

The Semantics of *ja* and *ye*:

Semantic variation in
Marathi motion verbs

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The verbs *come* and *go*, and their counterparts in other languages, are most commonly associated with a motion event, often with an implication of movement towards (“Come!”) or away from (“Go!”) the speaker. As a starting point this is ok, but it is also clearly insufficient, as many languages also utilize their forms of these verbs to encode a broader and more complex range of semantic information than simply a motion event through space, towards or away from the speaker.

This study will examine the use of the Marathi verbs *ja* and *ye* (‘go’ and ‘come’, respectively), paying particular attention to usages that are semantically divergent from the basic spatial motion event. Cross-linguistically such ‘semantically divergent’ usages include renderings of a range of physical, mental and existential states. Furthermore, and again cross-linguistically, evaluative connotations are often systematically encoded in the pair of verbs.

In this thesis I show that the ‘basic’ senses of *ja* and *ye* support a diverse range of metaphorical usages and are surrounded by several metaphorically and metonymically ‘extended’ senses. I also show that Marathi exhibits (as do Hindi, English and Thai) a figurative and evaluative systematization of its ‘go’ and ‘come’ verbs (*ja* and *ye*) with the contrastive notions of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ respectively.

The study integrates linguistic and cognitive linguistic work on subjectivity, prototypicality, metaphor, metonymy and image schemas to investigate the mechanisms and causes of the semantic changes leading to *ja* and *ye*'s current lexico-semantic situation.

One of the main theoretical avenues in previous work on this topic has been *deixis*. Here too *deixis* will bear significantly on *ja* and *ye*, but my analysis will also reflect the shifting of theoretical ground that has occurred in the field of semantics since some of the earlier 'come'-and-'go' studies (e.g. Fillmore 1971). Specifically, I will expound *polysemy* to join *deixis* as the twin principal component of my theoretical framework, which together more comprehensively cover the processes and motivations for semantic shift of the kind we are looking at.

Amongst the major questions that this study addresses are:

- How can we define (cross-linguistic) 'come' and 'go', and (Marathi) *ja* and *ye* in their uses as verbs of motion through space?
- What happens when *ja* and *ye* are used with some meaning other than these 'basic' meaning of spatial motion?
- In such cases, what semantic forces are at play in allowing or constraining extension of the verbs' meanings? What roles, for instance, are being played by the verbs' deictic properties, or by the underlying mechanisms and causes of polysemy?

1.2 Marathi

Marathi is an Indo-Aryan language spoken in the central western part of India, predominantly in the state of Maharashtra where it is an official language. It is bordered to the north and north-east by other Sanskrit-based languages, Gujarati and Hindi, and to the south-east and south by Dravidian languages Telugu and Kannada. Off the south-west corner of the Marathi speaking region lies Konkani, a closely related Indo-Aryan language.

Marathi is spoken by about seventy percent of people in Maharashtra state, or seven percent of Indians, which amounts to approximately 70million people, and ranks as the fourth most-spoken language in India (15th in the world). Addition of the global diaspora brings the total number of speakers up to over 80million.

Being sandwiched between typologically distinct Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages has had some interesting effects on the development of aspects of Marathi phonology, lexicon and syntax, where it displays some characteristic Dravidian features layered throughout its largely Sanskrit-derived base (Pandharipande 1997). Likewise, Marathi's prominent position both within India and now in the global language economy has contributed to an abundance and diversity of sociolinguistic variation (Pandharipande 2003, Nemade 1990). About 45 distinct dialects of Marathi are recognized, with many other regional varieties. Despite this, it is highly standardized thanks to Marathi-medium education and a proud (and highly politicized) ethno-linguistic identity (D'Souza 2006, Benei 2005).

Marathi uses the devanagari alphabet (similarly to Hindi, Nepali and Sanskrit), employing 47 individual characters (37 consonants and 10 vowels).

1.3 A note on translation.

I am providing ‘go’ and ‘come’ as English translations of *ja* and *ye*, as well as of other ‘equivalent’ lexical items in other languages. Neither ‘go’ nor ‘come’ are suitable candidates as either semantic primitives, nor as semantic universals (Goddard 1998:205-9, Goddard 2001:28, Wilkins and Hill 1995). The analysis of *ja* and *ye* will show that their semantic distribution is, in their ‘basic’ senses as verbs of motion through space, similar to English *go* and *come*, although still not identical. In some of their less prototypical applications, however the English-Marathi counterparts are less comparable. Thus, *ja* and *ye* do not *precisely mean* ‘go’ and ‘come’; all glosses should be thought of, especially in the finer details, as semantic approximations. Following Wilkins and Hill (1995) I will use (small caps) COME and GO when referring to an approximate semantic concept spanning a range of languages and their respective relevant lexical items. Note that I am not claiming the actual cross-linguistic existence of such linguistic (or underlying cognitive) structures; COME and GO are provided more as a procedural convenience.

1.4 Thesis overview

The remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows:

Chapter two presents the theoretical framework to be used for the subsequent semantic analysis. Commencing with a synopsis of some of the overarching concepts, the main sections on deixis and polysemy are then followed by a methodological discussion on representing meaning including justification of the chosen metalanguage for the present analysis.

Chapter three utilizes this theoretical framework in a semantic analysis of the Marathi verbs *ja* and *ye*. Based on written and spoken language data it presents arguments for the development of different senses of the verbs, as well as exploring their use of ‘figurative’ deixis.

Chapter four brings together the arguments and offers some Marathi-specific as well as some general theoretical conclusions on the themes.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Prior to our semantic analysis of *ja* and *ye* we must review the concepts and theoretical tools that will be utilized.

Cursory inspection of the data reveals a variety of uses of *ja* and *ye*. Central to the analysis will be a theory of polysemy, detailing the differentiation – or the integration – of these different ‘senses’. Polysemy’s mechanisms (metaphor and metonymy, and underlying these, image schemas) and causes (subjectivity, efficiency/expressivity) will be described. The other major component of the analysis will utilize the theory of linguistic deixis.

Broadly, this theoretical framework pertains to the nexus of structural linguistics and pragmatics, bridging language ‘knowledge’ and language ‘usage’ (Chomsky 1986). The close interdependence of these levels of language use and theory is detailed below (section 2.1.2). Whilst both polysemy and deixis are *semantic* theories, at a slightly finer level of distinction deixis has a somewhat more specific *pragmatic* element: In a theory of polysemy, ultimately a word’s meaning (or more correctly its *sense* in each usage), comprehended with the assistance of contextual information, can be glossed independently of the context – like dictionary definitions. The meaning of a deictic word, in contrast, (which has only one sense unless it is polysemous as well), relies directly in every case on the context of use.

Thus, the theoretical themes are all contributions to our understanding of the complex relationships between words, their use, and therein their meanings.

2.1.1 Subjectivity, Embodiment, Prototypicality

Before commencing on deixis and polysemy, we will consider some key concepts that permeate the theoretical areas and form links between them: Subjectivity, embodiment and prototypicality.

An appreciation of the significance of subjectivity must lie close to the heart of any theory of meaning. Subjectivity “involves the expression of self and the representation of a speaker’s... perspective or point of view in discourse”. (Traugott & Dasher 2002:20 quoting Finegan 1995:1). The inherent perspective of the speaker is a fundamental characteristic of much deictic language, as observed by Bühler ([1934] 1982) in his exposition of the ‘Origo’, the deictically situated a reference point of ‘*me, here, now*’. Indeed, according to Bühler it is precisely the subjective nature of deictic language that has been cited by the ‘ancient [Greek] grammarians’ and modern philosophers of language alike as complicating its logical and linguistic analysis. This conception of subjectivity aligns with Benveniste’s perspective that “c’est dans et par la langue que l’homme se constitue comme *sujet*; parce que la langue seul fonde en réalite, dans *sa* réalite qui est celle de l’être, le concept d’ ‘ego’”¹ (Benveniste 1966:259 quoted in Lyons 1982:101).

Moreover, semantics in general is “irreducibly interpretive and subjective” (Riemer 2005:417), as we each bring to our language use our own particular experiences and understandings. As such, in making claims about the ‘meanings’ of words or sentences, we are of course invoking an ‘idealized’ language user (Chomsky 1965); a certain shared

¹ *It is in and through language that man constructs himself as subject; because language, in its human reality, founds the concept of ‘ego’.* (translation mine).

standard of meaning as epitomized in the cumulative product of a language's dictionary and grammar, vital to linguistic analysis but elusive in real linguistic practice. Thus we must acknowledge subjectivity's capricious and powerful influence, and simultaneously, for practical reasons, downplay its significance in the hope of viewing more general (and *less* subjective) patterns of *shared* meaning. This analysis represents but one possible subjective interpretation of the data, but it also implicitly suggests that this interpretation reflects some recognizable *shared* meaning amongst Marathi speakers. Subjectivity will also be explored as a potential cause or motivation for meaning shift in language.

Closely related to the notion of subjectivity is the effect embodied experience has on our linguistic systems and the underlying cognitive structures. These claims pertain to the cognitive linguistics approach, which looks explicitly for “language-mind and language-mind-body linkages” in order to explain linguistic structure and behaviour (Gibbs 2006:90). The notion of embodiment then, like subjectivity, presents a functionalist account of the development of meanings.

Levinson (2003) observes the embodied nature of spatial perception and the explanatory power of semantic and pragmatic extension from this embodied understanding of space, whilst Gibbs (2006) explains that we conceptualize our sensory perceptions into general and extendable models of forces and phenomena – image schemas (cf. section 2.3.1), through which subsequent experiences may be conceptually filtered and understood. Being a *cognitive* model these image schemas can only be indirectly observed through such things as language and behaviour, and accordingly they are suggested as providing the underlying

structure to linguistic devices such as metaphor. The relevant cognitive linguistic theories – metaphor, metonymy and image schemas – will be more fully introduced later in this chapter.

Finally, the influential concept of prototypes pervades many aspects of this study. The prototypical understanding of categorization for which there is compelling evidence (Fillmore 1982:33), arose from the psycholinguistic work in the 1970s of Eleanor Rosch and was one of the significant advances that heralded the subsequent explosion of cognitive linguistic research (e.g. Lakoff et al's work on metaphor). The basic premise (Geeraerts 1997:11) is that categories:

- (i) ...exhibit degrees of typicality; not every member is equally representative for a category.
- (ii) ...exhibit a family resemblance structure, or more generally, their semantic structure takes the form of a radial set of clustered and overlapping readings.
- (iii) ...are blurred at the edges.
- (iv) ...cannot be defined by means of a single set of criterial (necessary and sufficient) attributes.

We will observe various permutations of these properties in the organization of the senses of *ja* and *ye*, and in shaping the senses' development. One reason why prototypicality is so inherently useful in the study of semantic *change* is because of its fundamental *flexibility*, which imbues it even as a static and synchronic theory of categorial structure with a highly *dynamic* nature (Geeraerts 1997:114).

These overarching themes – subjectivity, embodiment and prototypicality – will be referred to at numerous relevant points throughout the remainder of the study.

2.1.2 Semantics and pragmatics

As a semantic analysis this study will largely ignore issues of pragmatics. We will focus on only the explicitly encoded information, avoiding tacit communicative devices such as implicatures. Our data, however, are language *in use*: Where context-specific pragmatic pressures have already inevitably impacted on ‘decontextualised’ semantic information (such as our internal generalized ‘dictionary-like’ definitions of words). Despite this, polysemy by definition pertains to the initial level of semantic information (i.e. prior to pragmatics). So even though the data *do display* the effects of pragmatic pressures, our approach is to simply accept these at face value, and to focus on the subsumed semantic level of “stored communicable information associated with conventional signs” (Wilkins and Hill 1995:213). In general, therefore, we will assume that besides what is made explicit or is immediately contextually apparent, the context and other pragmatic effects are maximally simple. For instance, if someone is ‘going’ but their destination is not *mentioned* we will assume that none is implied.

2.1.3 Diachronicity in semantic change studies

Studies of semantic change often adopt a diachronic approach, using data spanning an extended period of time. This is, of course, appropriate for viewing unfolding stages of change. A synchronic data set, however, is also capable of showing (at least certain types of) semantic change. Specifically, when a word’s meaning shifts by becoming systematically (semantically) used divergently to its original meaning, but the original meaning does not disappear, the resulting situation is a word with two distinct meanings – historically (etymologically) related, but both simultaneously ‘current’. This situation, called polysemy, will be discussed in section 2.3. Accordingly, whilst diachronic data is certainly useful, it is

not absolutely crucial. The present study unfortunately lacks the space to include a wider, diachronic range of data, but is nevertheless justified in providing an account of diachronic semantic shift based on synchronic data.

2.2 Deixis

Deictic language is that which may only be fully and correctly “interpreted by knowing certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances” occurred (Fillmore 1971:39). In this way it contrasts with language that is non-indexical in the sense that each word can be sufficiently understood by its standard semantic content (say, dictionary definition), and that the sentence in turn can be deciphered according to a set of standard decontextualized syntactic and semantic rules. Although such non-deictic language exists widely (such as in gnomic statements, e.g. “Cats are stealthy”), deixis is also prolific. The meanings of verbs like *come* and *go* rely on deixis because their definition in a given usage includes a place which is relative to some discourse relevant person, usually the speaker or the addressee; this will be discussed more below.

Essentially then, deixis requires *contextualization* to provide or recover its complete meaning, thus connecting language and the world in a manner sensitive to the situational details of the particular linguistic act in which it occurs. Deictic language may be anchored to the context through a number of different channels, including (summarized from Fillmore 1971:39-40):

- The identity of the interlocutors, **person deixis** (eg. Personal pronouns, which refer to different people depending on who utters them and/or hears them.)

- The place/s in which the conversation participants are located, or some other place relevant to the discourse: **place deixis** (eg. Demonstratives like ‘here’ and ‘there’, which refer to different places depending on the location of the speaker and possibly the addressee.)
- The time at which the communication act takes place, or in the case of non-synchronic communication such as letter, when it is produced or received: **time deixis** (eg. Time expressions like ‘tomorrow’, ‘now’, ‘later’, ‘before’ etc. whose meaning is clearly dependent on some implicitly shared reference time, or tense and aspect markers which temporally situate the discourse and the event within the discourse.)
- Preceding and following parts of the discourse: **discourse deixis** (eg. Anaphorically functioning words like ‘this’ or ‘that’ when they refer to some previously made point.)
- Social relationships of the interlocutors or others: **social deixis** (eg. Respect forms of address like ‘Sir’, or honorifics.)

As this overview illustrates, deixis is of great and varied significance within linguistic communication. It endows language with an efficient means of referring to the immediate context, thus catering elegantly to language’s most frequent application as a practical tool for interacting with others in order to manipulate the environment, including other people.

