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Komunikační strategie politiků v interakci
Communicative strategies of politicians in interaction

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Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto diplomovou práci vypracovala samostatně, že jsem řádně citovala všechny použité prameny a literaturu a že práce nebyla využita v rámci jiného vysokoškolského studia či k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.

V Praze dne

Abstract.

The aim of this M.A. thesis is to apply on the sample of five transcribed interviews with American politicians the typology of strategies devised by social psychologists P. Bull and K. Mayer (1993) for ‘non-replies’ of British politicians in the *genre* of a political interview and to determine whether this typology could be qualitatively correlated to specific linguistic means (the use of passive, pronominal shifts, hedges). The responses of politicians are examined within the CDA method also in relation to the macro-principles of *evasion* (dissimulation), *coercion*, *legitimation* and *delegitimation*, which are claimed to be valid in political discourse by P. Chilton (2004) in order to discover whether Bull and Mayer’s social typology could be related to these principles and to the strategies of *face-management* (Brown and Levinson 1987). It is expected that politicians will boost their positive image in the interview and *coerce* the public in the agenda *shift* (Clayman, Heritage 2002) through every response in the interview. A question which according to Bull and Elliott (1996) consists of *face threat* is also expected to be attacked; quantitative results are presented which verify this assumption. In addition, as thirty strategies were observed to have been employed by Mrs Thatcher and Neil Kinnock in general election debates of 1987 in Britain, we will also compare the frequency of British strategies with the American political discourse of 2004-2008, which is according to Clayman and Heritage (2002), less adversarial and where in consequence different strategies are likely to occur. The behaviour of politicians in interaction is likely to transform with time (Fairclough 1992) so that it gradually becomes more fine-grained. The discussion of individual strategies employed by Pres. Bush, Sen. Obama and Gov. Palin is also compared in relation to the specific context.

Key words: critical discourse analysis, coercion, discourse, evasion, FTA, political interview, politeness, reply, strategies

Abstrakt.

Cílem této práce je ověřit na vzorku pěti rozhovorů s americkými politiky, zda typologie strategií vytvořená sociálními-psychology pro „neodpovídání“ na příkladu britských politiků v žánru politického rozhovoru (Bull, Mayer 1993) by mohla být kvalitativně podložena ve většině případů konkrétními jazykovými prostředky. Odpovědi politiků jsou zkoumány metodou kritické analýzy diskurzu (CDA) také v souvislosti s makro-principy pozitivního nátlaku (*coercion*), legitimizace (*legitimation*) a delegitimizace (*delegitimation*), které jsou podle Chiltona (2004) platné pro politický diskurs, abychom zjistili, zda typologie Bulla a Mayerové (1993) může být propojena s těmito rysy politického diskurzu a se strategiemi *face-managementu* (Brown Levinson 1987). Předpokládáme, že politici budou vylepšovat své pozitivní image a vynucovat si souhlas veřejnosti v prezentování programové části odpovědi (*agenda shift*, Clayman, Heritage 2002) a napadat v každé odpovědi otázku, která podle Bulla a Elliottové představuje hrozbu pro tvář politika (*FTA*), takže budeme kvantitativně ověřovat i tuto tezi. Jelikož u politiků Thatcherové a Kinnocka v předvolebních diskusích roku 1987 bylo rozeznáno třicet strategií, budeme taktéž porovnávat britské strategie se strategiemi amerického diskurzu období 2004-2008, který je podle Claymana a Heritage (2002) méně konfliktní, a kde je proto možné očekávat jiné strategie. Lze očekávat, že chování politiků v interakci se časem mění (Fairclough 1992), takže strategie politiku se stávají propracovanější. Jednotlivé strategie uplatňované senátorem Obamou, S. Palinovou a prezidentem Bushem jsou také srovnávány v závislosti na konkrétním kontextu.

Klíčová slova: kritická analýza diskurzu, nátlak, diskurs, vyhýbavost, FTA, politické interview, zdvořilost, odpověď, strategie

The list of abbreviations.

A: answer

B&L: Brown & Levinson

CDA: critical discourse analysis

CG: common ground

Connot.: connotation

Cs: subject complement

FPP: first pair parts

FTA: face threatening act

GM: Gricean maxim

IE: interviewee

Infinit.: infinitive

IR: interviewer

Metarep.: metarepresentation

O: object

Presup.: presupposition

S: subject

SPP: second pair parts

Q: question

VD: verbum dicendi

Abbreviated strategies (Bull 1993: 656-661)¹

[1]	ignores the question
[2]	acknowledges the question
[3]	questions the question
[3a]	request for clarification
[3b]	reflects back
[4]	attacks the question
[4a]	important question not tackled
[4b]	question hypothetical
[4c]	question based on a false premise
[4d]	question factually inaccurate
[4 e]	question includes misquotation
[4f]	question is out of context
[4g]	question is objectionable
[4h]	question poses a false alternative
[4i]	question not legitimate
[4j]	question not appropriate
[5]	attacks the interviewer
[6]	declines to answer
[6a]	lack of knowledge
[6b]	unable to answer
[6c]	unwilling to answer
[7]	makes a political point
[7a]	external attack
[7b]	presents policy
[7c]	justifies policy
[7d]	gives reassurance
[7f]	political analysis
[7g]	self-justification
[7h]	talking up one's own side
[7i]	external support
[8]	incomplete reply
[8a]	half answer

[8a]	half answer
[8b]	partial answer
[8c]	starts but does not finish
[8d]	negative answer
[8 e]	positive answer
[9]	repeats
[10]	states that Q was already replied
[11]	apologises
[12]	asking for conversational rights

¹ Cf. appendix 7.1.

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Richard Nixon: ... *Yep, I let the American people down. And I have to carry that burden with me for the rest of my life. My political life is over. (Frost/Nixon interview: May, 1977, Part 8)*

1. Introduction

In one of the most famous political interviews conducted in 1977 by British interviewer David Frost, the former president of the U.S. impeached during the Watergate case (1972-74), Richard Nixon, was made by the interviewer to admit his mistakes and apologise to the American people. The premiere episode of the interview was watched by 42 million people and until this day the watching rate has not been overcome.²

As political discourse presents an interesting area of research in many points of view, e.g., the analysis of *persuasiveness* of politicians in monological data, the aim of this thesis is to apply one of the classifications devised by socio-psychologists (P. Bull, K. Mayer 1993) for description of strategies employed by politicians in the *genre* of one to one news interview to find out whether these strategies could be correlated to any linguistic means.

The approaches we build our interpretative framework on include the Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1978), so that in terms of syntax and morphology, we will focus on noticing the differences in active/passive voice, nominalizations, weakening hedges, ways of increasing/decreasing *intrinsic* and *epistemic* modality and animate/inanimate nouns. The lexical aspect will be dealt with in terms of semantics (synonyms, antonyms, hyponyms, metaphors) and positive/negative connotation of lexemes, which belongs in the scope of stylistics. The pragmatic aspect will be also taken into consideration because strategies employed in responses of politicians were discovered by Bull and Elliott (1996) to be linked with the *face threatening questions*, so that our hypothesis that every question would be potentially attacked in the reply of an interview will be verified. In addition, contextual differences in the use of strategies will be discussed because the differences may clarify

² Conrad Black. "Foreword to Great interviews of the 20th century. Admit mistakes, not crimes", September 7 2007, accessed January 3 2012. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2007/sep/07/greatinterviews>>

which factors have impact on the occurrence of certain types of strategies in interaction. We presume that regional (cultural) aspect may play the role because our research is based on American sample of five interviews and according to Clayman and Heritage (2002) American interviewing style is less adversarial than the British one.

In the theoretical part of the paper (2.1.-2.4.6.) it is therefore crucial to provide the insight into the norms of turn-taking (Liddicoat 2007, Clayman 2010), which point to social principles operating in interaction (Goffman 1967), and to find out how the universal notions of positive and negative *politeness* (Brown & Levinson 1987) claimed to be universally valid for any two-part exchange relate to the particular principles of *coercion* and *evasion* that are characteristic of political discourse. These principles are therefore clarified in the following chapters dealing with political deictic space and political identity (2.2.) after the method of CDA applied in our research has been introduced. All results of the linguistic correlates can be found in the appendix (7.5.); the results of the pragmatic aspect of our thesis are discussed and depicted in (3.2.6-7.).

2.0. Theoretical background

2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis and its contribution to textual analysis

In this section we are going to clarify the basic concepts of *genre*, *action* and *representation* that according to Fairclough and Foucault characterise any type of *discourse* and in the next section (2.1.1.) the method of CDA which helps to reveal the potential abuse of the language by social groups in power is presented.

Along with texts produced by economists, scientists or teachers, it is spoken or written texts reflecting the practices of politicians, e.g. broadcast or televised interviews, recordings of parliamentary debates or political speeches that form the main focus of critical discourse analysis. Although all of the mentioned *genres* are examples of different social *events* with their contextual specificities and norms that according to Van Dijk include e.g. the setting, topic, people speaking or writing in a political context (*mode* of communication)³, all of them represent the same social order with its typified practices, that of political discourse (Obeng 2002: 5).

To be able to define more fully the notion of a particular *discourse*, it is then necessary to sum up not only the constant principles delineating it, as we do in the next section (2.2.), but also the more dynamic mechanisms operating in the order in the process of interaction, which forms the core of our attention in the latter section (2.3.). Our approach to the meaning of *speech events* (Hymes in Schiffrin 1994: 137) is thus pragmatic, shared not only by critical discourse analysts but also by conversational analysts (Schlegoff, Sacks) who claim that meaning is established by the preceding context and establishes the following context (Schiffrin 1994:235).

According to CDA analyst N. Fairclough (1978), for example, internal (syntagmatic or paradigmatic) relations of the text refer to external relations existing between the participants of the *speech event* (author and the addressee) and to their uneven distribution of power so that the particular social practice of e.g. politicians would be the result of the following elements: *action* and *interaction* forming the core of a specific *genre*, social relations and

³ Other factors relevant for defining the discursive situation are, the structures/institutions, events, the ways political actors interpret them, but also purpose, function of the discourse, discourse genres, who the political actors and target addressees are (van Dijk, 1993, 1997 c, 2000 in Obeng 2002: 5).

persons (with beliefs, attitudes, histories) forming the core of a *style* and the material world and *discourse* as a component of *representation* (ibid: 26).

However, the relationship between these components is claimed to be rather dialectical than separate, which is pointed out also by Foucault (1994: 318) in his explanation of three types of meaning. *Action* (genre) is understood as connected with ‘relations with others and actions on others’ as well as with power, *identification* (style) with relations with oneself, ethics and the moral subject and finally *representation* with knowledge and control over things (Fairclough 1978).

1.0. Schema: *Social practice*

Genres (ways of acting)- Discourse (ways of acting)- Styles (ways of being)

(ibid: 26)

In the analysis of political interviews it is therefore necessary not only to describe the mechanisms of turn-taking (2.4.1.) typical of the *interviewing genre* but also to be aware of the fact that some features of political discourse we are concentrating on can be the result of specific idiolectal styles of respective authors of turns, or of the interviewers they are talking to. This point is thus taken into consideration in the empirical part of the paper (3.2.2.1.) where it is noted, for example, which strategy is employed in our sample exclusively by Pres. Bush or Sen. Obama.

As the aim of critical analysts is to point at social inequality and abuse of power as created by language use by linking specific linguistic structures to their function, the aim of our theoretical chapter is to provide insight into the *representational* world of politicians based on the group of macro-principles as presented by other critical analysts P. Chilton (2004), A. Fetzer (2008) and P. Bull (2008, 1993, 1996). Although not all of these formally claim their drawing on the heritage of CDA, their approach to the texts, in our view, has its critical source at least partially in CDA because all of them focus on at least some aspect of language as tied to its function.⁴

⁴ Thus, Anita Fetzer (2008) deals with detecting the formal means of strengthening or decreasing the principle of political *commitment* and *covert* means of, in Chilton’s terminology, *dissimulation* while G. Lakoff and B. Mazid dedicate their research to the analysis of metaphors and presuppositions in terms of their *cognitive* frames, which in Chilton’s terminology correspond to *coercive* macro-principle of political discourse. All of the underlined concepts will be explained in the following sections (2.2.) The case of P. Bull (1993), the author of classification of *evasion* as a phenomenon occurring in political interviews, is more complicated because as a social psychologist, he does not formally affiliate with any strand of linguistic methods, but it could be claimed that his approach to the analysis of

2.1.1. The linguistic focus of CDA research in political discourse

The most frequently investigated linguistic features in the domain of political discourse by CDA is the discourse function of sentence types (assertions and denials), means of reinforcing the truth value of propositions within the category of modality, or positive self evaluation and negative other evaluation in the *genre* of speeches of particular politicians considered to be successful rhetoricians over the time (Fairclough, Chilton 2004, Charteris Black 2005). Only recently there have arisen the attempts to describe the mechanism of *evasion* in interaction (2.4.2.), which, however, lack a systemic and coherent description of linguistic correlates (Rasiah 2008, P. Bull 2008, 1993, 1996).

The aspect of political *commitment* (cf. 2.1.2.) is, for example, most often dealt with by these critical analysts in terms of modality markers pointing to either truth value of the statement (*epistemic modality*) or obligation-necessity as features of *intrinsic modality*.

2.0. Schema: *Level of commitment*

	<i>Truth</i>	<i>Obligation</i>
<i>High</i>	certainly	required
<i>Median</i>	probably	supposed
<i>Low</i>	possibly	allowed

(Fairclough 1978:170)

According to Fairclough (1978: 164), the distinction between these modalities lies in different *speech functions* and *exchange types*, so that *epistemic* modality fulfils the *knowledge* exchange while *deontic* modality *activity* exchange.

Persuasive rhetoric is thus viewed by the CDA analysts (Fairclough, Charteris Black) as such which embeds sequences of assertions followed by *denials* in the structure of the so-called *parallelism* (1), employs high modality markers (2-*must*) and evaluations often triggered by semantic sets with positive or negative stylistic connotations (3) forming the opposition of *desirable* versus *undesirable*. The following are examples of these three persuasive techniques in the speech of Tony Blair identified by Charteris Black in his monograph about the art of rhetorics (2005) and by N. Fairlough (1978) in his study about critical discourse analysis. As

question-answer pairs partly includes CDA method, particularly type 8-incomplete reply (2.4.3.). In our view this point is a reflection of relations in *presentia* and relations in *absentia*. (Fairclough 1978: 37)

we consider Fairclough's explanation of types of modality as authoritative in this paper, the examples from our own sample will be provided in 3.2.5.

Ex. (1) **They want** Government under them **not** over them. **They want** Government to empower them, **not** control them. (Charteris-Black 2005:5)

(2) The world community **must show** as much its capacity for compassion as for force. (Fairclough 1978: 176)

(3) The values we believe in should **shine through** what we do in Afganistan. (Fairclough 1978: 177)

As illustrated by (3), the CDA approach to textual analysis, in our view, incorporates also *cognitive* and *frame* (2.2.2.) semantics approaches which according to Chilton point to interpersonal mental representations 'that are not arrived at individualistically but in linguistic and other interaction' (2004:50). This view is also shared by V. Dijk (1990) and frame semanticist G. Lakoff (2004:51), who focuses on the analysis of emotional force of metaphors that can 'kill'.

Both semantic analysis and syntactic analysis of CDA therefore focus on such features of the language which point out to negative aspects of politicians' policies only indirectly to boost their positive image. Consequently, responsibility of politicians for a committed act is decreased by passives and impersonalisation and in the cultures where it is not possible to state the action of the enemy baldly, by metaphors or *innuendos* that have the function to persuade the electorate of the presented argument and to bind people by arousing the same emotion of fear (Obeng 2002). The following examples describe undesirable semantic evaluation (5) and the use of *innuendoes* (6) in African society.

(5): The opposition's claims were **shot down in flames** (Chilton, Schaffner 1997: 216).

(6): **Ananse sisifoo** = 'greedy Spider' in African, Akan society (Obeng 2002:13).

In our analysis we are going to apply the principles of CDA in the examples of strategies that were devised by interactional psychologists specifically for political interaction (2.4.3.) but before doing so, we need to clarify the concepts of *metarepresentation*, *coercion* and *commitment* that were discovered to represent the world of politicians by political analysts (2.2.). In the following section, the research of *coercion* of P. Chilton is related to *frame* semantics of G. Lakoff (2004) and to presuppositions of B. Mazid (2007) because in our view the findings of the last two of the mentioned analysts correspond to *emotive* and *cognitive* types of Chilton's *coercion* and finally the means of decreasing the principle of

commitment are exemplified in the work of A. Fetzer & P. Bull (2008) and Z. Kampfl (2009) in the section about political identity..⁵

2.2. Defining political discourse

2.2.1. Political deictic space

According to P. Chilton (2004), who in explanation of efficient communication between people adheres to the social theories operating on the basis of the maxim of *reciprocal altruism* (2004:17), politicians live in the world of formed representations that reflect their own conceptions of reality which are, however, imposing on the minds of the receiving public. This is made possible, on the one hand, by the nature of the language *per se* which is of arbitrary character so that the same *signifié* can be referred to by different *signifiers* (the meaning does not exist in absolute terms) but also by a specific position of a politician in his ontological space, the point that is elaborated by Chilton, as governed by four, so-called Habermasian, *validity claims* (ibid:43). These generally correspond to Gricean description of maxims (GM) universally valid in every conversation that is pragmatically managed but in different terminological 'labels', or *claims*: (1) to **understandability** = Gricean manner, (2) **to truth** = Gricean quality, (3) **to be telling the truth**= Gricean quantity plus quality, (4) to **rightness** (*Richtigkeit*).

With respect to political discourse Chilton argues that it is the third and the fourth maxim that are of supreme importance because politicians tend to produce statements which are *credible* in order to be trusted, so that *quantity* of their utterances is adapted to *quality* or *sincerity*. Moreover, they need to establish themselves as personas endowed with great degree of authority and respect, which relates to having access to *epistemic knowledge* but also to knowledge of what is 'right or wrong' in a moral sense, which is on the other hand, tied to *intrinsic modality* (ibid:59).

3.0. Schema: *The rightness wrongness scale*

⁵ *Coercion* (term used by Chilton) with its two aspects- 1. *desirability/undesirability*, and 2. *cognitive (implicated) presuppositions*, in our view, equals *persuasiveness* with its emotional perlocutionary effects of 'fear' - 'control'(term applied by Charteris-Black 2005 Lakoff 2004, Mazid 2007)





Figure 4.2 The rightness-wrongness scale

(Chilton 2004: 60)

While politicians' factual knowledge of objective truth is referred to by Chilton as *cognitive*, their knowledge of what is right or wrong is referred to by the term *deontic*, which is a label also used by other linguists (Quirk 1990:60). Both of these modalities serve as the means of the *legitimising* function of political discourse, which is again closely intertwined with the *delegitimising* function as a depiction of the action of the 'other' which is culturally remote and therefore *undesirable* (Chilton 2004: 61).

According to Chilton, these macro-principles of *legitimation* and *delegitimation* can be furthermore schematically perceived in terms of spatial *s*, temporal *t* and modality *m* axes which delineate the conceptual world of a politician and anchor him in the deictic centre.

4.0. Picture: Chilton's dimension of politician's deixis



(Chilton 2004: 59)

The centre of all three axes forms the anchor of the politician's *here* (*s*) and *now* (*t*). The more remote the speaker is (culturally, geographically) in terms of spatial axis *s*, the greater tendency for him to appear in a syntactic position of a *patient*, or morally in the *undesirable* and *wrong*. In our sample, for example, this principle seems to be frequently employed by

politicians when speaking about the terrorists who attacked USA on September 11/2001 (3.2.3.).


The categories of *rightness* and *wrongness* are in Chilton’s terminology also achieved by another principle operating in political discourse, that called *metarepresentation*. This, in our view, may include the CDA term *verb of process type* (Fairclough 1978: 182) and could be explained by ‘representations of other people’s representations processed in a space that is not asserted as holding true in the current reality of the current speaker, but in some future, possible, alleged, feared reality’ (Chilton 2004: 90). The following (7) is an example of *metarepresentation* from Chilton’s short analysis of radio talk. The example (8) was taken from our data of transcribed interviews with George W. Bush and seems to us as more manipulatory because the politician claims his knowledge of thoughts of a particular politician who disagreed with his policy in Iraq.

Ex. (7): **I am worried that people** will decide between voting Conservative or not voting at all. (Chilton 2004: 85)

(8): but no doubt **in my mind President Chirac would like** to see whole Iraq to emerge. (I)

However, *legitimising* and *delegitimising* strategies together with the principle of *metarepresentation* as valid in political discourse are, in our view, means of the hierarchically higher and more basic macro-principle, that of *persuasivness* of politicians. This is considered to be the main aspect of political discourse in publications dealing with the art of rhetorics from a literary, stylistic or cohesive point of view (Charteris Black 2005) and perlocutionary effect’ point of view (Lakoff 2004, Mazid 2007) and is labelled by Chilton as *coercion*.

5.0. Schema





inflow of some 50, 000 dependants..

(ex. from Chilton 2004: 114)

Our opinion is grounded in the fact that *coercion* is further subdivided by Chilton into two subtypes (1), *emotive*, and (2) *cognitive* or propositional, which both correspond to Lakoff's frame semantic analysis of metaphors that cause undesirable 'fear' and subsequent 'control' (Charteris Black 2005: 25) and to Mazid's (2007:118) analysis of presuppositions as a force of implied propositional meaning.

In the following sections the research of these two CDA analysts is presented in their semantic and pragmatic aspect.

2.2.2. Exploitation of the collocations and metaphors in U. S. Republican election debates

According to George Lakoff, who represents the *cognitive* approach to the analysis of 'lexical semantics' in national, that is American, political discourse there are some conceptual *frames*⁶ which are more persuasive (*coercive*) than others in a given context and have the power not only to establish the contrasting opposition of right (*desirable*) versus wrong (*undesirable*) but also override the borders of the country in the international discourse with fatal consequences.

Because they appeal to our emotional centres on the basis of *empathy* (Lakoff 2004:54), which in Chilton's terminology corresponds to the first type of *emotive coercion*, they are claimed to 'have the power to kill' and could be summed up as, 'Nation as a person' metaphor, 'Society as a building' or 'Rationality as the maximization of self-interest'(ibid: 57-58).

