Citizenship Status and Pressure Group Action

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This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the intersection between citizenship status and pressure group action. It asks a two-pronged question. First, does variation in citizenship status (to be citizen or non-citizen) produce variation in pressure group action? Second, where there is variation, *how* is it that citizenship status matters; where there is no variation, how is it that citizenship status (a decidedly political status) does not matter? In response to this two-part question, a two-part theoretical framework has been developed. To answer the question of whether citizenship status matters, an *interactive model of action* has been developed. This provides a common measure through which similarities and differences in action-paths between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups can be uncovered. It is found that citizenship status does have an effect on pressure group action, notably in a pressure group's interaction with a) their constituency; b) potential allies; c) other-state political institutions; and d) other-state media. To answer the question of how citizenship matters and does not matter, the idea of *the capability mechanism* has been developed. This asserts that variation in citizenship status - understood through either a rights or identity framework - produces, reduces, or removes capabilities. This, in turn, shapes action. This model is also used to explain similarities. Both the empirical findings and the theoretical frameworks developed within this thesis are useful for further analysis of the significance of citizen or non-citizen status on one's relationship to political systems.

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List of Abbreviations

CAPA	Council of Association of Postgraduate Associations
ISD-SRC	International Students' Department of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council
NLC	National Liaison Committee for International Students
NUS	National Union of Students
NUSA	International Students' Department of the Newcastle University Students' Association
SRC	Sydney University Students' Representative Council
SUPRA	Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association
USU	University of Sydney Union
VSU	Voluntary Student Unionism

Introduction

On April 28, 2005 the Sydney University Students' Representative Council (SRC), along with a collection of other student organisations, commenced a nation-wide protest in response to Voluntary Student Unionism (VSU)- proposed legislation changing the membership laws surrounding student unions. Thousands were in attendance (6,000 alone from the University of Sydney).[1] According to Rose Jackson, then president of SRC, it was a success. But for issues of apathy, there were few barriers to getting students in attendance.[2]

On September 2, 2009, the International Students' Department of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council (ISD-SRC), along with other international student organisations, commenced a rally in protest to existing laws regarding access to public transport concession cards for international students. According to *Irene*[3] (an executive with ISD-SRC), the rally was far from successful with only hundreds of international students in attendance.[4] It was her view that much of the international student body did not want to attend through fear of negative sanctions.[5]

Same political system, same political organisation, same issue-type: funding policy for university related activities. Yet there was a defining difference: citizenship status. SRC was made up of and, for this campaign, represented domestic students. ISD-SRC was made up of and represented international students. Citizenship status (to be a citizen or non-citizen) had introduced itself into the equation. Citizenship status was shaping the actions of these organisations.

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[1] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[2] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[3] Please note, all italicised names are pseudonyms.
[4] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[5] Ibid.

The Research Question

It is the investigation of this intersection- the moment at which citizenship status influences pressure group action- that is the purpose of this thesis. Drawing from the experience of three domestic student organisations from the VSU campaign, and three international student organisations from the concession card campaign, this thesis asks whether, and if so how, citizenship status influences pressure group action. This task is broken into two components.

The first component is descriptive in nature. It asks: does citizenship status affect pressure group action? Do citizen pressure groups act differently from their non-citizen equivalents? Is it possible to show that citizenship status is the likely cause of any observed variation?

Developing from the first component is the question's second component. It is analytical in temperament. It asks: if citizenship matters, then *how* does it matter? What is the mechanism by which citizenship influences pressure group action? Conversely, if citizenship does not matter, then how is it that this politically relevant concept has little sway over pressure group action (a decidedly political activity)?

This thesis provides a response to this research question. First, to answer the question of whether citizenship matters, the actions of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups are compared using *the interactive model of action*. The domestic and international student organisations analysed in this study are representative of citizen (domestic student) and non-citizen (international student) pressure groups. Apart from citizenship, the collection of domestic and international student organisations share numerous similarities. This provides a sound foundation on which to draw comparison. It is concluded that citizenship status *does* influence the actions of pressure groups, though its influence has discernable limits.

Second, to answer the question of *how* citizenship matters, and how it does not, an explanatory framework is developed. This framework- *the capability mechanism*- asserts that variation in

citizenship status produces, reduces or eliminates capabilities through variation either at the level of rights or identity. This variation in capabilities then explains the observed variation between the actions of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. In addition, where citizenship does not matter (where there is no observed variation) the capability mechanism is also employed to explain the non-existence or irrelevance of citizenship variation.

Organisation of Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature and presents the theoretical frameworks informing the thesis. First, it showcases the lack of existing discussion on the intersection of citizenship status and pressure group action. Second, it presents the interactive model of action which allows for comparison of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. Third, it presents the capability mechanism. This includes connecting this concept to the two types of citizenship under investigation: citizenship-as-rights, and citizenship-as-identity.

Chapter 2 discusses the thesis' methodology. Particular attention is directed towards the role of in-depth interviewing in the study.

Chapter 3 seeks to answer whether there is any variation between the action of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. To do so, it employs the interactive model of action.

The following three chapters analyse *how* it is that citizenship influences action in certain instances, and how it does not in others. Chapter 4 shows how citizenship matters through the use of the rights-based capability mechanism. Chapter 5 shows how citizenship matters through the use of the identity-based capability mechanism. Chapter 6 analyses the instances of similarity. Once again, the capability mechanism is employed.

The conclusion to this thesis reviews the findings, discusses their implications, and suggests further areas of research.

Chapter 1 - Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

To begin addressing this research question it is pertinent to turn to the literature. This provides a means to locate the research question within a gap in the body of academic literature, and to describe and develop appropriate theoretical frameworks. The literature review is structured as follows. First, the thesis' research question is located within the academic literature. Second, the theoretical framework is discussed. This includes a) the interactive model of action; and b) the capability mechanism.

Locating the Research Question

The research question addressed in this thesis fills a gap in the academic literature. None of the literature in the relevant fields (citizenship, non-citizenship, and social movement/pressure group action) asks how variation in citizenship status affects pressure group political action. For this thesis, political action is understood to be distinct from political participation. Political action is concerned with *how* a given group/individual goes about advocating its position. Political participation is concerned with *why* some groups/individuals participate within the political arena, and others do not.

The citizenship literature is composed of two parts. The first theorises the nature of citizenship via a) a status framework;[6] b) a rights framework;[7] c) an identity framework;[8] and d) a participation framework.[9] The second reviews the historical emergence of citizenship both

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[6] C. Joppke (2010) *Citizenship and Immigration*, (Cambridge: Polity Press): 28

[7] J.M. Barbalet (1988) *Theories of Citizenship*, (England: Milton Keynes): 15-18; G. Delanty (1997) "Models of Citizenship: Defining European identity and citizenship", *Citizenship Studies*, 1: 289; Joppke, 2010: 29; T.H. Marshall (1950) *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays,* (Cambridge: The University Press): 10-11; B.S. Turner (1993) "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship" in B.S. Turner (ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory,* (London: Sage): 190-5

[8] Delanty, 1997: 290; Joppke 2010: 30; J.K. Ronkainen, (2011) "Mononationals, hyphenationals, and shadow-nationals: multiple citizenship as practice", *Citizenship Studies*, 15: 247-63

[9] Barbalet, 1988: 2; L. Bosniak, (2006) *The Citizen and the Alien: dilemmas of contemporary membership* (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 19; Delanty, 1997: 290; Turner, 1993:208

within a given nation (England),[10] and across numerous nations.[11] Within this work, only Joppke (2010) compares citizenship and non-citizenship. Joppke (2010) provides comparative definitions of citizenship (citizen versus non-citizen), drawing no connection with political action.[12]

The non-citizenship literature can be divided into three parts. First, it theorises the nature of non-citizenship within a rights framework[13] and an identity framework.[14] Second, it analyses the legal status,[15] rates of political participation,[16] and types of political action of non-citizens.[17] Third, it presents normative arguments regarding non-citizenship at the national level[18] and the global level.[19]

Within non-citizenship literature there are various works that discuss the political action of non-citizens. Some examine transnational action. Wayland (2004) analyses the political action of Sri

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[10] Marshall, 1950

[11] Turner, 1993; M. Mann (1987) "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship", *Sociology*, 21: 339-54

[12] Joppke, 2010: 28-9

[13] S. Castles and A. Davidson (2000) *Citizenship and Migration: Globalisations and the Politics of Belonging* (London: Macmillan Press: 96; L. Foster and A. Seitz, (1986) "Legality and Illegality: The Issue of Non-citizens in Australia", *Journal of Sociology,* 22: 450; T. Hammar (1991) *Democracy and the Nation-State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration,* (England: Gower Publishing Group): 21; see also Bosniak, 2006

[14] Bosniak, 2006; Joppke, 2010

[15] R. Baubock (2005) "Expansive Citizenship: Voting Beyond Territory and Membership", *Political Science and Politics*, 38: 683-7; A.L. Blais, Massicotte, and A. Yoshinaka (2001) "Deciding who has the right to vote: a comparative analysis of election laws", *Electoral Studies,* 20: 41-62; M. Bulmer and A.M. Rees (1996) "Conclusion: Citizenship in the twenty-first century", in M. Bulmer and A.M. Rees (eds.) *Citizenship Today- The Contemporary relevance of T.H. Marshall,* (London: UCL Press Limited); G. Orr (2004) "Australian Electoral Systems- How Well Do They Serve Political Equality?" report for the Democratic Audit of Australia

[16] J.A. Garcia and R. O. de la Garza (1985) "Mobilizing the Mexican Immigrant: The Role of Mexican-American Organizations", *The Western Political Quarterly*, 38: 551-64; Hammar, 1991; D.L. Leal (2002) 'Political Participation by Latino Non-Citizens in the United States', *British Journal of Political Science*, 32: 353-50

[17] E.A. Chung (2003) "Non citizens, Voice, and Identity: the Politics of Citizenship In Japan's Korean Community", First Annual Summer Institute on International Migration Conference, University of California, San Diego, June 20-22, p. 20; L.E. Guarnizo, A. Portes and W. Haller (2003) "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants", *The American Journal of Sociology*, 108: 1211-1248; M. Martinello (2005) "Political Participation, Mobilisation and Representation of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe", Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 1/05; E.K. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2001) "Transnational political practices and the receiving state: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands, *Global Networks* 1: 261-81; S. Wayland (2004) "Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora", *Review of International Studies*, 30: 405-26

[18] Bosniak 2006; S. Day, and J. Shaw (2002) "European Union Electoral Rights and the Political Participation of Migrants in Host Polities", *International Journal of Population Geography*, 8: 183-99; Orr (2004); J.B. Raskin (1993) "Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage", *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 141: 1391-1470

[19] J.H. Carens "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders" in R. Beiner (ed.) (1995) *Theorizing Citizenship,* (New York: State University of New York Press): 229-54

Lankan diaspora.[20] Other works focus on national-level political action by non-citizens. This includes Rodan (2007) and Sebastian (2009), who both analyse the political action of international students in Australia.[21] None of these works compare non-citizen and citizen political action.

The literature on social movement/pressure group action also does not compare citizen and non-citizen political action. This thesis combines the ideas of social movement action and pressure group action on account of the similarity of ideas evident through both schools of thought. Meyer and Imgrim (1993) highlight the relevance of ideas on pressure group action to social movement action-paths and vice-versa.[22] Thus, for brevity, this section conjoins these two literatures.

The social movement/pressure group action literature incorporates two schools. The first defines the contours of political action. This includes studies into political action types, such as insider versus outsider action;[23] and locations of action, notably national/supranational levels.[24] Guarnizo and Haller's (2003); Ostergaard-Nielsen's (2001) and Wayland's (2004) works on locations of action analyse non-citizen action, but do not then conduct comparative analysis with citizen groups.

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[20] Wayland, 2010; see also Guarnizo, et al, 2003; and Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001

[21] P. Rodan (2007) "Dilemmas of Dissent: International Students Protest Mechanisms, Melbourne 2007", Paper presented at the Australian International Education Conference, online at: http://www.aiec.idp.com/pdf/Paper_Rodan.pdf, (accessed: 27/03/2011); E.F. Sebastian (2009) *Protest from the Fringe: Overseas Students and their Influence on Australia's Export of Education Services Policy 1983-1996*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney

[22] D.S. Meyer and D.R. Imig (1993) "Political Opportunity and the Rise and Decline of Interest Group Sectors"*, The Social Science Journal*, 30: 253-270

[23] M. Barakso (2010) "Brand identity and the tactical repertoires of advocacy organizations", in A. Prakash and M.K Gugerty *Advocacy Organisations and Collective Action*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); R.J. Dalton, S Recchia, R. Rohrschneider (2003) "The Environmental Movement and the Modes of Political Action", *Comparative Political Studies*, 36: 743-71; K. Kollman (1998) *Outside Lobbying- Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press); S. Staggenborg (2011) *Social Movements* (New York: Oxford University Press)

[24] M.E. Keck and K. Sikkink (1999) "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics", *International Social Science Journal*, 51: 89-101; Wayland, 2004

The second school theorises why groups employ certain courses of action.[25] This includes explanations via a) political opportunity structures;[26] and b) the internal dynamics of the groups (e.g. resources, leadership structure).[27] In this school, there runs an implicit assumption that the agents under discussion are citizens. Throughout, there is no attempt to compare citizenship types.

In sum, this review indicates that there has been no attempt within the literature to analyse the link between citizenship-status and pressure group action. This thesis attempts to bridge this gap through asking the two-pronged research question: does citizen status affect pressure group action? How does citizenship status affect or not affect pressure group action?

A two-part theoretical framework has been developed to respond to this two-part research question. First, to investigate if citizenship affects pressure group action, the interactive model of action has been constructed. This provides a set of common denominators which allows for comparison of citizen and non-citizen action paths. Second, to answer how citizenship produces variation (and how it does not), the capability mechanism has been developed.

Empirical Comparison: The Interactive Model of Action

The first part of this thesis' research question asks whether *there is any variation in the action-paths of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups*. To answer this question, it is necessary to build

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[25] Barakso, 2010; M. Bernstein (1997) "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 103: 531-565; T.L. Gais and J.L. Walker Jr. (1991) "Pathways to Influence in American Politics" in J.L. Walker Jr., *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press); H.P. Kitschelt (1986) "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies", *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 57-85; H. Kriesi (1995) "The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on Their Mobilization", in J.C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans (eds.) *The Politics of Social Protest- Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, (London: UCL Press Limited); D.S. Meyer (1993) "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement", *Sociological Forum*, 8: 157-79; D.S. Meyer (2004) "Protest and Political Opportunities", *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125-45; D.S. Meyer and D.R. Imig (1993) "Political Opportunity and the Rise and Decline of Interest Group Sectors", *The Social Science Journal*, 30: 253-270; D.D. Porta and M. Diani, (2003), *Social Movements- An Introduction*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing); S.B. Pralle (2010) "Shopping around: environmental organizations and the search for policy venues" in A. Prakash and M.K Gugerty, *Advocacy Organisations and Collective Action*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); C. Tilly (1977) "Getting it Together in Burgundy, 1675- 1975", *Theory and Society*, 4: 479-504;
[26] Kriesi, 1995, Kitschelt, 1986; Meyer, 1993; Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Imig, 1993
[27] Gais and Walker, 1991

a model through which to order the data. An interactive model of action, original to this thesis, has been designed for this purpose. It is an amalgamation of ideas derived from the Aberdeen approach;[28] the multi-actor approach;[29] and the home-state/host-state approach.[30]

The Aberdeen approach is used for its willingness to accept the ability of pressure groups to readily employ both *insider* and *outsider* tactics. It has been noted that the common typology for labelling the action-paths of pressure groups- the insider/outsider model- seeks to distinguish between groups of an insider or outsider nature. Insider groups exclusively use insider tactics (direct lobbying of government), while outsider groups exclusively use outsider tactics (indirect targeting of policy-makers via the media and public action).[31] This model is criticised for failing to recognise that groups often employ both methods within the same time-frame.[32] Binderkrantz (2005) argues: "the insider/outsider distinction does not capture relevant variations within the large majority of groups engaging in various combinations of direct *and* indirect activities."[33] During the course of data-gathering for the thesis, this contention was very quickly confirmed.

