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in Modern Societies, East and West**

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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A. Introduction

The following three papers* are independent pieces, related to different segments of my current research. But they all share a common concern, both in terms of their topic and their perspective. They are written on the interstices of West and East European concerns. In a perhaps unusual way. Not in the sense of trading information about the East for theoretical frameworks and tools of analysis provided by the West. Rather, they attempt to take the implications of the recent changes in the East of Europe to their theoretical limit; they try to use the mileage provided by these events and the insights that one can draw from living in between these 'two worlds' in order to re-think some of our basic assumptions concerning power - related to the modern state, society, individual conduct, and their multiple connections.

* These papers were all presented at the 1991 Congress of the Hungarian Sociological Association, *Hungary in the World: Central European Societies from the Perspective of Comparative Social Analysis*, Budapest, 24-28 June, 1991.

B. The modern state as a policy state

1. Introduction: The problem of the welfare state, again?

A study of the question of inequalities and institutional change in the second half of the 20th century immediately raises the question of the welfare state. And, indeed, once the current tide of liberal concerns, mixing real issues and rhetoric, is settled, it will only be a short time when the serious social problems will again be voiced. But the transition in East Europe happened, accidentally, in a period when for well over a decade, there was a prolonged discussion of the so-called crisis of the welfare state, identifying in this state and the related concept of 'bureaucratisation' the common enemy in both East and West. In a new clothing, the old enemy of 'the state' was thought to be again on the rampage.

In spite of its popular appeal and easy mobilising power, there are serious faults with this approach. Both its diagnostic and analytical power is fairly impaired. First, it is highly questionable whether it is the 'bureaucracy' which is the 'main enemy' today, along the lines of a Habermasian vision. This is not so much the correct diagnosis of our current concerns, of the state of affairs, as the - hopefully last - application of an obsolete discourse to a situation where it lost all its relevance; a discourse which on the one hand looks for an enemy to identify and annihilate; an enemy that is always close at hand, that everyone can easily perceive; and to offer consolation with an ideal discourse where this 'enemy' will no longer have any place. In this attitude, the conception of criticism as the elimination of the opposite side became all-too-often close to actual, physical annihilation; and the utopias always turned out to be a nightmare. To state just a truism that will be a little elaborated later, the modern world is a much more complex piece of reality that this game with the bureaucracy and the state as an enemy, and the ideal as a liberation would have it.

Second, it is also questionable whether the 'state' can be used as a universal category identifying jointly the main problems of both East and West, as the neoliberal or other scenarios affirm. As we argued elsewhere, the state which became problematic in the West was a much more different piece of reality than the party-states or rather state-parties of the East. (1) Moreover, concerning the former East European systems, the emphasis on the state is itself misleading, as the actual organs of the state, both at the central and local level, were always subordinate to the respective party organs. And if one is analysing the concrete, daily activity of the party apparatus, one soon discovers that even if there were obvious aspects of rigid hierarchy and bureaucracy within the apparatus, to claim that it was a 'bureaucratic machine' is simply to misunderstand how the mechanism actually worked.

Finally, these considerations already point to a major analytical problem: the usefulness of the 'theory of the state'. Too much discussion in the past was put in these theoretical terms, closely reminiscent of the standard preoccupation of classical German philosophy: What is the 'nature' of the state? What are its origins and purpose? There is a peculiar, mutual conditioning between the specific characteristics of the German state and German philosophy itself: on the one hand, the method of searching for the 'essence' and the 'basic nature'; on the other, the state being an all-too natural topic for this kind of investigation - the ideal harmony between method and topic not being restricted to the case of Hegel, but characteristic to the whole approach up to the Frankfurt school in particular and critical theory in general.

This paper therefore will not attempt to discuss 'the' state or 'the' theory of the state. Nevertheless, it intend to be a conceptual exercise on problems related to the specificity of the modern state. But instead of assuming *a priori* the existence of a unified object, the state, it rather tries to establish what is specific, what is different about this modern state, compared to all other types of political systems and institutions, or organisations of the 'body politic'. And for this, it proposes to start with an analysis of what actually state do; what type of activities they perform.

At one level, the answer to the problem seems obvious. A state as a form of political organisation deals with political issues; whatever belongs to politics. We are thus led to the enormous, and also general question of 'what is politics'? However, if we restrict our attention to the modern state, and to the question of what is specific about its activities, we find here an important difference. The basic target of most activities of modern states is not politics, but 'policy', or 'policy-making'.

2. The peculiar strangeness of 'policy'

This is a distinction that exists in English, but not in other languages; it is even very difficult to characterise it there. (2) Still, this paper insists that this point is crucial, and not just a verbal game. The point can be illustrated with the contemporary Hungarian political scene. What most actors have in mind about the 'nature' of politics is the traditional concerns of politics or 'politicking': questions of personal leadership; party politics; ideological and personal confrontations, power struggles. The focus is on the legislative body; the main question is 'who': who is in position, who has the power to decide, who is to be prevented or excluded from making decisions. The current political scene is a peculiar mixture of activities that were prevented by the former communist systems - the open play of conflicts, the importance of the Parliament, the plurality of parties, etc. -, and ideas, pictures and 'mentalities' taken over from the former system. The whole idea of 'policy-making' is almost missing from the scene; its Hungarian translation - 'politika-csinálás' - certainly sounds more as an item from witchcraft and secret practices, not the preparation of public 'policies'.

Let's stop here for a moment, and try to specify the meaning and scope of this concept of 'policy'. No matter how obvious and unobtrusive its English meaning seems to be, there is more here than meets the eye. Such an undertaking is all the more justified, as there was an explicit attempt in the last decades to separate

the study of policy-making from the mainstream of political science; to mark its specificity by creating a new academic discipline, policy analysis or the 'policy sciences', especially in the United States, but also in England.

Before reviewing the positive definitions of 'policy', 'policy-making', or 'public policy', let's first study the way its distance was established with respect to politics; something that was considered to be crucial for the proponents of the new discipline. Two points will be considered here. The first is a question of evaluation, a distinction made between 'politics' and 'policy' in evaluative terms. The central characteristics of this distinction remained the same since the programmatic statement of Lasswell: while 'politics' deals with matters involving confrontation, partisanship, even corruption, 'policy' is clean, and deals only with matters of common interest or concern. (3) This common usage has an interesting contrast with the Aristotelian concept of politics. For Aristotle, it was exactly the business of politics to deal with the common matters of the city. In the modern state, it seems as if policy-making were taking over this task, once politics proper could not be trusted with the common good. But, as we'll see later in more detail, policy-making is much different from 'politics' in other respects as well, for example concerning the importance of the possession of information and expertise. This is an issue which has utmost importance, among others, for the question of democracy.

The second is an analytical point, and refers to the place of this new 'science' between political science and administrative science; a relation that must reflect the way 'policy-making' originally marked out its space with respect to the traditional fields of politics and administration. Earlier, the distinction between politics and administration was at least analytically clear. 'Politics' dealt with the making of decisions, at the high positions; 'administration' referred to the low-level execution of the decisions. Now, even in the past, in daily reality, the drawing of the lines was more difficult. But with the concept of policy-making, even in principle, the line became impossible to be drawn. Instead of separating

politics and administration, with 'policy-making', the emphasis is not on the distance, but on the links and connections made between the two. Policy-making is at once a political and administrative activity; it links the two, continuously establishing connections.

3. Definitions of 'policy'

In a positive sense, most definitions on policy lay emphasis on three distinct elements: firstly, that an objective, a goal, is involved, that policy is always a matter of choice, and not just a chance event; secondly, that it is never a question of a single decision or choice made, but is related to a course of action or events, it is a regular, lasting pattern; and finally, that it is not merely a question of purpose or choice, but is related to the actual implementation of the aims in reality. (4)

In most definitions, especially the ones given in mainstream American policy science textbooks, 'policy' is basically identical with rational choice or decision. Thus, according to Anderson, it is 'a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern'; (5) Meehan states that 'the most promising line of development treats a policy as a guide to action or choice'; (6) and according to Lasswell, it deals with 'the most important choices made either in organized or in private life.' (7) In this context, 'public policy' is the specific case when a policy decision was made by the government. (8)

The problem is that at this general level, 'policy' becomes undistinguishable from the rationality of behaviour 'as such'; especially interpreted in the sense of economic rationality. There is an everpresent possibility that 'policy sciences' become identified with a general theory of choice, in the same way as there is an identical tendency in economics. In the latter case, this was 'realised' by the idea of von Mises about economics as a general praxeology; (9) in case of the former, there is the recurrent attempt to question the relevance of a separate actor,

the government, in a general framework of 'rational choice', and then, in the general, to add policy-making into the general theory of economics.

However, it is also obvious from an overview of the different definitions given to policy that this activity involves a type of decision-making that is different from the activities of a 'homo oeconomicus'. Firstly, policy-making is always eventual, and in two senses. It is related to concrete problems, dislocations and blockages in the ordinary course of events, while economic theory (and the theory of rational choice) intends to describe and explain all aspects of behavior. Secondly, the outcomes in this case are never given from the start. In this sense, there is a large gap between policy and economics, corresponding roughly to the difference between the words 'decision' and 'choice'. In case of a choice, the alternatives are always given, the only question is the selection. Policy-making, however, involves more than that: the innovative formulation of alternatives, the creation of a piece of reality that was not given beforehand. Third, in case of policy decisions, as opposed to economic choice, the problem of 'expertise' comes to the fore. According to economic theory, every man is an economic man, capable of making rational decisions. The idea according to which politics reduced to policy-making should be reduced to a general theory of choice leads to two different implications. According to the first, 'libertarian' implications, policy-making involves the same choice as the selection of a consumer-basket in a supermarket; thus, there is no need for a separate actor like the government. This is a hyper-democratic implication - except, of course, for the fact of inequalities. The other implication is quite different, the exact opposite. According to this, policy-making involves special, complex decisions, that has to take into account a large number of information. This is a matter for experts only. This is a distinctively undemocratic implication. Without further, abstract discussion, it should be pointed out that there is some peculiarity in the fact that while the major activity the liberal democratic world-view is giving to the citizen is choice - in terms of consumer choice and electoral voting - is only reconfirmative, the very concept of 'policy' or 'policy-making',

although its importance is unquestioned and its results everpresent, does not find an easy place in this universe.

But policy is concerned with something more than just choice: with guidance, the provision of direction. As the second element mentioned in most definitions states it, the target of policy is a lasting pattern, a course of actions, the shaping and altering of this course. And the way policy is related to the ordinary course of events is the solution of eventual problems or restitution. Time and again, one encounters very explicit medical analogies in books on policy making. While the first point made in this paragraph is close to the traditional view of politics, it is complemented with the second one, which is diametrically opposed to this.

This duality can explain, on the one hand, the coexistence of two, seemingly contradictory elements in the definitions: the emphasis on intentionality and change on the one hand, and the importance laid on the fact that policy always implies recurrent pattern, inertia, on the other. But what is common in most aspects is that the activity of policy-making always presupposes a separate, very diverse field of reality existing independently of policy-makers or policy-making, and where the intervention will always be external and occasional.

Let's now analyse this point in detail, the third common point of the definitions mentioned above, the question of the specific relation policy-making has with reality. Before this analysis, two additional points. First, another difference between policy-making and politics is that, as opposed to the latter, the former is continuous task. It is related to concrete problems, to individual decisions, that emerge continuously in the daily activity of policy-makers. Politics is usually a top-level activity, the occasional making of some large-scale decisions that will effect a lot of people for a long time; or, in another sense, it refers to constant 'politicking', interest group and other struggles. Policy-making is distinctively different from both meanings of politics. It is problem-oriented, and not partisan (at least in principle); but it is constant, regular, never-ending, always correcting itself. In

politics, the feedback comes after four years. In policy, it is almost coexistent with the decision. (10)

Second, another recurrent point in definitions of policy is the explicit emphasis on non-decisions and non-activity; no doubt due to the fact that the widely discussed work of Bachrach and Baratz introduced this idea into the debates. It is time and again emphasized that policy-makers may opt for non-intervention, and that this is also a matter of policy; on the verge of a paradox, it is often claimed that *laissez faire* is also a 'policy'. (11) Together with the previous points, all this has far-reaching consequences and implications. 'Policy' of 'policy-making' is a very peculiar type of activity. It does seem to have a specific relationship toward reality, while not possessing a reality, a separate existence on its own.

This point can be clarified if we compare policy to the classical definition of politics. Politics deals with the business of the city, the *polis*, the political community. There were a limited number of relatively well-defined matters that belonged to its scope. Other matters lay completely outside. Thus, for eg., in the framework of Aristotle, the very concept of 'political economy' would not make sense. The matters of the *polis* and the business of the *oikos* were almost completely separate matters. But even concerning modern politics, the topics that are the central concerns of political science cover a fairly well-specified field (government, political parties, electoral system, constitution, etc.). But 'policy' involves a specific relationship to all conceivable aspects of reality. There is economic policy, housing policy, health policy, etc. etc. The list can be continued without an end. Politics, on the other hand, was a separate reality. It was only dealing with a specific number or type of problems.

This point can also be supported by another argument, this time related to the concept of power. In most European languages, this word has two different, almost opposite meaning. 'Power' in common usage means control over actions, persons, things, the emphasis being on restriction; but the word also means the ability

to do, to accomplish, to carry through something. 'Political' power is obviously closer to the first of these meanings. But 'policy' power somehow shifts to the other side - at least this is the implication of the definition given by Roberts, according to which public policy is '[a] set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve' (12)

Policy, therefore, deals not with a separate sphere of affairs; it does not have a specific field. It is rather a specific type of relation to the world, a special intervention in the ordinary course of life. Perhaps this is the most important aspect of policy-making, drawing upon all elements of the definition mentioned earlier. Politics studies the way certain decisions are made, usually close to the top level; 'policies' start with the assumption that there is an ordinary course of affairs. 'Policies' intervene only in special cases. In this sense, policy is almost synonymous with the liberal concept of government, where the emphasis is on minimal government.

