



Partecipazione e Conflitto
 * *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*
<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco>
 ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)
 ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)
PACO, Issue 8(3) 2015: 695-717
 DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p695

Published in November 15, 2015

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

FRAMING SOCIETAL COSMOPOLITANISM IN EUROPE A Theoretical-Empirical Research Study

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ABSTRACT: Inspired by the notion of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ (Pendenza 2015a) – that combines attachment to local territory and openness towards others – social relations on the part of Europeans are tested empirically. The article posits that this type of cosmopolitanism can exist in concomitance with other relational forms towards Otherness. Its main characteristic lies in the idea that it is not nourished by the abstract principle according to which such status can be attributed only if one feels a ‘citizen of the world’. On the contrary, without totally rejecting the idea, societal cosmopolitanism maintains that if cosmopolitanism is to shrug off its abstraction, it requires a social anchorage to root it more firmly to real life. From a methodological perspective, a contrastive analysis is put in place relative to research carried out on European cosmopolitanism and subsequently tested empirically using data from EB71.3. Findings showed that almost 25.0% (30-40% in specific countries) of the European citizens fit the description ‘societal cosmopolitans’.

KEYWORDS:

Europe, Cosmopolitanism, Societal Cosmopolitanism, Belonging, Identity

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1. Introduction

The European identity still appears to be hovering on the horizon – seemingly a thick cloud struggling for definition in a motley, contrasting scenario. A *controversial identity*, as many have defined it, whose cultural dimension can be traced to the European myth as narrated by the ancient Greeks (Bloch 1935; Febvre [1944–45] 1999; Hay 1957; Chabod 1961; Mikkeli 1998). Such a long history weighs heavily on the building of a collective identity, the roots of which, though undeniably shared, are not sufficient to contribute to the process of shaping a single European space. It is a commonplace to say that geographical borders exist: currently there are 28 countries comprising the European Union, all quite different from a political and cultural perspective, which render even more indeterminate the European social space. In this respect, countries such as Sweden, Great Britain and Denmark share a territory from an institutional (but not a monetary) perspective, as do Cyprus and Bulgaria. One day in the future perhaps, Islamic Turkey will become part of the European Council and will discuss legislation and endorse treaties with Catholic countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy or with Orthodox Greece, its long-standing enemy. At the beginning, everything was much simpler. The six founding countries of the European Economic Community were all Christian democracies and their common ground was far more extensive and defined. Nowadays, such common ground is shrinking and in the future, obviously, will shrink even further, leaving room for only a controversial, abstract definition of common identity. If the political borders of Europe are now tending to shift towards the East (to Balkan, ex-communist and Orthodox countries) as seems to be the case, then clearly, European policies will become less and less marked by *substantial integration* and more and more by *formal integration*. One might ask what can Western European Christians, Southern European Muslims and Eastern European Christian-Orthodox citizens possibly have in common? Perhaps, as Habermas's (2001) concept of 'constitutional patriotism' would maintain, might it be possible to forego a cultural identity in favour (hopefully) of a sense of European institutions?

To aim at constituting a European society by means of a formal process of integration obviously bears its own risks and positive results cannot always be guaranteed, as the consequences of both economic integration (the Euro) and the economic institutions governing the process (the European Central Bank and Free Trade Treaties) have proved. Notwithstanding, it is undeniable that strong efforts have been made in the direction of effective European social and cultural integration. The EU can count on increasing legislation and a Court of Justice capable of administering it. A series of measures already in place by virtue of the European treaties (concerning European citi-

zenship, the Euro currency, a focus on the importance of human rights, and culture as a world heritage) has certainly determined a shift in attention on the part of European public opinion and far more stringent expectations from the European constitutive project. However, while citizens are asking for more and for a better Europe, at the same time more Euro-sceptic and even anti-European attitudes are emerging. Thus certain individual and public behaviours, such as France's and The Netherlands' 'no' to the Constitutional Treaty of Europe, and the success of anti-European political parties in the recent 2014 European election, cast some doubts on the consensus reserved for the project, because Europe, it is said, must not be merely useful but must also be imbued with meaning. In other words, without a soul, what kind of Europe can it be (Cerrutti and Rudolph 2001)?

From this perspective, efforts of interpretation and orientation are required of the social sciences and of sociology in particular (García-Faroldi 2008; 2009; Pendenza 2012). Over recent decades the issue of Europe has erupted in various academic disciplines. Currently what is lacking is a general framework for interpreting the complex processes at work in Europe and globally, in order to frame events such as the rejection by France and The Netherlands of the EU Constitutional Treaty and the wide support for Marine Le Pen. At the same time, what is also lacking is more targeted research on specific transnational issues. In other words, sociological reflection on Europe requires more *empirical* investigation and more precise *theoretical* frames. For example, what exactly does 'European society' mean and can we state that it actually exists? Furthermore, sociology must test whether the analytical categories used to date in relation to national societies can in fact work for supra-national societies. Sociology has always reasoned in terms of national societies, such as French, Italian or German, and less often in terms of European, Asiatic, African or global societies nor of Padanian, Catalanian or Basque societies, and so on. However, it now has to enquire *whether* and to *what extent* the ontology of the nation is still methodologically valid. This is necessary in order to comprehend our present-day world, characterised as it is by a marked degree of global connectivity, blurred geographical borders, and lifestyles ever more impacted by local and global interlinks.

