5-2009

Bling without blood? The role of natural resources in civil war

Kimberly L. Douglass

University of Tennessee

To the Graduate Council:

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We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:

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(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

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“Bling without Blood? The Role of Natural Resources in Civil War”

A Dissertation
Presented for
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Kimberly L. Douglass
May 2009

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the one person who ALWAYS knew this day would come.

Acknowledgements

I recognize Edward Tate, a great husband, a supportive partner, and a loyal friend. This day is so much better because you are a part of it. I also recognize Jackson Douglass-Tate, my son. You cannot even know yet how much you have helped me be a better me. In addition, I recognize all the babysitters who made this moment possible: Sydney Douglass, Kenya Douglass, and Rozella Tate. Finally, I recognize Dr. Anthony Nownes for honoring commitments and fulfilling promises.

Abstract

This study answers the research question: what factors determine the onset and duration of civil wars involving natural resources? This case study analysis uses determinants extracted from several quantitative studies to examine the role of natural resources in civil war. This study compares resource politics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Botswana from independence to the early 2000s.

The Congo officially became embroiled in a civil war in 1996 and then in 1998. During this same period another resource-rich country, Botswana was able to parlay resource abundance into positive development indicators. However, Botswana's political and economic weaknesses help exclude some of the factors commonly associated with the role of resources in civil war. For example, Botswana depended heavily upon resource exports. It also failed to develop sectors outside of the mining sector. In addition, it was a *de facto* single-party country. Still, Botswana remained peaceful.

Scholars believe that at the end of the Cold War rebels had to seek their own funding sources since superpower assistance was no longer available. This discourse suggests that we can understand more about rebel mobilization since the story is no longer clouded by Cold War politics.

The findings in this study suggest that the discourse has not moved as rapidly as previously thought. The discourse is now in its second generation. The first generation was characterized by economic explanations (as a departure from a history of political explanations). The second generation has come full circle, back to political explanations. Despite these developments, a number of operationalization problems inhibit a clear understanding of causality.

This study recommends new approaches to understanding the role of resources in conflicts. Currently, scholars over-determine the role of natural resources in civil war. For example, a set of unique historical circumstances merged to create the conditions for civil wars in the Congo in 1996 and 1998. The distinctions bêtween resource conflicts and conflicts caused by other political reasons are not clear in some of the quantitative studies.

Preface

Figure 1. Map of Africa

Source: nationsonline.org

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Chapter I: Introduction

“The meek shall inherit the earth, but not the mineral rights.” -J. Paul Getty

Scholars have identified several determinants of intra-state, violent natural resource conflict. In this study I answer the following research question: What factors appear to be associated with the onset and duration of natural resource conflict in developing countries? This study compares the diamond resource politics in Botswana with those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While a number of quantitative and qualitative studies address natural resource conflict in various ways, few offer case analyses of a range of determinants. This void suggests that more comprehensive case studies are needed to identify the determinants of the onset and duration of natural resource conflict in countries of the same region.

The Chapters

Chapter 1 of this study introduces the topic. Chapter 2 contains a literature review. From this literature review, I identify the determinants of the onset and duration of natural resource conflict. Chapter 3 explains the research methods I employ in this study. This chapter also provides a justification for case selection. In addition, it lists the sources that I consult for this study. Those sources include state archive documents, humanitarian reports, cease-fire agreements, development indices, state constitutions, corporate reports, personal communications, interviews, and reputable media reports.

Chapter 4 contains a case study of DRC, based on the determinants identified in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 contains analysis as well as findings. Chapter 5 contains a case study of Botswana, based on the determinants identified in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 also contains findings and analyses. Chapter 6 provides comparative analyses of the findings from both cases. In these comparative analyses, I examine the extent to which my findings can be generalized to other countries. In chapter 6, I also suggest avenues for future research.

Chapter II: The Determinants of Natural Resource Conflict

In this chapter I lay out what we know about violent conflict involving natural resources in developing countries. Here I define such conflict as "violent conflict between the armed forces of two or more parties, striving to gain economic advantage and control the extraction, the distribution, and the production of high-value goods" (Angstrom, 2001:109). Historically, scholars have been concerned about such intra-state conflicts largely because of their potential to destabilize the regions in which they occur. Since September 11, 2001 another concern has emerged--unstable regions in the world incubate terrorists (Rabasa, et. al, 2007). These regions provide bases of operations for terrorists and resources to finance their activities. Most importantly, natural resource conflicts place millions of innocent people in harm's way.

Natural resource conflict is present to some degree or another in all regions of the world. Natural resource competition can occur wherever people demand natural resources, regardless of the available supply (Harding, 1968). The resources referenced in this study are oil, gemstones, minerals and timber. The following literature review explains why, according to scholars, violent conflicts erupt or heighten as a result of competition over resources.

This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I will discuss the historical circumstances that have pushed the natural resource conflict discourse forward. Next, I will identify the major theories that have emerged to explain natural resource conflict. Different theories explain natural resource conflict differently. For example, some scholars contend that resource abundance alone causes and prolongs conflict. In contrast, others contend that state weaknesses explain the likelihood and intensity of conflict. Still others explain the onset and duration of conflict as a product of behavior by Western states and corporations. They explain conflict as the result of a "political economy of conflict." Still others use rebel motivations and behavior, elite contestation, and the nature of the resources themselves to explain the onset and duration of conflict. The key findings from this literature review will serve as guides in my subsequent analysis of natural resource conflict.

The Determinants of Natural Resource Conflict

Since the 1990s, the study of intra-state (violent) natural resource conflict in developing countries has exploded across a variety of disciplines including economics, political science, sociology, geography and environmental politics (Ron, 2005 and Isham, *et al.*, 2002). Findings from these studies have not contradicted each other so much as emphasized different factors (Ross, 2004). One key association that has been identified is that between resource dependence and civil war (Dunning, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). In their ground-breaking study, Collier and Hoeffler operationalized resource dependence as the ratio of a country's primary commodity exports to its GDP. Using a threshold of 1,000 battled-related deaths to indicate that a conflict has occurred, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that up to 32 percent of primary commodity exports to GDP an increase in the percent of primary commodity exports increased the likelihood of a conflict within the next five years. This study seemed to fulfill a World Bank economic policy agenda by using economic determinants to explain natural resource conflict. Subsequently, these findings have been challenged (Fearon, 2005) with the same or similar data, different data, and different foci altogether.

Another key association has been established between natural resource conflict and the economic interests of rebels. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) concluded that groups organize against the dominant power primarily to control resource revenue. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) contrast this explanation with an explanation that rebel groups organize against the dominant power primarily to correct some political injustice. The finding that rebels are primarily motivated by resource revenue has been disputed even by scholars using the same or similar data (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Hegre, 2002). This finding has catalyzed an entire discourse.

Despite recent developments in this discourse, violent conflicts with natural resources themes are by no means new. Strategic natural resource acquisition figured prominently, for example, in the European conquests of Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America. In addition, self-determination struggles fought throughout colonial history were struggles over ownership of human and natural resources (Ayittey, 2005; Ron, 2005; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005). In the absence of a colonial backdrop, natural resource conflict is now portrayed as “organized banditry” among African warlords (Thom, 1999: html format - under “Proxy Border Wars and Economic Insurgency”).

The Role of Resource Abundance

Some studies identify the abundance of resources itself as a key determinant of the onset and duration of violent natural resource conflict. Common use of the term “resource curse” implies that a country that has abundant natural resources originating within its legal boundaries is destined to suffer from underdevelopment (deSoysa-a, 20002). The suggestion here is that leaders will rely too heavily on one revenue source and/or rent-seeking officials will misuse the proceeds from that revenue source.

The notion of predestined underdevelopment is a crucial node in connecting natural resource abundance to natural resource conflict. The notion of predestined underdevelopment suggests that states will first fail to organize their own governments. They will also fail to educate and train their populations for meaningful work. In addition, states will fail to provide adequate health care, transportation, and utilities. Finally, states will fail to socialize their citizens to respect property rights and rule of law. Most incendiary, however, is the conclusion that states will abuse their people through various forms of physical neglect and direct force. This approach concludes that dire neglect, a weak governing system, and abundant resources are strong incentives for natural resource conflict.

Developing countries with vast resource(s) such as Angola, Colombia, and Indonesia, often struggle to meet the basic needs of their citizens (Karl, 1997). For example, while oil accounts for more than 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and more than 80 percent of all government revenues (Global Insight, Economic Risk Analysis, 2006), it is a cruel irony that Nigeria would experience an energy crisis. In such situations, oil, gemstones, minerals and timber act as “grapes of wrath” (Steinbeck, 1939), laying fully in view yet very distant from the people whose lives could be enhanced by them. Another term that appears frequently in the natural resource conflict discourse is “Dutch Disease” (Lewis, 1998). This term refers to the failure of countries to diversify their economies because of heavy dependence on a particular resource. Such was the case of Angola in the 1990s and its heavy dependence on the oil industry (Aunty, 2000).

Despite a host of anecdotal evidence that links natural resource abundance to conflict (deSoysa-b, 2002), some evidence suggests a tenuous link. Countries such as “Chile, Botswana and Norway” have used resource wealth as a“bedrock for economic development” (Ron, 2005:444). Ascher (1999), for example, concludes that by understanding the deliberate actions of governments we can know how resources become a hindrance to an economy rather than a boon. More specifically, he holds government responsible for regulating markets and making resource extractors accountable for attaching the appropriate value to natural resources. According to Ascher, at every step of the refining process, goods and services have to be priced appropriately to avoid under- and over-exploitation. For example, raw materials must be priced according to their inherent value plus the value of investment capital, the cost of extraction labor, the cost of equipment and supplies, and the impact to the local environment. While Asher notes policy failures in resource abundant countries that resulted in the misuse of resources, he also highlights policy shifts that have resulted in more efficient uses of resources in Brazil (land and forests), Chile (copper), Costa Rica (land and forests) and Ghana (cocoa). In short, violence vis-à-vis resource abundance is not a foregone conclusion. Still, mismanagement of natural resources presents a number of challenges for developing countries that struggle with basic organization.

Resource abundance has presented some serious challenges for the geographically diverse countries listed in Table 1. While the geographic diversity represented here counters the notion that natural resource conflict is an African problem (Banks, 2005), this extensive list suggests that there might be something to the notion of "resource curse."

Klare (2001) adds that we can easily draw a map of conflict in the post-Cold War system. He says:

> The analysis would begin with a map showing all major deposits of oil and natural gas lying in contested and unstable areas. The zones of potential trouble include the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea basin, and the South China Sea, along with Algeria, Angola, Chad, Columbia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Venezuela-areas and states that together house about four-fifths of the world's known petroleum reserves…The map would also trace pipelines and tanker routes used to carry oil and natural gas from their points of supply to markets in the West.
>
> A map of contested resource zones would also show all major water systems shared by two or more countries in arid or semi-arid areas (53-54).

This map would indicate major concentrations of gems, minerals, and old-growth timber in the developing world. As shown in Table 1 and described in the quote above, a variety of resources has played roles in intrastate conflicts across the world.

In short, many scholars conclude that the mere presence of natural resources is a curse that dooms societies to violent conflict. This rather deterministic view holds that countries with vast natural resources will inevitably face conflict over these resources.

Table 1. Examples of Natural Resource Conflicts

State	Resource	Period of Conflict
Afghanistan	Gems, opium	1978-2001
Angola	Oil, diamonds	1975-2002
Angola (Cabinda)	Oil	1975-Present
Cambodia	Timber, gems	1978-1997
Colombia	Oil, gold, coca	1984
Congo, Republic of	Oil	1997
Congo, Dem. Republic of	Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt	1996-1997, 1998-Present
Indonesia (Aceh)	Natural gas	1975- Present
Indonesia (West Papua)	Copper, gold	1969- Present
Liberia	Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold	1989-1996
Morocco[1]	Phosphates, oil	1975- Present
Myanmar[2]	Timber, tin, gems, opium	1949- Present
Papua New Guinea[3]	Copper, gold	1988- 2001
Peru	Coca	1980-1995
Sierra Leone	Diamonds	1991-2000
Sudan	Oil	1983- Present

Source: Ross, Michael. 2003. "Natural Resource Wealth Can Make You Poor." In *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds). World Bank: Washington, DC. Pp.17-42.

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[1] Sahara Press Service. February 3, 2009. West Sahara/UN-AU. "Negotiations Between Morocco and Polisario Front Will be Revived 'Soon' (Bon Ki-Moon)."
[2] Evidence of low-intensity conflict: International Crisis Group . February 1, 2009. *Crisis Watch*. Downloaded February 3, 2009.
[3] US Peace Institute: Digital Collection. April 30, 2001. Bougainville Peace Agreement, Signed at Arawa. Downloaded February 3, 2009.

This view glosses over histories of exploitation, abuse, and mismanagement of developing countries by former colonial powers. It also ignores that upon independence, developing states differed in their administrative capacities. Still, extant studies both support and contradict the “resource curse” explanation for natural resource conflict.

The International System

Some studies identify the current configuration of the international political system as a key determinant of violent natural resource conflict in developing countries. The World Systems perspective, for example, suggests that the international system is comprised of classes of actors, where progress for one set of actors--usually in Western states--is dependent upon the exploitation of actors in other states (Wallerstein, 1982). Dunning (2005) conceptualizes natural resource conflict as a two-level game. The game is activated by the value of natural resources at one level--the international market. International market prices and supplies determine whether there will be peace or conflict at the state level (Dunning, 2005).

The World Systems perspective explains natural resource conflict in terms of the dynamics among states, corporations, country leaders, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, trading blocs, other international actors, and local actors. Outside ownership of oil resources and refining processes, for example, assure that the locals in Nigeria can only control oil through violence. The dynamics between Nigerian rebels and the Shell Company are influenced by local circumstances. They are also, however, affected by the policies, business practices, and consumption habits of the Western world.

Even efforts to modernize developing countries (in Western-style bureaucratic processes) appear to play a role in these struggles. For example, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) push for foreign direct investment in developing countries may inadvertently increase the power base of local warlords, other local leaders, and national leaders who act as gatekeepers to resource-abundant land and with whom investors must negotiate (Reno, 1997). Also, IMF austerity measures (to modernize and stabilize fledgling economies) (Noble, 1990), "usually involve cutting public spending, devaluing the national currency to stimulate exports and reducing imports. By stipulating that governments to reduce subsidies on food staples, such programs have provoked rioting, most recently in Venezuela" (Bollag, 1989). Enduring such conditions, the unemployed may view short-term mining opportunities and a range of illicit enterprises as viable opportunities.

Martin (2005) takes a more radical stance. He concludes that domination of local resources by outside corporations is part of a continuing legacy. This legacy is comprised of deliberate attempts to decimate the African population in order to satisfy Western appetites for the products made from Africa's natural resources.

Other scholars working within the World Systems perspective also blame the current configuration of the international system for local conflicts. For example, Dunning and Wirpsa (2004) link the renewal of old local rivalries with the international demand for oil in Columbia and other former Third World countries. More specifically, they note that the "revival of the National Liberation Army (ELN), Columbia's second largest guerilla group, has been linked to payments received from foreign energy contractors" (84). Dunning and Wirpsa further contend that local conflicts in Columbia reflect foreign investors' willingness to protect their interest through military force. The U.S., for example, is willing to assert itself in this manner because of the growing uncertainty surrounding the Middle East oil supply. As a result of this willingness mercenaries are now thrown into the mix of old rivalries.

The World Systems perspective relates these rivalries to the international market value of natural resources. For example, a devaluation of abundant natural resources cuts into the profits of the resource abundant country. In theory, such policies hurt the citizens of the resource abundant country and further entrench inequalities. If a country, however, is well-positioned in the international market for that abundant natural resource, that position provides some degree of stability in profits (Dunning, 2005). Still, citizens may be unable to either purchase the resources that are abundant in their own country or unable to benefit from them indirectly.

It is also important to point out the roles that other developing countries play in the political economies of natural resource conflict. In the 1990s, for example, Liberia and Sierra Leone played a significant role in the "rebellion" in Guinea. These countries—most specifically Charles Taylor of Liberia--provided military assistance to the rebels and provided places to which rebel forces could retreat from battle. Taylor had set his sights on Guinea's natural resources. Such blatant destruction notwithstanding, states such as Liberia that border significant waterways may also benefit directly from natural resource conflict by serving as crucial links in smuggling and legitimate transportation routes (Gberie, 2001).

Scholars working from a World Systems perspective provide numerous examples of local, state, and international organizations' negative impacts on developing countries. However, this perspective also helps highlight a few positives in the international politics of natural resource management. First, non-governmental organizations, such as Global Witness (2004), have been instrumental in exposing (Gereffi et. al, 2001) corporations that exploit resource abundant countries. Such international activists have played key roles in nudging corporations toward stronger self-regulation. Other international organizations and programs have provided the structures needed for self-regulation. The Kimberley Process[4] (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005), for example, is a process by which diamonds are certified as "conflict free." While the Kimberley Process holds some promise, it ignores the notion that some of the local officials who can verify authenticity, maintain ties in illicit markets. Also, as of yet there is no systematic analysis to suggest that the Kimberley Process has prevented conflict. Still, other efforts to control natural resource conflict abound.

The United Nations has developed a sophisticated support network for businesses that are interested in implementing sustainable practices in their operations throughout the world. The UN's Global Compact[5], helps businesses understand, develop, and implement best business practices around "human rights, the environment, and anti-corruption." Also see the Association for Responsible Mining (http://www.communitymining.org).

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[4] http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/
[5] http://www.unglobalcompact.org

The UN and other international organizations, such as the Carter Center[6], have engaged in direct peacekeeping activities and operations in areas where resources have been violently contested. For example, the UN has established a peacekeeping mission in the highly fractured DRC.

> The United Nations Security Council established MONUC (UN Mission in DR Congo) to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Accord signed in 1999. With a budget exceeding one billion dollars, it is the largest and most expensive mission in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).[7]

Also, the European Union lists natural resource conflict prevention and management as specific areas of concern within its larger conflict prevention strategy (European Commission, 2001). Finally, other states have played roles in preventative measures and brokering peace agreements after conflicts have begun. For example, in response to the power shifts occurring in the post-Cold War era, the US articulated interest in preventing conflict in the historically fractured Balkan states (Steinberg, 1996). The problem with intervention by other states, however, is that their own interests may get in the way of preventative measures and agreements (Waltz, 1979). Of particular concern to the international community was the vast natural resource base in the Balkans.

While media are replete with anecdotes about how international players have brought attention and accountability to resource refining processes, there is no systematic, empirical evidence to suggest that non-governmental or inter-governmental organizations have prevented the onset or shortened the duration of conflicts. For

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[6] www.cartercenter.org
[7] http://www.monuc.org

example, UN actions may result in a truce among factions, but not necessarily peace (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Keen, 2001) for the average citizen. Citizens may still endure looting, violent checkpoints, forced labor, rape, and kidnapping by the controlling faction. Also, as of yet, there is no systematic analysis to suggest that the Kimberley Process has prevented conflict.

In summary, a World Systems perspective suggests that natural resource conflict is influenced by a range of actors inside and outside the state[8]. The literature suggests that organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank may contribute indirectly to natural resource conflict when they encourage foreign direct investment and impose austerity measures to modernize economies. The literature also suggests that corporate control of markets, corporate operating procedures, and Western consumption habits also influence natural resource conflict. Outside influence on natural resource conflict is not limited to Western states or corporations. The interests of neighboring states also influence conflict. Neighboring states often provide legitimate and illegitimate transportation routes and bases for rebel organization. The negative impacts of corporate interests and the interests of other states seem to compound when a government military or paramilitary (mercenary) group is present to protect the resources. All of these actors are connected by a political economy in which there must be exploiters and exploited. There is often overlap of these two categories.

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[8] The roles of inside actors are discussed a societal conditions.

It is important to note that the natural resource conflict literature also suggests that certain actors in the world system have attempted to reduce the number and length of natural resource conflicts. Groups such as Global Witness expose bad corporate behavior. Also, there is an international effort to establish certification processes for resources. In addition, the UN has established peacekeeping missions. Finally, organizations such as the UN, the African Union, the Carter Center, and other countries have attempted to broker peace agreements among warring factions. For example, South Africa has attempted to intercede in conflicts inside the DRC. However, other states' own interest may get in the way of a settlement. Also, there is no systematic evidence that suggests that these interventions have reduced or eliminated natural resource conflict.

The Role of Governance

Some studies identify governance as a key determinant of violent natural resource conflict. It is widely held that state strength and state behavior—two aspects of governance—play intermediate roles in natural resource conflict. Fearon (2004), for example, concludes that weak states rather than strong rebels are to blame for increased violence over resources, especially fuel. The term governance appears quite frequently in the natural resource conflict literature. According to Malone and Nitzschke (2005:5), level of governance appears to be a powerful explanation for violent natural resource. For some the term governance signifies the presence of an independent legislature, independent judiciary, and independent executive (Marshall, et. al., 2006). For others governance comes from "the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group" (Nye and Donahue, 2000:12).

In the natural resource conflict literature, corrupt legislatures, judiciaries, and executives are considered foregone conclusions because there appears to be little restraint on the collective activities of groups (Alao and Olonisakin, 2000). Auty (2000:30) conceptualizes these problems as the results of a "two-stage, staple trap model." First, resource abundance handicaps state development. Subsequently, the fragile state then fails to deliver the state services that would contribute to further development. Alao and Olonisakin (2000) also treat a weak, centralized state as a given in resource conflict. They, therefore, call for a "systematic understanding of economic and political motivations" of people who exploit the state from the outside and the inside (27).

For an analysis of natural resource conflict, two sets of choices appear to help define the strength of a state: (1) the manner in which state agents collect revenue; and (2) the way those agents choose to spend that revenue (Isham, et. al., 2002). The conditions created by these decisions determine how "feasible" it is for soldiers to wage war, or whether or not "permissive causes" will allow them to wage war (Humphrey, 2005:512). For example, when agents of the state depend heavily upon a limited number of revenue sources, they can ignore the demands made by the broader society. Since wealth is narrowly distributed and public demands can be ignored, elites have little incentive to spend resources on social services including education, healthcare, job training, and transportation. Also, those residing in the base can use their wealth to suppress political contestation.

Luong and Weinthal (2001) conclude that the interaction of low political contestation and availability of alternative resources appears to restrict control of resources to a narrow group of people who may treat the resources as their own (Luong and Weinthal, 2001)[9]. In doing so, they may fail to develop other sectors. State spending reflects their efforts to retain control of state resources. In a well-established kleptocracy, for example, the entrenched elites may not be interested in devoting resources to modern institutions which may redistribute state control (Dunning, 2005; Cater, 2003; Auty, 2000; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Economic diversification may create societal bases of power outside the control of political elites. These independent bases of power may then facilitate future challenges to the political power of state incumbents, especially during the catastrophic economic downturns and fiscal crises that typically characterize resource-reliant countries (Dunning, 2005:452).

A lack of broad-based public investment almost assures a surplus of low-skilled workers who have no bargaining power with employers (Ross, 2001; Goldstone, 2000; Cincotta, 2003). This surplus, as in the Rwanda/Congo region, becomes a hazard when refugees or migrants from neighboring communities place demographic pressure on a weak state. In the face of limited political and economic opportunities and fierce economic competition, resource mining, smuggling, and rebel-rousing are rational options (Goldstone, et. al, 2000). It is no wonder that natural resource conflict is associated with porous state borders (Auty, 2000). Auty attributes the success of Khmer Rouge factions, for example, to their commercial relationships and proximity to Thailand and Vietnam.

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[9] Their findings lend credence to the notion of a Dutch Disease.

In linking state capacity to natural resource conflict, scholars must temper their conclusions. The state governance explanation is riddled with problems in direction of causality. As previous paragraphs illustrate, low state capacity may lead to high resource dependence and violent competition. Resource dependence, however, can lead to low state capacity. It can hinder the development of organizing tools, such as rule of law and property rights (Barro, 2000; DeMesquita and Root, 2000; Klare, 1999). For example, Luong and Weinthal (2001:377) outline the process by which resource endowment hinders state capacity. The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided these scholars a unique opportunity to examine, within states with common political histories, resource policies that either lead to control by a narrow power base or to investment from a broader base.

In summary, state strength and state behavior appear to play intermediate or "permissive" roles in natural resource conflict. Phrased differently, a weak state is necessary for natural resource conflicts to occur. State strength may speak to a state's physical might, the durability of the rule of law, and/or the state's economic vitality. The state must be able to restrain the collective activities of groups within the state. The state that cannot maintain order within its borders is certainly vulnerable to natural resource conflict. Also, a state must be able to protect its borders from mass migration, as well as hostile military invaders. Mass migrations may lead to intense resource competition.

Even with sufficient internal order and border protection, to protect against resource conflicts it appears that states must adhere to a definition of rule of law that protects property as well as life. Contracts and ownership rights must be binding in order to attract the type of local and foreign investment that will lead to long-term economic development. Long-term economic development necessarily includes the development of a range of alterative sectors, beyond resource extraction. Long-term economic development is important because it appears to engage more of the citizenry in the state economy. Having found a productive place in a legitimate economy, citizens have less incentive to resign themselves to various forms of war entrepreneurship, including artisanal mining.

It appears that governments mediate those factors including basic order and rule of law that reduce the likelihood of natural resource conflict. Broadly speaking, the way government collects revenue and spends that revenue determines that state's vulnerability to natural resource conflict. If a government relies heavily upon resource revenue, it can afford to ignore the demands of the wider populace that is not contributing revenue through systematic, direct taxes[10]. Consequently, the government may not parlay resource revenue into public services and appropriate infrastructure projects. The literature suggests these dynamics create the grievances that foster natural resource conflict.

The Role of Societal Conditions

Some studies identify societal conditions as key determinants of violent natural resource conflict. These conditions include types and varieties of funding sources for rebels, widespread grievances among the population, a sense of economic entitlement, ethnic division, and demographic pressure.

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[10] A type of tax, however, may be extracted through inflation, theft, or bribery.

Sobels and the state

State behavior plays a key role in rebel behavior. As I mention above, a weak, kleptocratic state provides opportunities for rebel organization. Rebels may seek control of the state itself or separation from the state (Ross, 2002). These efforts, however, are not the exclusive domain of rebel groups. The literature indicates that in conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone and the Sudan, the state directs or is at least complicit in rebel behavior. "The oft-cited 'sobel' phenomenon ('soldiers by day, rebels by night') [is] witnessed in Angola and Sierra Leone where soldiers frequently collude with rebels for personal gain in the diamond-rich areas, with negative consequences for military discipline and the civilian population" (Malone and Nitzschke, 2005:7 and Reno, 1998:125-7).

Sources of rebel funding

Other factors such as access to diverse forms of funding and the funding sources themselves, however, help explain when rebels are able to organize and maintain group cohesion. Framed differently, Humphrey (2005) discusses when it is "feasible" (512) for rebels to organize. Weinstein (2005), for example, focuses on how amount and types of funding sources determine the types of members that rebel groups can attract. Because of consistent external support from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the Ethiopian secessionist group (1972-1991), the Eritrean People's Liberation Front's (EPLF), was ordered like a military unit. It was characterized by division of labor, ethnic diversity, and self-reliance. The organization could recruit and train the highly educated as well as the impoverished.

Hegre (2004) finds that diverse funding sources for rebels tend to prolong conflicts. He adds, "civil wars become long when no parties have the ability to achieve a decisive victory" (249). Similarly, Fearon (2004) points out how asymmetries in power shorten conflict. He reports that "civil wars in post-Soviet Eastern Europe have been relatively short…because the rebels in most of them had support from a strong power against quite weak and new states" (298). On the duration of interstate war, Smith and Stam (2004) conclude that the exhaustion of resources during prolonged wars tends to lead to negotiation. Government resources are important to this discussion. Given the lack of government military intelligence in African countries, decisive victories and negotiations are difficult for governments to come by (Hegre, 2004).

Despite the time and space to anticipate and counter the government's efforts, today's resource rebel is faced with a number of collective action problems (Weinstein, 2005). Pegg (2003) concludes that today's rebel is motivated away from group loyalty because of scattered funding sources. Cold War rebel activity was funded by one of two superpowers. Relying upon a powerful outside funding source required that groups be easily identifiable and easily manipulated. Group cohesion was essential to group existence. Pegg contends that since rebels now have to go where the resources are, rebels are more mobile, less connected to the land, and more destructive. All resources, including those yet unexplored, are ripe for rebel exploitation. However, Ross (2002 paper presented at APSA) contends rebels are typically unsuccessful in creating momentum around the promise of future resource exploitation or "booty futures."

Resource exploitation and ownership are as much political as they are economic. Those who control resources can have many of their political demands met. These demands may include control of the state itself or the creation of a new, separate state (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Buhaug and Gates, 2002). For example, natural gas politics played a key role in the separatist politics of Aceh from Indonesia (Duva, 2007). The politics in Indonesia typified the separatist conditions laid out by Fearon (2004). The island of Aceh was "culturally distinct from the [majority] Javanese" (Duva, 2007). Because Indonesia is comprised of a string of islands, the conditions also fit Fearon's (2004) criterion of a minority group occupying an isolated and distinct area. According to Fearon, quest for minority self-determination, which includes recapturing a lost homeland (a "sons of soil" conflict), appears to be a strong determinant of the onset of separatist conflict.

Greed

According to Collier and Hoeffler (2001), rebel greed for resources trumps historical grievances. This greed may manifest in war and peace. A key assumption in comparative politics and international relations is that peace is desirable (Keen, 2001). Peace in countries affected by natural resource conflict, however, often means that warlords, such as Salvatore Mancuso (commander of the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia – AUC) (Ashcroft, 2002), may have simply overpowered enemy combatants, including representatives of the state.

Peace that involves personal security for all (Caprioli, 2004), not just security for the state or the military, is even more difficult to come by because war entrepreneurs stand to benefit from the chaos. In the cases of natural resource conflict, conflict entrepreneurs are not interested in using those resources to develop the country; development of the state would render them unnecessary. They would no longer flourish through protectionism, patronage, the control of food staples, and harassment. While some war entrepreneurs clearly benefit from the chaos in these ways, war entrepreneurs can be found in the extraction, bargaining, refining, shipping, marketing and selling of natural resources (Reno, 1998). War entrepreneurs can also be found among heads of state.

Grievance

Collier and Hoeffler (2001) contrast the greed motivation with grievance as a determinant of natural resource conflict. Grievance refers to a claim that an injustice exists and is rooted in economic and/or social inequality. Olsson and Fors (2004:322) "model [grievances] as deliberate institutional differences, installed by the ruling group, between formal and informal sector production." For example, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 appeared to have spawned from the deeply ingrained social disparities between the Hutus and the ruling Tutsis (Verdeja, 2002). Since the spoils, in this case land, of a grievance war are potentially "public goods," then "justice rebellions…face [the threat of] free-riding" (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999:8). The motivation for greed rebellions, however, dampens this problem (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999). Still, extrapolating from case studies of Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia, Alao and Olonisakin (2000:35) conclude that "the potential for armed conflict in societies that are endowed with natural resources is great when group demands are not managed effectively and access to these resources is denied through a process of fair and just distribution."

Weinstein (2005) concludes that greed and grievance can be at work simultaneously. This point is important for those who are interested in extinguishing these conflicts. Giving a group access to revenue producing resources does not necessarily address underlying historical grievances, which may continue to fester. As Collier and Hoeffler (1999:15 and Kisangi, 2003) point out:

> the two motives for rebellion are potentially [emphasis added] empirically distinguishable…the motivation for instigating a rebellion war may commonly be a blend of an altruistic desire to rectify the grievances of a group and a selfish desire to loot the resources of others.

Also, the model used in Collier and Hoeffler (1999:12) appears to under-specify the causes of civil conflict. The pseudo R-squared value is only .20 for their narrow (incomplete) data set and .22 for their augmented data set[11]. Still, their study has been pivotal in shifting the study of intrastate conflict in developing countries from ethnicity to natural resources.

Ethnic divisions

Ethnicity is also invoked by many as a determinant of natural resource conflict. Heads of state, such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, are skillful at maintaining their strategic positions, wedged between their countries and other international actors. One of the ways they remain in such positions is by invoking the language of ethnicity. While ethnicity is

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[11] The authors imputed data by taking averages of the available years and filling in the missing years based on increments of these averages.

a social construct, it plays a real role in people's everyday lives. It helps mask the underlying problems associated with resource mismanagement and poor investment. Ethnicity occupies a large role in the lexicon of conflict. "Often, the weak political force of ethnic romanticism latches on to the stronger force of economic self-interest so that the secessionist movements voice ethnic grievances – Biafra (Nigeria), Cabinda (Angola), and Aceh (Indonesia) come to mind" (Collier, 2003).

While clearly there is a connection between ethnicity and conflict, studies show that ethnicity is not a primary cause of natural resource conflict. The explanatory power of ethnicity is believed to be enhanced by its interaction with other factors. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) point to population dispersion to explain the likelihood of conflict. Cincotta, *et al*. (2003), however, emphasize the tension created by rapid urbanization and a surplus of young, unemployed males (Nichiporuk, 2000). Still, ethnicity is invoked as a singular determinant of natural resource conflict because racial differences provide convenient, clear, polarizing cleavages. When rebel leaders are strapped for resources, they must invoke ethnic tensions to maintain member loyalty (Weinstein, 2005).

In summary, scholars are interested in the societal conditions that lead to resource conflict; the conditions that turn ordinary people into rebels. In one way or another, scholars have examined two broad determinants, rebel greed and rebel grievance. The rebel grievance thesis postulates that rebels organize in resource-abundant countries in response to injustices created by the misuse of resource abundance. As mentioned earlier, leaders in countries that rely heavily on resource revenue, as opposed to systematic, direct taxes from the citizenry, can ignore the demands of the populace. Therefore, poor education systems, unsanitary water systems, shoddy roads, and inadequate healthcare persist without broad scale revolt. Often, neglect by the government is viewed along racial lines. It is no wonder that scholars look to ethnicity to explain natural resource conflict. There are reasons to believe, however, that it is the interaction of ethnicity with other conditions, even beyond a weak state, that produce or agitate natural resource conflicts. These conditions include dispersed populations (and thus isolated pockets); rapid urbanization; and surpluses of young, unemployed males.

While the grievance explanations may have meaning a broader sense, the greed thesis looks beyond these conditions. It postulates that rebel groups form to control natural resources. From this perspective, they are nothing more than war entrepreneurs who benefit from the chaos, the control of mining resources, and the monopoly of supplies people depend upon for day-to-day existence. Some scholars see the greed thesis as inseparable from the grievance thesis. For example, individuals may initially organize in opposition to a rent-seeking government. Absent major foreign sponsors, group cohesion and loyalty are difficult to maintain among post-Cold War rebels. Therefore, control of resources becomes vital to the organization's survival.

Regardless of motivation, rebel activity is mediated by a weak state. The greed and grievance theses explain why natural resource conflict occurs. The weak state explanation provides the how. For example, the possibility of rebel activity appears to increase where military intelligence and deployment are limited by a poor transportation network and where the state cannot control its borders.

Conditions among the rebel groups themselves also foster natural resource conflict. The literature suggests that groups that have access to diverse funding sources, including resource wealth, revenue from foreign companies, remittances from expatriates, or advances ("booty futures") on revenue from resource extraction are more cohesive than groups that rely on a single revenue source. Also, diverse funding may allow a rebel group to be selective in choosing its members. In addition, such funding allows for strategic divisions of labor. However, where one group has a clear revenue advantage over other rebel groups or the state, resource conflicts appear to shorten. Even in the face of diverse funding sources, rebel activity is dampened by a strong state.

The Role of Resource Characteristics

Yet another set of studies identifies the resources themselves as key determinants of natural resource conflict. For example, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) find that mode of natural resource extraction, which is determined by the resource, affects risk of conflict. If the resource requires extraction primarily by free-lancing individuals, the state loses revenue and therefore capacity. If the resource is extracted primarily by industry, the state can channel revenue to state coffers. Also, streamlining of state revenue through industry reduces the amount of revenue available to rebels opposing the state. Ross adds, "oil dependence appears to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but not conflict duration,…and gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis…seem to lengthen pre-existing wars" (Ross, 2004:352; Auty, 2004; Fearon, 2004). Isham, *et al*. (2002) suggest that the type of resource contested may lead to weakness in the state apparatus in the first place. "Resources such as oil, diamonds and plantation crops can be easily captured by an elite-simultaneously exacerbat[ing] social tensions and weaken[ing] institutional capacity" (Isham *et al*., 2002:11 also read Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Klare, 2001). In addition, Luong and Weinthal (2001:370-373) find that availability of "alternative" resource bases (interacting with "political contestation") determine whether resource policy develops along a private or state controlled (read as stifled) path.

