaluation of care work more generally.

There are few other meaningful relationships between the social position of young people and skill reproduction security. rurality has some affect. Young people from rural coastal areas are 0.32 as likely for the person they work for to take an interest in the work

they do and 0.22 times to be given positive feedback on their work. Young people from rural inland areas are also half as likely to obtain feedback as to how competently they are performing their work. We might anticipate that younger workers are more likely to receive greater levels of supervision and support than older workers who may be trusted to work with limited supervision. However this is true in only a limited sense with younger workers being more likely to obtain advice as to how well they are working and receive positive reinforcement for working well. Even here the parameter estimates are only significant for twelve year olds. Young people from upper middle class backgrounds, those most likely to be involved in family owned production, are three times more likely than other workers to obtain help in their work if they ask for it. Young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds are less likely to obtain training to do their work effectively.

6.6. Relational embeddedness in the family economy

As discussed in Chapter Two, as an ideal-type, family based work is organised around achieving collective aims and, because labour is sourced through kinship relations, premised on obligation to the family group. Studies that have addressed the importance of family labour have tended to stress the instrumental use of and reliance upon family labour for the success of family modes of economic production. On this basis, because family based work involves the use of intimate relationships to meet instrumental outcomes, such studies emphasise the possibility for the transgression of the private sphere by institutional motivations (Edgell, 2006, Lovell-Troy 1980; Ram and Holliday, 1993). Viviana Zelizer (2002) describes this as a 'hostile worlds' view of the relationship between money and intimacy - that the social world is divided between spheres organised around competing and incompatible principles. Zelizer goes onto show that in response to 'Hostile World' arguments there has been a strong response which she labels the 'Nothing But' response, that is intimate relations are 'nothing but' a special example of economic rationality or culture. For our own purposes, the 'Hostile World' and 'Nothing But' views present two contrasting explanations for the relationship between family work and attitudes towards that work. From the 'Hostile Worlds' view, the entry of instrumental means such as monetization (measured here through instrumental attitudes around the use of money) into the worlds of caring and parent-child relations depletes these relations of their richness (and therefore we would anticipate intrinsic attitudes, measured here through work resulting in self-reliance, enjoyment and social contribution would be diminished). From the 'Nothing But' view we would expect that either payment

would be unrelated to intrinsic orientations or alternatively attitudes towards work would reflect the quality of relationships within the family, and therefore reciprocity and intimacy potentially facilitates intrinsic outcomes through work. Furthermore, the act of payment, rather than diminishing intrinsic attitudes, gives recognition to the work and can act as a marker of social status within the family economy, resulting in young workers taking a sense of pride in their work. In this respect payment valorises, rather than transgresses, intimate social relations (England, 2000).

Two main lines of enquiry are pursued here. First, we examine the prevalence of instrumental attitudes within the family economy, and the degree such attitudes differ with category of work. We then examine degrees of altruism and the extent of intrinsic orientations on the family economy such as appreciation, recognition and approval through meeting family obligations. We would anticipate that work that is oriented towards exchange on the market would be more likely to exhibit instrumental attitudes. Conversely, work that is oriented towards use by the family would be more likely to exhibit intrinsic attitudes. The alternative, as mentioned, is that more formal conditions valorise intrinsic attitudes. Table 6.10 maps out these lines of enquiry and associated hypotheses, and how the variables that are used to measure these attitudes map to the hypotheses.

Table 6.10: Concepts, hypotheses and measures: Analysing instrumental and intrinsic attitudes on the family economy

Concept	Hypothesis
<p>The entry of instrumental means such as monetization into the worlds of caring, parent-child relations potentially depletes these relations of their richness.</p> <p>Alternatively, family-based work emphasise reciprocity within symmetrical groups, based on logics of collectivity and may mean that young workers are treated with positive affect.</p>	<p>The more work is oriented to exchange value, greater levels of instrumental attitudes; and more work oriented towards use-value, greater levels of intrinsic and altruistic attitudes.</p>
Work Orientation	
<p><i>Instrumental Attitudes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • control over income; • cover expenses; • covers discretionary wants <p>Instrumental attitudes more evident in family owned production and consort work, because they are less embedded in the normal routines of family life and oriented towards exchange use on the market.</p>	<p><i>Intrinsic Attitudes:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • altruism; • responsibility; • build relationships; • social utility; • self-reliance; • enjoyment <p>Care work and household self-provisioning exhibit greater levels of intrinsic attitudes because family members may be contributing their labour to common family projects, family interdependence may develop through an organic division of labour, contributing to a sense of usefulness among children.</p>

The results are presented in the following sections.

6.6.1. Instrumental Orientations - Pay

Three variables are used to measure 'instrumental' attitudes in the family economy. These are whether working provides control over income, allows the young person to cover their expenses or allows them to buy what they want. These measures are to a certain extent, epiphenomenal to the concept of an 'attitude' or 'orientation' in that the benefit is also a measure of the reason to work. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the benefits obtained from working and the reasons to work, are related rather than disparate phenomenon that individuals can differentiate at different stages of the labour experience. All three variables measure the extrinsic orientations associated with individual payment and gain. They are the subjective counterparts of income as a measure of extrinsic rewards from work (Frey, 2002). The logistic regression models examining the likelihood of instrumental attitudes across family work category, socio-demographic characteristics and other work characteristics are presented in Table 6.11. Again, only significant results are reported.

Table 6.11: Instrumental attitudes by family work type, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

		Model I Control income	Model II Cover expenses	Model III Buy what I want
Age	Twelve	3.42*(0.62)		0.27 (0.84)
	Thirteen	2.56 (0.58)		0.27 (0.83)
	Fourteen	2.19 (0.56)		0.25 (0.82)
	Fifteen	1.42 (0.61)		0.17* (0.84)
	Sixteen =ref			
Rurality	Metropolitan	1.97 (0.49)		0.93 (0.33)
	Rural coastal	3.71* (0.47)		0.49* (0.35)
	Rural inland	1.53 (0.43)		0.68 (0.34)
	Sydney=ref			
Hours	6-10 hours a week			1.75* (0.23)
	11-15 hours a week			0.69 (0.33)
	16 hours plus a week			1.27 (0.35)
	0-5 hours a week =ref			
Regularity	Casual			1.26 (0.31)
	Regular			2.04* (0.34)
	One-off=ref			
Remuneration type	Monetary	5.87* (0.77)	6.54*** (0.19)	4.41* (0.65)
	Reward only	1.11 (1.14)	3.27*** (0.23)	7.04 (1.28)
	No pay or reward = ref			
Hourly rate	26-50th (\$4.01-6.67)	2.71*(0.46)		1.03 (0.29)
	51-75th (\$6.68-12.00)	1.28 (0.35)		1.69*(0.26)
	76-100th (\$12.01-highest)	2.77*(0.42)		2.14*(0.30)
	0-25th percentile (lowest to \$4.00)=ref			
Constant		0.73 (1.07)	1.11 (1.10)	1.99 (0.99)

*Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I - Working means I have some control over my own income.

Model II - Working means I can cover some of my own expenses

Model III - Working means I can buy what I want

The reference category is: Disagree

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

Unlike the informal economy, where exchange-use attitudes are related to the social relations of work, family economy categories have little relationship with exchange use. When considered with other variables, the effects of family economy category are not statistically significant. Instrumental attitudes are therefore consistent across the family economy, and have more to do with work conditions and the social value of money for different groups of young people. The strongest parameter estimates are associated with payment. Young people who are paid are almost six times as likely to be able to control their income, over six times as likely to be able to cover expenses and more than four

times as likely to buy what they want. Young people who are paid in the highest quartile of pay rates are also between 1.6 and 2.8 times to be able to buy what they want and control their income as a result of work (although young people who are paid moderately low pay rates are also 2.7 times as likely as those paid in the lowest quartile of rates to be able to control their income). However, social class is non-significant, indicating that instrumental attitudes are linked with monetisation but not economic need. Few other patterns are evident. Rural coastal workers are able to exert control over their income, indicating some level of individuated payment, but less likely to be able to buy what they want from their work. Sixteen year olds are most likely to be able to buy what they want, but the only significant difference is between fifteen and sixteen year olds. Conversely 12 years olds are approximately three times more likely to indicate that work means that they can control their income, suggesting that family-based work may provide an introduction into paid work for the youngest workers in this study. Regular workers and moderate short hour workers are also approximately twice as likely to be able to buy what they want from working.

Our findings suggest even though they may feel young people obliged to work for family; payment has a significant relationship with instrumental attitudes. Finch (1989) suggests that within kin relations the balance and direction of giving and receiving alters over time, young children receiving, with the expectation they will give when they become adults. The importance of pay in the results presented here suggests that with young people who work for family take a role in the interstices between the giver –receiver roles, as they give through their labour, but expect to receive something in return as workers, but also as dependants. This is more consistent with Zelizer's (2002) and Nelson and England's (2002) work on commodification of care, that argues against dichotomising views that position care and markets as antithetical. For the young people in the family economy, feelings of love, familial solidarity and obligation appear to exist alongside instrumental values of work providing capacity to spend and control money in an individualised way. The relationship between payment and intrinsic attitudes is examined in the next section.

6.6.2. *Intrinsic Orientations*

In the previous section we found instrumental attitudes reflect pragmatic opportunities that arise from being paid. However to what extent are these instrumental attitudes tempered by altruistic or obligation attitudes?

As per the previous two chapters, the variable 'Working means I can help out at home financially' is used as a measure of altruistic use of income. This is distinct from the utilitarian uses of income because it measures contribution to household, rather than personal, uses of income. Although a young person may expect specific modes of reciprocity from other household members in return for their work, financial contributions to the household are likely to contribute to generalized modes of reciprocity, with no expectation of immediate rewards. Rather young people who contribute income to their family may be doing so as part of a sequence of exchanges that are ongoing and ambiguous. Five other measures are used to operationalise non-instrumental attitudes, which within the family economy are likely to reflect recognition of the value of work by parents and other significant adults. These variables include whether work provides a sense of responsibility, opportunity to build social connections, sense of social utility, self-reliance and enjoyment. Despite occurring within a context of obligation to family, through their work, young people may feel as though they are making a worthy contribution to the functioning of their family. This may be reflected in young people feeling they have greater responsibility and are doing something useful⁴⁶. As for previous sections, logistic regression modelling was undertaken for each variable. Independent variables include family work category, socio-demographic characteristics and other work characteristics. Significant results are presented in Table 6.12.

⁴⁶ For example Invernizzi's (2003) study of child labour in Portugal and Peru, found that forms of mutual support within the family involved children taking responsibility for shared family projects, leading to overall improvements in family standard of living.