Cosmopolitan sociology, with its revision of 'methodological nationalism' as one of its constituent traits, is currently moving along these lines (Beck 2002; Fine 2003; Chernilo 2006; Turner 2006; Pendenza 2014a).¹ One of the recurring questions concerns

¹ Cosmopolitan sociology is at the same time a new field of investigation and a different sociological approach to the analysis of the globalisation process and its outcomes. This field is characterised by a marked interdisciplinary nature and its focus is on processes of socialisation, by means of which individu-

the cosmopolitan nature and shaping of Europe and its citizens (Habermas 2003; Delanty 2005; Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck and Grande 2007; Rumford 2007). Cosmopolitan sociology, with its at times engagé attitudes, has often addressed European public opinion in terms of advocating an even more cosmopolitan Europe (see, for example, Habermas (2011) and Beck (2013)). However, its most significant achievement lies in having shown – better than other approaches – the actual delineating of cosmopolitan institutions in Europe and a growing cosmopolitan vision of European citizens, both of which are the result of transnational processes within and external to European territory. By examining closely the tensions relative to European identity, scholars of cosmopolitan sociology have shown how such tensions are becoming subject to a much more self-reflexive and transformative process, the consequences of which could impact on people’s approach to the Other. In other words, they conclude that self-reflection on the issue of belonging both to local and to supra-national entities can effectively give rise to a genuine cosmopolitan identity. The observation of such a process is one of the remits of cosmopolitan sociology’s empirical research (Roudometof 2005; Olofsson and Öhman 2007; Roudometof and Haller 2007; Pichler 2008, 2009a/b; 2012; Haller and Routometof 2010). It has often happened that researchers have had to rely on secondary sources not really theoretically appropriate for cosmopolitan framing. However, many authors have simply exploited such data to show that multiple identities and cosmopolitan social relations actually exist and are already widespread in Europe. Rather than the findings of such studies, what is of particular interest to us is how cosmopolitanism has been conceptualised and operationalised. The main objective of our work is to frame the empirical evidence of a specific variety of cosmopolitanism, which we have defined as ‘*societal cosmopolitanism*’ (Pendenza 2015a/b).

2. Societal Cosmopolitanism: Rethinking Cosmopolitanism from a Local Perspective

In its classical sense, cosmopolitanism is mainly a normative conception of the world and it develops in a variety of forms. This implies that a certain tension exists between the concept and its concrete expression. In this respect, cosmopolitanism can be envisaged as a value that embraces others within our vision (and us in theirs) seeking a

als, social groups and institutions face the challenges of ever more transnational social phenomena. See *Special Issue on Cosmopolitan Sociology in Quaderni di Teoria Sociale* (Pendenza 2014b).

common point of reference which could be the world. From this point of view, cosmopolitanism has both a universalistic and a liberal connotation, as its focus is on the obligations individuals and their groups have towards one another outside their own milieu and its link with 'human rights'. Notwithstanding, cosmopolitanism is not immune from post-colonialist criticism relative to the hegemonic role played by Europe and the West and from the accusation of abstract rationalism expressed by particular 'contextual theory' approaches. This is especially true of cosmopolitan theory that, despite emphasising the value of openness towards others, highlights the role played by the historical-cultural context in validating the normative conception of cosmopolitanism.

Both conceptions could be wrong or incomplete. Perhaps an intermediate position is more realistic: in other words, one that acknowledges at the same time the existence of particular universal human and individual capacities with respect to resolving specific issues and the fact that such solutions can be influenced, but not determined by, the cultural context. Is this feasible? Is there any proof? Is this theory effectively descriptive of reality? The relation between cultural context, cognitive capacity and normative principles is highly contingent and always open to different outcomes. This makes diversity possible. Political philosophy claims this as a 'justificationist' approach (Habermas 1996; Benhabib 2004), the focus of which is on procedures as opposed to assumptions. In contrast, in sociology it is sustained by the advocates of 'critical cosmopolitanism' (Delanty 2006), for whom the focus is on the openness of encountering different cultures and their contaminating nature. In addition, from the perspective of *societal cosmopolitanism* we affirm the coexistence of a 'universalism' and 'particularism', whereby societal cosmopolitanism has the specific capacity to think beyond the cultural context without detachment from it (Pendenza 2015a/b). In other words, societal cosmopolitanism is a *cosmopolitanism grounded in the social*.

With a few exceptions, cosmopolitanism has always been presented as the standard-bearer of universalism versus particularism, the expression of the interests of humanity against those of this or that local community. Since the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope – self-declared 'citizens of the world' – to the time of the Greek and Roman Stoics, Zeno of Cizio, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, and finally to Erasmus of Rotterdam, Kant and the Enlightenment philosophers, cosmopolitanism has always maintained the 'particular', epistemologically and culturally speaking, an impediment to building a universal human community and universal Reason. Diogenes, for example, repudiated the definition of 'self' as determined by local origin or by belonging to a particular group. On the contrary, he connoted it in its universal sense (Nussbaum 1997, 5). For this tradition of thought, what counted most was the individual above all and, to a certain extent, the State. These scholars maintained that social relations were not influenced by

