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# Learning Lessons from Japanese Experience in Policing and Crime: Challenge for Japanese Criminologists

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## SYLLABUS

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※ This paper was originally presented at the U.S.—Japan Bilateral Session “A New Era in Legal and Economic Relations” on August 29–31, 1988, at Hotel New Otani, Tokyo, Japan. The author regrets to delete most of the original appendices for technical reasons and will be happy to provide the original paper upon request.

※※ Comments provided by Mr. Hideo Utsuro and other faculty members of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Mr. Yoshitake Shimada of the National Police Agency were most helpful during preparation of this paper. Without their tolerance, this paper would not have appeared here. The section on socio-cultural factors of crime reflects discussion with Professor Charles R. Fenwick of Trenton State College, who explored a comparative model of crime causation in Japan and the U.S. while staying at Kobe University as a Fulbright Research Fellow. As always, colleagues in the section of the sociology of law at the Faculty of Law of Kobe University, Professors Michio Nishihara and Shiro Kashimura provided useful comments and encouragement. Tony Chalhoub gave the author a helping hand to make his English a little more intelligible.

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## I. Introduction: Toward Mutual Learning

All the other panelists of this session focused on community-oriented policing. It is good to have intensive discussion on a specific topic, but such a narrow focus also requires a paper that provides a broader or different perspective of related issues. I would like to take the role of discussant and fill this need.

Community-oriented policing has been recently introduced in the U.S. as an innovation. Our American panelists, Professor David H. Bayley and President Hubert Williams of the Police Foundation are leaders of this innovation. Professor Bayley's new book, *The New Blue Line* (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986), describes this development in six American cities. As many of us know from Professor Bayley's earlier work, *Forces of Order* (1976), and from its Japanese translation, *Nippon no Keisatsu* (1977), Professor Bayley had found a prototype of this style in Japanese police, particularly in activities based on *koban* or police boxes. Owing to his effort, American criminologists, who were largely parochial or Europe-oriented until that time, started to seriously look at crime and criminal justice in Japan. Professor Bayley has thus opened a new era in U.S.-Japan relations in exchange of ideas in criminal justice, and we Japanese should welcome this session as another opportunity for further exchange of ideas. It is appropriate for Mr. Yoshitake Shimada of the National Police Agency, therefore, to present issues currently discussed among Japanese police executives and update our knowledge.

However, we Japanese criminologists should be prudent. Given a very low crime rate in Japan, it is natural for other industrialized countries to want to find explanations for it and to learn lessons from the Japanese experience. However, finding such explanations, not to mention providing lessons to other countries, still remains a challenge for Japanese criminologists.

The reason for this reservation is twofold. Firstly, studies on Japanese police have not reached the level of sophistication of those on American police. In the U.S., under the sponsorship of the Police Foundation, independent scholars evaluated police effectiveness, and their typical method is to experiment with random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups. As described in Chapter 1 of *The New Blue Line* (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986), community-oriented policing has attracted attention only after other strategies were found ineffective through such analysis. We may

expect that similar evaluation of community-oriented policing will be provided soon. However, no one has ever conducted such rigorous evaluation on any aspect of Japanese police, whether it is the *koban* system or otherwise, and this lack of rigorous evaluation research is same to other parts of the Japanese criminal justice system. Secondly, we should not simply assume that police are a significant, if not the largest, factor that explains enormous differences in crime rates between Japan and other industrialized countries. Recorded crime rate of the U.S., for instance, is four times that of Japan. It must be more reasonable to assume that such a wide variance requires introducing crime producing factors as well as crime preventive factors for fuller explanation, and our concentration on police strategies would be justified only if we knew the relative contribution of police compared to other factors. However, no criminologist has ever carried out quantitative research for such a purpose, and presented a set of factors that explain a substantial portion of the variance in crime rates.

No criminologist, whether Japanese, American, or otherwise, has ever produced research that satisfies our need in either regard, and Japanese criminologists are not the only group to be blamed for this lack of reliable information. Nevertheless, Japanese criminologists are in the best position to make contribution, and the present situation represents our intellectual dormancy. We might advance various explanations of this sorry situation in Japan: scholars outside police and other criminal justice agencies lack access to internal data; researchers inside those agencies are preoccupied with routine activities required by their employers; crime and criminal justice are not yet recognized as a major field among empirical social scientists, while criminology teachers in law faculties lack capability in empirical research, except a few; and, above all, due to relatively low and stable crime rate, crime and criminal justice have not become a major political and social issue that would naturally attract much scholarly interest. These explanations nonetheless do not justify us to speak here as if we have a reliable scientific basis.

Therefore, this session should be a starting point for our serious effort, in order to enable us to attain the main objective of this session in the near future. In the remainder of this paper, I shall (1) review some of the better studies on the effectiveness of Japanese police, (2) present hypotheses on socio-cultural factors, and (3) tentatively explore their policy implications. In doing so, I shall draw on theories, methods, and previous research in the U.S., for crime and criminal justice have been most actively studied in the U.S. American criminologists have already shown their willingness to listen to us for substantive findings, but we will not become able to answer their expectation unless we learn methods and theories from their research and engage ourselves in equally serious, empirical research. We will succeed in such a project only when we make it a process of mutual learning.

## II. Two Interpretations of the Same Statistics

Why do we have to engage ourselves in such cumbersome empirical research in the face of various governmental statistics that apparently show excellent performance of Japanese law enforcement? Before proceeding to the main section of this paper, I would like to spend a few moments on this very reasonable question.

Appendix 1 presents some statistics about five industrialized countries in 1985. The recorded crime rate in the U.S. is four times that of Japan, while the clearance rate in the U.S. is one third of that of Japan. Since our common sense expects that police deter crime, we often draw a conclusion from such statistics that efficient law enforcement is a significant factor to keep crime rate low. Furthermore, the 1986 edition of *Keisatsu Hakusho* or *White Paper on Police* reported that the size of population per police officer in 1985 was 556 in Japan, and this figure was higher than those in any industrialized countries compared. For instance, according to this *Hakusho*, the comparable figure in the U.S. was 361. Thus, we often conclude that Japanese police are the most effective police force in spite of their heaviest work load.

What is wrong with this reasoning? The problem is that we can construct different interpretations from the same statistics, and we cannot decide which to take without independent empirical evidence. I shall illustrate one of such rival interpretations. Take a look at Appendix 2. The first interpretation I have just presented is based on lines D, G, and J.

To start with, it does not make sense to calculate population size per police officer as an index of police work load unless the majority of the population are criminals. People are more likely to be conformists in any society, and they are most likely to be so in Japan. They might rather be construed as resources for police, since they guard potential crime targets in the absence of police officers and provide information for criminal investigation. After all, the basic idea of community-oriented policing is based on such a premise.

A more meaningful index of police work load might be crime rate per police officer because such a rate would represent the volume of crimes that police officers have to solve. Lines I and N provide estimations of such rates about all major crimes and about homicides. The number of crimes that police have to solve is lowest in Japan in both regards. West German police officers are generally busiest, but American police officers are busiest to investigate the most serious form of crime, that is, homicide. It would be interesting to calculate an overall index of police work load that takes into consideration both the prevalence and relative seriousness of different types of crimes. In any event, we might conclude that Japanese police officers are working under a vastly less demanding work load. Police efficiency should be evaluated in light of such information.

The index of police efficiency used by the first interpretation of governmental statistics was clearance rate. However, a low crime rate

automatically produces a high clearance rate simply as a result of definitions of these statistics. That is because the recorded number of crimes is both numerator of crime rate and denominator of clearance rate. If the number of recorded crimes becomes lower for measurement errors or any reasons, crime rate will become lower, clearance rate will become higher, and a negative correlation will appear between these rates, whether they are causally related or not.