Table 6.12: Intrinsic work attitudes by family work type, socio-demographic and selected work characteristics

	Model I Help at home (altruism)	Model II Responsibility	Model III Build relationships	Model IV Something Useful	Model V Self-reliance	Model VI: Like work
Family work type						
Self-provisioning	1.29 (0.16)	0.75 (1.50)			0.73 (0.38)	
Consort work	1.07 (0.17)	0.04** (1.16)			0.42*(0.44)	
Family owned prodn	1.47** (0.13)	0.26 (1.13)			0.49 (0.42)	
Care work=ref						
Age						
Twelve		6.24 (1.05)		9.29* (1.01)		5.32** (0.52)
Thirteen		8.50* (0.97)		3.08 (0.77)		4.37** (0.49)
Fourteen		12.82* (1.08)		2.19 (0.77)		3.95** (0.49)
Fifteen		1.55 (0.93)		1.59 (0.79)		2.07 (0.50)
Sixteen =ref						
Socio-economic status						
11-25th quantile	1.32 (0.33)					
26-50th quantile	1.06 (0.32)					
51-75th quantile	0.90 (0.30)					
76-90th quantile	0.50* (0.32)					
91-100th quantile	0.44* (0.39)					
0-10 th quantile (most disadv.)=ref						
Gender						
Female	0.52*** (0.17)					
Male=ref						
Rurality						
Other metropolitan	0.99 (0.27)		1.04 (0.38)	1.26 (0.58)		1.16 (0.40)
Rural coastal	0.43** (0.29)		0.38* (0.390)	1.69 (0.63)		0.42* (0.40)
Rural inland	0.63 (0.28)		0.63 (0.39)	6.43* (0.84)		0.82 (0.39)
Sydney=ref						
Remuneration type						
Monetary		2.99** (0.33)		1.87* (0.30)	1.86* (0.22)	1.89** (0.19)
Reward only		3.32* (0.49)		2.11 (0.41)	1.72 (0.29)	2.30** (0.26)
No pay or reward = ref						
Hourly rate						
26-50th (\$4.01-6.67)			2.01*(0.35)	0.33*(0.53)		1.46 (0.35)
51-75th (\$6.68-12.00)			2.33**(0.31)	2.32 (0.65)		1.31 (0.29)
76-100th (\$12.01-highest)			1.86*(0.32)	0.83 (0.54)		2.80**(0.34)
0-25 th percentile (lowest to \$4.00)=ref						
<i>Constant</i>	1.21 (0.81)	19.88 (1.96)	1.95 (0.19)	1.04 (1.35)	5.45 (0.20) ***	0.28 (0.92)

The reference category is: Disagree *Sig. at 0.05 **Sig at 0.005 ***Sig. at 0.000

Model I: Working means I can help out at home financially

Model II: Work gives me a sense of responsibility

Model III: Work gives me opportunities to build relationships

Model IV: Work makes me feel I am doing something useful

Model V: Working means I can rely on myself more

Model VI: I like the things I do at work

Figure in brackets is standard error for parameter estimate.

According to our formality hypothesis, work oriented to use by the family should exhibit greater altruistic attitudes. However the results do not fully support this hypothesis. Compared to care workers, young workers in family owned production are 1.5 times and those involved in household self-provisioning 1.3 times as likely to help out at home financially. However type of remuneration and level of pay are not significant, suggesting that collective contributions do not rely on monetization either valorising altruistic attitudes or crowding such attitudes out. We can only make sense of these results if we consider the concrete context of the work involved. Young people in family-owned production are self-consciously involved in income producing activities with their family, and thus understand that their activities directly contribute to household income. Something similar can be said for substantive forms of self-provisioning. Like family owned production, this type of work involves collective effort on the part of family members and can be directly linked to diminishing cash-outflows. Consort work on the other hand, which is most similar to care work in terms of levels of altruism, is reliant upon individual employment relations. Children who work in consort with family are involved in more conventional employer-employee relationships. Their work is not related to a household strategy and the remuneration they obtain is individualised. Unless these young people contribute their wages directly to household income, there would be no basis upon which they are contributing to family income. Care work, which is most privatised, may not be socially marked out as an activity that contributes economically. What this indicates is not that children use wages directly to help out at home, as an independent contribution to household income, but that their work is part of a household strategy whose direct purpose is to create income, which also helps explain why remuneration type and pay rate are non-significant.

The previous section established that social class is not related to exchange use attitudes. In regards to altruistic attitudes, however, wealthier young people exhibit the lowest levels of altruistic attitude, with young people from the second most and wealthiest neighbourhoods being 0.50 and 0.44 times as likely to show altruistic attitudes. This suggests that poor and middle class families utilise their children to directly contribute income and assist in overall household functioning, whereas for wealthier young people, the conventional view that income from work is used for personal uses holds. Within wealthier families there is less need to use the income generated from young people's work. In poorer households however, the reverse is likely to hold true, a finding that is

also consistent with the most disadvantaged households using family labour (see Section 6.4.1). Notably, young women are half as likely to exhibit altruistic attitudes, which again may be related to the undervaluation of care work.

While care work is least associated with altruistic attitudes, because it is an activity that is not marked out as having economic worth, care workers are most likely to feel their work provides them with a sense of responsibility and self-reliance compared to young people involved in other categories of work. This suggests that the responsibilities involved in caring and the autonomy with which it is undertaken, differentiates care work from other types of work, which are more likely to be undertaken in conjunction with other family members. Therefore while care workers do not feel they are contributing to the household economy (our measure of altruism), the ongoing commitments and responsibilities of young care workers evidence modes of generalised reciprocity which are also related to feelings of self-reliance (Sahlins 1974). Finch (1989) calls the moral character of these relations 'prescriptive altruism' a form of 'sharing without reckoning'. (1989: 303). This was particularly evident in the descriptions of collective and social reproduction care work in Section 3.2. Consort workers are 0.04 times as likely for their work to provide a sense of responsibility and 0.42 times as likely for the work to provide a sense of self-reliance. Consort workers are least able to exercise control and autonomy in their work, which may be an important factor in generating feelings of being responsible. Notably, other intrinsic qualities are not associated with family work category.

Similar to our findings regarding altruism, money marks an activity as having social value and therefore being something worthy of recognition. The act of payment valorises intrinsic attitudes, receives greater support in these results. Young people who are paid and rewarded are approximately three times more likely to obtain a sense of responsibility and approximately twice as likely to enjoy their work. Young people who are paid are also almost twice as likely to feel they are doing something useful and feel self-reliant through work. Furthermore pay rates are associated with intrinsic attitudes. Compared to young people who are paid the lowest rates, other young people are between 1.8 and 2.4 times to be able to build relationships through work and for those paid the highest rates, 2.8 times as likely to enjoy their work.

Similarly intrinsic orientations are significantly associated with age. Younger workers, those fourteen years of age or less, display markedly different levels of intrinsic attitudes compared to young people fifteen years or older. Younger workers are more likely for work to provide a sense of responsibility and to enjoy the work they do. Twelve year olds are almost 10 times more likely to feel they are doing something useful through their work for family. For younger children, their engagement in family based work may be one of the first experiences through which they are obtaining a more 'adult-like' status, and therefore of feeling responsible and useful. The gratification gained through work can involve, on the one hand, pride at their achievement, and, on the other, approval from adults. Wihstutz (2007) found children used work responsibilities as a means to transcend the 'childhood space of play' to which they were ascribed. They were particularly proud when they experienced approval and were treated in a way that altered the hierarchical relationship between children and adults. This also corresponds with the findings on Representation Security, with younger workers being far more likely to be able to exercise control over their work. Family work obligations are also potentially stricter for older children than younger children, reflecting how parents and adult family members expect more from them. Additionally, rural inland workers are more likely to feel they are doing something useful through their work. This may be linked to how forms of substantive self-provisioning, that are more likely to be undertaken in rural-inland areas can, as Nelson (1999b) points out carry access to other valued social and personal resources, such as opportunities to engage in sociability and receive public recognition of skills and abilities.

6.7. Conclusion to Chapter Six

In mapping out family based work, we have discovered that a broad range of work activities take place that have the family as their hub, spanning from care work within the 'private sphere' of the home to the operation of family businesses that are fully integrated into the 'public sphere' of the formal economy. The range of activities young people perform highlights the significant economic contributions young people make to their households, and from which adults benefit.

Involvement in family work cannot be assumed to be positive nor can it be summarily depicted as exploitative either. Instead, objective conditions are influenced by the degree to which work is undertaken, especially whether work is undertaken for use or exchange. Across a range of work conditions there is a clear distinction between work oriented to

the family and work oriented to the market. For example, work oriented towards the formal market (family owned production and consort work) provides income directly to the individual who produced what is paid for. For work oriented towards the household, particularly care work, it is less likely that payment will be made at all, and if income is generated, most likely via household self-provisioning, payment is made to the family as a whole. That is, however they are divided up for consumption, the outputs of labour are conceptually indivisible and belongs to the household as a whole. In terms of work commitments, we find similarly that the nature of work structures the time commitments involved. Care work commitments are 'on-call' but the time expected translates into a system of exchanges, which are discrete, but over time are reciprocal, indeterminate and continuous, which constitute part of the fabric of family life. For family-owned production the demands are more onerous but regulated by the ongoing running of family businesses. The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort work reflect discrete tasks-oriented work that can be differentiated from other family activities.

Autonomy within family-based work can be used to indicate the degree of interdependence that children may experience through their work, and thus the degree other family members rely on them to perform the work independently. The exercise of autonomy and control by young people in the family economy brings into relief how a sense of mutual need and interdependence is established between parents and young people. However we also find that the exercise of autonomy and control in the family economy relies partly the formality of the work. Care work involves significant task discretion, household self-provisioning and family owned production involves capacity to control work time and pace because the family owns the means of production and the work is task-oriented. Consort workers are least able to exercise control because these young people are most exposed to the formal market in an individualised way.

Young people's work in the family economy is characterised by the coexistence of altruism and instrumentality. Family life, as manifested in the forms of work undertaken by young people investigated here, is characterised by a mix of motivations, some of which are traditionally identified with family life and others that are traditionally associated with market exchange. These motivations do not transgress some ideal-type of family life but reflect how different aspects of the same interpersonal relations are marked out with different practices, which are experienced as varied obligations, rights

and exchange. Neither 'Hostile Worlds' or 'Nothing But' explanations adequately deal with the intersection of intimate relations and commodification of young people's labour through pay which perhaps characterises the family economy more than the other economic contexts examined in this thesis. What we have found instead is that the various types of work on the family economy encompass both instrumental tasks and affective relations. We find that not only care work, but other forms of work performed by young people on the family economy are motivated by altruism and are associated with some intrinsic orientations. The monetisation of these tasks however, does not diminish the intrinsic aspects of the work, but for several intrinsic attitudes, marks out the activity performed by young people as something valuable.

Means of marking out an activity as having social and economic value not only include pay and reward, but also disembedding the task from ongoing family practices (i.e. separating an activity from day-to-day routines) or highlighting how a task requires specialised skills. These ways of giving an act social status are often interconnected, in that tasks that are paid are often discrete and involve specialised skills. Young people in family-owned production are slightly more likely to believe they are helping out at home financially. Because these young workers are involved in income producing activities with their family, they are more likely to recognise that their work contributes to a household strategy whose direct purpose is to create income. A similar logic can be used to explain household self-provisioning, which involves a collective household strategy that saves money, rather than produces income directly. On the other hand, children who work in consort with family are involved in more conventional employer-employee relationships and are therefore likely to be paid directly. Their work is not necessarily related to a household strategy that is either income generating or saving. The remuneration they obtain is individualised, being their own. Care work, being socially devalued and privatised is least likely to be remunerated, and least recognised as making an economic contribution to the household.