specific groups or a historical *milieu*, and that the social setting did not affect progress and development in any way. Their conviction has resulted in a focus on the value of universal solidarity which welcomes everything, provided it is detached from any specific social root, and the underestimation of particular elements, national or local, which, on the contrary, fix existence to a concrete historic-cultural reality. Such a conflicting view has been seriously contested by many intellectual cosmopolitans (the so-called *new cosmopolitans*). New cosmopolitans maintain that a reconciliation is not only possible but that it is extremely necessary (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Pollock et al. 2000; Hollinger 2001; Turner 2002; Calhoun 2003; Fine 2003; Mazlish 2005; Delanty 2006). Probably, the outcome would be the resolution of an ontological dichotomy, in which often only local experience and lifestyles – *implicitly* presented as miserable, backward, provincial, conservative, naïve and narrow-minded – have been denigrated (Tomlinson 1999, 96).

The conflict between ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘localism’ – briefly mentioned here – has obliged cosmopolitanism to account to itself for provoking a rift in its echelons. The outcome has been a sharp forking off in two directions: (a) on the one hand, those who still have the propensity for a traditional version of cosmopolitanism – which we could define as universalist and *liberal* – who reject the social and all that is local and concrete; (b) on the other, those who uphold a version of embedded cosmopolitanism – which we prefer to denominate *societal* – for whom an opening towards a particular social milieu, as an embedded element of the universal, would be more opportune.² Although the two versions of cosmopolitanism have in common the fact of considering the individual as a citizen of the world who is loyal to the world community of human beings (Sheffler 1999, 258), the difference between the two is quite evident. While for the liberal cosmopolitans diversity is a problem, for the societal cosmopolitans it is a ‘fact’ to reckon with. If for the former the world can be united without the need for the anchorage of particular cultures – except for the Western culture – and the local milieu becomes an obstacle to universal solidarity, for the latter, global unity can be achieved only by giving importance to those with whom we are closely linked and with whom we share customary (even imagined) solidarity. Both versions of cosmopolitanism are diffident with regard to closing out barriers: while for the liberal version these are to be

²There are various ways of denominating this combination, many of which present few or almost imperceptible differences, for example: ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Cohen 1992; Ackerman 1994), ‘thin cosmopolitanism’ (Dobson 2006), ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Robbins 1998), ‘embedded cosmopolitanism’ (Erskine 2000), ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ (Nielson 1999; Brett and Moran 2011), not to mention national interpretations of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Cronin 2003; Calhoun 2006). For a more in-depth analysis of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’, see Pendenza (2015a).

feared the most, for the societal version they are merely a contingent, fleeting necessity for intimate and supportive relations (Hollinger 2001, 239). In other words, for *societal cosmopolitanism* it is useful to revitalise the tension between its constitutive ideals, relating the two, in order to recuperate ‘the local’ – more often declined as ‘national’ – *without detracting from its universal character*. The point is that societal cosmopolitanism rejects a logic of dichotomy, considered inadequate to understanding a reality in which every single thing is linked to all the others, and legitimises, on the contrary, the dynamic play of the two extremes as it considers them both essential elements of contemporary cosmopolitan thought.

The tension between the concept and the expression related to the cosmopolitan approach and its pluralistic effects is the backdrop to our research paper, the nature of which is both theoretical and empirical. However, our intention is not that of debating a theoretical position which has been clearly delineated in previous works (Pendenza 2015a) but to use it as a frame within which to analyse our empirical data. We intend to attest the theoretical validity of the notion of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ and to show that ‘united in diversity’ is not merely a motto of the European Union. To achieve this outcome, Eurobarometer 71.3 data will be used (European Commission 2009). We aim to show that besides the two predictable clusters of Europeans emerging from the findings – that is, the ‘nationalists/locals’ and the ‘cosmopolitans’ (in more limited numbers) – there is also another cluster which efficaciously combines *a sense of belonging to ‘the local’ and openness towards Others* and renders concrete the notion of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’.

3. Detecting Cosmopolitan/Local Attitudes in Europe

In our study, we intend to use Eurobarometer data (2009) to detect the extent of cosmopolitan attitudes of a ‘societal’ nature from a cross-national perspective relative to the citizens of the European Union. Beforehand however, we analyse some empirical research that has dealt with the constitution of European identity within the theoretical frame of cosmopolitanism. In support of our research and from a methodological perspective, we are interested mainly in how the authors have worked on and operationalised the concept of cosmopolitanism. In particular, we examine how the notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ has been associated with that of ‘the local’, that is, how widespread is the universalistic and classical conception of cosmopolitanism – one that privileges abstract openness towards Others rather than towards one’s own country-

men – compared to that with a focus on universalism and particularism envisaged not as antithetic but as coexistent.

