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Herbert J. Doherty Jr.



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RICHARD K. CALL vs. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ON THE SEMINOLE WAR

by HERBERT J. DOHERTY, JR.

In the city of Washington in the autumn of 1836, the United States War Department was in a state of high confusion. On the sixth of October Lewis Cass had resigned as Secretary of War and the vacancy was temporarily filled by an under secretary, C. A. Harris. Within a few days the office was bestowed upon Benjamin F. Butler, an interim appointee. These changes came during one of the crises of the Seminole War in Florida, which added to the confusion in Washington. In midsummer the command of that war had been vested in Governor Richard K. Call who launched an end-the-war campaign in early October. This initial move was not successful and rumors of its failure kept official circles in Washington in a state of nervous tension.

By the first of November, Washington had learned of the circumstances of Call's withdrawal through second-hand sources, yet no report from Governor Call had been received. President Andrew Jackson expressed surprise and disappointment at news of the retrograde movements of Governor Call, and directed Secretary of War Butler to relieve Call of the command of the campaign.¹ Accordingly, on November 4, 1836, Butler wrote a lengthy letter to Call relieving him of his command and explaining the confusion in Washington. He related that no official reports had been received and urged that Call explain fully without delay. In the absence of any report, Butler said, the public interest demanded that the government take what action it thought necessary. He related that reliable reports

1. B. F. Butler to R. K. Call, November 4, 1836, *Senate Documents*, 26 Congress, 1 Session, No. 278. Unless otherwise noted, all information in this article comes from the Senate Document here cited. This document is a 250-page compilation of all War Department correspondence relating to Call's conduct of the Seminole War in 1836.

stated that Call was suffering from illness and fatigue, consequently, the president had found it expedient to place Major General Thomas S. Jesup in command,

Jackson's order, sent through Butler, did not reach Call for several weeks. Meanwhile, after his initial failure of October 13, and before the orders relieving him were delivered, Call reorganized his forces and met the Indians in battle on November 17, 18, and 21. In each encounter the Indians were driven from the field, but their losses were relatively small. All three engagements took place east of the Withlacoochee River, in the area north of Dade's battleground. After the last battle, Call withdrew to his supply base at Volusia on the St. Johns River. It was there that he received the news of his removal.

After a lapse of several weeks time, Call replied to Butler in a bitter letter which was an index of his disappointment and chagrin at being removed from a post which he had so ardently desired. His bitterness toward the president was evident as he wrote, "I have been visited with the greatest injustice by the orders of the President." The nature of the injustice which he believed had been inflicted upon him was seen in his criticism of the president for removing him "on rumor, without waiting for my official report." He declared that his intent was to resign the governorship as soon as Jackson should grant him an investigation of the conduct of the war - a step which Jackson declined to take.

II

The dismissal of Richard K. Call from command of the Seminole War was an important point in the personal relations of Call and Jackson. Call had been an early protege of the old general, had served under him in the War of 1812 and in the Florida invasions, and had received important positions due to the esteem in which he was held by Jackson.

Their relations were of a most cordial and close nature during their military and brief Congressional careers. However, when Jackson became president in 1828 the two men began to drift apart. Their first major differences were over cabinet appointments. Call vigorously objected to the appointment of John H. Eaton as Secretary of War and John M. Berrien as Attorney-General. Jackson was offended, particularly by Call's opposition to Eaton, and both men served despite Call's objections.

Call played no major role in Florida during the Jackson administrations but devoted the years from 1828 to 1836 to private business for the most part, enhancing his personal fortune considerably. He had held the post of Brigadier General of the Florida Militia since 1823 and in this capacity he was concerned over the rising difficulties with the Seminole Indians. The federal government by 1830 had determined upon a policy of Indian removal to an area west of the Mississippi River. By 1834, treaties had been concluded with the Seminoles for their removal, and Indian agent Wiley Thompson and General Duncan Clinch had arrived to supervise the removal. Under the influence of fiery young warriors, however, the Indians became sullen and uncooperative and not until April of 1835 did Thompson secure their half-hearted assent to removal plans.