Scholars have examined the impact that the resources themselves have on natural resource conflict. Simply put, the literature suggests that "lootable" resources (Ross, 2004) such as diamonds and minerals that are easier to extract lead to more natural resource conflict because they are more accessible to even poorly organized rebel groups. Rebels cannot erect or maintain the type of infrastructure necessary for oil operations and other deep-shaft extractions. The state is usually the only domestic institution with the level of organization needed for such long-term investment.

The Role of Geography and Topography

Another set of studies identifies resource location as a determinant of natural resource conflict. According to DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the presence of mountain and forest cover helps to explain resource conflicts. Cover may provide rebels a safe haven to which they can retreat. Forest and mountain cover also provides routes through which rebels can smuggle resources to outside brokers. In addition, timber may become another source of revenue for rebels. However, Rustad, *et al.* find that forests play a limited role in internal conflicts and should not be associated with diamonds and oil. Others (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) find that rough terrain itself is a key factor. Still, others (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Buhang and Gates, 2002) are unsure about the impact of rough terrain on rebel behavior.

Other geographical determinants seem to offer more certainty in explaining conflict. For example, it appears that rebels are emboldened to wage longer wars if their resource base is located far from the capital (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; LeBillion-b, 2001). Also, Herbst (2004) finds that a larger country with poor infrastructure is more likely to experience conflict. From this perspective, groups are able to set up strongholds in remote areas. Also from this perspective, poor infrastructure makes government military deployment difficult.

In summary, the literature suggests that location plays a critical role in natural resource conflict. It suggests that geographical conditions such as heavy mountain and forest cover, rough terrain, location of resources from the state capital, and poor infrastructure, especially in remote areas increase the likelihood and intensity of natural resource conflict.

Summary of Determinants

Several themes move to the foreground and suggest opportunities for fruitful inquiry about the causes of natural resource conflicts and the conditions that prolong them. State capacity appears to be an overarching theme in this discourse. It appears to combine with other factors to affect the onset, the nature, and the duration of natural resource conflict. In short, it appears to be the permissive cause (Humphrey, 2005) of natural resource conflict. State capacity also seems to work in tandem with other determinants to cause or prolong natural resource conflict. State capacity can be evaluated by examining the manner in which the state raises and expends revenue.

Studies identify different variables as determinants of the onset and duration of natural resource conflict in developing countries. Some studies conclude that the abundance of resources itself may cause natural resource conflict. Other studies conclude that the international market for natural resources affects conflict and peace in developing countries. Still others conclude that governance plays an intermediate role with other factors. Yet others conclude that societal conditions cause and prolong natural resource conflict. These societal conditions include variety and types of funding for rebel groups, widespread grievances, a sense of economic entitlement, ethnic diversity, and demographic pressures. Other studies conclude that the characteristics of the natural resources themselves are determinants of the onset and duration of natural resource conflict. Finally, studies conclude that resource location is a key determinant of the onset and duration of natural resource conflict.

Which factors are most and least important in determining the onset and endurance of natural resource conflict? This is the question I will address subsequently. However, before I get to this question, I will describe my approach to answering it. This is what I will do in Chapter 3.

Chapter III: Data and Methods

In Chapter 2 I identified several determinants of natural resource conflict. In this chapter I discuss my research methods for addressing this question: What factors appear to be associated with the onset and duration of natural resource conflict? I use case studies to address this research question. In these case studies, I examine qualitative data over time.

My Approach: Case Studies of Natural Resource Conflict

This study uses a systematic comparison of two cases to examine the determinants of natural resource conflict. The use of such small-N case studies and qualitative data has been heavily debated in comparative politics (George and Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Rueschemeyer, *et al.*, 1992; Eckstein; 1975). One reason scholars challenge the use of small-N case studies is that such studies seemingly limit the number of observations that are available for comparison, especially compared to a quantitative study with multiple cases over multiple years.

As illustrated by groundbreaking studies (Rueschemeyer, *et al.*, 1992; Moore, 1963), small-N case studies, because of the complexity of any one person, group, society, state or region, offer multiple opportunities for observation. In short, small-N analysis helps move us toward "normal science" (Kuhn, 1962). An often-cited example of how small-N studies can yield systematic and fruitful evaluation is Theda Skocpol's explanation of the causes of revolution in France, China, and Russia (Skocpol, 1979).

While other scholars (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994) acknowledge the value of case studies, they relegate them to a limited role in political science. From this perspective, case studies are useful in developing research questions and forming hypotheses. In other words, they are most useful in the discovery phase of scientific development (Hempel, 1965). I argue, however, as do McKeown (1999) and Dion (1998), that case studies are also useful for testing theories. Well-crafted case studies can be crucial to theory-building because case studies offer in-depth analysis. Through this in-depth analysis, validity is enhanced; the tests measure what we think we are measuring. Conversely, validity may be compromised in a quantitative study where a single value represents a complex observation.

Reliability is the challenge for case studies. Can we generalize the findings of a few cases to a universe of cases? Sartori (1984) suggests there is danger in using a few cases to represent broad explanations. Although generalization is limited in a single case study, the aggregated findings of a small number of cases provide the bases by which we can further test findings from other case studies and cross-panel studies. In the short term our ability to generalize findings from small cases is limited. These findings, however, deepen our understanding of social dynamics. They therefore help clarify the questions we ask about larger sets of comparative cases.

Admittedly, small-N studies are limited when it comes to demonstrating causal inference (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Popper, 1968). For example, scholars can use descriptive analysis to explain the development of democratic institutions in terms of levels of party competition (Chavez, 2003). In their explanation, however, they cannot fully account for the universe of variables that may interact to produce the observed outcomes. Still quantitative studies face similar challenges, as scholars must operationalize terms effectively to demonstrate causal relationships (Rose, 1991). In the conflict discourse, for example, Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward (2005) argue that previous ground-breaking, quantitative studies in the natural resource conflict discourse (particularly Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 and 2004) have relied upon data (read as Correlates or War or COW) that record conflict only in terms of battle-related deaths. This accounting system worked well for the Cold War paradigm of conflict. The concept of war, however, has changed in recent years. War is no longer largely the domain of military organizations; war increasingly involves non-military targets. "The most notorious mass murder committed during the [Bosnian War, 1992 to 1995] was the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, in which Bosnia Serb forces and Serbian paramilitaries systematically slaughtered about 8,000 Muslim men and boys" (Flintoff, 2008). A more meaningful understanding of modern conflict would consider other factors, such as number of people displaced and loss of property, in addition to number of casualties, to indicate that a significant conflict has occurred (Angstrom, 2001). Without this holistic perspective, even large data sets that span time and space may inaccurately reflect the amount of conflict taking place in the world.

Case Selection

This study uses the most-similar design system (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) to compare natural resource management in two countries--Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The precedent of fruitful study emanating from the most-similar design system is well established in comparative politics. This design continues to play a role in the maturation of the field.

For example, Firmin-Sellers (2000), testing a principal-agent theory, begins with two similarly structured colonial, economic structures that resulted in two different post-Independence economic structures. In the 1950s the economies of Ghana and the Ivory Coast were both largely based on coffee and cocoa. In her selection of countries with similar economic levels and structures, she controls for these determinants. With these controls in place, she looks to the political colonial arrangements between the colonizing state, as principals, and tribal leaders, as agents, to explain why Ghana moved toward socialism and the Ivory Coast moved toward capitalism. Similarly, Shi (2001) begins his evaluation of what engenders or challenges political trust with states of a common historical background. He bases his findings on a comparison of China and Taiwan. This method of controlling for similarities has been used to evaluate a broad range of issues in comparative politics.

In small-N studies case selection is critical because within the choices for study cases are imbedded determinants of the dependent variable. As illustrated above, by using two cases with similar characteristics but different outcomes I am controlling for the effects of those similar characteristics. Geddes (1990) contends that selecting cases on the dependent variable creates a selection bias. However, the notion of a selection bias in such studies may be overstated because data informs theory and theory informs the data we use (McKeown, 1999; Dion, 1998) in all types of studies. Also as Diesling (1991) suggests, selection of cases, even on the independent variable, are informed by a prior understanding of what the outcome might be.

The Specific Cases

The universe of cases that can be used to address the questions posed above includes developing countries with contestable natural resources (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004). The natural resource conflict literature has identified the following types of resources as the most contested: timber, illicit drugs, oil, minerals and gemstones (Ross, 2004). In this study, if I can narrow the universe of cases to two resource-rich, sub-Saharan African countries--one plagued by natural resource conflict and one that has been able to control such conflict--I can further dispel the notion that natural resource conflict is an African or sub-Sahara African problem. In keeping with this goal, the universe of possible cases narrows to sub-Sahara African cases.

In the modern state system political, economic, and social development are closely tied to resource management (Nye and Donahue, 2000; Ascher, 1999). Therefore, it is important to understand how some countries with coveted resources have managed to parlay those resources into at least the likeness of development, while other countries have actually receded. Since independence, Botswana appears to be the only resource-rich, sub-Sahara African state consistently moving development indicators in a positive direction. From this perspective, Botswana is the “crucial case” (Eckstein, 1975:116-118) and the “counterfactual” case (Weber, 1949:272, 278) that shows how a resource-rich, African country can consistently show signs of average annual growth. Also, despite documented cases of minority discrimination, struggles with HIV/AIDS, and pockets of poverty, Botswana appears to have some influence over the international market of diamonds. The example of Botswana challenges both the notion of a resource curse and the dangers associated with a state's reliance on primary commodities. Botswana's diamond industry brings in "$2 billion of the country's $3 billion annual foreign revenue" (Mutume, 2004). Therefore, other factors are clearly at work.

Several sub-Saharan, post-colonial cases are available for comparison to Botswana including Angola, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan. A number of conditions suggest that the examination of the DRC's resource politics would result in the most interesting case study. Because of the DRC's location, its tumultuous resource politics figure into the resource politics of at least six other countries. At various points in recent history, factions from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda have sponsored the capture of the DRC's natural resources (Global Witness, 2004; UN Panel of Experts, 2002). The DRC's resource management problems are regional problems.

The thresholds that scholars use to indicate natural resource conflict range from 25 battle-related deaths per year (Hegre, 2002) to 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 1998). Several resource conflicts in the Congo exceed this threshold range (Global Witness, 2004). However, Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward (2005) suggest that civil conflict scholars, in their focus on the causes of conflict, have failed to acknowledge the range of consequences associated with civil conflict (LeBillion, 2003:216 and Ross, 2003:17). Guided by an economic development agenda, these scholars point to the importance of understanding the consequences of conflicts for various outside groups who attempt to repair war-torn areas. While 1,000 battle-related deaths may indicate that a major conflict has occurred, the number of people displaced by smaller-scale conflict is also important. Even if we ignore the notion that about 3.3 million people have died in the Congo as a result of the war(s) that began in 1998 (Global Witness, 2004; Lemarchand, 2003; UN Panel of Experts, 2002), we are still confronted with the estimate that 2.7 million Congolese were internally displaced in 2003 alone. The politics of the Congo suggest that if we are to really understand conflicts of any type, we must understand the costs to the living and the dead (Angstrom, 2001).

Scope of the Study

This study covers resource dynamics in Botswana and the Congo that occurred after their independence, leading up to the resource dynamics in the 1990s. The case study of Botswana's resource politics covers the 1990s. Land competition heightened in Botswana around 1997, when the state began removing minority Sans people from a game reserve where diamonds were believed to be. While this contest was non-violent, the existence of such a contest in a resource-rich, African country suggests a fruitful comparison with the war-ravaged Congo. In contrast, the Congo has experienced continuous rebel activity, with significant rebel uprising in 1996 and 1998.

An analysis of resource management in Botswana and the Congo can offer insight into the permissive causes of violent natural resource conflict. The Congo case, however, may better address how a permissive cause, such as a weak state, interacts with other causes to create or prolong violent natural resource conflict. Conversely, the Botswana case may be more useful in demonstrating the limitations of other explanations, when a permissive cause is not present. Despite the different resource politics, the Congo and Botswana are similar enough to allow a fruitful comparison.

Summary of Methods

This study uses a most-similar design system to compare two cases, resource management in Botswana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s.
A comparison of these two countries eliminates a number of determinants: sub-Saharan location, a subordinate status in a colonial relationship, the presence of lootable resources, and resource abundance. All these conditions are present in each case. However the Congo's resource management is associated with intense civil conflict, while resource management in Botswana has helped move development indicators in a positive direction. This study examines commonly debated explanations about the cause and agitating factors of natural resource conflict. A number of these explanations have evolved through quantitative studies that have used single values to represent complex observations. While these quantitative findings are broad enough to apply to a range of conflict situations, there are some problems with validity. This study addresses those problems.

Chapter IV: Case Study Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo

This case study provides insight into the determinants of natural resource conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)/Zaire, located in the Great Lakes Region of Africa[12]. More specifically, this case provides details of the circumstances surrounding conflicts in the 1990s. In the 1990s, there were two distinct periods of natural resource conflict: 1996-1997, and 1998 to the present (Ross, 2003:49). While observers use these two periods to mark recent civil wars in the DRC, this dissertation provides evidence that illustrates persistent violent conflict in the everyday lives of average Congolese citizens since the 1960s.

Several sections of this case study focus on the politics of Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the Congo from 1965 until 1996. Mobutu established the modern legacy of private ownership of state resources. His state apparatus permitted the conflict to occur in 1996. Therefore, the first sections of this chapter will explain the political and economic conditions under which he ruled. It will also highlight the role, if any, that phenomena such as a resource curse or Dutch Disease played in this state's unraveling.

In his efforts to retain power, Mobutu ultimately laid the foundation for both wars. Mobutu resorted to a range of tactics from coercion to anti-communism to maintain power. When Mobutu's coercive power and the West's fight against communism waned, he increasingly sustained his patronage system with revenue from resource exports

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[12] For the period 1965 to 1996, the name Zaire shall apply. For the period 1997 to the present, the name Democratic Republic of the Congo shall apply.

(Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). “The government’s use of resources rose from 11 percent of GDP in 1984-86 to 14 percent in 1987-89, with a peak of 17 percent in 1988” (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:641).

Mobutu’s legacy continues even today (beyond the scope of this case study). The Congo is entangled in a web of problems that reinforce each other. Despite the Herculean task of detangling ownership, motives, intentions, and responsibilities, the resource politics of the DRC offer some early insight to the role that natural resources can play in civil conflicts.

An Independent Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a former Belgian colony. Before it was an enterprise of Belgium, the DRC was the personal enterprise of King Leopold II (Hochschild, 1999). Under pressure from the international community, in 1908 King Leopold relinquished his personal hold on the colony to the Belgian state. DRC gained its independence from colonization in 1960.

> The First Republic (1960-1965) was led by President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba. The new regime could not rely on coercive compliance and the high degree of centralization was immediately challenged (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998:29).

Like many new states, political instability and problems with legitimacy marred the DRC’s promising start towards democracy. Kinship and familial ties thwarted the development of modern political institutions. Also, the colonizers left behind structures and institutions that were not compatible with the economic and political development of a modern, bureaucratic state. Because the Belgians controlled all political and economic structures and because the Belgians had not prepared the Congolese for independence, the Congolese did not posses the skills needed to run the state (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:630). In addition, while colonizing forces removed their physical presence, economic structures that benefited the imperialist powers remained in place. For example, the Belgian mining company, Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) continued to operate in the Shaba region and even supported Shaba in its secessionist movement from the central government headed by Patrice Lumumba (Gramot, 1964). As a result of economic domination by foreign business interests, revenue from state-run businesses, bureaucratic fees, and bribes for state services became convenient sources of revenue to dispense through patronage systems (MacCaffey, 1991).

Consistent with the business interests of the former colonizers, the colonizers left behind a system of economic/administrative boundaries that had no connection to the way people in the central African region related to each other. The colonizers also left behind administrative structures that could not represent popular interests of the newly independent citizens because these structures reflected the economic interests of the colonizing state. These same structures became convenient tools of repression for post-independence African dictators. In the Congo,

> …the Second Republic, including the Transition Period (November 23, 1965-May 17, 1997) was led by Mobutu Sese Seko who took office after a military coup. In order to rule Zaire, Mobutu created a highly centralized state, thus reproducing two of the key features of the colonial state. He undermined or co-opted competitors. The absence of equally powerful groups prevented the emergence of self-sustaining representative institutions. The lack of accountability led to the dissipation of potential revenues into bureaucratic fiefdoms, economic privilege, and corruption….the Mobutu regime was a mixture of traditionalism and arbitrariness (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998: 30).

Summary

This study provides a great deal of detail about political and economic conditions in Zaire under Mobutu. Since the 1980s, the Congo had been in economic and political freefall. As dismal as its indicators were, they do not completely describe the decline, as the formal economy was intertwined with the undocumented, informal economy. These conditions persisted despite the country's vast resources and the West's support of Mobutu for supporting the Western position in the Cold War. Mobutu continued a legacy (begun by King Leopold of Belgium) that has made the Congo vulnerable to civil war and foreign occupation.

This case study uses conditions in Zaire[13] (Democratic Republic of Congo[14]) to identify determinants of natural resource conflict. This country is a good case study since it became embroiled in what was labeled as a civil war in 1996, and scholars have treated this case as if natural resources played a prominent role in that conflict. The Congo became embroiled in a second civil war in 1998, in which resources clearly played a prominent role.

Geography

The DRC is about 2,345,000 square kilometers (Ministry of Mines, 2003). From 1973 to 1997, the country was spread out over eleven political provinces: Kinshasa, Bas-Zaire,

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[13] State name during the Mobutu years from 1973 to 1996.
[14] Renamed by Laurent Kabila in 1996.

Equateur, Haut-Zaire, Maniema, Nord Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Shaba, Bandundu, Kasai-Oriental and Kasai-Occidental (US Central Intelligence Agency, 1973-1997)[15].

The natural resources in the DRC are significant in number and variety. Table 2 illustrates the DRC's vast mining potential. Despite this extensive list of resources, the DRC's Ministry of Mines suggests that the Congo's resource potential may still be unknown (Ministry of Mines, 2003).

A number of the resources that are associated with conflict in Zaire –DRC are materials in products considered vital to the worldwide economy. Gemstone quality minerals are valuable in their most pure form. Other resources included coltan used in laptops and cellular telephones, casserite used in electrical components, copper used in utility lines, oil, gas, and timber. Extraction of these resources requires both surface and deep-shaft mining.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a vast country, surrounded by nine other countries. Its central position in the Sub-Saharan region made Zaire an important ally to Western interests. Zaire was important to the worldwide economy for other reasons. Administratively, the Congo consists of eleven provinces. Each of these provinces contains resources from which valuable products are made.

The Economy under Mobutu

Despite its resource wealth, as Table 3 suggests, the Congo has been in economic decline at least since the early 1980s. The decline in growth in 1982 came on the heels of the

[15] After 1997 Bas Zaire became Bas-Congo, Haut-Zaire became Orientale, Bas-Zaire became Bas-Congo, and Shaba became Katanga (UN Map of the Congo; Ministry of Mines 2003).

Table 2. Extractive Potential of Individual Provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Province	Resources
Bandundu	Diamond*, kaolin, clays
Bas Congo (Bas Zaire)	Bauxite, copper*, lead, zinc, vanadium, phosphates, asphaltic sands, gold*, diamond*, manganese, marble, granite, rock salt, iron, clays, gypsum, pyrite, talc, silica, kaolin, barytine, calcareous.
Equator (Equateur)	Diamond*, gold*, iron, calcareous, kaolin, clays, copper, granite, niobium*, ochre
Eastern Kasai	Diamond*, clays, chrome, cobalt*, copper*, nickel, gold*, iron, kaolin, talc.
Western Kasai	Diamond*, clays, gold*, chrome, nickel, cobalt*, platinum, copper, iron, kaolin, lead, saline
Katanga	Copper*, cobalt*, uranium*, niobium*, gold*, platinum, lithium, talk, tantalum*, wolfram, zinc, clays, bismuth, cadmium, tin stone, coal, iron, granite, gypsum, kaolin, manganese, monazite, saline, emerald, sapphire, diamond*, silver, calcareous
Kinshasa	Clays, silica, kaolin
Maniema	Gold*, tin*, stone, amblygonite, lithium, clays, copper*, diamond*, iron, kaolin, manganese, niobium*, lead, talk, tantalum*, wolfram
North Kivu	Clays, tin*, stone, basnaesite, emerald, coal, granite, monazite, niobium*, gold*, wolfram, tantalum*, calcareous
Eastern Province	Gold*, diamond*, clays, copper*, iron, kaolin, niobium*, ochre, phosphates, saline, bituminous, schists, talc.
South Kivu	Gold*, tinstone, amblygonite, silver, basnaesite, emerald, bismuth, diamond*, diatomite, monazite, niobium*, wolfram, zinc, tantalum*, calcareous

Source: Adapted from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Mines. June 2003. “Guide to Mining Investor.” Pp. 16-17.
*Resources linked directly or indirectly to conflict in the Congo. (The range of deposits is presented here to demonstrate the unmanaged economic potential in the DRC).

Table 3. Zaire - DRC Economic Indicators

Year	GDP (Current US$-Billions)	GDP Growth (Annual Percent)	GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual Percent)
1980	14.39	2.19	-0.87
1981	12.54	2.35	-0.62
1982	13.65	-0.46	-3.28
1983	11.01	1.41	-1.44
1984	7.86	5.54	2.55
1985	7.20	0.47	-2.43
1986	8.10	4.72	1.67
1987	7.66	2.68	-0.33
1988	8.86	0.47	-2.56
1989	9.02	-1.27	-4.41
1990	9.35	-6.57	-9.73
1991	9.09	-8.42	-11.73
1992	8.21	-10.50	-13.87
1993	10.71	-13.47	-16.68
1994	5.82	-3.90	-7.18
1995	5.64	.70	-2.30
1996	5.77	-1.02	-3.51
1997	6.09	-5.62	-7.65
1998	6.22	-1.62	-3.58
1999	4.71	-4.27	-6.25
2000	4.31	-6.90	-9.05
2001	4.69	-2.10	-4.63

Source: The World Bank Group. World Development Indicators Online. Downloaded January 6, 2009.

international downturn in the price of diamonds *(Johannesburg SAPA*. September 29, 1987) and the preceding decline in copper prices (1995; Coakley, 1996). This decline is even more pronounced when we examine growth on a per capita basis. On a per capita basis, Zaire shows a negative growth rate from 1982 forward, with the exception of a few years. Also, economic decline in the late 1980s corresponded to Western countries withdrawing support from the Mobutu regime, as the Cold War drew to a close (Turner, 1994).

The Informal Economy

We cannot take at face value the broad indicators presented in Table 3. First, while Zaire compiled information during these years, it did not always release this information (Reno, 2008). The second concern here is the inability of formal indicators to measure the activity of the informal economy, which was vibrant in Zaire and flourishes even today. "Calculations show that the real economy of Zaire may well be as much as three times the size of the official GDP" (MacGaffey, 19991:11). According to MacGaffey, the "second, informal or underground economy competes with and supports the formal economy in DRC. People in Zaire refer to *l'economie de debrouillardise, or systeme D*, or say simply: *'Nous vivons mysterieusement'*, for which the meaning is unambiguous" (MacGaffey, 1991:8,11).

> The second economy is here defined as economic activities that are unmeasured, unrecorded and, in varying degrees, illegal. They consist of i) legal production of goods and services concealed to avoid taxes or other charges; ii) production of illegal goods and service; iii) concealed income in kind, which includes the profits of barter; iv) other income opportunities that are illegal or in some way deprive the state of revenue…its most important underlying cause has been extremely low wages relative to prices (MacGaffey, 19991:12).

Scholars have conceptualized the informal sector as one that weakens and hinders, but also sometimes supports the formal economy. Consistent with MacGaffey's observations, Williame, *et al*. (1997:vii) describe the economic system in Zaire as a "system of parallel currencies." These views suggest that macro-indicators do not accurately reflect the weakness of the system, the vitality of the informal economy, nor the interdependence of the two systems. The informal economy of Central Africa, of which Zaire is a critical node, developed during colonization in response to artificial boundaries and trade restrictions created by the Belgians. These informal trade routes allowed indigenous groups to continue historical trade relationships disrupted by political boundaries (MacGaffey, 1991).

Mobutu's economic policies, such as printing un-backed currency, drove the economy further underground and deeper into neighboring states. Zaire's informal and formal economies are fragmented across provinces. The provincial economies' connections to the nation's capital are also tenuous. For example,

> Because the national Government in Kinshasa, 600 miles away, denies East Kasai the right to open its airport to international traffic, there are plans to build a highway linking East and West Kasai to the Angolan port of Lobito, 600 miles to the west, bypassing the faraway capital altogether (French, 1996).

There was certainly economic interdependence among Kinshasa and Bas-Zaire, for example. However, there were more vibrant trade patterns flowing from the provinces to border countries.

Trade routes reflected efficiency rather than political boundaries. It was more efficient for the Congolese in the Kivus to trade with Uganda and Rwanda than it was for them to trade with the Congolese in Kinshasa or Katanga, (French, 1996), especially when the principal modes of transportation were poor roads, waterways, and a disconnected rail system. Some argue that this cross-border, black market, necessarily operated by organized crime, helped maintain peace, as warlords counter-balanced each other (Reno, 2008). Williame, *et. al*, (1997) contend that Mobutu's dictatorship came under real threat only when people could no longer rely on their informal economic networks for basic survival; people could not bribe state officials for service, people earned less in illicit resource trades, and state price controls filtered down to the informal economy.

When the Belgians relinquished political control of the Congo (MacGaffey, 1991), the informal economy became a key source of revenue, power, and wealth in Zaire (MacCaffey, 1991). While this new state had potential competitive crops, such as coffee and palm oil (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994) the state had little administrative capacity. Eventually, the state itself became the product through which ruling groups acquired wealth. Under a mercantilist system[16], the ruling clique disrupts the formal economy. For example, Mobutu expropriated farms and small businesses and redistributed them through his system of patronage to people who lacked the management skills, innovation, or even interest to run these businesses (Wrong, 2000). Anyone who wanted to operate above ground and contribute openly to the formal economy had to

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[16] "States such as Zaire are described as mercantilist, meaning states in which the economy is governed by politics and not by markets, and where entry to the market is restricted not free" (MacCaffey, 1991:157).

reconcile his/her ambitions with the interests of this clique through payoffs, bribes, protection plans, or extortion payments (MacGaffey, 1991).

Dependence upon the state for revenue imposed limitations on people who would participate in the formal economic system. This dependence in Zaire stifled innovation and economic competition. Understanding these limitations, it makes sense that Mobutu's efforts to liberalize the economy had the effect of driving the economy further underground. Liberalization measures placed new transaction costs on the mercantilists and higher barriers to people whose access to the formal economy was already restricted. The logic of the underground economy in the Congo appears to be more enduring than specific liberalization measures and more powerful than the government itself. It has adapted to systems of supply and demand under an oppressive king, foreign occupation, an inefficient dictator, and now rebel factions. Under each of these conditions, the informal market incorporated and even circumvented rent-seeking actors. The informal economy in Zaire was a complete system in which natural resources played key roles. It was the exchange of natural resources for day-to-day products and money to purchase day-to-day products that made the system valuable to the Congolese. Still, as resilient as the informal economy might have been, it placed huge limitations on centralized, state development. It also freed state officials from their official responsibilities, as people learned to fulfill their needs by hustling the system.

Mining

The informal economy, as vibrant as it may have been, could not mitigate the impact of weak economic policies. From independence to the 1970s, Zaire's central government and the Shaba region in particular relied heavily upon copper revenue to support the economy. Copper revenue allowed Mobutu to take a hefty personal profit and still contribute to the state coffers (while he was still interested in doing so). The price of copper plummeted in the international market in 1975 (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). Short-sighted economic policies compounded the problem of lost revenue. *Gegamines* (*Le Generale des Carrieres et des Mines du Zaire*), the state's copper extraction and production facilities, fell into disrepair, due to neglect and theft (Coakley, 1996; Mobbs, 1995). "Formerly the nation's major foreign currency export earner, [*Gecamines*] continued to struggle to maintain copper production at only 5% of peak 1985 output levels" (Coakley, 1995). Also, countries such as Chile were cornering the market previously captured by Zaire through more efficient copper smelting processes. "Domestic copper companies continued to look toward South American investments to increase their capacity and lower their average production costs" (USGS Minerals Commodity Survey, 1996)

The crash of the copper industry was one of many threshold moments for Zaire; moments in which the country could have begun developing other sectors. History records that in these threshold moments, Mobutu chose to secure his profits from other natural resources rather than develop the infrastructure for efficient use of those resources. In the early 1990s, with the failure of the copper mining throughout the 1970s and 1980s, diamond extraction became the chief mining revenue source (Merrill, Meditz, and Smith, 1994). "Despite its decline, the diamond industry remain[ed] vital to the Zairian economy – and to the Mobutu regime – because it [was] widely regarded as the country’s last remaining source of hard currency” (Smith, *et al.,* 1994). “Diamond exports, chiefly from the Kasai provinces, became Zaire’s most important source of foreign exchange derived from the mineral sector” (Coakley, 1995). The economic vitality in the regions provided Mobutu with an alternate income. Because of its vibrant diamond industry, Mobutu allowed the Kasai regions to exercise some degree of economic autonomy.

“In the 1960s Mobutu set up MIBA (*Societe Miniere de Bakwanga*), a state diamond company intended to run the major mining concessions in Mbuji-Mayi” in Kasai (Global Witness, 2004:28). The state owned 80 percent and Sibeka owned 20 percent of MIBA. Sibeka was a Belgian company of which DeBeers was part owner (Mobbs, 1994). Under Mobutu, DeBeers maintained exclusive three to five-year contracts to buy diamonds in the DRC (Global Witness, 2004:30; Coakley, 1996). In 1994, *MIBA* accounted for about 40 percent of diamond production (Mobbs, 1995; Coakley, 1995).

DeBeers was heavily invested in the production and purchase of industrial diamonds and in the purchase of alluvial diamonds. In the artisanal mining industry, the buyer--De Beers (not the sellers – dealers in Zaire)--is in the most advantageous position. Artisanal miners pan for resources along riverbeds and streams (as opposed to industrial mining in which producers force diamonds to the earth’s surface). Artisanal mining is so prevalent that the buyer, in this case who also sets international prices, may undervalue his/her diamonds[17]. By the 1990s, Artisanal mining accounted for 60 percent of diamond production. Artisanal mining activity often included encroachment upon MIBA property.

> Estimates of the number of unauthorized mines digging on and around MIBA concessions ranged from 40,000 to 100,000. Their ranks swelled by Kasai refugees who had fled the ethnic violence in Shaba Province (Mobbs, 1994:945).

In 1981, Mobutu opened artisanal mining to licensed miners and dealers. He undertook this strategy to avert illegal mining in Zaire. Despite overt theft by miners and the deceptive practices of buyers, Zaire was a significant producer of diamonds in the early 1990s. In 1994, 1995, and 1996, Zaire's diamond production still constituted 13 percent of world mine productions each of those years (Mobbs, 1994; Coakley, 1995,

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[17] Resource extraction generally takes on two forms, industrial and artisanal. Artisanal miners mine resources from open pits or alongside riverbeds. In the 1990s, Zaire had only three industrial mining operations because most of Zaire's diamond supply consisted of alluvial diamonds or diamonds that are found along riverbeds, in soft sediment and streams. (IIED) "Diamonds from artisanal production are provided mainly by the following major centres: Tshikapa in Western Kasai Province, Mbuji-Mayi in Eastern Kasai, Kisangani in Eastern Province, Kahemba and Tembo Centres in Bandundu Province" (Ministry of Mines, 2003:26).

Zaire began officially promoting artisanal exploration in 1983 (Ministry of Mines, 2003). Mobutu's efforts to legalized artisanal mining was one component in a broader attempt to liberalize the economy. Artisanal mining involves extraction by panning by unskilled labor with rudimentary instruments. Also, artisanal miners can gain entry into the mining sector with little to no overhead or regulation. Mobutu legalized artisanal mining in an unsuccessful effort to curb smuggling and extract exchange fees. Legalization was one of two measures Mobutu undertook control the extractive industries. In the first major attempt to control these industries, Mobutu nationalized (Zairianized) the mining industry. Mining operations and their products became the property of the state. Zairianization and the expansion of artisanal mining sector pushed the trade even further underground, where traders could avoid exchange fees.

One estimate suggests that between 1995 and 2000, smugglers smuggled an annual average of $409 million worth of diamonds (Dietrich, 2002).

The diamond mining sector is one of the industries that require both industrial and artisanal mining. "Geologic processes create two basic types of diamond deposits, referred to as primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are the kimberlite and lamproite pipes that raise diamonds from the Earth's mantle, where they originate. Secondary sources, created by erosion, include such deposits as surface scatterings around a pipe, concentrations in river channels, and fluxes from rivers moved by wave action along ocean coasts, past and present." (American Museum of Natural History). Industrial mining is required to mine kimberlite diamonds.

1996). These figures do not account for the lucrative diamond smuggling trade. Because of their low weight ratio, diamonds were easy to smuggle, even in the absence of a modern transportation infrastructure (Global Witness, 2004).

Industry

Mobutu did not demonstrate the political will to support industry outside the mining sectors in a systematic fashion. Compounding a colonial legacy of a largely uneducated, unskilled populace, Zaire did invest in an adequate transportation system and other necessary infrastructure. The rail system, Sizerail, covers only 5,118km[18] (Ministry of Mines, 2003) [5,138 km reported in 1994 by Meditz and Merril] of the country, even today. Also, roads become impassible and nonexistent during heavy rains. The most reliable transportation routes connected the provinces with other countries better than with each other. The disrepair of Gecamines, the country's economic life source until the 1980s, is another compelling example of the state's lack of investment in meaningful capital projects (Coakley, 1996:1).

The state apparatus, from independence even until today was uneven across the provinces. The central government, i.e. Mobutu, doled out resources as needed to make statements about his power (Wrong, 2000). He devoted a disproportionate amount of resources to the capitol city and to his home village, Ghabolite in Equateur. Compared to the neglected Kivus (with 20.2 people per square kilometer), Equateur was sparsely populated, at 8.4 persons per square kilometer (Almquist, 1994). Consequently, provinces

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[18] "Within 858Km are electrified" (Ministry of Mines, 2003:7).

sought to distance themselves from the economically strapped central government. At various times, mineral-rich provinces sought (*de facto* and *dejure*) independence from the central government. As a show of independence and in an effort to survive, the Kasai refused to use Mobutu's newly issued money in 1993, using instead *Zaires* (the first generation of money issued under Zairianization rather than the *Noveau Zaires*). The vibrant diamond trade in that region backed the first generation of currency (UN Department of Humanitarian Afffaires, 1997). This point is important because by 1993 and 1994, the national inflation rate was 12,000 and 6,030 percent, respectively (Mobbs, 1995). These worthless banknotes were at the center of a number of social problems. Much of the violence and looting perpetrated upon average citizens during Mobutu's reign was committed by disgruntled soldiers who had either not been paid or had received worthless banknotes (Human Rights Watch, 1994).

In response to neglect and abuse, citizens created a safety net in their local communities. Williame, *et. al.* (1997) find that locals in the Kivus and Bas-Zaire pooled resources to provide economic, social, and physical security for themselves. East Kasians built their own university in Mbuji-Mayi, "recruiting visiting professors from abroad who often [taught] without pay" (French, 1996). The Kasians also built their own schools and hospitals. In addition, they embarked upon infrastructure projects involving roads, water, and electricity (*The Economist*, March 15, 1997). The local government sought exemptions from national taxes for providing these projects. At the same time, Kasai attempted to build local capacity without drawing too much attention to the region. "Already, East Kasai's style of creeping independence, in which the region's elites have been careful never to provoke a tottering state into direct confrontation, is being copied by other regions" (French, 1996).