A more meaningful index of police productivity might be the number of crimes actually solved by them. Lines L and R indicate estimates of such statistics. Generally speaking, German police officers solve the largest number of crimes, while Japanese and American police officers solve less than half of them. On the other hand, however, American officers solve the largest number of homicides, while the comparable figure is lowest in Japan. We might hypothesize that the lowest general productivity of American police was partly due to their need to devote themselves to investigation of homicides and other highly serious crimes. It should also be interesting to note that in spite of the homicide work load which is 70% higher than that in Japan, West German police produce a homicide clearance rate which is almost the same as that in Japan.

According to this line of interpretation, we should not easily deduce the higher efficiency of Japanese police from these statistics. Considering a work load which is twice or three times that for Japanese police, general clearance rates of 40% or so in West Germany and France and a homicide clearance rate of 72% in the U.S. could be taken as a sign of their rather impressive efficiency. Furthermore, we might also consider procedural advantages given to Japanese police: the suspect may be detained in the police station for up to 23 days; the attorney cannot be appointed by the state before indictment; he may not accompany the client during interrogation; their communication may be regulated by the need for investigation; etc (Miyazawa, 1985; to be published). We may argue, therefore, that the apparent efficiency of Japanese police can be explained by their work environment, which may be characterized by the larger number of law-abiding citizens, lighter work load, and less stringent procedural constraints, not necessarily implying truly higher efficiency of police activities themselves.

I am not presenting this second interpretation of Japanese statistics because it is true. I am presenting it simply as an illustration of the problem that governmental statistics usually allow different, yet similarly plausible interpretations. From the viewpoint of the first interpretation, we might of course argue that crime rate has been low and stable in Japan exactly because we have had more officers per crime or criminal and, as we can see in line F of Appendix 2, the country has been saturated by a larger number of officers than many other countries. However, we should also remember lessons of introductory statistics that coincidence or correlation of two things in one place is not in itself a proof of causality between them, and that the direction of causality is even more difficult to identify.

Here, I would like to ask you to listen to a leading police executive in Japan, Isamu Nitta. He is a translator of Bayley's *Forces of Order* (1976), and has recently been a troubleshooter in the Japanese police, first as the head of the public security department of the National Police Agency, and now as the head of the Osaka Prefectural Police. In his preface to a lecture given by Albert J. Reiss, Jr., entitled "The Social Laboratory of Policing and Police in Social Laboratory," Nitta states that "we can obtain approaches and perceptions about problems only through the use of internationally acceptable methods and objective logic, and I hope that new methods will be developed and adopted for healthier self-examination" (Nitta, 1985). As he says, "speculation" should be replaced by serious empirical research with sound methodological and theoretical bases. We Japanese criminologists should take our responsibility seriously and try hard to produce "internationally acceptable" empirical research.

### III. Evaluation of Police Effectiveness

We now proceed to the main body of this paper, and we will review research on police effectiveness in this section. This genre of research may be divided into two groups: one is non-experimental, statistical analyses of deterrent effect, and the other is experimental analyses of effects of more specific police strategies. I shall briefly summarize the situation in the U.S. and then review studies in Japan.

#### 1. Research in the U.S.

The crime preventive effect of criminal sanctions or activities of criminal justice agencies through deterrence of the general public is called general deterrence, and non-experimental, statistical analysis of the general deterrent effect of police activities has been carried out by various scholars as part of the large research movement on general deterrence since the idea of general deterrence regained the attention of scholars and practitioners in the late sixties. Typically, arrest rate, conviction rate, and length of prison term have been correlated with crime rate, and certainty of arrest or criminal sanctions has often been found to have a stronger effect on crime rate than severity of sanction.

The best review of this literature in general is probably found in *Deterrence and Incapacitation* edited by Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1978), and an article written by Wilson and Boland (1978) provides a concise, yet good review of police studies in particular. Various problems have been raised in these works, and I would like to summarize only a few of them.

First, the simultaneous, reciprocal relationship of the certainty of arrest or sanction and crime rate has been pointed out. For instance, while higher arrest certainty may reduce crime rate, higher crime rate may also reduce arrest certainty by overburdening police activities. Therefore, the simultaneous estimation method of econometrics has been used in more

recent studies. Even those studies which employed such method, however, have been criticized for their unrealistic assumptions in the construction of equations. Particularly, exclusion of various socio-economic factors from equations has been criticized. Third, inclusion of common terms in both sides of the equation has been also criticized. I have already discussed this problem. If the number of recorded crimes is used in calculation of both arrest certainty and crime rate, any reduction of recorded crime due to failure of reporting and other measurement errors will produce a spurious negative correlation between arrest certainty and crime rate. Fourth, the use of per capita police size or police expenditure as an index of police activities in some studies has been criticized, because there is no necessary reason to believe that these statistics represent actual aggressiveness or other characteristics of police activities in the field. Finally, some members of the population are likely to be incarcerated, and repeat offenders are more likely to receive prison terms. Imprisoned people are of course unable to commit crimes. However, it is rare to find studies that separate deterrent effect from the effect of imprisonment, which is usually called the incapacitation effect. In spite of methodological advancement in the U.S., non-experimental, statistical analysis of police effectiveness remains inconclusive.

An important development has been made recently in this type of analysis by Sampson and Cohen (1988). They used more direct indices of proactive policing as independent variables, and crime rates separately calculated for age and race groups as dependent variables. However, a more reliable, and more policy-relevant, research strategy is experimentation of specific police strategies with random assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups. This is exactly what the Police Foundation sponsored in various cities in the U.S. Chapter 1 of Skolnick and Bayley's *The New Blue Line* (1986) contains a summary of the findings of those and other studies. First, police size or police budget no longer has an effect on crime in the U.S. possibly because a certain threshold has already passed in the U.S. below which money and personnel might have been effective. Second, random motorized patrolling does not reduce crime, improve arrest certainty, or reduce the fear of citizens. Regular patrols on foot reduce citizens' fear, while it does not affect crime rate. Third, two-person patrol cars are no more effective than one-person patrol cars. Fourth, saturation patrolling reduces crime, but crime increases in other areas instead. Fifth, the most terrifying crimes such as robbery, rape, and homicide are rarely encountered by police on patrol. Sixth, improving response time to emergency calls does not improve the likelihood of arrest or the level of satisfaction of involved citizens. Victims already delay before calling. Seventh, crimes are not solved through criminal investigations by police officers. They are solved generally because offenders are immediately apprehended or someone identifies them. As Sherman (1986), a former director of research of the Police Foundation, argues, lack of statistically significant effects may be partly due to the small sample size, and a larger



sample might produce a significant result. However, Skolnick and Bayley (1986:5) conclude that "Those findings are devastating." Their interest in fear-reduction through foot patrolling and community-oriented policing in general is based on this observation.

Though Sherman and Berk (1984) reported a significant effect of arrest on later behavior of offenders in cases of domestic violence through an experimental research design, effectiveness of traditional police strategies have largely been held skeptical. We shall review research in Japan in light of this development in the U.S.

## **2. Research in Japan: Self-Examination**

Research on Japanese police by Japanese researchers have been virtually limited to in-house researchers and police executives of the National Police Agency, except for very few like my observational and survey study of police detectives (Miyazawa, 1985; to be published). Evaluation of police effectiveness is completely limited to in-house researchers and police executives because of their exclusive access to internal data about police activities. Such evaluation studies may be divided into four groups: they are research on overall police strength, on *koban* and patrol activities, on traffic regulation, and on other police activities. I would like to pick the best examples of these types of research.