However, in Lakoff's research the notion 'rationality of self-interest' has its source in semantically more deeply embedded model applied by the Republicans in USA that is linked

⁶ *Frames*, term in cognitive semantics, is characterised by C. J. Fillmore (2006: 613) as 'schematizations of particular situation types' evoked by independent linguistic entities in a text or discourse and could be contrasted with generative grammar approach to linguistics (Katz and Fodor 1963). In our understanding they prove the point presented in interactional pragmatics and CDA which links meaning of the language event to the context (social relations and action), which is also claimed by Merleau Ponty. 'The meaning does not have a pre-existing presence (in the words); it is an effect of relations that are set up between them' (Merleau- Ponty 1964 in Fairclough 1978: 24).

to 'Strict father morality model', which is opposed to 'Nurturant parent morality model' as used by the Democrats (ibid: 7).

Therefore, what is called for by Lakoff is to challenge the presuppositions and implications hidden in the language and reframe the representations in the minds of people used to such collocations as 'tax relief', which implies that 'tax is an abduction' (ibid: 4).

However interesting and important for the general public G. Lakoff's raising of awareness of Republican language 'manipulation' might be, we suggest, that it should not be forgotten that any reference to external 'truth-value' world including the Democratic reframing practices is not unbiased and semantically neutral.

2.2.3 Pragmatic manipulation with the presupposed common ground

Apart from *coercing* the public by stimulation of *emotional centres* (Lakoff, 54) due to presenting *desirable* and *undesirable* semantic sets, which could be otherwise also called *glittering generality* in B. Mazid's terminology, presuppositions are claimed to appeal to *cognitive* faculty of our mind because of their form which is more embedded in a clause (Mazid 2007: 356).

Although Levinson (1983) classifies them according to presuppositional *triggers*⁷ that signal their occurrence in a clause (8), the structural approach to presuppositions is in Mazid's sample analysis of Pres. G. Bush's discourse avoided and what is preferred is a more semantic and thematic approach to presuppositions (9-10).

(8) Referential trigger: **The** king of France has talked to Jane → there is a king of France, Jane exists (Levinson in Mazid 2007: 356).

(9) Nation as a person: And tonight, **the United States of America** makes the following demands on the Taliban (ibid: 365)

(10) Terrorism: Our enemy is **a radical network of terrorists**, and every government that supports them. (ibid: 365)

Mazid's analysis of presuppositions focuses similarly to G. Lakoff on Republican exploitation of implied knowledge in monologic data and similarly to him he recognises semantic models

⁷ In Levinson's typology, presuppositions are distinguished according to 'referential', 'cleft', 'factive' 'implicative' and 'too' triggers (Mazid 2007: 356).

of a 'Strict father morality model' such as 'Nation as a person', 'US as authority' versus 'dystopy' (terrorism) and 'Retaliation' (Mazid 2007: 368).

However, as the presuppositional *trigger* determines the presented information to occur as *implicitly* known to both speaker and a hearer (Dubois et al. 1994: 379 in *ibid*: 357) and establishes certain common ground between the participants of the talk, presuppositions can be highly manipulative especially when they are unchallenged (Huckin 1997 in *ibid*: 356). According to Van Dijk, for example, they contribute to forming certain 'ideological centre by emphasising our good properties and their bad ones which are simply assumed to be known' (Van Dijk 1995: 157, in *ibid*: 357).

Although our aim in this paper is to determine whether strategies employed by a politician in interaction could be correlated with certain linguistic means (2.4.6.), we will not focus specifically on the types of presuppositions in our transcribed interviews, so that we will only mark their occurrence in the charts of respective strategies of 'non-replies' (7.5.1.).

However, the employment of collocations and presuppositions that establish the common ground with the public seems to be related to another aspect valid in political discourse operating mainly in political interaction, that of *dissimulation* or *evasion*. This phenomenon has been given attention to by A. Fetzer, Clayman or P. Bull in connection with the principles of *commitment* and *credibility* which also help to define the notion of a political identity.

2.2.4. Political identity

The principles of political *commitment* and *credibility* are extremely important for *legitimizing* of a politician whose aim is to maintain authority and *richtigkeit* (2.2.1.) in a factual and moral sense and thus to avoid making statements which are threatening for his negative *face* (freedom of acting).⁸

Therefore, when referring to future actions, instead of producing real and *felicitious promises* (Searle 1969 in Schiffrin 1994), one of the main (sincerity) conditions is not fulfilled and the so-called *glib-promises* arise. Although these are not specifically dealt with by Chilton, nor exemplified, in our perception, they mark *the dissimulative* macro-principle of a political discourse because of their vague form. On the other hand, when the politician refers

⁸ Brown and Levinson 's politeness theory is going to be closely dealt with in the chapter (2.3.1.2.)

to the past act which caused disapproval of the general public and which needs to be repaired by an *apology*, the degree of personal responsibility of a politician has to be decreased and according to Z. Kampfl, the so-called *non-apologies* are produced (Kampfl 2008). As the *speech act* of apologising occurred also in our sample, it will be interesting to verify Kampfl's observation from Israeli discourse with the American context (3.2.6.).⁹ Although the principle of *dissimulation* will be discussed in more detail in the sections dealing with the interaction in political discourse (2.4.2.), its occurrence is related to the principle of *commitment*, which according to Garfingel (1994) means that politicians are responsible for what they say (*social actions*) and can be held accountable for it (Fetzer 2008: 326).

They are expected to be telling the truth and produce utterances that are truthful. This is often achieved by incorporating *credible* information helping to support their view, which boosts their *epistemic* commitment as quoting the respected authors who have a similar view or referring to people and their general wants (Chilton 2004: 117). The principle of maintaining political *credibility* then lies in 'grounding the truth claims in a produced series of assertions' (ibid, 117).

However, another possibility of maintaining this feature arises out of the fact that political identity is in fact multidimensional. According to A. Fetzer and P. Bull (2008), who focused on the analysis of pronouns in political discourse, politicians have three identities which they are able to use in different contexts to boost their *commitment* to truth value of the uttered statement, so that they often switch from the 'discursive identity of politicians' to 'collective,

⁹ Z. Kampfl (2008) gives examples from Israeli political discourse and makes a classification of *non-apologies* along the axis of four basic parameters :1. The remedy: Does the speaker use a formulaic and routinized expression of apology? 2. The offense: Does the speaker admit that a transgression occurred? 3. The offended: Does the speaker identify the offended party as such?, 4. The offender: Does the speaker perceive himself as the offender and acknowledge full responsibility and guilt for the transgression? (Kampfl, 2008:2260).

Ex. (from the first category)

IR: Will you ask for forgiveness from the Jewish people during your visit in Israel?

IE: Of course, of course. (Kampfl 2008: 2262).

Ex. (from the fourth category) IE: I am sorry if someone was offended and if my words were formulated and understood in contrast to my intention (ibid:2268)

party identity' (ibid: 277). The following (11) is an example of such a pronoun switch in the genre of an interview.

(11): Well, what **we are saying** is that if you have a national directorate and a much more coordinated approach than we have at the moment, that will help to identify. (Fetzer 2008: 282).

So far we have dealt mainly with the notion of strategic behaviour of politicians from the point of view of critical discourse analysts who focused on linking one macro-principle of political discourse with linguistic properties of the monologic text. However, as the aim of this paper is the analysis of communicative strategies in interaction whose principles were described by conversation analysts, it is crucial to relate the CDA principles of political discourse to *speech events* of dialogic character (Liddicoat 2007, Grice 1975 in Schiffrin 1994) whose indirect form has been discovered to reflect strategic use of language in connection to social principles of *face-management* (2.3.1.2.). As we expect that in political interviews politicians will try to minimise their *commitment*, in the next chapter the *preferred* responses in interaction will be compared with the *dispreferred* ones in conversation, so that the irrelevant, ironic and obscure talk of inappropriate length will be interpreted from the perspective of *politeness theory* (Brown & Levinson 1987).

2.3. Action in political discourse

2.3.1. Conversation analysis and its reflection of politeness theory

Although critical discourse analysis focuses on the social order as a shaping element of the linguistic properties in the produced talk of a specific *genre* and conversation analysis describes the recurrent patterns of talk as occurring in situations of everyday life (institutional or ordinary talk) without paying much attention to causes of *interaction* or the intentions of the participants, both approaches point to interrelationship between 'context as characterised' and its bearing on the 'doing of the talk'(Schlegoff 1987 a: 219 in Schiffrin 1994: 235). In both views, it is context which helps to compute out the appropriate meaning of the turn which refers both retrospectively and prospectively to the shared knowledge between participants of the conversation, so that language becomes the means of *social action* (Schiffrin 1994: 235).

This is, in conversation analysis, argued to be achieved *sequentially* in the second pairs (SPPs) of the *turn constructional sequence* by fulfilling the expectation defined by the trajectory of a preceding turn, so that certain structure of the SPP of the adjacency pair would be more *preferred* than another. The following (12) is an example of preferred form of an answer to preceding question.

(12) John: What time's it?

Betty: **Three o'clock**

(Liddicoat 2007: 107)

In comparison with *dispreferred SPPs*, preferred SPPs are conversationally easier, which means that they are produced without a delay which may consist of attributable silence, pauses or hesitation markers (*uhh, hms*) and account which serves to foreshadow the disagreement appearing explicitly or implicitly later in the turn (Pomerantz: 1984, Sacks 1987 in Liddicoat 2007:114). The following (13) is an example of dispreferred SPS consisting of refusal to invitation.

(13) Harry: I don't have much to do on Wednesday. Would you like to get together then?

(0.3)

Joy: **Huh well.** I don' really know if ..you see.

It's a bit hectic for me... Wednesday.. you know. (Liddicoat 2007: 110)

However, preference for maintaining the same trajectory of the first pairs (FPP) of the turn (*preference for contiguity*) is observed to be flouted in SPPs (14) when FPPs contain *negative self-assessment*, which means that the other person is negatively evaluated (Pomerantz, 1984 in Liddicoat, 120).

(14) Joy: ...now yuh see she won't talk about it.

Harry: Yeah

(1.0)

Harry: Uh well I don't remember much about it but **you know perhaps you're a bit hard on her.**

Joy: perhaps

(Liddicoat 2007: 122)

The avoidance of *negative other assessment* therefore reflects some hierarchically higher and inherently social principle, which is suggested not only by the indirect form of the *dispreferred SPPs* but also by their length.

Following from Gricean description of efficient communication (1975) between the partners in conversation, which schematically corresponds to Habermasian *validity* claims as outlined in (2.2.1), the four *conversational maxims* any speaker needs to adhere to in order to exchange the truthful information can be flouted because there is a distinction between *semantic*

meaning of a statement and a speaker's *intended* meaning, so that a conversational *implicature* may arise (Grice 1975 in Schiffrin 1994:226).

While flouting the maxim of quantity results in *tautology* (15) or a longer stretch of talk, flouting the maxim of quality leads to *metaphor* (16), the maxim of relevance to irrelevant talk (17) and maxim of manner to *obscurity* (18).

(15) **War is war.** (Brown Levinson 1987: 220)

(16) A: What can you tell me about Catherine's ability to concentrate on a task?
B: Catherine is a **butterfly flitting** from flower to flower

(17) A: What on earth has happened to the roast beef?
B: **The dog** is looking very happy.

(18) A: What are you baking?
B: Be I **are tea aitch deey wyesee ay kayee.** (Potts 2010: 4-7)

In addition, Grice also recognises the ways to circumvent the conversational maxim with the advantage of decreasing the risk involved in flouting of the maxim, e.g., *opting out of the maxim* (Schiffrin 1994: 196) which means that the speaker declines to provide the answer (19) justifying himself by his access to private knowledge and security reasons.

(19) No comment (Potts 2010: 2)

As such answers are in our view typical of politicians we would like to see whether they occur in our data and with what frequency (3.2.7.). It will be also interesting to observe whether other Gricean maxims are flouted in political interviews and whether *dispreferred responses* form the most of the replies (3.2.7.).

2.3.1.2. Application of social theories to Gricean framework for efficient communication

An interesting insight into the mechanism of interaction as governed by preference rules in conversation was provided by social theorist E. Goffman who in a book *Symbolic Interactionism* (1967) argued that verbal and non-verbal *encounters* with the others are in a society necessity which require mutual enhancement of *faces* of participants in *interchanges*. These as 'basic concrete units of social activities' were claimed by him to serve to keep the balance in the 'expressive order of a ritual' between two faces of people, *self-*

defensive, which is reflected in showing the respect for the self and *protective* which, on the other hand, shows considerateness towards the emotions of the others (Goffman 2006: 307).


According to Goffman, the primary motive for the interaction is *face-management* which, however, is not a study of intentions of participants in the encounters but rather ‘the traffic rules they adhere to’ (ibid: 307). Thus, what is observed is, for example, the corrective ritual for a transgression of these rules which is damaging for the faces (‘self-respect’) of both participants.

In his study Goffman also noted that some *acts* in the interaction as asking for time are not equally imposing for the face of the other because they do not require material goods and thus tend to be responded to in a less dispreferred way. This phenomenon is therefore in conversation analysis represented in a scale of *dispreferred interchanges* (Liddicoat 2007: 123).


However, the link of CDA with the social theory of E. Goffman had to be established only later by extension of Goffman’s study to subsume also the internal properties of the text. As Goffman’s contribution to the study of social interaction lacked systematic linguistic study which would interrelate the external and strategic function (the notions of respective faces) with their verbal correlates, this was further elaborated by Brown and Levinson (1987) in their own comparative study where they proved validity of Goffman’s principles of *politeness* in a universal way.

The outline of the internal macro strategies with respect to the *defensive* and *protective* nature of the faces is following:

6.0. Schema: *Positive and negative politeness*



(Brown and Levinson 1987: 102)



(Brown and Levinson 1987: 131)

The original term for *self-defensive* nature of face (self-respect) was replaced by the term *negative face*, which was defined as ‘want for freedom of action’ and *protective* character of the face (‘considerateness towards emotions of others’) was replaced by the term *positive face* as ‘a want to be approved of by the others’ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 145).

While *positive politeness* is thought of as forming the ‘kernel’ of joking and familiar behaviour and is linguistically reflected, e.g. in euphemising name-calling in the strategy 5.3.1. ‘claim the common ground’ (20) or what seems to us as contact maintainers (21) in the strategy 5.3.1.3. ‘intensify the interest’, *negative politeness* prevails in the respect behaviour when the social distance between the participants is greater. It gets reflected in the strategies 5.4.3. ‘be pessimistic’ which mitigate the imposition of the *face threatening act* (FTA), e.g. by hedging (22).

(20) Give us 10 rupees, **sonny**. I need it.

(21) I come down the stairs, and what do you think I **see?**-a huge mess all over the place...

(22) I don’t imagine there’d be any chance of you (doing it for me) (Brown Levinson 1987: 109, 114, 174)

As it is argued that any act which *disturbs* the mutual faces of the speaker and the hearer is attempted to be minimised by any rational agent in communication depending on relative weightings of at least three parameters¹⁰, it is hypothesised that not only acts towards the *negative face* of the hearer like orders or expressions of strong negative emotions toward the hearer will be politely decreased but also those imposing on *the positive face* of the hearer like contradictions, or mention of taboo and divisive topics (ibid: 68).

Moreover, as some FTAs like excuses, apologies or admissions of guilt, can be threatening in a cooperative talk also for the speaker, these are supposed to be avoided too and if they occur they are not referred to directly but minimised by *hedges* (ibid: 66).

In Brown and Levinson (1987: 145) they are defined as particles or phrases which modify the degree of membership of a predicate or a noun phrase in a set and could be divided according to their effect into (a) strengtheners and (b) weakeners¹¹ which are exemplified in (23-24) and which in our view consist also of cognitive verbs (25) that in the research of Anita Fetzer (2008) occupied specific

¹⁰ These parameters are (a), the want to communicate the content of the FTA x, (b), the want to be efficient or urgent, and (c), the want to maintain the hearer’s face to any degree, unless (b) is greater than (c). Ibid: 66.

¹¹ In another classification of hedges they are subdivided according to Gricean maxims into (a) hedges on quality (b) quantity, (c) relevance and (d) manner. Ibid: 164.

positions in a clause and which helped to decrease the epistemic or emotive *commitment* of the politician for the act mentioned in the question.¹² These were the final positions of verbs in a clause where the *I think* served as a parenthetical without the phonological prominence (stress) on the expression and which stood in contrast to *And I think* introducing new argument in the speech of the politician (26).

(23) A swing is **a sort of** a toy (Brown & Levinson 1987: 145)

(24) **.As** I recall....I **would** say..(McCord's testimony in the Watergate hearings, New York Times, 1973 in Brown & Levinson 1987: 165)

(25) And then, in the final irony, last week Tony Blair attacked me for what I said about hoodies. In that one cheap joke, **I think**, he gave up one of the best things he ever said.

(26) IE: I think there's a great deal of force in that. **And I think** all too often that social work is seen as the Cinderella end of... (Fetzer 2008: 393-4)

Therefore, similarly to Goffman, Brown and Levinson claim that the basis of social interaction is mutual maintaining of faces and equilibrium, which is reflected in encounters by a mixture of both, *positive* and *negative* strategies but the respective choice of a strategy is, in Brown and Levinson's perception, intertwined with specific *context*.

This is dependent on the degree of threat (W) subsumed in the face threatening act (*FTA*) for the face of the author and of the other and is defined in terms of three parameters: *power*, P, *social distance*, D and *ranking of imposition* of FTA in a respective culture.¹³ If the power relations are too high and the relationship asymmetrical, the person with higher status can opt for a *bald on record* strategy without maintaining the face of the hearer and the hearer will choose an *on record with redress* towards *negative face* or *off record* communicative strategy (ibid:250).


7.0. Schema: *Do the FTA*

¹² Epistemic commitment is understood as the commitment to the world of truth values while emotive commitment enhances solidarity. It has been discovered that cognitive verb *believe* in its positive form always boosts epistemic commitment while verbs *feel* and *guess* attenuate epistemic commitment and boost emotive commitment because of their subjectivity (Fetzer 2008: 393).

¹³ **Formula:**


$$W_x = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + R_x$$

H: hearer, S: speaker, Power : P, Social Distance: D, Weightiness: W , R: degree to which the FTA_x is rated an imposition in a specific culture (Brown & Levinson 1987: 76).



(Brown & Levinson 1987 : 69)

8.0. Schema: *Off record strategies*



(Brown & Levinson 1987 : 214)

As can be seen from the above schemata, the strategy which was added by Brown and Levinson to Goffman's original model of *self-defensive* and *protective* faces was elaboration of a new, *off record* strategy which consisted of hints, presuppositions and implicatures. According to Brown and Levinson (1987) the choice of this strategy has the payoff that the person using it cannot be held responsible for the implied information which is imposing on the face of the hearer and thus it could be applied in the context of a great asymmetrical distribution of power between participants of the talk when the 'patron-client' roles could be assigned to each of them (ibid: 69, 250).

In our view, in the specific context of factual interviews with politicians, it could be hypothesised that the category of the *social distance* D between the interviewer and the interviewee decreases with *power* P as this is said to subsume the roles or ‘role-sets’ (ibid, 78) so that politicians agree to respect their subordinate position of answering the questions and not posing their own ones. However, this is counterbalanced primarily by their superordinate position of access to *knowledge* as they are persons who are asked to provide or correct the information of interviewers included in the question. Furthermore, this stable interviewing format is, according to Clayman, also sometimes broken, so e.g. in non-deferential questioning style, it is politicians who ask the questions and not the interviewers (Clayman, Heritage 2002).

We also claim that the outlined *off record strategies* form the *emotive* and *cognitive* frames of political talk (*coercion*) dealt with in (2.2.) and therefore they are certainly valid in the *genre* of political interviews. However, we adhere to the point made by Brown and Levinson that metaphors, rhetorical questions, presuppositions, ironies and tautologies are always resolved contextually, that is, either as a *positive* or a *negative* politeness strategy (Brown Levinson, 212). The following example from the context when Apollo landed on the moon is therefore resolved as *off record positive* strategy.

(27) America is exactly America

(Brown Levinson 1987: 220)

Therefore what appears to be one of the concerns for us in this paper is to determine the maintenance of which specific faces is relevant for politicians in their discursive space.

The problem which arises out in doing so is that the proposed schemata for *positive* and *negative* face were devised out by Brown and Levinson universally for any talk in two-part exchanges and not specifically for political discourse, which is governed by the set of macro-principles (*coercion* and *dissimulation*) as dealt with in (2.2.) and thus so far lack systematic study which would critically correlate them with their linguistic patterns in interaction.

However, as *persuasiveness* is claimed to be the main macro-principle valid in political speeches, which we argued to be equivalent with *coercion* via appealing to *emotional* and *cognitive* frames, it seems to be linked to ‘the want to be approved of’ and thus to form the core of *positive* politeness strategy in political discourse. This is claimed to be the case in a political interview also by Jucker (1986):

It is clear that what is primarily at issue in news interview is the interviewee's positive face. (Bull 1996: 53).'

Negative face is of little importance because the interviewee, by consenting to appear in an interview, has already consented to having his or her freedom of action limited in this way (ibid: 222). On the other hand, according to P. Chilton the political talk is face threatening for both *faces* and therefore a politician has to achieve a balance between them via 'euphemising strategies, forms of evasion, solidarity and exclusion as well as some devices of persuasion' (Chilton 2004:40). Although Chilton does not specifically detect them in interaction, he adapts the Brown-Levinson schema in monologic data of political speeches and demonstrates that strategies of *coercion* and *evasion* have implications for communication of social cooperation and conflict in the international relations (Chilton 1990: 202).

2.3.1.3. Chilton's analysis of politeness strategies in monological data (political speeches)

In Chilton's (1990) attempt to apply Brown and Levinson's theory in the context of international relations, a number of *positive* and *negative* strategies were detected on the sample analysis of two public speeches of President Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan's in February 1986. Both speeches were produced at the time of reopening of the talks between the Americans and the Russians about the end of using nuclear missiles but as the setting of the talks was not determined primarily for international negotiations, the disagreements over this issue were not communicated directly in this platform.

It has been discovered that while President Reagan used mainly *positive face* (28) and *off record* strategies (29) when referring to the space programme, President Gorbachev used mainly *negative* (30) and *off record* strategies (31) which mitigated the negative impact of his criticism of the U.S. (ibid:221).

(28) Notice features of hearer: Mr Speaker...I want to **salute you for your service** to Congress and country. Here's to you.