The variety of channels through which deictic language may be anchored to its context are consolidated by one very common default, communally understood deictic reference point, the **deictic centre**, which is roughly: *‘me, here, now, at this point in the discourse, in my social position’* (Fillmore 1971). Once this centre has been located (usually implicitly) by the speaker, it can serve as a zero point for a more extensive system of relative coordinates or

directions - left, right, north, south etc. *of here*. (cf. Bühler 1934 *Origo*; and Fillmore 1982:45 on speaker 'grounding'), and which an addressee who is appropriately linguistically and culturally conversant will be able to decode. Deictic centering is highly significant in an analysis of any deictic language, including COME and GO. The default deictic centre, needless to say, is the mode par excellence of expressing our subjectivity (Lyons 1982).

Whilst for practical and phenomenological reasons the deictic centre often remains egocentrically located, it can also be shifted by the speaker to suit his pragmatic needs or preferences. We shall see such shifting of the deictic centre in the following discussion on the deixis of COME and GO.

2.2.1 Deixis in COME and GO as verbs of motion through space

We have so far introduced deixis and glimpsed its importance in linguistic practice. One aspect of deixis that has been examined is its role in the semantic structure of certain verbs of motion like COME and GO. From this point forward we will adopt Talmy's (1985) descriptive notation of typical verbs of motion: An object of some kind (the Figure) moves along a trajectory (the Path), away from one point (Source) and simultaneously towards another (Goal). Both the Source and the Goal are subcategorized as specific parts of the Ground, reference points against which the motion happens. The Path, being essentially a series of adjacent points between the Source and Goal, is also technically just a specific part of the Ground. So, reduced, motion involves a Figure and a Ground, the latter subspecified into Source, Path, and Goal (cf. SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema, section 2.3.1)

Deictic centering, as explained, occurs when the speaker (or more precisely some aspect of her utterance) utilizes a contextually referential anchoring point, often (but by no means always) ‘*me, here, now*’. Deictic centering is clearly relevant in English *come* and *go* as can be seen in these dictionary definitions:

come: (1) move or travel towards or into a place near or familiar to the speaker (Concise OED 11thEd.);

go: “(where) the prominent notion is that of destination or direction... the verb is distinguished from *come* by the implication that the movement is not towards the speaker, or the person whose point of view he for the moment assumes” (OED, quoted in Fillmore 1971:51)

These definitions suggest a relatively consistent spatial deictic centre for *come* and *go* in the location of the speaker. Or do they? Certainly, the deictic anchoring of *come* is made quite explicit, but *go*’s deictic properties seem dependent on being understood in opposition to *come*, rather than inherent. Such an interpretation is proposed by Wilkins and Hill (1995), along with the observation that an intrinsic semantic opposition between COME and GO has often been assumed but is not necessarily the case, especially outside of English. Staying for now with English, and the more clearly deictically anchored *come*, it is apparent that *come*’s deictic centre cannot simply be identifying with the location of the speaker:

“May I come in [to the house, i.e. towards *you, the addressee*]?”

“I came to the front door [where I *expected you, the addressee*, to be, but you actually were not; you *may have been there* earlier but were not necessarily], but you were not there.”

In these examples the deictic centre has been shifted to the addressee’s location, either actual or, as in the second example, potential, past or imagined.

Upon examination, Fillmore (1971:50) concludes that *go* indicates motion towards somewhere *other than* the speaker’s location at ‘coding time’. (‘Coding time’ is the time at which the communication act occurs. In contrast is ‘reference time’ which is “the temporal focus or background for the event or condition being described in the clause” [Fillmore 1971:52-54]). It is the Goal of *go*, then, which is deictically defined *negatively* as a place where the speaker is *not*.

Come, for its part, must be more volubly defined (Fillmore 1971):

motion toward the location of either the speaker or the addressee at either coding time or reference time [see note]... [or] motion at reference time which is in the company of either the speaker or addressee... [or] in discourse in which neither the speaker nor addressee figure as a character, motion toward a place taken as the subject of the narrative, toward the location of the central character at reference time, or toward the place which is the central character’s home base at reference time.

This definition identifies nine possible locations for *come*’s deictic centre: six when the speaker and/or addressee ‘figure as characters’ in the discourse, and three when neither of them figure as such. More generally the definitions contend that both *come* and *go* are, in

fact, deictic terms, as their meaning in a given usage is dependent on the context – specifically, the location of the speaker or some other discourse-relevant person.

All potentially semantically contributing in a given use of *come* or *go*, then, are:

- the location of the Source or Goal (place deixis);
- who is speaking/being spoken to and who is accompanying them (person deixis);
- who else is or isn't present in the discourse (discourse deixis);
- the relationship between coding time and reference time (time deixis).

The difference between *come* as motion towards a deictically specified Goal, and *go* as motion towards a *negatively deictically specified* Goal (i.e. deictically specifying a point and then stipulating movement to some *other* point) suggests (i) that *come* may be a 'more deictic' verb than *go* because *come*'s meaning is more dependent on an actual deictically specified location and (ii) that the meaning of *come* is intrinsically Goal-related.

Whether *go*, for its part, is more semantically associated with the Source or Goal is less clear-cut. Fillmore defined *go* with respect to a Goal, but it is a negatively deictically specified Goal. Such a negatively defined location clearly represents a more complicated semantic relationship between place and motion, but precisely what effects this has will, at this stage, remain open for discussion. Also on this point we might compare some NSM explications of the English motion verb pair (metalanguages are discussed in section 2.4). Interestingly – and this will be explored more later through *ja* and *ye*, Goddard (1998:205) provides a *separate* explication for when a *to*-phrase is added to *go*, pointing out that in this syntactic context “X went from A to B entails X *moved* from A to B”:

go:

X *went* (yesterday)=

before this, X was somewhere

X wanted to be somewhere else

because of this, X moved for some time (yesterday)

because of this, after this X wasn't in this place any more

X was somewhere else

go with a *to*-phrase:

X *went* from A to B (yesterday)=

before this, X was in place-A

X wanted to be somewhere else

because of this, X moved for some time (yesterday)

because of this, after this X wasn't in place-A any more

X was in place-B

come:

X *came* to place-A (yesterday)=

before this, X was somewhere

X wanted to be somewhere else

because of this, X moved for some time

because of this, after this X was in place (place-A) (yesterday)

someone in this place could think:

X is in the same place as me

The explication for *come* is identical to *go* in the first three components, “which is as it should be considering that an act of *coming* can be seen (from another point of view) as an act of *going*.” (Goddard 1998:210). The differences thereafter attest to (i) the different temporal perspectives on the *motion* itself: Motion is a prior condition for *coming*, whereas

motion is an outcome of *going*. And, more significantly, (ii) “the possibility of an ‘egocentric’ interpretation of X’s final location”, encoded in the final two lines which provide “the special quality of *come*” (Goddard 1998:210). Note that this ‘egocentric’ perspective can be that of the speaker, addressee or a third party, and (‘someone in this place *could* think’) can even express a “hypothetical or imagined” situation (Goddard 1998:211).

Upon this grounding the deictic properties of *ja* and *ye* will be examined in chapter three.

To conclude this section, and of significance for the present study, there is a considerable degree of cross-linguistic variation in the deictic referencing properties of COME and GO (Fillmore 1971:68-69; Wilkins & Hill 1995; Wälchli 2006; Ricca 1993; Goddard 1998:205-9). Mazahua, for instance, makes use of social deixis, (the only type of deixis not encoded in English *come* and *go*), by allowing the deictic centre to be shifted to the addressee *only* when used in “polite or deferential language”, thus referencing some aspect of the social relationship between speaker and addressee (Fillmore 1971:69). Whilst Ricca (1993, cited in Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2008:17) concludes from her study of 20 European languages that COME is a deictic verb but GO is non-deictic.

The deictic properties of COME and GO that we have so far been discussing have largely to do with spatial reference – locations and direction of movement. We shall see below that COME and GO often refer to events other than direction of movement through space. But first, as space does appear to be of some importance, we will review the theoretical area of space in language.

2.2.2 Space in language

Our experiential acquaintance with space provides an abundant stimulus for much language. Many grammatical constructions including temporal and aspectual, existential, change-of-state and causal expressions are directly or metaphorically couched in locative language grounded in ‘spatial notions’, and “[p]sychologists have suggested that these ‘localist’ tendencies may reflect the evolution of language out of spatial cognition.” (Levinson 2003:17). Space’s “primacy” may be cross-linguistically observed in “the fact that spatial relations often carry core conceptual content, as manifested by their expression in closed-class forms, and from metaphorical use of spatial relations throughout other parts of the semantic system” (Regier 1996:20).

Cultural variability in spatial conception is widely attested on the basis of cross-linguistic evidence. Specifically, variable ‘frames of reference’ (intrinsic, relative, absolute) reflect a range of possible conceptions of space and movement, as well as of many other related facets of cognition (Levinson 2003). A deictic centre is not in itself a frame of reference; rather, it provides an *origin* to which a frame of reference may be anchored (Levinson 2003:70-71; cf. Bühler on ‘Origo’ and Fillmore 1982:45 on speaker ‘grounding’).

The grounding of many cognitive and linguistic structures in ‘spatial notions’ is an assertion about embodied experience, as we only understand the abstract entity ‘space’ indirectly, as it is filtered through our sensory perceptions, and our linguistic and cultural models.

Furthermore, the claim that space is cognitively primordial, underlying and mapping onto other domains of experience and abstract concepts, relates to several other key (and themselves interrelated) concepts in the present study: The idea of central vs. peripheral

meanings and its foundation in prototypicality; theories of polysemy; and in the literal/figurative meaning distinction briefly mentioned above. Specifically, the implication is that *more prototypical* meanings, *more primary* senses (in polysemy), and what are perceived to be *more 'literal'* meanings lie semantically closer to the claimed cognitive prime – space.

Also the focus of much semantic interpretation is another experientially comprehended abstract concept – time. Some analyses suggest that our understanding of space is somehow more primal than our understanding of time, such as Lakoff's (1993) TIME PASSING IS MOTION conceptual metaphor. But this is merely a theoretical extension of the more cautious observation that aspects of spatial and temporal language are “structurally similar”, which does not necessarily entail that one stems metaphorically from the other (McClone 2001:103). An equally reasonable explanation is that aspects of our interaction with space may lead to a more “transparent” expression of a “common set of abstract principles” organizing our experiences of space, time and other abstract concepts (McGlone 2001:103 citing Jackendoff 1983, Gruber 1976 and Talmy 1996). The linguistic manifestations could (and often do) mislead us to infer that space is more cognitively real or fundamental.

Although McGlone does not expand on this ‘common set of abstract organizing principles’, it appears functionally analogous to image schemas (cf. section 2.3.1). More generally, Kovecses (2006:212) suggests that ‘conceptual space’ is structured by our embodied experience of physical space. Accordingly, naming (supposed) conceptual mappings between these domains ‘metaphors’ is perhaps overstating the case. (Or, on the other hand, this is a prototypical exemplar of ‘metaphor’. This is precisely the problem with trying to define metaphor at a conceptual level – where does metaphor end and embodied thinking begin?)

That native English speakers generally agree, for instance, that *long* is more basically a

spatial descriptor, and only derivatively a temporal one need not be interpreted as that space is cognitively prior to time, but is more soberly interpreted (by Fillmore 1982:32-33) as a prototype effect within that particular word.

This discussion is relevant because COME and GO, as verbs of *motion*, also implicitly encode movement through time. Change, in this case of a Figure's location, is inherently temporally grounded. This fundamental relationship between spatial motion and temporal 'motion' no doubt contributes to the impression of conceptual and linguistic mapping between the two semantic domains (cf. Hoyt 1994, Gibbs 2006:187-190).

2.2.3 'Figurative' deixis in COME and GO

So far, the deictic properties of COME and GO have been discussed in the context of movement through space. But these verbs are also used for a variety of other distinct semantic purposes. In a number of studies in various languages, COME and GO are seen to refer to a range of much more abstract events, such as the arrival, departure or occurrence of certain mental or physical states, or the occurrence of other (non-personal) events, none of which seem to involve any notion of spatial motion at all. Clarke (1974) suggests that these uses of COME and GO should be thought of as less 'literal' and more 'figurative'. This claim will be further examined below, but for the sake of the current discussion, the literal/figurative dichotomy will be observed. Even though these figurative uses of COME and GO occur in a broad range of semantic environments, and without clear person, place or time deictic anchoring points, the concept of deictic centre still contributes crucially to their meaning.

The observed tendency is for COME to indicate states or events which are favorable, or which are generally considered 'normal'. GO, in its turn, fulfills the reverse semantic roles, referring to things which are unfavorable, or which are considered departures from 'normal'. This contrast will here be simplified to 'good' (COME) vs. 'bad' (GO). The vital point is that deictic centre is still utilized, but it is 'located' at the figurative location of 'good', which events or states described with COME 'approach', 'arrive at' or simply 'are at'. Conversely, events or states described with GO 'depart', 'move away from' or 'are not at' the deictic center ('good'). With regards to what constitutes 'normal' and 'favorable' (here 'good'), Clarke (1974:316) suggests such things as sanity, consciousness, and socially accepted/expected behaviour, but acknowledges the likelihood of some cultural variation. Following are some illustrative examples from the studies whose findings have supported the above hypothesis. Sinha (1972) analysed *ana* (COME) and *jana* (GO) in Hindi, Clarke (1974) *come* and *go* in English, and Treerat (1990) *ma:* (COME) and *pay* (GO) in Thai. (The examples below are either from Clarke [English examples], Sinha [Hindi] or Treerat [Thai]).

- When something COMES it is good:

English:

I came up with the answer/idea/solution.

We came to an agreement.

She came into some money.

All of my dreams came true.

He came good in the end.

She came to/around (i.e. returned to consciousness)/out of a coma.

Hindi:

uska larka layak/yogya/widwannidar/bhadra/bhala nikal aya
his son able/a scholar/fearless/gentle/noble out came
His son turned out to be able/a scholar/fearless/gentle/noble.

musiibat me uskii buddhi nikal aayii
crisis in his wisdom out came

In crisis his wisdom came out.

ciijo ke daam niice utar aaye
things Poss. price down Obl. came

The price of things came down.

Thai:

khǎw tù:n ma: dûay cìtcay thî: caè:msǎy
He awake come with mind that glow
He woke up feeling bright

pho': khǎw fú':n ma: kó' hěn phû:khon ra:yló':m khǎw yù:
when he regain come then see people surround he Asp.
consciousness

As he came back to his senses he found that he was surrounded by people.

- When something GOES it is bad:

English:

A situation or thing goes/*comes bad.

Food goes/*comes stale/sour/off.

Metal goes/*comes rusty.

A person goes/*comes bald/deaf/blind/into a coma.

Hindi:

uska larka bewkuf/badmas/xarab/haramzada nikal gaya
his son fool/rascal/bad/bastard out went

His son turned out to be (Lit: went out) a fool/rascal/bastard/bad.

musibat me uskii buddhi nikal gayii
crisis in his wisdom out went

In crisis his wisdom went/left him.

ciijo ke daam upar carh gaye
things Poss. price up Obl. went

The price of things went up.