It is in this respect that we have 'winners' and 'losers' in the family economy. Those who are not paid are not only denied individual income but also the social recognition communicated through being paid. In the family economy, money reflects respect and gratitude for social contribution. Young people who perform work that can be marked out or which directly contributes in a collective manner are acknowledged either through

payment or social recognition as assets to their families. The marked contributions children make to the family economy, then, have the potential to affect their position vis-à-vis adults within the family, as other than being a dependent, as Hungerland et al. (2007) point out. However this recognition is less likely to be experienced by young people involved in work that involves general obligations that most closely resemble the day-to-day functioning of the family, such as care work. Gender is perhaps most salient in this respect. Young people's involvement in the family economy is as sex segregated as their parents' world of work, or perhaps more. The strong effect of gender on the type of work performed, regardless of the specific category in which such work is undertaken, suggests that the gender assignment of children's tasks is a powerful societal norm, which begins early in life. Young women dominate care work, are least likely to be paid and are paid less than males. Young women's contributions are naturalised as part of the gendered division of labour, subsumed within the day to day functioning of the family as care work or regular self-provisioning, and are therefore not as visible. Young men's work is instead marked out as distinct from the ordinary running of the household and therefore is seen to tangibly contribute financially. The distinctiveness of men's work serves to justify a different economic value being attached to the activities of males and females.

A significant feminist literature exists that point out the devaluation of care work, (England, 2005). Our results show that the devaluation of care work specifically, and of work oriented towards family-use more broadly, is also evident for young people. This is further compounded by the construction of children as dependent and economically useless. The qualities usually associated with care work are not those usually associated with childhood because childhood is constructed as a period of incompetence and irresponsibility. Teenagers must demonstrate maturity and responsibility if they are to move out of the stigmatised status of adolescent, and yet because adolescence is seen as a time of irresponsibility they are given few opportunities to demonstrate qualities essential for their admission as adults. This in part also explains the devaluation of care work undertaken by young people. While taking responsibility should result in being valued the taking on of this responsibility may not be recognised by adults and young carers themselves. Hungerland et. al (2007) suggest this transference of work responsibilities is legitimised by parents through the didactic benefits children obtain from this work (see also Zeiher, 2004). However the pedagogical benefits rarely correspond with the sort of

work children identify as being serious activities through which they can exercise their capabilities. Their inferior status is instead cemented because this kind of work is not socially valued. While taking on many adult-like responsibilities, young people who care are often not given the opportunity to attain adult like rewards like pay. This disjuncture between the exercise of responsibility and how little carers receive in return can serve to lower acceptance or satisfaction with work. This may therefore explain why care workers feel responsible themselves, but are less likely to gain other rewards, either through pay, or social recognition.

Parental employment patterns appear to enable and constrain different forms of family-based employment also, especially work most oriented towards the formal market. The wealthiest young people are least likely to work in consort with their parents, who are likely to be professionals and therefore involved in work that provides few opportunities for young people. Upper-middle class young people are most likely to work in family owned production. Rather than being small-scale low-end enterprises, at least some of these family-owned businesses are middle-class enterprises, typical of petit bourgeois arrangements. We also find that there is some merit in arguments that suggest that lower-income households engage in household self-provisioning out of economic necessity and also that that households who have more networks through paid employment, greater ownership of tools necessary for production, and greater capacity to purchase manufactured goods engage in household self-provisioning also. The significance of utilising young people's labour is therefore not limited to working class or poor communities. Nor is there a linear relationship that suggests that poorer families are more likely to use young people's labour in more privatised, 'hidden' forms out of necessity and wealthier families in more public types of work.

Age related notions of competence are also evident in the distribution of family-based work, with younger children being involved in private modes of work and older children in public modes of work. Older workers are less able to exercise control and task autonomy, and hence while their obligations are greater, are less able to exercise responsibility in their work compared to younger workers. As discussed earlier, for younger children, involvement in family based work may be one of the first experiences in which they can exercise meaningful levels of responsibility and autonomy. For older adolescents, family work may instead be experienced as a constraint on financial and

personal independence as they become to understand the limits of their parents' reliance upon them. Questioning the family work contract may precipitate a move to pursuing work on the formal economy, with the attendant material and social rewards that work outside the family economy entails.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In this final chapter we return to the key questions identified in the first chapter and more directly compare the three economies examined in the previous three chapters. Four key areas have been central to the analysis, and we return to each of these in turn. Firstly the relational definition of work that centers on the nature of appropriation is discussed and how the specifics of this appropriation delimit our framework of analysis. Only by explicating this framework can we make sense of the other three aspects of analysis - the structural factors that delimit and enable economic agency across each economy; the social distribution of different forms of work; and the extrinsic and intrinsic orientations evident across the economies. In so doing we assess how social relations influence the conditions, meaning and experience of work.

The conception of economic agency that has underpinned the analysis and which is reflected in the structure adopted in this thesis is action constituted intersubjectively, that occurs within the parameters set by and enabled through structures of social space. This has been operationalised as having two elements: structural embeddedness- the socio-structural context that shapes the dispositions and choices of individual actors; and relational embeddedness - the immediate interpersonal and organisational context of work, which can be analysed in terms of forms of motivation, justification and understandings/meanings of action. These form the 'rules' or characteristics of the 'field' in which work occurs. What this thesis has demonstrated is that agency is expressed through social fields of action, empirically represented as economies. Analysis of the three economies shows that social and economic structures define the economies children work in – the formal, informal and family based economies – and aspects of social integration and social group identification – namely gender, class cultural identity and age – are important in determining how work is experienced. These factors not only delimit children's capacity to assert their agency, but enable action by providing the social environment that legitimates certain types of activities as work, and through interactions with other social actors in these specific social environments, make these activities meaningful as work.

By situating children as active subjects within processes of production across different economies a type of 'de-objectification' results that broadens our understanding of children's agency and competence in several ways. The exercise of specific forms of agency depends on the field within which it is enacted. The meaning of agency is context-specific. Economic agency is not autonomy, but the possibilities for exercising agency are always in relation to the specific social environment and the broader socio-structural factors that determine that environment. This is perhaps crucial, because where agency is ascribed to children in economic discourse it is understood as the enactment of preference within constraint, which is merely a variant of neo-classical economic understanding of human action. Instead we have shown that structures both enable and constrain agency. On the formal economy, the deployment of skill that arises out of a polarization of primary and secondary jobs, especially within the service sector, in large part determines the economic agency of young people. Within the informal economy, the nature of relationships within community, whether universal or particular, or strong and weak, partly determine economic agency. Within the family economy it is the degree to which work is oriented towards exchange-value or use-value that determines the nature of economic agency.

Relatedly agency is expressed in a diversity of ways – that is the content of agency is more than choice oriented towards the accomplishment of a purpose or results. Pointing out field specific motivating logics of action, such as reciprocity, altruism and instrumental action, challenges how children are constructed in economic discourse more generally, as costs, burdens, passive consumers and coerced cheap labour. This is because logics of action, such as reciprocity and altruism, are not ascribed to children in these typical constructions and in these constructions children are objectified. Children's contribution to the family economy defies constructions of children as household costs to be accounted for within household budgeting. Furthermore the care work that children perform within families, as employees on the formal economy and within the informal economy shows that children are not only dependent 'care burdens', but also providers of care to others. The importance of intrinsic as well as extrinsic orientations means that children do not only work to consume. Furthermore we have shown commodification of work through payment also buttresses, rather than displaces, intrinsic orientations towards work. The value placed on enjoying work, not merely as providing future marketable skills, means that young people value work as

providing more than human capital. Despite the importance of age as an analytical category, a productivist and developmentalist orientation towards work is not evident in isolation from other goals and values.

Specifically, we have attempted to understand children's economic agency through an analysis of the work they perform. We have argued that an adequate conceptualization of children as economic agents has two elements – understanding the structures that delimit and define work environments (what we described as 'structural embeddedness'), and how these social structures are experienced as interactions between individuals within these work contexts (what we described as 'relational embeddedness'). The first element is examined in understanding the nature of appropriation and the social forces that have constituted and transformed these economies. The second element is assessed in understanding the distribution of intrinsic and extrinsic orientations across the economies. What bridges these elements is whether work acts as a form of social integration or division among different social groups of young people. The implications of these themes are discussed in this chapter, the discussion unfolding with a similar structure employed in the thesis overall. We initially discuss how the nature of appropriation defines the fields of economic action, before examining the specifics of structural embeddedness for the formal, informal and family based economies. We bring together the threads of the empirical analysis to examine the distribution of work opportunities and work securities across the different economies, before discussing the implications of our findings on work orientations for understanding economic agency. Returning to our initial research aims, we conclude by drawing out some implications of this thesis for the study of childhood and for future research.

Appropriating Children's Labour - Defining the fields of economic action

In Chapter One we described that not only popular discourse, but also careful research studies of children's work, often rely on restrictive definitions of work that capture some, but not all of the productive activities that children, like adults, perform. The work children perform includes, but is not confined to, conventional paid employment on the formal economy. Tasks performed in the household, on family farms, in the informal economy and as self-provisioning can all be productive work, even if they are undertaken outside the traditional paid wage relationship. We have shown that it is not the nature of the tasks that is

important, but the social field in which the tasks are undertaken that is most important. This thesis has detailed several of these fields, and shown that these social fields, defined through distinct sets of social interactions, partly determine what activities count as work, their social value and thus the meaning and experience of work for those involved. We have specified three distinct social fields in which children work, the formal, informal and family based economies.

What is critical in identifying what fields and social interactions count as work is the nature of appropriation between the child or young person who provides their labour and the other party who utilizes that labour. While some tasks are specific to one context, what is more usual is that the same activity occurs across social contexts but takes on a different meaning depending on the nature of appropriation between the actors involved. An activity is defined as work when the activity occurs within the context of some relation of appropriation, which has a relevance to the satisfaction of human needs or other provision of services. Who can appropriate children's labour is a question of structural embeddedness, determined by who has the power to purchase or demand labour within a specific social field. The interplay between individual-level exchanges around work activities and the structures that define the field (and therefore who can appropriate labour) is the nexus in which economic agency occurs. In the formal economy the relationship of appropriation is between the young person and market institutions, primarily formal workplaces and employers. In the informal economy economic transactions occur outside the formal market, and it is non-kin individuals and households based in communities that appropriate children's labour. These relations range from strong and particularistic ties that are reliant upon pre-existing relationships (for example, friends and neighbours) to weak and universalistic ties where the young person offers their labour to anyone willing to purchase it. Within the family economy relationships of appropriation are limited to members of family and kinship groups. The strength of the kinship network obliges children to work.

Although the nature of appropriation constitutes activities as work, and consequently the performance of the same or similar activities can be experienced differently depending on the nature of the appropriation, we have endeavored to use common standards of evaluation across different economies to understand work relations. This is a methodological process,

and in applying these common standards of evaluation, criteria that are used to assess job quality for adults have also been used to assess job quality for children. This relates to our second aim. The thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the characteristics of children's work, including an analysis of the quality and conditions of work and the social distribution of work. Through our analysis of the underlying structural patterns across economies, the role of skills in the formal economy, the particularity of relationships in the informal economy and whether work is oriented towards use or exchange in the family economy, we have illustrated that the work children do is not so much a special category for analysis, but the social relations of work are particular for children because of their generational location. That is, we can take account of the specificity of the context of children's work, the social relations between adults and children that impact on what work children perform and the conditions associated with that work, but nonetheless assess these conditions across contexts in a systematic way. In Chapters One and Two we specified the structural trends important for the formal, informal and family economies and the associated hypotheses for each economy relevant to structural and relational embeddedness. These were detailed and analysed in Chapters Four to Six. Table 7.1 addresses these hypotheses, summarising the key conclusions of the thesis. We discuss these conclusions in the following sections.

