Dehumanization of ethnic groups

in Britain and Romania:

Socio-cognitive and ideological aspects

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Abstract

This research explored why certain stigmatized and marginalized groups such as the Gypsies are dehumanized by being considered less than human. Twelve studies conducted in Britain and Romania (six in each country) explored what might predispose an ethnic minority to being dehumanized, and what functions dehumanization might serve in the context of inter-ethnic relations. Firstly, focus groups interviews probed how the human-animal binary as well as anthropocentrism can inform theories of dehumanization. It indicated that *rational autonomy* differentiates humans from animals, while *sentience* makes them similar, and that the motives underlying the ideology of *speciesism* may underpin dehumanization, too. Secondly, questionnaire surveys measured on a 7-point scale the human typicality of twelve emotions and twenty traits that were used in the operationalization of dehumanization in the present research. Some emotions and traits were rated as more typically human than others, and their human typicality ratings were not significantly correlated to their animal typicality ratings, suggesting that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal. Thus, dehumanization was measured through the lesser association of typically human attributes with the out-group than with the in-group. Three vignette experiments employing artificial out-groups revealed that while the target out-groups were overall dehumanized, the out-groups culturally different from the in-group, as well as the poor ones, were more dehumanized than the culturally similar out-groups and the rich ones, respectively. Concerning real groups, a pilot study indicated that the Gypsies and the Germans were perceived as threatening and non-threatening and as low-status and high-status groups, respectively. A questionnaire survey and a vignette experiment revealed that the Gypsies were dehumanized, but that the Germans were not, in both countries. Overall, the results indicate that dehumanization is not an automatic in-group bias, and that it may be shaped by ideologies that place poor low-status and marginalized people at the boundaries of the category 'human'.

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Chapter 1: Overview

"Fighting Japs is not like fighting normal human beings.... We are not dealing with humans as we know them. We are dealing with something primitive. Our troops have the right view of the Japs. They regard them as vermin."

—Sir Thomas A. Blamey, World War II commander of the Allied land forces in New Guinea, *New York Times*, January 9, 1943

Contents of Chapter 1

1.1 Aims of the present research

Some groups of people can be perceived in certain circumstances as being unlike most humans. Their humanness can be denied in a variety of ways: they may be viewed as deviants from the human norm, or may be portrayed as primitive and therefore as uncivilized and anti-social. Alternatively, they may be associated with animal-like attributes, in particular with animals that conjure images of dirt and induce feelings of fear, disgust, and contempt. Such denial of humanness to certain groups or individuals is an expression of extreme prejudice, which has been termed *dehumanization*. The present research is concerned with the antecedents, moderators, and functions of dehumanization in inter-group relations in the context of culturally diverse societies. The questions addressed here are whether only certain groups are dehumanized, whether dehumanization is an expression of in-group favouritism, and whether dehumanization is driven by motivations related to in-group identification, social dominance orientation, or endorsement of multicultural ideology. The present research was conducted in Romania and Britain, taking into account the perceived relative status of the in-group, and the influence of relative economic development, immigration history, and multicultural ideology on dehumanization. Last but not least, the present research is also concerned with how dehumanization may be best operationalized, and examines why the human-animal paradigm has been implicitly adopted in research on dehumanization.

1.2 Theoretical background and methodological considerations

There are two main theoretical perspectives within which most of the existing work on dehumanization has been conducted, namely the theories of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) (e.g. Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits) (e.g. Pérez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001). The infrahumanization researchers focus on the in-group and postulate that people have an intrinsic motivation to reserve the human essence to their in-group, and to deny it to out-groups. They view infrahumanization as a 'lesser form of dehumanization' which is contingent on in-group favouritism. By contrast, in ontologization research the focus is on the out-group and on the conditions that predispose ethnic minorities to being dehumanized and socially excluded by the ethnic majority. Ontologization researchers have suggested that when a group is

perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the in-group, it is attributed a different, and less-than-human essence, that explains its failure to be 'converted'. These theories of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits), with their different interpretations and operationalizations of dehumanization, will be at the core of the present research.

The present research was also informed by the conceptualization of dehumanization as *pseudospeciation* (Erikson, 1970; 1985), i.e. as a form of self-idealization at the group level which creates "a false sense of unique identity in groups and ignores the genetic integrity of the human species" (Erikson, 1985: 213). This conceptualization of dehumanization shows that infrahumanization and pseudospeciation are very similar insofar as they locate the cause of dehumanization in the individuals' motivation to view their in-group as more human than other groups. At the same time, the present research drew on the conceptualization of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice (Tajfel, 1981), taking into account potential ideological factors and legitimizing myths that justify the inhumane treatment of out-groups. In this sense, dehumanization is a form of *moral disengagement* (Bandura, 1975; 1996; 1999), of *moral exclusion* (Staub, 1989; Opotow, 1990), and of *delegitimization* (Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990). The conceptualization of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice that serves to delegitimize and exclude certain groups shares many assumptions with the thesis of ontologization, to the extent that the dehumanization is not a form of in-group bias, but rather serves specific functions in specific contexts.

The present research was also concerned with the ways in which dehumanization can be operationalized and measured in empirical (but not exclusively quantitative) research. The choice of operationalization depends largely on how 'humanness' and '*de*-humanization' are conceptualized. As the quote cited at the beginning of the chapter illustrated, one can dehumanize by considering the target deviant from the human norm, by viewing it as primitive, by associating it with animal-like attributes, or even by using all of the above strategies simultaneously. The multiplicity of dehumanizing strategies suggests that one can invoke various dimensions of humanness which can be denied in the target of dehumanization. Consequently, there does not exist a single, unique way to operationalize

dehumanization, as diverse aspects of humanness can be used as criteria, and as various opposites of 'human' such as humans vs. animals, or humans vs. machines can be employed.

However, most of the researchers on dehumanization, and in particular those working on infrahumanization and ontologization, have implicitly relied on the human-animal binary to operationalize dehumanization. In this sense, the in-group is expected to be associated with human-like attributes, while the dehumanized out-group is expected to be ascribed more animal-like than human-like attributes, and less human-like attributes than the in-group. Thus, one measures dehumanizatin through the differential attribution of humanness to in-group and out-group, the in-group often acting as a control or reference group. Furthermore, it is not enough to operationalize dehumanization in terms of humans vs. animals, one also needs to specify which dimensions of the human-animal binary are to be used. In this sense, the infrahumanization researchers have employed the distinction between primary and secondary *emotions*, where primary emotions are assumed to be common to animals and humans, e.g. *fear*, while secondary emotions are presumed to be uniquely human, e.g. *nostalgia*. Given that the in-group is associated with secondary emotions to a greater measure than the out-group, one can conclude that the out-group is infrahumanized (dehumanized). Rather similarly, the researchers working on ontologization have adopted the human-animal binary and have operationalized dehumanization in terms of human-like attributes, e.g. *creative*, and animal-like attributes, e.g. *dirty*. By being associated more with animal-like than human-like characteristics, the out-group is dehumanized.

Most research on dehumanization has adopted quantitative approaches, in particular the research on infrahumanization, which has often employed implicit measures such as IAT (e.g. Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), with qualitative approaches being rarely used (but see Tileagă, 2005; 2006). Researchers' choice of methodology in the field of dehumanization seems to have been largely informed by the particular epistemological positions they embrace, but also by their specific conceptualizations of dehumanization and their research hypotheses. For example, the conceptualization of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) as an in-group bias that occurs implicitly and automatically has lead to the use of IAT methods

(e.g. Paladino, Leyens, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, Gaunt, & Demoulin, 2002; Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007). By contrast, the focus on the legitimizations for the moral exclusion of dehumanized groups such as the Gypsy minority has lead to discourse analytic approaches (Tileagă, 2005; 2006).

In the present research the human-animal binary was adopted as the basis for dehumanization, and the operationalization by means of emotions and traits, in line with previous research. However, it departed from a strict categorical operationalization such as animal vs. human traits, and employed instead a continuous measure of how typically human the target emotions and traits were. Thus, in the present research dehumanization was measured through the differential attribution of human typicality to in-group and out-group. The present research was not driven by adherence to any one specific epistemology: both qualitative and quantitative studies were used to inform the process of dehumanization. However, most of the present research consisted of experiments which were designed to test specific hypotheses concerning the antecedents, mediators, and correlates of dehumanization. In total, six focus group interviews, six surveys and eight experiments were conducted in Britain and Romania. Their results will be summarized in the section below.

