

**ETHICAL ASPECTS OF 20th CENTURY NORWEGIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES**

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this monograph is to reveal the complex development of 20th century Norwegian environmental philosophies from a comparative perspective by outlining not only the role of the similar philosophical premises they derive from, but also how the differences in the chosen strategies affected the changes in the Norwegian environmental politics. That is why one of my main objectives is to analyze the origin and the elaboration of some concepts and ideas, which contribute to clarifying the multi-sidedness of the topic by going beyond the well-known theory of the founder of deep ecology, namely, the one of the Norwegian philosopher, mountaineer and environmental activist Arne Næss.

Before examining which ones are the questions we should not lose while examining both the genealogy and the impact of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I will first specify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. In this context, I raise the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic conceptualization of ecophilosophies took place in Norway since the Norwegian mountains became a crucial condition for the appearance of a unique philosophy of climbing developed in the mid-1960s. That is why I argue that it is the unique philosophy of climbing attracting some of the most illuminative Norwegian mountaineers and eco-philosophers that prepared the ground for the establishment of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies. Despite the fact that Norwegian ecophilosophies can be defined as having similar philosophical premises in so far as they all question the consequences of the expanding role of anthropocentrism, I will give arguments in favor of the thesis that we should talk about Norwegian ecophilosophies in plural rather than ecophilosophy with a capital letter.

Furthermore, I will investigate how the possibility to talk about Norwegian environmental philosophies in plural is driven by what I call turn of imaginative rationality (also due to some intellectual influences of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism), which revives the idea of rationality as irreducible to the one of cognitive rationality. I will also examine how rehabilitating the normative validity of imaginative rationality can benefit revealing the

ambiguous groundings of both radical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism.

Thus I will explore why disenchanting the methodological pitfalls of anthropocentrism does not necessarily lead to appealing for radical biocentrism, especially if the role of ethical gradualism is taken into account. Rethinking the influence of the latter will be interpreted as another key premise for specifying why we should discuss the role of Norwegian environmental philosophies. Since most of the debates about the process of self-realization within the framework of Norwegian ecophilosophies are closely tied with justifying the role of solidarity, in one way or another, I will investigate how the latter can be achieved by cultivating moral sensitivity towards others, which to be understood as a form of moral commitment to the biosphere as such.

The *first chapter* of the current monograph is devoted to examining the origin and the conceptualization of so-called philosophy of outdoor life (*friluftsliv*) in Norway by clarifying what particularly Norwegian aspects of this phenomenon are. One of my main objectives is to analyze to what extent Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life can be defined as a crucial premise for establishing Norwegian ecophilosophies of the mid-20th century.

Regarding the origin of the concept of outdoor life, which was introduced at the phase of Romantic Movement in Norway, I aim at revealing Norwegian outdoor life's contextualization within so-called by B. Tordsson National project.

Concerning the image of the fairy-tale hero Ash-lad, who embodies the typical Norwegian, I analyze how building the Norwegian identity is examined by the distinguished Norwegian ecophilosopher and environmental activist Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng as grounded in reconsidering the attitudes towards nature as a part of national psychology. That is why I explore how by clarifying the genealogy of the Norwegian national building movement, we can outline the correspondence between national identity and different attitudes towards time and nature. It is also important to outline how the ontological premises of the relationship between competence and time are clarified by answering the following questions. How is Per-and-Pål's¹ time justified as opposed to Askeladden's (Ash-lad's) one? Is Askeladden's competence a matter of introducing a different type of competence? And last but not least,

¹ According to the fairy tale, Per and Pål are Askeladden's brothers whose behavior is associated by Kvaløy with what typically Danish is.

to what extent are the Norwegian attitudes towards nature a prerequisite for discussing what typically Norwegian is?

In turn, so-called by Tordsson Social project of outdoor life requires the socio-cultural transformations provided by the industrialization in Norway to be examined, as well as to explore how the changes in the outdoor life affected the role of the mountain, which was defined by Br. Berntsen as typical Norwegian. In this context, I will analyze the impact of some culturally different conceptions regarding environmental protection on the discussions about Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life.

Furthermore, the challenges of so-called by Tordsson Modernization project will be determined as opening some new perspectives for Norwegian outdoor life. The modifications regarding the risks of growing sportification will be explored as a result of the clash of two different socio-cultural conceptualizations of nature, i.e. the ones supporting the ideal of uncorrupted nature and the idea of nature as a source of exploitation.

Investigating the development of Norwegian outdoor life as benefiting the justification of so-called by Tordsson Ecosocial project, I will analyze how the specificities of the outdoor life in question determined the formation of 20th century Norwegian environmental philosophies. Clarifying the methodological similarities between Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, I will examine why it is the common social, economic and political contexts in which Norwegian outdoor life took place that provoked some similar attitudes, namely, the understanding of nature to be examined as dependent on the gradual transformation of so-called by Berntsen growth and preservation (vekst og vern) debate (which took place in Norway in the mid-1960s) into the one about ‘sustainable development vs. environmental protection’ (vekst vs. vern).

On the other hand, I will compare the works on nature of some illuminative Norwegian philosophers, mountaineers and environmental activists such as Peter Zapffe, Arne Næss, Sigmund Kvaløy Setereng and Nils Faarlund for the purposes of revealing how they have been influenced by the activities of the NTK and KKK climbing clubs.

In this context, I will specify the implications of the ideas of exercising and practicing philosophy of climbing. The ideas will be explored as displaying two different sides of the process of climbing that make us discern between Norwegian climbing as an existential experience and Norwegian climbing as a sport. In turn, so-called Norwegian anti-expeditions to Tibet, whose aim was to practically prove that trackless experience in nature is more important than winning a climb will be investigated as an example of the way

Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life became a collective ideal without turning into a mass ideology.

The analysis of these issues will be done for the sake of outlining another embodiment of imaginative rationality, namely, what Næss described as ‘to think like a mountain’² mode. Furthermore, I will clarify why this way of thinking can be understood as introducing a new type of ontologically grounded rationality since ‘thinking like a mountain’ is one of the most important goals of the process of co-experience in the mountains, as recognized by Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund.

I will also explore why adopting the methods of ontological ethics can benefit reconsidering the ambiguous reasons of simplifying Zapffe’s implicit ecophilosophy as a pessimist project, which is described as such in contrast to the philosophies of Næss and Faarlund who emphasize the role of joy for the interaction between man and nature.

Against the background of the aforementioned examinations, I will investigate the impact of Næss’s reflections on his life in the mountain cabin Tvergastein by revealing the role of his anthropology of cabin man. The latter will be compared with what Kvaløy defined as Zapffe’s anthropology, as well as with Næss’s own pedagogical and cultural philosophy.

The current monograph will be also focused on giving arguments in favor of conceptualizing the pedagogical advantages of adopting Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life. For this purpose, I will analyze the origin of the following phenomena displayed in the works of the ‘father’ of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, Nils Faarlund: the reasons for the arising threat of the sportification of outdoor life, the genealogy of so-called dictatorship of understanding (*forståelsesdiktatur*), which inflicts the pseudo-stability of the ecosystems as well as the methodological challenges of adopting so-called conwaying (*vegledning*) and guiding (*veiledning*) models, which are an inevitable consequence of overexposing the role of contemporary technological culture. All these issues will be analyzed by revealing to what extent they benefited the parallel development of the Norwegian ecophilosophies as ‘stretched’ between the extremes of the ideology of industrial development and the theories of environmental protection.

As another primary objective, I aim at analyzing why the Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life contributes to clarifying Faarlund’s idea of nature as

² The phrase was introduced by the American environmentalist Aldo Leopold.

a way home. Furthermore, I will also specify why within the framework of contemporary technological culture in Faarlund's sense, the feeling of being out in nature radically changes its embodiments.

Special attention will be paid to the way the rehabilitation of intrinsic value of nature benefits revealing why the idea of outdoor life as a way home expands to the idea of 'nature is a home of culture', as Faarlund suggests. In this context, one of the main methodological contributions of Faarlund's theory will be sought in his analysis of ecolife as a life having a pedagogical value. Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I will examine what it means to 'be together with nature and in nature' in Faarlund's sense since the basic minimum of tools is devoted to strengthening the engagement of the whole personality including intellect, emotional and corporeal abilities at once.

I will also explore how moral learning and moral understanding regulated by the principles of imaginative rationality encourage the principles of complexity versus the ones of complication in Kvaløy's sense to be adopted. By outlining why the former principles can be successfully implemented in what Faarlund calls a process of conwaying (vegledning), I will clarify the origin of the conceptual differences between conwaying (vegledning) and guiding (veiledning), as displayed by Faarlund. Last but not least, I will analyze why his ideal of conwaying is conceptualized as a guiding principle of Askeladden's school, which affected the introduction of one new paradigm of experiential learning.

In the *second chapter*, devoted to the writings of the prominent Norwegian philosopher, playwright, poet and lawyer Peter Wessel Zapffe, I will outline the crucial premises of his theory, which give grounds he to be defined as Norway's first ecophilosopher. Furthermore, Zapffe's philosophy is unique in many respects compared to the other 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies as well. In this context, I will analyze the genealogy of some important topics such as why his theory of biosophy represents a certain type of experiential philosophy, which is irreducible to applied biology regardless of the fact that he uses 'biosophical' and 'biological' as synonyms. Furthermore, I will explore why we can find some implicit premises for introducing biological and ethical gradualism in Zapffe's theory of four interest fronts due to which biological interest front is examined as intrinsically connected with social, autotelic and metaphysical ones. Against the background of these investigations, I will outline whether we have good reasons to claim that Zapffe's experiential philosophy is not based on a deprived of any hope whatsoever pessimism, as Næss warns. By comparing and con-

trasting Schopenhauer's and Zapffe's theories of tragic, I will also clarify why regardless of Zapffe's questionable theory of biological morality, he builds a well-grounded conception of humankind's place in the biosphere that is equally critical to imposing both radical anthropocentrism and ungrounded biocentrism.

The contextualization of Zapffe's theory of biosophy will be revealed by analyzing the influence of G. Berkeley's theory of 'esse est percipi' and J. von Uexküll's biosemiotics. The impact of Berkeley's and Uexküll's conceptions will be explored by specifying the dependence of individual perception on the environment in respect with the aspects of the biological constitution of the different representatives. Furthermore, I will examine why due to the specificities of human constitution, we can talk about unfixability in Zapffe's sense, which is crucial for understanding man's place in the biosphere. In this context, one of the questions, which I will discuss, is how can we compare and contrast different environments (*Umwelt* in Uexküll's sense) if we remain on the level of comparing and contrasting different perceptions alone? Would not it mean that thus we should reduce biosophy to ethology?

On a macro methodological level, one of my main objectives in this chapter is to analyze how biosophy, if it is interpreted as experiential philosophy, leads to avoiding both epistemological and ethical relativism while clarifying interspecies relationships. For the purposes of outlining the gist of biosophy, I will pose the question how to understand Zapffe's mode of talking about "biosophy or biology", namely, whether we should compare two methods, two alternatives or two specific synonyms. I will also explore how analyzing the complex genealogy of biosophy, we can specify the multiple projections of man's interaction with the environment as socially, ontologically, metaphysically and existentially determined ones.

Investigating the aspects of Zapffe's biosophy, I will examine why his concept of vital balance should be extrapolated since it raises the issue how to interpret Zapffe's relevant statement that expressibility in the biological front is a heterotelic one. It is also important to clarify why the fight of interests in Zapffe's sense can be determined as preserving the vital balance of all living beings.

In turn, special attention will be paid to the role of autotelic-metaphysical engagements in order to specify why revealing both their origin and impact contributes to understanding not only the differences between human beings and the representatives of other species, but also the complex nature of humankind as such.

Clarifying the aspects of complexity of the different interest fronts, I will also examine to what extent the justification of surrogate objects in Zapffe's sense depends on the development of some fixation mechanisms, as well as on specifying why he does not provide a clear distinction between the latter and the mechanisms of compensation.

On the other hand, the analysis of so-called by Zapffe life's feeling raises another significant problem, which requires further examination, namely, how can we interpret what Zapffe defines as feeling in itself mode, i.e. do we have to refer it to the existence of life, to life's feeling, or to their mutual ontological dependence? That is why I will investigate why the autotelic interest in Zapffe's sense can be described as a universal one if it is interpreted in respect with the metaphysical interest.

Furthermore, the differences between the surplus and lack of equipment of the living beings, as represented by Zapffe, will be an object of investigation due to the purposes of clarifying why the surplus and lack should not be understood as a surplus and lack of real capabilities alone. Another specification, which will be made, is the one regarding the ontological difference and the difference concerning the normative validity of capabilities and expressibility, especially while analyzing the role of fixation mechanisms. That is why I will focus on revealing the complexity of Zapffe's theory on three levels, namely, on the one of equipment (capabilities), on the level of fixations, as well as on the one of solutions since they all provide different configurations of how one task can be fulfilled by a given subject.

In this context, I will analyze the origin of the differences by specifying why the surplus of equipment does not necessarily presume an over-fixation in Zapffe's sense to be adopted. Special attention will be paid to the issue regarding the blurred distinction between surrogate objects and compensatory objects, as well as the one between real and imaginary anchoring, which illustrate why the criteria of real and unreal are necessary but not sufficient ones. The latter specification would be examined in respect with justifying why subjective and objective values of the process of anchoring do not lead to both moral and epistemological relativism.

Referring to the aforementioned issues, as displayed in Zapffe's theory, I will look for an answer to the following questions. If we agree with Zapffe that only the one who is aware of one's interests has a destiny (so-called interest bearer), what would be the status of people who, for some reasons, are unaware of these interests? Does it mean that we have to compare them with sentient animals and if so, how can we avoid going beyond the diffi-

culties provoked by objective naturalism, while interpreting the aforementioned surplus and lack of capabilities?

Furthermore, I will examine how investigating the role of Zapffe's ethical yes and no, we can clarify why so-called cultural break in his sense is as important as the biological one, especially if we want to reveal how the interpersonal (interspecies) interaction can be ruled out not only by the multi-frontal engagements, but also by contradicting autotelic and heterotelic needs.

Regarding Kvaløy's reception of autotelic interest, as represented by Zapffe, I will specify why one of the main problems of this interpretation is that Kvaløy equates so-called ethical era with the autotelic one. Special attention will be also paid to some of the crossing methodological points between Kvaløy's ecophilosophy and Zapffe's philosophy concerning the question why both philosophers, albeit to a different extent, rely on ethics in reviving the ideal of uncorrupted nature.

Specifying Zapffe's conception of morality, I will examine the different types of morality introduced by him, as well as why so-called biological morality is a problematic issue. I will outline why Zapffe's theory of solving existential problems by introducing morality, which should have an apparent impact on the practical experience can be one of the strongest arguments against defining him as a nihilist. Regarding the contradictions deriving from Zapffe's conception of biological morality, I will clarify the genealogy of the problems, which stem from concepts such as the ones of biological value and biological responsibility.

In turn, reconstructing the methodological framework in which Zapffe's fundamental theory of tragic takes place, I will examine why the origin of the intersection of the autotelic and metaphysical engagements can be described as based on the strive for contextualizing man's initial feeling of cosmic panic. That is why I will analyze the origin of one of the main concerns about how to interpret Zapffe's idea of world's responsibility, taking into account that the metaphysical strive for meaningfulness faces the constraints of the autotelic mode of thinking due to which the world is recognized as an aim in itself.

Looking for a solution to this problem, I will also investigate why a methodologically relevant point in distinguishing between the two types of tragic in Zapffe's sense (namely, so-called subjective and objective tragic) is the one that avoids the contradiction between man and environment regarding both the internalization and the evaluation of feeling pain and suffering.

Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I will outline whether we can unquestionably accept Zapffe's distinction between so-called deficient and surplus pessimism, as well as how this distinction affects the existential potential of man compared to other species.

In the *third chapter*, devoted to the heritage of maybe one of the most well-known deep ecologists worldwide, Arne Næss, I will analyze why most of the methodological difficulties he faces, while discussing what relevant ecophilosophy and environmental politics should look like, derive from narrowing morality to moralization.

Examining Næss's theory of deep ecology, I will specify how its conceptualization is driven by being aware of the impossibility of solving ecological problems in the long run by adopting ecological means alone. That is why I will investigate how one of the main conceptual advantages of supporting the aims of deep ecology is concerned with the requirement for giving arguments, which to clarify why deep ecology's realization is possible only if ecology is defined as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the non-contradictory justification of the principles of bioegalitarianism.

Revealing the projections of Næss's statement *Here I stand*, I will outline the process aspects of the transformation of a certain place into a home specifying the role of his attempts at revealing why home is a good place to live in.

In this context, examining the implications of Næss's Ecosophy T as a personal philosophy will be done for the purposes of clarifying why it can also be defined as a certain type of mountain ecosophy.

In turn, comparing Næss's theories of deep ecology and ecosophy, I will focus on some problems, which arise from the fact that providing ontology of the contents is not a sufficient condition for denying the relativism of sensualism. In turn, the problems how to noncontradictory define the normative validity of intuition as a norm, as Næss suggests, will be investigated in detail.

Exploring the aspects of Næss's conception of self-realization, I will look for an answer to the following questions: what are the reasons for recognizing self-realization as a top norm in Næss's sense? Furthermore, if we need to cultivate ecological self to perceive reality, how can we explain the 'naturalness' of so-called beautiful actions? In other words, if we all 'naturally' produce 'beautiful actions' in Kant's sense, as Næss suggests, how can the cultivation of intuition derive from the reality as such?

Another problematic issue, which will be paid attention to is Næss's idea of extending neutrality of moral community to all species, while evaluating human behavior in ethical terms. Instead of arguing for the principle of moral neutrality, which questions the idea of morality itself, I will examine the benefits of adopting ethical gradualism from a comparative perspective by emphasizing the influence of Spinoza's and Gandhi's theories³ on Næss's ones.

Regarding Næss's reception of Spinoza's theory, I suggest Spinoza's influence to be traced in three directions, namely, in rehabilitating the role of joy by specifying the functions of pleasure, happiness and perfection, in outlining the possible misuse of emotions, as well as in exploring the origin of maturity of feelings through sorting out conflicts.

In turn, I will clarify how if it is the ethics of minimal interference that presumes a certain peaceful cooperation to be established, we can justify and inflict changes addressing the process of suffering, as well as measuring who suffers most in order to help him/her first, as Næss suggests.

On the other hand, pointing out the problems, which arise from narrowing the role of morality in deep ecology, I will explore why adopting Næss's theory of vital needs means that we should rely on an ideal intuition of what vital need is. On a macro-methodological level, I will investigate why most concerns about Næss's conception of what relevant environmental politics should look like arise not only from his vague definition of what a vital need is, but also from Næss's ambiguous theory of vital rights.

Presuming that deep ecology is justified by the process of deep questioning, as Næss suggests, I will also explore whether we can justify the equal right of the organisms to live and blossom, as based on so-called by him obvious value axiom. The connection between the intrinsic value of all living beings and the universal right defining what a valued interest is will be clarified, as well as whether the latter can be determined beyond the field of utilitarian ethics. Furthermore, I will analyze why Næss's statement that a given species is not 'more valuable' than the rest can easily turn into a speculation, especially when examining the cohabitation in so-called mixed communities. Another significant problem, which will be discussed, is how to provide one and the same classification deriving from Næss's presumption of having 'no duty'.

³ These theories will be mainly examined for the purposes of outlining how they have influenced the formation of Næss's ecophilosophy as such.

In particular, the failure of justifying the role of ethical gradualism on the level of environmental politics will be investigated against the background of Næss's theory of population reduction. That is why I will clarify why denying the role of ethical gradualism leads to diverting bioegalitarianism into a certain kind of speciesism, which is as dangerous as radical anthropocentrism is.

In this context, I will reveal why one of the main problems regarding so-called Apron diagram is provoked by the implications of the normative validity of the process of derivation. For this purpose, I will look for answers to the following questions. If we keep relying on the principles of logical deduction, how can we recognize the beliefs on level two, representing Næss's deep ecology platform, as grounded in the ones on level one, and at the same time, to postulate diversity on level one and unity on level two, taking into account that deriving from some diverse premises would not necessarily lead to reaching an agreement about the platforms they ground?

Furthermore, if the process of derivation is not based on "structuring" some value priorities, as Næss suggests, then, we should analyze whether the normative validity of level two concerning the agreement about deep ecology platform can be interpreted as unquestionably determining the actions on level four. In turn, if the activities of the adopters of so-called shallow ecology movement are merely recognized on levels three and four, as Næss argues, is not it problematic for the supporters of deep ecology movement to be restricted in their actions to levels one and two?

Analyzing the possible answers to the aforementioned questions, I will examine why we should not explore the political implications of deep ecology movement alone, but also trace how the difficulties stem from Næss's ambiguous position of giving priority to ecological problems over the ones raised by some other movements such as the movements of peace and justice. That is why one of the topics, which will be a subject to investigation is what makes Næss claim that deep ecology movement provides more solutions than the rest.

Regarding the practical implications of the ecopolitical initiatives as well as the role of specifying the objectives of deep ecology movement, the issue of whether we should give preference to Gandhi's ethics of non-violence or to so-called by Næss pacifist forms of activism will be explored. It will be done for the purposes of examining the origin of the preference in question in order to clarify the genealogy of the ways some Norwegian environmental campaigns (such as Mardøla and Alta campaigns) are held.

In this context, I will also bring to light the following questions. How can we evaluate the situation deciding whether to initiate what Næss defines as forms of radical struggle? How can we delimit the latter so that to prevent struggle's degradation into pure violence? Would it be a question of time, or of number of people involved? Does not this distinction rely yet on some implicit forms of violence as a means for achieving certain goals?

On the other hand, the advantages and disadvantages of Næss's reception of Gandhi's theory in the field of environmental politics will be mainly traced on two levels: on the level of Næss's reception of one of the sources of Hindu tradition, as represented in Bhagavad Gita, as well as on the level of gestalt ontology in so far as in the strive for grounding a new type of process philosophy both Næss and Kvaløy adopt some principles of Mahayana Buddhism.

In turn, comparing and contrasting Næss's and Kvaløy's theories in the *fourth chapter* will be done in order to outline how regardless of the fact that Næss and Kvaløy adopt similar philosophical premises such as the commitment to preserve the biosphere as a necessary condition for self-realization, the analytical reflection on the overestimated role of anthropocentrism at the expense of the values of bioegalitarianism etc., they build different visions of what relevant environmental politics should look like. In this context, I will investigate to what extent the differences in question derive from ascribing different normative validity to ethics and gestalt ontology respectively. That is why one of my objectives is to clarify whether it is the strive for environmental politics that needs a well-established ecophilosophical basis for its existence, or ecophilosophy is merely justified as a response to the attempts at controlling industrial development.

I will also analyze why in contrast to Næss's gestalt philosophy based on structuring space in gestalt systems, so-called by Kvaløy river time can be characterized as a time of constant change, which guarantees the coherence of space and time at once. Furthermore, recognizing the normative validity of time and space will be investigated for the purposes of finding an answer to the question why is the world picture based on the inexhaustible (unexploitable) dynamic rhythm of nature?

On the other hand, Kvaløy's conception of a new form of getting attached to a place, which corresponds to Næss's theory of how to develop a sense of belonging, will be analyzed by specifying to what extent the aforementioned attachment is determined in the life's stream by the river time. In turn, defining ecophilosophy as a process philosophy will be investigated by tracing what kind of ideas of processuality it entails, namely, how it is in-

fluenced by the idea of processuality, as displayed in Mahayana Buddhism. Due to the fact that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy adopts some of the main principles of Gandhi's ethics of non-violence, Kvaløy's reception of Bhagavad Gita will be examined as well.

On a macro methodological level, I will go back to specifying the role of Kvaløy's ecophilosophy by posing two main objectives. I will analyze why defining ecophilosophy in Kvaløy's sense is not just a matter of combing two words together, namely, the ones of 'eco' and 'sophy', as Næss claims. Against the background of the idea of total system crisis, I will clarify to what extent Kvaløy's ecophilosophy corresponds to Næss's theory that ecosophy understood as a matter of showing love strengthens the wisdom about man's home. Furthermore, I will also outline how the decentralization of knowledge affecting the decentralization of politics in Kvaløy's sense takes place as a counteraction to the monopolization of both knowledge and politics.

Secondly, special attention will be paid to Kvaløy's well-known distinction between complexity and complication as well as to the normative validity of their different embodiments. For the purposes of this specification, I will explore why the distinction in question is of crucial importance for reverting the transformation of the 'industrial development *versus* environmental protection' debate into the one about 'growth *and* environmental protection'.

Another significant object of investigation will be the one of discussing how the commonly shared conceptions of what a meaningful activity is make one society both ecologically and socially balanced as well as how the presumption of complex growth has an impact on the development of human potential and capabilities.

Exploring the implications of Kvaløy's distinction between complexity and complication, I will outline the internal relations between cultural traditions. That is why I will examine why the projections of Kvaløy's conception of two types of culture (so-called mono and multi-cultures) are based on two different visions of time, which justify two different types of aesthetics.

Going back to new time's tragedies dominated by the ontological ambition of time compression, I will investigate to what extent the consequences of Kvaløy's differentiation of organic and mechanical times are grounded in the fundamental distinction between complexity and complication. In turn, the quantification of time, which underlies the contradiction of so-called specialists and generalists as well as its crucial importance for understanding the influence of meaningful work upon developing relevant environmental politics on the global scene will be explored in detail.

On the other hand, I will outline how the problem of rehabilitating the role of national environmental politics in the field of global economics is affected by what Kvaløy calls Gaia vs. Servoglobe debate, which represents the conflict between two different worlds, the one of constructivism and the one of improvisation.

Furthermore, specifying the complex relations between Kvaløy's ecophilosophy and environmental politics, I will analyze the connection between the functioning of the ecosystems and establishing democracy in Næss's and Kvaløy's sense, as well as why so-called life's democracy does not have to be interpreted in the field of moral and political naturalism. Referring to Næss's theory, I will clarify why a new ecological grounding of democracy requires special attention to be paid to exploring how democracy is 'dependent' on ecology as well as in what sense. Revealing the implications of Kvaløy's theory, I will explore how the lack of democracy questions the types of personality encouraged by a given society, namely, how so-called by Kvaløy multisided person can confront the "pyramidal" one for which the climax of freedom is the successful integration in a hierarchically organized society.

On a macro-methodological level, Kvaløy's theory regarding the contradiction of the initial complexity of nature, which encompasses the diversity of living beings and nature's complication, achieved by the means of industrial development, will be investigated. It will be done by clarifying whether the contradiction in question is based on the arising tension that derives from the technological culture's ambition to impose the normative validity of industrial development at any expense. In this context, I will analyze why the dialectical tension between complexity and complication can be described as based on the 'complication society's' strive for being recognized as a complex society with a capital letter.

Regarding the debates about what specifically Norwegian environmental politics should look like, I will clarify the origin of both Kvaløy's and snm's criticism of the potential accession of Norway to the EU. The criticism in question will be examined by revealing to what extent it is not only a result of a strong personal stance on side of Kvaløy, but also a logically determined position, which includes some of the guiding principles of snm. That is why I will also outline how we should interpret snm's claim that Norwegian No to the EU is a 'positive no'.

Last but not least, I will investigate why ecological crisis turns into a global one in Kvaløy's sense. Exploring how the economic stabilization affects the homogenization of the ecosystems since growth has many forms such as bi-

ological, technological and economic growth, I will reveal the contextualization of bioeconomics, as represented in the works of Næss and Kvaløy.

Examining the implications of Gunnar Skirbekk's ecophilosophy in the *fifth chapter* of the current monograph, I will analyze how it provides some solutions to the problems, which are left open by both Næss and Kvaløy. I will also explore why Skirbekk's line of arguments is closer to the one formulated by Kvaløy rather than to Næss's theory by pointing out the origin of the methodological differences between them.

Skirbekk's contributions to the development of 20th-century Norwegian environmental philosophy could be clarified from three main perspectives, namely, from the one of his attempts at questioning the limits of technological rationality by building so-called hermeneutic competence, from the perspective of rethinking the role of ethical anthropocentrism for the purposes of justifying the one of ethical gradualism as well as from the perspective regarding Skirbekk's theory of the impact of vital needs and vital interests on revealing the important role of the welfare state.

Extrapolating Skirbekk's conception of the pitfalls provoked by the overexposed optimistic belief in some technological fix, I will investigate why the scientific expertise in Skirbekk's sense does not necessarily coincide with the technological one, albeit the latter undoubtedly functions as a certain kind of scientific expertise.

For the purposes of revising the theory of technological rationality, as represented by Skirbekk, I will explore why questioning the normative validity of this rationality is of crucial importance for rehabilitating the complex understanding of man's self-realization as dependent on the realization of nature.

Furthermore, due to clarifying how the sense of belonging can be cultivated, the reasons behind Næss's and Kvaløy's appeal for revising the status of the scientist and the politician by equipping them with an extended competence will be outlined. Comparing and contrasting Næss's and Kvaløy's conceptions, I will examine how Skirbekk introduces another important point justifying the image of so-called overcomer as a certain type of super-amateur (generalist) in Næss's and Kvaløy's sense. On a macro methodological level, I will outline why this new type of hermeneutic competence brings to light the crucial perspective of disenchanting the belief in the technological fix.

The second main perspective regarding Skirbekk's writings which I will focus on concerns why ethical gradualism is needed in order relevantly to evaluate the borderline cases in which (due to some ethical evaluations) one species (or representatives of one and the same species) should be given

priority over another (or others) in normative terms, as well as why the priority in question should be understood without entirely rejecting the impact of biological gradualism. Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, which affect the methodological relations between ethical and biological gradualism, I will analyze the role of so-called principle of advocacy representation, as adopted by Skirbekk.

Within the field in which he makes the distinction between being a subject to a biological life and being a subject to a biographical one, special attention will be paid to his conception of the broader application of the criterion of maturity.

On a macro methodological level, I will also investigate why Skirbekk describes the need of rethinking the dialectical connection between paradigmatic and gradual ways of thinking as one of the biggest challenges, which affect the justification of the moral status of non-humans.

For the purposes of specifying why ethical gradualism is irreducible neither to anthropocentrism, nor to biological gradualism, the reasons behind relating the three types of categories, namely, the ones of moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants in discourse ethics, as displayed by Skirbekk, will be investigated. In this context, I will specify how taking into account the complex relationships between moral discussants is of crucial importance for understanding why discourse ethics provides more relevant solutions in terms of cultivating moral attitudes towards moral subjects in contrast to deontological and utilitarian ethics.

Analyzing both the specificities of Skirbekk's thought-experiments with the robots and Martians displayed as borderline cases of creatures, which can meet some of the criteria of moral agents and the role of biological gradualism as such, I will reveal how the bodily experience affects the possibility to talk about moral experience, not only about ethical knowledge.

I will also explore how the aforementioned complex relationships have an impact on what Skirbekk defines as subjective and objective needs and interests. Thus I will investigate why it may turn out a subjective interest to be developed from the perspective of the inter-subjective interests while fulfilling a vital need in time.

Furthermore, extrapolating Skirbekk's theory, I will clarify how tracing the development of given subjective interests such as social interests, which are not recognized from the very beginning as vital interests for humans, gives an answer to the question why moral evaluation comes merely on human side.

In this context, I will analyze how determining social identity as a demarcation criterion for distinguishing the group of the moral subjects from the ones who are defined as ‘incapable’ (for one reason or another) moral agents or moral discussants requires the need of so-called by Skirbekk mini-ethics of the modern world to be explored.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I will examine how the other side of the coin of the properties debate regarding the principle of advocacy representation, as formulated by Skirbekk, contributes to clarifying the distinction between continuity and discontinuity, which is differently interpreted from the perspectives of utilitarian and deontological positions. That is why I will explore how the reconsideration of the problem of suffering in Skirbekk’s sense affects the issue of compassion, while evaluating the attitudes towards moral subjects as well as how it can benefit going beyond the continuity-discontinuity criterion and thus to reduce the impact of ethical anthropocentrism.

Taking into account the genealogy of these problems, I will analyze how the implementation of ethical gradualism into the field of environmental politics may contribute to achieving ecological sustainability in the long run, as Skirbekk points out. I will also clarify why his notion of solidarity benefits recognizing the normative validity of ecological sustainability for the functioning of the welfare state as well as the attempts at overcoming the ecological crisis by cultivating collective socio-political responsibility.

Investigating how Skirbekk’s theory of ethical universalizability and solidarity affects rethinking both the problems of vital needs and normative validity of the process of distribution of goods will be done against the background of the pros and cons of welfare state.

Furthermore, I will explore how dignity, as defined by Skirbekk, becomes a prototype characteristic of the principle of non-humiliation, which provides us with the opportunity to talk about communal in the sense of commonly shared solidarity. Adopting such an interpretation will be examined as giving an answer to the question why maximizing the overall non-humiliation in Skirbekk’s sense looks only at first sight as a principle with utilitarian connotations.

The issue of specifying the role of vital needs, which is crucial for Skirbekk’s conception of environmental politics, will be explored as intrinsically connected with the notion of just distribution. Extrapolating the aforementioned investigations, I will reveal the significant role of discursive interpretation outlining the normative validity of the relation between inter-

est and rights as well as the fundamental connection between the processes of distribution and delegation in the field of environmental politics.

Last but not least, I will analyze why another important methodological contribution of Skirbekk's theory can be seen in the rehabilitated relationship between vital needs and vital interests, on the one hand, and the justification regarding the flow of people and capital in the welfare state, on the other one. The investigation of these issues will be discussed as providing some new perspectives for the problems brought to light by the increasing flow of people and growth of capital, as defined by Kvaløy.

The perspectives in question will be explored against the background of Skirbekk's conception of political culture. Thus I will analyze why he recognizes one of the biggest challenges of establishing political culture in the modern welfare state by questioning the normative validity of the new topography imposed by the sustainable development society as well as by revealing why the traditional way of mapping is no longer valid.

“...the day we no longer experience the wonder of existence
will not be the day that we have found the answer,
but the day we have lost the question.”

Gunnar Skirbekk *A Young Man's Search for Meaning*

I.1. THE PUZZLE OF NORWEGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF OUTDOOR LIFE (*FRILUFTSLIV*)

Before examining which one is the question(s) we do not have to lose while analyzing both the genealogy and the role of Norwegian ecophilosophies, we should first clarify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. The unique attitude towards nature is an illuminative characteristic of the Nordic worldview, which has constantly been demonstrated in time. Some proofs of it can be found in the different embodiments of the understanding of nature such as the practical wisdom of the Icelandic Eddas, the amazing sense of orientation demonstrated by the Vikings who conquered many places without using compass, the significant influence of the pantheistic visions concerned with clarifying the role of national identity in Romanticism etc. However, reconstructing the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies by outlining the methodological continuity of the aforementioned phenomena is a necessary but not sufficient condition for finding an answer to the question why in Norway.

In this context, I raise the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic conceptualization of ecophilosophy takes place in Norway. Being the Nordic country with high mountains (except Iceland) is a crucial condition for the appearance of a unique philosophy of climbing developed in the 20th century. Despite the fact that Norwegian ecophilosophies can be defined as

driven by the idea of reconsidering the significance of expanding anthropocentrism, I suggest that we should talk about ecophilosophies rather than ecophilosophy with a capital letter.

I also investigate why Norwegian ecophilosophies implicitly derive from a philosophy of climbing, which becomes justifiable due to its functioning as based on some principles of applied ethics such as the ones of solidarity, cooperation and trackless experience in nature. The aspects of philosophy in question cannot be fully comprehended if we underrate the influence of what I call turn of imaginative rationality⁴ provided by the philosophy of climbing in Norway that requires the extension of the conception of rationality to be recognized as irreducible to the cognitive rationality as such.

The ‘official birth’ of the Norwegian ecophilosophies can be dated back to the 1960s, albeit it also incorporated some philosophical conceptions of nature displayed by some ‘earlier’ illuminative intellectuals such as 19th-century Danish-Norwegian philosopher Niels Treschow, Norwegian polar explorer and scientist Firdtjof Nansen, 20th-century Norwegian existentialist and mountaineer Peter Wessel Zapffe, who was a friend and supporter of both the founder of ecosophy Arne Næss and one of the informal leaders of the snm movement Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng⁵. As one of the commonly shared features of these conceptions, I point out the attempt at rethinking the unquestionable faith in the role of biocentrism by justifying moderate biocentrism, or ethical gradualism.

The multiplicity of Norwegian ecophilosophies concerns the conceptualization of at least two alternative ecophilosophies of two well-known mountaineers, philosophers and eco-activists, namely, the ecosophy of Arne Næss and the ecophilosophy of Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng. In this context, I will analyze why they share some philosophical prerequisites concerning the reconsideration of the relationship between man and nature, but build different visions of what successful environmental politics should look like.

Another crucial characteristic of Norwegian ecophilosophies is their strong connection with the development of sciences such as biology, ecology, social economy, social anthropology etc. These philosophies aim at inflicting

⁴ I argue that the turn of imaginative rationality concerns the rehabilitation of normative validity of feelings and emotions, which in turn leads to avoiding the reduction of rationality to cognitive rationality. In this context, I extrapolate the role of so-called moral imagination (Johnson 1993: 3-4).

⁵ Nowadays, the Norwegian ecophilosophy still remains an object of investigations in the works of Gunnar Skirbekk, Trond Jakobsen etc..

change since one of their main objectives is to show how adopting different philosophical models can contribute not only to revealing the pitfalls of overexposed anthropocentrism, but also to provide us with some constructive solutions to how protecting nature for the sake of both nature and mankind is possible only by introducing relevant economic, social and cultural changes at once. That is why I will explore why comparing and contrasting different ecophilosophies is a matter of tracing the genealogy of different vital interests rather than using different vital words alone. Due to the implementation of scientific knowledge, the philosophies in question encourage cultivating complex sensitivity and informed consent on side of general audience, while trying to eradicate the negative effects of populism as such. On a macro methodological level, it means that the interdisciplinary scientific framework benefits Norwegian ecophilosophies to be prevented from turning into ideologies, which to serve different political and economic interests.

Talking about ethics in this context is of crucial importance since the idea of normative validity contributes to clarifying why nature can have a value in itself, e.g. why the value of biosphere has to be understood as an intrinsic value concerning the complex net of ecosystems, which do not contradict man's nature. On the other hand, ethics is a significant factor in reconsidering the idea of life's orientation by adopting philosophy of outdoor life (*friluftsliv*); not only in revealing its practical wisdom, but also in giving arguments in favor of the thesis that we should cultivate sensitivity towards others. On a macro methodological level, it also contributes to recognizing the initial connection between the aforementioned philosophy and modern pedagogy.

In turn, I will explore why reducing the role of anthropocentrism does not obligatory lead to appealing for radical biocentrism. Since most debates about the role of self-realization are tightly concerned with justifying solidarity, I will investigate how this realization can be fulfilled by cultivating moral awareness towards others understood as a form of moral commitment to the biosphere as such.

1.1. The Long Way of Norwegian History of Philosophy

In the postwar period, I outline three significant methodological steps in Norwegian philosophy: the establishment of ethics as a university discipline, Næss's participation in the UNESCO group for coining the term democracy as well as the introduction of what Truls Gjeffsen calls "the third way" (Den tredje vei) (Gjeffsen 2012: 197-206), i.e. the rehabilitation of the role of Eastern philosophy as providing solutions for the dilemmas, which the Western philosophy faces.

Historically speaking, the development of Norwegian ecophilosophies took place against the background of the Norwegian traditions in outdoor life, more specifically, against the background of the ones concerned with the mountain life.

Regarding the discussions in Norway about the introduction of a new curriculum in history of philosophy⁶, they took place when the Norwegian philosophy of climbing reached its peak. Its starting point was the set of techniques of climbing based on different philosophical visions of the role of nature. Næss argued that similarly to climbing, which requires adopting given techniques in order to reach the peak, the philosophical investigation presumes mastering a rank of logical procedures, which to benefit revealing the gist of the philosophy in question. On a macro methodological level, I raise the hypothesis that this is one of Næss's first attempts to clarify why the way is more important than the goal itself; a philosophical conception, which underlies both Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life.

⁶ Næss's idea of preparing a new compendium in history of philosophy was in many respects a reply to Skard and Winsnes' *Times and Thoughts. Leading Ideas in the European Intellectual History (Tider og tanker. Ledende ideer i europeisk åndshistorie)* (Ibid). He believed that philosophy may become understandable only if we clarify the concepts and the connection between premises and conclusions, e. i. to compose one problem-oriented history of philosophy (Ibid: 206-207). For the purposes of his *History of Philosophy. Introduction to Philosophical Problems (Filosofiens historie. En innføring i filosofiske problemer)* (1953), Næss borrowed relevant literature from the University Library and transported the whole amount of 125-kilo books to his cabin Tvergastein (Ibid: 207). It was a great challenge to include not only chapters on Chinese and Indian religions, but also some chapters on not well-known French philosophers as well as American pragmatism, which was very important for Næss, but remained little known in Norway at that time (Ibid).

If we had good methodological reasons to call the aforementioned aspects ‘steps’, the third step could be characterized as a ‘turn’ in so far as the introduction of so-called third way inflicts serious changes in the Norwegian worldview attitudes regarding nature as well as in their philosophical conceptualization.

Analyzing the influence of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism on the intellectual efforts of Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund to clarify Norwegian outdoor life ecophilosophy is beneficial for revealing what are the reasons for justifying the need of a new type of rationality.

Examining Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence, which was adopted by both Næss and Kvaløy as well as what I call horizontal relatedness, contribute to revealing the dialectical entity of man-nature relatedness as a necessary condition for rehabilitating the impact of ethics. Thus only ethical anthropocentrism can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of moral objectivism. In turn, understanding Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies is useful for clarifying one of their main objects of investigation, namely, how biosphere, defined as a complex net of ecosystems, can have an unquestionable intrinsic value.

First and foremost, it is important to emphasize that it is not only the climb, which makes the third way’s embodiment possible because realizing the maxima “the way is the goal” is the climax of the long-lasting traditions in both climbing and philosophizing⁷. The long way from realizing the need of choosing environmentally friendly techniques of climbing to reconsidering the one of rehabilitating man’s initial connection to the biosphere, as a matter of a mutual social and political engagement, concerns the recognition of diversity as belonging to the gestalts of both nature and humankind.

On a macro methodological level, I argue that the introduction of the third way can be characterized as a turn in the Norwegian ecophilosophies since it signifies the transformation of the philosophy of climbing as a necessary condition for building ecophilosophies, which presumes a synchronization of practical wisdom with unique worldview attitudes to be made. In this context, I will examine the philosophy of Norwegian outdoor life as a significant factor of this synchronization exploring how it aims at cultivating people’s sensitivity towards nature as a net of mastering multiple living strategies, which to be in tune with nature’s mechanisms. This biospherical

⁷For a more detailed analysis of so-called anti-expeditions, see Gjefsen 2012: 187-196, as well as Faarlund 2015.

diversity is one of the main prerequisites to talk about ecophilosophies in plural, taking into account that harmonization in nature is not equivalent to harmony. Regarding the establishment of so-called anthropoinvasion, I claim that the idea of harmonization, which is replaced with human understanding of harmony, presumes the exclusion of any 'natural' contradiction whatsoever. Disenchanting the genealogy of harmonization vs. harmony is of high importance for avoiding the traditional way of talking about egalitarian and elitarian approaches towards nature.

That is why I define Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies, which are more than just the sum of the single ecophilosophies they entail.

2. SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE GENEALOGY OF NORWEGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF OUTDOOR LIFE

2.1. Is Norwegian Philosophy of Outdoor Life a Premise of Norwegian Ecophilosophies?

According to Gunnar Skirbekk, Norwegian identity is built on nature (Skirbekk 1992: 1). While the Danish landscape is characterized with flat areas, the Norwegian one is famous with its high mountains and picturesque fjords, especially in the western part of the country. Adopting Romanticist interest to look back at the wild nature means to reconsider the symbolic capital of what was a crucial part of Norwegian way of living, namely, to reconsider the symbolic capital of the landscape, which makes it different from the ones in Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

Thus the difference in the landscapes becomes a prerequisite for establishing some cultural differences. In turn, Bjørn Tordsson discusses the development of one new form of aesthetics “advancing a physically and sensuously active relationship with the landscape” (Tordsson 2007: 63). It is the aesthetics in question that makes revealing the genealogy of outdoor life so important for understanding the premises of so-called by Tordsson National project. This genealogy is initially concerned with elaborating unique ethics, which to contribute to shaping what he defines as a common understanding of natural and cultural characteristics (Ibid) recognized as a goal in the name of building a national identity.

Regarding the methodological similarities between Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, I argue that they face similar social, cultural, economic and political challenges. In turn, the need of solving these dilemmas illustrates why so-called by Br. Berntsen ‘growth and

preservation' (vekst og vern) debate in Norway gradually turned into 'industrial development vs. preservation' (vekst vs. vern) one.

Following the classification of Tordsson, I will investigate the methodological connections between outdoor life and so-called National project characterizing Norwegian Romanticism, which shows the need of specifying the relationships between Norwegian city and folk cultures. Furthermore, I will continue with the role of outdoor life for so-called Social project, revealing the significant impact of the class-stratification on the arising symbolic capital of leisure time. In turn, examining the formation of outdoor life within so-called Modernization project, which covers the interwar period, I will analyze how the new understanding of nature as an exploitable source implicitly contributes to discerning alpinism and philosophy of climbing.

On the other hand, investigating the works of some illuminative Norwegian philosophers such as Peter Zapffe, Arne Næss, Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund as well as analyzing how they have become zealous supporters of Norwegian environmental activism being influenced by the activities of NTK (Norsk Tindeklub) and KKK (Kolsås Klatreklubb) clubs, I aim at revealing how so-called moral geography of Nansen⁸ can be established as a source of inspiration for these mountaineers and philosophers.

Exploring the development of Norwegian outdoor life as benefiting the justification of so-called by Tordsson Ecosocial project, in the recent research I also provide some arguments in favor of the pedagogical advantages of adopting outdoor life's philosophy, as represented in the writings of some of the most prominent experts in this area such as Nils Faarlund, Gunnar Breivik, Bjørn Tordsson, Atle Tellnes. Analyzing both the philosophical and socio-cultural implications behind Faarlund's statement that 'outdoor life is a home of culture', I will clarify the origin of the following phenomena; the ones concerned with the wide-spread sportification of outdoor life, so-called by Faarlund dictatorship of understanding (forståelsesdiktatur) (Faarlund 2003: 26) as well as the methodological challenges faced while adopting so-called conwaying (vegledning) and guiding (veiledning) models, which arise as an inevitable consequence of the recognition of the contemporary technological culture.

In turn, revealing the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, we have to examine the socio-cultural background of the outdoor life traditions because, as Næss himself argues, outdoor life is a term indicating a "positive

⁸ I refer to Tordsson's thesis of Nansen's moral geography (Tordsson 2003: 116).

kind of state of mind and body in nature, one that brings us closer to some of the many aspects of identification and Self-realization with nature that we have lost... We should see true *friluftsliv* as a route toward paradigm change” (Næss 2003: 178). He makes a list of the ‘positive aspects *outdoor life* can bring to ecophilosophy’ (Randall 2007: 80) such as “favourable conditions for contact between humans”, a setting for training suitable for group work and leadership, “new impulses encouraging reflections of fundamental questions”, ”options for personal development”, “opportunities for one to realize oneself” etc. (Ibid: 80-81).

Comparing philosophy of outdoor life with the one of sport in Norway, I argue that we talk about two different philosophies of free time having two different prototype characteristics, namely, the ones of cooperation and competition. In this context, I raise the hypothesis that while Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life respectively can be defined as philosophies of home, philosophy of sport can be determined as a philosophy of arena.

Home is the place, where we can make room for the individual life as a project, i.e. to situate it in its total openness to the world itself. Tordsson argues that “the feeling of being someone goes well with feeling *at home at a place*, which raises memories and acknowledges a lived life” (Tordsson 2005: 179); a claim corresponding to what Zapffe calls to bear life, as it is, due to the help of nature (Zapffe 1978b: 204), i.e. the place where one’s self-realization is experienced as a part of the realization of life as such. Furthermore, home is where the subject recognizes the dialectics of life in its anachronism at the expense of the overdeveloped capacity for situatedness; where its pure openness to the biosphere (openness, which is determined by the initial openness of mankind as belonging to the universe) is a matter of reviving forgotten interrelatedness. In this context, I aim at showing that the openness in question is a necessary and sufficient condition for overcoming the frustration provoked by the feeling of *terror vacui*. However, we should keep in mind that the latter can be interpreted in two different ways: as a synonym of the fear of ‘no man’s land’ becoming a driving force of anthropoinvasion, or as a stimulus for reconsidering man’s place in nature’s bosom.

According to Næss, outdoor life is a rich life achieved by simple means; one conception, which underlies the modern understanding of outdoor life philosophy. Another common characteristic of Norwegian ecophilosophies and philosophy of outdoor life is the idea of man’s engagement with the biosphere, which presumes the mobilization of his/her rationality, emotions

and corporeal experience at once. What ecophilosophers call an engagement with the biosphere understood as a net of ecosystems, the outdoor life philosophers coin as a capacity to read ‘situation’s distinctive nature’⁹ (Tordsson 2005: 165), taking into account that the crossing point between them is the unquestionable normative validity of solidarity and its different embodiments¹⁰. The practical implications of the latter are considered as a long and uneasy process of cultivating sensitivity towards otherness in all its representations. It is solidarity showed by both philosophies that is based on the principle of self-realization, which is achieved by justifying respect to nature as a matter of self-respect. Last but not least, both philosophies adopt some similar “means” such as responsibility and thoughtfulness, which are realized by mobilizing the capacities of man’s nature as such.

On a macro methodological level, anthropocentrism can be disenchanted by questioning the epistemological dualism based on the binary opposition ‘mind-body’. On the other hand, reconsidering what I called horizontal relatedness cannot be achieved by simply reviving Rousseau’s appeal ‘Go back to nature!’ because it should have been paraphrased as ‘Go back and make your nature home again!’. This appeal cannot be considered as a form of reestablished anthropocentrism unless it is interpreted as a process of orientation in life, which requires rethinking the wholeness of man’s experience, namely, what I call one’s experiential gestalt¹¹.

In this context, the role of pedagogy¹² for outdoor life traditions is to justify the most relevant choice among many other choices. Talking about experiential gestalts, I go back to what Tordsson defines as a way of learning in the process of experiencing, which is understood as a form of experiential

⁹ According to Næss, outdoor life is a „concrete theme”, but it cannot be separated from metaphysics (Næss 1973: 181). That is why understanding nature begins with direct experience, which, however, “soon stimulated reflection” (Ibid).

¹⁰ Within Norwegian ecophilosophies, there are different interpretations of what kind of category solidarity is. For example, Næss describes it as an ontological category, which in turn affects the way the process of self-realization is understood.

¹¹ The term is borrowed from Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 81).

¹² Norwegian outdoor life’s traditions gradually became a subject to investigations on side of the Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, which adopted some methods from the scopes of pedagogy and sociology. This process is driven by researchers’ attempts to find the most successful ways of teaching people how to orient themselves in nature. In other words, they try to outline how one to cultivate the sensitivity towards the biosphere as a necessary and sufficient condition for one’s own self-realization as a human being.

learning deriving from the implicit human connections with the biosphere. In turn, outdoor life's learning relies on developing strategies within the process of life orientation while searching for an ontologically suitable life style. Nature gives room for interpretations (Ibid: 172), but it depends on the actors whether they will recognize it as a home for living opportunities or as an arena of self-sufficient goals. It is the open horizon of the biosphere that recognizes the act of addressing as more important than the addressee itself. Only against such a background, making the aforementioned opportunities 'ours' is not a matter of manifesting possession of being, but rather of justifying gestalt experience.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that in respect with Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life respectively, we see common visions of the role of biosphere, which gives me grounds to talk about similar types of experiential philosophies whose prototype characteristic is the initial total openness of man and nature. Another important similarity is the way the idea of complexity is interpreted as grounding the process of self-realization by following the rhythm of nature without leading to objective naturalism. In turn, the main methodological risk is the complex rhythm of life to be complicated by substituting the qualitative aspects of evaluating the biosphere with its quantitative projections. Furthermore, I raise the hypothesis that the rhythm of nature reveals why the definition 'in progress' can noncontradictory be replaced with the one of 'in process', disenchanting the myth that nature's growth can be successfully substituted with the one of sustainable development.

2.2. The Story of Norwegian Outdoor Life. The Traditions of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Traditions

Examining the genealogy of outdoor life phenomenon in Norway requires outlining and comparing the concrete implications of the different socio-cultural prerequisites, which contributed to its formation, as I mentioned above. Thus we can reveal not only the unique profile of the phenomenon in question, but can also emphasize the role of European tendencies in outdoor life, which have influenced its consolidation.

The term of outdoor life was firstly mentioned in Norway in the era of Romanticism since its recognition was closely tied with the need of defining a well-grounded national project (Tordsson 2007: 63)¹³. According to Nils Faarlund, the ‘father’ of Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, Norwegian constitution established in 1814 was a milestone of a process showing how the country has turned from a Danish province into a union with Sweden (Faarlund, Dahle and Jensen 2007: 394)¹⁴. The growing interest in nature was not an intrinsic characteristic of Norwegian Romanticism alone. In the current research, I look for arguments in favor of the thesis that Norwegian conceptualization of outdoor life was driven by the changes brought by adopting imaginative rationality since the latter contributed to cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness by the practices of moral understanding and moral learning. Extrapolating these investigations to the level of ecosophy¹⁵, as formulated by Arne Næss, I argue that learning how to ‘be in someone else’s shoes’ (which is the definition of empathy) should be paraphrased to how to ‘be in the net of biosphere’s shoes’, taking into account that gaining such a knowledge is considered as implicitly ‘encoded’ in human existence.

As one of the prototype characteristics of Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I outline the role of the aforementioned imaginative rationality, namely, how one meets the challenges in na-

¹³ Norway became a province of Denmark for the period 1536-1814, when the struggle for political independence was favored by the deteriorating position of Denmark in Napoleon wars.

¹⁴ Regarding Norwegian constitution, he argues that Norway has been preceded only by the US and France, emphasizing how “the struggle to fulfill the process of establishing a free nation” has gained more power, when the century passed (Ibid)

¹⁵ We should keep in mind that Næss does not recognize this process of learning as a moral process.

ture with a corporeal, meaningful and rationally integrated action of understanding (Tordsson 2005: 173). The latter is driven by the fact that outdoor life's nature is described as a "world full of expressions, colors, dispositions, esthetic and other qualities" (Ibid: 172). It is the voice of nature that requires adopting imaginative rationality because it is the only one, which can properly encompass the diversity of the biosphere, where the harmonization is not equivalent to harmony, as people wish.

According to Tordsson, we discover different sides of ourselves when we handle situations, which are different from the day-life ones (Ibid: 173). Such an experience is embodied in the formula "I enjoy the mountain" (Jeg liker *meg* i fjellet) (Ibid). In this context, I argue that the mountain is not passive scenery for the Norwegians, but a container of life, where one achieves one's self-realization supported by nature. Referring to Tordsson's statement that climbing the mountains means a different way to be a human than the one, which is a result of going around the mountains (along the valleys) (Ibid: 165), I also point out that in this example, two different modes of being are displayed, which presume two different models of self-realization.

On a macro methodological level, rehabilitating the meeting between man and nature can be conceptualized due to the principle of imaginative rationality as a meeting guided by the formula 'objectivity is transperspectivity'. It means that facing nature with an open face, one faces oneself in the diversity of one's own personality. Thus adopting imaginative rationality benefits reconsidering the positive role of emotions and feelings, which are an indispensable part of one's personality, but which are usually neglected in the name of manifesting the faith in cognitive rationality and cognitive abilities respectively. Grounding the thesis that feelings and emotions are not irrational, but rather imply a different type of rationality, which also has a normative validity, would contribute to avoiding the pitfalls of both moral relativism and moral absolutism, i.e. to trace how the different attitudes towards nature in the Nordic countries are inspired by some differences in the worldview in so far as the latter is based on a different type of philosophical conceptions that have their own socio-cultural prerequisites. Such a worldview imposes a new type of *kalokagathia*, recognized as an ideal, which relies on how to exert a strong and harmonious body having a sharp mind and a good heart in nature.

In turn, the role of imaginative rationality should also be explored on a different methodological level since the idea of representing man's holistic experience of nature is important for revealing the origin of the Norwegian

traditions in ecophilosophy. Beginning with the holistic implications of Treshow's conception of 'human-nature dilemma'¹⁶, which is explored in his famous work *Human Worth and Human Well-being (Menneskeværd og Messeskevel)* (1807) to Arne Næss's gestalt ontology, I draw the conclusion that the implicit premises of understanding the genealogy of the reception of nature in Norway requires clarifying the significant role of imaginative rationality for the gestalt understanding.

In this context, I give a preference to the concept of moral experiential gestalt in so far as cultivating our sensitivity towards the net of the biosphere in Næss's sense is a matter of justifying given prototype characteristics of our moral experience so that we to recognize the importance of different moral identities even for the ones who cannot be determined as moral discussants by default.

¹⁶Treshow is recognized as a predecessor of the modern Norwegian ecophilosophy and deep ecology in particular (Witoszek 1999: 460). See also Randall 2007: 1, 25.

2.2.1. Norwegian Outdoor Life in the Romantic Era

Romanticism in Norway was influenced by the Romanticism in Europe, albeit it followed its own line of development. According to one of the most prominent researchers of Norwegian outdoor life traditions, Bredo Berntsen¹⁷, it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conception of happiness of man who has gone back to nature that "contributed to the establishment of Romanticism in Europe, and then to the one in Norway" (Berntsen 2011: 24). This way of thinking broke with one long-lasting tradition, which goes back to the early Jewish-Christian time and which has been strengthened during the Renaissance. It has been influenced by the theory of Francis Bacon saying that man was created in God's image and left to be a master of nature (Ibid). Berntsen argues that Romanticism in Norway has first blossomed after the end of the Napoleon wars as well as after the constitution at Eidsvoll was signed, relating the role of wild nature to the issue of national pride (Ibid: 25)¹⁸.

In this context, it is important two aspects of Berntsen's theory to be emphasized, namely, that the perspectives on environmental protection (naturvernets dimensjoner) have three lines of development – a practical dimension, a value-oriented dimension (an emotional dimension) as well as a cultural one (Ibid: 34). Examining the role of so-called value-oriented attitude towards nature and the influence of the aforementioned dimensions during Romanticism in Norway would benefit clarifying some explanations such as Witoszek's ones that Norwegian Romanticism has been driven by "antiromantic" tendencies (Witoszek 1998).

It is the cultivation of the axiological attitude that illustrates why the problem of nature's utilization is not a matter of 'realism', but rather of clarifying some complex socio-cultural relations, which show how the practical perspective can be defined only in respect with the axiological and cultural perspectives. These dimensions, which represent how, against the back-

¹⁷In his book, *Green Lines: History of Nature and Environmental Protection in Norway (Grønne linjer. Natur- og miljøvernets historie i Norge)* (1994), Berntsen provides a detailed analysis of how the understanding of nature in Norway changes in time.

¹⁸The pre-history of the reception of nature can be traced back to the Early Middle Ages, when the laws about nature were passed. Berntsen finds the roots of this tradition in Gulatingsloven (Gulatingssloven), which specified the conditions for using nature as a source. The problem of its utilization was recognized as a conflict for the first time in the beginning of the 16th century. It was caused by the distribution of the water saw (utbredelsen av *vannsagen*), representing the first ostensible conflict between growth and protection ('vekst og vern'), between technology and nature (Ibid: 18).

ground of so-called National project, the admiration of nature was conceptualized by developing a new ethical attitude that acquires more than one methodological perspective to be adopted. These alternative perspectives do not question the Norwegian Romanticism itself. On the contrary, they benefit revealing its specific image, which is closely tied with European Romanticism has also cultural and axiological dimensions (regarding the understanding of nature).

What are the particular implications of outdoor life's philosophy against the background of the Norwegian Romantic Movement? First, we have to clarify that regardless of the fact that Romanticism came to Norway as influenced by the one in Germany, Norwegian outdoor life's traditions were closer to the ones in England. According to Nedrelid, the 'classical' outdoor life (Det klassiske friluftslivet) was introduced by the Englishmen in the early 18th century when England, being the first industrialized country, faced the consequences of the industrialization resulting in a gradually increasing need of leading a life in nature (Nedrelid 1992: 282)¹⁹. Thus 'Activities such as hunting, fishing, going for a walk and skiing' (Ibid) gained a value in themselves. Nedrelid claims that Englishmen and then Norwegian citizens went to the mountains in order to experience nature, water and waterfalls, albeit it was not necessary for their work or day-life²⁰ (Ibid).

On the other hand, the better understanding of the development of outdoor life traditions requires the important role of folk culture in Norway to be emphasized. Norwegian ecologists, Mytting and Bischoff, argue that Norwegian hunters, food gatherers, agriculturalists, farmers, fishermen etc. have transferred through generations a number of activities and skills, "which today we take in as outdoor life activities" (Mytting og Bischoff 1999).

Otherwise, exploring Norwegian Romantic Movement as conceptually 'frightened' by the Romantic Movement in Europe²¹ would have contributed to blurring its profile since Romanticism was not a homogenous phenomenon. On the contrary, investigating the multilateral relations between so-called by Berntsen practical, value-oriented and cultural perspectives would help us to follow the development of the ethical attitudes towards na-

¹⁹For this interpretation, see also B. Tordsson *The Risk-taker in the Light of Some Different Perspectives on Outdoor Life ("Risikotakeren" i lys av forskjellige perspektiver på friluftsliv)* (2000).

²⁰ According to Nedrelid, outdoor life is a key symbol for Norwegian culture (Ibid: 285).

²¹ See Witoszek 1998.

ture, avoiding this development to be seen through the clichés of ‘pure’ Romanticism.

Furthermore, Faarlund examines one very important aspect for rethinking the genealogy of nature during Romanticism, namely, that it is this movement that puts in question the idea of nature as *res extensa*, encouraging the cultivation of ethical attitudes towards environment (Faarlund, Dahle and Jensen 2007: 394). He claims that the leading philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment, René Descartes (1596-1650), “opened up nature for an unlimited exploitation” (Ibid) neglecting its intrinsic value and thus indirectly influencing the Industrial revolution by putting forward the basis of the natural sciences. Since the conditions of industrialized Europe have provoked a counter movement favoring the reconsideration of the intrinsic value of nature, outdoor life was defined as a “legitimate child of the Romantic movement of Europe” (Ibid: 395).

One of the main methodological advantages of referring to Faarlund’s theory for the purposes of clarifying the genealogical connection of European and Norwegian Romantic movements is concerned with the way he describes the encounter with the free nature. Extrapolating his conception, I argue that the encounter in question can be defined as driven by the principles of ontological ethics, which provides the understanding of realization as the highest form of a self-realization in the complete openness towards the world²². The phenomenological implications of this meeting are seen in recognizing the transperspectivity as a prototype characteristic, which has normative connotations. In turn, an illustration of the latter can be found in rethinking the role of transperspectivity as a dialogue between two equal representatives, which have achieved a unique level of closeness due to imaginative rationality.

²² These ideas will be explored in detail in the chapter on Faarlund.

2.2.1.1. *The First Use of the Term Outdoor Life in Norway*

The term outdoor life ('friluftsliv') was coined in 1860 by the famous Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen who introduced it in his poem *On the Heights (På Viddene)*²³. According to Faarlund, the French expression 'la vie en plain air' "might have inspired Ibsen to apply the word to describe the 'free-nature life'" (Faarlund 1989: 94; Leirhaug 2009: 2). The concept in question is used in the middle part of Ibsen's poem *On the Heights*²⁴ referring to a young nameless man who leaves his home. While planning to go back with a reindeer pelt for his mother, he meets a stranger who convinces him to choose the life in the mountains. Later, the term of outdoor life appeared in a three-act drama called *Love's Comedy* (1862) (Leirhaug Ibid: 5), where it becomes "the representation of the Romantic" (Ibid: 3-4) by illustrating the feelings of Svanhild who chooses so-called marriage of convenience with Guldstad²⁵. The third appearance was in the manuscript of Ibsen's last drama *When We Dead Awaken* (1899), where he mentioned the outdoor life for the last time in his writings²⁶ (Ibid). The word is pronounced by the elder sculptor Rubek describing the personality of his wife Marta at the time he met her²⁷ (Ibid).

According to Faarlund, Norwegian national identity is closely tied with "the land, which emerges in the outdoor life" (landet, "som det stiger frem" i friluftslivet) (Faarlund 1991: 3) (Leirhaug 2007:70). In this context, we have to interpret his statement "Life in the mountains is an outdoor life, which takes place in the mountain" (*Mestre fjellet*) not as a tautological one, but rather as an existential statement. As a statement that reveals the entity of one nationally determined worldview. Referring to C. Rubenson's conception²⁸ saying that "We learnt to examine/know about (at kjende) mountain in that way" (Rubenson 1978: 118), a way, which is equivalent to love, Faarlund specifies the existential projections of understanding outdoor life²⁹.

²³ The references follow Leirhaug's classification. Leirhaug 2009: 2-3.

²⁴In the lonely mountain farm//My abundant catch I take//There is a hearth, and table,//And friluftsliv for my thoughts. (Leirhaug 2009: 3).

²⁵Now I shall put aside my friluftsliv//The leaf is falling; let the world receive me! (Leirhaug 2009: 5).

²⁶Leirhaug argues that the manuscript in question is an older draft of the drama's last section.

²⁷Professor Rubek (nods): – bought you, despite all that fermenting friluftsliv in you (Leirhaug 2009: 6).

²⁸ C. Rubenson is one of the first Norwegian mountaineers. According to him, it is the sense of belonging to nature that provokes city people to go out to the sea, forests and mountains (Rubenson 1978: 117).

²⁹The existential project is specified by reviving imaginative rationality, which implies the highest normative validity to love while both knowing and experiencing the world around us. See also Leirhaug 2007: 98.

2.2.1.2. The Role of Outdoor Life in the Debates about Norwegian City and Folk Cultures

Reconsidering the significant role of the internal connections between Norwegian Romanticism and Romantic Movement in Europe, we should clarify the genealogy of “two traditions within Norwegian outdoor life, namely the outdoor life as understood by so-called city culture and outdoor life as displayed by folk culture (bykulturens og landsbygdas friluftsliv) (Breivik 1978: 8-10). Furthermore, the conception that the privileged class looked at wild nature “with an open mind” (especially after 1905)³⁰ requires some other specifications to be made³¹. In this context, I argue that understanding outdoor life within the framework of Norwegian city culture, which strives for getting an inspiration from folk culture, is not a homogenous tendency, but rather a matter of outlining a net of multilateral references.

According to Faarlund, outdoor life has to be examined as ‘an arena where nature meets culture; as culturally connecting with the past mechanism (som en kulturell tilbakekoblingsmekanisme) (Faarlund 1973b: 4). However, Breivik raises the critical argument that outdoor life derives from the premises of the city culture against the countryside (landsbygd) ones (Breivik 1979: 4-5). While farmers have knowledge (kjennskapen og kunnskapen), the adopters of city culture have interests and will (vilje) (Ibid). Breivik argues that outlining “the roots of national Romanticism are representative for nothing but outdoor life in the mountain, as developed by the city culture”³².

Extending Faarlund’s statement that Romanticist vision of outdoor life has to be examined through its own optics, I reach the conclusion that the genealogy of Norwegian outdoor life requires exploring the origin of the different socio-cultural layers, which intersect. It is the optics in question that provides us with a view on the city and folk cultures, being inseparable

³⁰1905 is the year marking the end of the union between Norway and Sweden.

³¹ Due to the cultural heritage of the Kalmar union (1397-1523) between Norway, Sweden and Denmark (under the leadership of the latter), many intellectuals in Norway, who have been educated in the traditions of Danish culture, were skeptical about the idea Norwegian folk culture to be recognized as a main source of inspiration. The debates about the status of folk culture can also be followed on the level of the debates about the national language, namely, about the need of introducing national language on the basis of the Norwegian western dialects.

³² Røttene i nasjonalromantikken ikke er “representativt for noe særlig mer enn friluftsliv i fjellet slik det ble utviklet av bykulturen” (Breivik 1978: 12). See also Leirhaug 2007: 57. For the discussions between Breivik and Faarlund, see Leirhaug 2007: 56.

from the understanding of 'low' and 'high' cultures, literary language and dialects, as displayed against the background of the nation-building process in Norway.

Accepting Breivik's criticism is understandable if we presume that there are 'privileged' lens in such optics; i.e. that there are some mechanisms forcing us to see the whole picture from only one initial perspective. Claiming that outdoor life is an arena, where nature meets culture means that transperspectivity is commonly shared by default: as nature meets culture, as culture meets nature, taking into account that the arena itself provides the multiple projections of the meeting as such. In other words, the interest of the representatives of city culture in nature is only one of the many layers concerned with investigating the search for the genealogy of National project in Norway. That is why I agree with Faarlund that the Norwegian outdoor life tradition is about identity, about "touching and being touched by free Nature" (Faarlund, Dahle and Jensen 2007: 395).

2.2.1.2.1. *Askeladden*³³. *The Fairy Tale of the National Project of Outdoor Life*

Norwegian nature can be seen not only by adopting the aforementioned phenomenological optics, but also through developing “pragmatic lenses”³⁴ (Witoszek 1997: 222), i.e. by outlining how the cultural heritage, which is implemented in the oral traditions contributed to shaping the Norwegian national identity in respect with the ideals of Romanticism. Ash-lad fairy tale is a Norwegian popular fairy tale documented in 1844³⁵, which was considered as having a character that embodies the typically Norwegian qualities by contrast to the other Scandinavians³⁶. It is not by chance that Sigmund Kvaløy Setereng analyzes the role of the new rationality, which positively influenced the process of building national identity by rethinking the impact of nature. Interpreting the plot of the story by referring to Bergson’s conception of laughter, he poses the following question. Why did not the children in Denmark and Sweden have a leading figure such as Ash-lad (Kvaløy 2007: 84)?

Kvaløy argues that almost one third of the traditional Norwegian fairy tales has this specific character, the Ash-lad, who does appear neither in the other Scandinavian fairy tale collections, nor in brothers Grimm’s collection (Ibid: 83). As one of Ash-lad’s illuminative qualities, Kvaløy points out the reconsidered attitude towards nature as a part of Norwegian national psychology (Ibid).

³³ ‘Ash-lad’ in Norwegian.

³⁴ However, analyzing Witoszek’s statement that deep ecology is a therapy for the cultural neuroses that troubled Ibsen, Hamsun, Sandemose and other “sensitive Norwegian souls” (Witoszek 1999: 459), we face one more concern at least, namely, how does deep ecology represent an expanded version of the values of Norwegian rural Enlightenment to the rest of the globe (Ibid: 456)? If we identify the values of deep ecology with the ones of Norwegian Enlightenment, it would mean to neglect the complex socio-political background deep ecology took place in as well as its unique philosophical aspects. Furthermore, one of the main objectives of deep ecology is to provide some relevant mechanisms for ‘healing’ not only the individual, but also the social and political helplessness in front of the environmental disasters and thus to introduce a given type of biocentrism as a counter measure. On a macro methodological level, it means that this objective is concerned not only with healing, but also with proposing a thoughtful decision-making paradigm, which to prevent the transformation of the short-term problems into long-lasting ones.

³⁵ It is documented in Asbjørnsen and Moe’s collection of fairy tales.

³⁶ The plot of the story is retold due to Kvaløy’s interpretation.

According to Kvaløy, instead of trying to prove himself in the outer world, Ash-lad “sits by the fireplace, stirring the ashes and watching the ever-changing flames of the fire (Ibid). He is fascinated by the process, how nothing is constant, and how he can kindle and re-kindle the process but never control it”³⁷ (Ibid). This initial attentiveness towards the world defined as “the watchfulness of the flame” (Ibid) provides the idea that the complex understanding of the world itself is possible only through adopting a new type of rationality, which to arm the self with a new complex competence. Such rationality affects extending the concept of the encounter with the world by revealing that the process of contemplation displays a new type of competence regarding our practical experience. That is why I argue that extrapolating the concept of encounter by establishing this existential competence is a logical consequence of expanding the idea of rationality, which is primarily recognized as a cognitive rationality.

Judging by those investigations, I draw the conclusion that changing the orientational metaphors inflicts the change of what Tordsson calls ‘Nansen’s moral geography’ (Tordsson 2003: 116). The result is that the idea of future “as an already made map” (Kvaløy 2007: 83) does not exist any longer³⁸.

³⁷ Kvaløy retells one of the versions of Ash-lad stories (Ibid: 83-84), according to which he had two brothers, Per and Pål. They were living in a kingdom, where the daughter of the king never laughed. That is why the king announced that if someone makes her laugh, he will marry the princess and will get one half of the kingdom. Per and Pål started to practice for the competition, while Ash-lad kept watching the fireplace showing no interest at all. Per prepared a trick of a march ending with an unusual limp. In turn, Pål learnt to imitate a priest who was popular with reciting masses at break-neck speed. Having got tired of his mother’s nagging, Ash-lad left home, but “instead of being directional and goal seeking”, he was “observant and fascinated” by what he saw along the road (Ibid: 83). Kvaløy points out that on his road, Ash-lad got experience, which Per and Pål missed being obsessed with the goal. In this context, Kvaløy quoted Gandhi’s statement “The road is the goal and the goal is the road” (Ibid). Reaching the castle, Ash-lad looked for work and was employed by the chief cook to carry firewood and water (Ibid: 84). Hauling water from the local well, Ash-lad found an unexpectedly beautiful fish, which he decided to catch. On his way home, Ash-lad met a lady with a golden goose. They agreed to trade and the lady told him that the goose has magic skills. If someone comes over and touches it when its owner says “If you want to join, just hang on!”, that someone gets stuck to the goose (Ibid). Ash-lad himself also found out that anyone touching someone, who is attached to the goose, is caught in the same way (Ibid). Similar things happened to several people and when Ash-lad reached the princess’s balcony, there was a huge queue of people behind him, falling and bumping into each other. Having seen the members of her entourage in that position, the princess bursted into laughter (Ibid).

³⁸ For Ash-lad, the only future is the one whose complexity of challenges consists of sitting and sharing food with hungry old people, enjoying the shape of a round stone etc.

Adopting the new experiential competence makes me argue that justifying the meeting of man and nature due to the specificities of the Norwegian worldview, requires adopting particular moral experiential gestalts, which to contribute to revealing how Norwegian national identity in Romanticism is built on questioning some principles of deontological ethics, as represented in the deeds of Ash-lad's brothers Per and Pål.

Going back to the level of the theoretical investigations, I conclude that one of the methodological advantages of adopting Kvaløy's interpretation of Bergson's idea of laughter is that we can trace how due to establishing the role of imaginative rationality, the new experience can be reconsidered by the practices of moral understanding and moral learning. It is possible since thus we are provided with the opportunity to non-contradictory conceptualize even this experience, which due to the traditional paradigms looks unsubjectable to any classification whatsoever.

Ash-lad's highly developed capability to improvise can be defined as a prototype characteristic of the new competence, giving arguments in favor of so-called by Faarlund Askeladden-school versus Per and Pål's time (Askelad-skolen versus Per og Pål's tid)³⁹ (Faarlund 2000b: 211). It concerns the impact of two different worldviews recognized by defining two different living competences, which ground two different national projects respectively. Faarlund claims that the framework of interpretations is also closely tied with reconsidering the idea of rationality. Otherwise, the latter should provide the implementation of a cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process, which make us live in Per and Pål's time (Ibid). The contemporary culture requires adopting a depersonifying way of thinking (a thinking, which takes into consideration the pure cognitive rationality alone, underrating the significant role of our emotions and intuition), while so-called cultures close to nature (naturnære kulturer) (Ibid: 212) rehabilitate the choice of a life in harmony (vegvalg for *et liv i lage*) (Faarlund 1996: 2). In turn, the pathos of the investigations of Norwegian outdoor life in the 1970s corresponded to one of the inquiries conducted in the early 18th century when a new type of evaluation (Faarlund 1991: 6) was introduced. He defines the aims of philosophy of nature as peace and tranquility achieved in the outdoor life (Faarlund 1992: 9-12).

On a macro methodological level, the analysis on Askeladden's outdoor life philosophy shows why this philosophy of nature has to be examined as an

³⁹Faarlund 1997: 3. See also Leirhaug's reconstruction of Askeladden's school (Leirhaug 2007: 84).

axiologically oriented philosophy, i.e. as a philosophy of nature's life (natur-livsfilosofi) (Faarlund 2000b: 212). In this context, I argue that it is the embodiment of the new imaginative rationality that has much to do with the process of choosing rather than with a given choice of life in peace; a process, which is based on the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature as a value in itself. That is why Faarlund claims that the world is not "only a rebus" (Ibid: 213), but also a way towards life, which is a way of knowing⁴⁰.

Going back to the plot of the story contradicting two different types of time, namely, Per-and-Pål's time vs. Askeladden's one is possible if we reconsider them from the perspective of Norwegian nation building movement. It is important to outline the ontological grounding of the relationship between competence and time answering the following questions. What is 'Per-and-Pål's competence'? Is it just a lack of competence or rather a different one? To what extent is Askeladden's competence defined as such due to the aims of the nation building movement, and to what extent does Per-and-Pål's time refer to the cultural heritage of the Kalmar union respectively?

In this context, I reach the conclusion that contradicting the aforementioned competences is a result of contradicting two different visions of time (past and present time), which are laid in one and the same temporal plane for the purposes of compromising two models of national identity. Reinterpreting Kvaløy's conception, we can outline how the differences of the landscapes (the ones between Norway and Denmark) function as socio-cultural boundaries revealing the contrast between two visions of time. This contrast can be determined as an axiologically grounded one, which is based on the contradiction of what Kvaløy calls organic time (embodied in Askeladden-time) and mechanical one (embodied in Per-and-Pål's one)⁴¹.

⁴⁰ In turn, the way towards life in harmony can be reached by the process of experiencing and understanding since in the meeting with home culture and free nature (defined as the good "helpers" (hjelperne)), Askeladden polished his manners, not only his education ("fikk Askeladden sin dannelse, ikke bare ut-dannelse") (Ibid: 4).

⁴¹ The distinction between organic and mechanical time will be discussed in the chapter on Kvaløy.

2.3. How ‘Social’ Is Norwegian Outdoor Life in the Social Project?

We should emphasize that the process of what Berntsen calls transition from Romanticism to industrialization, which gave birth to the modern outdoor life (Berntsen 2011: 24-29) as well as was focused on justifying the mountain as belonging to the typical ‘Norwegian’ (Ibid: 30) is provided in a new, complex way, taking into account the specificities of growing class stratification and the need of preserving the ‘old’ ideals of being in nature. It turned out that outdoor life kept being a home of the Norwegian climbers, who denied the role of alpinism as a sport activity. Referring to Conwentz’s theory⁴² (Ibid: 51), I argue that Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life at that time used to have much to do with different culturally determined conceptions of what environmental protection should look like.

In turn, examining the transformation of Norwegian outdoor life’s tradition⁴³ requires the genealogy of some new aspects to be explored. Tordsson argues that in the interwar time working class recognized the outdoor life as an ideal, as a way of deliberation (*befrielsesvei*) (Tordsson 2002: 3), contradicting the reconsidered old ‘new’ ideal of being in the forests and mountains, which became a “symbol of the class society” (Ibid: 2). It is the class stratification that inflicted the need of interpreting this ideal as a collective one since the old values were incorporated into a new system. Thus the role of Norwegian outdoor life was reconsidered by gaining a new collective value and a new symbolic capital⁴⁴. Furthermore, the stratification in question contributed to the justification of the ‘positive’ symbolic capital of the collective camping and hiking introduced by the Norwegian social Democ-

⁴² According to Berntsen, Hugo Conwentz considers the work on environmental protection as an expression of “culture and civilization” (Ibid: 50-51).

⁴³ The socio-cultural dilemmas in Norway also had another aspect since they were reshaped under the influence of the war situation in Europe. In the interwar period, the activities of the Land association were focused on the polar expeditions aiming at appropriating Svalbard and Greenland (Reinertsen og Asdal 2010: 19) (Berntsen 2011: 87).

⁴⁴ Analyzing the contribution of Sjur K. Selland, Berntsen claims that his article entails cultural optimism. In the publication of 1920 Selland argued that nature is not only a product of material profits, but also one of “an organic connecting totality” (*heile*) (Ibid: 75). Thus the “reconciliation between capital and work” (as Eriksen claims) (Ibid), as well as the critique of the misuse of nature were examined as a critique of modernity against the background of the growing industrialization.

rats (Gåsdal 2007: 80), which was a result of the increasing impact of the relation between work and leisure time.

The arising social stratification is one of the reasons for examining and representing nature as an arena of resources, which can be a subject to exploitation. Recognizing the practical perspective as the only one possible perspective at the expense of the axiological and cultural ones has its inevitable negative consequences.

Going back to the aspects of time dimensions, I reach the conclusion that the class-stratification provided a new understanding of time because the latter was more often considered as a matter of possession on human side. The competence that required Ash-lad's understanding of time was replaced with one established for the sake of imposing time itself, which became a source of justifying the most relevant and flexible competence while being in nature. In this context, outdoor life gained a collective value whose way of functioning was determined by the arising symbolic capital of the leisure time understood as a time, which is possessed by the individual for his/her own needs.

On a macro methodological level, the interwar period in Norway can be characterized with the acceleration of the misuse of nature. That is why not only the fight for gaining land, but also the one for nature was considered as a matter of preserving the national identity.

2.4. The Challenges of Modernization to Norwegian Outdoor Life

The methodological consequences of the increasing class stratification became more apparent in the war period as well as in the first year after the war⁴⁵, when the idea of nature as a place of living survived multiple transformations from a global perspective. In the first year after the war, the battle was no longer a battle for being, but rather for taking the challenge of living at different places, which are not necessarily homes.

After the liberation in 1945, the Norwegian Labor party (Arbeiderpartiet) (which governed for 20 years) supported the economic growth as well as established “working places through industrialization and planned control of the development of society” (Reinertsen og Asdal 2010: 20)⁴⁶.

In Norway, the first reforms were made in the beginning of the 20th century (after 1905), when the Prime Minister Christian Michælsen introduced a new workday; one reform that positively affected the idea that the distress has a high negative symbolic capital (Berntsen 2011: 61). That is why we may argue that all the counter strategies have to be oriented towards encouraging one collective ethos⁴⁷ (Tordsson 2007: 66-67) only in formal terms since the latter is based on the new elitarian ideal of being alone in wilderness as a stance of independence.

Regarding policy on nature, there was a “clear continuity between interwar period and the time before” (Ibid), which caused seeing nature as a resource. The latter has to be used for the best of society and its citizens as well as in a rational and good manner respectively.

⁴⁵According to Tordsson, war strengthened the connections between the city and countryside in Norway (Tordsson 2002: 4).

⁴⁶In turn, the conception regarding ‘humanized’ nature is a result of exaggerating the utilitarian role of thinking based on the pure cognitive rationality, which provoked what Tordsson described as the role of free time, namely, the need of deliberating from the instrumental rationality by reconsidering the closeness to nature and arising freedom (Tordsson 2003: 116). One project that was conceptualized by Labor party’s radicals who were deeply involved in promoting the slogan ‘outdoor life for all’ and who participated in the interwar era in building a new welfare state (Tordsson 2007: 4).

⁴⁷I extrapolate Tordsson’s concept of individual ethos, which has to be mirrored by the modern contemporary society (Tordsson 2007: 66).

An illuminative illustration of this thesis can be seen in what Faarlund writes about the ‘destiny’ of Ash-lad’s story and how it gained a new popularity during the war respectively. The need of rehabilitating the ‘romantic’ image of nature through reconsidering the axiological, practical and cultural perspectives in Berntsen’s sense represents the willingness of re-justifying the image of humanity as such in a pan-European context. In other words, going back to the cultural heritage as a source of strengthening the national identity was determined as a part of the global strives for rethinking the role of the national values in the name of mankind’s ones by revealing the impact of solidarity on social level, as Tordsson claims.

Reconsidering the increasing modifications of the debate about growth and environmental protection into the one about industrial development versus environmental preservation, the Norwegians began to discuss the ecological situation as a precedent; regardless of the political-economic system, the role of weather, accidents (uhell) and divine power, it is described as a beginning of wisdom (Berntsen 2011: 117). In the after war period, the aforementioned contradiction was modified as one grounded in growing technocratic optimism versus the need of environmental changes. The debate took place against the background of the classical understanding of the role of natural sciences. In this context, we may claim that the value of scientific knowledge was interpreted as having two sides contradicting the idea of progress and the one of process.

From the perspective of nature, the way back to nature was determined as a long way to practical wisdom, which brings us back to the new implications of the debate about episteme and techne. That is why the dilemmas can be recognized as stemming from the normative validity of practical knowledge.

According to P. Anker, in the 1960s nature was transformed from “a place of work into a place of leisure” (Anker 2007: 456), which happened within the framework of the sizable industry of vacationing (Ibid). The public access to nature became a politically potent issue due to the arising social distress and the need of dealing with it (Tordsson 2007: 67).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the modification of the growth and environmental protection debate also affected the increasing sportification of Norwegian outdoor life⁴⁸. It was a re-

⁴⁸ According to Tordsson, while Norwegian outdoor life did not have an important place in building the after war society, *idretten* played a central role in the project of Modernization (Tordsson 2002: 4).

sult of the clash of two different socio-cultural conceptualizations of nature, which first, concerned the ideal of uncorrupted nature and second, determined nature as an arena of resources. On a macro methodological level, I argue that the debate contradicted two conceptions of growth: the second conception culminated into what economists called ‘sustainable development’, while the first one was mainly focused on the theory of de-growth (especially in the mid-1960s). The contradiction gained new power against the background of the interwar politics, when economic development was justified by the idea of capital, which was gained for the sake of obtaining a surplus of resources (Berntsen 2011: 99). When the work was evaluated from the perspective of capital, it contributed to developing a new type of rationality, which supported the strengthening of class struggle⁴⁹.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that the clash between development and environmental protection became a fact due to the clash of different interests, which should have had to be uncontradictory anticipated by so-called ethics of conservation (Ibid: 109). The contradictions were more apparent in the after war period since compensating the losses of war inflicted the need of accelerating rationality by looking for additional sources of exploitation in order to broaden the net of capital investments. Yet in 1970s Norwegian state began to work on integrating the outdoor life to the Modernization project (Tordsson 2002: 5).

In turn, Norwegian nature was also considered as an arena for recreation⁵⁰ (Ibid); an issue, which has had a central place in the social policy of the Norwegian Labor party. The latter was focused, among other problems, on supporting vacations that are longer than three days as well as on the consolidation of public outdoor life areas⁵¹.

In conclusion, mirroring the individual ethos is not a unilateral process since building collective ethos presumes the ideal ‘to be alone in wilderness’ to be reproduced in any time and at any place available. In turn, vacation has to ‘occur’ at the ideal place and time supported by the means of technologies

⁴⁹The struggle in question took place within the framework of the similarities between economic liberalism and social democracy, as Trond B. Eriksen claimed (Berntsen 2011: 109).

⁵⁰ Tordsson also emphasizes that it is an arena of social fight (between upper and lower classes) (Tordsson 2002: 3).

⁵¹ The Outdoor life law (Friluftsløven) of 1957 included another important right, which characterizes Scandinavian environmental policy, namely, so-called public right to access (allemannsrett) that gave people access to nature, also on a private basis (Berntsen 2011: 125).

for a maximum number of people, recognizing the subject's leading role in the 'man-nature' relationship. In this context, I draw the conclusion that nature becomes an area of an over-exploitation. It is interpreted as a humanized nature, which means that it is misrecognized as nature that cannot function without humans.

2.4.1. The Sportification of Norwegian Outdoor Life

The dramatic fight of preserving the methodological balance between the need of rehabilitating the intrinsic value of nature and its utilitarianization was also represented on a different level, namely, on the one of arising sportification of Norwegian outdoor life. Justifying mass sport as a part of the state policy after the Second World War in Norway became a significant component of the strategy to develop ways of keeping the requirements of free time high.

According to one of the ‘fathers’ of Norwegian philosophy of sport, Gunnar Breivik, Norwegians like seeing themselves as “especially active” (Breivik 2010: 195). Being active is considered as an important part of improving health and social welfare by practicing different sports. The two paradigms, which Breivik analyzes, are the ones of Olympic sports and outdoor life⁵².

One of the main methodological concerns provoked by the aforementioned model is that the paradigm of outdoor life could interfere with the one of sport, referring the components of national identity to praising the physical experience and doing exercises alone. In other words, exploring outdoor life hides the risks it to be examined as a net of activities by overrating the role of physical participation at the expense of the worldview’s implications and the complexity of cultural and social attitudes respectively.

On the other hand, tracing the origin of the two words used in Norwegian for sport – the words ‘sport’ and ‘idrett’ contribute to showing the arising risk philosophy of sport to be replaced with the theory of sport, as Breivik argues. He clarifies that the word ‘idrett’ comes from Old Norwegian. Used by the Vikings, it has meant ‘strong deeds’ including “not only activities like running, swimming and sailing, but also the ability to ride a horse, make a poem and use a sword. It contained all the sides of a full-blown hero of the Viking era, similar to Homer’s Bronze Age heroes” (Ibid: 195). In this context, Breivik makes the specification that today the word can be taken in its narrow sense, in a sense similar to the word ‘sport’, but he will use it in a broader sense including play, games, dance and outdoor activities (Ibid). One of the reasons is that adopting the broader sense of the word

⁵² Breivik claims that ‘life in the open air’ (Ibid) includes practices such as hunting and fishing followed by hiking and climbing, which gave the ‘modern’ outlook of outdoor life in the 19th century (Ibid: 195-196).

benefits examining the role of sport among other outdoor activities, such as outdoor life.

In turn, the methodological advantage of investigating the common genealogy of the outdoor activities in Norway is concerned with revealing the multiple aspects of the national worldview, especially the ones related to the axiological perspective in Berntsen's sense. Neglecting outdoor life's axiological perspective would lead to simplifying it as a fundamental experience concerned with shaping unique moral experiential gestalts. It is the lack of axiological neutrality that makes the clarification of complexity of physical activities and psychological attitudes so important for specifying the boundary between real outdoor life and philosophy of outdoor life. In other words, exploring the axiological perspective benefits recognizing ecophilosophy as a particular worldview philosophy, which cannot reduce the 'transcendental experience in nature' (Repp 2001: 109-110) to the unlimited exploitation of nature's resources.

2.5. How Did Norwegian Outdoor Life Change in the Ecosocial Project?

According to Tordsson, outdoor life turned into a starting point in criticizing the whole Modernization project (Tordsson 2002: 5). Referring to Breivik's statement that technological culture has "bankrupted" (har spilt fallitt), which affected the reconsideration of outdoor life as both thinking and living form (Ibid), he argues that the meeting with nature cannot give pills for headache to one "ill living form" (en syk livsform) (Ibid: 6). In this context, the question of "what outdoor life" ("hvilket friluftsliv") is a starting point for the lively discussions about "what society" ("hvilket samfunn")⁵³ (Ibid).

Clarifying the origin of 20th century Norwegian ecophilosophies in respect with outdoor life, I argue that they are closely tied with the idea of justifying what the best environmentally friendly politics should look like. In turn, Norwegian environmental activism concerned the ways of establishing ecopolitics grounded in the 'right', in the sense of epistemologically relevant, informed consent as presuming the adoption of a certain kind of knowledge.

It is important to emphasize that the need of such activism in Norway was not merely a result of the collision between big concerns' interests and average people's ones. One of the main aims of Norwegian activism at that time was to politically revive the idea of uncorrupted nature as a matter of defending political right since the aforementioned two types of interest affected the degree as well as the regulation of nature's use, but from different perspectives. The conflict of interests was rather focused on the subject, namely, whether this is the ordinary people or the state. While the government supported the thesis that knowledge was necessary for justifying the interests, Mardøla and Alta actions showed that knowledge dominates what kind of interests to choose. That is why in the 1960s and early 1970s, we saw two different projects of ecopolitics in Norway. The first one was grounded in supporting given interests, which had to be protected by the means of science (science and nature were interpreted as sources of a similar kind, i.e. as sources of utilization), while the second one were based on the need of informed consent, which was recognized by the citizens as hav-

⁵³ Tordsson argues that the tendencies to drag (trekke) outdoor life in the Modernization project for the purposes of serving the dominating societal development were in this way considerably moderate (Ibid).

ing a high value. The tension derived also from the fact that the attempts at accelerating the ecopolitical mechanisms took place within the framework of the 'classic' understanding of the concept 'environmental protection' (naturvern)⁵⁴.

Furthermore, environmental protection (including the preservation of the opportunities for outdoor life) turns into a necessary condition for societal development. It gradually became a part of the ecosocial project of the late 1960s, which made possible to talk about "growth and environmental protection" as a subject to utilitarian ideology (Berntsen 2011: 144). During this period, giving natural sources to concession was a crucial problem discussed in so-called governmental *Long-time Program (Langtidsprogram)* (1973) because it strengthened the tension of the 'versus' mode. In tune with the aforementioned issues, so-called modern ecological thinking gained power. It also influenced the international trends showing why the technological invasion has a long-lasting influence upon mankind's development.

⁵⁴ Following Berntsen's explanation (Berntsen 2011: 133-134), we can see how the idea of environmental protection was exploited in two different ways: in the party programs and by the environmental activists respectively

2.5.1. The Impact of Earthliness, or What Does It Mean to Be at Home in Nature?

Maybe one of the first attempts to clarify the need of having ecophilosophy can be implicitly seen in the writings of Nansen who argues against reducing the role of philosophy of outdoor life. He appeals for discerning touring culture due to the philosophy of outdoor life and due to the city culture respectively (Samuelsen 2010: 25). The distinction in question depends on what kind of values we would prescribe to the initial meeting between man and nature: whether the latter will be recognized as a total openness or as a meeting by which man is 'in' nature without encompassing it.

Nansen argued for rehabilitating the ideals of outdoor life encouraging the establishment of the individual relationships with free nature as a guarantee of meeting the criteria of a successful self-realization. He explored the implications of the statement that people 'should always walk alone' against one of the main mountain rules of Norwegian outdoor life, namely, 'never go on a tour alone' (gå alltid alene... mot gå aldri på tur alene) (Østrem 2003: 2). In his well-known speech called *Outdoor Life (Friluftsliv)* (1924) Nansen opposed the city life and the one in nature encouraging the examination of the roots of outdoor life. It is the latter that "can compensate us and bring us back to "one more human existence" (til en mere menneskelig tilværelse) (Nansen 1995: 146). He pointed out that the stimulus to go back to our own nature is the simple outdoor life, in the forests, fields and mountains, "in the big heights, in deep loneliness (i den store ensomhet), where completely new thoughts come out to us and leave marks, which cannot be removed so fast again" (Ibid: 146-147). Thus one instinctively begins to feel oneself as a different person, as a "more natural and healthier person" (Ibid: 147). Thus one feels that one has something, which "lies below" (som ligger under), which is one's real personality. One comes back with a fresher and healthier attitude towards life compared to the one in the city (Ibid).

The aforementioned stances show that feeling at home in nature can be achieved through turning loneliness into a prototype characteristic of our experience, which to guarantee the transparency of the total openness of man and nature. Therefore going back to the roots of outdoor life means to adopt a new paradigm of moral learning. The paradigm in question could be based on the ideal of experiential learning; a process that could be compared with Gunnar Repp's theory of outdoor life's know how (Repp 2001: 112).

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the methodological continuity between Nansen's conception and the theory of the founder of deep ecology Arne Næss can be traced back to how Nansen's 'moral geography', as described by Tordsson, functions as based on ontological ethics. Extrapolating Tordsson's conception who claims that Nansen's moral geography is grounded in the pre-

sumption of natural man, who lives in his/her natural environment (Tordsson 2003: 15), we can outline the changing profile of the ‘nature-culture’ relationships (Ibid), emphasizing not only the dichotomic connections, but also their way of functioning as a dialectical relationship in Faarlund’s sense, namely, by recognizing nature as a home of culture (Faarlund 1989).

The pathos of Nansen’s theory was to reveal the disadvantages of giving preference to life in the city as being ‘captured’ in only one living form (so-called by him cage life (et kasseliv)) (Nansen 1995: 145) at the expense of adopting multiple living forms in noncontradictory manner. On a macro methodological level, it means that one of the main prerequisites for comparing Nansen’s and Næss’s philosophies can be seen in rehabilitating spontaneous experience as a prototype characteristic of the aforementioned experiential learning due to the principles of imaginative rationality. For Nansen ‘to live richly’ is what is for Næss ‘to live a life that is simple in means but rich in ends’ (Næss 1978: 144) because both of them emphasize the achievement of self-realization as a way of reconsidering man’s place in nature as being at home.

Another methodological similarity concerns the diachronic implications of the aforementioned moral geography, taking into account that both Nansen and Næss refer the presumption that ‘nature is a home of man’ to the very past; an ideal past, which could be revived by the practices of experiential learning. One of the benefits of adopting such a learning is that it would arm us with experiential moral understanding, which, paraphrasing Sigmund Kvaløy, would make the self-realization possible by grasping life’s complexity rather than by strengthening its complication (Kvaløy 1976: 19). Favoring the simple life in nature understood as a way of fulfilling a particular worldview philosophy (i.e. of accomplishing a given personal life philosophy) is grounded in the presumption that total openness is an essential mode of being. Both Nansen and Næss (albeit adopting different means) couple self-realization with the process of identification, which is projected within Næss’s ecosophy under the guise of a form of identification that is deprived of moral connotations⁵⁵

In turn, in the essay *My Belief (Min Tro)* (1922) Nansen appealed for establishing new morality based on the old guiding stars (ledestjernene) solidarity and love (Nansen 1995: 214-215) (Samuelsen 2010: 85). Regarding the promotion of self-realization within the framework of ontological ethics, the role of solidarity and love in Næss’s writings can be examined by outlining the influence

⁵⁵ This thesis will be discussed in detail in the chapter on Næss.

of Erich Fromm⁵⁶; an influence, which is usually overlooked at the expense of the ones of Spinoza and Mahayana Buddhism⁵⁷.

Furthermore, one of the possible parallels regarding the specifically Nordic understanding of nature can be drawn between Næss's theory and the one of the Icelandic philosopher P. Skúlason who discussed 'earthliness' as a grounding principle making one feel oneself a human being. Being fascinated by the mountain Askja, Skúlason argued that it represents the Earth itself saying that I am I, and You are You, and We are We because we are what we are in the face of Askja (Skúlason 2005: 48). Similarly, Naess displayed the idea that nature has a soul referring to Sami people's claim that river also has a soul⁵⁸. Analyzing both conceptions makes me conclude that it is adopting the principles of imaginative rationality that justifies the normative implications of the aforementioned understanding since imagination does not 'add' additional being, but rather reveals the complexity of the hidden one in a way, which does not put in question its objectivity. Thus Næss's question of what it means 'to think like a mountain' is comparable with Rudolph Otto's idea of numinous producing a state *sui generis*, which can be achieved neither by cognitive rationality alone, nor by relying merely on ethics (Otto 1970: 5).

⁵⁶ Andrew Brennan argues that Fromm used the term *biophilia* describing "a healthy love of life, interest in living things and joy at one's own being alive" (Brennan 2013: 113). Næss anticipates Fromm's conception saying that love of others and love of ourselves are not alternatives (Ibid). Furthermore, genuine love is "an expression of productiveness and implies care, respect, responsibility and knowledge" (Ibid). In this context, Brennan pays attention to Næss's quotations of Fromm's ideas exploring how the development of a philosophy of joyful affirmation of life distances Næss's ecosophy from the followers of Leopold's land ethic (Ibid).

⁵⁷ This influence will be examined in the chapter on Næss.

⁵⁸ He also argues that "I do not step into the river", as Heraclites claims, but "I am the river" (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 3).

2.5.2. The Steep Way of Norwegian Philosophy of Climbing

According to Anker, Norwegian ecologists at that time can be characterized as “advocates of a recreational nature” emphasizing the significant role of recreational values and conservation of nature (Anker 2007: 459). In this context, I draw the conclusion that it is the arising symbolic capital of recreational values that makes the risk of reducing nature to *res extensa* bigger in the name of searching for its unique, scientifically recognizable value.

KKK (1967), consisting of 37 climbers led by Reidar Eriksen, Egil Myhre, and Per Gaarder, functioned as a local climbing club which countered the elitism of NTK (Olsen 1992: 67). In turn, NTK was considered to be “perhaps the most exclusive of a myriad of outdoor recreation societies,” whose slogan was formulated by the prominent Norwegian philosopher and mountaineer, Peter Wessel Zapffe: “Climbing to other sports is like champagne to bock beer,” displaying the spirit of “this upper crust fraternity” (Anker 2007: 458). In the late 1920s, Arne Næss met Zapffe for the first time in Kolsås, which was called a “center for advanced friluftsliv” (outdoor life) (Kolsrud 1992: 119); a meeting that became one of the most crucial prerequisites for the further development of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies. According to Bruskeland and Støren, both Næss and Zapffe had been climbing Kolsås for over 30 years before the KKK was founded, and thus their climbing ethics was formulated as a matter of a “live” practical philosophy (Bruskeland and Støren 1992: 79).

Regarding climbing techniques, bolt climbing was promoted by Næss against the principles of NTK and the British influence in 1930s, while so-called clean climbing (Kolsrud 1992: 116) was imposed by the “father” of the Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, Nils Faarlund, and some other supporters in the late 1960s. During his stay in Austria (1954-1955), Næss was struck by the idea that the climbers in Norway should become as crafty as the Austrian ones, but by sharing another philosophy of climbing (Næss 1978a: 125). He was one of the first climbers to argue that the aim of climbing is not the experience of the climbers themselves, nor the mountain’s formations or routes, but rather the realization of the pilgrim meeting with the mountain (Ibid).

The anticipation of bolt climbing techniques had much to do with the fact that Kolsås and some other cliffs around it became “arenas” for climbing (Kolsrud 1992: 122). At first sight, it appears that bolts were recognized as aiding the process of conquering the mountain in so far as they made the most difficult ways accessible for the climber. Accessibility itself turned in-

to a key prerequisite for justifying the environment as an arena for conquering difficult or inaccessible peaks. However, rejecting the idea that peaks should be named after the people who have climbed them was a significant element of the new philosophy of climbing⁵⁹.

On a practical level, the use of bolts showed an increasing tendency to expand dependence on external factors to overcome the difficulties the climbers faced, but it happened against the background of understanding man's responsibility toward both others and nature. Otherwise, the problem of interacting with nature would have been reduced to how to approach the peak of a mountain fast and effectively, with "effectiveness" defined from climber's perspective alone.

If effectiveness had become a key characteristic of climbing and replaced the "natural" intensity of the climbing experience itself, the debates about safety would have been simplified to the choice and application of means and their instrumental value. It would have been a problem triggered by the use of bolts as means rather than by their contribution to easing the interaction with nature. Bolt climbing was recognized as dominated by so-called responsibility for the product (Ibid: 123), namely how long the bolts will last and whether the climber has the competence to adequately place them. This tendency has developed in time with the more widespread introduction of "modern" ideas of climbing due to increasing industrialization and its impact on turning nature into an exploitable source.

Analyzing the ethical aspects of bolt climbing makes it questionable to define it as uncritically adopted within the values of climbing sport's ethics. Bolts are introduced in order to meet the requirements of rising safety concerns, i.e. to improve the safety level of all climbers involved. In the 1950s, the essence of climbing was defined by Kolsås by the following formulas: "Never stay on one bolt!" and "The first man should never fall down!" (Høibakk 1992: 62). The shared responsibility for the others is one of the most significant embodiments of the interaction between the climber and the mountain that grounds the understanding of climbing ethics as a certain type of applied ethics.

In the article *Bolt Climbing*, published in the journal *Norwegian Mountain Sport (Norsk fjellsport)* (1948), Naess claimed that it is not right to enlist

⁵⁹ Naess mentions the name of the well-established Norwegian climber, Einar Hoff-Hansen, as an illuminative representative of a tendency toward wide egalitarianism and anti-heroism at that time (Hohle 1992: 41).

and encourage people to take up a sport which might create great sorrow for their relatives (Hohle 1992: 42). It is an experience that presumes not only that one will make particular engagements, but also necessitates awareness of one's responsibility to the experience itself, which is understood as an inseparable component from the responsibility to climber's life as a whole. To a certain extent, bolt climbing naturally entails the avoidance of experiential dualism, i.e. separating the climbing experience as an object from the climber as a subject.

Examining the value of climbing itself, I would argue that the role of training in the context of climbing is not equivalent to training for a sport. In the 1930s, climbing was addressed in Kolsås as "our dear sport" (Olsen 1992: 54), which shows that its prototype characteristics had less to do with the contemporary understanding of sport philosophy than might be thought. Climbing was described as "dear," since joy and fun are the characteristics that give coherence to the climber's experiential gestalt. As it is defined by the members of the club, Kolsås was not a goal in itself, it was a preparation for the mountain (Høibakk 1992: 65) in which participants cultivated their skills in order to be able to face physical, mental, and psychological challenges. Mastering such skills was designed to improve contact with nature and others rather than make the aforementioned skills goals in themselves.

In this context, a specification must be made. The ideas of exercising and practicing this philosophy of climbing—which are expressed by another representative of the later Kolsås generations, Dag Kolsrud, with one Norwegian word signifying both activities (the word "utøvelse")—should be examined in its double meaning, discerning between climbing as an existential experience and climbing as a sport. Since Kolsrud calls clean climbing an example of "a new ideology within exercising/practicing of climbing sport" (Kolsrud 1992: 116), it is important to emphasize that in the beginning, Norwegian bolt climbing was adopted as a means for keeping the complex interaction between man and nature as transparent as possible, while the forthcoming ideology of sport built on exercising rather than on "practicing"—understood as an existential mode of becoming—presumes treating the means as goals in themselves. On a micro-methodological level, it shows that the ideology of sport is focused on bolts rather than on bolt climbing, absolutizing the role of equipment by making it an object of severe competition: the more fashionable the equipment is, the better the climbers are. This is one idea whose development brings bolt climbing as it was introduced by Næss in Norway into question.

In turn, the revolutionary impact of “clean climbing” consisted in its introduction as a practical and environmentally friendly way to climb, since the changes in technique caused changes in the philosophical influences behind them. While the egalitarian ideas of NTK were influenced by British philosophy, clean climbing opened the door for a stronger American intellectual influence. According to Kolsrud, the American influence in question became more apparent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, triggering changes which, however, were not very instructive only for Norway (Ibid: 115). The Alpine traditions, the role of the mountain, and the philosophical foundations of outdoor life in the lives of Norwegian climbers predisposed them toward adopting the practices of Central Europe. In practice, such an impact means that the latter were rather replaced with some American ideas, shifting the focus to style and technology, and to the growing interest in safety equipment and free climbing (Ibid).

Free climbing itself was triggered by the generational shift in Kolsås in the early 1970s, as well as by the international development of the field of climbing, which both contributed to raising free climbing to the level of sport. The climbing in question also showed how the use of German words and expressions for climbing were being replaced with new English terminology. As Kolsrud himself argued, the secondary language in Kolsås was no longer *Ny Norsk*⁶⁰, but English (Ibid: 117).

The intensive internalization of climbing in Norway led to its transformation in the face of the increasing impact of industrialization on society generally. This transformation had both its positive and negative sides with regard to the uncritical reception of different ideals. In the case of Norwegian climbing, although the uncritical import of American ideals partly followed other dividing lines, it revealed how the development of climbing follows the development of society (Ibid).

In this context, the sportification of climbing caused by the internalization of foreign values can be seen as emerging from an uncritical acquisition of foreign norms, which in turn provoked the replacement of climbing ethics with the one of sport. The transformation in question presumed a change in the mode of becoming: the meaning of the climbing experience guided by the formula “Because it (the mountain) is there” was substituted with the

⁶⁰ *Ny Norsk* (New Norwegian) is one of the two official Norwegian written standards. It was created in the mid-19th century in order to provide an alternative to Danish, which was still dominant in Norway at that time.

Kolsås's "Because we are here"⁶¹. Thus, in order to understand the genealogy of the subject change in climbing, we should focus on outlining the normative validity of experiential gestalt as grounded in the complex pattern of implementing different ideals of climbing—namely, whether climbing is recognized as ascending a trackless passage (*ferdsel*) or a well-trodden way (*Ibid*).

However, so-called clean climbing is not only a cliché (*Ibid*: 115). In terms of safety, the better equipment is, the faster and safer the climbing is. On the other hand, the necessity of creating more elaborate equipment does not exhaust the debate about the purpose of climbing, which is a significant argument in favor of the thesis that such an interest is not necessarily a sign of a need for its sportification.

Since industrialization requires a mass production of artifacts, climbing faces the negative influences of those changes. The so-called lime debate (*kalkdebaten*) (*Ibid*: 117) in Norway is an illuminative illustration of how the aforementioned mode of non-necessity comes into question through pressure to mass-produce climbing equipment. The debate concerns the quality of "climbing production," which "does not have only cosmetic or psychological effects" (*Ibid*: 119). It is taking place at a time when free climbing is being introduced, showing a gradual change in climbers' attitudes towards exaggerating the role of equipment. This is also one of the first signs of the forthcoming sportification that makes the price a value in itself, and thus encourages striving for sportification for commercial reasons.

In turn, raising the level of safety does not lead to ruining the mountain, since clean climbing happens "almost silently and tracelessly" (*Ibid*: 116). That new securing process is based on placing and removing bolts with one's hands, as ease of execution is not recognized within the contemporary context as merely raising the level of efficiency, i.e. as reducing the time for reaching the goal, but also extending the space for both others and environment by "cleaning" given signs of man's presence in it. On a macro-methodological level, it means that the formula "Easy and fast" is a formula

⁶¹ These formulas are answers to the question of why people climb. The first one was given one hundred years ago by Albert Mummery (as a response to the question of why he climbed the Matterhorn in the Alps). He emphasized that the real subject of climbing is not the climber, but the mountain. The second answer shows the growing desire among the members of Kolsås to establish a certain type of group belonging which strengthens self-realization via the process of identification (*Ibid*: 117).

which differs when adopted in extreme rock climbing or indoor climbing, because it does not concern the amplification of time, but the clarification of space understood as a horizon of interacting rather than as an arena for certain sport activities.

As Kolsrud emphasizes in his essay, clean climbing established both a concept and its own activity, but it does not follow that safety should be put under the umbrella of climbing itself (Ibid). Clean climbing does not have to be exploited to win a climb, to move upwards, but only to prevent and stop falling without ruining nature.

2.5.2.1. The Turn of Imaginative Rationality and Its Impact on the Philosophy of Climbing in Norway

“Magic” underlying climbing does not have to be interpreted as a form of anthropomorphism, nor as merely an effective metaphorical expression, but rather as a new type of rationality extending the boundaries of cognitive rationality. An illuminative example in this respect is Næss’s idea of what it means to “think like a mountain”⁶². Such a mode of thinking becomes understandable through the adoption of imaginative rationality, which gives normative validity to the state of contemplation. The latter provides the justification for man’s being-for-itself as a “natural condition,” i.e. as a condition initially concerned with nature’s being-in-itself. On a macro-methodological level, the state of contemplation internalized as the purest form of meeting between man and nature has to be recognized as the most relevant form of self-realization based on the biosphere’s realization.

Furthermore, the rehabilitation of the normative validity of man’s holistic experience shows how mastering practical wisdom depends, in its initial stage, on a focus upon the physical experience of the climber, including the issues of food and clothes. Despite the fact that the physical experience is a necessary but not sufficient condition for clarifying the whole process of self-realization, it contributes to specifying why the concept of knowledge should be extended beyond the boundaries of pure rationality. In this context, we can outline the other aspect of imaginative rationality. “Talking and feeling like a mountain” presumes the rehabilitation of a certain type of ontological grounding, namely, seeing/hearing like a mountain, which is one of the most important goals in the process of contemplation as defined by Næss, Kvaløy, and Faarlund.

On a micro-methodological level, the reconsidered normative validity of understanding through the mode of imaginative rationality clarifies one of the puzzling topics in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s writings—how to talk about a mountain (i.e. Tseringma⁶³) as a god, father, mother, or princess in an ontologically grounded way. At first sight, the reader faces the challenge of interpreting the aforementioned statements purely metaphorically. However, the temptation to talk about irrationality comes from the conceit of insisting on examining reality from the perspective of the formula *adaequatio intel-*

⁶² The expression “to think like a mountain” was coined by the American environmentalist, Aldo Leopold, in his book *A Sand County Almanac* (1949).

⁶³ Tseringma (also Gauri Sankar) is a mountain in the Himalayas.

lectus et rei, which ascribes irrationality to non-existing things. If we refer to the non-existence, we would question one of the main principles of the 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies—the idea of meaningfulness (recognized as a surplus of meaning) determining the process of man’s self-realization (to be understood as driven by nature’s realization). Although the surplus of meaning is justified as ontologically grounded, i.e. as stemming from a surplus of determined being, it does not follow the regulations of the adequation of intellect and things, since the correlation requires evaluating the role of both emotions and corporeal experience.

Due to adopting the concept of imaginative rationality, we can see how the dialectical tension between man and nature can be handled—by reconsidering the presumption that irrationality has nothing to do with rationality as such.

On a macro-methodological level, this means that the process of understanding concerning man’s self-realization is impossible if we reduce it to cognitive knowledge as such. This would exclude complex understanding, which is a key in cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness in all its representations. An insight in this direction is provided by A. Jensen, who comments on the Norwegian word “kjennskap” (knowledge as understanding) (Jensen 2000: 102-103), illustrating how encouraging sensitivity towards the biosphere presumes adopting an awareness that has an uncontradictory normative validity.

2.5.2.1.1. *How Ethical Is Norwegian Philosophy of Climbing? Some Aspects of Applied Ethics*

In this context, we can find well-grounded arguments supporting the understanding of the Norwegian philosophy of climbing espoused by Zapffe, Næss, Kvaløy, and Faarlund as based on applied ethics. Regardless of the fact that ethics plays an implicit role in their writings, they agree about the main issue of climbing, which gives license to discuss Norwegian climbing philosophy as underlined by unquestionable applied ethics. The latter promotes the principle of cooperation over competition, as well as the rule of protecting nature rather than ruining it.

A good illustration of this is the so-called “anti-expeditions.” Sigmund Kvaløy, who was one of the many young adherents of Næss, spoke of their eighteen-day road trip from Oslo to Gandhi’s institute in Varanasi (1969) as a turning point in clarifying the role which Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence can play in overcoming the problems triggered by Western thinking. In 1971, N. Faarlund, Kvaløy, and Næss set out on an “anti-expedition” to Nepal with the aim of helping the local Sherpa in their campaign to protect the sacred mountain Tseringma from the invasion of tourist-mountaineers. During that trip, Næss completed a sketch of a new environmental philosophy (or “ecosophy”), Kvaløy formulated the principles of ecophilosophy of a “life necessity society” (as opposed to the dominant “industrial development society”), and Faarlund was inspired to continue his philosophy of outdoor life as a wider approach to outdoor education (Brennan 2013).

Judging by the aforementioned examinations, I would argue that in the beginning, dating back to Fridtjof Nansen’s description of his experience in Jotunheimen (Nansen 1978: 17), the evaluation of climbing still relied on the contradiction between *Homo Ascensus* and *Homo Viator* triggering reminiscences of Romanticism’s ideal. The ideal in question presumes vertical space to have higher symbolic value as a space of freedom and self-realization. It is the space where “fresh” and “free” are determined to be ontological synonyms (Nansen 1978a: 48) that in turn determine the realization of our nature in so far as both body and soul should “claim their right” (Rubenson 1978: 117).

The coherence of corporeal and spiritual experience having normative validity is illustrated in the early 20th-century Norwegian environmental texts as focused on the “material” part of the preparation, and its value as grounding the realization of the expeditions. The complexity of the climbing experience is gradually specified as an experience driven by all man’s capabilities, namely, by the coordination of his intellectual, emotional, and cor-

poreal abilities. The engagement of corporeal abilities is recognized as being of high importance, since the choice of relevant equipment is essential not only for safety, but also for environmental protection. The latter involves other considerations, such as the way that traces left by the climber carry ethical implications due to the presumption that the climbers should pass through the deep snow unaggressively.

An example in this respect is Zapffe's essay *Soveproser (Sleeping Bags)* (1934), in which first contacts with wild nature are evaluated through the opportunity to spend the night under the open sky in sleeping bags. This direct physical interaction with nature is motivated by traditions reaching back to the first Norwegian polar explorers, R. Amundsen and H. Hansen (Zapffe 1978: 178). In turn, the outdoor life shapes man's mentality in a unique way, which leads to implementing practical wisdom against a different background. Referring to this explanation, I would argue that the aforementioned background has to be understood as stemming from a different idea of compression of time and space. The practical striving for efficiency, which is focused on shortening the time and space for realization, inflicts the justification of mechanical time at the expense of organic time,⁶⁴ as well as the recognition of city space at the expense of nature's space.

While Zapffe describes the interaction in question as driven by the necessity to introduce one biological-ecological theory (Ibid: 175), Rubenson characterizes the physical as a part of the religion of the stars' sky. The latter does not have to be understood only as a metaphorical expression, but rather within the framework of *numinous*. It provides ethics *per se* by which man's self-realization is defined as intrinsically connected to the process of the biosphere's realization.

On a macro-methodological level, it means that the wide set of requirements regarding corporeal experience determines the way that successful (from an ethical point of view) interaction with nature should be accomplished. On a micro-methodological one, climbing values are justified by the normative validity of striving for harmony. If body and soul are in harmony with each

⁶⁴ Kvaløy refers to Bergson's distinction between organic and mechanical time.

other, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for recognizing harmony with nature⁶⁵.

On the other hand, the democratization of climbing as represented by Rubenson can be sought by seeing applied ethics as a matter of a collective responsibility that encourages cooperation at the expense of competition. The point is no longer to talk about loneliness, which is not reducible to either the concept or the feeling of being lonely, but rather to talk about the intrinsic value of transperspectivity on a generic level. On the other hand, men as belonging to mankind interact with different living forms because they are also a part of the net of biospherical knots in the sense described by Næss.

The need of clarifying the role of ethics is explicitly stated by Faarlund, who claimed in one of his early writings, *Mountain and Mountain Plateau (Fjell og vidde)* (1968)—published in the *Journal of Climbing (Tidsskrift for klatring)*—that it is of crucial importance to introduce a more binding ethical evaluation of both climbing (klatreetisk vurdering) and action, so that it can be built on facts rather than on illusions (Faarlund 1968: 32). Referring to his thesis, we should clarify that the evaluation does not have to be understood within the framework of objective naturalism, nor does it question the role of what I called imaginative rationality in climbing. On the contrary, it has to be focused on specifying relevant ethical rules in governing the diverse moral experience concerned with climbing. Thus, it should aim at outlining in a noncontradictory way the methodological connection between ethics and moral experience as it pertains to the contact of the climbers with the mountain. It is the development of an ethical grounding for climbing—recognized by Faarlund as a significant branch of the outdoor life—that justifies Faarlund’s philosophy as a form of modern pedagogy requiring the cultivation of one’s awareness of the diversity of the biosphere.

In turn, the idea of democratization—understood as a pluralism of interrelated living forms—has its adopters in Næss and Kvaløy, who try to implement the principles of “natural” democratization as the most relevant societal model. The expression “natural democracy” is not an ontological oxymoron because the latter word is implicitly seen as grounded in the initial

⁶⁵ This thesis is also supported by Faarlund, albeit he does not emphasize the normative connection between man’s harmony and nature’s harmony, namely that the former is a necessary and sufficient condition for the realization of the latter due to its strong ethical connotations. Faarlund stresses the fact that it is one and the same harmony, but does not explicitly reveal the premises of the ontological ethics lying behind this assertion (Faarlund 1978: 46).

interrelatedness of the living things, which have value in themselves. The ethical connotations derive from the presumption that all living things have an unquestionable intrinsic value, a value that depends on the fact that there is no Living Thing with capital letters.

In this context, I would argue that we should discuss the philosophy of climbing as based on applied ethics rather than the philosophy of alpinism. A reason can be found in Zapffe's essay *What Is Climbing Sport? (Hvad er tindesport?)* (1933) (Zapffe 1978a: 86). Judging by his explanations, I draw the conclusion that the Norwegian philosophy of climbing up to the late 1960s is irreducible to the philosophy of sport, because it should be understood through the Norwegian word *idrett*⁶⁶. It is a matter of a physical activity that stems from the complexity of man's emotions, expectations, and cognitive abilities, and is focused on how one should situate oneself in the world. In contrast to the present day, *idrett* used to be recognized as a process of applying practical wisdom in different activities in order to orient oneself within the world. This idea contradicts the common contemporary understanding of sport as a competitive physical activity focused on achieving concrete goals by scoring points or breaking records.

Extrapolating from Kvaløy's distinction between organic and mechanical time, I would claim that if *idrett* relies on the changing attitude towards time—from viewing it as a natural rhythm to seeing it as an intensification of speed—then the difference between sport and *idrett* can be defined as a difference between pace and speed, a difference wherein pace reaching its maximum corresponds to nature's rhythm, while maximum speed refers to the "best" time available according to calculations by humans.

It is the sensitivity towards the world embodied in the concept of *idrett* that allows cooperation to be recognized as having a high normative validity. As Zapffe himself claims, climbing is a certain type of experiential learning with strong moral connotations, since it is seen as signifying the difference between good and bad (Ibid: 87). Developing this idea, he explicitly argues that climbing is not a sport, but rather a Dionysian confirmation of life (Ibid). The Dionysian potential comes from the meeting with nature, which requires mastery of a different type of practical wisdom through what I called imaginative rationality. The latter determines the way in which nature can be understood as elusive. This elusiveness is one of the objects of man's

⁶⁶ There is no difference in the translation of the words "sport" and "*idrett*" in English.

striving that allows the climber to obtain an aura of transcendence insofar as practical wisdom helps unify knowing and feeling in a state of beyondness.

According to Zapffe, the climber does not “crawl up,” but “sets himself up” (Ibid). The Dionysian entity of climbing is also emphasized by the idea of so-called fighting geniality (en vildt strittende genialitet) having its exotic combinations. On a macro-methodological level, it means that the turn of imaginative rationality allows us to understand cooperation within the framework of ontological ethics as a form of cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness in all its representations. Furthermore, cooperation is recognized as engaging both cognitive abilities and emotional dispositions, i.e. as creating moral understanding that presumes a high level of responsibility on the part of the climber during the meeting between climber and mountain.

The more concrete aspects of the imaginative rationality can be traced through climbing because the latter provokes ecstasies beyond the norm. Faarlund adds one more distinction, namely the distinction between ascending and climbing. So-called “free climbing” mediates a form of movement’s ecstasy (en form for “bevægelsesrus”), which relies on “seeing the solutions in one passage and living out the solutions” in question (Faarlund 1978: 46). The climber measures the rhythm of the mountain with his own pulse because both of them have no beginning and no end (Ibid). The mode of beyondness becomes based on the prerequisite of nature’s repetitiveness, which is later interpreted in the context of increasing technocratization as a vicious circle.

The turn of imaginative rationality for climbing is also represented in Næss’s writings, where Zapffe’s Dionysian entity is recognized as a “climbing booze” (Næss 1978a: 122). Næss’s experience in the Pyrenees in the early 1930s is described as relying on spontaneity and prolongation of engagement (Ibid). According to him, climbing “in the high mountains has much to do with a given mountain’s mythology” (Ibid). This justifies a new type of meaningfulness, which is reaffirmed by rehabilitating the normative validity of spontaneity. The mythological framework should be outlined as contributing to the recognition of meaningfulness that becomes identifiable through the mode of beyondness. The methodological similarities between Zapffe’s and Næss’s ideas of climbing can be found by outlining the ecstasies they describe as prototype characteristics of the existential experience of climbing. The Dionysian is comparable with the booze, since in the ecstasies the climber sees the open face of nature, which fills him with joy.

Like Næss, Faarlund defines climbing as a life philosophy that is based on the development of joy as its highest value. While in his early writings he

sees the practical effects of applied ethics, in later writings the implicit idea of rehabilitating the role of ecolife through the lens of ontological ethics is emphasized. It concerns the intrinsic joy of life philosophy affirmed as a way towards nature. Similarly to the way the mountain grasps the man, man grasps the mountain in a non-aggressive way.

In turn, imaginative rationality is embodied in the idea of the sacred in the sense of Faarlund. It is his idea of the “very sacred mountain” (Faarlund 1983) that determines the distinction between “grasping” in its literal meaning versus the act of self-realization. Such an understanding is part of already established tradition concerning the mythology of the mountain. According to Næss, the Big Mountain (Storfjellet) is what is called in mythology a God (Næss 1978a: 120). A similar idea grounds the normative validity of the extended idea of rationality in Mahayana Buddhism, which has the benefit of avoiding the simplifications of anthropomorphic explanations. Næss claims that Tseringma makes it possible to identify the mountain with Buddha himself (Ibid).⁶⁷ In this respect, the most significant representation of implicit ontological ethics can be seen in how he argues that a new type of rationality has to be justified in order the meeting between man and mountain to be understood as crucial for their common realization.

⁶⁷ The strong references to Mahayana Buddhism are a result of the anti-expeditions.

2.5.2.1.2. The Role of Norwegian Climbing Ethics as Ontological Ethics

Ontological ethics is important for understanding 20th century Norwegian ecophilosophies since referring to it is a ‘natural’ (in the sense of logical) consequence of striving to find a complex perspective, which to clarify the problem of normative validity and its representations regarding man’s interaction with nature. This striving is also a logical result of two ways of thinking about the biosphere (Breivik 1979: 10), which can be determined as two worldviews that are not merely contradictory, but can also be reconciled with each other in terms of outlining the necessity of building the whole picture of rationality as irreducible to cognitive rationality.

Last but not least, the need to justify the role of ontological ethics against the background of philosophy of climbing is driven by what G. Breivik calls a strive for a ‘new global ethics’ (Ibid: 15), which stems from the world situation itself. In this context, I claim that the latter stems from the need to recognize the interrelatedness of all living forms, for which the only one way to avoid reference to the paradigm of objective naturalism is to reconsider the influence of ontological ethics as a way of justifying the normative validity of the meeting between man and nature. On a macro methodological level, it contributes not only to avoiding the implications of growing anthropocentrism, but also to avoiding falling into the trap of radical bioegalitarianism.

Faarlund argues that our life can be easier in so far as life in nature is easy by default due to its naturalness. According to him, it is easy to live for birds, fishes and forest (Faarlund 1989). The overlap between his views on climbing experience and experience in nature can be seen in the way the word of grasping mediates the methodological connection between the ideas of joy and the sacred. It is the outdoor life that “grasps us with joy” (griper oss med glede), and thus deepens both our knowledge and the sense of fellowship (Faarlund 1976: 29). Faarlund’s thesis illustrates how joy makes the integrity of our experience and knowledge possible by developing the idea of rationality, which introduces the one of common engagement. Regarding the logical connection between understanding and learning, since the latter leads to the development of the former, I argue that a certain type of fellowship should be encouraged. This would lead to a strengthening of moral understanding through the practices of learning that are recognized as moral practices.

Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, it is important to clarify why the idea that we can talk about pessimistic and optimistic vi-

sions – a conception that is even supported by Næss in his evaluation of Zapffe’s theory – reveals only one side of the problem. Rather than emphasizing the aforementioned distinction based on overexposing the literal textual references in their writings, I focus on pessimism and optimism as mutually interconnected representations of climbing philosophy.

According to Zapffe, the first practical experience in examining the mountains is characterized by a feeling of helplessness, thoughtlessness as well as cramps of desperation and a reliance on destiny (Zapffe 1992: 147). In this context, I argue that such emotions also contribute to the state of ecstasy, as loneliness has many faces that help to spur climbers’ self-realization in the mountain. Analyzing Næss’s statement that the mountain is always on both our side and life’s side (Næss 1978: 124), I also claim that what he calls balance refers to harmony, which is not equivalent to the process of harmonization. The latter presumes that the dialectical tension of nature’s own development has already been obtained. If the move from balance to balancing corresponds to the move from harmony to harmonization, so-called pessimistic feelings turn into a necessary condition for people and nature to be on one and the same side, making man aware that he/she is not the master of the universe.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that seeing Zapffe’s philosophy as contradictory to the ones of Næss and Faarlund is possible only if we interpret their texts as illustrating fundamental contradictions in the grounding of ontological ethics. Such a simplification would put in question the essential nature of Norwegian climbing philosophy – namely, the normative validity of experiential philosophy, whose prototype characteristic is practical wisdom driven by the imaginative rationality. This can lead to misunderstanding common ideas about the role of bioegalitarianism as inflicting man’s self-realization through the idea of biosphere’s realization. If Zapffe’s philosophy is examined as a pessimistic one focused on mankind’s initial deficiency, then the idea of self-realization itself would lose its normative validity for good.

Loneliness, understood and felt as a state of not only being but also feeling alone, can be seen as merely one possible representation of one’s experience, taking into account that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for triggering the sense of wholeness with nature. The idea of loneliness is still implicitly stated by Rubenson, who says that it is not the concept of it, nor the feeling, but loneliness itself (Rubenson 1978: 119). Therefore, what is evaluated in a negative way as pessimistic, wrongly equating concrete representations with their normative validity should be rehabilitated as a crucial condi-

tion for the realization of the state of ecstasy, since the latter has both logic and ethics *sui generis*. Within the framework of ontological ethics, the ethics of the numinous becomes recognizable as a way of clarifying why ecstasy can be explored only in a dialectical way, i.e. by combining the methods of cataphasis and apophasis as mutually supplementing each other. In the state of ecstasy, jubilation is indiscernible from the deep sense of morality and alienation, because the tension of their contradiction is what makes the cataphasis possible.

2.6. A Brief Historical Overview of Norwegian Ecophilosophies

Together with Næss, Kvaløy⁶⁸ was one of the founders of the famous ecophilosophy group at the University of Oslo. In June 1969 he was inspired by an exhibition called “And after us...”⁶⁹, organized by some students of the Oslo School of Architecture, whose idea was to attract people’s attention to the fact that children “after us” will have no environment to live in (Anker 2007: 463). Having invited some architects to join the students in ecology⁷⁰, some climbers of the Alpine Club as well as some philosophers including Kvaløy established Co-working Groups for the Protection of Nature and the Environment at the University of Oslo (Samarbeidsgruppene for Natur-og miljøvern) (snm) (1969).

At that time Næss’s positivism, which was developed much under the influence of the Vienna Circle, was associated by the students with “administrative nihilism” as well as with “the technocratic military complex and the Vietnam War” (Ibid). Due to the students’ pressure for a larger control, Næss left the seminar *Nature and humans* and went to his cottage. The crucial result was that Kvaløy had to organize the seminar to his own mind. Anker claims that “the Ecosophy Group would thus occupy Næss’s seminar from the autumn of 1969 through the spring semester of 1970, after which they would meet at the department of Zoology where Mysterud⁷¹ worked”

⁶⁸Kvaløy (1934-2014) grew up in the mountain village of Lom and became an air mechanic for the Norwegian Air Force. He was interested in mountain climbing, philosophy and jazz. As an assistant of Næss since 1961, he wrote a M.A. thesis under his supervision in 1965 and then started a PhD in philosophy, trying to implement the methods of philosophy to the ecological thinking at the Department of Zoology (Anker 2007: 459). According to Anker, “As active members of the Alpine Club, Kvaløy, Faarlund, and Næss sought to energize the Norwegian tradition of outdoor life among the Department’s ecologists” (Ibid).

