

Abstract

The intelligence failure regarding the estimates of the Iraqi regime is often cited as the main reason for President George W. Bush to change the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Between 2002 and 2003, the highest figures of George W. Bush's administration often used arguments of the intelligence community to justify their decision to overthrow Saddam's regime by force. Their arguments were based primarily on the information on Hussein's contacts with al-Qaeda and his continuing ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. After the war, these estimates were proven wrong and the intelligence community was marked as the force that triggered the invasion. In my master's thesis called *Crisis of U.S. Intelligence? George W. Bush and the decision to invade Iraq*, I put forward arguments contradicting this widespread idea. The goal of the thesis is to cast light on the fundamentals of the intelligence failure regarding Hussein's alleged contacts with al-Qaeda and his capability to stockpile and produce weapons of mass destruction. I reveal the ideological and strategic reasons behind the Bush's decision to invade Iraq and the fact that the intelligence findings played only secondary role. The true reason of the intelligence failure wasn't only flawed manipulation with human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), but chiefly politicization of the secret services. The politicization took place in both Pentagon and CIA. Therefore, the intelligence community was not in crisis, instead the crisis took place among the intelligence and political elite.