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How Terrorist Campaigns End

*The Campaigns of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the
Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States*

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ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the development of terrorist campaigns. This is done by presenting the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants' points of view, based on interviews with participants and extensive archival material.

Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two campaigns, but in different ways. This divergence derives at least partly from dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, research should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the life-span of a single organization.

The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants.

Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants' self-image. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that they got involved in.

Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns.

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Contents

1 Introduction	11
1.1 Theoretical background	11
1.2 Design of this study	18
1.3 Methods and sources	22
1.4 Case studies	27
2 The campaign of the Rode Jeugd	35
2.1 The protest phase	35
2.2 Split of the moderate wing	42
2.3 The resistance phase	46
2.4 Decline of the Rode Jeugd	52
2.5 New attempts for revolutionary armed struggle	56
2.5.1. The Rode Hulp	57
2.5.2. The Rood Verzetsfront	65
2.5.3 Henk Wubben, the RVF and the RAF	67
2.5.4 Joost van Steenis and the concept of small violence	69
3 The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army	71
3.1 Formation of the Symbionese Liberation Army	72
3.2 Getting started	75
3.3. The murder of Foster	77
3.4. The arrest of Little and Remiro	80
3.5 The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst	82
3.6 Patty/Tania spectacle	89
3.7 Preparing for the inevitable	93
3.8 Regrouping	97

3.9 Attempts to revitalize the SLA	103
3.10 Aftermath	112
4 Comparison of the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army	119
4.1 Strategy	119
4.2 Organization	122
4.3 Ideology and political objectives	126
4.4 Incentives and interests	131
4.5 External factors	134
5 Discussion: Ways forward in understanding the end of terrorist campaigns	145
5.1 When does a terrorist campaign end	145
5.2 Role of organizational resources and dynamics	147
5.3 Words and actions: Ideology and self-image as sustaining forces	152
5.4 Public support and countermeasures	157
5.5 Conclusion	162
References	165

List of tables

Table 1: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of Rode Jeugd	120
Table 2: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army	121
Table 3: The organization of the SLA's campaign	124
Table 4: Organization of the Rode Jeugd's campaign	125
Table 5: Ideology and objectives of the Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1974)	127
Table 6: Ideology and objectives of Rode Jeugd (1971–1972)	127

1 Introduction

This study started out as a simple idea about a topic and a method. When I completed my Master's thesis in the late 1990s, I noticed that there were few studies on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns and in particular, few on the last phases of the life cycle of these campaigns. Another observation I made was that there were generally not too many studies on terrorist movements, especially historical ones, that made extensive use of first hand sources. What seemed to be lacking in particular was literature that combined theoretical discussion with carefully researched case studies.

As a consequence, I decided to explore the questions about the decline of terrorism in my dissertation by making source-based in-depth studies on specific terrorist campaigns. I looked for case studies among the left-wing movements that were active in the Western countries around the 1970s. In the end, I selected two terrorist campaigns that had not been studied in-depth: those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States.

In the following, I introduce the theoretical background, approach, methods and sources in more detail. There are new studies on the decline of terrorism that have been published after this study was designed.¹ As these studies have not influenced the design of my study, I find it more suitable to include them in the concluding discussion. Overall, these studies provide support both to the relevance of my approach and to the research results obtained from my case studies.

1.1 Theoretical background

Since there was so little literature on how terrorism ends, it was clear from the beginning that my study would be explorative. The design of this study has been influenced in particular by two articles that explicitly discussed the end of terrorism that were available when I began: Martha Crenshaw's article entitled "How terrorism declines" (1991) and the article "Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and the United States" by Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr (1989). Besides these articles, Donatella della Porta's study entitled *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (1995) and Alison Jamieson's work on the Italian *Brigate Rosse* (both 1990) were a source of ideas and inspiration.

What is common to all these studies is that they raise doubts about the validity of many popular clear-cut explanations for the decline of terrorism. For example, the decline of

¹ The most important of these publications are Cronin 2008, 2009a & 2009b; Horgan 2009a & 2009b; Bjørge & Horgan (eds.) 2009, Jones & Libicki 2008. See also Gupta 2008; Demant et al. 2008. There are more ongoing research projects that have not published their results yet. These include e.g. "Why Do Terrorists Stop?", a project led by Dr. Timothy Naftali and financed by the Smith Richardson Foundation. My case study of the Rode Jeugd is also part of the project. The aim of the project is to produce in-depth case studies of the decline of various left-wing, ethno-nationalist and religious groups. For a tentative summary of research results of these case studies, see <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/index.asp?id=2416&view=pdf&pn=tagungsberichte> (retrieved on January 14, 2008).

terrorism does not seem to find its explanation from the success in reaching political goals, or from the failure to do so. Neither does terrorism seem to end generally because of the countermeasures taken by the authorities, although these clearly play a role. The studies also do not lend support to the popular notion that in order to stop terrorism, one should deal with its root causes.² In fact, the process of decline is more complicated than any of these explanations suggest.

In her above-mentioned study, Martha Crenshaw analyzes the life-span of 77 terrorist organizations. From this analysis, she concludes that the decline of terrorism could be best analyzed as interplay of three factors: the government response to terrorism, the strategic choices of the terrorist organization and its organizational resources. The key word for understanding the process is the interplay. There are often various developments that contribute to the decline of terrorism and the impact of individual developments is ultimately determined by how they are intertwined. For example, measures taken against the senior leaders of the Black Panthers did take the sharpest edge from the movement. However, Crenshaw argues that “its decline was also the result of organizational over-extension, inexperienced cadres, loss of leadership through defections as well as arrests, unrestrained factionalism, and poor strategic choices”.³

Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr⁴ analyze the decline of terrorism by adopting Andrew Mack’s general analysis of the strategy of conflict as their framework. They start from Mack’s observation that the strength of the contending parties in violent confrontations is determined by their coercive and political capabilities. This means that terrorist campaigns presumably subside when the group loses a significant number of its capabilities. This loss can happen either internally to the group or to the larger environment. As a result of their investigation, Ross and Gurr identify four general conditions that can lead to a decline in terrorism. The first two, pre-emption and deterrence, result from counterterrorist policies that lead to the loss of a group’s coercive capabilities. More critical for terrorist movements, however, is the loss of political capabilities. This can generally happen either in the form of backlash or burnout. Burnout refers to the declining commitment to the group and its purposes within the group itself and backlash to the declining political support that the group enjoys.

When using this model to compare the development of terrorism in Canada and the United States in recent decades, Ross and Gurr discovered that terrorism often subsided due to a combination of these conditions, thus also lending support for the importance of examining the interplay of the different processes. Their study also emphasizes the notion that there are developments originating both externally as well as internally to the group that affect the development of terrorist campaigns.

In a later article, Ted Robert Gurr has emphasized the role of a supportive climate.⁵ He argues that an erosion of political support is an underlying rather than an immediate reason for a decline in terrorist campaigns. Public support may decline for many reasons. The first is the aforementioned backlash. The second reason is the increased risk involved in

² On the root causes discussion, see Bjørgo (ed.) 2005; Richardson (ed.) 2006; also e.g. Horgan 2005, 83–85; Richardson 2006, 55–59.

³ Crenshaw 1991, 81.

⁴ Ross & Gurr 1989.

⁵ Gurr 1990.

supporting a terrorist group, which is called deterrence. The third reason for decline in support are reforms that meet some of the grievances of potential supporters of a terrorist campaign. Such reform may also be a policy that opens up alternative means to attain the objectives.

Gurr points out that backlash within the wider public is not necessarily fatal. What matters much more is how the group's (potential) supporters react. Further, the effects of deterrence depend on whether there has been any backlash or reforms. If no considerable backlash has taken place within the supporters, the deterrent effect is not likely to last long. Finally, Gurr notes that reforms are hardly going to affect people who are already strongly committed to a cause. Instead, the main effect that reforms can have is to undermine the political basis of the support for the campaign.

It seems that the relationship between political support and the development of terrorist campaigns is by no means simple and straightforward. While the lack of any support clearly makes it difficult to continue terrorist action, a decline in support as such cannot be assumed to lead to decline in terrorist action. As it will become clear later in this study, one reason the Rode Jeugd decided to opt for more radical means of action was precisely its declining number of supporters. Since there were less people involved, they felt a need to look for new tactics that would compensate for their lack in numbers. A similar kind of observation has been made by Donatella della Porta with regard to the left-wing movements in West Germany and Italy. She argues that the more organized forms of violence came into the picture when the mass mobilization started to ebb away and the movements returned to more institutionalized forms of action.⁶ Furthermore, in the later stages of a campaign, the declining support can lead a group to step up violence, for example, in an effort to polarize the society in order to avoid becoming irrelevant.⁷

One relevant question for evaluating the impact of various developments into the terrorist campaigns concerns the decision-making and priorities in terrorist organizations. There have been two common models into explaining terrorist behavior in the studies of terrorism, which are referred to as the instrumental model and the organizational model.⁸

The instrumental model looks at terrorism as an instrumental strategy, which is used for advancing political objectives.⁹ This approach is basically an application of Thomas Schelling's theories on conflicts to the use of terrorist tactics. According to this line of explanation, the decision to use or not to use terrorism is based on the calculation of the costs and benefits involved in alternative courses of action. Characteristic to this approach is also that the choices that the actors make are viewed as a chain of actions where actors react to each others' actual or anticipated actions.

⁶ Della Porta 1995, 53. Moreover Rubenstein (1987) argues, although from different grounds, that terrorism results from the failure of mass political movements.

⁷ One of many examples of this is the escalation of the ETA campaign in the mid-1970s, a time when the dictatorship of Franco was replaced by a more democratic system.

⁸ These are, by no means, the only models used in the studies of terrorism. Models and frameworks have also been derived from social movement studies (e.g. Della Porta 1995), conflict studies (Weinberg & Richardson 2004), and psychology (Taylor & Horgan 2006; see also reviews in Victoroff 2005; Kruglanski & Fishman 2006), to mention a few examples. For an overview, see Ranstorp 2007.

⁹ See e.g. Crenshaw 1987 and 1990; McCormick 2003.

There are several contributions that discuss how exactly the strategy of terrorism works to further the group's political goals (and whether it works at all).¹⁰ Terrorist acts can be designed to intimidate or wear out the enemy to make concessions, spoil negotiations, provoke the enemy to actions that work in the terrorist group's favor, polarize the society, or outbid the competitors with the show of strength and resolve. Terrorism has been viewed both as an overall strategy to achieve long-term political objectives and as a tactic by which to achieve smaller victories that contribute to the long-term objectives.

The calculations are obviously conducted under constraints and possibilities offered by the prevailing situation. There are various versions of this instrumental approach in terms of what kinds of assumptions are made about the constraints that bound the rational decision-making process. At the one end, one can assume an ideal-type situation where the actors have all the information they need for predicting the consequences of their actions. By knowing the actors' objectives and the constraints and possibilities, one can therefore predict their choices. Other variants acknowledge that the actors do not have complete information about their operational environment, but that they act on their beliefs that do not fully correspond with "reality".

Following the logic of the instrumental model, terrorism would be abandoned when the situation changes in such a way that terrorism is no longer the preferred choice. The balance of costs and benefits may have altered, for example, because the authorities have introduced countermeasures that raise the costs of involvement in terrorism significantly. The strategy of terrorism may also become abandoned when new alternatives arise with better cost-benefit ratios. Such a situation may develop, for instance, when the government agrees to start negotiations with the organization. On the other hand, the organization may continue to apply its terrorist strategy despite its weak leverage and high costs if no better alternatives are available. Furthermore, the strategy of terrorism can be abandoned because the political objectives that the organization advocates are reached and therefore there no longer is a need to use the terrorist strategy. That is, at least, if the success does not lead the actors to use that strategy to achieve new goals.¹¹

As for the organizational model, it starts from the notion that terrorism is usually a group action and thereby significantly influenced by organizational processes.¹² This model derives extensively from organizational theory and from the natural systems model in particular.¹³ This model normally shares the instrumental model's assumption that terrorists behave rationally¹⁴, but it proposes a different set of goals and incentives. Like any other organizations, an organization involved in terrorism is subject to various kinds of organizational dynamics and considerations that shape its actions. People who join these organizations have other incentives for participating than only working for the political goals that the particular organization represents. These other incentives may

¹⁰ See e.g. Merari 1993; Kydd & Walter 2006; Neumann & Smith 2005; Abrahms 2006.

¹¹ Ross & Gurr 1989, 408.

¹² This approach is elaborated on especially in Crenshaw 1985; Crenshaw 1987; Abrahms 2008. See also McCormick 2003; Taylor & Horgan 2006; Oots 1989.

¹³ For example, Crenshaw draws largely from the writings of James Q. Wilson (1973) and Albert O. Hirschman (1970) while Abrahms refers especially to Chester I. Barnard (1938).

¹⁴ On rationality of terrorism, see Caplan 2006; Gupta 2008.

prove to be even more powerful as a motivation for participation because they are more immediate and more likely to materialize.¹⁵

One of the more important of these incentives is the need to belong to a group, or “the sense of solidarity from participating in a social collectivity”¹⁶. Along with the need to belong, other considerations such as the opportunity for action may weigh heavily. People may also join terrorist campaigns because of their desire for social status. Being part of a terrorist organization may provide its members respect and renown among their community or at least give an ego boost to the person him/herself. Generally, the acquisition of material rewards often motivates individuals to join organizations, but it may play a lesser role in the case of the organizations using terrorism.¹⁷

This all has profound implications for the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. The presence of these other incentives makes the terrorist organization something other than a vehicle for political work. Thereby, the decision-making in the organization is influenced by various other considerations than merely furthering its stated political objectives. Sageman claims that organizational issues are likely to play an important role as early as in the beginning stages. Entrepreneurship may contribute significantly to the formation of political organizations and at the individual level, the need to belong to a group may be an important motivation.¹⁸ Their role may become even more important over time. James Q. Wilson, one of the key theorists of this approach, has observed that all conspiratorial organizations tend to substitute group solidarity for a political purpose as their dominant incentive.¹⁹ The willingness to preserve the organization, and thereby the benefits that it brings to its members, may thus provide the primary logic for its action.

Following from this, the objective (or even subjective) success or failure in reaching the stated political goals do not necessarily lead to the end of a terrorist campaign. Neither does it necessarily depend on the costs and benefits of other alternatives for achieving political goals. Instead, it can be expected that the group fights for its existence as long as it is able to provide those incentives that make it valuable to its members. Terrorism would, however, end when these incentives cease to be available, for example, if the solidarity and cohesion among the group breaks down, its members lose social status within their community or the group is not able to provide its members material incentives.

The relevance of organizational concerns for the decline of terrorist campaigns finds further support in several studies, among others, the work by Donatella della Porta and Alison Jamieson. In her study about the left-wing terrorist movements in Italy and West Germany, della Porta made the observation that the decline was “related to unforeseen consequences of the very choice of clandestinity made by small groups in democratic regimes”.²⁰ These led them to a vicious circle, where protecting their organization from the repressive measures taken by the authorities led to increased isolation. According to

¹⁵ See for example, the discussion in Richardson 2006, 71–103.

¹⁶ Abrahms 2008, 95.

¹⁷ Crenshaw 1985, 474–479.

¹⁸ E.g. Sageman 2004.

¹⁹ Ref. in Crenshaw 1985, 480. Also Della Porta’s study (1995) on the left-wing organizations in Italy and West Germany points to this direction.

²⁰ Della Porta 1995, 135.

della Porta, once a group started to operate underground, external aims tended to be given up and their efforts and resources were directed increasingly to survival. As survival required more and more of their resources, less was left for political actions. Furthermore, because the groups went underground, they were necessarily separated from their social settings. While many organizations tried to “keep their structures more open and decentralized”, the less clandestine model seemed to work for short periods only. As the groups tended to become more isolated, they were pushed to adopt more closed organizational models in order to survive the counterterrorist measures. As a result, their organizations became more and more introverted and less sensitive to external developments.²¹ The deteriorating effect of increasing isolation as well as internal fighting also stands out from Jamieson’s research on *Brigate Rosse*.²²

Another interesting dimension of what an organization using terrorist tactics needs to do in order to stay functional concerns the maintenance of focus. As, for example, Martha Crenshaw and later John Horgan have brought up,²³ these kind of organizations must prioritize action over talk in order to facilitate sustained involvement. This means that when the focus on violence or struggle against a clearly defined enemy is lost, the organization can then be in trouble. To counter this danger, organizations have directed their activities towards preparations and training in times when there has for one reason or another been less political action. From this point of view, allowing the organization to lose direction and organizational capacity emerge as possible contributing factors to the deterioration of a terrorist campaign.

Soon after I began the present research, John Horgan published his first article about the disengagement from terrorism at the individual level.²⁴ It brought further support for my tentative observations about some critical analytical distinctions. Disengagement from terrorism can, he argued, be either physical or psychological. In the case of physical disengagement, an individual no longer has opportunities to engage in violent behavior. This kind of change in an individual’s position may result, for instance from imprisonment or from being expelled or moved (voluntarily or involuntarily) to another role in the organization. Furthermore, physical disengagement from terrorist attacks does not necessarily mean that the individual stops his or her involvement in the organization.

Psychological disengagement, on its part, is often a lengthy process, although some people who have left terrorist organizations have sometimes cited particular incidents or experiences as important catalysts. The seeds for psychological disengagement may have existed in an individual’s mind almost from the beginning if an individual has not been able to come to terms with all aspects of their involvement in the campaign. Horgan tentatively identifies three kinds of factors that seem to contribute to a move towards psychological disengagement.²⁵ The first is the negative intensity of the group. In other words, while the group may be able to offer an individual such valued things as feelings of comradeship, a sense of purpose and admiration, the pressure and isolation resulting from living underground and how it makes the group increasingly isolated may at some point

²¹ Della Porta 1995, 113–135. Similar kind of observations have been made by Martha Crenshaw (1991, 87).

²² Jamieson 1990a; Jamieson 1990b.

²³ Crenshaw 1985, 476; Horgan 2005, 151.

²⁴ Horgan 2003.

²⁵ Horgan 2003, 115–120; also Horgan 2005, 149.

start to weigh heavily on the participants. The second factor identified by Horgan is the sense of changing priorities or the feeling that the prolonged investment in the campaign has provided the participants with little return. Thirdly, the individual may become increasingly disillusioned with the avenues being pursued, either concerning the political aims, the operational tactics, or the attitudes underpinning them.

An important observation that arises from Horgan's study is that physical disengagement does not necessarily lead to a lessening of commitment to the group. It also seems that physical disengagement does not necessarily indicate or result in psychological disengagement. Therefore, it seems appropriate to treat the abandonment of terrorist strategy and the development of the ideological beliefs and political goals of those involved as analytically separate processes.

Horgan also brings up those dynamics that may complicate the decision to disengage from a campaign. One of these is the fear of retribution by others involved in the campaign. Even when there is no such fear, once an individual has physically disengaged, he or she probably has to escape law enforcement. For this reason, return to a normal life is often not a realistic or at least an easy option. Furthermore, as Martha Crenshaw has suggested, the different environments may vary in their hospitality extended to re-entry. In her view, the ease by which the former terrorists can find their way afterwards in the society may depend on the public attitudes among the society or the current public policies. In cases where terrorism is continuous with non-violent forms of collective action, as often is the case in divided societies, reintegration may be easier. While offering reduced sentences or negotiations does not always lead to the desired outcome, Crenshaw believes that some factors can be helpful such as "a social environment that does not provide justifications for terrorism but permits integration, appropriate government policies that reward exit and institutions that facilitate the process".²⁶ Many observations similar to those of Horgan and Crenshaw regarding factors inhibiting or encouraging disengagement have been brought up in Tore Bjørgo's studies on why people leave racist or nationalist youth organizations.²⁷

To summarize, several important observations arise from these studies with regard to explaining the decline of terrorist campaigns. Researchers have identified significant developments and factors that can have an impact on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns on several levels. At the system level, we can point to the counterterrorist decisions and measures taken by the authorities, the development of larger political movement, and to the public support and attitudes of the mainstream society. At the group level, the internal dynamics that develop within the groups involved in a campaign clearly play an important role. At the individual level, we can point to developments such as a growing disillusionment with the attitudes and actions of those involved in the campaign and changing priorities. Common to all these previous studies and discussions is that all of them stress that the developments at different levels are interrelated and therefore their impact is conditioned by how they intertwine.

²⁶ Crenshaw 1995, 23–24.

²⁷ Bjørgo 1998; also Bjørgo 2009.

Furthermore, when assessing the impact of different factors, it is important not only to look at how things develop, but also at how they are interpreted by those involved in the terrorist campaign. As people act not based solely on the facts but also on their beliefs, then it is necessary to know the beliefs to understand the decisions. That the leader gets arrested, the group's safe house is raided, or that the group faces increasing challenges with finding people to help it with logistics, are objectively verifiable incidents in themselves. Whether these incidents are akin to failure and what kinds of conclusions the group should draw from them, is a matter of their interpretation.

Another important consideration that rises from these studies, and especially from the one by John Horgan, is that one needs to be clear about what the "end of terrorism" means. Horgan mentions that one should not equate the disengagement from taking part in terrorist attacks with the deradicalization of beliefs and goals, because neither one leads necessarily to the other. Furthermore, neither physical nor psychological disengagement necessarily leads to leaving the organization responsible for terrorism. While Horgan makes this observation at the individual level, my initial observations about the case studies suggested that the same may be true at the collective level. In other words, the demise of a terrorist organization, the decline of a terrorist campaign and the (collective) deradicalization of the beliefs and goals of the participants, should be treated as analytically separate processes that may or may not coincide with each other.

1.2 Design of this study

In my view, the most promising way to bring more light into processes that lead to the end of terrorism is to look at the development of the campaigns from the participants' perspectives. In this study, my aim is to present the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives that describe the situation from the participants' points of view as accurately as possible. This, I believe, provides a good basis for evaluating the impact of various internal and external factors on the campaign.

Such a narrative will by necessity be an approximation. To begin with, there are no sources that would enable the investigation of all aspects of the process (I will return to methodological questions later). Furthermore, I share the commonly held skepticism among historians about whether a historical account can ever truly capture the past, even when it is based on the best selection of sources. One reason is that there is always an agent involved in putting together the narrative and the end result is always his/her interpretation.²⁸ Therefore, the narratives that I provide of the campaigns reflect my best understanding of how the situation may have looked from the participants' perspectives.

A common objection against an approach that emphasizes the actors' points of view is that the narrative easily becomes apologetic for the violent movement. Focusing too much on the inner world of the group also has the danger of portraying the movement

²⁸ See e.g. Collingwood 1946/1994 or, for a more radical deconstructivist view on history, e.g. Munslow 1997.

excessively as reacting to what the authorities or its other enemies have done.²⁹ This danger certainly applies to all actor-oriented studies. In other words, the researcher should stay alert and explore his/her attitudes against the research topic to avoid bias.

Besides apologies, in my opinion, a researcher of terrorism should be equally worried about the bias of condemnation. Alex P. Schmid made the observation two decades ago that most researchers of terrorism seem to have no reservations of adopting the “fire-fighter” role with regard to terrorism. If one is interested in doing research that fulfils academic criteria, the role should rather be the student of combustion.³⁰ That observation seems still largely relevant. Besides compromising the objectivity of the research, it is questionable whether approaching terrorism with this kind of “hermeneutic of crisis management”³¹ is going to yield good results. Just as much as the “interpretative approach”, this approach includes the danger that it leads to exaggerating the influence of measures taken by the authorities against the terrorist campaign.

The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of terrorist campaigns, not to evaluate or develop counterterrorist policies. I have therefore consciously distanced myself from the debate concerning what kind of counterterrorist measures could be recommendable and I have omitted a considerable body of theoretical literature about that. To be clear, the purpose of this study is not to justify or condemn the deeds by those who took part in the terrorist campaigns. Instead, my objective has been to take seriously the notion that terrorism can be studied like any other social phenomenon and try to conduct case studies that meet the academic standards as fully as possible.

Before moving on to research questions, some of the key terms used in this study have to be defined. To describe the type of campaigns under study, I use the word “terrorist”. Since this term has strong pejorative connotations, it is not the best of terms to be used in academic research.³² To be sure, my use of the term should not be viewed as a political or moral evaluation. I use it simply to refer to a certain method of action. By terrorism, I refer to the premeditated (threatened) use of violence against people or property in order to provoke psychological reactions in a wider audience than the immediate victims and thereby to advance political objectives. A campaign can be referred to as being “terrorist” when terrorist means are used systematically and when these means play a central role in the campaign’s strategy.

It is also important to define what exactly the change is that I seek to explain. Generally speaking, the question “how terrorism ends” at the collective level can be understood either as a question about “how terrorist *campaigns* end” or “how terrorist *groups* dissolve”. It is true that the end of a terrorist campaign has often coincided with the demise of the organization that was responsible for it. However, splintering is also a very common phenomenon among the terrorist groups. It is also common that when the

²⁹ These issues are discussed in length e.g. in Thomas Robbins’ critique of Jeffrey Kaplan’s approach (Robbins 1997) and Kaplan’s response (1997). See also e.g. Guelke 1995/1998, 14–17; Silke 2004a, 19–22; Silke 2004b.

³⁰ Schmid & Jongman 1988, 179. About this and the relationship between the policy-makers and research on terrorism, see e.g. Gurr 1988, 143–144; McCauley 1991 (and other articles in the first issue of Volume 3 in *Terrorism and Political Violence*); Silke 2004a.

³¹ Brannan et al. 2001.

³² About the history of the term terrorism and its problematic nature, see e.g. Schmid 1983; Schmid 1997; Hoffman 2006, 1–41.

original organization ceases to exist, a successor group continues terrorism, perhaps in an even more radical form than before. There are also several examples of cases where the organization prevails after terrorism has been abandoned. For this reason, it seems analytically more accurate to treat the abandonment of a terrorist strategy and the demise of that organization as separate processes.

A third dimension of the “end of terrorism” is that of ideology, worldview and political goals. Previous studies on why people join terrorist organizations and on why they disengage from terrorism point to the fact that the changes in the participation in terrorist actions does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with changes in one’s political beliefs and goals. While this observation has been made primarily on the level of individuals, it seems sound also not to assume on the collective level that a change of strategy indicates a change in beliefs and goals.

Therefore, I suggest that an analysis of the “end of terrorism” should make the distinction between changes in strategy, organization and beliefs/goals. The change that this study seeks to explain is the abandonment of a terrorist strategy, that is, the end of a terrorist campaign. By campaign, I refer to a series of violent acts committed by people who identify with the same terrorist network. This network may change its name or shape. Furthermore, I call these campaigns by the name of the principal organization that was involved in it.

What constitutes a campaign is also a question of definition. The choice of the word campaign derives mainly from the desire to employ a category that would include not only the original group, but also its successor organizations or organizations where a significant number of people involved in the original group have continued their involvement in terrorist action. For a group to be considered a successor organization there must be continuity at the level of persons (people from the earlier organization playing significant roles) and ideology (the goals and ideologies are broadly speaking similar). I consider a terrorist campaign to have ended when the key persons involved in the campaign have ceased both the execution and planning of terrorist attacks.

What also needs to be expressed in more detail is what I mean by a group or an organization. Firstly, in the case of many groups involved in the use of terrorism in the Western countries, it would be misleading to treat them as solid organizations. Their organizational structure can be loose, sometimes to a degree that a good case can be made for them being mainly state-of-mind organizations.³³ The adherents of a group can therefore range from the core members to the more passive supporters who have not taken part in the actions themselves but have provided, for example, logistic support. What is also important to note is that while I speak about the group as a singular entity, I do not assume that these groups act unanimously and speak with one voice. It is clear that the members may have contrasting objectives and ideas and that this evidently also plays a role in the actions that are taken in the name of the group.

In this study, I concentrate on examining five sets of questions which emerge to me as important on the basis of previous research on the decline of these kinds of campaigns.

³³ Illustrative is the article of Roland D. Crelinsten about the FLQ, which demonstrates that contrary to what many people believe, the FLQ was hardly an organization at all (Crelinsten 1987).

The first three sets of questions involve the developments in strategy, organizations and ideology. As stated above, the abandonment of terrorist tactics does not necessarily result from, coincide with, or lead to, the disbanding of organizations, nor do they indicate changes in the political views of those who have been involved in the campaign. However, previous studies on the topic suggest that the factors contributing to the end of a campaign may include the internal group dynamics as well as disillusionment with the campaign's goals or methods. Therefore it is of interest to know how the developments in each of these areas are linked in the cases under study.

To outline the development of strategy, organizations and ideology, the following questions are of importance:

Strategy: How did the strategy/means employed in the campaign evolve? How and why were decisions regarding the tactics and concrete actions reached? Furthermore, on what kinds of information and beliefs were those decisions based on? What results were then expected from the actions? And after the action was taken how was the actual outcome evaluated? Finally, how were the decisions regarding the strategy influenced by the availability of resources?

Organization: What do we know about the development of organizational dynamics? Why and how was the "original" organization disbanded? Moreover, why and by whom were the possible successor organizations established? Why have there not been any (more) successor organizations committed to violent actions when the campaign had definitely ceased? How were the developments in organization linked to the changes in strategy?

Ideology and political objectives: What kind of collective belief system did campaigns have? How and why did that change? What were the official political objectives of the organization? How did they change? How did these changes affect the strategy and organization of the campaign? Finally, how did those involved assess their success in terms of reaching political goals?

The fourth set of questions concerns the *incentives and interests* that affected the development of the campaign. As it has been suggested above, the decisions that an organization makes are not likely to be based solely on determining how to work for the political goals most efficiently, but also the fact that the individuals and the group collectively have other interests and priorities that have a significant impact on their decisions. Based on previous research, the importance of these other considerations rather increase than decrease during the campaign.

The fifth area of focus is the effect of *external factors* to the campaign. I concentrate particularly on the organizations' interplay with the potential and actual supporters. The first step is to determine who they were, in other words, who those involved in the campaigns considered as their (potential) supporters and who reacted to the campaign in a manner that indicates that they saw themselves as representing the same kind of objectives. The next step involves examining the evolution of the interaction and communication between those parties. Secondly, I look at the countermeasures taken against the campaign by the authorities. This means that I will focus mainly on the police and on the other authorities responsible for internal security as well as the government. The analysis concentrates primarily on finding out what those involved in the campaign thought of the authorities and what they expected of them, how those in the campaign

viewed the countermeasures and the kind of effect they had on the campaign. Thirdly, I look at the type of media attention that the campaign attracted and the nature of the impact it had on the campaign.

To gain a longer historical perspective on the end of terrorism, an attempt has been made to follow up on what the key participants in the campaigns have done afterwards. The reason for this is to determine whether or not these people have remained politically active and how their ideological beliefs have changed. This also allows us to see if and how they managed to re-enter society after their disengagement from terrorism.

1.3 Methods and sources

Since the case studies deal with campaigns that have ended decades ago, the methodology employed derives largely from the field of history. Following from this and the fact this study is about finding out how those involved saw their situation, primary source material on these campaigns constitute the backbone of the study.

With the help of this primary source material, which I have supplemented by previous studies and press reporting, I have attempted to construct a narrative of the development of the terrorist campaign in the way they themselves saw it. To put this narrative into its context, I have used previous literature to describe the larger political and social environment in which they operated.

In this endeavor, this study has drawn on Bonnie Cordes' article on the terrorist literature.³⁴ Cordes argues that "terrorist literature" provides a good window to the mindset of those involved in the campaigns. The documents do not generally serve only as propaganda for explaining and legitimizing the violent actions, but they also have an aspect of auto-propaganda. With the texts, those involved in terrorism introduce the political context of their struggle the way they see it and explain why those tactics they have chosen are both legitimate and necessary. The writings also often include references to current events and thereby give clues to the events and developments that may have shaped their ideas and evaluations.

In order to extract this kind of information from the writings, I have conducted a simple content analysis on the written material produced by those involved in terrorist campaigns along the lines suggested by Bonnie Cordes. In particular, I have paid attention to such matters as their analyses of the prevailing situation, their identification of possible allies, their description of the enemy, the legitimization of their violent acts and their expressions that indicate the presence of mechanisms of moral disengagement as described by Albert Bandura.³⁵

One of the major complaints about the state of terrorism studies has been the lack of source-based research on terrorist movements. Andrew Silke, for example, has claimed that the studies on terrorism live on a fast food diet by which he means that studies are

³⁴ Cordes 1988.

³⁵ Bandura 1990.

often conducted very quickly and utilizing questionable “ingredients”.³⁶ It has often been claimed that source-based research on terrorist campaigns is particularly difficult. Such organizations are not famous for their activities being publicly documented in great detail. Moreover, getting interviews from those currently involved in terrorism is considered to be extremely difficult or even dangerous.

In the face of many challenges, the researchers have become arguably lenient with themselves and other researchers on the methodological issues. One illustration of this is Silke’s analysis of the methods used in the articles published in the two major academic journals of the field. A majority of articles (62 per cent) were based on a documentary analysis and review, while interviews of any kind were used in only one-fifth of the articles.³⁷

It is true that terrorist movements are difficult objects of study and that any study on terrorist movements is bound to encounter methodological problems. However, it is clearly not impossible to conduct research on them based on primary sources. In fact, it may not even be as hard as it is often claimed. To mention a few examples, several scholars, most famously J. Bowyer Bell, have managed to get an extensive number of interviews with people involved in the IRA.³⁸ Another example is Mark Juergensmeyer’s study³⁹ on religious terrorism, which is based on interviews with people from different religious denominations. In addition, Marc Sageman’s famous study on the al-Qaida networks relies heavily on interview material.⁴⁰ Other scholars such as Jeffrey Kaplan and Helene Lööw have conducted studies on the far-right groupings relying heavily on fieldwork and interviews.⁴¹ Furthermore, members of the left-wing groups that were active in the 1970s have been extensively interviewed, for example, by Donatella della Porta⁴² and Jeremy Varon⁴³. What is also worth noting is that while active key members of the organizations are often indeed difficult to reach, it is easier to obtain interviews from less prominent members or people who are no longer actively involved in violent actions. Besides the interviews, many groupings have produced an astonishing amount of written material which is much more easily accessible than interviews.

For this study, I have consulted four types of source material: communiqués and other publicized documents by the groupings involved in the two campaigns, other documents and correspondence that are available, autobiographies of the people involved in the

³⁶ Silke 2001, 12. For a review and criticism about the state of terrorism studies, see Silke (ed.) 2004; Ranstorp (ed.) 2007; Schmid 1983; Schmid & Jongman 1988; Zulaika & Douglass 1996 as well as articles in the recently established *Critical Studies in Terrorism*.

³⁷ Silke 2001, 6. The analysis covers the articles published in *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* in 1995–1999. The exact results were: documentary analysis/review 62 per cent, documentary analysis/review combined with interviews 11 per cent, unstructured non-systematic interviews 9 per cent, structured systematic interviews 1 per cent, database 7 per cent, surveys/questionnaires 3 per cent and no source, 6 per cent. According to a recent follow-up article, the situation has improved somewhat, but there is still a lot to do (Silke 2007). For the methodological critique of terrorism studies, see also Gurr 1988; Horgan 2004; White 2000; Schulze 2004.

³⁸ See e.g. Bell 2000.

³⁹ Juergensmeyer 2000/2001.

⁴⁰ Sageman 2004.

⁴¹ Kaplan 1995; Lööw 1998.

⁴² Della Porta 1995.

⁴³ Varon 2004.

events, and interviews conducted by this author with former participants. I will describe the material I have used in more detail in the later section dealing with the case studies. Obtaining the relevant written source material required visits to several archives and libraries, but it did not pose any difficulties. Part of the material included in this study was obtained from the personal archives of the former members and Dutch journalist Frans Dekkers.

Getting interviews from the former members of the groups under study proved to be a time-consuming project. In the end, however, I managed to get a comparably extensive and unique set of interviews for both cases, although “extensive” is a relative concept in this context. While hardly anyone responded with hostility to my first letter introducing my study, it sometimes took years before the initial hesitation turned into an approval. Had I not had the perseverance to write a letter every now and then to inform them that I would still be interested in an interview, I would have ended up with a much smaller number of interviews.

Before undertaking this research, I had no contact whatsoever with either the people involved in the terrorist campaigns under study or with the journalists or scholars who had studied them. In the case of the Rode Jeugd, I had some help in locating the former members from the Dutch journalists Frans Dekkers and Antoine Verbij, but I took care of establishing those contacts myself. In the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, I approached most former members directly. One interview request was mediated by an attorney because it was the only contact information I was able to find and in two cases, one respondent helped me contact other persons.

Besides persistence, I noticed that my age and background worked in my favor.⁴⁴ The fact that a postgraduate student from Helsinki, of all people, was asking for an interview, seemed to help me get their attention. At times, it almost seemed like my interview request was partly accepted because the person was curious to meet me. Furthermore, for someone who came from a distant country and was only born in the 1970s, it seemed easier to win trust as an objective researcher who was genuinely interested in hearing what they had to say. In the case of the Rode Jeugd, I am the only researcher who has managed to interview all the key members since the late 1980s. Several Dutch researchers have tried to interview the same people after me, but they had much poorer results. In the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, I have had the opportunity to interview people who have never been interviewed about their part in the campaign before.

The interviews I conducted could be best described as semi-structured theme interviews. As basis for the first interview with each respondent, I used the same questionnaire, which included questions about their involvement in the campaign and their life afterwards. The questions were largely arranged in chronological order and content of the interview came close to an oral life history. These interviews lasted between one and three hours. With several respondents, I had two or more interviews. The further interviews were arranged around themes that emerged as being important on the basis of the first interview and interviews with other respondents. All interviews were conducted in the native language of the respondent without an interpreter. I asked each respondent to sign a consent form explicating the terms under which the interview was granted. The

⁴⁴ A similar observation has been made by John Horgan (2004, 33).

respondent was also asked to indicate whether s/he would like to remain anonymous or not. Part of the contract was also that the respondent had the right to check the accuracy of the direct references to the interviews with him/her before the publication of the study. It was agreed that the interviews could be used solely for academic purposes and by me only. The terms created many obligations and limitations for me, but I opted for such agreement in the hope that it would help me win their trust. In retrospect, I think that was a wise decision.

While written source material indeed exists and it is possible to be granted interviews, the source material is at the same time limited in quantity and quality. There are not many documents produced by the participants that deal directly with the groups' evaluation of the situation, the internal conflicts or a change of mind regarding the justifiable means. Some material that may have existed before has been destroyed in the 30 years that have taken place between the time this study was conducted and the developments under study took place.

There are also several methodological challenges with using interviews as source material. One complicating factor is that the number of potential respondents is relatively small since very few people have been involved in the campaigns first-hand. Some of those have already died, others were difficult to locate, and still others were unwilling to talk about their experiences. The snowball sampling was not very efficient, either, because those involved were generally no longer actively in touch with each other. Therefore, it was a challenge to obtain a representative sample of the participants to be interviewed and thereby to insure that all points of view have been taken into account in this study.

The researchers have also called for a prolonged interaction with the movement under study to become immersed in the research field and to enable the researcher to penetrate the facade that the movement presents of itself to outsiders.⁴⁵ Proper field work in the form of participant observation was naturally impossible in this case, because the groups were no longer active. However, I tried to address this challenge by interviewing the same people several times.

Secondly, when drawing conclusions from the interview material, it is very important to keep in mind what the interviews reveal. The first point is that the respondents may have their own agenda when agreeing to be interviewed, which can have a significant impact on the content and tone of the interview. As John Horgan has noted, terrorist organizations are aware of how they can benefit from academic research.⁴⁶ Since the groups under study are not active, their political agendas are not such a concern as they are with active movements. Many other concerns, however, prevail. For example, even if there were no conscious agendas, the accounts may be colored by things such as the respondent's need to justify his or her actions to him/herself or to others, or to make a point of him/ her having been right.

Sometimes interviews on this kind of topic come to touch closely to very personal and emotional memories. Group dynamics, arrests and organizational disintegration are clinical terms, which actually refer to fierce disagreements between old friends involving feelings of betrayal and sometimes personal losses. Although a long time has passed since

⁴⁵ E. g. White 2000, 101.

⁴⁶ Horgan 2004, 34.

then, some of those involved are still not eager to elaborate, or to even to think back on these matters. In some cases, the matter is further complicated by legal considerations. The people involved in the campaigns have not always been sentenced for all of their illegal actions. For many of these crimes, they no longer can be prosecuted, but that this is not always the case. This can set considerable limitations for what the respondent can talk about, as well as create ethical questions for the researcher. Furthermore, the fact that there have been prosecutions on several cases of the political violence that took place in the 1970s in the United States in recent years, does not encourage the interviewees to be open about the more controversial sides of those times in their interviews. Concerning these issues, I found it best to try to avoid the problem beforehand by restraining from asking too detailed questions on the more sensitive issues, especially in areas that were of secondary importance for my research.

As for the present study, matters were further complicated by the distance in time. There are various ways in which memory can become distorted. Daniel L. Schacter has summarized these as the seven sins of memory. Particularly relevant in this context are those of transience, misattribution and bias. With time, the memories tend to lose their specificity and lack details. They become blurred with other recollections and become more general descriptions. The person may also fail to recall the source of information correctly and therefore misattribute it. A common example of this is that a person may think s/he remembers a situation from the childhood because s/he has seen photos of it. The sin of bias, on its part, “refers to distorting influences of our present knowledge, beliefs, and feeling on new experiences or our later memories of them”. What an individual believes in and is interested in now, influences also how and what s/he remembers his/her past actions.⁴⁷

These kinds of issues of memory influence all interviewing, because interviews almost without exception deal with the (more or less distant) past. In this case, however, the distance in time was measured not only in weeks or years, but decades. There is evidence, however, that memories are rather stable when they become “archived”.⁴⁸ Matters and events that prevail in this archival memory are typically experiences that are unique and salient and “relevant to the way one defines oneself”.⁴⁹

As a result, recollections tell us basically how the respondent now remembers and views his/her past actions – or to be more precise, how he/she chooses to share these recollections with a researcher. These recollections are unavoidably influenced by hindsight, since an individual keeps on interpreting and evaluating his or her experiences and thereby possibly acquiring different meanings in different phases of his or her life. For these reasons, I am quite hesitant whether or not even the most honest interviews can provide the researcher with a fully reliable picture of the respondent’s images and perceptions of historical events. As with any other source material, interview accounts have to be compared with other sources.

However, the issues of bias and transience by no means make oral history interviews useless for the researcher. From this study’s point of view, getting to know how people who were involved in the campaigns view their past actions, objectives and ideological

⁴⁷ Schacter 2001.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Hoffman & Hoffman 2006, 275–281.

⁴⁹ Hoffman & Hoffman 2006, 289.

beliefs today is very valuable. Examining these narratives and retrospective evaluations, as well as the present political activities and objectives of these people, constitute part of the efforts to understand how the change in political beliefs and objectives is linked to the end of their involvement in terrorist action.

Furthermore, the fact that the recollections are always biased and selective does not mean that the information and perceptions provided by the respondents would be completely misleading – quite the contrary. Interviews can provide invaluable clues for the analysis of written source material. Moreover, arranging meetings with people who were involved in the campaigns can also open opportunities for obtaining access to personal archives. All information from the interviews and autobiographies has been carefully compared with other interviews and written source material to see whether information finds support elsewhere. I have also included detailed and extensive footnotes to the case studies to make it as transparent as possible as to the sources of my information and views.

To help to situate the campaign into its context, I have collected media reports, both from the mainstream media and what may be called the “movement press”, that is, publications of other (radical) left-wing movements and journals that were otherwise sympathetic to the New Left. Besides the general tone and scope of reporting and opinions expressed about the campaign, I have used the media reports to track down the public face of the counterterrorist efforts: the kinds of statements the authorities gave to the press and what kind of information was published about the measures taken or planned. For practical reasons, I have concentrated mainly on the print media.

I have invested rather heavily in this media analysis for many reasons: Getting media attention is elementary for all terrorist campaigns, because they seek to exert influence psychologically and therefore the acts have little effect if they are not reported in the media. Even stronger, especially in the case of a very small group, the media is the primary arena in which they exist for a larger audience. The media also serves as an important communication function between those involved in the campaign, their potential supporters, the larger audience and authorities.

In order to discover more about what the authorities did and thought, efforts were made to procure official documents concerning the campaign. While a number of documents were obtained, a considerable part of them are still considered confidential and have therefore not been released. Information from these sources was complemented by the published memoirs of the former officials who were actively involved in the decisions or measures with regard to the campaign as well as by the interviews with these people. I have also made use of previous studies on counterterrorist policies. While I have also gone to certain lengths to obtain source material on this front, it has not been among my highest priorities.

1.4 Case studies

As case studies for this research, I have chosen the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. I started to look for case studies among

the organizations that were part of the New Left wave⁵⁰ and that were active in Europe or in the United States. The vast majority of them fill the first necessary criteria that the campaign has definitely ended. Secondly, as I want to construct as thorough a description of the campaigns as possible, it is important that the source material that makes this possible.

The choice of such marginal campaigns may seem odd at first. The Rode Jeugd had barely even started up its terrorist campaign and never went underground. The deeds of the Symbionese Liberation Army do not lack in their radicality, but the style of its communiqués and the conduct of its members have made people doubt whether it is more a heir of Charles Manson than Mao and Che Guevara.

While neither of the two organizations selected represents the image of a typical terrorist campaign in the way that, for example, the Weather Underground, the Brigade Rosse or the Rote Armee Fraktion do, they may actually be just as common-place cases. According to the statistics that Audrey Kurth Cronin has compiled from the MIPT database, it has been fairly common for the campaigns to die away quickly. From the total number of 873 groups, only 457 filled the criteria of having targeted civilians (and not only property or military targets without civilian casualties) and having displayed sustained organizational capabilities.⁵¹

My interest was also drawn towards these groups by some initial observations with regard to the possible explanations for the end of their campaigns. The Rode Jeugd is interesting, for instance, owing to some comments that its former members have given about its decline (including the liberal climate and the situation in West Germany).

As to the SLA, most attention has been directed to the case of Patricia Hearst. What is interesting beyond Hearst is that despite its very limited resources, the SLA managed to attract enormous media attention and to escape the authorities for a relatively long time. Furthermore, it is interesting to look at why the adherents decided to continue their actions and new people joined them even though most of the potential supporters quickly distanced themselves from them. With the recent arrests of former members, it has become possible to interview former adherents that have been living under new identities for decades. Another fact that spoke for these campaigns was that very little academic research has been conducted on these groupings, even though a substantial amount of primary source material is available, which means that there were also genuine opportunities to produce new historical information.

The primary source material I have used for the case study on the Rode Jeugd includes an extensive number of publications by the group and its successors, including pamphlets and papers published by the group and its successors, its internal discussion paper, *Voorwaarts*, and several unpublished discussion papers. I also refer to articles based on the interviews that the former members have granted to journalists in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, I have conducted interviews with nine people who have been involved in the campaign. This includes all key members of the Rode Jeugd who are still alive. With finding the former members, I received considerable help from a Dutch journalist, Frans Dekkers. After obtaining a general idea of where to look for them, most of their contact

⁵⁰ With waves of terrorism, I refer to the David Rapoport's four waves of modern terrorism (Rapoport 2004).

⁵¹ Cronin 2008, 77.

information could be found from the telephone book. The interviewees' reactions to my first letter seemed to be shock and amazement, followed by further questions directed to me. After answering these questions, an interview was granted almost without exception. Some of them agreed very quickly, while in other cases, it took a few years before the curiosity and hesitation of some potential interviewees turned into acceptance. With one exception, no-one asked to remain anonymous.

The media analysis covers articles on the Rode Jeugd and the Rode Hulp that were published in the most important Dutch newspapers (*De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad*, *Het Algemeen Dagblad*, *Trouw*, *Het Parool*), the local newspaper of Eindhoven (*Eindhovens Dagblad*) and in several weeklies (*De Groene Amsterdammer*, *Haagse Post*, *Vrij Nederland*). As to the left-wing oriented publications, I have included *De Rode Tribune* (the publication of the competing Maoist organization), *De Rode Vlag* (the publication of the original "mother group" of Rode Jeugd), *De Rode Jeugd (ML)* (the publication of the splinter group of Rode Jeugd), *Rode Hulp* (the publication of the original Rode Hulp; the other publication with the same name, which was published by the Rode Jeugd influenced radical splinter group, is also included, but it is treated as primary source material) and *Vrije Socialist* (an anarchist newspaper).

This study has also benefited from the previous accounts on the Rode Jeugd. The most elaborate texts on the Rode Jeugd are *'n Hollandse stadsguerilla. Terugblik op de Rode Jeugd* by the journalists Frans Dekkers and Daan Dijksman, which was published in 1988, and the MA thesis of Eric van Staalduinen under the title *Rode Jeugd 1966–1974: Van Provo aanhang tot RAF adept*, which was completed in 1996. The first of these is an account on the Rode Jeugd in retrospect, based on interviews with almost all the former key members of the Rode Jeugd, most of whom Frans Dekkers, without ever being part of the Rode Jeugd, knows from those times. Considering its focus, this book has obviously provided valuable information and ideas for my study. However, as the book is mainly constructed around the various persons, it does not even attempt to offer a comprehensive view on the kinds of things that the Rode Jeugd did and how its aspirations and actions developed over time. This is exactly what Van Staalduinen does in his MA thesis by providing a chronological account of the history of the Rode Jeugd by relying on archive material and the aforementioned book. His study is a very ambitious pursuit to be a MA thesis and it has been very helpful for me in finding the material and in coming to grips with the development of the group. However, the thesis by Van Staalduinen leaves many questions crucial to this study either open or not addressed.⁵² Another MA thesis by Wouter Beekers, *Mao in de polder: Een historisch-sociologische benadering van het Nederlandse maoïsme 1964–1978*⁵³, which deals with the history of the Maoist movements in the Netherlands includes a few pages on the Rode Jeugd. In addition, the documentary film *Rode jaren* about the Rode Jeugd directed by Leo de Boer was helpful.

On the workings of the Dutch Security Service (BVD) in the case of the Rode Jeugd, a couple of books have been helpful. The first one is *In dienst van de BVD*, which is the memoir of Frits Hoekstra, who worked for the BVD in the 1970s.⁵⁴ Hoekstra's

⁵² Moreover, in his study, there is some confusion regarding the timing of some incidents and developments which stem from the incorrect dating of pamphlets.

⁵³ Beekers 2005.

⁵⁴ Hoekstra 2004.

recollections provide a glimpse into the methods that were employed in the case of the Rode Jeugd and into the kind of results they obtained. The workings of the BVD in the case of the Rode Jeugd and the activities of the Rode Jeugd members afterwards are discussed in Giliam de Valk's dissertation, as well as in Dick Engelen's book on the BVD.⁵⁵ Besides this, my analysis has benefited from cooperation with Beatrice de Graaf, who at the time was writing her book on the counterterrorism in the 1970s.⁵⁶ I have also had access to a number of police and intelligence documents concerning the Rode Jeugd and its successors.