A multi-actor model is employed through the adoption of Rucht's (2004) approach to social movement action. Rucht (2004) argues that much analysis of social movement action occurs within a binary logic which employs a "simplified image of a two-party struggle between a (unified) movement and its (unified) opponent acting in ... a social vacuum."[34] Rucht (2004) advocates more sophisticated models which include affinity groups (actors outside the social movement who are potential allies); public bystanders (the general population of a political

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[28] B. McKinney and D. Halpin (2007) "Talking about Australian Pressure Groups: Adding Value to the Insider/Outsider Distinction in Combating Homelessness in Western Australia", *The Australian Journal of Public Administration* 66: 342-352

[29] D. Rucht (2004) "Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties" in D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, H. Kriesi (eds.) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.)

[30] Guarnizo and Haller, 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; and Wayland, 2004

[31] McKinney and Halpin, 2007: 344

[32] Ibid.

[33] Binderkrantz, 2005: 710, in McKinney and Halpin, 2007: 345 (emphasis added)

[34] Rucht, 2004: 197

system); and mediators (media through which the social movement and its target communicate).[35]

The interactive model of action used in this thesis is further informed by awareness for the domestic level and the inter-state level of action. Several works analysing non-citizens note the distinction between the *home-state* - the state from which the citizen is derived- and the *host-state* - the state in which they are currently located.[36] From this dual-level approach emerges the use of *the issue-state* and *other-state* concepts. The issue-state is that state within which the particular policy issue is occurring. For this study, this is Australia. Thus, in this study, citizens are citizens of the issue-state; while non-citizens are not citizens of the issue-state. The second are other-states. These are all states other than the issue-state. Non-citizens may be citizens to one of these other-states.

The issue-state/other-state model is employed instead of the home-state/host-state model. When used to discuss citizens and non-citizens the home-state/host-state model becomes confusing. A citizen's home-state is a non-citizen's host-state. The terms' meanings change depending on the citizenship-type under discussion. This is not the case for the issue-state/other-state model. Regardless of whether discussion centres on citizens or non-citizen, the meaning of the issue-state (Australia) and the other-state remains the same.

Having noted its conceptual origins, the interactive model of action will now be presented. It takes the pressure group as its locus. Pressure groups are understood to be organisations derived from civil society who seek to convince policy-makers to add, remove, amend or maintain a given policy or set of policies according to the perceived wishes of the pressure group's constituency.[37] In referring to a citizen pressure group this thesis is referring to a group made up

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[35] Rucht, 2004: 197
[36] Wayland, 2004
[37] E.E. Schattschneider (1948) "Pressure Groups versus Political Parties", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 259: 17-8

of predominantly citizen strategists and a citizen constituency. When referring to non-citizen pressure groups this thesis is referring to groups made up of predominantly non-citizen strategists and a non-citizen constituency.

In attempting to achieve the desired outcome, pressure groups must interact with several relevant actors in the political system. A pressure group may interact exclusively with policy-makers via direct communication,[38] or it may interact with other actors within the system (e.g. NGOs, media). Interaction with other actors may occur for three reasons. First, they may provide resources of benefit to the campaign (e.g. information, money). Second, they may lobby on behalf of the pressure group's cause (e.g. NGOs). Third, they may communicate the pressure group's position to other actors, without the intent to sway opinion (e.g. media). These latter two reasons produce indirect interaction with policy-makers. Of course, pressure groups may also interact with both policy-makers and other actors.[39]

In this model the political system includes seven relevant actor types, summarised in Table 1:

Table 1 – Actors within the Interactive Model (their interaction is illustrated in Figure 1 further below)

Actor Type	Description
Strategists	Executives deciding the direction of the pressure group. Locus of analysis.
Constituency	Section of civil society which a pressure group's strategists perceive themselves to represent.
Policy Makers	Individuals who enjoy political office and shape policy within the issue-state.
Potential Allies (issue-state or other-state)	Significant non-government individuals and non-government organisations
Other-State Political Institutions	Government institutions tied to other-states.
News Media (issue-state or other-state)	News media organisations
The Third Party	Part of the issue-state's civil society (citizens) but not part of the constituency nor likely to be a campaigning ally (like potential allies).

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[38] See Gais and Walker, 1991
[39] McKinney and Halpin, 2007

First, there is the pressure group. The actions of a pressure group are understood to emerge from the strategic considerations of its executive body. Members of this executive are referred to as *strategists*. Second, there is the pressure group's *constituency*. This is the particular section of civil society which a pressure group's strategists perceive themselves to be representing. Third, there are *policy-makers*: those individuals who occupy formal positions of power regarding the creation and implementation of policy within the issue-state.[40] This includes those who are in political office (e.g. Members of Parliament) and whose vote via parliament is required to bring about policy change. Fourth, there are *potential allies*.[41] This refers to significant individuals (i.e. non-politician VIPs) or non-government organisations situated within either the issue-state or other-states. Fifth, there are *other-state political institutions*. This refers to government entities tied to other-states. Sixth, there is *news media*. This includes both Australian and other-state media.[42] Finally, there is the *third party*.[43] This is that section of the issue-state's civil society which a) strategists, and their organisation do *not* perceive themselves to represent; and b) which are made up of citizens. Unlike potential allies (themselves often derived from the issue-state's civil society), the third party are not expected to directly assist in the campaign. A pressure group may seek to acquire the support of the third party, especially since within a democratic model this third party may carry the potential to influence policy-makers via electoral mechanisms.[44] Communication with the third party is understood to occur where a pressure group employs media, for there is no other reasonable means by which a pressure group can communicate with

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[40] Rucht, 2004: 200, 211
[41] P. Almeida and L. B. Stearns (1998) "Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata", *Social Problems*, 45:40; Rucht, 2004: 197
[42] Rucht, 2004: 211
[43] Ibid.: 211, 212
[44] Ibid.: 212

this group.[45] The third party and media are thus seen as intertwined and will often be discussed as such.

Interaction is only considered to have occurred when a two-step process is achieved. The first is the effort of the pressure group to instigate interaction. *Effort* occurs wherever a pressure group intentionally seeks to interact with a given actor.

The second concerns whether there is any positive response by these other actors. Interaction is not considered to have occurred where effort is made with no forthcoming response. Policy-makers are understood to *respond* when they allow the given concern to become an agenda issue. This includes: accepting private conferences, petitions, or submissions; extensions of support by individual politicians for the policy in question; bringing the matter up within the legislative assembly; or other such responses. Potential allies respond when they get involved in the campaign- either lobbying of policy-makers or resource provision to the pressure group. Media responds when it reports on campaign-related events performed by the pressure group (e.g. rallies, media releases, interviews). The constituency responds when it becomes involved in a given action organised by the strategists (e.g. public action). It is not possible to uncover whether the third party responds. The methodology used in this thesis (interviews and documents) does not provide insight into the shifting sentiment of the third party. So, no findings are presented in this area. Figure 1 shows the interactive model of pressure group action.

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[45] This was confirmed in the interviews with D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview

Figure 1 – The Interactive Model of Action

Figure 1 Legend:

Boxes- Actors within system

Solid arrows - Pressure group effort

Dotted arrows- Other actor response

Note on media:

In "responding", media may also communicate the pressure group's concern to other actors within the system.

Explanatory Framework: The Capability Mechanism

The second part of the research question asks how citizenship matters. An explanatory framework is built to understand the process through which citizenship affects pressure group action. This is the capability mechanism. It asserts that variation in citizenship status - at the level of rights or identity - produces, reduces or removes pressure group capability. This, in turn, affects action. It is built on a set of three conditionals which logically connect citizenship-status with pressure group action.

The first conditional - *the initial point* - asserts that variation in citizenship-status leads to variation in the relationship of an agent to the political system. Agents who are citizens will have

relationship X with the political system, while agents who are non-citizens will have relationship Y. An example is voting rights. Citizens can vote; non-citizens cannot.

This leads to the second conditional - *the intermediate point*. The variation in the relationship of the agents to the political system leads to variation in the available opportunities of action for pressure groups. Citizen pressure groups will be able to employ relationship X to acquire capability X; while non-citizen pressure groups, who do not have relationship X, are denied access to capability X. Conversely, non-citizen pressure groups may have access to exclusive capabilities (that are denied citizens) due to non-citizen specific relations with the political system. Returning to the example: citizen pressure groups may be aware that their constituency, due to its right to vote, may be a useful indirect lever; non-citizen pressure groups have no access to such a capability.

The third conditional - *the outcome point* - asserts that said variation in available opportunities shapes variation in action. This assertion rests on the assumption that, where a capability is available and relevant (perceived as useful for the campaign), a pressure group will attempt to employ it. Finishing the example: citizen pressure groups will use, due to its availability and relevance, the franchise of their constituency. Meanwhile, non-citizen pressure groups, denied the capability, cannot and so will not employ such a strategy. The impact of limitations in opportunity at the outcome point may be three-fold. Action may be denied *in toto*; made more difficult, so forcing mitigating action to achieve the same goal; or made more difficult such that the desired action occurs with less frequency or intensity.

At the core of the capability mechanism is the idea that an agent's relationship to their context shapes their actions. This model is built on a variation of the idea of political opportunity structures (POS). POS asserts that the mobilisation, tactical repertoire (action-paths), influence and continuity or failure of social movements or pressure groups is shaped by structural factors

beyond the control of said movements or pressure groups.[46] Of relevance is the idea that the action-paths of a pressure group will be both enabled and constrained by the broader structure of the political system in which the pressure group finds itself.[47]

However, a break with the literature must be noted. Much of the POS literature is concerned with comparing the impact of distinct political systems on agents of roughly the same nature. For instance, Kitschelt (1986) analyses the impact of opportunity structures on anti-nuclear social movements across four countries. The movements are considered to be roughly equivalent. The independent variable is the four distinct institutional structures of the four countries.[48]

This thesis adapts this notion by assessing the impact of the same political system on agents who, within that same system, are of a distinct nature. All pressure groups being studied have conducted their activities within the same country. The period under investigation for both citizen and non-citizen groups is largely parallel. Thus, the political system is similar. The variance in question is the relationship of the actors to that political system. The proposition is that citizenship-status changes one's relationship to that political system. It is not the political system that changes; rather it is the location of the agent within that political system that changes. This leads back to the idea of political structures. According to the two agents, we are in fact dealing with two differing political structures - such variance being the result of citizenship status. This would be the case even though, *prima facie*, it may seem that both citizenship types are acting within the same system. It is for this reason that this thesis asserts that the capability mechanism is built on a *variant* of the concept of political opportunity structures.

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[46] Kitschelt, 1986: 58; Meyer, 1993: 158; Meyer, 2004: 126-7; Meyer and Imig 1993: 253-4
[47] Kitchelt, 1986: 58; see also Meyer and Imig, 1993 for this applied directly to pressure groups.
[48] Kitschelt, 1986: 57-8

However, presented at this level, the capability mechanism provides little analytical clout. To begin richer analysis, it is necessary to ask an important question about the initial point: what type of citizenship are we analysing? The capability mechanism's initial point asserts that variation in citizenship status affects an agent's relationship with the political system. Therefore, to apply this model we need to know what type of citizenship is at play.

The literature understands citizenship in four ways. The first, citizenship-as-status, understands citizenship to be the formal demarcation of an individual as a member or not of a state.[49] The second, citizenship-as-rights, understands citizenship through the lens of rights provision.[50] Citizenship is the "formal capacities and immunities connected with such status".[51] The third, citizenship-as-identity, asserts that citizenship is connected to "shared beliefs or identity" formed via a collective national affiliation.[52] The fourth, citizenship-as-participation, defines citizenship as being the politically active individual: a *zoon politikon* caring about, involved in and important to public affairs.[53]

The capability mechanism employs two of the four definitions: citizenship-as-rights, and citizenship-as-identity. These definitions have been employed for their analytical relevance. The other two models, citizenship-as-status and citizenship-as-participation, are considered irrelevant. Citizenship-as-status is simply the assertion that citizenship denotes membership or non-membership. [54] It says little about what that membership entails, and so gives little insight into how variation in that status may matter. In contrast, the rights and identity frameworks provide clear insights into the impact of citizenship status on political action (discussed further below). The participation model is also problematic. Given that this study is looking at methods

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[49] Joppke, 2010: 38
[50] Barbalet, 1988: 15-8; Delanty, 1997: 289; Joppke, 2010: 29; Marshall, 1950: 10-11; Turner, 1993: 190-5
[51] Joppke, 2010: 38;
[52] Delanty, 1997: 290; Joppke, 2010: 30; Ronkainen, 2011
[53] Bosniak, 2006: 19; Delanty, 1997: 290
[54] Joppke, 2010: 28

of action, the notion of whether one participates or not is irrelevant. Each of the pressure groups investigated is assumed to be participating in the political system. If we were to employ the participation model, all pressure groups would notionally be "citizens", thus destroying the necessary variance for the study.

Citizenship as Rights

The citizenship-as-rights framework has implications for both the initial point and the intermediate point within the capability mechanism. For the initial point, the citizenship-as-rights framework asserts that variation in citizenship leads to variation in rights. This variation in rights affects the relationship of said agents to the political system.