### **(1) Effects of Police Manpower and Expenditure**

The most sophisticated analysis of the impacts of overall police strength on crime rate was carried out by Koji Yamaura (1982), a police executive of the National Police Agency. He properly expected the reciprocal, simultaneous relationship between police size and crime rate. While per capita police manpower is a determinant of crime rate, crime rate is also a determinant of per capita police manpower. Yamaura constructed five equations that predict crime rate, per capita police manpower, per capita expenditure of police wages, per capita expenditure of police equipment and operation, and crime clearance rate. He hypothesized that crime rate would be increased by income inequality, ratio of tertiary industry, ratio of population concentration, and ratio of fluctuating population, and reduced by clearance rate, per capita police manpower, and per capita police expenditure of police equipment and operation. Data was collected for all prefectures for the eight years from 1968 to 1975.

Results about the determinants of crime rate, per capita police manpower, and clearance rate are summarized below.

(A) For crime rate, clearance rate and population concentration did not show significant effects. Income inequality, tertiary industry, and fluctuating population increase crime rate, while expenditure of police equipment and operation decreases it. These results fit Mr. Yamaura's hypotheses and our common sense. A puzzling result is per capita police manpower. The sign of coefficient is positive, and its value is largest.

Yamaura interprets this result to mean that police manpower has been increased in areas with increasing crime rate. This result should not be surprising, however, in light of similar research in the U.S. It simply means that crime rate and police size have been rising together in some prefectures.

(B) For per capita police manpower, crime rate shows the expected positive impact. Combined this finding with that I have just mentioned, we may conclude that crime rate increases police size, but police size does not affect crime rate. This result can of course be an artifact of the use of overall crime rate and overall police size. If we use more direct indices of specific police activities and disaggregated measures of crime rate, we could have found the expected result. Therefore, we should follow the development in American police studies to explore such a possibility.

Other results show that police size is larger in prefectures with higher degree of population concentration and with higher average income. The largest determinant is, however, Tokyo. Urbanized prefectures have larger police forces, but Tokyo's police force far exceeds that general trend. A large number of police officers must be assigned to functions which are unique to Tokyo.

(C) For clearance rate, results are not surprising. Fluctuating population and population concentration make investigation more difficult, while police manpower and money make it easier.

From a comparative perspective, an interesting question is the possibility to use an index of police strength per crime or criminal, rather than per entire population. We have found a suggestion for this possibility in the section on two interpretations of governmental statistics. Per capita police manpower is smallest in Japan, but per crime police manpower is largest. Police are to deter potential criminals, not law-abiding citizens, and, unsurprisingly, Japan has the lowest crime rate.

Another possibility may be the use of police size per area. This statistic of police saturation may be conceptualized as an index of surveillance or guardianship of potential crime targets, something more direct than the deterrent effect of potential sanctioning. An apparent problem is the similarity in statistics of Japan and West Germany, while crime rates differ very much. However, the effect of police size per area is worth exploring.

Finally, while police strength does not appear to explain the domestic variance in crime rates, it may still explain international variance in crime rates. Domestic variance of crime rates is likely to be smaller than international variance, while police size in one country is likely to follow some standard or trend. Thus, in many countries, variance in crime rates and police strength could have been too small to produce statistically significant correlations. This standardization of police strength is indeed a characteristic of the centralized Japanese police force, and even the highly decentralized American police may be expected to follow a certain, shared trend. Adoption of a certain form of police strategy like community-oriented policing in such a decentralized context is hard to explain without such

informal, yet powerful trend. Of course, even when the significant effects of police strength are found through cross-national comparisons, many countries may be unwilling to follow other countries with a very much larger police force per crime like Japan and drastically increase police size. Still, this line of comparative analysis is worth conducting just for theoretical interest on the impacts of police strength.

## (2) Effects of *Koban* and Patrol Activities

*Koban* and police activities based on it have often been praised as the key to the excellent performance of Japanese police. However, as far as I know, no one has ever designed an experimental evaluation comparable to those in the U.S. What we have in Japan are some cross-sectional, statistical analyses.

A relatively recent example of such cross-sectional studies was published in 1980 by Iwao Matsumoto and Takaharu Ushikoshi, in-house researchers of the National Research Institute of Police Science of the National Police Agency. They wanted to find factors that affect the rate of burglary. They collected data for 81 independent variables for 71 police precincts in Tokyo in three years from 1977. These 81 variables included various indices of activities of patrol police based on *koban* and of characteristics of the precincts. Their dependent variables were recorded number of all types of burglary, recorded number of residential burglary, and rate of residential burglary per household. They did not pay attention to the possible reciprocal, simultaneous relationship between crime rate and police activities, and multiple regression analysis was carried out for each dependent variable for each year. Results about the rate of residential burglary are summarized below.

Variables with positive relationship with burglary rate are population density, ratio of wooden apartments among apartments, ratio of apartments among households, number of households per *koban*, number of recorded Criminal Law crimes per shift, number of cleared Criminal Law crimes per shift, number of cleared burglaries, number of apprehended burglars, and number of crime prevention warning cards issued. On the other hand, variables which showed negative correlation are area size of precinct, ratio of housing projects among households, average size of apartment buildings, number of *koban*, size of precinct per police patrol car, number of members of the Crime Prevention Association, and the number of street lights needed.

In addition to the lack of attention to the reciprocal relationship, this study has various methodological problems. Some variables were measured as absolute values, and no control was made for the effects of population size on those variables. Some variables seem to be highly correlated to each other, but the authors do not appear to have examined the possibility of multicollinearity among those variables. Furthermore, they included only such variables which might be manipulated by police activities, and excluded socio-economic factors. Therefore, significant correlations of the included

variables might be spurious.

Turning to substantive findings, it is not clear if police activities around the *koban* actually contribute to reducing burglary rate. The number of members of the Crime Prevention Association must attract attention from people who are interested in community-oriented policing. However, what appears as a safer precinct from these results is a sparsely populated large precinct, which has many *koban* because of its physical size and, thus, smaller number of residents per *koban*, and which is characterized by large housing projects, where many people live in independent houses or concrete apartments. This is surely an image of a newly developing, suburban, residential area. Therefore, the large membership in the Crime Prevention Association could be a result of higher conformity of local people, rather than a factor contributing to produce conformity.

Another, more focused paper was published by another in-house researcher of the same institution, Kanehiro Hoshino (1983), the incumbent President of the Japanese Society of Sociological Criminology. Using part of data obtained from an extremely large, nation-wide study, Hoshino tried to find positive relationships between patrol activities and reduction of fear and crime rate.

For data on police activities and crime rate, stratified random sampling of police precincts was conducted, and 350 areas under the jurisdiction of 329 police stations were chosen. Data was collected in 1975 for 30 variables about those 350 areas. Data on fear of crime was collected by a survey of randomly selected 10,000 adults. 8,160 respondents returned the questionnaire. Results appear to indicate that: the smaller the population per *koban*, the lower the fear and crime rate; the smaller the population per officer at a *koban*, the lower the fear and crime rate; the longer the distance covered by patrol on foot or by bicycle per distance of roads, the lower the crime rate; and the longer the distance covered by patrol on foot, by bicycle, or by car per distance of roads, the lower the fear and crime rate. Hoshino of course concludes that *koban* and patrol activities around it contribute significantly to reduction of fear and crime, and compare this result with negative findings in U.S.

However, a rival interpretation can be constructed easily. Crime rate is known to be higher in urbanized, densely populated areas. In such areas, population per *koban* is likely to be larger, and, with many roads, the total distance of roads to be covered by patrol activities may also be longer. If so, independent and dependent variables in Hoshino's analysis could both be determined by a common factor, namely, urbanization. Unless we compare areas with different levels of density of *koban* and patrol activities, while holding constant the degree of urbanization or other criminogenic factors, we cannot draw much policy implications.