1.3 Overview of the present research

<u>Chapter 2</u>
This chapter offers an extensive review of current theories of dehumanization as well as a summary of current research on dehumanization in inter-group relations. In Chapter 2 I first argue that while the humans vs. animals may be an adequate basis for theorizing and operationalizing dehumanization, the current researchers on dehumanization have somehow overlooked the ideological influences of anthropocentrism on the construction of animals as inferior to humans, as well as the potential parallels than can be drawn between speciesism (anthropocentrism) and dehumanization. Secondly, I review and critically assess and compare the most prominent research paradigms on dehumanization, infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits). Thirdly, I formulate the research hypotheses of the present research and

explain how conducting this research cross-culturally in Romania and Britain can inform the process of dehumanization.

Chapter 3

In this chapter I examine in greater detail why the current research on dehumanization has implicitly adopted the human-animal binary in the operationalization of dehumanization, and why animals are often taken for granted as the opposite of humans. While other researchers have examined whether animals can be viewed as an out-group (Plous, 2003), I do the reverse by exploring whether animals and their relationship with humans may serve as a model for the dehumanization of human groups. In this chapter I report and analyse six focus group interviews conducted in Britain and Romania (three in each country) which were centred on issues pertaining to human and animal life, e.g. abortion, animal experimentation, fox hunting. Exploring these ethical issues cross-culturally enabled me to take into account the influence of postmaterialist values (e.g. Inglehart, 1997) on animals' entitlement to rights. Bases on the findings of these studies, I suggest that the drawing of the boundary between in-group and dehumanized out-group may vary in line with particular ideologies or interests that need to be justified. I also suggest that one can extrapolate from speciesism and find motives of exploitation in dehumanization. Finally, given that the most excluded animals were the vermin, it may be that dehumanization may be a reaction to perceived threat from the out-group.

Chapter 4

Based on the existing research on dehumanization, twelve emotions and twenty traits were selected to be used as measures of dehumanization in the present research. In Chapter 4 I report on four questionnaires surveys (two in each country) in which I compared different methods of operationalizing the humanness and animal-ness of the target emotions and traits. The first study indicated that the traits and emotions were not perceived as either exclusively typical of human or of animals, respectively, but as varying in their degree of human typicality. In the second study, I adopted a between-participants design, and each emotion and trait was measured on a 7-point scale of human typicality or animal typicality, respectively. The results indicated that some emotions and some traits were more typically human than others, and the human typicality ratings were not significantly correlated with the animal typicality ratings.

This suggests that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal, in line with previous research (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). Only the human typicality ratings of the emotions and traits were used in the subsequent studies, with dehumanization being measured through the lesser attribution of human typicality to the out-group than to the in-group.

Chapter 5

In this chapter I report the first series of vignette experiments which explored whether cultural differences between the in-group and ethnic minorities as well as the minorities poor socio-economic status might predispose them to being dehumanized. I also explored the role of perceived threat, be it symbolic or material, in dehumanization. In the experiments, artificial ethnic groups were described as either culturally similar or as culturally different from the in-group, and as either rich or poor. The results indicated that while all the artificial target groups were dehumanized (through traits), the poor targets were more dehumanized than the rich ones, in both countries. The culturally different targets were more dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar ones only in Romania, and their dehumanization was mediated by the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group. Overall, perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization; instead the dehumanization of the poor targets mediated the perceived material threat against them, in Britain. The symbolic threat scales did not achieve adequate internal reliability in either country. The findings suggest that the poor groups and the culturally different ones may be more readily seen as deviant from the human norm, and they raise issues regarding the measurement of perceived threat.

Chapter 6

In this chapter I report on a second series of vignette experiments that aimed to replicate and elucidate the findings from the first experiment. A scale of perceived cultural differences and a more 'threatening' scale of perceived symbolic threat were introduced. The artificial groups and the vignettes describing them remained the same, except that the targets' economic status was expressed by means of their average income, which was described as either above or below the national average. Similarly to the previous experiment, the culturally different groups were more dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar ones, in both countries, and

the poor targets were more dehumanized (through traits) than the rich ones, but only in Britain. Regarding infrahumanization, i.e. the attribution of typically human emotions, in Romania only the poor out-groups were infrahumanized, whereas in Britain only the culturally different out-groups were infrahumanized. Perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the infrahumanization of culturally different groups in Britain, and the dehumanization (through traits) of culturally different groups in Romania. These findings bring support to suggestions that perceived differences at the level of values and beliefs might lead to the dehumanization of out-groups (e.g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Neither perceived material nor symbolic threat were found to play a part in dehumanization, although in Britain the poor groups and the culturally different groups invoked more material threat than the other groups, while in Romania endorsement of multicultural ideology was the only predictor of both perceived material and symbolic threat. Overall, the results suggest that dehumanization is not necessarily a reaction to perceived threat, but rather a response to the cultural and economic status of the out-groups, which may be interpreted as a rationalization of their economic and cultural status. The findings also raise the issue as to whether perceived threat should be best measured as combined scale of both material and symbolic items.

Chapter 7

Given that in the previous two experiments the two measures of perceived threat, material and symbolic, respectively, failed to have an impact on dehumanization, it was decided to combine the two types of threats into a single measure. At the same time, given that in some cases dehumanization predicted perceived threat, it was hypothesised that in the case of real groups perceived threat may in fact be a justification for dehumanization rather than an antecedent of it. Therefore I decided to contrast the dehumanization of artificial and real groups in order to examine how the relationship between perceived threat and dehumanization may differ in the different inter-group contexts. Firstly I conducted a preliminary within-participants study in each country using twenty-one ethnic minorities and immigrant groups as targets, aiming to find the groups that invoked the most and the least threat, respectively, with two items assessing material and symbolic threat, respectively. The Gypsies were found to be the group posing most symbolic and material threat in each country. The Germans were found to be the group invoking the least threat in Romania, while in

Britain the Chinese invoked the least material, and the Australians, the least symbolic threat. For the sake of comparability, the Germans were chosen as non-threatening target group in both countries, and the Gypsies, as the threatening one. The artificial groups were described as in the previous experiment. However, given the very high correlations between the perceived material and symbolic threat items from the pilot study, and the need for equivalent artificial groups, it was decided to describe the artificial targets as both rich and culturally similar to the in-group, and as both poor and culturally different, respectively. The participants were assigned either to the real or artificial group condition, and had either a 'threatening' (culturally different and poor) or 'non-threatening' (culturally similar and rich) target out-group. The results indicated that in both countries the artificial groups were dehumanized (through traits), the threatening ones more than the non-threatening ones, and that only the Gypsies were dehumanized, the Germans being attributed equal human typicality as the in-group. As for perceived threat, the factor loadings failed to distinguish between material and symbolic threat. Perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization, but neither did dehumanization mediate perceived threat. Instead, blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania. Overall, the results indicate that there are differences between artificial and real groups, as all artificial groups were dehumanized but only the Gypsies were. And they also suggest that dehumanization does not function as a form of in-group favouritism in the case of real groups, and that it may be contingent upon the perceived status of the out-group.

Chapter 8

In the final series of experiments I explored whether the perceived power status of the out-group and its perceived legitimacy can play a part in its dehumanization. The Gypsies and the Germans were retained as target groups, and I devised a vignette that assessed the relative power status and legitimacy of each group. Perceived threat from the out-group was also retained as a variable because it was expected to influence perceptions of legitimacy, and thus the process of dehumanization. But unlike the previous three experiments where threat was at the material and symbolic levels, in this experiment threat was conceived as threat to the in-group's social identity under the form of political pressure on the in-group. The vignette informed the participants that a recent EU report had highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) children in schools. In the 'Germans' condition, the participants were told that the German

Parliament had used the report to persuade the European Commission to propose a new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU. Their motive was to 'promote the German model of multiculturalism'. In the 'Gypsies' condition, the vignette informed the participants that the European Roma Rights Office had used the report to propose the same directive. In the threatening condition, this directive was supposed to entail spending public money and have some negative consequences, e.g. reducing school places available to non-Roma children, whereas the non-threatening condition, the participants were informed that if adopted, the directive would not be binding, but rather optional, and that it would be unlikely to have negative consequences. The results indicated that only the Gypsies were dehumanized (both through emotions and traits) in each country. Both the Gypsies and the Germans were perceived as less legitimate in the threatening condition. Furthermore, the Gypsies were perceived as a lower-status group than the in-group, and lower in status than the Germans, in both countries. But while Romanian participants rated the Germans as higher in status than the Romanians, the British participants rated the Germans as lower in status than their in-group. Given that the British participants did not dehumanize the Germans even though they perceived them as lower in status than themselves suggests that dehumanization is not a form of in-group favouritism, and that the relatively lower-status of the out-group is not always a precondition for dehumanization. Overall, the results indicate that a relatively high status protects group from being dehumanized, and that dehumanization occurs only in the case of certain groups.