(29) Off-record strategies (Metaphors): We pause together to mourn and honor the valor of our seven *Challenger* heroes. And I hope that we are now ready to do what they would want us to do: Go forward America and **reach for the stars...**

(30) Depersonalisation by passivization and 'reflexes' (participles): the reply **was received**, as had been set forth, linked to this

(31) Off-record (Irony): Reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals is made conditional on our consent to the Star Wars programme and reductions, unilateral, **by the way**, in the Soviet conventional arms. (Chilton 1990: 210-220)

As any political statement which could potentially lead to refusal and criticism of a certain part of the hearing public was considered by Chilton as a face threatening act, international political discourse consisted of a number of indirect (*off-record*) and *negative* politeness strategies. These were, however, shown to be intertwined with *coercing* another part of the hearing public sharing the common ground with the speaker, so that proclamations based on inclusion (32) were at the same time excluding for another group (ibid: 218-220)

(32) So yes, **this nation** remains fully committed to America's space program. (Chilton 1990: 220)

Although Chilton did not refer to the linguistic means of *negative* politeness explicitly by the term *dissimulation* or *evasion*, the fact that he interrelated *coercion* and *negative politeness* with regard to different hearing publics lead us to assume that political talk consists primarily of two macro-principles, that of *coercion* and *evasion*.

This point is also implicitly stated in his prologue to the article 'Politeness, politics and diplomacy' where Chilton criticises Brown and Levinson's theory for the fact that politeness phenomena were treated by them from the perspective of existing power relationships in a community and possibilities of 'reinforcing them (*coercion*) and of manoeuvre and change (*evasion*) in such relationships were simply ignored' (ibid: 204).

We agree with this point and claim that in order to be able to apply Brown and Levinson's schemata of *positive* and *negative* politeness strategies in the specific context of a political interview, we will have to extend the notion of FTA to that causing any type of positive or negative 'emotions' (approval, criticism) for the face of the other similarly as was done by Chilton.

However, in the specific context of political interviews, this has to be made with regard to a diverse hearing public represented by the face of the interviewer. In this way we could distinguish between various *disturbed* faces of a political talk, the personal face of the IR, the coerced face of the public and the criticised face of the public. In this way delegitimizing of the interviewer by politician could be from the public's point of view be considered as a *coercive* strategy of the politician (3.2.5.).

Nevertheless, in showing the disagreement with the posed question, the personal face of the interviewer is rarely appealed to by politicians who accept the footing¹⁴ of questions generally as neutral and thus in 'doing of the talk' contribute to the main purpose of the news interview, which is providing the missing information (Clayman and Heritage 2002:114).

2.4. Interaction in political interviews

In the previous sections (2.2.1-2.2.4.) we dealt primarily with the notion of *coercion*, *legitimation* and *delegitimation* as macro-principles of political talk but inspired by Chilton's sample analysis of Gorbachev and Raegan 'speeches we adopted a view that also *dissimulation* may occur in monologic data of political discourse. However, this is claimed to be the main feature of replies made by politicians in the genre of news interview. It could be defined as a 'routine strategy for responding to a question without answering it' (Dillon 1990:154) or as an 'agenda-shifting procedure which creates the opportunity to change the topic (of the question) and steer the course of the interaction in a more advantageous direction, either prior or following the response to a question' (Greatbach 1986 in Bull 1996: 52).

As a type of mechanism which helps interviewees to take and exert control of interaction, it presents a form of strategic management of the talk, which is worth paying attention to in the following chapters of our paper. This, however, needs to be related to the strategies of *politeness*, which were shown by Brown and Levinson as universal for any interchange in (2.3.1.2) but not specifically for the context of a political interview which we will, thus, present at the end of the theoretical part of this paper (2.4.6.).

Before proceeding to examination of *equivocation* in the context of televised and factual political interviews where the typology of 'non-replies' to questions was divided by P. Bull (1993), it is necessary to consider the norms of the news interview as these form the normative ground upon which the respective transgression could be classified.

¹⁴ Goffmann makes a distinction between animators, figures, authors and principals (Schiffrin 1994:104). In our view, in the genre of news interviews where assertions presented in questions are referred to other sources, interviewers could be considered not as authors of the statements *per se* but rather 'principals' or 'animators'.

2.4.1. Basic ground rules of conversation in the *genre* of political interview

In this section, the principles of turn-taking are presented in the genre of news interview with respect to deviations from what is considered as appropriate behaviour from interviewers who are setting the agenda of the response of the interviewee by their questions (Clayman 2002). As two of our interviews in the empirical part of the paper consist of high number of *conducive questions* and these are related to the frequency rate of ‘intermediate replies’, the concept of *adversarial* style of *questioning* is explained here and various types of hostile questions are exemplified.

According to Clayman and Heritage, whose research of the *genre* of news interview is based on conversation analysis in institutionalised setting and which we consider as authoritative in this respect, doing of the talk in political news interview is achieved by *negotiation* of rules by both partners who are, however, in asymmetric position due to the Q-A format (ibid: 96). These are called by Atkinson and Drew (1979) ‘turn-type preallocations’ because activities of asking and answering are pre-allocated to the roles of interviewer and interviewee (Clayman, Heritage 2002:98). In consequence, the constraints are created in the organisation of the talk, so that the interviewer cannot ‘overtly express opinions, argue with, debate or criticise the interviewee’s positions, nor, conversely, agree with, support, or defend them’ (ibid: 98). This stands in contrast to behaviour of interviewers in a different type of interviews, that with positively valued celebrities where interviewers express more frequently their friendship with interviewees and establish the same ground (Šaldová 2008).

Due to the constraints in political interviews, interviewers embed their questions into *prefaces* occurring before the question or after them where other source of the presented assertion is addressed (third parties), (a) by mentioning the specific name of the author of assertion, (b) by stating that it is the people (33) who are interested in knowing the information or (c) by generic means with empty *it* and passive (ibid: 150-177).

(33) IR: When **people** heard I was coming out to do an interview with you, you know what most people are interested in? (Clayman 2002: 171)

These are means of maintaining *neutrality* of the interviewer which also enhance his *credibility* and *legitimacy* in the task of asking the question as *a tribune* of the people (ibid: 152,166, 177). While interviewees are expected to wait until the completion of the question without commenting on the prefaces of the posed questions by ‘contact maintainers’, which

signal too early in their turn their disapproval (*oh, mm*), or without raising their own questions, interviewers can exert certain amount of power in interaction by their questions.

Although interviewers should be properly asking the *neutral* questions and interviewees properly answering them, what is considered to be an ‘appropriate’ question and answer has to be negotiated only throughout the interview (ibid: 96). Thus, when the interviewer does not seem to get the right reply for his/her question, he/she may continue to repeat it and gradually increase the pressure on the interviewee to provide the information needed.

However, certain norms for appropriate question in news interview have been observed. It was pointed out by Clayman (2002) and Bull (1994) that, e.g., most of the questions by British and American interviewers take the syntactic form of the *interrogative* (68%) including the (a) *polar/yes-no/* question, (b), Wh question and (c) *disjunctive* questions despite the presence of other syntactic types, e.g. (d) *declarative* questions with rising intonation or a *tag*. This typology is similar to Quirk and Greenbaum’s (1990: 232-239) main classification of questions (11.2-11.11) where *tag* questions are subsumed in the midway between *interrogatives* and *declaratives*. However, according to Harris and Bull *declarative* questions correspond mostly to *polar, yes-no* questions, (92%) and thus could be considered as such (Bull 1994: 126).¹⁵

In addition to formal characterisation of questions, questions have several *discourse functions* which may not only be asking for a missing information but also a polite request, offer or a command (Quirk 1990: 232). On the other hand, some questions do not expect any reply at all (*rhetorical* questions), some *echo* a part of the posed question signalling a misunderstanding (*echoic* questions) and others are *conducive* in creating a strong bias for a positive or a negative reply (ibid: 239-241). Thus, the interviewer may take control of the talk by the design of the question itself, which determines which topic will be dealt with and which action of the reply is the most preferred one.

9.0 Schema: *Dimensions of questioning and answering*

¹⁵ See appendix. 7.2.3.

Table 16.1 Dimensions of questioning and answering

<i>Interviewer questions</i>	<i>Interviewee responses</i>
set agendas:	conform /do not conform with
(i) topical agendas	(i) topical agendas
(ii) action agendas	(ii) action agendas
embody presuppositions	confirm /disconfirm presuppositions
incorporate preferences	align /disalign with preferences

Source: Clayman and Heritage 2002a

(Clayman, Heritage 2002: 228)

Raising the topic of the question with a preface which provides its background context and establishes its relevance, the question may *block* certain evasive actions of interviewees, e.g. by quoting the person interviewed which is exemplified in (34).

(34) IR: what **Mrs Thatcher has been saying** is that there is a danger of a socialist superstate being imposed from Brussels and what **Mr Heath and others are saying** is that is an illusory fear. Where do you line up on that issue? (ibid: 201)

Incorporating the questions which are *negative*, *tagged* or contain assertive items like *really*, *already* and *some* in interviewing can verge on neutrality and become the marker of hostile questioning because *conducive* questions are considered to contain certain presuppositions which are difficult to be challenged by an interviewee (ibid: 202-217).

If they have the format of *Wh question* and concern the so called *B-state*, or inner state of mind of the interviewee which depersonalises the interviewer from the assertion like in the following example (35), presuppositions are deeply embedded in the question (ibid: 206).

(35) IR: Why **do you think** you have not made a more substantial impression on some of these people who have been able to observe you up close? (ibid: 206)

Questions containing such a type of presupposition could be exemplified also by the type ‘When did you stop beating your wife’ and are called *quandary* (Nevin 1994 in Clayman 2002: 220).

A similar effect on the interviewee is achieved by *negative* and *tagged* questions, which make impression of accusation of the hearer especially with referring to past events.

- (36) IR: How could you talk about human rights when Doctor Sakharov has been banished without a trial? (ibid: 222)

The last type of the question which poses a difficulty in answering for an interviewee is called by Clayman a *split and fork* question which, in our view, corresponds to *Bavelas* type of the *question* referred to by P. Bull in his analysis of face threats in questions as a question which cannot be replied to without a ‘loss of face’ (Bull 1996: 64).

In Bull’s view such questions typically embed an assertion which is to a certain degree truthful and which is followed by a *tag* (37), so that the politician is presented with a dilemma that can be resolved only by a ‘non-reply’ (Bull 1996: 57).

- (37) IR (Brian Walden): Listen to this wonderfully blithe statement that the Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont gave to the House of Commons during treasury questions last year. He said: ‘Rising unemployment and the recession have been the price we’ve had to pay to get the inflation down. This is a price well worth paying’. A lot of people say. ‘I can’t imagine a more uncaring statement than that’. ...and that’s true, isn’t it?

IE (John Mayor): But it isn’t ---er---It isn’t uncaring policy to try and remove the difficulties that cause unemployment. (Bull 1996: 64)

Similarly, according to Clayman, the intention of *split and fork* question (38) is to present a politician in an inner conflict either with himself, party or an ally (Clayman 2002: 227).

- (38) IR: Uh what do you think the problem is really? Is it the leadership as it might be claimed up on the Hill, or is it the programs themselves...? You can’t have it both ways either..

IE: /silence/ (ibid: 231)

Both analysts also claim that responding to questions, which are presented above as associated with *adversarial* questioning, would be problematic and therefore explore the ways politicians *evade* them. Although, it is not clear whether there is any overlap between the form of *Bavelas* or *split & fork* question and a *conducive* question, in the empirical part of the paper we would like to examine what the proportion of *replies* is with respect to the *evasive* answers and whether the replies are less prone to occur in hostile interviews as this type of interviews is represented in our sample as well (3.2.2.). However, in our definition of *conducive* questions not only *tags*, *attitudinal* markers and *negative* syntax are subsumed but also questions where the attitude of the interviewer is expressed (39) via the language which arouses sympathy or which consists of paradoxical collocations (antonyms).

- (39) IR: Do you believe that the hand of **God** is guiding you in **the war on terror**? (I)

In the next sections of the paper the pragmatic motivation of *evasion* is therefore more specifically related to the face threats of the questions (2.4.4.) and different approaches to the phenomenon of *evasion* are critically presented.

2.4.2. Discussion of different approaches to *evasion*

In Bavelas et al. (1988, 1990) as well as in the framework of P. Bull (1996), it has been claimed that *evasion* as a form of strategic manouvering associated typically with political replies is related to the context of a previous question and thus politicians were found to equivocate when they were confronted with questions which placed them in a more serious conflict or a dilemma (Bull 1996). In this way both analysts contributed to the refutation of the widely held view that politicians do not reply to questions because they are ‘intrinsically dishonest’ (ibid: 53). In addition, Bull also devised a detailed typology of non-replies which presented which topics politicians direct attention to boost their positive image and thus how specifically positive consequences can be achieved by equivocation in interaction. These will also form the basis of our analysis in the paper.

However, in Chilton (2004) the analysis of evasion in interaction is dealt with only marginally on the sample of a broadcast interview with a political leader of the Labour party J. Humphry, whose evasion is observed to be caused by a question which is said to pose a ‘dilemma’ for her. The technique of reformulation of the question still within the frame of the topic is detected, which would in Clayman, Heritage (2010) be labelled as a *covert* means of evasion (ibid: 254). Clayman’s distinction of evasion into (a) overt and (b) covert is, nevertheless, not referred to by Chilton who seems to be rather interested in pointing out the means of *coercing* the public by presuppositions and *metarepresentations* (2.1.)

According to Clayman, Heritage (2010), *evasion* can be classified into two subtypes already mentioned, (a) overt practice (40-43) defined as a ‘resistant course of action which includes the steps to minimize the damage’ and (b) covert practise (43-44) -as a resistance ‘without acknowledging that anything out of ordinary is taking place’ and thus the divergence does not have to be minimised (ibid: 254). The following (40-44) are examples of these two practices with their subtypes which will be also noticed in our sample (3.2.5.).

(40) **Overt evasion:** Token request for permission

IE: Let me say- just make one comment in terms of what Ron says...

(41) Minimizing the divergence by temporal, numerical or ‘just’ minimizers

IE: Can I say **just** to set the context...

(42) Justifying the resistance

IE: But I think this is a **part of a much bigger picture...**(ibid: 248 -250-252)

(43) **Covert evasion**: Operating on answer

IR: What's **the difference** between your Marxism and Mister McGarhey's Communism?

IE: **The difference** is that it's the press that constantly call me Marxist when I do not.

(44) Operating on the question

IR: Your leader in the Senate, Bob Dole, said that a better qualified person could have been chosen. Other republicans have been so far more critical in private. Why do you think that you have not made a more substantial impression on some of these people who have been able to observe you up close?

IE: **The question goes** whether I am qualified to be vice president...


(ibid: 254-257)

While *covert evasion* is explained by Clayman as being achieved by 'subversive word repeats and anaphora'(Rasiah 2010:671) which help to maintain the topic of the question superficially and make an impression that the reply is provided as in the example (4) where the same lexeme *difference* is used, linguistic criteria for *overt evasion* are not explicitly stated by him

Although it seems to us that some subtypes like *token request for permission* (40) have linguistic correlates, e.g. a speech act of polite request containing a *verbum dicendi* (*say, accentuate*), others as *minimizing divergence* (41) are overlapping with *justifying the resistance* (42) or *operating on the question* (44) type via the temporal adjunct serving as a justification. In sum, Clayman and Heritage's subdivision of evasive types lacks in consistency, which could be resolved for the purpose of in-depth sample analysis but for the purpose of quantitative analysis, it does not appear to us sufficient enough to embrace the mechanism of evasion.

In Rasiah (2010), the disadvantages of Clayman and Heritage's model of evasion were attempted to be improved, in our view, more successfully, in the sample analysis of Australian parliamentary questions. According to the grammatical form of the question (Quirk) the respective subtype of a reply and a 'non-reply' (Harris, Bull) was marked and the level of (a) *full*, (b) *substantial*, (c) *medium* or (d) *subtle* evasion (46) was determined.

10.0. Schema: Analytical framework for the study of evasion



(Rasiah 2010: 667)

As politicians did not remain silent (*full evasion*), nor changed the topic of the question to ‘entirely different area of discussion’ (*substantial evasion*), political replies were coded as mostly *medium-level* (45) because the reply ‘was still within the parameters of the topic but performed a different task’ (ibid: 670).

(45) IR: When Prime Minister Howard meets President Bush later today in Washington, will **he be telling** the President that there will be **no** Australian military **participation** in any action against Iraq without a second UN resolution?

IE: The Prime Minister will **be taking** this **opportunity to express** Australia’s strong preference for a **new Security Council** resolution... (Rasiah 2010: 670)

(46) IR: Were all **necessary steps** being taken to protect civilians?

IE: **Unprecedented steps** were taken to protect civilians. (Rasiah 2010: 670)

In addition to this analytical procedure, some categories of a ‘non-reply’ adopted from P. Bull were recognised in the *agenda-shift* in the following stage by Rasiah and it was also suggested that the replies occurred more frequently with the questions posed from the Governmental colleagues than from the opposition.

11.0. Chart. Suggested dependency between the type of politician’s response and the question (Government vs Opposition)

Table 1
Questions answered, given intermediate responses or evaded.

Response type	Government	Opposition	Total
Answer	39	8	47
Intermediate response	0	21	21
Evasion	0	19	19
Total	39	48	87

Although Rasiah's classification appears to us similarly to Clayman and Heritage advantageous for a detailed sample analysis of one political interview but not systematic enough for both qualitative and quantitative analysis, we will employ Rasiah's third stage of analytical scheme for level of evasion (schema 10.0.) at least in distinguishing between the type of a *reply* and *intermediate* reply (3.1.2.).

2.4.3. Communicative strategies of politicians in interaction- a Socio-psychologic typology of 'non-replies'

Drawing on Jucker (1986), who claimed that primary aim of politicians is to enhance their *positive* image in the genre of news interview, P. Bull and K. Mayer contributed to the study of *equivocation* by devising a typology of strategies used by British politicians in the televised debates before 1987' General elections (1993). These were divided into eleven main categories which are all exemplified with their respective subtypes in the appendix (cf. 7.1.). They are also outlined in the abbreviated version below.

12.0. Chart. Types of Non-reply made by Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock

Table II: Types of Non-Reply Made by Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock

Non-reply category	Margaret Thatcher	Neil Kinnock
1. Ignores the question	5.5	5.3
2. Acknowledges the question	3.7	8.8
3. Questions the question	1.85	1.75
4. Attacks the question	25.9	36.8
5. Attacks the interviewer	13.0	—
6. Declines to answer	22.2	7.0
7. Makes political point	76.0	66.7
8. Gives incomplete answer	9.3	12.3
9. Repeats answer	5.5	3.5
10. States or implies that has already answered question	—	7.0
11. Apologizes	1.85	—

(Bull, Mayer 1993: 662)

The main purpose of Bull and Mayer's study was to discover whether the assumption that politicians commonly do not answer questions in interviews was true and which specific topics they divert attention to in boosting their image. *Evasion* was therefore not thought of as solely a *negative* phenomenon but also a *positive* one from the perspective of politicians. In the first stage of Bull's investigation, qualitative classification of 'non-replies' was presented and in the second the non-replies were applied to measure quantitatively the respective differences of evasive replies in case of two politicians, Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock. As both politicians were interviewed for an equal period of time by the same interviewers

(3.2.3.), the strategies were interpreted by P. Bull as caused by the specificities of their interpersonal style. While it was found out that both politicians replied equally with direct/indirect answers (38.0-38.9 %) and did not reply to 53.3-58.7%¹⁶ of questions, Margaret Thatcher was, for example, found to be attacking the interviewer for interrupting her (13%) unlike Neil Kinnock who instead used to attack the question itself more (36.8%) and stated that the question was already replied (Bull 1993: 662).

It was also discovered that Thatcher's technique of attacking the interviewer was more efficient because it resulted in interviewer's following reformulation of the question. In the case of N. Kinnock, the result of his techniques on the interviewer was different because the question was just repeated (ibid: 651).

However, the distribution of some strategies was found to be similar because both politicians employed with the highest frequency *making the political point* and the second most frequent was an *attack on the question*. The strategy *ignores the question* had the distribution of at least 5% with both partners, *questioning the question* nearly 2% and although *acknowledges the question* was employed with a different frequency, it was present in the responses of both politicians. If these are considered to be representative strategies of British political interaction, it could be interesting to compare them with American context (3.2.3.), which is according to Clayman and Heritage less adversarial due to the presence of American format of 'presidential debates' (Clayman, Heritage 2002: 47).

As it is the American interviews which form the the basis of our transcribed sample (3.0), we will therefore attempt to compare the differences in the British and American evasive strategies in (3.2.3.) although we are aware of the fact that employing of strategies may differ due to time lapse of eighteen years between Bull and Mayer's study and our research. In addition, further study would need to be carried out to verify that three strategies which were found to be used by both politicians to similar extent (*ignores the Q*, *questions the question*, *acknowledges the Q*) represent the typical strategies of the whole British political discourse.

Unlike the study of Rasiah, who improved Clayman's model of evasion but did not bring any conclusive remarks concerning the quantitative application of his categories, our study will take advantage of the quantitative outcome of Bull's research, which also has the practical purpose of raising the critical awareness of the public towards politicians and their

¹⁶ See chart 7.2.4. in the appendix.

non-transparent communication. While the non-extended presentation of Bull's thirty strategies can be found in the appendix (7.1.), our hypothesis concerning the linguistic patterns of these strategies is stated in the charts of the last section (2.4.6.) including also the diagram which incorporates the notion of FTA of questions possibly attacked in every response of the politician. The pragmatic motivation for aspect of *evasion* is therefore going to be dealt with in the next chapter.

2.4.4. Pragmatic reasons for evasion in political interaction

In contrast to P. Chilton, who deals with the issue of *face threatening act* as having its roots in the external, social world as a conflict between the nations (2.3.1.3.) and claims that politicians incorporate it in their speeches from their own initiation via euphemising strategies (2004:40), P. Bull distinguishes an FTA in the question itself asked by an interviewer.