Thai:

hà:k khô':sanøe: ní: tòk pay phǒm cà sǐacay mâ:k
if proposal this reject go I will sad very

I will be very unhappy if this proposal is rejected.

fay yù: yù: kó' dáp pay
power without any cause Conj extinguish go

The power went out without any reason.

khǎw ta:y pay yà:ng ráy yâ:t mît
he die go Adv without relative friend

He died without any friends and relatives.

phû:tca: hây sùpâ:p đǎaw cà kla:y pen khon ráy ma:ra:yâ:t pay
speak give polite other- will change be people without manner go
wise

Speak politely otherwise it will be considered bad manners.

Overall the three studies arrive at similar conclusions regarding the ‘good’ deictic centre of COME and GO when used in figurative ways.

The encoding of an evaluative standard in COME and GO as seen in this section is clearly an expression of subjectivity, presenting the perspective or opinion of, usually, the speaker, but also, as in the final Thai (‘social standard’) example, the subjectively projected ‘population in general’.

As was mentioned at the start of this section, many of the examples have little or no semantic relationship to ‘literal’ movement through space. But what (nearly) all of them *do* contain is *motion through time*. As discussed above, this is because COMING and GOING, whether literal or figurative, are inchoative verbs that refer to a *change* in state, which is inevitably extended through time. It is therefore suggested that *motion*, of a more elementary kind than *spatial motion*, is central to the inherent meaning of COME and GO, and hence remains even in their semantic extension into figurative senses.

In revealing the range of meanings COME and GO can encode, this discussion introduces the second major theoretical area, polysemy.

2.3 Polysemy

Polysemy is the development over time of a range of meanings, called *senses*, attached to a single lexical item. This section outlines the mechanisms and causes of polysemy, and specifically those that are applicable to this study. Afterwards, in applying the concepts in an analysis of *ja* and *ye* we hope to trace semantic threads through their different senses and perhaps arrive at their (individual or common) semantic ‘core’. That is not to suggest, however, that any single thread or core *needs to* pervade all of a word’s senses. Recall from the start of the chapter the characteristics of prototype style categories, any of which could be sought and (reasonably) expected within the readily identifiable category of a word’s set of senses. Accordingly, we may seek the most crucial features of the best prototype of a word or sense. The more of such features that a given example fulfills, the closer it is to the prototypical category member. Thus, some senses are more central, whilst others are more peripheral. This (along with other features of prototype categories) entails that different senses, and different semantic components of different senses, have varying levels of structural importance within the overall semantic topography of the lexical item with its varied senses (Geeraerts 1997:21).

Before proceeding to the mechanisms and causes of polysemy, we must briefly discuss possible tests for polysemy and the related topic of generality. Firstly, ‘generality’ means that a word does not encode one way or the other a potential definition-internal distinction: Whilst in its *general* definition it includes both sides of the distinction, in a *particular* context it may refer specifically to one or the other of the alternatives (Goddard 1998:19). For example, in many languages one lexical item covers the arm and the hand (Koptjevskaka-Tamm 2008:19 citing Brown 2005). In such languages, this lexical item is ‘general’

regarding the hand/arm distinction. (Speakers of these languages can, if they need to, of course refer to the hand and arm individually through other means, but the distinction is just not lexicalised at this same level that we are accustomed to in English). In particular contexts this ‘general’ (hand/arm) lexical item *may* refer to either the hand or the arm individually. This does not mean, however, that the lexical item is polysemous, with one sense meaning ‘hand’ and the other meaning ‘arm’. Instead its relationship with the alternate referents is called ‘general’. This subtle distinction hints at the inherent uncertainty (or just subjective variability) as to whether a usage or set of usages constitute a distinct *sense* or not. Which brings us to testing for polysemy.

Many tests for polysemy have been proposed including logical, syntagmatic and paradigmatic types (for details see Riemer 2005:133-48). Ultimately, however, none of these tests (individually or in combination) can guarantee a definitive judgement on the question of the polysemy (or not) of a given lexical item. This failing reflects (i) the inherently complex nature of *meaning*, (ii) the (already observed) ultimate subjectivity of any analysis, and (iii) the fact that we have no clear “pre-theoretical notion of what a distinct meaning [i.e. sense] is...” and so our search for criteria to distinguish between senses will inevitably be “...hampered by the fact that we do not know precisely what it is we want a criterion for” (Geeraerts 2006: 136). In response to this complexity, the following analysis of *ja* and *ye*’s various uses and senses consciously expounds multifaceted arguments.

Having observed various uses of COME and GO, possibly (but not necessarily) reflecting multiple senses, we are interested to ask: Are there semantic features which pertain to *all*

uses of COME (or GO)? If so, is there amongst them one (or perhaps several) key features which define a core meaning of COME (and, separately, GO)?

As previously mentioned, we would posit a shared core feature of *movement* (minimally through time and frequently through space and time). And additionally, for COME, a deictically specified Goal (which of course depends on the language specific deictic projection properties). GO's locational aspect may require a more complex definition depending on the particular syntactic environment such as specification (or not) of a Source or Goal, but a general restriction might be that the Goal may not be the location of the speaker at coding time. In both cases we have observed that the deictic centre – which recall provides a reference point for the Source and Goal, may be defined either literally or figuratively.

Motivated by our prototype approach to meaning, we might further wonder which movement (through space *or* time), and which deictic centre (literal *or* figurative) define the *more* prototypical COME and GO. For now these questions will be left aside, but their insinuation that the semantic structures of words are “networks of semantic concepts that are extendible from a core meaning” (Ravin and Leacock 2000:5) leads us back to the mechanisms and causes of these processes of semantic ‘extension’, to which we will now turn.

2.3.1 Mechanisms: Metaphor and metonymy

This subsection outlines two of the most commonly observed mechanisms leading to polysemy, metaphor and metonymy. Before this, though, we will look very briefly at another pair, pejorative and ameliorative change. Pejorative and ameliorative change is when

meaning shifts to encode inherent ‘bad’ or ‘good’ connotations (Geeraerts 1997:93-102). This type of change was (or perhaps will eventually be) a semantic component of many of the figurative senses of COME and GO discussed above. Their meanings in context do not *solely* amount to a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ connotation, but this is certainly in some respect *one part* of their new ‘extended’ meaning. To illustrate, the following two examples consist solely of the words *come* and *go* yet still convey good and bad respective connotations: When someone is uncontrollably drunk (‘bad’) we say they are “gone”; and to experience sexual orgasm (‘good’) is to “come”.

Returning now to metaphor and metonymy. Whilst in some respects these two concepts can be suitably defined and distinguished from one another, there is also a significant degree of crossover and interplay between the two. This exists both at a theoretical (i.e. definitional and conceptual) level, and more practically in seeking to identify their linguistic presence and effects. This ‘problem of demarcation’ (Riemer 2005) arises in part because the “the target and/or the source [of a metaphor] must be *understood* or *perspectivized* metonymically for the metaphor to be possible” (Barcelona 2000:31 italics original). In other words, for a mapping to be based on semantic *similarity* (metaphor), there must be some sense of semantic *contiguity* (metonymy). And vice versa, if two domains are contiguous with one another, they evidently also share some semantic similarities. Note that both ‘semantic similarity’ and ‘semantic contiguity’ are delineated according to culture-specific conventional practice; they are neither universal nor subjectively arbitrary. Even if we do accept a theoretical division, researchers have observed (e.g. Riemer 2005, Traugott & Dasher 2002), and the present study will likewise discern, that the two mechanisms often co-

occur in one semantic shift, with the concomitant complication of whether they occur simultaneously, or if one precedes the other.

These ‘demarcation’ issues aside, metaphor and metonymy are commonly defined along the following lines:

Metaphor is a mapping of some quality or qualities from one semantic domain (the source domain) to another (the target). E.g. (from Glucksberg 2001):

‘My lawyer is a shark.’

This statement takes the sharks’ qualities of aggressiveness and ruthless efficiency in what they do, and applies them to ‘my lawyer’. Lawyers and sharks would generally (to my mind at least) be accepted as belonging to distinct semantic domains (‘professionals’ and ‘marine life’, say). We will come back to metaphor after looking at metonymy.

Metonymy is a mapping between structurally adjacent semantic domains, which are in fact part of the same broader semantic domain. This is linguistically realized (loosely) in a ‘stand-for’ relation; ‘x stands for y’ (Kovecses 2006:97). E.g. (from Kovecses 2006):

‘Washington denied the charges.’

A place (Washington) which is systematically associated with the activities that occur there (governing America), is standing for one of the people who are known to engage in those

activities, a politician who is a member of the United States government. It is this politician who *actually* ‘denied the charges’. The connection between the politician and Washington is based on a chain of principled semantic affiliations, but that politician and Washington are also part of the same broad semantic domain of ‘The United States Government’.

The notion of metonymy is indispensable to the present study. COME and GO terms (like *ye* and *ja*), often being verbs and specifically inchoative verbs, semantically encode events (Croft 1990). Events can be viewed in their entirety, or they can be divided up into stages or constituents comprising the overall event. A translational motion event, for instance, could be portrayed as containing the following constituents:

1. An object is at a location.
2. The object departs from the location.
3. It moves along a trajectory through space.
4. It arrives at another location.
5. The object is at this second location.

This is essentially a restatement of the ‘basic motion event’ introduced above with its associated terminology (Figure, Path, Source, Goal, Ground). Each of these constituents has an obvious principled connection with each of the other constituents, and they simultaneously are congregated within the broader domain of ‘translational motion events’. Thus one or several of the constituents might be used to stand for others, or for the motion event in general. Or, conversely, the motion event could be used to stand for one or several particular constituents. Regarding its analytical capacity for this study, this ‘constituency’ concept will be re-presented below (section 2.4).

As traced above in the discussions of ‘figurative’ deixis in COME and GO, and the language of time and space, metaphor is another mechanism that may offer an account of the semantic development of these verbs. We briefly defined metaphor above, and now we will continue to a more in depth examination of the trope.

One influential claim is that metaphors in language are but a surface expression of an underlying cognitive structure and/or process, called ‘conceptual metaphor’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The precise nature of conceptual metaphors’ theoretical claim, however, needs to be explicit as their putative elements (sources or targets) are often demonstrably neither semantically universal nor primitive (Goddard 2008). Take, for instance, the proposed conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY. BODY *is* a universally lexicalized concept, and semantically ‘simple’; MIND, on the other hand, is “semantically complex and exquisitely culture-bound” (Goddard 2008:94). This argument legitimately attacks *universal* conceptual metaphors, but it does not preclude the positing of culture/language specific conceptual metaphors. Accordingly, any posited metaphor in this study is intended solely as an observation of *linguistic* metaphor, and only with reference to Marathi. I will neither assert nor refute conceptual metaphors, rather I will observe instances and broader patterns of linguistic metaphor, not extending the discussion to whether or not these reflect underlying conceptual metaphors.

Looking beyond this debate, conceptual metaphors are posited largely on the basis of general patterns of linguistically observed metaphor. Several are of obvious significance to the

present study, including (all from McGlone 2001 citing Lakoff 1987, 1993, Lakoff & Johnson 1977, 1980):

- TIME PASSING IS MOTION. Cf. discussions above on spatial/temporal connections both generally and for motion verbs.
- DEATH IS DEPARTURE. Departure is one constituent of the ‘basic motion event’ (cf. section 2.4) encompassing both COME and GO.
- THE MIND IS A CONTAINER (more generally ‘the CONDUIT metaphor’). Once the mind is a container, it can then be a physical location (e.g. a Source or Goal).
- HAPPY IS UP, HAVING CONTROL IS UP; SAD IS DOWN, BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN. ‘Up’ and ‘down’ could be directions of COMING or GOING movement. Also ‘happy vs. sad’ and ‘having control vs. being subject to control’ bear obvious relationship to COME and GO’s figurative deictic center (‘good’).

It must be remembered that these conceptual metaphors have been drawn from English. Whilst we should certainly expect cross-cultural variation they are nevertheless a useful starting point, especially as explanations of them are often in terms of embodied experience. Embodiment is also highly culturally variable, but it nonetheless includes at least one relatively universal element, the physical human form.

Metaphors involve cross-domain semantic mapping, but this description is by no means comprehensive. In fact, only specific semantic aspects of the source and target domains may be involved in the metaphorical mapping process (Glucksberg 2001:52-67). Drawing on contextual and encyclopedic knowledge, only particular aspects of the target domain will be

relevant to the discourse, and hence suitable to be mapped-to. Likewise, only certain specific elements of the source domain can be informatively and comprehensibly mapped-from, namely “the kinds of things that it [the source] can epitomize” (Glucksberg 2001:55). These constraints contrast with the more simplistic view that metaphor involves a relatively free (i.e. according to the will of the speaker) mapping of any similar features shared by the source and target domains. These constraints, and the ways in which they are extended or deliberately violated by speakers, no doubt reflect the cultural and linguistic norms of the particular community, as well as individuals’ judgments and communicative needs (our old friend subjectivity). Understanding the constraints (in general, and with respect to a particular linguistic community) provides a useful tool for comprehending the nature of metaphorical extension between or within senses, and also in indicating potential core semantic features that are shared between senses.

One proposed model sees metaphors’ as largely structured by conceptually underlying ‘image schemas’ (Gibbs 2006:90-96). ‘Image schemas’ are “experiential gestalts” that “emerge throughout sensorimotor activity”, informed by “patterns of force dynamics [that] underlie our embodied understandings of abstract concepts” (Gibbs 2006:90). Being essentially *cognitive* models, their empirical reality cannot be definitively confirmed or denied. They have nevertheless proven to be useful explanatory tools. Proposed image schemas which may be useful in the context of this study (i.e. with reference to the above conceptual metaphors) are the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, PATH, and the BALANCE image schemas (Gibbs 2006:90-96). For instance, take the statement, “We came to an agreement.” This could be interpreted as a manifestation of the metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS (Gibbs 2006:117), and in turn providing underlying structure to this metaphor we might posit the

SOURCE-PATH -GOAL image schema. Once again, the image schema (SOURCE-PATH -GOAL) conceptually structures the notion of a destination. This concrete concept ('a destination') is then metaphorically mapped (as the metaphor's source, via the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphor) onto the abstract concept 'a purpose' (the metaphor's target) (Gibbs 2006:91). Image schemas could thus be perceived as either mechanisms or causes of semantic change (or both). In underlying metaphor they could be interpreted as causing the metaphor, or simply as a more fundamental level of the metaphor. This matter will be further discussed in the context of the analysis of *ja* and *ye* (section 3.3.3).

A basic notion within most metaphor theory is that mappings tend to occur from more concrete domains towards more abstract ones (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). This assumption is reflected in the organization of semantic studies (such as Clarke 1974, Sinha 1971, Treerat 1990, all discussed above, as well as the present study), which present first 'literal' meanings and then contrast them with 'figurative' meanings, which are (explicitly or implicitly) claimed to semantically derive from the original 'literal' meanings. It is to this idea that we will now briefly turn.