But, curiously enough, exactly at that point, it also becomes the opposite of the liberal world view. A key element of the latter is the separation of the public and the private. This separation is again central for both Aristotle and the Roman Law. However, when considering 'policies', this separation in certain sense becomes irrelevant, undesirable, or meaningless. (13) Liberalism was concerned, among others, with the separation of politics and economics. It wanted to exclude political considerations, absolutistic methods of government from the inside of the (private) economic sphere. And so it succeeded, more or less. But this distinction no longer makes any sense if we consider the specific reality of 'policies', so separate or different from (even if not independent of) both politics and the law. It would be preposterous if we wanted to exclude 'policy' from the economy. (14)

4. The surprising familiarity of 'policy-making' in East Europe

This paper started with the difference between politics in East and West, and pointed out the specific, obsolete way 'politics' is interpreted by the new political elite in Hungary. An attempt was made to contrast it with the concept and reality of 'policies' or 'policy-making', looking as different from East European politics as it would be possible. However, the more this analysis proceeded, the more surprising its results became. The concepts of 'policy' and 'policy-making', instead of providing a way to introduce the basics of modern, democratic politics into a place where these principles were lacking, sounded increasingly all-too familiar. The meaning and connotations of the concepts of 'policy', this specific reality of the modern state, seemed not at all democratic; quite the contrary, it rather covered a specific type of activity done by (or with the help of) experts, with the explicit aim of transforming reality, where the electorate, the purported subject of democratic politics, became an object of 'policies'. Thus, while politics may well have become restricted in the liberal state, put under the control of law, enforced by the separation of powers, and subject to democratic rules of the game, 'policy' at the same time begin to be involved with and extend to everywhere.

That is the reason for the proposition of the paper: the description of the modern state as a 'policy-state', as opposed to concepts like the liberal idea of the night-watchman state' - something that may have had relevance to the programmes of the first half of the 19th century; the idea of a 'class-state' - something that was close in certain ways to the reality of the second half of the 19th century; or the welfare state, that puts the emphasis only on one set of the problems covered. The latter term is also misleading, as it lays the blame for the increased scope of state activity solely on redistributive policies, while neglecting others policies that have the same scope and type of impact on daily life. Thus, one may say that for this discourse, laying all the blame of the welfare state solely, one can apply an otherwise often obsolete category: ideology. It is to a large degree an ideology of the rich, using and

distorting some genuine concerns with the spread of the 'policy state'.

Thus, though 'policy-making' seems to be the most natural, unobtrusive, and modern term, when closely looked at, reveals quite peculiar characteristics that on the one hand look obsolete, on the other, quite distant from both democratic politics and the mainstream of modern social and political thought, and close to a very different type of reality - the state party. Let's review here some of these properties.

One of the most surprising parts of contemporary definitions of 'policy-making' are, on the one hand, the frequent, explicit reference to values, the impossibility and undesirability of a 'positive' or 'positivistic' policy science; on the other, the direct reference to concepts like the common good, the public interest, or the 'good life'. Thus, according to Goodin, '[a]bove all, the policy sciences were to bring values back into the relentlessly positivistic disciplines from which they sprang'. (15) Lowi states about the importance of macro-level policy analysis that '[t]here does not seem to be any other way to get systematically closer to the ultimate questions of justice, equity, the good life. (16) According to Salisbury, most common usages of the term 'policy' have their source in Easton's definition: 'the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society'. (17) But the most telling view is again given by Lasswell, who said that the central focus of the 'new sciences' should be a 'concern with the shaping and sharing of all values'. (18)

These are terms that are certainly not used in the common language of modern political science or theory. Quite on the contrary, the modern sense of politics emphasizes its combative, partisan character. Politics involves the choice of parties, the struggle of interest groups, etc., where the only way to keep the struggle in control is to connect the mandates to elections, to voting, and the enforcement of the rule of law. Not so in 'policy'. The best illustration of this difference can perhaps be found in the

work of Anderson, who explicitly contrasts political values and policy values. (19)

One of the most preposterous commonplaces of Marxist philosophy was the dictum about the 'unity of theory and practice'. Certainly, nobody in political and social thought would risk a statement like that without becoming ridiculous. Yet, similar statements are proudly made in the policy sciences. (20) And according to Lasswell, the 'policy sciences' can directly contribute toward the 'ultimate goal' of democracy, which is 'the realization of human dignity in theory and practice' (21) Perhaps, these are just an empty truisms that can be said about anything anywhere. Still, it is worthwhile to point out that 'policies' operates at a level where such abstractions are thought to be still relevant.

In the same vein, while the central liberal concern is separation, (22) and the contemporary sciences are moving toward specialisation, policy sciences proudly claim integration, linking, and unity. Thus, according to Lasswell again, '[t]he trend toward a policy sciences viewpoint ... is a move away from fragmentation. (23) Policy sciences should deal with aggregate problems; on the 'subtle ties' that 'bind every part to the whole' (24)

Direct concern with the public good, the common interest, the maintenance of unity through delicate, subtle links, an attempt to shape the values of society present two different kind of problems. The first is concerned with the reasons for these activities, for the persistence or return of this so 'un-modern' set of concerns at the 'heart' of the present; and the second with the feasibility of such activities at the ground level. The literature on policy sciences give ample examples for both problems.

On the one hand, there are frequent references to very far-reaching purposes. The most common one is the question of 'relevance'. Thus, according to Anderson, policy study is 'especially attractive to those who wish to be 'relevant', to engage in research and discovery that has some immediate social utility, (25) and the same aspiration to 'relevance' is singled out by, among others,

by Goodin. (26) There are two central elements in this view. Firstly, it implicitly opposes policy analysis to other, 'scholastic' academic topics. There are studies which are 'relevant', and which are not; the criteria for relevance being policy orientation. Secondly, in this view, studies that are concerned with policy-making are almost synonyms with empirical studies, i.e. studies that are connected to actual, existing, empirical reality. Which again has two interesting conclusions. First, it conflates empirical reality and policy-making, when policy-making exactly represents a very specific attitude toward reality - the urge to change it in a uniform and centralised way. In the concept of 'policy' or 'policy-relevant' analysis, the study and the alteration of reality become as if intertwined. Second, if we translate it into Hungarian, it has the strangely sounding implication that only 'political' research - i.e. research that has to do with 'political advice' has any relevance. Just when in East Europe social and political analysts are happy to separate themselves from political tutelage and immediate political concerns - or switch to politics from academia for good -, they are bound to face another attempt to re-define their work as either being irrelevant, or 'political' again - now in the sense of 'policy relevance'.

Besides the question of 'relevance', the literature also mentions other, even more explicit topics. In the programmatic book of Lerner and Lasswell, still considered to be the classic of the field, the point for the importance of policy analysis is put in a shocking language. According to Lasswell, '[t]he basic emphasis of the policy approach ... is upon the fundamental problems of man in society', and that the policy approach aims to concentrate energy on 'fundamental and often neglected problems which arise in the adjustment of man in society'. (27) To solve these problems, there is a need for 'more significant information than we have had in the past about the thoughts and feelings of mankind. (28)

Lasswell is an outstanding, but not unique case in producing statements that somebody in East Europe cannot help finding all too familiar. And not only there. Friedrich had this to say about the classic volume of Lerner and Lasswell: 'This spirit of great

satisfaction on the part of the contributors with their own labors and those of their colleagues permeates the entire volume. Indeed, this writer has seldom been privileged to review the work of so enthusiastic a group of fellow workers. What is even more striking is the genuine confidence with which they look forward to an even better future ... '. (29)

At the level of the daily activity of policy-makers, we find more humbleness towards the problems faced, but also more perplexity towards the 'nature' of the task. Thus, according to Sir Charles Cunningham, who was once permanent under-secretary of state at the Home Office, 'policy is rather like the elephant - you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it.' (30) In the book of Hogwood, an even better example can be found. Almost paraphrasing some of the political instructors we interviewed in Hungary, a local authority education official is quoted for the following comment: 'It might help here to consider the question of what we actually mean by government policy. ... I confess that I am by no means sure what constitutes government policy, although for the last nine years of my professional life the matter has been of the utmost practical importance.' (31)

This was not the only surprising similarity between policy-makers and party instructors. Another example is concerned with the information collection - a central task of former party workers. Several of our respondents stated there that party workers had to gather all sorts of information, they had no right to neglect any information that may have had 'political' relevance. (32) According to a statement by Lasswell, quoted also by Hoss, 'where the needs of policy intelligence are uppermost, any item of knowledge, within or without the limits of the social disciplines, may be relevant. (33)

There is no need to proceed with these comparisons. The thrust of this whole section has been equivocal. The purposes and activities of the party apparatus are at crucial points almost identical with the supposed tasks of policy-makers and analysts - let's just mention the promotion of the common good, the concern with the

interests and destiny of mankind, the aim to transform reality, to alter the values of the population, the extremely broad range of the activities performed, and the attention to all possible pieces of information. The differences are, of course, also great in other dimensions. Besides the obvious differences in their surrounding reality (a difference that will persist at least until everything will have been shaped by 'policies'), let's just mention three more specific instances, because these are singled out in the literature: (34) the actual, detailed regulations, and the appointment of personnel do not belong to 'policy-making', while, at least in principle, decision-making was not part of the job of the party apparatus. All this may have been due to the lack of distinction between political and policy (and often even 'police') activities in the state party, their integration in one particular organisation. But the problem is still there: why this similarity, at the ground level, between the aspirations and activities of 'policy-making' and the state-party, in both cases exclusive of 'politics'?

This question cannot be answered within the limits of this paper. Only one piece of analysis will be mentioned shortly here, a line of investigation that goes back to the point only mentioned earlier - the fact that the word 'policy' only exists in English. What is the reason for this? Can it possible have any relevance for this topic?

The word 'policy' has its distant origins in the Greek word *polis*, meaning the city-state. This is a well-known fact. It is much less known that 'politics' and 'policy' has distinctively different immediate roots and historical trajectories. 'Politics' is connected to the Greek word *politiké*, meaning the art of rule or government, while 'policy' to *politeia*, which had a much more complex set of meanings. In the 16th century, the words 'police', 'pollicie', or 'pollicy' were almost interchangeably used in both the continent and England. Their meaning was somewhat different from 'politic' or 'politique', even if the distinction was often blurred. It meant a set of regulations to be imposed; calculative action that was relevant to the common good; it was synonymous with 'government' or even the 'state'; and, in line with the original Greek usage, the 'constitution' of society. At the period, it was a

'hot topic'. To give an example: when Thomas Starkey, a leading humanist of the age, returned from Italy in the 1530s, Cromwell gave him a task: write something out of your studies that has direct relevance for me. Starkey answered by writing a treatise, still in manuscript, entitled 'What is pollycy after the sentence of Aristotle?' (35)

It is only from the end of the 16th century that the meanings of the terms became different in the continent and in England. In the continent, the word takes up the form of 'police', and becomes more and more identified with a particular apparatus of government. In England, in the form of 'policy', it comes to be restricted to a peculiar form of governmental action, without being connected to a specific apparatus. (36) Nevertheless, the specific reality of 'policy-making' preserves much of the same methods or purposes as the one employed by the early-modern 'police', and remained much different from 'politics'. Perhaps the specificity, and the real contribution of England to the emergence of modernity lies in not capitalism, the class society, or parliamentarism, but in the long gestation of the 'policy state'.

5. Concluding remarks

The political and social sciences - what else can they do - try to operate with clearcut dividing lines and well-defined categories. They try to separate the state from the economy, decision-making from the administration of decisions, society from government, the ruler from the ruled. However, in this way, the conceptualisation of the very interaction, link, connection between these categories is left out of the scope.

This omission is all the more problematic, since - as this article tried to show - it was exactly in these interstices that a new modality of government emerged in the modern states (perhaps even this made the modern state truly modern) and that was the idea of the 'policy' or 'policy-making'. Due to some reasons, this modality was almost completely neglected by political philosophy

and theory. Partly it was due to the fact that in continental languages - the strongholds of political philosophy - there was no separate category for this modality. Another reason is that the theory of state was a 'serious' matter, not supposed to be bothered with the minuscule matters of concrete 'policies' and 'policy-making'. As a result, in both critical theory and neo-liberal criticisms, the same partial concept of the state was reproduced. This 'state' was denounced from right and left alike as an external apparatus, a modern 'megamachine', overlooking the fact that the emperor was naked; that in moderate liberal democracies there was no overriding repressive apparatus controlling the population and colonising the life-world, but there were an infinite number of minor, recurrent policy processes that were much more flexible, but also, perhaps due to the same reason, all the more pervasive and dangerous that any theorist or administrator of the state ever imagined.

No matter what the neo-liberal paranoia says, it is not 'the state' or 'the government' whose despotism we should fear. But we must be aware of the fact that the subtle mechanisms, the specific rationality implied in policy-making takes over increasingly all aspects of human existence, presenting its own manners as the only rational way of action, connecting everybody and everything in its own peculiar way; perhaps not repressing anybody, but questioning the very right and reason to existence of anything that cannot be managed or 'policied'.