⁶⁹It was a traveling exhibition inspired by the writings of Rolaf Vik (1917-1999) about the eco-crisis. The exhibition was sponsored by the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Culture (Ibid: 463).

⁷⁰The students attending the seminars were mainly from the department of philosophy, which was in turmoil after a week-long student occupation led by the radicals and the followers of Mao (Ibid). They were appealing for a new curriculum, which meant abandoning the one introduced by Næss.

⁷¹Ivar Mysterud (1938) is a professor in zoology, one of the Finse ecologists fighting against the hydro-power developments (Ibid: 461).

(Ibid). According to him, the change was influential for Kvaløy, who set the agenda of the seminar, albeit the discussions gradually shifted due to the influence of Mysterud's and other ecologists' conceptions (Ibid).

In turn, Kvaløy described how the seminar *Nature and humans* has developed one 'activist oriented concept' (et aktivist-orientert begrep), namely, the one of ecophilosophy ("økofilosofi") (Kvaløy 2002: 122). The justification of ecophilosophy in Norway took place against the background of strong ecoactivism, which accompanied the theoretical clarifications of the philosophy in question. An illuminative example in this respect was so-called Mardøla action (Mardøla-aksjonen) (Ibid: 121) representing the common efforts of the Norwegians to protect Mardøla waterfall, one of the highest waterfalls in Norway, from turning it into a hydro-power station⁷². According to Kvaløy, it was Næss who emphasized Gandhi's central point⁷³ that participating "in the middle of society's conflicts" is the most important human source of knowing (Kvaløy 2002: 122). In this respect, the action in Mardøla, which was a failure in terms of managing to stop the construction work, was considered as a success since it has brought Gandhi's principles into the public eye.

Within the framework of the arising need ecophilosophy to become more useful while justifying ecopolitics, so that to inflict political, economic and social changes, outlining the differences between Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies is important for understanding what kind of solutions they provide. What are the arguments behind the choice of ecophilosophy (Kvaløy) and ecosophy (Næss) respectively?

⁷²In the summer of 1970 the civil disobedience sit in with more than one hundred and fifty protesters blocking the construction site (Anker 2007: 464). Kvaløy called Næss who came to join the protest. In the very end, both of them were carried away by the police meeting the mixed feelings of the local workers who wanted to secure their jobs. Anker provides a detailed explanation of the situation how Næss joined the demonstration in its dramatic last week, "so that the media could get an image of the famous philosopher being taken away by the police" (Ibid: 465) (Gjefsen 2012: 278-289).

⁷³His opening speech was entitled *Gandhi's thought and method and their relevance for activism to protect nature*. The focus was on the industrialization of Norway's rivers against the background of the arising eco-crisis.

According to Kvaløy, when Næss started to write the first version of his book *Ecology, Society and Lifestyle (Økologi, samfunn og livsstil)* (1973)⁷⁴, he contacted the snm group and offered them to replace the term “ecophilosophy” (“økofilosofi”) with the one of “ecosophy” (“økosofi”) (Ibid). On the other hand, the group was complaining that its members have been spending the whole winter in establishing ecophilosophy as a ‘signal-word’ (som et signalord) (Ibid) by defining it as an objective field such as sociology and psychology. In turn, one of Næss’s main concerns was that ‘ecophilosophy’ will turn into a neutral field of studies skipping the ‘philo’ part (which provides the idea of total engagement and love). Kvaløy argues that ecosophy could easily be associated with something esoteric, such as anthroposophy and theosophy (Ibid). Furthermore, he did not give up saying that studying ecophilosophy is always concerned with making total commitment (Ibid). Kvaløy argued that the difference was partly a difference between “this, which was considered as important to be done” (hva som ble oppfattet som viktig å få til) and “this, which had to be a matter of priority along a time scale” (hva som burde prioriteres langs en tidsskala) (Ibid). Against the background of the aforementioned discussions, Næss’s deep ecology raised new concerns about the methodological projections of vertical versus horizontal relatedness. As Kvaløy claims, the ecophilosophy group accepted the idea of distinguishing between self in small letters and Self with a capital one, but the Hindu philosophy and the theories of Spinoza⁷⁵ were considered as anachronous to the contemporary society (Ibid: 124).

⁷⁴ The first report of the group was the manifest *Ecocrisis, Nature and Humankind (Økokrise, natur og menneske)*, which raised further discussions about the preference of the word ‘ecosophy’ over the one of ‘ecophilosophy’. This debate was a crucial inspiration for *Ecology, Society and Lifestyle* (Kvaløy 2002: 122).

⁷⁵ The criticism concerns Næss’s statement that Spinoza is the first ecophilosopher. Furthermore, Kvaløy’s critique of Næss’s interpretation of some principles of Hinduism is provoked by the fact that Næss’s reception is closer to his own philosophical theory.

2.7. Some Reflections on the ‘Minimum’ and ‘Maximum’ of Norwegian Cabin Culture

Anker explores how “the ecological philosophies” had an influence upon the homes in which the respective philosophers have worked⁷⁶. They are used to be inspired by the ideal of the primitive hut; an ideal that has its roots in the epoch of Romanticism and even earlier (Anker 2010: 8). Among many examples illustrating human strive for going back to nature oriented life-style, he points out Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gilbert White, John Muir whose cabins look like a “hang-nest” (Ibid: 21). Stressing the vertical dimension is of crucial importance because thus the intellectuals have the opportunity to enjoy “a distant epistemological bird’s eye view of nature seen from homes, which are located on a mountain top” (Anker 2003: 131).

However, the reminiscences of Rousseau’s ideals are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for explaining the complexity of Norwegian cabin life. In this context, I argue that while the reminiscences can be clearly revealed, the ideal of cabin life gradually became more and more dependent on the cultural contaminations brought by the increasing tension between nature and culture. Similarly to the symbol of Ashladden, the cabin life was recognized as an illuminative part of the typical Norwegian, which made the ones who led such a life able to identify themselves through nature.

In turn, Nansen describes the cabin life as shaped in respect with Romanticism’s folk lore outlining the initial connection between the ideal of national and the one of nature. He talks about the old Jan Gjender who represents “a glimpse” from the Norwegian fairy tales with his self-built hut spending the long winters reading Voltaire (Nansen 1978: 17). Another vision is provided by G. Breivik who defines the mountain pastures as a model of a cabin life, which contributes to living in harmony with nature (Breivik 1979: 13). Furthermore, the joy of classical Norwegian cabin life (Næss 1999: 42) was recognized as an embodiment of the pleasure of prosperity to live in the moun-

⁷⁶ According to Anker, the way philosophers describe nature is implicitly concerned with the architecture of their houses (Anker 2010: 8), namely that the proximity of architecture, art and biological sciences illustrates how their theoretical conceptions reflected upon the building and the functions of their houses (Ibid). He argues that the dream about a solitary life in a cabin is embodied in the works of Henry Thoreau, Heidegger, Aldo Leopold and Næss since the cabins have been located as far as possible from “the social realm yet close enough to suggest various schemes for management of the household of nature and society” (Ibid: 22).

tain. That is why the prosperity in question does not have to be interpreted in economic terms, but rather in terms of positive symbolic capital whose normative validity is grounded in the potential of practical wisdom as a significant element of 'typical' Norwegian.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I suggest examining Næss's reflections on his own life in the cabin Tvergastein for the purposes of exploring the genealogy of anthropology of cabin man he provides. The latter is a contribution to what Kvaløy defined as Zapffe's anthropology and nature philosophy as well as to Næss's own pedagogical and cultural philosophy (Kvaløy 1974b: 66).

On a macro methodological level, the continuity of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life and Norwegian ecophilosophies can be outlined by analyzing the conceptualization of what T. Gjefsen calls a classical Norwegian culture of cabin life (*den klassiske norske hyttekulturen*) (Gjefsen 2012: 99). It turns into a significant premise showing how similarly to the Norwegian philosophy of climbing, Norwegian cabin life is strictly regulated by the principles of applied ethics. Furthermore, we may argue that cabin culture promotes its own environmental ethics, which is based on the requirements determined by the given place. Thus the life style that is appropriate for the place has as a main norm simplicity in means and richness in ends in Næss's sense. However, this formula should be interpreted not as a formula grounded within the framework of objective naturalism, but rather within the one of ontological ethics in so far as the cabin culture is about feeling the completeness of man and nature, as driven by the maxima 'all things hang together'.

Furthermore, analyzing Næss's theory of the existential role of his cabin Tvergastein, we can outline the principles of ontological ethics. Norwegian culture of cabin life is driven by the uncontradictory justification of so-called 'maximum' and 'minimum' understood as axiological marks. Næss claims that the cabin should provide a long rank of both maximums and minimums: minimum use of fuel, maximum space (*utsikt*), minimum triviality, maximum internal value (*egenverdi*), minimum chattering (*snikksnakk*), maximum contemplation (*dybdeboring*) " (Ibid). According to him, one old cabin is not another museum's function, but also revives the past: "It can be happy or sad"⁷⁷ (Næss 1995: 78-79). Everything obtains an increasingly complex character

⁷⁷ The cabin can be characterized as "happy" or "sad", taking into account that these conditions are determined in comparison with the human ones, albeit being irreducible to them since joy and sorrow are inherent to the possibility of having different living situations as a mode of becoming.

and thus thanks to Hardanger caraway (karvet), the mountain⁷⁸ mixes with it as a component (Ibid). In turn, the “mixing” becomes something unitary, “something integrated, with its own existence, where all elements hang together” (Ibid). On a micro methodological level, it means that nature, mountain, cabin, things and the person become one whole. It lays in the concentration (ligger i konsentrasjonen) of these things and takes place in a tremendously rich world, determined as a necessary requirement for knowing our place in the world (Ibid).

An important point in this respect is Næss’s classification of a specific group of people defined by Zapffe as people who prefer the vertical terrain at the expense of the horizontal one (Ibid: 60). As people, who strive for achieving the understanding of the macro cosmos rather than taking it for granted within the carefully planned space. In this context, we can go back to the idea of *Homo Ascensus* as a cabin man who zealously fights for finding a home without aiming to conquer the universe.

According to Næss, the cabin vision is the one of good life, namely, of life without mobility in a vertical dimension, which, however, is commuting between hanging (pendling) shortly in the high mountain, shortly in a low center of culture (Ibid: 28). In other words, the good life is the one in which the cultivation of the sense of belonging helps one to find his/her place in the world by becoming a subject who is aware of his/her intrinsic connectedness with nature.

On a macro methodological level, it presumes the process of mapping rather than planning to be adopted since one can find one’s place, but would be unable to have the whole landscape at a glance. The landscape is bigger than the place, but it is the landscape that contributes to calling one place a home. In turn, the cabin life is recognized as a phenomenon, which has strong traditions in the Norwegian culture. That is why Næss talks about cabin models referring to the great enthusiasm of Amundsen and Nansen (Ibid: 29); these models were supposed to be something, which gives the possibility to have a life ‘inside’ (Ibid: 28). However, it is not the ‘inside’ mode that is the main purpose of their building. Næss himself appeals for having much colder and more primitive cabins than the ones, which were warmer as well as equipped with some advantages (Ibid: 29) because they provide people there with the oppor-

⁷⁸ See Næss 2008a: 124.

tunity for a long-lasting concentration⁷⁹. It is the latter that makes the process of mapping irreducible to the one of planning, and at the same time, achievable for the individual as a process having a value in itself.

The ‘minimum’ of physical conditions is defined as a necessary and sufficient condition for having a life with a ‘maximum value’ since the life in tune with nature is always a ‘rich’ one. Being framed by a minimum that is impossible unless it is dialectically recognized as a certain kind of maximum, the cabin life entails both one macro cosmos and one micro cosmos. It is a space for spending the winter and in this sense, it is described as a place of the music of wind, which reminds of the music of sleeping compartment during the night (Ibid: 30). It is also a micro cosmos with four, big, beautiful ideas of stars (stjernetanker) on the wall, which is two meters high (Ibid). In other words, the projections of the micro cosmos can be seen in the way it provides the existential situatedness of man in the world by delimiting his/her presence to a given space, which he/she can call home. However, the sense of belonging to the macro cosmos developed by becoming an integral part of its micro projections is not a state, which is given by default to human beings, albeit it can be described as a ‘natural’ one to a certain extent. This state can be achieved by mastering the concentration that ignores the objects of secondary interest such as the ones, which do not concern human vital needs, interests and rights⁸⁰. I argue that it is a matter of cultivating sensitivity towards our own being into the world in so far as it strengthens the growing eco-consciousness about the fact that the macro cosmos can be revealed in all its greatness, even in the smallest of its representations.

On a macro methodological level, we can argue in favor of justifying the aforementioned holism as a matter of adopting a certain type of ontological minimalism as a premise, which to bring a given type of existential maximalism to life. Thus Næss’s anthropology of the cabin life advocates not only focusing on the purely practical aspects of one of the main principles of ecology, namely that ‘everything hangs together’, but also on reconsidering the

⁷⁹ Næss argues that the two important sources of information he takes with him at the cabin are Spinoza’s book *Ethics* and the note book called *Introduction to Logic* (Ibid: 34).

⁸⁰ In this context, Næss makes the problematic statement that we can describe the way of living in Tvergastein as a subculture (Ibid: 29). Such a statement raises many questions since the alternative lifestyle defined by Næss is supposed to function rather as a lifestyle, which to contradict the contemporary industrial living standard, being deprived of the pejorative implications one subculture brings with itself. However, Næss does not go into detail what would be the concrete crossing points between the cabin life and subculture.

latter as a necessary condition for reevaluating what life's meaningful situation is. It is the cabin life whose internal value is grounded in the meaning of life's nature as such that makes us claim that since life in nature has a value in itself, we can give a meaning to our own lives. It can happen if we follow such a life due to which the quality of life is irreducible to the standard of living. Furthermore, the latter illustrates why the aforementioned holism is not a purely 'biological' one. Otherwise, the quality of life should have been indispensable from the standard of living⁸¹.

Within the anthropology of cabin life, we can outline again some arguments in favor of avoiding the discussions about dead things to be understood as a process of ascribing human qualities to unanimated objects. It is the recognition of the initial biospherical equilibrium that determines the modes of being not only of humans but also of other species.

Similarly to Norwegian philosophy of climbing, where applied ethics is closely tied with postulating some rules for environmental protection and cooperation against the ones of competition, in the cabin life, the ethics in question requires defining regulations due to which both the ontological and ethical balance between the minimum and maximum can be kept. Some of these rules mentioned by Næss are the following: "Close the door of the warmed up room. Man slips in, breaths again and snaps the door shut so that his/her last part to be on the right side of the doorstep. The very last rule is "Do not ask the householder (host) whether the cabin is not too far!"(Gjeffsen 2012: 99).

Furthermore, life experience, which is axiologically marked through the categories of maximum and minimum, is heterogeneous one because it entails purely practical activities as well as some conditions having implicit ethical connotations. However, within the aforementioned order, they seem to obtain double axiological connotations. It is a matter of differentiating their contents' representations, which are placed in one and the same ontological order. A possible explanation of such a conceptualization can be seen in the presumption of understanding philosophy as a practical wisdom. In other words, it is interpreted as a specific experiential philosophy for which there is no sharp difference between theoretical and practical experience. It is the unique philosophy that transforms the cultural practices in its own discourse. The culture in question is defined by Næss as counter-culture (motkultur) (Ibid) since it is

⁸¹ All these things have a life in the sense that they have an ineradicable intrinsic value regarding their 'right' to be a part of this same world.

a culture of nature, by which the calmness, modesty and joy of nature are recognized as absolute values (Ibid).

On the other hand, the increasing differentiation between nature and culture imposed by the growing technocratization provokes the need of returning to nature by living a balanced life. Judging by these investigations, I argue that it is the arising social stratification that leads to the gradual transformation from cabin life to the culture of cabin life due to which national and transnational become mutually dependent because they are both affected by what is called 'life in harmony'.

Since the process of man's self-realization is intrinsically tied with nature's realization, I argue that if the cabin life can be defined as life in harmony, the culture of cabin life can be determined as life in harmonization that cannot be reduced to the life in harmony because it is not a state, but rather a process of permanent becoming for the subject.

Referring to Anker's theory that the 'oikos' is not merely a "vague metaphor for ecology", taking into account that built houses provide a key to understanding the household of nature (Anker 2003: 131), I reach the conclusion that the withdrawal in the mountain is a climax of the existential willingness of rehabilitating the initial connection between man and nature. It is due to creating conditions for achieving the total openness between them, i.e. through legitimizing situatedness by which we to reconstruct our first touch with nature, so that man to find his/her lost home in the bosom of biosphere, where he/she belongs to.

Extrapolating Gjefsen's theory about the culture of cabin life, I draw the following conclusion, namely that the initial strive for rediscovering a place as a home is concerned with the implicit willingness of demonstrating the authenticity beyond all possible definitions of otherness. It means that due to the authentic life in the mountain, one no longer wants to be recognized as a guest in the bosom of biosphere. If ecology is defined as a science of home ('oikos'), then Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as illuminative representations of "a given type of enlightened knowledge", i.e. of 'the wisdom about home' as in Næss's case (eco-sophy), of wisdom about the primary man's place in the universe since love has an experiential entity in respect with the fact that it derives from life as such.

Regarding Næss's anthropology of cabin life, the cabin men (hyttmennsker) are the ones who feel at home in the mountain due to the fact that they have recognized with both their reason and senses that they belong to this mountain. According to Næss, the cabin men automatically adjust to one way of existing, which is different from the city life (Næss 1995: 80). The existence in

question can be interpreted by referring again to the distinction between quality of life and living standard arguing that mountain's existence has the quality of life as its prototype characteristic, by contrast to the city one, which is dominated, as Næss claims, by the easy access, more info gained by the mass media, the complicated house holding, the big mobility and the scarcity of self-made things (Ibid).

On a micro methodological level, the cabin man is defined as an amateur in Næss's sense in so far as it is the one who does not rely on a narrow specialized knowledge about the world, but has a broad competence, which is irreducible to a given technocratic expertise⁸². The amateur is described, by contrast to the specialist, as the one who does not operate with the purely cognitive knowledge since he/she rehabilitates the role of understanding by reviving the normative validity of feelings, emotions and imagination. In other words, the cabin man does not take the responsibility of the expert to control the world of nature by pretending to know everything about it, but rather to live in it with 'open senses'.

According to Næss, the amateur in Tvergastein is aware that the whole research is incompatible with the grounding positive feeling for nature (Ibid: 82) because the direct examination of strong feelings matters just as much as the abstract thinking⁸³ (Ibid). In turn, judging by Næss's arguments, we can claim that the main object of the anthropology of cabin life is how to develop sense of belonging since it concerns how a given place in the mountain is never a place but a home, by contrast to the places in the big cities. Due to the raising mobility, every single place is formally recognized as a home but this place as such never presumes a sense of belonging to be internalized.

⁸² The problem of generalists and specialists is interpreted against the background of the choice between 'hard' and 'soft' technologies for the purposes of solving environmental crisis. It will be examined in detail in the chapters on Kvaløy.

⁸³ Næss argues that the simplest chemical processes are self-related in one fascinating world (Ibid: 86).

2.8. Norwegian Outdoor Life. Where to Go from Now on?

The Norwegian politics faced a new threat in the late 1980s, which raised the discussions about ecopolitics in a new voice, namely, the ones about the problems concerned with the possibility of producing nuclear energy (Berntsen 2011: 235-236). Thus the well-known arguments for the unrestricted exploitation of natural sources gained new strength since the ecological dilemmas became more complicated: they were provoked by the tension of the forthcoming global catastrophe, which could not be restricted to a given scope or scopes, hiding the risks nature and mankind to be devastated. In this context, it is important to examine government's attempts to change the social attitudes by diverting the mode of speaking as changing the use of words. Consequently the government replaced the word of atomic energy (atomkraft) with the one of nuclear power (kjernekraft) (Ibid: 238). According to Berntsen, the old social democracy's fight was engaged with the development of atomic technologies since the main arguments were the economic, but not the moral ones⁸⁴.

On the other hand, it was the period of increasing environmentalism in Norway. As Berntsen argues, it was people's activism against building Alta waterfall that gave a new direction to the fight⁸⁵ (Ibid: 249-250). What were the consequences of the aforementioned discussions and the arising civil disobedience? The result was that two thirds of the water falls in Norway were overbuilt or were in a process of building, which required the law to be changed⁸⁶. In this context, I argue that what Næss calls Norwegian governmental traditions in environmentally unfriendly politics derived from substituting the ideals of ecopolitics recognized as politics of sources with the one of preserving resources.

⁸⁴ In the debate, the parties against "atomic energy socialism" (atomkraftsosialisme) in Norway were Center Party (Senterpartiet), Liberal Party (Venstrepartiet) and Socialist Federation (Sosialistisk Valgforbund) (Ibid: 241-243).

⁸⁵ Having had harsh discussions, the political line was that Alta's concession should be finished at any expense. This decision provoked a big demonstration in Oslo with more than 2000 participants (Ibid: 252). However, at the following meeting of the Parliament, the construction was stopped again with a vote of 95 members against 32 (Ibid).

⁸⁶ In 1979 the Norwegian federation of protecting environment (Naturvernforbundet) organized one new initiative called "Save our last waterfall" (Vern våre siste vassdrag) (Ibid: 254).

The next turning point in the Norwegian debates about environmental politics, as represented by Norwegian public committee (“Liedutvalget”) and the Norwegian federation for protecting environment, made Berntsen claim that there were two completely different ‘energy cultures’ at that time (Ibid: 258), i.e. it raised the question whether the government to encourage the production of oil or to stabilize it⁸⁷.

In this context, the aforementioned debate about the exploitation of natural sources can be described as the climax of the contradictions regarding the conceptions of industrial development and environmental protection since they were also strengthened by some arguments raised against the potential accession of Norway to the EU. From this point of view, the ecopolitical concerns were a part of a strong tradition based on the need of strengthening bioregionalism. However, one of the main problems was provoked by the significant role of the Norwegian Oil Fund, which determines the economic stability of the country even after the economic crisis of 2011 took place⁸⁸.

In other words, the dilemma was no longer about ‘if’, but about ‘when’ and ‘how’ the sustainable development should be controlled. The socioeconomic situation, when the first referendum for the EU membership was conducted, was quite different from the one in the mid-1990s. While the first referendum was organized against the background of the discussions regarding the ‘growth and environmental protection’ debate, the second one was dominated by the strategies for surviving on the global arena by raising the gross national product (Ibid: 317-319). The second debates incorporated the legacy of the first ones regarding the concerns about the social and ecological crisis (Ibid: 320), but also added a new element – the faith of Brundtland’s government that it is still possible to compromise growth with environmental protection (Ibid: 317).

In Brundtland’s report called *Our Common Future* (1987), which was an object of investigations on side of both Næss and Kvaløy, we can trace the threat of the inevitable consequences of so-called by Berntsen tyranny of

⁸⁷ While in 1976 Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet), Conservative Party (Høyre) pled for expanding the growth of energy, Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), Center Part (Senterpartiet), Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), Liberal Party (Venstreparti) insisted on a sooner stabilization of the growth in question (Ibid: 259).

⁸⁸ The Fund guarantees the financial independence of Norway for the future generations, and, from an economic perspective, the question is not whether, but rather under what circumstances it could be used in a situation of a global crisis.

the small decisions, namely, some decisions that are good in a short-term perspective, but become uncontrollable in a long-term one. The methodological concern was emphasized by Berntsen saying that Brundtland's report was well developed on a county level⁸⁹, but not on the communal one (Ibid: 293).

In turn, the ungrounded optimism regarding the omnipotent power of the short-time solutions (defined for the sake of solving global problems) also derived from the overexposed optimist faith in the role of local responsibilities (bioregionalism), which remained an open question in Brundtland's report. In this context, the dilemmas about industrial development and environmental protection were narrowed to specifying the different aspects of the sustainable development itself. Nature and human health were understood by reexamining the normative validity of growth as such, but not by analyzing their own values. In other words, controlling the side effects of the industrial development was determined as equivalent to initially encouraging the benefits for nature and people. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that controlling is necessary but not sufficient condition for rethinking the role of environmental protection since thus we fall into the trap of man's made idea of normative validity, which does not coincide with the intrinsic normative validity of nature.

On the other hand, transforming the formula 'Think globally, act locally!' into the one of 'Think locally, act locally!' does not provide us with ultimate solutions because both working "too globally" and "too locally" inflict the risk of replacing the language of normativity with the one of the ideology.

What are the concrete challenges to the philosophy of Norwegian outdoor life? Referring to Berntsen again (Ibid: 273), I claim that one of the main contemporary problems is that striving for specifying the concrete opportunities for its development, the outdoor life may lose the power to contribute to the consolidation of man's experiential gestalt. It may lead to one to be

⁸⁹ The county division is an important policy implementation. The counties were introduced for the first time in 1972 as a part of the process of decentralization, which started in the 1970s (Ibid: 258). The division in question contributed to raising local people's awareness about their responsibility in governing local ecopolitics. However, the research of 1990s showed that the oil industry introduced a tax of 20% of the waste gasses in Norway (Ibid: 328). Despite the fact that the production of CO2 was limited in 1992, Labor Party and Conservative Party did not step back from the statement that the "clean technologies" (renseteknologiene) will solve all the problems we have (Ibid).

able to mobilize one's physical abilities alone, but not one's mental and corporeal abilities at once. Regarding outdoor life, it would mean that improving physical potential may become a goal in itself and thus to justify the sportification of outdoor life⁹⁰.

While in the beginning the 'fight' for outdoor life was focused on defining and specifying its scope and regulations respectively, contemporary debates are rather concerned with how to keep its normative validity in one frequently changing context without making it anachronic to both nature and society. The global need of taking a morally and economically justifiable stand upon climate changes makes developing sensitivity towards nature a moral engagement, which is more demanding than ever. It presumes establishing a new normative order due to which discussing the role of industrial development (and especially the one of sustainable development) as well as the one of environmental protection within the framework of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life is merely possible by adopting performative rhetoric. That is why the concrete connotations of dealing with technocratic optimism inflict the distinction between what kind of nature we want and what kind of nature is possible (Damman 2001: 730), namely, between what is possible and what is desirable by referring to different types of rationality models.

⁹⁰ The genealogy of this risk was examined in detail yet in the first writings of Faarlund.

3. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF 20TH-CENTURY NORWEGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF OUTDOOR LIFE AS AN OUTDOOR LIFE PEDAGOGY

The analysis of the socio-cultural situation in the 1960s, which became a fruitful premise for the arising Norwegian ecophilosophies would be incomplete without outlining the illuminative role of N. Faarlund for the justification of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life. As a devoted mountaineer, he had the ambition to turn “Practical know-how about outdoor vacations” (Anker 2007: 458) into a philosophical training; one training, which to contribute to the development of self-realization as closely tied with paying respect to nature. One of the first steps in that direction was the establishment of the Norwegian Mountaineering School in 1967 and his lecturing in Oslo at the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences since 1968⁹¹ (Ibid).

The popularity of Faarlund’s courses, giving practical knowledge about issues such as outdoor cooking, choosing proper winter clothes as well as pedagogical and psychological knowledge regarding man’s self-realization in nature can be ascribed to the idea of introducing contemporary model of Socratic teaching against the background of Scandinavian pantheist traditions. Faarlund’s model provides more particular strategies of the type ‘questions-answers’ by specifying the aspects of problem-solving process, while the issues of self-realization follow some of Socratic principles of arguing. The individual has to cultivate his/her sensitivity towards nature as a

⁹¹ According to Anker, Faarlund’s school and lectures “became legendary among environmentalists seeking a combination of philosophical training and practical experience in dealing with the wild” (Ibid). On the other hand, behind the idea of examining “outdoor life as a means to pursue scientific research” (Ibid) we had a person who had a very diverse academic background. Faarlund’s academic degrees included degrees in engineering and biochemistry, training in landscape architecture and ecology (Ibid).

matter of self-realization in the process of conwaying, taking into account that the personal responsibility is as important as the one adopted by the generations.

Thus revealing the image of nature as a net of knots of biosphere in Næss's sense is justified in the process of conwaying when the self should become a Self with a capital letter finding his/her place as a part of the universe, e.g. realizing that he/she is equally responsible for rehabilitating the total openness of the meeting between man and the world. In this context, solving practical issues is a necessary step for clearing the ground for the open questions of self-realization (namely, for the real Socratic dilemmas of philosophy of outdoor life).

Concerning the aspects of outdoor life's practical wisdom, it can be described by referring to one of the mottos introduced by Bob Handerson, namely, "Each day we reacted less like tourists and more like tenants [natives, as in native to a place]" (Handerson 1997: 1). In other words, the philosophy of outdoor life can be recognized as a way of rehabilitating coziness of nature understood as a way home. This idea is examined in detail by Faarlund in most of his writings. The contradiction between the tenant and the tourist brings us back to the distinction between alpinism as a sport and Norwegian philosophy of climbing since it is not the idea of place but rather the one of situatedness, which became an illuminative issue in the Norwegian moral geography of that time. On a macro methodological level, the implications of such a practical wisdom are seen in the process of joyful learning of nature's mechanisms: the one I called moral learning due to the principles of imaginative rationality.

It is the symbiosis of the theoretical legitimization of nature as home and its practical anticipation as a home, in which we all live that gives us reasons to oblige the subject not to cause his/her de-subjectification, but on the contrary; to oblige himself/herself (due to the power of self-commitment) to be committed to the biosphere. Regarding the practical implications of outdoor life's wisdom, the latter is understood as a "principal tradition for outdoor education", which seeks the "seeping of nature into one's bones and thus remains an apprenticeship for how to dwell in Nature." (Ibid).

In this context, another important specification has to be made. Philosophical knowledge and practical know-how going hand in hand are an illuminative characteristic of the Nordic way of living, which is based on developing different strategies for encouraging practical wisdom. In turn, the latter can have different representations, as I showed while analyzing Kvaløy's reception of Ash-lad's story. Thus Faarlund's philosophy of outdoor life, "which

inspired not only Næss, but also the inner circle of Norway's most developed young mountaineers and environmentally concerned ecologists" (Anker 2007: 459) provided the establishment of practical wisdom as a process of striving for the fulfillment of self-realization. Since in Faarlund's model the process is recognized as more important than the goal itself, the aforementioned wisdom can be described as entailing some of the characteristics of Socratic ideal, namely, searching for the sake of searching embodied in the formula 'the way is the goal', which is the only one relevant way of self-realization and self-recognition respectively. While the demon of Socrates is one's own consciousness, in Faarlund's case, we can argue that it is environmentally friendly consciousness that concerns the existential value of human being.

That is why one of the first steps which Faarlund made towards the conceptualization of outdoor life was concerned with its reconsideration as a "transformation tool" in building "an ecologically sensitive society" (Faarlund in Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 164). Paraphrasing Handerson, I draw the conclusion that outdoor life's transformative power consists in justifying the quest one to be a tenant (i.e. native with nature) understood as a matter of collective cultivation of sensitivity towards the tenant in question. The decontextualization is not a process of pure reduction, but rather of recontextualization, of finding a new meaning there, where the old one has already disappeared. To a certain extent, Norwegian outdoor life, determined as a tool of transformation in Faarlund's sense entails some of the characteristics of Socrates's demon, but they are reconsidered within a new framework, namely, within the one of so-called by Faarlund technological culture (Faarlund 2003: 3). In turn, the latter provokes the need of encouraging one collective demon, which to raise social awareness of self-realization as a realization of both being in nature and being with nature.

3.1. Challenging Man in Nature. The Methodological Contribution of Nils Faarlund

Faarlund analyzes the term ‘outdoor life’ against the background of the challenges posed by the environmental, political and ecophilosophical debates of the mid to late 20th century. In his article *Outdoor Life: What, Why, How (Friluftsliv: Hva, Hvorfor, Hvordan)* (1973)⁹² he defined it in respect with the role of our values in ecophilosophical understanding; as a type of ecophilosophy that is “crucial to address the ecocrisis” (Faarlund 1973).

Analyzing the genealogy of Norwegian outdoor life philosophy, it shows that for more than thirty years Faarlund explores its development in a diachronic perspective outlining the multilateral connections between nature and culture. His analysis also concerns the contemporary situation, where the aforementioned connections were a result of many different (and sometime contradictory) factors, which in turn determined the double-bind interpretation nature and culture to be considered as contradicting and mutually complementing each other at once. The seeming paradox arises from the fact that the development of so-called by Faarlund technological culture provides both underrating the intrinsic value of nature and the requirement the latter to be reconsidered again since ecological crisis inflicted the need of building a positive philosophy against the crisis in consciousness. On the other hand, the technologic culture, which protects its own right of existence, produces mechanisms against the philosophy of outdoor life in order to justify its functioning as an uncontradictory one. That is why the philosophy of outdoor life is questioned ‘from below’ by encouraging the arising symbolic capital of philosophy of sport, which aims at occupying outdoor life’s arena⁹³.

⁹² The ideas of this article have been revised several times.

⁹³ One of the main contemporary methodological challenges concerned with the need of redefining the relationship between outdoor life and sport as well as the new pedagogical aims and methods of shaping the profile of the collective subject is how to ground the image of so-called by Tordsson ‘risk-seeker’. The problem is only the tip of the iceberg since it increases the risk of recognizing the sportification of outdoor life as the only one possible form of interacting. In turn, the formula ‘high speed-quick changes’ extends the opportunity of reconsidering leisure time as an arena of self-realization. On a macro methodological level, we can clarify the pedagogical value of outdoor life if we follow how this arena has become a space of different embodiments of self-realization. That is

Against the background of Dahle's definition that outdoor life is "feeling the joy of being out in nature, alone or with others" (Dahle 2007: 23), it is important to clarify to what extent we can agree with Ese's statement that outdoor activity will be ruined by too many cultural contaminations (Ese 2007: 52). Within the framework of contemporary technological culture, the feeling of being out in nature radically changes its representations because sometimes the idea of outdoor life's joy may put in question the existence of nature as such. On the other hand, new is always considered as opposing old since the latter gets pejorative connotations, especially when it is compared with the new, justified as a presumably good one. This process makes the evaluation of cultural contaminations a more complicated phenomenon because not all the time the cultural contaminations contribute to turning outdoor life's philosophy into an old-fashioned ideology. In other words, the contaminations do not always have to be examined by adopting more complicated equipment and more complicated ideology respectively, but they can rather be understood as benefiting the reconsideration of the intrinsic value of nature. Such an example is the growing interest in the impact of life-long learning, one of the pedagogical 'achievements' of our time, which requires justifying the process of learning as a process encouraging cultural transmission against the background of the challenges, which this culture poses.

The dialectical entity of the elusive boundaries of cultural contaminations is revealed by Faarlund who used to examine the relationships between nature and culture since the 1980s onward. That is why it is not by chance that one of his illuminative definitions, namely, 'nature is a home of culture' (Faarlund 1989) (Leirhaug 2009: 79) should be read beyond exaggerating the role of cultural contaminations. Furthermore, justifying simplicity with which people can meaningfully engage with nature can also be recognized as one of the main principles of Faarlund's pedagogy of outdoor life.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that it is the conwaying in Faarlund's sense that is one of the prototype characteristics of outdoor life, which is determined as a pedagogical arena. Conwaying is not only a matter of adopting relevant means, e.g. not only does it have to be examined from a utilitarian perspective, but also from a deontological one. The differences in the choice of means provide the differences in the approaches, but we should keep in mind that the differences in the latter also

why building the image of the risk-seeker can be described as a matter of disguising the ideology of mass sports.

inflict differences in values. Thus preferring one or another approach determines the way we choose the means in axiologically relevant manner.

Understanding the need of defining outdoor life as an alternative pedagogical way was yet discussed in one of Faarlund's first articles, namely, in the article called *Outdoor life: Specifying the boundaries of the scope (Friluftsliv – emneområdet innhold)* (1967) in which he outlined for the first time the role of the premises for justifying the pedagogical role of outdoor life (Faarlund 1967: 38-43)⁹⁴. On the level of ethics, I raise the hypothesis that Faarlund's attempts at examining the genealogy of outdoor life can be interpreted as a genealogical analysis of the relationship between so-called values of contemplation (kontemplative verdier) and values of modernization⁹⁵. It is the examination of these values that contributes to revealing how the idea of outdoor life understood as a way home is expanded to the idea 'nature is a home of culture'. In this context, one of the main methodological advantages of adopting Faarlund's theory is that he reveals the development of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life in a broad perspective since he explores the dialectical connections between the aforementioned values. On a micro methodological level, it means that Faarlund investigates the values of contemplation and modernization not only as mutually excluding categories, but also as values whose contradiction is a guarantee for their existence and development. Rehabilitating the symbolic capital of the values of contemplation for the purposes of reconsidering the role of philosophy of outdoor life is a 'natural' reaction against the arising impact of the values of modernization, which have to be somehow restricted in the name of preserving the value of self-realization. In other words, if the influence of the latter was not so strong, the values of contemplation would have lost their significant meaning while benefiting the self to be recognized as a Self with a capital letter⁹⁶. Thus exploring the aforementioned values as functioning on the principle of contaminated vessels contributes to recon-

⁹⁴ The topic of values is elaborated in Faarlund's article *Outdoor Life: What-Why-How (Friluftsliv: Hva-Hvorfor-Hvordan)* (Faarlund 2003). See also the role of normative and descriptive premises (Ibid: 44).

⁹⁵ See Leirhaug 2007: 78, Note 70.

⁹⁶ My thesis is that vertical moral geography presumes that Selves with a capital letter are born this way, while the horizontal moral geography encourages the transformation of the selves into Selves with a capital letter. In turn, justifying vertical moral geography, which is based on the significant value of competition as one of the most important principles of contemporary technological culture, requires questioning the value of recreation.

sidering why the philosophy of outdoor life provides a way home⁹⁷ to a home where ecolife in Faarlund's sense requires particular values to be adopted. In turn, these values are reintroduced against the background of the increasing uncertainty of exploiting the idea of values as such. Therefore, Faarlund's conception of ecolife could be recognized as a measure against the threat of expanding moral relativism, which finds its grounds in the contemporary technological culture.

One of the main methodological concerns is how to normatively conceptualize one of the prototype characteristics of outdoor life, namely, the spontaneous experience in nature, in a normative way. Faarlund searches for solutions in the scope of so-called scientific ecology (*vitenskapen økologi*), which clarifies the characteristics of the aforementioned ecolife. I draw the conclusion that the normative aspects of the life in question have to be explored by revealing what the 'profitable life' in nature means. The latter does not have to be explored within the paradigm of meritocracy as gaining utilitarian benefits from nature, but rather as a way of being enriched in the process of self-realization. Therefore, leading a profitable ecolife means to take the responsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting nature as a net of biospherical knots.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that revealing the normative aspects of outdoor life presumes to analyzing two of Faarlund's main concepts, namely, the concept of ecolife understood as a "life in harmony" (*liv i lage*) as well as the one of spontaneous experience whose normative validity is recognized in the joyful experience of nature (*endring med glede*) (Faarlund 2000: 6; Leirhaug 2007: 102)⁹⁸. The latter does not have to be interpreted from the perspective of moral relativism, which to require a hedonist value to be ascribed to the experience in question. On the contrary, due to the principles of imaginative rationality, outdoor life, internalized as a joyful life in nature, presumes one to reconsider the intrinsic value of nature as a value in itself, which supports the process of self-realization. Defining ecolife as a life in harmony can be extrapolated to Nansen's statement that adopting outdoor life means to follow the individual path of maturity (Randall 2007: 38) due to which the path itself is more important than its end. Thus the value of the process, whose normative validity is grounded in es-

⁹⁷ According to Faarlund, in the field of environmental studies, we have one spontaneous way (*en u-middel-bar vei*) to changing our way of living with joy. See also Leirhaug 2007: 68.

⁹⁸ See also Faarlund 1973, Leirhaug 2007: 45.

establishing philosophy of outdoor life as a significant experiential philosophy, brings us back to the paradigm of ontological ethics. Its most illuminative representations can be revealed by examining the normative validity of so-called by Faarlund joy of way (veg-glede), joy of work (arbeids-glede) and joy of life (livs-glede) (Faarlund 1995: 2).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that staying with an open face towards nature in Faarlund's sense is due to the normative validity of spontaneity understood both as a spontaneity of man's joyful experience and spontaneity as an intrinsic value of nature, which is determined as a free nature. According to Faarlund, harmonic life is possible only in free nature (at harmonisk liv...bare er mulig i fri natur) (Faarlund 1985), which in turn shows that we have to examine the methodological role of what he called spontaneous understanding (u-middel-bart forståelig)⁹⁹ (Faarlund 1983) (Leirhaug 2007: 63). That is why I argue that the normative validity of the latter is a result of adopting imaginative rationality. It is an understanding, which presumably opens the door for both anticipating the diversity of the living forms and the diversity of the ways of self-realization.

One of the first classifications, which Faarlund offered is concerned with the formula "to learn how to use nature without misusing it" (Vi må lære å bruke naturen – uten å forbruke den) (Faarlund 1968: 3). However, during the 1990s, the problem was a result of the changing socio-cultural situation. Faarlund defined three perspectives, namely, political, commercial and thematic ones (den politiske, kommersielle, og tematiske) (Faarlund 1992: 39). Against the background of the arising tension between the fascination of free nature and nature's culture (naturens kultur), the political dimension was recognized as replacing the thematic one, while it was supposed to give way to the commercial dimension (Ibid: 13). In time, this conception made even a more radical turn since Faarlund argued that in modernity commercial interests made use of free nature as "an arena for trendy exhibitionism" inspired by the restless building of identity (Faarlund 1999: 5)¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁹ See Faarlund's reference to Konrad Lorenz (Faarlund 1985). Leirhaug 2007: 63.

¹⁰⁰ According to Leirhaug, in his writings since 2000, Faarlund was not so much concerned about clarifying the concept of outdoor life. An argument in favor of this statement is that he no longer saw the commercial as a "threat for understanding the rest" (Faarlund 2000: 5) (Leirhaug 2007: 102).

Outlining different type of interests is important for reconceptualizing the normative implications of the idea of free nature and the one of Norwegian outdoor life respectively in tune with given socio-cultural changes. In this context, I argue that justifying the understanding of nature as a home of culture in Faarlund's sense is a 'natural' consequence of establishing one new philosophy of outdoor life. However, it had to meet the requirements of a rapidly changing reality, which in turn makes the boundaries between the aforementioned three perspectives blurred.

3.2. The Pedagogical Role of Ecolife

In this context, Faarlund shows how “the complex ecosystem can be the best model for vigorous democracy” (et livskraftig demokrati) (Faarlund 2003: 26). Extrapolating his statement, I reach the conclusion that absolutizing the cognitive rationality and its embodiment in some cultural forms encourages justifying the pseudo-stability of ecosystems since what Faarlund defined as techno-cultural premises led to the dictatorship of understanding (forståelsesdiktatur)¹⁰¹ (Ibid).

Furthermore, democracy in Faarlund’s sense has to be interpreted as a right of non-contradictory existence of plurality of forms and a right of understanding diversity itself respectively. The two meanings became interchangeable in his writings, especially when he discussed the role of “democracy of understanding”. In this context, I draw the conclusion that outlining the problem is again a matter of extrapolating Aristotelian principle *adequation of intellect and things (adaequatio intellectus et rei)* in respect with imaginative rationality that makes the two modes of existence, namely, the ones of ‘to be with nature’ and ‘to be in nature’, ontologically interchangeable.

In turn, democracy of understanding benefits diversity in question to be anticipated by all human senses as well as the pedagogical value of conveying to reveal how to cultivate man’s consciousness about philosophy of outdoor life as a matter of practical wisdom on both mental and physical levels.

Regarding the cultivation of sensitivity towards intrinsic value of nature as a matter of self-realization, Faarlund provides different strategies how to encourage the development of collective imaginative rationality in so far as the problem-solving process is based on both knowledge and experience. Knowledge without experience lacks the implications of values, which would affect reducing moral understanding to cognitive one and thus to inflict the justification of moral objectivism, which provokes what Faarlund called dictatorship of understanding.

In turn, the distinction between the aforementioned types of understanding (democratic and dictatorship ones), based on different definitions of what living forms are, presumes some different types of motivation to be devel-

¹⁰¹ He does not go further in calling the latter an ideology, which would illustrate how the premises of technological culture are recognized as the only one normative premise.

oped, which individuals should cultivate depending on the moral geography they choose. Extrapolating Faarlund's thesis, I introduce two types of moral geography, as I already mentioned. The vertical moral geography requires adopting the competition as a stimulus with a high value, which has to initiate the process of self-realization. On the other hand, so-called by Faarlund motive of achieving (*prestasjonsmotivet*) could be examined as an illuminative component of what I call horizontal moral geography since it inflicts the reconsideration of life's quality within the framework of ontological ethics.

According to Faarlund, the competition motive is the driving power of the representatives of the technological society since it channels the powers of affects. It is a derailment of the motive of achieving (Ibid: 28). If outdoor life is grounded in the idea of control and conquering of nature (*Et friluftsliv bygget på behersker-og beseirerholdningen til natur*) (Ibid), it recognizes the latter as a field of competition (*konkurransbane*) (Ibid). When it is built on such premises, the outdoor life would use all the helping devices as well as would have no consciousness of how the used field would develop in the future (Ibid)¹⁰². On the other hand, the motive of high quality performances is a driving force of man, which encourages the willingness as well as making choices regardless of the absolutization of qualifications such as winner, high status, winning of accepted goods, as Faarlund argues (Ibid).

That is why Faarlund suggests that the motive of achieving is the driving force of enjoying both being with friends and being with (*med*) nature (Ibid: 32). Equating the two modes, namely, the ones of 'to be in' and 'to be with', he outlines the boundaries of human existence as depending on the recognition of the intrinsic value of nature rather than the one of recreation, which exploits nature as its arena. In this context, I reach the conclusion that the aforementioned modes could be examined as modes of 'being in itself' and 'being for itself' whose dialectical relationship makes them inseparable in the process of self-realization. On a micro methodological level, it means that the quality of life, understood beyond the perspective of utilitarian ethics imposed by technological culture, depends on the presumption that one is at home only if one is on one's way to nature.

¹⁰² Otherwise, this opportunity means that one, like in sport (*i idretten*), has set some rules, which would secure equal conditions for all competitors (Ibid).

Thus the normative choice of ecolife is modified into a utilitarian choice of having a comfortable life, which is presumably justified as the best life's choice ever. Extrapolating Faarlund's statement that outdoor life's values determine both the evaluation of quality of choice and the activities we take up (Ibid), I draw the conclusion that the normative validity of the motivation driven by the philosophy of outdoor life affected the lack of normative discrepancy between intentions and actions. The way you choose determines an object of choice, which inflicts the relevant actions for proving the need of choosing this way. That is why Faarlund talks about a fundamental engagement involving the whole personality (Ibid). Furthermore, experiencing nature is inseparable from the experience of man's own actions since complexity is a prototype characteristic of outdoor life philosophy.

In turn, the basic minimum of engaging whole personality includes the incorporation of intellect, emotional life (*følelsesliv*) and corporeal experience in an interactive unity (*kroppslig utfoldelse i et samspillende hele*) (Ibid). According to Faarlund, in the outdoor life we are not interested in meteorology, glaciology, hydrology etc. "We are interested in weather and climate, in having knowledge about glaciers and rivers, as well as about and waterfalls. It would be our life in nature that makes us gain knowledge about phenomena and conditions, which we cannot get a view by ourselves" (Ibid: 42). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that philosophy of outdoor life could be described by adopting the conception of experiential knowledge in so far as the latter contradicts the 'complication' imposed by the economization of science. Thus the differences between the two paradigms of knowledge can be interpreted as provoked by the differences in the profile of the interested groups, taking into account that the idea of interest is explored within two different ethics, namely, within the framework of ontological and utilitarian one. While for the adopters of outdoor life the mutual interests are understood as arising from the common experiential knowledge, the ones of life provided by the technological culture concern the scientific knowledge as favorable to obtaining practical benefits in supporting one's interests or another's.

Extrapolating Faarlund's statement again, I also claim that the entity of experiential knowledge is closely tied with experiencing nature and interacting with the ecosystems, which, as a process, is "not limited to the branches of human knowledge" (Ibid: 31). It means that due to imaginative rationality, which encourages the principles of complexity rather than the ones of complication in Kvaløy's sense, moral learning and moral understanding could be achieved by going back to what Faarlund called conwaying, namely, to the process of transmitting experiential knowledge so that the collective ex-

periential knowledge to contribute to the process of individual self-realization.

One of the main methodological benefits of Faarlund's idea of conwaying could be traced on the level of building collective imaginative rationality, which to rehabilitate the normative validity of experiential learning as such. According to him, outdoor life's learning (friluftslivslære) (Ibid: 37) presumes examining already discussed normative and descriptive premises, which determine the grounding norms for the practical outdoor experience as well as the choice of perspective of studying (turvalg) (Ibid). Furthermore, exploring the origin and functioning of norms requires investigating the ethics of outdoor life (friluftslivets etikk) (Ibid: 38), which is preceded by recognizing the role of ecophilosophy and ecopolitics as well as the mechanisms of so-called forms and qualities of experience (opplevelsesformer og opplevelseskvaliteter) (Ibid). In turn, the practical side of outdoor life is dependent on mastering the skills, which are important for the planning and realization of the tours in nature. These skills include the physical and mental abilities of the participants, their experience in respect with a given planning, the specificities of the region (time, season, geographical specificities) etc. (Ibid: 39-40). That is why, as Faarlund argues, the conwayer has to obtain general understanding of outdoor life (helhetssyn på friluftsliv), practical wisdom (praktisk dyktighet i friluftsliv) and methodic teaching (metodisk skolering) (Ibid: 44).

3.2.1. The Impact of Centralization in Education – Hemsedal and Telemark Schools of Outdoor Life

Examining the traditions of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life requires comparing and contrasting the models imposed by two schools, namely, by the Mountain University College in Hemsedal (Høgfjellskolen i Hemsedal) and the one in Telemark (Høgskolen i Telemark). While the former is associated with the name of Faarlund, some of the most significant representatives of the latter are Bjørn Tordsson and Atle Tellnes (Østrem 2003: 15).

As it was already mentioned above, Faarlund established the Mountain University College in 1967 and it was one of the first institutions, which arranged courses in mountain ski jumps, climbing and hiking (Mytting og Bischoff 1999) (Østrem 2003: 16). According to Jensen, the school was opened for making people enthusiastic about nature as well as motivating them for a different way of living inspired by the conwaying in outdoor life (Ibid). Few years after the school was established, a two-year course in conwaying started. Referring to the governmental report number 40 (*About Outdoor Life*), which was approved in 1988, Faarlund argued that examining outdoor life is a matter not only of improving people's health, but also of thoughtful (hensynsfull) use of nature as well as avoiding its misuse (Ibid).

Faarlund's conwaying model has as an objective to clarify some aspects of conwaying process in respect with the philosophy of outdoor life, namely, to specify the role of the conwayer and his/her functions. Regarding the latter, he claimed that they are mainly concerned with expanding the scope of knowledge about outdoor life beginning with the 'close and known' (det nære og kjente) for the individual and the group and then focusing on the 'distant and unknown' (det fjerne og ukjente) (Faarlund 1999: 4). Some other functions concerned the groups' safety, which has to be in tune with nature's interests. They include responsibilities such as developing common responsibility, defining the relevant size of the group etc. Furthermore, the key issues of Faarlund's model were focused on how to qualify experienced conwayers in outdoor life as well as how to find institutional support in providing the groups with relevant sets of tools, clothes, food during their trips (Østrem 2003: 17-18).

In turn, the representatives of Telemark school also defined the conwaying as benefiting the meeting with free nature, which provides joyful and high quality of life's experience. The meeting in question should encourage the

critical attitudes towards the use of nature's sources emphasizing the role of the consequences to both man and nature. Thus developing common responsibility through common work contributes to the personal self-realization as such (Tellnes 1992: 96) (Østrem 2003: 19). In this context, Tordsson outlined the significant role of experiential learning in conwaying¹⁰³. According to him, outdoor life "is a special, process-oriented method of transmission, which is built on the basis of both group-working form and a direct meeting with nature" (Tordsson 1993: 36) (Østrem 2003: 19). The group-working form itself is the key premise for achieving the goals of experiential pedagogy (*erfaringspedagogiken*) because it is grounded in learning in and by (i og av) given situations, i.e. in learning in and through group-acting: to learn by doing (Tordsson 1993: 198). Since the conwaying is a process-oriented method of transmission, the conwayer also has to reflect upon his/her role, to develop his/her own style of working and to discern between his/her own role and the one of the group in particular. Tordsson distinguished between three functions – the one of the conwayer (*veglederfunksjonen*) who has to establish a democratic structure regarding the group-life and its interaction, the one of the task (*oppgavefunksjonen*) concerned with the experiential learning of the group, and the function of the individual (*individfunksjonen*) referring to the process of self-realization in respect with the group instructions (Tordsson 1993: 212-219) (Østrem 2003: 23). Both Tordsson and Tellnes also emphasized the role of external factors such as time, nature, size of the group, its dynamic, the life style etc.¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰³The aforementioned specificities determine the conceptual difference in Faarlund's sense between conwaying (*veiledning*) and guidance in the sense of leading (*veiledning*). According to Jensen, conwaying is a "history, which can be referred to Faarlund and Norwegian Mountain University College (Norges Høggjellskole)" in particular, while the leading is "all the rest" (Jensen 2000: 6-7). Thus Askeladden's 'translation' (*oversettelse*) of conwaying, as represented by Faarlund, distances the conwaying of outdoor life from the process of guiding, as introduced in the general theory of guidance (*Ibid*: 6). Furthermore, Faarlund argues that conwaying in the outdoor life is nothing but an attempt at bringing to life meeting with free nature (*et forsøk på å levendegjøre*) "under threat" of (i farene til) cultures' tradition close to nature (*naturnaere kulturers tradisjon*) (Østrem 2003: 18). The image of the conwayer is represented by Faarlund within the framework of the aforementioned traditions as a figure, which functions like grandmothers and grandfathers in the traditional societies (Faarlund 1991: 4) (Østrem 2003:18).

¹⁰⁴ For the differences between the two schools such as the more moderate attitudes towards the use of devices in outdoor life, see Østrem 2003.

Another similarity between the two schools is that both of them stressed the risk of outdoor life's commercialization as well as the illuminative impact of the idea that for the conwayer 'the simple tour is the goal'. On a macro methodological level, expanding Tellnes's conception of nature method, i.e. of what "man learns in and out of situations" (man lærer i og av situasjonene) (Tordsson 1993: 198) (Tellnes 1992: 99) (Østrem 2003: 19-21) is a guarantee of keeping the dialectical tension between already discussed two modes of being, namely, 'to be in' and 'to be with' nature understood through experiential learning as 'to learn in' and 'to learn from' nature respectively.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the premises for the ideal model of conwaying can be seen in what Faarlund described as Askeladden's school, which recognized one new paradigm of experiential learning. The conwayer has to train the group so that people to realize that we all have deep relationships with other species and things (Østrem 2003: 19) and that is why the experiential learning can be developed only through adopting one saturated with imaginative rationality way of thinking, which listens to the voice of cultural tradition and free nature. One of the main advantages of Askeladden's model, which can be extrapolated to the contemporary reality, is that it searches for answers in meaningful situations (I gåtefulle situasjoner) (Faarlund 2000a: 22) exploring the aspects of the total openness of man and nature.

In other words, to understand that rehabilitating the role of experiential learning through Faarlund's formula 'the way is the goal' (veien er målet), we should make not only meaningful decisions in meaningful situations, but also succeed in revealing the meaning of these situations, which are used to be considered as deprived of any meaning whatsoever. The latter is a result of expanding the dominance of technological culture, which reduces the role of the experience at the expense of cognitive rationality.

In conclusion, the need of specifying the methodological differences between conwaying and leading can be defined as arising from the contemporary challenges inflicted by the technological culture, namely, by reviving the complexity of moral learning and moral understanding. It is the metaphor of Askeladden's school that represents why the understanding and learning in question are a matter of clarifying the entity of conwaying as a process of transmitting practical wisdom about outdoor life through the complex knowledge of experiential learning. This process becomes more and more demanding due to the fact that the technological culture is not a 'close to nature' type of culture.

3.3. Risking Culture, Risking Life. The Role of Monoculture

3.3.1. The Role of Technological Culture and Industrialization for Norwegian Outdoor Life

From the late 1960s until the late 1980s, one of the main problems in avoiding the misuse of nature was the need of clearly outlining the boundaries between commercial and political. In turn, from the 1990s onwards the problem is how to disenchant the real threat as a threat coming from the unclear boundaries between the three dimensions outlined by Faarlund, namely, commercial, political and thematic ones.

Regarding the expanding role of technology, technological culture turned nature understood as a way home into a store house, which affected the differentiation of cognitive rationality and understanding. According to Faarlund, the culture in question is focused on the development (‘utviklingen’), on the rational usage of resources (“rasjonell utnyttelse av ressursene”) (Faarlund 2003: 11), making nature “something different from itself” (som noe utenfor selvet) (Ibid: 12).

Furthermore, the uncontradictory justification of technological culture as the only one culture available leads to the absolutization of the competence at the expense of the cooperation provided by the philosophy of outdoor life. Faarlund claims that traditionally Norwegian outdoor life was rather based on the “quality of performance” (på kvalitet i utførelsen), i.e. on hunting expeditions, walking tours etc. rather than on the competition between the participants (Ibid: 21).

The changing value of recreation is a key issue in clarifying the sportification of outdoor life. According to Faarlund, in the contemporary Norwegian society, the role of outdoor life is radically deprived of its traditional values being recognized as an escape from society, namely, as a form of pure escapism, or as a legal form of escape, which is called vacation or free time (Ibid: 22). It is also important to outline that it is the multilateral connections between economy and ecology that make the ‘invasion’ of the new ideal of recreation in the scope of outdoor life possible. The roots of this tendency can be referred to Faarlund’s statement about the branches of outdoor life, especially in Central Europe. According to him, they are pulled in tourism (ski centers, tourist packages), industry’s interests (production of equipment) and parts of the service sector (expeditions, tourism) (Ibid).

The recreation itself becomes a guarantee for the health status of the participants in the technological culture. In this context, Faarlund draws the important conclusion that as long as the work roles and day-life are not the most valuable forms of the technological societies, we need a physical and emotional engagement outside of the “technological structures” (engasjement fysisk og følelsesmessig utenfor “teknstrukturen”), i.e. first and foremost, in nature (Ibid). Otherwise, being a rehabilitation form of technological culture, outdoor life becomes an “artificial breath for one cultural form” (et kunstig åndedrett for en kulturform) (Ibid), which is not in tune with (i utakt med) people’s inherited assumptions and the ecological interplay on the planet Earth (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, I argue that intermingling the principles of economy and ecology can be examined as a matter of intermingling some cultural and living forms, which starts with their total contradiction in the very beginning (when the living forms are explored as opposed to the cultural ones) and ends with outlining their ontological dependence.

The genealogy of this process is based on the following logic. In the beginning, the recognition of technological culture depends on imposing some cultural forms as the only ‘proper living forms’, which in turn leads to contradicting the values of traditional outdoor life and the ones of recreation. Gradually rehabilitating the importance of going back and adopting some living forms is considered as strengthening the influence of the cultural forms. An illuminative example in this respect is outlining the recreation as having a new symbolic capital outside of the field of technological culture.

If such a turn is done not for the sake of the participants as individuals who adopt different moral experiential gestalts, but for the sake of the culture in question, the recreation becomes a part of the free time planning. In this context, Faarlund outlines the role of the sector of free time (“fritidssektoren”), which is “one very expansive sector of the economic life in the technological societies”¹⁰⁵ (Ibid: 23). According to him, another risk is outdoor life to become “a combined therapy and economic milking cow in the form of the “activity tourism” (“kombinert terapi og økonomisk melkeku i form av “aktivitetsturisme””) (Ibid). In other words, the therapeutic effect of rehabilitation could be merely justified in its institutionalized form due to the presumption that the alternative living forms also have relevant cultural functions, but they are displayed in a different manner.

¹⁰⁵The institutionalization of living forms as alternative ones is strengthened by so-called *Long-time program* (Langtidsprogram) introduced by the Norwegian parliament for the period of 1974-1977.

II.1. SOME INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON PETER WESSEL ZAPFFE

Regardless of the fact that the conceptions of the Norwegian mountaineer, lawyer, writer and philosopher¹⁰⁶ Peter Wessel Zapffe are not as well-known as the theories of Arne Næss, they had a significant influence on the development of Norwegian existentialism. According to Kvaløy, “One might perhaps say that while neither Zapffe nor Næss have been fully accepted, they have been two of the major forces contributing to making Norwegian ecophilosophy and environmental politics something that probably is not easily fitted into the categories of contemporary thinking on these matters elsewhere.”¹⁰⁷ He characterized Zapffe as “Norway’s earliest ecophilosophical pioneer” (Kvaløy 1992b: 274), and as a “Buddhist minus Nirvana” (en “buddhist minus Nirvana”)¹⁰⁸ (Kvaløy 2002: 118) arguing that Zapffe’s way of thinking was a type of metaphysical ecology (en slags metafysisk økologi), which he called “biosophy” (Ibid: 118-119). In this context, Kvaløy intended to metaphorically displaying the metaphysical pathos of Zapffe’s philosophy, which culminated in existential pessimism¹⁰⁹.

¹⁰⁶ For a detailed description of Zapffe’s “multi-sided personality” (dette mangfoldige menneske), see Fløistad 1989: 13.

¹⁰⁷ See also Randall’s translation (Randall 2007: 45).

¹⁰⁸ Kvaløy argues that he has suggested this expression to Zapffe and Zapffe did not “refuse” it (Ibid).

¹⁰⁹ By revealing the total openness of man and nature, which provokes a certain type of pessimism, Zapffe justifies the profile of a new worldview related to the Buddhist one, albeit without accepting the state of Nirvana as a guiding light in the process of human salvation. According to Zapffe, biosophy illustrates how dynamics of life is grounded in the law of entropy exploring the aspects of so-called ‘equilibrium through change’ (Zapffe 2011: 73). In this context, ‘tragic being’ is analyzed against the background of the principles of biological dynamics (Ibid). Examining the implications of the law of entropy is a tendency, which, as I will show in the next chapter, is based on the increasing need of rethinking the normative validity of nature’s predictability questioned by man’s strive for omnipotence on different levels.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify why one should give arguments in favor of Zapffe's pessimism rather than Zapffe's nihilism regardless of Nietzsche's influence on his views of cultural degrowth, as well as of the possibility to draw some parallels with Nietzsche's melancholic metaphysics¹¹⁰, as Haave suggests¹¹¹ (Haave 1999: 236-238). Zapffe himself describes Nietzsche's theory of tragic arguing that his "aesthetic-tragic desire" ("aestetisk-tragiske lyst") is imprecisely interpreted (Zapffe 1941: 554).

According to Zapffe, pessimism takes place as an element of Nietzsche's works, namely, as a "Dionysian comprehension" ("dionysisk erkjendelse") (Ibid): thus the general law of cruelty, suffering and total destruction looks deep-rooted (Ibid). In turn, this understanding leads to Buddhism, to repulsion of acting and life (Ibid: 554-555). On the other hand, Zapffe emphasizes that here comes the difference with Schopenhauer: "Nietzsche wants to go back to life: he wants salvation from Buddhism and finds this salvation in the tragedy, as it was in Greece and as it was for us" (Ibid: 555).

Looking for some methodological similarities between Zapffe and Schopenhauer, I argue that we may compare Zapffe's pessimism with Schopenhauer's pessimism¹¹² and his theory of tragic in particular, taking into account that Zapffe himself is critical to some of Schopenhauer's ideas. He describes Schopenhauer as an author¹¹³ who, according to the public opinion, shapes an epoch within tragic theory (Ibid: 550). By contrast to the ide-

¹¹⁰While describing Zapffe's attempts at exploiting the vulnerability of human being, Næss defines his ideas as "disturbing, humorous, and thorough", albeit being "clear" (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 104).

¹¹¹ However, Haave also outlines some methodological differences between Nietzsche and Zapffe. While Zapffe's theory of tragedy can be considered as a continuation (videreføring) of the Socratic-Christian interpretation of suffering, Nietzsche does not recognize one already firmly built meaning of life as a whole (Haave 1999: 237). Furthermore, Haave emphasizes that by contrast to Nietzsche who argues that man can define his/her suitable values by himself/herself, Zapffe's claim on childlessness presumes that one would not be able to live in such a way so that in the moment of death to welcome a certain type of repetition (en *gentagelse* velkommen) (Ibid: 238).

¹¹² I refer to chapter eight (*On Ethics*) in the second volume of Schopenhauer's *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851) as well as to *The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung)* (1818-1819) and the essay *Studies in Pessimism: the Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer* (1788-1860) (in its English translation of 2004).

¹¹³ He outlines that Schopenhauer is one of the authors who can be described as "biosophical" ("biosofisk"), which makes them more "accessible" (mere tilgjengelige) to research (Ibid: 551).

alists who were strongly influenced by Christianity, Schopenhauer was oriented to Buddhism. Zapffe argues that he “met the world’s course not with Yes, but with No” (Ibid). When we do not have an opportunity to realize our mortal interests, we do not have any other chance but to give up the interest as such, “to resign and turn from life, which, according to its nature, is suffering” (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe defines the task of tragedy as teaching us “this art by the example of the hero” (Ibid). On the other hand, he clarifies that Schopenhauer goes further, namely, saying that the one who resigns from life and its affections, returns to Nirvana, which is a condition for “salvation without desire” (en salighetstilstand uten begjær) (Ibid). Zapffe also outlines that Schopenhauer’s resignation is not a result of “the qualified fight for perfectibility” regarding what Zapffe calls qualified catastrophe, but an escape due to the first sign of resistance (Ibid: 552).

Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I argue that analyzing Zapffe’s reception of both Berkeley’s ideas and Jakob von Uexküll’s biosemiotics, which had a crucial influence on the formation of Zapffe’s biosophy contributes to revealing how the uniqueness of the latter affected the complex understanding of humankind’s differences from other species on more than one level, namely, in so-called by him biological, social, autotalic and metaphysical interest fronts displayed against the background of so-called multifrontal engagements, which will be examined in the next chapters.

2. ZAPFFE'S THEORY OF BIOSOPHY. "THINK BIOSOPHICALLY, ACT MEANINGFULLY!"

2.1 The Influence of Berkeley's Principle "Esse Est Percipi" and Uexküll's Theory of *Umwelt*¹¹⁴ on Zapffe's Biosophy

Kvaløy defines Zapffe's biosophical perspective as partly gaining its empirical validity from Berkeley's philosophy (Kvaløy 1992a: 12)¹¹⁵. Another significant source influencing Zapffe's theory were the works of the Baltic-German biologist and founder of biosemiotics Jakob von Uexküll. According to Zapffe, Uexküll's fundamental idea can be seen as philosophically tied with Berkeley's principle "esse est percipi", and even going back to Protagoras's conception of

¹¹⁴ According to Uexküll, the concept of *Umwelt* (surrounding world or environment) is closely tied with animals' ability to discern some meaning, which goes beyond the purely instinctual reactions (Buchanan 2008: 21). That is why the approaches to environment do not have to be examined as belonging to the field of ethology alone (Ibid). Referring to Kant's contribution of "shaking" the position of the universe by exposing it as "being merely a human form of perception" (Ibid), Uexküll argues that we should make a step further in reinstalling "the *Umwelt* space of the individual human being in its proper position" (Ibid). In this context, it becomes logical to ask how the world appears to the organisms as a subjective experience (Ibid: 22). Another important specification is that since *Umwelt* is organisms' perceptive environment, which discerns from the world as an object, we may witness how the *Umwelt* of different organisms may overlap with each other (Ibid: 25).

¹¹⁵ Zapffe argues that in the field of dramaturgy, which is one of his main fields of interest, one metaphysical orientation is displayed by authors such as Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Josef Körner, Peter Rokseth. He argues that "biosophically relevant" is an expression, which one finds in the works of H.V. Brønsted (*Biology and Human Understanding*) (*Biologi og menneskeforståelse*) and Jakob von Uexküll (*Biological Worldview*) (*Biologische Weltanschauung*) (Zapffe 1992: 143).

‘homo-mensura’ (the understanding that man is a measure of everything)¹¹⁶ (Zapffe 1992: 144).

In his essay, *Biosophical Perspective (Biosofisk perspektiv)* (1961) Zapffe provided a detailed analysis of the way some ideas of Uexküll were elaborated in his own writings. Zapffe argues that the traditional dualism between individual and environment is no longer so effective since Uexküll has grounded the thesis that environment for a given species, even for the individual, is co-determined (eventually, completely determined) by the living beings’ perceptive equipment in respect with a possible inner elaboration of impressions (Ibid: 143-144). These abilities and organs are the only one means, the only one way of arranging environmental characteristics, or if we adopt the more precise expression, to arrange one X, which afterwards is called or treated as an environment (Ibid).

In this context, Berkeley’s formula ‘esse est percipi’ is interpreted in a broader context. The durability of his thesis is judged from a point of view of “percipi” (utenfor “percipi”) from which one can understand “esse” without “percipi” (Ibid: 144). Zapffe claimed that one has been constantly disproving Berkeley’s thesis indeed before one has managed to compare (endnu for man rakk å sammenligne) ‘esse’ with the ‘perceptum’ for the purposes of finding a solution to the question of identity (Ibid). Clarifying Uexküll’s intention, Zapffe argues that the aforementioned sentence can be reformulated in the following way: “Biologist cannot work with anything but with perceptum” (Ibid: 144-145). However, in the process of crossing many perceptions (eventually, in their accumulation), so that one student of Berkeley or Uexküll to adopt a perception in order to understand animals’ perceptions, there is (in any case) one first complication, namely, the one of “perceptum est percipi” (Ibid: 145). Zapffe emphasizes that in the practical life, mixing the perception with one supposed ‘esse’ has weighty consequences¹¹⁷. If another individual has another perception, it is nevertheless unimportant from what Zapffe calls a biosophical point of view¹¹⁸, unless with this (perception), the thing also gains relevance in terms of interest (Ibid).

¹¹⁶ He refers to Næss’s *History of Philosophy* (1953).

¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Kvaløy metaphorically argues that at Stetind’s cliffs existence precedes essence by explicating the slogan “Either Sartre, or Spinoza!” (På Stedtinds vegger “forutgår eksistens essens”. Heller Sartre enn Spinoza!) (Kvaløy 2002: 119). Thus existence without essence requires justifying nature as embodying a vital energy, i.e. as obtaining a dialectical dynamics, which to guarantee the noncontradictory diversity of living beings.

¹¹⁸ Such a conception, however, raises the problem whether we can distinguish between perception bringing a relevant interest and one, which brings irrelevant interest. This issue in turn raises the concerns about a relevant interest is, as well as whether there is a ‘disinterested’ perception as such.

Such an interpretation, however, raises the question whether we can have “disinterested” perception and if so, would not it mean that it is possible only if “esse” coincides with “percipi”? We should take into account that the latter formula is possible only if it is examined as substantially grounded which in turn causes its misconceptualization. On the other hand, determining biosophy in respect with what interested perception is provokes the following two problems at least. First, what would be the reasons for justifying biosophy as going beyond the pitfalls of epistemological relativism? Second, what would be the exact projections of the aforementioned unimportant perception, as well as do we have to introduce some kind of hierarchical classification of the different types of perception talking about more and less important perceptions respectively? If so, I argue that it would lead to the ambiguous conclusion one Umwelt to be considered as more important (epistemologically and even axiologically) than another one.

On a macro methodological level, specifying the role of perception and environment is of crucial importance for Zapffe since the way he justifies human ‘over-equipment’ is examined as driven by the biological constitution of man, albeit it is not restricted to it. Extrapolating Uexküll’s thesis, Zapffe claims that man’s biological constitution is not an isolated phenomenon, but it has much to do with the perception of the environment, which in turn makes the representatives of human kind bearers of different complex interests. According to him, there are two conspicuous tendencies, which dominate the description of the interest life of the civilized man in general (Ibid: 158). The first one is that as a rule, man harbors more and stronger interests than a life in a given environment can realize, which might be considered as a point, i.e. that it is the interests in question that raise the need of fixation. The other rich of consequences peculiarity of human, biologically determined constitution lays in the unfixability (*ufiksértheten*) in Zapffe’s sense (Ibid: 159). This is also what differs, to a high extent, man from the “highest animals” (Ibid). It is supposed to be a difference in being (i “væsen”) showing one incompatibility (Ibid). According to Zapffe, most of the ‘high’ animals have a “ruling” ability (“herskende evne”), which is concentrated in one specialized organ (Ibid). It dominates and limits their life’s development, together with the perceptive equipment. He refers to Uexküll’s thesis (as displayed in *Environment and the Inner Life of Animals*) that the ability in question also dominates surrounding world’s picture (omverdensbillede) and possible self-feeling (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify how to overcome interpreting biological constitution within the framework of natural objectivism. As a possible solution, I suggest defining constitution in question as a matter of biological gradualism, which in turn would explain why organisms’

specification is a necessary but not sufficient condition for defining unfixability as a capability that is a priority of humankind alone. Otherwise, sentient animals would have also had the capability of looking for fixations. On a macro methodological level, the tension derives from the fact that it is both biological constitution as such and biological constitution as a human constitution that make human interests stronger than particularly biological ones. This thesis can also be illustrated by the fact that fixation mechanisms depend on the limitation of physical abilities of the organism, albeit they are not restricted to them.

In this context, I will examine how within the theory of biological constitution of mankind are introduced many concepts such as the ones of under and over-equipment in Zapffe's sense, as well as the role of fixations, which reveal why the constitution in question is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for reconstructing the existential constitution of human beings. It is due to the fact that having existential constitution is closely tied with the role of environment, which is understood as having biological, socio-cultural, autotelic and meta-physical projections.

Fixation in Zapffe's sense is a result of experiencing and/or realizing the limits of perceptive equipment, namely, of the 'decentralized' way of human life's development. It is the reflection on this living development that is not directed by one ruling ability alone. However, from that it does not follow that human perceptive equipment, which determines the unfixability can be compared with animals' equipment even in the cases when they have less specialized organs. That is why I draw the conclusion that the genealogy of the difference can be found in what Zapffe defines as a role of consciousness and fantasy in particular.

According to Zapffe, animals' choice in a situation is between use and non-use (Ibid). Therefore the less specialized the organs are, the more versatile ways they can be used in¹¹⁹. In turn, man has many similar abilities (individualized due to agreement) that are "potentially" available: partly, due to "the primitiveness of limbs" (lemmernes "primitive"), which means that they are "undifferentiated forms", partly, due to the enormous size of consciousness and fantasy concerning the incomprehensible function of the searching thought (Ibid). Zapffe argues that this specificity is probably again concerned with the big quanti-

¹¹⁹ Zapffe gives an example with the bear, which can run, climb, dig, swim and beat (Ibid).

ties of non-differentiated protoplasm¹²⁰ in the main brain whose presence has caused so much trouble to the corresponding parts of the medical brains (medicinernes hjerner)¹²¹ (Ibid).

Going back to the first tendency regarding the genealogy of fixations, we should examine the two options proposed by Zapffe. Partly, one should constantly give up the experience of things, which the day dreams represent in a seductive light, but which are unachievable in fact: e.g. to go to the moon, to win a fortune, to liberate people etc. (Ibid: 158). Partly, one should choose between some achievable things, when one of them eliminates the other one. In turn, the need of choice is accompanied by choice's pain (pine), which, in given cases, grows with the number of opportunities (Ibid). In this context, the interest front is described by Zapffe as resembling a war front: the longer it is stretched out in respect with certain resources, the more vulnerable it is (Ibid). One vital and all-round developed person could suffer from realizing that he/she should have had hundred lives instead of one in order not to take 99% of his/her opportunities with himself/herself in the grave (Ibid).

¹²⁰ According to Zapffe, it is superfluous to care about species' existence or due to some other reasons, to participate in the scuffle on Darwin's grave (i haandgemaenget paa Darwins grav) (Zapffe 1941: 16). Successive, simultaneous or inexplicable genesis (genese) can be one and the same for us: we are merely allowed to hold the position on common fundamental relationship (om fælles grundforhold), on equality in front of law (om "likhet for loven") during the whole life, or more relevantly expressed, on the common distinctive feature of protection, experience and reproduction mechanisms' functional conditions in the peculiar, earthly power field (Ibid). This fellowship can be traced back to life's protoplasmic basis, as well as to the unity of the histological structure (the functioning of muscles and nerve tissues) (Ibid). Referring to Uexküll's theory, Zapffe emphasizes two of the many characteristics of protoplasm, namely, access to temporary peculiar characteristics and the one to lasting differentiation (Ibid: 41). The first sign of changes in original homogeneous matter regarding one individualized zoological unity is the formation of a membrane, one exterior layer (et ytre skikt) of firmer matter, which is called ectoplasm by contrast to the unchanged inner one, or so-called endoplasm (Ibid). According to Zapffe, these two forms of plasm can go over each other (Ibid). In this context, the existence of non-differentiated protoplasm (av udifferentiert protoplasma) is a condition for the form powers' activity (Ibid: 44). In turn, plasm is defined as the material in which these powers manifest themselves and reach us so that due to our need of reason, we should end up with "something" (til et "noget"). When the material is exploited by the differentiation, the powers enjoy steadily plainer circumstances until they no longer come into view as changing (Ibid)

¹²¹ He refers to Herman Poppelbaum, *Mensch und Tier (Man and Animal)* (1956). Remaining on the level of protoplasm explanations raises the risk of falling again into the trap of natural objectivism, albeit we may find some reasons for human biological specialization in protoplasm's functions of differentiation.

Furthermore, Zapffe specifies that man (similarly to other living beings)¹²² is characterized (in the broadest outline) by the following two factors. One has an *equipment* (*Utrustningen*), which due to the made demands, changes from under-equipment (under-utrustning) (insufficiency) (utilstrækkelighet, insufficiens) through equivalence (ækvivalens) to over-equipment (overutrustning): one state, where there are abilities and power left after the need is satisfied (Ibid: 160). The second factor is the *fixation's connection* (*Fiksations-forholdet*), which varies from under-fixation (including liability, the loss of conduct, the loss of character when something is unfavorably measured in respect with one given interest: it could be either the bearer's interest or the interest of others), well-adapted fixation (including the satisfied fixation etc., which shows a favorable degree of elasticity, perfectibility, control of alternatives) to *over-fixation* (characterizing with stubbornness, ossification (forbenethet) etc.), together with a *wrong fixation* taking place in different directions¹²³ (Ibid). Judging by Zapffe's classification, I argue that the degree of fixation determines how under or over-fixation depends on the equipment of the interest bearer, which to provoke a relevant behavior for the purposes of satisfying (partly or fully) a given interest, albeit the fixation remains irreducible to the equipment in question. That is why we should talk about interest bearers alone.

Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that analyzing the role of Berkeley's and Uexküll's theories for Zapffe's biosophy contributes not only to outlining the unique aspects of Zapffe's conception, but also to clarifying how biosophy functions as a type of experiential philosophy. It shows why we should avoid both biological determinism and ungrounded metaphysical spiritualism if we want to reveal the complexity of existential tension regarding the uniqueness of humankind as the only one species able to experience so-called by Zapffe cosmic feeling of panic, i.e. to be aware of its own being in the universe as a process of becoming, which, however, cannot bring complete reconciliation while facing some biologically determined processes such as death and suffering.

¹²² This specification brings some contradictions since Zapffe also argues that the ability of producing fixation is a priority of humankind.

¹²³ See Zapffe's self-reference 1941: 20, 28, 81.

2.2. Zapffe's Theory of Biosophy

According to Kvaløy, Zapffe's biosophical perspective has a deeper dimension, namely, that man is such a being that he/she requires a meaning with his/her life, as well as with humankind's life as a whole: the search for meaning is man's distinctive characteristic, which makes him/her different from all other living beings. It is a matter of an "over-equipment" ("overutrustning"), but nature cannot fulfill this requirement by itself (Kvaløy 1992b: 274-275).

In turn, Næss claims that Zapffe's biosophy is a type of ecosophy¹²⁴ saying that Zapffe's conception justifies an explicit ecosophical value (Næss 1973: 22). The crossing point is recognized in the understanding of wisdom (sophia) as providing knowledge and cleverness rather than a certain type of impersonal or abstract learning (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe's biosophy is characterized as giving an insight in life ("innsikt i livet), which in turn improves our anticipation of our human condition (Ibid). On the other hand, Zapffe's biosophy is a "thinking about life" illustrating why the systems of beliefs, which mankind has been basing its feeling of life on, should be taken into consideration, as well as examining why these systems guarantee the functioning of ultimate and determined values (Gundersen 1974: 24).

Zapffe himself emphasizes the role of biosophy as regarding the case of dramaturgy¹²⁵ (Zapffe 1992: 142). He specifies that biosophical view of a theme (within dramaturgy) clearly discerns from the metaphysical one (possibly, from spiritual, materialist, vital, teleological, religious etc.), which is

¹²⁴ According to Næss, ecosophy is "a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, prescription, not only scientific description and prediction" (Drengson and Inoue 1995: 8). The role of ecosophy will be examined in detail in the chapter on Næss.

¹²⁵ The question of dramatic impression in Zapffe's theory is defined as making one necessarily go to the precincts of psychology, while examining how dramatic should take place in the field, where "Life fights for its preservation and its development in one more or less favorable environment" (Ibid: 143). All disciplines, which have the aforementioned fight as an object of investigation should be applied to the examinations of the "biosophically interested researchers" (Ibid). Furthermore, Zapffe defines the biosophical picture of human condition in the world as an overall horizon (rundhorizont) regarding the expanded, concrete courses, where precious interests are "entangled in a fight" (Zapffe 1992: 167): "so that they to make these courses a dramatic matter" (Ibid).

understood as a speculative, aesthetical overall view, and which the aforementioned biosophical view stays indifferent, but not necessarily polemically opposite to (Ibid). If these overall pictures (the biosophical and metaphysical ones) are of such a type that the “unknown powers” are adopted in order to make themselves valid by the “natural laws” and “biological life”, then they should have been built on the same material of observation (Ibid). Thus the difference would have been only in the way of interpretation (Ibid). Zapffe continues that the situation could have been different¹²⁶ if they have included some impulses, which, from a given theological perspective, were broken, as well as could break in and change the course of events whenever (nårsomhelst); a course, which, otherwise, one should have expected due to the common experience (Ibid: 142-143). When the difference lays in the deeper assumptions and in one missing common platform, it is impossible to reach a compromise (Ibid: 143).

In this context, the main problem is whether referring to what Zapffe calls ‘biological life’ does not increase the risks of falling into the trap of objective naturalism, namely, while striving for overcoming the challenges posed by the metaphysical view on tragic, biosophical to turn into a method of objective naturalism. Another question arises of Zapffe’s definition of metaphysical view as aesthetical one, albeit he makes the relevant specification that biosophical and metaphysical do not necessarily exclude each other. Such an analysis favors only at first sight talking about substantial similarities; one speculation, which is clearly disenchanting by Zapffe. Successfully describing the problem of biosophical and metaphysical overviews, he, however, does not clarify the genealogy of the complex relationships between the views in question, namely, how biosophy can be indifferent, without being necessarily opposed to metaphysical view. Extrapolating his theory of the interest bearer, I suggest the aforementioned difficulty to be examined by investigating to what extent biosophical and metaphysical views are based on different interests, which may overlap when so-called multifrontal engagements in Zapffe’s sense are initiated.

In his attempts to outline the specificities of biological experience against the background of metaphysical one, Zapffe argues that one belief, which is grounded in the *prolongation* (*i forlængelsen*) of experience, is of curiosity

¹²⁶ Here, we can talk about substantial difference.

interest¹²⁷ alone from a biosophical perspective (Ibid). Furthermore, one belief, which *goes against* (*strider mot*) experience (God provides all human beings' earthly necessities (*fornødenheter*)¹²⁸, even when people do not need to work), which is defined as being of interest only as a symptom (Ibid). In this context, the differences may be defined as differences in the degree of interest since in the first case, we witness an interest in itself, which concerns the matter, while in the second one, it affects the interest as such.

Zapffe points out that the choice of method which to clarify the role of tragic requires revealing the grounding connection of tragic with organic life's characteristics, as well as with life's conditions¹²⁹ in the "earthly environment" (Zapffe 1941: 11). That is why applied biology is introduced as a method (Ibid: 12). Zapffe refers again to Uexküll's theory, which disregards the philosophical consequences and examines the living cell as something principally different from the earth-bound (Ibid: 15-16). The latter statement is interpreted by a reference to Uexküll's chapter *The Problem of Proto-plasm (Das Protoplasmaproblem)* (Ibid: 16, Note 1). Among the key features of the living beings are mentioned the ones of shaping (*Formbildung*), regeneration (*Regeneration*) and super-mechanical regulation ("übermaschinelle Regulation"), i.e. the reaction, which is changed by repeated stimulus (Ibid).

¹²⁷ I also argue that the justification of the ontological groundings of biosophy is a logical consequence of revealing the genealogy of the tension brought by the imaginative rationality within Zapffe's experiential philosophy. This issue will be examined in one of the next chapters by outlining so-called autotelic and heterotelic aspects of fantasy in Zapffe's sense.

¹²⁸ Zapffe also specifies that a biosophical aspect was already constructed by the "prophet Jesus" (Ibid), who in his *The Parable of the Sower* showed how the seed corn, which fell on different grounds, being smaller than a nutshell, has given the general form of life and its conditions in a corn-husk (Ibid). In *On the tragic*, Zapffe argues that yet Jesus of Nazareth was aware of so-called law of coincidence (*denne tilfældighetens lov*) realizing the lack of a guiding overview, an economic principle, a guarantee of a task and meaning concerning every single germ. In this context, he outlines that Jesus of Nazareth was aware that not only germ's own quality, but also the most random chance is decisive for its further destiny, namely, that many are called but only few are chosen (Zapffe 1941: 18).

¹²⁹ Zapffe emphasizes that against the use of applied biology some objections can be raised in two directions: first, on side of the biologists who find that their science is misused, and second, from philosophical and aesthetic perspectives since due to the latter one refuses the interference of natural sciences' thinking mode (Ibid: 12-13).

Exploring Uexküll's theory, Zapffe argues that it is important to take into account that the possible difference of degree regarding man and maybe some other sentient beings is so big that it is experienced as a difference of being ("væsensforskjel") in its everyday meaning (Ibid). In the next sentence, Zapffe claims that we believe that tragic should connect itself with the spontaneous life's experience¹³⁰ (den umiddelbare livsoplevelse) and not with the things, which they (people and some sentient animals) represent within the scientific approach (problem stating) (Ibid). Thus the object of investigations allows one to refer to the biological ideology alone (Ibid). However, biological itself does not provide an explicit difference between experience and the objects of experience as such. Another problem is that due to the scientific problem solving, we may also treat the objects in the process of experiencing unless it postulates a certain scientific dualism.

¹³⁰ Judging by these investigations, we may speculate to what extent, such a spontaneous experience may have an unquestionable normative validity as an organic experience.

2.2.1. Biosophy as a Method

Zapffe also outlines that in his book *Elements of One Biological Worldview* (*Bausteine zu einer biologischen Weltanschauung*) (1913) Uexküll gave an expression to the concerns on side of the biologists who claimed that their science is misused (Ibid: 12, 13). The intention was not to idolize developmental biology (en utvidet biologi) in a professional sense of the word, but only to consider the development of organic life under the view of the fight of interests (Ibid). Neither is it intended to burden the poetry theory with the terminology of natural sciences, nor to narrow down the life of fantasy by biological dogma¹³¹ (Ibid). According to Zapffe, the method goes deeper as when one cleans up an attic (Ibid). One puts boxes with “art and poetry” at one place, but, on the other hand, he/she does not take a stance on the contents (Ibid).

Zapffe draws the conclusion that it is the need of specialization that carries such interferences with itself (Ibid). Paraphrasing the aforementioned example, I argue that biology can turn out to be the content of biosophical ‘boxes’ since the latter bring to light human existential perspective. This happens against the background of one’s need to throw light to the only one necessary and always burning question, namely, what does it mean to be a human being? (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe makes the important conclusion that when none of the disciplines can give us an answer, then here comes so-called good dilettante (den gode dilettant) (Ibid). The figure of the dilettante as obtaining a complex interdisciplinary knowledge is later developed by Næss and Kvaløy who introduce the figure of the generalist and so-called super-amateur¹³².

Applied biology, however, cannot provide us with a detailed answer to the question *What does it mean to be a human being?*, which reveals why defining tragic is an existential problem that illustrates something different that is “more” than individual and species’ death (Ibid: 18). According to Zapffe, plan (understood in the broadest sense) is the human way of giving meaning to things, “an arrangement of the coincidences with some structural groups bounded by a scheme in space or in time” (Ibid). Otherwise, defining the existential prehistory of justifying the meaning of life in respect with the idea of meaningfulness would have been reduced from an existential to a purely biological issue. Thus tragic in Zapffe’s sense would have been simplified to the physical end of be-

¹³¹ This conception, however, is not explicitly stated by Uexküll.

¹³² The definition of these two categories will be a subject to special investigations in the chapter on Kvaløy.

ing, which would have made tragic be noncontradictory extrapolated to all forms of life on Earth.

Many of the aforementioned difficulties regarding the specification of the term biosophy derive from the fact that Zapffe himself defines it in an ambiguous way, as Hessen points out (Hessen 2012: 148). He argues that the biosophical perspective or the biological method is a part of most of Zapffe's analytical writings (i de fleste analytiske arbeider) (Ibid). In the monograph *On the tragic*, he gives preference to the term 'biological' over 'biosophical' ("the thinking of life") because biosophical "has a mystical connotation, which does not belong here..." (Ibid). In some "later contexts" (I senere sammenhenger) (Ibid), Zapffe uses to a bigger extent the concept 'biosophical' (Ibid). The difference between the two terms is not clear apart from the fact that 'biological' indicates something more empirical and less mystical than 'biosophical' (Ibid). Hessen emphasizes that Zapffe talks about biological or biosophical methods, not about biosophy as such (Ibid).

However, biosophical in Zapffe's sense cannot be understood as mystical. He does not imply a certain type of irrationalism to this concept, but rather emphasizes the difficulties in specifying what particularly biosophical is. What is defined as a more frequent use of biosophical in his later writings can be explained with the more precise theoretical specifications regarding the overcoming of the problems of Uexküll's theory, namely, the problems, which should be overcome by relying on Zapffe's theory of four interest fronts and the status of the interest bearer. On a macro methodological level, we may trace how the aforementioned difficulties in both defining and contextualizing the concept of biosophical derive from Zapffe's attempts at showing why biosophical is irreducible to biological. Otherwise, human existence would have been simplified to the way of being in the universe.

In this context, Hessen argues that anthropomorphization, which we see especially in the first two chapters of *On the tragic*, together with the fables about animals, should clarify human conditions by the use of metaphors from the animal world (Ibid). He also argues that it is the animals as such that are of interest for Zapffe (Ibid).

Zapffe himself claims that not only due to the accordance between abilities and tasks do animals beneficially affect men (Zapffe 1941: 48). He specifies that maybe they (animals) make this effect stronger by showing natural peacefulness by which they rest on their determined form (i sin fæstnede form) and by this form they give us the sense of security to feel at home (av at være i hus med) with one really solid-cast character (Ibid).

Zapffe, however, does not encourage anthropomorphization. He outlines not only the similarities but also the differences between animals and people in order to clarify the limitations of the over-equipment of the former. Zapffe emphasizes that regardless of the fact that one admires some cats' possibilities¹³³, the process of anthropomorphization is a double-bind issue. He explicitly argues that human character's formation cannot approximately be compared to cat's one when it is a matter of launching a being, which is no longer disputable by nature with itself (hvor i naturen ikke mere er splidagtig med sig selv) (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that it is not possible to rely on experience or well-known knowledge alone (Ibid: 48-49) since it is necessary to fit a bridge span (at passere brospænd), which can be solidly built without damages (Ibid: 49). In this context, he clearly states that one obvious objection concerns outstretched anthropomorphization of animals' conscious and unconscious life (den utstrakte *antropomorficering* av dyrenes bevisste og ubevisste liv) (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe draws the conclusion that anthropomorphization in question can be done only if a person has merely a biological interest front, which in turn would have made him being "one abstraction" (være en abstraktion) (Ibid).

Zapffe begins his explanation with the statement that the examinations regarding the antropomorphization can also be applied to much bigger extent (relevance) to human beings in their pure biological fight of interests alone (Ibid). It is nevertheless with malice aforethought that situations and designations are placed on the simplest (possible) animal level (til det enklest mulige dyretrin) (Ibid): thus the picture would not be polluted (skal bli forurenset) with all associations that inevitably would appear by the transfer to human conditions (Ibid).

Investigating the genealogy of Zapffe's biosophy, we may trace how the aforementioned interpretations raise more questions than provide answers since Zapffe's experiential philosophy is irreducible to any forms of both anthropomorphism and ethical anthropocentrism, especially taking into account that giving arguments in favor of nature's antropomorphization would have meant to reduce biosophy to its 'biological' content.

¹³³ He discusses that very often one has been admiring cat's dazzling safety in the social intercourse; one has been witnessing with envy how the cat has been going through (gjennemfører) its sovereign autonomy (sin suveræne autonomi) without being offended, as well as without losing its dignity in the most ignominious situation (Ibid: 48).

2.2.2. Biosophy as an Existential Philosophy

Regarding the possibilities of interpreting how biology refers to biosophy, G. Fløistad emphasizes the role of biosophy as a method, as represented in the monograph *On the Tragic*. Fløistad refers to Zapffe's definition that the chosen method is biological *or* biosophical (Fløistad 1989: 18). Thus this method is described as giving Zapffe the opportunity to start with a discussion on the organic life in general (Ibid).

Later on in his investigations on Zapffe's work *Introduction to Literary Dramaturgy (Inføring i litterær dramaturgi)* (1961), Fløistad goes back to that idea while commenting on Zapffe's essay *Biosophical perspective (Biosofisk perspektiv)*. Against the background of the clarifications concerning the biosophical picture of humankind's conditions in the world, staying as an all-round horizon, he interprets Zapffe's function of 'or' as a matter of choosing between two alternatives, i.e. biosophical is examined as an alternative of biological (Ibid: 40). Such an interpretation, however, requires specifying how to define both the origin and internal connections between these two alternatives. If we presume that biological and biosophical are two, substantially different alternatives, which is indicated by the connector 'or' (either biosophical, or biological) rather than ontological synonyms, then it would mean that we cannot examine biosophy as a certain type of experiential philosophy. I also argue that it is not a sufficient condition to define the aforementioned two concepts as synonyms but as ontological synonyms because otherwise, the method of biosophy would have been recognized as coinciding with the methods of applied biology, which is against Zapffe's conception, as well as against what Fløistad claims while specifying that Zapffe uses biological method in a way that goes beyond its traditional use in biology (Ibid: 52).

Furthermore, another problem arises from defining biosophy and biology as alternatives because then we face the inevitable need of constantly discussing why biosophical method is not a purely biological one, but entails the latter to a certain extent. In this context, one of the most apparent difficulties is to specify how from the fact that the method is biological (being at the same 'neutral' since it is built on one particular vision of life) (Ibid: 79), it does not follow that when one chooses this method, one ends up with a stance against Zapffe's complex theory of life, which is irreducible to biological interests. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that one of the main concerns about such an explanation is that accepting the thesis of the two alternatives would lead to interfering the concept of meth-

od with the one of alternative. On the other hand, if we agree with the idea of method as splitting between two (substantial or not) alternatives, then, the next issue is how to refer the idea of experiential philosophy to the existential one in Fløistad's sense. Fløistad defines existential philosophical perspective as a biosophical perspective applied to people, which should be given preference (skulle ligge bedre til rette), albeit we should be careful in providing some direct parallels between them (Ibid: 52). However, from the fact that the argument against talking about environment in itself is one, which is shared by Zapffe and some existentialists (Ibid: 53), it does not follow that biosophy, as an experiential philosophy, provides the interpretation of what Uexküll calls functional circle as a matter of adopting existential philosophy alone.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the difference between biosophical and biological remains unclear if we neglect the ontological grounding of Zapffe's experiential philosophy. An important suggestion how to interpret the practical implications of the latter can be seen in what Fløistad defines as an ecological perspective recognized in the broader sense of the word¹³⁴ (Ibid: 78).

¹³⁴ According to him, the concept of method (biosophical and biological) used by Zapffe merely indicates that life should be examined from an ecological perspective (fra "økologisk" synspunkt) understood in the widest sense, i.e. from the perspective of interests, recognized as the fight of the single individuals for self-realization (Ibid). According to Hessen, Zapffe describes biosophical method as a type of ecology for the humankind. In turn, it would explain how we react to this challenge (the fear of fear) (angsten for angsten), which requires one more important, more advanced apparatus to be adopted than the one for the challenges, which all living beings (from the amoeba to the ape) meet on their life's way (Hessen 2012: 148).

According to Zapffe, biosophy means a philosophy, one theoretical view upon existence¹³⁵, which is oriented towards biology and its annexes (paleontology etc.), and which in line with this, orients itself thorough empirically to all its “problems” (Zapffe 1992: 142). Furthermore, he points out that biosophy is a way of thinking, which is built on biology in a manner acknowledged by life. In “a fanatical but necessary simplification”, we can think about the first coming biosophical conclusion from the position of observation and introspection, without being accused of adopting free and irresponsible fantasy¹³⁶ (Zapffe 1992a: 269).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that biosophical is a mode of philosophical thinking that is initially based on the philosophy of nature rather than on nature as such. In turn, philosophy of nature does not have to be interpreted as an ‘artificial thinking mode’, but rather as providing an examination of the internal logic of nature’s complex development, which has its own dialectics. The latter contributes to understanding why biosophical and biological can replace each other if we examine them as ontological synonyms, as I already suggested. It is possible by determining the complexity of the mode of being as irreducible to the sum of its concrete embodiments. Furthermore, I conclude that it is the normative validity of biosophy defined as an experiential philosophy that makes

¹³⁵ An important aspect of Zapffe’s theory is how he examines culture from a biosophical perspective, which is another argument in favor of the thesis that biosophy does not have to be reduced to a method of applied biology, as Zapffe himself argues. From a biosophical perspective, which, in its capacity for research, looks for a general view and clarity instead of edification of rich in comfort fictions, this part of culture comes out (fremtræder) as “one steady, more elaborated palace” (Zapffe 1992: 165). The latter is surrounded by the wall of “sweat crystals (sved-krystaller)” that “human soul excretes in its long, feverous fight with itself” (Ibid): “hung, as it is, between the trivialities of self-preservation and the splendid, desperate fall in a deadly expansion “in one togetherness with everything” (i en “forening med altet”) (Ibid). The latter excludes every single opportunity for an appropriate choice of a “margarine-type” (Ibid). Thus the culturally conscious and culturally active part of humankind works on one endless task: to build its own valuable world inside the big value-indifferent environment (Ibid: 167).

¹³⁶ According to Zapffe, in a phase of a million-year development, among the myriads of bigger and smaller differentiations, a cleavage (spaltning) takes place. It divides animals’ kingdom into two groups: on the one hand, we have animals, and on the other one, humankind as such (Zapffe 1992a: 269). Regardless of some possible parallels, since man knows his/her spiritual and psychological over-equipment and unfixibility, he/she is determined to have one both quantitatively and qualitatively different (in terms of being) living form (Ibid).

the normative validity of its own judgments both rationally acceptable and deriving from the ‘real’ matter.

Zapffe himself gives some strong arguments against simplifying the existential projections of life to the biological ones criticizing Uexküll of not tracing the philosophical consequences of biosophy (Zapffe 1941: 15-16)¹³⁷. By environment Uexküll means the unifying environment where the animal receives its impressions from and which, in turn, it looks to act on (Ibid). One can say that on the one hand, through its individual perceptive equipment, the animal can undertake a choice of factors that constitute man’s world, in so far as this world is the more comprehensive one (Ibid). On the other one, there is an open possibility for having an animal with perceptive abilities (ved sensoriske evner), which people miss (Ibid: 26-27). Thus the animal will experience qualities of environment, which are unknown for us (e.g. dog’s world of smells): since we know nothing about how the different animals gain impressions. Otherwise, it requires having the same type of perceptive apparatus: e.g., the sense of depth (dybdesyn) achieved by stereoscopically coordinated lens (Ibid).

Due to the terminology of Uexküll’s *Environment and Inner World of Animals* (*Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere*), Zapffe adopts the expression “functional circle” (*funktionskreds*)¹³⁸, which displays animals’ total report of reality (dyrets totale virksomhetsrapport) including animals’ specific world¹³⁹ (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines the role of the issue raised by Uexküll’s attempt at defining reaction as an expression of the world’s feeling (verdensfølelsen) (Ibid: 28).

In this context, the two main questions, which he poses, are as follows: Can an animal reply with the same reaction (for the purposes of our same investigation) to some impressions from a different origin? Can an animal answer to the same perception (“fornemmelse”) with qualitatively deferent reac-

¹³⁷ Uexküll’s scheme is based on the vision that the living environment of the individuals is dependent on the individual’s receptive and effective equipment (dets effektoriske utrustning) (Ibid: 26).

¹³⁸ Referring again to Uexküll, Zapffe argues that every single functional circle consists of a net of activities (“virkenet”) and a net of signs (“merkenet”); thus in the metaphysical life, (which, in its “fastened” (fæstnede) form means ‘religious’ by rule), we can also see the human contribution to the response of world’s subject and God’s one (Ibid: 203). Thus God and world’s plan form together the hypothetical-metaphysical environment (Ibid). In turn, in the prolongation of biological life’s holding lay some religious benefits such as sacrifices with food and drinks (brændoffer og drikoffer) (Ibid).

¹³⁹ See the scheme, Ibid: 27.

tions regardless of the bluntness (sløvhet) or sharpness (skjærpelse) of the reaction, which is driven by a given repeated stimulus? (Ibid). According to him, it is the latter question that raises the issue of unfixability (Ibid). Such a statement, however, provokes the conclusion whether unfixability in Zapffe's sense is not triggered by environmental conditions alone under which the animals react. This in turn would contradict Zapffe's other definitions of unfixability regarding individual's equipment, even if we do not take into consideration his previous definitions of the priority of humankind while shaping fixations. In other words, it would have meant that unfixability would be simplified to a lack of fixations concerning the presence or lack of a given equipment, i.e. unfixability would be reduced from the level of potentiality to the one of equipment.

Zapffe's answer is that as long as one should deal with only one simple reaction and only one type of perception (sanseformidling) respectively (which seems to be the most important one) (Ibid), it is not a matter of a real experience of the object (*gjenstandsoplevelse*), but only of a perception of quality (Ibid). This conclusion, however, could be interpreted as grounded in the presumption that the real experience of the objects entails many perceptions: not in the one that many individuals may anticipate one and the same object in different ways¹⁴⁰.

Zapffe also provides a similar conclusion, taking into account the consequences of defining the concept of individual due to the biological *principium individuationis*¹⁴¹ (Ibid: 177) as determining the difference between given bearers of interests. On a macro methodological level, it signifies that recognizing the accomplishment of unity of man and environment can be achieved by revealing the connection between them, which is driven by the fact that the individual makes the latter his/her 'own' environment in differ-

¹⁴⁰ According to Zapffe, most of the anchoring cases (de forankringstilfælde), which we have been dealing with have an individual nature (var av *individuel* natur) (Ibid: 177), namely, they had their premise in the individual human heritage and experience, its "raison d'être" was in subject's determined need (Ibid). Furthermore, ideas and values that can profitably be called collective ones (*kollektive*) are also interpreted as a side of individual life. Thus due to our terminology, they constitute a part of individual's social life front (Ibid).

¹⁴¹ It is defined as an indivisible rule in life (udelelighetens grundsætning) (in-dividuum) due to organism's complete functionality (functions' entity) in contrast to mucus (i motsætning til slimet) and non-organic matter (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe argues that it is the individuals that carry the collective impulses as well as that in given cases they can fully cut the latter off (Ibid).

ent ways without possessing it¹⁴². Last but not least, I argue that the lack of possession mode is a result of one's anticipation of the environment as a living environment due to one's individual capacities to interact with it on all levels.

On the other hand, defining the vital balance in Zapffe's sense as dependent on the accommodation capacities of the individual, namely, whether the individual has over-biological or under-biological equipment¹⁴³ (Ibid: 35) raises the risk of advocating a certain type of biological determinism or metaphysical absolutism, which might be misconceptualized for the purposes of providing a biosophical understanding. In this context, Zapffe argues that the aforementioned two types of equipment are brought to light, when a functional circle should be set in action (skal træde i virksomhet) as demanded (besides ability) also by need and *energy* (*energi*), plus the fact that the inhibitions are not present (samt at der ikke er hemninger tilstede) (Ibid). That is why regarding the energies in question, we can talk about over or under-equipment (Ibid).

One of the main methodological concerns, which arises is, however, whether under and over-biological equipment are the only one embodiment of what under and over-equipment are. Zapffe himself provides a detailed examination of the complex reasons for having under and over-fixations as built on the complex investigation of individuals' under and over-equipment. Probably one of the few cases when under and over-biological coincide with under and over-equipment in his sense is in the process of fixation's satisfaction, when the capability is neither more nor less than what is sufficient for realizing the fixation in question.

On the other hand, going back to Zapffe's theory of energy, we may explain why capability is irreducible to the expressibility since energy may be needed only as its necessary condition. Furthermore, it is the idea of energy that provokes the question of life's meaning to be interpreted beyond the one of satisfying needs. As one of the illuminative embodiments of how need determines expressibility can be seen in Zapffe's conception of lower and

¹⁴²Zapffe's specification concerns the receptive functions of the individuals as organisms rather than their ability to transform the environment due to man's potential to interfere into the habitat one lives in.

¹⁴³ According to Zapffe, over-biological or a-biological development takes place only when existential needs are secured (Ibid: 38). In turn, the distinction between biological and over-biological equipment partly overlaps with the one between fixed and unfixed use of organs (Ibid: 48).

higher potentials presuming the possibility two opposite energy types to be adopted (Zapffe 1992: 149). If lower potential strengthens the sense of safety, it would have meant that it decreases the need of imposing fixation mechanisms. However, according to Zapffe's theory, the energy types include both positive and negative charging (Ibid).

In turn, the question of life's meaning as such concerns the transformation of the mode of being into the one of becoming i.e. it illustrates how given living environment turns into a meaningful space of existence rather than remaining an arena of being.

The explicit conceptualization of this matter is also outlined by Næss who claims that one is recognized as a fragment of nature. That is why the process of identification¹⁴⁴ is interpreted as a process in which relationships that define the crossing points expand more and more in terms of defining how "the Self grows" (Selvet vokser) (Næss 1973: 52).

In turn, Zapffe claims that in a biosophical light, living beings, things and conditions are considered as sources of destiny (*kilder til skjæbne*) (Zapffe 1992: 147). He specifies that only the bearer of interests has a destiny because the world deprived of interests does not experience "a difference in well-being" ("forskjel i trivsel") (Ibid: 148). For example, we can talk about humanly determined units such as "moon", "ice-block", "potato" that are "dissolved/merged together or dissolved, crushed and spread, burn or get frozen" (Ibid). Zapffe argues that many of these unities have ascribed more than once "history" in the sense of "identity with variations"¹⁴⁵ (Ibid). On the other hand, the word 'potential' (*potential*) means fellowship, which connects the whole known world (Ibid). Furthermore, he points out that all potentials resemble each other so that if they are not hindered, they will "leak" ("lække"), will be "set off" ("utløses") etc. until the higher potential becomes such a potential of environment¹⁴⁶ (Ibid). For that reason, nature does not allow one potential to accumulate from itself. Thus the laws say

¹⁴⁴ According to Næss, by identification we should understand a process in which the relationships that define the crossing point are developed for the purposes of "including more and more" (Ibid). This is how the Self "grows" (Ibid).

¹⁴⁵ In this context, it is important to introduce ethical gradualism in order to specify identity's variations regarding well-being, when the latter is ascribed to humans and animals respectively.

¹⁴⁶ One of the questions in this context is if they all resemble each other, how can we talk about low and high potential in general since there should be some reasons for one of those to start dominating the rest in the process of intermingling.

“Yes” to equation (utjevning) and “No” to accumulation (Ibid). If, however, every single position is an accumulation of energy, how can we explain the fact that nature does not allow one point to accumulate?

On the other hand, Zapffe supports the idea of accumulating potentials since he explicitly claims that ‘potential’ means “accumulation of energy” (“ophopning av energi”) (Ibid). Examining the connection between so-called high and low potentials, which are defined in physics as a tension, Zapffe argues that among many other things, values should be constantly supplied with energies from outside (e.g. economic subsidy), while destruction “gets help from nature” (Ibid: 148-149). The study of such a matter in biology is called ecology or bionomy (Ibid: 149). If one leaves the words to cover the whole “struggle for interest” with the “survival of the fittest and the luckiest” (Ibid), then, so-called objective dramatic (“objektivt dramatiske”) should be examined as belonging to the ecology of man’s life (Ibid), or to what Næss calls human ecology¹⁴⁷ (Næss 1973: 265).

On a macro methodological level, it means that so-called by Zapffe interest fronts illustrate why the interest bearer is affected not by the blind fate, but by a destiny, which has strong regulative functions. Within the framework of destiny, potential in Zapffe’s sense, which is understood as an accumulated energy becomes a part of the biosophical perspective, albeit we may speculate whether the aforementioned uploading with energies from outside is indifferent to what can be described by extrapolating Zapffe’s investigations as a culture of technological optimism¹⁴⁸. However, I argue that his definition of values (due to which they should be set from ‘within’) can be referred rather to the idea of ontological ethics, i.e. values to be examined as

¹⁴⁷ According to Næss, ecological treatment of biosphere concerns knowing this inner connection, namely, that we are part of the ecosphere as we are part of society (Ibid).

¹⁴⁸ Zapffe constantly appeals against the overexposed use of technologies in different fields of day-life culture arguing that in many areas, the objects are too much, which makes offers be more than the demands (Zapffe 1992: 153). This in turn leads to creating, with the help of advertisements, an artificial need (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe makes the important comment that technology is also on disposal to metaphysics, and this can be traced to devices such as missions-planes, evangelical texts played on a gramophone, as well as to the bean mills working with water power or the ones, which are connected with an electrical engine (Ibid: 155). According to him, technology and growing surplus of free time and shopping power made possible for constantly broader groups of people to also maintain an autotelic interest front having a changing cultural value (valør) (Ibid: 152).

deriving from the complexity of nature itself by avoiding the pitfalls of both moral naturalism and moral relativism.

On the other hand, following Zapffe's interpretation, we face the challenge how to explain the normative validity of the 'survival of the fittest and luckiest' as well as how to cultivate the solidarity with others if this dominating form of survival turns into a top norm in Næss's sense. Zapffe still leaves the question open giving no definite answer how we can keep living when it happens that most mechanisms of compensation, developed within the culture we live in, cannot help us to live a better life. Furthermore, introducing the idea of the survival of the fittest and luckiest illustrates why we might not talk about accumulation of potential by itself, but we should talk about accumulation of energies in so far as we have different intermingling interests.

Otherwise, it would mean that we should overexploit the validity of so-called intuitive models falling into the trap of objective naturalism and justifying either egoism, or appeal for nihilism as a top norm.

2.3. How Much Vitality Could Tolerate Biosophy? Zapffe's Idea of Vital Balance

A crucial question regarding the understanding of biosophy is how can we define so-called vital balance? Since the latter is determined against the background of justifying the wholeness of the interactions between man and nature, one of its main projections concerns the meaning and harmony. If the achievement of vital balance is the ontological grounding of the harmony in question, then the fight of interests in Zapffe's sense should be interpreted as preserving the vital balance in all living forms, which in turn would mean to keep life's own potential for development. Furthermore, the idea of vital balance also affects our understanding of what Zapffe calls a full harmony between ability and need among animals¹⁴⁹ (Zapffe 1941: 40). From a biological point of view, the body makes possible three types of use: the balance to be fulfilled by being aware while choosing between what is suitable for life (livstjenlig), what is indifferent to it (livsindifferent) and what ruins life (livsskadelig)¹⁵⁰ (Ibid: 47).

According to Zapffe, there is rarely something in the organ itself such as "use instructions" ("bruksanvisning") (Ibid). Furthermore, he emphasizes that there is nothing, which deserves the name "soul organ" ("organsjæl"), making the ambiguous conclusion that it should be relevant to say the same for the sex organs [sic!] (Ibid). Zapffe points out that most of our actions

¹⁴⁹ The secret of calming and recreating effect, which together with animals, has an influence on many people, undoubtedly lies partly in the fact that there is a harmony between capability and need among the animals, as Zapffe argues (Ibid). Due to a relevant degree of food and warm among the animals a condition (state) of joyous rest and worryless comfort (well-being) takes place. According to Zapffe, "World is calm as a sea and nothing more could be done" (Ibid). Regarding human being, as long as we know one in time, one has tried to gain a similar peace in soul (soulful peace), in innumerable ways such as thinking and asceticism, day-dreams, drugs and wars (Ibid). People's "philo-genetical" situation (Menneskets "fylogenetiske situation") is stopped at relatively early stage of specialization (Ibid: 45). Zapffe emphasizes that from a morphological perspective, human kind is "on its way" ("underveis") (Ibid): it appears in a condition of "static infancy" (i en tilstand av "stillestaende vorden"), which the paradox should necessarily obey to in order to cover all options and as such, humankind as a species has been fixed in its unfixibility (Ibid).

¹⁵⁰ One learns how to make the right choice among them: this is a matter of competence, which is acquired by experience such as making mistakes and feeling pain (Ibid). Referring to R. Eriksen's book *What Is Man (Hvad er mennesket)* (1934), Zapffe argues that in turn, child's self-feeling and self-consciousness grow with the growing self-supporting insight (Ibid).

pass the conscious instance (instans) in any case, where they are subjected to nominal control (Ibid). If they had their roots in the subconscious (due to the prevailing opinion), they should have been subjected to one integrated constellation of drives (Ibid).

In practice, biological grounding of preserving the vital balance depends on whether the strive for the object can be satisfied or not¹⁵¹. It is a matter of biologically predetermined success or failure of intentional projections as well as of their normative validity. When the objective satisfaction of the strive in question is impossible, some capacities (e.g. fantasy) produce surrogate objects. In this context, Zapffe outlines that the expressibility (evneutfoldelsen) in the biological area is a heterotelic one, i.e. it has “its goal outside of itself”; it is controlled and directed by a consideration, which lies outside the ability and which theoretically can be examined as satisfied also by another ability (Ibid: 35). On the contrary, expressibility is autotelic when we talk about over-equipment (Ibid).

Regarding the role of surplus and lack as such, I argue that they concern the mode of being, as determined by the projections of what ‘over’ and ‘under’ equipment in Zapffe’s sense are. However, talking about expressibility, we should keep in mind that the aforementioned specification should also be made in respect with what autotelic and heterotelic are since they both affect its normative validity. Otherwise, expressibility would have been reduced to an autotelic need, which strengthens biological determinism underlining the fact that heterotelic is irreducible to autotelic also due to having human capabilities such as fantasy, which can have both heterotelic and autotelic embodiments.

According to Zapffe, the “surplus of capability phenomenon” (fænomenet “overskudd i evne”), and eventually energy would play an important role in putting (at indfælde) tragic in the general context of life (Ibid: 36). It summarizes the main thought that this phenomenon is compatible with a picture of life understood as attempt’s strive (forsøksdrift) showing that organisms’ equipment, in respect with environment’s power, has a tendency to defi-

¹⁵¹ Regarding abilities, individual’s “conscious and chosen instance” (“bevisste og vælgende instans”) displays substrates and maintains vital balance (Ibid: 34). In this context, ability is described as a fund of potential life’s expressions (Ibid).

ciency or surplus¹⁵² (et “forlitet” eller et “formeget”) (Ibid). In the case of deficiency, the individual or the species would suffer or die. In the one of surplus, the subject is threatened by an inner blast: his/her free bunches of capabilities (evnebundter) stick up after useful objects and find a surrogate, in the best case (Ibid). In turn, it can be said that the subject produces a hypothetical need out of or being at variance with the real living needs (Ibid). That is why Zapffe argues that both the surplus and deficiency are equally compatible with the wrong fixation¹⁵³ (Ibid: 133-134).

In this context, the existential panic in Zapffe’s sense can also be interpreted as driven by the fragility of life due to the fact that life and death are initially recognized as aspects of wholeness. Therefore, the “cosmic feeling of panic” is incompatible with the details of the day life in so far as the latter are deprived of the necessary attention and power (Zapffe 1992: 163).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that Zapffe’s conception of the impossibility of finding a place, where one to feel at home for the purposes of overcoming the cosmic feeling of panic can be described as stemming from what he calls autotelic activity of fantasy. This fantasy concerns the existential affirmation of man’s awareness of his/her lack of home on Earth, understood as a lost possibility of finding an asylum in life since the attempt is defined by Zapffe as a strive for meaning.

Analyzing the projections of Zapffe’s biosophy, I argue that it is dialectical life’s potential (its being for itself) that makes the autotelic and heterotelic embodiments of the vital balance be considered as having an unquestionable normative validity under different circumstances. The potential in question illustrates how the expressibility¹⁵⁴ has a meaning for itself, which goes beyond the aspects of its real being as an over-equipment or under-equipment, i.e. as a surplus or deficiency of equipment, which is not necessarily identi-

¹⁵² Zapffe outlines that generally speaking, the surplus phenomena have a disappearing role among the animals besides life’s preserving activities (Ibid: 40). Regarding the possible surplus, he argues that the animal hardly has some difficulties in achieving safety in a full compatibility with the severely biological offer: e.g. by fight, play and raid for pleasure (Ibid). For the purposes of fully understanding how both surplus and deficiency are a type of wrong fixation, we should examine the way Zapffe distinguishes between two types of wrong fixation, namely, when the ability is too much fixed (so-called over-fixation) and when the fixation is too loose (so-called under-fixation). These two cases will be examined in detail in the chapter on fixation.

¹⁵³ He gives an example with the psychopathic behavior (Ibid: 134).

¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, it is the existential dialectics concerning expressibility’s surplus that confronts its being for itself, i.e. expressibility’s heterotelic deficiency.

cal to the surplus or lack of possibility of becoming, only to the one of individuals' being.

Such a paradoxical at first sight 'mixture' of autotelic and heterotelic needs is another argument in favor of the thesis that biologically predetermined intentionality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for recognizing man's complex capabilities because life's meaningfulness is irreducible neither to the fulfillment of a given set of objective goals, nor to the one of certain objectifiable meanings. It has much to do with understanding life as an experiential strive, which can be embodied in different ways even in one and the same organism in time¹⁵⁵.

One of the main paradoxes deriving from the absolutization of biological behavior in Zapffe's sense stems from generalizing its autotelic and heterotelic needs. I argue that biological front is irreducible to biological behavior in Zapffe's sense because biological front's normative validity presumes it to be examined within the complex net of the other interest fronts.

In turn, biological behavior is the most illuminative illustration of understanding the role of autotelic and heterotelic needs as determined albeit unrestricted to the relationships between surplus and lack. Regarding biological behavior, in both cases (when we talk about both surplus and lack), the intention never succeeds in fulfilling its potential, i.e. it cannot reach, albeit due to different reasons, its object¹⁵⁶. While the lack concerns the impossibility the need of a given object to be satisfied, when it exists, the surplus mode used to presuppose the need of inventing the object (or modifying it) in order to avoid neglecting not the object but rather the impossibility as such. Thus we have a possibility for creating surrogates.

As an example of under-equipment, Zapffe gives the one with "the released encaged bird" (den frigivne burfugl) (Zapffe 1941: 35). The object demands a capability, but it does not find it (Ibid). There is food in the cage but it is

¹⁵⁵ This hypothesis can be supported by Zapffe's arguments of energy, which were already discussed.

¹⁵⁶ A heterotelic aspect of biological behavior in Zapffe's sense can be traced to what he defines as immoral behavior. From the perspective of the latter, biological behavior cannot satisfy its needs unless we accept Zapffe's questionable explanation of biological morality as the only one available morality. In turn, the autotelic aspects of biological behavior as such concern one ideal example, namely, the survival of the fittest and the luckiest to be achieved by every single living being. This, however, would question the normative validity of the definitions of what fittest and luckiest are. These issues will be examined in detail in Zapffe's chapter on morality.

acquired only by a degree of competence (*dygtighet*), which is not present (Ibid). On the other hand, when capability and task overlap (cover each other) (dækker hinanden), the object looks for a capability and finds it (Ibid).

A special case is the one with the over-equipment, or so-called unharmed bird in captivity. Here, we have a capability, which looks for an adequate object without finding it (Ibid). Having fulfilled the biological needs, the given objects with the given meanings regarding the development of capability come to an end (Ibid). Supplementing capabilities (such as fantasy and imagination (opfindsomhet)) can be of some help in providing (forskaffe) the unemployed capability with one surrogate object (et *objekt-surrogat*); thus the conscious instance should give by itself a meaning to the employment force (kraftanvendelsen) (e.g. play) if there is a need for such a meaning (Ibid).

According to Zapffe, for us, as people, capability often has its meaning in the idea that it will be “opened” (bli spillet ut) with a helping intention and provide a desired condition (Ibid). Zapffe claims that it is the capability itself that directs, and the intention is developed exactly by this capability alone and nothing else (Ibid: 36). Capability’s existence is often combined with a tendency to use it: the capability is described as “an absorbing and shaping pipe for available power” (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines that the individual enjoys the fact that he/she functions knowing that he/she “has a life” in a good way (Ibid).

The difficulties in justifying autotelic and heterotelic needs as an opposition rather than as a dialectical relationship can be illustrated by going back to already discussed examples of the released bird and the one, which is not threatened by external dangers being encaged (Ibid: 35-36). However, it is problematic to claim that the latter is ‘over-equipped’ compared to the former. Theoretically speaking, the over-equipment is used as an example showing the life of the encaged bird, but it concerns its externally determined status, i.e. it has much to do with the degree of expressibility, which does not necessarily coincide with the over-equipment, as I already showed. On a macro-methodological level, it means that over-equipment would be a result of external conditions such as the cage itself, not of a surplus of capability on side of the bird as such.

As Zapffe points out later on in his analysis, the surrogate objects (understood as additional objects) presume a new type of consciousness to be adopted by mentioning the role of playing, which differs when it is adopted

by people or animals¹⁵⁷ (Ibid: 58). Applying this explanation to the engaged bird again, the surplus of equipment, namely, the cage of the bird giving an extra-safety from external threats requires a certain type of expressibility to be developed if we consider the threats to that bird (due to the power of our imagination) as a secondary object, as something, which may happen to it. Otherwise, the reality of the cage does not speak for itself in favor of such an interpretation, especially in terms of equating the over-equipment with a surplus of expressibility. It only signifies that the bird is placed in a bounded space but from that fact it does not necessarily follow that it is, or that it would be exposed to any potential threat whatsoever in its life.

On the other hand, one of the reasons for not examining the differences between the surplus and the lack of equipment as a matter of biological (factual) capabilities alone is that even when we talk about biological behavior, some representatives of one and the same species can, under different or even under the same circumstances, be defined as having surplus or lack of one and the same capability, as I showed while examining Zapffe's reception of Uexküll's theory of perception. In addition, a specification which should be made is the one regarding the ontological difference and the difference concerning the normative validity of the lack of full overlapping between capabilities and expressibility. The surplus of capabilities is a necessary but not sufficient condition for manifesting a higher level of expressibility in so far as the possibility for creating surrogate objects can be physically available but not employed. For example, some highly developed species may have developed conscious capabilities¹⁵⁸, but not all the representatives of this species to use them.

¹⁵⁷ Zapffe argues that animals certainly do not distinguish between the pure pleasure game (den rene lyst-lek) and the process of playing, which human theoreticians interpret as an unconscious elaboration of biological or social reality (Ibid). He continues that for people, in many cases there is a difference between pleasure and playing on the one hand, and duty, on the other one (Ibid). This topic will be an object of special interest in the chapter on Zapffe's theory of morality.

¹⁵⁸ We should also question Rudolph Steiner's idea saying that our technological fantasy is a direct compensation of the unavailable specialization (Ibid: 46). Following such an ambiguous statement, however, would mean that from the perspective of capabilities, the less developed species would have had elaborated the most complicated capacity of imagination. Furthermore, Zapffe argues that mapping living conditions in the world of the 'lower' animals, as well as mapping the interests in the world of the 'higher' ones would create a compelling supplement to the study of genealogy (nedstammingslæren) and development studies (Zapffe 1992: 150).

What is the role of the heterotelic needs in the field of biology then? Do they derive from biological behavior alone, or from something else? In this context, I argue that since biological behavior is focused on achieving given objects, which does not always presume merely some biological reactions to be performed, it can be considered as containing both heterotelic and autotelic needs in Zapffe's sense.

2.4. Biosophy in the Arena of Four Interest Fronts¹⁵⁹

According to Zapffe, when the individual is engaged with fulfilling a given interest (possibly, being threatened), his/her pleasure, attention and ability are functioning together for the fulfillment (Zapffe 1992: 150). For example, if one tries to secure oneself and one's food by chasing and hunting, the situation can be described with the help of the following three factors: the interest or the need (the need of food, of being hungry, which is a condition one wants to get rid of), the object or the thing (if death means covering the need; its fulfillment) (the existing task), the helping means (which are on disposal of the hunter (armor, muscles' power, but also skills, practice, resourcefulness, cunning, fastness in carrying out), other conditions (landscape, weather conditions) (Ibid). In turn, the risk is associated (forbundne) with the process of undertaking (Ibid). It exists not only because one can have no chance (and due to the made efforts one could be even more tired or hungry), but because of the animal, which is also an interest bearer (Ibid). If animal's interest is different and even opposite to the one of the hunter, he can by himself, or with the help of the others, launch a counterattack and destroy values, which have been working (som indtil nu var i behold) until now (Ibid). As a next condition, Zapffe outlines hunter's object of action in connection with the theater, film, illusion, which arise during and after the undertaking (hunter's joy, foolhardiness, fear, cowardice, the betrayal against fellows, the chance interpreted as a competence etc.) (Ibid: 150-151). Furthermore, the next condition concerns the ending (*Utgangen*), which can be one of the following three options: the hunter succeeds, he gets food for himself and his fellows, he feels joy and he is proud of himself being howled by his tribe relatives (Ibid: 151). The second option is that in the essence there is a status quo of 'ante bellum', which is accepted either with relief (animal was over-powerful), or with a disappointment (he should

¹⁵⁹ According to Zapffe, individuals gain biosophical relevance given that they behave as interest bearers (Zapffe 1992: 145). The expression has many benefits (Ibid). It displays (dækker) the individual as a biosophical entity and makes unnecessary to take a stance on some disputable dualisms such as "spirit and matter", "soul and body", "materialism and spiritualism", "psychological law of causality and free will" (psykisk årsakslov) (Ibid). Regarding lower animals and plants, which we do not ascribe choosing (vælgende) consciousness, it is more relevant to talk about living conditions (livsbetingelser) (Ibid: 147).

have been able to stop it) (Ibid). The third option is the most dramatic one: the hunter is harmed or killed either without being able to achieve something, or because his contribution means salvation (or a brave attempt at salvation) made for the family or the tribe (he is a hero)) (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, Zapffe draws the conclusion that the engagement's components two, three and four (the object (the task), the helping means and the external conditions) stay in a flexible mutual connection with the ideas of balance, surplus and deficiency: one connection, which can cause surprising complications (Ibid).

In this context, talking about interest fronts, as Zapffe does, contributes to outlining the motivation of one's attempt to unsuccessfully make the environment his/her own one by gaining a certain kind of cultural experience and economic control. The failure of this endeavor illustrates how mankind tries to elaborate compensatory mechanisms in dealing with so-called existential feeling of cosmic panic (Zapffe 1992: 163).

Analyzing the implications of Zapffe's theory, I draw the conclusion that one of the main methodological consequences of adopting biosophical perspective concerns the justification of man as a bearer of more than just biological interests, which, however, does not exclude a certain implicit biological gradualism, as I showed in the previous chapters. Since human kind differs from the other species as an interest bearer, one important question arises, namely, whether we can extrapolate the concept of interest to all representatives of human kind in one and the same way since they are bearers of different interests due to their individual capabilities, albeit they also share some species' interests. Paraphrasing Zapffe's theory, I argue that the differences are based on different potentials for adopting different living energies. If we agree that only the one who is aware of his/her own interests, i.e. so-called 'interest bearer', has a destiny, how can we define the status of people who, for different reasons (e.g. biological or socio-cultural ones), are temporary or constantly unaware of these interests? Does it mean that we have to compare them with the animals whose sentience concerns the biological interests alone and would not it lead to imposing an evaluation from the perspective of problematic objective naturalism I already talked about¹⁶⁰?

¹⁶⁰ An illuminative example of how such a comparison entails the growing risk of noncontradictory justifying a certain type of objective naturalism is the one in which Zapffe makes the distinction between so-called primitive and 'great' persons, which will be discussed below.

The word ‘interest’ is used by Zapffe as a common name for a set of terms, which are more or less synonymous, namely, ‘need’, ‘drive’, ‘desire’, ‘wish’ etc. (Ibid: 145). According to him, there are four interest fronts, namely, biological, social, autotelic and metaphysical ones. While talking about fronts, he also uses the words “plans”, “fragments” or “sectors”¹⁶¹ (Zapffe 1941: 50). Zapffe’s definition of front relevantly characterizes the entity of the interaction between species and nature, i.e. it reveals that the front provides a perspective on the interaction in question rather than merely focusing on its concrete projections¹⁶².

As one of his objects of investigation, Zapffe points out the expression of the interest circle (den *utvidelse av interessekreds*) and environment, which “meet us” (møter os) with the transition from animal to human (Ibid). In this context, he refers to Uexküll’s claim that the environment of simple organisms is in a close relationship with their “Merknetz”¹⁶³; with the help of the latter, the organism chooses (“utvælger”) the environment, where it is able to live (Ibid). When the perception of environment is accompanied with some ideas of perception’s source and these ideas are embodied in a structure, we talk about understanding (“erkjendelse”) on a day-life level. In turn, perception’s source is theoretically set as available to influence and control on side of the subject (Ibid). Zapffe argues that the control of the environment entails a scale varying from the best passive conduct to the active engagement of the object due to some long-term plans or a spontaneous need (Ibid).

In turn, “the bearers of interests” (*interessebærere*) (Ibid: 619) demonstrate interests, which are arranged in a scale varying from an assumed indifference (on side of the inorganic world) through groups which man projects interests to (such as plants, insentient animals) to what we call sentient animals with a more differentiated interest front (Ibid). Zapffe also analyzes the status of so-called primitive or inferior person (“lavtstaaende” menne-

¹⁶¹ According to Zapffe, the description depends on the model of representation one has chosen (Ibid).

¹⁶² In this context, the existence in biological front is determined as dependent on ‘individual’ and ‘species’ biological maintenance (Ibid: 51).

¹⁶³ According to Uexküll, anatomical structure of every organism “possesses” a certain “Merknetz” and a certain “Wirknetz” – “a receptor system and an effector system” whose cooperation makes organisms survive (Cassirer 2003: 128). Due to the receptor system, the organisms receive outward stimuli while due to the effector one, they react to them (Ibid). Both systems are considered by Uexküll as “links in one and the same chain”, namely, in the functional circle of the animal (Ibid).

ske) who characterizes with some elementary interests, namely, with some biological interests and simple pleasure-interests (enkle lyst-interesser)¹⁶⁴ (Ibid). Then, the scale continues with an increasing differentiation and ends up with the “great” people (de “store” mennesker), the highest representatives of their respective culture or groups (Ibid). In addition to the primitive man’s interests, here we also find pleasure interests and value concerns understood in the broadest sense of the word, together with some social and metaphysical interests at the last stages of the possible empirical (experiential) differentiation (Ibid).