2.3.1.1 Meaning 'extension'

There is a 'commonsense' understanding of a contrast between 'literal' language and 'figurative' (i.e. 'non-literal') language (Turner 2005). 'Literal' language describes the world transparently, 'objectively' and 'truthfully' (Turner 2005:25-26). Of a word's senses, some may be 'literal' and others are 'non-literal', 'figurative' or 'metaphorical'. 'Literal' language is often thought of as representing 'concrete' things and 'concrete' relationships of meaning: regular nouns and their tangible referents, verbs for experientially common events, or spatial

prepositions. ‘Non-literal’ language, on the other hand, describes more ‘abstract’ entities, events and relations.

However, just as prototype theory advocates the idea of graded category membership, there is substantial evidence based in our linguistic patterns of language use that we do not actually implicitly recognize such a definite divide between ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ meaning (Gluckberg 2001, Coulsen & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2005).

Meaning is, in fact, dynamically located along a continuum of ‘literalness’. What is more:

- non-literal (or metaphorical or figurative) meanings are just as easily produced and understood as literal ones;
- both literal and non-literal meanings can, when appropriate, operate simultaneously; and
- in a conducive context, non-literal meaning may be immediately construed and/or produced before literal meaning has even entered the cognitive or linguistic picture.

These findings largely refute some of the most common claims about the literal/figurative meaning divide (Glucksberg 2001). Their implications for the present study are manifold: We must acknowledge that the notion of *inherently* ‘basic’ (and ‘centrally’ located) senses of *ja* and *ye*, with ‘extended’ senses branching off from them, is in some sense *brought to* the analysis, rather than pre-existent to it. Likewise, the relationships described here between all of the senses (‘basic’ and ‘extended’ alike) represent but one possible interpretation of the data. This issue is in some sense but a particular manifestation of the ‘tests for polysemy’ problem discussed above; the broader problem concerns *whether* to conceptualise a distinct sense, and the present (literal/figurative) one concerns *how* we conceptualise of distinct

senses (cf. Israel 2005:153-4). Thus, whilst this study cannot claim to represent any absolute theoretical or cognitive *truth* (cf. Riemer 2005), it does of course propose a principled and (thus) defensible explanation of the linguistic facts. In response to the specific arguments (above) against a clear literal/figurative divide, we will concede. We will, however, maintain on the basis of our prototype model of meaning categorisation, that there is a most ‘basic’ sense of a word, which is the prototypical instance, and other senses which are peripheral, or ‘extensions’ (Fillmore 1982:33). Whether or not these necessarily correspond to ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ meaning will be discussed during the analysis but will not be assumed.

2.3.2 Causes: subjectivity and expression/efficiency

So far we have discussed the mechanisms of semantic change, metaphor and metonymy. Now we turn to its causes. Semantic shift (of the kind we are here concerned with) is essentially innovation, starting with a single utterance that over time is progressively adopted until it eventually becomes commonly accepted usage. The initial act of innovation, and its subsequent success or failure, are commonly understood to be a result of two opposing forces inherent in language: efficiency and expression. The expressive imperative, that we want and/or need to express ourselves, within constantly evolving (and parallel) physical, emotional and discursive environments, is tempered by the efficiency requirement, that we must make sure we are understood otherwise our expression has been futile. Note that the dichotomy maps neatly on to the two sides of the communicative dyad: Speakers desire expressivity and hearers require efficiency (Traugott & Dasher 2002:17-19). Thus phrased, these apparently ‘opposing’ forces are revealed as “complementary sides of the same [communicative] coin”. Our need or desire to express ourselves in a given novel situation will encourage innovation and change. But that innovation and change will be constrained by

the requirement for communicative efficiency – if a given change interferes with successful communication then it will not flourish into common usage (Geeraerts 1997:108).

Characteristics of prototypical categories contribute to both sides of this equation:

Prototypical categories contain a large amount of densely structured information for categorizing, and structurally (in terms of the relationships between different features of a category) they exhibit stability in some aspects and flexibility in others. These features – informational density and complementary structural stability and flexibility – all contribute to language's potential for communicative efficiency. The last of these features, structural flexibility, also offers a wealth of potential for innovative expression (Geeraerts 1997:112-19). Efficiency/expression provides a *functional* explanation for semantic change; it locates the causes of semantic change within the basic (as we generally understand it) *functions* of language: to communicate effectively (Geeraerts 1997:103-6). An answer to the question of what exactly we are likely to want to communicate can be found in the second part of our causal explanation: Subjectivity.

As (arguably) reasonably cognitively evolved beings, humans are capable of a great deal of empathy even (again, arguably) to the point of altruism. And yet it is hard to deny that overall most of our thoughts and actions most of the time are reflexively directed towards ourselves. This tendency, of course, is not frivolous, but has obvious evolutionary foundations in our instincts of survival and self-preservation. In this way subjectivity should also be thought of as basically a functional explanation. This basic *subjectivity* of our experience is a powerful underlying force in semantic change. This claim derives from observations that meanings often shift towards a more subjective orientation (Traugott & Dasher 2002; Marchello-Nizia 2006). Thus *meaning*, due to these subjective tendencies,

comes to be “conventionalized and *reanalyzed as semantic polysemies*” (Traugott & Dasher 2002:1, emphasis added). In other words, subjectification and polysemy exist on the same continuum of semantic change, just at different levels of integration into common usage – subjectification prior and polysemy following afterwards.

The two causes for semantic shift that we have thus identified, efficiency/expressive and subjectivity, can both be regarded as semantic change *attractors*. Attractors are ‘preferred patterns’ that a system will evolve towards; they “reflect emerging points of stability in a system as it engages in real-world interaction” Gibbs (2006:114-115). In this case, new information (semantic change) feeding into the system (our individual and shared linguistic practice) gravitates towards a conceptual point grounded in our experientially- based models of ourselves (subjectivity) and linguistic communication (efficiency/expression).

Within this section we have explored polysemy’s primary mechanisms (metaphor and metonymy) and causes (subjectivity and efficiency/expressivity).

2.4 Representing meaning

There are a variety of ways commonly utilized by linguists to discuss, analyse and represent meaning. Underlying many of them are some key suppositions, one of which is that meaning is decomposable, or at least re-composable. This assumption, of course, also underlies the very existence of semantic analyses such as this one.

Semanticists often employ reductive paraphrases, couched either in (relatively) familiar (eg. NSM) or more abstract (eg. Jackendoff's conceptual semantics) metalanguage (see Goddard 1998:56-68 for a summary of different approaches). Both assume semantic primitives, and both have a limited lexicon and a distinct syntax. But semantic primitives are problematic (cf. Riemer 2005), and as an examination of their feasibility is not my purpose, they will be avoided altogether.

Instead, ordinary English paraphrase will be used. The implicit claim is not necessarily that the paraphrases are semantically *simpler* than the objects of analysis, but that they *expound more explicitly* the semantic details of the objects of analysis. It must at any rate be remembered that any description of meaning is "grounded as much in the semantics of the metalanguage as in those of the object language. The 'correct definition' of an object language term is thus not a single construct, but a field of alternative analyses that can be recast in a number of possible ways" (Riemer 2005:155).

Whilst the primary metalanguage up to this point has been, and for the ensuing analysis of *ja* and *ye* will be, ordinary English, I will also utilize a schematic representation of a 'basic motion event' using Talmy's (1985) terminology outlined in section 2.2.1. This should not be understood as an abstract metalanguage, but merely as a more concise way of expressing information which could just as acceptably be expressed (albeit more capaciously) in ordinary English. The schematic representation lays out the constituents of the 'basic motion event' and thereon displays a visual mapping of the constituent(s) that are more semantically prevalent in a given example. The value of this tool will become apparent as we see that *ja*

and *ye* (like COME and GO more generally), whether in their ‘basic’ or ‘extended’ senses, often vary as to which constituent they focus on.


So, the ‘basic motion event’, in chronological order, is:

Figure (F) at Source	F departs from Source	F moves away from Source	F moves along Path	Figure moves towards Goal	Figure arrives at Goal	Figure at Goal
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII

The often subtle ‘shift’ from one constituent to the next alludes to the lack of truly distinct boundaries between them; the Figure leaving the Source (II) logically requires that it was, in the first place, at the Source (I)², and the Figure moving along a Path (IV) is self-evidently moving away from somewhere (III) and simultaneously towards somewhere else (V), and so on. The point is not that these are discreet constituents, but that they are each aspects of the motion event, which in a given sense (or instance) of the verb can be semantically highlighted, or more or less focused on or emphasised. Thus the constituents (I-VII) are not being claimed to be functionally or semantically discrete, rather they should be more accurately conceived as a continuum. Also note that a combination of different areas along the continuum can be variously semantically emphasised (or perhaps, differentially semantically ‘weighted’). These ideas can be represented as follows:


² Distinguishing constituent I could be useful in a context where the presence of the Figure at the Source is the motivation for the comment. eg. A person has overstayed his welcome and says “I will go”. The person (Figure) *departing* the Source is relevant (constituent II), but what is equally relevant in this particular situation is that the Figure is (still!) *at* the Source in the first place (I).

“Go!”




The above illustrates that the semantic focus of this instance of *go* is around constituents II-III. This could be contrasted with:

“He goes home.” (i.e. habitually)



and:

“He is going home.” (i.e. right now)



Semantic ‘weighting’ of the various constituents is represented in the size and concentration of the shaded regions underneath the corresponding constituent. Remember that the diagrams could of course be paraphrased in ordinary language. For instance, in the first example, *go* focuses on the Figure leaving and moving away from the Source (constituent II and III), whilst in the second example, explicit mention of the Goal has the effect of shifting some of the semantic focus over to the Figure’s movement towards and (possibly) arrival at the Goal (V & VI), whilst still maintaining some semantic weight on the Figure’s leaving the Source and moving away from it along a Path (II, III & IV). The exact proportionate ‘weightings’ depend on the specifics of the context and the interpretations intended and understood by the speaker and hearer respectively.

One advantage of the diagrams is that they capture the ‘fuzzy edges’ that are characteristic of (both components within, and at the edges of) prototypical categories, and hence reflect the theoretical stance of this study that meaning is organized according to similar prototype-like principles. Also, they express very clearly the fact that different constituents of the motion event are being semantically emphasized in different proportions. In this regard they will be especially useful in identifying event-internal metonymy (where specific constituents are selected for semantic emphasis). The diagrams, however, still fail to represent more subtle levels of meaning specific to the particular usage, such as the existence or the nature of the interrelationships between the different constituents, or the extent to which the verb in a given instance refers to the event as a whole, or relationships with other elements external to the event (such as, say, the cause of motion). These observations about the interdependence of the constituents and the difficulty of specifying the nature of connections between them

reinforces the earlier observation of the arbitrariness of divisions, whether within or at the borders of, a motion event (cf. Riemer 2005).

Whilst the shaded ‘fuzzy-edged’ representations are visually useful and conceptually revealing, they are somewhat cumbersome. As such I will ‘abbreviate’ them to the following:

“Go!”

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
	+++	+++	++			

Concentrations of shaded grey are replaced by concentrations of + signs. ‘Fuzzy’ edges should be assumed. So, +++, ++, + represent respectively high, medium and low concentrations of semantic weighting at the allocated constituent *with* fuzzy edges which, when adjacent, blend into each other.

Additionally, to keep an eye on any possible ‘figurative’ deixis, in examples where it is deemed that a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ evaluation could be assigned to the sentence’s referent (or a part of it) this will be indicated next to the constituency weighting diagram:

elektrisitii gelii aahe,
 electricity go-pst-3sf be-prs-3s
 There’s a blackout. [Shr]
 I II III IVp V VI VII /ja-bad
 +++

elektrisitii parat aalii
 electricity back come-pst-3sf.
 The electricity is back on. [Shr]
 I II III IVp V VI VII /ye-good
 +++

These abbreviated analytical tools are provided as a means of tracking the semantic properties of individual examples as they are presented, but all patterns or other points of interest that they reveal will be explained and discussed in the primary metalanguage of this study, ordinary English.

2.5 Summary

- Deixis and polysemy are the backbone of the ensuing semantic analyses.
- The concepts of subjectivity, embodiment and prototypicality permeate the theoretical framework, and in many cases draw elements of it together.
- Deixis is a crucial part of the meaning of GO and COME, especially COME.
- Space and time are key underlying conceptual structures of GO and COME.
- Deictic properties can extend from the ‘literal’ to the ‘figurative’ realm of language.
- Polysemy concerns the multiple historically related senses of a word.
- Polysemy occurs due to causes like subjectivity and efficiency/expression, and via mechanisms like metaphor and metonymy (and underlyingly image schemas).
- A clear literal/figurative linguistic divide is fictitious, and at any rate, probably not useful in understanding our actual meaning-making practices.
- No semantic metalanguage is perfect. Ordinary English provides an approachable (to analyst and reader) metalanguage, potentially as adequate as any other.

Upon this theoretical grounding we will commence the semantic analysis of *ja* and *ye*.

3.1 Introduction

The Marathi verbs *ja* and *ye* are primarily used, like GO and COME, to indicate motion of objects (Figures), often people, through space. But they are also used in a variety of other semantic contexts.

The analysis will proceed with respect to the two main theoretical loci, as outlined in chapter two: Deixis and polysemy. We saw in chapter two that deictic properties are crucial to the various uses and senses of COME and GO; they form an integral part of the semantic structure of the verbs. It will similarly be seen that the semantic structures of *ja* and *ye* rely heavily on their deictic properties.

Initially (section 3.2) the semantics of *ja* and *ye* as verbs of motion through space will be examined; their ‘basic’ senses (to continue with our established terminology). Here we will examine the deictic properties of basic *ja* and *ye*, as well as other aspects such as ‘basic motion event’ constituent selection as outlined in section 2.4 (Representing Meaning).

Following, (3.3) we will turn to other ‘extended’ senses of *ja* and *ye* and investigate their semantic affiliation with the basic senses, as well as the processes of semantic change that these extended senses have undergone; the mechanisms and the causes thereof.

3.1.1 Data

Data for the study consists of over four hundred sentences containing any word form of the two lexemes (*ja* and *ye*) under investigation, which were drawn from several sources (approximate number of instances from each source shown in brackets).

1. (270) Ayurvedic books written in Marathi by native speakers, and used widely in Maharashtra as primary sources in doctor training. Specifically, two books were selected as the chief data sources:
 - a. the Mahadhawanidaan, a diagnostic manual [MaNi]; and
 - b. the Padaarthawidnaan, a treatise on the basic principles of Ayurveda based on the fundamentals of Classical Indian philosophy [PaVi].

Both are Marathi commentaries on Sanskrit primary sources.

2. (80) Two Marathi grammars, Pandharipande (1997) [P97], and Wali (2005) [W05].
3. (30) Two Marathi-English dictionaries, Molesworth's (2nd ed. 1989) [Mol], and Navneet [Nav]; and one English-Marathi dictionary, Oxford (2003) [Oxf].
4. (60) Elicited sentences from several native speakers representing a range of different regional dialects [Shr], [Vish], [Smit], [Ash], [Brd].