> Shaba Province's Governor had declared the Province's autonomy from the Nation in December 1993. Calling itself the Katanga Parliament, the provincial parliament announced that it was claiming 'concessions and leases on the province's land, mines, minerals, mineral oils, and hydraulic resources' (Mobbs, 1995:943; French, 1996).

As a result of poor infrastructure, neither manufacturing nor agriculture ever played a significant role in the national economy. Although the agricultural sector was promising, average annual growth rates hovered around two to three percent during the Mobutu years. Promising crops such as the cassava suffered man-made catastrophes (Williame, *et. al*, 1997:5). In a personal cost-benefit analysis, farming for the average Congolese was a less profitable way of life than mining. Soldiers looted, burned, and pillaged agricultural land. Disgruntled soldiers often committed these acts because the Mobutu Administration failed to pay the soldiers or issued them worthless banknotes. In addition, land ownership often became entangled in ethnic cleavages (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002). For example, the Shabans expropriated land after they forcibly removed the Kasians, who had lived in Katanga for about three generations. Kasians who survived these episodes of fury, fled to the Kasai regions in which they were truly foreigners. The "lack of clear title prevent[ed] land from being offered as collateral for a loan and discouraged individual farmers from making the capital investment in land improvement needed to raise output" (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:171). Those who did farm were subsistence farmers (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994).

Agricultural development provides another example of how Mobutu incorporated public funds into his patronage system. “Rural and agricultural development projects and programs, [funded by international aid], were mostly implemented in Shaba and other regions which were harboring political opposition to Mobutu, as well as in the native villages of the most influential political and military leaders” (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998:13). Mobutu, as representative of this sovereign state, was the proxy through which aid was distributed. Therefore, distribution of aid reflected his personal connections and agenda to deflect opposition, instead of utility or need.

The loss of agricultural production, the lack of manufacturing, the competition among miners, and the personal risks involved in artisanal mining intersected to produce a high unemployment rate. “One estimate placed unemployment in the mid 1980s at 40 percent for Kinshasa and as high as 80 percent for other cities. Only mining towns had unemployment at lower figures” (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:166). However, higher rates of employment did not equate to vibrant economies. Also, the high unemployment rate and the lack of employment alternatives beyond mining and public service were detrimental to trade unions. The only official trade union, at least until 1992, was the National Union of Zairian Workers (*Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zairois* – UNTZA). UNTZA was affiliated with Mobutu’s central party the MPR (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:166). The proliferation of any meaningful trade unions, until 1992, was stifled by the central government. Also, the surplus of unemployed workers undermined workers’ bargaining positions. In addition, since the central government had not organized the mining industries across the country, artisanal mining placed workers in isolated working conditions where it was difficult to organize (International Labor

Organization, 1999).

Because of a lack of investment in infrastructure and human resources, plummeting commodity prices, and a lack of fiscal discipline, Zaire was heavily in debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western countries. While Zaire fell victim to spikes in oil prices in 1973-74 and the decline in the price of copper (its chief export) in 1975, a number of the country's woes can be attributed to the nationalization of enterprises in 1973 under Mobutu's (African) authenticity program. His public rhetoric suggested that he undertook Zairianization to signify a clear break with Zaire's colonial past, even reassigning provinces African names. This program was not sustainable and acceptable to Western donors, so Mobutu began to reverse this process in 1975. Also, in 1972-1973 foreign donors financed ridiculous public projects, such as a power line from the Shaba region to Kinshasa that would allow Mobutu to pull the plug on the region for bad behavior.

> By financing nonviable projects under commercial credit conditions in the early 1970s, and not providing appropriate debt relief ten years later when the country was in the process of reforming, [the donor community] contributed to making adjustment difficult to sustain (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:629).

In addition, each time donors rescheduled debt, made structural adjustments, or extended credits to Zaire, Mobutu made it clear that he would not abide by the financial restrictions attached to these plans.

New plans to adjust Zaire's debt emerged in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1986, and 1988 (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). These liberalization efforts resulted in reputable and not-so-reputable companies profiting from the shadow economy (Reno, 1998). This brand of liberalization involved Mobutu being courted by foreign companies who saw Zaire as a cash cow. They had to put down investment money. Mobutu would then connect business owners with Mobutu's favorite warlords, who served as surrogate police forces for their respective territories. It was a win-win for everyone except the average Congolese. The foreign company would be able to operate with few restrictions, while appearing to aid in the liberalization process (Reno, 2008).

The uneven application of liberalization measures wreaked devastation upon rural communities.

> Our studies in Kivu, Lower Zaire and Shaba show that this reform has not been put into effect in rural areas distant from the central government: price controls continue to be imposed with the result that food crops are extensively smuggled across the borders to take advantage of higher [selling] prices and acquire commodities scarce or unobtainable in Zaire (MacCaffey, 1999:19).

Mobutu engaged Western organizations with promises of liberalization. As show in Table 4, he instituted just enough reforms and showed enough progress to keep them on the hook until the early 1990s. By itself, this see-saw relationship seems irrational for these organizations. However, they stood to gain from Zaire's vast resources. Equally as important, they could use Zaire as a post from which to mount anti-communist campaigns.

Until the late 1980s, Zaire's mounting debt seemed a minor concern for the Western community. The physical location of Zaire in the African continent was of strategic importance to the US in its crusade against communism. Mobutu's relationship with Western states precedes his presidency. "On November 24, 1965, with the support

Table 4. Economic Reforms and Development in Zaire – DRC

Year	Stabilization Reorganization Reform Plan	Debt Credits Standbys	Growth Reduced Deficit High Growth Lower Inflation Debt Service	Decline Inflation Gross Expenditures High Deficits Low Revenue
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
1990				
1991				

Source: Adapted from Kiakwama, Gilbert and Jerome Chevallier. 2001. "Democratic Republic of Congo." In *Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies*. Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar, and Torgny Homgren (eds.). The World Bank: Washington, D.C. Pp.629-643.

of Western governments, Mobutu seized power in a bloodless coup" (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:630). "Together with Cuba and Vietnam, Congo had the dubious privilege of being a hot spot in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West during the Cold War" (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:630; "Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo," 1998). Through Zaire, the US supported rebels in Angola, for example. In return, the Angola government would play a critical role in Mobutu's overthrow ("Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo," 1998).

Throughout Mobutu's rule he was considered a friend of the United States. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a strong hand in Zairian politics. However, Mobutu was a source of frustration for the CIA (Rising Star, 1997). "The United States actively supported Mobutu with weapons" ("Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo," 1998:877). Mobutu made several appearances at the Reagan and Bush I White House (Government Printing Office/US State Department, 1987) (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). Other prominent US citizens have had strong economic ties to the Mobutu regime. Pat Robertson, the Christian Broadcast Network (CBN) evangelist, contends that he established the *Operation Blessing* in Zaire for humanitarian purposes. However, Robertson is less vocal about the African Development Corporation he established for resource extraction in Zaire, with Mobutu's blessing (Sizemore, 2003).

The relationship between Mobutu and Western interests, until the 1990s, meant a steady stream of aid and arms to Mobutu from Western powers, even in the face gross human rights violations. It also assured Mobutu cash flow, although he failed to invest in his own economy. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had little need for Mobutu. In

1996, the US Congress denounced Mobutu's for his gross violations of human rights. Citing the commitments Mobutu agreed to in the Declaration of the Cairo Conference of November 29, 1995, and the Tripartite meeting of Zaire, Rwanda, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (December 22, 1995). A House Resolution pointed out that Mobutu had failed to address the refugee crises in Eastern Zaire (104th Congress, 2nd Session: 1996), which he is partially responsible for creating.

Given the U.S.' economic and political ties to Zaire, it is no wonder that these officials looked away from evidence of economic and political mismanagement. While some of Zaire's economic woes were due to the plunge of copper values in 1975, these woes stemmed largely from Mobutu's mismanagement. He failed to develop other sectors, skimmed off the profits of parastatal companies, and even failed to invest in new equipment for his copper operations. When Mobutu defaulted on loans (which was often), from other countries and through the IMF, the Western authorities interceded to ask for the debt to ask for leniency and that the debt be rescheduled (Kiakwama, Chevallier. 2001).

"The World Bank closed its office in Zaire in January 1994, due to the country's failure to pay its debts" (Human Rights Watch). "In 1990, official development aid to Zaire reached a peak of more than $800 million" (Williame, et. al, 1997:8-9). These debts reached dizzying heights, despite efforts by the IMF and individual Western powers to assist in the stabilization of the Zairian economy (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001). In retrospect, however, IMF and Western efforts appeared to be hollow, since these same organizations had supplied Mobutu a seemingly unlimited amount of money and military aid, with little accountability for state spending or treatment of his people.

Summary

Throughout most of Mobutu's tenure, Zaire's economy declined. A number of the worst periods of decline corresponded with downturns in resource prices and also with the ending of the Cold War. However, Zaire was in a general state of freefall from the 1970s onward. As dismal as its macroeconomic indicators may have been, these numbers do not reveal the depth of despair. Since the formal economy intertwined with the informal economy, the extent to which the average Congolese struggled was difficult to quantify.

Mobutu continued the legacy of private ownership of the state begun by King Leopold of Belgium. When the Belgians relinquished the Congo, they had failed to prepare the Congolese to administer the political state and to regulate its economy. While the Belgians withdrew to some degree from Congolese politics after independence, they continued to control the Congolese economy. Given the limited opportunities for economic development through a private sector, the Congolese depended upon the state at a source of revenue. The state resources provided convenient sources of revenue for Mobutu and his patronage system. However, he failed to develop the very infrastructure that would have made the mining industry competitive. For example, he failed to develop a strong education system and transportation system to support the mining sector and other sectors. Zaire became heavily indebted to Western donors, who knowingly funded untenable projects. Consequently, Mobutu went through many cycles of economic readjustments with development banks and other Western donors. These cycles led to more debt and a mountain of evidence that Mobutu was not interested in strengthening the economy.

People and Patterns

Despite the importance of Zaire's location to Western states, the people of Zaire did not reap the benefits of Zaire's association with the West. The few macro-economic indicators that suggest growth in Zaire's economy are discounted by larger growths in population (Almquist, 1994:70-75). Between 1991 and 2000, the population of the Congo grew from approximately 39 million to approximately 52 million. Despite this growth, Zaire was sparsely populated. Table 5 illustrates the wide range of average population size throughout the eleven provinces.

Despite exponential population growth, DRC has been plagued by low life expectancies. Between 1991 and 2000, life expectancy for the average Zairian ranged

Table 5. Population Density by Province in Zaire, 1994

Region	Persons per Square Kilometer (km)
Zaire	14.9
Kinshasa	266.3
Bas-Zaire	36.5
Nord-Kivu (dense), Sud-Kivu (dense), Maniema (sparse)	20.2
Shaba	7.8
Equateur	8.4
Haut Zaire	8.4

Adapted from Almquist, Alan. 1994. "The Society and Its Environment" In *Zaire: A Country Study*. Sandra W. Meditz. and Tim Merrill (eds). Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: Washington, DC. Pp.61-131.

from 48.06 to 50.81. In comparison, life expectancy for the average American during this same period ranged from 75.50 to 76.62 (U.S. Census Bureau, International Database).

Human displacement has played a key role in population shifts in Zaire. After the 1993 Burundi civil war and the 1994 Rwandan genocide 800,000 to 1.2 million (“Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,”1998; Reed, 1998) Hutus poured into refugee camps in the North Kivu region of eastern Zaire. Also, between 1991 and 1994, Shabans displaced about 100,000 Kasians from the Shaba Region to the Kasai Provinces (Human Rights Watch, 1994). “Most of them are thought to have returned to impoverished farming communities in Eastern Kasai, although many remain crowded into certain towns in northern Shaba, where they depend on international assistance for survival” (US Department of State, 1995). Ethnic manipulation has historically played a role in human mobility in Zaire. The population in the Congo has historically consisted of four major ethnic groups: the Bantu, the Sudanian group, the Pygmoid group, and the Nilotic group[19]. The Bantu group has covered two-thirds of the country. The Sudanian group has generally resided in North Congo. The Nilotic group consists of a few tribes living in North East Congo. The Pygmoid group have been scattered throughout the country (Ministry of Mines, 2003). These groups can be subdivided further into over 250 different groups (Meditz and Merrill, 1994), many of whom are related through these four major groups. Despite these familial connections, Mobutu was able to exploit the subtle and the obvious differences among other groups.

[19] I say has historically to account for the recent and current human displacements.

Throughout his reign, ethnic tensions resulted from deliberate acts by Mobutu or his agents to ensure that national or sub-national groups did not unite against him. In Southern Zaire, the governor of the Shaba province, Kyunguwa Kumwanga incited atrocities against (and incited the removal of) ethnic Kasians (French, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1994; Noble 1993) who had migrated to the Shaba region decades before. The Kasians constituted the professional class in Zaire. Ironically, Mobutu often dispersed Kasians throughout the country to lead administrative activities. This status, which elicited resentment from other Congolese, was fostered by Belgians during Colonialism. The Belgians circulated the idea that the Kasians were more malleable to the Western-style of administration (Noble, 1993). While the refugee Kasians bore the brunt of this divisiveness, the entire national economy suffered as a result of this forced exodus. "The Shaba Government actively forced the departure of engineers and technicians from Shaba-based Gecamines through May. Nearly 50% of Gecamines staff was harassed to leave Shaba (Mobbs, 1995:943).

In one final example of ethnic manipulation for political expediency, Mobutu was careful to place provincial officials who were of mixed race. Since the mixed race official would have no allegiance to any particular group, the official would not mobilize his own ethnic group in opposition to Mobutu's power. The divisiveness of coordinated racial tension was sufficient to prevent the formation of viable opposition to the state (Reno, 2008).

Summary

Through 2000, Zaire-DRC was a country of about 52 million people. Populations across the provinces ranged from 7.8 people per square kilometer in Shaba to 266.3 people per square kilometer in the much smaller Kinshasa. Civil wars in border countries and human displacements figured prominently in where these people lived. Although Zaire's – DRC's population consisted of four key groups, the ethnicity of some 250 subgroups played a large role in Zairian politics.

Political Structures

By every standard imaginable, Zaire was ungoverned. Zaire certainly did not meet the basic standards of a modern, bureaucratic state (Weber, 1965). History suggests that the goal of the Mobutu patronage system was not to govern, but to maintain itself through an elaborate patronage system (Wrong, 2000). The beneficiaries of this system managed to enrich themselves without providing social services, transportation infrastructure, health infrastructure, or a disciplined military. Policy decisions over time suggest that Mobutu became less and less interested in meeting the needs of his people. Further in this discussion, we see that a number of structures left over from the Mobutu regime supported the new mercantilist class, under the Kabila regime.

> Illegal activities also benefited from the old transportation network that existed prior to the 1998 war. This network consists of key airlines and trucking companies, a number of which aided ADFL troops in their war against the Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport remains similar today: merchandise or arms are flown in and natural resources or their products are flown out (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #31).

The transportation arrangement under the Kabila regime was marked by the use of more air transportation. This arrangement reflected the increased economic activity of Ugandans, Rwandans, and other foreigners in the Congo (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #72).

Under Mobutu, there were few political institutions through which meaningful negotiations for adequate infrastructure to take place. In reality, Zaire's legislature, judiciary, executive, and labor unions were governed by the MPR party for 35 years. Human Rights Watch contends, "President Mobutu repeatedly undermined prospects for multi-party elections, which he promised in April 1990. His term officially expired December 1991" (2004). Mobutu held power six years beyond that expiration date.

Before his decree of almost absolute sovereignty in the 1990s, Mobutu had appeared to allow a host of reforms in Zaire. He had suggested that a more independent legislature and judiciary, free and fair elections, and tolerance of opposition parties were within reach. The lip service paid to reforms was the direct results of new domestic and international realities. The Soviet Union was imploding and political revolt against repressive regimes was gaining moment in Eastern Europe in other parts of Africa. This mood was reflected in the student uprisings and Christian marches in the Congo in 1990 and 1992, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 1993) in reaction to Mobutu's unfulfilled promises of democratic elections. In response, Mobutu "announced a limited transition to 'three-party' democracy on April 24, 1990" (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998: 17).

Mobutu also agreed to the demand for a Sovereign National Conference, through which various forces in society could negotiate their interests (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998).

The Transitional Act of August 1992 established an independent judiciary. In addition to ignoring the mandates of the Transitional Act and reconfiguring the legislature to suit his needs, Mobutu installed a cabinet and prime minister to compete with the legitimate cabinet and prime minister selected by the legislature. In 1993, the DRC was being run by two competing governments.

> Since March 1993, Zaire has had two cabinets. One is headed by Tshisekedi, elected by the CNS under the terms of the Transitional Act. This transitional government, the so-called government of national union, was reconfigured and broadened in September 1993. The rival, Mobutu- appointed government, the so-called government of national salvation, is headed by Birindwa as prime minister (Turner, 1994).

However, Tshisekedi was never a formidable opponent considering his lack of access to military, other state apparatus, and other state resources (Turner, 1994). For these reasons, the West did not accept Tshisekedi as the sovereign figure (Reno, 2008). The West recognized Mobutu's authority. However, his people did not give him legitimacy.

Since Mobutu did not depend upon the public for his resource base, Mobutu could ignore the needs of his people. The state did not collect taxes from a wide base of citizens, in a systematic fashion. Citizens paid taxes in the way buying off violent soldiers or bribing state officials for goods and services. However, these types of revenue collections were isolated and personal. They undermined the prospects for a formal economy in which citizens pay fair taxes for the goods and services they need consistently (Weber, 1965). Citizens did not pay, in a systematic way, into the state operations. “The share of income taxes and taxes on goods and services in total revenue declined an average of 60 percent [from 1984-86 to 1988-89] to an average of 35%” (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:641).

> Apart from potential and actual fiscal revenues there were three other financial flows that served to enrich Mobutu, his family and associates: 1) covert payments by foreign governments, including the United States, 2) diversion payments for mineral export, and 3) foreign aid and investment funds. Of these export revenues, the mineral industry provided the most important and reliable source of hard currency. Identifiable ‘leakage’ often exceeded $100 million per year (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998:8).

Consequently, state expenditures did not reflect the interests of the average Congolese.

> The share of defense, security, foreign affairs, and administrative and political functions increased from 38 to 62 percent of the total during the period, while the share of education and health declined from 39 to 22 percent (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:641).

There was no systematic welfare distribution plan in place. Redistribution of wealth was based upon favor. The political elite were patrons of a system that rewarded them with political positions, unchecked graft, agricultural lands, expropriated business, and direct wealth. Mobutu’s clients (in this case his extended family) received wealth or tools to acquire wealth without having to invest much into economic ventures of the broader society.

Bureaucracy

Mobutu gave his public employees incentives and opportunities to rob the state. It was common for the regime to allow lower-level clerks and public agents to profit personally from the state services they provided.

> Among the most threatening for the people and businessmen [were]: Army and *Garde-Civile* (Police), *Service National d’Immigration* (National Service of

Immigration), *Office des Douanes et Assises* (Customs), and *Office Zairois de Commerce* (OZAC) (Mokoli and Binswinger, 1998).

There seemed to be a tacit understanding that since the state would not pay adequate and consistent wages, employees could compensate themselves through bribes, excessive fees, and all out robbery. Also, public employees understood that their positions were tentative, based on the mood of the president. Public employees understood that they needed to get as much as they could, while they still had his favor. For example, provincial governors needed to establish a power base quickly because Mobutu was especially careful to rotate them. He would not allow them to build a following in their respective regions (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998). "During the 1980s Zairian governments lasted on average less than one year" (Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001:642). Mobutu also appointed national commissioners to monitor the provincial governors. Given the precarious nature of public employment under Mobutu, it was difficult for a state bureaucracy to become institutionalized. Also, "civil servants were reluctant to make policy decisions or to enforce changes based on the World Bank recommendations for fear of losing favor with Mobutu" (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998:11).

Mobutu's was a generous wealth distribution system with a limited number of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of the state's wealth consisted of "a tiny, extremely rich ruling class that absorb[ed] more than 45 percent of the national wealth" (Williame, *et. al*, 1997:6). People who could not get a piece of the state's action resorted to looting and rioting. "A series of revolts and looting [took place] in Kinshasa in December 1990, in

Mbuji-mayi in May 1991, in Kinshasa again in June 1991, then in almost all the Zairian cities between September and October 1991" (Williame, et. al, 1997:7). Obviously, citizens were dissatisfied with their central government. Yet rioting and looting were their most powerful responses, as coordinated rebellions had been undermined by Mobutu's social and political manipulation. One example of this manipulation was the constant shifting of provincial leaders so they could not build a power base. Using the looting and plundering as indicators, we can say that contestation against elites was high. However, this contestation was also difficult to organize and target because Mobutu was constantly redefining who the elite were.

Military

Mokoli and Binswanger (1998:14) point out that upon the DRC becoming an independent state, "the army was the only political organization with a national base." Mobutu corroded this institution by failing to pay the military or issuing personnel worthless banknotes. This behavior diminished loyalty. However, Mobutu did not want loyalty from the rank-and-file. He used them in their desperate states to frighten the people into submission and to contain each other. As they competed with each other, they could not form coalitions against him. Consequently, the military's reach corroded because it was disorganized and undisciplined. Ultimately, Mobutu's rag tag brigade would not prevail against outside forces in 1996-1997.

Illustrating the weakness of the state army, Mobutu's confidence and his life lay in the hands of his special military guard, the Service for Action and Military Intelligence

(*Service d' Action et de Renseignements Militaires* (SARM) and *Division Speciale Presidentielle* (DSP). Mokoli and Binswanger write that this guard was:

> drafted mainly from his Ngbadi and Ngbaka tribes. They were loyal only to him and his family, but were paid and armed out of state revenues. After a while, they also were affected and weakened by the mismanagement. During this process other competing sources of coercion not under state control, such as private militias, grew in influences for public and mostly for personal goals (Mokoli and Binswanger, 1998:9).

Upon the advance by the ADFL, one of the government's "principal strategies was reportedly to recruit mercenaries from Europe, South Africa, and Angola" (Reed, 1998:150).

Education

Education in the DRC was also farmed out to organizations outside the state. Since colonization, education in Zaire had largely been provided by the Catholic Church. Upon gaining independence, there were only about 30 college graduates in the vast Congo. However, given the unnecessarily dire conditions, it is no surprise that education in Zaire in the 1980s and 1990s was taking a back seat to survival. Still, individuals and communities pooled resources to compensate for this neglect. Also, the Catholic Church continued to be the principle source of education in Zaire. Mobutu further undermined the capacity of the educated populace. Mobutu recruited heavily from among young, college graduates who, in most societies, would struggle to break into the job market. Since Mobutu recruited them, they would not have to struggle against the experience and expertise of their senior colleagues. This tactic ensured the loyalty of grateful, young college graduates (Almquist, 1994). However, it also assured a brain drain from entrepreneurial markets and authentic political development. From a different perspective, higher education in Zaire may have had a dampening impact on opposition to a repressive regime. The idea is that people in Zaire still psychologically connected education opportunities with economic mobility despite overwhelming of limited mobility. So in assessing their plight, they might have been focusing on their ambitions rather than their realities (Almquist, 1994).

Infrastructure

Despite citizens' attempts to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, they suffered immensely because some important institutions were missing from the DRC society. Rather than fight the central government, the conditions in Zaire forced people to retreat to their local ties and their own resources. Regional systems of transportation, for example, developed around the informal economy and smuggling routes. Both formal and informal transportation routes were decentralized. Producers in the south relied upon the rail system in Angola. When it shut down due to rebel fighting, producers had to rely on the South African transportation system (Kiakwama, Gilbert and Jerome Chevallier. 2001). "The national [roads] network is [only] about 145,000 Km throughout the country" (Ministry of Mines, 2003:8). "The Congolese railways network has [only] a total of 5,118 Km within 858 Km are electrified" [sic] (Ministry of Mines, 2003:7).

Rule of Law and Property Rights

The resourcefulness of the Congolese was no substitute for clear rules, regulations, and enforcement. For example, land ownership and property rights, for the average citizen, were tentative, if they existed at all**.** Regardless of the official rules, the average understanding of land rights was caught between the concept of land tenure, which requires land to be used for the present livelihood of the members of kinship groups and the notion that land could be expropriated for the state or on behalf of corporations for commercial activities. Technically, the land belonged to the present and future kinship group, and therefore could not be sold. Mobutu exploited the tension and confusion between the traditional concept of land ownership and a modern concept of land ownership (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002). The judicial system offered little recourse to the Congolese in matters of private property. Despite the presence of a supreme court, Zairian law was largely the domain of local chiefs, with no law credentials (Turner, 1994).

Under Zairianization the state could expropriate any land and whatever lay below ground. As of 1971 and 1973, “individual land rights [were] derived from either concessions by the state or indigenous customary law. These laws did not abrogate preexisting customary land rights, but they left unclear the future concessionary status of these lands” (Turner, 1994:171). In reality, under the Zairian system, property rights were based on favor with Mobutu or forced control.

In settled regions, such as Shaba, a whole group of people could be uprooted (French, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1994; Noble, 1993). Well-established communities were often threatened by people who felt neglected by the state. Since systematic political and economic changes appeared to be beyond the reach of the Congolese people, unpaid soldiers, along with groups of citizens, felt entitled to loot and to pillage (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Their behavior further threatened the development of property rights and continuation of well-established communities. However, the lack of enforceable property rights cannot be taken to mean a lack of order entirely. Mobutu used desperate soldiers and territorial groups to control property and to maintain order and fear at the local level. He did not neglect order. He simply allowed others to provide it.

Despite these difficulties, history reflects attempts to democratize Zairian politics and liberalize the Zairian economy. Both came as a result of pressures by Western powers, to whom Zaire was deeply in debt. The IMF had pressured Zaire in 1983 and then again in 1986 to open its market and attract foreign investment (US International Trade Administration, 1991).

> Following Zaire's liberalization of its economy in the late1980s, several U.S. firms invested in telecommunications, agribusiness, and manufacturing enterprises under the joint protection of Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance and the implementation of a U.S.-Zaire Bilateral Investment Treaty.
>
> The largest U.S. investor in Zaire in 1990 is Chevron Oil, with its Zaire Gulf Oil subsidiary. Other U.S. investors include Citibank, Intercontinental Hotel, and Mobil. U.S. investments include a livestock biofeed project, a tire factory, a group of plantations and ranches employing some 12,000, and a flour mill.
>
> The Government of Zaire made a commitment to foreign investment in the U.S.-Zaire Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) signed in 1984. The government is favorably disposed towards American companies and is focusing increased attention on attracting U.S. firms to Zaire. Zairian laws
>
> covering investment, with minor exceptions, do not differentiate between foreign and domestic enterprises (US International Trade Administration, 1991:Investment in Zaire Section).

Summary of Grievances

By the early 1990s, several groups were openly expressing discontent with the Mobutu regime and expressing their aspirations for democracy. They had good reason to do so. In the Zaire years, most Congolese were locked into patterns of destitution and desperation. These positions did not occur by accident. They resulted from Mobutu's deliberate efforts to entrench himself in Zairian politics (Wrong, 2000) at others' expense. Not only were people living in dire straits, the society lacked the institutions that could help them rise out of these conditions. Their grievances are many and varied. They included the following:

- Land ownership rights were vague. The regime often challenged these rights with violence by Mobutu's underpaid soldiers. Farmers were reluctant to invest in improvements given the tenuous nature of ownership.
- The regime failed to compensate military and other civil servants. Consequently, soldiers sought compensation in looting the citizens of Zaire (Human Rights Watch, 1994).
- Groups experienced disparate treatment under the law. This treatment reflects Mobutu's efforts to pit one group against another.
- Despite the short-term and long-term resource wealth available, educational opportunities were privately negotiated.
- The Zaire currency was worthless. When the state ran out of money, he simply printed more, to the point of becoming indebted to printing firms (Smith, Merrill, Meditz, 1994).
- The banking system collapsed in the early 1990s. Again, citizens found themselves relying even more on the informal economy for (limited) financial services. When the banking system was active, "the central bank, the Bank of Zaire (*Banque du Zaire*)

and seventeen commercial banks had been underdeveloped and largely confined to urban areas" (Smith, Merrill, and Meditz, 1994:165).

- Since Mobutu operated a system based on patronage rather than administrative logic, there were no legitimate through which citizens could address political concerns.

A Very Bad Year: 1994

The genocide in Rwanda had a direct relationship to the wars that broke out in Congo in 1996 and 1998. In 1994, the ethnic Hutus controlled the Rwandan government. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF-Tutsi) had invaded through Uganda, and in 1990 and waged a civil war inside Rwanda; the Hutu/Tutsi competition in Rwanda had been smoldering for at least four years (*The Economist*, October 18, 1996). In 1994 the smoldering heat erupted into a full-blown fire. Rwanda's Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi's president were killed when their plane was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali (US Department of State, Background Notes, 2008).The Hutu extremists circulated the rumor that the Tutsis shot down the plane. Tutsis circulated the rumor that the Hutus themselves had staged the whole episode in order to ignite the passions of the other Hutus. As news of the plane crash spread, an increasing amount of hate speech filled the airwaves. Hutu leaders called upon all Hutus to arm themselves with machetes, and exterminate the "cockroaches" (Barker, Greg, 2004). When the dust settled, 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathizers lay dead.

The Tutsi-led RPF gained control of the Rwandan government as they drove the Hutu west into Zaire. A humanitarian crisis quickly ensued. In an effort to flee the actual or the perceived retaliation of the new Tutsi regime, Hutu refugees from Rwanda and

Burundi fled into refugee camps in the Congo and Tanzania (*The Economist,* October 19, 1996). They also fled into the Zaire proper. These camps included the Kibumba Camp in Goma (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996) and Runingo, just west of the Burundian border (CNN: Dateline October 13, 1996; Wallis, October 19, 1996). At a cost of about $2 million a day, 1.5 million Rwandans and Burundian Hutus poured into their camps (CNN: Dateline October 13, 1996). In addition to the staggering costs, this mass exodus created a dilemma for humanitarian organizations because humanitarian personnel could not distinguish the killers who had committed genocide from the innocent citizens. Also, to make matters worse, the fleeing Hutu militia members used innocent refugees as human shields in their violent conflicts with the Congolese militia, Rwandan army, and paramilitary groups.

The Camps

New efficient communities developed within the camps housing the Hutu refugees (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001; Reed, 1998). From these camps, the Former Government of Rwanda (FGOR) (Hutu) was able to reorganize aspects of their formal social order, including their military order. Reed writes, “Movement into and out of the camps was regulated by the FGOR, which also controlled the movement of goods and services, including information” (140). The camps altered local Zairian economies by injecting new goods. Congolese could find items in the camps that they could not find previously in Zaire’s formal or informal economy (Reed, 1998).

The flight of Hutus into Zaire and the newly organized economies within the camps agitated local ethnic tension, where none previously existed. For example, Banyarwanda Hutus and Tutsis living near Masisi in North Kiva had found a way to reconcile their separate ethnic identities (*The Economist*, October 19, 1996). Their relationship had emphasized their common ancestry. The Hutu militia brought attention to the locals' Hutu-ness or Tutsi-ness. Also, this new military order was able to launch attacks on the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from the camps (*The Economist*, October 19, 1996; Reed, 1998). Actions taken by the US government suggest that Mobutu may have facilitated, or at least allowed, the "flow of arms to Hutu extremists living in eastern Zaire" (104th Congress, 2nd Session: 1996; Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996; *The Economist*, October 19, 1996). The instability of the border region would justify Mobutu's attempt to expel the refuges and secure military aid from the West, as his regime came under serious attack. It would also justify Uganda's and Rwanda's foreign occupation of Zaire.

The Banyamulenge: Congo Tutsis

At this point in the narrative we come back to the Banyawardina and Banyamulenge issues with citizenship. The Hutu militia living in the refugee camps inserted themselves in these local citizenship disputes. In the north the militia exploited the marginalized position of the Banyawardinya of Masisi (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996). The militia expropriated the Banyawardinya's land and chased them into the forests of North Kivu. In a similar fashion, militants from the southern camps crossed over into South Kivu to challenge the Banyamulenge. In the summer/fall of 1994 the Rwandan government signaled that it was safe for Hutu refugees to return, without threat of retaliation. Since the FGOR controlled information in the camps, as Reed (1998 and also Perlez, 1994) finds, they convinced Hutu refugees that the RPF was waiting to slaughter them upon their return. “Despite the smooth return of Rwandan refuges from Burundi, Rwandans in Zaire and Tanzania refused to return to Rwanda until security in Rwanda could be guaranteed” (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996) The people’s reluctance to return to Rwanda created a proper justification for Rwanda to occupy the border regions.

The Zairian government offered no protection for these Tutsi groups. The state acted in concert with the attackers.

> In Uvira, on September 11, 117 Zairians--104 women and children--of Rwandan Tutsis ancestry arrived at the compound of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)…In their fight for recognized Zairian citizenship,…threats turning into killings, jeopardizing the safety of the 400,000 Zairian Tutsis living in southeastern Zaire….The intimidated refuge seekers agreed to be repatriated to Rwanda, though they do not consider themselves Rwandan. These Zairian Tutsis most recently came under attack after three Zairian soldiers were killed in an ambush on August 30. Two of the attackers were killed and identified as Rwandan Tutsis. Local military officials believe that these Tutsis entered Zaire through Burundi and were assisting Zairian counterparts in their struggle for political recognition.
>
> This uprooting of Zairian Tutsis in the Uvira region bears an eerie resemblance to the ethnic cleansing of another part of eastern Zaire, that of Masisi (Banyawardina) (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996).

CNN reported that “during September, Zairian authorities executed 35 Banyamulenge, and 50 more disappeared. [Also], South Kivu deputy governor Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji last week [October 7, 1996] gave the Banyamulenge a week to leave Zaire or be treated as rebels and face all-out war with Zairian soldiers” (CNN, Dateline: October 13, 1996; *The Economist*, October 19, 1996). These reports chronicle the origins of the “rebel” attack that would ultimately overthrow the Mobutu regime.

The Banyamulenge’s responses to these invasions were quite different from the Banyawardina response. The Banyamulenge were thought to have previous ties to RPF and Rwanda. Those who made this connection, contend that the Banyamulenge had received military training in Uganda by the RPF (Kirpatrick and Ghedini, 1996; CNN, 1996).

> There is evidence that they have been creating a militia among Zairian Tutsis as a counterforce to the Rwandan and Burundi Hutu militias operating from Zaire. Last month a well-equipped unit of the Burundi army was reported to have driven through Uvira, heading up to the Mulenge hills. And Zaire and Rwanda exchanged artillery fire on the border between Cyangugu and Bukavu (*The Economist*, October 19, 1996).

In what, at the time, appeared to be bold and daring move, as early as October 13, 1996, the Banyamulenge launched offensives into the camps (the Runingo Camp) (*CNN Interactive*, October 13, 1996). However, a Tutsi coalition consisting of Rwandans, Burundians, and Ugandans flanked the Banyamulenge offensive. This offensive sent Hutu militia, along with innocent people, into the Congolese hills. Others fled back to Rwanda.

As early as late October, observers reported Rwandan interference in the Banyamulenge skirmishes in Zaire (Facts on File News Service, October 31, 1996). This interference seemed to be part of a vicious cycle in which Rwanda claimed security threats by the Hutus and Zairian soldiers. “While denying involvement, Rwanda twice has sent troops into the fray [Bukavu and Goma]– first on Tuesday and then today” (Buckley, November 2, 1996). Rwandan and Ugandan fingerprints were all over these campaigns. As they gained momentum, “ADFL soldiers would move through the bush, leaving room for soldiers to retreat on the main roads” (*The Economist*, March 8, 1997). This approach would allow retreating soldiers time to alert people ahead of the ADFL’s arrival. Analysts argue that this sort of tactic comes from state military training. "Disciplined and purposeful, the ADFL copies the tactics of its mentors, the National Resistance Army, which seized power in Uganda in 1986, and its offspring, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which seized power in Rwanda in 1994" (*The Economist*, March 8, 1997).

The instability of the border regions served several actors in different ways. The instability justified the presence of Uganda and Rwanda. Their presence justified Mobutu's request for military assistance from the West. At this point, the French were willing to intervene to maintain its presence in the region, as it had lost its Hutu alliance and was in threat of losing its alliance with Mobutu (*The Economis*t, October 15, 1994). The French had previously maintained diplomatic ties with the Hutu regime (*The Economist*, October 19, 1996). Since the U.S. had not come to the aid of the slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda, the US was balancing its guilt about failing to address the genocide in Rwanda and its concern for human rights violation perpetrated by the new Tutsi administration in Rwanda (*The Economist,* October 19, 1996).