Chapter 9

In the final chapter I highlight the key findings of the present research and link them to the existing research on dehumanization. I argue that humans' relationship with animals and the ideology of speciesism can offer a blueprint for the dehumanization of human groups. But at the same time I suggest that dehumanization does not need to be based on the human-animal binary, but can be operationalized in terms of what is typically human or how typically human certain target attributes are. Moreover, I argue that traits may offer a better operationalization of dehumanization than emotions given the higher consistency in the results using the traits measure. I suggest that cultural differences between in-group and out-group, poverty, and perceived relative group status can act as antecedents of dehumanization. Nevertheless, given

that the artificial target groups were overall dehumanized, I suggest that the dehumanization of artificial groups may be based on judgements of human typicality and deviation from the norm, where the in-group is taken as the prototype, whereas the dehumanization of real groups may draw on other factors such as relative group status. I conclude that dehumanization may be an instance of out-group derogation but not necessarily one of in-group favouritism, and that studying it cross-culturally can reveal its relationship to the in-group's status and to specific power relations.

Chapter 2   Dehumanization: A theoretical overview

Contents of Chapter 2

2.1 Introduction to dehumanization

In 2003, a Hungarian judge decided that two Gypsy men wrongly accused of murder should receive less compensation than they had demanded in their wrongful-arrest suit. The judge argued that the two Gypsy men had "more primitive personalities than the average, therefore, the psychological damage they suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested" (*Transitions On Line*, 18-24 November, 2003). Cases like this illustrate *dehumanization*, the process whereby out-group members who suffer discrimination are associated with more animal-like attributes, or are perceived as being less than human. The present research is concerned with the cognitive underpinnings and the ideological functions of dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations.

Recent research on prejudice and on inter-group relations has shown that prejudice against out-groups can be not only evaluative, but also semantic-anthropological. While evaluative prejudice uses a negative — positive dimension to discriminate against out-groups, semantic-anthropologic prejudice employs an animal—human continuum to discriminate between in-group and out-group, and between different out-groups. This semantic-anthropological prejudice, termed dehumanization, associates certain groups, be they ethnic out-groups or other stigmatized groups, more with animal-like than with human-like attributes, and deems them as less than human. At the same time, this type of prejudice associates the in-group with more human-like than animal-like attributes, and with more human-like attributes than the out-group. Dehumanization is assumed to play a role in inter-group relations because it implies considerations of inferiority of hence of status, and because it is assumed to underlie process of delegitimization and social exclusion. This chapter will review theories of dehumanization, will examine the dimensions upon which dehumanization hinges, and will discuss the potential functions of dehumanization as well as whether dehumanization is different from other forms of prejudice. Finally, this chapter will examine why dehumanization is important to the study of inter-group relations, and will explain how the present research will contribute to the existing body of research on dehumanization.

2.2 Defining dehumanization

Defining dehumanization is complicated by the existence of different research paradigms which have theorized and operationalized dehumanization in rather different ways. Moreover, the dehumanization paradigm is complicated by the lack of a clear definition of 'humanness', which is what is denied to others when they are dehumanized (Haslam, 2006). Largely, dehumanization is a form of prejudice involving the denial of human essence to out-group members, or the attribution of a less-than-human essence to them (e.g. Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000). Dehumanizing others, either at the individual or the group level, means viewing them as less than human and perceiving them as more similar to animals (or machines) than to humans. Dehumanization is assumed to go beyond the negative dimension of prejudice, as out-group members can be dehumanized in terms of positive animal attributes (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003; Pérez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002), or in terms of highly efficient robots. For example, artists are associated more with animals than automata, whereas business people are associated more with automata than animals (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007).

Defining dehumanization is also complicated by the fact that it constitutes not only a psychological phenomenon, but also a *social practice* (Tileagă, 2007). Groups such as the Gypsies and the poor are dehumanized, but they are also denied equal opportunities in health and education, and are marginalized by society, that is, by both ordinary people and by societal institutions (see Pérez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001; Lott, 2002). Thus, dehumanization is not a question of metaphor, nor should it be seen simply as a matter of social perception, but it should be seen as part and parcel of social practices that have negative consequences for the dehumanized groups. To dehumanize is not simply to *associate* out-group members with animal-like attributes, or to *perceive* them as being less than human, but to endorse beliefs or to engage in behaviours that maintain the social exclusion of these groups. Otherwise, simply perceiving others as being less than human may not be of consequence for inter-group relations. Arguably, it would be more accurate to envisage the perceptions of others as less than human as a consequence of the social practice of dehumanization rather as an antecedent of it. Therefore defining dehumanization should take into account the consequences of this phenomenon for inter-group relations, as well as ideologies that favour it. Having said this, it may not always be possible to examine dehumanization

by observing dehumanizing behaviour or social practices, as one can hold dehumanizing views about a particular group without necessarily engaging in dehumanizing behaviours towards that group. Equally, the association of out-groups with less-than-human attributes is not always tantamount to dehumanization, as for example the association of artists with animals (see Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). From a methodological perspective, in experimental settings dehumanization is inevitably reduced to being an association of less-than-human attributes with the targets in question, which arguably cannot take into account issues of ideology or of social practice. Nevertheless, it could be argued that studies of dehumanization should distinguish between dehumanization as an issue of perception, and dehumanization as an *ideological representation* (see Hopkins, Reicher, & Levine, 1997; Augoustinos & Walker, 1998; 1999).

To illustrate dehumanization in more concrete terms, two research paradigms on dehumanization will be briefly mentioned here but we will return to them later (for a more detailed description, see section 2.5 of this chapter). One such paradigm, the *infrahumanization* paradigm, defines infrahumanization as a "lesser form of dehumanization" and argues that all groups are bound to infrahumanize all out-groups because people have an inherent motivation to reserve the human essence to their own group (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000; Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & Demoulin, 2001; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, Paladino, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, & Vaes, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Infrahumanization has been operationalized in terms of the differential attribution of *primary* and *secondary* emotions to in-group and out-group, where primary emotions are common to animals and humans, e.g. *fear*, whereas secondary emotions are uniquely human, e.g. *nostalgia* (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001, 2003). It should be stressed here that this attribution of emotions to groups does not refer to the emotions that people feel towards those particular groups, but to the emotions people think those groups can experience or are more typical of those groups' feelings. While the primary emotions are attributed equally to in-group and out-group, the secondary (more human) emotions are attributed more to the in-group than to the out-groups, hence the infrahumanization of the out-groups. It is argued that infrahumanization shows that out-groups are perceived as being less human than the

in-group because they are perceived as lacking the ability to feel uniquely human emotions in the same measure as the in-group. Infrahumanization is assumed to be a general phenomenon, independent of the status of the in-group or of the out-group, because all human groups are assumed to be motivated to reserve the human essence to their in-group.

The second main strand of research on dehumanization, the *ontologization* paradigm, has focused on the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority. The ontologization paradigm argues that the majority creates a different ontology for those social groups which have resisted cultural assimilation for centuries in order to explain their resistance. This approach has operationalized dehumanization in terms of the differential attribution of animal (or *natural*) and human (or *cultural*) attributes to the Gypsies, where animal attributes are common to animals and humans, e.g. *dirty*, whereas human attributes are uniquely human, e.g. *creative*, (Pérez, Chulvi and Alonso, 2001; Pérez, Moscovici and Chulvi, 2002; Chulvi and Pérez, 2003). Research has shown that the Gypsies are attributed more animal than human attributes, but also less human attributes than the in-group (e.g. Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Ontologization is not the same as infrahumanization, because it conceives of dehumanization as being a form of prejudice directed at specific groups for specific reasons. Pérez et al argue that nature and culture act as principles for social classification, and that ontologization functions by excluding the ethnic minorities from the map of humanity. However, they argue that ontologization does not necessarily fall into negative discrimination, because out-groups can be dehumanized by being attributed a positive animal essence.