Citizenship is commonly associated with rights. Marshall (1950) asserts that citizenship is composed of three forms of rights: civil, political and social. Civil rights are "necessary for individual freedom- liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice."[55] The essence of Marshall's civil rights is freedom from state interference.[56] Political rights are an entitlement to be involved in the polity, either as a member imbued with political authority (e.g. politician) or an elector.[57] Social rights are an entitlement, likely from the state, to the provision of fundamental goods and services, namely education and welfare.[58] In this framework, citizenship rights pertain to one's relationship with a given state or set of states. Rights are provided to those individuals or groups through the state or set of states of which they are citizens. This idea falls in line with the state-centric understanding of citizenship.[59]

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[55] Marshall, 1950: 10
[56] Barbalet, 1988: 20
[57] Marshall, 1950: 11
[58] Barbalet, 1988: 20; Marshall, 1950: 11
[59] Delanty, 1997: 285

Citizenship and non-citizenship influence one's access to such rights. It is argued that variation in citizenship status should, by definitional fiat, produce variation in rights.[60] Hammar (1991) presents a typology of citizenship status built around variation in available rights. It includes citizens, denizens and foreign citizens. C*itizens* have full legal (equivalent to civil), social and political rights in a country.[61] D*enizens* (a type of non-citizen) have full social and legal rights, have limited political rights (e.g. disenfranchised) and have permanent resident status.[62] *Foreign citizens* (a type of non-citizen) have limited social, legal and political rights and do not have permanent residence.[63] Castles and Davidson (2000), and Foster and Seitz (1986) suggest a fourth variant. Castles and Davidson (2000) conceive of the *margizen,* while Foster and Seitz (1986) devise the *prohibited non-citizen*.[64] These concepts (akin to each other) represent a non-citizen whose residency is permanently under threat (e.g. illegal migrants). In sum, citizenship is understood as complete access to rights within a given state, while non-citizenship is understood as the curtailment of some, most or all of the rights of citizenship within that same state.[65]

A criticism of the literature's approach to rights needs to be noted. A common refrain when discussing non-citizenship is the assumption of a lack of political rights.[66] These works suffer from a variation of the fallacy of "electoralism". This fallacy is associated with democratic studies. It asserts that a mistake made by analysts of democratic societies, especially emerging ones, is to define the existence of elections as a sufficient condition to designate a society as democratic.[67] In the same way, analysts of non-citizens often equate an inability to vote or be represented as a sufficient condition to demarcate non-citizens as lacking political rights. This is true when using a limited conception of political rights, namely Marshall's approach which is

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[60] Bosniak, 2006: 37
[61] Hammar, 1991: 21
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Castles and Davidson, 2000: 96; Foster and Seitz, 1986: 450
[65] Bosniak, 2006; Castles and Davidson 2000; Chung 2003: 20; Foster and Seitz, 1986; Hammar, 1991
[66] Bosniak, 2006; Hammar, 1991
[67] P.C. Schmitter (1991) "What Democracy Is... and is Not", *Journal of Democracy*, 2: 78

concerned only with the right to vote or stand for election.[68] However, it fails to note the fact that non-citizens, though perhaps electorally excluded, may have other rights of relevance to political affairs. First, they may have the right to participate in public events of a political nature (e.g. protest) within the issue-state. Second, they may enjoy rights-based relationships with other-states which are of significance to their political life in the issue-state. Given that T.H. Marshall's conception of rights fails to note such possibilities, two amendments are made to his conceptions of rights.

The first concerns the right to participate in public events of a political nature. It is called: politico-civil rights. It combines Marshall's civil rights- freedom of action within the public space, with political rights- rights to participate in political affairs. To have politico-civil rights is to have the right to be involved in the public arena in affairs of direct and intentional relevance to the political arena, though not necessarily voting. The second regards rights-based representation from other-states. It is called politico-social rights. This combines Marshall's social rights - state provision of services, with political rights - the services are of a political nature. To have politico-social rights is to have rights-based support from a given state regarding political action. This may include the provision of politically relevant information, or indirect lobbying by the given state towards another actor.

That said, generalising the rights situation for all non-citizens across all polities is fraught with danger. Baubok (2005), Blais et al. (2001), and Bulmer and Rees (1996) all highlight variation in the rights-location of non-citizen across different polities. [69] Nonetheless, Australian international students (the non-citizen under investigation) can be defined as *foreign citizens*. The conditions of an international student's visa suggest this. Their civil rights are limited as they are entitled to work no more than 20 hours a week during their study period; while they must remain enrolled

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[68] Marshall, 1950: 10
[69] Baubock, 2005; Blais et al., 2001; Bulmer and. Rees, 1996

in order to maintain said visa. This includes continuously studying full-time, as opposed to domestic students who have the option of part-time study.[70] Their politico-civil rights are potentially limited by condition 8303 which states that, among other things, international students "must not become involved in any activities that are disruptive to... the Australian community".[71] Such vague wording does not clearly deny political activity (peaceful rallying may be considered not disruptive), but it does produce ambiguity on the subject. Failure to comply with any of the above may lead to deportation: an act opposed to the "liberty of the person" inherent in Marshall's civil rights.[72] Further, international students are generally not entitled to apply for permanent residence until after the completion of their studies (a distinction between denizen and foreign citizens).[73] Finally, they are disenfranchised - a reduction in their political rights.[74] Such rights-limitations do not exist for domestic students. So, there is reason to suggest that the citizen and non-citizen types in question have a differing relationship to the political system of the issue-state.

A feature of the *foreign resident* non-citizen type under discussion is that they are represented by a state elsewhere (unlike the *margizen* category). This provides potential avenues of action via other-state political institutions exclusive to non-citizens. Thus citizens and non-citizens have differing relationships to the political system of other-states.

Rights variation can be understood in two ways. The first is *actual* variation: where citizenship status variation equates to actual variation of rights. An example would be suffrage. Whether a non-citizen is aware of it or not, in Australia they do not have a vote. The second is *perceived* variation: the rights that an individual or group perceives themselves to have or not to have: This

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[70] Australian Government (2011), Student Visa Conditions, online at: http://www.immi.gov.au/students/visa-conditions-students.htm (accessed: 23/03/2011)
[71] Australian Government, 2011
[72] Marshall, 1950: 11
[73] K. Robertson (2008) "Residency, citizenship and belonging: Choice and uncertainty for students-turned-migrants in Australia", *International Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies,* 4: 99
[74] Orr, 2004: 6-8

may or may not reflect actual variation. One may perceive themselves to have more or less rights than they actually do.

Rights variation may affect the intermediate point by producing, reducing or removing capabilities for pressure groups. Barbalet (1988) asserts that rights attach to an individual or group a "particular capacity... by virtue of a legal or conventional status... persons may have certain capabilities or opportunities for particular actions- certain powers- as a consequence of their status."[75] The provision of rights creates capabilities; while the denial of equivalent rights undermines capabilities.

This citizenship-as-rights framework provides an understanding for how citizenship relates to the capability mechanism. First, citizenship affects rights, and these rights shape one's relationship to the political system (initial point). Second, rights-variation affects capabilities (intermediate point). This framework will be applied to explain instances of observed variation.

Citizenship-as-Identity

The capability mechanism is also applied via the citizenship-as-identity framework.

This framework asserts that citizenship leads to variation in identity. Citizenship is the demarcation of an individual or group as a member of a national community. As Joppke (2010) states: citizenship includes the "identity that ties the individual to a potential community".[76] This produces, as Bosniak (2006) puts it: "affective elements of identification and solidarity" amongst a given community.[77] These theorists ultimately conceive of this form of citizenship, that of shared identity amongst a community, as equivalent to nationalism. Ronkainen (2011) ties the

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[75] Barbalet, **1**988: 15-6
[76] Joppke, 2010: 30
[77] Bosniak, 2006: 20

notion of citizenship-as-identity to the work of Benedict Anderson, stating that identitarian elements of citizenship pertain to the idea of "belonging to 'imagined community'".[78]

Variation in identity-location thus influences ones relationship to the political system. Since, as noted above, citizenship shapes affective ties, it can then be expected to impact the level of concern for the well-being of other individuals or groups. Sub-sets of a nation will be concerned for the status of the nation in general, and the nation in general will be concerned for the status of its sub-sets. This concern exists only for fellow nationals. Equivalent concern will not exist for non-nationals. This is not to say that concern will not be directed towards non-nationals, but it is to say that greater concern will be directed towards those who share a national association.

These national ties affect pressure group capabilities. A pressure group, when exclusively representing the sub-set of national group X, will have an increased chance of acquiring support from national group X due to the effect of the national ties. Meanwhile, that same pressure group may have less relative ability to acquire support from national group Y, due to a lack of national association. National ties transcend specific state borders. So it may be that pressure groups are able to utilise national ties with groups located both within the issue-state and the other-state (this is especially the case for non-citizens).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature and presented the theoretical framework used throughout the thesis. In reviewing the literature it was asserted that current academic work has not provided an analysis of the affect of citizenship status on pressure group action. The theoretical framework was concerned with two ideas. The first was the interactive model of action which allows comparison of citizen and non-citizen pressure group action. The second was the capability

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[78] Ronkainen, 2011: 250

mechanism: an explanatory framework which asserts that variation in citizenship - either as rights or identity - produces, reduces, or removes capabilities for pressure group action.

Chapter 2 – Methodology

Case Selection

The case selection was built around the use of interest group sectors. Meyer and Imig (1993) state that interest group sectors are "composed of the set of organised groups that share broadly similar policy concerns."[79] Fifteen representatives from six pressure groups were interviewed for this thesis, and the groups are broken into two interest group sectors. The first interest group sector was made up of three citizen pressure groups, whose shared policy concern was the issue of Voluntary Student Unionism (VSU).[80] The second interest group sector was made up of three non-citizen pressure groups, whose shared policy concern was the issue of concession cards.[81] Moreover, two further interviews were conducted: *Joanne* from the Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association (SUPRA), and *Tom* from the Council of Association of Postgraduate Associations (CAPA). These were two domestic students (citizen strategists) discussing the international student (non-citizen) dominant issue of concession cards. Given the hybrid status of these interviewees (citizen strategists representing non-citizen constituency), they are not included in the empirical comparison. However, where relevant, they have been cited to assist analysis of how citizenship matters.

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[79] Meyer and Imig, 1993: 258

[80] Rose Jackson noted the high degree of interaction between the groups involved in the campaigns. (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

[81] *Nye* noted the high degree of interaction between the groups involved in the campaigns. (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview

Table 2 – Student Pressure Groups

Pressure Groups	Number of Strategists Interviewed	Organisational Level (state if applicable)	Issue Area
Non-Citizen			
ISD-SRC	4	Local (New South Wales)	Concession Cards
NUSA	3	Local (New South Wales)	Concession Cards
NLC	2	National peak body	Concession Cards
Citizen			
USU	1	Local (New South Wales)	VSU
SRC	1	Local (New South Wales)	VSU
NUS	4	National peak body	VSU

The three citizen groups were the Sydney University Students' Representative Council (SRC) - a local level student organisation representing the interests of students at the University of Sydney; the University of Sydney Union (USU) - a local level student organisation running services for students at the University of Sydney (for this campaign it was politically active); and the National Union of Students (NUS) - the peak body representing the interests of students in Australia.

The VSU campaign pertains to the efforts of several student organisations to prevent the implementation of Voluntary Student Unionism and, after its acceptance as legislation in 2006, the efforts of these same organisations to repeal said legislation. VSU, through ceasing compulsory membership of student unions, was expected to lead to a dramatic reduction in resources for clubs and societies across a number of universities.[82] Although the campaign continues, and there have been other campaigns against VSU in the earlier 2000s, and late 1990s,[83] the time frame for this study includes events from 2005 to late 2007. This time frame was adopted for two reasons. First, it represented the period in which the strategists were active

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[82] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

[83] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

within the pressure-groups. The validity of strategists' comments on years they were not active was considered to be low, and so not used. Second, including multiple years for the period ensures that a more complete view of activity was possible.

The three non-citizen groups are the International Students Department of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council (ISD-SRC) - a local level student organisation representing the interests of international students at the University of Sydney; the Newcastle University Students Association (NUSA) - a local level student organisation representing the interests of international students at Newcastle University; and the National Liaison Committee for International Students (NLC) - the peak body representing the interests of international students in Australia up until mid-2008.[84]

 The concession card campaign refers to the efforts of several student organisations to repeal legislation which bans international students from using concession. Although this campaign has been running for an extended period of time,[85] analysis is limited to the period of early 2007 to 2011. This time frame was adopted because a) interviewees were active in pressure group executives; and b) multiple years provided more complete perspective.

The *most similar* method is employed in this thesis to compare citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. This method involves comparing two cases which share broadly similar independent variables, with only a few divergent independent variables. Thus, this controls for numerous explanatory variables and highlights the role of citizenship status as an independent variable.[86]

The two sectors shared similarities. First, both shared the same issue-location. The arena in which the policy was relevant is the same (Australia). So, both sectors act with the same political system (including both the federal and New South Wales state systems) and the same domestic

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[84] From 2008, its role changed from political advocacy to commercial pursuits.
[85] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[86] J. Hopkin (2002) "Comparative Methods" in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.) *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 254-5

media system.[87] Second, several of the pressure groups interviewed were branches of the same organisation. ISD-SRC is a branch of SRC;[88] while the NLC was a branch of the NUS.[89] So, organisational variation is partially controlled for. Third, the issue-type was similar. Both the VSU and concession card campaign refer to issues of services within the university environment. Fourth, the two sectors include both local and peak bodies. The impact of differing locations within the representative hierarchy is therefore controlled. So, these two sectors provide a strong empirical foundation on which to compare citizen and non-citizen pressure groups.

A potential criticism is why this thesis analyses two distinct issues. Since no issues were found where citizen and non-citizen constituencies and citizen and non-citizen pressure groups were both equally affected and active, comparative analysis of same issues was impossible.

Data Acquisition Method

Two methodologies were employed: in-depth interviews and documentary analysis.

Interviewing, the dominant method in this thesis, was used because it provides rich, multi-level data.[90] It uncovered data at two levels. The first was organisational action. This included public action: that action intended for public consumption (e.g. rallies); and internal action: that action not intended for public consumption. The second was decision maker perspectives: the impact of strategists' viewpoints on their decision-making.

Two interview approaches were used: *standardised open-ended* and *the interview guide* method. The standardised open-ended method occurred via the use of pre-written questions and probes.[91]

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[87] Though, of course, their relationship to these systems may vary.
[88] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview; Students' Representative Council – The University of Sydney (2011), SRC Departments, online at: http://www.src.usyd.edu.au/?q=node/4, (accessed: 26th June, 2011)
[89] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[90] M. Egeberg (1999) "Transcending intergovernmentalism? Identity and role perceptions of national officials in EU decision-making", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6: 456-74; N. Fielding, And H. Thomas (2001) "Qualitative Interviewing" in Gilbert, N. (ed) *Researching Social Life* (2nd ed.), (London: SAGE Publications): 137; S. Staggenborg (2011) *Social Movements* (New York: Oxford University Press): 48-9
[91] M.Q. Patton, (1990) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (2nd ed.) (Newbury Park: Sage): 287

These questions and probes were all open-ended, allowing the interviewee to respond on their own terms, minimising the "imposition of predetermined responses."[92] The interview guide approach occurred through the use of improvised probing.[93]

The interview guide encompassed three areas.[94] First was an overview of the group and its campaign issue. Second, it inquired into the action-paths of the political group. These questions were built around the interactive model of action. Finally, questions were asked about the perceived impact of citizenship status on their decision-making process. This focussed on the impact of access to rights, and identity-location.[95]

For interviewing, theoretical and snowball sampling were used.[96] Theoretical sampling occurred through the selection of interviewees pertinent to the theoretical inquiry: strategists from citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. Snowball sampling was also employed where available for there is limited publicly accessible information on the groups' relevant decision-makers.

Data analysis occurred through coding: condensing the data into "analysable units" by creating over-arching categories.[97] This allows analysis of similarity and variation across the different sectors.[98] The coding framework had two categories.[99] The first are *strategy codes*, which categorise the actions of the group within the interactive model, including what courses were and were not adopted. Second are *subject perspective codes*, asking how "informants think about

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[92] Patton, 1990: 295; see also Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 126; D.M.Keats (2000) *Interviewing: A Practical Guide for Students and Professionals* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd.): 40-1
[93] Patton, 1990: 283
[94] See Item One and Item Two in the Appendix
[95] There are actually two interview plans, one for citizens (Item One) and one for non-citizens (Item Two). The variation between these two guides is minimal to ensure comparative validity. There are only two areas of difference. One, asks about the impact of being "non-Australian" for non-citizens, while the equivalent question for the citizen interview guide asks about the impact of being an "Australian citizen". The term "non-Australian" is used to replace "non-citizen", for this latter term is not expected to be commonly understood. Two, in the questions on "legal punishments", the non-citizens version has a further elaboration on the impact of deportation concerns (something which is irrelevant for citizens).
[96] V. Minichiello, R. Aroni, E. Timewell, and L. Alexander (1990) *In-Depth Interviewing: Researching People*, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire): 198-9
[97] A. Coffey and P. Atkinson (1996) *Making Sense of Qualitative Data* (Thousand Oaks: Sage): 26
[98] Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 46; Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 137
[99] These are borrowed from Bogdan and Biklen's non-exhaustive typology of codes. (Minichiello et al., 1990: 296)

their situation."[100] Of interest is how citizenship status shaped their decision-making process, with particular focus on the effects of rights and identity factors.