In terms of understanding the political and cultural context, the studies by James Kennedy⁵⁷ and Ruud Koopmans⁵⁸ have been particularly useful. I have also used Antoine Verbij's account on the left-wing radicalism in the 1970s⁵⁹, as well as Jacco Pekelder's study on the *Rote Armee Fraktion* in the Netherlands⁶⁰.

In the case of the SLA, the primary source material I have used includes all publicized written communiqués and transcripts of the SLA's tape recordings, as well as the open letters sent by Russ Little and Joe Remiro during their imprisonment. Many of these communiqués and tapes are compiled in the book edited by Robert Brainard Pearsall⁶¹ and many more are reprinted, for example, in *Berkeley Barb*. I have also obtained a number of documents found from SLA safe houses under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOIPA). Particularly important are also the two articles compiled by Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer in early 1976.⁶² They include the Harrises' account of the events without editorial comments, as well as several comments by Russell Little and Joe Remiro. A shorter version of these articles has also been published by The Bay Area Research Collective under the name of *The Last SLA Statement*.

Besides the written sources, I have used a number of interviews I have conducted with the former associates of the SLA during the period of 2005–2008. Getting the former members to grant interviews was both complicated and facilitated by the fact that several of them were at that time in prison. Although they were easy to find, arranging interviews was difficult. I approached all six imprisoned former associates with a letter. In one case, my letter was delivered to the person via an attorney. Through those imprisoned associates, opportunities arose to approach other people who had been involved in the campaign.

In the end, I had the opportunity to conduct interviews with four associates of the SLA after the LA shootout. The interviews took place both in and outside prison. I have also had access to an unpublished memoir of one of these people. One of the respondents

⁵⁵ De Valk 2005; Engelen 2007.

⁵⁶ De Graaf 2010. We also wrote together an article on the early demise of the left-wing terrorism in the Netherlands, which will be published in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (De Graaf and Malkki, forthcoming).

⁵⁷ Kennedy 1995/1999.

⁵⁸ Koopmans 1992.

⁵⁹ Verbij 2005.

⁶⁰ Pekelder 2007.

⁶¹ Pearsall (ed.) 1974.

⁶² Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976; Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: "The story of the SLA", *New Times* April 16, 1976.

initially asked to remain anonymous, but withdrew that request after having read the manuscript and being released from prison. I have used only three of the interviews in this study. Namely, one of the respondents, Sara Olson, while she was curious to meet me and clearly liked me, was still very reluctant to talk openly about her activities in the 1970s and her time as fugitive. Therefore, the interview was of little help for this study.

Conducting an interview in prison posed considerable methodological problems. It was not possible to get a visitor permit as a researcher or journalist, so I had to enter as a regular visitor. Under that status, I was not allowed to bring a pen, paper or any recording device with me. I was also worried whether there would be sufficient privacy to allow an openhearted discussion. The meetings took place in the visitor cantina, face-to-face with the interviewee. In all cases, it was possible to talk without anyone in the room overhearing us. In some cases, it was possible to take a walk in the yard for yet more privacy. The interviewees did not seem to be overly concerned about whether the prison authorities listened to our conversation. The guards were reportedly mostly interested in tracking any drug traffic-related conversations or smuggling attempts and were not the least bit concerned about such old political matters we were discussing.

One of the luxuries in the prison interviewing was time. With each of those I met, I had at least two days of five hours completely dedicated to our discussion. After leaving the visitor center, I immediately recorded my memory of the interview on a digital recorder. Right after that, I processed the recording into the form of written notes. The interviews were supplemented by written correspondence that helped to verify my own recollections, especially with regard to factual information. Despite the limitations of the prison as a location for an interview, it was definitely worth all the effort and I feel that I have managed to account for the methodological challenges as well as it was possible under these circumstances. In terms of winning the trust and building rapport, meeting face-to-face was absolutely elementary. I believe that only by correspondence, I would never have been given the information and insights that I got this way. Having said that, the interviews differed much in terms of respondent's openness for discussing their involvement in the campaign of the SLA, much more so that was the case of the Rode Jeugd.

Last, but definitely not least, there is the memoir of Patricia Hearst.⁶³ This book provides a very detailed and intimate description of the time Hearst spent with the SLA and a very rare glimpse into the life inside an active terrorist group. The first edition of the memoir was published seven years after the events. It clearly derives heavily from Hearst's confessions and testimonies during her arrest and trial. Several questions can be posed about the validity of her account of the events, already based on her status as a kidnap victim and her mental state after first being held in a closet for several weeks. Several people who feature in the Hearst's account have, however, have confirmed to me that the facts and interpretations that she presents are largely accurate. Her description of Bill and Emily Harris may be somewhat colored owing to her own position with regard to them and it is visible in the text that she was not familiar with the extraparliamentary politics of the day. These issues notwithstanding, things went by and large as she describes. To my knowledge, no-one involved in the SLA has publicly disputed her story

⁶³ Hearst & Moscow 1982.

apart from the way she describes her own involvement and attitude towards the SLA. Therefore, I have made extensive use of her account, but have always tried to find other sources to support and contrast the view that she has presented.

Biographies have also been written about Joe Remiro, William Wolfe and Kathleen Soliah (later known as Sara Jane Olson). The biography of Joe Remiro⁶⁴ is written by a sympathetic journalist, John Bryan, and his own position towards Remiro clearly influences his account. This book has been useful in terms of understanding the milieu the SLA emerged from. Moreover, it provides insights into the milieu that surrounded the SLA. The biography of William Wolfe⁶⁵ written by Jean Kinney concentrates predominantly on Wolfe's life story. The book draws heavily from interviews with Wolfe's family and friends. The biography of Kathleen Soliah, aka Sara Jane Olson⁶⁶, has been written by Sharon Darby Hendry and published in 2002. This work was written without any cooperation from Olson and contains little original material.

The media analysis of the SLA includes a local Californian newspaper, *San Francisco Chronicle*, a national newspaper, *The New York Times*, weekly magazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*, and a more limited selection of articles published in *San Francisco Examiner* and *Los Angeles Times*. From the left-wing oriented movement press, I have gone through *Berkeley Barb*, *The Black Panther*, *Guardian*, *Ramparts*, *New Times*, *Rolling Stone* and *Dragon*. I have also used some KPFA radio broadcasts preserved by the Freedom Archives in San Francisco.

An overwhelming majority of the books about the Symbionese Liberation Army have been written in the 1970s by journalists who were reporting on it or by people who had a personal link to either Patricia Hearst or the SLA members. The previous academic studies on the SLA are limited to a couple of Master's theses submitted around the same time, although I am aware of another researcher who is currently studying the SLA as a part of a larger research project. The best book about the SLA by far is *Voices of Guns* by Vin McLellan and Paul Avery⁶⁷. Another well-known book, *The Life and Death of the SLA* by Les Payne and Tim Findley⁶⁸, is less detailed and less balanced although Tim Findley was among the stars of the investigative journalists who were reporting on the SLA at that time. However, credibility of their account suffers from providing overtly detailed and dramatized accounts of events for which there were no living witnesses who could have provided them with that kind of information. Furthermore, there are several articles on the developments inside the SLA campaign published in the 1970s that rely on interviews with those involved and provide accounts.⁶⁹

The rest of the books are more about the writers themselves or Patricia Hearst. To mention a few, another frontline reporter on the SLA case, Marilyn Baker, describes her

⁶⁴ Bryan 1976.

⁶⁵ Kinney 1979.

⁶⁶ Hendry 2002.

⁶⁷ McLellan & Avery 1977.

⁶⁸ Payne & Findley 1976.

⁶⁹ Most importantly, two articles based on interviews with Emily and Bill Harris, Joe Remiro and Russ Little that were written by Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer and published in *New Times* (March 5 and April 16, 1976). Also, there are two *Rolling Stone* articles written by Howard Kohn and David Weir (October 23, 1975, November 20, 1975, April 22, 1976) which rely on information from Jack Scott and Steve Soliah. On these articles, see McLellan & Avery 1977, 384–385.

experiences in tracking down the SLA in her book entitled *Exclusive!*⁷⁰. Patricia Hearst's fiancé, Steven Weed, has also written his side of the story in *My Search for Patty Hearst*.⁷¹ William Graebner's book *Patty's Got a Gun* focuses on the case of Patricia Hearst and particularly its reading⁷².

In the following two chapters, I will first present the history of both campaigns in a narrative form. After that, I go through the development of the campaigns focusing separately on strategy, organization, ideology and political objectives and external factors and examine what kind of similarities and differences can be found in the campaigns. In the concluding chapter, I will provide my analysis of how and why the campaigns declined and bring up the most important insights that can be drawn from them in terms of how and why terrorism ends and how to analyze processes that lead to it.

⁷⁰ Baker 1974.

⁷¹ Weed 1976.

⁷² Graebner 2008.

2 The campaign of the Rode Jeugd

The Netherlands of the 20th century is hardly known for its rich tradition of political violence. However, the first steps towards starting up an armed struggle were also made there at the same time as, for example, the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF) began to operate in West Germany and the Weathermen conducted bomb attacks around the United States. These efforts were made by the radicals involved into a loose organization called the *Rode Jeugd* (Red Youth). Like other New Left organizations involved in armed struggle, the adherents of the Rode Jeugd were also radicalized by the Vietnam War and believed that the world was on the brink of revolution. They thought their struggle was part of a worldwide struggle against imperialism and capitalism and looked to China as the leader of the struggle. However, the activities of the Rode Jeugd or its successors never developed on the same scale as those of the RAF or the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy.

2.1 The protest phase

A historical account of the Rode Jeugd, which was published in its internal paper in 1973, divides the history of the group into two periods: the protest phase of the years 1966–1970 and the period of resistance with the initiatives for armed struggle in 1970–1973.⁷³ After the organization was disbanded in 1974, many of its former members continued their involvement in armed struggle in the context of the *Rode Hulp* (Red Help) and in other networks.

The Rode Jeugd has roots in two directions – in the protest movement of the mid-1960s and in a small Maoist organization called the *Rode Vlag* (Red Flag), which was established by former members of the Communist Party of the Netherlands who were expelled from the party following a dispute between those supporting the line of China and those supporting the line of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴

In the mid-60s, the protest movement and mood was quickly building up in Amsterdam. The main phenomenon of these years was the Provo, which was established in 1965. This loosely organized movement was influenced by anarchist ideas and was best known for its style of protest. It aimed at provoking people by parodying the values and the way of living of the bourgeois. Provo was hugely appealing to protesting youths, and its gatherings drew together hundreds of people.⁷⁵

The development of youth protests were closely watched by members the Rode Vlag. In their eyes, the spring of 1966 marked an important turn. In March, thousands of youths gathered in Amsterdam to demonstrate during the wedding of Princess Beatrix who, even though the Nazi Germany had occupied the country a couple of decades ago, married a

⁷³ “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Rode Jeugd Stadsgeurilla Cahier no. 1, 15. On the Rode Vlag and Maoism in the Netherlands in general, see Beekers 2005.

⁷⁵ On protesting in Amsterdam around the mid-1960s, see e.g. Bosscher 1992; Kennedy 1995/1999. On the political background of the Rode Jeugd, see also Van Staalduinen 1996, 15–52. On Provo’s history see e.g. Mamadouh 1992, 54–85; Pas 2003.

German prince. While the protests so far had been mostly cultural in character, this time there seemed to be clear political overtones. The Rode Vlag members were excited to see the youths taking to the streets to protest against the prevailing system, but they felt these youths lacked understanding on what they should do and on who they should target. To help the protestors with this, the young members of the Rode Vlag established a youth paper, which became called the *Rode Jeugd* (Red Youth), and they started to distribute it among the protestors and thereby educated those on Marxism-Leninism.⁷⁶ Two central figures behind this paper were Willem Oskam and Joost van Steenis, both in their twenties and prominent activists of the left-wing scene.

Besides the youth, workers also seemed to be becoming more active. In June of 1966, construction workers marched in the streets of Amsterdam to protest against unfair holiday bonuses. The demonstrations turned into riots when a man was found dead among the crowd. The demonstrators widely believed that he was killed by the police. When the morning edition of the populist-conservative newspaper *De Telegraaf* (correctly) reported that the man died of heart failure, the demonstrators, reinforced by many more people, stormed into its building.⁷⁷

In the aftermath of these riots, the Rode Jeugd got its first moment of fame. A few days before they began, the Rode Jeugd had been handing out its third pamphlet in the city centre of Amsterdam. This pamphlet listed a number of American banks and other locations with their addresses and a following text:

Above is a short and very incomplete list of American companies and institutions where the following things could be done: breaking windows, chalking anti-American slogans on the walls, setting fires and so forth. But as several of our “left-wing” newspapers and weeklies [...] have already stated vehemently, and we fervently agree, something like that would be scandalous! That is certainly hooliganism. Creatures who do such things are dubious people, beggars of the worst kind.⁷⁸

The pamphlet landed in the hands of the widely respected novelist Godfried Bomans, who then accused the Rode Jeugd in his op-ed of being the culprits behind the recent riots.⁷⁹ The op-ed drew considerable attention and led to the arrest of four Rode Jeugd members who were sentenced to four weeks in prison and a 1000 guilder fine. Bomans, however, received so much criticism for his writing and the consequences it caused, that he was forced to apologize. As a token of his regret, he donated 100 guilders to the Rode Jeugd’s fundraising campaign to cover the fines and legal costs.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ “Communique,” *Rode Vlag* 3, no. 6 (June 1966); *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad* 1, no. 1 (June 1966); “Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. 1” (Rode Jeugd’s pamphlet, May 26, 1966).

⁷⁷ See e.g. Bosscher 1992; Kennedy 1995/1999, 155–158.

⁷⁸ “Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. III”, dated June 10, 1966.

⁷⁹ Bomans, Godfried; “De raddraaiers,” *de Volkskrant* June 18, 1966.

⁸⁰ Rode Jeugd managed to collect at least 1300 guilders by the campaign. The sum donated by Bomans was given to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam in Prague in the form of medicine and plastic. Eggen, Fr.: “Zilverlingen van Bomans”, *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad* no. 3 (1966); “De in ons land bekend staande humorist “Godvruchtige Godfried”...”, *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad* no. 4 (1966); “Voorlopige verantwoording steunlijsten Rode Jeugd,” *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad* no. 5 (1966).

While the Rode Vlag leaders were pleased with the initial success of the youths their relations soon disintegrated. In the leaders' view, instead of introducing the protesting youths to Marxism-Leninism, their own youths had become badly infected by the playful anarchist style of the Provo movement, which was the main phenomenon of the protests. When Willem Oskam praised the Provo and slandered the working class on the pages of the Rode Jeugd, Rode Vlag had had enough.⁸¹ The youths went on to establish the Rode Jeugd as an independent organization in October, 1967. Its first meeting, which was advertized during the Provo activities, was attended by about 60 youths, many of whom joined the organization.⁸²

The first years of the Rode Jeugd were characterized by spontaneity and by their loose organization. Around the core leaders and key members, there were perhaps a few hundred youths, mostly workers. Activists who aligned with the Rode Jeugd took part in demonstrations, published their own paper, chanted slogans on walls and distributed pamphlets. In other words, the Rode Jeugd did not have any concise and strictly defined political program. Rather, its agenda and ideology was a mixture of Marxism-Leninism and the concerns of the protest movement. The Rode Jeugd was involved in protests against the US and for the liberation movements and took part in almost any leftist demonstration that was organized in Amsterdam. On the other hand, it brought to the fore the more traditional working class issues such as the poor position of young workers in the labor markets, the working conditions and wages in particular companies, and the development of communist movements elsewhere in the world.⁸³

The Rode Jeugd became soon known for its hard approach. This means that they did not believe that peaceful protesting would lead anywhere and they therefore advocated more confrontational methods. When the Rode Jeugd adherents were confronted by the police, they did not withdraw but struck back. In the demonstrations, the Rode Jeugd people carried flags and placards bound on stout poles that were used as a cudgel and many youths also brought chains with them. It was exactly this militant attitude that made the Rode Jeugd attractive for those who got involved.⁸⁴ This extreme approach became an important part of its self-image and its trademark that distinguished it from other Marxist-Leninist organizations:

De "Rode Jeugd", the only consistent revolutionary organization in the Netherlands, WILL realize its action program, step-by-step and despite the intimidation or reactions that it gets. As Marxist-Leninists, we consider it our responsibility to respond with ALL means to the insults and challenges posed by imperialist capitalism.⁸⁵

⁸¹ For the dispute see Oskam, Willem: "Rode Jeugd interviewt Provo Rob Stolk," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad* 1, no. 5/6 (December 1966); Oskam, Willem: "De beweging en de stilstand," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad* 1, no. 6 (January 1967); Oskam, Willem: "Leve de lange haren en de witte spijkersbroeken!!!!!!!!!!," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad* 1, no. 7 (April 1967); Bischof, C: "Proletariaat of Provotariaat?" and "Inhoud van Rode Jeugd valt niet onder verantwoording van redactie Rode Vlag," *De Rode Vlag* 4, no. 5 (May/June 1967).

⁸² "Organisatie!!!! *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 10 (October 1967).

⁸³ See *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 1–13 (1966–1968).

⁸⁴ E.g. interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

⁸⁵ *Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven* no. 1 (1968).

The same extreme approach, however, strained its relations with other Marxist-Leninist movements and to a degree, with the protest movement of the day.⁸⁶ By 1968, it had come so far that the Rode Jeugd was often not invited to demonstrations. For the Rode Jeugd, though, not being invited seemed like the strongest invitation of all. An obviously frustrated Rode Vlag leader wrote about a Vietnam demonstration organized in October, 1968:

Because the [...] organizations had not dared to ask the Rode Jeugd to participate (apparently because of the prior experiences!), they [Rode Jeugd] found it necessary to suddenly show up with slogans that had nothing to do with defending the Vietnamese people. The police got a reason to intervene when other demonstrators, who wanted to remove these slogans, got into a fight with the Rode Jeugd.⁸⁷

In the late 1960s, new Rode Jeugd branches were established in the various towns in the late 1960s. These were established by people who had come to Amsterdam for demonstrations, had met the Rode Jeugd people and had put together their own organization back in their home town. New Rode Jeugd branches were established in Eindhoven, IJmuiden, Kampen, The Hague and in several other cities (of which little was heard afterwards).⁸⁸ The activities of the different branches took varying forms as a result of the differences in the local protest scene, the reactions from the authorities and the aspirations of the local Rode Jeugd leaders. In most places, their actions did not really go much further than chalking, distributing pamphlets in the streets and inside companies, and participating in the demonstrations.

The most important of the new branches was that of Eindhoven. Towards the end of the 1960s, Eindhoven became a major locus of the Rode Jeugd's radical actions. The Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven also emerged as a very open club of mostly working youths who were eager for action. The character of this branch, however, was strongly shaped by the local conditions together with the determination of its local leader, Henk Wubben. After returning from a thought-provoking eight years of sailing with the mercantile marine, Wubben joined the Rode Jeugd and established its Eindhoven branch.⁸⁹

When it came to local conditions, Eindhoven was a much more conservative city than Amsterdam. Eindhoven was largely run by one party (*Katholieke Volkspartij*, Catholic People's Party), one company (Philips) and one publication (*Eindhovens Dagblad*, the Eindhoven Daily). The Rode Jeugd in Amsterdam was one among many protesting groups, but in Eindhoven, it was practically the first youth group which outspokenly challenged the policies and values of the major power holders. The reaction of the authorities was harsh, reflecting a determination to prevent youth movements gaining

⁸⁶ See e.g. "De Vietnam-demonstratie van Piet Nak", *Rode Jeugd. Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad* no. 8 (1967); "Rode Jeugd. Ontstaan en ontwikkeling," *Rode Jeugd. Stadsgeurilla Cahier*, no. 1 [1972]; "Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973," *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973; Interview with Aat van Wijk on April 17, 2007.

⁸⁷ Bischof, C: "Provotariaat of Proletariaat," *Rode Vlag* 5, no. 1 (November 1968).

⁸⁸ See e.g. *Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven*, no. 1 (1968); "Rode Jeugd actief in het land," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 13 (November 1968). About the activities of different branches, see *Rode Jeugd – in dienst van het volk*, no. 3 (1970), no. 1–4 (1971).

⁸⁹ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 26–27.

ground in the city. The first arrests were made during the first public action of the Rode Jeugd, which involved pasting wall posters about the situation in Indonesia. Besides taking photographs and finger prints and keeping the youths overnight in the cell, the police had, according to Wubben, informed their employers, “as if we had committed a murder.”⁹⁰

Provocative confrontations with the authorities and especially with the police became a prevalent aspect of the Rode Jeugd’s actions in Eindhoven. They took the form of more or less spontaneous taunting of the policemen by shouting things, of damaging police cars, or of doing something to which the police would react but by making sure the Rode Jeugd people remained just out of reach. That seems to have been mostly an enterprise of certain younger members of the Rode Jeugd, while Henk Wubben was rarely seen taking part in these actions.

Besides the authorities, the Rode Jeugd’s adherents frequently ended up in a confrontation with American soldiers who were based in West Germany and who regularly visited Eindhoven on their furloughs. These “beer patrols”, as the Rode Jeugd called them, came several times to the Rode Jeugd stand at the market place to pick a quarrel and to destroy the propaganda material. According to eye witnesses’ and the Rode Jeugd’s own account, the police were not eager to interfere with the fighting, which was interpreted as a sign of discrimination against the left-wing and progressive youths.⁹¹ The third front of these confrontations was at the factory gates. The Rode Jeugd youths came often into conflict with the security guards when they were delivering pamphlets to the workers who were entering the factory grounds.⁹²

From the Rode Jeugd youths’ perspective, it looked like whatever they did, they were confronted by countermeasures. To defend its right of existence, the Rode Jeugd decided to respond to every action taken against them with an even harder reaction. This soon led to a process of escalation:

In the morning, confrontation group of the Rode Jeugd goes to the [factory] gate to deliver pamphlets to the arriving workers with calls such as do not take this, protest, go to resistance, etc. Then the factory guards come and say, you must go away, you are in the territory of the factory [...]. A couple of days later, you go back [...]. Away from the sight is what was called a strike force. Again the security guards came out to beat us. The strike force stormed immediately to the fore and beat the security guards with cudgels.

The next step was that you came back again with the confrontation group and the strike force to the gates and invite the security guards to come out. [...] If that did not help, then we came to the next phase [...]. You located the house of the company’s director, chalked it, broke the windows and turned his car around.

⁹⁰ “Hoofdinspecteur de Jager contra Rode Jeugd” (Rode Jeugd Eindhoven pamphlet [July 1968]); Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003. Reactions by the local police of Eindhoven to the first actions of the Rode Jeugd are also characterized as strong by the BVD (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst*, National Security Service) in its reports (“Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973).

⁹¹ “rj 7: Amerikanen in Eindhoven” (Rode Jeugd Eindhoven pamphlet [October 1968]); “Politie solidair met Amerikanen,” *Publikatie Aktiegroep Rode Jeugd Eindhoven*, no. 1 (1968); Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 29; “Politie zou niet hebben ingegrepen”, *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 7, 1968.

⁹² E.g. interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003.

These are naturally hard and extreme methods, but other methods did not work in Eindhoven. We had to act this way, not only to continue existing as political movement, but also to enforce our authority. That was thus a culture of violence, an institutionalized culture of violence that was used against us in the first instance and which we resisted. That way you came to a process where one step provoked another.⁹³

The most famous confrontation of the Rode Jeugd with the authorities took place in February, 1969. The Rode Jeugd organized a demonstration against Philips together with the *Studenten Vakbeweging* (SVB, Students' Trade Union Movement)⁹⁴ under the name of *Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland* (Action group Eindhoven Greece). A couple of months earlier, Philips had opened a new factory in Greece which in the demonstrators' opinion, indicated that Philips was supporting the US-backed military junta that had come to power two years earlier.⁹⁵ Overall, Philips was a manifestation of those powers that the Rode Jeugd was opposing: imperialism and the local establishment of Eindhoven.

The demonstration reached its climax when the demonstrators, led by Henk Wubben and Evert van den Berg (another prominent Rode Jeugd member of Eindhoven in the years to come), approached the statue of Anton Philips to lay a wreath made of barbed wired and decorated with a swastika.⁹⁶ The police had called the demonstrators to stay away from the statue, and when that order was not obeyed, the police dogs were released and allegedly several plainclothes Philips security guards attacked the demonstrators. A couple of days later, the police commissioner, Odekerken, defended his decision in the local newspaper:

The boundaries must be set somewhere and for me personally it was in front of the statue of Dr. A.F. Philips. Dr. Anton Philips has meant a lot to Eindhoven; to prevent this statue, his memory being damaged, I consider that I acted sensibly when I gave leave to release the dogs.⁹⁷

This demonstration was followed by a wave of reactions that brought the Rode Jeugd into the national awareness.⁹⁸ For Henk Wubben, it cost his job, as it turned out that the company he was working for was linked to Philips.⁹⁹

The escalation process between the Rode Jeugd and the authorities in Eindhoven undoubtedly played a central role in Rode Jeugd's radicalization. Faced with the ever-escalating conflict, its members expected that a similar kind of polarized situation would

⁹³ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003.

⁹⁴ SVB was a student union established in 1963 to advocate the interests of students with the French *Union nationale des étudiants* as its model. For more about the SVB, see e.g. Regtien 1969; Kijne 1978, 37–68.

⁹⁵ "Demonstratie zaterdagmiddag 22 februari [...]" (Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland pamphlet [February 1969]).

⁹⁶ *Eindhovens Dagblad* February 24, 1969; Linden, Frénk van der: "Ik zit gevangen in mijn eigen onbuigzaamheid," *NRC Handelsblad* April 19, 1997; "Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973; Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 29–30.

⁹⁷ "Politie gebruikte honden tegen demonstranten," *Eindhovens Dagblad* February 24, 1969.

⁹⁸ E.g. *Trouw* February 26, 1969.

⁹⁹ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003.

eventually develop in the Netherlands as already had occurred in West Germany and France. That suggested that a change of tactics was necessary:

The tactics of extraparliamentary actions that the Rode Jeugd uses in Eindhoven will change significantly and fundamentally. The traditional forms of passive resistance such as demonstrations [...] have proven to be insensible and can be reconsidered. It has been naive and unrealistic to think in the first place that monopoly capitalism of the establishment would be moved by a pamphlet where the disastrous consequences of the capitalist system are underlined. [...] We must move from peaceful, sterile protests to progressive resistance. [...] It is clear that our tactic [...] has to be to wage aggressive urban guerrilla war. The possibilities for such guerrilla struggle in the population centers of the west must be studied. [...] The use of progressive violence against the reactionary violence will thus lead to the total reorientation of the Rode Jeugd's purpose, methods and ideology.¹⁰⁰

It was announced that the Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven had adopted a new approach called *Revolutionaire Buitenparlementaire Oppositie* (REBO, Revolutionary Extraparliamentary Opposition), modeled after the German and French extraparliamentary oppositions. The use of violent tactics was justified by drawing a parallel between the Rode Jeugd and the guerrilla movements in the Third World. They all found themselves in similar kinds of situations and were acting as vanguards for the suppressed masses.¹⁰¹

After the Philips demonstration, the conflict continued to escalate in Eindhoven. This time, the Major of Eindhoven, Herman Witte, became their target. The Rode Jeugd accused him of unsavory behavior during the Second World War. In September of 1969, his car was hit by an incendiary device when he was returning from the opening ceremony of the new city hall. In response, the police arrested thirteen youths and seven of them were forced to sign a written commitment that they would not take part in political activities for the next six months.¹⁰² In June of 1970, the home of a police sergeant, Piet Snijders, stationed together with two other sergeants in the inner city of Eindhoven, seemed to have been the target of a fire bomb attack, although the bomb actually hit the neighboring house. A few months afterwards, three local Rode Jeugd members, including Henk Wubben, were arrested and held in custody until they were acquitted from the original charges, most of them being related to the aforementioned firebomb attack. Wubben himself ended up serving six months for another charge.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ "REBO", *Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd*, no. 3 (1969).

¹⁰¹ "REBO," *Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd*, no. 3 (1969).

¹⁰² Van de Pol, Dick: "Iemand om zeep helpen is in onze ideologie volkomen vanzelfsprekend," *Vrij Nederland* August 7, 1971; Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 30–33; "Oproep--oproep--oproep..." (Rode Jeugd pamphlet); In April 1969, a firebomb was thrown into Witte's house, but the Rode Jeugd has always claimed that it was not responsible for that act (Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 30).

¹⁰³ Wubben was arrested as a suspect in a firebomb attack against a house close to where Piet Snijders lived. The police assumed that the perpetrators had mistakenly hit the wrong house. Wubben was found not guilty in the end (as was Luciën van Hoesel, who was also charged with the same deed), but he received a sentence of two months for another charge pressed against him in the same trial (destroying the carpet at the town hall), which was quite likely included in order to guarantee a conviction. The arrests trials are described from the Rode Jeugd's point of view in *Rode Jeugd vogelvrij? 1. Het Proces 2. Dubbelspion. Uitgave Rode Jeugd* [1971]. The third member arrested as a suspect in the firebomb attack was Geert Paulussen, who was released without being tried after three months and soon afterwards was recruited as a police informant and

2.2 Split of the moderate wing

While the Rode Jeugd kept radicalizing, the protest movement around it was also changing. This had a profound impact on the Rode Jeugd:

The year 1970 was important for RJ, and it found its expression in 1971. After 4 years of disturbances, during which the Rode Jeugd kept going well, the movement began to ebb away. This happened in 1969 and 1970. With this, also the potential of RJ became slowly washed away. What was left were the motivated adherents, a few key members and the leaders. Whereas during the period 1966–1970, violence was used only in the form of stones, smoke bombs, cudgels and a few Molotov cocktails, in 1970, the discussion of more serious violence began, the development of the “urban guerrilla,” about which little was known at that time.¹⁰⁴

The protest movement, which was largely based on spontaneity, was losing momentum. Instead, many of those who had been active in that context started to orient themselves towards the established politics. Most typically, they joined small parties that had close bonds with the movement or the increasing number of single-issue (peace, environmental, etc.) organizations established within it.¹⁰⁵ This was made possible by the attitudes of the Dutch elite towards the new political movements. Towards the mid-1960s, a rather common perception among the elite was that the world was changing quickly and it made no sense to fight against it.¹⁰⁶

For a small minority, which included the core of the Rode Jeugd, this co-optation and institutionalization was no way to go.¹⁰⁷ With the ebb of the protest movement, however, the Rode Jeugd lost the majority of its adherents. What was left were the leaders and the most committed members.¹⁰⁸

The new situation intensified the discussion among the core members about the group's future. While spontaneity had had its advantages in the earlier years when a large number of youths were easily mobilized into action, the new circumstances, according to the activists, called for stricter organization and for a more serious approach. This was demanded especially by Henk Wubben, who had never been a big fan of spontaneity. The Rode Jeugd put considerable faith in the working class youths to show themselves to be more revolutionary and committed than the students.¹⁰⁹

Besides good organization and discipline, a good revolutionary movement also needed a clear political program. This turned out to be a particularly tricky question. In the previous years, the ideas and activities of the Rode Jeugd in the different cities had developed in different directions and along several political lines. While the development

later doubled by the Rode Jeugd. Snijders' close colleague, Flip Raap, confirmed in an interview that the Rode Jeugd's description of the events is largely accurate (Interview with Flip Raap on June 11, 2003).

¹⁰⁴ “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973.

¹⁰⁵ Koopmans 1992, 64–66.

¹⁰⁶ Kennedy 1995/1999, 146–173.

¹⁰⁷ Koopmans 1992, 66–67.

¹⁰⁸ “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” *Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973.

¹⁰⁹ “RJ van protest naar verzet,” *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 1 (1970);

Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003.

of the Eindhoven branch was generally met with interest and excitement by the Rode Jeugd youths in other cities, there were also critics.

Efforts for a coherent program and a more structured organization were made already in 1969 when the first congress of the Rode Jeugd was held. On that occasion, Willem Oskam was appointed as Rode Jeugd's chairman and both Henk Wubben and Joost van Steenis were selected as the other members of the leading troika. Moreover, a document outlining its principles was drafted, but not everyone was happy with it.¹¹⁰

During 1970 and 1971, a fierce dispute developed among the Rode Jeugd. The battle about the appropriate course of action was waged with the writings of Marxist-Leninist classics as a weapon in the Rode Jeugd's internal discussion paper, *Voorwaarts* (Forwards). Opposed to each other were the moderates in Amsterdam and Kampen, led by Ton Meurs on the one side and the radicals, including the whole branch of Eindhoven and most of the Rode Jeugd's leaders, on the other side. The key issue was very typical for the radical left-wing movements of its time: violence¹¹¹ now or only later. That violence was necessary to further revolution was self-evident to all of them.

For the moderates, the best actions of the Rode Jeugd were committed around the period of 1969–1970 in Amsterdam where the group had become active in organizing the youths working for the Albert Heijn supermarket chain. In those efforts, the Rode Jeugd was working along real communist lines and not caught in such sidetracks as insensible fighting with the authorities.¹¹²

In Eindhoven, community work never really took hold. The activities there were more characterized by direct action and by an ever-escalating confrontation with the authorities. The local Rode Jeugd members and most of the organization's national leaders supported what was called the radical or Leninist line. Besides the classics of Marxism-Leninism, their ideas derived just as much from Carlos Marighella, whose manual for an urban guerrilla struggle had just been released and was being published in the Rode Jeugd paper in several parts, starting in August, 1970. The radical line was consolidated into a single document for the first time by Henk Wubben, but several other people also had a role in its development.

Unlike the moderates, the radicals thought it was virtually impossible to bring the masses into power in fully industrialized societies by means of traditional workers' organizations. This was because, the radicals reasoned, the workers had so hopelessly lost their class-consciousness that they no longer realized they were being exploited. So the best way for the Rode Jeugd to bring the revolution closer was to act as a vanguard organization. Through its actions, this vanguard should support the struggle in the Third World by attacking the capitalist institutions in the Netherlands and in that way, to escalate the destruction of capitalism along the lines of the encirclement theory of Lin Piao¹¹³. Based on that theory, they predicted that revolution would first succeed in the

¹¹⁰ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 33; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; "Rode Jeugd wil aktie: beginselverklaring", *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 1 (1970).

¹¹¹ The concept of violence included in this debate also acts against property, such as sabotage and firebomb attacks.

¹¹² "Diskussiegrondslag voor het congres van Rode Jeugd (ml) Amsterdam November 27, 1971".

¹¹³ The encirclement theory of Lin Piao had a strong impact on the Rode Jeugd's worldview. The first reference to it is in the Rode Jeugd paper published in October, 1967 (Oskam, Willem: "De volksoorlog of de parlementaire weg," *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*; no. 10 [October 1967]).

Third-World countries and then spread to the heartlands of capitalism. By driving capitalism into chaos at home, they could best help the progression of the revolutionary struggle and at the same time, they could demonstrate to the Dutch workers how the capitalist system could be effectively attacked. Furthermore, the vanguard would benefit from the mobilization of the masses in the Netherlands by developing tactics and by spreading information so that when the time comes to challenge the system, the masses would know what to do.¹¹⁴

The text also established the legitimization of violence:

With this economic oppression, the owner practices violence against the working class in all forms from physical to mental violence. Breaking free from these circumstances requires the take-over of means of production by the proletariat which returns them to society. To achieve this, it is necessary to respond to the violence of the ruling class with violence. [...] Because violence stems from economical relations and does not depend on any kind of ethical conceptions about freedom or humanity, we must consider violence as a technical question, as a political tool for destroying the adversary. From this perspective, the relationship between the objectives and means also becomes a technical question. The use of intimidation and terror is necessary in the fight against the private interests of the oppressors. [...] Here [in the Netherlands], we are facing the destructive phase [of the struggle] and the situation requires from us that we use all possible means without reservations to achieve our objective, which at this phase is to drive capitalism into chaos. Fraud, intimidation, sabotage, destruction of lives, stratagems and so forth are necessary for this purpose. At this phase of the revolution, we must free ourselves from all values and norms of the ruling class because these rules restrict us and they are directed at preserving the status quo.¹¹⁵

Soon after Wubben's paper was published, several key leaders of the Rode Jeugd were leaving for China. Theirs would be a three months' visit on the invitation of the Embassy of China. Ton Meurs demanded that they should not travel. When they decided to leave anyway, the parties agreed on a ceasefire: the radicals would refrain from any further action and the moderates would not attack the radicals publicly.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, the moderates drafted their response to Wubben's paper. They claimed that its interpretation of the revolutionary struggle was outright dangerous for the struggle of the working class in the Netherlands. The moderates argued that the working class had not lost its class-consciousness. This was because monotonous work on the assembly lines increased class-consciousness and did not destroy it, as Wubben has claimed. So the moderates felt that the first priority at that moment was to organize the workers in companies and labor unions. In other words, inciting use of violence without the masses would only lead to the destruction of the vanguard. The moderates also accused Wubben of misreading Lin Piao's encirclement theory.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 4 (1971). The same text is published again in *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 5 (September 1971) partly rewritten by other members of the Rode Jeugd.

¹¹⁵ *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 4 (1971).

¹¹⁶ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹¹⁷ "Enige voorstellen omtrent en politieke lijn en de taak van de Rode Jeugd. Antwoord van afdeling Amsterdam aan Kameraad Wubben" (July 1971).

Very little came out of the agreed cease-fire. Before the leaders left, it was also agreed among the Eindhoven branch that, should there be one more attack against them by the police, they would attack the police commissioner himself. Sometime after the leaders were gone, another police operation took place and consequently, a firebomb exploded under the car of the police commissioner of Eindhoven. The Rode Jeugd claimed the attack.¹¹⁸

During the next few weeks, the secret headquarters of the Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven were visited by an army of reporters. In several interviews, anonymous Rode Jeugd members stated that things had gone so far that there could be deaths and they announced the group's responsibility for several other deeds.¹¹⁹ A weekly paper, *Vrij Nederland*, published a full-page interview with a young man who was "22 years old and has a long hair" where he stated that no legal or moral norms restricted them in their struggle to bring down the system.¹²⁰ In another weekly, a member of the Rode Jeugd stated that professional revolutionaries need money and therefore there was a expropriation program of a Dutch bank waiting for execution.¹²¹

The attack and the press campaign effectively sealed the split among members of the organization. The moderates responded by publishing a pamphlet where they proclaimed the words and deeds of the Eindhoven section as being misinterpretations of Marxist-Leninist theory.¹²² The news about the bomb attack reached the Rode Jeugd delegation which, on their way back to the Netherlands in early October, 1971, stepped out of the plane in Brussels and travelled the rest of the way by train, fearing that the police would be waiting for them at the airport. While the leaders had argued that time was ripe for the use of violence, they were not totally pleased with what had happened. They did not have any complaints about the burning of the police commissioner's car, but the younger members were severely criticized for the press campaign, which the leaders found unnecessary and counterproductive.¹²³

The split of the Rode Jeugd was sealed in November, 1971. The moderates had summoned the Rode Jeugd members to a congress to sort out the differences. Only two activists supporting the radical line showed up, only to announce that all the moderates had been expelled from the organization. The moderates consequently established a short-lived organization called the *Rode Jeugd (ML)*.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ "Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. I," (Rode Jeugd Eindhoven pamphlet [August 1971]); Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005; "Brandbom in dienstauto van Eindhovense hoofcommissaris", *Eindhovens Dagblad* July 24, 1971; "Rode Terreur in Eindhoven", *De Telegraaf* July 24, 1971.

¹¹⁹ E.g. "Rode Jeugd stak politiebureau aan", *De Telegraaf* July 31, 1971; "Rode Jeugd in Eindhoven kondigt sabotage aan", *De Tijd* August 5, 1971; Ummelen, Bert: "Rode Jeugd wacht niet tot platte land de steden omsingelt," *Eindhovens Dagblad* August 14, 1971.

¹²⁰ Van de Pol, Dick: "'Iemand om zeep helpen is in onze ideologie volkomen vanzelfsprekend,'" *Vrij Nederland* August 7, 1971.

¹²¹ Paumen, M. "Guerilla met geweld en terreur," *NRC Handelsblad* August 5, 1971.

¹²² "Verklaring van Rode Jeugd Amsterdam M.L." (Rode Jeugd Amsterdam pamphlet [August 1971]).

¹²³ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Dekkers, Frans & Daan Dijksman: "Revolutie in de polder", *Haagse Post* January 9, 1988.

¹²⁴ In English, the Red Youth (ML = Marxist-Leninist). "Revolutionaire strijd in Nederland," *Rode Jeugd ml*, no. 2 (December 1971). Rode Jeugd (ML) soon joined forces with *Bond van Nederlandse Marxist-Leninisten* (BvNML or BNML, Bond of Dutch Marxist-Leninists), which was an organization established by

2.3 The resistance phase

After a period of meetings and discussions, the first modest steps towards illegal work were taken in 1971. In 1972, these were extended, diverse contacts were established and experiences were gathered in this terrain that was new for all groups. It brought certain danger with it, because there was not a lot [of experiences] to draw from yet.¹²⁵

In the next couple of years, the remaining members of the Rode Jeugd adopted more serious and radical ways of action. The term urban guerrilla appeared first in the Rode Jeugd paper as early as in 1967. Then it was concluded that it was naturally not possible to start a guerrilla struggle in the Netherlands, but that the working class had to show its class solidarity with those people who were standing face-to-face with imperialism or are directly opposing it.¹²⁶ Now, they were of differing opinions. At the same time, the more radical the group became, the more people left its ranks.

Besides the withering of the protest movement at home, the strategy and worldview of the Rode Jeugd were challenged by some developments abroad. The Rode Jeugd had perceived itself as part of the worldwide revolutionary movement that was led by China. However, China's commitment to the world revolution came seriously under question in the latter part of 1971, when China started to normalize its relations with the United States and announced that President Richard Nixon would come on a state visit. Around the same time, Lin Biao, the figurehead of the encirclement theory, died in a suspicious plane crash. The revolutionary community was there no more (if it ever existed in such form as they had envisioned), so the Rode Jeugd could not count on any such alliances.¹²⁷

In the coming months, new lines for the struggle were drafted.¹²⁸ The plan was basically to start building up an urban guerrilla organization in the Netherlands with the resources they had in hand.

They did not expect the struggle to be easy:

We are still a small group and we have to map out our tactic cautiously to avoid us becoming destroyed before we have achieved our objectives. The first steps will be difficult. There will be strong attacks from the right but also from many who call themselves leftists. We have to convince these leftists by conducting the correct and clear politics. From the struggle conducted by Tupamaros, the RAF in Germany or the NRP in France, it has come out that many leftists are against the line of violence. But our politics are correct and by following our line consistently, after so-called "leftists" actions fail again and again, the majority of the leftists will start to support the line of violence and agree that we have to start the violent revolutionary struggle now. [...] At first, it will

the *Rode Vlag* group in 1969 (see e.g. *De Rode Vlag* 9, no. 4 / *Rode Jeugd ml* 2, no. 7 (June/July 1972); "Van de Rode Jeugd tot de nieuwe kommunistische jeugdorganisatie," *De Rode Vlag* 11, no. 5 (June 1974).

¹²⁵ "Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973," *Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973.

¹²⁶ *Rode Jeugd. Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad* no. 10 (1967), 14.

¹²⁷ Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005; Ottens, Luuk, Piet Hein Scheltens & Rob Siebelink: "Muziek maken is een uitlaatklep, dat weet ik wel. Maar het is nog altijd beter dan surfen," *De Groene Amsterdammer* February 13, 1985.

¹²⁸ See especially *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2 (May 1972). The following description is mainly based on this document. The matter is also discussed in *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 5 (September 1971).

appear that we become isolated, but in the longer term, our force and support will start to grow quickly.¹²⁹

In the internal discussion paper, three goals were identified for the urban guerrilla organization to accomplish. Firstly, it would prepare for revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands. This struggle was not expected to actualize in the near future. In the meanwhile, it would support the struggle of the people in the Third World by attacking the economic power of the imperialists in the Netherlands. Thirdly, contacts would be established with other guerrilla organizations in other West European countries. The purpose of those contacts was to provide help and to learn from those who had more experience with urban guerrilla struggle.

The plan included creating an organization with legal and illegal branches. The illegal branch was to consist of largely autonomous cells that would train themselves through learning-by-doing and would school themselves further in Marxist-Leninist theories. Besides training and recruiting, the cells and the national command also needed to be involved in putting together the necessary material resources for the actions, such as cars and other transportation vehicles and weapons. At first, the cells should commit small acts such as graffiti chalking, setting cars on fire or breaking windows. Later, they could use all kinds of explosives to attack the economic and political power holders. It was emphasized that at all times, it should be made sure that they did not endanger the public.

While this structure was to be created for committing illegal acts, it was considered very important that, to avoid isolation and recruit new members, these professional revolutionaries would maintain their normal contacts within society and would be involved in legal activities. The illegal organization should be supported by a legal arm, in other words, a network of sympathizers could provide intelligence information, hiding places and other things that the illegal cells need.

Some experiments with illegal actions were conducted as early as in 1971. Besides the attack against the car of the police commissioner in Eindhoven, Aat van Wijk recalls that there were a few unsuccessful bomb attacks, including an attempt bomb attack during the state visit of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. A bomb was placed in the hotel he was staying at, but it failed to explode properly.¹³⁰

In early 1972, the urban guerrilla campaign began. The first bomb attack took place in February, 1972, when a small explosion hit Evoluon, the exhibition center established by Philips in Eindhoven. The next morning, a letter signed by *Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep* (Philips Greece Actiongroup) arrived at the press office of Philips. In this letter, it was stated that Philips had one month to deliver one million guilders to the Greek resistance movement, otherwise the group would start its sabotage program and, if necessary, hold the directors of Philips personally responsible for their deeds.¹³¹

In the media, there was immediately speculation about a link between this action group and the Rode Jeugd. The Rode Jeugd had after all picked Philips as a symbol of imperialism and oppression of the working class, had held demonstrations against it and

¹²⁹ *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2 (May 1972).

¹³⁰ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & June 30, 2003.

¹³¹ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 55; "Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973.

had distributed pamphlets among its workers. Furthermore, members of the Rode Jeugd had played a significant role in an action group that had earlier voiced a similar request to Philips.¹³² However, the spokesperson of the Rode Jeugd denied that the group was responsible for that action, but emphasized that the Rode Jeugd did not distance itself from such deeds.¹³³

During the spring, there were many more small-scale bomb attacks (both successful and failed attempts) in Philips facilities, which went unclaimed. On April 24, bombs exploded in the Philips facilities in Rotterdam, Baarn and Hilversum.¹³⁴ A month later, there was a bomb attack in the Philips facilities in Arnhem and an attempted attack in Amsterdam. Moreover, in early June, an attempt at a bomb attack was made in the Philips facility in Eindhoven, but that bomb failed to explode.¹³⁵ These attacks were not reported in the media at that time.

On May 8, a previously unknown group called the *Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland* (RVN, the Revolutionary People's Resistance of the Netherlands) claimed an arson attempt on the office of the Turkish Airlines in Amsterdam. It was announced that this attack was a protest against the execution of three left-wing extremists in Turkey.¹³⁶ On June 18, another arson attack was made in the name of the RVN. This time, the target was the American Library in Amsterdam and this attack caused significant damage.¹³⁷

Both the Philips Griekenland Aktiegroep and the *Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland* were action names of the Rode Jeugd that were used for illegal actions. In this way, the Rode Jeugd could remain a legal organization, only covertly supporting illegal actions taken by the ad-hoc commandos who operated under different names.¹³⁸ Both the Philips

¹³² "Sabotage?" (pamphlet of Aktiegroep Eindhoven Griekenland [May 1970]).

¹³³ See e.g. "Rode Jeugd: Wij pleegden aanslag op Evoluon", *NRC Handelsblad* February 25, 1972; "Philips zwijgt nog over brief Evoluon", *NRC Handelsblad* February 26, 1972; "'Philips moet politieke steun aan Griekeland staken'", *Algemeen Dagblad* February 26, 1972; "Vage brief actiegroep na bomaanslag op Evoluon", *Eindhovens Dagblad* February 26, 1972; Geffen, Wim van: "Politie ontdekt hermost bomontstekingen", *De Telegraaf* February 26, 1972; "Actiegroep zou dader van bomaanslag zijn", *Trouw* February 26, 1972.

¹³⁴ "Bomaanslagen bij Philips", *Het Parool* April 24, 1972; "Bommen bij Philips nog raadselachtig", *De Volkskrant* April 25, 1972; "Bomaanslagen op Philipsgebouwen", *NRC Handelsblad* April 24, 1972; "Aanslagen op Philips werk van amateurs", *De Telegraaf* April 25, 1972; "Actiegroep houdt woord", *Algemeen Dagblad* April 25, 1972; "Bomaanslagen bij Philips", *Trouw* April 25, 1972; "Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973.

¹³⁵ "Loos bomalarm op Eurostrand", *Eindhovens Dagblad* June 9, 1972; Geffen, Wim van: "Politieberaad over nationale terreuraanpak", *De Telegraaf* October 18, 1972, "Philips-topmensen bedreigd", *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 21, 1972; "Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973. According to the article published in *Eindhovens Dagblad*, the bomb attacks in Arnhem and Amsterdam would have taken place in late April.

¹³⁶ "Misdaad werpt schaduw over weekeinde", *De Telegraaf* May 8, 1972.

¹³⁷ E.g. "Brand in bibliotheek gesticht uit protest", *Het Parool* June 19, 1972; "'Verzetsgroep' claimt brand bibliotheek", *De Volkskrant* June 19, 1972.

