

**Discovering Fragmented Speech: Towards a
Bakhtinian Approach to the Unconscious**

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by
Geoffrey Leonard Beale

Department of Human Sciences, Brunel
University

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ABSTRACT

Fragmented speech, the discovery of which forms the basis of this dissertation, provides the aim and direction of our thesis. The aim is to clarify precisely what fragmented speech is, and subsequently define its application. In this thesis, we begin by providing the historical background to the initial collision between psychoanalysis and literature. This broad base provides the impetus needed in order to formulate certain conclusions regarding the *unconscious* and the *dialogic*. Our methodology involves a combination of Freud-Lacanian theory and Bakhtinian linguistics. As we approach an understanding of our subject, it becomes increasingly necessary to develop the issues surrounding the significance of fragmented speech.

The significance of our work becomes focused when we provide an analysis of a ‘psychotic discourse’, namely, the *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*, by President Schreber — using the methodology described. In the final stages of our thesis fragmented speech becomes a *symptom* of psychosis. Under pressure from the unconscious, the image of speech may fragment. It is the interaction between the body image and the speech image that provides us with a *speech complex*. Consequently, this dissertation discovers fragmented speech at the very heart of the psychoanalytic session.

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Geoffrey L. Beale, 2003.

INTRODUCTION

In his landmark essay on The Mirror Stage, Lacan discovered in the child, prior to the consolidation of the rudimentary ego at the mirror stage, the fragmented body as the child's own introduction to its later development of a supposed whole body image. In this dissertation, we have taken as our major thesis and organizing principle, this idea of the fragmented body, which, according to Lacan, returns to the analysand in the course of psychoanalytic treatment, and asked ourselves a simple question. If the child has a fragmented body image, prior to the whole body image inaugurated at the mirror stage, why is it not equally possible that the child also has an *image of speech* that is similarly fragmented? Whilst this appears to have been overlooked as a possibility by Lacan, this dissertation sets out to argue that the fragmented body *and* fragmented speech are both repressed at the mirror stage, taking up residence in the unconscious, where they continue to haunt consciousness.

Before, however, we proceed any further a brief word of explanation is required. Lacan did not refer at all to the *image* of language or the *image* of the word. Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, however, did and we shall refer to his extensive *oeuvre* throughout this dissertation. In order to substantiate this thesis, our work explores the function, impact and value of the discovery of fragmented speech within psychoanalysis and linguistic theory. This is achieved through the dialogic interpenetration of the work of Freud, Lacan and the Russian linguist, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. Why Bakhtin? The answer to this is simple: to discover the dialogic activity of fragmented speech, the

Structuralist project will not suffice. There is not, and will not be, any attempt to detect a code or system in this dissertation. Did Bakhtin not say that the code is the death of context?

If fragmented speech exists, and it is our intention to prove, as far as possible, that it does, then its discovery is rooted in the two disciplines of psychoanalysis on one hand, and literary/linguistic theory on the other hand. We begin by tracing a line of this interface between the two. Before we proceed any further I think we should point out that fragmented speech exists as an unconscious *potential*, it is not a conscious phenomenon, unless, in the case of mental illness, consciousness is swamped by the unconscious.

In order to develop this thesis, we have studied the work of Bakhtin, who provides a rich linguistic harvest capable of sustaining our concept of fragmented speech. Certainly, I can think of no other philosopher of language whose work could provide a context or conceptual horizon for fragmented speech (or the fragmented body for that matter) other than Bakhtin. Hopefully, in the course of this dissertation we may discover why this should be so. This proves to be our starting point then, *fragmented speech*. During our dissertation we shall provide evidence of the possibility of the existence in the unconscious of fragmented speech and take the necessary steps to clarify both its existence and its nature. We shall explore the possible correlation between the fragmented body and the image of fragmented speech and/or the collision that may ensue. The whole process is complicated by the necessity of an approach to the partial drives, or

fragmented drives, and their connection with the image of fragmentation of the body and word. Likewise, we shall develop the collision in terms of the *méconnaissance* of the *whole body image* and the *whole system of speech* — as image.

So it is that we have, to borrow a phrase from Bakhtin, set a dialogic or dialogizing background in the first instance, of the dialogic atmosphere in which psychoanalysis and literary theory first collided in the ‘*marketplace*’ of 19, Bergasse. The psychoanalytic (and dialogic) atmosphere in Vienna at the turn of the nineteenth century was, one might imagine, vibrant with ideas. So how have we tried to achieve our objective? By creating an exploratory *genre* potential at the birth of the psychoanalytic movement, and placing it at an angle of interpenetration with the literary field. In this, we have tried to penetrate the voice zones present in those early dialogues, creating a backdrop and dialogic threshold, in which we set the tone and scene for the rest of our dissertation. Perhaps we could say that we re-accentuate it for our own purposes and attempt to tune in to the apperceptive background.

In our opening chapter, we hear the voice zones of both Freud and his disciple Otto Rank, where, in those early days, an absence of psychoanalytic case studies led to the vast field of literature being psychoanalysed upon the couch, as it were. This early dialogic angle sets the opening chapter in the time and space of those early days, where the overlap between psychoanalysis and literature first took shape. At the very opening meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Otto Rank was in a hurry and excited at the prospect of reading his extensive work based on Freud’s discovery of the core and model of

psychoanalysis, Oedipus Rex. This core complex of psychoanalysis provides our opening model of psychoanalytic thought provided by Freud. By opening our first chapter at the interface between literature (Sophocles' Oedipus Rex) and Freud's discovery of the incest complex provides the initial graft binding the two together. This chapter then opens up the field of the Freudian unconscious and the rest of the dissertation. The concept of fragmented speech had to be carefully contextualized against the backdrop of psychoanalysis and linguistic theory, those early days provided the impetus necessary to formulate our hypothesis and led us on to the Freudian unconscious and Lacan's Mirror Stage.

CHAPTER ONE

OEDIPUS REX: SIGMUND FREUD AND OTTO RANK

Introduction

In this opening chapter, we outline our major argument and then contextualize it within a certain historical background and finally draw out the implications. Our major hypothesis states that: *the formation of the ego entails the creation of fragmented speech in the unconscious*. Having thus stated our hypothesis, we now set about contextualizing it within certain basic parameters. The discovery of fragmented speech is, in fact, the child of two disciplines, namely psychoanalysis and literary theory. In order to ascertain the historical background, however, we begin with the work of Otto Rank, for many years a disciple of Sigmund Freud, and continue with the work of the father of psychoanalysis, Freud himself. We do not wish to be accused as Rank was: ‘Freud was always disturbed by Rank’s impetuous way of breaking into the middle of a problem, taking the historical or scientific underpinning for granted, never hesitating to apply any conclusion in universal terms’ (Taft, 1958: 55). Sensitive to the possibility of any such accusation, we have unfolded our blueprint in the early days of the psychoanalytic movement.

We create also in this chapter an argument that underlines aspects of Rank’s methodology and its weaknesses, in his application of psychoanalysis to literature, and suggest a counterpoint score of Freud’s application of his own thought to *Jensen’s Gradiva* (SE. IX: 7-95). In this way we tackle two problems simultaneously, first, an initial incursion into both fields, and secondly we check the methodology and manner of

attempting to psychoanalyse texts in those early days. Thereby, hopefully, we avoid the accusation directed against Rank, namely of entering the problem half way through.

Early days and early ways

On February 15, 1905, Otto Rank, who had recently discovered the work of Sigmund Freud, wrote in his diary: ‘A medically proven artist’ (Lieberman, 1985: 36). Rank produces this interesting comment in his diary and this description doubtless would have pleased the father of psychoanalysis, who spoke in similar terms of Charcot. This early entry, however, seems to contain an immanent ambiguity. What, we may think, *is* a medically proven (or constituted) artist? Obviously the comment has a certain lightness of touch, but this apparently casual comment by Rank contains two propositions that interest us in this dissertation, namely, the *scientific* and the *artistic* and their juxtaposition and interpenetration.

In the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic group, we have the early interpenetration of the two disciplines so far discussed on one hand, and the activation of conscious and unconscious forces within that group on the other hand. ‘The year 1905, when Rank met Freud’ (Lieberman, 1985: 67) becomes crucial for us in this chapter. For, following that meeting, Rank was to develop a psychoanalytic theory of literary criticism, which embraced much of Freud’s early thought. We see, for example, that: ‘Rank had served as Secretary of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and Freud’s closest colleague from 1906-1924’ (Lieberman, 1985, xxviii). Freud himself was born on May 6, 1856, at Freiberg, in Moravia, Czechoslovakia, (SE: XX: 7). By 1896, he had developed a theory that held

'traumatic sexual events in a person's childhood were the cause of psychoneurosis' (Lieberman, 1985: 51). Freud had discovered in the infant's life, the part played by childhood sexual trauma. On October 15, 1897, in a letter to Fliess he was to say:

To be completely honest with oneself is good practice. One single thought of general value has been revealed to me. I have found, in my own case too, falling in love with the mother and jealousy of the father, and I now regard it as a universal event of early childhood, even if not so early as in children who have been made hysterical (Similarly with the romance of parentage in paranoia — heroes, founders of religions.).

If that is so, we can understand the riveting power of *Oedipus Rex*, in spite of all objections raised against its presupposition of destiny ...the Greek legend seizes on a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he feels its existence within himself. (SE: I: 265).

Freud, however, in 1925 was to state: 'the ubiquity of the Oedipus complex gradually dawned on me' (SE: XX: 23). So, by the *fin de siècle* the former nuclear complex discovered by Freud had, it seems, metamorphosed into the Oedipus complex. Freud discovered the earlier nuclear complex to be neurosis based upon the incest fantasy.

As early as 1902, however, one Wilhelm Stekel 'suggested a weekly meeting of a few Viennese colleagues to discuss psychoanalysis' (Lieberman, 1985: 61). In the Minutes of those early meetings (Nunberg, 1962), the opening papers concern the work of Otto Rank and outline his theme of incest in literature. The minutes are remarkable, because in the first few pages it is quite apparent that only Freud grasps the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, and the other members are even uncertain of the contents

of the unconscious. Notwithstanding this, the first papers presented are those of Otto Rank. It is fascinating to see in these minutes that as Freud's psychoanalytic theories gradually emerged, Rank seized upon them and incorporated them into his work on the incest theme in literature.

We see that Rank probably first attended sessions in 1905. They met at 19, Berggasse. The group were a devoted band that followed the professor [Freud] in awe (Lieberman, 1985, variously). By October 1906, Rank presented to the group a major topic '*Incest Theme in Literature and Legend*'. Rank read three papers on the subject successively over three Wednesdays. Criticized by the members, including Freud, they formed the basis for Rank's later published work.

It is worth remembering that this early dialogic activity, in the presence of Freud, is the *first* attempt to apply psychoanalytic principles directly to literature, at least in a dialogic setting. That is, apart from Freud himself who wrote a full psychological analysis of a literary work — Jensen's *Gradiva* (SE: IX; 7-95) and also separate from his early comments on Oedipus Rex and Hamlet in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (SE: IV-V: *variously*) and finally his comments on *Die Richterin* ['The Woman Judge']. The early problems with Rank's paper were formed, in part, around the sibling element in the incest motif. In the discussion of sibling love, we have the following comment:

From the field of literature, Freud mentions C. F. Myers short novel *Die Richterin* where the theme is sibling love; at the end of the story it turns out that the two main characters are not really brother and sister, whereupon they marry. This mechanism, which has the

purpose of annulling painful conditions in one's own generation, is frequently operative in the family romances of neurotics (Nunberg, 1962: 20)

Freud's first commentary upon *Die Richter* is contained in his letter to Fliess of 20th June, 1898 (Freud, 1954: Letter 91: 256). This is Freud's first application of analysis to a work of literature.

The *Minutes* are, in themselves, a specific literary *genre* and perhaps one may add that their interpretation is also a *genre* activity. We can see in this activity, the developing theories of Freud impinge, in a particular dialogic psychoanalytic space, upon the world of literature and literary theory. However, so that we understand the image of conscious and unconscious forces more clearly at this point in Vienna, we look at a comment from the Introduction of those minutes by Herman Nunberg:

Indeed, some members of the Society could not face the Unconscious as revealed by psychoanalysis. As Freud once, after a paper given by Paul Schilder, remarked, they could not breathe in the sticky atmosphere of the dark background, of the "sewers", as it were, but longed to bask in the bright sunshine on the surface.

Also on the same page in the *Minutes* is another important consideration that affects our purpose. We shall engage in an analysis of Rank's methodology (and its weaknesses) in his approach to literary criticism and literary theory; and later in the chapter we shall also analyse Freud's methodology in his work on Jensen's *Gradiva*. In the interim, however, we should note from the Minutes the following:

In those early days it was difficult to obtain suitable case material for psychoanalytic study. But this material was easily available from non-clinical sources. This may explain the striking fact that at the outset, and even later, problems of art, literature, mythology, religion, education, were discussed more than problems of psychiatry (Nunberg, 1962: *xxiii*)

In this comment we are able to visualize that it was the absence of *case studies*, of a dearth of patients, which primarily led to an engagement with literature. To avoid confusion, we must add that Freud did indeed weave certain psychoanalytic motifs through literary texts, but the *analysis* of a text was primarily because of this dearth of patients and their case studies, as the above comment from Nunberg shows. In those meetings, however, according to the *Minutes*, Rank was accused of attempting to force Freudian theory to fit the literature discussed and Freud, who was present, did not seem to feel the need to interject.

The question of whether or not the literary product may in fact be psychoanalysed does not seem to have been posed, at least directly. If, however, one analyses a literary text immediately it poses the problem of 'the other'. One further comment that arises from these *Minutes* is Freud's remark concerning the psychoanalytic patient when he says:

He is ill only to the extent that he suffers.

(Nunberg, 1962: 100).

So, for Freud, it is not the normativization of the psychoanalytic patient that appears to be important but rather that the patient does not suffer. Returning to Rank, it is perhaps

worth noticing along the way, that although chronologically it appears that Rank's book on the incest theme follows on from the earlier *Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, in fact, that is not the case. In Lieberman, we have the following:

Rank already had achieved something remarkable. His forthcoming monograph *The Artist [Der Kunstler]* was the first psychoanalytic book to be published by a member of the group other than Freud. His massive book *The Incest Motif in Poetry and Legend* (1912) was essentially written before his presentation in 1906; although he delayed publication of the 685-page tome, he was eager to talk about it with the Wednesday Group. (Lieberman, 1985: 70)

By this point, Freud had discovered through his clinical practice the possibility of an inherent incestual impulse within the child. This incestual impulse became the core of the nuclear complex and subsequently Freud had observed the ubiquitous nature of this incest motif in the Greek tragedy by Sophocles entitled, *Oedipus Rex* (Sophocles, 1982). So in this first period Freud, who by this time was well acquainted with Otto Rank, had developed a theory concerning a core complex of neurosis based upon Oedipal conflict. Otto Rank's intellectual development was paralleled in some ways with Freud's, and Rank was keeping abreast of Freud's ever-increasing discoveries. Freud had discovered the Oedipal triangle of father-mother-child as a dominant metaphor and key of psychoanalysis. Rank took the Oedipal model of Freud, and the mechanism of repression, and along with Freud's revolutionary discovery of the unconscious, transposed elements of Freud's work into the field of literary criticism.

Repression

As we shall not progress too well without a working hypothesis of Freud's theory of repression, we now look at some basic elements of this expression in Freud's work. When Freud teaches: 'The oldest word in our psychoanalytic interpretative terminology, "repression" ' ... (SE.xxi:153) we need to take note. Prior to moving any further in this text, we dwell momentarily upon this very early concept of Freud. It will figure largely in our later assessment of *fragmented speech*. In his 'History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1914)', Freud declared that 'the theory of repression is the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests'. The earliest reference to it is in Breuer and Freud: 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 (SE. II: 10). The concept of repression was suggested to Freud by the phenomenon of *resistance*, which 'in turn was brought to light by a technical innovation — namely, the abandonment of hypnosis in the cathartic treatment of hysteria'. (SE. XIV: 144). And it is with the term *hysteria* in mind, initially, that we use the term *repression*. We now check Freud's own comment:

'Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neuroses, moreover, leads us to conclude that repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning , and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity — that *the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious*. (SE. XIV: 147) .

Freud also teaches that 'repression does not hinder the instinctual representation from continuing to exist in the unconscious'... (SE. XIV: 149). And finally, Freud says:

‘Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual representative to *one* psychological system, namely to that of the conscious’. (SE. XIV: 149).

The repressed thought situated in the *Ucs.* is not stationary, however, but is re-arranged and altered by a continuous influx of new material. It is often re-accentuated as the result of *deferred-action*, whereby material is encapsulated at a certain point, and remains in a relatively static state until a newer stage of development is reached. This allows the previously encapsulated information to be re-accentuated in the light of this subsequent newer stage. For an example of this we may think of repressed oedipal material in childhood, subsequently resurrected and re-accentuated at the pubertal stage, thereby triggering the family romance, to be discussed shortly. We may also understand the newer concept of *time* involved in this. The correlation of time and space are discussed in the final chapters. So, with the onset of puberty, unconscious oedipal material may be re-accentuated, brandishing *new* hatred for the father, and sexual rivalry for the attentions of the mother, for example. We shall, however, discuss Freud’s theory of Repression again later.

By 1912, Rank had published his major work on the theme of incest and oedipal conflict in literature, and it is a fundamentally important discourse of psychoanalytic literary criticism. It is also tinged everywhere with the outcome of discussions based in those early days of the Wednesday meetings. It was well known in those early days that Freud considered Rank’s exhaustive work on the theme of incest to take first place as a scientific application of psychoanalysis to literature.

It is perhaps worth noting the exact title of Otto Rank's work: *The Incest Theme in Literature and Legend, Fundamentals of a Psychology of Literary Creation* (Rank, 1912).

We note this because when we embark upon the work of Jensen's *Gradiva* by Freud, we shall see that Freud himself does not in fact, other than in a general sense perhaps, seek to discover the literary creative matrix, as in fact we find in Rank's work. However, this is the first major attempt to apply psychoanalytic practice to literature other than by Freud himself.

Rank's Literary Criticism and Theory

It is important to note, however, that Rank produces a psychology of literary creation, not literary effect. Rank is tracing a line of the literary creative matrix, in which ultimately he discovers the Freudian *Oedipus complex* existing as a core and model of the creative process itself. We may recall here that Freud had outlined as much in his criticisms of Rank's early papers in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg, 1962, variously). So it is that by presenting Oedipus as the core and model, as Freud recommended, Rank is able to position the horizon of world literature to it. Rank, although tracing oedipal conflict at the root of the literary creative process, in effect analyses the whole field of literature and poetry on the psychoanalytic couch. So, we may ask, precisely how does Rank achieve this?

First, he traces much incestual and oedipal material within the literary creative matrix itself. We may of course ask ourselves the question, where precisely is the literary creative matrix positioned in the mental space, in the conscious or the unconscious?

Presumably one would think that it arises from the unconscious. Notwithstanding this, however, he detects in the need to express one's self in literature, poetry, or drama, as, in *itself*, an attempted resolution of incestual impulses deriving from early childhood. As Rank himself states ... 'Thus the author is led to seek gratification in his unconscious fantasy' (Rank, 1912: 94).

Secondly, Rank traces *psychobiographical* detail in the corresponding lives of many of the authors he analyses. As an example of this let us take a comment by Rank concerning the poet Byron:

Typical of the mother's neurotic character is the way, often mentioned by Byron, his mother was wont to upbraid him for the slightest offence — out of proportion to the nature of the infraction. This displacement of psychic intensity (Freud) from an affectionate relationship to an indifferent one is a basic principle of the psychology of neurosis (Rank, 1912: 109)

In this way, Rank is able to detect the oedipal tensions in the writer's work either as a process of catharsis or as unresolved repression. Wish-fulfilment, always present in dream material is, in literature, expressed by the authors in their work.

It is as well to remember that the incest configuration may operate either way, as repressed desire from the point of view of the child or the adult, depending upon the viewpoint of the author. Rank cites biographical detail of authors' personal lives to

corroborate his theory of the emergence of incest in their work. Let us again see what Rank seems to have in mind when he makes the following observation:

The regular appearance of the childhood incest fantasy, its content — soon felt to be distasteful (leading to the expression of the fantasy) — and finally the powerful after effects of the fantasy that arise from the unconscious to play a role in the emotional and fantasy life of the adult, all lead us to see that the universal dramatic effectiveness of the incest theme is quite understandable (Rank, 1912: 34).

In this comment Rank discovers Freud's core and model of the Oedipus complex to be at the heart of the literary creative matrix and much of his book on the *Incest Theme* is his justification for this hypothesis. Even if we accept this as true, which is not likely, we may still ask: in any triad of writer/ plot/ reader, where would the position of the reader be in this assumption?

Literary Resistance and Disguise

Rank finds in literature that in some instances *unconscious* repression is still in force, and consequently an unconscious *disguise* of the incest theme takes place. There is evidence, in more than one place in the *Vienna Minutes* (Nunberg, 1962), that Freud encouraged Rank in the pursuit of *disguised* material in literature. Of course this corresponds with the consulting room dialectic, whereby the analysand presents the analyst with a screen discourse. In literature, according to Rank, this occurs in the following way: (i) The authors may devise screen discourses, or disguises of the incest configuration through *displacement* activity, or the dampening down of unacceptable incestual material. Or (ii)

they are aware of the oedipal material but disguise it because the current social milieu is unable to accept incest undisguised.

So we have, on one hand, deliberate disguise because of the social mores of a particular epoch and unintentional disguise because the repressed unconscious material has failed to cross the threshold of consciousness. We have outlined a few of the methods whereby Rank uses psychoanalysis to derive from the author's own life *psychobiographical* material that leads the way to incest in the author's text itself, either as still-repressed material, catharsis, as disguise, or through *displacement* activity. However, Rank considers that there is a progressive *epochal elaboration* of the need to disguise oedipal material. Rank's example is that whilst Oedipus directly murders his father and marries his mother, from the plays of the Greek tragedian onward it became increasingly necessary — because of social taboos — to disguise and displace oedipal material and this, according to Rank, continues to the present day.

But is this not all similar to the consulting room technique and psychoanalytic session itself, and is it possible to treat the *authors* and their *heroes* and the *readers* of literary creation as candidates for analysis? To define the literary field in general as an *analysand* has, to say the least, its problems. Without at this point moving away from Rank's work, we may in passing consider the following. If one places the writer and hero on the psychoanalytic couch as Rank does, one also needs to involve, in some form, the reader. For example, does the reader collude with the author?

Is there, for example, an incestual pact between the writer and reader? Rank does not really answer this but he does detect an evolutionary progressive theory of repression and defence. It seems repression and defence — from the age of Sophocles onward — are *progressively* disguised, as it becomes increasingly necessary to conceal or leave incest or incestual impulses behind, both on a personal and on a cultural level.

Repression is the mechanism through which the ego tries to maintain its integrity against the continuous *return of the repressed*. Repression, as a mechanism, guards the conscious mind from the invasion of forces from the unconscious that, it is felt, may overwhelm the psyche. Repression in literature takes the shape of *disguises, screen discourses, displacements* and *rescue fantasies*. In fact a whole gamut of devices and tricks are installed to ensure that oedipal material cannot be recognised consciously. It becomes, however, quite difficult one would think to analyse the literary ‘product’ and bring the whole family along, so to speak. Freud’s discovery of Oedipus, may throw the whole family romance into disarray, but may we apply this directly to a text? This direct application of psychoanalysis to a literary text is fraught with difficulty. However, if we outline the more specific areas that Rank deals with, we can perhaps begin to understand the setting for his application of Freudian theory to literary creativity.

Incestual Mist

So it appears that the reader likewise receives a cathartic release from oedipal tensions. Again, it is difficult to see how this operates if Rank does not install the reader within the triangulated *writer/plot/reader* relationship. However, according to Rank, this the author

achieves, both for himself and for the reader. The concept that the author and reader share an incestual mist, a vapour that hovers around the text has a point, if the motif is universal. But the interrelatedness of the writer, plot, reader, is a complex interaction that, as stated earlier, cannot just be given a gloss of assumed knowledge of incestual interaction, unless, of course, this interrelatedness itself is analysed to tease out these incestual interconnections.

This could take one into the realm of psychoanalytic *transference* in the interrelationship of writer/plot/reader, but it takes us too far from our theme. If this were attempted, we would in fact attempt to cross too many thresholds. If, however, this is *not* achieved then the whole dialogic intertextuality of writer/plot/reader has been ignored and we cannot accept that as a possibility. In other words, Rank approaches the writer, plot and reader monologically, whereas, in fact, they constitute a multiplicity of voice zones and dialogic stratification of differing intensity. Therefore, they would have to be analysed on that basis and as we have seen possibly on the basis of *transference*. As this chapter is a spring board of preliminary exercises into a dialogic pool, we cannot follow every lead, but we have engaged both disciplines on to a similar plane.

Sophocles and Shakespeare

Clearly, Rank believes that in many cases, the author designs some form of *screen discourse*, so that the precise nature of the oedipal material is not immediately comprehended. According to Rank, a certain *dampening down* of the material takes place, as direct incest with the mother and murder of the father, has to be displaced

through a 'progression' through the centuries of cultural taboos. This displacement occurs through various literary devices. For example, Rank continuously returns to the theme of the stepmother or mother-in-law (or step/ father-in-law, if we accept a similar complex in women) as the replacement or stand-in for the incestual object of desire. We shall see further examples of these literary devices in our discussion of *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet*. Rank makes the following observation that perhaps clarifies the thought:

With increasing repression, a second psychic process arises, and a knowledge of it is extremely important to understanding literary production. It corresponds to long-known laws of the psychology of consciousness: directly similar thoughts and series of mental images are closely associated not only with each other, but also with opposing thoughts and images. It now appears that similar laws hold for unconscious psychic processes as well. (Rank, 1912: 40-41).

Rank himself speaks of the 'psychic x-ray' (Rank, 1912: 17), the ability to trace the incestual core and model that may be detected throughout history in the literary text. He builds a picture of various devices employed to disguise these incestual impulses. It is important to note that these concepts, utilized by Rank, are based on evidence that Freud discovered through his clinical practice. Freud only gradually became aware of oedipal material, through his own self-analysis and dream analysis of his patients. He found, through an analysis of patients' dreams, a repetition of certain fundamental motifs. He observed that the incestuous emotions in the child's psyche, repressed into the unconscious, are in fact satisfied later in the dream world of the adult, containing in the male child the death wish for the father and sexual union with the mother.

Things of course are never this simple, and Rank considers that the child's erotic feelings toward the father or mother are unconscious, concealed beneath the child's love for the parent, which is permitted and encouraged. This allows for a perception that seems to confirm that the incestual material is also an admixture of the child's love for the parents. Rank acknowledges also in his work the incestual impulses of the parent. The author may see the incestual provocation coming from any quarter. Sometimes, as Samuels (1985) points out variously, the failure (at some level) to acknowledge the incestual impulse on either the side of the child, or on the side of the parent, can be perceived in adulthood as a cruel deprivation.

Hamlet

So it now appears that this incestual motif, this filigree of oedipal phantoms dominating the unconscious as a *thought*, and consciousness as an *affect*, is traceable, according to Freud and his follower Rank, to the child's first love — a parent. If we now check an example of this, we may see the practice of the theory, so to speak. We take as an example, Freud's comments on Shakespeare's *Hamlet*:

A fleeting idea had passed through my head of whether the same thing [incestual impulses] may not lie at the bottom of *Hamlet* as well. I am not thinking of Shakespeare's conscious intention, but I believe rather that here some real event instigated the poet to his representation, in that the unconscious in him understood the unconscious in his hero. (SE: I: 265-266).

In Freud, we see that he develops his argument still further, by building upon the line ‘Thus conscience does make cowards of us all’. Freud is able to handle subtly the question of Hamlet’s inability to avenge his father by killing the king. Freud says that Hamlet ‘who sends his courtiers to their death without a scruple, hesitates in the murder of his uncle’. Freud explains this by saying: ‘How better could he justify himself than by the torment he suffers from the obscure memory that he himself had meditated the same deed against his father from passion for his mother’ (SE.1: 266). And Freud’s *coup de grâce* in letter 71 to Fliess states: ‘And does he not in the end, in the same remarkable way as my hysterical patients, bring down punishment on himself by suffering the same fate as his father of being poisoned by the same rival?’ (SE: I: 266).

Let us then centre ourselves upon this incestual theme in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, briefly. It is an important development from Sophocles’ Oedipus myth, according to Rank himself. He follows on from Freud’s earlier comments, by an elaboration of the incest motif in *Hamlet*. The tragic hero Hamlet, ‘stabs the listener behind the curtain and sends his two friends to the death intended for Hamlet himself’ (Rank, 1912: 35). The direct murder of the father (in *Oedipus Rex*) is transposed in *Hamlet* to the stepfather, thereby setting up a *screen discourse*, disguising the true wish of Hamlet to murder the father. The incest motif is now, as it were, once removed. It is no longer direct murder of the father that is contemplated but the ‘indirect’ murder of the father, replaced in this instance by the stepfather. This allows Hamlet (and perhaps a desire Shakespeare harboured, as Freud suggested variously) to project his unconscious desire to kill his own

father, on to the king. Subsequently, this allows Hamlet at once to disguise one motive with another. Now he has the righteous cause of killing his father's murderer.

Thus, having the scene set for us psychoanalytically by Freud and Rank, the opening dialogue takes place with Shakespeare's use of the 'ghost' of Hamlet's father. Hamlet himself is the reluctant revenger, sworn to avenge his father's murder. But Hamlet too, has designs upon his father's wife. Cruelly murdered, the 'ghost' of Hamlet's father requires revenge. If, however, we understand Hamlet's oedipal desire for his mother, then the impossibility of his situation becomes clear.

The event of his father's murder demands action from Hamlet. Claudius, Hamlet's uncle, who has murdered Hamlet's father and married his mother, deserves swift retribution but our hero hesitates. Why? Because Hamlet can accomplish everything but the revenge upon the man who has killed his father and taken his father's place beside his mother — the man who shows him the realization of his repressed childhood wishes.

Oedipus Rex

At this point we can reflect on our theme thus far, of oedipal material. In the case of the Greek tragedy by Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex*, Oedipus kills his father and marries his mother. So this is of course direct incest, unlike Hamlet. Oedipus himself is unaware that the man he killed is his father, or that the woman he marries is his mother. Much is made contemporaneously of Oedipus' lack of knowledge of his father's murder and his marriage to his mother. It is almost as if certain voices consider Freud mistaken in

locating incest in Oedipus Rex, because Oedipus did not know — that which he did. Let us take up a point by Rank:

That the Oedipus legend sprang from prehistoric dream material dealing with the painful disturbance that arises in the relationship with the parents at the first sexual feelings is unmistakably clear from a hint in the text of the Sophoclean tragedy itself. Jocasta comforts Oedipus, who has not yet discovered the truth but is disturbed by the memory of the oracle's words, by mentioning a dream dreamed by many persons, yet in Jocasta's opinion a meaningful one: 'For many men have seen themselves joined with the mother in dreams. But he who disregards all of this bears life's burden lightly'. (Rank, 1912: 45)

We can perhaps detect the meaning stressed by Freud himself: that the oedipal material is in fact dream material of the adult's repressed childhood incestual fantasies. Truly, this is the *return of the repressed*. This is an important axis in the psychoanalytic justification by Rank of his work. In Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* we see the pedigree of Freud's directly incestual material; that is why its universality is important to Freud. It is an original motif, in its direct use of incest with the mother and the murder of the father. The father is killed by Oedipus, thereby allowing him to marry his mother, Jocasta. But, as Rank points out: 'that both acts occur without recognition of the parents' identity merely reflects the psychological repression of these infantile wishes' (Rank, 1912: 139).

Oedipus does not know that he kills his father and marries his mother. But in the light of Freud's discovery of the unconscious, can we be sure that Oedipus does not know — in the other place? Freud's unconscious surely teaches us quite firmly that we are not in charge in our own house? With the primal hordes and patricide, releasing the tribal

females for the sons, constituting the mythical and dialogic background to *Oedipus Rex* does Oedipus, with this incestual contextualized backdrop, slay the father for another purpose? Here, in *Oedipus Rex*, we are presented by Sophocles with the *direct* spectacle of incest with the mother and the murder of the father. With increasing repression through the centuries, apparently necessary throughout successive generations, the evolutionary process becomes quite sophisticated and advanced by the Renaissance and the earlier mentioned Shakespearean plays.

A Fine Web of Intrigue

The direct incest and murder of the father had developed intricate and elegant disguise mechanisms by the time Shakespeare dramatized his plays. The fine web of intrigue had been spun, screen discourses, displacement, disguises, tricks and devices and the incest motif were no longer directly discernible, as in the plays of Sophocles. We interrupted our narrative upon Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, to cast the first stone of incest (not counting Adam of course) against Sophocles' *Oedipus*, but now we return to *Hamlet* — unable to kill his uncle, the king. In *Hamlet*, due to greater *disguised* defence than in the Oedipus play, we have thus far seen the carefully structured screen discourse and displacement involving the murder of the father.

The incestual discourse, being carefully concealed in *Hamlet*, requires further elaboration. Rank says: 'In *Hamlet*, owing to greater repression, only the reverse side of love for the mother appears — jealous hatred' (Rank, 1912: 36). This greater repression

referred to by Rank is contrasted with Oedipus, where incestual fulfilment with the mother is achieved. So Rank becomes bound to say:

Just as the erotic affection for the mother is expressed less naively than in Oedipus, the same is true of the wish for the father's removal. It finds gratification only behind a double disguise created by defence mechanisms.... The playwright lets Claudius, the king's brother, murder the king, thus apparently removing the need for Hamlet to experience the painful desire to murder his father (Rank, 1912: 38)

In our analysis of Rank's literary theory and criticism we have described various Freudian techniques utilized by Rank to discover Freud's core and model of the Oedipus fantasy at the heart of literary creation. We have pencilled in the problem of the reader, the problem of 'the other' not present in Rank's text, and this will allow us to think more carefully of the reader in the distillation of our discourse on *fragmented speech*. As Freud came to understand the interaction of mechanisms, operating at the level of the psyche, discovering them practically daily, he applied his theories to his patients that he treated in those early days. Rank as we see, is busy taking the relations involved in these mechanisms and applying them directly to the writer, the hero, and the literary text. However, the reader does not 'triangulate' the relationship with the writer and the plot in Rank, hence he misses the problem of 'the other'.

Rank's analysis of the author and hero and the literary text act together as the protagonists for the author's repressed desires. As we can see, this forces an inner complex to be projected into the external plot of the author's story and characterization.