History has revealed the depth of Rwanda's and Uganda's involvement in Mobutu's overthrow. Rwanda actually provided forces and Uganda at least provided artillery and armored personnel carriers (Bonner and French, 1997). Despite Rwanda's initially denying involvement, in 1997 Paul Kagame (Rwanda's former Defense Minister) admitted to the *Washington Post* (1997) that Rwanda played a key role in the campaign. He even said that the plan for the overthrow originated in Kigali. Also, Rwanda helped capture key cities and provided training to the rebels (Pomfret, 1997).

Western officials suggested that Mobutu negotiate a settlement with Kabila during talks on April 29, 1997. However, Kabila refused to make concessions because the odds of winning were on his side; negotiations might have actually weakened his position. By this time Kabila had already taken Kisangani and moving towards Kinshasa (Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo, 1998). The *New York Times* reported that US Intelligence indicates that the ADFL received reinforcements from Angola in April, for a final push. Much of the Angolan reinforcement came from Zairians previously exiled there by Mobutu (Bonner and French, 1997).

Mobutu's request for aid from international entities was based on legitimate need. To illustrate the seriousness of threat perceived by Mobutu, he placed a capable general in charge of defensive operations against the campaign mounting in the eastern region, outside the camps. Although they were armed with French and American weaponry (*The Economist*, November 2, 1996), the Congolese forces were too fragmented to contain the situation. Mobutu was relying upon forces which he had underpaid or failed to pay for years. Many in his military had taken second jobs in order to sustain their families (Bonner and French, 1997). Mobutu was also confronted with the mentalities of men whom he had allowed to make their livings looting and pillaging villages.

> Mercenaries form Serbia, France, and Belgium; Israeli training for the president's special guard; French training for the airborne brigade; assistance for the air force from the Italians; a military academy run by the Belgians; and US logistical support (Bonner and French, 1997:A1 and *The Economist*, November 2, 1996)

Mobutu's dilapidated military was weak. The troops were too undisciplined to convert into an organized and professional military outfit (*The Economist*, November 2, 1996).

> Mr. Mobutu has brought in a few hundred European mercenaries, reviving memories of the 1960s ‘dogs of war’. But they have found that a white man with a gun no longer petrifies the natives. Mostly Russians and Serbs, the mercenaries are inexperienced in Africa and, while their helicopter gunships initially disrupted the rebel advance, they did not stop it. Yet it would not be hard to hit Mr. Kabila’s men as they approach the key city of Kisangani. Impenetrable jungle forced the rebels to keep to the road, and where that crosses big rivers in spate from the recent rains, they could easily be ambushed (*The Economist*, February 2, 1997).

Rag-Tag Rebellion

The weakness of Mobutu’s army is further illustrated by the weakness of the opposing forces. One report says that “the rebel army grew, training on the march in war-combat fatigues, t-shirts, rubber thongs and tennis shoes. [However], they were motivated” (Bonner and French, 1997:A1). Bonner and French (1997) concluded that the war shortened and cost less because the army did not slow down the rebellion.

Mobutu’s inability to organize a defensive operation against the Banyamulenge offensive exposed weaknesses that a range of players were poised to exploit. The Banyamulenge offensive was eventually packaged and labeled as the rebel offensive of the ADFL (*Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire*), the organization that would ultimately overthrow the Mobutu regime. The legitimizing face of the ADFL was that of Congolese Laurent Kabila, who had been associated with the Reviving his People’s Revolutionary Party. This fledgling party had challenged the central government in 1984 and 1985 (Turner, 1994). In his manuscripts, the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevera depicted Kabila as a man more committed to the trappings of rebel leadership than actual leadership. He also depicted Kabila as a man prone to partying and chasing women. Guevera’s depictions suggest that Kabila would leave the serious organizing to others (Guevara, 1999 1st American Edition). Despite his attempts to portray himself as revolutionary, Kabila was really a gold and ivory smuggler.

> Kabila formed an alliance with the *Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la Liberation du Zaire*, the *Alliance Democratique des Peoples* (dominated by Tutsi from North and South Kivu), and the *Counseil National de Resistance pour la Democratic* (whose members came from eastern Zaire and Kasai), creating the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL). Resting on a regional base in three provincial areas – eastern Zaire, Shaba (formerly known as Katanga), and Kasai – the ADFL was to spearhead the battle against Mobutu (Reed, 1998:146).

This movement was different from earlier protests against Mobutu in that it had the military power of at least two countries backing it--Uganda and Rwanda. Without this assistance, the ADFL's efforts might be remembered as another insignificant botched attempt to overthrow a ruler who seemed destined to rule until he died (Reed, 1998). While these groups constituting the ADFL were united in their desire to overthrow the dictator, they were not united in their visions for DRC.

Prior to the exposition of Mobutu's weaknesses against the Banyamulenge offensive, no group known as the ADFL had previously staged guerilla operations in the Congo. News accounts from December 1996 referred to the ADFL action that occurred in mid-October. However, news accounts released round October appear to make no such references. One of the first references to Kabila as leader of the offensive was made on November 2, 1996. The article in question does not refer directly to the ADFL but the Tutsi rebel movement (Buckley, November 2, 1996). Before the name ADFL started to appear in news accounts reporters cast what was happening in Zaire as the Banyamulenge campaign to protect their homeland. Reports from the fall of 1996 were laden with examples of violence against this group. “In mid-September 1996, more than 100 Banyamulenge, mostly women and children were massacred in the villages of Lueba and Mboko by armed Babembe ‘combatants’” (AI, December 19, 1996). Zairian soldiers committed these atrocities allegedly in response to atrocities committed by the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge had reportedly attacked a Lemera Hospital, near Uvira, which housed military and civilian patients (Amnesty International, 1996).

The Banyamulenge defensive campaign became an offensive campaign, turning its attention to the refugee camps. *The Economist* and Amnesty International documented the campaign’s shift from defending the Banyamulenge homeland, to raiding the camps, to capturing major cities. They write,

> From mid-October onwards, the refugee camp of Kangunga, Runingo, Kibigoye, and Luberezi were attacked by ADFL forces. Kagunga camp was heavily shelled on or around 18 October. Then it was the turn of the Runingo Camp. Luberezi camp was attacked on the night of 20 or 21 October (Amnesty International, December 19, 1996).
>
> The Tutsis of South Kivu – the Banyamulenge, as they are called – did not stick to defending their mountain land and homes. A well-armed and co-ordinated force swept north up the road along Lake Tanganyika, capturing towns as it went. (*The Economist*, November 02, 1996) From the camps, the offensive focused its attention on the major cities Kiliba and Uvira (AI, December 19, 1996).

Table 6 outlines the rapid progress of the “ADFL” offensive through the major cities. In response to news of the rebels’ approach, MIBA officials in Kasai said that they would not resist (*The Economist*, March 15, 1997). “The most powerful man in the province [Kasai], Mukamba Kadiata Nzemba, declared he would collaborate with Mr. Kabila when he [came]. Mr. Mukamba [was] the boss of MIBA” (*The Economist*, March 15, 1997; African Mining and Energy, March 19, 1997).

Table 6. The Course of the ADFL Military Campaign

City/Province	Date
Uvira,	October 25, 1996
Village of Mboko	October 28, 30, 1996
Bukavu, South Kivu	Previous Tuesday; October 29, 1996
Town of Goma, North Kivu	November 2, 1996
Bunia, Orientale (North East)	December 27, 1996
Kisangani (3rd largest city)	March 15
Mbuji-Mayi	April 4
Lubumbashi (2nd largest city)	April 9
Kinshasa (capitol)	May 17

Sources;

(1) Amnesty International. "Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire." December, 19, 1996.

(2) Amnesty International. "Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire." December, 19, 1996.

(3) Buckley, Stephen. November 2, 1996. "Rwandan Army Captures Refugee-Filled Zairian Town: Thousands of Hutus Flee Joint Tutsi Attack." *The Washington Post*. A Section, Page A01. and *Facts on File News Digest*. "Hundreds of Thousands of Rwandan Hutu Refugees Stranded in Zaire as War Looms: UN Sends Envoy to Broker Cease-Fire." October 31, 1996. Retrieved July 27, 2008.

(4)Africa Energy & Mining. January 8, 1997. "Rebels Knock on OKIMO's Door." Sections: Mining; Zaire; No 196.

(5) "Mobutu Imposes Military Rule in Zaire As Rebels Take Second Largest City: Ailing Ruler Ousts New Premier; Other Developments." Facts on File World News Digest. 10 April 1997. Facts on File News Services. 27 July 2008.

(6) "Zaire Rebels Capture Key City: Advance Threatens Mobutu's Rule." March 20, 1997. Facts on File News Digest. Retrieved July 27, 2008 from Facts on File World News Digest.

(7) French, Howard, May 17, 1997. "Rebels Victorious." ProQuest, New York Times (1851-2005), p.1.

Summary

Mobutu's involvement in the hate politics of the Hutus and the Tutsis predated the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Mobutu had sponsored rebels in Uganda against President Museveni and against the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Also, prior to the Hutus' mass exodus to Eastern Zaire Mobutu had challenged the citizenship and land rights of the Banyarwanda (a Tutsis group native to Zaire) of the North Kivu Province, even forcing them to provide evidence of citizenship (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002; Human Rights Watch) dating back before "colonial partition" (Reed 1998:143). When the Hutus fleeing Rwanda began expropriating Banyarwanda (native Zairian's) land, Mobutu looked the other way (Reed, 1998). Not only did the Hutus expropriate foreign land, their flight into Zaire taxed the limited capabilities of an already fledgling Congo state. For example, "the pyrochlore operations at *Societe Industrielle et Miniere du Kivu (Somikivu)* at Lueshe, 70 kilometers (km) north of Goma, were discontinued, owing in part to the disruption of its transportation route by the influx of Rwandan refugees" (Mobbs, 1995:943).

The Tutsi label provided a clear target for ethnic persecution. Anti-Tutsi groups lumped all Tutsis together, even loosely affiliated groups, whether they were from Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, or the Congo. The state's general neglect of its population meant that marginal or ostracized groups such as the Tutsi collective received no protection from the state. To make matters worse the state was one of the agitating forces. The Banyamulenge of the South Kivu, in contrast, resisted the Hutu invasion more vigorously than the Banyawardina. However, it became clear shortly after the resistance, that the Banyamulenge had received military assistance from Rwanda and Uganda. Still, the Banyamulenge resistance exposed fundamental weaknesses in Mobutu's army.

Shortly after the resistance began it became an offensive campaign under the auspices of the rebel group ADFL. Kabila Laurent, a Shaban, became the face of the largely Tutsi coalition. Prior to his leadership in the campaign, he was known as a shadowy gold and ivory trader. The ADFL campaign began in September 1996. By May 1997 the group had taken the capital, Kinshasa. As further indication of the weakness of Mobutu's forces, the ADFL was able to overtake the army while wearing t-shirts and flip-flops. Moreover, Mobutu's soldiers and his citizens were willing to sign on with or endorse the ADFL forces.

Internal political organizations had formed in opposition to Mobutu's rule. Zairians had legitimate grievances related to resource mismanagement, state decay, and social disparities created from resource wealth, and tenuous property rights. Indicators of well-being, as dismal as they were, understated the real wealth gap between the elite and the poor (French, 1996). Several groups took Mobutu to task on these issues. Groups such as Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) appealed to Mobutu's democratic inclinations. In 1980 a group of 13 members of the parliament released an open letter to the press outlining Mobutu's abuses (United Nations, 1986). In return Mobutu jailed them. In 1990, Mobutu turned his elite guard on students who were peacefully protesting against the poor conditions in educational institutions (Almquist, 1994). While groups may have acted on their litany of grievances against Mobutu, ultimately their strategies and tactics could not overthrow the dictator. These groups were clearly outmatched as they attempted to use democratic approaches to address a leader who was willing to use undemocratic methods of suppression. Also, they lacked a clear base of international support.

A Crucial Period: 1997-2001

Kabila initially projected the public image of a liberator and a substantive alternative to the Mobutu regime. He promised a multi-party system and a "national salvation government" ("Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo," 1998:877). In reality the transition occurred from a loosely centralized feudal system, under Mobutu, to an even less centralized feudal system in the latter Mobutu years and under the new Kabila regime.

The system of resource management under Mobutu involved private ownership of public resources (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998). As one observer noted: "Mr. Mobutu has run the country like a medieval king, taking personal dues from his appointed barons around it. Already, its mineral-rich provinces of Shaba and Kasai are virtually autonomous" (*The Economist*, February 15, 1997). The Mobutu regime designed a business model that other entities could exploit immediately. The general model changed very little from one regime to the next. In the period between the overthrow of Mobutu and the second civil war (1998), the constellation of players simply realigned. "Previously, the distribution norm was (via legal and illegal channels) through locally based Congolese, mostly civilian-managed, business operations. However, these traditional modes were quickly overtaken by a new power structure" (UN Panel of Experts, 2001, #23).

Problems with Legitimacy

Shortly after the takeover the new power structure consisted of Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda and their front-man, Laurent Kabila.. After power consolidation, Kabila's legitimacy among the Congolese waned for a number of reasons. First, Kabila and his representatives engaged in gross human rights violations. Second, Kabila stifled the multi-party system and other democratic institutions he had promised. He also failed to exert bureaucratic control over the Congo. In addition, he hired people with little or no experience for the jobs he assigned them. His justice minister formerly worked in the district attorney's office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His finance chief was an adjunct professor of agricultural economy at the University of Kentucky. His foreign minister had no government experience at all (McKinley, 1997). Kabila also initially refused to appoint long-time opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi to the new government. This decision led to two days of protesting (Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo, 1998a; *New York Times*, May, 25, 1997).

The Seamless Rebellions

The Congolese balked most strongly at Kabila's appointment of Tutsi supporters to top-ranking posts in the government (McKinley, 1997). Consequently, Kabila asked foreign forces to leave Congo (*New York Times*, July 29, 1998). This request marked a turning point in Kabila's relationship with Rwanda and Uganda. A storm had already been brewing for months between Kabila and his Rwandan supporters about the continued attacks from the Hutu refugees living in the camps on the Congolese border (Bonner and French, 1997; McKinley, 1997). Again, the power structure realigned, as Kabila sought reinforcement from Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to battle Rwanda and Uganda. In this new arrangement Zimbabwe was Kabila's principal ally (UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo, 1999) and a chief beneficiary of economic contracts.

At least by July/August 1998, Rwanda and Uganda had planted rebels in the Congo to fight the new Congolese government they had helped install (Erlanger, 1998). Concurrently, Tutsi coalitions inside the Congo began staging rebellions. Because of the leverage Kabila had allowed his former Tutsi allies, they were able to stage open attacks in Kisangani, Goma, and Bakuva. Tutsi coalitions controlled the eastern region (French, 1998).

Shifting Alliances

Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) was a principal rebel group from which other groups spawned as a result of factional fighting. Rwanda and Uganda initially backed the RCD. One observer stated: "The RCD was put together in Kigali rather than in the Congo, and did not gain the support of the local population being a coalition of self-interested individuals rather than a popular movement" (Global Witness, 2004:12). Before his ouster as RCD leader Wamba da Wamba had planned to repair the road from Kisangani to Bunia. He also planned sanitation projects, most for clean water (Fisher, 1999). It seems local legitimacy was of some concern to the RCD. However, the infrastructure projects he advocated would also benefit his economic enterprises. Emile Ilunga became the new leader (*New York Times*, August 2, 1999).

Uganda planted its own rebel group in northwest Congo. The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) was headed by the son of one of the Congo's richest men (Fisher, 1998:A8). Wamba da Wamba had been hostile to the second force of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) sponsored by Uganda and led by John Pierre Bemba (Fisher, 1999). The group Global Witness reported: "The New-RCD (RCD – Kisangani/Liberation Movement), [formed by Wamba da Wamba to better establish local legitimacy], emerged in November 1998, which challenged the movement over its inability to mobilize the people of the Congo. This led to the original RCD being referred to as the RCD (Goma)" (Global Witness, 2004:12).

As shown in Table 7, in this new system Rwanda and the rebel group RCD controlled North and South Kivu. Jeane-Pierre Bemba (MLC), representing Uganda, controlled Equateur and part of Orientale. The RCD-ML controlled North Kivu, Ituri, and sections of Orientale. These rebel groups functioned more like cartels than rebels. The second civil war that formally began on August 2, 1998. (HRW, 1999), looked more like a hostile, economic takeovers rather than military coups. Because of struggles among and within rebel groups warlordism in remote areas increased (UN Secretary General on the War in Congo, 2000).

By December 1998, reports estimated that Uganda had a heavy military presence 700 kilometers from the border, in the name of peacekeeping. Uganda had begun fighting the Hutu rebels in the border camps and Congolese rebels the previous spring. Also, at

Table 7. Rebel Groups: Regions and Resources Controlled and Foreign Supporters

"Rebel" Group	Region Controlled	Resources Controlled	Foreign Support
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) – Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma (RCD-G) – Launched the initial war against the Kabila regime in August 1998	Sections of North and South Kivu, sections of Maniema, Orientale and Katanga (not a popular movement)	Diamonds, gold, timber, coltan, cassiterite	Rwanda, Burundi, Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), by Uganda earlier
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) – well organized group	Equateur Province, parts of Orientale Province	Gold, diamonds, timber, *coffee	Uganda (a Ugandan-supported alternative to Rwandan-dominated RCD)
Congolese Rally for Democracy – Kisangani/Congolese Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-K/RCD-K-ML)	Northern North Kivu, Ituri, sections of Orientale	Gold, coltan	Uganda, Kinshasa
RCD – National	Near Bafwasnede and Osiro, Orientale Province	Gold, diamonds	Uganda

Source: (UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth, 2001, 2001; Global Witness. 2004. "Same Old Story: A Background Study on Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." Global Witness Publishing: Washington, DC.

least by December 1998, the media had begun questioning Uganda's motives, since these conflicts were primarily between the Hutu rebels and the Rwandan government. From spring to winter, Uganda's troop level increased from 1,500 to 6,000. This military build-up further weakened the fragile diamond-trading network. The rebels and their backers bought up diamonds so quickly, "presumably to finance the war," that they distorted the diamond value. In this confusion, diggers stopped digging (Fisher, 1998:A4). Before Mobutu's overthrow about 465 diamond dealers operated in the Congo. After the second rebellion began, there were only 47 dealers (Fisher, 1998). As further evidence of Uganda's economic involvement in the Congo. *The New York Times* reports,

> In September, a plane crashed in the Ruwenzori Mountains, along the two countries' borders, carrying a Uganda colonel, several gold traders, and business associates of President Museveni's brother, Salim Saleh, a general in the Ugandan army (Fisher, 1998:A8).

Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called this regional conflict "Africa's first world war" ("UN Secretary General on War in the Congo," 2001:159). The Lusaka Accord (1999) was supposed to end the fighting. The Accords also stipulated that foreign forces had 180 days to leave Congo after signing the Lusaka Accord (Onishi, 1999). The Inter-Congolese talks (stipulated by the Lusaka Accords) were to be moderated by former Botswana President Keumile Quett Masire (UN Secretary on War in the Congo, 2001). Although their backers signed the Accords on July 10, 1999, the main rebel groups, the MLC and RCD would not sign the Accords (McNeil, 1999; "UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo," 1999). The countries could appear to have pulled out but still have economic, political, and military representation. Even if their backers had actually withdrawn support, the rebels were becoming more autonomous in raising their own cash (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). Jean-Pierre Bemba of Former Secretary Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called this regional conflict “Africa’s first world war” (“UN Secretary General on War in the Congo,” 2001:159). The Lusaka Accord (1999) was supposed to end the fighting. The Accords also stipulated that foreign forces had 180 days to leave Congo after signing the Lusaka Accord (Onishi, 1999). The Inter-Congolese talks (stipulated by the Lusaka Accords) were to be moderated by former Botswana President Keumile Quett Masire (UN Secretary on War in the Congo, 2001). Although their backers signed the Accords on July 10, 1999, the main rebel groups, the MLC and RCD would not sign the Accords (McNeil, 1999; “UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo,” 1999). The countries could appear to have pulled out but still have economic, political, and military representation. Even if their backers had actually withdrawn support, the rebels were becoming more autonomous in raising their own cash (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). Jean-Pierre Bemba of the MLC signed the Accords on August 1, 1999 (*New York Times*, August 2, 1999; “UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo,” 1999).The RCD finally signed the Accords in August 31, 199 (*New York Times*, September 1, 1999; UN Secretary General Annan on the War in the Congo, 1999). Robert Mugabe, a prime Kabila supporter, had “objected to the rebels sitting alongside the presidents” (McNeil, 1999). The war(s) continued even after the signing of the Lusaka Accords (Onishi, 1999).

Continuing to shift alliances, Kabila allied with the Hutus (Interwahame) against the Rwandans and Ugandans. The Hutus eventually lost his support (Onishi, 1999).

However, his recruitment helped to equip the Interwahamwe for future cross-border raids into Rwanda (UN Secretary General Annan on the War in Congo, 1999), thereby lengthening their conflicts with Rwanda. The local Congolese Mayi-Mayi and the Hutu guerillas united in their common hatred for the Tutsi. The guerillas depended upon the Mayi-Mayi for local goodwill (Fisher, 1999). There were many other examples of former enemies setting aside differences to pursue their common economic interests. “That is the case of Mai-Mai doing business with RPA civilian coltan leaders, who in turn sell to *comptoirs* controlled by Rwandans and their companies Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda Metals” (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:179).

Resource Motivations

Although Kabila was a self-proclaimed Marxist who said he would return production and resources to the people (*The Economist*, June 3, 1997), his economic intentions became clearer very early in his rule. Two experts have noted: “Two weeks after the uprising Mr. Kabila publicly appeared on the scene. He first set his sights on the gold-producing region of Zaire around Isiro north of the refugee camps” (Bonner and French, 1997:A1). An African publication stated:

> At the end of last week the rebels were advancing deep into the concession of the Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO), whose ownership was recently transferred on paper to the Barrick Gold Group…It was clear that AFDL was keen on grabbing mining riches in the north-east country, either as a bargaining chip or with the idea of financing it war effort. Confirmation of the fact was provided by the movement’s leader, Laurent-Kabila on December 26 when he issued an ultimatum to companies with interests in South Kivu (Banro-Cluff Mining) and in Upper Zaire (Mindev and Barrack). They were warned to make contact with him within a week regarding a resumption of mining on the different sites. Otherwise, he said, AFDL would ‘call on other investors to mine them.’ AEM has learned that the movement, at least in Belgium, was taking steps before

> the week lapsed to recruit mining engineers and technicians (*African Mining and Energy*, January 8, 1997).

Kabila, a shadow figure only a few months before, began identifying production goals in January. He also appointed an economic minister. In addition, he began stipulating the conditions of agreements with foreign investors. First, however, he suspended about 50 state enterprises and even arrested mining operators so that they could "give detailed account of the pillaging of the country's resources under Mobutu" ("Congo Business Shakedown," 1997:3). He also seized Sizerail and removed the private management (McKinley, 1997). *African Mining and Energy* reported:

> A boost in production from 2kg [gold] a month to 10 is the goal of the ADFL's 'economy minister' Mawapanga Mwana Nanga, believes could be achieved by a 'recovery plan' proposed by Zairian executives of the *Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto* (OKIMA). He said this would be an alternative to Zaire's agreement with Barrick since the American company hadn't yet made contact with the rebel movement…As for SOMINKI, Mawapanga told AEM that several local entrepreneurs had come forward to ask for operating permits on its concessions. This was also the case on small-scale diamond-extraction sites in Upper Zaire which are presently being occupied by AFDL soldiers. The operators are specially keen because the 'rebel' government's policy calls for a tax on export revenue but not 'a fee of $100,000' for operating permits, as the Kinshasa government had done" (*African Mining and Energy*, March 19, 1997).

The Economist magazine (June 3, 1997) reports that mining representatives were aggressively courting the rebels. "Companies were lining up outside the Ministry of Mines" (Bonner, 1997:D4). American Minerals Fields reportedly gave Kabila access to its jet. *The Economist* wrote:

> On April 16th [the] company signed a $1 billion deal to recycle the tailings of the Kolowezi copper mine and build a plant to produce 200,000 tonnes a year of zinc at Kipushi. The rebel alliance will have a 49% share – but, in theory, ultimate control – in the project (French, 1997; *The Economist*, June 3, 1997).

One report contends that the US Embassy in the Congo facilitated the signing of new contracts with American investment bankers (Keppel, 1997). Also, "the U.S. honorary consul in Bakavu, as he presented himself, Ramnik O. Kotecha, in addition to promoting deals between American companies and coltan dealers in the region, is himself Chairman of the Kotecha group of companies based in Bakavu and deals in coltan (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#183).

During the second war Kabila blamed his former allies Rwanda and Uganda for fighting between rebel factions in the face of the Lusaka Accords (*New Pittsburgh Courier*, August 14, 1999). Consistent with this accusation, The UN later argued that Rwanda and Uganda aggressively sought Zaire's riches. Prior to the invasion, both countries had set up financial institutions through which they could easily funnel proceeds from natural resources (UN Panel of Experts, 2001). Uganda's economy eventually increased in exports such as gold and diamonds. Ugandan soil does not produce gold in massive quantities (UN Panel of Experts, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 1999). However, the war appears to have kept Kabila in power. "Without it he would have virtually no power base and no resources to confront the country's underlying economic and social problems ("UN Secretary General on the War in Congo," 2000:979). The UN Panel of Experts (2002:#175) concluded that "without control of Mbuji-Mayi, the DRC government could not sustain the war. It is no small wonder that he would not participate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue" ("UN Secretary General on the War in Congo," 2000:979).

Even after signing the Lusaka Accords, Uganda and Rwanda continued to protect their economic interests in the Congo. “Residents closed shops and schools to protest high taxes and insecurity they blame on the Rwandan army which controls the town” (*New Pittsburgh Courier*, February 12, 2000:A2). On August 15, 1999, a news source reported that Uganda and Rwanda sponsored rebels in Kisangani. They were fighting for the main airport in Bangoka. At this point the former leader of the RCD, Wamba da Wamba insisted on signing the Accords. Emile Ilunga, the current leader refused to sign. Uganda, Ilunga’s sponsor, had expanded its hold on “Kampala’s hold on lucrative timber, tea, coffee, gold, and diamond markets in northern Congo. Uganda favor[ed] a quick withdrawal from Congo as long as its interests are protected” (New York Times, August 16, 1999:A6). Rwanda’s condition for withdrawal was that the Hutus be handed over for trial for genocide (*New York Times*, August 16, 1999).

Becoming further entrenched in the areas they occupied even after the Accords these countries exploited local politics. “Lendu tribesmen have killed 5-7,000 members of the Hema tribe since June partly over land disputes in Bunia about 200 miles north of Goma” (*New Pittsburgh Courier*, February 12, 2000:A2). Rebel leader Ernest Wamba da Wamba blamed the economic and political instability, not ethnicity, on the conflict (*New Pittsburgh Courier*, February 12, 2000). However, the rebel factions and their backers exploited these land disputes for their own ends. “Reports clearly showed that while the Kazini camp was helping with the training of the Hemas, the Colonel Peter Karim camp was assisting in training the Lendus. Both camps belonged to the UPDF” (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#180).

As fighting continued, the *New Pittsburgh Courier* (City Edition) (May 13, 2000) reported that Uganda and Rwanda continued to position their troops around abundant resource areas. “Rwandan attacks seem to coincide with the period when coltan has been extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the Mai-Mai” (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#177). Reports surfaced of fighting between the Mai-Mai and Rwandan soldiers in the coltan belt (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#176). Table 8 lists some attacks in resource-rich areas.

The final report of the UN Panel of Experts, published in 2002, helps bring the conditions and intentions of the 1998 war into perspective. At the time of the report’s release in 2002, Uganda and Rwanda still occupied Congo land, controlled resources, monopolized trade, and avoided (DRC) state taxes. Zimbabwean business interests also controlled extractive industries with the blessing of the Congolese government. Uganda and Rwanda continued to justify their presence by invoking insecurity near their borders; the insecurity they helped create by agitating racial tensions and disrupting local economies. In 2002, the UN Panel of Experts predicted that while the Pretoria and Luanda Agreements of 2002 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002) called for the withdrawal of

Table 8. Attacks on Resource-Rich Areas in DRC, 2000

Date	Rebel Group	Resource	Location
November 18	RCD-Goma	Diamonds	50 mi northwest of Kisangani
December 31	RCD-Goma	Diamonds & Coltan	Kandole
Late December	RCD-Goma	Diamonds	Lakutu

Sourrce: UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002:#178.

foreign forces from the Congo, withdrawals would not change the economic structures and networks that the occupying forces had institutionalized in the Congo (2002). Those networks became further entrenched.

Summary

The second war was simply a realignment of bandits. By this time, Kabila had his own problems of legitimacy with the Congolese and his former allies. The Congolese were disgruntled about the number of Tutsis in high-ranking positions in the government**.** Kabila responded by exiling the Tutsis. They responded with their own internal uprisings. Rwanda supported its Tutsi brothers in their rebellion. Rwanda had already been engaged in harsh exchanges about Kabila's unwillingness to control the Hutus launching attacks into Rwanda. When Rwanda and Uganda interceded, Kabila was only able to stave off an overthrow because of help from Namibia, Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe. In return for their support, Zimbabwean players were able to entrench themselves in the Congo economy. Kabila also solicited help from the Hutu militias in the border camps. Before his alliance with them ended, he had reequipped them.

By the end of this surge by Rwanda, Uganda, and internal Tutsis, rebels would be in charge of over one-third of the Congo. Rwanda and Uganda planted rebels on the eastern border. A later split between the two countries resulted in the formation of a second rebel group and other splinter groups. These groups controlled or sought to control key resource areas. Eventually the countries would sign a cease-fire agreement, although their sponsored rebel groups would refuse to sign. The rebels' refusal to sign meant that the countries received credit for disengaging, while still protecting their economic interests in the Congo. Ultimately, the two major rebel groups would sign the agreement. Despite this show of goodwill, the fighting continued and countries continued to pillage resources. By Kabila's death in 2001, rebels would control almost one-half of the Congo. Also, the UN Panel of Experts reported dramatic increases in exports from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi of natural resources that are not indigenous to those countries in those amounts.

Kabila had been in power a little over a year when the second major war began. However, his short tenure does not absolve him of responsibility for the war. The war involved institutions that Kabila allowed to be put in place and factions he ushered into Zairian politics. The war also reflected institutions Kabila failed to put in place. While a large ship must be turned slowly, it still needs direction. Kabila gave direction by allowing factions to establish business enterprises in the Congo and also by failing to set up critical institutions.

Sovereignty and Laurent Kabila

Kabila gave "legality or legitimacy to otherwise illegal operations" (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #207) by selling contracts in a state over which he did not rule. The UN Panel of Experts (UN Panel of Experts, 2001) recorded sources who testified that Kabila, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and President Museveni of Uganda had already created a network through which resource wealth could flow back to them. "During the early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and networks were already in place. At the heart of the financial setting was the *Banque de commerce, du developpement et d'industrie* (BCDI) located in Kagali [Rwanda]" (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #29). BCDI is part of the Citibank network (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:184). The Panel of Experts also found that many of the Rwandan and Ugandan military personnel who became active in the resource trade in 1997 had become familiar with the wealth potential as a result of their presence in the Congo during the first civil war. There is a great deal of overlap between those foreign military officials who later set up extraction operations and the military personnel present during the first war (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). From this perspective, these officials acted as much like economic prospectors as they did military personnel protecting their home borders (UN Panel of Experts, 2001).

The short-term business model for these occupying factions was to pillage resources and financial instruments from stockpiles and banks (UN Panel of Experts, 2001). The long-term business model involved extraction, transport, and bartering operations. "Between September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including minerals, agricultural and forest products and livestock" (UN Panel of Exports, 2002 #32). These groups also dismantled factories and robbed banks, under the pretense of corporate restructuring. Each occupying force engaged in its own brand of raiding based upon resource availability. The UN Panel of Experts found evidence suggesting that the between November 1998 and April 1999 Rwandans pillaged "between 2,000 and 3,000 tons of cassiterite and between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of coltan" from SOMINIKI *(Societe miniere et industrielle du Kivu).* That same report cites evidence of Ugandan generals looting logging operations. "In late August 1998, General Kazini's soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located in

Bagboka" (UN Panel o Experts, 2002 #34). In addition, that report cites evidence that in 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba and General Kazini of Uganda looted coffee beans from vendors in the Equateur Province. "The localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and Mindembo for a year did not have coffee stocks to export because of these seizures. The *Societe congalaise du café*, the largest owner of coffee stocks in the area, went bankrupt" (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #35). The report further suggests that the initial looting camouflaged the level of sophistication and organization of the foreign sponsored extractive operations. These processes were legitimized by the same veneer of standard business practices used by the likes Pat Robertson (Sizemore, 2003).

These same groups necessarily disrupted local economies. First, the Panel received accounts of soldiers robbing the locals of their personal savings in gold. "In Bukavu, individuals have told Panel members how Rwandan soldiers confiscated their life savings in dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and keeping as *monnaie* refuge in the face of the repeatedly devalued Congolese franc" (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #42). Second, the occupying forces determined what price would be paid for goods and services and who would trade with whom. They also forced (literally by force) their foreign products into the local markets. In a field visit Panel members identified Uganda as the country of origin for beer, most cigarettes, beverages, and toilet paper found in Ghabolite and Bunia (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #64; Fisher, 1998). The Panel also identified Burundi and Rwanda as the countries of origin for goods found in Kisangani, Bukavu and Goma (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #64). Finally, monopolies and price controls by the occupying forces forced small businesses out of local economies.

These systems insured that locals would not be adequately compensated for their products or benefit from taxes paid by local businesses. As a result of price controls, the Rwandans and Ugandans undervalued the prices they should have paid for local goods, while inflating the selling price of these goods in foreign markets. “Mahogany originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is largely available in Kampala, at a lower price than Ugandan mahogany” (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #48). Also, The Ugandan-Thai Company DARA-Forest extracted timber without regard for sustainability (UN Panel of Experts, 2002). In addition, Ugandans exported mahogany without paying taxes to the DRC customs and in violation to the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification of process. Occupying forces could easily circumvent certification processes because of the lack of border controls and the complicity of importing countries (UN Panel of Experts, 2002).

As further protection for their investments, occupying forces also appointed local (DRC) officials. For example,

> Congolese in the civil administration in areas potentially rich in natural resources in order to secure his networks. This was exactly the case in Ituri, where he appointed Adele Lotsove in 1999 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #44).

> In the case of coltan, all the needed documentation for its export is provided in Kigali, but there are accomplices in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Mines. The importing companies and their facilitators are aware of the real origin of their coltan, however. According to manifests that the Panel received, Sabena Cargo as well as SDV of the Bollore Group have been among the key companies in this chain of exploitation and continuation of war. Thousnads of tons of coltan form the DRC were carried from Kigali through the port of Dar es Salaam (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:#182).

"Ugandans [also] operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder" (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #49), as they had operated previously through Kabila.

Human Rights for Sale

As the UN Panel of Experts points out, the transition from Mobutu to Kabila was marked by a "redistribution" of political and financial resources (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001). Both leaders lacked control of basic law and order. The feudal groups, i.e. the resource cartels (presented as rebel groups) dispensed the law in their respective areas of control. Legal standards were set by individual groups. For example, "the RCD established a human rights branch within its Department of Justice and Human Rights" (HRW, 1999). Usually, however, protection of human rights was reserved for people who were members of the investigating group.

Many claimed to have been raped, beaten, and tortured by RCD troops (US Department of State, 1999). Human Rights Watch (1999) documented mass executions and scorched earth campaigns. "Authorities from the RCD have publicly acknowledged that these killing were carried out by their own forces" (HRW, 1999:37th and 38th printed page). Rapid urbanization occurred as people retreat to urban areas to avoid the insecurity of living in rebel-held areas (Moyroud and Kataunga, 2002).