Roudometof (2005) has thrown new light on the diffusion of a cosmopolitan sentiment in a cross-national perspective and has analysed in depth its characteristics compared to a national-local sense of belonging. From a conceptual point of view, he divides, above all, transnationalism from cosmopolitanism.³ For Roudometof, while the former ‘is an emergent property that is born out of internal globalization [that does] not refer to qualitative feelings or attitudes of individuals’, the latter refers, on the contrary, to an *attitude* which renders people ‘more “open” towards the world’ (Roudometof 2005, 118 and 122). Conceptually, he maintains, furthermore, that the individual under the pressure of globalisation expresses sentiments ranging from openness and comprehension towards others (*cosmopolitan attitudes*) to closure and defensive feelings (*local or parochial attitudes*).⁴ In this sense, the cosmopolitanism–localism continuum is measured by Roudometof as the attachment to specific places, institutions, cultures and economies, where ‘low’ or ‘high’ values correspond respectively to cosmopolitan or local attitudes.⁵ Roudometof is aware that his is an indirect measurement of cosmopolitanism, not dissimilar in method to that used for other concepts in sociology. However, he considers it a legitimate and valid instrumental tool for working empirically on the issue. To avoid confusion, Roudometof distinguishes between a rooted cosmopolitanism and a thin/cool cosmopolitanism (or *cosmopolitanism-as-detachment*). While the former is the outcome of routine transnational experiences, the latter, on the contrary, is not linked to a context-specific sense of belonging, but indicates a change in values with effects at both local and global levels. In other words, thin cosmopolitanism is an attitude towards life and the world not rooted in specifically local experiences but in global ones. Obviously, this does not mean that indifference exists between the two types of cosmopolitanism. Although Roudometof tends to suggest a direct link between local sense of belonging and local attitude, he himself believes that ‘the existence of universalized, “thin/cool” cosmopolitanism does not necessarily exclude the possibility of rooted or context-specific cosmopolitanism’ (2005, 127). The advantage of this point of view, with which we are in agreement, lies in the explicit *re-*

³ This, Roudometof explains, is to avoid falling into the epistemological trap of which Beck (2002) himself was a victim, whereby cosmopolitanism is, at the same time, both its own cause and its own effect.

⁴ According to Roudometof, transnationalism (i.e. ‘transnational experiences’) is distinguished as a kind of infrastructure for cosmopolitanism, although not – in divergence from Beck (2005) – in a deterministic sense. Roudometof maintains, in fact, that the relation between the two ‘can (and should) be considered an open-ended question’ (2005, 122).

⁵ In Roudometof’s words: ‘cosmopolitans and locals occupy the opposite ends of a continuum consisting of various forms of attachment’ (2005, 124).

butting of the thesis which excludes any relation whatsoever between ‘cosmopolitanism-as-openness’ and ‘context-specific sense of belonging’. In theory, this approach underlines the pluralistic nature of the cosmopolitan attitude for which adherence to universalistic values is not simplistically opposed to the embedded character of daily relations.

The ambivalent nature of the cosmopolitan attitude is grasped effectively by Olofsson and Öhman (2007). These authors are of the opinion that the concept is far too wide to be detected merely by means of a territorial sense of belonging.⁶ Therefore, though on the one hand they do not invalidate Roudometof’s theory, with which they in fact concur, on the other hand they operationalise cosmopolitanism using not one but two empirical dimensions, capable, in their view, of enhancing its complex nature. From a methodological perspective, they distinguish an ‘identity’ dimension of cosmopolitanism – which they develop empirically by means of the ‘global–local’ continuum – from a more ‘cultural’ one, operationalised through the ‘protectionism–openness’ continuum. The two scales highlight the empirical complexity of cosmopolitanism and by combining them Olofsson and Öhman create a four-cluster matrix: ‘local protectionists’, ‘open globals’, ‘global protectionists’ and ‘open locals’. The latter cluster is of particular interest in that it sanctions the coexistence of solidarity towards one’s own community and the non-exclusion of outsiders. In other words, the plausibility is confirmed both of people’s attachment to their own territory and the enrichment resulting from cultural exchanges.

In line with Olofsson and Öhman, Pichler (2008; 2009a/b; 2011) also considers it more opportune to operationalise cosmopolitanism by means of two dimensions rather than one. The first dimension is what he defines as ‘identity approach’, subjective and based on feelings of belonging; the second, more objective, dimension he defines as ‘attitudinal’ and relates to particular attitudes towards diversity.⁷ Furthermore, conceptually Pichler does not deny that cosmopolitanism can indicate, above all, being a ‘citizen of the world’ and as such is mainly the expression of ‘a sentiment towards a community of people beyond national boundaries’ (2009a, 7). Like the other authors, however, he acknowledges the coexistence of this sentiment and the sense of proximity with nearer geographical contexts, although this point of view does not always emerge from his empirical works. He declares, for example, that ‘the findings indicate

⁶ From Merton (1964) onwards, this was the most widespread form of operationalisation of cosmopolitanism.

⁷ This dimension was operationalised by Pichler (2009b) by means of only one variable in his research using EVS data and by means of two (‘ethical orientation’ and ‘political orientation’) in that using WVS data (Pichler 2011).

that a large share of people feel close to other Europeans in addition to groups of people within the nation-state' (ibid., 18). In another study, Pichler underlines, in contrast, the fact that 'the stronger the cosmopolitan orientation, the smaller the share of people belonging to the locality in the first place' (2009b, 721). Hence the contradiction which, in effect, is only apparent. He is in fact convinced that the issue of the link between universalism and particularism has not been resolved at all. In other words, according to Pichler neither the approach that accepts the coexistence of the two nor the contrary approach which rejects such coexistence, can claim to be empirically proved. In this respect, the rather rhetorical question he poses – 'are people really "more cosmopolitan" if they feel relatively an attachment to the global?' (ibid., 726) – would seem to confirm this view. Our research starts from this premise.