Alongside the dominant use of interviewing is an auxiliary use of documents. Documents both acquired from the public arena (e.g. media reports) and those from the internal arena (e.g. private letters) are used within this study. Though useful, they are used to supplement the interviewing process.

Validity and Reliability

Several techniques were used to increase validity. First, triangulation was employed. Often, multiple members of each organisation were interviewed.[101] Further, two interviews were conducted with interviewees outside of the specific pressure groups. This provides further perspective, and another means to test the validity of concepts emerging within the data. Where possible, documents were used to verify claims made in interviews.[102] Second, the interview schedule sampled a breadth of possible action-paths. However, to ensure all possible action-paths were discussed, a question was included asking "did you participate in any other types of campaigning not discussed?" Third, clarification probes were used wherever the interviewer was unsure of the meaning presented by the interviewee.[103]

Reliability is increased in two ways. The first is through the provision of this methodological section, which discusses a) the sampling logic; b) the interview guide; and c) the coding and analysis process. The second is through providing full versions of the interview schedule in the appendix.[104]

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[100] Minichiello et al., 1990: 296
[101] K. Macdonald (2001) "Using Documents" in N. Gilbert (ed) *Researching Social Life* (2nd ed.), (London: SAGE Publications): 208
[102] Macdonald, 2001: 208
[103] Fielding and Thomas, 2001: 129; Keats, 2000: 64-5
[104] Minichiello, 1990: 211, 218

Saturation

This study sought to achieve a "saturation" point. Saturation is a technique in qualitative methods whereby the researcher conducts enough interviews such that further interviews reveal little to no new relevant ideas or data.[105] Saturation allows a study to claim its findings are comprehensive.[106] Saturation was achieved by the 12th interview. Further interviews were conducted, and they confirmed that a "saturation" point had been reached.

Generalisation

Having employed a small-N, qualitative method, it is not possible to confidently generalise from this thesis' particular findings. However, the case-specific findings this thesis produces may be useful in the development and testing of more general theories of the relationship of citizenship status and pressure group action.[107]

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the methodology used in this thesis. First, the case selection was explained with an emphasis on the use of a most similar comparative method to produce findings of increased merit. Second, the data acquisition methods were discussed, namely in-depth interviewing (the main method of data collection) and primary documents (a supplementary method).

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[105] Minichiello, 1990: 288
[106] Ibid.
[107] See A. Strauss and J. Corbin (1998) "Grounded Theory Methodology- An Overview" in N. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.) *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry* (Sage: Thousand Oaks): 167

Chapter 3 – Empirical Comparison: Showing Citizenship Matters

The research question informing this thesis is: how, if at all, does citizenship matter for pressure group action? This chapter seeks to answer whether there is an "if at all"; if citizenship affects pressure group action. Answering this question involves comparison of the instances of pressure group action. This thesis has analysed the campaigns of a set of citizen pressure groups and a set of non-citizen pressure. These cases were chosen for their most similar logic. In the instance of any variation between citizen and non-citizen action paths it would be possible to posit the importance of citizenship status as an intersecting variable. If there is no variation at all, then the impact of citizenship status would seem minimal, if not non-existent.

Through this comparison it is concluded that there *is* variation between the action-paths of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. This suggests that citizenship status influences pressure group action.

In presenting this comparison, this chapter first describes the instances of similarity; and then, second, describes the instances of variation.

Similarity

There were three areas of similarity. First, all pressure groups utilised domestic media. Second, this media campaign was part of a broader strategy of targeting the third party. Third, all pressure groups communicated directly with Australian policy-makers.

Domestic Media

Both citizen and non-citizen sectors sought to and were successful in acquiring domestic media attention. This is clear amongst the non-citizen groups. NUSA developed a strong network with Newcastle media, namely the Newcastle Herald, which ensured that "whenever something

comes up, we can always call them and say: hey this is going on and they'll come and get the information from us or talk to us over the phone to get the information and get it out."[108] NLC commented that they "had fairly well-established networks with journalists both with the national newspapers and the local newspapers".[109] This included the Australian, the Age, and the Herald Sun.[110] The relationship with the media allowed for, as Mohit Tolani (NLC) put it: "a fairly good transfer."[111] This is likewise the case for the citizen groups. Rose Jackson (SRC) noted that: "We were always trying to get the media, media releases, calling journos.... We got heaps and heaps of media."[112] David Barrow (NUS) commented that "[Australian] media was probably the basis of the campaign."[113] Sam Crosby (USU) mentioned that they interacted with The Sydney Morning Herald, and The Daily Telegraph (two Sydney-based broadsheet newspapers) with a high degree of success.[114] So, for both citizenship types, domestic media was an important feature of their campaign.

Third Party

Such incorporation of domestic media was itself part of a wider campaign to acquire the support of the general Australian population- the third party. Non-citizen groups actively pushed this. Responding to a question about why they targeted domestic media, Heather Richards (NUSA) noted: "we need the general public to know the situation and to understand the situation because at the end of the day it has to be changed by a vote in the state government."[115] *Nye* (ISD-SRC) mentioned: "we try to communicate with the local Australian people to let them know about this issue, is an urgent issue that has to be tackled."[116] Citizen groups also sought the greater public's

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[108] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[109] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[113] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[114] S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview
[115] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[116] *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview

support. Rose Jackson (SRC) mentioned that: "we hoped to take our message... out to the broader community so that they knew what was being proposed."[117] Angus Macfarland (NUS) noted: "we also had a community campaign."[118] Although, we cannot measure third party responsiveness from this method, it is clear that both citizenship types actively sought to influence the third party.

Australian Policy-Makers

Second, both citizen types made an effort to interact directly with Australian policy-makers. In this, they enjoyed a degree of responsiveness. Eduardo (NUSA) noted: "during the period before the [2011 New South Wales state] election we [had] conversation with the different political parties and even the Liberal party to talk about this issue..."[119] In the period after the election, Heather Richards (NUSA) organised a lobbying campaign with local members (namely Sonia Hornery, a New South Wales Member of Parliament) via letter writing.[120] It was noted by NUSA strategists that there has been considerable reciprocal interaction with Sonia Hornery.[121] NLC noted that they often were in touch with Australian politicians at the national level. This included Julie Bishop as education minister before 2007; and, in the run up to the 2007 Australian Federal election, Julia Gillard - then shadow education minister.[122]

Citizen groups incorporated direct contacting of policy-makers within their campaign. In 2005, the period before the introduction of VSU, there was a significant lobbying campaign by NUS, SRC, and USU directed towards two particular politicians: Family First Senator Steve Fielding and Nationals Senator Barnaby Joyce – two Federal Members of Parliament (MP) whose vote

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[117] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[118] A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[119] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[120] Document provided by H. Richards (1st July, 2011)
[121] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[122] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

was key to the passing of VSU.[123] Also, Rose Jackson (SRC) noted that: "we often tried to have political speakers at our rallies, almost always Labor or Green politicians."[124] This included the likes of Federal Labor MP Tanya Pilbersek, Federal Labor MP Jenny Macklin and Kerry Nettle (then a Greens senator in Federal Parliament). Such politicians were, in Rose's words, "really keen to participate".[125] So, both sectors made an attempt to, and achieved a degree of success in interacting directly with policy-makers.

Variation

There were four areas of variation. There was variation pertaining to the incorporation of other-state political institutions; the manner in which constituencies were incorporated into the campaign; the type of potential allies utilised from the wider Australian population; and the use of other-state media.

Other-State Political Institutions

The first refers to variation in the use of other-state political institutions. There is considerable evidence of non-citizen pressure groups making an effort to use other-state political institutions. These institutions were often, though not uniformly, responsive. The predominant other-state political institution was consulates. *Irene* (ISD-SRC) noted that there is an informal relationship between their department and the Chinese Consulate. *Irene* commented that another member in the group utilised their personal networks within the Chinese community as a means of informally lobbying the Chinese consulate.[126] Danny Craft and Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA) both

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[123] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[124] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[125] Ibid.
[126] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
The member *Irene* is discussing remains unnamed due to a belief on the part of the author that this would be requested by that member.

mentioned that they contacted the Indian, Chinese and Malaysian consulates.[127] As part of this, it was commented that the Indian consulate was highly responsive, taking up the issue of concession cards as part of the greater issue of student safety.[128] The NLC noted that they had been in touch with the Malaysian, Singaporese, Chinese and Indian consulates.[129] Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) stated that many, though not all, of these diplomats were open to informal discussion with the pressure groups on the issue. Also, Mohit Tolani (NLC) noted that the Malaysian consulate provided legal advice.[130] From this, it is clear that consulates were used in one of two ways: a.) as a source of resources (notably, legal resources); b.) as an indirect lobbying agent.

In addition to consulates, pressure groups occasionally were able to incorporate the main political institutions located in a given state. Mohit Tolani (NLC) noted that, in the period after the 2009 issue of violence against Indian students, there was an ability for NLC, alongside a coalition of other actors, to place the concession card issue on the agenda of both the "Indian upper house and the lower houses of Parliament."[131] This was achieved by associating concession cards with the issue of student violence- the latter issue being the one gaining traction at this institutional level.[132]

In discussing the use of other-state political institutions, it is necessary to note three qualifications. First, not all available other-state political institutions were used. Danny Craft (NUSA) commented that he, and by association NUSA, had not attempted to access the United States' consulate.[133] *Irene* (ISD-SRC) had commented that there had been little attempt on behalf of ISD-SRC to directly contact the Malaysian consulate.[134] Second, the level of response from

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[127] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[128] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[129] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[134] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

the consulates was inconsistent. Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) commented that consulates at times would simply state that they were unable to provide any assistance.[135] Mohit Tolani (NLC), Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA), and Danny (NUSA) all presented a similar point: noting that some consulates would cite Australian sovereignty to justify non-involvement.[136] Third, the use of other-state political institutions, especially the Indian consulate and the main Indian political institutions, increased in response the issue of violence against Indian students in 2009.[137] It is clear that both effort and response were not uniform. Nonetheless, non-citizen pressure groups employed, with limitations, other-state political institutions in their campaign.

Amongst domestic student groups, no such efforts occurred. All citizens strategists interviewed stated that their organisation (NUS, SRC, and USU) neither considered nor attempted to contact other-state political institutions for the campaign in question.[138]

Constituencies

A second area of variation pertains to the use of constituencies. Both non-citizen and citizen student groups were aware of the need to mobilise support from their constituencies. All groups sought to use their constituencies as vehicles of influence through petitions and rallies.[139]

However, there was clear variation in the utility of their respective constituencies. First, citizen groups employed the voting capabilities of their constituency. This included three facets. First, the citizen pressure groups sought to explicitly shape the voting direction of their constituency.

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[135] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

[136] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

[137] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

[138] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

[139] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

Rose Jackson (SRC) commented: "when elections were on, we were right out there saying to students do not vote Liberal. We did report cards where we listed policies that were important to students."[140] Second, the citizen pressure groups sought to ensure that as much of their constituency was eligible as possible. Angus Macfarland (NUS) noted: "...we ran student campaigns in [the 2007 Australian federal] election to encourage students to vote and telling them where all the different political parties stood on the issue of voluntary student unionism."[141] Third, in discussions with policy-makers it was argued by citizen pressure groups that their constituency was unhappy with the current policy and likely to respond at the electoral booth. This was regardless of any attempt to actually change the constituency's attitude.[142]

No equivalent effort was noted amongst non-citizen pressure groups.[143]

Further, non-citizen pressure groups experienced difficulty mobilising their constituency to participate in the campaign. For non-citizen pressure groups it was noted that often their constituency was unwilling to participate in rallies,[144] to be photographed (especially at rallies) or interviewed by media,[145] or to sign petitions[146] for fear of negative sanctions. This reduced constituency participation impacted strategies. It reduced the extent to which non-citizen decision-makers were willing to employ rallies.[147] In certain cases, rallies were avoided (e.g.

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[140] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[141] A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[142] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[143] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview; Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview; *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[144] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[145] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[146] *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[147] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

ISD-SRC, NLC) after realising this reduced participation;[148] in other cases rallies were limited in scope (NUSA), occurring only on the university grounds.[149] Where rallies were attempted, it was necessary to develop awareness campaigns to militate against these concerns about negative sanctions.[150]

This issue was not present for the citizen pressure groups. Rose Jackson (SRC), Sam Crosby (USU) and Angus Macfarland (NUS) all commented that fear of negative sanctions was not an issue amongst their constituency.[151] Thus, the extent to which non-citizen pressure groups' constituency was a responsive and useful actor was varied.

Potential Allies in Australia

Third, though both citizen and non-citizen groups were able to utilise potential allies within Australia the exact type of potential ally was distinct between citizen and non-citizen groups. Citizen pressure groups targeted and received support from a number of arts and sports related individuals and organisations from the wider Australian community. This was considered an important feature of the citizen campaign. Rose Jackson (SRC) mentioned: "we were constantly on the look-out for celebrity endorsements. And look I think we were pretty successful at a number of levels, particularly in the entertainment and arts area..."[152] David Barrow (NUS), in response to a question about the use of significant individuals, said: "that was a big part of the campaign, there was a whole lot of sports people, and a whole lot of artists and musicians that supported it."[153] Sam Crosby (USU) commented that attempts were made to incorporate the

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[148] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[149] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[150] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[151] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[152] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[153] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview

Australian sports communities into the campaign, with a large degree of success.[154] There was no evidence of non-citizen pressure groups incorporating allies from the arts or sports communities of Australia's greater public.

Meanwhile, non-citizen pressure groups targeted a specific type of group: ethno-national community organisations. These ethno-national groups are generally comprised of individuals who are rights-citizens within Australia, but maintain citizenship-identity with not only Australia but other nationality groups. Danny Craft (NUSA) noted that: "there are a lot of ethnic community groups around here [Newcastle] that reflects the student population on campus, like Malaysians and Asian groups within the community around here who do have their PRs [permanent residency]. You try to connect with them and make them aware of what's going on with us, and ask them, urge them to have their say when it comes time for the vote."[155] Mohit Tolani (NLC) noted: "we had the Malaysian Club in Victoria, and they would generally be Australian citizens of Malaysian origin."[156] These groups were used for both their informational resources (notably, legal information) and for their potential vote.[157] There was no evidence of citizen pressure groups interacting with such organisations.

There is clear variation in the type of Australian potential allies used by citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. Citizens interacted with the broader Australian sports and arts community; non-citizens interacted with ethno-national community groups.