Therefore, our knowledge on the effectiveness of *koban* and patrol activities are inconclusive. Furthermore, there are issues we have to examine carefully if we want to present our experience as a guide to other countries.

First, the reciprocity of police-community relations and the possibility of input from community to the police organization is often emphasized in discussion on community-oriented policing in the U.S. However, local people remain to be something to be mobilized in the Japanese context. On the basis of his year-long observation study of Japanese police, for instance, Japanese-speaking, American anthropologist of law, Walter Ames (1981), reported how some people provide daily cooperation to police through giving information on their neighbors. However, the highly centralized structure of the Japanese police is not likely to accept a more active initiative on policy formation from the community. I will be delighted to find contrary evidence, but a model of such community impact is better to be sought elsewhere. Since American police are basically organized at the city level, and they are accountable to local governments, the American experience can probably become a model of such reciprocal relationship.

Second, closer relationship between police and community would expand the scope of information that police could obtain about local residents, while the scope of information that police are willing to disclose about themselves would not increase very much. This pattern seems evident in *junkai renraku* or police house calls in Japan. It is not required of course for the public to answer questions, and, according to a survey published by in-house researchers of the National Research Institute of Police Science, Shingo Suzuki and Haruo Nishimura (1986), two thirds of the respondents accept the official explanation for the need of house calls, and only one percent of them reject the need of it. The official explanation is that they need information for public services such as giving directions or protecting old people who live alone. However, Ames (1981:39) reports that the real purpose for police officers is its use in criminal investigation. A majority of us would probably accept it even if Ames is correct, because we do not believe that we can become targets of police investigation. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the fact that people have not been asked for their consent to such use, and that they do not have control over their own information. Considering a very different sense of right and liberty of American people, anyone trying to design a specific scheme of community-oriented policing should prepare well for the implication of this problem.

Third, improvement of the relationship with minority people seems to be an expected benefit of community-oriented policing in the U.S. However, Ames (1981: chapter 5) reported that, at least in the city where he studied, police officers collected information of former outcasts and Korean people, and tried to screen out former outcasts from police applicants. The truthfulness of this report has been debated. However, it is at least advisable that police planners in the U.S. try not to turn a closer relationship into simply a higher degree of surveillance that will antagonize minority people.

Fourth, the status of patrol functions in Japanese police should also be studied carefully. In spite of the international reputation of Japanese police that largely depends on *koban*, local *koban* is staffed with young recruits or

oldtimers who failed to receive promotion, and Ames (1981: 191) reported the result of a survey of police officers that officers assigned to patrol function were most likely to want to leave for another function. On the other hand, at the National Police Agency, the section in charge of patrol function does not have the organizational status equal to that of the public security function in charge of politically motivated crimes or that of the detective function in charge of conventional crimes. In this regard, again, locally organized, smaller police organizations in the U.S. might be in a better position to experiment with radical change of police priorities and of official recognition given to different functions.

It should be clear by now why I hesitate to talk about "lessons" from the Japanese experience. We should welcome interest in us expressed by foreign observers, but the fact still remains that we do not know much about ourselves, and we should not express too much confidence in our approach.

### (3) Effects of Traffic Regulation

Turning to the effects of traffic regulation, a small, yet interesting study was published by Jun Tanigawa (1987), a police executive of the National Police Agency. Tanigawa constructed five indices of the level of traffic regulation and correlated them with accident rate with data from 27 police precincts in Osaka. Like many studies on the relationship between police size and crime rate, correlations are all positive, suggesting that the level of regulation is affected by accident rate, and is higher where more accidents occur. He further found that changes in the rate of deaths or injuries due to traffic accidents varied with changes in gasoline price. When the price is high, fewer cars are on the street, and fewer accidents occur.

However, he also reports promising results. One is the possible effect of saturation policing. When the Osaka Police increased the level of regulation on certain roads for one month, by increasing the number of police officers by 160%, the number of cars by 50%, and the number of field check by 30%, deaths caused by traffic accident decreased by 75%. Unlike American studies of saturation policing, he does not examine possible increase in deaths in other areas, namely, the displacement effects. But this still suggests a promising line of analysis. The other is the merit of disaggregating the index of police activities. The overall index of speeding regulation showed a positive correlation with the index of accidents related to speeding, a familiar result. However, when the index of regulation of high speeding was correlated with the index of speeding accidents, the correlation was negative. This result must suggest the possibility that if our analysis became finer and focused on specific strategies and specific effects, more positive results might appear.

### (4) Effects of Higher Degree of Surveillance

Finally, I would like to review a study which came closest to experimental research design in the U.S. Kenji Kiyonaga and Osamu Koide (1987), a team of an in-house researcher of the National Police Agency and an engineering

professor of Tokyo University, published an article on the effects of experiments in Aichi Prefecture that deliberately increased the degree of surveillance of streets. In 1981, 31 street blocks in Aichi were chosen as Model Streets for Crime Prevention. For each block, pay phones were added; emergency buzzers were added, including those with a blinking red light; street lights were added; sidewalks were added, including those being brightly painted; bushes and abandoned signboards along the street were cut down or taken away; patrolling was increased; *bohan renrakujo* or crime reporting points were added, with signboards indicating these; associations of cooperating local residents were organized; and signboards indicating the designation of the street as a Model Street were erected. The planners consulted convicted criminals, and they tried to create the impression of higher degree of surveillance that might deter potential criminals.

Crime trends of these blocks were compared with the trend of the prefecture as a whole. While the prefecture-wide crime rate showed a steady increase, trends of these blocks steadily decreased. Particularly noteworthy was a large decline of crimes committed on these streets. On the other hand, a case study of one specific block revealed a problem familiar to American criminologists. While crime rate in the block was stable or slightly declining, neighboring blocks experienced rising crime rates, some being radically higher than before. Nevertheless, they conclude that this strategy was worth continuing.

Compared to similar studies in the U.S., problems are obvious. Experimental blocks were not selected randomly, nor were they matched with comparable non-experimental blocks when changes in their crime rates were examined. It is also unclear if levels of surveillance were maintained constant across these blocks. Therefore, we cannot be sure if the reported decline was truly due to the experiment. Furthermore, it is not clear if the displacement effect observed in one block was also examined for other experimental blocks. Therefore, we cannot calculate the net benefit of this strategy.

Research design should be refined, data analysis should be more rigorous, and policy implications should be drawn with more reserve. Nevertheless, a very good start was made.

##### (5) Need for Prudence and More Research

You have seen that some good efforts have been made in Japan in evaluation of police effectiveness. A few of them are very promising. Still, they do not match the level of sophistication of evaluation studies in the U.S., and they will not withstand criticisms raised to the best studies in the U.S. If we learn carefully, however, what American criminologists have done to their police, we will probably become able to present reliable lessons to foreign countries. Considering possible criticism from the public and the media, a truly randomized experiment is not feasible in too many areas of police strategies in Japan. Still, if we accumulate a large number of second-best studies, we will become much more confident in our findings.

One thing seems essential, however, if the present state of Japanese criminology is to be improved. That is, evaluation studies have to be carried out by independent scholars. In-house researchers of police and other governmental agencies are working under tacit expectation for producing positive results, while what matters most to independent scholars is their scholarly reputation in methodological and theoretical sophistication. Opening up police and other criminal justice agencies to independent scholars is a necessary condition for making the critical leap to what Nitta (1985) wanted to obtain, that is "internationally acceptable" knowledge. I would like to assure you that a respectable number of Japanese scholars are ready to participate in that project, including, of course, myself.