In general, the state under Kabila remained a force of repression and fear. The FAC (government soldiers) were able to erect roadblocks at which they extorted money and obstructed humanitarian aid (HRW, 1999:21st printed page). In its own efficient approach to public dissent, the regime drained the country of its intellectual class. The humanitarian group Human Rights Watch writes:

> Two well-known political prisoners, Professor Kabila Kalele, a lecturer of sociology at Kinshasa University, and his collaborator Jean-Francois Kabanda, a free lance journalist, both prominent members of the UDPS political party were arrested on October 24, 1997, following the publication of an article in which they alleged that President Kabila had ‘sold the country’ to the Rwandan Tutsis (HRW, 1999: 14th printed page).

Kabila jailed many political opponents (Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo, 1998). The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Congo had set out in 1997 to investigate human rights violations by the ADFL and the new regime (Special Rapporteur, 1998). “Evidence mounted that Kabila’s forces had slaughtered thousands of Hutu refugees during their drive for power” (“Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,” 1998: 880). After blocking investigations (“Secretary of State on New Government in the Congo,”1998), Kabila finally permitted investigations in 1999, aimed at abuses committed by Rwandans (HRW, 1999). As under Mobutu, the weak and vulnerable populations had no protection in this system.

Even before officially taking power Kabila wielded a heavy hand. He was a strong authoritarian figure throughout the ADFL campaign. A strong executive can be an effective force in uniting a divided polity and bringing discipline to a fragmented economy. As discussed above Zaire was a divided polity that had struggled to accommodate diversity. However, Kabila was willing to use his influence to control resources, but not to accommodate disparate interests. He allowed state officials to spew hateful rhetoric. Human Rights Watch found that rebels and government officials alike often used to the radio as a medium for hate speech (HRW, 1999). On August 4, President Kabila’s cabinet director Abdoulaye Yerodia made a public declaration on national television in Kikongo, the language of Bas-Congo, addressed to the population of that region. His declaration was a thinly veiled call for ethnic attacks on Tutsis. Yerodia instructed "'his brothers to rise up as one man to kick out he who looks like the common enemy'" (HRW, 1999:16th printed page). Human Rights Watch further contends, "the virulent discourse and incitement to violence from state agents, ended only in mid August after international pressure" (HRW, 1999:16th printed page).

The Kabila regime did not appear interested in providing a civil system of justice to provide due process. "A military court, which superseded civilian courts, conducted trials without due process guarantees and imposed death sentences on political suspects and criminals, some of whom were executed immediately, without the possibility of appeal" (HRW, 1999). The regime even sought to actually expand the authority of the military court that had been established in 1997. The official reason was to respond to threats by foreign invaders. In 1998, the regime added "new chambers at Lubumbashi, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, Kamina, Madadi, Lakasi, and new roving courts. The jurisdiction of the Military Court was further expanded on January 2, 1999 by Decree Law 171" (HRW, 1999: 11th printed page).

The accused in the Congo had to navigate legal minefields. The regime subjected them to arbitrary arrests, poor defenses, hasty rulings, blocked appeals, an ineffective pardon system, and summary executions. Human Rights Watch observed instances in which release orders did not guarantee a prisoner's release (HRW, 1999; US Department of State, 1998). "Over seventy-three death sentences have been carried out since the creation of the court. The court lacks an appeal process, even for those sentenced to death. Many executions were carried out the same day as sentencing or shortly after. .A convicted pregnant woman in the town of Uvira was granted a stay of execution until she gave birth to her child" (HRW, 1999:11th and 12th printed pages). Also, the courts allowed little time for defense attorneys to prepare their cases. The system lacked other transparencies. Human Rights Watch (1999) felt compelled to ask the government to hold "prisoners only in publicly recognized places of detention, and that [it maintain] up-to-date registers of all prisoners in every detention center." The people's best hope lay in a "cluster of organizations [that] came together to provide legal assistance to cases before the military court" (HRW, 1999:25th printed page).

The Kabila regime suppressed the possibility of an independent, civil judiciary in a number of ways. Jurists suffered harassment by the Kabila regime. "Mukuntu Kiyana, the president of the Military Court, was himself arrested on August 6 and released after four days, only to be rearrested on August 28 reportedly for having ordered the death sentence of a group of twenty-four [of Kabila's] soldiers" (HRW, 1999. 13th printed page). Even judges lived below the law.

Legislative Functions

Kabila made a public call for a multi-party system in 1999 (Special Rapporteur, 1998). However, he failed to foster an environment in which opposing parties could voice legitimate dissent. He also instituted irrelevant and excessive barriers to party participation. "Despite a January 29 decree law that called for a return to multi-party politics, excessive registration requirements for political parties [a $10,000 fee] effectively excluded many of them from participation in the political process. Arrests of civilians and leading politicians increased in 1999" (HRW, 1999). In addition, the regime would often raid the headquarters of opposing political parties (HRW, 1999). Finally, Kabila initiated a constitutional review process. "Most human rights groups stepped up their work on constitutional and electoral issues and civic education in advance of elections promised for 1999" (HRW, 1999:25th printed page). However, Kabila limited the circle of reviewers of the new constitution to a small number of "yes men." Even those in his cabinet who disagreed with the process were dismissed and/or harassed (HRW,1999: 25th printed page).

Executive Control

During the ADFL invasion, the ADFL instituted three types of power structures: "civilian government, ADFL political authorities, and the military" (Bedford, 1997). Bedford recounted that conquest was too rapid for adequate government organizations to be installed. He wrote:

> The ADFL retained local government structures. Most mid-level bureaucrats under Mobutu [had been] reinstated, the Alliance appointed governors in Goma and Bukavu. In Kinsangani, the Alliance permitted popular elections of local officials by show of hands. The governor in Kisangani is the regional President of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the political party of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi. Kisangani's vice governor is a popular university president (Bedford, 1997).

However, these local officials possessed little decision-making power. Also, "during the year, presidential appointees gradually replaced governors popularly elected during Kabila's overthrow" (US Department of State, 1999: 11). It appeared that military commanders were the only local officials with real authority shortly after the takeover

(Bedford, 1997). Local communities became the fiefdoms of these military leaders and other foreign occupants.

The fiefdoms that emerged after the ADFL invasion had their own rules. Therefore, institutions and implementation took on different forms. Consequently, this arrangement inhibited coordinated efforts to stimulate industry and manufacturing (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998) and create jobs. As a result, a number of unemployed youth were vulnerable to appeals from various militia groups (Cincotta, 2003). These arrangements also stifled the development of a national bureaucracy. As mentioned before, Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian factions had played key roles in the ADFL invasion, during which they staked out their resource bases in Zaire. They also identified Congolese citizens to legitimize ownership, provide themselves a rebel cover, and secure their holdings with military protection. This arrangement set up a fragmented resource management system. In this system, local factions, not the national government, determined rates and modes of resource extraction (Mokoli and Binswwanger, 1998). Also, certification requirements, such as that on timber, did not deter unsustainable extraction products (UN Panel of Experts, 2002).

The fiefdoms became more entrenched after the war in 1998 began. By 1999, the RCD controlled more than 1/3 of the Congo (US Department of State, 1999). “By 2000, Congo was essentially divided in half, with most of the north and the east controlled by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the rebel forces aligned with them; most of the south and the west were controlled by remnants of Kabila’s army, various militias, and the armies of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia" ("UN Secretary General on the War in Congo," 2000:978).

In addition to resource management problems the Kabila regime lacked control over a number of basic state functions. Dealers experienced some success in flooding local markets in the Equateur Province with fraudulent money. Oddly, rebel leaders with control of that area acted to rein in these counterfeit notes.

> A very reliable source told the Panel that in mid-1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba ordered the production of 100-franc Congolese notes. Simultaneously the Victoria Group also produced counterfeit Congolese francs. By the end of 1999, Equateur Province was flooded with counterfeit Congolese currency so that Mr. Bemba decided to suspend all 100-franc notes, including the ones he had produced, so as to stop inflation in the areas he controlled (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001:#67).

Also, the regime lacked the basic control to stimulate local, provincial, and national economies. The arrangement that the regime established with occupying forces--carving out fiefdoms--actually crowded out the local agricultural economies. Occupying forces enforced inefficiency among local farmers. They also forced and lured workers from productive farming to mining activities. As the locals were relegated to mining activities, their lives became more precarious. These unregulated mining activities were fraught with dangers from which the national government offered no protection. Also, Kinshasa was deprived of tax revenue in a number of ways. Given the lack of support from the central government, locals could not afford to send tax revenue to Kinshasa (UN Panel of Experts, April 2001).

As they had done under the Mobutu regime, some locals pooled resources to provide police, military, education, and health services. However, locals were willing to pay this price, without seceding, as long as the central government left them alone (*The Economist*, November 11, 1996).

In addition to neglecting the affairs of the state, the Kabila regime intentionally impoverished the state through the pursuit of the regime's self-interests. The U.S. Department of State noted:

> Most sectors of the economy continued to decline. Production and incomes continued to fall and the modern sector virtually disappeared. Physical infrastructure suffered serious damage, financial institutions collapsed, and public education and health deteriorated. Annual per capita national income was estimated at $115. Subsistence activities, a large informal sector, and widespread barter characterized much of the economy. The insolvent public sector could not provide even basic public services, and external economic assistance remained limited (U.S. Department of State, 1999).

Evidence suggests that Kabila skimmed a percent of profits from private and parastatal companies. These companies either delivered money to a Kabila associate or encouraged these companies to open accounts with BCD (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #41). The UN Panel of Experts wrote:

> In a letter signed by J.P. Moritz, General Manager of *Societe minere de Bakwanga* (MIBA), ad diamond company, and Ngandu Kamenda, the General Manager of MIBA ordered a payment of US$ 3.5 million to *la Generale de commerce d'import/export du Congo* (COMIEX), a company owned by late President Kabila and some of his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #30).
>
> The Government has claimed from MIBA since August 1998 on average two fifths of their earnings. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort appears to be on two levels. On the one hand, one third of the company's profit was taken directly by the Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the Government contributed directly to the expenses of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces between May 1999 and October 2000. The former Government of the DRC often used the potential of its vast resources in the Katanga and Kasai regions to secure the assistance of some allies or to cover some of the expenses they might incur during the war. The late President Kabila transferred two of MIBA's richest concessions-

> the kimberlite deposits in Tshibua and the alluvial deposits in the Senga River. [Two Zimbabwe affiliated companies], Oryx Zimcom and OSLEG together created Segamines (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #161).

The occupying forces in the guise of rebels collected their own taxes while evading DRC taxes (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #68). Both the Ugandans and Rwandans used profits from the Congo to provide social services in their home countries. even while these countries continued to accept foreign aid for development projects.

> Sectors benefiting from this assistance [to Ugandan and Rwanda] are related to poverty, education and governance. Priority sectors have been water and sanitation, health and governance, including institutional reforms, justice and human rights, especially for Rwanda (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #185).

Aid from donors to Rwanda and Uganda had the effect of freeing up government funds for military operations that should have been used to build social and political institutions The UN Panel of Experts (20002) suggests that even while earning profits in the Congo, both Uganda and Rwanda were recipients of World Bank aid. In this same period Uganda's and Rwanda's defense budgets continued to increase (UN Panel of Experts, 2002 #189-190). A number of Western donors steadily increased aid to Rwanda between 1997 and 1999 (UN Panel of Experts, 2002:185). Also, "as is the case of Uganda and Rwanda, Burundi's export of diamonds dates from 1998, coinciding with the occupation of the eastern DRC" (105).

Summary

Kabila received the gift of sovereignty from Western governments and companies. However, he compromised his own sovereignty even before he took office. The presence of foreigners during the ADFL campaign gave them a stake in the outcome.

They essentially used the ADFL campaign as a prospecting campaign; they became aware of the wealth potential. Persistent instability provided foreigners pretext to plant themselves in the Congo. They set up cartels to pillage resource stockpiles, to systematically extract resources, and to control local economies. Kabila was not able to protect local communities in certain regions.

Kabila wanted the perks that came along with sovereignty, but not the responsibilities. He was not interested in protecting law and order. Under Kabila, human rights were negotiable and justice was arbitrary. He jailed political opponents and allowed summary executions. He even allowed a military court to dispense civilian justice. Kabila excluded legitimate opposition groups from the decision-making process. During the ADFL campaign he had allowed locals to elect their officials by a show of hands. Later in his tenure, he began replacing these elected officials with appointees. Many of his bureaucratic appointments were unqualified for their positions.

Kabila became the new, insecure king over the fiefdoms within the Congo. He extracted profits from parastatals. He extracted fees for contracts. He required that companies funnel money to his private accounts.

Epilogue

"At the outset of 2001, the Congo conflict had been in stalemate for nearly two years, in large part because of resistance to UN-sponsored peace moves by the Congo's self-declared president, Laurent Kabila" ("UN Secretary on War in the Congo," 2001:159). One of Laurent Kabila's bodyguards assassinated him on January 21, 2001. At the time of Kabila's death, the second war, begun in 1998, continued ("UN Secretary on War in the Congo," 2001). This war has morphed into the conflict we see even today in eastern Congo.

Chapter IV Summary

Chapter 4 discussed the conditions that made civil wars possible in Zaire-Congo in 1996 and 1998. This chapter gave a great deal of attention to the Mobutu regime because this regime established the conditions that would lead to Mobutu's overthrow and to subsequent challenges to state power. Understanding the workings of the Mobutu regime is also important to understanding how the legacy of private ownership of state resources passed from Leopold, to the Belgian state, to Mobutu, to Kabila.

By 1996 Zaire's economy had been in freefall for at least 20 years. The extent of its economic woes is unknowable because a vast portion of its citizens relied upon their informal economic ties for survival. Despite vast resources, Mobutu failed to develop the infrastructure needed to support a modern economy. Consequently, citizens leveled a host of grievances against him. However, their actions were insufficient to overthrow Mobutu because of his support from the West. For many years, the West propped up Mobutu's dictatorship in exchange for his support in Cold War politics. In short, citizens' complaints about how resources were being misused did not result in an organized effort to capture state resources.

This chapter highlights the border politics among Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and other African countries. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, humanitarian organizations established refugee camps for expelled Hutus on the border shared by Zaire and its eastern neighbors. The Hutu militia reorganized inside the camps and waged attacks on Rwanda and the Zairian Tutsi. The Tutsi Banyamulenge's defense of its homeland transformed into attacks on the camps and a campaign to capture major resource areas inside Zaire. Rwanda and Uganda aided in this campaign and packaged it as a rebel attack from within Zaire. Uganda and Rwanda initially tried to conceal their involvement in this effort by using a washed up Congolese smuggler, Laurent Kabila, as the face of the movement.

The "rebel" movement swept through Zaire with relative ease because the Zairian army was so dilapidated from Mobutu's years of neglect. When defeat was eminent, the West all but asked Mobutu to step aside. However, before Mobutu stepped aside and before the "rebels" even captured the capital, Kabila advised companies that were interested in doing business in the Congo to contact him immediately with their offers. After assuming power, Kabila's legitimacy was short-lived. His human rights abuses from the "rebel" campaign and his administration had drawn the ire of local and international human rights organizations. However, more critical to his future, the Congolese were displeased that he employed a number of Tutsi in key administrative posts.

Kabila responded to his crisis of legitimacy by attempting to expel Tutsis from the Congo. This act, along with Kabila's unwillingness to control border attacks on Rwanda from the Hutu refugee camps, ignited conflicts with Uganda and Rwanda against the Congo. Given the weakness of his administration, Kabila avoided defeat only by enlisting the help of other African militaries. Despite this narrow escape, Rwanda and Uganda continued to control critical resource areas through cartels packaged as "rebel" groups. The UN Panel of Experts provided evidence suggesting that Rwanda and Uganda military officers had become aware of the wealth potential of the eastern regions of the Congo during the initial "rebel" campaign.

After parting ways with Kabila, Uganda and Rwanda became embroiled in their own disputes, resulting in a reordering of rebel groups. There were many starts and stops to peace processes among these and other players. Despite political withdrawals from the Congo, as with the Belgian exit from the Congo, regional players continued to control portions of the Congolese economy.

Chapter IV: Analysis Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo

Mobutu's overthrow--which led to the violence that engulfed the country for years--did not begin as a rebel movement *per se*. It began as an uprising in anticipation of brutality from Hutu extremists living in refugee camps near the Rwandan/Zairian border. The conditions that allowed this uprising to escalate into a war were the Congo's weak military and foreign intervention.

A Weak State

In 1996, a weak Congolese military combined with foreign intervention turned a local uprising into a war. Ironically, the weakness of the Congolese military actually served to shorten the conflict. However, military weakness and foreign intervention alone were not sufficient to launch these conflicts. These conflicts began due to conflicts over citizenship and property rights, ethnic agitation, and porous borders. They continued due to foreign aid, military strength in refugee camps, porous state borders, and ethnic manipulation. Inadequate state services, poor transportation, an abusive military, and a corrupt bureaucracy also contributed to a decline in Mobutu's legitimacy, which led to ADFL victories across the country.

Poor infrastructure made it difficult for military personnel to reach rebels in towns and villages. Poor transportation infrastructure was a problem for both sides because people simply could not travel efficiently. After the first war in 1996, poor infrastructure affected the type of companies that set up shop in the Congo. Less reputable companies that were willing to risk harsh conditions would establish production in remote areas, particularly "Canadian junior mining and exploration companies, for new grassroots exploration and joint ventures with Gecamines" (Coakley, 1997:J1). Once their operations were up and running, they would sell them to more reputable, established companies (UN Panel of Expertise, April 2001).

In 1997, a weak military and foreign intervention moved three countries into full blown conflict again. However, these factors alone did not lead to these conflicts. Kabila lacked legitimacy because of poor state services, poor transportation, an abusive military, and a concentration of power. But most important was Kabila's placement of Tutsis in positions of authority. To increase his legitimacy Kabila ordered Tutsi leaders and foreign troops out of his country. These orders, together with border issues, inflamed Kabila's relationship with former allies Rwanda and Uganda. Conflicts began over citizenship and property rights, lawlessness, ethnic agitation, and porous borders. They continued because of foreign aid to the militants in the refugee camps, ethnic agitation, and porous borders. This time around resource revenue and revenue from Rwandan and Ugandan-rebel control of local economies lengthened the conflicts. Foreign intervention, which already involved Rwanda and Uganda, now involved Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad and Namibia. Kabila sought help from these countries to counterbalance Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. This move made things even worse.

A Crisis of Legitimacy

A weak state also contributed to conflict in indirect ways. The weak state created legitimacy problems that encouraged people to submit to the ADFL takeover. Throughout his 30-year tenure, Mobutu increasingly concentrated executive, legislative, and judicial powers in this hands. Single-handedly he determined most state priorities. His administration did not protect citizenship rights, land rights, rule of law, or human rights. Prior to the Banyamulenge conflicts with the Hutu refugees in the camps, Mobutu had allowed (and even encouraged) refugees to attack the Banyarwardinya in the Northern Kivus. It was clear to the Banyamulenge in the Southern Kivus that the justice system would not protect them. They trained, with the aid of the RPF, to defend themselves.

The average Congolese had to fend for him/herself in a number of ways, as the state did not meet people's basic needs. For years, people's needs had been met through the informal economy. Mobutu had used resource wealth and foreign aid to enrich himself and his patronage network at the expense of healthcare, employment training, and education. State bureaucracies were corrupt and inefficient. Many of the administrative structures that remained after Mobutu's ouster were remnants from colonialism 30 years earlier. Local citizens often pooled resources to fill the gaps in police services, education, and healthcare. For example, the Mbuji-Mayi Region, MIBA and the Kasians provided their own university and schools through the resources they were allowed to retain from the parastatal MIBA. As mentioned earlier, the Mobutu regime neglected the borders of the far-east regions. The social service needs of the region were neglected entirely. Consequently, six to seven months into the ADFL campaign people ceased to resist.

Ultimately, Mobutu's neglect of the state apparatus cost him his throne. His legitimacy problems also encouraged military personnel to abandon their posts to join the winning team. The Mobutu regime had either failed to pay military personnel or had issued them worthless banknotes. Not only did the military suffer from low morale, they were terribly undisciplined. Mobutu provided military resources to his top ranking officers and his elite personal guards as minded his personal fiefdom. Mobutu's poorly funded military could not resist the unorganized troops of the ADFL. One news outlet reported that ADFL troops in flip-flops and tennis shoes managed to defeat the country's military. Mobutu eventually brought in outside reinforcement from foreign mercenaries. However, a weak military strengthened the ADFL's resolve. Rwanda and Uganda also strengthened the ADFL's resolve with prior military training and economic support.

The weak state apparatus also created problems for resource distribution. The weak bureaucracy prevented the establishment of clear predictable channels of income redistribution. The absence of these channels further endeared people to their traditional (ethnic) ties, creating problems of national identity. The artificial state boundaries separating kingdoms already presented problems of national identity. These boundaries were the culmination of colonial processes that had no regard for the way societies constructed themselves. These lines exacerbated tensions that existed during and prior to colonial partition (Saugestad, 2001:170).

Mobutu suffered a crisis of legitimacy because of his lack of commitment to the state he governed for 32 years. He was able to continue ruling because the outside community upheld his sovereignty. The IMF, and multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors were willing to continue restructuring debt for Mobutu as long as he promised to use his country's resource wealth to liberalize his economy. However, circumstances suggest that Western donors would likely have contributed huge sums of money even in the absence of resources. The Congo, because of its geographic location, was a strategic base from which Western donors could contest communists in neighboring countries.

Foreign Powers

The genocide that occurred two years prior and spilled over into the Congo played a major role in the 1996 and in the 1998 conflicts. Refugees fleeing Rwanda fled to camps at the Zairian border. Military activity coordinated among the Hutu camp refugees provided a self-defense justification for Rwanda's occupation in Zaire. Because of foreign occupation in Zaire and foreign involvement in "rebel" conflicts, these wars had international implications. Also, because of the overwhelming representation of a range of countries (from around the world) in these conflicts, these wars could qualify as world wars. Still, a number of scholars have included the Congo in their quantitative analyses of civil wars in a way that glosses over the uniqueness of these circumstances.

The foreign invaders had plenty of justification for their presence, particularly in the camps on the Uganda – Rwanda and Congo borders. The Hutu militants could launch raids into Uganda and Rwanda from these camps. Later reports suggest that officials from Rwanda and Uganda assessed economic prospects during their initial occupation during the overthrow of Mobutu. Even without this evidence, the outcome was that Rwanda and Uganda, and later other countries set up economic strongholds in the Congo. Again, from these perspectives, we cannot decisively say that this was internal natural resource conflict by an aggrieved internal group. These findings, however, lend credence to the notion that porous borders lengthen natural resource conflicts. This case also suggests that proximity of a country's resources to another country's border also plays s role in the decision to occupy another country. For Kabila, the rise to power with support from Rwanda and Uganda challenged his sovereignty as a leader from day one. Kabila suffered a crisis of legitimacy early in his tenure as leader of the Congo.

During both wars, the central government lacked the ability to defeat rebel groups. The force that overthrew Mobutu was able to do so because of the weakness of the Congolese military, not the ADFL's strength. Thus the Congolese military under Kabila needed assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and even the Hutu rebels in the refugee camps. The introduction of these new countries into Congo politics created new beneficiaries of the Congo's resource wealth. For example, the UN has documented the economic ventures with which Kabila rewarded Zimbabweans.

Essentially, rebel groups and the Congolese government under Kabila carved out sections of the country as their own. Rebel factions meted out local justice. While the

RCD instituted its own humanitarian review board, the RCD also tortured, raped, and executed people. Although these groups overtook local economies by force, they also sought local legitimacy. Wamba da Wamba, as the early RCD leader, envisioned the type of projects that his group could provide to support the local economy. These groups were economic cartels protecting and expanding their territory and even challenging the territory staked out by the state. At this point the motives are completely distinguishable from any grievances by the locals.

Private Ownership

Thom labels the new pattern of African warlordism as "organized banditry." For me this pattern is not new, but a continuation of the organized banditry of colonialism. Just as Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and the Congo have carved up the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so did European colonizers. This notion of private ownership is important because (1) it interfered with the development of the Congo, thereby making the country susceptible to war and (2) it gave challengers such as Rwanda and Uganda the impression that the state was up for grabs. The role of the military in Congolese political processes is also a colonial legacy. The movement toward independence was mired in military and authoritarian control. The intersection of military control and the notion that the state was ripe for personal ownership created a system of cartels that used military muscle for personal security.

Common Explanations

The natural resource conflict literature identifies two periods in recent Congolese history during which resources figured prominently in civil war. The first round of violence

(1996 against Mobutu) did not originally involve resources directly. It began as violent expressions of grievances by the Banyamulenge for the citizenship rights, land rights, and rule of law. The ADFL became associated with this effort about two weeks later. This campaign later involved the control of natural resources.

Grievances

There were plenty of grievances to challenge Congolese leadership under Mobutu and Kabila. However, consistent with the Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the expression of a wider range of grievances ultimately did not overthrow Mobutu. A number of groups including the UDPS, tried to register complaints through political channels. However, they failed because the international community (i.e. Western powers) refused to acknowledge their (elected) leaders as sovereign. One could argue that the ADFL campaign was grievance transformed into greed. However, the campaign occurred in the context of international, not civil war. As is often the case, rebels received economic and military aid from external factions which prolonged the Banyamulenge campaign. The supporting countries, however, did not limit their pursuits to influencing from the outside. They set up political and economic strongholds within the country.

In the second round of fighting a number of obvious grievances surfaced. The Congolese were angry that Kabila had placed so many Tutsis (foreign and local) into leadership positions in government and the military. In an effort to establish legitimacy, Kabila persecuted, killed, and exiled Tutsis. He also brutally suppressed political dissent inside Congo. He was also contending with grievances outside of Congo. The Rwandans were angry about the Hutu attacks from the refugee camps. The combination of these attacks and Tutsi persecution provided Rwanda justification to attack Congo.

Resource Extraction

The body of literature that discusses the role that resources play in civil war suggests that where heavy infrastructure is necessary to extract resources (industrial diamonds, oil), the state will be contested. The reasoning here is that such large projects require space, time, and investment that only the state can control. The application of this contention to the first war is unclear, since an abundance of lootables and unlootables were present in the Congo. However, other applications are clearer. The literature suggests that rebels who are united by a common identity and who have secured resources in a remote area (away from the capital) will be more likely to seek separation. In both wars, the lack of common identity interfered with separation. Another consideration here may be the location of resources from another country's borders.

The Congo under Mobutu and Kabila had certainly fallen victim to Dutch Disease. Resource extraction was a chief sector, in addition to a number of consumable sectors. Because of fear and instability agricultural production was limited to subsistence farming. The number of employment opportunities outside of mining dwindled. Throughout his 35 years as leader of Zaire Mobutu made gestures and promises to the Western world that he would liberalize the country's economy. The average percentage (of GDP) of single commodity exports and the economic conditions in Zaire support the notion that a country's dependence upon a small number of commodities makes it vulnerable to natural resource conflict. The thinking here is that downturns in the commodity cycles will cause chaos. Yes, Zaire has been vulnerable to downturns in commodity cycles. However, the fall in prices was a part of a larger backdrop of insecurity. By that time, Mobutu had nationalized large companies to some extent, rendering them unproductive. Moreover, the instability reduced the number of sectors available to the Congolese. For example, the agricultural sector declined because people began to view mining as a more profitable venture and because disgruntled soldiers often looted agricultural holdings. The resource cycles were not directly linked to the ADFL takeover. However, the backdrop of instability was. When a downturn in the prices of Zaire's chief export (copper) occurred in the 1970s, the regime simply began to rely on revenue from diamonds. Also, Mobutu sustained himself through a combination of resource wealth and foreign aid. In the end, economic instability played a secondary role in the second war.

Society: Sobels and More

During neither war do we see a perfect fit of soldiers to the sobel (soldiers by day--rebels by night) model. Before the first war, soldiers were soldiers by day and looters by night--looters of homes, property, agriculture, and resources. Also, in the first war soldiers worked for both sides, joining the ADFL along its campaign. While other political groups aggrieved by Mobutu were nominally a part of the ADFL coalition, it appears that their grievances were not chief considerations in this process. In the end, Kabila jettisoned them from the group and ignored their requests for representation in the new government. The circumstances of the second war challenged the sobel description even more. These rebels were private mercenaries of foreign occupants. Rwanda and Uganda did not just support the rebels, they were the rebels.

In Zaire, the us vs. them dichotomy could be seen in Kasai, Shaba, the Kivus, and against the Tutsis in general. Grievances were clearly articulated as group issues. The ADFL campaign spawned from Tutsi rebellion against attacks from the Hutu refugee camps and the state's challenges to Banyamulenge citizenship. The effort was Tutsi-controlled in the sense that Tutsi-led Rwanda and Uganda ultimately took over resources in Zaire. Later, when Kabila wanted to eliminate the foreign presence of Rwanda and Uganda, he attached his rhetoric to popular anti-Tutsi sentiments. Support of their Tutsi brethren, in addition to attacks from the Hutu camps, provided Rwanda and Uganda reasons to enter. Both greed and grievances were wrapped in ethnic clothing, suggesting we will probably continue to see a correlative rather than causal relationship between ethnicity and natural resource conflict.

Once in office, Kabila, like Mobutu, dominated all political processes. He controlled the constitutional development process, recruiting reviewers who would not challenge him. He installed a weak cabinet of people who had no government experience whatsoever. He instituted a military-style justice system where Kabila imprisoned and executed political dissidents without due process. He reacted to mass political protest brutally and lethally. Accusations of humanitarian abuses dogged his administration even after his death in 2001. In short, Kabila provided no political nor legal channels through which people could funnel their opposition. Kabila did not develop a political plan to complement his military campaign. The lack of political planning lends credence to the idea that this campaign was largely for economic reasons.

Kabila's legitimacy derived from his overthrowing Mobutu and the promise of a different type of governance. However, after he assumed power, it became clear that it would be business as usual. Once in office, Kabila refused to include the established political opposition. Also because of his ties to Tutsi Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila's legitimacy among the Congolese suffered. The Congolese were resentful because Kabila rewarded the Tutsis who had assisted in Mobutu's overthrow by assigning them to high-ranking positions in the government. To restore his legitimacy, Kabila asked Rwanda and Uganda to leave the country. He also allowed abuses to remaining Tutsis. These acts turned former friends into foes, with both countries sponsoring rebels in northeast Congo. Rwanda had already threatened action upon the Congo if the international community would not control the Hutu rebels launching attacks from the refugee camps.

Sovereignty

The international community's acknowledgement of Kabila as the sovereign figure stoked his greed and helped project the ADFL as the winner of the conflict. Kabila's rebel army was really a collection of mildly committed soldiers. When it appeared that the ADFL would capture the state, corporations began courting the new leader with money and other resources. Evidence suggests that the ADFL sold booty futures or production rights to a variety of companies. The ADFL sold these rights quickly to fund its war efforts, thereby diminishing the power of the state to resist. Outsiders' willingness to acknowledge Kabila's sovereignty helped initially lengthen the conflict, then shorten it, as he resources that Kabila and the ADFL liquidated helped the "rebels" achieve a decisive victory quickly. There was also a psychological impact here. As companies, other countries, and the Congolese people were projecting the ADFL as the winner, it seemed that the ADFL only had to take its rightful position.

Despite his decisive victory, by relying upon outside sponsorship from Rwanda and Uganda Kabila's sovereignty was challenged even before it was recognized by the international community. The Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels had direct access to companies, in the same way Kabila had when Mobutu's overthrow appeared imminent. The rebels controlled local economies by controlling the extraction of natural resources, the flow of consumables, and the market values of goods and services.

Tilting the Balance

The role of foreign aid and assistance in these conflicts cannot be overestimated. Foreign aid could be used for and against the state, as the Congo's weak state apparatus did not require all aid to be filtered through the central government. Evidence suggests that Rwanda and Uganda stage the Banyamulenge offensive as a pretext for capturing resources. Their presence clearly lengthened this offensive into a full-blown military campaign and government overthrow. While waging a profitable war on foreign soil, Rwanda and Uganda continued to receive aid from foreign sources to pay for projects that Rwanda and Uganda could have paid for by diverting funds away from military exercises.

On the other side, the Hutus converted humanitarian aid from organizations into weapons and resources through which they could control people in the refugee camps.

With these resources and weapons they could attack Tutsi in the Congo and in Rwanda. For Mobutu, the refugee camps provided a good reason to ask for foreign aid. Western officials had begun cutting off his unlimited money supply. He had to enlist the help of European mercenaries. However, the European mystique had dissolved and so combatants were not fearful of the superior might of white forces. Mobutu's own arrogance assured him that the West would come to his aid, and this aid would be enough to beat back the onslaught. So the promise of unlimited aid and the delivery of some financial aid and military assistance was enough to make him confident that he could contain the ADFL. However, in late April and early May 1999, Western powers (e.g.. the United States) essentially told Mobutu to do the right thing and step down from power (Wrong, 2000).

Summary

Abuse of resources was one among many problems leading up to both conflicts. Along these trajectories of conflict other factors were unique to this region. Humanitarian organizations established refugee camps along the eastern Zairian border after the genocide. The Hutu rebels reorganized their political and military apparatus inside these camps, as it was difficult for humanitarian organizations to distinguish the killers/militants from innocent refugees. The rebels controlled the distribution of goods and service.

A legacy of resource mismanagement began with King Leopold of Belgium, as the Congo and the resources therein were literally his personal property. After Leopold was pressured into relinquishing his personal possession to the Belgian state, the authoritarian rule of the Belgians stifled the development of administrative and social structures in the Congo. The Congolese went from colonial subjugation to manipulation by Cold War powers. This cloud of superpower manipulation further stifled political development. Since the superpowers installed leaders rather than encouraging them to seek public legitimacy, the state was viewed as a set of spoils for competing factions that could capture the state resources by force. From this perspective, the Congo has operated more like a Medieval Kingdom than a modern state.

The Kabila regime simply continued a legacy of feudalism and personal ownership of the state. Kabila's regime was different from Leopold's and Mobutu's in that Kabila had to share a larger portion of his spoils with the outside forces that had helped him capture the state from Mobutu. But the continued attitude of personal ownership invited contestation.

Chapter V: Case Study Republic of Botswana

Scholars and public officials see the Republic of Botswana, in the heart of dark Africa, as a brilliant light. It has used its vast resource wealth to propel itself into modern statehood (Nyamnjoh, 2006:87). The macro-economic indicators in Table 9 provide evidence of Botswana’s steady progress.

While Botswana’s development has been remarkable, this dissertation is concerned with the ways resource wealth has contributed to this development, rather than creating political chaos. This chapter will examine the conflict determinants identified in Chapters 2 and 3. More specifically, it will look for evidence of the resource curse and Dutch disease, and state strengths and weaknesses in general. If some of the conditions show up in Botswana that appeared to play a role in the Congo conflicts, then this analysis will help eliminate those conditions as determinants of civil conflict.

In order to compare resource management in Botswana directly with that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), this case study will examine resource development from Botswana’s independence up the late 1990s, the period in which resource ownership became most tentative in the Congo.

Governance: The Macro-economy

The exact size of the Zaire-Congo economy was unknown, as the formal economy was deeply intertwined with the informal economy. The macro-economy in Zaire began to

Table 9. Botswana Macro-Economic Indicators

Year	GDP (Current US$-Billions)	GDP Growth (Annual Percent)	GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual Percent)
1980	1.06	11.99	8.01
1981	1.07	9.06	5.35
1982	1.01	12.17	8.48
1983	1.17	13.15	9.53
1984	1.24	8.55	5.13
1985	1.11	7.13	3.78
1986	1.39	8.17	4.83
1987	1.97	11.88	8.47
1988	2.64	19.45	15.86
1989	3.08	13.06	9.71
1990	3.79	6.77	3.66
1991	3.94	7.46	4.38
1992	4.15	2.92	0.03
1993	4.16	1.92	-0.85
1994	4.34	3.63	0.95
1995	4.77	4.40	1.87
1996	4.80	5.55	3.14
1997	5.18	10.17	7.82
1998	5.19	10.57	8.39
1999	5.62	7.22	5.30
2000	6.18	8.23	6.50
2001	6.03	5.21	3.74

Source: The World Bank Group. World Development Indicators Online. Downloaded January 6, 2009.

show obvious decline in the early 1980s. Previously, the state had relied heavily upon resource exports. However, the state did not develop the infrastructure to support the mining industry, even engaging in inefficient public works projects. For example, the country depended upon copper revenue at least until the mid-1970s. Yet it allowed its central operation, Gecamines, to fall into disrepair. When copper prices rebounded, Zaire was no longer competitive with countries such as Chile that used more efficient, modern processes to refine copper.