In this context, it is important to outline that adjectives such as primitive and elementary do not entail negative axiological connotations, but merely both epistemological and ontological ones since they should illustrate the different degrees of differentiation and their internal connections, i.e. they have evolutionary implications. Furthermore, the idea of interest and the differentiation of different groups of interests follow merely at first sight the evolutionary mode of explanation since introducing higher interests such as autotelic and metaphysical ones, Zapffe gives preference to exploring the genealogy of existential dilemmas regarding not only the ones of being, but also of meaningfulness as such. In turn, an illuminative example in this respect is Zapffe’s conception of multi-frontal engagements such as biological-autotelic and biological-metaphysical engagements. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the differences should be traced on the level of what Zapffe calls uniform object. While in the case with animals, the object in question is a matter of a temporal coincidence, in the one with humans, it concerns the realization of temporal continuity, which is an existential one¹⁶⁵.

In the introductory notes of *On the tragic*, Zapffe characterizes the social front as closely associated with life’s maintenance front (livsopholdelses-fronten), which also occurs among the animals (Ibid: 51). The similarity between animals’ and human social engagements is nevertheless defined as so scarce that there are hardly useful views, which to help us to go deeper in animals’ social life (Ibid). While animals probably ‘experience’ (oplever) their fellows only when they participate in the individual “Merkwelt” (“per-

¹⁶⁴ However, it remains unclear what the criteria of distinguishing between the simple - pleasure interests and biological ones are. Nor does Zapffe specify the difference between simple pleasure interests and pleasure ones, which are recognized as ‘higher’ interests.

¹⁶⁵ Animals also secure their existence as well as the one of their heirs, but within the limitations of time imposed by the realization of their instincts.

ceptual world”), human being, for example, considers all his/her fellow human beings in time, i.e. from the perspective of past, presence and future being guided by a simple idea, namely, by the one of human kind (Ibid). Thereby, Zapffe claims that one can take a stance on that as a stance on a uniform object (Ibid). Thus average man has knowledge about his/her fellows’ needs (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that the difference between social and biological needs can be seen in the fact that humans have secured a basis of existence both for themselves and for their heirs, being anyway unhappy due to their relationships with other people¹⁶⁶ (Ibid).

Extrapolating Zapffe’s investigations, we may conclude that the difference between human and animals’ social fronts consists in the awareness of the needs of the other representatives, which are either consciously anticipated as closely tied with the ones of the self, or are accidentally coinciding with them.

According to Zapffe, social environment is considered as always constituted in its last instance of people, but also entailing this, which has a meaning regarding the connections between people (*res publicae*) (Ibid) (Ibid). However, from such a presumption, it does not follow that fellows always behave as social objects: for example, they can also “belong” to the biological environment¹⁶⁷. In this context, Zapffe draws the conclusion that compared to biological world, social world is constituted to a much higher degree of mind (*av sind*), of other related interest bearers, of units, which the bearers do open interest contacts with and which one can appeal to from the perspective of a better condition due to this appeal (Ibid: 52).

An illustration favoring the aforementioned thesis can be found in Zapffe’s statement that sympathetic environment means recognizing others as potential bearers of interests¹⁶⁸ (Ibid). While the ‘with’-mode characterizes man’s belonging as a process of being ‘with’ others in so far as by identifying others as potential bearers of interests, one also identifies himself/herself as such a bearer (a bearer who is existentially dependent on others’ choices of interests), animals’ sense of belonging presumes the bearer to be recognized

¹⁶⁶ Among the social goods, he mentions the ones of love, respect and trust in particular (Ibid).

¹⁶⁷ Zapffe gives the examples with cannibalism, primitive fights (Ibid).

¹⁶⁸ According to Zapffe, the fellow human beings are a material, which by itself, or due to common elaboration, can appear as a sympathetic environment varying in tune with the individual needs (Ibid).

in respect with kinship's existence and 'natural' recognition. That is why I argue that man's indifference to others and animals' indifference in Zapffe's sense are incompatible since animals' belonging mainly has a normative validity within the biological front (and partly, within the social one). By contrast, man's belonging gains its validity being enriched with both autotelic and metaphysical needs, while realizing in the social front.

According to Zapffe, the methodological difference between biological and social fronts comes from the distinction regarding the different performative potential of so-called social imperative¹⁶⁹ (Ibid: 57). In the discussions about biological meaning of the principle of pleasure (*av lystprincippets biologiske betydning*)¹⁷⁰, it is argued that if we want to avoid conflict, what is pleasant should be incorporated to what is useful for life (Ibid: 58). Zapffe claims that something similar happens to the social environment. If the principle of pleasure works relying on loyalty and solidarity, everything, which serves the others and the whole ("det heles") should be pleasant (and the rest – to be considered as unpleasant respectively) (Ibid). However, it remains unclear whether he provides a difference between 'simple' pleasure and social one implying a degree of usefulness due to the differences of environment.

Furthermore, adopting such a perspective requires specifying how the concept of 'social' pleasure is elaborated as such because remaining on the level of principles (talking about principle of pleasure) does not have normative validity alone, being necessarily grounded in loyalty and solidarity. On the contrary, social interactions often presume some personal distress if the moral agent wants to show loyalty and solidarity under given circum-

¹⁶⁹ Zapffe argues that for the normal individual, the course of unfortunates may bring social anger, fear, danger and need of salvation for the social self (the social self-feeling, which is a concept borrowed from Uexküll) (Ibid: 57). The social self can lose himself/herself in social catastrophes such as banishment, imprisonment for life etc. (Ibid). Therefore, the individual reacts due to social responsibility, i.e. he/she should respond when the right concerned authority (*rette vedkommende*) asks him/her for the social values he/she was set to guard (Ibid). If one has brought the social imperative, one could have been considered as responsible for doing so, i.e. his/her will or purpose would have been considered as a contributing factor to what has happened (Ibid). Thus his/her further destiny would have depended on the action he/she has done.

¹⁷⁰ In this context, breaking social imperatives is described as balanced by developing so-called social hygiene (*social hygiene*), which would contribute to developing social consciousness (Ibid). Zapffe also talks about biological imperative (Ibid: 29). Such an imperative for the animal is "You should eat!" (Ibid).

stances. In turn, loyalty and solidarity may contribute to constructively preventing rather than avoiding conflicts since societal discourse provides a difference between preventing and avoiding conflicts.

On a macro-methodological level, the distinction in question is an illuminative example of why we cannot noncontradictory treat ‘pleasant’ and ‘useful for life’ as synonyms. In turn, even if we assume such an ideal situation when the principle of pleasure relies on loyalty and solidarity, the responsibility for serving the others will be elaborated in the best possible way within the paradigm of utilitarian ethics.

Zapffe’s further specification that social contribution can be pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent to pleasure respectively (Ibid) raises the risk these statements to be evaluated again from the perspective of utilitarian ethics whose normative validity concerns avoiding the unpleasant for the biggest number of people. This, however, does not mean that avoidance in question would necessarily lead to a ‘positive’ social contribution. Another concern, which arises from Zapffe’s interpretation, is how to define and evaluate the indifference to pleasure on a normative level, namely, where does such a normative validity stem from, while prescribing which pleasant to be identified with what good?

Referring to aesthetic literature, Zapffe argues that autotelic is a category, which has its goal in itself. In this context, he points out that nevertheless, we look for a category that entails every single engagement in which the reception or activity, or inner elaboration (adaptation) (bearbaidelse) “have their objective in themselves”, namely, have end in themselves (“självändamål”, “Selbstzweck”): being disinterested (“interesseløs”) or autotelic (“autotelisk”)¹⁷¹ (Ibid: 59-60). Zapffe continues that the concept ‘autotelic interest front’ can also be maintained due to a negative purpose: autotelic is the life’s field, which is neither biological and social nor a metaphysical one “as it is defined in § 14”¹⁷² (Ibid: 61).

¹⁷¹ Zapffe refers to Yrjö Hirn’s *Aesthetic Life (Det estetiska Lifvet)* (sic!) (1913). See Note 1 (Zapffe 1941: 60).

¹⁷² As a reason for justifying this negative interpretation, I point out the self-sufficiency of autotelic front, which might be considered as deprived of interests in so far as it is predetermined in the sense of having its objective in itself. On a macro-methodological level, it would mean autotelic to be interpreted as ‘disinterested’ neglecting the role of the ‘or’ connector. It is the field of morality where autotelic is subjected to rather positive definitions in respect with metaphysical in Zapffe’s sense.

However, similarly to the other interest fronts, it can arrange an engagement (*et engagement*), an expectation (*en forventning*), a course (*et forløp*) etc. (Ibid). As a rule, the subject should also collaborate with the environment, but in turn, without an environmental perception, it could be considered as a rupturing and depressing condition as well (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe discusses the role of ‘high’ and ‘low’ autotelic engagements¹⁷³ (Ibid: 62) pointing out that these engagements can change or develop the value feeling (*værdifølelsen*)¹⁷⁴. Thus the experienced thing becomes more particular (*mere kræsen*) (Ibid). In turn, the choice of object can shrink “below” (“*nedentil*”) as well as can be expanded “above” (“*oventil*”) (Ibid), which gives a clue why we should discuss the role of the two types of autotelic engagements¹⁷⁵.

The last front, which also raises similar methodological concerns from the perspective of the aforementioned three fronts, is the metaphysical front. According to Zapffe, the first sign of one metaphysical engagement is some questions such as “How big is the world?”, “What is the meaning of human life?” (Ibid: 64). Furthermore, he argues that essentially important for man’s picture of life is the circumstance that while animal probably does not have knowledge about its own death before it comes, man is already aware of the possible length of the life span (Ibid).

¹⁷³ This distinction will be examined in detail in the chapter on Zapffe’s morality.

¹⁷⁴ According to Zapffe, autotelic experience is detached from all connections with life; it can appear as discontinuous in respect with one constructed, biological-social destiny and as far as it goes, it has a stamp of infertility (Ibid: 62).

¹⁷⁵ Zapffe argues that most of these issues are examined in chapter nine of *On the tragic*. He outlines that there are cases when due to powerlessness (“*av svakhet*”), one autotelic good is given preference over a heterotelic good, which one cannot do without (without the heterotelic need), when he/she is in his/her full moral power and works with heavy horizons (*med svære horisonter*) (Ibid: 308) Furthermore, Zapffe emphasizes that this process works vice versa: often one low-autotelic interest can replace a high autotelic interest in the process of subjective evaluation (Ibid). He also introduces a scale due to which we can witness the combinations between different interests (Ibid). Due to the variation scale AB, we have a variety from high autotelic valuability (*fra autotetisk høiværdighet*), i.e. from the highest desirability (*høieste ønskelighet*) at A to low valuability (*lavværdighet*) (abomination) (*avskyelighet*) at B (Ibid: 158). In turn, due to another scale CD, we go from the direct mortality at C to the biggest biological favorability (*gunstighet*) at D. In conclusion, Zapffe outlines that the two scales run parallel from A and C to B and D (Ibid). Thus the effect of organisms’ “way of choosing and rejecting instance” (*vælgende og vrakende instans*) is the “runner” (*løperen*) EF, which moves at the two scales at once (Ibid).

Before exploring what specific in the metaphysical behavior is, we should examine some of the main methodological similarities¹⁷⁶ and differences between autotelic and metaphysical fronts. Such an investigation presumes to explore how autotelic refers to life's unfolding, and then, how metaphysical refers to life's feeling as such. Starting the examination of life's feeling, however, raises another significant question, namely, how to interpret the mode of feeling in itself, i.e. whether to ascribe it to the existence of life, to life's feeling, or to their mutual ontological dependence. On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify why the autotelic behavior is not defined by Zapffe as a universal one in the sense of metaphysical behavior, albeit it is also self-sufficient in the sense of being a-historical.

On a macro methodological level, I argue that world's feeling is defined by Zapffe within the autotelic and metaphysical fronts from two partly related perspectives: due to the autotelic one, the feeling is strictly determined by the world itself, i.e. its subject is the world, so that the emphasis is put on its being in itself as world's feeling. Furthermore, Zapffe sees the autotelic character of the world as deriving from the normative validity of life's plan as such. The latter is defined as wholeness functioning for its own sake, for the sake of what it is (Ibid: 66).

Comparing life's unfolding and life's feeling against the background of the presumption that we have autotelic-metaphysical multi-frontal engagements, I draw the conclusion that the similarity concerns the contextualization of the idea of existential continuity, which gains its normative validity partly due to the imaginative rationality (a fantasy in Zapffe's sense). According to Zapffe, the latter is not something we can see in animals' life (Ibid: 64) since the surplus can partly lie in the capability's size, partly, because the individual has this capability in general, in addition to the rest of his/her equipment (Ibid). The differences, however, lie in the way fantasy is adopted for the purposes of realizing life's feeling. Judging by Zapffe's investigations, I draw the conclusion that autotelic activity of fantasy mainly brings life's feeling, while heterotelic one characterizes a heterotelic metaphysical need of finding the meaning of life's feeling refracted through the lens of existential question of human life.

¹⁷⁶ Zapffe discusses the role of autotelic continuity of fantasy, which in turn should be discerned from its heterotelic activity (Ibid: 97). According to him, autotelic fantasy is cultivated for its own sake: it provides surrogate objects for uncovered (udækket) experiential ability and imaginary satisfactions of different types. In addition to this, autotelic fantasy brings a spontaneous life's feeling with its own luxuriant existence (Ibid).

From a metaphysical perspective, man is an experiential subject whose coherence of experience, guaranteed by the continuity of his/her consciousness about the latter, is not something taken for granted, nor is it a mode guaranteeing the existence of experiential content. That is why I refer to Zapffe's statement saying that now, probably there are people as well as undoubtedly some periods in every man's life, which characterize with a corresponding fragmentarization of readiness for life (*livsberedskap*) (Ibid: 63). He continues that in such cases, there is not metaphysical life's feeling, nor is the latter available so far if man shows such a continuity of awareness, which we miss among animals (Ibid). While within the autotelic behavior, the sense of being self-sufficient can be stated because autotelic life's development is a-historical (Ibid: 62), as it was already discussed, within the metaphysical behavior (which may include heterotelic needs as well), the mode of universality is understood as a recognition of the idea of ontological coherence of one's own life in principle by developing a hypothetical attachment to world's feeling¹⁷⁷.

¹⁷⁷ This thesis could be illustrated again with another example provided by Zapffe, namely, with his definition of life's feeling (*livsfølelse*) described, in the broadest sense, as a result of partial environmental feelings (*miljø-følelser*), inner feelings, fantasy's expansion of given conditions (ideas etc.), memory pictures and thoughts' results, which are determined by the type of character and acquired fixations as well as by individual's "temperament" and "dispositions" ("gemyt") (Ibid: 107).

2.4.1. ‘Mono’ or ‘Multi’? The Impact of Autotelic and Metaphysical Interests on the Multi-frontal Engagements

The individual likes or dislikes, says yes or no to the respective retention (bibehold) or change of a given condition (Ibid: 145). According to Zapffe, clarifying the role of interest fronts is driven by the task to pursue the simple trends, to point out certain motives in the human texture of life (livsvæv), which can be considered as gaining meaning by defining tragic (Ibid: 50).

Furthermore, he emphasizes not only the role of multi-frontal engagements, but also the impact of interest conflicts (interest collisions) (Ibid: 157), which in turn have different configurations as well¹⁷⁸.

According to Zapffe, we can dare to say that biological drive for self-preservation, autotelic urge for development and the desire for power, together with metaphysical restlessness, are the interest fields, which most strongly characterize the history of the sphere of Western culture for the last three thousand years (Zapffe 1992: 152). For the purposes of reconstructing the methodological background, where tragic takes place, we should examine the genealogy of the intersection of autotelic and metaphysical engagements, as they represent Zapffe’s attempt at contextualizing man’s initial feeling of cosmic panic.

He argues that there are two things, which occupy man’s consciousness with an “absolute meaning”: the self and the enormous (uhyre) space (Zapffe 1941: 112). Self feels himself/herself as a centre of a “pure existence”, of an “absolute existence” (Ibid). In turn, the space is where this naked, liv-

¹⁷⁸ As an example of a conflict of two biological interests, Zapffe gives the one with an isolated garrison, which cannot be defeated, but which lacks foods and drinks. Outside of the walls, soldiers can find both, but it is forbidden to come closer due to the threat of being shot or captured (Ibid). The example with the social interests concerns the question whether the politician A should give up his career in order to join a helping action (Ibid). As an example of a conflict of metaphysical interests, Zapffe gives the one whether the theologian B should live an isolated life of piety, or to devote his life to criticizing the Bible in order to track down the possible “fatal” wrong sources (Ibid). The clash of autotelic interests regards questions such as should the young man C become a painter or musician? (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe also explores the role of what I call multi-frontal conflicts presuming a conflict between biological and social interests, between biological and autotelic ones, between biological interest and metaphysical interest, between autotelic and social ones, between autotelic and metaphysical interests and between social and metaphysical ones (Ibid). For more details, see Zapffe 1992: 157-158.

ing self “feels himself/herself” (“befinder sig”)¹⁷⁹ as deserted, cold, whizzing and unfamiliar (Ibid). In this context, one of the main questions which arises is how to interpret Zapffe’s idea of world’s responsibility, taking into account that the metaphysical strive for meaningfulness faces the constraints of the autotelic mode of thinking due to which world as a goal in itself is questioned by man’s willingness to recognize his/her mode of becoming as a goal in itself as well. In other words, clarifying the role of autotelic-metaphysical engagements requires to trace the different embodiments of meaning behind what a goal in itself is as well as behind specifying to what extent they overlap in order to have metaphysical life’s feeling as a subject to autotelic-metaphysical engagement¹⁸⁰.

Regarding man’s status, the existential fear concerns the feeling of one’s incapability to encompass the world in its full transparency, which is non-achievable as a transparency in itself. That is why world’s being for itself is internalized by people as a restricting being since it shows the impossibility of achieving one’s own independence of natural casualism, namely, future to be determined by the destiny of the interest bearer at any expense.

In turn, the normative validity of metaphysical fear derives from Zapffe’s saying that we are tyrannized by one law, which does not ask about our values and needs (Ibid: 117). That is why the experiential grounding of this fear can be referred to the limited perception due to which the self cannot experience his/her personal situation as a world’s situation, but only as a matter of realizing the boundaries of the possibility of belonging.

¹⁷⁹ The metaphysical-melancholic vision (Det “*metafysisk-melankolske klarsyn*”) (Ibid: 112) has been mainly driven by the „fear of being” (“angsten ved det at være til”), by the state to be born human, to feel yourself left with interests, which should not be overruled (sættes tilside) (Ibid: 113). According to Zapffe, “world’s fear” (“Verdensangst”) is the word, which gives direction: it signifies “world’s loneliness” (“verdensesomhet”) and “world’s distress” (“verdensesnød”) (Ibid). In turn, the whole situation as such is described as one of “crisis of understanding” (“erkjendelseskriser”) (Ibid: 116).

¹⁸⁰ As an example of autotelic-metaphysical engagement, Zapffe gives the one of metaphysical life’s feeling (Ibid: 71). According to him, it can be saturated with fear or feeling of happiness to a higher extent than when it is considered as necessary related to metaphysical sanctions or veto (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the complicated interest situations can be described as a combination of simpler interests: then, the situation in question is considered as a multi-frontal one (*polyfrontal*) (Ibid: 69). Thus the play between monofrontal and confluent interests can easily be observed by the role, which one given object plays under life’s changing circumstances (Ibid).

According to him, in the human fight of interests, we can gather/divide the tasks into two different groups. The first one correlates with the choice of actions and the safety of reactions, as well as with the fixation's conditions in the organism. In turn, the second one is defined in respect with capability's capacity regarding both some given tasks and the quantitative disproportion between task and capability. Furthermore, Zapffe argues that the problems of meaning are rooted in both groups: such a particular problem is the one of meaning together with the one regarding the existence as a whole, which have a long-lasting history (meaning) (Ibid: 161). The two groups of problems are defined as being related to the object's quality (Ibid).

While one is about to solve one task, one is an object of strong and different emotions (sindsbevægelse), which are dependent as a general rule on the destiny of the undertaking process (Ibid). In turn, when the task is solved, the organism calms down: the functional circle is closed, capability is finally set off (utløst) and acknowledged (Ibid). If the difficulties are not overcome, the interest front is doomed to suffer from damage (at lide skade) (Ibid). Then one condition of a reduced well-being, which varies from the easiest disapproval to the experience of all destroying (altutslettende) catastrophe, takes place (Ibid).

In this context, Zapffe points out that the solution groups can be divided into two groups, namely, into the ones of real and unreal solutions (Ibid: 162). And when the solutions are performed (hitføres) as a matter of conduct (behavior) (adfærd), we can also talk about real and unreal behavior respectively (Ibid). In turn, behavior and solution can collapse, but there is no need for that to happen (Ibid).

If one looks around for a positive designation of the unreal solutions, some words come forward such as "imaginary", "illusory", some "fictive" and suggestive solutions, pseudo-, superficial (glare) (skin) and surrogate solutions (Ibid). According to Zapffe, the word 'surrogate' signifies a low quality, but not only this. No one would have thought of calling baked beans a surrogate if the coffee was unknown (Ibid). He argues that the decision lies in the fact that the surrogate comes to the scene (passes off as) (*utgives for*), takes place as (something), has pretensions to be "the real thing" (den "egte vare") (Ibid). That is why Zapffe outlines that it is important to draw the boundary between the good surrogate and the plain real satisfaction (Ibid: 163). However, managing to define the surrogate as something more than a low quality substitute would mean to refer to the autotelic activity of fantasy, i.e. to examine the surrogate as having an objective, which is not com-

paratively determined. If we extrapolate Zapffe's statement, it would have meant that the baked beans should be treated as a good surrogate if they are examined as well-baked coffee beans without exploring them as beans alone, which in turn is a premise of having a coffee.

On a macro-methodological level, it would be possible if the substantial comparison is replaced with autotelic investigation of quality as such, namely, the baked beans to be analyzed as a result of a super-equipment (of some extremely well-baked beans as a sort); then, the surrogate would be a good coffee sort, which gives the possibility of having well-baked beans. Furthermore, this would mean that the surrogate is not necessarily subjected to a negative evaluation.

It is subject's capacities and the qualities of the object, defined as a necessary condition for finding both real solutions and surrogate ones that make the problem of the embodiment of meaning relevant on both epistemological and ontological levels. According to Zapffe, there is one dizzy (svimlende) feeling of emptiness, which can be explained with the stance that all empirical objects are weighted and easily found (Ibid: 123). As a last asylum, fantasy goes beyond life's boundary, which is the outermost consequence of organism's capability to look for optimum in the environment (Ibid). In its distress and homelessness, this thought can cling to the opportunities' protoplasm, which history's flames have not "hardened" into a law yet (endnu ikke har hærdet til lov) (Ibid). Regarding the role of the existential capacities, it means that man's sense of safety is inevitably questioned, which in turn may provoke catastrophic consequences¹⁸¹.

Why is the cosmic feeling of panic a crucial condition for understanding Zapffe's existential philosophy? I draw the conclusion that when the plain satisfaction is defined by revealing the impossibility of identifying home with a given place, it raises the fear of empty space (*terror vacui*), which is based on the normative validity of the feeling that there is nowhere to go. Furthermore, the recognition of the mode of homelessness leads to justifying the cosmic feeling of panic as a matter of a metaphysical fear since re-

¹⁸¹ In this context, Zapffe's main argument displayed in his early essay *The Last Messiah* (*Den sidste Messias*) (1933) was that all different fixation mechanisms cannot lead to eradicating the feeling of cosmic panic, which escalates when catastrophes crash into man's life (Zapffe 1941: 250, 254). According to Zapffe, by catastrophe we understand "a qualified type of accident" (en kvalificert ulykke) (Ibid: 250). The word means "upheaval, revolution" (omveltning), which illustrates how one complex of interests has been completely destroyed or violently replaced with another one (Ibid).

vealing the transparency of the initial impossibility of being situated in the world is beyond the potential of man's experience.

According to Zapffe, it concerns the genealogy of so-called last problems of being (Zapffe 1992: 161). They include issues such as world's and life's being, origin, future and meaning (Ibid). He claims that besides these questions, we find the ones regarding so-called questions of last fixations (de "siste fiksatjonsspørsmål") (Ibid), which are examined in the light of a given evaluation. Not every single life's meaning and world's nature seem to be equally good for us, we only learn this to know (Ibid). That is why there is one general and continuous tension between our needs regarding traceable contact, goodness and/or justice and meaning (acceptable intention) in our connection with the universe, and "the answer" ("svaret"), which is interpreted in the light of experience as marked with a total indifference (Ibid). The indifference itself could be described not as a lack of interest with a capital letter, i.e. this answer to be recognized as an autotelic one, but rather as indifference, which only one fate can show to individual's destiny in Zapffe's sense.

He argues that facing this double-bind difficulty, people try to help themselves partly with fantasy's transformation of the given ("omformning av det givne") (Ibid) (without always to discern it from the process of interpreting), and partly, with the ability to a deliberate fixation (Ibid). In this context, he draws the conclusion that most people take their inner history with themselves in grave, where all histories are the same (Ibid: 168). Only the few ones who have gained ("won") (har vundet) the imagination (den form-skapende evne) in the process of the lottery of reproduction, can make recipient's stream of his/her life go to one new knowledge and new being; a happily expansion of the dark and sparkling awareness (den tidrende bevissthet) of what it means to be born as a human being on Earth (Ibid). Judging by Zapffe's investigations, I point out that we do not have to contradict fantasy's transformative function and deliberate fixation since it is the introduction of the concept of imaginative rationality that makes 'deliberate' and 'fantasy' be put in one and the same sentence in a non-contradictory way.

2.4.2. The Role of Fixation Mechanisms

In turn, the problem of fixations as such has much to do with the scale of interests I already talked about. Zapffe emphasizes that due to this scale of interests, we can lay a scale of abilities (*evner*) (Zapffe 1941: 619), which is defined as “a specific group among the one of units” (in this case, among the group of organisms’ qualities) (Ibid). This scale of abilities is specially coupled with a group of interests, which is called a group of development – or realization interests (Ibid). Due to the help of the abilities, the bearer consciously looks for realizing his/her interests (Ibid). These abilities can be “partly enough” (*dels strække til*) (i.e. be sufficient) (*sufficiens*), partly insufficient (deficiency) (*underskudd*), and there partly can be a surplus of ability (*et overskudd i evne*), together with this, which is required by the task or the situation (Ibid). Besides, the surplus can give advantages (*kan gi fordele*), to be irrelevant to the task’s solution or to provoke bad consequences (Ibid).

When a given ability can demonstrate itself in few or in only one functional variant, then it is called fixed (*fiksert*) (Ibid). If the ability is extended with variability, eventually, with an unlimited choice of the way of use, then it is called unfixed (*ufiksert*) (Ibid: 619-620). Zapffe points out that there is a scale between these two extremes (Ibid: 620). One unsuccessful fixation, compared with another one, which is assumed to be more successful one, is called wrong fixation (*feilfiksertion*): in turn, the variants of this wrong fixation include an over-fixation (*overfiksertionen*), when the ability is too much fixated, and under-fixation (*underfiksertionen*), when the ability is too loose (Ibid). By contrast to them, the ‘normal’ and fully valid satisfaction of interest is indicated as a real solution (*realløsning*) of the task, which existed (*forelaa*) before the satisfaction took place (Ibid).

The surplus of abilities can be described as a ‘positive’ phenomenon (e.g. as giving methodological advantages) when we go back to the relationship between surplus of abilities in Zapffe’s sense and expressibility. That is why I argue that having more abilities than the ones, which are required for one to fulfill a task, is beneficial in the sense of revealing the potential of expressibility. In this context, it is important to outline that the surplus of abilities and over-fixation are not set in a corresponding relationship alone, namely, the surplus of abilities to provoke by default over-fixation because otherwise, the surplus would not have led to bad consequences, as Zapffe suggests. Another concern is that the surplus of abilities also presumes having abilities, which might not be required by the task. That is why if the ability

can demonstrate itself in many varieties, it would mean that due to the unlimited choice of the way of use, it would correspond to what Zapffe defined as 'unfixed'. Then, we face the contradiction of the surplus of ability and the over-fixation since the latter presumes the ability to be too much fixed.

On the other hand, another problem arises from the concerns about the further elaboration of the degree of fixing ability, in its full realization, when a real solution takes place, namely, when the fully satisfied interest is a result of adopting one fixed ability. In this context, the problem is to measure the risks of avoiding this 'relatively' fixed ability to turn into too fixed ability in time, i.e. the real solution to deteriorate due to extrapolating the functions of a wrong (over)-fixation. The ambiguous definitions themselves derive from ambiguously extrapolating the elements of the definitions whose crossing point is the process of specifying whether the ability can fulfill the task under given circumstances (taking into account the qualities of the given objects) for the purposes of providing a real or unreal solution.

Zapffe himself does not specify at this stage what kind of solutions the wrong fixation as such provides, namely, whether and under what circumstances wrong fixations can provoke unreal solutions alone. I draw the conclusion that the aforementioned difficulties derive not only from Zapffe's difficulties in clearly outlining which solutions come from what abilities that are mediated by different types of fixations, but also from the fact that that he is aware that even if we somehow explicitly state which abilities are 'over' and which are 'less' regarding the fulfillment of a given task, from that it does not follow that we can unquestionably discern between imaginary fixation and real solutions as well as between imaginary and real actions respectively. An illuminative illustration in this respect is Zapffe's statement that compensation, which is considered as a real solution, has unclear boundaries with the surrogates and the one that imaginary fixation may be a result of a 'real anchoring'.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that regarding different types of fixation as well as the deficiency and surplus of abilities correspond but are not restricted to individuals' over- and under-equipment since both over- and under-fixations are provoked by the complexity of satisfying different biological, social, autotelic and metaphysical needs.

Furthermore, referring the scale of abilities to the degrees of fixation raises the following question. What can we understand by unsuccessful wrong fixation? Due to the principle of negation, we should presume the existence of

‘right’ fixation as well as what would be the reasons to rely on the ambiguous assumption that there is a “more successful” fixation without specifying in what terms it is a successful fixation indeed.

Furthermore, Zapffe argues that for the purposes of understanding the genealogy of fixations¹⁸², we should divide five groups according to which the categories of abilities, or capacities and fixation relationships to be taken into account (Ibid: 165-166). The first group consists of biological, social, autotelic, metaphysical, inter-frontal and multi-frontal environment. However, we should keep in mind that the distinction between the last two concepts is not clearly stated by Zapffe. In turn, the second group entails the possibilities of sympathetic, indifferent, hostile (satanic) environment. The third group entails different abilities such as perceptiveness (Sansning), intellect, memory, fantasy, feeling, expressibility (Uttryksevner). The fourth group concerns the different types of equipment and fixations, namely, under-equipment, over-equipment, under-fixation, over and wrong fixations. In the last, fifth group, Zapffe places the real and surrogate solutions (Ibid).

One of the problems regarding this classification is that both abilities and fixations are examined by Zapffe as an environment being set without further explanation in different groups. Regarding the classification in question, I argue that by environment Zapffe understands both interests (as displayed in the first group) and environment recognized as a matter of interpersonal interactions (as represented in the second group). In this context, most methodological concerns are about the third and fourth groups since Zapffe does not explicitly reveal why the abilities as such should be examined in a separate group, while they are referred to fixations. All abilities in the third group can be explored in terms of having surplus or lack, which in turn raises the different types of fixation, as displayed in fourth group. Furthermore, one of the main issues concerns the role of fixations as such. If over- and under-fixations are subgroups of a wrong fixation, does it mean that first, under- and over-fixation are always ‘wrong’, and second, if so, why are they defined in the fourth group in a different manner since under and over-fixations are no longer examined as sub-groups but rather as belonging to the rank of fixations which are not necessarily wrong?

¹⁸² However, we should keep in mind that Zapffe makes a distinction between the processes of differentiation and fixation outlining that they are not inextricably connected (Ibid: 43). He refers to Uexküll’s theory saying that differentiation is not concerned with the first step (med det første skridt) alone, it continues through changing forms as long as cells are grounded (har rester) in unused protoplasm in condition, still possessing creative (skapende) reserve supplies (Ibid).

In this context, Zapffe discusses the role of compensation¹⁸³ as a means: it signifies that one replaces the defective ability (den defekte evne) with another one so that man still to prove oneself through the unifying result (Ibid). If the under-equipment is localized in only one sense, it happens so that the organism itself makes compensation work (Ibid). In turn, with the help of technological fantasy, one can cause nature's powers to perform the work one cannot manage to do by himself/herself due to physical weakness (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that it is important to specify why under-equipment requires compensation or wrong fixation (over-fixation) under different circumstances. In other words, the difference should be traced back to whether the work of the only one sense is defined as the relevant ability or as a matter of under-equipment. Thus we can outline how under-equipment, in so far as the ability is fixed in only one variance, makes the boundary with the surrogate unclear while provoking the need of justifying a well-adapted fixation. The ambiguity itself derives from the disability of specifying under what circumstances the work of the only one sense is justified as a physical weakness, which should be compensated.

However, it is problematic to equate the specification of one ability as concentrated in one sense with the defectiveness of this ability. Furthermore, the boundary with the surrogate is unclear because performing the result is reconsidered by default as a real objective, which might be embodied in different types of solutions, which, regardless of the fact whether they are imaginary or not, should not put the realness of the objective as such at stake. That is why Zapffe talks about good and bad surrogates in terms of how well they prove the 'real' need of elaborating some mechanisms of a successful performance. Furthermore, it is the idea of successfulness that should determine one surrogate to be better anticipated under given circumstances than a certain compensation.

One of the starting points regarding the role of fixation mechanisms, which is emphasized by Zapffe, is that by rule, the fictive behavior is built, when the real solution goes beyond the capability, or if it is excluded for some other reasons: when it is associated with discomfort or when it is underrated

¹⁸³ Referring to the works of Norwegian philosopher Harald Schjelderup (his monograph *Psykologi (Psykologi)* (1927) in particular), Zapffe argues that compensation and over-compensation are well-known and well-appreciated means, which can be used "in real" (Ibid: 168).

as an insufficient one (Ibid: 164). This in turn would mean that ‘surrogate’ solutions¹⁸⁴ and real ones cannot exist simultaneously

Elaborating the aforementioned conclusions on the level of solutions requires adopting the mode of ‘or’, namely, it is determined as a matter of either introducing compensatory solutions, or surrogate ones. It is due to the fact that they concern proving the realness of the objective by tracing its embodiments in the individual behavior. That is why the process of evaluation no longer depends on specifying real and unreal alone, but also on how the multi-frontal engagements affect the anticipation of the result as such. An illuminative example in this respect is including the criteria of sufficient and insufficient, which have not only epistemological but also existential and ontological connotations. Thus a real solution, which is evaluated as real but insufficient, might be substituted with unreal but sufficient solution. This in turn presumes that disenchanting and rejecting the role of real does not have to be an objective in itself, but it should be done when the individual has the capability of elaborating an alternative solution due to having the potential to go beyond the one, which might be reached by adopting a given ability. Zapffe, however, is aware that we do not have to argue in favor of a fictive counter balance because entirely losing the idea of real would mean to question the intrinsic value of abilities as such.

Later in his monograph *On the tragic*, Zapffe claims that underestimation can also be realistically grounded (være *realt* begrundet), but then it assumes surplus (Ibid: 167). On the other hand, one widespread form of a fictive counter balance due to a deficiency means that one underrates the given object or the whole environment (projection) (Ibid). That is why if we want to clarify the complexity of the impossibility mode in Zapffe’s sense as irreducible to the real-unreal distinction, we should examine the genealogy of the compensation mechanisms.

Regarding this issue, Zapffe argues that the formation of so-called work or desire pictures¹⁸⁵ is not the only one applicable tactic (Ibid: 235) because isolation is also one of the tactics left (Ibid). Sublimation is defined as having high value for the cultural strive/aspiration: it is a process due to which the problem of bounded energy (hvorved den av problemet bundne energi) would be released by a roundabout method (Ibid). Since such a cultural em-

¹⁸⁴ In turn, the surrogate solutions can be both successful and unsuccessful ones.

¹⁸⁵ Two important functions of the two pictures will be examined in the chapter on Zapffe’s morality.

ployment of power in what happens is arranged as an unquestionable real solution of autotelic surplus¹⁸⁶ (som utvilsom *realløsning* av det *autoteliske overskudd*)¹⁸⁷, we see this employment as a metaphysical way out if real satisfactory meaning can be disputed (Ibid). Furthermore, when the view of sublimation is replaced with the one of distraction, one is guided from these “more qualified cases” down (fra disse mere kvalificerte tilfælde) to culturally indifferent or even harmful forms of distraction if the task is only to turn the attention from the painful metaphysical questions (Ibid).

According to Zapffe, imaginary anchoring (en imaginær forankring) often originates from a real anchoring (realforankring), which thins out more and more until the foundation is already gone (Ibid: 172). On the other hand, he relevantly points out that there are also many imaginary forms, which do not function as fixations. The multiple aspects of the problem are strengthened by the fact that the formation of fixations has a different impact in time. The individual can be dependent, to a bigger or smaller extent, on his/her anchoring: he/she can have a bigger or smaller fixation and safety behavior (fiksations- og tryghetsbehov) to brood or spend his/her anchoring goods, as Zapffe points out (Ibid: 174). In turn, some other imaginary fixation’s impulses, which resemble guild’s ones (laugets), partly collective, partly more individualized, lay in the prolongation of some real attributes such as nature, race etc. (Ibid: 188-189).

Simplifying the problem to a distinction between imaginary fixation and a real one would also mean to neglect the complex net of relationships between underrating and overrating the normative validity of the process of

¹⁸⁶ Examining heroism’s social position and psychological opaqueness, Zapffe argues that one could say that autotelic optimal development has sometime played a role of metaphysical surrogate (Ibid: 232). The tip of the iceberg (the peak ascent) (tindestigningen) is that in some central European countries, especially nowadays, has been an asylum of the sacrificers and the ones looking for death (Ibid).

¹⁸⁷ Zapffe examines the transformation of compensation into anchoring giving some examples of over-compensation (Ibid: 185). The latter examples, however, concern the transfer to real anchoring. One of those is when the shy person (Det generte) constructs a bragging disposition in order to cover his/her uncertainty. The simulated disposition can eventually cease being a habit and being “natural” (til “natur”) respectively so that one hardly can suspect whether one does not know how the “character” (“karakter-trækket”) has been functioning (Ibid: 185-186). On the other hand, imaginary anchoring displays a varied picture (Ibid: 186). The grounding illusion itself is of a constantly changing nature; in turn, the method after which the self leans to the illusion, using it in its fight for assertion, is also a different one (Zapffe takes into account anchoring’s substantial (“substansielle”) and its functional (“funktionelle”) peculiarity) (Ibid).

compensation. On the other hand, it would have led to underrating the process of sublimation and especially the implications of its autotelic surplus.

Zapffe's analysis raises some other concerns as well. It is problematic to argue that the feeling of biological, social and autotelic deficiencies, which involve unfavorable characteristics, are interpreted in the field of religion as an original sin ("arvesynd"), as a metaphysical wrong fixation (Ibid: 204). Zapffe himself does not clarify whether the latter displays over-fixation or under-fixation, i.e. whether the aforementioned deficiencies should be interpreted as too fixed or too loose. Judging by his definitions, we may talk about over-fixation since at least the biological and social abilities can be understood as too fixed for showing the genealogy of the original sin in Zapffe's sense. In this context, it would be problematic to examine biological, social and autotelic deficiencies as equally unproductive because they interact in different ways with the metaphysical needs and second, because what is defined as deficient in one front (e.g. being defined as a heterotelic need) is sufficient in another one (i.e. as an autotelic need).

Extrapolating his investigations, I argue that over-fixation regarding morally wrong fixation can be defined as driven by a certain kind of a high autotelic value in Zapffe's sense. Otherwise, every single autotelic value (both low and high ones) would have been provoking a common type of over-fixation. This in turn raises the concern that high autotelic values trigger wrong fixations. Furthermore, if we presume that wrong fixation is driven by low values alone, does it mean that low values in Zapffe's sense inflict merely wrong fixations and if so, under what circumstances?

His statement that wrong fixation is a fixation easily implicating both a feeling of a lower dignity and a need of a new formation of fixation (Ibid: 182) raises a question that remains unanswered by Zapffe, namely, what exactly is a low autotelic value? Does it mean that it is provoked by a heterotelic need alone presuming that low value is not a self-sufficient one being defined in respect with some 'higher' values? Furthermore, does it mean that over-fixation and under-fixation contradict each other as motivated by 'high' and 'low' values respectively? The embodiments of the aforementioned two types of fixation make the things even more complicated because it should have meant that the stubbornness and ossification characterizing over-fixation, as Zapffe suggests, are dominated by high autotelic values alone.

Another problem takes place if we assume that the typical for a condition of surplus in an autotelic state of readiness (en tilstand av overskudd i autotelisk beredskap) is that one ability, or yearning, search for an object for the

sake of the realization itself¹⁸⁸ (Ibid: 190). Then it would mean that the ‘higher’ values mainly affect the self-sufficiency of the realization as such. Regarding the definitions of fixation, it would mean that either is over-fixation a wrong fixation based on high autotelic values, or that we should end up with a certain kind of moral naturalism concerning the speculations with some natural values in themselves. Related issue is that if we follow Zapffe’s definition of autotelic engagement (Ibid), which is focused on the use of time and power, we should also pay attention to the complex origin of the motivational factors. According to Zapffe, the engagement in question can be interpreted as a waste of opportunities when it is framed in the searchlight of one metaphysical question, namely, how can you use your time and power? (Ibid).

Regarding the discussions about the mechanism of under-fixation as aiming to solve real and imaginary anchoring (Ibid: 171-172), we face again the difficulty to refer a wrong type of fixation in Zapffe’s sense to providing both real and unreal anchoring, which to be normatively valid. On the other hand, the concern whether we are able to discern between when we talk about ‘pure imagination’ (or what might be called connotations without denotations) and ‘relevant imagination’ (understood as a given projection of connotation-denotation relationship) takes place. Since the real anchoring is described by Zapffe as a matter of building safety units (Tryghets-enheter) (Ibid: 171) such as when among children we witness a fragmental construction of a reliable arrangement (“If I do this and this, it will go well”), which is illustrated with the example of the ship navigation¹⁸⁹, the imaginary anchoring is described in a double-bind way. The crossing point is the hero worship, which is determined as often ‘catching’ (griper) real and imagi-

¹⁸⁸ The statement is based on Zapffe’s assumption that the subject is reached beyond (naadd ut over) the first, quite unfixed condition of indeterminate infatuations and loss as well as that he/she has had a fairly secure feeling regarding which direction one’s state of readiness goes to (Ibid: 190). As for the surplus in general, Zapffe argues that one of the ways is to look up for a surrogate object (Ibid). He specifies that to a certain extent daydream and sleeping dream are maybe the main providers (hovedleverandøren) of such surrogates (Ibid).

¹⁸⁹ The ship is anchored so that to avoid breaking a drift and reverting whatever (Ibid). Thus the results of experience work together (in a different way) with the approach of inherited fixation (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe emphasizes that in the prolongation of the more practical formation of character, which aims at biological-social and partly at autotelic safety of reaction, lies the elaboration of one attitude towards life understood as a general, determining behavioral instance that is often defined on a metaphysical basis (Ibid). Thus he reaches the conclusion that in the need of fixation, as a rule, admiration to heroic quantitative greatness meddles in (Ibid).

nary fixation's models as inseparable from each other (Ibid). In turn, the gist of imaginary anchoring is explained as an assumption, belief, one conviction of the bearer that one or another thing in the environment, or something in the individual, or some other relation "behave" (*forholder seg*) (Ibid: 172) such and such as well as that this absolutely secure ("absolute sikre") condition of the things has a meaning as a guarantee, which is a guarantee of one's choice of behavior, in general or in particular (Ibid). Zapffe specifies that the aforementioned feature concerns all anchoring. The circumstance that the conviction should be "insane" ("gal") for one "objective" ("objektiv") trial of something else, without, however, to lose its subjective value for the bearer, is defined by the adjective "imaginary" (imaginær) (Ibid). As one of the main problems, Zapffe outlines that environment has too little constancy (Ibid). In turn, both real and imaginary anchoring are unlimitedly big in terms of both number and types (arter) (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, Zapffe's distinction between heterotelic and autotelic activities of fantasy also concerns the conception of what a goal in itself is, as well as to what extent intentionality can be defined as substitutable with the goals. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that we should go beyond Zapffe's distinction of subjective and objective values because otherwise, it would have meant that imaginary anchoring would not have had any normative validity whatsoever. Such a conclusion brings to light two significant consequences: first, imaginary anchoring to be interpreted as an object of pure epistemological relativism, which in turn would lead to the second consequence, namely, imaginary anchoring to be irrelevant to the real one. In turn, hero worship in Zapffe's sense is an illuminative example of why imaginary anchoring becomes understandable by referring to the concept of imaginary rationality. Due to the latter, the normative validity has different embodiments according to which the subjective is recognized as intrinsically connected with objective. Otherwise, there would have been no difference between imaginary and real anchoring.

According to Zapffe, we find in our souls a yearning for fixations' peace of maximum development, but not for the fixation itself (Ibid: 102); a strive, which is driven by the willingness to have a safe world in order (Ibid: 109). In other words, we have implicitly embodied the possibility of the mode of fixation, but without possessing it, or reducing it to a given set of fixations. That is why I argue that ontological potential, which concerns the mode what it means to be in progress affects the rehabilitation of the potentiality as something more than just a lack of ontological power. It makes the possibility of choosing irreducible to the particular choices, albeit thus it shows

how the (non)fixation has an unquestionable normative validity by being focused on producing surrogate objects¹⁹⁰. Furthermore, Zapffe points out that due to the entire unfixated lifestyle, we experience a choice, namely, we can follow an autotelic impulse or elaborate it, and replace it at the expense of a heterotelic consideration, taking into account that not all autotelic tendencies are incompatible with the life's necessary ones¹⁹¹ (Ibid: 102). If autotelic tendencies were coinciding with the life's necessary ones, however, it would have signified that choosing is a matter of defining a set of predetermined choices. In turn, missing the metaphysical component would have meant that the act of choosing would have been irrelevant to the question of what man's life is (recognized as a mode of becoming).

Going back to the question of the itself mode that concerns autotelic activity of fantasy, I claim that the universal behavior in Zapffe's sense could be interpreted as 'open' to the world's feeling-mode, which is a mode in itself because it presumes inflicting an experiential behavior on side of the subject, which is not under his/her control¹⁹².

¹⁹⁰ The autotelic activity of fantasy has a normative validity regardless of the particular embodiments of the surrogate objects it produces.

¹⁹¹ The lack of full incompatibility derives from the fact that some of life's necessary goals are a part of world's plan and as such, they have an autotelic origin.

¹⁹² Regarding human behavior, we face a heterotelic activity of metaphysical phantasy.

2.4.3. Biosophy and/as Ontological Ethics?

2.4.3.1. *The Role of Zapffe's Yes and No*

Zapffe introduces the topic of morality in his attempt at examining the ways of overcoming the indifference of environment. According to him, against nature's indifference, we design a society, which is presumably built on the opposite, namely, on the common nouns regarding all crossing interests, which are called morality, "the ethical yes and no" (Zapffe 1992: 162). In turn, education also provides a fixation help. In this context, the one who breaks morality is defined by Zapffe as collaborating with indifference, and consequently as "being one pest or one conscious enemy of human kind"¹⁹³ (Ibid).

Furthermore, he argues that if man was not indignant at the "rarely met, meaningless destructions of value" ("slumpetræffets meningsløse værdiødelæggelser") etc., i.e. if the fixation was adjusted to the environment, there would have been no depriving of power tension between human mind and nature (Ibid). This also shows in time that an ethically more indifferent character is more capable of living, having a richer outer life and bigger spontaneous joy of life respectively than people with emotional, ("in poor health/sick") ("skranten") intelligence: either is now this intelligence religious, or it is a "human-ethical" one, ("human-etisk") (Ibid).

In turn, justifying the 'yes' and 'no' decisions explored against the background of so-called cultural paradox¹⁹⁴ (Zapffe 1941: 144) raises indiffer-

¹⁹³ Similarly, we show solidarity with one shipwrecked crew: "one symbol of betrayal is the conduct to fill up the vessel with salty water, in order to hide the betrayal", as well as to avoid being judged by the formulated principles (in a given situation) (Ibid).

¹⁹⁴ Zapffe argues that the cultural paradox is formulated in the end of chapter five in *On the tragic* (Ibid: 178). According to him, there are two types of culture, namely, collective and individual ones (Ibid: 136). Collective culture should be considered as exterior, group-determined, historically traceable (efterviselige), generally recognized forms and contents of man's life development (Ibid). In turn, individual one concerns the personal manifestations displayed in the light of consideration's evaluation (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe outlines that unfortunately, we cannot find a reliable grounding of evaluation of a cultural contribution either (Ibid: 137). Generally speaking, one uses the development of the biologically provided evaluation: the bigger competence is, the bigger life's strength is, but this norm is supported by autotelic view points as well as by timely and spatially determined social and metaphysical components (Ibid).

ence towards nature as well as the need of extrapolating Zapffe's theory of energies. On the one hand, both the more developed spiritual and mental equipments and the unfixability mechanisms give possibilities of a rich outer and inner life (culture) (Ibid). However, they also create "a jungle of conflicts, problems and controversies", both collective and individual ones as well as a permanent pressure of life, similarly to the one the deep water pressure has on diver's helmet (Zapffe 1992a: 270).

Going back to the idea of culture, Zapffe points out that we should talk about changing the biological-social conditions of the given cultural personality under the retention (bibeholdet) of the collective cultural ideal or under the one of the recognition of some individual varieties (Zapffe 1941: 150). This change of conditions can be eventually examined in respect with the development of medicine that secured the abnormal against (som sikret det abnorme) some harmful to health side effects in both body and soul (Ibid). Sometime biological regeneration makes necessary "relaxing" (avkobling) from the critique as well as reducing consciousness to a minimum, which requires a collective biological intention to be adopted (Ibid: 178). Similarly to the individuals, a nation can be inclined to take a "cultural break" (en "kulturpause") in order to strengthen the elementary basis without which there is no life, and thereby nor is any culture whatsoever (Ibid). A new collective anchoring as a positive factor (explicated in the slogans) is supported by the isolation mechanism as a negative one (in the public life, it takes the form of censorship) (Ibid). Furthermore, Zapffe argues that a cultural unity can be based on more or less rounded off system of anchoring, which is built on carrying out some ground beams, i.e. the fundamental cultural thoughts¹⁹⁵ (Ibid: 179). In this context, he outlines that many people consider the imaginary anchoring as the most meaningful fixation surrogate, i.e. as a universal means (Ibid).

On the other hand, Zapffe examines how cultural and pathological can stay in different relationships in respect with each other (Ibid: 135) arguing that psychiatric position to higher cultural forms is not so clear (Ibid: 140). Another important specification is the definition of greatness of anti-cultural type (av kulturfjendlig art), which should also contain a "positive kernel" (en "positiv kjerne") (Ibid: 344). The greatness can be determined as such in respect with the following three factors, namely, in respect with the type and degree of fixation ("static fixation"), due to the type of development ("dynamic fixation") and in respect with the degree of development (capacity) (Ibid).

¹⁹⁵ This idea of fundamental cultural thoughts as grounding beams is defined for the first time in Zapffe's essay *The Last Messiah*.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we may trace how Zapffe avoids both biological and cultural relativism and absolutism outlining that biological evolution is only one of the necessary conditions of having a cultural evaluation as such. On a macro methodological level, it turns out that cultural break is as important as the biological one for the purposes of revealing the genealogy of the complex relationships between man and nature. As an illuminative embodiment of the aforementioned complexity, I point out Zapffe's example of the shipwrecked cats, which shows how the internal connections between biological and cultural breaks are driven by the arising tension between autotelic and heterotelic needs that function together on a day life level. Furthermore, it is their contradiction that makes referring imaginary to real anchoring more desired than ever since the question of what meaningful life is has more than one answer available. It is easier to find the answer merely in a biological environment, which, however, requires a biological break to take place when a question is posed by the representatives of humankind. In turn, cultural break becomes a 'natural' result of having too many answers, i.e. it becomes a natural reaction to preserving the normative validity of the question as such.

Zapffe gives the example with a ship full of cats, which is abandoned by the crew and shipwrecked at a desert island, whereafter cats jumped on the land. The only living beings on the island were some lively (bouncing) (sprættne) but uneatable beetles, which made it look like that the fate of the cats is sealed (Ibid: 158). Then, one discovered that the soft clay along the beach contains fat and palatable (delicious) shells, which can easily be opened (Ibid). Zapffe argues that from an autotelic point of view, it is far less tempting for the cats to dig in the clay than to make a tiger jump on the ground beetles (Ibid: 159). However, only the last is the life that is worthy for cats (Ibid). To choose this is an expression of an idealist life-stance, which is highly-valuable and deadly at once (Ibid). Therefore, life-giving is defined by Zapffe as another, atrocious occupation (en anden avskyelig syssel), which no one decent cat would condescend to (Ibid).

With this illustration, Zapffe explicitly gives a preference to the autotelic needs due to the fact that their fulfillment is a dreadful one. However, the preference is explained with the fact that under extreme circumstances, the choice is between being and becoming, and more precisely, it is between satisfying heterotelic needs or autotelic ones. Thus the contrast between life's meaning and meaning of different lives becomes more apparent. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that here Zapffe discusses the biological needs from the perspective of the ideal hero worship, which makes autotelic be understood in respect with heterotelic via adopting the versus

mode. It is due to the fact that it concerns not the survival of the fittest and luckiest, but rather the mode of survival as such.

Zapffe claims that individuals, which to the highest extent represent the cat's form (*katteformen*) in its distinctive life style, would have had difficulties to participate in the shell digging and that is why, under the given conditions, they are biologically inferior (Ibid). In this context, optimism comes to cover the feeling of guilt and humiliation: cats notice nothing about such scruples¹⁹⁶, nor are the scruples established (reckoned) for the cats (er de heller ikke for katter at regne) (Ibid). Soon they should further build their defense: land cats would be called neurotic and psychopaths (Ibid). In turn, water cats would triumph, but also would do the others finding out that the explanation (it is described as a "resistance to be cured", which makes the diagnosis be 'fear of water') is a relevant one; they would accept it because they know what lies behind¹⁹⁷ (Ibid).

On the other hand, the hunting cats could be described as pessimists¹⁹⁸: not because of such evil things, which the others attach great importance to: i.e. to be soar and hungry, to brief with difficulties and to freeze, but because these cats have found themselves to be placed in a world, which does not have conditions for the sacred formula in their hearts (Ibid). Zapffe emphasizes that gaining such knowledge, these cats stop breeding. However, "soon among them some prophets appeared and they taught them the art of hope (haabets kunst)" (Ibid).

Elaborating the contradictions regarding the ideas of cultural and biological breaks requires giving some arguments against defining Zapffe's anthropology as a purely pessimist one. Næss interprets Zapffe's no as being associated with suffering rather than with joy, i.e. as a matter of one "fundamental no" (Næss 1992: 274). However, we should take into account that the meaning of pain in Zapffe's sense is not the premise making life meaningless,

¹⁹⁶ Zapffe outlines that others, showing a bigger indifference to cats' standard, will lay all the day in the mud and will only stuff (gorge) themselves (mække seg) and breed (Ibid). Periodically, they would raise a countenance, which is driven by dirt and would squint (myser) against the snobs on the land; mockery and satire would be replaced with a burning hate because the land cats remind them of their betrayal against family's most precious possession (Ibid).

¹⁹⁷ This example can be examined as an embodiment of what I would call ascribing pathological to some higher cultural forms in Zapffe's sense.

¹⁹⁸ This is an example of so-called surplus pessimism, which will be discussed in detail in the chapter on Zapffe's pessimism.

namely, life to be understood as having no meaning. On the contrary, Zapffe's meaninglessness concerns the surplus of meaning, which corresponds to the surplus of being, as I already showed. That is why Zapffe's no regarding vital needs can be defined as a *conditio sine qua non*¹⁹⁹.

Næss also claims that man's vital interests are an unbreakable connection between tragedy and high dignity, when we talk about experience (Ibid: 269). His conclusion is that not every single form of high value (høyverdighet) predetermines catastrophic development: biological or any other type of destruction (Næss 1992: 266). However, from that it does not follow that anthropological yes can be restricted to the non-catastrophic living potential of man alone either. A life centered on increased experience is not frightened by some catastrophe that is provoked by the process of experience itself (Ibid: 271). But the product is evaluated due to what has happened (skapes), not due to this, which determined the result²⁰⁰ (Ibid).

In this context, we can outline the differences between Næss (1992: 280) and Zapffe concerning the ontological groundings of yes and no standpoints as a matter of giving priority to different types of frameworks they should be discussed in. Despite the fact that it is not explicitly articulated neither by Næss nor by Zapffe, in both cases it is the implicit role of ethics that contributes to justifying the normative validity of one's experiential gestalt. A significant proof in favor of ethical premises can be found in one of the basic assumptions of Zapffe's ontology, which is also taken into consideration by Næss, namely that both man and life have gestalts (Ibid: 281).

¹⁹⁹ If we underrate the ontological groundings of Zapffe's conception as well as if we presume that its determinism is equivalent to objective naturalism, we would simplify Zapffe's theory and its implementations. It would mean that examining Zapffe's conception as a determinist one is possible only if we neglect his theory of man as a bearer of different interests, which shape one's complex behavior.

²⁰⁰ On the other hand, discussing the concerns regarding Zapffe's yes and no, Næss does not mention that Zapffe outlines the role of empathy and solidarity with all living forms as the only one way of living with the cosmic feeling of panic, which is ineradicable.

2.4.3.1.1. *The Role of Moral Experiential Gestalt and the Feeling of Cosmic Panic*

Extrapolating Zapffe's conception, I argue that the cosmic feeling of panic determines man's experiential gestalt to be interpreted as what I called moral experiential gestalt: gestalt that contributes the process of self-realization to be guaranteed regardless of the initial weak position of man in the universe. By showing respect and solidarity with all living beings one can make a step further in coping with *terror vacui*.

What I defined as a moral experiential gestalt becomes a necessary condition for the realization of both man and nature providing the justification of the problem of normative validity on two levels: on the one of mankind as well as on the one of biosphere. Similarly to Zapffe, Næss argues that regarding both mankind and universe, man is nonetheless merely a flake whose life lasts only a second (Ibid: 280). In this context, the idea of gestalt can be extrapolated to Zapffe's theory, taking into account that one's unity is dependent on the unity of the universe, albeit being irreducible to the latter. However, we should emphasize the specification that unity is not equivalent to the gestalt itself²⁰¹ because the gestalt represents the structured experience of a person, or a given form of being. That is why I draw the conclusion that unity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for discussing man's identity regardless of the fact that it can be applied to the one of nature. Furthermore, we can agree with Næss's statement that gestalts are the same (Ibid: 281) merely in the sense that we can outline the genealogical similarities in the way unities of man and nature are constructed. When we analyze the rank of unities, as Næss suggests, namely, the ones of man, life and everything, they should be considered from a "gestalt-theoretical" ("gestalt-teoretisk") perspective (Ibid: 282) because otherwise, we could deal with some incomplete (atomized) descriptions that display only given parts of the aforementioned entities.

It is human kind that can cultivate its sensitivity towards otherness if it wants to rehabilitate its initial connection with nature, which is a point shared by both Zapffe and Næss. Judging by these investigations, I claim that the origin of human solidarity cannot be explained by adopting biologically grounded arguments, assuming that human beings are the only moral discussants. Furthermore, referring to Zapffe's theory, I draw the conclusion that we cannot define solidarity in ethical sense, unless it is determined as a prototype characteristic of man's experiential gestalt, which gives us reasons to talk about moral experiential gestalt as such²⁰².

²⁰¹ Næss also outlines the differences between universal and gestalt (Næss 2005y: 461-466).

²⁰² I introduce the concept of experiential morality as based on rehabilitating the role of moral experience by reviving the normative validity of our feelings and emotions in respect with clarifying both the complexity of moral motivation and the decision-making process.

2.4.3.2. *The Way to Morality*²⁰³

Examining the implications of Zapffe's theory, Kvaløy specifies that according to Zapffe, man is recognized as an aware (full of understanding) living being (erkjennelsesmessig) as well as that his conception of morality can be defined as "over-equipped" in respect with the environment it has to function in (Kvaløy 1992: 255).

In turn, the connection between metaphysical interest front and morality in Zapffe's sense is a complex one since morality requires metaphysical behavior to be differently formulated when we discuss so-called morality of world order ("verdensordenens" moralitet)²⁰⁴, autotelic-morality etc. (Zapffe 1941: 66). Zapffe argues that the question of life's meaning presumes metaphysical need of a heterotelic meaning of life to be clarified unless this question is posed as one about life "as it is", when we ask about life "for the sake of life itself" (Ibid). On the other hand, morality of world order requires the metaphysical need to be defined (Ibid: 66-67). Due to this order, everything has a plan and meaning: if it is necessary, suffering is caused by following an economic principle according to which everything goes fairly well in respect with the evaluation of every single man, or in respect with an evaluation regarding the fact that all can "raise themselves up" ("hæve sig op til") with their own help (Ibid: 67). In this context, Zapffe makes the important comment that if justice cannot make the necessary, love does the rest and thus the metaphysical environment should be strengthened by a sympathetic disposition (Ibid).

Analyzing Zapffe's example, we could specify the role of morality of world order²⁰⁵ as based on metaphysical behavior that has both autotelic and het-

²⁰³ Zapffe argues that morality has a meaning only in respect with a norm, which should (bør) be fulfilled (Ibid: 30).

²⁰⁴ Fløistad argues that it is the need of a world's moral order that is recognized by Zapffe as a sign of what it means to be a human being (Fløistad 1989: 15). This need takes place against the background of one "collision between the power of human and the world this power is set in" (Ibid). That is why Fløistad draws the conclusion that due to such a misconception people can experience tragic by their own living (Ibid). Furthermore, he also examines how this moral order is a general condition of every big development of capacity, together with the comprehension of capability's development understood as a matter of surplus in Zapffe's sense (Ibid: 66)

²⁰⁵ Zapffe outlines that this is the "need of perfectibility as a way of confirming life" that is blocked due to the tragic constellations of the course of real solutions as well as by being referred to false solutions or destruction (Ibid).

erotetic aspects (needs). From the perspective of the world as such, it should be defined as a certain type of autotelic-metaphysical morality, which is grounded in achieving fairness *per se* by reducing the role of morality to the one of world's justice. However, from the perspective of man's needs, it can be described as a metaphysical need having a heterotelic aspect: otherwise, the role of love would have been neglected. Zapffe himself is aware of this problem saying that if we talk about one who has a "need of a moral world order" (Ibid), we should make the following specification. The need of finding life's meaning is not identical with the ones of loving God or believing in life after death²⁰⁶ (Ibid). It has much to do with the fact that humans are bearers of interests. At some point, they may show solidarity with other people and even with all living beings because "we assert the principle that all interest bearers have a claim on destiny that is relevant to the interest" (Ibid).

²⁰⁶ Zapffe argues that if the need of meaning could have been satisfied in a different way, it would have been the most important issue: then, we could have thought about giving up on God and immortality. But such a decision would have caused us troubles: that is why we hold the idea of metaphysical salvation, which is entailed in the probability of analogy anyway (Ibid: 67). Zapffe points out that many people confuse their metaphysical need with the religious one (Ibid: 68).

3. WHY DO NOT WE CALL ZAPFFE A NIHILIST? ON THE GENEALOGY OF ZAPFFE'S MORALITY

Zapffe's theory of solving the existential problems by introducing noncontradictory morality, which to be closely tied with the practical experience is among the strongest arguments against defining him as a nihilist. However, maybe one of the most puzzling issues is what Zapffe calls biological morality. Within the framework of the latter, he introduces a set of problematic concepts such as biological value and biological responsibility that become a methodological obstacle even for his own analysis, while he aims at justifying the need of showing love and compassion for other living beings. On a practical level, so-called by Zapffe biological justice²⁰⁷ (Ibid: 33) turns out to be something more than a projection of a biological veto (Ibid), albeit, as Zapffe relevantly claims, the question of biological hubris is not limited to the one of safety²⁰⁸.

Some implicit arguments that support the establishment of a certain kind of experiential morality can be found in Zapffe interpretation of Johannes Müller's conception²⁰⁹ of 'Erfüllung' ('fulfillment'). According to Zapffe, the one who

²⁰⁷ According to Zapffe, both morality and justice presume a certain kind of "developed consciousness" (utviklet bevissthet) to be adopted (which again questions the role of biological morality and the status of its bearers) as well as a given degree of non-fixation that does not have to lead to relativism but rather to avoiding absolutism to be presumed. However, thinking about morality and justice by adopting oppositions, on the principle A-not A, contributes merely to showing that they are not absolute categories, which can be justified by employing certain imperatives, as Zapffe suggests.

²⁰⁸ Furthermore, he provides well-grounded arguments in distinguishing biological hubris from heroism, which represents in a conflict situation the quantitative, more dynamic (active) idealism in contrast to the qualitative static one, which can appear in all combinations (Ibid: 223).

²⁰⁹ Johannes Müller (1801-1858) is referred to as the father of experimental physiology. In his monograph *Handbook of Man's Physiology. Lectures (Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen: für Vorlesungen)* (1834-1840), Müller argued that physiology and psychology are to be subsumed under a broader philosophy of nature. According to Macleod, his philosophical views show the influence of the German metaphysical idealists, but he "might be more properly classed as an Aristotelian in his conception of nature, and his approach to science was very close to that of Goethe" (Macleod: 1968).

looks for a confirmation of the way of perfection “can say to oneself in one’s own heart: “This landscape, this man talks to something in me, which answers. I will allow this thing in me to answer and to be one whole with my answer. I have an experiential readiness (oplevelsesberedskap): it is as rare as the inalienable opportunity to fulfill it, to give a meaning to that side of my life” (Ibid: 103). That definition corresponds to a certain extent to what I call experiential morality in so far as it is based on the normative validity of the dialogue due to which the response is considered as a responsibility to learn both to hear and to be heard. Through the process of communication, the meaningfulness is determined as embodied in different meanings that expand the idea of experiencing and experientiality as such. It is a given type of responsiveness irreducible to the response itself, albeit it has the latter as its necessary condition since experientiality reveals what it means to think globally (stort)²¹⁰ (Ibid: 104), as Zapffe suggests, in non-quantitative terms.

In this context, some parallels can be drawn between Zapffe’s theory of empathy and Schopenhauer’s conception of compassion who argues that just person and good person can be distinguished due to the compassion they show²¹¹. According to Schopenhauer, the good person aims at alleviating the suffering of the others, which may culminate in the willingness to sacrifice his/her own well-being for the sake of the others (Schopenhauer 2007: §67). In turn, this ethical conduct corresponds to the embodiment of sacrifice in the conduct of heroism, as displayed by Zapffe (Zapffe 1941: 403-404).

The understanding of man’s meaning of life posed as a question about his/her destiny has much to do with the one of the normative validity of his/her situatedness into the world, where being is not a goal in itself because it is not equivalent to the mode of becoming. That is why we may claim that what Zapffe calls historical responsibility (Ibid: 111) is a heterotelic responsibility²¹², while world’s responsibility²¹³ is an autotelic-metaphysical one due to which the metaphysical meaning of life concerns life’s plan as such base don dominating autotelic needs.

²¹⁰ Zapffe argues that one does not want to think for a long time (længe), but to think globally (Ibid).

²¹¹ This idea is gradually elaborated in Schopenhauer’s writings (most explicitly in *The World as Will and Representation* (1818/1819), §67).

²¹² According to Zapffe, autotelic experience can be detached from all connections with life in general as well as to appear as discontinuing in respect with the grounding biological-social strive inasmuch it has an indicator of sterility (Ibid: 62).

²¹³ Zapffe argues that world’s responsibility is the optimal expression of “man’s awareness of acting”, which requires a moral norm having a similar validity: “one norm, which encompasses and supplies all the partial norms we know from the given interest fronts” (Ibid: 111-112).

It is not by chance that world's responsibility, defined as both "response for and response to the world itself", is described by Zapffe as the optimal expression of awareness of deeds (Ibid: 111-112, Note 19). This expression has an "encompassing and thrilling validity" (Ibid). It is encompassing because it determines the role of the derived norms in all four intersecting interest fronts. Zapffe also argues that the "developing" personhood first inflicts "pressure of responsibility", and then "increasing metaphysical perplexity" (Ibid: 112). His analysis explains why the metaphysical restlessness is irreducible to the biological dissatisfaction, which, on a macro methodological level, shows why the aforementioned awareness does not lead to imposing certain moral absolutism regardless of its autotelic projections.

The moral choice is driven by a high-value norm²¹⁴, while competing with some impulses of more luring norms, which are less "full of value" by nature (Ibid: 30). Such an interpretation brings us back to the issue whether we can correctly interpret the distinction between 'more' and 'less' valuable avoiding moral objectivism, which is grounded in a certain kind of naturalism. Remaining on the level of applied biology, it would mean to equate values with facts, or even worse, to argue that values are 'natural' facts if we assume that they are valuable by nature. One of the main methodological disadvantages of adopting

²¹⁴ Zapffe introduces so-called metaphysical-moral scruple (*den metafysiske-moralske anføgtelse*) (Ibid: 124). According to him, the one who is sensitive to morality feels oneself also responsible for the consequences of actions, which cannot be predicted (Ibid: 125). One knows that one's "prima causa", which is carried out from now until the end of the world, is something no one can have a notion of (Ibid). That is why there is something repulsive in the requirement to stop the work on motivation (Ibid). Analyzing the aforementioned theory, I argue that such an interpretation leads to justifying autotelic-metaphysical morality, which in turn would affect the establishment of a certain type of moral absolutism. In turn, putting in question the role of moral motivation would cause morality to be misconceptualized as a form of fatalism.

Regarding the status of the moral subject, it would mean that the complexity of interests would negatively affect one's moral motivation, which in turn would make the latter entail contradicting factors having different normative validity. According to Zapffe, the highly moral person chooses between, on the one hand, violence against reason: a negligence of the "finest, deepest, and most 'sacred' in his /her being", which is a betrayal of human in him/her and a refusal of the relevant "biological, social or autotelic" action, on the other one (Ibid: 126). One of the contradictions in this context is that Zapffe reduces morality to autotelic-metaphysical morality as well as gives priority to an autotelic action, which is a micro-embodiment of this order indeed. Zapffe also provides the problematic interpretation of the autotelic in so far as he contradicts the autotelic-metaphysical engagements and the autotelic interest, which is supposed to have a higher normative validity.

such an interpretation is that we should accept by default that the more developed (in a biological sense) forms have a higher moral potential²¹⁵.

Regarding the biological perspective, another problem derives from evaluating the metaphysical moral need as a “prolongation, as an interpellation of the development from unconscious reflex to responsible choices of action made on a broad basis” (Ibid: 121). Zapffe himself is aware of the difficulties regarding such a ‘biologized’ (“biologistisk”) interpretation arguing that it is in tune with the one concerning distress reactions (*reaktionsnød*)²¹⁶ (Ibid), which arise from man’s knowledge of death – “the last and the bitterest fruit of knowledge” (Ibid). Extrapolating Zapffe’s analysis, I reach the conclusion that the aforementioned biologization of morality can lead to reducing it to a certain form of moral behaviorism due to which moral responsibility to be examined from the perspective of stimulus-reaction paradigm. Not less problematic is another statement made by Zapffe, namely, that we should keep in mind that moral guilt can take place in the biological as well as in the social, autotelic and metaphysical fields of interests (Ibid: 308). On the other hand, if we agree with him that in an ethical trial, we do not have to measure the “technical correctness” (den tekniske rigtighed) with the factual result, but with one’s good will, which is described as one’s subjective understanding of the deeds (Ibid: 309), it would mean to favor both the instrumentalization of morality and a certain type of ungrounded moral relativism.

²¹⁵ This is a statement revealing Zapffe’s conception how animals try to overcome pain. However, he poses arguments against when one replaces a fact with a value by claiming that people have substantially ‘higher’ moral values. Such an interpretation would lead us to denying that the must-mode has a different normative validity compared to the ethical and biological points of view. Otherwise, it would mean to favor a certain form of ethical speciesism.

²¹⁶ Zapffe points out that the transition to the moral need is not something new. Most of the metaphysically aware individuals examine their biological-social environment as a part of their metaphysical environment; as the only one field where it is possible to gain an experience and do a trial (Ibid: 127). That is why they used to practice their metaphysical morality as well as to elaborate a universal life’s course throughout some partial courses (Ibid).

3.1. The Role of Social Morality

Another questionable issue is how to interpret Zapffe's definition of social morality²¹⁷. Undoubtedly, so-called social environment, which does not overlap with social behavior, is based on understanding the interests of the others rather than on merely being focused on one's self-understanding. However, referring to such an approach does not contribute yet to clarifying how to determine the origin and the function of the values as having unquestionable ethical validity. Zapffe discusses the role of social or 'absolute' values adopted by so-called moral geniuses, and possibly by religious and technological geniuses (Ibid: 230), without explicitly revealing what the moral aspects of these values are.

Related contradictions arise from Zapffe's definition of duty, which is examined by the idealists not only from the perspective of the presumed superiority of moral idea, but also, to a bigger extent, from the one of 'feeling of duty' (ut fra en følelse av "*pligt*") (Ibid). Judging by the latter definition, I argue that examining the heterotelic aspect of duty means to explore it against the background of consequentialist rather than deontological ethics since it is determined as a strive for avoiding unpleasant consequences (Ibid). On the other hand, Zapffe justifies this interpretation by referring to arguments of ethical gradualism as well as by elaborating a precise definition of autotelic validity of the duty itself (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, it leads to reviving the role of duty by combining definitions, which characterize some contradicting ethical paradigms.

²¹⁷ The first definition of social morality in *On the tragic* takes place as a footnote (Ibid: 53, Note 1). Zapffe argues that the word morality is used in the sense of "social morality" in contrast to juridically relevant conduct (Ibid). Furthermore, he points out that such an interpretation, which is widespread in both everyday language and ethical literature, raises some "unnecessary difficulties" (Ibid). All the questions become simpler when one goes through the following way of thinking: The concept of morality is used regardless of interest fronts' nature. In turn, social morality also entails the juridically relevant behavior. That is why one can make a distinction by using the expression 'juridical ethics' (Ibid). The parallels are drawn on the level of the variability of juridical directives and ethical norms, which change with time and place (Ibid: 55) by clarifying that the moral rules can be incorporated in the process of law giving (Ibid: 56). Later on in the monograph, Zapffe provides a more specific distinction between morality and law arguing that we have ethical justice and ethical injustice (Ibid: 77). However, this specification is a result of the way he examines the multi-frontal engagements rather than finding some reasons within the framework of morality by specifying why it is irreducible to the field of law.

Furthermore, investigating Zapffe's theory of so-called social morality raises the problem that we should either wrongly postulate the existence of a certain asocial morality (if the social morality is only one among many different types of morality, as he suggests), or if we accept it, we should ambiguously interpret (Ibid: 53, Note 1) juridical and ethical categories as ontologically interchangeable ones. I emphasize that we have more arguments in favor of immoral society rather than asocial morality, which would put in question the normative validity of morality as such since it presumes counting the interpersonal relationships as a necessary condition for discussing morality in general.

If we recognize a given type of consequentialist morality in Zapffe's sense, it would lead to misleadingly equating social and moral motivation as well as neglecting the premises and the impact of the egoistic and altruistic demands²¹⁸. Referring to Zapffe's definition of demand (Ibid: 52, Note 1), I argue that it is discussable whether we can determine the satisfaction of the egoistic need as a direct process (in so far as its object is the self himself/herself) in contrast to the altruistic one, as Zapffe suggests. Furthermore, from the fact that altruism is directed to the others, it does not follow that it has a secondary normative validity. Otherwise, the indifference would have had a higher value compared to altruism.

In turn, it would mean to deny the role of autotelic-metaphysical morality in Zapffe's sense by simplifying its role to the absolutization of the survival instinct. The other alternative is to investigate the genealogy of the norms and their practical application as determined within the framework of utilitarian ethics, which supports the questionable recognition of what Zapffe calls biological morality. Thus egoism and altruism would have been quantitatively defined depending on whether they affect one or many individuals, while the qualitative aspects of the definition would have been employed, as Zapffe suggests, in respect with the level of interference between so-called desire for happiness and desire for cooperation with others in society (Ibid: 242). In this context, it is important to emphasize that merely in a sympathetic environment in Zapffe's sense, the other can be described as a bearer of similar or different interests in a noncontradictory way.

Defining social morality in respect with juridical ethics²¹⁹, Zapffe assumes that discussing social morality is not necessarily relying on different argu-

²¹⁸ See also Schopenhauer 1965: 150-158.

²¹⁹ See Ibid: 242, Note 114.

ments (Ibid: 53, Note 1). Examining his theory, I point out that moral rules can be adopted while formulating juridical judgments, but from that, however, it does not follow that these rules can replace the judgments in question. Furthermore, from the fact that both moral and juridical rules benefit formulating social sanctions and social veto in Zapffe's sense, it does not follow that they affect the rehabilitation of the complex multifrontal engagements.

Zapffe outlines that metaphysical environment should be determined as strengthened by a sympathetic disposition²²⁰ (Ibid: 67), and as such, it should affect the humankind alone because the objective is no longer to get the gist of the world and life themselves, but to understand man's presence into the world. Regarding man's search for existential meaning, one should stress the idea of searching as such in order to compare and contrast its embodiments in the different fronts. Concerning morality, Zapffe defines this behavior as "valuable" (*vurderingsmæssig*) (Ibid: 69). The fight for finding a real metaphysical solution takes into account that the differences stem from the metaphysical morality, which depends on the way one should serve one's metaphysical interests (Ibid: 197).

²²⁰ According to Zapffe, sympathetic environment is closely tied with the metaphysical tragic since the indifferent environment gives more room to the chance, while within the sympathetic environment, tragic should be evoked by misunderstandings, mistakes and ignorance (Ibid: 365). He also argues that we should make a distinction between sympathy concerned with the interest of greatness and some other interests of the bearer (Ibid).

4. THE GENEALOGY OF EXISTENTIAL PESSIMISM

4.1. Experiencing Pain, or How ‘Painful’ Can Be Zapffe’s Pessimism?

Zapffe’s understanding of the internalization of pain²²¹ is regarded as based on the biological predispositions of the individual (Ibid: 89). Similarly, analyzing the principle of pleasure is done from the perspective of ‘stimulus-reaction’, i.e. from the one of ‘natural’ causality, which is defined as presumably overlapping with the logical causality. One of the main methodological concerns about this interpretation, however, derives from the simplification of the normative validity of experience. If we accept such an interpretation as a noncontradictory one, it would mean that tragic in Zapffe’s sense would be explored as driven by physical pain alone, which contradicts his own theory, namely, it would mean surplus pessimism to be reduced to what Zapffe calls deficient pessimism. While it was mainly the character, which was examined in respect with the essence of man’s fixation culture regarding some biological and cultural norms, the word personality was directed against the quantitative conditions, against the capacity as such (Ibid: 107).

In turn, the growing capacity of the individual affects the strive for developing more complex nets of fixations and surrogate objects due to the arising need of overcoming substantial deficiencies; a stage of development that makes pain and suffering irreducible to each other. As Zapffe outlines, suffering “widens” personality regardless of expansion’s usefulness (tjenlighet) (Ibid: 109).

A similar point is made by Schopenhauer who argues that the essence of existence is suffering, which is most apparent in the life of human beings due to their intel-

²²¹Zapffe argues that the issues of pain and suffering (spiritual suffering in particular) are examined in detail in chapter sixth in *On the tragic*. They are defined as a possible means of achieving high autotelic, social and moral, and metaphysical objectives (Ibid: 85).

lectual capacities (Schopenhauer 2004: 1-10). However, the latter is not a tool for relieving the suffering, but it rather makes it more apparent in human lives since human beings cannot overcome it. This understanding of the initial deficiency of humankind is comparable with Zapffe's ontological groundings of cosmic feeling of panic as well as with his analysis of the impotence of elaborating mechanisms of fixation. While Zapffe discerns between fate and destiny, Schopenhauer finds the reason of the ineradicable suffering in the blind will, which reveals the deficiency of existence as a result of the impossibility of will's fulfillment (Schopenhauer 2007).

According to Zapffe, (emotional) depression and (intellectual) pessimism brought by humankind's historical misery lose nevertheless their ground when evil reasons are defeated and disenchanting as a deficiency phenomenon or a wrong fixation (Zapffe 1941: 157). Zapffe argues that there is no principal obstacle to disregard Schopenhauer's, Hartmann's and Leopardi's theories²²² of evil as well as the remaining influence (de gjenværendes indvirkning) on the common well-being to be reduced to a minimum, albeit the practical difficulties look considerably bigger (Ibid). In turn, the metaphysical value pessimism, which deprives its bearer of all gifts of consolation, provides a maximum of experiential pressure and moral sensitivity at once (Ibid). In this context, Zapffe describes so-called human qualities (one expression, which is vaguely defined) as mainly referring to the autotelic-metaphysical surplus of consciousness (det autotelisk-metafysiske bevissthetsoverskudd) (Ibid), which is characterized with a powerful requirement for confirmation urged to expanding as well as with an interest contact, meaning and connection (Ibid). This consciousness represents the will to shape not only a house and a landscape, but the whole universe after human ideals, to radiate eternity and endlessness by love and spirit (Ibid).

²²² In *Studies in Pessimism*, Schopenhauer argued that one of the greatest absurdities regarding philosophical systems is that they declare evil "to be negative in its character" (Schopenhauer 2004: 1). However, it is positive because it makes "its own existence felt" (Ibid). Since Zapffe mentioned only the last name, he might have meant Schopenhauer's student Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) and his three stages of illusion (Zapffe 1941: 553), which ground the tragic. Referring to Freud, Hartmann advocated the theory of the necessary conflict between happiness and culture (Ibid). Regardless of the lack of a detailed examination, Hartmann is described as contributing to the "Renaissance" after the idealistic optimism concerning the "tragic dark time" ("tragiske mørketid") disappeared (Ibid). The last reference is to the Italian poet and philosopher Giacomo Leopardi and his theory of pleasure saying that everything is evil because the purpose of the universe is evil (Leopardi 2013).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that such an analysis stems from Zapffe's attempt to clarify the origin of the axiological conflicts embodied in the complex nature of pessimism. However, it does not mean that Schopenhauer's pessimism can be explored as deprived of normative validity, taking into account that Schopenhauer himself looks for finding normatively valid means for living with pessimism by cultivating sensitivity towards otherness.

On the other hand, as Zapffe points out, the axiological implications of pessimism do not exclude the role of so-called new, social orientations as well as the one of "technological triumphs" (Ibid). Otherwise, it would have meant to underrate one of Zapffe's main principles, namely, the mutual ontological dependence of the different interest fronts. In this context, I conclude that we cannot talk about casually simplified pessimism²²³, and then, about metaphysical one. It would lead to recognizing the latter as a connotation without denotation, namely, to justify metaphysical pessimism as independent of its factual premises, being determined as a form of 'unreal' pessimism, which satisfies autotelic needs in Zapffe's sense.

He argues that the clearer the interest is formulated, the better (more precisely) the environment is described (Ibid: 220). That is why what we can call a 'higher' type of pessimism²²⁴ is defined by Zapffe as a value pessimism, which is not based on the prevailing role of evil, but rather on the idea that good cannot be extended (Ibid: 411). For one to be a bearer of suffering of the highest order (lidelsesbaerer av høieste orden) means his/her heart to be full not only of hunger and frost, having holes in the tissue, but also of divine desperation, of choice's difficulty; thus one "gets" the issue, which he/she calls free will (Ibid: 239). Zapffe emphasizes that this is the only one door, which life allowed to stay open behind its prisoner in order he/she to keep the hope and the inspiration regarding the thought of liberation alive (Ibid). The only one thing, which life has given, as one feels it now, is will (being confident that life's drive is tied) (Ibid).

Regardless of the contradictions deriving from his definition of biological value, Zapffe's methodological contribution concerns the reconsideration of the universal pessimistic point of view as intrinsically connected with already examined idea of morality of world order. The latter embodies the principle that all the destinies of the interest bearers should have a meaning "both in the big and small things"

²²³ See Zapffe 1941: 220-221.

²²⁴ According to Zapffe, one can work with a scale, which has two poles, namely, the "factual" ("saklig") pole, on the right side, and the "neurotic" ("nevrotisk") pole, on the left side (Ibid: 220). Thus a given case of pessimism can be placed on the right or on the left side depending on the circumstances (Ibid).

(Ibid: 411). It presumes that we have already set up the demand for the moral world order (characterized by Zapffe as a matter of metaphysical justice). It is defined as a dispensable sign of what the culturally relevant view regarding whole-man (*hel-menneske*) is, as interpreted from a humanist perspective (Ibid).

There is a particular opinion that it is the metaphysical interest dominating the metaphysical front that makes the pessimistic views of life take place under the supposed cosmic conditions (Ibid: 220). On a micro methodological level, pessimism is characterized by Zapffe as provoked by the lacking belief in the opportunity of interest realization (Ibid: 410).

On a macro methodological level, the nature of Zapffe's surplus pessimism can be revealed by exploring it as intrinsically connected to the one of metaphysical morality²²⁵ in so far as they both have their origin in the autotelic-metaphysical front. The autotelic component of pessimism derives from one's conviction, which has a high positive value because, according to Zapffe, it justifies his/her higher intellectual honesty (wholeness)²²⁶. The concrete representations of the autotelic-metaphysical engagement can be seen in the internalized tension (due to the functioning of consciousness as self-consciousness) between real and desired in Zapffe's sense, which in turn is strengthened by the distinction between desirably real and necessarily fictive (*det ønskelig-reale og det nødvendig-fiktive*) (Ibid: 163)²²⁷. Such a complex understanding of the ontological tension is another proof in favor of the thesis that not only objective tragic, but also suffering as such are irreducible to the biologically verifiable pain, albeit the latter might be their necessary condition.

²²⁵ According to Zapffe, for the purposes of giving real help in life, the idea of the entity of metaphysical environment should be "supplied" with a *moral learning* (*morallære*), which connects the organic (*organisk*) with the experience picture, the desire picture, or the work picture (Ibid: 221). In turn, morality of experience picture provides a future metaphysical perspective, which neither would change the character of the picture itself nor would it bring some changes in the morality (Ibid: 222). By contrast, the work picture (with its flexibility) may provoke more varying diversity (*mere broget mangfoldighet*) of moral rules than the one displayed by religions (Ibid).

²²⁶ The word *redelighet* in Norwegian has two meanings ('honesty' and 'integrity'), which, can be used as ontologically interchangeable in Zapffe's theory of pessimism since the latter concerns the existential wholeness of the individual. One is recognized in the process of development of his/her intellectual capabilities that are inseparable from his/her emotions and feelings.

²²⁷ Such a distinction requires going beyond the genealogy of the principles of overcompensation. (Ibid: 207). Due to the desire picture (*ønskebilledet*), the metaphysical matter is "tightened in the contours" and reduced to a partly manageable task (Ibid).

4.1.1. The Role of Surplus and Deficient Pessimism

Adopting the distinction between factual and principal has some other implications such as defining objective and subjective tragic in Zapffe's sense. According to him, objective tragic is the one that can easily be determined as a destruction of the principal possibility for fight (Ibid: 336). It more apparently illustrates how autotelic and metaphysical interests are interconnected. Thus the impossibility of realizing the autotelic need of life's power and complexity, when the subject faces its embodied representations, is considered as an objective one in so far as it affects the understanding of the life mode as presumably non-achievable by the developing existential mode of the subject²²⁸. In turn, the autotelic deficiency regarding the process of self-realization provokes metaphysical insecurity, which is not a form of pure subjectivism. That is why man's veto breaking his/her trust in life down comes not from the subject, but from life itself displaying the impossibility the latter to be dialectically examined as a possibility for itself.

On a meta-methodological level, it is the issue of normative validity that can make us understand Zapffe's explanation of so-called tragic destiny of tree²²⁹, which misses both the opportunity to choose and the strive for perfection (*fuldkommenhetslængsel*) (Ibid: 337). The projections of tragic's

²²⁸ Zapffe argues that in the foreground, we have the 'personal' tragic, where the interest bearer is an individual. In this case, collective interest is experienced as a personally grounded one (Ibid: 341).

²²⁹ Zapffe discusses the case of the apple tree, which is examined regardless of man's understanding (Ibid: 336). He argues that from tree's point of view, there is nothing dissatisfying every single year it to get the same number of relevant big apples, with a periodical variation of what average is (Ibid: 336-337). Since the tree does not have the ability to choose and the strive for perfection (from the point of view of unrealized substrates and inherited tendencies of fixation), it is deprived (*avskaaert*) of the possibility to experience a tragic destiny (Ibid). Everything changes if the tree or the bunches of trees combine a value with the current growth and for that reason, it feels a stimulus or finds a reason to strive for, or recognizes it and is proud of it, when it (the tree) appears of itself (Ibid). According to Zapffe, the alarming point is first the situation, when the new value starts to compete with the continuity's consideration (Ibid). In the process of production of more and big enough apples, the tree sees the only one meaning of its existence. Zapffe emphasizes that with the new value, a new catastrophe and a new perspective take place (Ibid) quoting E. Berggrav that the tree becomes tragic when man projects on it his/her own need of confirmation, his/her urge for perfection, his/her strive for endlessness, his/her tendency for going beyond borders ("*grænseoverskridende tendens*") (Ibid). Such a need for affiliation is not triggered by the principle of ontological participation (i.e. by a physical analogy), but rather by providing a normative analogy, which is defined as justifying the metaphysical interests as such.

normative validity affect the opportunity to recognize and question the impossibility of realization not as a fact, but rather as a mode that in turn includes not only the awareness of unrealizable, but also the one of inaccomplishability of the possible fixations and surrogates.

In this context, Zapffe's distinction between 'deficient' and 'surplus' pessimism (en underskuddets og en overskuddets pessimisme) has to be clarified (Ibid: 221). The tension arises from the comparison of the normative validity of the 'fulfillability' of the tasks with the one of the impossibility because both of them are driven by autotelic needs of specifying what fulfillment is, whose confrontation is grounded in the differences regarding the ontological premises²³⁰. According to Zapffe, due to deficient pessimism, the bearer has lost hope and belief because he/she is not adequate (ikke strækker til): the task is both clear enough and its solution brings salvation, but he/she is unable to perform it (Ibid). In turn, due to surplus pessimism, the lack of confidence is a result of the understanding that none of the tasks one can engage with could give what one innermost strives for and cannot give up, albeit the tasks were solved to perfection (Ibid). It takes place against the background of the misunderstood distinction between objectively and normatively valid whose most puzzling aspect derives from the presumption that ontological validity is a necessary and sufficient condition for defining the normative one. It leads to evaluating Zapffe's pessimism on the principle A or not-A, where A is the category of hope²³¹.

Regarding surplus pessimism, the explicitly stated lack of both ontological and normative validity of the possibility (i.e. of the possibility in itself) does not stem from the sum of the different kinds of impossibility (such as the ones concerning the means). Furthermore, it is the understanding of the experiential incapability for itself that has a positively defined normative validity, albeit it is practically unrealizable as fulfilling given experience by adopting the corresponding means.

²³⁰ Extrapolating Zapffe's statement, I argue that the confrontation is a result of the clash of real and unreal autotelic interests.

²³¹ Zapffe discusses the role of factual and principal hope since the latter functions as a nonfactual hope grounding the 'surplus' pessimism (Ibid). He also examines the impact of hope in respect with the definition of tragic pointing out that in the tragic course, the destruction of hope's way is embodied (Ibid: 410). Thus the tragic finds its place on the way between hope and no hope since in the beginning of the tragic course, there should be also some hope available, which to be killed in the end (Ibid).

Going back to Zapffe's definition that deficiency pessimism takes place when the person has lost his/her hope and belief because he/she cannot extend them (Ibid), I argue that the ontological lack is considered as reducing the impossibility to a physical lack of possibilities rather than to a possibility for itself. On the other hand, it is the impossibility understood as a lack of potential on man's side who cannot reach the goal by adopting the means he/she has.

According to Zapffe, the 'more real' pessimism (Den "mere egte" pessimisme) should be considered as a function of animals' pure biological pessimism²³², when the conditions and chances are sufficiently plain (Ibid: 220). Zapffe refers to Schopenhauer's theory finding a proof of it in Kowalewski's monograph *Studies in Psychology of Pessimism*²³³ by arguing that Kowalewski "confirms" Schopenhauer's conception (Ibid, Note 1). However, another crucial issue arises again from Zapffe's simplification of the aims of Schopenhauer's pessimism reducing the latter to some basic biological representations, without taking into account some of Schopenhauer's works, which examine the interpersonal relationships. Otherwise, it would mean to talk about a specific type of pessimism, which can be compared with Zapffe's theory of deficient pessimism, but does not characterize Schopenhauer's one at all.

In turn, 'unreal' pessimism ("Uegte pessimism") (Ibid: 221) is defined as pessimism, which is a matter of building a desire picture, i.e. a result of world's underestimation, which has a 'neurotic' origin (Ibid). According to Zapffe, the pessimist "takes revenge on life" (Ibid) because something has gone wrong with him/her in one or another partial front (Ibid).

However, it is problematic to claim that the desire picture in Zapffe's sense is based on underestimating the world rather than on the lack of providing a relevant evaluation due to the incapability of approaching the world in its transperspectivity. Furthermore, the underestimation is a projection of neuroticism, but it does not concern the gist of the unreal pessimism as such. Otherwise, pessimism would have been just another name of neuroticism.

²³² However, even if we adopt Zapffe's own arguments regarding animals' biological pessimism as a form of simple pessimism, it raises the following question. How can we discern pessimism from the purely physical states of animals' immediate suffering?

²³³ Arnold Christian Felix Kowalewski (1973-1945) was a professor in philosophy in Königsberg. Except his monograph *Studies in Psychology of Pessimism (Studien zur Psychologie des Pessimismus)* (1904), he has published several works on Kant's and Schopenhauer's philosophical theories.

On the other hand, the important role of all values, which are not understood as strictly ethical ones, is determined by Zapffe in a contradictory way. One of the first concerns arises from the affirmation of life achieved in contrast to its partial embodiments. Value of life becomes understandable as placed in the metaphysical front, which does not exclude the biological, social, autotelic interests and their interaction due to the fact that the metaphysical front may entail not only autotelic, but also different types of heterotelic needs.

III.1. *HERE I STAND*. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMIZING DEEP ECOLOGY. INTRODUCTION TO ECOSOPHY T

1.1. An Overview of the Topic

In 1972 Arne Næss participated in a conference in Bucharest, which was devoted to the problems of the future development of the third world countries (Third World Future Research Conference). At the conference, he discussed the role of ethics reconsidering the common attitudes towards nature in respect with the principles of bioegalitarianism. Next year Næss published an article in the journal *Inquiry* called *The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement* in which he introduced the term ‘deep ecology movement’.

In turn, conceptualizing deep ecology was driven by the impossibility to solve ecological problems by adopting ecological ‘means’ alone. The latter is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fulfilling the requirements of meta-ecology since it is irreducible to ecology being one of the many natural sciences available. In this context, I argue that deep ecology is focused on revealing the philosophical gist of ecology understood as a ‘science of home’, as a way man to find his/her ‘natural’ place in the biosphere and thus to avoid facing the problems of ecocrisis.

According to Næss, we should provide a distinction between the deep ecology movement searching for solutions in a long-term perspective and so-called shallow ecology one, which is focused on solving problems in short terms. Referring to his explanation, I claim that the differences between both movements derive from two different modes of thinking, namely, from the problem-solving mode and the one of decision-making thinking. While shallow ecology movement aims at restricting the overexposed anthropocentrism in general, since it questions the balance between man and bio-

sphere, the deep ecology movement strives for preventing further problems by rethinking the normative validity of the whole frame. In other words, if shallow ecology movement relies on an inductive way of restricting the side effects of anthropocentric paradigm to both nature and society, the deep one functions the other way around, i.e. as deductively justifying bioegalitarianism for the purposes of avoiding the possible ecological concerns as side effects of humankind's development. The philosophical implications concern not only the ontological prerequisites, but also the ethical premises of environmental problematizing because Næss outlines that deep ecology movement aims not only at achieving planet's good in the name of man, but also in the name of nature itself (Næss 1973: 95-100).

On a macro methodological level, Næss's deep ecology is grounded in two main principles: in the interrelatedness of all ecosystems presuming the reconsideration of the anthropocentric perspective as one of the many possible perspectives as well as in the requirement the process of self-realization to be examined as an act of identifying with different living forms, which to lead to the identification with the whole ecosphere²³⁴. Since the living organisms are recognized as 'knots in the biospherical net' (Ibid), Næss offers a system of eight principles whose incorporation into a platform illustrates different levels of a genealogical analysis. The principles grounding so-called deep ecology platform are the following:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realizations of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital human needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is widely worsening.

²³⁴ According to Næss, we should learn not to corrupt our planet as we have learnt not to cut our fingers (Næss 1973: 95-100).

6. Politics must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher status of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation to directly or indirectly try to implement the necessary changes²³⁵ (Næss 1989: 29).

As one of the first implications of the aforementioned platform, I outline the problematization of anthropocentrism, which is built on implicit utilitarian ethics. Furthermore, I argue that a significant proof of the need of reconsidering the platform in question within the framework of ontological ethics is the way the idea of intrinsic value is introduced. It is the latter that contributes the internal relationships between human and nonhuman world to be justified outside of the paradigm of moral objectivism. In this context, I draw the conclusion that if we keep recognizing this interrelatedness as a form of moral objectivism, it would mean either to keep supporting anthropocentrism, or to fall into the trap of radical bioegalitarianism, which in turn would become an obstacle for adopting the methodological benefits of ethical gradualism. The need of implying the latter is formulated in point three of the deep ecology platform²³⁶, albeit it still requires further clarification what ‘vital human need’ is as well as how it can be applied to the other species.

²³⁵ The platform is represented in its later version composed after the discussions and the exchange of papers between Stan Rowe and Næss were accomplished. For the first publication of the platform in *Trumpeter* (1996), Nr. 13 (1) and the way it was contextualized in the work of B. Devall and G. Sessions, see Drengson’s article *Ecophilosophy, Ecosophy and the Deep Ecology Movement: An Overview* (1999) (See also Drengson and Inoue 1995: 5). In turn, A. Drengson and Y. Inoue proposed a deliberately simplified version of Næss’s platform due to which to clarify the methodological need of introducing a personal ecophilosophy, namely, so-called by Næss Ecosophy T (Næss 1995: 10-12). The platform is also illuminative for how, through adopting a genealogical analysis, the universal values are introduced as well as how they contribute to legitimizing given practices.

²³⁶ All the points will be examined in detail in the chapter on deep ecology platform.

Another reason for examining why introducing ethical gradualism is important for rethinking not only the role of ethical anthropocentrism, but also the one of radical biocentrism, is the one that the intrinsic value of nature²³⁷ derives from the diversity of life as such, i.e. from the uncountable living forms that cannot exist in themselves if they are not related to each other. Adopting ethical gradualism can reveal how the idea of a high status is replaced with the one of normative validity, which explains why 'big' is not interchangeable with 'great'.²³⁸ In turn, within deep ecology, the role of ecopolitics determined as a process of a 'positive' interference with nature that should inflict change, is declared as having an obligation. It explains why the ideology regarding the appreciation of human life has to be defined as a positive change of both thinking and acting perspectives.

On the other hand, Næss's deep ecology platform can be characterized as providing a view on meta-ecology (requiring also an ecosophy to be adopted)²³⁹ by which justifying the long-term perspective as an aim is based on implementing environmental philosophy, which provides a specific type of ontological ethics. The latter can be legitimized by adopting an ontological analysis oriented towards clarifying the values (and moral motivation respectively) while solving given ecological conflicts. In this context, I argue

²³⁷ In the current research, I will try to prove that one of the main difficulties in defining the role of intrinsic value of nature against the background of the non-contradictory justification of vital needs and vital interests is Næss's problems in avoiding the pitfalls of radical biocentrism by narrowing the role of morality.

²³⁸ On the other hand, all attempts to conceptualize and reduce the side effects of technocratization imposed by the development of culture through a possible decrease of population, as Næss suggests, are a discard in a direction to moral objectivism, which provides simplified solutions to long-lasting problems. Analyzing Næss's theory, I claim that reducing the number of people would not affect the restricted use of natural sources by default since the growing consumption is provoked not only by the growing population, but also by the increasing consumption of insufficient goods. The problem of population reduction will be examined in the chapter on Næss's environmental politics.

²³⁹ In the current research, special attention will be paid to Næss's arguments why narrowing morality to moralization at the expense of gestalt ontology requires adopting ontological ethics indeed. In turn, due to Næss's theory, Ecosophy T does not have to be equated with deep ecology platform since it is placed on the level one of so-called by him Apron diagram, while the deep ecology platform is defined on level two of the diagram in question. The Apron diagram itself consists of four levels: the one of fundamental premises including Christianity, Taoism, Ecosophy T, level two, which is the level of agreement entailing deep ecology platform, level three regarding policy strategies and level four concerning the decision making process.

that it is the genealogical analysis that contributes Næss's ecosophy to be recognized as having strong prognostic functions in the sense of predicting what changes should be prescribed, i.e. not only to reveal the reasons of choosing one value over another concerned with the decision-making process in the scope of ecology, but also to 'foresee' how the negative consequences in ecopolitics regarding both vital needs and vital interests to be avoided in a long-term perspective. Such a prognostic function, which is axiologically-loaded, should be defined as an ethical task reflecting upon the cultivation of positive rational attitudes without negating the normative validity of feelings.

In turn, so-called shallow ecology movement is characterized by Næss as proposing solutions on the level of ecology. He argues that sometime the solutions promote "technological fixes" (Drengson and Inoue 1995: 1) alone, which are based on the same consumption-oriented values and methods of industrial economy that bring them to light (Ibid). Thus the practical tasks concerned with the fight against pollution and exemption of natural sources mainly aim at improving health and well-being of people in the third world countries.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that while so-called shallow ecology movement is oriented towards looking for solutions in the field of ecology, examining the ecological concerns as belonging to the scope of natural sciences, the deep ecology movement gives the opportunity of recognizing different ecosophies as equally fundamental ones, in the normative sense of the word. Adopting such philosophies means to cultivate man's sensitivity towards his/her own initial relatedness with nature through a genealogical analysis of what intrinsic value is and how it should function respectively. It is also important to clarify that reconsidering the category of value, which refers not only to the productive activity of man, but also to the creative functions of nature, affects the realization of Næss's ecosophy. Such an understanding of value implicitly encourages a form of ontological ethics to be adopted, albeit Næss himself prefers to define it as a given type of gestalt ontology.

The Norwegian philosopher claims that the preservation and the development of the ecosystems is a value in itself. That theory reveals why the principle of holism turns into a guiding one regarding gestalt ontology. In this context, I argue that the hypothesis that reconsidering the role of intrinsic value corresponds to the tasks of gestalt ontology inflicts the need of recognizing the status of Ecosophy T.

1.2. Ecosophy's Wisdom to Feel at Home in the Biosphere

1.2.1. Ecosophy T as a Mountain Ecosophy

Næss's Ecosophy T, named after his cabin Tvergastein, which is determined as one of the many individual ecosophies, can be described, among its many other functions, as a certain type of mountain ecosophy. It is a life philosophy in which the gestalt of the mountain becomes a significant premise for understanding wisdom needed for reviving the normative validity of the harmony between man and nature. Thus we can rehabilitate the normative validity of the bioequilibrium recognized as a main goal of this life's philosophy. An important feature of the latter is the reconsideration of the role of identification as something more than a strive for finding direct (physical) correspondences. It provokes a given type of imagination, which in turn determines man's self-realization as intrinsically concerned with nature's one.

Næss talks about Tvergastein's metaphysics, which concerns the feeling of being locked up and lost as a vital one (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 73). The metaphysics in question contributes to seeing the mountain as a shelter, as a home, as a symbol (as a personified mountain), as well as a concrete physical phenomenon (Ibid: 75). In this context, I argue that the feeling of being integrated is inseparable from the one of being lost because both of them benefit internalizing the implications of the macro cosmos as inseparable from the ones of the micro cosmos. This relation is not analogous to the ones between a big elephant and a small mouse, as Næss points out (Ibid: 177), since the micro cosmos is essential for the realization of the macro cosmos and vice versa. It is due to the fact that the realization should be understood as gained in a qualitatively different sense, namely, in connection with the catalogization of the other, qualitatively different living beings (Ibid). That is why the human role is defined by Næss as grounded in the aforementioned metaphysics, illustrating how perfecting the cosmic role we have (Ibid: 311) can help us to fulfill the ideal of ecological sustainability in time if it is 'decoded' in the right way.

What are the practical implications of Ecosophy T as a mountain philosophy? I argue that one of its prototype characteristics concerns 'thinking like a mountain' mode in Næss's sense. The imaginary identification presumes something more than simply relying on the methods of animism. If the mode 'to think like a mountain' is interpreted as Watson does, namely, as merely driven by the fact that people imagine mountains as thinking entities (Watson 1999: 117), it would mean

to underrate the ontological potential of the mode itself. Næss defines the mountain as full of life and friendly atmosphere in so far as it is a place of rebirth (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 203). Furthermore, the mountain Tseringma is described as a holly mountain, which is a “combination” of awe and identification (Ibid) giving us the opportunity to “sense what something is” by stimulating our imagination (Næss 1995: 72, 73). The latter statement elucidates one more important issue: how can the mode of thinking like a mountain have an unquestionable normative validity within the field of epistemology? In other words, how can the intuition for the sacred be referred to a given type of knowledge as well as to what extent can feelings and emotions be recognized as having normative validity similar to the one of pure cognitive knowledge?

Næss also argues that we should examine the mountain as a symbol in so far as such an examination can help us to reveal the meaning of life by clarifying the one of our interconnectedness with nature. According to him, all things with forms have a symbolic function and the “non-forms” are often human ones (Ibid: 78). How can we interpret the mountain symbol and the one of the ocean then? Næss claims that regardless of having something in common, they are not the same. The commonly shared characteristics are majesty, timeless, self-reliance (i-seg-selv-nok-het)²⁴⁰ (Ibid: 81). Næss deliberately denies presenting a theoretical vision (Ibid), which is in tune with his understanding that knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding. The common origin concerns this ineradicable sense of belonging to the world of nature, which has a value in itself. In other words, one can succeed in mastering mountain and/or ocean, without fully conquering them, albeit one equally belongs to both of them, namely, one is equally connected to nature, regardless of the different embodiments of these connections. Thus man can be better in climbing than in sailing, but he/she belongs in a similar manner to both mountain and ocean due to the fact that both of them are parts of nature.

²⁴⁰ Despite the fact that technology has reduced, again to a certain extent, the roles of the mountain and ocean, the strong need of them has partly the same origin in our materially rich society. However, in contrast to the lack of control over the ocean, one partly can “master the mountain” (mestre fjellet) (Ibid).

1.2.1.1. Mountain as a Home Gestalt

Ecosophy T (as a philosophy of life) can be explored as embodying the idea of homeness's gestalt, whose prototype characteristic is the wisdom about the oikos, i.e. wisdom, which is irreducible to the contemporary scientification of the idea of logos. It can be described as experiential wisdom, which is achievable by adopting imaginative rationality that helps to understand life's philosophy in Næss's sense²⁴¹.

On a macro methodological level, Ecosophy T as a mountain ecosophy can be described as requiring the cultivation of sensitivity to the state 'to feel like at home' in the biosphere in a non-anthropocentric way; or as Næss himself outlines, to learn how to feel at home in life because the landscape of opportunities is endless, taking into account that everything can happen during the way (Næss 2008b: 103). Cultivating such a sensitivity contributes to avoiding Fromm's dilemma 'to be or to have' guaranteeing that the feeling would be evaluated from the perspective of 'to be' rather than from the one of 'to have'. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that 'to feel like at home' in the mountain and nature in general means to live in an ecologically responsible way.

Næss defines the sense of situatedness as a matter of developing sensitivity towards a given place as a home against the background of the corrosive processes in the global space. On the other hand, the sense of situatedness in the contemporary society can be described as deteriorating in so far as it is reduced to the multiplication of places none of which can be called home. It is not the case that there are no places to live in, but rather that it is more and more difficult to develop a sense of belonging to a given place due to replacing the idea of mapping with the one of a new topography, which is introduced with the idea of sustainable development. The growing mobility, which is accompanied with both rapid urbanization and centralization as well as with an increasing dependence on goods and technologies, affected the declining structural complexity and the destruction of the sense of belonging, as Næss alarmed (Ibid). The sad conclusion is that there is no longer a place where one to belong (Ibid) since the sense of belonging has no longer a value as such. That is why I draw the conclusion that one could come back, but he/she she could not 'visit home' again because home is not

²⁴¹ Drenegson and Inoue characterize Næss's interest in the pursuit of wisdom and wondering as a significant part of his Pyrrhonist attitudes (Drenegson and Inoue 1995: 19).

a place to visit but rather an anchor in life, which makes staying with an open face to the world possible.

Home is recognized due to the fact that there is a distinction between ‘to be at place’ and ‘to have a place’, which is erased in the technocratic societies whose main aim is to make each and every to feel at home wherever he/she is. In turn, the place itself is determined depending on whether the self will stay longer or shorter before going somewhere else. Næss himself provides the relevant argument that situatedness in question should not be interpreted as a matter of finding a location, but rather of developing an orientation (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 262). Otherwise, the dimension of elaborating ‘my space’ would lose its symbolic capital of attaching and thus will lose what Næss calls mythogenic mountain.

The methodological connection with the changed paradigm of knowledge can be also traced on the level of how to find new gestalt ontology in Næss’s sense. Furthermore, it raises the question how can we interpret Næss’s own statement that ecosophy requires the word magic to be adopted (Næss 2008d: 172), namely, whether his appeal for learning both science and magic does not lead to establishing a certain type of mysticism? Næss claims that understanding is a three-stage process, which includes the role of imagination, building positive feelings and learning (Ibid: 72)²⁴², or so-called induction (Ibid: 139) in so far as we not only learn, but also unlearn²⁴³ (Ibid: 145). Thus so-called amateur research becomes a pillar of the ecophilosophical education (Næss 2008: 62), consisting mainly in developing the taste and the appreciation of “what is this there, which is enough of” (Ibid).

The next question, which arises is, how do we have to reconsider the role of what is enough indeed? Regarding the development of Næss’s Ecosophy T, I argue that it elucidates what it means to feel at home in life. In turn, life is

²⁴² A ‘negative’ version of imaginative rationality can be found in Hjalmar Hegge’s reference to Marcuse’s definition of “irrational rationality”, which, however, is specified in respect with industrial society. In this context, rationality is coined as a mixture of technological rationality and irrational consequences (Hegge 1974a: 79).

²⁴³ Næss argues in favor of the “un-learning of mythopoetical pictures” saying that environment where people grow up does not promote self-confidence when the fantasy is available (Ibid: 146), i.e. he remains aware of the process of constructing images as a process irreducible to pure irrationality. “In Tvergastein, when I saw the microscopic beings in one drop, I did not like that the drop dried up” (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 61).

recognized by Næss as an open landscape (Næss 2008d: 1) because it is a traveling through a landscape with both easy and broken terrains, as well as light and dark places for the sake of experiencing big and small encounters (Ibid). Therefore, to feel at home in life requires both moving towards a goal and simply being. Life itself can be achieved by going through what Næss calls a “critical choice of path”, a vital challenge in listening to reasons and emotions. In this context, I reach the conclusion that it is a part of Self’s (with a capital S) responsibility to justify the sense of home as a feeling showing what the difference between activity and activeness is. On a practical level, the task is how to turn the negative feelings into a positive direction.

Epistemologically speaking, the answer should be sought in how to listen to both reason and emotions at once, while, from a pedagogical point of view, it raises the concern about how to cultivate the aforementioned transformation in order to enhance the quality of life for all beings and yield genuine happiness (Ibid: XIX). I argue that referring to ontological ethics, we may provide a relevant answer to Næss’s interpretation of the question *How do you feel yourself in the world?* (Ibid: 20).

On the level of ethics, it would mean that what Næss calls goal-oriented and sensible choice is based on a choice of values, which is always grounded in the positive feelings, as Næss claims (Ibid: 7). On a macro methodological level, what he defines as a prevailing emotional tone has a value in itself, based on the need of building a more complex vision of comprehending due to which wisdom to be determined as a result of understanding that provides respect, love and care. That is why what I defined as a moral experiential gestalt can be referred to what Næss coins as a life-compass, namely, as a ‘compass’ that helps us on the way to greater freedom, by pointing the path along which we to continue (Ibid: 86).

1.2.2. The Sense of Belonging. How Can We Feel at Home in Life?

Regarding the understanding of Ecosophy T as a mountain ecosophy, I argue that it is not just the importance of places themselves, as Drengson claim (Drengson and Inoue 1995: VIII), but rather the one of situatedness and its normative validity, namely, it is not ‘this’ or ‘that’ mountain, but rather the mountain as a landscape. In this context, I claim that it is the ontological dependence of man’s self-realization on mountain’s/nature’s realization and vice versa that makes evaluating life’s philosophy through gestalt thinking in Næss’s sense possible.

Gratefulness to life is what makes people feel at home in life in so far as it contributes to triggering the reduction of living standard if necessary to the quality of life due to which the way of living is defined as an environmentally friendly one shared with the other living beings. According to Næss, to feel at home in nature means that I am something, which is not isolated, but achieved through the constant interaction of environment and organism (Næss 2008b: 140). Invading mountains as such is characterized as a process of taming the wild, which makes not only ‘great’ to be reduced to ‘big’, but also wild to become a subject to unlimited cultivation, i.e. wild to lose its intrinsic value in time. All these investigations concern the understanding of the idea of habitat. Referring to Reed and Rothenberg’s statement saying that we do not choose our habitat (Reed and Rothenberg 1993), I argue that the latter benefits developing a particular sense of belonging since its naturalness gives us the opportunity to internalize it as a feeling at home.

Furthermore, the aforementioned sense of feeling at home is closely tied with the being of the mountain in so far as the latter is not a *topos* but an arena of becoming for the self. In other words, if the place itself can be justified as a place of being, the home functions as a *topos* of becoming, where the individual turns into a person by cultivating his/her sensitivity towards the holistic character of nature. Næss emphasizes that one can feel at home at a given place, but from that it does not follow, as I argued above that every single place, where he/she lives in is his/her home place. Thus expressions such as man “was” at home, he/she “left” home (reiste hjemmefra), he/she “came” home (Næss 1995: 102) illustrate that home is not the building itself (Ibid) but it is rather the place where one belonged to (hørte til) (Ibid).

What are the concrete projections of this sense of belonging? Næss claims that it is “a part of the self” constituting an ecological entity with a rich in-

ternal character, or even better, relations to what today is called environment (Ibid). As he argues, it is of crucial importance to understand what it means to 'feel at home' against the background of the statement *Here I stand* (Diehm 2004: 6). It is the latter statement that benefits recognizing the sense of belonging as intrinsically connected with the need of countering the uncontrollably growing mobility by choosing a given place as a home. It reveals how one *chooses* to determine life's possibilities as a mode of becoming due to which to cultivate one's unique sense of belonging that can always be commonly shared. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the statement *Here I stand* implies the one of *Here is my home* in so far as the others have the same right to have a home, and to insist on the recognition of this right as a vital one respectively.

Within the framework of the classical theory of understanding, as Næss himself claims, home is determined in a geographical sense, as a birth place, and only later it becomes a Place with a capital letter (Ibid). It is the external exemplification of the internalized sense of belonging that has the geographical place merely as a necessary condition. On a macro methodological level, it is the Place that makes Næss's statement *Here I stand!* recognizable as *Here I feel at home!*

Some arguments in favor of the latter conclusion can be found in Næss's saying that it is important those, who have experienced and preserved the process of belonging to tell us how it is possible because thus they can help others to strengthen their own motivation (Næss 1995: 103). Regarding the better motivation, he claims that most of the supporters of the deep ecology movement are people who feel the urbanization impact with their bodies, "something, which in fact furthers this issue to be examined on a global level" (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned arguments, I draw the conclusion that cultivating the need of choosing a home for the sake of developing a sense of belonging not only to the place in particular, but also to nature as a home for all beings, presumes eco-logy to be interpreted as an understanding of what our home in nature is due to adopting moral imagination. The latter is a necessary condition because this act of choosing is always an axiologically determined one. It concerns the worldview stance by which one achieves an optimal openness of oneself to the world one lives in.

On a macro methodological level, the cultivation of the sense in question is defined as a necessary condition for building profound eco-consciousness in so far as choosing a given place as a home in nature, the individual presumably chooses to recognize nature as everybody's home, and thus to rees-

establish the role of ecosophy as giving not only knowledge, but also an emotional affiliation and evaluation, which have an existential value. Such an affiliation is implicitly embodied in the justification of the normative validity of the body language, as Næss suggests, due to which the language is extended to the understanding of the body speaking with all its covering (Ibid: 109). In turn, knowledge is defined as an absorbing one because it initiates revealing a new type of process knowledge, which is irreducible to cognitive algorithms. According to Næss, with the body language, we can lead the others in a direction, so that they to experience the same thing as we do (Ibid).

However, Næss's conception of the role of language requires further elaborations. If we presume that the language follows already structured gestalts making them understandable, as Næss outlines, it would mean to restrict the creative functions of this language as well as to narrow the idea of communication itself. That is why I argue that the language, as a part of a given culture, benefits both having culturally common gestalts and their internalization in the social life.

Strengthening the process of communication contributes to supplying the criterion of what home is with strong axiological connotations. Næss's question *What* can we learn from each other? (Ibid: 107) can be transformed into the one *How* can we learn from each other due to sharing one and the same idea of home?

1.2.2.1. T Like Tvergastein. Why Does Gestalt Ontology Have a Future as Ontological Ethics?

What is gestalt ontology about and why is it so important for reconsidering the role of ecosophy as based on a specific type of ontological ethics? Næss emphasizes that it is not merely a matter of rehabilitating our “spontaneous” gestalt experience²⁴⁴, but also of clarifying its unquestionable axiological validity. This statement is stressed more than once by Næss, which gives me grounds to examine his theory of gestalt ontology as comparable with a form of ontological ethics, albeit he explicitly neglects the role of ecological ethics at the expense of gestalt ontology (Næss 1989: 235-236).

The prerequisites of developing such a hypothesis can be found in some key statements made by Næss. When he talks about the methodological importance of gestalt ontology, Næss argues that values are a crucial part of reality, which we experience, i.e. they determine ‘the profile’ of a given gestalt. In turn, ontology initiates solving ecological conflicts so that the intrinsic value of nature to be reconsidered through so-called gestalt shifts. The latter make possible the coherence of man’s experience be achieved by rethinking the value of nature in its diversity. In other words, values are recognized as a part of reality in a sense that does not provide an interpretation within the framework of moral objectivism.

According to Næss, our whole experience is a result of perceptions. That is why its value is inherent to the one of reality itself, which contributes to achieving the coherence of man’s experience by the act of perception (Ibid: 25). In turn, this conception questions so-called Galilean ontology based on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities²⁴⁵. By contrast to Galilean ontology, Næss presumes that the secondary qualities are also part of reality. It is important to emphasize that the thesis of the Norwegian philosopher does not lead to ontological relativism since the secondary quali-

²⁴⁴ See Diehm 2006: 23.

²⁴⁵ Diehm argues that Næss’s ontology is “most easily understood” as a response to the theories that provide a distinction between reality determined as independent of our experience and reality recognized as inseparable from our anticipations respectively (Diehm 2006: 23). This fundamental distinction, which relies on two different thinking modes, represents two different modes of being, namely, the things “for us” and the things “in themselves”. It becomes a prototype characteristic of a broad range of theories described by Næss as “Galilean” ones (Ibid).

ties are not determined as coming from the subject alone, but rather as deriving from the normative validity of the act of perception.

On a macro methodological level, justifying ontological ethics as preceded by a 'new ontology' putting both the ethics in question and the practical activities of man "at place", as Næss suggests (Ibid: 2), would negatively affect so-called by him ecosophic ontology whose main principle is to encourage an individual ecological Self.

Some implicit reasons of recognizing gestalt ontology as a specific type of ontological ethics can also be found in the process of cultivating ecological consciousness as an important condition for justifying bioegalitarianism. Only by introducing such a presumption, regarding the environmental protection, a given type of non-egoistic motivation in Næss's sense can be justified. Thus Erik Katz's criticism that Næss's gestalt ontology is still dominated by anthropocentric values can be overcome²⁴⁶.

²⁴⁶ See also Katz's interpretation of Næss's conception of the secondary and tertiary qualities, which are understood as real in the relational field (Katz 2000: 30).

1.2.2. 1.1. *The Sense of Belonging to a Home Gestalt*

Næss argues that when a child grows up, the dominating home gestalts seriously change, albeit they remain the same in their essence (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 145). It is this essence that contributes to constructing the sense of home belonging as an inter-woven, diverse gestalt, with the outermost, strong symbolic value (Ibid). In this context, one of the main questions, which arises is *Shall we move, or shall we stay where we feel at home?* According to Næss, leaving the landslide area (rasområdet) would mean one to lose an essential part of oneself, namely, of the gestalts, which include one's own entity (ens eget), "my/our environment" because it is impossible to form the most fundamental gestalts and symbols again (Ibid).

Regarding the relevance of gestalt thinking to the conceptualization of the sense of belonging, Næss examines also the status of the one who feels at home in the forest, which is not only a calm environment, but also a "hard world of snow, dangerous abysses, meaningless mountain's widths" (Ibid: 151). Over the trees' border, it is cold and inhospitable, while below it, it is warm and friendly (Ibid). In turn, this statement shows how the contrast has some apparent metaphysical dimensions²⁴⁷ (Ibid). Judging by these investigations, Næss makes the questionable statement that by not feeling at home at a given place, we are biologically inclined to feel at home everywhere (by everybody), having an understanding for all, more specialized living forms (Ibid: 155). However, I point out that there is no obligatory normative connection between the two parts of Næss's statement. An illuminative example in this respect is the industrial type of man who may not recognize a given place as a home, but at the same time, he/she does not feel empathy with other beings.

On a gestalt level, I argue that the sense of belonging becomes understandable by changing the subordinate gestalts in Næss's sense²⁴⁸, but not the main ones. He also claims that this sense has a value in itself because it is grounded in the culturally shaped gestalt way of thinking. On the other hand, the process of shaping does not necessarily coincide with what Næss determines as an essential part of everybody in so far as within the aforementioned way of thinking, it is difficult to discern what a matter of specifically cultural way of behaving is, as well as how far the individual characteristics in the process of embodiment go.

²⁴⁷ However, it remains problematic to keep talking about positive and negative gestalts, as Næss does. We may rather argue in favor of "positive" and "negative" contents or representations of the gestalts in question because the connotations derive from the process of internalization on side of the individual and his/her specificities.

²⁴⁸ See Næss 2005ii: 119-121.

2. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS IN NÆSS'S WRITINGS

Examining Næss's theories of deep ecology and ecosophy, I argue that the main problem in Næss's writings concerns the way he underrates the role of ethics, which is simplified to a certain kind of moralization. Næss also discusses the role of genuine ethics of conservation, which, in my point of view meets the requirements of ontological ethics since the requirements in question can benefit understanding how living beings are examined as genuine fellows. In turn, distinguishing between ethical relativism and ethical relationalism, as Næss suggests (Næss 2008: 137), would not necessarily help us in clarifying the issue either (Ibid: 100). On a macro methodological level, the aforementioned difficulty is also driven by the ambiguous definition of so-called moral intuition²⁴⁹. As one of the main methodological concerns in this context, I point out Næss's statement that confronting intuitions is a part of the process of development itself because it is not always the case when we talk about contradicting moral intuitions. The origin of this problem can be traced to the fact that in Næss's system, moral intuition is something more than having a value, it somehow precedes the latter, both ontologically and ethically, in a way that is not clearly specified by Næss himself.

²⁴⁹ The methodological connection between knowledge and intuition, which is crucial for understanding the implications of the environmental crisis in Næss's sense, is also emphasized by another prominent Norwegian philosopher Knut Tranøy. According to him, the difficulties derive from the moral and philosophical reactions to the paradox of our time, namely that "environmental crisis" threat is against one livable and sustainable world being an unintentional "side effect" ("bivirkning") of an energetic striving for creating better living circumstances" (Tranøy 1991: 47). On a macro methodological level, it means that adopting theory in order to improve practice, we should adopt the principles of "our time's normative ethics" (Ibid: 46) for the sake of overcoming environmental crisis. However, Tranøy's criticism to Næss's conception of ethics concerns what Tranøy calls "Norwegian specialty to prolong the strong and clear standpoints" (Ibid), namely, to overrate the epistemological verification at the expense of the validity of norms.

According to him, the idea that all living beings have the right to live derives from an intuition (Næss 2005g: 67). However, there are at least two main concerns stemming from his thesis. First, there is no necessary and sufficient condition intuitions to contradict morals by default (Næss 2008: 93), as Næss suggests, since they function either as moral intuitions in practice, or as a certain kind of epistemological ones, which brings us back to the question whether we should give priority to the criterion of verification (and somehow to refer those intuitions to it) over the one of normative validity. Second, arguing that some other intuitions, with unclear normative validity, can change a norm (Ibid: 109), is also a highly questionable statement. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that the problems derive from Næss's willingness to justify that the 'I feel' mode has a normative validity by default. Furthermore, the paradox comes from the fact that on a macro methodological level, he unilaterally equates morality with moralization, while on a micro one, the intuition should work both as a moral intuition and something "initially higher" (according to his own words) than the intuition in question²⁵⁰.

Referring to such a vague intuitionism does not contribute to overcoming the critics posed on side of some social ecologists²⁵¹ saying that Næss pays more attention to non-human beings than to human ones. That is why I argue that denying the role of ethics Næss does not succeed in providing relevant grounds of ethical gradualism. According to him, a tiger should be killed when a hungry child should be nurtured, so that in some confronting situations, "humans might yield" (French 1999: 129-130), albeit people do not have the right to reduce richness of life (Ibid). On the other hand, narrowing morality to moralization raises the problematic issue, which is neglected by Næss while commenting on Zapffe's theory of the role of justice, namely, how does Næss's own lower sensitivity to injustice make him unresponsive to the intrinsic value of nature (Næss 2008d: 164)²⁵²? The concrete consequences of narrowing morality to moralization also affect the understanding of duty in so far as Næss considers it as an important issue moving

²⁵⁰ Another methodological difficulty stems from Næss's attempts to verbalize intuition. He makes the relevant stance that we cannot talk about degrees of intuition or inherent values, but from that it does not follow that we can cultivate our environmental responsibility.

²⁵¹ See the critical comments made by M. Bookchin.

²⁵² This is another proof in favor of questioning the internal connection between deep ecology movement and the justice one.

from “ethics to ontology and back” (Næss 2008: 77). He points out that clarifying the differences in ontology may contribute to revealing the function of different policies and their ethical basis²⁵³. One of the first problems, which arises is that so-called by him ontology of the contents is not a sufficient argument in denying the relativism of sensualism since the way of feeling is also axiologically determined. Another questionable issue is Næss’s difficulties in explaining how spontaneous experience is irreducible to a form of sense experience (Ibid: 201). That is why I argue that in his attempts to identify the world with a set of contents (not with structures), which to be conceived as contents of *gestalts*, Næss underrates the transition from ontology to ethics and the other way around remaining focused on specifying the embodiments of the ontological level alone.

Furthermore, I claim that relying on what Næss calls intuition is only a necessary condition for justifying the role of moral choices, albeit I agree with him that moral intuition is irreducible to the moral duty as such as well as that cultural setting is important for how we define the felt closeness to different living beings²⁵⁴. Duty itself is determined as relational rather than relative, as I already showed (Næss 2005k: 125), but this definition does not benefit understanding why acting from inclination should be ‘superior’ to acting from duty. The latter is a problematic statement because it does not take into account the significant role of the normative validity of ethics, which is crucial for giving us grounds to talk about any ethical discourse whatsoever. In turn, it would not be effective to postulate an ethical system based on superior and inferior relations since it would lead to determining the system in question as a matter of reviving moral objectivism.

What is Næss’s suggestion of avoiding the pitfalls of deontological ethics and is this a constructive solution at all? He discusses the need of reconsidering the role of so-called by Kant beautiful actions. Thus we can provide arguments against Kant’s deontological ethics, which is described as an illuminative example of moralization. In this context, I argue that rejecting the role of deontological ethics stems from Næss’s ambiguous understanding of duty as a ‘main motive’ of moral action, as well as from simplifying the role of duty in the strive

²⁵³ Analyzing the discussion, which starts with examining fact-value dichotomy, we can outline the influence of Vienna circle on Næss’s theory regarding the status of ethics, albeit he aims at justifying particular moral behaviorism.

²⁵⁴ Næss relevantly points out that it is better to talk about living beings than organisms (Næss 2005g: 69).

for achieving so-called deepened realism, which is grounded in the recognition of environmental ontology at the expense of environmental ethics (Næss 2005bb: 527), (Næss 2008: 93).

Næss talks about “supremacy” of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics, which comes from “nature” and man’s natural ability to act beautifully (Ibid). If we follow his line of thoughts, however, the ethical model he provides would fulfill the requirements of moral objectivism, which in turn would not meet the ones of ecosophy, but rather the requirements of a self-sufficient form of radical biocentrism that is as questionable as narrow moralization is.

Næss emphasizes the role of Kant’s theory of beautiful actions as benevolent ones (Næss 2005k: 122), but from the fact that one action is benevolent, it does not follow that there is no conflict of feelings involved. Such an interpretation still raises the problem how to evaluate two contradicting beautiful (benevolent) actions, in Næss’s sense, if both of them are driven by pure benevolence, but are motivated by two contradicting in their contents motives.

Another ambiguous argument of Næss’s theory is how can the moral action be transformed into a beautiful one²⁵⁵ (Næss 2008: 136) especially through its habitualization, which is supposed to make the moral action ‘morally natural’? He misleadingly identifies habitualization with the process of internalization by evoking again the very problematic act of ‘feeling natural’. On the other hand, according to Næss, it is of crucial importance we still to have an inclination that comes ‘directly’, namely, in a ‘natural’ way²⁵⁶ (Ibid). If we accept such an interpretation, then every habit can be misrecognized as having a moral value by default, provoking certain actions. On a macro methodological level, it would mean that by extending the normative validity of the concept of beautiful actions, more and more desires would be easily habitualized as vital needs.

If these beautiful actions are moral by default, how can we compare and evaluate their normative validity? Furthermore, if they embody two contradicting intuitions, how can we judge ‘whose normative validity’ matters

²⁵⁵ According to him, if a moral action forms a habit, it starts feeling natural and inclination occurs. Thus the moral action glides into a beautiful one.

²⁵⁶ See also Næss 2005a: 5.

more²⁵⁷? It would be also problematic to accept the three different strategies proposed by Næss (French 1999: 132), namely, to talk about usefulness of ecologically positive actions, moral obligations and inclinations, recognized as three separate spheres of life (Næss 2008: 135).