#### **IV. Comparative Explanation of Crime Rates:**

##### **A Preliminary Research Design**

Seeking foreign countries models or lessons for policy making assumes that the compared countries differ only with regard to adopted policies. Otherwise, we cannot tell if apparent differences in policy outcomes are really attributable to differences in policy effectiveness, or how much of such differences in outcomes are due to differences in people or social environments. Of course, it is more reasonable to expect that countries more or less differ from each other with regard to their people and social environments. Therefore, we need a theory that can explain cross-national differences in crime rates, if we want to estimate how much difference we can expect to make by changing policies.

As I said at the beginning of this paper, however, no one has ever presented a quantitative, empirical research, that satisfactorily explained cross-national differences in crime rates including Japan. Therefore, what I want to do here is to suggest some variables that I believe should be included in such a study. I shall first review a study by American criminologists that seems to give us hope that such a study is feasible, then present a basic perspective toward crime causation, and finally discuss some variables and present tentative ideas about possible empirical proxies of those theoretical variables.

##### **1. Cross-National Determinants of Child Homicide:**

###### ***Disaggregated Crime Rates and Non-Cultural Bases of Cultural Rhetoric***

One of the studies that give us hope for the feasibility of cross-national crime rate analysis is a study on cross-national determinants of child homicides by Fiala and LaFree (1988). Appendix 3 indicates the results of their analysis. The figure in Appendix 3 shows a remarkably positive relation between the rate of homicide of children less than one year old and the rate of participation of women in the labor force. Child homicide rate is per 100,000 children of each age group. Fiala and LaFree also collected



data on children between one to four years old, but the pattern was the same. They took the rate of female labor force participation as a proxy of economic stress that pushes women into work out of economic necessity. This figure suggests that where economic stress is high, child homicide rate is generally high. However, there are notable differences in homicide rates at comparable rates of female labor force participation. Among countries where approximately 40% of the labor force are women, for instance, child homicide rates in Japan and Austria are three times that of Finland. It is also easy to see that Scandinavian countries generally show the lowest rates, irrespective of the rate of female labor force participation.

After rejecting several possible hypotheses with their data, Fiala and LaFree examined the effects of social status of women and governmental assistance to the family. The results of regression analyses are presented in the table in Appendix 4. The fifth equation, for instance, indicates that the four variables included in it explain 77% of cross-national variance of homicide rates of children less than one year old. Economic stress, measured by female share of labor force, increases homicide rate, while higher status of women, measured by ratio of tertiary enrollment, and governmental assistance, measured by social security spending per GNP, reduce homicide rate.

Residual value, namely difference between the homicide rate predicted from these variables and the actual rate, is very small for Japan. This small residual means that this set of universally applicable variables almost completely explains child homicide rates in Japan. Like many other phenomena in Japan, child homicide in Japan has often been explained by the unique culture in which mothers feel their children as part of themselves, and mothers kill children when they kill themselves. The familiar story of *oyako shinju*. However, real causes can be economic, social, and even political, and conventional cultural explanation is a rhetoric that blinds us from these causes. In any event, Fiala and LaFree told us the productivity of using crime rates disaggregated by crime types and seeking non-cultural bases of conventional cultural rhetoric.

Of course, one reason for their remarkable result is the relatively higher reliability of the dependent variables, that is, child homicide rates. Measurement of homicide rate in general, not to mention the rate of property crimes, must be far more unreliable. Cross-national differences of crime definitions, and underreporting, underrecording, and other sources of measurement error are inevitable. However, information from victimization survey may be used to estimate true crime rates, for instance, and if many studies produced similar results, we would be able to obtain some approximation of the reality. There should be no reason for us to abandon our quest for cross-national explanations of other forms of crimes.

## **2. Routine Activity Approach to Crime:**

### ***Expanding Scope of Crime Causation***

Criminologists have traditionally focused on factors that motivate people to commit or refrain from crime. Poverty is a historical example of factors considered to increase motivation, while deterrence is a historical example of factors considered to decrease motivation. However, even highly motivated people cannot commit if targets are not available, or if targets are guarded well. In other words, crime occurs only when three ingredients come together: potential offenders, potential targets, and lack of guardians. This was what Cohen and Felson stated in their seminal paper in 1979. They reached this idea in their effort to explain an apparent paradox of increasing crime rate under improving economic conditions. In short, Cohen and Felson argue that life structure which determines the level of convergence of these three ingredients of crime causation has changed, and crime has become easier to commit. They call this approach a routine activity approach because it sees illegal behavior similar to legal routine activity and closely linked to the latter.

Cohen and Felson presented several data that supported their approach. Household activity ratio is used as a proxy of the ratio of households whose routine activities are relatively more frequently carried out away from home or family. Members of such households are expected to have higher risk of personal and property victimization in terms of both unguarded household or exposure to unrelated people. The proportion of people between 15 and 24 years old was included as a control variable because they were considered most active in criminal behavior, but, except for aggravated assault, household activity ratio has a larger coefficient. As routine activities move away from households to outside locations involving nonhousehold members, crime opportunities seem to increase.

In short, Cohen and Felson have thus expanded the scope of crime causation, and provided a general framework by which various criminological theories can be synthesized. The applicability of this perspective to Japan has already been examined with anecdotal data by Nishimura (1986), an in-house researcher of the National Research Institute of Police Science, and Charles R. Fenwick has been trying to apply this approach in a more systematic manner. However, no statistical analysis of cross-national differences of crime rate has used this approach. For instance, papers of Hansmann and Quigley (1982) and of Messner (1982) tried to explain homicide rate differences by indices of societal heterogeneity and economic inequality, but they did not pay attention to the structure of routine life which may determine the chance for potential criminals to meet suitable and unguarded targets. We should join Nishimura and Fenwick in their effort to find a fuller model of cross-national criminological theory, though this paper itself is only my first attempt in that direction.

In the remainder of this section, I shall first discuss motivational factors such as crime preventive impact of policing and criminal sanctions, culture of violence, anomie, and bond to conventional order, and then discuss factors that determine availability of unguarded targets.

The basic paradox of Japan is that economic development does not seem to have increased crime rate, while most other developed countries have experienced increased crime rate at least until the early eighties. Following Durkheim, Messner (1982) argues that economic development does not in itself increase crime because a new type of social order can appear to replace the old one, but economic inequality is a significant criminogenic factor. Hansman and Quigley (1982) also argue that economic inequality and other aspects of societal heterogeneity are significant determinants of homicide rate. Hansmann and Quigley in fact proceed further to calculate that 35% of the difference in homicide rates between Japan and the U.S. is explainable by their variables. However, results of these studies are not too robust, and their models do not include crime preventive and routine activities variables. There is much to be done in cross-national criminology.

### *3. Preventive Effects of Policing and Criminal Sanctions*

As I have already reviewed, it is difficult to find convincing evidence of preventive effects of policing or criminal sanctions through statistical analysis of intra-country variance. However, as I have also discussed, cross-national differences of police size per crime, criminal, and area could be quite large. For instance, Japan and the U.S. differ widely from each other in these regards, and the same pattern is found in clearance rate. On the other hand, the severity of punishment does not appear to matter much, because, for instance, prison terms are relatively short in Japan.

However, policy implications of the positive results of these factors would be difficult to implement. For instance, even when the strength of police per crime, criminal, or area was actually found to be a significant crime-preventive factor, it might be difficult to drastically increase police size and saturate the country with them for political and other considerations. Even if so, we might still learn how much incremental change we could expect by an acceptable level of police increase.