¹³⁸ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003. However, some other former members of the Rode Jeugd have made reservations for this interpretation. Henk Wubben maintained in the interview that the Rode Jeugd was not directly responsible, even though it did take political responsibility for the acts. He also said that it is not like the Rode Jeugd had nothing to do with the acts (Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003). Therefore, it seems that his stand derives back to the view that the Rode Jeugd was the legal part of the campaign and the acts were not committed in its name and thus not acts of the Rode Jeugd. Evert van den Berg, on his part, recalls only that there were articles about these organizations in the Rode Jeugd publications. However, he was aware that there were some illegal operations taking place at that time, but he was not part of the cell structure involved in them (Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005 &

Griekenland Actiegroep and the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland were featured in a Rode Jeugd booklet that was published in August, 1972. The Philips Griekenland Actiegroep was portrayed as group acting independently of, but according to, the ideological lines set by the Rode Jeugd. As for the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland, it was said that it had recently been established by a group of people from Marxist-Leninist movements with the intention of building up an organization capable of committing illegal acts and to prepare for armed struggle.¹³⁹

In October, the name of the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland appeared in the headlines again in the context of a series of attacks that caused considerable alarm. The first attack took place at the Holiday Inn in Utrecht on October 4. Two weeks later, there were several attempted or successful bomb attacks within days of each other. The targets of these attacks were the Bank of America in Rotterdam, Zwolsche Algemeene (which was owned by the major American company ITT) and one of the former top executives of Philips in Eindhoven.¹⁴⁰ Those bombs were largely similar to each other and much more professional than the ones that were used in bomb attacks against Philips in the spring. These bombs bore resemblance to some bombs used by the RAF in West Germany.¹⁴¹ These attempted bomb attacks caused great hysteria. In the latter part of October, there was a flood of false bomb alarms around the country.¹⁴²

The police concluded almost immediately that the attacks had to be the work of a domestic organization.¹⁴³ Again, there was speculation about Rode Jeugd's responsibility.¹⁴⁴ More focus on the attacks came on October 21, when several newspapers reported that a letter was received by the media from the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland:

April 15, 2007). See also *Rode Jeugd Stadsgeurilla Cahier*, no. 1; John Ubbink & Hans Polak, "Rode-Jeugd-secretaris Willem Oskam: 'Niet alleen zaak van bommen'," *Het Parool* December 14, 1972; "Voorwoord," *Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966-1974 Rode Jeugd* (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief 1975).

¹³⁹ *Rode Jeugd Stadsgeurilla Cahier*, no. 1 (1972).

¹⁴⁰ The fact that all the bombs were visibly placed made the police believe that the bombs were meant to be found on time and that those who had placed them were trying to create panic among the companies, the public and the police ("Nieuwe aanslag in Utrecht", *Algemeen Dagblad* October 19, 1972; "Politie verdenkt de Rode Jeugd", *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 20, 1972). In an interview with the author, Aat van Wijk denied this and claimed that the bombs did not explode simply due to technical faults (Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003). There was still another bomb found in Leiden, which according to some reports, turned out to be a fake bomb ("Ook bom in Leiden", *Het Parool* October 19, 1972; "Ook bom in Leiden", *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 20, 1972; "Leidse bom was nepbom", *NRC Handelsblad* October 20, 1972).

¹⁴¹ "Terreur houdt aan: in Utrecht bom gevonden", *NRC Handelsblad* October 18, 1972; "Bom houdt Rotterdam urenlang in spanning", *Algemeen Dagblad* October 18, 1972. In a BVD report from February 1973, it is said that the new, more professional bombs were largely similar to those that RAF had used, among other places, in Frankfurt. It is stated that interestingly enough, Luciën van Hoesel travelled to Frankfurt in September, 1972 to meet the RAF and/or Rote Hilfe members ("Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973).

¹⁴² E.g. "Philips-topmensen bedreigd", *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 21, 1972; "Politie op spoor bomterroristen", *De Telegraaf* October 23, 1972.

¹⁴³ "Terreur houdt aan: in Utrecht bom gevonden", *NRC Handelsblad* October 18, 1972; "Veel raadsels na bomaanslag in Eindhoven", *De Volkskrant* October 18, 1972.

¹⁴⁴ E.g. "Nieuwe aanslag in Utrecht", *Algemeen Dagblad* October 19, 1972; "'Geheim' officier leidt onderzoek naar bomboeven", *De Telegraaf* October 19, 1972.

The Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland is responsible for the attacks on the Holiday-Inn Utrecht, the Bank of America R'dam and on the Z.A. [Zwolsche Algemeen] Utrecht. The attacks are directed against the U.S. imperialism in Vietnam and in Chile in particular. One should not expect us to distribute pamphlets any more. The struggle will be fought with weapons. Down with all American companies in the Netherlands. Long live the armed uprising. Venceremos.¹⁴⁵

Another letter signed by the RVN was received by the top executives of Philips:

Despite several exhortations, the executive board has not found it necessary to accept our request. Therefore, the tribunal has decided to go into the next phase of the action program. The last warning has been given. From now on, we will proceed to direct personal attacks. The tribunal has valued you personally at 48,000 guilders. Should you not pay, then the action group will apply the last phase to you or your surroundings. If you accept our suggestions, we expect you to place the attached advertisement on 26/10 or 27/10 or 28/10. Then, the action group knows that you want to accept the suggestions and will contact you in due time to arrange the transaction with you. In return, the tribunal will call off personal acts against you and your surroundings.¹⁴⁶

One day later, yet another letter signed by the RVN reached the newspapers. In that letter, the RVN denied its responsibility and announced that it had not sent the earlier letter. Instead, it was claimed that the whole campaign was a stunt of the right-wing elements in the Netherlands and were aimed at turning people against the left-wing groups on the eve of the elections.¹⁴⁷ In reality, this letter was written by those involved in the RVN to confuse the police and judiciary.¹⁴⁸

Until now, other left-wing organizations had felt little need to discuss the doings of Rode Jeugd in their publications. After the bomb attacks in October, however, the competing Marxist-Leninist organization, KEN (ml), published an article on the bomb attacks in its newspaper, *The Rode Tribune*. Here the Rode Jeugd was accused of false revolutionary politics and called anarchist-terrorists who endangered the real revolutionary struggle by resorting to childish activities. Furthermore, the authorities were blamed for using the Rode Jeugd to discredit the entire revolutionary movement and to legitimize the development of stricter counterterrorist measures.¹⁴⁹ In *Vrije Socialist*, a publication of an anarchist group, the *Federatie van Vrije Socialisten*, it was suspected that the attacks were

¹⁴⁵ "Politiek groep legde bommen", *De Volkskrant* October 21, 1972. See also "Twee brieven van linkse extremisten", *Algemeen Dagblad* October 21, 1972; "Philips-topmensen bedreigd", *Eindhovens Dagblad* October 21, 1972.

¹⁴⁶ Quoted in "Chantage op topmensen van Philips", *NRC Handelsblad* October 21, 1972.

¹⁴⁷ "Werkgroep op spoor daders bomaanslagen", *NRC Handelsblad* October 23, 1972; "Volksverzet wijst bomaanslagen af", *De Volkskrant* October 23, 1972.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003. Evert van den Berg, however, did not recall the second letter (Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005).

¹⁴⁹ "Voor de revolutionaire massastrijd – tegen de individuele terreur", *Rode Tribune* no. 13 (December 1972). Before this, the Rode Jeugd's deeds had been commented only on the publication of its mother organization, the Rode Vlag, at any length. In the dispute between the moderates and radicals in the Rode Jeugd, the Rode Vlag supported the moderates (see e.g. *De Rode Vlag* 8, no. 7 [1971]).

the work of the right-wing forces. How else could one explain that all bombs were so visibly placed, that few of them went off and that no organization claimed and explained the attacks?¹⁵⁰

The authorities seemed to be sure that the attacks were committed by the Rode Jeugd members but there was no conclusive evidence against any particular person.¹⁵¹ Since the question of responsibility for the attacks remained unanswered, there was room for speculations in the lines of the last letter signed by the RVN.¹⁵² The Rode Jeugd, on its part, announced that it was not responsible for any of the bombs and did not know whether the RVN was responsible, but that this kind of acts got their sympathies.¹⁵³ Later in December of 1972, Willem Oskam admitted in an interview that there were people from the Rode Jeugd in the ranks of the Revolutionair Volksverzet Nederland.¹⁵⁴

Even though the Rode Jeugd was behind the RVN and the PGAG (and most probably also behind most of the unclaimed bomb attacks against Philips), not everyone active in the Rode Jeugd were up-to-date with at least the practical side of the illegal activities. The organization was divided into legal and illegal parts, even though some of the people involved in the illegal acts also took part in schoolings and in other legal actions. Those involved in the illegal activities included at least Henk Wubben, Aat van Wijk and Luciën van Hoesel, and to some degree Joost van Steenis and Willem Oskam (who was sometimes left in the dark for the fear of him not being able to keep things secret). In addition, Theo Engelen and Theo Engelen, both central figures of the Eindhoven branch, were sometimes involved.¹⁵⁵ Besides them, there was at least Jan Mölling, a Rode Jeugd member from Amsterdam, who helped by making the jackets for the bombs.¹⁵⁶

During 1972, preparations were under way for the urban guerrilla struggle. This meant that weapons were bought and plans were made for renting safe houses and obtaining money through bank robberies. There were also renewed efforts for political schooling.¹⁵⁷ However, just as the urban guerrilla struggle started to get off the ground a bit, some worrying developments took place. In West Germany, most of what later became known as the first generation of the RAF had been arrested and some of its members were killed by the police. If an organization such as the RAF, which was much larger and more

¹⁵⁰ “Terreur geweld”, *De Vrije Socialist* November 1972.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973; “Politie op spoor bomterroristen”, *De Telegraaf* October 23, 1972.

¹⁵² See e.g. Galen, John Jansen van: “Ook Arend Lijphart is het partij-politieke spoor bijster,” *Haagse Post* October 18, 1972; “Chantage op topmensen van Philips”, *NRC Handelsblad* October 21, 1972; “Voor de revolutionaire massastrijd – tegen de individuele terreur,” *Rode Tribune*, no. 13 (December 1972); *Rode Tribune Bulletin: Extra uitgave* [October 1973]; Heyden, Jan van der: “Eindhovens Rode Jeugd-lid woensdag voor gerechtshof. Vader van Hoesel: “Er zit iets fout in de vervolging van mijn zoon Lucien”, *Eindhovens Dagblad* September 8, 1973; Chorus, Boudewijn: “Gesprek met Luciën van Hoesel: Bomaanslagen, de BVD, de Hoge Raad, en de Scheveningse gijzeling,” *Haagse Post* November 30, 1974.

¹⁵³ “Rode Jeugd doet in Albanië theorie op”, *De Telegraaf* October 24, 1972.

¹⁵⁴ Ubbink, John & Hans Polak: “Rode-Jeugd-secretaris Willem Oskam: ‘Niet alleen zaak van bommen’,” *Het Parool* December 14, 1972.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003; “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973. According to the BVD report, Joost van Steenis would have been the leader of the illegal arm, but this was not the case.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003; BVD: “Rode Jeugd,” BVD report, February 2, 1973; Hoekstra 2004, 70.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Aat van Wijk on April 17, 2007; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

sophisticated, could not survive, what would be the chances of the Rode Jeugd? In other words, if one knows that the organization would not be able to hold up for more than a very short time, would it make any sense to start with it at all? These were questions that many of the Rode Jeugd key members pondered.

2.4 Decline of the Rode Jeugd

After the bomb attacks, the authorities feared there were more attacks in the making and felt a need to take action against the Rode Jeugd.¹⁵⁸ In December 1972, the police raided the houses of three Rode Jeugd activists. Two of them were released quickly, but for the third one, Luciën van Hoesel, the situation was more complicated. Under his bed, the authorities found boxes of bomb supplies similar to those used in the recent bomb attacks. Everything suggested that the authorities must have had an information source inside the group.

The members fervently tried to hunt down the traitors among their ranks and organized support for Luciën van Hoesel's upcoming trial. For this latter purpose, they took part in establishing an organization called the *Rode Hulp* (in English, Red Help). The task of this organization was to support so-called political prisoners, especially Luciën van Hoesel, but also the imprisoned RAF members and Palestinians. At the same time, they continued their activities as before and planned new bomb attacks. In March of 1973, when Van Hoesel's trial started, the Rode Jeugd threatened public prosecutor J. Peijnenburg with revenge if Van Hoesel was sentenced. In addition, Philips was warned.¹⁵⁹

Then in June of 1973, Ger Flokstra, a less prominent Rode Jeugd member, was arrested with a suitcase full of bomb supplies. That particular bomb was meant to be used in an attack against an American target similar to those attacks that had been committed in October. Again, it was obvious that there was an informant involved. According to a police document, the Rode Jeugd had come up with a plan to commit several bomb attacks to strengthen the position of Van Hoesel. But the police had followed Flokstra when he brought the bomb materials in a suitcase from Amsterdam to Eindhoven and stored them in a locker at the train station. When he came back to collect the suitcase, he was arrested.¹⁶⁰

While the Rode Jeugd people recovered rather quickly from the initial shock caused by the arrest of Luciën van Hoesel, the arrest of Ger Flokstra paralyzed the group. By now, it was a well-known fact that there were informants inside the group. These arrests still

¹⁵⁸ "Rode Jeugd," BVD report, February 2, 1973. According to a BVD report ("Informatie politiek terrorisme," BVD report March 29, 1973), the arrests in December, 1972, mentioned below in the text were made because the authorities learned about the existence of two bombs. Due to circumstances, the operation had to be accelerated and therefore only Luciën van Hoesel was caught with bomb material. The Rode Jeugd has always claimed that the boxes in the possession of Van Hoesel were destined for the Greek resistance movement, LEA (Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 58–59; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003).

¹⁵⁹ *Rode Hulp Informatie-bulletin*, no. 2 (1973); "Rode Jeugd bedreigt officier van justitie," *NRC Handelsblad* March 27, 1973.

¹⁶⁰ "Rode Jeugd", found from the collections of Streekarchief Eindhoven (nowadays called Regionaal Historisch Centrum Eindhoven).

managed to plant a considerable degree of suspicion and almost paranoia among those in the organization. As a consequence, questions about trust and what to do with people they suspected of being informants consumed all their energy.¹⁶¹

The Rode Jeugd activists of course knew that they were under close scrutiny by the security service and they had indeed spotted informants among their ranks as early as in the late 1960s. It was also clear that if they wanted to commit to urban guerrilla struggle, they had to be disciplined enough to keep their plans secret. The organization, however, still remained very open, and the outer rings of the group were easily infiltrated by the security agencies. This was because each cell operated rather autonomously, and it was difficult to keep everything under control. This was not too threatening, as long as all confidential information stayed within the core group. The real problem was that while most core members developed high security awareness, there were some who had trouble resisting the temptation to share confidential information over a glass of beer.¹⁶²

The Rode Jeugd, and especially Henk Wubben, put considerable effort into developing counterintelligence measures. Some of the informers, for example, were exposed or outed themselves, and were instructed to feed the BVD false information in return.¹⁶³ The BVD “runners” were deceived by providing them with the same false piece of information through several informants, thereby increasing its credibility. In other cases, the Rode Jeugd publicly exposed the informers, thereby embarrassing the BVD.¹⁶⁴

The issues of infiltration also gained a prominent role in the trial of Luciën van Hoesel. He initially got a sentence of three years for the possession of explosives, which was an exceptionally long term for such crime. Van Hoesel did not accept this verdict and appealed to a higher court. At this stage, his attorney, Pieter Herman Bakker Schut, and the Rode Jeugd members, made an attempt to cast doubt over the evidence that formed the basis for Van Hoesel’s sentence. They did this by exposing the details about one case where the BVD had used an informant in an attempt to incriminate another Rode Jeugd member. Danny Mulders, one of the less prominent young members of the Rode Jeugd, had come clean about his contacts with the BVD after his runner had allegedly provided him with money to buy a pistol and to return it with Evert van den Berg’s fingerprints on it. An official BVD history claims that Van den Berg himself instigated it and that Mulders surprised his runner with the gun.¹⁶⁵ Be as it may, the issue was deeply embarrassing for the BVD. This evidence did not overturn the sentence of Van Hoesel, however, but he received a reduced sentence of two years in November, 1973.

¹⁶¹ “Arrestatie week geheim gehouden. Politie Eindhoven pakt man met bomonderdelen,” *Eindhovens Dagblad* June 24, 1973; “Politie pakt man met materiaal voor bomproductie,” *Trouw*, June 22, 1973; interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹⁶² Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003, Hoekstra 2004, 75, *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-leninistisch jongerenblad*, no. 1 [1970].

¹⁶³ Cf. Rode Jeugd leaflets: *Rode Jeugd vogelvrij? 1. Het Proces 2. Dubbelspion. Uitgave Rode Jeugd* [1971]; *Rode Jeugd vogelvrij. Het BVD spel* [1973]; Rode Hulp Special, devoted to the Van Hoesel case [May 1974]; *Rode Hulp*, no. 7 (July 1974).

¹⁶⁴ The double agent affairs are presented in the “Rode Jeugd vogelvrij” brochures mentioned in the previous footnote. About infiltrators and informants, interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003; interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹⁶⁵ Engelen 2007, 192–193.

During the fall of 1973, it was becoming increasingly evident to the members of the Rode Jeugd that it was time for some drastic changes. It was at this point that the history of the Rode Jeugd, quoted several times above, was written. That history ended in the following way:

It is clear that we all have still a lot to learn. There is no room for carelessness that can lead to blunders and bring the comrades and organization in danger.¹⁶⁶

The members kept on analyzing the international situation and the learnings from other revolutionary movements to decide what they should do. There was no question that the revolution would come, but they clearly felt that the strategy of an urban guerrilla struggle needed to be defined better. The symbolic bombings against imperialist targets were still found to be productive and all in all, they remained steadfast in their belief that revolution was not possible without violence. In other words, any revolutionary organization that wanted to be successful and to be able to defend itself, needed not only a strong legal arm, but also an illegal arm. In fact, the recent example of Chile had proven that very point once again and there were no grounds to think that it would be otherwise in Europe. In West Germany, the whole Left was under pressure and a couple of hundred people had been arrested; in Belgium, newspapers and books were banned, the workers on strike were intimidated and fired. Moreover, in France, a number of left-wing organizations had been banned and in Italy, the police and fascist gangs were cooperating. The same trend had likewise taken place in the Netherlands, the establishment of “terrorist brigades” being one example of them. Therefore, it was necessary to build the illegal side of the revolutionary struggle also in the Netherlands.¹⁶⁷

Concerning the legal arm of the struggle, it was concluded that they could not develop the type of political organization from the Rode Jeugd that could take up this task:

The Rode Jeugd is organizationally not up to a long-lasting struggle in the metropolises, not well adjusted to the reality of waging armed anti-imperialist struggle and class struggle. It is therefore unavoidable that we have to remodel our organization. The image of the Rode Jeugd that is formed through several years’ practice does not go together with the level in which we need to start working. It can even be that this image hinders the building of a resistance organization in the Netherlands.¹⁶⁸

As a consequence, the organization was formerly disbanded on March 14, 1974, on the anniversary of the death of Karl Marx:

The national command of the Rode Jeugd has decided to disband the Rode Jeugd as a legal political organization. The formation of sharpshooter brigades whose task is to kill, the establishment of the National Criminal Investigation Service for so-called ideological criminality, and increasingly stronger calls of the police corps in the big cities to broaden

¹⁶⁶ “Bijdrage LLL: Rode Jeugd 1966/1970 – 1970/1973,” *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973.

¹⁶⁷ *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973, especially “Bijdrage IV: De illegale organisatie”.

¹⁶⁸ “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” *Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973.

their repressive apparatus, all these are seriously threatening the Rode Jeugd's normal way of functioning. [...] As the Rode Jeugd refuses to be voluntarily experimented on, or to serve as a target for the rising fascism any longer, the national command has decided to disband its legal status.¹⁶⁹

In this press release, the need to disband the Rode Jeugd is largely explained by the severe counter-measures encountered by the organization. In the texts written by the Rode Jeugd members¹⁷⁰ for more restricted consumption, the miserable state of urban guerilla movement in the Netherlands was blamed on the stagnation of theory forming. As a result, same old mistakes had been made over and over again. The problem with most Marxist-Leninists was, from the Rode Jeugd activists' point of view, that they stubbornly and uncritically held to the mass line and strived for building up a mass organization. In short, the Rode Jeugd did not have an understanding of the structure and development of imperialism at the global level and requirements that it established for the struggle. While focusing on the legal organization, they ignored the importance of building an illegal organization by its side to help it prevail the countermeasures by the capitalist and imperialist forces. In this situation, the Rode Jeugd, more than any other organization, had wiped away the dust from the old classics and dared to bring up the question of violence.

To put it simply, the Rode Jeugd lacked supporters. Its relations with other Marxist-Leninist organizations had always been troublesome. The movements such as the Bond van Nederlandse Marxisten-Leninisten¹⁷¹ and the KEN ml did show support when someone from the Rode Jeugd was arrested and criticized the authorities for the way they attacked the Left¹⁷², but that was the extent of their solidarity.

The second problem, specific to the Rode Jeugd, concerned their organization. The problem was that when it was decided to move from protest to resistance, the organization had not changed accordingly. The purpose had been to build up a resistance organization with well-schooled revolutionaries capable of consistent and disciplined action. Nevertheless, many of its adherents were young workers who acted spontaneously out of their dissatisfaction with the societal situation and they did not care for ideological schooling. Furthermore, the more experienced and motivated members had problems adapting to the new situation. The result was an organization with initiatives for resistance, but which continued to be characterized by spontaneity and openness.¹⁷³

The lack of schooling was also seen as an obstacle in the further development of the Rode Jeugd's own organization because it made it difficult to recruit new supporters or

¹⁶⁹ Cited in "Actiegroep Rode Jeugd opgeheven," *Eindhovens Dagblad* March 15, 1974.

¹⁷⁰ "Bijdrage IV: De illegale organisatie," *Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973; "Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie," *Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973; "Voorwoord" and "Inleiding," *Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966-1974 Rode Jeugd* (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief 1975).

¹⁷¹ The bond of the Dutch Marxist-Leninists, the successor of the Rode Vlag group.

¹⁷² E.g. "Onmiddellijke vrijlating van Lucien v. Hoesel," *Rode Tribune* no. 14 (January 1973); "Klassejustitie!" *Rode Tribune* no. 17 (April 1973); "Onmiddellijke vrijlating van Lucien van Hoesel," *Rode Tribune* no. 23 (October 1973); *Rode Tribune bulletin: Extra uitgave* (1973); "Het volgende artikel is..." *De Rode Vlag* 7 no. 1 (January 1971); "Politie en justitie terreur," *De Rode Vlag* 11 no. 8 (November 1974).

¹⁷³ "Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie," *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973; Interview with Henk Wubben on April 3, 2003.

allies, especially among the intellectuals. It was mentioned that the low theoretical level was one reason why some people, especially intellectuals, did not want to work with the Rode Jeugd.¹⁷⁴ This showed a shift in the Rode Jeugd members' thinking. The Rode Jeugd had been distinctively a working class movement. Its members had been suspicious at best about the leftist students who went to the factories to learn about the life of workers while the young workers, like they themselves, made every effort to get out of there.

Even if things had gone awry with the revolutionary struggle, it was no reason to quit. There were, however, only a handful of core members who continued the struggle while the rest quietly left the scene.

2.5 New attempts for revolutionary armed struggle

In reality, the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd did not bring any big change to many of its key members' activities. In the resistance phase of the Rode Jeugd, key members had already functioned in many ways rather autonomously and few had a concise overview of everything that was going on. After the disbandment, many of them simply went on as before with their own network of people and activities. The relations between the key members had become strained to the degree that it was felt that it would be best for everybody if they went their own ways. Some stayed in contact, but distanced themselves from the other members.

The following years (1974–1976 in particular) were characterized by a search for ways to contribute to the world-wide revolutionary struggle. Preparing for an urban guerrilla struggle in the Netherlands was still on the agenda, but due to the increasingly unpromising perspectives, many former Rode Jeugd activists leaned more and more towards supporting other groups that already started the armed struggle. Generally, there was the feeling that while their motivation was still there, there were few opportunities for action. They were all so well-known to the BVD by then that it was hard to do anything without the agency being aware of it almost immediately.

Support for other movements had been an important part of their activities almost from the beginning. From the late 1960s, together with other people in the Netherlands, they had provided logistic support for the Greek and Portuguese resistance movements and helped, with German activists, those American soldiers who did not want to go to Vietnam to escape from the army bases in West Germany to Scandinavia. When the preparations for urban guerrilla started in the early 1970s, the contacts with the German activists intensified. The key members of the Rode Jeugd have claimed that they provided many kinds of support for the RAF and other German activists later in the 1970s, but the extent of their activities is not clear.¹⁷⁵ The Rode Hulp members sent all kinds of supplies to the imprisoned activists and helped them with legal issues by contacting lawyers. Some of the former Rode Jeugd activists have claimed that they assisted the German activists by obtaining explosives and guns, and by providing safe houses in the Netherlands. Indeed,

¹⁷⁴ “Bijdrage V: Enige opmerkingen over de legale organisatie,” *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Hoekstra 2004, 172–173; Verbij 2005, 152–156.

there is evidence that at least a dozen fugitive members of the RAF stayed in the Netherlands. The Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp members therefore might have been involved in providing support.¹⁷⁶

Besides that, there is some evidence of their attempts in the mid-1970s to help the IRA with obtaining weapons.¹⁷⁷ Some people, like Luciën van Hoesel, as well as Mirjam Lucassen and Annie Westebring, who became active in the “Rode Jeugd” corner of the radical Left around this time, played with the idea of taking it one step further and leaving for Nicaragua or for some other place that offered better perspectives for revolutionary struggle.¹⁷⁸

2.5.1. The Rode Hulp

Several people from the old cadre of the Rode Jeugd joined an organization called the *Rode Hulp* (Red Help). As it was previously mentioned, this organization was established in January of 1973 to organize solidarity with progressive activists in trouble.¹⁷⁹ Instead of merely joining, the former Rode Jeugd members rather kidnapped the Rode Hulp to use it as a legal cover to continue their efforts towards starting an urban guerrilla movement. This displeased many of the original members of the Rode Hulp, who soon established their own short-lived organization, the *Rood Solidariteitsfront* (Red Solidarity Front).¹⁸⁰

The former Rode Jeugd members who joined the Rode Hulp included Evert van den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel (after he was released from prison in late 1974 and had moved to Amsterdam) who became the central figures of the radical Rode Hulp. They were joined by new people, most importantly, by Annie Westebring¹⁸¹, who became the secretary of the Rode Hulp. From the former members of the Rode Jeugd, Aat van Wijk and Willem Oskam were also active in the Rode Hulp, although Oskam remained more and more on the sidelines. For a long time, he worked in a progressive bookstore. In the years to come, the disappointment with the ever-gloomier perspectives for revolution seemed to hit this die-hard leftist very hard.¹⁸² Joost van Steenis was also participating in the activities of the Rode Hulp for some time, but became expelled.

Under the banner of the Rode Hulp, the participants had many discussions about the future of the revolutionary struggle and the role of the Dutch activists in it. However, when it came to concrete radical action in the form of bomb attacks and the like, not much happened. In May of 1976, the RAF leader Ulrike Meinhof died. Several people from the Netherlands traveled to Meinhof’s funeral and some of them gave a speech over her grave.¹⁸³ After her death, there was a strong urge to do something. As a consequence, a

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003; Interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Hoekstra 2004, 73; Engelen 2007, 194–202; Pekelder 2007, 126.

¹⁷⁷ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 86–87.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006.

¹⁷⁹ *Rode Hulp. Publikatie met medewerking van de Bond voor Vrijheidsrechten* [1973].

¹⁸⁰ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 78–79.

¹⁸¹ Annie Westebring was actually a member of the Rode Jeugd in its very last months, but became very active only after its disbandment (Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007).

¹⁸² Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 21; Interview with Evert van den Berg on April 15, 2007.

¹⁸³ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 96; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

bomb was placed in the office of the main dealer of Volkswagen in the Netherlands, Autopon. A bomb threat call was subsequently made to the police in Amsterdam and the bomb was found before it exploded. There appears to have also been another attempted bomb attack that targeted the German company Hoechst.¹⁸⁴

In the summer of 1976, a new opportunity presented itself for the radicals around the Rode Hulp. There was a chance to participate in a month-long training at the training camp of the Palestinian resistance organization, the PFLP¹⁸⁵, in South Yemen. This opportunity was arranged by Ciska and Adrie Eeken. The couple felt sympathy for the Palestinian cause and they were involved in various kinds of support activities.¹⁸⁶

The group that eventually left for South Yemen was organized by Evert van den Berg, Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring. The offer to accept fifteen people for the training was incredibly royal considering the small number of people in the Netherlands who were interested in such an opportunity. Most of those few who were interested were monitored so closely by the security service that it was difficult for them to do anything without it being noticed. After a great deal of hesitation, it was decided to accept the offer and try to fill all the places, because such an opportunity did not present itself too often.¹⁸⁷

The list of people who left included Evert van den Berg, Luciën van Hoesel and his girlfriend, Mirjam Lucassen. Adrie and Ciska Eeken also enrolled in the training, as did Annie Westebring and her boyfriend, Roel Koopmans. In addition, other participants were Lidwien Janssen and Rinus Nieuwburg from the network of Evert van den Berg in Breda, two other couples active in the radical leftist milieu, a Moluccan called Sam Pormes, recruited through Annie Westebring and an Irishman Flinton Vallery from the People's Democracy invited by Evert van den Berg.¹⁸⁸

The fifteen people who left for South Yemen did not form a homogeneous group. Each of them had their own agendas and came from different backgrounds. In an attempt to bring more cohesion into the group, a lengthy document¹⁸⁹ was produced, with Evert van den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel probably as the primary authors, and it was signed by all travelers. This document was largely a summary of the Rode Jeugd ideology. The basic idea was to build up the logistics and organization in order to conduct a revolutionary

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006; Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, Recherchedienst, Centrale Recherche, Bijzondere zaken, records on the case (no. 3449/1976); The information about the bomb attack at Hoechst is based on the interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007. Also Lidwien Janssen has given an account of the attempt when she was questioned by Mossad and later by Dutch authorities (the minutes are available in the private archive of Frans Dekkers).

¹⁸⁵ The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006.

¹⁸⁸ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 99–100. Sam Pormes has always maintained that he did not participate in the training and instead, someone else must have used his name. His participation in the training was brought up again by Antoine Verbij in his book that was published in March, 2005 (Verbij 2005) and a few months later in an article in the Dutch weekly *HP/De Tijd*. At that time, Pormes was a member of the upper house of the Dutch parliament. Pormes initially denied his participation, but his party (*GroenLinks*, in English, the Green Left) forced him to leave his position after it was concluded in an investigation instigated by the party that it was very likely that he indeed attended the training (e.g. Hippe et al. 2007).

¹⁸⁹ *Filosofisch en methodisch uitgangspunt* (Philosophical and methodological premises), available in the private archive of Evert van den Berg.

struggle in the Netherlands and to support the struggles elsewhere in the world. This was, however, only one of the agendas that the participants had in mind. Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring at least had talked about the possibility of leaving for Lebanon and of fighting for the Palestinians, while others were more interested in helping the RAF.¹⁹⁰

The training turned out to be a typical guerrilla training, including long days of gymnastic exercises, combat training, shooting and explosives training.¹⁹¹ That camp also had a group of Germans who seemed to have been there for a longer time and they at times acted as co-instructors. This group was led by Siegfried Haag. In addition to Haag, Günther Sonnenberg, Verena Becker, Rolf Clemens Wagner, Rolf Heissler, Willy Peter Stoll and Elisabeth van Dyck were also reportedly there. While the Dutch did not know all of the real identity of all Germans during the training, Luciën van Hoesel recognized Elisabeth van Dyck as someone he had met in Amsterdam when she was hiding there. When Van Hoesel brought that up, he was confronted by the whole German delegation for this security blunder, which to them seemed like another addition to the list of amateurish deeds by their Dutch comrades.¹⁹²

Even though the Dutch activists felt sympathy for their German comrades and had provided help for them, some ambivalence had remained concerning the methods used by the German urban guerrillas. The experiences with the Germans in the camp fed into that ambivalence. The RAF people irritated the Dutch because they seemed to think they knew it all better than the Dutch and showed how the revolution should be done. The relations were further colored by the historical hatred that the Dutch felt for the Germans.¹⁹³

Instead of a new beginning, the South Yemen episode thus marked the beginning of the end. In retrospect, Evert van den Berg has concluded that all ingredients for disbandment were there before the trip, but it took a while to realize it.¹⁹⁴

The whole trip to South Yemen was full of security blunders. To begin with, making such a journey clandestinely while being so closely watched by the security service was quite a challenge. The participants were aware of that, but their eagerness to leave overcame their concerns for their security.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, the participants made the situation even worse by their own actions. For instance, for their travel arrangements, they used regular travel agencies, which noticed a sudden increase in queries for alternative travel routes to South Yemen. Evert van den Berg's retrospective statement that he made in 2005 that "we could have just as well rented a tourist bus"¹⁹⁶ is hardly an exaggeration. Moreover, it did not help that prior to the trip, Ciska Eeken had travelled with a collection of passport photos of all the participants to the Middle East and that these photos were found and copied by security guards at the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹⁹¹ Remmers, Henri & Sauer, Derk: "Marius Nieuwburg: Een mislukte terrorist," *Nieuwe Revu* November 12, 1976; Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 112, 118–120.

¹⁹² Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 121–123.

¹⁹³ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 122–123.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006; Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 113–116.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

¹⁹⁷ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 115–116; also interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

The trip was further compromised by the way the participants were selected. This compromise was largely based on “whoever wants to come can come” principle. The biggest mistake was, according to the participants, that people were allowed to take their boyfriends and girlfriends with them. Besides bringing a sufficient degree of social drama with it, the selection process produced a very heterogeneous group of people.¹⁹⁸

When accepting such an offer as the training was, it was evident that the time might come to return the favor. This came shortly afterwards. Ciska Eeken received a request from Wadi Haddad of the PFLP to inspect the arrangements on board in an Air France flight to Tel Aviv. Originally, Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen were supposed to go, but cancelled, because they were afraid they were too well-known to go through the passport control without being recognized. In the end, it came down to Rinus Nieuwburg and Lidwien Janssen to carry out the assignment. They boarded the flight in Paris on September 24, 1976. Rinus Nieuwburg travelled to the end destination, New Delhi, whereas Lidwien Janssen left the plane in Tel Aviv where it made an intermediate landing.¹⁹⁹

When Janssen arrived in Tel Aviv, she was told that the authorities had been informed that there was a bomb in her suitcase. After the inspection, she was directed to the airport police office where a representative of Mossad came to question her.²⁰⁰ It soon became clear that Mossad was well informed about her past activities. According to Lidwien Janssen, it seemed that it was mostly the PFLP and not really the Rode Hulp that interested the authorities, even though they seemed to be very well informed about the latter, too.²⁰¹ Her case was handled in the court in early 1977. In March, she was sentenced to six years for indictment, espionage and for helping a hostile organization. She was released three years after her arrest.²⁰²

After Janssen had left the plane, Rinus Nieuwburg flew the whole way to New Delhi as planned and continued his travel unhindered to Bombay. Later, he went to the airport to meet Janssen, as was agreed in advance, and got arrested. That arrest put him in a difficult situation. This was because there was no extradition treaty between India and Israel, and hardly any evidence to press charges against him. Returning to the Netherlands was difficult, because he did not have enough money and the airline companies were not particularly keen to have someone suspected of planning a plane hijacking as their passenger. With the help of the other Rode Hulp activists, a deal was negotiated with a Dutch journalist that in return for arranging Nieuwburg’s travel to the Netherlands, Nieuwburg would grant an interview.²⁰³

Before the interview with Nieuwburg was published in November, 1976, the arrest of Lidwien Janssen, as well as the training in South Yemen, had already received extensive coverage in the Dutch media. Immediately after the arrest of Nieuwburg, a small story

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007; Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006.

¹⁹⁹ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 133–137.

²⁰⁰ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 137–138.

²⁰¹ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 138–143; Sauer, Derk & Remmers, Henri: “Rode Hulp: ‘Dood en verderf is niet onze stijl’,” *Nieuwe Revu* November 19, 1976.

²⁰² Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 147–151.

²⁰³ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988. The result of this deal is Remmers, Henri & Sauer, Derk: “Marius Nieuwburg: Een mislukte terrorist,” *Nieuwe Revu* November 12, 1976.

appeared in a newspaper about a Dutchman who was arrested in Bombay. For the Rode Hulp activists, that was the first sign that the operation did not go as planned. Confirmation for this came early the following morning when the police showed up on the door of the Rode Hulp activists and conducted house searches.²⁰⁴

In this situation, there seemed to be only one thing to do. On December 31, 1976, the disbandment of the Rode Hulp was announced. Just like when the Rode Jeugd was disbanded, the actions by the authorities were mentioned as a cause for their decision. It was claimed that the criminalization politics of the Dutch government and the “bourgeois” media had greatly impeded the Rode Hulp’s work as a relief agency. It was also pointed that these instances were influenced by the Israeli secret service and propaganda machination, which tried to label the Rode Hulp as a terrorist organization.²⁰⁵

Another wave of operations against the Dutch activists took place in January of 1977, most evidently prompted by the confessions of Lidwien Janssen in Israel.²⁰⁶ This operation was so extravagant that it must have been organized to also work as a deterrent. It does not seem to be out of the question that pressure from Israel to act firmly against the people suspected of cooperating with its adversaries played a role as well.²⁰⁷ To those arrested, the situation seemed almost comical:

They came to arrest us [Annie Westebring and Roel Koopmans] in the morning. There were a lot of red lights and policemen everywhere. We were first brought to the police bureau in Groningen and later that day, we were transported to Amsterdam, separately, because we were so dangerous [she laughs]. One of us was transported via Amersfoort and the other one via the Closure Dike. I still remember that I could not help laughing in the car when then told me this.²⁰⁸

The tour-de-force was largely unnecessary, because most of the trainees and their accomplices had already drawn their conclusions. With the ever-increasing attention by the security services and the experiences with the training, the contemplations about the possibilities and expediency of an urban guerrilla struggle had reached a culmination point. Luciën van Hoesel had told the reporters, even before the Rode Hulp was disbanded, that it was high time for him to distance himself from the armed struggle.²⁰⁹

For some, one reason for this was the experiences in South Yemen. The training put them face-to-face with the reality of armed struggle much more concretely than they had been before, which made some of them feel uncomfortable. Lidwien Janssen has said that it was only there she realized how much the weapons were the last option, and how weapons give a false feeling of power. She spoke about this with the Germans in the camp

²⁰⁴ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 143–144.

²⁰⁵ “Rode Hulp. Amsterdam, 31-12-1976”.

²⁰⁶ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 152–153; also interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

²⁰⁷ The impact of Israel on the measures taken by the Dutch authorities in the case of Rode Hulp was speculated e.g. in Sauer, Derk & Remmers, Henri: “Rode Hulp: ‘Dood en verderf is niet onze stijl’,” *Nieuwe Revu* November 19, 1976.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

²⁰⁹ E.g. Sauer, Derk & Remmers, Henri: “Rode Hulp: ‘Dood en verderf is niet onze stijl’,” *Nieuwe Revu* November 19, 1976.

who stated that once you use weapons, you realize that you won't reach thirty.²¹⁰ According to Mirjam Lucassen, when she and Luciën were training with the weapons in the camp, they did not really think that they would use those skills against other people. Only after the training, the consequences of a full-fledged involvement in the armed struggle started to sink in. To continue with the armed struggle would mean that they should put their acquired skills into practice. This was too much for them.²¹¹

The explanations that those who were active in the radical Rode Hulp have given for their detachment from armed struggle have most often included two elements: continuing the armed struggle became impossible because the security service was too well informed and up-to-date of their activities and the liberal climate destroyed their motivation. With their withdrawal, the contacts between the former comrades also quietly faded away.

In the case of Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen, the long process of disengagement crystallized in a particular moment. During a nightly bus ride home during the fall of 1976, Luciën and she sat on the last bench and agreed that they should stop altogether with what they had been doing in the past years. They decided to try out something completely different for a while, and maybe try again the armed struggle after few years.²¹²

Shortly after that bus ride, Van Hoesel and Lucassen got married, moved to Groningen in the north of the Netherlands, and started a family. As for their political activities, trying something "completely different" became joining a political party, the *Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij* (PSP, Pacifist Socialist Party). That decision has been later explained by Mirjam Lucassen followingly:

We had always been in the same lines with the PSP with regard to how the economy should be organized, how the society should be organized, you name it. Only the armed struggle was somewhat contradictory, because the PSP was pacifist and we were just the opposite. But if you come to the point that you decide to end armed struggle, then that last difference is [...] gone. That was then the only party that came into question. [...] I think what has also played a role is that we thought that if we joined a political party, then we would be safer, then you were part of something. You can of course start up something yourself, but nobody will believe you and you continue to be placed in that same corner.²¹³

For the PSP, letting the former urban guerrilla fighters join was apparently no problem. In the local elections of 1978, Luciën van Hoesel was the leading candidate of the PSP and got elected.²¹⁴ In his own opinion, his past has only helped him in his career as social worker. As Lucassen has later noted, Van Hoesel's past made it easier for him to win the trust of those youths he worked with. Ironically enough, his job brought him face-to-face

²¹⁰ Dekkers & Dijksman 1988, 120–121.

²¹¹ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006. On the other hand, Rinus Nieuwburg told in an interview in late 1976 that the experience with the training in South Yemen strengthened his motivation to fight against capitalism. However, in the same interview he told that he would not participate in the armed struggle in the future (Remmers, Henri & Sauer, Derk: "Marius Nieuwburg: Een mislukte terrorist," *Nieuwe Revu* November 12, 1976).

²¹² Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006.

²¹³ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006.

²¹⁴ E.g. "Ex-leider Rode Jeugd kandidaat gemeenteraad", *NRC Handelsblad* November 17, 1978.

again with the same prosecutor who was involved in the lawsuit that brought Van Hoesel his prison sentence.²¹⁵

Evert van den Berg also joined the PSP around the same time, and he has continued to be active in the parliamentary context ever since. “A political animal does not stop”, as he put it. It has cost him time and energy to make his way and to eventually win the respect of everyone, but the fact that it has succeeded, has been a proof to him that a return to society was still possible.²¹⁶ Together with another former Rode Jeugd activist, Theo Engelen, he was a representative in the agglomeration council in Eindhoven in the early 1980s. While both of them had at that point left their revolutionary past behind, the security service was not convinced about this and recruited people to monitor them. This became public when the recruited informants told about the operation to Evert van den Berg.²¹⁷ In 1986, Van den Berg was elected to the city council of Eindhoven and in 1994–1998, he worked as a policy maker for the parliamentary faction of parties propagating the interest of elderly people. Today, he assists the representatives of the local council in Eindhoven in policy-making. From time to time, his past has been brought up. “If you are 35 years active in the politics, you naturally make some enemies”.²¹⁸

Like Van Hoesel, Evert van den Berg has felt that his involvement in the Rode Jeugd has helped him in his life. It was an important emancipating experience for him. On the other hand, the fact that he has been able to make a political career afterwards has changed his attitude towards the prevailing system:

At one moment, I decided to take another direction [...]. I remained politically active. I had to fight my way in, but in the end, I have gained the respect of all parties, including even my former enemies. That shows that the liberal climate was there. I think that has certainly contributed to my deradicalization. And that I have got rid of some of that anger I had when I was young.²¹⁹

Like Luciën van Hoesel and Mirjam Lucassen, Annie Westebring also left Amsterdam and moved to Groningen. She found a new political home in the anarchist movement, which was much more rewarding and comfortable than the militant radical Left had ever been. Unlike the Marxist-Leninist movements, the anarchist movement, in her opinion, acknowledged the diversity of human beings and the richness that it brings to life. Westebring became active in many kinds of grass-root activities and ran an anarchist bookstore for some time. Over the years, she has worked as a teacher and a chef and nowadays, she is involved in the education of challenged children through giving them lessons in cooking.²²⁰

Even though leaving the armed struggle behind appears to have been rather easy and smooth in practice, it did not happen in the blink of an eye. None of those involved were sought by the police or had any other of the sorts of practical issues complicating their

²¹⁵ Interview with Mirjam Lucassen on February 6, 2006; Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 58.

²¹⁶ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

²¹⁷ E.g. de Valk 1996, 80–81.

²¹⁸ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

²¹⁹ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

²²⁰ Interview with Annie Westebring on April 18, 2007.

detachment. For Evert van den Berg, “stopping was one thing, dissolving another issue”. He told me that it took him a long time to look after people in his network and to make sure they would not get involved in the same kind of action again.²²¹ It also seems that for many, it took a long time to process the meaning of their experiences and their choice to abandon the idea of armed struggle.

Not everyone, however, stopped their involvement in the armed struggle in 1976. One of those who continued was Aat van Wijk. After the Rode Jeugd, he was active in the context of the Rode Hulp, mostly in the form of helping imprisoned German activists by sending them goods and by speaking to lawyers on their behalf. He did not leave for South Yemen, but was asked by Evert van den Berg and Luciën van Hoesel to provide logistical support for their group after they had returned home.²²²

When Rode Hulp was disbanded, he continued for a while in the *Rood Verzetsfront* (RVF, Red Resistance Front), an organization that was established shortly afterwards (more about the organization in the below). In 1979, Van Wijk left that organization as it became clear to him that the activities of the RVF were developing along the same lines as those that the Rode Jeugd and the Rode Hulp had adopted earlier. In a discussion paper he wrote around this time, Van Wijk fiercely criticized his potential comrades in arms concerning their impatience and inability to learn from past mistakes, and especially for not recognizing the importance of building up the necessary logistic infrastructure before starting up with the armed struggle.²²³ He argued that this impatience and inability took the Dutch urban guerrilla time and again back to the square one. After voicing this criticism, he and his associates from The Hague were kicked out the organization.²²⁴ Worth noting in this context is that in this paper, he did not call into question the concept of urban guerrilla as such, but was rather frustrated by his comrades’ amateurism.

While leaving the RVF behind was an easy choice to make, abandoning the whole concept of armed struggle was a much more emotional and difficult issue for Van Wijk:

You have ideals, you have ideas, regardless of whether those are good ideals or good ideas. We thought for a long time that we, together with other groups in Europe, could bring on the revolution. You had lost your sense of reality a bit, okay, but that was your vision, that was your point of view. If you discover that it is not true, it is like cutting your umbilical cord or so, a painful feeling.²²⁵

After leaving the RVF, Aat van Wijk has had contacts with people in the extra-parliamentary left-wing scene, but has not been politically active himself. For the next fifteen years, he was so tired of everything to do with the politics that he did not even vote in elections. Later, he regained his interest in the politics, but he has made a conscious decision not to take part in any party or movement in order to prevent whatever he joined from being discredited by revelations that there is an “ex-terrorist” among their ranks.²²⁶

²²¹ Interview with Evert van den Berg on June 29, 2005.

²²² Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & April 14, 2003.

²²³ Aat van Wijk: “Paralel tussen Rode Jeugd, Rode Hulp, Rood Verzetsfront”, August 1979.

²²⁴ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003 & April 14, 2003.

²²⁵ Interview with Aat van Wijk on April 14, 2003.

²²⁶ Interview with Aat van Wijk on March 24, 2003, April 14, 2003 & April, 17 2007.

For a long time, he worked as graphic artist and later he has run a cultural centre and a restaurant in Zoetermeer.

2.5.2. The Rood Verzetsfront

When the Rode Hulp was pronounced dead, a new organization called Rood Verzetsfront (RVF) was established. The driving forces behind this latter organization were Ciska and Adrie Eeken and a few of their acquaintances from the Palestine Committee. Those who got involved were predominantly people who had had ties with the Rode Hulp but who were not active in it. From the former core Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp members, only Aat van Wijk and more discreetly, Henk Wubben (more about him will follow in the next section), continued their activities in its context. They were joined by a new generation of activists, at least some of them had been radicalized by the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer by the RAF in September and October of 1977.²²⁷

The purpose of the Rood Verzetsfront was to support those who opposed the fascist system. This was to be done mostly in two ways: by publicizing about the resistance against the system and by helping activists who were in trouble. For the purpose of publicity, a paper named after the organization was established and printed on the Eekens' own printing press. The Rood Verzetsfront was also actively involved in organizing information evenings and demonstrations in support of the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist movements.²²⁸ In practice, its activities concentrated heavily on the conflict between the state and urban guerrilla groupings in West Germany. Attention for the German situation was also sought by using methods of direct action. An example of this occurred in March, 1979, when the RVF occupied the office of Swiss Air in Amsterdam as a protest against the treatment of two members of the German *Bewegung 2. Juni* (the 2nd of June Movement), who were imprisoned in Switzerland.²²⁹

In analogy with the Rode Jeugd and Rode Hulp earlier, there seems to also have been initiatives for armed struggle behind the façade of Rood Verzetsfront. However, little concrete information is available about these initiatives. Paul Moussault, a former core member of RVF tells in his controversial book about the group that in the spring of 1979, a grouping called the B-group was established within the RVF. The purpose of this group would have been to begin preparation for an armed struggle in the Netherlands by obtaining the necessary resources (such as money, cars, weapons and explosives). According to Moussault's account, which is evidently mostly based on his own recollections but is also at times supported by his interviews with other former members, the group drafted several plans for stealing money and cars, some of which were aborted only at the last minute. The group also hit twice on the city hall of Groningen with the

²²⁷ Moussault 2009, 37–38; Ottens, Luuk; Scheltens, Piet Hein & Siebelink, Rob: “‘ Muziek maken is een uitlaatklep, dat weet ik wel. Maar het is nog altijd beter dan surfen’,” *De Groene Amsterdammer* February 13, 1985; “De toepassing van “klein geweld” in Nederland,” BVD Report March 21, 1977.

²²⁸ “Het ROOD VERZETSFRONT gaat ervan uit...,” *Rood Verzetsfront* 1, no. 3 (May 1977).

²²⁹ “Verklaring bij appel gevangenhouding” (statement by two RVF members [May 2, 1979]).

intention of obtaining identification papers.²³⁰ After the first such action in June 1979, two RVF members were arrested. This action led to a controversy among the RVF members about whether the RVF should be involved in such activities in the first place. As consequence, several people left the group.²³¹

In these attempts, the RVF seems to have confronted the same challenges that the Rode Jeugd, the Rode Hulp and many other groupings aspired to conduct armed struggle had confronted earlier: how to combine legal and illegal actions.²³² Many thought that, in order to be successful, the branch committing illegal actions should be clearly separated from the legal branch. These organizations had too little patience and too few resources to create such an illegal branch. Besides, many people involved were already well-known so the possibilities of clandestine action were not very good. At the same time, the craving for action was so great that it was very difficult not to act against one's best judgment. This dilemma was not properly solved within the organization.²³³

For the remaining members, the treatment of the imprisoned RVF member, Joop Bolt, became a focus of their attention. Activities around his case culminated in a bomb attack against the house of J. M. Schampers, a judge involved in Bolt's case, in late February 1980. The attack was claimed under the name of the Rood Volksverzet and it was the first bomb attack that the alleged B-group committed.²³⁴

The existence of B-group remained shortlived. By late 1980, the group members' disagreements had developed to such an extent that it made it impossible to continue their cooperation. The same can be said about the Rood Verzetsfront in general. In other words, the cooperation between its branches in various cities declined and its members concentrated their efforts mostly on working within the context of the militant squatter movement, anti-militarism and on the actions against nuclear power.²³⁵ After that, the Rood Verzetsfront continued its existence in the form of a publishing enterprise until the late 1980s.

As mentioned earlier, one objective of the RVF was to help people involved in armed struggle more concretely than by merely seeking publicity for their cause and conditions. In this context, the name of another Rode Jeugd veteran, Henk Wubben, has been mentioned.

²³⁰ Moussault 2009, 207–216.