Notes

- (1) This is discussed in detail in Agnes Horváth and Arpad Szokolczai, *Senkiföldjén : A politikai instruktorok tevékenységéről az állampártban* (On the No Man's Land: the activity of political instructors in the state-party), (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1989), to be published by Routledge as *The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of Hungary*, in 1992.
- (2) See Jacques Donzelot, *L'invention du social* (Paris, Fayard, 1984), pp. 261-3.
- (3) See Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Policy Orientation', in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford University Press, 1951), p.5.
- (4) For definitions of 'policy', the following books were consulted: James E. Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* (London, Nelson, 1975); John

- Dearlove, *The Politics of Policy in Local Government* (Cambridge University Press, 1973); Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Hecllo, and Carolyn T. Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 2nd ed. (London, Macmillan, 1983); Brian W. Hogwood, *From Crisis to Complacency? Shaping Public Policy in Britain* (Oxford University Press, 1987); Robert E. Goodin, *Political Theory and Public Policy* (The University of Chicago Press, W. I. Jenkins, *Policy Analysis* (London, Martin Robertson, 1978); Harold D. Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (N.Y., Elsevier, 1971); Lerner and Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences*; Yves Mény and Jean-Claude Thoëny, *Politiques publiques* (Paris, P.U.F., 1989); Stuart S. Nagel (ed.), *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences* (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1979); Kent E. Portney, *Approaching Public Policy Analysis* (Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1989); Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago, Markham, 1968); Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *Policy Styles in Western Europe* (London, G. Allen, 1982); Brian Smith, *Policy-Making in British Government: An Analysis of Power and Rationality* (London, Martin Robertson, 1976); David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice* (Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1989).
- (5) See Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, p.3.
 - (6) See Eugen J. Meehan, 'Philosophy and Policy Studies', in Nagel, *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences*, p.187.
 - (7) See Lasswell, 'The Policy Orientation', p.5.
 - (8) See for eg. Dearlove, *The Politics of Policy in Local Government*, pp.2-4, and Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, p.3.
 - (9) Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action: A treatise on economics* (Chicago, Contemporary Books, 1966).
 - (10) This is, of course, a simplification, as the line between policy and politics is not at all that clear. The aim here was to point out a definite tendency, and not to separate politics and policy as it were 'completely'.
 - (11) For eg. see Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, p.4.
 - (12) Quoted in Jenkins, *Policy Analysis*, p.15.
 - (13) See, for eg. Lasswell, 'The Policy Orientation', p.3., on the background for the emergence of 'policy sciences': '[f]or years there has been a lively concern in intellectual circles for the problem of the overcoming the divisive tendencies of modern life and of bringing into existence a more thorough integration of the goals and methods of public and private action'.
 - (14) In the sense of public policy, at least; though one could argue that the very idea of a 'private policy' just does not make any sense; etimologically it is certainly a non sequitur; and in this sense one could argue that the need of putting the adjective 'public' in front of 'policy', so strongly felt especially in the US, only indicates that the 'publicness' of 'policy' became somehow intergrated into individual behavior.
 - (15) Goodin, *Political Theory and Public Policy*, p.3; see also Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences*, p.2.
 - (16) Theodore J. Lowi, 'What Political Scientists Don't Need to Ask About Policy Analysis?', in Nagel, *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences*, p.273.
 - (17) Robert H. Salisbury, 'The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles', in Ranney, *Political Science and Public Policy*, p.152.
 - (18) Daniel Lerner, From Social Science to Policy Sciences: An Introductory Note', in Nagel, *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences*, p.5.

- (19) Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* , p.15.
- (20) Goodin, *Political Theory and Public Policy* , p.3.
- (21) Lasswell, 'The Policy Orientation', p.15.
- (22) see Michael Walzer, 'Liberalism and the Art of Separation', in *Political Theory* 12 (1984), 3: 315-330.
- (23) Lasswell, *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* , p.xiii
- (24) *Ibid.*, p.2; see also Weimer and Vining, p.7.
- (25) Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* , p.162.
- (26) Goodin, *Political Theory and Public Policy* , p.3.
- (27) Lasswell, 'The Policy Orientation', p.8. and pp.14-5.
- (28) *Ibid.*, p.13.
- (29) Carl J. Friedrich, 'Policy - A Science?', in *Public Policy* 4 (1953), 269-70.
- (30) Smith, *Policy-Making in British Government* , p.12.
- (31) Hogwood, *From Crisis to Complacency?* , p.3.
- (32) See Horváth and Szokolczai, *Senkiföldjén* , Ch.6.
- (33) Phillip O. Foss, 'Policy Analysis and the Political Science Profession', in Nagel, *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences* , p.278.
- (34) Anderson, *Public Policy-Making* , p.2.
- (35) See W. Gordon Zeeveld, *Foundations of Tudor Policy* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 143. ff; and Thomas F. Mayer, *Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- (36) From this perspective, a re-assessment of the similarities and differences of German cameralism and English mercantilism would be most interesting.

C. Were State and Civil Society Ever Identical?

The concept of civil society seems to have a peculiar endurance in East Europe. It is well known that in the 1980s, especially with the stimulus given by the application of this concept to Solidarity, it became one of the most popular slogans. (1) It was also widely stated immediately after the revolutionary changes of 1989 that this concept probably has no longer much relevance, as it was not particularly helpful in explaining and predicting the actual changes - the events did not follow the evolutionary logic of the 'Big March'; and it was also thought that the term became obsolete either because the confrontation between the state and civil society was no longer an issue, or - from an opposite perspective, treating the use of this concept in the 1980s rather as an euphemism - because there was no longer a need to employ this term in lieu of the concept of 'bourgeois society', in order to leave the problems of bourgeoisie and private property untouched. (2)

However, this was not to be the case. 'Civil society' still seems to be a most popular concept. Moreover, while earlier this idea was not important in the (former?) Soviet Union, now it is taken up with a vengeance even there. (3)

But one must be cautious here. Let's not be deceived by the identity of words - this is not the same civil society. The reason for this is not to be searched solely in the disappearance of the enemy, the state-party or the political police. The re-definition was extended to the other side as well.

At one level, this is only a shift of emphasis. While previously the accent was on the second term - 'society', not in is rather on the first - 'civil', or 'civilised'. The opponent is no longer the state, it is rather the state of nature. (4) And this change is not merely cosmetic or linguistic. It is due rather to the disappearance of the former - alleged - unity of society. In the old discourse, recourse to 'society' was a major way to legitimate opposition and dissent to the **system**. Any counter-political activity was waged in the name

of 'society'. 'Society' was the real subject of political activity, even if due to the adverse conditions, this was a potential only, not realised in concrete activities. The new discourse of civil society is something completely different. Society became an object again - a target to be civilised.

This development is quite understandable, and is connected to real problems. It does not simply reflect the views of some segments of the former dissidents or 'quasi-dissidents' who became disappointed with the changes or with 'society'. The former discourse of civil society was idealistic and even ideological, not suitable for the reality of a 'society' that was heavily influenced and moulded by communism, even in the forms of counterstrategies and resistance. But, still, this idea of the 'civilisation' of society carries a number of extremely dubious elements on its own - elements that are so close, among others, to the very project of bolshevism that it makes one question whether the proponents of these views have properly digested this experience.

Let's just list here a few questions:

1. To the analogy of the question of privatisation or re-privatisation: is it supposed to be an 'original' civilisation or a re-civilisation? Some claim that society as such did not exist in Hungary; (5) others, on the contrary, referring for example to the work of Hankiss, (6) affirm that a full-blown civil society was destroyed here by the bolsheviks.

2. Who is talking here? What is the relationship between the subjects and objects of this civilising process? Do some people really think seriously that they have the right to sermon to others? Is the dividing line here according to social classes - that is, should it be the civilisation of the population by the intellectuals? But, then, were not intellectuals the kind of people who in one way or another could not avoid being among those who were most touched by the former communist systems? Is not this discourse just an excuse to avoid facing oneself - the real legacy of communism from which nobody can be exempted in one

way or another? Is it not just another method of searching for the problem in 'others'?

3. What are the supposed sanctions of this civilising mission? Will this be content with sermoning, which, as we all know, is not very effective, or does it intend to use other means? And if so, exactly what type? Can it be risked to say that, for eg. behind the current, impossible treatment of the issue of foreign debts, there is a lurking feeling among the new political elite that this can be considered as a just punishment for the past sins under bolshevism, the tacit contract between the population and the regime that as a recompense for the rising standard of living, the issue of democracy and freedom was as if swept under the carpet? This point may perhaps explain some of the differences in the current tones of the discussions and policies among Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

4. How is this 'civilising project' related to education? Is it only intended toward children, or should it be interpreted as a return to the project of civilising adults?

5. Is this civilising being done by private property, the idea being that anyone who owns property will be civilised by the inherent need for carefulness? But what will this do for the non-propertied classes? Will it happen in the region that after the resurrection of 17-18th century theories and technologies of government, the principle of *raison d'état* and the apparatus of 'police' with the state-party, (7) and now the resurrection of early-19th century liberalism, will we repeat in the close future the discourses and confrontations of the mid-to-late 19th century?

6. Is this civilisation supposed to be an urbanisation - something that is close to the etymological meaning of 'civility'? Or, to give an identical, only Greek and not Roman reading, will it be a 'policing' - that was a synonym for 'civilisation' up to the mid-19th century? But did the proponents of the discourse of civil society consider seriously that one of the most intolerable aspects of the bolshevik systems was exactly their handling of the peasantry - their attempt to force them violently into an urban, 'policed' model?

Instead of tackling these problems directly - something that seems to be a task that is almost by definition impossible -, this paper intends to discuss an analytical problem that has relevance to these issues as well. It is the question concerning the actual status of the separation of the state and civil society in the modern period - or rather their alleged former unity in the previous period.

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The statement that the separation of state and civil society is a recent, modern phenomenon is one of the commonplaces in the literature on civil society. However, there is immediately something problematic with it as a starting point of an analysis. First, it is a pretense to neglect history. This idea justified the omission within the literature on civil society the relationship between politics and the social body before the end of the 18th century. Second, it is all-too Spencercian. There is some definite structuralist-functionalist evolutionism behind this view - the idea that there was something like the 'original unity' of state and society, a lack of distinction between the political and social sphere, a sign of backwardness that was broken down only by the emergence of the modern liberal-industrial world. Finally, underlining this perspective, the whole idea that the state and society were once identical gives a peculiar picture of 'ancient times', reinforcing whig beliefs concerning the pre-modern period as the rule of an omnipotent state, existing outside the law, etc. This framework thus helps to neglect the past, to reinforce prejudices about it, and therefore to misunderstand the specificity and the stakes of the emergence of the modern world.

Even if most references to this alleged primal unity are often quite unreflexive, there is a respectful tradition to which they may and do have recourse: the work of Manfred Riedel on the Hegelian concept of civil society. (8) In this case, we can't just talk about a side-remark. As a matter of fact, Riedel makes the proposition that this separation between state and civil society is

the central novelty and achievement of Hegel's political philosophy. It is by the realisation and theoretisation of this gap that Hegel can be truly considered as the founder of modern political philosophy; a thinker with clearer sight and more original and lasting vision than, for eg., Marx.

However, something still seems to be wrong with this scenario. In spite of all the historical and philosophical sophistication, this account in some of its basic characteristics is still too Spencerian - and, needless to say, Hegelian. We have here a historical fallacy - a taken for granted identification of certain developments of European society with the universal march of world history. And we have a highly questionable methodological assumption - a view of thinking as the reflexion of the 'great mind' upon the totality of human experiences, contemporary and historical, and then the grasping of the essence, the truth; the 'theoretisation' of the universal; a perspective that while seemingly gives an overblown, exaggerated role to thinking and the thinker, in actual fact reduces it to the putting into words, in the form of a 'perfect discourse', of events in the real that supposedly happened 'outside' thought.

Certainly, something very significant has happened around the turn of the 19th century concerning the relations between political power and social activities, daily life, and individual behavior. But it is highly questionable that this can be defined as 'the' separation of 'the' society and 'the' state.

The purpose of the rest of this paper is to introduce some elements towards an alternative conceptualisation of this rift. It will not be along a Hegelian path, although it will neither be completely disconnected from Hegel. It will rather fit in the line of the analyses of Michel Foucault itself having a peculiar link with the tradition of Hegel. (9) The work of Foucault has not yet been seriously considered, apart from some Habermasian misreadings. (10) About this, only three short remarks. First, in the books analysed there, Foucault was never talking about civil society. That was not his problem there. On the other hand, he did analyse

this concept in some of his lectures given at the end of the 1970s, and also returned to this point in a few essays and interviews. Due to lack of space, we cannot discuss this point here. (11) Second, the question of nihilism. This is a problem concerning the interpretation of Nietzsche and Foucault that reminds us of a game we encountered in our study of the party apparatus - it was called that 'the head of the messenger of bad news will be cut off'. Nietzsche and Foucault were not nihilists; they were diagnost. One may very well take issue with their diagnoses; they themselves modified and specified it on several occasions. But it is a grotesque error to charge, by a slipping, the - alleged - illness to the diagnost. Third, instead of the false issue of nihilism, what we have is a problem of intellectual conscience: the ability of questioning, at the proper moment, of one's own cherished beliefs; or, to the contrary, to need to take up a complacent refuge in some verbal juggling about a perfect, unquestionable ideal. (12)

What was then the problem behind this separation of state and civil society in theory and also in actual reality? For this, let's review a work that was written some decades before and published some decades after the famous work of Hegel: *The Limits of State Action* by Wilhelm von Humboldt. (13) A work that did not aim to represent a totality, that was only partly analytical and partly polemical and programmatic, but that nevertheless - or perhaps all the more so - pins down some of the central problems of the period.

This is a short book, and we will only make a few points. First of all, the title, which is quite revealing. The problem is the limit of the state action - it is about its boundary; about restriction in space. There is no question of abuses or illegitimate uses of state power; no consideration of the form and the art of government. Nothing is reminiscent here of the concerns of Montesquieu with the spirits of the laws, the separation of powers in the sense of checks and balances - even if Montesquieu's work was complementary to Humboldt's, and served as an important background. And Humboldt is perfectly aware of the specificity and importance of this point. He starts the opening chapter by

remarking that the definition of the sphere of the state's action is an important subject which has not yet been pursued so far, compared to other topics like the question of who shall govern and how. He also specifies the point of sensitivity, the source of this new problematisation of the state's activities: the problem is not tyranny, but welfare; or, to use the contemporary terminology, the 'welfare police'.