Plans were drawn up for the departure of the Indians from Tampa Bay in January, 1836, but all were forgotten when on December 28, 1835, Wiley Thompson was murdered near Fort King and Major Francis L. Dade and his troops were massacred in Big Wahoo Swamp. Three days later the first pitched battle of the Seminole War was fought at the Withlacoochee River. In this battle Call commanded a group of mounted volunteers and General Clinch commanded the regulars. Clinch ferried his men across the river while Call and his volunteers proceeded on the north and west side. Clinch soon engaged

his troops with the warriors of Osceola and a bitter battle was waged. Call's volunteers, probably about four hundred men, watched the battle from across the stream despite the fact that Call and several of his officers crossed over to the aid of Clinch. Why the volunteers did not cross has been the subject of much controversy. Call claims that he was unable to force the men over. The official excuse was that the stream was too fast and too deep, at the point of battle, for a safe crossing. The regular army was bitterly critical of Call and the volunteers, and the newspapers censured Call unmercifully.²

About a week after the Withlacoochee fiasco of December 31 Call wrote to Jackson that Clinch had only 150 men and that at least 2500 to 3000 would be necessary to end the war. He added that he had put at Clinch's disposal 150 mounted volunteers. Though Call had disagreed with Jackson on some of his policies the two men had not yet broken friendly relations and Call ended this report on the state of affairs with a plea for command of the war: "I should be highly gratified to command the army, and believe I could soon bring the war to a close. I fear, however, this I cannot do without injustice to General Clinch; he is a brave and good man, but I fear he is too slow in his movements to conduct a war against the Indians." With this letter, Call began his campaign to win command of the Seminole War.

Call's interest in the conduct of the war was diverted in February when personal tragedy struck him. On the twenty-eighth of that month his beloved wife, Mary Kirkman, died after a very brief illness. This loss came as a climax of personal troubles, for in their twelve years of married life Mary and Richard Call had lost five children. Andrew Jackson was sorely touched by each of the deaths in the Call family, par-

2. Sidney W. Martin, "Richard Keith Call," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXI (April, 1943), 339-341.

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ticularly that of Mary whom he had regarded almost as a daughter. He forwarded his condolences to Call, then within two weeks time affixed his signature to a commission naming Call to the governorship of Florida. In later years Call claimed that the appointment was a complete surprise to him, coming without his knowledge or application.³

Call accepted the office and requested Jackson to name Leigh Read of Tallahassee to his former post of Brigadier General of Militia, which request was granted. Call succeeded his one-time friend, John H. Eaton, whom he accused of attempting to keep him out of military activity, and started immediately a barrage of correspondence to the War Department requesting attention to the Seminole War and offering advice as to its conduct. Almost two months after taking office he directed an indignant letter to President Jackson informing him that he had received no answer whatever from the Secretary of War and asking presidential attention to the correspondence. He pictured the Territory as being in dire straits and said, "I can hear of no measure proposed for our defense, and I assure you, sir, if something is not promptly done, that this country will be desolated during the summer."

In his voluminous correspondence, Call proposed a summer campaign to be launched as a maximum effort, with the aim of destroying the homes and crops of the Indians. This was based upon the theory that offense is the best defense. One thousand men employed in such a campaign would, he believed, do more good than ten thousand stretched on a line across the peninsula for purely defensive purposes. Call's plan struck Andrew Jackson very favorably and before his letter complaining of inattention reached Washington Secretary of War Cass wrote him that he and Jackson had approved his plan. They had believed, Cass wrote, that a summer campaign

3. *House Executive Documents*, 26 Congress, 1 Session, No. 136.

could not be endured in Florida, but had decided to defer to Call's experience and knowledge.

Call immediately replied to Cass, apologizing for his warmth of expression and outlining at greater length his war strategy. He added, "I should be gratified by being directed to lead the expedition against the Seminoles." To Andrew Jackson he wrote, "Nothing have I so much desired as to have the direction of the Florida War," and he added, "In conducting the campaign, I shall be governed by the rules pursued by you with so much success, and with which I am perfectly familiar."

General Winfield Scott had been placed in command of the forces in Florida in January, 1836, but by May the Department of War had decided to move him to Georgia to direct operations against the Creeks. Cass wrote to Call that should Scott leave Florida and General Clinch retire from the service, then Call was authorized "to assume the command of the regular forces and the militia serving in Florida, and to employ them in the best manner for the defence of the country and the speedy subjugation of the Indians." Call was further advised that should General Thomas Jesup move into the Territory then the command would automatically devolve upon that officer.