Table 7.1: Structural trends, hypotheses and key conclusions by type of economy and form of embeddedness

The Formal Economy					
Socio-structural Embeddedness			Relational Embeddedness		
Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions	Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions
<p>Fragmentation of standard employment contract.</p> <p>Gains from growth in the knowledge economy reflected in skills polarization across the formal economy.</p> <p>Development of primary and secondary labour markets resulting in division between good and bad jobs across the economy.</p> <p>Tertiarization of economy (rise of service economy)</p>	<p>Labour market segmentation in young people's work exists according to skill level.</p> <p>Alternative role hypothesis: young people work in the secondary labour market because an alternative role of subsistence outside the labour market is available to them.</p>	<p>Labour market segmentation is also evident for young people's work with skills utilization central to young people's experience of work on the formal economy. However young people are largely situated in elementary skill jobs. Therefore alternative role hypothesis is also supported, with most young people situated in work suitable only because an alternative role outside the economy is available to them, defined through their role as students and dependants within the family.</p>	<p>Commodification of labour prioritises instrumental behaviour on the formal economy. Money payment acts as both incentive and reward.</p>	<p>Formal economy is associated with instrumental behaviour. Given young people's primary identification as consumers rather than producers, then consumption motivations are a primary rationale for young people to work. Alternatively a mix of motivations will be evident.</p>	<p>High level of instrumental orientations. Reward and motivation highly correlated with evidence of class differentiation in extrinsic orientations. Act of monetary exchange also associated with intrinsic orientations.</p> <p>However consumption motives moderated by intrinsic orientations which are differentiated by class and skill level. Altruism related to economic background. Intrinsic orientations are highest in high skill jobs. Therefore mix of motivations evident.</p>
	<p>'Post-class society' hypothesis good and poor quality work is relatively evenly distributed across socio-economic strata. Alternatively markers of social position, remain important explanatory categories and influence distribution of good and bad jobs.</p>	<p>Post-class hypothesis supported, as the majority of young people work low-end elementary skill jobs in the service sector. However some evidence of labour market segmentation by gender and age, rather than class. Evidence of gender differentiation of occupations and age based progression into formal economy. Young women more likely in service and young males more likely to perform trades. Class does not differentiate because most young people in elementary skill jobs and barriers to entry into high skill jobs are not class specific but generalized across social groups.</p>			
	<p>Skill level associated with differences in conditions for young people, consistent with dual labour market theory. High skill jobs associated with higher pay, more regular work; greater control and autonomy, and increased supervision and training.</p>	<p>Despite ubiquity of elementary skill jobs, skills associated with condition trade-offs, rather than clear polarization between 'winners' and 'losers'. For high skill jobs less predictability in income and work-time security, but better conditions when obtained. For elementary skill jobs payment and hours are determined institutionally. Young people in high skill jobs more likely to have better Representation security and Skill reproduction security.</p>			

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Table 7.1 continued.

The Informal Economy					
Socio-structural Embeddedness			Relational Embeddedness		
Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions	Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions
<p>Boundaries of informal economy effectively defined by regulatory deficit.</p> <p>Informal economy either peripheral to or an alternative dynamic source of economic development.</p>	<p>Marginality hypothesis: marginalized social groups are more likely to participate in the informal economy as a strategy to counteract decline in household purchasing power. As a survival strategy, young people from poorer communities are more likely to be involved in work organised through existing social networks, that is, as informal employees.</p> <p>Alternative social resource hypothesis: wealthier households are more likely to be involved in the informal economy as participation is reliant upon availability of human capital resources and social network ties. Therefore higher levels of enterprise work in middle and higher income neighbourhoods.</p> <p>Associative work no class differentiation – related to shared identity.</p>	<p>Mixed support for both the marginality and social resource hypotheses. Relational embeddedness interacts with class-based segmentation, with class differentiation according to strength of ties between exchangers. Young people from poorer backgrounds are more likely to undertake work as informal employees. Wealthier young people more likely to be involved in enterprise work, undertaking work based on weak and universal ties. Middle class young people are more likely to undertake associative work.</p> <p>Furthermore differentiation according to other social characteristics – females' strong particular ties result in little diversity in work; males' weak and universal ties result in greater diversity of work; age differentiation is also evident, with young - strong particular ties; older -weak and universal ties; and work in rural areas more embedded in community 'gemeinschaft' relations.</p>	<p>Informal work is socially, culturally and geographically embedded. Individuals are motivated to engage in economic activities by a variety of goals, including utilitarian, communal and reciprocal goals. Conventions associated with orthodox market relations are either suspended or mixed with other motivations.</p>	<p>Marginality hypothesis - informal work is a survival strategy of poorer households, then participation for economic reasons is more likely in poorer households. Wealthier households participate in informal economic activities for other reasons, because they find the work fulfilling and enjoyable for example.</p> <p>Because informal employee relations are predicated upon strong, particularistic ties hypothesise higher level of intrinsic attitudes for this type of work. For enterprise workers whose work relations are predicated upon weak universal ties hypothesise higher levels of instrumental attitudes. For associative workers hypothesise emphasis on symbolic rewards and non-instrumental orientations.</p>	<p>Social relations of work effect extrinsic orientations, but social group membership is more important in determining intrinsic orientations.</p> <p>'Informal employee' relations, predicated upon strong particularistic ties, do not evidence greater levels of intrinsic attitudes but are least commodified. 'Enterprise work' predicated upon weak universal ties characterised by higher levels of instrumental attitudes. Reward and motivation are highly correlated. Hence marginality hypothesis is not supported – work for money is a generic experience even on the informal economy.</p> <p>Class differentiates intrinsic orientations, with young people from poorer neighbourhoods more likely to show altruistic orientations. Payment also valorizes intrinsic orientations to generate reciprocity.</p>
<p>In the absence of formal regularity and institutional boundaries other normative structures operate, based upon weak or strong ties within social networks. Conditions are largely determined through enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in</p>	<p>Worse conditions hypothesis: The lack of formal regulation and structural trends towards destandardisation of labour mean that conditions on the informal economy are poor, experienced as low pay rates, unpredictable hours, lack of support, control and effective representation.</p>	<p>Some evidence that lack of formal regulation of labour standards translates into comparably poor conditions on the informal economy, especially work-time security, which is highly precarious.</p>			
	<p>Work conditions differentiated for informal workers depending on the type of work performed. Because informal</p>	<p>Effects of relational embeddedness largely consistent with hypotheses. Specifically income security is mediated</p>			

<p>group membership.</p>	<p>employee work is organised through known social networks, hypothesise that informal employees are more likely to perform unremunerated work, receive lower pay, and are less able to exercise control. Enterprise workers, being more 'market' oriented, hypothesise are more likely to be paid, receive higher pay and have more control over their work. For associative workers, returns for work involve symbolic rewards. Because of the rule-based nature of the work, hypothesise that they experience less autonomy and control in their work, but have more predictable work hours.</p>	<p>by closeness of social ties, with closer social relations exerting discipline on payment and associative workers gaining symbolic rewards. High levels of autonomy reflects regulatory deficit, with exception of associative work and skill reproduction security, which are differentiated by organizational context.</p>	
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The Family Economy					
Socio-structural Embeddedness			Relational Embeddedness		
Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions	Structural Trends	Hypotheses Arising	Key Conclusions
<p>Households have been transformed from producing and consuming units into consuming units as part of broad scale social changes associated with modernity.</p> <p>Cultural expectations about the value of children have correspondingly shifted, from being economic contributors to economic dependants. Children's contributions to family life raise issue of balance between obligation and responsibility within the domestic sphere.</p> <p>Household productive activities embedded in continuum from use-value to exchange-value.</p>	<p>Care work is more common in poorer households because of reliance on older siblings to provide care to reduce cash-outflows for the purchase of care services. Consort work is reliant upon an adult family member being in formal employment, therefore more likely in areas of greatest employment. Poorer households, unable to meet their consumption needs via the formal market have higher rates of self-provisioning. Capital intensity of establishing and operating businesses, require resources not generally available to poorer households, therefore family owned production more likely in wealthier households.</p>	<p>Children contribute to the productive activities of households. Relationship between household as productive unit and formal economy is central. Productive activities are differentiated by use-value or exchange-value.</p> <p>Type of family work is dependent on the social position of the household, however not in ways hypothesized. Care work is common across the class spectrum and class differentiation is evident for self-provisioning – for poorer households because of the necessity to reduce consumption costs and for wealthier households to individualise products.</p> <p>Task segmentation is related to gender, age and cultural background. Gender differentiation reflects gendered socialization within the family. Age related progression is evident, with youngest working for use-value progressing into older workers undertaking exchange-value tasks. Cultural background is important for family owned production, with young people from minority cultural and linguistic backgrounds more likely to work in family-owned production.</p>	<p>Family theorised either as a site where economic exchanges are humanized (and therefore interactions involving reciprocity, collectivity and obligation); or alternatively the entry of instrumentality into an arena of intimate social relations, such as monetization of caring and parent-child relations, depletes these relations of their richness.</p>	<p>The more work is oriented to exchange value, the greater the level of instrumental attitudes; the more work is oriented towards use-value, the greater the level of intrinsic and altruistic attitudes. Therefore family owned production and consort work exhibit higher levels of instrumentality, and care work and household self-provisioning greater levels of altruistic orientation.</p>	<p>Extrinsic orientations evident within the family regardless of exchange or use-value of work. Hence instrumental orientations are not more evident for work oriented towards the formal market.</p> <p>Intrinsic orientations are, however differentiated by class but also by type of work. Work that more evidently contributes to the 'collective' life of the household has higher levels of altruistic orientations. Payment, age and autonomy are also determinative of intrinsic orientations.</p>
	<p>Formality hypothesis: Young people have fewer formal conditions in the family economy</p>	<p>Conditions are differentiated by the extent work is oriented towards use or exchange. Some</p>			

	<p>compared to the formal economy, which translates into exploitation.</p> <p>The more work is oriented to the market the more formal the conditions. More 'formal' conditions for family-owned production and consort workers, less formal conditions for self-provisioning and care work. For work oriented to family-use, work time and family time seamless and pay via non- monetary goods. For production oriented externally family-based obligations tempered by pay and work-time distinct from family time.</p> <p><i>Embeddedness hypothesis:</i> greater division between work and family is evident the more work is oriented towards the formal market. Greater demarcation between 'work-life' and 'family-life' evident for production for the formal market (family businesses and consort work), and less where work is for use-value for households (care work and household self-provisioning).</p>	<p>support for formality hypothesis that the more work is oriented to the market the more formal the conditions. While least commodified economy, income security and skill reproduction security differentiated by orientation towards formal market. Work-time security and representation security are determined by level of embeddedness in family life. Care work is ongoing and family-owned production involves long hours but at regular times.</p>	
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Reconsidering Structural Embeddedness - How structures define arenas of economic action

One of the aims of this thesis has been to explore whether the different economies children work in have different logics of social action, and the relationship between these different logics, work activities and work conditions. We have found that work experiences are embedded in socio-structural contexts that set the parameters and choices of individual actors. In the formal economy the fragmentation of standard employment, development of primary and secondary labour markets and tertiarisation of the formal economy has led to skills polarization in labour market opportunities for young people. The skill dimension of this fragmentation plays a large part in defining good and bad jobs. In the informal economy the 'regulatory deficit' that defines this field raises questions about its structural role as either peripheral to, or as an alternative dynamic source of, economic development. The relational aspects of these two trajectories have more proximate consequences for young people. In the absence of formal rules, conditions are largely determined through other normative structures based upon weak or strong ties within social networks. In the family economy the transformation of the household and therein the productive capacity of children has resulted in households having an ambivalent relationship with the formal economy. However this ambivalence creates productive opportunities for households that can be understood as a relationship defined through use or exchange value. This in turn has a variety of implications for children's work in the family economy. We examine these issues in more detail below.