Second, the book effectuates a reorganisation on the whole question concerning the relations between politics and rights. Partly it is the same old - and very important - story of the shift of emphasis to individual rights, the defense of the equal rights of each and every individual, and the overriding concern that the only justification for the infringement of individual freedom is the freedom of other individuals - it should be of no surprise that on its 1851 publication, J. S. Mill gave such a welcome reception to this book. But there is more here. Humboldt's definition of the scope of political action does not merely represent an extension of rights, but also a corresponding reduction of politics to the restitution of such rights. The idea that the rights formerly restricted to the monarch are to be extended to each individual should be understood in a very literal sense. The point is not just equality before the law and the issue of human rights, but the extension of a restricted meaning of politics to each and every citizen. One aspect of the political activity of sovereign power in the past was the power of the sword, the original sense of the *imperium* : the right to wield power against the infringers of sovereignty; the interpenetration of penal law and politics; a definition a crime as committed against the sovereign (whether it is the king or the republic), and therefore the task of punishment given as the restitution of the former situation. (14) Thus, Humboldt seems to imply the reduction of the sphere of state action to this particular instance of restitution, even if it is now extended to cover everybody. Which leads to the third point: related to this operation, Humboldt gives us a new target of political activity, which is security. (15)

Which adds up to a strange definition: a reduction of political activity to what we now consider to be the activities and tasks of the police; an identification of politics and police. The argument is that because the 'state' became involved in too many activities, especially welfare-type and moralising activities, its scope must now be restricted; and this restriction means the 'depoliticisation' of society, which is identical with the reduction of political activity to the maintenance of security, i.e. to police activity.

But, interestingly enough, this is not the way Humboldt himself defines the police, even though 'police laws' are one of the areas that he considers to be central for the newly defined state, and begins the description of the proper sphere of state activity exactly by these 'police laws'. The definition is quite surprising, and different from what one would expect. It is given in the title of Ch. X. as 'solicitude of State for security with respect to actions which directly relate to the agents only', and in the text it is explicitly stated that it has nothing to do with what 'refers immediately to the rights of others'. (16) Police laws solely refer to the self or subjectivity, and not to relations between individuals or towards objects (properties). 'Police', in this sense is a matter of ethics, of ethical behavior. The next sentences explain a bit this peculiar use of the word: there the synonym of 'police laws' is given as 'preventive laws', and it is specified that such laws are related to the restriction of actions that may endanger the rights of others. 'Police', thus, is something like self-discipline, the internalisation of the norms of civilised behavior.

Let's stay here for a moment, at the peculiar relationship between the 'state' and the 'police'; a relationship that is all the more so interesting as it is well-known that the kind of 'state' towards which the discourse of civil society was developed by German liberals was exactly the contemporary *polizeistaat*. Let's have now a glimpse into this concept of 'police-state'.

Today, this concept is used exclusively in a pejorative sense, and is identified with the unlawful, violent abuses of state power. However, as the review of Chapman makes it clear, this was not

the case in the past. (17) He distinguishes between two major types of police states: the traditional and the modern, totalitarian police states. In the latter case, he even makes a finer distinction between the modern police state (Germany between 1933 and 1939), and the totalitarian police state (Germany, 1939-1945, with some additional remarks on Stalinism). In the case of the traditional police states, the Prussian *polizei-staat* or the Piedmontese or French 'police states', the term was not at all pejorative. The 'well-policed' state was rather an ideal. It stood for just, efficient, impersonal administration; public order, safety and tranquility; and a well-disciplined, prosperous, numerous and healthy population.

However, in our view, there is much more in the concept and reality of the police state, in the specific and multiple links between 'state' and 'police' than the reestablishment of this distinction; something that does have contemporary relevance for both East and West. The term 'police state' can be used in other contexts, for other systems. First, obviously, there is room for a more thorough investigation concerning the application of this term to the reality of bolshevism. After all, protagonists in these countries applied this concept to their world, called communist systems 'police states' well before the idea of 'totalitarianism' gained currency. However, as opposed to the standard usage, on the basis of our empirical studies of the activity of the party apparatus, we would call bolshevik-type systems not simply totalitarian police-states - a term that certainly belies the type of reality we were living in from at least the 1960s to the 1980s -, but as a peculiar combination of both traditional and modern police states. Without going into details, we simply state that instead of identifying, or at least washing together the party apparatus and the secret police, it was the ambivalent, uneasy relationship between the two that was one of the 'dialectics' involved in the evolutions of these systems; a 'dialectics' that was due to this uneasy, incompatible combination of the coexistence of two apparatuses, two political techniques: the old-fashioned 'welfare police' embodied in the party apparatus, and the modern political or secret police that was granted special privileges, but

that belonged in its positivity to different periods in the development of Western states and societies. Thus, if the discourse of the civil society was first deployed in Germany against the traditional 'police state', it was re-deployed in East Europe in a quite analogous way against this peculiar combination of pre-modern and 'modern' police states. (18)

But there is another sense in which the concepts of state and police should be contrasted; this time related to the modern, liberal concept of the state. The liberal ideal of the state has two major characteristics. Firstly, negatively, concerning the manner of state activity, it is defined as a *rechtstaat* as opposed to the *polizei-staat*; it is a state that adheres to the rule of law. Secondly, positively, it is a 'minimal state', a 'nightwatch-man-state' where the activity of the state is reduced to the minimal possible scope: it is solely concerned with the maintenance of order and the upholding of the law. Combining the two definition, we may say that in a very specific sense that has nothing to do with a certain 'leftist' discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, the liberal state is also a 'police' or 'policing' state: a state whose activity is restricted to the police; or where, at least ideal-typically, there is a desire to reduce politics to policing - interpreted obviously in the modern sense. In the *polizei-staat*, the 'police' included the whole state, as far as internal matters and organisation were concerned; it extended to all sorts of activities, and stood outside the law. In the liberal state, the activities of the police became much more restricted, and - at least under ideal conditions - firmly under the control of the law. But the same identity between state and police was maintained; the same identification of politics and police. This point is clear in the work of Humboldt, but can also be found, and in a much more elaborate theoretical form in the political theory of Weber. After all, does not Weber consider the central characteristics of the state being the monopolisation of the legitimate use of force - something that clearly is almost identical with the definition of the activity of the modern police given in new textbooks? (19)

In sum, liberalism has a specific sensitivity, a strong fear towards the police state - something that nobody is seriously questioning today. But beyond this, there is a peculiar, more or less hidden assumption: the identification of politics and 'police'. The corollary of all this is a generalised mistrust, fear of politics, a peculiar reaffirmation of the both the Christian and stoic reservation against politics, a perspective quite different from the Greek ideal; a perspective that, surprisingly enough, has a strong parallel in socialist thought: in the socialist utopia of the withering away of the state, in the bolshevik (or socialist?) dislike of all conflicts and problems, and therefore the denial of the need for politics in an ideal system - the only difference being that the ideal is liberal democracy for liberals, and socialist democracy for socialists. (20) Also, it is against this perspective that two major contemporary critical movements, reaffirmations of politics are rooted: a return to the civic tradition (from a new conservative perspective), and a reaffirmation of the civil society as a political concept (from a new socialist perspective). (21) Both are discourses of the 'good', discourses against which it is hard to voice reservations on principle, but that seem to neglect some problems concerning both the possibility and the desirability of the realisation of their ideal, in our contemporary world.. They try to resurrect ideals in their purity which are quite noble, but without taking into account the fact that on the one hand, there must have been some reason for their disappearance; on the other, that as they - at least to some extent - become parts and parcels of our modern reality, there may be dangers concerning their resurrection.

Returning to the liberal mistrust of politics, one may be justified in having certain doubts concerning the liberal horror of government. There is something peculiar about the fact that while liberalism tries to criticise government, to restrict the activity of the state in the last 200 years, and is very much the dominant principle of contemporary government, nevertheless the specter of the state does not stop raising its head time and again. Our purpose is not to play the tune of the spread of rationalisation and bureaucracy, or the colonisation of the life-world and related

matters, but at any rate to be suspicious about the claim that the activity of government, interpreted in the wide sense, is decreasing under liberal systems. (22) Can we not say that the recurrent liberal attacks against the monster of the state - a real threat in many parts of the world - serve also to distract attention from the very real and specific methods, techniques, and rationalities of government applied in liberal systems?

These remarks open the road toward two possible paths of analysis. One is the actual study of a peculiar reality under liberal systems: policy-making. This would involve a direction of research that instead of trying to come up with a general theory of the 'state', would be analysing the specificity of this 'policy-state'. We pursue this line in an other paper. (23) The second is a more detailed analytical account of the question of the relationship between politics and police - a question that has relevance for the analysis of 'policy', as well as for the question of the civil society - state distinction.

Let's return, then, to the question of the difference between and identity of state (or politics) and civil society. On the one hand, we have here an uninteresting linguistic point. In both the Greek and Roman tradition, the terms that describe politics, or political activity, are derived from the respective word for 'urban settlement': *polis* and *civitas*. Thus, the identity of political and civil society that can be found, for example, in the works of Hobbes or Locke reflect nothing but the interchangeable use of the Greek and Latin terms.

On the other hand, however, the Greek term *polis* has a number of different derivatives that have played an important role in both Greek political life and theory, and had important trajectories in Western political history. It is a much more interesting, and not solely linguistic question. It has relevance, among other things, for the distinction between 'politics' and 'police'. In spite of the problem of the confusion concerning their difference and identity that was pointed out in this paper, and their similar derivation from the word *polis*, the etymology of these terms are quite

distinct. The origin of the first is the Greek term *politiké*, standing for the art of rule or government. It is addressing the question of how to rule a political society. The other term, *politeia*, is dealing with a much more disparate set of issues. Let's give a detailed definition this concept, all the more so as even if this was a central concept for Greek political theory, its importance was somewhat lost in the later period, in spite of all references to the Greek ideal of democracy. (24)

First of all, *politeia* embodies something like the constitution, the form of government for the Greeks. It includes the definition, the criteria of citizenship. It refers to the formal rules of the games, the mutuality of duties and obligations. Second, it has a more concrete sense, related to the citizen body itself. It does not mean simply the concrete, numerical sum of citizens, for which the Greeks had another term (*politeuma*). Rather, it referred to the specific ensemble, of 'togetherness' of citizens, citizenship as an ethical way of life; it included considerations about the education of citizens, the education for citizenship; and finally, it was considered as the daily (public) activity of the city, and all military considerations were omitted from the term. Third, it stood for something more specific: the actual organisation of government, techniques for the distribution and assessment of offices, the concrete setting up of the governing bodies of the *polis*. Finally, it had a much more general and vague meaning; a meaning that was nevertheless the most crucial of all: *politeia* stood for the soul of the city, the vital, binding links between the citizens and the polis. In a sense that lies exactly in the line of classical Greek philosophy and its tradition - perhaps even giving the specificity of this tradition -, *politeia* was the essence of the polis.

Both the difference between the two terms and their importance for classical Greek theory is not our invention. It is there in the standard classical texts. Actually, the titles of the two most read Greek political works bear witnesses to this difference. The work political work of Plato is called *Politeia* (translated as 'Republic' or 'State' in contemporary European languages), while that of

Aristotle is called *Politikon* (translated as Politics). This difference is not accidental. The work of Aristotle is closer to modern, 'positivistic' view of politics, as the study of the forms and techniques of rule or government, while Plato is more concerned with the living spirit, the ethos of the city. It is also well known that for Hegel, Plato was a much more important thinker than Aristotle. In light of all this, it simply defies understanding why it happens that this distinction has so far been mostly lost not only in the literature on civil society and the state, but in political theory and philosophy in general. In Riedel's piece on Hegel, even if it abounds in original Greek and Latin words, the term *politeia* is mentioned only in the closing pages, more as a lingering problem that can't be avoided in connection with Hegel's use of the concept of police, and not as a central question on its own right.

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So far, one may say, all this is just a matter of historical interest; some obscure points about the history of classical Greek political thought. But, in our view, something more is involved here; something that may well turn out to be quite important for the understanding of the emergence and stakes of the modern links between the political and social spheres. As the relations between 'politics' and 'police' played a crucial part, a key episode in the manifold ways 'politics' and 'society' were connected and disconnected throughout the 16-19th centuries.

This story is obviously impossible to treat in a single paper, but some points must be made along a quite long historical period in order to situate the problem of the separation of state and civil society around the turn of the 19th century. First, we have to go back again in time in order to make a few points about the medieval period.

The meaning of 'politics' in medieval times does not present a problem for us here, as there was a significant continuity in the treatment of politics as an art of ruling or government. On the

other hand, in medieval Europe, there was nothing resembling to the idea of *politeia*. Moreover, there was something both in the medieval ideal and practice of doing politics that was completely different from and even hostile to this Greek concept. The medieval way of doing politics was based on two key elements, both different from each other and from the Greek model. One was the Christian view, hostile toward politics as a matter of principle - a hostility that originated perhaps in the Hebrew experience of the Babylonian captivity; a rejection of the cruelty and the threatening, war-like character of ancient civilisation that can also be found in the other axial religions and philosophies around the same time; (25) a perspective that found its clearest exposition in the work of Augustinus that had such a large impact on medieval politics. The view concerning the relations between ethics and politics inherent in this perspective was the opposite of the Greek ideal. Political life was not a source of ethical conduct, nor the sphere of ethical action, but one of power, greed, violence, abuse, temptation. Instead of positing ethics as being internal to politics, it concentrated on religion, morality, and laws, in order to provide external controls on politics.

The target, the subject of medieval treatments of politics was not the citizen, but the ruler. The aim was to attain his compliance to higher ethical principles. Christianity also introduced another consideration quite alien from the Greek world of politics: a task of the ruler being to care about the well-being of his subjects in an individualised manner; at least as a matter of principle.