Another formulation of dehumanization is *pseudospeciation* (Erikson, 1970; 1985), which, as the name implies, is the false belief that the in-group is prototypically human, and that it is more human than other human groups. Erikson stressed the intentional falsity of pseudospeciation, which he defined as a "dominant psychosocial and potentially maladaptive process" which creates "a false sense of unique identity in groups and ignores the genetic integrity of the human species" (1985: 213). In Erikson's view, pseudospeciation "denotes that while man (sic) is one species, he appears and continues on the scene split up into groups (from tribes to nations, from castes to classes, form religions to ideologies, and professional

associations) which provide their members with a firm sense of unique and superior human identity — and some sense of immortality" (1985: 214). It is noteworthy here that not only ethnicity, but also class, religion, ideology, and even occupation may predispose an individual or a group to being dehumanized. Pseudospeciation can be reinforced under conditions of war or propaganda, and can make a "group's self-idealization both more defensive and more exclusive" (Erikson, 1985: 214).

Theoretically, pseudospeciation bears resemblance to infrahumanization because both assume dehumanization to rest on an exaggerated sense of humanity of the in-group. But both approaches are different from ontologization which assumes that dehumanization occurs in the case of specific out-groups, regardless of the in-group's sense of its own humanity. Unfortunately, the concept of pseudospeciation was never fully developed, nor operationalized by Erikson, therefore the comparisons to infrahumanization and ontologization are inevitably speculative. Overall, these different formulations of dehumanization raise the question whether dehumanization is contingent upon an exacerbated sense of the in-group's humanity (an overhumanization of the in-group as it were), or on particular features of the out-group, such as their cultural or economic status, or even on an interaction between the two. This issue is important because the overhumanization of the in-group may not necessarily translate into the dehumanization of the out-group (although this has often been inferred in experimental settings, as in the infrahumanization paradigm).

Overall, the infrahumanization and the ontologization paradigms have focused on the dehumanization of ethnic out-groups, but studies have shown that other low-status or stigmatized groups can be infrahumanized: women (Viki & Abrams, 2003), lesbians and gay men (Brown & Hegarty, 2005), the mentally ill (O'Connell, unpublished manuscript), and the homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006), to name just a few. However, the focus of the present research is on the dehumanization of ethnic groups, and therefore those aspects of dehumanization which are relevant to inter-group prejudice will be at the forefront of the present theoretical review.

2.3 Dehumanization and related concepts: depersonalization and deindividuation

Dehumanization could be seen as somewhat similar to the processes of depersonalization and deindividuation. Just as animals or machines do not possess personhood or identity, it can be argued that individuals or out-group members who are dehumanized are also depersonalized and deindividuated. Dehumanization and depersonalization have been theorized as ends of a continuum (Tajfel, 1981) in the sense that depersonalization refers to the cognitive aspects of prejudice, whereas dehumanization consists of the emotional, motivational, ideological and behavioural elements of prejudice (see also Billig, 2002). It may well be that dehumanization involves an element of depersonalization, but depersonalization alone may not be a sufficient condition for dehumanization. Tajfel (1981) viewed the dehumanization of out-groups as "the next stage" after their depersonalization. Dehumanization is not mere categorization of out-groups into 'less-than-human', but involves ideological factors and legitimizing myths that justify the inhumane treatment of out-groups (Tajfel, 1981). Otherwise stated, "merely to be categorized as a member of an out-group is not sufficient to be considered as being non-human, although, conversely, it can be said that an ideology of dehumanization must rest on the distinctions of social categorization" (Billig, 2002: 181).

Dehumanization is a different phenomenon from the depersonalization process envisaged by self-categorization theory where the focus is on the self and on the loss of individual identity. According to SCT, people depersonalize themselves in the process of becoming group members (see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Here, depersonalization is seen as inevitable side-effect of group formation and not as a negative thing, and refers to a contextual change in the level of identity. Similarly, dehumanization is different from deindividuation which, like depersonalization, focuses on the self and refers to individuals behaving as group members rather than as individuals as in Zimbardo's famous prison experiment (see Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Deindividuation is a negative form of depersonalization, and is assumed to underlie antisocial collective behaviour such as violent crowd behaviour, hooliganism, or lynching mobs (see Diener, 1977; Postmes & Spears, 1998). Given that depersonalization and deindividuation focus on the self and refer to decreased self-awareness, it cannot be argued that dehumanization is the same phenomenon as the other two. Nonetheless, it is possible to envisage that

individuals who belong to dehumanized groups may also be depersonalized and deindividuated, and that groups which are dehumanized may also be perceived as entitative, i.e. perceived as a uniform entity rather than as a collection of individuals (see Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000).

2.4 Cognitive and ideological underpinnings of dehumanization

What is the structure of dehumanizing beliefs? If dehumanizing others means denying them full human status, then we need to understand what humanness is and what substitutes it during dehumanization. Recent research has suggested that humanness can be conceptualized in terms of what makes humans unique and different from animals, i.e. *uniquely human* features, but also in terms of the features that are typical of humans and which may be shared with animals, i.e. *human nature* (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). While the uniquely human features such as reason, language, morality, secondary emotions, rest on comparisons between humans and animals, the human nature component of humanness is not contingent upon comparisons to animals because both humans and animals display instinctive behaviours, primary emotions, and other features relating that make humans and animals living organisms. Instead, the human nature component is often contrasted with machines (Haslam, 2006). Human nature refers to what all humans have in common, "those permanent and universal capacities, desires and dispositions that all human beings share by virtue of belonging to a common species" (Parekh, 2000: 115). Human nature traits have been found to comprise cognitive flexibility, warmth, and emotions responsiveness, whereas uniquely human traits refer to self-control, morality, intelligence, openness, and sociality (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006). The human nature traits were found to be relatively emotional, desirable, prevalent, and universal, whereas the uniquely human traits were judged as relatively infrequent and culturally specific (Haslam et al., 2005). The uniquely human characteristics may represent human essence in a sortal sense, grounded in dimensions such as religion, language, or culture, whereas the human nature traits may represent human essence in a natural kind sense, based on biological or natural dimensions. However, while Haslam et al. argue that the uniquely human and the human nature dimensions are independent of each other, it could be argued that uniquely human features such as morality, sociability or culture may be viewed as part of human nature because no human individual or group exists without them. Admittedly, cultures are acquired, but

humans cannot exist outside culture or outside a human community, because they are "culturally embedded in the sense that they are born into, raised in and deeply shaped by their cultural communities", as Parekh points out (2000: 120). Therefore, it may be difficult to separate human nature from human uniqueness, especially as these aspects can be disputed in discourse where their construction may be contingent upon various rhetoric purposes. For example, in-group members may argue that having culture is in their group's nature, while at the same time arguing that the dehumanized out-group is inherently averse to culture.

What constitutes human nature and human uniqueness, however subjectively constructed, can help understand the structure of dehumanizing beliefs. Haslam et al. (2005) have shown that only human nature traits are conceptualized in an essentialist manner, and have consequently argued that if dehumanization rests on the denial of human essence to the out-group, as envisaged by the infrahumanization paradigm, then dehumanization must take place at the level of human nature. And as human nature traits represent what is typically human, it could be argued that dehumanization consists of a denial of human typicality, although Haslam et al. (2005) concede that other forms of dehumanization involving human uniqueness can also occur (see Haslam, 2006). However, this makes it unclear whether dehumanization involves essentializing beliefs or not, an issue which remains unsolved to date in the dehumanization research.