The Formal Economy

In the formal economy young people's work is embedded in a field that has undergone fundamental structural change, with major implications for the work that young people can perform. From being relatively central to production processes, children and young people have been marginalized into a narrower range of work roles. This can be discerned across several dimensions. The standard employment relationship has in considerable part broken down, with the labour market becoming polarized between standard and precarious work with an associated development of dual labour markets. Jobs in the primary labour market are reserved largely for individuals whose main role is as employees. These jobs have, relatively speaking, better income security, work time security; representation security and

skill reproduction security and are filled by individuals who can most fully commit to these work opportunities – namely adult men. Jobs in the secondary labour market are defined in large measure by decent work deficits – they are poorly paid, involve non-standard hours, have little permanency and provide few opportunities for career development. These jobs are therefore largely reserved for those who are not available or do not have the skills to obtain permanent work. This is the case for many women (although less so), migrant workers and young people who are locked out of the primary job market because of the increasing importance of educational qualifications as an entry requirement into the primary labour market. Additionally, the increasing importance of the service economy has resulted in greater heterogeneity in the types of work that people can do and the types of skills that are required. The skill requirements for this work reflect this heterogeneity and are also fragmented, with an increase in jobs requiring high-level skills and an increase in jobs that are either deskilled or are low skills jobs. Consequently, the skills fragmentation that has been associated with the increased importance of the service sector for the economy overall has not necessarily seen so much an upskilling in the economy, but a skills polarization between high and low skill jobs. This is the key form of fragmentation evident for young people in the formal economy - the application of skill is associated with a range of other conditions and associated experiences of job quality.

Our starting hypothesis was that labour market segmentation in young people's work exists according to skill level. The alternative hypothesis was that young people's experience would instead be rather homogenous, reflecting that work is a secondary role for young people. What we found is that the fragmentation between primary and secondary labour markets means that young people are predominantly working in low-skill secondary labour market jobs. The effect of labour market segmentation on young people's work opportunities is a more considerable influence on the type of work children perform on the formal economy than whether children are relegated to 'children's jobs'. The main division is therefore not between primary and secondary work, especially between stable and contingent employment, but whether contingency is experienced as providing the conditions for autonomy and creativity or whether it is experienced as insecurity or control. This second issue turns on the deployment of skill. We found that the exercise of skill significantly influences whether contingent labour is seen as an opportunity for autonomy, creativity, skill development and

future career prospects, or whether work is just a job done in complement with other activities for extrinsic rewards. We find evidence of both. Relative to the informal and family based economies, the greater diversity in types of work creates opportunities for more interesting types of work to be available for young people on the formal economy. However we also find that most young people are relegated to a limited number of low skill jobs, largely in the service sectors of the economy.

The Informal Economy

Unlike the formal economy where the deployment of skill and the nature of the task have an important relationship with conditions and economic agency, in the informal economy, the specific relational context in which work is performed is most important. As discussed in Chapter Five, the distinction between formal and informal economies hinges on the presence or absence of legal regulation. A number of consequences arise from this for young people. First, in the absence of formal laws, rules or regulations, other forms of social relations function to provide informal modes of regulation and prescribe rules of conduct. These relational contexts are perhaps the most important determinant of economic agency for young workers on the informal economy, helping constitute social networks and norms from which trust develops.

These rules of conduct can be differentiated by whether strong and particularistic ties or weak and universal ties typify the relationship between the employer and employee. In the former this includes those workers we have described as informal employees, where the young person is employed directly by people known to them, what most closely resembles the idea of 'disguised workers'. The latter describes those we have described as enterprise workers, involving the young person running their own small scale enterprise and offering their services more broadly, what most closely resembles the idea of 'informal entrepreneurs'. We also uncovered a third category of informal work that involves universal and strong ties – associative work – that includes work for third sector organizations. Organisational rules and affiliations structure this work and organizational commitment is generated from shared values or interests. These categories emphasise the relationship between young worker and 'employer', rather than the type of work undertaken.

The Family Economy

Transformations in the formal and informal economies have also had a profound influence on the family as a social structure, with households to some degree transforming from a producing and consuming unit in pre-industrial societies into consuming units in industrial and post-industrial societies. However the division of the 'public' and 'private' is, as detailed by feminist economists and historians, not neat or clear. We have found that the ambivalent role household's play in being both 'public' and 'private' translates into different work opportunities for family members, including children and young people. Children and young people are not merely economic dependants within their families but also economic contributors. The relationship between economic dependency and economic contribution is seen in a range of economic activity undertaken by children and young people with and for their families. Care work involves sustained personal interaction and support of other family members; household self-provisioning involves utilizing goods bought from the formal economy as household capital to produce more goods for consumption, normally by the household; working in consort with family involves young people working as employees with another family member where the means of production is owned by a non-family member, and therefore the young person's employment status is an extension of the adult relative; and family-owned production where the young person works in a family owned and operated business, normally on the formal economy.

Therefore the question is how we make sense of the range of economically productive activities that households undertake, and by implication how this structures the experience of work for young people. These activities can be categorised by examining their relationship with the formal economy, from use-value within the household, to exchange-value on the formal market. That is by being both within the domestic sphere and maintaining productive capacity, work activities can range from being oriented towards the needs of the family or to exchange on external formal markets.

The Multiple Economies and Social Integration

What are the implications of these structural trends for the opportunities work provides for different groups of young people? Does work act as a source of social integration or as a means of social exclusion for different groups of young people? Do different social groups obtain advantage because they are more likely to have access to better quality work? What

we have found is that participation in different types of work across and within economies is differentiated by social position, especially class, gender and age. For the formal economy this means examining whether the gains from growth in the service economy are equitably shared across society, indicative of a post-class society where risks are linked to life-course rather than class position (the post-class hypothesis); or whether skills polarization is associated with 'winners' and 'losers' in the economy, indicated in clear divisions in participation in work and different quality work, according to socio-economic and demographic characteristics. For the informal economy the question is whether socially marginalised groups participate in the informal economy to manage lack of other employment opportunities (the marginality or coping strategy hypothesis) or whether less marginalised groups also capitalize on the opportunities within the informal economy, in part because such opportunities are linked to participation on the formal economy. Put another way, do social networks that drive the informal economy operate in different ways for different social groups, especially for young people from poorer or wealthier communities; in other words, is there an inequality in social networks available within poorer or wealthier communities? Within the family economy the issue of social integration turns on whether different opportunities manifest in exchange or use-value; that is whether the household uses the work or whether the work is exchanged on the formal market, as the different types of work require different sorts of resources and create different opportunities for households and young workers. In particular, are the differences in work opportunities, according to how it is oriented towards the formal market, different according to factors such as class, gender, age and cultural background? In different ways, across the three economies, we find that three key social characteristics are significant in structuring work opportunities – class background, gender and age. Rurality and cultural background also have some influence.

Class

On the formal economy the fragmentation of the labour market results in the majority of young people working in low skill jobs regardless of social class. Because these jobs have low entry-level requirements, barriers to accessing them are few, which mitigates class effects. In this sense the formal economy has less social closure than either the informal or family economies that have entry requirements defined through specific, and in the case of the

family strong and pre-existing, relationships. While there is some evidence of class based labour market segmentation, involving high skill jobs, the large number of elementary and intermediate skill jobs means that the class distribution of work on the formal economy is less important than other forms of social differentiation.

Class plays a far more important role on the informal economy. While there is only provisional support for the hypothesis that working in the informal economy is a strategy used by poorer households, class effects are evident for different categories of work in this field. A combination of material conditions and the density of social networks establish different opportunities for the type of work performed for young people from different class backgrounds. Young people from wealthier areas undertake entrepreneurial work because they have greater access to practical resources and a local market willing to purchase services, both of which are required for successful conduct as entrepreneurs in the informal economy. Density of local networks is especially important for the work that young people from poorer neighbourhoods perform, where people known to them hire them as informal employees. Within these neighbourhoods there is some evidence of mutual aid under conditions of limited economic opportunities. What appears to differentiate work opportunities between more and less wealthy neighbourhoods is the strength of ties between the exchangers. While social networks seem most pertinent in providing work opportunities for young people from the least and most disadvantaged communities, middle class young people are most likely to engage in work opportunities provided by associative organizations, that are not reliant so much on knowing people, but sharing interests and values. For young people from middle class backgrounds, work on the informal economy involves pursuit of value-based identities. This has implications for both work conditions and attitudes towards work.

In the family economy, class also plays an important role; specifically, poorer households utilise young people's labour more so than wealthier households. However, as in the informal economy, what is most important is not the overall prevalence, but the class distribution of different types of work. Despite hypothesizing that care work may be more likely in poorer households, young people across the class spectrum share care responsibilities. Consort work and family owned production are most prevalent among

young people from middle income and lower-income communities, linked to adult labour market structures that generate opportunistic work for young people. Young people from poorest and wealthiest neighbourhoods are most likely to be involved in household self-provisioning. While our data do not allow us to specify the exact reasons for household self-provisioning, previous research (Gershuny 1979, 1983; ILO 2002, Pahl 1984, Sassen 1991) suggest that the reasons are likely to differ by socio-economic background. It is likely that poorer households, less able to meet their consumption needs via the formal market, reduce their demand for goods on the market and by undertaking certain types of household self-provisioning, like essential household repairs, to reduce costs. For higher income households a greater proportion of household self-provisioning may be performed out of choice, reflecting a desire to individualise the end product or the pleasure of doing the work.

Overall, what we find is that class effects are lived out through particular social networks at a community level, generating different opportunities for young people depending on their class position. In the formal economy, where we would expect class to be an important determinant of work opportunities, we find relatively little differentiation, because young people are marginalized from the labour market more generally. However in the informal and family economies, the links between social networks and value-identities have quite strong class effects. These effects are not so much seen in categories of 'winners' and 'losers', but rather reflect and consolidate the economic opportunities already available to children and young people from different class backgrounds.

Gender

While class effects are evident in different ways across the economies, we find a relatively stark division of occupations between males and females across all the economies. Gender is a powerful social structure influencing the types of work that young males and females perform. Work in general occurs within a framework of generalised norms about masculinity and femininity that not only shape expectations about what is the appropriate behaviour of women and men but also can be seen in labor market segmentation and pay inequity between men and women. We can conclude that this is also the case for young workers. On the formal economy where policies outlawing gender discrimination are intended to redress gendered stereotypes and practices, we find significant gender differences. While outside the

ambit of this thesis, indirect discrimination, also apparent in the adult labour force, appears to occur at an early age in the form of socialised role differentiation practiced by employers and internalized by young workers.