### *4. Guns and Culture of Violence*

Crime rate difference between Japan and the U.S. is wider for physical crimes than for property crimes. Appendix 2 shows that the U.S. homicide rate is four times that of Japan, while overall crime rate is two and one half times of that of Japan. Even more striking is the robbery rate. According to the 1986 edition of *Keisatsu Hakusho* or *White Paper on Police*, it was 1.8 per 100,000 in Japan in 1984, and 205.4 in the U.S., more than one hundred times the rate of Japan. Therefore, there is a compelling reason to try to

find explanations of cross-national variation of physical crimes.

As far as premeditated, predatory physical crimes are concerned, one possibility is a more or less shared notion that physical force is a legitimate means to solve interpersonal or personal problems. I tentatively call it a culture of violence. Then, we will realize that this idea has been tried by American criminologists to explain regional variations of crime rate within the U.S. A recent example is a paper published by Williams and Flewelling (1988).

Williams and Flewelling tried to explain inter-city variations of homicide rate by resource deprivation, social disintegration, and cultural violent orientation. They disaggregated homicide rate into rates of different types of homicides. Percentage of the poor below the poverty line is the proxy of resource deprivation, ratio of official justified intentional killing is the proxy of cultural violent orientation, and divorce rate is the proxy of social disintegration. Other three variables are introduced as control variables. Both resource deprivation and social disintegration are strongly related to the total homicide rate, and significant factors to all or most disaggregated homicide rates. We should note that even homicide can be largely explained by economic and social factors. On the other hand, cultural violent orientation is a significant, but weak determinant of homicide arising out of only face-to-face conflict situation. It is generally weaker than the percentage of black population, which might be construed as a proxy of normative disintegration with regard to the legitimacy of existing social arrangement.

I suspect, however, that culture of violence may appear as a larger factor in cross-national analysis. As in the case with impacts of police and criminal justice, comparison of units within one country may have produced a variation too small to produce a significant result. Furthermore, we may find another proxy that would more directly measure the culture of violence. That is the level of gun ownership or legalization of gun ownership. Moore (1983) summarizes empirical findings on the impact of guns: large fractions of criminal attacks are committed by people using guns, primarily handguns; the presence of guns in assault situations increases the likelihood that a homicide will occur; and the presence of guns in robbery situations also increases the likelihood that a homicide will occur, and shifts victimization away from weaker, less lucrative targets as the elderly, to more lucrative, better-defended targets as stores and young men. Of course, we need not assume that most physical crimes are committed by people holding guns. We simply assume that public acceptance of the use of physical or even deadly force as a legitimate way to respond to personal or interpersonal conflict is epitomized by gun ownership. Needless to say, Japan and the U.S. provide extreme contrast.

##### *5. Anomie and Culture of Endurance*

There are two basic strategies in motivational theories in criminology.

One strategy explains how people gain motivation to deviate and violate the law, and the other strategy explains how people gain motivation to stop conformity and law-abiding behavior. Among influential theories, Robert Merton's anomie theory is an example of the first strategy, while Travis Hirschi's control theory is an example of the latter. I will examine applicability of anomie theory in this subsection, and that of control theory in the next subsection.

Merton's anomie theory explains production of deviant behavior as a result of dysjunction of shared goal and means to attain it. For instance, we may assume that in capitalist industrialized countries, most people value highly the quality of life related to economic well-being. If some people were severely deprived of economic resources in such a society, then, they might want to obtain valued objects through other means, which might include illegal, criminal behavior. In a macro level analysis, therefore, we may expect a positive relationship between crime rate and indices of economic distress. Indeed, those studies I have already reviewed in this paper often included proxies of economic distress. Even physical crimes have been found to be related to economic distress, probably because some of them are committed in the course of property crimes or because severe economic distress damages normative integration of the society and motivate some people to take deviant forms of behavior in many spheres of their life.

To cite one more example, Devine, Sheley, and Smith (1988) wanted to explain changes in crime rate in the U.S. by changes in economic distress and social control. Male unemployment rate and inflation are proxies of economic distress, and prison population rate and public spending in relief to families, the disabled, etc. are proxies of negative and positive forms of social control. Fitting to our interest, they also include the same variable used by Cohen and Felson (1979) as a proxy of routine activities away from household. Unlike most studies that failed to find significant effect of criminal sanction, the largest factor here is prison population rate. We also see that economic distress measured by male unemployment rate is also a consistently significant factor, and has stronger impact on robbery and burglary than on homicide.

Thus, unemployment rate should be included in our cross-national study as a proxy of economic distress. Appendix 5 shows unemployment rate for some countries. Countries with higher crime rates show consistently higher unemployment rates. Indeed, Jun Tanigawa (1981), the police executive who analyzed the impact of traffic regulation, has already published a small study that compared changes in crime rate in some countries and their unemployment rate.

An interesting comparative issue regarding anomie is the possibility that economic distress does not necessarily produce an anomic situation among people. This possibility is suggested about Japan by anthropologists Wagatsuma and De Vos (1984) in their study of residents of Arakawa Ward of Tokyo in the sixties. What they saw there were people who were generally poor, but still maintained positive attitudes about their life and

the existing social arrangement. They called such attitudes "heritage of endurance." According to them, those people were accepting their economically distressful situation and maintaining positive attitudes and manners of behavior because of their perception distortion that passive compliance would be rewarded in the future. Wagatsuma and De Vos then analyze mechanisms that produce and maintain such perceptions.

We may use their insight in our macro level analysis if we assume that there is a rational basis for this culture of endurance. If even those at the bottom of social stratification could believe in the continuing improvement of their economic well-being and the decreasing inequality in the distribution of economic resources, they might not become anomic, and such could be the case in Japan. As far as the economy can maintain growth, giving something to everyone with narrowing inequality of distribution, crime rate may remain stable or even decline to the extent that average level of economic well-being has improved. Then, we should introduce proxies of economic growth and economic inequality.

Economic growth is usually measured in terms of annual rate of change of GNP or GDP. Appendix 6 indicates long term changes of growth rate of major countries. Japan has had a consistently high rate of economic growth, and has diverted only a little to non-civil, military uses after World War II. Since we are interested in the benefit of economic growth in civil life, we should include proxies of both economic growth and of military expenditure.

It is interesting to note also that the U.S. once had the highest growing economy, and this fact reminds me of an argument of the conservative criminologist, James Q. Wilson (1983) that the U.S. experienced declining crime rate in the nineteenth century and people invested very much in their effort to maintain conformity. According to him, the U.S. started to change when self-expression replaced conformity as the legitimate way of life. Whether or not we accept Wilson's argument, negative relationship between economic growth and crime rate is again suggested by Tanigawa (1981).

Economic inequality is usually measured by economists by the Gini coefficient. Among the studies I have already cited, Yamaura (1982), Hansmann and Quigley (1982), and Messner (1982) used this index and found a positive relationship with crime rate. Appendix 7 compares Gini coefficients of income distribution of several countries. Japan has the second lowest coefficient, while the U.S., France, and West Germany have highest coefficients. Other data indicate that inequality declined in Japan until the mid-seventies. Since inequality of wealth is known to be larger than inequality of income, our analysis should use Gini coefficients for both of them. Anyway, in light of these statistics, the culture of endurance of the Japanese people is easy to explain in economic terms.

There is still another possibility to refine anomie variables. That is the possible impact of relative deprivation in affluent societies. The wealthier the society as a whole, the stronger the perception of deprivation might be. We may expect that the combination of highest average income and higher inequality in the United States would have a rather devastating effect. We

should probably measure this interaction effect by multiplying a proxy of per capita annual income by a proxy of income inequality.