While the conceptualization of humanness seems to rely on human nature and human uniqueness, these two dimensions are in turn underlain by various binaries, such as *human* vs. *animal, human* vs. *machine, human* vs. *less-than-human, culture* vs. *nature, civilization* vs. *savagery*. For example, human uniqueness may be based on the human-animal dichotomy, while human nature may be based on the human-machine contrast (Haslam, 2006), and even on the human-God comparison as in those instances where human weakness needs to be explained. These various binaries can underpin the process of dehumanization and have been employed to different degrees by researchers on dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). These structures are cognitive, for they provide the building blocks of the dehumanizing beliefs, but ideological at the same time, because their use can perform specific ideological functions in specific contexts and in relationship to specific groups. For example, equating an ethnic

minority group such as Australian Aborigines to primitive savages may serve to justify their social exclusion (Buchan & Heath, 2006), whereas comparing an out-group to machines may serve to portray them as emotionally inert (Haslam, 2006). At the same time, the human vs. animal and the civilization vs. savagery binaries may be used in inter-ethnic group prejudice, but they may not be appropriate for the dehumanization of other stigmatized groups, such as the physically or mentally disabled, where the human-machine binaries may be more useful, or the dehumanization of sexual minorities where the human vs. less-than-human may be more adequate.

Also, in inter-group relations, these different binaries can reflect the different status of out-groups: low-status groups may be dehumanized along the human-animal dimension (e.g. the Gypsies), whereas high-status groups may be dehumanized along the human-machine dimension (e.g. the Americans, which may be perceived as highly efficient but as lacking warmth). Arguably, there may be similarities between the use of these different binaries and Glick & Fiske's (1996; 2001) stereotype content model. According to this model, stereotypes about groups vary according to perceptions of competence and warmth in the out-groups, which lead to four different types of stereotypes: paternalistic, where the out-group is viewed as incompetent but warm; envious, where the out-groups is stereotyped as competent but cold; admirative, where the out-group is both competent and warm; and contemptuous, where the out-group is viewed as incompetent and cold. One could argue that the human-animal binary underlies paternalistic and contemptuous prejudice, whereas the human-machine dichotomy underlies envious prejudice.

All the binaries mentioned above might relate to dehumanization to various extents, and given their different connotations they may perform different ideological functions and may be appropriate to different degrees to the study of inter-group prejudice. Therefore these binaries will be briefly examined here to understand how dehumanization may work and what functions it may fulfil in inter-group relations.

2.4.1 Culture vs. nature, and civilization vs. savagery

Binaries such as *culture* vs. *nature* and *civilization* vs. *savagery* are very similar to each other and will be analyzed here together. They indicate that the dehumanized groups are perceived as savages lacking culture (or possessing a primitive culture) and as being closer to nature than to civilization. The ontologization paradigm, for example, is built on these binaries (although it also employs the human-animal dichotomy). Largely, culture is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man (sic) as a member of society" (Tylor, 1958:1). Culture is also a set of "explicit and implicit patterns, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including the embodiment in artefacts" (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952: 181). Culture, in the sense of *civilization*, denotes human progress, "an achieved condition of refinement and order" (Williams, 1988: 58), "intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development" (Williams, 1988: 90). Importantly, culture "begins at the point at which humans surpass whatever is simply given in their *natural* inheritance, and implies "the cultivation of the natural world" as well as "the ability of human beings to construct and to build, and the ability to use *language*" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999:102, original emphasis). Nature, on the other hand, is "that which is opposed to, prior to, or simply outside human *society* and *culture* (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999: 256, original emphasis). It follows that if nature is outside society and culture, out-groups associated with nature may be perceived or may be ideologically constructed as outside society, hence their social exclusion. As Edgar & Sedgwick point out, "if nature is opposed to human society, then it can either be because nature is seen to be superior to society, or because it is inferior" (1999: 256). Arguably, the construction of the other as 'noble savages' or as 'uncouth primitives' suggests dehumanization in both cases, but the former also involves a positive connotation, whereas the latter, a negative one.

At another level, culture is "a system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a groups of human beings understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives" (Parekh, 2000: 143). Cultural values can play a role in inter-group prejudice (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993) and have been found to be at the core of perceived symbolic threat (e.g. Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The theory of belief congruence (Rokeach, 1960; 1968) can be

relevant in this respect: one's culture provides a frame of reference, and any different culture from one's own may be judged, subjectively, according to its similarity and compatibility with one's native culture. Research has found that perceived dissimilarity between groups in terms of the hierarchy of basic values can lead to perceived inhumanity of the out-group (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In particular, perceived trait inhumanity and perceived value dissimilarity mediated the effect of perceived conflict on aggression. Thus, the cultural beliefs, values and norms of behaviour can be considered to reflect a group's humanity, and in this case dehumanization involves a negative evaluation of the out-group's cultural practices.

How might the *civilization* vs. *savagery* binary underlie dehumanizing beliefs? *Civilization* has often been contrasted with *savagery* or *barbarism* (Williams, 1988), and it generally refers to social order, refinement, and knowledge. At the same time, the concept of *primitive* has been considered the polar opposite of a variety of concepts, including *Western, civilized, advanced, prosperous, modern*, and although its use has greatly changed in recent times, it nonetheless carries negative connotations (Berndt, 1968). Similarly, *human* has often been contrasted with *savage* or *barbarian* (see for example Jahoda, 1992; 1999; Montagu, 1968). Historically, the 'domesticated man' ('l'homme domestique') and the 'wild man' ('l'homme sauvage') have been conceptualized as the ends of a continuum of humanness, where the domesticated man is assumed to possess intellectual, social, technical and scientific powers, whereas the wild man is presumed to lack science, religion, logic, is more inclined to mythical and magic thinking and to observing 'narrow-minded' social practices (Moscovici, 1979, my translation). The former incarnates the superior model of reason, culture and refinement, the 'civilized' man *par excellence*, while the latter is represented by the primitive, the peasant, the nomad, or the stranger. Moscovici (1979) argues that this continuum of humanness serves to define the relationships between human groups as it establishes and legitimizes a social hierarchy, and whichever group views itself as the epitome of humanness then feels compelled to 'domesticate' the other groups. However, it is not clear whether such thinking is universal or idiosyncratic to Western cultures, although Moscovici (1979) suggests that it was linked to Western cultures' need to justify their exploitation of non-Europeans (cf. Jahoda, 1992; 1999).

The contrast between civilization and savagery provides clues to the ancients roots of modern prejudices in Western cultures (Jahoda, 1999), and arguably has had repercussions in contemporary debates about multiculturalism and the assumed clash of cultures. A historical examination of the construction of what it means to be human shows that this has been used in the past as a tool to dominate and exploit the peoples living in the European colonies in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Therefore one could argue that humanness is not merely a point of philosophical debate, but also an issue relating to scientific and political practices, where the dehumanization of the 'other' can serve power interests and legitimizing ideologies (Jahoda, 1992; 1999). The peoples the colonizers came into contact with, e.g. North American Indians, African tribes, Australian Aborigines, were perceived as savages due to their apparent lack of economic and scientific progress. It could be argued that these peoples were indeed less developed economically and scientifically than their European counterparts, but their lack of economic and scientific development could have been explained through other factors such as lack of domesticated animals and crops, environmental conditions, or climate (see Diamond, 1997). Or it could be argued that they were equally developed if 'development' includes models that sustain the ecosystem. At the same time, even when the newly-encountered peoples were economically and scientifically developed, e.g. the Maya, the Inca, this did not prevent the European occupiers from abusing and subjugating them, and from failing to recognize their contributions to science. One could perhaps argue that the dehumanization of the colonized 'other' stemmed from a fundamental attribution error (see Ross, 1977), whereby their less developed economies were explained in terms of a dispositional nature (i.e. a less-than-human essence) instead of situational factors. The indigenous populations were often viewed, or rather ideologically constructed, as being driven only by instinct, lacking rationality and the assumingly essential human and universal propensity for cultural progress. But the Enlightenment standards of economic development and scientific progress were often used as yardsticks of civilization and implicitly of humanness, and served to exclude from the realm of humanity those groups appearing to be lacking in them (Larrain, 1994).