In turn, it is also questionable to argue that experienced reality can also become a crucial factor of environmental ontology, which should presumably help us to avoid the traps of ontological relativism. In this context, there are some significant issues that arise, namely, how to claim that every single subject objectively experiences the objective content of reality. And if so, how can we recognize the self-realization as a top norm in Næss's sense? If we all naturally produce 'beautiful actions', how does the cultivation of the intuition in question derive from the reality itself? Judging by Næss's explanations, I point out that it also remains unclear what a 'strict' environmental ethics and 'strict' egalitarianism in his sense is. The understanding of the process of transformation from being in the world to being in nature does not contribute to explaining how nature is "outside of the world", especially if it is a matter of transformation from being in this world (Ibid: 93). We should keep in mind that the world itself is recognized as a net of ecosystems.

On the other hand, eco-impartiality, which is defined by Næss as a choice of interests that are conceptualized as intrinsic opportunities (regarding the decision-making process), affects both blurring the definition of vital needs and making the clarification of moral engagement within ontological ethics more difficult. In this context, I argue that another aspect of the problem derives from Næss's literal interpretation of what an intrinsic value is because thus a certain form of reductionism regarding moral objectivism is introduced²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁷ Analyzing Næss's theory of Ecosophy T, Glasser outlines as a serious problem his idea of normative validity. He poses the question how can we be sure that "the right intuition" will supersede the other interests and obligations (Glasser 1999: 380)? Presuming that this intuition has a higher normative validity than any wrong obligation is a statement that can be valid within the framework of moral objectivism alone, namely, if we presume an unquestionable universalizability of potentials' realization.

²⁵⁸ Some researchers go even deeper in their evaluations saying that Næss's ontology of deep ecology raises many questions due to the fact that it differs from the contemporary liberal accounts of morality (See M. Humphrey), i.e. that the misunderstandings stem from the contradiction of a given ontology and a given type of morality. However, these researchers do not develop their statements about the origin of the problem, namely, how the latter arises from contradicting ontological ethics and a form of moral relativism, which is typical for the postmodern culture.

2.1. Whose Ethics? Which Gradualism? The Challenges of Ethical Gradualism

In this context, I argue that Næss's idea of equal share does not significantly benefit the interpretation of the idea of intrinsic value²⁵⁹ in so far as it brings us back to the debate about 'more' or 'less' values depending on the capabilities of the different species. If we interpret the view 'equal share' in the sense of processing intrinsic value 'by nature', then the next question is how can we justify the 'sameness' beyond the reduction to its quantitative or qualitative projections?

My suggestion regarding Næss's definition is that 'the same' can be interpreted as a generic term²⁶⁰ since it is intrinsic, but not one and the same in terms of its qualitative embodiments. Otherwise, humans *should have been* birds, animals, etc., i.e. this criterion would have had no normative validity at all. Furthermore, I argue that human beings have the 'same value' as living beings, which provides an equal universal right to live and blossom²⁶¹, but this would not give us a hint how to interpret what an equal value is while two rights are at stake. On a macro methodological level, it signifies

²⁵⁹ Another argument in favor of this interpretation can be seen in Næss's claim that right is not an unconditional norm but rather a guideline (French 1999: 130). Næss approves the idea of value as deserving equal concern (Ibid: 131), but the latter does not say something new in terms of clarifying the issue of equal share.

²⁶⁰ The idea of interpreting the value in itself as a generic term comes from Wetlesen (Wetlesen 1999: 406) presuming that 'intrinsic' and 'inherent' should be considered as its specifications. According to him, 'intrinsic value' could be referred to certain "states or achievements of living beings" as understood within teleological ethics, while "inherent value" could be applied to these beings as interpreted due to deontological ethics (Ibid). In this context, inherent value is justified as concerning moral subjects towards whom moral agents have directed moral duties.

²⁶¹ Before specifying why 'equal in worth' is determined by 'under what circumstances' mode as a necessary but not sufficient condition, we should explore how the idea of intrinsic value grounds the one of the universal right to live and blossom. As French points out, this specification remains on a theoretical level (on the one of principles), but it is not applied in practice. Against the background of Næss's investigations of the principle of equal rights of all beings, which is recognized as only one norm among others (French 1999: 130), French argues (referring to Taylor) that moral weight can be examined as an "equal share" (Ibid: 135). However, claiming that a value is the same for all, which does not require excluding the possibility of additional arguments for respect and protection (Ibid: 133), does not contribute much to clarifying the aforementioned definition of equal share.

that equality concerns the role of rights, while sameness regards the one of values, taking into account that 'equal' and 'same' are not ontological synonyms.

Secondly, the problem with Næss's skepticism to ethical gradualism also affects the recognition of the connection between right, norm and guideline (French 1999: 130-131) by stressing the process of relativisation of the 'under which circumstances' mode. As a crossing point of the terms, he justifies the role of mutual agreement in order to keep the principle untouched. However, the implicit regret in Næss's sense can be treated as a sufficient condition because the motivation for it can have nothing to do with the principles of deep ecology. Another concern about the normative validity of the regret is that we are tempted to feel stronger regret to the ones who are "nearer to us" (Ibid: 132)²⁶², i.e. we are used to be affected not only by the motives of feeling regret, but also by the affiliations with the other subjects and the subjective feeling of proximity.

On the other hand, a serious methodological concern derives from the interference of the universal right with the principle of equality. Even if we take this principle as a guiding light, it would not help us to avoid the hoax between theory and practice, as Næss insists. Furthermore, to be guided by so-called realistic egalitarian attitude does not mean to be necessarily motivated by a moral behavior. Referring to Næss's example, I emphasize that discussing the spirit of a bear is not realistic at all, nor does the regret is a guarantee of showing a 'real' attitude, as he suggests.

What is the influence of these speculations on the justification of ethical gradualism in Næss's writings? The attempts to examine biospherical egalitarianism as a "qualified realistic egalitarianism" (Ibid: 131) would be a successful endeavor only if the egalitarianism in question is explored as a form of ethical gradualism. Such an interpretation, however, cannot be reduced to the specification of the vital needs understood as basic or row ones

²⁶² French also questions this approach (Ibid).

because thus we cannot clarify their normative validity without contradictions²⁶³.

French relevantly claims that deep ecology is normatively inconsistent in so far as moral principles cannot be separated from moral practice. Otherwise, the strict egalitarianism as an abstract ideal may turn into a justification of wrong actions, as Næss himself is aware (Ibid: 132). However, rejecting the ranking system does not obligatory lead to a loss of regret, so that the problem is whether the latter provokes the agents to try to develop alternative ways of avoiding similar situations in the future. In this context, French makes the statement that without moral ranking of the various vital interests, in a conflict situation we simply have a ranking of assertion of power (Ibid), which also increases the impossibility to apply this principle to tragic situations. On the other hand, without a notion of species' ranking, it would also be impossible to ground Næss's position, as French argues.

On a macro methodological level, it means that clarifying the connection between the intrinsic value of all living forms and the universal right presumes to analyze what a valued interest in Næss's sense is (Ibid: 135) as well as whether the latter can be defined beyond the framework of utilitarian ethics. The principle of minimum wrong is the one of calculations that does not change the anthropocentric perspective determining which interests are basic and which ones are not (Ibid). The interests, which are basic should have 'moral weight' regardless of whether they are human interests or not. Another important point in French's interpretation of Taylor's theory is that Næss at least outlines that his form of biospherical egalitarianism still accepts that vital human interests outweigh nonhuman ones, while for Taylor, humans may kill animals and destroy planet out of necessity (Ibid). However, the problem is that we still need to emphasize that the idea of respect (even the one to nature) is a concept elaborated by humans.

Furthermore, we should keep in mind that not only animals' basic needs, but also human needs can be neglected. A significant problem, which arises

²⁶³ P. Taylor supports the distinction between basic interests of animals and plants and non-basic interests of humans arguing that the principle of minimum wrong covers only these cases in which the norm is basic (Ibid: 134-135). But even if we imply a certain principle of correspondence, it does not guarantee yet that the change can be initiated by relying on a purely moral motivation. An illuminative example in this respect is replacing vital needs with vital interests as well as the assertion of so-called raw power. The examination of the latter can also be seen in French's attempts at specifying the role of harm to non-humans as well as that human interests are "not intrinsically incompatible with respect for nature" (Ibid: 135-136).

is how to provide one and the same classification deriving from the presumption that not all the species have duty because accepting the latter may lead to imposing either radical biocentrism, or radical anthropocentrism. On the other hand, it may also turn out, as French points out, that highly valued but non-basic interests can be ascribed “greater moral weight” than the basic interests of animals and plants. Since humans are the ones who can be defined as moral agents²⁶⁴, the principle of self-defense in Taylor’s sense (Ibid: 136) can be used as an excuse for imposing non-vital needs as vital ones. However, if some ‘non-basic’ interests outweigh more than some basic ones, why are not the former classified as basic interests as well? This problem takes place against the background of the questionable definition of so-called high level of a civilized life²⁶⁵ (Ibid).

The same problem derives from the premise that not all the interests are ‘equivalent’. That is why we should accept that under given circumstances, some one’s life would be preserved at the expense of someone else’s one. On the other hand, the explanation of this decision is not necessarily an evolutionary one, albeit it does not deny a certain form of biological gradualism to be adopted, as Skirbekk suggests. In turn, the definition of value recognized due to finding apparent proofs of rationality, or other ‘higher’ capabilities of living, brings us back to the question how can we justify the vital interests of living beings, when we cannot find clear evidence of their consciousness? If we keep talking about sentience ‘in proportion to their interests’, it would mean that we refract the principle of distributive justice through the lens of objective naturalism. This, however, makes the genuine respect to the ‘interests of well-being of all living beings’ be a subject to theoretical speculations alone²⁶⁶.

Related problems arise if we give preference to so-called additional need over moral value in so far as the former cannot be a sufficient criterion of moral evaluation. On a macro-methodological level, it means that a comparative normative claim is not a result of a greater development and com-

²⁶⁴ Taylor argues, however, that it does not necessarily entail that only humans are moral agents (Ibid: 136).

²⁶⁵ The other alternative, namely, clarifying under what circumstances some non-vital interests can be transformed into vital ones, would be examined in detail in the chapter on Skirbekk.

²⁶⁶ In turn, distinguishing between moral consideration and moral significance does not provoke a vicious circle (Ibid: 139) if we keep the idea of “different moral importance” untouched (Ibid: 140).

plexity, as French argues, while analyzing Johnson's conception (Ibid: 141) because we still face the problem how to discern between big and great²⁶⁷.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that ethical gradualism should take into account not only the complex relationships between basic and non-basic needs, interests etc., but also the ones between the subjects they are applied to. Ethical gradualism requires a certain principle of moral differentiation (e.g. between moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants) to be taken into account as a guiding rule. In this context, the problem of how equality has a normative validity, which cannot be solved by examining basic and non-basic needs as well as human and non-human capabilities, derives from the fact that they are defined on the principle of contaminated vessels. In turn, introducing concepts such as the ones of equal concern and consideration does not help much, when the idea of 'actual duty' is at stake (Ross in French 1999: 138).

According to Næss, adopting so-called ethics of ecosystems, or environmental ethics, means to accept the philosophy of Natural Right (Næss 2005w: 388-389). However, he does not specify how to understand the latter in order to avoid the speculations with moral objectivism, namely, how to avoid identifying 'natural' with 'intrinsic', nor does he clarify the potential 'dependence' of natural right on the law of nature in so far as natural right should be examined as the one of living and blossoming. In this context, another issue is how to define the universalizability of the vital needs (Næss 2008: 294) whose solution is found by Næss in prioritizing 'what serves the vital needs of humanity', when special ethical obligations to fellow beings are made. The double bind implications of the formulation in question arise from Næss's hesitation to practically apply ethical gradualism to preserving the biospherical equilibrium without underrating human vital needs at once.

Furthermore, Næss introduces some norms, which should guide the successful realization of mixed communities. He presumes grounding a long-range global concern requiring long-range "global norms" (A3) (Næss 2005u: 310). One of the main methodological problems in this respect is how to de-

²⁶⁷ Even if we accept Callicott's idea of seeing ranking as the greatest risk of potential vulnerability, which is based on commitment to responsible choice and action as well as Aldo Leopold's stance on talking about community-sensitive respect rather than biocentric egalitarianism (Callicott 1999: 152), we still face the problem how the understanding of what 'greater' is can be noncontradictory recognized in normative terms.

fine the ultimate norms by “stopping somewhere”, as Næss insists (Ibid: 311). If stopping somewhere is a random procedure, it would mean that the latter would have no normative validity at all.

By providing A4 norm²⁶⁸, Næss aims to divert the utilitarian argument of suffering, albeit the probability is used to be examined in a vague way, which makes it a subject to misinterpretations. The probability that a greater number of animals will suffer is explored as taken ‘*pari passu*’ (Ibid: 313). Such an interpretation, however, still leaves the question ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’ open, especially while defining the measure of ‘greater’ suffering. The quality, the degrees of intensity and the idea of simple pain itself require normative evaluation, which is not outlined as a measure by Næss. On the other hand, he makes some relevant statements regarding the number and the type of suffering as clarified by the idea of experienced suffering (Ibid: 314) as well as that suffering is not something “additive” (Ibid). Furthermore, Næss comments on the ethical implications of suffering stressing that “beauty and intelligence” are completely irrelevant to suffering (Ibid), albeit he still adopts many of the utilitarian arguments regarding the sentence as a guiding criterion in measuring suffering.

Discussing A6 norm²⁶⁹, Næss aims at clarifying both the reasons of the political conceptualization of A3 one and the role of the distribution of responsibility in particular. The A6 norm concerns the willingness of central authorities to arrange a “fair and swift compensation” (Ibid: 317). However, it does not contribute to finding solutions for overcoming the problems of two or more species living in one and the same area. Decentralization and centralization concern merely humans as political subjects. That is why ecopolitics cannot be explored on the level of evaluating the probabilities of cohabitation alone. For example, sheep holders will not agree to change their area because it would lead to depriving people of their initial income. On the other hand, Næss relevantly claims that the norms of protection do not follow from the hypotheses about scarcity. The normative “vagueness” of the practical solutions is also apparent on the level of A7 norm, (Ibid: 318-319), where the reference to the principle of blossoming in general is not

²⁶⁸ If of two decisions, the first is more likely to contribute to the probability that a greater number of animals will suffer, then the second one is to be taken *pari passu* (Ibid: 313).

²⁶⁹ If a traditional sheep area is considered by degree of authorities as an area in which the wolves are protected, it depends on the authorities to arrange proper compensations for losses, or financial support for hiring shepherds (Ibid: 317).

grounded in solutions of the scope of ethical gradualism. Otherwise, it would remain unclear how the value strategies in Næss's sense should guide our behavior (Ibid: 320).

What would like some of the arguments against Næss's conception? Testing his theory of mixed communities, B. Norton examines the problems of deep ecology as a social movement while building environmental policy, which is not more successful than a broad and long-sighted anthropocentric viewpoint (Norton 1999: 394). According to Norton, deep ecology makes sense merely against "the backdrop of empirical beliefs about environmentalists and their actions" implying so-called Divergence Theory of Environment (Ibid). The question is not simply whether we can define a philosophical distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric value systems, but whether it can be successfully applied to deep ecology.

Norton claims that divergence theory "represents not just an indirect expression of a false empirical hypothesis", but it also implies some destructive heuristic assumptions (Ibid: 396) saying that these policies, which are good for people, are bad for nature (Ibid). Furthermore, Norton points out that he prefers so-called convergence theory, which is better for both humans and nature (Ibid). Since anthropocentrists articulate broadly and long-term based policies, the latter will converge with the ones of deep ecology and the other forms of non-anthropocentrism. If the divergence hypothesis is correct, it could be possible to describe given policies including Næss's and some anthropocentric ones as 'sufficiently distinctive'. However, if one finds compromise positions for both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists, then, Næss's example with the policy towards wolves and bears conforms the convergence hypothesis (Ibid: 397). While summarizing Næss and Mysterud's theory about discerning some areas as agricultural and some others as nonagricultural ones respectively, Norton disagree with their interpretation of the international law because losses cannot be compensated (due to a special designation) "across borders or across generations" (Ibid).

In turn, the compromise policies, which aim to make wolves be as little disruptive for established human communities as possible, can also be supported by some anthropocentrists, as Norton claims, who approves Næss's emphasis on the sensitivities of traditional communities, while examining policy towards wolves (Ibid: 398). The sensitivities in question are justified as encouraging the recognition of multigenerational communities and cultural institutions, which are focused on creating sustainable societies (Ibid). In this context, the change should not be grounded in justifying equality of species, but rather in the importance of holding opportunities for the future.

Norton also claims that Næss's position on policy towards wolves converges with a certain long-sighted anthropocentrism. The foundations of this conception are not in the revolutionary theory of intrinsic value, but in the concerns about sustainable communities due to the wisdom of local cultures (Ibid: 399).

In this context, at least two main questions arise. First, how can we guarantee that the intergenerational perspective is a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing sustainable communities, especially, taking into account that the role of local communities is inseparable from the one of the unsustainable (big) ones? Furthermore, how can we guarantee that the principle of preservation will not be distorted due to what Næss calls *docta ignorantia*, or due to the impossibility (in the ideal case) to reasonably count the results of a possible intervention, i.e. to presume that the value of future generations is 'higher' (by default) than the one of nature? Secondly, defining sustainable community for species is done from a man's perspective since humans, as I already specified, are the only ones who can be moral discussants and moral agents. Then, the question is what would restrict the idea of sustainability not to be replaced (deliberately or due to the lack of knowledge) with the one of unsustainability disguised as sustainability with a capital letter in the name of future generations? Otherwise, the latter would bring us back to the vicious circle of ethical speciesism because the rest living beings have generations as well.

2.1.1. Who Suffers Most? The Measurement of Suffering

2.1.1.1. *The Impact of Ethical Gradualism on Mixed Communities*

Despite the fact that ethics is not considered as having high priority in Næss's writings, its role is explicitly stated in respect with the life in mixed communities in so far as it concerns the establishment of a successful symbiosis of different species. Næss's main concern is how to achieve the latter against the background of the principles of natural selection since the one of survival dominates species' behavior. According to him, predation is not the most important factor because so-called struggle for life, struggle against enemies and survival of the fittest do not describe the most important factors of evolution among most animals (Næss 2005l: 136). They rather show its complication to the extent that violent death is a part of animals' life since the less the chances of getting killed are, the less is the pressure of having as many descendents as possible²⁷⁰ (Ibid).

In this context, maturity of the self is seen by Naess as consisting of three stages, namely, of the ones of ego, social self and metaphysical self. He also explores the development of the ecological self in the mixed communities, where the possibility for conflicts leading to annihilation is much higher, having more irreversible consequences. Even at this stage, one of the main methodological concerns derives from the fact that Næss does not consider ranking "wholly on ethical affairs" because the 'sameness' of an inherent value (shared by all species) does not necessarily exclude the opportunity of introducing a consideration of rank²⁷¹. He sees the solution in examining the intrinsic values by stressing the slogan of the ultimate unity of all life (Næss 2008: 131). According to him, it does not mean that the big fish eats the small one, but rather reveals their profound interdependence (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that according to Næss, a statement about the fishes would mean to ignore the impact of the criterion of natural selection, when it does not meet the requirements of promoting symbiosis. However, from that it does not follow that we will automatically establish symbiosis unless we try to recognize an

²⁷⁰ This statement raises the concern to what extent the possibility of offspring is the only one necessary and sufficient condition of facing violent death: e.g. it raises the question of hunger as a factor.

²⁷¹ It is one illustration of the difficulties he faces while applying the principles of ethical gradualism in practice presuming that the rank is always equivalent to introducing hierarchy.

uncontradictory view on how ethical gradualism could be applied. Furthermore, I claim that the feeling of identification is a necessary but not sufficient condition in establishing the symbiosis in question even if we presume that it is always ‘there’, as Næss does. Otherwise, we should follow a line of arguments, which is based on the presumption that all the other living forms are potentially sentient as we are. Referring to Næss’s statement that the role of the “immediately experienced world” (defined as a sphere of self-realization) is not a sufficient one, I argue that it does not provide a solution when two, or more, immediately experienced worlds contradict in practice.

Another methodological concern is how to restrict the “necessary” killing of animals for food. It should be admitted by introducing special hypotheses and norms, while all these implementations should be made due to the presumption that we cannot reach an agreement on how to establish a norm against inflicting “unnecessary pain”, as Næss argues (Ibid: 178). The problem with his interpretation is that he still faces difficulties in clarifying the term “unnecessary” against the background of the questionable definition of what a natural right is (Ibid).

The need of introducing a certain kind of ethical gradualism takes place, when Næss appeals for solving the problems in the mixed communities, especially in the ones of sheep and wolves, by claiming that we have not only a brain, but also a heart (Næss 1999b: 122). In this context, it is also important to discuss his understanding of so-called primacy of wilderness within the framework of ‘the intuitions of organic wholeness’ regarding the principle to live and blossom. On a macro methodological level, the concern is how the animals can evaluate their initial ‘right’ to have an intrinsic value²⁷² in order to avoid giving preference to the criteria of natural selection at the expense of ethical rules.

Claiming that the intrinsic value presumes that no being has a priority in principle in respect with its potential (Næss 2005v: 291), i.e. that the value in question is a value in Kant’s sense. It still raises the issue that the evaluation is possible merely on side of the rational and moral beings. Another problem derives from Næss’s ambiguous view that his reception theoretically leaves room for justifying ethical gradualism by providing experiments in mixed communities, albeit he implicitly mixes different visions of ‘priority in principle’ at once. On a macro methodological level, there is no

²⁷² Næss relevantly argues that *modus vivendi* is culturally determined by the vital right of every living being to have an equal right to live and blossom.

priority in principle (understood as an abstract concept) because otherwise, we should go back to what Næss denies, namely, to one vague and abstract understanding of life. Elaborating the idea of right by adding ‘equal’, as Næss does (Ibid: 292), brings us back to the presumption that the equal right in question is both understood and accepted by default by the subjects having rational and moral capacities for that²⁷³.

Only then, the appeal for ‘Maximal complexity!’ in Næss’s sense (Ibid: 293) can be understood as a norm in so far as it is derived from the basic norm of maximizing diversity (Ibid). Næss argues that maximizing diversity implies maximizing complexity, but such a derivation would mean that diversity ‘precedes’ complexity, while they appear simultaneously. In the ontological sense of the word, diversity *is* complexity. On a micro methodological level, it illustrates what is to “act out of its own particular conatus” since the key to a successful symbiosis is the potentialities for realization of different species such as wolves, sheep, bears and human beings²⁷⁴ to be anticipated in their maximal complexity (Ibid: 295-299)²⁷⁵.

²⁷³ Næss ignores the criticism of McCloskey who argues that animals should have relevant moral capacities in order to have rights (Ibid: 299-300).

²⁷⁴ Næss defines this approach as “more a posteriori and less elitist” compared to the one of Regan saying that it is probably wiser to introduce the concept of ‘right’ in the codification of norms covering animal-human interaction (Ibid: 298). It is relevant to claim that sometimes it is important to keep the words of human and animal behavior apart, but it is “never wise to try to eradicate the wider ones” (Ibid: 299). Practically speaking, it shows how to ascribe different meanings to one and the same concept, while referring to human and animals respectively.

²⁷⁵ In this context, dependence should be understood as a dependence on complexity, which is embodied as a matter of how to co-exist without contradictions.

2.2. What Goes Around, Comes Around. Some Critiques of Deep Ecology and the Role of Ontological Ethics

Næss's attempts to define the preference to gestalt ontology over environmental ethics raise strong criticism due to the fact that underrating the normative validity of morality leaves many questions regarding deep ecology unanswered. Espen Gamlund emphasizes two main concerns arguing that it is unclear how deep ecology's focus on the processes of identification and self-realization is dissociated from anthropocentrism, which they do not want to associate with (Gamlund 2012: 236). According to him, the ideas of identification and self-realization are anthropocentric in their nature (Ibid). Gamlund's second argument is provoked by the fact that identifying with nature and feeling deep concern about all living beings do not necessarily lead to self-realization and happiness (Ibid). People do not experience that this understanding of happiness or good life appeals to them because such a life is not anticipated as a good one, or the best one, by all of them (Ibid: 236-237).

Starting with the first argument, I argue that even if we accept that the concepts of identification and self-realization are anthropocentric ones, it does not question the way they contribute to rehabilitating the intrinsic value of nature, especially if these concepts are incorporated into the process of cultivating sensitivity towards others due to the principles of ethical gradualism. On a macro methodological level, it means that certain types of biocentrism do not necessarily exclude all forms of anthropocentrism. In turn, ethical gradualism shows why we should avoid the extremes of both radical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism while striving to cultivate our sensitivity to both ourselves and other living beings. In other words, if we face some problems in this context, they are connected with being unaware that we should avoid reducing ethical gradualism to ethical anthropocentrism rather than talking about the disadvantages of treating identification and self-realization as anthropocentric concepts.

Regarding the second critical argument, before asking a question about what a good life is, we should make a certain distinction between quality of life and living standard. If these concepts remain synonyms, then persuading people to identify with nature may not necessarily provoke changing attitudes, as Gamlund argues. Thus the question of good life would not be understood as a normative question.

The origin of most of the aforementioned contradictions can be found in what Gamlund defines as Næss's obsession with environmental ontology rather than environmental ethics (Ibid: 239). Gamlund's arguments against reducing ethics to gestalt ontology again concern the issues deriving from the lack of clarifying morality's normative validity. According to Gamlund, gestalt theory leads to "subjective relativism", which is impossible to be used as a firm grounding of environmental ethics²⁷⁶ (Ibid). One of the reasons is that Næss's gestalt theory cannot be justified as a normative theory since none of us "can make a mistake"²⁷⁷ due to it (Ibid: 240). In this context, the second critical argument refers to the impossibility of solving the conflicts of interests between man and nature unless environmental ethics is based on a critical moral way of thinking (Ibid: 240-241).

I agree with Gamlund that even if we do not have 'wrong' gestalt experience, from that it does not follow that the latter is unquestionably valid in normative terms because the criterion of verification cannot be equated with the one of normative validity. I also agree with his second statement in so far as the process of solving conflicts from the perspective of 'Whose justice? Which rationality?' does not lead to satisfactory explanations²⁷⁸. Furthermore, the methodological connection between ontology and ethics cannot be defined by adopting the hypothetic-deductive method²⁷⁹ alone either due to which 'first' to 'second' refers as 'reason' to 'consequence'. Ontology is not a premise for ethics in the sense that the latter comes 'next' because then, there would be ethics without ontology and vice versa: it would be unnecessary ontology to have axiological connotations. If so, the following question arises: which ontology provides whose ethics?

²⁷⁶ Gamlund refers to E. Katz's skepticism of basing ethical obligation to protect nature on favorable natural experience (Ibid: 240).

²⁷⁷ He gives the example with the mountain's characteristics. The mountain has characteristics x and y in relation to man, while the same mountain is recognized as having characteristics z and æ in relation to the cabin constructor (Ibid).

²⁷⁸ The problem becomes of crucial importance especially when some vital needs are at stake.

²⁷⁹ Gamlund argues that according to Næss, 'should' and 'must' do not have to be interpreted as an ethical order, but rather as a hypothetical imperative in Kant's sense (Ibid: 235). But if we consider them as a form of hypothetical imperative, it would mean that we can keep proceeding only from the perspective of our own intrinsic value as a value in itself. On a macro methodological level, taking such a stance would lead to developing egoism, which is against Næss's principles as well.

To a certain extent, Næss's skepticism to ethics can be defined as coming from some unsolved problems regarding Sylvan's land ethics, which is an object of criticism on Næss's side. Sylvan's ethics²⁸⁰ is focused on denying the role of ontology at the expense of the one of ethics claiming that values depend on the existence of the choice-making preferences²⁸¹. Another aspect of the problem is that the ranks in question do not solve the concerns about the definition of so-called 'nature's way' whose first and most apparent representation is that we simply may be wrong what is good for the planet (Watson 1999: 116). In turn, such a concern raises another one regarding the definition of what is good in itself and if so, what would be the normative validity of the latter? Some difficulties that bring us back to the extrapolation of ethical anthropocentrism to an ideology based on the principles of polarization.

Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that there is one more 'dangerous' prerequisite, which could lead us again to the paradigm of ethical anthropocentrism. It is the idea of conceptualizing the ontological stance on impartiality (eco-impartiality in particular) as moral neutrality in Næss's sense. This crucial issue provokes another contradictory conception, namely, the normative validity of moral engagements to be simplified to choosing between different types of interests, which should guide people in the process of interaction. Last but not least, I emphasize that it is the theory of moral neutrality that supports the ideology of evolution within the framework of moral objectivism, which is dominated by the understanding that the biological development is in tune with moral cultivation.

Regarding Næss's critics of ethics in favor of gestalt ontology, I argue that his definition of the latter implicitly meets the requirements of ontological ethics, which can be described as based on horizontal relatedness²⁸², making possible to talk about holism of man's experience. Holism is recognized by the Norwegian philosopher through adopting a set of already discussed gestalt shifts due to the fact that they are incorporated in what I called moral

²⁸⁰ The pitfalls of Sylvan's conception are already emphasized by Grey who argues that a principle that affirms that all living things are of equal value is of no help in establishing preference-ranks (Grey 2000: 49). In other words, the axiological approach can be defined as a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying the need of adopting ethical gradualism.

²⁸¹ See Grey's comments on Sylvan's axiology (Ibid: 48).

²⁸² Næss also talks about a certain kind of horizontal relatedness.

experiential gestalts²⁸³. These shifts contribute to understanding how through cultivating sensitivity towards Otherness, man's self-realization is inseparable from nature's realization²⁸⁴.

Regardless of the different visions on how the critics of deep ecology can be overcome, most researchers²⁸⁵ see the pitfalls in what I called a problem of normative validity, i.e. how the ethical commitment to the biosphere can be justified through clarifying so-called by E. Katz ontological commitment. He points out that the extension of the principles of deep ecology means to expand the idea of ontological commitment, which in turn has much to do with extending the visions of environmental ethics (Katz 2000: 28). Another crucial benefit of adopting his statement in terms of revealing the role of deep ecology is that Katz also sees the main methodological advantage of the latter in respect with the socio-political context (Ibid: IX).

On the other hand, the thesis that the theory of deep ecology has not succeeded in eliminating ethics, but rather in distinguishing its assumptions as psychological ones (Reed and Rothenberg 1993: 70) can also be accepted merely to a certain extent since it would have meant to contradict psychology and ethics. Næss himself still gives some positive definitions of ethics, but they mainly concern its practical role, i.e. it is determined as a given type of 'supplementary' "instrumentarium" cleaning the ground for the establishment of gestalt ontology. He argues that it is the ontological frame-

²⁸³ Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that finding an explanation in favor of ontological ethics rather than moral objectivism is concerned with examining the normative validity of the question 'What does it mean for a living being to have a value 'by nature'?. If the latter is literally understood, we should establish a certain form of moral objectivism as an explanatory paradigm.

²⁸⁴ Otherwise, man's gestalt would be simplified to the number of given experiential actions presuming that the coherence is a result of the sum of the aforementioned actions. Thus the process of man's self-realization would be justified as a self-sufficient one, which strengthens the anthropocentric mode of thinking.

²⁸⁵ According to V. Plumwood, Næss's treatment of ethics is strongly influenced by his positivist background. That is why he aims to show that "nonextensional and nonhierarchical ethics" is possible (Plumwood 1999: 206). We may speculate to what extent we can refer this examination to so-called hierarchical and non-hierarchical ethics (Ibid) since the positivists do not support such a distinction, nor do they give preference to one of them over the other. It is also similarly problematic to discuss extensional and non-extensional ethics (Ibid). The latter have rather an instructive function showing the general line of Næss's theory, namely, that deep ecology should be introduced as rehabilitating the principles of bioegalitarianism.

work that is a container in which we make our ethically based choices²⁸⁶ (Næss 1999: 142).

In this context, I draw the conclusion that Næss recognizes the role of ethics to the extent to which he presumes that the process of identification depends on the variations of the intensity of subject's affection. If we remain on the level of affection, however, it would mean the whole process to be reduced to a behaviorist 'stimulus-reaction' model, which in turn might also serve the purposes of the egoist self. That is why I argue that only the moral experiential gestalt can "widen and deepen the effect of identification" in Næss's sense (Næss 2005y: 466) as well as enrich the concrete contents of experience because it justifies the normative validity of 'to make me see' mode.

I also argue that what I called moral experiential gestalt has much to do with Naess's gestalts of action, or gestalt units constituting the problem-solving processes (Næss 2005aa: 508). The first question which arises is whether every single unit is equivalent to gestalt. We can examine them as ontological synonyms, but only to a certain extent due to the fact that they both contrast the process of fragmentarization. Every single gestalt presumes a form of unity because it is based on a given, subjectable to structuring experience. However, from that it does not follow that every single unit is a gestalt.

Gestalts can rather be described as what Næss calls "greater wholes of action and living" (Ibid). Furthermore, they can be characterized as such because the commitment to life comes from nature itself. Thus the commitment in question can be examined as a moral one only if it does not provide the establishment of moral objectivism. In turn, Næss provides arguments, which make the contradictions become even more complicated. He argues that two opponents may share the same ethical prescriptions, but to disagree about a decision of environmental character because the object of moral at-

²⁸⁶ A proof of his thesis is that the norms of the ethically responsible communication are the ones of the effective communication (Næss 2000: 49). In this context, one of the main methodological risks that arises is that it is quite problematic to evaluate moral responsibility due to the criterion of effectiveness.

tention is perceived through relying on radically different ontologies²⁸⁷ (Cavazza 2014: 24).

This, however, would mean that the ‘access’ to different paths can be evaluated as deriving from the one regarding ontologies in question rather than ethics. Concerning the issue of different realities, the term ‘furthest’ applies to signify whether we will experience a certain reality as one or another. It has much to do with the specification whether the experience is considered as having a value in itself or value for itself, which is also an argument in favor of the thesis that ontology is inseparable from ethics. Regarding ontological differences, we should first clarify why some people can have similar views on different things, i.e. on seeing different realities, as Naess suggests. That is why it is important to emphasize the risk of simplifying ontology if we reduce it to a way of seeing reality in so far as it provides the coherence of the latter²⁸⁸.

²⁸⁷ Naess’s misconception of the knowledge about ethics derives from his claim that people have an “access” to different parts of reality due to the specificities of their different background. If so, it would mean to revive the subject-object dualism as well as the reduction of ontological to social relativism.

²⁸⁸ Related difficulty is the one of defining value as an objective one (Cavazza 2014: 40), i.e. value to be understood as being entangled with emotional tones (Ibid). However, from the fact that “objectivity is loaded with value” (Ibid), it does not follow that the value itself is objective, nor does it mean that values as such are naturally colored with so-called emotional tones.

2.2.1. The Role of Altruism, Empathy and Compassion

I suggest interpreting Næss's definition of altruism within the framework of ontological ethics since increasing the identification with others does not have to be understood as a process of full identification. Furthermore, the process of increasing does not have to be considered in quantitative terms, but as a qualitative transformation, i.e. as a process of gaining maturity. Only in this case, it can be analyzed as inescapable, taking into account that the Self is irreducible to a narrow ego in so far as the self-realization is characterized by Næss as an ecological approach to being in the world (Næss 2008: 81).

An important specification in this context is how Næss describes the process of identification as one of finding something about the other in yourself by relying on feelings (Næss 2008d: 114). The problem is that such recognition can have a normative validity if the moral imagination is adopted because people's ability for "easy identification" (Ibid) is merely a necessary condition even when feelings are involved. Otherwise, so-called extended understanding would have been determined as a result of imposing moral objectivism, which in turn would lead to the question why are not all people equally empathic? On a macro methodological level, it would mean that we cannot justify a line of thoughts in favor of normative validity on the level of genuine feelings in Næss's sense.

Maybe one of the most illuminative illustrations of Næss's problems in overcoming the restrictions of anthropocentric paradigm can be seen in the way he interprets the role of empathy and compassion, which become understandable if we contextualize his explanations within the paradigm of ontological ethics. According to the Norwegian philosopher, empathy is a process of identification – it is a vital power, it can be defined as seeing in others part of God that exists in every single being (Ibid), and which is showed to the most suffering beings.

On the basis of the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that it is the ontological potential of imaginative rationality that helps compassion to be oriented towards a broader group of addressees. At the same time, Næss's theory leaves some significant questions unanswered. For example, the Self cannot be a Self from the very beginning: he/she should rather *become* such a one. However, values are not a part of the nature itself, unless we presume a certain moral objectivism to be adopted.

According to Diehm, Næss does not clarify what the particular ways of identifying with other beings would be so that the respect to their specific-

ties to be preserved (Diehm 2006: 34-35). Another issue, which also raises some questions, is concerned with the particular ability of identifying with others by taking care, while the criteria of recognizing the normative validity of the different ecosophies still remain unclear.

Næss himself introduces the concept of comprehensive maturity (Næss 2005bb: 515-516). The latter is described as a process regarding the fulfillment of Self's potentials²⁸⁹ in others. If natural was literally interpreted, then the Self would have annihilated the others²⁹⁰ and thus would have remained obsessed with his/her own narrow ego (Ibid). In the process of becoming, however, the self cannot escape from contributing to the fulfillment of life's manifestations (Næss 2008: 196). The specification of "being mature in all major relationships" is not a sufficient argument either because it raises the question how both to evaluate these relationships and to discern them from so-called 'minor' ones. In turn, the specification of the potentials' fulfillment, which is the main objective of the self-realization, is recognized by Næss as a fulfillment of life in its meaning through experiencing joy. In this context, he makes again the ambiguous statement that we should rely on acting beautifully than on acting dutifully facing difficulties to show how we can avoid moral relativism. On a meta-methodological level, to answer the question *Why is it 'inescapable' to "see ourselves in other"?* as a "part" of the increasing maturity (Næss 2005bb: 516) presumes that moral commitment is initially grounded in so-called enlightened self-interest.

²⁸⁹ Examining the Selves as process ones is under the influence of Mahayana Buddhism. Næss outlines the role of Buddhist view that there are no entities, which are not characterized as processes. "To realize oneself" means to "follow the path" (Næss 2008: 198). He also emphasizes that the Buddhist conception of the realization of so-called Great Self does not correspond to Hindu idea of realizing the absolute Atman (Ibid: 135). In this context, Næss outlines the role of Sanskrit phrase "realizing svamarga", which means to "realize one's own way" (Ibid). The latter also helps us seeing how so-called Great Self is interpreted as deeply involved in the realization of the aforementioned way. Referring to some concepts of Mahayana Buddhism, Næss distinguishes the self in small letters from the self with a capital one.

²⁹⁰ However, Næss avoids the contradiction by referring to Erich Fromm's vision of persons' love arguing that ecosophers find a broader meaning of this concept in respect with other beings (Næss 2005bb: 518).

2.3. Næss's Reception of Spinoza's *Ethics*

On a macro methodological level, the influence²⁹¹ of Spinoza on Næss can be traced in three main directions at least, namely, in recognizing and rehabilitating the role of joy by specifying the functions of pleasure, happiness and perfection (Næss 2008: 304), in analyzing the possible misuse of emotions as well as in exploring the origin of maturity of feelings while solving conflicts, which corresponds to another illuminative source of inspiration for Næss, namely, to Gandhi's ethics of non-violence.

According to Næss, Spinoza's theory²⁹² furnishes an excellent basis of the deep ecology concept of identification with every living being, emphasizing that self-preservation is not a fundamental term in his system, nor is any other concept a fundamental one. Furthermore, Næss is aware of the distinction between Spinoza's conception of self-preservation (to be and to act in *suo esse*) and self-realization (Ibid: 246). According to Spinoza, to preserve in one's being means not to preserve in someone else's essence (Ibid: 247), which in turn leads to the relevant statement that altruism is not to jump into the essence of somebody else, albeit he does not specify why the self-preservation, as defined, does not have moral connotations.

In turn, the fundamental norm of self-realization in Spinoza's theory contributes to clarifying how "one to preserve oneself by expressing oneself", i.e. how one to achieve a self-fulfillment by realizing one's potential. In this context, I draw the conclusion that Næss does not reveal how preservation in *suo esse* provides a basis of a comparison with the process of self-realization in normative terms, while, on the other hand, the preservation in question is characterized by him as a non-Spinozist term. Regarding the issue how to relate the concept of self-preservation to the one of self-realization, I argue that Spinoza's conception of

²⁹¹ However, Næss explains that many supporters of deep ecology movement do not appreciate the works of Spinoza because of the way he underrates the value of animals' life (Næss 2008: 249).

²⁹² In his earlier writings, Næss summarizes twenty points due to which we can recognize Spinoza as an ecophilosopher. Among them, he outlines some characteristics of Spinoza's conception such as the lack of duality, the dynamic thinking, the role of democracy and freedom within the system thinking, the impact of joy on the relevant understanding etc. (Næss 1974: 1-4).

self-preservation²⁹³ refers to the one of self-realization as activity refers to activeness (Næss 2005j: 389). We should keep in mind that we cannot replace the concept of self-preservation with the one of self-realization in so far as the prototype characteristic of the latter is the performative activeness triggering the self-fulfillment to be recognized as intrinsically connected with the fulfillment of the others.

Another issue is whether preserving one's essence is always a guarantee of preserving one's being. That is why the difference between the modes of self-preservation and self-realization can be defined as a difference between the mode of 'to be', as Næss himself clarifies in respect with Spinoza's conception of preservation, and what I called the mode of 'to become' presuming activeness, which is irreducible to a set of given activities. As Næss argues, we can be involved in all kinds of activities without being in a state of activeness²⁹⁴.

In turn, he claims that two of his main sources of inspiration were Askeladden and Spinoza emphasizing that the inspiration should be sought in decoding the slogan of the symbiosis with the other beings, namely, to find an answer to the question how to have both meaningful and joyful life in our nature, in a non-naturalistic sense of the word (Næss 1999: 9). Extrapolating Næss's theory, I argue that experiential learning can be justified by outlining the role of personal choice as a life's choice due to which the individual chooses how to make his/her personal commitment to nature's process of harmonization. In this context, so-called essential man's nature (Ibid) does not have to be interpreted as a strive for imposing a form of moral naturalism, but rather as a way of rehabilitating the intrinsic value of nature and thus the one of man's role in the biosphere.

As one of the main reasons of adopting Spinoza's ethics, Næss points out Spinoza's understanding of what a total view is, namely, his theory saying that we rely on our thinking about ourselves and reality we are part of, which Spinoza applies to concrete situations (Næss 2008: 234). It concerns the recognition of a certain kind of derivation, which to be subjectable to verification on every sin-

²⁹³ Regarding Spinoza's theory of self-preservation, its connection with the concept of *cupiditas* is brought to light. It would illustrate how to understand the relationship between the mode of *in suo esse* and freedom. Spinoza provides a hint in this direction saying that he does not discern between joy and joyful (Næss 1999: 48).

²⁹⁴ This statement is extrapolated for the purposes of better understanding Gandhi's ethics of non-violence not as a 'passive' resistance, but rather as an impossibility to reduce activeness to a given set of concrete activities.

gle level of its development avoiding the possibility for falsification, as Spinoza does, by structuring ethics as based on hypotheses, theorems and conclusions. However, there are some crucial aspects of Spinoza's theory and his ethics in particular, which illustrate why he cannot be described as a proto-ecophilosopher, as Næss's suggests²⁹⁵. Spinoza's ethics as such is oriented towards the other human beings rather than the living beings in general. Spinoza's suggestion of reaching a symbiosis concerns the establishment of "circles of friends", which are examined as extending the feelings of joy towards the others (Næss 1999: 9-10). It is the normative validity of the initial feeling of fulfillment recognized as a feeling of self-identification that would be achieved by the identification with others. This makes necessary the transformation of what Spinoza calls passive affects.

In turn, the transformation of negative to positive emotions can be defined as one of ontological deficiency to ontological sufficiency, while the transformation (in the sense of cultivation) of the self with a small letter to the one with a capital letter (namely, the ecological Self) can be determined as a transformation from an 'undeveloped' moral commitment to a 'developed' one. However, the latter cannot be defined as a transformation based on the transition from 'less' to 'more' because then, the process of self-realization would not have been justified as a top norm in Næss's sense. This conclusion is also grounded in the fact that maturity is not equivalent to the process of physical development. Otherwise, there would not have been such an initial possibility for a complex fulfillment, or a rehabilitation of so-called by Næss affective engagement²⁹⁶ (Ibid: 43) in so far as the complex understanding presumes already specified cultivation of activeness to be internalized.

By relying on Spinoza's theory of transforming the negative feelings into positive ones, Næss outlines the role of the latter for the choice of values, which in turn contribute to establishing what he calls "goal-oriented and sensible choice" (Næss 2008d: 7). Næss refers to Spinoza's statement that emotions make us something we appreciate being (Ibid: 8-9). On a macro methodological level, reconsidering the role of emotions within the decision-making process is important for realizing that moral progress is irreducible to the scientific one. It pro-

²⁹⁵ Næss explains that many supporters of the deep ecology movement do not appreciate the works of Spinoza because of the way he underrates the value of animals' life (Næss 2008: 249).

²⁹⁶ Reason is helpless unless it is not in harmony with an affect (Ibid: 43). Then, an incoherent point would be that the progress, which is rationally determined, would presuppose an affective engagement (Ibid).

vokes searching for life's meaning, which requires taking moral responsibility because meaningfulness as such is inseparable from the idea of intrinsic value. Secondly, self-realization is interpreted as a matter of a goal-oriented becoming through showing love and care to all living beings, which activates our 'whole' nature. One process that is possible due to the fact that the activity in question derives from nature's activeness.

Why do we need to explore the transformation from passive to active affects and the one from activity to activeness respectively, taking into account Næss's statement that environment movement could help us to form concepts that fuse insight and emotion (Ibid: 85)? Maturity of emotional life, in so far as Spinoza talks about active and passive feelings (Næss 1999: 9), is reached only when others' happiness releases happiness in ourselves (Ibid: 76). According to Spinoza, we should give preference to active feelings because they promote the feeling of community and the one of moral conduct, as a consequence of natural causes (Ibid: 80). However, in order to avoid moral objectivism, we would rather claim that these are causes, which have an intrinsic value in themselves.

Exploring the role of emotions in Spinoza's writings, Næss refers to the term of prevailing emotional tone (Ibid: 33), while focusing on how to avoid emptiness as a prevailing emotional tone, i.e. how to justify the rehabilitation of 'to become' mode since a possible distinction from the one of 'to be' would provoke two different feelings: the ones of being lived and living (Ibid). In this context, I draw the conclusion that the feeling of being lived is the prevailing tone of the 'narrow' ecological self in Næss's sense, while the one of living concerns the ecological Self with a capital letter²⁹⁷.

²⁹⁷Regarding the role of ethics, I draw the conclusion that Næss's references to Spinoza contribute to introducing the role of intuitionism and the one of inner voice. As a prototype characteristic of this new ecology, we can point out so-called reasonable sensitivity (Ibid: 44).

2.3.1. The Inspiration of Spinoza's Theory of Joy

Spinoza defines joy against the background of the distinction between pleasure, happiness and perfection since it provides a transition from a lower to a higher degree of perfection (Næss 2008d: 92). In turn, Næss argues that Spinoza's philosophy of joy²⁹⁸ is a "great inspiration" because it is focused on joy as a process rather than a fleeting emotion (Ibid: 171). Furthermore, he claims that it is the intuition of the living beings that grounds the feeling of joy and its different representations. On a macro methodological level, the problem is whether intuitionism, understood as a third kind of knowledge in Spinoza's sense, is recognized by Næss as a type of knowledge, which does not need further clarifications. And if so, how can we justify a certain ethical gradualism in this context?

Borrowing the concept of perfectionism from Spinoza is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding the process of self-realization because, as Næss relevantly argues, perfection and perfectionism are not equivalent to each other (Næss 1999: 42). Perfectionism contributes to defining the different embodiments of joy, namely, the ones of *titillation* (titillatio), or so-called restricted joy, and *hilarity* (hilaritas), encompassing all the parts of nature (Ibid). According to Næss, Spinoza's hilaritas is a joy of which it can never be too much since it is a prevailing emotional tone (Næss 2008d: 172)²⁹⁹. Regarding Næss's own writings, the reception of Spinoza's joy is crucial for his understanding of the performative power of self-realization as inseparable from the one of nature in so far as the fulfillment of life's meaning triggers a positive prevailing emotional tone.

In turn, the recognition of this second type of joy is also one of Næss's arguments against Zapffe's existential pessimism. Næss emphasizes that 'hilaritas' is the love that fulfills the whole soul (Næss 1999: 108) so that we are completely absorbed with joy (Ibid). This fulfillment is an illuminative example of why its 'naturalness' is understandable as having normative validity within ontological ethics since love should not be interpreted from the perspective of objective naturalism. Otherwise, it would have been impossible one to fulfill one's potential unless reaching a given stage of fulfillment.

²⁹⁸ See Næss 1999.

²⁹⁹ In turn, *Amor intellectualis* in Spinoza's sense as well as Buddha's smiling status are described by Næss as a type of hilaritas (Ibid) to the extent they are based "on that unavoidable, in the sense of all encompassing, form of love" (Ibid).

Furthermore, it would have caused the self-realization to be underrated from a process to a state.

The latter concerns the need of rehabilitating a certain type of experiential joy within Spinoza's theory of process experience of joy in the world. According to Næss, this experience is irreducible to a momentous one (Ibid: 110), which makes me claim that 'spontaneous'³⁰⁰ is not determined as a temporal characteristic, but as an existential one concerning life's quality in non-absolutist terms. In this context, I argue that Næss's reception of Spinoza's theory gives grounds to discuss the issue of normative validity of imaginative rationality in so far as he distinguishes between playfulness and play, taking into account that the former is irreducible to a set of rules (Ibid: 113)³⁰¹.

One of the main methodological concerns in Næss's explanation, however, is how to recognize joy as having a value by contrast to sadness, which is defined as deprived of such a one. Referring to Spinoza, Næss argues that Spinoza describes sadness (*tristitia*), fulfilling the whole person under the guise of a melancholia, which is a state having no value (Ibid: 109). On a textual level, it remains highly questionable how as well as to what extent Spinoza's virtue lacks the moral atmosphere of *arête*, taking into account that Spinoza discusses the role of *conatus* in part five of *Ethics* as instructive, i.e. as concerning the things due to the third way of cognition (Næss 2008: 248). If the lack of intrinsic value is recognized in instrumental terms, namely, in respect with the principle of deprivation, it would mean to equate virtues with values. However, virtues cannot be equated with values, even if we agree with him that the common feature of Spinoza and deep ecologists is the recognition of nature's perfection in itself, which is amoral.

Another concern derives from the contradiction regarding so-called complete differences in nature (Næss 1999a: 95). Næss commented upon Spinoza's fragment IVP29 saying that it may not be intended to cover relations to animals (Ibid). He extrapolates Spinoza's statement that someone's joy "differs in nature" from the joy of another person because the essence of the former is not equivalent to the essence of the latter (Ibid). Despite the fact that merely people discern between *hilaritas* and *letitia*, these 'qualitatively'

³⁰⁰ Spontaneity does not have to be interpreted as a matter of pure improvisation, nor as a form of epistemological relativism.

³⁰¹ In Norwegian, the difference is defined as the one between 'lek' and 'spill'. According to Næss, playfulness can, however, easily lead to a condition close to *hilaritas* (Ibid).

different types of joy are misleadingly ‘quantified’ by presuming that the differences in nature are of a lower rank than the ones in essence. An argument in favor of the thesis can be implicitly found in Næss’s statement that “perhaps not their natures are completely different” (Ibid).

In this context, at least two methodological questions arise, namely, how to analyze the role of perfection when applied to nature and man respectively as well as how to understand Næss’s theory that the intrinsic value of nature is irrelevant to morality by default. The first concern is about the presumption of intuitive coherent knowledge and imperfect, fragmentary one of order, but not about the entity of nature itself. Næss does not go into detail why the imperfection in question is not a result of knowledge of order itself, but rather of the fact that this knowledge pretends to encompass the one of nature. In other words, the aforementioned imperfection could be interpreted not as provoked by the premise that we are not able to know the common order of nature, but rather from the pretention that such a knowledge derived from nature as such. Furthermore, instead of examining the ethical projections of this issue, Næss remains on the level of investigating the distinction between perfect and imperfect knowledge³⁰².

³⁰² This distinction can be examined by referring to Næss’s reception of the two types of perfection introduced by Spinoza, namely, so-called P1 and P2. The first type of perfection is intuitively conceived as achieving completeness and realness (Næss 2005w: 387). We may develop Næss’s investigation saying that the perfection in question is something already accomplished. Næss relevantly describes it as related to the concept of “mature ecosystem” in so far as it concerns the ontological climax of diversity. That is why the ‘maximum’ mode does not have to be interpreted as an accomplishment, but rather as a dialectical completeness having the dynamic equilibrium as its prototype characteristic. In turn, the second type of perfection can be described as a strive for completion whose ontological potential consists in the strive itself, namely, the latter to be recognized as a form of orientation. That is why if it is considered as per-factum, we should deny the initial strive for perfection and then, the self-realization as a form of maturity, i.e. to deny what Næss calls enlightened gradualism.

2.3.2. Some Comments on Næss's Reception of Spinoza's Ethics

Regarding Næss's reception of Spinoza's ethics, Lloyd argues that Spinoza combines "a strong rejection of anthropocentric perception with an equally strong affirmation of a man-centered morality" (Lloyd 1999: 74)³⁰³. It is the morally significant common nature of men that is expressed in the strive for collaborating through the cultivation of reason (Ibid: 82). Spinoza's ethical system is determined as centered on the process of self-preservation as well as on the survival of human beings, being incompatible with G. Sessions's interpretation that both Leopold and Spinoza examine the total systems of nature as "ethically fundamental" ones (Ibid: 83).

To these speculations, Næss raises the argument that Spinoza does not use the word 'morale', 'moralis', namely, that what we recognize as moral is closest to what Spinoza defines as *pietas*, i.e. to the desire to do good (Næss 1999a: 92). In this context, we can witness again the double bind narrowing of morality to moralization as well as the need the definition of "the desire to do good" to be specified in ethical terms as having a relevant normative validity. Næss makes the questionable conclusion that Spinoza's ethics is about generosity and love rather than morality saying that finding satisfying metaphors of environment is not necessarily concerned with moralization. Despite the fact that he gives some arguments for the latter, from that it does not follow that generosity, love and morality are initially contradicting

On a macro methodological level, Næss's main argument against Lloyd is that she makes Spinoza look "too much like Hobbes" in so far as she intellectualizes too much his *amor Dei*³⁰⁴ (Ibid: 91). Regardless of the fact that Næss poses relevant concerns about the lack of distinction between moral

³⁰³ In turn, Clark argues that Lloyd is wrong in interpreting morality as a constraint for the moral agent (Clark 1999: 104).

³⁰⁴ The 'constructive' role of imagination can be examined by referring to Spinoza's three forms of understanding (Næss 2008: 84) since so-called *Amor Intellectualis* to God does not imply a distinction between feelings and reason. It is a matter of a "unified emotional understanding" (Ibid) in which love is based on the creative force of nature. Næss argues that experiencing the third kind of knowledge should be done from the perspective of God because we are not fully able to understand the "common order of nature" (Næss 2005w: 386). In turn, this knowledge is not only 'unified' but also unifying in so far as it does not encompass but rather activates the potential of all living beings.

and natural right in Spinoza's writings³⁰⁵ (Ibid: 93), he emphasizes the role of 'power over' rather than the one of 'power to'³⁰⁶ (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that Næss misinterprets the idea that there is no abyss between men and beasts, so that it is always unprofitable for humans to "associate" with beasts (Ibid: 95). Furthermore, I argue that Næss introduces an incomplete induction based on Spinoza's IVP37S saying that horses and men are filled with a desire of procreation as well as that men and insects have "lusts and appetites" in common. At the same time, Næss claims that Spinoza never specifies this desire (Ibid). On the basis of the vague similarity of horses and men, he jumps to the conclusion that humans can associate with beasts. It is possible due to the presumption that it is the desire that makes us aware of their common traits.

In this context, I conclude that 'moral' does not have to be understood as being presumably 'good' or 'bad', i.e. the good/bad connotations do not correspond to the good/bad matter in Spinoza's sense. However, from that it does not follow that talking about self-realization of the ecological Self within the paradigm of ethics is a form of narrow moralization. In other words, accepting that in the state of nature there is nothing good or bad by default, namely, something, which to be defined as 'substantially' good or bad, it does not follow that man cannot evaluate his/her nature as good under given circumstances. Næss describes this state as Spinoza's paradox (Næss 1999: 71), which, on the other hand, might be recognized as a paradox merely within the paradigm of moral objectivism due to which the normative validity is equated with the criterion of verification.

³⁰⁵ According to him, humans have "much more rights" in relation to the animals than they have in relation to humans.

³⁰⁶ On the basis of the definitions two and three of emotions in Part three of Spinoza's *Ethics*, Næss claims that animal may increase or decrease in perfection (Ibid: 95).

2.3.3. The Role of Amor Dei Intellectualis

In this context, *ratio* shows us to what extent the direction taken by making a decision affects the complex understanding being in harmony with the nature of human beings and thereby with *natura naturans* (Næss 2008d: 87). On the other hand, even if we accept that *ratio* is the starting point of realizing the commitment to the wholeness, it does not underrate in any way whatsoever the role of morality for the transformation in question. Furthermore, if sadness is provoked from the knowledge about one's suffering (Næss 1999: 64), the eradication of the latter never stems from the knowledge alone, as Spinoza suggests, because the transformation comes from the cultivated sensitivity towards otherness, recognized as a form of commitment to someone else's suffering. Thus the transformation is initiated by rehabilitating understanding as irreducible to pure rationality, as I already claimed.

Næss also specifies that Spinoza's theory of love to God (*conatus*) is not interpreted against the background of a given hedonistic psychology, which takes pleasure and pain as starting points (Ibid: 37). On the other hand, the presumption that *conatus* is not a "servant of the third way" is a necessary but not sufficient condition in realizing the complex understanding, nor is it a means, which is more elaborated than the intuition itself. Furthermore, if we accept that reason is just a 'servant', how can we define the process of self-realization as "the logically deepest principle" (Næss 2008d: 113) in Næss's sense? That is why I argue that Spinoza's three types of knowledge can be applied to the aims of deep ecology if they are examined as diachronically connected rather than hierarchically ordered³⁰⁷.

Referring Næss' reception of Spinoza, two significant points should be emphasized, namely, that Spinoza's system is not a speciesist one, albeit he is personally what we call a speciesist today. However, this is not because it is based on a strict premise-conclusion model. It rather concerns the lack of such a thinkable distinction in his theory. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I agree with Næss's criticism that we need not "say that today man's relationship with the non-human world is immoral" is "going too far from Spinoza's propositions" (Næss 1999a: 99). It is enough to say that it lacks generosity (Ibid).

³⁰⁷ Otherwise, adopting such a hierarchy would mean reason to be examined as having 'less' epistemological validity than intuition.

In this context, the contribution of Spinoza to developing ecological thinking can be sought on the level of what Clarck (using Næss's terminology) calls 'deep' level of questioning of our concepts of humanity, namely, on the one of adopting a similar approach such as the one of deep ecology (Clarck 1999: 103). However, we should still be aware of the fact that moral experientialism is not equivalent to ethical gradualism as such.

2.4. Næss's Reception of Gandhi's Ethics of Non-violence

The definition of ethics of non-violence corresponds to the way Næss defines ecophilosophical pluralism³⁰⁸ (Næss 2005x: 421) since every systematic ethics is examined as containing a general norm against violence. One of the specifications that should be made is that such pluralism covers not only the physical violence (Ibid: 425). That is why the concept of ecophilosophical pluralism does not have to be left vague, as he suggests.

In this context, we should examine the ontological internal relations of goals and means in Gandhi's sense, which is a crucial premise for understanding Næss's theory of deep ecology movement. I argue that we can interpret Næss's statement that "means are all on last instance" (Næss 2000: 60) avoiding the methodological concern about recognizing them as an implicit reference to Machiavellianism. Despite the fact that there are no clear differences between means and goals (Ibid) in respect with the normative validity of common goal, from that it does not follow that the means can replace the goals themselves. According to Næss, the key solution is providing a different type of evaluation for the means and goals respectively, namely, the former should be evaluated separately from the latter (Ibid: 30). He finds a positive answer to this question in Gandhi's ethics (Ibid)³⁰⁹, which is explored against the background of the concerns about Lenin's uncritical use of means and the one of Western economic liberalism (Ibid). On the other hand, a good specification made by Næss affects the clarified connection between achieving goals and informed consent of all parts, which should affect both mind and heart (Ibid: 33). It benefits avoiding ethics of non-violence to be questioned by the criterion of effectiveness in moral

³⁰⁸ Næss points out that Spinoza does not develop a special theory about the origin of evil, but also argues that his categories of good and bad apply to the doers and not to the deeds themselves. This argument is compared with Gandhi's ones in favor of ethics of non-violence. Furthermore, Næss claims that we should be particular about the way Spinoza interferes the role of the deeds with their consequences. In this context, I argue that Gandhi's theory of exploring enemies as potential friends cannot be uncontradictory referred to Spinoza's conception of friends' circles in so far as it would require the initial distinction between so-called good doer and wrong doings to be specified.

³⁰⁹ This way of a separate evaluation, however, contradicts the one proposed in Næss's later writings.

practice. This is one of the few cases in which Næss does not give unquestionable priority to feelings in the process of understanding since they can inflict hate under given circumstances.

Furthermore, I claim that communication in Næss's sense (as influenced by Gandhi's theory) is important for overcoming some generalizations (i.e. the possibility to impose speciesism within ecophilosophy) at the expense of rehabilitating the principle of differentiation as well as recognizing its normative validity as a means of revealing the concept of intrinsic value. In turn, justifying non-violence as a new type of activeness, which is irreducible to a given set of activities, leads to rehabilitating the concept of passiveness as a possibility for realization that provides one's potential to be fulfilled in a process, rather than to be stigmatized as a lack of potential. Therefore, the new types of activeness do not have to be examined as undeveloped passiveness, but as activeness whose ontological potential triggers a new form of ethically grounded activism. Thus we can reconsider responsibility as a key premise for defining non-violence as a top norm³¹⁰ in Næss's sense; a norm, which has a status in his system that is similar to the one of self-realization.

According to J. Galtung, who is a co-author of some of the most illuminative publications of Næss on Gandhi, Næss's interest in Gandhi's life and works is intrinsically connected with two of his lifelong projects, namely, with the justification of non-violence and the world philosophy (Galtung 2011: 31). The "challenge to engage explicitly with Gandhi" (Ibid) came in the early 1960s when the Norwegian government started a project on the technological assistance for fisheries in Southern India (in Kerala) (Ibid). In this context, Galtung outlines the development of Næss's ideas showing the way they have been elaborated from targeting the general audience to becoming more philosophically specialized in time. Thus he clarifies why the

³¹⁰ We can justify such a hypothesis in so far as in both cases, in the ones of non-violence and self-realization, the opponents are presumably examined as cooperators (Næss 2000: 45) (Ibid: 53) in their strive for counteracting the norm of isolation (Ibid: 48).

first investigations of Gandhi's heritage³¹¹ took place against the background of the need of reconsidering the dilemmas of the post-war situation in Europe³¹².

One of Næss's main reasons for adopting Gandhi's ethics of non-violence is his attempt at finding the conflict centre as well as discerning between topic and person while attacking the deeds rather than the doer (Næss 2005II: 423), (Næss 2000: 7). Næss's significant argument for adopting Gandhi's ethics concerns showing how solving conflicts by distinguishing between deeds and doer is a crucial representation of what it means to have a rich life with simple means.

According to Næss, if the average people are content during the leadership process with reporting their intuitive conclusions and these conclusions are contradicting to each other, the chances for a common initiative become much lower (Galtung and Næss 1955: 22). Such a difficulty can be avoided if the leaders provide a relatively firm and explicit normative system, which they to refer their conclusions to, namely, a reference framework which their actions to be formed in (Ibid). This system of norms can never replace a practical judgment and reasonable considerations because there is no reason to want this. That is why we do not have to take up only main norms (and a part of sub-norms of a second order), but also many norms on levels

³¹¹ In this context, a significant problem arises from Gandhi's definition of non-violence (ahimsa). Gandhi himself allowed many exceptions to ahimsa (in his early writings) that scandalized Hindus and Jains arguing that "all killing is not *himsa*" (Gier 1996: 87). Due to the fact that Gandhi's ahimsa is described as reactive and flexible, not as passive and absolute (Ibid), he accepts that some tigers, snakes, and rabid dogs might have to be killed if they threaten human life. Then, the question which arises is how can we compare Gandhi's implicit ethical gradualism with Næss's one? Ahimsa in Gandhi's sense is personal and refers to everybody. Only a perfect yogi should pacify danger animals. However, Gandhi does not exclude the possibility to sacrifice nonviolence for the sake of truth. That is why I argue that within Gandhi's ethics of non-violence, truth is justified as the highest value since it is a value in itself, which is irreducible to Næss's epistemological truth.

³¹² Galtung argues that the book *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age* (1965) displays "Næss's peace studies program: as Gandhi studies"³¹² (Ibid), taking into account that the definition of the international conflict in the 1950s was still referred to the traumas of the Nazi occupation. One of the most crucial questions at that time was *Can non-violent defense replace military defense?*; a question, which was answered by Næss in his program (Ibid). While *Gandhi's Political Ethics* (1956) was written to satisfy the interest of the general audience *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age* is described by Galtung as both being "at a much deeper theoretical level" and today's key source for Næss's work on Gandhi (Ibid).

three and four (Ibid). In the end, we will have a certain type of a complete teaching about all life's connections, which are relevant for the political ethics (Ibid). In turn, the reduction of the intuitive conclusions is done not as a process of complete annihilation, but rather for the purposes of providing a dissection of the normative validity.

Presuming that "descriptive-constitutive research" needs different helping means such as historical psychology, Næss claims that albeit intuition³¹³ and pure practical judgments play a significant role, there would be more achievements if one looks for a logical and analytically elaborated form of work (Ibid: 25). The preference to normative validity over intuition contributes to clarifying the positive connotations of so-called ethical validity³¹⁴ (etisk gyldighet) (Ibid). However, it looks like that the validity in question is "at its place" to classify the main "descriptive-constructive work with political ethics as a research", despite the fact that it includes statements of ethical validity (Ibid). According to Næss, when these statements are justified (by discussing their consequences), it would mean to complying them with the possibility to break the norm (Ibid).

In this context, I argue that the double bind understanding of the concept of ethical validity derives from Næss's attempt to rehabilitate the role of ethics in building ethics of non-violence in Gandhi's sense as well as from his intention to define the aforementioned descriptive and normative components as a matter of a hypothetic-deductive set of procedures. Rehabilitating normative validity of ethics would lead to avoiding the specification that the aforementioned grounding norms should be ethical ones rather than statements having ethical validity. The latter is an influence of Næss's interest in semantics at the expense of ethics, especially when he argues that some illuminative ethical categories are not ethical ones since we can use the different meanings of the words while defining them.

³¹³ Regardless of this statement, Næss keeps the vague definition of the normative validity of intuition. He disenchants the speculations that a teaching, established by a "son of the East" such as Gandhi, is not accessible to the one who uses analytical methods. That is why Gandhi's teaching should be captured by intuition (Ibid: 31). However, as Næss shows, Gandhi builds a very structured, in a logical sense, system of norms, which to guide our non-violent behavior.

³¹⁴ Næss emphasizes that political ethicists should propose something, which is ethically valid: "It should be building sentences, which introduce something as a first normative joint in the ethical groundings" (Ibid). He claims that we can discuss whether such an ethical validity is a part of the research itself (Ibid).

2.4.1. Gandhi's Conception of Truth (Satyagraha)

As one of the most important contributions of Gandhi's ethics, we can outline his psychology of so-called way of truth (satyagraha). The absolute truth is not a category, but an eternal principle, i.e. God, as Næss points out (Næss 2000:59). *Ahimsa* is not only non-violence, but also a whole world of meanings: that is why we cannot discern ethics from the search of meaning. On the other hand, from the fact that Gandhi exercises non-violence with 'scientific preciseness', it does not follow that truth in the sense of *ahimsa* (non-violence) is achievable by epistemological means alone. According to Næss, if truth is not related to the process of self-realization, then, the experience of non-violence would turn into an empty dream (Ibid) ³¹⁵. A proof in favor of this theory can be found in Næss's interpretation of Gandhi's statement that truth is an engagement, which can be adopted by the non-believer as well (Ibid: 69) because it (satya) implicates love and solidness (graham) (Ibid: 77). In this context, Næss suggests to distinguish between essential, practically political and essential ethical foundations (Ibid: 75) claiming that the meaning of the political arguments in Gandhi's theory comes from the restrictiveness of the ethical ones. Adopting such a classification, however, does not explain how we can evaluate the opponent's whole situation, unless our imagination is involved, which to guarantee the process of empathizing.

One of the most significant projections of the ethics of non-violence is that it changes the understanding of victory as a goal-oriented win. The new type of victory is based on the premise that to win the opponent is not done for the sake of the win, but rather for the sake of the cause as such (Ibid: 39). That issue is also relevant to the aims of deep ecology movement while trying to impose ecopolitics, especially when the latter aims at avoiding the degeneration of radical biocentrism.

In this context, I argue that the systematization of Gandhi's theory is determined by the idea of self-realization, which, as developed in Næss's writings, is more Næssian than Gandhistic (as Galtung also points out), especially in terms of recognizing what it means to clarify the role of truth. A crucial problem of Næss's interpretation is that the feeling of friendship is left aside of the normative system as something, which is supposed 'to

³¹⁵ Næss talks about Gandhi's search for the core of the conflicts by demanding a matter-of-factness in its ethical meaning (Ibid: 103).

come naturally' (Ibid). Such a premise leads to one even more questionable conclusion, namely, that there is no normative obligation in the "search for truth" and the realization of non-violence respectively (Ibid: 56). Næss argues that the most difficult thing in Gandhi's ethics is to understand his norms rather than how violence should be 'read' as a moral problem (Ibid: 64). If we follow Næss's logic, it would mean that in the best possible case, we can define a certain type of informed consent, which would be applied in an epistemologically successful way. However, it would be done regardless of the specificities of the target groups, namely, regardless of the uniqueness of the moral commitments that should be made in the socio-political discourse.

Judging by the aforementioned arguments, I claim that both Gandhi's and Næss's theories are based on justifying a particular type of holism whose prototype characteristic is the integrity of the people involved since people is understood as a collective subject, whose integrity depends on, albeit it is irreducible to the integrity of the given individuals. Integrity itself derives from clarifying the presumption that every single subject is always a participant and addressant of interaction³¹⁶.

Comparing Næss's and Kvaløy's receptions of Gandhi's ethics, I draw the conclusion that Kvaløy provides more complex classification in terms of analyzing Gandhi's principles of *satyagraha*. Næss only points out that the norms regarding the grasp of truth contribute to understanding the groups and the opponents (Ibid: 80-82), but he does not clarify how the sensitivity towards otherness can be cultivated in order the premise of judging one's deeds alone to be recognized as a normative premise. In turn, Næss refers to Kvaløy who stresses that ecological conflicts can be solved from 'beneath', namely, by increasing the sensitivity towards ecological conflicts as such (Ibid: 84).

³¹⁶ Regarding the integrity in question, it is important to both justify and specify the image of so-called mass man in social psychology (Ibid: 26-29). Ethics of non-violence can be adopted by the collective subject as well as by given individuals, albeit the process does not have quantitative aspects alone (i.e. to proceed in the process of evaluation starting from one to many), but also qualitative ones. He extrapolates Gandhi's theory that one can exert non-violence since every single subject is not only a participant, but also a spectator (Ibid: 26).

3. HOW ‘DEEP’ ARE DEEP ECOLOGY, ONTOLOGY AND DEEP ECOLOGY MOVEMENT? AN OVERVIEW

Most of the contemporary debates on environmental politics took place against the background of the arising challenges concerned with the global environmental crisis. Næss opens his illuminative book *Ecology, Society and Lifestyle (Økologi, samfunn og livsstil)* (1973) with a chapter on the seriousness of the situation clarifying the role of the ecocrisis by describing the situation as such (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 1). While in his previous writings he has been arguing in favor of living in harmony or in favor of living in equilibrium with nature, later on he started to talk about ‘balance’ (Ibid: 32). In this context, Næss claims that a significant part of the aforementioned crisis is that we have made ourselves dependent on the situation, which decouples us from ourselves as ecological beings (Ibid). He points out that the problem is similar to the one in war, i.e. it is no longer *How much can we afford?*, but *How much is needed?*³¹⁷ (Ibid: 278).

According to Næss, environmental crisis brings not only negative consequences, but also positive ones making us aware about the possibility of introducing a new criterion of progress and rationality by giving “a new start, new social forms of commonly shared life” (Ibid: 35). Thus the quality of life would begin to include not only what one has, but rather what he/she feels, which in turn presumes some minimum regarding what makes one be together with the others (Ibid: 36).

However, rehabilitating the role of situational thinking does not mean that Næss advocates a certain kind of situationist ethics to be adopted, but that the reconsideration of the idea of cognitive rationality reflects upon the un-

³¹⁷ This statement, however, is accompanied with the problematic clarification that one of the most dangerous ways of thinking about the environmental crisis is to think about it as carrying a consensus between the big countries (Ibid). The latter might be a problem if the consensus in question underrates the voices of the other countries, which want to speak with their own voice.

derstanding of the situationism itself by rethinking its normative validity. Then, within the framework of the latter, the concept of balance would become irreducible to the one of harmony. In a similar way, the concept of intuitionism would be irreducible to the concept of irrationality as such. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the understanding of environmental crisis in Næss's sense is driven by the collapse between two different modes of dependence on the situation, namely, between the ones of living standard and quality of life.

However, Næss pays special attention not only to the negative consequences of ecopolitical desirability, but also to the positive ones³¹⁸, i.e. how can we overcome the environmental crisis by building politics and a way of living so that to preserve as much as possible of Earth's richness as well as the diversity of living forms including the human ones (Ibid: 238)? The solution is seen in justifying meaningful, intensive connections with them in so far as the objective to achieve the preservation of the deep cultural, human living forms (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, the 'positive' aspects concern both the philosophical reconsideration of rationality including normatively valid intuitionism and the goals of ecopolitics, namely, that the deep ecology's role refuses the metaphor of man-in-the environment giving priority to the ones of man-in-the ecosystems and politics-in-the ecosystems (Ibid: 231). Furthermore, one of the advantages of adopting such a politics affects the generalization of most ecopolitical questions, i.e. the transformation of the ones of resources, quality of life and consumption to the questions of resources, quality of life and consumption 'for' (for) somebody including not only humans but also other living beings (Ibid).

In turn, the impact of deep ecology on ecopolitics in Næss's sense is based on revising the normative connections between means and goals in so far as the means are no longer recognized as instrumental tools, but rather as dialectically referring to the successful fulfillment of the goals as such. According to Næss, we should ask ourselves what are the means and what are

³¹⁸ However, some concerns arise from his statement that in global politics, which strives for achieving an ecological harmony, we should strictly discern between this, which is needed and this, which is desired understood in the sense of something that is not directly connected with what is needed (Ibid: 181). Such a definition is rather focused on the negative aspects of the desired described as a surplus, which does not necessarily concern the vital needs and vital interests respectively. On the other hand, it is desirability that helps the neglected role of the interests in question to be reconsidered, so that we cannot presume that what is desired has negative connotations alone.

the goals in the political fight respectively, striving for establishing responsible environmental politics, which to be a criterion for environmentally responsible politics (Ibid: 232). As a main criterion, he outlines the need of introducing a long-term local, district-sensitive (*distriktsmessig*) regional, national and global ecological sustainability (Ibid). Judging by his investigations, I conclude that it is the latter that can positively affect the debate on environmental protection versus industrial development.

Distinguishing between so-called deep and shallow ecology movements, Næss claims that we should talk about supporters rather than members of (or participants in) the deep ecology movement (Næss 2005i: 87) because the concept of deep concerns the ecophilosophical aspect of the movement (Ibid: 89). If we equate deep ecology with deep ecology movement, it raises the risk the supporters of deep ecology to be restricted to the ones who support the movement in question. It is also important to clarify that Næss does not equate deep ecology with Ecosophy T arguing that the latter is only one of the many possible personal ecosophies, while one of the aspects of the deep ecology approach is associated with the joyful acceptance of the relationship with nature (Næss 2005c: 14). In turn, referring ecology's approach to Gandhi's ethics of non-violence by presuming that we should judge people's actions and not people themselves (Ibid), Næss specifies that deep and shallow concern the argumentative patterns rather than the evaluation of the supporters as such.

According to Gamlund, deep ecology and deep ecology movement are often defined as synonyms in the environmental literature (Gamlund 2012: 230). In addition, the concept of deep ecology is interpreted in a narrower sense for the purposes of realizing a philosophy due to which Næss's deep ecology platform³¹⁹ and deep ecology movement to come to life (Ibid). In this context, Gamlund argues that we have one concept with a double bind meaning referring to both the philosophy in question and its historic background (Ibid: 231). He emphasizes that Næss is very careful using these two concepts, adopting the one of deep ecology movement for the broadly determined ecological grassroots movement, which strives for a political grounding on environmental principles and holistic way of thinking (Ibid). In

³¹⁹ Gamlund finds an analog of Næss's deep ecology platform in Rawlsian model regarding common morality in a multicultural society. This model is determined by norms and values that are accepted with an overlapping agreement by all sides (Ibid). However, such a consensus concerns only a given societal type, while Næss's one appeals for a broader societal network, which means that Rawlsian consensus can be referred rather to level four than to level two of Næss's Apron diagram.

turn, the concept of deep ecology is mainly referred to clarifying the one of Ecosophy T (Ibid).

The differences between deep ecology movement and shallow ecology one are examined by comparing the ethical and ecopolitical effects regarding the development of environmental issues in space and time, namely, where, how and to what extent they can be used for the purposes of building one constructive ecopolitical program. While the principles of deep ecology movement can contribute to formulating such a program, the ones of shallow ecology movement cannot since they provide a certain degree of fragmentarization in Næss's sense, which stems from the discrepancy of ethical, ecological and political principles in a long-term perspective. One of the main methodological problems concerning Næss's analysis of shallow ecology movement is that looking from a human perspective does not necessarily lead to strong anthropocentrism in so far as even the 'shallow' movement can successfully cooperate with the one of social justice. However, Næss claims that only deep ecology movement asks what kind of society should be the best one for maintaining a particular ecosystem. It is defined as a question of value thinking for politics and ethics (Ibid: Note 215), but from that it does not follow that shallow movement's solutions deny the role of politics and ethics as such. On the contrary, I argue that both deep ecology and shallow ecology movements address the social transformations as a desired objective, but merely the addressing from an ethical perspective provides radical changes³²⁰.

Some arguments in favor of this thesis can be seen in Næss's explanation how nature's sources are examined as resources by the representatives of shallow ecology movement. However, the emphasis on using some resources does not necessarily lead to a wrong exploitation of them on side of human beings. Furthermore, the habitat of all living beings, which is kept for their own sake, does not contradict the need of exploiting nature's sources in some border line cases. The contradiction arises if the exploitation is justified by presuming the unquestionable normative validity of 'at

³²⁰ Due to W. Fox's interpretation, the distinction between deep and shallow is explored from the perspective of transpersonal ecology against the background of the anthropocentric attitude towards conservation (Fox 1999: 153). Regarding deep ecology, its influence is found in replacing the figure/ground boundaries with a holistic (or a gestalt) view, i.e. the latter is recognized as a certain "total field conception" (Ibid: 153-154). In turn, the shallow ecology movement is characterized in G. Sessions's theory as implying "discrete entity metaphysics" (Ibid) due to which "the dominant metaphysics of mechanistic materialism" provides a total isolation of ethics.

the expense' mode, i.e. some sources, which are turned into resources, to be always explored as a result of an axiologically negative process. It is problematic to claim that introducing ethical gradualism for the aims of ecopolitics is a matter of contradicting choices of value priorities, which in turn would lead to contradicting man's well-being and nature's one.

Another comparison is the one concerning the connection of deep and shallow ecology movements with the idea of growth. In this context, I argue that while the shallow ecology movement accepts the ideology of economic growth (so-called resource management, or resource conservation), the deep one aims (according to Næss) at replacing the ideology in question with the one of ecological sustainability (Fox 1999: 155). In this context, the objective regarding the process of rehabilitation is how to live in a given place developing a sense of belonging as well as how to dwell and care for the place itself³²¹.

Some other important ideas concerning the need of partly contradicting deep ecology and shallow ecology movements can be seen in the conceptualization of the ideas of progress and cultural diversity (Næss 2005e: 44-45) since Næss relevantly describes the unifying Western perspective as a unilateral one by giving priority to cultural anthropology.

However, we should give priority not only to cultural anthropology, but also to ethics in education, with a special emphasis on education in environmental ethics. A good example in this direction can be found in what Næss claims about education and scientific enterprise, which shows how cultivating increased sensitivity is inevitably concerned with rehabilitating the idea of distributive justice, albeit Næss does not precisely formulate it in that way. He keeps talking about the role of education in providing non-consumptive goods as well as about such consumables from which we have enough for all, understood as a way of implementing sane ecological politics (Ibid: 45).

Regarding the level of normativity, as explained by Næss, the preference to deep ecology movement should be done for the sake of encouraging the development of fundamental normative orientation by contrast to the shallow

³²¹ In this context, Fox emphasizes Næss's specification that many who can be characterized as adherents to the principles of deep ecology do not necessarily describe themselves as supporters of the philosophy in question. Næss prefers to talk about supporters of deep ecology movement, or even about supporters of other movements who agree about the deep ecology platform, without being necessarily engaged with the tasks of the deep ecology movement as such.

ecology movement, which either stops before reaching the fundamental stage, or jumps directly from the fundamental premises to the particular decisions (from level one to level four of the Apron diagram)³²² (Ibid: 49).

In turn, the definition of deep ecology movement as preserving the biospheric equality, since the principle of living and blossoming is “an intuitively obvious axiom” (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 50), raises the question whether it is relevant to adopt some of Næss’s concepts such as ‘intuitive value axiom’ (or axiom anticipated on the principle of intuition)³²³. Taking into account that intuition as such contradicts the concept of axiom, the only option is to refer its functioning to the one of practical wisdom in Næss’s sense, as it is defined in Ecosophy T.

Furthermore, presuming that deep ecology is justified through the process of deep questioning, I argue that the latter benefits understanding the equal right of the organisms to live and blossom ‘from within’, as grounded in so-called by Næss ‘obvious value axiom’ (Næss 2005b: 8). Coming back to the axiom issue, I claim that the axiom in question becomes understandable since it is based on two principles, which are outlined by Næss, namely, on the ones of self-regulating diversity and symbiosis embodied in Næss’s formula “Live and let live!” (Ibid). In this context, I draw the conclusion that the latter is a mode of being, which grounds the normative validity of every single realization of the organisms as a formula for self-realization.

³²² If so, however, the latter stance contradicts Næss’s statement that shallow ecology movement finds solutions within the existing policy alone without looking for new ones. This issue will be examined in detail in the chapter on Apron Diagram.

³²³ The notion of axiom does not presume any intuitive knowledge whatsoever.

3.1. Normative vs. Deductive Aspects of Ecosophy and Deep Ecology Movement

Furthermore, it is the normative validity of deep ecology that prevents deep ecology movement to be justified by induction from its principles as well as ecosophy to be recognized as a philosophy of wisdom whose prototype characteristic is keeping ecological equilibrium untouched (Ibid: 11)³²⁴. In turn, the differences cannot be explored as differences in facts alone, but also as ones regarding the priority of values, which would benefit justifying the process of derivation as one of the main principles supporting Næss's formula 'Live and let live!'. One of the significant problems regarding ecosophy is how can we ground the normative validity of the different ecosophies, when their value priorities are not only different but also contradict to each other, providing different views on how wisdom is embodied?

In this context, I argue that an important common feature of deep ecology and ecosophy is that they both rely on a certain type of "rough approximations of global systematization", which means that they should be a subject to a common type of verbalization, as Næss suggests (Ibid: 12). Similarly to the distinction between so-called hard and soft technologies, Næss provides the one between hard and soft methodologies (Næss 2008d: 167). In the diagram showing the systematization of Ecosophy T, Næss points out that it is inspired by empathy (Ibid), albeit he also argues that there is no room for the ethical and normative priority in this scheme (Ibid: 169). The problem derives from the fact that he contradicts again the processes of logical and axiological derivation equating the idea of normative validity with the one of generalization. If it was merely a process of transformation from more general to less general statements, then every single norm should have been justifiable by logical procedures alone. In turn, the definition of logical, which is determined by Næss, in a fairly wide sense, would have easily been subjected to misinterpretations³²⁵; for example, self-realization would have been defined as the "logically deepest principle", as he argues (Næss 2008d: 113) rather than as a normative process. The misrecognition stems

³²⁴ It is summarized by the formula "Self-realization for all beings!" (Ibid).

³²⁵ Næss supports the deliberate use of vagueness and ambiguity to achieve multiple interpretations (Næss 2008: 169).

from Næss's statement that the basic views on values are neither less, nor more justifiable than the basic rules of logic and science (Næss 2005m: 181), which in turn affects the simplification of the top norms due to the logical need "to stop somewhere" (Ibid: 182), as I already showed. On a macro methodological level, the potential recognition of ethics as a part of a total premise-conclusion pyramid, as Næss suggests, would lead to reducing it to a causal system, where normative validity is discredited to outlining that the logical connections do not necessarily imply ethical relationships.

Related argument is that from the fact that various interpretations are needed, it does not follow that we have to encourage ambiguity, as Næss claims, especially when we have to question the framework of anthropocentrism by examining concepts such as vital needs and vital rights, which have obvious ethical implications. Furthermore, another serious concern derives from Næss's conception to prescribe a higher validity to "non-normative" than to normative as such in so far as there is a preponderance of non-normative in a normative system (Næss 2008: 175). According to him, the validity of derived norms depends on the validity of the non-normative assumptions (Ibid). However, the hypothetical character of the derived norms does not question the need of adopting norms. On the contrary, it contributes to revealing why we can talk about a noncontradictory process of derivation in normative terms rather than about supporting a methodology with absolute norms.

Deep ecology system itself is described as grounded in some premise-conclusion chains for which the depth of the premises is of crucial importance (Næss 2005d: 21). According to Næss, deep questioning is described as a process of problematizing that is also illuminative for Ecosophy T (Ibid: 22). However, I argue that from the perspective of 'whys' and 'hows' characterizing deep questioning, it does not follow that the normative validity and performativity are set in a noncontradictory relationship, namely, that every single sentence about normative issues has a clear normative validity. Such a double bind interpretation of the connection between normative and non-normative would lead to misrecognizing the descriptive as normative. Næss presumes certain closeness between deep ecology questions and the silly ones. By silly³²⁶ he means questions, which seem to look silly only at first sight, while in the process of deep questioning, they have an intrinsic value as well as a creative function (Ibid: 24). On the other

³²⁶ It is described as being on 'millimeters' away from 'trivial' and 'conventional' (Ibid).

hand, since deep ecology is determined as grounded in a derivational system (Næss 2005e: 48), Næss relevantly claims that this pyramidal model shares only few features with the hypothetical-deductive system. One of the main problems of such an interpretation is that he does not specify what the ethical implications of the aforementioned system are.

Instead of discussing the role of sentences about the process of communication, it would be more relevant to discuss norms (including top norms) and their verbalization. We should also keep in mind that we do not move from 'is' to 'ought to' mode, as Næss suggests (Ibid). Otherwise, deep ecology would not have been based on deep questioning having uncontradictory normative validity. Another methodological question is why the obligation to take part in an action to challenge policies³²⁷ (Ibid: 48-49) can be examined as an obligation at all, in the sense of asserting that life is considered as having a higher priority (in normative terms) than the policies' changes. Similar concern is that the process of derivation in Næss's sense is explored in purely quantitative terms, i.e. from unity to multiplicity, in so far as intensifying the principles of variety is a statement with a very low rank, as he suggests; a statement, which, however, contradicts the one of keeping diversity unattached (Ibid). There are few propositions on the top of the pyramid, a great variety on the middle level, and innumerable recommendations at the bottom (Ibid: 49).

In turn, Ecosophy T is defined as based on two hypothetical assumptions. Due to the first one, there is no level on which living beings to be unable to reach the realization of their highest potential, while due to the second assumption, there is no limit in the development of the symbiosis as such (Næss 2005f: 134). According to Næss, life and nature with a capital letter do not exist independently of the living beings. Preserving richness and diversity of life can be recognized as a top norm, which presumes to cultivate moral intuitions in so far as the complexity of the 'web of life' requires Ecosophy T to release extreme suffering within the framework of culture³²⁸ (Ibid: 135). The practical implications of the latter concern the maximum realization of some other living forms, which is important to the extent to

³²⁷ In logical terms, it is considered to be at the lowest level of derivation because it is derivable from principles, which are 'higher up' in the pyramid (Ibid).

³²⁸ In this context, an important point made by Næss is that the principle of universalizability can be kept merely by addressing suffering within a given cultural framework, or frameworks (Ibid: 135).

which we should keep in mind the distinction between diversity and plurality (Næss 2005ff: 592).

On a macro methodological level, the aforementioned investigations affect the way Næss determines self-realization as a top norm as well as how he grounds the hypothesis that the higher the level of self-realization is, the bigger increase of others' self-realization we can witness (Næss 2005l: 137).

What are the epistemological aspects of ecosophy as extending the boundaries of the knowledge as such? Næss suggests distinguishing between three concepts, between T1 (ego triggering the process of realization), T2 (the one of self-realization), and T3 (concerning the self-realization with a capital letter) (Næss 2008b). Judging by Næss's arguments, I claim that ecosophy is supposed to question the normative validity of knowledge by developing our intuition about reality in order to understand the enormous complexity of the planet as well as the one of ourselves since we need a new type of knowledge³²⁹. That is why I claim that only if we presume that the intuition has a certain normative validity, we can determine in a non-controversary way ecosophy's wisdom as related to practice. Næss characterizes wisdom in question as wisdom, which does not have an exclusively ecological foundation that presumes the unity of all living beings in so far as ecology does not specify the aspects of conservation" (Næss 2008d: 100).

The main reason for announcing that "I feel at home in Ecosophy T" is defined by Næss as both didactic and dialectic (Næss 2005e: 52). Thus the methodological connection with deep ecology can be described as deriving from the feeling of situatedness, which contributes to better understanding the knowledge about biosphere as a home. However, I also point out that it is more relevant to talk about 'ethical' rather than 'didactic' reason for the purposes of showing more explicitly that the grounding of normative validity is related to the process of ethical evaluation. That is why Næss adopts Socratic approach in raising ecological issues as well as using Ecosophy T as a foil (Ibid). In Næss's chart, self-realization is justified as a fundamental norm (Ibid: 52-53)³³⁰ because keeping the plurality of living potentials is crucial for retaining biospherical equilibrium. In this context, an important note should be made for the purposes of clarifying whether Næss considers

³²⁹ However, the main problem is still how to uncontradictory define the normative validity of this intuition, taking into account that Næss determines its functioning as both moral and a-moral, as I already showed.

³³⁰ In Fayerabend's terminology, Ecosophy T is defined as "Gedankenlaborat" (Næss 2005aa: 505).

‘systematical’ as (non)equivalent to ‘collective’, which to be understood within the framework of life’s manifestations embodying performative potential. He proposes the term of collectivity, when he has to choose between maximum self-realization and maximum symbiosis. If the process of self-realization is interpreted in favor of producing so-called colossal ego trips, the symbiosis is examined as an elimination of individuality in favor of collectivity (Ibid: 52). In the next sentence, Næss argues that it is “viewed systematically”, not individually (Ibid), which raises the question whether both terms are adopted as interchangeable ones³³¹.

The symbiosis itself has much to do with defining another top norm, namely, the one of Diversity! (Ibid: 53). According to Næss, the latter should function as a norm, which is “more fundamental” than the one “Self-realization for every being!”(Ibid). Then, the norm “Maximum symbiosis!” can be characterized as deriving from the presumption that maximum diversity implies maximum symbiosis. The aforementioned “more fundamental” norm of Diversity! is recognized due to the fact that it has performative power per se, while the one of self-realization for all beings is accepted by anticipation (Ibid). That is why I emphasize that we should rely on the role of moral commitment and cultivation of becoming in respect with others if we want to refer to Næss’s imperative Diversity!, Self-realization!, Symbiosis!, and skip the maximizing part of it³³² (Næss 2005cc: 533-534, Note 9). On the other hand, we could reveal that the concept of symbiosis³³³ does not question the one of complexity. However, there are some internal relationships that do not support the process of self-realization, as Næss claims. Otherwise, if we examine complexity as a simple sum of mutual relationships, it would mean to go back to the question which ones are more important than the rest. Furthermore, defining the connection between complexity

³³¹ This use can raise many questions regarding the performative power of the aforementioned symbiosis, e.g. the latter to be misrecognized as a maximization of well-being.

³³² Complexity alone cannot yield an increase in self-realization. It is Ecosophy T that makes complexity opposed to complication.

³³³ An interesting specification on a social level is that complexity and symbiosis maximizing diversity are “on the common ground” with classless society (Ibid) since the latter also depends on the self-realization of all beings guided by the principle of non-exploitation. In turn, I argue that “the extreme appreciation of diversity” (Ibid) is not definable as an ‘extreme’ one in both qualitative and quantitative terms, but rather in the ones of intersubjectivity whose aim is to support cultural diversity in the future.

and diversity is possible if we avoid the disadvantages of reducing the qualitative evaluation to a system of preferences made on a quantitative basis.

In this context, Glasser discusses so-called depth metaphor claiming that the difference between deep and shallow can be outlined as deriving from Næss's empirical semantics and communication theory (Glasser 1999: 362). One of the main aims of deep ecology is described as articulating the general level of argumentation accompanied by one's willingness to consider a wide range of policy alternatives (so-called general TO-sentences and the derivation itself) (Ibid: 362-363). In turn, the metaphor of shallow is characterized as treating the symptoms and not the causes being grounded in the technological optimism and economic efficiency, by contrast to deep approaches, which involve people in the process of systematical questioning (Ibid: 365). However, it remains unclear to what extent the "healthy skepticism of technological optimism" (Ibid) can trigger social transformation merely in the process of deep questioning. That is why I argue that we can accept the semantic criterion of preciseness, understood as being always context dependent (Ibid: 367), but only as a necessary condition when the misunderstandings might arise as a consequence of the possibility of "ascribing different statements to the same expression", as Næss argues (Ibid). The contradictions can be semantically conceptualized, but they rather represent conflicts having ethical or socio-political origin due to which the way of verbalization is only a way of making them visible³³⁴.

³³⁴ Glasser's own arguments regarding the lack of such a derivation (from logical to normative one) concern the way of problematizing deep ecology as well as the role of policy in Næss's writings. He also emphasizes that "it does not logically follow that particular policies advocated by the opposing approaches will always be in opposition" (Ibid: 368). Furthermore, Glasser relevantly outlines that Næss underscores the attempts to motivate a response to the ecological crisis solely through ethical appeals (Ibid: 369). In this context, one of the main arguments against Næss's scientism is that so-called 'objective' science cannot impose principles and ecologically responsible policies by itself because the calls for action require some normative premises to be justified.

3.2. Næss's Definitions of Vital Need, Vital Interest and Vital Right

Another serious problem regarding the simplified version of moralization is how ethical gradualism to be contextualized in environmental politics. In the field of the latter, a certain gradualism mainly affects the issue how to define which vital interests are “more”/“less” vital against the background of the intuition that all the individuals have the same right to live, as Næss claims (Næss 2005g: 67). However, discussing this issue by adopting the distinction of ‘more’/‘less’ leaves us trapped within the paradigm of quantitative instead of qualitative evaluation. In turn, remaining on the level of examining economic status provokes some methodological difficulties because then the debates in question would be explored as restricted to the contradictions between industrial and nonindustrial communities. Adopting such an approach does not benefit understanding how the developed countries would be convinced to give priority to ‘the real vital needs’ of the developing ones in Næss’s sense. Extrapolating the concerns about this interpretation raises again at least two main difficulties, namely, how would the subjects be recognized as subjects having vital needs as well as how can we avoid examining the needs in question beyond the paradigm of objective naturalism³³⁵? Furthermore, how can we behave in a morally relevant way, when we should compare and contrast different types of needs including both vital and non-vital ones?

Vital needs themselves are defined by Næss in respect with having minimum conditions for self-realization in so far as the minimum is recognized in terms of biological, environmental and social needs (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 182). Another puzzling interpretation, which indirectly follows from Næss’s ambiguous presumption of leaving vital needs deliberately vague (Næss 2005l: 39), is the one of unquestionable ‘application’ of intuition while justifying the connection between intrinsic values and basic

³³⁵Næss presumes that the “right” subject is the one of the nonindustrial community whose vital needs should be evaluated as a criterion of defining others’ needs as ‘more’ or ‘less’ vital outlining the reference to local, regional and national particularities (Næss 2005ee: 568-569). However, he does not examine the cases when the members of the aforementioned communities are also inclined to exert inappropriate practices such as the ones, which are not driven by the need of satisfying vital needs (for some culturally determined purposes), but which provoke the conflicts by the invasion of the vital needs of industrial communities.

rights. According to Næss, the concepts of own value and right are adopted to describe an intuition and inclination towards life's intrinsic value understood in the light of belonging to the world (Ibid: 184). Due to this intuitive understanding, all the individuals have the right to live; our closest vital interests have equal priority, which in turn explains why the interest conflicts concern the issues of vitality and closeness (Ibid: 185).

Even if we accept the definition of the aforementioned minimum, it does not explain yet what we should do if/when two different 'minimums' contradict, which would lead, on a practical level, to the accomplishment of a given self-realization at the expense of another one³³⁶. On the other hand, if both intrinsic value and basic right are intuitively examined, it would mean that they are ontologically substitutable, which raises many problems as well. One of the most apparent concerns would be that such a definition brings us back to a vicious circle. We would neglect the fact that both vital and non-vital needs and vital and non-vital interests determine the sense of belonging, which, however, does not mean that we can examine them as a part of a situationist ethics.

³³⁶ I claim that the hypothetic-deductive mechanism does not have a normative validity by default.

3.2.1. The Definition of Right in the Deep Ecology Platform

3.2.1.1. Some Receptions of Næss's Definitions of Environmental Value and Environmental Right

According to Tom Regan, rights should be interpreted from the perspective of preservation principle, which means that the latter should be regarded as a moral imperative of non-interference and non-meddling (Regan in Watson 1999: 110). Næss himself anticipates such a definition of non-interference as a passive one, but also as applicable to the every-day life (Næss 1999: 125), i.e. as a practice related definition. Adopting the definition, however, does not contribute to minimizing the risks of substituting natural rights with the ones by nature. Such a risk is pointed out by G. Sessions who reveals another important aspect of the problem, namely, the one of initial determination of 'is-ought' distinction as a crucial premise for the obstacles, which ecosystem ethics faces while relying on utilitarian grounds or grounds, concerned with rights and obligations (Sessions in Watson 1999: 111). Extrapolating Sessions's statement about the implications of the Commoner's third law 'Nature knows best!', I argue that it is important to outline the genealogy of interfering what is right with what a natural right is (Ibid: 110). His analysis throws light on how 'it is right' mode, which benefits preserving integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, turns into a main principle of the being mode³³⁷.

Judging by these investigations, I claim that the problem of rights in Næss's sense is intrinsically connected with the one of activeness, which is irreducible to a set of given activities in so far as the preservation of nature is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the process of self-realization. Furthermore, I argue that it remains unclear how natural right can inflict justice since it is based on redefining the concepts of same/equal rights within a complex matrix, where justice is not both ontologically and epistemologically dependent on natural rights. Otherwise, it would have meant

³³⁷ Among many critical arguments, the ones of Watson should also be examined in detail. Exploring Næss's theory of rights, he focuses on the five principles of anti-anthropomorphic biocentrism (Ibid: 113-114). The moral imperative of ecosophy is that human beings do not have the right to alter the equilibrium. However, the imperative in question functions as an ethical rule rather than an ethical imperative. Another ambiguous aspect of Næss's theory is that the process of non-interference is literally understood without presuming the possibility of transforming the idea of non-interference as such.

that the question of normative validity of natural rights³³⁸ can be recognized by adopting the principle of extended analogy with the human rights. Thus we would have faced already mentioned difficulty in ascribing rights to all living beings³³⁹ regardless of their rational, moral and legal capabilities³⁴⁰. Another alternative is to examine natural rights as independent of justice, but then, it would lead to problematizing the idea of right as such.

In turn, the concerns regarding the aforementioned law of nature are determined by Næss as stemming from the misconception of the pre-established moral order (Næss 2005w: 387). That is why the law is interpreted in contrast to what is written about human justice. According to Næss, the latter is irreducible to the law of nature, but the way of examination is a vague one recognizing environmental justice as a “long-range issue” (Næss 2005gg: 598-599). Furthermore, he claims that increasing environmental justice depends on how the sufferers define the status of what a ‘satisfactory’ environmental justice is (Ibid: 604). However, if we want to inflict a certain change, the idea of exerting injustice would also change. Striving for eradicating the latter, Næss goes back to the concept of vital needs simplifying it to the ideal presumption that desires can be benevolently reduced at the expense of rehabilitating the needs in question, which is possible if we rely on one presumably pure intuition. At the same time, Næss claims that justice is important to outline the role of enlightened self-interests of both humans and animals (Næss 2005bb: 516-517), without specifying how we can actually avoid defining the latter from the perspective of moral relativism.

Related crucial point, which negatively affects Næss’s understanding of the concept of right against the background of adopting general principles to new moral perceptions, is the one of misleading egalitarianism in applied

³³⁸ If Næss had explicitly recognized gestalt ontology as ontological ethics, his contradictory expression of “being normative by nature” (Ibid) would have been substitutable with the one of “intrinsically normative”. Thus we could have clarified why we should talk about “value priority system” as an ecosophical rather than ecological system.

³³⁹ A good specification can be found in Reed and Rothenberg’s critical remarks upon Næss’s theory of interests. They argue that the analysis in terms of establishing interest identity would not make us able to dispense the differences because solidarity and respect cannot be understood as processes of eliminating otherness (Reed and Rothenberg 1993). Reed and Rothenberg claim that we need a concept of other, which to be justified as interrelated to the one of self, but also the latter to be recognized as a separate being in his/her own right (Ibid).

³⁴⁰ Some alternatives in this respect are formulated by G. Skirbekk, which will be discussed in the chapter on his environmental philosophy.

ethics, namely, that everyone in general and no one in particular can bring moral perceptions, as he points out (Næss 2005r: 241)³⁴¹. In this context, one of the main problems concerns the overexposed potential of the concept of moral responsibility due to which the number of the people involved, and not the moral motivation³⁴² as such, is justified as a criterion for the normative validity of the responsibility itself. Thus the effect to reach a moral consistency is recognized as only one fragment of ethical reflection (Ibid: 242).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that most concerns arise not only from Næss's vague definition of what a vital need is, but also from the unclear justification of the concept of right. The latter is contradictory determined by Næss due to the fact that right is recognized as "to do what is in one's power" (Næss 2005w: 389). This statement can easily lead to establishing an authoritarian type of society, where the power is exerted as a right of the ones who have more power to dominate over the less powerful ones.

In turn, French relevantly criticizes the evaluation of the interests from a deep ecology's point of view. The latter derives from the inconsistencies of ethical idealism in theory and ethical gradualism in practice, which, however, is dominated by power and raw necessity (French 1999: 128). I argue that this contradiction stems from the lack of justified normative validity of vital needs and their embodiments on both levels of Næss's theory. French himself discusses the separation of moral principles from practice (in the field of biospherical egalitarianism), which is done at the expense of some 'utopian abstractions' that "exert no decisive normative weight" (Ibid). The decisiveness, however, does not necessarily mean an unquestionable definition of normative validity to be adopted in so far as the latter is irreducible to the criteria of verification, namely, to whether one criterion is true or not. It can be true, but still deprived of the necessary normative validity it needs. In this context, French defines biospherical egalitarian ethics as a utopian one since it fails to provide normative guidance in decision and action (Ibid). Emphasizing the ambiguity of Næss's writings, he suggests avoiding

³⁴¹ He refers to E.C. Hargrove's statement (Ibid).

³⁴² In this context, he reaches the contradictory conclusion that altruism is primarily motivated by duty as well as that ethics is reducible to a certain type of thinking (Næss 2005dd: 549).

talks about ‘moral differences’ in value, while Devall and Sessions argue that the latter can be interpreted as “equal in intrinsic worth”,³⁴³.

On the other hand, the question is whether the definition of ‘no moral differences in value’ can be automatically interpreted as ‘equal in intrinsic worth’. R. Taylor provides a hint in this direction claiming that we should talk about the same inherent worth (Taylor in French 1999: 133), but the latter should be analyzed within the equality paradigm. This interpretation raises the problem whether ‘the same inherent worth’ would be quantitatively or qualitatively analyzed since the idea of equality has different embodiments depending on the choice of ethical and socio-political paradigm.

However, accepting a line of thoughts based on the recognition of what factual property is raises the risk to go back to the point that human beings are ‘factually’ more developed than other species. Thus the analysis of the concept of inherent (intrinsic) value can tacitly turn into specifications of one generic term due to the fact that we can find living beings for which it is difficult to say whether they have a value in themselves (e.g. one-cell organisms). On the other hand, accepting this speculation would mean that we rely on a wrong induction since from the fact that some living beings cannot be morally engaged, it does not follow that they do not have an intrinsic value at all, albeit the value in question might not be a matter to reflection on their side.

³⁴³ An alternative interpretation can be seen in Jon Wetlesen’s thesis who claims that we should discuss whether to talk about intrinsic, inherent value or instrumental one (Wetlesen 1999: 405). He defines the problem as deriving from whether things are valued due to their states or achievements, i.e. due to what they have rather than what they are, which favors teleological rather than deontological ethics (Ibid). Wetlesen defines two types of teleological ethics – one consequentialist and one holistic. While the former denies, the latter affirms that actions or persons may be ascribed an intrinsic value as a matter of their own right (Ibid: 410). The intrinsic value within holistic teleological ethics is based on the assumption of the highest good and final end of human actions (Ibid: 411). As Wetlesen claims, and we can agree with him, one weakness of holistic ethics is that it easily invites accusations of authoritarianism (Ibid: 414). In this context, he argues that the holistic aspects of deep ecology should be incorporated as a “supplementary ethical consideration” (Ibid: 414-415). Referring to Wetlesen’s interpretation, I argue that providing a distinction between moral person and moral agent (Ibid: 409) requires further elaboration in so far as this criterion revives again the idea of factual property. Wetlesen states that humans and non-humans have a value in themselves because their states of well-being and flourishing also have values in themselves (Næss 1999f: 418). In turn, Næss accepts the definition of values in themselves, albeit he disagrees with Wetlesen’s specification of intrinsic and inherent values. On the other hand, Næss agrees with Wetlesen about the role of deontological and teleological ethics stating that we may direct duties towards animals.

Even if we presume the ideal case, namely, that one species is a subject to moral treatment on side of another one due to the hypothetical sentience of the latter, we cannot guarantee that the species in question would exert this capability even when it does not 'lack' it. Furthermore, even if we presume that a class of moral agents is a sub-class of moral persons, as Taylor suggests (Ibid), we cannot define the status of the rest without contradictions, i.e. we do not have unquestionable criteria of justifying what it means to be a 'potential moral subject'.

A related problem is that the principle of exclusion does not lead to avoiding speciesism in so far as it is based on an incomplete induction. Excluding some species does not contribute to expanding the scope of the moral persons³⁴⁴ in Taylor's sense to the other species. On a macro methodological level, it does not solve the problem of 'Whose justice? Which rationality?' in the process of evaluation. That is why providing an extrapolation by analogy from human to non-human beings in Wetlesen's sense³⁴⁵ (Wetlesen 1999: 415) should be taken seriously into consideration because the non-humans can never become moral discussants nor can they become moral agents.

³⁴⁴In this context, I argue that Wetlesen interferes the idea of right to live and blossom with the one of intrinsic value, as Næss does in so far as value itself is not a synonym of right, but a necessary condition for defending the latter. Furthermore, we should clarify that the value of well-being and flourishing is irreducible to an instrumental value, but, on the other hand, we cannot justify the values in themselves by ascribing them to some self-sufficient states either. If hedonism has had such a value, it would have put in question the idea of inherent value, as understood by Wetlesen. On a macro methodological level, one of the main concerns arises from the fact that neither does Næss's conception of deontological ethics contribute to clarifying the problem, nor does Wetlesen's theory provide more convincing arguments by favoring teleological ethics. That is why I conclude that Næss faces serious difficulties in both introducing and recognizing the role of ethical gradualism because including other species as moral subjects does not benefit revealing the normative validity of the value in question, nor does it favor deontological ethics at all.

³⁴⁵The extension in question is recognized as a basis of both internal and inherent values but in two different ways (Ibid).

3.3. Is Næss a Bio-fascist? Deep Ecology and the Problem of Population Reduction

In this context, the problem of population reduction, as examined by Næss, raises some serious difficulties in terms of rehabilitating the connection between the exploitation of nature's sources as resources and the requirement to go beyond the framework of the deep and shallow ecology movements for the purposes of questioning radical biocentrism. According to Næss, reviving the issue of controlling the population reduction is a necessary step for preserving nature³⁴⁶ emphasizing that the problem of the increased population is proportional to the choice of technologies. That is why the bigger the population is, the softer the adopted technologies should be (Næss 2005i: 85)³⁴⁷.

While according to the ideology of the shallow ecology movement, the inevitable evil is interpreted as exertable on the other living beings, due to the theory of deep ecology movement, the focus is put on the fact that it comes on man's side, which raises the need of elaborating a long-time prevention policy. Regarding time and space, however, evil is defined by Næss as inevitable. Furthermore, in both cases it is recognized as deriving from one and the same aspect of the industrial society, namely, from the one of economic profit, albeit Næss does not go into detail about the embodiment of its mechanisms in the industrial society by outlining how prevention can contribute to cultivating collective socio-political responsibility.

According to Næss, population reduction should be considered as a result of liberating habitats (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 199). He prefers to examine it

³⁴⁶ While Næss provides vague solutions to how the problem should be treated, Wetlesen introduces a mathematical scheme of calculating the number of the "constant optimal population" (Wetlesen 1974: 126). One of the main methodological problems, which arise from his interpretation, is that he interferes the descriptive with normative premises, albeit he generally supports their distinction. The result is that Wetlesen appeals for planning in politics, which to be built on descriptive resources and population accounts, keeping in mind (minne ut) the normative resources and the population budgets by relying on a statistical mapping (Ibid: 129). However, I argue that it is not obligatory the geometrical progression, based on descriptive calculations, uncontradictory to lead to a normative one, which to imply the population to be restricted to a constant number. On a macro methodological level, it means that the normative validity of 'optimal' is not necessarily both derived and referred to the notion of 'constant', especially taking into account that the humankind cannot be examined as a simple sum of limited, or unlimited, number of individuals.

³⁴⁷ The issue of population reduction is examined within both deep ecology and shallow ecology movements, albeit it has been contextualized in a different manner.

as reaching an optimal population arguing that we should fight against the “future imperialism” (fremtidimperialismen) (Ibid: 206) built on the overconsumption of resources as well as on the growing process of annihilating nature. In this context, Næss emphasizes the difference between deep ecology and the Greens as one regarding the impact of the population on the rich countries saying that we should admit to ourselves that the gradual reduction of population is necessary from an ecological point of view (Ibid: 236).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that there is no objective goal of reaching a given number of living beings that may depend on the existence of five billion of them, as Næss claims. It is another proof in favor of the thesis that the quantity cannot be used as an argument in inflicting reduction. Extrapolating Næss’s investigations³⁴⁸, I argue that it is better to affirm a certain type of constructive pessimism (or provocative pessimism in von Wright’s sense) rather than supporting morally ungrounded optimism. Even if we adopt the ‘act now’ mode and try to ground it in a long-term perspective, it does not mean that this mode should be ethically justified. In other words, there is no basic contradiction between the number of human population and the one of the other living beings, nor is there a correspondence in exact numbers that should be reached. We also cannot rely on Næss’s stance that nature is more diverse than human species due to the presumption that the latter is a single species (Næss 2005r: 231). The next question that comes out following from such a line of arguing is why should we protect biodiversity at the expense of the human kind, which is also a part of it?

I draw the conclusion that the strategies, which ecological colonialism is based on, as stated by Næss, inflict a change in the quality of life that does not necessarily presume population reduction. If the exploitation of nature’s resources is examined as a matter of reducing the living standard for the sake of raising the quality of life, then we do not need to talk about population stabilization, which to require reduction in numbers. Furthermore, if the issue of stabilization is explored within a broader framework, which to be focused not only on preserving the number of the other living beings, but also on the socio-economic, cultural, and last but not least, ethical aspects of the stabilization in question, then the change in the habitat would no longer be recognized as the only one necessary and sufficient condition for the aforementioned reduction.

³⁴⁸ Næss argues that the optimum population could not be defined in respect with humankind alone (Ibid: 241), which, however, does not mean that the minimum human population should be merely anticipated in quantitative terms.

3.3.1. The Anti-fascist Character of Deep Ecology and Cultural Pluralism

In turn, it is important to clarify that Næss's theory of population reduction is not an appeal for introducing biofascism³⁴⁹ or ecobrutalism, as some representatives of social ecology (such as M. Bookchin) claim. Næss defines the anti-fascist character of deep ecology for the purposes of avoiding the strong to prevail over the weak ones (Næss 2005j: 93). He provides some arguments against attributing a supreme value to a given ecosystem. In this context, Næss claims that point one of the deep ecology platform, regarding the intrinsic value of nature, is an anti-fascist position (Ibid: 95). He relevantly outlines that 'every' is not equivalent to 'all', so that by reducing the preference to only one ecosystem, we cannot necessarily avoid the wrong justification of speciesism. Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that the question of relative importance is not similar to the one of intrinsic value because they concern different ontological and axiological projections³⁵⁰.

From an epistemological point of view, Næss faces some difficulties in disenchanting the priority of one ecosystem supporting the recognition of radical bioegalitarianism. He refuses to rely on the distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric leaving it deliberately vague in order to overcome the accusations that he gives priority to non-humans alone.

Referring to Kant's imperative³⁵¹, Næss stresses that no living being should be treated merely as a means (Ibid: 97). In this context, we should justify not only how we should avoid using others as means, but also how we should avoid treating them as means for the sake of someone's self-realization. For the purposes of overcoming the risks of introducing a certain speciesism, we go back to the idea of cultural diversity in Næss's sense,

³⁴⁹ I also claim that the ambiguity of the question regarding population reduction is seriously affected by Næss's willingness to leave point six of the deep ecology platform, i.e. the one of vital needs "purposely vague" (Næss 2005m: 170). Adopting his approach does not explain what can provoke the "change in the attitudes" Næss talks about if we want to achieve an optimistic vision for the future (Ibid).

³⁵⁰ Furthermore, I argue that the anti-fascist character of deep ecology becomes apparent on level four of Næss's Apron diagram, where the decision-making pluralism is unquestionably manifested (Ibid: 96).

³⁵¹ This statement contradicts his general views on deontological ethics while criticizing Kant.

which should be ascribed to so-called first order commands specified while discussing point two of the deep ecology platform (Ibid: 99). The main concern, as Næss himself argues, is that some cultures have a basic intolerance towards others (Ibid). Even if examine the problem on the level of the first order commands, it remains unclear how to normatively discern these cultures from the ones supporting equality and diversity as well as how to uncontradictory interpret and apply the idea of intolerance as a 'basic feature' of a culture since, as he insists, culture is not something static.

Related concern is driven by Næss's thesis that there is a necessary correspondence between the population reduction and the increasing natural/cultural diversity (Næss 1999d: 223). He adopts a different rhetoric, namely, the one of population stabilization, which, however, does not contribute to seeing the issue in a less questionable way.

Dispersing moral responsibility while making such decisions follows the same logic like the one of achieving ecological sustainability in Næss's sense. That is why I claim that in both cases we talk about utopian scenarios since population reduction is determined by Næss as prolonged in time, when the big number indicating far future is used as an excuse for blurring the responsibility for making moral decisions. Næss argues that a new kind of sustainability can be achieved in minimum five hundred years (sometime in the 21st century) (Ibid: 224). On the other hand, he points out that reaching this stage is a utopian project, but if so, how could we justify such a radical moral choice, keeping in mind that Næss distributes the vagueness of vital needs to the one of the cross-generational change?

3.4. The Deep Ecology Platform

An important specification is that all points of Næss's deep platform can be examined as derivatively connected to the principle of ethics of responsibility, which, according to Næss, discerns deep ecology movement from the shallow one (Næss 2005b: 9). However, we should keep in mind that introducing responsibility as a criterion does not mean that shallow ecology movement is irresponsible; it rather means that a complex responsibility may trigger long-lasting ecopolitical changes only if it is interpreted within the paradigm of ethical gradualism.

According to Næss, the eight-point platform (that seems to be accepted by all supporters of deep ecology movement) is a set of "fairly general and abstract statements" (Næss 2005f: 58). It is explained in the process of verbalization, namely, by putting words to views that people always had, but had not expressed (Ibid). These statements represent an attempt at emphasizing something, which can be accepted by most supporters of the deep ecology movement on a general or abstract level³⁵² (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 219). Næss calls his points "tentative formulations" for protecting the planet (Næss 2008: 100), but not principles (Ibid: 105).

However, Fox argues that justifying this platform is not a matter of introducing a deductive or inductive system because it is a matter of a general worldview systematization (Fox 1999a: 171-172). Furthermore, from the process of logical derivation it does not follow that the formulations could be automatically anticipated. It is also necessary to outline that the platform has been a subject to numerous revisions in time, also by Næss himself, which illustrates why understanding the genealogy of the aforementioned formulations requires the development of their normative validity to be investigated.

At a later stage of his research, Næss sent the eight-point program to differ-

³⁵² He does not specify what the difference between general and abstract is.

ent people³⁵³ such as scientists, journalists, politicians, who to help him in clarifying the intrinsic value of biosphere (Næss 2005m: 151-153). If we accept point one, speculating whether the intrinsic value of nature is a value in itself, or a narrow human concern, it would mean we to remain trapped in the discussions about giving preference to big over great. Then, we could argue that human concerns are ‘big’, but not necessarily ‘great’. Otherwise, there would be an increasing risk to support a questionable version of ethical anthropocentrism³⁵⁴.

In this context, I argue that one of the contradictory definitions is the definition of ‘narrow’ in point one. Næss clarifies it by examining how mature human beings should rejoice in the wholesome treatment of other beings (Ibid: 159). His comments accompany Ødegaard’s thesis who points out that we should talk about value for human beings rather than value independent of them (Ibid: 158). Going back to the discussions about big versus great, I claim that exploiting while utilizing nature can be characterized as ‘great’, if the exploitation in question is determined as having value in itself, i.e. if it is presumed as being ‘big’ in terms of value. A hint in this direction can be also seen in Næss’s writings, who specifies that the only good supplement is when we distinguish between means satisfying the need and the need itself (Næss 2008: 113).

Furthermore, he outlines that the clarification of human need as specified by J. Tveit requires to problematizing the employment of the term demand rather than the one of need (Næss 2005m: 160). However, the idea of life cannot be used as an argument in this respect because not every single de-

³⁵³ According to Glasser, deep ecology approach focuses on transforming environmental policy by helping the individuals to develop more reasonable, well-informed and consistent policy positions (Glasser 1999: 361). He outlines six points in the deep ecology approach, which would be discussed below, namely, the stress on the total views recognized as broad, all encompassing philosophical systems that incorporate ontology, epistemology, semantics, ethics and social philosophy. Glasser also emphasizes the role of normative-derivational systems, certain type of deep questioning, “loose derivation”, the use of particular ultimate premises for a “wide identification” as well as the deep ecology platform (Ibid: 361-362). Furthermore, Glasser argues that it is the focus on praxis including reasons and actions that separated deep ecology platform from the more traditional and descriptive inquires into ecophilosophy.

³⁵⁴ One of Næss’s arguments against blurring the boundaries of this discussion is that talking about ecosphere instead of biosphere (for showing that we are not concerned about forms of life in a narrow sense) is not a better immunization against narrowing the role of value as such (Næss 2008: 112).

mand is based on a vital need. Næss also emphasizes that in green economics, there is a distinction between need and demand on the market (Næss 2005p: 206).

Regarding point two³⁵⁵, which concerns the intrinsic value of richness and diversity of forms of life (Næss 2005j: 99), Naess provides the relevant conclusion that they do not have to be understood in terms of contents alone because the philosophy of conservation also represents a certain type of ecophilosophy, namely, one that develops attachment to a place as a home. As Næss argues, maintaining both species' communities and their traditional places presumes understanding 'traditional' in the sense of habitats (Næss 2005m: 153).

Concerning point three, some of the main questions, which are formulated by Næss, are the following: *What can be done there?* and *What can be used there?* (Ibid: 162). I argue that regardless of the fact that these questions are not of a similar rank, they do not contradict by default. *What can be done?* can be interpreted as a question that is provoked by appreciating the need of exerting a policy of conservation. Introducing the aforementioned questions as separate ones, we can merely show that they have a different performative potential. On the other hand, relying on such a comparison does not contribute to revealing the differences in the normativity validity³⁵⁶.

The definition of the term 'right'³⁵⁷ in point three of the deep ecology platform (Næss 2005m: 163-4) concerns so-called "intuitive response to the ethical aspect of natural law". According to Næss, this acceptance on based on the analysis of the expression of 'right to' (Ibid: 164). In this context, relying on the vague normative validity of the aforementioned response is strengthened by Næss's statement that we should connect the rights and interests, which in turn would mean to accept for granted that the "mature

³⁵⁵ Point two addresses the role of cultural diversity and so-called first order comments (Næss 2005l: 99).

³⁵⁶ In turn, point five is scarcely discussed. Næss does not outline some objections, but he also does not provide suggestions in showing how to solve the environmental problems on the level of ecopolitics (Ibid: 168).

³⁵⁷ Regarding the definition of right, Watson argues that Næss goes back to Spinoza's theory looking for arguments in favor of his statement that every being may have the right to do what is in its power (Watson 1999: 111-112). Judging by the latter, Næss provides the interpretation that it is 'right' to express your own nature "as clearly and extensively as natural conditions permit" (Ibid). In this context, claiming that rights are a part of a separate moral order is a fiction (Ibid).

members' deepest interests are not destructive" ones (Næss 2005n: 187). A statement that would bring us back again to defining the concept of deep in respect with the one of vital needs. That is why I claim that recognizing such a connection is possible if we presume that deep interests are satisfying vital needs alone.

On a macro methodological level, the crucial importance of specifying the problem of rights derives from the need of clarifying what French finds problematic in Næss's biospheric egalitarian approach while talking about "*equally* inherent moral value" (French 1999: 127). Instead of introducing the ranking procedure of interests proposed by French, I argue in favor of ethical gradualism in order to reveal the significant role of vital needs in practice. Næss claims that biocentrism does not imply any devaluation of human beings (Næss 1999e: 230), but such a development becomes a fact if the moral issues are used to be examined from an epistemological point of view.

On the other hand, the question to what extent we can interpret the concept of 'same' right as one of 'equal' right is relevantly posed by Næss. However, he does not find a satisfactory answer in his writings. Næss emphasizes that we should be particular in specifying under what circumstances life's richness is possible in general (Ibid), but he does not go into detail what are both the ontological and epistemological differences in fact³⁵⁸. Differences, which would give us grounds to avoid replacing 'equal' with 'same' right because specifying the problem of rights has a significant influence on defining the role of environmental ethics by going beyond the frame of anthropocentrism³⁵⁹.

³⁵⁸ Næss's preference to the use of the concept 'same' over the one of 'equal' in the 1990s is also justified in a quite vague way too (Næss 1999c: 146).

³⁵⁹ On the other hand, Næss does not take into account a significant argument, which is well explicated by Watson, namely, that if we want to question anthropocentrism by isolating human species, it would mean to justify radical biocentrism that does not differ too much from anthropocentrism, giving priority to a given species alone. Watson argues that if we absolutize the problem with sameness, we should presume that being worse, man is not like the others (Watson 1999:115), and thus we will end up with a new kind of speciesism. Furthermore, we should be aware of what Tyler Miller calls the task "to give up our fantasies of omnipotence" (Ibid: 110).

3.5. The Apron Diagram

According to Næss, within the framework of Apron diagram, the fundamental premises and ecosophies represent a rich diversity of fundamental views, which are compatible with the platform of deep ecology movement (Næss 2005h: 75). That is why Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism and Ecosophy T are placed on one and the same fundamental level (on level one) of the diagram, albeit they substantially differ in the worldviews they support (Næss 2008: 105). In this context, I draw the conclusion that the lack of a common ethical presumption, which to be explicitly stated as a fundamental one, inevitably leads to ethical pluralism in the sense of relativism on the level of ecopolitical decisions (on level four of the diagram in question). However, from the latter it does not follow that all ecopolitical solutions would be environmentally friendly, nor would the environmentally unfriendly ones be immediately recognized and excluded from what successful ecopolitics should look like, if there is even the slightest chance pluralism to be interpreted as imposing relativism.

In turn, the clarification of deep ecology platform on level two is important for outlining the process of transition from the fundamental premises to the decision-making procedures. According to Næss, the eight-point platform does not have to be misconceptualized with the process of establishing ultimate premises (Ibid) in so far as the supporters of deep ecology movement are supposed to be motivated by their philosophical and religious beliefs from which, however, does not follow that their decisions are determined by the platform³⁶⁰ (Næss 2005j: 98). As Næss points out, the diversity on level one is a strength since there are no deep cultural differences without diversity on the level in question (Næss 2005h: 79).

A serious concern, however, arises from Næss's theory that the explanation of the Apron diagram follows logical, and not genetic relations, between terms, which are based on articulated relationships between premises and conclusions³⁶¹ (Ibid: 75). On a macro methodological level, one of the main

³⁶⁰ Næss claims that the eight points are never meant to describe the core of deep ecology (Reed and Rothenberg 1993) because they should illustrate the functioning of "some other movements" as well (Ibid).

³⁶¹ The relationship in question is more precisely defined by Jon Wetlesen as a relation between normative premises and normative conclusions, which cannot be derived from the ones of scientific ecology (Wetlesen 1974: 92-93).

problems derives again from the difficulties how to prove that the differences in the fundamental premises (on level one) do not trigger contradictions on the level of so-called general policies as well as how to prevent the decisions (and the consequences respectively) (on level four) to be inconsistent because it would lead to questioning the process of derivation as such. If unity is merely determined on level two (Ibid: 77), as Næss argues, it would mean that this unity has a higher normative validity than the fundamental premises, which are different from each other. Therefore, we should claim that the potential lack of normative validity does not concern the mutual inconsistency of the premises, but rather their embodiments in different contexts, which support different worldviews. On a macro methodological level, the problem is how to avoid the inconsistencies' deviation to supporting uncontrollable disagreement on level two as well as on the levels three and four³⁶².

Remaining on the level of derivation, it would mean that the deductive approach to ethics helps merely the 'clear' connections between the different levels to be outlined by skipping the ones that presume the contradictions to be constructively anticipated for the sake of rehabilitating the concept of diversity. In other words, following the epistemological derivation, we would miss the point that what is considered as noncontradictory in logical terms may turn out to be contradictory in ethical ones, as I already argued. Furthermore, if the process of derivation does not presume a measurement of value priorities, as Næss suggests (Næss 2008: 110), then, how can the normative validity on level two be considered as uncontradictory determining the actions on level four? Referring to some 'intuitive norms' in Næss's sense is not a solution either. If we presume that the process of derivation is grounded in some intuitive norms, a new question arises, namely, how can we justify the logical transition from top norms to the rest? If the process is based on our intuition, it would mean that we may face serious disagreements not only on levels three and four, but also on level two. On the other hand, if the logical derivation only partly (or only sometime) coincides with the ethical one, then we cannot argue that there is an unquestionable (in the sense of being normatively noncontradictory) decision-making process on level four.

³⁶² Furthermore, if we remain within the paradigm of logical deduction, how can we recognize the agreement about the beliefs on level two as based on the ones on level one, and at the same time, to postulate diversity on level one and unity on level two, taking into account that deriving from diverse premises would lead to recognizing diverse conclusions?

According to Næss, an important specification concerns not only the ontological lack of contradictions on level one, but also the agreement that we cannot jump from level two to level four because the normative validity of the latter should be mediated by the facets of level three (Næss 2005h: 79). However, I argue that the normative connection between the diversity of the premises on level one and the cultural diversity on level four is not necessarily based on the process of derivation. This connection is a necessary but not sufficient condition especially in terms of deriving the premises-conclusions pyramid, a fact, which is also stressed by Næss (Ibid: 81).

Another methodological problem regarding the process of derivation is provoked by Næss's statement that providing such a logical derivation from levels one to four is accompanied with a motivational one following from levels four to one (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 222). Næss gives the example that we can make a decision, which is not fully conscious, emphasizing that the two ways of connecting, namely, the logical and motivational ones, can be explained as interconnected "with the help of a mandala" (Ibid). On the other hand, the statement about their dialectical interrelatedness contradicts the next one in which Næss excludes the role of so-called genetic relations at the expense of the logical ones (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, it would mean that the more basic the logical groundings are, the less motivational they are, and the other way around. The more motivational groundings should be justified as less logical and abstract³⁶³.

In turn, the requirement of having level three between level two and level four is another proof in favor of the thesis that Næss implicitly looks for a normative derivation, which has the logical determination only as its necessary but not sufficient condition. Næss claims that level three is the only one that can be skipped in some rare cases, albeit it plays an important role in mediating between levels two and four (Ibid: 227). However, even if the adopters are also focused on levels three and four, as Næss suggests (Ibid: 228), can we be sure that they would not absolutize their engagements on levels one and two? Næss himself does not take into account these risks presuming an ideal case in which all the levels are available, as well as that normative derivation coincides with the logical one.

³⁶³ Introducing the idea of mandala as an explanatory mechanism remains without clarification. Regarding the scheme provided by Næss, it corresponds to Heraclites's theory of the two ways, but here we have two ontologically different perspectives, which cannot be transformed into each other. Otherwise, it would have meant that at given stages, they have different normative validity.

Furthermore, the problem is extrapolated to the one arising from Næss's statement that we may have disagreements on levels three and four. Then, he claims that the most "remarkable similarities" are seen again on these levels (Næss 2008: 111). However, if shallow and deep ecology movements sometime reach an agreement on level two, and then the differences come out merely on levels three and four respectively, what would be the status of their ultimate premises? There are two possibilities. The first one is that the ultimate premises of the shallow ecology movement are not similar to the ones of deep ecology movement, but then, it would be impossible to specify under what circumstances we can reach an agreement on level two. The second option is that that deep and shallow ecology movements derive from similar fundamental grounds, but then the question is how can 'shallowness' be defined as justifiable on level two? In turn, it would mean that we cannot define the process of deep questioning as a fundamentally different one.