We might also expect that if deprivation concentrated in a certain group of people who were identifiable by race or otherwise, and were already subjected to other forms of discrimination, they would become most anomic. If such people had a substantial share in population, normative disintegration would occur. Blacks in the U.S. are a typical example, and the percentage of black population was found by Williams and Flewelling (1988) as a significant factor that explain inter-city variations. Regarding Japan, Wagatsuma and De Vos (1984) report that delinquency arrest rates of former outcasts and Koreans in my town, Kobe, are, respectively, four times and seven times the average rate. I do not know if their statistics are accurate, but minority population is small in Japan, anyway, and their rate will not much affect the overall rate. Thus, we should introduce a proxy of socially discriminated minorities to our analysis.

#### ***6. Bond to Conventional World and Structural Commitment***

Hirschi's control theory explains production of delinquency by loss of bond to conventional associates that controls juveniles not to deviate. He identifies four types of bond: emotional attachment to conventional associates, future-oriented commitment to conventional goals, present involvement in conventional activities, and belief in the legitimacy of conventional norms and their enforcement agents. Haruo Nishimura (1979), an in-house researcher of the National Research Institute of Police Science, tested this theory in 1977 with a survey of more than 1,800 high school students. This study used self-reporting of delinquency for the first time in Japan, and Nishimura found positive correlations between delinquency and contact with bad friends and failure in school, and negative correlations between delinquency and attachment to mother and father and good self image. The latter findings appeared to indicate the applicability of control theory in Japan.

Control theory was originally developed as a delinquency theory, but the same logic may apply to crime in general. We may think of conventional associates, conventional activities, and conventional norms for adults as well as juveniles. Wagatsuma and De Vos (1984) suggested how strongly people in Arakawa were committed to and involved in conventional activities and believed in the legitimacy of conventional norms. As we can see in various survey results (Keizai Kikaku Cho, 1988), the Japanese people are so satisfied with their life that many of them must feel a stake in their continuing conformity with the conventional world. I can present some statistics that give us some sense of their conformity, particularly their involvement in conventional activities.

For many Japanese adults, their company epitomizes the conventional order. A comparative survey of American and Japanese workers by Whitehill and Takezawa (1981) indicates that while the most frequent

answer in the U.S. is that they pursue common goals with the employer only during working time, almost two thirds of Japanese respondents think that the company has at least the same importance to them as their private life. Japanese labor statistics (Keizai Kikaku Cho, 1988) indicate that they are serious in their answers. They work longer than anyone in the world, rarely take vacation, and lose almost no work days by strikes. Furthermore, according to a survey of young workers conducted by the Japanese government (Tsuda, 1982: 88), they spend their spare time simply to rest and recover their energy for company work, and rarely spend their time for social activities. Their stake in conformity is indeed high, and it lies in the future. If they lose or change their job, they will lose whatever they would have received for seniority and in the form of retirement bonus. Furthermore, since their employer is likely to be their largest creditor in housing loans and other financial arrangements, it is often impossible to change employers.

The value of conformity is first taught at schools. For children, school epitomizes the conventional world. Japanese school children are the busiest children in the world. A survey conducted by the Japanese government (Sekaino Nakano Nippon o Kangaeru Kai, 1985) indicates that they do homework more than anyone else, play for a relatively short time, and sleep the least. According to one source, Japanese junior high school students spend in each class day six hours in the classroom and more than three hours in extracurricular activities and homework. It will be interesting to compare this with figures in other countries. Parents expect their children to succeed in the school in the conventional sense, in terms of academic achievement. Children appear to be trying hard to satisfy this expectation from their most important conventional associates. However, their apparent conformity does not necessarily mean that they are emotionally attached to their parents. Indeed, the survey I have just cited rather suggests that Japanese children are relatively less attached to their parents. Their commitment and involvement might be better understood as their responses to social arrangement that makes cost of deviance very high. As Nishimura (1979) aptly called it, their commitment is a structurally enforced one.

Therefore, we should introduce some proxies of structurally induced commitment to the conventional world. Working hours, school hours, paid vacation, lost workdays, job mobility, and divorce rate may be such proxies. On the other hand, as a proxy of incentives to conformity, income inequality by seniority and by education may be introduced.

### *7. Crime Targets and Guardianship*

Finally, we have to introduce proxies of variables of the availability of crime targets and the level of guardianship. It may not be easy to find reliable proxies at cross-national level, but we should nonetheless try.

First, we may introduce proxies of expected benefit and cost of committing crime. Econometric studies of crime rate often use the average



income of the highest fifth of the population as a proxy of expected benefit, and that of the lowest fifth as a proxy of expected cost. The wealthier the wealthiest, the better targets they will be. The poorer the poorest, the less costlier it will be for them to invest their time in crime. We may try these proxies.

Second, we should introduce a proxy of the availability of consumer goods, for targets of the largest category of crime in any country are such goods. Cross-national statistics of consumer expenditure are available, and we can convert them into per capita figures. We may start with such an index.

Third, we need proxies of the guardianship of household, for total crime rate is largely determined by the burglary rate. One possibility is the size of household, and another possibility is the proportion of single-member household. Household size is still relatively large in Japan, and that the elderly rarely lives alone. Furthermore, still another possibility is the rate of labor-force participation of wives.

I should add a comment on a common assumption in studies in the U.S. with a routine activity approach that activities away from home increases the chance of encounter with criminals and, thus, crime rate. However, such chance seems to depend on the prevalence of criminals on the street, and we may plausibly argue that it is more difficult to commit crime in Japan exactly because potential criminals and potential victims are closely surrounded by a large number of law-abiding people, wherever and whenever they go. We are better to start our cross-national analysis without this assumption.

#### 8. *Note on Yakuza*

Some people may wonder why a criminologist from Kobe does not discuss *Yakuza*, particularly in light of a recent book by Kaplan and Dubro, *Yakuza* (1987), that pays much attention to the Kobe-based, largest *yakuza* family, Yamaguchi-*gumi*. If they disappeared, our already low crime rate would become still lower. It seems most efficient to invest most police resources to break up those organizations if we are truly interested in reducing conventional crimes. As Kaplan and Dubro and Professor Ames suggest, such a task will have to first confront a sector in the Japanese elites who have encouraged or condoned *yakuza* as their instruments. However, as far as our purpose is to find explanations of cross-national crime rate, *yakuza* is not a relevant consideration, because we already have the lowest crime rate in spite of their presence. Furthermore, it is difficult even for *yakuza* to obtain firearms in Japan, and that is why they were entrapped by the FBI in Hawaii. Even *yakuza's* culture of violence seems to pale compared to the culture of violence in the U.S.

### **9. Implementation of Implications of Socio-Cultural Factors**

If the hypotheses that I have presented in the section on the culture of violence and the subsequent chapters were supported by empirical research, they would suggest the need of various social and economic policies. Such policies are likely to reach beyond the traditional authority of police and criminal justice agencies. However, Japanese police have an advantage in this regard. Japanese police are centralized at the national level, and the National Police Agency have more chances to participate in national policy making processes than highly decentralized American police. The centralized police force of course has a risk to become an instrument of the government to suppress opposing people. Nonetheless, it seems advisable for American police forces to have a government agency at least at the state level that coordinates policing strategies with other social and economic policies.

### **V. Conclusion: Taking Challenge Seriously**

I welcome this session as an opportunity to strengthen exchange of ideas across the Pacific, and to start serious scholarly effort to understand ourselves and become able to present any practical lessons from our experience. I have reviewed existing research on police in Japan, and explored several hypotheses for cross-national explanation of crime rate. I hope that this paper will serve to present a larger framework, and other, well-focused papers will be evaluated in light of it.

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
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### Appendix 1. Crime Rate and Clearance Rate of Major Offences(1985)



Notes: 1. "Crime Rate" means the number of reported offences per 100,000 population.