²³¹ Moussault 2009, 134–135.

²³² The similarity of the challenges is reflected by the fact that the former RVF member Paul Moussault uses almost direct quotations from the Rode Jeugd/Rode Hulp texts in describing these aspects of the history of the RVF (e.g. Moussault 2009, 140, 207–208. The fact that he does it without referring to the documents, is problematic in terms of the credibility of his account.

²³³ Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998, 59, 67, 71–82; Verbij 2005, 143; Pekelder 2007, 153–154.

²³⁴ Moussault 2009, 141–144, 217. The attack is discussed also in Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998.

²³⁵ Moussault 2009, 141, 165–166, 222; Onderzoeksburo Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 1998, 59.

2.5.3 Henk Wubben, the RVF and the RAF²³⁶

One of the questions that have intrigued the students of the left-wing movements in the 1970s is what Henk Wubben actually did after 1974. Soon after the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, he moved to Amsterdam and started to study cultural anthropology at the university. He was still seen in the radical left-wing circles, but did not seem to play a particularly prominent role in the Rode Hulp or any other grouping. As zealous as he felt about the idea of revolution, he seemed to be very doubtful about the prospects for revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands and, perhaps even more, about the capabilities of his potential partners in it.

During the last years of the Rode Jeugd, Henk Wubben had been calling for a more professional attitude and methods. Moreover, after the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, he remained highly critical of the activities of other former Rode Jeugd people. This became especially clear in the letters he wrote to some of them in June, 1975 where he expressed his disappointment that people seemed not to have taken warning of their past mistakes and that they were not doing enough to find out what exactly had happened in the case of Luciën van Hoesel. In that correspondence, he broke off all contact with them.²³⁷

Henk Wubben had his eyes more on what was going on in West Germany and he oriented his activities towards supporting the groups who waged the revolutionary struggle there. He was active in several organizations supporting the RAF. Already during the Rode Jeugd time, he had established many contacts with German comrades, for example with people involved in what were called the *Knastgruppen* (prison groups) that supported the imprisoned German activists. Through these contacts, he met many people who later joined the RAF and went underground. Even though Wubben himself never became part of an illegal structure, he instead played a role in *das Umfeld*, in other words, the support networks of RAF. Wubben emphasized that this help did not include renting cars or houses, because a professional organization such as the RAF does not make itself vulnerable by assigning such tasks to outsiders. He gave the impression that he has been one of those who the RAF had more trust in, but avoids being specific about his activities.

Some clues about the degree of Wubben's involvement can be determined from what is known about his activities. For example, it can be derived that he has considered himself as being capable of hiding explosives and of taking care of a German comrade escaping from prison.²³⁸ Considering the length and palpable strength of his commitment

²³⁶ Information about Henk Wubben's activities in this sub-chapter is based on the interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003, unless mentioned otherwise.

²³⁷ "Aan: Willem Oskam, Joost van Steenis, Evert v.d. Berg, Aat van Wyk en Lucien van Hoesel" (letter written by Henk Wubben, June 26, 1975).

²³⁸ In 1980, Wubben was arrested when he visited a garage where there were ingredients for explosives. According to his account, the materials were destined for the IRA and he had helped to hide them after the first attempt for delivery to the receiver had failed. The supplies were, according to Wubben, obtained by a BVD infiltrator (interview with Henk Wubben on July 15, 2003). Paul Moussault, however, has claimed that this was a story that was fabricated for defense purposes and that the chemicals were obtained to be used in their own bomb attacks (Moussault 2009, 216–218). By hiding comrades on the run I refer to what is referred to as the Celler Loch Affaire. As part of efforts to infiltrate the RAF, Henk Wubben was asked whether he could take care of his friend Sigurd Debus, who was allegedly at that time in bad health, after he

to the RAF, it would be surprising if he had kept himself in the margins for the whole time. Fully in line with his thinking and way of action is to not betray his comrades by offering a too detailed rambling about his past activities.

It has been claimed that Wubben acted as an important contact person between the RVF and the RAF²³⁹, and there is no reason to doubt that. His contacts with the RVF date back to the beginnings of that organization. According to Wubben, the Eekens were in the process of directing their activities from supporting the Palestinian cause more into supporting the RAF and they were looking for people who were already involved in such activities. In the context of Rood Verzetsfront, Wubben was involved in developing the political line of the grouping and in helping with the printing press. He also participated in some actions that were organized in support of the RAF.

Wubben's role in the initiatives for armed struggle is not clear. In any case, he did not then and does not currently reject the idea of committing, for example, small-scale bomb attacks or occupations. Through these kinds of militant actions, people could train and explore "whether they were fit for the hard work". According to Moussault, Wubben would have been part of the B-group and involved in various plans for robberies and bombings.²⁴⁰

In the 1980s, Wubben withdrew slowly from his involvement in the armed struggle. A crucial turning point in this regard took place in June, 1980 when the house where he lived with Ciska Eeken was almost completely destroyed by an explosion. A few days afterwards, Wubben was arrested for hiding explosives. While Wubben maintains that the explosion was work of the German intelligence agencies as a consequence of the unsuccessful attempts to infiltration through him, many people are convinced that explosion was most probably caused by his own mishandling of explosives.²⁴¹

After the campaign of the Rood Verzetsfront sputtered out, no other similar kind of opportunity for a revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands has arisen that Wubben would have found worthwhile. He still maintains that the struggles that the RAF and other groups were engaged in as honorable and just ones.

Today, Henk Wubben lives with Ciska Brakenhoff (formerly Eeken) in Almere, on a street named after one of the heroes of the Dutch resistance movement during the Second World War. In 1997, his book on North Korea was published and he occasionally lectures and gives interviews on that theme. As for Ciska Brakenhoff, she remains steadfast in her refusal to grant interviews.

was helped to escape from prison. Initially, Wubben agreed to help in this, but later became suspicious and withdrew from the plan.

²³⁹ E.g. Verbij 2005, 144.

²⁴⁰ E.g. Moussault 2009, 210–211, 214–215, 220–221.

²⁴¹ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 46–47; "'Nederland wist van bomaanslag'", *Het Parool* June 14, 1986. Van Staalduinen claims that it had later come out that the German authorities knew about the explosion (Van Staalduinen 1996, 200). However, this information seems to be based on misreading the above-mentioned article in *Het Parool* (which deals with the role of the German authorities in the explosion at the wall of the prison that Debus was in).

2.5.4 Joost van Steenis and the concept of small violence

Of the former Rode Jeugd people, Joost van Steenis is one of those who have stayed involved in the radical politics the longest. After the Rode Jeugd, he too took part in the Rode Hulp for a time. Others, however, had serious reservations about his concept of the anti-imperialist struggle. According to Van Steenis, the concept of the urban guerrilla did not suit well the prevailing circumstances in the developed countries. Instead, the best way for action was the use of “small violence” (*klein geweld*), that is, all kinds of acts that required little logistics. Most typically these acts would be directed against the power holders of imperialist and capitalist system in person, such as harassment, intimidation and other deeds that would disturb their lives.²⁴² Most of the others did not support this idea and expelled Van Steenis from the Rode Hulp.²⁴³

From the late 1970s on, Van Steenis has been active in various movements. In 1977, he was a parliamentary candidate for a small party called the *Verbond tegen Ambtelijke Willekeur* (Alliance against Arbitrary Official Rule). One year later, he established, together with his friend Tom de Booij (who had also been active in the Rode Hulp), an organization called *Schoon van Lichaam, Helder van Geest* (Clean Body, Lucid Mind) which purportedly supported the doctrine of small violence, as well as the *Stichting Macht & Elite* (Foundation Power and Elite), which had as its task the research on the balance of power in the Western countries. In the early 1980s, Van Steenis was actively involved in the squatters’ movement as well as the movement against nuclear power.²⁴⁴ He currently maintains a website entitled Foundation Power and Elite where he publishes his letters, articles and books.

Part of Van Steenis’ ideology is the propagation of the autonomy of individuals and autonomous action. His opposition of all elites also includes reservations against the strict organization of resistance against the ruling elite, because “centralization will always lead to the rise of a new elite”.²⁴⁵ As this shows, Van Steenis has largely abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology in its most typical form and he had done so already in the late 1970s.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Discussion paper for the meeting in Amersfoort December 13, 1975 (“Vergadering zaterdag 13 december 12.00 precies Restaurant Amershof...”); a letter from Joost van Steenis to Aat van Wijk, August 10, 1979; “De toepassing van “klein geweld” in Nederland,” BVD report March 21, 1977.

²⁴³ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 79.

²⁴⁴ “Who is Joost van Steenis?” <http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/whoisjoostvansteenishtm> (retrieved February 12, 2008); Quarterly survey of BVD 4, 1981, reprinted in English in de Valk 2005). About his role in the movement against nuclear power, see especially de Valk 1996, 191–204.

²⁴⁵ “Who is Joost van Steenis?” <http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/whoisjoostvansteenishtm> (retrieved February 12, 2008).

²⁴⁶ Letter from Joost van Steenis to Aat van Wijk, January 16, 1980. See also the webpages of his foundation at <http://members.chello.nl/jsteenis/index.htm> (retrieved February 12, 2008).

3 The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army

The radical Left in the United States and the Netherlands followed closely many of the same international developments – the Vietnam War, Latin American struggles and the inequalities in the socioeconomic position at home. In contrast to the Dutch, however, the American radical Left was strongly influenced by the race question. To many activists, the people of color were an internal colony of the United States. Like the independence movements around the world, the movements of the people of color in the United States, and those of African-Americans in particular, were seen as the frontline fighters and the natural leaders in the fight against imperialism. From this perspective, the task and moral obligation of the white activists was to support these struggles.

Another distinctive feature of the American New Left was its interest in prisoner issues. By the late 1960s, the treatment and the rights of prisoners had captured the activists' attention in the San Francisco Bay area and elsewhere. In the previous two decades, dissatisfaction and protests against the prison conditions and policies had grown among the convicts. This took many forms, one of them being an overt politicization and organization of prisoners.

Interaction developed between the politicized inmates and the New Left activists.²⁴⁷ This exchange of ideas happened through books written by these inmate activists – such as Eldridge Cleaver's book, *Soul on Ice* (1968), and George Jackson's, *Soledad Brother* (1970) and *Blood In My Eye* (1972). More direct contacts were also made possible by the model of prisoner treatment that had been adopted as the organizing principle in the Californian prisons. What this treatment involved was that from the early 1960s on, outside experts, such as psychologists, university students and community groups, were brought into prisons in increasing numbers to participate in the convict reform programs that aimed at curing the inmates of their criminal tendencies. These people were often very sympathetic to the prisoners' position and brought a flow of ideas (including Marxist-Leninist thinking) from the outside with them.

Through this interaction, the radical Left activists started to regard prisons as the ultimate manifestation of what was wrong in the society and as an important front in their struggle against the capitalist and imperialist system. They also saw prisoners as being members of the underclass who were forced to commit crimes to stay alive. Since they had ended up in prison essentially due to the faults in the political system, they were considered political prisoners. Following the analysis of Cleaver, the radical Left saw prisoners as a source of massive revolutionary potential and expected the underclass to be the instigators of the people's revolution in the United States.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ The following description is based mainly on Cummins 1994, which is the most detailed study on the radical prison movement in California. This book is strongly influenced by the writer's disillusionment and condemnation of the way the New Left dealt with the prisoner issues. Cummins blames the New Left at destroying the emerging attempts for serious prison organizing by feeding the prisoners revolutionary fantasies and by hijacking the prisoner cause away from the prisoners themselves. Nevertheless, in this author's opinion, Cummins manages to capture very well the essentials of the evolution of the narratives of resistance and revolution among the prisoners and leftists. See also e.g. Gottschalk 2006, 165–196; Van Deburg 1992, 97–111.

²⁴⁸ Cummins 1994, 93–186.

This activism around prison issues peaked in the early 1970s in the Bay Area. The prisons were a topic of various demonstrations and teach-ins. Besides that, the California Department of Corrections offices became targets of bomb attacks. Towards 1974, however, the interest in prisoner issues was decreasing in the Bay Area, as was the interest in Marxism-Leninism on the university campuses. At the same time, many of those who remained active, radicalized further.²⁴⁹

3.1 Formation of the Symbionese Liberation Army

The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) is one of those radicalized groups that were heavily influenced by the ideas and utopias that developed from the interaction between the New Left and the political prisoner movement. The SLA was formed and its program developed in the summer of 1973 by a black escaped convict, Donald DeFreeze, and by a handful of white activists from the Berkeley area in California. DeFreeze, 30 years old at that time, had been in and out of prison for years for petty crimes and robberies. In the early 1970s, he became politicized in prison and started to plan for committing himself to armed revolutionary struggle. In March, 1973, he was assigned to a light-security job which left him unguarded at times. On his first day, DeFreeze seized the opportunity and escaped.²⁵⁰

Once outside, he looked for people whom he had met in prison to help him – ex-convicts, escapees, and political activists. Finally, he ended up at the doorstep of the so-called Peking House in Oakland, California, the residence of William Wolfe and Russell Little. Wolfe and Little had participated as tutors in the inmate study groups and had become friends with DeFreeze.²⁵¹ At that point, both Wolfe and Little were politically radicalized and associated with the Venceremos organization. Venceremos was known as the most radical and militant of the radical Left movements at that time in California. This organization was active in various issues, ranging from defending and educating prisoners, operating a people's medical center and staging violent anti-war demonstrations, to organizing self-defense classes and allegedly planning military actions.²⁵²

Wolfe and Little arranged DeFreeze to stay with someone who was beyond the suspicion of authorities, Mizmoon Soltysik. Soltysik was their friend-of-a-friend who was politically active in the women's movement but not involved in the prisoner issues.²⁵³ With her, DeFreeze began to write down the plans and program for the SLA. Soon

²⁴⁹ Cummins 1994, 222–224, 228–229.

²⁵⁰ E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 87–88, 308–321; Payne & Findley 1976, 1–52; also “Criminal records of the two prison fugitives”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 16, 1974.

²⁵¹ E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 56–63.

²⁵² To my knowledge, there is no academic study on the Venceremos organization. For information presented here, see McLellan & Avery 1977, 58–59, 53–64; *America's Maoists: Report by the Committee of Internal Security* (1972), 109–112; Bryan 1976, 103–107; Elbaum 2002, 100; Payne & Findley 1976, 121. According to McLellan & Avery (1977, 94), Wolfe, Little and Nancy Ling Perry, who comes up in the following paragraph, had been involved in another army called the Partisans' Vanguard Party, which was a group of black inmates and ex-convicts. Their efforts had failed by the summer of 1973.

²⁵³ Payne & Findley 1976, 7–8, 95; McLellan & Avery 1977, 87–90, 92–93.

afterwards, they were joined by William Wolfe, Russell Little and another friend of theirs, Nancy Ling Perry.²⁵⁴

The mission of the Symbionese Liberation Army was presented as follows in its declaration of revolutionary war dated on August 21, 1973:²⁵⁵

The Symbionese Federation and the Symbionese Liberation Army is a united and federated grouping of members of different races and people and socialist political parties of the oppressed people of the Fascist United States of America, who have under black and minority leadership formed and joined The Symbionese Federated Republic and have agreed to struggle together [...] in the gaining of FREEDOM and SELF DETERMINATION and INDEPENDANCE [sic] for all their people and races.²⁵⁶

The purpose of the SLA was thus to unite all oppressed people in their struggle against the common enemy. The word “symbionese” in its name referred to this purpose. The SLA explained that this word is derived from “symbiosis” and it defined its meaning as “a body of dissimilar bodies and organisms living in deep and loving harmony and partnership in the best interest of all within the body”.²⁵⁷ As the logo for the army, the SLA adopted the seven-headed cobra. This logo also symbolized the alliance: the cobra had seven heads, but they were all united in one body, just as the people of the SLA came from diverse backgrounds but have united themselves in the struggle.²⁵⁸ The movement would operate under black and minority leadership. In this, the SLA followed the idea that blacks and other “third world people” (rather than middle-class whites) should lead the revolutionary struggle because they experienced the oppression first-hand.

Moreover, in terms of ideology and goals, the SLA was a blend of ideas and influences, representing the grievances and desires of all those oppressed people it wanted to represent. It was most strongly influenced by the issues of race, feminism and

²⁵⁴ There are somewhat contradictory accounts about who became involved at which stage (cf. Payne & Findley 1976, 88–144; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 138–139; McLellan & Avery 1977, 75–122, 174–187; The last SLA statement). Furthermore, Little’s girlfriend, Robyn Steiner, and possibly also other friends of those mentioned, were at least partially involved (Payne & Findley 1976, 101; “Former S.L.A. member tells of the group’s early days”, *The New York Times* November 27, 1973).

²⁵⁵ The SLA communiqués and transcripts of its tapes have been published in various newspapers (e.g. *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Berkeley Barb*). Many of them are also included in the FBI files that have been released under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act. The communications until the end of April 1974, are also reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974. I have used here Pearsall (ed.) 1974 because it is the most convenient source for citations and also the easiest to obtain for an interested reader.

²⁵⁶ “The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese Liberation Army Declaration of Revolutionary War & The Symbionese Program”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 22–23. Interestingly enough, despite the total condemnation of the US as it was, the SLA still referred to the Declaration of Independence of the United States as legitimization of its own declaration of revolutionary war against “the fascist capitalist class”.

²⁵⁷ “The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese Liberation Army Declaration of Revolutionary War & The Symbionese Program”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 23.

²⁵⁸ “The emblem of the Symbionese Liberation Army....” reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 15–17. In the SLA documents, several meanings are given to the seven heads of the cobra. Another explanation given in the communiqué introducing the emblem describes it in almost esoteric terms as an ancient symbol that people have used to signify God and life and that two heads on each side represent the four principles of life and the three heads in the middle represent God and the universe.

Marxism.²⁵⁹ The influence of black nationalism is also clear in the values of the SLA that were presented side-by-side with the seven-headed cobra. The values are almost word-for-word *Nguzo Saba*, the seven key values which are part of the black cultural nationalist *Kawaida* theory about cultural and social change which was developed and propagated by Maulana Ron Karenga and the US Organization he led.²⁶⁰ These values were unity, self determination, collective work and responsibility, collective production, purpose, creativity and faith.

The objectives and visions about the society the SLA strived for were outlined in its document called “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”. Their aim was to destroy the capitalist state and its value systems and to replace it with a system that serves the interests of all people and is “based on the true affirmation of life, love, trust, and honesty, freedom and equality that is truly for all”.²⁶¹ The values the SLA despised were individualism, fascism, racism, sexism, imperialism and capitalism.²⁶² To get to this kind of society, the SLA called for political and economical changes that were rather typical for Marxist movements, such as taking over the land owned by the state and the capitalist class, and a more democratic form of government. Furthermore, according to the SLA, institutions needed to be established that would help the women grow, the elderly needed to be taken care of with respect and the whole prison system had to be destroyed and replaced by a system based on comradeship and education.

These objectives would not be achieved without military action. The SLA was established explicitly for the purpose of conducting armed struggle. Its whole program was based on the conception that violence was the only means left for the people to fight back against their enemy and to achieve their freedom. In fact, to deny this was absolutely antirevolutionary. It was emphasized that the SLA’s commitment to revolution was total and fully uncompromisable.²⁶³

To organize the people to join the revolutionary struggle, the SLA developed an alternative model to the party organizing which its members thought had proven to be an ineffective way to mobilize people in the struggle. It looked at establishing a “Symbionese Federation” that was to administer both the fight for and living in the new kind of society.²⁶⁴ The SLA was to be “a federation formed in the style of a revolutionary United Nations”.²⁶⁵ This federation would be led by the War Council, where each group that chose to participate would be represented. There would be two types of units, combat units and support units.²⁶⁶ In fact, the Symbionese organization structure was designed on paper in detail.²⁶⁷

²⁵⁹ The SLA members later identified their key sources of inspiration to be Marxism, revolutionary nationalism and revolutionary feminism (the last SLA statement, 3).

²⁶⁰ E.g. Van Deburg 1992, 171–173.

²⁶¹ “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 26–28.

²⁶² “The emblem of the Symbionese Liberation Army...” reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 15–17.

²⁶³ The SLA oath, “The United Symbionese War Council Terms of Military/Political Alliance”, “Tactical support units”, “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, all reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974.

²⁶⁴ “The goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 26–28; Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: “The story of the SLA”, *New Times* April 16, 1976, 30.

²⁶⁵ “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.

²⁶⁶ “Tactical support units”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 33–34.

²⁶⁷ Reprinted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 106–110.

The idea of establishing a federation was an attempt to enable coordination and cooperation without interfering with each group's autonomy and self-reliance. The uniting force in the federation would be "a basic belief in the necessity to use armed force to destroy U.S. corporate fascism."²⁶⁸ The context of federation would not place too much pressure on agreeing on every single issue and thereby facilitate cooperation. The federation would also enable the taking of initiative by a smaller group of people even when everyone did not fully agree. With this, the SLA tried to avoid the common-place situation among the Left that organizations fell apart over bitter fighting about the future course of action.²⁶⁹

An essential part of the SLA's program was that change not only had to occur in society, but also individuals would need to change. The revolutionary project thus also had a personal dimension and violence was its essential component: "[a] revolutionary is not a criminal nor is she or he an adventurer, and revolutionary violence is nothing but the most profound means of achieving internal as well as external balance."²⁷⁰ As a symbol of transformation and commitment, the SLA members adopted new names, following either the tradition of Latin American revolutionaries to use code names or the black nationalist movement's custom to abandon the "slave name" given at birth (or both).²⁷¹

The army that the SLA members designed was for far more people than they had in their ranks at that moment. Thus, a call was issued for all people to join:

... what is needed now is for you as lovers of the people to select in what area you are able and willing to fight in or give support to, either in the combat units or support units of The S.L.A., the choice is yours alone: to be and show yourselves as lovers of the people and our children and true to your word revolutionaries, or as egotistic opportunists and lovers of the group and organization and enemies of the people.²⁷²

3.2 Getting started

From the late summer of 1973, there are reports of DeFreeze contacting several radical leaders and proposing an alliance. The SLA members also reportedly searched and tested for potential recruits in the Marxist study groups.²⁷³ The last SLA document stated that:

²⁶⁸ The last SLA statement, 4.

²⁶⁹ "Tactical support units", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 33–34, see also The last SLA statement, 3–4.

²⁷⁰ "A letter to the people from Fahizah", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.

²⁷¹ Payne & Findley 1976, 111–112, cf. McLellan & Avery 1977, 18–19, Hearst & Moscow 1982, 46. Nancy Ling Perry took the name Fahizah, Mizmoon Soltysik became Zoya, William Wolfe started to call himself Kahjoh (often written incorrectly as Cujo) and Russell Little became Osceola (or Osi). Emily Harris was called Yolanda and Bill Harris was Teko. Joe Remiro became Bo and Angela Atwood adopted the name Gelina. Soltysik had actually already changed her name from Patricia to a more poetic Mizmoon earlier, most evidently in the cultural spirit of the 1960s. Donald DeFreeze had already replaced his slave name with the name Cinque (Cin) Mtume. According to McLellan and Avery (1977, 18), Cinque came from an enslaved Wendji chief who led a famous revolt on the slave ship in 1839 and Mtume from the word that means "apostle" or "disciple" in Swahili.

²⁷² "Tactical support units", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 34.

²⁷³ McLellan & Avery 1977, 98; Bryan 1976, 110.

The original group, Nancy, Willie, Mizmoon and Cin, decided to draft a program of revolutionary ideas and objectives for a multi-national organization. They took the program around and showed it to a lot of community people and a few Bay Area organizations. They got a really mixed reaction to it – most people didn't feel it was practical to try to form multiracial units.²⁷⁴

According to all accounts, the reactions to the Symbionese program were indeed mixed at best. The idea of multiracial units was only one of the concerns. For many people, the program sounded so weird that they suspected DeFreeze was either crazy or a provocateur. Few seemed to get excited about his ideas.²⁷⁵ Rumors started to spread in Berkeley that there was a very violent group in the making that had the weapons and ammunition-making equipment.²⁷⁶ That, however, was not very spectacular in the Berkeley context “where new messiahs, tribes and armies surface regularly”²⁷⁷ and they do not seem to have provoked any heightened alarm.

While the response in general was negative, the SLA found a handful of new members among a circle of friends. Through their political activities, Wolfe and Little had met Joe Remiro, Emily and Bill Harris (a married couple) and Angela Atwood. Like Wolfe and Little, they were active in the context of the Venceremos organization but none of them (except for Remiro) were official members, nor held a key position within that organization. In the context of the Venceremos, they took part in Marxist-Leninist study groups and self-defense classes where they practiced with weapons. They also worked together on prison issues.²⁷⁸ By January of 1974, all of them had joined the SLA.²⁷⁹ Around this core of people who were fully committed to the SLA, there were evidently a network of friends and possibly also more members. Some of these people dropped out as the SLA became more radical, and others were cut out when the SLA tightened its security.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ The last SLA statement, 2–3.

²⁷⁵ McLellan & Avery 1977, 98; Payne & Findley 1976, 140. McLellan and Avery (1977, 104) report that a group called Chicano Liberation Front would have joined the federation.

²⁷⁶ Bryan 1976, 113–114.

²⁷⁷ McLellan & Avery 1977, 105.

²⁷⁸ The last SLA statement, 12–14; McLellan & Avery 1977, 99.

²⁷⁹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 94. It is not clear when exactly the Harrises, Joe Remiro and Angela Atwood joined the ranks of the SLA. In the last SLA statement, it is stated that their contact to the SLA was mediated by William Wolfe and that the crucial talks and joining the SLA took place in late 1973 (The last SLA statement, 15). Even though Emily Harris has claimed that she did not get to know Soltysik or Perry well before January, 1974, it seems that she had at least met Mizmoon Soltysik by April, 1973. McLellan and Avery suspect that the Harrises would have been close friends of Soltysik if not part of her commune already at that time. Patricia Hearst has said that Joe Remiro and Angela Atwood would have joined earlier and the Harrises only after the murder of Foster because they were initially not trusted enough (Hearst & Moscow 1982, 138–139). Be it as it may, according to all accounts, all those people mentioned became involved by the beginning of 1974.

²⁸⁰ Bryan 1976, 108; see also Payne & Findley 1976, 127. The SLA had also contacts inside prisons. Besides Wolfe and Little, Emily and Bill Harris were also frequently visiting politicized prisoners. They had regularly visited, for example, James “Doc” Holliday, an alleged head of the Black Guerrilla Family, who they met nine times during 1972–1973 (Cummins 1994, 241; see also Payne & Findley 1976, 118). The Black Guerrilla Family was a dreaded revolutionary inmate gang (e.g. Cummins 1994, 223, 236). Also, Wolfe and Little had been in contact with various prisoners, including Clifford “Deathrow” Jefferson, who also claimed to be a leader of the Black Guerrilla Family and has been sometimes portrayed as the cellblock

During the summer and fall of 1973, the SLA core members also started to train and stockpile supplies and equipment. According to McLellan and Avery, the SLA members also committed several robberies to obtain money and identification papers. At that point, plans were made for future attacks. For several attacks, communiqués in the form of warrant orders issued by the court of the people were drafted. There was a plan to kidnap one of the presidents of a subsidiary of the ITT Corporation as a protest against that corporation's deeds against the people of Chile, Brazil, South Africa, Rhodesia and The Philippines and to demand 50,000 dollar ransom in exchange for his life. Other planned targets were the Avis Rent a Car, The Kaiser Corporation and the General Tire and Rubber Company, which were accused of serving and supporting the fascist governments of Israel, Portugal, South Africa, Chile, and Great Britain. These attacks were not conducted, perhaps because they were not considered to be good enough targets. There were also rumors that one of the priority targets of the SLA would have been Raymond Procunier, the director of the California Department of Corrections. McLellan and Avery have stated that, according to police intelligence sources, the murder would have been already planned but was cancelled because the convict associates of the SLA vetoed the idea in fear of the repercussions that it may have caused inside the prison.²⁸¹

3.3. The murder of Foster

The plan that the SLA decided to go ahead with was the assassination of Marcus Foster, the black Oakland school superintendent. On the evening of November 6, 1973, three SLA members, Nancy Ling Perry, Mizmoon Soltysik and Donald DeFreeze²⁸², shot him with cyanide bullets as he was leaving the school building. His close colleague, Robert Blackburn, who accompanied him, was shot several times, but survived.²⁸³

The SLA claimed the attack in a communiqué that was received by the media within a few days. The charges that were presented against Foster and Blackburn read as follows:

Supporting and taking part in forming and implementation of a Political Police Force operating within the Schools of the People, Supporting and taking part in the forming and implementation of Bio-Dossiers through the Forced Youth Identification Program.

leader of the SLA (McLellan & Avery 1977, 99–104). Another early convict contact was Thero Wheeler. Wheeler was a well-known black prison militant and reportedly the first convict member of the Venceremos organization. He escaped from prison in August, 1973. He has later claimed that he got help through his Venceremos connections. It is not clear whether DeFreeze was involved in arranging his escape, but there was a role for Wheeler in DeFreeze's plan for revolution. Although Wheeler has claimed he did not agree with DeFreeze's politics, he stayed in the SLA commune for some time and according to some accounts, was actively involved in recruiting new people into the SLA or even competing for the leadership (McLellan & Avery 1977, 94–95; Payne & Findley 1976, 122–144). Some have claimed that he would have participated in the group's actions still in the spring of 1974 (see e.g. Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 61–62).

²⁸¹ The last SLA statement, 2–3; McLellan & Avery 1977, 105, 110–111, 168–172; Payne & Findley 1976, 134–136, 147–149; “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Unit 10; Subject: Charles W. Comer”, a communiqué dated October 15, 1973, included in the FBI headquarters file 157–30832.

²⁸² The last SLA statement, 10; Payne & Findley 1976, 168.

²⁸³ “School Official Killed in Ambush by 3 Gunmen”, *The New York Times* November 7, 1973; “Chief of schools slain in Oakland”, *San Francisco Chronicle* November 7, 1973.

Supporting and taking part in the building of composite files for the Internal Warfare Identification Computer System.²⁸⁴

The SLA threatened to shoot-on-sight other members and supporters of these programs as well.

The accusations refer to plans that had been proposed in order to improve the security situation in the Oakland schools. These plans included the introduction of identification cards that students had to carry with them and the placement of police officers in the schools. According to the SLA, these measures were part of the efforts of the fascist ruling class to subordinate the blacks and other minorities to its servitude and to crush any opposition against it. It was no coincidence, the SLA claimed, that such measures were introduced in the Oakland-Berkeley area, because “the ruling class must seek to stop the revolutionary community here before the ruling class can regain its arm of control around the struggling and oppressed people of the world”.²⁸⁵ The planned measures as well as other means that were used to monitor activists were modeled after the “fascist American tactics of genocide, murder and imprisonment practice by American financed puppet governments in Vietnam, The Philippines, Chile and South Africa”.²⁸⁶

It is not known for certain how and why the SLA ended up choosing Marcus Foster as its target. Foster was not among the “usual” enemies of the Left. According to one source, the SLA likely chose Foster after they heard about the critique that the Black Panthers had raised against him.²⁸⁷ Thero Wheeler, another black escaped convict who took part in the SLA for some months, has said that the issue of Foster came up one night. There had been a lot of negative feelings about him in the community and “Bobby Seale [a prominent Black Panther leader] was raising hell about him and all”. In the middle of this conversation, DeFreeze allegedly exclaimed that “We’re gonna waste that nigger!”.²⁸⁸

Even though Foster was considered to be an “Oreo cookie” (black on the outside, white on the inside) when he started his job in Oakland, he had largely won trust and respect by late 1973. In some circles, the opposition to Foster prevailed for a longer time and it may be that the SLA members had been disproportionately influenced by these voices. These circles could be found, for example, in prisons. The news about the possibility of a student ID card being issued, as well as other plans, were received very critically, because it provoked the idea that school children would be placed under a similar kind of surveillance as the prisoners themselves were experiencing. The story seemed to lose some nuances and details in the process, and by the summer of 1973, Foster was reportedly considered to be a “Black Judas in Oakland” by many prisoners, at least in Vacaville where DeFreeze had been imprisoned.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁴ “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974.

²⁸⁵ “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974.

²⁸⁶ “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique no. 1”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974.

²⁸⁷ Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story: Part two”, *Rolling Stone* November 20, 1975, 34, 36.

²⁸⁸ Quoted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 111.

²⁸⁹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 68–69. See also Payne & Findley (1976, 149–151) who claim that the murder was part of DeFreeze’s war against the black bourgeoisie stemming from his childhood experiences.

The communiqué published after the Foster murder was the first time that practically anyone, including the radical Left, had heard about the Symbionese Liberation Army. The authorities did not take the SLA seriously until a few days later when it was found out that the assassination was made with cyanide bullets just as the communiqué claimed.²⁹⁰

In reaction to the assassination, people were generally horrified and amazed. Who would want to kill a superintendent who was well liked in the community? What kind of a revolutionary movement would start its campaign by assassinating a *black* person? Moreover, the radical Left found the deed and the communiqué bizarre. Even though the communiqué included references to many common themes of those days – the oppression of the ethnic minorities, “criminalizing” dissent to the prevailing system and so on – the choice of the target seemed strange and the analysis far-fetched. All this combined with the fact that the SLA seemed to come out of nowhere made many people suspect that the SLA might not be a genuine left-wing movement. The Black Panthers in particular felt outright threatened by the SLA and feared that the Foster assassination was a cover operation which was intended to give a bad name to the Black Panthers and to the black community in general. “The revelations of the Watergate investigations have clearly established that powerful, fascist elements in this country, in cooperation with high officials, do engage in assassinations, murders and violence to achieve their objectives”, the Black Panther weekly noted.²⁹¹ The reception among others whose support the SLA wished to gain was hardly any better.²⁹²

What made the attack even more controversial was that the SLA had not got its facts right. It was true that Foster had initially supported the plan, but he had renounced his support before the attack. The SLA members seemed to be unaware of this. In short, the SLA seemed to have misjudged the role of Foster.²⁹³

A week later, the SLA issued a new communiqué where it withdrew the shoot-on-sight order, because the controversial plans had been halted. Besides that, it wanted to set things straight and to salvage its image. The SLA accused the “fascist news media” of suppressing the truth about Marcus Foster. This time, it attacked Robert Blackburn in particular and claimed he was a CIA agent.²⁹⁴ The bottom line of the message was that the assassination had produced the desired results and that the SLA was right about Foster and Blackburn. The audiences in Oakland, Berkeley, and elsewhere were still not convinced.

The murder of Foster was a powerful way to introduce the SLA but this turned seriously against the group. It gave the SLA a reputation as being adventurists who were out of touch with both reality and “the people” and cast doubts about the real identity of its members. The inmate sympathizers of the SLA were not impressed, either. Some of them

²⁹⁰ Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 35, *The Black Panther* November 24, 1973, 3; “Oakland 'Army' Puzzles Police”, *The New York Times* November 11, 1973.

²⁹¹ *The Black Panther* November 17, 1973, 3.

²⁹² E.g. Payne & Findley 1976, 174–175.

²⁹³ E.g. Findley, Tim: “Evidence back claim of Foster ‘Assassins’”, *San Francisco Chronicle* November 10, 1973; “Hunt for motive in Foster death”, *San Francisco Chronicle* November 12, 1973; Payne & Findley 1976, 175; “Bullets That Killed Oakland Educator Contained Cyanide”, *The New York Times* November 10, 1973.

²⁹⁴ “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Youth Unit Communique No. 2”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974. See also Jennings, Duffy: “New letter by Foster’s killers”, *San Francisco Chronicle* November 19, 1973.

felt they had been misled about the true character of Foster. There are rumors that some SLA-connected inmates would have even ordered DeFreeze to be executed. The assassination also weakened the SLA's support networks, as several of its associates and helpers were appalled by the deed and consequently distanced themselves from the group.²⁹⁵

However, the SLA members were not deterred by this. They went on preparing for new attacks. Towards this end, they gathered information on potential targets for kidnap and assassination, practiced bomb-making and studied other skills useful for their armed struggle. Later, an unmailed Symbionese Liberation Army communiqué number 3 was found in the safe house suggested that the SLA had planned to execute the California Department of Corrections prison personnel by cyanide bullets.²⁹⁶

3.4. The arrest of Little and Remiro

The SLA's preparations and planning were interrupted by a routine traffic inspection. On the night of January 10, 1974, Joe Remiro and Russell Little were stopped by patrolling policemen when they were driving in the deserted streets near their safe house. When the policemen asked the two men to step out of the car, Joe Remiro opened fire and fled. Russell Little tried to escape by car, but had to stop when a shot flattened a tire and Little was then arrested. In the van, the police found a pile of leaflets with the SLA cobra emblem on them. Eventually, Remiro was arrested a couple of hours later while walking in the neighborhood.²⁹⁷

It seems probable that Remiro had gone to the safe house to warn the others and after that, let himself be arrested to take some heat off from the rest of the group. The weapon Remiro carried at the time of the arrest was the one that was used to kill Foster.²⁹⁸ Bill Harris has later said that Donald DeFreeze and Willie Wolfe felt very guilty for their comrades' fate because Wolfe had borrowed the gun for the Foster murder from Remiro. DeFreeze had tried to modify the identifying characteristics so that it would not be recognized before they gave it back to Remiro.²⁹⁹

Later that day, the SLA members left the house and set it on fire to get rid of all the material in the house they could not take with them.³⁰⁰ However, the fire did not burn down the house entirely. When the police entered the place, they found a remarkable collection of documents and bomb-making material. Due to the documents found in the

²⁹⁵ McLellan & Avery 1977, 146–148; Payne & Findley 1976, 176–177.

²⁹⁶ “Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Womens and Mens Unit, Communiqué no. 3; Subject: The Department of Corrections & Its Agents Associates Members”, included in the FBI headquarters file 157–30832. The communiqué provides the same kind of explanation of a military coup in the US around 1963/64 that was included in “A letter to the people from Fahizah” that was sent to the media in January, 1974.

²⁹⁷ McLellan & Avery 1977, 159–164; Symbionese Liberation Army: A Study, 3–4.

²⁹⁸ McLellan & Avery 1977, 165; Payne & Findley 1976, 191–192.

²⁹⁹ Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: “The story of the SLA”, *New Times* April 16, 1976, 31.

³⁰⁰ McLellan & Avery 1977, 166, The last SLA statement, 17.

car and in the house, everyone involved in the SLA became a suspect and those who had not yet gone underground were forced to do so.³⁰¹

These arrests were a serious setback for the SLA. Russ Little has later regretfully stated that they were just two months away from getting it all together, from having a much stronger organization. They had recruited a network of supporters to help them but were forced to cut contacts with them for security reasons.³⁰² Soon after the arrests, they decided to send another statement to the media in an evident attempt to improve the public image of the SLA by giving it a human face and by providing justification for its acts. This document was “a letter to the people from Fahizah”, i.e. Nancy Ling Perry.³⁰³

The letter responded to several criticisms and claims about the SLA. Perry restated the SLA’s position on the Foster murder. She also denied that they had not intended to burn down the safe house completely, just enough to melt down any fingerprints they may have overlooked.³⁰⁴ She denied that there would have been a vast cache of armaments in the house and claimed that such statements were purely lies that were designed to incriminate Remiro and Little. In short, the SLA had not made any mistakes. If a mistake was made, then it was rather that not everyone was heavily and offensively armed and that they were not aware that they were under attack.

This letter also introduced the SLA’s analysis of the recent history of the United States. According to that letter, the country was now a dictatorship run by Richard Nixon. This dictatorship was established by a coup that took place when John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Furthermore, the government was after everyone who opposes it, all those people were in acute danger of being thrown into concentration camps (a word they used for prisons). Moreover, “... the government is now in the rapid and steady process of removing the means of survival from the lower class and giving these benefits to the middle class in an effort to rally support from them.” In this situation, it was only natural that those who were robbed by the government would try to take back what was theirs. The only means left for the people to achieve their liberation was violence. It was in the nature of people to fight when they were oppressed, but people were terrified by this revolutionary violence because they had been conditioned to be afraid of it.³⁰⁵

This letter did not serve the interests of the SLA any better than the assassination and the previous communiqués. It did not convince the communities in Berkeley and Oakland that the SLA had been on the right track. Rather, it added to people being perplexed.³⁰⁶ To counter the backlash, they decided to step up their actions and try to get their comrades out of prison.

³⁰¹ The last SLA statement, 18; McLellan & Avery 1977, 167–168; Payne & Findley 1976, 193–194.

³⁰² The last SLA statement, 18.

³⁰³ “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.

³⁰⁴ In the last SLA statement (p. 17), Joe Remiro states that the house was set on fire because they were worried that the house would be linked to the car before they had time to move everything out. The fire, however, ignited because of bad ventilation. The biggest mistake, in his view, was that they had all that material lying around in the first place.

³⁰⁵ “A letter to the people from Fahizah”, reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.

³⁰⁶ See e.g. Pepper, Sgt: “SLA’s Fahizah Just Naive”, *Berkeley Barb* February 1–7, 1974, 2.

3.5 The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst

The SLA's next target was Patricia Hearst, the heiress of the well-known media dynasty and the grand-daughter of the legendary William Randolph Hearst. Her name had appeared on an apparent hit list that the police found in the safe house, but that had not led to any action by the authorities. On the evening of February 4, 1974, a group of SLA members³⁰⁷ entered Hearst's apartment in Berkeley and took her with them. Three days later, the SLA sent out a similar kind of arrest warrant for Patricia Hearst that it had sent earlier for Foster. The communiqué ended with the promise that further communication would follow.³⁰⁸ Patricia Hearst was taken to a safe house in Daly City where all seven active SLA members lived at that time.³⁰⁹

The kidnapping was instantly³¹⁰ a major news story which attracted world-wide attention. It was the first political kidnapping of its kind in the United States. Some interpreted the incident as an (already predicted) arrival of a Latin American-style political terrorism to the country and expected to see many more of this type of acts.³¹¹

Right after the kidnapping and the communiqué, there was intense speculation about why Hearst was kidnapped. The FBI, which immediately got involved in the investigation³¹², assumed that the SLA would demand the release of Joe Remiro and Russ Little. This was a widely held assumption.³¹³ Randolph Hearst said he would do everything in his power to meet the kidnappers' demands. At the same time, he expressed publicly his concern that the SLA would demand something that was not in the control of his family, meaning specifically the demand to release prisoners.³¹⁴ From the comments of the director of FBI's San Francisco office, one got the idea that the release of prisoners would not happen, if not for any other reason then for the fear that their release would lead others to try the same thing.³¹⁵

The release of Remiro and Little was indeed what the SLA strived for.³¹⁶ It seems that the SLA waited for a few days to see what the reaction to the kidnapping would be, and then they sent out their demands. A week after the kidnapping, they sent out their

³⁰⁷ McLellan & Avery (1977, 197) state that Hearst would later testify that these people were Donald DeFreeze, Bill Harris and Angela Atwood.

³⁰⁸ "Symbionese Liberation Army Western Regional Adult Unit, Communiqué No. 3", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974; McLellan & Avery 1977, 200.

³⁰⁹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 213.

³¹⁰ To be precise, "instantly" is not entirely correct term. While the news about the kidnapping spread fast through grapevine, a news embargo was declared on Randolph Hearst's (Patricia's father) demand at first. It did not last more than a few hours. After that, there was no holding back and probably also little to be gained with the news embargo (e.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: "Hearst daughter abducted by 3 armed commandos", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 6, 1974; "Granddaughter of Hearst Abducted by 3", *The New York Times* February 6, 1974).

³¹¹ Carroll, Jerry: "New Latin-style terrorism feared", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 9, 1974.

³¹² Raudebaugh, Charles: "No message from Hearst kidnapers", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 7, 1974.

³¹³ E.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: "Kidnapers expected to ask 'prisoner exchange'", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 9, 1974; "No Ransom Demands Received in the Hearst Case", *The New York Times* February 10, 1974; Findley, Tim: "Unusual hostage offer", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 11, 1974; "The hostage heiress", *Newsweek* February 18, 1974.

³¹⁴ "Hearsts endure a terrible silence", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 9, 1974.

³¹⁵ "An FBI agent talks of kidnap", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 14, 1974.

³¹⁶ The last SLA statement, 18-19; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 44-45.

communication kit to a radio station. This included a tape-recorded message and a pile of SLA documents that the SLA demanded to be published in full.³¹⁷

In the taped message, the SLA explained in DeFreeze's voice that they had kidnapped Patricia Hearst for the crimes that her parents had committed against the American people and against all oppressed people around the world. Her father was the editor of the newspaper *San Francisco Examiner*, and to use the SLA's wording, the "corporate chairman of the fascist media empire of the ultra-right Hearst Corporation, which is one of the largest propaganda institutions of this oppressive military dictatorship of the militarily armed corporate state that we now live under in this nation".³¹⁸ Patricia Hearst's mother was a member of the University of California Board of Regents which had been attacked by the Berkeley left on several issues.

The SLA had obviously concluded that their demand for the release of Remiro and Little may not be met. Instead, they demanded that the Hearst family deliver a token of good faith. Once that token had been performed, the SLA would then start negotiating for the release of Patricia Hearst. The good faith gesture that the SLA demanded was to distribute 70 dollars worth food to "all people with welfare cards, Social Security pension cards, parole or probation papers, and jail or bail release slips".³¹⁹

The SLA did hint, however, that it was the release of Remiro and Little what they were after. It was explained in Patricia Hearst's voice that she was treated according to the Geneva Convention but that her conditions would at all times correspond to those of Remiro and Little,³²⁰ thus implying that when Remiro and Little were free, she would be, too.³²¹ One purpose of the food delivery demand was clearly to test whether it would be feasible to demand the release of their comrades. According to the retrospective statement of the SLA members, their aim was also to get as many people involved in a guerrilla action as possible and to make the people think of revolutionaries as a valid part of their everyday lives.³²²

The documents that were sent with the tape described elaborately the objectives and design of the SLA. They were widely published.³²³ The food delivery demand, however, was more difficult to come by: it was quickly calculated that the costs of such food delivery would add up to over 400 million dollars. Hearst replied that the demand was impossible to meet, but he would soon come up with a suggestion along the lines of the SLA's demands based on what he would be able to do.³²⁴ The SLA members obviously understood now that their demand was not reasonable. They made a new tape in which they replied using Patricia Hearst's voice that they did not intend to be unreasonable and

³¹⁷ The documents to be published included all the central documents of the SLA that were written in the latter part of 1973, that is the cobra emblem and its meaning, The Symbionese Federation & the Symbionese Liberation Army declaration of revolutionary war & the Symbionese Program, the goals of the Symbionese Liberation Army, The United Symbionese war council terms of military&political alliance, and tactical support units.

³¹⁸ Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 55.

³¹⁹ Transcript and communique printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 53–58, 63–64.

³²⁰ Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 58–61.

³²¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 44.

³²² The last SLA statement, 18.

³²³ McLellan & Avery 1977, 208; e.g. *San Francisco Chronicle* February 13, 1974.

³²⁴ Statement printed in *San Francisco Chronicle* February 14, 1974. McLellan & Avery 1977, 208–209.

“whatever you come up with is basically okay. And just do it as fast as you can and everything will be fine”.³²⁵ Hearst responded by introducing a two million dollar program, called People in Need, which would feed approximately 100,000 persons during the next year.³²⁶

The SLA dismissed the Hearsts’ offer as “throwing a few crumbs to the people”.³²⁷ Instead, the SLA demanded four million dollars more and gave a list of new instructions as to how to organize the distribution. Randolph Hearst replied that the demand was beyond his capabilities, but the Hearst Corporation stepped up and offered the extra four million dollars in two parts, one part when Patricia Hearst was released unharmed and the second in January, 1975. The offer was valid until May 3.³²⁸ For the SLA members, this was no offer at all because they were convinced that once Patricia Hearst was released, the corporation would not live up to any of its promises.³²⁹

When days went by without a word from the SLA, Randolph Hearst demanded that Patricia Hearst should be allowed to write him a letter. He legitimized his demand with reference to the Geneva convention according to which the SLA had stated it was treating Patricia Hearst. Soon afterwards, the SLA responded that the demand would be met if Russell Little and Joe Remiro were given the possibility to communicate via a live national television broadcast about their health and conditions. Randolph Hearst repeated that he would do anything he could to meet the demands. The broadcast, however, was eventually refused by the court.³³⁰

During the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA members, the public and authorities all communicated through the media. The SLA members were following the media reporting on the kidnapping very intensely. Their communications included much more than the above-mentioned demands and responses. There were also many messages for different audiences.

Judging by the tone and content of their communication, the SLA members were particularly attentive to what the radical Left was saying about them. According to Patricia Hearst, the SLA had expected that the publication of the tape and the SLA documents would rally most of the radicals in the Bay area for their cause.³³¹ In the tape that the SLA had sent out, the purpose of the kidnapping was explained in Hearst’s voice:

I am basically an example and a symbolic warning, not only to you but to everyone, that there are people who are not going to accept your support of other governments and that,

³²⁵ Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 66.

³²⁶ Hearst put half a million dollars of his own money to the program and the rest of it came from the Hearst Corporation. McLellan & Avery 1977, 220–221.

³²⁷ Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 71.

³²⁸ McLellan & Avery 1977, 247; Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst discloses free food plan”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 20, 1974; “Hearst Captors Offered 4-Million”, *The New York Times* February 23, 1974; “The Hearst nightmare”, *Time* April 29, 1974.

³²⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 77–78.

³³⁰ E.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: “Hearst wants TV time for SLA ‘Soldiers’”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 12, 1974; “Hearst Will Try to Meet Demands”, *The New York Times* March 12, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: “Judge forbids TV speech by 2 SLA ‘soldiers’”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 20, 1974; “Hearst to Ask TV Time for 2”, *The New York Times* March 21, 1974; “SLA again denied a TV forum”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 26, 1974.

³³¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 59.

faced with suppression and murder of the people. [pause] And this is a warning to everybody. It is also to show what can be done. When it is necessary, the people can be fed, and to show that. It is too bad that it has to happen this way, to make people see that there are people who need food. Now maybe something can be done about that, so that things like this won't have to happen again."³³²

The hopes of the SLA did not, nonetheless, materialize. The public in general was strongly on the Hearsts' side. Support poured in for the Hearst family in the form of expressions of sympathy and money to pay for the food program. In the letters sent to the *San Francisco Examiner*, many people who qualified for the food deliveries announced their refusal to accept food.³³³

The response from the people ideologically closer to the SLA was reserved and sometimes outright hostile. The reactions of those organizations that the SLA wanted to monitor the food deliveries were illustrative.³³⁴ Most of them agreed to participate in the end, but only to save Patricia Hearst's life. In a joint statement, they strongly expressed their opposition to terrorism.³³⁵

The SLA responded that they understood the hesitation of these organizations to participate because of the dangers that an affiliation with the SLA could entail. However, the SLA also claimed that this hesitation was partly based on a lack of understanding about the nature and tactics of the enemy. According to the SLA, the enemy always sought to negotiate with those political groups and leaders that were most willing to compromise the needs and concerns of the people. Overall, the enemy tried to destroy the revolutionary forces by granting sufficient reforms to make the majority of people satisfied and then kill those who did not concede. The SLA warned the people not to play into this scheme.³³⁶

It is not uncommon for revolutionary leftists to disagree on their tactics. Starting up the armed struggle in Western countries at the time was a highly controversial idea and every group that attempted was subject to fierce criticism. The SLA, however, seemed to get an exceptionally strong and sharp condemnation from the majority of the radical Left. It is noteworthy that several movement papers and magazines did not print the SLA documents

³³² Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 66.