Although we may refuse Rank's offer of the psychoanalytic couch for the literary 'product', because of the complexity of dialogic interpenetrations on too many planes and too many levels involved in this, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of the Oedipus complex and its interrelationship with literature.

Family Romance: The Birth of a Myth

In 1907-1908 Rank wrote *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. Freud again assists Rank, providing Rank with ideas from Freud's paper on the *Family Romance* (SE: XIV: 236) for his book. In the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (SE. VII:226. f.1) the following describes the *Family Romance*: ... 'and the so-called "Family Romance", in which he [the subject] reacts to the difference between his attitude towards his parents now [pubertal period] and in his childhood'. This occurs because the 'phantasies of the pubertal period have as their starting point the infantile sexual researches that were abandoned in childhood' (SE. VII: 226. f.1). And, 'The close relations existing between these phantasies and myths has been demonstrated in the last instance by Otto Rank (1909)' (*ibid.*).

Rank, in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, is able to interpret and understand that there was a deepening and resurgent echo of the oedipal motif by Freud in the *Family Romance*. Oedipus is now to be writ large on the mythic and family imagoes, reaccentuated in puberty. This time, however, Rank deals directly with the hero configuration, following his work on Oedipus and incest, transposed now to the level of the birth of the hero, the mythic birth of the hero and the symbolization that it entails.

Having led us through the labyrinthine passages of oedipal and incestual motivation, Rank now leads the way to the myth creators and myth interpreters. If Freud and Rank are correct and the repression of oedipal material into the unconscious sphere exists, then we must surely assume that myth makers and myth interpreters, may likewise have repressed material. They may, in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis, have repressed material and installed defence mechanisms of resistance against its acceptance on the plane of consciousness.

Freud himself elevated the family to the level of myth. So we may see in Rank at this point, that he allows the shift from the oedipal conflictual plane to the plane of the derivation myths of the birth of the hero and, with the help of Freud, discovers them in the Family Romance. We may perhaps, even at this early stage, wonder at the image of the *hero* and its close proximity to the *ego*, and the relationship of the *author* to the hero. As we have discovered, through Freud, the Oedipus complex has relevance for at least two literary texts that we have examined: *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet*. We now need to trace this motif in an extension of the previous material. The *Family Romance* is a key Freudian text. The paper deals with the child's revolt against the parents. Elements of this paper by Freud appeared in Rank's *Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (Rank, 1907-1908) *bearing no heading*. Perhaps we should note that this was not used as a formal Introduction by Rank, but was, 'simply introduced into the course of Rank's argument with a few words of acknowledgement' (SE. IX: 236).

If we now consider Freud's paper on the *Family Romance* we can see that the oedipal jewel discovered by Freud, is simply one stone set in a crown amongst many other incestual gems. Oedipus is set within the *Family Romance* and Freud, as we have said, intuitively raises the family to the level of myth. If Oedipus is the jewel and the *Family Romance* is the incestual crown, then it appears to have a firmness of setting holding things together. The filigree patterning of incest weaves the Oedipus jewel and crown, inextricably entwined in this early development of Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex. Freud, in *Family Romance*, discusses the painful necessity of the child's movement away from the authority of the parents, thereby allowing the child individual stature and liberation. In this Family Romance, the early childhood sexual experiences and phantasies are now re-accentuated in puberty around the setting of the Family Romance.

In the *Family Romance* of Freud, separation of the child from the parent is a task in later life for the child. In this task to be accomplished, Freud points out: '... there is a class of neurotics whose condition is recognizably determined by their having failed in this task'[separation] (SE: XIV: 237). Freud reminds us that separation from the parents is by no means automatic. He describes for us the child's early years, where children wish to be like their parents. As Freud says: 'to be like his parents ... to be big like their father and mother' (SE: XIV: 236). In time, however, the child gets to know other parents and compares them with his or her own. So the child, according to Freud, begins to criticize the parents, using material based upon fault-finding episodes and using the knowledge

thus gained to assume that other parents are in some respects preferable to the child's own.

As we have seen in our previous discussion of the Oedipus complex, these feelings are intensified by the impulses of sexual rivalry. Freud goes on to say that the child feels slighted, does not believe it has the whole of the parents love and resents and regrets having to share love with siblings. This often leads, says Freud, to the later recollection of being a stepchild or an adopted child. So in puberty, we see the re-writing of the incest 'script' of the early sexual experiences and phantasies now 'elevated' to the plane of pubertal phantasy of 'another' Family Romance. Here we find the 'essence' of myths. It is important to note that in Freud this would hardly be remembered consciously by the child but could later often be revealed by psychoanalysis. But if, however, these mental impulses of childhood *are* remembered, then they embody the factor that enables us to understand the nature of myths.

The Myth of the Birth of the Hero

We may perhaps agree with Lieberman that Rank's book *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (Rank, (1964) [1914]) is no more than: 'in large part like an encyclopaedia of myths' (Lieberman, 1985: 89). This is true, but notwithstanding Lieberman's comments, Rank makes a significant contribution to the myths surrounding the birth of the hero by developing Freud's paper on the family romance. For example, Lieberman understands that the hero myth, with royal and humble parents, is the family romance played backwards. Instead of being cut off from good parents and brought up by bad ones, the

hero is cruelly exposed at birth and then rescued (Lieberman, 1985). Without multiplying the emblematic of incest any further than necessary, Rank does point out that the *rescue* theme, as a *disguise* for incestual phantasy, involves the actual ‘rescue’ of the parent, acting as a disguise for the act of incest.

Lieberman describes the use of a standard myth pattern for the myth of the birth of the hero and this is used extensively and in a variety of forms by Rank in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. It provides a template that together with the Oedipus complex creates a psychoanalytic base of motivation in early childhood and later in adolescence. This skeletal outline is paraphrased as follows. The hero is the child of distinguished parents, usually royal. His origins begin with great difficulties. However, during or before the pregnancy there is some form of prophecy — a dream or oracle. This is always a warning against the child’s birth, and threatening danger to the father or his representative. The child is cast into water in a box of some kind. Then he is rescued by animals or shepherds and is weaned by humble folk. After he attains adulthood he ‘discovers’ distinguished parents. He takes revenge on his father and is himself declared king (Lieberman, 1985).

This is the skeletal outline found by Rank in a variety of myths in his *Myth of the Birth of the Hero*. In this, we detect the core myth upon which so many birth myths are based. But do we not also detect Freud’s *Family Romance* as the core and motivation of this birth myth? Cannot we detect in this core myth, early myth makers around a camp fire, creating for young and old a myth that encapsulates their own youth, with the nuclear

complex of *Oedipus* and the *Family Romance* stitched in to the fabric of their mythic narrative? In other words, their epic structure is based upon their own oedipal material re-accentuated at the level of phantasy in puberty. If we take on one hand Freud's *Oedipus complex* and on the other hand his *Family Romance* which constellates the pattern, then it is possible, in the myth makers, to detect the retroactive return of the repressed, in the skeletal outline of the core birth myth of the hero. Once Freud's latency period of childhood is over, the earlier sexual experiences and phantasies of early childhood are re-cast in another mould. As Freud said variously, like a nation, the child re-vamps its past in *epic* proportions in the unconscious.

Thus it is we discover, glistening, Freud's oedipal crown. The gem of the individual Oedipus, set in the crown of the re-accentuated family complex, underlines the motivation of the myth makers of antiquity, as well as the individual, all dominated by oedipal tensions and the family romance. The individual and the myth are steeped in these oedipal tensions. By commencing with the Freudian Oedipus complex, and developing ideas concerning his complex of the myth of the family romance, we can begin to locate the basic elements of Freud's thought on a psychoanalytic plane that involved Rank's transposition of them on to the literary plane.

We begin to understand that all of this is not simple in the collision between the oceans of psychoanalysis on one hand, and literature on the other. The swirling torrents and churned up matter that are involved have one struggling against the deeper currents on one hand and surface waves on the other. However, before we get caught in these peaks

and troughs of experience, we may observe another comment by Freud that seems to position both ideas concerning Oedipus and relating to the family complex. Freud said:

We forget how high are the intellectual achievements and how complicated the emotional impulses of which a child of some four years is capable, and we ought to be positively astonished that the memory of later years has as a rule preserved so little of these mental processes, especially as we have every reason to suppose that these same forgotten childhood achievements have not, as might be thought, slipped away without leaving their mark on the subject's development, but have exercised a determining influence for the whole of his later life. And in spite of this unique efficacy they have been forgotten!

(SE VI: 46)

Jensen's Gradiva and Freud

We turn our attention now to Freud's own work: *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva*. (SE. IX: 3-95). In the summer of 1906, Freud was writing a study of Jensen's *Gradiva*. Wilhelm Jensen, (1837-1911) was a North German playwright and novelist. In the October of the same year, Otto Rank presented papers on the 'Incest Theme' to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Freud's study was published in May, 1907, and soon after its publication, Freud sent a copy to Jensen. *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva* (SE. IX: 3-95) was, in fact, Freud's first published analysis of a work of literature, apart, of course, from his comments on Oedipus Rex and Hamlet in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. As part of the background to Freud's analysis of the *Gradiva* we note the following:

Apart from the deeper significance which Freud saw in Jensen's work, there is no doubt that he must have been specially attracted by the scene in which it was laid. His interest in Pompeii [scene in the *Gradiva*] was an old-established one. It appears more than once in his correspondence with Fliess.

...Above all, Freud was fascinated by the analogy between the historical fate of Pompeii (its burial and subsequent excavation) and the mental events with which he was so familiar — burial by repression and excavation by analysis. (SE. IX [Editor's Note] 4-5).

In this comment we see that Freud finds the analogy intriguing, his fascination with Pompeii, and its obvious connection with the process of excavation that takes place when one explores the dark continent of the unconscious. Prior to Freud of course it was the 'Heart of Darkness'. Did not Freud numerous describe himself also as a conquistador? This setting a scene, a space for the unconscious, is of course in itself intriguing. And it does leave one wondering about the space and shape of the unconscious. Consider also the following:

Embedded in the discussion of the *Gradiva*, indeed, there lies not only a summary of Freud's explanation of dreams but also what is perhaps the first of his semi-popular accounts of his theory of the neuroses and of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. (SE. IX: Ibid.)

So what precisely is Freud's methodology in his analysis of the *Gradiva* and how does it differ from Rank's analysis? Freud wonders if the dreams, delusions, and phantasies created by Jensen submit to the construction of dreams, delusions, and phantasies outlined in his *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In a sense, he wishes to test whether or not

Jensen has constructed the ‘reality’ of dream and delusional formation. Freud finds that Jensen has, in fact, obeyed the ‘rules’ outlined in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. We now check what Freud himself had to say about this:

It is far from being generally believed that dreams have a meaning and can be interpreted. Science and the majority of educated people smile if they are set the task of interpreting a dream. Only the common people, who cling to superstitions and who on this point are carrying on the convictions of antiquity, continue to insist that dreams can be interpreted. The author of *The Interpretation of Dreams* has ventured, in the face of the reproaches of strict science, to become a partisan of antiquity and superstition. (SE. IX: 7)

The Interpretation of Dreams

From this we can see that Freud’s methodology in *Gradiva* consists of ‘embedding’ the *Gradiva* text within the frame of his *Interpretation of Dreams*. As we draw a certain subtlety from the *Gradiva*, we note Freud’s own comment in the *Gradiva* study relating to its characters:

My readers will no doubt have been puzzled to notice that so far I have treated Norbert Hanold [hero] and Zoe Bertgang [female hero], in all their mental manifestations and activities, as though they were real people and not the author’s creations, as though the author’s mind were an absolutely transparent medium and not a refractive or obscuring one. And my procedure must seem all the more puzzling since the author has expressly renounced the portrayal of reality by calling his story a ‘phantasy’. We have found, however, that all his descriptions are so faithfully copied from reality that we should not

object if *Gradiva* were described not as a phantasy but as a psychiatric study. (SE.IX: 41).

It is as well to point out, even at this early stage, that the problem of 'I' and the 'Other', in terms of the literary text, have to be understood in terms of their dialogic interrelationships. We understand that Rank and Freud have both missed the problem of 'the other' in the literary text. It is not possible to ignore these interrelationships if one wishes to analyse any literary text and its contextualization. It is on the plane of their *intersubjectivity* that these relationships have to be understood. So it would not just be a problem of psychoanalytic motivation in the author or his hero, but all the levels of intersubjectivity that these relationships involve. We discuss these problems more fully in the next chapter, but hold them in one hand whilst exploring Freud's own text with the other. We check now Freud's own words on his methodology in his paper on the *Gradiva*.

There are two methods that we might adopt for this enquiry. One would be to enter deeply into a particular case, into the dream-creations of our author in one of his works. The other would be to bring together all the examples that could be found of the use of dreams in the works of different authors. The second method would seem to be far more effective and perhaps the only justifiable one, for it frees us at once from the difficulties involved in adopting the artificial concept of 'writers' as a class. (SE. IX: Ibid.)

Freud continues by telling us: 'In spite of this, however, these pages will be devoted to an enquiry of the first sort' (Ibid.). It is possible, in the above comment by Freud, to infer

that Rank adopts the second method in his theory of literary criticism whereas, as we see, Freud himself prefers the category that involves ‘adopting the artificial concept of “writers” as a class’. This methodology frees Freud to analyse the text in terms of the interweaving of phantasies of the hero — based on premises made in *The Interpretation of Dreams* — on a plane constituting psychoanalytic ‘reality’, without having to fulfil the need of empirism, which became the cross that Rank had to bear.

In discussing Freud’s methodology, we need to take note of the following. Freud’s own original sortie into the field of literary criticism begins with his discovery of the incest theme in *early* childhood and he thus discovers the theme interwoven in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*. In *Die Richterin*, Freud interweaves the sibling incest theme as a form of the ‘*Family Romance*’. So thus far we have: the parental imago of incest in early childhood, re-accentuated as an adolescent or pubertal reflection of the earlier parental complex in *Die Richterin*. Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* (analysis by Freud) interweaves the *disguised* form of incest. *Gradiva*, develops the theme of the brother/sister pair already established in *Die Richterin*.

Conclusion

Contrasting Rank’s methodology with that of Freud enables us to now interpret certain characteristics of the work of both men. Rank identifies, through the use of psychoanalytic mechanisms, incest as the core and model of Freud’s original schema at that particular time; thus he develops a theory of literary criticism, literary theory, and literary creativity as immersed and continuously implicated in Freud’s incest motif.

Freud's methodology differs inasmuch as he never relies solely upon Freudian mechanisms himself. In other words, Rank relies upon 'Freudian' mechanisms for his literary theory, whereas Freud himself does not just rely on his own mechanisms. He continuously extrapolates upon his own themes.

So the difference is that Freud *always* picks up a loose thread from a previous motif and interweaves this thread into a new garment and so on. However, the two men do have the same methodological weaknesses in one very particular sense. And here we take up the previously mentioned problem of failing to 'triangulate' the relationship between the writer, the plot, and the reader. In both Rank and Freud the finer-nuancing of the interrelationship between the writer, the text and the reader is an opportunity missed. These relationships appear to be, in Rank and Freud, welded together somehow with the flux of psychoanalytic theory. The weld will not hold. If one pursues it, any vibration will tear these relations apart. If we wish to understand this interrelationship of writer/text/ reader, then we must explore more deeply the field of literary theory, and these interrelationships.

To achieve this, we contextualize these relationships within literary theory and philosophy of language developed by the Russian scholar and linguist Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. In the next chapter, the cross-currents of Freudian libido theory collide with the contra-currents of Bakhtinian language libido. And, just as Freud does not find *one* current flowing in *one* direction in the mind, so too, Bakhtin does not find *one* current flowing in *one* direction in language. So it is then that we have cast ourselves

into the swirling vortex of Freud's early discoveries. In this maelstrom of activity we have Freud's base, the core and model of incest and the character Oedipus. To which we now intend to add elements of the extensive *oeuvre* of Bakhtin. It is in this narrow corridor of dialogic interaction that we begin to build our case, and discuss the heavily guarded approaches to *fragmented speech*.

CHAPTER TWO

FREUD AND BAKHTIN: COLLISION IN THE UNCONSCIOUS

Introduction

In our first chapter, we saw that the problem that Rank and Freud missed, in the literary text, but in fact Bakhtin lights upon, is the problem of 'the other'. In this chapter we shall address the problem not only of the Freudian unconscious but also the problem of 'the other' and its interrelationship with the Freudian unconscious, from certain key dialogic angles. In the first chapter, the rules of engagement paralleled the aims and purposes of Rank and Freud in some ways. Perhaps we should explain the use of the term rules of engagement here. The rules of engagement are self-imposed by us and are cast on the plane of the dialogic encounter between Freud and Bakhtin.

In some ways, we allowed Rank and Freud to provide the impetus or drive-shaft for the first chapter. This was, in a sense, inevitable because we situated ourselves within the historical apperceptive background of our major aim — the discovery of *fragmented speech* in the unconscious. In this chapter, we shall deal with the problem that naturally arises as a result of the first, namely, the problem of the existence, nature, and 'positionality' of the unconscious and the problem of 'the other' left vacant by Rank. Crucially, we shall deal with the Freudian unconscious, and its potential rules of engagement with the philosophy of language, and particularly the Bakhtinian philosophy of language.

Thus it is that we have two specific aims. First, we shall need a rough *working hypothesis* of the Freudian unconscious for the rest of this dissertation; so we outline some key elements of Freud's definition of the unconscious. In fact, what we have done is to give ourselves an angle of approach to the unconscious, rather than an interpretation of it. Secondly, we need to understand Bakhtin's possible interpretation of the Freudian unconscious, his response to it, and the possible existence of a 'subtle polemic' in Bakhtin, as a possible counter-statement to the Freudian unconscious.

The Freudian Unconscious

Between April 4th – April 23rd, 1915, Freud produced a paper entitled: The Unconscious (SE. XIV: 161). In the *Editor's Note* written by James Strachey, we come to understand that: 'The concept of there being unconscious mental processes is of course one that is fundamental to psycho-analytic theory' (SE. XIV: 161-162). Freud himself opened his paper with the observation:

We have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression, lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. (SE. XIV: 166.).

Freud said, and it is one of our first markers, a salient point:

... It is necessary because the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them; both in healthy and in sick people psychical acts often occur

which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which, nevertheless, consciousness affords no evidence. (Ibid.).

It is these gaps in the data of consciousness that intrigue Freud. In these gaps in the conscious discourse, Freud detects an underworld, a second discourse within, and external to, the conscious discourse. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud discovered his Royal Road to the unconscious, through his analysis of manifest and latent dream content, and his discovery of the underlying dream thought. Most importantly, Freud discovered that the unconscious *speaks*, this was Freud's great discovery in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The dream is the *utterance* of the unconscious and we shall later develop this idea to discover a newer meaning of utterance, thanks to the work of the Russian linguist, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. At any rate, the discovery that the unconscious *speaks*, is, Freud's great achievement.

We must, I think, be quite clear on some of these points, if we are to discover a 'Freudian Bakhtin' or for that matter a 'Bakhtinian Freud' in the initial stages of our search for *fragmented speech*. We hypothesize that it is by no means certain that Bakhtin rejected the Freudian unconscious out of hand, as we shall argue later. However, this next statement, by Freud, is quite crucial for our understanding of the dialogization of the unconscious and its later application to our dissertation. Also in the following statements, Freud leads us to his conceptualization of a 'second consciousness' and it is thus that we interconnect with aspects of the Bakhtinian conceptualization of the 'second consciousness' or

the problem of 'the other'. We now trace the path followed by Freud heading toward his concept of the 'second consciousness'.

First, however, it needs to be noted that we do not necessarily imply that the concept of the 'second consciousness' draws Freud and Bakhtin, in terms of psychoanalysis on the one hand, and Bakhtin's philosophy of language on the other hand, on to the same plane. However, the move does allow us to develop an idea of the 'second consciousness' of the Subject and the possible inference of the 'second consciousness', namely of 'the other', as it were entwined through Freud's conceptualisation of the conscious and unconscious forces. In other words it allows us to think of the 'positionality' of the unconscious and its interrelationship with the problem of the 'other'. We need to recall that any incursion into the field of literary theory, in fact requires a conceptualisation of 'the other'. We check now where this is heading, again with Freud:

The assumption of an unconscious is, moreover, a perfectly *legitimate* one, inasmuch as in postulating it we are not departing a single step from our customary and generally accepted mode of thinking. Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind; that other people too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour of theirs intelligible to us. (SE. XIV: 169).

Here we see where Freud is heading, that 'I' possess a consciousness *may* be a fact to myself, or *I-for-myself*, but that someone else possesses a consciousness

similar to mine is problematic. Freud now explains *quite clearly*, precisely what this implies for the concept of consciousness. He says:

...But even where the original inclination to identification has withstood criticism — that is, when the ‘others’ are our fellow men — the assumption of a consciousness in them rests upon an inference and cannot share the immediate certainty which we have of our own consciousness.

Psychoanalysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this process of inference to ourselves also — a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not constitutionally inclined. If we do this we must say: all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. (SE. XIV: 169).

Freud makes it clear that one’s recognition that the other too may have a consciousness similar to one’s own is an inference one draws, by analogy, from the other’s utterances and actions. However, as Freud stresses ‘I’ can have no ‘immediate certainty’ that the other too possesses a consciousness. It is by inference that ‘I’ do this. Freud leads us to understand that if ‘I’ am prepared, through inference, to accept that the other has a consciousness similar to my own, which is nevertheless an assumption, then why cannot ‘I’ apply the same principle to myself? May I not infer that ‘I’ too may have a ‘second consciousness’? Freud, clarifies the situation again:

This process of inference, when applied to oneself in spite of internal opposition, does not, however, lead to the disclosure of an unconscious; it leads logically to the assumption of another, second consciousness which is united in one's self with the consciousness one knows. But at this point, certain criticisms may fairly be made. In the first place, a consciousness of which its own possessor knows nothing is something very different from a consciousness belonging to another person, and it is questionable whether such a consciousness, lacking, as it does, its most important characteristic, deserves any discussion at all. (SE. XIV:170).

We take especial note here of Freud's comment of a 'second consciousness', which is '*united* in one's self'. No mention here of the duality of the Cs. and the Ucs. Freud clearly states that there is a second consciousness. However, presumably in order to placate the scientific establishment, he has to follow-up by saying that we cannot say that it is a second consciousness because how can one speak of a consciousness of which one is unaware? Obviously, it is a contradiction in terms. However, Freud, at least it seems to us, is in no doubt that we have a 'second consciousness'. And, as he says, a consciousness of which I am unaware is hardly likely to be a consciousness at all.

Hence the unfortunate term '*un*' conscious. The second consciousness is hampered considerably by the term '*un*', which does not adequately describe the second consciousness. Hopefully, by this point we have grasped an outline of Freud's concept of the unconscious. Enough at least to provide us with the earlier

mentioned *working hypothesis* of the Freudian unconscious, an angle of approach on the unconscious allowing us to position the *fragmented speech* image and *fragmented body* image as a correlate, in due course.

Repression — Revisited

It is impossible to ignite the Freudian Ucs. without simultaneously linking in his mechanism of repression. In his paper on Repression (SE. XIV:143). Freud provides us with another working hypothesis, at least another approach, thus enabling us later to detect fragmented speech and the fragmented word, in the unconscious. Freud's concept of repression, lighted upon in the first chapter, was initially comprehended through the clinical phenomenon of *resistance*, which in its own turn was discovered through Freud's own technical innovation, which included the abandonment of hypnosis in the cathartic treatment of hysteria. As so often occurs, Freud's opening lines sear the page. His paper on repression is no exception. We have:

One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to meet resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions ... the impulse then passes into the state of 'repression'. (SE. XIV: 146).

He continues: 'At some later period, rejection based on judgement (*condemnation*) will be found to be a good method to adopt against an instinctual impulse'. (Ibid.). And importantly he adds: 'A necessary condition of its

happening must clearly be that the instincts attainment of its aim should produce unpleasure instead of pleasure' (Ibid.).

Freud teaches that the satisfaction of an instinct under repression is possible but that it is irreconcilable with other claims and intentions. As our claim for the existence in the unconscious of a fragmented *body* and fragmented *word* image rests upon an assumption of a psychic mechanism of repression, we identify the outline of the concept. To reinforce this point Freud says: ' Under the influence of the study of the psychoneuroses, which brings before us the important effects of repression, we are inclined to overvalue their psychological bearing and to forget too readily that repression does not hinder the instinctual representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious'. (SE. XIV: 148-149). With these short comments upon the Freudian theory of repression, hopefully we have installed the basic parameters that we need to outline, providing us with, up to this point, a basic *working hypothesis* of the Freudian unconscious, or as we say at least an angle of approach upon it. With these outlines in place we turn our attention now to Bakhtin's possible 'subtle polemic' against the Freudian unconscious.

Bakhtin's Ambiguity and Ambivalence

In terms of Bakhtinian analysis, we seem immediately to stumble upon a problem. How did Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin view the Freudian unconscious? At first

sight the problem seems fairly straightforward. The book, *Freudianism*, by Volosinov (V.N. Volosinov, 1976) *may* have been largely written by Bakhtin. It is, however, quite easy to be seduced by the assumption that *Freudianism* provides a linchpin between Bakhtin and Freud, but does it? In the books that are *known* to be written by Bakhtin, is there any direct mention, let alone critique of Freud? Is it possible that *Freudianism* is a red herring — graveyard for the unwary. In pursuit of our enquiry we check a letter from Bakhtin himself to Kozhinov. The letter, dated 10 January, 1961, reads:

The books *The Formal Method* and *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* are very well known to me. V.N. Volosinov and P.N. Medvedev were my friends; in the period when these books were being written we worked in the closest creative contact. Furthermore, these books and my book on Dostoevsky are based on a *shared* conception of language and speech. In this respect V.V. Vinogradov [the source of the information for Kozhinov] is completely right. I should point out that the presence of a shared conception and contact in work does not diminish the self-sufficiency and originality of any of these books. As for the other works of P.N. Medvedev and V.N. Voloshinov, they lie on a different plane and do not reflect our shared conception, and I did not play any part in their creation. (Hirschkop, 1999: 129).

This comment by Bakhtin himself would seem to indicate that *Freudianism: A Marxist Critique* by Volosinov is on ‘a different plane’ to Bakhtin’s thought and that ‘he did not play any part in [its] creation’. Again, this would seem to indicate that Bakhtin himself played very little part in the authorship of *Freudianism* and

perhaps we need to look elsewhere to discover Bakhtin's attitude to Freud. If one dismisses *Freudianism* as a text written by Bakhtin it appears, initially at least, as if a vacuum is left in Bakhtin's point of view on Freud. Without the *Freudianism* book, there appears to be both *ambiguity* and *ambivalence* present in Bakhtin's scant references to Freud in his major signed works. If this ambiguity and ambivalence are taken into account, it is entirely possible that Bakhtin himself did not reject the Freudian unconscious out of hand. It is on this axis of ambiguity and ambivalence that we begin to build our case.

Bakhtin's Resistance

In *The Problem of the Text* by Bakhtin, we find the following relevant comment:

The problem of the limits of the text. The text as *utterance*. The problem of the functions of the text and textual genres.

Two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the realization of this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their struggle, which determine the nature of the text. Their divergence can reveal a great deal Freudian slips of the tongue and slips of the pen (expression of the unconscious). Change of the plan in the process of its realization. Failure to fulfil the phonetic intention. (Bakhtin, 1986: 104).

Although of course the above comment by Bakhtin (taken from his notes, hence the fragmented style) do not provide justification that Bakhtin accepted the Freudian unconscious. They do at least indicate, however, that Bakhtin himself was prepared at that point to accept the possibility of the Freudian mental space

and its effect on dialogicality. To build an image of this *ambiguity* and *ambivalence* toward Freud in Bakhtin, we take note of a few scant references to Freud's extensive *oeuvre* in Bakhtin's major works. The first:

Forces that lie outside consciousness, externally (mechanically) defining it: from environment and violence to miracle, mystery, and authentic freedom, and personality is destroyed. There among these forces, must one also consign the unconscious (the 'id'). (Bakhtin, 1984b: *Appendix II*: 297)

In this comment, Bakhtin states clearly that the 'unconscious (the "id")' is a force that lies *outside* consciousness. And he counterposes to it 'authentic freedom'. In the following quotes we shall be able to identify both Bakhtin's ambiguity and his ambivalence toward the unconscious. In order to float perception, however, at the level of unconscious and conscious forces, we need to examine more closely Bakhtin's relationship to the Freudian unconscious. In 'The Bakhtin Circle's Freud: From Positivism to Hermeneutics', Pirog's opening lines allow us pause for thought. 'Bakhtin's writings are at the centre of the two interrelated or perhaps parallel and still unsettled issues: the relation of the individual ego to intersubjectivity and the connection between thought and language' (Pirog, 1987: 591). In this statement, Pirog allows for a certain speculation on our part. Following Pirog's own point, we may ask: To what extent is Freud's project, from the beginning, an example of intersubjectivity? In order, at least in part, to answer this, we check another comment by Pirog:

This same mutuality of understanding is the ideal goal which founds Bakhtin's anthropology and which precludes any concern for the private or subjective in so far as he considers them external to the 'dialogic nature of language' (DN 273). More importantly, Bakhtin does not deny the existence of something like the unconscious but considers it destructive of a person's authentic freedom (Bakhtin, 1984b: 297) in so far as it separates him or her from a genuine dialogic relationship that could in fact constitute this freedom (Pirog, 1987: 603).

So, according to Pirog, Bakhtin does not deny the existence of 'something like the unconscious'. We have already noted the quotation from *The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Appendix II*, but we shall remind ourselves of it shortly. Meanwhile, we check another remark from Bakhtin:

The attempt to understand the interaction with another's word by means of psychoanalysis and the 'collective unconscious'. What psychologists (mainly psychiatrists) disclose existed at one time; it was retained in the unconscious (if only the collective unconscious) and was fixed in the memories of languages, genres, and rituals; from here it penetrates into the speech and dreams (related, consciously recalled) of people (who have a particular psychic constitution and are in a particular state). The role of psychology and of the so-called psychology of culture (Bakhtin, 1986: 144).

The reference here to the 'collective unconscious', is possibly (Bakhtin does not make the derivation clear) from Dostoevsky's *Diary of a Writer*. Caryl Emerson says, with reference to Dostoevsky: '... and several entries in *Diary of a Writer* profess sympathy not only for an unconscious but also a collective national

unconscious' (Emerson, 1991: 38). We assume this to be the case, rather than Jung's conceptualization of the collective unconscious.

It is important to note Bakhtin's statement in *From Notes Made in 1970-71* (Bakhtin, 1986). If we compare this statement with Bakhtin's comments dated 1961 we divine a substantial difference. In the *Appendix II* we have: 'Forces that lie outside consciousness ... among these forces, must one also consign the unconscious (the 'id')' — as we have seen. And then (written in 1971): 'The attempt to understand the interaction with another's word by means of psychoanalysis and the 'collective unconscious' ... Added to which we consider the previously recalled comment: 'Freudian slips of the tongue and slips of the pen (expression of the unconscious)' (Bakhtin, 1986: 104). The earlier comments on the unconscious could of course conceivably have been based on non-Freudian assumptions concerning the unconscious, but the latter comment certainly could not.

Curiouser and curiouser. There is an intriguing *ambiguity* and *ambivalence* in all of these statements connected to a conception of the unconscious, but we still do not seem to have discovered Bakhtin's position *vis-à-vis* the unconscious. So is it external, is it internal, is it destructive of freedom, does it lie outside consciousness, what precisely is the dialogic angle on the unconscious in Bakhtin's works? Or perhaps he just objects to Freud's style of thought? Bakhtin, the fox, knew we think, precisely what he was doing. His cluster of

images surrounding the unconscious seems paradoxical, ambiguous and ambivalent.

Bakhtinian Freud or Freudian Bakhtin?

To discover the 'Bakhtinian Freud', we must concur with Caryl Emerson when it is stated that: 'It must be emphasized at the outset that this image of a 'Bakhtinian Freud' has nothing to do with the well-known polemic against *Freudianism* written in 1927 by Bakhtin's friend and associate Valentin Voloshinov' (Emerson, 1991: 33). This statement assists our move away from the image of *Freudianism*, as somehow being the work of Bakhtin. We also find agreement with: 'For Bakhtin, the problem of the self was not strictly a psychological problem but more broadly and loosely a philosophical one' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 174). We counterpose this with a comment by Strachey: 'It should be made clear at once, however, that Freud's interest in the assumption [the unconscious] was never a philosophical one — though, no doubt, philosophical problems inevitably lay just round the corner. His interest was a *practical* one' (SE. XIV: 162). However, some attempt will be made to hypothesize a *psychoanalytic-philosophic* plane that, hopefully, will be of use, for this field of course is a genre in its own right. At any rate, we should also note:

...Beyond these differences in spirit and tone, we may note one other crucial difference between Bakhtin's and Freud's many approaches to the mind. Bakhtin's theories studiously avoid invoking an unconscious as Freud understood it (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 175).

We are not so sure of this, for the following reasons. (1) Bakhtin would have had considerable difficulty, ideologically, in the Soviet Union, justifying any validation of Freud's work, on whatever level. (2) There is 'evidence' to suggest, we shall explain shortly, that Bakhtin did, at least *unofficially*, encompass and endorse the Freudian unconscious and Freud's various mechanisms. This 'evidence' is present in Bakhtin's *Rabelais and His World* (Bakhtin, 1984a) to be discussed in the next chapter. However, we may wish to note the following: Bakhtin's work on *Rabelais* was submitted for a degree at the Gorky Institute in 1946. Hirschkop tells us that:

The Zhdanovite ideological offensive of the late 1940s put paid to any lingering prospects of the higher award [degree of Doctor of Science] in 1947 an unsigned (and therefore editorially endorsed) article in the cultural press attacked the Gorky Institute in general, and Bakhtin's thesis in particular for its 'anti-scientific' and 'Freudian' orientation (Hirschkop, 1999: 185).

Perhaps this criticism levelled against Bakhtin for his 'Freudian orientation' was not, in fact, entirely unjustified. Apart from the often-considered socio-ideological levels of this work, we believe that Bakhtin also expresses the Freudian unconscious, and certain Freudian mechanisms. In addition to this, *Rabelais and His World* also expresses the nature of the problem of the *ego* and Freud's discovery of *oral*, *anal*, and *genital* phases within human development. It also expresses the problem of the Freudian censor and most importantly a 'theory'

of the instincts set against a cultural and artistic backdrop. However, continuing we find:

When Freud describes a conflict between the conscious and the unconscious, Volosinov (in the 1920s) and Bakhtin (in the 1920s and 1930s) describe a complex dialogue among the numerous, diverse, socially heteroglot voices present in inner speech. Basically their contention is that thinkers turn to an unconscious when they have an extraordinarily impoverished idea of consciousness. (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 175).