2. Based on the following sources:

United States

United Kingdom

Federal Republic of Germany

France

Japan

Crime in the United States

Criminal Statistics England and Wales

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik

La criminalité en France

Statistics of the National Police Agency

3. The number of reported offences in the respective countries are based on the following criteria:

United States

Only Crime Index offences (murder, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft; in 1979, arson was added to Index offences) are counted, and the figures are estimates.

United Kingdom

Only indicatable offences till 1978 and notifiable offences since 1979 are counted; based on statistics from England and Wales. The number of Straftat is counted, excluding traffic offences and Staatsschutz-delikte.

Federal Republic of Germany

The number of crime et délit is counted, excluding traffic offences.

France

Penal Code offences other than traffic professional negligence.


Japan

Source: Homusho Homu Sogo Kenkyujo, *Hanzai Hakusho*, 1987, Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsuyoku.

### Appendix 2. Comparison of Crime Statistics of Four Countries (1985)

	Japan	U.S.	W.Germany	France
A. Population (thousand; mid-year estimate; <i>Asahi Nenkan</i> , 1988)	120,754	239,283	61,015	54,621
B. Area (sq. km; same source)	377,708	9,372,614	248,577	547,026
C. Population density (per sq. km; same source)	320	26	245	100
D. Population per police officer ( <i>Keisatsu Hakusho</i> , 1986)	556	361	317	276
E. Estimated number of police officers (thousand; from A and D)	217	663	192	198
F. Estimated area per police officer (sq. km; from B and E)	1.7	14.1	1.3	2.8
G. Rate of major crimes (per 100,000; Appendix 1)	1,328	5,207	6,909	6,500
H. Number of major crimes (Appendix 1)	1,607,663	12,430,000	4,215,451	3,579,194
I. Estimated number of major crimes per police officer (from E and H)	7.4	18.7	22.0	18.1
J. Clearance rate of major crimes (%; Appendix 1)	64.2	20.9	47.2	40.1
K. Estimated number of cleared major crimes (from H and J)	1,032,120	2,597,870	1,989,693	1,453,257
L. Estimated number of cleared major crimes per police officer (from E and K)	4.8	3.9	10.4	7.2
M. Number of homicides ( <i>Hanzai Hakusho</i> , 1987)	1,847	18,980	2,796	2,497
N. Estimated number of homicides per 1,000 police officers (from E and M)	8.5	28.6	14.6	12.6
O. Rate of homicides (per 100,000; <i>Hanzai Hakusho</i> , 1987)	1.5	7.9	4.6	4.5
P. Clearance rate of homicides (%; same source)	96.1	72.0	95.0	84.0
Q. Estimated number of cleared homicides (from M and P)	1,775	13,666	2,656	2,097
R. Estimated number of cleared homicides per 1,000 police officers (from E and Q)	8.2	20.6	13.8	10.6

**Appendix 3. Plot of Female Share of the Labor Force 1965 on Child Homicide Rate for Children Less Than One Year Old. (Fiala and LaFree, 1988)**





**Appendix 4. Cross-sectional Regressions Examining the Effects of GNP, Female Share of Labor Force, Female Tertiary Enrollment Ratio or Female Professional Enrollment Ratio, and One of Three Measures of State Spending on Known Child Homicides for Children Less than One Year Old, and One to Four Years Old. Analysis on Developed Countries Only (Fiala and La Free, 1988)**

Dependent EQ <sup>a</sup> Variables <sup>a</sup>	Independent Variables <sup>b</sup>												R <sup>2</sup>	N
	GNP/Capita 1970			Female Share of Labor Force, 1965			Female Tertiary Enroll. Ratio, 1970			Gov. Rev./GDP 1973				
	b	s.e.	t	b	s.e.	t	b	s.e.	t	b	s.e.	t		
1. H<1	.41	1.16	.35	.33***	.07	4.92	-.15***	.05	-2.86	-.16***	.05	-2.86	.82	18
2. H 1-4	1.33***	.45	2.93	.04*	.03	1.48	-.00	.02	-.06	-.07***	.02	-3.56	.67	18
										Soc. Sec. Fam. Allow./GNP, 1974				
3. H<1	-2.12*	1.37	-1.54	.40***	.10	3.87	-.20***	.07	-2.90	-.03	.77	-.05	.75	15
4. H 1-4	-.01	.51	-.03	.05	.04	1.27	-.00	.03	-.18	-.37	.29	-1.27	.45	15
										Soc. Sec. Spend/GNP 1974				
5. H<1	-.73	1.17	-.63	.36***	.07	4.92	-.17***	.05	-3.18	-.16**	.08	-2.16	.77	18
6. H 1-4	.65*	.48	1.35	.05*	.03	1.70	-.00	.02	-.21	-.08***	.03	-2.52	.52	18
										Ratio F:M Professional, 1960				
7. H<1	-1.26	1.30	-.97	.37***	.07	4.92	-6.84***	2.25	-3.04	-.18**	.08	-2.32	.79	17
8. H 1-4	.87**	.50	1.73	.05**	.03	1.86	-.71	.87	-.81	-.09***	.03	-3.00	.60	17

<sup>a</sup>H=Known homicide rate <1=Less than one year old 1-4=One to four years old EQ=Equation number

<sup>b</sup>b=Unstandardized regression coefficients

\*=p<.10, one-tailed test

s.e.=Standard errors

\*\*=p<.05.

t=t-ratios.

\*\*\*=p<.01.

**Appendix 5. Unemployment Rate (%)**

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987.6
Japan	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.9
U.S.A.	7.1	7.6	9.7	9.6	7.5	7.2	7.0	6.3
Germany, F.R.	3.8	5.5	7.5	9.1	9.1	9.3	9.0	8.3
U.K.	7.3	10.4	12.1	11.6	11.7	11.9	11.9	10.5
France	6.3	7.3	8.1	8.3	9.7	10.2	10.4	-
Italy	7.6	8.4	9.1	9.9	9.9	10.3	11.1	-
Canada	7.5	7.5	11.0	11.9	11.3	10.5	9.6	8.5
Austraria	6.1	5.8	7.2	10.0	9.0	8.3	8.1	7.8
Korea,R.	5.2	4.5	4.4	4.1	3.8	4.0	3.8	2.6
Singapore	3.0	2.9	2.6	3.2	2.7	4.1	3.7	3.5
Sweden	2.0	2.5	3.1	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.1	1.7
Norway	1.3	1.7	2.0	3.1	3.2	2.5	1.8	1.4

Source: Tokyo Shoko Kaigisho, *Kokusai Hikaku Tokei Yoran*, 1987, Tokyo: Tokyo Shoko Kaigisho.

**Appendix 6. Real Growth Rate of GNP or GDP (Average Annual Rate)**

	1861~1913	1914~1938	1954~1963	1964~1973	1974~1983	1954~1983
U.S.A.	4.3	2.0	2.9	4.0	2.0	3.0
U.K.	2.4	1.0	3.0	3.1	1.0	2.4
France	1.1	1.1	4.9	5.6	2.4	4.3
F.R.G.	3.0	1.3	7.0	4.7	1.6	4.4
Japan	4.1	4.5	9.3	10.2	3.7	7.7

Source: Kimihiro Masamura, *Jissen Zeminaru Nihon Keizai*, 1987, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.

**Appendix 7. Gini Coefficients of Income Distribution (ca. 1970)**

	Before Tax	After Tax
Australia	0.313	0.312
Canada	0.382	0.354
France	0.416	0.414
F.R.G.	0.396	0.383
Japan	0.335	0.316
Holland	0.385	0.354
Norway	0.354	0.307
Sweden	0.346	0.302
U.K.	0.344	0.318
U.S.A.	0.404	0.381

Source: Kikuo Iwata, *Nyumon Keizaigaku*, 1987, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.