The other model provided a different type of check on political power. It was the feudal technique of representation. The point concerning specificity of this technique of representation was recently made by Alessandro Pizzorno who, among other things, called attention to a widespread misreadings concerning the origins of modern democracy: its all-too-easy identification with the Greek ideal, and the neglect of the feudal representative tradition. (26) According to Pizzorno, modern representative democracy has much more to do with the feudal than with the Greek technique and 'spirit' of government. Representation was a

way of controlling central power and connecting the center and localities, without having recourse to religious, ethical or moral claims.

The difference of and the tension between these two principle was as much in the center of 'politics' in the middle ages as the much better known struggle between spiritual and temporal power. Though the Greek idea of the *politeia* was missing from the feudal manner of government, it did survive, through Roman mediation and combined with the principles of the Roman law, in medieval cities and city states, making the link between the representative and *politeia* principle in these cities a potentially interesting field of study. The Renaissance, at least according to the 'civic humanist' interpretation, (27) was to a large extent nothing but the re-discovery of this ancient, 'pagan' principle. One may even risk to propose an interpretation of Machiavelli along these lines. His concept of the *virtù* can be considered as the transposition of the Greek ideal of politics as ethics into a feudal Christian setting, into the person of the prince. As it is well known, Machiavelli's genre was the Christian treatment of politics: a mirror to the prince, even if he blew up the constraint of the genre; and not just the genre was the same, but the target of intervention as well: the Prince. It was the technique and the ideal, the 'ethical substance' of political action that was Greek. It should not be surprising that the principles proved to be incompatible, unworkable.

So far, this is still only an historical analysis. But it serves two practical purposes for the paper. Firstly, it prepares the ground for the analysis of the introduction of the Greek concept of *politeia* into this field of reality. Second, it also helps to underline the point that it does not make much sense in talking about the identity of state and civil society in feudal Europe - first of all, because it is highly questionable whether something like the 'state' or 'civil society' existed at all at that time. This point can also be made by an analysis of the history of the term 'state': in the middle ages, it referred solely to the private domain of the king. It was, thus, the opposite of both 'society' - meaning some

kind of aggregation of the whole population; and 'civil' - meaning public, in one way or another. (28)

It is well-known that the 15-16th centuries were the times of the waning of the Middle Ages, the break-up of the medieval order. It was also stated recently that a helpful way to characterise this period is through the growth of princely power. (29) We would only like to make one point here; that as one of the attempts to deal with this problem, the Greek ideal of *politeia* was suddenly reintroduced into European political thought. Here, just a short example will be mentioned, the work of Seyssel; a work that sheds some light on the peculiar way Christian, representative, and Greek concepts were joined in the period. (30)

Claude de Seyssel does not belong to the well-known names in the history of political thought, but he is not forgotten either. In the literature on the history of 16th century political thought, he is considered as the starting point of all accounts of modern French constitutionalism. He gives at once a synthesis of medieval constitutionalism, and a glimpse toward modern constitutional theories. In introductions to his work, *la police* figures as one of the three constitutional checks or bridles on the absolute power of the prince, alongside with religion and justice. (31) In general terms, it refers to the complex network of feudal rights and obligations which no monarch can overstep; at least, not without potentially disastrous consequences. In this sense, *la police* is nothing but a new word given to the feudal system of representation and monarchy.

But all this discussion is restricted to Part I of the work, neglecting the more perplexing considerations of the remaining four sections. Here, *la police* refers not only to customs and laws as the existing state of affairs, as given checks on the power of the prince, but as targets to be maintained or conserved. The exact purpose of the intervention is not defined clearly, but is related to the maintenance and growth of the monarchy. In one sense, it was just a reinforcement of the feudal ideal. But this went well beyond the traditional feudal concept of the king's obligation of providing

defense and justice. The specific, detailed points in the remaining sections of the book make it obvious that *la police* referred here to the regular task of the safeguarding of the whole social structure and way of life, the society of estates, against threats from the inside, and not only defense against occasional external transgressors.

Seysssel's work is just an example - and a fairly early one - of the series of attempts made in the 16th century to control a political power that seemed to have lost all control; that, as Machiavelli discovered it, became independent. One attempt was return to the old methods that proved to be inefficient: religion and the law. In one reading of history, this attempt was characterised by centuries of failures, only to succeed, suddenly, with the birth and victory of liberalism. But there is an other possible reading of this political history; a less noble, much misunderstood, but perhaps more effective one. This focuses on the theory of *raison d'état*, understood in the 16-17th century not in a pejorative sense, but as a theory of how to place the art of government on a rational basis as opposed to the tyranny of the personal interest of the prince; a quest for the internal rationality of state action, that was found in the principle of the growth of the forces fo the state. (32) This led to a novel way of conceptualising the tasks of the prince and the state - redefining the prince's search for self-interest as a positive principle and not an abuse of rule; and the links between sovereign power and society - by involving the 'state' in the daily activity of the population at large. In order to assure the growth of the forces of the state, the population had to be maintained, cared for, 'civilised', or, to use the contemporary term, 'policed'. These two novelties were parallel processes, starting from the two ends of a gap; a gap that was enormous in the feudal period between the central political power and the subjects, the 'population': on the one hand, the extension of the 'state' to cover the whole body politic, the whole citizenry, and not just the private domain of the king or the central apparatus; on the other, the inclusion of the daily activities of the population among the concerns of sovereign power. This is the process of the 'harmonisation' of interests; the aim to bring closer the personal

interest of the monarch - posited as being identical with the interests of the whole state - with the interests of each and every citizen, on the basis of the alleged truism that after all, the health and wealth of the population is the main target of both the prince and each and every one of his subjects. Instead of the identity of state and civil society as an original condition, a historical universal, we have rather the *identification* of state (the 'police-state') and civil society as a target, a project.

At the end of the 18th century, at the period of Enlightened absolutism, for a fleeting moment there was a considerable belief that this project may indeed succeed. Let us introduce here a last additional concrete reference that will help us both to illustrate this point and also to return to the book of Humboldt, in order to better situate it. This is the work of Justi, the greatest theoretician of the *Polizeiwissenschaft*, the contemporary science of police, and the emphasis will be on the interpretation of the shift between Justi and his most important follower, Sonnenfels. They all wrote in the same period, in the last half of the 18th century, and were almost contemporaries of Humboldt. Their major problem, like Humboldt's, concerned the links between state and society, politics and police. None of them tried to establish an identity of all these terms. But the links between them were thought of in thoroughly different ways. (33)

Justi, on the one hand, makes a clear distinction between the respective tasks of politics and police - a distinction which, he claims, was so far neglected, creating a lot of confusion in the field of political and police sciences. In a way, the tendency of this distinction is identical with the way we would separate 'police' and 'politics': one should only deal with 'negative' matters, questions of defense and security, while the other has more 'positive', problem-solving-type tasks. But he identifies the respective spheres in exactly the opposite manner as we would have: for Justi, it is politics which has a solely negative sense, while 'police' has a full, positive meaning.

The concrete tasks Justi assigns to the 'police' are extremely broad. It involves practically anything we consider a social or economic activity, and beyond, concerning even 'private' methods of behavior control. As he says in almost as many words, the major target of the police is society itself - man as a social being. What Justi has in mind is not just a force outside society that is supposed to control and supervise it, but that police and society are almost coextensive terms - synonyms. The fact that there is a need for a separate police apparatus is only an indication of backwardness, the sign that the state of affairs is still far from being ideal. In the end, a truly successful police will eliminate itself. (34) This is the dream of the identity of 'police' and society; an identity that still leaves a certain sphere of politics and state action separate and intact.

Justi is the 'fulfilment' of the 'destiny' of *Polizeiwissenschaft*, of almost two centuries of attempts trying to define to true object of this new reality, the 'police'. His immediate follower, Sonnenfels suddenly claimed that the whole effort besides the point. In his view, there was no need to to give a sufficiently broad definition to 'police'. The problem lay exactly with this very attempt. The desire to provide a comprehensive, broad definition was something like chasing a mirage. Sonnenfels made a Don Quijote out of Justi. Instead, he gave a restricted, negative definition: the police was to concern itself with prevention. Instead of producing all sorts of goods, it should rather deal solely with the prevention of bad. (35)

This change left the separation between 'politics' and 'society', understood as the central decision-making organs and the daily life of the majority of the population, intact. But it completely re-located the place of the police in this game. Instead of belonging to the field of society, becoming - under ideal circumstances - at one with it (in a sense truly advancing the Hegelian concept of *aufgehoben*), it was suddenly relocated to the field of politics. And while the earlier problem was concerned with the relations between police and society - the maintenance of order, discipline, morality, etc. all being matters outside law, outside politics, close

to everyday perceptions and morality, closely integrated to social forms and structures -, now the question becomes the relation between the politics and police, pointing toward the liberal problematisation of the limits of politics, of the state, the reintroduction of the question of law concerning the police, a concern that gave support at the level of philosophy and law to voices raised at the level of daily life against the police by earlier 'libertines'. In a way, the French revolution symbolised so powerfully this newly found unity: (36) the unity between the philosophers and politicians fighting the monarchy (high-level absolutism) and the 'common men' of the third estate struggling against the police (everyday absolutism); a development that is not without parallels with contemporary events in East Europe. And perhaps in the line of this investigation, another parallel between the French revolution and bolshevism can also be better understood - the spell-binding link between the republican idealism and the kind of 'police terror' involved in Jacobinism, and in general in the Rousseauite tradition.

The police, even if it tried to become internal to and at one with society, remained and was finally rejected (at least in its original form) as an external body. Its main concerns were explicit moralisation, sermoning, disciplining. The whole concept of civil society was deployed as an opposition to the moral and welfare police. Still, in many ways, we can also find persistences and continuities. This development can be well compared to the transition from the 'mirror-of-princes' literature to theories of *raison d'état* - the end of moralisation, the binding of individuals by their own interest, redefining the principle of self-interest the principle of order from that of disorder. Even if the original policing project did fall into pieces, his elements did survive in a different form in liberal societies as well - in decentralised and no longer centralised manner, like the case of the delegation of policing authority to individual enterprises; on the basis of the idea that there is better 'on-the-spot' knowledge of individual circumstances; (37) or by changing the objects of 'policing' or 'civilising', the main target being no longer the whole social body the three estates, especially the 'third estate', but those strata that

were not yet civilised, not yet part of civil society, either because of their age or their marginal behavior or characteristics.

Civil society was an effective solution in a concrete historical setting. It was also almost immediately considered as a travesty of the principles - and with some degree of justification. It was claimed that it promoted egoistic individualism to the detriment of ethics and community. With this, a new game was introduced into the field of political thinking, the antagonism of liberalism, conservatism and socialism: the concrete reality of liberal, bourgeois civil society opposed to the travesty of the police state, neglecting, or rather not being able to think of itself as a partial inheritor of the original, traditional policing project; and the opposition to the betrayal of principles by this very bourgeois civil society, with the recurrent attempts of trying to resurrect the true Greek ideal, not being able on its own to think the links between the Greek ideal and the history of the early-modern and modern police. It is perhaps this game, especially the game between liberalism and Marxism or socialism that prevented for such a long time to 'discover' the peculiar fate associated with this ideal of *politeia*.

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The concept of the civil society is an uneasy, unstable discursive programme. It cannot but oscillate, since its inception - or rather since the instrumentalisation of the *politeia* as a 'police' as a tool of social disciplining and civilisation- endlessly between two extremes: on the one hand, the affirmation of the irreducible reality of 'society' as a fact and also a major source value; on the other, the reaffirmation of the programme to create, to mould this reality into a proper, 'civilised' shape. Its stability was gained only by reference to a self - the incalculable of self-interest, and the related concepts of self-disciplining, self-control, self-government, etc. But the form of subjectivity thus reaffirmed is not independent of the former civilising projects, as the major target of these civilising projects was exactly the shaping of this

individuality. Ancient civilisation may well have presented the image of an irresistible, alien mega-machine. (38) But the danger involved in modern civilisation is not simply the threat of a totalising state, but is related to the long project of the development of an 'individualising power'. (39)

The current changes in East Europe perhaps represent an invitation to think again the links between politics and society, in order to create new forms of government, beyond liberalism and socialism, while not neglecting the basic values of each of the approaches: some of the *answers* of liberalism - human rights, the rule of law, the respect for personality and freedom, for eg. on the one hand, and some of the *questions* of 'socialism' - concern with the chances of others, inequality, poverty, etc. on the other -, but also think and make something new. Without neglecting the fact that this may be an opening that is impossible to realise.