The abbreviations shown after each source in square brackets will be used, along with a page number reference, to indicate the source of each example. For example [MaNi:56; Vish] indicates that the example comes from page 56 of the Mahadvanidan, and was translated with the assistance of the native speaker coded 'Vish'.

Written texts were predominantly used primarily for practical reasons, avoiding the heavy time and technical demands of transcription and spoken pragmatic devices like gesture.

3.1.2 Dictionary definitions

Many senses of *ja* and *ye* are listed in the dictionaries consulted but these will receive little attention during the analysis. It is well observed that distinct dictionary-defined senses do not necessarily correlate with speakers' intuitions about sense boundaries (Riemer 2005:74).

Secondly, these are based on observations of usage, which, whether they do or do not reflect folk categorization of the senses, are nonetheless not (necessarily) grounded in a systematic semantic analysis as is applied in this study.

3.1.3 *Ja* vs. *Ye*?

As alluded to in chapter two, COME and GO are often assumed to comprise a binary opposition, and also (thus) a complete or closed semantic set. This assumption is probably based on the situation in English, and in fact is not supported by cross-linguistic data (Wilkins and Hill 1995; Goddard 1998).

One such complicating factor in the case of Marathi is the word *chaal*. Often translated as 'go', *chaal* means to proceed or move, and seems to differ from *ja* in that it doesn't have the same emphasis on departure from a Source. Rather, it is used to indicate more general (translational) movement where the direction of movement is not specified. The reason why *ja* is here being analysed in opposition to *ye*, then, is because it more closely mirrors the English language opposition between movement towards the deictic centre (speaker or projected; *come/ye*), and movement which is explicitly not towards that center (*go/ja*). Whilst on the face of it this is a reasonable opposition on which to select *ja* vs. *ye*, failing the space to conduct a thorough investigation into *chaal*, the precise nature of the semantic distinction between *chaal*, *ja*, and *ye*, cannot be specified and thus should not be assumed.

3.2 ‘Basic’ senses: *Ja* and *ye* as verbs of motion through space

The following discussion will focus on two key interrelating aspects of *ja* and *ye* in their respective senses as verbs of motion through space: (i) their deictic properties, and (ii) their variable reference to constituents of the ‘basic motion event’. These two aspects are closely related because two significant aspects of the ‘basic motion event’ are the Source and Goal locations, which we have seen are often variously deictically referenced by COME and GO.

3.2.1 Grammatically invited inference

Even within the basic senses of *ja* and *ye* we still encounter much semantic variation. This variation is often due to ‘grammatically invited inference’. Grammatically invited inferences arise due to choices about which aspects of a situation or event are made linguistically explicit, such as which verbal arguments to mention and how to encode the tense-aspect-mood. Whilst their effects are not the focus of this study, they are nevertheless relevant because they can occur in systematic or regular relationship with particular senses of *ja* and *ye*.

For instance, tense-aspect plays a role in determining the semantic qualities of *ye* in the following examples:

<i>I</i>	<i>mii</i>	<i>gharii</i>	<i>yet</i>	<i>aahe.</i>		
I	home-Loc.	come-Pres.Part	be-prs-1s			
I am coming home						
I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			+++	+++		

2 (kaal) mii gharii aalo.
 (yesterday) I home-Loc. come-pst-1sm

(Yesterday) I came home.

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			+	++	+++	+++

The two sentences describe the same event. In *1*, in present progressive tense-aspect, the semantic focus is on the Path and the motion towards the Goal (IV & V). In *2*, however, in past (and perfective) tense-aspect the semantic focus shifts onto the arrival at the Goal and the subsequent location (existence) of the Figure at the Goal.

This is because the tense-aspect system anchors the utterance deictically with respect to some combination of the events described in the utterance, the rest of the discourse, and the coding time or some other reference time. That is to say, the tense-aspect is a deictic marker, and one effect of variation in tense-aspect deictic marking is variation in constituent focus.

Clearly, however, we cannot say that examples *1* and *2* represent two distinct senses of *ye*.

The two sentences refer to the same event and so make use of the same sense. What is variable is simply the perspective on the event. One reason to take note of this is because it will be seen below (section 3.4) that some of *ja* and *ye*'s extended senses are characterized by their shift in semantic focus in precisely this way, i.e. towards a focus on the constituent(s) representing the result or outcome of the event.

Interestingly, the grammatically invited inference of increasing semantic focus on the Path (as seen above in the progressive aspect) can be similarly invoked by use of a lexical item which refers specifically to the Path, such as *saphar* ‘journey’:

3 mii sapharawar jaaiin.

I journey-on go-fut-1s

I will go on a journey

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
	+++	+	+++			

Consider, finally, the following examples which show that grammatically invited inference is even more pervasive than just the immediate syntactic environment, extending even across different parts of the discourse: The same word (*gelo*) in the same utterance is variably semantically imbued depending on the preceding utterance. (A & B are conversation partners):

4 A: “to aataa kuthe aahe?” (Where is he now?)

B: “to shaalalaa gelo” (He went to school.)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
	+				+	+++

Versus:

5 A: “to ithe aahe ka?” (Is he here?)

B: “to shaalalaa gelo” (He went to school.) (i.e. No, he is not here)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
+++	+++	++			++?	++? ³

³ ‘?’ indicates that the speaker assumes (but does not necessarily *know*) that the Figure has arrived (or will arrive) at the Goal, and subsequently is (or will be) located there.

Apart from anything else, the variation between 4 and 5 highlights the difficulty of prying apart semantics and pragmatics (cf. section 2.1.2).

Whilst numerous studies have observed that different senses of polysemous words tend to occur in distinctive grammatical contexts (Robert 2008:85), these distinctive contexts nevertheless do not *define* the sense (cf. section 2.3 on tests for polysemy). They may be thought of as an effect of the sense or as a secondary attribute, but the sense definition will include other factors.

3.2.2 *Ja*

In order to find the basic sense of *ja* an intuitive step is to examine some very ‘basic’ sentences containing the verb:

6	“Jaa!”		(Go!)					
	I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
		+++	++					

7	“To jaato.”		(He goes.)					
	I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
		+++	+++	++				

Sentence 6, the imperative, deictically specifies the Source as the location of the addressee, i.e. “Go [from here]!” The speaker is generally at the same location as the addressee, explaining why we intuit “Go[from here]!” - ‘here’ referring deictically to the location of the *speaker*. But, in the case of speaker and addressee not being co-located, a phone conversation

for instance, “Go!” obviously intends the addressee to leave her *own* location i.e. “Go [from *there*]!”. Thus, departure from and movement away from the Source (II-III) are emphasized. Example 7 is similarly semantically weighted (in terms of the constituents), but the Source is much less firmly deictically anchored to the location of the speaker or addressee. Indeed it is just as likely to be tied to the location of the subject of the narrative *to* ‘he’, but context (such as whether the speaker and/or addressee are also co-located with *to* ‘he’) will probably be a determining factor. Both of them, however, fail to recognize that *ja* (like English *go*) is often pragmatically accompanied by a specified Goal, whether or not it is explicitly encoded. Thus *To jato* ‘He goes’ quite likely means ‘He goes [somewhere/there/home etc.]’:

8 “[Roj] to [ofisla] jaato.” (He goes [everyday to the office])

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			+	++	++	+++

Recall, however (section 2.1.2), that if an element is not *explicitly* included we will here assume it to be (also) implicitly absent. The inclusion of a Goal, then, significantly shifts the constituent focus. Recall Goddard’s (1998) requirement of two separate explications for (English) ‘go’ and ‘go with a specified Source and/or Goal’. Similarly, contrast:

9 “to gelo.” (He went)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
	+++					

10 “to gharii gelo.” (He went home)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
	+++	+	+	+++	+?	+?

The deictic property observed when a Goal is *not* specified (e.g. the imperative “Ja!”) does not merely disappear, though, in the Goal-specified examples (8, 10). The Goal of *ja*’s motion is overwhelmingly a location *other than* the speaker’s at coding time; in this regard it is like English *come* (Fillmore 1971:50). This specification is, however, perhaps slightly less strict in Marathi as the following example shows, where the speaker *could* be located at coding time in Nagpur:

II tuu kadhii naagpurlaa geli aahes ka?

you ever Nagpur-Dat go-pst-3sf be-prs-2s Q

Have you ever been to Nagpur? [P97:417]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+ +++

In this scenario in English we use *been* or maybe *come*, but *gone* definitely sounds odd.

So, even in a range of very simple sentences we observe variation in the deictic and constituent-focusing properties of the ‘basic’ sense of *ja*. How then – on the basis of which examples, to provide a definition of ‘basic’ *ja*?

Firstly, (disregarding its superlative morphological simplicity) the imperative will not be proposed as the most basic use of *ja*’s basic sense, due to its sole use in a very specific and marked pragmatic situation. The imperative of any verb is distinguished by its orientation to the addressee’s current situation: the addressee is *not* currently doing whatever it is that the speaker is commanding. Thus the Source-orientation of “Ja!” is perhaps as much due to the

fact that the Source is the location of the addressee at coding time, rather than that Source is *ja*'s most semantically dominant constituent.

Next, without a principled reason to decide whether the Goal- and/or Source- specified examples represent the 'basic' usage, or if it is where these locations are not specified, we must content ourselves (like Goddard's NSM *go* explication in section 2.2.1) with two parallel basic senses. This exemplifies the potential complicating effects of grammatically invited inference.

For our purposes we will propose the following generalizations about basic *ja*:

1. it encodes movement that is usually to a Goal that is *not* the coding time location of the speaker or the addressee.
2. if no other contextual elements or constituents of the motion event are specified, then the semantic focus is on constituents I-III.
3. if the Goal is specified then this will raise constituents V-VII's weighting (and probably concordantly lower I-III's weighting).
4. if the Path is somehow specified (such as use of the present continuous tense/aspect, or inclusion of a Path-focusing lexical item like 'journey') then IV's weighting will increase.

The variations in 2. to 4. are metonymic effects, selecting or deselecting constituents of the event such that the general motion event word *ja* stands for only the combination of selected constituents. So, even within a single sense of the word metonymic effects are constantly

occurring. Also, as it happens, the same statement is true of metaphorical effects; these will be discussed in section 3.3.1

3.2.3 *Ye*

As with *ja*, we will start with some ‘basic’ (looking) sentences containing *ye*.

I2 “Ye!” (Come!)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	+++	+	

I3 “Tii yete.” (She comes.)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	+++	+	

I4 “Tii gharii yete.” (She comes home)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	+++	+	

I5 “Tii gharii aalii.” (She came home)

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	++	+++	+++

So far, *ye* most frequently and strongly emphasizes constituent V – motion towards the Goal. This is slightly affected in *I5* by a grammatically invited inference, specifically the past-perfective tense-aspect, which inheres a perspective to the constituents representing the result

of the (otherwise) semantic focus (V) – arrival of and presence of the Figure at the Goal (VI-VII).

Another grammatically invited inference is activated if the Source is specified, and the focus shifts accordingly (partially) to the relevant constituents (I-III):

16 mii kaal mumbaihuun aalo.
 I yesterday Bombay-Abl. come-pst-3sm

Yesterday, I came from Bombay. [P97:336]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
+++	+++	+++	+++	++	++	+

17 gharaachyaa aatuun aawaaj aalaa.
 house-Poss. in-from sound-3sm come-pst-3sm

The sound came from inside the house. [P97:339]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
++	+++	++	+	+		

The Goal still receives some attention, either a significant amount and from V all the way to VII (in *16*), or only a more subtle suggestion from the implicature that the sound (Figure) was heard by the speaker (or someone who had reported to the speaker) in *17*.

The fact that the understood Goal in examples *12* and *16* is ‘where I (the speaker) am now (coding time)’, and of *17* is ‘where I (speaker) was at the time of the event (reference time)’, suggests that *ye* contains a similar inherent core quality to English *come* (and COME in many other languages). As discovered in section 2.2.1 COME is centrally defined by being (i) a verb of motion and (ii) having a Goal which is deictically located, often at (or with respect to) the location of the speaker, but also possibly elsewhere depending on the properties of deictic

projection that the language allows (generally and for this verb specifically). Marathi, it appears, is no different. And the rules of deictic projection are also fairly similar to English, as we see the deictic centre shifted by the speaker to:

(i) the location of the addressee:

18 “mii tithe yeuu ka?” (Shall I come there?)
 I II III IVp V VI VII
 ++ +++ +++

(ii) the location of a third party (Vaishali is in Kolhapur but the speaker or addressee are not):

19 mii purchaa aathawadyaat kolhapuurlaa yenar aahe,
 I next week-Loc Kolhapur-Dat come-fut be-prs-1s

he vaishaliilaa mahitii aahe ka?
 this Vaishali-Dat know-prs-3sf be-prs Q?

Does Vaishali know that I'm coming to Kolhapur next week? [Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 + ++ +++ +++

This usage is, however, restricted to third-party-locations that the speaker has some claim of affinity or association with. The speaker of the above example, for instance, although not *in* Kolhapur at coding time, would be understood to have been there before, or at the very least to have family members there. As one informant puts it *ye* is an “emotional word”, it “has some hidden meaning”.

(iii) a potential or imagined location (in the following example it is the imagined location of the addressee):

20 mii darwajya aalo pan tuu tithe nauhota!
 I door come-pst-1sm but you there be-pst-Neg-2sm
 I came to the front door, but you weren't there!

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			+	+	++	+++

Based on such similar possibilities of deictic projection as English *come*, and on the observed Goal-orientation – whether movement towards it (constituent V) or arrival and location at it (VI-VII), we will propose a basic sense of *ye* fairly similar to Goddard's (1998) explication of English *come* (obviously though, not in NSM but in our metalanguage of ordinary English):

Ye encodes movement to a Goal that is the location – real, imagined or potential – of either the speaker or addressee, or is a place to which the speaker claims personal affiliation.

Of course the final element, 'a personal affiliation', is ill-defined, but the exact nature of this 'affiliation' will need to be left as the subject of future work. Also, as with the above discussion of basic *ja*, constituent metonymy effects due to grammatically invited inference (see variation in constituency weighting diagrams for 12 to 20) are absorbed within the meaning of this basic sense of *ye*.

Having thus defined the basic senses of *ja* and *ye*, the analysis will proceed to senses semantically extended from them.

3.3 Meaning ‘extensions’

From these basic senses of *ja* and *ye* several other semantically related but distinct senses have developed. They have developed by way of the mechanisms of semantic change, metonymy and metaphor, and due to the causes of semantic change, subjectivity and efficiency/expressivity, as detailed in chapter two. Because many of the extended senses involve combinations of the mechanisms, the senses will be presented individually rather than being classified according to mechanism. A discussion of causes will follow.