III

On June 18, 1836, the letter which Call had so long desired was dispatched by Jackson. It placed command of the regular army, fifteen hundred Tennessee mounted volunteers, and the Florida militia in the hands of Governor Richard K. Call. Joyfully Call wrote to the president, "I accept, with great pleasure, of the trust you have conferred on me; and I promise you that I will soon put an end to the war in Florida, or perish in the attempt." Cass cautioned Call that everything rested upon his judgement, for Florida conditions were unknown in Washington. He urged him to use extreme care in

exposing the troops to the Florida climate and authorized him to procure all necessary supplies and equipment for the campaign. Five steamboats, he advised, were being sent under naval personnel for Call's use.

Call planned to assemble all available regulars, marines, seamen, and militia to attack the Indian homeland in the Withlacoochee River area. His program called for the setting up of a supply depot on the Withlacoochee by moving in from the Gulf. This would provide an advance base for land forces. He would also concentrate supplies at Micanopy and at Tampa Bay. Mounted troops would advance from Tampa Bay and Micanopy while infantry would be landed at the Withlacoochee base. These troops would converge upon Indian settlements in the Withlacoochee valley. Call also sent an immediate request to Commodore Alexander J. Dallas at Pensacola to blockade the coast for the prevention of all communication between the Indians and Spanish fishermen, whom he feared were supplying the Indians.

In organizing his forces, Call ran into immediate difficulties. The regulars resented being placed under the command of a civilian and remembered bitterly the inactivity of Call's volunteers at the first battle of the Withlacoochee. The naval forces cooperating with him resented being placed under the orders of a civilian who had once been in the army. The Florida militia were restless because of their uncertain pay. The regulars were badly in need of officers and Call found that among eleven artillery companies there were only six officers; eight infantry companies had no officers at all; and there were no ordnance, subsistence, or quartermaster officers in the entire Territory. ⁴ To these difficulties was added the fact that Call

4. The Adjutant-General informed Call that he had often told the Secretary of War about the officer shortage, but that that official had insisted that internal improvements demanded attention and "he will not consent that the absent officers so employed shall be withdrawn and ordered to join their companies." The Adjutant-General saw no early remedy.

had never before had complete charge of a major campaign. Despite these hindrances, Call's plan of operations won the approval of prominent military men, including President Jackson and General Jesup.

In putting his operations into effect, Call asked Commodore Dallas for his cooperation and requested that he establish a blockade to cut off foreign aid to the Seminoles. Commodore Dallas, aboard the U.S. Frigate *Constellation* in Pensacola Bay, replied that he had used all measures to prevent contact between the Spanish and the Indians, and observed, "I flatter myself nothing has been neglected or left undone that could in any way give effect to the military force in Florida. This explanation of what has been done is given, not that I feel in the least called upon to make it, but out of courtesy to your station as Governor of Florida, and the high consideration I entertain of you as a gentleman." Dallas assured Call that he should be happy to cooperate with him by complying with any of his suggestions which did not interfere with more important duties, but added, "I beg that your suggestions may have less the character of an order than those heretofore received."

Call was indignant at the coolness shown by the Navy and informed Cass that the measures of Dallas had been totally ineffective in suppressing contraband trade. The Indians, he asserted, continued to kidnap Negroes and to exchange them with the Spaniards for supplies. The only remedy Call could suggest was for Cass to have several revenue cutters placed directly under his command for the blockade activities. Cass, however, felt that this move would be improper in that it would imply lack of confidence in the Navy. That Call felt such lack of confidence is obvious, but Cass was content to minimize the difficulties in Florida. He advised Call to correspond "frankly" with Dallas on naval matters and said,

“Should you find it indispensable that some vessel be under your immediate direction, would it not be better to employ one of the steamboats already engaged, or to procure another for the purpose?”

Governor Call made it a point to keep General Jesup, who was commander of the Army of the South, informed as to his plans. In one letter after his exchanges with Dallas and Cass he told Jesup that Dallas had “imperfectly complied” with his request for cooperation. He further related to Jesup:

I have since addressed the Secretary of War on the subject, who, instead of acting with the promptness and energy which the importance of the case required, refers me back again to Commodore Dallas, and suggests that I may employ one of the crazy steamboats of the Government on this service, while the whole West India squadron is lying at anchor in the bay of Pensacola.