Other-State Media

Fourth, non-citizen groups made an effort and received a response from other-state media. Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA) commented: "when there was the issue of the Indian students, our

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[154] S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview
[155] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[156] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[157] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

office spoke practically with all the big newspapers around the world, with all the big radios around the world... We managed to speak nearly every day with China, Thai, with Indian, whatever it is, with London."[158] *Irene* (ISD-SRC) mentioned: "the most effective I've seen has been from the Chinese international media, especially in the rally in 2009...a few main Chinese TV news companies, like TVBS and other stuff, who came to interview."[159] Mohit Tolani (NLC) noted that, from 2007, they had been using "national newspapers and electronic media in Malaysia, Singapore, China and in India."[160] *Irene* (ISD-SRC) noted that other-state media provided a means of getting Australian policy-makers to hear "an alternate view".[161]

However, as with the use of other-state political institutions, the responsiveness of other-state media was not uniform. In particular, the issue of violence against Indian students and the September 2, 2009 rally against existing concession card laws, brought with them a significant increase in media attention.[162] It was noted by Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) that a lot of his other-state media contacts (namely from India) were uninterested in the story until the student safety issues emerged in 2009.[163] There was still media coverage before 2009, but in a reduced form.[164]

Citizen pressure groups commented that they made no effort, nor did they receive much interest from other-state media. Angus Macfarland (NUS) stated that they did not "proactively" contact other-state media.[165] *Jennifer* (NUS) was emphatic in stating that there was no interaction with other-state media.[166]

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[158] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[159] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[160] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[161] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[162] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[163] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[164] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[165] A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[166] *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

Conclusion

The prevalence of difference in observed action suggests that citizenship status affects pressure group action. This is amplified by the similarity between cases.

However, concluding that there is variation between citizen and non-citizen pressure group action paths is only part of this thesis' goal. The second task is to answer *how* citizenship matters. The thesis will seek to explain the instances of variation via the capability mechanism. The existence of similarity between groups also demands explanation. Once again, the capability mechanism will be employed to show the limited effects of citizenship status on political action.

The following two chapters analyse the instances of variation through a) the citizenship-as-rights framework, and b) the citizenship-as-identity framework. Then, a further chapter will analyse the instances of similarity.

Chapter 4 – Citizenship-as-Rights: How Rights Matter

During the interview with *John* (ISD-SRC), the issue of suffrage elicited periodic expressions of despondency. As he put it: "it's common sense, you don't have voting rights you don't have rights to say."[167] Contrast this with the vigour of Rose Jackson (SRC) as she reminded herself and the interviewer that: "as Sydney [University] students, Tanya Plibersek [a Federal Parliamentary Labor representative] was our local member. We have a say in who she is."[168] Two citizenship statuses, two rights locations, and two sets of capabilities. Rights, it seems, matter. It is showing how they matter that is the purpose of this chapter.

Many of the instances of variation can be explained via the rights-based capability mechanism. This thesis suggests three clear instances where rights variation shaped variance in pressure group action. The first pertains to the citizen pressure groups' use of their constituency as a voting body. The second refers to the difficulties with mobilising constituency support amongst non-citizen pressure groups. The third concerns the involvement of other-state political institutions in the non-citizen campaign. This is summarised in Table 3:

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[167] *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[168] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

Table 3 – The Capability Mechanism and Citizenship-as-Rights

Observed Variation (Outcome Point)	Initial Point (variation in agents)	Intermediate Point (capability provided to pressure groups)
<u>Constituency as a voting body</u> **Citizen:** used constituency as a voting body **Non-citizen:** no equivalent action	**Citizen**: Can vote (actual, political right) **Non-citizen**: Cannot vote	**Citizen**: Latent power of constituency **Non-citizen**: no latent power
<u>Public Action and the Constituency</u> **Citizen:** comparably higher use of constituency-heavy activity. **Non-citizen:** Reduced intensity/outright non-use of constituency-heavy activity.	**Citizen**: no constituency concern **Non-citizen**: constituency concern due to: a) perceived lack of politico-civil rights in the issue-state b) perceived lack of politico-civil rights in relation to the home-state c) actual lack of social rights within university.	**Citizen**: no such issue. **Non-citizen**: constituency less willing to participate due to increased cost and risk; therefore reduced availability of constituency for political action.
<u>Other-State Political Institutions</u> **Citizen:** No use **Non-citizen:** Heavy use	**Citizen:** no right of representation **Non-citizen**: right of representation (actual, politico-social right)	**Citizen:** no access **Non-citizen**: access to other-state political institutions

Constituency as a Voting Body

The first instance being discussed is the observed variation in the use of constituencies as a voting body. Citizenship groups employed their constituency as a direct electoral threat, while non-citizens did not. This variation is explained by the rights-based capability mechanism.

First, it is necessary to show citizenship-based variation at the initial point. In this instance there exists variation in suffrage rights. Within Australia, voting rights represent a key distinguishing feature between citizens and non-citizens: citizens are enfranchised while non-citizens are disenfranchised.[169] Thus we find variation in actual political rights which is impacting both strategists and the constituency.

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[169] Blais et al, 2001: 44; Orr, 2004: 6-8

Variation in suffrage impacts the intermediate point through its resulting impact on the electoral significance of the pressure groups' constituency. Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell (1990), and Potters and Sloof (1996) both assert that a pressure group's ability to use its constituency as a voting body provides a useful means of influencing policy-makers.[170] So, the electoral right of a constituency provides a latent lever of influence. This lever can operate in two ways. First, it can be explicitly activated. A pressure group consciously tries to shape the voting pattern of its constituency, and advertise this practice to policymakers. Second, it can be implicitly activated. In discussions with policy-makers it is asserted that the given policy will agitate the pressure group's constituency, leading to an electoral impact. For these levers to exist, the constituency must be enfranchised. Since citizenship status affects enfranchisement, it thus affects this lever's availability.

Discussion with citizen strategists highlighted awareness for this capability. David Barrow (NUS), Sam Crosby (USU), Felix Eldridge (NUS), Angus McFarland (NUS), and Rose Jackson (SRC) were all aware of the latent electoral power of their constituency.[171] David (NUS) suggested that it was a "key" part of the campaign. He was particularly aware of the implicit electoral threat of their constituency, notably in regional areas.[172] Rose and Angus answered in the affirmative when asked whether voting rights impacted their strategies.[173] Responding to the question "did you try to use the fact that the people you were representing could vote?", Rose (SRC) stated: "We did absolutely." She then stated that they focussed "on the fact that students are voters", asserting that "as Sydney [University] students, Tanya Plibersek [a Federal

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[170] P.J.Coughlin, D.C. Mueller, and P. Murrell (1990) "A model of electoral competition with interest groups", *Economic Letters*, 32: 307; J. Potters and R. Sloof (1996) "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 12: 407, 421

[171] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

[172] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview

[173] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interivew

Parliamentary Labor representative] was our local member. We have a say in who she is. We definitely tried to play that up."[174] The latent power of their constituency was well understood by relevant strategists, explaining the use of their constituency as an electoral body.

Conversely, the denial of the franchise featured significantly amongst the considerations of non-citizen strategists. First, several non-citizen strategists noted that disenfranchisement denied the first type of electoral threat: explicitly activated threats. In response to the question "how, if at all, has an inability to vote impacted your strategies?" Heather Richards (NUSA) commented: "well it means that some of the campaigning methods that are open to, would be open to domestic students are not really open to us."[175] Mohit Tolani (NLC), *John* (ISD-SRC), and Danny Craft (NUSA) were all clear in noting the limiting impact of disenfranchisement.[176] *John* (ISD-SRC) suggested that disenfranchisement limits the ability of ISD-SRC, and international students in general, to present their "voice" to the government.[177]

Second, the impact of disenfranchisement on the second type of electoral threat- the implicit threat- was also prominent. In discussing difficulties relating to lobbying efforts, Mohit Tolani (NLC) commented: "at the end of the day we were not voters and it did not make a big difference to them [policy-makers]. So I think there was only an extent to which we could go."[178] Danny Craft (NUSA) presented a similar sentiment.[179]

In discussing the impact of enfranchisement on pressure group strategies it is necessary to qualify the significance of this variation in capability. First, the existence of this capability does not mean that strategists are convinced of its efficacy. Rose Jackson (SRC) commented that: "the problem with [the direct electoral threat] is that a lot of students already vote Labor and Greens.

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[174] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[175] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[176] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[177] *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[178] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[179] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

Liberals don't see students particularly as a lucrative pool of voters... They rely on old people, they don't rely on young people."[180] Nonetheless, this lever was utilised. It is a case where all relevant tactical options will be utilised, even in light of limited perceived efficacy. This was summarised in a brief exchange with Rose (SRC). The researcher asked: "because it [the right of your constituency to vote] was there you used it, but you didn't expect much?" Rose replied: "Exactly."[181]

Second, access to this tactic for citizen pressure groups clearly did not preclude the use of other pathways. Citizen strategists constantly stated that the use of the direct electoral threat was only part of a larger campaign.[182] The capability created is not overwhelming. Nonetheless it is there.

Third, the impact of disenfranchisement for non-citizens is also far from overwhelming. Though aware of the limitations which disenfranchisement imposes on their available repertoire, many non-citizen strategists went on to conclude that, instead of denying political action *outright*, disenfranchisement made them consider it important to focus on *other* methods of action. This included targeting ethno-national community groups;[183] and other-state political institutions.[184]

Qualifications aside, the rights-based capability mechanism is at play here. There exists variation in actual, political rights at the initial point (suffrage). This affects the intermediate point by creating (citizen) or removing (non-citizen) a latent power within the constituency. This explains the observed variation.

Constituency and Public Action

The second variation refers to the involvement of the pressure group's constituency in public action. Non-citizen pressure groups had significant difficulty utilising their constituency.

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[180] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[181] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[182] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[183] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[184] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

Amongst citizen groups there was no evidence of equivalent problems. This variation can be explained via the rights-based capability mechanism.

Three rights-based factors produced variation at the initial point, all reducing rights for non-citizens. The first occurred through the perception of reduced politico-civil rights within the issue-state. The second occurred due to reduced perceived politico-civil rights in relation to a home-state for non-citizens. The third occurred due to reduced actual social rights within the university. The nature of each of these variations is expounded; the resulting impact on capabilities is then highlighted.

The first instance of rights variation pertains to the perceived reduction in politico-civil rights within the issue-state. In reality, the politico-civil rights location of non-citizens is ambiguous. The international student visa includes condition 8303 which states that, among other things, international students "must not become involved in any activities that are disruptive to... the Australian community."[185] The ambiguity of the term "disruptive" makes the perception that public action is illegal understandable. However, non-citizen *strategists* were confident that they were entitled to participate in public action with no resulting punishment from the Australian state.[186] *Irene* (SRC) noted "[legal punishments are] a little bit less prominent in some of our [the strategists'] minds".[187] While Heather Richards (NUSA) stated: "a lot of the representatives know that there are no legal ramifications."[188] The notion that the Australian state would tolerate peaceful public action by non-citizens is further strengthened by the fact that, where non-citizens

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[185] Australian Government, 2011

[186] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

[187] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

[188] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview

did conduct public rallies there was no state-directed backlash against the non-citizens involved.[189]

Regardless, non-citizen strategists noted a perception amongst much of their constituency that participation in public action (e.g. rallies, media involvement, petitions) would lead to negative sanctions from the Australian state. These perceived sanctions were specific to non-citizen constituencies. According to eight of the nine non-citizen strategists interviewed, their non-citizen constituency was wary that involvement would a) negatively impact the prospects of acquiring permanent residency; and b) may lead to deportation through the revocation of the visa.[190] *Irene* (SRC) noted "those people especially feel very strongly about, especially when media's involved, they're like: oh they see my face, they know that I've said these bad things about the government before and I'm going to not get my [permanent residency]."[191] Further, she points out that "the minute rally as a word, as a term came about, and these concerns came back to us it was really all about saying [to the constituency] no, there's nowhere in the clause of your visa in some hidden clause that says that if you protest you're going to get deported."[192] While Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA) added: "many times what's an issue... is that some students were reporting that when their visa was allocated to them, there was a clause that says basically: don't get involved in any political activity."[193] Interestingly, all citizen strategists were also aware of the issue of constituency concern amongst international students.[194]

[189] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[190] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview; *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[191] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[192] Ibid.
[193] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; this was also asserted by *Tom* (personal communication. 29th July, 2011) personal interview
[194] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; R.

Citizen strategists noted that, amongst their constituency, such concerns were not present. Responding to the question: "are there any concerns about legal punishments for participating?" Angus McFarland (NUS) stated: "no, no... from domestic students that wasn't a concern [referring to potential legal punishments], it wasn't that hard getting students to come."[195] Rose Jackson (SRC) stated: "we did not have to deal with the objection: 'I'm worried I'm going to get in trouble.'"[196] *Jennifer* (NUS) and Sam Crosby (USU) also commented that legal punishments didn't feature as a concern for their constituency.[197]

For non-citizens there was also the issue of sanctions from one's home-state. Non-citizen strategists commented that their constituency was wary of participating due to concerns about how their home-state would respond to such action. Heather Richards (NUSA) noted: "if... they are at an event we can't put their pictures on Facebook, because they don't want people at their home-country to be able to identify them to have been involved in anything like this because it would be a political action."[198] This highlights the dual rights-location of non-citizens. They perceive themselves to be subject of both the state they currently reside in, and their home-state. As such, perceived rights limitations from both the issue-state and their home-state are relevant. In this case perceived reduced politico-civil rights in one's home-state minimised one's willingness to participate in action in the issue-state.[199]

Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[195] A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[196] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[197] S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[198] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[199] In some cases, home-state rights limitations may be actual.

This dual rights location does not apply to citizens. At no point in any of the interviews with citizen strategists was there a comment suggesting that their constituency was wary of negative sanctions from other-states.[200]

These two issues of perceived negative sanctions, and the resulting impact on constituency perceptions, are termed *constituency concern*. Taken in its most general form, constituency concern refers to the perception, on behalf of strategists, that their constituency is wary of participating in acts of political agitation (either peaceful or violent) due to concerns about potential legal punishments from two sources: the issue-state and other-states.

This constituency concern had definite impact on capabilities for non-citizen pressure groups. To understand the effect it is necessary to equate constituency concern with the notion of repression. Repression is the threat or actual implementation of negative sanctions (generally violent) employed by a state towards those within it territory as a means of minimising political agitation amongst all or some of the general population.[201] Constituency concern, both from the issue-state and other-states, represents a soft form of repression. Regarding issue-state relevant concerns, it should be noted that the threat is not actual, but only perceived. Further, the extent to which other-state relevant concerns are actual or perceived is difficult to discern. Nonetheless the deterrent effect of *perceived* repression remains ever-present. Opp and Roehl (1990) assert that there is general scholarly agreement that "repression is a cost and therefore a negative incentive for protest."[202] Constituency concern, understood as repression, thus negatively influences pressure groups through reducing the willingness of its constituency to participate in public action.

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[200] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

[201] C. Davenport (2007) "State Repression and Political Order", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10: 2

[202] K.-D.Opp and W. Roehl (1990) "Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest", *Social Forces*, 69: 524

An awareness of this reduced capability is present in the perceptions of non-citizen strategists. *Irene* (ISD-SRC) noted that, in response to the 2009 rally where non-citizen participation was marginal, ISD-SRC became aware of the difficulty they faced to mobilise their constituency. In response they changed their focus to "less violent, if you like, or less strong kind of approaches to those that commanded more support on a local level."[203] Mohit Tolani (NLC) noted that "we compensated for the fact that they [their constituency] would not come out on to the streets. I think in terms of the strategy it affected us in a very big way because we decided to move from a form of public demonstration to active lobbying."[204] It is clear in these comments that a capability, that of public action, has been harmed.