As a result of preferential treatment and patronage, companies such as DeBeers maintained monopolies under Mobutu. Conversely, Kabila's way of doing business attracted disreputable companies (or lesser known subsidiaries of larger companies) that would assume the initial risk and then sell their operations to more reputable companies. This process allowed established companies to disassociate their names from the conflicts.

All sectors struggled to survive in the Congo. The insecurity of land ownership damaged the agricultural sector under the Mobutu regime. Under Kabila, foreign occupants controlled the flow of crops and money in local economies.

Mining

Since Independence, Botswana's principle sources of revenue were diamonds, cattle, and revenues from its regional economic association. Other notable sources of revenue included nickel, copper, clay, coal, semiprecious gemstones, gold, salt, sand, silver, soda ash, and construction stone (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). "'Botswana closed

1985 with record proceeds of sales of diamonds, beef, copper, and, nickel'" (*Gaborone Domestic Service*, January 24, 1986). Table 10 shows that this pattern of record proceeds continued well into the late 1990s.

Table 11 shows how production of a range of minerals grew from the 1985 to 2001. Between 1994 and 1999, minerals constituted about 50 percent of Botswana's GDP. Revenue from the custom's pool was about 14 percent, non-mineral income tax was about six percent, general sales tax was about four percent, Bank of Botswana profits from foreign exchange reserves was about 17 percent, and other revenue was about eight percent (BIDPA, 1999). The US Geological Survey reports, "in the 1990s the entire mineral "industry accounted for more than 40% of the GDP. It also provided more than 85% of exports, as well as about 50% of Government revenue" (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa "belong to the common customs union through which the black states receive up to 35% of their revenue[20]" (*Johannesburg International Service*, June 27, 1985). These production numbers help explain why "Botswana's very high level of public spending provision has been achieved without imposing a high tax burden on the domestic economy" (Republic of Botswana, 2005:9).

Botswana's diamonds are located in three principle sites: (1) Shashe at Selebi-Phikwe, established in 1970; (2) Orapa, productive in 1971; and (3) Jwaneng, productive in 1976 (Masire, 2007). The state developed Shashe as a mine and a township. Although

[20] This union is the Southern Africa Customs Union. http://www.sacu.int/index.php

Table 10. Mining Production, 1985-2001- Botswana

Year	Diamond (Carats)	Semi-Precious Stones (Tons)	Gold (kg)	Nickel (T)	Copper (T)
1985	12,634	14	13	19,565	21,692
1986	13,100	5	25.2	18,972	21,337
1987	13,225	40	31.7	16,528	19,000
1988	15,229	38	21	22,539	24,428
1989	15,252	146	67	21,309	23,403
1990	17,351	1	46	19,022	22,000
1991	16,506	0	20	19,294	20,576
1992	15,946	39	165	18,873	20,413
1993	14,730	40	192	21,621	20,132
1994	15,550	67	234	19,041	22,780
1995	16,802	20	86	18,088	20,461
1996	17,707	35	5	22,095	23,299
1997	20,111	54	28	20,157	19,820
1998	19,639	38	1	22,851	22,124
1999	21,263	84	8	22,898	20,960
2000	24,635	112	4	21,446	18,722
2001	26,190	76	2	22,454	19,209

Source: Republic of Botswana, Department of Mines. 2002. “Annual Report.”

Table 11. Mining as a Percent of Government Revenue and Export Earnings

Year	Portion of Revenue	Portion of Export Earnings
1972	10% of government revenue	1/3 export earnings
1978-1980	1/3 of government revenue	½ export earnings
1982	1/2 of government revenues	2/3 of export earnings
1998	60% of government revenues	3/4 of export earnings

Source: Masire, Quett. 2007. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat. Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. (ed). Macmillan Botswana Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd.: Gaborone, Botswana.

the mine was unproductive, it played a vital role in the local and national economies. To support the operation and the township, Botswana built a power company in Morupule. The government announced funding for the Orapa site in 1967. In the early stages of production in 1971, the government developed Orapa as a closed town and mining center (Masire, 2007:204).

Prudence

Botswana was able to survive economic challenges because of prudence, performance, and good luck. Despite its efforts to open other sectors, Botswana relied heavily upon diamond revenue. Botswana balanced its reliance on a limited number of exports with economic frugality. Rather than extravagant spending on unsustainable or unnecessary public works projects state officials used surpluses to establish reserves for import cover (Executive Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997; Johannesburg International Service, August 8, 1982). State officials also "sank diamond profits into viable development projects, stabilisation, public Debt Service, Productive Employment Development Fund, [and] long-term resources outside the country" (Masire, 2007:205). In 1982, "low prices for diamonds and minerals had caused a rapid deterioration in Botswana's balance of payments" (Johannesburg International Service, May 7, 1982). In response, the government devalued the currency (the Pula) by 10 percent and instituted huge budget cuts (Johannesburg International Service, May 7, 1982). It is important to note that Botswana's own austerity measures--controlling public sector wages, reserving funds, and trimming the budget--were self-imposed.

Botswana's reserve funds from diamonds helped Botswana ride the commodity cycles in minerals and in cattle trades. "Before 1970, livestock formed the economic backbone of the country" (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:20). Severe droughts occurred upon independence, in 1982-83, 1987-88, and in 1992 (Love, 1994). Despite a persistent six-year drought, GDP increased by 41.5% in 1986-87, up from 14% in 1985-86 (*Gaborone Domestic Service*, July 21, 1988). Another reason Botswana's cattle trade continued against serious odds is because of its preferential export agreement with the European Union (EU). In 1989/90, 69 percent of Botswana's cattle exports went to the EU (Stevens and Kennan, 2005). "Europe has been one of the important importers of Botswana beef" (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:20). Despite the EU's protectionist policies toward the Botswana cattle supply, the Botswana cattle industry struggled against increased shipping and storage costs, other costs associated with hoof and mouth disease, and the costs associated with drought. While Botswana cattle owners incurred these additional costs, prices for cattle products remained relatively steady in the EU (Stevens and Kennan, 2005).

Luck/Performance

In the throes of economic crises, the new mining operation—Jwaneng--came into full production in 1982. It was the most profitable mine in the world (Masire, 2007). So, five years after a downturn, Botswana experienced a 14.5 percent increase in prices in 1986 (Johannesburg SAPA. September 29, 1987). Also, during the first quarter of 1989, prices on three main export commodities-- diamonds, beef, and copper-nickel--were nearly 80 percent higher than in previous corresponding periods. Diamond exports were about $1,378 million or about 2.8 million Pula, up 72 percent. Former President Masire recounts that Botswana experienced an economic boom between 1978 and 1980. In 1980 production doubled. Botswana produced 2.5 million carats with the opening of Orapa. With the opening of Jwaneng, the state generated 13 million carats. The state generated 15 to 17 million carats by the end of the 1980s. In 1997, the state generated 10 million carats (Masire, 2007). Copper-nickel exports were up 110 percent. Also, recovery in the beef industry in 1988 continued into the first quarter of 1989. As a result, surpluses exceeded projections (*Gaborone Domestic Service*, July 11, 1989.

Botswana's economy grew because of low inflation and strong purchasing power. Botswana had stockpiled minerals in July 1987. Also, "Botswana has never nationalized or expropriated any foreign business. There were no restrictions on reinvestments or production, repatriation of earnings and capital, and the Government liberalized exchange controls at year end 1994" (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). However, Botswana's foreign direct investment suffered in the early 1990s because of its low interest rates. "Businesses arrange so as to borrow local money. The low interest rates on the Pula" meant that it was impractical for investors to bring in funds from outside of Botswana (*Gaborone Daily News*, April 20, 1990). Also, "productivity in transports and manufacturing has been declining since the late 1990s" (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008: 17). Manufacturing was only 3.7 percent of foreign direct investment stock in 1999, "in spite of the fact for many years investment in this sector benefited from an incentives scheme" (UNCTAD, 2003:10).

Despite the challenges to the non-mineral sectors, by 1999 thirty-two percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 29 percent in other African countries[21]) surveyed were satisfied with the state of the national economy. Fifty-five percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 64 percent in other African countries) were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the state of the national economy (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001).

Corporate Negotiation

Former President Quett Masire suggests in his 2007 memoirs that the founders of Botswana kept the country's resource abundance in perspective. Botswana's government was lauded for several practical approaches, including planning its resource extraction, gaining revenue, and expenditure of revenue. More specifically, government built up the reserves and negotiated aggressively with mining companies. Masire's memoirs suggest that the founders understood the artificial value of diamonds. This perspective shows up in their negotiations with the international diamond mining industry. The state did not allow mining companies to "hold a deposit off the market" (Masire, 2007:201) because diamonds have a "fictitious value" (Masire, 2007:205). The state wanted to extract the diamonds as quickly as possible and convert them to a form, such as the dollar, that was not as vulnerable to commodity cycles as diamonds. The state would then place these dollars into reserve (Masire, 2007).

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[21] Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

These booms were boons for the state as well as private mining companies. In 1968 (*Business Week*, 2009), the Republic of Botswana established Debswana in a 50/50 shareholding arrangement with the South African company DeBeers. The state required 100 percent investment by DeBeers. The founders did not want to be left with unproductive operations when companies defaulted on unprofitable projects. Also, since the government established that all minerals below the land belonged to the state (Republic of Botswana, 1967), three-fourths of the profits went to the government as the owner of the minerals. In addition, the state required companies to pay income taxes on their own profits. Operations in countries such as South Africa and Namibia had to produce quotas for DeBeers. These arrangements disadvantaged these countries when production was low and countries were forced to stockpile to meet quotas during downturns. Rather than stockpile to cover imports, Botswana negotiated its agreement based on production capacity (Masire, 2007), rather than quotas.

The Central Selling Organization (CSO) (DeBeers) controlled the marketing of diamonds, with long-term contracts throughout the world. Botswana had an official check after DeBeers' pricing because of the variability in pricing for seemingly similar stones. As part of Botswana's 1975 agreement with DeBeers, DeBeers constructed Orapa House in Botswana to sort and value diamonds before they left the country. Botswana had previously sent stones to Kimberley in South Africa for sorting and valuation. Also as part of this agreement, state officials considered forming its own CSO, but all the international marketers had connections to DeBeers. The happy medium was for officials to closely watch the market. The state tried its hand at diamond cutting at Serowe. It proved to be a losing venture, and the state abandoned the project (Masire, 207).

Botswana's haggling with DeBeers played a pivotal role in the country's development. Public officials recognized the leverage the state had with DeBeers; either DeBeers would work in Botswana according to terms favorable to the state or Botswana would conduct business with another company. For example, Masire recounts that DeBeers wanted to limit Jwaneng mine production to 40 percent (to raise prices). In response Botswana threatened to find someone else to mine the site (Masire, 2007:208). Also by the 1980s, DeBeers anticipated international fallout from the apartheid system in South Africa. Fearing future economic restrictions, DeBeers wanted to stockpile diamonds. DeBeers asked for part of Botswana's stockpile in exchange for company shares. Also in exchange, Botswana could appoint two directors to DeBeers' board (Masire, 2007). State officials recognized the need to "increase technical and management capacity [among Batswana] since Debswana mine management was reporting to Anglo in Johannesburg" (Masire, 2007:208), as opposed to reporting to Botswana's own project managers.

Tough negotiations with mining companies, not the mineral wealth alone, helped secure maximum profits for Botswana. These negotiations were part of a larger atmosphere that valued planning of resource extraction, revenue generation, and sustainable expenditures. At the heart of these negotiations was durable mining legislation. Specifically, the legislature enacted the Mines and Minerals Act in 1967 and amended the act in 1976 and 1977 (*Ministry, Mines, and Minerals Act*, 1967, 1976, 1977). The state would permit 25-year leases (*MMA*, Provision 42), with the option for the state to review leases for malfeasance. Provision 76 permits the state to suspend permits for false statements. In addition, the legislature enacted provisions to make sure that contracts would always work to the state's benefit. Provision 44(2) requires that if a permit holder makes new discoveries in the course of mining, he/she has to report them to the Ministry. Provision 40 allows the state the "option of acquiring up to 15 percent working interest in a proposed mine." Provision 66 outlines the following royalties for mining: 10 percent for precious stones, five percent for precious metals, three percent for other minerals and mineral products. Finally, Provision 53 stipulates that only citizens of Botswana may issue mining permits.

Other Sectors

Despite its overwhelming successes, Botswana has struggled to develop sectors outside mining and cattle. Agriculture is now being treated as a relic in Botswana. Figure 2. illustrates the fluctuations, but overall decline, in the agricultural sector.

Agriculture

Drought played a major role in Botswana's agricultural decline. However, as Love (1994) pointed out, the drought explanation is an oversimplification of a larger political context. The emphasis on livestock over agriculture favored the political elite cattle owners. As the state structured subsidies and gave land privileges to wealthier cattle owners, these incentives converted the cattle owners into a modern commercial/industrial class. The mining sector was not without blame here. Because of



Figure 2. Botswana Total Agricultural Output, 1985-2001

Source: Republic of Botswana, Central Statistics Office: Gaborone, Botswana. File Created: April 19, 2005. Updated: August 24, 2007.

the unprecedented rate of mining production, diamond prices inflated the exchange rates, thereby inflating agricultural prices. As Love explained:

> recurrent drought created the paradoxical situation wherein the government gained credit for limiting the extent of human distress through its drought relief program while benefiting from the way in which effects of drought disguised major biases impacting agriculture (Love, 1994, html version).

While agricultural policy seemed to mask class inequalities and favor the cattle-owning elite, Niemann (1993) contended that the relationship between the elite bureaucrats benefiting from the mining sector was at odds with the interests of old cattle-owning elite. He argued that since elite bureaucrats derive their wealth from stock in mining companies, they have prevented surpluses from being invested in other sectors, including cattle.

Land played a central role in Botswana’s economic development. Land was a contentious issue in Botswana because of the competing claims to hunt, to graze, to grow crops, and to mine resources. The first comprehensive land regulations, the 1975 *Tribal Grazing Policy* established three types of land: commercial farming areas (freehold), communal grazing areas (tribal), and reserved areas (state) (Vaughan, 2003; UNCTAD, 2003). To address land issues, the legislature erected local Land Boards. These boards are “not quite executive, legislative, or judicial – quasi-bureaucrats” (Werbner, 2004:111). The “Tribal Land Act of 1993 strengthened powers of the Land Boards” (Werbner, 2004:114). These Acts weakened tribal power, in favor of the Land Boards, and thus evoked dissent from tribal chiefs (Vaughan, 2003).

Problems with access to water exacerbated problems with land. Because of the dry conditions in Botswana, borehole syndicates developed as “a new type of private group ownership of resources” (61) to drill for water on arid land. “Many drilled on pasture lands” (110). The boreholes lead “to the *de facto* control of pastures by borehole ownership, despite the *dejure* communal status of grazing land” (111). The existence of the boreholes supported the idea that “rights to water are rights to land” (111). "Since the boreholes must be five square miles apart, that requirement has meant to some that they should crowd in pastures in that five square mile range” (Peters, 1994).

Manufacturing

The “non-mining private sector grew more slowly than GDP as a whole in the past decade” (Republic of Botswana, 2005:6). In the late 1990s, Botswana‘s manufacturing sector faced a number of challenges. While Botswana’s Export Development and Investment Authority reports that exports increased between 1996 and 2000, this surge was because of the large Hyundai plant in Botswana, which closed in 2000. The Motor Company of Botswana employed 600 people. The Halte Garment Company employed 1,000 people. It also closed in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2003).

Botswana officials wrote, “efforts to diversify the economy had some success in the 1980s and early 1990s, but it has been less diverse in recent years” (Republic of Botswana, 2005:6). Going into 2000, the regional customs union, the SADC, tried to move from a struggling customs union to an integrated market. More fundamentally, Botswana struggled to wean itself off protectionist policies in food processing, textiles, clothing, wood products, and furniture production. However, the country’s struggle to diversify its economy was institutionalized by protective tariffs (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008; Bank of Botswana, 2002). One observer noted: “Perceived impediments to doing business in Botswana are related to the labor force and the functioning of the labor market, an inefficient government bureaucracy, inadequate and high cost infrastructure, as well as issues of access to and cost of finance, in particular for smaller firms” (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008:19). The state itself expressed concerns about structural problems (Republic of Botswana, 2005). As a result of these structural issues, “manufacturing is strongly dependent on international market niches to attract foreign direct investment” (UNCTAD, 2003:73).

Reports suggest that another fundamental challenge to economic diversity was a lack of education among many citizens (Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority; Delechat and Gaertner, 2008). One report noted: “The education system was for many years biased towards the needs of the public sector and neglected those of the private sector (including the needs of the mining sector)” (UNCTAD, 2003:16). As a result of poor skills training, foreign investors had to train workers on the job. However, industrial training focused on unskilled positions (UNCTAD, 2003). Consequently, foreign investors relied heavily on the skilled expatriate workforce. In recent years, foreign labor has constituted about five percent of Botswana’s workforce. This figure compares negatively to Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) countries (including Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the UK) which generally have less than five percent (UNCTAD, 2003).

Table 12. Foreign Direct Stock,[22] 1999 - Botswana

Sector	Percent
Mining	75.2
Retail and Wholesale Trade	9.1
Finance	7.0
Manufacturing	3.7
Real Estate and Business Service	2.0
Tourism	1.1
Other	1.1
Transportation, Storage, Communication	.6
Construction	.1

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD, 2003

Finally, it appears that HIV/AIDS played a large role in personnel attrition in Botswana (Delechat and Gaertner, 2008). The Republic of Botswana estimates that as late as 2004, the epidemic possibly affected annual growth by as much as two to three percent (Republic of Botswana, 2005). "One investor interviewed is losing at least one skilled member of his staff every month due to death from HIV/AIDS" (UNCTAD, 2003:16).

Even with labor shortages and structural problems in other sectors, the government remained committed to the development of the mining industry. As shown in Table 12, foreign-direct stock favored mining projects in 1999. UNCTAD (2003) reports despite Botswana's having to import technology for manufacturing, "foreign investors make sure technology in mining is updated" (UNCTAD, 2003:16). Also, while

> mining accounts for 1/3 of the GDP and ¾ of the total stocks of FDI, it generates only 3.5 percent of total employment.[In addition], mining, which is the largest

[22] stock aimed at the development of "technology, skills and access to export markets" in various sectors of the economy (UNCTAD, 2003:3).

> economic sector, still relies heavily on imported supplies and equipment and there is no industry cluster built around this sector (UNCTAD, 2003:18-19).

Summary

At a broad level, Botswana managed to avoid the economic and political problems present in a number of African countries. Resource revenue, particularly from diamonds, played a central role in this outcome. Botswana had the good fortune of owning the most profitable mine in the world, the Jwaneng Mine. Botswana invested heavily in the infrastructure to support the mining industry. While Botswana also relied heavily upon its cattle industry, the state used revenue from the diamond industry to prop up the cattle industry. Botswana also benefited from its regional, trading arrangements.

The sheer value of resources extracted in Botswana could not completely account for the state's economic success. Botswana officials were prudent in imposing austerity measurements upon themselves. Officials maintained high levels of import cover and foreign assets. They also engaged in practical infrastructure projects. In addition, they controlled public sector wages. Finally, they did not nationalize Botswana's economy.

To complement good fortune and prudence, state founders were also tough, objective negotiators. They set conditions whereby mining companies could not default on unprofitable projects. They also demanded royalties from each project, as well as mining fees and part ownership. In addition, they established contracts with companies based on production, not quotas. Therefore, companies could only demand the resources Botswana was able and willing to provide.

Botswana did not develop other sectors as well as it did the mining sector. Agricultural output fluctuated through the 1990s, but was generally in decline. Exchange rates, driven up by the mining industry, artificially inflated agricultural prices. Small agriculture operations suffered while industrial operations grew in number. A central problem associated with agriculture was land distribution. Botswana is generally a dry country. As such, ranchers had to invest in boreholes to water cattle and irrigate crops. Wealthy syndicate members who owned the boreholes essentially controlled the land. Also, the distinction of land as private, state, or tribal also resulted in unequal access. Wealthy, private owners used communal lands, in addition to their own land, to graze cattle. The decision to support agriculture at a level lower than the cattle trade was the result of a political calculus controlled by cattle ranches.

Manufacturing also took a back seat to mining. In 2000, two key facilities closed in Botswana, putting about 1,600 people out of work. Manufacturing fell victim to poor worker training and a poor work ethic. Consequently, as foreign direct investors were unwilling to take the risks. Also, investors had to contend with protectionist policies and less technical support for manufacturing than was available for mining. Finally, HIV/AIDS created personnel challenges for investors.

State Infrastructure

The lack of sound infrastructure in Zaire – DRC contributed to both Mobutu's and Kabila's legitimacy problems. Because they both were perceived by some groups to be illegitimate, citizens were willing to embrace outside liberators. The DRC depends even today to on a poor transportation, healthcare, and education system.

Physical Infrastructure

Former President Masire contends that the state did not undertake mining for its own sake. Officials intended to use mining to build needed infrastructure and social supports (Masire, 2007). The state employed a "development strategy focused more on the mining sector" (Buthali, 1997:8). The benefits of the mining sector were supposed to trickle down (Buthali, 1997). However, in terms of state capacity, most respondents find it difficult to "obtain household services (like piped water, electricity, or telephone), 53 percent, and a loan or payment from the government (such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant), 56 percent" (Bratton, *et al*., 2005:41).

For an upper-middle-income country (as classified by the World Bank), Botswana has limited telecommunications infrastructure. While system capacity lines increased about 175 percent (66,000 in 1995 and 180,000 in 2001) and the number of subscribers connected increased about 150 percent (about 51,000 in 1995 and 136,000 in 2001), Botswana had poor access to electricity. It had poor access when compared to countries with comparable average incomes and also compared to poorer, sub-Sahara African countries. Botswana has to rely heavily upon electricity sources emanating from South Africa because of Botswana's "peculiar pattern of spatial distribution of population and economic activity, as well as the fact that Botswana has few local means of generating electricity" (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). However, Botswana provides electricity at prices about half the price for electricity in other upper-middle-income countries[23] (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32).

Botswana's provision of improved water sources paints a brighter picture of access to quality of life services. Ninety-five percent of the population has access to improved water sources. Only the economically advanced countries have greater access (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). Access to improved sanitation, however, paints a different picture. Comparable to upper-middle income countries, Botswana provides about half of the average access among these countries, 41 percent and 86 percent, respectively. The rural/urban picture breakdown of access more closely resembles other sub-Sahara African countries. About 25 percent of Botswana's rural population has access to improved sanitation, while about 57 percent of the urban population has access to improved sanitation. Comparably, about 28 percent of the rural population in sub-Sahara African countries had access to improved sanitation, while 54 percent of the urban population had access in these countries (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32).

Suzanne Daley reported that Botswana had less than five miles of tarred roads at independence. By 1996, it had more than 1800 miles (Daley, 1996). Still, compared to its income group, Botswana's road-kilometers per 1,000 is only two-thirds of that for upper-middle-income countries (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:37).

> With only 18km of road per 1,000 people there are only five countries with worse density: Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Sudan and UAE. The comparable figure for upper-middle-income countries is 1,076 km and 1,340 for OECD, while SSA has road density of 156 km. However, this could be a reflection of population density

[23] Authors argue however, that the low pricing may result form under pricing rather than discounts.

> given the large size of the country and small population concentrated along the South African border (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:37).

Table 13 compares infrastructure access in Botswana to other country categories. An examination of Botswana's utility infrastructure paints a bleak picture in terms of access (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:38). Table 14 further quantifies the stark economic inequalities. .Also, as Table 15 shows, average annual growth in the state's GDP appears to grow at a much slower pace when analyzed on a per capita basis.

Social Welfare

Botswana achieved an overall annual income growth of 13 percent between 1966 and 1991. Also, by 1991, Botswana experienced a real per capita income increase five times that of 1966. The UN attributes "government policies for employment and the creation of provisions of infrastructure and services" for these developments (Executive Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997). However, Botswana's persistent problem with poverty and gross economic inequalities overshadowed these successes.

Although Botswana became increasingly urban in the late 1990s, throughout this development period it was largely rural. "The 1971 Census showed that nearly 80% of our people lived in settlements of fewer than 5,000 people, and more than 60% lived in settlements of fewer than 1,000" (Masire, 2007:216). However, the state appeared to target a number of programs at the gap left by the transition from an agricultural to an urban economy. It also focused social programs at the general population, rather than directly at the poor (Bathali, 1997). Still, Masire writes, "the traditional safety

Table 13. Comparison of Infrastructure in Botswana to Country Categories, 2006

	% Electricity Access	Electricity Pricing Cents/Kwh (residential)	% Access to Improved Water	% Access to Improved Sanitation	Road Density Km/1,000 people
Botswana	10	4	95	41	6.2
Upper-middle Income	87	9	93	86	9.2
Low-income	31	6	65	41	3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	15	6	64	37	3.3
OECD	NA	13	99	100	17.3

Adapted from: Bogetic, Zelijko and Johannes W. Fedderke. August 2006. "International Benchmarking of Infrastructure Performance in the Southern African Customs Union Countries." World Bank Policy Research Paper 3987. Pp.32-39.

Table 14. Botswana Income Distribution, Reported in 1997

	Poorest 40 %	Middle 40 %	Richest 20 %
1985/86 (household)	10.7	27.8	61.5
1993/94 (personal)	11.6	29.1	59.3
1993/94 (household)	9.4	29.4	61.2

Adapted from: Buthali, Dabilani, Botswana Central Statistics Office. May 7-9, 1997. "Poverty Measurement in Botswana." Presented at the Seminar on Poverty Statistics in Santiago.

Table 15. Botswana GDP Growth and GDP Growth Per Capita

Year	GDP Growth (Annual Percent)	GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual Percent)
1980	11.99	8.01
1981	9.06	5.35
1982	12.17	8.48
1983	13.15	9.53
1984	8.55	5.13
1985	7.13	3.78
1986	8.17	4.83
1987	11.88	8.47
1988	19.45	15.86
1989	13.06	9.71
1990	6.77	3.66
1991	7.46	4.38
1992	2.92	0.03
1993	1.92	-0.85
1994	3.63	0.95
1995	4.40	1.87
1996	5.55	3.14
1997	10.17	7.82
1998	10.57	8.39
1999	7.22	5.30
2000	8.23	6.50
2001	5.21	3.74

Source: The World Bank Group. World Development Indicators Online. Downloaded January 6, 2009.

nets – going to live at your uncle's place, or borrowing oxen from someone else to plough your lands if you had no oxen – had no parallel in the towns" (Masire, 2007:217). Consequently, Botswana had a 47 percent poverty rate in 1997 (still down from 59 percent in 1985/86). Most of the poor lived in rural areas (Executive Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997).

Healthcare

By the late 1990s, Botswana had made some notable strides in access to healthcare.

> At independence, we had only eight small hospitals and perhaps two-dozen clinics and dispensaries. By the late 1990s, we had 30 hospitals, more than 300 clinics or health posts with nursing staff, over 200 facilities with other trained health-care staff, and mobile health teams made stops at more than 650 other locations. Over 80% of our people in rural areas now live within 15 kilometres of a primary health care facility (Masire, 2007:219).

Despite these strides, prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Botswana challenged quality and availability of care; it placed a great deal of stress on the system. By 2001, 38.8 percent of the adults in Botswana were HIV-positive. This percentage increased from the early 1990s in, especially in the major urban centers. The rate of HIV infection in Gaborone was 14.9 percent in 1992. In 2001, it was 39.1 percent. The rate of HIV infection in Francistown was 23.7 percent in 1992. In 2001, it was 44.9 percent. The rate of infection in 1994 was 27 percent in 1994. In 2001, it was 55.6 percent. This epidemic intensified at the same time that Botswana was regularly breaking country records in government revenues (UNAIDS, UNICEF, WHO: 2002). Lamenting the government's initial ineffective response, Former President Masire writes:

> Our failure to deal with HIV/AIDS in an effective way in the early days of the disease arose from judgmental errors. It is one of those things I wish I had

> handled differently, and it is perhaps my greatest regret. HIV/AIDS is an area where we failed to apply the model of policy-making that worked successfully in so many other fields (Masire, 2007:237).

In the early years (1980s) Botswana's government developed plans to deal with HIV/AIDS, when other countries would not address the issue. However, those early programs were narrowly focused on health issues. Later plans began to address development issues, such as poverty, economic inequality, and gender equality that were woven into this epidemic (UNDP, 2000).

In 1994, Botswana developed a National Policy on AIDS. In 1996, it began collaborating with Harvard University in the Botswana–Harvard School of Public Health AIDS Initiative Partnership for HIV Research and Education[24] (Masire, 2007). In 1999, the government established the National AIDS Coordinating agency to address the epidemic systematically[25] (Masire, 2007). In 2000, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Merck & Co., Inc. and the Republic of Botswana established "the Botswana Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership, a new initiative to improve the overall state of HIV/AIDS care and treatment in Botswana" (CSRWire, 2000; Masire, 2007).

Education

By 1998, Botswana had established public funding for old-age pensions (US Social Security Administration, 2007; Bathali, 1997), orphan's care, survivor's benefits, disability benefits, and medical benefits. However, Botswana still does not have social security legislation. It had also established a framework whereby employers would

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[24] http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/bhp/
[25] http://www.naca.gov.bw/about.htm

provide unemployment benefits, sickness and maternity benefits, and worker injury benefits (US Social Security Administration, 2007).

During its years as a protectorate, local governments and missionaries provided education in Botswana to whites. However, during this period, Botswana was able to establish a regional university, the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland at Roma (Masire, 2007) and make it available to black students. In 1965, Botswana had 12 university students. By 1997, 7,500 students were enrolled (Masire, 2007). UNESCO puts this number around 8,500 by 1998 (UNESCO, 1998).

> The government has established a grant/loan scheme such that students of priority subjects- the sciences, applied sciences, engineering and technology, and science teaching - are awarded grants while those pursuing disciplines of lesser priority are awarded loans on a sliding scale. It also began providing technical training (UNESCO, 998:2).

The state made similar strides in primary and secondary education. “By 1980, it had eliminated primary school fees” (Masire, 2007: 221). The state also established a Unified Teaching Service so that poorer local districts would also have access to qualified teachers (Masire, 2007).

Beyond education, the state provided two other institutions to promote equality- “a progressive income tax and an incomes policy” (Masire, 2007:216). Despite the state’s attention to social services, the combination of welfare resources provided by families and welfare resources provided by the state, still left many Batswana without a social safety net (Wikan, 2004). It appears that the founders wanted to establish a mining system that would ultimately develop communities, sectors, and employment (Masire, 2007). However, there is a tone in Masire’s writing that suggests that state governing elite (at least the earliest ones) believed that they coddled the poor population into a state of helplessness. Although he admits that the economy produced a limited number of viable economic opportunities, he writes:

> while many individuals took advantage of the many new programmes of assistance or started successful businesses, many more failed to take up those opportunities. It also becomes harder to motivate people to improve themselves if they see people who appear to be enriched without great effort) Masire, 2007:244).

Summary

The general attitude among the founding officials and subsequent governments of Botswana was that by supporting the mining industry they were supporting the entire economy. They intended for proceeds from mining to support infrastructure in other areas. However, compared to its income group (upper-middle income), Botswana provided poor access to utilities with marked equalities in rural and urban access. In general, indicators show an unequal distribution of wealth and a heavy concentration of wealth among the top 10 percent, although the state instituted a progressive income tax.

Officials targeted Botswana's social welfare programs at the general public and not specifically at the poor. Since independence, Botswana increased the number of hospitals and healthcare facilities. However, the government's failure to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic in its initial stages, placed a great deal of stress on the healthcare system. While the education system was limited at independence, Botswana increased primary and secondary access. It also established its own university. However, the education system did not adequately prepare students to fill the market.

State Apparatus

Zaire – DRC maintained a weak state since independence. The Belgians knew well the wealth potential of the Congo, as Belgium and Leopold had profited from it. At independence, the Belgians vacated the political apparatus, while maintaining economic control. Also, at independence, the Belgians had not prepared the Congolese for self-rule. As part of Leopold's legacy, the Congo essentially remained a kingdom, with increasingly subdividing fiefdoms.

Before Botswana became an independent state, it was Bechuanaland, a British protectorate, as of 1885. The central tribe of Botswana, the Ngwato, asked the British Crown for protection against Boer invasion and annexation by South Africa. Beaulier (2003) suggests that Bechuanaland offered few economic opportunities for the British Crown or British multi-nationals. The vastness of diamond resources was not known until after independence. As Former President Masire puts it, "we were fortunate that at that time there was not even a rumour of any possible minerals other than in the Bangwato area" (Masire, 2007:199). Had the vastness of Botswana's resources become known prior to independence, the protectorate would have likely been a colony, and we would be analyzing a different Botswana. Since the Crown had already extended itself in its more profitable holdings: India, South Africa, and Rhodesia, it did not make sense to invest much in a low-return protectorate (Beaulier, 2003:230). Limited British investment diminished the need for a Batswana independence struggle against a colonial oppressor. "The emergence of formal political parties to voice dissatisfaction with British rule emerged only in late 1950s" (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:32), although Botswana's founding father Seretse Khama seemed to have understood the necessity of violence associated with nationalist movements in other African countries (Mungazi, 2005). Also, while he did not allow liberation movement bases inside Botswana, between 1976 and 1979 Botswana allowed the establishment of camps for fleeing Namibians, Rhodesians, Angolans, and South Africans (Niemann, 1993).

A number of the initial developments in Botswana's governance can be traced back to its first president, Seretse Khama and his inner circle. Khama had been heir to the throne of a central tribe, the Ngwato Tribe. Before independence, in 1958 leaders of the Ngwato tribe appealed to the Crown to form a legislative council in Botswana of 35 or more members and to do away with its advisory council comprised of the chiefs of the major tribes (Mungazi, 2005). This was one of the early steps through which state officials diminished tribal power in favor of a more national orientation. Through this legislative council the people elected Seretse in 1965. On September 30, 1966, Botswana became a parliamentary democracy when it received its independence from the British Crown. The Crown's hands off (but still paternalistic) approach proved beneficial to the modernization of the protectorate, as the Crown placed less social and economic pressure on the protectorate than on its former colonies.

The Republic of Botswana became a multi-party system, although one party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), has held power since independence. However, when viable opposition developed in 1994 the electoral competition did not disrupt social or political life in Botswana (Mungazi, 2005). The country has experienced nine non-violent presidential elections. Also, when Khama died in 1980, there was no military coup to contest the open presidential seat (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007). Evidence of the tribes' commitment to democratic principles dates back as far back as 1795 (Mungazi, 2005)**.** Under a protectorate system the tribes of Botswana were able to continue their own form of democratic assembly.

> In order to understand the proposals we made for new democratic institutions at both local and national levels, one must understand the consultative traditions of Batswana. The *kgotla* had always been the focal point for the whole community. It was a place where people were called for announcements by the chief. It was a place where the chief would discuss affairs related to the tribe, as well as a place for making laws and for addressing administrative requirements. It was also a consultative council – the chief might say he was considering something, and he wondered what the people thought of it and what their views were (Masire, 2007:62 also in Beaulier, 2003 and Ayittey, 2005).

"The spirit and the practice of the *kgotlas* are represented in the district level planning that exists today. Even today, the National Development Plans are developed at the national level, but approved at the local level. This plan covers a number of areas, including housing, education, and budget" (Global Insight, Economic Forecasts, 2006). As a continuation of this legacy, when Khama took office, he articulated his desire to strengthen democratic competition rather than install a one-party government (Mungazi, 2005)

Mungazi points out that Khama, focused on development:

Built new lines extending outside Botswana for access to more markets,
Explored minerals to reduce dependence on South Africa,
Developed irrigation schemes, and
Developed national education programs (Mungazi, 2005:132).