This information was forwarded to the War Department by Jesup, but was not answered by Lewis Cass who resigned as of October 6, 1836. The acting Secretary of War, C. A. Harris, replied on October 7 reproving Call for his censure of the War Department. Harris deemed it “highly indecorous, improper, and unjust.” He reminded Call that the Department had no control over naval operations and asserted that the Navy Department had not been laggard: “Full and positive instructions have been repeatedly given to Commodore Dallas . . . to cooperate with you.” Harris also was irked at Call’s criticism of the “crazy steamboats.” “This department,” he wrote, “certainly had no expectation that you would select a ‘crazy’ one . . . as you had already been invested with full public power to buy or charter whatever vessels might be necessary for your marine operations.” Harris, apparently annoyed by Call’s habit of writing to the president, closed with, “This letter has been seen and approved by the President.”

The interim Secretary of War, B. F. Butler, later got Call's explanation for his low regard for the steamboats. Call wrote that he called them crazy ". . . on the report of the officers who commanded them, and who represented them as being dangerous in running from one port to another, along the coast, even in most favorable weather. He [Harris] says that he did not expect me to send a crazy one. When all were crazy, how could I do otherwise?" Scornfully Call declared that the War Department would have had him charter or build boats while the whole West India squadron idled in Pensacola Bay.

IV

Meanwhile General Thomas Jesup, who was to assume the command upon arrival in Florida, ended his service against the Creeks and arrived with his forces in West Florida about September 25. Call immediately tendered the command of the war to Jesup, but the general declined, insisting that Call carry out the operations which he had planned. Call communicated this news to Washington and reported that Jesup had voluntarily placed himself and his forces under his command.

Call's first major setback came when the regulars abandoned Micanopy which he had planned to use as a supply base. The supplies which were destined for Micanopy he then directed to Volusia. In the west, he set up a supply depot at Suwanee Old Town and concentrated supplies at St. Marks for transport to the Withlacoochee. Supplies from New Orleans and St. Marks were then moved to the mouth of the Suwanee River from which place the expedition to the Withlacoochee River was to depart. Of the five "crazy" steamboats, two were laid up for repairs, two were unsuited for operations on the Withlacoochee, and the other had been ordered back to Pensacola by Commodore Dallas. Call coun-

termanded this order and sent instead the two vessels unsuited for his needs. Call reported that these two never returned and that he had no idea what became of them. General Leigh Read was ordered to take the one good steamboat, two barges, and a chartered vessel and establish a depot fifteen miles up the Withlacoochee River.

The major movement of troops overland from Middle Florida was then begun. On October 8 the troops were strengthened and refreshed at Fort Drane and marched southward to the Withlacoochee. The day of October 13 was spent in unsuccessful attempts to cross the river in the face of Indian resistance. With only about a day's rations left on the fourteenth, Call decided to seek out the depot which Leigh Read had been order to set up. However, due to a series of comic opera mishaps, Read had not yet reached the point upon the river where the supply center was to be located.

Read had left the mouth of the Suwanee River with one government steamboat, the barges, and the chartered vessel according to plan. However, in proceeding up the Withlacoochee, the government steamboat had run aground straddling the narrow channel, and at low tide promptly broke in two. That the vessel ran aground, Call blamed upon the Navy. He declared that officers used to ocean navigation had been placed in charge of directing this vessel in a narrow unfamiliar stream. Read's second attempt to plant the depot was made on October 22 and succeeded, but Call's forces had by that time fallen back on Fort Drane and Black Creek.

It was this initial reverse, due to Read's failure to establish his base, which led to Call's removal. Through some mishap Call's reports, which do not indicate that Call considered the withdrawal anything more than a temporary delay, did not reach Washington. Reports from other sources, together with the accurate news that Call was not well, so alarmed the

administration that orders were forwarded for General Jesup to take immediate command.