At this stage we merely hold on to the idea of ‘socially heteroglot voices present in inner speech’ as a possible Bakhtinian counterstatement to the Freudian unconscious. Perhaps Freud’s lost paper on Consciousness may have helped in clarifying some of these matters. It is not unimportant that Bakhtin himself was fascinated by Freud’s work, which of course does not suggest compliance, or that he endorsed Freud’s ideas. In Hirschkop’s book, we have the following quote of an interview with Bakhtin:

...Bocharov has confirmed the first claim and added in his report of another conversation[with Bakhtin] from 1974:

Bocharov. Mikhail Mikhailovich, may be at some time you were enthused by Marxism?

Bakhtin. No, never. I was interested, as in many other things, in Freudianism, even spiritualism. But I was never a Marxist to any degree. (Hirschkop, 1999: 132, note 51).

We note this not because it validates a Freudian Bakhtin, but it does indicate a profound interest, if, under those particular circumstances and in that particular setting and context, Freud was the first name that arrived on his lips. It is a premise here that Bakhtin had a deep and enduring interest in the work of Freud, and it is compelling to understand that in spite of this he neither mentioned directly (other than our exceptions) nor directly critiqued Freud's extensive *oeuvre* in his major works. Again we note: 'In the 1920s, Bakhtin did not engage in direct debate with psychologists and psychoanalysts — as did Volosinov — because, for him, the problem of the self was not strictly a psychological problem but more broadly a philosophical one Bakhtin detected something "non-evaluative" and "causal" about psychology — something, as he puts it, that was opposed to the "soul" which was individual and free'. (Emerson, 1991: 34)

Although one notes with interest this observation by Bakhtin, we have to remember by way of counter-statement that Freud had devoted himself to the cure of mental illness. Continuing, so that we may further position ourselves with respect to the Freudian unconscious and the possible Bakhtinian response to it, we note another comment by Emerson:

To be sure, Bakhtin — like his associate Voloshinov and like their contemporary, the developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky — did not believe (and who ever has) that we are fully aware of the implications of our actions, and that everything we do emerges in a controlled fashion from the centre of our attention. But rather than invoke an unconscious, these Russian thinkers were

more likely to turn to the dynamics of memory and habit. Most important, they resisted the notion of a separate and inaccessible structure out of which our impulses, fears and surprises emerge, and argued for a richer and more varied picture of consciousness (Emerson, 1991:35).

The important point here is that, in fact, Freud divines gaps in the conscious discourse that clinical practice has to account for. There is certainly, in psychopathology, a *lack* in the conscious discourse. This is where Freud positions the unconscious, in the space, lack and gaps left blank in consciousness. Taking Emerson's last point, if it is true that '...they resisted the notion of a separate and inaccessible structure of which our impulses, fears and surprises emerge' then this would seem to be the end of the matter, but Bakhtin does not seem to have rejected the concept of the unconscious, and it is the significant 'shape' of the unconscious where Bakhtin provides so much assistance. Bakhtin may help us to discover, consciously or unconsciously, the 'positionality' of the unconscious.

The Link: Freud with Bakhtin

Before we move on to a possible Bakhtinian statement of the 'second consciousness', we need to make the following, totally invaluable, comment by Freud himself that acts in our opinion as a *link* between Freud and Bakhtin:

It is a general truth that our mental activity moves in two opposite directions: either it starts from the instincts and passes through the system *Ucs.* to conscious thought-activity; or, beginning with an instigation from outside, it passes

through the system *Cs.* And *Pcs.* till it reaches the *Ucs.* cathexes of the ego and objects. (SE. XIV: 204)

If, for a moment, we ignore the abhorrence that Bakhtin may have felt for Freud's genre-specific use of the word *system*, there is a vital connection here between Freud and Bakhtin. If we refer, in the above, to Freud's phrase 'from outside', to what precisely does it relate? If the first thing this 'instigation' from the 'outside' reaches is the system *Cs.* then it would seemingly approach from the external world. So we have, on the one hand, mental activity that may derive from the instinctual field in the unconscious, or, on the other hand 'instigated' from the outside it passes through the system *Cs.* and *Pcs.* and on through to the *Ucs.* In this quote from Freud, although it is nowhere explicitly stated, on the planes of the inner world and the outer world, we must surely assume certain facts? There has to be (a) an *image of the body*, in relation to the instinctual field and inner world and outer world experience; and (b) there has to be an *image of language*, however rudimentary, in relation to inner world and outer world, that is, at least, if one wishes to cross the threshold between inner and outer experience.

Admittedly, we have made assumptions that Freud did not make, but it is, we think, a valuable hypothesis. We hypothesize this as a condition, but notwithstanding this remark, we may now refer back to our earlier comment about the Freudian unconscious and attempt to place it within the context of the *image of the body* and the *image of language*. For, it is undoubtedly true that the conceptualisation of the unconscious is, in Freud, the other. If we have in

Freud's work a 'second consciousness', which he nominates as the unconscious, where do we locate a second consciousness, 'the other' or its possibility in the work of Mikhail Mikhailovich?

The Body — Crossing the Threshold

In Bakhtin, the problem of the second consciousness is not the 'double' internal voice of the unconscious (which, incidentally, is projected externally and crosses the threshold of the body) but rather the 'second consciousness' of the other — whatever that 'other' may be. This is the *intersubjective* field of the interplay *between* consciousnesses, at least on one level. The identification 'of myself' in Bakhtin's work requires an 'echo' from the other. In Bakhtin, 'I' requires an *external* image and echo of itself that can only be refracted through the prism provided by the other. It is in the dialogic intensity of *intersubjectivity* that 'I' discover the relevance of the second consciousness, of 'the other'. I must, in a sense, *author* myself from outside. We now check aspects of Mikhail Mikhailovich's possible reaction to a second consciousness to 'the other'. Bakhtin sets the scene for us:

The first matter we must consider is the exterior or outward appearance as the totality of all expressive, 'speaking' features of the human body. How do we experience our exterior? And how do we experience outward appearance in the other? On what plane of lived experience does the aesthetic value of outward appearance lie? Such are the questions we shall now take up.

There can be no doubt, of course, that my own exterior is not part of the concrete, actual horizon of my seeing, except for those rare cases when, like Narcissus, I contemplate my own reflection in the water or in a mirror. My own exterior (that is, all of the expressive features of my body; without exception) is experienced by me from *within* myself. It is only in the form of scattered fragments, scraps, dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself, that my own exterior enters the field of my outer senses, and, first of all the sense of vision. (Bakhtin, 1990: 27-28).

Here we see clearly that Bakhtin tells us that ‘my own exterior ... is experienced by me from *within* myself’. Bakhtin’s early metaphor of the *excess-of-seeing* that ‘I’ have concerning the ‘other’ and the other has concerning me, is initially perceived through the sense of vision. My own exterior, however, is essentially perceived by me from *within* and then only as ‘scattered fragments’, ‘scraps’, ‘dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself’. The essential point we note, at least at this stage, is my *inner experience* and my *outer experience* and how — and this is the important point — these experiences cross the threshold of the body, as image. They cross the threshold of the *body as image*, and they cross the threshold of the inner and outer *word as image*. It is on this plane, although he never mentions it, that surely Freud wished us to experience the journey from the unconscious instinctual field through to the ‘outside’ and also why he provides us with the return ticket? Freud too worked with threshold phenomena and border symbolism.

Returning to Bakhtin, however, he adds to the previous point by expressing:

But the data provided by these outer senses do not represent an ultimate authority even for deciding the question of whether *this* body is or is not mine. That question is decided only by my inner self-sensation. And it is again my self-sensation that imparts unity to the scattered fragments of my outward expressedness, translating them into its own inner language. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28).

Bakhtin clarifies this matter by adding:

This is the case in actual perception: in the outwardly unified world that I see, hear and touch, I do not encounter my own outward expressedness in being as an outwardly unitary object among other objects, I am situated on the boundary, as it were, of the world I see... While my thought can place my body wholly into the outside world as an object among other objects, my actual seeing cannot do the same thing; my seeing that is, cannot come to the aid of thinking by providing it with an adequate outward image. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28).

With these few comments, Bakhtin outlines a new plane of inner and outer dialogic potential, and casts the body as a peripheral zone of inner expressedness and its relationship to outward expressedness. It is in this intersubjective zone that Bakhtin eventually discovers the inner dialogized heteroglot voices, that some have seen as countermanding the Freudian unconscious. Let Bakhtin clarify another point, however, for us:

...that is myself, I do not *see* at all: myself I *experience* from within myself. Even when I dream about the admiration that my exterior calls forth in others I do not have to represent it to myself; I represent to myself only the result of the impression it makes on others.... Here, too, the leading actor is not expressed outwardly and exists on a different plane from that of the other participants, while they are expressed *outwardly*, he is experienced *from within*. (Bakhtin, 1990: 28-29).

Even in this early philosophical work by Bakhtin, the intersubjective dialogic zone of intensity is apparent, and also the potential for the stratification of the centrifugal forces operative in language. We now check another comment by Mikhail Mikhailovich that, in part, simplifies the idea:

One can of course, make the attempt to visualize one's own outward image in imagination, to 'feel' oneself from outside, to translate oneself from the language of inner self-sensation into that outward expressedness in being. But this is far from easy to do. It requires a special and unusual effort; and this difficulty and effort are quite unlike those we experience when trying to recall the not-too-familiar and half-forgotten face of another person. What is involved is less a matter of having an insufficient memory of our outward appearance than it is a matter of a certain fundamental resistance exerted by our outward image. (Bakhtin, 1990: 29).

In these introductory statements to Bakhtin's essay *Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity* (Bakhtin, 1990), we can at least perceive the dialogic space potential of Bakhtin's *intersubjectivity*. We see, for example, how the inner and outer voice,

allow for inward and outward expressedness. We also see that the understanding of oneself involves the crossing of a threshold, and the other in fact has the *excess of seeing* that provides an ‘image’ of ourselves. And, importantly, we have now involved ourselves in the world of the inner body and outer body as experience — and image, both on the plane of *seeing* and on the plane of the *other*, and we might add, on the level of the conscious and the unconscious. Later, in our work on Lacan, we shall have another view of the other and Other, in psychoanalytic terms. But at this point we are expressing the other as the problem in the relationship to the ‘text’.

Crossing a Threshold

However, inner speech and inward expressedness are *not* the unconscious. Outer speech and outward expressedness are not the conscious. The inner *voice* and the outer/external *voice* exist on a multiplicity of interpenetrating dialogic planes and they are internalized heteroglot voices, as Bakhtin discovered. But they are not the unconscious. They may be conscious phenomena of high intensity but they are not unconscious phenomena *unless* they cross a threshold.

Paradoxically, however, they may become unconscious phenomena and maintain their status, *if*, they cross a threshold. The conscious speaks and the unconscious *speaks* but they are, to borrow from Bakhtin, not on the same drive-belt; they are not the same ‘*system*’, and we shall see why. They may *appear* as one belt in a figure-of-eight, but they are different drive belts nevertheless. It is suggested, that

as a preliminary stage to understanding this, we superimpose the images of the conscious and the unconscious, upon the inward and outward expressedness planes already outlined by Bakhtin. After all, Freud taught that the unconscious crosses the line, slips of the tongue, etc., and we bear in mind the Freudian *transference*.

Bakhtin's Utterance — Initial Response

This superimposition of images leaves inner and outer voice zones intact and the Freudian conscious and unconscious likewise intact but superimposed upon each other — as images. So that we gain some understanding of Bakhtin's work that is essential to this dissertation, we now outline briefly Bakhtin's use of the term *utterance* that will often 'replace' aspects of the statuesque sentence in this piece.

A clear idea of the nature of the utterance in general and of the peculiarities of the various types of utterances (primary and secondary), that is, of various speech genres, is necessary, we think, for research in any special area. To ignore the nature of the utterance or to fail to consider the peculiarities of generic subcategories of speech in any area of linguistic study leads to perfunctoriness and excessive abstraction, distorts the historicity of the research, and weakens the link between language and life. After all, language enters life through concrete utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well. We shall approach certain areas and problems of the science of language in this context. (Bakhtin, 1986: 63).

Taking note of a further comment by Bakhtin we find:

Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances.

These we may well call *speech genres*. (Bakhtin, 1986: 60).

The *utterance* is the basic unit of language for all the linguistic thinking of the Bakhtin School. The utterance is a unit of *actual living speech* grounded in the *reality of a particular situation*. Again we check a comment by Bakhtin:

The difference between primary and secondary (ideological) genres is very great and fundamental, but this is precisely why the nature of the utterance should be revealed and defined through analysis of both types. Only then can the definition be adequate to the complex and profound nature of the utterance (and encompass its most important facets). A one-sided orientation toward primary genres inevitably leads to a vulgarisation of the entire problem (behaviourist linguistics is an extreme example). The very interrelations between primary and secondary genres and the process of the historical formation of the latter shed light on the nature of the utterance (and above all on the complex problem of the interrelations among languages, ideology, and world view). (Bakhtin, 1986: 62).

In the above statements by Bakhtin, we have merely endorsed the Bakhtinian categories of the *utterance* and *speech genres*. Later we shall position ourselves more acutely in their concrete use. (In a fairly generalized Bakhtinian sense, we wish to posit the primary genre as *everyday* dialogue and the secondary genre as *literary* formalised dialogic activity. Of course, this *zone* itself creates a dialogic

field of intensity). If we connect this information with the earlier mentioned Freudian slips of the tongue considered by Bakhtin, then we must understand that — and this is an early premise, the forces of the conscious and the unconscious must be part of the Bakhtinian *utterance*.

The unconscious is not just active during sleep but operates throughout the day (see *The Interpretation of Dreams*). Of course the dream is itself an unconscious *utterance*, but obviously different inasmuch as its first pre-requisite is to withdraw *action* from the external world. In fact, as Freud never tires of mentioning throughout *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the unconscious only ever works with the speech act that existed in consciousness. It may use fragments and re-order them or regurgitate previous speeches, or symbolize them, but it will never initiate new dialogic interaction, it does not have the *living event of speech* at its disposal.

Thus far then, we have defined a working hypothesis of Freud's forces of consciousness and the unconscious, and we have posited possible attitudes that Bakhtin may have adopted toward Freud. We have outlined a possible alternative to the Freudian unconscious seemingly indicated by Bakhtin, but we have retained the Freudian unconscious *and* Bakhtin's philosophy of language and ignited the pathway of Bakhtin's *utterance* and *speech genres* for possible future use in psychoanalysis and in our dissertation. In Bakhtinian terms, it is as well to remember perhaps that Bakhtin does not cut language as others do, he takes an

angle-grinding cutter to dialogic activity and cuts language at a totally new dialogic angle.

The Battlefield

It is crucial to note the unfolding of ‘I’ and ‘Other’ relationships present in the work of Bakhtin. It is the *intersubjective* field of dialogic intensity, where Bakhtin takes up arms. It is in the crossfire of dialogic arrows that he bravely places himself. And this, we might add, is not a structured battlefield, like real battle — it’s a messy business. Following Bakhtin again we note:

This difference in the experiencing of myself and the experiencing of the other is overcome by cognition, or, rather, cognition ignores this difference, just as it ignores the uniqueness of the cognising *subiectum*. In the unitary world of cognition, I cannot find a place for myself as a unique *I-for-myself* in distinction to all other human beings without exception — past, present, and future — as *others* for me. On the contrary, I know that I am just as limited a human being as all others, and that any other human being experiences himself essentially from within himself and is not embodied for himself in his own outward expressedness. Such cognition, however, does not provide those conditions which enable an actual seeing and experiencing of the once-occurrent concrete world of a once-occurrent *subiectum*. The correlation of the image-categories of *I* and the *other* is the form in which an actual human being is concretely experienced; this form of the *I* (the form in which I experience myself as the one-and-only me) is radically different from the form of the *other* (in which I experience all other human beings without exception). And the other person’s *I* is also experienced by me in a manner which is completely different from the

manner in which I experience my own *I*: the other person's *I* is also subsumed under the category of the *other* as a constituent feature of him. (Bakhtin, 1990: 37-38).

In Bakhtin, as we have expressed, there is an *excess-of-seeing* that 'I' have concerning the 'other'. The same is true of course the other way round. This metaphor of Bakhtin's allows for the perception of *outsideness*. In the uniqueness of my 'once-occurrent being' I cannot *consummate* myself from within. I must step outside myself and attempt to constitute myself, not on the plane of the 'I' but on the plane of the other. The 'secret' of my being is not constituted on the *horizon* of *I-for-Myself* but in the *environment* of the other. In this very fundamental sense, I have to *author* myself and dialogize myself not upon the plane of 'I-for-myself' but on the highly distinctive plane of 'the other'.

In the earlier quote by Freud, we saw the 'experience' of the instinctual field crossing various thresholds through to consciousness, and we saw the 'instigation from outside' (SE. XIV: 204), and also we saw the contra-movement through to the unconscious. Bakhtin operates on this plane too, but casts us upon the inner and outward image, crossing the threshold of the body on a plane of '*seeing*'.

Bakhtin tells us that:

One can easily ascertain by way of self-observation that the initial result of such an attempt will be the following: the visually expressed image of myself will begin to assume unsteady definition alongside myself as I experience myself from within, it will just barely detach itself from my inner self-sensation, in a

direction ahead of itself; it will shift slightly to the side and, like a bas-relief, separate from the surface of my inner self-sensation, without breaking away from it entirely. I shall become slightly 'doubled', but shall not come apart completely: the umbilical cord of my self-sensation will continue to connect my outward expressedness in being with my inner experience of myself. A certain renewed effort is required in order to visualize myself distinctly *en face* and to break away completely from my inner self-sensation. (Bakhtin, 1990: 29-30).

In this we see the 'vision' that is necessary to *author* oneself; Bakhtin allows us to author ourselves and in this surely we constitute and are constituted by the problem of the other, missed by Rank and Freud. Here then we trace the elements of Bakhtin's 'second consciousness', it is the move outside of oneself, it is the experience of oneself as an *outward image*, as well as an inward image, it is to cross a threshold. In Freud too, these perceptions are constantly present, although, it is to be sure, not cast in the same fashion. If we doubt this we only have to consider the psychoanalytic conceptualization of the *transference*. The transference crosses the threshold of inward and outward images of 'oneself' and the threshold of the image of the conscious and the unconscious forces in terms of 'the other'.

The Centripetal and the Centrifugal

If, in the extensive *oeuvre* of Freud, we discover the force fields of the unconscious and the conscious, in Bakhtin, we discover other force fields in his philosophy of language. For example, we may think of the force fields of the centripetal and centrifugal in language. It will be a crucial aspect in the formation

of the concept of *fragmented speech* that we understand these forces — ever-present. Bakhtin's discovery of the centripetal and centrifugal drives in language needs some explanation. The centripetal is the tendency in any language, always present, to unify that language, to centralize. It is monologic in intention and *always* veers toward centrality. It is the ethos of 'all roads lead to Rome'. It is BBC Received Pronunciation, centralized and centralizing grammar, it is all the forces that attempt to make language cohere, centrally.

It is unification of the conceptualization of language. It is an image of language that, by its very nature, is unified. Also of course it is *I-For-Myself* as the encasement of the subject, which is itself formed monologically (and has resonance with the ego position that we shall discuss later). It is the withdrawal from crossing borders or thresholds. It is the single-voiced plane. In Bakhtin's work, the centripetal force of monologism in language is represented as monoglossia. So it is that we see monoglossia as normativization of language. Conversely, the centrifugal force of language drives outward toward the periphery, away from the centralizing influence of monoglossia. The centrifugal dialectical diversification is counterposed to, although simultaneous with, monoglossia, it is dialogical diversification and heteroglossia is the interpenetration of a multiplicity of voice planes colliding in the *utterance*. These two forces in language are stressed at this point because of their possible connection with the Freudian conscious and unconscious.

The forces in language of centripetality and centrifugality correspond with the Freudian concept of the Cs. and the Ucs. How? Centripetal forces have the quality of egocentricity and appear to cohere more on the level of consciousness. This will be explained in greater depth later. The unconscious is more connected to the centrifugal forces present in language. We may think of the Freudian dream work, for example, as an expression of the unconscious, which contains all the elements of dialectical diversification. There is no homeostasis in language, perhaps the original heteroglot voices *within* are the interplay between Cs. and Ucs., where value acts as the arbitrary axis. Next, we check the glossary in *The Dialogic Imagination*, carefully provided by Michael Holquist, and the translation of Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. This Glossary remark describes *heteroglossia* in an accessible form.

The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions — social, historical, meteorological, physiological — that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualisation as is possible of that locus where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic linguistics must always suppress. (Bakhtin, 1981:428).

So that we understand this more fully, we cite another remark from Bakhtin that hopefully clarifies the situation:

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such diversity. And this active participation of every utterance in living heteroglossia determines the linguistic profile and style of the utterance to no less a degree than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a unitary language.

Every utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin, 1981:272).

It seems as if the *utterance* makes its appearance as the sea wall of monoglossia tries to repress the crashing waves of heteroglossia. The interaction of these forces is crucial in the assessments that we shall make. However, we must not run away with the idea that there is some philosophical match between Freud and Bakhtin. Answers will be needed in view of the relevance of *action* and *answerability* in Bakhtin, presumably both on axiological and ethical planes of thought. In our search for fragmented speech, however, we do not consider the multiplication of each and every principle possible or desirable.

Conclusion

In order to summarize and conclude this chapter, we note especially the discursive links between the forces of *monoglossia* and *heteroglossia* and the Freudian conceptualization of the *conscious* and the *unconscious* — for us, vital categories in the discovery of *fragmented speech*. In these concluding remarks that bring to a close this chapter, we have, hopefully, drawn Freud and Bakhtin on to a similar plane, even if we have cut-in certain concepts. We have attempted to activate an image of the body as a threshold of inner and outer experience and an image of the unconscious and stress their simultaneity of operation. In other words, we have attempted to address aspects of the problem of the other and the unconscious.

Threshold phenomena, for example, the inner body as experience, or the external body as experience, or inward speech and outward speech, and the threshold of the conscious and the unconscious, need to be formulated around a concept of open unity rather than heavy structure. Therefore, I propose in the next chapter to provide a ‘container’ for our concepts loose enough to express the unconscious and to offer some evidence of our early hypothesis, namely, that Bakhtin may have embraced the Freudian unconscious and certain Freudian mechanisms. In the next chapter, we shall analyse elements of Bakhtin’s concept of Renaissance *Carnival* as, in our opinion, an expression of the unconscious in Bakhtin’s work and investigate the *Carnival system of images* in terms of Freud’s various

'mechanisms'. As a verbal bridge between the comments in this chapter and the next we check a remark:

The medieval world is said to have viewed the body as licentious, crude, self-destructive, and to have divorced it from any meaningful relationship to human speech (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 437).

The *image of the body* plays a crucial role in the development of our theory of fragmented speech within the unconscious. In the next chapter, we approach the problems of the *image of the body* and the *image of speech* and the *image of conscious* and *unconscious* forces. Luckily for us, Bakhtin rediscovered the public square, where all these forces intermingle.

CHAPTER THREE

BAKHTIN, CARNIVAL, AND DISMEMBERMENT

Prelude

To suddenly introduce the concept of Carnival may seem a strange turn of events following our previous chapters. But carnival, particularly Bakhtinian Renaissance Carnival, will prove absolutely crucial to our project and we now begin to explain why. We shall explore carnival in terms of the idea of the market place, of the heteroglossia (multi-voicedness) occurring in the carnival town square. The market place or carnival town square acts as a dialogic crossroads of interpenetrating and differing voices and voice-zones connected to a stratification of many genres. The carnival backcloth draws all genres into the town square in an inmixing of subjectivity. Bakhtin's 'fortuitous' use of carnival is ideal for our purposes concerning the images of the grotesque (fragmented) body and grotesque (fragmented) speech and the disparate (fragmented) drives that occur in carnival and particularly Bakhtinian carnival.

The noisy bustle of the Renaissance carnival square may seem a far cry from the bourgeois containment of the psychoanalytic session — with its secrecy and privacy. When the analyst deliberately 'sets up' his artificial discourse in the hushed chambers of, for example, 19, Bergasse. This assessment, however, might not have a natural line of demarcation so readily assumed. Does the merchant's sign of the psychoanalyst swing in a cobbled side street of the carnival square

after all? Lacan in fact makes a statement that might lead us to suspect that it does. He tells us:

The establishment of a common discourse of a public discourse I would almost say, is an important factor in the specific functioning of the mechanism of repression. In itself repression stems from the impossibility of granting discourse to a certain past of the subject's speech which is linked, as Freud stressed, to the specific world of infantile relations (Lacan, 1993[1981]: 60).

He mentions the all-important infantile relations, the working out of which is so prevalent and vital in carnival. Of course in this remark by Lacan, we can see that he does not quite draw the analysand and analyst into the public sphere, or the town square, nevertheless the meaning glimmers through. He does, however, appear to ask the question: to what extent is repression a reaction to, or response to, the *crowd*?

The crowd of course is the essential ingredient of the carnival feast; the street cryer, the hawker, draw a heterogeneous contention of voices on to a similar plane. For our purposes we shall draw Bakhtin's *depth of field* in carnival on to a single plane of perception. We take carnival as a one-dimensional surface because later we shall superimpose the image of carnival over a map, a topography of our own making to see if it fits. We understand that Bakhtin discovers the depth of field vision in *Rabelais and His World* and of course *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, but we borrow the concept and place it on to a

single plane of interpretation. In *Rabelais and His World* and *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, depth of field and the interpenetration of various planes are essential as Bakhtin works out theories of *heteroglossia* and *polyphony*.

Introduction

In this chapter we attempt to keep an *overview* of the unconscious as being synonymous, in some ways, with Carnival. One does not have to be a precise replica of the other for the similarities to be striking. And, we must immediately note the term *dismemberment* and its dialogic interconnection with our discourse. The image of dismemberment is fundamental to Bakhtinian carnival, either the dismemberment of the body or of speech, or the image of both. *Fragmented speech* requires the backdrop of carnival on a cultural and artistic plane, and we therefore introduce elements of Bakhtin's concept of carnival in this chapter.

Hopefully, this will become plain later. If, however, Bakhtin did see carnival as somehow synonymous with the Freudian unconscious he is extremely unlikely to have said so. Let us check two interconnecting comments that Bakhtin makes in his critique of Kayser in *Rabelais and His World*. Bakhtin tells us:

...Another of Kayser's definitions is characteristic of the modernist interpretation: 'the grotesque is a form expressing the *id*'.

The *id* is understood by the author[Kayser] not so much in the Freudian as in the existentialist sense of this word. *Id* is an alien, inhuman power, governing the world, men, their life and behaviour. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 49).

In this comment Bakhtin floats the idea of the Freudian *id*, hastening to add *of course*, that Kayser is speaking of the existentialist form of the *id*; but surely the very mention of Freud, allows the reader *unofficially* to think of Freud?

As this chapter is so distinctly connected with carnival, we need perhaps to remind ourselves of (a) centripetal forces in language; and (b) centrifugal forces in language; and their interconnection with Freud. We take as an example a footnote from *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

The distinction between the primary and secondary systems and the hypothesis that psychological functioning operates differently in them, are among the most fundamental of Freud's concepts ... that psychological energy occurs in two forms: 'free' or 'mobile' (as it occurs in the system Ucs.) and 'bound' or quiescent' (as it occurs in the system Pcs.). (Freud, 1991, [Editor's Note]: 761).

It seems to us that the connection here with Bakhtin's conceptualisation of centripetal and centrifugal forces operating in language is quite clear. Following on from these fundamental points of contact, there is another comment, this time by Bakhtin, that is pertinent to ideas concerning the *unconscious* and *carnival* and we take note of this crucial point:

"The unsaid" and its special nature and role are interesting from this standpoint. The early stages of verbal cognition. The "unconscious" can become a creative factor only on the threshold of consciousness and of the word (semiverbal/semisignifying consciousness). They are fraught with the word and the potential

word. “The unsaid” as a *shifting boundary*, as a ‘regulative idea (in the Kantian sense) of creative consciousness. (Bakhtin, 1986: 163).

Again, we see the fragmented note-taking style of Bakhtin here that leaves us, in a sense, to fill in the spaces. I think, to start with, that the carnivalesque needs to be viewed against a backdrop of ‘the unsaid’. Carnival is always, to borrow Foucault’s phrase, the anonymous murmur.

Teasingly, Bakhtin leaves us with the phrase ‘the early stages of verbal cognition’ by which presumably he means verbal cognition in the development of the child. The next phrase again ties Bakhtin and Freud in some ways ‘the unconscious can become a creative factor only on the threshold of consciousness and of the word’; so it seems here that Bakhtin dialogizes the unconscious on a dialogic threshold. We would make one further connection, however, at this point and add from Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams*: ‘It [the dream] shows a preference for what is *immoderate, exaggerated and monstrous*’ (Freud, 1991: 155). Quite clearly the *dream* itself — Royal Road to the unconscious — has a close connection with the carnival system of images. At this point we offer the premise that there is a distinct synonymy between the concept of the Freudian unconscious and Carnival. Of course this also includes the dream. Exaggeration and hyperpole play an essential role in carnival and have a distinctive role later in the development of our thesis concerning *fragmented speech*.

Rabelais' Shadow

I am, I must admit, loathe to broach physiological ground in the shadow of the laughing Franciscan monk and Bachelor of Medicine Francois Rabelais, but there may be use in the following observations from Schilder and we note them regarding their possible serious relationship to Renaissance Carnival. The first is:

Disease of any organ, is connected with a special psychic attitude. It may be said in a schematic way that the difference between psychogenic and organic is, among other things, a difference in the direction in which the process moves. In organ diseases the periphery is affected first, and the affection goes from the periphery to the centre; in psychogenic cases the change goes from the centre to the periphery (Schilder, 1950: 155).

He goes on:

I should like to emphasize the fact that the connotation of the prevalence of centrifugal tendencies in functional diseases and centripetal tendencies in organ diseases means not only physiological but psychological processes as well. (Ibid.)

And one more comment should clarify this matter for us.

The mental problems and libidinous conflicts of the neurosis lie in the centre of the personality and flow from there to the periphery of the personality and into the postural model of the body. Psychogenic disturbance has necessarily a centrifugal character. It expresses itself in a nervous symptom, or even in an anatomical change which is created by a centrifugal psychic process. In organic

disease the process begins in the periphery of the experience and provokes the changes in the central attitude. The organic process is therefore centripetal from the point of view of the psychology of the central ego and postural model of the body. The difference between an organic and psychogenic disease is merely a difference in the psychic direction. (Ibid. 301).

In a slightly different context we see: ‘There is also a general fear about the integrity of the body, or, as I have called it, a general dismembering motive and fear. In psychosis, especially this dismembering motive plays an important part’. (Ibid. 190). We hold on to these ideas in the first instance; the concept that the body is subject to these centripetal and centrifugal forces relates to our conceptualization of the Bakhtinian forces of the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language. At this stage we are not suggesting that there is direct correlation but we hold on to the thought nevertheless. So that we may link our thoughts later we also add the comment ‘...the tendency of the organism to self-defence reflects itself in the fear of castration and pre-genital castration in the fear of being dismembered’. (Ibid. 190).

Body — As Image

Popular-festive images, may seem a strange space to develop our thesis, but hopefully this will become clearer as we progress through this third chapter. Our dissertation is based upon the hypothesis that speech has an unconscious repressed base of fragmentation. To draw close to an image of fragmented speech requires that we must first generalize certain terms, certain parameters, so that we

may position ourselves quite distinctly in relation to them. The *body in pieces* has a direct correlation with our project in general. The image of the body, in our hypothesis, is directly related to the image of the word, so we shall need to delineate the image of the *body in pieces*.

In his book, Schilder makes the following comment: ‘Is the postural model of the body a fixed static entity, or is it a changing, growing, and developing one? I hope to show that the postural model of the body is in perpetual inner self-construction and self-destruction’ (Schilder, 1950: 15-16). In this we have a dynamic image of the body and its capability for construction *and* destruction as an image. It is certainly the case that the body has to be *imaged*. In the case of the amputation of a limb, for example, the body image has to be reformulated — here we may think of phantom limbs existing after an amputation — the body image has to adapt itself. Or Schilder tells us of the Japanese Illusion, which most children know, by twisting the fingers in a certain way, it becomes impossible to identify one of the fingers by sight. It is not parodic to imagine that the amputation of Bakhtin’s leg affected his perception of the body image, as the inward and outward image of the body is so vital to his ideas.

However, Schilder further tells us that: ‘The original shape [postural model of the body] is based upon continual transformations from the postural model of the

child into the postural model of the adult. There is a long series of images' (Ibid. 67). (We wish to postulate, as we shall see, that the *speech image* may well also be formed by a similar long series of images). Continuing, it is also likely that we have an image of the internal organs within and this is crucial in an understanding of Renaissance Carnival. If Schilder is correct, then there is a continuous process of building and demolishing images of the body. There is a continuous *series* of images. This of course applies equally to the *image of the body of the other*, which is internalized as an image and of course subject to variation in a series of images. We shall deal in more detail with this concept later in the dissertation.

This all provides, initially, a brief sketch of the body as image. However, before we progress with these ideas, we need to make one point clear. We are here considering the carnivalesque, at least the Renaissance carnival, as, in some ways an image of the unconscious and the unconscious forces. Of course, there is interplay between the forces of the unconscious and consciousness, as there is interplay between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language.

Ego — as Image

There is a connection, a *tie*, between the *image of the body* and the *image of the word* and we shall endeavour to justify our premise. Within Bakhtinian carnival we shall introduce the concept of the *ego*. At this stage, perhaps we need justify the concept no further than to ascertain that the *ego appears* to be — and is often

thought to be — a centralizing agency within the psyche that provides the unity of consciousness, as it acts as the headquarters of incoming and outgoing stimuli. The fact that the image of the ego is itself a *méconnaissance* will be dealt with later.

It is on this Bakhtinian plane of Carnival that the *image of the body*, the *image of the word* and the *image of the ego* have an open unity on the same plane, and this will prove invaluable to us. Undoubtedly, the *ego* is the crowned king or queen of the Subject. But is the king only a pretender to the throne? Is this monarch a usurper? The crowning and uncrowning of the ego is crucial to this chapter. Unquestionably, Freud's discovery of the unconscious decentralized the ego. So that we have some coherence of terms, we shortly shall check what Freud himself had to say about the 'king' of the personality — the crownéd ego.