Historically, sciences such as anatomy or linguistics were pervaded by racist views such as *polygenism*, the belief that white Europeans, the peoples of Africa and the peoples of Asia were different human species (Jahoda, 1999), a belief which bears

a family resemblance to pseudospeciation and ontologization. In line with the ethos of the time, the peoples of the colonized territories were viewed as *simple-minded*, *stupid*, *weak*, and *brutal* savages, and were assumed to lack *internal autonomy*, *intelligence* and adequate *impulse control*. These scientific doctrines about the presumed animality of the colonized "savages" seem to have acted as both rationalizations of these groups' status and as justifications for European colonialism: by denying their humanity, it became possible to justify and to legitimize their exploitation and slavery. For example, polygenism was used to justify slavery in 19th century USA (see Gould, 1981), which suggests that dehumanization is selectively invoked to justify existing social arrangements. Similarly, the colonialization of Australia was made possible through the portrayal of Aborigines as savages living in a pre-civilized state (Buchan & Heath, 2006). That the Aborigines were dehumanized is quite evident in the social policies directed at their forceful 'emancipation', such as the removal of Aboriginal children from their families in order for them to become 'civilized' through White upbringing. Buchan & Heath argue that 'savagery' and 'civilization' were discursive constructions that justified "the appropriation of Indigenous land through the non-recognition of Indigenous social forms, modes of governance and relationships to land" (2006: 6).

While it may be possible to envisage how dehumanization might take place at the level of culture, dehumanization may not involve a total denial of culture in the 'other', because all human groups have culture regardless of their economic development. If culture is used as a criterion for dehumanizing groups, it would be more appropriate to envisage dehumanization as a devaluation of the out-groups' culture, i.e. considering their culture 'primitive' or inferior, rather than as an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It could be argued that to dehumanize out-groups on the basis of their culture may involve elements of cultural essentialism or determinism, in the sense that culture is naturalized and the out-group members are seen as inexorably constrained by their cultural heritage (see Parekh, 2000; Eagleton, 2000). Those immigrants, for example, who endorse different cultural practices from those of the host society can be seen as deviants and can be abnormalized by host society members (Verkuyten, 2001), their abnormalization stemming from the immigrants' presumed violation of what is culturally normal. Culture can be essentialized by both host society and minority group members (Verkuyten, 2003), albeit for different

political purposes, and this demonstrates that essentialization can take place at the level of "uniquely human" features, contrary to Haslam et al.'s claims (2005) that essentialization takes place only at the level of "human nature" features. This discrimination on the basis of cultural norms ("culturalism", as Eagleton, 2000, might put it) makes dehumanization resemble the 'new racism' or the 'racism of difference' (see Barker, 1981; Taguieff, 1987; Hopkins et al., 1997), and also the 'symbolic racism' (Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003), where the focus of prejudice shifts from race to culture. This is perhaps due to the contemporary norms of prejudice suppression (see Crandall, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Thus, dehumanization at the level of culture may provide a new form for an old bigotry, and a more subtle one at the same time (see also Pérez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001).

2.4.2 Human vs. animal, and human vs. less-than-human

The human-animal binary has figured in the construction of humanness and of dehumanizing beliefs (Haslam, 2006), and underlies the paradigms of infrahumanization and ontologization. In both paradigms, the operationalization of dehumanization, i.e. primary vs. secondary emotions, and animals vs. human attributes, respectively, has relied on the contrast between humans and animals. Animals are presumed to be unable to experience secondary emotions such as *pride* or *nostalgia*, and traits such as *creative* or *competent* cannot be applied to them. Humans resemble animals in terms of their 'nature', but differ from them in terms of their human uniqueness (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006). That is not to say that human nature and animal nature are the same, but that certain elements such as survival instinct, sleeping, eating, and reproduction are common to both, and distinguish both humans and animals from machines.

But how exactly is the human-animal boundary drawn? And how can anthropomorphism as well as anthropocentrism be avoided in the attempts to define what animal nature is? Defining humanness in contrast to animality is not only a scientific but also an ideological exercise because "the relationship between humans and animals is not a given. There is no line on the map that allows us to define the boundary between Man and Beast. We have to draw that line ourselves, according to our needs and perspectives" (Malik, 2000: 205). And although the drawing of this line

can be shaped by "our understanding about what it means to be human" (Malik, 2000: 205), it can also be shaped by humans' needs for using animals for food, clothing, or scientific experimentation.

One way to define what humans are in contrast to animals is to examine the rights they enjoy and the dimensions that underlie them. Human rights rest on cognitive and non-cognitive criteria: the cognitive criterion is *rational autonomy*, and the non-cognitive one, *sentience* (Regan, 1997). It can be noticed here that sentience is an element of human nature, while rational autonomy is a uniquely human feature. The *rational autonomy* criterion holds that humans are rational autonomous agents and therefore are entitled to rights. Indeed, the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "all human beings (...) are endowed with reason and conscience". But Regan (1997) remarks that rights are given to humans who are not rational autonomous agents, such as infants or the severely mentally disabled, while they are refused to certain animals such as primates who have more rational autonomy than some brain-damaged humans. Arguably, the criterion of rational autonomy is applied inconsistently to animals and humans. As Garner notes, "the attempt to distinguish between humans and animals on the grounds of mental capacity falls down when it is considered that some, so-called 'marginal', humans do not have the mental capacity, and therefore moral worth, of other 'normal' humans" (2003b: 238). It thus becomes clear that rational autonomy is not so much an objective as an ideological criterion for distinguishing between humans and animals, and that the line demarcating animals from humans is bound to be disputed. Since animals are assumed not to have rational autonomy, they are also considered not to be moral agents, and this provides another reason for denying them rights (see Cohen, 1997).

The other, non-cognitive, criterion holds that humans are *sentient* beings, i.e. capable of feeling pain and pleasure, and that rights therefore should be granted to them in order to protect them from suffering. As the article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates, "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". However, despite animals being sentient beings, too, humans' anthropocentric attitudes prevent animals from being granted such rights (Regan, 1997). To be sure, organizations such as the

RSPCA or PETA[1] show that there are attempts to protect animals from pain and suffering, but one could argue that they are a drop in the ocean compared to the thousands of animals caged and killed by the food industry. Generally, more 'humane' treatment of animals is reserved to pets, through what Billig (1985) might call *particularization* and *categorization*: pets are particularized animals, humanized by their owners, while the animals reared for food production are depersonalized, faceless exemplars of the larger category 'animals'. Pets and farm animals are arguably a good example of the 'waxing and waning' of speciesism, and they somewhat show that being an animal does not necessarily lead to dehumanization. Certain animals such as dogs and cats can be anthropomorphized and 'humanized', and it could be argued that dehumanization may be not so much an issue of real essence, as an issue of interests and needs.

Animals are denied rights, and in consequence they are often excluded from the scope of justice (Opotow, 1993), and are less morally considerable than humans (Garner, 2003a; 2003b). To understand animals' exclusion from the scope of justice, we need to examine humans' anthropocentric attitudes. These are pervaded by the ideology of *speciesism* (Ryder, 1971; Singer, 1990), which is a lived ideology in the sense that it permeates many aspects of human individual life and of social organization. Humans' attitudes to animals' capacities for rational autonomy and sentience are more often than not contradictory: depending on humans' interests and animals' utility to them, animals are either anthropomorphized, such as one's pets, or dehumanized, such as pests, their anthropomorphization sometimes depending on their utility to humans (Opotow, 1993). But just like humans, animals have interest to stay alive, enjoy freedom of movement, and be free from pain and exploitation. Drawing on Bentham's principle of moral equality, Singer (1990) argues that the equality of animal and human rights should not rest on equality of characteristics and abilities, but on "the moral principle of equal consideration of interests" (p. 237), for "if a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration" (p. 8). Singer argues that "the capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all" (1990: 7), and that it is

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[1]RSPCA stands for the *Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals* (in UK), and PETA for *People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals* (in US).

speciesist to believe that human life is sacrosanct and that only humans are morally entitled to rights and protection from harm and suffering.

As an ideology, speciesism contains elements such as "a well-systematised set of categories which provide a 'frame' for the belief, perception and conduct of a body of individuals" (Eagleton, 1991: 43). In this case, the body of individuals whose actions are so framed is 'humans' themselves. Speciesism is legitimized by a host of beliefs which come both from science and religion. In Christian thought, for example, humans are considered to be at the centre of God's creation and animals are viewed as being given to humans in order to serve their needs. In science, there is a certain 'reverse anthropomorphism', in the sense that animals are experimented on in order to inform human physiology and behaviour (Rollin, 2000). However, while science extrapolates from animals to humans on the basis of their similarity, animals are not considered similar enough to humans to prevent experiments from taking place, although nowadays animal experimentation does take place within strict guidelines which limit the amount of pain and discomfort for experimental animals.