President Jackson reported to Congress that “. . . early measures were taken for placing at the disposal of Governor Call, who as commander in chief of the Territorial Militia had been temporarily invested with the command, an ample force for the purpose of resuming offensive operations in the most efficient manner so soon as the season should permit.” He informed the Congress that Call’s moves had had results which “excited much surprise and disappointment. A full explanation has been required of the causes which led to the failure of that movement, but has not yet been received.” Meanwhile, fearing that Call was not in condition equal to the crisis, he had given Jesup the command.⁵

As we have noted, news of his removal did not reach Call until after he had reorganized his campaign, repulsed the Indians in three engagements, and retired to Volusia. In his letter of removal, Secretary Butler informed Call that no definite judgement against him had been formed but that he had been “instructed by the President to express to you his disappointment and surprise that you should have commenced the execution of a campaign of so much importance, and so long meditated, without first taking effectual measures to secure all needful supplies from the various depots, which, for several months, have been subject to your orders; and . . . after approaching with so large a force within so short a distance of the enemy . . . you should have retired without a more serious attempt to cross the river and to drive him from his position. This disappointment and regret are greatly increased by the considerations that these retrograde movements will probably expose the frontiers to new invasions by marauding parties, and encourage the Indians in their resistance, thereby

5. James D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 20 volumes (Washington, 1896-1927), III, 253.

increasing . . . the severity of the measures which will now be required to subdue them.”

On December 2, 1836, Call replied to Butler in a lengthy, bitter letter which he said was delayed by ill health. He scoffed at Butler's words that no judgement had been formed of him by pointing out that the president had visited upon him the highest disgrace possible in removing him from command. Should I be able to show injustice, he asked, can the injury be repaired? Call then retraced the entire campaign under his command, citing his preparations, his difficulties, and the accidents involved. He defended his original withdrawal from the Withlacoochee on October 13 and declared that the crossing “could not have been accomplished by General Jackson himself.” The successful November crossing had cost four lives by drowning.

Butler was unsympathetic with Call's position and viewed his report as excited and full of rash statements. He wrote, “. . . you indulge in many remarks not at all necessary to the explanation of your conduct, or the defense of your character.” Call was in error, Butler said, in assuming that his removal was punishment for misconduct. He reminded the governor that he had been only temporarily put in command from the beginning and that information at hand in Washington had caused the decision that Jesup must assume the command for which he had been intended in Florida. The demand for an explanation Butler thought was well warranted by conditions in the Territory. He reminded Call that the fact that what occurred should excite and surprise the president, “no one better knows than yourself.”

The Secretary of War told Call that after due deliberation he had been exonerated of any responsibility for the failure of General Read to establish his supply depot, but he asserted that the exoneration was “the fullest measure of justice

to which you are entitled." In the opinion of the War Department, Call was still at fault for moving his troops without definite knowledge that the indispensable depot had been established. Butler pointed out that from the outset the chances had been great that Read would fail, however, he conceded that the president cheerfully allowed that Call's error lay in a patriotic desire to win the war. "More than this . . . it seems to us impossible, consistently with justice, to concede." The administration held that the basic cause of the fiasco was still Call's negligence in not insuring a steady flow of supplies to maintain a vigorous offensive.

Call's exchanges with Butler continued until the end of Butler's term of office in March, 1837. In February, Call struck back at Butler's censure, holding that the Secretary of War was in no position to judge his moves from a vantage point 1000 miles away. "You may," Call wrote, "by intuition, possess that knowledge of the profession of arms which others have acquired by years of hardy service in the field . . ." He admitted that his letter of reply to his dismissal was written under excitement and deplored any injustice he may have done to the president, for whom he professed the deepest respect. In further defense of his reputation, the governor related that when he took command the Indians had been conquerors and he had relieved the frontier from invasion; he had rebuilt Fort Drane; he had established the Withlacoochee depot; he had in thirty-four days made all necessary preparations for a vigorous campaign; and he had won three victories after being relieved.

With a note of relief, Butler directed his last letter to Call on March 13 saying, "I shall leave the department this day. . . . I find it impossible to reply, in detail, to the various suggestions, arguments, and complaints presented by you. Nor do I deem it at all necessary that I should do so." Call de-

livered up his command to Jesup and returned to Tallahassee, a proud man deeply wounded.

V

Call remained Governor of Florida, and in 1839 was re-appointed by President Martin Van Buren. Yet his criticisms of the government's war policies continued, much to the disgust of Joel R. Poinsett who was Secretary of War in the Van Buren administration. In Florida, Call's pro-Whig political activity caused local Democrats to petition the administration constantly for his removal. Finally, in December, 1839, Van Buren replaced Call with a staunch Democrat, Robert Raymond Reid. Probably both Call's Whiggish political activity and his criticism of war policy were the causes for his removal, but the latter was the official reason. According to Poinsett, ". . . no disgrace was attached to his removal. He thought proper to assume an attitude opposed to this department, and his continuance in office was therefore deemed incompatible with the interests of the public service."