Botswana took advantage of resources offered from foreign donors. In the first few years, all of its development income came from the British Crown (Masire, 2007). Also, “Botswana relied on expatriate teachers, many of whom were under sponsorship of the US Peace Corp” (Mungazi, 2005:136). The new government, however, was careful to accept aid for the short-term and under conditions favorable to Botswana’s future. Later, in an effort to raise the living conditions in the rural areas of Botswana, the government requested assistance in 1986 from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) for the Remote Area Development Program. In 1993, the two countries agreed to phase out the program by scaling back the program to “a low intensity continuation of the infrastructure components” (Saugestad, 2001:137). The government oversaw the beginning, the execution, and the ending of the larger program.

Evidence suggests that Botswana’s founders firmly guided the state’s development, even before independence. Tshikedi Khama, Seretse’s uncle, convinced the Ngwato Tribe to allow Roan Selection Trust (RST) to mine copper and nickel. This arrangement resulted in the Bamangwato Concessions Limited (BCL) and led to the first large mining development (Masire, 2007). After independence, it was serendipitous for the nation that the next big discovery occurred in the Central District, home of Seretse’s tribe. Through his tribal connection, he was able to convince them to allow mining operations for the good of the nation (Masire, 2007).

Summary

This section has provided an overview of development in Botswana in the years before and immediately after independence. In summary, the Republic of Botswana evolved from the British protectorate Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland remained a protectorate because, at the time, it did not promise much wealth for the British Crown.

Since Bechuanaland was a protectorate, its future leaders had room to negotiate with British administrative authorities. The first president and chief founder of Botswana was Seretse Khama, the British-educated heir to the Ngwato throne, one of the eight principle tribes. Prior to independence, Botswana's founders appealed to the British crown for a proper legislative council to replace the National Advisory Council. Botswana had experienced forms of democratic government, prior to independence. In addition to the legislature, the tribes had previously engaged and continued to engage in community meetings known as *kgotlas*. Also prior to independence, Botswana had experience with the provision of university education (Masire, 2007). Experiences with these institutions seem to have helped smooth the transition to a modern democracy.

Governance

The pursuit of self-interest weakened the Congo-Zairian state. Mobutu governed through a patronage system. Contracts with mining companies had implications for this patronage system. He negotiated contracts with companies behind closed doors without legislative or bureaucratic input. At various times he allowed elections, but he always diminished the value of their outcomes. Also, he ruled through his single party. Ultimately, he would decree himself sovereign over the legislature and the judiciary. In addition, he used the military as his personal security. Because he underpaid or failed to pay public employees, they felt justified in skimming off the profits of the parastatals and accepting bribes. Also, the military felt justified in looting and pillaging.

Kabila's regime also concentrated power in the executive. He believed in transparency, but only for his enemies. He negotiated contracts in private with Uganda and Rwanda. When relations with them soured he negotiated with other countries such as Zimbabwe to divvy up the spoils. Kabila, like Mobutu was judge, jury, and executioner.

Transparency

Public assessment of Botswana's governance and resource management, in particular is generally positive. The Corruptions Perception Index ranked Botswana 23rd out of 85 countries in 1998, 24th out of 99 countries in 1999, and 26th out of 90 countries in 2000 (Transparency International, 2008). As of the 1999 election, Freedom House rated Botswana's elections as free and fair (Freedom House, 2006). The Polity IV Project has rated Botswana as increasingly democratically since 1966 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). Also, 38 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 36 percent of other African countries) thought that corruption was rare or very rare among civil servants. Only 32 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 48 percent in other countries) thought that corruption among civil servants was fairly or very common.

Botswana developed a number of institutions in the 1990s that support openness and transparency in public service. In 1994, Botswana passed the *Corruption and Economic Crime Bill* (Hope, 1997; Freedom House, 2006). The state also set up an independent election commission in 1996 (Freedom House, 2006). Public institutions have earned the legitimacy of a majority of citizens as well as the respect of the international community.

The governance of the Republic of Botswana has garnered a great deal of praise from scholars, policy analysts, and development organizations. However, some aspects of the country's development have been less than democratic. Throughout the country's short history, the executive branch has played a strong, arguably authoritarian (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007) role in Botswana's development. Only 44 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 55 percent in other countries) reported trusting the president. Thirty-six percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 39 percent in other African countries) reported distrusting the president somewhat or a lot. The delicate balance in post-colonial countries has been to install an executive strong enough to unite the country without concentrating too much power in one branch of the government and reducing transparency.

For this study, it is important to discuss how degrees of transparency have factored into resource development. Botswana has instituted various controls to restrict individual actors from using state resources as their own personal resources. A central feature of the system is a well-organized civil service (Modisi, 1997). Masire (2007) explains that in terms of a civil service the founders wanted a system that mirrored the British system more closely than the American system; that is, a system with a limited number of political appointments (Masire, 2007). While notable cases of corruption have surfaced, it appears that they received a great deal of attention because they were anomalies in the system. It appears that the system responded aggressively to eradicate transparency problems (Hope, 1997). Masire (2007) notes:

> But more important than any specific legislation and investigations was that we did not give too much power to any one person. No minister could make other major decisions on his or her own but had to involve one or two or three other departments. In fact, we went through an elaborate process within government when a major decision, such as granting a mining lease, was to be reached. It involved consultation between ministries and ultimately discussion and decision within cabinet (Masire, 2007:240).

Following a corruption scandal in 1992, Botswana established anti-corruption legislation in 1994 (Corruption and Economic Crime Bill, 1994; Hope, 1997) with the aid of an expert from Hong Kong (Masire, 2007). 1994

> We established an anti-corruption unit that is independent of the police. A number of experienced investigators from London's Metropolitan Police were recruited to set the unit up properly and to train our own people (Masire, 2007:240).

While international assessments of Botswana's public management are generally positive, others have criticized state officials for less-than-transparent budget decisions and resource management (Freedom House, 2006).

As another measure to control employee profits from the state, the founders of the system instituted an incomes policy. Masire (2007) contends that he and other founders wanted to insure that ministers would not get rich off public service. "It was many years before we allowed any first class air-travel, or official cars with drivers, for anyone except the late president. The traditional modesty of our people was helpful, of course" (Masire, 2007:242). The Incomes Policy also served to control the impact of wages and salaries on the resource management system. The fear was that overvalued salaries would overwhelm the mining system and undercut employment opportunities (Masire, 2007). Masire credits the decision to restrain wages as one of the two reasons the country achieved economic diversification. "The restraint on wages and economic disparities through the Incomes Policy and sound macroeconomic management were two major reasons why we achieved the economic diversification we did" (Masire, 2007:244).

This attempt to control inputs and outputs in the system netted a number of gains for Botswana. However, this control (lower wages and benefits) took the luster out of public employment for Batswana. In the late 1990s, Botswana began to struggle to find qualified public employees. The decrease in the availability of quality public employees occurred in Botswana because of conditions opposite of most African countries (Hope, 1997). The public sector had to compete with the very private sector opportunities the central government had worked to create.

> In 1990, the salary structure was decompressed so that it would be competitive at senior levels. [Also,] labor unrest culminating in a week-long strike of over 13,000 industrial class workers in November 1991 and other political pressures persuaded government to increase salaries by slightly higher margins of 23.4 percent and 16 percent at the lowest levels and 15 percent across the board for the middle and senior levels in 1992 (Modisi, 1997:66).

While the founders' intentions in instituting wage controls were noble, these policies created disparities in the pay for locals and pay for expatriates (Masire, 2007). At independence, because of the limited previous educational opportunities for Batswana, expatriates filled most public service positions. To reverse this pattern the government systematically assessed opportunities to replace expatriates with trained and educated Batswana. Botswana established the 1972 Presidential Commission on Localization and Training. However, the government retained a number of expatriates to ensure proper training and transition of under qualified Batswana (Modisi, 1997:54-57).

Legitimacy

The Westminster style of government is one of many legacies of British rule in Botswana. As such, Batswana directly elects its legislative representatives. However, as a legacy of African rule, the constitution calls for a House of Chiefs (*Ntlo ya Dikgosi*) to act in a consultative fashion to the president and the legislature and to consider rural interests. However, the movement toward a modern state negated the power of the chiefs, at least at the national level (Denbow and Thebe, 2006). Botswana experienced legislative rule prior to independence. The British Crown allowed an advisory council in the protectorate. The National Advisory Council, formed in 1920, later became the African Advisory Council (Masire, 2007; Vaughan, 2003).

Botswana government enjoyed a great deal of internal and external legitimacy. However, the government was marked by a concentration of power in the presidential office. Still, the state went to extraordinary lengths to operate above ground. It established boards and policies to deal directly with transparency and corruption. It also limited the number of political appointments, rather than civil service employees, working in the public sector. In addition, it instituted an Incomes Policy to control public sector compensation. However, the state had to decompress salaries in the early 1990s to retain qualified workers. All of these institutions promoted the understanding that the state itself was not to be used as a direct source of personal wealth.

Party-Legislative Representation

Indices that measure democracy have often noted that Botswana, although constitutionally a multi-party democracy, was ruled by a single party since independence (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007; Nyamnjog, 2006). The single-member district electoral system helped institutionalize this single-party status (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007). By the late 1990s, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had been the party of all three presidents. Despite this concentration of power in a single party, 42 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 40 percent in other African countries) thought that corruption was a fairly rare or very rare problem among elected officials. Twenty-nine percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 40 percent in other countries) thought that corruption was fairly or very common.

In 1965, the Botswana National Front (BNF) party formed as a counterweight to the BDP (Denbow and Thebe, 2006). The BNF formed to address what it perceived to be neo-colonialist developments (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007). Organization members believed the political elite represented Western and their own capitalist interests. While the separation into two parties marked a contentious period in Botswana's political history, the separation did not erupt into violence. However, the BNF set the course for his own demise with factional infighting (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007: Monty and Jaggers, 2006).

> Despite the political hegemony of the BDP, every election since independence has been fairly contested by the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) and two other smaller parties. The BNF derives its political support mainly from the rapidly growing urban areas and among the younger middle and working class. The 1999, 2004 and 2006 legislative elections were viewed as free and fair, despite some constraints on opposition access to the media and allegation of campaign finance improprieties by the BDP. Opposition parties have long argued that the BDP uses its political position to manipulate the electoral process to its advantage (Monty and Jaggers, 2006).

Still "the BNF won 13 of 40 seats in 1994. The elections of 1999, however, reversed those gains, and the Botswana Democratic Party now controls 33 seats, with those of the BNF falling to six" (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:33).

BDP retained broad-based support into the 2000s. In 1999-2001, 75 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 57 percent in other African countries) surveyed felt close to a political party (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). The inference here is that 75 percent of Batswana felt close to the BDP, since demonstration of party affiliation has been closely aligned with the BDP.

The Judiciary

Despite its one-party rule political development in Botswana has fostered an independent judicial system. Sixty-five percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 54 percent in other African countries) reported that they trusted the court system somewhat or a lot. Twenty-four percent (compared to 38 percent) reported that they distrusted the police somewhat or a lot (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). With regard to business ventures, authors of the US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook found that the “courts repeatedly upheld contracts” (Lloyd and Mobbs, 1994:113). The UN Conference on Trade and Development (2003) also deemed the judicial system as fair and competent (UNCTAD, 2003). Providing additional insight about the justice system, Masire writes:

> We agreed within the council that we should permit the two systems of civil law to function in parallel – Twasana customary law on the one hand and statute law with its Roman-Dutch common law tradition on the other. To provide a degree of uniformity in interpretation and to ensure there was not an arbitrary element in decision-making, we established a system of appeals from decisions of customary courts. In the appeals court for customary law, the judge sits with local assessors who understand the local conditions. The High Court in Lobatse makes a final determination if there is a further appeal. After 40 years of independence, it is estimated that more than three-quarters of all civil and minor criminal matters in Botswana are still adjudicated in customary courts (Masire, 2007:65-66).

The Military

As an extension of a modern system of law and order, Botswana’s military has been apolitical. N’Diaye suggests that Khama deliberately dragged his feet on establishing a military that could challenge his political authority (Henk, 2004; N'Diaye, 2001). Conversely, Henk (2001) focuses on the economic limitations that prohibited the development of a military. However, even inside the military Khama had a voice, as his son Ian was second in command. Also, the act establishing the military did not establish a Ministry of Defense. Researchers believe that defense decisions were made by the president and a small group of advisors (Henk, 2004; Malebeswa, 2002; N'Diaye, 2001).

It was clear from the outset that the military was a tool of the state, rather than some other entity or person. When the legislature passed legislation to institute a military (the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977 (*Botswana Defense Force –BDF- Act, 1977: Chapter 4*), the provision called for a highly professionalized organization. When the legislature created the BDF it did so in response to an international border issue. Decolonization campaigns in Rhodesia, Angola, and South West Africa were taking place all around Botswana. The battles in Rhodesia posed an internal threat to Botswana. The Rhodesian military hunted insurgents who had sought refugee in Botswana. These military campaigns claimed the lives of Batswana as well as Rhodesians (Henk, 2004). Prior to the legislature's establishing the BDF, the police force handled matters of internal order (Henk, 2004; N'Diaye, 2001).

The military retained public legitimacy throughout the 1990s. In 1999-2001, 73 percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 61 percent in other African countries) reported trusting the army somewhat or a lot. Sixteen percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 32 percent in other countries) reported distrusting the army somewhat or a lot (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001).

> Evidence points to a high level of military perception of government legitimacy: (a) the very limited number of instances of violent clashes between the government and its opposition (b) virtual absence of the use of BDF against opponents (c) total absence of instances of military restiveness such as mutinies, conspiracies, or coup attempts (80).

Also, Chapter eight of the BDF Act explicitly places the military under civilian control (BDF, 1977: Chapter 8).

> The President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The BDF is primarily composed of a Regular Force and a Reserve Force, although the Reserve Force has never been mobilized. It is noteworthy that none of the three Presidents to fulfill this position to date, have had any military background (Malebeswa, 2002).

The president's legal connection to the military is but one example of his broad powers. This section has highlighted concerns about the concentration of power in the president's office, as well as the concentration of power in one ruling party. However, Batswana surveyed between 1999 and 2001 considered the system to be legitimate, although they demonstrated less confidence in the president than other institutions (Afro barometer, 1999-2001). Batswana also considered the court system to be legitimate, as it was willing to challenge the other two branches of government. Finally, Batswana considered the military to be legitimate, although a great deal of military authority was vested in the presidential office. State officials established a military 11 years after founding the state to address border issues. Therefore, the military did not become entrenched in the political system that was already dominated by a single party, the BDP (Maudeni, *et al*., 2007:22).

Summary

Intergovernmental organizations, foreign direct investors, and the Batswana generally rated the county's transparency as positive throughout the 1990s. Features such as an apolitical military and an independent judiciary distinguished Botswana from most other African countries. However, several aspects of the government were authoritarian including military decisions, budget decisions, and decisions about mining. Also, in practice a single party, the BDP, controlled the government. The BDP established its firm control on state politics prior to independence. Despite this control the state founders developed a system that allowed for opposition to emerge. The BNF Party earned legislative seats in 1994. This party protested what it perceived to be the BDP's neocolonial governance.

In its effort to promote transparency, the government instituted a civil service system that reduced the number of political appointees. The government also instituted an incomes policy to control wages in the public sector. This policy prevented individuals from using state revenue as their own personal incomes. However, this policy later backfired. By controlling public sector wages, the government made public sector employment less attractive than private sector employment. Consequently, the government was challenged to find qualified employees. Also, because of education deficiencies both the public and private sector depended heavily upon expatriates.

Chaos on the Borders

Porous borders played a central role in both conflicts in the Congo. The instability created by the Hutu camps provided a pretext for foreign occupation. The presence of responding forces began a cycle of violence that ultimately justified the presence of at least seven countries in the Congo. Once they were there they could prospect for resources, set up military/paramilitary to control those resources, and control local economies.

Throughout its young history, the Republic of Botswana has had to balance its own interests against volatile circumstances in neighboring countries (Battersby, 1994). The volatility subsided by 1997 among all neighbors, except Angola (Executive Board of the UN Development Program and the UN Population Fund, 1997). However this history of conflict created some challenges for Botswana. Conflicts developed between the Shona tribe (77 percent of blacks) and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe. Although the Ndebele "supported the idea of a unitary state at independence in 1980, in 1992 it advocated more regional autonomy in Zimbabwe" (JB, 1992:11). In Lesotho, fighting broke out among army factions in on January 5, 1994. On April 4, 1994, army faction members shot the Deputy Prime Minister and took four cabinet members hostage because of threats to investigate the army (*New York Times*, April 15, 1994). In 1998, South Africa, by request of the government, tried to thwart a coup in Lesotho by factions contesting the election results. The factions were strong enough to stave off the South African forces (Daley, 1998). Democratic elections were bones of contention throughout the region. Also, Angola's civil war renewed in 1991. Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rejected the results of the first democratic elections in September 1992 (Battersby, 1993).

In racially segregated South Africa, blacks voted for the first time in 1994 (Walker, 1994). This strict dividing line created a debilitating socioeconomic imbalance in South Africa. For Botswana, this dividing line created the need for delicate negotiations with a white-run government that was openly hostile to black-rule. More specifically, South Africans raided African National Congress (ANC) bases in Gaborone, Botswana in the mid-eighties. While relations with South Africa were fragile, Botswana treaded lightly because it relied heavily upon South African railways (*Johannesburg International Service*, June 27, 1985).

Despite its trepidations, Botswana demonstrated a willingness to control its borders. This tradition began even prior to its protectorate status. The prominent chiefs appealed to the British Crown to protect Bechuanaland from Boer invasion. More recently, Botswana's government reported that it was working with other states in the region to crack down on illegal immigrants screening for jobs and residence. This response came after widespread complaints that Botswana had become a haven for illicit activities (*Dakar PANA*, November 9, 1987). Also, border incidents in 1977 pushed the legislative assembly to enacted legislation creating a military (*Botswana Defense Force – BDF- Act, 1977*).

Summary

Chaos in surrounding countries eventually spilled over into the Congo. It appears that Botswana dealt with its own share of border issues. Tribal warfare occurred in Zimbabwe, and the Lesotho army attempted to overtake the government. Also, socioeconomic decline resulting from apartheid challenged South Africa's stability.

Closer to Botswana, asylum seekers from South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) party took refugee in Botswana, provoking South Africa's wrath. Generally, however, Botswana was able to control its border. It established a military in 1977, in response to such issues.

Societal Factors

Ethnic manipulation played a central role in the conflicts in Eastern Congo and in resource ownership. After the beginning of the second war, Tutsis largely controlled resources in Eastern Congo. The second war occurred in part because the Congolese contested the status and resource control by Tutsis in Congo.

Ethnicity

Despite Botswana's impressive developments, ethnic politics created obstacles for the government. The questions for this dissertation are: (1) Did wealth and poverty straddle ethnic lines? (2) Was this wealth associated with access to resource revenue? and (3) Why did unequal access to resource revenue not result in violent conflicts?

Despite the government's intent to shift from "ethnicity to territoriality" (Nyamnjoh, 2006), creating a national identity[26] required deciding which group identity the state would elevate to prominent status. The public face of Botswana was Twasana (Werbner, 2004), the face of one of the major tribes and the tribe of founder Seretse Khama. "The name of the country derives directly from dominant Tswana tribes" (Nyamnjoh, 2006:93). As public policy came to reflect this domination, minorities were

[26] "Botswana nationals (singular is Motswana; plural Batswana)" (Nyamnjoh, 2006:93).

concerned that the domination of the political space also lead to cultural subversion. "At its most extreme, the tendency was fundamentally against pluralism" (Werbner, 2004:38). For example, since English and Twsana became the languages of public education[27], other cultures were concerned that their languages would be lost (Masire, 2007; Nyamnjoh, 2006). Werbner (2004) argues that this dynamic of a generic national identity began with Botswana's protectorate status. Even then, this generic identity benefited some tribes more than other.

A more institutionalized problem for minority groups was that Botswana's constitution (enacted in September 30, 1966) identifies eight central tribes as the tribes of Botswana: the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa Tribes (*Botswana Constitution*, *Chapter 78*). The constitution explicitly grants each group a representative in the House of Chiefs. The House of Chiefs is a consultative, tribal legislature to the National Assembly. Since founding, however, some minor tribes have had at-large representation. By explicitly naming these tribes, this document marginalized the unmentioned tribes. "The constitution contained clauses, for example, in sections 77, 78, 79 that fixed continuity in tribal citizenships, such as land rights, but even more, that reaffirmed the constitutional inequality of subject communities" (Werbner, 2004:39).

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[27] "The Twsana language is used as the principal medium of instruction in almost all primary schools during the first two years, and it is compulsory subject for all students in public and private schools." Denbow, James and Phenyo C. Thebe. 2006. *Culture and Customs of Botswana*. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT.

Cultural subversion was a necessary outcome of a state attempting to transform from a collection of traditional, tribal arrangements to a modern state with a national identity. Consequently, land distribution took on ethnic dimensions. Because of its history as a protectorate, the state inherited the concept of land under private ownership. This distribution system was problematic for tribes such as the indigenous Sans whose livelihoods of cattle-raising developed through a communal land base.

Nyamnjoh (2006) suggests that group awareness also coincided with the distribution of opportunities from diamond revenue. He suggests that Batswana drenched themselves in their ethnicity in an effort to distinguish themselves (and their right to employment) from foreigners who might take employment opportunities.

> The surge in the politics of difference and claims to recognition and representation among Batswana as individuals and groups has coincided with an increased awareness of distinction between 'locals' and 'foreigners'. This awareness is deeply informed by concerns regarding the opportunities and economic entitlements under the diamond boom that has, since the 1970s, attracted an impressive number of immigrants, 'particularly skilled immigrants' (Nyamnjoh, 2006:101).

> Ethnic differences and overt conflicts were largely masked and re-channeled until the 1980s (Nyamnjoh, 2006:87).

In his analysis of the government's relationship with the indigenous population, Saugestad (2001:223) refers to a "general reluctance on the part of the government to enter a dialogue with organized groups." He suggests that the government's ignoring minority demands was part of a larger pattern of dismissing marginal concerns.

Ethnic tensions may actually speak positively about the Botswana's political development; that the system was strong enough to allow dissent without tearing the system apart (Nyamnjoh, 2006:87). Table 16 suggests that the Batswana typically saw themselves more as part of an ethnic group, than any sub-national groups. They also saw their identification with their respective ethnic group as strong and enduring. Even in their relatively strong group-identification, Batswana generally thought that the government represented the interests of all people and treated all groups fairly most of the time.

Marginalized Kalanga Elite

Another way to explore the issue of ethnicity in Botswana is to discuss the broader society's relationship with the two groups that are marginalized at the bottom and the top: the Kalanga and the Barsarwa.

At the "top" end of ethnic marginalization are the Kalanga, who constitute a sizeable portion of the business class in Botswana. The line dividing Botswana from Zimbabwe also divided the Kalanga (Werbner, 2004). The BaKalanga in Botswana are part of the same groups as the Makwerekwere in Zimbabwe (Nyamnjoh, 2006:93). Under the former tribal system, the Kalanga did not reign over a particular area. Subsequently, in the land-distribution system of modern Botswana, the Kalanga were losers, for a time.

The Kalanga were losers, based on the traditional, tribal arrangements. However, since they could not depend upon returns from the land, they invested in the economic and intellectual capital available in the burgeoning modern economy. In a modern economy the Kalanga could amass economic and intellectual capital (Nyamnojoh, 2006). Their status in society resembles the status of the Kasians in Congo (living outside of the Kasai Provinces). The Belgians distinguished the Kasai from other groups as

Table 16. Group Identity and Relationship to Government

Question	Response Option	Percent Responses Botswana	Average
Do you think government represents the interests of all citizens or of only one group?	One group only	11	25
	All citizens	85	68
	Don't know	4	5
Besides being (Motswana, etc.) which specific groups do you feel you belong to first and foremost?	Occupational	8	27
	Language/Tribe/Ethnic	28	25
	Religion	5	17
	Class	2	13
	Race	3	6
	Religion	17	2
	Gender	0	2
	Individual/person	<1	2
	Party affiliation	3	4
	Other	1	2
	Won't differentiate	33	3
	Don't know	2	2
Do you want your children to think of themselves as members of (your identity) group?	Disagree/strongly disagree	5	13
	Neither	4	4
	Agree/strongly agree	90	81
	Don't know	1	2
Do you have stronger ties to (your identity group than to other Batswana, etc)?	Disagree/strongly disagree	20	21
	Neither	11	9
	Agree/strongly agree	65	68
	Don't know	5	3
How often are (your identity group) treated unfairly by the government?	Always/to a large extent	8	23
	To some extent	17	28
	Hardly at all/never	64	42
	Don't know	11	7

Adapted from Afro-barometer 1991-2001. "The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. Samples range from 1200 to 2400."

intellectually capable. When Mobutu came to power, he exploited this cleavage by placing the Kasai in administrative provinces in which they had no ethnic ties. While this placement and distinction made them “superior,” it also garnered hatred and disdain from other groups. The venom toward the Kalanga in Botswana was especially sharp among the central Twsana groups that viewed the Kalanga as outsiders (Nyamnojoh, 2006) who benefited disproportionately from Botswana’s modernization and economic developments. However the Kalanga, as high-level beneficiaries of the system, like the Congo Kasian were unwilling to rise up in violence over unequal treatment or the distribution of wealth.

The Marginalized Barsarwa/San

At the “bottom” of Botswana society are about 100,000 indigenous citizens called Barsarwa, Sans, Kwe, or Bushmen (sometimes considered a derogatory term). Spread across Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, half of them are in Botswana. Demonstrating the fragility of their place in Batswana society, the Barsarwa appealed to the UN in 1996 to help prevent the removal of 3,000 of their people from the Kalahari Game Reserve by the Botswana government to make way for tourism (Crossette, 1996). “The Botswana government wants them out of the reserve, saying their cattle raising and hunting game with guns cannot be tolerated in a national park” (Daley, 1996b). At one point, reporters of the story about the San relocations clouded and sensationalized it by adding diamonds as a motivating factor for the removals (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001).

Former President Masire’s (2007) memoirs argues that the Barsarwa did not seem the least interested in bettering themselves. He further contends that they scavenged off the more prosperous groups. He argues that this attitude made them ripe for exploitation by others who were in search of a side show. Masire (2007) describes some of the interest in the Barsarwa as spectacle; people interested at gawking as these romantic creatures left from time gone by.

In Masire's estimation, these romantics wanted the Barsarwa to be able to enjoy the best of both worlds; that maybe their demands lacked authenticity. He describes an incident in which the government established a borehole for a mineral prospecting operation. According to Masire the Barsarwa flocked to the watering hole. When the government abandoned the mining project, it also abandoned the borehole. Critics raked the government over the coals for abandoning the borehole to the detriment of the Barsarwa who had come to depend on it. The following excerpts include government responses to such criticism:

> Everyone knows Barsarwa had never relied on boreholes for water in their traditional life; but when the borehole was abandoned, the critics complained that we were discriminating against the Barsarwa! For the romantics who talk of preserving the traditional Barsarwa way of life to protest the removal of a modern convenience seemed hypocritical to me, in fact, virtually all Barsarwa are in contact with modern society in various ways; many use cell phones and other conveniences and hunt from Land Rovers using high powered rifles (Masire, 2007:236).

. 'They are not demanding traditional rights, said Mr. Mogae, Vice President. They are demanding modern citizenship rights. As long as they are in the park, they cannot have those rights.' They were offered five head of cattle or 15 goats plus a small piece of land (Daley, 1996b).

Masire describes the central government's approach to the Barsarwa as one of benevolence, in which the government was attempting to provide greater access to services, such as schools and utilities (Masire, 2007). "The government has suggested for years that it has only attempted to stir initiative among the Barsarwa. It contends that is time for the Bushmen to leave the desert, learn to read, earn a living, and otherwise join the 20th century" (Daley, 1996b).

On the other hand, as Werbner, (2004:36) points out, "precolonial Africa had frontiers, not boundaries" (Werbner, 2004:36). Despite this tradition, Daley (1996b) pointed out that encroaching cattle ranches that had been subdivided in respect for modern property rights squeezed out communal lands on which the Barsarwa used to hunt. The Freedom House reports:

> Discrimination against ethnic minorities is a problem. Since 1985, authorities have relocated about 5,000 San to settlements outside the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. Almost all of those remaining -530 people – left in 2002 when the government cut off water, food, health and social services. The San tend to be marginalized educationally and do not enjoy the same employment opportunities as more privileged groups (Freedom House, 2006).

The San have shown signs of resistance for sure. However, the signs indicate the dissent of a marginalized group within the existing social/power dynamic, not necessarily the quest for freedom (Saugestad, 2001).

Summary

Ethnicity played an important role in Botswana's development. In forging a national identity, the founders saw ethnicity as something they needed to overcome. However, contentions grew around the question of whose identity would constitute the national identity. The minor tribes expressed concern about cultural subjugation in favor of a Tswana national identity. The minor tribes were concerned about practices such as the state designating English and Setswana as the official languages of the public schools.

“The name ‘Botswana’ literally means ‘the land of the Setswana-speaking peoples” (Denbow and Thebe, 2006:8). The minor tribes were also concerned about their limited input in political processes. The state institutionalized their minor status by explicitly writing the eight major tribes into the constitution.

Two of these minor groups were the Kalanga elite and, at the other end, the indigenous Sans. The Kalanga previously had no access to tribal land. So this group did not pin its hopes on a fledgling cattle economy; its members trained themselves to thrive in the modern economy by cultivating economic and intellectual capital. Their status evoked resentment from the Tswana. Members of the general population also resented the indigenous Sans who were getting in the way of tourism development in the Kalahari Game Reserve. The media sensationalized this struggle by blaming it on diamonds. However, it was simply a struggle between traditional and modern society. Increasingly, the new Botswana squeezed out the Barsarwa way of life.

Despite struggles along ethnic lines, ethnic divisions did not lead to violence. During this study period, most people still identified with an ethnic group. However, they largely believed that the government represented all citizens and that the government treated most people fairly.

Civil Society

Civil society organizations had some life in the Congo. However, the system ultimately robbed them of their power beyond providing services. Both Mobutu and Kabila suppressed such organizations. Both men damaged their legitimacy by closing off channels of meaningful political dialogue, especially in the eastern regions

The question of ethnicity leads to further discussion about the role of civil society in general. In 1987 Curry warned that the “pattern of growth is producing two Botswanas-one rich and the other poor-and this poverty is disillusioning many Botswana” (1987:487). With regard to access to public utilities, huge disparities exist even today (Bogetic and Fedderke, 2006:32). The discussion of inequality is highly relevant to the potential for civil society development in Botswana. People find it difficult to rally around issues that are important to them and develop a vibrant civil society when they are hungry or otherwise in need of physical security (Inglehart and Welzel, 205; Nyamnjoh, 2006).

Patterns of inequality persisted through the 1990s, despite the development of what seemed to be a vibrant civil society. Botswana used a number of vehicles to get people to “buy-in” to the society, such as employment brigades for the youth, local education boards of governors, and National Development Plans (Masire, 2007). Forty-six percent of Batswana (compared to average of 23 percent among other Africa countries) surveyed considered Botswana a full democracy. Thirty-six percent Batswana (compared to an average of 27 percent in other countries) considered Botswana a democracy (Afro-barometer authors, 1999-2001).

Nyamnjoh (2006) warns of the tendency in Africa for procedural rather than substantive democracies to emerge. For Nyamnjoh (88), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other organizations with a limited amount of political power may have presented a picture of democratic action. Seventy-seven percent of Batswana (compared an average of 53 percent in other African countries) reported never having attended a community meeting. Seventeen percent of Batswana (compared to 29 percent in other African countries) reported that they had attended a community meeting sometimes. Six percent of Batswana (compared to an average of 18 percent in other African countries) reported that they had often attended a community meeting (Afro-barometer, 1999-2001). Peters (1994) points out that the *kgotla* was not open to everyone, as everyone is not a member of the principal tribes. "Most CSOs prefer and are encouraged by government to stay out of politics" (Maudeni, *et al*, 2007:30). The authors note the apathy toward *kgotlas* and the unwillingness of women to attend these male-dominated forums. They also reference the hostile atmosphere of political rallies, which also drove people away from public discourse. Similarly, *The Economist* (1994) points out the limitations of using the *kgotla* for public input. The publication's description of the *kgotla*s suggests that they are forums where the central government goes to explain what it has done for the people, not to get input.

Carroll and Carroll (2004) lend some support to the notion that the central government was dismissive, maybe even hostile to civil society organizations. They point out that this attitude appeared to change in the mid-1990s. President Masire established the High Level Consultative Committee in 1996 for regular input. In 1999, President Mogae "required each ministry to develop equivalent consultative processes" (348). Carroll and Carroll argue that elected officials began to demonstrate more comfort with challenging civil servants because viable opposition had formed against the BDP in 1994.

Summary

Botswana's government provided many opportunities for Batswana to buy into government decisions. Leaders used the tribal meetings to connect to the people through their local chiefs, although the meetings were not open to everyone. Scholars have noted a general reluctance on the part of officials to allow groups input in the political process. However, the central government began to allow more input by civil society organizations in the mid 1990s, when the BNF formed viable opposition against the central party.

Chapter Summary

Scholars and the media often cite Botswana's growth as a positive example of development in Africa. Their assessments are based upon macro-economic indicators. However, analysis at a micro-economic level shows a different picture. Botswana's poverty rate approached 50 percent. The principal source of wealth in Botswana was the mining industry, especially the diamond industry. However, the diamond industry only employed about six percent of the population.

Botswana was fortunate to discover vast resources under its soil. However, the development of the economy also occurred because of prudent management. For example, government officials used revenue from minerals to build cash reserves and sustain the economy during downturns in the mineral sectors. In addition, Botswana officials negotiated aggressively with the resource extraction companies. State law requires the companies to invest 100 percent in projects, pay royalties, and pay licensing fees. Also, the state has been careful to filter foreign donations and control deficit spending.

Despite the success of the mining industry in Botswana, other sectors struggled. On average agriculture declined. Scholars argue that the agricultural industry was compromised in favor of the interests of the cattle-owning elite. It is no surprise then that the small number of cattle-owning elite increasingly owned a greater portion of the industry. The manufacturing sector also suffered because of the state's lack of commitment. Officials were unable to attract foreign investment in the manufacturing industry at the same level as they were able to attract foreign investment in the mining industry. Also, despite rapid progress in education, state officials were unable to devise an education system that adequately trained students to participate in the economy. The problem of underemployment was exacerbated by personnel attrition caused by HIV/AIDS. The disparities in educational access were reinforced by a range of disparities in Botswana society. For example, the rural population's access to utilities was significantly below urban access. Healthcare had improved but had been stressed by high HIV/AIDS rates.

Botswana experienced a number of notable successes, including the development of a functional Westminster model of government. Because the British Crown took a hands-off approach with Botswana as it approached independence, Botswana's founders had a great deal of leverage to tailor-make a political system for Botswana. Botswana instituted a multi-party system-although a *de facto* single-party system. In 1994, a minor party achieved some measure of victory in contesting the principal party. This contest provided political leverage to civil society organizations.

Botswana accepted and encouraged praise for its pre-colonial democratic history. However, the minority tribes felt marginalized because the majority tribes are explicitly recognized in the constitution. Still, several indices have recognized Botswana government for its transparency. The high-profile nature of corruption cases suggests that corruption was an anomaly in the system. Also, the state instituted an incomes policy that controlled the amount of income public employees could earn by working for the state. In addition, the state was able to provide law and order, without politicizing the military. Just the same, critics condemned the government for guarding decisions about the mineral industry.

Chapter V: An Analysis of the Republic of Botswana

Scholars and policy analysts often hold Botswana up as evidence that African states can thrive. There is plenty of evidence to support this position. I selected Botswana as a counterfactual, as it has managed to avoid conflicts, although it was a resource-abundant country. In this analysis, I will first explore Botswana’s shortcomings. Beginning with its shortcomings up through the 1990s will allow me to focus on those factors in the Congo that appear to have contributed to “resource wars” or civil wars involving natural resources. Despite the country’s unique successes, Botswana showed signs of the resource curse and Dutch Disease, two phenomena often associated with resource wars. However, these phenomena have not lead to conflict or played a central role in civil conflicts. Botswana has a number of other state weaknesses that have not parlayed into violent conflicts.

Botswana: Cursed?