3.5.1. The Modifications of Gandhi's Scheme in the Apron Diagram

Aiming to reveal the genealogy of Gandhi's ethics of non-violence by referring to his teaching and life, Næss makes a schematic representation of the connection between the different sides of the teaching in question and some other corresponding systems (Galtung and Næss 1955: 28). At first sight, this scheme represents levels, which are later seen in the Apron diagram. Since the reception of Gandhi's ethics of non-violence is not one of the main objectives of the current research, I will focus only on two aspects of Næss's scheme. On level A, we find all the teachings, or all the people who can follow Gandhi from level two to level three (i.e. from his general statement of politics to his special instructions for acting) (Ibid), but who cannot accept his background as well as his deep premises. As an example in this respect, Næss points out many Western pacifists.

However, Gandhi's background examined on the first level of the Satyagraha column (Ibid) cannot automatically be referred to level one of the Apron diagram, albeit it might be considered as corresponding to Næss's Ecosophy T. Otherwise, two main questions arise. First, do we have good arguments to call Gandhi's philosophy an ecosophy in Næss's sense? And second, what would be the criteria for calling every single vision a personal philosophy, and if so, how can we justify the normative validity of the latter?

In turn, level B "covers" the ones who still consider themselves as following Gandhi's concrete instructions, but who previously disagreed with, or were indifferent to the attempt to ground them by adopting a normative system (Ibid). Næss gives an example with India's fight for freedom claiming that the political leaders can accept the situationally determined statement of a political and ethical kind, without recognizing themselves as Gandhi's students (Ibid). According to Næss, political leaders can do so since they see *satyagraha* as the only one technique, which can be imposed over the Brits (Ibid). In this context, I argue that there are some concerns regarding the example as well. If the political leaders accept *satyagraha* not as a principle, in a normative sense, but only as a strategy, it would mean that we have a consensus on level three, and not on level two (if we extrapolate the main principles of the Apron diagram), which is crucial for Næss. Thus, in the case with India, we face consensus on level three defined regardless of the consensus on

level two, which provokes similar actions on level four. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I do not encourage making direct parallels between this scheme and the Apron diagram regardless of the fact that the scheme as such is useful in a sense that it shows the normative way of derivation, namely, how Næss's thinking has been developed in time in terms of specifying the issue of normative dependence.

4. THE ROLE OF GESTALT ONTOLOGY. THE THREAT OF BIOCENTRISM WITHOUT ETHICS

4.1. Næss's Definition of Gestalt. Some Methodological Specifications

Analyzing Næss's theory of gestalt ontology is of crucial importance for understanding his biocentrism, namely, why one of the advantages of adopting gestalt ontology is to show how ontology supports the complexity rather than complication in Kvaløy's sense³⁶⁴. In this context, it is necessary to analyze what Næss means by saying that deep ecology emphasizes complexity (Næss 2005b: 9). I argue that complication also has a gestalt and that is why it is so easy to wrongly replace it with the gestalt of complexity. According to Næss, we should explore why gestalt is irreducible to the concept of pattern (Ibid) in so far as it determines the way of living including both the modes of continuity and discontinuity of the selves. That is why I claim

³⁶⁴ On a macro methodological level, rehabilitating the role of responsibility would affect encouraging the broader perspective on understanding complexity, namely, it would affect deep ecology movement revealing the processes of complexity rather than the ones of complication in Kvaløy's sense. Extrapolating Kvaløy's theory of complication in respect with complexity, as understood by Næss, would mean that the principles of ethics grounding deep ecology movement could be interpreted as based on the rehabilitation of the intrinsic values of natural rhythm and organic coherence, while the ones of shallow ecological movement could not be uncontradictory referred to the principles regarding accelerated industrial tempo and technological coherence. The lack of explicit ethical principles in Næss's theory, however, may lead to imposing the model of complication since the prognostic functions would be limited to accomplishing non-vital interests in the fast run race.

that by relying on gestalt ontology³⁶⁵, Næss justifies the global character of the ecosystems without making them abstract since the use of gestalts implies the principle of universalizability to be adopted.

On a macro methodological level, gestalt ontology in Næss's sense contributes to uncontradictory introducing the idea of deep ecology as a total view. In turn, the understanding of total view is described as a premise, as Næss suggests, that can be provided by engaging with deep ecology movement as a response to environmental crisis³⁶⁶ (Næss 2008: 25). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the concept of 'total view' displays Næss's attempts to compromise 'good' with 'big' modes whose crossing point should be the policy of building sustainability, or what later is called by Næss gestalts of living and aging.

In turn, the word 'total' can be considered as synonymous to 'gestalt', when we need to indicate the coherence of the experience of the subject, the object and the mediation for the purposes of outlining the objective character

³⁶⁵Næss emphasizes the role of Spinoza's holism, which he adopts for the purposes of his own theory of gestalt thinking. It is the thinking in question that is recognized by Næss as a necessary condition for outlining the similarities between Spinoza and the research in ecology (Næss 2005w: 393). However, Næss is also aware of the problem that how man to reach symbiosis with all living beings is not one of Spinoza's main goals. Focusing on the idea of realizing symbiosis, Næss points out that the better understanding of the right "to live and blossom" presumes the reconsideration of some gestalt relations as well as the role of intuitive interaction to be taken into account (Næss 1999:143). Thus the crossing point between Spinoza and deep ecologists could be sought in the mechanisms of elaborating the gestalt maxima "all things hang together". However, Næss leaves the question why we cannot predict the long-term effects of a particular action (if this slogan is a gestalt slogan) open (Næss 2005w: 386) relying on Spinoza's theory that man is unable to understand the "common order" of Nature (Ibid).

³⁶⁶ It still appears together with concepts such as 'broader view' based on a deep questioning.

of experience, which comes from nature³⁶⁷ as well as due to the requirement of avoiding misleading subjective interpretations, while discussing the experience of gestalts (Ibid: 76). On the other hand, we should take into account that the view in question embodies some ultimate premises concerning the principle of ‘unity in diversity’, which is adopted for the sake of performing already examined formula ‘Live and let live!’. The latter is defined by Næss against the background of Gaia theory as a basic unit in which every living being has an intrinsic value (Næss 2005c: 18). In this context, Næss’s gestalt ontology can also function as giving a general orientation, as Cavazza suggests, namely, as a general orientation with concrete applications that provide a frame of consistency to our world (Cavazza 2014: 30).

³⁶⁷ Næss refers to Spinoza’s definition of *Deus sive natura* (Næss 2005w: 383), an expression, which occurs twice in the preface of part four of Spinoza’s *Ethics*. The process of identification can be outlined by extending God’s influence, which would mean to reinvest nature with perfection, value and holiness in so far as the two roles of God or Nature are equally basic, namely, the ones of being infinite and non-explicable (Ibid). In this context, the implications of gestalt thinking can be outlined on the level of understanding: the more we understand particular things, the more we understand nature, as Næss suggests (Diehm 2006: 24). Within the framework of these investigations, holist way of thinking can be interpreted as establishing gestalt ontology if we examine how the interconnectedness of the parts and whole can be achieved, i.e. how the process can be accomplished by the strive for being in harmony with the dictate of reason as well as in tune with the love of nature determined as the highest good (Næss 2005w: 384).

4.2. The Role of Gestalt Thinking. Main and Subordinate Gestalts

It is ontology due to which the primary properties are considered as *enta rationis*: they are recognized by Næss as characteristics of abstract structures, without being interpreted as contents of reality. He also emphasizes that in the process of gestalt thinking, we should talk about subordinate gestalts, not about parts of gestalt, which is a qualitatively different issue (Næss 2005ii: 120). Næss's interest in this way of thinking is driven by the need of evaluating the normative validity of spontaneous experience (Ibid: 125). That is why gestalt thinking is defined by him as concerning the way of conceptualizing spontaneous experience in principle, which is irreducible to the given contents of spontaneous moments (Næss 2005y: 461). Næss points out that gestalt appreciation is different from the gestalt perception in so far as it affects the better functioning and understanding of the holistic system thinking. On the level of verbalization, the methodological complexity of the gestalts in question is represented as a structured experience, which is "without a full stop"³⁶⁸ (Næss 2005ii: 122).

According to Næss, gestalt ontology is based on three main aspects. First, the subjective, the objective and the mediational should be examined as aspects rather than subunits (Næss 2005y: 462). Second, the contents of reality are indivisible, they are merely separated in the discourse and third, the gestalts are more or less comprehensive (Ibid). Extrapolating his statements, I argue that the third point is crucial for outlining the differences between

³⁶⁸ He discusses the need of adopting exclamation marks saying that the latter indicate 'imperative announcements' However, we should keep in mind that not all the structured experience can be expressed by adopting a performative mode. Næss adds (in his ambiguous way of arguing) that there are other kinds of exclamations without specifying what they are going to be used for (Næss 2005ii: 122). The point is that Næss wants to emphasize the normative validity of the statements regarding gestalt experiences, but due to neglecting the role of normative validity as such, he vaguely justifies the reduction of the validity in question to a set of verbalized sentences. On a macro methodological level, Næss reaches the problematic conclusion that from the fact that gestalts as experienced realities "have *appeal*", it follows that they are not neutral (Ibid: 122-123). This speculation leads us back to the problem of reconsidering the normative validity within the paradigm of ontological ethics.

the gestalts of complexity and complication³⁶⁹. In the turn, there is an increasing risk in the industrial societies the gestalt of complication to be defined as a gestalt with a capital letter due to the misleading presumption of implying higher-order gestalts in Næss's sense.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the gestalts, as defined by Næss, make up reality since they guarantee the normative validity of the contents, which are neither a set of things, nor a state of affairs.

³⁶⁹ However, Næss argues that the ontological “emancipation” of tertiary qualities does not necessarily imply a positive evaluation of the natural phenomena (Næss 2008: 79).

4.2.1. The Different Types of Qualities

Starting with a rejection of the ‘absolutist conception’ of *ding an sich*, Næss argues that concrete contents and abstract structures build reality, as it is in fact (Næss 2008: 73). This turns out to be a result not only of rehabilitating the role of the secondary and tertiary qualities, but also of the reconsideration of so-called primary ones. That is why Næss argues that it is the configuration of the tertiary qualities that gives us grounds to talk about gestalts as contents of reality, which are irreducible to the representations of the contents themselves as well as about nature that is irreducible to a bleak consisting of primary qualities alone (Ibid). Otherwise, we should have looked at the biosphere as a resource of exploitation alone³⁷⁰. On the level of primary qualities, the things in themselves retain their unquestionable entity despite of the bewildering diversity of the secondary and tertiary ones. According to Næss, in the process of development of the Western natural sciences, Galilean days are exceptional, but among the costs we paid for them, it is widely experienced, subjectivised “de-ontologisation” that is recognized within the axiological way of thinking (Næss 1974a: 85). Furthermore, he argues that in our culture, there is a recent tendency of objectifying the models of natural sciences as well as subjectifying both the diversity, which we know by our sense and the diversity of evaluation (Ibid). The tendency is strengthened by the ideology of political economy and the one of everyday considerations (Ibid: 86)³⁷¹.

In this context, we should also pay attention to Næss’s understanding of the internal structural relations in the world, which are different from the abstract structures of science (Næss 2008: 78). The difference between gestalts and abstract structures can be examined as one between internal structural relations and invented ones (ones, which are imposed by science). On a macro methodological level, the question is to what extent the abstract structures of science both correspond and display the internal structural relationships between gestalts. Næss merely claims that the concept of ecosys-

³⁷⁰ In this context, I argue that gestalts in Næss’s sense can be called experiential ones, having experientiality as its prototype characteristic.

³⁷¹ According to Næss, Galilean traditions confuse the instrumental excellence of the mechanistic worldview with the one of holistic philosophy (Næss 2008: 128). The cleavage into the two worlds can be overcome by putting joy, as Spinoza does, as well as by putting other subjective phenomena into the “unified, total field of realities” (Ibid). Thus the latter refers to gestalt ontology understood as an arena of rehabilitated connections between many gestalts.

tem is used to describe abstract structures and that is why the work of deep ecology consists in examining them. However, he does not clarify that the problem with the ecosystems takes place when the abstract structures substitute the gestalts due to the wrong presumption that they are one and the same. The contents are units, which can be filled with different elements making possible the embodiment of the structural experience as such, by avoiding the reduction to the aforementioned representations.

Næss claims that gestalt ontology has an adequate framework, which is not the only one giving uncontradictory philosophical grounding for the deep ecology movement (Ibid: 80). However, his vague idea of methodological pluralism is not supported by providing some other alternatives, and second, it is followed by the contradictory statement that he “knows no better frame of reference” (Ibid). Regarding the principle of systematization, Næss introduces another confusing statement, which requires further elaboration, namely, gestalt ontology does not put in question “the importance of abstract structures such as ecosystems” (Ibid). He neglects the difference between the concept of ecosystem and the ecosystem itself, which also has a gestalt character in so far as it represents a certain kind of structured experience (having secondary and tertiary characteristics)³⁷². Furthermore, regardless of clarifying that abstract structures are timeless and merely reason employs them for a long or short time (Ibid: 195), Næss often underrates the fact that the ecosystems can also change in time not only in terms of their concrete contents (Ibid).

There are also some arguments against the instrumental understanding of gestalts, namely, that we can locate them, but cannot dissect them. It is the rehabilitation of the secondary and tertiary characteristics that contributes to uncontradictory defining gestalts as contents of reality. Næss recognizes the gestalt conception as helping to go even further, i.e. to reconsider not only the role of secondary, but also the one of tertiary qualities as “genuinely real” (Næss 2005y: 464). In this context, Næss’s contribution can be seen in the way he determines what I called experiential gestalts. It is characterized as belonging to a lower or higher order merely via mental dissection, namely, by exerting gestalt thinking, not by finding distinctions in the gestalts as such.

³⁷² As another similarity with non-dualism in Buddhism, Næss points out that in Zen poetry we do not need a subject, mind, nor do we need a consciousness in the form of container (Ibid: 200).

However, it is quite unclear what Næss's reason of specifying the relation between 'opplevelse' and 'erfahrung' is, because they are understood as two types of experience (Light 2009: 218). Another point, which is rarely emphasized, is the one that we can influence the stream³⁷³, namely, that we can anticipate the experienced spontaneity as such, which makes one anticipating the gestalt structures. It is due to the fact that gestalt experience has certain sovereignty since it is not a sum of different experiences. On the other hand, D. Rothenberg outlines that Næss does not specify the gestalt perspective (Ibid: 220), i.e. he does not provide an alternative how the embodiment of the mode of experiential spontaneity not to be considered as both methodological and epistemological paradox.

Furthermore, I argue that gestalt character entails the spontaneous experientiality making possible not only man to interact with nature, but also the other way around. Thus creativity consists in the ontological dependence of gestalt's richness on nature's complexity and vice versa. That is why it is the dialectics of contents that contributes to seeing gestalt ontology in a non-positivist way, namely, to reveal its process character due to which even if we see a patch of yellow and a round shape (to elaborate Næss's conception), it is a thing that is not a thing in itself.

Extrapolating Næss's theory, I conclude that it is gestalt thinking that makes the normative validity of the premise-conclusion chain possible, by contrast to the patterns that merely ground its logical derivation, which in turn illustrates what the difference between deep questioning as problematizing³⁷⁴ and questioning as such is. In this context, I argue that the differences between the gestalts of complexity and complication can be called differences between the gestalts of 'greatness' and 'bigness'. On a practical level, the object of complexity gestalt thinking is complexity of the web of life in Næss's (Næss 2005l: 135), which is indirectly connected with human ability to create "general norms about equal rights" (Næss 2005n: 186)³⁷⁵.

Another argument in favor of introducing moral experiential gestalts is that it does not merely mirror a superior structure. The mirroring is the initial

³⁷³ On a micro methodological level, it shows how the stream has a normative validity, which corresponds to Kvaløy's conception of so-called river time. The latter will be examined in detail in the chapter on Kvaløy.

³⁷⁴ Næss refers to the methods of the Pyrrhonist inquiry.

³⁷⁵ One of the most illuminative examples of complexity gestalts is the gestalt of the mountain Gauri Shankar.

process of an ontological participation of every single living being into the net of biosphere. It shows how the quantitative projections are implemented on the level of qualitative ones so that the small wholes are examined as resembling the big ones. In turn, the logic of replacing bigness with greatness derives from the presumption that something is 'great' as a part of supreme wholes in Næss's sense (Næss 2005cc: 532).

His statement that the micro-cosmos is essential for the existence of macro-cosmos merely displays the epistemological diversity of the principle mentioned above, namely, that big is big not only because it is a part of the supreme, but also the other way around. Supreme can be considered as supreme since it is ontologically dependent on the internal connections between many big fragments remaining irreducible to their sum. Referring to Næss's own specifications, I argue that gestalt ontology justifies the process of logical derivation. If the latter was normatively sufficient, it would have meant that there would not be a difference between "Complete realization!" and "Maximum self-realization!" (Ibid). Næss appeals for replacing self-realization with these two formulas in order to provide more positive evaluations in respect with increasing the potentials' realization (Ibid). On the other hand, completeness and maximum self-realization can be used as ontological synonyms only if self-realization is recognized as a form of moral commitment to the others.

Another important feature of understanding the complexity of gestalts is the role of unity and totality. Many philosophical systems are determined by Næss as a structured experience of total views (Næss 2008: 145). They articulate the deepest insights by structuring them as ultimate premises subjectable to derivation. In all systems, Næss aims at outlining the approach emphasized in the Apron diagram, in order to show that the premises in question represent total views whose crucial importance can be explicated by elaborating higher-order skepticism³⁷⁶ against *docta ignorantia* (Ibid: 145-148). However, the problem is that he sees *docta ignorantia* as an epistemological concern without axiological projections, i.e. as a moral disinterest, which can be countered by explicating fundamental or total frames. The higher-order skepticism should guarantee keeping the unity of diversity. Furthermore, it aims at causing an epistemological turn in systematic thinking, namely, to turn the immediate into a premise of achieving the highest

³⁷⁶ Skepticism is a key issue in Næss's writings, which is briefly explored here.

kind of knowledge. Naess is aware of the paradoxes accompanying the processing of total views (Ibid: 155), but he still refers to that principle.

Næss argues that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Næss 2005ii: 119) because it is a matter of ontological influence irreducible to a certain type of calculations. The projections of experiential gestalt in his sense can be outlined by analyzing the role of gestalt thinking as bringing poetry and science close together (Ibid: 122) in so far as the world view presumes people to make the world subjectable to their experience without making it relative. He argues that the whole of nature is alive and one *individuum* (gestalt) (Næss 2005w: 388), a statement, which still needs to be clarified. Næss refers to the Latin meaning of the word *individuum* (in-divisible), which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for having a gestalt.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the un-divided represents the pattern-stage of the gestalt without necessarily to contribute to its explanation. Nature as such is recognized as a whole and it is un-divided to the extent that it cannot be divided by anything belonging to its entity, nor could it be divided by something external. Every single division regarding nature's entity should be provoked by something 'un-natural' then. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize Næss's specification of what a definition 'in a limited sense' is since nature is unity in diversity, where the latter is determined through the potentiality of dividing, i.e. nature has a being for itself, which is inseparable from the being in itself.

5. WHAT SHOULD ‘DEEP’ ECOPOLITICS LOOK LIKE? THE MISSION OF DEEP ECOLOGY MOVEMENT

Anker describes Næss’s definition of deep ecology platform as a Pyrrhonist one regarding how to ask deeper questions about human relation to the world from a skeptical standpoint (Anker 1999: 434). According to him, deep ecology interacted with the English-speaking community, transforming questions about ecologically sustainable life into principles for living such a life (Ibid: 431)³⁷⁷. Discussing so-called depth of questioning and the connection with deep ecology movement, Næss emphasizes the role of Pyrrhonist aspiration, when he asks questions about self-realization (Ibid: 435), i.e. about being a “seeker on the path” (Ibid: 432).

Regarding Næss’s reception of skepticism, which is also embodied in his Ecophilosophy T, we should take into consideration that he insists on the skeptical way of formulating deep ecology as an open philosophy. On the other hand, if we absolutize openness, how can we ground its normative validity, especially when we discuss some principles of derivation and norms? Finding a certain truth is not a dogmatic endeavor by default, nor can the criterion of verification automatically be equated with the one of normative validity, as I already showed.

Anker characterizes Næss’s optimism as one of Ragnarok kind insisting that evil in the 21st century is a necessary condition for the sake of having tomorrow (Ibid: 440). In turn, he claims that Næss remains silent whether “we will have to morally submit to ecological laws” in order to cope with the crisis, i.e. whether intuition and ecological empathy can be a basis against crimes (Ibid).

Næss’s main argument against Anker’s interpretation concerns the way of formulating, namely, the need of keeping in mind the distinction between a

³⁷⁷ Næss describes that explanation as a simplification (Ibid: 448).

definition of a term and a descriptive formulation of the essence of something as well as how to avoid the reduction of the process of problematizing to a naïve form of asking³⁷⁸ (Næss 1999g: 445). Furthermore, Næss, however, disagrees with Anker that Pyrrhonist skepticism can contribute to associating deep ecology movement with a social movement denying Anker's idea that evil is necessary (Ibid: 446, 449). On a macro methodological level, it would mean that we should examine not only the political implications of deep ecology movement as such, but also to explore how the contradictions derive from the lack of awareness of the role of ethical gradualism and the differences with other movements aiming at social and political transformation respectively.

³⁷⁸ The deep ecology movement is not defined by asking deep questions alone because, as Næss argues, it would have been naïve to claim such a thing (Ibid).

5.1. Ecological Sustainability Scenarios: Between Utopias and Dystopias

Næss's critics of Witoszek are explicated in his theory of so-called Green utopia of 2084³⁷⁹. He argues that the elimination of the crisis, which is a negative goal, requires optimism to be treated not as a goal, but rather to be examined from the perspective of decreasing ecological unsustainability (Næss 1999h: 469).

Næss discusses the development of four possible scenarios about ecological sustainability in the long run. Due to the first one, there is no big move concerning environmental politics, or global poverty in so far as the introduced measures may be considered as undemocratic ones since they are motivated by the dramatic situation they occur in (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 276). The second scenario partly follows the first one apart from the big changes in the poor countries, where one experiences considerable economic growth of a Western type. Thus it would mean that five times more people will have a life style, which is not sustainable (Ibid). The development will be sharply stopped by an ecological breakdown providing a sustainable life style, which will make it more difficult to fight the chaos (Ibid). According to the third scenario, the crisis is followed by a shift to achieving a sustainable life style, but only after a complex ecological destruction takes place (Ibid). Last but not least, due to the fourth scenario we should make a step to an ecologically enlightening time characterized by one more realistic evaluation of the drastic reduction of the quality of life, which derives from the unsustainable development (Ibid). This scenario may take place in the future, i.e. in 2101 (Ibid). The positive evaluation of the latter can be seen in

³⁷⁹ Næss's green utopia is built on three main premises, namely, all living beings have one and the same right to live and blossom, all of them have an own value and that is why they do not have to be used as means as well as the power, which has been exerted by the politicians and school people to secure the richest life for as many as possible, should derive from the deepest values and most possible means (Næss and Tschudi 2007: 124). In brief, green utopia presumes an ideal connection between ethical and political distinctions of means and ends to be established so that ends can never, ethically or politically, be reduced to means. Otherwise, the latter should be a result of replacing the epistemologically based derivation with the idea of normative derivation due to which both the intrinsic value and intrinsic right, which is related to the law of nature, to provide the contradictory justification of certain top norms: the same right for life and development, and the same intrinsic value, which may have different embodiments.

Næss's description of what the ecologically sustainable society should look like, namely, as a versatile society defined within an ecologically sustainable framework, which concerns not what realistic is, but rather what is possible (Ibid: 288). Furthermore, we should outline that Næss does not define ecological development by adopting a given plan economy, but by encouraging so-called mixed economy (blandingsøkonomi), which can tolerate one limited framework (Ibid: 301).

5.1.1. The Roles of Quality of Life and Living Standard within the Framework of Ecological Sustainability Scenarios

On a macro methodological level, the lack of specifying the normative validity of vital needs as influencing the vagueness of understanding what a necessary means is has an impact on the problematization of one of Næss's key concepts, namely, the one of quality of life understood as irreducible to the concept of living standard. According to Næss, every supporter of deep ecology movement feels and sees the possibilities of changing the course of the world (Næss 2008d: 7). Analyzing his conception of the connection between deep ecology and environmentally sustainable life style, I draw the conclusion that choosing simple means for achieving rich life should be based on cultivating sensitivity towards otherness as a prototype characteristic. On a practical level, dwelling into situations means to appreciate diversity (both cultural and natural ones) as well as to be morally engaged with sacrificing the living standard for the sake of increasing the quality of life for the ones who need it. The ethical aspect, never to treat any living form whatsoever as means, becomes understandable if we explore it within the paradigm of ethical gradualism, which gives us grounds to use some sources as resources without looking at the other beings as means in themselves. In this context, if we introduce ethical gradualism, we may have good reasons to adopt the principle of universal protection that is much appreciated, especially in conflict situations, where mutual commitment and respect embodied in non-violent actions are required.

Regarding social dynamics, it is understood as a sacrifice of so-called meaningful work (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 143), the one, which determines the living standard and quality of life to become comparable in positive terms. In this respect, Næss's theory corresponds to the one outlined by Kvaløy, which concerns the sensitivity to children (Ibid: 298) and their life. According to Næss, a key characteristic regarding the development of labor division in respect with work's fragmentarization (Ibid: 143). In the field of industry, it means a reduction of the over-ordered gestalts (super-ordinary gestalts), of the meaningful things, which are an important class of anticipated gestalts (Ibid). When the same attention is not projected to one abstracted gestalt, all understanding is acquired. Furthermore, it means that its units are anticipated gestalts: they are neither elements of perception, nor are intellectual elements since facts and values are different areas (Ibid).

Thus the lifestyle based on a free choice would automatically lead to obtaining a high quality of life which cannot be associated with the living standard³⁸⁰ by default. Otherwise, it would mean that work as a goal would be simplified to a means of striving for a higher living standard. On a macro methodological level, it would signify that consumerism underrates the quality of life by imposing politics, which overrates the role of the many non-ecological specificities in the local communities, as Næss argues. His suggestion of reducing the living standard for the sake of increasing quality of life (Næss 2005c: 19) follows some of the arguments provided by Kvaløy, namely, rehabilitating the role of hand work without eradicating industry as well as encouraging people to work together. The main idea behind these implementations is to support so-called mixed economy, which in turn would benefit the functioning of the democratic structures adopted by the local societies. Facing the challenge to choose between the advertisement expert knowledge and natural competence to enjoy stars, people should ignore the illusion that by exaggerating the faith in the complicated means, they would accomplish complex goals.

In this context, he argues that full ecological sustainability³⁸¹ should be reached until 2050 (Næss 2008: 280), but it does not explain what gives him grounds to believe that the reduction of energy can be overcome exactly due to then, so that to avoid the justification of the next utopian scenario. On the other hand, talking about ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, Næss draws the relevant conclusion that in terms of development, the industrial countries can be defined as overdeveloped ones, taking into

³⁸⁰ An important point is what Næss calls a new Romanticism, namely, the scenario when the adopters of consumerism, (who dislike most animals, hate outdoor life and appeal for the lost 'consumerist' life in an ecologically sustainable society) would be described as new Romantics. They are characterized as people who try to revive the strive for the distant past as a reason for transgressing the real 'romantic' image.

³⁸¹ According to Næss, Brundtland's report defines development in respect with the economic progress in developing countries, which, however, does not mean that ecological sustainability is not a necessary condition (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 233). On a micro methodological level, ecological development is consistent with the maintenance of life's richness and diversity on Earth (Ibid: 234). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that rethinking the concept of sustainability in Næss's sense reveals that it is irreducible to the one of development: it is reducible rather to the concept of growth since ecological growth is supported by so-called by Næss ecological culture.

account that they are ecologically underdeveloped³⁸² (Næss 2005gg: 595). However, Næss outlines that the term developing country “should either be avoided or applied to rich countries as well as to poor” since every country today is “developing in a way that is ecologically unsustainable”³⁸³ (Næss 2005ee: 564).

He also provides a clear distinction outlining the symbiosis of sustainability and unsustainability within different societies discerning three classes. The latter include societies with unsustainability below the average level, ones with roughly an average level (Næss 2005o: 195) as well as societies with unsustainability above the average level. An important argument in this context is the role of political speculation with the idea of permissible policies ‘near the average level’ of sustainability, i.e. the ones, which follow a norm of a forced status quo in terms of their degree of unsustainability³⁸⁴.

Næss aims at releasing the fear of the third world countries that deep ecology is a new form of colonialism (Næss 2005s: 251). However, he does not succeed in clarifying what would be the common ground of guaranteeing the normative validity of mutual trust while arguing that a criterion of wider sustainability should be imposed. On a macro methodological level, I claim that the problem with ecological unsustainability stems from what he calls narrow ecological sustainability (Ibid: 257).

³⁸² On the other hand, Næss questions the role of rehabilitating a ‘genuine’ economic process (Næss 2005s: 262), which is also a simplified explanation that might bring us back to the frame of moral objectivism.

³⁸³ However, it does not mean that he is a zealous supporter of zero growth. Næss relevantly emphasizes the need of talking about societies with industries rather than industrial societies (Næss 1999h: 471).

³⁸⁴ This issue will be examined in comparison with Skirbekk’s theory of sustainability in the chapter on Skirbekk.

5.2. Deep Ecology Movement, Social Justice Movement and Peace Movement through the Lens of Næss's Biocentrism

Næss discusses three main social movements: deep ecology movement, the one of social justice, and the movement of peace (Næss 2005r: 236). His main concern is that they may merge into one quasi-green movement (Ibid) because their potential convergence would lead to a certain type of a self-destruction (Næss 2008: 99). According to Næss, all three movements are important but the ecological crisis deepens in years; that is why the latter should be given a certain priority (Light 2009: 77-78). In this context, I argue that the same situation refers to the need of encouraging justice and reducing poverty in so far as so-called exponential growth is not a self-sufficient factor, but it is dependent on the complex relationships between distributive justice, effective environmental politics and controllable sustainable development. Against Næss's other argument, namely, that deep ecology movement is the only one dealing with the intergenerational transition³⁸⁵, I raise the thesis that the complex engagement with the aforementioned movements presumes people with different background and from different generations to be involved for the sake of achieving long-lasting results.

On a practical level, the ontological requirement of comparing and contrasting deep ecology movement and the ones of peace and social justice would cause the potential change of politics as aiming to appreciate the quality of life rather than the increasing standard of living. Extrapolating Kvaløy's model, I draw the conclusion that such a change is seen by Næss in the appeal for rehabilitating two key points, namely, that humans have "no right to reduce diversity" unless vital needs are involved as well as cultural diversity should be justified by analogy to natural diversity (Næss 2005c: 18-19).

³⁸⁵ In another writing, Næss stresses the fact that the deep ecology movement also considers the role of generations in time (Næss 2008:104).

5.2.1. Is Biospherical Democracy an Oxymoron?

Næss argues that the maxima ‘to live and let live’ points out to a classless society in the biosphere, namely, to a certain kind of democracy (Næss 2008b: 146), which in turn is comparable with Kvaløy’s conception that natural interdependence grounds the political one. One of the main issues which arise is how to avoid the speculations with the status of natural interdependence while determining so-called biospherical democracy. Regarding natural order, we cannot talk about democracy in the full sense of the word because the latter is based on egalitarian attitudes and practices initiated by conscious, politically and morally engaged subjects. Furthermore, we do not have to forget that ‘natural’ equality can be (in the best possible way) only a necessary but not sufficient condition for having a democratic order. Otherwise, we should have reduced democracy to a law of nature neglecting the role of political will as well as the common delegation of rights and duties in solving political problems.

In ecopolitics, the first derived norm is to live due to the principles of a maximum symbiosis whose concrete projections are to live with others without minimizing their opportunities for a self-realization. However, from the fact that Næss defines such a ‘symbiotic imperative’, it does not necessarily follow biospherical democracy to be established since this imperative presumes the interconnectedness between all living beings to be achieved by encouraging joy and love. By contrast, democracy itself is built not on joy and love, but rather on commonly distributed responsibilities and rights.

In this context, biospherical democracy in Næss’s sense can be understood if we examine how, according to him, life’s embodiments depend on the different ideological frameworks, which the given societies are grounded in.

Næss claims that life’s democracy has “realistic egalitarianism” as a prototype characteristic (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 133). According to him, the belief that we do not possess the forest is a belief shared by many so-called primitive societies³⁸⁶ (Ibid), which illustrates the similarity of all creatures and the meaning of circulation and connection to nature. This conception is defined by Næss as realistic egalitarianism because, as it was already mentioned, “one does not hunt his/her friends” (Ibid: 134). Only by

³⁸⁶ Næss explores the functioning of life’s democracy in the primitive societies arguing that property ideology has no place in a philosophy, which underlies ecology. Norway’s people do not possess Norway, so that in the same sense, world’s sources are not people’s one (Ibid).

work, playing and understanding, a long-lasting and deep identification is developed, which can determine society's living conditions and ideology (Ibid). The egalitarian realism is a feature that also has an impact on the requirements of what economics should best serve life's democracy. The latter requires distinguishing between two main types of "scarcity society" (knapphetssamfunn): the first type is the society, where deprivation dominates while the second type is the one, where dissatisfaction with what we have and the indifference to what we are prevail (Ibid: 265). I argue that within the framework of life's democracy, the 'positive' scarcity has to be understood as one regarding the satisfaction of some vital needs for the sake of every single living being to have the same right for manifesting its intrinsic value.

What are the main implications of building relevant environmental politics in this context? One of the reasons for introducing the concept of life's democracy is the 'naturalness' of being in continuity in Næss's sense, which is irreducible to the one of harmony.

On the other hand, this specificity has an impact on the justification of the biospherical egalitarianism and its normative validity since 'natural' dependence is not equivalent to the one established by man on nature. However, from that it does not follow that life's democracy neglects what Næss calls main and subordinate gestalts. On the contrary, they are examined as intrinsically connected in a way that does not presume hierarchical forms of control to be adopted.

In turn, realistic egalitarianism³⁸⁷ is not realistic in the objective sense of the word because otherwise, it would mean to examine life's democracy within the framework of moral objectivism and thus to neglect Næss's theory of classless society on a political level. Going back to his example with the reasons against hunting friends, I agree that it is not just a statement, but rather a normative prescription. Friends are recognized as such due to the fact that we accept their intrinsic value, which is as 'intrinsic' as our own is. It presupposes the process of recognition to be based on a certain type of

³⁸⁷ On a macro methodological level, I argue that Næss's understanding of biospheric egalitarianism as a realistic one goes beyond the paradigm of moral objectivism only if the process of identification is interpreted as one of cultivating solidarity. According to Næss, biospheric egalitarianism is a matter of fight against human self-destructive dissociation from the other living forms. He claims that people's hubris and their complex of superiority can be overcome by the process of solidarization, which imposes 'I-You' relationship with nature at the expense of 'I-It' one (Ibid: 209).

identification, which in turn presumes a given kind of solidarity to be adopted.

Regarding political changes, it is important to see how adopting two contradictory principles, the ones of complexity and complication can contribute to overcoming the problems in industrial and non-industrial states in Næss's sense as well as the ones regarding the use of so-called by him soft and hard technologies (Næss 2005i: 85). The crucial point is that talking about policies, Næss introduces two types of ecological sustainability and unsustainability shifting the focus from life's democracy to sustainable development. In this context, I argue that one of the main concerns regarding Næss's interpretation of democracy is that he presumably sees the deep ecology as both incomparable with a given working social model and corresponding partly to the goals of Green society. He insists on the claim that there is no such a thing as "deep ecology society" because deep ecology society provides "wide ecological sustainability" than the green one (Næss 2005f: 65)³⁸⁸.

What are the concrete embodiments of the ecological sustainability according to Næss? He outlines that one of the main aims to provide relevant ecopolitics is based on supporting a full, long-range regional and global ecological sustainability³⁸⁹ (Næss 2005o: 193), which implies biodiversity and abundance of living forms since avoiding the threats of extinction "is not enough". On a micro methodological level, it means that it is necessary to justify the politics of conservation as a prototype characteristic of implementing ecologically sustainable politics.

Undoubtedly, ecopolitics and ecological crisis are intrinsically connected in so far as ecological problems are ineradicable unless they are examined as

³⁸⁸ Glasser outlines the origin of this inconsistency as deriving from people's inability to communicate in Næss's sense (Glasser 1999: 366), which, however, is only one of the reasons in so far as Næss aims at promoting radical bioegalitarianism.

³⁸⁹ Jon Wetlesen describes Næss's investigations as optimist ones since Næss interprets the ecological challenges as a matter of a logical problem, namely, as being impossible to provide complete prognostics of the "development" in time (Wetlesen 1974: 90). In turn, Wetlesen emphasizes that ecological challenges should be explored separately because they differ from the ones we witness in the pragmatic and instrumental way/mode of thinking (Ibid: 92). On a macro methodological level, he advocates making a distinction between the special ecopolitics, on the one hand, and the reformulation and the new way of thinking, when we talk about "normal, political ways of stating", on the other one (Ibid: 87). However, such a distinction would lead us back to the risk of neglecting environmental politics by giving it in the hands of narrow specialists.

“questions of policy” (Ibid: 191), as Næss suggests³⁹⁰. It is also reasonable to elaborate his thesis that it is important to make a difference between politics and politicizing, albeit the arguments he provides are as questionable as the ones concerning the difference between morality and moralization. Such an interpretation may be explored against the background of investigating how ecologically sustainable policies can be contextualized as well as to what extent this process differs from the one provided by so-called green society.

However, a serious concern arises from Næss’s definition of deep ecology movement as aiming at centralization, while encouraging different forms of decentralization. In this context, it is problematic to support the thesis that the flourishing of human life and cultures requires population reduction. On the other hand, it is relevant to accept his statement that the transformation of the ideal of progress from growth to development still leaves room for connecting the former with the establishment of “human development” (Næss 2005e: 563). In turn, Næss’s theory of ecological sustainability can be explained by analyzing his principle “Maximize biodiversity!”, which embodies so-called fairly sustainable agreement guaranteeing relevant ecopolitics to be justified. Despite the fact that there is no green-party’s political program derivable from the adopters of deep ecology movement, as Næss suggests (Næss 2005o: 194-195), from that it does not follow that the greens do not provide conceptions of relevant ecopolitics.

Judging by the aforementioned specifications, I conclude that Næss’s theory of remaining on the level of system ethics restricted to the norms regarding ecosystems’ destruction (Næss 2005v: 294) leads to underrating the function of informed consent in the process of moral engagement, which in turn affects both the concept and the practice of so-called substantial mobilization. As Næss points out, we cannot revive the values of cultures belonging to the past and thus to question industrial development, but we can find a way back to ecological sustainability (Næss 2008: 290). One of the main problems lies in the fact that there is no normative requirement for inflicting societal changes if we revive the values alone, without being able to trace their embodiment in relevant ecopolitical models. Related issue is that it remains ambiguous how starting with the interest in other people’s problems, we can provoke “general talks” rather than “small narratives”, as

³⁹⁰ This is one of the few cases, when he analyzes the eradication of ecological problems by re-evaluating the socio-political conditions, which lead to them.

Næss claims (Ibid: 279) in so far as this is a matter of evaluating moral concern that raises moral commitment. Furthermore, regarding cultural diversity, it is common local people of industrial countries also to disrespect their own culture, as Næss proves more than once while describing the Sherpa who wanted to turn the sacred mountain Tseringma into a tourist area for commercial reasons (Ibid: 282).

5.2.2. The Burden of Suffering and Compassion. Who Cares about Ecological Sustainability?

Even if we assume that it makes sense to ascribe rights to bears without attributing moral capabilities to them, we cannot argue that the right to live and blossom depends merely on one norm. On a macro methodological level, species' egalitarianism 'in principle' concerns many different types of mixed communities. Næss provides relevant arguments in favor of substituting the criterion of similarity with the one of sameness in so far as thus he qualitatively extends the target group. However, the idea of outlining similarities is a necessary but not sufficient condition since as Næss himself argues, the identification needs not result in love by itself (Næss 2005u: 303). As I already emphasized, the main problem is how and when we can cultivate sensitivity towards otherness³⁹¹ for the purposes of justifying the connection between identification and love as a necessary one from a normative point of view. In this context, it is one of the few cases when Ecosophy T is defined in respect with the eradication of suffering (Ibid: 308-309). If all suffering is defined as negative, this would mean that it has an intrinsic negative value in Næss's sense.

On the other hand, leaving the concept of rights deliberately vague affects the understanding of responsibility, which turns the process of distribution of justice into a vague process as well. One definition, which is determined from the perspective of utilitarian ethics. In turn, from this, it does not follow that the obligation is necessarily driven by a moral motivation, and second, that the objectivity of so-called severe suffering can be uncontradictory proved³⁹².

Before going into detail about the need of rehabilitating the role of ecological sustainability, the contextualization of the problem of suffering has to be examined. According to Næss, it is impossible to deny or underestimate suffering in nature (Næss 2008: 245). It is defined as a "good name for a class of gestalts" (Ibid: 199) due to which the directedness of subjective appreciation of pain is recognized as a main criterion in so far as compassion aided

³⁹¹ Næss claims that human beings have an obligation to avoid exposing the domestic animals to a risk of severe suffering (Ibid: 310).

³⁹² Norton illustrates why it is more complicated than just deciding what has an intrinsic value if we determine that suffering of both sheep and wolves as intrinsically bad. The latter does not tell us what to do (Norton 1999: 398).

by the brain encompasses everything capable of pain (Ibid: 296). In this context, Næss's ethics can be examined as influenced by Gandhi's one of non-violence, but even such a comparison cannot fully benefit the clarification of two main problems, namely, how, if it is the ethics of minimal interference that presumes a certain peaceful cooperation (in the minimum sense) to be adopted (Næss 2005x: 437), we can justify and inflict change regarding suffering. Another crucial concern is who and how to measure who suffers most in order to help him/her first, as Næss suggests.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Næss adopts some principles of utilitarian ethics while evaluating suffering since he promotes intensity as a criterion of verification (Næss 2005t: 287). The comparison of so-called degrees of pain is made on the bases of measuring the 'felt pain' (Ibid). Within this framework, the subjective experience of pain is determined by default as objectively measurable and thus as an objective criterion of an evaluation affecting the presumption that it is the bystander who can objectively evaluate someone else's experience of pain. Relying on such a presumption is rather an ideal case in so far as in most cases, it benefits supporting the definition of quantitative criteria of pain measurement by being tempted, as Næss himself states, "to let numbers decide" (Ibid).

5.2.3. The Role of Solidarity for Environmental Politics

Analyzing Næss's theory of environmental sustainability, I draw the conclusion that if we remain within the paradigm of moral objectivism, it would mean to be unable to avoid equating the process of identification and solidarity in the field of environmental politics in so far as identification in Næss's sense does not necessarily presume certain changes in the moral behavior to be made if the rights of the objects of identification are somehow corrupted. Furthermore, if the process of identification is spontaneous, as Næss suggests, how can we be 'equally spontaneous' to all other beings' interests³⁹³?

Extrapolating Næss's theory, I argue that it is morality that makes possible solidarity and identification be put in a dialectical relationship as mutually dependent factors. Despite the fact that solidarity strengthens the identification, the other way around is not necessarily realizable. If morality is reduced to 'natural' identification, then we would be able to recognize, by 'feeling' solidarity, mainly the other representatives of the human species, which would cause, in the best way, the justification of ethical anthropocentrism rather than the one of ethical gradualism.

If the process of identification is not a matter of gaining moral value, then at least three main problems arise. First, the spontaneous recognition would be deprived of normative validity. Second, even if spontaneous recognition is defined as a natural state, it would not explain how we end up with a certain form of anthropocentrism, and not one of biocentrism in Næss's sense. And third, we cannot rely on the criteria of degree and recognition, as Næss suggests. Otherwise, we would keep facing the risk of adopting ethical anthropocentrism as well as examining the moral consequences from the perspective of Hume's dilemma regarding the connection between cause and effect, namely, to presume that what comes next is intrinsically dependent on what precedes it, in both moral and ontological sense.

Further concerns are also raised by Næss's thesis that spontaneity of identification should be understood as a non-rational process due to which we react to another being's interest (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 159). Except already discussed implications of the lack of normative validity of spontaneity itself, I argue that such an interpretation brings us back to the debate about

³⁹³ Some implicit premises of avoiding this discrepancy can be also found in Næss's writings, when he discusses the projections of 'egalitarianism' in so-called super-ordinary meaningful gestalts.

the status of moral subjects, namely, what would be the criteria of defining one living being as a moral subject if we refuse the criteria of morality and rationality? Does it mean then that every living being is a moral subject and if so, how would this vague way of speaking contribute to avoiding the justification of ungrounded biocentrism?

Næss's attempts to use the criteria of degree and intensity as supporting ethical gradualism merely reveal the superficial aspects of the functioning of the latter, namely that there are specifications, which make us talk about gradualism, but leave the question why these specifications should be treated as axiological ones untouched³⁹⁴.

³⁹⁴ Næss argues that we should develop ethics that to take over itself (a ta inn over seg) the differences between the non-human living beings (Ibid: 187-191). Arguing that identification depends on both culture and economics makes it also, both directly and indirectly, dependent on morality. However, refusing the role of normative validity of ethics by default, he makes the problematic statement that such ethics should be a form of deeper realism and therapy (Ibid: 191).

5.3. Distinguishing Gandhi from Pacifism. Some New Perspectives on Norwegian Environmentalism

Næss analyzes the origin of the distinction between Gandhists (whom he identifies with) and so-called pacifists. The difference is outlined as coming from the pacifists' lack of search for conflict's center. That is why Næss argues that while pacifists³⁹⁵ do not look for the latter, Gandhists³⁹⁶ do so (Næss 2000: 57). Against the background of this problematic thesis, Næss defines his behavior during the Second World War as a behavior of a "Gandhist without a weapon" (Ibid: 104). A similar phrase is used, when he discussed his participation in the environmental demonstrations in Mardøla (1973) and Alta (1981) (Ibid: 62). Regarding his experience, Næss claimed that as a Gandhist, he has been looking for the conflict's center, which concerns the intrinsic values (Ibid).

In this context, I argue that some of the main methodological problems in Næss's reception of Gandhi derive from the vague definitions of both what a conflict's center is as well as what are the prototype characteristics of the center in question that make Gandhists unique. On the other hand, Næss does not specify the implications of the normative validity of the slogan 'to

³⁹⁵ In turn, there is also serious criticism in the field of peace studies to Næss's attempts to reduce the complex aims and methods of the studies in question, while elaborating strategies for solving already available group-conflicts. Galtung claims that Næss's work on Gandhi is "limited and even limiting as a general conflictology-praxiology" (Galtung 2011) since Næss saw non-violence as an alternative to nuclearism and to violent behavior in group conflict in general (Ibid). Galtung argues that there is an explicandum in Næss's works on Gandhi, namely, something to be explained, and this is Gandhi's political ethics. Næss's method of explaining itself reveals the connection between Gandhi's action and speech, and the layers of Gandhi's thought. In this context, there are two modes of investigating: the one of extension of Gandhi's political ethics by referring it to a set of action reports and a set of sentences respectively, and the one of intension, which concerns the meaning, i.e. the justification starting from the first and deep principles (Ibid).

³⁹⁶ According to Galtung, Næss's survey on Gandhi is very precise in terms of reviving the image of Gandhi's world (Ibid). However, he outlines that "As a guide for conflict resolution and peace work, it is rather limiting" (Ibid). Galtung claims that Næss's assumption built on the presumption that normative power stems from the first principles along the lines of deduction of norms and actions, makes the whole system vulnerable because if we have problems with the first principles, then we cannot talk about the unquestionable normative validity of the rest (Ibid). Furthermore, Galtung makes the relevant conclusion that Næss's deductivism is both his strength and weakness (Ibid).

fight without weapons' as well as why this fight would be more successful than the traditional forms of struggle³⁹⁷.

According to Næss, ethics of non-violence presumes a certain type of cooperation to be developed. He also explicates his concerns about the role of human rights embodied in Gandhi's saying that human beings have obligations, not rights (Ibid: 96) pointing out that Gandhi's obligations are explained through the idea of rights³⁹⁸ indeed.

On the other hand, a relevant point in Næss's interpretation of Gandhi's philosophy is that he describes the cult to ecosystems as being as dangerous as the one to people. However, the problem is that questioning speciesism does not contribute to justifying the non-acceptance of given human rights. On a macro methodological level, it means that disenchanting speciesism is a necessary but not sufficient condition in clarifying the problem of justice within the framework of ethical gradualism.

An illuminative example illustrating one of the main concerns regarding Næss's interpretation is his comments on the *Earth First!* movement (Næss 1999e: 229) revealing the effectiveness of so-called ecotage (Ibid) that is accepted as a part of ecodefense (Ibid). He specifies that ecotage can be adopted unless less drastic methods do work (Ibid), which raises the question how and from whose perspective the situation can be objectively evaluated. Næss considers the ecotage in Scandinavia as ineffective because of "the traditional level of trust between people in power and the population" (Ibid). However, relying on the premise of trust is a double-bind issue. Otherwise, we would not have witnessed how the debate about environmental protection and industrial development has gradually turned into a 'versus' debate in time. It is also questionable who decides that it is appropriate to adopt ecotage since thus there would be a risk to go back to the formula 'the

³⁹⁷ Regarding traditional forms of struggle, Næss argues that hate during the occupation of Norway has been a very strong one (Næss 1999: 77). Another open question is how to understand Næss's statement that Gandhists' efforts can help after-war Germany to overcome the pain and sorrow (Næss 2000: 24).

³⁹⁸ The methodological connection between rights and informed consent does not necessarily presume narrowing morality to moralization, as Næss suggests. Regarding the role of informed consent, it explains why first, we cannot claim, like Næss does, that since Gandhi's experience is quite complicated, our conclusions do not have a scientific status (Næss 2000: 35), and second that sympathy with others is straightly expressed (Ibid: 38). It is the informed consent achieved by various techniques of communicating that makes Gandhi's ethics of non-violence a well-grounded one.

end justifies the means'. It also remains problematic to what extent we can refer to the mode of violence as a sufficient reason while identifying someone as a supporter of deep ecology³⁹⁹.

Furthermore, if deep ecology movement is determined as a revolutionary one, as Næss suggests, the role of social ecology may also be clarified as a revolutionary one in so far as both of them insist on some political changes to be primarily performed in the rich countries (Næss 1999h: 469). The difference with social ecology is defined by Næss on the level of ecodefense, which in turn can also be grounded in Gandhi's ethics, namely, as a way nonviolently to protect a place, where "you belong" (Næss 1999e: 228).

³⁹⁹ See Næss's interpretation of the status of Earth First!-ers (Næss 1999e: 230).

5.3.1. Gandhi and Norwegian Activism

What is the concrete impact of the reception of Gandhi's ethics⁴⁰⁰ on Norwegian environmental activism according to Næss? As a zealous supporter of the grassroots movements, Næss argues that he "feels at home with such movements" as well as that he has found a strong motivation in the way Gandhi has managed to mobilize people (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 221).⁴⁰¹

In the mid-1970s, Næss contributed to the people's action *Future in Our Hands* (*Framtiden i våre hender*). In the preface of Erik Dammann's book (having the same title and published in 1972), he wrote that "we need only a small insight to realize that the flow of goods and services we give a central place in life does not make us necessarily happier" as well as that the way to a human life, which presumes a responsibility to the third world to be taken is also the way of achieving a "better well-being for ourselves" (Ibid: 281). The book became a huge success, several thousand people showed their interest in participating in the action and as a logical result, the Action Committee of People's with Næss as a foreman was established in Nadderud (April 2nd 1974). An important point in this context is that the action saw

⁴⁰⁰ What is the line of arguments that can contribute to revealing Næss's willingness to universalize Gandhi's ethics of non-violence as a core of peace studies? According to Galtung, Næss's deep interest in semantics as well as in rational reconstruction of Gandhi's thoughts is not 'his' (Galtung 2011). Galtung claims that Næss accepts Gandhi's approach to structural violence, but not the one to direct violence, which is defined as too risky. Furthermore, Galtung argues in favor of a peaceful conflict transformation, which to be fulfilled before the actual conflict takes place, or as he called it "to mediate conflicts before violence", to reconcile if it fails and to "build peace structures to transform conflicts with empathy, non-violence, creativity" by imagining new realities (Ibid). Galtung also argues that Næss takes into account the role of empathy and non-violence, but does not search for new realities – only for common goals (Ibid).

⁴⁰¹ Næss's engagement with the peace movement in the 1940s and 1950s was the step that helped him to move forward getting engaged with the environmental activism (Ibid: 221).

the fight against the ecocrisis in connection with the fight against poverty in the world⁴⁰² (Ibid).

This experience made Næss claim that the folk action is a process that consists of three phases⁴⁰³. The first one is the phase of self-inquiry (selvgranskingsfasen), i.e. the phase of determining the aim, or so called motivational phase, which encourages the simplicity and the role of specifying own values (Ibid: 283). The second phase is the explanation phase (utredningsfasen), which presumes people to agree on something to be achieved on a local basis. Here, we do not have to forget that we are all experts (Ibid). The third phase is to make local, or more encompassing collective decisions (Ibid). In this context, Næss emphasizes two main steps, which should be made. During the first one a strategy of a collective and organized change should be developed, while the second step concerns the thorough discussions about the means of social changes (Ibid: 286).

These three phases were brought to light ten years later, in order the aspects of the deep ecology movement to be explained⁴⁰⁴ (Ibid: 221). In the Apron diagram we see again the three levels developed in Nadderud (Ibid). The grounding level, the one of self-inquiry, is the level, where one formulates his/her values, norms and develops his/her ecosophy inspired by the plurality of pictures (Ibid). On level two, one should find something common, a platform of formulations, which the supporters can agree about. On level three, we should concentrate on the consequences, means and plans for actions, which bring us back to one multi-sided stage of the movement (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that we cannot talk about a direct parallel between the three stages and the ones dis-

⁴⁰² At the first meeting, Næss delivered a lecture explaining how one can develop and strengthen people's movement. The lecture had the title *The light side of the issue (Sakens lyse side)* emphasizing both the light sides and the joy of triggering the necessary changes (Ibid). However, this title was changed against Næss's will in the book *New Lifestyle (Ny Livsstil)* (1974) into the one of *We should begin to step on the politicians' toes (Vi må begynne å trække politikerne på tærne)*. Næss himself did not like the change of the title and when he published the lecture in his book *Technology, Pedagogy and One New Life Style (Teknikk, pedagogikk og en ny livsstil)* (1978), he brought the first title back making the following comment: "We wish the Norwegian people to have more joy, less struggle after protecting themselves with means that may, or may not, give joy" (Ibid).

⁴⁰³ The phases were defined at the first meeting in Nadderud in 1974 (Ibid: 221).

⁴⁰⁴ One position, which as I already showed, was subjected to further modifications by Næss in favor of solving environmental problems first.

played on the Apron diagram in so far as at the three stages, we have the role of engagement as a prototype characteristic, which is irreducible to a hypotetic-deductive analysis.

On a macro methodological level, going back to the problem of introducing the motivational gradualism in quantitative terms by presuming that they should later coincide with the qualitative ones, we face again the concerns deriving from Næss's statement about the connection between logical and motivational components. There is a serious methodological problem if we presume that motivation comes first, and the actions (graduating from individual to collective ones) come second because such an approach does not explain why the individual is able to act without being necessarily engaged with collective initiatives. Otherwise, it would mean that we should deny the role of the individual heroes as a less significant one. Regarding values, they should be formulated at the first stage, but their clarification is equally important for the next two levels since the expertise is impossible as a value-natural competence.

Concerning the clarification of environmental problems in Norway, Næss emphasizes three trends in solving conflicts, namely, violent, passive and non-violent trends (Næss 2000: 42). In his analysis, he faces the same problems as the ones, while discussing the need of justifying ethical gradualism, i.e. how to define the cases of self-defense as something different from exerting other forms of violence. Non-violence is irreducible to pacifism because according to Næss, the latter is a form of passivization in contrast to Gandhi's ethics that presumes a given type of activism to be adopted (Ibid: 57). One of the main methodological differences is seen on the level of activeness in solving problems for which there are no normative arguments. However, Næss does not deny that most principles proposed by Gandhi are also implemented in pacifist activism. In turn, I disagree with Næss's statement that Gandhists look more intensively for conflicts than the pacifists because in both cases, there are values involved as well as consensus that violence reduces self-realization.

The issue of whether we would give preference to Gandhi's ethics or so-called by Næss pacifist forms of activism is important for revealing the ways environmental campaigns in Norway were held. Is it possible, and if so, how can Mardøla and Alta actions be defended as Gandhist initiatives (Ibid: 62, 83) merely on the basis of the friendly attitudes towards the opponent, taking into account that most activists were not led by the reason to be friendly, but rather by the one of protecting environment? In this context, I argue that the friendly attitude is a necessary but not sufficient condition for

self-realization if it is understood within the framework of nature's realization as a goal.

Another significant problem is that we should question Næss's distinction of activism, demonstration and reformation. Relying on Gandhi's ethics, he argues that albeit the direction is revolutionary, the steps should be reformatory ones (Næss 2005p: 216). That is why one of the main concerns is that there is no normative need the quantitative changes to be recognized as qualitative ones. Distinguishing between action, campaign and movement (Ibid: 215), Næss does not take into consideration that goals are 'more than' just a means in qualitative sense underrating the fact that the quality is determined by the idea of normative validity. That is why none of these levels can be necessarily anticipated as quantitatively 'bigger' (in size, aims and means) than the previous one. The tension is raised by justifying the quantitative implications of the proportion between risks and alternatives (however, big risks may provoke big alternatives even within the small activities), which does not contribute to specifying what the qualitative differences between activism, demonstration and reformation are. Nor is the time longitude a criterion of providing such a classification in so far as the long-lasting action is not the only one criterion of organizing campaigns (regardless of the fact the duration can be its significant characteristic).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the problem is how would we evaluate the situation deciding whether to exert all these forms of radical struggle? Furthermore, how can we delimit them so that to prevent their degradation into pure violence? Would it be a question of time, or of number of people involved? Would not this distinction rely on the implicit forms of violence as a means of achieving certain goals? And if so, what would be the normative requirement of stopping these protests respectively?

5.4. Norwegian Green Party's Platform as Seen from within

Examining the genealogy of deep ecology movement and its aims, it is important to emphasize its relationships with the green movement, as represented by Næss as well as to clarify to what extent we can claim that Næss defines the green movement as 'closer' to some of the principles of shallow ecology movement. According to Næss, the green society characterizes with a high degree of decentralization, grassroots' democracy and non-violence (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 289), i.e. it has some aims, which are also shared by the supporters of deep ecology. In turn, the green society is described as taking place against the background of deep ecology's stance on our relationships with nature and natural processes (Ibid: 290). On the one hand, Næss argues that such a society is a general utopia (Ibid: 293), while on the other one, he emphasizes that between 1965 and 1975 we have witnessed unique creativity within the framework of green social and political thinking (Ibid: 295). Naess points out that the difference concerns the attempt of the social greens to first change the society, i.e. to impose "a more social form" of a green lifestyle (Ibid: 291) and only then to look at the environment.

On a macro methodological level, Næss's theory of so-called green utopia is contextualized in Norwegian ecopolitics regarding green economy since the latter can contribute to reducing ethically unacceptable unemployment. It envisions a labor-intensive economy because the capital intensive one is closely tied with the raising level of unemployment. However, Næss clearly states that there are no great green economists (Light 2009: 79-80).

He argues that green parties do not necessarily show the feelings of solidarity and compassion (Næss 2005o: 199)⁴⁰⁵. In turn, this statement remains too general. It does not reveal how the issue of balance between ecological sustainability and moral engagement with people in need can be kept, nor does it clarify why deep ecology movement provides better solutions.

⁴⁰⁵ It is a matter of increasing the contributions to the Third World in its daily fights with hunger and torture looking for more ecologically sound solutions (Ibid).

Næss also discusses the more general implications of ecopolitics examining the three poles of so-called political triangle⁴⁰⁶ (Ibid: 203), namely, the blue, green and red ones. Green cannot be placed between blue and red because, as Næss relevantly claims, a second dimension is needed (Ibid). On the other hand, even if we accept that the red, blue and green circles overlap and thus to presume that “green is a dynamic wavelikeforce” (Ibid) and an intuition of a sudden realization should affect all points along (Næss 2005v: 204), we still cannot argue that the politics of greens can be reduced to a form of seeing affinity, as Næss suggests (Ibid), especially within green politics’ attempts to minimize the interference in the biosphere (Næss 2005aa: 504).

In relation to I.A and III. B of Næss’s scheme, green politics is displayed as opposed to the red and especially to the blue one (Næss 2005p: 209)⁴⁰⁷. Undoubtedly, green politics combines local and global perspectives (Ibid: 210), but we do not have to forget that national identity is not a static term, as Næss claims. It can never be based on unchangeable local communities even historically. Despite the fact that Næss rejects the opportunity deep ecology to share similar philosophy with green politics, the latter is called “good or responsible ecopolitics” (Ibid).

Judging by what Næss argues, I draw the conclusion that we face the following contradictions. Green politics would have a higher status if we accept Næss’s statement that ecopolitics is neutral to the extent it is a form of ecophilosophy, as he suggests. Such a presumption would lead to questioning the normative validity of deep ecology because thus it would only partly share the goals of green politics. In this context, there are two options: deep ecology to be recognized as ‘more responsible’ than green politics. It is a vague definition, which (if adopted) would also provoke the well-known discussions how to define the qualitative evaluation. The other option is deep ecology to be determined as ‘less responsible’ than green politics. This statement remains problematic in terms of how to justify the role of empathy with other living beings.

Furthermore, keep thinking about the evaluation of ‘more’ and ‘less’ does not contribute to solving the problem of so-called by Næss hybrid cases,

⁴⁰⁶ According to Næss, green societies and cultures may be quite diverse, but so-called blue economy hides this fact (Næss 1999h: 466).

⁴⁰⁷ IA concerns the politics of polluting human environment, while III B affects the politics of population of non-human beings (Ibid).

namely, when according to the principles of deep ecology, we should react both centralizing and decentralizing (Ibid: 208-209). Such an interpretation would limit the debates to the quantitative projections of the issue by thinking in oppositions such as shallow vs. deep, local vs. regional, national vs. global etc. (Ibid). The only qualitative dimension in Næss's classification is the one of favored vs. unfavored, which still needs to be examined from a dialectical perspective.

6. THE IMPACT OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM AND HINDUISM ON NÆSS'S PHILOSOPHY

Outlining some parallels between the heterogeneous number of Buddhist sources and ecosophy in particular is required for outlining the origin of Næss's specific interpretation since revealing the role of these sources is useful for understanding the horizon of his statements (Cavazza 2014: 43). On the other hand, the idea of talking about so-called green Buddhism and deep ecology should be carefully examined. Regarding the analysis of the Green Buddhism, I refer to Cavazza's theory saying that "a Buddhist ecological attitude towards nature is simply problematic"⁴⁰⁸ (Ibid: 27).

The influence on Næss's gestalt ontology can also be explored on the level of self-realization's embodiments in so-called engaged Buddhism. Regarding the connections between deep ecology and engaged Buddhism, it is important to replace the latter with green Buddhism, as K. Kraft suggests (Gregory and Sabra 2008: 60). According to Kraft, what are sometime recognized as individual Buddhist practices are better understood as starting points for cultivating deep ecology (Ibid) because "walking in the world as if it were our lover leads inevitably to deep ecology" (Ibid: 61). However, even if we accept such a premise, form that it does not follow that engaged Buddhism can be defined as a form of Green Buddhism. One of the most distinguished representatives of the engaged Buddhism, the Vietnamese monk Hanh argues that we begin to see the non-self first (Ibid: 55). Then, we start seeing the interdependent nature, and once we see the latter, we see

⁴⁰⁸ As Devall and Sessions argue, Buddhism places undue emphasis on sentience, which does not allow us fully to develop our capacities for deep ecology thought (Devall and Sessions 1985: 8). According to them, Buddhism in general seems to ignore the importance of rocks and trees, namely, whether or not non-sentient beings can achieve enlightenment. Furthermore, taking this sentience as a basis of our identification remains "shallowly anthropocentric" from the perspective of deep ecology" (Leopold in Gregory and Sobra 2008: 62).

Buddha (Ibid). In this context, he defines ecology as deep ecology, in the sense that it is not only deep, but also universal, claiming that we need to protect ecology of the Earth, and the one of the mind respectively⁴⁰⁹ (Ibid: 56-67). Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that it is the process ontology that can be justified as initiating the recognition of the necessary dependence of self-realization on nature's one as a form of mutual engagement.

Furthermore, as Ian Harris claims, “no direct parallel to the western nature can be found there” (Cavazza 2014: 28), which would mean to compare two quite different in their origin and embodiment concepts. Another relevant line of arguments in this context is the one of Elisa Cavazza who points out that Næss also does not provide a definition, or a semantic field for nature (Ibid). According to her, he makes use of Husserlian concept of *Lebenswelt* (our lived world) (Ibid), but from that it does not follow that we can draw a direct methodological parallel between Næss's understanding of nature and the one of Mahayana Buddhism, which to be recognized as a necessary and sufficient condition for justifying deep ecology. On the other hand, a serious concern derives from the fact that Næss's references to Mahayana Buddhism are quite vague in many respects, so that I draw a conclusion similar to the one made by Kvaløy, which refers to Næss's interpretation of Spinoza (i.e. that it is rather Næss than Spinoza), namely, that Næss's reception of the principles of Mahayana Buddhism entails more of the characteristics of his own paradigm rather than staying ‘closer’ to the original messages of Mahayana Buddhism⁴¹⁰.

On a macro methodological level, the impact of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism on Næss's conception can be mainly traced on the following levels: on the reception of Gandhi's ethics of non-violence due to the fact that Gandhi himself is influenced by both Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism (Bhagavad Gita) as well as on the level of gestalt ontology in so far as in the strive for grounding a new type of process philosophy both Næss and Kvaløy return to some sources of Mahayana Buddhism.

⁴⁰⁹ For Næss's reception of Engaged Buddhism, see also Cavazza 2014: 26, Notes 11-12.

⁴¹⁰ Going back to Mahayana Buddhism's influence on Næss (Næss 1997: 4), we should also specify the role of feeling. If “feeling” to one of these premises does not imply philosophical knowledge or interest, as Næss suggests, how can some of the premises be used as ultimate ones so far? If the one who is interested in Buddhist teaching about greed (for instance) is not interested in nirvana, he should stop in the middle of the way seeing no sense in continuing it.

Judging by those investigations, I reach the conclusion that Kvaløy outlines in detail the genealogy of the problem saying that environmental philosophy understood as a certain type of process philosophy cannot be identified with the one represented in Mahayana Buddhism. It is due to the fact that this process philosophy also adopts some specificities which are typical for the Western process philosophies.

6.1. The Role of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism on Ecosophy

According to Hinduism, life has four goals, namely, power and wealth, aesthetic enjoyment, ethics (dharma) and liberation from rebirth (so-called moksa) (Jacobsen 1996: 224). Examining Næss's reception of Gandhi's interpretation⁴¹¹ of Bhagavad Gita, I argue that the inconsistencies regarding the latter derive to a certain extent from Gandhi's own misconception of the relationship between Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism. Discovering Bhagavad Gita as a source, Gandhi anticipated this relationship as one based on the understanding of Buddhism as a reform movement within Hinduism⁴¹² (Gier 1996: 88).

Mahayana Buddhism's theory of atman is anticipated in Næss's statement that seeing the larger Self everywhere strengthens solidarity and non-violence due to the process of identification in Næss's sense. However, the aforementioned comparison regarding ethics requires at least one significant difference to be outlined, namely, that Mahayana Buddhism pays special attention to the role of ethics⁴¹³, while Næss narrows morality to moralization. As De Silva argues, Næss misses the role of moral laws, which is crucial for Buddhism in general (De Silva 1998: 41). In this context, I argue that the broad parallels concerning ethics can be drawn on the level of ethics of non-violence, which is grounded in the idea of liberation from suffering (in Buddhism) as well as in the positive transformation of the possibility for

⁴¹¹ Being raised in Gujarat, Gandhi was interested in the Jainist version of Hinduism (Gier 1996: 94).

⁴¹² On the other hand, Næss is criticized by some Indians that he misses the entity of Gandhi's perspective (Jacobsen 1996: 238).

⁴¹³ Mahayana's six perfections include generosity, morality or good conduct, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom. Compassion (karuna) remains as important as wisdom since Mahayana Buddhism made compassion one of the highest virtues in its system. Since Mahayana Buddhism acknowledges the Four Noble Truths, the connection between wisdom and compassion can be defined as concerned with the understanding of the ego illusion (atta-ditthi) and suffering (dukkha) (De Silva 1998: 37), which should be overcome by the right vision. In turn, the fourth principle of the eight-fold path concerns the right action, which is not harmful for the others (Ibid: 55). Thus the ultimate good is justified as liberation from suffering, or as a strive for so-called state of nibbana (nirvana) (Ibid: 71).

conflicts in Næss's conception, which is due to the reception of Gandhi's ethics of non-violence.

Regarding beautiful actions in Buddhism and Næss's theory, De Silva relevantly points out that they are irreducible to Buddhist ethics (Ibid: 107). Compassion (karuna)⁴¹⁴ arises spontaneously when impermanence (anicca) and non-self (anatta) are truly seen (Cavazza 2014: 42). Concerning the extrapolation of compassion to Næss's theory is recognized by refuting the ontological separation between the ego and the other. But as De Silva points out, Næss's understanding of morality makes it difficult to relate beautiful actions to Mahayana Buddhism because "A beautiful action in the Buddhist context" should be defined as "the finest expression of morality" (De Silva 1998:107). Judging by these investigations, I claim that being spontaneous, as understood by Næss, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying ethics since being 'spontaneous in time' is irreducible to 'spontaneous' as a part of the complex understanding of someone's motivation.

⁴¹⁴ Cavazza emphasizes that compassion is the "worldly virtue *par excellence*" concerning bodhi-sattva resolution to delay the ultimate liberation for the purposes of liberating all beings (Cavazza 2014: 43).

6.2. Reading Ecosophy T through Bhagavad Gita.

Næss's interest in Hinduism is provoked by Gandhi's influence on his own writings. Næss argues that Hinduism is not as clear (as a religion) as Christianity and Islam are (Galtung and Næss 1955: 95). According to him, the Hindu concept of God is described as a universal one, but "with many different realizations (embodiments) for the different people" (Ibid). In this context, it remains problematic why the 'clearness' of one religion can be explored as contrasting its versions, and second, to what extent the clearness itself can be determined by the clearness of the definition of the concept of God alone.

Hinduism is described by Næss in a practically related way as a system of social norms and religious rituals in which the existence of the caste and sacredness of cows are central (Ibid). The latter is used as an illustration, which shows a fundamental respect and modesty also for beings, which are subjected to people's treatment. However, Næss claims that it is not an obstacle for Gandhi to attack the Indians⁴¹⁵, when this cult reaches a paradoxical level (Ibid). Regarding the analysis of Gandhi's religious visions, Næss examines his concept of God referring to Andrews and Mühlemann's theory of the three crucial concepts in Gandhi's theory, namely, the ones of insistence on truth (satya), brahmacharya (self-control) and ahimsa (non-violence) emphasizing that it is not easy, from a linguistic point of view, to find a relevant translation of the aforementioned terms (Ibid).

As Knut Jacobsen points out, Næss does not mention Hinduism among the ultimate premises of deep ecology, albeit he refers several times to Bhagavad Gita while justifying deep ecology⁴¹⁶ (Jacobsen 1996: 219). One of the questions concerns Næss's reception of Hindu terminology regarding the distinction between individual selves and comprehensive one (Ibid: 234, Note 2). In this context, we face two problems. First, we should clarify how

⁴¹⁵ He argues that during his own life, Gandhi declares himself as a Hindu who fights against casteless rights not because he was against every form of the caste system, but because he considered Hindu discrimination of "God's children" as breaking one more fundamental principle, namely, the one of human entity (Ibid).

⁴¹⁶ According to Zimmerman, Ecosophy T can be partly compared rather with the principles of Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, while Heidegger's theory can be examined as influenced by Buddhism and Taoism (Næss 1997: 4).

to interpret the distinction between so-called individual self (jiva) and the comprehensive Self (Atman) while discussing Gandhi's conceptions.

Emphasizing that 'jiva' and 'atman' are Sanskrit words, Næss, however, does not want to explicitly associate himself with Hinduism claiming that he refers "to some Eastern traditions" (Ibid). Næss tries to further remote atman's consistency with Buddhist Anatman (non-self) since the atman in his ecosophy is not a "permanent indestructible soul" (Ibid). A suggestion in respect with this refusal can be seen in De Silva's statement that Næss is "perhaps aware that metaphysics of atman as a permanent entity may conflict with a Buddhist position" (De Silva 1998: 130). In turn, there are several revisions of how to consider the methodological connection between the self and so-called non-self, namely, how to talk about self "of-non-self elements" (Cavazza 2014: 23), or about Buddhist non-self⁴¹⁷ (Curtin 1996: 240). The problem is even more serious if we want to trace its genealogy, i.e. to find an answer to the question what kind of methodological borrowing are anticipated in order Næss to defend the concept of ecological self, or Self with a capital letter, within Ecosophy T.

On the other hand, Gandhi's theory of the brahmachariya's purification is merely partly comparable with Ecosophy T. While according to Mahayana Buddhism, truth about our causal relations dictates the good we ought to do (Gier 1996: 97-98), in Næss's theory it is ontology rather than ethics that determines our behavior.

⁴¹⁷ According to Næss, the Self is not an eternal or permanent Self. Furthermore, he presumes that it is wrong to think that "the ego is dissolved" in the "larger Self" referring to the metaphor of the moving arrow (Reed and Rothenberg 1989: 9) (De Silva 1998: 130).

6.2.1. “The Hybrid Use of the Vedanta Concept of Larger Self”

De Silva argues that Næss’s reception of the larger Self it is a matter of “unsteady hybrid, using of Vedanta metaphorical concept of the larger Self”, but painted this with “characteristic Buddhist brush strokes” (De Silva 1998: 131). In this context, he outlines that Buddhism does not accept neither self nor Self of a permanent entity talking about ultimate experience (nibbana), as an experience without a self (Ibid). Fox and Rothenberg also claim that the positive definition of the “comprehensive Self” has much to do with Næss’s understanding of a disciplined meditation (yoga), which is recognized as a means for self-realization.

According to Næss, every element is non-separate (Næss 2005ii: 121) referring to the Buddhist formula *sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam theory*, which reveals how the lack of substance and self-existence are interrelated (Næss 1997: 3). If some interrelated phenomena lack substance, as implied by the aforementioned Buddhist formula, there would be no ultimate ontological gap between subjects and non-subjects, between humanity and nature. Næss adds the idea of ultimate and absolute (Ibid), but ambiguously reveals in what sense the absolute is different from the ultimate.

6.2.2. The Role of Bhagavad Gita for Næss's Reception of Gandhi

An important premise for understanding the role of Ecosophy T is the impact of Gandhi's interpretation of Bhagavad Gita as well as Næss's particular reception of the reading in question, which differs in many respects from both Gandhi's interpretation and the text itself.

K. Jacobsen argues in favor of affinity between Bhagavad Gita and Ecosophy T, albeit "environmentalism is not the purpose of the teaching" of Kṛṣṇa (Jacobsen 1996: 221). The statement of Hindu non-duality is that the self is identical with the brahman. Everything is brahman in the sense that nothing can exist apart from this principle (Ibid: 222). For Sankara⁴¹⁸, reality has several levels (Ibid: 223)⁴¹⁹. However, when the highest level is achieved, there is only one Self, namely, plurality does not exist any longer (Ibid). In turn, due to Hindu monism, the realization of the self (atman) is recognized as identical with the permanent and unchanging source of the world (brahman) (Ibid). In this context, Jacobsen claims that there is a divergence between Sankara's Advaita and Ecosophy's T non-dualism concerning the aforementioned disappearance of plurality (Ibid).

He emphasizes that in Advaita Vedanta, the self-realization is a result of a soteriological experience of contentless consciousness rather than of one of enjoying nature's processes (Ibid). It is a cause of the world understood as an ultimate reality, not of the diversity of self-realization (Ibid: 224). Regarding these examinations, Jacobsen points out the need of keeping the

⁴¹⁸ Næss adopts some principles of Mahayana Buddhism (as displayed in the Diamond Sutra) and some of the Theravada texts (Cavazza 2014: 27). However, according to De Silva, he has taken the metaphysical terminology of Vedanta, introducing to its content a concept that may be close to the Buddhist context, albeit not completely. If he has used a neutral vocabulary regarding self-realization, which to be independent of Vedanta and Buddhism, there may not have been a great number of commentaries on that issue, but more clarity (De Silva 1998: 131). Næss refers to Mahayana Buddhism since in contrast to Hinayana, it defines nirvana as achievable goal for all humans in this lifetime, namely, here and now (Gregory and Sabra 2008: 53), replacing the image of the 'Arhant' with the notion of Bodhisatva and thus asserting the possibility of compassion (Ibid).

⁴¹⁹ According to Jacobsen, the implications of this advaita (non-dualism) concept for environmentalism is that one can identify with all beings because one's true identity is the same as theirs (Ibid), as Næss suggests.

methodological difference between Ecosophy T and Advaita Vedanta⁴²⁰ as a difference concerning the point that the goal of Advaita renunciant was how to leave the world, not how to preserve it, while for Ecosophy T, the true self is the natural world (Ibid: 224-225).

On the other hand, the experience of unity within Ecosophy T presumes the fulfillment of the individual self-realization, but it does not imply the reduction of plurality to singularity, as in Advaita Vedanta (Ibid: 225). It rather reveals the need of being aware of the organic unity of the interdependent parts, which are not essentially different from the self himself/herself. To the extent that Ecosophy T recognizes the true self⁴²¹ as the natural world, the mode of realizing oneself does not correspond to the Hindu idea of realizing the absolute Atman, as Jacobsen claims (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, the differences should be traced on the level of whether it is possible the self within Bhagavad Gita to be interpreted as creatively supporting the deep ecology platform (Ibid: 227) as well as how does it affect Gandhi's understanding of the self and its reception in Næss's writings? Starting with the first part of the question, as explored by Jacobsen, I argue that in the interpretation of Gita, the self-realization is understood as a form of identification, which in turn is determined on the highest level of perfection. Thus the dialectics between unity and diversity stated in Ecosophy T does not correspond to the one represented in Gita because the former is hierarchically organized in favor of unity. The idea of unity, as in Bhagavad Gita, should entail and annihilate the diversity as such in so far as the latter is justified as a lack of being, namely, diversity is recognized as an illusion (maya).

Regarding the second question (i.e. Gandhi's understanding of the self), Jacobsen claims that it is a result of interpreting the person with stabilized mentality as a satyagrahi (Ibid: 228) as well as determining the liberation (moksa) as something, which one attains by adopting a social duty (dharma) (Ibid). According to Jacobsen, "This is the same as seeing other beings in one's Self", which in turn means to make some progressive steps in yogic

⁴²⁰ Gandhi's interpretation of Vedanta concerns the clarification of the deprived of qualities absolute and two equivocal affirmations of Advaita (Gier 1996: 100).

⁴²¹ Jacobsen argues that Næss wants to give a non-religious meaning to the atman by contrast to Bhagavad Gita in which the latter is defined as a form of religious experience (Ibid: 231). Such an attempt leaves the question whether Ecosophy T may imply religious experience at all open (Ibid: 232).

experience” (Ibid: 228-229). While Næss distinguishes between ego and self, Gandhi is rather focused on how the Supreme Self is everywhere when the self is extinguished (Ibid: 229). Furthermore, the one who has realized⁴²² the Self in question is in constant service to the others⁴²³.

Jacobsen also argues that Radhakrishnan’s contemporary form of Advaita Vedanta, which entails some principles of Hinduism and Christianity, is comparable with Ecosophy T, more precisely, in respect with monism and social activism (Ibid: 230). The path goes first inwards only in order to go back again to everything. In Næss’s interpretation, this is the path of action (karma-marga) that leads the action-yogi (karmajogi) into a contact with all creatures (Næss 1989: 194).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that we cannot talk about direct methodological borrowings from Mahayana Buddhism and some versions of Hinduism on side of Næss, but rather about affinity in Jacobsen’s sense since the theoretical references in Næss’s writings are rather vague to the extent they are based on interfering concepts with broader interdisciplinary meanings. Even if we can outline some similarities on a macro methodological level, i.e. some similarities regarding concepts and definitions, we should take into account that they have a different origin and contextualization. That is why one of my main concerns about Næss’s interpretations derives from the fact that he decontextualizes the principles he borrows as well as that he insists on providing ambiguous definitions, even when the latter may raise some misconceptions. The mechanism of borrowing itself is realized on the principle of incomplete induction, when the similarities of the definitions are described by default as deriving from similarities of the premises, albeit the similarities in question may have a different normative validity.

⁴²² On the other hand, Næss argues that Gandhi’s first principle is the same as in Ecosophy T, namely, his Norm 1 is “Seek complete self-realization!” (Ibid).

⁴²³ The liberation of the self at the fourth stage of life is abandoned in classical Hinduism (Ibid).

6.3. Næss's Gestalt Ontology as Inspired by Advaita Vedanta

According to Jacobsen, Næss quotes the philosophy of Sankara, which displays one of the tendencies towards non-duality in Hinduism (Jacobsen 1996: 222)⁴²⁴. However, Vedanta's non-duality determined as an ideal model is incomparable with the gestalt thinking in Næss's sense since this singularity presumes a very specific form of unification to be accomplished. On the level of understanding knowledge, the problem in the Buddhist teaching of Four Noble Truths⁴²⁵ concerns the role of ignorance (*avijja*) (Cavazza 2014: 32) and so-called *docta ignorantia* in Næss's sense⁴²⁶. In this context, the issue of *docta ignorantia* can be examined as regarding not a general form of ignorance, but rather the ossification of views. Referring to Cavazza's statement that Buddhist soteriology begins with 'right vision' (*sammaditthi*) (Ibid: 33), which is a form of inquiry, I argue that the point in question is the quest for experiential wisdom whose distant premises can be found in "Buddha's predicament on free inquiry and the value of doubt" (Ibid). In the latter case, however, the epistemological ignorance is much more clearly related to the problem of moral misconceptions than in Næss's writings. Ignorance is described as involving both cognitive deficiency and "unfavorable attitude" or "prejudice" (Ibid: 35) since the immoral conduct takes place by misapprehending the facts.

The second important issue that should be clarified in this context is the parallel between the concept of Buddhahood and self-realization. Næss recognizes Buddhahood as permissible to gestalts alone (Næss 2005s: 196). However, if Buddhahood is permissible merely to the gestalts, it remains unclear how to interpret the aforementioned discontinuity and impermanence in so far as every single being 'participates' in Buddha's nature for

⁴²⁴ See also De Sylva 1998: 131.

⁴²⁵ It explains the problem of suffering with craving and passionate greed, which produce desperate attachment or clinging to things as if the egos and the objects were independent things in themselves. In turn, clinging arises from ignorance. It is not a general form of ignorance but ossification of views.

⁴²⁶ However, as Jacobsen relevantly points out, Advaita Vedanta and Ecosophy T have different aims since the former was a system of religious thoughts of how to liberate the self from the burden of rebirth.

the sake of being free of suffering and realizing its own nature. Such a comparison is possible if we keep the definition on the level of gestalt ontology, where the principle of analogy is considered as an ontological one alone. However, in both cases with Mahayana Buddhism and Næss, rejecting the role of the subject-object dualism is a necessary condition for referring the process of liberation to the one of self-realization.

6.3.1. The Influence of Mahayana Buddhism on Næss's Gestalt Ontology

The influence of Mahayana Buddhism on Næss's gestalt ontology becomes understandable if we examine the genealogy of the Sanskrit expression 'sva marga' (your way) (Næss 2008b: 160), which means to focus on the way that cannot be obtained by following some rules alone. I argue that according to Næss's interpretation, 'your way' is recognized as an internal compass that redirects the person, when the self falls in the ditch, or loses the way. This way is unique and it cannot be articulated, nor can it be scientifically shared. It is an imperative whose performative power has ontological roots in so far as it derives from life as such inflicting a way of engaging.

On a gestalt level, the engagement can be explored as a matter of engaging with the world situation based on the principle 'everything is connected', which can be identified as a crossing point between Næss's gestalt ontology and Mahayana Buddhism. This principle does not have to be interpreted as belonging to Mahayana Buddhism alone because, as Sessions points out, this is also the first law of ecology. Due to Næss's interpretation of the principle, as referring to Mahayana Buddhism, we can see the contextualization of already discussed formula "sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam" (all entities have no essence) possibly paraphrasing Nagarjuna's words (Cavazza 2014: 26).

On the other hand, I argue that the methodological connection between Mahayana Buddhist way of thinking and gestalt ontology can be seen by drawing some parallels whose starting point could be ascribed to already discussed mode of 'to think like a mountain'. The idea of walking is of crucial importance for both Mahayana Buddhism and ecosophy; one aspect, which is also stressed by Curtin since according to him, "we are realized by the mountain's walking" (Curtin 1996: 245). He claims that if we have doubts about mountain's walks, it means that we do not know our own walking (Ibid: 246).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the practical implications of self-realization achieved through the process of identification are grounded in different views on gestalt ontology, which Næss compares with 'becoming a Buddha'. In both cases, it is not a matter of presuming a certain unity. The recognition of Ecosophy T, which aims at "seeing oneself in all things" can be described as having not only ontological, but also moral connotations due to which the subject can contribute to "the life style of all the other beings" while realizing themselves, and the

other way around (Næss 2008: 196). In turn, the differences between gestalts are described by Næss as ones regarding joy and suffering, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss's theory of gestalt ontology. In Næss's sense, subject's realization is defined as a form of identification with others by developing a certain kind of activeness, while in Mahayana Buddhism, it is a matter of a specific unifying process. On the level of gestalts, the difference in question concerns the different understanding of experiential gestalts since Næss's one 'I am the river' has a different process character than the gestalt manifested in Mahayana Buddhism, whose prototype characteristic is the illusion of permanence. Næss still relies on the point that diversity comes from the experience itself and the never-ending need of its structuring. Otherwise, we would have all turned into abstract structures.

IV.1. KVALØY'S ECOPHILOSOPHY. A GENERAL OVERVIEW

1.1. To Be Carried Away by the Stream without Getting Drawn. Ecophilosophy of River Time⁴²⁷

In contrast to Næss's gestalt thinking mode⁴²⁸, Kvaløy introduces the one of river time (elvens tid) focused on the continuity of time and its normative validity rather than on the spatial continuity. According to Kvaløy, one of the main methodological questions is how to discern between space and time as fundamental life's dimensions (Kvaløy 2014: 82). The possible answer can be found by reflecting upon the type of engagement we make against the background of the illusion that we can 'arrest' time; similarly, we try to "arrest" the sound with the help of different devices such as gramophone record and cassette recorder (Ibid: 6) that both expand and orient our ambitions to elaborating new methods for 'catching' the sound. In this context, the biggest illusion is recognized as stemming from people's belief that it is possible to subject time. That is why our communication is reduced to living with the initial impossibility of possessing the world picture as a dynamic one having its own normative validity.

On a micro methodological level, Kvaløy's river time can be characterized as a time of a constant change which guarantees the coherence of space and time. In this context, one of the most challenging tasks is how to anticipate time and space in their varieties since the world picture has its inexhaustible (unexploitable) dynamic rhythm. Referring to Kvaløy's theory of time, I argue that time presumes embodiment of rhythm, which never starts and never ends.

⁴²⁷ River time is the title of the last compendium of Kvaløy's texts written in 2014.

⁴²⁸ See also Kvaløy 1985a: 43.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that Kvaløy's process philosophy can be examined as a philosophy of time, as a process philosophy due to which time speaks with its own voice. It is a thinking mode that is also a mode of practicing in so far as the powers of improvisation (Ibid: 13) have their own normative validity.

Under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, Kvaløy defines experience as a stream of events (Kvaløy 2004: 270). The latter presumes reconsidering the thinking mode since time dimension provides us with momentous pictures (processes), while the spatial one is justified by the modern scientific tradition. Thus the new thinking mode creates an obstacle the wholes and traditions (Kvaløy 1976: 21) to be considered as a break with our European scientific tradition since the thinking mode resembles the Buddhist one but does not overlap with it. Regarding the Taoist way of thinking, the aforementioned new mode can be compared with it in respect with the status of being, but in contrast to both Buddhism and Taoism, it uses other, sharper thinking tools for evaluating experience (Ibid).

In turn, Næss defines deep ecology as an expression of a spatial structure presuming that the Self can be determined in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. He interprets the self in small letters (the non-ecological self) as a vertical one in so far as building space is considered as a vertical process. However, from this it does not follow that the process of shaping the ecological Self should be horizontally understood by default since it is a multidimensional one. The self in small letters can be determined in a vertical dimension due to its potential to subordinate nature. On the other hand, Næss's conception of depth can be defined as implying a sense of verticality because it is built as contrasting the idea of surface, which is considered as a superficial one (Ibid). Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that we could introduce two modes of dimensionality, which are neither ontologically nor axiologically contradicting, i.e. we could talk about both vertical and horizontal dimensions⁴²⁹.

What are the macro methodological implications of the aforementioned contradictions between horizontal and vertical dimensions? At first sight, it is a contradiction between dynamic and static, Eastern and Western thinking modes. Analyzing Kvaløy's theory in comparison with Næss's one, I argue that this distinction concerns the one between two types of philosophy: be-

⁴²⁹ Similarly to Næss, Kvaløy specifies that one's presence depends on where and how one leaves one's traces (Kvaløy 2014: 100).

tween the one of gestalts and the one of streams. On a micro methodological level, this distinction is determined as discerning between thinking in structural entities and thinking in temporal continuities.

The space-time mode in Kvaløy's sense provides one dimensionality to be explored as a compressed space (Kvaløy 2014: 93). The latter is recognized as the only one space available whose anticipations are considered as projections of one dimension into different directions, namely, into the ones of up (height), middle (length) and down (width) (Ibid). As Kvaløy points out, thus we have a civilization which, first and foremost, aimed at stopping time expansion (Ibid). It is math that helps time to be quantified and depicted on the surface of the clock⁴³⁰, i.e. time to be incorporated into apparent space measurement (Ibid). Regarding math's calculations⁴³¹, the formula regarding the knowledge of power was dominated by the knowledge of height, length and width, mass and speed, or so-called primary (mechanical) characteristics (Ibid), which can be objectively measured. In this context, the projections of power can be traced back to anticipating as much space as possible in the least possible time.

In turn, we can replace the word 'experimenting' in Kvaløy's texts with the one of diverse experiencing. He suggests the engagement with space to be substituted with the one with time, but then one of the main methodological problems is how to keep interpreting both modes in a noncontradictory way. We cannot argue that engagement with time is 'more natural' (in the sense of being original and more valuable) than the one with space. Otherwise, extrapolating Kvaløy's theory, we should discern between two types of organicity, which is a problematic distinction since organic interconnectedness is indiscernible as such. Furthermore, the genealogy of such internal connectedness can be revealed if we trace what both Næss and Kvaløy understood by spontaneity.

According to Næss, intuition is extended to the concept of improvisation (Næss 2008: 200) seen as an embodiment of temporal fluctuation. The improvisation itself has a given normative validity, which provides following natural rhythm, as it is. However, the engagement with rhythm does not exclude the one with space. Paraphrasing Kvaløy's theory, we may claim that

⁴³⁰ He argues that the time of the clock has replaced time as such (Ibid).

⁴³¹ According to Kvaløy, nowadays, one should change the track of both space and time, and even worse: one should be in one space, which lacks time since one changes one's identity as one changes shirts (Ibid: 100).

rhythm can be examined not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms in so far as the metrical rhythm is something, which has been equated with its quantitative implications post factum and thus it has contributed to justifying the rhythm as accelerating tempo in the industrial development society.

On a cultural level, such a measurement leads to so-called need of cultural fundament of living culture through geometrical anticipation of the world provided by the industrial civilization (Kvaløy 2014: 96), which embodies a mechanistic rationality (Ibid: 97). A society promoting such a rationality is characterized as a stop-time society (Ibid: 102) since Kvaløy's main concern derives from the presumption that this is a world, which underrates itself and which works with abstractions (Ibid: 104).

On a macro methodological level, the distinction between time and space (Ibid: 106) can be examined as implying two world pictures (Ibid: 157) – the one of Western world, which is static and subjectable to unique mapping. According to this picture, math formulas are considered as a key for understanding how the changing mode is made as static as possible. The most illuminative illustration of the Eastern world can be found in Kvaløy's reception of Mahayana Buddhism, which contributes to rehabilitating the role of improvisation against the background of the understanding that stability is an illusion, i.e. by strictly discriminating fantasy from illusion⁴³².

⁴³² The illusion of the Bhutanese is implied in the 'readiness for improvisation' rather than in the system planning (Ibid: 158).

1.1.1. Some Implications of Diversity and Time for Kvaløy's Theory

Calling Bergson the first ecophilosopher⁴³³ (Kvaløy 1985: 30), Kvaløy defines improvisation as a rhythmic improvisation with qualitative implications (Ibid: 23). The organic interrelatedness presumes the orientation to provide a better understanding of the environment in terms of "taking a place". Otherwise, the interrelatedness in question would have lost its potential to initiate the need of committing moral and political engagements.

The meta-methodological connection between diversity and time presumes the genealogy of so-called organic and mechanical time⁴³⁴ to be examined in so far as they are key elements of Kvaløy's theory of life necessity society and industrial development one. In this context, I argue that the difference in specifying time stem from the different understandings of reality as space: whether it is interpreted as a complex coordinate system. Regulating two systems in a different way presumes grounding two different forms of control, namely, a quantitative controllability, which determines that everything is a subject to control and a qualitative self-regulation of the system. In turn, the control of the coordinate system that supports the multiple dimensions, and thus brings the visibility of diversity to life, can be described as a qualitative rather than quantitative control in which the insecurity⁴³⁵ is a necessary condition for the development of the system itself. It is a guarantee for the variation of the quality as such.

The indisputable conceptions of control derive from the aforementioned distinction of time being based on an illusion. The latter corresponds to the 'as if nature' mode due to which phenomena are recognized as unreal (or less real) representations. To a certain extent, the impact of the control in question can be explored by a reference to Johan Galtung's social cosmology of homo occidentalis oeconomicus (Galtung 1985: 13).

⁴³³ Næss's critique of Bergson's distinction of time is a problematic one. He claims that Bergson says nothing against the quantification and use of time's measures, albeit the steady use of 'exact time' (av 'eksakt' tid) is deeply grounded signifier of our global society (Ibid: 42).

⁴³⁴ This distinction will be examined in detail in the chapter on Kvaløy's theory of organic and mechanical time.

⁴³⁵ This idea takes place against the background of Kvaløy's interest in chaos theories. See Kvaløy 2004.

If we investigate Kvaløy's theory that space is a function of a process focusing on his arguments that it is not only the way but also the conditions, which specify it, it would lead to justifying the following conclusion: time is not ontologically superior to space, i.e. the latter is not a function of the former.

On the other hand, Kvaløy also provides relevant arguments for exploring the gist of computers as unable to deal with the conflicts' dialectics neither in place, nor in time since they are focused on a problem solving from the type A or non-A rather than on expanding the decision making process. Otherwise, we should reject the idea of 'being on the way', which is of crucial importance for understanding the phenomenological character of Kvaløy's philosophy.

Going back to his idea of streaming (*strøm på veg*) (Kvaløy 1985: 29), i.e. of the possibility to be involved with the stream by being in motion, I claim that it is the possibility mode that presumes the stream to be explored as a process rather than a goal. In this context, time is understood as a horizon that needs to be investigated in respect with the idea of situatedness, i.e. with the one, where we can find our home place.

In turn, constituting and recognizing space as a factor in programming a given machine is necessary in order 'to have job done', as Kvaløy suggests (Ibid), but even if we accept this theory, it does not mean that time ontologically precedes space. Furthermore, I argue that it is a matter of internalizing the idea of situatedness, i.e. of anticipating the potentiality of places as being at place in order to describe one job as done.

The socio-political implications of the sense of belonging defined as a certain form of fellowship built on the attachment to work clarify what it means to be grasped by the stream, namely, to be forced to teach yourself to swim (Kvaløy 2014: 68). Partly, the 'must' mode comes not only on man's side, but also on the one of the river. The latter mainly regards the responsibility for being engaged with conflict situations in so far as 'staying against the unexpected' (Ibid) strengthens the maturity of the individual. On a macro methodological level, it means that to teach yourself to swim presumes to take moral and political responsibility as a commitment to life. Kvaløy himself emphasizes that young people who jump for the first time into the deep water of environmental activism, swim for the first time, taking responsibility for both themselves and their environment (Ibid: 84). Thus the global responsibility remains noncontradictory merely by making given individual commitments to life.

Developing the idea of situatedness, Kvaløy supplies it with very strong socio-political connotations, namely, it is considered as a prototype characteristic of cultivating “a right to Earth” (Kvaløy 1985b: 129), which is a matter of law of nature. The law is to be left to gain living power from the initial connection with Earth through cultivating the sense of belonging to a piece of land. The later opens a new mode of working with nature going beyond the distinction between sources and resources⁴³⁶.

In this context, we should confront two types of helplessness – the one of the natural efforts required for reviving the organic intuition of time, and the one of repairing defined in terms of fixing time. The process of reviving is realized by opening the space for children and giving time back, as Kvaløy suggests (Kvaløy 1985: 34). It is the performative power of deliberating but not by repairing that takes place within the framework of depriving man of the authority to compare space and time. This would mean that to be on time would presume to be at place (i.e. at home), where the orientation mark should be understood in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms.

On a macro methodological level, extrapolating Kvaløy’s conception of time, we may speculate whether our culture is based on the idea of place (Kvaløy 1985b: 136), due to the fact that the possibilities of space become technological ones⁴³⁷. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that it is not the ranking of space, technology and time, but rather the intrinsic inseparability of time and space, which has an impact on the establishment of monoculture or multi-cultures in Kvaløy’s sense. Otherwise, it would mean that the problem arises not from the opportunities themselves, as much as they are determined as space opportunities, but from the intensification of time and space dimensions. It is also a matter of how to make ‘where and when’ mode possible in minimum time and minimum space.

Referring again to Tordsson’s idea of Nansen’s moral geography, I argue that Kvaløy’s theory contributes to avoiding the reduction of geography in question to cartography, which deprives the locus of life by compressing its

⁴³⁶ According to Kvaløy, to work with (med) nature is a driving force in developing the aims of green workers on an international level.

⁴³⁷ According to Kvaløy, we have roots in a space-based culture (Ibid). We make time embodied due to the spatial opportunities, which are technological opportunities.

dimensions. The moral geography⁴³⁸ itself describes the places that are three-dimensional, which in turn shows their intrinsic value.

On the other hand, outlining the normative validity of the latter presumes to reveal the coordinates of the places, which make one locus. On a macro methodological level, it means that a given place becomes recognizable as a home, when we noncontradictory decode both its location and duration not only here and now, but against the background of the coordinate system of the biosphere.

⁴³⁸ Kvaløy's conception is that Europeans behave as if the world is a map of lines and dots depicted on a paper, or on computer: a piece of space, where a given measure is always determined by the plot (Kvaløy 1985: 23).

1.1.1.1. The Role of Process Philosophy in Shaping Cultural Traditions

According to Kvaløy, justifying cultural traditions and their embodiment is ontologically dependent on the recognition of time and space as well as on their internal relations within the framework of process philosophy, which is understood as a reaction against ‘arresting’ time and space (Kvaløy 2004: 1), as I already showed. Furthermore, the impact of cultural traditions is important in so far as the need of process philosophy as an explanatory one occurs. It takes place when the need of analyzing the sense of homeness provokes a genealogical examination regarding the recognition of situatedness mode. Concerning culture, it means that one grows up in a cultural tradition in which the ‘spatiality’ of the place is justified by outlining its culturally determined boundaries. Kvaløy claims that our civilization provides an enormous experiment in seeing how long one can persist in grasping people and nature in machines’ size as well space to be anticipated as being high, long and wide alone (Kvaløy 2014: 62).

In this context, it is important to emphasize that the aforementioned experimenting is different from the one of improvising since it is an experiment whose aim is to quantify both the object and the process itself. The quantification should compress the multidimensionality by imitating the process of creation and situating it in only one given dimension. That is why I argue that the most successful way of cultivation within sustainable development society is understood as a process of planning due to which the idea of landscape is replaced with the one of compressed (‘flat’) space.

Reconsidering the role of culture in building identity in Kvaløy’s sense is also a matter of justifying an ‘own’ mode, which is not the one of possession, but rather a mode of belonging. Thus following the natural dynamics of environment, we should cultivate the sense of homeness, which again presumes to question the Western rationality thinking mode. Breaking the cultural boundaries, which determine identity’s ones, inevitably leads to the self-sufficient process of expansion provoking the myths of European ideal “beyond nationality” to be established (Ibid). These myths contribute to erasing the contradictions of the boundaries in order to provoke new ones regarding the justification of some new identities.

In turn, the unity of cultures (Enhets-kulturene) gives a proof of recognizing cultural diversity as independent of the material expansion or competition, as Kvaløy suggests (Kvaløy 1976: 63). We are parts of nature before we want this or not, namely, even before we decide whether to strengthen the equilibrium or to develop the balance disorders. The win achieved at the

expense of nature is always a loss for the self. In this context, Kvaløy recognizes the role of religion as the most important part of a total culture (en total-kultur), which holds the groups together (Ibid: 77).

On the other hand, Kvaløy's justification of life necessity society is based on questioning the distinction between monoculture and multi-cultures⁴³⁹ arguing that the former supports so-called technocapitalism since it is based on the development and encouragement of a certain type of cultural knowledge and historical interactions. However, he specifies that while examining technocapitalism, he does not make fundamental distinctions between the systems in which it takes place (whether it is in the EU, US, Japan etc.) (Ibid: 96). Within the framework of ecological thinking mode, Kvaløy recognizes imperialism as a systematic decomposition of the diversity of nature as well as of culture's specificities and man's resistance potentials (Ibid: 100). In this context, he talks about "future imperialism", which is defined as a new form of colonialism (Ibid). That is why Kvaløy determines the varieties of bio and human ecology as the most important scientific specificities against the development of the aforementioned future imperialism (Ibid: 109).

Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that technocapitalist model turns out to be the one grounding the uncontradictory recognition of imperialism beyond the 'here-and-now' mode. It is based on supporting so-called omnipotent expertise by all means, namely, by the ones of hard technologies reducing the need of conducting critical research which strengthens pluralism. In other words, pluralism in Kvaløy's sense is defined as a socio-political embodiment of natural diversity, which contradicts the imperialism of mono-reality/mono-culture.

In turn, new colonialism is supported by so-called value-prognoses (Ibid: 104), which are examined against the background of Pittsburgh Values Project. In ecology, the values are always determined as implying a certain kind of responsibility for the sake of preserving both the values themselves and their objects.

On a macro methodological level, it is the contradiction between industrial development and nature's growth, whose prototype characteristic is the balance of nature's dynamics (Ibid: 109) that makes the idea of multi-cultures having a higher normative validity than the one of monoculture. Regarding

⁴³⁹ According to him, the culture, which gives identity, is a result of a close, specific long-lasting interplay with one special place as well as with specific nature's conditions (Kvaløy 2014: 126).

researcher's responsibility⁴⁴⁰ (Ibid: 110), recognizing neutrality and 'value freedom' do not support nihilism or moral relativism, but rather a free choice of values for the sake of achieving epistemological, moral and cultural integrity.

⁴⁴⁰ Kvaløy explicitly states that researchers do not have to be involved in promoting defensive or negative measures (Ibid: 112). Related issue is whether they should impose an active or a passive form of popularization, which in turn affects the anticipation of the promoted issues (Ibid: 113).

1.2. The Influence of Mahayana Buddhism on River Time Philosophy

Kvaløy defines ecophilosophy as a process philosophy. He is partly influenced by the idea of processuality, as represented in Mahayana Buddhism, which is not uncritically borrowed, as I showed in the chapter on Næss. This idea, as anticipated by Kvaløy, is one of the main prerequisites for questioning the Western thinking mode that supports the implementation of dualism in contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, which is focused on the integrity of all living forms. In turn, this integrity is interpreted by Kvaløy, while conceptualizing natural rhythm as a means for measuring both ontological and normative validity of change.

Referring to Bhagavad Gita, Kvaløy argues that in Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism man is recognized as an inextricable part of all other living beings when he/she anticipates himself/herself as an individual. It “depends” on the deception (*beror det på et bedrag*), namely, that he/she is fully conscious about both himself/herself and the situation as such (Ibid: 18). The Buddhist process thinking and its role are evaluated against the background of the dialectics of general system theory since Buddhist philosophy is considered by Kvaløy as “the most radical attack against the ideas of permanent structures and mono-centered individuals” (Kvaløy 2004: 330). Furthermore, Buddhism is characterized as the world-view, which provides the most radical description of the world as a process due to which soul is seen as a type of rhythmic paradigm (Kvaløy 2014: 26). It changes and goes from one way of being (form) to another, almost like an improvised music piece or as a whirlpool in a river (Ibid).

What are the practical embodiments of the process thinking in Mahayana Buddhism, which are anticipated by Kvaløy in his theory of river time? Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that he justifies the process thinking as a mode while striving for rehabilitating the idea of organic time, as defined by Bergson, which contradicts the one of mechanical time characterizing industrial development society. In this context, Mahayana Buddhist process thinking becomes one of the necessary conditions for establishing ecophilosophy since the rehabilitation of time as a process is used for giving priority to life necessity society at the expense of the industrial development one in Kvaløy’s sense. This change goes beyond the idea of meaningfulness as reducible to a set of given meanings, which would

hinder man's self-realization to be recognized within the framework of nature's realization.

Another serious concern derives from the understanding of the unity between man and nature in Buddhism, which, according to Kvaløy, is often misunderstood in the West by some researchers such as Alan Watts⁴⁴¹ (Kvaløy 1976: 63). However, I argue that not every single form of non-dualism can be considered as belonging to the Eastern thinking mode. In this context, Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as providing a non-dualist mode of thinking that combines different (in their contents) non-dualist tendencies, which are irreducible to the idea of processuality, as described in Mahayana Buddhism.

⁴⁴¹ Allan Watts (1915-1973) is a British philosopher who is a populariser of Eastern philosophy.

1.2.1. Kvaløy's Reception of Gandhi's Ethics of Non-violence

In addition to Mahayana Buddhism, Kvaløy is strongly influenced, similarly to Næss, by Gandhi's ethics of non-violence, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss. Gandhi's conception of 'the way is the goal' is analyzed by Kvaløy against the background of what it means to be taken by the stream, namely, to leave yourself to be reunited with the wholeness which you belong. The latter cannot be recognized as a passive behavior since organic belonging is a matter of a 'life in time'.

Kvaløy argues that both Bhagavad Gita and Mahayana Buddhism take place in one and the same environment (Kvaløy 2014: 168). He explores two quotations formulated by Gandhi while interpreting Bhagavad Gita, namely, "You who enter here, leave of yourself the whole self"⁴⁴², and "The man who acts without binding is the Highest!" (Ibid).

Kvaløy examines the first statement in a Buddhist context, or at least, as an expression of a Buddhist influence (Ibid): sometime the real Hindu can use it as a starting point but would talk about the self as being together with all living beings, i.e. to become a Brahman (Ibid). In turn, the second statement is analyzed in the light of the first one. Referring to Bhagavad Gita, Kvaløy claims that to behave without any binding whatsoever means to behave in tune with truth and non-violence in order to spread them into the world (Ibid). While doing so, one should be bound neither to oneself, nor to the goals of the deeds. The idea of truth is recognized as both 'truthfulness' and 'a position of an open and unrestricted contact between people, and between people and everything, which lives, when violence is missing: in thoughts, in feelings as well as in word and doing'⁴⁴³ (Ibid).

⁴⁴² On the other hand, it is not well-clarified how the illusion of the self can contribute to internalizing freedom as a form of moral commitment to the others. Referring to moral experiential gestalt would contribute to understanding the gist of social engagement, or what in Kvaløy's terminology is to learn how to swim. According to him, environmental politics requires reconsidering the engagement with nature as an attachment to life (Ibid: 84).

⁴⁴³ This interpretation is supported with two more quotations of Bhagavad Gita: "To stay away from deeds' fruits is the way to something" and "This is the centre to which Gita is woven" (Ibid: 168). However, it does not mean that we should look for postulating an eternal goal, but rather that the result is as important as the deeds are.

In this context, Kvaløy emphasizes the role of Gandhi's interpretation of what it means to say that "the way is the goal" (Ibid: 169). Gandhi also outlines two aspects, namely, that everything is a part of a process pattern as well as that the new teaching should be sought in Satyagraha (Truth). The aim of revealing the process pattern is provoked by the one of laying new ways in order the dynamic rhythm to be corrupted with difficulties. The goal itself is based on the correspondence that if violence inflicts violence, then non-violence should also inflict non-violence (Ibid).

Regarding insistence on truth as a new teaching, it would contribute to knowing more about the world and its own opportunities on the way. In turn, it would lead to testing them, in order to adjust the way so that it to lead to better opportunities (Ibid: 170). This theory can be clarified if we go back to Kvaløy's metaphor of the self, which co-creates stream's whirlpools (Ibid). Thus one of the most illuminative contemporary projections of 'Kharma Buddhism' can be seen in a certain kind of 'wakefulness' (Ibid: 171) regarding the impact of human actions in time as well as in their influence on nature in a long-term perspective. Paraphrasing Kvaløy's conception, I argue that the implicit gist of karma should be man to know that his/her responsibility towards biosphere is ineradicable since mankind's space and time are an irreducible part of the biosphere's ones.

By contrast to Næss, Kvaløy does not insist that ecophilosophy, as based on a certain type of process philosophy, is directly influenced by the Eastern traditions. Kvaløy argues that the increasing interest of ecology in the self-regulation of the organic systems as well as the issue of equilibrium are proofs of a thinking mode, which the old Indians and Chinese have not had, but which is given to us by the modern science (Kvaløy 1974b: 74). Furthermore, Kvaløy does not underrate the fact that it is provided by the same Western tradition, which has contributed to the establishment of the environmental crisis by giving priority to the process of specialization (Ibid).

1.3. To Think Like a River

Analyzing Kvaløy's theory, I claim that his process philosophy can be characterized by the mode 'to think like a river', which corresponds to Næss's one 'to think like a mountain'. Both modes presume justifying a new type of knowledge, namely, experiential knowledge, which inflicts the reconsideration of the normative validity of feelings and emotions. That is why both modes require the subject to achieve his/her self-realization by having ecstatic experience (Kvaløy 1985b: 128).

Næss and Kvaløy share the understanding of the father mountain, but they also interpret the idea of experiential in the sense of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus⁴⁴⁴, namely, that the process mode is embodied in the formula 'everything flows (panta rhei), everything changes'⁴⁴⁵ (Kvaløy 1985: 32). It is the continuity mode of experiencing fluctuations of time that makes the constant dynamics irreducible to the statics of space as such. Giving priority to temporal dimensionality rather than to the spatial one (Kvaløy 1985b: 135) concerns the different way of defining the idea of structuring experience itself. While Næss's thinking like a mountain, interpreted as *conditio sine qua non*, displays gestalt thinking, Kvaløy's one concerns the embodiment of holistic rhythm that may not necessarily be harmonic, but rather harmonizing time. The latter clarifies the dialectics of time whose being for itself is recognized as dependent on the one in itself within the horizon of temporality mode.

Referring again to Heraclitus's metaphor, I argue that the river in Kvaløy's sense is the ocean, where water is never the same in its stream, but it is still similar to itself in terms of keep being water. Extrapolating Kvaløy's interpretation, I conclude that it is the organic coherence that follows its own natural rhythm.

In this context, Kvaløy's methodological contribution can be seen in introducing a new form of getting attached to a place, namely, in recognizing river as a home: not as a locus, but as a lifestream, where the mode of becoming is justifiable both in time and place.

⁴⁴⁴ Næss also adopts Heraclitus's idea but in a different context, namely, while interpreting Sami's slogan "Let the river live!"

⁴⁴⁵ As I outlined in the previous chapter of the current research, Næss argues that "I am the river!" (Næss 2008: 3).

Judging by what Ø. Dalland (Ibid: 129) claims about the river folk and the power of poetry of the river, I also draw the conclusion that the comparison of the aforementioned two thinking modes contributes to revealing another type of mythopoetic projections. They are similar to the ones outlined by Næss, which concern the strive for achieving proximity with the river. In turn, recognizing the latter is a matter of realizing a certain type of both pedagogical and poetic proximity (Ibid).

2. WHAT PRICE DID THE ECOPHILOSOPHY PAY?

Ecophilosophy is coined as an attempt to build up a logical, connected, understandable, articulated description of life's society and its condition, with a special attention to the structure, processes and communication (Kvaløy 1974b: 73). It also represents an attempt to formulate norms for actions from an objective point of view, i.e. to maintain or to open "an ecological balance of systems" (Ibid).

The strive for philosophizing is recognized as a practical activity of experimenting (Kvaløy 2014: 34), which is always a politically relevant activity. In this context, Kvaløy's attempt at building ecophilosophy is driven by the idea to develop a way of thinking engaged with nature's rhythm, which has a shaping function (Ibid). It is the rhythm obtaining the normative validity of organic that remains open for the new due to the fact that unrepeatedness through repetition is something intrinsic for its nature. Shaping is not a matter of building a system or a structure because its constitution does not require machine's perfection to be adopted as an ideal goal.

On a macro methodological level, ecophilosophy takes place in order to bring out and make understandable the contradiction between multi-sided man⁴⁴⁶ and mega-machine (Kvaløy 2004: 150). By reconsidering the normative validity of nature's enigmatic rhythmic stream, we face a strong reaction against the cartography of man's planning.

Furthermore, ecophilosophy aims at connecting with the Norwegian traditions regarding outdoor life and so-called 'work in nature' because it is the body experience that is in the center (Kvaløy 2014: 86). However, from that it does not follow that we should discern between qualitative and quantitative modes of evaluation while referring to the initial connection between man and nature since corporeal representations concern both modes. The

⁴⁴⁶ Diversity, however, can be recognized as a radical one within industrial development society, which questions the existence of life necessity one (Kvaløy 2004: 180).

main benefit of avoiding such a distinction is the opportunity to deepen the empathic engagements in so far as the complex understanding goes beyond the purely cognitive framing.

Regarding political activities, ecophilosophy is defined by Kvaløy as providing an orientation to the conditions, which lead to the environmental crisis, as well as clarifying how such a crisis can be overcome by reconsidering the implications of the engagements the political actors make. On the other hand, experimenting is not equivalent to speculating since the former presumes to uncontradictorily integrate the new knowledge as a form of a new engagement. Related problem in this context is the interest in questioning specialists' monopoly of knowledge (Kvaløy 1976: 4) at the expense of practical engagement⁴⁴⁷.

Kvaløy claims that the task of ecophilosophy is to try to understand the crisis's development as far as possible in its wholeness and on this basis, to propose something useably (brukbart) new (Kvaløy 2004: 3270). The field is outlined by introducing four illuminative characteristics (Ibid: 3271) regarding the clarification of the relationship between man and nature's philosophy of life. The characteristics in question also refer to the different activities that support saving man and nature by developing ecophilosophy as an engagement as well as establishing a new lifestyle. In this context, Kvaløy points out that defining ecophilosophy is not just a matter of combining two words together, namely, the ones of 'eco' and 'philosophy' unless a clear engagement is made, as I showed in the first chapter of the current research.

In turn, reconsidering the connections between man and nature is an attempt to clarify the global and local aspects of their interaction by examining them as interdependent wholes: when all these aspects are explored within a net of holistic interactions in so far as the initial connection between man and nature is seen as a complex one.

Concerning the description of so-called by Kvaløy communication, I argue that it corresponds to Zapffe's explanation of the living energies, namely, to his theory about the myriads of energy impulses (Kvaløy 1972: 748). Characterizing Zapffe's philosophical conception as belonging to the realm of philosophical anthropology, Kvaløy examines how anthropocentrism based

⁴⁴⁷ Another issue is the ecological definition of other types of imperialism such as cultural, economic, political imperialism etc.

on both overexposed self-awareness and the strive for meaning, typical merely for the human beings⁴⁴⁸, leads to the contemporary ecocrisis⁴⁴⁹.

According to Kvaløy, the communication concerns the origin of the disseminating network of ecosystems understood as a multidimensional subject (Kvaløy 1976: 178). Each ecosystem consists of a net of disseminating channels, like the communication system (Ibid: 23). That is why if man's communication is based on the 'natural' one deriving from the 'natural' spreadability of the living energies, it can avoid the complicated process of standardization⁴⁵⁰, which distances it from the complexity of natural rhythm. The normative validity of the aforementioned naturalness is inflicted by the intrinsic relationship between humankind and other systems in the biosphere in so far as they are initially connected in a way that does not presume the reduction to objective naturalism. Kvaløy displays this initial dependence as a mutual involvement in a gigantic thread net (trådnett), or as a net channel stretched between us and the rest of our world (Ibid: 24). He uses the bridge metaphor to show that the communication channels between the individual, group and the circumstances (Ibid: 38) should be examined as bridging opportunities, which support complexity of nature.

The ecopolitical aspects concern the task of ecophilosophy to inflict political changes by engaging all man's capabilities in solving not only conflicts, but also in reconsidering their significance, namely, by rehabilitating the normative validity of the conflicts, when they represent a fight for life's values.

The understanding of the forth component (Kvaløy 2004: 3271) is described by Kvaløy as connected with the third one⁴⁵¹. It clarifies why and how the

⁴⁴⁸It provokes the false justification that man is a very special living being, which in turn encourages the noncontradictory overrating of the role of anthropocentrism.

⁴⁴⁹ Referring to Zapffe's disenchantment of overexposed faith in anthropocentrism, I argue that it is done for the sake of showing how ecophilosophy cannot function driven by its own interests alone (Ibid).

⁴⁵⁰ For the standardization of the communication between man and environment, see Kvaløy (Ibid: 34).

⁴⁵¹ The forth component concerns how ecophilosophy to formulate values, norms and ways of preserving the diversity of life's processes in respect with the given individual, human society and life's processes as a whole. In turn, the third one affects the critical function of society, namely, how to formulate ecophilosophical engagement due to the critical evaluation on side of science, technology and economical and political conceptions and governmental control (Ibid).

ecophilosophical change can be a successful one only if it is accomplished as a normative change. In turn, such a normative change illustrates the re-consideration of the value of life's processes understood as wholes, which should be 'walked' by each and every man and society at once (Ibid). Within this framework, diversity can be appreciated merely by rehabilitating the initial value of nature as such.

Furthermore, justifying ecophilosophy as a practical philosophy is done for the purposes of providing a response to the global crisis (Kvaløy 2014: 138-139). Its 'practical' aim is to give an insight, methodological advice and training principles (Ibid: 139) in order to start a process, which goes away from the course of catastrophe⁴⁵².

Another significant aspect of ecophilosophy's practical implementation concerns how it initiates the noncontradictory recognition of given ecopolitical platforms in terms of abstracting and embodying some of the ecosystems' correspondences. Clarifying the impact of the latter and their extrapolation (including internal ecosystem's dynamics and its role in solving conflicts) (Kvaløy 2004: 1110) as well as regaining concreteness as a main prerequisite for revising the environmental crisis as a systems' one, ecophilosophy provides us with an answer to what is wrong with our industrial development society (Kvaløy 1976: 17). The ecopolitical implications of the latter affect the recognition of imperialism in Kvaløy's sense by conquering the world in all its modes. In this context, ecopolitics (Ibid: 18) is recognized as a project, which is important for the social life. That is why I argue that the generalization of such a project can be defined as irreducible to pure abstraction if we deepen the opportunities for empathy.

While the decision-making process in conflicting situations is interpreted due to Kvaløy's theory of ecopolitical engagements, including both moral and political aspects, Næss claims that Kvaløy has been searching for more conflicts to get involved into than necessary. This statement brings us back to the point how to uncontradictory define what a 'necessary' confrontation is. Næss himself finds the solution in similarly problematic terms, while talking about the differences between action, demonstration and reformation, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss, because the directedness

⁴⁵² That is why it does not have to be neither too specialized, nor too abstract, but to allow 'peoples' language (Ibid) to be concrete and full of illustrations, which can help people easily to identify with. According to Kvaløy, we need a religious feeling inspired by man and nature, something to reunite us with the rhythm's streams in the usually chaotic world (Ibid: 170).

of the conflicts cannot be a criterion of the validity of motivation, nor is it representative for keeping so-called by Næss harmony model unattached.

On the other hand, we cannot talk about activeness if it is not built on the engagement with different actions for social and political change, which to be directed to a given situation or situations, albeit there is no situation with a capital letter. Regarding time's reference to space, I suggest discussing the role of situatedness as a matter of complexity rather than complicated situationism. Such a distinction further strengthens contradiction between the processes of transformation and reparation since the latter has modifying effects merely on a surface level. In turn, diversity as well as its normative validity derive from life as such because according to Kvaløy, diversity is life's potential (Ibid: 34). The latter statement is shared by both Kvaløy and Næss in so far as they argue that cultural diversity is inseparable from the natural one⁴⁵³.

⁴⁵³ On the other hand, Kvaløy emphasizes that contradicting deep and 'green' is an effect of propaganda in some situations, where it could be a matter of simplifying so-called organic system thinking. In this context, he claims that the crossing point between Marxists and Gandhists is the inspiration to embody situatedness in different situations without reducing it to a certain form of situationism.

2.1. Ecophilosophy and/or Ecosophy? The Strive for Finding a Place

As it was outlined in the first chapter of the current research, comparing and contrasting Næss's and Kvaløy's theories is not just a matter of examining why they choose different words for ecophilosophy, but rather of outlining why regardless of the fact that they share common philosophical groundings, they provide different conceptions of what the most relevant (environmentally friendly) ecopolitics should look like.

Some common features are concerned with what I called experiential philosophy, namely, with issues such as the normative validity of man's self-realization, with the common commitment to preserve the biosphere as a condition of achieving the realization in question, with analytically questioning anthropocentrism at the expense of rehabilitating the values of biocentrism.

According to Kvaløy, ecophilosophy is a product of changes in the world understood as initiated by nature's dynamics. Epistemologically speaking, it would mean that raising the awareness is a matter of cultivating sensitivity by encouraging our responsibility to both ourselves and the world. Ecophilosophy contributes to clarifying the role of human society as an integrated, but not necessarily harmonic part of the ecosystems' net (Kvaløy 1976: 23). The dialectics of integration as a strive for harmony provides the need people to cultivate a sensitivity towards the normative validity of processuality.

Kvaløy himself claims that the prefix 'eco',⁴⁵⁴ stays for the global ecosystem (Kvaløy 1985: 22). The system's component is removed because it is often associated with fast relationships between "fast points" (Ibid), but the idea behind is the process character of philosophy to be more and more emphasized. Kvaløy argues that the aforementioned prefix points out to what extent the modern ecological way of thinking should be spread (Ibid: 19). In this context, he couples wisdom with love emphasizing the role of power of intuition for the "forgotten time" or the attempt "to stop time" (Ibid: 30), representing the internal ontological tension between intuition and intelligence. The latter provide different capacities of orientation. While the intui-

⁴⁵⁴ According to him, ecologists have developed a worldview, which is similar to the one of Eastern philosophy. The prefix 'eco'(øko) is the one signifying that modern ecophilosophical thinking is indebted to Gandhi's ethics, which provides a fellow feeling with the whole nature (Ibid).

tion fights by provoking love in response to civilization's amnesia, the intelligence is focused on expanding the obsession with planning (cartographing).

This statement is interpreted as an argument against Næss's claim that different ecophilosophies do not point to something new in so far as the idea of novelty is embodied in the one of diversity by default. In turn, Kvaløy argues that the 'sofi' suffix concerns the insight, wisdom and love showing the internal engagement and feeling the full motivation to the object of the feelings (Ibid). That is why we can talk about the priority of insight or world picture rather than the one of value and normative interests.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the practical implications of Kvaløy's ecophilosophy concern the coordination of process thinking and process action, which to redirect the orientation process to solving the global ecological crisis. As one of the methods, generalisation is understood as a certain type of comparativism adopting the concrete language for the sake of grounding the normative validity of the process of understanding by experiential learning. According to Kvaløy, it becomes possible because the concrete world is a value saturated, creative process, as understood by Whitehead and Buddhism (Kvaløy 1994: 29), so that it presumes the relevant understanding to be initiated by process learning.

Since people participate in keeping the crisis's dynamics, they may regulate it by introducing some new forms of engagement, which to boost the process of self-identification on a group level. In this context, the process thinking's embodiment is possible only if norms are not contradicted to insights, but are rather examined within the framework of experiential morality due to which the participants' interests can be defined in a complex way.

However, it is also problematic whether if we define Næss's philosophy as a "holistic, relational, total field image" and Kvaløy's one as concerning nature as a "diversified process" in its openness and change (Jakobsen 2011: 186) respectively, the dilemmas would be solved. According to Næss, the idea of ecosophy is a result of elaborating the philosophical groundings of ecology, while Kvaløy's ecophilosophy is a "short version of philosophy of ecology" (Næss 1973: 22).

In this context, I argue that Kvaløy's contribution can be also found in his point that we talk about emotionally engaged strive for situations (Kvaløy 1985: 22), which makes the necessary conflicts part of love. This is possible because the social and political conflicts are focused on clarifying so-called life's truth, which is a complex rather than complicated phenomenon. Fac-

ing such conflicts is a stage of development of both love and wisdom in the process of building and directing attitudes towards home. However, emotional engagement cannot be interpreted as imposing a form of moral relativism since love is coupled with wisdom due to the implementation of a new type of rationality, namely, due to adopting imaginative rationality in respect with ecophilosophy. That is why I argue that Kvaløy's ecophilosophy benefits seeing the ecopolitical embodiments of the internal connection between love and wisdom.

On a macro methodological level, ecophilosophy presumes adopting and elaborating moral experiential gestalts since philosophy in question can be defined as based on a certain type of ontological ethics, which contributes to understanding the process of self-realization. As a prototype characteristic of the latter, I point out the complex moral engagement, which in turn provokes the responsibility for making relevant political engagements. However, it does not mean that 'moral' becomes an ontological synonym of 'political', but rather that it is the engagement itself that provides the integrity of moral and political as two mutually connected sides in changing ecopolitics and thus in recognizing the role of collective responsibility towards preserving nature. A proof of this statement can be found in Kvaløy's stance that life is full of meanings, when political and philosophical engagements go hand in hand (Ibid).

While Næss defines ecosophy as based on an ecologically oriented social anthropology, Kvaløy argues that adopting the methods of sociology and social anthropology is not enough (Kvaløy 2001: 743). Man is such a being, which cannot conquer the world by using a miraculous technology; regarding his/her basis of existence, he/she is still primitive.

Outlining the methodological similarities between Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies presumes examining some crossing points such as the one that both ecophilosophy and ecosophy require total engagement making the process of self-realization dependent on the one of nature and the other way around, the commonly shared respect to Gandhi's ethics of non-violence, the recognition of nature's wholeness, which corresponds to Næss's conception of the knots of biosphere, the normative validity of the connection between ecophilosophy and ecopolitics etc. In turn, regardless of the aforementioned claims, Kvaløy explicitly emphasizes the role of ethics in establishing a relevant ecopolitics, while Næss prefers to talk about gestalt ontology, as I already showed.

Analyzing Kvaløy's ecophilosophy, I raise the hypothesis that it is an experiential ecophilosophy whose prototype characteristic is the normative va-

lidity of wholeness understood as a being 'in process'. The latter could be interpreted as equivalent to the definition of 'in progress', taking into account that the progress itself does not have to be recognized as technologically oriented one. Furthermore, the definition of 'in process' can be determined as corresponding to the one of 'in progress' evaluated from the perspective of the complexity of nature if the progress is not a strive for achieving aim by aim, but rather one for revealing the potential of the new living energies. That is why the progress does not have to be examined as grounding a geometric progression, but as a horizon, which contributes to disenchanting the multitude of the unknown (only for the bystander), configurations of living energies. It is this interpretation of progress as a self-regulation that is questioned by the technological progress as a primitive one. On a macro methodological level, it gives preference to the meaning of natural as primitive instead of the one of being 'first in its genus'.

3. KVALØY'S THEORIES OF COMPLEXITY AND COMPLICATION

Kvaløy claims that the distinction between the concepts of complexity and complication is borrowed from the modern ecological thinking (Kvaløy 1976: 19). He clarifies that these concepts have qualitative multiplicities (Ibid: 27), which are defined on the principle of opposition (Ibid). The distinction in question concerns the specification of the normative validity of diversity that is a prototype characteristic of the system's building. Such a distinction is of crucial importance due to the fact that it contributes to clarifying what the implications of the "industrial development *versus* environmental protection" debate would be if we want to keep recognizing the latter under the guise of "industrial development *and* environmental protection" debate.

In this context, Kvaløy talks about eco-growth (økovekst) (snm 1974: 71), which has been discredited within the framework of so-called circulation economics (kretsløpsøkonomi) (Ibid). The principle of economic growth is recognized as nevertheless meaningless, it can only be fulfilled at a steadily bigger speed (tempo) in the process of circulation (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that among the other factors, it is the acceleration of time in Kvaløy's sense (which initially contradicts the organic ('river') time mode) that leads to narrowing the concept of economic growth to the one of industrial development.

Kvaløy borrows the concept of diversity, as defined by the system ecology and Odum school⁴⁵⁵ (Kvaløy 1976: 5), while the one of difference is determined as a difference between qualitative dynamic diversity and quantitative static complication, namely, between to be yourself and to lose yourself (Kvaløy 2004: 2760). Thus diversity regarding the building and working

⁴⁵⁵ Eugene Odum (1913-2002) was an American biologist who is well-known for his pioneering work on ecosystem ecology. Together with his brother, Howard T. Odum, Eugene Odum is an author of many publications on developing the term ecosystem.

modes, and communication is understood as a diversity of existence, which presumes gathering things as they are (Kvaløy 1976: 27).

In turn, the contextualization of life necessity society and stable ecosystems can be described against the background of Kvaløy's process philosophy. It would mean to internalize subjects' dialectical mode of thinking since the process thinking is steadily based on the process ontology I already discussed. The 'non-stopping' change does not have to be understood as having a self-sufficient 'being-for-itself', but rather as having the latter as intrinsically connected with its being in itself. On the other hand, the specification, which should be made is that it is a change of time and space keeping the ideas of both time and space 'unchangeable'. According to Kvaløy, it illustrates that the process thinking requires rehabilitating the temporal continuity corresponding to a given spatial extension (Næss 1985: 38).

3.1. Complexity of Life Necessity Society

Furthermore, Kvaløy argues that it is the reconsideration of the role of ecological dynamics and its conceptualization as dialectics that make the understanding of complexity possible. The latter presumes a never ending organic interplay (interaction), which is always changing on its way to something new. Nature develops diversity and diversity gives living force – it is a process of changing encouraging the outburst of life's loom (*livsvevet*) (Kvaløy 1976: 136). Last but not least, it is a matter of wholeness that is irreducible to its parts requiring a certain kind of cultural cooperation to be established.

Extrapolating Kvaløy's concept, I point out that complexity is justified as a particular mode of both being in nature and its anticipation, taking into account that it is the role of organic interaction that becomes its prototype characteristic. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that nature's mode requires processing to constantly developing rhythmic balance, which to be recognized for the sake of relying the whole potential of life's force as such. On a micro methodological level, the intuition about complexity in Kvaløy's sense grounds the capability of improvising while building and participating in nature's wholeness. Thus the participation in question can be understood by employing analogy without falling into the trap of moral objectivism. In turn, the role of rhythmic improvisation (Kvaløy 2014: 34) is defined by Kvaløy as complex since it presumes that the new changes are initiated due to its internal logic. That is why the rhythmic improvisation can be considered as triggering a qualitative change due to the fact that its dialectics makes movement be recognized as a complex mode of changing, which does not exclude some static moments as conditions for its function.