In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud enlightens us with a few useful comments: 'consciousness is the *surface* of the mental apparatus; that is, we have ascribed it as a function to a system which is spatially the first one reached from the external world' (Freud, 1927: 9). And Freud also tells us that: 'In essence a word is after all the mnemonic residue of a word that has been heard' (Freud, 1927: 11). In Bakhtin, however, we add another dimension: there is also an inner dialogic integrity to the word. The word is *active* from within, it resonates with internal dialogic activity. It bursts upon the world with an inner energy that is psychologically, ideologically, aesthetically, physiologically, philosophically,

resonant with the echo of its own history, with its own present, and its own future — and crucially — interwoven with the word of the Other. As Bakhtin states variously, there is an intra-atomic intensity in the dialogic interconnections of the word. And as Bakhtin also states variously, the word has a memory.

Word — as Image

The word is not a hollow tin can. It is *packed* with action, potential and intent, and as Bakhtin teaches, ‘meaning is not born, nor does it die’ (Bakhtin, 1990: 108). This is perhaps the moment to point out that from now on, the Bakhtinian *utterance* must contain the collision of unconscious and conscious forces. Obviously it always did, but the recognition of this fact is not necessarily an easy matter. Continuing now with Freud, we find that: ‘The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it’ (Freud, 1927: 14). Simultaneously with this we note: ‘A grotesque-word matrix drags the messy body into territory previously occupied by disembodied, hierarchical word systems’ (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 438).

There is no precise connection here, but we would note the similarity of the ‘dragging down’ of the grotesque-word matrix and the ego merging into the ‘id’ as relevant shortly. And, as a further point we have: ‘The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the resistances of repression; it can communicate with the ego through the Id.’ (*Ibid.*). Checking Freud again we also find the following:

‘For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to instinct’ (Freud, 1927: 15). And, most importantly for us we have:

The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength, while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own. (Freud, 1927: 15).

From the following page Freud states:

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface.

(*From Freud’s footnote 1 p.16.*) we have [i.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus]. (Freud, 1927: 16).

Bakhtin’s Carnival

As an example, and introduction to Bakhtin’s Carnival and his *Rabelais and his World* (Bakhtin, 1984a) we need to think about Bakhtin’s term *heteroglossia*. Once again we take up the Bakhtinian optic and view his term *heteroglossia*, so

that we may be quite clear. Heteroglossia, ‘ the centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in a ‘unitary language’ operate in the midst of heteroglossia’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 271). And ‘Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward.’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). We need also to note the following:

But no living word relates to its object in a *singular* way: between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme ... (Ibid. 276).

The gloss on the above comment reminds us that there are interpenetrating dialogic arrows filling the sky between speaking subjects. The whole field is permeated with dialogic relationships and it is these that Bakhtin draws our attention to. We must not assume that between the speaker/listener there is a dialogic vacuum, as Bakhtin indicates in the above, far from it. Bakhtin goes on to tell us:

Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse toward the object; if we detach ourselves completely from this impulse all we have left is the naked corpse of the words from which we can learn nothing at all. (Ibid. 292)

It is extremely important that we take note of Bakhtin's use of the 'corpse of the words' here, the rotting corpse of the body and the rotting corpse of the word play a significant role later in the dissertation, but it is very important that we mark them at the level of carnival. Why? Because later we shall have need of the concept, but in a sense it has a root in carnival, on the plane of grotesque imagery.

So, may we perhaps describe *heteroglossia*, generally, as a diversity of speech styles in language, and multi-voiced dialogue? And likewise may we describe, in a generalized sense, Bakhtin's use of the term *polyphony* as the position of an author in a text in relationship to the interpenetration of dialogic voice-ideas? In these few comments we have hopefully introduced some basic elements of Bakhtin's *heteroglossia*, before we move into the space of the Renaissance *Carnival*. The relevance of heteroglossia for the concept of fragmented speech is crucial. Fragmented speech — for reasons that will become clear later — is, in a sense, a pathological form of heteroglossia, a 'clinical' conception of heteroglossia. And this is, also in a certain sense, counterposed to *monoglossia*. However, and this is an extremely important point, the idea we have is one of *conversion*; to bring *value* to fragmented speech through Bakhtin's conceptualization of heteroglossia and carnival.

Heteroglossia and Fragmented Speech

As fragmented speech is hauled dripping from the unconscious, it needs some sort of 'container', a net, however loosely formed, to hold *its* form. Carnival, in this

instance, is the container and the contained. Heteroglossia, is a dialogic marketplace; it is the centrifugal force of language bursting open the barrel of the centripetal forces, always trying to re-hoop the barrel of language. It is within this force field of heteroglossia that Bakhtin leads us through the streets of apothecaries, to the razzmatazz of the public square. We find that: 'Bakhtin is not describing a medieval public square, he is describing a modern discursive space as a medieval public square' (Hirschkop, 1999: 200). I would like to suggest too, that Freud's laugh is directed at the public square, his consulting room dialectic is an accident of fate.

If the *body image* and the *word image* resonate throughout medieval carnival, and if the *ego* is the crowned carnival king and there is always an uncrowning ceremony, how and in what terms do we locate the *system of images* described by Bakhtin in his *Rabelais and his World*? (Bakhtin, 1984a) And, most importantly, how is all this likely to add up to a useful image of *fragmented speech*?

In the first place, we need to detect the system of images in *Rabelais and his World* and apply it to our own text, and, secondly to delineate in terms useful for our approach, the *potential* location of elements of fragmented speech. If this is not complex enough, we must also remember that carnival is very much a relationship of 'I' and the 'Other', not to mention the 'author' and the 'hero'. In other words we are approaching a system of folklore symbols whose compass of

vision may correspond with ours at the level of fragmented speech. Before moving on, we recall another statement by Schilder:

There are vague feelings of temperature. It is more or less the feeling of warmth. But the outline of the skin is not felt as a smooth and straight surface. This outline is blurred. There are no sharp borderlines between the outside world and the body. (Schilder, 1950: 85).

And again on the *body image*:

There is a long series of images. But one of the most important characteristics of psychic life is the tendency to multiply images and to vary them with every multiplication. It is one of the inherent characteristics of our psychic life that we continuously change our images; we multiply them and make them appear differently. This general rule is true also for the postural model of the body. We let it shrink playfully and come to the idea of Lilliputians, or we transform it into giants. We have therefore, an almost unlimited number of body images (Schilder, 1950: 67).

In Bakhtin's carnival, we have the body image and the word image and they are 'contained' along with the image of the ego (unconscious or otherwise) in the open unity of carnival. We now explore this carnival *system of images* as an artistic heteroglossia of interpenetrating images that may have room for the dismembered body or the fragmented *image* of the body and the fragmented *image* of the word. Justification of the concept of *fragmented speech* will occur

later. Meanwhile, we shall explore Bakhtin's analysis of Rabelais' *system of images*, and interconnect where appropriate with the work of Freud.

Freud's Influence on Carnival

In his article 'Freud's Influence on Bakhtin: Traces of Psychoanalytic Theory in *Rabelais and His World*' (Byrd, 1987: 223-30), Byrd traces connections between Freud and Bakhtin, but does not take the bold step of making carnival the unconscious, and the unconscious carnival, at least in its cultural and artistic aspect. Once this bold step is made we believe that Freud's 'mechanisms' begin to make more sense in a carnival setting. However, so that we may have a flavour of Byrd's text let us explore the following:

Later in his book, Bakhtin exposes a 'form of scatophagy' in the grotesque Rabelaisian image of sweating. This reading can only be based on a Freudian theory of displacement, since it relies not only on Rabelais explicit evocation of the salty taste of sweat, but also on an unconscious association of sweat with 'other elimination'. The discovery of a sensational meaning related only inexplicitly to the image but seemingly responsible for it directly parallels Freud's unravelling of displacement mechanisms to find the subversive 'latent content' of dreams and jokes. The hermeneutics of Bakhtin's close reading of a Rabelaisian text again seem influenced by Freud (Byrd, 1987: 227).

This comment gives us, I think, a significant genre placement within the concept of carnival and the unconscious and I cite it merely to position ourselves within, and external to, Byrd's text. If the unconscious is seen as parallel to, and

synonymous with, Bakhtin's Renaissance Carnival, then the juxtaposition of the *system of images* in Carnival and Freud's mechanisms becomes easier to handle.

We draw no strict analogies but consider the following as inherent both in carnival and psychoanalysis: we may think in terms of: (i) *repression* which is vital to an understanding of psychoanalysis, and the release of repression which is vital to the formation of carnival. Following this we may likewise consider (ii) *resistance*, which the psychoanalyst has to understand in terms of repression, and the *resistance*, which carnival represents, for example, its crowning and uncrowning ceremonies of kings and queens and opposition to an authoritative discourse. We consider also (iii) the *ego* — decentralized in Freudian psychoanalysis, and uncrowned and turned in a clown in carnival, the ego, as it were, turned upside down. We may also think of (iv) *free association*, vital as a technique in psychoanalysis to trigger the discourse of the unconscious, and vital too in carnival where the free interplay of relationships between objects, like dreams, allows the whole discourse of carnival to develop.

Notwithstanding this, at this stage, we need to sketch in a few construction lines so that we do not get lost in the welter of material from Freud and Bakhtin. I suggest we do this in the first instance by analyzing the Bakhtinian categories, derived from Rabelais, of the *Grotesque Image of the Body* and the *Language of the Marketplace*. The juxtaposition of these images is crucial to our cause whereby we trace fragmented speech.

Grotesque Image of the Body

If, in Schilder, we have come to understand the image of the body, we now try to understand the grotesque image of the body and its relevance. In Schilder, the image of the body is built-up by a series of images of both construction and destruction. Now we check the relevance of Rabelais' use of the grotesque body and Bakhtin's interpretation of it. Precisely what is the grotesque body and what is its relevance for *fragmented speech*? The two words that immediately spring to mind are *exaggeration* and *hyperbole*. Grotesque realism is the multiplication of images of the body. It is also where the body exceeds its own boundaries, especially in relationship to the comic. And, as we know: 'The comic, in general, is based upon the contrast between the feeling of pleasure and displeasure' (Bakhtin, 1984a: 305).

It is difficult to understand the point of the grotesque without the image of bodily topography. In the upright towers and concealed and hidden valleys of the landscape there are always analogies to be made with bodily topography. Also we note the connection between the material bodily lower stratum and upper, more 'respectable' body. Between earth and heaven. Let us take as an example, Bakhtin's opening image in his chapter on the grotesque image of the body namely the image of the stutterer. We note Bakhtin's comments:

A stutterer talking with Harlequin cannot pronounce a difficult word; he makes a great effort, loses his breath, keeping the word down in his throat, sweats, and gapes, trembles, chokes. His face is swollen, his

eyes pop; 'it looks as if he were in the throes and spasms of childbirth.'
Finally Harlequin, weary of waiting, relieves the stutterer by surprise;
he rushes head forward and hits the man in the abdomen. The difficult
word is 'born' at last. (Bakhtin, 1984*a*: 304).

This is a fine example for us because it makes a link between the image of the body and the image of the word 'stuck' in the body. It is also about the threshold of the word in the inner and outer world. Let us follow the image of the stutterer further.

The gaping mouth, the protruding eyes, sweat, trembling, suffocation, the swollen face — all these are typical symptoms of the grotesque life of the body; here they have the meaning of the act of birth. Harlequin's gesture is also quite obvious: he helps to deliver the word, and the word is actually born (Ibid. 308).

In this, of course, as Bakhtin points out the bodily topography allows the bodily hierarchy to be turned upside down. Lower replaces upper, the word is taken from the upper level (thought) and plummeted to the lower level, so as Bakhtin again stresses the 'entire mechanism of the word is transferred from the apparatus of speech to the abdomen' (Bakhtin, 1984*a*: 309). We must not I think underestimate the importance of this connecting symbol. In this example we have exaggeration and hyperbole, essential to a definition of the grotesque. Bakhtin allows us to glimpse the logic of the grotesque body. Bakhtin goes on to discuss other elements of the grotesque: 'It must be recalled that the belfry (a tower) is the usual grotesque symbol of the phallus' (ibid. 310). These images do not just

locate a bodily topography they also fuse the body with the object; there is a blurring of boundaries.

All these elements of speech create a specific, free atmosphere. Most of them are linked to the lower stratum; they lend a bodily character to objects and degrade them, fuse the body and the world, thus introducing the concluding theme: the transformation of the belfry into a phallus. The bowels and the phallus play of course a leading role in the exaggeration and hyperbole of the images. Bakhtin depicts all the acts of 'depravity' for us, but we need stress only at this point the image of *dismemberment*, which is essential for our use of the grotesque body and its relationship to *fragmented speech*. We obviously do not underplay the significance of the anus, the phallus, and all the convexities and orifices that Bakhtin describes for us but we note the continuous use of the term *dismemberment*. However, let us see how far we have travelled with Bakhtin:

The body discloses its essence as a principle of growth which exceeds its own limits only in copulation, pregnancy, child birth, the throes of death, eating, drinking or defecation (Bakhtin, 1984a: 26).

Return to the Grotesque Body

In this second phase description and assessment of the grotesque body, we need to note the juxtaposition of the image of the whole body image, the *gestalt* image that is in stark contradistinction to our aim. Bakhtin tells us in respect of this *whole* body:

The new bodily canon, in all its historic variations and different genres, presents an entirely finished, completed, strictly limited body, which is shown from the outside as something individual. That which protrudes, bulges, sprouts or branches off (when a body transgresses its limits and a new one begins) is eliminated, hidden, or moderated. All orifices of the body are closed. The basis of the image is the individual, strictly limited mass, the impenetrable façade. The opaque surface and the body's 'valleys' acquire an essential meaning as the border of a closed individuality that does not merge with other bodies and with the world. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 320).

So that we clarify this point fully by Bakhtin, we take another quote from his work.

Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics [i.e., such as they have come down to us] have all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular 'own' language, and have postulated as well a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual. Such disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of language, between which are located all the linguistic and stylistic phenomena they know: on the one hand, the system of a *unitary language*, and on the other the *individual* speaking in this language. (Bakhtin, 1981: 269).

These remarks by Bakhtin, above, now position us partway to where we need to be. The singularity of the closed down body, of its orifices and protrusions has a similarity with the closed down discourse of monoglossia. In psychoanalytic terms, we may say that we are drawing close to a conceptualization of a

psychoanalytic *speech complex* that derives from the body image *and* the word image.

Continuing, we must understand the basis of Bakhtin's assessment of the grotesque and we find:

...at the basis of grotesque imagery a special concept of the body as a whole and of the limits of this whole. The confines between the body and the world and between separate bodies are drawn in the grotesque genre quite differently than in the classic and naturalist images ... and [we] disclose the sources of Rabelais' grotesque concept of the body. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 315).

However, in all these comments we see that the body image is seen in terms of construction or destruction. But the border between the body and the world becomes deliberately blurred in Rabelais and Bakhtin (and objects for that matter). As the border likewise between the social and the individual also becomes blurred in Bakhtin. Perhaps now we may say that if the *body-image* has to be built-up and the *word-image* has to be built-up, so does the *world-image*. It is in answer to some of these questions that the ubiquitous carnival presents, in part, solutions. Carnival deals with the living instinct and the instinct, as Freud never tired of saying, lies on the frontier between the mental and the physical. Checking again with Schilder we note the following:

The enormous psychological importance of all openings of the body is obvious, since it is by these openings that we come in closest contact with the world. By

them we ingest air, food, sex products; by them we eject urine, sex products, faeces, and air. We have therefore distinguished points in the postural model of the body. These points are at the same time points of erotic importance. (Schilder, 1950: 124).

These openings and orifices of the body become crucial as the development of the image of the fragmented body becomes entangled with the image of fragmented speech and the fragmented 'image' of drives. The above statement is also emblematic of Rabelaisian carnival. The openings of the body have their own interplay with speech. As an addition to this point we may also note the following:

I have specifically pointed out the fact that whatever originates in or emanates out of our body will still remain a part of the body-image. The voice, the breath, the odour, faeces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, are still parts of the body-image even when they are separated in space from the body (Cf. Roheim) (Schilder, 1950: 213).

In these images we begin, I think, to detect Bakhtin's zone of the genre of the grotesque body and its 'opposition' to the *gestalt*, to the whole body image. Of course as we know, these images re-connect with the image of the centrifuge. We have no wish to multiply the images of the grotesque beyond necessity, but note the proximity to the zone and register of *fragmented speech*. However, we now connect the images of the grotesque body with the image of 'grotesque' speech.

Language of the Marketplace

One could be forgiven for blurring the images present in Bakhtin's chapters on 'The Language in the Marketplace in Rabelais'; and 'The Grotesque Image of the Body', because there is a general merging. However, we need to explore the images of the language of the marketplace or as Bakhtin describes it, *billingsgate*.

The grotesque always has in mind the *material bodily lower stratum*, the zone of the genital organs. Bakhtin pinpoints for us, in the opening pages of this chapter the 'besmirching with mud' and 'tossing of excrement' (Bakhtin, 1984a: 148) and this he dates as far back as Aeschylus' satiric drama 'The Collector of Bones'.

Of course we still use the word mud-slinging for any form of dishing the dirt. Again here Bakhtin connects up with the topography of the body. High immediately becomes low once the excrement reaches its target. However, I do not think that we should miss the point made by Bakhtin that the language of excrement was interconnected with fertility and this separates Bakhtin from those who only see the narrow form of vulgarity. If we are to continue with the images already nominated by Bakhtin then surely we need to bear in mind the term *ambivalent*. In the grotesque body-image the initial and overriding ideas were exaggeration and hyperbole and here, in the marketplace we shall have *praise* and *abuse*.

Bakhtin leaves us in no doubt that 'Rabelais scholars usually understand and evaluate the novel's billingsgate and marketplace elements in the spirit of modern

interpretation, distinct from the carnival action as a whole. The deep ambivalence of these images is no longer understood' (Ibid. 150). The interconnection of the grotesque body-image and the grotesque word-image are of course counterposed to the whole body-image with its smoothed out surfaces and the whole word-image, likewise, with its smoothed out surfaces.

So what precisely do we mean by the language of the marketplace? This is what Bakhtin calls free familiar speech: curses, profanities and oaths. Bakhtin shrewdly picks up on the *barker's* style in the marketplace; Rabelais' own opening lines, for example, 'Most noble boozers, and you my very esteemed and poxy friends' (Rabelais, 1955: 37). Here is the perfect example of intertwining praise and abuse in the *style* of the barker. Now we see the connection that Bakhtin made earlier of the stutterer and how the body-image and the word-image become more entwined as they are connected through the symbolic head-butting episode. Not the word in the head (thought) any longer but the word in the belly, ready for birth. We must not miss the point that the physical attribute of the word is not missed in Bakhtin. Birth is given to the word in the example of the stutterer. I would connect the images brought forth by Bakhtin of exaggeration and hyperbole as the grotesque body and praise and abuse as the grotesque word. Let us see how Bakhtin himself connects these ideas in respect of praise and abuse:

This phenomenon is reflected in imagery and is extremely important for the understanding of entire periods of the development of thought. This

development has not as yet been analysed, but in a preliminary and rather simplified way we can say that it is based on the conception of the world as eternally unfinished: a world dying and being born at the same time, possessing as it were two bodies. The dual image combining praise and abuse seeks to grasp the very moment of this change, the transfer from the old to the new, from death to life. Such an image crowns and uncrowns at the same moment. (Bakhtin, 1984a: 165-166).

Again there is no need to multiply images beyond necessity but the merging of the image of the body and the image of the word is essential among the quacks and apothecaries in the marketplace, all the images of the body and the images of the word interpenetrating in the carnival square. But what of the carnival space itself?

Carnival Space

The image of the body and the image of the word interconnect in the carnival square, the forces of the conscious and the unconscious undoubtedly collide there too, but what of the space itself? Psychoanalysis has its part to play in Bakhtin's formulation of the symbol formation in *Rabelais and His World* of this, in our opinion there is little doubt. Psychoanalysis is implicit in the work, if not, understandably, explicitly, so this we offer as a theme in a minor key. However, if Freud does have a signboard hanging in a carnival back alley, how does it affect the carnival space? Let us check the following remark:

A comparison which reminds us that the marvellously open expanses of the public square are not only literally but metaphorically spacious, allowing history a room for movement which it is denied in the bourgeois parlour. (Hirschkop, 1999: 249).

And:

But Bakhtin is not describing a medieval public square, he is describing a modern discursive space as a medieval public square. (Ibid. 260).

We now analyse these remarks in the light of psychoanalysis in the dialogic public square.

Here we see that Bakhtin has taken dialogism into the public domain; he has opened up a 'new' discursive space. He has unfolded his linguistics not in the bourgeois parlour but in the thoroughly Socratic public square. But what of Freud, where is he in the dialogic town square? Huddled away in a 'bourgeois parlour' or offering his wares on a public stall? In other words what space does Freud occupy? It is a serious question. To answer this, we need to take a leaf out of Bakhtin's book; if Bakhtin's interpretation of some elements of psychoanalysis is contained in his book *Rabelais and His World*, then presumably Bakhtin placed Freud in the public square — or was it the bourgeois parlour?

We also consider the carnival space and what it may or may not represent psychologically, in other words we have to consider the chronotope of carnival its

relationship to its own time and space and its relationship to other chronotopes. Compare the following statement by Schilder that is itself, without of course meaning to be, carnivalesque:

Experience in pathology, which I cannot discuss here in detail, leads me to the conclusion that the psychological space concerning one's own body is different from other space. Space, therefore, psychologically shows a lack of homogeneity. The outside space and the body space differ in their structure (Schilder, 1950: 57-58).

This position of the carnival space, which of course has its associations with centripetal and centrifugal forces, as well as psychological space also finds an echo in the following remark:

... we must renounce those 'givens' which, according to the system of reference chosen, find their place either 'in the world' or 'in the psyche' (Sartre, 1969: xxvii).

When Hirschkop tells us that Bakhtin is 'not describing a medieval public square' but a 'modern discursive space' we should take notice. Hirschkop opens up the carnival space dialogically for us, we are now in a heteroglot space of the dialogic, and he also sets us in a metaphoric space. Following on from this in *Art and Answerability*, (Bakhtin, 1990) Bakhtin opens up the body as inward and outward in terms of the other, and in terms of expressedness. In a sense, we are

crossing boundaries all the time and of course boundary space preoccupies the carnivalesque. In Sartre's comment he refuses to place us either in the world or in the psyche — at least as 'givens'. So precisely what strange space are we occupying in carnival?

Counter Space

Undoubtedly carnival space represents a counter space and has to be apprehended in this sense. But is space homogeneous? Is it homogeneous or heterogeneous and fragmented? Certainly it would appear that in the case of the unconscious and the conscious the mental space does not seem identical. With the unconscious 'prone' to fragmentation and the conscious 'unified'. So that we may locate ourselves more clearly we find '[space] is reinforced not only by administrative subdivision, not only by scientific and technical specialization, but also — indeed most of all — by the retail selling of space' (Lefebvre, 1991: 355).

We shall follow Lefebvre a little further. He tells us:

Under its homogeneous aspect, space abolishes distinctions and differences, among them that between inside and outside... (Ibid.)

In these comments by Lefebvre, we see I think the problems of homogeneous and heterogeneous concepts of space, but like heteroglossia and monoglossia they do operate simultaneously. For the present, however, we merely note the question of space, especially in its carnival setting. We have still to answer the question of Freud in the public square. I think, at least as far as this dissertation is concerned,

two figures pushed open the old-oak rusted doors of Renaissance Carnival: Bakhtin who took us back to the robust imagery of Rabelais, and Freud who ‘released’ the instincts endlessly repressed since the Renaissance. Bakhtin knew that he could not push such heavy doors open single-handedly and he enlisted the assistance of Freud to interpret the images, at least *unofficially*.

Lord of Misrule

Finally in this chapter, we must mention the *Lord of Misrule* — the carnival king. If *repression* and *resistance* and *displacement* are all part of the carnival imagery, then what of the crowning *and* uncrowning of the Carnival king? The carnival king is a cultural and artistic equivalent of the Freudian *ego*. The earlier mentioned *language of the marketplace* included *praise* and *abuse* and it also included the *thrashing* of the king. In carnival, according to our hypothesis, the carnival king is the conscious and unconscious ‘form’ of the ego. The unified monoglot voices are represented by the king, and the carnival folk represent the interpenetrating voices of heteroglossia and the stratifying forces involved in this.

However, as we shall see, the ego is from the first a *méconnaissance* and the rivalry and jealousy associated with this primary identification are reflected or refracted in a quite concrete sense within the Renaissance conceptualization of carnival. We shall in our next chapter continue our discussion of the Freudian *ego*. Finally, in this chapter we leave the last word with Freud. If in carnival we have cross-dressing and upside-down and back-to-front and the clown and joker

and all those carnival figures that exceed the boundaries of the body and the word, they are in fact all represented in the bourgeois parlour of Freud with his method of *free association*.

CHAPTER FOUR

REFLECTIONS ON LACAN: THE MIRROR AND THE PRISM

Introduction — the consulting room

If, in carnival, we discovered the systems of images, and the devices that created the crowning/uncrowning ceremonies of mock kings and queens, then we have found the mimes, masks, mummers' plays and rituals and ceremonies of antiquity. In carnival, we discovered a highly complex system of imagery, which is weaved with all the intricacy of girls' plaited coloured ribbons around the maypole. It is a totally collective experience and does not harbour separation anywhere in its organic form. It has no *footlights* separating the spectator from the performer; all the forms are fused together in the spectacle.

By attempting to unleash the forces of the unconscious discovered by Freud, and simultaneously opening the floodgates of the Bakhtinian contrapuntal forces in language, we create a maelstrom of activity, which is not easy to assimilate nor control. We need, however, to ask ourselves a certain question. Why have we attempted to release these forces, to what purpose, and how does it affect our lives? It is in the *psychoanalytic session* (the 'bourgeois parlour') that the interplay of all the forces previously discussed comes into play, where the forces of the unconscious collide with the Bakhtinian philosophy of language. If we focus upon the consulting room dialectic, then the fusion of the psychoanalytic plane and the interpenetration of the speech plane become paramount. By this point, we see that the 'reality' of both psychoanalysis and the unconscious on one

hand, and linguistics and literature/literary theory on the other hand, are being pushed closer together into the 'bourgeois parlour'. There is no longer, hopefully as the result of our efforts, the 'spatial' difference that occurred in the first chapter.

In a pincer movement operated by psychoanalysis and linguistic theory, they catch, take hold and embrace in the heady atmosphere of the psychoanalytic session at last. If the route seems circuitous, it is because all the generalized parameters need to be in place to reach the *psychoanalytic session* and our discussion of fragmented speech. Both psychoanalysis and linguistic theory embrace in this space, because the only tool of psychoanalysis *is* speech and its background agency, silence. In this chapter, we introduce the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, allowing us to interpret the discovery of *fragmented speech* in the unconscious.

In the case of Lacan a cursory interpretation will never suffice. In Lacan's work too, the problem of the 'second consciousness' is raised. The 'other' in Lacan is not a directly exchangeable coin of currency with the 'other' of Bakhtin. In fact, we may say that the coin of currency of the 'other' in Lacan is not itself a single coin, but is exchanged and chinks in a variety of ways. We have to mint a new coin of the 'other' for an understanding of Lacan. Primarily, in his work we have to contend with the other and the Other.

I think it is important to understand that Lacan's Other is deliberately *ambiguous* and *ambivalent*, it shifts in meaning. That is why it is a space of the Other, it is also *the* Other, it is language as the Other (Symbolic) and it is the Other of the unconscious. It is this dance of significations that is deliberately provoked and choreographed for us by Lacan. If, in Bakhtin, the 'drive' is not just monologicistic or dialogistic but the interrelationship between both, then in Lacan, it is not just the other and the Other but their interrelationship in the analytic session that provides the 'drive'. Hopefully, this briefest description of the other and the Other as *interrelationships* in Lacan's work, will suffice for the present and provide at least a small example of how Lacan's coins of currency ring out against each other. Lacan thus provides us with an interrelationship of the other and the Other — a 'second consciousness'.

Bakhtin and Lacan

I think the essential question posed for Bakhtin's work, is not only its interconnection with Freudian psychoanalysis but also its link with Lacanian psychoanalysis. Notwithstanding the undoubted parallelism between aspects of ethics in Bakhtin and Lacan, a preoccupation with the 'other', in terms of dialogic activity, vitally links the work of both men. Even as a first instance, this is the case. For example, we think of a comment by Hirschkop that provides initial momentum:

When we first meet this concept [‘dialogism’] in Bakhtin’s work it describes a certain relation between distinct ‘voices’ in a narrative text ... (Hirschkop, 1989: 3).

There is an interesting relationship of intersubjectivity between the other (Other) in Lacan and the dialogization of the other in Bakhtin. Taking up one further thread of Hirschkop, we find the following:

That Bakhtin should be compelled to describe dialogism in terms of encounter and making present the other is no accident ... (Hirschkop, 1998: 186)

This steady build up of a picture of the other in Bakhtin is juxtaposed remarkably with the other (Other) in Lacan. Hirschkop goes even further when he says:

Of course, even to mention that ugly word [*gesellschaft*] is to set people on edge, to seem to prescribe an endless diet of linguistic alienation and homelessness. (Hirschkop, 1998: 194).

This alienation and homelessness casts us into the very heart of Lacan’s project. Once more in Hirschkop, we find: ‘one cannot speak without getting into an argument’ (Hirschkop, 1998: 186). Have we not already seen Lacan say variously that the very basis of communication is misunderstanding?

In our process thus far, we have only gradually drawn psychoanalysis and literary theory into the same social space, the psychoanalytic session. It is here that we

investigate aspects of Lacan's work and his assessment of the other/Other in the distinct dialogic space of the psychoanalytic session. Why should we say that there is no *direct* parallel of the other in Bakhtin on one hand and Lacan on the other hand? The answer to this nests in the fact that Lacan *directly* accepted the unconscious and the right to interpret it.

If one is prepared to accept the existence of the unconscious, and this is certainly true of the Freudian unconscious, then one is placed in the position of analysing at least elements of its *content* and *form*. Unless one is prepared to ignore it altogether, not unfortunately unknown today even in psychoanalysis, then one must be prepared to make some observations on its probable form and content. That is unless of course one is able to formulate a discourse that endlessly exposes the unconscious in discourse anyway, or discourse in the unconscious. At any rate, it is the assessment of some probable elements of its form and content that makes up this chapter.

So, we have drawn this narrative into a narrower, smaller, and more intense social space, known as the psychoanalytic session. The Bakhtinian philosophy of language and psychoanalysis becomes condensed into the steamy and sultry hothouse atmospheric of the consulting room dialectic, with the 'gaze' of the analyst and the couch of symptoms. This is the place where the two domains of psychoanalysis and linguistic theory finally meet — and so too the *analyst* and the *analysand*.

Hunting with Lacan

But what, where, and whom is the subject in this smaller intense social space? Having installed, in true Bakhtinian style, an intense 'ideological' purview, a shared scene and a mutually contextualized space, we can now pinpoint elements of a Lacanian discourse in the psychoanalytic session. To hunt with the falconer Lacan, is to chase 'an other' quarry. The Lacanian hawk, stoops to its prey but is schooled with a different lure, is tempted with another bait. Lacan poses the problem of *desire* and the shifting field of the *other*. In him we see for the first time, effectively, the marriage of literature/linguistics and psychoanalysis.

No one, as far as we know, has drawn literature and literary theory into the psychoanalytic field with the same intensity as Lacan, except Freud. The problems inherent in any convergence of the two are expressed more fully in his work than anywhere else. Freud could not take advantage of the linguistics of the Soviets nor the Swiss. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to argue that much of Freud's work seems to intuite certain developments in linguistics. Is not Freud's technique of *free association* an attempt to locate *unconscious dialogism* through the holes left in the conscious dialogue? Anyway, it is certainly possible to argue that he discovered an unconscious discourse that interfered with the intentions of consciousness.

In his *style*, Lacan refracts psychoanalytic 'light' at differing angles. The optic of his images reflects and refracts a series of angled mirrors that shimmer with this

different light, because of his linguistic intensity in a psychoanalytic field. So it is that we discover in Lacan his predisposition toward the concept of the image and the social milieu. How then do we approach the myriad beams of interaction and intensity in the work of the psychoanalyst, Lacan?

In Lacan's the '*Mirror Stage*' paper it is all too easy to hurry forward. The formulation of his concept lends itself to hurrying forward. And it is as well to content oneself, at least at this stage, with a couple of pages only. Also of course we do not wish to be accused in a similar fashion to Freud. He was frequently charged — and is to this day — with the accusation that he asserted that *resistance* to his ideas proves their validity and the only other alternative is acceptance of them. In fact of course this was never true, Freud, however, was aware of the charge and responded to it. In our analysis of Lacan's *Mirror Stage* we do not wish to be accused similarly. Anyway, it is all too easy to pass over the *Mirror Stage* far too quickly.

No Innocent Space

So even before we start we may ask, is Lacan's mirror itself a metaphorical device *in the first instance*? In other words, does Lacan offer a chimera early, prior to the introduction of his ideas? The metaphor would be surrounded by *innenwelt* and *umwelt* reflections, illusions and *méconnaissance*. Also the mirror teases the verification of the unconscious in a symbolic form. The reflection must

accept the conscious and unconscious duality as first outlined by Freud, at least in terms of psychoanalysis.

So it is not the Mirror Stage as a concept that has a metaphorical form, rather the mirror. The chimera involves firstly an assumed *identification* as a first term and *signification* as a second term. It is suggested also that we do not ‘spring without the slightest hesitation from mental to social’ in terms of space. We also do not wish to incorporate ‘a *mental space* which is apparently, but only apparently, extra-ideological’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 6) and of course this seemingly applies to physical space. So it is that we must be careful with the conceptualization of space, as we saw in the last chapter on carnival; it may be seen in terms of *homogeneity* and *heterogeneity*. We have already posited the idea of unified and fragmented space. We must remember, however, that according to Lacan our first reflection in the mirror appears hardly to have been a success. So the first step is to stand back from the mirror and deflect its reflection. Returning to our earlier remarks concerning Freud, it is only with the entirety of Freud’s *oeuvre* that we now position ourselves in relationship to a mirror.

Humphrey Bogart and Identification

Once we begin to speak of *identification* in terms of the mirror, we have already marshalled Freud’s *oeuvre* in advance. Hence, Lacan’s advice to *Return to Freud*, presumably before you even pass this point. In the light of Freud’s theories the mirror poses a problem. Precisely what is the image that is mirrored?