Notes

- (1) For some of the best known examples, see Andrew Arato, 'Civil Society against the State: Poland 1980-81', *Telos* (1981), 47: 23-47; George Konrad, *Antipolitics* (London: Quartet Books, 1984); and Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).
- (2) See for eg. Timothy G. Ash, *We The People* (London, Granta Books, 1990); and Iván Szelényi, 'Polgárosodás Magyarországon (Embourgeoisement in Hungary): An Interview by András Bozóky', *Valóság* 33 (1990), 1:29-40. TGA
- (3) See recent and forthcoming work by Richard Sakwa and T. H. Rigby.
- (4) About this, see Richard Sakwa, 'Civil Society and Commune democracy in the USSR', paper presented at the IV. World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 21-26 July 1990.
- (5) Péter László, 'Volt-e magyar társadalom a XIX. században? (Was there a Hungarian society in the 19th century?)', *Valóság* 32 (1989), 5: 1-24.
- (6) Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives: Are There Any?*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
- (7) About this, see more later.
- (8) Manfred Riedel, "'State' and 'Civil Society': Linguistic Context and Historical Origin", in his *Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1984); and also Z. A. Pelczynski, 'Introduction: The significance of Hegel's separation of the state and civil society', in: Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.) *The State and Civil Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
- (9) Foucault wrote about his relationship to Hegel in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, where he took up the chair left

- vacant by the death of Jean Hyppolite, a former professor of his, one of the greatest authority in France on Hegel. In it he says that in order to escape truly Hegel, one must be aware of how much one owes to him; and that the distance one makes with respect to Hegel only takes one back to him, in a different way, as if another ruse of history, only to leave again. (Michel Foucault, *L'ordre du discours* (Paris, Gallimard, 1971). A somewhat damaged English translation can be found as an appendix to the American edition of the *Archeology of Knowledge*). This work is not much known, though it is not only an excellent analysis, well beyond the type of formal statements such occasions usually suscite, but also a good clarification of Foucault's relations to Hegel, and an example of how generous Foucault could be with his assessment when he deemed it proper.
- (10) Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, 'Civil Society and Social Theory', *Thesis Eleven* (1988), 21: 40-64.
 - (11) On this question, see Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality: An Introduction', and Graham Burchell, 'Peculiar interests: civil society and "governing the system of natural liberty"', both in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect* (Brighton, Harvester, 1991).
 - (12) About intellectual conscience, see for example Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (N.Y., Vintage, 1974), # 2.
 - (13) See Wilhelm von Humboldt, *The Limits of State Action* (Cambridge University Press, 1969). This work was written almost exactly 200 years ago, in 1792, and published in 1851. On reasons for the delay in publication, see Paul R. Sweet, *Wilhelm von Humboldt: A Biography* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1963), v.1, pp. 100-103.
 - (14) See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (N.Y., Vintage, 1977).
 - (15) See Ch.IX in Humboldt, *The Limits of State Action*.
 - (16) *Ibid.*, p.86.
 - (17) Brian Chapman, *Police State* (London, MacMillan, 1970).
 - (18) On this in more detail, see Agnes Horváth and Arpad Szakolczai, *Senkiföldjén : A politikai instruktorok tevékenységéről az állampártban* (On the No Man's Land: the activity of political instructors in the state-party), (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1989), to be published by Routledge as *The Dissolution of Communist Power in Hungary* in 1991.
 - (19) For eg. see the definition of of police given in Carl B. Klockars, *The Idea of Police* (London, Sage, 1985).
 - (20) See Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le libéralisme économique: l'histoire de l'idée de marché*, (Paris: Seuil, 1989), first published as *Le Capitalisme utopique* in 1979; and Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, Oxford: Berg, 1988 [1959].
 - (21) As an example of the latter, see John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London, Verso, 1988), and John Keane (ed.), *Civil Society and the State* (London, Verso, 1988).
 - (22) For a definition of government in the wide sense, see Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', Afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, The University Press, 1982).
 - (23) See Arpad Szakolczai, 'The Modern State as a Policy State', conference paper, 1991.
 - (24) See Aristoteles, *Politics*, ed. and trsl. by Ernest Barker (London, Oxford University Press, 1958); and Isocrates, "Aeropagiticus", in: *The Complete Works of Isocrates* (William Heinemann, London,

- 1928-45), vol. 2., p.113. For a recent overview of the topic, see Jacqueline Bordes, *Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à Aristote* (Paris, Les Belles lettres, 1982).
- (25) See especially the philosophy of the Stoics. For a secondary literature on axiality, see the works of Karl Jaspers, and Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man* (New York, Collier Books, 1956).
 - (26) Alessandro Pizzorno, 'Notes on Representative Regimes, their Crises and Corruptions', paper presented at the meeting on Westerb Democracy over the past 40 years, Florence, 7-9 November, 1990.
 - (27) On civic humanism, see Hans Baron, *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance*, 2nd ed (Princeton, 1966), and J. G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton University Press, 1975).
 - (28) For some of the best treatments, see Gaines Post, *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100-1322* (Princeton University Press, 1964); and Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. Two: The Age of Reformation* (Cambridge University Press, 1978), Conclusion.
 - (29) See J. H. Shennan, *The Origins of the Modern European State 1450-1725* (London, Hutchinson University Library, 1975).
 - (30) Claude de Seyssel, *La Monarchie de France* (ed. by Jacques Poujol), (Paris, PUF, 1961) [1515].
 - (31) See William F. Church, *Constitutional Thought In Sixteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941); J. H. Hexter, *The Vision of Politics on the Eve of Reformation: More, Machiavelli and Seyssel* (London, Allen Lane, 1973); and Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. Two*.
 - (32) On *raison d'état*, see Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and its Place in Modern History* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1957); see also Árpád Szakolczai, *A fejlődés megkérdőjelezése* (Questioning development), (Budapest, Akadémiai, 1990).
 - (33) See Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, *Elémens généraux de police* (Paris, 1769). From the secondary literature, see Roland Axtmann, "'Police" and the formation of the modern state: legal and ideological assumptions on state capacity in the Austrian lands of the Habsburg Empire 1500-1800' (Mimeo, 1990); Michel Foucault, 'Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of "Political Reason"', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 1981); Albion W. Small, *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity* (University of Chicago Press, 1909); and Keith Tribe, *Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse 1750-1840* (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
 - (34) See Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The History of Economic Analysis* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 172.
 - (35) According to Axtmann, this was a major displacement from the medieval concept of the promotion of the public good towards the modern idea prevention of future misfortunes.
 - (36) To show that this unity was newly found, see about the earlier close connections between the philosophes and the police: Pierre Chevallier, *Les Philosophes et le lieutenant de Police, J. Ch. Pierre Le Noir (1775-1785)*, (Troyes, 1967), referred in Marcel Le Clère, *Bibliographie critique de la police* (Paris, Yzer, 1980).
 - (37) Jacques Donzelot, *L'invention du social* (Paris, Fayard, 1984).
 - (38) See Lewis Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine, Vol. One: Technics and Human Development* (New York, Harcourt, 1967).
 - (39) See Foucault, 'Omnes et Singulation', and 'The Subject and Power'.

D. Discipline and Govern: The Transition in East Europe and Languages of Power

1. Introduction

Besides the grave economic, social, political, cultural and other problems that all countries have to face in the region, the fact and circumstances of the transition and the current situation in the former Eastern Europe presents a number of problems and surprises for social and political thought and analysis as well. Such is first of all the question of how these changes could have happened at all, and especially in this particular way - a question that does not stop perplexing those who lived in or followed closely the path of these systems. Second, there is the problem of the discourse, the language itself that is applied to the transition and the nature of the former system both by analysts and protagonists - social and political scientists, journalists, and politicians; a language emphasizing dictatorship, repression, and totalitarianism, where the paradox is exactly that if this language were correct, the transition could not have happened in the way it actually did, at least in Hungary. This language is motivated on the one hand more by an urge to write out ideas that were formerly impossible to get into print than by considerations of clear-minded analysis - a situation that is understandable on the basis of psychology, but that is unacceptable for analytic purposes; on the other, by the implicit or explicit (often - especially in case of the new 'populist' leaders - cynical) desire of the new political elite to secure their legitimacy. For anybody who had a first-hand experience of the events of the last 3-4 years in Hungary, a discourse that talks about the downfall of a tyranny simply does not make any sense.

Third, there are some considerable problems with the language of contemporary political and intellectual programmes of the region. On the one hand, we have a resurrection of the idea of 'modernisation'. Everybody wants to 'modernise' the former

Eastern Europe - liberal, neo-liberal, nationalist or other politicians, intellectuals, businessmen, social administrators and social scientists. The discourse of 'modernisation' seems an almost natural answer to the current sets of problems. However, two points are lost or forgotten in this discursive euphoria - two historical experiences. Firstly, that after a similar upsurge of modernisation theories in the 1950s, this concept became much discredited later. The times and places may well have been different then and now, but a neglect of the possible analogies is still not justified. Secondly, it is also quite forgotten that bolshevism, after all, was exactly an overall programme for modernisation. It is true that the ideology and the means chosen were different, and also that reality became quite different from the original dreams. Still, beyond ideology, it is not at all certain that all techniques are so dissimilar. There is also the danger that reality will be different from the programme again, and in perhaps surprising ways.

On the other hand, there is some problem with the almost consensual view concerning the manner of 'modernisation', the new slogans of the day. These are everywhere the same: market economy, private property, civil society, etc. We certainly do not want to question the relevance of all these considerations. Still, there is reason to find fault with a discourse and attitude that in its sensitivity does not seriously go beyond an early-19th century perspective. First, intellectually, because too much things have happened since that time to make the adherence to a strict, dogmatic liberalism an intellectually unsatisfactory attitude. (1) The second point is related to actual social and political problems. After all, even if bolshevism - perhaps even socialism *tout court* - proved to be a failure as an answer, it does not deny the validity and seriousness of the problems which provoked these answers; problems that certainly will be a part of daily reality in these countries for a long time (unemployment, poverty, declassation, insecurity, large and according to everyday perception unjustifiable inequalities income, etc.).

In this context, it is to be remarked that these discourses did not originate in the events of 1989 and 1990. One can refer to a much longer conceptual impasse. On the one hand, scientific discussions between East and West often took up a fruitless scenario in the past decade or so when the Eastern delegate was no longer distinguishable and peculiar by his Marxist rhetoric, but by his boundless admiration for the wonders of modernisation, the market and related matters; and his Western opponents were no longer pointing out the failures of socialism, but were trying to give often quasi-paternalistic, and always very general and broad advices about the dangers of the market, private property, etc. etc. On the other hand, this discourse of modernisation, the market and civil society is hardly different from the language used by the 'late' reform communists. Of course, the references concerning the need for socialism or the Party are now omitted - but reform communists may easily point out that the possibilities are now different than they were then. All things considered, there is something really perplexing about the fact that the current discourse of the new democracies of East Europe displays so few really new ideas - except for the fact that some elements of the nationalistic and religious 'revivals' were completely unforeseen by the different 'reformist' intellectual scenarios.

Finally, there is the problem of the legacy of communism as an analytical issue, the survival of the effects of the past system in reality - in daily life, social and personal relationships, individual attitudes and behavior. There is a real need to analyse post-communism beyond the rhetorics of daily politics and journalism, especially because if there was any point in the discourse of totalitarianism, it should indicate that the impact of such a thorough system of control cannot so simply disappear into thin air.

2. The discourse of the transition

The radical changes that were happening in East Europe in 1989 were certainly most surprising, even unbelievable, unintelligible

for most observers, both East and West. However, given the enormous curiosity and the need for understanding, there soon developed a dominant orthodoxy concerning the reasons. While the former theoretical frameworks seemed to be incapable of making sense of an event that counterdicted their basic axioms, the new interpretations were nevertheless based to a large extent on these very theories.

In a very rudimentary way, this orthodoxy can be characterised in the following way. These societies lived under a totalitarian (or post-totalitarian) dictatorship, where the repressive and illegitimate power of the communist parties were maintained by the external force of the Soviet army. This system was claimed to be unique, far from the mainstream of modern history and development; it was a Russian aberration. It was an oppressive, monolithic block, impossible to change from within, impossible to challenge from without.

Nevertheless, these systems collapsed, and the reason can be summarised in one word: Gorbachev. Due to certain reasons, Gorbachev decided to lift the lid, to declare unilaterally the Brezhnev-doctrine and the Yalta pact invalid. This liberated the spirit from the bottle, the oppressed people have arisen everywhere, the communist systems collapsed, the road was opened towards freedom and democracy. The difference in the respective countries was only in the timing of the changes, and it was due to previous attitude toward reforms, and the responsiveness of communist leaders to the spirit of the times.

This explanation that is all too journalistic, putting too much emphasis on one personality - a solution that is certainly most unsatisfactory according to the current views in the social and political sciences and even in history - is usually complemented with another, opposite explanation, the reference to the economic crisis. If the first explanation was 'subjective', this is certainly 'objective', structuralist-functionalist. The two views nicely complement each other, they together form a firm web. The fall of the communist systems was due to objective factors, the iron laws

of economic life; and they happened now because this was the time when a man came who realised the problem and had the courage and the vision to act; a man with whom it was 'possible to do business with'. Objectivity and subjectivity form a coherent theory that seems to be inassailable.

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the exclusivity of this scenario, both concerning the nature of the past systems and the reasons for their downfall, in order to contribute to a different understanding; in order to tackle some problems of the transition that the above framework was not able to situate.

Firstly, no matter how obvious it seems first problems of fact. It is obviously true that there was a deep economic crisis in these systems; but that was the case since the beginning. It would especially be a mistake to project backwards the current decreases in GNP as the origin of the whole upheaval - a mistake often committed by economists. And the very nature of this crisis - the question whether it was an 'economic' crisis - does present an intellectual problem.

The prolonged economic problems of these systems are facts. But to explain the collapse of these systems as a consequence of an economic crisis is a mistake of thinking. One has to be careful with words. The term 'economic crisis' is misleading, as it is employed as a *terminus technicus* for the description of an internal process of modern capitalist market economies, referring to the periodical crises of the economy, the regularly returning event of a decrease of output, or at least a radical decline in the growth of the GNP. This was something that obviously did not happen in this form in the centrally planned economies for long decades.

This fact, by the way, gave rise in Hungary to a considerable literature in the last decade on the existence of cyclical phenomena in the economic system. Economists, on the basis of the 'theory', were searching for cyclical phenomena, and not without success. Such a cyclicity was in fact discovered in the investment process, and was linked to the peculiarities of the

five-year planning system. (2) However, another line of investigation led to a perhaps more interesting result. This was the project of Mária Csanádi that also started as an investigation of the reason for irregularities concerning the allocation of investment funds, but which led completely outside the sphere of economics: into the Central Committee of the party itself. Csanádi found that there was one variable that showed extremely strong correlation between the amount of money firms received in particular periods; and the was linked to CC membership. Thus, it was this economic investigation that led to one of the few empirical studies of the party. (3)

The point here is not to deny the fact that there may have been cyclical phenomena associated with the path of the economic system under existing socialism, nor to deny the relevance and validity of such studies. It is rather a question of perspective or logic; the aim is to question an attitude that is trying to apply the same logic to every phenomena; that in order to convince itself of its own explanatory strength, needs to assume and transpose identical - economic - mechanisms everywhere.