³³³ E.g. "The hostage: a game of terror", *Newsweek* February 25, 1974; "The public reaction to the kidnaping", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* February 17, 1974.

³³⁴ The list included Nairobi College in East Palo Alto, Glide Memorial Church in San Francisco, and The Black Teachers Caucus, the National Welfare Rights Organization, the American Indian Movement, the United Prisoner's Union, the Third World Womens Alliance, the United Farm Workers, and representatives from people's news services such as Getting Together, Kalayan, Triple Jeopardy, the Black Panther Party and The Anvil (Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 63).

³³⁵ Power, Keith: "Go-between offer in the kidnap", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 14, 1974. The only one really expressing his support to the SLA was Revender A. Cecil Williams, a pastor of Glide Church, who also played a major role in convincing the other organizations to join. Wilbur "Popeye" Jackson, the chairman of United Prisoners Union, did not seem an entirely reluctant participant, either (see Johnston, David: "Popeye blames PIN for screwing up food program", *Berkeley Barb* April 5-11, 1974). The Black Panthers, while still vehemently opposing the SLA, offered to take care of the program, but that offer was refused and the Panthers withdrew completely ("Huey P. Newton's letter to Hearst family", *The Black Panther* February 23, 1974; McLellan & Avery 1977, 244-245).

³³⁶ Tape transcribed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 75-77.

as the group had requested.³³⁷ However, there were also those who supported the SLA. The Black Liberation Army showed solidarity with its struggle in the following words:

... we have been waging this protracted War of Liberation virtually alone; Oh but how sweet it is to hear the thunder of your weapons resounding on the battlefield. ... From our vantage point the most advanced forms of struggle are our clandestine BLA assault squads, the weatherunderground, and the SLA combat units. All are working from the promise laid down by our fallen Comrade George Jackson.³³⁸

The SLA was also warmly, although more reservedly, greeted by the Weather Underground. A communiqué signed by Bernardine Dohrn stated that the kidnapping dramatized what was wrong with the society and that change was needed.³³⁹

The SLA gladly expressed its love for those who had saluted it. At the same time, it seemed to be bothered by those who condemned its actions:

There have been many on the left who, without a clear understanding, have condemned the actions of the SLA and the people's forces who have chosen to fight rather than talk. These speakers condemn without clearly recognizing that our actions are a direct response to the vicious and murderous actions of the enemy corporate state against the people. It has been claimed that we are destroying the Left but in truth an unarmed and nonfighting Left is doomed – as the people of Chile can sadly testify.

The analysis of these so-called leaders who presume to speak for the people can be traced to one of two qualities: Either they are cowards afraid of revolutionary violence because it is a direct threat to their personal security or they are opportunists who have personal gains in allowing the enemy to enslave or oppress and tranquilize the people.

[..]

The actions of the SLA are based on a clear understanding and analysis of the enemy and its actions against the lives and freedom of the people. We call upon the people to judge for themselves whether our tactics of waging struggle are correct or incorrect in fighting the enemy by any means necessary.³⁴⁰

In the communiqués sent during the first five weeks of the kidnapping, the SLA operated from the assumption that the opposition against its project was based on a lack of

³³⁷ *The Berkeley Barb* published every document and tape the SLA released. The Black Panthers published the set of documents that were demanded to be published in the SLA's communication of February 12. However, publications such as *Ramparts* and *the Guardian* did not publish a single communication. For more information on the reactions on the SLA, see the next chapter.

³³⁸ "Black Liberation Army welcomes SLA struggle", *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974.

³³⁹ Letter from Bernardine Dohrn/Weather Underground, February 20, 1974. Freedom Archives. For more supportive statements about the SLA, see especially *Berkeley Barb*, e.g. Albert, Stew: "Fear, Loathing and paranoia on the left", *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974; "SLA helping revolution struggle to spread", *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974; "A Silent Supporter" and "Welcomes Guerrilla Warfare", *Berkeley Barb* 19/6, February 22–28, 1974. Solidarity with the SLA was also called for in some letters from the readers published in *the Guardian* on March 20 and 28, 1974.

³⁴⁰ Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 81–82.

understanding.³⁴¹ It seems as if they expected that after all this explaining, the people would stand up and say that “now I understand” and commit themselves to revolution. The SLA clearly still firmly held to the belief that the desire for freedom was strong among the people and could be mobilized with the right kind of leadership, something that other revolutionary movements in the US had failed to provide.

Besides the statements of potential supporters, the SLA was naturally actively listening to what the authorities and to the Hearst family were saying. When it came to the authorities, the SLA literally expected the FBI to show up and kill them all, including Patricia Hearst.³⁴² It was communicated that the primary concern of both the Hearsts and the FBI was the safety of Patricia Hearst and that the inquiry was at that moment subordinated to the wishes of the Hearst family. Randolph Hearst’s approach, in turn, had been from the beginning to take the SLA as what it claimed it was, a politically-motivated group, and to try to negotiate with it accordingly. Having said that, the FBI was, however, working intensely on the case. The local office told the press that they had about one hundred agents working on it and that they were ready to employ hundreds more if that was needed.³⁴³

The authorities and journalists were very quickly up-to-date with the identities of most SLA members. The fact that Cin, who talked on the tape, was Donald DeFreeze, was published on February 15, 1974.³⁴⁴ The press reports presented DeFreeze as a megalomaniac ex-convict who drank too much plum wine and depicted the SLA as a product of his fantasies that he had developed in the isolation of his prison cell.³⁴⁵ The story about the origins of the SLA was put together largely within a month from the kidnap, but it was run in the newspapers only in late March.³⁴⁶

It was clear for most from very early on that the SLA was a small group,³⁴⁷ although the U.S. Attorney General William B. Saxbe, known for his sloppy statements, claimed that there were indications that the SLA might be an organization with a nation-wide reach.³⁴⁸ Saxbe’s comments were also otherwise controversial. For example, when the SLA announced its demand for food delivery, he stated that the Hearst family should not

³⁴¹ Besides the tapes, this is apparent from Hearst’s memoir, see e.g. Hearst & Moscow 1982, 93.

³⁴² See e.g. the transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 86–87.

³⁴³ Randebaugh, Charles: “Hearsts tell how the silence scares them”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 12, 1974.

³⁴⁴ Findley, Tim: “Strange story of ‘Cinque’”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 15, 1974; “Hearst kidnapping linked to two escaped convicts”, *The New York Times* February 16, 1974. Other, equally unflattering articles on his background appeared later: Findley, Tim & Paul Avery: “The troubled past of the SLA’s leader”, *San Francisco Chronicle* April 8, 1974; “’70 report on DeFreeze”, *San Francisco Chronicle* April 11, 1974.

³⁴⁵ “Two fugitives names as possible Hearst suspects”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 16, 1974.

³⁴⁶ Findley, Tim & Paul Avery: “The origins of the SLA”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 27, 1974; Findley, Tim & Paul Avery: “The SLA ‘Fantasy’”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 28, 1974; Findley, Tim & Paul Avery: “A twist of fate for the SLA”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 29, 1974.

³⁴⁷ Findley, Tim: “The Symbionese Army”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 8, 1974; Anspacher, Carolyn: “Hearst get kidnap demand --- daughter tapes plea to parents”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 13, 1974. On the state of public knowledge on the SLA in mid-February 1974, see *Symbionese Liberation Army: A study*.

³⁴⁸ E.g. U.S. Attorney General W. B. Saxbe according to “The chronology of SLA’s emergence”, *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* February 10, 1974; Siegel, Dan: “SLA act gets no support”, *Guardian* February 27, 1974.

comply with the demand. Furthermore, he stated that he would consider it a dereliction of duty if the police knew where members of the SLA were and did not attempt to get Patricia Hearst out.³⁴⁹ The SLA took Saxbe's comments as being prematurely exposed government policy decisions.³⁵⁰

According to Patricia Hearst's account, the SLA members were disappointed and angry with the response to their actions. They did not believe it for a minute that Randolph Hearst would have had problems with meeting the demands had he really wanted to. Neither did they like how Charles Bates, the local head of the FBI, had called the SLA a bunch of hoods or that Saxbe had requested the FBI to kill the SLA and get Patricia Hearst out. Moreover, the SLA was angry about all the lies that the media had told about them. They were also very annoyed by the fact that practically no-one had praised them for arranging food for the poor.³⁵¹

The confessions and memoir of Patricia Hearst are the only elaborate first-hand accounts of what was going on inside the SLA during the kidnapping. The image she gives in her memoir is one of a very isolated group that was fully dedicated to preparing for the revolutionary struggle. Most of their time was devoted to physical exercise, weapons training (without ammunition in their apartment), information gathering and ideological discussion. Moreover, they had intensive sessions of criticism-self-criticism in an effort to get rid of their bourgeois background and to become better revolutionaries. The ideological schooling extended to Patricia Hearst, who was lectured by them about the SLA's position on the American society.³⁵² They all lived in the same apartment and they rarely left the house. When they did leave, they donned disguises. At least in the beginning stages, they had some help from people who brought them supplies. One of them, Camilla Hall, a friend of Mizmoon Soltysik, moved in with them a few days after the kidnapping.³⁵³

In their tape of March 9, where they demanded the television broadcast for Remiro and Little in exchange for the opportunity for Patricia Hearst to communicate with her father, they also announced a suspension of communication. They had kidnapped Hearst in an effort to exchange her for Remiro and Little and the food delivery program was an additional idea that they had come up with when it seemed questionable whether the original plan would work. Since the food deliveries did not work out too well, it clearly made no sense to demand the release of Remiro and Little. Hearst had the impression that the SLA did not know what to do next.³⁵⁴

In the meantime, the media attention started to shift to the Hearst food delivery. These deliveries began at the end of February. In the next few weeks, People In Need, the organization established to take care of the project, organized five sets of food deliveries. The project soon got a bad name, because it was organized poorly, food got stolen and the

³⁴⁹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 235; Raudebaugh, Charles: "Hearst blasts Saxbe's comments on the kidnap", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 15, 1974; Turner, Wallace: "Hearst scores Saxbe Kidnapping View", *The New York Times* February 15, 1974.

³⁵⁰ See transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 87.

³⁵¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 59–61, 79.

³⁵² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 71, 78.

³⁵³ McLellan & Avery 1977, 124.

³⁵⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 64.

deliveries were often chaotic and occasionally deteriorated into rioting.³⁵⁵ Even so, the media interest in the story remained high. As a consequence, the yard of the Hearst mansion in Hillsborough had become a campground for reporters waiting eagerly for the next statement by the family or the SLA. The telephone company installed a battery of press telephones across the street from the Hearst mansion already in mid-February.³⁵⁶

3.6 Patty/Tania spectacle

What attracted most attention in the aforementioned tape from March 9 was the statement by Patricia Hearst. She said that she was no longer afraid of the SLA and that she was beginning to understand what they were talking about. What she really feared now was the FBI. To Patricia Hearst, it seemed that no-one cared for her anymore and her family and authorities were more interested in protecting their own interests or in taking advantage of her. She said that the SLA had given her a weapon of her own and trained her to use it.³⁵⁷

The tape intensified the already circulating (unfounded) rumors that Patricia Hearst might have arranged the kidnapping herself. Many made the remark that the tone of her voice seemed more sincere and together than in the earlier tapes, so she actually might have meant what she said. Still, for many it was unimaginable that a kidnap victim would genuinely change her views so fundamentally within just one month and while virtually held at gunpoint. Hearst herself later stated that she was given the script and while she did not agree with the text, she just thought it wise to do what they asked her to do – which was the general approach that Hearst has told that she adopted during the kidnapping.³⁵⁸

As it was already mentioned, the SLA members had begun quite early in the kidnapping to educate Patricia Hearst on their political views and ideology. Hearst has said that some time during March, DeFreeze approached her with the question of whether she would be interested in joining the SLA. It is not known how exactly the SLA members came up with this idea, but Jerry Rubin actually came close to proposing it in his open letter in the middle of February. He suggested that the SLA should take everything out of their position of power leverage and then release Patricia. In the meantime, they should treat her so well that she walks away as an ally to their cause.³⁵⁹

After the initial overtures, the question of her joining was officially posed. She was formally given the alternative to leave, but Hearst said she understood immediately that it was not a real option. Hearst, seeing her joining as her best chance for survival, eagerly told them that she wanted to join. After several days of talks between Patricia and all

³⁵⁵ On the PIN program, see e.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 234–251. See also e.g. “First day of food plan is chaotic”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 23, 1974; Anspacher, Carolyn: “How Hearst food giveaway is shaping up”, *San Francisco Chronicle* March 8, 1974; “Hearst Food Distribution Plan Has Been Completed”, *The New York Times* March 27, 1974; “Hearst Food Distribution Reported Beset by Theft”, *The New York Times* April 1, 1974.

³⁵⁶ E.g. “They all await word”, *San Francisco Chronicle* February 12, 1974.

³⁵⁷ Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 88–93.

³⁵⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 91–92.

³⁵⁹ “Jerry Rubin’s letter to the U.S. – and the SLA”, *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* February 17, 1974.

members of the SLA, where Patricia was to convince the others that she should be allowed to become a member, a unanimous decision was reached.³⁶⁰

In late March, the food delivery program was completed and the public waited for the next step from the SLA. In the last days of March, two open letters to the SLA and Patricia Hearst were published in the media. The first one was from the captured Remiro and Little, who greeted Patricia warmly and expressed their conviction that she would be released unharmed. The second letter, signed by the purported SLA inmate members Clifford Jefferson, Al Taylor and Raymond Scott, suggested that the SLA should start negotiations to release Patricia Hearst and that they had been guaranteed that four million dollars would be indeed used for feeding the poor.³⁶¹ The authenticity of the letter was verified with the signatures of Reverend Williams and Randolph Hearst, who had met with Jefferson several times.³⁶²

After these communications, the SLA decided to play an April fool's joke. A communiqué hinting that Patricia Hearst would be released, was to be sent out. On April 2, one day later than intended, a delivery including the Communiqué number 7, SLA's Codes of War and half of Patricia Hearst's driver's license arrived to John Bryan, an editor of the San Francisco Phoenix.³⁶³ This communiqué was titled "Negotiations and Release of Prisoners". It said that the details of the release of Patricia Hearst would be made public within 72 hours.³⁶⁴ The communiqué was greeted with considerable enthusiasm.

This excitement turned into amazement when the next communication, this time in the form of a tape recording, followed on the next day. In that tape, Patricia Hearst announced:

I have been given the choice of, one, being released in a safe area, or, two, joining the forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army and fighting for my freedom and the freedom of all oppressed people. I have chosen to stay and fight.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁰ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 96–100. The question "What really happened to Patricia Hearst" is probably the single most widely discussed issue related to the SLA. It is of secondary importance to the study at hand, so I will not deal with this question in detail. Hearst's own interpretation is that as she adopted the strategy of agreeing with everything the SLA said or requested, she slowly started, if not believe, at least to adopt their views. A large part in this was played by her increasing desperation. She did not see a way out, feared actively for an FBI raid, and felt that no real effort was made to get her out alive. When she was offered the chance to join, she welcomed it because it would allow her to survive. Later, after the experience of the bank robbery and being branded as a "common criminal", she felt that a numbed shock set in. For different interpretations, see Graebner 2008, also e.g. Anspacher, Carolyn: "SLA and brainwashing", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 6, 1974; Albright, Joseph & Carolyn Anspacher: "Brainwashing – what it really is", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 24, 1974; "Theory on SLA brainwashing", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 28, 1974; "'Brain-impressing' and Patricia Hearst", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 29, 1974; "The Hearst nightmare", *Time* April 29, 1974.

³⁶¹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 294–296.

³⁶² E. g. Belcher, Jerry: "Death Row Jeff's message to SLA", *San Francisco Chronicle* March 31, 1974.

³⁶³ Bryan was chosen because he had written an entirely fabricated story about the SLA (Hearst & Moscow 1982, 115). He is the same person who wrote the biography of Joe Remiro (Bryan 1976).

³⁶⁴ Reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 97–98.

³⁶⁵ Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 114–118.

She announced that she had been given the name Tania, in the spirit of a comrade of Che in Bolivia. With that tape, a now famous photo was released of Patricia Hearst dressed in a jumpsuit and beret and holding a carbine.³⁶⁶

Patricia's statement was accompanied by statements by Bill Harris, Nancy Ling Perry and Donald DeFreeze. They declared that the operation was over, and that there was no need for negotiations, as Patricia Hearst was free to leave whenever she wished to. At the same time, the SLA made a final call for people to stand up and struggle for their lives as the SLA no longer expected its communications to be published in full.

While the first communications had contained long segments about the fortunes of the Hearst empire by which the SLA members attempted to prove their point, the more emotional elements started to increasingly overrule the factual content in the later communications. A reoccurring theme then became the issue of leadership. They stated that the enemy had murdered prophets and leaders that the people had brought forth, including Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr. and George Jackson. Donald DeFreeze was proclaimed to be another prophet and leader that the people had brought forth. DeFreeze greeted his own children and explained how he was fighting for them. The tape closed with "the national anthem of the Symbionese Liberation Army".³⁶⁷

During March, the SLA was running out of money and looked for ways to get more funding. They started to plan a bank robbery. Besides money, which the SLA badly needed, the operation was also designed to generate publicity. It was decided that Patricia Hearst should participate in that robbery. On April 15, 1974, the time was ripe to put their plan into action. The SLA members entered a Hibernia Bank location in San Francisco and Patricia Hearst identified herself to the surveillance camera.³⁶⁸

According to Hearst, the SLA members were ecstatic about the sensation that the bank robbery created and believed once again that it would help turn around the people to support them.³⁶⁹ After the robbery, the SLA decided to send another tape. The main message of that tape was summarized by Donald DeFreeze's voice:

Now people, I warn you again: The only way, I repeat, *the only way* you will regain your life and freedom is to fight. The only way you can keep your guns is to use them. Your time is running short. Open your eyes.³⁷⁰

In their eyes, the recent developments had shown that the enemy was terrified by the SLA and was fighting against it with all possible means. Hearst later told the SLA was particularly happy with the tape, calling it the opening salvo of the coming revolution.³⁷¹

The transformation of Patricia Hearst to an urban guerrilla was a media scoop unlike any other. It is still the photo of Tania above anything else that people are likely to

³⁶⁶ McLellan & Avery 1977, 301; on the name, see also Hearst & Moscow 1982, 113–114.

³⁶⁷ Transcripts printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 107–114.

³⁶⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 126–127, 144–149.

³⁶⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 151.

³⁷⁰ Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 122–123.

³⁷¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 166–167. The transcript of the tape is printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 120–124. There was a shift in the publication policies. While the *San Francisco Chronicle* had published all communication from the SLA during the kidnapping in its entirety, this time it published only the transcript of Patricia Hearst's statement.

remember of the SLA. The posters with this photo became common in the Berkeley area. The front page of the *Berkeley Barb* exulted that Patty was free.³⁷² Other movement press barely commented on the Tania issue. The SLA was criticized, though, for gunning down two innocent persons during the bank robbery.³⁷³ Evidently, shooting bystanders was just not what American revolutionaries did.

The messages that the SLA sent out in April hardly raised the SLA's stock. In terms of winning the larger segments of the radical Left on their side, it was not the best idea to talk about DeFreeze as a prophet. As McLellan and Avery write, a revolutionary messiah was the last thing that American radicals were looking for.³⁷⁴

At this point, Randolph Hearst lost his temper with the SLA. He and his wife said they did not believe a word Patricia said and came to believe that she was brainwashed. He claimed the SLA members had not proven to be worthy of their promises but were merely cruel people with twisted ideas.³⁷⁵ He seemed particularly offended with the SLA's April fool joke. The statements that were given after the bank robbery indicated that the authorities had also changed their approach in dealing with the SLA. The local FBI head, Charles Bates, said that the robbery had put the investigation into a new perspective as they had now people identified committing a federal crime.³⁷⁶ Instead of the old message of how "Patricia's safety is our primary concern", the FBI began to repeat that they were going to get the SLA.³⁷⁷ The authorities gave conflicting statements on whether they considered Hearst as being still a hostage or a criminal, in other words, whether she was a willing participant in the bank robbery.³⁷⁸ The FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley announced that while the FBI did not know at the moment where the SLA was, when such information was available, the FBI would enter the location. "We will make every effort not to injure and certainly not to kill anybody... It's going to be well-planned, but we're going in", he stated.³⁷⁹

After the bank robbery, arrest warrants were immediately issued for Donald DeFreeze, Mizmoon Soltysik, Nancy Ling Perry and Camilla Hall, who were wanted for bank

³⁷² *Berkeley Barb* April 5–11, 1974.

³⁷³ Flynn, William: "Venceremos founder says SLA subverts radical causes", *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle* April 28, 1974.

³⁷⁴ McLellan & Avery 1977, 305.

³⁷⁵ Raudebaugh, Charles: "Tape from Patricia – 'I've joined the SLA'", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 4, 1974; "Miss Hearst Says She Joins Terrorists", *The New York Times* April 4, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: "Why Mrs. Hearst won't believe it", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 5, 1974; Revenaugh, R. L.: "Hearst feels Patty has been brainwashed", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* April 7, 1974; "Hearst says SLA 'ripped off press'", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 11, 1974.

³⁷⁶ Raudebaugh, Charles: "Two shot in S.F. bank raid – Patricia Hearst in photos", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 16, 1974; "The saga of Patty Hearst", *Newsweek* April 29, 1974.

³⁷⁷ "The Hearst nightmare", *Time* April 29, 1974. See also e.g. Cooney, William: "Younger's kidnap pledge", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 16, 1974; "Alioto says SLA's days numbered", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 16, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: "Four more warrants issued in hunt for SLA", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 18, 1974.

³⁷⁸ E.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: "Four more warrants issued in hunt for SLA", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 18, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: "Saxbe is criticized for calling Patricia 'criminal'", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 19, 1974.

³⁷⁹ Cited in Raudebaugh, Charles: "SLA has the FBI 'stumped'", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 10, 1974.

robbery, and Hearst who was wanted as a material witness.³⁸⁰ The police were conducting house-to-house searches in the area where the bank robbery took place.³⁸¹ A couple of days later, Emily Harris, Bill Harris, William Wolfe and Angela Atwood were declared wanted nominally for committing perjury in obtaining drivers' licenses under false names, but it was naturally their SLA involvement that the police were interested in.³⁸² Now, there was an arrest warrant for every active member of the SLA. The police seemed to be coming closer to the SLA. In early May, the police found the SLA safe house in the Western Addition (1827 Golden Avenue) that its members had left about a week earlier.³⁸³

3.7 Preparing for the inevitable

The bank robbery became a point of no return, not only for Patricia Hearst, but also for the other SLA members who had not had a criminal record before. Hearst said that Willie Wolfe in particular changed his ways after the robbery and became more disciplined and dedicated than before.³⁸⁴

After leaving the old safe house, the SLA had moved into another apartment in the Hunter's Point District of San Francisco.³⁸⁵ Hearst recalls that around this time, "a new intensity crept into our lives, a combination of revolutionary zeal and sheer paranoia: we were running out of time".³⁸⁶ DeFreeze kept declaring that the struggle was intensifying and that it would be only a matter of months before the revolution would begin. How else would it be possible that they could find people to run errands for them by ringing doorbells randomly in the neighborhood?³⁸⁷

Even if all the police cars and helicopters they saw were not looking for them, as they appeared to think, there was a major hunt for clues about the whereabouts of the SLA. The newspapers were filled with stories about the SLA, including the identities and the former lives of its members. Several articles published claimed that DeFreeze had formerly been a police informer. Furthermore, his letter to a judge where he explained all his troubled past was published in its entirety.³⁸⁸

It was no wonder that the SLA members felt encircled and in the middle of a war. The realities of their own everyday life supported the analysis of DeFreeze about the state of the revolution which had largely taken shape in the isolated and repressive world inside the prison walls. The other SLA members had, through their personal histories, a somewhat wider perspective on the state of affairs, but the Bay Area was not a particularly

³⁸⁰ E.g. Raudebaugh, Charles: "Two shot in S.F. bank raid – Patricia Hearst in photos", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 16, 1974; Raudebaugh, Charles: "FBI names SLA leader in bank raid", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 17, 1974.

³⁸¹ "A door-to-door FBI quiz around Sunset District", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 17, 1974.

³⁸² Raudebaugh, Charles: "Four more warrants issued in hunt for SLA", *San Francisco Chronicle* April 18, 1974.

³⁸³ "SLA apartment is found in S.F.", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 3, 1974.

³⁸⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 168–169.

³⁸⁵ McLellan & Avery 1977, 338–339; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 172–173.

³⁸⁶ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 177.

³⁸⁷ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 178–179; McLellan & Avery 1977, 339.

³⁸⁸ Avery, Paul: "DeFreeze's letter to a judge", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 13, 1974.

suitable place to draw conclusions about the conditions in the rest of the country. Moreover, because of their belief in third-world leadership, DeFreeze was supposed to be the one who had the best understanding of revolution. According to Hearst's account, occasional disputes notwithstanding, the others seemed to rely a great deal on DeFreeze's judgment. The information that they got from their only outside contact, the Black Muslims they had recruited to help them, reinforced that image. They said that the SLA hunt was enormous, there were wanted posters everywhere and that the photo of Patricia Hearst as an urban guerrilla, with the text "We love you, Tania", had become a popular poster in Berkeley and in the East Bay Area.³⁸⁹

With the forthcoming struggle in mind, a decision was made to split into three teams which would start operating independently and just have occasional meetings. The idea was to decrease the security risk and to expand the SLA's activities. Each team was supposed to recruit new people. After a long dispute, the first team, led by DeFreeze himself, consisted of Camilla Hall and Angela Atwood. The second team was led by Nancy Ling Perry, the other members being Willy Wolfe and Mizmoon Soltysik. The third team, the one of Bill Harris, included Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst. As a result, they all started to do everything in teams and planned to move to different locations.³⁹⁰

The next combat operation in their plans was, according to Hearst, to go out to the streets, search-and-destroy style, and kill policemen during the night. During the day, they would hide in the people's houses. With this campaign, they (or DeFreeze) envisioned that they would force the authorities to intensify countermeasures, which in turn would enrage the people and make them join the SLA in its fight.³⁹¹

Before it came to that, they reached the conclusion that San Francisco was becoming too dangerous and it was time to move out. They followed DeFreeze's idea to move to Los Angeles, because he had grown up there. After they arrived in Los Angeles in three teams, they found a cheap safe house in an all-black neighborhood and started to look for new recruits and helpers. They contacted people in the area they knew and asked for help but with little result.³⁹²

According to Hearst's description, the group was becoming even more frantic in their combat drills and weapons practices and they were enclosed in their own world. Her retrospective analysis is that they were all "suffering from a combination of group hypnosis and battle fatigue, our anxieties and fears stretched to the breaking point."³⁹³ Death had become a regular discussion topic, as not only being beautiful, but increasingly also as a necessity. They felt that any other end to the SLA would be demoralizing for the people.³⁹⁴

As the reader may have already noticed, the above account of the state of mind within the SLA was solely based on Patricia Hearst's account. The way that these discussions are described in her memoir is so coherent and paves the way towards the future developments so perfectly, that one cannot help wonder what the role of the co-writer

³⁸⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 186–187.

³⁹⁰ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 182–183, The last SLA statement, 27.

³⁹¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 185–186.

³⁹² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 187–188, 193–194, 202–203.

³⁹³ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 199.

³⁹⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 196–202.

Alvin Moscow has been in constructing the narrative. The overall claim, however, finds support in other sources, too. While words such as death, murder and execution had been present in the SLA's communications from the beginning, there were increasing signs of desperation and agonized calls for the people to take up arms and to defend themselves or otherwise they would be killed. In the tape from early April, in which Patricia Hearst announced that she had joined the SLA and the SLA declared that the negotiations were terminated, DeFreeze told his own children that "even when I may never see you again, know that I love you and will not for any price forsake your freedom and the freedom of all oppressed peoples".³⁹⁵

On May 16, Bill and Emily Harris, together with their third team member, Patricia Hearst, went to buy clothes and other supplies that would be needed in combat.³⁹⁶ In a shop called Mel's Sporting Goods, Bill Harris, on the spur of the moment, stuffed a bandana inside his sleeve. The security guards had seen that and stopped him and Emily Harris as they were leaving the store. At that point, Patricia Hearst, who had stayed behind in the car to wait, grabbed a submachine gun and fired. That enabled Bill and Emily Harris to escape and to return to their car.³⁹⁷ The Harrises and Patricia Hearst then left their car and escaped by hijacking one car after another. There was no way of going back to their safe house, and they tried to establish contact with the others with the use of pre-agreed arrangements made for this kind of situation, but without any result. Finally, they drove past the house and saw that it was empty. They then decided to check in to a motel near Disneyland in Anaheim and to lay low for a few days.³⁹⁸

In the car that the Harrises and Patricia Hearst left behind during their flight, the police found a parking ticket that was issued in the neighborhood of the SLA safe house. The registration information of the gun that Bill Harris had lost at Mel's pointed towards the SLA. By the next morning, the police had located the SLA's (by then abandoned) safe house.³⁹⁹

After leaving their safe house, the other SLA members drove around looking for a place to go. At long last, they located a small stucco house in Compton, a black neighborhood where all the lights were on. They went to ask whether they could hide there for a couple of hours and were let in. Trusting that black people were on their side, they made no secret about who they were. During the next hours, many people went in and out of the house as the rumor spread that the SLA was in that house.⁴⁰⁰

The police too learned soon about the SLA presence in Compton. By the afternoon, the police had located the house. The news about the increasing police presence reached the

³⁹⁵ Transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 113.

³⁹⁶ One question that has barely been discussed is why the SLA people needed woollen socks and other heavy clothing at that time of the year in Los Angeles. In an article in the *Berkeley Barb*, it is suggested that the SLA would have planned to leave for the high Sierra (Reynolds, Ric: "The first massacre", *Berkeley Barb* May 24, 1974). Such speculation is also brought out in the *San Francisco Chronicle* article in which it is claimed that documents referring to such plans were found from a former hideout of the SLA ("SLA memo to 'burn down pad'", the *San Francisco Chronicle* May 20, 1974). While this seems like one possible explanation, there is no evidence to support this claim.

³⁹⁷ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 203–208.

³⁹⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 208–221.

³⁹⁹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 343–346.

⁴⁰⁰ McLellan & Avery 1977, 348–353.

SLA, who began to prepare for a confrontation and reportedly planned to take as many cops with them as possible. A little bit before 6 pm, the police called for the people inside the house to surrender. After this call had been repeated several times, rockets with CS tear gas were fired into the house. The SLA responded with gunfire and the police fired back. What followed was several minutes of intense shooting. The police shot more tear gas inside the house. After three quarters of an hour, the house caught fire. The police called a ceasefire and asked those inside to surrender. Two of them, Nancy Ling Perry and Camilla Hall, did come out of the house, but when Hall opened fire, they were killed by the bullets that the police fired in return. The rest of them died inside the burning house. During the shootout, ten thousand bullets were fired, half of them by the SLA and the other half by the police, but amazingly enough, no-one but the SLA members got hurt.⁴⁰¹ The entire shootout was broadcasted live on television.

Immediately after the shootout, it was not known whether Patricia Hearst had been inside the house. The police had reportedly tried to find this out in advance from those who had visited there during the day, but they received conflicting information.⁴⁰² Within a couple of days, the identities of the deceased were confirmed. With that, it became clear that Patricia Hearst was not in the house, but was the one who had fired at Mel's Sporting Goods. The FBI announced that it no longer considered Patricia Hearst to be a kidnap victim, but instead, she was seen as an armed and dangerous fugitive.⁴⁰³

The media attention was again at its height. The newspapers ran many stories on those who died in the shootout and on the remaining members. The national magazines also featured these stories with Patricia Hearst appearing on the cover of *Newsweek* for the second time in a month, and on the cover of *Time*.⁴⁰⁴ There was also a great deal of bewilderment over the shootout. The police defended themselves by saying that their actions were in line with the situation and that they were backed up by Attorney General Evelle Younger and, although somewhat less wholeheartedly, by the FBI. According to their account, the SLA had opened fire, and the police were amazed by their firepower. What ensued was a shootout that was allegedly the biggest gunfight ever in Los Angeles. While there was little sympathy for the SLA itself, there was a sense of outrage on behalf

⁴⁰¹ McLellan & Avery 1977, 352–363; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 230; Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles: Report prepared by LAPD (July 1974). The shootout and the preceding events were also discussed elaborately in the newspapers. There are somewhat conflicting reports on what exactly happened. The description in the text is based on McLellan and Avery's account which seems to be the most careful and impartial analysis.

⁴⁰² "The search for Patty", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 18, 1974; Cook, Stephen & Jerry Belcher: "Patricia Hearst not among those killed in L. A. shootout", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* May 19, 1974; "5 Who Died in Siege Identified as S.L.A. Members; Miss Hearst Not Among Victims in Gunfight on Coast", *The New York Times* May 19, 1974.

⁴⁰³ Avery, Paul & Charles Raudebaugh: "FBI charges Patricia was involved in L. A. shooting", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 20, 1974; "Miss Hearst Called 'Dangerous Fugitive'; F.B.I Charges Due in Machine-Gunning", *The New York Times* May 20, 1974. See also Raudebaugh, Charles: "New counts against Patricia", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 23, 1974. For stories about the deceased SLA leaders, see e.g. *San Francisco Chronicle* May 18, 20 and 22, 1974.

⁴⁰⁴ Hearst was in the cover of *Newsweek* on April 29 and May 27, 1974. Before that, she had made the cover once already and would still make it four more times, for the last time on March 29, 1976. As for *Time*, she had three covers in total. That was unique by any measure (see e.g. Nacos 2002, 40, 48–51).

of the people who lived in the area. This was in part because the police had not evacuated anyone from the neighborhood, not even from the neighboring houses.⁴⁰⁵

The campaign of the SLA was generally considered to be over. The only remaining identified members, Emily and Bill Harris and Patricia Hearst, were called to surrender by several parties, including their friends, relatives, the FBI, Randolph Hearst and Governor Ronald Reagan.⁴⁰⁶ It was generally claimed that the SLA had made a huge mistake by moving to Los Angeles, because they did not know the terrain well and did not have any helpers.⁴⁰⁷

Among the Left, the shootout provoked mixed feelings. All were appalled by the brutality of the LAPD.⁴⁰⁸ That outrage, however, did not really translate into support for the SLA. The fundamental differences between the SLA remained and the recent events had underlined the risks that helping the SLA might include. This hostility towards the SLA became evident in the context of DeFreeze's funeral. His brother had welcomed all radicals, but no-one of any distinction showed up.⁴⁰⁹

Tips about the possible location of the Harrises and Patricia Hearst poured in during the first days after the shootout. Even though there were no signs of progress in the investigation, the police seemed to believe that the matter would soon resolve itself. This is because they expected it would not take long before the fugitives had exhausted their limited resources and could not hide anymore.⁴¹⁰

3.8 Regrouping

Among those who watched the live broadcast shootout had also been Patricia Hearst and Emily and Bill Harris. They had just checked into the motel. Watching their comrades burn alive in front of their eyes was a devastating experience. This is how Emily Harris described the moment in retrospect two years later:

The first things I remember feeling were a numbness and a feeling of disbelief. I couldn't even cry. [...] There was just nothing we could do. We all felt responsible because of the

⁴⁰⁵ E. g. Avery, Paul: "Cinque reported among victims", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 18, 1974; "L.A. police gunplay angers neighbors" and "Patricia Hearst not among those killed in L. A. shootout", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* May 19, 1974; "Younger lauds L.A. Police", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 23, 1974; "Los Angeles will Pay for Damage in Its Raid on S.L.A.", *The New York Times* May 23, 1974.

⁴⁰⁶ Wegars, Don: "Patricia's parents ask her to give herself up" and Avery, Paul & Charles Raudebaugh: "Warrant out for Patricia – Search for SLA widening", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 21, 1974; Avery, Paul & Charles Raudebaugh: "FBI plea to Harrises and Patricia", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 22, 1974; Anspacher, Carolyn: "Friends, relatives appeal to fugitives", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 23, 1974; Reagan urges last SLA to surrender", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 24, 1974.

⁴⁰⁷ E. g. "Leftists tell how SLA made big mistake in L.A.", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 21, 1974.

⁴⁰⁸ E. g. "L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics exposed", *The Black Panther* June 15, 1974.

⁴⁰⁹ "Services for two SLA members", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 23, 1974.

⁴¹⁰ "Border watch tightened in SLA hunt", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* May 26, 1974; "FBI thinks Patricia is still in L. A.", *San Francisco Chronicle* May 27, 1974.

Mel's thing. Now maybe we can see that a lot of things caused it [...] but at that moment it seemed so clear that the three of us were to blame.⁴¹¹

And Bill Harris stated:

... the police agencies didn't know that the SLA was in the LA area until Mel's. Knowing that makes all the other things seem unimportant and the psychological burden of that has been really incredible for me – I mean how can you describe what it's like to watch the six people you love most in the world being killed? [...] It was like there was a record continually going over in my head, "if we just hadn't done this, or if we had just moved faster." My brain was in a turmoil and my heart felt about as big as a trash can.⁴¹²

According to Hearst's description, the death of their comrades provoked a strong sentiment of obligation in Emily and Bill Harris. They felt that they owed it to the deceased ones to continue the struggle.⁴¹³

Now that Donald DeFreeze was no longer there, it was Bill Harris as their team leader who was in command. One of the first priorities of the remnants of the SLA was to get a new tape out and to let people know that the SLA was still alive. The tape was sent out in early June.⁴¹⁴ This tape included an eloquent description of each fallen comrades' revolutionary prowess. Even though DeFreeze had been an important leader, they emphasized that his death had definitely not left them leaderless. On the contrary, they claimed that their unit, which they called Malcolm X Combat Unit, had been a leadership training cell, so the SLA was all but lacking leadership. Another matter that they needed to set straight was that, contrary to what had been claimed in the media, the six SLA members that died in the shootout were not suicidal, "just determined and full of love". Cinque most definitely did not commit suicide, as was claimed in the first reports of the coroner. Moreover, the idea that he was a police informer was described as ridiculous beyond belief. He was a true black leader and like so many black leaders before him, he was killed by the "pigs". They also denied that the SLA had made a mistake by moving to Los Angeles. They explained that SLA made that move because it had become increasingly difficult to hide in the Bay area and that they left for the LA only after careful investigation. That Bill Harris had shoplifted was a cheap lie and much of the blame was put on a particular individual who gave the crucial tip that led the police to the right door in Compton. And most of all, the SLA was definitely not going to surrender. With the voice of Patricia Hearst, they announced: "I died in that fire on Fifty-fourth Street, but out of the ashes I was reborn, I know what I have to do."

The interpretation of the recent events they offered was basically that the "pigs have won a battle, but the war of the flea is not over". They claimed the shootout just showed how scared the authorities were of the SLA. They knew that when the oppressed people unite in struggle, like the SLA calls for, the police could not overpower them. According

⁴¹¹ Quoted in Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976, 30.

⁴¹² Quoted in Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976, 30.

⁴¹³ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 222–228.

⁴¹⁴ A transcript of the tape is reprinted in e.g. the *Berkeley Barb* June 14–20, 1974.

to the SLA, the shootout and its live broadcast were part of the authorities' terrorist tactics to deter people from rising up against the "fascist dictatorship". Those tactics, however, were going to backfire, because they only raised people's consciousness. The struggle that the SLA was leading was practically impossible to break: "The pigs boast that they have broken the back of the Symbionese Liberation Army. But to do this, the pigs would have to break the back of the people." From now on, Bill Harris announced on the tape, they would proudly take up the banner of New World Liberation Front (NWLFF), a left-wing armed revolutionary group that was operating in California at that time and had called anyone sharing its goals and ideology to operate in its name.⁴¹⁵

The Harrises and Patricia Hearst were almost penniless and did not have anyone to help them. Therefore, finding new supporters and networks was a high priority. They decided that they should move back to the San Francisco area, where it would be much easier for them to make such connections without endangering their security.⁴¹⁶ Once in the Bay area, Emily and Bill Harris started to go through their old friends who they thought would be ready to help them and who they knew well enough to judge their trustworthiness. One after another of their friends turned them down, some of them very bluntly. The Harrises felt betrayed and furious. Finally, they decided to turn to Kathleen (Kathy) Soliah who had been a close friend of Angela Atwood who they had met before going underground. Her address was listed in Emily Harris' notebook, but they had not contacted her because they did not know her too well and they were hesitant as to whether she was the kind of person who could be trusted. Lacking better options, the Harrises decided to take the chance.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ In late May 1974, the May 19th Combat Unit of the NWLF had committed a bomb attack to show solidarity to the slain SLA members (Buck 1978, 119; "NWLF Chronology", *Dragon* no. 1 (August 1975), 5. The New World Liberation Front had called everyone sharing its objectives and ideology to operate in its name. McLellan & Avery (1977) give the picture that all NWLF bombings would have been committed by the SLA remnants and the new team, stating that Hearst had declared that they were the NWLF. I have found no support for this claim. Instead, all those I interviewed stated that the only attacks they committed were those that took place in August, 1975 and are mentioned later in the text.

⁴¹⁶ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 222–228. There are somewhat conflicting accounts from the events from here on. This description here is based largely on Patricia Hearst's account and my interviews with former SLA associates. Two of these associates, James Kilgore and Michael Bortin, who were both deeply involved in helping the Harrises and Hearst, have confirmed to me that Hearst's account is largely accurate. For more elaborate discussion on the memoir of Patricia Hearst, see the introduction. McLellan and Avery also reached the conclusion that the full confession of Patricia Hearst, which was available at the time they wrote their book, was the most reliable one. The events have also been described, although more selectively and with more bias, in three *Rolling Stone* articles, two of them allegedly based on information from Jack and Micki Scott (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The inside story", *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975 and Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The inside story part two", *Rolling Stone* November 20, 1975) and one on information from Steve Soliah (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The lost year of the SLA", *Rolling Stone* April 22, 1976). In none of these articles, for example, Michael Bortin, who comes up later in the text, is mentioned by name. Also, references to Jo Soliah and several other friends who helped them are almost non-existent. There is also no discussion about the (attempted) attacks that the group committed in August–September 1975.

⁴¹⁷ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 242–243; see also McLellan & Avery 1977, 375–376. In the article by Kohn and Weir (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The inside story", *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975, 41) it is said that the Harrises and Patricia Hearst would have attended the SLA rally and spotted Kathy Soliah there. This information, however, is based on second-hand sources and is contradicted by the accounts of Patricia Hearst as well as that of the Harrises (Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976, 32). As for why the Harrises hesitated to contact Kathy

Kathy Soliah had been devastated by the death of her friend Atwood and, along with her boyfriend James Kilgore, agreed to help them. Soliah also mobilized her sister, Josephine (Jo) Soliah, and brother, Steven (Steve) Soliah, to take part in the effort as well as Kilgore's good friend, Michael Bortin.

Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and Michael Bortin all had been involved political activism before they met the Harrises and Hearst, although they were not very high profile activists in the Bay Area. Even though the Harrises berated them as intellectuals who had done nothing, Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin were not entirely unfamiliar with the armed struggle either. Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore had studied at the University of California at Santa Barbara during the Isla Vista riots in 1970. Soliah and Kilgore had participated in the protests, and witnessing the National Guard occupation of Isla Vista had had a profound and radicalizing impact on them.⁴¹⁸

Via Los Angeles and Monterey, Soliah and Kilgore had moved to the Bay area in 1971 in search of political action. The initiative to move there came through their contacts with Jack Scott, a well-known radical sports writer who called for the better inclusion of minorities and the poor, and for less authoritarianism in the sport system.⁴¹⁹ Another attraction for Kathy Soliah was the good theater acting possibilities. When they arrived in the Bay area, the protest movement had already peaked, but it was still incredibly vibrant in their eyes. They got involved in all kinds of grass-root activities, such as food conspiracies⁴²⁰ and free clinics and attended numerous demonstrations. It was in the food conspiracy that Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore met Michael Bortin and Willie Brandt. They all lived in the same area in North Oakland. Kilgore and Bortin became good friends with Steven Soliah who also had recently moved to the area. Together, they started to earn money by painting houses. Bortin and Brandt, as well as Bortin's girlfriend, Pat Jean McCarthy, had also known Jack Scott for some time by then. In addition, Kathy's sister, Jo, also moved to the Bay Area in 1973.⁴²¹

Willie Brandt had his own project called the Revolutionary Army. During the early 1970s, he made several bomb attacks to protest against the US involvement in the Vietnam War. While his army consisted of him and to some extent, his girlfriend Wendy Yoshimura, he asked people he knew to help him in individual bombings. Brandt had made such a request to Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, but they declined. Michael Bortin, an action-hungry man who did not delve on the possible consequences of his action, accepted the request in March, 1972. Brandt, Bortin and Paul Rubenstein, who was

Soliah, another explanation that has been often brought up is that she had just spoken in the SLA memorial rally in Berkeley and thus might have been under police surveillance. This might not be a good explanation, because according to Jo Bortin, the Harrises would have contacted Kathy Soliah already before the rally (Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008).

⁴¹⁸ McLellan & Avery 1977, 379; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. On the Isla Vista riots, see e.g. Whalen & Flacks 1990.

⁴¹⁹ On Jack Scott's background, see Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The inside story", *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975; Goldstein, Richard: "Jack Scott, a prominent critic of sport's excesses, dies at 57", *New York Times* February 8, 2000.

⁴²⁰ Food conspiracies were projects where people grouped and bought food products directly from the producers. For a retrospective account, see Rosen, Laurel & McGrane, Sally: "The revolution will not be catered", *San Francisco Chronicle* March 8, 2000.

⁴²¹ Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; McLellan & Avery 1977, 379–380, 392.

a roommate of Soliah and Brandt, were arrested when they entered the garage that housed the Brandt's bomb factory. Judged by a communiqué found in the car, they had planned to commit an arson bombing at the UC Berkeley Naval Architecture Building. That arrest also put Yoshimura into danger, because the garage had been rented by her. As a consequence, she fled from the Bay Area with help from Jack Scott. Bortin ended up in prison for one year and Brandt got a sentence of one to fifteen years. James Kilgore helped Michael Bortin in his trial, and visited Bortin and occasionally Brandt in prison.⁴²²

By the spring 1974, Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin had become sympathetic to the SLA.⁴²³ In their eyes, the Hearst kidnapping was a wonderful soap opera. While they were not particularly attracted to SLA's political program and did not comprehend the Foster murder, they thought it was great how the SLA managed to pressure the Hearsts to give many millions of dollars to food deliveries and thereby exposed cleverly both the extent of the richness of the rich and the poverty of the poor.⁴²⁴

The personal contact between Kathy Soliah and Angela Atwood, however, seems to have been the all-important factor that got Soliah and her friends involved. Soliah had met Atwood in a theater company in Oakland and became very good friends with her. They also worked together in a restaurant and made efforts to organize its employees. Those close to Soliah have said that there was a great change in her character and conduct after the Los Angeles shootout.⁴²⁵ Soliah and her friends felt a need to do something. They took part in organizing a memorial rally for the SLA and established the Bay Area Research Collective (BARC) to organize support for the group and the underground in general. Later, when Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore got more deeply involved in helping the Harrises and Patricia Hearst, they withdrew from the BARC. From then on, BARC was mainly run by Kathy Soliah's roommates.⁴²⁶

While for Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin, at least, helping the Harrises and Patricia Hearst was also a continuum of their involvement in the politics, their friends, including Jo and Steve Soliah and Bortin's girlfriend, Pat Jean McCarthy, and a couple of others, were helping mainly from their personal loyalty towards Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin.⁴²⁷

⁴²² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 270, 275, 281–282, 296–297; McLellan & Avery 1977, 389–391; Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005 & June 9, 2008. Rubenstein, who had provided information to the authorities, got out after eight months and immediately left the area.

⁴²³ McLellan & Avery 1977, 380–381.

⁴²⁴ Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008.

⁴²⁵ McLellan & Avery 1977, 381–383, 394; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008.

⁴²⁶ McLellan & Avery 1977, 381–383, 394; Brown, Mareva: "Kilgore given six years for his role in SLA killing", *The Sacramento Bee* May 11, 2004; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008. One of these room-mates was Andrea Behr who later became a journalist (see Behr, Andrea: "A bourgeois desire for a long life", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 3, 1999).

⁴²⁷ Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Letter from James Kilgore on January 30, 2009; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin; Steve Soliah's portrayal in Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The lost year of the SLA", *Rolling Stone* April 22, 1976; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 303–305, 317; McLellan & Avery 1977, 392–393, 434.

Kathy Soliah and her friends provided the fugitives with money and arranged them a temporary place to hide. They also brought the Harrises in contact with Jack Scott. Besides his activities in the field of sports, he and his wife, Micki Scott, had also a history of providing help for activists in trouble. Scott suggested that he would arrange the fugitives to be transported to the East coast where they could relax and lay low for a while. The Scotts had rented a quiet farmhouse in the country in Pennsylvania where the Harrises and Hearst could stay and he would provide them with everything they needed. It was not an easy decision for the security-minded Harrises to surrender their destiny into the hands of people who they had just met, especially when the Scotts required that all the weapons should be left behind in California, but in the end, they accepted the offer.⁴²⁸

What seemed to attract the Harrises to Jack Scott in particular were his reputed contacts with the Weather Underground Organization (WUO). They were considering the possibility of a merge with the group. Hearst says that the Harrises were impressed by the WUO's reputation and dreamt about convincing them that the tactics of the SLA were more efficient.⁴²⁹ In fact, they had good grounds for believing that the WUO would be interested in helping them. On May 31, the Weather Underground Organization had made a bomb attack on the California attorney general's Los Angeles office as a salute to the fallen comrades of the SLA. In its communiqué, the WUO had praised the SLA's successes and lashed out at the Left for its failure to back up the SLA. This communiqué ended with following words:

... many members of the SLA are still free. They must be defended, publically and privately. Anyone who is in a position to help them directly should give them encouragement, support, shelter, and love. Empty your pockets. Struggle with them. Learn from them. We must protect our fighters.⁴³⁰

Around late June, Emily and Bill Harris, and Patricia Hearst were separately transported to the East coast by Jack Scott, his parents and friends.⁴³¹ The Scotts had arranged for Brandt's fugitive girl friend, Wendy Yoshimura, to stay with them in the Pennsylvanian farmhouse.