In his article published with J. Elliott in 1996 he determines to discover in which context *the non-reply* is more prone to occur and finds out that *evasion* is present with greater chance if preceded by the so called, *Bavelas* type question (2.4.1.). He also specifies types of face threats in the question (7.2.1.) to discover whether *evasion* is more likely to occur in the context of tougher questioning so that two types of questions were distinguished, a *NNT* and *Bavelas* type of the question. The findings showed that when politicians were presented with the face threat of *not-supporting subgroup of own party* (60%) or a *negative personal competence* (57%) they were more willing to provide a plausible explanation and avoid a 'non-reply' (Bull 1996: 61).¹⁷ The following (47) is an example of a *NNT* question.

(47) IR: Are you aware that a good many of your supporters would like to see you leading the Tory campaign in a more forceful and a dynamic way?

IE: Well, I find it interesting that you should say that..Er..I spend half of my time being told by some people that I've suddenly become too aggressive and half my time being told by other people that I ought to be more aggressive.. (Bull 1996: 62)

On the other hand, *Bavelas* type of the question was found to be associated more with the threat of *not supporting the significant body of opinion in the electorate* (69%), *losing credibility* and *personal difficulties in the future* (54%), which would correspond to questions

¹⁷ See chart 7.2.2. in the appendix.

dealing with *commitment* of the politician like asking about his further plans. Distribution of particular face threats with these two types of questions can be found in the chart in (7.2.1) However, the difference between a *NNT* and *Bavelas* type question is by no means self-evident since (a) only a few examples are provided for each of them in the article, (b) some face threats like *not supporting a colleague* or *supporting negatively valued other* are closely linked with both types of questions and (c) neither are the criteria for decision making in these cases explicitly mentioned (Bull 1996: 61).

Although it was suggested that the demarcation line between them depends on whether the response of the politician brings an explanation avoiding the threat (thus *NNT*), it is still not clear what the form of the *NNT* question is and whether it always leads to what can be coded as a ‘reply’.

What is also absent in Bull and Elliott’s research is an attempt to find out whether politicians use the same strategies of non-replying to questions in their avoidance of the respective face threats and a provision of the chart of scalability of face threats is also missing.

As it is not the primary goal of this paper to cover these deficiencies of Bull a Elliott’s research, we will only attempt to identify the form of the *NNT* question in the chapter dealing with the contextual properties of interviews (3.2.2.) and outline the strategies of Sen. Obama in his avoidance of *FTA negative personal competence* in a short extract from our sample (3.2.7.) and the strategies of Pres. Bush in the detailed qualitative analysis attached to the appendix (7.6.).

2.4.5. Criticism of P. Bull’s methodology

The problem which arises out of Bull’s typology of ‘non-replies’, as we perceive it, is basically twofold. It lacks (a) a more systematic methodology and (b) linguistic representation of the recognised strategies which call for a general verification of typology in political interviews in other, non-British contexts. The arguments for showing the first point will be dealt with in this section while the second point which leads to formulation of our hypothesis is subsumed in the following section.

As far as the first point is concerned, we claim that Bull’s distinction of ‘non-replies’ (1993) presented in the abbreviated chart in (2.4.3.) does not seem to be entirely consistent

with his later typology (1994) where *intermediate* answers are exemplified (48) because in our view the *intermediate* answers can be delineated along 'the non-replies' categories as well.¹⁸

(48) IE: I know what I would do./**reassurance**/ I just could not be responsible for the men under me under those circumstances it wouldn't be fair to put them in the field if other people had nuclear weapons /**self-justification**/(Bull 1994: 127)

Drawing on Bull's definition of a *direct/indirect* reply as 'a reply, which clearly provides the information asked for in the question' (Bull 1994: 123), an *intermediate* reply as the one 'which provides the information implicitly or partially' and a *non-reply* which is a failure to do so (Bull 1994: 124-5), we also argue that inexplicit confirmation or a denial of the question typical of an *intermediate* answer can be recognised alternatively in a 'non-reply'(49).

(49)David Dimbleby: ...are you saying that a third of the people are supporting a party that is revolutionary and quite different and militant and unacceptable in the way the Labour Party used to be? That they've been all conned:

Margaret Thatcher: they have done everything possible to hide their militants and to hide their real plans during this election/ **external attack-acknowledges the question**/ (Bull 1993: 659)

This suggests that *evasion* is not a phenomenon with clear demarcation lines but rather a continuum between an *intermediate reply* and a *non-reply*. Our view is also supported by P. Bull's later (1994) rearrangement of one of the 'non-reply' strategies (1993) into an *intermediate* answer without his explicit reference of doing so, that of an *incomplete reply* which, in our view, could have been similarly divided into the segments of *acknowledges the question* or *-attacks the question-based on a false premise* (2.4.6.).

Therefore, in case of our research of political interviews, we will limit the distinction of a three-member scale or replies into two of them, *direct/indirect* reply and an *intermediate* reply when the *acknowledging the question*, *attacking* it or *declining* to provide the reply can be distinguished (3.1.2.).

¹⁸ However, the defining criteria are difficult to handle also for other authors dealing with the topic of evasion (Rasiah 2010).

2.4.6. Presentation of the hypothesis

A detailed observation of Bull's typology of 'non-replies' makes us notice another deficiency of his classification, that is (b) the complete absence of clear linguistic or other critical discourse criteria for identifying the respective types of strategies. Furthermore, the strategies are exemplified only by one and a very short interview exchange which is not, without a clear provision of their definition, sufficient enough to distinguish them from others.

Therefore it would be our task in this paper to detect these criteria in the interactive context of political interviews and add or improve the definition which was not clearly provided by P. Bull. This would, however, in some cases as the following two examples (50-51) involve a greater degree of creativity on our part.

(50) Incomplete reply

(a) Partial answer (answers part of a single-barrelled question).

David Dimbleby: is it still your position that nobody earning under 500 pounds a week is going to be damaged in any way financially by the return of a Labour government in terms of tax?

Neil Kinnock: they won't be worse off in income tax that's for certain

David Dimbleby: well that's not the full answer because income tax is only one part of the tax people pay

(Bull 1993: 660)

Hypothesis (Def.) – partial answer- restricted reply allowed by lexical semantics of a collocation (*tax*) presenting a possible FTA in the questions

(51) Half answer

(b) Half answer (answers one half of a double-barrelled question).

David Frost: but do you regret the leaking of that letter was that a black mark against the government?

Margaret Thatcher: well I indeed I indeed I indeed said that I regretted the the leaking of that letter I said so at the time

(ibid: 660)

Hypothesis (Def.)- half answer- restricted answer allowed by syntax of the question (S-V-O and S-Vcop-Cs. S of the second question is also O of the previous question-*letter*)

We have also noticed that due to the absence of clear-cut definitions, some strategies (52-53) could be redundant and overlapping (multifunctional), which was not considered in the study of Bull and Mayer.

(52) Self-justification

(g) Self-justification.

Robin Day: does it surprise you or upset you when you see yourself or hear yourself described as a hard woman uncaring and out of touch with the the feelings of ordinary folk?

Margaret Thatcher: . . . I certainly hope they would not level it at me personally because as you know both Dennis and I spend a great deal of time working for our own favourite causes my my own the National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children

(ibid: 659)

(53). Talking up one's side

(h) Talks up one's own side.

David Dimbleby: do you think it does you political damage do you think that's why the Tories are not making the advances that you must have hoped when you came into office eight years ago they would be making?

Margaret Thatcher: no but I think we have made the advances there is I think we have actually transformed Britain

(ibid: 660)

Both strategies seem to be the same in boosting the positive image of a politician but *self-justification* possibly includes the verbs calling for sympathy like *hope*.

We therefore hypothesise that only some strategies are likely to correspond with specific linguistic means, e.g. *external attack* where we assume the overt expression of agency and lexemes with negative connotations.

These are presented in the following chart.

13.0. Chart of linguistic correlates (hypothesis) with examples taken from P. Bull's typology (1993)

Strategy	Example	Hypothesis of definition
1	<i>IR:But ..why did you say that?</i> <i>IE: ...and then don't forget I have also another submission to make</i>	
2	<i>please</i>	Asking for CR? Hedges, modals '
3a	<i>the 15 p?</i>	IE:Q, repetition of the same lexemes from the Q
3b	<i>Well you tell me...</i>	Subject of VD is the IR, dispreferred marker (<i>well</i>)
4a	<i>the fact that (T2) is the predominant issue</i>	Focusing premodifier 'important', S-Vcop-Cs
4b	<i>I don't think it should be regarded as a serious proposition</i>	Negation plus lexemes with the meaning <i>hypothetical</i>
4c	<i>The starting place he chose isn't the right one</i>	Negation of Q's presupp.; lexemes with neg. connot.
4d	<i>But they don't have to rely on basic</i>	Negation of Q's presupp

	<i>state pension</i>	
4e	<i>yes I haven't said that by the way</i>	Negation of IE's agency plus verbum dicendi (VD)
4f	<i>you've got it out of context</i>	Colloc. 'out of context'
4g	<i>no you're going to tr and you're going, yes, and that's exactly a typical question</i>	
4h	<i>You have posed a false alternative</i>	Lexemes with the meaning 'false alternative'
5	<i>I'm not going any further than that Mr Dimbleby</i>	IR is personally addressed by sg 'you' or a name, negation of the action
6a	<i>I wish I could promise, I can't</i>	Negated modal verbs (decreased intrinsic modality) -opts out of the Gricean maxim
6b	<i>I'm not going to prophesy</i>	Negated verbs
7a	<i>they have done everything possible to hide their militants</i>	Agency of verbs expressed, universal quantifiers, presupp
7b	<i>It is a Labour govern. that is committed to combating inflation</i>	Covert evasion- pronoun switching, depersonalisation (party)
7c	<i>Cruise weapons have never enjoyed the majority support of the British people</i>	Inanimate subjects, metarepresentation
7d	<i>I think that British people have come to know me well enough to know that there is nobody on what you describe as hard left</i>	Cognitive verbs implying <i>knowledge</i> , universal quantifiers, metarepresentation, /persuasiveness/
7e	<i>I'm talking about Britain's history</i>	Nation as S, O, lexemes with pos.connot.
7f	<i>Most of our inflation is imported</i>	Technic. voc., passive voice
7g	<i>I hope they would not level at me personally because..</i>	Verbs with emotive <i>coercion</i> , IE as a S, pronoun switches
7h	<i>I think we have actually transformed Britian</i>	Agent- IE, lexemes with pos.connot.
8a	<i>They won't be worse off in income tax</i>	The meaning of the word in Q is, meronymically restricted and in the reply hyperonymically making vague
8b	<i>I said that I regretted the leaking of that letter</i>	Some parts of the Q will be avoided due to advantageous syntactic pattern of the question, e.g. V-S-O-Cs
8c	<i>Because the health service is run...Look Mr Frost...</i>	First part of the reply (non-reply) provide the missing variable for the grid in the Q, e.g. subordinate clause of reason, the second contains contact maintainers (shift to different topic)
8d	<i>What I'm setting aside is the idea either the guding lights of S.Lloyd or the legislated income policies</i>	Maintaining the topic via the same lexical words from the Q ('income') in the reply, pronoun switch, inanimate or other-party agents, negative restriction e.g.

		'setting aside the idea' instead of positive specification (we will do)
9		
10	<i>I think I made that pretty clear</i>	Past tense, VD, anaphora
11	<i>Well, I'm sorry if it does</i>	Cs-sorry, the IE is the agent


However, as can be seen from the chart other strategies like *ignores the question* [1], *question objectionable* [4g], or *repeats the same* [9] seem to be more difficult to find correlates to since they were possibly applied with respect to the context of a previous question.

Thus, it will be our task also to determine what the function of the strategies in the reply of politicians is with respect to macro-principles of *coercion*, *legitimation*, *delegitimation* and *evasion* and whether they could be somehow related to Brown and Levinson's politeness schemata of *positive* and *negative* face. However, in doing so, we would have to focus not only on linguistic correlates of the strategies in the reply itself but also critically examine the question in order to discover what is *present* and *absent* in the reply (Fairclough 1978:37). In addition we would also have to set the restrictions of critical discourse analysis, as not all of the features can be coded in this paper with respect to its length and primary aims.

As it was claimed by Jucker (1986) that the main goal of politicians is to enhance their *positive* image and by P. Bull and Elliott (1996) that the basic cause of *evasion* for politicians is the context of the question which is face threatening, we assume that both *positive* face and *negative* face strategies will be applied in interviews. We also assume that politicians will boost their positive face and *coerce* the public after the *attack on the question* which we expect to occur in every response of the politician.

We suggest the following schema valid for the political interview:

Picture 14.0.



3.0. The analysis

The typology of evasive strategies proposed by P. Bull and K. Mayer (1993) for the British political discourse of 1987 will be applied to more current data of five interviews with American politicians from the years 2004-2008. The original typology can be found in the appendix in its non-abbreviated form (cf. 7.1.); our hypothesis about its linguistic correlates was presented at the end of theoretical part of the paper (cf 2.4.6.) and our modification of the typology is described in the methodology (cf 3.1.2.).

Our aims in this chapter are the following:

- (a) to tackle methodological problems with distinguishing ‘replies’ from ‘intermediate’ replies and ‘non-replies’ outlined in 2.4.5.
- (b) to discover whether the typology of ‘non-replying’ to questions in political interviews as presented by Bull in Britain is functional also in other, that is, non-British contexts; discuss stylistic and contextual differences of *evasive* strategies in interviews; detect the possible overlaps in applied strategies (cf 3.2.1-4.)
- (c) to discover whether the strategies are related to any linguistic forms which would enable us to define them more clearly (cf 3.2.5.)
- (d) to verify Jucker’s and Chilton’s notion that action in political discourse relates to Brown and Levinson politeness schemata of *coercion* and *evasion* (cf 3.2.7.)
- (e) to illustrate the possible directions for future research (cf. 3.2.8.)

The empirical part of the paper is thus divided into three basic sections dealing with (1) presentation of frequency ratios for P. Bull’s strategies as identified in the American context with discussion of factors accounting for differences in distribution of strategies corresponding to the point (a) and (b) above, (2) presentation of those linguistic correlates which proved to be different from our original hypothesis corresponding to the point (c), and (3) pragmatic function of the ‘non-reply’ corresponding to point (d). Each of the respective stages of our research will be also introduced by a short description of our method which was devised for quantitative as well as a qualitative outcome.

3.1.1. Data

Our research is based on five interviews with American politicians available on the internet channel <youtube.com> from the years 2004-2007-2008 (cf.7.7.). They were transcribed without marking the phonetic placement of primary stress in words or changes in pitch of interviewees in their respective replies which is a common requirement in a detailed conversation analysis (cf. Dubois 1991). However, the hesitation markers (*hms*), pauses and self-repairs were paid attention to since these are relevant for distinction of overlaps and interruptions, which might be used as a ‘non-reply’ strategy of its own (cf. [12] 7.5).

The content and the year of production of interviews seems to be related because although the interviews cover various topics, four of them touch also the topic of war in Iraq with three interviewees, Pres. George Bush before and after his re-election in 2005 (I, II¹⁹), Sen. Obama (III) and Gov. Palin (V) before new presidential election in 2009. In addition, the first two interviews with President G. Bush were managed by foreign country TV presenters from Ireland (2004) and Australia (2007) while the remaining three interviews were led by local, that is, U.S. interviewers, Katie Couric from CBS’ *Evening news* and Charlie Gibson from *ABC News* both broadcast in 2008. This fact suggests that in deciding which interview to transcribe the author might have been led by the preference filter provided by the *youtube* channel located next to each video recording.

As context is important for anchoring any *speech event* (Hymes in Schiffrin 1994: 100), the following chart presents the main contextual properties of transcribed interviews which will be discussed in relation to stylistic differences in frequency of ‘non-replies’ in the section (3.2.2.).

1.1. Chart. *Contextual properties of five interviews*

Number of interview	I	II	III	IV	V
Number of turns	14	14	20	12	29
Number of words	2073	1669	3516	819	2137
Number of segments	81	54	88	25	61
Number of strategies*	103	74	123	42	86
IR : IE	C. Coleman : Pres. George Bush	D. Speers: Pres. George Bush	K. Couric: Sen. Barack Obama	Ch. Gibson: Sen. Barack Obama	Ch. Gibson: Gov. Sarah Palin
TV	RTE	Sky news	CBS Evening	ABC World	ABC World

¹⁹ The exact *youtube* addresses of the five interviews (I-V) can be found in *Sources* in Bibliography 6.0.

			News	News	News
Date of production	June 2004	September 2007	July, 22, 2008	July, 23,2008	September 11, 2008
Setting	Washington D.C, the White House	Washington D.C, the White House	Jordan, Amman	Israel	Alaska, U.S
Duration	10 min:41 sec	Part 1: 4 min: 37sec Part 2: 4 min: 34 sec	22 min: 54 sec	5 min: 67 sec	Part 1: 9 min: 21 sec Part 2: 2 min: 06 sec

• The number of strategies includes also the overlapping strategies.

3.1.2. Method

After transcribing the interviews, each of the interviewee turns was divided into a number of segments representing the strategies based on P. Bull's typology (1993) with a minor modification presented further in the chapter. The final number of strategies employed by politicians in the sample reached the number of 428 including the strategies which were overlapping. The total number of segments was 309 including 101 segments where these multifunctional strategies occurred and 208 simple segments.

The turns of the interviewers were not included in this number because Bull's typology was devised for the turns of interviewees in relation to asked questions. However, we observed that in some cases, e.g. when the politician *attacked the interviewer* [5] or his *question* [4], interviewers tended to *self-justify* [7g].

Ex (1) IE: Katie, you have asked me three different times...[5]
 IR: But yet you're saying ... given what you know now, you still wouldn't support it....so I'm just trying to understand this.[7g] (III)

Although it may seem that the boundaries of a *segment* could be easily determined at the end of every clause, in the real texts they must be defined more broadly to contain phrasal realizations of utterances (2), or fragments.

(2) IE: And I do believe the world is becoming a better place [4c]. Absolutely.[4d]
 (I)

The final number of segments (309) was revised four times and our results varied in four revisions only by approximately 3.3% due to unclear demarcation lines between some strategies which not only turned out to be repeated within the same reply but also to be overlapping with another one, two or in one case also with three other strategies (3.2.4., 7.4.1.). Thus, the segments where more strategies occurred (32.6%) were not coded as one

definite type of strategy (simple segment) but as more strategies. The following extract of the turn of the interviewee (3) consisted, for instance, of four strategies and two segments.

- (3) IE: ...We will not put any pressure on Iraqis to stand up and take this burden on alone **[reassurance/presents policy/ negative answer]**. What I'm gonna do is to set a vision of where we need to go and a specific time frame within which we're gonna pull back our armed forces **[presents policy]**. (III)

The assigning of segments to particular types of strategies had to be made with respect to the previous question. According to its syntactic subtype (*Wh*, *polar*, *disjunctive* or *declarative*) the IE's response was coded as a *direct/indirect* reply or an *intermediate* answer. For the reasons clarified in 2.4.5., we thus narrowed the three-member scale of *replies-intermediate answers-non-replies* into two.

A *direct* answer occurred when the particle *yes* or *no* in case of *polar* questions was used, or in case of *Wh* question (4) an answer provided explicitly the variable for the missing information.

- (4) IR: You're heading to Israel after Jordan and according to some polls in Jerusalem, Israeli Jews favour more John MacCain for president forty-three to three with one third undecided. Why do you think it is the case?

IE: Well, Katie, I'm not that well known as John MacCain...[7g] (III)

An answer which provided the information asked for, that means, fulfilled the *action* of the question (cf. 2.4.1.) and contained *subtle* evasion (2.4.2) without changing the topic of the question much to *reframe* it or consider it as an *incomplete* reply, was coded as *indirect*.

- (5) IR: Having talks with Irani people...somehow that signals to them **you are not going to be tough enough with Iran**. What's your response to that?

IE: Well, I'm encouraged to see that Bush administration, for example, has set an outstanding diplomatic model to participate with discussions in Iran **[external support]**. This is what I was talking about for a year and a half **[implies Q already dealt with]**. **Engaging in tough diplomacy is not a sign of weakness**. It's a sign of strength **[denies/replies]** (III)

On the other hand, an *intermediate* reply (6), in our understanding, presented a *medium-level* evasion (2.4.2.) when some parts of the question were avoided or replaced, which was sufficient enough to consider it an *incomplete* answer or when some parts of the question were *acknowledged* or *attacked*.

(6) IR: The polls indicate that considerably larger percentage of people in the United States think John MacCain would make a better Commander in chief than you. So is this trip designed to narrow that gap?

IE: The main purpose of the trip from my perspective is looking at some of the most critical issues that the next President is going to deal with...[incomplete/half answer]. (IV)

However, as can be seen from the examples (4-5), even the *replies* can be segmented along P. Bull's categories, so that *denying the question* [4c] as a reply would be preceded and followed by other strategies. These were taken into account in our quantitative analysis as well as in the description of linguistic correlates.

Furthermore, the observation of actual responses made us add several more strategies to those proposed by P. Bull and to modify the definition of the already existing ones. While some strategies were only redefined, e.g. *half* and *partial* reply (2.4.6.) or *presenting policy* to include also presenting itinerary of a politician in his visit of a foreign country, others, e.g., *question not legitimate*, were established to reflect more specifically the response of the politician. In this way, P. Bull's strategy of *acknowledging the question* was divided into two strategies, one bearing the same name but covering also *replies* (7) and another *asking for conversational rights* which resembled more the original strategy in its polite request (*please*).

(7) IR: And they are angry over Iraq and particularly the continuing death toll there

IE: Well, I can understand that. People don't like war [acknowledges the Q] but what they should be angry about is that there is a brutal dictator there [important not tackled] (I)


Therefore, every *reply/intermediate* reply was at first segmented into parts where question was *attacked* [4] and where it was *acknowledged* [2]. The modification and extension of Bull's typology is depicted in the following charts (2.1.-2.2-2.3.) which include twelve strategies with a different definition. The examples will be provided in the next sections. Other strategies have remained the same and are listed in (2.4.6.) or (7.00.).