However, the impact on capabilities needs to be qualified. Unlike the issue of suffrage for instance, the issue of constituency concern (in particular that related to the issue-state) could be mitigated. Given that it was largely a perceived rights variation, as opposed to an actual rights variation, non-citizen strategists clearly understood that, if they could change the perceptions of their constituency, they could potentially regain this capability.[205] Danny Craft (NUSA) stated: "we have to put out a lot of awareness. The ISD [International Student Department] group here itself meets once a week and we speak to, we try to get new students to come... We have to inform them and speak to them and let them know what they can expect before we can get their involvement."[206] *Nye* (ISD-SRC) noted: "we have to clear this kind of misconception, make sure they know they're identity is completely safe... We have to let them know that things are different in Australia."[207] Thus the impact on capabilities is, at least partially, resolvable.

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[203] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[204] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[205] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[206] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[207] *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview

Nonetheless it is clear that non-citizen specific factors- both reduced perceived rights in the issue-state and reduced perceived (and, potentially, actual) rights in relation to one's home-state - play a role in reducing capabilities for non-citizen pressure groups.

A potential criticism to this argument exists. It would be incorrect to assert that constituency concern is the only factor shaping the willingness of the constituency to take part in public action. Other factors are also important. Both citizen and non-citizen pressure group strategists commented on the issues of logistics and apathy. These were noted to be a limiting factor.[208] However, it is possible to rebut this position. This thesis is not looking to explain all factors influencing pressure group action. Rather it is interested in those factors where citizenship matters. Since both citizen and non-citizen groups commented on the issue of apathy and logistics, these factors cannot be seen as related to citizenship status.

A third variation at the initial point also exists. Within university, the rights location of non-citizens is distinct from citizens. This loosely falls into the idea of social rights variation: non-citizens suffered increased restrictions on the nature of their access to education, with significant penalties for failure to comply with these conditions. Non-citizens *must* conduct full-time, as opposed to part-time study, and must, according to condition 8202 of the International Student Visa Conditions, "maintain satisfactory attendance in your course and course progress for each study period as required by your education provider".[209] Failure to fulfil condition 8202 is grounds for the revocation of an international student's visa, thus leading to deportation.[210] This is not the case for citizens.

The impact at the intermediate point is evident. Whereas it can be expected that at least some of the citizen constituency is part-time; none of the non-citizen constituency is part-time. Therefore,

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[208] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[209] Australian Government, 2011; this situation was noted by R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[210] Australian Government, 2011

on average, it is reasonable to expect that the non-citizen constituency has reduced time-resources. In addition, the implications of spending less time on study and more on other activities (such as public action) is greater, with deportation a potential by-product. So, the costs (stretching already comparatively thin time-resources) and risks (potential deportation) for the non-citizen constituency of participating in public action are relatively higher than for the citizen constituency. The non-citizen pressure groups thus face another hurdle in acquiring constituency support, this one being caused by variation in actual rights.

This was noted by non-citizen strategists. Heather Richards (NUSA) noted that: "international students have to do full time load, and they don't have the ability to give up the amount of time required to participate in them [rallies] necessarily."[211] *Natalie* (ISD-SRC) also commented that time factors undermined support.[212] This was something about which citizen strategists were also aware. Rose Jackson (SRC) commented that domestic students enjoy much more free-time, and need not worry as much about the implications of failing courses. These time-resources for citizens certainly assisted the citizen campaign.[213]

Thus, observed variation in the involvement of constituencies between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups can be explained via a rights-based capability mechanism.

Other-State Political Institutions

The third significant variation pertained to the use of other-state political institutions. All non-citizen pressure groups utilised such institutions. There was no equivalent action from citizen pressure groups. The rights-based capability mechanism explains this instance of variation.

Variation can be uncovered at the level of the initial point. Notionally, a given state is constructed in order to represent its citizens. This ideal-type notion is continued irrespective of

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[211] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[212] Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview
[213] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

the location of those citizens- either within the state or without the state (i.e. expatriate). For instance the U.S. State Department states that one of its purposes is "protecting and assisting U.S. citizens living or travelling".[214] The Indian Ministry of External Affairs states one of its purposes is: "extending consular facilities to ... Indian nationals abroad."[215] The Chinese Foreign Ministry states that one of its purposes is "to coordinate efforts to... safeguard the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens ... abroad."[216] There is no statement that these institutions will seek to do the equivalent for non-nationals. Thus the relationship of citizens and non-citizens to other-states is different. Non-citizens have reason to expect representation from their home-state political institutions while in the issue-state. Citizens have no reason to expect representation from other-state political institutions while they are a) in the issue-state; and b) concerned with matters not affecting any specific other-state (or its citizens). So, there is actual politico-social rights variation between citizenship types.

This variation at the initial point has implications at the intermediate point. For non-citizen pressure groups this inbuilt mechanism of (potential) representation for non-citizens creates a potential capability. Namely, it provides the means to develop an alliance with other-state political institutions. This alliance is built on the fact that some or all the pressure group's constituency is made up of citizens of one or a number of other-states. So, it becomes reasonable for a non-citizen pressure group to expect, and potentially receive, some degree of support from a given other-state political institution when representing that state's expatriates. This opportunity is not available for citizen pressure groups. As noted above, no right of representation exists, and so there is no foundation for an alliance to be built between citizen pressure groups and other-state political institutions.

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[214] U.S. State Department (2011), Department Organization, online at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm, (accessed: 10th August, 2011)

[215] Indian Foreign Service (2011), A Backgrounder, online at: http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=5002, (accessed: 10th August, 2011)

[216] Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2009), Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, online at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz/t558670.htm (accessed: 10th August, 2011)

This alliance may provide two benefits. First, they may provide resource support to the pressure group.[217] Second, they may lobby the policy-makers on behalf of the constituency, and in response to the given policy issue. Thus, they ally with the goals of the pressure group.[218] This notion is similar to Keck and Sikkink's (1999) concept of the transnational *boomerang*, where social movements utilise transnational organisations as a means of lobbying their own government.[219] In this formulation, non-citizen pressure groups are advocating to their constituency's home-state political institution(s) in order to influence the policy of their issue-state.

Discussion with non-citizens highlighted an awareness of this capability. When asked why he considered contacting consulates to be a useful pathway, Danny Craft (NUSA) stated: "it's probably the most direct route to get, like you were asking about outside government influence on it, that's probably the most direct route to get it. If the students are having problems, then they go to their consulates and speak about it. If they can't seem to find any help anywhere else they're going to go to their consulates, hopefully the consulates if they're taking their responsibilities seriously their going to talk to their government and hopefully it goes up to a higher level and comes to the national level, the Australian government and put some pressure on them."[220] Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA) noted that, after the 2009 issue of violence against Indian students, NUSA was aware that the Indian ambassador was responsive to issues relevant to the Indian student body, including concession cards.[221] This sentiment was echoed by *Irene* (ISD-SRC) who stated that, especially for non-citizens who lack political representation within

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[217] M. Tolani noted that this process occurred with the NLC (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

[218] E. Carvajal noted that this process occurred with NUSA (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

[219] Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 93-4

[220] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

[221] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

the issue-state political system, consulates provide a potential source of representation.[222] These positions showcase an awareness of the boomerang potential of other-state political institutions.

Further evidence can be found if we look at the national make-up of the international student body. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the top five nationalities making up the intake of international students at the national level between 2002 and 2008 were: China (24%), India (18%), South Korea (8%), Thailand (5%), and Malaysia (5%).[223] The consulates for China and India- the two states from which the majority of international students are derived from- featured as a predominant target for non-citizen pressure groups.[224] In addition, Malaysia also featured as a commonly targeted consulate (especially by the NLC).[225] This supports the notion that strategists were aware of the likelihood for support from other-state political institutions.

Meanwhile, there was some evidence that citizen strategists perceived other-state political institutions to be unavailable. David Barrow (NUS) commented that, alongside having little need, they were "never... able to leverage international politicians."[226] In addition, Sam Crosby (USU), Felix Eldrige (NUS), and *Jennifer* (NUS) noted that the relevance of contacting other-state political institutions seemed negligible.[227] Angus Macfarland (NUS) stated that the issue involved the Australian political system and impacted Australian citizens. It was a local issue.[228] Thus, both the availability and the relevance of other-state political institutions were questionable.

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[222] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[223] Australian Bureau of Statistics (2009), Feature Article: International Students in South Australia, online at: http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1345.4Feature%20Article1Dec%202009 (accessed: 1st September, 2011). These statistics concerned both South Australia, and the national intake.
[224] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[225] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[226] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[227] F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[228] A. Macfarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

Qualifications must be noted. First, though a *formal* opportunity may exist, strategists may not perceive these opportunities to be *substantive*. They may consider the consulate to not be concerned with representing the interests of their citizens. *Irene* (ISD-SRC) noted that, due to issues of home-state ethnic cleavages between Malays and Chinese-Malaysians, she was unwilling to use the Malaysian consulate. She, a Chinese-Malaysian, said: "it varies with different countries because with the Malaysian consulate I know they're just crap and useless, because there's this whole racial thing in Malaysia and a lot of the government officials are Malay and they have their own party affiliated UMNO [United Malays National Organisation] which is predominantly Malay which pursues predominantly Malay interests... So, when it comes to me I know that it is useless to approach the Malaysian consulate here."[229] However, the willingness of NUSA and NLC to attempt to use the Malaysian consulate, suggests this non-use to be an idiosyncratic phenomenon.

Second, strategists may assume a consulate is uninterested where the number of that consulate's expatriates affected by the issue is considered low. Danny Craft (NUSA) noted that they had not considered contacting the American consulate for they felt that too few American international students were affected, and their presence in country was too temporary (often only six-months compared to the multi-year presence of other international student populations). Thus they anticipated that the U.S. consulate would be uninterested.[230] An opportunity may have been available- especially given the declaration made by the U.S. State Department to represent its citizens- but no attempt was made to utilise it. Given that Danny is an American citizen, this suggests that the capability is created not by the citizenship status of the strategist, but rather by the citizenship status of the constituency.

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[229] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[230] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

Third, the opportunity provided by other-state representation cannot be understood as static. Rather it is a dynamic phenomenon that is influenced by changing context. Gamson (2004) notes that opportunities may exist in one of two forms: static or temporary. The latter are "windows of opportunity".[231] In this case, contextually specific factors produced a type of window of opportunity. Eduardo (NUSA) noted that, in the wake of the 2009 issue of violence against Indian students, support from the Indian ambassador increased dramatically.[232] Mohit (NLC) also noted that in response to the same event, the main political institutions of India were far more responsive.[233] In this case, a variant of Gamson's concept is produced: contextual specificity affects not whether an opportunity is available (as in Gamson's definition of windows of opportunity), but rather the intensity of already existing opportunities.

Qualifications aside, in this instance rights matter. At the initial point, citizenship status affects one's actual political rights vis-a-vis other-state political institutions (initial point). This enables or removes opportunity for alliance construction with other-state political institutions (intermediate point).

Conclusion

Using the rights-based capability mechanism, this chapter has analysed instances of observed variation between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. First, variation in the employment of a pressure group's constituency as a voting body was explained through variation in suffrage. Second, variation in the use of the constituency in public action was explained through a) non-citizen constituency concern resulting from reduced perceived politico-civil rights in the issue-state, and in relation to their home-state; and b) reduced social rights at university. Third, the exclusive incorporation of other-state political institutions by non-citizen pressure groups was

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[231] Gamson, W.A. (2004) "Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media" in D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited): 249
[232] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[233] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

explained due to variance in politico-social rights with these institutions. Rights variation produced, reduced or removed certain capabilities for pressure groups in turn producing variation in observed action.

Though the citizenship-as-rights framework explains many of the instances of variation, this framework cannot explain several other instances of variation. So, the identity-base capability mechanism will now be used.

Chapter 5 – Citizenship-as-Identity: How Identity Matters

When talking to Danny Craft (NUSA) it became clear that representing non-Australians mattered. Simply put, tt was harder to get the Australian public to care.[234] Contrast this with David Barrow (NUS) who suggested the VSU campaign actively and vigorously tapped into that shared identity of Australia.[235] Two citizenship statuses, two identity locations, two sets of capabilities. Identity, it seems, matters. It is showing how it matters that is this chapter's purpose.

This chapter analyses certain instances of variation via the identity-based capability mechanism. Through this a more nuanced reading for the intersection of citizenship status and pressure group action is produced. This thesis suggests three clear instances where identity-variation produced variance in pressure group action. First was non-citizen pressure groups' use of ethno-national communities within Australia. Second was the attempt and ability to use international media amongst non-citizen pressure groups; something not found amongst citizen pressure groups. This is summarised in Table 4:

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[234] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[235] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview

Table 4 – The Capability Mechanism and Citizenship-as-Identity

Observed Variation (Outcome Point)	Initial Point (variation in agents)	Intermediate Point (capability provided to pressure groups)
Potential Allies: Arts and Sports **Citizen:** Heavy use **Non-citizen:** No use	**Citizen:** Australian constituency **Non-Citizen:** Non-Australian constituency	**Citizen:** Shared concern for sub-set of nationals. So alliance potential. **Non-Citizen:** No national ties. No alliance potential.
Potential Allies: Ethno-National Groups **Citizen:** No equivalent use **Non-Citizen:** Used such groups	**Citizen:** Limited other-national ties **Non-Citizen:** Other-national ties	**Citizen:** Limited access **Non-Citizen:** High degree of access
Other-State Media **Citizen:** No use **Non-citizen:** Heavy Use	**Citizen:** Limited other-national ties **Non-Citizen:** Other-national ties	**Citizen:** Limited access **Non-Citizen:** High degree of access

Potential Allies: Arts and Sports Community

The variation in targeting of potential allies within Australia demands explanation. Citizens sought and were able to acquire the support of individuals and organisations from the arts and sports communities of Australia. Non-citizen pressure groups did not. This variation can be explained via the identity-based capability mechanism.

There was identity-based variation at the initial point. Citizen pressure groups were advocating on behalf of a constituency predominantly constructed of citizens; that is, Australian nationals.[236] This was not the case for the non-citizen pressure groups. Their constituency is made up of a mixture of expatriate nationals (predominantly from China, India, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia) who are all part of national communities separate from Australia.[237] The important factor is the existence of a national binary: citizen pressure groups represent Australians; non-citizen pressure groups represent non-Australians.

This initial point variation had implications at the intermediate point. The imperatives of both the arts and sports communities involved in the VSU were, at least partly, informed by the logic of

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[236] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[237] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009

national concern. The Australian Olympic Committee (an important ally within the campaign) states that it "is committed to Australia's athletes".[238] Meanwhile, during the VSU campaign, the arts community released an advertisement entitled: "A Dagger Through the Arts". It was signed by over two hundred members of Australia's artistic community. It states, among other things, that: "extracurricular activities, available to each and every student on campus, have produced a huge array of talented artists who have enriched *the nation's culture*."[239] So, both before and during the VSU campaign, these groups adhere to the logic of national-concern: they are interested in the improvement of Australia as a nation, in particular showing concern for the quality of opportunities available to sub-sets of that nation. Given that citizen pressure groups represented a sub-set of that nation, one that was affected by these policies, there were then affective national ties assisting the development of an alliance.