3.3.1 Metaphorical applications of ‘basic’ senses

Oftentimes, what may appear as extended senses are actually metaphorical applications of the basic senses (cf. Riemer 2005). The uncertainty arises because the context of usage may be highly metaphorical, including elements not prototypically part of a basic motion event. These usages, however, should still be treated as instances of the basic senses because although the metaphorical mechanism is being applied, it is not to the verb (*ja* or *ye*) itself, but rather to other elements of the ‘basic motion event’, such as the Source, Figure, Path or Goal. Once one or several of the basic motion event elements have become the targets of metaphorical mapping, which often takes the prototypical metaphorical form of [ABSTRACT] IS A [CONCRETE], then the elements (along with their appropriately mapped source attributes) are free to participate in the basic motion event. Whilst these instances, then, do not constitute extended *senses* of *ja* and *ye*, they are included in this section because they are nevertheless less prototypical *uses* of the verbs. In other words, the verb’s sense remains *basic*, but the broader grammatical and pragmatic context of its use is *extended*.

Recall (section 2.3) that properties of a metaphor’s target or source domains are more or less suitable for being metaphorically mapped. Thus, depending on whether highly suitable elements of the source and target are cross-mapped, or less suitable elements, we find a continuum of metaphors ranging from the very conventional and readily decipherable to the highly unusual and decipherably opaque (with everything in between).

The subtle effects of basic motion event elements being more highly metaphorical or less-so in sentences containing *ja* and *ye* can be seen in the following:

21 hyaa utpann houun tyaachaa praaN jaato.
 this produce(n.) become-Conj.Part he-Poss life(m.) go-prs-3sm
 this having occurred, he [the patient] dies. [MaNi:85]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ +++ /ja-bad

22 praaN pakheru uduun gele
 life(m.) birds fly-Conj.Part. go-pst-3plm
 He passed away (eupemistic) [Shr] (Lit: Life-birds flew away)

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ +++ + + /ja-bad

In both 21 and 22 the metaphor’s source *praaN* ‘life’ is mapped onto the target Figure. In the second example, however, *praaN* takes on the form of a mythical or imaginary animal, it is ornitho-morphised. By taking on this tangible form it becomes somewhat *less* metaphorical, because a prototypical Figure is a concrete physical object such as *pakheru* ‘birds’ rather than an abstract concept such as *praaN* ‘life’. This accounts for the perceived effect of the more motion-bearing constituents (III-IVp) receiving greater emphasis in 22. The *existence* of an

abstract concept is perhaps fairly directly conceptually analogous with the *location* of a physical object at a location (constituent I), as suggested in the fact that cross-linguistically “the word for ‘happen’ [often has a] secondary meaning approximating ‘appear’ or ‘arrive’” (Goddard 2001:24). Thus an abstract entity (*praaN* ‘life’) *not being somewhere* simply equates to it *not existing*. Its actual *physical motion*, on the other hand, is perhaps less easily imagined, and hence less completely synthesized into the metaphor. In these examples *ja* is semantically most similar to the Goal-unspecified exemplars above (6 & 7: *Ja!* ‘Go!’; *to jaato* ‘He goes’). This may logically suit this particular metaphorical application because where exactly life ‘goes’ when one dies, and by what route (i.e. a Goal and a Path), do not necessarily have meaningful answers, especially within the normal wordly context of basic motion events. This analysis would clearly benefit from a more thorough integration of cultural details (such as metaphysical beliefs on whether life can actually ‘go’ somewhere, and if so, where?) and native-speaker intuitions (on, for instance, the relative abstractness of *praaN* and *praaN pakheru*).

Another metaphorical application of *ja*’s basic sense, this time of the Goal-specified variety:

23 mi vikopaas jaato!

I aggression(m.)-near go-prs-1sm

I’m at my wits end! [Vish]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
				++	+++	++?	/ja-bad

24 ajiirN phaar vikopaas gele.

indigestion(n.) very aggression(m.)-near go-pst-1sn

(The) indigestion is in its final stages. [MaNi:59; Vish]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
				+	+++	+++	/ja-bad

The abstract concept *vikop* ‘aggression’ is metaphorically mapped to the Goal, and then motion occurs towards it; motion either of the highly prototypical Figure *mii* ‘I’ (in 23) or of the much more highly figurative Figure *ajiirn* ‘indigestion’ (in 24). The intermixing of elements of varying metaphoricity, and the flexibility even within one highly syntactically specified example (*vikopaas jaaNe*) attests to the plasticity of the language and of our linguistic faculties, as discussed above regarding the literal/figurative ‘divide’.

Also, temporal expressions are metaphorical applications of the basic senses of *ja* and *ye*:

25 *jewaNaapuurviiche don taas (ajuun) jaayachet.*
 lunch-until two hours (still, yet) go-Inf.-Poss.-3pl

Two hours to go before lunch. [Oxf:325]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	++	+++	

26 *aamchyaa gharaaNyaachaa itihaas gelyaa 300 warshanchaa aahe.*
 us-Poss lineage(n.)-Poss history(m.) go-perf. 300 years-Poss be-prs-3s

Our family goes back 300 years. [Oxf:326]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	++		+++

27 *tiche naaw itihaasaat lihile jaaiil.*
 she-Poss name history(m.)-Loc read-pst-3sf go-fut-3s

Her name will go down in history. [Oxf:326]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			++	++		+++

This is an interesting metaphorical application because an abstract entity, time, is seemingly both Figure and Path simultaneously: Time is moving (or more specifically, going), but with respect to what medium (Ground) is it moving? Time!

28 weL jaato
time(m.) go-prs-3sm

Time passes. [Shr]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++

29 divas agadii mand gatiine jaat aaHet.
days quite slow speed(f.)-Inst. go-Prs.Part be-prs-3pl

The days go by so slowly⁴. [Oxf:326]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++

Moreover, Source and Goal being specific parts of the Ground, time is also apparently simultaneously ‘going’ away from (a particular moment in) time (the Source), and towards (another particular moment in) time (the Goal), which of course it is! In the above examples the provision of a specific point in time (sometimes more specific *jewan* ‘lunch’, *300 warsha* ‘300 years’, and sometimes less so *itihahas* ‘history’) locates a Goal. Note that in all cases a significant proportion of the focus remains on the Path (IV), more systematically and consistently than in basic *ja*. This may be interpreted as a reflection of the nature of time as a

⁴ Note the use of the progressive construction ...*jaat aaHet*, literally ‘...are going’ is translated into the habitual aspect. This is typical in Marathi (Wali 2005:30), and probably in other Indo-Aryan languages as well as it reflects a common Indian-Englishism of using the present participle construction (i.e progressive aspect) when referring to a habitual event, e.g. ‘Every morning at 9 I am going to work.’

metaphorical Figure/Path: It is difficult to conceive of time ever *not* moving or being moved along (or ‘through’, as we would say in English).⁵

Marathi speakers may also speak deictically of time moving towards a subjectively oriented Goal, such as ‘me’ (the speaker) ‘now’ (coding time), using *ye*:

30 diwaalii aalii.

Diwali come-pst-3sf

It’s Diwali. [Shr]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
					+++	+++

31 diwaalii yet aahe.

Diwali come-Prs.Part be-prs-3s

Diwali is coming. [Shr]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII
			+++	+++		

This analysis of time phrases conflicts with Fillmore’s (1982:33) assertion that “a prototype semanticist would explicitly *not* choose to construct a single general formulation of the meaning of the word that would simultaneously cover both its spatial and its temporal uses.” On the contrary, my analysis proposes that the semantic domain of time is *less prototypically* associated with basic motion events, but in theory is as suitable a source for metaphorical mapping as any of the other semantic domains we have so far seen mapped onto *ja* and *ye* (cf. discussion in 2.2.2 and McGlone’s 2001:103).

⁵ This distinction – moving ‘along’ or ‘through’ time, is not really a distinction at all, for a Path is nothing but a series of contiguous points within (or upon) the Ground, i.e. the Path is *part of* the Ground. There is, however, obvious cause to single out the Source and Goal as points of particular interest in the context of motion events. This is also corroborated by cognitive linguistic work which has led to image schemas like SOURCE-PATH-GOAL

Whilst the *ja* temporal examples express both ego-moving and the time-moving metaphors (i.e. where people ‘move’ through time, or time ‘moves’ towards or away from people; Lakoff & Johnson 1980), the data does not present any ego-moving *ye* examples (e.g. ‘We are coming up to Diwali’), and indeed one informant claimed this was not acceptable in Marathi. This by no means, however, indicates that the Ground (including Source and Goal) of *ye* may not be metaphorical, as the following examples demonstrate.

32 mi janmaat aalo.

I existence-Loc come-pst-1sm

I was born. [Shr]

I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
					++	+++	/ye-good

33 to prashna ajuun aalaach naahii.

that question yet come-pst- be-prs-Neg

The question hasn’t come up yet. [Oxf:145]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	

34 (achaanak) kaahii aDachaNii aalyaa aahet.

(suddenly) some problem(f.-)pl. come-Ger. be-prs-3pl

A couple of problems have come up. [Oxf:145]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

In all three cases (32-34) there is a (more or less) metaphorical Path and Goal. In general in this section we have seen a wide variety of elements – and combinations of elements – of the basic motion event being metaphorized, and then applied to the basic senses of both *ja* and

ye. The following section will show some cases where the basic senses of *ja* and *ye* are themselves extended via the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy.

3.3.2 ‘Extended’ senses with metaphor and metonymy

Three extended senses will be presented, two of *ye* and one of *ja*.

Ye as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree:

35 hii aangaThii toLaabhar vadzan yeiil.
 this ring(f.) 1 tola weight come-fut-3s

This ring weighs 1 tola (10 grams) [Mol:677; Brd]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++

36 he paagoTe changale aale naahii aNkhii baandh.
 this turban good come-pst-3sn be-prs-Neg. again tie-Imp.

This turban is not good, tie it again. [Mol:677; Brd]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 + +++ /ye-bad

37 ghar agadii moDakaLiis aale aahe.
 house literally broken come-pst-3sn is-prs-3s

The house is nearly broken (i.e. is in bad condition). [Mol:677; Brd]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 + +++ + /ye-bad

38 bil wiis paunDaaitake aale
 bill 20 pounds-much come-pst-3sn

The bill came to 20 pounds. [Oxf:145]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 + +++

As in some of the above ‘metaphorical applications’ examples, we see here a host of metaphorical Goals, *vadzan* ‘weight’ (35), *changale naahii* ‘not good’ (36), *modakaliis* ‘broken’ (37) and *wis paund* ‘20 pounds’ (38). The difference in these examples (35-38), which makes them a separate sense rather than just metaphorical applications of the basic sense, is that the *motion* itself is metaphorical: There are relatively prototypical Figures, physical objects which are perfectly capable of movement (*hii angathii* ‘this ring’, *he paagote* ‘this turban’, *ghar* ‘[the] house’ and *bil* ‘[the] bill’), which ‘come’ but which do not *actually* move anywhere. The attendant claim, then, is that making *ye*’s *motion* metaphorical is a more fundamental semantic shift than making other elements (its Figure or Goal, say) metaphorical, and is hence more likely to result in the development of a distinct sense. A potential counterargument would point out that having a highly metaphorical Figure such as *praaN* ‘life’ (in example 21) would seem to necessarily entail abstract (i.e. more metaphorical) motion – because an abstract object cannot *literally* move. But in this case (21), the *initial* metaphorization of the Figure (*praaN*) allows the *motion* to be metaphorical without undermining the basic sense of the verb. This contrasts with the sense currently being discussed, where a *physical* (and so more literal or prototypical) Figure moves *metaphorically*, and thus seems to produce (along with other factors no doubt) the interpretation of a separate sense.

A further feature of this sense is constituent metonymy placing semantic focus around the *result* of the motion event, namely, the arrival of the Figure at the Goal and its subsequent presence there (constituents VI-VII). Whilst these constituents are also semantically dominant in basic *ye*, this sense focuses on them to the more emphatic exclusion of the

‘motion’ aspects of the event – the Path and motion towards the Goal (IV-V). Example 37 is an exception as it describes the resultant state from the perspective of the immediately preceding ‘approach’ to the state – it is ‘nearly’ in a certain state. In all of the examples for this sense (except for 35) the perfective aspect emphasizes the perspective of the resultant state, as this aspect views a completed event whose effects or results are thus perceptually (in theory or in fact) available.

The distinction, then, between metaphorical applications of the basic sense, and metaphorical extension to a separate sense (such as the sense currently being discussed), whilst subtle, appears to be necessary. It may also assist us to pinpoint the core semantic features of the basic sense, as it has been observed that verbs, when used metaphorically, are understood to refer to a general category of actions which can be *epitomized* by the metaphorically used verb (Glucksberg 2001:49 reporting on Torreano 1997). Accordingly, we may infer from this sense of *ye* that its original metaphorical extension (although now frozen) identified basic *ye* as being centrally defined by the quality which was emphasized in the metaphorical usage, namely, the arrival of the Figure at the Goal and its subsequent presence there (constituents VI-VII).

Ye for existence/presence

Ye can be used to mean that its (grammatical) subject is present somewhere:

39 paN jewha te phaar waaDhatat tewhaa aamaashayaakaDehi war yetat.
 but if they much increase- then buttocks-to on come-prs-3pl
 prs-3pl

But if there are too many [germs] then they are also on the buttocks. [MaNi:64; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ /ye-bad

40 yeThaparyantachyaa sarwa shlokaant granThaant aalelyaa
there-up to-Poss all shloks-Loc treatise(m.)-Loc come-Perf.

rogaanchii anukramaNikent dilii aahe.
disease-about index-Loc give-pst-3pln be-prs-3s

All of the diseases in these shlokas⁶ are given in the index. [MaNi:17; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++

41 parantu to amukach prakaarachaa yeiil he nichshra- samajat naahii.
but that particular type-Poss come- this certain understand- be-prs-
fut-3s Prs.Part Neg

But you can't predict the particular type that it will be. [MaNi:18; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++

Like the previously described sense (*ye* as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree), this sense semantically focuses on the *result* of the motion event, which is the location of the Figure at the Goal (VII). In this way the primary mechanism of its extension from basic *ye* is constituent metonymy. However, it does differ from the previous sense in being even *more* heavily focused on this constituent. No other constituents receive any semantic weighting at all, in contrast to the previous sense where several of the examples retained some suggestion of the Path or arrival at the Goal (IV-VI). This is quite a significant semantic development because the verb effectively switches from being referentially 'complex' – encoding a series of continually shifting relations between the Figure and the Ground, to referentially 'simple'

⁶ Shloks are Sanskrit verses characteristic of much of classical Indian writing.

– representing a single unchanging relationship between Figure and Ground (Kovecses 2006:241-2 citing Taylor 2002).

There is one other very prevalent situation wherein this sense of *ye* is used. That is when *ye* is used to express the presence of a wide range of physical and mental conditions. These usages are a slightly nuanced special case of the ‘existence/presence’ sense of *ye*, because in addition to a primary focus on the presence of the Figure at the Goal (VII) they do also retain some slight semantic orientation to the *arrival* of the Figure at the Goal (VI). Thus they do not shift quite so dramatically from a ‘complex’ to a ‘simple’ relationship expression as observed in the above examples (39-41). This is because the *presence* of a condition, so often a *temporary* state, is inescapably associated with the *onset* of the condition at some prior time. Nevertheless, native Marathi speakers overwhelmingly translated these examples as existential or stative type statements, only rarely using an inchoative English verb.