Like other ideologies that justify hierarchy and exploitation, speciesism is accompanied by representations of what one might call false consciousness in animals, i.e. an internalization of their inferiority. Of course, it is very unlikely that animals can experience false consciousness, but, nevertheless, humans often portray them as enjoying their exploitation, and farm animals depicted in mass media or children's books as happily working for the benefit of humans are not difficult to locate (Singer, 1990). For example, food packaging such as the *Laughing Cow* can mask the exploitation and pain that comes with intensive animal farming in consumer societies. As Plous notes, "animals are often described as benefiting from being used, as being content with their lot, as being insensitive to pain, unintelligent, unaware, or wanting to be used" (2003: 510). Similarly, writers on National Hunt horse racing in the UK routinely balance coverage of equine fatalities in races with claims about steeplechasing being within thoroughbreds' nature and a source of satisfaction to them (see Montgomery, 2006). It could be argued that such representations of false consciousness in animals function as a form of system-justification (see Jost and Banaji, 1994) in the sense that they naturalize and legitimize humans' exploitation of

animals (see also Garner, 2003), but they also ease humans' conscience and reduce cognitive dissonance (Plous, 2003).

Animals and their relationship to humans can inform the dehumanization paradigm at two levels. The first one is operational and concerns the operationalization of dehumanization in psychological research, be it quantitative or qualitative, in the sense that the dimensions that underlie the differences and similarities between humans and animals such as rational autonomy, sentience, but also morality, cognition, sociality (see Haslam et al., 2005) may also serve to define the boundaries between in-group and the dehumanized out-group. If either emotions or traits are used as target characteristics to describe the out-group, their choice or their connotations of humanness may be informed by the dimensions mentioned above (see also chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the operationalization of dehumanization in empirical research). At the same time, when conducting pilot studies on animal emotions or traits, one should be aware of how anthropomorphism might shape the drawing of the human-animal boundary and the attributions of animal cognition and sentience (see Eddy & Gallup, 1993). Given that anthropomorphism may underlie the ratings of human or animal typicality, pilot studies should consider the type of animals used as a target, and also whether 'animal nature' or 'human nature' may be measured through different and less direct means than traits and emotions. For example, similarities and differences between animals and humans may be constructed in terms of what animals are capable of doing, what rights they should enjoy and why, what position they should hold in society, etc. Alternatively, to avoid interference from anthropomorphism, pilot studies may want to explore human nature, or human typicality in a non-comparative sense, leaving aside the comparisons to animals. While there may not be a definite solution to the problem of anthropomorphism, in future studies researchers might want to use designs that can reduce its impact (an issue to which we will return in Chapter 4 on the operationalization of dehumanization in empirical research). At the same time, given the possible influence of postmaterialist values on attitudes towards animals, one might wish to explore dehumanization cross-culturally, or to examine how vegetarians and non-vegetarians within the same culture may construct the human-animal binary.

Secondly, animals' relationship with humans can inform dehumanization at an ideological level, and here exploring the discrimination of animals can be useful, because "the very act of 'treating humans like animals' would lose its meaning if animals were treated well" (Plous, 2003: 510). As we have seen above, humans' relationship with animals has often been one of domination and exploitation, and of exclusion from the scope of justice. Speciesism demonstrates that there is prejudice against animals, although it has been disputed whether speciesism is equivalent to sexism or racism, the argument against being that "people are capable of suffering in many ways that animals are not" (Plous, 2003: 510). Nevertheless, one could argue that there are many 'psychologically meaningful' parallels between speciesism and the dehumanization of out-groups, such as "power, privilege, dominance, control, entitlement, and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance when committing harmful acts" (Plous, 2003: 510). Witness the use of African Americans and Gypsies as slaves, or the forceful removal of Australian Aborigine children from their parents in an attempt to 'civilize' them, the exhibition of 'exotic' people from Africa (e.g. the Hottentot Venus), or the scientific experimentation on prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. To be sure, these practices belong to the past, although there are contemporary forms of human slavery such as human trafficking and sex slavery, and it should not be surprising if the victims are dehumanized both by the perpetrators and by society at large. Both speciesism and dehumanization may serve system justification goals, because in both cases people are motivated to "balance their desire to be fair with their desire to maintain an inequitable status quo (regardless of whether the out-group is human or another species)" (Plous, 2003: 512). Justifications of the sometimes cruel use of animals can involve considerations of sentience, namely to "deny that animals feel pain in the same way that humans do" (Plous, 2003: 519), but also of rationality: "another common way people reduce conflict over their use of animals is to acknowledge that animals feel pain, but to deny that animals are intelligent or self-aware" (Plous, 2003: 521). Thus, it could be argued that the dehumanization of out-group members, too, may involve denials of sentience and of rationality, which we may find reflected in the secondary emotions, or in the cultural traits. Another ideological parallel between speciesism and dehumanization regards false consciousness: just as representations of false consciousness in animals reduce cognitive dissonance and bolster their exploitation, so the dehumanization of certain groups may be accompanied by representations of false consciousness in them.

Moreover, it may be possible that groups which have been historically dehumanized may experience false consciousness themselves, as it has been suggested with regard to the Gypsy minority (see Barany, 1998). Thus, studies of dehumanization may want to take into account the perspective of the dehumanized groups themselves, and explore whether dehumanization leads to false consciousness, in-group derogation and out-group favouritism.

While animals are ideologically constructed as essentially inferior to humans and are used to "show people their origin, and therefore their pre-rational, pre-management, pre-cultural essence" (Haraway, 1991: 11), in many instances arguments of similarity between the two categories are brought up to explain or justify humans' behaviour, such as group aggression, competition, gender-based divisions of labour, or even genocide, often fulfilling system-justifying functions. Witness for example Darwin's misunderstood and misquoted notion of 'survival of the fittest' (which is, one might argue, a mainstay of capitalism!), or how 'natural selection' and other notions have been turned into 'social Darwinisms' in order to explain and justify social arrangements (see Hofstadter, 1955). As Haraway notes, "despite the claims of anthropology to be able to understand human beings solely with the concept of culture, and of sociology to need nothing but the idea of the human social group, animal societies have been extensively employed in *rationalization* and *naturalization* of the oppressive orders of domination in the human body politic" (1991: 11, emphasis added), for example in areas such as the patriarchal division of authority and human sexuality. Haraway further argues that "animal groups have been used in theories of the evolutionary origin of human beings, of 'mental illness', of the natural basis of cultural co-operation and competition, of language and other forms of communication, of technology, and especially of the origin and role of human forms of sex and the family" (1991: 12). Arguably, animal groups models have been used in those psychological theories of human aggression which conceive of out-group prejudice as stemming from humans' innate aggressive drive and propensity for in-group bias, which Tajfel (1969; 1981) criticized as the 'blood-and-guts' models of prejudice (see Billig, 2002). Thus, rational autonomy, the crucial element of humanness, can sometimes be conveniently overlooked from explanations of human behaviours which need to be explained, justified or naturalized. However, this is not to say that the humans in question are dehumanized: instead, they are merely

portrayed as humans who follow whatever their 'human nature' dictates and are thus exonerated from guilt. Similarities to animals can be used to justify human consumption of meat, hunting or inter-group aggression. It could therefore be argued that constructions of similarities between humans and animals and attributions of animal nature do not always results in dehumanization, unless there is a specific, and one might add ideological, reason for doing so. For example, negative behaviour on the part of out-group members may be seen as a manifestation of their animal or less-than-human essence, whereas the same negative behaviour on the part of in-group members may be explained as an inevitable manifestation of 'human nature'. Thus, it could be argued that constructions of 'human nature' may be context-dependent and may overlap with constructions of 'animal nature' only if there is a reason for doing so, and that these constructions can fulfil system legitimizing functions for both the out-group's and the in-group's behaviours or social statuses.