2.0. Chart . Modification of P. Bull's original typology.

2.1. Redefinition

No 7: Making a political point 7b: Presents policy→presents itinerary	No 10: Implies Q already dealt with→issue dealt with	No 4c: The question is based on a false premise→any explicit or implicit disagreement with the question
No 4f: Attacking the Question Q includes quotation out of context→ question misinterpreted	No 8: Incomplete reply- half→avoidance of reply due to syntactic pattern of the Q partial→semantic reframing of the lexeme in the question	

2.2. Redefinition plus extension



2.3. Extension

	No 4 i: Q not legitimate	No 4j: Q not appropriate
No 6: Declines 6c: lack of knowledge	No 7i: External support→ other nation, other institution, person, army	No 8: Incomplete 8e: Positive answer→followed by question with a tag

3.2. Presentation of results


3.2.1. Frequency of 'non-replies' in American interviews

Out of the total number of strategies (428/100%), the ratio of occurrence for each strategy was calculated with respect to the occurrence of strategies both in *simple* segments which were instances of one specific strategy and in *overlaps* which amounted to 32.6% in the sample (7.4.1.). At this stage the reasons for differences in distribution of every strategy in the respective interviews were not specifically dealt with. In the next step the most and the least frequent strategies were arranged in the chart according to the decreasing frequency of occurrence.

However, after redefining and modifying P. Bull's original typology of thirty strategies (3.1.2.), only twenty-nine strategies were identified. The strategy of *declines to answer* and *incomplete* reply were for the low distribution of their subtypes considered at this stage of research as two groups of strategies instead of eight strategies.

The following schema presents the distribution of individual strategies in the sample

3.0. Schema



The axis *y* displays the *percentage* and the axis *x* depicts the number of *strategies* (1-29)

The most frequently employed strategy was *self-justification* with 12.5% of occurrence in *making a political point* (53.34%), which was frequently employed by G. Bush with Irish interviewer.

(7) IR: Unfortunately the majority of our people do not welcome your visit because they're angry over Iraq, they're angry over Abu Ghraib. Are you bothered about what Irish people think?

IE: Listen, I hope that Irish people understand the great values of our country..[7g] (I)

The second most prevalent strategy was a strategy *acknowledging the question*, which in our redefinition covered also replies.

(9) IR: The national security is a whole lot more than energy.

IE: It is [2] but I want you not to lose sight of the fact that energy is a foundation of national security. It's that important. It's that significant. [4a] (V)

The same frequency was observed also for the strategy *external support*, which we devised to mark the positive diplomatic relationship with other nations or allies but which also served to mark the support of institutions and branches of the state like the army or of personalities who were referred to in decreasing one's own personal commitment for the proposed argument and boosting its *credibility* (2.2.4.).

(10) IR: Mr President, just finally. A lot of Sydney siders are complaining about the impact of the APEC and particularly of your stay in city. The data say that it will affect the city for a week while you are there. Do you have any message for them?

IE: ..My intent is to represent my country in an important meeting, in a country that I admire a lot, country with whom we've got great relations and it's important that we continue to have great relations [7i] (II)

Out of the attacks on the question, the strategy *based on a false premise* (6.16%) and *important question not tackled* (5.68%) were the most frequently employed ones. However, unlike in the original definition of [4c] where certain 'precondition' of the question was challenged without factually correcting it, in our modification (3.1.), any *direct* or *indirect* disapproval with the question's premise was marked as a denial of the question.

(11) IR: Are you satisfied that you are getting enough help from European countries? You are more friendly now but they are not really setting up to the place with help, aren't they...

IE: I think, first of all, most of our decisions are supported in Iraq [4c] I know what you're talking about is France, isn't it? [2] They did vote for U.N. security council resolution that said 'disclose, disarm or face serious consequences' [4d]... but most European countries are very supportive and are participating in reconstruction of Iraq [7d/4d]. (I)

The least frequent strategies were linked with *talking up one's own side*, *repetition of the reply* (1.9%), *questioning the question* (1.17%) and *attacks on the IR* (0.9%) as well on some types of the question.

We had hypothesised that *talking up one's side* is similar to *self-justification* and assumed that it would be redundant but it proved out to be functional (12) though not so prominent (2.6%).

(12) IR: What area do you feel least comfortable with?

IE: ...I know quite a bit about health care...[2] but when it comes to foreign policy I feel confidence in my ability to apply good judgement on a broad set of problems that are out there [7h] (III)

The *repetition* of the reply from the previous turn was distributed with lower frequency (1.89%) to that of *talking up one's side* and was possibly connected to the interviewer's repetition of the questions with the same focus, that of future policy of the United States concerning cooperation with other nations like Israel or the Great Britain.

However, unlike the strategy *question hypothetical* (4.5%), other attacks on the question, e.g. *question factually inaccurate* (1.65%) or *question poses a false alternative* (13) were less prominent (0.47%).

(13) IR: If General in Chief says to you: 'Hey, President Obama, if that comes to pass, you cannot take out the final complement of comeback troops. We need them in theater. You would say...

IE: ...I'm not interested in a false choice between either perfect inflexibility, either next six months or next two years I ignore everything that's happening in Iraq or alternatively I'll just have an open ended indefinite occupation in Iraq [4h] (III)

This type of strategy [4h] seems to be again interrelated with the *context* of the previous question as it is the question which implies an *alternative* that is refuted by the interviewee although this alternative is not explicitly stated by the interviewer, so that the strategy opens up the possibility of *reformulating* the question which would correspond to Clayman's *covert evasion* on the *question* (2.4.2.). The strategy also seems to be *coercive* for the public because it presents the alternative in its extreme poles via paradoxical collocations with ironic meaning which consist of a qualifying premodifier from an opposing semantic field (*perfect-*

inflexibility) and the negative prefix *-in-* (*indefinite*) suggesting that the default form for antonyms (*flexibility*, *definite* occupation) have preferred and positive meaning contributing to *rightness* of the politician (2.2.1.)

Therefore it would seem useful not only to discover what linguistic patterns in respective strategies enhance *coercion*, *legitimation* or *evasion* of politician (3.2.6.) but also to discuss also some differences in distribution of respective strategies in observed interviews and find out what is the role of the context in them.

3.2.2. Discussion of contextual and stylistic differences in *evasive* strategies of American politicians

An interesting insight into the employment of strategies by politicians in our sample was provided by calculation of segments of ‘non-replies’ in each of the five interviews. Not only it was discovered that distribution of some strategies varied in some interviews, but we could also observe that some of them were used exclusively by the Republicans or by the Democrats. In this chapter, the contextual properties of the five interviews, e.g. the *timing*, the *setting* and the *nationality* of the interviewer (European versus American), which are all summed up in the chart 1.0 of our data (3.1.1.), will be related to our interpretation of differences in frequency of five employed strategies. We will also comment on the consequences of *hostile* interviewing style on the higher frequency of *intermediate* answers of politicians and their tendency to *decline* to answer *conducive* type of questions (3.2.2.1.). The connection between the *syntactic* aspect of such questions and *evasion* will be discussed, too.

As was already suggested in the previous section, the strategy which we had originally hypothesised to be redundant in political interaction, *talking up one’s own side* was found to be used by politicians in four interviews. The highest proportion of its occurrence (3.25-5.81%)²⁰ was employed by Senator Obama and Governor Palin (14) in interviews with Katie Couric and Charlie Gibson, which could be explained by their position as candidates for future presidency of U.S. (2009) trying to boost their positive image before election.

- (14) IR: Governor, let me start by asking you a question that I asked Sen. John MacCain about you...Can you look the country in the eye and say ‘I have the

²⁰ Percentages in the parentheses refer to the proportion of individual strategies from the total number of strategies calculated in the particular interviews.

experience and I have the ability to be not just the Vice-President of the U.S. but also the president of the United states of America?

IE: I do, Charlie [2]. ..**We'll be ready. I'm ready** [7h]

IR: And you didn't say to yourself: 'Am I experienced enough? Am I ready?'

IE: I did not hesitate, no [4c]

IR: Does not it take some purpose?


IE: I answered him 'yes' because **I have the confidence and the readiness** and knowing that you cannot blink [7g/7h] (IV)

However, it was not employed by Sen. Obama in the fourth interview in Israel lasting only 5 min: 67 sec in contrast to the third and fifth interview that lasted at least 10 minutes. This suggests that the *duration* of the interview is probably a factor determining some types of evasion, too.

The following diagram (4.0.) displays the differences in frequency of five strategies representing the subtypes of *making a political* point which include also *talking up one's own side* [7h]. The strategies were chosen to be discussed after the chart of distribution of all the strategies in five interviews was made and the most frequent strategies were marked in yellow colour in each interview in the appendix (cf. 7.4.1.). Those strategies which showed to be most frequent at least in one interview but not in another one (or two, three, four) were thus compared and represented in the following diagram. Thus, e.g. *appeals to nationalism* (green colour) has the highest percentage in the Interview V (axis x) and the lowest in the Interview II. The potential causes accounting for these differences in these five strategies will be commented on further in the section.

4.0. Diagram

Distribution of [7h], [7a], [7b], [7d], [7e] in five interviews



The axis *y* describes *the percentage* of occurrence, the axis *x* represents the five (1-5) interviews.

As can be seen from the diagram above, the *talking up one's own side* was not employed either by Pres. Bush in the interview II with Australian presenter before the international summit of APEC in Sydney. The interview revolved around the topic of Iraq and U.S.-Australian partnership in the war there, which along with the decreased number of *conducive* questions presented in the chart (5.0.) further in the chapter seem to suggest that the strategy of *talking up one's side* was not as necessary as in the other interviews.

This observation is also supported by the decreased frequency of political justification by *external attack* of S. Hussein and the terrorists (2.7%) in the interview, which confirms that the common ground with the ally was already established before the interview when Australia joined the war in Iraq.

The lower frequency of *external attack* occurred only in discourse of Sen. Obama in Interview III because the war against terrorism was not approved of by him (0.81%).

In contrast to him, it was most frequently employed by the Republicans, by Pres. Bush in Interview I with Irish reporter Carole Coleman and by Sen. Sarah Palin in the Interview V. Its

distribution of frequency is similar because in both interviews interviewers pose the similar number of questions about Iraq (11) and Pres. Bush replies by *external attack* to 27.2% of them while Gov. Palin to 36.3% of them.

We could hypothesise that the strategy *appeals to nationalism* (diagram 4.0) occurring in relation to the topic of war in Iraq could be more prevalent with the foreign interviewers but it was used by Palin in the local interview with Gibson to *coerce* the American public (11.6%). However, unlike in the Interview II where this strategy was made almost redundant because of the U.S-Australian alliance in Iraq (2.7%), it was employed by Pres. Bush in Interview I (14) presumably because the common ground between the two nations was not established.

(14) IR: Unfortunately the majority of our public do not welcome your visit because they're angry over Iraq, they're angry over Abu Ghraib. Are you bothered about what Irish people think?

IE: Listen I hope that Irish people understand the great values of our country [7g]. **We don't represent that. We are compassionate. We are strong country**[7e] (I)

The first interview was also the one where the strategy *reassurance* reached the highest point (10.6%) with less frequent distribution in the remaining interviews conducted by local interviewers (5-5.8%).

Although we are aware of the fact that *reassurance* is not the only strategy used by politicians to *persuade* the public about the presented arguments (see also *talking up one's side* in 7.5.), the results in our sample might reflect the broader tendency in studying the phenomenon of *evasion*, namely the different degree of *involvement* of politicians in interaction in the context of foreign interviews and the local ones.

It seems that in replying to questions posed by foreign interviewers who represent the countries sharing the same policy which is by the respective interviewers approved of or disapproved of, the U.S politicians might be more prone to establish the common ground with them than in the domestic arena. Despite the uneven distribution of interviews with foreign versus domestic interviews in our sample (2:3), the occurrence of a lesser number of *reassurance* with the candidates for U.S presidency seems to confirm the finding of Clayman, Heritage (2.4.3.), that due to the existence of another genre of political interaction in U.S., that of 'presidential campaigns', domestic political interviews do not reach such an adversality (Clayman, Heritage 2002: 47).

However, our original expectation of a higher occurrence of *reassurance* in political discourse of presidential candidates in America based on the common practise of politicians to give *glib promises* (2.2.4.) before elections was counterbalanced by their more frequent employment of *presenting policy*, which is related to their more urgent need to clarify the political programmes to the electorate.

Drawing on our finding about the higher involvement of politicians in interviews with foreign interviewers based on the frequency of *reassurance* (diagram 4.0) and on Clayman's statement about non-adversarialness of domestic interviews, it is important to comment on the differences in interviewing style of interviewers, too.

3.2.2.1. The impact of interviewing style on the production of evasive strategies

The most adversarial of all interviews appeared to be the Interview I with Pres. Bush, which was also banned from broadcasting on American television after it was conducted by the Irish interviewer in September 2004, because the White House press reported that she transgressed the conventions of politeness.²¹

Our data presented in the following chart (5.0.) show that this might have been caused by the higher number of *conducive* questions (64%) asked by the Irish interviewer and they mostly consisted of *negative* questions and stylistically *marked* language.

5.0. Chart.

	I	II	III	IV	V
Number of interview					
Number of questions	14 (100%)	14 (100%)	20 (100%)	12 (100%)	29 (100%)
Overlaps/interruptions	3/4(IR)	1/2 (1-IE)	3 (1-IE)	1(IR)	0
Conducive Q	9 (64.4%)	4 (28.8%)	8 (40%)	5 (41.6%)	4 (13.8%)
Replies; Direct/Indirect	1 1/0 (7.1%)	3 2/1 (21.4%)	6 4:1 (30%)	1 0/1 (8.3%)	11 9/2 (37.9%)
Declines	1 (7.1%)	3 (21.4%)	5 (25%)	4 (33.3%)	2 (6.9%)

²¹ "Interview with George Bush that was banned from American television", *Infowars Ireland*, 12 March 2009, accessed 10 January 2012. <<http://info-wars.org/2009/03/12/interview-with-george-bush-that-was-banned-from-american-television/>>

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The extended chart can be found in the appendix (7.00). The abbreviation (IR or IE) in the overlaps/interruptions marks whether the IR or IE are agents of the interference. The *interruptions* and *overlaps* were resolved after careful listening to the video recordings, so that when the interviewer interfered in the unfinished turn of the interviewee before his completion of a clause (the *decreased transition space*), the interference was resolved as *interruption*. However, the pause of an interviewee after the first sentence of his turn was not considered as an appropriate space for an overlapping turn and was marked as interruption from the interviewer as well. Other pauses of interviewees located further in their turns were considered as markers of finished clause and thus the interference of the interviewer was coded as an *overlap*. The fields in green colour suggest the relationship between the number of *conducive* questions and *replies*, or *declination* to provide the answer.

The following is an example of such a *conducive* question with negative syntax in Interview I.

- (15) IR: Indeed, Mr President. I think that Irish people understand that but I think there is a feeling that the world has become a more dangerous place because you have taken the focus of Al-kaeida and diverted it to Iraq. Do you **not** see that the world is a more dangerous place? I **saw** four of your soldiers lying **dead** on the television the other day....the picture of **four** soldiers just lying there **without their legs**. (I)

The occurrence of questions which despite the interviewer's attempt to provide neutral footing to the presented argument (reference to *Irish people*) verges on objectivity and leads to the diminishing number of *replies* or the increased number of *declination* to answer them. This observation is again confirmed by our data because the *replies* reached the lowest number in the Interview I (7.1%), which is accompanied also by the occurrence of some other strategies that are most possibly typical of *hostile* questioning. These strategies are *asking for conversational rights* (4.85%), *ignores the question and reflects the question back* which most frequently occurred in Interview I

The following (16) is an example of interviewing *style* of Mrs Coleman who interrupted Pres. Bush frequently before he completed his turn (50%) . Her interrupting turns are considered as beginning of new turns when they are responded to by the interviewee.

- (16) IE: ...he was a brutal dictator who posed a threat...such a threat that the UN voted unanimously to say: 'Mr Saddam Hussein..
(inter)-
IR: Indeed, Mr President but you did not find the weapons of mass destruction
IE: **Let me, let...**
IR: (overlap) unhearable
IE: May I finish? (I)

Although *asking for conversational rights* occurred also in Interview III, the local interviewer interrupted Sen. Obama in decreased transition space to show her agreement and knowledge

of the information provided by the politician. The strategies *ignores the question* and *reflects the question back* (17) were identified only in Interview I.

(17) IR: There are terrorist bombings every single day. It's now a daily event. It wasn't like that about two years ago...

IE: **What was it like September 11 2001?** It was relative calm??[3b] (I)

Furthermore, in the local interviews more *replies* (18) to posed questions are provided (21-37.9%).

(18) IR: Senator Obama, first of all. You have not been in Iraq since 2006. What did you learn on your recent visit that surprised you? **What was new?**

IE: Well, there is no doubt that **the security situation has improved.** [7f] (III)

This again confirms Clayman's finding about American less hostile interviewing style.

As can be seen from the frequency rate of *replies* in the chart 5.0 and the example above, the questions posed by a foreign ally interviewer (II) and American interviewers seem to be not so problematic for the face of the politician.

However, in case of the Interview IV with Charlie Gibson held in Israel, the matter is more complicated since the number of produced *replies* is only slightly higher than in Interview I with the Irish reporter and the number of *declination* to answer is in this interview the highest of all (33.3%).

There may be several reasons for this occurrence. Firstly, as the Interview IV was produced only a day after the interview with CBS reporter Katie Couric in Jordan, Amman (III) and the number of *conducive* questions in both interviews was nearly the same (40- 41%), the *setting* of the Interview IV in Israel (3.1.1.) might have been a factor physically threatening Sen. Obama's production of certain replies. These might have been influenced also by the more risky *topic* of the discussion or the higher number of occurrence of questions dealing with such topics. A closer examination of the questions which were *declined* by Sen. Obama to answer in the two interviews (III, IV) proved that while 100 % of questions rejected by B. Obama in the Interview IV concerned the international relations (19-20), only 40% of questions posed by Katie Couric concerning international politics were not answered. The *syntactic* type of the question was not decisive in this respect since both *Yes/No* questions and *Wh* questions were similarly *declined* to reply to.

(19) IR : Would you move the U.S embassy, if you were a president, would you move the U.S embassy to Jerusalem ?

IE: Charlie, as you know, I think that we're gonna work through this process before we make these kinds of decisions [6/4b] (IV)

(20)

IR: In the two states what do you envision as the capital then of Palestine?

IE: You know, Charlie, I will let the party to sort that out [6] and I don't think that it's United States job to make that decision [4i] (IV)

However, in contrast to Ch. Gibson's questions which were all threatening for future cooperation with other nations (Israel, Palestine) in the Interview IV, K. Couric's questions (21-22) open more possibilities for a non-problematic (NNT) reply (2.4.4.), because they often consist of the modal *may* and do not always refer to future policy of politicians by conditional mood or hypothetical, *irrealis* statements.

(21) IR : If they reject negotiations, how likely do you think the pre-emptive military strike by Israel against Iran **may be**?

IE: I will not hypothesise on that. Israel has the right to defend itself but I will not speculate on the difficult judgments they would have to make in the whole host of possible scenarios.[6/4b] (III)

(22) IR: This is not a speculative question then. **Was it appropriate**, in your view, for Israel to take out that suspected Syrian nuclear site last year?

IE: Yes. I think that there was sufficient evidence that they were developing a site using a nuclear or using ... a blueprint that was similar to the North Korean model... (III)

The threatening style of Ch. Gibson's interviewing may be caused also by the sequence of a number of short questions in simple turns without a contextual preface (75%) which has the effect of 'investigation' of the interviewee²²

Sen. Obama's response to the occurrence of such questions is observed to be either *declination* to reply, stating that *question is hypothetical* or *illegitimate*.

²² This style is typical also of the interview with Sarah Palin where 68.9% of questions are arranged in this way.

Ex.

IR: Have you ever met a foreign head of state?

IR: What insight into Russian actions particularly in Alaska for the last couple of weeks as for the proximity of the state did give you?

IR: Are you in favour of putting Georgia in and Ukraine into Nato?

Other strategies employed exclusively by him in contrast to the Republicans, Pres. Bush and Gov. Palin who as the only interviewees used *requests for clarification* (0.97% -2.3%), were *question misinterpreted* which in contrast to original Bull's definition did not cover the quotations that were misinterpreted but any issues stated to be misinterpreted (3.1.) and *question not appropriate to be answered* (23) in the context of the interview. The following is an example of such strategy.

(23) IR: Aren't these things that you went through in your mind?

IE: ..They are, but they are not necessarily things that I should say on Charlie Gibson Evening news [4j] (IV)

The strategy of *implying that question was already answered* (24) was most frequent (7.3-7.1%) also in political discourse with Sen. Obama, which in our view, creates the impression of consistency of a politician, especially in questions dealing with threats to his *credibility* (2.2.4.).

(24) IR: So what if Israel decides in the name of its own security that it needs to make strikes on Iran?

IE: It is not my job, certainly, as a candidate for President to tell the Israelis what their defence posture should be [6/ 4b] I've said I would not take away military options out of the table when it comes to dealing with nuclear testing with Iran [10/8d]. Beyond that I think we've got to make sure we're doing everything we can to trying to avoid it [7b/9]. (IV)

A similar technique was employed also by the Labour candidate for British elections in 1987 debate, Neil Kinnock in contrast to Mrs. Thatcher who in P. Bull's psychological observation proved to use exclusively the strategy of *attacking the interviewer* or *talking up her own side* (Bull 1993: 663). Although we are aware of the fact that the results of our research were based on interviews from different contexts (interviewer, setting, year of production, timing) we would like to compare at least some features observed by P. Bull in the interaction with the British politicians with our findings from American context. These will be discussed in the next section along with comparison of the number of *interrogative* type of questions and of *direct/indirect* replies to illustrate some similarities with Clayman's and Bull's findings, which could indicate that the method applied in our research was reliable.

3.2.3. The comparison of American ‘intermediate-replies’ with the British results

In this section the frequency of five strategies employed by Thatcher and Kinnock in 1987 is compared with some of their new subtypes found in American interviews (3.1.2.), which might reflect differences in adversiality of two interviewing *styles* (Clayman 2002), so those strategies which were employed by both politicians in British interviews were considered as potential markers of *hostility* of British interviewing style. These were *ignores the question*, *asking for conversational rights* and *questioning the question* while *external support* was discovered to be used by American politicians instead of British *attack on the opposition* (2.4.3.). However, the differences might also display a more general and dialectic change of political discourse that transforms with time (Fairclough 1992). In this interpretation, our recognition of new types of strategies in American context might suggest the tendency of politicians to adapt to social situation and gradually innovate their strategical behaviour in interaction.