4. Investigating Societal Cosmopolitanism

4.1. Constructing the dependent variable

The 71.3 Eurobarometer (EB) edition (European Commission 2009) will be used to prove the existence amongst Europeans of a cluster of *societal cosmopolitans*, that is, people who, although they feel attachment for neighbouring territories, are also open towards diversity. To analyse this cluster, which represents the dependent variable, two research questions present in the EB have been combined: one linked to 'cosmopolitan identity' (more subjective) and one addressed to detecting cosmopolitan and open attitudes on the part of the interviewees (more objective). We define the latter as 'moral cosmopolitanism'.

Research question no. 1 ('cosmopolitan identity'): *To what extent do you personally feel you are... European, national, inhabitant of your region, citizen of the world?* Responses were ranked on a 1–4 point Likert scale. Although there was no query on attachment to 'local area', we did however distinguish a sense of belonging which marked a more territorial deep-rootedness ('region' and 'country') compared with that of a more cosmopolitan grounding ('Europe' and 'world'). From the combination of responses concerning the feeling of belonging to the four territories, we measured the extent of attachment on a left (negative value) to right (positive value) scale, from region to world. The resulting 7 point Likert scale provided a range in synthesis indicating: ('-3') those with a marked sense of belonging to the surrounding territory; ('+3') those with a marked sense of belonging to distant territories; ('0') those with a sense of be-

longing to both.⁸ Table 1 shows, in percentages, how the Europeans of the EU-27 are ranked on our scale, by individual country and as a whole.

Table 1 – Distribution of the local–cosmopolitan scale of sense of belonging

	← Local sentiments						Both	Cosmopolitan sentiments →					
	-3	-2.5	-2	-1.5	-1	-0.5		0	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5
FR	2.4	3.3	9.1	13.4	17.1	16.4	28.0	5.7	3.1	1.2	0.3	0.1	-
BE	1.0	2.2	4.5	9.7	17.5	18.4	35.7	6.4	2.6	1.4	0.6	0.1	-
NET	1.2	1.6	7.1	12.3	22.5	21.6	20.7	7.3	3.3	1.4	0.8	0.2	-
GE-W	2.1	3.5	4.8	14.7	20.4	20.4	22.5	5.9	3.5	1.6	0.6	-	-
IT	2.2	5.2	8.8	16.6	19.5	13.5	25.6	4.9	2.7	0.6	0.3	-	-
LUX	0.2	1.1	3.4	9.5	19.3	12.2	28.8	8.5	8.4	5.9	2.3	0.4	-
DEN	1.4	1.8	4.5	12.5	22.8	20.3	26.7	6.8	1.8	0.7	0.5	-	0.2
IR	0.7	2.2	4.9	13.0	26.9	25.0	22.9	2.2	1.0	0.8	0.4	-	-
GB	5.4	4.9	9.6	15.9	17.3	18.7	18.2	4.8	2.7	2.0	0.3	0.1	0.1
N-IR	1.0	1.8	5.4	17.1	12.3	20.1	24.3	8.7	7.4	0.8	0.9	0.3	-
GR	3.2	5.3	10.6	16.0	25.8	20.2	16.1	1.4	1.0	0.4	0.1	-	-
SP	1.7	1.6	4.3	6.8	17.7	15.6	41.1	7.4	2.2	1.1	0.1	0.4	-
PO	2.7	1.5	4.3	10.3	26.7	19.6	29.8	3.1	1.9	0.1	-	0.1	-
GE-E	1.9	5.2	9.0	20.9	20.4	14.5	21.6	4.9	0.4	0.6	0.5	-	0.1
FIN	1.4	2.1	8.6	19.6	25.1	21.4	16.1	4.2	1.2	0.3	-	-	-
SWE	0.6	0.9	4.5	7.7	22.1	24.4	32.6	5.0	1.7	0.5	0.1	-	-
AUS	1.7	3.8	10.3	19.2	20.1	21.3	18.9	3.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	-	-
CYP	1.1	1.9	9.6	14.1	26.1	25.6	17.9	1.8	0.9	0.4	0.5	-	-
CZ	3.1	7.1	14.5	22.9	21.7	16.9	11.4	1.7	0.7	-	-	-	-
EST	1.8	2.1	7.5	13.0	24.2	20.2	27.1	2.6	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.1	-
HUN	1.6	2.6	7.4	17.0	26.2	23.8	18.7	1.8	0.6	0.3	-	-	-
LAT	4.2	4.4	10.3	19.0	23.1	15.2	17.5	3.4	2.0	0.5	0.2	0.1	-
LIT	2.8	3.1	7.0	9.6	30.9	23.6	17.5	3.6	1.5	0.3	-	-	-
MAL	1.0	0.6	5.1	8.2	20.4	25.0	33.0	3.7	2.8	0.1	-	-	-
POL	2.8	4.7	8.9	13.6	23.0	19.5	22.4	3.8	0.8	0.3	0.1	-	0.1
SK	0.5	1.5	4.1	9.6	22.8	20.0	36.0	3.4	1.2	0.8	-	-	-
SI	1.7	2.4	8.4	11.2	21.4	17.6	31.7	3.4	1.6	0.6	0.1	-	-
BUL	8.7	8.3	13.2	15.6	24.7	13.1	14.4	1.1	0.6	0.3	-	-	-
ROM	0.3	0.6	2.4	5.3	13.0	27.3	45.2	4.5	0.9	0.2	0.3	-	-
UE-27	2.5	3.6	7.5	13.7	19.9	18.4	25.6	4.9	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.1	0.0