Regarding the methodological impact of complexity on man's being, I argue that Kvaløy simplifies what Næss defines as benefits of adopting gestalt thinking for the sake of rehabilitating temporal continuity mode. However, exploring the role of complexity, Kvaløy emphasizes the impact of gestalt sensitivity as a reference frame, which guarantees the normative validity of relating intellectual and emotional capabilities. It means to simultaneously introduce and compare moral feeling and aesthetic sensitivity (as tertiary qualities), introducing moral imagination; an approach, which can help us to avoid the distinction between ethical and aesthetic methodology, as Kvaløy himself suggests (Ibid: 37).

He defines life necessity society as a society, which does not necessarily deny the idea of industry (Kvaløy 1976: 17). As an illuminative illustration, Kvaløy points out the role of Sherpa's society, clarifying what it means to be in one and the same boat while giving priority to the satisfaction of vital needs (Kvaløy 2014:74) (Kvaløy 1976: 62). Analyzing the role of this illustration, we can see how following the rhythm is not a matter of establishing a physically grounded process of imitating by analogy. Otherwise, breaking the rhythm would have been conceptualized as equivalent to breaking with the roots, which in turn means breaking with the natural rhythm⁴⁵⁶ as such. Thus the process of rebuilding would have been reduced to a simple form of reconstruction containing no innovative element at all.

In this context, I argue that one of the main methodological benefits of adopting Kvaløy's statement concerns the clarification of the vital needs in the process of the self-regulation of equilibrium by effectively preserving nature's dynamics, namely, by building an equilibrium society through justifying complex diversity, as Kvaløy suggests (Ibid: 19, 21, 63). The difference with the contemporary industrial society is considered as a difference between improvisation and planning, between abstract and concrete (Kvaløy 2014: 48) in so far as the idea of freedom is embodied against the background of the difference between living and mechanically constructed systems (Ibid: 56).

In this context, life necessity society can be examined as built not on 'freedom from' but rather on 'freedom to' justifying meaningfulness as such. To a certain extent, the latter can be defined as a freedom from given meanings for the sake of engaging with the idea of meaningfulness.

What should the life necessity society look like? Kvaløy argues that Tseringma is a symbol of the equilibrium society becoming a positive alternative to our unstoppable (ustoppelige) industrial development society (Kvaløy 1976: 78). On a macro methodological level, it shows why outlining the genealogy of the experience in the mountain is crucial for understanding the one of life necessity society because mountain is a meaningful landscape, which provides meaningful self-understanding. Here comes the role of cultural experience. Pain and joy, life and death, tears and smile are interpreted by Kvaløy as shared by all people regardless of their cultural and ethnic origin (Ibid: 79). This is an argument that strengthens the thesis of

⁴⁵⁶ Kvaløy argues that the planners (belonging to the industrial development society) do not take into account that people's "roots in mother earth's soil" are torn off (Kvaløy 1976: 152).

unity (not of monopoly) of cultures, which is irreducible to establishing monoculture itself. Such a unity boosts fellowship among people since it concerns the knowledge of how nature can be used without being destructed (Ibid: 86). In other words, the role of culture in life necessity society reveals how nature can be considered as providing sources rather than resources in different ways.

The understanding of what meaningful is illustrated what Kvaløy called a direct interaction, or playing⁴⁵⁷. Due to the latter, the normative validity of imagination regarding the achievement of the coherence of individual and collective experience is guaranteed. Playing strengthens the sense of identification in respect with what ‘life should be’ since this life is always based on a rhythm, which provides a mode of changing to be uncontradictory adopted. In turn, rhythm is always embodied in the ‘between’ mode (in the one of interacting) due to which the dynamic of nature presumes one change to be justified as normatively valid rather than causally determined.

In this context, understanding Kvaløy’s theory of life necessity society presumes the genealogy of complexity to be clarified as a strive for “rhythmic development of diversity” activating the ability to differ living from mechanical (Kvaløy 2004: 450). The development is justified as built in tune with (in rhythm with) the landscape and human behavior (Kvaløy 2014: 9) because its plan and order mainly stem from the relationship between man and nature. For the purposes of understanding life necessity society’s internal logic, we should realize that it does not have to be understood as a lack of planning, but rather as a matter of preserving organic coherence, which cannot be abstracted from the internal structure of the plan itself.

In other words, having a plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving organic coherence in its complexity. That is why I argue that the rhythm of human behavior in Kvaløy’s sense follows the one of the landscape without imitating it because, otherwise, it would mean that there is no such a thing as man’s behavior. It is a matter of participating on the principle of anticipating the organic coherence. Therefore, we should talk about normative dependence, not about physiological one in so far as the latter should have reduced the idea of society to the accomplishment of the physical process of satisfying vital needs. As Kvaløy outlines that by contrast to the industrial development society, life necessity society is based on the in-

⁴⁵⁷ The idea of playing as irreducible to the one of game, or games is also shared by Næss, as I showed in the chapter on Næss.

herent economy (*bondeøkonomien*) (Ibid: 40) that presumes experience in which the ‘green diversity’ can never be simplified to a resource alone.

Judging by these arguments, I draw the conclusion that one of the main methodological differences between life necessity society and industrial development one can be traced back on the level of life’s quality. While in the ‘complex’ society, the stress is put on reaching high quality of life, in the ‘complicated’ one, a preference is given to raising the living standard. The close supporter of Kvaløy, Hjalmar Hegge⁴⁵⁸, describes this distinction as a matter of contradicting economic values and life’s ones (Hegge 1974: 78). Hegge defines the living standard as being determined by the index of life’s cost (“*levekostnadsindeks*”) (Ibid), in contrast to the quality of life that is specified due to the value of fundamental life’s goods such as to be able to breathe a clean air, to drink a clean water etc. (Ibid).

It is important to outline that the axiological distinction between the two types of values, characterizing the quality of life and the living standard, is also projected as an axiological difference on the level of goods. The latter affect how the process of evaluation is misplaced with a certain type of a cost-benefit analysis reducing value to a calculable price on side of the mass population. That is why we can define the living standard in the modern industrial society as intrinsically based on the value of mass production, which should aim at satisfying the needs of the general audience. According to Hegge, these mass goods have a “scarcity value” (Ibid: 79), which in turn is closely tied with justifying the need of industrial and technological expansion (Ibid: 83) for the sake of increasing the quantity of goods. Furthermore, I argue that the principal difference between the calculable values and the life’s ones can be recognized as a contradiction between ascribing value to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the concept of value, as Hegge⁴⁵⁹ suggests.

On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the difference between the life necessity society and the industrial development one can be traced back to the origin of continuity and its break understood as necessary conditions for defining man’s experiential gestalt. The break in question is provoked by the replacement of rhythm on side of the industrial develop-

⁴⁵⁸ Together with Kvaløy, he is one of the leading figures of *snm*. He is also one of the authors of the *snm* manifest as well as of many other important texts of the movement.

⁴⁵⁹ According to him, people’s experience of space was connected with the concrete, “quantitative experience of it” (Hegge 1974b: 105).

ment society with so-called staccato break (Kvaløy 1976: 140), which is caused by accelerating the idea of growth's tempo and flexibility coming from nature itself. That is why going back to the idea of reviving life necessity society means to be in tune with the rhythm of the landscape⁴⁶⁰.

In turn, Kvaløy claims that breaking the natural rhythm is an illuminative sign of the civilization in its fight with itself as well as with homeless and restless man, which is driven by the fabulous success in subjecting nature through imposing the ideal of competition (Ibid: 91). Extrapolating his concept, I claim that the civilization is built on exaggerating the role of analogy by simplifying it to a literal correspondence between one form and another one, which in turn provokes the substitution of the mode of becoming with the one of being understood as the only one possible mode. Only in a different context, the formula 'to travel to yourself' recognized as an already forgotten thinking mode may have an uncontradictory normative validity.

⁴⁶⁰ According to Kvaløy, the unfolding of rhythm in Sherpa society concerns the outstanding cultural surplus achieved by complexly balanced social institutions, religion and art (Ibid: 133). Furthermore, rebuilding means society to build its own rhythm in what Kvaløy calls elastic way regarding growth (Ibid: 132).

3.1.1. The Role of Meaningful Work in Life Necessity Society

Kvaløy's theory of meaningful work is highly influenced by the one of E. F. Schumacher in the mid-1970s (Kvaløy 2014: 127). In this context, eco-activism is reconsidered as a form of meaningful work, namely, as a fight for a meaningful work in which young people find themselves by denying their own ego.

The work issue is also emphasized by Næss who sees the opportunity of overcoming the crisis as an effort to overcome an ecosocial crisis in so far as questioning the implications of work may contribute to questioning both the normative validity and its impact (Næss and Tschudi 2007: 129). However, it is important to outline that the negative consequences to the environment, while strengthening the sustainable development are not caused by the changing meaning of work alone, but rather by changing the symbolic capital of the connection between production and consumption. It should be clarified that meaningful work becomes more and more a matter of accepting the expertise provided by the technocrats who operate with a preliminary specified concept of work. One concept, which is coined to meet the needs of the sustainable development society alone.

According to Kvaløy, meaningful work guarantees that the commonly shared conceptions of what a meaningful activity is make one society both ecologically and socially balanced because it is based on the presumption of a complex growth, which affects the development of human potential and capabilities (Kvaløy 2014: 71). The idea of self-sufficient resourcefulness can be properly interpreted merely within the life necessity society. Otherwise, it should have been grounded in erasing the difference between source and resource, recognizing self-sufficiency as a factor of a 'capsule environment' in Kvaløy's sense.

In other words, work can be called meaningful only if it contributes to seeing and accessing nature's diversity without corrupting it. Furthermore, meaningful work as such encourages the direct interaction with nature, but not its direct exploitation⁴⁶¹. An illustration favoring the latter statement can be found in Kvaløy's analysis of the role of both society and nature in revealing the implications of a given work as a meaningful one (Ibid: 70).

⁴⁶¹ As a significant difference with the industrial development society, the lack of distinction between working time and free one in Sherpa society is outlined (Ibid: 84).

The direct contact with nature is described as having different embodiments due to the varieties of the relationship between body and environment.

Kvaløy introduces five criteria of meaningful work (Ibid). According to the first one, the latter guarantees the material grounding of life. Due to the second criterion, meaningful work contributes to securely building different qualities including both good and bad ones because the challenges in life are as diverse as people themselves are. The third criterion of the work in question is that it benefits the development of solidarity, loyalty and common work. In turn, due to the fourth criterion, the products, both goods and services, promote life in nature and society. Last but not least, work is recognized as the most important social field in which children can participate (Ibid).

In this context, Kvaløy pays special attention to engaging children with meaningful work because thus they become integrated in a society by giving priority to vital needs, finding a meaning in their lives. He characterizes the process of rehabilitation as an appeal for giving time back to children in order they to develop themselves as human beings (Ibid: 36). However, meaningful work presumes a certain space to be given, so that rehabilitating time should be examined as inevitably connected with revising the idea of space as such. The participation of children in work along with their parents made them meaningful as well since the presumption of the need of work is no longer reducible to the one of survival (Ibid: 71)

The main pedagogical effect of the aforementioned participation is seen by Kvaløy in the fact that it functions as a behavior modeling (Ibid: 95) in so far as children can solve tasks following their own initiatives (Ibid: 158). They can steadily look for a quality plan in order to orient themselves in nature in a steady way (Kvaløy 1976: 138). Children are the ones playing along the river, which is a metaphor of the life's stream (Kvaløy 2014: 80). Playing is also recognized as a "normal activity" outside of the industrial society (Ibid: 92) since the modeling of life's meaning presumes cooperation to be understood not only as strictly referring to given obligations alone, but also as a form of process interaction on side of man with his/her environment in time.

It means that cooperating is a meaningful activity that contributes to cultivating the sense of situatedness understood as a sensitivity towards the group belonging. Life's meaning as such is provoked by the interaction with nature justified as a 'natural' activity, i.e. as an activity that does not contradict the entity of human nature, but rather benefits man's self-realization. It is both driven and not driven by nature because, otherwise, it would mean

that there would be no need of cultivating fellowship by the common participation.

As the most important part of the process of elaborating meaningful work, Kvaløy points out the cultivation of process empathy recognized as a complex understanding of natural and social diversity, which continuously constitute the course of events, where everything changes in the process of interaction (Ibid: 116). The latter has different representations in different 'spatial' scopes, albeit it always remains grounded in a certain type of relatedness (including relations such as part and whole, new time and traditions, society and nature, theory and practice). Furthermore, empathy could be defined as 'feeling with understanding' due to which none of the components is reducible to the rest; one premise, which guarantees the character of the interaction in question.

According to Kvaløy, man is the most diversely equipped of all beings, but at the same time, he/she is the least specialized one (Ibid: 26). That is why one person's diversity presumes the role of what a meaningful work is to be clarified as well as its connection to what Zapffe calls individual freedom to be revealed. The meaningful work concerns both the task and the means, which makes it possible work to be considered as supporting the functioning of life necessity society. Regarding man's behavior, environmental protection is seen in the realization of the equilibrium society by elaborating sensitivity towards diversity (Kvaløy 1976: 63). In this context, the problem of freedom enters the scene as initially referring to the possibility man to expand his/her ego-boundaries (Kvaløy 2014: 60). However, the latter does not have to be understood as an argument in favor of biological determinism. By looking for freedom in life necessity society, Kvaløy interprets the expansion of the boundaries in question in order to raise the level of the normative validity of self-reliance, i.e. the self to become self-reliant, conscious, active part of a bigger wholeness (Kvaløy 2004: 1140).

3.1.2. The Strive for Freedom in Life Necessity Society

Kvaløy claims that meaningfulness is expressed in the freedom of thoughts (Kvaløy 2014: 99), which I define as a 'space' given by the work in different landscapes. The intrinsic methodological connection between understanding meaningful work and man's freedom is crucial for his theory supporting the need of adopting the principles of life necessity society. Kvaløy's view of freedom can be described as a way to freedom due to which man simultaneously chooses different paths for the purposes of living many parallel lives as well as using the uncountable diversity of navigation means (Ibid: 26). The latter are available to every man and every man's group, which is naturally disposed to them (har kimene til) (Ibid). Thus freedom's objective is to grasp both the world and ourselves in our natural continuity.

In other words, freedom in Kvaløy's sense is understood as navigation to meaningfulness achieved by taking different ways, while wondering, in Aristotle's sense, rather than walking. However, the simultaneousness of living opportunities leads to the following conclusion, namely, it is a wandering-wondering endeavor since wandering as such means moving without destination or purpose. In Kvaløy's sense, it is a way of wa(o)ndering, which has reaching meaningfulness as a goal, i.e. to enjoy the possibility of having living alternatives, which are embodied in the possibility of uncountable paths. Adopting the parallelism mode does not mean that one alternative is more meaningful than another one, but rather that they share a similar normative validity as being ways to meaningfulness. An important point, which has to be outlined on a macro methodological level, is that their qualitative representations are not guarantees for the implications of their normative validity.

In turn, the qualitative difference determines the debate about freedom against the background of already discussed distinction⁴⁶² between living and mechanical (Kvaløy 2004: 450). In this context, the key feature of life's process is unfolding freedom as irreducible to something, which can be constructed by man and as such can be specified in the form of system theory or cybernetic models.

⁴⁶² According to Kvaløy, the prototype characteristic of the living systems is not equilibrium, but complexity and its tendency, which freedom has much to do with (Kvaløy 2004: 450).

Analyzing the role of freedom within the two traditions outlined by Kvaløy, namely, within so-called individual and fellowship traditions (I-tradisjonen og F-tradisjonen) (Ibid: 510) presumes their genealogy to be examined. He argues that the individual tradition is an idealist one, which concerns seeing the world as full of conflicts merely on the surface level because on a deeper one, there is only harmony (Ibid). In turn, the fellowship tendency is described as deriving from the tradition of fellowship liberation after Marx⁴⁶³. It is materialistically oriented towards recognizing the world as a dualist one by claiming that harmony is on the surface, while on the deepest level, there are always conflicts (Ibid). Furthermore, joy itself comes from the state of togetherness with the fellows while fighting for achieving a commonly shared goal (Ibid).

According to Kvaløy, within the framework of the idealist tradition, the world can be determined as a static one mentioning Spinoza's theory. This is the European tradition, which dates back to Antiquity with its ambition of eternal perfection. The tradition in question shows how time is justified as an embodiment of a spatial dimension⁴⁶⁴, changing and originality are recognized as an illusion⁴⁶⁵, as well as the specification of time is defined as time-deafness (Ibid: 600). However, Kvaløy clarifies that adopting the latter expression provides us with more associations than the one of time blindness. The sight (*Blikket*) can 'return' to the starting point, we can 'reserve' the process, while the chance of hearing gives us an access to a stream that cannot be stopped or reserved (*Hørsels-sansen*) (Ibid: 600, Note 5.23).

The second tendency within the idealist tradition is to see the world as a process. According to Kvaløy, an illuminative illustration in this respect is Hinduism, which aims at capturing world's dynamics as a counter action to the mechanistic world picture. Hinduism is defined by him as developing a

⁴⁶³ Regarding Marx, Kvaløy argues that his ideas differ from Bergson's ones. He criticizes Marx's theory saying that it successfully questions the pyramidal character of society on an individual level alone (Ibid: 1200, Note 22).

⁴⁶⁴ In our time, Europeans confronted many problems regarding the understanding of relativity theories, e.g. the ones of 'space and time' in contrast to the theories of dialectical and orientation process thinking (Ibid: 540-570).

⁴⁶⁵ Kvaløy refers to Buddhist theory of questioning the experience of the world as static (Ibid: 600).

coherent tendency to establish a series of different attempts to build a liberation learning based on the awareness of the map of world's processes⁴⁶⁶.

On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that Kvaløy's conception of freedom should be considered as recognizing ecophilosophy as a process philosophy⁴⁶⁷ belonging to the B mode of idealist tendency whose prototype characteristic is freedom, understood as liberation on both individual and collective levels. In turn, the process of liberation, when it is projected on the level of politics (i.e. understanding ecophilosophy as grounding relevant ecopolitics) entails some of the features of the fellowship tradition, namely, the common efforts for liberating via inflicting activeness, which is needed for achieving certain commonly shared goals.

That is why I argue that the change of the growth vs. industrial development discourse presumes two forms of freedom to be adopted at once, namely,

⁴⁶⁶ According to Kvaløy, the most radical attempts at building a teaching of salvation on the basis of world's process character are made by some representatives of "North Buddhism", albeit they are already embodied in *The Song of Shakyamuni* (*Den Vise av Sakya-slekten*) (Ibid: 720). Due to Shakyamuni's conception, it is a matter of stretching world's dynamic character which goes beyond Hinduism. He eliminated the thought about the soul as transmitted through generations as well as the thought about one "Big Self" (Ibid: 750). Man is captured in Buddhist life circle for such a long time so that he/she does not see the self as an illusion. Kvaløy examines Buddhist term of rebirth as immensely different from the Hindu reincarnation (Ibid: 750, Note 8.1). There is no soul's unity: the individual is a chain of deeds in time and this chain does not break with death, which in turn leads to disability of achieving the state of nirvana (Ibid).

⁴⁶⁷ According to Kvaløy, Næss's interpretation of Spinoza is "more Næss than Spinoza" (Ibid, 5.3 Note). He recognizes Spinoza's conception on freedom as a premise, which is "totally colorless" because Spinoza's liberation of man does not concern him/her as a social being, but rather as an individual, intellectually pressed to deepen his/her situatedness in the world (Ibid). Furthermore, Kvaløy characterizes Spinoza's interpretation of man's status as an unrestricted fragment of nature, of something, which we, first and foremost, accept as qualitative diversity (Ibid). Outlining this aspect makes his point similar to the one of Næss since both of them are focused on rehabilitating the crucial role of bioegalitarianism for the sake of both mankind's and nature's realization. However, discussing Spinoza's theory of freedom Kvaløy argues that in contrast to the atomist, radical process learning, partly represented in Mahayana Buddhism, we do not find a form of pure learning of unity, or so-called pure monism in Spinoza's writings. He claims that in Spinoza's texts, we can find an echo from the Jewish distinction between God and the world (Ibid). In turn, it is contrasted with the Chinese Mahayana providing a differentiation between eternal, motionless and motion (Ibid: 399). According to Kvaløy, if we choose the static monism as a grounding belief, we will always have troubles with explaining our own proof of perceptions (*vidnesbyrd*), especially if we refer to the Western mechanistic world picture based on distinctions such as time/space, I/the others (Ibid: 693).

the ones of ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’, as I already argued. On a micro methodological level, the meaninglessness of egoistic strives (Ibid: 809) does not have to be understood as being in a passive mood. Relying on Gandhi’s ethics of non-violence, it initiates becoming free through regulating the impact of rhythm’s means. The latter require the responsibility to the world to be developed on both man’s and world’s sides.

However, Kvaløy defines the situation as displaying the dynamics of life. He tries to preserve the Buddhist strive, but refers it to the means of dialectics by examining Marx’s understanding of freedom as a goal (as a dialectical materialist freedom). The main methodological solution derives from defining freedom as a way to freedom (Ibid: 3030), as a way of learning about both the world and ourselves. The simultaneous choice of different ways contributes to seeing conflicts and harmony as irreducible to the correspondence between surface and depth. Furthermore, the practical projections of questioning surface-depth relationship can be seen in Kvaløy’s description of freedom by implicitly revealing the role of deficiency of pyramidal fundament (Ibid: 1470), where the pyramidal character presumes a given hierarchy to be justified. It is a matter of radical decentralization, which to rehabilitate the normative validity of nature’s continuity.

In this context, the unity of soul and body is examined by Kvaløy in respect with so-called dialectical materialism (Ibid: 1080). He specifies that the dialectical or so-called by him dynamic materialism does not automatically presume adopting uncontradictory process philosophy. It may contribute to getting closer or enlarging the difference between idealist and fellowship tendencies (Ibid: 1110), which in turn to benefit the infliction of political change via building a relevant fellowship engagement.

Man’s freedom is considered as a quality, which can be trained up (tenes fram) in the sense of an activity of its own type. It is a statement in favor of solidarity saying that solidary behavior is a significant component of the entity of freedom (Kvaløy 2014: 68). The sense of cultivating stance of solidarity is developed in time. Thus the fluidity of human existence is examined against the background of the time thinking mode due to which the continuity of fluctuations is taken from its constructive side, namely, from the perspective that ego identification is merely one swirl of the flow. The control of the stream itself is not a subject to people’s will. However, from that it does not follow to irresponsibly choose because the act of choosing differently derives from the requirement to life as such: it is a choosing mode realized for the sake of fulfilling life’s aims.

In this context, freedom concerns to responsibly choose the uncontrollable life, which is controllable merely by following its own internal logic. It is a certain kind of compatibilism in which freedom presumes interacting by expanding our understanding for otherness.

To the personal freedom, industrial society confronts so-called pipe society, as Kvaløy argues, where functionality is measured by adjustment (or so-called customization). I draw the conclusion that we can talk about two self-sufficient systems whose development is due to their self-sufficiency, while the huge methodological difference concerns the genealogy of the mechanisms of changing. Regarding the case of pipe society, change is characterized as misbalance because it is driven by the contradiction between subject's changes and system's status quo. However, in the case with the life necessity society, motivation presumes full internalization as a condition for fulfilling, i.e. the changing mode is recognized as a process of self-realization providing the modes of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. On a micro methodological level, we can comment on this issue by referring to Kvaløy's statement that every single individual has energy to interact with the world (Ibid: 57). The different projections of the interaction in question determine whether one of the aforementioned two modes is adopted.

Referring to Kvaløy's statement, I claim that to approach freedom means to allow to be carried away by the stream without getting drawn in so far as the latter is the basic form of control over the uncontrollable which we may exert upon.

3.2. The Impact of Complication on Building Industrial Development Society

In his analysis of the genealogy of the contradiction between complexity and complication Kvaløy refers to R. Margalef's theory⁴⁶⁸ (Kvaløy 2004: 2400). However, he argues that Margalef does not scientifically ground this distinction in a clear enough way (Kvaløy 2014: 142). Introducing the way complication mechanisms function, Kvaløy claims that they are based on the understanding of machine's diversity (Ibid: 143) that only superficially reminds of nature's one. In turn, the idea of working machine can be understood by exploring the role of its exchangeable parts because its activity can be described with mathematical punctuality. Its main characteristic is that machine is subjectable to control on man's side. We can control and govern it in so far as it can be broken to pieces but machine itself can never turn into something it has never been before. Since the machine should have a control centre, it is not complex but complicated. The embodiment of complication on a societal level brings to life so-called industrial development society⁴⁶⁹.

The methodological differences are based on differentiating the normative validity of the contradictions between dynamics and statics as well as their multiple representations. In this context, analyzing the latter is important for understanding what it means to live in a situation, namely, what it means to be in someone else's shoes being focused on the situation rather than on the subject, and thus to restrict the potential empathy by triggering co-experience alone. Defining via opposing since complexity and complication are considered as two ideal modes, Kvaløy refers to Whitehead's conception of fallacy regarding the possibility of misplacing concreteness (Ibid: 144).

On the other hand, it is the ecological equilibrium that makes us aware of the different types of organicity, namely, of the dynamic one, which does not recognize the opposition between center and periphery since it does not provide the qualitative saturation of some living energies to be considered

⁴⁶⁸ Ramon Margalef (1919-2004) was a Catalan biologist who became one of the leading figures in modern ecology.

⁴⁶⁹ According to Kvaløy, the Western complication society develops balance by adopting technology and administration expertise (Kvaløy 1976: 60).

as an emanation of ontological potentiality. Nor does it require favoring the classical mechanics (dynamics as a branch of physics) due to which every motion to be examined in respect with the relations between forces and torques⁴⁷⁰. Regarding the transformation of growth and development debate into the one of environmental protection versus industrial development, we see that another concept that changes is the one of environment. It becomes identifiable as a “technological capsule” or so-called “Apparat-environment” (Apparat-miljø), which stays between man and nature as well as between different people (Kvaløy 2014: 58; Kvaløy 1976: 45).

In this context, Kvaløy analyzes the contradictory aspects of the unquestionable justification of complication society. He argues that “A naturally complicated life society” functions merely slightly, or cannot contribute with almost anything to man’s use (Kvaløy 1976: 10). By the term ‘natural’ he does not mean produced by nature, but originally complicated. In turn, reducing natural to naturalism leads to simplifying the understanding of growth by expanding its definition with the one of exponential growth (Ibid: 12) and thus to recognize a type of economic growth, which causes the collapse of life’s diversity.

Regarding the practical aspects of complication society, Kvaløy argues that it is based on competition as well as on a casually justifiable connection between industrial methods and products (Kvaløy 2014: 144). Practically speaking, it means to overrate the role of applied scientific knowledge (Ibid: 128) that is supported by unquestionable applied ethics whose main aim is to achieve a level of perfection at the expense of cultivating moral sensitivity.

⁴⁷⁰ They concern the casual relations in the center-periphery space.

3.2.1. The Burden of Meaningless Work in Industrial Development Society

By increasing competition, industrial development society provides a different justification of the quantitative and qualitative implications of what a meaningful work is (Ibid). It also recognizes a misleading connection between the understanding of sources, resources and products since being focused on multiplying the latter, the industrial development society encourages a questionable identification of sources with resources. Thus it underates nature's diversity concerning nature's own dynamics. According to Kvaløy, in the industrial development society, the products are deprived of a constructive role (Ibid: 128), namely, to engage the subjects of production with their own achievements. From that it follows that there is no solidarity and loyalty between them, neither are the children engaged with the process of working in so far as the latter is reduced to the products and the increase of their quantity. In turn, the transformations presume a passive rather than active interaction on side of the citizens, which leads to defining the industrial development society as a deficient one⁴⁷¹ (Ibid).

Without work, environmental changes become a situation with no meaning (desperate situations) because work does not provide the subject with a grounding behavior how to interact with the environment in a meaningful way, namely, how to keep being engaged with it, and by that, to develop his/her own living capabilities.

On the other hand, Kvaløy argues that pseudo-meaningful work is done at an accelerating pace as well as that it is realized due to the criteria of industrial development society (Kvaløy 1976: 16): it is internalized as a form of violence, which one imposes on himself/herself (Ibid). The paradox de-

⁴⁷¹ Schumacher's response (Ibid: 146-147) is to transfer the activity mode by transforming the lack of meaning as well as by outlining the boundaries of what a meaningfulness is and how it can be achieved respectively. Work is recognized as a first necessity like food because meaningfulness concerns not only the existence but also the value of interaction. In this sense, I argue that it is a goal in itself, which does not have to be examined within the paradigm of objective naturalism since it is the meaningfulness that cannot be objectified to the extent it grounds the normative validity of being. Work is a goal in itself because it supports the becoming mode due to its unquestionable meaningfulness.

scribed by Kvaløy affects the fact that pseudo-meaningful work presumes the noncontradictory justification of unnecessary work and decreasing number of workers by planning. Thus the work in question strengthens the quantitative rather than the qualitative nuances. Their embodiment, which also provides their empowerment, guarantees man's body, mind and heart's potential to function properly⁴⁷².

On a macro methodological level, the distinction between meaningful and technological work in Kvaløy's sense concerns the fight against artificial intelligence contradicting robot-work and genuine one (Kvaløy 1985: 27). Kvaløy claims that if we lose the war against machines, we lose everything (Ibid). He starts analyzing the specificities of the 'work-in' mode (Ibid: 29) examined as a spatial activity but not as a temporal process. However, from the fact that it describes a spatial relation, it does not follow that it is not a real process.

A significant consequence of defining and discerning meaningful from non-meaningful work affects the status of the subjects exerting the work who provide a certain type of specialization or generalization due to which they give priority to life necessity society or to industrial development one. Regarding the clarification of subject's mode of becoming, what is considered as mystic and sentimental is evaluated as "an extremely down to Earth function" (Ibid). In turn, what is missed in the industrial society is workers who to be emotionally connected with their working place. According to Kvaløy, this attachment is defined by the capitalist society⁴⁷³ as a waste of a "colossal energy" (Kvaløy 1985b: 129).

⁴⁷² However, the critical reception of Mahayana Buddhism has multilateral implications. On the level of practice, Kvaløy argues that some concerns arise from the wrongly posed questions about the mutual exclusion of work and meditation, namely, from questions such as "Meditation during work, or work as meditation?" (Ibid: 164). Kvaløy refers to Schumacher's Buddhist economy revealing the illusion of Western tradition to discern between body and soul (Ibid). If work is defined as contradicting meditation, which is not prescribed by Mahayana Buddhism, then its meaningfulness would no longer be considered as a necessary condition for the relevant functioning of life necessity society. This would lead to simplifying the role of time as implying a coherent temporal perspective, which entails the dialectical entity of being.

⁴⁷³ In this context, work becomes recognizable as a meaningful activity in so far as it contributes to clarifying the situatedness of the worker, with the socio-political aspects of the place where he/she belongs to, while working. According to Kvaløy, the concept of worker is wider than the one introduced by Marx (Kvaløy 1985b: 129-130). It concerns the fellowship between all of those who foresee that in the end, we are finally dependent on the Earth and the greens (Ibid).

According to Kvaløy, industrial development society (IVS) (Kvaløy 1976: 90) does not tolerate steady economic growth in so far as it is based on boosting individual economic competition remaining implicitly dependent on quantified planning. Adopting the latter statement means that growth should be smooth, but in fact, the planning as such concerns the justification of a specific type of acceleration, which goes at a higher and higher speed. That is why planning is defined as a management, which is “foreign” to the international development of the systems in so far as so-called exponential development (Ibid: 91) concerns the accelerating non-equilibrium.

3.2.2. The Role of Knowledge in Industrial Development Society

Another crucial aspect in understanding the role of growing technocratization in the industrial development society concerns the changing attitude towards knowledge and its connection with the process of development. These tendencies are outlined not only by Zapffe, Næss and Kvaløy, but also by another distinguished Norwegian philosopher, Knut Tranøy. His methodological contribution to this debate can be specified by revealing how the uncritical reception of our intellectual heritage affects the substitution of the contents of the category of knowledge with the one of scientification. He follows a line, which is similar to the one provided by Kvaløy, albeit pointing out another crucial argument, namely, the lack of critical reflection on how the ‘old’ working categories are replaced with categories with a new meaning, which gives a green light to the new knowledge as a knowledge with a capital letter.

By contrast to Næss, however, Tranøy argues that epistemological normative validity is closely tied with the ethical one, i.e. that all the problems of our knowledge derive from underrating the role of ethical norms, which should guide us in having a balanced and ecologically sustainable society. According to Tranøy, the well-grounded position is the one, which has two foundations – our best knowledge and our best ethical norms (Tranøy 1991: 49). The latter contribute to obtaining two principles of our cultural heritage: to secure knowledge recognized as a scientifically grounded one as well as to consider the new scientific knowledge as better than the old one (Ibid). While the first principle binds us as both individuals and society with the search for truth in the name of mankind’s well-being, the second one legitimizes the hunting for a new knowledge as related to connection between searching for truth and increasing well-being (Ibid). Similarly to Kvaløy, Tranøy defines the hunting for a new knowledge as a dynamic category, which benefits justifying the role of unlimited technocratization since science is defined as a search for new knowledge.

It leads to ascribing a completely new meaning to the concept of growth (Ibid: 48). Gaining such a meaning provides a radically new stance, which determines the complicated society to be defined as sustainable development society, where the experts should have control over the most critical spheres by obtaining a relevant knowledge about them (Ibid). However, not all the new knowledge is similarly valuable, which illustrates why the axiological aspect of knowledge does not have to be examined as isolated from

the epistemological one, especially if we want to witness ecopolitical changes by achieving the highest possible ecological sustainability.

In this context, Kvaløy talks about so-called pyramidal societies (Kvaløy 2014: 46) and pyramidal citizens (Ibid: 47), which are determined as “elementary particles of the system” (Ibid). The success measure is the use of the industrial output justified by strengthening the individual competition. It is supported by the means of a new applied science, which operates for the sake of determining abstract social ideals. On the other hand, from that it does not follow that since the pyramids are spatial constructions, time is irrelevant to their formation. On the contrary, space reduction is possible in so far as time is narrowed down to its present dimension of ‘here-and-now’. Against the background of these specifications, Kvaløy argues that pyramidal societies make man feel like a machine as well as look alike (Kvaløy 2004: 1350). On a macro methodological level, the truth of pyramidal societies contradicts the one of democracy (Ibid: 95), so that the worst existential consequence is that we become reserve parts adjusted to timeless drawing board (Ibid).

Industrial development society provides “structured and safe existence” (Kvaløy 2014: 40). The requirements to its structuring come from ‘outside’ and to a very small extent correspond to the real behavior of the society’s members. The dependence on the living environment is big and society has only a small potential to introduce changes. By contrast to the natural economy, the industrial one is built on manipulation (Ibid).

However, the dependence in question is not a physical one because, otherwise, it should have caused a dependence on living nature. It is rather a dependence on deeds in so far as they are examined as produced and subjected to human will.

In turn, the definition of industrial development society, as provided by the snm’s ecophilosophy group (Ibid: 42), is examined within the framework of the quantification of some other concepts, namely, the ones of balance and (re)sources. In this context, the exponential growth⁴⁷⁴ is characterized as a constant growth of products, not of abilities. It becomes justifiable as an economic growth by default, while standardization and quantification are

⁴⁷⁴ The exponential growth is defined by Kvaløy as based on the unquestionable presumption that social balance replaces the natural one, but not in the sense of life necessity’s balance (Ibid: 44). It brings the consequence of grounding the uncontradictory justification of competition within the framework of the competence of applied knowledge.

reconsidered as preventive measures against social imbalance by adopting the means of so-called social engineering.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that it is the replacement of life necessity society with the industrial development one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be substitutable with the one of development understood as sustainable development⁴⁷⁵.

Kvaløy himself sees in the life necessity society an alternative in avoiding the contradiction that derives from the industrial development society. However, he specifies that life necessity society cannot provoke a process of pure transformation, but it rather gives priority to a certain type of production, which is in tune with satisfying the vital needs of the population. That is why what Kvaløy and Næss mean by imposing soft technologies is intrinsically connected with the successful mediation between the processes of production and consumption. On a micro methodological level, it should illustrate the role of grounding behavior, which counters sustainable development by taking into consideration that not every single need can be unilaterally satisfied in one way only.

As Kvaløy points out, “without identity there is no development” (Ibid: 125). Within the framework of sustainable development, humankind’s opportunity for existential self-development is denied because human freedom is not responsibly referred to the environment. On a macro methodological level, it means that the ontological potential of grounding behavior is underrated since it also presumes one to grow up in a cultural tradition, which to internalize as one’s own and thus to obtain an identity (Ibid).

Emphasizing the other forms of grounding behavior can be determined as a significant premise of how uncontradictory to avoid the identification of growth with development in so far as the culturally determined understanding of the former is a guarantee for justifying the normative validity of the latter.

Identity crisis in the industrial development society comes not only from the pure act of restricting the diversity of life’s impulses, but also from the fact that the latter have strong axiological connotations. In other words, such a

⁴⁷⁵ The normative validity of the latter comes from the presumption of Brundtland’s report that sustainable development is a “grounding behavior” (Ibid: 124), i.e. it gives grounds for evaluating the alternative behavior for the sake of building continuity of generations.

crisis restricts the possibility for both man and other living beings to express their potentials by questioning their intrinsic value and thus to underrate their basic right to live and blossom.

Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that Næss and Kvaløy's starting point is the similar ontological vision of complexity having diversity as its prototype characteristic, albeit Næss remains on the level of ontology, as I already showed. While he claims that life is a complicated set of subordinate gestalten, Kvaløy talks about sensations and 'happenings' (Næss 1985: 40), emphasizing the fragileness of the temporal dimension as such.

On the other hand, the methodological differences between them are irreducible to differences in terminology and illustrations. An illuminative representation of a conceptual difference can be seen in Næss's statement that the lack of a common political understanding derives from the impossibility to understand the other, simplifying Kvaløy's position of non-violence in the individual world (Ibid: 40-41). The interpretation in question can be read in the sense of Næss's Ecophilosophy T as a matter of self-realization, which is irreducible to atomism. In this context, his claim that Kvaløy underrates the meaning of diversity within ecosophy (Ibid: 41) is a questionable one because Kvaløy rather emphasizes the lack of commonly shared moral commitment to it.

In this context, Kvaløy introduces three types of societies, namely, the ones of Gaia, Servoglobe and Disney world (recognized as a pseudo-complex society) (Kvaløy 2014: 52-54). All three models differ in the problem-solution patterns they provide. Within complexity's framework (the Gaia type), the solution is grounded in the development of so-called natural course, within the complication one (the Servoglobe type⁴⁷⁶), it is seen in achieving a given practical goal, while within the pseudo-complexity framework (the Disney-world type), the solutions are recognized as a goal, which functions as if it is naturally determined. In turn, the as if mode gets a negative normative validity since it creates illusions disguised as improvisations.

⁴⁷⁶ An interesting parallel can be drawn with Knut Tranøy's analysis of Harry Martinson's poem *Aniara* (1956), which I define as a literary version of Servoglobe scenario. Kvaløy's interpretation gives a hint why the latter can be examined as a product of human hybris that cannot replace the logic of the real life and development. In this context, we can find a similar unquestionable faith in the intellect as a meta-structure (as the one embodied in Servoglobe). It is examined by Tranøy as leading to the problematic justification of human control understood as the only one possible control (Tranøy 1991: 52).

3.2.3. Complexity vs. Complication. The Fight against Servoglobe

Gaia versus Servoglobe debate can be characterized as provoked by a certain, deliberately caused amnesia⁴⁷⁷ (Kvaløy 1985: 27), when people are forced to forget about organic time for the sake of making more apparent some of its dimensions such as intensity and functionality which is wrongly equated with effectiveness. The result is the justification of time as reducible to its own representations.

The philosophical grounding of complexity vs. complication distinction is described as having projections on the Norwegian ecopolitics as well. In turn, industrial development society, which made the dream of Servoglobe fulfilled, is described by Kvaløy as an explosion of individualizing ways marked with catchy slogans and references to where one should feel at home (Kvaløy 2004: 2070).

According to Kvaløy, Norway accepts computerization “with a great naivety” (Kvaløy 2011: 100), which should be overcome due to the need of stopping computer violation of privacy imposed by the EU’s Big Brother scenario for control (Ibid). His arguments against growing technocratization are based on the double-bind meaning of primitive, which is embodied in two different contexts whose prototype characteristic is the one of naivety. Within the technocratic discourse, naivety is recognized as following the rationality of the primitive understood as the one, which is *prima facie* unmediated. In turn, relevant ecopolitics should disenchant the naivety of taking the complication as if it is complex by avoiding taking the complication for granted since the management of the natural dynamic systems is interpreted as problematic from the perspective of social constructivism. Referring to Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that the double-bind connotations of primitive defined either as ‘first in nature’, which is its initial meaning, or as simplistic (due to the false deduction of simple) contribute to justifying two different visions of naivety, namely, the naivety of complexity determined from the perspective of complication and the one of complication, which is recognized from the perspective of complexity respectively.

In contrast to the sociopolitical differences in building the best environmentally friendly society, here, we can outline the methodological similarities

⁴⁷⁷ According to Kvaløy, we have forgotten about time, namely, about genuine or natural time (Ibid).

between Næss's and Kvaløy's models in so far as they both share the main principles of Gaia theory. On the other hand, reconsidering the genealogy of the ontological tension between complexity and complication presumes to emphasize one more significant aspect, namely, the inheritance of Zapffe's ideas about technological invasion and expanding ungrounded anthropocentrism.

Kvaløy outlines how the problem of rehabilitating the role of national ecopolitics soon becomes an issue on the global scene since national is stigmatized as local by contrast to establishing the new normative validity of the global itself. Thus the extrapolation of the global conflict is conceptualized as the one between Gaia and Servoglobe⁴⁷⁸ representing the conflict between two different worlds, the one of constructivism and the one of improvisation (Kvaløy 2011: 99).

Servoglobe itself is the name of a super-nationally run 'global supercomputer'; an artificial intelligence system "coupled to a global network of information" "created partly by economic globalization forces, partly to serve mankind's survival in the face of a destructively simplified natural biosphere" (Ibid: 101). In this context, Gaia is recognized as "too messy for rational management" (Ibid) in contrast to Servoglobe that is justified as a final solution to all problems. Striving for perceiving complex as if it is complicated, while increasing the strength of the self-propelling processes, which are rooted in the impossibility to realize the aforementioned management, Servoglobe determines its own death. The overexposed mechanical control is doomed to decline because the destructively simplified biosphere still produces dilemmas, which cannot be easily eradicated.

⁴⁷⁸ While the Gaia theory became popular in the Norwegian public discourse of the late 1960s, mainly by the works of some well-recognized ecologists (such as Dag Østerberg and Ivar Mysterud), the Servoglobe phenomenon was coined as Servex in Chr. H. Williams's book *Fistful of Digits* (1968) (Ibid) (Kvaløy 2004: 1800) in respect with examining the idea of how to create an all encompassing machinery control system. In turn, the concept of so-called all encompassing, state machine system was announced in 1948. Then it was further developed by N. Wiener who aimed to justify the machine in question using all the possible means (Ibid: 1830, Note 30:1). From the 1980s onward the theory of Servex has been elaborated as encouraging the adoption of fantasy's full structures and utopian constructions recognized as parts of the industrial development society. The process took place against the background of the human attempts to succeed in 'arresting time'. In this context, Kvaløy defined Servex as a product of world's ideology (Ibid: 2160), which was considered as incompatible with the character of life's processes and nature as such.

On a macro methodological level, it means that pretending to fight chaos, Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results in chaos again, revealing different sides of it. In turn, the fear of empty space (*terror vacui*) becomes apparent since it does not come from man, but from nature itself, albeit man is the only one species that consciously anticipates it. Thus I reach the conclusion that Servoglobe fails in the way it pretends to find panacea for the fear in question. The only one solution is humankind to get reconciled and to develop its self-estimation by thinking how to find meaning in the meaninglessness as such. Last but not least, I argue that the myth of final solution is the worst myth of technocratization in so far as it encourages the formula ‘goal justifies the means’ to be adopted.

A possible solution in specifying the search for meaning can be seen in what Høyer calls a distinction of life’s strength and survival one (Høyer 2011: 50), taking into account that life is always ‘more’ than the survival itself. Kvaløy gives another name to the difference between qualitative and quantitative, albeit sharing the same logic. He talks about a clash between qualities and parameters since complexity should be referred to qualities, while complication – to mechanical parameters (Kvaløy 2011: 103)

It is the double bind meaning of the specification of ‘more’, i.e. whether it would be considered in qualitative or quantitative terms that makes the contradiction between normative validity of complexity and complication apparent only in the process of comparison. In other words, there is no contradiction when ‘more’ is not determined in qualitative terms within the framework of complexity model, nor when is it defined in quantitative ones within the complication paradigm. The contradiction arises when qualitative ‘more’ is compared with the quantitative one because it automatically raises the debate which normative validity matters ‘more’.

A significant part of understanding the ontological tension between Gaia theory and Servoglobe’s one is driven by analyzing the genealogy of so-called space ship as well as how it has been modified within the technocapitalist ideology. The influence of K. Boulding’s theory of spaceship economy vs. cowboy economy presumes recognizing the ship as a coherent, centralized system with a uniformed, goal oriented man pilot (Kvaløy 2004: 1230). In this context, it is important to emphasize, as Kvaløy does, that the unity of the model (eternity’s model) is a matter of a rational planning, which is based on the presumption regarding the idea of hierarchy. The latter in turn strengthens the one of political centralization within the industrial development society.

On the other hand, I claim that the unity of ecological systems determined as a spaceship in Kvaløy's sense (Ibid: 1500) is mainly on disposal to the person who is reduced to an 'intelligent fragment'. The spaceship makes sense only if we uncontradictory ground so-called pseudo-dynamics (Ibid: 2760, Note 51.4) due to which turning the qualitative change into a quantitative one means a reduction of the plurality of time and space to a spatial dimension to be made. However, the technocratization of time, as embodied in the industrial space, underrates the fact that "the spaceship is not a ship, and the space between stars is not an ocean", as Kvaløy outlines (Ibid: 3000). The world's space is extremely frightening to human environment. Being frightening as such determines nature's dialectics to be positively evaluated as having conflicts as its necessary condition for development.

In turn, J. Lovelock claims that Gaia hypothesis concerns the justification of Gaia as Earth organism's intelligence analyzing why man can never play the role of Gaia's intelligence (Ibid: 1530). Furthermore, we should outline that one can try to obtain a position merely by adopting organic expertise. That is why one of the main methodological arguments arising from this interpretation is that intelligence is irreducible to the intellect as such, which in turn means that the relevant understanding presumes a different process thinking mode to be acquired as well as that it is the intelligence mode that requires a normative validity of intuition to be ascribed. On a micro methodological level, it illustrates that even if the intellect can be possessed by man in planning his/her own behavior and interactions with the world, intelligence cannot.

What is the Norwegian contribution to this crucial debate? The technocratization embodying the raising appeal for countering the fear from empty space corresponds to Zapffe's emphasis on the mechanisms of fixation. The attempt concerns humankind's willingness to compensate the deficiency of meaning, which it needs to have at hand in order to develop its confidence in the universe as a dominant species as well as to question the 'natural' grounding of insecurity⁴⁷⁹.

⁴⁷⁹ Høyer specifies that Zapffe's and Kvaløy's interests in investigating the Disneyland effect represent the strive for disenchanting the means of compensating the human tragedies of the Industrial Growth Society (IGS) (Høyer 2011: 67).

3.2.3.1. *The Clash of Organic and Mechanical Time*

While complexity refers to the existence of something real, the complication is a product of human intellect “taken to express the real world” (Kvaløy 2011: 103). Furthermore, to be real means to be concrete, imperfect and practice-related, pre-intellectual by contrast to artifacts such as computers, which are considered by Kvaløy as an “extension of living” (Ibid). Thus the tension between complexity and complication is recognized as driven by the tension between organic and mechanical diversity since it is the complexity that provides diversity in “structure, function and communication”, by contrast to the complication providing one without organic coherence (Høyer 2011: 49).

Organic time characterizing complexity is expressed through the idea of rhythm as a part of the natural processes because it is the “movement itself” (Kvaløy 2011: 103). In turn, mechanical time grounding the complication model is defined as an “intellectual invention” (Ibid) that quantifies natural time and makes culture as such possible.

To the two different types of time examined by Kvaløy, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Vetlesen opposes the compression of time and space understood as an embodiment of the most primitive narcissism⁴⁸⁰.

That is why the macro methodological projections of Servoglobe’s vicious circle can be traced to how humankind’s tragedy, driven by the feeling of being temporary species in the universe, has turned into Homo consumens’ tragedy. Referring to Kvaløy’s theory, I claim that the latter is multiplied into some other tragedies because the mechanisms of compensating the initial tragedy, which stems from the fragility of human beings, are strengthened by the unsuccessful attempts at playing different happy endings that end up as tragedies. On a macro methodological level, it means that the tragedy of species becomes tragedy of time. The clash is provided by the strive for

⁴⁸⁰ Vetlesen defines annihilating time and space (Vetlesen 2011: 29) due to the omnipotence of technologies that allow us “liberation from the constraints of distance and frustrations of waiting” (Ibid). The latter are justified as ontologically driven contrasts, which contribute to differentiating possible from impossible. Compressing time and space is done for the sake of reducing all constraints regarding the effects of the unpredictable, which were described as both frustration of waiting and unlimitedness of our desires. The latter is a part of the project to create one unquestionable ‘here-and-now’ model, which is called by Vetlesen “gigantic production of presence” (Ibid: 30) making the world bigger by becoming smaller while creating its own kind of absence and loss.

compensating the lack of general solutions with short-term ones, which to be justified in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, I argue that the tension of the new time's tragedies is a result of the ontological pretention of time compression to rehabilitate the surplus of being. Going back to the new time's tragedies dominated by the ontological pretention of time's compression, I examine how Kvaløy's differentiation of organic and mechanical time grounds the fundamental distinction between complexity and complication. In this context, I claim that time compression is strengthened not only by the myth of final solution, but also by the one saying that organic time can be artificially extended to eternity. Projections of the latter are well-depicted in already examined distinction between meaningful work and mechanical one (Ibid: 106), which is based on the tension between organic and mechanical time respectively (Ibid: 103-104).

Judging by these investigations, I reach the conclusion that the division between organic and mechanical time in Kvaløy's sense does not prevent the risk organic time to be equated with the free one; a tendency imposed due to the growing normative validity of the model of complication that is disguised as the model of the only one possible complexity. Defining organic time as a free time is provided by the aforementioned transformation of the debate 'growth and environmental protection', as I already emphasized, which in turn benefits environmentally unfriendly politics to be justified by the maxima 'grow or die'. Furthermore, equating organic time with the free one would mean that the former is possessed by the subject. It can unrestrictedly be exploited by the latter for his/her own sake and thus to be recognized as a different representation of the mechanical time itself.

The compression of time, which is made from the perspective of the mechanical time, pretends to encompass, if not to annihilate organic time: it benefits equating the spatial dimension with the temporal one. The compression in question refers to the compression of time and space at once that is provided by the compression of being. Thus the normative validity is reduced to a top norm of consumption, which determines the politics of meritocracy as environmentally unfriendly politics.

3.2.3.1.1. 'Timing' Culture in Kvaløy's Theory

Kvaløy makes an important statement about two types of culture based on the two different visions of time, which justify two different types of aesthetics, namely, the one of Western culture whose climax is the engineering perfection of the Greek temple and so-called stop-time aesthetics of the Eastern culture represented in the Sherpa house, i.e. in an organic structure decaying day by day (Ibid: 104-105). In this context, I raise the hypothesis that the fundamental difference between the two cultures is based on the justification of the myth of perfection that is tightly concerned with the one of already discussed final solution, while examining the genealogy of *Servoglobe*.

The myth of perfection contradicts the stop-time aesthetics since the latter can be described as an ontological aesthetics supported by the understanding of nature as a home project (*oiko-logos*). The ontological aesthetics grounds the presumption that the house should be a home by nature because it should behave like a living organism: to follow the organic rhythm, which can be captured by adopting imaginative rationality alone. On the other hand, the myth of teleological perfection that dominates Western culture is strengthened by the ideology of the static harmony, which has its groundings 'here-and-now'. Due to the myth in question, the world understood as a living organism is opposed to the one functioning as a machine, as a global spaceship that will substitute *Gaia* (Ibid: 110). That is why the conflict-fertilization, emphasized by Kvaløy, is recognized as a result of the invasion of the hyper-aesthetics, according to which small and organic is never beautiful.

Extrapolating Næss's and Kvaløy's theories, I conclude that imposing hyper-aesthetics at the expense of the ontological one would lead to confronting generalists to specialists-saboteurs⁴⁸¹ who overexploit the use of service as servitude, reducing the transperspectivity of knowledge to the one dimensionality of eco-ideology. Compressing ethics and aesthetics, which is a result of the hyper-compression of time and space nowadays provokes what Kvaløy calls the soap era of science fiction due to which people end up as a redundant part of the machine (Ibid: 111).

⁴⁸¹ This problem will be examined in detail in the chapter on *Skirbekk*.

3.2.3.2. Growth vs. Growing. Methodological Challenges to the 'Sovereign Power' of Market

A shared point of Næss's and Kvaløy's theories is the one regarding the need of rehabilitating the role of bioregionalism within environmental politics, which is formulated, last but not least, against the EU's 'global' politics⁴⁸² of introducing 'global' market.

The idea of expanding the boundaries of the market is examined as provoked by the increasing use of high-technologies promoted by the EU. Thus the pyramidal models as well as the free market ones inflict a contradiction on governmental level, where the centralization in Kvaløy's sense stems from adopting 'artificial intelligence' and microprocessors (Kvaløy 2014: 66). All that takes place against the background of the abstract Servoglobe machinery and 'concrete' nature, taking into account, as Kvaløy outlines, that Servoglobe puts a full stop to the free competition. On a macro level, the global market contributes to establishing a crisis society based on planning, which, as Kvaløy relevantly specifies, makes its own members passive to the society itself (Ibid: 76). The internal logic of the crisis society contradicts the processes regarding the internal development of societal functions since the crisis society is driven by politically powerless regimes, which can easily degenerate (Kvaløy 2004: 1380).

In this context, Kvaløy contrasts the pyramidal way of social engineering and Buddhist process philosophy⁴⁸³ by analyzing how social development should follow the mechanisms of connecting with others, as they are intrinsically determined in nature. However, this analogy does not have to be simplified to outlining literal correspondences but rather to finding uncontradictory arguments in establishing similar interactions, which do not question neither man's status as a social actor, nor environment as such.

⁴⁸² As it was emphasized by the representatives of snm, the EU does not have a compound and developed regional politics (snm 1974: 57).

⁴⁸³ Kvaløy claims that he does not support so-called folk Buddhism that presumes the existence of a uniform soul, which achieves through the wheel of life's series the state of transmigration (Kvaløy 2004). Such a misrecognition regarding man's soul is justified as a commonly shared characteristic of the pyramidal structures, where it is supported by 'pyramidal' means. In this context, Kvaløy introduces so-called pyramidal person (contrasting him/her to the multiple-sided one) whose subjection to particularization (de-individualization) is outlined as a prototype feature of one's nature. The latter requires the person to be further subjected to management of a pyramidal character (Ibid: 1350) and thus to become a 'disk man' (Skivemennesket) (Ibid).

Næss and Kvaløy agreed about the statement that so-called technocapitalism is helpless not only in finding solutions for the ecological problems, but also in clarifying the social dilemmas about solidarity and self-realization. Therefore, the double bind attitudes towards economics should be examined, taking into account that the two extremes are either to deny the idea of growth as such (i.e. to talk about zero growth), or to absolutize the benefits of the latter.

According to Høyer, most of the complications concerning the problematic conceptions of growth derive against the modified background of transforming humanity into an accessory of the machinery (Høyer 2011: 49), i.e. it takes place within the framework of gradual dehumanization of society due to the overexploitation of technologies that are introduced for the sake of achieving growth at any expense. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that sustainable development becomes a goal in itself, which justifies the means, namely, the unrestricted use of technologies. If we support the thesis that nature works in a 'trial-and-error mode' (Hägerstrand 2011: 141), where the error is a subject to fixation by default, the process of 'correcting mistakes' could be defined a self-sufficient goal: it could be determined in the name of the machinery rather than for the sake of nature itself.

However, we should also keep in mind that growth as such has many faces, for example, we have biological, technological, economic growth. Høyer argues that this multiplicity should be explored in respect with the distinction between the complicated, quantified time of the Industrial Growth Society (IGS) and the complex one (Høyer 2011: 51) as related to the different forms of cultures, which contributes to clarifying one more aspect of the role of biological growth. Interfering its different aspects (mainly the aspects of economic growth with the ones of biological growth) leads again to escalating the pressure regarding the debate about industrial development and environmental protection. Going back to the conception about nature understood as a 'trial-and-error mode', I draw the conclusion that biological growth, recognized as supporting nature's diversity, is simplified by the myth that everything can be fixed with proper means. It opens the possibility of interpreting the contradictions as an imperfection that has to be changed. Following this mode of development, biological growth is defined as representing a lower stage, which should gain its ontological validity by analogy with the technological growth having a higher value.

3.2.3.2.1. *The Benefits of Bioeconomics*

Regarding the different aspects of economic growth and its normative validity, we should analyze the role of bioeconomics, as represented in the works of Næss and Kvaløy. Exploring the role of bioeconomics⁴⁸⁴ is important since it contributes to outlining the impact of ethics on the Norwegian ecophilosophies' growth criticism (Høyer and Næss 2011: 200).

According to Høyer and P. Næss, the entropy law applied to economics presumes reconsidering the laws of thermodynamics showing how to think about economics as such (Ibid: 201). A. Næss (1989) and Kvaløy (1974) analyzed Roegen's theory seeing in it an opportunity of rehabilitating the normative validity of bioeconomics as a field (Ibid). Referring to Roegen's *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process* in his *Ecophilosophical Fragment*, Kvaløy calls Roegen one of the most critical contributions to the Norwegian ecophilosophy (Ibid: 209). He claims that due to the crucial role of bioeconomics, the limited life of industrial development society can be overcome by reconsidering the mechanisms of the latter as a pendulum between "production and consumption within an isolated system" (Ibid: 204). Against the background of the aforementioned investigations, Høyer and P. Næss see one of the main benefits of adopting the law of entropy, as displayed by A. Næss and Kvaløy, in the conception that only due to the law of entropy, things can have a value (Ibid: 205). They get such a one when entropic resources are transformed into human labor and capital equipment (Ibid).

Furthermore, I argue that another methodological benefit of examining Næss's and Kvaløy's conceptions of bioeconomics is that we can reveal the complex picture of the methodological pros and cons of decoupling growth from environmental impact as well as with outlining how sustainable development not only provokes ecological unsustainability, but also modifies the social theories to the extent to which we can neglect the ecological limitations. This means that one of the main problems is not the exploitation of nature as such, but rather the management of the exploitation itself, which is determined by different social and political conceptions about the connection between development 'in process' and the one "in progress'.

⁴⁸⁴ Introducing the entropy law to economics is done by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen who coined the term bioeconomics providing critical arguments to the neoclassical economics.

Furthermore, it is also important to examine how dangerous is so-called disciplinary tunnel vision towards eco-centrism; i.e. whether the definition of treating nature as a living laboratory hides the risk of pushing the pendulum to its other extreme by rejecting any development whatsoever, which can help people to live a better life.

While Næss does not pay special attention to the imperative of capital growth, Kvaløy is convinced that “a steady growth cannot be tolerated without a break down” (Ibid: 210) because the ecocatastrophe can be prevented if growth takes place only within one or few areas (Ibid: 209). In turn, Næss is reluctant to “explicitly recommending zero-growth” since it is not easy to justify an ecologically responsible policy (Ibid: 206).

In this context, I draw the conclusion that analyzing the origin of the contradictions regarding economic growth presumes to clarify the dilemmas concerned with the political framework it takes place in, precisely, with the tension between the processes of centralization and decentralization. On a macro methodological level, it illustrates that the fight against the ecocrisis is driven by the strive for questioning the normative validity of centralization without reducing the one of decentralization, i.e. without equating the latter with anarchy.

According to Næss, due to the fact that people have a full control over their technological and economic systems, it is the cultural traditions that make the understanding of growth axiologically justifiable (Næss 1973: 12). He argues that talking about centralized materialism requires exponential material, which benefits the deep change in terms of production and ideologies both in the western countries and Japan (Ibid: 14). Despite the fact that Næss is not a zealous supporter of economic growth, he sees the opportunity of rehabilitating its normative validity in encouraging the use of soft technologies and local production. As an argument in favor of the latter, we can point out that Næss also disenchants the pitfalls of the global framework revealing the unwillingness on governmental side to strengthen the ecopolitics on a local level since the decentralization would make the government less powerful.

Otherwise, growth would become misleadingly connected with the idea of control, which drives from the questionable presumption that there is no uncontrollable (in a centralized way) growth. If so, it would have led to the destruction of the system itself. On the other hand, it is the distributive form of control implemented in the democratic societies that makes growth be irreducible to the industrial development as such.

3.3. The Pseudo-complexity of Tivoli-Effect

Pseudo-complexity is defined by Kvaløy in the sense of being complicated, i.e. as an ‘imitation’ of the complex⁴⁸⁵. Regarding the clarification of the latter, he outlines the role of imitation as an aesthetically oriented decoration, which reveals the double bind character of the imitation as such (Kvaløy 1976: 144). Judging by these investigations, I argue that the methodological difference between complication and pseudo-complexity is recognized by Kvaløy on the level of engagement by introducing the as if mode. The normative validity of self-experience within the framework of complexity determines the as if mode to be accepted as the ‘most’ normatively valid one (as a real mode), while the complication manipulates the use of the latter by imposing a generalized experience as a self-experience.

In turn, pseudo-complexity is defined by Kvaløy as a surrogate, as a security arch (velv) due to the natural disposition of man to be involved in a complex interaction with other beings and nature (Ibid: 145), so that it can be coined as a surrogate in the sense of imitating the process dependence of man on nature. Speculating with the normative validity of the dependence in question takes place against the background of justifying mapping versus planning, which can be quantified, while the mapping is rather a subject to qualitative evaluations (Ibid: 31).

It is the normative validity of the quantitative ‘more’ that grounds what Kvaløy calls “Apparatlandschaft society”; society, which masters its total environmental potential through choosing technologies, which contribute to “the dominance of the level of complication” (Høyer 2011: 50). Against the background of the attempt “to replace naturally flowing eocsocial system with an artificially controlled mechanic scheme”, so-called ‘Amusement diversity’ and ‘Disneyland effect’ take place (Kvaløy 2011: 102).

⁴⁸⁵ According to Næss, this new type of pseudo-complexity is reached by diverting the sense of awareness while watching TV. Its messages concern the development of awareness of what happens, or even better, what can be elaborated providing an active state, which deserves an equal status with the daily tasks (Næss 1995: 75). Listening to the forecasts about weather and wind has “big and important differences” (Ibid: 71) with the real conditions. Næss compares the TV visits with the visit to a small cabin, somewhere in the ocean, on a small island (Ibid: 80). What he claims is that regardless of the way of reproducing reality, the ‘natural’ representation has its intrinsic value even if it is mediated by sources and channels. The latter make the concept understandable if we recognize it more visibly attractive.

Regarding the clarifications of freedom, so-called Tivoli-effect is defined by Kvaløy as justifying the role of pseudo-freedom as the only one possible freedom (Kvaløy 2014: 55). It is due to the fact that the latter produces simplified engagements by absorbing the tension between physical and psychological complexity's growth, which every man is born with (Ibid: 54) and thus creates obstacles for the realization of human potential. However, from that it does not follow that man's survival strength is neglectable. It represents the global tendency that the change of environment is made to a technological capsulation (Ibid: 60).

To a certain extent, Tivoli-effect can be defined as such a technological capsule in so far as it suppresses the full representation of man's complex abilities for self-realization by creating a self-sufficient reality through adopting technologically specified means alone. It would show that technological strength is recognizable as life's strength by becoming one of the most illuminative representations of Boudrilard's simulacra.

On a macro methodological level, Kvaløy argues that man's "complexity impact" can unilaterally be mitigated with "Tivoli-means" by increasing the economic combination of mobility and rootlessness of the big cities (Kvaløy 1976: 43). The mobility in question is achieved by the bombing with effects and powerfully established "budge" of channels of communication, which support the Tivoli-effect (Ibid: 41). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the illusion of pseudo-complexity is justified by strengthening the circus effect: it keeps making people breathless and thrilled at once in so far as mobility is reduced to a restless motion without a goal and accomplishment.

One of the main methodological characteristics of the Tivoli-effect is its impossibility to uncontradictory justify the mode of improvisation. That is why it provides pseudo-life's strength. In turn, the dream does not have a constructive power any longer since it is simplified to an illusion, which may underlie the ungrounded pretensions for over-control. The result is so-called synthetic reality due to which the development is understood by the means of complication, namely, by the ones of calculating, quantifying etc.

Kvaløy also emphasizes that the Tivoli-effect questions the opportunity one to build one's strength of life (Ibid: 62). He specifies that by contrasting life's strength and nature, which can be elaborated as a process on the basis of its dynamical ways of changing some grounding structures, the survival strength of the ecosystem becomes based on monocultures. Despite the fact that the latter support and prolong its existence, survival strength can also

be reduced within the same life's strength (regarding ecosystems) in a long-term perspective (Ibid: 63).

In this context, I argue that the Tivoli-effect can be considered as justifying the technological strength at the expense of life's one by reducing the life's strength to survival one through decreasing the multicultural diversity to a simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures, where 'mono' becomes and ontological synonym of 'global'. The latter contributes the normative validity of the Tivoli-effect to be explored by justifying this effect as a global phenomenon. That is why Tivoli-effect can be defined as inflicting the idea of surplus (Ibid: 64) to be recognized in quantitative terms alone, i.e. the maximum of life's strength to be interpreted as having apparent quantitative dimensions, which to be understood as saturated with life's potential.

4. ENVIRONMENT OR LIFE! SOME TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMAS IN ECOPOLITICS

Kvaløy describes the society, which is grounded in the total mastering of environment as a techno-capitalist society (Høyer 2011: 50). This issue is illuminative for clarifying how the society in question is justified by the uncontradictory recognition of the monopolization of knowledge, which determines the global vision of ecopolitics. Another important objective is to outline whether techno-capitalism based on the monopole of knowledge, which has to determine different forms of exploitation, is the only one model problematizing the environmentally friendly ecopolitics as such.

Due to the increasing role of technologies and their exploitation, transperspectivity is wrongly defined as equivalent to the total visibility, which does not leave any side whatsoever unseen. Regarding this tendency, we should emphasize that setting the total visibility as a goal is possible only from the perspective of the bystander, but does not follow from nature. In tune with the aforementioned tendency, the idea of equilibrium understood as a process is substituted with the static vision of balance.

In turn, the monopole of knowledge brings one more negative consequence to light, which is also concerned with the increasing faith in human power; with what von Wright calls change in the predictability of natural processes (von Wright 2011: 118). Pretending to have all knowledge at hand, humankind empowers itself with the potential to predict all the possible changes in nature as well as to control them because it can foresee the consequences of their functioning. One of the most illuminative projections of this over-control is the vicious circle of technological development recognized for the sake of the development itself. Its teleology to provide all possibilities on people's disposal leads to producing more and more new technologies, which to meet the forthcoming challenges.

4.1. The Ethics of Provocative Pessimism

On the level of ethics, I argue that we can talk about different types of engagement; one problem, which is pointed out by Næss in his book *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* (1976) and quoted by Vetlesen, namely, that the engagement with nature is reduced in favor of the one with technology (Vetlesen 2011: 25). The aforementioned engagements are grounded in different attitudes towards ethics, precisely, in the ones towards ontological ethics, when we talk about nature as well as in what I call ethics of compressed time. An illuminative illustration of the implications of the latter is von Wright's explanation of typical environmental questions, which are "what we should call technological problems"⁴⁸⁶ (von Wright 2011: 119).

On a macro methodological level, the problem is provoked by the well-known concerns about normative validity, i.e. by the human pretention to ascribe one and the same normative validity to different goals and means, in our case – to the ones of nature and technologies. On a micro methodological level, it means that the normative validity of environmental issues is wrongly recognized as one of the technological issues, which leads to the misleading presumption technological solutions to be defined as suitable in solving environmental problems by analogy. The latter is a main prerequisite for the justification of one of the strongest ideologies: the ideology of anthropocentrism whose subject is the omnipotent man dealing with all the difficulties by mastering his/her own capabilities. Furthermore, the relevant ecopolitics appeals for providing environmental solutions to environmental problems rather than technological ones since technological solutions are not panacea giving us merely short-term solutions in the scope of ecology, as I already showed.

In this context, it is important to outline Kvaløy's conception of the difficulties regarding spontaneous experience of nature, whose normative validity also entails the unpredictable which goes beyond human capacity as a bystander. What is unpredictable for man is realizable within natural predictability because the latter does not arise from the perspective of the bystander, but from the one of nature's dialectics, i.e. from the process of

⁴⁸⁶ According to him, the current ethical debate in science is opened by technology in *statu nascendi* since employing technology presumes acquiring a particular understanding of the value of goals and means (von Wright 2011: 119).

harmonization based on the development of life's forms that contradict each other. Substituting equilibrium with balance as a socially constructed pattern is done by man for the sake of isolating the unpredictable; the one, which is recognized as uncontrollable in terms of pure rationality that excludes the forms of imaginative rationality in its strive for becoming rationality *per se*. In this context, globalization makes one more problem apparent. It justifies the work with categories *per se* (such as economy *per se*, technology *per se*) aiming to noncontradictorily impose the negation of only one category, the one of nature *per se*.

As Vetlesen points out, one asymmetry is substituted with another one, when the concern about the others is suppressed by the one about us (Vetlesen 2011: 35). According to him, now wilderness takes place as a "sacred place in the disorientation of technology",⁴⁸⁷ (Ibid). We have forgotten to see the full dimensionality of things in the initial transperspectivity of nature giving preference to our own perspective, which has been determined as the perspective with a capital letter. The symmetry of complexity including what we consider as asymmetry by default is erased by the technological invasion at the expense of the symmetry of complication. The latter is based on so-called natural asymmetry, namely, on hindering self-realization, which is narrowed to the being of a given living form. In the complicated societies, the asymmetry in question presumes reconsidering the role of normative validity as well since the dominating concern for us is the lack of concern about the others.

Referring to Kvaløy's conception, I also claim that the normative validity of the as if clause is justified by adopting imaginative rationality, which contributes to avoiding the restriction of the circle of 'Thou' to the ones who are 'close' to the Self and thus to reduce the target group of the empathy addresses. In other words, it is the as if clause and imaginative rationality it entails that make the asymmetry symmetrical through the act of addressing. However, restricting the multilateral relationships between the Self and the

⁴⁸⁷ Vetlesen emphasizes one more significant aspect, which is also relevant to Kvaløy's theory. Technology is a means of decontextualizing the meaningfulness by reducing it to a sum of different meanings. He argues that technology is a way of making something accessible by breaking its pre-existing and particular context (Ibid: 31). One of the main methodological concerns which arise is that there is no such a thing as a pre-existing context at all because all the forms of being are 'born' in a context. A problem, whose logic is similar to the logic regarding the problem of unpredictability, is the reconsideration of the idea of lack of pre-existing context that makes possible what Vetlesen calls letting "things be in the fullness of their dimensions" (Ibid: 35).

Other to the substratum of their being (their interdependent self-realization to the dependence of their being turns the space of the mutual recognition into an arena of meritocratic invasion.

Regarding ethics, I draw the conclusion that the technological invasion encourages the substitution of ontological ethics with moral relativism grounded in the overexposed trust in human potential to dictate the boundaries of his/her own self-realization. One process, which leads to a vicious circle provoked by the way the subjectively held point of view, recognizes itself as an objective judgment due to the normalization of the subjective insights as arguments with unquestionable validity. As Vetlesen claims, how we perceive something determines how we are disposed to treat it (Ibid; 42); one process that brings the dramatics asymmetry to the arena of contradictions.

4.2. The Role of Generalists and Specialists

The difference between specialists and generalists, as recognized by Næss and Kvaløy, also contributes to clarifying the distinction between hard and soft technologies, while giving priority to industrial development society or life necessity one because, according to Kvaløy, technological performance can contribute to building complexity (Kvaløy 1976: 45). On a macro methodological level, it means that the differences in question concern even the literal embodiments of Kvaløy's river time, namely, whether river will be considered as a source, which should be preserved, or as a resource that should be exploited (Kvaløy 2014: 72). Practically speaking, it leads either the river to be left 'free', or to be exploited by building atomic energy's constructions. Kvaløy points out that the running water in the landscape gives the complete image of wholeness, which is used as an example in the life necessity society in contrast to the concession picture that is focused on quantifying the landscape by planning (Ibid: 80).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Kvaløy contributes to the tendency established by Zapffe, namely, to reconsidering the priority of industrial development as grounded in the idea of technologically supported practice of competition. The idea of competition has much to do with the expertise of so-called by him and Næss generalists and specialists.

According to Næss, there are two types of generalists: those who have an orientation in all fields and those ones who have a good competence in two fields respectively (Næss 1973: 210). The specialization should be restricted on the level of local communities, where ecologically responsible politics is of crucial importance in judging which technologies should be changed or how to set knowledgably specified technologies in life (Ibid: 105). Restricting specialization, however, is not concerned with increasing the lack of competence, but with the process of centralization. That is why it is the uniqueness of competence rather than the role of expertise that matters.

An additional methodological challenge is brought to light by the fact that research and science are a part of our economic/social growth's system, as Kvaløy argues (Kvaløy 1976: 120), so that they inevitably depend on the objectives stated by the industrial development as well as on the conditions for their fulfillment. In this context, the specialization turns out to be grounded in the project of centralization of knowledge. Furthermore, the decentralization in question, which provides the decentralization of politics, should counter the authorization of both knowledge and politics.

In turn, Kvaløy's conception of the ecophilosopher as a super amateur (Kvaløy 2001: 747) due to which amateur does not mean that he/she is incompetent, but rather that his/her knowledge is irreducible to a narrowed competence and thus may see the things in their wholeness, benefits the understanding that integrity is not the same as harmonization. Otherwise, we should put in question the dialectical character of nature itself, i.e. of what Kvaløy calls the total ecoperspective as such.

According to Kvaløy, the super amateur is a specially oriented and "articulated everyday philosopher" (Kvaløy 1974b: 66). In this context, one is defined as a "searching amateur" who is supposed to make relevant decisions against the background of the contradiction between the city and countryside environment (Ibid). On the other hand, the possibility of justifying the role of ecophilosophy as intrinsically connected to the one of ecopolitics becomes possible due to the impact of ecology, which strives for understanding the complicated common play within the units (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, it means that ecology contributes to providing the generalists with a thinking tool (tankeredskap), i.e. with a "key for understanding" (forståelsesnøkkel), which helps them to be trained as super-amateurs (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that it is the rehabilitated role of human ecology that makes the ecophilosophical competence be irreducible to an expertise knowledge and thus to affect building a relevant ecologically sustainable politics⁴⁸⁸. The competence in question has understanding as its necessary condition for justifying the need of moral and political commitment⁴⁸⁹. Thus the super-amateur can be defined as a super-generalist due to the fact that he/she not only aims to elaborate the ecological knowledge as crucial for building the political decision-making process, but also how this knowledge can fully benefit experiencing all the aspects of the situation we live in, i.e. of the living situation as a mode of becoming. The latter, which, according to Kvaløy, is a key element of estab-

⁴⁸⁸ Kvaløy argues that environmental politics should rely on the wide-ranging attempt to have the view, empathy and co-experience provided by the ecophilosophy (Ibid: 75).

⁴⁸⁹ This commitment is recognized by Kvaløy as a total engagement, which concerns the different types of experience in the interplay with nature being irreducible to the knowledge, which is provided by one given discipline (Ibid: 75). In other words, it is an engagement grounded in the normative validity of the embodied understanding in different contexts, where every context is an interplay of different living situations.

lishing the life necessity society, is determined as “understanding and empathy (innlevelse) in a situation” (Ibid: 71).

The concrete implications of the role of the super amateur, who is defined as an “ecological super-amateur” (Ibid: 76), concern his/her ability to constantly mediate between speculations and reality as well as between theory and practice (Ibid). Regarding ecophilosophy, which should function as ecopolitics, the human and human society should be the centre of attention; the latter is a matter of adopting a total ecological perspective in so far as it recognizes man as “an integral (but not harmonic) part of the ecosystem” (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the aforementioned dialectical balance, which is irreducible to reaching harmonization (taking into account that harmonization and balance are not one and the same in the biosphere), becomes a prototype characteristic of the super amateur’s expertise.

Analyzing Kvaløy’s implicit ontological ethics, we can see that one of the main problems concerns the complex society as well as why it misses an ethical objective in human understanding (Kvaløy 1978: 208). In this context, the lost surplus of meaning is recognized as a lost moral understanding, which in turn leads to the incapability of moral learning.

Maybe one of the most significant consequences of the overexposed faith in technologies is that natural imbalance becomes recognizable as a technocratic balance, which diverts the whole idea of normative validity since the idea of accelerated tempo turns into the most significant representation of time. The aforementioned changes imply the need of justifying the principle of compensation at the expense of the one of correlation, i.e. the irrigations of culture and outdoor life’s offers, imposed with the help of apparatus and electronics, should compensate the broken social connections (Ibid: 209). In this context, I claim that Kvaløy’s appeal for rehabilitating the assumptions for a meaningful life embodied in a living democracy is a strive for rehabilitating the idea of necessity within ethics. It has an initial unquestionable value since it derives from life as such. Last but not least, the necessity should contribute to building a complex society functioning as a life necessity one.

Næss himself is also not indifferent to these problems emphasizing the role of so-called soft research of future (“myk fremtidsforskning”)⁴⁹⁰ based on milder prognostics and a better clarification of opportunities (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 53). Such a research would contribute to building an ecologically responsible politics in the current century, which requires an exponential growth of technological knowledge and inventive spirit looking for new directions to be developed (Ibid). On a micro methodological level, it means that the expertise concerns the combination of economic growth and the maintenance of a sound environment, which raises the awareness of some advanced manipulative technologies (Ibid: 202). In this context, Næss argues that the experts in general should feel that they have an insufficient competence beyond the scope of their own expertise (Ibid: 305).

What is the role of generalists and specialists in this area? Kvaløy argues that generalists are such specialists who should be better equipped in an open debate with big economic and big bureaucratic specialists (Kvaløy 1976: 114). His appeal for the need of educating generalists concerns mobilizing these ones who suffer most directly from the crisis into new alliances for political action⁴⁹¹ (Ibid: 153).

In this context, the role of generalists can be defined in line with what Tranøy recognizes as a great challenge, namely, the challenge of environmental crisis to the society of researchers, and last but not least, to the philosophers in particular (Tranøy 1991: 46). It is the critical attitude that is emphasized by both Tranøy and Kvaløy to the extent it questions taking for granted the new knowledge as the best one. Regardless of the fact that Tranøy does not provide a distinction between generalists and specialists, his conception of the role of the scientist is similar to the one of generalists in Kvaløy’s sense. According to Tranøy, it is scientist’s responsibility that contributes to maintaining a critical position also to this, which we consider as our best heritage (Ibid), i.e. to search for knowledge that is most necessary for attacking the environmental crisis in practice (Ibid: 49).

⁴⁹⁰ Disenchanted the complex relationships between competence and expertise contributes to revealing the ones between prognostics and life’s possibilities going beyond the statistical calculations. The latter is an objective that is justified by Næss’s ‘soft research’, which strives for making the ideal of ecological sustainability fulfillable nowadays.

⁴⁹¹ Kvaløy’s statement advocates what Tranøy identifies as an origin of the environmental crisis, namely, that it derives as a product of the Western knowledge and its technological offspring (Tranøy 1991: 46).

In turn, the aforementioned changes concern the need of justifying new expert knowledge, which to be both recognized and regulated as following nature's dynamics by grounding the one of life necessity society beyond the paradigm of objective naturalism. On a macro methodological level, referring to the latter would mean to support a radical biocentrism, which would lead to as serious consequences as the ones provoked by anthropocentrism.

According to Kvaløy, here comes the role of generalist, namely, of a certain type of super-amateur (Kvaløy 1976: 1). The latter is supposed to provide one issue along some lines of development, which cannot be implemented by the specialists. The new type of expertise also concerns the justification of the political life because democracy is examined as irreducible to obtaining a given expertise alone (Ibid). The super amateur's expertise is a new type of holist expertise, which should affect both society and the "life system's health",⁴⁹² (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that the super amateur's expertise in Kvaløy's sense is the one adopted in democracy because it is built on the idea of pluralism of vital needs. Furthermore, super amateur's expertise is based on life necessity society's vital needs proposed as an ideal in so far as it takes as a premise the genuine experience of different situations, determining what vital needs are and how they should be fulfilled respectively.

Referring to Kvaløy's understanding of ecophilosophy as a practical philosophy, it becomes clear why the super amateur is determined as a day-life philosopher, i.e. as one who can understand the normative validity of the day-life experience (Ibid: 2). His/her competence, which is justified as a special type of expertise, can be defined as concerned with experiential understanding. The latter is grounded in the modern scientific ecology, which is called by Kvaløy an attempt at "experienced understanding" of the most specific concepts of the ecology in question (Ibid: 23). However, I choose the concept of experiential understanding because it emphasizes the normative validity of the process character of experiencing.

The new type of competence concerns the opportunity of avoiding artificial elaborations of individual contacts with both nature and society since they hinder the possibility of realizing complex fellowship relationships. That is why Kvaløy outlines the role of non-academic language adopted by the

⁴⁹² Kvaløy argues that its prototype characteristic is so-called branching vision (forgrenende innsikt) that is missed by the specialists (Ibid).

generalists, who have to relate their insights to everyday life (Ibid). It is the role of natural language that does not operate with 'naturalisms' becoming language of time (Kvaløy 2014: 36). It is a result of justifying a new type of expertise, which is not focused on elaboration for the sake of achieving perfection, but rather on rehabilitating the role of imperfection as preserving nature's dynamics in its complexity.

According to Kvaløy, the role of language of time (as a natural one) questions how the abstract epistemological time has forgotten time itself (Ibid). On the other hand, we should keep in mind that from that it does not follow that natural to epistemological languages refers as concrete to abstract. Natural is irreducible to the concrete as such because it includes the 'natural' logic (the pace of life's development) in which new is always (in its potentiality) irreducible to the being itself. On the other hand, natural as a structuring mode would lose its structural character if we define that wholeness (especially if we talk about ecosystems) consists of a given sum of concrete beings/meanings alone. Such a simplification would problematize the interconnectedness between the ecosystems denying the possibility to reveal the biosphere as a net in Næss's sense.

4.2.1. The Know-How of Ecology

As I already mentioned, Norwegian ecophilosophies are closely tied with relying on a given type of knowledge about different scopes such as ecology, social economy, social anthropology etc. These disciplines contribute to contextualizing the aforementioned philosophies as well as to clarifying how they can bring social and political changes proposing relevant ecopolitics.

On the other hand, Kvaløy argues that it is possible for one to orient one's reality in tune with the entropy theories, with the help of soft technologies and thus to control time's process instead of fighting against it.

Regarding ecology, one of the biggest methodological problems concerns the normative validity of fragmentarization⁴⁹³ and how it could be contextualized respectively. According to Kvaløy, cybernetic/structural anthropology's main problem is that it cannot avoid the application of a certain degree of fragmentarization to the study objects (Kvaløy 2004: 2640). The point is to reveal the atomist foundation as a matter of a stable theoretical argument. Furthermore, it should forward a way of thinking due to which one's different reactions always to be explained by each other on all levels as well as from the perspective of the social structure they function in (Ibid). There would be no factors, boundaries or levels, which can be considered as grounding ones (Ibid: 2670). Furthermore, personal diversity would be developed as something constructive and enlightening. Thus the potential for freedom would be explored in a ground-breaking sense (Ibid).

These investigations make me argue that natural fragmentarization leads to questioning the normative validity of freedom, which can be rehabilitated by adopting process philosophy. Otherwise, natural development would be misinterpreted by simplifying its dynamics via reducing it to a sum of conflicts, which, on a macro methodological level, would lead to reading Kvaløy's statement that we are born of a conflict in a purely literal sense.

⁴⁹³ This conception was also outlined by the representatives of *snm* saying that ecology's meaning lays in the new perspective that introduces a total understanding of the assumption of having a life on the Earth (*snm* 1974: 11). Such holism is in contrast to the fragmentarization, which is implied by the modern politics and science. In this context, the Western technological development presumes, last but not least (*skyldes ikke minst*), that one should isolate casual connections and lawfulness in nature (Ibid). Furthermore, what we experience today is a backlash in the form of catastrophes (Ibid).

Kvaløy argues that human ecology is crucial for recognizing the need of adopting ecophilosophy, namely, how a part of bio-ecology's thinking mode can be applied to understanding the changes in our society (Kvaløy 1976: 7). In turn, the latter reveal what is considered as risks of complication since the exploitation of nature negatively affects the society people live in. As I already outlined, for both Næss and Kvaløy, ecology is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying the role of ecophilosophy as a certain type of metaecology because ecology merely provides the direction of some possible normative changes in ecopolitics. In other words, it shows why relevant ecopolitics should be focused on legitimizing the intrinsic value of nature as such, but it does not presume the prevention of the destructive ecopolitical practices in the long run. On a macro methodological level, it means that justifying ecopolitics as concerning the better understanding of environment is possible only if it is mediated by defining a relevant ecophilosophy, which has normative validity. This thesis is shared by both Næss and Kvaløy since they refer to the normative validity of ecophilosophy as a premise for questioning anthropocentrism for the sake of imposing biocentrism.

An illustration of the necessary but not sufficient role of ecology for ecopolitics can be found in Kvaløy's statement that ecology deals with the diversity of forms and working modes, which constitute life's society (Ibid: 8). Man himself/herself is examined as a product of Earth's enormous long-lasting development of life's diversity recognized as dependent on the fact that complicated life's pattern continues to be complicated (Ibid). Since this tracery of life's forms and cooperation advices look very complicated, it is important for man to have an overview of what happens to one intervention⁴⁹⁴ (Ibid).

According to Jakobsen, the problem with Kvaløy's and Næss's ecophilosophies is their 'closeness' to biology and ecology. They have not elaborated an in-depth analysis of the distinction between the transitive and the intransitive dimensions (Jakobsen 2011: 195); i.e. between 'being as a process and change', and 'being as a part of wholeness' (Ibid). However, we can keep discussing whether so-called 'being as a part of wholeness' is an intransitive dimension since 'being' a part of nature' is not being, but becoming, which entails implicit ontological connotations. In this context, I reach the conclusion that 'being as a process and change' is a crucial condition for justifying the being as a part of

⁴⁹⁴ Regarding the reconsideration of knowledge in Kvaløy's sense, I argue that adopting human ecology contributes to raising the awareness of the ontological need of specifying the relations between complexity and complication as well as the boundaries of our own sense of belonging.

wholeness, illustrating that the transitive dimension is a necessary condition for recognizing the intransitive one.

Furthermore, building Norwegian ecophilosophies is conceptualized by Jakobsen as a matter of reductionism in a different sense. That is why we should talk about ecologism rather than physicalism (Ibid: 180). Jakobsen's thesis benefits revealing the normative validity of sciences for the purposes of justifying the potential of ecophilosophies. This type of non-traditional reductionism is based on the Norwegian ecophilosophies' way of recognizing ecology as "an ontological model for environmental philosophy" (Ibid: 184). In turn, Kvaløy's ecophilosophy is defined as a philosophy of ecological sciences since the concept of complexity is interpreted as having its origin in ecology by contrast to the one of the physicalism of complication (Ibid). Another methodological benefit of adopting Jakobsen's theory is that it stresses the role of philosophy in turning ecology into a prerequisite for determining relevant ecopolitics. What Jakobsen calls 'to formulate an ecophilosophical approach with relevance to ecopolitics' (Ibid), illustrated by Kvaløy's conception of the equilibrium state in which no form of being is able to develop itself at the cost of the others, shows where to search for a model of the steady state society. The direct implementation of ecology would be a form of classical reductionism, but taking into account that this reductionism is interpreted as an ontological model, ecologism as such may be determined as a model, which to be mediated by ecophilosophy for the purposes of gaining normative validity.

In this context, Jakobsen makes one more relevant specification, namely, that no one knows what metaphysical or ontological views of nature, humans and society can be derived from ecology as well as whether such ecologism may turn out to be "too simple" (Ibid: 185). Talking about ontological dependence would lead us either to a form of determinism, or to one of relativism because, as he claims, there are no unquestionable reasons for outlining objective forms of dependence between ecology and society. That is why I argue that instead of an ontological model, we may talk about ontological ethics, which to be considered as a paradigm in evaluating the normative validity of horizontal relatedness on the level of ecology, ecophilosophy and ecopolitics. Theoretically speaking, it means that we can analyze Kvaløy's theory by referring to the normative validity of equilibrium in nature as a model of evaluating the one of the equilibrium in society. It is the idea of normative validity that contributes to avoiding physicalism, or what I called moral naturalism, while comparing both models in the search for finding similarities. Thus we can avoid reducing the process of explanation to the one of the direct 'borrowings'.

Jakobsen outlines that Næss believes that ecology can provide us with a model for thinking “about the deep philosophical questions that need to be addressed” (Ibid)⁴⁹⁵. It shows us how to justify the decentralization on social level without questioning the status of local communities. He also claims that human ecology represents the cultural variations coupled with the ones of environment⁴⁹⁶ (Næss 1990: 242). Last but not least, Næss suggests that the study field of human ecology is the deep ecology movement, which clarifies its own aims by referring to the researchers’ results in the scope of ecology. Thus studying ecosystems makes us aware of our own ignorance (Ibid: 38).

Diversity of the ecosystems has objective groundings, which gives us reasons to adopt the mode of speaking by analogy, when we face diversity in society. It is the cultural diversity, benefiting the recognition of the process of decentralization in the field of ecopolitics that contributes (by analogy with natural diversity) first, to discerning politics from ideology, which is embodied in different utopian scenarios and, second, to talking about different ecopolitics rather than ecopolitics with a capital letter. On a macro methodological level, it means that extrapolating the idea of nature’s diversity has an influence upon recognizing the premises of an environmentally friendly social and political change. It clarifies how to question monoculture as an artificial form of centralization as well as to restrict the use of hard technologies at the expense of the soft ones.

Against the background of Næss’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions concerning the role of ecology for ecophilosophy, I agree with Høyer’s statement that Norwegian ecophilosophy should be understood as a philosophy of involvement (Høyer 2011: 63). It is the presumption based on human ecology that provides a relevant grounding for the reconceptualization of the biological interactions in the public discourse, which are recognized as inflicting mutual engagement.

⁴⁹⁵ According to Næss, ecology is the one that has taught us to respect the big common play in the biosphere (Næss 1973: 17).

⁴⁹⁶ That is why the green politics should take into consideration the risks raised by the technological monoculture because most utopias ignore the need of cultural diversity.

4.2.2. How Much Democracy Do We Need to Overcome the Ecocatastrophe?

According to Kvaløy, industrial development society would hardly tolerate a food-production society next to itself, especially in a long-term perspective. On the other hand, Earth's life system would not tolerate another total industrial development in a short period (Kvaløy 1976: 73). In this context, I argue that environmental crisis is provoked by implying different normative validity to both short and long term perspectives. They are determined as non-interacting and thus as mutually exclusive, which raises the tension between the two societal models built on them, namely, between life necessity society and industrial development one. Otherwise, the role of so-called continuously improvising person in the society would be lost in so far as improvisation is defined as a key resource in human mastering of the myriads of challenges that withdraw from quantification (Kvaløy 2004: 4000).

In turn, the recognition of democracy due to the principles of ecology is also discussed by the representatives of snm, who argue in favor of ecological reasons in building democracy (snm 1974: 92). This contradictory, at first sight, statement has its roots in the justification of the general system thinking. The topic is of special interest for snm since 1969, when the representatives of the movement started arguing that the general ecological system's modes can be used for the purposes of human society (Ibid). In other words, providing such a comparison can contribute to finding a new beginning in reconsidering the equilibrium and permanent life's strength (varige livsstyrke) as dependent on the practically functioning democracy (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, it means that it is the system thinking that makes human ecology comparable with a certain kind of sciences regarding the development of society in so far as the mechanisms guiding the functioning of the ecosystems are similar, in the sense of being based on common principles, to the ones regulating the societal mechanisms. On a micro methodological level, I argue that the development of human society, when it meets the requirements of what Kvaløy calls life necessity society, functions as an ecosystem. The crossing points can be found in justifying the equilibrium since the society in question is grounded in satisfying the vital needs and interests of its participants, which are 'natural' but not in the sense of being objective by nature. Furthermore, equilibrium in a given society is dependent on the functioning of democracy, but not in the sense that the equilibrium in question *is* a matter of democracy. In the biosphere, the equilibrium aims at satisfying the vital needs and interests, which are recog-

nized as significant issues with an unquestionable normative validity both for human beings and other species, albeit in a different way regarding the specificities of their own nature. Therefore, we can think about the functioning of the ecosystems and society by analogy, which in turn is irreducible to simply transferring the characteristics of the ecosystem to the ones of society. The analogy could be recognized as searching for similarities on system level rather than outlining factual coincidences, which would bring us back to the paradigm of moral objectivism.

In turn, the representatives of snm examine the problem of environmental protection as based on the common work by emphasizing the role of decentralization (Ibid: 69). According to them, the only one thing, which guarantees the permanent equilibrium and the strength for survival is the own control of the system based on geological and human delimitations that make them claim that “We should also deal with a new ecological grounding of democracy” (Ibid).

Such a statement, however, requires special attention while exploring how relying on the aforementioned delimitations, we can reach the conclusion that democracy is ‘dependent’ on ecology as well as in what sense. In this context, I argue that we should take into account the different way of implying the criterion of decentralization to nature and society. In both cases the own control of the system presumes a certain type of decentralization, while in human societies, the decentralization is a matter of rationalized procedures, which are based again on the mutual delegation of rights and duties. On the other hand, the similarity is that in both cases the decentralization is irreducible to annihilation of the system control because it rather contributes to the process of development itself.

According to Kvaløy, a certain big society should be free willingly and collectively built of many small, with a huge self-reliance, societies (Ibid: 92). In turn, the collective building should be organized so that even the smallest societal units to be benefited of this in their strive for a balanced life, presuming that each of them should have a connection with its own distinctive character (Ibid). Furthermore, all these small units should be “naturally” limited: due to their functional competence, they have been developed in the long-lasting process of a close common work; a work of solving common survival and life problems, which are different for each and every environment (Ibid).

On the other hand, the concrete implications of the system thinking concern the normative dependence of ‘big’ on ‘small’ and vice versa, as being both ontologically and normatively interrelated, because the normative related-

ness clarifies how the gist of the equilibrium should be interpreted. The aforementioned interrelatedness does not put in question the independence of the given links of the chain in so far as it is a necessary condition for having a 'bigger' living organism (both in terms of its natural and social) functioning. Furthermore, there is also a difference that makes us talk about natural equilibrium and democracy adopting the mode of analogy. I draw the conclusion that if the development of the equilibrium in nature is determined due to the principles of evolution projected into the common work, in democracy, the common work is a matter of a deliberate delegation of rights and duties in respect with the recognition of a common moral and political engagement. Regardless of the fact that the small societal units are 'limited' to the 'natural' abilities of developing a competence for a common work, the latter concerns solving the common life problems, like in the case with other species. However, it also includes the element of expertise, which is typical merely for human beings in so far as they can be moral and political agents and discussants.

Regarding the first members of the 'natural' small societies, they know themselves, as well as their own close conditions better than the people from 'outside' since the old, small local societies have a diverse "root" to grow from (Ibid). In this context, we can elaborate the aforementioned distinction again: i.e. in the small, human societies the better recognition is based not only on being a part of the traditions, but also on being aware of the function and the role of the traditions in question. This reflection is not typical for the other species by default.

For Kvaløy, democracy is examined as achieved by the efforts of the generalists as super amateurs who had not only expertise, but also competence to couple politics with ethics. Thus they develop meta-competence, which can make democracy a subject to a system thinking analysis, albeit it is irreducible to the idea of ecological equilibrium. According to him, democracy means an amateur power (*amatørvelde*) (Kvaløy 1974a: 5), which concerns knowing something about many things (Ibid). If we have a technocracy instead of democracy, the specialist can avoid the worst contaminations (Ibid). The solutions would be found by relying on technologization and a total administration of the global environment (Ibid). When this day comes, the whole nature would function at the technological man's cost. Thus all normative advices would be incorporated in the gigantic supply machine, which is needed in the big cities (Ibid). Furthermore, there would be only one culture: the Western one as well as specialists who to control the world since the whole responsibility would be placed on the technicians' arms (Ibid). In turn, the global technocratization would support itself with the

myth of the need of a standardized production, which would lead to the replacement of man with the mass man (Ibid: 6).

On a macro methodological level, it means that the centralized administrative function becomes more and more ‘foreign to the system’ being non-functional in respect with the small systems. Kvaløy defines the climax of this development as a dictatorship. However, the “system’s own form” of control could lead to establishing a completely decentralized system. Survival strength of the societies increases in these decentralized areas because they have a capacity to temporarily unite with bigger, free collaborative entities, when they are threatened by a common enemy (snm 1974: 92). In turn, the bigger entities are immediately dissolved when the external threat is eliminated and do not create permanent “over-national” (overnasjonale) administrative organs⁴⁹⁷.

On a macro methodological level, Kvaløy emphasizes again the internal connections between the system thinking mode and the democratic type of decentralization, which is irreducible to the annihilation and the lack of responsibilities and duties. In this sense, dictatorship is justified as politically irrelevant to the extent that it is ‘foreign’ to the system thinking mode and functioning. In turn, democracy is recognized as the best system supporting bioregionalism on the global scene. In this context, the over-national formation can be defined as closer to the dictatorship rather than to a democratic order because it is built on the permanent incorporation of the small units that are deprived of the possibility to follow their own logic of development.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that in Kvaløy’s writings, the recognition of system thinking mode in democracy comes on a new level, namely, it reveals why system’s mode is ‘better’ for both people and nature while incorporated into a political system. The generalists are the ones whose competence is irreducible to expertise, albeit the latter is a necessary condition for having such a competence. However, it is the lack of full overlapping between competence and expertise, between experiential knowledge and expert knowledge that makes the administration of global environment something more than an administrative task, being rather a form of both political and moral commitment. On a macro methodological

⁴⁹⁷ According to Kvaløy, “We have a democracy in a pure form”, where the growth is grounded in system’s own control (Ibid).

level, democracy is recognized as a political system⁴⁹⁸, which can counter the invasion of Servoglobe in all spheres of human life.

The connection between real democracy and environmental protection is an important object of investigation since Kvaløy argues that the connection in question is mediated by the relevant realization of life necessity society. On a practical level, such a realization is interpreted as a matter of complexity's disposition (Kvaløy 1976: 37). Democracy is defined as encouraging the projection of different alternatives, which the members of society to choose as well as to give concrete meaning to the choices they make (Ibid). Kvaløy himself specifies that choosing contradicts the process of standardization supported by the complication's cells and 'cancer-development', which in turn stops the mechanism of process development (Ibid).

Reconsidering these statements, I argue that one of the crossing points between natural and political pluralism derives from the normative validity of the intrinsic value of meaning, namely, life as such to be regulated by its internal meaningfulness, which, due to the specificities of the different life's forms, gains its embodiments in different meanings that not necessarily contradict. It is the premise of meaningfulness provoking every single meaning to get its relevant embodiment that may contradict the rest only in terms of content, but not normatively. Regarding politics, democracy is the one that guarantees pluralism of choices to be normatively refrained in a non-contradicting way and thus to avoid the simplification to political speculations and accusations of relativism.

According to Kvaløy, there is a clear relation between environmental protection and work for democracy (Ibid: 38). The latter is examined again on the level of expertise in so far as it is researchers' responsibility to outline the methodological dependence of political pluralism on pluralism in knowledge. That is why he argues that democratic-critical tradition should remain independent for the sake of strengthening future research (Ibid: 101), presuming the common work of sciences such as social anthropology,

⁴⁹⁸ Naess emphasizes the political benefits of adopting democracy by expanding the concept of "democracy in the biosphere" (Hansen 1974: 13). He claims that ecosophy contributes to establishing a classless society within the biosphere – "a democracy, in which everybody can talk about justice not only in respect with men" (Ibid). This conception is justified against the background of the principle that everything hangs together and we are only fragments, with limited capabilities, in this area (Ibid). However, defining democracy's problems as biospherical ones leads to underrating the particularly political implications of these problems, namely, that people are not only fragments, but also responsible moral and political agents who can take care of both themselves and environment as such.

ethnography etc. to be taken into account. The aim of the aforementioned sciences is to contribute to questioning the Western colonial power while striving for reducing cultural diversity (Ibid: 100).

On a macro methodological level, it would mean that pluralism in culture and politics should be derived from nature's one without equating it with a certain kind of objective naturalism. In turn, it would mean that cultural pluralism mediates nature's diversity and politics' one so that multi-cultural societies such as life necessity societies to embody democracy in the best possible way. On the other hand, diversity of nature is represented on a cultural level as a plurality of cultures driven by the plurality of ecosystems. At that stage, the differences, even when they contradict each other, are not examined as initially contradicting due to the principle of total exclusion. This principle is extrapolated also on the level of politics as political pluralism in so far as the plurality of political choices is determined as a guarantee of the implication of a relevant ecopolitics based on the process of harmonization rather than the one of static harmony.

Thus the lack of democracy would question the type of personality that would be encouraged in society, namely, so-called multisided person to confront the pyramidal one in Kvaløy's sense for whom the climax of freedom is to be effectively integrated in a hierarchically organized society, as I showed in the chapter on freedom.

In this context, Kvaløy discusses three types of personality, namely, unitary personality (Enhetlig personlighet), integrated or multisided personality (Integrert, flerdelt personlighet) and fragmented personality (Fragmentert personlighet) (Kvaløy 2004: 2477). Referring to the definitions in question, I argue that the fragmented personality cannot be supported by the democratic regime, which in turn means that fragmented person would best realize himself/herself in a centralized society of a pyramidal type. A proof of this thesis can be found in Kvaløy's statement that having big pyramidal societies is possible as a result of societal perfection only if it is grounded in gathering "small (persons') pyramids" (Ibid: 2762). By contrast to the pyramidal society, he describes the one of multisided people whose most illuminative embodiment, is Sherpa society⁴⁹⁹ (Ibid: 2478), where the sense of

⁴⁹⁹ Sherpa society is recognized as an ideal society in so far as it is grounded in the idea of meaningful life, which in turn presumes a meaningful growth to be realized. The role of democracy concerns the retrieval of ecological balance (Kvaløy 1976: 143), which is undermined today due to the mass production of thinking machines that pretend to control the whole decision-making process.

freedom does not derive from any centralization whatsoever supported by machine dependence.

The preservation of the strive for freedom itself as well as its normative validity stem from so-called natural dependence of the ecosystems, which, due to its normative validity, questions the attempts at hierarchization in so far as the aforementioned natural dependence of the systems is irreducible to any hierarchy whatsoever (Kvaløy 1976: 139). As Kvaløy argues, it takes place due to the fact that life's forms do not constitute a pyramid but rather a circle⁵⁰⁰ (Ibid: 10).

⁵⁰⁰ On a macro methodological level, the idea of this double bind vision of centralization is developed due to the restrictions of so-called Holon theory. However, I argue that the theory of decentralization and democracy-holon conceptions hide the risks the second type of multi-sided person to be replaced with the fragmented person, which explains why Kvaløy gives preference to elasticity over Koestler's holarchy model (Kvaløy 2004: 2520).

4.2.2.1. *'We Are All in the Same Boat!'*

Extrapolating Næss's argument that "We are all in one and the same boat" (Næss 1973: 216), I argue that accepting this statement could raise the risk of neglecting the role of solidarity if it is left without clarification. Næss's association with the boat sets forth values and norms, which, however, may lead either oneself to cling tight to the boat, or to leave oneself to be taken by the stream⁵⁰¹.

In this context, I claim that Kvaløy's interpretation can be described as focused on the purely political implications of being in one and the same boat with others as well as on what it means to be carried away by the stream⁵⁰² (Kvaløy 2014: 139). The latter may be recognized as a strong and devastating whirlpool, which to turn the boat down if the balance and the dynamics of the stream for itself and the one in itself are not taken into consideration. The need of a new boat is outlined because it should better tolerate strokes and thus to give possibilities for the downstream (Ibid: 149).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I emphasize that revealing the aforementioned genealogy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for building relevant ecopolitics since it does not benefit disenchanting the problem of normative validity. In other words, it would mean that changing the mode of speaking does not have the power to inflict social and political changes alone. Thus it could easily become a part of the propaganda talk. That is why I draw the conclusion that we would rather say that the boat is one and the same, but we stay on different decks. In this context, so-called by Kvaløy new colonialism can be defined as a result of ascribing the normative validity of the 'instead of' mode to a different boat, i.e. to a different reality arguing that it is different because of its different social, economic and cultural potential.

Otherwise, neglecting the specificities of the boat, it would mean to disguise the fact that the differences themselves are constructed from our perspective of differentiation since we are always on side of homogeneity. The problems regarding the contradictory justification of the aforementioned new co-

⁵⁰¹ Galtung describes in detail how the inequality in question stems from economic, social and ecological polarizations, which derive from the ideology of centralized power. The latter is justified by authoritarian experts who approve the increasing implementation of the hard technologies.

⁵⁰² According to Kvaløy, to set up values and norms is considered as clinging to a boat carried away by the stream and then as a matter of discussing alternative movements against the stream (Ibid).

lonialism come from the forgotten fact that we can keep being in one and the same boat preserving the prototype characteristics that make us 'we-they'. Furthermore, it means to keep talking about togetherness. 'We' and 'they' make togetherness possible because 'they' keep what makes them 'we', respecting the principle that 'they' for 'us' is always like 'we' for 'them'.

4.3. The Role of Ecophilosophy for the EU Debates

Since one of the main functions of ecophilosophy in Kvaløy's sense is to provide unquestionable reasons for triggering changes in ecopolitics when necessary, it is not surprising that he looks for potential solutions to the environmental crisis by outlining what the place of Norway in the global picture is. In this context, ecophilosophy is recognized as a necessary means for overcoming the crisis in question since the construction mistake of civilization is spotted yet by Zapffe and Rolf Edberg (Kvaløy 2014: 32). The practical implications of the problem become apparent when the development is no longer under control (Kvaløy 1976: 7). Furthermore, Kvaløy defines the lack of controllability as affecting not only nature, but also life as such in so far as all the ecosystems in the biosphere are intrinsically connected. Thus the environmental crisis is justified as simplifying life's systems: in order to better understand the crisis, we should better understand ourselves and our own situation (Ibid: 8, 96).

On a macro methodological level, the negative consequences can be explored from two perspectives, namely, from the one of man's self-realization and from the perspective of life as harmonizing the net of ecosystems by determining their initial value, which is questioned by specifying the concept of growth in economic terms⁵⁰³. Kvaløy himself defines the crisis as life's fight (Ibid: 21), which does not have to be literally understood in so far as it also presumes a fight for grasping life's meaning as such. According to him, one of the main consequences of the crisis affects man's intense experimenting with both his own psyche and society (Kvaløy 2004: 1650). However, when experimenting turns into an aim in itself, it simplifies its own dialectical character by reducing its mechanisms to a set of 'successful' experiments. Then, as Kvaløy claims, one does not need much fantasy in order to understand why "Live better electrically" becomes something more than just an advertisement (Ibid: 1770).

Against the background of these investigations, he recognizes ecophilosophy as specifically 'Norwegian' because it is a combination of a unique "work-in-nature" romantic and the efforts of the Norwegian working movement, which, according to him, is also unique, since it was only partly

⁵⁰³ Kvaløy argues that there are growth's mechanisms, which simplify the ecosystems for no reason (Kvaløy 2014: 12).

involved in the industrial proletariat (Kvaløy 2014: 32). In its other part, the working movement is described as established by the community of small Norwegian producers such as highland farmers, fishermen who have been building their own boats etc. (Ibid).

Judging by Kvaløy's investigations, I argue that Norwegian society's romantic, which promotes a unique work production, can be interpreted as justified by introducing a unique idea of meaningfulness of being and becoming embodied in the vision of what a cultivated place is. In turn, romantic concerns the recognition of social and cultural groundings of life's necessities, which are recognized by revealing the concrete aspects of what a meaningful work is. That is why I draw the conclusion that it is the normative validity of the contextualized romantic that becomes a necessary condition for supporting bioregionalism on the level of politics.

4.3.1. When Does Nature Say ‘No’? Ethical Dilemmas in the Ecopolitical Projects Pros and Cons the Potential Accession of Norway to the EU

The debates about the increasing technological invasion took place against the background of two fundamental events of the Norwegian history, namely, the two referendums of the potential accession of Norway to the European Union conducted in 1972 and 1994. The situation was also escalated with the statement of the Norwegian Prime Minister at that time, Bratteli who said that he will resign if people vote ‘no’ to the EU, which he later did. In the summer of 1972, Næss and a group of people wrote an open letter to Bratteli about the consequences of Norway’s accession to the EU explaining why Norway could contribute to building an ecologically sound course for Europe’s future if people vote ‘no’. As Næss and Haukeland argue, both sides were mobilized, and the supporters of the ‘no’ movement reached 110 000 people⁵⁰⁴.

What are the practical implications of these debates? The negative attitudes inflicted by the discussions about Norway’s accession to the EU were grounded in the view that the increasing transfer of goods as well as the uncontrollable flow of people would lead to irreversible consequences, namely, that ecological unsustainability would become the *status quo*, which in turn would affect the equilibrium of the biosphere. Both Næss and Kvaløy share arguments that raise concerns about to what extent environmental preservation should be defined as a goal in itself if the inseparability of ecological problems from those of poverty and justice is taken into account. However, Næss and Kvaløy adopt different philosophical, ecological and economic arguments since they do not similarly evaluate the role of ethics in solving ecopolitical problems, as I already outlined in the chapter on Næss.

Against the background of these investigations, the representatives of snm defined the EU as a system of a catastrophic course (snm 1974: 90) because the eco-catastrophe is recognized as increasing overexertion (stigende overbelastning) on the people by introducing a stable, more technologized and distant way of directing (Ibid). The latter is imposed on the average people

⁵⁰⁴ As a result of expressing his main concerns about the future of ecological sustainability in the long run, in 1973 Næss published his well-known article about deep ecology and shallow ecology movements (Næss and Haukeland 2008c: 49).

with an accelerating extermination of the small societies, which people and nature have built in the 1000-year interaction (Ibid). The representatives of snm emphasized that regardless of the fact that people are aware of the ecological catastrophe, they are not aware, among the other things, of the human ecological crisis (humanøkologiske krise) because these people do not have objections against what they wish, i.e. against appealing for more technology and experts (Ibid). In turn, human ecology means that there is one almost postponed collapse, which will encompass everything, when it comes (Ibid). That is why a decentralized society in the EU will, sooner or later, force itself to become acceptable, but not before a period of violent revolutions and chaos is overcome (Ibid). In this context, the representatives of snm formulated the main point in the debate about the EU, as follows: Why would not Norway contribute to one less painful replacing system by going against the incorporation into the catastrophe system, which has the label (merkelappen) EU? (Ibid).

The discussions regarding the referendums raised scientific arguments pros and cons, which were represented on the pages of the Norwegian *Vett* series⁵⁰⁵. Sigmund Kvaløy claims that when his book *Nature's No: On the EU, Free Trade and Ecological Chaos (Naturens nei: om EU, frihandel og økologisk kaos)* was published in 1994, it was focused on revealing how environmental problems are proportional to the expanding free trade process, namely, to the fear of reconsidering to what extent the latter is responsible for the growing number of transmitted diseases and dangerous organisms (Kvaløy 2006: 4). His solution was to restrict the free flow of people and goods encouraged by the European Union. According to Kvaløy, Norway's potential accession to the EU is dangerous not only for the people, but also for the other species (Ibid) since the flow in question should be considered as a global threat to the biosphere⁵⁰⁶. In turn, Næss⁵⁰⁷ also warned against

⁵⁰⁵ *Vett* is a thematic journal of *No to Eu's movement*, which is published three to five times per year. In turn, *No to EU (Nei til EU)* is a Norwegian interest group, an antiracist and pan-political organization, which strives for justifying Norway's independence of the EU.

⁵⁰⁶ His conception is in tune with the one of the other representatives of snm who emphasize that the modern, industrial society creates mobility (snm 1974: 89), which leads people to be known of the (kjennes ut av) clearly set out, domestic, close environment. Due to this approach, they become "suitable for" an objective outside of their own living situation. These people can be used as "makers of working power", while, on the other hand, the possibilities of a socially meaningful existence concerning the average man are destroyed (Ibid).

the threat cultural diversity to be put at risk by the aforementioned accession as well as against the disputable ways of evaluating zero growth within the framework of the challenges posed to the national economy.

Another part of the problem is how to evaluate the normative validity of knowledge understood as being crucial to justifying relevant ecopolitics. That is why it is not by chance that Kvaløy described ecopolitics as deriving from the fight to obtain monopoly of knowledge. He argues that the ideology imposed by the supporters of the EU avoids researchers who see in it a threat to the health of mankind, animals and plants (Ibid: 7). Furthermore, the ecological perspective becomes ‘dangerous’ (farlig) from the ‘yes’ standpoint because due to its normative validity, the work of the supporters can be questioned and they can be dismissed in the long-run perspective. Kvaløy himself argues that the ‘no’ standpoint rests on stronger arguments since they contribute to understanding the complex process of the present situation through the focus of climate change (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ arguments have a different normative validity because they are based on different understandings of what knowledge is. One of the main methodological issues is that by recognizing one type of knowledge as ‘more objective’ than another, we still face the risk of confusing objectivity with normative validity, supporting the privilege of speaking from the best possible perspective. Last but not least, we should clarify that specifying the normative validity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for avoiding the pitfalls of ideological rhetoric, which stems from questioning the distorted presumption that ‘our’ arguments are always better than the rest.

However, the criticism to Norway’s potential accession to the EU was not only a result of a strong personal stance, but rather of a stance, which was advocated due to the principles of snm, which Kvaløy belonged to. The representatives of snm argued that Norway’s membership would be a step to a global environmental crisis (snm 1974: 2), which, on a macro methodological level, would mean that average man’s opportunities to regulate his/her own living situation would be reduced (Ibid). Snm built its own work on the insight ecology gives by clarifying the total life’s strength of the society and

⁵⁰⁷ Næss’s critical position is revealed in detail in the following two articles: *Zero Growth of Zero Importance? (O-vekst av null betydning?)* (Klassekampen 4/6/1992) and *Cultural Diversity Needs Protection (Kulturelt mangfold trenger vern Rapport fra Konferansen Norske Kunstners og den Europeiske Unon)* (1994).

the ability for survival (Ibid), which are recognized against the background of the open conflict between the ideology of the industrial development and the ecological life's values. Extrapolating the aforementioned statements, I argue that Kvaløy's skepticism to Norway's potential accession to the EU can also be described as provoked by the transformation of the growth and development debate into a contradiction between ideology and axiology⁵⁰⁸ due to which ideology pretends to be axiology with a capital letter. In turn, justifying such a contradiction as a leading one explains why bioregionalism is displayed at the environmental platform of snm as having a higher normative validity than the one of the macro-development in so far as bioregionalism means to preserve the unique life's possibilities as life's values without which human life is deprived of a value as such. Furthermore, both Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm insisted on solving the regional problems as a priority task, i.e. as a national task, nevertheless, it often confronts the Treaty of Rome (Ibid: 57). Therefore, the genealogy of the connections between Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian environmental politics can be revealed if we trace the preservation of bioregionalism as one of the main objectives of national ecopolitics. This objective can be determined due to its interconnected moral and existential implications regarding the intrinsic value of each and every individual of a given society⁵⁰⁹.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm see the main threat of the arising flow of people in the increasing instrumentalization of human power, which is simplified to exchangeable capital, i.e. to reducing the flow of people to the one of goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable resources. This also negatively affects both the understanding and the functioning of the living situation, which is determined as a possibility of implying a cost-benefit

⁵⁰⁸ The representatives of snm are even more radical in their statement. They argue that in front of the EU's ideology stays the choice between democracy and progress (Ibid: 55), which in turn explains why the EU does not have a complex and elaborated regional politics (Ibid: 57).

⁵⁰⁹ According to the representatives of snm, it is the Treaty of Rome that plays a central role in the EU's reports (Ibid: 46). They argue that clause two justifies the European community to be based on unbroken and misbalanced development providing a common trade policy towards the third world countries. It aims at withdrawing the member countries from the obstacles regarding the free flow of people, goods and capital as well as to guarantee that the competence on the common market would not be displaced (Ibid). In this context, snm's members reach the important conclusion that, from an ecological perspective, the Treaty is a matter of recognizing a philosophy of economic (industrial) development (Ibid: 47).

analysis. Since the EU is defined as supporting the global market policy that strengthens the exploitation of people as goods, snm's conclusion is that the potential membership of Norway to the EU would mean not only to raise the depopulation, but also the centralization of power, capital and working problems (Ibid: 64), which is grounded in the risk management concerning ecological sustainability.

The concrete implications of the centralization affect the underrating of the interests of regional politics, which in turn is based on providing a different type of planning. By contrast to the ecologically responsible mapping, centralized planning does not support the reestablishment of multidimensional and for that purpose, stable ecosystems, but rather the "externally specialized area of exploitation" (Ibid: 72).

The global crisis is triggered by internalizing the pseudo-complexity mode, which in so far as it is based on the pseudo-experiential one, determines the quantification of the world. In turn, the latter is justified by introducing global tourism against the background of the work of institutions such as FAOs, IMFs and World Bank (Kvaløy 2014 :145) believing that the crisis in question can be overcome by "repairing" the landscape similarly to the way we repair machines. In turn, the careers of the administratives are concerned with presenting and determining the complex as if it is complicated for the purposes of making the reparation looks possible. The quantification itself is grounded in the appeal for monoculture pretending that factory's chemistry can improve, in the sense of perfecting, Earth's performance. Thus the planning makes mapping through calories and dollars possible (Ibid).

Furthermore, Kvaløy points out that the European Union is the best example in contemporary Europe of how the industrial development society tries to consolidate itself by the economic crisis (Kvaløy 1976: 119). According to him, one of the crucial questions Norway faces nowadays⁵¹⁰ is not the EU membership, but, like in many other countries, the constantly accelerating tact of destroying the variabilities of the survival of global life's society (Ibid). Both the European Union system and the nature system it includes contribute an enormous (uhyre) network of causes and effects to be constructed. That is why a broad ecological analysis of the EU is required, which to support the need of decentralization to be reconsidered. In this context, Kvaløy evaluates Norwegian negative vote as a strive for preserv-

⁵¹⁰ It is a reference to the time when the book was written.

ing the portion of the global human habitat, which is corrupted by the industrial development society (Ibid: 146).

On a macro methodological level, the origin of the aforementioned contradictions can be seen in what the representatives of snm recognized as a matter of replacing values with price mechanisms, which is based on reducing the concept of value to the one of price. According to them, the economic structure that lays up in the EU makes the price mechanism a factor of a primary regulation and thus justifies the considerations of the industrial economy as the most important one (snm 1974: 32). There are many and big values, which do not express themselves in numbers, and which cannot be regulated by the price mechanism (Ibid). In the EU, the guiding principle is the one that the market determines the development, and the regional politics has, first and foremost, a character of a “socially supported measure” (sosialt pregede støttetiltak) (Ibid: 32-33).

On a macro methodological level, it means that the yes and no arguments have a different normative validity in so far as they are based on different types of knowledge. Last but not least, the difference between the two types of normative validity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for avoiding the pitfalls of ideological rhetoric. The latter derives from questioning the distorted presumption that ‘our’ arguments are always better than the rest.

An illuminative example in this respect is how preserving the balance of local communities by analogy with the one of ecosystems is justified as an important prerequisite for preventing the invasion of global chaos. It is possible when ‘identity’, ‘ecological’ and ‘social’ are no longer examined as mutually connected on an ontological level alone. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the ecocatastrophe would turn into a global one due to the fact that two different projects collapse, namely, the one of the expanding free trade and the one of local markets, which impose two different perspectives for self-realization. Both models are models of dependence, but they presume different modes of fulfillment. The mode represented by Kvaløy, whose philosophical groundings correspond to the ones of Næss’s ecosophy as well as the mode of global economics concerned with the dependence of making nature’s sources unlimited resources of exploitation.

Analyzing the ideas displayed in *Nature’s No*, I argue that Kvaløy diverts the logic of explanation by emphasizing the visible (socio-economic) consequences of globalization by relying on some implicit philosophical premises. These premises are more influential in terms of disenchanting the genealogy of national communities’ crisis, understood as provoked by the cri-

sis of self-realization. If global economics works to accomplish goals set according to the top-down principle (thinking about macro results first and then about their consequences), local ecopolitics functions the other way around. That is why the idea of stability is replaced with the one of stabilization: with a mechanism of keeping a given order for the sake of the order itself. In this context, I reach the conclusion that Kvaløy's critiques to the free trade politics of the EU are critiques to the economic turn it entails.

The aforementioned problem can be characterized by referring to Georg Henrik von Wright's definition of market as a sovereign power in which a planned economy is replaced with "galloping capitalism"⁵¹¹ (von Wright 2011: 121). The latter is grounded in the compression of time, which requires improving efficiency not in terms of quantity, but rather in terms of quality. Extrapolating von Wright's theory, I claim that the goal of Norwegian society is to limit the galloping, when it contradicts the development of the new local (the one of developing countries, which are the new local political actors on the global arena). This is why clarifying the role of ecopolitics is of crucial importance in determining how local communities can face the challenges of increasing complication by preserving the normative value of their complexity

In the biosphere, ecological crisis turns into a global one since the economic stabilization causes the homogenization of ecosystems recognized as a process of harmonization, which has a high value in the normative system. However, such a homogenization narrows down what Kvaløy calls existential opportunities. The most significant representations of the latter are the increasing mobility questioning the old ecosystems' boundaries as well as the reduction of multiplicity providing the dominance of organisms, which "flourish in chaos" ("trives i kaos") (Kvaløy 2006: 50). This statement brings the debate back to the point who has the power to impose a new type of normative validity. Extrapolating Kvaløy's statement that there are two levels of discussing life's richness, namely, the one of local systems and the one of different ecosystems on a global level (Ibid: 48), I argue that we

⁵¹¹ In this context, Kvaløy's critiques to Brundtland's report derive from the description of the galloping crisis. According to him, one of the most serious concerns is how to understand the "system's necessary dynamics of crisis" (Kvaløy 2014: 114). It presumes the interpretation of different world pictures for the purposes of overcoming the traditional European elitism, which appeals for a narrow specialization. At the first pages, Kvaløy argues that most of the proposed methods just lead to strengthening the crisis by undermining the possibility that there is a different type of economic growth (Ibid: 50).

should consider two types of globality. The first one is the one driven by what I called horizontal relatedness regarding the normative validity of the initial (natural) relationships in the globe. According to the second meaning, global is defined as an ontological synonym of 'bigger' underlied by the presumption that the local systems should become bigger (global), i.e. we should talk about one polarized globe.

Kvaløy himself talks about ecosystems' nationalism, which is interpreted within the framework of small nationalisms regarding the objective need of keeping the boundaries of the local communities untouched. However, it is still problematic whether we can call globalism a 'big nationalism' since the latter puts in question the idea of national as such. Erasing boundaries has mainly economic reasons that are concerned with the value of the import-export processes. The free trade suppresses the development of the poor countries in two ways: by the increasing import as well as by the export affecting the low development of schools' subsidies and local goods, which are incomparable with the cheaper and better goods coming from the rich countries (Ibid: 18).

4.3.1.1. *The Threat of Mass Tourism*

Furthermore, the connection between free trade, local markets and the arising number of harmful organisms (Ibid: 11), which leads to the growing resistance to antibiotics as well as to expanding the side effects of the intakes of hormones (Ibid: 26), as Kvaløy suggests, inflicts the transmission to be considered as a transformation by default. According to Kvaløy, a significant part of this process is not only the transfer of goods, but also the one of a special category of people, namely, the tourists. Regarding the increasing challenges provoked by the globalization, he directs the attention to one not so well-known problem at that time for which he has been strongly criticized in the press, namely, the negative influence of mass tourism and its difference from the migration process.

At the beginning of *Nature's No*, Kvaløy described the tourists as “spreading infections” (Ibid: 7). However, he was quite surprised to see that the Norwegian journal *Daily Economic Life (Dagens Næringsliv)* had registered the appearance of a paper called *Nature's No* three years after his own was published. In this paper, Tore Stubberud⁵¹² misinterpreted Kvaløy's conception as saying that he “hates the tourists” (Ibid): he distorted Kvaløy's main argument that urbanization and mass tourism contribute to the spread of diseases⁵¹³ (Ibid: 11).

Kvaløy justifies his significant distinction between tourists and migrants by claiming that it results from a methodological specification. He argues that immigrants and refugees are also mentioned as transmitting infections, albeit they are not as dangerous as tourists. Tourists want to travel, but are not obliged to do so, while refugees do not want to, but have to (Ibid: 18). Due to the fact that tourism is an industry driven by competition, the travellers strive for economic goods in the “society's mutual fight” (Ibid). Tourists should live an unrestrained life, deprived of consciousness, as this is the way they spend their money.

Since Kvaløy's ecophilosophy is shaped within the philosophy of snm, it becomes clear why his appeal for restricting the flow of tourists is not a matter of hate. The restriction can be described as concerning the problem of distributive justice because Kvaløy's ideal social model of realizing the

⁵¹² Tore Stubberud (1947-) is a Norwegian writer, philosopher and publisher.

⁵¹³ The latter is caused by the intensified transfer of goods and people through the channels of free trade and mass tourism which makes man's health more endangered than ever.

most relevant ecopolitics requires solidarity and equal distribution of goods to be achieved due to which the process of self-realization is maximally supported by society. On a macro methodological level, movement is recognized as a prototype characteristic of both groups (tourists and immigrants), but the fundamental distinction comes from the different understandings of the meaning of life and lifestyle. While the tourists' lifestyle is examined as determined by the complication model, which justifies itself as a model with a capital letter, the one grounding immigrants and refugees' way of living is not so clear. The latter is affected by the pretention of the complication society as being the most complex formation: a pretension that deprives the local community of the possibility to realize its complexity in full. In this context, the tourist becomes a "passive client on the Western market" (Ibid: 29).

According to Kvaløy, it is the lack of politicians' responsibility that grounds the mixture of technological and economic power requiring a strong determination in the name of complicated world (Ibid). There is one more crucial reason why Kvaløy's theory is not a theory of hate in so far as it is not based on absolutizing the principle of negation alone. He argues that we are responsible for providing the hungry people with food, but also for preparing space for the ones who have lost the place they have had, the immigrants who cannot go back (Ibid). Following this line of arguments, Kvaløy introduces the thesis that if we use some of the tourists' resources, we may help the others deprived of space (Ibid).

He argues that politicians have even less chances than the scientists in reconsidering the deep roots of contemporary ecocrisis (Ibid: 13) because their decision-making process lacks the necessary normative validity. Kvaløy claims that missing the process thinking is also typical for the journalists. While they rely on the mode of compression of space and time focused on the concrete implementations of the formula 'here-and-now', the politicians prefer to think in abstract concepts: by ideologies that pretend to be omnipotent ones since the politicians are obliged to govern on behalf of the world.

Kvaløy also outlines the crucial role of the media in shaping public opinion seeing the biggest danger of its influence in justifying so-called monoculture at the expense of the normative diversity of the multiplicity of cultures. According to him, the media misses the opportunity of thinking in relations and processes, i.e. the opportunity to evaluate the events in a process oriented way (Ibid: 9) because it supports the popularization of the sensational points embodied in the thinking 'here-and-now' mode. Judging by the

aforementioned definitions, I reach the conclusion that journalists are described as falling into the category of the specialists who are qualified to work only at a given moment of compressed time as well as whose efficiency is the most apparent one. The insufficiency of their work derives not from the object of investigations, but from the pretention brought by the normative validity of time with a capital letter, namely, that the 'here-and-now' mode embodies the time and space as such.

Going back to Tordsson's theory of Nansen's moral geography, I claim that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy introduces another moral geography based on having home as a top norm. In this context, he sees the biggest threat of so-called new colonialism driven by the globalization, which forcefully deprives people of the opportunity of having a home and thus justifies social chaos by inflicting an ecological one. The concrete implications of the ecological chaos concerned with the climate change are just the tip of the iceberg because the regulation of the living Earth is not restricted to the forms of being in nature, but to the ones of the biosphere itself.

4.3.1.2. The EU and the Establishment of Monoculture

Another significant issue concerns the origin of monoculture as a product of a technological invasion in Kvaløy's sense, which is outlined by revealing the genealogy of the 'old-new' dichotomy. Kvaløy's theory corresponds to the views of the other representatives of snm who emphasize the negative role of the unstable monocultures developed by the EU (snm 1974: 7). They represent societies with a unilateral and specialized economic basis (Ibid), by contrast to the traditional, local societies, where the concrete experience is both anticipated and internalized since their economy is based on care and cultivation of many resources at once (Ibid).

In this context, Kvaløy analyzes in detail how the negative axiological connotations of the old are a result of a secondary interpretation, which is provoked by the desperate fight for recognizing the authenticity of the new. That is why he tries to provide a revision that to rehabilitate the ontological grounding of natural as authentic and thus not only to expand, but also to give arguments in favor of the thinking by analogy, when we talk about cultures. Kvaløy claims that diversity of culture is 'natural' because its authenticity can be interpreted by analogy with the one of the diversity of ecosystems. Referring again to the as if clause, we can understand why cultural diversity is similar to the natural one without being equivalent to it. According to Kvaløy, the old ecosystems are like the old cultures – “developed and stabilized as an answer to the very different conditions, which are offered by the world's different regions” (Kvaløy 2006: 28). The strive for keeping the diversity on all levels whose normative validity is justified by analogy to the one of biosphere, is more 'authentic' than the appeal for justifying the Earth as a unified field of exploitable resources governed by monopolist politics⁵¹⁴.

Another important issue, which is stressed by Kvaløy, is that monoculture is a self-sufficient system that does not have the potential to contradict the ex-

⁵¹⁴ A good example in this respect is what Kvaløy argues about the mechanisms of weakened ecosystems, which increase the chances of invasion (Ibid: 40). The monoculture is determined as “more susceptible to new organisms” (Ibid), which explains the increasing resistance to antibiotics and dangerous microorganisms transmitted by the growing flow of people and goods. Furthermore, Kvaløy claims that maintaining monocultures means a fight against nature's own way of being (Ibid: 46). A fight, which we are doomed to lose due to the prevalence of nature's superior sources of multiplicity and ingenuity over the power magnet of our epoch, namely, the industrial system grounded in the competition (KIS) (Ibid).

ternal influences by developing its own resistance. His statement corresponds to what is defined by the other representatives of snm as a connection between the establishment of monoculture and so-called mono-production (Ibid: 52-52). The representatives of snm also argue that the EU has traditionally tried to solve the stabilization problem with colonization. However, its attempts to stabilize a given monoculture as achieved by adopting different forms of trade represent only a short-term solution because the population and the use of resources increase everywhere in the world (Ibid: 53).