During the summer, the SLA members continued their fierce training program and planning for their future attacks.⁴³² Another major activity during this time was the making of tape-recordings for a book on the SLA. Jack Scott had not agreed to help the SLA only for mere benevolence, but he wanted to take advantage of the opportunity and write a book about the group.⁴³³

⁴²⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 243–248, 260–267; McLellan & Avery 1977, 387–389.

⁴²⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 260–261.

⁴³⁰ Communiqué reprinted in *Berkeley Barb* June 14–20, 1974. A copy of this and many more SLA-related pamphlets is also available at the Freedom Archives SLA collection.

⁴³¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 267–277.

⁴³² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 278–290.

⁴³³ Jack Scott has himself stated that he had got interested in the SLA during the kidnapping. While it was the opportunity to write a book that played a major role in his decision to help the SLA, but so did his increasing disillusionment with how the authorities handled the SLA. This is stated, for example, in an article by Howard Kohn and David Weir which is allegedly based on information from Jack Scott (Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The inside story", *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975). See also Hearst & Moscow

The relations between the Harrises and Scotts, however, deteriorated quickly. Jack Scott was irritated by the military posture of the Harrises and felt uneasy about their ongoing preparations for new attacks. The Harrises allegedly tried to recruit Jack Scott into the SLA, but he did not want to have any part in such plans. The Harrises, on their part, became scared that the Scotts, who had the access to the incriminating tape recordings, would betray them. According to Hearst, their distrust towards Jack and Micki Scott became so severe that they even decided to kill the Scotts, but did not get an opportunity to do that. By the end of the summer, it was decided that it was best for everyone if the Harrises and Hearst returned to the Bay area. Besides, the Harrises were eager to get back in business.⁴³⁴

For the whole summer, the Harrises and Patricia Hearst had been helped only by the Scotts and their friends. Both the SLA members and the Scotts seemed to be annoyed that even though several people who had connections to the underground knew what the Scotts were involved in, they offered no help. They seemed to be particularly annoyed that the Weather Underground had not acted out its own call for solidarity.⁴³⁵ With their actions, the SLA had made itself such a high-risk business that almost everyone, including those who felt sympathy for it, were too afraid to help.

3.9 Attempts to revitalize the SLA

With the Scotts having withdrawn their support, the Harrises and Patricia Hearst landed back at the doorstep of Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and their friends, henceforth called the “new team”. The new team arranged an apartment for them in Sacramento. As they all had many acquaintances in the Bay area, it was felt to be safer to have their base somewhere else. Another reason for choosing for Sacramento was that the trial of the arrested SLA members Joe Remiro and Russ Little was going to be held there. The Harrises and Patricia Hearst moved in sometime in early October, 1974.⁴³⁶

The initial and primary reason for the new team to get involved was to help Emily and Bill Harris and Patricia Hearst to hide from the authorities. They were terrified to death with taking up the task, but they felt that they could not decline. The new team was not particularly well-equipped at all to help the fugitives. Besides Jack Scott, they had no connections that would help them in gathering the financial resources and in tapping them into any underground network. They merely went on with their lives as before, kept working and using the money they earned to support the fugitives. If they managed to keep the Harrises and Patricia Hearst safe and sound, they felt they had already accomplished a valuable political deed.⁴³⁷

1982, 271; McLellan & Avery 1977, 387–389 who claim that Patricia Hearst has testified that the initiative to write the book came rather from Bill Harris.

⁴³⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 291–294; Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975, 41–46, 76; McLellan & Avery 1977, 408.

⁴³⁵ See e.g. Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The inside story”, *Rolling Stone* October 23, 1975, 76.

⁴³⁶ McLellan & Avery 1977, 410, 418; Hearst & Moscow 1982, 295–300.

⁴³⁷ Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008.

The Harrises, however, were not ready to settle for mere survival. They were determined to advance the struggle that had claimed the lives of six of their comrades. Furthermore, they wanted to help Russ Little and Joe Remiro escape from prison so that the SLA would again have an experienced cadre. They also looked at training their new associates to become part of their army. But the new team felt very uneasy about that. All but Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and Michael Bortin were not interested in such an endeavor in the first place. Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore had indeed played with the idea of getting involved in armed struggle. Michael Bortin, on his part, had already been involved in a bomb attack plan and was interested in new opportunities to engage in similar actions. However, with armed struggle, Soliah, Kilgore and Bortin were not thinking in terms of an SLA-style campaign that included attacks against people's lives. They argued that instead of new attacks, the Harrises should take a critical look at what the SLA had accomplished so far and think again. It was clear for the new team that the SLA's ideas had not found acceptance and legitimacy among the Left. Soliah and Kilgore argued that the Harrises should study classical Marxist literature and integrate that kind of analysis into their propaganda. The Harrises, however, remained steadfast in their belief in the power of SLA-type action in vitalizing the revolutionary struggle.⁴³⁸

These differences led to disputes about how they should work together. The Harrises looked at the new team as part of the SLA. As a consequence, the Harrises considered Bill Harris as their leader and demanded the others to obey him. Nevertheless, the new team resisted Bill Harris' authority. They demanded instead that they should function in a more democratic way and make decisions together. The Harrises were also looking at recruiting a new black leader for the SLA. Their reasoning was that since they only had whites in their organization, they could not legitimately claim that they represented "the people". The new team thought that the Harrises' third-world leadership idea was a ridiculous idea stemming from excessive white guilt and romanticization of blacks.⁴³⁹

Besides these political differences, there were also personal tensions along various lines that were exacerbated further by disagreements about how to deal with these differences. One of the rifts that developed over time was between Patricia Hearst and the Harrises. Early in the kidnapping, Patricia Hearst had started to agree with everything the SLA members said or suggested, because she felt that it was the best way to survive. Towards the fall of 1974, however, she started openly to resist the Harrises, Bill Harris in particular. In her memoir, she said that she found the new associates much more likable and reasonable and their conversations affected her thinking a great deal.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 300, 304, 322; Letter from James Kilgore on March 17, 2009; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21 & 22, 2005; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008.

⁴³⁹ E. g. Wendy Yoshimura's letter to a friend (who was Willie Brandt, according to McLellan and Avery), quoted in Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The lost year of the SLA", *Rolling Stone* April 22, 1976, 68 and McLellan & Avery 1977, 481-483. About the attempts to recruit a new leader, see e.g. McLellan & Avery (1977, 425-427) who claim that the Harrises may have tried to recruit Ulysses McDaniels soon after the LA shootout. The Harrises made renewed attempts to recruit a black leader in September, 1975. These will be discussed later in the text.

⁴⁴⁰ E. g. Hearst & Moscow 1982, 300-302; McLellan & Avery 1977, 419-320. Also the Harrises, who have said little about their interaction with the new team, have acknowledged the existence of tensions between them and Patricia Hearst. At the same time, they have emphasized that there was also a great deal of comradeship. Like all comrades, however, they too needed some time away from each other: Patricia because she got tired of the way Harrises patronized her, and Emily and Bill Harris because they had a hard

The new team did not constitute a single entity, either, but was rather a mixture of people. Kathy Soliah was the central person, along with her boyfriend, James Kilgore. Michael Bortin was also deeply involved, but was in and out of the group due to his clashes with the Harrises and with others of the new team, as well as to his own mixed feelings about their plans. Kathy Soliah got her sister, Jo, and brother, Steve, involved in helping, but their commitment was based on their loyalty to Kathy rather than on any political viewpoints. Jo Soliah made it clear to the others that they did not want to be actively involved and took the propaganda-type activities as their responsibility. Steve Soliah had a relationship with Patricia Hearst, but beyond that, his commitment did not seem to be wholehearted. What added to the drama was that there were ever-changing relationships between those involved. While in the original SLA sexual relationships were politicized⁴⁴¹, this time the relationships were something that happened aside from the other things they were involved in.⁴⁴²

All in all, while these differences prevailed until the very end, it seems that the Harrises succeeded well in getting their way. They seemed to have three aces in their hands: The first was that they were more experienced in the business of revolution, which made it difficult for the less experienced new participants to dispute their arguments. The second ace was that the Harrises did not hesitate to remind everyone that six of their comrades had given their lives in the struggle. Finally, the third was that they often managed to wear out the opposition by their persistence.⁴⁴³

Over time, the involvement of the new team started to extend from merely helping to survive into taking part in the Harrises' plans for armed struggle. The process that took the new team towards deeper involvement in armed struggle started with what "helping" the fugitives entailed. During the first months, they tried to support the Harrises and Patricia Hearst by using the new team's savings and the money they earned from painting houses. But that job did not pay too well. By late 1974, it was clear that they needed other, less time-consuming, sources of income. As a result, they started to conduct petty thefts: shoplifting, stealing money from a mail truck and stealing wallets in health spas and tennis courts.⁴⁴⁴ The new team reasoned that money was needed to take care of the fugitives, so it was part of their commitment to help them.

The new team also helped the Harrises in their planning of new acts, including acts against people. Although the new team was by far more horrified than excited by these plans, they still gathered information about the possible targets and conducted surveillance. In addition, taking part in the planning activities drew them closer to committing violent attacks. Michael Bortin later described the process as follows:

Unfortunately, simply by the very act of discussing these major, major felonies, we tacitly accepted our assemblage as a guerrilla unit, and to that I must attach much blame to

time dealing with Patricia's "bourgeois mentality" (Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976, 32).

⁴⁴¹ There were not supposed to be any exclusive relationships and the comrades were expected to take care of each other's sexual needs.

⁴⁴² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 326; Letter from James Kilgore on January 30, 2009; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008.

⁴⁴³ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 304–305, 307, 321–322.

⁴⁴⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 307, 326; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin.

myself, because I co-operated with researching a hit list (or pretended I did) rather than challenge the legitimacy of such acts in my protracted visit since at our first meeting we had clearly stated our refusal to engage in those activities. And though we did not, thankfully, follow-up on these outlandish and clearly not executable acts by ourselves, we simultaneously bargained, or dumbed down, to committing ourselves to various and sundry petty felonies acts, which we did commit.

[...]

Ironically, we justified these petty crimes, although we were all painting together, in that we were developing cohesiveness and teamwork as a functioning guerrilla unit. And so we journeyed around on a syllogistic kind of tautologically closed system, where somewhere along the way the true premise at political involvement only in hiding out the trio and perhaps some guerrilla theatre [...] somewhere along the line that true and, I believe, heart felt premise, was substituted by a false premise – face-saving foot-dragging and procrastination now our tools of denial rather than straightforward discussion and political dialectic – the false premise being our defining ourselves as a guerrilla (if not combat) unit or at least one in a provisional stage of formation.⁴⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the group's financial problems continued. The thefts provided them with a few hundred dollars now and then, but not enough. They tried to find ways to knock on the Weather Underground's door to get help and looked for possibilities to make a book deal for the Harrises and Patricia Hearst. That did not bring any results. Generally, they were too scared of getting caught to approach other people for help.⁴⁴⁶ In the end, they decided to rob a bank. Bill Harris wanted the new team to do the job so that they would get their hands on the revolution properly. Planning for the robbery started in late January, 1975, and a month later, Mike Bortin and James Kilgore entered a small Guild Savings and Loan Association bank on the outskirts of Sacramento. They walked away with several thousand dollars. The group issued no claim to the robbery and no-one got hurt.⁴⁴⁷

The major act in planning during the winter was the prison escape of Remiro and Little. Many messages were exchanged between the prisoners and the Harrises with their new team and the courthouse was under their surveillance. The plan was eventually put together, but it never materialized. There was opposition to the plan inside the group owing to its weaknesses (it would all fall apart if even one single thing went wrong). In fact, most from the new team had not thought at any stage of the preparation that such an operation could really work out. The decision did not please Remiro and Little. Some time afterwards, on March 1, they made a failed attempt to break out on their own. The police found out that there was a getaway car waiting for them next to the jail elevator. They evidently had help from someone, but according to Patricia Hearst, the SLA associates could not figure out from whom.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁵ Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin.

⁴⁴⁶ Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008.

⁴⁴⁷ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 309–312, 314–319; McLellan & Avery 1977, 432–434.

⁴⁴⁸ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 307–308, 312–314, 319–320; McLellan & Avery 1977, 422–424, 438–439; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin.

In mid-March 1975, with the help of information from Jack Scott's brother, the FBI discovered that the Scotts had been involved in hiding the SLA and that the Harrises and Patricia Hearst had stayed in the Pennsylvanian farm house. In that house, the investigators found a fingerprint of Wendy Yoshimura. The discovery was a major news story and Yoshimura's photo was all over the newspapers. In the fall of 1974, when the Harrises and Patricia Hearst left Pennsylvania, Yoshimura had also returned to the Bay area but announced that she did not want to have anything to do with the SLA. However, she stayed in contact with the new team. When the news about her presence in the farmhouse hit the news, she ran to them and moved in with Patricia Hearst in one of their safe houses in Sacramento. The FBI went strongly after the Scott connection, but did not really start investigating Yoshimura's background.⁴⁴⁹

By this time, Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Steve Soliah and Michael Bortin had committed themselves to the armed struggle plans to the degree that they agreed to move to Sacramento (save for Michael Bortin, who continued to travel between the Bay area and Sacramento because of his obligation to report to his parole officer). Their friends involved in helping them, including Jo Soliah, stated that they still did not want to have any part in such plans. Wendy Yoshimura also had a very reserved attitude towards the plans that the others had.⁴⁵⁰

The next act under intensive planning was another bank robbery. The target was to be Crocker National Bank branch in Carmichael, just outside of Sacramento. Bill Harris allegedly wanted to make it a full SLA operation, but the others talked him out of this idea because they thought it would put too much pressure on them. All eight of them (Emily and Bill Harris, Kathy and Steve Soliah, Patricia Hearst, James Kilgore, Mike Bortin and Wendy Yoshimura) were going to be involved. On April 21, 1975, they acted upon the plan. The robbery was successful in terms of money – they walked away with over 15,000 dollars. But there were serious complications. Emily Harris had shot one of the customers when she did not obey the order to go down quickly enough. The customer, Myrna Lee Opsahl, died quickly of her wounds. What added to the gravity of it all was that James Kilgore had stood directly behind Opsahl and had he stood in a slightly different position, he would have been hit.⁴⁵¹

According to Hearst, the shooting incident provoked serious turmoil among the group. The Harrises played the whole incident down: since Opsahl was a wife of a doctor and thus a "bourgeois pig", it therefore really did not matter that much. But the others were deeply shaken by the event. It was the first time they were involved in an action that cost someone's life. It seems that they had never really imagined that they would end up in such a situation. They were also very frustrated with the Harrises for their nonchalant and belittling attitude towards that incident.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 305, 322–323; McLellan & Avery 1977, 411, 435–441; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. The new team had rented initially one apartment in Sacramento and got another one (where Patricia Hearst moved) in late 1974. The living arrangements of the SLA and the new team were in constant flux and I have not included all the details in the text.

⁴⁵⁰ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 323–324; McLellan & Avery 1977, 428.

⁴⁵¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 331–333; McLellan & Avery 1977, 444–447.

⁴⁵² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 332–335.

With the police looking for bank robbers in Sacramento, they decided to leave the city and move back to the familiar Bay Area in early May. The Harrises and Patricia Hearst would stay underground, but all others would return to their normal lives as much as possible and get jobs. Part of the new team stayed in the apartments they had rented, while others lived with friends. Who lived where changed almost on a weekly basis, reflecting the ongoing personal disagreements between them.⁴⁵³

A new element was added to the internal dynamics of the fugitives and the new team around this time when the women involved (including Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst) started to work on the issues of feminism and revolution. What fed into this development were Emily Harris' heated disputes with Bill Harris. The women established their own study group in which they worked on their own position on feminism and trained with weapons, with Patricia Hearst acting as their instructor.⁴⁵⁴

Once they had settled in San Francisco, the tensions from the previous months subsided, as everyone had more space and time away from each other. The planning for attacks, however, continued. Around this time, the group got a new recruit, Bonnie Wilder, who was a friend of Kathy Soliah. The plan was for her to become a police agent and thereby an agent for the group inside the Oakland Police Department. Wilder made the first steps in that direction, but depending on the source, either did not pass the physical test or did not show up to a required written test. She, however, stayed involved to some degree in the activities of the SLA associates.⁴⁵⁵

During the next few months, the Harrises and the new team seemed to find a common ground on which to operate. The idea was to conduct a bombing campaign and to claim it under the name of the New World Liberation Front (NWLFF) and call themselves the Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit. They had no idea who those responsible for the bombings conducted in the NWLFF's name were, but they found it a good idea to connect their efforts to a bigger campaign. Furthermore, for the new team, this had the benefit of them not having to operate under the name and heritage of the SLA. To honor the direction that the SLA had been moving in, they were still looking at targeting policemen, however. Indeed, that had been DeFreeze's vision about how to spark the revolution. The hit list that the group compiled reportedly included such targets as the San Francisco police chief, whose department harassed blacks during the search for the so-called Zebra killers⁴⁵⁶, the FBI Office in San Mateo and the LEAA headquarters in Burlingame.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵³ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 338–339; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin. McLellan and Avery (1977, 449–451), evidently relying on Steve Soliah's account, credit the move to San Francisco to personal conflicts. According to them, Emily would have moved first to Steve to Berkeley and the others had followed suit.

⁴⁵⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 339–341; McLellan & Avery 1977, 428–429. SLA Communiqué written by "sisters of the Symbionese Liberation Army" apparently driving from these efforts was published in *Dragon* no. 4 (November 1975).

⁴⁵⁵ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 341; McLellan & Avery 1977, 451; Letter from James Kilgore on January 30, 2009.

⁴⁵⁶ A series of killings, known as the Zebra murders, had been committed in the area of San Francisco in 1973–1974. During the first months of the Hearst kidnapping, some suspected that the SLA and the Zebra murders would have been linked to each other. The SLA, on its part, claimed that it was a covert police operation directed against it (e.g. the tape released after the Hibernia bank robbery in mid-April 1974, transcript printed in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 121–124). Later, it turned out that the murders were committed by a

Besides the slippery slope from helping the fugitives towards committing the crimes described above, there were also other processes at play that led people from the new team to commit themselves to armed actions despite their initial, and to some degree still prevailing, reluctance:

You accept certain assumptions and once you accept them your capacity for lateral/creative thinking is gone. Once you accept the “violence is the only true way” paradigm you got caught up in a cycle of bad decisions. It is like “group think”. [...] I think we fell prey to a kind of blinkered thinking. If violence is the only way, then you think more violence is even better way. People’s value becomes measured not according to how well they can analyze, strategize or build organization but how far they are prepared to go. Once you accept that you are going to die soon (which we did, or at least be captured, tortured, etc.) then why worry about risk? The person who wants to go out with the biggest bang becomes the model. Now normally if you’re in a group and things get a little extreme, you can walk away or create some distance. [...] But when you’re in a small group, underground, surviving on a shoestring, and every cop in the country is looking for you, you’re always immersed up to your eyeballs in this crazy logic you’ve created. Fortunately for us, the most extreme of our plans never came to fruition – either because we were incompetent militantly, scared but too afraid to admit it, or just too confused to pull off something big and crazy. [...]

I think the intensity of Bill and Emily, plus their moral weight as the heirs of the martyrs, gradually pushed us all with the mold of the urban guerrilla group think. I’m not trying to blame them. We could have pushed back harder. We could have walked away or just provided material support. We chose to jump into the whirlpool.⁴⁵⁸

Around this time, impatience started to set in. Michael Bortin especially began to criticize the others for just talking and not really doing anything. According to Hearst, Bill Harris challenged Bortin to come up with the plan for action, which he did. He proposed they would carry out a bomb attack at a coffee shop in the Richmond district that was frequented by police officers. However, the Harrises found this plan too risky. As a result, Bortin lost his temper and decided that he had had it with them and left.⁴⁵⁹ The urge for action, nonetheless, lived on and was now, according to Patricia Hearst, voiced primarily by Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore.

Finally, a decision was reached to conduct a bomb attack against the police cars parked outside two stations, one in the Mission District (a classic target for attacks in the previous years) and one at the Taraval station. The operation was conducted on August 7, but with poor results. The Mission District bomb failed to ignite and moreover, Wendy Yoshimura

group called the Death Angels, which was a group within the Nation of Islam. On the Zebra murders, see Howard 1979; Sanders & Cohen 2006.

⁴⁵⁷ Kohn, Howard & David Weir: “The lost year of the SLA”, *Rolling Stone* April 22, 1976, 35; Unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin.

⁴⁵⁸ Letter from James Kilgore on March 17, 2009. Also in the unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin, a similar kind of phenomenon of groupthink is described.

⁴⁵⁹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 341–343.

and Kathy Soliah, who had been tasked to place the Taraval bomb, did not even have a chance to place their bomb.⁴⁶⁰

Six days later, they made another attack with an improved bomb design on the Emeryville police station, which was related to a well-known controversial police slaying of a young black called Tyrone Guyton that the SLA had referred to in its communiqués. That explosion destroyed the police car completely. Following that attack, they sent out a communiqué in the name of New World Liberation Front and called themselves the Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit. The Harrises insisted that they should add the SLA slogan “death to the fascist insect that preys upon the lives of the people” to the communiqué.⁴⁶¹

The next operation they started to prepare targeted the Marin County Civic Center. They decided to plant two bombs in the building so that the first explosion would take place in the parking lot and the other one in front of the sheriff’s office. In that way, their explosion would affect as many policemen as possible. Patricia Hearst has said that Wendy Yoshimura resisted this idea but could not make the Harrises change their minds. Later, it was decided that with the Marin County bombing, they could conduct another bomb attack in Los Angeles simultaneously and thereby demonstrate that they had enough strength to carry out action in two parts of the state at the same time. They carried out these attacks on August 20. Both bombs in the Marin County Civic Center, which were placed there, according to Hearst, by Steve Soliah, herself, Bonnie Wilder and Jo Soliah, went off, but in the wrong order. There were no casualties. The bomb attack in Los Angeles, however, did not work out. The group charged with the bomb attack, according to Hearst, consisting of Bill Harris, Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, placed two bombs under parked police cars in East Los Angeles and set them to go off when the cars left. The first bomb did not ignite and both bombs were later found.⁴⁶²

Even though the group managed to find enough common ground to pull off these operations together and some of those who had declared they did not want anything to do with such operations had taken part in them, the old grudges were not over. The disputes erupted in full force after the August 20 attacks. According to Patricia Hearst, the dispute concerned the proposition of Emily and Bill Harris to approach a recently paroled black convict, Doc Holiday, and to ask him to become the SLA’s leader. Hearst has said that the dispute had ended with Bill Harris declaring that it was all over and that they should split up. Emily and Bill Harris would find the black leader, while the others could do whatever they wanted. In fact, the new team was probably even less keen to continue the cooperation. Hearst stated she did not like the idea of a black leader because she feared the others would fall under the new leader’s control just as the first team had fallen under DeFreeze’s control.⁴⁶³

The dispute described by Patricia Hearst was only one among many similar disputes, but it was the last straw. Kathy Soliah, Steve Soliah, Patricia Hearst, James Kilgore and Wendy Yoshimura (and with them, practically all the group’s support networks) started to actually make new plans. As for Michael Bortin, he had already distanced himself from

⁴⁶⁰ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 345–347.

⁴⁶¹ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 348–350.

⁴⁶² Hearst & Moscow 1982, 350–354.

⁴⁶³ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 355–356.

the group. The Harrises were nonetheless still determined to revitalize the SLA. A few days later, with help from Kathy Soliah (who stayed still in touch with the Harrises and seemed to be somewhat ambivalent about the split), the Harrises made contact with Doc Holiday. However, he declined their offer for the SLA leadership position.⁴⁶⁴

For all this time, the FBI's investigation was producing few results. That was certainly not due to a lack of effort. In an interview with a New York weekly, two special agents recounted that the resources that the FBI had invested in the case in ten months amounted to three million dollars, 270,000 man-hours and (attempted) interviews with 25,000 people. The major obstacle for the investigation seemed to be the lack of cooperation. The majority of the people the FBI had approached had refused to talk.⁴⁶⁵ Even though the SLA really did not have the sympathies of the Left on its side, many still held to their principle of not cooperating with the police, as they thought the police represented an illegitimate authority.⁴⁶⁶

In early July, the FBI started to investigate Jack Scott and his connections more carefully. This was prompted by Scott's attempts to negotiate a deal with the parents of Patricia Hearst. The FBI eventually contacted Kathy Soliah's father and with the help of information it got from him, found a track to Soliah and her friends. Alerted by Soliahs' father, they all disappeared underground in late August, soon after the Marin County bombing. For the FBI, this provided a signal that they were on to something. By mid-September, the FBI had located the Soliahs and their friends, allegedly through checking out independent painting jobs in the area. On September 18, Yoshimura and Hearst, as well as Emily and Bill Harris, were all arrested in two different locations. Kilgore as well as Jo, Steve and Kathy Soliah heard the news about the arrest of the Harrises on the radio. Steve Soliah went to the apartment of Yoshimura and Hearst to warn them, but did not get there in time and was arrested. Kilgore, Jo Soliah and Kathy Soliah fled immediately.⁴⁶⁷

The arrests were followed by lengthy trials. In the end, Steve Soliah was acquitted of the charges. Patricia Hearst was convicted of the Hibernia Bank armed robbery and the use of a firearm to commit a felony in March, 1976, as the jury did not believe her claims that she had been forced into crime. She eventually was given a sentence of seven years and was released in February, 1979. Bill and Emily Harris got a prison sentence for kidnapping Patricia Hearst and some other crimes they conducted while being members of the SLA. They were released in 1983. Wendy Yoshimura's sentence was one to fifteen years for which she spent less than a year in prison.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ Hearst & Moscow 1982, 356–359; Kohn, Howard & David Weir: "The lost year of the SLA", *Rolling Stone* April 22, 1976, 70; McLellan & Avery 1977, 478–479; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008; Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008.

⁴⁶⁵ McLellan & Avery 1977, 413–414.

⁴⁶⁶ E.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 414–415, also "FBI chief losing sleep over Tania", *Berkeley Barb* July 26 – August 1, 1974.

⁴⁶⁷ McLellan & Avery 1977, 458–462, 469–478, 483–494.

⁴⁶⁸ Turner, Wallace: "Miss Hearst is convicted on bank robbery charges", *The New York Times* March 21, 1976; Fosburgh, Lacey: "Patricia Hearst gets 7 years on robbery charges", *The New York Times* September 25, 1976; Hunger, Marjorie: "Carter clears Miss Hearst's release", *The New York Times* January 30, 1979; Fosburgh, Lacey: "Joyful Miss Hearst leaves prison five years after being kidnapped", *The New York Times* February 2, 1979.

The arrests effectively ended the campaign of the SLA. With the Harrises arrested, and no need to take care of Patricia Hearst, the driving forces of the struggle were gone. It is obvious that the Harrises did not expect Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and others still outside the prison, to pick up the torch of the SLA and to continue the struggle. In fact, they angrily protested when a political statement by Soliah and Kilgore was published using the name of the SLA.⁴⁶⁹ Half a year after the arrests, Bill and Emily Harris, together with Russ Little and Joe Remiro, gave an interview where they called themselves the last four surviving members of the SLA and said that with their arrest, the SLA had ceased to exist.⁴⁷⁰ That corresponded with the self-perception of the new team. None of them ever thought of themselves as being members of the Symbionese Liberation Army.⁴⁷¹ The demise of the Symbionese Liberation Army, however, did not dampen the spirits of the former SLA members, because the struggle continued in other forms.⁴⁷² In the letter from Bill and Emily Harris from prison, as well as in other comments published in the BARC's publication, *Dragon*, they portrayed their arrest as yet another desperate attempt to break the armed struggle.⁴⁷³

The Bay Area Research Collective (BARC), originally set up by Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, continued to defend the SLA and called for solidarity with it. It organized a rally in Berkeley on September 27 to support the SLA and all other captured comrades, together with a number of other organizations.⁴⁷⁴ The last issue of its publication came out in late 1976.

3.10 Aftermath

After the arrests of September 1975, Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Jo Soliah and Bonnie Wilder became fugitives. Jo Soliah and Bonnie Wilder left directly to Seattle, while James Kilgore and Kathy Soliah first stayed for a few weeks in the Bay area in their friends' houses and then also headed to Seattle. They stayed there for about a year, doing odd jobs in restaurants and offices. Kathy Soliah also continued to act in plays under an assumed name. Michael Bortin stayed in the Bay area for about a year, because he was still on probation from the 1972 sentence and was still not, at least publicly, linked to the SLA.⁴⁷⁵

After having been in Seattle for about a year, Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore headed to Milwaukee, where they were joined by Michael Bortin. Seattle was, after all, too close to California to avoid the risk of meeting people they knew. Jo Soliah and Bonnie Wilder

⁴⁶⁹ Harris, Emily, Bill Harris, Joe Remiro & Russ Little: "SLA", *Dragon* no. 5 (December 1975). This statement is "History will absolve us" which will be discussed in more detail later in the text.

⁴⁷⁰ Lyne, Susan & Robert Scheer: "Twenty months with Patty-Tania. By Bill & Emily Harris", *New Times* March 5, 1976; Harris, Bill and Emily, Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, as told to Susan Lyne and Robert Scheer: "The story of the SLA", *New Times* April 16, 1976.

⁴⁷¹ Letter from James Kilgore on March 17, 2009; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on June 10, 2008.

⁴⁷² The last SLA statement, 38.

⁴⁷³ *Dragon* no. 3 (October 1975).

⁴⁷⁴ "These days", *Dragon* no. 3 (October 1975), 3.

⁴⁷⁵ Letter from James Kilgore June 15, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005; Hendry 2002, 211–212.

stayed for some more months in Seattle and then decided to go back to the Bay area, because it became clear that they were not wanted for any crimes. As for Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore, they stayed in Milwaukee for about half a year and as they could not find anything of interest there, they moved on to Minneapolis. Michael Bortin moved with them, but soon headed by himself to Colorado. By this time, Soliah and Kilgore were no longer a couple, but were still regularly in contact with each other.⁴⁷⁶

Kilgore and Soliah had abandoned the idea of the armed struggle, because they thought it had proven to be an ineffective method to work for political change. The worst fault of the SLA and the campaign they had themselves been involved with was, in their opinion, that it was not connected to any mass movement. A closer look at their thinking at the time of the September, 1975 arrests is provided in a paper entitled “History will absolve us” that was distributed with the November 1975 issue of *Dragon*. This was published anonymously, but its main authors were James Kilgore and Kathy Soliah.⁴⁷⁷ This paper also reflects the differences that prevailed between the SLA tradition of the Harrises and the more moderate approach that the new team represented. This publication contained few poetic expressions or overtly militaristic language or name-calling. Instead, it offered an analysis of the state and recent history of revolutionary struggle in the international context that resembled rather the argumentation style of the WUO:

There is a definite need for broader forms of organization than currently exist on the Left. Many comrades are presently trying to solve this problem by putting all their energy into organizing a new communist party. We believe this is a dogmatic application of revolutionary theory and ignores the reality of the state of the Left in this country. Before a viable party, one that could be meaningful to the lives of millions of people, can come into existence there is much work to be done. We are certain that any party which formed at this time would quickly come to be dominated by white male leadership, with Third World people, between men and women, and between mass organizers and guerrilla fighters before the revolutionary movement can unite under any form of democratic centralism.

At this stage of the struggle we see a practical mechanism for uniting serious Marxist-leninists, revolutionary nationalists, revolutionary feminists and gays, and non-aligned freedom fighters. The only prerequisite for membership would be a sincere commitment to fight U. S. imperialism and a willingness to politically support and share resources with other members of the federation. The important feature of the federation is that it would have no central command which would have power over the political ideology and actions of its members.⁴⁷⁸

As it is evident from this quote, Soliah and Kilgore still supported armed struggle and also thought it was necessary to prepare for it in the United States. But they argued against individual groups that commit attacks without any link to a larger context. Similarly, they criticized the aboveground Left for failing to support those involved in armed struggle:

⁴⁷⁶ Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin June 10, 2008; Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005.

⁴⁷⁷ Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008.

⁴⁷⁸ “History will absolve us”, an appendix to *Dragon*, November, 1975.

Since September 18th the media has done everything in its power to remove all political content from the actions and philosophy of the Symbionese Liberation Army. The capture of revolutionaries has been made into another episode of “As the World Turns.” Many Leftists have also participated in this process, repeatedly issuing condemnations of terrorists to the straight press in the hopes that it will legitimize their own political work. When any revolutionary is thrown into a concentration camp, they should get nothing but support from the Left publicly. Political differences should be struggled out among revolutionaries, not brought into the living rooms of every home via the pig media.⁴⁷⁹

After September, 1975, Soliah and Kilgore continued being politically active, but in aboveground projects and movements. An important part of that was their processing for themselves the meaning of their experiences with the SLA, finding better ways to bring about social change and to compensate for their past mistakes. In Seattle, Kilgore wrote texts under an assumed name for *Northwest Passage*, an equivalent of the *Berkeley Barb*. In Minneapolis, they found a very diversified scene of left-wing activism. They joined a number of action and study groups and did volunteer work in progressive bookstores and research centers. In 1978, Kilgore and Soliah, together with a handful of other people, formed the Twin Cities Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa. They supported ZANU in Zimbabwe. Through a prominent ZANU leader, Farayi Munyuki, who lived in Minneapolis, they developed good connections with the movement and collected medical supplies and clothes to be sent to the Zimbabwean refugee camps in Mozambique.⁴⁸⁰

When Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, Munyuki returned there. Soon afterwards, James Kilgore, now using the name Charles Pape (but keeping the name John he had used in Minneapolis as his nickname), likewise left for Zimbabwe. With the help of his contacts with Munyuki, Kilgore got a teaching job at a high school. In 1984, he became involved in curriculum development and later contributed to the writing of two widely used high school history text books in 1988. In the same year, he organized a night school for domestic workers.⁴⁸¹

Two years later, in 1986, Kilgore moved to Melbourne, Australia with the intention of getting an academic degree under the name Charles Pape. He completed a B.A. in Social Sciences in 1987 at Deakin University. In 1988, he returned to Zimbabwe and went on six years later to complete a doctorate through distance education at Deakin University. In 1991, Kilgore left for South Africa, as he got a teaching assignment at Khanya College. Three years later, he became the director of the same college. In 1997, Kilgore, together with wife and two sons, moved to Cape Town. Kilgore then started as the co-director of ILRIG (International Labour Research and Information Group). Kilgore spent his time at ILRIG much the same as he did at Khanya College, as his teaching activities were oriented towards educating union and social movement activists on how to advance their interests. Kilgore also wrote several publications on globalization.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁹ “History will absolve us”, an appendix to *Dragon*, November, 1975.

⁴⁸⁰ Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Hendry 2002, 212–213.

⁴⁸¹ Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Brown, Mareva: “Kilgore given six years for his role in SLA killing”, *The Sacramento Bee*, www.sacbee.com (retrieved on May 27, 2004).

⁴⁸² Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008; Hrab, Neil: “‘Comrade John’”, *The National Post* January 21, 2003; Bond, Patrick: “Activists play tribute to ‘fugitive’ John Pape”, *Green Left online* November 27, 2002, <http://www.greenleft.org.au/2002/518/27065> (retrieved on September 6, 2003).

In 1980, Kathy Soliah, using at that time the name Sara Jane Olson, married Fred Peterson, who had also been active in the action groups for Zimbabwe in Minneapolis. In February, 1981, they left for Zimbabwe (this was some time before Kilgore left). They worked in remote areas with poor people, providing them with healthcare and schooling. A few months after that, Soliah and Peterson moved back to the United States and settled in Baltimore, where Soliah completed a cooking certificate and Peterson earned a Masters' degree at the medical school. In 1985, Soliah and Peterson moved back to Minneapolis. Soliah took more classes, did volunteer work and participated in theater productions. She has three daughters.⁴⁸³

After the arrests of September, 1975, Michael Bortin stayed for some months in the Bay area. A year later, violating his parole conditions, he left the area. He joined Kathy Soliah and James Kilgore in Milwaukee and Minneapolis for a while, and then left by himself to Colorado. Unlike Soliah and Kilgore, he was still looking forward to some kind of radical action, but never got the opportunity for that. He stopped looking for that kind of opportunities when he got his first child in 1979. He returned aboveground in 1984 to fulfill the wish of his dying mother and was sentenced to 18 months for parole violation. After he was released, he was in contact with Steve Soliah again and also met Jo Soliah, whom he married in 1988. They lived in Berkeley for a while and moved to Portland, Oregon. Michael Bortin has his own hardwood floor company and Jo Soliah is a nurse. Both are still very much interested in politics, but not actively involved. They have four children, three of them from their former marriages.⁴⁸⁴

Not much is known about the lives of Emily and Bill Harris after being released from prison in 1983. They separated soon afterwards, but they have stayed in close touch with each other. At the time of the sentencing, Emily and Bill Harris still fiercely defended their viewpoints.⁴⁸⁵ Since then, both of them have left radical politics behind.

Since Emily Harris, now called Emily Montague, left prison, she began a career with computers, using the skills she had acquired in prison. She started up her own successful consulting business in 1994. Besides that, she has been involved in various kind of charity activities.⁴⁸⁶

Bill Harris, on his part, became a private investigator in San Francisco and has worked occasionally for the district attorney's office. He has married again and has two sons. To my knowledge, he has not been politically active since the mid-1970s.⁴⁸⁷ In an interview from 2001, he commented on his past activities:

⁴⁸³ Hendry 2002, 212–220; Letter from James Kilgore on June 15, 2008.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with Michael Bortin on May 21, 2005 & June 9, 2008; Interview with Jo Bortin on June 10, 2008.

⁴⁸⁵ E.g. Fosburgh, Lacey: "A Girlish Fugitive In a T-Shirt, Smiling", *The New York Times* September 19, 1975; Chambers, Marcia: "Harris demand dismissal of Jury", *The New York Times* June 30, 1976; "Date set for kidnapping trial", *The New York Times* December 4, 1977; *The New York Times* September 2, 1978; *The New York Times* September 3, 1978.

⁴⁸⁶ Landsberg, Mitchell: "New Life, Old Murder: Ex-Radical Emily Harris Faces Charges 19 Years After Release from Prison", *The Seattle Times* June 15, 2002.

⁴⁸⁷ Johnson, John & Mohan, Geoffrey: "Graying Radicals Are Facing New Ire in America", *Los Angeles Times* January 29, 2002; Vollers, Maryanne: "Was This Soccer Mom a Terrorist?" *The New York Times Magazine* May 20, 2001.

I don't want to make a bunch of reactionaries happy by saying it was all a bunch of garbage," he says. "They want me to denounce what I did and what I thought and what I was. They want me to be David Horowitz, for Christ's sake. And that's not me. I'm not the person I was when I was 30 years old. The person I was was a very angry person, and I probably was a little bit unconcerned about my mortality. I had nothing to lose. In my own mind I was living in misery because of what I saw around me. And I felt powerless to change it. If anything, we were deluded into thinking that we could have any effect by doing the things we did. [...] But am I embarrassed? Yes. We were a bunch of amateurs. I wish everyone would forget us."⁴⁸⁸

Wendy Yoshimura is not known to have been politically active after serving her sentence and according to other SLA associates, her involvement in the armed struggle was always based more on unfortunate circumstances than on a politically-based commitment. She has worked as an artist in California.⁴⁸⁹ Steve Soliah likewise appears not to have been politically active since 1975.

Soon after she was released from prison, Patricia Hearst married her former bodyguard, Bernard Shaw and is now known as Patricia Hearst Shaw. She has remained in the spotlight since. In 1982, she published her memoir, *Every Secret Thing*, which I have referred to several times in this study. She has also made a career as an actress. In January, 2001, she was granted a full pardon by President Clinton.⁴⁹⁰

Since the 1970s, the crimes allegedly committed in the context of the SLA have occasionally been re-investigated. In 1999, the police in Los Angeles started to once again investigate the bomb attack attempts against the police cars in 1975, which were, according to Patricia Hearst, committed by Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore and Bill Harris. This led to the airing of the pictures of Kathy Soliah, who has now legally adopted the name Sara Olson, and James Kilgore. Soon afterwards, the police found Olson and arrested her in June, 1999. The arrest was followed by a lengthy and complicated legal process which ended with Olson being found guilty.⁴⁹¹

This was also followed by prosecutions in the case of the Carmichael robbery committed in April of 1975, something that the son of Myrna Lee Opsahl had tried to make happen for years. Emily Montague, Bill Harris and Michael Bortin were arrested in January, 2002. Montague got a sentence of eight years, Bill Harris seven years, and Bortin and Olson both six years in February, 2003. Bill Harris was paroled in September, 2006

⁴⁸⁸ Vollers, Maryanne: "Was This Soccer Mom a Terrorist?" *The New York Times Magazine* May 20, 2001.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview with Mike Bortin on June 9, 2008; Hoge, Patrick: "SLA's Yoshimura Keeps Mum While Ex-comrades Serve Time", *San Francisco Chronicle* December 27, 2003; <http://www.wendyoshimura.com/pages1/home.html> (retrieved on March 15, 2009).

⁴⁹⁰ When she was released from prison, her sentence was commuted by President Carter. Marjorie Hunter: "Carter Clears Miss Hearst's Release", *The New York Times* January 30, 1979; Fosburgh, Lacey: "Miss Hearst and Ex-Bodyguard Are Wed Amid Intense Security", *The New York Times* April 2, 1979; Morgan, Ted: "Everything but the Reason", *The New York Times* January 3, 1982; Lacey, Marc: "Clinton Pardons Deutch but Not Milken Or Hubbell", *The New York Times* January 21, 2001.

⁴⁹¹ The process from finding Olson until her verdict is described in Hendry 2002, 221–331; see also "70's Radical Is Arrested", *The New York Times* June 17, 1999; "National News Briefs; Woman Acknowledges Being Fugitive Radical", *The New York Times* July 10, 1999; Sterngold, James: "70's Radical Is Sentenced, Then Arraigned in New Case", *The New York Times* January 19, 2002. On the process and the lives of the defendants afterwards, see also Jordan 2002.

and Emily Montague in February, 2007. Michael Bortin was released in February, 2006 and moved back to Portland to resume his floor-contracting business. Sara Olson, who also had to serve the earlier sentence for the attempted murder of police officers, was paroled in March, 2009. She was allowed to serve her parole in Minnesota where her family lives.⁴⁹²

The last remaining fugitive, James Kilgore, was arrested on November 8, 2002, one day after the other four had pleaded guilty in the Carmichael bank robbery. His arrest was based on a federal indictment for the possession of an illegal explosive device issued in 1976.⁴⁹³ After the Carmichael Bank Robbery case was reopened, Kilgore had established contact with a lawyer to initiate negotiations for surrender. Making this connection probably helped authorities to find him. Kilgore was sentenced to 54 months for explosive and passport fraud convictions and six years for his participation in the bank robbery. He was paroled in May, 2009 and allowed to join his family in Illinois.⁴⁹⁴ During his imprisonment, he wrote several novels. One of them entitled *We Are All Zimbabweans Now* was published immediately following his release.⁴⁹⁵

None of those who were involved in the SLA currently hold its flag very high. The general feeling among the former associates is that the SLA rather contributed to the rise of conservatism and to an increase in investment in law enforcement, than to the creation of such a society as it had envisioned.

⁴⁹² Sterngold, James: “4 Former Radicals Are Charged In 1975 Killing in Bank Robbery”, *The New York Times* January 17, 2002; “4 in Radical Group of 70’s Are Sentenced in Murder”, *The New York Times* February 15, 2003; “1970s radical freed from California prison”, *AP* March 17, 2009; Mackey, Robert: “Former Symbionese Liberation Army Member Released From Prison”, *The New York Times* March 17, 2009.

⁴⁹³ FBI San Francisco Press Office Press Release, April 26, 2004.

⁴⁹⁴ E.g. “New Sentence For Ex-Radical”, *The New York Times* May 11, 2004; “The Captured Member of ‘70s Radical Group Is Freed”, *The New York Times* May 10, 2009.

⁴⁹⁵ “Announcing James Kilgore’s *We are All Zimbabweans Now* (with Excerpt)”, <http://umuzi.book.co.za/blog/2009/06/03/announcing-james-kilgores-we-are-all-zimbabweans-now-with-excerpt/> (retrieved on September 30, 2009).

4 Comparison of the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army

In the preceding chapters, I have presented the historical narrative of the campaigns that reflect my understanding of how the situation looked from the participants' point of view. In this chapter, I will compare the development of the campaigns in the light of the research questions that were outlined in the introduction.⁴⁹⁶

4.1 Strategy

Besides those well-known movements that are at the heart and in the limelight of a wave of terrorism, there are always several smaller groups that are inspired by the actions of the larger movements and decide to join their struggle. The Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States are both very much cases in point. Both were small groups inspired by the successes of the bigger movements, such as the Weather Underground and the Rote Armee Fraktion and both believed that there was a role for them to play despite their lack in numbers.

The Rode Jeugd was formed in 1966, but its initiatives for terrorism started only in the first half of 1971. The start of the campaign was signaled by the firebomb attack against the car of the Eindhoven police commissioner and the publication of the text outlining the logic and legitimation of violence “now” in its internal discussion paper. The highpoint of the campaign was reached in the latter half of 1972. After that, there was little action, but the planning went on until late 1976. The campaign ceased largely when Lidwien Janssen was arrested and the training trip to South Yemen became public knowledge.

Initiatives for terrorism continued under the banner of the Rood Verzetsfront. It is a matter of interpretation whether the RVF should be considered as a successor organization of the Rode Jeugd or the Rode Hulp, the latter being the most important of the groups in which the former Rode Jeugd members were active afterwards. Only one of the key members of the Rode Jeugd, Henk Wubben, was involved in it for any longer period of time. Ideologically, the RVF did share quite a few traits, but it made no positive reference to the legacy of the Rode Jeugd or the Rode Hulp.

The campaign of the SLA began with the establishment of the group. Unlike the Rode Jeugd, the SLA was established for the purpose of conducting a terrorist campaign. Its first terrorist act occurred in November, 1973. This campaign had clearly two phases, with the LA shootout as the dividing line. The campaign ended in September, 1975, when several of those involved, including Bill and Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst, were arrested.

⁴⁹⁶ Since most developments and incidents mentioned in this chapter have already been discussed in the preceding chapters, I have provided information on the sources only for such issues that have not yet been raised.

Below is a list of attacks that were part of the campaigns by both the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army. To provide an overview of the activities, the lists include all the known successful or attempted politically motivated attacks as well as the felonies and violent incidents that are known to have involved those taking part in the campaign.

Table 1: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of Rode Jeugd

Date	Incident	Claim
July 22, 1971	Firebomb attack against the car of Odekerken	Rode Jeugd
February 23, 1972	Evoluon bomb attack	PGAG
April 24, 1972	Attacks at Philips facilities in Rotterdam, Baarn and Hilversum	No claim
May 8, 1972	Bomb attack at the Turkish airline company in Amsterdam	RVN
May 28, 1972	Bomb attack at a Philips facility in Arnhem and an attempted bomb attack at a Philips facility in Amsterdam	None
June 8, 1972	An attempted bomb attack at a Philips facility in Eindhoven	None
June 18, 1972	Arson at the America Institute in the Museumplein, Amsterdam	RVN
October 4, 1972	Bomb attack at the Holiday Inn in Utrecht	RVN, claim later withdrawn
October 16, 1972	Bomb found in front of the Bank of America in Rotterdam	RVN, claim later withdrawn
October 17, 1972	Bomb found under Bavinck's car in Eindhoven	No claim, but a letter sent to Philips
October 18, 1972	Bomb found at Zwolsche Algemeene in Utrecht	RVN, claim later withdrawn
October 19, 1972	Bomb (possibly a fake) found in front of a taxation office in Leiden	None
May 11, 1976	Attempted bomb attack at the Autopon facility	None

Table 2: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army

Date	Incident	Claim
November 6, 1973	Murder of Marcus Foster and an attempted murder of Robert Blackburn	SLA
February 4, 1974	Kidnapping of Patricia Hearst	SLA
April 15, 1974	Hibernia bank robbery	SLA
May 16, 1974	Shooting at Mel's Sporting Goods	None, but soon known that the SLA was involved
May 17, 1974	LA shootout claiming the lives of six SLA members	The SLA presence in the house known
February 25, 1975	Guild Savings and Loan bank robbery	None
April 21, 1975	Carmichael bank robbery	None
August 7, 1975	An attempted bomb attack in the Mission district and at the Taraval Street police stations	None
August 13, 1975	Bomb attack at the Emeryville police station	NWLF Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit, SLA slogan included
August 20, 1975	Bomb attack at the Marin County Civic Center, failed attempt for a simultaneous bomb attack in Los Angeles	NWLF Jonathan Jackson/Sam Melville Unit

When comparing the development of the campaigns in terms of strategy, the most striking difference concerns the nature of the attacks. In the first phase, the SLA was involved only in those actions that targeted people, while the Rode Jeugd or its successors never crossed that border. The Rode Jeugd committed a few bomb attacks that were targeted against personal property, but not with the intention of killing a person. The Rode Jeugd members had guns in their possession, but to my knowledge, not a single shot was fired during the campaign in the context of attacks or arrests. Even though the Rode Jeugd called for armed struggle, its strategy was not based solely on terrorism. Instead, their position was that capitalism should be attacked by all means possible. Towards this objective, illegal actions should be the priority but it should be combined with legal forms of action that would convince more and more people to join and support the revolutionary struggle.⁴⁹⁷

Having said that, it must be added that when compared to the prevailing attitudes and legitimate strategies in the surrounding (counter)culture of that time, both campaigns represented the most radical edge. Few people in the Netherlands wanted to have anything to do with any form of political violence, including small-scale symbolic bombings. In the United States, political murders had not been part of the action repertoire of the radical Left and the kidnapping of Patty Hearst was the first political kidnapping in US history.⁴⁹⁸

Typical for both campaigns was that after their initial period of activity, their campaign started to wind down, both in terms of the number of actions and of their scope. After the arrests of Luciën van Hoesel and Ger Flokstra, the campaign of the Rode Jeugd became

⁴⁹⁷ See e.g. *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 4 (1971), *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2 (1972).

⁴⁹⁸ E.g. Koopmans 1992; Verbij 2005; a typical example of the New Left's attitude towards the SLA is "Terrorism from the left", *Ramparts* May 1974.

paralyzed and efforts to revitalize it afterwards failed. As for the SLA, there was a clear, though unintended, strategic shift after the LA shootout. That shootout was followed by months of inactivity. When the plans to start up the campaign again began to materialize, they took the form of bombings targeted at the police and bank robberies. The SLA members had many long and heated discussions about what kind of attacks they should commit. Emily and Bill Harris supported the idea of attacking the police because such acts had been the next step in DeFreeze's plan. Finally, they managed to win most of the others over, some of them despite their opposition to the use of violence.