Precisely what is the space that it mirrors? So, as we say, before we confront the mirror we nominate its metaphorical or metonymic or symbolic role. What do we mean by this? If the mirror is viewed metaphorically it replaces an image with another image, if metonymically it juxtaposes images. It *transfers* the image into an ‘other’. We may think here of the film *To Have and Have Not* (Director, Howard Hawks, 1944). From an original story by Ernest Hemingway but part screenplayed by the Nobel prize winner William Faulkner, the hero has two names — without explanation. The actor Walter Brennan calls Humphrey Bogart ‘Harry’ and Lauren Bacall calls him ‘Steve’. Presumably his *identity* slips away in the interstice.

Unfortunately, any psychoanalyst cannot afford the luxury of dealing solely with the *rational*; they must also contend with the *irrational* as a factor and reality of the psyche. So is the mirror a contradiction? Is it a carnivalistic counter-image? Does the mirror in fact shatter into shards under the impact of Lacan’s thought? One further consideration is *representation*, what does the mirror represent? What does the mirror reflect in terms of the unconscious? We do not arrive at the mirror this time unarmed, thanks to Lacan.

So it is suggested that before we even arrive at the mirror we must take cognizance of: (i) *identification*; and (ii) *signification* in terms of the psychoanalytic process. Also the mirror despite its significance is still an object. There is no subject-to-subject correspondence of course. It is an object (as object)

and an objective of the dialogic. We repeat, we should not arrive innocently at a mirror twice. However, it is surely the play of significations that *fascinates*. Fascination with the image introduces us to the Lacanian mirror. Before we proceed we need to look perhaps at a few more comments. For example, if we are not in charge in our own house, if there is no unitary image of ourselves (in terms of conscious and unconscious forces) or unitary image of ourselves on an external plane, who precisely is the stranger in the mirror?

With these few comments we have attempted to introduce the Lacanian mirror as a concept and not, up until this point, the *Lacanian Mirror Stage* as experience. Now we glimpse the Mirror Stage concept presented for us by Lacan. In and with Lacan's Mirror Stage paper we draw together all the previous implications of our work thus far. Here we shall discover the relevance of centripetal and centrifugal forces in language: of monoglossia and heteroglossia, of the *image of the body* and the *image of the word*; the forces of consciousness and the forces of the unconscious. So, what precisely happens in the Mirror Stage paper? Let us check a comment that helps in the initial stages:

Lacan's principal thesis is that the newly born human infant, initially sunk in motor incapacity, turbulent movements, and fragmentation, first experiences itself as a unity through experiencing some kind of reflection of itself, the paradigm for which would be self-reflection in a mirror (Muller and Richardson, 1982: 29).

Lacan gives us to understand that this initial experience of the fragmented body is due to the ‘*specific prematurity of birth in man*’ (Lacan, 1977: 4). We now check another Lacanian comment that describes for us the experience of the child at the mirror stage:

This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the *infans* stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the *I* is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other.... The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power, is given to him only as *Gestalt*, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting size (*un relief stature*) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him. (Lacan, 1977[1966]: 2).

The next point is crucial, Lacan remarks:

This fragmented body — which term I have also introduced into our system of theoretical references — usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking arms for intestinal persecutions — the very same that the visionary Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, for all time, in painting, in their ascent from the fifteenth century to imaginary zenith of modern man. (Lacan, 1977: 4-5).

So from this we see that the *fragmented body-image* is held, as a 'value' in the unconscious. The image of the 'whole body' is held by the *conscious*, and the image of the fragmented body is held by the *unconscious*. However, in our hypothesis the image of the fragmented body is *tied* to the image of the fragmented word, hence it is a *speech complex*. Before we analyse the nature of the fragmented word we *also* assume that the 'whole word-image' is held by consciousness, like that of the body image, and that it too represses a fragmented image in order to 'unify' the ego. As Lacan says, however, the ego is a *méconnaissance* by the subject in the first place.

The 'whole body-image' in terms of speech has more in common with monoglossia and is therefore tied to the ego; and the 'fragmented body-image' in terms of speech is, in effect, tied to the unconscious and has more in common with heteroglossia. The whole word-image *is* monoglossia in the conscious, and the fragmented word-image *is* heteroglossia *in the field of the unconscious*. We know that monoglossia and heteroglossia are both situated in consciousness, but speech in its fragmented aspect would have to be nominated within the register of heteroglossia in the unconscious. Monoglossia and heteroglossia may both be interpreted in terms of psychoanalysis, as we shall see. Just as we know that speech in its unified aspect would have to be nominated to consciousness and monoglossia, at least in terms of an ego position. However, we would state that *monoglossia* and *heteroglossia* do have a role in the formation of the *body-image* and the *word-image*. So how do we come upon the fragmented image of speech?

Fragmented Speech

At the present level of our enquiries we have assumed that *fragmented speech* is connected to the image of the *fragmented body*, in the first instance, in the infant, we must add to this the ‘image’ of fragmented drives, however, this is not a dominant of our discursive field at present. The image of speech is probably built-up by a *series* of images, at first inchoate, in much the same way as the body image is built up, with the capability for construction or destruction. In a similar way, the word has an ‘image’ of itself, an historical apperception that builds up internally (within itself) and externally (in the world of the other). It appears to us that the word has a relationship to itself — inner dynamic — and an exterior relationship — external dynamic and, so Bakhtin tells us, memory.

The word also has an *inward* relationship to the Subject and an *outward* relationship as it crosses the threshold from the inner to the outer world. There is a connection between the image of the body and the image of speech, which it is hard to ignore. However, our case does not rest upon this assumption, although it is an interesting point to note. As the image of the fragmented body is replaced by the image of the ‘whole body’, the gestalt, at the Mirror Stage, so the image of the fragmented word is replaced by the image of the ‘whole word’, i.e., the ‘gestalt’ of the word. The image of ‘wholeness’ is now held in consciousness, and the image of fragmentation repressed into the unconscious. The fragmented body image and fragmented speech are *tied* to each other as image and accrue as a

‘value’ in the unconscious, fragmented speech has far more in common with spectral dispersion than unity.

Lacan tells us that the *event* of the mirror stage takes place from the age of six months. Continuing, Lacan says: ‘unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up...’ the child ‘... overcomes in a flutter of jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image’ (Lacan, 1977:1-2). It seems to us that these observations are *generally* observable if a child is confronted with a mirror. It certainly does not need, in any general sense, quantifiable evidence of the phenomenon one would have thought. Lacan’s ‘flutter of jubilant activity’ is quite easily observed. However, before moving any further we must recognize the concept of *aggressivity* and *alienation* that Lacan detected also. Lacan tells us:

We have only to understand the mirror stage *as an identification*, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image. (Lacan, 1977: 2)

Lacan again:

This form would have to be called the Ideal-I if we wished to incorporate it into our usual register, in the sense that it will also be the source of secondary identifications, under which term I would place the functions of libidinal normalization. But the important point is that this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will

always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being (*le devenir*) of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as *I* his discordance with his own reality. (Lacan, 1977: 2).

We have already discovered that the mirror stage, as experience, reflects initially a total unity replacing fragmentation. But we now discover, crucially, that the primary identification becomes an idealized model, and all subsequent secondary identifications are based upon this assumption. However, the form of this assumption, just prior to identification, is ‘other’, external to the subject, and consequently is experienced as alienation. This leads to ‘the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’ (Lacan, 1977:4). Aggressivity and alienation are now enclosed in the ego, and we shall have to bear this constantly in mind.

Fragmented Body Image

In the light of our previous comments we need to reflect differently and peer, as it were, deeper into the mirror. The child perceiving itself in the mirror still lacks co-ordination of movement; however, it comprehends the visual image, at some point, as a unitary image of wholeness. This of course belies the uncoordinated and fragmentary nature of the child’s movements. The initial jubilation of the child absorbing the image of wholeness is in fact *premature*, because the

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fragmented body-image lags behind the unitary image perceived in the mirror. The ego is formed at this point.

The child perceives the image as jubilatory on one hand but also identifies the image as the *other* and this relationship is one of alienation. As the child absorbs in a jubilatory fashion the unity of its person (we leave aside for the moment any ‘Other’ comment or reflected image) reflected in the specular image, the alienation between the reflected specular image and the subject is manifest. The child now has an imaginary relationship with its specular image. So there now exists a libidinal relationship with the body image.

Identification

So it is that the ego is constructed by *identification* with the specular image at the Mirror Stage, setting up also the relationship of alienation with the ‘Ideal’ mirror image. The child is now in the perilous position of alienation with its own image as *other*. This results in an aggressive tension between the subject and the image. The child, to resolve the aggressive tension, *identifies* with the image. This is the earlier mentioned *primary identification*. As we now see the mirror stage has become a *mise en scene*, a site of alienation for the subject — from himself.

The child has also identified the other as rival. We find Lacan’s *aggressivity* situated in the dual relation existing between the ego and its counterpart (see Lacan, 1977: 8-29). Now, however, the wholeness of the unitary image threatens

the body with the previous condition of uncoordinated movements, dismemberment and fragmentation. So the child identifies with the apparently unitary specular image, and ejects the previous condition of the fragmented and uncoordinated into the unconscious.

As Bakhtin said on numerous occasions, only Adam received language *unannointed* (and we might add) with the discourse and inflection of the other. We may, however, liken the process of *aggressivity* in Lacan, formed at the Mirror Stage experience, to the hostile brothers Cain and Abel. As soon as language was handed down from Adam and Eve, as holders of the original utterance — to Cain and Abel — the first murder took place. Perhaps the mirror was only discovered by the second generation? The hostile brothers are the metaphor for the image *perceived* and image *received* — *aggressivity* at the point of the formation of the ego.

In several places we left out the Other holding the child in front of the mirror and the reflected environment seen by the child. The reason for this is that the social 'I' and the role of the Other in the first instance of the Mirror Stage need to be cautiously interpreted.

Image of Language as System

We consider that Lacan is quite correct in his assessment in the Mirror Stage paper, with the exception that *fragmented speech* is tied to the *fragmented body* as

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image. Now it follows that the fragmented nature of the *word* and *language as system* accompanying all the previously mentioned fragmented and dismembered considerations, is held somewhere as a fragmented image along with the fragmented body image that returns in the psychoanalytic session. The small cluster of fragmented word images and the assumption of *language as system* image arrive at the mirror simultaneously (this simultaneity is not vital, at this stage it is the principle of the repression of both that is crucial) with the image of the fragmented body. The visual image snaps shut the unitary ego with its *assumption* of unity.

Hence, the *assumption* of the unity of the specular image draws the word into the illusion, and the specular image is a *méconnaissance*. The fragmented body-image is held in the unconscious to become the *return of the repressed*, so too the fragmented word-image is held in the unconscious. We now look at two further comments by Lacan that describe elements of the fragmented body:

One only has to listen to children aged between two and five playing, alone or together, to know that the pulling off of the head and ripping open of the belly are themes that occur spontaneously to their imagination, and that this is corroborated by the experience of the doll torn to pieces.

Also:

We must turn to the works of Hieronymus Bosch for an atlas of all the aggressive images that torment mankind. (Lacan, 1977: 11)

Lacan may as well have added *Gargantua and Pantragrue* by Rabelais, however, in far more carnivalesque *merry time* (Bakhtin, 1984a). Hopefully, by this point, we have built up a reasonable image of the *fragmented body*. The image of fragmented speech has been repressed along with the image of the fragmented body and they both now take up residence in the unconscious. Conversely, the statuesque ego ‘the stone guest’ now holds the keys of unity of the body and the word. The keys of fragmentation have been discarded, thrown into the dungeon of the unconscious. This is the situation that prevails at the Mirror Stage as experience.

Return of the Repressed — Carnival Images

We can now, with profit, remember of course the earlier mentioned *carnival* images in connection with the Lacanian concept of the *fragmented body* and its connection with the *lower material bodily stratum* and the *Grotesque Body*. In connection with this, we may refer to two relevant studies in: *Bakhtin Carnival and Other Subjects* (Ed. by David Shepherd). The first of these is *The Ethics of Subject Creation in Bakhtin and Lacan* (Handley, 1993). Obviously, as the title suggests, Handley deals primarily with the ethical positions of both Bakhtin and Lacan, in relation to subject creation. This does not immediately concern us in the direct way that it is developed by Handley. However, Handley’s study is extremely informative and is a necessary addition to the current discussion. As an example of this we have:

Lacanian analysis, for all its theoretical applications, is first and finally such an event [open event of the lived life], an active dialogue or process between the analyst and the analysand, like that between the author and hero. (Handley, 1993: 145).

If this is correct, then we could argue that Lacan has developed the possibilities inherent in author and hero relationships that are present neither in Rank nor Freud. This would appear to be in part due to his *other* and *Other* interrelationships. At any rate, we may see a useful connection made by Handley, linking the analyst and analysand with the author and hero, and he develops his argument accordingly. From our point of view, this connection seems extremely useful for future research. However, we would suggest that Handley does not quite develop enough connections to be drawn from Lacan's mirror stage. Although he discusses the fact that there is 'no internal sovereign territory' (Handley, 1993: 150) according to Bakhtin, he moves a little too quickly in his assessments. For example, we consider that the implications of Lacan's Symbolic Order are developed too quickly, too soon, whereas we have tried to halt perception at an earlier point.

The second study to which we refer is *Unachievable Monologism and the Production of the Monster* (Hall, 1993). Hall too develops Lacan's Mirror Stage in terms of a Bakhtinian analysis. Hall has this to say:

The Lacanian mirror phase is helpful here, since the idealising perception of the body unified by the 'je ideal' corresponds almost exactly to the Classical

monologism which Bakhtin's narrative locates as triumphant over the collective 'grotesque body' (Hall, 1993: 104).

Although we have not moved very far with the Lacanian concept of 'je ideal' we must agree with Hall when he says '... correspond[s] almost exactly to the Classical monologism which Bakhtin's narrative locates as triumphant over the collective "grotesque body" ' (Hall, 1993: 104). We see here the connection between monologism and the grotesque body. The connection, however, that we wish to develop is the idea that the fragmented body *and* the fragmented word are linked with the conception of the grotesque body and the grotesque *language of the marketplace*. Hall is not quite correct when he makes the following comment:

The infant's pleasurable identification with this idealised and idealising image of the self might as well be said to correspond dialectically to the uncontrolled dispersive drives and non-individuation, now left behind but 'obscurely remembered' as a terror overcome. (Hall, 1993: 104).

To take the last point first, it is certainly far from being the case that it is a 'terror overcome', as hopefully we shall see in the rest of the dissertation.

Anxiety

In fact, we wish to argue that *terrible anxiety* accompanies the repressed images of the fragmented body and fragmented speech. Also, the 'infant's pleasure' is of course tainted in Lacan by aggressivity (Lacan, 1977: 8-29), when the child finds in the specular image along with jubilation, alienation. However, the point we

wish to make is that Hall's phrase 'obscurely remembered' is not, at least for our purposes, quite correct and the 'uncontrolled dispersive drives' and 'non-individuation' (Hall, 1993: 104) are actually repressed into the unconscious. We have no wish to be pedantic but 'obscurely remembered' is not accurate enough.

Having now looked at these two studies briefly, let us return to our theme. We have seen that there is a fragmented body, as image, held in the unconscious. As we know the image of the fragmented body exists in Carnival — the image of dismemberment (grotesque body). And, as we have also seen, the grotesque body is accompanied by the grotesque word (language of the marketplace) in Carnival. Returning, however, to the Mirror Stage experience, it becomes clear in Lacan that the relationship of the subject to the specular image is filtered through a prism of inversion; there is consequently a distortion of the ego's perception of reality, leading to a *méconnaissance* that structures the ego.

This leads to a *misrecognition* by the child itself, of itself, and of others and the associated spaces. As we said earlier, however, we must hold steady in this mental space at present, we must neither move too quickly into the social space, nor into physical assumptions of space. Neither must we move too quickly into the space of the *other/Other* described for us by Lacan. Unfortunately, it seems we must hold the image of the unitary mirror and the fragmented mirror simultaneously as image(s). Now, however, we theorize on a separate path from Lacan's work on the *fragmented body*. The fragmented body is rejected or

ejected by the developing ego (*méconnaissance*) and consciousness at the Mirror Stage. The subject, perceiving the illusory premature unity of the body image, assumes the spurious unity of the ego.

Imaginary

It is an imaginary unity for, because of *prematurity at birth*, the infant appears to be in a hurry to constitute and consolidate its own image; so the child fortifies the castle of the ego with armour-like defences, in its rush to evade the ramifications inherent in its earlier motor incapacity, nursling dependence and fragmented body. Now, as the fragmented and dismembered are discarded in favour of the unitary ego, they are now to be found in the unconscious. And, according to both Freud and Lacan, we will always experience, at some stage, the return of the repressed. To this point Lacan has taken us. It is here that we recall the crowning and uncrowning of the carnival king. The ego is not only uncrowned but also *beaten* in carnival. There is a carnival image of the crowned and uncrowned ego and the ego is displaced through the recognition, in carnival, of the *méconnaissance*, hence the *uncrowning* through laughter.

However, what we wish to suggest here, is that the image of the *fragmented body* that is driven into the unconscious, is accompanied by the *fragmented word*. The thing that must constantly be borne in mind in all of this, is the fact that, for Lacan, the ego unity is a *méconnaissance*, in other words it is a fiction. But outside of this spurious ego construction there is still a field of fragmentation and

dismemberment. And this field of the fragmented and dismembered has an image in language itself. Not, however, until Bakhtin does it become possible to visualize this. This is because language is generally assumed to seek (as with the ego) unity of the image. However, as we have seen, Bakhtin has left us with an alternative to monologism, to monoglossia, and that is *heteroglossia*. Armed by Bakhtin with this information, allows us to identify the unity of the ego (*méconnaissance*) within the field of monoglossia in Bakhtin's theory of the centripetal and centrifugal forces operative in language.

We have now discovered the discarded sibling of the unified ego, the fragmented and dismembered, taking up residence in the field of the unconscious. Following its exclusion from the field of the unitary ego, it is now in the centrifugal force field of dispersal. The *fragmented body*, of which Lacan speaks, is now accompanied by the image of *fragmented speech*. As the unity of the ego is a *méconnaissance* in Lacan, I suggest there is a similar *méconnaissance* of the image of speech as a unity also; and this will have far-reaching implications.

Register of fragmented and dismembered

The ego resides in the unitary image of language known by Bakhtin as monoglossia and the fragmented and dismembered resides in the field known as heteroglossia. These images of fragmentation nest in the *fields* of heteroglossia, or in the case of assumed unity, monoglossia, but they are not monoglossia or heteroglossia *per se*. In the case of Lacan, we must note that he deals in the psychoanalytic session with the problem of the fragmented body, but he does not deal with the problem of the *speech complex*, which is the tie between the inner body (including images of the organs) and outer body in terms of fragmentation and dismemberment, and the possibility of the fragmentation of speech. But, and this is where Bakhtin comes in, the image of the fragmented body and fragmented word as a *speech complex*, can only be formulated in terms of Bakhtin's monoglossia and heteroglossia. We are not speaking here of symptoms that involve brain lesions, we are speaking of a *speech complex* derived from psychoanalytic and linguistic theory.

The child initially has a fragmented body-image and just as surely has a fragmented speech-image. Driven by the premature need to unify the ego, the fragmented body image is repressed into the unconscious and so is the fragmented image of speech. As the ego spuriously unites the image of the fragmented body, it drives the image into the unconscious by which it is haunted, creating the possibility of its return as the *return of the repressed*. In the case of the fragmented image of speech, the child assumes the unity of the image of speech

(monoglossia), thereby driving the fragmented and dismembered image of speech into the unconscious also, and under certain circumstances this too becomes the *return of the repressed*.

In the case of a unitary image, of speech or the body, this creates a *premature* state of unity in consciousness. Speech now crystallizes as a monologic field in support of the ego and monoglossia is now the image of speech, held by consciousness and the ego. In the unconscious the fragmented body-image (which according to Lacan still exists, and returns during psychoanalysis) and the fragmented word-image, create a heterogeneous state of the image of the body and speech in the unconscious. So it is that the fragmented image of speech is a heteroglot force in the unconscious.

Surface of Language

Not until Bakhtin is the surface of language drawn back for long enough to reveal heteroglossia; previously a monologic world is assumed. Now we see that fragmentation is reflected and refracted through the prism of language as well as the image of the fragmented body. So the *speech complex* is an inchoate image of the body and the word *tied* to each other in the *unconscious*. Meanwhile, consciousness, it is assumed, holds all the cards of unity. All that is fragmented and dismembered has been despatched to the unconscious. However, if Lacan is correct and the fragmented body (now including the fragmented image of speech)

returns from the unconscious during the analytic process then it obviously has remained active in the unconscious.

Fragmented Body and Word — Return of the Repressed

It is easier to pause momentarily and reflect upon the implications of these ideas. For example, Lacan did not identify the possibility of a fragmented and dismembered image of speech as also being repressed into the unconscious. He did, however, identify the fragmented body and its implications for psychoanalysis, and he certainly visualized its presence in the unconscious. But if we are correct and the fragmented image of speech is repressed at the same time as the image of the fragmented body, then we must demonstrate, as Lacan did, that in this case too there will be the return of the repressed. The approximate timing of the repression of the fragmented image of the body, and the timing of the repression of the fragmented image of speech requires more research but at the moment would impede progress. For the moment, we assume the simultaneity of ejection from the ego of the image of the fragmented body and fragmented speech.

So it is that we understand the fragmented image of speech, with all its inchoate impulses, devoid of the unifying presence of the ego, it sinks under the surface of consciousness to take up residence in the unconscious. This, however, would have had to be the end of the matter, but Bakhtin discovered a force field in language, which he named *heteroglossia*. It is often assumed that everyone works

toward a unified vision of language, but heteroglossia is an *other* force field, perhaps in many ways still to be discovered. It is into the forcefield of heteroglossia that the *voices* of the fragmented and dismembered disappear into the unconscious. And it is in the field of heteroglossia that they must indeed become the *return of the repressed*. They cannot re-group around any notion of monoglossia because the ego has already repulsed them, so they must return in the form of heteroglossia. This would appear to be the psychoanalytic aspect of heteroglossia.

Heteroglossia and the Unconscious

Desire cannot have language at its disposal until we understand what happened to the inchoate images of language. We could not understand any of these possibilities anyway, until the Bakhtinian concept of heteroglossia had arrived. Of course, as Bakhtin did not specifically deal with heteroglossia in the unconscious, or monoglossia for that matter, certain difficulties arise, but certainly not any problems that we have failed to encounter before. Nevertheless, we attempt to deal further with this concept now. If Bakhtin is right and monoglossia and heteroglossia exist as forces within language, and if Lacan is correct and the unconscious is structured like a language, then we are confronted with an immediate dilemma. It is likely that monologic and heterogeneous forces exist in both consciousness and the unconscious.

The monologic obviously veers towards consciousness, with its unitary ego, leading the battalion of the conscious forces. Of course this does not indicate that heterogeneity does not operate in consciousness as we have already seen, in fact, it does. However, heteroglossia would seem to be indicative of the nature of the unconscious. In other words there are a multiplicity of voices in the unconscious. Nevertheless, in dreams the monologic, or at least the ego, would seem to have its representative also. As Lacan himself says:

Correlatively, the formation of the *I* is symbolized in dreams by a fortress or stadium — its inner arena and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish tips, dividing it into two opposed fields of contest where the subject flounders in quest of the lofty, remote inner castle whose form (sometimes juxtaposed in the same scenario) symbolizes the id in a startling way. Similarly, on the mental plane, we find realized the structures of fortified works, the metaphor of which arises spontaneously, as if issuing from the symptoms themselves, to designate the mechanisms of obsessional neurosis — inversion, isolation, reduplication, cancellation and displacement. (Lacan, 1977:5).

It would surely appear from this, that the *image* of the unified ego is also in the unconscious field? Although care has to be taken with this, because it is possible to shatter into a multiplicity of images and characters in dreams and even turn into another person or people. All this allows us to realise a crossover of the two forces, from one field to another.

Whether or not there is the possibility of *enantiodromia* in this process and to what effect is difficult to say at this stage. In terms of the image of language, it seems to exist as monoglossia and heteroglossia in both consciousness and the unconscious but with a distinct *bias* in both cases. To sum up at this point, we could say that the unconscious holds the image(s) of heteroglossia dearer to itself. Likewise, consciousness tends to hold the image of monoglossia sacrosanct. Perhaps we could extrapolate from this that the *unconscious* tends to drive consciousness toward a multiplicity of voices (heteroglossia) and consciousness attempts, through monoglossia, to hold in check the multiplicity of voices emerging from the unconscious. By this principle, discovered by Bakhtin, we are able to locate both of these forces of language in the conscious and unconscious discovered by Freud.

Field Theory

At the moment we lack a field theory for the fragmented and dismembered, but slowly it becomes possible to build a picture. We have seen that the unitary and centripetalizing nature of monoglossia in language also extends to the *méconnaissance* of the ego detected by Lacan. But Bakhtin has taught us that the assumption of homogeneity in language is not correct. This fact allows us to expand our horizons into the multiple world of heteroglossia. Hopefully, it becomes clear at this point that we are attempting to provide a dialogized background for the fragmented and dismembered. It begins to occur to us that the systematicalness that Bakhtin so correctly rejected, in fact stood in the way of any

effective assessment of the value and buried treasure of the fragmented and dismembered. This may remind us likewise of Michael Holquist's comment in *The Dialogic Imagination*:

Bakhtin is constantly working with what is emerging as the central preoccupation of our time — language. But unlike others who have made substantial contributions to our understanding of language in the twentieth century — Saussure, Hjelmslev, Benveniste and, above all, Roman Jakobson (all of whom are systematic to an extraordinary degree) — Bakhtin is not (Holquist, 1981: *xvii-iii*).

And a further comment from Holquist is:

... Bakhtin, need it be said, is not working in this dichotomy of forces with the kind of binary opposition that has proved so important in structuralist linguistics (and so seductive to social scientists and humanists lusting for a greater degree of systematicalness). That opposition leads from human speech to computer language; it conduces, in other words, to machines. Bakhtin's sense of a duel between more widely implicated forces leads in the opposite direction and stresses the fragility and ineluctably historical nature of language, the coming and dying of meaning that it, as a phenomenon, shares with that other phenomenon it ventriloquates, man. (Holquist, 1981: *xviii*).

It is surely in this world that we must build a body-image and word-image 'united' as a *speech complex*. It is in this sense that we have posited the background of *Carnival*. That is why we outlined the form of carnival so

distinctly in the previous chapter on *Carnival*. It holds a cultural and artistic key to the background of the fragmented, through the complex *system of images* known as Renaissance *Carnival*. It lends itself, if only as a background, to the dialogic terrain of the psychoanalytic session, to the *fragmented body*, and *fragmented speech*.

Hopefully this clarifies the need for Bakhtin's vision in the preceding chapter on carnival. Again it is necessary to take full cognizance of the facts in carnival, stressing the fragmented, the dismembered, along with the displaced. But now we take up a *snag* deliberately left by Lacan when the image of the fragmented body was discovered. This is the psychoanalytic discovery by Lacan, of the *aggressivity* that accompanies, or seems to accompany, the fragmented and dismembered; fled as they are by the ego, for fear and terror of a return of the fragmented and dismembered.

If we have maintained the connection between the fragmented and dismembered and all we have said about *Carnival* images, then we have the space, the ground at least for the base of our field theory. We need I think to remember that carnival links a complex system of images, often a non-verbal sign system of images. We return now, to our theme of *aggressivity* in Lacan, and its connection with the fragmented and dismembered, again bearing in mind the case we wish to represent, namely, the image of the body and speech, held fragmentarily in the unconscious.

Fountain of the Ego

Correlatively, we have found the fragmented body and the fragmented word. Both have been denied succour at the fountain of the ego. Here we note that if there is dialogic fragmentation that accompanies the image of the fragmented body (left out by the agency of the ego) then it affects the *whole field*. The image of the fragmented body is cast back into the unconscious, *anxiety* holding in check its return. The formation of the ego is a *méconnaissance*, and the child misinterprets language too by enclosing only the monologic field of perception, establishing, within the child, a monologic *field of vision*, which is in fact a *meconnaissance*. So it is that we see the spuriously united image of speech in consciousness, which now coalesces with the image of the unified body, and presumably there is an attempt to unite the inchoate desires; in other words the whole process of unitary speech, unitary body, and unitary desires are all imagined and interrelated and all are an illusion.

This is true at least in terms of the unitary ego. The fragmented body reappears in the psychoanalytic session as we have seen in Lacan, through the return of the repressed, analysed by the Freudian process of free association. In speech, the image of multiplicity, of heteroglossia is driven partially (there is no totalization in this) into the unconscious. The child has understood language only through a monologic reflective prism; the child has a monologic *field of vision* and naturally must assume that the *other* too holds this imaginary monologism.

There are planes of inner and outer conscious dialogic activity that play a crucial role in speech. For example, the *other* inside to whom we speak. It is essential that we fully orchestrate Bakhtin's polyphonic score in an analytic setting. We are using the term *polyphony* here in the sense as that which dialogizes all the interpenetrating voices of heteroglossia. We must identify the forces of centripetality and centrifugality as 'formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience'. Thus it is we can see how one of the forces is driven underground. We find certain traits of the conscious and unconscious correlative to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language.

Anxiety concerning the return of the image of the fragmented word and body results in fleeing from the image of disunity. It is this interplay that leads to the repression into the unconscious of the fragmented dialectic into which the child is born. Unfortunately, fragmented speech does not directly have language at its disposal. Along with the image of the fragmented body it was repressed too early. It exists only in the unconscious, symbolized as the dismemberment of the body and the word, *although it may return*. Fragmented speech is thrust into the unconscious only as the bruised word of uncoordinated speech *movement*. But this is just as terrifying, one would have thought, as the image of the fragmented body. And it is fled with just as great intensity surely as the fragmented body image? However, as nothing ever comes to rest in the unconscious, this repressed early speech movement, progresses in some form in the unconscious.

Flotsam and Jetsam

The evidence would appear to be that the fragmented and dismembered in fact develop as an underground stream of *carnival* that, for example in the novel, endlessly flows from a *carnival* sense of the word and world. As carnival flows past the supposed flotsam and jetsam of the fragmented word, it gathers it up and passes it, as it were, along an associated cultural and artistic chain. This achieves two purposes. It releases the forces of heteroglossia in the unconscious into the stream of *life* and *ritual* and it consequently allows the image(s) of heteroglossia to develop, even if these images are part of a non-verbal sign system.

As the image of the fragmented body is not subject to stasis in the unconscious, so too the image of fragmented speech attaches itself to whatever carnival or heteroglossia emblems, of any kind, that it finds as it drifts. We must remember, however, that this may only be part of the release of heteroglot forces from the unconscious; we are not suggesting that carnival is the *only* release, merely a probable one. We shall see later that under certain circumstances all the forces are released.

It is to this extent that we have attempted to derive a Bakhtinian linguistic analysis, from the Lacanian Mirror Stage. When Lacan discovered the mirror stage, he burst open, along with Bakhtin, as we said, the old-oak banquet doors of heteroglossia that had remained rust-locked since the Renaissance. In Lacan's analysis of the development of the child, he pinpoints for us the singular moment

when the child attempts to realise its own unity and rushes terrified from the images of the fragmented body and speech. In order to co-ordinate the image of its dismembered parts the child consolidates within itself a 'stone guest who joins the banquet'. It is only Lacan, and Freud of course, who recognizes the stone guest at the banquet. Even if Lacan were wrong about the consequences/impact of the Mirror Stage, he would still be right because there is, or must be, a moment of reflected *fascination* when the subject is held in thrall by the prospect of unity, escaping the terror of dismemberment. All of this creates imaginary relationships that have a profound impact on the child and adult.

The *aggressivity* of which we have spoken, is interconnected with the analytic process itself and develops further of course in a clinical setting than we can possibly achieve here. However, what we have attempted, over the course of the previous chapters, and what we also do here, is to *slowly* draw Bakhtinian linguistics into the psychoanalytic field of study.

We discovered a gap too wide in Chapter One, where Otto Rank discovered the Oedipus complex at the centre of the literary creative matrix, thereby psychoanalytically couching and casting the novelist and poet. His 'discovery' of the unconscious seemed to complicate our collected *mise en scene*. Nevertheless, we opened a dialogic space that allowed the possibility of a monologic and heteroglossic discursive field. By the time we reach this chapter, we introduce only the early original thought of Lacan. His mirror stage allowed us to place the

prism of Bakhtinian linguistics against the reflected, if inverted, image of the ego. If we have failed to deal with big Other relations and other relations and the all important *transference* at this stage, it is only because we have held a fixed frame long enough to reflect Lacan's image of the Mirror Stage, with all its ramifications, and paused long enough to hold Bakhtin's prism up against the image of language.

Image of the Ego

In Lacan's Mirror Stage paper, he unlocks the sacrosanct image of the ego, exposing it to the forces of the unconscious. But, as we now know, the unitary image of the ego recognized by Lacan is a *méconnaissance*, consequently the crown of the ego slips and Bakhtin pushes the carnival door open. Lacan releases us from the fiction of the unitary ego; creating the possibility of the entry into the interstice, of the Bakhtinian centripetal and centrifugal forces. The unitary ego, that has been so effectively prised apart by Lacan at the Mirror Stage, allows for the further possibility of heteroglossia appearing within the broken frame of the encased ego. We see that Bakhtin's conceptualization of heteroglossia has wide implications and we can see why, from Holquist:

The reason is that not only most critics, but most genres begin with this assumption: the homogeneity of the genre corresponds to ideas about the privileged status of a unitary, centripetalizing language shared by its practitioners on the one hand and its students on the other. (Holquist, 1981: xxx).

In this comment we can see the *effect* of heteroglossia quite clearly, although a description of the Bakhtinian *genre* is dealt with later. Let us again remember what Holquist tells us:

Bakhtin's basic scenario for modelling variety is two actual people talking to each other in a specific dialogue at a particular time and in a particular place. But these persons would not confront each other as sovereign egos capable of sending messages to each other through the kind of uncluttered space envisioned by the artists who illustrate most receiver – sender models of communication (Holquist, 1981:xx).

So here we see the dialogic space opening up, and it is also in a psychoanalytic sense that it opens up, as we saw when Lacan discovered his Mirror Stage.

Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water

We now move to the end of our comments in this chapter on Lacan's Mirror Stage paper, the experience and its conceptualization and the possible interaction with dialogic planes of thought in Bakhtin. Along with the fragmented body, we have attempted to introduce the similarly discarded fragmented image of speech. The unifying ego throws out the baby with the bath water on the one hand, and creates the 'stone guest' of the ego on the other hand with its single-voiced monoglossia. It may well be asked, is it not in the nature of things to unite the ego, afraid of its image of the dismembered body and the voice strangled by its early guttural cries? The answer of course is yes, there will always be, along with heterogeneity the monologic (which it seems is never truly dialogic), but in the

case of psychoanalysis and Lacan's mirror stage in particular, the *act* is premature and, worse still, a *méconnaissance*.

This all creates a space for heteroglossia in the psychoanalytic field. Added to this there is the unconscious/conscious spectrum, which features monologic and heteroglossic characteristics. We now perceive the gradually emerging crossover points, the misrecognized unity in consciousness, and the other thing being held in the unconscious. It will be necessary at some time in the future to enter the psychoanalytic space of paranoiac knowledge and to develop further theories concerning aggressivity, certainly in language. But the major premise that we have attempted to introduce in this chapter outlines Lacan's Mirror Stage and Bakhtin's heteroglossia and attempts to introduce them into a psychoanalytic setting entwined. Plus, it outlines the possibility of latent vestiges of fragmented speech that, not unlike the fragmented body, is cast aside by the premature formation of the ego. We must also not forget the space of the public square and the 'bourgeois parlour', because Bakhtin, Freud, and Lacan, are essentially of the public square. Their laughter and their despair are, as with Socrates, situated there.

CHAPTER FIVE

LACAN WITH BAKHTIN: FRAGMENTED SPEECH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Introduction

Introducing Lacan's mirror and Mirror Stage involves a number of complex formulations. Let us revise our interpretation of a few of the salient factors. In the first place, and moving on, we have to understand that space does not only exist as an homogenous space of an empty area, according to Lefebvre. It is not in itself necessarily unified, it too is also fragmented. Introducing a mirror into the conceptualization of space is obviously a complex matter. Nevertheless Lacan defines for us a point (similar to Foucault's field hospital) bringing together diverse phenomena at the place of the mirror. We need to brake perception at this point. Why? To answer this and to introduce our topic in this chapter, we look now at a footnote in *The Production of Space* by Henri Lefebvre. In this footnote Lefebvre begins by quoting a definition of the mirror from Jean Baudrillard seeing the mirror as: 'nothing more for the bourgeois than an extension of his drawing room or bedroom' (Lefebvre, 1991: 185. *n.* 19). Lefebvre comments that this limits the mirror's real significance attempting to abolish the (psychoanalytic) notion of narcissism.

Lefebvre goes on to say that the ambiguity of these phenomena (mirrors) along with their 'inherent complexity' emerges clearly 'from the analyses of Jacques Lacan'. Lefebvre considers that: 'For him [Lacan] the mirror helps to counteract the tendency of language to break up the body into pieces' (Lefebvre, 1991:185). And Lefebvre, in the same footnote, goes on to say that the mirror for Lacan, 'freezes the Ego into a rigid form

rather than leading it towards transcendence in and through a space which is at once practical and symbolic (imaginary)'.

So it is that we pause at this place concerning space. If the notion that language has the tendency to break up the body into pieces, is correct then it must be dealt with. Now, for the moment, we assume nothing. Nothing is assumed because we must first of all take cognizance of those spaces with which we must deal. These are: (i) mental space; (ii) social space; (iii) space of the specular image (space of positionality) and (iv) space of language. If these spaces are thought of independently, for the moment, they halt the tendency to rush forward from Lacan's mirror. Lefebvre's point concerning the fact that Lacan opposes the tendency of language to break the body up into pieces, is a matter with which we shall attempt to deal. If we mark the above-mentioned spaces as *junctions* provided by the mirror, it becomes easier to break our work down.

Echo and Narcissus

At this point we introduce, in a basic manner, the theme of Echo and Narcissus. The myth is fairly familiar but we intend to use it as a metaphor for the fragmented body and the fragmented word because it *ties* the two together. There is a painting that helps enormously in clarifying our position. The painting of Echo and Narcissus by J.W. Waterhouse R.A., shows Narcissus gazing at his own reflection in the lake — in the centre of the painting, but to the side of him on the left we see Echo anxiously awaiting as he is captured by his own image. As so often happens with the ancient myths they enfold the events of childhood, may we think of Oedipus for example? However, the

importance of this picture is the simultaneous representation of Echo and Narcissus *within* the same *mise en scene*, as he beholds his specular image. The painting conveys entirely what we are endeavouring to capture. If the scene is set *as* the mirror stage, the ‘fragmented body’ of Narcissus (fragmented because he has yet to encounter the centralizing effect of his specular image) is accompanied by the fragmented word of Echo who cannot finish her sentences; they both partake of the same scene. The crucial point to note is that the body image and the word image arrive together fragmented before the mirror.

Lacan failed to realize that fragmented speech arrives simultaneously with the image of the fragmented body and this oversight has considerable implications for psychoanalysis. For example, one must ask the crucial question: throughout the mirror stage period what precisely is the state of the child’s perception of language? And how does the child state: ‘*That is me!*’ if language is not around? There is, in my opinion, no *instantiation* of the creation of the image of language. Although, having said that, the image of the *system of speech* is enclosed simultaneously with the ‘acceptance’ of the unified specular image. The problem is not just one of Narcissus, however, it is the problem of Narcissus *and* Echo.

The Greek myth is quite correct, in that it holds the specular image and speech together. Of course we must recall that the whole scene is affected by the child’s prematurity at birth. One of the crucial considerations is that the ego encloses the *méconnaissance* of speech unity, which the child does not possess, like the gestalt of the body image, which

is a sad reflection of the child's inner turmoil and conflict. This state is therefore not easily escaped. The idea that the child has captured the *system of speech* whole, in an instant, is also a sad reflection of the child's inner turmoil and conflict and a speech delusion. The myth tells us quite clearly (or at least Waterhouse's painting does) that Echo *and* Narcissus approach the mirror.

Before we proceed any further we need to note a matter that seems to complicate further an already complex situation. We note the following:

We cannot deny that a deeper insight into the structure of the body-image (postural model of the body) must lead to a new conception of human actions. The greatest progress that has been made so far in the understanding of human action is due to Liepmann's investigations. He has shown that every action is based on an anticipatory plan. This anticipatory plan has a specific structure. It not only contains the final aim, but also comprises the insight into the single actions which are necessary for the actualisation of the plan. Liepmann refers to 'Teilzielvorstellungen' (images of partial aims)... (Schilder, 1955: 50).

The idea here is that we are now in the zone of the partial aims and partial drives of the child — the fragmented body. Let us check another comment this time by Lacan:

[the subject] He is originally an inchoate collection of desires — there you have the true sense of the expression *fragmented body* — and the initial synthesis of the *ego* is essentially an alter ego, it is 'alienated'. (Lacan, 1993: 39).

The Satyr

In these last two comments we discover the ‘partial drives and aims’ — the fragmented. So, thus far we have the image of the fragmented body and the image of the fragmented word. We shall have to consider also the position of the fragmented drives, the ‘image’ of the drives may not necessarily be ‘whole’ of course, here we may think of early childhood. We would consider the relationship of fragmented speech, body, drives, to be a kind of reciprocal interaction somewhat akin to reflective mirrors whose surfaces reflect and refract the interaction. This interaction would also have to be a part of what we call the *speech complex*. In the case of fragmented drives, however, we see no reason why we could not add in the background to Narcissus and Echo the figure of the *satyr* to represent these ‘partial drives’. Was not the satyr himself an aggregate, a conglomeration?

The idea of the interconnection between all of these spaces and images at the mirror stage has a tendency to *float* conceptualisation. In order to check this we *tie* in Narcissus and Echo, so that at least the spaces of the specular image and the fragmented word are *tied*. We must of course also add the aspect of the fragmented drives and desires — the *satyr*. So it is that we see, at least for the time being, the specular image and speech tied together with the fragmented drive. The fragmented word, it is suggested, *approaches* the mirror with the fragmented body as image.

When the unity of the specular image is assumed by the ego, which exists only from the *moment* of the assumption of the image, so too the fragmented word assumes the identity

of *wholeness* of the *word* and the *system of speech*, which is a *meconnaissance*. Whatever is left of the fragmented body and fragmented word ‘disappears’ into the unconscious. This is why Narcissus is tied to Echo. Now, however, we need another link. Prior to the child’s primary identification with its image, the child realizes its own inner turmoil and dismembered state, and initially, *just* prior to the identification with the image views it as ‘other’ and is alienated from the image; this is the foundation of Lacan’s term *aggressivity*, and forms the basis of all secondary identifications.

Why does the child become alienated from its own image? Because the child realizes that its own inner state of turmoil is not truly matched by the assumption of the unity of the image it is about to make. And therefore just prior to the absorption of the image, the child experiences rivalry with and alienation from its own image. Thereafter, the fragmented images (body and speech) are despatched to the unconscious and there is left in consciousness a unitary image of the body and speech, a *méconnaissance*, with just a ‘hint’ of aggressivity.

We must make it clear that Narcissus and Echo only provide, at this stage, a metaphor that *ties-in* the specular image and ‘reflected’ image of the word. We draw no further implications from the myth at this stage other than its capability to tie, however loosely, the specular image and the word. The reason we tie the two together is that they both join in the *assumption of the image* at Lacan’s Mirror Stage. The key to the myth is that Echo *loves* Narcissus (Ovid, 1955 ed.: 83-87). As the specular image enfolds the Subject, Echo is caught in the deadly embrace of Narcissus. We must stress that the assumption

of the image is a totalizing experience (but *méconnaissance* nevertheless). Now we can see that the ‘space’ of the mirror is totalized as an apprehension of a unified and unifying space (also a *méconnaissance* of space). There is, by the child, no assumption of the possibility of a fragmented space. Specular image, speech image, space as image, all frozen and unified in that moment as a unified ego that is a *misrecognition* and *alienation* through the image — from itself.

Arising from this, however, a particular problem occurs that is worthy of interpretation. In the Mirror Stage we saw in the infant the attempted consolidation of the agency of the ego by a ‘prematurely’ born child. If we take another look at a phrase used in The Mirror Stage paper by Lacan, we recall his following statement:

This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the *infans* stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence (Lacan, 1977: 2)

So we see that the child moves away from ‘motor incapacity and nursling dependence’. If we look more closely at Lacan’s Mirror Stage we may note another interesting point:

The *mirror stage* is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation — and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic — and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development... (Lacan, 1977: 4)

And extending a comment from earlier:

This fragmented body — which term I have also introduced into our system of theoretical references — usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal persecutions — the very same that visionary Hieronymus Bosch has fixed, for all time, in painting, in their ascent from the fifteenth century to the imaginary zenith of modern man. But this form is even tangibly revealed at the organic level, in the lines of ‘fragilization’ that define the anatomy of phantasy, as exhibited in the schizoid and spasmodic symptoms of hysteria. (Lacan, 1977: 4-5)

From this we see that as the rigid armour of the ego begins to fall away during the analytic process, the analysis encounters ‘a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual’. The subject is split at the mirror stage. As the ego ‘falls away’ so the images of fragmentation return. However, Lacan does not elucidate the fragmented word for us so we must search for its ‘essence’ ourselves.

Function of Fragmentation

We can see quite clearly from this that the fragmented and dismembered body image is hastily rejected in favour of the unity promised by the agency of the ego. But if the unity of the ego is a *méconnaissance* in Lacan, does this mean that fragmentation and dismemberment have, however strange this may appear, a *function* that has been rejected by the haste of the consolidation of the ego? If the fragmented and the dismembered have been rejected with the development of the prematurely created unified ego, then we

may ask, what happens to the hastily rejected fragmented and dismembered images? Obviously, the child rushes away from them as quickly as possible to consolidate the ego, but the ego, as we have seen, is a *méconnaissance*. We recall Freud's comment:

...in both cases (castration and birth) what is in question is the separation of part of the body from the whole. (Freud, 1991: 510, *footnote* 1 [added 1909]).

Since antiquity, have they not spoken of the 'treasure' that lies buried in the dirt, the treasure that is hidden in the most rejected thing? Could this be the treasure? But how could there be value in the fragmented and dismembered; on this occasion was not the Royal Ego correct to rush so quickly from uncoordinated limbs, shattered body image, splintered dialogic interaction, in other words fragmentation and dismemberment? As Lacan said, motor incapacity and nursing dependence. At this point we could ask ourselves another question: does the rejection of the image of the fragmented body and word in fact have an effect on the *shape* of the unconscious? The dream offers a 'shape' of the unconscious, and if the dream is taken as an exemplar it works with a dismembered discourse and the fragmented body. In other words does symbolization take place in the lacuna created by the separation of the fragmented image and the whole image?

So, it looks as though in the haste to unify the ego, something of value was left out. At first sight it would appear of little value. But on closer analysis, we have to acknowledge that the fragmented body and fragmented word had been an essential part of 'being'. Uncoordinated and lost they may have been, they still had the essence of 'being'. And we know that they were 'foreclosed' too soon. The clue to the possible value of the

fragmented and dismembered lies in the image. If the infant is in a hurry to consolidate the specular image, then there is an element of the *image* that has been left out. This is where we would introduce the next hypothesis of the *speech complex*. By the way, it is by no means clear that *aggressivity* (Lacan, 1977: 8-29) is not, in part, the result of this factor being left out. Another point of *value* is that, by their very nature, the fragmented body and word image have been left out of the consolidation of the ego. The fragmented images take up their position, or more correctly positions, outside of the ego. So what precisely is the *speech complex*?

Speech Complex

The *speech complex* is the interrelationship between the image of the fragmented body and the fragmented word in relation to the unified ego. What happens if they are left out of the agency of the ego? Before we answer this, we must understand that the image(s) can in no way be seen as in any sense unified. Unless, we consider what Freud noted in *The Interpretation of Dreams* ‘ Even the very centre of the dream is only loosely put together’. (Freud, 1991: 104). It is an image of fragmentation and dismemberment and as such lies disused, like a cracked mirror, deflecting light at the strangest angles. But it haunts human consciousness. If it is rejected and therefore outside of the ego, what happens to it?

Presumably, in the classic psychoanalytic manner it is repressed into the unconscious realm, as we have already seen in our previous chapter. This is because there is a certain psychic energy, otherwise it could not have been left out; it must take up residence

somewhere. It must be repressed into the unconscious. Or is it possible that the problem is one of *foreclosure* in the Freudian and Lacanian sense? At any rate, if it is repressed it will situate itself as the return of the repressed at some point, in some way. So as we initially pass through the Lacanian Mirror Stage what do we find on the other side? How do we make use of the fragmented body-image and fragmented word-image in the first instance? To answer this question we discover a dialogic echo left from the first chapter concerning the Oedipus complex and the psychoanalytic form this takes known as *neurosis*.

Neurosis

Introductory Remarks

It must be fairly obvious by now, that we have not accepted the generalized conceptualization of Structuralist linguistics. Less obvious perhaps is that a point by point refutation of Lacan's acceptance of certain Saussurean principles will not essentially lead us very far. This is because the overall approach of Bakhtinian linguistics affects the psychoanalytic process in a different way. We may recall Bakhtin's comment: 'Structuralism has only one subject — the subject of the research himself' (Bakhtin, 1986: 169). The trouble is, *if* we accept a Structuralist concept and approach to language, then we are applying a *centralizing* form of linguistics to psychoanalysis, which itself involves the *de-centring* of the position of the ego. And we cannot effectively use a centralizing code system of evaluating language in an assessment of the de-centred ego altered by Freud's discovery, in our opinion.

However, having said all of this, it seems necessary and relevant perhaps to think of clinical definitions of psychoanalytic categories in terms of *structure* as well as *symptoms*. This Lacan achieved to quite an extraordinary degree. So we may speak of the clinical structure of neurosis and psychosis, for example. It is obviously one thing to speak of molecular structure, for example, and quite another to speak of the structure of language, however. In the following remarks we define elements of the structure of neurosis and psychosis, and we restrict ourselves to certain key issues. We shall attempt to define these terms in respect of: (a) body-image; and (b) the word-image they provoke, in terms of (c) conflict; and in terms of their relevance for our hypothesis (d) image of fragmented speech. Or we could pose it in the form of another question. What is the interrelationship between the fragmented body/word image (speech complex) and neurosis/psychosis and the symptom/structure? Once we have reasonably defined these terms (neurosis and psychosis), we shall then assess them against a backdrop of Bakhtin's definition of the *utterance* and *speech genres* and later the *chronotope*. This all creates the space for us to broaden our horizon without being hog-tied by Structuralist linguistics.

Both terms, neurosis and psychosis, have had an extremely chequered career and seem to be endlessly reaccentuated by various interceding factors and institutions, so the terms themselves are ambiguous and ambivalent and are certainly a movable feast. If we blow the dust of the nineteenth century away from the term *neurosis*, certain key features do begin to appear. For example, we note a dialogic echo from the first chapter, namely, the Freudian term that combined Greek mythology, self-analysis, and psychoanalysis, which he nominated as the Oedipus complex. In the Oedipus complex, as we have seen, along

with the image of the mother and her child — that dyad of complexity, we have also the crucial image of the Father.

The Oedipus is, as Freud himself stated, the nuclear complex upon which *neurosis* and psychoanalysis is based. Now we shall attempt to define certain aspects of the structure of neurosis and psychosis, without, however, necessarily following Lacan into the depth structure of his own unique definition of Saussure's signifier and signified. I hasten to add that we do not critique Lacan's use of the signifier and signified to achieve the aims and purposes of his diagnostic 'intervention'. We just do not move in that direction in totality and cannot follow Lacan into the labyrinthine pathways of the signifier and signified. So it is inevitable that we shall not necessarily draw the same conclusions as Lacan, although we follow considerably along the trail that he blazed.

Background

In the nineteenth century, neurosis seems to have covered a whole range of mental disorders. There was a great variety of the symptomatology itself, but Freud first posited the idea of *neurosis* in opposition to *psychosis*. In Lacan, we *always* find neurosis in opposition to psychosis. Lacan emphasizes structure, but traces no difference between the normal and the neurotic. For Lacan, mental health is an illusion, an ideal of wholeness, which is never attainable because, as we saw, the subject is split. As we also saw in the first chapter, in neurosis we find that the conflict lies in the subject's childhood, and symptoms constitute compromises between wish and defence. The neurosis speaks its symptoms in the language of the unconscious, which the analyst may

hear. In psychosis the symptom does not speak in the language of the unconscious, so in a very direct sense psychosis has to be seen in terms of its structure.

The term neurosis itself, seems to have a long history dating from 1777, and was apparently coined by a Scottish doctor, William Cullen. As we shall see later, words have a memory of their earlier use; they resonate with their own history and have a rhythm and cadence, and an echo. They also vibrate with their future possible use. As Bakhtin said variously the word *sentimentalism* was reaccentuated from its original use, in the nineteenth century. So too with neurosis, it is now a generalized term as well as an antiseptic clinical category. If the *parody* of the last remark seems wholly inappropriate, we may add that the word neurosis may be seen as a Bakhtinian *utterance* and *speech genre* and as such prey to a multiplicity of stratifications of meaning. As Bakhtin said: 'Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions' (Bakhtin, 1981: 294). However, and notwithstanding this remark, referring once again to neurosis let us check this remark by Lacan himself:

What is repression for a neurotic? It's a language, another language that he manufactures with his symptoms, that is, if he is a hysteric or an obsessional, with the imaginary dialectic of himself and the other. The neurotic symptom acts as a language that enables repression to be expressed. (Lacan, 1993: 60).

This seems to sum up quite adequately a definition of neurosis. However, as we are pursuing fragmented speech, I suggest we also follow a comment by Freud:

The verbal malformations in dreams greatly resemble those which are familiar in paranoia but which are also present in hysteria and obsessions. The linguistic tricks performed by children who sometimes actually treat words as though they were objects and moreover invent new languages and artificial syntactic forms, are the common source of those things in dreams and psychoneuroses alike. (Freud, 1991: 269).

If we wish, however, to understand the impact of the *fragmented word* on neurosis and psychosis, in terms of symptom and structure, we must understand that there is terrible anxiety concerning the return of the repressed *fragmented speech*.

In fact, at this stage of our research we consider the return of *fragmented speech* as potentially more 'serious' than the return of the fragmented body as image. Why? Because fragmented speech has an earlier archaic base than the fragmented image. The inchoate visualization of speech in the child begins with the first time the child *listens* rather than speaks. In fact it is probably the first thing a child does when it is born (other than scream that is). *Listening* probably loses its 'innocence' earlier than most other senses. Didn't Echo lose the power of speech because she colluded with Zeus in halting Hera's discovery of his adultery with the wood nymphs? All of this is not unimportant when it comes to the return of the repressed fragmentation in neurosis and psychosis. We would add, however, that in the case of neurosis the appearance of fragmented speech is not as marked as it is in psychosis. We should also add that all the psychoanalytic categories are implicated in the *speech complex* of course.

Regarding Lacan's use of the term *dialectic of the fragmented body*, it seems to us (a) that dialectic needs to be visualized in terms of fragmented speech (b) if it is not, then it is seen in terms of neurosis only because the dialectic of the fragmented body is seen only in terms of the expression of fragmented drives and there is more at stake here than this. We must recall that Lacan discovers the image of the fragmented body when the analysis encounters a certain aggressive disintegration with the 'arrival' of the negative transference. If we recall that neurosis invariably involves the configuration of the Oedipus complex we shall have the basis of an argument.

Psychosis

Preliminary Remarks

A tremendously broad range of mental illnesses appears under the diagnostic realm of the word *psychosis*. Again we meet the problem of structures. It has different structures, namely, paranoia, schizophrenia and melancholia and mania. But psychoanalysis seems to discover the common denominator as a disturbance of the libidinal relation to reality. Again, we need to blow away the musty nineteenth-century dust from the word psychosis. Throughout the work of Foucault, for example, we find his regular reference to the fifteenth century notion of the carnivalesque 'folly' instead of the usual madness. A metamorphosis through the 'wisdom' of the centuries has taken place and turned the carnival 'folly' into paranoid schizophrenia. Neurosis and psychosis evolved, however, in different contexts. The neuroses were derived from disturbances that were seen as nervous disorders.

In the case of psychosis, there appears to be an immediate rupture between the ego and reality. In psychosis also that prime figure of dismemberment, the castration complex, arrives on the psychoanalytic stage with all the power that Oedipus arranges neurosis. Obviously too, *fragmented speech* has a relation to the *castration complex*. Castration is not just a relationship to the vision of the fragmented body. What would we consider to be a set of 'classic' symptoms in psychosis? Perhaps hallucinations, delusions, 'regressive' conduct, senseless speech? In Lacan's work, we shall consider *The Name of the Father* as a crucial factor because, as Lacan sees it, the Name of the Father is not integrated into the symbolic realm of the psychotic; it is foreclosed. It also appears that the psychotic structure results from a malfunction of the Oedipus complex. However, we now look at a couple of comments made by Lacan himself that are of especial interest to us:

I was brought in, in short, to declare that she was psychotic and not, as had at first appeared, an obsessional neurotic. I refused to diagnose her as psychotic for one decisive reason, which was that there were none of those disturbances that are our object of study this year, which are disorders at the level of language. We must insist upon the presence of these disorders before making a diagnosis of psychosis. (Lacan, 1993: 92).

And:

If psychoanalysis inhabits language, in its discourse it cannot misrecognize it with impunity. This is the whole sense of what I have been teaching you for a number of years, and this is where we are with respect to the psychoses. The emphasis on, the

importance given to, language phenomena in psychosis is for us the most fruitful lesson of all. (Lacan, 1993: 144).

We would go even further, and say that if a clinical definition of language were built around a fictitious evaluation of language all hell would break loose. So that we may move on let us take one final example by Lacan in this section:

But for us to have a psychosis, there must be disturbances of language... (Lacan, Ibid., 92).

We need I think elaborate no further on psychosis at present, as it will be analysed in much greater depth in our final chapter. We wish now, however, to carry out the following functions: draw out some implications of neurosis and psychosis in terms of the Bakhtinian *utterance* and the Bakhtinian *Speech Genres* and their interrelationship with neurosis and psychosis. If we ourselves wish to elaborate neurosis and psychosis on to a plane that discovers a field of fragmented speech we must first tap in place certain Bakhtinian linguistic features that act as a counterweight to the Structuralist approach.

Bakhtinian Horizon

Through the very distinctive nature of Bakhtin's philosophy of language, it becomes possible to rethink the problem of the fragmented and the dismembered, in the sense of both the *body* and the *word*. May we recall first of all Bakhtin's work *Art and Answerability — Early Philosophical Essays* (Bakhtin, 1990), especially the vital essay *Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity*, in which there is a fascinating sequence of events

that interest us. First, we have the metaphor of *seeing* or the *excess of seeing* that one has of the other, and the reverse. So here Bakhtin, in a similar fashion to Lacan, begins by placing us at the level of visual perception. For Bakhtin, *seeing* never crosses the threshold of the body — *thinking* may. We may think ourselves across the threshold of the body, into the objects of the external world but we *see* only from an internal unitary perspective.

However, if we take into account Lacan's mirror stage, at this vital junction of Bakhtin's work, we may perceive why Bakhtin sees our *own* inner image fragmenting when it crosses the line of the body and why the other holds the key for Bakhtin. Bakhtin begins with the metaphor of visual perception, and Lacan too of course begins with visual perception. The next stage for Bakhtin, however, is to move (as far as our work is concerned) to the inner and outer body in self-experience (Bakhtin, 1990: 59). If 'I' experience myself as the unitary 'I', according to Bakhtin, when I cross the threshold of the body and experience myself on an outward plane, and we repeat the following occurs:

It is only in the form of scattered fragments, scraps, dangling on the string of my inner sensation of myself, that my own exterior enters the field of my outer senses, and, first of all, the sense of vision. (Bakhtin, 1990:28)

One has to wonder just how far Bakhtin is away from Lacan at this point. First of all, we accept a crossover, for example, fragmented body-image may cross with whole word-image and fragmented speech may cross with whole body-image. If this is accepted certain things come to light. We need to hold on to the image of fragmented outward

perception — of oneself — present in Bakhtin. If both men are right, then Bakhtin's observations in *Art and Answerability* on the inward and the outward image of the body are perceived at the post-mirror stage position. When the 'unified' inner ego position crosses the threshold between the body and the world, the image of oneself fragments in the world of the 'other'. If this is the case, then we must perceive ourselves as projecting the fragmented image of ourselves as it crosses the threshold of the body. So, as Bakhtin says I do not experience myself as whole when the threshold of the inner to the outer world is crossed.

This seems entirely in line with Lacan's thinking. At least to me, the fragmented image is left behind in pursuit of the unitary image, the unitary image is enclosed by the ego prematurely, and the image of oneself (not of the other) 'unifies' as an inner experience but not as an outer experience. When we experience ourselves on an outer plane, in other words when we cross the threshold, we do so fragmentarily. We must take into account all these matters if we are to make the correct assumptions of fragmented speech. Thus far we have: (1) body as whole image and body as fragmented image; (2) word as whole image and word as fragmented image; (3) the dialogic reaction of the subject to the inner and outer threshold of the body, in terms of the unified and the fragmented as one in fact crosses that threshold. And one final point on this matter, if I have an *excess of seeing* with respect to the other and the other has an *excess of seeing* with respect to me, then I and the other must be marked by a *lack* with respect to ourselves. Lacan, has the final word at this point, in answer to the question: Who is the *inner* other to whom I speak? Lacan would have answered: the ego.

It is in this very specific sense that we re-enter the Bakhtinian world of the *utterance* and *speech genres*, especially as they may affect *fragmented speech*. We now look at a few comments that may orient us within the specific domain of *Speech Genres* in Bakhtin. In his Introduction (Holquist, 1986:xvi), Holquist makes the following highly relevant comment:

...But genres are constructed with words not as they exist in the system Bakhtin here calls mere language, but rather as they are present in communication. The distinction between the two is not, as is sometimes assumed, merely a reformulation of the difference between *langue* and *parole*, general system and particular performance. “Communication” as Bakhtin uses the term does indeed cover many of the aspects of Saussure’s *parole*, for it is concerned with what happens when real people in all the contingency of their myriad lives actually speak to each other. But Saussure conceived the individual language user to be an absolutely free agent with the ability to choose any words to implement a particular intention. Saussure concluded, not surprisingly, that language as used by heterogeneous millions of such wilful subjects was unstudyable, a chaotic jungle beyond the capacity of science to domesticate.

Bakhtin, on the other hand, begins by assuming that individual speakers do not have the kind of freedom *parole* assumes they have: the basic unit for the study of actual speech practice is the “Utterance”, which, “with all its individuality and creativity, can in no way be regarded as a *completely free combination* of forms of language, as is supposed, for example, by Saussure ... who juxtaposed the utterance (*la parole*) as a purely individual act, to the system of language as a phenomenon that is purely social and mandatory for the individuum”.

And Holquist goes on:

The problem here is that the great Genevan linguist overlooks the fact that “in addition to the forms of language there are also *forms of combinations* of these forms” (Holquist, 1986: *xvi*).

This, as we shall see, is highly significant for our whole project. Because, again as Holquist says: ‘These forms of combinations of forms are what Bakhtin calls *speech genres*. And although he recognises their enormous variety, he is able to conclude, unlike Saussure, that the immediate reality of living speech *can* be studied...’ (Holquist, 1986: *xvi*). By his evocation of the category of *speech genres*, Bakhtin opens up the possibility of finding these speech genres in the most unlikely places and unlikely contexts. And one wonders if the narrow doorway through which we would need to pass could be at this place, in our search for the fragmented and dismembered word? Especially with reference to neurosis and psychosis.

Bakhtin’s use of *speech genres* allows voices to appear that never before could have seen the light of day, because he has articulated a whole range of speech phenomena that Saussure missed. The holes in conscious dialogue Freud discovered revealed the nature of the unconscious. Added to this, the dialogization of hitherto unknown fields of discourse by Bakhtin, means that it is possible to re-group around the study of the *méconnaissance* of the ego, discovered by Lacan. The installation at the mirror stage of *aggressivity* allows for the possibility of an interpretation of the fragmented body and *fragmented word* on this level too. In reference to the *utterance* we particularly note: ‘An

essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed toward someone, its *addressivity*' (Bakhtin, 1986: 95).

Symptom of Fragmented Speech

The symptom of fragmented speech reveals itself in a number of ways. As we have said the return of the image of fragmented speech from the unconscious is a cause of terrible anxiety in the Subject and as such its return meets with considerable *resistance*. To understand the nature of fragmented speech we must first of all understand that 'unitary' speech is held as a '*value*' by the ego. But as we have seen the ego is itself a *méconnaissance*. When the ego encloses the body image as unified it also encloses the image of the *system of speech* as unified. In other words we are all deluded in the assumption that we understand the *system of speech* in its entirety, and that we somehow encompass the *system of speech* (rather than fitting into it, as Bakhtin said so often).

Let us recall that the mirror stage involves the child from the age of six to eighteen months — although the image is absorbed in an instant. This leads, in the infant, to a form of speech *megalomania* in the sense of the *power of the world*, and *omnipotence* in the sense of the *power of the spirit*. These are the senses in which the unified word of the infant is enclosed in the stone structure of the ego. If we require 'proof' of the arrival of fragmented speech at the mirror, then *Echo* provides this, the whole point of the myth is her incompleteness in the face of Narcissus' 'completeness', surely? If we miss this, then we miss the whole point of the myth of Narcissus *and* Echo. We see now that there is a *misidentification of language* too at the mirror stage. From the mirror stage onward there

is a never-ending flicker that takes place between the image of the body and the image of the word and the 'image' of desire. And it appears that these images are interrelated to the effects of centripetal and centrifugal forces operating upon the ego. In other words we would constitute all these phenomena as being a part of a *speech complex*. As we know, however, the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language also operate — crucially for us, Outside of the ego.

Now, however, we must take up a strand that appears to have been lost, namely the *aggressivity* that is involved in the formation of the ego. We must stress immediately that this aggressivity is as much tied with fragmented speech as with the fragmented body. We have seen the *identification* that takes place, but just prior to this identification there is an alienation of the image, whereupon the 'other' is perceived in terms of rivalry and jealousy and this brings about the Lacanian aggressivity as well as an erotic connection with the image. This notion of aggressivity in Lacan is correlative with the narcissistic structure. Now, within the psychoanalytic session the image of the fragmented body appears when aggressive disintegration begins to take place brought about by the 'induced' negative transference that is the 'initial knot' of the analytic drama. In other words this is the carefully installed 'paranoiac knowledge' of the split subject.

Lacan deliberately drives a wedge into the heart of the split in the subject. He bursts asunder the identification of the subject with the ego. This surely is the basis of paranoid knowledge? The aggressivity toward the analyst becomes manifest. However, the analyst provides a 'mirror' that is implacable. Or, as Jessie Taft said of her analysis with

Otto Rank, 'I was deprived of a foe' (Taft, 1958. *xii*). Images of fragmentation involve aggressivity. However, along with the aggressivity that is present at the mirror stage there is also satisfaction. This derives from the power of the feeling when the organic incapacity is overcome by the unitary formation of the ego. This creates the narcissistic 'energy' of self-love. In a sense here we can perhaps see the interconnection between Bakhtin's constant refusal to separate birth from death — as image, and Freud's insistence upon the erotic and death drive as the black horses pulling the hearse of the Subject.

Sacrifice

We now reiterate an idea made earlier. It would not be possible to reach this spot if it were not for the articulation of the problem itself by Lacan and the possibility of a solution by Bakhtin. Let us then make a beginning with the fragmented and the dismembered. It is 'foreclosed' in the very first instance by the specular image. It is the assumption of the unity in the specular image that leads to the rejection of the fragmented. So it is, as it were, left on the outside of the ego. Apart, that is, from a tiny *entrail* of aggressivity left in the 'unified' ego. Therefore the ego must have rejected it because it was not, of itself, unified. It was rejected because it was a multiplicity therefore it stayed on the Outside. Is the fragmented body/word the part of ourselves of which *sacrifice* is demanded even at a very early stage? The very word sacrifice has a link with dismemberment. It seems a possibility that the shape of the unconscious itself could have been altered with this eventuality. It certainly seems to take place at around the 'time' one would have expected the cleavage to take place between the conscious and

the unconscious. As we travel on with this heterogeneous journey, we need, I think to take note of another vital matter that excludes the unitary from our discourse, and allows us to penetrate the image of *fragmented speech*. Freud, in a letter to Fliess states:

As you know, I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come about by a process of stratification: Thus what is essentially new in my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over ... (Freud, *Origins*. 1954: Letter 52, p. 173 — dated 6.12. 1896).