Citizen strategists were clearly aware of this capability. Rose Jackson (SRC) suggested that the logic underpinning this tactic was the sense that, with VSU, "we are going to have barren campuses, which are education machines that pump out graduates that have no world view, no extra-curricular skills."[240] This was considered something that would sway the significant individuals and the NGOs, many of whom understood "how important a vibrant student life is."[241] Angus MacFarland (NUS) noted that the ability to acquire both Alan Jones and the Australian Olympic Committee (representatives of the sports community) as allies stemmed from an awareness and concern on the part of all parties that "if you get rid of student unions essentially we're going to get less gold medals because it flows on because university sport is where so many athletes start and get support and get identified and get training."[242] Angus stated

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[238] Australian Olympic Committee (2011), Role, online at: http://corporate.olympics.com.au/about-us/inside-the-aoc/role, (accessed: 5th October, 2011)

[239] Rood, D. (2005) "Union fees law a 'dagger in the art'", *The Age.com.au,* online at: http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Union-fees-law-a-dagger-in-the-art/2005/05/16/1116095908448.html, (accessed: 5th October, 2011)

[240] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

[241] Ibid.

[242] A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

that the decision to employ this tactic stemmed from an assertion that student unions, the entities facing reduced funding under VSU, "provide leadership opportunity, opportunity to excel in sport, opportunity to excel in the arts. And that there's an untold story about the impact that they have... and there's a danger that if these services don't have a sustainable funding source that those opportunities will not continue to exist for the next generation of athletes, actors."[243]

Non-citizens strategists, conversely, were aware that such a capability was not available for them. Their constituency are neither currently Australians, nor is it expected that they will become part of the Australian nation. In 2004, According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 66% of international students did *not* receive permanent residency, necessitating their departure from Australia after their studies.[244] Given this situation, it is more difficult for non-citizen pressure groups to argue that their constituency will remain in Australia, and provide continuing benefits to the Australian nation. Danny Craft (NUSA) expressed the perception that the public opinion from some parts of Australia was "oh you're just here for your degree, you're not really going to be here, why should we bother with helping you if you're going to be gone."[245] He agreed that "to some degree... that might be true... we might not be here the whole time".[246] Angus McFarland (NUS) agreed with this position, presenting the comparison that: "if you are a domestic student you are more likely to be living here and contributing beyond your degree to Australian society as opposed to using your education to return home and contribute to your home society... therefore arguments about elite sport in Australia, great actors... will have probably resonated more with domestic students than international."[247] Meanwhile, Heather (NUSA) perceived a sense of "resentment" from segments of the Australian public towards

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[243] A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview
[244] Australian Bureau of Statstics (2007), International Students in Australia, online at: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/E0FE4ACEF9C8A65ACA25732C00207596?opendocument#Untitled%20Section_3, (accessed: 1st October, 2011)
[245] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[246] Ibid.
[247] A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

international students on account of their un-Australian status.[248] Thus, where alliances are built on a shared concern for a sub-set of the nation, pressure groups representing non-nationals may be unable to develop such coalitions.

Potential Allies: Ethno-National Groups in Australia

There was variation in the targeting of ethno-national groups within Australia. All non-citizen pressure groups sought and received support from ethno-national community groups situated within Australia. The equivalent was not seen in the case of citizen pressure groups. This can be explained via an identity-based capability mechanism.

There was identity-based variation at the initial point. Citizen pressure groups were advocating on behalf of a constituency predominantly constructed of citizens; that is, Australian nationals.[249] Such was not the case for the non-citizen pressure groups. As noted above, their constituency is a mixture of expatriates from several other nationality groups.[250] This creates the potential for national solidarity with the ethno-national community groups.

This variation in nationality has implications at the intermediate point. T. Ambrosio (2002) comments that diasporic groups are often constructed to represent the interests of that nationality when in another state.[251] For non-citizen pressure groups, an ethno-national community group's impulse to support their diaspora assists the development of an alliance. This alliance emerges because some or all of the pressure group's constituency is made up of individuals who are of equivalent nationality with the ethno-national group. So, it becomes reasonable for a non-citizen pressure group to expect, and potentially receive, some degree of support from these ethno-national community groups. Such is not the case for citizen pressure groups. There are few

[248] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[249] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview
[250] Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009
[251] T. Ambrosio (2002) "Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy" in T. Ambrosio (ed.) *Ethnic Identity Groups and United States Foreign Policy,* (Westport: Praeger Publishing): 1-2

national ties (they neither represent the given nationality, nor represent an issue pertaining to the given nationality) and so there is little reason for an alliance to emerge.

Discussion with non-citizen strategists highlighted an awareness for the impact of these national ties. Danny Craft (NUSA) suggested that a key reason behind the development of an alliance with these community groups was because "these students [NUSA's constituency] are from their home countries [the ethno-national community groups' home countries] so it is a matter of showing care for those students who share their same cultural background."[252] *Natalie* (ISD-SRC) suggested that, within the university context, her Chinese nationality provided a means through which to gain the support of Chinese student associations.[253] Heather Richards (NUSA) noted that the process of acquiring ethno-national community group support often involved using national groups within the university who then had further associations with equivalent national groups outside. For instance, she noted the strong national linkages the Malaysian student society in Newcastle University had with "the broader Malaysian community in Newcastle." Such ties then provided a means of acquiring support from these larger national communities.[254] *Joanne*, a citizen strategist campaigning on the issue of concession cards with SUPRA, noted that her Indian national association (though she was an Australian status-citizen) provided a "bridge" through which to acquire the support of Indian community groups in Australia. She also noted that, in general, domestic student strategists involved in the campaign were "absolutely useless at engaging with those types of groups, they just didn't want to know."[255] National ties between ethno-national community groups and non-citizen pressure groups' constituency and, in the case of *Joanne* and *Natalie*, strategists provided an evident capability.

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[252] D. Craft (personal communication. 5th[th] October, 2011) email interview
[253] Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview
[254] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview
[255] *Joanne* (personal communication. 8th August, 2011) personal interview

Amongst citizen strategists, the nature of the issue- notably the Australian status of the constituency- made accessing these ethno-national groups largely irrelevant. Throughout the interviews, citizen strategists defined the issue within the framework of the Australian nation. Sam Crosby (USU), Felix Eldridge (NUS), and Angus Macfarland (NUS) all commented that the issue was specifically concerning Australia. The relevance of non-Australian ties was considered negligible at best.[256] Even where there were limited national ties, there was no point in going to, for instance, Chinese-Australian ethno-national groups and saying that "we're all Chinese". The prefix side of the hyphenated nationality was redundant.

However, this argument needs to be qualified. Namely, as with the use of other-state political institutions, it is the case here that the responsiveness of ethno-national community groups, and so the significance of the opportunity, was not uniform. It was noted by the NLC and ISD-SRC that, in certain instances, there were difficulties acquiring support from such groups.[257] This was confirmed by *Joanne*, the citizen strategist with SUPRA working on the concession card issue.[258] The effect of national solidarity, though apparent, has its limits.

Nonetheless, notions of national solidarity help to explain the observed variation between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups.

Use of Other-State Media

The third instance of variation pertains to the use/non-use of international media. Citizen pressure groups made no effort to employ international media. Non-citizen pressure groups made an effort, and received a degree of response from international media.

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[256] S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview

[257] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview

[258] *Joanne* (personal communication. 8th August, 2011) personal interview

There is variation at the initial point. Once again this is occurring due to variation in the national associations of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups' respective constituencies. For non-citizens pressure groups, the important factor was the multiplicity of other-national ties; something citizen pressure groups lacked.

There is a citizenship exclusivity built into the nature of media. Demertzis et al. (1999) comment that "ethnocentrism forms one of the main and durable journalistic values through which the news is *selected and presented.*"[259] Media prioritises reporting on its own nation. Of course, other national identities may be covered (especially where a story is of high significance); but, all other things being equal, media will prioritise the reporting of its own national groups.

The implications of this for citizen and non-citizen pressure groups are evident. Citizen pressure groups, when representing an issue of relevance only to their own nationality, will have a harder time acquiring media attention from other-state media. Conversely, non-citizen pressure groups, when some or all of their constituency corresponds to the national identity of the media in question, will find it easier to acquire the attention of other-state media.

Discussions with non-citizen strategists suggested that this dynamic shaped action. Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) noted that other-state media was "especially always interested in their specific citizens... If you'd explain they'd quite often run the story with the angle that our students are being discriminated in this state."[260] *Irene* (ISD-SRC) commented that, especially during the 2009 rally, the incorporation of Chinese media emerged from the perception that their constituency was made up of Chinese nationals.[261] Mohit Tolani (NLC) asserted that the flow of international students to Australia was having an impact on the economic systems of other nations. In turn, he stated, it was reasonable to expect media from these nations to be interested

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[259] N. Demertzis, S. Papathanassopoulos, and A. Armenakis (1999), "Media and Nationalism- The Macedonian Question", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 4: 26-7 (emphasis added)
[260] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[261] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

in the status of said expatriate students while in Australia.[262] This perception of likely national concern informed the use of other-state media.

Qualifications to the resulting opportunity must be mentioned. First, it does not follow that national ties ensure other-state media provides intensive coverage. Non-citizen strategists often stated that other-state media was irregular in its response. Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) noted that, though overseas media was involved, the stories were often "small stories saying this is an issue", in the "small corners of pages... every now and then we'd get something. But not as much as we could."[263]

Second, the extent of the opportunity was, in the same way as other-state political institutions, prone to variation due to contextual factors. An opportunity window emerged from the issue of violence against Indian students in 2009. Though non-citizen groups acquired media attention before this issue emerged, it was noted by Eduardo Carvajal (NUSA) that "when there was the [2009] issue of the Indian students, our office spoke practically with all the big newspapers around the world, with all the big radios around the world."[264] Ruchir Punjabi (NLC) noticed a similar variation in response levels from Indian media before and after the emergence of the violence against Indian students issue.[265] This instance highlights not so much a dichotomous situation of other-state media being interested or not, but rather that other-state media's level of coverage will be shaped by short term contextual variations. Nonetheless, an identity-based capability was both perceived and employed - to considerable, if inconsistent effect - by non-citizen groups.

For citizen pressure groups it was clear that there was little opportunity inherent within other-state media sources. Angus Macfarland (NUS) commented that he could not see the relevance of

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[262] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[263] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[264] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview
[265] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

acquiring the involvement of other-state media. The issue was Australian based, and so the involvement of other-state media was irrelevant.[266]

Conclusion

Using the identity-based capability mechanism, this chapter has analysed instances of observed variation between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. The exclusive use of the sports and arts communities by citizen pressure groups; the exclusive use of ethno-national community groups by non-citizen pressure groups; and the exclusive use of other-state media by non-citizen pressure groups were all explained through variation in affective national ties.

Having analysed instances of variation (both through a rights and identity lens), it is now important to discuss instances of similarity. The following chapter will use the capability mechanism to show how, in certain situations, variation in citizenship status *does not* matter.

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[266] A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

Chapter 6 – Limits of Citizenship: How Citizenship Does Not Matter

Amongst both citizen and non-citizen strategists, the refrain remained the same: to bring about policy change, first and foremost, you need to win the support of policy-makers. As part of this, it is best to go directly to the target. Different citizenship status, same impulse, same action. Though clearly influential, it would do well to show the limits of citizenship. This pursuit informs this chapter.

The intention of this thesis was not only to show how citizenship may matter, but also suggests its limits; how is citizenship *not* important in shaping pressure group action? Within this study the instances of similarity provide a foundation to analyse the limits of citizenship status as a variable affecting pressure group action. Given the most similar method employed, it is reasonable to suggest that, where there is no variation in observed action, citizenship status is not having an effect.

To analyse these instances, and show the limits of citizenship status, the capability mechanism is again used. Two types of explanation are suggested. The first possible explanation for similarity would be that there is no variation at the initial point. With no initial point, no intermediate or outcome point can occur. The second possible explanation is that citizenship status *does* produce variation at the initial point, but it is irrelevant. In this case an intervening variable mitigates the significance of the initial point variation, thus ensuring it is of little to no relevance for the intermediate point. In certain cases the first explanation may hold. In other cases the second explanation may hold. This is summarised in Table 5:

Table 5 – The Capability Mechanism and the Limits of Citizenship

Observed Similarity (Outcome Point)	Initial Point (variation in agents)	Intermediate Point (capability provided to pressure groups)
Citizenship-as-Rights		
Policy-makers Mutual effort and response	No rights-based variation regarding direct interaction.	Nothing producing, reducing or removing variation in direct interaction.
Australian Media Mutual effort and response	Little rights-based variation. Amongst **non-citizen:** some limits due to constituency concern.	Constituency concern reducing some forms of media use for non-citizens. Nothing barring access for either citizenship type.
Citizenship-as-Identity		
Policy-makers, Australian Media, and The Third Party Mutual effort, and response	**Citizen:** Australian constituency **Non-Citizen:** Non-Australian constituency	**Intervening variable:** Issue-location (Australia)

Citizenship-as-Rights: Australian Policy-Makers and Australian Media

Rights variation between citizens and non-citizens is not total. Within Australian, non-citizens and citizens have several similar rights. Where they enjoy equivalent rights that are pertinent to their interaction with policy-makers and Australian media, the significance of citizenship (understood within a rights framework) is negligible. In such instances, the capability mechanism does not function (there is no initial point variation). This logic partly explains how both citizenship types a) interacted directly with policy-makers; and b) interacted with domestic media.

Australian Policy-Makers

The process of direct communication with policy-makers is not regulated within a citizenship exclusive framework. Citizens and non-citizens have access to policymakers through formal means (e.g. submissions, petitions) and informal means (e.g. personal communication). This appears the case for both the Parliament of New South Wales and the Federal Parliament. In the

procedure rules for contacting policy-makers there is *no clear statement* that non-citizens are excluded from formal methods of direct interaction. The rules on presenting a petition to either the New South Wales Parliament or Federal Parliament make no comment suggesting that non-citizens are unable to take part in this practice.[267] The rules on engaging with the New South Wales parliamentary committees (including providing submissions, giving evidence and attending hearings) are similarly accepting of non-citizens. In the guide to preparing submissions there is no explicit statement that submissions will be accepted only if its authors are citizens.[268] The delimiting factor for those who can provide evidence are "the public, interest groups and organisations".[269] Those who can attend hearings are "the public". The use of these terms - as opposed to "citizens" - ensures that there is no clear denial of non-citizens' right access to these mechanisms. Finally, there is no clear statement denying non-citizens the right to, via phone or email, contact members of either the New South Wales Parliament or the Federal Parliament.[270] This suggests no informal barrier. In sum, there appear to be no actual rights variation for citizens or non-citizens regarding access to direct interaction with policy-makers. So, there is no variation at the initial point.

This lack of rights variation manifested in a similar sentiment amongst citizen and non-citizen strategists about the perceived availability of policy-makers. Both groups perceived no rights-

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[267] Parliament of Australia (2011), Chapter 15. Documents and petitions, online at: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/pubs/standos/pdf/chapter15.pdf (accessed: 15th August 2011); Parliament of New South Wales (2011), S.O. 121 Petitions- content of, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/precdent.nsf/0/4EBEAACE6AED3CF9CA2572A000246874 (accessed: 15th August, 2011); Parliament of New South Wales (2011), S.O. 123 Petitions- procedure for lodgement and presentation, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/precdent.nsf/0/17F677741D0E64D2CA2572A000246876 (accessed: 15th August, 2011); Parliament of New South Wales (2011), About petitions, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf//key/AboutPetitions, (accessed: 15th August, 2011)

[268] Parliament of New South Wales (2011), About committees, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees, (accessed: 15th August, 2011); Parliament of New South Wales (2011), Engaging with committees, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf/key/LACommitteesEngaging, (accessed: 15th August, 2011)

[269] Parliament of New South Wales, 2011, About committees

[270] Parliament of Australia (2011), List of Members, online at: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/memlist.pdf (accessed: 15th August, 2011); Parliament of New South Wales (2011), Contact your member, online at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/common.nsf/key/ContactYourMember, (accessed: 15th August, 2011)

based barriers of entry to direct interaction with policy-makers. Amongst citizen strategists there was no mention of barriers to lobbying. Some perceived that, being citizens, they had a right to present their position to Australian politicians.[271] Non-citizen strategists likewise perceived a right to lobby Australian politicians. When asked whether there were any barriers to communicating with Australian politicians Mohit Tolani (NLC) stated: "there wasn't a lot of trouble for us."[272] Non-citizen strategists such as *John* felt that the democratic nature of Australia ensured they could express their voice to Australian politicians.[273] There was no actual or perceived rights variation for direct interaction with policy-makers.