On the informal economy gender differences are highlighted in the differences in categories of work, between informal employees and enterprise workers. This has quite important implications for the experience that such work can offer. Being overrepresented as informal employees, young women are constrained in the work they can perform by the reciprocal relations that define this work. Young males, overrepresented as enterprise workers can, at least theoretically, pursue whatever sort of work they want limited only by the personal and material resources at their disposal. Empirically we see this in young males performing a much more diverse range of types of work compared to females. What distinguishes the experiences of young men and women is where the onus of 'choice' lies between the employer and the employee. Informal employee work is largely demand driven, neighbours and friends seeking out the young person to perform work, resulting in females being overrepresented in traditionally feminised forms of work. For enterprise work the young worker offers services or goods more generally, which allows these workers to capitalise on skills they possess, resulting in young men performing a greater range of work. Therefore work related social interactions both constrain and create opportunities for what is deemed appropriate work for males and females.

In the family economy the content of work males and females are expected to perform is substantively different, with the gendered allocation of work tasks to children intertwined with socialization practices within the family from an early age. Young women are regarded as responsible for care work and young men involved in a broader range of activities. Here the distinction between the private sphere of care of others and the public sphere of working for family are intertwined and reinforce gendered notion of the private female and the public male. What is concerning about these results is that forms of economic socialization, of children learning to labour, also reveal highly gendered notions of masculinity and femininity. We therefore find some tentative evidence that gender role segregation in the adult labour market may have part of its foundation in the gender socialization of children.

While we can only speculate, these early experiences may have quite profound influences on economic socialization, influencing educational and labour market choices made by young males and females. Especially for work on the informal and family economy, the range of job tasks are constrained by the social relationship through which the work is undertaken. This not only means, therefore, that the range of work activities are constrained for females relative to males by the nature of social relations that define the work, but the ability to express autonomy is also constrained. This is an area requiring further analysis.

Age

One of the prevailing themes in the child work literature is that age based development primarily determines young people's experiences of work. A focus on socialization has contributed to undervaluing young people's work, contrasting with the adult world. While the focus on socialization outcomes and development in the majority of research has marginalized age as an analytical category in new childhood studies, we find that age is an important analytical category – there is an age-based differentiation of how work is experienced and the types of work that young people perform. We can observe two related dimensions that arise from the interaction between age and work. First, the results suggest a pathway of youth participation in the economy, from working in the family and informal economies, which are likely to be embedded in day to day practices, to working on the formal economy, which is a progression into more formally institutionalised economic practice. Second, within the informal and family economies, the more the work is oriented to external environments, the more likely older young people will be undertaking the work. The youngest workers are therefore more likely to undertake work as part of particularistic and strong social ties (i.e. as informal employees) and therefore potentially protective work environments. Older workers are involved in work that is premised on weak and universal ties (i.e. in enterprise work) that require more obvious forms of autonomy and initiative. In the family economy the more work is oriented towards use-value (and therefore embedded in family life) the more likely that younger workers will undertake this sort of work. Conversely the more work is oriented to exchange-value (and therefore embedded in the market) the more likely older workers will undertake this sort of work.

The 'developmental capacities' of children and young people do not determine age patterns observed around work (as the review of previous studies in Chapter One indicated), but children, young people and most likely the significant adults in their lives, appear to be making 'sociological' judgments about age-related work transitions. However implicated in these judgments are competing discourses around protecting children from work and moral development of children through work. Negotiating these two competing discourses has conventionally driven discussions around when children and young people might participate in the formal economy. But we find that children and young people work from quite an early age and this negotiated autonomy influences the type of work undertaken within each economy. Hence negotiated autonomy, arising from the negotiation between protection from work and moral development through work, influences not only the age that young people are likely to work on the formal labour market, but also the other economies and types of work within each economy.

Other aspects of social integration- Rurality and Cultural Background

Opportunities for young people to work are also associated with regional differences in economic development, with work in the formal economy a suburban experience and work in the informal and family economies more likely in rural and regional areas. These differences reflect broader patterns of economic development, specifically that formal economic development and opportunities to work have historically emerged within cities, with markets in large cities sufficiently developed to provide work for young people across the class spectrum. This can be seen in the broad range of elementary and service oriented jobs available in suburban areas. Informal work factors prominently as an economic activity among young people from rural areas, especially work reliant upon strong and particularistic ties, highlighting the importance of local networks in rural and regional areas in underpinning informal employment. Family-owned production and household self-provisioning are also more likely in rural compared to urban areas. The development of informal and family based alternatives to the formal market helps explain the increased likelihood of enterprise work in rural areas which potentially is a low cost, low capital and local alternative that provides niche goods and products in an area. The availability of natural resources in rural areas is also a crucial basic input for many forms of household self-provisioning and enterprise work. With the exception of large-scale agribusinesses, the

smaller size of formal economies in rural areas, the importance of family-owned agricultural enterprises or family owned businesses that service rural communities appear to also provide employment opportunities for young people, which may explain the increased likelihood of family-owned production in rural areas.

It is in work in economies where group membership provides the primary means of entry that cultural background plays a factor. For the formal economy we find no evidence of any relationship between cultural background and work on the formal economy and in the informal economy we find only minor effects. However, in the family economy, cultural background plays an important role in the utilization of young people's labour, especially in family-owned production. In an environment where the substantive nature of the binding relationship determines who can and cannot work, in some of these circumstances shared cultural identity contributes to a sense of obligation among family members. As found in prior research, the more prevalent reliance on family labour for many businesses run by people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds is not only a strategy to reduce labour costs, but reflects the need for adults to rely on more intimate forms of labour, such as translating and mediating, in the conduct of business.

However, while we have some evidence of that cultural background is a factor, it is one factor among several. As already noted, class, age, rurality and gender are also important in determining either whether young people work in the family economy and the type of work performed in the family economy. Cultural and linguistic background is only a relatively minor influence. This finding is important because it also highlights the ongoing necessity of questioning conceptual and common sense prejudices and understandings that surround young people's work.

Decent work and the multiple economies

What has our comparative analysis of the three economies told us about young people's work conditions? Our assessment of the structural contexts that shape the three economies has assisted us to identify the parameters for the analysis of work conditions. Despite examining the same conditions, we have identified quite distinct factors that influence work securities across the formal, informal and family economies. Within the formal economy, young people are involved in precarious forms of work. However the extent that this

precariousness is experienced as opportunity or cost varies for different groups of young people. Skill level also exerts a considerable influence over work conditions on the formal economy. On the informal economy, the lack of formal regulation and trends towards labour destandardisation places downward pressure on work conditions. However, because much informal work is based upon relational ties within social networks, conditions are largely determined through enforceable trust and negotiation rooted in group membership, which serve to build agreement around remuneration, work hours, control overwork and support in performing work. The relational context provides different constraints or opportunities for young workers. For the family economy, the ambivalent position of the household as having both productive capacity and being responsible for the private well being of individuals structures the type of work performed and work conditions. The degree work is oriented towards the formal market determines the sorts of conditions obtained by young people on the family based economy. These dynamics are evident in our examination of four work conditions or securities – income, work time, representation and skill reproduction security. We discuss each of these in turn.

Work-time Security

In the formal economy young people work with in different underlying structures from adults, structures that centre on work as an alternative role. Across the broader labour force, secondary labour markets and the associated contingent employment arrangements are mechanisms for employers to displace the impact of adjustment onto employees, especially low-skill workers. This is also evident for young people. Casual part-time work is the most common experience for young workers on the formal economy. However among young people, elementary skill jobs are comparatively regular. Labour market regulations provide some protection in terms of work-time regulation. Exposure to contingent and precarious work is more likely for high skill workers. The informalisation of high skill jobs and the application of skill serve as compensating conditions for other relatively poorer conditions.

In the informal economy, the unregulated nature of work is also borne out in the high levels of as-needed work. However, unlike income security where the type of social relationship influences conditions, the lack of regulation has more general effects on work time security, with enterprise and informal employee work being equally precarious. This is because both

kinds of work are reliant upon demand generated from within social networks, which are far less predictable than demand generated in the formal economy. The main exception to this is associative work, which, because it is run through organizations, generates ongoing activity, commitment and work for young people.

In the family economy, boundary maintenance between the public and private lives of the family is particularly expressed through work time security. The performance of work for young people in the family economy is either segregated from what children do with the rest of their time or, alternatively, is embedded with other everyday activities so that their work occurs in the context of family needs and circumstances, constituted as part of family life. This appears to be particularly the case for care work where work tasks and family life are largely indivisible, and the performance of such tasks is an expected part of daily obligations. The demands of family-owned production are more onerous but regulated, involving longer but more predictable hours. The time patterns for household self-provisioning and consort work suggest involvement in discrete tasks that can be differentiated from other household activities.

Income Security

Across all the economies income security is not only related to instrumental exchange of labour for money but is embedded in substantive aspects of the relationship between the young people who provide their labour and those who appropriate it. In the formal economy, skill is a major determinant of conditions, but in ways that both confirm and challenge the typical segmented labour market narrative. What we find is that the formal economy is divided into non-competing groups of workers: namely, a small number who provide niche or technical services and the majority of workers in elementary skill jobs located in 'youth intensive' sectors of the labour market. Institutional factors are the key determinant of pay for these jobs. In the Australian context this means the application of youth wages set by Awards, which govern pay and conditions at an industry level. For young people this results in some degree of pay equality in the elementary skill labour market. In contrast high skill jobs are subject to less stringent forms of regulation, with pay for high skill jobs likely to be negotiated less formally, for instance through individual or verbal employment contracts. Furthermore, the exercise of specialized skills, especially for young

workers, in unusual segments of the economy, also results in these young people working for non-monetary forms of remuneration, such as for experience, even though the work is located in the formal economy. These young people are not just working for the money (which is central for most young people in elementary skill jobs) but also because the work may be related to some type of personal interest or pursuit of a possible vocation. Consequently these young people may have a different expectation of conditions- it is the exercise of particular competencies that may be the rewarding aspect of the work. This is discussed further later in this chapter. However because these young people offer niche skills and therefore a specialized market position, when they are paid they are able to attract high levels of payment.

The informal economy remains largely a cash based, rather than gift, economy. However the type of social relationship in which the work is embedded influences type and level of pay received by young workers. The closer, or more particular, the relationship, the more likely the work will be unremunerated and when paid, pay rates are lower. So for informal employees, reciprocity based upon pre-existing relationships between buyers and sellers, such as friends or neighbours, lowers the price for this work. For enterprise workers, where the relationship is less mediated by social ties, the price for a good or service is set by other factors, such as the good or service being offered, capacity of buyer and seller to negotiate and the degree of local competition. Enterprise workers, taking on this risk, also obtain greater rewards. For associative workers, who are most likely to work for non-monetary remuneration, real money is not used as an indicator of value, but instead associative workers are paid honoraria, in recognition of, not exchange for, services and expenses. Other forms of cultural capital are exchanged instead, relevant to the particular associative group.