Source: EB 71.3 (2009)

⁸ The scale – borrowed from Recchi's research on European identity (2013, 197) – was constructed by subtracting the combined average score obtained relative to attachment to 'region' and 'country' from that relative to attachment to 'Europe' and the 'world'. In other words, the values are the result of the difference between the average of the first two territories and that of the other two. For example, someone may not be attached in any way to Europe and the world (average score equal to '0'), but, conversely, may be extremely attached to their 'country' and 'region' (average score equal to '+3'); if '+3' is subtracted from '0', the result is '-3', i.e. the maximum value for attachment to local territory.

As can be seen, the most frequent response for the EU-27 as a whole is the feeling of belonging to the four territories indistinctly (25.6%). Values indicative of local feelings (all in the negative range) appear much more frequently than those for cosmopolitan feelings (all in the positive range), to the extent that only 9 persons of the 26,577 interviewed indicate a value of '+3' and only 20 persons indicate a value of '+2.5'. Values indicative of moderate 'local' sentiments ('-1' and '-0.5') are the most frequent, with almost 4 out of 10 Europeans selecting this category of attachment. Despite marked differences between the various countries, the highest percentage of 'local' sentiments emerged from countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Latvia; the lowest percentage emerged in Romania, France, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. Interviewees from just 4 countries indicated the maximum value for cosmopolitan identity ('+3') – Denmark, Great Britain, East Germany and Poland – with few countries presenting average or high values ('+2.5' and '+2') in this category.

Research question no. 2 ('moral cosmopolitan'): *Please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: 'People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our country)'*.⁹ Table 2 shows how the opinion of the Europeans on this issue is distributed.

Table 2 'People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our country)'

Country	Tend to disagree	Tend to agree	Country	Tend to disagree	Tend to agree
Malta	92.2	7.8	Germany East	39.1	60.9
Greece	68.1	31.9	Latvia	37.3	62.7
Cyprus (Republic)	66.0	34.0	Portugal	36.5	63.5
Austria	56.5	43.5	Romania	35.6	64.4
Czech Republic	54.5	45.5	Northern Ireland	33.3	66.7
Italy	49.5	50.5	Poland	32.0	68.0
Slovenia	49.5	50.5	Denmark	29.9	70.1
Hungary	49.0	51.0	France	29.6	70.4
Belgium	47.1	52.9	Luxembourg	28.4	71.6
Lithuania	46.6	53.4	Spain	28.4	71.6
Bulgaria	46.1	53.9	The Netherlands	27.3	72.7
Slovakia	45.5	54.5	Finland	24.5	75.5
Ireland	40.4	59.6	Germany West	22.7	77.3
Great Britain	39.7	60.3	Sweden	15.0	85.0
Estonia	39.3	60.7	<i>UE-27</i>	<i>36.0</i>	<i>64.0</i>

Source: EB 71.3 (2009)

⁹ A similar research question was posed by Mau, Mewes and Zimmerman (2008) to measure openness toward difference.

The next step in building the dependent variable (i.e. ‘societal cosmopolitanism’) was that of cross-tabulating on the matrix the two research questions concerning ‘cosmopolitan identity’ and ‘moral cosmopolitanism’. See Table 3.

Table 3 – Societal cosmopolitanism

	2. Moral cosmopolitanism (immigrants enrich cultural life)		Total
	Tend to disagree	Tend to agree	
1. Cosmopolitan identity			
-3	330	163	493
-2.5	504	284	788
-2	844	768	1,612
-1.5	1,375	1,636	3,011
-1	1,660	2,741	4,401
-0.5	1,380	2,800	4,180
0	1,568	4,332	5,900
0.5	259	946	1,205
1	113	401	514
1.5	30	199	229
2	14	66	80
2.5	1	17	18
3	0	9	9
TOTAL	8,078	14,362	22,440

Source: EB 71.3 (2009)

As the table shows, in line with the theory of cosmopolitanism, persons with identities that are detached from the surrounding territory tend to be more open towards others, while those more attached to their local territory tend to be in disagreement with the statement ‘people from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our country)’. The correlation between ‘cosmopolitan identity’ and ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ is thus statistically significant. This means that persons with identity values from ‘-3’ to ‘-1’ (local) are less likely to believe that the presence of immigrants enriches their cultural life, while those with values of ‘-0.5’ upwards (cosmopolitan) are more likely to believe it. The focus of our research was to verify, empirically, the presence of persons with both a local territory identity and an attitude of moral cosmopolitanism. In Table 3, the individuals with such characteristics are highlighted in grey – 5,592 cases, almost 25.0% of those interviewed.

Again, significant differences between the individual countries emerge regarding the variable ‘societal cosmopolitanism’. See Table 4.