And:

... for consciousness and memory are mutually exclusive (Ibid. 174).

It appears that memory too is dialogically stratified and occurs more than once and that ‘consciousness and memory are mutually exclusive’. This comment is crucial for us, because fragmented speech has itself a memory in the unconscious.

Bakhtin’s Utterance and Speech Genres

In the final section of this chapter, we shall draw out the implications of fragmented speech against a background of Bakhtin’s two conceptualizations of, on the one hand, the *utterance* and on the other hand *speech genres*. We do this because our task now is to sift through the linguistic debris left after the formation of the ego. An utterance, for Bakhtin, is the event of *turning to someone* in speech — without this the utterance cannot take place. The problem of the utterance, unlike the statuesque sentence, is the question

of *addressivity*. To whom do 'I' speak, in what situation and context? So it is that we see the utterance as a unit of speech communion. The *speaker* and the *listener* are always the *co-authors* of the utterance. Let us follow a little more closely a comment by Bakhtin:

It is all the more remarkable that linguistics and the philosophy of discourse have been primarily oriented precisely toward this artificial, preconditioned status of the word, a word excised from dialogue and taken for the norm (although the primacy of dialogue over monologue is frequently proclaimed). Dialogue is studied merely as a compositional form in the structuring of speech, but the internal dialogism of the word (which occurs in a monologic utterance as well as a rejoinder), the dialogism that penetrates its entire structure, all its semantic and expressive layers is entirely ignored. (Bakhtin, 1981: 279).

It is the internal dialogism of the word that has such a profound effect upon *fragmented speech*. If, as we hypothesize, the speech image is built up gradually by a series of interpenetrating images, then there is a certain *spectral dispersion* that exists in the linguistic mist in which the word is formed. The word does not just have an outer *value* as presence in an external field; it has an inner value — a relationship to itself. The subatomic particles of speech have an inner relationship to themselves. This is as well as the projection of their outward life. The memory of this *spectral dispersion* is continuously present in the unconscious. If the image of the word collapses then it is no longer possible to think. It is the terrible anxiety that even a hint of this occurring presents that determines the symptoms of fragmented speech under specific conditions. Of course this also includes the image of the fragmented body.

The Return of Fragmented Speech

The conditions bringing about the *return of the repressed* fragmented speech are associated with the conditions appertaining to the image of the fragmented body and partial drives, because as we have seen they are all interconnected. There is another link, a strand, between the earlier mentioned *aggressivity, dismemberment* and the relation to the *ego*. Fragmented speech is, at least at this stage in our research, a more serious development than the return of the fragmented body image. It is not that the subject experiencing fragmented speech does not understand the *glue* that holds language together, but the *glue* no longer holds. Prior to this eventuality occurring, the subject meets it with the utmost *resistance*. If the inner integrity of the word dissolves, it is no longer possible to think. Madness is the result of expecting this will occur. It is the attempts made to stave off this eventuality that provide the *symptoms* that accompany *fragmented speech* and is the ‘structure’ that accompanies it.

The Bakhtinian utterance and speech genres provide an apperceptive background allowing us to reconnoitre this terrain. We must recall that the emergence of fragmented speech proceeds from the unconscious. As the fragmented body appears there is always the chance that the cloth of language covering the subject will alter shape.

Moving on slightly from the utterance, earlier we spoke of “*forms of combinations of these forms*”, and they are what Bakhtin refers to as *speech genres*. Looking again at Michael Holquist’s ‘Introduction’ we see the following:

And although he recognises their enormous variety [speech genres], he is able to conclude, unlike Saussure, that the immediate reality of living speech *can* be studied, for although ‘each separate utterance is individual ... each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types of these utterances* (Holquist, 1986: xvi).

This allows the way in, through Bakhtin, for the study of genres that would not normally be seen in language. This is not just literary genres and literary critical genres but, for example, would include the development in the philosophy of language of the whole psychoanalytic discourse as a highly specific ‘speech genre’, and of the certainty of sub-genres within the overall field. Here we may think of neurosis and psychosis. Now this in turn leads us to what Holquist describes:

...I shall not dwell on these, but remark only that, for those concerned with the thought of Bakhtin himself, this piece [*The Problem of Speech Genres*, p.60] holds great interest as a further contribution not only to his translanguists, but to his conception of the subject. (Holquist, 1986: xvii).

By this last remark: ‘conception of the subject’, we are released into the dialogic atmosphere of Bakhtinian thought, allowing us to become steeped in the linguistic mist that surrounds the utterance and that Bakhtin releases for us. Of course, we see that literary genres are probably the most studied. But Bakhtin, takes us into the world of ‘short rejoinders’ of daily dialogue, and these, seemingly so simple, have a variety of subject matter, situations and participants. In other words Bakhtin discovers for us the *everyday genre* or the *genre of the everyday*. He

goes on to describe other speech genres, 'brief standard military command', elaborate and detailed order, repertoire of business documents and the 'diverse world of commentary: social, political', and 'scientific statements'. These develop over time, as '*relatively stable types*' and are genre specific, again we may be reminded of psychoanalysis itself as a specific *genre*.

In Bakhtin, as we have seen, the word itself has an internal value — for itself. It echoes with its own history it resonates with its own possible future — and it has a memory. So that we are clear on this point let us take an example from Bakhtin himself:

The expression of a performed act from within and the expression of once-occurrent Being-as-event in which that act is performed require the entire fullness of the word: its content/sense aspect (the word as concept) as well as its palpable-expressive aspect (the word as image) and its emotional-volitional aspect (the intonation of the word) in their unity. (Bakhtin, 1993: 31).

We should do well not to forget these ideas; there is an internal integrity of the word in Bakhtin. It is not just affected by an outside interlocutor; it affects itself from within it. In reference to speech genres, Bakhtin tells us:

Each sphere has and applies its own genres that correspond to its own specific conditions. There are also particular styles that correspond to these genres. A particular function (scientific, technical, commentarial, business, everyday) and the particular conditions of speech communication specific for each sphere give

rise to particular genres, that is, certain relatively stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic types of utterance (Bakhtin, 1986: 64).

As we build a picture of speech genres we quote from Holquist's 'Introduction' again, and his borrowed heading:

To strive at higher mathematical formulas for linguistic meaning while knowing nothing correctly of the shirt-sleeve rudiments of language is to court disaster. (Benjamin Lee Whorf "Linguistics as an Exact Science", 1941). (Holquist, 1986: *ix*).

The problem to solve now is: does it become possible to use Bakhtin's speech genres to try and locate the possible psychoanalytic category of fragmentation and dismemberment? It is on the basis of the preceding evidence that we would have to think through a discourse of the fragmented and the dismembered. It is certainly not a discourse articulated in consciousness. It has been rejected by the ego and operates as an unconscious force. So that we reinforce our ground quite clearly, for an assumption of fragmented speech depends on it, we look again at a comment by Bakhtin:

Saussure defines the utterance (*la parole*) as an "individual act. It is wilful and intellectual. Within the act, we should distinguish between (1) the combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his own thoughts; and (2) the psychological mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations" (*Course in General Linguistics* [New York: McCraw-Hill, 1966]: 14). Thus Saussure ignores the fact that in addition to forms of language there

are also *forms of combinations* of these forms, that is, he ignores speech genres.

(Bakhtin, 1986: 81: *footnote f*).

Not until Bakhtin is there the possibility of discovering a mental space for the area marked out by Lacan. But we see that, according to Bakhtin, when we construct an utterance and choose words we do not, as he has said so often, take them from the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form. We take them says Bakhtin from *other utterances* and usually from utterances that are similar to ours in *genre*, that is, in theme, composition, or style.

It is an assumption here, that something is known, in the infant, of the fragmented and dismembered nature of its disposition prior to the consolidation of the ego. It is the suspicion of this that leads to the *aggressivity* mentioned in Lacan's second chapter in *Ecrits* (Lacan, 1977). The child tends to assimilate images, language, others, and objects as unified, as monologic. However, something has been left out, and left out because of the infant's prematurity at birth, leading to the enclosure of the ego. It is closed too soon, and a fragmented 'sibling' is left out. When Bakhtin says: 'The speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with virgin and still unnamed objects, giving them names for the first time' (Bakhtin, 1986: 93), we may whole-heartedly agree and say the speaker is not the 'only' speaker and his discourse is formed by the nature of the desire of the other. For Bakhtin, *turning to someone* is the essence of the utterance and the addressee and addressor are the very stuff of the utterance. It is always a question of the *relationship* of entities to each other that is of prime concern to Bakhtin.

Consequently, we have the relationship of the author and the hero, the relationship of the inner and the outer world, space and time and 'I' and the 'Other', just as examples. However, as addressee relations are part of the utterance we look now at another relationship and that is the problem of the addressee in dialogic relationships, and the new term the *superaddressee*.

The Problem of the Text

Bakhtin discusses the superaddressee in useful terms for us in the chapter *The Problem of the Text* (Bakhtin, 1986: 126). There is, in Bakhtin, a superaddressee that is part of the utterance itself. So what precisely is this superaddressee? Let us check a few comments by Bakhtin himself, to achieve some understanding of the term. 'Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness and so forth), whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses' (Bakhtin, 1986: 126). And Bakhtin goes on to say 'that this is the second party'. Bakhtin now, however, introduces a third figure into the field of the utterance and he has this to say:

But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with a greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher *superaddressee* (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). In various ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddressee and his ideally true responsive understanding assume various ideological

expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science and so forth). (Bakhtin, 1986: 126)

So that we become clearer of Bakhtin's meaning, he adds the following: 'Each dialogue takes place as if against the background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the participants in the dialogue (partners)' (Bakhtin, 1986:Ibid.). In these statements we reach what Bakhtin is to call the microworld of the word. The superaddressee is the 'person' present in the utterance beyond the addressor/addressee and the immediate proximity of their relations. So, for Bakhtin, the utterance is not a dyad but a trinity. All that we need to remember for the present is the third party present in any utterance.

In psychoanalysis, the superaddressee may be seen in such terms as Lacan's *Name-of-the-Father* and *No-of-the-Father*. For Bakhtin, there is never only a direct correlation (as in Saussure, for example) between sender/receiver messages, which in itself would be in the nature of a monologic relationship. Sender/receiver messages are not transferred or transposed across a semantic void according to Bakhtin. There is an endless penetration of dialogic activity within a dialogic forcefield. The borders of the sentence do not govern the borders of the utterance for Bakhtin. For him the borders of the utterance are governed by a *change of speech subjects*, and this is the essential border of the utterance. This border zone is essential, it seem to me, in any understanding of Bakhtin. As he says, the *utterance* can only occur by *turning to someone*.

Newer Dialogic Fields

In this, admittedly brief, exploration of Bakhtin's thought on the utterance and the superaddressee, we attempt to open up these dialogic fields discovered by Bakhtin. In the case of Lacan's *Name-of-the-Father* we take note of the following. Initially Lacan referred (in the 1950s) to the name of the father without capitals as the prohibitive role of the father, as the one who lays down the incest taboo in the Oedipus complex (see Chapter One). Lacan, however, develops this theme further and in the seminar on The Psychoses (Lacan, 1955-56), the term becomes more precise and is capitalized and hyphenated.

In Lacan, if the *Name-of-the-Father* is foreclosed (not included in Lacan's symbolic order) the result must be psychosis. This concept develops within Lacan, to become the Paternal Metaphor, involving the Name of the Father with metaphoric substitution for the desire of the mother. However, this takes us too far into the Lacanian psychoanalytic field at present.

Suffice it to say that the potential for the connection between the *superaddressee* and the Name of the Father could have significance in the future for analysis of any psychotic discourse because Bakhtin penetrates the word. He does this, for example, by his use of the addressor/addressee/ superaddressee. In this way he reveals the internal meaning of the word in relationship to itself and thereby exposes, for example, the psychotic word that seemingly is complete.

If the problem is approached from, as it were, the atomic elements of the word, then we enter the problem from the heart of speech. If we add to this Lacan's Name of the Father then we certainly have added another dimension to the unidimensionality of the psychotic word. In other words we approach the problem from within the word in the first instance, and the fragmented word at that. Bakhtin does not accept a direct addressor/addressee relationship in the utterance but posits also a superaddressee to whom one is also referring in any utterance. If we take the superaddressee of Bakhtin and compare it with the Name-of-the-Father and Paternal Metaphor in Lacan's work we can see the similarities immediately.

The usefulness of this is that the superaddressee is already 'contained' in the utterance; we assume a third party in our discourse (as an outside interlocutor present in the formation of the utterance). God is already locked in the word. As we draw this chapter to a close let us look at a comment by Lacan that provides thought for the subject of speech:

For the unripe grape of speech by which the child receives too early from a father the authentication of the nothingness of existence, and the bunch of wrath that replies to the words of false hope with which the mother has baited him in feeding him with the milk of her true despair, set his teeth on edge more than having been weaned on an imaginary *jouissance* or even having been deprived of such real attentions. (Lacan, 1977: 143)

In this continuation of Lacan's *stone guest* 'speech' we see as the father, 'that obscene, ferocious figure in which we must see the true signification of the superego' (Lacan, 1977; 143). Who is this if not the father or Father? The Name of the Father has its double meaning in Lacan too. Added to this we remember Freud's words ... 'for the father of prehistoric times was undoubtedly terrible' (SE: XIV: 131), and as he also said: 'Just as for primaeval man, so also for the unconscious' (SE: XIV: 298).

We now check the whole symphony of Bakhtin's *superaddressee*. Let us begin by making a few cursory remarks concerning the *superaddressee* assisted again by Michael Holquist. He comments: 'Thus, each speaker authors an utterance not only with an audience-addressee, but a superaddressee in mind' (Holquist, 1986: xviii). This *superaddressee* may be seen in a metaphysical distance or in distant historical time. Holquist goes on to itemize some of these superaddressees discussed by Bakhtin. So we have: 'God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science and so forth' (Holquist, 1986: xviii). So, in both cases, *Name of the Father* and the *superaddressee*, we cannot pretend that incense has not been swung over the word; it is always impregnated with the ritual magic of its history along with its emptiness and its future. This *superaddressee* says Bakhtin is 'not in any mystical or metaphysical being' (Bakhtin, 1986: 126) although, he says it could be, but is 'a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it' (Bakhtin, 1986: 126-127). The word then,

according to Bakhtin, moves ever forward in search of responsive understanding. So it seems that the word is not only for the second other but there is an awareness of the possibility of a third other.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have drawn implications from the work of Bakhtin and Lacan and in certain instances we have discovered common ground. We have developed Lacan's Mirror Stage, from the previous chapter, into the compass of vision of Bakhtin. We have tried to define more closely our conceptualization of fragmented speech and discovered the field of the *superaddressee* and the *Name of the Father*. However, if fragmented speech in the unconscious exists and it is our hypothesis that it does, then it must be our task to provide some form of application of fragmented speech to a given text. Primarily in this chapter we have attempted to draw Lacan and Bakhtin on to a similar plane by the use of Lacan's landmark Mirror Stage paper and Bakhtin's philosophy of language — especially his use of the *utterance* and *speech genres*. Most importantly for us, we have clarified certain thoughts appertaining to *fragmented speech*. If we have our parameters in place, we may now move into the final chapter and provide an application of *fragmented speech* to a given text.

CHAPTER SIX

FRAGMENTED SPEECH IN THE SCHREBER 'TEXT'

Were such things here as we do speak about?

Or have we eaten of the insane root

That takes the reason prisoner?

Shakespeare: Macbeth, I, iii (1605)

Introduction

If, in the first chapter, we noted that Rank had refused to acknowledge that the reader is a third party who triangulates the relationship between the writer and the plot, then it becomes incumbent upon us not to do precisely the same thing. In other words, if we wish to interpret aspects of a 'text' we need, in the first instance, to describe quite clearly our own methodology. In this final chapter, we interpret aspects of: *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (Schreber, 1955). To what end? We intend to discover fragmented speech in practice. However, before we attempt to discover fragmented speech within a given *utterance* (Schreber's work) we must position ourselves *vis-à-vis* that work. We must attempt to dialogize our relationship with Schreber. So, prior to approaching Schreber's text in terms of fragmented speech we first *describe* our own methodology, based upon assumptions we have made hitherto.

In order to position or pinpoint our methodology quite precisely, we wish to quote Bakhtin:

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In order to position or pinpoint our methodology quite precisely, we wish to quote Bakhtin:

The exact sciences constitute a monologic form of knowledge: the intellect contemplates a *thing* and expounds upon it. There is only one subject here — cognising (contemplating) and speaking (expounding). In opposition to the subject there is only a *voiceless thing*. Any object of knowledge (including man) can be perceived and cognised as a thing. But a subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, for as a subject it cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless, and, consequently, cognition of it can only be dialogic. (Bakhtin, 1986: 161).

We therefore enter into a dialogic relationship with Schreber (hence the opening remark from *Macbeth*). Inasmuch as we attempt to ‘confront’ Schreber within an intersubjective zone, is our sanity too then open to question? If we see the Schreber ‘case’ as a subject-object relationship presumably not. But, if we enter into a dialogic relationship with Schreber (subject-subject) then our own dialogic stance is surely at least questionable? We only stress that we too are implicated in Schreber’s discourse. We do this in the fond knowledge that our reader will also enter into a *dialogic* relationship with us.

It becomes impossible to locate fragmented speech, or determine what precisely it is, unless one understands it, first of all, in terms of methodology. So our approach is essentially *dialogic*. The aims and purposes of this final chapter are twofold. First, to provide a methodology of interpretation of Schreber’s *utterance* and secondly, to interpret, as a result of that methodology, our own discovery of fragmented speech. ‘Any understanding is a correlation of a given text with other texts’ (Bakhtin, 1986:161), and this correlation is dialogic. The dialogic correlation we have chosen is: Schreber – Freud – Lacan. If the overall rationale in this chapter is the detection of fragmented speech in

Schreber's book, then we note several premises that are necessary in our interpretation of the Schreber text.

The first premise is that Schreber's metaphor of '*rays*' is equal to 'language' in a generalized sense. His metaphor of '*nerves*' is likewise equal to the 'body' or the penetration of the body. It is a second premise that Schreber is especially subject to the centripetal and centrifugal forces in language (examples of our premises will follow). Schreber uses the term 'basic language', which we premise as an attempt to hold on to the 'whole' *language as system*, when the image of language starts to fragment. These are the basic premises upon which we interpret Schreber's text. In terms of conceptualization, we deliver the following ideas. First, if there is an image of the whole body and the whole word, incarcerated in the ego at the time of the mirror stage experience, then, in psychosis, the image of the 'whole' body and 'whole' speech image begins to fragment.

Our second concept is that as the images of 'wholeness' begin to collapse they are accompanied by *terrible anxiety* in the subject. The return of the fragmented body and speech image is the reason for this *terrible anxiety*. It is a further concept that the symptoms of the psychotic are arranged in such a way, that they attempt to stave off the approach of the images of the fragmented body and fragmented speech existing as a force in the unconscious. There is considerable resistance to the return of the images of the fragmented body and fragmented speech in psychosis. In fact, the psychotic sets up a flimsy discourse of intensified 'wholeness' to compensate for the insurgent forces

emanating from the unconscious. Hence we find what one may only describe as a baroque insignia of grandiose speech.

Thirdly, and essentially, the problem dealt with in this dissertation has been the problem of the ‘second consciousness’, whether that second consciousness is the duality of the ‘inner voice’ of Freud’s unconscious plane, or the problem of the ‘other’ that we have defined in Bakhtin and Lacan. We have seen the discourse of the other and the Other in Lacan. ‘The Other is nothing but the dimension of the others that remains unknown to the speaker, because he approaches them via language’ (Nobus, 2000: 12). Nobus points out for us the enigma of the Other in Schreber:

‘Schreber for instance described how divine figures tormented him day and night by uttering unfinished sentences such as ‘Now I will myself...’ and ‘You ought to ...’, which he was forced to complete with the endpoint, respectively ... ‘face the fact that I am an idiot’ and ‘ ... be exposed as the negator of God and as given up to dissolute sensuality, not to mention other things’. (Nobus, 2000: 13)

The memoirs of President Schreber provide the focus and the impetus for this final chapter. It is here that we shall draw the final implications of our work. We shall approach his *Memoirs* from differing dialogic angles. Freud analysed Schreber’s text and so did Lacan. We shall examine Schreber’s ‘text’ in the light of our discovery of *fragmented speech*. Bakhtin’s oeuvre will provide the dialogic-linguistic angle and we shall use his all-important *utterance* and *speech genres*. Let us, throughout this chapter, recall that: ‘A grotesque-word matrix drags the messy body into territory previously

occupied by disembodied, hierarchical word systems'. (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 438).

Working hypothesis — Fragmented Speech

Fragmented speech — base condition upon which unitary speech is acquired. It is initially, in the child, a conscious phenomenon, in other words the only 'form' of speech. It is half-understood words, it is a partial understanding of relationships between words (also one's own word, and the other's word), it is the tower of babel of all the interpenetrating voices to which the child is subject — both inner and outer.

It is the centrifugal without the necessary condition of the centripetal. It is heteroglossia without monoglossia. It is the *living event* of spectral dispersion. It is the confusion of inner and outer voices and voice environments. We may assume it is the jigsaw puzzle of speech, emptied out of the box. It is the state in which the child approaches the mirror as *Echo*. At the level of the mirror stage experience, *Echo* (speech image) joins forces with *Narcissus* (the specular image) and the pair unify both the specular image 'That's me!' and speech image — assumed mastery of the *system of language*. However, as Lacan teaches, the unification of the specular image and (as we believe) speech, unified to meet the needs of the developing ego, are based upon a *méconnaissance* due to the prematurity at birth of the child.

When the rudimentary ego is formed, the fragmented images of the body and speech are repressed into the unconscious to make way for the unification of the specular image and

speech image in consciousness. If once the fragmented specular image (non-unified visual image) and the fragmented speech image (non-unified speech image) return to consciousness from the unconscious, they are met with, in the subject, with *terrible anxiety*.

This base condition needs to have an application if it is to prove valid. We need, in other words, to provide evidence of its existence as an unconscious force operating in the unconscious. Fragmented speech is applied here to Schreber's book, *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*. There is a correlation between the carnivalesque grotesque body image and the grotesque speech image (language of the marketplace) and the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image. In psychosis, fragmented speech would be a symptom of the illness.

Schreber's 'Text'

Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) was a distinguished German jurist, who in 1884 suffered the first of a series of mental collapses that affected him for the rest of his life. Before his mental collapse, he served as chief justice of the supreme court of the state of Saxony. He was the son of a distinguished German medical authority on child rearing. His book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (Schreber, 1955) was originally published in 1903; Freud's celebrated paper on Schreber was published in 1911 (SE. 12: 9-70). Schreber's father, Moritz Schreber, was, as we say, a renowned authority on child rearing. In her 'Introduction' to the most recent reprint of Schreber's *Memoirs*, Rosemary Dinnage makes the following comment:

Moritz Schreber was in fact hugely influential. As late as the 1930s (I am told by a German friend) German children were being threatened with the Schreber *Geradehalter*, a contraption of boards and straps, if they did not sit up straight. He had a system and a manual for everything — the cold-water health system, the system to cure harmful body habits, indoor gymnastic systems for health preservation, outdoor play systems, the life-long systematic diet guide. But of his two sons, one committed suicide and one (Paul, author of *Memoirs*) went mad. (Schreber, 1955: *xiii*).

In Schreber, we discover that his *Memoirs* ‘were written whilst he was in Sonnenstein public asylum, as an account of what he believed were his unique experiences and as a plea for release’ (Schreber, [Introduction] *xiii*). As Bakhtin may have said: ‘Who speaks?’, in which context and under what conditions? In Schreber, it appears, we have the answer to all three. Resulting from his *Memoirs*, written as they were to bring about his release from the Asylum, we need to bear in mind Bakhtin’s description of a *loophole discourse* and his *sideways glance* (see Bakhtin’s *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, especially pp. 232-36 for loophole discourse) which understandably pervade Schreber’s ‘text’.

Schreber’s Voices

In his work on Schreber, Freud did not deal with the voices that Schreber heard. We, however, shall position ourselves directly at this point. We shall deal with the *voice zones* present in Schreber’s text; it is the interpenetration of voice zones that will interest us. If the generalized diagnosis of psychosis is *hallucinations* and *delusions*, then the *dialogic* implications of this for the fragmented body image and the fragmented speech

image are of direct concern to us and hopefully we shall see why. As Schreber himself says: 'The system of not-finishing-a-sentence became more and more prevalent in the course of the years' (Schreber, 1955: 198) Our methodology draws directly from Bakhtin's assessment of the *utterance* and his *speech genres*. In fact, if we follow Bakhtin in his course of action we discover that we may position ourselves 'within' Schreber's text *and* interpenetrate it with Freud and Lacan's comments as *utterances* and *speech genres*. So let us begin with a definition recalled from Bakhtin:

Two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the realization of this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their struggle, which determine the nature of the text. (Bakhtin, 1986: 104).

The fragmented body-image and the fragmented speech-image appear throughout Schreber's 'text', as we shall see. 'The event of the life of the text, that is, its true essence, always develops *on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects*' (Bakhtin, 1986: 106). In Schreber of course many voices occur within the same individual. Of one thing Schreber makes us quite clear however: the voices are, at least at the outset, loud and persistent, to such an extent that Schreber often has to *bellow* (confirmed by his physician Dr. Weber) to override these persistent voices.

At this point we recall why we placed our conception of Bakhtin's Carnival on to a single plane. In Schreber, we find Carnival without the laughter, for what in Schreber is pathologically serious, is in Rabelais parody through laughter. Schreber's text has remarkable parallels with the magnificent Rabelais: 'On one occasion 240 Benedictine

Monks ... moved into my head to persist therein' (Schreber, 1955: 57). In Rabelais we have:

This was the manner in which Gargamelle was brought to bed — and if you don't believe it, may your fundament fall out! Her fundament fell out one afternoon, on the third of February, after she had overeaten herself on *godebillios*. *Godebillios* are the fat tripes of *coiros*. *Coiros* are oxen fattened at the stall and in *guimo* meadows, and *guimo* meadows are those that carry two grass crops a year. They had killed three hundred and sixty-seven thousand and fourteen of these fat oxen to be salted down on Shrove Tuesday. (Rabelais, 1955: 47).

It is the preoccupation, in both cases, with numerical accuracy that is interesting and is, by the way, carnivalesque as Bakhtin variously points out. There are other instances of this in both Schreber and Rabelais. If one takes a one-dimensional image of carnival and places it, similar to an acetate or transparency, over the Schreber case one may map the dialogic lines of similarity, and the images correspond, in many ways, quite precisely. For example, the grotesque body image and language of the marketplace, prevail and see-saw throughout Schreber's text.

We must bear this in mind, because carnival encompasses the forces of consciousness and the unconscious and, in a sense, leaves room for 'folly'. Schreber is intensely subject to the high and low tides of the unconscious and the conscious. However, let us now recall the Bakhtinian *utterance* once more. The utterance is 'The change of speaking subjects and the change of speakers' (Bakhtin, 1986: 108). But how does this refer? In the case of Schreber's *Memoirs*, the utterance of Schreber, who is locked up, is obviously

not the same as the utterance of Dr. Weber, who is in charge of the incarcerated Schreber, although the utterances meet upon similar dialogic terrain. For example, Schreber marks his own inner and outer world dimension, but it does not in all instances correspond with Dr. Weber's apperception of the 'scene'.

As Schreber describes his inner life, he does not describe the terror in his own eyes that Weber perceives. He does not describe the terrified and terrifying laughter that Weber describes. The horizon of Schreber's *seeing* and his *environment* provide a contrapuntal score that allows us to visualize that Schreber is certainly not unaware of his *environment* as many may suppose. Also we may note an area of dialogic intensity between Schreber's *Memoirs* and the '*Medical expert's report to the court*' (Schreber, 1955: 327) by Dr. Weber, Superintendent of the Asylum. So that we delve more deeply into our methodology and analysis of the Schreber 'text' we need, I think, to utilize the 'micro dialogue' of Bakhtin. We need, in other words, to nest ourselves in the heart of Schreber's text, in the heart of his subjectivity and intersubjectivity. We have taken Bakhtin's advice and realise that the most important thing is to avoid severance from the text.

Bakhtin tells us:

Dialogical relations among utterances that also pervade individual utterances from within fall into the realm of metalinguistics. They differ radically from all possible linguistic relations among elements, both in the language system and in the individual utterance. (Bakhtin, 1986: 117).

Schreber's dialogic life is furrowed with the dialogic echoes of the discourse of others and the inmixing of his own voices and visions. Schreber is caught up in the 'carnival' body topography of *upper* and *lower* body, or as Bakhtin might say the *lower material bodily stratum*. 'I observed here too the otherwise frequent phenomena that friendly souls always tended towards the region of my sexual organs (of the abdomen etc.) where they did little or no damage and hardly molested me, whereas inimical souls always aspired towards my head' (Schreber, 1955: 114: *footnote 57*). If we are to make sense of Schreber's 'empty babel', we must take not only the Bakhtinian utterance but also his vital *Speech Genres* as part of our methodology. In respect of fragmentation, we make another comment so that we can make some sense of the terms *hallucination* and *delusion*. We have to assess, as Freud indicated variously, to what extent hallucination and delusion are sired from the stable of *phantasy*. Freud made the following observation:

Phantasies arise from an unconscious combination of things experienced and heard, constructed for particular purposes. These purposes aim at making inaccessible the memory from which symptoms have been generated or might be generated. Phantasies are constructed by a process of fusion and distortion analogous to the decomposition of a chemical body which is combined with another one. For the first kind of distortion consists in a falsification of memory by a process of fragmentation, which involves a disregard of chronological considerations. (Chronological corrections seem to depend precisely on the activity of the system of *consciousness*). A fragment of a visual scene is then joined up to a fragment of an auditory one and made into a phantasy, while the fragment left over is linked up with something else. (Freud, 1954: 204).

This remark by Freud of course is related to phantasies, but we hypothesize that there is a relation between phantasy and the delusions and hallucinations present in Schreber's text.

We now note a further comment by Freud:

... the most important genetic difference between a neurosis and psychosis: *neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and the id, whereas psychosis is the analogous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world.* (SE. XIX: 149).

Freud again:

The close affinity of [this] psychosis to normal dreams is unmistakable. A pre-condition of dreaming, moreover, is a state of sleep, and one of the features of sleep is a complete turning away from perception and the external world. (Ibid. 151).

And finally on this point:

In regard to the genesis of delusions, a fair number of analyses have taught us that the delusion is found applied like a patch over the place where originally a rent had appeared in the ego's relation to the external world (Ibid.).

In a slightly later paper Freud says:

I have recently indicated as one of the features which differentiates a neurosis from a psychosis the fact that in a neurosis the ego, in its dependence on reality, suppresses a piece of the id (of instinctual life), whereas in a psychosis, this same ego, in the service of the id, withdraws from a piece of reality. (SE. XIX: 183).

In psychosis, Freud tells us that there is the ‘creation of a new reality’ (Ibid. 185), so that: ‘in neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in psychosis it is remodelled’ (Ibid.). Freud further asserts: ‘Thus the psychosis is also faced with the task of procuring for itself perceptions of a kind which shall correspond to the new reality: and this is most radically effected by means of hallucination’ (Ibid. 186). He goes on:

The fact that, in so many forms and cases of psychosis, the paramnesias, the delusions and the hallucinations that occur are of a most distressing character and are bound up with a generation of anxiety — this fact is without doubt a sign that the whole process of remodelling is carried through against forces which oppose it violently (Ibid. 186).

We would add, however, that the return of the image of the *fragmented body* and the image of the return of *fragmented speech* are responsible for this generation of anxiety.

We leave the final word on this with Freud:

... It can hardly be doubted that the world of phantasy plays the same part in psychosis and there, too, it is the storehouse from which the materials or the pattern for building the new reality are derived. (Ibid. 187).

This final remark allows us to place ourselves at the point of phantasy originally mentioned.

In a letter to Fliess from Freud, we also find the following:

... let me repeat that I have discovered the source of auditory hallucinations in paranoia.

The origin of the phantasies, as in hysteria also, is things heard but only understood *subsequently* (Freud, 1954: Letter 62: 201, dated 16.5. 1897).

Freud's comment resonates with the conceptualization of Carnival. The relation of the ego to the external world and the creation of a 'new reality' are the everyday stuff of Carnival. One could perhaps be forgiven for wondering to what extent Carnival is a 'psychotic discourse', or at the very least, it appears to incorporate many of the mechanisms.

We now turn our attention to Bakhtin's *Speech Genres*, to see how Bakhtin's work allows us to place ourselves, without confusion, at the heart of Schreber's utterance. The utterance — written or spoken — always has a previous referent and will always leave a hook at its end, unless one assumes that one speaks into the void or, as Bakhtin says, that one is Adam. Also there is always an outside interlocutor to which one refers in the triad of speech. But this outside interlocutor is within the utterance, this is Bakhtin's *superaddressee*, and bears comparison with Lacan's Name of the Father, however, this time within the utterance.

System of Language

The utterance in Bakhtin cannot be placed within the *system of language* and it is not just the *individual utterance*, it is the *expression* of what happens intersubjectively. It is a

dialogic vein that connects one concrete utterance to another and by-passes the *system of language* (although of course the *system of language* is presupposed). Bakhtin's linguistic transfusion takes place through the living event of the utterance, supplying blood to the *dialogic* heart of language and not the *system of language*. In this Bakhtin is subversive, as Freud was subversive.

In Schreber's *Memoirs*, I consider that they may, in fact, be divided into two sections. In the first half of the book (roughly), Schreber deals primarily with descriptions of his bodily disintegration and the interpenetrating voices attached thereto. In the second half of the book speech disintegration begins to predominate, speech disintegration becomes the dominant. At this point we must clarify a particular matter. We do not question that Schreber displays, throughout his book, a coherent and sustained discourse. In fact, his book played a significant part in his release from the asylum. Fragmented speech, in Schreber, relates not to a change in writing style, for example, but rather to the *object of description*, i.e., his psychic reality. We would expect to find, for example, the dissemination of Schreber's *actual* speech, which is in fact authenticated for us by Dr. Weber.

To continue, one may find many examples of bodily disintegration in the first half of the book, and then there is a gradual diminution of such references (although, it must be said, not entirely) in the second half. As an example of this let us check the following statement in Schreber:

The reason for this was the fact that the manifestations of the disease were always subsequently removed by pure rays. For one distinguished ‘searing’ and ‘blessing’ rays; the former were laden with the poison of corpses or some other putrid matter, and therefore carried some germ of the disease into the body or brought about some other destructive effect in it. The blessing (pure) rays in turn healed this damage. (Schreber, 1955: 95).