In the family economy we find that commodified relations (i.e. work for money) is most common where work is undertaken for exchange rather than use value, that is in consort work and in family owned production. The ambivalent position the household has in terms of production is symbolically marked by whether work is paid or not. The monetisation of different types of work within the family economy indicates a separation of internal family-based production and work more directly engaged with the formal economy. However,

compared to both the formal and informal economies, a larger proportion of young people work for no money or for payment-in-kind. The effects of use-value compared to exchange-value oriented work are also apparent. When we compare pay levels in the family economy with those in the formal and informal economies, the pay gaps are greatest for work involving obligation and the closest emotional attachment, care work and household self-provisioning. Limits to the commodification of family relations, including those that revolve around work, are therefore apparent. Yet this also has the perverse effect of devaluing this kind of work. Families undertake a complex set of interactions that maintain a boundary between the public and private, in which the formality of work undertaken by the household plays an important part. The act of boundary maintenance that family members engage in is ongoing and the treatment of certain work activities compared to others maintains the division between the private life and the public life of the family.

Representation Security

Our analysis of work-time security has shown that the precariousness of young people's work can be experienced as providing autonomy for young people or alternatively, can diminish work quality. For example, high skill workers on the formal economy and enterprise workers on the informal economy may find that the irregularity of their work allows them autonomy and control over their work times. Yet whether work flexibility is experienced as autonomy for employees or as being controlled by employers goes to the issue of representation security, encompassing the level of control young people can exercise over their work schedules, work tasks and the extent they can participate in workplace decisions.

On the formal economy, most young people have repetitive work, lacking in variety and done at a forced pace. However, skill and autonomy are closely related, with more complex tasks being reliant on the discretion of the worker for their effective performance. The benefits of task autonomy, work-time control and ability to set the daily pace of work are disproportionately obtained by young people in higher skill jobs, with less skilled jobs being more closely controlled by rules or close supervision. In this respect the insights of labour process theory are also relevant to young people's work.

In the informal economy, work provides ample opportunity for task autonomy and control, especially for enterprise workers and informal employees, unlike the formal economy, where autonomy is traded off against regularity. For informal employees, and to lesser extent enterprise workers, the closeness of social relations facilitates negotiated control over work. Again this is largely because the work occurs outside the jurisdiction of formal laws and regulations. However, similar to work-time and income security, for associative workers, the institutional rule-based work environment means that these workers are less likely to be able to contribute to workplace decisions, exercise task autonomy and are less likely to be able to exercise control over when they work and the pace they work.

Within the family economy the nature of family work obligations are not altogether binding and many young people report significant amounts of latitude to negotiate their work. However this is qualified by the extent that the work is undertaken for use or exchange. The lack of work-time control on the formal economy is not evident in the family economy for work that is most oriented to the formal market, family-owned production. However similar levels of autonomy are also evident for household self-provisioning. As the family owns the means of production, young people in family owned production and household self-provisioning are able to exercise a certain degree of latitude over when they work and when they take breaks from work. Care work, since it is unsupervised has high task autonomy but, since it often revolves around parental work schedules, gives less autonomy over when the work can be carried out. Consort workers experience similar limits on representation security as young people who work on the formal economy. They are least likely to be able to exercise control and autonomy, being under the direct authority of the adult that they work with and have to meet performance expectations similar to those on the formal economy, including employer set work times and tasks.

Skill Reproduction Security

Our analysis of skill reproduction security has indicated that what constitutes the training, supervision and support young people receive varies according to the economy that young people work in. In the formal economy this includes not only off-the-job training but work-based learning and supervision. In the informal and family economies, however, skill reproduction security reflects the quality of interpersonal relationships beyond, for example,

formal training and supervision. This contrasts with more formal employment where supports are institutionalised through organizational practices. In the informal economy the quality of skill reproduction security reflects the social relations between the worker and employer as part of informal social networks. In the family economy skill reproduction security reflects relationships between family members that occur within the context of achieving an economic objective.

This variation is reflected in patterns associated with skill reproduction security within each economy. In the formal economy, skill level also plays a central role in whether young workers receive training and supervision. In addition to being able to exercise greater discretion as to how the task should be done, young people in high skill jobs are also more likely to receive instruction and supervision. For these young people decision latitude is supported, rather than negated, through employer supervision. This is somewhat counter-intuitive. Many elementary skill jobs, especially in the service economy are highly scripted and often involve induction to perform the work to specification. The training provided appears to be extensive. However young people in these jobs, relative to those in high skill jobs, indicate that these measures are not so much about promoting skill reproduction security, as they are about control over the work process. This is supported by our findings on representation security. Moreover, workers in high and intermediate skill jobs are using and developing skills that will potentially provide them with future occupational advantage beyond process skills obtained from 'just having a job'. This holds less true for the majority of young workers who are in elementary skill jobs.

In the informal economy, what is notable is that skill reproduction security is fairly common. Support and supervision are embedded in relationships of trust and reciprocity, which in turn make the economic exchange possible. However despite this the semi-institutional nature of associative work manifests in greater likelihood of support. Associative workers are most likely to get help from the people they work with if they ask for it; most likely to obtain ongoing feedback about how good or bad they are doing their work, are most likely to obtain the training they need to do their job and are also most likely to obtain skills from the work they do. These resources are part of the quasi-bureaucratic work environment of associative work and are aimed at maintaining commitment. However this is traded off with

lower levels of control and autonomy over work. This represents an important contrast to elementary skill work in the formal economy that is similarly subject to administrative organization, but where control over the labour process is experienced as discipline rather than support

Within the family economy, differences in skill reproduction security are systematically associated with different modes of family based work. The more work is oriented towards the formal economy, the more extensive the support provided to young workers. Compared to the formal and informal economies, the extent of skill reproduction opportunity is more limited. However, no differences are evident for work providing long term benefits, which most likely indicates that few young people see their work for family context as providing future educational or career benefits.

Economic agency across the three economies - Children as passive or active subjects ... or something else?

The early parts of this thesis highlighted how children have either been objectified in many existing analyses of children's work, or alternatively children's subjectivity through work has been overly voluntaristic, seeing agency in opposition to structure. The discussion of key work securities within the context of the structural determinants of work instead shows that social forces specific to the field influence children and young people's economic agency. The features of these fields shape the experience of economic agency for individual actors, the definition of their activity as productive or not, and the conditions under which they perform these activities. We suggested in the early part of the thesis that, as ideal-types, each field would have its own logic of action, empirically reflected in different orientations towards work. We also suggested that working is not motivated only by the attainment of extrinsic rewards, such as money, but also less tangible benefits, such as respect and esteem, and in turn these less tangible benefits differ between the economies. As well as exchange orientations, obligation, altruism and reciprocity are also orientations associated with work that represent types of economic agency embedded in different social environments. What we have found, however, is that a mix of orientations exist in any particular setting even though certain orientations are more prominent in some economies than others. We found that even in the overtly instrumental exchange of money for labour, the act of payment is

associated with intrinsic orientations. Monetary payment acts as a ranking device and a form of valuation of individual and occupational status. More generally because the capacity to work and purchase goods is an expression of a struggle to assert and express autonomy for young people, the decision to work cannot be viewed as the simple choice to consume but rather represents a necessary act on the part of many young people to participate in many of the 'normal' routines of being a young person.

In the formal market we hypothesized that young workers would be motivated by extrinsic gains – to make money and to gain marketable skills. We hypothesized that, given young people's primary identification as consumers rather than producers, consumption motivations would be a primary rationale for young people to work. In the informal economy, we hypothesized that work promotes and solidifies relationships of reciprocity within social networks. While there may be an expectation of instrumental exchange, such as money for work, conventions associated with orthodox market relations are either suspended or mixed with other motivations. Furthermore we hypothesized that orientations within the informal economy would also be different. Because informal employee relations are predicated upon strong particularistic ties we hypothesised that higher level of intrinsic attitudes will be displayed for this sort of work. For enterprise workers whose work relations are predicated upon weak universal ties, we hypothesised that higher levels of instrumental attitudes would be more evident. For associative workers, because the work expresses shared value commitment or interest, symbolic rewards and non-instrumental orientations would be stressed. For the family economy, because this work involves fulfilling expected kinship roles and norms, higher levels of obligation would be evident. However, because the family is involved in work for its own use and also for exchange, different types of orientations would be evident for different types of work. The more work is oriented to exchange, the instrumental attitudes will be; and the more work is oriented to internal use, the more intrinsic and altruistic.

Instrumental Orientations

In the formal economy, although skill plays an important role in determining who gets what sorts of conditions the relationship between conditions and instrumental orientations are linked. The extrinsic rewards from work are also the motivation to work on the formal

economy, much like the adult labour market. Young workers view pay as a pragmatic resource – those who are paid more have a greater capacity to purchase goods for themselves than those who don't. However we also see class effects, with young people from lower middle-class and middle class backgrounds more likely just to 'work for the money'. Because young people's social position marginalises them from obtaining independent income, the income available to any young person depends upon factors within the household, particularly the level of disposable income and the way income is shared within families. It is unsurprising then that extrinsic motivations are more apparent for young workers from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

In the informal economy, the way that work is configured relationally has an impact on exchange orientations towards work. Among enterprise workers the relative anonymity between buyers and sellers is evident in the overall tendency towards greater exchange orientations, compared to informal employees and associative workers. Conversely, informal employees are least likely to display utilitarian orientations because this work is conducted through particular social relations. Work reinforces the closeness of the relationship, and to be overly instrumental in such exchanges may transgress the more intimate relationships that exist between friends and neighbours. Furthermore, in the informal economy, class does not act as a differentiating factor, highlighting the importance of social networks across the class spectrum. Statistically associative work is similar to informal employees, but we can surmise that this may be because this work is based in trade of symbolic goods and rewards, such as recognition through acknowledgement of shared interests.

On the family economy, while exchange of labour involves personal relationships that express social obligations and family affection, in many instances work is also performed with the expectation of some form of return, whether money or some other reward. Therefore a system of reciprocity also functions within family groups, in which young people exchange work for their family for some form of recompense. This is evident whether the work is oriented towards exchange or use value. Payment for family work is fairly common and that there is little evidence that payment depletes parent-child relationships. The persistence of instrumental orientations even among those who are paid the least shows how the act of payment confers symbolic rewards, something that also occurs within the formal

and informal economies. However the value given to work may be contested between parents and children, especially for care work.

Intrinsic Orientations

In the formal economy, instrumental orientations are associated with commodification, while intrinsic orientations are associated with social need. Young people from the poorest neighbourhoods are most likely to exhibit altruistic orientations, which also buttress feelings of self-reliance that can be generated through work, with young people from the poorest neighbourhoods also more likely for their work to provide them with a sense of self-reliance. The income that young people contribute to their families, especially in economically disadvantaged households, valorizes a sense of larger purpose for young people. This is an important finding because much research on young people's work in developed economies suggests that young people, if they contribute at all, contribute only indirectly to the overall household economy by purchasing consumer items with their earnings, which parents would otherwise have to pay for. We also find that intrinsic orientations are influenced by the degree young people can exercise control at work in two respects. Firstly, intrinsic orientations are less prevalent among older workers, with younger workers more likely to view work as an avenue for social exploration beyond school and home. Older workers view work more skeptically. This is because the majority of older workers are in elementary skill jobs that have high responsibility and low autonomy. Secondly, higher skilled jobs are more likely to be associated with intrinsic orientations. While elementary skill jobs are relatively less precarious and provide regular income, it is higher skill jobs that are associated with greater intrinsic orientations. These jobs provide greater enjoyment and sense of purpose. The strong relationship between skill and intrinsic orientations and the weak relationship between pay and intrinsic orientations suggests that incentive structures for work and pay are quite distinct. Young people might work for the money, but this is unrelated to other aspects of a satisfying job.