Table 4 – Societal cosmopolitans by country

Country	%	Country	%
Finland	39.8	Estonia	23.3
Bulgaria	34.6	Ireland	21.9
Latvia	34.1	Italy	20.0
Germany East	30.4	Slovenia	18.0
The Netherlands	27.9	Northern Ireland	16.9
Germany West	27.9	Luxembourg	16.7
Sweden	27.8	Spain	16.7
Poland	27.2	Slovakia	16.7
Czech Republic	26.8	Greece	14.1
Denmark	24.7	Austria	12.5
Great Britain	24.3	Cyprus (Republic)	12.3
France	24.0	Belgium	11.9
Portugal	23.9	Romania	9.7
Lithuania	23.8	Malta	2.4
Hungary	23.6	<i>EU-27</i>	<i>22.9</i>

Source: EB 71.3 (2009)

In the cases of Finland, Bulgaria and Latvia more than 1 citizen out of 3 emerges as a societal cosmopolitan; in contrast, societal cosmopolitanism emerges in fewer than 1 in 5 citizens from Slovenia, Northern Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Austria, Cyprus (Republic), Belgium, Romania, and especially Malta. The greater or lesser number of persons in this cluster depends, obviously, on the number of people who are both attached to their local territory and who have an attitude of openness. However, the greater weight has to be attributed to 'moral cosmopolitanism' (openness), given that national differences – in both relative and absolute terms – between the number of respondents with local identities are fewer than those detected between the number of respondent open attitudes. This explains the 2.4% result for societal cosmopolitanism in Malta, where only 7.8% of the population sample considers that people from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of one's country and the 39.8% result in Finland, where 75.5% of the sample are moral cosmopolitans.

4.2. Constructing the independent variable

Once the dependent variable was built – of a dichotomist nature ('1' for those with a local identity and at the same time open towards others; '0' for the remaining cases) – the next step was to calculate three logistic regression models to discern the factors

that favour or hinder the profile of the societal cosmopolitans. New variables were then added to each model. The independent variables used were of three types:

a) Socio-demographic variables (Model 1)

These are: gender, age, level of instruction, type of residence, political ideology and nationality of interviewees ('1' for a national of the country, '0' for a foreign national) and of their parents ('1' if they are nationals of the country, '0' if one or both are foreign nationals). From the findings we would expect that better educated people living in urban areas would be more cosmopolitan (Pichler 2009b), and likewise foreign nationals.

b) Elements of national identity (Model 2)

In this case, various elements are used as dummy variables for the interviewees to grade in order of importance, in terms of considering themselves as members of the same national community. Some are of a more 'ethnic' nature (four elements), others of a more 'civic' character (four elements): 'to be Christian', 'to share cultural traditions', 'to be born in the country', 'to have at least one national parent', 'to feel national', 'to master the official language', 'to exercise citizens' rights', 'to have been brought up in the country'. Some of these items have already been used in analysing cosmopolitanism. Olafsson and Öhman (2007), for example, in order to measure cosmopolitanism in Sweden, included in their analysis a research question on the importance of 'sharing cultural traditions to be Swedish'.

c) National context (Model 3)

As pointed out by Vertovec and Cohen (2002) and by Pichler (2009), the State is an important player in the formation of cosmopolitan sentiments. Public policies adopted in response to issues of globalization, socio-political culture, number of immigrants, type of national building, and so on, are significant factors impacting on the degree of openness towards others. To take into account such national contexts, using Italy as the country of reference, each EU member country was included as a dummy variable.

4.3. Findings

Table 5 shows the findings for the three models proposed. The first includes only the socio-demographic variable, the second takes into account also the elements of national identification and the third adds national contexts. The interpretation of the odds ratio is simple: values below '1' indicate a negative association between the dependent and independent variables (i.e. the likelihood that the case of a social cosmopolitan will occur is lower), while values higher than '1' show a positive association. The

inclusion of new variables improved the previous model but the most complete case was that in which the countries were included, increasing fourfold the explication capacity of Model 3 compared to Model 2 (R2 increases from 0.014 to 0.066).

Table 5 – Logistic regression. Dependent variable: ‘societal cosmopolitanism’

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>			
Constant	0.234***	0.187***	0.280***
Gender (ref. male)	0.883***	0.883**	0.889**
Age (ref. 35 to 44)			
15 to 24	0.761**	0.774**	0.756**
25 to 34	0.880*		
45 to 54			
55 to 64			
65+	1.209***	1.224***	1.130*
Education (ref. students)			
No education			
Primary education	0.774**		
Secondary education			
University			
Ideology (Left-right scale)			0.975**
Size of community (ref. rural)			
Medium-sized city			0.899**
Large city	0.880**	0.875**	0.820***
National origin interviewee	1.410***	1.393***	1.320**
National origin both parents	1.233**	1.249**	1.208*
<i>Elements of national identity</i>			
To be Christian		0.862*	
Share cultural traditions		1.167***	1.161***
Be born in the country			
National parentage			
Feeling national		1.161***	1.144***
Exercise citizens’ rights			
Grow up in the country		1.131**	1.105*
Participation			
To master language			
<i>Countries (ref. Italy)</i>			
France			
Belgium			0.390***
The Netherlands			
Germany West			
Luxembourg			0.665**
Denmark			
Ireland			0.704**