Sachs and Werner (1995) contend that countries that are resource-abundant will fail to develop. From a macroeconomic perspective, Botswana avoided the resource curse. This picture reflects prudent mining sector management and state planning over time. High growth rates in the overall economy continued from independence well into the 1990s. The state was able to maintain the diamond and cattle markets, even during downturns in because of its deep reserves. Especially, if we compare Botswana with countries such as the DRC that obviously suffered from what Sachs and Warner call the resource curse, it is even more evident that Botswana avoided the curse. However, using Sach's and Werner's definition as a guide, Botswana actually succumbed to the resource curse. But its resource curse did not result in a violent society. If we examine Botswana's development on a per capita basis, then the picture changes drastically. About 47 percent of the population lived in poverty by the late 1990s. The education system had failed to prepare students for the job market, even the mining industry. Consequently, the better jobs were secured by expatriates.

Despite rapid development throughout the 1990s, Botswana was riddled with vast inequalities. An overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that the mineral industry helped create many of these inequalities. While the state may have set out to use mining revenue to develop state infrastructure and services, by 2001 the mining industry employed only six percent of the population. Despite the general population receiving residual benefits from the mining industry (including schools, hospitals, roads, etc), there were gross inequalities in access to basic utilities, skills training, and health care. In addition, the state's initial ineptitude in the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic created a health crisis that exacerbated the disparities further. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS created personnel challenges and disincentives for foreign direct investors.

Botswana had trouble establishing a manufacturing sector in the 1990s. Still, this shortcoming did not result in insecurity and violence. Foreign direct investment disproportionately targeted the mining sector. For example, investors made sure that technology to support the mining industry was available. Neither investors nor state officials systematically developed such support for the manufacturing sector. The difficulties in the mining sector did not occur by happenstance. They resulted from deliberate political decisions. The old political elite clearly supported cattle production to the detriment of agriculture, and the cattle industry was propped up by diamond revenue. Also, the sparsely populated Botswana did not provide large markets for goods. In addition, Botswana had one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infections in the world in the 1990s. These factors severely impacted productivity.

Other Signs of a Weak State

A single party, the BDP, ruled Botswana throughout the 1990s. This single-party rule amounted to the control of resources by an elite political clique. Botswana's first-past-the-post electoral system was partially responsible for this outcome. In addition to this structural cause, the BDP solidified its power base prior to independence. Concentration of power in a single party is more troubling considering the concentration of power in the presidential office. Although the legislature selects the executive, members of Parliament often fill cabinet posts under the president. Also, the president has wide discretion in directing the military, as there is no minister of defense.

Relevant to this concentration of power, minor ethnic groups were concerned about limitations on their public input. Despite Botswana's history of democratic institutions through Ngwato heritage, not all groups were included in this process. Ethnic groups were also concerned that the generically Batswana national identity suppressed their cultures and muffled their political voices.

State Strength: The Key to Avoiding Violence

Despite the resource curse, Dutch Disease and state weaknesses, Botswana resembled a strong, modern state in many ways. The deep disparities present in Batswana society did not lead to warlordism. As Vaughn (2003) suggests, Seretse Khama and other state planners used the local chiefs as links to the rural population. Also, supporting the cattle trade was a political coup for the ruling party. The state was able to develop a cattle industry that primarily served the cattle-owning elite, while appearing to offer a hand-up to smaller, poorer cattle operations and the rural poor in general.

> Masire succeeded in dominating power by maintaining the collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats, while ensuring the stability of the government's market-based developmental strategy, which focused on the exploitation of the cattle and diamond industries. This lucrative economy rewards those who dominate the prevailing political-economic arrangement while trying to provide for the essential needs of the masses of local people (Vaughn, 2003:138).

For example, the establishment of communal lands appears to have benefited various groups of people. However, this arrangement opened up additional grazing land for private owners who used private land in addition to their own.

Legitimacy

By and large, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches enjoyed legitimacy through the 1990s. Foreign direct investors, for example, received assurances that the courts would honor contracts in Botswana. Also, corruption appears limited to a few cases to which the government responded forcefully. However, others have complained about the limitations on public input, especially in the mining industry.

An Apolitical Military

The military was not overtly politicized and certainly not active in the distribution of resources. The state established the military as a public institution, rather than security for private ownership of resources. State officials have used the military sparingly throughout Botswana's modern history, but that have never used it to suppress political opponents. Botswana did not even institute a military until 1977. It did so in response to a border issue. By that time, the central party had entrenched its political base. The military continued to protect Botswana's borders through the 1990s. This responsibility became less of a burden over time, as its regional neighbors became more peaceful. Still, the history of the military speaks to the overall respect for law and order in Botswana.

Law and Order

Respect for law and order was established even before independence. Early political arrangements helped establish the attitude that the state itself was not a source of personal wealth. State planners took advantage of the latitude they had to drive tough bargains with mining companies. They did not have to act in haste to get resources out of the ground as quickly as possible to liquidate them and pocket the money. Also, the modernizing elite did not gamble with the state's sovereignty by placing it on the auction block to private companies. In addition, they created access to sources of revenue beyond the mining industry, although many of the opportunities were still in the public sector.

Private Ownership

The state did not evolve from a legacy of private ownership of state resources. Evidence suggests that Botswana has avoided problems with resource management because the bulk of resource discovery did not occur until after independence. The timing of these discoveries affected the state in two ways. First, since the British Crown had invested a limited amount of resources into Bechuanaland, it allowed prospective state officials a great deal of input on the future status of the protectorate. Since resource discovery was late in coming, the British Crown did not have to protect the interests of a parent company, such as the East India Company. Second, since the British Crown (or a proxy company) did not exert absolute control its hands-off approach did not necessitate a national movement that would ignite a history of state and resource contestation. This situation also reduced the need for a military-style state apparatus. As equally important, Botswana's non-aligned[28] status in the Cold War reduced the need for a military-style state political apparatus (Masire, 2007).

Control Over Extraction

The state exercised rigid controls over the mining industry. Opportunities for warlords to negotiate with booty futures were limited. For example, the state initially established the diamond site Orapa as a closed city. Also, regulations stipulated that mining companies had to report any new discoveries not covered in the original mining permit. These diamonds and other mineral were lootable. Still the state maintained bureaucratic control over the mineral supply.

Foreign Aid

The state initially controlled all foreign aid coming into the country. When the state began, it relied heavily on foreign aid. Over time it was able to wean itself from donors because of reserves and stockpiles of minerals. Even during periods of heavy dependence, Botswana diversified its donors, not relying too heavily on one source. By controlling foreign aid, the state was able to control the influence of foreign groups on the Batswana population. In addressing African and American relations, former President Khama warned against African countries' dependence on foreign aid. In this same address, he encouraged the US to consider providing more technical assistance to help

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[28] http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm It is important to note that countries, such as Cuba, who clearly engaged in Cold War politics appears on this list. However, since independence, Botswana appears to have taken a neutral stance in superpower struggles.

African countries capitalize on development opportunities and on income from various sources (Khama, 1971).

Single Party Politics

As mentioned above, a single party effectively controlled Botswana politics through the 1990s. However, viable opposition (primarily through the BNF Party) emerged to compete in the 1994 elections. The government was forced to respond by creating more inclusive political processes. The important point here is that state founders established the political channels, although difficult to navigate, that would allow opposition to emerge without violence. Also, the founders institutionalized the national connection to the rural populations by writing the House of Chiefs into the constitution, although the chiefs had no legislative power. In addition, the tradition of the *kgotla* at least gave the impression of input, but it certainly helps maintained a degree of prestige for the chiefs.

Ethnicity

Minor ethnic groups expressed concerns about how their cultures were being subverted in favor of the generic Twasana identity. The inclusion of the eight major tribes legally subordinated minor tribes. Groups such as the Barsarwa and the Kalanga struggled to find their identities in Batswana society, as the Kalanga shared culture identities with the Makwerekwere in Zimbabwe. Despite problems with the assimilation of minor ethnic groups, Botswana was able to forge a national identity.

Summary

In summary, a number of conflict determinants present in the Congo in the late 1990s were present in Botswana in the late 1990s. However, these conditions did not combine with the abundance of natural resources, including lootable resources to produce violent conflict. Botswana had to contend with complaints of marginalization by minor ethnic groups. The government even challenged the Barsarwa's access to their traditional hunting lands. Also, a single-party effectively ruled Botswana. In addition, Botswana showed signs of the resource curse and Dutch Disease. Poverty afflicted almost half the country's population, and there were gross economic inequalities. As for the Dutch Disease, the state had a limited manufacturing sector, a steep decline in agriculture, and a superficial cattle trade. Finally, chaos in border states represented security threats to Botswana. But violence was kept to a minimum.

Various signs of state strength in Botswana offer plausible explanations for Botswana's avoidance of violent conflict. First, while Botswana faced issues with ethnic marginalization, state officials did not engage in systematic hate campaigns and ethnic goading, nor did they humiliate minor ethnic groups by challenging their citizenship. Second, Botswana did not nationalize its industries. It did not place bureaucrats in charge of parastatals simply because they were members of the main patronage system. Moreover, the elite did not establish a state for direct personal ownership and personal contestation. They also worked to create economic opportunities outside of the mining industry, although these opportunities were largely public sector.

Things that occurred before independence also helped Botswana avoid natural resource conflict. For example, because British companies did not understand the vastness of resources in Botswana, the British Empire gave a great deal of latitude to the local elite in developing a new political system. Having overlooked Botswana's wealth, the Crown did not establish a system of personal ownership of the state's resources. The Crown's loose control over the protectorate also negated the need for a nationalist movement. The lack of a nationalist movement reduced the chances of politics becoming militarized.

Botswana's ability to provide for its own security also contributed to the lack of violence. In short, Botswana's military was able to control the country's borders. Inside its borders there was a general respect for rule of law. There was also the perception that public officials and bureaucrats were legitimate. Unlike their analogs in the Congo, Botswana state officials exercised absolute control over the mining industry. They also controlled the flow of foreign aid. While Botswana received military assistance from donors, it largely stayed out of Cold War politics. Finally, Botswana was effectively ruled by a single party. However, that party was held accountable to some extent and did not operate based on the whims of a single dictator.

Final Thoughts

Kaldor (1999), Duffield (2001), and Berdal (2003) speak of conflicts like those in the Congo as a new type of civil war, while Thom (1999) talks about the new African warlordism and organized banditry. I disagree with both assessments. The conflicts in the Congo were the continuation of a legacy of organized banditry that began at least as early as colonialism. King Leopold robbed the Congo of its resources while brutalizing its people and arresting the country's development. The Belgians continued this legacy, as part of the larger campaign known as colonialism, which carved up various pieces of Africa into fiefdoms. Eventually the fiefdom known as the Congo landed in the hands of the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. As his fiefdom became too weak to defend itself in the 1990s Kabila and his allies, Rwanda, and Uganda further subdivided these fiefdoms. This arrangement resembles those brokered by Great Britain, France, Belgian, and Germany to divide up Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

Cilliers (2003), Renner (2002), and Klare (2001) have called the conflicts such as those in the Congo "resource wars." However, resources are but one set of factors in a trajectory of war that may have began hundreds of years ago. Given the complexity of these conflicts, the labels resource war or natural resource conflict are misguided. The notion of a resource conflict is attention-grabbing, as it sensationalizes and simplifies the dynamics of a complex conflict. In my opinion, too many scholars treat these conflicts as phenomena based on cost-benefit analyses of present circumstances. These conflicts extend far beyond their temporal and spatial circumstances. Malone and Nitzscheke (2005) provide a more valid portrait of these types of conflict when they examine resources in the context of a political economy of civil war. Although scholars, such as Ross (2003) refer to the role that natural resources play in civil conflict, they muddy the waters by using the phrase "resource curse." This phrase raises the prominence of resources in conflicts that have a range of non-resource determinants.

Chapter VI: Conclusions & Generalizations

In this dissertation I have examined the determinants of the onset and the duration of intra-state conflicts that involve natural resources. I extracted these determinants from the findings of a number of quantitative studies. Given the proliferation of these studies since the 1990s, I tested a range of determinants. Case study analysis of these determinants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Republic of Botswana revealed some important differences in resource politics, demonstrating the importance of several factors and exposing the limited explanatory value of others. My study indicates that the most important factors that affect the onset and duration of intra-state natural resource conflict are the following: (1) the colonial and Cold War legacies of the country in question; (2) the extent of state control over resource extraction; (3) the strength of the state's military; (4) the level of foreign intervention in the conflict; and (5) asymmetries in resources in one case - Mobutu's Congo versus the "rebels" and in another case - Kabila's African alliance versus Rwanda's alliance. Less important factors include the onset and continuation of war because of political grievances, the effect of the resource curse and Dutch disease, and the types of resources under contention.

Colonial Legacy

My analysis indicates that the manner in which a country exited colonialism determines to some extent whether the state pursues a rational-bureaucratic state or a kleptocratic state. The Congo was brutalized during its colonial history. It was controlled first by King Leopold of Belgium as his personal property. The international community shamed King Leopold into relinquishing the Congo to the Belgian state. When the Belgians reluctantly left the Congo, they had not prepared the Congolese for neither political nor economic independence. Moreover, while the Belgians abandoned the political apparatus, they maintained economic control of the Congo. The state became the principal source of wealth for the Congolese. It is no surprise then that after Belgian control Mobutu nationalized the Congo's major industries to avoid outside control. Although the nationalization efforts largely failed, they gave Mobutu almost total control over resources and further entrenched the kleptocratic state.

Botswana's road to independence was a starkly different experience than that of the Congo's. Botswana had been a protectorate state. As the name suggests, the British Crown acted largely as a protector from Boer invasion. The Crown allowed Botswana to remain a protectorate (rather than a colony) because the Crown did not know the extent of Botswana's wealth until after independence. Since Botswana was unprofitable for an already overstretched British Empire, neither the British Crown nor British companies were willing to invest heavily in Botswana. Therefore, native Batswana controlled the national economy after independence. Although the post-independence economy depended heavily upon mining, the Batswana controlled economic opportunities that could eventually be extended to their own people. Also, while Botswana depended heavily upon public sector employment, officials put controls in place to ensure that no individual would benefit disproportionately from the state.

Botswana did not have the same legacy of personal control over state resources as the Congo. Public officials did not consider state resources to be in the private domain. Operating from this perspective, state officials could demonstrate patience in negotiating with corporations. There was no haste to secure contracts before opportunities for personal gain passed. In short, Botswana went into political independence with the autonomy necessary to make economic decisions as a state, rather than as a group of economically-rational individuals.

Cold War

During the Cold War Mobutu was a puppet of the Western powers. His location in the heart of Africa was strategic for Westerners, as the Congo touched borders with nine other African countries. The Western powers could, for example, sponsor rebels in socialist Angola through the Congo. Consequently, Western powers looked the other way as Mobutu abused his own people, continually restructured bad debts, and avoided democratic reform. Western powers provided unlimited sources of personal wealth and military aid. With these resources, Mobutu was careful to prop up his own personal security forces, while neglecting the rank-and-file military. His Cold War status further supported the notion of the state as a source of personal wealth. However, once the Cold War ended the Western powers had little use for Mobutu. The Clinton Administration strongly suggested that Mobutu concede his public office to the front man of the “rebel” forces, Laurent Kabila.

Cold War politics helped set up a number of structural elements for the eventual onset of conflicts in 1996. However, the dissipation of Cold War politics helped achieve a decisive end to the first set of conflicts, as Western powers would no longer compensate for the Congo's weaknesses with aid.

Botswana's experience with the Cold War was starkly different from the Congo's. Botswana stuck to a non-aligned position. Consequently, superpower politics did not obstruct the officials' vision for Botswana. Also, Botswana's founders were careful about becoming too dependent upon foreign aid. As a result of avoiding such attachments, Botswana did not get trapped in the endless cycle of deficit spending in which the Congo found itself. These findings demonstrate Botswana's commitment to developing a rational-legal state rather than a kleptocratic state. The Botswana officials did not supplant sound economic planning with superpower resources.

State Control of Resources

My findings indicate that the legacy of personal ownership is important because it established an attitude in the Congo that state resources are the spoils of contests between individuals. Uganda and Rwanda entered into conflict with the Congo in 1996 and 1998. In 1996 these countries entered as allies of Mobutu's successor, Laurent Kabila. In 1998 they re-entered as Laurent Kabila's enemies. In 1998 Laurent Kabila, responding to Congolese complaints about the number of Tutsis occupying top positions in his regime, expelled Tutsis from the Congo. Also, he refused to protect Rwanda from the Hutu attacks organized in Hutu refugee camps along the Congo border. However, reports from the area do not clearly establish Rwanda's and Uganda's motives for re-entry into the Congo. Some evidence suggests that they re-entered for security reasons. Other evidence suggests that they re-entered to finish the resource exploitation they had started during the first war in 1996.

Regardless of Rwanda's or Uganda's actual motives, the UN Panel of Experts on the Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Congo found that during the 1996 conflicts a number of high-ranking Rwandan and Ugandan military officials set up financial networks through which they could funnel resource extraction revenue. Although officially re-entering the Congo for border control and in response to human rights violations, individuals from these countries controlled the local economies in the east, north, and northwestern regions of the Congo well after 1998. Kabila enlisted the help of Namibia, Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe to help him maintain majority control over the state. Kabila rewarded officials from these countries, especially Zimbabwe, with business ventures in the mining sector.

The large fiefdom formerly controlled by Mobutu was politically and economically subdivided into smaller fiefdoms controlled most notably by Laurent Kabila, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In short, because resources in the Congo were considered to be Mobutu's personal property, groups felt justified in challenging his ownership rights. Mobutu developed political, financial, social, and communications networks that allowed theft from the state. Those networks later served as models for interlopers. The pervasive acceptance of private ownership of state resources contributed to the onset of conflict in 1996, as other countries refused to relinquish their illegitimate claims on foreign resources.

States can minimize outside claims on state resources by taking or assuring full control over extraction processes. This finding should not be confused with the thesis that lootable resources (resources that can be mined) are risk factors for conflict. Lootable resources do not have to be risk factors if states exert control over resource operations. Throughout most of the late 1960s and early 1970s, copper was a principal means of revenue for the Congo. However, the state failed to maintain its main facility in the Shaba region. Not only did the state fail to provide vital infrastructure, the insecurity at this facility and facilities in a chief diamond region in the south allowed rogue operations. When the "rebel" campaign rolled through with military assistance from Uganda and Rwanda, resource sites were vulnerable to immediate takeover. These vulnerabilities mattered a great deal in both sets of conflicts, as the "rebels" quickly sold resource contracts to purchase arms. Conversely, when Botswana officials established the Orapa mining site, they controlled entry into and exit from the mining city.

Foreign Intervention

Ownership of the Congo's resources was complicated by the number of claimants. As Ross (2004) contends, civil wars that involve natural resources often draw outside intervention. Such was the case when Rwanda and Uganda intervened against Mobutu while other African countries allied with Mobutu. These interventions lengthen civil conflicts (Hironaka, 2005). The Congo became embroiled in two wars in less than two years between 1996 and 1998.

Initially, Rwanda's and Uganda's interventions prolonged the Congo's internal strife. The Banyamulenge were a group of Tutsis living in the Congo. After the 1994

Rwandan genocide, the Hutus who committed the genocide, along with innocent refugees, fled to humanitarian camps on the Congo's border. From there, Hutu militants launched attacks on the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda and on Tutsis living inside the Congo. The Banyamulenge (Tutsis native to the Congo) retaliated against the extremists. However, with support from Rwanda and Uganda the Banyamulenge took on a more aggressive role. This "rebel" alliance eventually sought to control key resource sites. After the alliance captured key resource sites, it was able to exhaust the state's (and the state's allies') capacity to defend itself. My findings are consistent with those of Fearon (2004) and Smith and Stam (2004) who find that asymmetries in economic and military resources shorten conflicts. It is also consistent with Buhaug and Gates' findings (2002). They conclude that the group(s) that controls vital resources controls the state.

Military Strength

Several scholars use state strength to explain the onset or duration of conflicts involving natural resources (Humphrey, 2005; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005; Fearon, 2004; Herbst, 2004; Cincotta, 2003; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Ross, 2001; LeBillion, 2001-a; Isham, *et al.*, 2001; Alao and Olonisakan, 2000; Goldstone, 2000). My findings point to a simple state weakness explanation that centers on the military. Related to state weakness, Congo state officials largely collected state revenue from exports, resource extraction revenue, and Cold War donations prior to the 1996 and 1998 conflicts. These revenue sources placed limitations on citizens' demands on the state since these sources supplanted personal tax contributions. On the expenditure side, the state failed to construct vital infrastructure, such as roads, communication networks, and key social services. However, it was a poorly trained, underpaid, disloyal military that failed to stop the “rebel” onslaught. Mobutu even hired mercenaries and enlisted the help of the South Koreans to train his soldiers. Mobutu’s undisciplined forces were not amenable to such training. The weak military presented no real threat to the “rebels” who were also operating on limited resources. Although the rebels captured the capital city wearing t-shirts and flip-flops, the asymmetry in military capability helped the “rebels” achieve victory in a relatively short time—in about nine months.

Botswana’s civilian leaders (as opposed to the military) controlled their society. The military had not become a privileged class during the colonial period. Consequently, the military did not play a role in the transition to an independent state. By the time state officials formed a military in 1977, the principal party, the Botswana Democratic Party, had consolidated political power. Since its inception the military has remained apolitical.

Asymmetries

The conflicts that began in 1996 were marked by asymmetries in power, ultimately leading to a decisive victory by the “rebels.” First, Mobutu’s forces were unable to cope with the might of a Rwandan--Ugandan alliance that eventually included other countries. Angola, in particular, had a strong interest in assisting these countries since Mobutu had sponsored rebels inside Angola. While France tried to intervene on Mobutu’s behalf, outside opposition to the Mobutu regime was overwhelming. Other states committed to the effort to overthrow Mobutu. Rwanda and Uganda increased their military budgets during the first and second set of conflicts, even as they received social aid from international organizations. Inside opposition was equally daunting. Once the ADFL movement gained momentum, local officials went on record saying that they would not resist the ADFL. Some even celebrated the coming of the ADFL. Others went as far as joining the ADFL forces. Also, tilting the balance in favor of the ADFL was its capture of key resource sites. Finally, the US helped further tilt the balance by asking Mobutu to bow down gracefully.

In the second set of conflicts, the Rwandan-Ugandan alliance was offset by the alliance Kabila established with Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Consequently, neither Kabila nor Rwanda achieved a decisive victory. Kabila retained majority control of the Congo and Rwanda and Uganda controlled the eastern, north, and northwest regions.

Less Important Factors

The factors listed above played important roles in resource politics in the Congo and Botswana. Other factors also played roles in the cases I examined. They were, however, less important than the factors I list above. These factors include the following: (1) War as an expression of political grievances; (2) resource curse and Dutch disease; and (3) type of resources under contention.

Grievances

The initial set of conflicts in the Congo was set in motion by activity in the Hutu refugee camps on the Congo border. Humanitarian shelter and aid allowed the Hutu militants to reorganize their military apparatus. The militants launched attacks on Rwanda from these camps. They also launched attacks on the Tutsi population living inside the Congo. One Tutsi group, the Banyamulenge, retaliated with support from

Rwanda and Uganda. The Mobutu regime had previously victimized this native group by challenging its citizenship rights. Consistent with Collier and Hoeffler's (2001) findings, the Banyamulenge campaign appeared to be an expression of grievances that morphed into an expression of greed (to take over key resource sites and control the state). However, reports suggest that Tutsi rebels operating out of Uganda and Rwanda had trained the Banyamulenge in advance of this "rebellion." Therefore, there is still some question as to how much the early stages of this campaign truly expressed the grievances of the Congolese Tutsis.

The idea that rebel mobilization is largely driven by grievances is challenged by conditions in the Congo prior to the 1996 conflicts. For over 32 years, conditions in the Congo fostered grievances. However, the groups that sought redress through political channels were largely ineffective. Also, they had limited relationships to the campaign that eventually overthrew Mobutu. During the Cold War the Western powers actually rebuffed the political claims of legitimate political organizations.

The Botswana case provides additional evidence that grievances are weak predictors of the onset and duration of civil war. The mining industry was the chief source of wealth and development in Botswana. That development was limited to certain segments of society, as evident by an almost 50 percent poverty rate and an education system that left a number of Batswana unemployable in productive sectors. Still, Botswana remained peaceful.

Resource Curse/Dutch Disease

The Congo, like Botswana, was clearly the victim of what scholars call the resource curse. The Congo was also a victim of Dutch Disease, the phenomenon in which countries fail to develop sectors other than mining. The literature suggests that these conditions lead to conflicts over resources. However, these conditions existed in the Congo for over 32 years before the 1996 conflicts. Also, the Congo had endured a number of downturns in resource export values prior to 1996. The Congo's resource wealth was vast and varied enough that when there was a downturn in one market, Mobutu simply shifted dependence to other resources. When there was an overall shortfall in resource wealth, Mobutu could rely upon donations from Western powers.

While these conditions made the Congo vulnerable to instability, Mobutu used his patronage network to control rebel mobilization. He gave local leaders the privilege of local control. He also shuffled regional leaders around to make sure no leader established a strong political base. He went as far as placing leaders outside their ethnic bases, making it difficult for them to establish a foothold.

Botswana, like the Congo, had a number of important vulnerabilities. At the macro-economic level, Botswana appeared to have escaped the resource curse. In short, resource abundance did not thwart the state's development. However, on a per capita basis, as with the Congo, Botswana was victim to this curse. The mining industry was supposed to support other areas of development. However, there was clearly an unequal distribution of wealth in the country. About ½ of Botswana's population lived in poverty throughout the 1990s. Also, in terms of utility access, Botswana failed to measure up to countries with similar average incomes. Disparities in utility access were especially pronounced when measuring them along rural-urban lines. Still, Botswana was free of violent conflicts over resources.

Botswana was also a victim to Dutch disease. It failed to adequately develop other sectors, especially manufacturing. Industrial resources and foreign direct investment largely targeted the mining industry, which employed only about six percent of the population. Expatriates occupied a number of key positions in the mining workforce because the Botswana education system had not prepared its students to enter the job market. Despite these conditions, Botswana did not become embroiled in conflict.

Theoretical Applications and Implications

I undertook this project to test theory. Specifically, I wanted to know which factors are associated with the onset and endurance of conflicts involving natural resources. My case studies suggest that some factors are more important than others in fostering and promoting natural resource conflict. I summarize my primary substantive findings above. In closing, I would like to offer some final thoughts on the study of natural resource conflict.

One thing that my case studies make clear is that in some cases unique historical circumstances contribute to the onset and duration of natural resource conflict. While this finding makes formulating a general theory difficult, it is an accurate reflection of the Congolese experience.

My data show that the 1996 and 1998 conflicts developed and continued because of unique historical circumstances in the Congo. In 1994, someone shot down a plane carrying the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. These assassinations triggered the Rwandan genocide. This genocide was the climax of tensions that stretched back hundreds of years. Colonial cleavages had only exacerbated these tensions. As Tutsi rebels took control of the Rwandan government, Hutus fled *en masse* to bordering Zaire. Among the refugees were men who had committed the genocide. Residing in camps along the Rwanda/Zaire border, Hutus began attacking Tutsi groups native to the Congo. The Hutu military apparatus was able to regroup in the camps, even controlling the behavior of other refugees in the camps. Mobutu offered no protection to the Tutsi from the Hutu. However, one Tutsi group, the Banyamulenge, retaliated with help from Rwanda and Uganda. The Banyamulenge's defensive campaign became an offensive campaign that ultimately overthrew the government of Zaire.

Despite heavy involvement from Rwanda and Uganda, the Banyamulenge operation packaged itself as a rebel movement. A washed up Congolese rebel turned smuggler, Laurent Kabila was the front man for this campaign. Laurent Kabila rushed to take control of vital resource areas. Mobutu was unable to defend his country because his troops were undisciplined and disloyal. He had previously failed to pay his troops. He had also allowed the military to loot Congolese communities. Consequently, soldiers were undisciplined, even as Mobutu sought outside training for his soldiers.

Scholars explain that rebel mobilization often occurs among the ranks of enlisted military. According to this thesis, enlisted soldiers compensate for low pay by moonlighting as rebels. Mobutu's high-ranking officials and rank-and-file soldiers certainly resorted to pillaging and looting. However, their actions did not amount to serious rebel mobilization, although they constructed road blocks, pillaged citizens, and looted resource sites.

As Kabila attempted to consolidate power, the Congolese protested his regime. In addition to their outrage at gross human rights violations, they were angry that Kabila had placed so many Tutsis in positions of power. These Tutsis, some of them foreign, had formed the basis of Kabila's earlier "rebel campaign." In the background, tensions had already been brewing between Kabila and his ally Rwanda because Kabila refused to control Hutu activities in the refugee camps. Refugees had mounted attacks on Rwanda from the camps. Kabila aggravated this situation by expelling the Tutsi from the Congo. With help from Uganda and Rwanda, the Tutsis in the Congo retaliated. However, Kabila was able to suppress them, but only with the aid of Namibia, Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Just the same, Rwandan representatives maintained control of key resource areas in northeastern Congo. Uganda took control of the north and northwestern areas. A UN Panel of Experts concluded that factions from Rwanda and Uganda, especially their military leaders, had become aware of the Congo's resource potential during the initial incursion with Kabila. It was during those incursions that top-ranking military personnel from these countries began to establish financial and transportation networks to support resource exploitation.

Operationalization

My case studies also show that future scholars of natural resource conflict might want to rethink how they operationalize key variables. First of all, the conflicts I studied here support the notion that battle-related deaths no longer sufficiently define the severity of a civil war. My case studies show that civil wars increasingly involve civilian targets who become victims of personal insecurity, rape, and displacement. As such, quantifying the impact of war in terms of battle-related deaths cannot sufficiently portray the true nature of a civil war. In addition, the very notion of "civil war" may need to be rethought by scholars of natural resource conflict. My case studies show that foreign occupiers often play major roles in what we tend to label "civil wars." For example, Rwanda and Uganda did not just sponsor "rebels" inside the Congo. Both countries committed military personnel to the occupation and exploitation of the northern and eastern regions. Their occupation was certainly justified by the attacks from the Hutu camps. However, both countries robbed stockpiled resources, robbed banks, pillaged personal savings, controlled mining and agriculture, diverted resources to their home countries for export, and controlled local economies. Third, many of the conflicts that we call natural resource conflicts may not actually be natural resource conflicts. For example, the Zaire-Congo conflicts I discuss here involved a range of political dynamics, including a political genocide. There is a risk of assigning natural resources too prominent a role in these conflicts. While scholars have debated the merits of case study analysis, my case studies have highlighted some of the operationalization problems present in a number of quantitative studies that examine the relationship between natural resources and conflict. Scholars have convincingly quantified a link between natural resources and civil war. However, the role of the resources themselves is over-determined in many of these studies. This over-determination is reflected in terms such as "natural resource conflict" and "resource curse," which appear frequently in this discourse. An abundance of natural resources is one among many historical factors that draw resource-abundant, developing countries into civil war.

Because of these operationalization problems scholars have found it difficult to establish causality between resource dependence and civil conflict. Zaire-Congo had depended heavily upon resources for over 30 years before the 1996 conflict occurred. Botswana had also depended heavily upon resources, but without violent conflict. In the other direction, conflict in Zaire-Congo seemed to only entrench the already existing resource dependence. I can even say that the Congo depended less on resources after these conflicts because other countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda, controlled and relied upon the Congo's export resources.

The Way Forward/Future Study

The findings in this dissertation require that we step back from the generalizations falsified above because they are based on the assumption that the conflicts beginning in 1996 and 1998 were about natural resources alone. Yes, we can say that conflicts around resources have taken place in the Congo. However, a number of quantitative studies give limited weight to other political factors involved in these conflicts. For example, the initial onset of conflicts in the Congo in 1996 was as much about the misuse of humanitarian aid as it was about natural resources. In failing to account for the full range of factors that contribute to civil war, findings on the role of natural resources in conflict have been misleading. It is not surprising then that scholars have struggled to establish causality for these conflicts.

This dissertation also suggests that we should reexamine conflicts in other parts of the world involving natural resources, paying special attention to the difference between inter-state and intra-state wars. The conflicts in the Congo have been called civil wars. This label has led to over-deterministic explanations. In the first Congo conflicts, internal grievances (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001) played a role in fostering conflict. However, these grievances did not sustain the conflict. Greed and outside intervention sustained these conflicts up to the point where Mobutu was overthrown. The triggering Banyamulenge offensive/defensive constituted a civil conflict. When Rwanda and Uganda intervened, these disputes morphed into interstate war. Also, as Hironaka (2005:6) explains, there is a "bias in the international systems against territorial reshuffling." International norms and laws support this bias. The literature on the role of resources in conflict also supports this bias. This discourse often portrays challenges to a state by other states as components of civil war, when much broader phenomena are taking place. The 1998 war occurred as a result of Rwanda's self-defense, Rwanda's and Uganda's greed, and Rwanda's grievances over the way Congolese were treating Tutsi's inside Congo.

Botswana

One of the reasons I chose Botswana as a case study is that it represents a relatively successful case of development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in the last few chapters I have largely glossed over the lessons we can learn from Botswana. In conclusion, I will examine some of these lessons.

Botswana is a powerful case that demonstrates natural resources can serve an African country well. Botswana went into independence in the unique position of controlling its own wealth. It was able to do so because the British were not aware of Botswana's vast wealth during the colonial period. Still, the state founders carefully laid the groundwork that allowed the state to benefit from every stage of the mining process. Also, the founders were willing to walk away from negotiations if companies would not agree to the state's terms. In addition, the country enlisted the help of the London Police to institute anti-corruption measures. Also, the incomes policy attempted to limit the amount of money people could make off the state. Most importantly, such measures helped shape the attitude that the state would not be a source of personal wealth.

Despite its relative successes, Botswana grappled with a number of deeply–rooted problems over the years. First, there has always been a huge wealth gap in the country, particularly between the urban and rural populations. The limited capacity of the mining sector exacerbated this wealth gap. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the mining sector employed only six percent of the population. Despite this low capacity, Botswana officials were less committed to the development of other sectors. Also, expatriates played a disproportionately large role in this sector because most Batswana were undereducated for key positions. In addition, the Batswana work force (as with other aspects of society) was in a state of attrition in the late 1990s because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Botswana also grappled with concerns from its minority populations about second-class status. Eight major tribes are explicitly mentioned in the constitution, suggesting their prominence in Batswana society. Minor tribes were concerned about a loss or subversion of their tribal identities as Tswana was the "official" identity in Botswana. Despite these concerns, Botswana maintained a peaceful society.

Through the 1990s, Botswana was *de facto* a single-party regime. The Botswana Democratic Party was the only viable party in a multi-party system. The first serious challenge to its authority did not occur until 1994. On the whole, however, Botswana's public officials enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy. How was this possible? First, the founders played upon Botswana's pre-colonial experiences with democracy. By invoking the history of a tribal public meeting, the leaders were suggesting that the people had direct input into government decision-making. However, national officials did not usually seek meaningful input from these meetings. They used these forums to report the news. These public meetings also helped maintain the prestige of the tribal chiefs, even in the face of an increasingly modernizing society. The chiefs' presence and input also helped legitimize the national government's positions. Second, the government decided early on to support the cattle-owning elite at the behest of the agricultural sector. Both sectors were difficult and impractical to maintain because of drought. Since a number of Batswana were tied into the cattle market, even if in non-profitable way, public policies that supported the agendas of the cattle-owning elite were seen as supporting the society at large. In addition, Botswana gradually asserted itself as a regional leader, being careful not to seem too combative with its more powerful neighbor, South Africa. Botswana was the product of a number of contradictions. However, these contradictions allowed the country to move development indicators in a positive direction.

The Botswana case, with all its contradictions, presents somewhat of a challenge to public policy prescriptions for conflict prevention. This case suggests that positive development can take place even among a number of characteristics that we associate with state weakness. By closely aligning elite interests with the traditional interests of the people, states officials were able to maintain a sense of satisfaction internally. Externally, Botswana limited its involvement in the security issues of other countries, while being careful to protect its own border. Again, Botswana, unlike the Congo and most post-colonial countries, was able to control its internal and external politics because of the absence of control by a former "mother" country.

Since Botswana asserts direct control over its resources, the Botswana case suggests room for further study of companies that operate in Botswana under a number of restrictions but play by a different set of rules in other countries. Botswana would serve well as a control case for a number of studies on the developing world and African countries in particular.

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Vita

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