In contrast to our five American interviews, which were led only by three local interviewers, Katie Couric (III) and Charlie Gibson (IV, V), P. Bull’s results were based on the sample of eight interviews with four British presenters, Sir Robin Day (50 min), Jonathan Dimbleby (25 min), David Dimbleby (7min) and David Frost (25min). Each of them asked two politicians, Mrs Thatcher and Mr Kinnock, questions for the same period of time, which was considered as a guarantee of the objectivity of Bull’s research, so that the respective differences in applied strategies of two politicians were explained by uniqueness of their interpersonal style.

Both interviewees were found to provide similar number of replies (38.0-38.9%)²³, both did not reply to 56%-59% of questions and both were discovered to be employing with similar percentage the strategies of *ignores the question* (5.5-5.3%), and *questions the question* (1.8%-1.7%).²⁴ It was also discovered that out of all strategies employed by British politicians, it was *making the political point* which achieved the highest frequency (76-66.6%) followed by *attacking the question* (25.9-36.8%).

²³ Percentages in the parentheses mark the scale of employed strategies in individual interviews..

²⁴ See section 2.4.3.

The ranking for *making the political point* (53.34%) and *attacking the question* (21.28%) was the same in our sample where questions with *interrogative* syntax prevailed, which confirms the findings of Clayman, Heritage about *syntactic* types of employed questions in Great Britain and America (2.4.1.). However, in the interviews with foreign presenters (I, II) their occurrence was lower than 68 % which we do not presume to have any implications for the study of phenomenon of *evasion* since in the Interview IV that we considered as one of the most adversarial ones, the number of *interrogative* questions was much higher than in the first interview (7.4.2.).

In comparison to the British context where only *attacks on the opposition* were present (22.2-14%), in American interviews the strategy *external support* also occurred and it included the support of political opponent. The frequency of *attacks on the opposition* was lower in our sample and it covered only instances of attacks against terrorists and of Iran and Russia in relation to their potential physical threat towards other countries in the international politics (7.7-0.81%).

6.0. Chart. Comparison of strategies employed in American and British context.

	American interviews						British sample	
	I	II	III	IV	V		Thatcher	Kinnock
External support	7.7%	16.17 %	10.05 %	2.3%	6.8%	-	0	0
External attack	7.7%	2.94%	0.81%	2.3%	6.97 %		22.2%	14%
Attacks the Q	22.3 1%	24.63 %	21.11 %	20.94 %	15.0 8%		25.9%	36.8%
Asking for CR/ British 'acknowledges'	4.85 %	-	0.81%	-	-		3.7%	8.8%
Ignores the Q	0.97 %	-	-	-	-		5.5%	5.3%
Questions the Q	1.94 %	-	-	-	1.94 %		1.85%	1.75%

The extended chart can be found in the appendix (7.4.3.). Examples of British sample were taken from Bull 1993: 659.

What is also worth noting is the form of the *attack*. In Bull's example, external attack of Mrs Thatcher (25) seemed explicit (on-record bald) in the expression of agency of negative action performed by the opposition.

(25) IE: **they have done** everything possible to hide their militants and to hide their real plans during this election (Bull 1993: 659)

Although we do not know whether the attacks on opposition in Britain are as bold as the example above from 1987, in American context, the attacks on the enemy were similarly explicit in the speech of Pres. Bush with Carole Coleman because they frequently consisted of qualitative predications and lexemes with negative semantic frame causing fear (2.2.2.). Emphasising subjuncts which are according to Quirk markers of modality with a scope on the whole sentence (Quirk 1990: 179) were also detected in responses of Gov. Palin to questions of Charlie Gibson.

(26) IE: I believe that what President Bush has attempted to do is rid this world of Islamic extremism, terrorists who are **hell bent** on destroying our nation. There have been blunders along the way, though. There have been mistakes made. And with new leadership, and that's the beauty of American elections, of course, and democracy, is with new leadership comes opportunity to do things better. (V)

In contrast to the Republicans, what could be called *off-record* attacks on the enemy, were observed in the speech of Sen. Obama (27) or of Pres. Bush in the Interview II with an ally nation (28), because they consisted of conditional clauses or attacks triggered by presuppositions (2.2.3.).

(27) IE: Hm, **if Iran gets** a nuclear weapon it triggers a potential arms race, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. That is not only life threatening to Israel but it is a profound game changing shift when it comes to our national security. (IV)

(27) IE: Hm, first I wanna thank the Howard Government and the people of Australia for joining **this global struggle** against extremists and radicals who are trying to impose their vision on the world. (II).

The factors which might have influenced the *on/off* recordness of *attack* were the different policy of Democrats towards the war in Iraq but possibly also the year of production of interviews because we could hypothesise that Republicans who launched the war in Iraq will tend to self-justify by more direct *attacks on the enemy* in debates before election. This is

confirmed by our data because the lowest number of attacks by Republicans occurred in an *off-record* form in the Interview II which was also broadcast after the presidential election.

Making of political point reached much lower frequency in comparison to the British results only in cases of the Interview I and the Interview IV (51.1-32.6%), both of which we considered as the most adversarial in our sample. Their adversarialness was discovered to be related to the *setting* (Israel) in case of the Interview IV, to the *conducive* nature of posed questions, their *topic* and also the *interviewing style*, which in case of the Interview I might have been influenced by European interviewing culture that to a certain extent ignores the boundaries of the *genre* even in the interviews with foreign statesmen. It is also reflected in the lowest number of *replies* (7.1-8.3%) and the highest number of *intermediate* replies (92.9-91.7%) in these two interviews that in contrary to British findings where ‘non-replies’ and *intermediate* replies obtained together 63.3-65.5%, reached much higher figures (cf. 7.3.2.).

As far as the strategy *attacking the question* is considered, the lower frequency of this strategy in comparison with the British results (21.28%) cannot be considered as fully revealing in terms of a lesser degree of hostility of questioning because in political responses where more attacks on the question occur, they are just stylistic (cohesive) repetitions of the same argument and therefore cannot fully describe the involvement of politician in the interview. The following is an example of Sen. Obama’s reply where more attacks on the question occur.

(28) IR: But what area do you feel least comfortable with?

IE: Well, you know there are so many issues in which I am not an expert but require you to be an expert [7g/2]. **that the most important job that I’ll have as president is choosing excellent people to help me to shape the policy [4a].** So I’ll give you a clear example. I know quite a bit about health care..but I’m not a doctor, I’m not a biochemist.. [2]. **My job is to be smart enough to really choose people smart enough and not to be intimidated by people who are smarter than me..[4a/7i]...**

It does not have to mean that I’m an expert on everything, it means that I’m gonna be consulting with people who have special knowledge in particular area or region [4a/7i] (III)

In addition, in American context which is considered as less adversarial by Clayman, Heritage (2.4.3.) the strategy *attacks the question* reached in four interviews similar figures to British frequency rate (chart 6.0). In comparison with its British subtypes, in the American context the subtype *question includes misquotation* was not present but when, e.g., Sen. Obama was quoted by Charlie Gibson, he said that *the issue was misinterpreted* and that he already apologised for his ‘poor wording’ (29). However, his apology had an *indirect* form because it

consisted of an *if*-clause and the past tense, which corresponds to Z. Kampfl's observation (2008) of public *non-apologies* in Israeli discourse (2.2.4.).

(29) IR: Senator, it's a very simple declarative statement 'it must remain undivided' and you started the paragraph by stating 'let me be clear'.

IE: Charlie, **if the day** after or the day of speech **I conceded** that the wording was poor and it was immediately corrected? (IV)

Apart from other types of *attacking the question*, new strategies which had not been originally recognised by Bull were discovered to be used by American politicians, e.g., the *question illegitimate* and *not appropriate in the setting*. The employment of these strategies could reflect the broader tendencies of political discourse which is constantly developing in a given historic context, so that more possibilities for *evasive* replies are available to politicians nowadays but it is linked also more physically to the context of the *topic* of the preceding questions (international politics). In the future research it would therefore seem useful to discover whether the absence of the strategies in the British interviews was caused by the absolute omission of this topic by British interviewers in P. Bull's analysis. However, their higher frequency in the interviews with Sen. Obama and Gov. Palin (1.62-4.6-2.3%) in contrast to interviews with Pres. Bush is also related to the fact that these interviewees were American candidates for presidency in 2009 and therefore could *evade* the question more easily by stating that they are not yet in the position of making decisions that the president of country is in charge of.

As most of the strategies presented by P. Bull for Thatcher and Kinnock varied with these two politicians, they cannot be considered as representative of the whole British discourse but in the strategy *ignores the question* and *questioning the question* the percentual distribution is very similar and in *acknowledging the question*, which in our redefinition resembles *asking for conversational rights*, it was employed by both politicians.

The first of the mentioned strategies, *ignores the question*, was not present in either of the interviews with American local interviewers, nor with the Australian one, the *questioning the question* was employed in the Interview I with Coleman where its use verged on irony in *reflects the question back* and in the Interview V with Charlie Gibson where mere *requests for clarification* were present.

The strategy *asking for conversational rights* was present most frequently in the Interview I and its frequency (4.85%) in comparison with British results falls between the frequency of Thatcher and Neil Kinnock (3.7-8.8%). The following (29) is an example of Thatcher's *acknowledging the question* taken from Bull's presentation of British 'non-replies'.

(29) IE: **please, there's just one other thing.** When we get bad weather the Labour party only gave 90 million pounds a year on heating allowances, with us it's up over 400 million... (Bull 1993: 656)

Although the non-adversarial nature of the American interviewing style could be best measured on the sample of interviews led by the American interviewers in the local setting before election, the highest number of *intermediate* answers, of the strategy *asking for CR* and the least number of *direct/indirect* replies in the Interview I together with the absence of the strategy *ignores the Q* in other interviews and the virtual 'non-existence' of the strategy *attack of the political opposition* in USA seems to indicate that American interviews with local interviewers appear less adversarial possibly due to the genre of U.S 'presidential' TV debates. In the future research, it would be, however, useful to confirm this premise also by examining more interviews with British politicians before election to discover whether *ignoring the question, asking for CR* and *questioning the Q* are frequently present in *replies* of other politicians to become the constant stylistic feature of the whole British discourse. It would also be interesting to find out whether these strategies were not prominent only in their discourse before election as a response to tougher interviewing style, which would explain the feature of adversarialness in any type of pre-election political discourse.

Although we have presented the constant principles operating in the political discourse in general in the theoretical part of this paper (*coercion, commitment, credibility*), it would be interesting to examine whether some strategies of 'non-replying' to questions are not somehow interrelated despite the contextual differences of interviews. The possibility of *overlaps* in strategies was not specifically dealt with by P. Bull in his research but as it occurred in our sample, we are going to present it in the next section. If we are able to show that there is an existence of a relationship of dependency between the strategies, it would be possible to conclude that the choice of some communicative strategies is not just the matter of a personal style of a politician but the result of *pragmatic* and *politic* behaviour of politicians.

3.2.4. Overlapping (multiple) strategies

The purpose of this section is to point at certain interdependencies between the strategies used by politicians in their responses to questions, so that a certain higher principle governing the political behaviour in interaction could be discovered as valid. Our method was following.

From the data of 309 segments, 32.6 % were marked as overlapping (multifunctional) with one or or two other strategies which we considered as an indicator of dependency between them.²⁵ Every strategy occurring in the overlapping segments was therefore observed in 101 segments and in four strategies, the connection was found with more than 50% probability.

The following chart presents the result of our findings.

7.0. Chart: *The interdependent relationship in overlapping strategies*

Strategy	Overlapped with	Percentage	Examples
Acknowledges the Q	Incomplete reply	64.7%	IR: Do you believe that hand of God is guiding you in this war on terror? IE: I've turned to the Good lord for strength and I've turned to the Good Lord for guidance [2/8a]
Declination to answer	Attack on the question (question hypothetical, illegitimate)	100%	IE: I'm really not going to get involved in the election down there [6/7g/4i]
Important question not tackled	General policy (attacks the enemy, support, presents policy)	69.2%	IE: I think it's a terrific momentum builder and we've got to keep on making sure that we're making progress on those fronts [4a/7b]
Incomplete reply- Negative answer	Presenting policy	100%	IR: If general in chief says to you 'Hey president Obama, if that comes to pass, you cannot take out the final complement of comeback troops, we need them in theater', you would say... IE: We will not put any pressure on Iraqis to stand up and take this burden on [7d/7b/8d]

²⁵ The distribution of overlapping strategies in five interviews can be found in the appendix (7.4.1.)

Although we have not verified the dependency relationship between the eight strategies above also in responses where overlaps did not occur, our finding seems to suggest that principles of *coercion* and *evasion* are interrelated because the *evasion* needs to be justified, so that when the *negative* answer is produced to a question without a tag and the politician states what he would not rather do, the *rightness* of politician is enhanced by his *presentation of policy* which appears to be characterised by increase in the *intrinsic* modality of (negative) action (cf. [7b] in 7.5.). In the following section we therefore aim to discover what the linguistic representation of strategies is and what their function is in the context of the political reply.

3.2.5. Linguistic correlates of analysed strategies

In order to examine whether the strategies proposed by Bull have any specific linguistic realization, we examined the instances representing twenty-nine strategies one by one in each interview and observed that some of the possible strategy markers (2.4.6.) were not present in all the instances (3.2.6.) and some were difficult to find a correlate to. This was caused by the fact that the typology applied in our research was too specific, so that more strategies shared the same features, e.g. weakening hedges in *self-justification*, *based on a false premise*, and *important question not tackled*. In the last nine strategies whose frequency of occurrence in the total sample was below 1% (cf. [5]-[4j] in 7.5.), the statistic outcome of correlates was also too low to define the strategies objectively and in the future would need to be verified on more examples. While the section 3.2.6. deals with those strategies whose correlates proved to be different from our original expectation, in this section the restrictions of CDA method applied in this paper are clarified and some of the strategies which proved to be definable by the correlates are presented.

We focused primarily on syntactic differences in passive/ active voice, expressed (overt) agency of subjects in actions or their *covert* evasion via pronominal shifts (I→we) and via *metarepresentation* in the strategies since, in our view, *metarepresentation* (30) is not only the means of *coercion* by its emphasis of the presupposed views and emotions of the nation (*desire*) but also that of *dissimulation*

(30) IE: We've got to **remember what the desire** is in this nation [7e]. (V)

It was most prominent with *justification of policy* and *appealing to nationalism* (29.1%) but in neither of the strategies it reached more than 40%.

Weakening hedges (31) and passive voice were taken into account, too, because both of them contributed to decreasing the personal *commitment* of the politician. Although these correlates were identified separately from each other in *self-justification* and their percentage did not reach to more than 50% to consider each of them as sufficient enough to define the strategy, overall, they were considered as the means of depersonalisation and *evasion*, which was typical of this strategy in 52.7%.

(31) IE: The fact is that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel so I was **simply** stating the fact [7g] (IV)

Weakening hedges included also cognitive verbs increasing *emotive* commitment of the politician (Fetzer 2008) and decreasing *epistemic* modality (32).

(32) IR: Do you not see that the world is a more dangerous place? I saw four of your soldiers lying dead on the television the other day..the picture of four soldiers just lying there...

IE: You know, nobody **cares** about the death more than I do [7g]... (I)

They were also observed in the *important question not tackled* (60.9%) and *question based on a false premise* (57.7%) where nominalizations occurred.

(33) IE: **Engaging** in tough diplomacy is not a sign of weakness, it's a sign of strength [4c](I)

Passivization was linked to morphological distinction between animate/inanimate nouns and these were in the strategy of *external support* further divided into *proper* geographical nouns of states or *names of persons* (81.9%).

Modal verbs were found to be the means of boosting or limiting modality in Faicloughian sense (2.1.) and therefore also the cognitive verbs implying the access to *knowledge* (34) were interpreted as the means of increasing *epistemic* modality. They were employed in *acknowledging the question* (35.4%) when the obvious truth referred to in the question was admitted in the response of the politician, which helped to enhance *credibility* of the politician.

(34) IE: **I know** what you are talking about is France, isn't it? They didn't agree with my decision. They did vote for U.S. Security Council that said 'disclose, disarm, or face serious consequences'[2] (I)

This principle was also boosted in *factually corrects the question* (35), where new rhematic items were added to the theme introduced by the question (FSP) and the presupposition located in the background context (preface) of the question was corrected in the reply.

(35) IR: If you believe, Senator, that Afghanistan was a central strategic point on the frontier, why was your first trip there and why did not you hold the first meeting **as the chairman of subcommittee that oversees the fighting force there?**

IE: Actually the subcommittee that I chair is **the European subcommittee** and any issues related to Afghanistan were always dealt with the four-member committee [4d]. (III)

In *reassurance*, not only modal verbs (36) but also content (modal) disjuncts occurred (37), which also increased *epistemic* modality of the strategy (50%).

(36)IE: America **has to** exercise all options out there [7d] (V)

(37) IE: **Absolutely**. I wouldn't be doing this if I didn't think that the world will be better [7d] (I)

However, this strategy also consisted of the means increasing *intrinsic* modality (36.7%), which was achieved by the future simple tense, present continuous tense and generally by verbs implying *action* (38). It was a frequent device in the strategy *presenting policy* (59.2%) where agent occurred in explicit (overt) position

(38) IE: What **I'm gonna do** is to set a vision where we need to go [7b] (III)

As this strategy was found out to be often overlapped with the *negative* reply (cf.3.2.4.), politicians evaded the action of the question by stating what they would not rather do than do, which was discovered to be at the same time *coercive* because they reassured the public about not doing something *face-threatening* (39). In the following example, the FTA was indicated by negatively evaluated abstract nouns (*pressure, burden*), so the withdrawal of the American troops was perceived as undesirable.

(39) IE: We **will not** put any **pressure** on Iraqis to stand up and take this **burden** on [7d/7b/8] (III)

As far as lexical factors are concerned, apart from noticing animate/inanimate nouns in the strategy *external support* (81.9%), another interesting lexical aspect was identified there, namely, the presence of nouns (40), verbs (41) and speech acts with reciprocal meaning.

(40) IE: It is **the relationship** based on common values [7i] (II)

(41) IE: I'm gonna **be consulting** with people [7i].....(III)

In *political analysis* technical vocabulary (63.6%) and numerals were frequent (36.4%).

(42) IE: They've got to declare **25 million** new jobs per year in order **to stay even** and in order to keep their economy growing and so in my view of China is that they're internally focused to the extent that they want the economic growth and vitality [7f]... (II)

More neutral lexemes or the lexemes from the same co-hyponymic semantic set were observed to be used by politicians in the case of *incomplete* reply but also in strategies *question based on a false premise* and *important question not tackled*, where the context of the question had to be examined in order to define the ways the original topic of the question was reframed (reformulated).

In other strategies the lexemes with positive and negative stylistic connotations were found to be employed by politicians serving the *legitimation* and *delegitimation* macro-principles in political responses. The presence of the so-called *glittering generalities* and *presuppositions* was discovered in most of the strategies where they did not exceed 50% but in *appeals to nationalism* and *external attack* (61.1%) they were salient.

Presuppositions were not further subdivided in the final charts into *existential*, *factive* or *implicative presuppositions*, although in the *external attack* (43) we have noticed the presence of *implicative* and *existential presuppositions* which enabled to justify the political actions by making impression of imminent threat.

(43) IE: I will not **allow** terrorists to determine the fate of the people [7a](I)

We restricted our observation on the lexical semantic aspect, so that specific use of idioms or collocations in political discourse was not covered. In *external attack*, for example, co-meronymical relationship was discovered to be used in several cases (44).

(44) IE: They had their **right hands** cut off by S. Hussein..Their **hands** have been cut off and crosses or Xs carved on their **forehead** [7a] (I)

In *acknowledging the question*, *synonyms* were found as defining for the strategy while *antonyms* were identified in the *question based on a false premise* (45)

(45) IR: So it is not premature that the British **withdraw**.

IE: ..the Brits are going to **keep their presence** [4c] (II)

The stylistic aspect was also taken into consideration in strategies like *reassurance* or *talking up one's own side* where devices of *persuasiveness* (rhetorical questions, parallelisms) were applied and in *external support* were speech acts of 'thanking' had an expressive function. As in *reassurance* politicians often agreed with what had been mentioned in the previous question

and this strategy was also discovered to be preceded by *repeats the reply* and *implies that question was answered* (50%), *reassurance* helped to establish the common ground with the public (46).

(46)IE: **As I said** [10], I'm really not going to get involved in the election there [7d].....(II)

Apart from noticing the correlates that could define the respective strategy the best and marking their function in relation to macro-principles of political discourse in the final chart that accompanied each strategy, we also tried to relate the strategies to pragmatics, namely, to Gricean maxims (GM) of conversation (2.3.1.2.) and Brown and Levinson's politeness schemata. When politicians, for example, declined to provide the answer, opting out of GM was marked in the respective chart (cf. 7.5.9.) and when, e.g., the familiar names of the interviewers were used in *attacking the interviewer*, *coercion* equalled establishing the common ground (CG). It was also presumed that when the politician *delegitimated* a certain group, another part of the public that shared the same view towards this group was *coerced* to the politician, so that asking interviewer for conversational rights might have had the *coercive* function for the politician too despite threatening the face of the interviewer (IR).

The results of our pragmatic observations are presented in the following sections.

The charts summing up the details of our linguistic observation can be found in the appendix (7.5.) and the twenty-nine strategies will be organized from the most frequent ones to the least frequent ones as was already illustrated (schema 3.0. in 3.2.1.).

However, the percentage of all the correlates found in the strategies exceeds the 100 % because we have observed every correlate independently of others in the same strategy and some correlates were also overlapping, e.g. metarepresentation (*important for the country*) and weakening hedges (*I think*) in *self-justification* in the following example.

(47) IE: My job is to do my job and make the decisions that **I think** are **important for the country.**[7g]_ (I)

The following are markers in the first of the most frequent strategies that occurred in our sample.

Self-justification [7g]

Number of Interview	Examples	Total : 53
Covert evasion: Weakening hedges	IE: We just had different sets of opinions about when you say something, do you mean it...(I) IE: The fact is that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel so I was simply stating the fact (IV)	18 (33.9%)
Covert evasion: Depersonalisation (passive, pronoun shift)	IE: Charlie, if the day after or the day of the speech I conceded that the wording was poor and it was immediately corrected? (IV)	10 (18.8%)
Evasion plus coercion: Metarepresentation	IE: That has happened and will happen to every politician. You are not always gonna hit the mark in terms of how you're gonna phrase your policies. (III)	12 (22.64%)
Emotive coercion (cognitive verbs of <i>believe</i> , <i>hope</i> type)	IE: I believe that it is in the Palestinian people's interest and I believe that it is in Israel's interest (I)	18 (33.9%)
Cognitive coercion (Lexemes with pos. or neg. connot., /glittering gener. and presup.)	'this global struggle'(II) /existential presup./	17 (34%)

3.2.6. Discussion of linguistic results

In the previous section we suggested that in some of the strategies the occurrence of a particular pattern was below 50% of instances of a given strategy, which might have been caused by our subdivision of correlates into distinct categories as subtypes of the same higher principle, e.g. of *weakening hedges* (33.9%)²⁶ and *passives* (18.8%) in *self-justification*. This was also the case of means for boosting *intrinsic* modality (37.7%) and *extrinsic* modality (50%) in *reassurance*, which both enhance modality of the strategy (87.7%).