A qualification is needed. Non-citizen strategists did perceive that their disenfranchisement meant that the efficacy of lobbying was reduced.[274] Nonetheless, such rights variation affected efficacy but not access. Regardless of being disenfranchised, it was perceieved as necessary to target policy-makers, for they were the key means achieve policy change.[275]

Australian Media

For Australian media there were also no perceived legal barriers of interaction. None of the citizen strategists commented on rights-based barriers to interaction with Australian media.[276]

Amongst non-citizen strategists the use of Australian media was, for the most part, perceived as available. None of the non-citizen strategists mentioned rights-based barriers for their own interaction with Australian media.[277] Once again, non-citizen strategists felt that, as *John* (ISD-

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[271] R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview
[272] M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview
[273] *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[274] R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[275] *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview
[276] D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview; S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview; F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview; R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview; A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview; *Jennifer* (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview
[277] E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview;

SRC) put it, non-citizens: "have the right to speak up for themselves";[278] and that people- understood to include non-citizens- "have a say. In the constitution, in the constitution there's a freedom of speech, that's a basic right."[279]

To suggest that non-citizen strategists perceived the legal availability of Australian media, is not to say that other factors did not limit this capability's availability. As noted above, constituency concern limited the ability of non-citizen pressure group's to organise media-attracting events (e.g. rallies).[280] However, these instances suggest that rights-based factors *limited* as opposed to *removed* access to Australian media. Further, such barriers did not apply to strategists, who felt little concern communicating with media.[281]

Thus, when discussing lobbying efforts towards Australian politicians or the use of Australian media, there is no rights-based variation at the initial point sufficient to bar access. Rights- variation may a) limit the perceived efficacy of lobbying for non-citizens; and b) undermine certain methods of communication with Australian media, but it never completely removes these options.

Citizenship-as-Identity: Policy-Makers, Domestic Media, and the Third Party

When analysing the situation via a citizenship-as-identity framework it seems, at first glance, difficult to understand why there was little observed variation in action between citizen and non- citizen pressure groups regarding policy-makers and domestic media.

At the initial point there is clear variation. The national composition of the pressure groups' relevant constituencies is distinct, and this should impact available opportunities. Within the

H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview; *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview; Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview; *Nye* (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview

[278] *John* (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview
[279] Ibid.
[280] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview
[281] H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview

national-identity model it should follow that policy-makers (who represent Australian nationals), and Australian media (which has a bias for reporting on Australia) would be uninterested in responding to the efforts of non-citizen pressure groups. These groups should quickly learn this and thus reduce or remove all efforts in this area. However, this does not occur. Non-citizen pressure groups contacted and received responses from policy-makers and Australian media. This is explained through an intervening variable: *the issue-location*.

For both the citizen and non-citizen pressure groups the location in which the issue is occurring is Australia. For both the VSU and the concession card campaign, the policy in question has been developed by the Australian political system, applies only to those within the Australian system, and can only be changed via the actions of the Australian political system. This minimises the significance of the national origin of the actors. Whether an actor is Australian or non-Australian is irrelevant, so long as their actions have an impact on Australia. The notion of national-bias (both from policy-makers and Australian media) still holds. The source of that national concern, however, is not the type of agents involved (Australian or non-Australian), but rather the impact those agents have on Australia in general. This intervening variable neutralises the significance of citizenship-based variation at the initial point.

Non-citizen strategists were aware of this factor. As *Irene* (ISD-SRC) stated: "it would be a lot different if there were only a few people doing this, because there's so many of us and we have a role in here for so long as international students, there's such a huge population of us and it impacts a lot on revenue that to a certain degree we've gone we're this set of people and even though we're not Australian we do have a lot of influence in the state [New South Wales] at least."[282] Providing AUD18.5 billion in export credits in 2009, and only recently dropping from the third to the fourth largest export industry in the country, Australia's international education

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[282] *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

industry is clearly economically important.[283] International students (being part of that industry) are thus significant economic actors within Australia. Given this, non-citizen pressure groups are thus aware that they can tap into national self-concern. This concern is then used in to gain traction with both Australian policy-makers in direct interaction, and with Australian media. By gaining traction with Australian media it was also expected to have impact on the third party and, in turn, lead back to an indirect impact on policy-makers.[284] This entire tactical approach fits interestingly into an indirect logic of national-concern. It is not that the agents are nationals, but rather that they have an impact on the health of the nation through their actions.

Conclusion

This chapter has used the capability mechanism to explain instances of similar action between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups. There was no clear rights-variation denying non-citizens access to Australian policy-makers. Similarly, rights-variation was not sufficient to totally deny either citizenship type from the ability to use Australian media. Meanwhile, the intervening variable – that both policy issues (VSU and concession cards) are located in Australia – was used to explain why identity-variation was not sufficient to produce variation in interaction with Australian policy-makers, Australian media, and the third party.

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[283] Sebastian, 2009: 16; Universities Australia (2011), Broader implications from a downturn in international students, online at: http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/resources/618/1100, (accessed: 1st October, 2011)

[284] D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview; *Irene* (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to investigate the intersection of citizenship status and pressure group action. To begin exploring this relationship, a two-pronged research question was asked: does citizenship status affect pressure group action? and how is it that citizenship status matters or does not matter?

This thesis provided a response to both of these questions. First, through empirical comparison of citizen and non-citizen pressure groups via the interactive model of action, it was possible to conclude that citizenship status does in fact matter. Variation can be generalised into four groupings. First, there was variation in the incorporation of a pressure group's constituency. Citizen pressure groups a) utilised their constituency as a voting body; and b) were able to incorporate their constituency into public action with little difficulty. This was not the case for non-citizen pressure groups, whose constituency were often wary of participating in public action for fear of negative sanctions. Second, non-citizen pressure groups utilised other-state political institutions. Third, non-citizen pressure groups also used other-state media. Citizen pressure groups did not interact with other-state institutions (political institutions or media). Fourth, the relationship with potential allies located within Australia was distinct. Citizens targeted arts and sports communities; while non-citizens targeted ethno-national community groups.

Yet, there remained similarity. Both citizenship types interacted with policy-makers, issue-state media, and the third party.

Having demarcated variation between citizen and non-citizen pressure groups, it was time to respond to the second component of the research question: *how* does citizenship matter, and how does it not matter? To achieve this, an original theoretical idea was developed: the capability mechanism. This three-step mechanism argues that citizenship status produces variation in rights

or identity which in turn produces, reduces or removes pressure group capabilities. Action variation then follows. Importantly, this mechanism creates a lens through which a nuanced reading of the impact of citizenship can be deciphered. Moreover, it helps to explain the instances where citizenship variation produced little to no variation.

The significance of this thesis' findings are twofold. First, these findings go some way towards developing a theory on the intersection of citizenship status and pressure group action. Though, given the small-N qualitative nature of the study, it is not possible to draw generalised conclusions, the findings of this work do assist further research by suggesting expected areas of variation and similarity. These expectations provide a useful departure point in a field of comparative research otherwise short of prior studies. Second, the thesis has both developed, and showcased the utility of, the capability mechanism. This can be further used, tested, or developed for future comparative analysis of citizenship status and pressure group action.

It is possible to suggest two further areas of research. First, given that there are multiple types of non-citizen (in a rights sense), it may be beneficial to conduct comparative analysis both between different non-citizen and citizen types, and also across divergent non-citizen types themselves. Second, given that the nature of citizenship is distinct across different countries, it may be beneficial to conduct a similar process of investigation across numerous countries. From here, it would be possible to delimit those factors which are country specific, and those that generalise cross-nationally.

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Interviews

Please note, all italicised interview names represent pseudonyms.

Council of Association of Postgraduate Associations (CAPA)

Tom (personal communication. 29th July, 2011) personal interview

International Students' Department of the Sydney University Students' Representative Council (ISD-SRC)

Irene (personal communication. 23rd June, 2011) personal interview

John (personal communication. 22nd June, 2011) personal interview

Natalie (personal communication. 11th May, 2011) personal interview

Nye (personal communication. 29th June, 2011) personal interview

National Liaison Committee for International Students (NLC)

R. Punjabi (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

M. Tolani (personal communication. 25th August, 2011) telephone interview

National Union of Students (NUS)

D. Barrow (personal communication. 19th July, 2011) personal interview

F. Eldridge (personal communication. 10th August, 2011) personal interview

A. MacFarland (personal communication. 15th July, 2011) personal interview

Jennifer (personal communication. 5th August, 2011) telephone interview

International Students' Department of the Newcastle University Students' Association (NUSA)

E. Carvajal (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

D. Craft (personal communication. 28th June, 2011) telephone interview

H. Richards (personal communication. 4th July, 2011) telephone interview

Sydney University Students' Representative Council (SRC)

R. Jackson (personal communication. 27th July, 2011) personal interview

Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association (SUPRA)

Joanne (personal communication. 8th August, 2011) personal interview

University of Sydney Union (USU)

S. Crosby (personal communication. 4th August, 2011) personal interview

Appendix

Item One --- Citizen Question Sheet

General Questions

Please briefly describe your organisation.

Please describe the campaign.

- What are the issues?
- What are your goals?
- What have you done so far?
- What are your further plans for the campaign?

Political Action

How, if at all, have you used Australian politicians in your campaign?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?
  - Would you have been liked to?
  - Would it have been possible?

How, if at all, have you used politicians from other countries in your campaign?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?
  - Would you have been liked to?
  - Would it have been possible?

How, if at all, have you used Australian individuals (not politicians) in your campaign?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?

- o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - • If no:
    - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used individuals (not politicians) from other countries in your campaign?

- • If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- • If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used personal networks (friends and family) from within Australia?
- • If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- • If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used personal networks (friends and family) from outside Australia?
- • If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- • If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used protest/petitions in your campaign?

- • If yes:
  - o How?
  - o What were the main points you sought to convey when protesting?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - o Were there concerns about employing protest?
- • If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from protesting?

How, if at all, have you used Australian media in the campaign?

- • If yes:
  - o Which media sources have you contacted?
  - o How did you set up contact?
  - o What were the main points you sought to convey when talking with media?

- o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- o Were there concerns about talking to the media?
  - If no:
    - o What were the factors which prevented you from using Australian media?

How, if at all, have you used overseas media in the campaign?

- If yes:
  - o Which media sources have you contacted?
  - o How did you set up contact?
  - o What were the main points you sought to convey when talking with media?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - o Were there concerns about talking to the media?
- If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from using overseas media?

How, if at all, have you used non-government organisations within Australia?

- If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - o What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used non-government organisations from outside Australia?

- If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - o What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you tried to gain support from other political groups also involved on the issue?

- If yes:
  - o Who did you contact?
  - o How?
  - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - o What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you participated in other types of campaigning not discussed so far?

- If yes:
    - o What were they?
    - o How were they done?
    - o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?

Impact on Decision-Making

Are there factors specific to being a domestic student which have impacted your campaign?

How, if at all, has voting (either at a state or federal level) impacted your strategies?

How, if at all, have concerns about potential legal punishments impacted your strategies?

Are there issues with acquiring enough resources to achieve what you want with the campaign?

- If yes:
    - o What factors impact your level of resources?
    - o How does this impact your strategies?
- If no:
    - o Why is it not an issue?

Do you feel that Australian society accepts your campaigning methods as legitimate?

- If yes/no:
    - o What factors make you think this?
    - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Do you feel that you have a right to campaign for what you want?

- If yes/no:
    - o What factors make you think this?
    - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Do you ever feel that being an Australian citizen has an impact on how you campaign?

- If yes/no:
    - o What factors make you think this?
    - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Were you ever concerned about how your actions might be perceived by sections of Australian society?

- If yes/no:
    - o What factors make you think this?
    - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Item Two --- Non- Citizen Question Sheet

General Questions

Please briefly describe your organisation.

Please describe the campaign.

- What are the issues?
- What are your goals?
- What have you done so far?
- What are your further plans for the campaign?

Political Action

How, if at all, have you used Australian politicians in your campaign?

- If yes:
    o Who did you contact?
    o How?
    o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?
    o Would you have been liked to?
    o Would it have been possible?

How, if at all, have you used politicians from other countries in your campaign?

- If yes:
    o Who did you contact?
    o How?
    o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?
    o Would you have been liked to?
    o Would it have been possible?

How, if at all, have you used Australian individuals (not politicians) in your campaign?

- If yes:
    o Who did you contact?
    o How?
    o What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    o What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used individuals (not politicians) from other countries in your campaign?

- If yes:
    - Who did you contact?
    - How?
    - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used personal networks (friends and family) from within Australia?

- If yes:
    - Who did you contact?
    - How?
    - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used personal networks (friends and family) from outside Australia?

- If yes:
    - Who did you contact?
    - How?
    - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
- If no:
    - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used protest/petitions in your campaign?

- If yes:
    - How?
    - What were the main points you sought to convey when protesting?
    - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
    - Were there concerns about employing protest?
- If no:
    - What were the factors which prevented you from protesting?

How, if at all, have you used Australian media in the campaign?

- If yes:
    - Which media sources have you contacted?
    - How did you set up contact?
    - What were the main points you sought to convey when talking with media?
    - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
    - Were there concerns about talking to the media?
- If no:
    - What were the factors which prevented you from using Australian media?

How, if at all, have you used overseas media in the campaign?

- If yes:
  - Which media sources have you contacted?
  - How did you set up contact?
  - What were the main points you sought to convey when talking with media?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - Were there concerns about talking to the media?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from using overseas media?

How, if at all, have you used non-government organisations within Australia?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you used non-government organisations from outside Australia?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you tried to gain support from other political groups also involved on the issue?

- If yes:
  - Who did you contact?
  - How?
  - What made you consider this to be a useful pathway?
  - What, if anything, did you gain from talking to them?
- If no:
  - What were the factors which prevented you from contacting them?

How, if at all, have you participated in other types of campaigning not discussed so far?
- If yes:
  - What were they?
  - How were they done?

     o   What made you consider them to be a useful pathway?

Impact on Decision-Making

Are there factors specific to being international students which have impacted your campaign?

How, if at all, has voting (either at a state or federal level) impacted your strategies?

How, if at all, have concerns about potential legal punishments impacted your strategies (e.g. deportation)?

Are there issues with acquiring enough resources to achieve what you want with the campaign?
- If yes:
  - o What factors impact your level of resources?
  - o How does this impact your strategies?
- If no:
  - o Why is it not an issue?

Do you feel that Australian society accepts your campaigning methods as legitimate?
- If yes/no:
  - o What factors make you think this?
  - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Do you ever feel that being an Australian citizen has an impact on how you campaign?
- If yes/no:
  - o What factors make you think this?
  - o Has this impacted your strategies?

Were you ever concerned about how your actions might be perceived by sections of Australian society?
- If yes/no:
  - o What factors make you think this?
  - o Has this impacted your strategies?