In the informal economy, similar to the formal economy, young people from the poorest neighbourhoods exhibit the greatest levels of altruistic orientations. There is however no significant association between altruism and informal work category. Intrinsic work orientations are prevalent across within the informal economy, regardless of the relationship

between 'buyer' and 'seller'. In the case of informal employees, close ties between people who already know each other, in the case of enterprise workers the 'strength of weak ties' between people who do not know each other very well and for associative workers the moral character of the work, play a comparable role in underpinning intrinsic work orientations in the informal economy. Despite this, payment functions as a medium, or 'social glue', in consolidating social relationships. Young people who are paid are more likely for their work to provide a sense of responsibility, social usefulness and enjoyment. Given the general inequalities in status and resources between young workers and adult purchasers on the informal economy, reciprocal exchange relations may be unequal, with one party feeling or being obliged to give more than the other. The respective resources of the giver and the recipient need to be taken into account when considering who has power in the exchange. In the case of a young worker and an adult purchaser the adult might be compelled by strong normative expectations to pay for the service provided, so as to maintain their superiority in the asymmetrical power relation. In so doing, payment may also act to redress this inequality and at the same time give recognition to the value of the work. Furthermore modes of non-cash repayment are probably clear in adult-to-adult transactions, but adults may struggle as to how to reciprocate a favour provided by a teenager.

Within the family economy it is family-owned production and household self-provisioning, rather than care work, which evidences higher levels of altruistic orientations. We can only make sense of these results if we consider the concrete context of the work involved. Young people in family-owned production are self-consciously involved in income producing activities with their family, and thus understand that their activities directly contribute to household income. Something similar can be said for substantive forms of self-provisioning, which involves a household strategy aimed at reducing costs around a specific project. Consort work on the other hand is reliant upon individual employment relations and the links to a collective household strategy are less clear. Care work, even that done by adults, is rarely recognized as making an economic contribution (Berk 1985, England 2005, Folbre 2001). As in the informal economy, the act of payment marks an activity as having social value and therefore being something worthy of recognition. Payment is an explicit means through which the dependency relationship between adults and children can be partially altered into an exchange of equivalence. It acknowledges and values the work and in so

doing shows that the young worker is capable, competent and responsible enough to perform the work, without necessarily disrupting status relations between adults and children within the family.

Final Reflections

The comparative empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis and summarized in the previous sections of this conclusion has served two important functions. It has detailed the characteristics of children's work in a modern capitalist economy, including the quality, conditions and social distribution of their work. It also provides the empirical vehicle to show how structural factors both delimit and enable children to assert their agency by providing the social environment that make possible certain types of activities. In its most apparent form, agency is the expression of a mix of socially embedded orientations. The analysis has intentionally proceeded from outlining broader economic and social processes to individual experience as expressed in orientations to work. The rationale for this method is to show that economic agency is an expression of relational embeddedness, which in turn, is in part determined by forms of structural embeddedness. While analysing children's work as an example of how economic agency is expressed, this type of analysis could also be extended to other aspects of children and young people's economic activities, such as consumption patterns.

The starting premise of this thesis was that while the adult world of work has been subject to careful and rigorous analyses of politics, policy and structure, analysis of children and young people's work, especially in developed economies, has not. Analysis of children's work has in large part been either overly atomistic or structural. What we have endeavored to show in this analysis is instead that structural and relational embeddedness not only have a conceptual relationship, but are also concretely related in different ways across the three economies investigated in this thesis. However the specific ways structural and relational embeddedness are related is a matter of empirical investigation. Therefore the detailed analysis in Chapters Four, Five and Six, represents the operationalisation of our conceptual framework, but also populates our theoretical premises with empirical contours. These empirical contours undoubtedly will vary across social, geographical and historical space.

What this suggests is that we should not assume that our investigations are definitive, but require continuous questioning and updating.

We see this variation in this study. The empirical analysis of the three economies shows that work conditions and orientations are organized quite differently across the three economies, reflecting the importance of skill on the formal economy, characteristics of social relationships on the informal economy, and whether work is oriented to internal use or exchange use for the family economy. It is this distinction that represents different forms of situated economic agency, embedded in quite distinct sets of social relations. These are specific examples of the interplay of the structural and individual, which move beyond the question of whether structures repress individuals or to what extent individuals can express their free will. Instead structures organize and facilitate individual behaviour, which in turn reproduces and alters structural relations over time. Furthermore, this interaction generates different opportunities and experiences for different groups of young people. Work across the three economies has evident class, gender, age and cultural background distributions. Therefore agency is situated in at least two senses, by social structure and social position.

This evidence also represents a powerful critique of developmental analyses of children and young people's work. The reliance on age-based development as the basis for differentiating between good and bad work not only treats children as the objects of socialisation processes, but also overlooks a range of other factors that are equally or more significant in explaining the quality of work. Yet, our analysis also shows that age remains a valuable analytical category. We see quite evident age related patterns, which reflect the importance of age as a social, rather than developmental, category. This calls for a reconsideration of what role age should play in analysis of children and young people's work. Instead of abandoning age as a developmental category, analysing the social function of age may provide ongoing critical insights into children and young people's experience of a range of social phenomena.

Methodologically this thesis has also shown that quantitative methods can take account of the multiple contexts and diversity of children's work. In so doing work conditions have also been consistently assessed and a specific social universe has been mapped that has allowed us to identify the prevalence of different types of work and conditions across economies,

and inequalities between different social groups of young people. This has been done in a way that has allowed some degree of conceptual openness around the meaning of work and what activities count as work. However by viewing work through the prism of specific economic spheres work has been meaningfully differentiated from other activities. This combination of systematic comparison and conceptual openness has allowed us to identify quite important variation in the underlying explanatory dynamics for each economy.

It is hoped that this investigation can assist develop future theoretical developments in this area. As usual for this sort of endeavor this thesis has raised questions as well as answering them. For instance while this thesis has indicated the conceptual link between structural and relational embeddedness, detailing the relationship between broader economic and social processes at one level, and individual experience is an area requiring ongoing empirical examination. Furthermore, qualitatively investigating the relationships between young workers and those who appropriate their labour will deepen and extend our understanding of the relationship between work orientations, relational and structural embeddedness. We would anticipate that such research may confirm, but also elaborate and challenge the conclusions drawn in this thesis. How extrinsic and intrinsic orientations are experienced on a daily basis, what the conceptual links between the two are and how orientations are generated out of the nature of social relations also requires separate investigation. Furthermore while the results suggest an age-related pathway around work, longitudinal research could test whether this pathway is evident robustly. This thesis has only provided some insight into these issues at a point in time. A more dynamic investigation would require further, and different types, of research to be undertaken.

Finally, in the spirit of raising questions, we will end on one. How are the three economies distinct and related to the adult world of work? To this we can only provide a tentative response. Child and adult economies are interrelated, but in some important respects they are not the same. Instead they are best thought of interlocking social structures, related but independent. Young people's work on the formal economy is highly integrated with the adult world of work. Yet what is perhaps interesting here are how adult sub-populations that have been defined as having an alternative role beyond that of employee, traditionally women, but also those with tenuous links with the formal labour market (retirees, newly

arrived immigrants, adults with few formal qualifications), share similar locations in the formal economy as young people. Hence young people's work on the formal labour market is a particular case of a population who has an alternate role. Within the informal and family economies we also find instances where children and adults work together. Especially on the family economy, household self-provisioning, consort work and family-owned production are types of work where adults and children often work together for a common purpose. However there are certain activities where the work children and young people do is quite distinct from that of adults. We see this especially on the informal economy, where as informal employees or enterprise workers children and young people may be in competition, rather than work with, adults. Again the boundaries are more porous than seamless. Despite the continuities, the work children and young people do remains undervalued because children are undervalued as a social group, even though children make important economic contributions with and in parallel to the work adults perform.

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Appendix A: Sample Characteristics

Table A1: Sample Characteristics by Economy and Work Status

		Formal Economy (n/% within sample)	Informal Economy	Family Economy	Total Not working	Total Working	Total Sample
SEIFA	0-10 th quantile (most disadvantaged)	231 (17.9)	65 (5.0)	232 (18.0)	761 (59.1)	528 (40.9)	1289 (12.3)
	11-25 th quantile	255 (20.9)	112 (9.2)	234 (19.1)	622 (50.9)	601 (49.1)	1223 (11.7)
	26-50 th quantile	633 (25.9)	341 (14.0)	509 (20.8)	960 (39.3)	1483 (60.7)	2443 (23.3)
	51-75 th quantile	777 (24.2)	436 (13.6)	577 (18.0)	1419 (44.2)	1790 (55.8)	3209 (30.6)
	76-90 th quantile	403 (28.0)	268 (18.6)	224 (15.5)	546 (37.9)	895 (62.1)	1441 (13.7)
	91-100 th quantile (least disadvantaged)	281 (32.0)	146 (16.6)	107 (12.2)	343 (39.1)	534 (60.9)	877 (8.4)
Age (years)	Twelve	197 (9.9)	227 (11.4)	414 (20.9)	1147 (57.8)	838 (42.2)	1985 (18.3)
	Thirteen	353 (12.8)	414 (15.1)	618 (22.5)	1365 (49.6)	1385 (50.4)	2750 (25.4)
	Fourteen	585 (20.8)	427 (15.2)	519 (18.4)	1286 (45.7)	1531 (54.3)	2817 (26.0)
	Fifteen	1171 (44.4)	283 (10.7)	309 (11.7)	877 (33.2)	1763 (66.8)	2640 (24.3)
	Sixteen	345 (52.6)	48 (7.3)	74 (11.3)	189 (28.8)	467 (71.2)	656 (6.0)
CALD	Non-Anglo Australian	681 (19.6)	233 (6.7)	633 (18.3)	1921 (55.4)	1547 (44.6)	3468 (31.7)
	Anglo-Australian	2003 (26.7)	1179 (15.7)	1318 (17.6)	2988 (39.9)	4500 (60.1)	7488 (68.3)
Rurality	Metropolitan	465 (24.6)	284 (15.0)	290 (15.3)	854 (45.1)	1039 (54.9)	1893 (17.2)
	Rural coastal	476 (28.0)	286 (16.8)	366 (21.5)	572 (33.6)	1128 (66.4)	1700 (15.5)
	Rural inland	393 (24.0)	290 (17.7)	397 (24.3)	55 (33.9)	1580 (66.1)	1635 (14.9)
	Sydney	1352 (23.4)	550 (9.5)	898 (15.6)	2968 (51.5)	2800 (48.5)	5768 (52.5)
Gender	Female	1070 (22.2)	779 (16.2)	907 (18.8)	2066 (42.8)	2756 (57.2)	4822 (44.3)
	Male	1594 (26.3)	622 (10.3)	1031 (17.0)	2814 (46.4)	3247 (53.6)	6061 (55.7)
Total		2686 (24.4)	1412 (12.8)	1951 (17.7)	4950 (45.1)	6040 (54.9)	10999 (100.0)

Appendix B: Child Employment Questionnaire