We have also found out that in more strategies, e.g. *reassurance* and *presenting policy*, *declines* and *question hypothetical/question illegitimate*, the same correlates (increasing/decreasing modality) occurred, which indicates that Bull's typology cannot be fully defined by patterns which are exclusive only to particular types of the strategies and

²⁶ The percentage in the parentheses denotes the distribution of the respective marker in the strategy from the total number of its instances in five interviews.

which also suggests that some segments will be overlapping (multifunctional, cf.3.2.4.). While nine strategies did not correspond with some aspects of our hypothesis about correlates presented in (2.4.6.) and seventeen of them confirmed that, e.g. *important question not tackled* would be represented by the syntactic pattern S-Vcop-Cs, or that *question hypothetical* would consist of the meaning ‘hypothetical’, they all needed to be specified more precisely (7.5.)

Those strategies whose correlates proved different are therefore compared in the following chart.

8.0. Chart. *Comparison of linguistic hypothesis with results*

Strategies	Original hypothesis	Definition
3a	IE: Q, repetition of the same lexemes from the Q	IE asks the Wh question or suggests his incomprehension in interrogative complex clause with Wh word (75%):
3b	Subject of VD is the IR, dispreferred marker (well),	The verb of speaking is not necessary when the sentence type of the question for the IR occurs:
5	IR is personally addressed by sg ‘you’ or a name, negation of the action	The IE objects to the style of questioning by the verbs implying ‘asking’ or ‘talking’ which has negative connotations. Action is not necessarily denied as replies fw [5] also occur. The attack is hedged.
11	Cs-sorry, the IE is the agent	Indirect apology: Verb of speaking (<i>say, apologize</i>) in the past tense or restricted by focusing adjunct, <i>if</i> -clause
7b	Covert evasion- pronoun switching, depersonalisation (party)	Boosting intrinsic modality (the action)
7c	Inanim. subjects, metarep.	Complex and compound sentences with expression of causality
4c	Negation of Q’s presupp. lexemes with neg. connot.	Negation of Q’s presupp. (also in [4d], [7]) -antonyms, implied negation (<i>but</i>) - <i>not</i> plus lex. rephrasing
4d	Negation of Q’s presupp.	Negation of Q’s presupp. located in the preface of the question developing new rhematic items -developing new rhematic items
8a	The meaning of the word in Q will be, e.g. meronymically restricted or hyperonymically making vague	The semantic meaning btw lexeme in the reply and the question is not necessarily that of hyperonymy and meronymy

We have discovered that *talking up one’s own side* was not a redundant strategy because although it shared the *coercive* feature with *self-justification* in boosting the positive image of

the politician, the agency of the politician was always expressed and no weakening hedges occurred. In *declination* to answer, the inability to answer [6a] and unwillingness to answer [6b] do not have to be specifically distinguished because they were replaced with each other by Gov. Palin in her turns (48) for the same question.

(48) IR: What if Israel decided it felt threatened and need to take out Iranian nuclear facilities?

IE: Well, first, we are friends of Israel [7i] and I don't think that **we should** second-guess the measures that Israel has to take to defend themselves for their security [6/4i].

IR: So if we wouldn't second-guess it and they decided to do it, because Iran was an extrastensial threat, would we be cooperative and agree with that?

IE: I don't think **we can** second-guess what Israel can do to secure its nation [6/4i] (V)

The *negative reply* occurred after the question without a tag while *positive reply* (49) followed the question with a negative tag.

(49) IR: Would you be trying **to convince** him **not to do** that?

IE: I'll be glad **to explain to** him why I'm optimistic that the hard work will achieve what we all want, which is, you know, over the time, fewer troops and peace[8e] (II)

We have also hypothesized that in three segments no correlate would be found but in *ignores the question* the hesitation marker 'ehm' was detected, in *repeats* the same thematic items from the previous turns were present and in *question objectionable* the lexemes developing the objected sememe were found.

However, the correlates for the last nine strategies would still need to be verified in the future research because of the low occurrence of these strategies in our data (below 1 percent).

Most of the strategies reflected only the themes of the respective segments but from the last six strategies, four of them were also found to be related to the context of the previous question so that *question objectionable* (50), *question misinterpreted* and *ignores the question* were preceded by *conducive* or *Bavelas* type of questions associated with *accusatory* interviewing style (2.4.1.).

(50) IR: **Why can't you** be **more specific** as to what you envision?

IE: Well, I keep in mind that when I talk about timetables people say that's **too specific** whether when there is a residual force people say that is **not specific enough** [4g] (III)

As the exemplified response consists of contradictions and the degree of specificity is made relative, the attack on the question can be considered as *off-record* (schema 8.0., strategy 7, cf. 2.3.1.2.).

On the other hand, question *inappropriate in the setting* occurred when the question focused on future policy of the politician and was committing for *negative* face of the politician, which was also the case of other attacks on the question, *question hypothetical*, *question illegitimate* as well as of *declination* (51) to provide the answer [6].

(51) IR: if he doesn't win the election and Kevin Rod does become a Prime minister, will the alignments change?

IE:...so certainly **I'm not going to prejudge** the decision of Australian people [6](II)

In this way Gricean maxim of quantity was opted out in 13.57% of cases out of the total number of evasive replies. However, this maxim was opted out also with the maxim of quality in the strategy *incomplete reply* which in our view describes in the best possible way the *covert* tactics of politicians who acknowledge those thematic areas which are neutral and which enhance their credibility and at the same time avoid, replace or lexically reframe the meanings presenting a potential *FTA* for them (3.2.7.). Although *half* replies (38.8%) were most prominent ones from this type of strategy, *partial* replies (22.2%) occurred as well, so that the lexeme from the question was reframed by more neutral, that is less committing and specific one (52).

(52) IR: If general P. says..., you would **say**:

IE: I would always **listen** to commandors on the ground [8b] (III)

Although the verbs from the example above derive from the same semantic set of 'communication', in our perception, the act of 'speaking' from the question is not superordinate (hyponymic) to that of 'listening' in the response.

The Gricean maxim of quantity was also opted out in *acknowledges the question* in 68.3% because the theme of the question was rephrased via synonyms or deixis.

On the other hand, in the strategy, like *reflects the question back*, the maxim of quality was flouted because of the ironic meaning of *questioning the question*, which could be considered as an *off-record* way of *attacking the question*. The violation of the maxim of quantity (short reply) was responded to by the strategy *asking for conversational rights* because politicians were found out to be interrupted by interviewers also in decreased transition space (50%).

Along with the strategy *question implies false alternative*, which was employed by politicians even when the question did not contain the stated alternative (3.2.), *asking for CR* was employed by politicians when their turn was conversationally finished but because of their longer pauses (1-2 sec) after the end of a clause the interviewer began his new turn and the following complaint of politician gave impression of unfair conversational behaviour of an interviewer. However, in our sample 42% of these cases occurred at the end of the first sentence of the politician's turn, which we do not consider as an appropriate space for transition of turns²⁷.

- (53) IE: You know nobody cares about the death more than I do
 [2.0]
 -(inter) IR: Is there a point
 [IE]
 -(inter) IE: Let me finish, please, please, let me finish and then you can follow
 up if you don't mind.[12] (I)

When the politician replied in an ambiguous way and the maxim of manner was flouted, interviewers tended to repeat the same questions and force the interviewees to provide the answer as in the following example taken from the Interview V with Gov. Palin.

- (54) IR: Forgive me if I'm asking you, we have the right, in your mind to go across the border with or without the approval of Pakistani government?
 IE: In order to stop Islamic extremists, those extremists who would seek to destroy America and our allies we must do whatever it takes and we must not blink, Charlie, in making those tough decisions of where we go and even who we target.
 IR: Let me finish with this, cause **I just got lost in the blizzard of words. Is that a yes?** Do you think we have the right to go across the border with or without the approval of the Pakistani government to go after terrorists in Arabia? (V)

The Gricean maxim of relevance was also found to be flouted in the strategy *important question not tackled* but at the same time Clayman's *overt* means of *justifying* the agenda shift in interaction was noticed (2.4.2.).

- (55) IR: Why is it that others don't understand what you're about?
 IE: I don't know...**Let me say one other thing** about America that your viewers must know. It's not only that we're working hard on promoting security and peace, we're also working to eradicate famine and disease [4a] (I)

²⁷ According to Clayman and Heritage (2002: 113) neither too long nor too short answers of politicians are appropriate in news interview.

These had the function to *minimize* evasion and *coerce* the public.

In the following section, it is therefore necessary to discuss the pragmatic aspect of strategies and relate them to Brown and Levinson politeness schemata.

3.2.7. Towards pragmatics or relating Bull's strategies to Brown and Levinson framework of politeness

In the analysis of linguistic correlates, we have discovered that the macro-principles of *coercion* and *evasion* are present in the most of the strategies, but in *questions the question* it is not clear whether this strategy is meant as *evasion* by pretending that politicians do not understand the question or whether it expresses a genuine interest of politicians to cooperate with interviewers, so that it is only an *intrasequence* leading to *coercion*. In *declination* to answer and *ignores the question* what seems to prevail is *evasion* because the Gricean maxim of quantity is opted out. However, these strategies can be interpreted to be *coercive* too when they are related to the questions which were found out to have been dealing with future specification of policy (cf. [1] in 7.5.). In this case politicians did not produce the statements which would threaten their further cooperation with some states and thus were *coerced* to all the faces of the states. In addition when *declination* to answer the question is followed by *attack on the question (question hypothetical/ illegitimate)*, the aspect of *evasion* could be understood as balanced by its justification.

- (56) IR: In the two states what do you envision as the capital then of Palestine?
IE: You know, Charlie, I will let the party to sort that out [4 b] and I don't think it's the US's job to make that decision [6/4i]. (IV)

We have found out the similar micro-structure in other strategies, e.g., in *important question not tackled* where the presentation of a more important topic was hedged by *overt* tokens of the maxim of relevance or by pseudo-clefts (7.5.), in *based on a false premise* where the attack on the question was hedged by the present continuous tense or in *attacking the IR* where familiar names of interviews served as weakening hedges (57).

- (57) Positive politeness- 4. Use in-group identity markers (B&L 1987: 102)
IE: Katie, you have asked me three different times [5].. (III)

This demonstrates the premise of Brown and Levinson's about the indirect form of face threatening acts towards the others and the importance of maintaining the common ground for

politicians in political interviews, which is a crucial aspect of the art of *persuasiveness* (2.1.). However, as is illustrated in the examples, the disagreement in conversation (imposition of one's opinion) suggested by the *attacks on the Q*, *attacks on the IR* or even by *asking for CR* is not only weakened by Brown and Levinson's strategies of *negative* politeness but also of *positive* politeness (cf 2.3.1.2.) because the familiarity markers are employed and the interest is intensified in hedges in the *important question not tackled* or in other strategies like *reassurance* (58) due to the increase of parallelisms.

(58) Positive politeness- 3.Intensify the interest (B&L 1987: 102)

IE: There's some kind of attitude: 'Oh, Gosh, there are terrorist attacks, let's let the Iraqis suffer all the more.' **We are not gonna** let them suffer more, **we're gonna** work with them [7d]

(I)

The common ground is established also by *acknowledges the question*, which was the second most frequent strategy in our interviews after *self-justification*, where sympathy is aroused by verbs like *believe* and by presuppositions (59) that occur also with metaphors as *off-record* markers of *positive* politeness (2.4.1.2.) in other types of *making of the political point*.

(59) Positive politeness-7.claim (presuppose) common ground: empathy (B&L 1987: 102)

IE: And America saw the fact that their hands have been cut off and crosses or Xs carved on their forehead and we flew them to America and they came to my office with a new hand grateful for **the generosity of America** and with Saddam Hussein's brutality in their mind [7h/7a] (I)

Positive politeness is also employed in the strategy of *external support* where the particular actions done by the states or other politicians are praised via *glittering generalities* with positive connotations (*the progress*) which help to establish reciprocity between the nations on the lexical ground (7.5.3.) and via attitudinal disjuncts (*fortunately*).

(60) Positive politeness- 5.3.1.attend to hearer and 5.3.2. convey that S and H are cooperators (B&L 1987: 102)

IE: **I'm pleased with the progress** being made in Asia and obviously the interesting relationship is the trading relationship. Australia **fortunately** has got a surplus with China and America has got a major deficit with China [7i] (II)

On the other hand, the means of *negative* politeness are not only weakening hedges (*is becoming*) in *attacks on the question* which decrease the possible disagreement between the interviewer and the interviewee as in the first of the following examples (61) but also

nominalizations, pronoun shifts, passives and apologies (*that's not my intent*) in *making the political point* that serve to justify the politicians (62).

(61) IR: Do you not see that the world is a more dangerous place?

IE: ...but I do believe that the world is a safer place and **is becoming** a safer place [4c] (I)

(62) Minimize the imposition (B&L:1987: 131)

IR: ..a lot of Sydney siders are complaining about the impact of APEC, they say your stay will affect the city for almost a week while you are there.


IE: if I inconvenience people , **that's not my intent** [11] (II)

As the distribution of strategies employed in our sample suggests that *self-justification*, *acknowledges the question* and *external support* are three most prominent segments in political replies, *making of political point* could be considered as subspecification of *self-justification of politician* (53.34%) in the structure of a political response. The *external support* could correspond not only to 'attending the hearer' but in terms of evasion from personal *commitment* also to 'stating something as a general rule'(2.3.1.2.).

We therefore propose the following schema.

9.0. Picture

Coercion (CG) /evasion (negative politeness)



In this way, reference to people in *external support*, *self-justification* or *appeals to nationalism* could be also interpreted as arguments supporting the politician in his rightness (Habermasian

richtigkeit-2.2.1.) by suggesting that what he did or aims to do is in accordance with the common rules, so that he has no personal involvement in the matter (*off-record* negative). The following (63) is an example of decreasing the personal commitment in the issue brought in the discussion by Gibson in the response of Sen. Obama who employs statements with a universal quantifier *every* and the second person singular generic human pronoun *you* in *self-justification* before enhancing his credibility by evasion to stating policy of his party colleague, Bill Clinton.

(63) IR: You said that Jerusalem should remain undivided and then you backtracked on that argument..

IE: **That has happened to every politician. You are not always gonna hit the mark in terms of how you're gonna phrase your policies** [7g]. But my policy hasn't changed. It's been the same policy that Bill Clinton has put forward and that says that Jerusalem is going to be the capital of Israel that we shouldn't divide by barkwire [7i] (IV)

This switch is also typical of *metarepresentation* whose coercive nature could be subsumed under Brown & Levinson's strategy 'asserting of knowledge of hearer's wants' (1987:102).

It turns out that it is not possible to relate each of Bull's strategies to either *positive* politeness (*coercion*) or *negative* politeness strategies (*evasion*) devised by Brown and Levinson because most of them incorporate means of boosting both principles. In addition, some of the correlates like the contact maintainers *you know*, the questions (*See?*) and the familiarity markers like the names of interviewers (*Charlie, Katie*) suggesting the common ground with the interviewer and the public as markers of *positive* politeness cannot be attributed to any strategy exclusively. These points therefore suggest that *coercion* and *evasion* are narrowly interrelated in political interaction, which proves Chilton's observation from monological data as well as Jucker's (1986) and Bull's argument about positive effects of evasive strategies in interaction (1993). However, it also implies that these 'effects' are related pragmatically to questions because the attempts of politician to establish the common ground suggests that in the starting position of interviews this ground between him/her and the interviewer did not exist. This is also shown by the rank of the *attacks on the question* in the frequency rate of strategies in our data where *based on a false premise* ended up as fifth (6.16%) and *important question not tackled* as seventh (5.68%) from the total number of evasive responses.

The face threat of the questions was furthermore suggested by the presence of dispreferred markers, e.g. *well*, pauses and contact maintainers, e.g. *you know, listen* and names of the

interviewers, *Charlie*, *Katie* that in eighty-nine turns proved to reach 50.5%²⁸. When the replies are not taken into account (twenty-two cases), these add up to 67% but we are aware of the fact that even responses initiated by these discourse markers can be coded as replies. The following (64) is an example of such an answer.

(64) IR: Senator Obama, first of all, you have not been in Iraque since 2006. What did you learn on your recent visit that surprised you? What was new?

IE: **Well**, there is no doubt that security situation has improved [2] and that was very encouraging to see that markets are reopening, that in places like A. province you have seen the complete reversal in terms of Suni tribesmen towards American forces there...we've got to keep on making sure that we're making progress on those fronts [4a] What hadn't changed was there's still an enormous suspicion between Suni and Shites... (III)

As is illustrated in the example, even replies consisted of *attacks on the question* [4] but our original hypothesis that every face threatening question would be attacked in political responses was not confirmed since in thirty cases out of eighty-nine turns (33.3%) no attack on the question occurred and from these, replies formed only 36.6%. The attacks were absent in the Interview II, III, IV and V in contrast to the first interview where every turn consisted of [4] with the exception of intrasequence consisting of *questioning the question*, so that every *attack on the question* was in its environment justified (hedged) by other strategies. However, despite the absence of *attack on the question* in the remaining interviews, the strategies in respective turns (65) served to justify politician too because the questions were discovered to contain a negative presupposition, so that politicians tried to persuade the public about its falsity.

(65) IR: Do you sense that there is a considerable proportion of Israelis and even American Jewerie who are very **reserved** and even **distrusting** of your commitment to Israel?

IE: People understandably wanna live the hood and kick the tires and that takes some time [2] Those who know my track record have absolutely no doubt about my unwavering support for Israel and its security [7d/7b] (IV)


In this exchange the question consisted of the presupposition 'negative personal competence' of politician and of his negative relationship with the face of the other, Israel which would in Bull's typology of face threats in the questions correspond to threat 'not supporting positively valued other' (7.2.2.). As it is in politician's interest to cancel these presuppositions, he

²⁸ The dispreferred markers were observed only at the beginning of eighty-nine turns.



chooses the strategy of *reassurance* and *presenting policy* to refute the implications of the questions suggested by FTA adjectives *distrusting* and *reserved*.

We therefore adapt our original picture presented in (2.4.6.) to a new one.


Picture 10.0. Political interaction



Questions asked/Negative presupposition



Positive face/Negative face of Politicians



Even the turns which we coded as replies and did not contain *attack on the question* turned out to employ the strategies to avoid the FTA presupposition of the question. This presupposition of the question was found in most of the interviewer's questions.²⁹

(66) IR: But talking microcosmically, did the surge, the addition of thirty thousand additional troops help the situation in Iraq?

IE: Katie, you have asked me three different times [5] and I've said repeatedly [10] that there is no doubt that our troops helped to reduce the violence [7d/2]
(III)

In this example where Sen. Obama provides the reply, the question's negative presupposition was that the politician had an inconsistent policy with respect to Iraq because at the beginning of his career he criticized the war in Iraq but during the interview he admitted that it had positive results, so that the contradiction in his statements could arise.

The politician chooses to confirm the statement in the question by stating that *the question was already replied to*, which makes impression of his consistency and which helps to cancel the presupposition that he contradicts himself in the interview. However, the interviewer continues to produce questions concerning the FTAs of *credibility*, so that when the politician is forced to decide between defending his credibility and contradiction of his statements (67), Senator chooses to decline to answer but defends at least the face of the American soldiers that would be threatened out of denying the question.

(67) IR: and I do not mean to believe it Senator...I'm trying to figure out your position. Do you think that the level of security in Iraq would exist today without the surge?

IE: Katie, I have no idea what would have happened had we applied my approach which was to put more pressure on Iraqis to drive at a political reconciliation, so this is all hypothetical [6/4b]. What I can say is there is no doubt that our US troops have contributed to reduction of violence in Iraq [7d] (III)

The issue of credibility implied in the questions posed to Sen. Obama does not seem to be that threatening to him possibly because he considers the explanations provided in his answers as sufficient enough to avoid the threat, so that the previous question (66) could possibly correspond to Bull's NNT question because the politician rather focused on emphasizing his

²⁹ The questions which were responded to by backchannels were considered as polite prefaces to following questions and were not coded as turns. This was also the case of the final sequences (*closure*) of the interviews where interviewers thanked the interviewees for discussion. However, the question where the interviewer responded to *request for clarification* (II), the question did not necessarily contain a negative presupposition or FTA (depending on the type of information provided-degree of threat to *credibility*).

personal consistency in the interview. What is also interesting is that in his choices, he does not perceive the threat of implicit support of his political opponents who announced the war in Iraq, so that he does not attacks them nor explicitly supports them.

In comparison with Sen. Obama who in the previous three turns opted for avoiding the threat of contradiction in his statements by [reassurance] and [implies that question was already replied] while the threat to credibility was not paid attention to, in the first six turns of the interview with Pres. Bush (7.6.), threats to both types of FTAs of questions were tried to be avoided. The negative personal competence was minimised by [external attack] and [external support] of institutions while threat to obvious truth of the question was avoided by [acknowledging the question] and [factually correcting the question].

In the following example (68) the president seems to employ successfully strategies avoiding both types of negative presuppositions because the FTA of *credibility* is cancelled by implications of his mistake by noun (*forgiveness*) and quotation about his imperfection which also contributes to enhancing his positive image as a Christian who has the knowledge of the Bible and which helps to minimize the FTA of negative ‘personal’ face (religion).

(68) **A7**: Do you believe that hand of God is guiding you in this war on terror?