While revolution was the ultimate objective of both campaigns, the groups had different views on their role in the struggle, as well as on the effects of their terrorist attacks. The SLA set out to provide the revolutionary struggle in the US with the committed and uncompromising leadership it had lacked and to unite all oppressed people to fight the common capitalist and imperialist enemy. With their bold actions showing the potential of armed action committed by dedicated revolutionaries, the SLA hoped to bring new life to the revolutionary struggle.

The Rode Jeugd's strategy was based on the idea of developing a worldwide revolution that was articulated by Lin Piao. This theory placed the Netherlands on the periphery of the revolutionary struggle at the moment and thereby ascribed a secondary role to the Rode Jeugd. Its members saw themselves mostly as one among many (future) foot soldiers in this struggle. By creating chaos at home, it sought to contribute to the attrition of the global capitalist and imperialist enemy. At the same time, they would give the people of the Netherlands a good, concrete example of how imperialism and capitalism can be attacked and for those who committed the attacks, this was a valuable exercise for the coming struggle. After the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, the support function became all the more pronounced, as the prospects of any kind of armed action in the Netherlands became dimmer. Especially the group around the Rode Hulp, which was led by Evert van den Berg, Luciën van Hoesel and Annie Westebring, oriented itself strongly towards the Rote Armee Fraktion.

Finally, what was common to both campaigns in all their phases was that terrorism was considered to be a strategy of the first phase only. Later, when more and more people would become mobilized and the vanguard developed better resources, the struggle would be escalated.

4.2 Organization

An evident common denominator between the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army is that they were both very small groups. They had more supporters and helpers at first, but they cut ties after the decision was made to start using terrorism. Both tried to recruit more people to join their struggle all the way through, but they never managed to increase their ranks. In both cases, there were organizational changes during their campaigns. The overall organizational trend after the start of the campaign was in both cases that of deterioration despite their constant attempts to revitalize the struggle.

The original team of the SLA was a very closely-knit and coherent group that placed a significant number of expectations, rules and demands on its members. Their participation was full-time and they lived a very isolated life after the arrest of Joe Remiro and Russell Little. The group had a clear leader, Donald DeFreeze, who as the only African American in the group, was the only one who could make a legitimate claim on leadership. Besides the core group, the SLA initially had a network of friends and associates who helped them. However, after SLA members went underground they were practically left alone. Illustrative to their isolation was that when they needed people to assist them with getting supplies, they went door-to-door to find people to help them in this task. Thus, the realities were very different from the organization that they envisioned and portrayed in their documents, a federation of units composed of people from all races, gender and ages.

After the LA shootout, the Harrises with Patricia Hearst found people to help them through their former social contacts. They were looking at revitalizing the struggle. The plan included helping Russ Little and Joe Remiro escape from prison and training their new helpers to become guerrilla fighters. They were also looking for a new non-white leader. This plan never worked out properly: they did not manage to devise a realistic plan for the prison escape, no new non-white leader was recruited and their new associates were reluctant to take part in the type of struggle that they envisioned. While the Harrises were still carrying the flag of the SLA, they did not really bestow its membership to them. Neither did the new team think of themselves as being part of the SLA. Rather, they were helpers or “freelancers” working with it.

In the end, the Harrises and the new team managed to find enough common ground to commit a few bomb attacks. In the context of those attacks, they used the name of the New World Liberation Front. According to Patricia Hearst, this was because the new associates thought that referring openly to the SLA would put them under too much heat.

At this phase, there were basically three layers of people involved in the campaign: the remnants of the SLA, i.e. the Harrises and Patricia Hearst who were underground, a small group of people (Kathy Soliah, James Kilgore, Michael Bortin, and to some extent both Josephine Bortin and Wendy Yoshimura) who worked with them, and a group of their friends who occasionally helped them. Patricia Hearst and Emily and Bill Harris continued to live in isolation. The ones who started to help them, however, did not go fully underground and preserved some level of normal life. They seemed to have wanted it this way because rather than a sudden disappearance, this way of life provided them with security. While their lives appeared normal to an outsider, this was not how they experienced it. In reality, they felt mentally detached and isolated from the society and were totally oriented towards the underground existence. All other social contacts were a smoke screen.⁴⁹⁹

The dynamics within this group of people were very different from those that prevailed within the SLA before the LA shootout. Those who joined the Harrises and Hearst simply did not come to possess the same kind of mentality that the founding SLA members had had. This is because they were not in it to fight for the bitter end and they did not become as paranoid. Furthermore, the leadership was more contested. Bill Harris made the claim for leadership as the successor of Donald DeFreeze, but this was not accepted by everyone

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with James Kilgore on June 8, 2008; also unpublished memoir of Michael Bortin.

unconditionally. Emily and Bill Harris commanded the others' respect to some degree owing to their experience with armed struggle, but there were several issues of disagreement. There was a dividing line between the Harrises and the others, but there were also shifting alliances along other lines as well. The inner dynamics of the original SLA were all the way through influenced by relationships between those involved.

The difficult situation inside the group finally led to the decision to split into smaller teams and to go on from there as each of them wanted. This plan did not materialize before the arrests and it is not self-evident that it would have. On the other hand, had it not been for the security concerns and especially the need for protecting Patricia Hearst, they probably would have made the decision to split much earlier. The arrests in September, 1975 effectively destroyed the organization. Those arrested included the driving forces behind the initiatives for armed struggle (Emily and Bill Harris) and the main reason for underground existence (them and in particular, Patricia Hearst). Those remaining who had been genuinely motivated for some kind of political action were now fugitives. Now, instead of staying and fighting, they decided to leave California and search for other ways of doing political work. By this time, the SLA had earned such a bad reputation that no-one saw any good in taking up its banner.

Table 3: The organization of the SLA's campaign

	1973	1974(Jan-May)	1974(Jun-Dec)	1975
Name	SLA		Using the name of NWLF	
State of organization	Small coherent core group looking for allies	Small coherent core group, underground	Ex-SLA members underground, new associates closely in touch with them, partly underground	
Numbers	Less than 10 core members, small number of helpers	Eight core members, few helpers	Core of less than 10, some friends who occasionally helped	

The Rode Jeugd and its successors were very different in terms of organization. They were loose networks of part-time activists. Originally, the Rode Jeugd consisted of a number of core members around the country, their local associates, and a network of youths who showed up to participate in its demonstrations and activities. After the Rode Jeugd started to escalate its campaign and the protest movement began to ebb, the last group of people largely disappeared. The Rode Jeugd had a formal organizational structure with the leading troika and a committee consisting of local leaders, but in reality, it worked much less hierarchically. The local cells acted rather autonomously and cooperation crossed these lines.

When the decision was made to move from protest to resistance, efforts were made to increase discipline and organization within the core group. These efforts had mixed results. The Rode Jeugd continued to be a loosely organized network of people, but it managed to create a small core group that was not easily penetrated by outsiders.

Furthermore, no-one from the Rode Jeugd ever went underground or even became partially detached from their previous life. They did not establish communes, neither did they spend longer periods of time together as a whole group. Therefore, the Rode Jeugd never developed the same kind of group dynamics and cohesion among its ranks as the SLA. One issue remained an issue until the very end – the lack of discipline and organization. The Rode Jeugd members, however, also became somewhat paranoid after the arrest of Luciën van Hoesel and later Ger Flokstra, when the degree of infiltration became evident and trust and reliability among the members became a question.

After the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, organization became even more diffuse than it had been during the Rode Jeugd. The former Rode Jeugd people and their associates had their own informal networks of people who were to some degree aware of what the others were doing. What is illustrative of the situation is that the networks barely had names at this stage. Moreover, the little structure that there was fell largely apart after the training in South Yemen. As a consequence, a new organization called the Rood Verzetsfront was established, but in terms of people involved, it was derived only loosely from the Rode Jeugd. By the end of 1970s, almost all those who had been involved in the Rode Jeugd came to the conclusion that there were no prospects for engagement in armed struggle in the Netherlands.

Table 4: Organization of the Rode Jeugd's campaign

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Name	Rode Jeugd					Rode Jeugd (radicals left)/action names RVN and PGAG			RH and other loose networks		
State of organization	Loose network of largely autonomous branches					Split in late 1971; Efforts towards cell structure and more discipline, but still a loose network		Plans interrupted, paralysis	Very loose and informal networks		
Numbers	Core group (20-30), loosely attached supporters (a couple of hundred)				Number of supporters declines	Core group of max 20 members left, few new recruits			Less than 20 key persons (incl. few new participants) a few dozen associates		

4.3 Ideology and political objectives

With regard to their ideology and worldview, the Symbionese Liberation Army and the Rode Jeugd shared many basic tenets. Both were fighting against the capitalist system that they considered to be oppressive and in conflict with the interests of the people. Both were striving for a revolution that would lead to the demise of capitalism and imperialism and to the establishment of a new system that would be based on equality between all people and a more even distribution of wealth. Both believed that there was no other way to destroy the system than through violence and that instead of mass organizing, the revolution could be sparked by actions of a committed vanguard. They also believed they were in the beginning stages of a revolutionary struggle. For these reasons, it was unavoidable that they would face setbacks and get beaten by the authorities. After all, they thought that it was part of the evolution of the revolutionary struggle that people make mistakes and others learn from these mistakes.

The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army also shared heroes and models. For example, both admired the Latin American struggles and thinkers, Carlos Marighella in particular. Both were influenced by Marxist-Leninist thinkers, although in the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, these references were not as explicit and as frequent.

The focus of these two organizations on this revolutionary struggle was, however, different in many ways. While the communiqués and tapes of the Symbionese Liberation Army indicate that its members were very aware of the progress of revolutionary struggles abroad, its own program focused strongly on the United States. The objectives and worldview of the SLA were strongly influenced by the race question as well as by the political prisoner movement, and by the writings of George Jackson and other convict authors. The oppression of people was rather a race issue than a class issue for the SLA. Furthermore, revolution was not only a question of the economic system, but it was just as much a cultural issue. Besides capitalism itself, the SLA opposed all kinds of ideologies and institutions that supported capitalism. To the SLA, that made the SLA a representative and a leader of all oppressed people. Overall, its objectives were ambitious and heterogeneous. They were almost like a showcase of the issues that were raised by the protest movement and the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s.

Table 5: Ideology and objectives of the Symbionese Liberation Army (1973–1974)⁵⁰⁰

Goal	Revolution establishing freedom, self-determination and the independence of all people (in the US)
Group's contribution to struggle	Mobilizing all oppressed people to a revolutionary struggle by providing leadership
Enemies	Capitalism and institutions supporting it, incl. racism, sexism, ageism, fascism, individualism, possessiveness, competitiveness
Potential allies	All people, particularly non-white
Ideological influences	Marxism, revolutionary nationalism, revolutionary feminism, George Jackson, Carlos Marighella
Models	Tupamaros, Weather Underground

The Rode Jeugd's vision of the revolutionary struggle was closer to the classical communist model. The Rode Jeugd explained the situation in the world and how it would proceed towards a worldwide revolution largely in Marxist-Leninist terms. The Rode Jeugd looked more outside the Netherlands, in those areas where the revolutionary struggle was already ongoing or imminent. At home, it paid considerable attention to traditional working class issues, such as the treatment of workers in companies, the wages paid to young workers and the living conditions in the neighborhoods. The Rode Jeugd's self-image differed from the Symbionese Liberation Army in that it considered itself to be a working-class youth movement. However, the Rode Jeugd did not really prioritize feminist issues or the equality between people of different ages. The Rode Jeugd was largely a men's club – women were also involved, but they were mostly viewed as girlfriends.⁵⁰¹

Table 6: Ideology and objectives of Rode Jeugd (1971–1972)⁵⁰²

Goal	Worldwide communist revolution
Group's contribution to struggle	Support to Third World struggles, preparing for revolution in the Netherlands, one of the many similar revolutionary groups
Enemies	Capitalism and imperialism
Potential allies	Working class youths, other similar movements abroad
Ideological influences	Marxism-Leninism, Lin Piao, Carlos Marighella
Models	Rote Armee Fraktion, Brigade Rosse

The premises of the revolutionary struggle as summarized in the table above were largely articulated during 1971 and 1972. After that, attempts were made to refine their ideological position, but no significant changes appeared. After the Rode Jeugd was

⁵⁰⁰ Information presented in the table is a synthesis of the key documents of the SLA that it demanded to be published in its first lengthy communication that it sent out during the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst.

⁵⁰¹ Interview with Marjanne Stas on October 14, 2008; Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003.

⁵⁰² Information on this table derives mainly from *Voorwaarts* 1, no. 4; *Voorwaarts* 2, no. 2; *Rode Jeugd. Stadsgeurilla Cahier*, no. 1 (1972).

disbanded, the activities of those who had been involved seemed to generally develop away from supporting the third world struggles to supporting other European movements, with the Rote Armee Fraktion being the most important one. Preparing for revolution at home was also still on the agenda for some.

Those involved in the Symbionese Liberation Army also kept on working on its theoretical premises. After Bill Harris, Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst returned to the West Coast, they, together with their new associates, were prolific writers and developed their position on various matters. The original program of the SLA became strongly contested by the new associates and equally defended by the Harrises. While the new associates eventually went along with the Harrises in terms of the actions they took, their ideological differences were never fully solved. The somewhat less radical form that their actions took reflects the practical compromise that they were able to reach. What is noteworthy is that, despite all those disputes, the ideological position of the SLA was not publicly or privately redefined in such a way that would essentially change its basic premises. When the new team distanced itself from the Harrises shortly before the arrests of September, 1975, the Harrises seemed to look at operating according to the original SLA program and goals.

Since terrorism as a strategy crosses the prevailing legal and moral norms, one critical issue for all involved in terrorist campaigns is to establish the legitimacy of their strategy, for themselves as well as for others.

In the case of the Rode Jeugd, a coherent effort to justify their armed struggle is provided in the article establishing the theoretical foundations of their armed struggle that was published in their internal paper in 1971. In that article, violence is justified as a logical response to the physical and psychological violence that the state is perpetrating against the working class. Therefore, violence is merely a technical question and there is no need for further moral reflection on it. Violence does, however, serve a purpose for an individual that is linked to morals and norms: in order to break from the role to which the capitalist society has submitted the working class, it is necessary to break the norms and morals that maintain that social order. Besides that, violence was also justified on the grounds that the violence of the Rode Jeugd, unlike that of the state, served the interests of the people.

What constitutes violence can range from small-scale sabotage to mass killings. The aforementioned text calls to attack capitalism by all means possible and it explicitly mentions fraud, intimidation, sabotage, the destruction of lives and stratagems as necessary means. Theoretically speaking, the Rode Jeugd did thus consider attacks against people as being morally legitimate and theoretically feasible, although the organization never committed such acts.

Considering that the Symbionese Liberation Army adopted such radical methods of action, one might expect that considerable effort was made to also establish their legitimacy. That was indeed the case with the SLA in the sense that the tapes and communiqués include many passages that address this question. The attempts to justify their actions are, however, quite vague and abstract. They make no reference to Marxist-Leninist literature, or to any other thinker or ideology to provide a theoretical basis for the use of violence.

The following fragment from the so-called eulogy tape, in which the remaining SLA members defend the conduct of the SLA members during the LA shootout, is a typical example:

The pigs want the people to believe that the bad-ass tactics of the SLA guerrillas drove the fascists to use such barbaric force. But we say that the SLA is a reaction to fascism. The SLA uses automatic weapons and homemade bombs because the pigs have automatic weapons, artillery, and hydrogen bombs.⁵⁰³

The presentation of each parties' weaponry parallel to each other may sound beautiful and illustrate that the SLA was the underdog fighting an evil system. The argument, however, would have been more convincing had the authorities actually used such weapons against the SLA.

The logic that the SLA employs in its justification of violence is that the enemy, often described in poetic terms, is committing horrible acts and the people must defend themselves. The enemy is "murdering, oppressing and exploiting" the people and therefore, the lives of the people are under threat. The negative characteristics of the enemy are underlined by making unfavorable comparisons to Germany under Nazi rule. Those who believe that the Left could survive without developing a military arm are advised to look at what happened in Chile.⁵⁰⁴ Considering the wretchedness of the enemy, the people must then defend themselves if they wanted to stay alive. The only means left is violence. During the spring of 1974, this becomes increasingly pronounced and finally, in the last tapes, an explicit and urgent call is made for people to defend themselves or they would die at the hands of the fascist ruling class.

Whereas the SLA did not spare its words when describing the evil nature of its enemy, the vocabulary of the Rode Jeugd was much more modest. In the Rode Jeugd publications, the enemy is usually referred to in such terms as monopolies, the capitalist system and imperialism. There are few cases of an unfavorable comparison and also fewer euphemisms or metaphors are used. As for the SLA, it was routine to refer to the United States as Amerikkka, describe its practices as genocide and use the word "pigs" for the police. In the Rode Jeugd publications, the word pig is used a few times only. Overall, the most extreme expression I have found along these lines is: "We should not let us be treated like cattle. The ones who treat us that way, we should not view as humans but as rats. With rats, you do not speak, but you catch them and kill."⁵⁰⁵

Overall, however, the language used by the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army differ radically from each other. The style of the Rode Jeugd publications is largely matter-of-fact, not very different from the publications of other youth political movements of that time. In the first years, the style of the Rode Jeugd was even

⁵⁰³ A transcript of the tape is reprinted in e.g. the *Berkeley Barb* June 14–20, 1974.

⁵⁰⁴ With this, they refer to the fall of Salvador Allende's regime in 1973. Allende became the president of Chile after winning the elections in 1970 and declared that he would establish socialism in the country. He was removed from power by a military coup. Those in the radical Left who called for the use of violence in the revolutionary struggle interpreted this incident as a proof that revolution would not succeed if the revolutionaries were not able to defend themselves militarily. The Rode Jeugd also refers to Chile in its texts in the same light (*Voorwaarts* November 15, 1973).

⁵⁰⁵ *Rode Jeugd – in dienst van het volk* (June 1971).

whimsical, mirroring the style of *Provo*, the most important manifestation of the protest movement of that time. Moreover, the Rode Jeugd did not refer to itself as an army, nor did it use titles or ranks that referred to military organizations. The Symbionese Liberation Army, in contrast, had all that in use. The SLA's codes of war read like rules of an army, its leader called himself Field Marshall, and his unit prepared itself for combat. The style of writing is overall poetic, exaggerated and extreme.

Last, and by far not least importantly, the original program of the Symbionese Liberation Army had a dimension that the Rode Jeugd lacked almost completely. In her letter to the people, Nancy Ling Perry wrote that "revolutionary violence is nothing but the most profound means of achieving internal as well as external balance."⁵⁰⁶ The campaign of the SLA was therefore not only about changing the social and economic system, but also about personal transformation. As the capitalist system would not be destroyed unless the value systems that supported it are abolished, one should also get rid of his/her bourgeois values and habits. This need to change was dictated by the conflict between the background of the SLA members (and the majority of white revolutionaries in the US in general) and their political agenda. By birth, most SLA members were privileged middle-class people, the very people whose position and values they opposed. The Marxist-Leninist thinkers were unanimous in that it was not going to be the middle-class that made the revolution. Therefore, to become fully part of the revolutionary struggle, it was necessary to renounce the privileges and adopt a lifestyle and values that made them one among "the people". Bill Harris said in his message to white revolutionaries:

Many of us have been "bold" enough to intellectualize about revolution, but far too chickenshit to get down and help make it. Most of us have been nearly fatally stricken with the vile sickness of racism. Again, most of us have been immobilized by our sexist egos and have watched and done nothing as our sisters have rushed by us into battle. [...] However many of us have seen through this sham, and are fighting beside comrades from all races and classes, women and men, old and young. We know we have a long way to go to purify our minds of the many bourgeois poisons but we also know that this isn't done through bullshitting and ego tripping [...] It is done by unleashing the most devastating revolutionary violence ever imagined, by proving that all races and groups of people can unite and fight together for the true freedom of us all.⁵⁰⁷

This aspect was significantly less pronounced in the period after the LA shootout as the new team did not share the SLA position on the role of the third world people vis-a-vis the whites in the revolutionary movement.

These differences between the Rode Jeugd and the (original) SLA in this regard resemble the description by Gordon McCormick⁵⁰⁸ about the two competing philosophies of terrorism that developed in the late 19th century. The first one of them was a philosophy of rationalism, which entailed violence as means to an end, which was represented, for example, by the Russian movement Narodnaja Volya. The second one was terrorism as means of individual expression, as a redemptive act. This type of terrorism served not only a political function, but also responded to the psychological

⁵⁰⁶ "A letter to the people from Fahizah", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 43–50.

⁵⁰⁷ Transcript reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 104–105.

⁵⁰⁸ McCormick 2003.

needs of the terrorists themselves. In other words, the commitment to terrorism presented an existential choice and a personal leap of faith. McCormick sites one of the later proponents of anarchism saying that “an idea must not be left to pure understanding... Only feeling, passion, and desire have moved and will move men to acts of heroism and self-sacrifice; only in the realm of passionate life, the life of feeling, do heroes and martyrs draw their strength”⁵⁰⁹. While the Rode Jeugd was clearly rather the heir of the first tradition, the description of the second tradition seems to touch the heart of the SLA’s character.

4.4 Incentives and interests

The differences between the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army become even more obvious when one looks at the incentives and interests involved in being part of these campaigns. Membership in a terrorist group had different kinds of implications and incentives in these cases. The Rode Jeugd and even more its successors were part-time enterprises that were largely based on everyone’s own initiative. There were rules for the members, but by and large, the requirements set for individual members, as well as incentives that a membership in the group provided its members with, were all rather modest. Being a member of the Rode Jeugd was clearly a source of self-esteem and pride for its members. It gave them a positive ego-boost and ways to make adrenaline flow. In addition, it provided them with opportunities to educate themselves. Even though the Rode Jeugd was not very dogmatic, it invested in political schooling. The schoolings were open to everyone interested, so joining the Rode Jeugd was not a prerequisite for entering the schoolings. While the Rode Jeugd provided these incentives for participation, there never developed very strong vested interests that depended in the existence of it or its successors as organizations.

The clear differences between the Rode Jeugd and the SLA emerge particularly in how the requirements and characteristics of an individual revolutionary and guerrilla fighter are dealt with in their publications. In the Rode Jeugd publications, actually very few references are made to the conduct of individuals. The Rode Jeugd publications and internal discussion papers contained various action programs, but they deal with what *they* should *do* and less with how an *individual* should *be*. The closest that the Rode Jeugd texts come to the conduct of an individual are the rules that were published in the *Rode Jeugd* paper in 1970 when there were calls for more disciplined and organized action:

- Each RJ member must be constantly involved in political propaganda.
- Each RJ member has to prepare for hard and violent struggle.
- Each RJ member must constantly enhance his/her ideological knowledge.
- Everyone must be on time.
- Everyone has to pay his/her contribution on time.
- Everyone must show comradeship towards the others.

⁵⁰⁹ McCormick 2003, 478.

- It is not allowed to be a member of another organization without first getting a permission for that from RJ.
- It is not allowed to give information about RJ to third parties.
- If arrested, the RJ member gives only his name and address and does not explain anything to his political opponents.
- No excessive drinking or use of drugs.⁵¹⁰

As we can see, this is very much a list of what to do and not to do, rather than how a revolutionary is like. I have not found a single Rode Jeugd document that would praise a single individual for his/her character and qualities. The Rode Jeugd members also did not give out public messages, neither at that time or right afterwards, where they would have explained their own background, world view and commitment to the struggle.

The Symbionese Liberation Army is a very different story in this respect. For the original members, it was a full-time job and high expectations were set for each individual member, including the transformation of one's values and lifestyle. The group had strict rules written down in the Codes of War. These rules were made public during the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, probably at least partly to impress the authorities and the radical Left. These codes defined the rules and the punishments for violating these regulations, including the death penalty. The codes also defined how the members should treat their prisoners and act with the people. The tone of the Codes of War was very militaristic:

Penalty by death

[...]

1. The surrender to the enemy.
2. The killing of a comrade or disobeying orders that result in the death of a comrade.
3. The deserting of a comrade on the field of war.
 - a. Leaving a team position, thereby not covering a comrade.
 - b. Leaving a wounded comrade.
4. The informing to the enemy or spying against the people or guerrillas.
5. Leaving a cell unit or base camp without orders.

Penalty by disciplinary action

[...]

1. Lack of responsibility and determined decisiveness in following orders.
2. Nonvigilance or the leaving of an assigned post without orders.
3. Lack of responsibility in maintaining equipment or proficiency in all guerrilla skills, especially shooting.
4. The use of any unmedically prescribed drug.⁵¹¹

In exchange for their investment, the members got the self-image of a top-class revolutionary. Being a member of the SLA and living by the standards they set for revolutionaries became an issue of identity. The communication of the Symbionese Liberation Army is littered with emotional language and the individualization of the

⁵¹⁰ "Rode Jeugd", *Rode Jeugd – Marxistisch-Leninistisch Jongerenblad*, no. 1 (1970).

⁵¹¹ "Codes of war of the United Symbionese Liberation Army", reprinted in Pearsall (ed.) 1974, 99–100.

revolutionary struggle. The six members who were killed in the LA shootout were eulogized (with the voice of Patricia Hearst) for their courage, commitment, love for the people and for their prowess as guerrilla fighters, as is expressed below:

Zoya wanted to give meaning to her name, and on her birthday she did. Zoya, female guerrilla, perfect love and perfect hate reflected in stone-cold eyes. She moved viciously and with caution, understanding the peril of the smallest mistake. She taught me, 'Keep your ass down and be bad'.

Cinque loved the people with tenderness and respect. They listened to him when he talked because they knew that his love reflected the truth and the future. [...] Most importantly, he told me how to show my love for the people. He helped me see that it's not how long you live that's important, it's how we live.⁵¹²

The campaign of the Rode Jeugd also had an element of transforming individuals, since it called for abolishing alienation and becoming a subject of one's own life again instead of an object exploited by the capitalist system. This did not, however, translate into the same kind of personal reform programs. All that the program of the Rode Jeugd called for was to break free from the capitalist laws in order to overcome alienation.

While the personal rewards in the form of providing positive identity and purpose for oneself motivated the original members of the SLA, the new associates that joined the Harrises and Patricia Hearst after the LA shootout had other motives. Their eagerness to help the remaining SLA members was based partly on political grounds, but even more on personal bonds. Kathy Soliah was devastated by the loss of her friend, Angela Atwood, in the shootout, which certainly increased her motivation to help the remaining ones. Many of those who joined her in the effort were cooperating out of loyalty to her and to the others involved, rather than out of political concerns. Their participation in the team is a manifestation of the importance of social bonds that can sometimes override the disinterest or even hostility towards the political side of the activities.

Looking at the incentive structure and development of the campaigns, it appears that those involved in the Rode Jeugd's campaign were more sensitive to the changes in their political environment and were more open for reconsidering the adopted strategy. It also seems that their decisions followed closer the cost-benefit type calculation that the instrumental model for explaining terrorist behavior suggests than is the case with the SLA.

If one adopts a strict definition of rationality, it is difficult to defend the claim that their actions would have been rational. However, in the context of their political objectives and worldview, the decisions they took show signs of instrumental calculation. The choice by the Rode Jeugd to adopt terrorism can be seen as the best among the choices that the participants saw open to them at that point. The protest movement was in decline and their numbers were shrinking. That called for a new strategy that would make the most out of their limited resources. The strategy they came up with was their solution to how to contribute to the revolutionary struggle in that particular situation. The decision to disband the Rode Jeugd suggests that concerns of instrumentality won over those of organization.

⁵¹² Transcript quoted in McLellan & Avery 1977, 366.

Having said that, there were other considerations that ran against their best political judgement. One of the most important of such considerations was their striving for action. It was the Rode Jeugd's readiness for hard action that was particularly appealing for its adherents and it became an important part of the group's self-image. Even so, there were limits to their hunger for action, however. One manifestation of this was the leaders' reaction to the firebomb attack against the car of the Eindhoven police commissioner and the following press campaign in July-August of 1971. While the leaders had nothing against the use of these kinds of methods as such, they thought the press campaign in particular was stupid and counterproductive.

All in all, the SLA corresponds closer to the organizational model than the Rode Jeugd or its successors. The first team of the SLA was clearly fighting for survival and the major motivating force for Bill and Emily Harris to go forward was to carry the torch of the SLA. This difference in focus derives at least partly from the fact that the Rode Jeugd never became an underground organization. Rode Jeugd members thus did not have the same kind of need to struggle for survival. Moreover, the rewards that working as an organization could provide and the investments that the members had made in it were not worth fighting for to the end.

4.5 External factors

The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army had the same problem, namely a lack of *public support*. What the SLA strived for was to unite all people in their fight against the capitalist system and they laid their hopes especially on combining the forces of white and non-white people. The reception that they got was mixed at best. The public in general was flabbergasted, horrified and did not comprehend the SLA's project. In the highly politicized milieu of Berkeley and Oakland, there was no need to explain why setting fire to a Bank of America location was a political act even though not everyone agreed that it was a good political act. Still, the SLA took their ideas and methods of action so over the top that it managed to alienate itself from that scene. As a result, the reactions they received from those they tried to approach when setting up the army were largely hostile and filled with suspicion. This was sealed with their highly controversial opening attack, the murder of Marcus Foster.

The reactions to the SLA among the radical Left followed generally three lines of argumentation. The first common argument was that the SLA was an unfortunate and utterly counterproductive development that the establishment was likely to use to discredit the whole Left. Among others, this interpretation was voiced by Jerry Rubin, one of the big stars of the protest movement, in his widely publicized letter.⁵¹³ It was argued that the SLA was a result of the organized Left's failure to regroup and revive itself after its

⁵¹³ "Jerry Rubin's letter to the U.S. – and SLA", *San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle* February 17, 1974. See also "The Hearst kidnapping: Romantic ultra-'leftism'" etc., *Guardian* February 27, 1974; "Left running scared of revolution?" *Berkeley Barb* February 22–28, 1974; "Daily Cal criticizes kidnapers", *San Francisco Chronicle* February 12, 1974; "Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism from the left", *Ramparts* May 1974.

collapse in the late 1960s. As there was no mass movement, there was also no moral community that would restrain excesses but extreme frustration at the lack of action. In an article written by the editors of *Ramparts*, a high-profile New Left magazine, it was concluded that in a country like the US, they could not “afford to be without an organized mass movement of the Left”.⁵¹⁴

Second, there were those who blamed the enemy for the existence of the SLA. Part of these people saw SLA as a product of the forces that the Left opposed, a manifestation of the moral crisis in the US, karma reaching the capitalists. Or as the ex-Venceremos leader, H. Bruce Franklin, summed up the argument:

I cannot imagine what political movement the SLA is part of. I blame this on the government in power now in the country. The whole moral fabric of the society is falling apart. We had (Charles) Manson and now we have the SLA.⁵¹⁵

Others suspected that the SLA was literally a product of the enemy. This interpretation got its credibility from the observation that no-one in the Bay area radical circles seemed to know the SLA members and few of these members had any long-term background in political activism. There were also reports that DeFreeze had been a police agent at the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, everything the SLA did, seemed to serve more the interests of the right-wing forces than the agenda they presented in their communiqués. This view was expressed particularly by those who appeared to fear most that they would be discredited because of the SLA, for example the Black Panther Party. Furthermore, the SLA provided further proof for some people who were developing wider theories about the sinister forces that shaped the US secretly behind-the-scenes. Ironically, they claimed that the SLA was part of the very same projects the SLA had announced its opposition to in its pamphlets and accused Foster for being part of.⁵¹⁶

Finally, there were those who supported the SLA, such as the Black Liberation Army.⁵¹⁷ The SLA was also warmly, although more reservedly, greeted by the Weather Underground. In a communiqué signed by Bernardine Dohrn, it stated that the kidnapping dramatized what is wrong with the society and that change was needed. Dohrn gladly

⁵¹⁴ “Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism from the left”, *Ramparts* May 1974. See also Viewpoint: One tendency covers another”, *Guardian* March 27, 1974.

⁵¹⁵ “How some Bay activists view kidnaping of Patricia”, *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle* February 10, 1974.

⁵¹⁶ “How some Bay activists view kidnaping of Patricia”, *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle*, February 10, 1974. See also “SLA part of CIA zombie program” [anonymous letter], *Berkeley Barb* February 22–28, 1974; “Marxists say SLA short on analysis”, *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974; S.L.A.’s Field Marshal Cinque: Revolutionary or police agent?” *The Black Panther* April 13, 1974; Avery, Paul: “Cinque called ex-informer”, *San Francisco Chronicle* May 11, 1974; Flynn, William: “Venceremos founder says SLA subverts radical causes”, *San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle* April 28, 1974. The best known “conspiracy theory” account on the SLA is probably the one of Mae Brussell, see her interview Brussell, Mae & Stephanie Caruana: “Is SLA’s Cinque the first black Lee Harvey Oswald?” *Berkeley Barb* April 19–25, 1974. Her arguments made Russ Little angry enough to write a response to her: [Little], Russ: “Solution is revolution, says Little”, *Berkeley Barb* May 3–9, 1974. On DeFreeze being a police agent, see the above-mentioned article in *The Black Panther*; “L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics exposed”, *The Black Panther* June 15, 1974; Pepper, Sgt: “Cinque called police patsy”, *Berkeley Barb* April 19–25, 1974.

⁵¹⁷ “Black Liberation Army welcomes SLA struggle”, *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974.

points that even though the media has concentrated mostly on the violent aspect of the deed, many organizations and leaders have provided support for the SLA's goals and demands and called for the safety of both the SLA and Patricia Hearst. Even though the WUO did not comprehend the Foster murder, it underlined that it should not legitimize an all-out leash on the SLA.⁵¹⁸ In a later communiqué, the WUO called everyone to show solidarity to the SLA and to help it.⁵¹⁹

Another stronghold of the SLA support were the prisons. The Black Guerrilla Family expressed its solidarity⁵²⁰ with the SLA in a public communiqué. Eric Cummins recounts in his study how the support for the SLA was very high among the San Quentin inmates. The idea of kidnapping someone like Patricia Hearst had lived in the dreams of some inmates.⁵²¹ Among those who praised the SLA were also Martin Sostre, a black activist and bookstore keeper who at that time served a COINTELPRO-related prison sentence. He lashed out at the Left for failing to support or for even seriously discuss the SLA. Armed struggle seemed to be all right when it took place in Latin America, but when someone started it in the US, the Left was appalled. Most of the movement just condemned the SLA outright and evidently tried to isolate it without any real examination and criticism of its program.⁵²² In this, Sostre has a point. There were indeed few articles in the movement publications (besides a couple of WUO communiqués) where the SLA program was discussed in detail.

The lack of such discussion may reflect the fact that the general distaste of the Left did not derive from the details of the SLA program, but more about the morals of its methods and choice of targets. There were fundamental disagreements among the Left about the necessity and sensibility of waging the armed struggle in the US at that moment. Attitudes were further polarized by the specific style of armed struggle adopted by the SLA. Completely overruling the need for legal mass work, it relied on the power of the bold and audacious action of the committed and uncompromized vanguard. Adopting assassination and kidnapping as methods of revolutionary struggle were more radical choices than the Left in general was prepared to digest, especially when it involved murdering a person who was not generally considered to be an enemy and the kidnapping of an innocent girl.⁵²³

The LA shootout that cost the lives of six SLA members was generally met with outrage among the radical Left. All found the brutality of the LAPD appalling.⁵²⁴ The

⁵¹⁸ Letter from Bernardine Dohrn/Weather Underground, February 20, 1974. Freedom Archives. For more supportive statements about the SLA, see especially *Berkeley Barb*, e.g. Albert, Stew: "Fear, Loathing and paranoia on the left", *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974; "SLA helping revolution struggle to spread", *Berkeley Barb* March 1–7, 1974; "A Silent Supporter" and "Welcomes Guerrilla Warfare", *Berkeley Barb* February 22–28, 1974. Solidarity with the SLA was also called in some letters from the readers published in the *Guardian* on March 20 and 28, 1974.

⁵¹⁹ Communiqué reprinted in *Berkeley Barb* June 14–20, 1974. A copy of this and many more SLA-related pamphlets is also available at the Freedom Archives SLA collection.

⁵²⁰ "Power to SLA, Off the Pigs", *Berkeley Barb* February 22–28, 1974.

⁵²¹ Cummins 1994, 242–243. Whatever the number of SLA supporters in the prisons may have been, it did not really help the SLA.

⁵²² Sostre, Martin: "Armed struggle natural response to fascist rule", *Berkeley Barb* May 3–9, 1974.

⁵²³ For these points, see especially "Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism and the Left", *Ramparts* May 1974.

⁵²⁴ E. g. "L.A.P.D. search and destroy tactics exposed", *The Black Panther* June 15, 1974.

outrage, however, did not really translate into support for the SLA. The incident further underlined the risks that helping the SLA might entail.⁵²⁵ Those who had supported it before, mourned the deaths of these revolutionaries.⁵²⁶ Memorial rallies were organized in the Bay area and were attended by a few hundred people.⁵²⁷ Those who had been particularly fierce in their criticism of the SLA from the beginning, had little sympathy for the dead. The SLA lost the battle; they knew what they were up to and they were silly enough to choose to fight. Those who praised the SLA were accused of “murder mouthing”:

It is murder mouthing when you incite people to warfare, but you don't really believe it yourself. It is murder mouthing when you confuse strategy with despair. And it is murder mouthing when you hype the SLA as some kind of revolutionary example for other tormented and guilt-ridden militants to follow.⁵²⁸

All in all, the politics of the SLA together with the massive hunt for Patricia Hearst made many in the Left to view the SLA rather as a security risk than as a group to be solidar with. The massive investigations brought investigators to Berkeley and the Left was afraid that the right-wing forces in the country would use the SLA as an excuse to leash an attack on the whole left-wing scene.

That kind of drama never developed around the Rode Jeugd. It operated in a largely different context than the SLA, because it was practically a lone island of activists supporting the armed struggle in an otherwise moderate and non-polarized political climate. The reception they got from other left-wing organizations was largely disinterest. The supporters of the Rode Vlag, Rode Jeugd ML (the original “mother” organization and the splinter group of Rode Jeugd) and KEN ml (another Maoist organization) published some critical articles and expressed their solidarity when members of the Rode Jeugd were arrested. Articles discussing the Rode Jeugd do not, however, abound in the left-wing publications. The radical Left in general did not really like what the Rode Jeugd was doing, but on the other hand, hardly any of them felt a need to discuss the Rode Jeugd in their publications. While the Rode Jeugd was a competitor, it did not seem to pose a serious threat to them in their opinion. At the same time, there was not very much solidarity, either. When Luciën van Hoesel was arrested in December 1972, there were some calls for solidarity with him, but it seems they remained as isolated articles and pamphlets that hardly became backed up by action.

The Rode Jeugd was a rather atypical New Left group, because it consisted almost entirely of young workers. The organization saw its biggest recruitment opportunities among other young workers and drop-outs. Its relations with the students were mostly hostile. The Rode Jeugd members despised and ridiculed the students who went to the

⁵²⁵ See e.g. “YIP forms SLA defense”, *Berkeley Barb* June 12–18, 1974.

⁵²⁶ E. g. “A.I.M. on S.L.A.”, *The Black Panther* June 8, 1974; WUO communique reprinted in *Berkeley Barb* June 14–20, 1974; Johnston, David: “SLA part of the struggle”, *Berkeley Barb* June 7–13, 1974; “SLA supporter will act alone”, *Berkeley Barb* June 7–13, 1974.

⁵²⁷ Avery, Paul: “S.F. eulogies for the SLA”, *San Francisco Chronicle* May 24, 1974. In the memorial rally organized in Berkeley on June 2, there were about four hundred people, many of them reportedly there just out of curiosity. No-one of the biggest stars of the Left attended the rally (McLellan & Avery 1977, 376).

⁵²⁸ “Murder mouthing” [Editors in response to a letter from Stew Albert], *Ramparts* August 1974.

factories to learn about the real life of the working class. What the Rode Jeugd members wanted was to get out of the factory and to establish another kind of life for themselves and their kind.

When the Rode Jeugd members became disappointed by the disinterest and lack of commitment among its primary recruitment pool, it started to reconsider recruiting among the intellectuals. This possibility was discussed in its internal paper in late 1973. This idea was based on the observation that there might be more support for armed struggle in those circles. In order to be successful in their recruitment efforts, they felt that they should step up their level of theory-forming. However, there were clearly worries about where bringing such people into the group may lead to, and it was underlined that the workers should remain in control. The plan did not materialize before the Rode Jeugd had disbanded, but in their successive attempts to revitalize the revolutionary struggle, the former members cooperated with students and intellectuals as well.

The participants in both campaigns generally used similar kinds of lines of explanation for their lack of support. First, it was considered to be natural for the stage of revolutionary struggle they were in. In the beginning stages, there would be ups and downs, as that was considered to be part of the picture. Furthermore, they did not even aspire to be a big organization, but rather stayed as the vanguard of professional revolutionaries. Second, in the context of both campaigns, the stagnation of theory-forming among the Left was blamed for the underdeveloped state of the revolutionary struggle. The explanation was evidently a defense against the critique against their theoretical positions. Both represented themselves as much-needed reformers of the dusty and outdated Marxist-Leninist dogma. The Rode Jeugd core members blamed those who supported the mass-line for not grasping the realities and not appreciating the fact that for a revolutionary movement to prevail, it was necessary to create an illegal arm to the struggle. The SLA members explained in retrospect that those who had criticized the SLA for its poor attempt at Marxist-Leninist policies were missing the point. The SLA had consciously tried to distance themselves from these politics and “took up the philosophy of revolutionary direct action as a tactic to provide initiative and incentive we felt was necessary to get people out of the stagnant dogma and practice so characteristic to the “New Left”.”⁵²⁹ In other words, those who had failed to support their theory and action plan were the ones who were ultimately to be blamed for the miserable state of affairs.

That other leftists did not get excited about their dogmatic breakthrough finds its explanation in the political culture that surrounded them. The Netherlands in the 1970s was not a very supportive environment for armed struggle. The liberal climate had its basis in some more general features of the Dutch culture. The Dutch political system was essentially based on pluralism and consensus. In other words, conflicts and confrontations were avoided and the authorities felt uneasy with the use of violence. There were some overreactions to the first protests, but the authorities soon learned to avoid unnecessary provocations.⁵³⁰

The protesting in the Netherlands in the late 1960s had largely channeled into small parties or single-issue movements which directed their activities towards influencing the

⁵²⁹ The last SLA Statement, 37; *Over gewapende strijd. Aanzetten tot de stadsguerilla in Nederland. 1966–1974 Rode Jeugd* (Marxisties Scholings Kollektief 1975).

⁵³⁰ Kennedy 1995/1999, 149, 155–168; Schmid 1993, 80–83.

decision-making within the political institutions. There was not very much support for revolution in general, and hardly any support for starting up the violent revolutionary struggle at that moment. There was considerable support for ideas brought up by the revolutionaries and the left-wing liberal consensus ruled the country. However, there was a big difference between the revolutionaries and the rest: While revolutionaries were against the entire system, most people limited their political and societal involvement to smaller issues and worked within the context of the parliamentary system. There was some degree of sympathy for the Rote Armee Fraktion and other similar organizations in West Germany, but that was more typically based on opposition to the German political system and to measures taken by the authorities than on what the Rote Armee Fraktion itself did.⁵³¹

Besides in terms of political climate, the Netherlands was not a very convenient place for armed struggle in terms of geography, either:

Everybody lives close to each other and therefore there are few places to hide. In the United States there were whole neighborhoods the police did not dare to enter. Those are perfect hiding places for urban guerrilleros. Such places do not exist in the Netherlands. You saw also what happened in Germany. Germany is many times bigger than the Netherlands, but it did not work out there either, because the social control and the technical level of the police and intelligence services were so high.⁵³²

Politically and geographically, the Symbionese Liberation Army operated in a very different milieu. There was considerably more support for armed struggle, although in the context of the entire country, it was also very limited. The SLA did not manage, however, to tap into that support. This was most of all due to the aforementioned extremity of its actions, but also because it started to operate relatively late. By 1974, consensus was also building up in the radical fringes of the Left about the futility of armed struggle. One indication of that were the efforts of the Weather Underground to build itself an aboveground existence. The WUO's political program *Prairie Fire* calling for this kind of change of direction was published in May, 1974. It is questionable whether the SLA's actions would have met much more support earlier, but at least it affected its possibilities to gain support from the Weather Underground.

Those involved in the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and Symbionese Liberation Army also faced very different kinds of *countermeasures*. This was due to both the differences between the culture of law enforcement in the Netherlands and the United States, as well as to the nature of their own attacks. What, however, is similar in the campaigns is that those involved expected no less from the authorities than they actually became faced with.

What the authorities did in the case of the Rode Jeugd was essentially that they tried to operate low-key, to control the Rode Jeugd through infiltration and to avoid doing anything that would radicalize them and their potential supporters.⁵³³ At least some

⁵³¹ Kennedy 1995/1999; Koopmans 1992; Verbij 2005 (especially 11–12); Pekelder 2007.

⁵³² Interview with Aat van Wijk on June 30, 2003.

⁵³³ The measures against the Rode Jeugd will be discussed in more detail in an upcoming article by me and Beatrice de Graaf (De Graaf & Malkki forthcoming). See also Klerks 1989; Schmid 1993; Hoekstra 2004; Engelen 2007.

politicians and security service personnel actively tried to avoid creating the same kind of alarmist and polarized atmosphere that had developed in West Germany. It must be added, though, that the policy against the Rode Jeugd was not wholly uniform and concerted. Sometimes, police officers – especially in Eindhoven – went quite far to get the Rode Jeugd members convicted, and were not very subtle in doing so. Nevertheless, the basic tone was low key. After September of 1972, weekly meetings took place in order to coordinate all prosecuting, intelligence gathering and other measures against the Dutch revolutionaries. Furthermore, the “success” did not result only from good policies and skillful implementation, but was also a product of failures. The authorities would have liked to see more processes against the Rode Jeugd members but these attempts failed due to lack of evidence.⁵³⁴ The advantages of this were also noted by the director of *Landelijk Bijstandsteam Terreurbestrijding* (LBT, National Support Group for Combatting Terrorism) who concluded in 1981:

Even though the LBT has had many successes, the penal wrapping up of terror cases [through convictions] has been one of the exceptions. But we are not very sad because of that. The experiences in the last years have taught that terror can be combated very well by “disturbing” it. That way, more than one act has been prevented. That is perhaps not very spectacular, but effective.⁵³⁵

The Rode Jeugd members were early on aware that countermeasures were being taken against it and that there were informers in its ranks. In fact, reading the texts published in its paper, one gets the impression that they were expecting more severe repression than they faced.⁵³⁶ This understanding translated poorly into action. The Rode Jeugd members knew fully well that if they wanted to commit to armed struggle, they needed to strengthen their organization, but they did not manage to bring about the changes that it would have required. One reason for this stemmed from their reluctance and fear of becoming isolated. Besides that, evidence from neighboring West Germany suggested that if they chose to go underground, they probably would not have been able to sustain the organization for any length of time that would have made it worth their effort. When they were not pushed underground, there were still realistic opportunities to abandon the struggle.

From the Rode Jeugd’s point of view, the countermeasures that the authorities took against them slowly drove them into a situation where they could do nothing without the authorities knowing about it. The most debilitating effect of the countermeasures was the paranoia created by the knowledge that informers were among them.

The SLA was faced with intensive countermeasures almost from the start. Committing a murder and a kidnapping ensured that the authorities would initiate an intensive hunt to find them. The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst put the SLA under immense pressure. The search for Patricia Hearst was probably the biggest manhunt in US history. While the FBI was investing vast resources in locating the SLA and Patricia Hearst, in the first weeks of the kidnapping, the FBI announced that it respected the wishes of the Hearst family and let them negotiate. The attitude changed, however, after Patricia Hearst announced she had

⁵³⁴ See e.g. Klerks 1989, 95–99.

⁵³⁵ Cited in Klerks 1989, 99.

⁵³⁶ E.g. “REBO”, *Publikatie aktiegroep Rode Jeugd*, no. 3 (1969).

joined the SLA and participated in a bank robbery. From then on, the message was that the FBI would find the SLA and arrest them.

The SLA expected nothing less from the authorities. They were fully disillusioned about the authorities and they routinely called them fascist pigs. The SLA members appeared literally to wait for the police to come and expected that they would try to shoot them, including Patricia Hearst, on sight. The feeling of being hunted at all times clearly consumed the SLA members. The massive countermeasures most likely acted as a deterrent for potential supporters and friends of those involved in helping the SLA.

After the Los Angeles shootout, the need to escape from the authorities started to dictate the development of the campaign even more. Even though a new series of attacks was initiated in the late summer of 1975, the SLA did not manage to move properly from defensive to offensive action.

During the time from the Los Angeles shootout to the arrests in September, 1975, those involved benefited greatly from the fact that the FBI largely neglected the possibility that Kathleen Soliah and her friends could be involved in the SLA. In retrospect, it seems astounding that it took so long for the FBI to start to investigate seriously Kathy Soliah, Kilgore and their friends. A more careful look at Yoshimura's past would have brought them quickly on the right track. As McLellan and Avery put it, "from Yoshimura to Brandt to Soliah and Company there was a trail like a five-lane interstate".⁵³⁷ Soliah, Kilgore, as well as the Scotts, and Bortin's girlfriend, Pat Jean McCarthy, were on Willie Brandt's (who was Yoshimura's boyfriend) visitor list.⁵³⁸

The most plausible explanation for that seems to be that the FBI considered Soliah and Kilgore to be too obvious and visible SLA sympathizers to play a role in the underground.⁵³⁹ Besides, it may have seemed improbable that a handful of working people could support three wanted fugitives for months. This interpretation is supported by the fact that when the FBI got on Soliah's track, she was not expected to lead them to the Harrises and Patricia Hearst directly, but to provide further clues about their helpers and whereabouts. The same may have applied to Michael Bortin, who was on parole for the entire time (and who evidently benefited from having a sympathetic parole officer who let him report flexibly). According to Bortin's own recollections, Bortin was monitored by the police at least occasionally, but if that was the case, it did not lead to the discovery of Bortin's links with the fugitives.⁵⁴⁰

The *media attention* that the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and Symbionese Liberation Army received was very different. The Rode Jeugd and its successors did not figure very prominently in the media, some occasional sensational reporting notwithstanding, and they never became demonized in the public debate. In fact, its name hardly ever appeared in the context of bomb attacks. There was some speculation as to whether the Rode Jeugd was behind the action names, but the reporters did not appear to make much effort to get to the bottom of it. The whole affair seemed very easily forgotten for the public, maybe save for Eindhoven, where it had been a rather prominent local phenomenon.

⁵³⁷ McLellan & Avery 1977, 441.