42 aaLas yeNe
sluggishness come

be/feel sluggish [MaNi:18]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

43 jwar yeNe
fever come

have a fever [MaNi:18]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

44 okaarii yeNe
vomit come

vomit [MaNi:23]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
					++	+++	/ye-bad

45 phoDa yeNe
pimples come

get pimples [MaNi:23]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
					+	+++	/ye-bad

46 chakkar yeNe
dizziness come

feel dizzy [MaNi:23]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

47 ghaam yeNe
sweat come

sweat [MaNi:23]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
					+	+++	/ye-bad

48 jhop phaar yeNe
sleepiness very come

feel very sleepy [MaNi:24]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

49 paDase yeNe
common cold come

have a cold [MaNi:24]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

50 gandhii yeNe

boils come

get boils [MaNi:25]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+ +++ /ye-bad

51 indriyaveikalya aale aahe

organ-broken state come-pst-3plf is-prs-3s

the organs feel old [MaNi:40; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ /ye-bad

52 tyaat mrutyu yeto

in that way, death come-prs-3sm

thus [the patient; 'he'] will/could die. [MaNi:30; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+ +++ /ye-bad

And so on. This is an extremely common sense of *ye*, especially in the context of bodily (including mental) functions: The primary data sources (Ayurveda books) contain at least a hundred different physical and mental states expressed using this sense of *ye*. Most of the examples hitherto have been of physical conditions; following are some of the mental ones that make use of the same sense of *ye*.

53 manaatsii shaantii parat aalii.

mind-Poss. peace back come-pst-3sf.

peace of mind returned. [Shr]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ /ye-good

54 tasech dishaa kaal aadii goshTiichaa anubhaw aapaNaalaa yeto.

Thus space time principal- matter(f.)- experience(m.) we-Dat come-
 (adj) Poss prs-
 3sm

Thus, we have experience of space and time as the chief constituents. [PaVi:67; Smit]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ /ye-good

55 ...jhaalyachii shankaa yete.
 ...become-pst-Poss doubt(f.) come-prs-1sf

[the preceding] having happened there is doubt/we have doubt. [MaNi:48,54; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ /ye-bad

This sense of *ye* is difficult to distinguish at times from a metaphorical application of *ye*'s basic sense because the interpretation of the word is dependent on the context and even more subjectively on the perspective that the addressee or reader decides to construe. Thus even in context the following (56 & 57) were claimed by the native Marathi translation assistant to be capable of meaning *either* of the two provided glosses:

56 prasang yeNe
 situation come

to have a situation [PaVi:5; Shr]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++

or: for a situation to arise

I II III IVp V VI VII
 ++ +++

57 baadhaa yeNe
 obstacle come

there are obstacles [PaVi:15; Shr]

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
						+++	/ye-bad

or: obstacles appear

I	II	III	IVp	V	VI	VII	
					++	+++	/ye-bad

This lack of absolute determinacy suggests that *ye* may in fact simply be ‘general’ (cf. section 2.3) as regards its reference to ‘presence’ or ‘arrival’. (‘Arrival’ may be better substituted for other words in the English glosses such as ‘onset’, ‘appearance’ or ‘occurrence’ depending on the particular example.) That is, in its most general basic definition *ye* could mean both ‘arrival’ and ‘presence’, but in a specific instance the same basic sense could refer more (or even *only*) to one or the other. The semantic range within the data and the native-speaker translations suggest that the most satisfactory explanation might be a continuum of semantic possibilities extending from the most clear-cut distinct sense-like examples (such as the first three exemplars provided for this ‘presence/existence’ sense of *ye*, example 39-41), through instances where the verb is more vague as to ‘presence’ or ‘arrival’ (such as these latter examples, 56 & 57; and the long list of symptom examples of the similar form ‘noun *yeNe*’, 42-55), to those that represent the most prototypical basic sense in that they definitely retain the fundamental *motional* quality of the verb by describing primarily ‘arrival’ (such as many, although still not all, of the examples discussed for basic *ye* in section 3.2.3). Indeed, Goddard (2001:24) observes a cross-linguistic proclivity for “the word for ‘happen’ [to have] a secondary meaning approximating ‘appear’ or ‘arrive’”. The drawing of any demarking lines along this continuum is perhaps anyway futile in light of the ultimate interdependence of constituents VI (arrival of Figure at Source) and VII (presence of Figure at Source): If VI has occurred then VII also pertains, and if VII pertains then VI has at some point occurred.

Ja as body part's loss of power or normal functioning ability

This sense of *ja* is, on the face of it, quite similar to the application of the metaphorical Figure *praaN* 'life' to *ja* as discussed above (examples 21 & 22). Loss of life is simply the *whole person's* 'loss of power or normal functioning ability' (as opposed to just a single body part's):

58 bal wa varna he donhii jaatat.
power and skin this pair go-prs-3pl

Power and skin both deteriorate. [MaNi:66; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
++ +++ /ja-bad

59 hii baayko chaanglii paN kambarent gelii.
that woman good but waist/loins(f.) go-pst-3sf

That woman is good but has some problem with her waist. [Mol:313; Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ ++ /ja-bad

60 majhaa pay gelii
me-Poss legs go-pst-3pln

My legs don't work (have stopped working). [Vish]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ ++ /ja-bad

61 indriyaache bal gele aahe
organs-Poss. strength go-pst-3sn is-prs-3s

power in the organs has gone. [MaNi:40]

I II III IVp V VI VII
+++ ++ /ja-bad

One potential reason for identifying here a distinct sense of *ja* is the same as that provided for the ‘physical extent/evaluative degree’ sense of *ye*: That in most cases the Figure is a tangible object (*varna* ‘skin’, *kambarent* ‘waist/loins’, *pay* ‘legs’) and is therefore highly prototypical (in contrast to *praaN* ‘life’). As such any statement of its ‘going’ can only be interpreted as metaphorical and not literal motion, which we observed above (in ‘*ye* as physical extent or evaluative degree’) as being sufficiently semantically divergent from the basic sense to posit a separate sense. Furthermore, the present sense of *ja* may be used to describe the loss of power or function of the whole body, i.e. *sharir jaaNe* ‘to waste away’ (literally: for the body to go; [Mol:313]), which contrasts with *praaN jaaNe* ‘to die’ (literally: for life to go).

This sense of *ja* is metonymically analogous to the two senses of *ye* already discussed. It focuses on the *effect* or the *result* of the event. Unlike for *ye*, however, the result of the event is not the existence of the Figure somewhere, but the opposite, the *non*-existence of the Figure somewhere, specifically, at the Source (see discussions in sections 2.2.1 & 3.2.2). But this observation frustrates the preceding claim that the Figures in examples 58 to 62 (for this sense of *ja*) are concrete physical objects. Because although *literally* (i.e. *syntactically*) the Figure is the (tangible) body or part thereof (e.g. *majhaa pay gelii* = literally ‘my legs went’), *actually* (i.e. integrating the *semantic* ‘facts’) the Figure is the *abstract* ‘power or normal functioning ability of the body or part thereof’ (i.e. *majhaa pay gelii* = ‘my legs stopped functioning’). So, after this abstract Figure ‘goes’ from its *regular* location (the Source; the body or part thereof) this sense of *ja* does not provide for the inclusion of any semantic information surrounding the subsequent Path or Goal (III-VII). Indeed, the only relevant (or

perhaps even, experientially accessible) information is that the Figure has departed from the Source and is henceforth no longer present there (I-II).

To reiterate, two divergent interpretations are proposed above: The ‘literal’ (i.e. syntactic) interpretation wherein a prototypical (tangible object) Figure moves *metaphorically* (similarly to *ye*’s ‘physical extent/evaluative degree’ sense); and the ‘semantically integrated’ interpretation which looks more like a metaphorical application of basic *ja* as opposed to a distinct sense. In this second interpretation an abstract entity is metaphorically mapped onto the Figure which then ‘literally’ (*as* an abstract Figure) moves. Whereas the first interpretation sees a literal Figure moving figuratively. Whether we chose one or the other, however, does not alter the specific and marked *metonymic* process displayed, and hence even on the sole basis of this active mechanism the proposal of a distinct sense is justified.

Another aspect of the body’s normal functioning ability is the mind’s normal functioning ability. This same sense of *ja* can also be used to describe the loss of such mental function.

62 tyaachii buddhii gelii
 he-Poss. sense go-pst-3sf

He lost his mind / became stupid.⁷ [Shr]

I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ ++ /ja-bad

63 manaachii shaantii gelii (aahe).

⁷ Interestingly, the converse of this statement cannot be expressed by replacing *ye* with *ja*, but instead by substituting *chaal* which in many contexts means the same as *ja*, i.e. ‘go’:

tyaatsii	buddhi	chaalalii
his	sense	proceeded

He thought smart. [Shr]

mind-Poss. peace go-pst-3sf (has)
 Lost peace of mind. [Shr]
 I II III IVp V VI VII
 +++ /ja-bad

We have described four cases of meaning extension with respect to basic *ja* and *ye*:

1. metaphorical applications of the basic senses (recall though that these are not extensions *of* basic *ja* and *ye* but extensions of meaning *within* the basic senses).
2. *Ye* as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree.
3. *Ye* for existence/presence.
4. *Ja* for the loss of function of the body or part thereof.

Within these extensions we have witnessed both of the mechanisms (metaphor and metonymy) functioning, usually in combination with each other. More specifically, metonymy has functioned to focus on the *results* of the events, and a vast range of metaphorical mappings onto all elements of the basic motion event have been seen to effectively operate. We will now turn to a discussion of the possible causes for these semantic shifts.

3.3.3 Causes

The operation of ‘result metonymy’ in all of the extended senses is causally interpretable in terms of subjectivity. That is, these shifts are the outcome of innovation tending (or being ‘attracted’) towards meanings which are more subjective. Metonymic selection of the ‘result’ constituents fits with a subjective explanation because with both *ja* and *ye* it is these constituents which most directly relate to the deictic centre – generally the speaker. This is because the Ground orientation of the verbs (the Goal for *ye*, and variable according to syntactic context for *ja*, but normally predominantly the Source and/or Goal) is often tied to a subjectively located deictic centre – especially so for *ye* which is strongly deictically imbued. Note that this ‘subjectivity’, like the deictic centre, can be ‘projected’ to express the perspective of someone other than the speaker, such as the penultimate example above (62: *tyachii buddhii gelii* ‘his common sense abandoned him’), where the Source of *gelii* ‘went’ is the subject of the narrative *to* ‘him’. This is what Traugott and Dasher (2002) call *intersubjectivity*, various peoples’ subjectivities relating with each other.

Result metonymy in the case of motion verbs also has a possible cognitive basis suggested in experimental results showing that “our memory for the spatial location of an object is biased in the direction of the object’s motion, even when the object is presented statically” (Gibbs 2006:56 citing Freyd & Finke 1984). The experiments demonstrated that when presented with a still image of a moving object we tend to ‘remember’ the object’s location as being further in the direction that it was depicted to be moving. This is called ‘representational momentum’. Combined with the findings presented above on the conceptual and linguistic integration of the literal and the figurative (section 2.3.1.1; Glucksberg 2001, Coulson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2005), there is every reason to assume that this phenomenon of

representational momentum – even after multiple and various metaphorical applications within the ‘literal’ motion event – could be accessed, adapted and adopted into the metaphorized motion event.

Turning now to the other posited cause of semantic change, the twin efficiency/expression imperative. The fact that the three extended senses of *ja* and *ye* have become conventionalized sufficiently attests to their general communicative efficiency (i.e. if it didn’t work then it wouldn’t catch on). Briefly, though, the result metonymy is efficient in that it selects only the most significant part of the motion event for semantic focus. The other constituents, being less essential in terms of the particular communicative motivation (i.e. what needs, in this case, to be expressed), are de-emphasized. This point could actually be restated in terms of subjectivity and the need/desire for expressivity: ‘What *needs* to be expressed’ *requires* someone’s subjective perspective to integrate the communicative demands of the situation with their own personal communicative needs/desires (cf. Traugott & Dasher 2002 on subjectivization in modal verbs). In the case of *ja* and *ye*, their result constituents (departure from or arrival at a location) also happen to be central in their respective basic meanings. Thus, their ‘result metonymy’ is also ‘core-constituent metonymy’. This kind of metonymic selection is semantically efficient because it maintains, via a core constituent, a relatively simple and transparent relationship to the (more broadly conceived) basic motion event. This argument for the ‘efficiency’ of result/core-constituent metonymy is further supported – although only for *ye* – by the ‘representational momentum’ phenomenon discussed above; this kind of metonymy in *ye* is a semantic shift towards the same part (constituents) of the basic motion event as ‘representational momentum’ concentrates on.

Looking now at the expressive requirement as a cause of semantic shift we might consider some of the underlying cultural tendencies which led to the development of these particular semantic forms. Many of the usages of the extended senses can be seen to be in the broad domain of physical and mental health (and illness). Of course this is a reflection of the major data sources (Ayurveda books), but it may also suggest a cultural-internal tendency to use inchoative verbs in this particular domain. Inchoative verbs inherently express temporal flux, as well as ‘complex’ rather than ‘simple’ relationships between parts (see discussion in ‘*ye* for existence/presence’; Kovecses 2006:241-2). This linguistic pattern then, expresses peoples’ physical and mental states as *processes* rather than static relationships.

This pattern could reflect an underlying CYCLE image schema which is variously manifested in sub-continental culture and cosmology, such as in cyclical conceptions of time (Hoyt 1994, e.g. belief in a continual cycle of birth and rebirth), and is hence not surprisingly found expressed in their language. The CYCLE image schema relates to the BALANCE image schema (Gibbs 2006:93-4, 103), also highly significant in the Indian conception of health and healing – health is defined as a balance of the three vital bodily humours (*dosha*), and illness is their imbalance (Kirmayer 2004). The recurrent process of the body (or mind or universe or anything) coming and going in and out of balance is distinctly cyclical. Things (Figures) ‘coming’ and ‘going’ to and from a person (Source/Goal), it appears, determines health (or lack of it). It is precisely the same notion of adding or subtracting things from a system which will either balance it or imbalance it. Thus we can see the conception of human CYCLES of BALANCE and IMBALANCE displayed in the linguistic tendency of using verbs of motion (*ja* and *ye*) to describe human states and conditions.