B7: I think, listen, I think, that God ..that my relationship with God is a very personal relationship.. and I’ve turned to the Good Lord for strenght and I’ve turned to the Good lord for Guidance.. /8 a / I’ve turned to the Good lord for forgiveness.. ..[7g] but but but the God I know is not the one that ..[8c].. the God I know is the one that promotes peace and freedom / 4c/ and but I get great sustenance from my personal relationship that cannot make me think that I am a better person than you are , by the way, cause one of the admonitionss in the Good Book is ‘don’ try to take a speck out of your eye if I’ve got a log in my own’[7g].. (1)

FTA:

Confirm: political credibility (the interference of personal issue of religion in political sphere/analogy with terrorists and their fanaticism)

Deny: threat to personal ‘religious’face, possibly Contradiction with his past statement about his reverence to God (admission of transgression of the Christian principles, implication that war in Iraque is not morally right)

Choice: Denies

In the future research it would be therefore interesting to continue in this type of research to find out whether politicians opt for the similar choices when presented with the same FTAs in questions, e.g. *personal contradiction* versus *credibility* and to tackle which FTAs are more risky to confirm.

3.2.8. Future research

Although it was already suggested by us that adversariality of the interviewing style is related to the contextual properties of the interview, like the *setting*, number of *conducive* questions, *replies*, *declination* to answer and the *topic* (3.2.2.), the latter can be interpreted in terms of specific FTA of questions, so that *declination to answer the question* could be linked to questions dealing with threats to *commitment* or *clarification of future policy*. In the future research it would be therefore interesting to find out what is the degree of face threats like *political credibility*, *negative personal competence*, *not supporting the other* in questions, so that, e.g. *clarification of future policy* would represent the major threat because of the same responses of politicians employing the strategy *declines*. It would be also useful to discover whether in some contexts like, interviews with allies they employ predominately *off-record* strategies in *external attack* (Interview II, 3.2.3.) while in others they go mostly *on record* (Interview I). It is also necessary to verify whether strategies that were found in the first interview with the Irish interviewer, e.g. *asking for CR*, *ignores the question* and *questions the question*, are typical of the British interviewing culture that is considered by Clayman and Heritage as more adversarial

Although we tried to discover by comparison of questions in the third and fourth interview in (3.2.2.1.) what the form of a *NNT* question was, what also needs to be resolved in the future is whether such questions always produce *replies*, whether their form is in all cases non-conducive and whether *conducivness* of questions overlaps with *Bavelas* type of questions.

We also suggest verifying whether *ignores the question*, *repeats*, *question objectionable* are responses to *Bavelas* type of questions and accusatory interviewing style and to specify the occurrence of linguistic patterns in nine strategies whose frequency was below 1%.

4.0. Conclusion.

In this paper we aimed to discover whether socio-psychologic research in political ‘non-replies’ carried out by P. Bull and K. Mayer (1993) in the British context of 1987 political interview had any implications for the study of linguistics and pragmatics. As Bull and Mayer’s study resulted in devising a typology of thirty strategies employed by British politicians to *evade* the questions and as it was deficient in clear methodological and linguistic definition, we verified their findings on the sample of five interviews with American politicians from 2004-2008. We also aimed to find out whether the principle of *coercion* claimed to be operating primarily in monological data of political discourse by Chilton (2004) is present in political interaction which would confirm view of Jucker (1986) and Bull (1993) about enhancing the positive image of the politician in an interview.

While the method of CDA (Fairclough: 1978) was applied in the examination of linguistic means of the strategies in the central part of our analysis (3.3.), Quirk’s (2002) distinction of questions and Rasiah’s (2010) distinction of level of *evasion* were applied in resolving the type of *reply*. The strategies of ‘non-replying’ were considered as *intermediate* replies because in every response of politicians *direct/ indirect* confirmation or *attack on the question* was present, so that the original trichotomy of *replies- intermediate replies- non-replies* adopted by Rasiah (2010) and Bull (1993) was reduced in our framework to the first two of them.

We hypothesised that all the strategies except *ignores the question, repeats the question* and *question objectionable* would consist of certain linguistic patterns and that *talking up one’s own side* would be redundant as it helped to boost the positive image of politician similarly to the strategy *self-justification*. As Bull and Elliott (1996) also found out that the principle of *evasion* in political interaction is related to the FTAs of questions posed to politicians, we have also expected that every question consisting of FTA would be *attacked* in the political response.

After defining the basic unit of our research, the *segment*, we divided every response of politician into *evasive* strategies which were in 32.6 % (101 segments) multifunctional and overlapping with one, two or three other strategies (7.4.1.). We have found out that only twenty-nine strategies were employed by politicians and that Bull and Mayer’s original typology was not fully convenient for our purposes in the American context because, e.g., it did not cover the instances where the representatives of other states or opposition leaders

would be praised, so that new strategies like *external support*, *question not legitimate* and *question not appropriate to be answered* had to be introduced. This might have been caused by the fact that in British interviews no questions concerning international politics were asked or by the gradual change of political discourse whose strategies in new contexts become more fine-grained. Other strategies that were discovered to be present in American interviews were also the *lack of knowledge* in *declination to answer* and the subtype of *positive reply* in *incomplete reply* which we devised in opposition to original *negative reply* to subsume the cases where response of the politician consisted of a more neutral (hyponymic) lexeme to that of a question with a tag (*convince not to do- explain*). Several other strategies were also redefined, so that *acknowledging the question* covered also *replies* in our sample and a new strategy *asking for conversational rights* was recognised. The latter of the strategies with the strategy *question implies a false alternative* were found to be employed also in contexts where the question did not explicitly imply the stated alternative and where the interviewer did not interrupt the interviewee, so the strategies were exploited by politicians to make impression of unfair interviewing behaviour.

To be able to compare the distribution of strategies in American and British interviews, we devised the frequency diagram where *making of political point* (53.34 %) and *attacking the question* (21.28%) reached the highest frequency which corresponded to the finding of Bull and Mayer (1993) in the British context. However, the strategy *question includes misquotation* was not present in the American sample and the strategies *ignores the question*, *asking for conversational rights* and *questions the question* were most prominent in the American interview with foreign interviewer. This might suggest that interviews of American politicians with local interviewers are less adversarial than British interviews, which would confirm the observation of Clayman and Heritage (2002). The differences in prominence of strategies in respective interviews were also discussed, so that *external attack* and *questioning the question* were associated with the Republicans (Pres. Bush and Gov. Palin) while *talking up one's own side* and *presenting policy* primarily with candidates for future presidency in U.S. The strategy *implies that the question was already answered*, *question illegitimate* and *not appropriate to be answered* was associated with Sen. Obama. The production of *replies* and *intermediate* replies was also examined in relation to the *duration* of an interview, its *setting*, *year of production*, the number of *conducive* questions which helped to define the interviewing *style* and the *topic* of the question which was interpreted in terms of an FTA of

the question (declines to provide answer-*commitment -clarification of future policy*). We suggested that the shorter *duration* of an interview may limit the occurrence of *talking up one's own side* and the *setting* of an interview in a foreign country may physically threaten the production of committing replies. However, in *declination to answer the question* the *syntactic* type of the question (*Y/No, Wh, declarative*) was not found to be decisive for the frequency of *replies* although the future tense and the conditional mood of the question determined following opting out of the question.

The principle of *commitment* of a politician was not the only one discovered to be defining for the interaction in political discourse because the existence of higher principles of *coercion* and *evasion* operating in political discourse was indicated by the dependency relationship in overlapping strategies. The strategy *acknowledges the question* was found to be interlinked with *incomplete reply*; because some parts of the question which pointed at obvious truth were *acknowledged* while those parts of the question which were potentially face-threatening were avoided, replaced or semantically reformulated. The strategy *negative reply* where politicians refused to do negatively valued action was associated with *presenting policy*; the *strategy declination* to provide the answer with *attack on the question* and the strategy *important question not tackled* with *general policy* (7.5.).

In the examination of linguistic correlates, the passive and weakening hedges including cognitive verbs calling for sympathy were noticed, e.g. in *self justification* and question based on a false premise. The depersonalisation via pronominal shifts and other-agency was also indentified in *important question not tackled* (60%) where pseudo-clefts and modals occurred in S-Vcop-Cs. The increased intrinsic modality was observed in *presenting policy*, *talking up one's own side* and *reassurance* where also epistemic modality was boosted. On the other hand, decreased modality occurred in *declination to reply* and *question hypothetical, illegitimate* or *not appropriate* to be answered. The morphological distinction between animate and inanimate nouns was found in the strategy *external support* where locational and proper nouns occurred (81.9%) also with lexemes marking the reciprocal relationship (*partnership*). In *political analysis* inanimate nouns, numerals and technical vocabulary was prevalent. The lexical semantic aspect was observed also in *based on a false premise* (antonyms), *acknowledges the question* (synonyms) and *incomplete partial* reply where less restricting lexemes were used. The stylistics was observed in accumulation of the same predicates in the figure of *parallelism* and of *rhetorical questions* in the strategies of

reassurance, *talking up one's own side* and *important question not tackled* where the tokens of Clayman's (2010) *overt* and *covert* evasion were noticed.

Our hypothesis of linguistic correlates in strategies presented in (2.4.6.) was confirmed in most of the cases but in nine strategies, it proved to be different, so that, e.g. *apology* was found to have an indirect form caused by the adjunct of respect, past tense or if-clause, which confirmed the observation of Z. Kampfl (2008) from Israeli discourse, *justification of policy* proved to consist of complex and compound sentences expressing the relationship of causality and *incomplete reply* to consist of more neutral and less restricting lexemes, which did not necessarily correspond to hyponymic relationship. In addition, the strategies which we originally considered to have no correlates were found to be defined by hesitation markers, e.g., *ehm* in *ignores the question*, or the occurrence of the same thematic items in case of *repetition of reply*. *Talking up one's own side* was not absent as we originally predicted but proved to be different from *self-justification* in explicit agency of positively framed action.

The principles of *coercion* and *evasion* were found to be closely interrelated in all of the strategies where the linguistic means were detected because even the *attacks on the question* enhanced *credibility* of the politician by incorporation of weakening hedges, e.g. the names of the interviewers as the markers of *positive politeness* or contact maintainers (*you know*), verbs arousing empathy (*believe, hope, care*), so that the common ground with the interviewer was attempted to be established. Although it is possible to relate some of the strategies to flouting of Gricean maxims, e.g. *declination to answer* the question with opting out of the maxim of quantity and to Brown & Levinson's politeness schemata, e.g., the use of contradictions in the *question objectionable*, or *external support* to 'convey that speaker and hearer are cooperators', it is not possible to correlate all of them to definite Brown & Levinson's strategies. It is caused by the fact that markers of *positive* and *negative* politeness are dispersed in more strategies of the political response.

Furthermore, the hypothesis that questions consisting of FTA would be *attacked* did not prove tenable because the *attack on the question* occurred in 66.7% of the eighty-nine turns. In the remaining turns the employed strategies served to refute the negative presupposition of the question which was found in every question of the interview. We therefore had to adapt our original schema to a new one.

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6.0. Resumé

Cieľom tejto práce bolo zistiť, či sociopsychologický výskum neodpovedania na otázku v britskom kontexte politického rozhovoru roku 1987 (Bull, Mayer 1993) má implikácie pre lingvistiku a pragmatiku. Keďže štúdia Bulla a Mayerovej vyústila do vytvorenia typológie tridsiatich stratégií využívaných britskými politikmi na vyhnutie sa odpovedi na otázku (tzv. *evasion*), ktorému však chýbala jasná metodológia a jazykové koreláty, rozhodli sme sa overiť si ich výsledky na vzorke piatich rozhovorov s americkými politikmi za obdobie 2004-2008. Snažili sme sa tiež zistiť, či princíp pozitívneho nátlaku (*coercion*) fungujúceho najmä v politických monológoch sa nachádza i v interakcii, čo by potvrdilo názor Juckera (1986) a Bulla (1993) o zvyšovaní pozitívneho imagu politikov.

Zatiaľ čo v ústrednej časti práce bola aplikovaná metóda kritickej analýzy diskurzu na výskum jazykových korelátov, Quirkove rozdelenie otázok a Rasiachove (2010) rozoznávanie úrovne neodpovedania (*level of evasion*) bolo využité pri určovaní typu odpovede (*reply*). Stratégie neodpovedania boli považované za odpovede stredné (mediačné), pretože v každej reakcii politika sa nachádzala časť, kde sa s otázkou súhlasilo, a kde bola otázka napádaná, takže pôvodná trichotómia politickej odpovede, priama/nepriama-stredná-neodpoveď, ktorá bola prijatá Bullom a Rasiachom (2010) bola v našej koncepcii zredukovaná na prvé dva typy odpovede.

Predpokladali sme, že všetky stratégie budú definovateľné nejakým korelátom s výnimkou *ignorovania otázky*, *opakovania otázky* a stratégie *otázka je napadnutelná*. *Rozprávanie o sebe* by bolo zbytočné, keďže pomáhalo zvyšovať pozitívny obraz o politikovi podobne ako stratégia *sebavysvetľovania*. Keďže Bull a Elliottová (1996) tiež zistili, že princíp vyhýbania sa otázke (*evasion*) súvisí s typom hrozby pre tvár politika (FTA), predpokladali sme, že v každej odpovedi bude táto otázka *napádaná*.

Potom, čo sme definovali *segment* ako hlavnú jednotku nášho výskumu, sme rozdelili každú z politikových reakcií na stratégie vyhýbania sa otázke, ktoré boli v 32.6 % (101 segmentoch) multifunkčné a prekrývali sa s ďalšou jednou, dvoma, alebo troma stratégiami. Zistili sme, že iba dvadsať-devať stratégií bolo využívaných americkými politikmi, a že typológia Bulla a Mayerovej nebola plne funkčná pre náš kontext, pretože napr. nezahŕňala prípady, kde by boli hlavy štátov alebo opoziční lídri chválení, takže nové stratégie, napr. *externá podpora*, *otázka nelegitímna* alebo *nevhodná v kontexte* museli byť zavedené. Toto mohlo súvisieť

s tým, že v britských rozhovoroch sa nevyskytovali otázky o medzinárodnej politike, alebo s tým, že politický diskurz sa časom mení (Fairclough 1992), takže jednotlivé stratégie politikov sa postupne vylepšujú. Ďalšie stratégie nájdené v politickom diskurze boli *nedostatok znalosti* ako dôvod *odmietnutia odpovedania* na otázku a podtyp *kladnej odpovede* v *neúplnej* odpovedi, ktorú sme vytvorili ako kontrast k odpovedi zápornej. Táto *kladná* odpoveď zahŕňala prípady, keď neutrálnejšia lexéma bola použitá na rozdiel od tej v otázke. Otázka pritom musela obsahovať postojový indikátor (*tag*). Niektoré ďalšie stratégie boli tiež redefinované, takže *súhlasenie s otázkou* v našej vzorke pokrývalo aj odpovede (*reply*) a nová stratégia *dovolať sa konverzačných práv* bola vytvorená. Druhá zo spomenutých stratégií bola spolu so stratégiou *otázka implikuje zlú alternatívu* využívaná aj v prípadoch, keď otázka neobsahovala explicitne danú alternatívu a moderátor neprerušil odpovedajúceho, takže obe stratégie boli využité na vytvorenie dojmu nespravodlivého zaobchádzania s politikom zo strany moderátora.

Aby sme mohli porovnať distribúciu stratégií v amerických a britských rozhovoroch, vytvorili sme frekvenčný graf, kde *vyjadrenie sa k politike* a *napádanie otázky* dosiahlo najväčšie čísla, čo korešpondovalo s výsledkami Bulla a Mayerovej v britskom kontexte. Avšak stratégia *otázka obsahuje zle citovaný výrok* nebola prítomná v americkej vzorke a stratégie *ignorovania otázky*, *pýtania sa na otázku* a *dovolať sa svojich konverzačných práv* boli najviac zastúpené v prvom rozhovore so zahraničnou moderátorkou. Toto naznačuje, že americké rozhovory s domácimi moderátormi sú menej konfliktné než britské rozhovory, čo potvrdzuje tézu Claymana a Heritaga (2002). Rozdiely vo frekvenčnom zastúpení stratégií v rozhovoroch boli tiež okomentované, takže *externý útok* a *pýtanie sa na otázku* sa najčastejšie spájalo s republikánmi v Amerike, zatiaľ čo *rozprávanie o sebe* a *prezentovanie programu* s kandidátmi na budúceho prezidenta USA. Stratégia *otázka bola už zodpovedaná*, *otázka nelegitímna* a *otázka nevhodná v danom prostredí* sa zasa spájala s diskurzom senátora Obamu. Odpovede (*reply*) a stredné odpovede (*intermediate reply*) boli tiež skúmané z hľadiska *trvania* interview, *miesta* jeho konania, *roku* jeho produkcie, počtu otázok s vyjadrením postoja (*conducive question*), ktoré umožnili definovať štýl rozhovoru, ako aj z hľadiska *témy* rozhovoru, ktorá bola interpretovaná v zmysle FTA (odmietnutie zodpovedať otázku- *commitment*- objasnenie budúcej politiky). Naznačili sme, že kratšie trvanie rozhovoru môže obmedziť výskyt *rozprávania o sebe* a miesto konania interview môže zasa fyzicky ohroziť do budúcnosti sa zaväzujúcu sa výpoveď. Syntaktický typ otázky

(*Y/no, Wh, declarative*) nebol pritom rozhodujúci pre *odmietnutie zodpovedania otázky*, aj keď podmieňovací spôsob a budúci čas v otázke boli nasledované vystúpením z Gricovej konverzačnej maximy (*opting out*).

Princíp zaviazania sa (*commitment*) nebol jediný, ktorý definoval fungovanie vyšších princípov interakcie v politickom diskurze, pretože prekrývajúce (*overlapping*) stratégie naznačili vzťah závislostného prepojenia stratégií. *Súhlasenie s otázkou* sa prekrývalo s *neúplnou odpoveďou*, pretože niektoré časti otázky, ktoré poukazovali na očividnú pravdu boli potvrdené, zatiaľ čo tie, ktoré predstavovali FTA boli vynechané, nahradené, alebo sémanticky zreformulované. Stratégia *zápornej odpovede*, kde politici odmietli podniknúť zle hodnotený krok bol zasa napojený na *prezentáciu programu*; *odmietnutie zodpovedania otázky* na *napadnutie otázky* a stratégia *dôležitá téma nenastolená* na všeobecnú *prezentáciu programu*.

Pri skúmaní jazykových korelátov boli nájdené, napr. trpný rod a vetné modifikátory s oslabujúcim účinkom (*weakening hedges*) v stratégii *sebavysvetľovanie*, depersonalizácia a zmeny zámen v stratégii *dôležitá téma nenastolená*, kde sa tiež vyskytovali pseudo.vytýkacie konštrukcie a modálne slovesá vo vzorci S-Vcop-Cs. Zvyšovanie koreňovej modality (*intrinsic modality*) bolo nájdené v *prezentovaní programu*, *rozprávaní o sebe* a *presviedčaní*, kde sa zvyšovala i epistemická modalita. Morfológické rozdiely medzi životnými/neživotnými substantívami sa vyskytovali v *externej podpore*, kde boli prítomné miestne a vlastné mená a v *politickej analýze*, kde bol využitý odborný slovník. Lexikálno-sémantický aspekt bol zohľadnený v *otázke založenej na zlej téze* (antonymá), *súhlase s otázkou* (synonymá) a *neúplnej čiastočnej* odpovedi. Štylistika bola pozorovaná v akumulácii rovnakých predikátov v paralelizme a rétorických otázok v stratégiách *rozprávanie o sebe*, *presviedčanie* a *dôležitá otázka nenastolená*, kde sme si všimli explicitné (*overt*) a implicitné (*covert*) signály vyhýbania sa odpovedi (Clayman, Heritage 2010).

Naša hypotéza o prítomnosti jazykových korelátov prezentovaná v , bola vo väčšine prípadov potvrdená, ale v deviatich stratégiach sa ukázala byť iná, takže sme zistili, že napr., *ospravedlnenie* malo nepriamu formu pozostávajúcu z minulého času, adverbiami zreteľu alebo podmienkových súvetí, čo potvrdilo pozorovanie Z. Kampfla (2008) z izraelského diskurzu. *Vysvetľovanie programu* pozostávalo zasa z priraďovacích a podmieňovacích súvetí vyjadrujúcich kauzalitu a *neúplná* odpoveď z neutrálnejších lexém, ktoré nepredstavovali

nutne vzťah hyponymický vzhľadom k otázke. Tiež sme zistili, že stratégie, u ktorých sme predpokladali, že nebudú vyjadrené žiadnym korelátom, tento korelát mali, takže *ignorovanie otázky* obsahovalo dizkurzívne prvky váhania (*ehm*) a opakovanie odpovede tie isté tematické prvky z hľadiska informačnej štruktúry výpovede. *Rozprávanie o sebe* sa ukázalo byť funkčné, lebo na rozdiel od sebaujasňovania obsahovalo explicitné vyjadrenie agenta a deja, ktorý mal kognitívne kladný význam.

Princípy pozitívneho nátlaku (*coercion*) a vyhýbania sa (*evasion*) otázke boli prepojené vo všetkých stratégiách, kde sme našli jazykové koreláty, lebo aj *napádanie otázky* zvyšovalo *kredibilitu* politika vďaka oslabujúcim vetným modifikátorom (*weakening hedges*), menám moderátorov (pozitívna zdvorilosť) a slovesám vzbudzujúcim empatiu. V rozhovoroch tak bola nastolená spoločná platforma (*common ground*). Hoci je možné napojiť niektoré stratégie pragmaticky na porušovanie Griceových maxím, napr. *odmietnutie zodpovedať otázku* na vystúpenie z maximy, a na zdvorilostné stratégie rozoznávané Brownovou a Levinsonom (1987), napr. používanie kontradikcie v *napadnuteľnej otázke*, *externá podpora* na “vyjadrenie, že hovoriaci a recipient spolupracujú“ (Brownová & Levinson 1987:102), nie je možné k týmto priradiť všetky Bullove stratégie. Je to spôsobené tým, že signály pozitívnej a negatívnej zdvorilosti sú vo viacerých stratégiách rozložené. Hypotéza, že každá otázka obsahujúca akt ohrozujúci tvár politika (*FTA*) bude *napádaná v odpovedi* sa neukázala pravdivou, pretože *napádanie otázky* sa vyskytovalo v 66.7% z osemdesiatich-deviatich konverzačných výmen (*turn*). Vo zvyšných výmenách boli však stratégie využívané na vyvrátenie negatívnej presupozície otázky. Boli sme preto nútení pozmeniť našu pôvodnú schému, vyjadrujúcu vzťah odpovede politika k otázke.