⁵³⁸ McLellan & Avery 1977, 440–441.

⁵³⁹ See e.g. McLellan & Avery 1977, 377.

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with Michael Bortin on June 9, 2008.

This was at least partly due to a deliberate policy of the authorities. There are indications that the BVD consciously tried to withhold information from the public that could have caused upheaval.⁵⁴¹ The treatment of the Rode Jeugd reflects the more general line adopted with regard to such politically-motivated activism as it was called. The key objective of the policy was to maintain legal order and at the same time, to avoid any unnecessary provocation, to try to prevent the isolation of those who are frustrated, and to use violence only when it was necessary and in proportion to the threat. An illustration of the Dutch policy is that the Dutch government chose not to use the term terrorism and instead rather used the term politically motivated activism. This was because it was felt that speaking about terrorism could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the BVD reports, however, the term terrorism is used and the activities of the Rode Jeugd are included in this category.⁵⁴²

One of those occasions of sensational reporting was after the arrest of Lidwien Jansen and the trip to South Yemen. This extensive media coverage served as a final catalyst for disbanding the Rode Hulp and for finding a new direction. If it had been difficult to do anything worthwhile for the revolution in the Netherlands before, after those reports, those involved concluded, it would have been hopeless.

What also played a role in the non-demonization of the Rode Jeugd was that it was outshined by other, more serious incidents. The prime domestic concern with regard to terrorism-like activities in the Netherlands were the radicalized young Moluccans who had occupied the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in 1970 and later in 1975 and 1977, hijacked a train twice and occupied an Indonesian consulate and a school. Another serious concern was Palestinian terrorism. In early February of 1972, there were two (one successful and one failed) big bomb attacks on the Gasunie facilities in Ommen and Ravenstein which were claimed by the Palestinian Black September. When the bomb exploded in Evoluon at the end of February, 1972, the first question was whether it was work of a foreign organization. When it immediately came out that the attack was far too amateurish to be that, there must have been a degree of relief. The same kind of comparison also took place in the case of many other (attempted) bomb attacks by the Rode Jeugd later on.⁵⁴³

The media attention that the Symbionese Liberation Army received was huge. The murder of Marcus Foster was big enough news to be printed not only in the Californian newspapers, but also in *The New York Times*. The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst has been called a media event of the decade and it was also a prominent news story internationally. Achieving this kind of attention was definitely a success in the SLA's own terms. The action plan of the Symbionese Liberation Army depended highly on getting their message through in the "bourgeois" press. Getting so many newspapers to print out their documents as they requested must have made them happy.

⁵⁴¹ See especially Hoekstra 2004, 73.

⁵⁴² Schmid 1993; e.g. "Informatie politiek terrorisme," BVD report March 22, 1973.

⁵⁴³ E.g. "Aanslag in Eindhoven werk van amateurs", *De Telegraaf* February 25, 1972; "Aanslag Evoluon duistere zaak", *De Volkskrant* February 25, 1972; Bank, Jan: "Terrorisme in Nederland toch kneuterig", *De Volkskrant* October 19, 1972.

The media attention, however, also had very negative consequences for the group. In a retrospective evaluation of the successes and failures of the SLA, Emily Harris touches upon this point:

One of the main criticisms that I have was how the SLA got caught up in a sensationalized portrayal of the organization through the media. Revolutionaries can't do that – they have to keep their ideas and actions grounded in reality. I think in some ways the drama of the whole thing even discouraged people. They began to see the SLA as such a fantasy that the group lost its potential for motivating other people to act and participate in some form of revolutionary struggle.⁵⁴⁴

Soon after the SLA started its campaign, it became first and foremost a literary product. The original team of the SLA seemed almost obsessed with its public image. The tapes and communiqués are filled with reactions to other people's comments about the SLA. Truth in terms of what really had happened became often the victim in this media struggle. The SLA seemed to put its hope in the power of communication. From Patricia Hearst's memoir, one gets the impression that the SLA members would have believed that when they managed to explain themselves in a way that people "get" what they are saying, when all those misunderstandings about the SLA are cleared, then people would join the SLA in its fight. The SLA managed cleverly to provoke the media to talk about it, but it was clearly not very well prepared to deal with the fame.

To the list of external factors, I would add the *other similar movements which were conducting the armed struggle* that the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army members viewed as their comrades-in-arms. The global context not only brought inspiration for starting up the campaign. All the way through, those involved in the campaigns thought they were part of a world-wide revolutionary movement. Being part of a global wave of terrorism was thus not merely a classification made by scholars, but a reality that at least the most committed ones felt they were living in, a reality which influenced their evaluations and decisions. The knowledge that they were not alone in their fight provided them with a rationale to continue their struggle despite their lack of numbers. Every little action they did would contribute to the larger struggle in any case. When the perspectives for revolutionary struggle declined in the Netherlands, the possibilities for helping other organizations made it possible for the Dutch activists to continue their contribution to revolution. On the other hand, the setbacks faced by other movements, most notably the German ones, influenced the calculations by the Rode Jeugd and its successors concerning their own chances.

⁵⁴⁴ The last SLA statement, 31.

5 Discussion: Ways forward in understanding the end of terrorist campaigns

If one was to provide a simple answer to the question of *why* the terrorist campaigns under study ended, it would be the lack of public support. The Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army did not have many members and supporters to begin with, and despite all their efforts to recruit more people, their ranks became increasingly fewer towards the end of the campaigns. In many respects, the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and that of the Symbionese Liberation Army in particular, are examples of terrorist campaigns that Audrey Kurth Cronin has described as campaigns ending primarily due to failure, that is, resulting from imploding, provoking a backlash or from becoming marginalized.⁵⁴⁵

Another important point to add is that the countermeasures taken by the authorities had a significant impact. While these countermeasures did not “eliminate” the campaigns as such, in both cases, the (temporary or permanent) de-escalation of terrorism (in terms of attacks that reached the execution stage) almost always followed the countermeasures taken by the authorities.

Countermeasures and the lack of support also featured in the explanations that those involved in the campaigns gave to the decline both at the time and afterwards. However, they blamed themselves too. Looking more closely at these case studies, it is clear that the countermeasures and the lack of public support would not have had such an impact as they had on the campaign, were it not for certain characteristics of the organizations and individuals involved in the campaigns.

While it may not be very surprising why the campaigns ended, several important insights arise from the case studies in terms of *how* these terrorist campaigns subsided. This is at least equally important as the question of why their campaigns ended. It has been often emphasized that terrorism, including the processes that lead to its decline, are highly context-specific. Looking at historical cases in detail helps us move forward to gain a more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of terrorist campaigns. This not only brings light to the role of the internal factors, but also furthers our understanding of how exactly contextual factors such as countermeasures and public support affect the course of terrorist campaigns.

I will start the discussion by focusing on the internal development of the campaign in terms of its organization and ideology and then return to how the above mentioned contextual factors influenced the course of the campaign.

5.1 When does a terrorist campaign end

First, to return to what was stated in the introduction, my initial understanding on the issue of “how terrorism ends” was that the demise of a terrorist organization, the decline of a terrorist campaign and the (collective) deradicalization of the beliefs and goals of the

⁵⁴⁵ Cronin 2009b, 94–114.

participants should all be treated as analytically separate processes that may or may not coincide. This was confirmed by the analysis of the case studies.

In the cases of the SLA and Rode Jeugd, it could have been easy to assume that the campaigns ended when the original organizations had collapsed. This is because in both cases, it took a long time before the successor groupings conducted attacks that actually went beyond the planning stage. This did not, however, mean that the initiatives for continuing the campaign had ended. Indeed, the remnants of the SLA, together with their new associates, initiated a new bomb campaign a year after most of the original members of the group had died in a police shootout. In contrast, the successor networks of the Rode Jeugd did not commit a single successful bomb attack from 1973 to 1976. Nonetheless, planning for such attacks continued all that time. Later, bomb attacks and sieges were conducted in the context of the campaign of the RVF.

For this reason, in the cases in which the attacks have ended rather recently and there are still people known to be psychologically engaged in such forms of action, silence may rather reflect a temporary lull in the terrorist acts, for example due to operational problems or organizational disputes, than signal a permanent abandonment of their terrorist strategies.

Second, this study illustrates that the decline of a terrorist campaign should not be too closely associated with the demise of any particular organization. Even in the cases of the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, which certainly were among the smallest groups and had little support, the campaign did not end with the dissolution of the original organization. Even a brief look at, for example, the situation in Northern Ireland and at the Israeli/Palestinian conflict provides further support for this argument. That splintering has been common among terrorist groups is also evident from the recent RAND study on the end of terrorist groups. Of those 404 groups which were listed in the MIPT database and were no longer active, 136 (36 per cent) had ended because of splintering.⁵⁴⁶

This is not to deny that there could be a link between the decline of terrorist campaigns and the demise of organizations involved in implementing them. The abandonment of a terrorist strategy can bring about major challenges to the organization, as does a collapse of the organization bring challenges to the continuation of a terrorist campaign. The point is that even if these processes may be interrelated, they do not necessarily coincide. Therefore, in order to fully understand the dynamics of terrorist campaigns, the analysis must look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the life-span of a single organization and take into account whether the campaign is carried on by other organizations (or several organizations at the same time), for example, by extending the analysis to the level of a terrorist campaign as it was undertaken in this study.

While in most studies on the end of terrorism, it is at least passingly noted that the demise of a particular organization does not necessarily mean that terrorism ends, the theoretical discussion would benefit from more precise terminology.

⁵⁴⁶ Jones & Libicki 2008, 13.

5.2 Role of organizational resources and dynamics

In most studies that have addressed the decline of terrorism, attention has been focused on organizational issues. As we witnessed in the introduction, Martha Crenshaw has suggested that the decline of terrorism results from an interplay of the government response to terrorism, the strategic choices of the terrorist organization and its organizational resources.⁵⁴⁷ Organizational dynamics are strongly present also in Audrey Kurth Cronin's evaluation, both as conditions that affect the outcomes of counterterrorist measures (e.g. killing or capturing leaders), as well as a direct cause of the difficulties in the form of internal disputes, failure to attract new recruits or loss of operational control.⁵⁴⁸ In studies of individual disengagement conducted by John Horgan, various kinds of organizational considerations have come out as both factors leading to disillusionment, as well as constraints for leaving the organization despite increasing disillusionment with tactics, political objectives or the organization.⁵⁴⁹ Furthermore, group-related motivations and dynamics also feature strongly in Dipak Gupta's study on the lifecycle of terrorist movements.⁵⁵⁰

The courses of the campaigns under study were affected by the developments in the organization and resources of the campaign, as well as internal dynamics of the organizations in various ways. The overall trend in both cases was that of declining membership and organizational capabilities. What is noteworthy, however, is that there were major differences in the role that the organizational concerns played in each case. This underlines the fact that organizations involved in the use of terrorist strategies exhibit major differences when compared. It is not only the terrorist organizations of the different waves of terrorism that differ from each other, but as this study demonstrates, even groups that are of the same size, operate at the same time and share the ideological orientation, can be very different.

The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army in many ways follows the logic that the organizational model suggests. Special value was attached to the survival of the organization called the Symbionese Liberation Army by its original members and the organizational concerns were an important sustaining force in that campaign. After the arrest of Remiro and Little, and especially after the LA shootout, the SLA campaign became increasingly driven by the need to survive. The case thereby resonates strongly with what Donatella della Porta writes about the development of respective Italian and German leftist terrorist campaigns.⁵⁵¹

The campaign of the SLA also illustrates well the role that group pressure can have on those involved.⁵⁵² It was clearly very strong in the original SLA. One manifestation of this was the refusal of all those inside the LA safe house to surrender and to instead be burned with the house. The "conversion" of Patricia Hearst can also perhaps be partly interpreted as a product of group pressure. While the dynamics of the new composition was different,

⁵⁴⁷ Crenshaw 1991.

⁵⁴⁸ Cronin 2009b, especially 94–114.

⁵⁴⁹ E.g. Horgan 2009a & 2009b.

⁵⁵⁰ Gupta 2008.

⁵⁵¹ Della Porta 1995.

⁵⁵² For discussion on this topic, see e.g. Crenshaw 1992; Horgan 2005, 125–130; Post 1990.

group pressure also played an important role in the participation of the new team. In the chapter dealing with the campaign, I quoted how the former associates have described the “whirlpool” that took them from merely helping the Harrises to survive to conducting violent attacks with them.

The case of the SLA also demonstrates how revenge and survivor guilt may sustain the campaign.⁵⁵³ The fact that six members had been killed and two were in prison made it morally and emotionally very difficult for the Harrises to give up. Especially the deaths of the SLA members were a major reason that led the new associates to help them. Furthermore, it seems that the power that the Harrises had over the new associates was partly based on their position as being the heirs of the martyrs.

Overall, the organizational concerns and dynamics were sustaining forces in the SLA campaign. Their role was not, however, this clear cut. Namely, as it was noted in the previous chapter, the campaign was halted for months after the LA shootout and when it started again, the nature of the attacks had changed. This was partly due to the disputes between the Harrises and the new team concerning their terms of cooperation and proper strategies. Those disagreements prevented them from pulling together any political action in the first months of their cooperation and subsequently paralyzed the campaign. This happened again when the disputes erupted later and led the new team to distancing itself from the Harrises shortly before the arrests in September, 1975.

The disputes among those involved also meant that the most ambitious and radical plans of the Harrises never materialized. When the Harrises and the new team finally reached a compromise about their political actions, the acts that followed were bomb attacks instead of murders and kidnappings. These attacks were much less dramatic as no-one got hurt. However, one should be careful not to overstate the change in strategy. They may have been less spectacular than the political murders that the Harrises had planned, but all of them were not merely symbolic bombings intended to inflict material damage even if the new team might have perceived them that way. That the attacks did not cause any casualties was mainly due to operational deficits in conducting those attacks.

In contrast to the SLA, the Rode Jeugd or its successors never became organizations in the strict sense of the term. In fact, there was another rival Maoist group that was not involved in violent actions but which organization-wise was closer to the SLA and corresponds better with a stereotypical image of a terrorist group.⁵⁵⁴ The Rode Jeugd resembled much more an informal network of activists and had very different kind of internal dynamics. In terms of organization, it was not necessarily very unlike the present-day “ad-hoc networks” and “homegrown” terrorists. In fact, many left-wing groupings of the 1970s may have been closer than we may think to “universes of like-minded fanatics in which there are galaxies and constellations, networks and ad hoc conspiracies, even

⁵⁵³ On revenge as a sustaining force in terrorist campaigns, see e.g. Richardson 2006, 113–120; Bjørge 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Silke 2003b.

⁵⁵⁴ The group I refer to is the Socialistiese Partij (Socialist Party). It is interesting to note that the former members of this group seem to have much more complicated relationship with their past activities than the Rode Jeugd members. See Zomeren, Koos van (1987): “De revolutie die niet doorging: Koos van Zomeren en zijn Rode Jeugdkameraden”, *Vrij Nederland* November 7, 1987; Verbij 2005, 102–109; Voerman 1986.

individual operators”⁵⁵⁵, a characterization that Brian M. Jenkins has provided for new terrorist organization forms.⁵⁵⁶

Moreover, whereas the SLA maintained a high group pressure and discipline among those involved, in the case of the Rode Jeugd and its successors, the group pressure was considerably low and the discipline more lax. In fact, lack of discipline and organization was identified as one of the key problems with the Rode Jeugd campaign by the participants. A major reason for the almost instant failure of armed struggle in the context of the Rode Jeugd was indeed that its members were unable to change their conduct and organization to respond to the new tactics of resistance.

It is clear that the maintenance of the organization called the Rode Jeugd, or any of those that followed, was not a priority in itself. When the existence of the Rode Jeugd became more a liability than an asset towards 1974, a decision was reached to abolish it. However, the abolishment of the Rode Jeugd did not end its members’ involvement in the revolutionary struggle. Rather, it was a strategic move that was conducted in the hope of finding a way out of the impasse.

While the case of the Rode Jeugd corresponds weakly in this regard to the hypothesis of the organizational model, it does not mean that the kind of incentives that the organizational model proposes, such as a hunger for action, social status, and a need to belong to a group, would not have played a role in the case of the Rode Jeugd. However, it would be inaccurate to see the Rode Jeugd or its successors as the sole producer of those incentives that made the participation worthwhile. Attaining those incentives did not really necessitate the existence of the Rode Jeugd. The more important context for the activities was the international community of revolutionary movements in which one could participate by taking action for the revolution.

What is noteworthy here is that neither the Rode Jeugd nor the Rode Hulp and other successor organizations defined the social networks for the initiatives undertaken for the armed struggle in the Netherlands. In effect, they were rather action names than organized groups. In fact, in terms of social structures, the Rode Jeugd and its successor provided only a very loose context for the initiatives for armed struggle. A more defining social context for the activities were the broader individual networks of the key activists. After the Rode Jeugd was disbanded, these networks by and large remained.

This kind of organization, while it was in many ways perceived as being inappropriate for a group involved in resistance, remained partly because those involved withdrew from the plans to go underground. Even more importantly, people were not injured in its attacks, which also meant that the members had no active need to hide from the authorities and nobody depended on the Rode Jeugd for their survival. Therefore, the Rode Jeugd or its successor organizations never went into the “survival mode”.

What is important is that the differences in organization and internal dynamics seem to be connected with how those involved reacted to the backlashes they faced and thereby affected the course of the campaign. That the differences in organization may be linked to the development of the campaigns has been appreciated to some degree in the discussion, for example with regard to the “old” and “new” terrorism where a link has been

⁵⁵⁵ Jenkins 2001, 324.

⁵⁵⁶ See also Duyvesteyn 2004 & 2007; Hoffman 2001, 426; Tucker 2001, 3–4, who all question whether “old” and “new” terrorist groups really differ so much in terms of organization or in other respects.

established between the lethality of acts and the differences in organizational structures⁵⁵⁷, but the question deserves to be further explored. What seems particularly significant in the light of the case studies is the kind of possibilities that are open to the participants in the campaign when they become dissatisfied with the prevailing situation, and how susceptible they are for changes in the external environment.

Regarding these questions, Albert O. Hirschman's study on the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty in organizations provides tools for analysis and insight. His study seeks to explain the ways in which people may react when the quality of the product or service deteriorates, whether the provider of the product is a business company, a political movement or any other type of organization. According to Hirschman, the customers, or those involved in political movements, have basically two alternative ways to respond: they can either "exit", in other words, stop consuming the product, or "voice" their dissatisfaction with the hope that it would contribute to the product improvement. The balance of exit and voice, he argues, depends on the detail of the institutional design.

Hirschman argues that exit and voice rarely coexist. When exit is an easy option, it usually leaves little pressure of discontent to foment voice. Voice, in turn, activates effectively only when exit is not available as an option, as is the case with tribes, families or states. The dynamics of exit and voice are, however, further complicated by loyalty. This means that being loyal to an organization typically makes exit a more costly alternative. At the same time, it does not necessarily automatically lead to the effective activation of voice.⁵⁵⁸

In the cases of the Rode Jeugd and the SLA, the dynamics of exit, voice and loyalty were very different. Starting with the SLA, the original SLA in the time between the Foster murder and the LA shootout is an example of a situation where both exit and voice are blocked. Hirschman explains that this is typical in such cases where both entrance and exit from an organization involve high costs.⁵⁵⁹ The participation in the SLA meant that the individual had to devote all aspects of his/her life in taking part in the organization. The rules and dynamics of the group, although not entirely ruling out the possibility of exit, made it very difficult. Moreover, the fact that the members were intensively sought out by the authorities further complicated exit. According to the available source material, there indeed appears to have been little exercise of voice inside the group and they seemed to have a strong inclination towards coherence and conformity.

The situation was significantly different for the new team. For them, exit was possible, but they exhibited strong loyalty towards the organization, or more specifically, they shared a commitment to help the fugitives escape and that tied them to the campaign. Instead of leaving the Harrises and Patricia Hearst on their own, their new associates expressed their dissatisfaction with the plans that the Harrises had and the expectations that the Harrises had for the new associates. Following the logic described by Hirschman, when that dissatisfaction became more severe, loyalty broke down and the new associates started seriously to plan their exit.

⁵⁵⁷ This discussion started already before 9/11, see e.g. Hoffman 1997, 4–6; Gurr & Cole 2000, 167–168, Laqueur 1999, 5; Ranstorp 1996. For my earlier treatment of the "new terrorism" argument, see Malkki 2003.

⁵⁵⁸ Hirschman 1970, 76–86.

⁵⁵⁹ Hirschman 1970, 92–98.

In the case of the Rode Jeugd and its successor organizations, exit was an entirely open option all the way through for all members and associates. The members also did not face high entrance fees, because the membership requirements were relatively low and did not exclude living a normal life, including having a job and social contacts outside the group. While there was some loyalty towards the organization, this was not that all-pervasive and critical to survival, as it was in the case of the SLA. Indeed, many adherents of the Rode Jeugd quietly left the organization when they were no longer motivated to take part in its action. There were, however, enough members who cared about the future of the organization to activate voice. This activation of voice eventually led to the disbandment of the Rode Jeugd, but not to the end of the campaign. The disbandment of the Rode Jeugd could be understood in Hirschman's terms as the collapse of an organization in front of too powerful a voice.

All in all, in the case of the Rode Jeugd, the good opportunities for exit, both in terms of leaving the group and possibilities for creating a new kind existence within the larger society, enabled the early "retreat" from the use of a terrorist strategy. In the case of the SLA, the exit-voice-loyalty dynamic rather made new reluctant helpers into more active helpers and thereby sustained the campaign.

The starting point of Hirschman's discussion was a situation where the quality of the product had lapsed, and his interest was in seeing how both exit and voice can help an organization to recover from it. This means that the dynamics of exit and voice are also closely related to how the group reacts to the changes in the external environment.

It has been pointed out many times in organization studies that the ebb and flow of sentiments in the larger society does not affect all organizations equally. One of the early contributions arguing this is the seminal article entitled "Social movement organizations: Growth, decay and change" by Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, which was published in 1966.⁵⁶⁰ They claim that two dimensions of organizations mediate the extent of the effect of external developments. The first one is the extent of membership requirements, both initial and continuing, and the second one is the extent to which the organizations are oriented to changing member behavior or individual behavior versus changing society.⁵⁶¹

According to Zald and Ash, the inclusive organizations are more susceptible for the ebb and flow of sentiments than are the exclusive organizations. This is because "competing values and attitudes are more readily mobilized in an inclusive organization." Furthermore, "members of inclusive organizations are more likely to be subjected to conflicts in the face of threats or in the face of competing social movements that appeal to other values". On the other hand, "commitment of members in [an exclusive] organization is less dependent on the external success of the organization. Commitment is based to a greater extent on solidarity and/or expressive incentives than on purposive incentives."⁵⁶²

As a consequence, the design of the organizations and the requirements and the goals it sets for its members can condition the effects of external factors, for example public support, on the campaign. Indeed, it seems that the Rode Jeugd, which was closer to an inclusive organization, was more susceptible for changes in the external environment than the organizationally more exclusive Symbionese Liberation Army was. However, while

⁵⁶⁰ Zald & Ash 1966.

⁵⁶¹ Zald & Ash 1966, 330–332.

⁵⁶² All quotes in this paragraph Zald & Ash 1966, 331.

inclusive organizations are more vulnerable to external influences, this responsiveness may be actually help them prevail. Namely, in the recent literature on organization change, staying in tune with the external environment has also been identified as one of the critical issues in organizational survival.⁵⁶³

5.3 Words and actions: Ideology and self-image as sustaining forces

The question concerning the relationship between one's ideas and action is not by any standard a trivial one, but rather one of the fundamental questions of the social sciences. The role of radical ideology in terrorism has been discussed especially in relation to the (individual) radicalization into terrorism. By now, it has become clear that it is too simplistic to think that the adoption of radical ideology embracing and legitimating the use of terrorist strategy would automatically lead to the participation in a terrorist campaign. It has been noted that in the individual level, joining a terrorist organization may take place before ideological radicalization.⁵⁶⁴ Moreover, as for leaving terrorism behind, the link between the change in ideas and beliefs seems to be equally complex. This process has been often referred to as "deradicalization", implying that the change would deal not only with that of actions, but also with beliefs. As John Horgan has convincingly argued, this is not an accurate way to interpret the process. Rather, one should speak about disengagement and draw a distinction between physical and psychological disengagement. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that an individual continues his/her involvement in terrorist activities despite deep disillusionment.⁵⁶⁵

This study provides further support to this line of argumentation. On the level of the individuals, it seems that the ideological beliefs of the key participants have undergone the most significant changes only after the abandonment of the terrorist strategy and not the other way around. My interviews with them during the 2000s indicate that not all of them have ever fully "deradicalized" in the sense that they would condemn the use of terrorist strategy.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that this observation holds mainly for the key participants and not for everyone involved in the campaigns. Even though the source material does not allow for drawing any definite conclusions, it strongly seems as if a significant part of those involved never fully became ideologically radical. I have the impression that not all of those who were more marginally involved in the Rode Jeugd and its successor organizations had thoroughly internalized the ideology propagated by the core members but that their association was sometimes at least as significantly based on their friendship with those who were ideologically more committed and/or their hunger for action. Furthermore, my research on the campaign of the SLA suggests that people may become physically engaged in a campaign without ever developing a commitment to the

⁵⁶³ See e.g. Burke 2002.

⁵⁶⁴ See especially Sageman 2004; on becoming involved in terrorism also Horgan 2005, 80–106; Silke 2003a; McCauley & Moskalenko 2008.

⁵⁶⁵ Horgan 2009b.

group's political goals, or even accepting its methods of action. Some of those people who helped the SLA fugitives did it out of their personal loyalty to others involved in helping and even participated in the armed actions despite their explicit opposition to armed struggle. These observations resonate with John Horgan's claim that those involved in terrorist campaigns may not be as committed as we may tend to think even when they are deeply engaged.⁵⁶⁶

As for the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, information strongly suggests that there is no direct link between strategy and ideology in the sense that the decline of radical strategy would have been a result of the moderation of ideology or political goals. In other words, here was no conscious collective decision to opt for less radical methods or a revision of political goals and program that would have been equivalent to, for instance, the change of course with the Weather Underground that manifested itself in the booklet entitled *Prairie Fire* that was published in May, 1974.

On the other hand, issues related to ideology and political objectives did play an important role in the development of the campaign. It seems that commitment to the ideological tenets and chosen methods were mainly a sustaining force, rather than a variable that would explain changes in it. Occasionally, though, differences in opinion with regard to ideology and methods, as a source of disputes, did halt the campaigns.

Ideology seemed to provide the framework for analysis and for absorbing new information. This observation is hardly surprising. As Martha Crenshaw has noted, the psychological research has generally indicated that individual beliefs are usually rather more stable than volatile and that even more stable still are the collective attitudes that are continuously reinforced by group interaction.⁵⁶⁷ Another point is that belief systems are likely to shape the way that the individuals observe and interpret the developments around them. Researchers have referred in this context to theories of cognitive consistency to explain that people do not absorb equally all kinds of information, but rather only information that supports their existing beliefs, while ignoring disconfirming evidence and neglecting to reconsider decisions they have already taken.⁵⁶⁸

Looking at the case studies, one gets the impression that those involved went to great lengths to defend the original ideology and assessment of the prevailing situation. Such attempts are evident especially in the communications of the Symbionese Liberation Army, and more precisely in those of its original composition. The texts and tapes were replete with comments on other people's opinion in the SLA which the group tried to refute.

Another tendency that points to this direction is that those involved in the SLA's campaign were more prepared to blame their own errors of judgment and planning for their lack of success than to question ideology and interpretation of the prevailing situation. In a retrospective account of the SLA, the following observations are made:

The fact that our six comrades were killed and the four of us are captives is not due to the invincibility of the state, but to our own mistakes and impatience. There's no doubt in my

⁵⁶⁶ Horgan 2009b, 149–150.

⁵⁶⁷ Crenshaw 1992, 34–35. See also e.g. Taylor & Quayle 1994, 35–41.

⁵⁶⁸ Festinger et al. 1959.

mind that the SLA proved the validity of urban guerrilla warfare as a military/political strategy for furthering the revolutionary struggle.⁵⁶⁹

and:

The four of us are the last remaining members of the SLA. But this isn't really demoralizing to us because the number of underground revolutionary groups has grown and many of these groups are operating in a way that will insure their continued survival. Mistakes are unavoidable at this stage, but it's inexcusable not to learn from your mistakes. Many of the principles of the SLA are shared by other groups, and in that sense the spirit of the SLA will always be carried on, no matter what the name of the group or organization.⁵⁷⁰

A similar kind of argumentation can be found from the documents produced by those involved in the Rode Jeugd campaign. In these documents, the poor state of the revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands is explained by the deficits in understanding what the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution entails. These deficits had manifested themselves in a negative attitude against violence harbored by many leftists as well as in the failures to build up organizations that would have both a legal and illegal arm of the organization.⁵⁷¹

At the same time, the Rode Jeugd members in particular underlined the need for sophisticated theory as prerequisite for successful action. Rode Jeugd presented itself in its first pamphlet as a mobile group of youths who wanted to educate the protestors about Marxism-Leninism to ensure that their good actions would not fail due to their lack of perspective.⁵⁷² When the group faced internal disputes and setbacks, it tried to work out its ideology and action program by publishing an internal paper. The last of these papers, published in November, 1973, begins with the call for all Rode Jeugd members to put their ideas and critiques on paper so that they could put together the best possible program that would ensure the development of a correct political line and a political organization that would form the basis for revolutionary action.⁵⁷³ The Symbionese Liberation Army also continued to reformulate the presentation of its ideology in an attempt to make itself understood and to make its actions more efficient, even if it was less preoccupied with the classical Marxist-Leninist theory.

That ideology is important for terrorist campaigns has been noted by several researchers. It has been emphasized that the way the terrorist organizations present themselves may have an "auto-propaganda" function that can be even more important for the participants than the propaganda function vis-a-vis their external audience. As terrorism is a controversial method that is in contradiction with the moral code, its

⁵⁶⁹ The last SLA statement, 36.

⁵⁷⁰ The last SLA statement, 38.

⁵⁷¹ See e.g. discussion paper by A. van Wijk, W. Oskam and others, April 10, 1976; Marxisties Scholings Kollektief: *Over de gewapende strijd: Aanzetten tot de stadsguerrilla in Nederland: 1966-1974 Rode Jeugd* [1976].

⁵⁷² "Rode Jeugd bulletin nr. 1" (Rode Jeugd's pamphlet, May 26, 1966).

⁵⁷³ *Voorwaarts*, November 15, 1973.

legitimacy therefore needs to be actively maintained.⁵⁷⁴ Furthermore, it has been noted that groups with a weak institutional structure depend more on ideology to provide unity.⁵⁷⁵ Similarly, Audrey Kurth Cronin has argued that “[b]ecause of their relative weakness, terrorist groups are almost uniquely depending on their driving narrative or vision”.⁵⁷⁶

When looking at the campaigns under study, it transpires that we may benefit from being more specific about what we mean by ideology. Ideology is, after all, one of the most contested concepts in political science. While the question deserves more effort than can be made in this context, I have adopted as my starting point the description given to the term by Andrew Heywood. According to him, ideology refers to:

... a more or less coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organised political action. In this sense all ideologies therefore, first, offer an account or critique of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’; second, provide the model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’; and third, outline how political change can and should be brought about [...]. Ideologies thus straddle the conventional boundaries between descriptive and normative thought, and between theory and practice.⁵⁷⁷

The key ideological tenets of the campaigns that fall under the first two categories were shared by many leftists at the time. Moreover, quite a few former participants in the campaigns still subscribe to their earlier analysis on the existing order and vision of a good society. The most interesting aspect in terms of understanding the development of the strategy is that last one, “how political change can and should be brought about”.

These views on how revolutionary struggle should be waged were an important part of their self-image. The former members of the Rode Jeugd implicitly underlined that by stressing to me that they were not only adherents of Marx and Mao, but were also of Carlos Marighella. However, it was not only this viewpoint that defined these organizations and set them apart from their competitors. Equally important was the commitment to act upon this understanding. The main difference between the Rode Jeugd and other leftists was, according to its own definition, that the Rode Jeugd will not just talk about its action program, but will also systematically and unrelentingly implement it. As a consequence, all major disputes among its ranks were primarily about what to do. The SLA, respectively, defined itself as a group of real revolutionaries, which entailed that they, unlike other leaders of the revolution, would not shy away from doing what needs to be done, they would not compromise, even if it meant fighting until the bitter end.

Thus, the use of armed struggle as method was not merely an outcome of dispassionate instrumental calculation, but it was a significant part of how they defined their organization and themselves (at least in the case of the core members). In terms of understanding their commitment to the use of terrorist strategy, it is, in fact, more illuminating to look at what kind of qualities those involved attributed to their organizations and themselves than to ideology and political objectives per se.

⁵⁷⁴ See especially Cordes 1988; also e.g. Crenshaw 1992; Bandura 1990; Taylor & Quayle 1994.

⁵⁷⁵ Jasper 1997, 243. This is also argued by Decker and Winkle (1996) on their study on gangs.

⁵⁷⁶ Cronin 2009b, 101.

⁵⁷⁷ Heywood 2000, 22. This definition is used also in Demant et al. 2008, but without further elaboration.

My observations from the case studies agree with what James M. Jasper has written about the choice of tactics in social movements and organizations. Irrespective of the exact composition of identifications, “tactics are rarely, if ever, neutral means about which protestors do not care.”⁵⁷⁸ According to Jasper, people develop “tastes” for certain methods of action so that certain choices appear intrinsically more appealing to certain actors. These preferences may be at least partly independent from their efficacy in terms of attaining the formal external goals. “They reflect what we believe, what we are comfortable with, what we like, who we are.”⁵⁷⁹ The tactical choices reflect not only cognitive estimations, but are linked to morality and emotions as well.”⁵⁸⁰ Furthermore, Jasper notes, winning is not always everything so even if the actions were not likely to reach the objective, they might still be considered “the right thing to do – for the sake of personal identity and dignity, and for the broader subculture”.⁵⁸¹

Moreover, these tastes may become important sources of identity. Jasper suggests that there are several levels of movement identities. The primary identification of activists may be either to a particular organization (organizational identity), tradition of activism (activist identity, usually involving a history of political activity broader than an involvement in one particular organization) or to a style of protest or being in some wing of the larger movement (tactical identity).⁵⁸² What is important in understanding the tactical choices that are made is the relative salience of these identifications.

For the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army, the involvement in armed struggle, thus the tactical identity, seemed to be the most important of these aspects. For the Rode Jeugd, this commitment to the method of action seems to have been stronger than the identification with any particular organization, because efforts towards the armed struggle also continued in the absence of a real organizational structure. In some respects, the commitment to the method exceeded the commitment to the goal: some of them agreed to leave for South Yemen even though they could see that it was not in the best interest of their long-term objectives.

This commitment and identification to a certain tactic explains their reluctance to reconsider the strategy and to evaluate it strictly only as a means to a political end. In addition, the way the participants described their organizations seemed to be a good predictor of the way their campaigns developed. Both defined themselves as the radical edge of the revolutionary movement that was committed to armed struggle. The self-image of the Rode Jeugd, however, relied heavily on the notion that the Rode Jeugd was operating in the metropolises, which at that time were at the periphery of the revolutionary action, and accordingly its role was mainly to support struggles going on elsewhere. When this could not be done accomplished by conducting their own supportive armed struggle, they moved on to providing support for other groups conducting such struggle in other ways.

The SLA, on its part, presented itself as the group who fearlessly did what needed to be done, using all means necessary. Since the group had defined itself so strongly as not

⁵⁷⁸ Jasper 1997, 237.

⁵⁷⁹ Polletta & Jasper 2001, 284, 293.

⁵⁸⁰ Jasper 1997, 238.

⁵⁸¹ Jasper 1997, 239.

⁵⁸² Jasper 1997, 85–87. On identity and strategy, see also Polletta & Jasper 2001.

willing to compromise, it left itself little room for moderation in tactics without touching both the core of its reason for existence and the bases of its claim that it was the vanguard to be followed.

This observation correlates in an interesting way with the results of the comparative study of the communications of non-violent and violent groups conducted by Allison G. Smith. Her analysis shows that while violent and non-violent groups do not differ much in what kind of values they attach to their enemy, there are clear differences in what kind of values they attribute to themselves.⁵⁸³

5.4 Public support and countermeasures

In the beginning of this chapter, I argued that significant factors in explaining why the campaigns under study ended were the declining public support and countermeasures directed against the campaigns.

In both cases, the countermeasures were often the immediate reason for the de-escalation in the use of terrorist strategy (in terms of attacks that were successfully conducted). As for the campaign of the Rode Jeugd, there were two major turning points which both were instigated by the countermeasures taken against the group. The first was the arrests of Luciën van Hoesel (December, 1972) and Ger Flokstra (June, 1973). The second turning point came in the fall of 1976 when Lidwien Janssen was arrested and information about the training trip to South Yemen became public. In the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, the first turning point was the arrest of Joe Remiro and Russell Little in January, 1974. The second and more significant turning point was the Los Angeles shootout in May, 1974 and the third turning point came with the arrests of September, 1975.

The effects that these incidents and the counterterrorism policies in general had on the campaigns were, however, dissimilar in many ways. The arrests of Remiro and Little put the group on the defensive and led it to step up its activities. The LA shootout was an almost fatal setback for the SLA because the majority of its members were lost in that incident. Lastly, when Emily and Bill Harris and Patricia Hearst were arrested, the primary reason for the existence of the group vanished. Those who were left decided to pursue another direction in their lives.

In the case of the Rode Jeugd, the removal of the people who were arrested did not matter as such. What was more dangerous was what those arrests implied. Namely, the arrests of Van Hoesel and Flokstra indicated that the Rode Jeugd's ranks had been infiltrated extensively. These infiltrations were made possible by the open character of the organization and the deficits in terms of discipline. The Rode Jeugd was aware that there had been infiltrators in the organization before and had tried to strike back by doubling agents and using them to feed disinformation, but it ended up on the losing side. What made the infiltrations dangerous was not only, or even primarily, the content of the information that was leaked out, but rather that the arrests indicated that someone from the inner circle could not be trusted with confidential information. Rumors about informants

⁵⁸³ Smith 2004.

and betrayals intensified the conflicts regarding the proper course of action that were already in the making. Each of them had their somewhat differing opinions about how to conduct the revolutionary struggle most efficiently. There were likewise disagreements about what to do with people they knew or suspected of being informants: should they be simply kicked out of the organization, or used to confuse the security service by providing false information. These problems created by the infiltrations played against the background of an on-going dispute over the need for more punctuality, discipline and organization and aggravated the already existing distrust and frustrations.

When several key activists of the Rode Jeugd continued their involvement in revolutionary struggle after 1974, they were again confronted with similar kinds of challenges which they were not able to solve any better. This time, discipline in action and organization as well as good planning would have been all the more important, because the authorities were better equipped to act against them than they had been previously. The arrests and media attention in 1976 led to the culmination of a burnout and a sense of being cornered that had already been mounting.

One of the starting points of this study has been that it is not only the direct consequences of incidents such as arrests that matter, but also how countermeasures are perceived by those involved in the campaigns and what kind of conclusions are drawn from them. What is noteworthy in both cases in this study is that those involved expected to face severe countermeasures, and in fact, even more severe than they actually did face. Furthermore, countermeasures were sometimes rather welcome. The following quote from an interview with Luciën van Hoesel, a former key member of the Rode Jeugd, is illustrative of this:

You accepted the repercussions as a kind of role play that went with it. Or more strongly, if public prosecutor Peijnenburg had said, you are a fool, we let you go, that would have been worse than his claiming that I represented a revolutionary danger to the society.⁵⁸⁴

When it comes to deterrence, it seems as if the countermeasures against the left-wing terrorism in West Germany had an effect that was a stronger deterrent than the measures that were used against the Rode Jeugd. When German activists were faced with ever harsher repression towards the end of 1960s, the Rode Jeugd members felt they should prepare themselves for a similar kind of confrontation. The key Rode Jeugd activists expected that they would be either arrested or killed if they continued with the urban guerrilla struggle, just as many German activists already had. The fact that they saw it coming, made them think again whether it would really make any sense to go that far, especially because they would not likely be able to accomplish much before ending up to that situation because they were not very advanced in their skills and resources. In this way, the *expectations* about the future countermeasures had a deterrent effect. It did not lead them to end their involvement in revolutionary struggle, but it did make them consider other more efficient ways to contribute to it.

⁵⁸⁴ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 153.

In the longer run, the fact that their expectations were not fulfilled weakened their motivation to continue their struggle, as Luciën van Hoesel explained in the same interview quoted above:

If you situated my case in Germany, I would have been dead, received a life sentence, or I would still have been a fugitive. It is actually too crazy, once you realize this. In the Netherlands, you get so much leeway that the motivation to act falls apart. [...] The liberal climate in the Netherlands put a stop to terrorism, whereas in Germany, reactionary forces artificially sustained terrorism for ten years.

[...]

The last time we were arrested early in the morning and brought to the bureau with BMW's, the only reaction from the neighbors was: "Hey, you were early up". In such atmosphere, everything just falls apart.⁵⁸⁵

The SLA basically expected the authorities to strike with all means it had in its disposal. Even though the group faced very intensive countermeasures, they appear not to have surpassed their expectations. The account of Patricia Hearst gives the impression that the SLA members expected the authorities to raid their safe house at any time and thought that once they were found, the police would shoot all of them, including Patricia Hearst. Furthermore, the countermeasures dideffectively pre-empt the SLA campaign, first de-escalating it considerably after the LA shootout and finally ending it with the arrests of the Harrises and Patricia Hearst in September, 1975.

However, when looking at the countermeasures, our focus should not only be on how they influenced those directly involved in the campaign, but also on how they influenced their actual and potential supporters, or the political climate and the public perception of the counterterrorist measures in general. As Cronin notes in her study on the end of terrorism, terrorism is a tripartite phenomenon and the effect of countermeasures is always dependent on the way the audience reacts.⁵⁸⁶

From the case studies it is clear that the effect of the countermeasures was not merely based on how much they managed to weaken the coercive capabilities of those involved in the campaign or to undermine their morale. The countermeasures also had important indirect consequences in terms of how they influenced the potential supporters' readiness to provide active or passive support to the campaign. This observation is corroborated by Ted Robert Gurr's claim that the public support "conditions the effects of almost all public policies directed at terrorism".⁵⁸⁷ In other words, the perception of the campaign among its potential supporters was a key factor in how well those involved in the campaign could, or in these cases could not, recover from the setbacks caused by the countermeasures.

The countermeasures against the campaign of the Rode Jeugd left the general public, as well as the larger left-wing community and protest movement, largely disinterested. With the institutionalization of the protests, the Rode Jeugd was left alone in the radical

⁵⁸⁵ Dekkers & Dijkman 1988, 153–154.

⁵⁸⁶ Cronin 2008 11.

⁵⁸⁷ Gurr 1990, 94.

corner as the sole proponent of armed struggle at that moment. The low-key response of the authorities to the campaign contributed to the difficulties that the Rode Jeugd and its successor groups encountered in recruiting more support. In this regard, the most significant things were those that the authorities did *not* do. In the lack of spectacular court cases and outright repression, the countermeasures did not provide the Rode Jeugd with new agitation points that it could have used to mobilize the sympathies of the more moderate leftists in the Netherlands. In many ways, the countermeasures used against the campaign provide a good example of repressive tolerance.

The countermeasures against the SLA were much more broad, intense and partly unprecedented in their severity. The LA shootout was one of the first times when white revolutionaries had died in a confrontation with the police. This caused considerable outrage, and theoretically, it could have produced deep sympathy and solidarity towards the SLA. The SLA members had, however, put themselves in such a position by then that even such a dramatic and tragic event did not give them access to the safety nets of the radical Left. Even if their common enemy would have helped overcome the disagreements about the SLA's strategy, the SLA had made itself such a high security risk by kidnapping Patricia Hearst that few wanted to take high risks for its members. On the other hand, the LA shootout did mobilize the new associates to participate in the campaign.

The reluctance of the radical Left to help the SLA did not, however, benefit the authorities as much as it could have. Even though the radical Left would have liked to see the SLA disappear, their reluctance to get involved in the SLA affair also meant that they were reluctant to cooperate with the police. From the countless people whom the FBI tried to interview while searching for Patricia Hearst, just as many declined to cooperate as agreed to talk. Overall, the authorities were deeply despised by the radical Left. Many on the radical Left were afraid that the authorities would use the SLA as an excuse to attack the entire Left and they were therefore very much against the measures that were taken.

From a broader perspective, the case studies underline that the effects of counterterrorist measures are highly context-specific. It is unclear if these same measures would have been effective in another context. In other words, the approach that was adopted in dealing with the Rode Jeugd would probably not have produced the same kind of outcome had it been directed against a group that was already more radicalized or organized. The fact that no-one had been killed because of the Rode Jeugd's actions made it morally easier to think pragmatically. This approach, in turn, would not have been as successful had the Rode Jeugd itself not done such a poor job in protecting itself. With regard to following the development of the Rode Jeugd, the authorities also benefited from having identified many of its core members years before they got involved in armed struggle.

This brings support for the claim that when the authorities have good intelligence at hand, they are better able to disrupt terrorist campaigns. This is one of the major points that arise from the case studies collected in the edited volume of Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson that examine the history of counterterrorism and terrorism in democracies.⁵⁸⁸ In contrast, as for the SLA, one of the handicaps that the authorities had was the lack of intelligence. This problem was partly due to the negative attitude towards the authorities

⁵⁸⁸ Art & Richardson 2007, 565–568.

concerning the measures they took against the protest movement, the New Left and the black movement, and this had created antagonism among those who could have provided the authorities with relevant information.

The cases also bring further evidence for the claim that harsh repression is not necessarily negative from the perspective of those who are involved in the terrorist campaign. From point of view of the authorities, it can be rather counterproductive than constructive. As for the Rode Jeugd, repression would have most probably accomplished just what Adrian Guelke assumed it could, namely it would have provided the Rode Jeugd with evidence of the effectiveness of their campaign and therefore a reason to persist.⁵⁸⁹ Repression would therefore have given more credit to the activists' claim that "German circumstances" were also developing in the Netherlands. It might have resulted in more active and passive support for the urban guerrilla struggle groups. The sympathy towards the RAF based on the harsh measures adopted by the West German authorities indicate that there most probably would have been more support for the Rode Jeugd and its successors had the authorities treated their members more harshly.

Having said that, repressive measures did work rather well against the SLA, because the group had marginalized itself through its own actions very early on and therefore the countermeasures did not create such a "boomerang effect" that would have manifested itself as considerable active support for the SLA. However, the measures had the downside that they created some passive support in the form of a refusal to cooperate with the authorities and this was indeed problematic for the authorities. On the other hand, the SLA was so marginal and isolated that it may have died out rather quickly even if the authorities had not pursued it. This option, however, was hardly available for the authorities since the group had committed one murder and held a hostage.

To those involved in the campaigns, the declining public support manifested itself mostly as a lack of members and supporters. The political milieu surrounding the campaigns was very different, but what is common to both cases, is that the campaigns did not have many active supporters to begin with, and their numbers declined towards the end of the campaigns. Moreover, the participants in the campaigns tried continuously to increase their support and membership without success.

While the countermeasures were clearly one factor that influenced the development of the public support, there were also other developments at play.

The decline in public support has to be interpreted in the general context of the decline of the protest movement and in the New Left activism towards the mid-1970s. It was not only the Rode Jeugd, its successor organizations and the SLA that were losing support, but the crowds involved in protest actions were generally getting smaller. What diminished the SLA's perspectives in particular for gathering support was that it started its armed struggle relatively late. By 1973, revolutionary zeal was already on the wane. When the SLA was preoccupied with the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst, the Weather Underground, the country's foremost white revolutionary organization, was preparing its new program that called for mass-organizing.

⁵⁸⁹ Guelke 1995/1998, 180. A similar kind of argument has been put forward by, among others, Art & Richardson 2007; Cronin 2009b; Frey 2004; Silke 2003b; Parker 2007; De Graaf 2010.

For the Rode Jeugd, the diminishing public support was more due to the general developments in the political climate and to the lack of repression than to any Rode Jeugd specific matters. The moderate response to protests and reforms in the form of providing the protest movements an access to parliamentary politics undermined the claim that such tactics that the Rode Jeugd propagated were necessary or that the revolution was a desirable objective in the first place. In this respect, its ideology and strategy became not only more irrelevant, but in the Dutch context, to start with, they were actually rather irrelevant for most of its potential supporters.

The reasons for the increasingly low level of public support for the campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army were very typical. This involved all the developments mentioned by Audrey Kurth Cronin: its ideology became irrelevant, it became too isolated and it lost contact with “the people” and it made errors in choosing targets for its attacks.⁵⁹⁰ The SLA originated from a much more radicalized political milieu but it quickly alienated itself by the extremity of its actions. As a result, the little support that there was become eroded with the backlash created by the Foster murder.

Finally, what these cases highlight is the importance of examining the attitudes among the potential supporting communities beyond one of being mere support or rejection of terrorism or a particular group using such a strategy. Equally important are the attitudes towards the authorities. If the surrounding subculture feels threatened by the authorities, for example, because of the way that either the current or previous incidents of protest or terrorism have been handled, this can become an important handicap for the investigations. Furthermore, what may appear as passive support for a terrorist campaign to outsiders can just as well be motivated by unwillingness to cooperate with the authorities. From the point of view of those involved in the campaign, opposition towards the campaign is not the only dangerous development in the wider society, but disinterest can be equally damaging.

5.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to provide carefully researched case studies that offer more insight into the question of how terrorist campaigns end. From the theoretical point of view, the most important observations from this study can be summarized as follows:

- The demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, the studies on how terrorism ends should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the life-span of a single organization.
- Organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly in terms of their structure, incentives and organizational dynamics, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being sensitive to these differences.

⁵⁹⁰ Cronin 2009b, 104–110.

- The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which all developments were interpreted. On the other hand, it appears that all participants in the campaigns under study never fully internalized the radical ideology, but their participation was much more based on their friendship with other participants.
- In terms of understanding the development of the terrorist campaigns, it may be more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the struggle than ideology and political objectives per se. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the self-image of the groups involved in the campaigns. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded with the forms of action that they got involved in.
- Countermeasures played a significant role in the development of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community or the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities seem relevant.
- The decline of the terrorist campaigns must be evaluated by taking into account the general decline of the protest movement and the New Left activism, although in the case of the SLA, the decline also resulted from its own targeting errors and isolation.

Another more implicit point that I hope I have made with my research is that conducting in-depth case studies on historical terrorist organizations, even those that are perceived as marginal, is both entirely possible and meaningful. Such source-based research may require some extra time and effort, but it will provide the studies on terrorism with a more solid and diverse body of basic research.

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