On a macro methodological level, it means that building a monoculture by establishing mono-production with a capital letter is a matter of relying on a vicious circle since it is grounded in providing quantitative solutions for qualitative problems, as I showed above.

4.4. Isolation vs. Solidarity in the EU

Kvaløy sees the recognition of normative validity of natural, i.e. of the diversity of ecosystems and the multiplicity of cultures respectively, in what forms the perspective of complication, which is determined as isolation. According to him, taking off the border control leads to reducing the biogeographical obstacles that influence the development of life's diversity on the Earth (Ibid: 32). Within the framework of complexity vs. complication model, isolation should be understood as a preservation of ecosystems' ontological potential, which may be questioned by bioinvasion. Such a threat is born in the process of globalization that endangers the development of the net of ecosystems by denying the normative validity of the boundaries as such⁵¹⁵. Thus it diverts the logic of establishing the normative validity of the natural *status quo*.

In turn, the fight for normativity could be examined as supported by inflicting different fears in the society through adopting different rhetoric strategies. Due to establishing relevant ecopolitics, the fear of increasing pollution is recognized as proportional to the fear of destroying life's diversity⁵¹⁶. Against the background of what Chr. Bright calls invasion diseases (Ibid: 36) these fears raise the question what kind of politics should be applied in order bio-invasion to be restricted.

On a macro methodological level, the normative validity of isolation as a 'state of nature' contradicts the isolation understood as an ethical and socio-political problem, namely, as a matter of alienation. Within the framework of the debates about the Norwegian membership to the EU, Kvaløy and some of the supporters of snm agree on the following issue: solidarity is of crucial importance for reconsidering the role of global arena. In turn, Dag Seierstad discusses whether the EU is not the political answer for the glob-

⁵¹⁵ A relevant embodiment of the latter can be seen in what Harper calls a climate changing Europe (Harper 2006: 15). In this context, I reach the conclusion that the climate changes gradually turn into a sovereign power such as the market itself, which leads to diverting the logic of being and becoming.

⁵¹⁶ In this context, the developing oil industry is given as an example of why the threat of erasing boundaries is a crucial threat for life's diversity.

alization, but rather its inspiratory (Seierstad 2005: 22)⁵¹⁷. That is why the political answer should be sought by questioning big concerns' politics whose main objective is to expand the force of capital⁵¹⁸.

In turn, it is problematic to keep thinking about the relationship between big and small as a methodological pattern giving omnipotent solutions. According to D. Seierstad, since the Norwegian population is 1% of the whole population of the EU, it is easier to change the Norwegian politics rather than the one of the EU, albeit changing the latter is more important for the others (Ibid: 23). In this context, he raises the rhetorical question: What should we choose: the simpler or the more important solutions?

On the other hand, extrapolating Seierstad's statement, I also draw the conclusion that one of the main methodological counter arguments is that we do not have to examine solidarity as a 'possession' of the minority i.e. as justified by analogy with the contradiction between 'big' and 'small'. A possible solution can be found in Kvaløy's principle of collaboration due to which the unity is initiated by respecting not only the interests of other species, but also human interests as such. However, accepting his position of keeping the physical isolation also creates some difficulties because keeping "offensive close interests" smaller (Ibid: 24) does not make them less offensive, neither less interests at all. Such a problematic conception underlies the process of the pseudo-justification of the globe as globality, which in turn leads to making rich countries richer and poor poorer.

How can we summarize Kvaløy's and Seierstad's main arguments against the potential accession of Norway to the EU? A tentative answer can be found in snm's stance that it is a "positive no" (et positivt nei) (snm 1974: 93). No, which means "yes" to the fight for a well-balanced future society; a society that provides democratic conditions for people and meaningful collective work with nature instead of a fight against nature (Ibid). The fight

⁵¹⁷ Seierstad gives examples with different conferences, where Norway has declared its support for the developing countries by ratifying different crucial moratoriums such as the conferences in Johannesburg (2002), in Rio (1992), the one in Montreal (2000) etc. (Ibid: 26-27). However, we should be skeptical about justifying a correspondence between the size of the country and the degree of solidarity it shows as well as whether to be outside of the EU is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a morally engaged political state. In this context, Seierstad's question whether the EU is a project of solidarity (Ibid: 4) finds its well-justified no-answer.

⁵¹⁸ Taking into account that Norway is a part of the EEA, it follows many of the EU's market regulations, which directly or indirectly, affect the developing countries.

for the balanced society is defined as one giving inexhaustible joy and opportunity for internal growth, with its “fantastic, endless creative surplus” (Ibid).

In other words, this tentative yes is recognized for the purposes of justifying an ecologically sustainable society in the long run. It presumes the development of the welfare state to be done by solving the debate about how to eradicate ecological unsustainability. This is possible if the society in question is determined as a life necessity society, where the standard of living is less important than raising the quality of life. On a macro methodological level, it is the ‘complication’ society that is described as a result of the EU’s global politics. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the ‘positive no’ can be interpreted as ‘no’ to the sustainable development society, justified by the EU, for the sake of saying ‘yes’ to the life necessity one.

In this context, the democratic functioning of the small societies relies on the normative validity of the self-regulation process, which entails some of the characteristics of a life’s process, but being adopted for the purposes of the mutual commitment. The latter takes place by achieving consensus, which in turn is irreducible to compromise. By contrast, the self-management in the global society, introduced within the EU, does not necessarily concern people’s common interests, but rather experts’ ones, which are, first and foremost, economically oriented, and only afterwards, socially oriented. Against the background of such a self-management, nature’s own rules should be understood in a broader sense as referring to both man and nature in so far as man is an integral part of the biosphere.

According to Kvaløy, the supporters of the potential accession of Norway to the EU believed that the Norwegian No in 1972 would contribute to the division of the EU (Ibid). The EU was defined as an “especially badly” suited organ for a collective work in terms of environmental political problems to the extent the ecopolitical co-work is a global issue (Ibid: 94). As a possible alternative of how to overcome the side effects of the bad common work, the representatives of snm outlined the globally responsible eco-politics, which would have provided a real protection of our life’s environment (Ibid).

Judging by these investigations, I draw the conclusion that the ‘bad’ collective work could be recognized as a strictly operationalized one, which does not necessarily presume informed consent and commonly shared understanding of interaction to be adopted, i.e. this work could be uncontradictory justified even if it functions as a meaningless work. The only one require-

ment is it to be uncontradictory in an administrative sense because its efficiency is evaluated due to expanding the principles of the global market as having the highest 'positive' value by equating the latter with the concept of price. In conclusion, snm's interpretation, and Kvaløy's one in particular, concern the justification of a global transformation, which to emphasize the need of rehabilitating the concept of global responsibility (not only the one of global justice) as a prototype characteristic of the ecologically sustainable national and international politics.

Skirbekk's significant contribution to the development of 20th-century Norwegian environmental philosophy can be traced, among many other issues, to the reconsideration of the limits of technological rationality by distinguishing between expertise and hermeneutic competence, to conceptualizing the sense of belonging to nature within the framework of ethical gradualism, which requires a deeper ecological consciousness to be adopted as well as to the rehabilitation of the role of vital needs and vital interests by justifying the role of the welfare state in changing the vision of ecological reproduction.

V.1. BOOSTING THE FAITH IN TECHNOLOGICAL PANACEA. THE PROBLEM OF TECHNICAL FIX

1.1. Some Disadvantages of Technological Expertise. The Need of Counter-expertise

Questioning the role of technological rationality is of crucial importance in rethinking the complex understanding of man's self-realization as existentially dependent on the realization of nature by developing a unique sense of belonging. The sense of belonging to nature, as introduced by Skirbekk, benefits clarifying the question why we should give preference to what I defined in the previous chapters as experiential knowledge over the 'purely' cognitive knowledge. He defines the aforementioned sense as life's attitude embodied in a particular "ecosophic reverence for life" (Skirbekk 1992: 95)⁵¹⁹.

While Næss and Kvaløy appeal for revising the status of the scientist and the politician by 'equipping' them with an extended competence, namely, with the

⁵¹⁹ The ecosophic reverence is associated by Skirbekk with mountaineering and ecological concerns (Ibid). It is understood in terms of Albert Schweitzer's concept of "reverence for life" ethics (Ibid).

one of so-called by Kvaløy super amateur⁵²⁰, which is not equivalent to being inexperienced, Skirbekk looks for a transformation on the level of the normative validity of knowledge. So-called by Skirbekk hermeneutic mediation between the different disciplines (Ibid, Skirbekk 2007: 82) opens new perspectives in addition to the ones outlined by Næss and Kvaløy since adopting the hermeneutic approach not only broadens the scope of the expertise itself, but it also strengthens the normative validity of both expert's role and expertise in so far as it clarifies why the rationality is intrinsically connected with the process of understanding.

On a macro methodological level, it means that instead of presuming a transformation from the bottom to the top such as the one of introducing competence, which to avoid the reduction of knowledge to cognitive rationality, we have to revive what hermeneutic understanding is. This understanding does not follow a certain hierarchy of transformations, but affects them all at once due to the fact that it questions the normative validity of the rationality as rationality with a capital letter. In this context, we can talk about "supplementary expertise" in Skirbekk's sense (Ibid: 22, Ibid: 84) because it concerns the recognition of a complex change whose target is not only the subject and the idea of knowledge, but also the rehabilitation of the complex human experience.

According to Skirbekk, one of the main problems accompanying the process of modernization concerns the overexposed role of the "technical fix" in the decision-making process, which is recognized as a certain kind of panacea against all the societal and economic problems (Skirbekk 2007: 77). It is not the need of elaborating the role of technologies themselves, but rather the "optimistic belief" in some technical fix⁵²¹ (Ibid), as Skirbekk argues, which, in my point of view, corresponds to the consequences brought by already discussed by Kvaløy myth of final solution. In other words, the normative validity of the aforementioned panacea can be defined as deriving from the belief that relying on technologies, we can 'fix' all the possible problems by looking for technological solutions alone.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that we can talk not only about narrowing the idea of expertise, but also about misrecognizing the normative validity as such reducing it to the one of verifying calculations. An illuminative example in this respect is examining the problem of the technological ex-

⁵²⁰ The role of the super-amateurs as generalists was already discussed in the chapter on Kvaløy.

⁵²¹ A similar concern is expressed by Næss and Kvaløy as well as by von Wright who argues against the growing technocratization, which turns into an aim in itself due to the ideology of the free market.

expertise in the framework of what Skirbekk characterizes as a cost-benefit analysis (Ibid). Thus the ‘narrowing’ aspects of the expertise can be outlined if looking for technological solutions for the economic problems evaluated on the basis of two prototype criteria, which are also economically determined, namely, the ones of costs and benefits. Furthermore, the justification of the connection between these criteria and means is described by Skirbekk as made for the sake of preparing for actions in accordance with the cost-benefit analysis in which the issues of cost and safety are defined by the experts (Ibid). The normative validity of this connection is grounded in the “ability of being scientifically rationalized” (Ibid), which makes the technologically based approach appropriate for the free-market economy (Ibid).

However, the idea of expertise becomes so important because it should be applied to a situation of global crisis. According to Skirbekk, the experience of the crisis indicates not only the limits of nature, but also “a growing awareness” of the limitations of the technological rationality and practice (Skirbekk 1992: 1). Otherwise, the decision-making process would have remained ‘trapped’ within its own premises due to the fact that it works with purposes merely on an epistemological level. Furthermore, referring to the cost-benefit analysis means that the crisis expertise can be productive in short terms rather than in long ones in so far as it concerns the concept of interest, which is determined by the experts as a utilitarian interest. In turn, the self-regulation derives from the presumption that the basic needs are no longer regarded as implying the normative validity of the vital interests, but the other way around. The latter are examined as ‘produced’ by purposive rationality (Skirbekk 2007: 78) and that is why they are unquestionably determined as vital interests, albeit in practice they may function as non-vital ones.

Regarding the safety criterion, the genealogy of the overexposed normative validity of rationalization can also be revealed by providing a well-grounded risk management. Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, this would mean to talk about an optimistic belief in the controllability of the risk management as such (Skirbekk 2015: 2-3). Examining the reactions to the possibility of building a subsea cable⁵²², Skirbekk claims that in the press, the project was represented by the ex-

⁵²² Skirbekk discusses how Auke Lont, who became the new President and CEO of Statnett in 2009, declared that “According to our assessment, one subsea cable solution would not provide us with robust and secure power supply.” (Ibid: 1). Lont stated that the focus on security of supply, value creation and climate should step up developments in the years ahead. Examining the different arguments, Skirbekk poses the question whether the risk management is seriously considered by Statnett in a dialogue with some representatives of political and military authorities, discussing the option of choosing between

perts as a safe one since technological risks were defined as manageable ones (Ibid: 7). The role of specifying the impact of risk taking by avoiding the economic argument⁵²³, accompanied with the one of elaborating an expertise in the process of comparing the benefits of similar initiatives, does not give better results either⁵²⁴.

That is why I claim that the risk management is focused not on clarifying both the real risks and real consequences for the general audience, but rather on overexposing the role of safety, which is based on supporting the belief in the 'unquestionable' parameters of the technological expertise such as preciseness and controllability. The consequences of the risk management are evaluated from the perspective of technological/economic understanding of success-failure, which in turn is determined due to the implementation of the manageability criterion. However, when we talk about politics and ecopolitics in particular, there is an intention of under-communication (Ibid: 7-8), as Skirbekk argues, which in turn strengthens the need of introducing the component of loyalty⁵²⁵ (Ibid: 8) to the ones that make technological rationality definable as purposive one (Skirbekk 2007: 79).

In this context, technological expertise should be recognized as an expertise with a capital letter in so far as it is presumably justified as a climax of the rationalization making the decision-making process recognizable as the best possible process. On a micro methodological level, the role of 'pure' cognitive knowledge is equated with the one of scientific rationalization, while the latter is defined as a modification of the utilitarian mode of maximizing economic goods and minimizing economic deficiencies. The problem arises from the fact that these goods are supposed to function as social benefits, albeit they are evaluated from an economic perspective alone due to the overexposed implementation of technologies. Thus the decision-making process is simplified to mastering one or another calculation for the sake of elaborating the calculation process

overhead lines and subsea cable (Ibid: 2). He also examines the double-blindness of the reasons behind Lont's later decision to outline the challenges for Norway against the background of the problems Norway to contribute with the renewable energy and the need for a better climate (Ibid: 10).

⁵²³ Skirbekk argues that when the economic argument is 'dead', the question about the subsea cable gains new power, namely, it starts concerning the need of power supply as a new crucial argument (Ibid: 7).

⁵²⁴ According to Skirbekk, we live in an education society (utdanningsamfunn) (Ibid: 8).

⁵²⁵ In democracy, loyalty to politics is described as preceding the loyalty to particular people (Ibid: 8).

as such since it is justified by the presumption that economic needs in the contemporary society are mainly vital needs.

On the other hand, the optimistic belief Skirbekk talks about derives from the presumption that technology and free market economy are intrinsically dependent on each other, which in turn requires they to be self-regulating due to the wisdom of “the invisible hand” (Ibid: 77-78). Furthermore, this wisdom is grounded in the epistemological equation of the potential impact of the technological and its real implementation on the market. Both modes, the ones of potentiality and actuality, are interpreted as having similar ontological validity. That is why if we have to talk about global ethics in this context, it inevitably meets the requirements of the utilitarian one⁵²⁶.

One of the main consequences of the optimistic belief in the technical fix is that the scientific expertise does not necessarily coincide with the technological one, albeit the latter undoubtedly represents a certain kind of scientific expertise⁵²⁷. The distinction between scientific and technological expertise should be traced on the level of defining what competence is, which has the expertise as a necessary but not sufficient condition for its justification. Skirbekk argues that a “range of relevant branches of expertise is required in order to realize the various consequences and to start discussing their negative and positive values” (Ibid: 81). A necessary condition is that “the *right kind* of expertise” is the one that does not operate with an “inadequately narrow range of disciplines”,⁵²⁸ (Ibid). Skirbekk claims that this condition should be taken into account “if we want to be *rational* in our attempt at understanding the case with its far-reaching consequences...” (Ibid).

In turn, the idea of counter-expertise, which requires not narrow specialists, but rather generalists in Næss and Kvaløy’s sense to be involved is crucial for understanding the multiple aspects of the scientific expertise as well as for revealing its normative validity. So-called supplementing expertise (or counter-expertise) (Ibid: 84) can easily lead to conflicts, as Skirbekk points out, firstly,

⁵²⁶I argue that when the idea of global ethics is examined as based on a cost-benefit analysis, it would lead to its justification due to overexposing the role of the processes of maximization and minimization as its necessary and sufficient conditions.

⁵²⁷ Analyzing the implications of what is technologically acceptable in respect with the ecological expertise, Skirbekk outlines the role of scientific expertise as creating an “optimal basis for decision makers” (Skirbekk 1992: 5).

⁵²⁸ Skirbekk gives an example with the ecological expertise, which is embodied in many large scale projects (Ibid).

on a professional level regarding the self-understanding of the representatives of different disciplines, and secondly, on economic and political levels justifying various “particularistic short-term interests” (Ibid). On the other hand, the aforementioned expertise can also be examined as having a constitutive effect, namely, in terms of extending the criterion of verification to the one of normative validity due to which the counter examples are interpreted as showing the complexity of the chosen criterion.

Questioning the idea of supplementing expertise is also important for understanding why environmental politics is dependent on how we define verification as a main principle regarding the decision-making process. Going back to Skirbekk’s example with the subsea cable, we face the problems concerning the position of the energy minister Terje Riis-Johansen, who was called ‘The Bureaucrat’ in the press (Skirbekk 2015: 9). Among the three main weak points of the discussions in the press, Skirbekk outlines the point of first giving priority to the argument of economy and then replacing it with the one of power supply (Ibid). One of the crucial concerns is that reducing the problem of rationality to a cost-benefit analysis indicates that rationality should be developed by providing minimum alternatives, i.e. by gaining benefits while choosing the first ‘suitable’ alternatives. Only then it is relevant to talk about ‘economically rational way’ of solving social problems since the values will be ‘rationally’ (in a rationally grounded way) reduced to prices. If we want to avoid the recognition of this process, we should think about the opportunity to limit the technological expertise by introducing a better functioning definition of what a competence is, as I argued above.

The process of transformation is described by Skirbekk as a matter of overcoming understood in Hegel’s sense (Skirbekk 2007: 87) in so far as the instrumental rationality is no longer seen as having a being in itself, but also a being for itself. According to Skirbekk, this is an internal overcoming of “a narrow technological expertise” toward a “discursive and procedural rationality” (Ibid: 83). Regarding the role of morality, such an overcoming concerns the eradication of the cost-benefit analysis at the expense of introducing global ethics in Skirbekk’s sense. In political terms, it affects the overcoming of narrow bureaucratic interests toward a “political culture of co-responsibility” (Ibid), which means that such an overcoming gains a global transformative function due to the normative validity of the process of transforming without annihilating.

The latter process can be better understood if we not only question the overestimated instrumental role of rationality, but also the choice of the discourse itself. Skirbekk argues that the normative decision theory (and the rational choice theory respectively) is “a paradigmatic version of *instrumental* rationality”, which has an “appropriate function within some realm of action” (Ibid: 91, Note

4). In this context, he defines the process of overcoming as a matter of sublation: as a matter of both situating and translating since a relative legitimacy can be achieved within the theory of the communicative or normative regulating action (Ibid). Such an interpretation raises the issue that the ‘ought to’ mode should be determined as a purely rational one because the ideal presumption of a rational choice is supposed to optimally regulate the accomplishment of the determined goals. Only then the latter can be defended as constitutive ones.

That is why I argue that the instrumental aspects derive from the justification of the way of choosing understood as a way of accomplishing, i.e. as a process, which should be recognized as one of progression. The progression itself implies what Skirbekk calls “a knowledge of causal connections” (Ibid: 79): knowledge, which principally allows us to control events either by “precluding an undesired event” (by suppressing some causal elements), or by producing a desired one (by establishing the causal elements) (Ibid). Furthermore, the progress as such is justified by establishing causal connections for the sake of the overall maximization achieved by the best, in the sense of most rational, predictions, which can function as a certain kind of a grounded explanation. In turn, the technical fix is based on technological maximas, which are the ones whose normative validity directs the actions to what is defined as a technologically progressive way.

On the other hand, the issue of unpredictability is also important for specifying the normative validity of the values and their adoption for the sake of supporting the technical fix. According to Skirbekk, we should strive for some modesty in our “ambitions for technological planning” (Ibid: 82) because this is “an issue of a political importance”⁵²⁹ (Ibid: 93, Note 15). The element of unpredictability concerns our calculations of probability values (Ibid), which again leads to justifying the cost-benefit analysis as regulated by the criterion of verification.

On a macro methodological level, questioning the impact of the taken for granted goals in the normative decision theory (in the sense that their ‘rightness’ is not discussed) (Ibid: 79) faces the difficulties in evaluating their consequences since the evaluation is a normatively determined process⁵³⁰. As Skirbekk

⁵²⁹In this context, political importance can be traced back to the way the optimistic belief in the technical fix affects so-called social engineering.

⁵³⁰The latter is a criterion of evaluating the possible benefits as ‘real’ or ‘unreal’ ones, while the criterion regarding morality is the one of normative validity.

claims, it is “intuitively reasonable”⁵³¹ to choose rationally between different alternatives (Ibid) while comparing highly probable with improbable consequences, which in turn have highly positive or highly negative values⁵³² (Ibid). Such an evaluation is a double-bind process. First, it concerns the probability of the consequences, in terms of desirability or lack of desirability, and second, it affects the consequences themselves. Relying on this intuition affects the need of evaluating the two aforementioned aspects due to the normative decision theory, taking into account that the concrete evaluations are examined as a sum of “mathematical products” of probability values⁵³³ (Ibid), which aim at clarifying the normative validity of the chosen alternative.

According to the normative decision theory, the agent is rational if he/she chooses the alternative with the highest sum of the mathematical products of probability values as well as the consequences of evaluation. Skirbekk argues that “the choice between playing safe and gambling is a choice of strategy, which appears somewhat differently in cases”, where the actor plays with his own interests or with the interests of other people⁵³⁴ (Ibid: 81) relying on the presumption that minimizing suffering has a broader effect than maximizing well-being.

⁵³¹ However, his definition of what reasonable intuition is does not correspond to Næss’s one, which meets the criteria of irrational insight. In contrast to Næss, Skirbekk provides well-grounded arguments against another ‘extreme’ interpretation, namely, against defining reasonability as predictability, which is understood as a sum of given calculations.

⁵³² As Skirbekk points out, the process of their evaluation is a normative one, while the one regarding probability is a purely scientific problem (Ibid).

⁵³³ Skirbekk claims that in the normative decision theory, the intuition is considered as based on the sum of mathematical products, i.e. on the “numerical size of probability and of desirability” for each consequence, as well as by characterizing the choice of the alternative with the highest positive sum, or the lowest negative sum, as the rational choice (Ibid: 80).

⁵³⁴ This issue is another illuminative example showing why it is the criterion of normative validity rather than the one of verification that should be applied while evaluating people’s interests. It is the specification that the reasonable intuition is not ‘reasonable’ in the sense of predicting given changes, as I mentioned above. It is ‘reasonable’ since it is normatively grounded when others’ interests are at stake. Evaluating the consequences of probability values would lead to adopting a certain kind of utilitarian ethics, which, among many other problems, raises the following one: minimizing suffering to have a broader effect than increasing the well-being, which is not a less important issue.

1.2. Are Overcomers Super-amateurs?

Another crucial issue that is related to the question why overcoming should be understood in Hegel's sense as a dialectical transcending, as Skirbekk suggests, is the need of defining experts as generalists, as both Næss and Kvaløy do. According to Skirbekk, the different attitudes to such an 'overcoming transcendence' regarding rationality lead to outlining the following four groups: the one of 'technocrats' (relying on a few natural scientific or technological disciplines), the group of 'humanists' (who underestimate the impact of the aforementioned disciplines), the one of 'total-refusers' (rejecting reason *tout court*), and the group of the 'overcomers' ('sublaters') (who appeal for overcoming the technological rationality in favor of hermeneutic understanding, which mediates between disciplines and researchers and general audience) (Ibid: 83, Skirbekk 1992: 7). The latter can be described as the category of generalists in Næss and Kvaløy's sense, who argue in favor of multidisciplinary that is not realized at the expense of underrating the role of the disciplinary knowledge. From that, however, it does not follow that 'more' knowledge is better than 'less' knowledge (understood in quantitative terms), but rather that we need to reconsider the idea of normative validity of knowledge in qualitative terms.

That is why the interdisciplinary competence of the generalists cannot be defined as a sum of given competences, but as grounded in broadening the concept of competence as such by justifying the normative validity of the interaction process. As a prototype characteristic of the latter, we can point the process of understanding, or what I called experiential understanding, which is not a matter of utilitarian predictability. In turn, the methodological difference between utilitarian and pragmatic takes place in so far as Skirbekk introduces a new discursive type of competence, which does not coincide with the expertise. In this context, communicative rationality is determined as grounded in the "enlarged interdisciplinary understanding" because it is driven by a dialogical reflection of discursive or argumentative rationality (Skirbekk 2007: 83).

Regarding ecological sustainability, the irreducibility of generalists' competence to an expertise is concerned with the need of guaranteeing the legitimacy of the ecopolitical decisions. As Skirbekk argues, the administrative procedures are not enough for making political decisions (Skirbekk 2015: 9). The problem is that from the fact that certain interests are not explicitly stated, it does not follow that they are supported due to adopting a generalist competence because the latter presumes its own boundaries to be estab-

lished as a result of an enlightened consensus. Extrapolating Skirbekk's analysis, I argue that while the administrative staff mainly relies on expert knowledge, the politicians should master a competence, which to contribute to relevantly justifying the decision-making process as a process with a certain normative validity, i.e. they should react as generalists in Næss and Kvaløy's sense.

Furthermore, Skirbekk points out that the politicians should not permit to be dominated by powerful expert groups (Ibid: 18). The statement presumes generalists' responsibility of a different type to be adopted. Extrapolating Kvaløy's theory, I claim that this responsibility is more complex than the one of the narrow specialists which is two-folded: it can be either right or wrong in so far as its demarcation criterion is the one of verification. Since generalists' competence is based on looking for more than one alternative as well as on not necessarily choosing the first appropriate alternative available, it provides more possibilities for mastering informed consent.

That is why clarifying the methodological connection between politics and expertise is a leading factor in revealing how the issue of informed consent can contribute to strengthening the political engagement, including the one with nature. Speaking in negative terms, it is a political task to oppose a specialized narrowness (*fagleg trongsyn*) and narrowing expertise, as Skirbekk claims (Ibid: 12). For the purposes of avoiding such a simplification, he justifies the role of the open discussions, which are not based on instrumental and strategic reason seen from the perspective of a narrowed model (Ibid).

In turn, the reconsideration of the generalists' competence is also crucial for reevaluating the issue of ecological sustainability due to the aims of building relevant environmental politics by determining politicians' competence⁵³⁵, as I mentioned above. In this context, it becomes important to avoid making one given model dominate, as Skirbekk points out (Ibid: 8), because the narrow expertise affects the justification of the monopoly of knowledge.

Regarding ecological expertise, at first sight, it seems that Skirbekk follows Næss and Kvaløy's distinction of generalists and specialists, but he introduces one more aspect, namely, the impact of normative evaluation, which is not explicitly outlined by both of them. Skirbekk claims that due to the ecological expertise, what is politically, economically and technologically

⁵³⁵ Skirbekk points out that the politicians should be governed by "ecologically enlightened and rational expertise" (Skirbekk 2007: 89), which is realizable in the modern societies (Ibid).

possible is not always morally acceptable (Skirbekk 1992: 2). Regardless of the fact that both Næss and Kvaløy agree about the need of avoiding the scientification of ecology, their stances on how to overcome the is-ought distinction, while discussing environmental ethics, need further elaboration; especially in Næss's writings who narrows morality to moralization due to his vision of imposing gestalt ontology as a paradigm of environmental philosophy, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss. By contrast, Skirbekk explicitly argues that the question of evaluation is a normative one, which should be distinguished from the question of predictability. The latter is seen as a scientific prediction of possible results achieved by adopting scientific methods⁵³⁶.

Regarding ecological sustainability, we should examine its role within the framework of what Skirbekk calls a sustainable ecological reproduction, which is a part of sustainable socio-cultural reproduction (Skirbekk 2007: 89). The ecological reproduction is defined as a "balanced interplay" of the institutions "for a sustainable future for the whole of our ecosphere" (Ibid) against the background of the joint appeal to "reasonableness, solidarity and co-responsibility" (Ibid). In this context, politicians' competence can be defined as concerning the generalists' responsibility for preserving the socio-political and cultural balance in the welfare state.

In practice, the competence, having an impact on the clarification of so-called Hardanger case⁵³⁷, affects how to take into account the role of climate changes as well as the implications of new, collaborative engagements (nye samarbeidsopplegg), which to be seriously evaluated by relevant and independent experts (Skirbekk 2015: 14). Skirbekk points out that we should pay attention to the case if a new evaluation requires gaining a political legitimacy (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that it is the role of evaluation that makes the expertise and competence similar and different at once. Due to generalists' competence, the evaluation gains a broader normative validity, while due to providing a full expertise (understood as recognizing as much non-contradictory knowledge as possible), the validity in question is reduced to the criterion of verification, which I already discussed.

⁵³⁶ These methods were discussed in the previous chapter.

⁵³⁷ The case with the subsea cable in Hardanger is an important topic of Skirbekk's writings on the practical implications of Norwegian environmental politics.

On a macro methodological level, we should specify that the climate prediction is always a matter of axiological predictions, when we talk about competence in predicting climate changes. Skirbekk describes the problem as one of looking for environmentally optimal response (Ibid), which is another example of why expertise and competence are irreducible to each other. However, it does not mean that the response in question is an aim of the generalists alone. Both specialists and generalists strive for preventing the climate change problems, albeit by implying different criteria of what ‘objective’ evaluation is.

In this context, the ones who can be defined as specialists in examining the aforementioned problems are not only the narrow specialists themselves, but also the administrative staff since they aim at elaborating ‘true’ expertise by calculating predictions. Comparing generalists and specialists, we should consider two different types of efficiency. Achieving short-term solutions in the scope of environmental politics means a political task to be solved in an administrative way. In this case, the political efficiency is understood as coinciding with the administrative one, which would lead to simplifying and deteriorating the mechanisms of the welfare state by overexposing the role of rational expertise as a technological fixation⁵³⁸.

Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that generalists’ competence is defined as a multidisciplinary one, being recognized in qualitative rather than in quantitative terms since it is based on a pragmatic ability. The difference between the latter and the ability to automatically fulfill tasks is a matter of adopting a different kind of normative validity because the practical ability to move trans-disciplinary in Skirbekk’s sense (Skirbekk 2007: 82) concerns informed consent to be acquired through the process of aware participation. Furthermore, such ability is affected by the inherent “need for *interdisciplinary pluralism*”, as he suggests, due to which the agents are seen as “the educated participants” in a democratic society (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, it means that the idea of competence, which is irreducible to the instrumental expertise supporting the technological fixation, is possible only in democratic societies, where the participants are involved in open and enlightened discussions, as Skirbekk points out.

⁵³⁸ Another problem derives from the bureaucratic language because it supports the instrumentalization of values.

2. WHY IS ETHICAL GRADUALISM BACK ON THE SCENE? SKIRBEKK'S PERSPECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Comparing already examined implications of Næss's deep ecology and Skirbekk's environmental philosophy, I argue that aiming to avoid ethical anthropocentrism, Næss advocates the justification of radical biocentrism, albeit he theoretically supports the principles of ethical gradualism, as I already showed in the chapter on Næss. In this context, an alternative solution for how the principle of solidarity could contribute to rethinking the negative consequences of radical biocentrism can be found in Skirbekk's theory of ethical gradualism, which could be interpreted as a way to counter ethical anthropocentrism as a certain type of eco-speciesism. One of the main issues regarding the clarification of the latter concerns the debate about actual and advocacy participation of the living beings, which presumes the concept of moral difference to be examined on a different level, as Skirbekk suggests (Skirbekk 1994: 93). Furthermore, one of the main challenges is how to examine this difference beyond the scopes of both moral naturalism and moral absolutism, which however, does not mean that we should entirely neglect the role of biological gradualism as such.

In turn, Skirbekk does not completely deny the role of anthropocentrism, nor does he completely reject the one of biological gradualism. He claims that anthropocentrism can get a certain support within the framework of discourse ethics, but it is "only to a certain extent", i.e. on an empirical level (Ibid: 92-93). Judging by his investigations, I draw the conclusion that Skirbekk makes a step further by rehabilitating the role of ethical gradualism and clarifying that even when a given form of anthropocentrism is permissible, from that it does not follow that ethical anthropocentrism should be adopted (Ibid).

The question why ethical gradualism is needed for the purposes of relevantly evaluating the borderline cases, where due to ethical evaluations one species (or representatives of one and the same species) should be given

priority over another (or others), is preceded by the question concerning so-called paradigmatic case of human beings. In turn, we should specify that the problem of choosing 'either-or' regarding human and other species' relationships is inevitably grounded in absolutizing the principle of priority, especially when we talk about *either* anthropocentrism, *or* biocentrism.

2.1. The Principle of Advocatory Representation

One of the issues, which benefits rethinking the role of ethical gradualism is the principle of so-called advocatory representation, namely, the one clarifying how living beings, which do not have a relevant moral status can have moral rights as well as to be subjected to moral evaluation. According to Skirbekk, the notion of advocatory representation is “the standard case for minors” (Ibid: 81) concerning the delegation of responsibility. He also emphasizes that in certain cases, the advocatory representations can be gradually reduced in time, when the subjects become mature individuals who can take care of themselves (Ibid).

As another crucial aspect, Skirbekk outlines the need discussed by J. Rachels to distinguish between being a subject to a biological life and being a subject to a biographical one (Ibid: 117, Note 10). For the animals, biological life coincides with the biographical one, so that it is problematic to use the latter as a criterion against killing animals. In turn, we may speculate whether this conception makes clear how to choose if two biographical lives are ‘at stake’, i.e. how to make a decision when killing is unavoidable anyway. Otherwise, we will face again a certain type of speciesism, namely, one individual of a given species to be recognized as more important than another one of a different species⁵³⁹. In this context, Skirbekk specifies that the confusing point is that “biology works with continuity whereas we are used to thinking of morality in terms of absolute borders” (Ibid: 85)⁵⁴⁰.

However, the principle of advocatory representation leaves the question how to implement ethical gradualism unanswered. It still remains ambiguous to define and establish one both objective and equally valid for everybody concept of development (in the sense of maturity) in so far as the criteria of human behavior, even the ones regarding the representatives of the human kind are very complicated. On the other hand, the concept of maturity is a result of social elaboration, i.e. it can refer only to the ones recognized as becoming members of the social communities. That is why the ad-

⁵³⁹ A more serious problem would arise when the individuals belong to one and the same species, which in turn is an illuminative example showing why ethical gradualism should be adopted.

⁵⁴⁰ This is an argument against ethical speciesism. Skirbekk also emphasizes that our moral intuition of ethical speciesism presumes the definition of humankind to be provided in purely genetic terms (Ibid: 86).

vocatory representation is a complex issue requiring further examinations not only on an individual level, when we face the plurality of borderline cases, but also on a collective one since it is one and the same concept of maturity that should meet the criteria of a procedural consensus every now and then. An illuminative example of showing some difficulties on the level of community is what Skirbekk defines as a concern about the future generations (Ibid: 114). In this context, the broader application of maturity should be predicted so that the most complicated relationship between moral rights and moral status to be regulated (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, introducing ethical gradualism contributes to giving relevant suggestions for the discussions about actual and potential properties of the beings due to the principle of advocatory representation. However, if we remain on the level of choosing between different types of properties alone, we still face the risk, as Skirbekk warns, of a possible naturalistic fallacy⁵⁴¹, namely, the ‘is’ mode to be misconceptualized as ‘ought’ one since relying on the ‘is’ premises does not lead to a normative conclusion.

On a macro methodological level, Skirbekk argues that one of the greatest challenges is rethinking the relationship between paradigmatic and gradual thinking, which concerns the clear justification of the moral status of humans as well as the definition of gradualism having different aspects such as the one of the biological gradualism. Furthermore, he points out that overcoming this challenge is possible within the field of discourse ethics (Ibid: 87). It is important to specify that if ontological gradualism, based on actual and potential properties, is represented as an ethical one, then we will be forced to adopt ethical speciesism, or biological gradualism in the best scenario.

In turn, so-called reasonableness of intuition regarding the definition of ethical gradualism can be referred to what Skirbekk describes as a gradual transition from the paradigmatic case of autonomous persons to the cases of “mere” moral subjects (Skirbekk 1996: 35). Before examining the concerns about the implementation of ethical gradualism as such, I will focus on the genealogy of the distinction between moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants, as displayed by Skirbekk. According to him, moral agents are all humans, but not all members of *Homo sapiens* are moral agents (e.g.

⁵⁴¹See Ibid: 119, Note 17. In this reference, Skirbekk does not examine the concrete implementations of the naturalist fallacy but rather points out the role of the principle of equality.

fetus, mentally retarded people etc.). There are those who are able to take part in moral discussions, which means again that moral discussants are all humans, but not all members of *Homo sapiens* are moral discussants (e.g. infants) (Ibid) (Skirbekk 1994: 105). Judging by these investigations, Skirbekk claims that the complex interrelations between moral agents and moral discussants are examined in the universal pragmatics as well as in the theories of socialization and modernization (Ibid: 103). Last but not least, those who are neither moral agents nor moral discussants, but who can still be morally harmed, are defined as moral subjects⁵⁴².

⁵⁴² “The beings who only belong to this category we could, for the lack of a better name, call *moral subjects*”. (Skirbekk 1996: 45, Note 16).

2.2. Skirbekk's Definitions of Moral Subject, Moral Agent and Moral Discussant

Regarding the three types of categories, namely, moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants, I will first explore Skirbekk's distinction between moral subjects and moral agents because its clarification is important in terms of revealing the normative validity of what moral obligations should be. According to Skirbekk, moral agents are capable of acting morally, while moral subjects "are capable of being harmed in a morally relevant sense" (Skirbekk 1994: 101). In this context, moral obligations are defined in respect with the "interrelationship between moral agents and their relationship to moral subjects" (Ibid). Moral subjects "who are not moral agents are unable to have obligations..." (Ibid).

The concept of moral subject can be described as a broader one compared to the notion of moral agents whose prototype characteristic is the capability of acting morally. This agency is determined as a matter of rational evaluation, which makes agents reasonably active, but at the same time, such an evaluation may not necessarily require to building a morally motivated moral engagement in so far as moral motivation is not equivalent to building a rational motivation, as Skirbekk argues. It is moral discussants whose moral agency is initiated by some open and enlightened discussions leading to a consensus on how to react morally (Ibid: 102). This, however, does not mean that the motivation is a purely moral one. We may give many examples in this respect such as reciprocal altruism, behavior of social sanctions etc.⁵⁴³, which require a moral action to be performed as driven by a complex moral motivation. Furthermore, due to the specificities of the different social practices and their requirements, there might be a gap between the rational consensus what an ethical agreement is and the pure moral motivation for initiating a moral behavior as a result of a given agreement.

⁵⁴³ Skirbekk also raises the following important question: could we claim the other way around i.e. that being able to participate in a moral discourse is a sufficient condition for being able to act morally? (Ibid: 103). According to him, it depends on the presuppositions regarding the concept of moral discussant (Ibid).

Against the background of these specifications, I draw the conclusion that the difficulties in defining the status of moral subjects⁵⁴⁴ partly derive from the fact that there is a tendency they to be misleadingly treated as objects of moral interest⁵⁴⁵. They are not able, and this characteristic brings us back not only to the debates about how the actual and potential abilities directly to affect moral agents and discussants, but also to the ones how moral subjects to be treated on their behalf (for their own good) by avoiding their treatment as moral objects.

Animals also meet the definition of moral subjects to the extent moral agents, or moral discussants, are the ones deciding on their behalf for the sake of their own well-being. It is the two characteristics, namely, not only deciding on the behalf of, but also for the sake of that make the principle of advocacy representation recognizable as an ethical principle. The ethical aspect derives from moral agents'/moral discussants' understanding that to be harmed is a morally unacceptable action, which they project on animals, being aware that the latter are not able to reflect on that state in a morally relevant manner. The obligation stems from the ideal presumption that since someone is defined as a moral agent/moral discussant, he/she becomes responsible for the decision-making process he/she participates in. On a macro methodological level, the principle of advocacy representation is grounded in the unquestionable moral obligation one to be morally engaged with the diversity of otherness. This principle can be referred to specifying the normative validity of the distributive responsibility regarding the obliga-

⁵⁴⁴ The concept of moral subject is a double-bind one depending on whether it is examined in contrast to, or in relation to the status of the moral agents and moral discussants. When moral subjects are defined in contrast to moral agents and moral discussants, they represent borderline cases of individuals or species (including some particular groups of people), which cannot become moral agents and moral discussants. However, when moral subjects are examined in respect with moral agents and moral discussants, i.e. when it is emphasized that the latter groups are also moral subjects, the definition of moral subject is analyzed from the perspective how one to develop a competence from a pragmatic point of view. In other words, I argue that while 'the positive' definition of moral subjects mainly concerns the representatives of human kind, the 'negative' one characterizes the group of non-humans, plus some groups of people i.e. moral subjects who are unable to become neither moral agents, nor moral discussants.

⁵⁴⁵ They represent borderline cases of different species since the criterion of selection is the capability of making moral decision and exerting undoubted moral actions. Furthermore, defining the status of moral subjects as 'incapable' moral agents or moral discussants raises the risks the subjects in question to be objectified in the ethical sense of the word.

tion to care, which is exerted by the moral agents or moral discussants. As a prototype characteristic of such a responsibility we can determine what Skirbekk calls an evaluation of the moral importance of what one does and does not do, which provokes an action “in accordance with that understanding and evaluation” (Ibid: 101). The stress is also put on the mode of distribution, which is understood as a mode ‘in accordance with’ what is morally valuable.

Having clarified the methodological differences between moral subjects and moral agents and moral discussants, we should also specify the complex relationships between the three groups since such an analysis is of crucial importance for understanding why discourse ethics provides better solutions in terms of building moral obligations to moral subjects. Skirbekk argues that the concepts of moral agent and moral discussant are co-extensive: those who are able to act morally are able to discuss⁵⁴⁶ moral actions and vice versa (Ibid: 102). However, he points out that even if these concepts are co-extensive, they do not converge into one. That is why it is reasonable to think of moral agents as potential moral discussants (Ibid). Skirbekk claims that the interrelatedness of moral agency and ethical discourse can be elaborated by referring to the universal pragmatics (as represented by Apel and Habermas) as well as to the theory of socialization and modernization (as defined by Kohlberg and Weber) (Ibid).

However, evaluating the similarities is easier compared to outlining the differences because it is easier to imagine a case in which moral agents⁵⁴⁷ become moral discussants due to the process of cultivating sensitivity towards otherness by initiating open and enlightened discussions, as Skirbekk outlines. It occurs since both moral agents and moral discussants are able to exert moral agency as well as to be morally engaged, taking into account that in both cases a certain level of moral awareness and reflection is need-

⁵⁴⁶ If we refer to Skirbekk’s thought-experiment with the robots and Martians (Ibid: 99-100), we see that there might be borderline cases in which some agents to be able to act morally but without being able to discuss the actions in question in so far as they miss a relevant bodily experience, or are not aware about the complexity of moral motivation as such.

⁵⁴⁷ According to Skirbekk, the difference between moral agents and moral discussants can be also a result of moral agents’ disability to be good at discussing ethical issues, albeit they may have good (in ethical sense of the word) intentions. On the other hand, he also emphasizes that the ones who are good at arguing might be self-deceptive due to different reasons such as having “false consciousness”. This is the case when one is what one is doing but does not see the consequences, which might be negative ones.

ed. Exploring the differences hides the risk to go back to examining the mode of the paradigmatic beings, namely, to go back to the idea of potential and actual capabilities, albeit this time they are elaborated on the level of moral commitment as moral (potential or actual) qualities. If in the case with potential and actual capabilities, the elaboration is examined as an evolution, or as a certain type of biological development, in the one with potential and actual moral qualities, it is justified as a cultivation provoking moral agency. In turn, the cultivation concerns the opportunity of providing an evaluation, i.e. of making moral agents/moral discussants aware of the moral motivation behind a given moral action. In turn, the motivation is irreducible to the physiological explanations what the process of elaboration is, albeit it can partly be driven by them.

Undoubtedly, the ability to discuss moral questions presumes considerable intellectual skills to be adopted as well as a certain training to be mastered (Ibid). As Skirbekk argues, the latter requires not only having mature individuals, but also a given cultural development, which is a matter of “a certain degree of modernization” (Ibid). In this sense, the definition of moral discussants becomes understandable if we determine what a moral development is within the broader framework of cultural and social definitions and thus to trace both the origin and the role of the enlightened discussions. Skirbekk claims that the concepts of moral agents and moral discussants do not have to be explored in empirical terms, but rather in terms of presuppositions and idealizations (Ibid: 103), i.e. in the field of universal pragmatics by outlining “competences inherent in speech acts”, as well as due to the theory of modernization and socialization regarding the impact of conceptual development and the development of social identity (Ibid).

This theory also affects how to extend the practice of advocatory representation by investigating the role of gradualism not only in terms of physiological and psychological capabilities, but also in the ones of discursively achieved decisions by giving an answer to the value question *What is a “good life”?* on behalf of moral subjects (Skirbekk 1996: 35).

Skirbekk claims that everybody with a point and everybody concerned should have a say, in a normative sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 96). He also discusses the role of pragmatically competent speakers who are not able to participate because they could not be there at a certain time, or who cannot yet participate (children), or who are no more able to participate, the ones who could never be able to participate in any discourse (babies with severe brain defects) (Ibid). An important sub-group is the one of the “merely hypotheti-

cal participants, of coming generations” (Ibid) who are not yet individualized, but who are statistically recognized (Ibid).

One of the main issues in this context is how by defining the pragmatically competent speaker, we can avoid legitimizing a given kind of speciesism since we differently talk about the discursive representation by somebody else (Ibid: 97). Skirbekk finds a solution in determining the pragmatic capacity, namely, he goes beyond justifying the biological implications of what a legitimate participant is at the expense of emphasizing the aspects of the pragmatic capacity, understood as aspects of a mastered competence rather than biological capability.

What is the role of so-called paternalistic agreements, or decisions based on discursive interpretations of available and “relevant knowledge”? (Skirbekk 1996: 36). According to Skirbekk, “the discursive element remains untouched” (Ibid), but “the participatory and consensual aspects are weakened” due to establishing forms of advocacy representation (Ibid). Since many of the moral subjects in the welfare state can never be autonomous persons, it does not make sense these arguments to be called “paternalistic” ones in an unqualified pejorative sense (Ibid). However, we should distinguish between various kinds of paternalism, as Skirbekk suggests: ‘some being *legitimate*, others *not*’ (Ibid). He argues that adopting this term is appropriate for moral, legal and political theory to the extent that social politics aims at protecting the interests of “moral subjects”-beings who are only potential moral agents, (or “moral discussants”) (Ibid). That is why it is irrelevant to call this “an act of illegitimate paternalism” (Ibid).

Furthermore, it is important to clarify that avoiding the pejorative aspects of paternalism depends not only on *how* we decide, but also on *who* decides because the decision-making process should be realized on behalf of the others, when they are moral subjects alone. That is why I argue that regarding the principle of advocacy representation, it means we to choose a different type of a ‘positive’ definition, as I already argued, i.e. the one of what these moral subjects *are* rather than relying on the negative one saying what they *cannot be*. On a macro methodological level, such a change demonstrates that the illegitimate paternalism can be avoided if we examine others as moral subjects, not as incapable moral agents and/or moral discussants. However, we should keep the criterion of capability in mind, in both ethical and biological sense, because such a specification is a necessary but not sufficient condition for acting morally.

2.2.1. The Criteria of Continuity and Discontinuity. Does Biological Gradualism Still Have a Place in the Ethical Anthropocentrism?

In this context, one of the main risks is to overexpose the impact of the paradigmatic case of human beings, which to lead to what Skirbekk calls ethical anthropocentrism based on the discussions about the role of actual and potential properties of the individuals (Skirbekk 1994: 84). Overexposing the role of properties would provoke simplifying not only the similarities, but also the differences between moral agents and moral discussants. Despite the fact that ethical gradualism does not exclude by default the development of a certain type of ethical anthropocentrism, it cannot be reduced to the latter since the process of moral differentiation goes beyond the problem of real properties, which are a prototype characteristic of the aforementioned paradigmatic case.

Furthermore, if we want to examine the benefits of adopting ethical gradualism beyond the field of ethical anthropocentrism, we should pay attention to the status of moral discussants as social beings. According to Skirbekk, human freedom, which sets people off from nature, is closely tied with their status as social beings (Ibid: 88) because it concerns the social identities of the ones who communicate by language (Ibid). Transcending the limits of the immediate adaptation, human beings become able to develop their prognostic attitudes by making a socially determined existential choice between different alternatives rather than by making a prediction, which concerns one and the same paradigmatic case. In turn, the socially determined choice is a result of a reflexive decision-making process, which is driven by what Skirbekk calls “personal identity acquired through a vulnerable process of socialization and individualization” (Ibid).

Regarding the connection between ethical gradualism and ethical anthropocentrism, we can talk about normative continuity in terms of what Skirbekk defines as paradigmatically appropriate characteristics of humans as moral beings (Ibid). These characteristics justify the normative validity of continuity of moral beings as such since the “phenomenology of humans as moral beings” (Ibid) is a necessary condition for avoiding the reduction of ethical gradualism to ethical anthropocentrism, which can be defined as a certain kind of eco-ethical speciesism.

According to Skirbekk, the arguments from potentiality are determined as “partly reasonable” ones (Ibid: 84). One can always go further because they entail “an implicit normative notion of nature” (Ibid: 117, Note 9), which in turn hides the risk of reducing ethical gradualism to a biological one. Oth-

erwise, it would mean to introduce a given kind of misleading determinism intermingling the current moral status of the individuals with their future status by accepting reality as a necessary and sufficient condition for prognostics. It would affect the equation of the capability with the probability mode.

As Skirbekk claims, the ability to act rationally and freely does not necessarily support the idea of moral difference (Ibid: 89) and its implementation in practice, while distinguishing between humans and non-humans as well as between the representatives of human species as such. He specifies the role of so-called potentiality of a second order, i.e. the potentiality of having potentialities (Ibid). One of the challenges in this context is that changing the focus from considering the real potentials of an individual to the ones of the species which the individual belongs to would lead to replacing the individual characteristics with the species' ones in the process of moral evaluation. Thus we face what Skirbekk calls a distinction between genetic and conceptual approaches (Ibid: 90) in so far as the genotype difference is not enough for providing a well-grounded moral differentiation, not only when we compare two different species such as human and chimpanzee (Ibid: 89), but also when we compare representatives of one and the same species.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the argument of potentiality can be accepted as an unquestionable one within the framework of ethical gradualism only if we deliberately interfere the first and second orders of potentialities. In turn, one of the main issues concerning the clarification of the debate about the actual and potential properties presumes the concept of moral difference to be examined on a different level, as Skirbekk suggests (Ibid: 119, Note 17). Therefore, the problem is how to interpret this difference beyond the scope of moral naturalism as well as how to avoid a certain form of moral absolutism to be established, which can be provoked by imposing the principle of ontological determinism.

The other side of the coin of the properties' debate is the one regarding the distinction between continuity and discontinuity, examined against the background of the utilitarian and deontological positions, which narrows ethical gradualism to the biological and psychological ones. In this context, Skirbekk explores the question how to define morally relevant continuity and discontinuity in respect with biological gradualism⁵⁴⁸ while talking

⁵⁴⁸As one of the most outstanding aspects of utilitarian theory, Skirbekk points out the role of biological and psychological gradualism as implying ethical gradualism from an utilitarian perspective (Ibid: 94).

about humans and non-humans (Ibid: 85), i.e. how to define them in normative terms, which can contribute to avoiding the interference of the first and second order potentialities. We may argue that the difficulties in specifying the relationships between the different types of gradualism concern also the fact that it is problematic to determine some unquestionable criteria for applying biological gradualism such as the one of sentience. In other words, the problem is how can we firmly define the characteristic of being sentient as a prototype one, which in turn to benefit the justification of suffering as a morally inappropriate one? Such an interpretation would lead us to adopting again the mode of ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’ while talking about the normative validity of sentience. It raises the concern whether we will not remain trapped again in the framework of ethical anthropocentrism since the criterion of sentience is determined from a human point of view.

2.2.2. The Role of Suffering with, or without Compassion⁵⁴⁹

According to Skirbekk, the problem of suffering is intrinsically connected with the status of the moral agents, which requires a further elaboration in so far as it theoretically displays a mediating status between two extremes, namely, between the fully competent moral subject (the moral discussant) and the completely incompetent one (the moral subject) (Skirbekk 1992a: 99-100). Furthermore, if we do not discuss whether the good will is a premise for being a moral agent since the latter is seen as capable to act morally, we should leave the question of the moral motivation⁵⁵⁰ open, as I already argued. We should also leave the one how a moral agent can do immoral things open. Thus we will be forced to neglect problems such as the one of the harm of white lie. On a macro methodological level, following this line of arguments would provoke the wrong conclusion that the concept of ethical discourse never changes.

In this context, Skirbekk argues that those who cannot be harmed in a morally relevant sense cannot be moral subjects, and therefore, they cannot be moral discussants⁵⁵¹ (Skirbekk 1994: 104), even if “they have the intelligence, the information and the semantic competence required” (Ibid). These investigations raise, among many other issues, the following questions: what would be the status of the moral agents if they are only able to act morally, without necessarily experiencing moral harms? What kind of subjects are they? How do they exactly differ from the moral discussants? And last but not least, is not it the characteristic of moral acting too broad including creatures such as the Martians and the robots of Skirbekk’s thought-

⁵⁴⁹ Before examining some implications of Skirbekk’s theory of compassion, it is important to emphasize that he recognizes compassion as something that comes naturally not in the sense of moral naturalism, but rather in terms of ontological ethics, namely, as something very basic and human that determines our life as human beings. In turn, it is culture, religion and mythology that provide the ‘differentiation’ of understanding compassion and anger in the different types of societies.

⁵⁵⁰ Otherwise, we should presume a complete overlapping between deeds and motivation claiming that a certain deed is a moral one because it is driven by default by a purely moral motivation.

⁵⁵¹ The problem is whether and how we will define the issue of moral harm due to the principle of advocatory representation. If so, it raises again the question about the connection between moral and rational reasons for the definition of harm. Moral agents have an ethical knowledge of harm, so to speak, but do not necessarily have a moral experience in contrast to the moral discussants. This is one of the reasons why Skirbekk examines different borderline cases such as the ones with the robots and Martians as belonging to the group of moral agents.

experiment, which are deprived of the experiential capability of being moral, and if so, are they moral subjects and moral agents at all? According to Skirbekk, biologically rooted learning and vulnerability represent a shared foundation of moral discussants, moral agents, and moral subjects (Ibid: 105).

An illuminative example in this respect is what Skirbekk outlines as a change in the questioning mode. Referring to J. Bentham's theory, he argues that the question is no longer "Can they (animals) reason? nor "Can they talk?", but "Can they suffer?" (Ibid: 94). However, even if sentience is determined due to whether it can be witnessed or not, the evaluation of biological gradualism remains a necessary but not sufficient condition for defining ethical gradualism.

In this context, Skirbekk clarifies that while the principle of advocacy representation reveals why animals do not have rights in the full sense as human beings have rights, the issue of compassion gives new perspectives for moral evaluation beyond the intuitions of continuity and discontinuity (Skirbekk 1992a: 92-93).

Furthermore, Skirbekk claims that discourse ethics and utilitarianism are two rationalized approaches, which support the intuition of making a difference between man and animals as well as the one between them in respect with continuity (Ibid: 92). He also argues that neither of these two approaches "fully captures the dimension of compassion, which has an importance of its own" (Ibid: 93). Compassion concerns not only the understanding of the main aspects of human relationships with higher mammals and the full eco-ethical status of the latter, but also the "widening of the human self-understanding and identity relative to these animals" (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, I argue that the role of compassion in building experiential morality with a certain normative validity as well as its impact on cultivating so-called by Skirbekk eco-consciousness should be explored.

Analyzing the role of eco-consciousness is important since having rationalized ethical procedures does not necessarily give us an answer to the question what it means to be in someone else's shoes, namely, how the 'positive' normative validity of moral imagination can be recognized. As I already argued in the previous chapters, moral imagination can be defined as having a different type of normative validity, which is irreducible to pure irrationality, namely, it provides the need of rehabilitating the normative validity of feelings and emotions in building a complex eco-consciousness. In this respect, Næss's statement regarding the introduction of new experien-

tial learning should be positively evaluated. A similar line of thoughts is articulated by Skirbekk who claims that the imagination of childhood and fairy tales might still be of some eco-ethical importance in the modern scientized world⁵⁵². According to him, they “teach us on a personally experienced level something about the ecological togetherness and interdependence which scientific ecology describes and explains” (Ibid: 105).

⁵⁵² See also Næss’s comments on Feyerabend’s thesis why children should learn magic at school, which I discussed in the chapter on Næss.

2.2.2.1. Calculating Morally Unacceptable Killing. The Impact of Pain-calculus Utilitarianism

According to Skirbekk, utilitarianism has some other problems of its own, which derive from the notion of justice when it is referred to the seeming asymmetry between negative and positive values such as pains and pleasures (Ibid: 99). In these cases, we have different versions of utilitarianism depending on the subject they treat (Ibid). What are the consequences of that for so-called pain-calculus? Skirbekk argues that from a pain-utilitarian perspective, the “cases of equal pain have equal right or equal status”, regardless of whether the pain is incarnated in a human body or in an animal body (Ibid). However, if the pain of smashing the hand of a man and chimpanzee with a hammer is the same⁵⁵³, “how could the act be morally wrong in the first case and morally neutral in the second” one? (Ibid: 99-100)⁵⁵⁴.

This example is instructive not only because it raises again the question of how we know that the pain is the ‘same’, namely, that there is an unquestionable connection between the physical experience and its moral evaluation, and our knowledge about it respectively. It also benefits understanding how recognizing that we are moral discussants who interact with moral subjects, which are initially deprived of the consciousness of what moral is, does not necessarily result in reducing the pain-calculus to a certain speciesism. Otherwise, the principle of advocatory representation would leave no room for compassion with other species. On a macro methodological level, it means that the comparative pain analyses require not only biological or psychological interpretations, but also ethical ones. This, however, does not mean to neglect the role of the former as a factor in providing such analyses.

Furthermore, it is the introduction of discourse ethics that makes pain analysis going to a deeper level of evaluation, as Skirbekk suggests, by clarifying why albeit we do not underrate animals’ suffering in all its forms, we should distinguish between morally acceptable killing of animals and morally un-

⁵⁵³ By examining utilitarianist projections as a pain-related calculus, Skirbekk outlines the role of human-size mammals for measuring pain sensitivity in the bio-medical research (Ibid).

⁵⁵⁴ Skirbekk emphasizes the role of immediate pain experience “disregarding the question of pain expectation or pain-remembering” (Ibid: 100).

acceptable killing of humans⁵⁵⁵ (Ibid: 101). As he points out, adopting such an approach brings us back to reviving the principle of advocacy representation supplemented with the criterion of painless killing of animals.

An instructive example in this respect is how pain-utilitarian considerations are related to the principle of advocacy representation in practice, which in turn requires the pain-utilitarianism to be included into the discursive ethical procedures (Ibid: 102). The reconsideration of the issue of compassion is of crucial importance for what Skirbekk calls a transition “from a compassion embracing pain and well-being to a compassion embracing only pain” as well as a transition from a compassion with an individual creature to a compassion with the species as such (Ibid: 104). Thus the debate about morally (un)acceptable killing gains another dimension, namely, it takes into account the relationships between individual and collective suffering at once by illustrating why so-called preference utilitarianism should not be neglected.

However, we should keep in mind that the pain-utilitarian calculus can non-contradictory be carried out by a moral agent who does not feel compassion by relying on the means of scientific data and cost-benefit analyses, as Skirbekk relevantly argues (Ibid: 103). This investigation shows that ethical utilitarianism is not the most appropriate paradigm if we want to differentiate the scale of minimizing pain and suffering because it does not take into account the whole complexity of the problem remaining focused on its regulation in quantitative terms. If we remain within the framework of these interpretations, it would mean that minimizing suffering would automatically increase the well-being. Such a presumption is contradictory also in the sense that due to it compassion and empathy should increase the well-being at any expense. Secondly, working in terms of calculating does not benefit the complexity of the specificities: neither of individual/species’ suffering, nor of their well-being.

In turn, the deontological paradigm is defined by Skirbekk as specifying why it is moral agents alone who can have moral rights in the process of evaluation (Skirbekk 1994: 95-96). Neglecting the diverse relationships be-

⁵⁵⁵ Furthermore, he also pays special attention to the difficulties regarding the definition of what morally acceptable killing is when we talk about painless killing of animals. Skirbekk claims that even if the latter may be justified by the transition from utilitarianism to discourse ethics, the painless killing of people such as euthanasia remains even more questionable within the field of discourse ethics (Ibid: 101).

tween moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants by specifying the status of the moral agents alone would lead to ethical anthropocentrism. Due to the latter, we will have the ideal image of a capable moral agent who exercises his/her rights in respect with the power of his/her duties. As Skirbekk claims, moving from the status of moral subjects to that of moral agents affects the restriction of the conditions of being a moral subject (Ibid: 95). The latter has an impact on the aforementioned debate by giving priority to the actual properties alone (since the possibility of having a real duty and the duty itself are important aspects of this ethics), but does not provide solutions by going beyond the debate as such.

Referring again to Skirbekk's thought experiment with the robots and Martians, which theoretically meet the requirements of moral agents, it would mean they to be able to require a reduction of suffering without being morally engaged. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that compassion can be felt without reaching a procedural consensus, even when we talk about mutual compassion, which illustrates why the rationalized ethical procedures provided by the discursive ethics are merely a necessary condition for encouraging empathy and compassion. In this context, Skirbekk makes the relevant comment that personal experience, plus scientific knowledge, plus discursively improved opinions are "all essential to promote compassion for "beasts" and other sentient animals and even to promote some deeper identification with all other species" (Ibid: 104).

On a macro methodological level, discussing the role of compassion beyond the positions of both discursive ethics and utilitarianism is of crucial importance for justifying ethical gradualism as a measure against anthropocentrism seen as a form of eco-ethical speciesism (Ibid: 106). As Skirbekk argues, eco-ethical speciesism cannot be defended from a universal pragmatic position by referring to its formal characteristics, nor from a utilitarian position (Ibid). However, this fact does not imply a relativism or reductionism of anything which, from the perspective of these two positions, can be said in favor of human dignity and worth (Ibid). Thus, according to Skirbekk, gradualism presupposes including non-humans to the extent they feel pain, have needs, or can even be ascribed an interest in the survival of the own species (Ibid).

2.3. The Remedy of Discourse Ethics. The Roles of Mini-ethics and Universal Ethics

What would be the solution to the aforementioned problems as well as why is discourse ethics justified against the background of utilitarian and deontological ethics as providing some new alternatives for treating moral subjects? Examining the role of universal pragmatics and discourse ethics, Skirbekk emphasizes “the operative priority” of answers revealing “insufficient perspectives or views” by stressing the need of improvement (Skirbekk 1992a: 95). However, from adopting such an approach it does not follow that a certain “positive claim of absolute truth within the discursive procedure” (Ibid) is found. According to Skirbekk, gradualism is implicit in the process of ‘correcting’ in so far as it is based on the gradual nature of the tentative process of improvement (Ibid). On a micro methodological level, it means that we should talk about gradually increased discursive treatment dependent on the real case, but without presuming a definite end, which to provide guaranteed final answers (Ibid). It is the relevance of the pragmatic competence that reveals how discursive treatment is dependent on the “actual case” (Ibid) and as such has a normative validity with an unquestionable status. The unquestionability itself derives from the presumption that a definite end is not equivalent to having a final answer. On the contrary, it is a process of coming as close as possible to the most suitable solution for a given case.

According to Skirbekk, “Sufficient rationality, and finitude, and a belief in improvement, are all constitutive for discursive rationality” (Ibid). Discursive rationality presumes not only a strong belief in the process of improvement, but also understanding (on side of the participants in the discourse) of what finitude is as well as an agreement about what sufficient rationality is (Ibid). On a macro methodological level, the gradualism characterizing discursive treatment is the one that makes man’s status differ from the one of animals since it is human that is qua pragmatic speaker (Ibid). In this context, Skirbekk reaches the conclusion that the main strength of the discourse ethics is grounded in the “self-referential inconsistency inherent in denying any of the pragmatic preconditions of argumentation” (Ibid: 94). Among such preconditions, we should outline the one of reciprocal recognition of the participants, which is normatively essential in so far as it presumes justifying these participants as (rational) discussants (Ibid), i.e. it requires a common ethical status for all pragmatically skilled language users

to be approved⁵⁵⁶ (Ibid). The normative validity of the preconditions, however, does not have to be interpreted in absolutist terms, as something having both an unchangeable form and content. On the contrary, it should be explored as intrinsically tied with the mode of becoming of the discursive participants because it is the precondition of the reciprocal recognition that makes us able to talk about moral discussants at all, albeit the latter may differ in their moral views and ethical stances. Therefore, the preconditions do not have to be defined as absolute conditions, but rather as conditions without which⁵⁵⁷, with all their specificities, it becomes impossible to introduce discourse ethics in Skirbekk's sense. As he argues, within the discursive frame, there are various "substantial" issues (in the sense of normative questions) (Ibid), which are open in their contents and realization. On the other hand, it is the presupposed equality of all participants that provides "a pragmatic *a priori* defense against ethnocentricity and inter-human differences" (Ibid).

Skirbekk argues that all obligations (except the ones regarding 'perfect duty'), either between moral agents, or between moral agents and moral subjects should be discursively interpreted (Skirbekk 1994: 106). In turn, discursive rationality is adopted when the questions of the utility of individual rights are addressed (Ibid). Otherwise, a pre-skeptical stage of "defective self-reference among the proponents of utilitarianism" and deontology will be established (Ibid). The pre-skeptical itself should be understood as not aiming at a procedural consensus in so far as the decision-making process it provokes is deprived of its initial normative validity. On the other hand, referring to the paradigm of discourse ethics can contribute to overcoming the aforementioned difficulties, while discussing the interrelatedness between moral agents and moral subjects if we enrich the concept of obligation with the one of responsibility. Thus we can avoid distributive responsibility to be restricted by moral absolutism, which is not a result of open and enlightened discussions.

Since discourse theory does not necessarily reject the implication of all utilitarian principles, Skirbekk raises the issue how it can display "a critical but also a sublating rationality in relation to utilitarian thinking, with its var-

⁵⁵⁶ However, we do not have to forget that, as Skirbekk himself argues, being rational is only one of the necessary conditions for talking about morally aware agents and discussants.

⁵⁵⁷ Absoluteness does not have to be understood as a fundamental mode, i.e. as a universal grounding.

ious versions of cost-benefit analyses” (Ibid: 107). Adopting such analyses would mean that the differences with the discourse ethics cannot be seen in the context of implementation alone, but rather in the one of revealing the methodological reasons behind a certain evaluation, which is defined as a moral one. On a macro methodological level, it illustrates that the discourse ethics gives us relevant grounds for reconsidering the principle of advocacy representation within the meta-ethical discourse, by rethinking the role of so-called meta-ethics and mini-ethics in Skirbekk’s sense.

Utilitarian propositions are described as too narrow to clarify the borderline cases, from which, however, it does not follow that the descriptive analysis⁵⁵⁸ adopted by the utilitarian proponents is wrong in itself (Ibid: 97). In his conclusion, Skirbekk claims that the idea of a paradigmatic difference between humans and non-humans is most relevantly conceived by the theorists of social identity and discursive rationality (Ibid), which benefits understanding why defining humans as a paradigmatic case does not necessarily question the role of moral obligations, nor does it underrate the role of biological gradualism as such, as I already showed.

According to Skirbekk, discourse ethics focuses on the self-reflective insight of argumentation “using irrefutability of its constitutive preconditions as its foundation” (Ibid: 98)⁵⁵⁹. He argues that this ethics provides the best proposal for a fundamental ethical theory specifying the normative validity of concepts such as justice and solidarity as well as the opportunity for achieving critical universalizability in so far as discourse theory contributes to avoiding abstract individualism and naturalism concerning the problem of rights and properties (Ibid). Compared to utilitarian and deontological ethics, which only partly touched the issues of rights and properties, the discourse ethics, as Skirbekk points out, justifies the universalizability in question by stressing the role of social identity, as I already mentioned.

On a macro methodological level, the procedural norms of discursive activity represent so-called by Skirbekk “a common mini-ethics of the modern world” (Skirbekk 2007: 85), which is supposed to be “universally valid while rationally irrefutable” (Ibid). He outlines that discourse ethics is uni-

⁵⁵⁸ We can argue that this analysis is ‘right’ in terms of descriptively specifying the problem, but insufficient in terms of clarifying its normative validity.

⁵⁵⁹ Skirbekk argues that he disregards the differences between Apel’s and Habermas’s theories concerning the status of discourse ethics (Ibid: 122, Note 33) for the sake of outlining the impact of the general role-taking and the presupposed mutual recognition (Ibid: 98).

versal, albeit from that it does not follow that it has a metaphysical content (Ibid). The norms are described as procedural and formal ones in Kant's sense since they are normatively binding as pre-conditions of a rational discourse (Ibid). This means that the various issues discussed within these procedures cannot be prescribed a priori, which in turn makes the content of a given rational discourse an open question (Ibid).

Furthermore, the definition of the procedural norms is normatively valid in its way of functioning rather than due to the implications of its content. If the latter was unchangeable, then the idea of procedural consensus⁵⁶⁰ would have been one and the same, while the consensus itself should have lost the opportunity the potential to change its own content⁵⁶¹. In this context, Skirbekk reveals the role of "unsurpassable meta-ethics" as a rationally binding set of norms for doing research and discussing (Ibid). It is the normative validity of ethical unsurpassability that is a pre-condition for having a possibility of a rational consensus. In turn, the requirement of 'mini' can be seen as 'basic' in terms of normatively grounding and thus as having an universalizing function because it can be equally referred to all both real and potential members of the discourse.

It is the normative indetermination of mini-ethics and mini-rationality⁵⁶² that makes the 'mini' requirements a subject to both ethical and epistemological examinations, which are dependent but irreducible to each other. Otherwise, mini-ethics should have functioned as utilitarian ethics based on the principles of the cost-benefit analysis: the other alternative is rationality to be justified as incompatible with the idea of solidarity, which would put in question the role of ethics as such. According to Skirbekk, mini-ethics "displays a modern, post-skeptical notion of rationality and ethics independent of cultural and religious differences" (Ibid: 86), i.e. it presupposes

⁵⁶⁰ The idea of procedural consensus is defined due to the fact that it is based on the presumption of having a reciprocal recognition on side of the participants in the ethical discourse.

⁵⁶¹ Comparing Skirbekk's and Næss's theories of consensus, I argue that the misleading recognition of moral objectivism is due to the fact that Næss considers academic environmental ethics as meta-ethics as well as ambiguously interprets the objectives of the latter (Light 2009: 83). In this context, I draw the conclusion that Næss grounds his theory in the misconception that ethics coincides with activism, while the rest is a talk about ethics that embodies the strive for consensus (Ibid). However, he underrates the fact that not every single consensus is a result of a commonly shared moral agreement.

⁵⁶² In this sense, mini-rationality and mini-ethics can be recognized as crucial factors since their definitions concern their functioning in principle regardless of their contents.

the need of introducing universal ethics. In this context, I draw the conclusion that one of the most apparent implications of justifying universalizable ethics is rebuilding the role of so-called by Skirbekk communicative competence⁵⁶³, which contributes the role of moral engagement to be relevantly evaluated⁵⁶⁴.

⁵⁶³ That is why we can justify the competence of being morally engaged as a prototype characteristic of the communicative competence.

⁵⁶⁴ In turn, the aforementioned idea of reciprocal recognition of moral discussants is seen as a matter of both collective and individual moral responsibility. Even when moral engagements differ in their contents due to the complex purposes of the social interaction, or because moral agents are acting “communicatively” in different ways (Skirbekk 1994: 108), the reciprocal recognition is defined by Skirbekk as not embraced by the utilitarian view (Ibid). From a utilitarian perspective, there is an agreement but it is made by the ones who are already accepted as moral participants. On the other hand, within the framework of utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism in particular, it remains unclear why we have to adopt the principle of overall utility maximization as an obligation. One possible explanation can be found in the concept of maximizing self-interests. However, recognizing such a presumption does not benefit finding an answer to the question how to prevent turning the interests in question into egoist interests, which might lead to equating the personal preferences with the moral obligations.

2.3.1. Vital Rights and Moral Obligations. Some Perspectives on Ethical Gradualism

According to Skirbekk, ethical gradualism does not have to be interpreted as relativism since we have a clear obligation as moral discussants to keep the discussion open (Skirbekk 1994: 115). Compared with ethical anthropocentrism, adopting ethical gradualism “requires even greater caution” because, for example, it relies on rejecting analyses that are exclusively based on anthropocentric values due to which the “demands in question have far-reaching” implications (Ibid). What are these implications regarding the status of the participants in the ethical discourse? On a macro methodological level, Skirbekk emphasizes the tension between “an ecologically uninformed, short-term and local anthropocentrism” and “ecologically well-informed, long-term and global anthropocentrism”⁵⁶⁵ (Ibid: 116). He also points out that in many cases, the “decisive practical difference” is the one between the aforementioned two versions of ethical anthropocentrism rather than the difference between a comprehensive ethical anthropocentrism and ethical gradualism (Ibid).

In this context, I argue that the first form of anthropocentrism can be examined as supporting what Næss calls shallow ecology movement due to which the ecological problems are instrumentally solved within the anthropocentric paradigm. On the other hand, the vision provided by so-called global anthropology may contribute to raising deeper ecological consciousness in Skirbekk’s sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 103).

Despite the fact that the definition of moral subject places the latter at the bottom of the ethical system since it presumes the ‘lowest’, or the lack of any ‘moral’ capabilities at all, moral discussants are presumably considered as moral subjects (Ibid: 105) in the sense that they are ‘morally developed’ moral subjects. The development could be understood as a matter of an articulated moral engagement, namely, as a cultivation of sensitivity towards otherness in its representations, especially when it requires the principle of

⁵⁶⁵ Discussing the role of deep ecology, Skirbekk outlines that except deep ecology, we have the following two main positions: the ones of short-term local interests and long-term global interests for human survival (Skirbekk 1992a: 103). In this context, he argues that we should work on mediating the short-term local interests with the long-term global ones for human survival (Ibid). This is another important example of why neglecting the role of human responsibility and obligations is not a necessary condition for including the living organisms as belonging to the category of moral subjects.

advocatory representation to be adopted. Furthermore, it is the competence of the moral discussants that makes the procedural consensus possible.

If so, what would be the moral responsibilities of the ones preserving nature if they witness suffering, which can be relieved? For example, we may see an animal, which has fallen in a trap and needs help. On the other hand, this animal can be the last option for saving another animal from starvation. The issue becomes even more complicated, when the relationship presumes the dilemma to be extrapolated to the representatives of human species and especially to the ones belonging to human and non-human species because in these borderline cases of suffering, the one who can react as a moral agent is the human being alone.

Another issue arises when we have to apply this way of reasoning to plants, biological systems, understood in terms of Gaia theory etc. According to Skirbekk, such reasoning problematically encourages the notion of interest to be recognized as “conation”, without any connection to sentience (Ibid: 112). Skirbekk points out that due to these speculations, the implications of ‘conation’ are merely related to the inherent striving and the possibility of being harmed⁵⁶⁶ (Ibid). In this context, I argue that instead of discussing moral harm and ‘conation’ alone, we should also take into account the projections of empathy and solidarity, which contribute to avoiding not only the potential moral harms, but also benefit seeing how to strengthen moral well-being in qualitative terms. Thus the problem of whether to give a preference to negative or to positive needs will be sublated.

On the other hand, overrating the role of sentience as a demarcation criterion also brings to light some problems whose origin can be seen if we go back to Skirbekk’s though experiment with the robots and Martians. He defines the concept of the latter as a flexible one⁵⁶⁷, which describes “prag-

⁵⁶⁶ In this context, Skirbekk examines John Rodman’s conception that rejects the role of sentience as a condition for being a moral subject, while examining so-called zoocentrist sentientism (Ibid: 125, Note 57). Skirbekk also refers to Jon Wetlesen’s theory arguing that not all the animals are morally equal, which requires a certain gradualism to be adopted.

⁵⁶⁷ For the differences between robots and Martians, see Skirbekk’s latest article *Ethical Gradualism and Reverence for Vulnerable Life. Ecophilosophical Reflections (Etisk gradualisme, og ærefrykt for sårbart liv. Øko-filosofiske refleksjoner)* (2016) (Skirbekk 2016: 238-239). He outlines that artificial intelligence is not a necessary and sufficient condition for participating in ethical and meta-ethical discussions (Ibid). In this context, ethical gradualism concerns the ethical difference between intelligent biological creatures and intelligent non-biological creatures (Ibid: 239). He gives the example with the robots, which can participate in many fields, but are not able to participate in discussions when ethical gradualism should be adopted (Ibid).

matically competent biological beings who are like us... in all relevant perspectives but who are genetically different from us” (Skirbekk 1992a: 99, Note 6). Some other contradictions stem from the distinction between intelligent biological being and intelligent non-biological being, which raises the question whether we should talk in biological gradualist terms alone. The comparison follows the line of exploring reasonable co-mammals, with a body and with a pragmatic competence as well as analyzing the status of creatures without a bio-body and semantic competence. The latter, however, should be excluded due to already discussed conclusion that being deprived of bodies, they cannot obtain a ‘real’ moral experience (Skirbekk 1994: 122, Note 36). In this context, discussing biological gradualism provokes the question how can we evaluate the behavior of moral agents who have a bodily experience, but at the same time, react as if they are deprived of such an experience being guided by an absolute duty? If we elaborate the thought experiment, we can argue that the robots and Martians can act as representing an ideal case of agents from the perspective of deontological ethics⁵⁶⁸, which presumes duty to be obtained in respect with a purely moral motivation of acting dutifully.

In turn, defining rights⁵⁶⁹ in the field of discourse ethics, as Skirbekk suggests, provides more complex solutions than the ones proposed by the utilitarianists, which are focused on elaborating decisions for the dilemmas regarding the properties debate. In turn, the latter can be defined as simplifying the relationship between the individual maturity and rights as well as the one between the rights and the moral status of these individuals. According to Skirbekk, discourse ethics gives a rational foundation for a universal ethics, also for an eco-ethics (Skirbekk 1992a: 101) to the extent that within its

⁵⁶⁸One of the differences with moral agents who have bodily experience is that the latter react due to the specificities of the intersubjective relationships. Therefore, their notion of action is determined by the one of how to act responsibly to others. On the other hand, Skirbekk outlines that the differentiation of the levels of responsibility affects the differentiation of the levels of blame, which in turn differs humans from animals.

⁵⁶⁹ According to Skirbekk, broadening eco-consciousness should be also based on interest in and compassion with species, even if any specific individual creature of that species can be legitimately killed (Ibid). In this context, Skirbekk explains the lack of sensitivity towards species-perspective with the fact that it follows the logic of human rights as well as that there is a distinction between utilitarian positions and the ones supporting individual rights (Ibid: 96). Exploring why humankind as a species displays an ecological threat to other species, he gives arguments in favor of defending the future survival of endangered non-human species (Ibid).

framework, we can outline three important subjects: pragmatically competent participants, potential participants who are advocatory represented, and creatures that are neither pragmatically competent, nor entitled to advocatory representation⁵⁷⁰ (Ibid). On the other hand, he also emphasizes that extending the notion of potentially pragmatically competent participants to the whole of human species, we should not limit ourselves to the strict realm of discursive ethics and universal pragmatics discourse especially while discussing the status of the aforementioned subgroups of non-humans (Ibid: 102).

Discourse ethics benefits clarifying the field of morality since moral rights are irreducible to natural rights. From the fact that moral rights are not identical to the natural ones, it follows that moral capability is irreducible to the 'natural' one. The differentiation on the level of maturity should be projected to the questionable issue of what potential 'full' membership is, which hides the risk the latter to be understood in purely naturalist terms, albeit moral capability has natural capability merely as its necessary condition⁵⁷¹.

Otherwise, if the moral rights are examined as 'developed' natural rights, it would mean to fall into the trap of moral naturalism, which can provoke the establishment of moral absolutism.

On a macro methodological level, the latter specification contributes to clarifying why understanding the problem of rights presumes implying gradualism of the interests behind, so that the latter to have a well-grounded normative validity because some of these interests concern the vital needs of moral subjects, moral agents and moral discussants.

Skirbekk claims that from a deontological point of view, the focus is on our obligations towards moral subjects, both humans and non-humans (Skirbekk 1994: 101), which, however, does not necessarily require a form of concern on side of the moral discussants to be expressed (Ibid). According

⁵⁷⁰ In this context, a question arises how to deal with these subjects who cannot be advocatory represented since it becomes more problematic to discern what a moral harm is for them, i.e. whether we can interpret them as moral subjects at all, and if not, how relevant is to call them moral objects. Furthermore, if we treat them as moral objects, then again the problem of ethical anthropocentrism gains a new strength. In this context, I argue that the category of moral subjects is not a homogeneous one, which provokes the concerns about differentiating the criteria of evaluation for the ones who cannot be entitled to advocatory representation.

⁵⁷¹ Otherwise, we should go back again to the debate about actual and potential properties regarding moral evaluation.

to the deontological conception, the obligations are examined as deriving from the agreement between autonomous individuals, which means that both non-humans and non-autonomous human beings are presumably excluded (Ibid: 108). That is why the contract is agreed “on the level of speech agents”,⁵⁷² not on the level of moral agents, nor on the one of moral subjects (Ibid). Thus the distinction between consensus and compromise disappears (Ibid) in so far as tracing the moral motivation becomes a difficult task in terms of specifying when it is a result of an enlightened discussion or not. In this context, Skirbekk describes contractarianism as insufficient on the levels of moral discussants and moral agents since there is no distinction between strategic and communicative actions (Ibid).

In contrast to deontological and utilitarian ethics, discourse ethics determines the basic obligations as “the pragmatically irrefutable normative preconditions of argumentation” (Ibid: 105). On a micro methodological level, it means that the obligation has to follow the better argument and the reciprocal recognition among the discussants (Ibid). Furthermore, it is the reciprocal recognition that makes possible justice to be defined as universally valid because it is achieved by the attempts of the moral discussants to reach an enlightened agreement. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the reciprocal recognition becomes possible if the universalizability in Skirbekk’s sense is examined on the level of solidarity, which brings us back to the field of experiential morality⁵⁷³.

Extrapolating Skirbekk’s theory, I draw the conclusion that elaborating the principle of advocacy representation due to some perspectives outlined by discourse ethics would concern the fact that its normative validity is justified by referring to a mode in which duty is transformed into a self-obligation on side of the moral discussants, while deciding whether they should avoid treating moral subjects as moral objects. I also argue that this principle is based on the presumption regarding ideal understanding of interests. First, it concerns moral agents’ awareness of what their duty is, and second, the awareness of what the interest of the moral subjects is, which might create some difficulties if these two aspects are merely interpreted

⁵⁷² However, speech agents cannot be treated by default as moral discussants, albeit the latter should be ‘capable’ speech agents.

⁵⁷³ Morality in question can be better understood if we extrapolate the idea of knowing to the one of understanding, namely, to start arguing in favor of understanding by experiencing due to which the latter has an unquestionable normative validity.

from the perspective of deontological ethics. That is why we should keep in mind that if the idea of moral agency is grounded in the ideal presumption of pure ethical knowledge alone, which provokes, regardless of the circumstances, a moral engagement to be made, then it would mean to neglect the role of moral experience as such. Even if such a duty functions as an elaboration of the notion of interests, it does not take into consideration the specificities of the latter, but rather stems from the aforementioned ideal presumption trying to adapt the moral cases to it in respect with the knowledge about what dutiful is.

2.3.2. Vital Needs and Vital Interests

To what extent are such interests definable as vital ones? According to Skirbekk, there is a basic intuition regarding our obligation towards moral subjects, which depends on the moral interest of those subjects (Ibid: 111). The interest itself is determined as an interest of an explicit claim (Ibid: 112). Furthermore, he argues that interests that are strongly defended by moral subjects should be respected in so far as the strength of the defense derives either from will and pure force, or from good reasons and justice (Ibid)⁵⁷⁴. The problem is that this strength of defense is not a sufficient criterion for distinguishing between different types of motivation since a moral subject can make other interests be misrecognized as moral ones, even when one is motivated by good reasons. Another aspect of the problem is that even if we presume the existence of an ideal, morally aware moral agent, there is always a risk he/she to advocate for a good reason, which can be morally unacceptable, as I already showed.

An important issue, which is emphasized by Skirbekk, concerns the twist from talking about a moral subject *being interested in* something to talking about a moral subject *having an interest in* something⁵⁷⁵ (Ibid). If the state of the former implies some mental capacities as well as some sense of belonging to be developed on side of the moral subjects, the state of the latter does not require such a thing (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, this distinction presumes a gradualist analysis of obligations to non-humans to be accepted because higher mammals also have subjectively expressed interests, which are communicated by their behavioral and various objective interests⁵⁷⁶ (Ibid). All these interests vary from the fulfillment of psychological needs to the need of some social setting (Ibid). Skirbekk also claims that in gliding

⁵⁷⁴ Skirbekk argues that these interests can be either of verbal expression, or of bodily one as well as that the differences are crucial for defining the limits of our moral obligations towards humans and non-humans (Ibid).

⁵⁷⁵ This social setting, however, does not have to be equated with the process of having a social identity.

⁵⁷⁶ It is important to specify what the connection between behavioral and various objective interests is, namely, to what extent behavioral interests also meet the criteria of objective interests, especially when we talk about social behavior. As Skirbekk claims in the next sentence, these varying interests cover different types of needs including social ones.

down the scale of animals ranking, we get less of the subjective needs while the objective ones remain untouched (Ibid).

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we should specify the complexity of the relationships between subjective and objective needs, and subjective and objective interests respectively since subjective interests may also require the fulfillment of given objective needs. It may occur in the process of evolution, or in the one of the inter-communal interaction, especially among the higher mammals. Another aspect of the problem is the notion of so-called societal interest in maintenance and survival (Ibid: 114). Skirbekk points out that converting these interests into obligations requires to “filter” them discursively, which leads to separating morally legitimate from morally illegitimate interests (Ibid). Thus we have an obligation for the survival of the society in which we live (Ibid). This statement is an illuminative illustration of how one, at first sight, non-vital interest such as the societal one becomes a vital interest due to the fact that the survival of human beings is intrinsically connected with the development of the societal life. To a certain extent, we can claim that survival and social development posed as tasks are used as ontological synonyms in the modern welfare state⁵⁷⁷.

The basic needs themselves, and basic human needs and interests in particular, are defined by Skirbekk in Habermas’s sense (Skirbekk 1992a: 94, Note 3). In this context, Skirbekk outlines that such needs and interests also imply a relation to some ideas of what a good life is, i.e. a relation to values, and not merely to the ideas of justice in the pragmatic preconditions, which are constitutive for the discursive rationality. Adopting such an approach presupposes the question of values’ context-dependence to be examined (Ibid). Skirbekk determines the double-bind meaning of the hierarchy of needs understood as a ranking of basic to superficial ones as well as the role of gradualism for our knowledge about them, namely, how to favor a better knowledge of negative rather than of positive needs⁵⁷⁸ (Ibid: 104). On the other hand, the knowledge in question should be examined as dialectically related to both positive and negative needs in so far as the process of favor-

⁵⁷⁷ Skirbekk discusses the role of so-called societal survival.

⁵⁷⁸ The problem becomes even more complicated when we have to evaluate which of these positions and negative needs are vital and which ones are non-vital respectively.

ing does not presume an ontological hierarchy to be introduced⁵⁷⁹, but rather an axiological one. This means that better understanding the impact of basic needs is impossible without better understanding the non-vital ones and the other way around. The process depends on the evaluation of how this interrelatedness is interpreted within different methodological paradigms such as the ones of utilitarianism, deontological ethics and discourse ethics, which in turn depends on the definition of what a moral subject is.

Furthermore, the question how to relate (vital) interests to vital needs requires further elaboration. It raises the concern whether all so-called objective interests, if we presume the ideal case when they meet the criteria of what objective interest is, do manage to satisfy vital needs at all. Another risk hides the development of some subjectively held points of view, which can be misunderstood as an elaboration of objective interests. Thus the mis-evaluation of the objective interests may result either in equating biological with ethical gradualism, or in equating technological with ethical ones. Among many other consequences, it would mean to simplify the need of social identification, i.e. this need to be justified by mastering biological instincts or technocratic ambitions for power and control⁵⁸⁰. In turn, such a reductionism would negatively affect the question how to distinguish between ‘more’ and ‘less’ developed (social) communities arguing in favor of a certain group-belonging speciesism.

⁵⁷⁹ An important comment in this context is the one, which Skirbekk makes about the definition of need, namely, that it also embraces possible positive states, not only the absence of negative ones, viz. pain (Ibid: 102).

⁵⁸⁰ On the other hand, leaving the connection between vital interests and vital needs unclear indicates that they will restrict again the influence of the principle of fallibility in the ethical discourse.

2.3.2.1. Who Has the Right to Defend Animal Rights?

Skirbekk claims that we move from libertarian to a social-democratic notion of rights, i.e. from formal to substantial one (Skirbekk 1994: 96). Such a change has an impact on the way animal rights are anticipated. Examining the moral status of the animals, his line of arguments starts with encountering the differences between the validity of utilitarian positions and the one of individual rights (Ibid: 120, Note 26). According to Skirbekk, utilitarian positions have their problems with the issues of justice and formal rights. They also have difficulties in displaying a “weak defense for endangered species” regarding the painless death of their representatives, which cannot meet (in most cases) the criteria of minimizing suffering and maximizing well-being (Ibid: 96). In this context, Skirbekk argues that ascribing individual rights is equally weak as the defense of naturally endangered species. He points out that if a species is about to extinct by a rational selection, it is possible to talk about obligations to intervene in natural processes (Ibid).

As Skirbekk relevantly claims, the problem of rights and obligations concerns the one of normative validity. He argues that it is problematic to ground an ‘ought to’ mode in the ‘is’ one, by relying on evolutionary facts (Ibid: 121, Note 28) emphasizing that we may find it ‘correct’ to change nature in terms of species and environment, even though we cannot, and therefore, ought not to do so, in terms of physical laws⁵⁸¹ (Ibid). This interpretation reveals the double blindness of the issue how to define the projections of the ‘ought to’ mode. We do not have unquestionable arguments to avoid turning ethical gradualism into ethical anthropocentrism since defining and thus differentiating the rights to environment and the ones to nature respectively⁵⁸² may easily be initiated from the perspectives of ungrounded moral relativism or moral absolutism. This in turn can cause the replacement of the moral obligations to the environment with the ones to nature. Skirbekk also points out that the concern is about so-called bottom line: i.e. how and where we could rationally posit a bottom line in evaluating human-non-human relationships (Ibid: 110). The idea of bottom line requires further elaboration, taking into account that very often species’ interests for survival are very different from the individual ones (Ibid: 112), which affects the understanding of the idea of interest as a homogeneous concept.

⁵⁸¹The problem is whether we should intervene by correcting the natural process if these species are endangered by the process of natural evolution (Ibid).

⁵⁸² I refer to Páll Skúlason’s distinction between environment and nature.

Neglecting the complexity of the concept of vital interest would lead the whole process of evaluation to be justified by analogy as a matter of extending the concept of vital need as such, which inevitably presumes a certain form of moral naturalism to be adopted, i.e. some needs to be recognized as more important by nature than others, which does not necessarily mean that they are less vital indeed. In this context, another concern arises from the fact that the importance of interests will be evaluated in speciesist terms, while the complex evaluation, in so far as there are subjectively expressed interests, presumes an interspecies comparison to be made as well. Regarding the existence of non-organic nature, it is more relevant to talk about representatives rather than individuals of a given species. Skirbekk poses the question whether we have any obligations to preserve the landscape (Ibid: 113), whose development, by the laws of nature, is independent of our immediate being. There can be many reasons for this thesis such as instrumental ones (“if the landscape is of any value for some moral subjects”)⁵⁸³ (Ibid), aesthetic reasons based on aesthetic values (if some aesthetic experience can be initiated by the contact with the landscape as such), and social ones (“if a human community has its social identity related to a certain landscape”) (Ibid). It is the social identity that is one of the elaborated ideas of what vital interest is since the social needs can be examined as developed vital needs within the ‘developed’ welfare society, as I argued above.

Going back to the idea of conation, Skirbekk argues that “non-organic nature cannot be described in terms of any conation” whatsoever (Ibid), albeit the latter is important in the sense of being relevant to the development of life and living creatures. That is why moral agents have an ‘indirect’ obligation to protect certain aspects of it.

Why should the aforementioned idea of developing vital interests be explored in normative terms? I claim that it can be clarified by revealing what Skirbekk defined as a ‘being interested in’ mode, namely, by revealing why certain subjective interests gradually turn into vital ones due to the fact that moral evaluation comes on side of human beings alone who are able to master the principle of advocatory representation.

On a macro methodological level, the problem is how to introduce one and the same set of criteria for all living beings, which to be equally normative

⁵⁸³ Skirbekk points out that even if all human beings are dead, the landscape should be preserved if there is a possibility for having animals around since it has “value *for* other beings, not only for us” (Ibid: 125, Note 60) as well as because these beings have a value in themselves.

in the sense of having equally objective grounding rather than providing the same prescriptions to the different species. Otherwise, it would mean to put in question the concept of normative validity as such, or to start operating with an imaginary concept of objectivity. For example, the vital needs of the one-cell organism are incomparable with the ones of the many-cell organisms. The latter have more differentiated subjective interests, which also, directly or indirectly, affect the evolution of the basic ones. In this context, a possible evaluation would mean to merely discuss the role of evolutionary morality due to which the quantitative terms to replace the qualitative ones, or to adopt again a certain type of anthropocentrism. Then, the interests will be examined in terms of their 'usefulness' to human beings and their rights. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the problem arises from the fact that not all living beings have both already discussed 'being interested in' and 'having an interest in' modes. Regarding the process of evaluation, it is difficult to compare the vital needs of these organisms since such a comparing presumes prioritizing, as I already showed.

Why should we question the distinction between subject and object as well as the one between anthropocentrism and biocentrism? (Ibid: 112). Among many different answers Skirbekk outlines the phenomenological explanation, the ontological one (in Spinozian terms), the evolutionary explanation (in Darwinian terms) (Ibid: 125, Note 57), albeit he emphasizes the role of the teleological discussions in the field of casual explanations and already examined danger of naturalistic fallacy. The latter occurs when lower animals and plants are defined as having interests, which presumes "implying a duty for moral agents" (Ibid: 112). The complexity of the latter interpretation was explored as a matter of increasing the risk of interfering moral rights with natural rights, which in turn brings us back to the debate about actual and potential properties.

3. HOW TO GET RID OF THE ECOCRISIS? ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY AS A MAIN ECOPOLITICAL OBJECTIVE

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that neglecting the principles of ethical gradualism leads to distinguishing ethical problems from the ones of justice, poverty, ecological sustainability and industrial development, as in Næss's writings. It occurs in so far as radical biocentrism advocates a different kind of ethical speciesism to be adopted, which affects the recognition of nature as a meta-species. On the other hand, presuming the complexity of ethical, social and ecological problems could benefit finding an answer to the following question: Why is the argument of solidarity so important for defining a long-term ecological sustainability by providing solutions for overcoming the ecological crisis as a crisis, which affects the welfare state?

Extrapolating Skirbekk's thesis, I aim at revealing why his argument of solidarity is crucial for clarifying the normative validity of ecological sustainability in the welfare state as well as for the attempts at overcoming the ecological crisis by cultivating a collective, socio-political responsibility. According to Skirbekk, solidarity, which encourages giving aid does not have to be considered as charity, but as a "communal sharing" organized through a "general welfare arrangement" (Skirbekk 1996: 34). He argues that the support of so-called reproductive tasks⁵⁸⁴ can be defined as closely tied with showing solidarity by pointing out that every "human being should have a right to live" getting some minimal economic support (Ibid).

⁵⁸⁴Regarding Skirbekk's definition, the minimum notion of welfare state includes the values of solidarity and reproductive rationality. According to him, the utilitarian argument of collective insurance should be adapted to the situation, while the one of equality should be strongly moderated for the sake of achieving optimal survival (Ibid: 39). Skirbekk also emphasizes that the model implies some economic differences and "it does not guarantee that everybody will make it" (Ibid).

On a macro methodological level, the question how to reach ecological sustainability in the long run is intrinsically concerned with the one what the modern welfare state should look like. In this context, Skirbekk examines both the arguments pros and cons welfare state emphasizing the crucial role of socialization for the cultivation of sensitivity towards environment. One of the arguments against welfare state is based on the negative attitudes towards the idea of public property (Ibid: 28), which leads to raising the theory that a welfare state that redistributes economic values is a “morally rejectable”,⁵⁸⁵ one (Ibid). Skirbekk poses the counter argument that despite the fact that the libertarian conceptions of private property are opposed to the utilitarian defense of the latter, they both oppose the welfare state (Ibid: 43, Note 1). Furthermore, he argues against the statement that “any normative political theory that operates with rational and educated individuals as a basic notion disregards the necessity of socialization” (Ibid). Otherwise, the notion of self-sufficient individual would have been defined as an inadequately abstract one, which in turn would provoke some concerns about the (de)ontological premise for justifying an abstract individualism (Ibid).

In turn, the issue of socialization becomes of crucial importance for increasing the awareness of the representatives of a given society about ecological sustainability, which is one of the necessary conditions for building a welfare state.

⁵⁸⁵ According to the proponents of this theory, charity and private welfare are not considered as contradictory notions (Ibid).

3.1. Vital Needs, Vital Interests and Vital Rights in Ecopolitics

Revising the role of global ethics and solidarity concerns rethinking the problems of vital needs in environmental politics as well as outlining the specifications of the process of distribution of goods, which are examined against the background of the complex connections between vital interests and vital rights. However, it is important to point out that regarding politics and environmental politics in particular, Skirbekk talks about vital needs and vital rights of pragmatically competent participants. That is why I claim that we should analyze the specifications regarding vital needs, vital interests and vital rights because within the framework of ethical gradualism, these issues are examined in the context of interspecies interaction. According to Skirbekk, objective needs are discursively interpreted⁵⁸⁶; their examination is justified by reaching an enlightened consensus about how the normative validity and function of these vital needs can be recognized (Ibid: 29).

He also clarifies that objective needs are dependent on the traditions and “the material resources in each society” (Ibid). However, Skirbekk specifies that if the interpretation of “the question of need is left to certain traditions or professions, we can easily be overruled by entrenched power instead of being led by reason”,⁵⁸⁷ (Ibid). The balance between the ‘reasonable’ tradition and the authoritarian one is a complicated issue in so far as the general consensus may be reached as imposed by a given interested group or groups regardless of the fact that the reason is coupled with tradition, i.e. regardless of the fact that universalizability is a result of a mutual agreement.

On a macro methodological level, the question of specifying the role of vital needs is intrinsically connected with the notion of just distribution. One of the arguments against welfare state affects the aforementioned distribution because, as Skirbekk claims, there is a gap between the idea of exchange value in terms of money and the “value of use in terms of experienced and obtained well-being” (Ibid). In this context, he emphasizes the ambiguity of

⁵⁸⁶ Skirbekk argues that “intersubjectively recognizable needs” can also be determined by adopting a discursive interpretation in so far as the intersubjectivity is opposed to subjective needs (Ibid: 29).

⁵⁸⁷ He refers to Fraser (1989) (Ibid).

equal satisfaction in this paradigm since the issues of equality⁵⁸⁸ and justice “become even more acute when the time dimension is added⁵⁸⁹” (Ibid: 44, Note 5). Skirbekk also argues that the idea of the welfare state should not operate “with happiness as its goal”. It should rather try to avoid “some basic forms of unhappiness” because it is easier to reach a consensus on what counts as unhappiness⁵⁹⁰ (Ibid: 29).

Exploring the methodological connections between vital needs, justice and well-being, as represented by Skirbekk, I argue that the crucial role of the normative validity of discursive interpretation can be seen in clarifying the validity of vital regarding the intrinsic relationship between the process of distribution of responsibilities and the delegation of rights, which concern both the integrity of individual freedom and individual (as well as collective) responsibility required by the welfare state. The enlightened public discussion is built upon the presumption of free, educated and self-reflective human beings, which have the capability to interact with others in order to reach a consensus beyond the need of making compromises.

According to Skirbekk, one of the main arguments against the welfare state is the one that it “repudiates” what is regarded as a collective coercion of individual freedom (Ibid: 30). He claims that a sound version of the argument is that we cannot maximize all values at the same time revealing the impossibility to maximize the publicly organized welfare (Ibid). In this context, I draw the conclusion that even if we presume an ideal connection between the collective arrangements and welfare, it is unreasonable to contradict them unless we neglect the presumption of individual freedom as a precondition for reaching a consensus in the process of delegating rights. Otherwise, personal freedom would not have been defined as a crucial factor for the process of delegation.

⁵⁸⁸ Skirbekk also points out that understanding the idea of equality in terms of exchanging values is quite problematic in principle (Ibid: 29, 44, Note 5).

⁵⁸⁹ As one of the problems in this context, we should outline the need of dialectically interpreting the processes of delegation and distribution for the purposes of specifying the definitions of delegation of rights and distribution of responsibility.

⁵⁹⁰ However, we should go back to his statement that positive needs are defined as indispensable from the negative ones. That is why one of the arguments against welfare state relies on the risks of speculating with the implementation of utilitarian ethics since ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are evaluated from the perspective of maximizing and minimizing, while building the ideal model of welfare state.

Furthermore, Skirbekk claims that since we have a public welfare, there are certain restrictions to one's personal behavior: "not only the restrictions imposed by laws and regulations", but also the ones, which operate due to "the functional need for a certain minimum of a behavioral solidarity" (Ibid). This need is defined as a need, which, on an individual level, "takes the forms of moral obligations and possibly of normative sanctions" (Ibid). Judging by the aforementioned investigations, we can examine how in the process of delegation in which people deliberately delegate their freedom for the sake of having their rights protected, the distribution of responsibility is one of the main criteria for justifying the role of the modern welfare state in Skirbekk's sense.

3.1. “Be Solidary, Be Sustainable!” The Future of Ecological Sustainability in the Welfare State

According to Skirbekk, ecological sustainability is explored within the broader debate about ecological and social reproductions. It takes place against the background of so-called appeal for recalling “the societal need for reproductive sustainability” as well as to indicate the relationship between rational criticism and the attempt to act politically (Ibid: 33). Skirbekk argues that in the modern society, the necessary types of reproduction concern either the market, or they are taken over the state since the market does not adequately respond to these fundamental demands (Ibid: 32). In this context, he claims that “the final *intellectual* institution has to be politics”, which to provide enlightened discussions organized among competent participants in the public sphere (Ibid: 33). In turn, the final operative institution should be politics, which also relevantly functions in terms of legal and administrative agreements (Ibid). It is due to the fact that the reproductions (both biological and socio-cultural ones) are of crucial importance for that system guaranteeing the societal survival whose role I already discussed (Ibid: 34). It is their appropriate implementation that supports the normative validity of a certain minimum of care that should be provided by the society. For this purpose, the welfare state justifies a basic support for the sick and unemployed people which is irreducible to the utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits, as Skirbekk argues (Ibid: 35). In this sense, the minimum has to be understood not only in quantitative terms, but also in qualitative ones in so far as the distribution is a matter of being morally engaged on a societal level.

3.2.1. The Need of Solidarity

The normative validity of solidarity in Skirbekk's sense derives from the one of dignity as a prototype characteristic of the principle of non-humiliation, which gives us the opportunity to talk about already discussed sense of commonly shared solidarity (Ibid: 34). However, maximizing the overall non-humiliation looks only at first sight as a principle with utilitarian connotations since the normative validity of dignity makes the maximization a normative process. Thus it becomes one of the communal engagements, which is irreducible to a cost-benefit analysis because thus the community becomes involved in its own functioning and development in time.

Furthermore, the particular aspects of the argument of solidarity, which is displayed by Skirbekk as one of the arguments in favor of the welfare state, concern the issue of what 'pure' solidarity is skipping the problem of utility or societal sustainability (Ibid: 35). It is called an ethical argument in so far as the argument of solidarity is related to the question "who we are and who we want to be" (Ibid). Thus the implications of the ecological sustainability debate have an impact on how adopting this argument would benefit overcoming global ecological crisis by achieving ethical and ecological universalizability in the long run.

3.2.2. Ecological Sustainability and the Problem of Reproductions

Skirbekk points out the risk of easily misrecognizing the need of biological reproduction with so-called cultural one provoked by adopting a utilitarian argument (Ibid: 34). However, he clarifies that the argument of utility gains a new meaning, especially, against the background of the ecological sustainability⁵⁹¹ debate (Ibid: Note 13). Skirbekk claims that sustainability can be seen as an objective per se, especially, if we shift the focus from the instrumental means to the good as a goal (Ibid). Regarding the aforementioned misrecognition, its genealogy is interpreted as coming from misunderstanding what “utility of life” is (Ibid) because it relies on “mixing the standard with that which is measured by the standard” (Ibid). In other words, the misrecognition in question can be defined as provoked by replacing the quality of life with the standard of living.

Furthermore, such a misunderstanding leads to replacing the ecological sustainability with the ecological unsustainability in the long run due to which the notion of utility would be defined in purely utilitarian terms. The replacement derives from the normative validity of the per se mode, which is simplified by the ecological unsustainability as a utilitarian goal in itself. Adopting the latter leads to building *curriculum vitiosum*, in so far as it contributes to determining the utility of life as an ontological oxymoron⁵⁹².

By analyzing the internal connections between different types of reproduction, we can find the crossing point between the ecological reproduction and societal one in the issues of immigration and population growth, as represented by Næss and Kvaløy. In turn, Skirbekk explores two aspects of emigration, i.e. the ones of “coming and getting” due to which the substantial support is given by the welfare state (Ibid: 37). The latter is described as more sensitive to both immigration and emigration than a pure market soci-

⁵⁹¹According to him, this is a premise requiring any society to preserve its own reproduction within given ecological frames (Ibid). Thus the idea of ecological reproduction contributes to grounding the concept of ecological sustainability by referring to the one of sustainable reproduction, which should be recognized as an environmentally friendly one.

⁵⁹²Life’s utility can be seen as having both being in itself and being for itself. If the latter, which concerns how life to be used for ‘other purposes’ (i.e. for the ones of human kind), is misrecognized as a being in itself (i.e. how people to exploit life’s sources as resources, which is understood as life’s goal in itself), then we fall into the aforementioned vicious circle.

ety (Ibid), and this implies for both capital and people (Ibid). Against the background of the aforementioned examinations, the free movement of people and capital is defined by Skirbekk as “only compatible with a welfare state when the desire to move is small” (Ibid). Otherwise, there would be a tension between the ideal of the state in question and the one of unrestricted movement (Ibid).

Movement becomes a problem when it is unrestricted, and this is a point, which is also clearly emphasized by Kvaløy since it increases the impact of the ecological and demographical crisis worldwide.

In turn, Skirbekk argues that evaluating the insufficiency of the vital resources benefits answering the question why can the survival of everybody (Ibid: 46, Note 27) can be guaranteed by adopting a certain type of gradualism, which does not concern the economic distribution alone?

Another similarity between Skirbekk’s and Kvaløy’s conceptions is the reconsideration of the problem of consumption. Skirbekk argues that in some cases it is not the population growth, but rather the issue of uncontrollable consumption (Ibid). According to him, where the consumption is ecologically too high, it should be reduced (Ibid: 47). Similarly, where the population growth is too high, it should be reduced (Ibid). The reduction, however, concerns the issue of improving quality of life instead of leaving the question open, as Næss does while discussing why we should be responsible for the reduction itself (Næss 2005c: 19). Both Kvaløy and Skirbekk look for solutions, which differ from the ones provided by Næss⁵⁹³. They argue in favor of alternatives, which do not concern taking responsibility for the direct reduction of overpopulation, but rather for improving the quality of life. While Kvaløy gives an example with India, where the quality of life can be enhanced by reconsidering the status of women who are treated as ‘baby-making machines’, Skirbekk compares the politics in Norway and Shanghai

⁵⁹³ According to Næss, there are also three types of migration: people moving from one of high unsustainability increase to one of low unsustainability increase, the opposite as well as people moving to a place with a roughly equal status of sustainability (Næss 2005t: 284). In this context, one of the methodological benefits of adopting Næss’s theory can be traced to his conception of the two-fold migration. He talks not only about migration from poor to rich countries, but also clarifies under what circumstances citizens of rich countries travel to help people in poor countries as well as how the former to be encouraged to do so in the long run. However, since Næss thinks that a vital need should be vaguely defined for the sake of preserving pluralism, he does not manage to specify (due to neglecting the role of ethical gradualism in practice) how a green economy can contribute to helping people in the different countries to distinguish need from demand (Næss 2008:113).

regarding the one-child policy (Skirbekk 1996: 46, Note 24). Furthermore, both of them emphasize the role of education and political culture for improving the situation in so-called developing countries by raising the quality of life.

In this context, I argue that the question whether we should give priority to the living standard at the expense of quality of life, has a strong impact on the need of introducing measures regarding ecological and demographic reproductions in so far as their problematization derives from the embodiment of the differences between rich and poor on different levels of the societal interactions.

Skirbekk outlines three extreme cases of a welfare state, namely, an “elimination of all political borders and of all restrictions on the movement of men and money”⁵⁹⁴, the justification of a basic social welfare on a global level promoted by introducing a certain legislation for welfare and for ecological sustainability⁵⁹⁵, which to be accepted in all countries as well as a “fortification of a welfare system within one state or a group of states”⁵⁹⁶ (Ibid: 37-38). By contrast to Næss’s vague scenarios regarding ecological sustainability as a future project, Skirbekk sees the realization of the sustainability in question as inseparable from the sustainability of the welfare state. Another crucial argument regarding Skirbekk’s conception is that it is sustain-

⁵⁹⁴ The elimination of borders and restriction of men and money (Ibid: 37) corresponds again to the scenarios represented by both Kvaløy and Næss who criticize the potential accession of Norway to the EU. Skirbekk argues that the global equation of all the conditions for both capital and people will increase the differences between rich and poor in former welfare states and thus it will lower the material standard of living for most people leading to an abduction of the welfare state as such (Ibid: 37-38).

⁵⁹⁵ The second scenario concerning the legislation of the welfare state, which also includes the issue of ecological sustainability, should be accepted in all countries “equalizing the competition conditions for capital worldwide” as well as “leveling the differences” in the living conditions worldwide (Ibid: 38). In turn, encouraging a basic welfare and ecological sustainability on a global scale presumes the ethically inappropriate differences to be erased.

⁵⁹⁶ The third scenario is defined by Skirbekk as an “easier option”, but also as an option causing both moral and political problems for the decision making process (Ibid: 38). He claims that from the point of view of ideal universalizability, the second scenario is preferable, while from the point of view of political feasibility, the third one is attractive (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, to mediate between the two options means to create a local welfare state in which the average material standard of living to be radically reduced to basic welfare arrangements and some basic conditions for investments as well as for work (Ibid).

ability and not sustainable development that guarantees the universalizability of this principle; one important comment, which should make us aware of the fact that the debate about environmental protection *versus* industrial development in Norway started in the mid-1960s as a debate about the complexity of the different aspects of growth itself, which are irreducible to the ones of sustainable development.

In this context, I argue that by contrast to Skirbekk's scenarios showing how the development of a relevant welfare state may affect the problems regarding the justification of ecological sustainability in the long run, Næss's⁵⁹⁷ ones are focused on rather outlining, in a descriptive manner, what most of the 'unsustainability scenarios' would look like. Næss does not point out the normative aspects of a possible social, economic, and even ecological transformation, namely, how the sustainability in question can be achieved in practice by introducing given changes in an already existing social order.

Promoting a basic welfare defined as built on positive arguments is based on what Skirbekk calls ethical universalizability, which makes that scenario be realizable with difficulties in the long run. Regarding the realization in question, Skirbekk's arguments are similar to the ones proposed by both Næss and Kvaløy, namely that it is demanding to motivate rich countries to equate their basic needs with the ones of the developing countries. On a macro methodological level, it means that the optimism of this scenario derives from the ethical universalizability that has implications in some different scopes such as economics, politics etc.. However, we should keep in mind that the difficulties derive also from the fact that ethical universalizability is realizable since it should be based on a well-grounded, collectively shared responsibility between all countries.

⁵⁹⁷ As I already outlined in the chapter on Næss, according to him, there are three main classes working on the principle of contaminated vessels: those with a level of unsustainability "considerably below the average", those with "roughly an average level of unsustainability" and those "considerably above the average level of unsustainability" (Næss 2005o: 195).

3.2.3. Ecological Sustainability Scenarios and Ethical Universalizability

According to Skirbekk, the norm of universalizability satisfactory implies that everyone seeks a form of life, which is ecologically universalizable, i.e. a form of life, which is sustainable worldwide and in the long run (Skirbekk 1992: 74-75). However, we should also add to the latter statement that this principle intrinsically concerns the need of satisfying vital needs of the representatives of the welfare state in the most complex way. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that the question of ethical gradualism in Skirbekk's sense, as projected within environmental politics, depends on what we understand by universalizability as well as how the consensus about objective needs can counter the strong tendency of abstracting these needs from their contents for the sake of imposing certain ideologies.

Specifying the normative validity of consensus, which is irreducible to compromise, so that we to avoid these ideologies to annihilate each other's normative validity, raises the problem how to keep the balance between the preservation of a lower welfare standard for all and the one regarding the diversity of cultures and natural resources. Skirbekk suggests that ecological sustainability is realizable by selectively interpreting and discursively adapting the norm of ecological universalizability to morally relevant differences (Ibid: 75). According to him, the constructive power, going beyond both moral relativism and moral objectivism, derives from the adaptation to some "morally relevant differences" (Ibid). The latter are examined in respect with the connection between vital needs and vital sources⁵⁹⁸, which in turn inflicts the need of rehabilitating the normative validity of the vital needs as irreducible to both sources' content and context.

Extrapolating Skirbekk's theory, I argue that ecological sustainability stems from the premise what 'natural' growth is rather than from the one of industrial understanding of growth, and thus makes the criterion of universalizability unsubjectable to the rules of moral objectivism, which provoke the negative effects of the contemporary industrialization. On the level of sustainable development, accepting such an interpretation shows why we

⁵⁹⁸Ibid, Note 25. The insufficiency of the vital sources for the survival of everybody is defined as a crucial premise for understanding the content of the vital needs themselves. Last but not least, it is important to emphasize that according to Skirbekk, the low cost (Ibid: 76) is only one of the many aspects of the sustainable welfare.

should question not the idea of consumption itself. It is the replacement of univesalizability (understood in qualitative terms) with the universalization (determined in quantitative ones) that raises the need of distinguishing between ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if we overestimate the role of sustainable development as the only one possible development⁵⁹⁹.

Discussing the role of so-called developing and developed countries, we should talk about ethically universalizable principle of advocatory representation due to which the developing countries to be treated as potential moral discussants whose well-being is at stake, when they react as moral subjects. The common future requires more responsible commitments on side of the developed countries to be made, which to operate on the behalf of the developing ones for the sake of the development of the latter. Thus the developing countries can take their lives in their own hands as soon as possible and turn into moral discussants in practice.

In this context, Skirbekk's scenarios give us the opportunity for examining sustainability as based on ethically universalizable principles, which makes it possible to avoid the ecological unsustainability in the long run. The difficulties derive from already discussed fact that equation is not universalizability, albeit the latter has the former as a necessary condition in a normative sense. That is why Skirbekk's conception of universalizability is grounded in the normative validity of the possibility of applying global ethics due to which the relationship between equal-global-universal could be interpreted in Hegel's sense as a dialectical relationship.

Furthermore, universalizability can be examined as based on two different aspects regarding the normative validity of globality, namely, on the distribution concerning the fulfillment of basic needs due to giving access to exploiting some material resources. The distribution itself functions as a process of minimizing (leveling) "the differences in living conditions worldwide", as Skirbekk points out (Skirbekk 1996: 38) for the sake of equating. In other words, this process takes place for the sake of providing a given standard of living for everybody while justifying a certain lifestyle as based on fulfilling some basic needs. The second aspect is the one of common sol-

⁵⁹⁹However, from this point of view, Skirbekk's theory of universalizability does not share many features with Næss's criterion of universalization because the latter is rather focused on outlining the epistemological preciseness of deriving norms by testing whether they are based on verifiable hypotheses.

idity defined as revealing better life's possibilities since these possibilities are also examined as opportunities of recognizing the process of self-realization as a vital need. Within the framework of the ideal universalizability in Skirbekk's sense, the first aspect is realizable if the second one is cultivated.

According to him, the ecologically universalizable forms of life are the ones, which are achieved by the people who are willing "to lower their material consumption substantially" (Ibid). The willingness is a result of cultivating common solidarity interpreted as a social top norm. Thus environmental politics can be grounded by adopting universalizable ethical values, which are not abstract ones, as Skirbekk argues. He emphasizes that it is crucial the ideal of welfare state to imply "a really low level of welfare" (Ibid), where 'low' is recognized in quantitative terms. However, this level should be understood as 'high' in qualitative ones, i.e. as satisfying the needs of the participants.

Looking for universalizable solutions is what Skirbekk defines as strengthening the idea of welfare state in ethical terms (Ibid) in so far ethical and ecological universalizability provoke the reconsideration of the problem of justice. Skirbekk claims that if justice means universalizability, then we should argue that a form of life, which is not ethically universalizable is morally unacceptable, i.e. it is unjust (Ibid). This in turn presumes the concept of justice, which has at least two meanings, namely, the ones of 'fair' and 'equal' to be examined. If they are defined as ontological synonyms, justice can be determined as universalizing since it is recognized as a distributive justice by default. Furthermore, we should discuss the normative validity of such an interpretation if we aim to discursively analyze the differences in the process of distribution.

Skirbekk points out that eco-ethically we can claim that the norm of universalizability concerns the idea of need satisfaction, which implies that everyone should seek a form of life that is ecologically universalizable (in the sense of being sustainable) in the long run (Ibid). He outlines the difference between the anthropocentric sustainability and ethical gradualism against the background of how the welfare state should function, claiming that we should also take into account the "social rights"⁶⁰⁰ of the non-human moral subjects as well as their habitat (Ibid: Note 26). The universal need satisfac-

⁶⁰⁰ Here, we should go back to the idea of social setting, which is irreducible to social behavior. In this context, the social rights of non-humans in Skirbekk's sense are defined by analogy.

tion presumes not only the satisfaction of vital needs, but also the one of some basic rights, which makes these rights a matter of what Skirbekk defines as social rights. Thus being sustainable worldwide is to recognize and compare sustainability within different welfare systems (Ibid).

3.2.3.1. Skirbekk's Conception of Low Cost Welfare State and the Idea of Universalizability

Skirbekk claims that there are three important advantages of adopting so-called universal grant. It is universal, excludes some kinds of moral misuse and presupposes a lowering of the material standard in accordance with what society can afford. It is also a solution in a situation with permanent and extended unemployment (Ibid).

In this context, the idea of low cost welfare state illustrates why the minimum of universalization regarding mainly the equation of material resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving minimum universalizability. According to the scenario, every adult person should receive a given basic sum each month, "enough to survive but not to live well on" eliminating all other redistributive transactions⁶⁰¹ (Ibid: 39). From this total sum, we "can deduct all the present public costs of redistribution", namely, payments to pensioners, the unemployed, the ill etc. (Ibid). This should also be the case with "the redistribution of economic resources to work sectors and regions" (Ibid). All "public salaries would be reduced accordingly" for the purpose of everybody to start with a universal substantial grant (Ibid). As Skirbekk points out, the main problem is where the money for supporting the welfare state should come from. It may turn out that providing the basic minimum for everybody is more expensive than the present system (Ibid).

Skirbekk argues that such a welfare state has a "share-scarcity, ecologically-oriented market socialism, with a universal grant ensuring tolerable subsistence levels for all, plus material and other incentives for work" (Ibid: 47, Note 31). However, he claims that in the thought-experiment, we should keep not only the classical, universal system for health care and child care, but also the "possibility (and probability) of a major lowering of the material expenditures" in these fields (Ibid: 39). In turn, all the administrative work for the redistribution should be reduced to this one system that "can-

⁶⁰¹ As Skirbekk argues, his model differs from the one of van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) (Ibid: Note 31). They presuppose some abundance, while Skirbekk examines the impact of scarcity and envisages the implications of the low standard of living (Ibid). According to him, van der Veen and Van Parijs aim at establishing "communism" "in the sense of giving equal grants to everybody regardless of their personal work relationship" (Ibid). In turn, Skirbekk advocates a universal survival grant, but also a differentiated income of work (Ibid).

not be misunderstood, nor misused” (Ibid). Thus the politicians would be engaged with more meaningful tasks to deal with (Ibid).

As another problem regarding the functioning of the welfare state, Skirbekk points out not the money but rather the motivation to work. A statement that partly corresponds to Kvaløy’s concerns about how meaningful work can contribute to engaging also children, which is crucial for building, and more important, for supporting what he coins as a life necessity society, as I already outlined in the chapter on Kvaløy. According to Skirbekk, in such a low cost welfare state, people should be motivated to work, “not to be satisfied with the meager support” from the state in question (Ibid). That is why keeping the differentiated payment affects the stability of the universal monthly grant. Despite the fact that society implies that everybody knows what to expect, the dropping down motivation is a serious factor, which does not have to be neglected if we want to avoid making the differentiated payment pointless as a social initiative, as Skirbekk warns (Ibid). Furthermore, the material basis is predictable (Ibid: 40), but from that it does not follow that it makes the motivation in question a stable one. One of the questions is how to motivate people to work more and get a differentiated payment⁶⁰², taking into account that the latter also varies within what is determined by the minimum welfare as an achievable income, i.e. it varies but still remains very low (Ibid). Skirbekk outlines that when the substantial grant drops towards the level of survival, those who are able to work would probably try to do so (Ibid). In this way, the assets will gradually be created to benefit the whole society and thus to provide the general support for the welfare state (Ibid).

He relevantly argues that after some time, there probably will be a double market, one for the people on the substantial grant alone, and another for those who have an additional income. That is why the political price should be considered as providing both inequality and a lowering of the average material standard of living (Ibid). According to Skirbekk, the inequality in question is inherent to that system, which “implies a free labor market on the top of an equal share to absolutely everybody” (Ibid). On the other hand, it is lowering the average material standard of living for the purposes of meeting “the economic requirements of affordable public costs” and the ecological ones of reduced consumption that is encouraged (Ibid). Another

⁶⁰²Increasing inequality can be avoided if what Skirbekk calls extended or permanent unemployment prevails, but then it would mean that the common solidarity will be instrumentalized (Ibid).

problem, however, is how to treat this inherent inequality of keeping affordable public costs without creating economic and social imbalance by inflicting bigger inequality.

As Skirbekk suggests, the notion of common solidarity and political culture should be elaborated if we want to reduce the material aspects of living standard and inequality (Ibid). The simplification of the administrative procedures increases the possibility the ones who deserve the grant to be the ones who get it (Ibid: 39), albeit it is merely a necessary but not sufficient condition against inequality. It may turn out that the ones with differentiated payment to start to speculate with the outcomes of their labor. Skirbekk stresses that it is hard to say how high or how low we can go claiming that it can be “as high as economically and ecologically possible”, and “as low as necessary” (Ibid: 39, 47, Note 34). Thus the idea of expanding the criteria of possibility goes beyond the necessary and sufficient requirements regardless of the fact that possibility is its important premise.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that accepting this social disproportion can be recognized as a double-bind issue unless it is specified by referring to the principle of common solidarity due to which people would deliberately agree to work for the sake of the others without being exploited by the society as such. This can happen only if the latter category of people is not able to work for itself, i.e. when these people are unable to work rather than being satisfied to get something from the state, as Skirbekk argues (Ibid). In turn, establishing a differentiated market⁶⁰³ would mean that the group of the ones satisfied with the universal income is a very small one. Thus the over-income will serve the purposes of covering both the universal grant and the possibility of differentiating the level of consumption.

⁶⁰³ Furthermore, Skirbekk argues that the idea of welfare state presupposes a modern, differentiated society: “some material basis, both economically and ecologically”, which to “determine the level of possible expenditures” (Ibid: 36).

3.2.4. The Role of Political Culture

According to Skirbekk, political culture should be defined in a normative sense as a “balanced interplay” between different dimensions (Skirbekk 2007: 87)⁶⁰⁴. On the one hand, each dimension maintains its peculiarity, while, on the other one, it is co-determined by the “*reciprocal interplay*” (Ibid), which makes him argue in favor of drawing a conceptual triangle regarding the implementation of the aforementioned dimensions (Ibid). The interplay is described as a cohabitation between autonomy and dependence (Ibid) in so far as the normative notion of political culture implies multidimensionality with an emphasis on a “sufficient equilibrium between the various dimensions” (Ibid). As Skirbekk claims, “the interesting political category” is the one of ‘enough’ and ‘not enough’, “not that of utopic goals” (Ibid). The latter statement is an argument supporting the thesis that the normative validity of the political culture has an ontological grounding, which derives from the ‘between’ mode, namely, from the one provoked by the tension, which is brought by the dimensions of the triangle. Skirbekk points out that when we try to obtain and maintain a sufficiently well-balanced interplay between the various dimensions of our political scene, we start “a process of learning and formation (Bildung)”, which entails “both personal experience and multidisciplinary insight” (Ibid: 88).

What is the ‘quality’ of the political culture itself? The answer to that question would also clarify what a sufficiently well-balanced interplay is. Both answers are intrinsically related to understanding the competence of society’s representatives who prudently evaluate what is enough to maintain the interplay as such. It is the normative validity of the necessary and sufficient conditions that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis in so far as the balance of the latter is a goal in itself, while the quality of the culture presumes the interplay to be interpreted as a goal for itself. Thus one of the main projections of the interplay concerns how what is enough or not enough in practice mediates the justification of the basic norms. According to Skirbekk, these projections presume both “a personal experience within the various dimensions” as well as “a discursively enlightened knowledge” to be taken into account (Ibid).

⁶⁰⁴ Skirbekk emphasizes the role of the sphere of rational and autonomous decisions, the one of justice and legality and the role of the sphere of truth. They cover the fields of democracy, human rights and enlightenment (Ibid).

Skirbekk argues that the need of a certain political culture is closely tied with the one of well-educated and politically trained citizens who take part in various ways in a mature and enlightened discussion (Skirbekk 1996: 35). Referring to Habermas's theory, he points out that it "is intellectually important to transcend the implicit conceptual restrictions" of the market and "state bureaucracy" giving due "attention to the public sphere of argumentation and the personal sphere of post-conventional morality" (Ibid: 37).

On a macro methodological level, Skirbekk clarifies that achieving ethical and ecological universalizability is due to defining what sustainable life is (Ibid: 38), which is irreducible to the life provided by the sustainable development society. In this context, one of the arguments for the welfare state concerns how to cultivate political culture, which is examined in a democratic environment since it contributes to the justification of "a politically mature welfare culture" (Ibid: 35). As Skirbekk points out, the argument of political culture benefiting the building of a mature welfare culture is an argument related to the notion of moral agents as well as to "the realm of well-entrenched moral obligations"⁶⁰⁵ (Ibid).

In turn, this argument can be explored within the framework of deontological ethics in so far as moral agents advocate a societal maturity understood as a matter of cultivating collective duty. On a macro methodological level, developing political culture is in tune with so-called by Skirbekk social morality (Ibid: 31), which guarantees the long-term feasibility of the welfare state, namely, the development of a diverse welfare society. The concerns about the feasibility in question are defined by Skirbekk as regarding the cost-benefit analysis, i.e. as clarifying whether it is economically sustainable to operate in the field of social morality as well as how the latter can affect the decisive demographic and ecological changes worldwide (Ibid). The practical implications of the morality in question are driven by the need of introducing the idea of modesty due to which the welfare society should be regulated⁶⁰⁶.

Furthermore, the normative validity of the welfare state has an impact on whether the dominating scenario will be the one of ecological sustainability,

⁶⁰⁵ According to Skirbekk, such a morality can be cultivated if the moral discussants are enlightened moral citizens, who are "able and willing to conduct their lives in accordance with internalized constraints" (Ibid: 30).

⁶⁰⁶ Skirbekk argues that most concerns are about the fact that the situation is already established while the functioning of the welfare state is becoming increasingly complicated (Ibid).

or the one of ecological unsustainability, i.e. whether the normative validity concerns the implications and the embodiment of sustainability itself as well as the one of its desirability, especially when such sustainability is politically desirable.

In this context, I argue that the definition of political competence is not a sufficient condition for cultivating political culture, albeit it is a necessary factor for its functioning. This is due to the fact that the mode of togetherness determines the normative validity of the competence in question. It is the discursively mediated insight in relevant discussions that contributes to coupling rational expertise with global ethics in Skirbekk's sense (Ibid).

3.2.4.1. The Impact of Political Culture on the Modern Norwegian Topography

On a macro methodological level, one of the biggest challenges to the political culture in the modern welfare state is how to counter the normative validity of the new topography analyzed by Kvaløy in his theory of industrial development society, which I already discussed. According to Skirbekk, Norwegian topography concerns the fact that we often run subsea power cables⁶⁰⁷: due to that plan, the way in and the way out are “justifiably secured”, compared, for example, to the ones in the mountain (Skirbekk 2015: 2). The misuse of mapping encouraged the new topography, which is a matter of planning achieved by the process of calculating possible benefits for the society by elaborating a mapping with instrumental functions. Going back to already examined idea of moral mapping in Kvaløy’s theory of industrial development society, I draw the conclusion that Skirbekk’s scenarios outline the justification of utilitarian morality’s mapping due to which the issues of safety and functionality are still embodied, albeit being projected on a different level, namely, on the one of providing mapping of nature’s sources as resources.

Furthermore, the epistemological distinction between the ‘old’ way of mapping in Nansen’s sense and the ‘new’ topography seriously affects the re-consideration of the role of regional politics. As Skirbekk argues, revealing the negative ecological consequences of running such a subsea cable on the Norwegian side, makes the lack of feedback apparent, when the regional identity is at stake: “We have demonstrated again that the way between Oslo and Bergen is longer than the one between Bergen and Oslo”⁶⁰⁸ (Ibid: 6). In this context, he points out that the Hardangerfjord is not just a spot on the map. It is an issue of aesthetic and tourist interest, but also one concerning identity (Ibid).