But there is another inherent weaknesses of any economic explanations of the dismantling of communism. In order to talk about the self-contained existence of an economic crisis, it is necessary that 'the economy' as such exist. It is the contention of this paper that in the formerly existing socialist systems there was no such thing as 'the economy'.

This statement is not so paradoxical or new as it sounds. On the basis of the work of Braudel (in a direction opposite to the one taken up by Wallerstein, using, among others, the works of Foucault, Furet, Hirschman and Pocock), it was recently stated by a new generation of French intellectual historians that 'the economy' is a recent invention; it can be connected to the emergence of liberalism. Stretching the point just a little bit, one could say that Adam Smith single-handedly discovered 'the economy'. (4) This invention was an answer to a specific problem. **This problem** was not an economic one; it couldn't have been so.

The 'economy' was discovered as a solution to a political problem; the solution of a crisis of government, of governmental rationality.

In this scenario, the 'economy' emerged as a solution to a political problem. In the East European countries, the problem, at first sight, was exactly the opposite. There, it was due to political and ideological considerations that the logic of the economy was neglected, denied. Still, what both cases have in common, and what therefore can be a promising starting point, is the indexing of the 'economy' - in the sense of a political economy - to the political sphere. Thus, a way was found to analyse the internal, and not merely external connections between the economic and the political spheres - beyond such statements that 'the political sphere 'represses' the economy'.

3. What was intolerable in daily reality under communism?

If, on the one hand, there are serious problems about widely accepted explanations concerning the changes, there are, on the other hand, questions concerning the recent image of the past that come out of the discourse of the new elite. To talk about 40 years of 'communist dictatorship' in Hungary certainly does not help to illuminate the situation; it is clearly out of step at least with my experiences concerning the system. Not that it was not intolerable and suffocating. But, in my view, many of the most unbearable aspects of the former system were exactly related to the fact that it long ago ceased to be a simple dictatorship. The language of dictatorship is dangerous not only because it presents at most a partial truth, but also because of its strict division lines, its binary oppositions, its language that only knows good and evil helps to wash away the real questions concerning the impact and the legacy of the past.

It was exactly this ugly, grey, unshaky situation, this lack of clear values, dividing lines, stands, that was - among other things - so unacceptable in the Hungary of the last one or two decades. And against this situation, the **call** of many intellectuals and writers in

the past to talk clearly, to set up clear standards, even the famous call for official censorship were right to the point. But these dividing lines cannot be simply transposed today towards the past, when they did not exist in this form.

The discourse of the dictatorship is misleading, partial, incorrect; it is dangerous as it impedes and does not help clear sight and thinking. It is also a symptom. It points to the insufficiency of language. We do not possess a proper way to address power. We have no language to deal with it, except the language of the law. We have no tools to denounce situations that seem to be intolerable, except through looking for somebody to blame; somebody who is hiding behind the scenes, who is abusing his position, who is repressing and exploiting others. This failure of the language is not restricted to us in East Europe. It is this same language that comes to the fore whenever in any modern society a problem is observed, whenever certain individuals or groups raise a problem concerning the intolerability of the continuity of certain aspects of their existence, whether it is related to the situation between classes, races, sexes, adults and youngsters, husbands and wives, or even mental problems. It is this same language that is characteristic of Marxists, psychoanalysts, civil rights movements, feminists, new social movements, etc. The figures are the father or the judge, the tyrant or the liberator; the model is the tribunal, the uprising and the complete elimination of injustice.

There are many situations to which this language is adequate. But the problem is that, although we have many theories of power, we do not have an alternative language to use. This is the language used, irrespective of whether it is appropriate to the actual situation concerning the application of power and the feeling of intolerability. This is the problem that has been tackled by Michel Foucault, and that's why his work has such a relevance to so many questions in social and political thought today.

In my view, this approach is especially helpful for us today in East Europe, as there were many aspects of the past system that could

not be subsumed under the categories of 'repression, exploitation, tyranny, and dictatorship', but that were felt to be intolerable. Moreover, I would risk the hypothesis the one of the reasons why today there seems to be such a large and widening gap between the new elite and the population at large is exactly due to the fact that the problems, the intolerability of the past systems were felt differently by the two groups. This point is often misconceived today, perhaps due to the perceived populist threat. It is often stated that assumed that the population 'at large' was in the past some sort of a beneficiary of the former system; a tacit, infantile ally of the paternalist system. This is a mistake - and it certainly would be unhelpful in explaining the definite rejection by the majority of the former system. The point is not that the population accepted the system, but that it was hurt in somewhat different ways. (5)

4. Foucault on power as government and on governmentality

It is widely acknowledged by now that Foucault did some major works on the question of power. (6) However, there are some important points about his works that are much less known, but quite crucial for any use and interpretation. Let's review some of these.

1. Michel Foucault was not a social or political scientist. He was a philosopher. It does not mean that therefore his work is mere speculation, without any relevance to social or political analysis. Quite the contrary. But in order to perceive the difference he made, his status as a philosopher must be kept in mind, in order to avoid the mistake of misreading the difference of his work, by reducing him, for eg., to the status of another theorist of social control.

2. As a philosopher, Foucault had a particular problem - like Husserl or Heidegger. As he stated several time, his problem was not the question of power. It is more difficult to specify it in positive terms, even if in some of his late lectures, introductions, and interviews, he tried to specify it. His problem was the status of individual (the subject) and truth; the way in which individuals

became objects of study in their very individuality, and were actively involved in this process of 'subjectivation': the construction of an identity on the basis of the discovery of the truth about themselves; and how all this was connected to the specific ways modern societies function. (7) Power only became important for him as if 'by default' - due to the fact that he found that there was a lack of tools for the analysis of power relations. (8) Which again does not disqualify *a priori* his excursions into the field of the problem of power. Quite the contrary, as the widespread references to his works make it obvious. Which, by the way, is an interesting methodological point on its own: it seems that sometimes we can tackle problems more successfully as a 'side dish'. When we want to confront them head on, with all our knowledge and might, and want to write 'the' theory of power or the state, one often finds the food to big too swallow.

3. On the basis of the volumes published - two books on the problem of power in 1975 and 1976; a long silence; finally the publication of two volumes on the history of sexuality different from the 1976 projections, and having nothing to do with the problems of power -, two interpretations suggest themselves concerning Foucault's works on power. First, that he thought the two volumes dealt with the problem comprehensively, and there was no need for further study. The second, opposite reading is that he found fault with these works, and dropped the whole topic. In fact, none of these interpretations stand up to inspection. For Foucault, the publication of a work did not mean a prelude to a long intellectual holiday, spent by becoming a living advertisement for the work; nor was it an occasion to close a finished chapter. On the contrary, it was an occasion to step back and reflect. And that's what he did in the late 70s and early 80s, giving lectures and publishing some articles and interviews that represent new directions in his conceptualisations of relations of power. (9)

At this place, only a few short comments can be made concerning these changes. First, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault proposed the concept of power as discipline, as opposed to the view of power as sovereignty, and the model of war to that of law. In his

later lectures and articles, he profoundly displaced his position. On the one hand, he gave a more general definition of power as government, of which discipline was only a possible aspect. He defined government as the 'conduct of conduct', or as 'action upon action', and no longer as direct action upon individuals, the production of certain types of individuality. (10) On the other, already in his 1976 lectures, he stepped outside the model of power as war, and gave a historical analysis of this view. (11)

Second, he shifted his emphasis from the micro-level to the question of the links between the micro and macro spheres, the techniques and rationalities of 'government'; the actual historical links made between the broad and narrow meanings of government: the government of the conduct of men, and the government of states. For these analyses, he developed the term 'governmentality' or 'governmental rationality'. (12) This was, on the one hand, an analytical tool for the study of relations of power. In Foucault's words, the study of power should concern itself not with the problem of Law or the myth of Power, but 'with the complex and multiple practices of a "governmentality" which presupposes, on the one hand, rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentations through which to operate and, on the other hand, strategic games which subject the power relations they are supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal.' (13) On the other hand, the concept of 'governmentality' serves as a diagnosis for the specific Western 'mentality' concerning government, an urge to govern all sorts of behavior; an urge that is related but not restricted to the modern state. It is in this vein that he talked about governmentality as 'the manner in which the behavior of an ensemble of individuals became implicated, in an increasingly marked way, in the exercise of sovereign power'. (14) It is in this vein that he specified his views about the process of disciplining, stating that '[w]hat is to be understood by the disciplining of societies in Europe since the C18th is not, of course, that the individuals who are part of them become more and more obedient, not that they set about assembling in barracks, schools, or prisons: rather that an increasingly better invigilated process of adjustment has been sought after [own emphasis]- more and

more rational and economic - between productive activities, resources of communication, and the play of power relations.' (15) And it is also in this vein that he altered his diagnosis concerning both the key characteristics and the major dangers of the exercise of power and power relations in modern societies.

Foucault's concern in all his works was that he found the standard interpretation concerning the relations between truth, freedom, and individuality, on the one hand, and power on the other insufficient. Power, especially the type of power prevalent in modern societies, is not simply outside truth, freedom, and the individual, though is obviously neither identical with them. His aim was to think their relationships in ever novel ways, in order to effectuate a real change in our freedom and individuality. His major point was not to take up an untenable view that modern societies are thoroughly penetrated with 'Power', but that the danger is that they became quite involved with government, interpreted in the broad sense, in ways that our traditional discourse centering on repression and the law is not able even to conceptualise. Instead of adhering to individuality and its deep truth as a source of resistance to power, one should study the ways in which individuals in modern societies are urged to discover their own truth, and are supposed to behave according to the 'prison' of an identity they fabricate for themselves, by the full exercise of their freedom. Instead of opposing 'freedom' to 'power', one must think 'modernity' as a system in which the very freedom of individuals became incorporated into complex strategical games - in the words of Foucault, liberty now has become an indispensable element of governmentality itself. (16) This opens up novel possibilities, but also involves the trap that it is all too easy to reduce one's freedom to the choice between pre-fabricated models of individualities, with the techniques gaining access to the 'deep self' doing the job of actively involving the individual in this fabrication. Perhaps one may say that Foucault agrees that there are much more openings and free games in modern societies to work one's way toward true individuality, but only at the price that it is much easier to lose one's own way in

these games; lose the distance from one's own actions, and thus the ability to change.

All these considerations seem to lie far apart from the reality of East Europe. But is it really so? Is not the questions of truth and lie, rationality and irrationality, the status of modernity and modernisation, the question of freedom and the power exercised in daily life, in a regular, continuous manner, over individuals, a central problem of East Europe?

5. *Raison d'état* and 'police'

The aim of the research on which this paper is based was to apply the tools developed by Foucault for the study of East Europe. However, it turned out that some of the very results of Foucault's analyses also were particularly relevant. Foucault attempted to conceptualise the transition from 'absolutist' to 'liberal' governmental rationality in a novel way, without having recourse to a theory of the state, or a given conceptual schema like the growth of bureaucracy or rationality, the struggle between state and civil society, the colonisation of the life-world, the logic of capitalism, the struggle of classes, or the dialectic of the base and infrastructure. In order to explain the crisis of a 'socialist' governmental rationality, we first have to specify what it was; whether there was such a thing?

It is well-known that as soon as socialists acquire political power under any circumstances, they immediately run into difficulties concerning the practical tasks of government. It is particularly well-known and documented in the case of bolsheviks. I only want to make two points here. First, any state in the 20th century needs some art of government. If one refused the liberal method and had not even a hint of the need of an alternative, one may well have had to accept the only available alternative possibility: the theory of *raison d'état*. (17) All talk about the accidentality of war communism or the claim that the socialist economy was a war economy is misleading: it was not at all accidental, but it was

not simply as 'war economy', only in the sense in which the very theory of *raison d'état* as a governmental rationality implies a quasi-military model for the organisation of the economy and the society in times of peace. Second, any government that tries to base itself on the willing and ready participation of individuals, needs to ascertain the compliance of the actual behaviour to the ideal of self-government and self-discipline. Now, due to a number of different factors, the method chosen for this individual-oriented disciplining, the deployment of the party apparatus, was an almost perfect copy of the governmental apparatus and technology that accompanied the *raison d'état* in the so-called 'absolutist' states: the 'police'. (18)

This is not the place to discuss the problem of 'absolutist' government. Still, a few points must be made for our exposition. *Raison d'état* was a specific governmental rationality with its goal given as the growth of the forces of the state. It found in the 'police' a proper governmental technology to fulfil its goal.

In the 16-18th centuries, the 'police' was not just an apparatus of the state, a force existing outside of society and threatening its very fabric. Quite the opposite: in the early 16th century, following the Greek usage, especially in France 'police' meant the constitution. At that period, it had nothing to do with the legal concept of the constitution; it rather referred to the very material constitution of society, what we would call the social structure. (19) Later, from the beginning of the 17th century, this was increasingly given as a task, and not as a statement of fact: the good 'police', the ordered structure of the state had to be maintained and created; the social ties that were threatened by religious and civil wars, increased mobility and vagabonds, had to be reinforced. This was not a completely new phenomenon. Since the waning of the middle ages, there was a constant concern with the maintenance of social hierarchy throughout Europe - one only has to refer here to the sumptuary laws. (20) What was new was the scale of the problem, and the eventual solution found to this question: the institutionalisation of the police - at least in the continent.