Motion verbs also have a broad cross-linguistic tendency to describe ‘self-volitional’ events, thus largely excluding external agents (Croft 1990:61). This could be interpreted in two contrastive ways: (1) such events are the actions of discrete and autonomous entities, acting according to their own internal and isolable motivations, or (2) such events are ‘natural’ occurrences which do not *require* external agents but which simply *happen* of their own accord. Interpretation (1) is clearly more suited to prototypical instances of the basic senses of *ja* and *ye*, where the Figure is a person and hence (at least by *my* intuitive/conditioned understanding) capable of having their own internal motivations. For many of the examples illustrating extended uses/senses, however, I suggest that more metaphorical Figures (such as abstract concepts) do not possess such a capability, and so interpretation (2) must be favoured. This suggests a conception of health and illness as being internally regulated, which is confirmed by ethnographically supported claims that Ayurveda is an ‘internalizing’ medical system (Kirmayer 2004). ‘Internalizing’ systems view health and illness as being the result of internal states and processes. In the case of Ayurveda this is also linguistically expressed in the polysemous word *dosha*, which refers to the bodily humors but also just means ‘illness’. In other words, illness is just *you*, but in a different form (specifically, an imbalanced form, as earlier discussed). We can thus observe the (independently attested) internalizing conception of health and illness linguistically manifested in the widespread use in this domain of motion verbs which do not have (nor require) external causative factors.

This contrasts with the tendency in English of a linguistically implied separation between patient and illness, e.g. ‘he has an illness’, ‘she suffers from an illness’. This contrast is reflected in the more thorough integration of personal, social and environmental factors into

the Indian conception of health and illness, in terms of causes, processes and treatments as compared to the Western model (Warner 1976).

Finally, we may posit that subjectivity, especially perhaps in its outsourced manifestations like deictic projection, is underlyingly structured by the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema (Gibbs 2006:91). Based on our embodied understanding of ourselves as, literally, the centre of *our* universe with all else happening around us, we can project the model and place another person at the CENTER and then organise everything else with respect to them, at their PERIPHERY.

We cannot here speculate any further on the specifics of the language-culture interrelationships that the above observations might reveal; more ethnographic inquiry would be required. But the findings presented here could certainly be valuable in supplying the linguistic data of possible anthropological linguistic research in this area.

3.4 'Figurative' deixis in *ja* and *ye*

Finally, before wrapping up this chapter, we will return to the idea of figurative deixis which has featured in several cross-linguistic analyses of COME and GO (section 2.2.3). The general hypothesis is that if the deictic centre is projected into the abstract realm it will be 'located' at (broadly) 'good'. Due to this, uses or senses of COME which incorporate metaphorized elements involve motion towards or arrival at this figurative deictic centre. GO, in part deictically characterized in terms of opposition to COME's primary deictic property, involves

departure or motion away from the figurative deictic centre ‘good’. Do the Marathi data confirm the hypothesis?

The general answer is yes, they do. We will discuss some qualifications to this affirmative answer, but firstly, some examples which support the premise:

- COME/*ye* = ‘good’

64 malaa lakshaat yete.
me-Dat attention(n.)-Loc come-prs-3sn
I get it (know/understand how to do it). [Ashi]

65 maajhaa dhyaanaat yete tuu
me-Poss attention(n.)-Loc. come-3sn you
I remember you [Smit]

66 mi janmaat aalo.
I existence-Loc come-pst-1sm
I was born. [Shr]

67 mi srimantiit aalo.
I richness-loc come-pst-1sm.
I became rich. [Shr]

68 tiche pot aale ahe.
she-Poss. stomach come-pst-3sf is-prs-3s
She is pregnant [Vish]

69 mhanaje suuj kamii yeil

means swelling less come-fut-3s

That will relieve you of swelling. [Ajit]

70 nusatyaa aushadhaane tyaaas gun yeNe shakya naahii.
just medicine-Inst those benefit(m.) come-Inf feasible be-prs-Neg

They are difficult to cure with only medicine. [MaNi:43; Vish]

- GO/ja = 'bad'

71 panchatvaalaa jaaNe
death-Loc go-inf

to die. [PaVi:114]

72 ...rogyaachaa shabd khol jaato.
patient(m.)-Poss. voice(m.) deep go-prs-3sm

the patient's voice becomes (Lit: goes) low/deep. [MaNi:97]

73 aawaaj waadhat jaaNe
voice high go-Inf.

The voice becomes high [Vish]

74 aang waaLat jaaNe
body dry go-Inf.

The body becomes dry. [MaNi:31]

75 to khuup presharamadhun gela.
he much pressure-under go-pst-3sm

He was under a lot of pressure. [Smit]

76 nikaal tyaaachyaa viruddh gelaa.
verdict(m.) he-Poss against go-pst-3sm

The verdict went against him. [Oxf:326]

There are many examples which also seem, on the face of it, to contradict the hypothesis. However, upon closer inspection these are overwhelmingly descriptions of conditions – either internal (personal) or external (general circumstances) which have become metaphorical Figures and then either ‘come’ (i.e. happen or persist) or ‘go’ (i.e. cease or desist). Obviously, whether some abstract Figure’s ‘coming’ or ‘going’ (i.e. is present or absent) is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depends entirely on the nature of the abstract Figure. For instance, money (*paisa*) or energy (both human [*shaktii*] and electrical [*elektrisitii*]) can ‘come’ (=‘good’) and ‘go’ (=‘bad’) in Marathi. But this does not imply a ‘good’ deictic centre because fever (*taap*) and anger (*raag*) can also ‘come’ (=‘bad’) and ‘go’ (=‘good’).

Similarly, recall the list of physical symptoms exemplifying the ‘existence/presence’ sense *ye*. All are clearly ‘bad’, but this profusion of *ye*=‘bad’ examples does not necessarily indicate that there is a *ye*=‘bad’ semantic tendency in Marathi. Rather, it is just as likely a reflection of a bias in the data due to the fact of one of the main sources being a physician’s diagnostic manual. Accordingly, we can also find examples of ‘good’ conditions ‘coming’ which hence could be claimed to bear out the “‘good’ deictic centre” hypothesis (these are repeated from section 3.3.2):

77 *manaachii shaantii parat aalii.*
 mind-Poss. peace back come-pst-3sf.
 peace of mind returned. [Shr]

78 *tasech dishaa kaal aadii goshTiichaa anubhav aapaNaalaa yeto.*
 Thus space time principal- matter(f.)- experience(m.) we-Dat come-

(adj) Poss

prs-3sm

Thus, we have experience of space and time as the chief constituents. [PaVi:67; Smit]

The point is that these examples where a metaphorical Figure ‘comes’ or ‘goes’ should not be taken to either support or refute the hypothesis.

Before leaving this point, let us follow the ‘symptom’+*yeNe* exemplar full circle. The lack of or cessation (‘departure’) of the symptom or condition can sometimes (but not always) be expressed simply by substituting *ja*, e.g.:

79 phoD jaaNe
pimples go-Inf.
to stop having pimples [Vish]

My informant explained that *ja* can be used when the condition is a drawn-out one that occurs gradually and over a long period of time. Conditions that ‘come’ on suddenly *will*, in Marathi, ‘*ye*’, but *cannot* then ‘*ja*’. Instead, they can be semantically inverted with *kamii ye* ‘come less’:

80 mhanaje suuj kamii yeiil
means swelling less come-fut-3s

That will relieve you of swelling. [Ajit]

This turn of phrase, notice, slots back in to the hypothesized frame – COME/*ye* = ‘good’, as does its contrastive *ja* counterpart (below), where the ‘condition’ (*vyaadhiawasthaa*) ‘going

less' (*kamii hot jaaNe*) is clearly a 'bad' thing as it is cited as the 'main cause' of the subsequent digestion problem:

8I tyaamuLe vyaadhiawasThaa kamii hot jaaNe mhaNajech doshaanchaa
 accordingly condition(f.) less become- go-Inf means problem-Poss?
 Prs.Part

paak ghaDuun yet chaalalaa aahe,
 digestion(m.) happen-Conj.Part come-Prs.Part proceed-pst-3sm be-3s

If the condition is easing, then that's the main cause of the digestive problem [PaVi:49; Smit]

Thus we have seen a certain (although admittedly not compelling) amount of supportive evidence for the proposed "'good' deictic center" hypothesis. It was suggested in section 2.3 that 'ameliorative' and 'pejorative' change may be a systematic part of COME and GO's semantic development, as witnessed in the hitherto discovered cross-linguistic pervasiveness of the COME = 'good' / GO = 'bad' dyad (Sinha 1972, Clarke 1974, Treerat 1990). This claim can now be buttressed with the Marathi evidence, but more fundamentally, with the semantic 'attractor' of subjectification: To place the deictic centre at (the figurative location) 'good' is patently to align one's own perspective with one's own preferred situation. Thus subjectivity, which has already been so influential in the analysis, further consolidates its value as a causal explanation of semantic change in *ja* and *ye*.

Unfortunately, we have not had the benefit of a more exhaustive range of data nor of sufficient access to (or possession of) native-speaker intuition to decisively confirm (or disconfirm) Marathi's concordance with the "'good' deictic centre" hypothesis. We have presented some evidence suggesting concordance, and made some useful observations about

the phenomena from the Marathi perspective, but ultimately we must recommend that future work is still required on this topic.

3.5 Discussion

Before wrapping up this chapter we will briefly consider some of the general implications of the findings.

Firstly, and in agreement with Traugott and Dasher (2002:29), the findings indicate that “conceptual metonymy needs to be expanded to account for subjectification”. In the context of the metonymic extensions of *ja* and *ye* and their subjectivity-based causes, we observed numerous significant interrelationships between the two concepts.

The array of metaphorical applications to the basic senses, and at the same time of distinct metaphorically extended senses, can be understood with reference to the property of ‘dual reference’. Broadly characteristic of metaphor usage and understanding, ‘dual reference’ allows multiple senses and applications of words to be simultaneously (cognitively and linguistically) ‘active’, allowing them all ‘online’ access to each other’s semantic attributes (Glucksberg 2001:50, Israel 2005:155). This remarkable aspect of our linguistic faculties explains the ease with which we manage the dynamic continuum of literal-figurative meaning discussed in section 2.3.1.1. With regards to the dominant semantic domain of the data in this study (health, illness, healing), Kirmayer (2004) has found that the efficacy of many traditional healing practices relies on the mutually reinforcing effect of *synchronically interpreted multiple levels of meaning* (literal and figurative). In this study we have observed

ja and *ye* expressing a variety of literal and figurative meanings. This variety of levels of meaning may actually be functionally contributing to the discourses of healing that they are a part of (cf. Kirmayer 2004:42).

One final area which we do not have the space to cover, but will mention briefly, is the syntactic applications of *ja* and *ye*. Both *ja* and *ye* have a number of grammaticalized forms and functions, and within these they exhibit many of the same mechanisms and causal motivations that have been discussed with regards to their lexical manifestations. I would identify the integration of grammaticalized forms into regular studies of semantic shift as another area for future research in this field and language (cf. Robert 2008; Traugott & Dasher 2002; Heine & Kuteva 2002).

3.6 Summary

- The basic senses of *ja* and *ye* are similar in meaning, although not identical, to English *go* and *come*.
- Both crucially involve (i) movement, and (ii) implicit or explicit reference to one or more locations (Source and/or Goal).
- *Ye* is generally Goal oriented. The Goal is deictically referenced by the verb and is often subjectively (speaker) oriented but can be quite freely projected.
- *Ja*'s deictic properties are less explicit but also tend to be subjectively deictically referential. The Goal or Source orientation of *ja* depends on grammatically invited inference.
- Grammatically invited inference is also capable of generating many more general semantic variations with the basic senses.

- Extensions of meaning occur both *within* the basic senses by metaphorization, and also *from* them by associated mechanisms of metaphorization and metonymization.
- At least two distinct senses of *ye* and one of *ja* can be distinguished, although their classification is not unproblematic.
- The ‘result/core-constituent’ metonymic effect is largely a semantic shift towards (the ‘attractor’ of) subjectivity.
- Efficiency is also a subjectivity-grounded cause of semantic change.
- Expressivity as a cause illuminated some cognitive (image schemas) influences, and suggested some language-culture connections worthy of further investigation.
- *Ja* and *ye* conform to the “‘good’ deictic centre” hypothesis, although more evidence would strengthen this finding.
- The plasticity and flexibility of meaning, both inherently and in the context of language and our linguistic faculties, is fundamentally responsible for the variation observed in *ja* and *ye*, but remains far from fully understood.

Chapter Four: Conclusions

COME and GO are widespread but neither universal nor semantically primitive. As such there is still much new and interesting ground to cover regarding their special properties of meaning, both basic and extended, and within individual languages and cross-linguistically.

Deixis is an inherent feature of language. Moreover, it is inherently *complicating* in its dual influence in more structural aspects of language, and more applied areas like semantics and pragmatics. But also, it simultaneously *simplifies* communicative practice thanks to its directly referential capacity. As such we can observe deixis as attending all at once to our inclination to subjectivity (the default deictic center *me, here, now*), as well as to our requirements for communicative efficiency and expressivity. Deixis plays a key role in the meanings and uses of both basic and extended *ja* and *ye*, and more broadly of GO and COME. The extension of GO and COME's deictic properties from the 'literal' to the 'figurative' realm eloquently exemplifies the interplay of literal and figurative meaning.

Polysemy provides powerful theoretical tools for the explanation of a particular type of semantic change – where a single lexical item develops multiple senses. One of its primary mechanisms, metaphor, taps into the creative capacity of language (and people) to manipulate the dynamic (literal/figurative) potential of meaning. Underlying metaphor we can detect (through empirical means such as language) cognitive models called image schemas which structure our construal of the world in all its concreteness and abstractness. Image schemas can illuminate linkages between language, cognition and culture, but ultimately they are theoretical tools that empirically can neither be proven nor disproven.

Another of polysemy's main mechanisms, metonymy, is underpinned by forces both personal (subjectivity) and interpersonal (efficiency/expression, intersubjectivity). These semantic 'attractors' allow us to perceive a degree of regularity within a diversity of semantic change, including in that of *ja* and *ye*. Prototypicality provides yet another organizational model for the multiple complex structures and processes involved in semantic change.

Distinguishing polysemous senses (as with semantic theory in general) is fraught with theoretical and practical difficulties, ruling out any possible claims of absolute or exclusive 'truth'. The best we can hope for is what has been achieved here for *ja* and *ye*, namely a "redescription of semantic phenomena which classifies them according to a transparent and obvious – though not necessary or objective – set of criteria" (Riemer 2005:418-9). A principled investigative procedure was established and applied to the data, yielding a coherent account of the semantic 'facts' as witnessed in the actual usage of *ja* and *ye*.

All told, the theoretical examination and semantic analysis of *ja* and *ye* provided here suggest that the current linguistic paradigms for the study of motion verbs are inadequate. In too often focusing on one or other of the theoretical perspectives they over-simplify what is actually a complex interplay between various aspects of coinciding fields: The various cognitive, social and linguistic influences subsumed within semantic change towards polysemy, deixis, the language and conception of space, but to name a few. Also, much research on motion verbs is grounded in 'localist' hypotheses of the primacy of space, and branches out from there to the (apparently) less directly graspable figurative and metaphorical realms of language and meaning. In this respect it assumes rather than directly addresses some of the deeper perceptual and theoretical questions surrounding space,

cognition and language, and fails to provide a truly functional explanation that draws together our experiential reality and the subjective and intersubjective processes of creating and using 'meaning'. It is in this direction that I hope future excursions into the language of motion verbs will move.

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