Conversely, let us check another comment much later in the book:

It is true that I used strong language occasionally; but these words did not spring from my own spiritual soil, but are used only as far as I can see, *when I relate* the content of a conversation the voices carry on with me. It is not my fault that these voices often use expressions not fit for drawing rooms; to give a faithful picture I had to render these forms of speech literally. I will give only one example as proof that the ‘strong language’ used by the voices could not have been produced by my own nerves: that particularly offensive word beginning with f—— hardly passed my lips ten times in my earlier life whereas in the course of the last few years I have heard it ten thousand times from the voices ... (Schreber, 1955: 380-381).

We recognize that these two examples are by no means exhaustive, but they are representative of a ‘trend’ towards concentration on *language* rather than the *body* in the second half of the book. Schreber becomes more preoccupied with the fragmentation of speech. First half, *Narcissus*, second half, *Echo* — the pair came together at the mirror stage and they stay together — however fragmented they may appear.

Schreber does not depend upon a stable body-image, it is for him a permeable membrane, he crosses the boundary and re-writes the body image continuously and, subsequently, the speech image. For example: ‘At times M. and Sch. unloaded into my body a part of their bodies in the form of a foul mass in order “to remove themselves” (Schreber, 1955: 118). Here we see an example of *appersonization*, whereby what normally may be the unconscious absorption of the body image of another, in this case is designated consciously. Schreber is also subjected to *depersonalization* in the form of’ finally a *change in my whole stature* (diminution of body size) — probably due to contraction of the vertebrae and possibly my thigh bone’ (Schreber, 1955: 142).

We posit a correlation between Schreber’s ‘rotting’ body image and its effect upon his general body image and speech image. ‘God’s rays appeared to act from the instinctive knowledge that it would be most distasteful for them to have to allow themselves to be attracted by a rotting body’ (Ibid. 146). Schreber tells us that:

The effect of the pumping out was that the spinal cord left my mouth in considerable quantity in the form of little clouds, particularly when I was walking in the garden’ (Ibid. 146).

And the comment: ‘Rays [language] did not seem to appreciate at all that a human being who exists *must be somewhere*’ (Ibid. 151). We must also note:

As mentioned in chapter nine the talk of the voices had become mostly an empty babel of ever-recurring monotonous phrases in tiresome repetition; on top of this they were

rendered grammatically incomplete by the omission of words and even syllables. (ibid. 152).

In the interplay between the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image we repeat, in Schreber, there is a gradual increase in the use of fragmented speech, which ultimately becomes the dominant. There is a distinct inmixing of ‘rays’ and ‘nerves’ in which the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image interpenetrate each other—this we would designate as a *speech complex*.

Speech Genres

As speech genres play such a vital role in our discussion of the Schreber case, we clarify their use described for us in Bakhtin’s *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*: ‘Each separate utterance is individual of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances. These we may call speech genres’ (Bakhtin, 1986: *xxi*). If the utterance dialogically by-passes the *system of language*, then it becomes possible to understand that the utterance may be defined in terms of *relatively stable types* of utterances, thereby forming a speech genre. What is an example of a speech genre? The discursive field of *everyday* dialogic interaction, the rejoinder, turning to someone, the give-and-take of everyday discourse in other words, is a speech genre. In a text such as Schreber’s it is crucial to mark the *change in speech subjects* (the utterance) and discursive ‘groups’ of utterances (*speech genres*), otherwise one becomes lost in the welter of voices. When we first speak, as infants, we do not speak in terms of the *system of language*, but we do address ourselves to utterances and,

as Bakhtin tells us, we have speech genres at our disposal from the very beginning. A stratification of genres will be our aim in attempting to interpret the Schreber 'text'.

We consider, however, that in the first instance there is no greater language stratifying force than that which exists between the conscious and the unconscious. This is, for us, a basic premise. Also, it is a premise of ours that unless we pick up on the dialogic implications of Bakhtin's thought, we find ourselves with an imaginary relationship to language. 'The language is, so to speak, more or less self-conscious of its "face" because it has encountered an image of itself' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 310). This is, in effect, the mirror of speech; the utterance is *interindividual*. It seems that one has to be able to take up a position external to language and 'see' language as the 'other'. 'The *superaddressee* is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 135). As we move deep into the Schreber text, we should recall that 'Dialogue moves into the deepest molecular and, ultimately, subatomic levels' (Bakhtin, 1981: 300).

Our primary purpose is to locate fragmented speech in a 'psychotic discourse' and draw certain conclusions, and so, we find that the proof of the pudding must surely be in the eating? We understand that 'Dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not reside within the system of a language' (Bakhtin, 1986: 117). Bakhtin also teaches: 'Thus, the listener who understands passively, who is depicted as the speaker's partner in the schematic diagrams of general linguistics, does not correspond to the real participant

in speech communication' (Bakhtin, 1986: 69). As Bakhtin says so often, we understand with the utterance that someone relinquishes the floor.

Authoritative and Internally Persuasive Discourse

The interpenetration of genres and the dialogic relationships of the utterance provide us with the methodology that allows us to interpret the Schreber text in our own terms. We draw another line in the sand and delineate clearly the Bakhtinian *authoritative discourse* and the *internally persuasive discourse* and its acute application to Schreber. Proceeding through Schreber's text we shall trace evidence of the *authoritative discourse* and the *internally persuasive discourse*, just as we found and traced evidence of the centrifugal and centripetal forces operative in language. So what precisely is an authoritative and internally persuasive discourse? To trace just an outline, we borrow the definition provided by the *Editor of The Dialogic Imagination*, Michael Holquist, in the *Glossary*.

First:

Authoritative Discourse: 'This is a privileged language that approaches us from without, it is distanced, taboo, and permits no play with its framing context [Sacred Writ, for example). We recite it. It has great power over us, but only while in power; if ever dethroned it immediately becomes a dead thing, a relic.

Opposed to it is *internally persuasive discourse* which is more akin to retelling a text in one's own words, with one's own accents, gestures, modifications. Human coming-to-consciousness, in Bakhtin's view, is a constant struggle between these two types of discourse: an attempt to assimilate more into one's own system, and the simultaneous

freeing of one's own discourse from the authoritative word, or from previous earlier persuasive words that have ceased to mean'. (Bakhtin, [Holquist] 1981: 424-425).

We may ask ourselves as we work through the Schreber text, to what extent is Schreber caught up in his failure to apprehend the difference between these two quite specific *voice zones*?

As we draw to a close our comments on the utterance and speech genres, we just note the following as clarification: 'The problem of understanding the utterance. In order to understand, it is first of all necessary to establish the principal and clear-cut boundaries of the utterance. The alternation of speech subjects.' (Bakhtin, 1986: 112). We understand the utterance is a unit of speech communication. The work (Schreber's *Memoirs*) is related to other work-utterances (Freud's paper on Schreber, and Lacan's work *The Psychoses*, for example). And now the absolutely crucial '...only the contact between the language meaning and the concrete reality that takes place in the utterance can create the spark of expression' (ibid. 87). We may wish at this stage to assess the *contradistinction* of this with Lacan's statement: 'When he speaks, the subject has the entire material of language at his disposal, and this is where concrete discourse begins to be formed' (Lacan, 1993:54). Bakhtin tells us: 'We repeat, only the contact between the language meaning and the concrete reality that takes place in the utterance can create the spark of expression. It exists neither in the system of language nor in the objective reality surrounding us' (Bakhtin, 1986: 86-87).

Approaching Schreber's Utterance

We now analyse certain aspects of Schreber's text in respect of our discovery of *fragmented speech* and in the light of the work produced surrounding Schreber by Freud and Lacan. We should also add that the *medical text* of the report produced by Dr. Weber — as his medical assessment of Schreber, interpenetrates *our* assessment of the dialogic voices of Schreber as well. Let us begin with an opening assessment of the fragmented body image of Schreber himself that is outlined for us by Freud:

During the first years of his illness certain of his bodily organs suffered such destructive injuries as would inevitably have led to the death of any other man: he lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn oesophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs, he used sometimes to swallow parts of his own larynx with his food etc., But divine miracles ('rays') always restored what had been destroyed. (SE. XII: 17).

Freud allows us here to glimpse the fragmented body image of Schreber and our first mention of the 'rays'. Schreber's use of *rays* we define as a metaphor of *language* for Schreber. The term *nerves* we define as a metaphor describing the *body*. Schreber's 'rays' and 'nerves' are attempts to stabilize the image. Within the Schreber text itself there are variations on this theme but basically 'rays' often refer to voices and the 'nerves' are an impregnation of the body. We would also expect to find Schreber's 'basic language' or something of the sort, in any similar discourse. The reason? At the mirror stage, as an experience, the acquisition of 'whole' speech is marked by a language *megalomania* and *omnipotence* in contradistinction to the repressed fragmented images of

both the *body* and *speech*. ‘In contrast the genuine basic language, that is the expression of the souls’ true feelings before the time the mechanically repeated phrases commenced, excelled in form also by its dignity and simplicity’ (Schreber, 1955: 156). There is, in Schreber, a continuous duality between the forces of heteroglossia and monoglossia but, in pathological form. We note: ‘Fancy a person who was Senatspräsident allowing himself to be f——d’ (Ibid. 164). And finally, we have ‘...in senseless monotony like a barrel-organ by all the other tasteless forms of speech’ (Ibid. 171). Again, we may remind ourselves of the similarities with the Bakhtinian carnival and language of the marketplace.

So, to some degree, we shall always expect to find hi-falutin’ language accompanied by ‘grotesque’ language in Schreber: ‘it would be preferable that the content of these spoken words made sense — even if in endless repetition — and not consist of sheer nonsense or frank vulgarities’ (Ibid. 172). It is at such times that Schreber approaches Rabelais, alas, however, without the parody. Again, it is as if, in the case of psychosis, as the unconscious crosses the frontier of the censor and unsettles the ego, it drags with it the previously repressed fragmented body image and fragmented word image — we regard the interaction of the two (fragmented body/speech image) as: the *speech complex*. We must, I think, remember that there *is* an image of the whole body, there *is* an image of the whole word, but in the Lacanian register both would be a *méconnaissance*. And both are constitutive of the ego. On the other hand, the fragmented body and fragmented speech are held as images in the unconscious, and they seem to have a relationship with, what one can only describe as, the fragmented libidinous investment.

Schreber — Carnival Motif of Crossdressing

‘I venture to assert flatly that anybody who sees me standing in front of a mirror with the upper part of my body naked would get the undoubted *impression of a female trunk* — especially when the illusion is strengthened by some feminine adornments’. (Ibid. 248). Let us set up a dialogic encounter here with Dr. Weber’s comment in his medical report (speech genre). ... ‘ the patient was frequently found in his room half undressed, declared that he already had feminine breasts, liked to occupy himself by looking at pictures of naked women’ (Ibid. 331). We have here an *in-between* discourse in more senses than one, we have the dialogic space between Schreber and Dr. Weber. That, in itself, is a discursive field, or at least contains the germ of a speech genre. We may also understand that, as Bakhtin teaches, an utterance is unique and unrepeatable. This becomes apparent in the differing dialogic zones of Schreber and Weber.

We now recall a comment by Freud that clarifies for us certain questions that one may have regarding Schreber’s *phantasies, hallucinations* and *delusions*:

In the final stages of Schreber’s delusion a magnificent victory was scored by the infantile sexual urge; for voluptuousness became God-fearing, and God himself (his father) never tired of demanding it from him. His father’s most dreaded threat, castration, actually provided the material for his wishful phantasy (at first resisted but later accepted) of being transformed into a woman. (SE. XII: 55-56).

Freud provides a brilliant insight into part of Schreber's delusional structure. So what precisely did Schreber himself say, and how does it fit in with our analysis of visual and auditory hallucinations?

Furthermore, one morning while still in bed (whether still half asleep or already awake I cannot remember), I had a feeling which, thinking about it later when fully awake, struck me as highly peculiar. It was the idea that it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse (Schreber, 1955: 46).

Increasingly, these thoughts will haunt Schreber, as he drifts in and out of a state that we may describe as the genre of *voluptuousness* within his *utterance*. 'Mere common sense therefore commands that as far as humanly possible I fill every pause in my thinking — in other words the periods of rest for intellectual activity — with the cultivation of voluptuousness' (Ibid. 252). We shall return to this crucial genre later. Freud makes the following points that help us position, as it were, our first essential genres in Schreber's delusional system. However, first of all a crucial comment by Freud: 'It may be added that the "voices" which the patient heard never treated his transformation into a woman as anything but a sexual disgrace'. (SE. XII: 20).

Freud tells us that '... the medical officer lays stress upon two points as being of chief importance: the patient's *assumption of the role of Redeemer*, and his *transformation into a woman*'. (SE. XII: 18). Now, although we do not elaborate on Freud's assumptions here, because we are tracking down *fragmented speech*, we must mark both — first, as Freud calls it, the theologico-psychological system and Schreber's voluptuousness as *both*

interpenetrating and *separate* genres. This is where Bakhtin's meaning becomes clearer. by delineating specific genres; their interpenetration may create a new genre. This appertains even if earlier dialogic echoes have furrowed the genre out previously. On this level it becomes possible to reaccentuate Schreber's discourse.

In the last statements, we have attempted to position ourselves *vis-à-vis* genres in Schreber's text, but now, although still connected, we check a comment made by Schreber himself. 'The souls to be purified learnt during purification the language spoken by God himself, the so-called "basic language", a somewhat antiquated but nevertheless powerful German ...' (Schreber, 1955: 26). In this kind of statement Schreber is holding on to the image of 'whole' speech, he is resisting the return of fragmented speech. In Schreber's text there is a web of interpenetrating discursive fields and if we are to discern effectively this interpenetration we must now locate ourselves again at the level of the body image.

The Body Image

'In November 1894 the patient's stiff posture loosened a little, he came out of himself more, became more mobile, started to speak coherently although in an abrupt and somewhat staccato manner; there now emerged undisguised, the fantastic delusional elaboration of his continual hallucinations' (Dr. Weber's medical report, [Schreber: 329]). We note also: 'For some time the physical behaviour of the patient showed only little change, the peculiar very loud forced laughter and the monotonous uttering in

endless repetition of incomprehensible abusive language (for instance, the sun is a whore). (Ibid. [Weber]: 331).

The onset of Schreber's illness appears to have been marked by hyperaesthesia (sensitivity to light and noise) and also to hypochondria. We have already mentioned *appersonization* and depersonalization; we now clarify the image: 'We take parts of the body of others and incorporate them in our own body-image (This phenomenon is called "Appersonization" in general psychopathology)' (Schilder, 1950: 172). An example of this, in Schreber, is: '... about that time I had Professor Flechsig's soul and most probably his *whole* soul temporarily in my body' (Schreber, 1955: 86). Further to this: 'In "depersonalisation" the individual withdraws from his body-image' (Schilder, 1950: 173). And again in Schreber: '... finally a *change in my whole stature* (diminution of body size) probably due to a contraction of the vertebrae and possibly of my thigh bones (Ibid. 142).

We would make a considerable mistake if we assumed that these oscillations in the conceptualisation of the body image had little or no impact on the speech image. It is only through Bakhtin's utterance and speech genres that we have a hope of discerning these correlations between the body and speech image. We need perhaps to note the following: 'the language we assimilate comes to us already dialogised, already spoken about, already evaluated; it is encountered as learned as something used and patched, as an aggregate rather than a system' (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 145). And: 'Utterances are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-sufficient; they are aware of and

mutally affect one another'. (Bakhtin, 1986: 91). Before moving on, we wish to note also a comment by Schreber that relates directly to the body image of the other:

On the contrary my nerves were shattered again the following morning, indeed so badly that I vomited the breakfast. A particularly terrifying impression was created in me by the totally distorted features which I thought I could see on the attendant R. when I awoke. (Schreber, 1955: 51-52)

In this we see that the 'physical' image of the other begins to fragment, a fragmented visual image of the other. Fragmented speech, it has to be remembered, is connected to the partially developed drives of the child, or fragmented drives, in other words the development of libido.

The splintered nature of the acquisition of speech leaves linguistic shards comparable with the images of the fragmented body. The child just — or so it thinks — needs an image of *wholeness* of the body and speech in order to be Ideal. We must, I think, note that there will always be a reaction from the ego to the return of fragmented speech in the form of *terrible anxiety*. It is a question of the relationship of the ego to the fragmented. In this we may recall Lacan's comment: 'I say that the subject speaks *to himself with his ego*' (Lacan, 1993[1981]: 14). Following this thread of Lacan's: '... psychosis, where at some time there has been a hole, a rupture, a rent, a gap, with respect to external reality' (Lacan, *ibid.* 45). In this rent, in this tear does not the unmediated unconscious appear? Notwithstanding this, however, we must now detect the Lacanian mirror stage register,

because the *aggressivity* detected by Lacan also looms large at this point of our investigation. Lacan teaches:

...all erotic identification, all seizing of the other in an image in a relationship of erotic captivation, occurs by way of the narcissistic relation — and it is also the basis of aggressive tension. (Lacan, 1981: 92-92).

We must make this quite clear because Bakhtin does not essentially deal with the aggressivity inherent in the ego and we do not wish to miss the fact in passing. So that we do not lose sight of these facts, Lacan tells us also:

This is precisely where the mirror stage is useful. It brings to light the nature of this aggressive relation and what it signifies. If the aggressive relation enters into this formation called the ego, it's because it is constitutive of it, because the ego is already by itself an other, and because it sets itself up in a duality internal to the subject (ibid. 92-93).

And finally and most importantly:

In every relationship with the other, even an erotic one, there is some echo of this relation of exclusion, *it's either him or me*, because, on the imaginary plane, the human subject is so constituted that the other is always on the point of re-adopting the place of mastery in relation to him, because there is an ego in him that is always in part foreign to him (Lacan, ibid. 92-93)

Schreber's Fragmented Speech — as Image

'The term "text" is not at all adequate to the essence of the entire utterance' (Bakhtin, 1986: 136). This is undoubtedly true in the case of Schreber. We are dealing with 'The problem of the second consciousness in the human sciences' (Ibid.) we must recall. It is the dialogic interpenetration of all the voices, including the unconscious that is necessary in Schreber. In the first instance, the way in which we trace fragmented speech in Schreber's discourse is: his relationship to 'whole' speech and his relationship to fragmented speech as inner and outer experience and his interrelationship with language. As Hirschkop has said, we must understand what it means to participate in language.

It is here that we see the merit of inner (conscious/unconscious) experience and outer (conscious/unconscious) experience. 'But here I saw only extraordinary figures, among them fellows in linen overalls covered in soot. Almost all of them were silent and practically motionless; only a few used occasionally to utter certain fragmentary sounds ...' (Schreber, 1955: 104). As we saw earlier, the face of the Attendant R. fragmented, so in this last comment we see that the *image of speech*, of those surrounding Schreber, is now fragmenting. There is also, for example, a distinct genre that could be followed through appertaining to Schreber's inner body experience as he himself describes it, and his relationship to the external world, his *environment*, and the way in which his physician, Dr Weber, experiences the outward image and discourse of Schreber.

For Schreber, it appears as if the unconscious drips undiluted into consciousness. Following Dinnage again, we note her comment: ‘His [Schreber’s] own identity having been invaded, fragmented, distorted, and annihilated, a story had to be found that made sense of it’ (Schreber, [Introduction]: *xviii*). In our opinion the story makes no sense without the *speech complex*. Now we check a vital comment by Schreber that places us at the outset of his illness:

During several nights when I could not get to sleep, a recurrent crackling noise in the wall of our bedroom became noticeable at shorter or longer intervals; time and again it woke me as I was about to go to sleep. Naturally we thought of a mouse although it was very extraordinary that a mouse should have found its way to the first floor of such a solidly built house. But having heard similar noises innumerable times since then, and still hearing them around me everyday in day-time and at night, I have come to recognize them as undoubted divine miracles — they are called ‘interferences’ by the voices talking to me...(ibid. 47).

This would seem to indicate that the voices are penetrating his consciousness and perhaps we need to ask from where do the voices emerge? It seems plausible that they must arise from the unconscious, not, as in neurosis in the form of a language intelligible to consciousness, but, in the case of psychosis, as an echo of the image of the fragmented body and fragmented speech recalled from the mirror stage experience. Two things now seem to happen; the fragmented images ‘appear’ to come from both *inside* and *outside*. It would seem that if the unconscious penetrates consciousness in this way, it predominantly returns from *without*. The unconscious now appears to be on the outside looking in. If the unconscious can only be on the inside, how then would we explain the

transference? Projection? Maybe, but even so surely the projection of contents to the outside necessitates movement of the unconscious? At any rate, the voices penetrate Schreber from both *inside* and *outside*. The unconscious must be inside or outside, for obvious reasons it cannot be *in* consciousness, at least in full. We now intend to check a crucial footnote by Schreber himself that we consider constitutes, within his ‘text’, the onset or perhaps one should say *onslaught*, of the fragmentation of his speech:

The word ‘think’ was omitted in the above answer. This was because the souls [part of religico-philosophical genre] were in the habit — even before the conditions contrary to the Order of the World [perhaps *Law of the Father* genre] had started — of giving their thoughts (when communicating with one another) grammatically incomplete expression; that is to say they omitted certain words which were not essential for the sense. In the course of time this habit degenerated into an abominable abuse of me, because a human beings nerves of mind (his ‘foundation’ as the expression goes in the basic language) were excited continuously by such interrupted phrases, because they automatically try to find the word that is missing to make up the sense. For instance as one of innumerable examples, I have for years heard hundreds of times each day the question: ‘*Why do you not say it?*’, the word ‘*aloud*’ necessary to complete the sense being omitted, and the rays giving the answer themselves as if it came from me: ‘Because I am stupid perhaps’. For years my nerves have had to endure incessantly such and similar nonsense in dreary monotony (as if it came from them). I will later say more about the reason for the choice of expressions and the effects they were designed to produce (ibid. 56)

Although this footnote by Schreber is far from the very first instance of the existence of *fragmented speech* in his text, this seems to be the first case where an interpenetration of various *voice zones* is penetrated by the possibility of fragmentation. The language glue

is coming unstuck; it will not hold. The grandiose speech, the unified discourse so brilliant in its continuous rhetoric (another genre) is falling apart. There is always a reflection and refraction existing between the image of the fragmented body and the fragmented word; there is correlation, a never-ending flicker of meaning between the two, which, under certain conditions, may prove fatal. The fragmented body image and fragmented speech image may act as a reflective prism. This of course is interrelated with the 'whole' images of the body and the word — and the 'pure' body and the 'pure' word in contradistinction of course to the grotesque. Note, however, Schreber's continuous juxtaposition of 'high' and 'low' language.

So that we remain quite clear about the relationship with the fragmented body we recall another comment by Schreber:

A lung worm was frequently produced in me by miracles ... I had the definite feeling that my diaphragm was raised high in my chest to almost directly under my larynx and that there remained only a small remnant of lung in between with which I could hardly breathe (ibid. 143).

We should not discard Schreber's comments, variously made, that he believed he would have to rot alive. Again, the decomposition of his body corresponds to the decomposition of his speech. It appears that the body-image and speech-image are interconnected in such a way that the dissolution of one brings about the dissolution of the other. Schreber's *Symphony to Madness* has to be transcribed for a number of orchestra parts. Schreber wrote the symphony but he could not transcribe it.

Checking Schreber again we find:

My nerves are influenced by the rays to vibrate corresponding to certain human words, their choice therefore is not subject to my own will, but is due to an influence exerted on me from without. From the beginning the *system of not-finishing-a-sentence* prevailed that is to say the vibrations caused in my nerves and the words so produced contain not mainly finished thoughts, but unfinished ideas, or only fragments of ideas... (ibid. 197).

Again, *Narcissus* and *Echo* provide the answer to Schreber's 'question' of the specular image and the speech image. We now find that Schreber gives us the 'grammar' of fragmented speech completely unfolded for us:

1. Now I shall,
2. You were to,
3. I shall,
4. It will be,
5. This of course was,
6. Lacking now is,

With this teasing space, Schreber now provides us with the answers:

1. (second part only) resign myself to being stupid,
2. be represented as denying God, as given to voluptuousness [genre] excesses etc.,
3. have to think about that first,

4. done now, the joint of pork,
5. too much from the soul's point of view,
6. only the leading idea, that is — we, the rays, have no thoughts. (Schreber, 1955: 198-199)

Schreber is not playing around here, the image of speech is slowly disintegrating. It would, however, not necessarily be a slow disintegration, it could be a flash of lightning, or like a firework taking ages to prepare and taking only a second to go off. We must not of course neglect the ego and the ego position and remember Freud's remark:

We might add, perhaps, that the ego wears a 'cap of hearing' ... but it might be said to wear it awry' (SE. XIX: 25).

Freud tells us that the paranoid builds his world again:

And the paranoid builds it again, not more splendid, it is true, but at least so that he can once more live in it. He builds it up by the work of his delusions. The delusional formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction. Such a reconstruction after the catastrophe is successful to a greater or lesser extent, but never wholly so; in Schreber's own words, there has been a 'profound internal change' in the world. (SE. XII: 70-71).

In Schreber's *decomposition* of the body image and the speech image we come to understand, we think, that there is interplay between the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image that is itself, a reflective symptomatology. Lacan tells us:

I refused to diagnose her as psychotic for one decisive reason, which was that there were none of those disturbances that are our object of study this year, which are disorders at the level of language. We must insist upon the presence of these disorders before making a diagnosis of psychosis. (Lacan, 1981: 92).

Clarifying this statement by Lacan — for ourselves, Lacan is quite clear here that a disturbance at the level of language is symptomatic in psychosis. Lacan also said: ‘As soon as there is a delusion, we enter at full tilt upon the domain of intersubjectivity’ (Lacan, 1981: 193). However, perhaps in contradistinction to Lacan, we would *not* consider that Saussure was the conquistador capable of taking us into that particular territory. By which we mean Saussure did not dialogize intersubjectivity, whereas Bakhtin of course did. Continuing, the reciprocal relationship between fragmented speech and the image of the fragmented body means of course that they are *tied* to each other as we saw previously — Narcissus and Echo. As Lacan’s *aggressivity* returns in the psychoanalytic session, so the image of the fragmented body and fragmented speech emerge simultaneously — at least in the case of psychosis. Let us recall again Lacan’s comment in his mirror stage paper:

This fragmented body — which term I have also introduced into our system of theoretical references — usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. (Lacan, 1977[1966]: 4).

This is because as a state of 'regression' (we do use the word cautiously) is reached in psychosis, to the mirror stage, the image of the fragmented body returns and so does the image of fragmented speech. The image of fragmentation of both the body and speech are constituted outside of the formation of the ego. They owe no allegiance to each other. It is the *méconnaissance* in the experience of the mirror stage, the prematurity of the child at birth, that catapults (at the mirror stage) the fragmented body image and fragmented speech image into the unconscious.

If the fragmented body image and speech image return, associated with the aggressivity discovered by Lacan, then the ego strengthens its defences against the marauding forces opposed to it. In psychosis, presumably one will always find an attempt to shore up the defences of the ego, which is now under threat. As Freud rightly tells us, in psychosis, after the deluge the crippled ego attempts to re-construct its image of the psyche in terms of delusions and hallucinations in order to create a new reality. These constructs, however useful they may be in order to stabilize consciousness, are 'contaminated' now with images that are fragmented and dismembered.

It is the return of the images of fragmentation that causes such terrible anxiety. If these images 'cross the line' at any time by, as it were, swamping consciousness the deluge is too great. The ego we must remember has only the misrecognized solidity of the unified body image and the unified speech image at its disposal and has also enclosed *aggressivity* within its solid parameters. The reason that the ego cannot stand up against the return of the fragmented is that it threw away the keys of fragmentation. Instead it

picked up the keys of a unified assumption of its specular image, a unified assumption of its speech image, and finally the key of an alienated split-subject of aggressivity that is, in fact, an alienated image of itself.

In the Schreber case, there are two methods that allow for reinterpretation and reassessment in the light of the discovery of fragmented speech and in the light of Bakhtin's discovery of the utterance and speech genres. In the first place, Schreber's text may be completely re-interpreted in terms of a *change in speech subjects*, conducive with Bakhtin's expression of the *utterance*. For example, there is a genre or sub-genre of cross-dressing that cuts through various other genres. There is the genre of the Law of the Father and as the *superaddressee* it is already contained in the trinity of the word. It is suggested here that the image of the two *suns* in the sky spoken of by Schreber (despite being depicted as female) are the father (personal) and the Father (God). There seems little doubt that Schreber unconsciously considers being penetrated by the 'rays' of both.

Bakhtin allows us to set up fields of dialogic potential that dialogically criss-cross the whole Schreber 'text' enabling us to discover new genres continuously. In this way the reader is within the subjective field of Schreber; intersubjectivity holds sway and there has to be a subject-subject relationship to the text. Bakhtin forces us to interact discursively with Schreber, and there is no possibility of a subject-object relationship. If one follows Bakhtin's direction within the text then one is *responsive* to Schreber; it is no longer possible to hold Schreber at a convenient distance — right in there, in the padded cell — it's the only way. To continue our earlier comments about the Law of the Father,

in genre terms we now have the law of the father (personal) superseded by the Law of the Father (God), but they are crossed, in Schreber, by the earlier mentioned genre of *voluptuousness*. I am aware that we have not in any way completed a stratification of all the voices present in Schreber's text, let alone a comprehensive assessment of genres, but our aim and purpose have been primarily to discover within and without of Schreber's text evidence of our hypothesis concerning *fragmented speech*. Here again, we have not itemized every occurrence where fragmented speech seems to be suggested, but hopefully we have stressed relevant passages. If one carefully articulates Bakhtin's utterance in the *change of speaking subjects* in Schreber one re-writes the map of Schreber's thought.

The second re-interpretation we need to make is of Lacan. If Lacan's work is approached in terms of an assumption of fragmented speech occurring at the mirror stage, then Lacan, in spite of his brilliant exposition, has left out half of what occurs in Schreber's discourse. Once one realizes that Schreber's *language meaning* is collapsing (we need not be seduced by Schreber's early eloquence) then the signs are everywhere. At some point, a psychotic revisits the scene of the mirror stage experience and ignites once more the memory and problem of *Narcissus and Echo* and the accompanying libidinal investment.

As the fragmented images inherent in Schreber's work drift in and out of focus, with his voices that speak quietly in '*lispering tones*' that eventually transpose into *hissing*, and where he compensates for the voices by *bellowing*, we can more easily locate the interpenetration of Schreber's heterogeneity of dialogic voices by the use of Bakhtin's utterance and speech genres. In other words, if we have a superimposed image of

conscious and unconscious forces superimposed upon the utterance and the respective speech genres, it is possible to understand the psychotic discourse, because the unconscious appears to be present in consciousness in psychosis. The consciousness and the 'second consciousness' are co-authors of the utterance in psychosis. There is an inmixing of forces, hence the tower of babel. The unconscious speaks from within and from without. And in psychosis the unconscious does speak, but the speech is fragmented, and has the quality of dream thoughts, fragments of phantasies that plague consciousness *from within*. If Schreber, and we when approaching the text, are plagued by his stratification of voices on so many dialogic levels, it needs the open unity of Bakhtin's thought to iron out Schreber's dialogic creases, long enough to wear Schreber's verbal vestments, and be present at the altar where Schreber worships. Perhaps all the contraptions and straps and devices that Schreber was subjected to as a child, consciously or unconsciously, should not be replaced in any assessment of his work by the rigid constraints of further structure but by the open unity of anti-structure.

CONCLUSION

In this project we have presented a hypothesis of fragmented speech. It had to be contextualized, however, and this we attempted to achieve in the first chapter by locating the early relationship between psychoanalysis and the literary text. The first engagement with a text was predominantly Freud's own engagement with *Sophocles' Oedipus Rex*. However, towards the end of the first chapter we discovered that Rank and, to a certain extent Freud, had overlooked the triangulated relationship of the reader and the writer/plot. This problem — as we found, was not about to go away.

The development of the idea of fragmented speech depends upon certain assumptions concerning the Freudian unconscious and in our second chapter we attempted to engage our assumptions within a loosely formed Bakhtinian framework. Fragmented speech appears in much evidence throughout Renaissance Carnival, and here we saw the first splitting of the image of the conceptualisation of the 'whole' body and the dismembered body and fragmented speech — the grotesque speech (language of the marketplace). In this carnival atmosphere we found sufficient strands to form a hawser strong enough to hold our thesis. The imagery surrounding the language of fragmented speech, or grotesque speech in carnival, leaves room for a linguistic harvest.

Following on from this, we found ourselves in front of Lacan's mirror and his specular image and the fragmented body. However, Lacan did not approach the problem of fragmented speech, thereby leaving Narcissus alone with his specular image,

unaccompanied by his 'lover' Echo. Lacan focused upon the problem of aggressivity and the statuesque ego, enabling us to make certain assumptions about the possibility of fragmented speech accompanying the image of the fragmented body across the Styx to Hades. This left us with the problem of drawing Lacan and Bakhtin into a similar field of research. Lacan does not deal with the concept of *fragmented speech* in the unconscious and neither does Bakhtin, but together they make the analysis of such a possibility probable.

The entwining of Lacanian and Bakhtinian thought provokes many questions at the level of fragmented speech that still remain to be answered. If one can accept the possibility that there is a 'whole' image of the body and a 'whole' image of the word, then it is equally possible to argue that they may be opposed in some way in the unconscious. It is the lack of permanence of the body image, outlined for us by Schilder, and its destructive capability that engaged us. The grandiose speech of psychosis has a counterpoint score of intense vulgarity — the fear of the return of the fragmented provokes *terrible anxiety*.

If one digs down into the soil of language, one invariably finds the broken crockery of fragmented speech at the base. If one digs down hoping to find a statue of language intact, one is likely to be disappointed. The future? In psychosis, the 'positionality' of the unconscious seems to be a crucial issue. The shift in the axis of the unconscious that occurs in psychosis needs to be developed much further. Also the *interrelationship* between the unconscious and the imaging of both the body and speech requires future research. If we collide the two (fragmented body image and fragmented speech image) it

seems possible that we shall create a genre, a *speech complex* that takes into account the flash of expression, of energy, that is generated when the two are opposed, perhaps similar to matter and anti-matter. Meanwhile, Schreber's discourse fragments continuously, which for him, leaves only the silence of the cell.

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It is also worth noting that Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Vol. IV and V have been taken from Sigmund Freud, Vol. 4. Penguin Freud Library. London and New York: 1991. See text. On occasion I have cited books that have also been printed separately, but they are indexed accordingly.

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