⁶⁰⁷ His comment concerns the debates in Norway about running subsea cables for the sake of gaining more energy for commercial reasons (Skirbekk 2015: 2). In this context, the question is why do not we run such cables all along the fjords, where the electric power is produced? (Ibid: 16). The example illustrates the new type of topography, which is based on examining natural sources as resources alone. Due to such topography, the places are described as depending on sources’ potential as consumable resources rather than having an intrinsic value as belonging to the landscape.

⁶⁰⁸ In this context, he emphasizes the role of ideology behind the centralization of Norwegian environmental politics at the expense of bioregionalism.

While mapping has an impact on the sense of belonging, which gives us reasons to favor building the latter as a crucial premise for shaping our sense of identity, the topography as such aims at clarifying the boundaries of the places and their internal connections. It is the sense of belonging that makes us talk about both ethic and aesthetic aspects of nature, as Skirbekk argues, in so far as it regards the intrinsic dependence of man on nature and the other way around. In this context, the ‘old’ mapping can be illustrated by referring to already discussed statement formulated by Næss, namely, to the one *Here I stand* clarifying the boundaries of human sense of belonging to the biosphere.

Analyzing the implications of Kvaløy’s and Skirbekk’s theories, I draw the conclusion that while mapping in Nansen’s sense, which was discussed in the first chapter of the current monograph, encourages grasping multidimensionality of our existence in nature, the ‘new’ topography, provoked by the increasing technocratization and the requirements of the free market, is rather focused on grasping and compressing dimensions for the sake of improving the idea of visualization, which replaces the one of visibility.

CONCLUSION

One of the main objectives of the current monograph is to clarify that Norwegian ecophilosophies are a complex phenomenon whose genealogy cannot be fully understood if it is examined as an umbrella term alone. Justifying what I called horizontal relatedness as one of the prototype characteristics of the philosophies in question contributes to outlining the dialectical entity of the relationships between man and nature as intrinsically connected with the rehabilitation of the principles of ethics. Thus only the ungrounded faith in (radical) ethical anthropocentrism, which Norwegian ecophilosophies criticize, can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of moral objectivism, nor into the one of radical biocentrism. Furthermore, recognizing Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies can benefit clarifying one of the main objects of investigation of the current monograph, namely, how the biosphere, which is determined as a complex net of ecosystems having an intrinsic value, can be better understood by applying the methods of ethical gradualism. They illustrate why introducing relevant ecophilosophies affects building relevant environmental politics without neglecting the role of biological gradualism as such.

As one of the crucial factors, which provoke the need of specifying the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I point out the debates about growth and environmental protection which took place in the mid-1960 and which gradually turned into discussions about sustainable development vs. environmental protection. In this context, I claim that one of the main challenges Norwegian ecophilosophies faced was how to revive the use of 'and' mode without supporting zero-growth.

On the other hand, I draw the conclusion that clarifying the role of one's self-realization as closely tied with nature's realization can be done by introducing the concept of moral experiential gestalt in so far as cultivating our sensitivity towards the net of biosphere is a matter of how to teach ourselves to recognize the equal right of all living beings to live and blossom. Specifying the role of moral experiential gestalt is of crucial interest if it is referred to the principles of Norwegian ecophilosophies because reconsidering the influence of so-called moral imagination, we can specify what it

means ‘to think like a mountain’ in Næss’s sense by going beyond the purely metaphorical interpretations.

The aforementioned new mode of thinking, which appeals for avoiding the reduction of rationality to cognitive rationality by rehabilitating the role of feelings and emotions in our interaction with nature shows why by human self-realization we presumably understand the realization of an aware moral agent. That is why one of the main objectives is the individual to become morally engaged with preserving nature’s sources by avoiding their transformation into resources of exploitation on both individual and collective levels. It is the reconsidered normative validity of feelings and emotions that helps cultivating compassion for other living beings even when they are not ‘similar’ to us, i.e. it contributes to cultivating our sensitivity to what it means to be in someone else’s shoes without being in his/her/its shoes themselves. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that cultivating moral imagination, as done within the Norwegian ecophilosophies, benefits disenchanting the statement that understanding nature’s harmony is merely a matter of human understanding.

Otherwise, due to the increasing anthropocentric invasion in nature, the idea of harmonization of the biosphere would have been replaced with human understanding of harmony, which presumes the exclusion of any contradiction whatsoever. Furthermore, I argue that revealing the origin of the distinction harmonization vs. harmony is important for avoiding the unproductive way of talking about egalitarian and elitarian approaches towards nature.

In the *first chapter*, which is devoted to outlining the genealogy of Norwegian outdoor life, I reach the conclusion that both Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life (*friluftsliv*) are based on some similar conceptions of the role of biosphere’s intrinsic value. This conclusion gives me grounds to examine Norwegian ecophilosophies as experiential philosophies whose prototype characteristic is the strive for rehabilitating the initial total openness of man and nature. Another important similarity is found in the way the idea of nature’s complexity determines the process of self-realization by following the rhythm of nature without promoting a certain type of objective naturalism.

Regarding the genealogy of Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I draw the conclusion that Norwegian Romanticism, with its specific attitudes towards nature, was not ‘more’ ‘anti-romantic’, as N. Witoszek suggests. Both of them presumed adopting mutually complementing perspectives,

which affected what Tordsson calls a common understanding of natural and cultural characteristics formulated in the name of building national identity.

The projections of new ethics, which are brought with the Norwegian outdoor life, can be traced on the level of investigating the image of the Norwegian fairy tale hero Ash-Lad and the attitudes towards nature understood as a part of Norwegian national identity. Examining the aforementioned projections, I argue that one of the methodological advantages of adopting Kvaløy's reception of Bergson's theory of laughter, which was extrapolated to the analysis of the fairy tale hero in question, benefits revealing how due to establishing a new type of rationality, the new experience (including the one of nature) can be relevantly interpreted by referring to the practices of moral understanding and moral learning.

Analyzing Kvaløy's interpretation of Ash-Lad's tale, I outline how the differences in the landscapes (the ones between Norwegian and Danish landscapes) function as socio-cultural limitations providing the contrast between two visions of time (between past and present, which in turn characterize two different types of national identity). This contrast can be determined as an axiologically grounded one, which is based on the contradiction of what Kvaløy calls organic time (embodied in Ash-Lad's time) and mechanical time (as displayed by Per-and-Pål's time).

Going back to the aspects of time dimension and the genealogy of so-called by Tordsson Social project regarding the development of Norwegian outdoor life, I reach the conclusion that the class-stratification imposes a new understanding of time. The latter is considered as a matter of possession on man's side due to which the idea of value is equated with the one of price. Thus Norwegian outdoor life is determined as having collective value whose functioning is regulated by the arising symbolic capital of the leisure time. In this context, I argue that the competence that guarantees Ash-Lad's understanding of time is replaced with the one reducing time to accelerated tempo.

In turn, regarding the challenges of so-called by Tordsson Modernization project, I reach the conclusion that the conflict between the objectives of industrial development and environmental protection became a fact due to the clash of the different interests, which had to be noncontradictory integrated in respect with the objectives of conservation ethics. The contradictions were more apparent in the post-war period since the need of compensating the losses of war inflicted the need of accelerated rationality for the purposes of finding additional sources of exploitation and capital investments.

All the aforementioned changes affected the attitudes towards being in the mountain as a crucial part of Norwegian outdoor life. Referring to Nansen's description of his experience in Jotunheimen, I draw the conclusion that the evaluation of Norwegian climbing experience relied on the contradiction between *Homo Ascensus* and *Homo Viator* entailing some reminiscences of Romanticism's ideal due to which the vertical space was ascribed a high symbolic value.

On a macro methodological level, I find one of the main prerequisites for comparing Nansen's conception of nature with Næss's ecophilosophy in defining spontaneous experience as a prototype characteristic of experiential learning by adopting the principles of imaginative rationality. Furthermore, I argue that for Nansen 'to live richly' is what is for Næss 'to live a life that is simple in means but rich in ends' in so far as both of them emphasize the self-realization as a way of reconsidering man's place in the biosphere by developing what it is to feel at home. Another methodological similarity is concerned with the diachronic implications of so-called by Tordsson moral geography determined from Nansen's perspective of outdoor life. This is also due to the fact that both Nansen and Næss referred the statement that 'nature is a home of man' to an ideal past, which has to be revived by the practices of experiential learning and understanding.

Judging by the impact of climbing on Norwegian outdoor life, I draw the conclusion that the mountaineering experience of Zapffe, Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund was an important factor for developing their ecophilosophies since the change in the climbing techniques of KKK and NTK clubs illustrated how both the ideas of trackless experience in nature and the rehabilitation of nature's intrinsic value have been elaborated in time. I justify the hypothesis that Norwegian philosophy of climbing is based on a particular applied ethics whose prototype characteristics are cooperation rather than competition as well as the deep respect to nature manifested in so-called anti-expeditions due to which the way was recognized as more important than conquering the peak itself. In turn, outlining these ethical principles shows why philosophy of climbing adopted by Zapffe, Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund cannot be defined as a philosophy of sport.

That is why I argue that the worldview change regarding the anticipation of climbing experience in Norway was driven by the increasing role of imaginative rationality, which contributed to seeing nature through the lens of 'numinous'; as an entity *sui generis* that puts in question the logic of the anthropocentric invasion of the biosphere.

Regarding the development of climbing techniques adopted by KKK and NTK, I point out that the introduction of bolt climbing by Næss in Norway determined the overcoming of experiential dualism, i.e. to separately talk about climbing experience as an object and climber as a subject. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that the initially lower level of sportification of bolt climbing in Kolsås in the 1960s was provoked by the need of rehabilitating the value of safety, which addressed both the climber's interactions with others and his/her contact with the mountain as such, albeit in different ways. Furthermore, clean climbing, as it was introduced by Faarlund in Norway, cannot be seen as a sport from the very beginning since its prototype characteristics 'faster' and 'easier' primarily concerned the safety of the climber and have not been examined in terms of price as when they were promoted in climbing as a sport.

Analyzing the implicit ethical foundation of the early 20th-century essays on Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I argue that Norwegian philosophy of climbing can be defined as based on a given applied ethics also due to the fact that it was developed as a form of experiential learning whose normative validity arises from outlining practical wisdom as its main characteristic. I draw the conclusion that it is applied ethics grounding Norwegian philosophy of climbing that makes me specify the difference between sport and *idrett* in its initial meaning as corresponding to the one between speed and pace. While the pace reaching its maximum embodies pure natural rhythm, the maximum speed is associated with the best time available understood as a subject to calculations on man's side.

Extrapolating the investigations regarding Norwegian climbing ethics, I also conclude that Næss's theory of what it means 'to think like a mountain' clarifies what it is 'to see/hear like a mountain' in so far as understanding the thinking, hearing and seeing can give us a clue what it is 'to be like a mountain', namely, to recognize the normative validity of the as if mode.

Reconsidering the role of the aforementioned mode, I claim that regarding Norwegian philosophy of climbing, we can talk about *adequation of understanding and things* because the restrictions of the principle of adequation itself are driven by some conceptual limitations, not by the matter itself.

With all this considered, I draw the conclusion that the 'magical' power of Norwegian climbing derives from the ontological tension created by the mode of beyondness, which shows how mastering practical wisdom in order to reveal nature as an object in itself is a result of adopting a complex sense of rationality that does not coincide with our common sense. Thus Zapffe's definition of Dionysian is comparable with the booze since in the state of

ecstasy, the climber sees the open face of nature, which makes him/her fulfilled with joy. Referring Zapffe's analysis to the climbing experience in general, I argue that we should rather talk about mountain's playfulness as a mode corresponding to what Næss calls playing (*lek*). I conclude that the climbing *Homo Ludens* is the one whose experiential gestalt has an existential joy as a prototype characteristic guaranteeing his/her complex self-realization. That is why we can examine pessimism and optimism as two mutually connected aspects of the climbing philosophy, which are driven by the state of ecstasy experienced by the climber.

In this context, I argue that contradicting Zapffe's philosophy as a pessimist one to the philosophies of Næss and Faarlund recognized as optimist philosophies raises some concerns about their ontological groundings since so-called pessimist feelings are a necessary condition for people and nature to be 'on one and the same side', making man aware that he/she is not the master of the universe.

Discussing the role of the mountains, I argue that developing a sense of belonging to them concerns the establishment of so-called cabin culture as well as its influence on building ecosophy in Næss's sense. Furthermore, I emphasize that Norwegian cabin culture promotes a certain environmental ethics whose requirements are determined by the place itself. The lifestyle is the one appropriate for the place whose main norm is simplicity in means and richness in ends provided by nature as such, as Næss suggests. However, the latter formula does not have to be interpreted from the perspective of objective naturalism. That is why I argue in favor of justifying environmental holism by adopting a certain type of ontological minimalism, which to bring a given type of existential maximalism to light.

Extrapolating Gjefsen's theory of the culture of cabin life, I draw the conclusion that the initial strive for rediscovering a place as a home is concerned with the implicit willingness to 'demonstrate' a sense of authenticity beyond the possible definitions of otherness. It means that by choosing the authentic life in the mountain, one no longer wants to be recognized as a guest in the bosom of biosphere. If ecology is defined as a science of home (eco-logy), Norwegian ecophilosophies can be described as based on a certain type of enlightened knowledge, i.e. on 'wisdom about home' (eco-sophy), which means that rediscovering man's fundamental place in the universe presumes developing a specific personal philosophy.

Regarding Faarlund's philosophy of outdoor life, I draw the conclusion that it is the process of conwaying that determines outdoor life to be recognized as a pedagogical arena. It should be examined not only from a utilitarian

perspective, but also from a deontological one. The differences in the choice of means justify the differences in the choice of approaches, but the differences in the latter inflict differences in values as well. Thus preferring one approach or another shapes the way we choose the means of determining outdoor life as axiologically-loaded phenomenon.

On a micro methodological level, I argue that one of the benefits of Faarlund's approach is that he investigates the values of contemplation and modernization not only as mutually excluding ones, but also as values whose contradiction is a guarantee for their further development. Reviving the symbolic capital of the values of contemplation is a 'natural' reaction against the arising role of the values of modernization, which have to be somehow restricted in the name of preserving the value of self-realization. Exploring the aforementioned values as functioning on the principle of contaminated vessels, as I suggest, reveals why Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life provides a way home in Faarlund's sense due to which establishing ecolife requires adopting particular values. In this context, his conception of ecolife can be justified as a measure against the threat of increasing moral relativism, which is provoked by the contemporary technological culture.

Analyzing Faarlund's illuminative statement that one feels at home in nature, I draw the conclusion that the normative aspects of this life have to be explored by specifying what profitable life in nature is. The latter does not have to be interpreted within the paradigm of utilitarian benefits, but rather as a way of being personally enriched in the process of self-realization. In other words, leading a profitable ecolife can be recognized as taking the responsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting nature as a net of biospherical knots.

As long as the competition has to be evaluated from the perspective of cooperation in outdoor life, I argue that Faarlund's theory can be read as grounded in two coordinate systems implying two different types of morality. The coordinate system of technological culture is the one, which I define as driven by a 'vertical' moral geography, while the Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life is explored as establishing a 'horizontal' moral geography due to which situating places on the same plane means to provide the participants with equal opportunities for self-realization. Thus moral genealogy can be explored as encouraging the transformation of the selves into Selves with a capital letter in contrast to the 'vertical moral geography', which presumes that the Selves with a capital letter are born this way.

I also argue that the distinction between the two types of understanding based on the different definitions of what living beings are determines dif-

ferent types of motivation to be developed, which individuals should cultivate depending on the moral geography they choose. The ‘vertical’ moral geography requires adopting the competition as a stimulus with a high value, which to dominate the process of self-realization. On the other hand, so-called by Faarlund motive of achieving (prestasjonsmotivet) can be examined as a crucial component of the ‘horizontal’ moral geography since it encourages the reconsideration of life’s quality within the framework of ontological ethics.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that while for the adopters of outdoor life the mutual interests are interpreted as arising from the common experiential knowledge, the ones of life promoted by the technological culture give priority to the scientific knowledge, which is defined as favorable to obtaining practical benefits from supporting different types of interests. That is why one of the main methodological advantages of extrapolating Faarlund’s idea of conwaying could be traced on the level of building collective imaginative rationality due to which to rehabilitate the normative validity of experiential learning as such.

Furthermore, I argue that rethinking the role of experiential learning through Faarlund’s formula ‘the way is the goal’ (veien er målet), we not only make meaningful decisions in meaningful situations, but also manage to see the meaning of situations, which are used to be considered as deprived of any concrete meaning whatsoever. Judging by those investigations, I reach the conclusion that the latter is a result of expanding the dominance of technological culture, which reduces the role of experience at the expense of pure rationality and thus turns the philosophy of outdoor life into a leisure time activity.

In turn, examining Zapffe’s theory of biosophy in the *second chapter* of the current monograph reveals how one unique, not only for Norway, philosophy exploits the methods of applied biology for finding solutions to some crucial existential problems, albeit it is not restricted to the use of biological methods alone. Taking into account that Zapffe himself ambiguously defines to what biosophy as a method is using ‘biosophical’ and ‘biological’ as interchangeable concepts, I argue that the two concepts could be interpreted as ontological synonyms for the purposes of clarifying biosophy’s potential as an experiential philosophy. Regarding Zapffe’s definition of biosophical as “mystical”, which, according to Hessen, is used in his later writings, while “biological” indicates something “more empirical”, I draw the following conclusion. The use of ‘mystical’ does not have to be interpreted as a matter of pure spiritualism, but rather as indicating the difficul-

ties in specifying what purely biosophical is because otherwise, it would have contradicted Uexküll's idea of *Umwelt* that is crucial for Zapffe's biosophy. Furthermore, if biosophical was interpreted as deprived of substantiality, it would have put in question the normative validity of the four interest fronts in Zapffe's sense, as well as we would not have been able to talk about interest bearers, which is a key concept in his theory.

Taking into account that the conceptualization of biosophy is strongly influenced by both Berkeley's theory of "esse est percipi" and Uexküll's bio-semiotics, I argue that clarifying the role of perception, Zapffe's theory provokes some contradictions regarding the definition of so-called unimportant perception. Presuming that one perception might be 'unimportant' from a biosophical point of view raises the question what are the reasons for justifying one perception as more important than another one? Extrapolating this explanation would lead to the ambiguous conclusion that one individual's interests matter more than others. On a macro-methodological level, it would mean that one *Umwelt* in Uexküll's sense is more important (in both epistemological and moral sense) than another one, which is against the theories of both Uexküll and Zapffe. Otherwise, it should have provoked the problematic conclusion that 'esse' coincides with 'percipi' imposing either epistemological absolutism, or epistemological relativism.

On the other hand, as one of Zapffe's methodological contributions, I point out his investigations of human biological constitution as irreducible to its biological features. Thus he reveals how human unfixability makes human kind different from the other species including so-called higher animals. In this context, I conclude that biological gradualism in Zapffe's sense regarding the interspecies differences in their biological constitutions is merely a necessary condition for exploring the role of unfixability in question since biological interests are only one of the four types of interests outlined by Zapffe. Thus we can explain why the degree of fixation mechanisms partly depends on the physical abilities of the organisms to fulfill their interests.

Analyzing the genealogy of biosophy, I draw the conclusion that it is the normative validity of what I called horizontal relatedness that makes biosophy irrelevant to the justification of objective naturalism, i.e. the mode of becoming to be reduced to the one of being. Otherwise, thinking from the perspective of defining biosophy and biology as alternatives hides the risk they to be examined as substantially different alternatives, which in turn would negatively affect reducing biosophy to the methods of applied biology as well as to intermingling the specifications of biosophy as an alternative with the ones of biosophy as a method. If Zapffe had provided argu-

ments in favor of objective naturalism, which he did not do, it would have meant that the realization of nature would have been a necessary and sufficient condition for the realization of man, but not vice versa. Such a statement would have questioned both the process of man's self-realization and the idea of horizontal relatedness itself. Furthermore, it would have implied that nature is in a 'higher' position in respect with man having 'bigger' (better) normative validity.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that the difference between biosophical and biological remains unclear if we neglect the ontological grounding of Zapffe's experiential philosophy whose projections can be outlined by what Fløistad defines as an ecological perspective in the broad sense of the word. That is why I claim that biosophical is a mode of philosophical thinking that is initially based on the philosophy of nature rather than on nature's mechanisms and their application as such. This philosophy of nature does not have to be interpreted as a sophisticated construct, but rather as clarifying the internal logic of nature's development, which has its own dialectics. I argue that it is the normative validity of biosophy understood as an experiential philosophy that makes the recognition of its own judgments both rationally acceptable and deriving from the real matter.

In turn, understanding the complexity of vital balance in Zapffe's sense can be revealed by analyzing the reasons behind his statement that expressibility in biological front is a heterotelic one. Referring to Zapffe's examples of the released bird and the one in captivity, I draw the conclusion that the differences in defining the relations between autotelic and heterotelic needs derive from the fact that the degree of expressibility is not necessarily determined by the degree of individual equipment and over-equipment in particular, especially when the latter is a result of overexposing the role of external environmental conditions. As another argument in favor of claiming that biological equipment in Zapffe's sense is only a necessary condition, I point out the one that some representatives of a given species may have the surplus of capabilities but not to use them, for one reason or another.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that Zapffe's biosophy is one of the first Norwegian philosophies showing how the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism can be overcome without supporting a certain form of radical biocentrism' while examining the biological interest front as intrinsically connected with the social, autotelic and metaphysical fronts.

The paradoxical at first sight intermingling of autotelic and heterotelic needs regarding man's over-equipment, as represented by Zapffe, is another

argument that what he described as biologically predetermined intentionality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for revealing man's complex capabilities in so far as life's meaningfulness is irreducible neither to the fulfillment of a certain set of objective goals, nor to the one of given objectifiable meanings. That is why I draw the conclusion that this intentionality has much to do with understanding life as an experiential strive, which can be embodied in different ways in one and the same organism in time, especially if we take into account the role of what Zapffe calls living energies.

On the other hand, I claim that another paradox, deriving from the possible absolutization of the biological interest front as a leading one, would stem from intermingling biological autotelic and heterotelic needs. Biological behavior cannot be determined as driven by autotelic needs alone even if we accept Zapffe's theory of the role of biological directives, unless we presume a certain type of moral (epistemological) naturalism to be adopted, or take for granted his questionable conception of biological morality. In this context, I point out that biological front in Zapffe's sense is irreducible to biological behavior because the normative validity of the biological behavior presumes it to be examined within so-called by Zapffe multi-frontal engagements; such a presumption contributes to finding an answer to his question how what is coined as autotelic in one front is recognized as heterotelic in another one.

In turn, the contradictions regarding Zapffe's specification of the surplus and lack of capabilities cannot be solved unless we specify that the surplus of capabilities is irreducible to expressibility as representing a given type of surplus. That is why I draw the conclusion that expressibility in Zapffe's sense concerns the understanding of impossibility as a possibility for itself that derives from the fact man can have more capabilities than the ones required for fulfilling the task.

Referring to Zapffe's descriptions of so-called over-biological (overbiologisk) and its definition as autotelic, we should take into account that the impossibility of fulfilling the intension is determined as a given kind of meta-possibility. I argue that the latter affects the qualitative implications of what over-biological is because the meta-possibility is irreducible to the sum of the possible compensatory objects. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that one of the illuminative embodiments of over-biological is the existence of moral norms.

Furthermore, exploring Zapffe's thesis of the internal connections between the four interest fronts, I claim that man's indifference to others and animals' indifference are of a different rank in so far as animals' sense of be-

longing is used to have a normative validity mainly within the biological front. In contrast to animals, man's sense of belonging gains its validity from the intersection of some autotelic and metaphysical engagements as well as while one is realizing one's potential in the social front. On a macro methodological level, it means that developing different types of engagements, humans aim at recognizing a chosen locus as a home by making one's environment not only a biological, but also a social habitat, where they choose to live with others.

The differences between biological interests of animals and human beings can be made apparent by examining what Zapffe defines as a matter of achieving unifying result. That is why I draw the conclusion that while for the animals continuity is a matter of temporal fragments, for the human beings, it is an existential continuity. Furthermore, regarding the process of protecting the heirs, in the former case, we see how the mode of temporality is guaranteed by the instincts, while in the latter one, it is a result of the existential projections that are not axiologically neutral.

Comparing Zapffe's conception of life's unfolding and life's feeling against the background of the presumption that autotelic and metaphysical fronts are not one and the same, albeit they encourage autotelic-metaphysical engagements, I argue that we should compare two conceptions of existential continuity, which gain their normative validity due to the principles of imaginative rationality. On a macro methodological level, I reach the conclusion that Zapffe's theory of world's feeling is defined within the framework of autotelic-metaphysical engagements. From an autotelic perspective alone, the emphasis is put on the self-sufficiency of the world, which has a predetermined order, while from a metaphysical perspective, the crucial questions of both life's meaning and human being's life illustrate how human beings are not able to grasp the meaning of life regardless of the fact that they elaborate different mechanisms of living with such an inability. In this context, the metaphysical tension can be described as brought by the one between autotelic and heterotelic needs of finding a meaning in being, as displayed by Zapffe.

In turn, the aforementioned specifications depend on the role of fantasy in his sense. That is why I draw the conclusion that while autotelic activity of fantasy concerns life's feeling, its heterotelic activity characterizes the metaphysical need of finding meaning in life's feeling itself.

Analyzing the complex relations between different multi-frontal engagements is grounded in outlining the diverse connections between the individual abilities, the degree of fixation and the type of solutions due to the dif-

ferent opportunities for fulfilling a given task under given circumstances. Applying this approach to Zapffe's theory, I draw the conclusion that it would not only contribute to revealing why having a capability is not equivalent to mastering expressibility, but also to specifying why Zapffe leaves the boundary between compensatory objects and surrogates, as well as the one between real and imaginary anchoring unclear. First, I justify that the over-fixation and the surplus of abilities are not necessarily set in a corresponding relation because a contradiction arises from Zapffe's definition of over-fixation as including ability, which is too much fixed and the one of surplus that may include abilities that are not required for fulfilling the task, as I showed above.

I also emphasize that he does not examine how the abilities and fixations regarding the unification in question may vary in time depending on the circumstances, i.e. he does not investigate when and how one well-adapted fixation can become a wrong one.

Going back to the issues of both imaginary and real anchoring, and the unclear boundaries between the compensatory objects and surrogates, I conclude that Zapffe's criteria of real and unreal are only a necessary condition for revealing the multiple opportunities for fulfilling given tasks. As an illustration of this thesis, I refer to his example of having 'good' and 'plain' surrogates, both of which are imaginary objects. Furthermore, as one of the possible arguments for revealing the insufficiency of the criteria of real and unreal, I point out that achieving a result by performing different abilities is recognized by default as a real objective regardless of the contents of the latter since they concern the fulfillment of a real need.

On the other hand, the complexity in specifying the boundary between real and unreal solutions can be defined as a matter of behavioral solutions because they are achieved by interest bearers. That is why we may have real solutions, which are less sufficient than some imaginary solutions from the interest bearer's point of view.

Clarifying the role of evaluation itself raises the question how to interpret Zapffe's statement that we should assume a condition of surplus in an autotelic state of readiness since it would mean that merely high values encourage the self-sufficiency of realization. Accepting such a thesis, however, would lead to the problematic conclusion that high values alone determine the fulfillment of real solutions, which would cause confronting the processes of sublimation and (over)compensation with some 'good' surrogates in Zapffe's sense.

Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that if we remain on the level of comparing and contrasting imaginary and real anchoring due to the ambiguous criterion of what objective and subjective values are, as Zapffe suggests, it would provoke questioning the normative validity of imaginary anchoring. There would be at least two problematic consequences. First, imaginary anchoring to be interpreted from the perspective of epistemological relativism, which would trigger the second one, namely, epistemological relativism to become irrelevant to the process of real anchoring.

In turn, analyzing the contextualization of Zapffe's ethical "yes and no" against the background of what he defines as rich outer and inner life (culture), I draw the conclusion that the cultural break in Zapffe's sense is as important as the biological one since the multi-frontal engagements presume not only to outline how autotelic needs are compared with heterotelic ones, but also why and how they contradict each other. In this context, I conclude that it is the tension brought by confronting autotelic and heterotelic needs that illustrates why in given cases autotelic need regarding finding a meaning in life has "higher" normative validity than a heterotelic one: namely, in some borderline cases, when the versus mode concerns not the survival of the fittest and luckiest but survival as such. Regarding the clarification of the process that is not an axiologically neutral one, I argue that referring to the concept of moral experiential gestalt would contribute to revealing the implications of so-called by Zapffe cosmic feeling of panic.

Within the framework of fixation mechanisms, the following conclusions can be reached. If autotelic needs were coinciding with the living ones, it would have meant that defining a set of choices is equivalent to the process of choosing. Furthermore, missing the metaphysical component would have indicated that the act of choosing is irrelevant to the question of what man's life is. That is why I argue that so-called by Zapffe universal behavior can be defined as experiencing world's feeling-mode, which is due to the potential openness of the mode in itself. However, it also presumes performing an experiential behavior on side of the subject, which to be driven by some metaphysical motives as well as revealing why one should search for meaning.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that specifying the normative validity of metaphysical front benefits understanding the role and the multiple types of morality in Zapffe's sense.

Regardless of the fact that he does not aim at discussing the interactions between man and environment on the level of ethical gradualism, I claim that Zapffe's parallels between morality and biology should be paid special at-

tention. By contrast to his well-grounded examinations of the origin of so-called social and autotelic-metaphysical morality, Zapffe's conception of rehabilitating the role of biological dispositions of human beings raises many concerns about the normative validity of ethics, which derives from purely biological factors. The complexity of these problems will be later formulated with different words by G. Skirbekk, namely, how could we talk about ethical gradualism without entirely rejecting biological gradualism as such?

Zapffe provides another comparison between morality and biology in respect with foreseeing the consequences of the deeds and their normative validity. That is why I reach the conclusion that he underrates the fact that cultivating responsibility takes place in the fields of so-called by him social and metaphysical morality, while in the one of biological morality, it would be examined as a matter of evolutionary development of the instincts of survival due to the changes posed by the environment.

Zapffe also discusses the value-biological paradox, but it does not affect his theory of biological grounding of morality. If we accept Zapffe's conception of biological morality, as well as extrapolate his theory of the aforementioned paradox, it would mean that all living beings are 'naturally' moral, which in turn would question the role of morality and the one of ethical gradualism in particular.

On the other hand, investigating Zapffe's theory of social morality raises the problem that we should either wrongly postulate a certain paradoxical asocial morality (if morality of social nature is only one among many other types of morality, as he suggests), or if we accept it, it would lead to the ambiguous interpretation of juridical and ethical as ontologically interchangeable concepts. Extrapolating these investigations, I draw the conclusion that we have more arguments in favor of immoral society rather than asocial morality, which questions again, albeit in a different manner compared to biological morality, the normative validity of social morality.

The problem how to discern biological morality from social one in Zapffe's sense is an important issue because it can contribute to rethinking how it is possible to minimize pain and suffering not only for human beings. The topic is also an object of investigation on side of Næss, Kvaløy and Skirbekk since it concerns the transition from ethical anthropocentrism to ethical gradualism. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the examination of suffering and pleasure, as displayed by Zapffe, derives from minimizing the risks of simplifying the normative validity of experience if it is reduced to a set of biological functions. Otherwise, it would have meant that tragic in

Zapffe's sense should have always been examined as driven by physical pain alone.

If we go back to the arguments of adopting Zapffe's methods of applied biology, we would leave room for defining the meaning of life in respect with meaningfulness as a purely biological issue. Then tragic, as determined by Zapffe, would have been reduced to the physical end of being and thus it should have been noncontradictory extrapolated to all living beings on Earth, which is against Zapffe's claim. On a macro methodological level, it would have meant to neglect the distinction between what he calls deficient and surplus pessimism.

On the other hand, suffering covers the whole spectrum of existential restlessness, fear, emptiness, meaninglessness in the framework of metaphysical front. In turn, meaninglessness is one of the most illuminative representations of why man's existential mode should be defined as having higher normative validity compared to other species.

The mechanisms of compensation elaborated on man's side cannot contribute to overcoming the existential pessimism that has the biological nature of human species merely as a necessary condition. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Zapffe's surplus (or what we can call a 'higher type') pessimism does not have to be negatively examined as a form of nihilism, but rather as a constructive criticism of the arising faith in technocratic invasion and interpersonal alienation, which can be minimized by cultivating empathy and love.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that regardless of the methodological similarities between Schopenhauer's and Zapffe's theories of pessimism, we should also pay attention to the way Zapffe criticizes Schopenhauer's pessimism and his theory of tragic in particular. The practical implications of this issue can be outlined if we examine what Zapffe calls value pessimism.

Extrapolating Zapffe's conception, I conclude that the cosmic feeling of panic determines man's experiential gestalt to be referred to what I called moral experiential gestalt: a gestalt that contributes the process of self-realization to be guaranteed by showing respect and solidarity with all living beings. On a macro methodological level, I suggest that one of the crossing points with Schopenhauer's philosophy can be found in his theory of empathy and compassion as one of the few ways of living with the fundamental feeling of alienation and cosmic panic.

However, a serious problem arises if we establish a certain type of consequentialist morality in Zapffe's sense, which would lead to ambiguously

equating social and moral motivation as well as neglecting the premises and the impact of egoistic and altruistic demands. Furthermore, adopting the principles of consequentialist morality would mean to simplify the role of autotelic-metaphysical engagements by reducing them to an autotelic need, which is a certain type of a modified embodiment of the survival instinct. The other alternative is to investigate the genealogy of the norms and their practical application as determined again from a utilitarian perspective since the latter concerns the quantitative minimization of suffering that derives from the unquestionable presupposition of biological morality. Thus egoism and altruism would be problematically described as depending on whether they affect one or many individuals, while the qualitative aspects of the definition itself would have been provoked by so-called desire for happiness specified in naturalist terms. That is why it is important to emphasize that the other is justified as a bearer of similar or different interests merely in sympathetic environment, which is another proof in favor of the thesis that the problems of biological morality and utilitarian ethics require further elaboration.

On a macro methodological level, I argue that it is the issue of normative validity that can make us understand Zapffe's explanation of tree's tragic destiny, which misses both the opportunity to choose and the strive for accomplishment. I conclude that the projections of the normative validity of tree's tragic concern the possibility to recognize and question the impossibility of realization not as a fact, but as a mode. The latter in turn presumes not only to be aware of what unrealizable is, but also the clarification of the double-bindness of the multiple mechanisms of fixations and surrogates, which illustrate why the metaphysical interests are dominating.

Examining the methodological advantages and disadvantages of adopting deep ecology in the *third chapter* of the current research, I argue that the critical attitudes are mainly provoked by the fact that Næss neglects the problem of normative validity on the levels of morality and environmental politics, which leads to introducing radical biocentrism at the expense of ethical gradualism. As one of the most illuminative illustrations of this thesis, I point out his statement that the ecological problems should be separately treated from the ones of poverty and justice. This would explain why Næss mainly interprets the scenarios of ecological sustainability as a subject to vague futurism.

What are the implications of the mountain philosophy embodied in the mode 'thinking like a mountain'? Justifying a process of identification by referring to some practices of animism, which Næss, Kvaløy and Faarlund

witnessed in their contacts with the Sherpa in Tibet, shows how we co-experience the state of feeling the mountain and the one of feeling for the mountain, namely, how we tacitly intermingle the process of identification with the one of equanimity. If we completely reject the influence of animism (coming through Tibetan Buddhism) on Næss's theory, we cannot fully explain why self-realization should be determined in a normative way as dependent on nature's realization.

Furthermore, accepting the thesis that animism and panpsychism may not necessarily have a scientific justification, as he suggests, would mean that the symbolic characteristics directly derive from reality as such. Thus the symbol would be misleadingly equated with the physical phenomena it represents. That is why I reach the conclusion that the connection between mythopoesis and Næss's Ecosophy T can be sought on the level of adopting culturally common gestalts as well as gestalts, which may entail different structural experience regarding both the understanding and the interaction with nature.

Judging by those investigations, I draw the conclusion that the normative validity of the mountain's gestalt can be explained by referring to Næss's formula 'live and let live', which implies two modes at once, namely, mountain's being in itself and mountain's being for itself concerning the being of the one who is in the mountain.

These arguments are important for revealing the genealogy of the sense of belonging, as introduced by Næss. I reach the conclusion that if the place can be justified as a place of being in his sense, the home functions as a topos of becoming, where the individual turns into a person by cultivating his/her sensitivity towards the holistic character of nature. In turn, analyzing the sense in question requires understanding the scientific grounding behind the transformation of Næss's statement *Here I stand*.

Investigating the way Næss determines intuition as a-moral (as being irrelevant to morality), I suggest that if we manage to recognize the normative validity of intuition, we can noncontradictory determine how ecosophy's wisdom is related to practice. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the role of Ecosophy T cannot be fully revealed by referring to Næss's understanding of moral intuition since relying on the latter, we should unquestionably adopt the problematic principles of moral relativism.

Furthermore, I argue that what Næss calls intuition is not a sufficient condition for justifying the role of moral choices, albeit I agree with him that moral intuition is irreducible to moral duty as well as that the cultural setting affects how we define felt closeness to the different living beings.

However, I question Næss's statement that duty is 'relational' rather than 'relative' because it does not contribute to understanding why acting from inclination should be 'superior' to acting from duty. I conclude that adopting such a theory does not provide a sufficient explanation while postulating an ethical system based on superior and inferior relationships. Otherwise, it would have led to determining the system in question by reviving a certain moral objectivism.

On the other hand, one of the main methodological problems comes from the discussions whether deep ecology can be interpreted as holist metaphysics or ontology, as Næss suggests. Such an issue provokes two other concerns. First, if deep ecology is recognized as holist metaphysics, it would still leave the question of normative validity of man's self-realization and nature's one open because defining the intrinsic value of all living beings presumes cultivating environmental awareness that can be merely achieved by moral understanding and moral learning. I draw the conclusion that talking about holist metaphysics would mean to neglect the complex role of morality and thus to encourage one to go back to the paradigm of ethical anthropocentrism due to which Self with a capital letter is understood as born this way, as I already showed. I also prove that defining deep ecology as holist ontology alone raises similar concerns in so far as the gestalt shifts are a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying man's moral experiential gestalt. Furthermore, the implications of the latter can be clarified by referring to Næss's reception of Spinoza's theory of the different types of joy, which contributes to better understanding the genealogy of what Næss describes as moral inclination.

Neglecting the normative validity of morality, as Næss suggests, we would keep facing serious ethical contradictions because then empathy would be simplified to a process of identification merely with the ones who are close to us. On a micro methodological level, it would mean that there is an increasing risk the ecological self to be identified with the narrow one in Næss's sense. Extrapolating this issue on the level of environmental politics, I argue that the principle of identification may negatively affect the interests of conservation, namely, they to be determined as interests with a capital letter and thus instead of building a bridge between self-love and self-realization, as Næss claims, to strengthen love to the ego and its narrow realization respectively.

Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that the implicit ontological ethics grounding deep ecology can be described as based on the need of reevaluating the intrinsic value of natural rhythm and organic coherence, which does

not mean that shallow ecology movement is necessarily encouraging complication in Kvaløy's sense. However, we should take into account that the lack of explicit principles of ontological ethics may provoke the ones of complication to be justified.

In this context, I argue that both deep ecology and shallow ecology movements address the social transformations as a desirable aim. On the other hand, merely the act of addressing from the perspective of ethical gradualism can encourage the changes to be performed and maintained in time.

On a macro methodological level, I see one of the main concerns about Næss's justification of radical biocentrism in establishing a certain kind of utilitarian ethics, which is supposed to contribute to reducing ethical anthropocentrism. Disenchanted this misconception requires reconsidering the ethical implications of Næss's deep ecology platform by focusing on the way the idea of intrinsic value is recognized. That is why I draw the conclusion that it is the normative validity of the interrelatedness of human and nonhuman world that benefits intrinsic value to be defined beyond the paradigm of moral objectivism. If we keep anticipating this interrelatedness as a form of moral objectivism, it would mean either to keep supporting ethical anthropocentrism, or to fall into the trap of radical biocentrism, which in turn would become an obstacle for evaluating the methodological benefits of ethical gradualism. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I claim that the latter is implicitly formulated in point three of Næss's deep ecology platform, albeit it still requires further clarification of what 'vital human need' is as well as how ethical gradualism can be applied to the other species in practice.

If we follow Næss's line of thoughts regarding man's natural ability to act beautifully, the ethical model he provides would meet the requirements of a self-sufficient form of radical biocentrism that is as questionable as the narrow moralization is.

In turn, the potential justification of ethics as a part of a total premise-conclusion pyramid, as Næss insists, would lead to reducing the latter to a causal system whose normative validity would be simplified to outlining logical connections that do not necessarily imply ethical ones.

As one of the main methodological problems regarding Næss's difficulties in establishing ethical gradualism, I outline his willingness to leave the definition of vital needs 'deliberately vague', which in turn provokes the question how to interpret the statement that all living beings are 'equal in worth'. I suggest that Næss's definition due to which 'the same' can be described as a generic term does not have to be understood in terms of contents alone.

Otherwise, it would have meant that the value of all human beings has the 'same content'. Such a specification would have made it impossible to take a stance when the lives of two different individuals are at stake. On the other hand, there are some typological differences while talking about equal value, when the right as such is embodied in life. On a macro methodological level, I reach the conclusion that equality, which concerns the general level of rights, affects the one of the intrinsic values, taking into account that 'equal' and 'same' are synonyms but not ontological ones. In this context, I argue that 'same', however, can be referred to the value of having a universal right but not to the treatment itself, as Næss claims, because the definition of the universal right may provide a noncontradictory differentiation treatment.

Analyzing the origin of the aforementioned issues, I draw the conclusion that introducing ethical gradualism should be based not only on the complex relations between vital and non-vital needs, interests etc., but also on the ones between the subjects they are applied to. Furthermore, the problem of the normative validity of equality cannot be solved by examining basic-non-basic and human-non-human relationships alone; otherwise, they would be determined on the principle of contaminated vessels.

If we agree with Næss that environmental ethics means to accept the philosophy of natural right, we do not have any chance to avoid the speculations with moral objectivism, namely, to avoid the identification of 'natural' with 'intrinsic'. Nor does Næss clarify the aspects of the potential dependence of natural right on the law of nature in so far as the natural right should be examined as the one of living and blossoming.

In my point of view, another problem derives from Næss's misunderstanding that he can easily justify ethical gradualism by providing experiments in mixed communities while implicitly interfering different attitudes towards 'priority in principle'. Even if we assume that it makes sense to ascribe rights to bears without attributing moral abilities to them, from that it does not follow that the right to live and blossom depends on one norm alone, nor does the species' egalitarianism 'in principle' concern many different types of mixed communities by default. On the other hand, I claim that by providing a certain type of species' egalitarianism, Næss gives relevant arguments in favor of replacing the criterion of similarity in so far as thus he qualitatively extends the target group of his investigations.

Going back to the point that Næss underrates the role of ethical gradualism, I draw the conclusion that we should pay attention to two main questions in his theory at least. First, how can we guarantee that the intergenerational

perspective is a necessary and sufficient condition for establishing sustainable communities; especially, for building local communities whose development is inseparable from the one of the unsustainable (big) ones? Furthermore, how can we prove that the principle of preservation would not be distorted due to the one of *docta ignorantia*, or due to the impossibility (in the ideal case) to reasonably count the results of a possible intervention, i.e. to presume that the value of future generations is 'higher' by default? Second, defining sustainable community is always done from man's perspective since humankind is the only one species that can take moral responsibility. Then, what would prevent the idea of sustainability to be replaced (deliberately or due to the lack of knowledge) with the one of unsustainability, which might be disguised as fulfilling the ideal of 'the most sustainable community' in the name of future generations? Last but not least, I argue that the latter interpretation would bring us back to the vicious circle of ethical speciesism because other living beings have generations as well.

Analyzing the projections of the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that if we face some problems in this context, we should keep being aware of avoiding the reduction of ethical gradualism to ethical anthropocentrism rather than criticizing the identification and self-realization as anthropocentric concepts, as Næss suggests.

Regarding gestalt ontology, Næss's contribution can be seen in the way he determines the experiential gestalts to be described as belonging to a lower or higher order by providing a mental dissection alone, namely, by implementing a certain gestalt thinking rather than finding distinctions between the gestalts as such. One of the main concerns about this approach is that from seeing does not automatically follow a certain kind of understanding and doing, as Næss points out, in so far as the latter is achievable merely by making a form of moral commitment.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that one of the main methodological problems of Næss's theory is provoked by his unwillingness to examine gestalt ontology within the field of ontological ethics, as I already emphasized, albeit he refers the normalization of gestalt shifts to the intrinsic value of nature. Furthermore, I argue that if Næss had explicitly stated that his gestalt ontology meets the requirements of ontological ethics, his contradictory expression of 'being normative by nature' could have been replaced with the one of being 'intrinsically normative'. Thus we would have had good reasons to talk about value priority system in the field of ecosophy rather than in the one of ecology.

In turn, some of the aforementioned specifications also affect the contextualization of Næss's Apron diagram. If unity was merely recognized on level two of the diagram, as Næss suggests, the latter should have had a higher normative validity than level one, which entails some diverse normative premises. I argue that it is not the premises that are inconsistent, but their embodiment in different backgrounds, which support different worldviews to be adopted; from which, however, it does not follow that these premises are initially incomparable. That is why one of my main concerns is how to avoid the inconsistencies in question to supporting uncontrollable disagreement, which would provoke some obstacles for the transition from level one to level two of the Apron diagram.

Remaining at the stage of derivation, I point out that the deductive approach to ethics does not benefit the internal contradictions to be constructively anticipated. On the other hand, if this process is based on our intuition, it would mean that we may face serious disagreements not only on levels three and four, but also on level two since the intuition does not have a normative validity. I reach the conclusion that if the logical derivation partly (or sometime) coincides with the ethical one, then we should question the decision-making process on level four. A significant problem arises if we presume that shallow and deep ecology movements sometime reach an agreement on level two, and the differences are only on levels three and four, as Næss insists. If so, what would be the status of their ultimate premises?

I suggest that there are two possibilities. The first one is the ultimate premises of the shallow ecology movement to differ from the ones of the deep ecology movement in a normative sense, but then, there would be some complications to specify under what circumstances these two movements can reach an agreement on level two. The second possibility is the deep and shallow ecology movements to derive from similar fundamental grounds. However, then the question is how can 'shallowness' be still justifiable on level two since judging by Næss's description, it should be described as mainly concerning some differences on levels three and four?

Furthermore, I claim that the lack of awareness about the role of ethical gradualism implied in point three of the deep ecology platform leads to misunderstanding Næss's radical biocentrism as bio-fascism, or ecobrutalism by some researchers such as the social ecologist M. Bookchin. The misunderstanding has apparent implications while examining the problem of population reduction. That is why I draw the conclusion that there is no objective goal of reaching a given number of living beings that may de-

pend on the existence of five billion of them, as Næss argues, so that the quantity cannot be used as an argument encouraging both quantitative and qualitative reductions. It means that there is no basic contradiction between the number of the human population and the one of the other living beings, nor is there a correspondence in the exact numbers that should be reached.

As one of the problems regarding the evaluation criteria, I point out the political speculation with the idea of permissible policies 'near the average level' of sustainability in Næss's sense. I conclude that one of the main methodological problems which arise is whether we can keep the balance by imposing sanctions alone, as Næss suggests, unless a certain kind of moral responsibility is cultivated. Adopting the latter would contribute to specifying why the compromise with reaching status quo is not arbitrary, but rather politically motivated.

Going back to Næss's statement that ecological problems should be separately treated because solving the ones of justice and poverty takes time, I draw the conclusion that this approach questions not only the role of ethical gradualism, but also the one of what relevant environmental politics should look like. In turn, comparing and contrasting deep ecology movement and the ones of peace and social justice would positively affect achieving the objectives of environmental politics by appreciating the quality of life rather than the increasing standard of living.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that Næss's comparison of so-called degrees of pain, which are specified on the basis of measuring 'felt pain', provokes some serious concerns such as the ones about how subjective experience of pain is defined as objectively measurable by default as well as why it is the bystander who can objectively evaluate someone else's experience of pain. Referring to this thesis would lead to the ideal justification of quantitative criteria of pain measurement by letting numbers decide, as Næss specifies, which, however, questions both the process of evaluation and the idea of biological gradualism as such.

On a macro methodological level, I argue that the need of reconsidering the aforementioned issues affects the opportunity of showing why achieving ecological sustainability in the long turn is not a matter of building a utopian scenario, which may be fulfilled in the 22nd century, as Næss claims. I reach the conclusion that by contrast to Næss's vague definitions regarding ecological sustainability as a future project, Skirbekk sees the realization of sustainability as inseparable from the sustainability of the welfare state. As a crucial argument in Skirbekk's conception, I outline the one that it is sus-

tainability and not sustainable development that guarantees applying the principles of universalizability to the state in question.

Furthermore, in contrast to Skirbekk's scenarios showing how the development of a relevant welfare state may affect the problems regarding the justification of ecological sustainability in the long run, Næss's ones are focused on descriptively outlining what most unsustainable scenarios could look like. That is why I conclude that Næss does not fully take into consideration the normative aspects of the possible social, economic, and ecological transformations, namely, how sustainability can be achieved in practice by introducing given changes in an already existing social order.

As another methodological problem concerning the process of building collective socio-political responsibility, I point out the way Næss reduces solidarity to a process of spontaneous identification. However, from the fact that solidarity strengthens the identification, it does not follow that the other way around is necessarily realizable. If morality is reduced to a 'natural' identification, then by 'feeling' solidarity, we would be able to approach mainly the other representatives of human species. In turn, it would cause the justification of ethical anthropocentrism rather than the one of ethical gradualism.

If the process of identification is not defined as a having moral value, then at least three main problems arise. First, spontaneous recognition in Næss's sense would be deprived of normative validity. Second, even if the spontaneous recognition is determined as a natural state, it would not explain how we end up with a certain form of anthropocentrism, and not with one of biocentrism, as Næss insists. And third, we cannot rely on the criteria of degree and recognition, as he suggests. Otherwise, we would have kept facing the risks of adopting ethical anthropocentrism as well as examining the moral consequences from the perspective of Hume's dilemma, namely, to presume that what comes next is intrinsically dependent on what precedes it, in both moral and ontological sense. Last but not least, I reach the conclusion that the examination of these problems would bring us back to Næss's ambiguous discussions about the role of biospherical egalitarianism as a 'realist' process.

On the other hand, investigating his distinction between deep ecology and shallow ecology movements, I claim that the differences derive from two different modes of thinking, namely, from the one focused on solving given problems and the one of perspective thinking. That is why I draw the conclusion that the concerns about the shallow ecology movement may be defined as ignoring the role of the 'big' gestalt entities by absolutizing the

subordinate ones in Næss's sense as well as neglecting both the constructive role and the multiple aspects of the sense of belonging of all species.

Analyzing what Næss argues about the similarities and differences between deep ecology and the greens, I see the following contradictions. If we presume that environmental politics is 'neutral' to the extent that it is a form of ecophilosophy in Næss's sense, such a presumption would lead us to questioning the normative validity of deep ecology. There are two options. First, deep ecology would be described as 'more responsible' than greens' politics. However, it is a vague definition, which would bring us back to the well-known discussions about replacing the qualitative aspects of evaluation with quantitative ones. The other option is deep ecology to be defined as 'less responsible' than greens' politics. This statement also remains problematic because it leaves the question how to justify life's democracy in Næss's sense undiscussed.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that keep thinking about the evaluation in terms of 'more' and 'less' does not contribute to solving the problems with so-called by Næss hybrid cases, when according to the principles of deep ecology, we should impose both centralizing and decentralizing policies. That interpretation still limits the discussions to the quantitative projections of the problem by thinking in oppositions such as shallow vs. deep, local vs. regional, national vs. global etc. The only 'qualitative' distinction outlined by Næss is the one of favored vs. unfavored, which still needs to be elaborated from a dialectical perspective.

On the other hand, revealing the methodological concerns about both deep ecology and environmental politics in Næss's sense requires the reception of some principles of both Mahayana Buddhism and Bhagavad Gita to be explicated.

Regarding Gandhi's influence on Næss, I reach the conclusion that one of the crossing points of their theories is the way they recognize friendly communication and pluralism as prototype characteristics of non-violent life, which in turn could set on level four of the Apron diagram. However, I give arguments against Næss's statement that Gandhists look more intensively for conflicts than the pacifists because in both cases there are values involved, as well as consensus about the fact that violence reduces self-realization. That is why I draw the conclusion that the friendly attitude is a necessary but not sufficient condition for self-realization if it is interpreted for the purposes of achieving nature's realization as a goal.

Another problem deriving from Næss's reception of Gandhi's principles concerns his distinction between action, demonstration and reformation.

Analyzing Næss's theory, I reach the conclusion that he examines demonstrations and actions mainly due to their quantitative implications, which are determined as illuminative for the impact these activities have, namely, demonstration is considered as 'bigger' than the action as such. In my point of view, the tension is raised by justifying the quantitative implications of the correspondence between risks and alternatives (neglecting the fact that big risks can also reveal big alternatives even within the small activities), which, however, does not benefit specifying what the qualitative differences between activism, demonstrations and reformation are.

In turn, I see another methodological problem in Næss's too general reference to some principles of Mahayana Buddhism, which makes me draw a conclusion that is similar to the one reached by Kvaløy in respect with Næss's interpretation of Spinoza (that it is rather Næss than Spinoza), namely (as in our case), that it is rather Næss than Mahayana Buddhism.

Extrapolating Kvaløy's investigations of the parallels between Mahayana Buddhism and Western environmental philosophy, I emphasize that we cannot claim that Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies directly borrow some principles of Mahayana Buddhism. The parallels could be sought on the level of process philosophies in general, which include some principles of Western process philosophies as well as the first principle of ecology "everything hangs together".

Comparing Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies *in the forth chapter* of the current monograph, I conclude that it is Kvaløy's ecophilosophy that contributes to understanding how the impact of radical biocentrism can be restricted on the level of environmental politics if environmental problems are examined as inseparable from the socio-political ones. Adopting this approach, however, does not mean to appeal for reviving the role of ethical anthropocentrism. On the contrary, I argue that with his critical reception of Næss's ideas, Kvaløy brings to light what Skirbekk justifies as a need of implementing the principles of ethical gradualism.

In this context, I clarify that while Næss's 'thinking like a mountain' mode is based on a certain type of gestalt thinking, Kvaløy's one can be described as a process philosophy grounded in the mode 'thinking like a river'. The latter is justified by the embodiment of natural rhythm that may not necessarily be harmonic, but rather harmonizing time.

Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy analyzes what it means to adopt *Here I stand* mode by developing a unique sense of belonging, which presumes to follow the river time and learn how to resist to be carried away by the stream. The sense of belonging to nature, as intro-

duced by Skirbekk, corresponds to the interpretations of Næss and Kvaløy providing an answer to the question why should we give preference to the experiential knowledge rather than to the purely cognitive one due to so-called by Skirbekk ecosophic reverence for life?

Referring again to Tordsson's conception of Nansen's moral geography, I claim that Kvaløy's theory contributes to avoiding the reduction of geography in question to cartography, which deprives the locus of life by compressing its multidimensionality.

Analyzing the implications of Kvaløy's ecophilosophy, I raise the hypothesis that it is an experiential philosophy whose prototype characteristic is the normative validity of wholeness recognized as a being 'in process'. The latter could be interpreted as corresponding to the definition of 'in progress', taking into account that the progress itself is not a product of technological expansion alone. I also argue that the specification of 'in process' is equivalent to the one of 'in progress' if it is evaluated from the perspective of the complexity of nature because the progress in Kvaløy's sense is not a strive for achieving aim by aim, but rather for revealing the potential of the new living energies.

However, I emphasize that Kvaløy's process philosophy has apparent political implications since his appeal for 'teaching yourself to swim' can be described as a matter of taking moral and political responsibility by committing to life. In turn, Kvaløy's reception of Gandhi's philosophy can be traced on the level of internalizing Gandhi's formula 'the way is the goal' for the purposes of defining ecophilosophy as a type of process philosophy with political connotations.

Comparing Kvaløy's ecophilosophy with Næss's Ecosophy T, I draw the conclusion that ecophilosophy is not merely a result of combining the two ancient Greek words of 'eco' and 'sophia', as Næss claims. It presumes the need of adopting and developing moral engagement, which in turn encourages the responsibility for making relevant political engagements. That is why I argue that it is the interpersonal commitment that provides the integrity of moral and political as two interconnected sides of changing environmental politics as well as strengthening the collective responsibility towards preserving nature.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the rehabilitated role of human ecology in Næss's and Kvaløy's writings contributes to building environmentally sustainable politics by avoiding ecophilosophical competence to be reduced to a narrow expert knowledge. In this context, I outline that both Næss and Kvaløy justify the competence in question,

which has the process of understanding as its necessary condition for recognizing the need of moral and political commitments. Thus the image of super-amateur in Kvaløy's sense corresponds to the one of so-called by Næss super-generalist due to the fact that one not only aims at elaborating the ecological knowledge as crucial for grounding the political decision-making process, but also defending how this knowledge can fully benefit experiencing all the aspects of the situation we live in.

I also claim that it is the critical attitude emphasized by both Tranøy and Kvaløy that questions taking for granted the new knowledge as the best one. Despite the fact that Tranøy does not provide an explicit distinction between generalists and specialists, his theory of the role of scientists is similar to the one of generalists, as represented by Næss and Kvaløy.

On a macro methodological level, I conclude that super amateur's expertise in Kvaløy's sense is the one adopted in democratic society because it is built on the idea of pluralism of vital needs. Furthermore, super amateur's expertise can be described as based on what Kvaløy defines as life necessity society's vital needs. They are proposed as an ideal in so far as the society in question takes the genuine experience of different situations as a premise, which to determine what vital needs are and how they should be covered respectively.

That is why I argue that investigating the image of super-amateur/super-generalist, both Kvaløy and Næss see the possibility of socio-political transformation to environmental sustainability in changing the public opinion about the role of technologies. In this context, I draw the conclusion that by questioning monoculture as an embodiment of socio-political centralization, Næss and Kvaløy clarify the need of restricting the use of so-called hard technologies at the expense of the soft ones.

Regarding Kvaløy's fundamental distinction between complexity and complication, I claim that life necessity society encourages the engagement with organicity to be understood as a meaningful engagement with the world by adopting meaningful work strategies, i.e. strategies due to which work is defined as a goal rather than a means in itself. It shows that cooperation is a significant activity that contributes to cultivating the sense of situatedness internalized as a sensitivity towards group belonging. Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that life necessity society is built not on 'freedom from' but rather on 'freedom to' justifying meaningfulness as such. To a certain extent, the 'freedom from' can be determined as operating with given meanings for the sake of engaging with the idea of what meaningful is.

Analyzing Kvaløy's critique of contemporary technocratic society, I argue that it is the substitution of life necessity society with the industrial development one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be replaced with the one of development whose climax is the idea of sustainable development. That is why I draw the conclusion that the symmetry of complexity including asymmetrical moral relationships is erased by the technological invasion at the expense of the symmetry of formal relationships, which are based on the principles of meritocracy. Exploring the methodological advantages of what Kvaløy disenchant as a techno-capitalist model, I conclude that the latter is grounded in supporting so-called omnipotent expertise by all means, namely, by the ones of hard technologies reducing the need of conducting critical research, which to strengthen pluralism.

In this context, I outline that Tranøy's contribution to the debate can be seen in revealing how the uncritical reception of our (intellectual) cultural heritage affects the gradual replacement of the contents of the categories of growth and knowledge. In turn, this problem can be solved by rehabilitating the connection between ethical and epistemological normative validity.

On a macro methodological level, it would lead to fighting the ideology of sustainable development understood as growth with a capital letter by building relevant environmental politics, which to overcome the naivety of interpreting the process of complication in Kvaløy's sense as if it is complex. If we accept sustainable development for granted, the management of the natural dynamic systems would be defined as a problematic from the perspective of social constructivism.

Referring to Kvaløy's theory of the distinction between life necessity society and industrial development society as influenced but not restricted to the distinction between Gaia theory and Servoglobe one, I argue that pretending to fight chaos, Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results in provoking a different type of chaos. I draw the conclusion that Servoglobe activates the fear of empty space (*terror vacui*) in so far as the latter does not come from man, but from nature itself, albeit humankind is the only one species that consciously anticipates it. Thus Servoglobe fails in the way it pretends to find a panacea for the fear in question.

Furthermore, I see the micro methodological projections of Servoglobe's vicious circle outlined by Kvaløy in revealing how mankind's tragedy, which is driven by the feeling of being a temporary species in the universe, turns into a tragedy of *Homo Consumens*. The latter is multiplied into some other tragedies because the mechanisms of compensating the initial tragedy, which stems from the fragility of humankind as such, are strengthened by

the unsuccessful attempts at playing different happy endings that result in tragedies. Such a conception corresponds to Zapffe's theory regarding the role of tragic. Furthermore, I argue that the fixation mechanisms in Kvaløy's sense benefit personalizing tragedy and thus multiplying its embodiments by recognizing consumption as what Næss calls a top norm. This would lead the self-realization to remain a norm, but with a different normative validity: it would be modified within the field of meritocracy whose target group is the shopping gifted audience, which exploits nature's sources, as Kvaløy points out. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that time compression is strengthened not only by the myth of final solution, but also by the one saying that organic time can artificially be extended to eternity.

I also argue that the myth of perfection, which is closely tied with the myth of final solution, contradicts the stop-time aesthetics in Kvaløy's sense since the latter is ontological aesthetics supported by the understanding of nature as a knowledge of home. If we extrapolate Næss's and Kvaløy's theories, and choose to favor hyper-aesthetics at the expense of the ontological one, it would lead to confronting generalists and specialists-saboteurs who overexploit the use of service as servitude by reducing the transperspectivity of knowledge to the one-dimensional eco-ideology.

Examining the projections of Kvaløy's theory of complexity and complication, I reach the conclusion that the division between organic and mechanical time benefits avoiding the wrong equation of organic time with the free one; a tendency provoked by the growing normative validity of the model of complication. Otherwise, defining organic time as free time would be triggered by the transformation of the debate about 'economic growth and environmental protection' into the one about 'industrial development vs. environmental protection', which in turn contributes the environmentally unfriendly politics to be justified by the maxima 'grow or die'.

Clarifying these conceptions, I also claim that Kvaløy's definition of so-called Tivoli-effect understood as a pseudo-complex phenomenon concerns the recognition of technological strength at the expense of life's strength by reducing the latter to the survival one as well as decreasing the multicultural diversity to a simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures in which 'mono' becomes an ontological synonym of 'global'.

On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the development of society, which meets the requirements of what Kvaløy calls a life necessity society, functions on the principle of ecosystems. The crossing points can be found in justifying equilibrium since the society in question is

grounded in satisfying the vital needs and interests of its participants, which are 'natural' but not in the sense of being given by nature alone. That is why I argue that if the development of the equilibrium in nature is determined due to the principles of evolution adopted in the process of common work (in the democratic society), the common work would affect the deliberate delegation of rights and duties in respect with the need of establishing common moral and political engagements.

Analyzing Kvaløy's theory, I also argue that both nature and society presume a certain type of decentralization of the system control to be established, taking into account that the centralization in human societies is a matter of adopting rationalized procedures, which are based again on the mutual delegation of rights and duties. On the other hand, I pay attention to the fact that in both cases, the decentralization is irreducible to the annihilation of the system control because it contributes to the process of development.

By contrast to Kvaløy's conception, Næss's theory of ecosocial crisis raises some other concerns since he examines the social reasons of the environmental crisis, but only for the sake of overcoming it as a goal in itself, without tracing the origin of the need of social transformations as well as how the latter could affect the members of a given society.

In turn, it is important to outline that the literal interpretation of democracy's problems as biospherical ones in Næss's sense would lead to underrating the specifically political implications of these problems, namely, to underrating that people are not only fragments of the biosphere, but also responsible moral and political agents who can take care of both themselves and environment as such.

Regarding the discussions about Norway's potential accession to the EU, I argue that Kvaløy's skepticism can be described as provoked by the transformation of the growth and environmental protection debate. The latter affects the realization of ecological sustainability since it is based on the contradiction between ideology and axiology due to the fact that the ideology pretends to be an axiology with a capital letter.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm see the main threat of the arising flow of people in the increasing instrumentalization of human power, which is simplified to exchangeable capital, i.e. in reducing the flow of people to the one of goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable resources.

Furthermore, neglecting the role of bioregionalism in environmental politics for the sake of justifying one global market would lead to revising the role of national on the global arena. That is why I claim that Kvaløy's appeal for restricting tourists' flow is not a matter of hate, as his critics argue. It emphasizes the need of reviving the ideal model of the most relevant environmental politics as based on solidarity and equal distribution of goods by recognizing the process of self-realization as maximally supported by the society. In turn, restricting the flow of tourists is done for the purposes of preserving both biospherical equilibrium and the opportunity the flow of migrants to be regulated by improving the quality of life in the developing countries.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the ecocatastrophe turns into a global one due to the fact that two different projects collapse, namely, the one of expanding free trade and the one of local markets, which impose two different perspectives for self-realization. Both models are models of dependence, but they presume different modes of fulfillment. The first model is Kvaløy's model whose philosophical groundings correspond to the ones of Næss's deep ecology, while the second one is the model of global economics turning nature's sources into unlimited resources of exploitation.

Extrapolating Kvaløy's statement that there are two levels of discussing life's richness, namely, the one of local systems and the one of biosphere, I draw the conclusion that we could talk about two types of globality. The first one is based on what I called horizontal relatedness concerning the normative validity of the initial (natural) relationships in the globe. Due to the second perspective, global should be defined as an ontological synonym of 'bigger', which is underlied by the presumption that the local systems should become bigger (global), i.e. that we should reconcile with one polarized globe.

Extrapolating Tordsson's investigations of Nansen's moral geography, I claim that similarly to Næss, Kvaløy introduces a moral geography based on having a home as a norm. He sees the biggest threat of the potential accession of Norway to the EU in so-called new colonialism provoked by the globalization, which I describe as forcefully depriving people of the opportunity to have a home and thus inflicting social chaos by triggering an ecological one.

However, I am skeptical about justifying the correspondence between the size of the country and the degree of solidarity it shows, as Seierstad suggests, as well as whether to be outside of the EU is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a morally engaged political state since there are

some other small countries, which are not members of the EU, but do not have the potential to become visible political actors.

As one of the main methodological arguments against the extrapolation of the relation between 'big' and 'small' in the field of politics, I see the argument that we do not have to examine solidarity as a 'possession' of the minority against majority, i.e. as a relation determined by analogy with the one between 'big' and 'small'. A possible solution can be found in Kvaløy's principle of collaboration due to which the unity is initiated by respecting not only the interspecies interests, but also the human interests as such. On the other hand, I point out that his position of keeping the physical isolation does not provide a satisfying solution either because keeping so-called offensive close interests 'smaller' does not make them less offensive, nor are they less interests at all. Such a problematic conception underlies the process of pseudo-justification of the globe, which in turn leads to making rich countries richer and poor ones poorer.

That is why I also argue that the representatives of snm, and Kvaløy in particular, appeal for a global transformation, which to provide the need of rehabilitating the concept of global responsibility (not only the one of global justice) as a prototype characteristic of the ecologically sustainable national politics.

In this context, analyzing Næss's and Kvaløy's no to the EU can be examined as a tentative yes, which is recognized in favor of establishing an ecologically sustainable society in the long run. It presumes the development of welfare state to be done by solving the problem how to eradicate ecological unsustainability worldwide. The latter is possible if the state in question encourages a form of life necessity society, where achieving high living standard is less important than achieving good quality of life for its members.

Furthermore, another methodological benefit of examining Næss's and Kvaløy's conceptions is that we can reveal the complex picture of the advantages and disadvantages concerned with decoupling growth from environmental protection as well as outlining how sustainable development not only provokes ecological unsustainability in the long run, but also depends on the current societal conceptions to the extent to which we can neglect the ecological limitations.

That is why I draw the conclusion that the analysis of so-called biological growth is negatively influenced by already discussed myth of final solution. Going back to Kvaløy's examination of the pitfalls regarding the analogy of nature with the 'trial-and-error mode', I claim that biological growth, defined as supporting nature's diversity, is simplified by the myth that every-

thing can be fixed with proper means, when we are used to interpret the contradictions as a matter of imperfections that have to be corrected. Following this line of thoughts, we should define biological growth as displaying a lower stage of development, which gains its ontological validity by analogy with the technological growth having a higher value.

Comparing and contrasting Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies, I reach the conclusion that many crucial questions, which they leave open, find their answers in Skirbekk's theory of environmental philosophy that is an object of investigations in the *fifth chapter* of the current monograph. Some of his solutions such as how ethical anthropocentrism can be overcome by rehabilitating the role of ethical gradualism, as well as by fulfilling the scenarios of ecological sustainability illustrate why reaching the sustainability in question is not a utopian scenario.

Examining the issue what relevant environmental politics should look like in respect with the development of welfare state, as Skirbekk suggests, I claim that his solutions can be described as conceptually closer to Kvaløy's ones rather than to Næss's solutions. One of the crossing points with Kvaløy's theory is found in the way Skirbekk rehabilitates the connection between ecophilosophy and environmental politics by revealing the role of morality in cultivating solidarity on a collective level. As a methodological advantage of reconsidering the role of solidarity as an issue with normative implications, I point out the possibility of examining environmental problems as closely tied with the political and societal problems.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that in contrast to Næss, Skirbekk emphasizes one of the most important consequences of adopting moral perspective in environmental politics, namely, the rehabilitation of ecological expertise. Taking into account that Skirbekk's definition of hermeneutic competence benefits broadening the scope of generalists' expertise, I argue that it is the justification of informed consent as an issue with strong ethical connotations that makes the decision-making process irreducible to a cost-benefit analysis. Comparing Skirbekk's, Næss's and Kvaløy's conceptions of what competence should look like, I argue that they share a similar understanding of how a new type of competence to be introduced, which to strengthen both the normative validity of expert's role and his/her expertise by challenging the impossibility of having rationality without understanding.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that Skirbekk makes a step further in rehabilitating the normative validity of values in the field of expertise by revealing why their normative validity is

irreducible to the criterion of verification. Regarding environmental politics, it would mean that political planning presumes environmental politics to be based on a discursive understanding provided by both politicians and experts, as Skirbekk suggests, which in turn would positively affect mastering ecological sustainability in the future.

Another crucial question, which finds its answer in Skirbekk's writings, is how can we avoid the extremes of both ethical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism without denying neither the responsibility of humans for the decision-making process nor the moral status of the other living beings, which can merely be justified by adopting the principle of advocacy representation? Analyzing Skirbekk's theory, I draw the conclusion that the origin of the problem of choosing 'either-or' concerning the relationships between humans and other species is grounded in absolutizing the issue of giving priority regardless of whether we talk about anthropocentrism or biocentrism. On a practical level, denying the role of ethical gradualism raises concerns about how to choose if two biographical lives are at stake, as Skirbekk points out, especially, when killing is unavoidable.

Extrapolating his investigations, I claim that adopting Skirbekk's theory of ethical gradualism provides some suggestions for the debate about so-called actual and potential properties of the beings and the principle of advocacy representation respectively. Otherwise, if we remain on the level of choosing between different types of properties, we raise the risk of misconceptualizing the 'is' mode as an 'ought' one, regardless of the fact that 'is' premises do not lead to a normative conclusion by default.

By referring to Skirbekk's theory of ethical gradualism, I argue that we should specify whether ontological gradualism, concerning the question of actual and potential properties, is not represented as an ethical one by over-exposing the role of biological gradualism. If so, we would be forced to justify ethical speciesism, which to be evaluated again from the perspective of ethical anthropocentrism. Thus the unilateral functioning of the latter regarding the priority of human vital needs and vital interests over the rest would be defined as what Skirbekk calls eco-ethical speciesism.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that the argument of potentiality can be accepted while introducing ethical gradualism if we compare what Skirbekk calls first and second orders of potentiality. In turn, questioning the debate about actual and potential properties presumes the concept of moral difference to be examined on a different level, as he suggests, namely, on the level of meta-ethical discourse. That is why I point out that the debate on properties affects how to interpret this difference beyond the scope of

moral naturalism by avoiding falling into the trap of a certain kind of moral absolutism.

However, we should keep in mind that evaluating the moral similarities is easier compared to clarifying the role of moral differences in Skirbekk's sense because it is easier to imagine a case in which moral agents become moral discussants by participating in open and enlightened discussions. Exploring the role of moral differences alone hides the risk to go back to the case of so-called paradigmatic beings, albeit this time the potential and actual capabilities would be elaborated on the level of morality as moral (potential or actual) qualities. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I reach the conclusion that if exploring the distinction between actual and potential capabilities is done from an ontological perspective, it may culminate in following the principles of utilitarian ethics. By contrast to when the elaboration is examined as a process of evolution (as a certain type of biological development), in the case with the moral qualities, it should be justified as a cultivation, which requires moral agency to be explored beyond the debate about potential and actual capabilities.

On the other hand, I argue that the evaluation of moral similarities and differences depends on how we initially define moral subject as such: as 'incapable' moral agent and discussant or as a subject who has the potential to become moral agent and moral discussant under given circumstances. That is why I draw the conclusion that while 'the positive' definition of moral subjects mainly concerns the representatives of humankind, the 'negative' one characterizes the group of non-human representatives including given groups of people such as mentally retarded people etc. i.e. moral subjects who are unable to become neither moral agents, nor moral discussants.

Furthermore, I claim that thus we can avoid calling not only non-humans, but also certain groups of humans 'insufficient' moral subjects in so far as 'insufficiency' in morality is no longer based on the ontological, and especially on the biological implications of the debate on properties. We can justify the competence of being morally engaged as a prototype characteristic of so-called by Skirbekk communicative competence.

In this context, I conclude that one of the main methodological difficulties concerns whether good will can be recognized as one of the premises of defining someone as a moral agent, which in turn would mean to presume a complete overlapping between deeds and motivation. In practice, this would cause leaving the questions how a moral agent can do immoral things as well as how to discuss the motivation of the white lie (for instance) open.

Introducing ethical gradualism in Skirbekk's sense contributes to clarifying what would oblige us to treat other beings morally even when they cannot be morally responsible? I draw the conclusion that due to adopting the principles of ethical gradualism we can find an alternative in grounding the principle of advocacy representation as an ethical principle without completely denying the role of biological gradualism.

Another problem regarding the status of moral agents is overcome if we elaborate Skirbekk's thought experiment with the robots and Martians representing borderline cases. Judging by these investigations, I reach the conclusion that the robots and Martians are an ideal case of moral agents, which displays an ideal vision of deontological ethics, i.e. in the best case, they can adopt an abstract duty alone.

Exploring the methodological advantages of Skirbekk's interpretation of well-being, first, I outline his contribution to specifying that discourse ethics affects examining the internal relations between vital needs and vital interests beyond the principles of utilitarian ethics (however, without entirely denying its role), and second, Skirbekk's contribution to avoiding vital needs getting purely eudemonic embodiments. That is why I conclude that referring to the methods of discourse ethics can benefit overcoming the difficulties while discussing the mutual connections between moral agents, moral discussants and moral subjects if we expand the concept of obligation to the one of responsibility.

Referring to Skirbekk's theory of mini-ethics, I claim that it can be interpreted as a premise of establishing mini-rationality and the other way around in so far as both of them are mutually determined in a normative way. Otherwise, mini-ethics should have functioned as a utilitarian ethics based on a cost-benefit analysis: the other problematic alternative is rationality to remain incompatible with the idea of solidarity as such.

On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that exploring ethical gradualism intrinsically depends on what Skirbekk understands by universalizability as well as how the consensus about objective needs can counter the strong tendency of abstracting vital needs from their contents, which favors imposing certain ideologies.

Against the background of already examined problem of leaving the concept of vital needs deliberately vague, as Næss suggests, I reach the conclusion that Skirbekk's contribution can be seen in analyzing how vital needs can be objectively determined without losing their normative validity. Otherwise, if they were examined as 'natural' needs, it would have meant a certain type of moral objectivism to be justified.

I also argue that the question how to relate vital interests to vital needs requires special attention due to the fact that some subjective needs such as some societal needs and interests may turn into objective ones in the process of evolution. This can explain why Skirbekk defines the inter-subjective needs as irreducible to the subjective ones. On the other hand, simplifying the role of vital needs raises the concern whether so-called objective interests, if we presume the ideal case when they can be established as objective ones, do manage to encourage the satisfaction of vital needs. In this context, I emphasize the risk of the problematic elaboration of some subjectively held points of view as vital interests.

Judging by these investigations, I conclude that the evaluation of vital needs as objective ones alone may result either in equating biological with ethical gradualism, or in equating technological with ethical ones. It would mean to simplify the concept of fallibility in Skirbekk's sense as well as the need of building social identity to be recognized as mastering biological instincts or technocratic ambitions for power and control. If so, such a reductionism would negatively affect the question how to distinguish between 'more' and 'less' developed (social) communities arguing in favor of a given group-belonging speciesism.

That is why I emphasize that the whole process of evaluation would have been justified as a matter of extending the concept of vital need by analogy. In turn, it would have inevitably led to establishing a given type of moral naturalism. Another concern arises from the fact that vital interests would have been evaluated in speciesist terms, while the complex evaluation presumes, in so far as there are different subjectively expressed interests developed in time, comparison of species to be made.

Going back to the problem how to interpret biological gradualism as referring to ethical gradualism, I draw the conclusion that the projections of biological gradualism can be seen since vital needs and vital interests are not equally applicable to all living beings. I claim that the contradictions arise from the fact that not all living beings have both 'being interested in' and 'having an interest in' modes in Skirbekk's sense. Regarding the modes in question, it is difficult to compare vital needs of different organisms because such a comparison implicitly presumes the criterion of giving priority to be adopted.

We may argue whether it is still problematic to define unquestionable criteria for applying biological gradualism by justifying sentience as a demarcation criterion that determines the evaluation of suffering of all beings (even the suffering of the ones, which are not sentient beings) as morally inappro-

priate. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that relying on the criterion of sentience alone would lead to adopting the mode ‘Whose justice? Which rationality?’. It raises the concern whether we would not remain trapped again in the framework of ethical anthropocentrism because sentience is always defined and witnessed from a human point of view.

This problem provokes the question how do we know that pain is the ‘same’ for all evaluated beings, namely, how do we know that there is an undoubted connection between physical experience and its moral evaluation as well as our knowledge about it? Otherwise, arguing that we are moral discussants who interact with moral subjects, which are initially deprived of the consciousness of being moral, may not result in reducing the pain-calculus, nor would it cause leaving room for compassion.

As one of the methodological benefits of Skirbekk’s theory of compassion, I outline his argument that compassion can be felt without reaching a procedural consensus, even when we talk about mutual compassion. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the impact of compassion on building experiential morality could be explored by clarifying how compassion can affect cultivating eco-consciousness, which to rehabilitate the normative validity of feelings and emotions. Regarding the role of ethical anthropocentrism, I claim that the need of introducing so-called by Skirbekk preference utilitarianism is driven by the one of specifying whether the maximization of intrinsic value is examined in respect with the representatives of one and the same species, or in respect with the ones of different species.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that it is important to clarify Skirbekk’s conception of welfare state as an ecologically sustainable state by outlining how the arguments in favor of the state in question encourage the embodiment of sustainability itself. Such an analysis would benefit revealing the role of desirability, especially when sustainability is considered as a politically desirable one.

Judging by the aforementioned specifications, I reach the conclusion that the distinction between the standard of living and the quality of life, as represented by Kvaløy and Skirbekk, has an influence on the need of introducing measures regarding ecological and demographic reproductions because the problematization of the latter stems from the multiplicity of differences between rich and poor, which are embodied on different levels of societal interactions.

Furthermore, I argue that referring to Skirbekk’s theory about the three extreme cases of movement of people and capital contributes to better under-

standing the problems Næss faces while talking about the three types of migration against the background of the discussions about how to achieve ecological sustainability in time.

As another methodological similarity between Skirbekk's and Kvaløy's conceptions, I point out the reconsideration of the problem of consumption in the debate about gradualism. Examining the genealogy of the concerns deriving from the production-consumption dilemmas in the sustainable development society, as represented by both of them, we should pay attention to the way Kvaløy and Skirbekk justify the role of education and political culture in rethinking the role of quality of life, especially in so-called developing countries.

For the purposes of examining the pitfalls of growing industrialization, referring to Skirbekk's interpretation gives some clues why we should question not only the idea of production, but also the one of consumption. I argue that it is the replacement of the idea of universalizability, which is understood in qualitative terms, with the process of universalization evaluated in quantitative ones that raises the need of distinguishing between ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if sustainable development is overestimated as the only one possible development. That is why I claim that Skirbekk's conception of universalizability does not share many features with Næss's one of universalization because the latter is rather focused on outlining the epistemological preciseness of deriving norms by providing verifiable hypotheses.

Regarding the future of environmental politics, I point out that ethical universalizability is achievable with difficulty because it should be based on a well-grounded, collectively shared responsibility taken by all countries. I draw the conclusion that talking about developing and developed countries, we should talk about ethically universalizable principle of advocacy representation due to which the developing countries to be treated as potential moral discussants whose well-being is at stake, when they react as moral subjects alone. The common future requires more responsible commitments on side of the developed countries to be made, which to operate on the behalf of the developing ones for the sake of the development of the latter. Thus the developing countries can take their life in their own hands as soon as possible and turn into moral discussants in practice.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Skirbekk's thought experiment of how a low cost welfare state can work illustrates the importance of specifying that the minimum of universalization is not equivalent to establishing a minimum, which meets the criteria of universalizabil-

ity. Analyzing the aspects of Skirbekk's experiment, I reach the conclusion that achieving ethical and ecological universalizability can be based on 'positive' arguments, namely, on the ones how to cultivate political culture if we want to build relevant environmental politics. In turn, the benefits of examining political culture in his conception concern how to create a climate of enlightened democracy, which to contribute to the justification of so-called politically mature welfare.

In this context, I claim that clarifying the normative validity of the idea of welfare state by outlining what political culture should look like reveals how we reframe the idea of unsustainability in so far as political sustainability is a crucial premise for obtaining and regulating both the economic and ecological reproductions in Skirbekk's sense. Furthermore, I argue that trying to attract people's attention to crucial ecological problems, he also outlines the risks how the language of ecophilosophy can easily turn into the one of ideology regarding ecological unsustainability as well as how the traditional way of mapping (reaching back to Nansen's time) is modified into the one of sustainable development's topography as a mapping with a capital letter. Regarding the change in the way the sense of belonging is internalized as a crucial premise for building identity, I conclude that this new topography, which finds a similar interpretation in both Skirbekk's and Kvaløy's writings, aims at revealing the new symbolic capital of the places and their internal connections.

Examining the role of Norwegian environmental philosophies is a task, which requires finding answers not only to questions such as "What is typically Norwegian?", but also to the one "How does 'typically Norwegian' contribute to addressing global issues, which to provide relevant local solutions?", taking into account that 'local' is irreducible to 'less meaningful'. I point out that analyzing the impact of Norwegian environmental philosophies is inseparable from outlining what the global challenges in front of Norwegian environmental politics are. In this context, the slogan "Think globally, act locally!" can be interpreted within the framework of Norwegian environmental philosophies as "Think meaningfully, act responsibly!" which in turn presumes the engagements to be examined as moral, cultural and socio-political ones rather than as epistemologically justifiable engagements. That is why arguing for Norwegian environmental philosophies in plural does not mean to think about 'global' and 'local' in relative terms, but in what Næss calls relational terms. Thus we can preserve the diversity

of the philosophies in question while they address common problems such as clarifying the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism, disenchanting the political lack of environmental constructivism etc.

On a macro-methodological level, “Think meaningfully, act responsibly!” becomes possible if the way of asking which questions we do not have to lose is internalized as an issue regarding how one to find a place in the net of the biospherical knots, which to call home (Næss). Similar issues concern the ineradicable cosmic feeling of panic (Zapffe), how to build a balanced society as a life necessity one (Kvaløy), as well as how dangerous is to find an asylum from the threat of environmental catastrophe in the myth of final solution (Skirbekk). Regardless of the different ways of emphasizing the need of rethinking the role of biocentrism, these questions derive from the fundamental dilemma “Whose Environment? Which Nature?”. Thus Norwegian environmental philosophies’ approach to challenging the ideal of cognitive rationality reveals how we can keep posing the micro-questions ‘which’ and ‘whose’ without losing the macro-ones, namely, the questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ in a world where reconsidering the role of ethical gradualism is one of the few ways of learning how not only to be *in*, but also *with* nature in the long run.

SUMMARY

The aim of this monograph is to reveal the complex development of 20th-century Norwegian environmental philosophies from a comparative perspective by outlining not only the role of the similar philosophical premises they derive from, but also how the differences in the chosen strategies affected the changes in the Norwegian environmental politics. That is why one of my main objectives is to analyze the origin and the elaboration of some concepts and ideas, which contribute to clarifying the multi-sidedness of the topic by going beyond the well-known theory of the founder of deep ecology, namely, the one of the Norwegian philosopher, mountaineer and environmental activist Arne Næss.

Before examining which ones are the questions we should not lose while examining both the genealogy and the impact of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I first specify why ecophilosophies and why in Norway. In this context, I raise the hypothesis that it is not accidental that the Nordic conceptualization of ecophilosophies took place in Norway since the Norwegian mountains became a crucial condition for the appearance of a unique philosophy of climbing developed in the 20th century.

I investigate how the possibility to talk about Norwegian environmental philosophies in plural is driven by what I call turn of imaginative rationality (also due to some intellectual influences of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism), which revives the idea of rationality as irreducible to the one of cognitive rationality. I will also examine how rehabilitating the normative validity of imaginative rationality can benefit revealing the ambiguous groundings of both radical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism.

Justifying what I called horizontal relatedness as one of the prototype characteristics of the philosophies in question contributes to outlining the dialectical entity of the relationships between man and nature as intrinsically connected with the rehabilitation of the principles of ethics. Thus only the ungrounded faith in (radical) ethical anthropocentrism, which Norwegian ecophilosophies criticize, can be relevantly questioned without falling into the trap of moral objectivism, nor into the one of radical biocentrism. Furthermore, recognizing Norwegian ecophilosophies as process philosophies can benefit clarifying one

of the main objects of investigation of the current monograph, namely, how the biosphere, which is recognized as a complex net of ecosystems having an intrinsic value, can be better understood by applying the methods of ethical gradualism. They illustrate why introducing relevant ecophilosophies affects building relevant environmental politics without neglecting the role of biological gradualism as such.

As one of the crucial factors, which provoke the need of specifying the genealogy of Norwegian ecophilosophies, I point out the debates about growth and environmental protection which took place in the mid-1960 and which gradually turned into discussions about sustainable development vs. environmental protection. In this context, I claim that one of the main challenges Norwegian ecophilosophies faced was how to revive the use of 'and' mode without supporting zero-growth.

On the other hand, I draw the conclusion that clarifying the role of one's self-realization as closely tied with nature's realization can be done by introducing the concept of moral experiential gestalt in so far as cultivating our sensitivity towards the net of biosphere is a matter of how to teach ourselves to recognize the equal right of all living beings to live and blossom, as Næss suggests. Specifying the role of moral experiential gestalt is of crucial interest if it is referred to the principles of Norwegian ecophilosophies because reconsidering the influence of so-called moral imagination, we can specify what it means 'to think like a mountain' in Næss's sense by going beyond the purely metaphorical interpretations.

The aforementioned new mode of thinking, which appeals for avoiding the reduction of rationality to cognitive rationality by rehabilitating the normative validity of feelings and emotions in our interaction with nature shows why by human self-realization we presumably understand the realization of an aware moral agent. That is why one of the main objectives is the individual to become morally engaged with preserving nature's sources by avoiding their transformation into resources of exploitation on both individual and collective levels. It is the reconsidered normative validity of feelings and emotions that helps cultivating compassion for other living beings even when they are not 'similar' to us, i.e. it contributes to cultivating our sensitivity to what it means to be in someone else's shoes without being in his/her/its shoes themselves. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that cultivating moral imagination, as done within the Norwegian ecophilosophies, benefits disenchanting the statement that understanding nature's harmony is merely a matter of human understanding.

In the *first chapter*, which is devoted to revealing the genealogy of Norwegian outdoor life against the background of so-called by Tordsson National, Social, Modernization and Ecosocial projects, I reach the conclusion that both Norwegian ecophilosophies and Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life are based on some similar conceptions of the role of biosphere's intrinsic value. This conclusion gives me grounds to examine Norwegian ecophilosophies as experiential philosophies whose prototype characteristic is the strive for rehabilitating the initial total openness of man and nature (i.e. their phenomenological openness). Another important similarity is found in the way the idea of nature's complexity in Kvaløy's sense determines the process of self-realization by following the rhythm of nature without promoting a certain type of objective naturalism.

All the aforementioned changes affected the attitudes towards being in the mountain as a crucial part of Norwegian outdoor life. Referring to Nansen's description of his experience in Jotunheimen, I draw the conclusion that the evaluation of Norwegian climbing experience relied on the contradiction between *Homo Ascensus* and *Homo Viator* entailing some reminiscences of Romanticism's ideal due to which the vertical space was ascribed a high symbolic value.

In turn, analyzing the implicit ethical foundation of the early 20th-century essays on Norwegian philosophy of outdoor life, I argue that Norwegian philosophy of climbing can be defined as based on a given applied ethics also due to the fact that the latter was developed as a form of experiential learning whose normative validity arises from outlining practical wisdom as its main characteristic.

Discussing the role of the mountains for the Norwegian culture, I argue that cultivating a sense of belonging to them concerns the establishment of so-called cabin culture as well as its influence on building ecosophy in Næss's sense. Furthermore, I emphasize that Norwegian cabin culture promotes a certain environmental ethics whose requirements are determined by the place itself. The lifestyle is the one appropriate for the place whose main norm is simplicity in means and richness in ends provided by nature as such, as Næss suggests. However, the latter formula does not have to be interpreted from the perspective of objective naturalism. That is why I argue in favor of justifying environmental holism by adopting a certain type of ontological minimalism, which to bring a given type of existential maximalism to light.

In this context, explaining Faarlund's illuminative statement that one feels at home in nature, I draw the conclusion that the normative aspects of this life have to be explored by revealing what profitable life in nature is. The latter

does not have to be interpreted within the paradigm of utilitarian benefits, but rather as a way of being personally enriched in the process of self-realization. In other words, leading a profitable ecolife can be recognized as taking the responsibility to become a Self with a capital letter while respecting nature as a net of biospherical knots.

In turn, examining Zapffe's theory of biosophy in the *second chapter* of the current monograph reveals how one unique, not only for Norway, philosophy exploits the methods of applied biology for finding solutions to some crucial existential problems, albeit it is not restricted to the use of biological methods alone. Taking into account that Zapffe himself ambiguously defines what biosophy as a method is using 'biospherical' and 'biological' as interchangeable concepts, I draw the conclusion that the two concepts could be interpreted as ontological synonyms due to revealing biosophy's potential as an experiential philosophy.

In this context, I reach the conclusion that Zapffe's biosophy is one of the first Norwegian philosophies showing how the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism can be overcome without supporting a certain form of radical biocentrism while examining the biological interest front as intrinsically connected with the social, autotelic and metaphysical fronts.

Regardless of the fact that Zapffe does not aim at discussing the interactions between man and environment on the level of ethical gradualism, I claim that the parallels he draws between morality and biology should be paid special attention. By contrast to Zapffe's well-grounded examinations of the origin of so-called social and autotelic-metaphysical morality, his conception of rehabilitating the role of biological dispositions of human beings raises many concerns about the normative validity of ethics, which derives from biological factors. The complexity of these problems will be later formulated with different words by G. Skirbekk, namely, how could we talk about ethical gradualism without entirely rejecting biological gradualism as such?

The issue how to discern biological morality from social one in Zapffe's sense is an important issue because it can contribute to rethinking how it is possible to minimize pain and suffering not only for human beings. This topic is also an object of investigation in the writings of Næss, Kvaløy and Skirbekk since it concerns the transition from ethical anthropocentrism to ethical gradualism. I draw the conclusion that the examination of suffering and pleasure, as displayed by Zapffe, derives from minimizing the risks of simplifying the normative validity of experience if it is reduced to a set of biological functions. Otherwise, it would have meant that tragic in Zapffe's sense should have always been examined as driven by physical pain alone.

The mechanisms of compensation elaborated on man's side cannot benefit overcoming the existential pessimism that has the biological nature of human species merely as a necessary condition. Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I argue that Zapffe's understanding of surplus (or what we can call a 'higher type') pessimism does not have to be negatively examined as a form of nihilism, but rather as a constructive criticism of the arising faith in technocratic invasion and interpersonal alienation, which can be minimized by cultivating empathy and love.

Examining the methodological advantages and disadvantages of adopting deep ecology in the *third chapter* of the current research, I argue that the critical attitudes are mainly provoked by the fact that Næss neglects the problem of normative validity on the levels of morality and environmental politics at the expense of the criterion of verification, which leads to introducing radical biocentrism at the expense of ethical gradualism. As one of the most illuminative illustrations of this thesis, I point out his statement that the ecological problems should be separately treated from the ones of poverty and justice because solving the latter would take some time. This would explain why Næss interprets the scenarios of ecological sustainability as a subject to vague futurism, which is grounded in the way he leaves the concept of vital need deliberately vague.

Investigating the way Næss determines intuition as a-moral (as being irrelevant to morality), I suggest that if we manage to justify the normative validity of the intuition, we can noncontradictory determine how ecosophy's wisdom is related to practice. In this context, I draw the conclusion that the role of Ecosophy T cannot be fully revealed by referring to Næss's understanding of moral intuition since relying on the latter, we should unquestionably adopt the problematic principles of moral relativism.

Neglecting the normative validity of morality, as Næss suggests, we would keep facing serious ethical contradictions because then empathy would be simplified to a process of identification merely with the ones who are close to us. On a micro methodological level, it would mean that there is an increasing risk the ecological self to be identified with the narrow one in Næss's sense. Extrapolating this issue on the level of environmental politics, I argue that the principle of identification may negatively affect the interests of conservation, namely, they to be determined as interests with a capital letter and thus instead of building a bridge between self-love and self-realization, as Næss appeals, to strengthen love to the ego and its narrow realization respectively.

On a macro methodological level, I see one of the main concerns about Næss's justification of radical biocentrism in establishing a certain kind of

utilitarian ethics, which is supposed to contribute to reducing ethical anthropocentrism. Disenchanted this misconception requires reconsidering the ethical implications of Næss's deep ecology platform by focusing on the way the idea of intrinsic value is recognized. That is why I draw the conclusion that it is the normative validity of the interrelatedness between human and nonhuman world that benefits intrinsic value to be defined beyond the paradigm of moral objectivism.

Furthermore, I claim that the lack of awareness about the role of ethical gradualism implied in point three of the deep ecology platform leads to misunderstanding Næss's radical biocentrism as bio-fascism, or eco-brutalism by some researchers such as the social ecologists. This misunderstanding has apparent implications while examining the problem of population reduction.

In this context, I draw the conclusion that there is no objective goal of reaching a given number of living beings that may depend on the existence of five billion of them, as Næss suggests, so that the quantity cannot be used as an argument in inflicting both quantitative and qualitative reductions. It means that there is no basic contradiction between the number of the human population and the one of the other living beings, nor is there a predetermined correspondence in the exact numbers that should be reached.

Judging by the aforementioned investigations, I draw the conclusion that Næss's comparison of so-called degrees of pain, which are specified on the basis of measuring 'felt pain', provokes some serious concerns such as the ones about how subjective experience of pain is defined as objectively measurable one by default as well as why it is the bystander who can objectively evaluate someone else's experience of pain. Referring to this thesis would lead to the ideal justification of quantitative criteria of pain measurement by letting numbers decide, as Næss suggests, which, however, questions both the process of evaluation and idea of biological gradualism as such.

Comparing Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies *in the forth chapter* of the current monograph, I conclude that it is Kvaløy's ecophilosophy that contributes to understanding how the impact of radical biocentrism can be restricted on the level of environmental politics if environmental problems are examined as inseparable from the socio-political ones. Adopting this approach, however, does not mean to appeal for reviving the role of ethical anthropocentrism. On the contrary, I argue that with his critical reception of Næss's ideas, Kvaløy brings to light what Skirbekk justifies as a need of implementing the principles of ethical gradualism.

In this context, I clarify that while Næss's 'thinking like a mountain' mode is based on a certain type of gestalt thinking, Kvaløy's one can be described as a

process philosophy grounded in the mode ‘thinking like a river’. In turn, the latter is justified by the embodiment of natural rhythm that may not necessarily be harmonic, but rather harmonizing time.

Regarding the aforementioned investigations, I conclude that the rehabilitated role of human ecology in Næss’s and Kvaløy’s writings contributes to building ecologically sustainable politics by avoiding ecophilosophical competence to be reduced to a narrow expert knowledge. I outline that both Næss and Kvaløy justify the competence in question, which has understanding as its necessary condition for recognizing the need of moral and political commitments.

Regarding Kvaløy’s fundamental distinction between complexity and complication, I claim that life necessity society encourages the engagement with organicity to be understood as a meaningful engagement with the world by adopting meaningful work strategies. It shows that cooperation is a significant activity that contributes to cultivating the sense of situatedness internalized as a sensitivity towards group belonging. Furthermore, I draw the conclusion that life necessity society is built not on ‘freedom from’ but rather on ‘freedom to’ justifying meaningfulness as such.

Analyzing Kvaløy’s critique of contemporary technocratic society, I argue that it is the replacement of life necessity society with the industrial development one that makes the idea of multiplicity of growth be substituted with the one of development, whose climax is the idea of sustainable development. That is why I draw the conclusion that the symmetry of complexity including asymmetrical moral relationships is erased by the technological invasion at the expense of the symmetry of formal relationships, which are based on the principles of meritocracy.

Referring to Kvaløy’s theory of the distinction between life necessity society and industrial development society as influenced but not restricted to the distinction between Gaia theory and Servoglobe one, I argue that pretending to fight chaos, Servoglobe falls into a vicious circle because the fight results in provoking a different type of chaos. That is why I draw the conclusion that Servoglobe activates the fear of empty space (*terror vacui*) in so far as the latter does not come from man, but from nature itself, albeit humankind is the only one species that consciously anticipates it. I argue that Servoglobe fails in the way it pretends to find a panacea for the fear in question.

Clarifying these problems, I also claim that Kvaløy’s definition of so-called Tivoli-effect understood as a pseudo-complex phenomenon concerns the recognition of technological strength at the expense of life’s strength by reducing the latter to the survival one as well as decreasing the multi-cultural diversity

to a simple set of given, self-sufficient monocultures in which 'mono' becomes an ontological synonym of 'global'.

Regarding the discussions about Norway's potential accession to the EU, I draw the conclusion that Kvaløy and the other representatives of snm see the main threat of the arising flow of people in the increasing instrumentalization of human power, which is simplified to a capital, i.e. in reducing the flow of people to the one of goods in so far as both are determined as exchangeable resources.

Comparing and contrasting Næss's and Kvaløy's environmental philosophies, I reach the conclusion that many crucial questions, which they leave open, find their answers in Skirbekk's theory of environmental philosophy that is an object of investigation in the *fifth chapter* of the current monograph. Some of his solutions such as how ethical anthropocentrism can be overcome by rehabilitating the role of ethical gradualism, as well as by fulfilling the scenarios of ecological sustainability illustrate why reaching the sustainability in question is not a utopian scenario.

Examining the issue what relevant environmental politics should look like in respect with the development of welfare state, as Skirbekk suggests, I claim that his solutions can be described as conceptually closer to Kvaløy's ones rather than to Næss's solutions. One of the crossing points with Kvaløy's theory is found in the way Skirbekk rehabilitates the connection between ecophilosophy and environmental politics by revealing the role of morality in cultivating solidarity on a collective level. As main methodological advantage of reconsidering the role of solidarity as an issue with normative implications, I point out the possibility of exploring environmental problems as closely tied with the political and societal problems.

Another crucial question, which finds its answer in Skirbekk's writings, is how can we avoid the extremes of both ethical anthropocentrism and radical biocentrism without denying neither the human responsibility for the decision-making process nor the moral status of the other living beings, which can merely be justified by adopting the principle of advocacy representation? Analyzing Skirbekk's theory, I draw the conclusion that the origin of the problem of choosing 'either-or' concerning the relationships between humans and other species is grounded in absolutizing the issue of giving priority regardless of whether we talk about anthropocentrism or biocentrism.

Investigating the consequences of his conception regarding the lack of complete 'reducibility' of moral discussants to moral agents, I claim that thus we can avoid calling not only non-humans, but also certain groups of humans 'insufficient' moral subjects in so far as 'insufficiency' in morality is no longer

based on the ontological, and especially on the biological implications of the debate on properties. Furthermore, I argue that we can justify the competence of being morally engaged as a prototype characteristic of so-called by Skirbekk communicative competence.

Going back to the problem how to interpret biological gradualism as referring to ethical gradualism, I draw the conclusion that the projections of biological gradualism can be seen since vital needs and vital interests are not equally applicable to all living beings. I claim that the contradictions arise from the fact that not all living beings have both 'being interested in' and 'having an interest in' modes in Skirbekk's sense. In this respect it is difficult to compare vital needs of different organisms because such a comparison implicitly presumes adopting the criterion of giving priority.

The problem provokes the question how do we know that pain is the 'same' for all evaluated beings, namely, how do we know that there is an undoubted connection between physical experience and its moral evaluation, as well as our knowledge about it? Otherwise, arguing that we are moral discussants who interact with moral subjects, which are initially deprived of the consciousness of being moral, may not result in reducing the pain-calculus, nor would it cause leaving room for compassion.

As one of the methodological benefits of Skirbekk's theory of compassion, I outline his argument that compassion can be felt without reaching a procedural consensus, even when we talk about mutual compassion. On a macro methodological level, I draw the conclusion that the impact of compassion on building experiential morality could be explored by clarifying how compassion can affect cultivating eco-consciousness by rehabilitating the normative validity of feelings and emotions.

On the other hand, comparing Skirbekk's and Kvaløy's conceptions, I point out the reconsideration of the problem of consumption in the debate about ethical gradualism. Examining the genealogy of the concerns deriving from the production-consumption dilemmas in the sustainable development society, as represented by both of them, we should pay attention to the way Kvaløy and Skirbekk justify the role of education and political culture in re-thinking the role of quality of life, especially in so-called developing countries.

Furthermore, I argue that it is the replacement of the idea of universalizability (which is understood in qualitative terms) with the process of universalization evaluated in quantitative ones that raises the need of distinguishing between ecological sustainability and ecological unsustainability, especially if sustainable development is overestimated as the only one possible development.

That is why I claim that Skirbekk's conception of universalizability does not share many features with Næss's one of universalization because the latter is focused on outlining the preciseness of deriving norms by providing verifiable hypotheses.

In conclusion, I argue that examining the role of Norwegian environmental philosophies is a task, which requires finding answers not only to questions such as "What is typically Norwegian?", but also to the one "How does 'typically Norwegian' contribute to addressing global issues, which to provide relevant local solutions?", taking into account that 'local' is irreducible to 'less meaningful'. I point out that analyzing the impact of Norwegian environmental philosophies is inseparable from outlining what the global challenges in front of Norwegian environmental politics are. In this context, the slogan "Think globally, act locally!" can be interpreted within the framework of Norwegian environmental philosophies as "Think meaningfully, act responsibly!", which in turn presumes the engagements to be examined as moral, cultural and socio-political ones rather than as epistemologically justifiable engagements. That is why arguing for Norwegian environmental philosophies in plural does not mean to think about 'global' and 'local' in relative terms, but in what Næss calls relational terms. Thus we can reveal the diversity of the aforementioned philosophies, while they address common problems such as clarifying the pitfalls of ethical anthropocentrism, disenchanting the political lack of environmental constructivism etc.

On a macro-methodological level, "Think meaningfully, act responsibly!" becomes possible if the way of asking which questions we do not have to lose is internalized as an issue regarding how one to find a place in the net of the biospherical knots, which to call home (Næss). Similar issues concern the ineradicable cosmic feeling of panic (Zapffe), how to build a balanced society as a life necessity one (Kvaløy) as well as how dangerous is to find an asylum from the threat of environmental catastrophe in the myth of final solution (Skirbekk). Regardless of the different ways of emphasizing the need of rethinking the role of biocentrism, these questions derive from the fundamental dilemma "Whose Environment? Which Nature?". Thus Norwegian environmental philosophies' approach to challenging the ideal of cognitive rationality reveals how we can keep posing the micro-questions 'which' and 'whose' without losing the macro-ones, namely, the questions 'why' and 'how' in a world where reconsidering the role of ethical gradualism is one of the few ways of learning how not only to be *in*, but also *with* nature in the long run.

РЕЗЮМЕ

Целта на настоящата монография е да се анализира в сравнителна перспектива комплексното развитие на норвежките екологически философии през XX в. чрез артикулирането не само на сходствата във философските предпоставки, но също така и как методологическите различия оказват влияние върху промените в сферата на екологическата политика в Норвегия. Ето защо една от основните цели е да се изследва произходът и развитието на онези понятия и идеи, които допринасят за проясняването на сложността на проблема отвъд добре познатите концепции на основателя на дълбинната екология (*dypøkologi*) - норвежкия философ, катарач и екоактивист Арне Нес.

Преди да бъдат открити въпросите, „които не трябва да губим“ (Г. Ширбек) докато проучваме генеалогията и влиянието на норвежките екологически философии, в рамките на настоящата монография първо се аргументира употребата на понятието норвежки екологически философии в множествено число, както и причините за тяхното зараждане именно в Норвегия. В този контекст е формулирана хипотезата, че нордската концептуализация на въпросните философии се реализира в Норвегия, тъй като норвежките планини се превръщат в ключов фактор за появата на уникална философия на катеренето през XX в.

Нещо повече, изследвано е как възможността за обговарянето на норвежките екологически философии се обуславя от т.нар. обрат на въобразимата рационалност (не на последно място и под влиянието на Махаяна будизма и хиндуизма), който реабилитира идеята, че рационалността е несводима до когнитивната рационалност. Същевременно е анализирано как преосмислянето на нормативната валидност на въобразимата рационалност би оказало влияние върху проблематичните основания както на радикалния антропоцентризъм, така и на радикалния биоцентризъм.

На свой ред, аргументирането на т.нар. хоризонтална съотносимост като една от прототипните характеристики на въпросните философии допринася за открояването на диалектичката природа на взаимоотношенията човек - природа като имплицитно зависими от усвояването на определени етически принципи. Само така преекспонираното дове-

рие в ролята на (радикалния) етически антропоцентризъм, който е обект на критика от страна на норвежките екологически философии, може успешно да бъде поставено под въпрос като се избегнат противоречията, провокирани както от моралния обективизъм, така и от радикалния биоцентризъм. Дефинирането на норвежките екологически философии като процесуални философии би допринесло за проясняване на един от основните обекти на изследване в настоящата монография, а именно, как биосферата, която функционира като комплексна мрежа от екосистеми, имащи изначална ценност, може да бъде разбрана по-добре чрез прилагането на методите на етическия градуализъм (*ethical gradualism*). Въпросните методи обуславят разбирането на основанията за въвеждането на релевантни екологически философии като фактор за утвърждаването на релевантни екологически политики, без да се пренебрегва ролята на биологическия градуализъм.

Като един от ключовите фактори, който провокира необходимостта от осмисляне на генеалогията на норвежките екологически философии е открояната ролята на дебатите относно растежа и опазването на околната среда (*vekst og vern*) от средата на ХХ в., които постепенно се превръщат в дебати за ролята на устойчивото развитие *versus* опазването на околната среда. В този контекст се анализира как едно от основните предизвикателства пред норвежките екологически философии е свързано с реабилитирането на „и” конектора, без да се апелира към налагането на т.нар. нулев растеж (*zero growth*).

От друга страна е направено заключението, че проясняването на ролята на себerealизацията на индивида като тясно свързана с реализацията на природата може да се осъществи чрез въвеждането на понятието морален експериментален гещалт, доколкото култивирането на чувствителността към биосферата предполага да се научим да признаваме правото на всички живи същества „да живеят и да просперират” в смисъла на Нес. Специфицирането на моралния експериментален гещалт е от значение за съотнасянето му с принципите на норвежките екологически философии в степента, в която преосмисляйки влиянието на т.нар. морално въображение, ние можем да конкретизираме какво означава апелът на Нес „да мислим като планина”⁶⁰⁹, надхвърляйки чисто метафоричните обяснения.

Тази нова мисловна парадигма, която предполага избягване на редуцираността на рационалността до когнитивна рационалност чрез реби-

⁶⁰⁹ За първи път формулировката е въведена от Алдо Лиополд.

литирани на нормативната валидност на чувствата и емоциите в процеса на взаимодействието ни с природата, илюстрира защо под себerealизация на индивида ние по презумпция разбираме реализацията на съзнателния морален агент. Поради това една от основните цели е индивидът да бъде морално ангажиран с опазването на природните източници, избягвайки тяхната трансформация в ресурси за експлоатация както на индивидуално, така и на колективно ниво.

Именно преосмислянето на нормативната валидност на чувствата и емоциите допринася за култивирането на състрадание към тези, които не са „подобни“ на нас, т.е. тя обуславя култивирането на чувствителността ни към това какво означава да бъдем „на мястото на някой друг“, без буквално да бъдем на мястото на въпросния друг. На макрометодологическо ниво е направено заключението, че култивирането на моралното въображение така, както това е направено в рамките на норвежките екологически философии, допринася за осмисляне на твърдението, че осъзнаването на природната хармония не е проява на разбиране единствено от страна на човека.

В *първа глава* на настоящата монография, която е посветена на изследването на генеалогията на норвежката философия на живота на открито (*friluftsliv*) на фона на т.нар. от Тордсон *Национален проект, Социален проект, Модернизационен проект* и *Екосоциален проект*, е направено заключението, че норвежките екологически философии и норвежката философия на живота на открито се основават на сходни концептуализации относно ролята на имплицитната ценност на биосферата.

Това заключение дава основания норвежките екологически философии да бъдат дефинирани като експерименталистки философии, чиято прототипна характеристика е стремежът към реабилитиране на изначалната тотална откритост на човека и природата (т.е. на тяхната феноменологична откритост). Друго важно сходство се проявява в начина, по който идеята за комплексност на природата в смисъла на Квалъой определя процеса на себerealизация чрез следване на ритъма на природата, без да се утвърждава специфичен тип обективен натурализъм.

Особено влияние оказват и нагласите към процеса на пребиваване в планината, представляващ ключов аспект от норвежкия живот на открито. На базата на позоваване на описанията на Нансен, свързани с преживяванията му в Йотунхаймен, е направено заключението, че оценяването на катераческия опит в Норвегия се базира на противопоставянето на *Homo Ascensus* на *Homo Viator*, които съдържат реми-

нисценции от идеала на Романтизма, утвърждаващ позитивната символна стойност на вертикалното пространство.

На свой ред, чрез анализиране на имплицитните етически основания, изложени в ранните есета, отразяващи норвежката философия на живота на открито от началото на ХХ в., е формулирана хипотезата, че норвежката философия на катеренето може да бъде дефинирана като основаваща се на специфичен тип приложна етика. Въпросната етика е доразвита като форма на научаване в опита, чиято нормативна валидност произтича от утвърждаването на практическата мъдрост като нейна прототипна характеристика.

При проучването на ролята на планините за норвежката култура е аргументирана хипотезата, че култивирането на чувството за принадлежност има отношение към налагането на т.нар. култура на хижния живот (Т. Гефсен), както и към нейната роля за формирането на екософията в смисъла на Нес. Нещо повече, акцентирано е върху наблюдението, че норвежката култура на хижния живот насърчава усвояването на определен тип екологическа етика, чиито изисквания се определят от самото място. Начинът на живот е този, който е подходящ за мястото, чиято основна норма по думите на Нес е „умереност в средствата, многообразие в целите“, зададени от природата. Въпросната формулировка обаче не трябва да бъде интерпретирана от гледна точка на обективния натурализъм. Ето защо е формулирана хипотезата, че утвърждаването на екологическия холизъм се реализира чрез усвояването на определен тип онтологически минимализъм, който да провокира екзистенциален максимализъм.

В този контекст анализът на добре познатото твърдение на Фаарлунд, че „човек се чувства у дома си в лоното на природата“ води до заключението, че нормативните аспекти на въпросния живот могат да бъдат анализирани чрез рефлексия върху това какво означава смислен (удовлетворителен) живот в природата. Смесеният живот не трябва да бъде разглеждан в парадигмата на утилитаризма, а по-скоро като начин на личностно обогатяване в процеса на себerealизация. С други думи, воденето на „удовлетворителен“ екологичен начин на живот може да се възприеме като поемане на отговорност към Аза с главна буква в смисъла на Нес (т.е. към екологическия Аз) чрез проява на уважение към природата като „мрежа от биосферни възли“ (Нес).

От своя страна изследването на биософската теория на Запфе във *втората глава* на настоящата монография цели да проясни как една философия, която е уникална не само за Норвегия, се позовава на методите на приложната биология в търсенето на отговори на някои съ-

ществени екзистенциални въпроси, без да се ограничава до употребата на въпросните методи.

Обръщайки внимание на факта, че самият Запфе нееднозначно дефинира какво представлява биософията като метод (използвайки „биософски“ и „биоложки“ като взаимозаменяеми понятия), правим заключението, че въпросните две понятия трябва да се разглеждат като онтологически синоними, доколкото биософията има потенциала на експериенталистка философия.

В този контекст е достигнато до заключението, че биософията на Запфе е една от първите норвежки философии, разкриваща как проблемите на етическия антропоцентризъм могат да бъдат преодоляни без да се утвърждава радикален биоцентризъм. Това е възможно в степеня, в която фронтът на биологичните интереси е изначално свързан с интересите в сферата на т.нар. от Запфе социален, аутотеличен и метафизичен фронт.

Независимо че Запфе не проблематизира взаимовръзката между човека и природата на нивото на етическия градуализъм, е изложена хипотезата, че паралелите между морала и биологията, които авторът откроява, представляват особен интерес със своята иновативност. За разлика от детайлно обосноваваните наблюдения върху т.нар. социален и аутотелично-метафизичен морал, концепцията на Запфе за реабилитиране на биологичните предразположения на човека поражда редица въпроси относно нормативната валидност на етиката, основаваща се на биологични фактори. Впоследствие, комплексността на този проблем е преформулиран от Г. Ширбек по следния начин – как можем да говорим за етически градуализъм без изцяло да отричаме ролята на биологичния градуализъм като такъв?

Разграничаването на биологичния морал от социалния в смисъла на Запфе е важно, защото то допринася за преосмислянето на питането как е възможно да се минимализират болката и страданието не само по отношение на човешките същества. Въпросът е обект на анализ и в съчиненията на Нес, Квалъой и Ширбек, доколкото има отношение към прехода от етически антропоцентризъм към етически градуализъм. В този контекст е направено заключението, че анализирането на страданието и удоволствието в концепцията на Запфе произтича от минимализиране на рисковете, свързани със пренебрегване на нормативната валидност на опита, когато той бъде редуциран до набор от биологични функции. В противен случай това би означавало, че трагичното в смисъла на Запфе трябва да се изследва като провокирано единствено от физическата болка.

На свой ред, механизмите на компенсация, разработени от човека, не допринасят за преодоляването на екзистенциалния песимизъм, който третира биологичната природа на човешкия вид единствено като необходимо основание. На базата на гореспоменатото наблюдение е направено заключението, че песимистичният „излишък“ (който можем да определим като „висш тип“ песимизъм) в смисъла на Запфе, не трябва да се разглежда като форма на nihilизъм, а по-скоро като конструктивна критика на нарастващата увереност в ролята на технократската инвазия и междуличностната алиенация, които могат да бъдат редуцирани чрез култивиране на любовта и емпатията.

Чрез анализа на методологическите предимства и недостатъци, свързани с усвояването на дълбинната екология, в *третата глава* на настоящата монография е формулирана следната хипотеза. Критическите аргументи, свързани с теорията на Нес, са провокирани от факта, че Нес пренебрегва проблема за нормативната валидност на морала и екологическата политика за сметка на принципите на логическата верификация, което на свой ред води до утвърждаването на радикален биоцентризъм за сметка на етическия градуализъм. Като една от емблематичните илюстрации на тази хипотеза е посочено твърдението на Нес, че екологическите проблеми трябва да бъдат разглеждани отделно от проблемите на бедността и справедливостта. Проучването на въпросното твърдение би обяснило защо Нес интерпретира сценариите за екологическа устойчивост като проблем в сферата на футуризма, доколкото той целенасочено не конкретизира понятието за жизнена нужда (livsnød).

Изследвайки начина, по който Нес дефинира интуицията като аморална, т.е. като ирелевантна към морала, формулираме хипотезата, че ако съумеем да легитимираме нормативната валидност на въпросната интуиция, бихме могли по непротиворечив начин да определим как „мъдростта“ на екософията се съотнася с практиката. В този контекст е направено заключението, че ролята на Екософия Т не може да бъде напълно прояснена чрез съотнасянето ѝ с моралната интуиция в смисъла на Нес, тъй като подобно позоваване би допринесло за усвояването на проблематичните принципи на моралния релативизъм.

Нещо повече, пренебрегването на нормативната валидност на морала, както предлага Нес, би довело до необратимото изпадане в етически противоречия, защото по този начин емпатията би била сведена до процес на идентификация единствено с тези, които са ни близки. На микрометодологическо ниво това би означавало, че съществува нарастващ риск екологическият Аз да бъде идентифициран с т.нар. от Нес

„ограничен Аз” (narrow self). Екстраполирането на този проблем на нивото на екологическата политика предполага, че принципът на идентификация може да се отрази негативно върху интересите, свързани с процеса на опазване на околната среда, а именно, те да бъдат детерминирани като водещи интереси и така вместо да се установи приемственост между любовта и себerealизацията в смисъла на Нес, да се провокира любовта към егото и неговата ограничена роля.

На макрометодологическо ниво едно от основните възражения срещу легитимирането на радикалния биоцентризъм в концепцията на Нес е свързано с утвърждаването на специфичен тип утилитаристка етика, чиято функция е да минимализира влиянието на етическия антропоцентризъм. Проблематизирането на въпросната концепция изисква преосмисляне на етическите импликации, характеризиращи т.нар. платформа на дълбинната екология (deep ecology platform) чрез проясняване на начина, по който е осмислена идеята за имплицитна ценност. Ето защо е направено заключението, че именно нормативната валидност на взаимосвързаността на човешкия свят с биосферата е това, което допринася гореспоменатата ценност да бъде дефинирана извън парадигмата на моралния обективизъм.

Изложена е и хипотезата, че липсата на съзнание относно ролята на етическия градуализъм на ниво три от въпросната платформа е факторът, който води до преиначаването на радикалния биоцентризъм на Нес като биофашизъм, или еко-брутализъм от страна на някои представители на социалната екология. Подобно преиначаване придобива видими импликации, когато Нес разглежда проблема за редуцирането на населението.

В този контекст е формулирано заключението, че не съществува обективна цел, изискваща достигането на определена численост на живите същества, която да предполага съществуването на пет милиарда от тях, както твърди Нес. Ето защо количеството не може да бъде разглеждано като аргумент за прилагането на количествени и качествени редукции. Това означава, че не съществува изначално несъответствие между броя на хората и този на останалите живи същества, нито предварително зададено съответствие между броя на техните представители, който трябва да бъде достигнат.

На базата на гореспоменатите наблюдения е направено заключението, че сравняването на видовете болка, предложено от Нес, които са реализирани на базата на „почувстваната” болка, поражда редица сериозни възражения, а именно - как субективното преживяване на болката да бъде дефинирано като изначално обективно измеримо, а също

така и как наблюдателят може обективно да оцени преживяването на болката от страна на друг субект.

Чрез съпоставката на екологическите философии на Нес и Квальой в *четвъртата глава* на настоящото изследване е направено заключението, че именно екофилософията на Квальой допринася за осмислянето на въпроса за ограничаване на влиянието на радикалния биоцентризъм на нивото на екологическата политика, ако екологическите дилеми се разгледат като изначално свързани със социално-политическите проблеми. Усвояването на подобен подход обаче, не означава да се реабилитира ролята на етическия антропоцентризъм. Напротив, изложена е хипотезата, че критическата рецепция на идеите на Нес от страна на Квальой прояснява проблема, който Ширбек характеризира като необходимост от имплициране на принципите на етическия градуализъм.

В този контекст е проучено как за разлика от модела на Нес „да мислим като планина“, който се характеризира с определен тип гешалтно мислене, моделът на Квальой може да бъде определен като специфичен тип процесуална философия, основаваща се на принципа „да мислим като река“.

Направено е заключението, че реабилитираната роля на т.нар. екология на човека (human ecology) така, както тя е анализирана в съчиненията на Нес и Квальой, допринася за изграждането на екологически устойчива политика, която избягва редуцирането на екологическата компетенция до специфично експертно знание. На базата на гореспоменатите изследвания е проучено как Нес и Квальой утвърждават необходимостта от подобна компетенция, чиято ключова особеност при формирането на морални и политически ангажменти е именно разбирането.

На свой ред, на фона на фундаменталната дистинкция между комплексност и комплицираност, предложена от Квальой, е формулирана хипотезата, че т.нар. общество на жизнените необходиминости (“*livsnødvendighetssamfunnet*”) насърчава ангажирането с органичността на природата да бъде разбрано като смислово-натоварен ангажимент към света чрез усвояването на изпълнени със смисъл стратегии. Въпросното общество показва, че съвместната дейност е значима дейност, допринасяща за култивирането на чувство за ситуираност, което се интернализира като чувствителност по отношение на груповата принадлежност. Нещо повече, направено е заключението, че обществото на жизнените необходиминости е формирано не на принципа „свобода от“, а на

принципа „свобода да”, утвърждаващ идеята за смисленост като такава.

Анализът на критичните основания от страна на Квальой по отношение на технократското общество допринася за формулиране на хипотезата, че замяната на обществото на жизнените необходиминости с обществото на индустриалното развитие (“*industrivekstsamfunnet*”) води до подмяната на идеята за многообразие на растежа с идеята за устойчиво развитие. Ето защо е направено заключението, че “симетрията на комплексността”, включваща асиметричните релации в сферата на морала, е дискредитирана чрез технологическата инвазия за сметка на симетрията на формалните отношения, които се основават на принципите на меритокрацията.

Въз основа на теорията на Квальой за дистинкцията между обществото на жизнените необходиминости и обществото на индустриалното развитие като повлияни, но не и ограничени до противопоставянето на концепциите за Гая и Сервоглоуб, формулираме хипотезата, че в стремежа на човека да овладее и победи хаоса, Сервоглоуб активира страха от празното пространство (*terror vacui*), доколкото въпросният страх не протича от човека, а от природата като такава, независимо че човешкият вид е единственият вид, който изпитва подобен страх. В този контекст е направено заключението, че Сервоглоуб се проваля като проект поради начина, по който претендира да намери панацея за страха от празното пространство.

Чрез проясняването на тези проблеми е аргументирана хипотезата, че дефиницията на Квальой за т.нар. Тиволи ефект, разбран като псевдокомплексен феномен, има отношение към утвърждаването на технологичната сила за сметка на жизнената сила чрез редуцирането на жизнената сила до сила на оцеляването. По този начин мултикултурното многообразие е сведено до набор от определени самодостатъчни монокултури, при които „моно” се превръща в онтологически синоним на „глобален”.

По отношение на дискусиите, свързани с потенциалното присъединяване на Норвегия към Европейския съюз, е достигнато до заключението, че Квальой и другите представители на есенем движението (snm) виждат основната заплаха в нарастващия поток от хора поради увеличаващата се инструментализация на човешката сила, която е редуцирана до капитал, както и в свеждането на потока от хора до поток от стоки, доколкото и хората, и стоките, са определени като разменни ресурси.

Сравнителният анализ на екологическите философии на Нес и Квальбой до заключението, че много съществени въпроси, които остават неразрешени, намират своя отговор в екологическата философия на Ширбек, представляваща обект на изследване в *петата глава* на настоящата монография. В нея са анализирани някои от неговите решения, например, как етическият антропоцентризъм може да бъде преодолян чрез реабилитирането на ролята на етическия градуализъм, а също така и как чрез реализирането на сценариите за екологическа устойчивост, въпросната устойчивост може да бъде постигната извън сферата на спекулациите с утопични сценарии.

Изследвайки проблема каква трябва да бъде екологическата политика по отношение на развитието на социалната държава в смисъла на Ширбек, е направена хипотезата, че неговата теория може да бъде характеризирана по-скоро като концептуално близка с теориите на Квальбой, отколкото с теориите на Нес. Една от пресечните точки с концепцията на Квальбой се открива в начина, по който Ширбек реабилитира връзката между екофилософията и екологическата политика, разкривайки ролята на морала за култивиране на солидарността на колективно ниво. Едно от основните методологически предимства, свързани с преосмислянето на нормативната роля на солидарността, е възможността за изследване на екологическите проблеми като имплицитно свързани с политическите и социалните проблеми.

Друг ключов проблем, който намира своето решение в съчиненията на Ширбек, е възможността едновременно да бъдат избегнати крайностите на етическия антропоцентризъм и радикалния биоцентризъм, без да се пренебрегва отговорността на хората при вземането на решения, както и моралният статус на другите живи същества, който може да бъде утвърден единствено чрез усвояването на принципа на заместващата представителност (principle of “advocatory” representation). Анализирайки теорията на Ширбек, стигаме до извода, че генезисът на проблема, а именно преекспонирането на избора „или-или” (или антропоцентризъм, или биоцентризъм), е свързан с отношенията между хората и другите живи същества, основавайки се на абсолютизацията при даването на приоритет, независимо дали става въпрос за антропоцентризъм или биоцентризъм.

Проучвайки ролята на решенията, предложени от Ширбек, които са свързани с невъзможността за отъждествяване на моралните дискусанти с морални агенти, формулираме хипотезата, че по този начин можем да избегнем както дефинирането на живите същества, така и на определени групи хора като „непълноценни” морални субекти, докол-

кото „непълноценността“ в морала не се основава на онтологически и особено на биологични импликации, отнасящи се до т.нар. дебат за реалните и потенциални характеристики на субектите (the debate about actual and potential properties). Нещо повече, аргументирана е хипотезата, че ние можем да дефинираме компетенцията, свързана с моралната ангажираност, като прототипна характеристика на т.нар. от Ширбек комуникативна компетенция.

Връщайки се към въпроса за интерпретацията на биологическия градуализъм като съотнасящ се с етическия градуализъм, стигаме до заключението, че проекциите на биологическия градуализъм могат да бъдат открити в степента, в която жизнените нужди и жизнените интереси не са еднакво приложими към всички живи същества. На свой ред, противоречията произтичат от факта, че не всички живи същества притежават модусите „да бъде заинтересован“ и „да имам интерес към“ в смисъла на Ширбек. Ето защо възникват затруднения при съпоставянето на жизнените нужди на различните организми, тъй като подобно сравнение имплицитно предполага да бъде приложен критерият за приоритет.

Този проблем провокира отново въпроса откъде знаем, че болката е „еднаква“ при всички същества, а именно, откъде знаем, че съществува неоспорима връзка между физическия опит и неговата етическа оценка, както и знанието ни за него. В противен случай, твърдението, че сме морални дискусанти, взаимодействащи с морални субекти, които изначално са лишени от съзнанието да бъдат морални, не води до формулирането на механизъм за изчисляване на болката (pain calculus), нито до разглеждане на възможността за изпитване на състрадание.

Като едно от основните методологически предимства, свързани с теорията на Ширбек за състраданието, се посочва неговият аргумент, че състраданието може да бъде изпитано без да се достига до процедурен консенсус, дори когато говорим за минимални прояви на състрадание. На макрометодологическо ниво е направено заключението, че състраданието оказва влияние върху култивиране на екологическото съзнание чрез реабилитиране на нормативната валидност на чувствата и емоциите.

От друга страна, при сравняването на концепциите на Ширбек и Квальой е открита необходимостта от преосмисляне на ролята на консумацията в дебата за етическия градуализъм. Изследвайки генезиса на затрудненията, свързани с парадигмата на произвеждане и консумиране в обществата с устойчиво развитие, така както те са представени от двамата автори, разглеждаме начина, по който Квальой и

Ширбек утвърждават ролята на образованието и политическата култура за реабилитирането на качеството на живот, особено в т.нар. развиващи се страни.

Нещо повече, формулирана е хипотезата, че именно подмяната на идеята за универсализиране (в нейните качествени измерения) с процеса на универсализация (имаща количествени измерения) поражда необходимостта от разграничаване на екологическата устойчивост от екологическата липса на устойчивост (*ecological unsustainability*), особено когато устойчивото развитие е преекспонирано като единствено възможно развитие. Ето защо е направено заключението, че концепцията на Ширбек за ролята на универсализирането се различава от тази на Нес, доколкото критерият на Нес за универсализация е фокусиран по-скоро върху открояването на прецизността при извеждането на норми чрез полагането на верифицируеми хипотези.

В заключение е аргументирано твърдението, че ролята на норвежките екологически философии е задача, която изисква намирането на отговори не само на въпроси от типа „какво е типично норвежкото в тях?“, но също и „как „типично норвежкото“ допринася за поставянето на глобални проблеми, които изискват релевантни локални решения?“, имайки предвид, че „локален“ не означава „маловажен“. На свой ред анализът на влиянието на норвежките екологически философии е имплицитно свързан с открояването на глобалните предизвикателства пред норвежката екологическа политика. В този контекст призивът „Мисли глобално, действай локално!“ може да бъде реинтерпретиран в сферата на норвежките екологически философии като „Мисли по начин, изпълнен със смисъл, действай отговорно!“, което на свой ред предполага ангажираността да се проявява по-скоро на морално, социокултурно и политическо ниво, отколкото в епистемологически план. Ето защо утвърждаването на термина норвежки екологически философии в множествено число предполага мисленето на категориите „глобален“ и „локален“ не като релативни, а като релационистки термини в смисъла на Нес. Така можем да открием многообразието на въпросните философии при поставянето на сходни проблеми от типа на проясняването на противоречията, свързани с етическия градуализъм, преформулирането на политическите задачи на екологическия конструктивизъм и др..

На макрометодологическо ниво призивът „Мисли по начин, изпълнен със смисъл, действай отговорно!“ е възможен, ако питането кои въпроси не трябва да бъдат загубени (Ширбек) се интернализира като въпрос как човек да намери своето място „в мрежата от биосферни

възли” (Нес), което да нарече дом. Подобни проблеми са свързани с неизкоренимото космическо чувство на паника (Запфе), със създаването на екологически балансирано общество от типа на обществото на жизнените нужди (Квальбой), както и с редуциране на опасността да се търси убежище от заплахата от екологическа катастрофа в мита за окончателното решение (Ширбек). Независимо от различните начини на артикулиране на необходимостта от преосмисляне на ролята на биоцентризма, тези въпроси произтичат от фундаменталната дилема „чия околна среда? коя природа?”. Така подходът на норвежките екологически философии към проблематизирането на идеята за когнитивна рационалност разкрива как ние можем да продължим да поставяме „микро” въпроси от типа „кой?” и „чий?” без да изгубим глобалните въпроси („макро” въпросите), а именно, въпросите „защо?” и „как?” в свят, където преосмислянето на ролята на етическия градуализъм е един от малкото начини да се научим не само как да бъдем в, но и с природата в дългосрочна перспектива.

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