Great Britain			
Northern Ireland			0.677*
Greece			0.492***
Spain			0.592***
Portugal			
Germany East			
Finland			2.004***
Sweden			
Austria			0.436***
Cyprus (Republic)			0.357***
Czech Republic			
Estonia			
Hungary			
Latvia			1.616***
Lithuania			
Malta			0.054***
Poland			
Slovakia			0.543***
Slovenia			0.570***
Bulgaria			1.338**
Romania			0.297***
Chi-squared	131.683***	183.038***	843.343***
R ² Nagelkerke	0.010	0.014	0.066
n	18983	18983	18983

Odds ratio. Sig: * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

Source: EB 71.3 (2009)

As can be seen in Model 1, women, young people, less educated people and those who live in large cities are less likely to be societal cosmopolitans; on the contrary, all the older people and those born in or with relatives born in the national territory are more likely to be so. These findings are predictable if we consider our target cluster: people who are more open towards others yet with a deep-rooted attachment to their local territory: in other words, people born in the national territory, living in small communities rather than large.

In the second model, previous findings are confirmed – except for the reference to the primary level of education, which no longer has significance – with four identity elements appearing as relevant. In particular, to be a Christian does not seem to affect the odds of becoming a societal cosmopolitan; conversely, sharing cultural traditions, feeling ‘national’ and being brought up in the country – all elements of a more ‘civic’ and ‘voluntaristic’ rather than ‘ethnic’ nature – would indicate greater likelihood of becoming so. As can be seen, the type of their national identity has a clear impact on the

greater or lesser likelihood of people becoming societal cosmopolitans.¹⁰ Finally, Model 3 takes into account national contexts. As shown, 15 of 26 EU member countries are statistically different from Italy, also taking into account socio-demographic and national character variables. Before analysing these differences it should be noted that in Model 3 political ideology and the dimensions of the cities gain relevance: those who live in medium-sized cities and have a right-wing political orientation are less likely to become societal cosmopolitans. Regarding national contexts, the most interesting finding is that except for Finland, Latvia and Bulgaria, all the other countries have in common that, compared to Italy, their citizens show less likelihood to become societal cosmopolitans. The most significant differences are reported by the new members of the EU. However, it is possible to detect negative divergences also in the founding countries of the EU, as in the case of Belgium and Luxembourg, and in certain Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Spain. Conversely, in other founding countries such as The Netherlands and Germany, Northern European countries such as Denmark and Sweden, and those of Eastern Europe such as Estonia, Poland and Hungary, the odds are not exceedingly different from those of Italy. It is not simple to find an explanation for differences between countries which, in theory, are in close proximity, or to explain similarities in countries with historical, economic and cultural profiles that are quite different. In any event, our findings show the importance of also taking into account macro factors in attempting to interpret complex phenomena such as cosmopolitanism, as previous studies have shown regarding Europeanism (García-Faroldi, 2009).

5. Conclusion

With reference to the notion of cosmopolitanism, defined as ‘societal’ in previous works (Pendenza 2015a/b), our approach was to consider observing the social relations of Europeans, starting from the hypothesis that this type of cosmopolitanism – combining attachment to local territory and openness towards others – exists in concomitance with other forms of attitude towards Otherness. The main characteristic of ‘societal cosmopolitanism’, which distinguishes it from other concepts of cosmopolitanism, lies in the idea that it is not nourished by the abstract principle according to which the status of cosmopolitanism can be attributed only if one is (or feels) a ‘citizen of the world’. On the contrary, without totally distancing ourselves from such an idea, we are howev-

¹⁰ This result coincides with Haller’s and Roudometof’s thesis (2010), that there are four items that weigh together in the nation-oriented dimension of cosmopolitanism: to have been born and to have been brought up in the country, citizenship of the country, and feeling ‘national’.

er convinced that if cosmopolitanism is to shrug off its abstraction, it needs social anchorage to root it more firmly to real life. The empirical testing of this assumption showed that almost 25.0% of the European citizens interviewed possessed such characteristics – that is attachment to local territory and openness towards others (with peaks of 30–40% in some countries).

In this cluster, characteristic elements were mainly the ‘civic’ nature of the national model and the fact that the persons involved had been born in and lived in their country of origin, as had their parents. These two traits could be considered contradictory, but that is not the case. Being born in one’s own country certainly represents one of the most relevant conditions for loving it, but not to the extent of excluding the possibility that someone else – even if he or she were only brought up in that country – can do so. Undoubtedly, a peculiar trait of societal cosmopolitanism is that individuals professing this attitude and having deep roots within their particular territory do not rebuff relations with whomever they consider a source of enrichment of their personal and national cultural life, even if not fellow countrymen by birth. Deep-rooted cosmopolitans are attached to their territory but not in an exclusive manner. Indeed, they are inclusive towards others and constantly open to contingencies. Furthermore, the findings from our research confirmed that there is no single way of defining cosmopolitanism, but that, on the contrary, within a more accomplished theory of cosmopolitanism there is certainly room for its different forms, coexistent with patriotism and a pluralistic vision. To date, the theory of cosmopolitanism is still in its embryonic state and the implications for future research are manifold. However, cosmopolitan behaviour and attitudes are not necessarily triggered from reciprocal connections (or transnational experiences, as Roudometof calls them). Notwithstanding, we are certain that if specific identity policies of a cosmopolitan type are associated with these experiences, then some outcomes are perhaps more likely than others. In this context, the implications for European cohesion and for cosmopolitan social unity are numerous and could have far-reaching results for the future.

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