When Jackson relieved Call of his military command the cordial friendship between the two men came to an end, though Call continued to respect the military prowess of the old general. Increasingly Call had been drifting away from the president in politics. His growing property interests inclined his political views more and more toward the policies of the Whig party and in 1840 Call openly avowed his support of the Whigs and his opposition to the Democrats. Jackson was provoked at the apostacy of his old protege and assumed that he must be in debt or broke, "for we find all who are broke join the opposition and are in favor of Banks, wishing to pay their debts by a depreciated paper."⁶

6. Andrew Jackson to F. P. Blair, Sept. 26, 1940, John Spencer Bassett, *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*, 7 volumes (Washington, 1926), VI, 78.

In Call's mind, both of his removals had been injustices to him. Van Buren removed him, as he saw it, only because he had been critical of the "weakness and imbecility" of Poinsett in prosecuting the war. However, there seems to be more real grounds for a plea of injustice in the case of the earlier removal from military command. The original appointment of Call as commander of the Seminole War seems illogical, even fantastic, in light of all the circumstances, unless it was intended as a purely interim appointment during which time no extensive military activity was to be undertaken. Call was notoriously unpopular with the regulars and had no reputation for successful field command of any element larger than a battalion. He had held no regular army rank higher than captain, and that fourteen years earlier, and he had given up his post as militia general when he became governor.

These are marks against the Jackson administration, however, not against Call. The worst that can be said of Call is that he was an overly ambitious man who sought a post which another might have filled to better advantage. In Call's favor is the vigor with which he pursued his frustrating task in the face of War Department complacency, militia rebelliousness, Navy hostility, and Army suspicion. He was awake to the seriousness of the Indian troubles while the War Department was still trying to believe that only a minor disturbance threatened. His plans for the attack upon the Indian home territory were admirably conceived, even if not well carried out. Of his activities, General Jesup told Secretary of War Butler, "As an act of justice to Governor Call, I take the occasion to remark that no man could, under the circumstances in which he has been placed, have accomplished more than he has done. His plan of campaign was admirable."

Studying the documents from the vantage point of the present day, Jackson's action in relieving Call appears to have

been hasty and not based upon sufficient information. However, in that day of poor and slow communication, his removal probably was the only safe step which could be taken in Washington. Call was known to have been ill through the entire campaign. Jesup was known to be on the scene, and had previous orders to assume command - orders he had declined to carry out until Call should complete his campaign. If the reports which Washington had received of a disastrous withdrawal were true, then Call's campaign must have been wrecked. In the absence of any word from Call the administration must assume that he was incapacitated by illness, or that he might even be dead. At any rate, with the news available of events in Florida the federal government took the steps which seemed to it to be those best calculated to protect the public interest.

Had telegraphic communications been available, Richard Keith Call might have been the military hero of the Seminole War. The story which has been related, however, shows that he was allowed to command the war only about four months and in this period he was unable to launch any decisive action against the Indians.

Whatever his shortcomings may have been, Call must be credited with having had a clearer view of the overall picture of the war than did the War Department. The department, with President Jackson's approval, planned to suspend the war each summer in the mistaken belief that a summer campaign could not be endured by the troops. Call correctly foresaw that such a policy would allow the Indians to harvest their crops and prepare to sustain another winter campaign. Rather than concentrate the troops in forts through the summer, Call would maintain a mobile striking force to lay waste the Indian fields and villages and draw back the marauding warriors to defend their own homes. He realized that no stationary defense line could contain the Indians, who were masters of infiltra-

tion tactics. Call's plan would thus carry the war to the Indian territory and provide the best defense against Indian attack upon rich Middle Florida. The War Department, with hesitation, eventually deferred to Call's experience and knowledge. It is to be regretted that his plans were not earlier executed with firmness, efficiency, and the full cooperation of all responsible authorities.

(The author in his research for a biography of Richard Keith Call is using all known collected material, but for certain periods and episodes the amount available pertaining to Call and his associates in Florida is limited. Should any reader possess or know of Call letters, letters referring to Call, or other unpublished or scarce material which might touch upon this subject, the QUARTERLY as well as Mr. Doherty would be grateful to be told of such.)