In time, the aim of the police concerning the reinforcement of the social structure became somewhat shifted towards the reinforcement of the middle classes. The police was something of a tool for *embourgeoisement*. This, by the way, shows some interesting light on the special case of Britain, both in the past and the present. The absence of the 'police' in Britain not only meant the lack of hindrance to freedom, but also the maintained polarity of the social structure. Though in one particular period, it may have served as an 'advantage', but today, it probably contributes to England's contemporary problems, and its steady slide towards an occasionally almost third-world-like status.

The result of the combination and co-adjustment of *raison d'état* and 'police' was an increased pressure on individuals. It was the joining of the forces of the state to the traditional, authoritarian types of social controls that made the daily life under 'absolutist' regimes ever more insupportable, and that contributed so much to the revolutions and the victory of liberalism. The reason why liberalism gave a solution was exactly that it based order on individuals; on disciplined individuals, following their own self-interest. (21)

This solution, however, almost immediately presented a dual problem concerning social structure. For conservatives, individualism threatened the very fabric of society. Though often mistrustful of the monster of the 'state', they mourned the loss of a good 'police'. Socialists, on the other hand, attacked the actual joining of the forces of the new, individualistic order and the old social structure: the inequality of access to the benefits of new system, the threat of new police, whose main target was to preserve new economic and not old social relations, although the two were often related: the history of social and civil rights movements is the history of the successive separation of these ties.

The transposition of these models into 20th century East Europe, in the form of the 'workers' state' carried its own surprises. First,

the doctrine of *raison d'état* was invented at a period when 'the economy' did not yet exist. The 'economy', therefore, was not a sphere which towards which this doctrine had a proper, rational attitude. Moreover, it was instrumental in bringing about the creation of the economy. (22) However, in the bolshevik version, this development, due to ideological reasons, was precluded from the start. Any such orientations were repressed in their rudimentary stage. One could say that in a way, the bolsheviks 'learned' from the history of absolutism: they made it sure that the possibility of the future solution was eliminated in advance. (23) Thus, in the Soviet case, the crisis of this governmental rationality had to be different from the case of the Western crisis around the turn of the 19th century, when the new solution could have been based on the real impact and partial attainments of 'reason of states'; and also, this 'rationality' had something of the absurd in it from the start.

The second problem, closely related to the first is the 'rediscovery' of the 'police' and its links with the social structure. Although originally the 'police' was a technology for the reinforcement of community, (24) it became effective only because it successfully 'produced' certain forms of individuality. The 'police' was a technology for isolating individuals, making them conscious of the own activity and self, trying to increase their own forces when left alone, to target one's energies into abstract goals, unrelated to given, contextual, mundane concerns. Its aim was the capitalisation of efforts; the shaping of an individual into a 'human capital'. Now, the goals towards which this disciplining, this specific orientation of the 'conduct of life' - to use a Weberian term - can be different: salvation; profit; the common good; the building of socialism. One thing is certain: this is by definition against the views and attitudes of the popular and working classes. This is a method to shape a middle class.

That's why bolshevism was never a movement or an ideology of the working classes. But that is not the only point here. It is related to the absurdity, the inherent irrationality of the whole project, the incompatibility between the techniques employed and

the purposes, the ideology which these techniques were allegedly serving. The absurdity can be traced in both main aspect of the 'police': the goal of maintaining the social structure, and of shaping individual behavior.

The problem of the 'police' was to defend the social structure, to increase its cohesion. It had to fight the very forces that were disrupting it, thus it had to posit himself outside the law. The bolshevik 'police', the party apparatus, on the other hand, first disrupted the very social structure the 'police' was attempting to promote, its main targets being exactly those aspects of society the 'police' was trying to promote: the middle classes. After that, it tried to build a social structure. But technique used - the 'police' - was incompatible with the ideology - working classes, solidarity, collectivity. Moreover, due to the destruction of existing social structures and ties, this strive for a 'community' had no basis in real life whatsoever. On the contrary, it led to an enormous disorientation for individuals. What gave life stability in the past suddenly disappeared or was questioned.

Second, the 'police' could only accomplish its tasks by focusing on the individual - disciplining, shaping, forming, moulding individual behavior. Starting as a tool to restore the community, it ended up being a technique for the shaping of individuals. At the end, this turned against itself in a certain way - the aim to shape individuals who follow their interests and not their passions may well have succeeded, but this meant the demise of the very social and political order the 'police' tried to create. Still, in this case, there was a certain coherence between the strategies deployed to promote order, and the type of individuality that emerged as a response to these questions.

The bolshevik-type state-parties ended up using the same mechanisms in order to promote community and to shape and control individual behavior, but in a manner that worked against the very mechanisms deployed. They promoted calculable, conscious, interest-oriented behavior, but denied its satisfaction, even claimed that its pursuit was a 'sin'. The product of this

incompatibility was not so much 'atomisation', as the promotion of a new form of subjectivity: frustrated individualisation. All the efforts of the official sphere went towards the creation of a certain type of self-governing, self-controlled, self-disciplined individual, but the system was unable to base itself on this type of individuality due to a fear of 'capitalism', etc. It promoted and then refused the perhaps only possible way that could have been used to coordinate individuals who were shaped in this manner: self-interest. (25)

Individuals who are first disoriented and then frustrated desperately need some sort of basic stability. This explains the second, also unexpected and perhaps surprising effect of life under communism in Hungary: the exclusive importance of personal relationships and connections. There were two images of the world, of the way things were going, matters could be arranged under communism. The official one: strict discipline, bureaucracy, and hierarchy. And the real one: the backdoor and the direct telephone line. All this is well-known by now from the literature. (26) But less attention is paid for interconnections and perhaps inherently functional impacts. For individuals living under the system, the two strategies were opposite. The formal system did not exist in its strict form since a long time in Hungary; perhaps never did. But it existed as a threat, as a potentiality. It justified the second; made it not only acceptable, but even rightful, a proper strategy of survival and resistance. And, moreover, the link also worked the other way around. The systems of personal links that consisted in the real 'undercurrent' of the formal official system helped to reinforce the official system. And here we return to an important difference between popular and elite perceptions of the reality of communism.

For the elite, the key dividing line existed between the networks of official system - the state and party apparatus and the nomenclatura - and its own circles, itself divided among populists and urbanists, former communists and former participants of the 1956 revolution. For the large part of the population, however, the distinction between the elites and the official hierarchy was not so

clearly visible. They were all too aware that firstly, there were manifold connections between the two sides; secondly, that all segments of the elite did have access to the better, decent jobs, while hardly anyone outside these circles stood a chance; and finally, that these elites were fairly closed upon themselves - the nomenclatura still being the most open of them. In this situation, the acceptance of the pursuit of a career along the official lines did no longer involve a major ethical wager, a 'selling' of one's soul, but the only possible solution for a way upwards, at the price of the minor inconvenience of putting up with some degree of party ideology and participation in meetings - in a situation where for decades, there was little visible signs of repression, and where the memories of the last popular upsurge and the consequent repressions were quite efficiently swept under the carpet for a long time.

6. Conclusion

These points raise two problems that cannot be handled by the important legal changes of the political system. First, how would it be possible to get rid of the legacy of frustrated individualisation, without claiming that it is necessary to push the whole population again through a now 'proper' 'policing' - that is at any rate an impossibility - , or without promoting some sort of shock-therapy of 'possessive individualisation' through the the disciplinary effects of private property - another strategy that is doomed to failure from the start? Second, how to break up the pervasive presence of reliance upon direct, personal connections and networks in all aspects of social, cultural, economic, political, academic, etc. life, where the system of such connections presents at least three problems: the reliance on these relations is almost exclusive; it is hardly at all connected to performance and ability; and in it, there are not more than traces of a Weberian ethos of impartiality, neutrality, judgment, without which a modern society simply cannot function. There is too much talk about the extensive bureaucratisation today, on the basis of the mistaken view that the party was just a 'bureaucratic machine', and too

little attention being paid on the perhaps more serious problem of the lack of a proper bureaucracy and bureaucratic ethos.

Volumes of articles may be written on the legacy of communism in terms of the current influence of former party members, the guilt of secret police agents, the salvaging of the nomenclatura, the ties between fathers and sons, etc. etc. Without denying the importance and partial truth of most of these points, 'frustrated individualisation' and the all-pervasive network of personal connections may have a much larger and more penetrating impact on the future.

Finally, the application language of power that is outside the model of the law is also crucial for the current situation in Eastern Europe, where there is an all-too great emphasis exactly on this language. (27) The point is not to deny the importance of *rechtstaat* or the problem of human rights - that would be absurd anyway. But to point out that an exaggerated importance attributed to questions of - or the power of - the law reinforces a gap between the elite and the population, and neglects the problems of power exercised in daily reality that was as important and as intolerable an aspect of daily reality as the macro-level considerations of legitimacy, and that may have a much more prolonged legacy.

A central aspect of the changes is that the exercise of political power today is legitimate now in these countries, according to the criteria of the 20th century. This is a very important point. But once this is settled, another question have to come to the fore: what is the substance of this now legitimate power? How is it exercised? What happens when it is exercised? How is it related to our daily reality? To these, and related questions, the legal model of power has not much to offer as an answer.

Notes

- (1) Similar points were made by Lengyel László, in his 'Tudomány és politika' (Science and politics), in: *2000* (1991), 3: 45-47.
- (2) See Tamás Bauer, *Tervgazdaság, beruházás, ciklusok* (Planned economy, investment, cycles), (Budapest, KJK, 1981).
- (3) See Mária Csanádi, 'Beyond the Image: the Case of Hungary', in: *Social Research* 57 (1990), 2: 321-346. The other major empirical work on the party apparatus was also started by economists as a study of the labor and capital 'markets'. See Károly Fazekas and János Köllő, *Munkaerőpiac töképiac nélkül* (Labour market without capital market), (Budapest, KJK, 1990).
- (4) See Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le libéralisme économique: l'histoire de l'idée de marché*, (Paris: Seuil, 1989), and Denis Meuret, 'A political genealogy of political economy', *Economy and Society* 17 (1988), 2: 225-250.
- (5) It is interesting to note that although according to László Lengyel, who did an excellent, comprehensive survey of the Hungarian literature in social and political sciences of the 1970s and 1980s, the key problem of these works was the question of power, these hardly referred to major new theoretical or historical works on the problematic of power. See László Lengyel, *Végkifejlet* (Endgame), (Budapest, KJK, 1989), p.9.
- (6) The best known volumes are *Discipline and Punish* (N.Y., Vintage, 1977); *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1. (N.Y., Vintage, 1978); and the collection edited by Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Essays and Interviews 1972-1977* (Brighton, Harvester Press, 1980).
- (7) On this, see especially 'Questions of Method', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect* (Brighton, Harvester, 1991); 'The Subject and Power', Afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago, The University Press, 1982); the 'Introduction' to *The Use of Pleasures* (Vol. 2. of *The History of Sexuality*), (N.Y., Vintage, 1986), and Maurice Florence [pseudonym for Michel Foucault and François Ewald], 'Foucault', item in the *Dictionnaire des Philosophes* (Paris, P.U.F., 1987).
- (8) 'The Subject and Power', p. 209.
- (9) See especially *ibid.*; 'Governmentality', in Burchell et al., *The Foucault Effect*; and *Résumé des cours 1970-1982* (Paris, Juillard, 1989), 99-123, *passim*.
- (10) 'The Subject and Power', pp. 220-2.
- (11) *Résumé des cours*, pp.85-94.
- (12) See 'Governmentality', and also Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality: An Introduction', in Burchell et al., *The Foucault Effect*.
- (13) See Paul Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader* (N.Y, Pantheon, 1984), p.338.
- (14) *Résumé des cours*, p.101.
- (15) 'The Subject and Power', p. 219.
- (16) *Ibid*, p.222, and 'L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de liberté', in *Concordia* (1984), 6: 99-116.
- (17) This idea is based on a lecture given By Miklós Szabó on liberalism in January 1989 in Budapest, who stated that liberalism and *raison d'état* are the only two major political theories available. See also Kenneth F. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1980).
- (18) On Foucault's discussion of these two concepts, see his 'Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of "Political Reason"', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake

- City, The University of Utah Press, 1981). A more detailed analysis of this question, and its relationship with the bolshevik-type state party is given in Agnes Horváth and Árpád Szakolczai, *Senkiföldjén : A politikai instruktorok tevékenységéről az állampártban* (On the No Man's Land: the activity of political instructors in the state-party), (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1989), to be published by Routledge as *The Dissolution of Communist Power in Hungary* in 1991.
- (19) This is discussed in detail in Árpád Szakolczai, 'Were State And Civil Society Ever Identical?', conference paper, 1991.
 - (20) On sumptuary laws, see Frances E. Baldwin, *Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in England* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1926).
 - (21) See Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton University Press, 1977).
 - (22) See note 4, above, and also Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality'.
 - (23) Braudel, for eg., is mentioning a statement made by Lenin and widely accepted by and circulated among Soviet historians that left free, every village market would in the end reproduce capitalism. See Fernand Braudel, *Afterthoughts on Material Civilisation and Capitalism* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 62.
 - (24) See Gerhard Oestreich, "'Police" and prudentia civilis in the seventeenth century', in his *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
 - (25) Here we applied to the very mechanisms and techniques the system set to work the ideas developed by Elemér Hankiss for the description of the crisis of values - the sanctioning and rejection of the very values the system was promoting. See his 'Az infantilizmus (Infantilism)', in *Diagnózisok* (Diagnoses), (Budapest, Magvető, 1981).
 - (26) See Elemér Hankiss, *Társadalmi csapdák* (Social Traps), (Budapest, Magvető, 1978).
 - (27) This is summed up by Zsolt Papp in his article: 'Az év fogalma: a legitimitás' (The concept of the year: legitimacy), in Sándor Kurtán et al. (eds.), *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1990* (The Political yearbook of Hungary 1990), (Budapest, Aula-OMIKK, 1990).



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