Besides the human-animal binary, there is also the *human* vs. *less-than-human* dichotomy which shows that while out-group members are not viewed as savages, nor as animals, they are nevertheless viewed as not quite fully human. This binary has been at the core of the infrahumanization paradigm, which has argued that infrahumanization is a lesser form of dehumanization and does not involve the animalization of out-group members, only a denial of their humanity. Arguably, the human vs. less-than-human dichotomy rests on the conceptualization of humanness as having 'fuzzy' boundaries, and as representing what is typically human, as Haslam et al. (2005) proposed. But what is typically human is not necessarily conceptualized in a comparative sense to animals, although it may involve a comparison to machines, as Haslam (2006) later suggested. Thus, conceptualizing out-group members as being less-than-human may indicate conceptualizing them as less typically human, and these beliefs may be present in the dehumanization of sexual minorities, people with learning difficulties, the mentally ill, or the physically disabled. It could perhaps be argued that while the human vs. animal binary is rather categorical, the human vs. less-than-human binary is rather continuous and it therefore may be more subtle and more appropriate for the study of ethnic prejudice, given the current norms of prejudice suppression. The human vs. less-than-human binary might have advantages over the human-animal binary in the operationalization of dehumanization of ethnic out-groups, because one cannot deny that ethnic out-group members lack language or

rationality. Nonetheless, one could shape the human vs. less-than-human comparison along dimensions such as morality, sentience, or self-awareness, where the dehumanization of out-group members may involve beliefs about lack of morality or sociability. Another advantage of the human vs. less-than-human binary is that it is less likely to be influenced by anthropomorphism.

2.4.3 Humans vs. machines

While most research on dehumanization has used the human-animal paradigm as the basis of the conceptualization and operationalization of dehumanization, it is possible to envisage dehumanization in terms of the human-machine binary. This has been termed the *mechanistic* form of dehumanization, and is assumed to involve the denial of *human nature* features, which comprise sentience, cognitive flexibility, agency, and depth (Haslam, 2006). Through mechanistic dehumanization the out-group members are associated with inertness, coldness, rigidity, passivity, and superficiality (Haslam, 2006). Research has shown that automata are associated more with uniquely human traits and with social categories such as businesspeople, whereas animals are associated more with human nature traits and with social categories such as artists (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). However, it could be argued that machines also lack uniquely human features such as morality and sociability, therefore dehumanizing beliefs in terms of machine-like attributes might rest on both human nature, *and* uniquely human dimensions. Within this binary, the opposite of humans can be computers, robots, cyborgs, androids, humanoids, etc., which can vary from one another to the extent that they are hybrids of machines and organisms, with some having higher cognitive capabilities than others.

Is the human-machine binary as appropriate for the study of dehumanization as the human-animal one? The latter may seem more relevant to inter-group relations, because depicting the out-groups as animals or as brutal savages can play an ideological role in justifying their exploitation or discrimination (see Jahoda, 1999; Buchan & Heath, 2006). Arguably, the human-machine boundary is not as dilemmatic as the human-animal one, because machines do not have interests to stay alive, to be free from pain, and to reproduce, therefore interfering with them or exploiting them does not pose the same moral dilemmas. Animals can be harmed by humans whereas machines cannot, therefore comparing out-groups to machines does not carry the

same moral or ideological implications as comparing them to animals. While social psychologists have noted that animals constitute an out-group for humans (see Plous, 2003), it is not entirely clear whether machines are an out-group, too.

Secondly, it could be argued that the human-machine binary may be restricted to those cultures or societies where machines endowed with artificial intelligence (e.g. computers, robots) are commonly used and where references to machines are a cultural practice. Given that dehumanization as a psychological and ideological phenomenon is not necessarily restricted to industrialized societies, one may find it difficult to explore mechanistic dehumanization in less technologically advanced, agrarian societies. Thirdly, the human-machine binary may miss out the alleged essence of dehumanized groups. As Haslam et al. (2005) have found, only human nature traits are essentialized, and human nature traits have not been found to be associated with machines (see Haslam, 2006; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Machines do not reproduce among themselves as animals and 'savages' do, nor do they transmit their 'primitive' cultural values to their children, therefore it may be difficult to envisage machines as having an essence in the same way that animals or 'primitive' groups may be assumed to have. Consequently, dehumanizing certain out-groups in terms of machine-like characteristics may not capture the assumed essentialization of the out-groups.

Fourthly, dehumanization is not mere metaphor, but also social practice, as Tileagă (2007) points out, and it remains to be seen whether the mechanistic form of dehumanization underpins social exclusion to the same extent as the animalistic one. Businesspeople may be associated more with automata than with animals, as Loughnan & Haslam (2007) suggest, but it remains to be seen whether this association translates into dehumanization, prejudice and social exclusion. Nevertheless, it could be argued that one can dehumanize without engaging in social exclusion, and that a mechanistic dehumanization may occur precisely in those situations where social exclusion is not at stake. For example, soldiers defending the country may be dehumanized in terms of 'killing machines' which follow orders and behave like automata, but their dehumanization may serve a palliative function (e.g. cognitive distancing from their deaths) rather than a social exclusionist one. By contrast, enemy soldiers can be seen both as killing machines and as barbarians or as

animals, which will justify their moral exclusion and killing, as this American commander from Second World War illustrates: "fighting Japs is not like fighting normal human beings (...). We are dealing with something primitive. Our troops (...) regard them as vermin" (Okamura, 2003). Thus, mechanistic and animalistic dehumanizations may be applied to different targets and may fulfil different functions, and future research may want to address this issue.

Regarding the operationalization of dehumanization in terms of the human-machine paradigm, this may be slightly more difficult than operationalizing it in terms of the human-animal binary. As we have seen, within the human-animal binary, dehumanization has been operationalized by means of emotions or traits which can be rated in terms of their animal and human typicality, or in terms of their animal or human uniqueness. This is possible because one can envisage animals experiencing emotions, be they only primary, or possessing certain traits, e.g. *wild, affectionate.* Computers, too, have been found to be anthropomorphised and to be attributed human personality traits such as *friendly, intelligent, trustworthy, persuasive* and *competent* (Nass & Moon, 2000). However, infrahumanization may not be possible if the human-machine binary were to be used because machines cannot experience emotions. Secondly, as in the case of animals, where the type of animal, e.g. mammals vs. insects, might influence the ratings of human typicality or uniqueness of the target emotions or traits, the type of machine might influence what kind of emotions or traits people attribute to them. It has been found for example that the more a robot looks and behaves like a human, the more positively people respond to it. However, if the robots are very realistic and resemble humans very much, people start finding them repulsive. This has been termed the "uncanny valley" hypothesis (Mori, 1970), and holds that if robots are mostly unlike humans, then people focus on their similarities to humans, whereas if they are too human-like, then people focus on their dissimilarities from humans. Thus, when operationalizing dehumanization in terms of the human-machine binary in empirical research, one might think about what should be the optimal level of the machine's similarity to humans in order to elicit the best response from the participants. Equally, one might use the appearance of robots as a moderating factor in the drawing of the human-machine boundary.

2.5 Current main research paradigms on dehumanization: infrahumanization and ontologization

How might the various binaries reviewed above be applied to dehumanization in inter-group contexts? In recent years, two research paradigms, infrahumanization and ontologization, have focused on the process of dehumanization in inter-group relations. The infrahumanization paradigm has made use of the human vs. animal and the human vs. less-than-human binaries, whereas the ontologization paradigm has focused on the human vs. animal dichotomy. These paradigms will be examined in turn.

2.5.1 The infrahumanization paradigm

One research paradigm on dehumanization is infrahumanization, which has focused on the perceptions of human emotions in the in-group and out-groups (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000). Infrahumanization is argued to stem from an essentialistic view of social groups, and from in-group bias (Leyens et al., 2000, 2003; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004). The infrahumanization paradigm builds on studies of subjective essentialism and on the assumption that people tend to attribute various essences to social categories (see Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), and argues that people have an intrinsic motivation to reserve the human essence to their in-group. While the infrahumanization paradigm does not make fully explicit what the 'human essence' is, it illustrates it through 'uniquely human' features such as intelligence, language, morality, and secondary emotions (i.e. emotions which can only be experienced by humans, such as *nostalgia*). Infrahumanization is assumed to be a 'lesser form of dehumanization', hence its name, and the infrahumanization paradigm argues that when out-group members are infrahumanized they are not necessarily associated with animal-like attributes, but are rather viewed as being 'less-than-human'.

Infrahumanization, the phenomenon of attributing more humanity to the in-group than to the out-group, has been operationalized in terms of the attribution of secondary emotions to in-group and out-group. The infrahumanization paradigm distinguishes between primary emotions which can be experienced by both animals and humans, such as *fear*, *disgust*, *surprise*, *anger*, and secondary emotions which can be experienced only by humans, such as *shame*, *pride*, *nostalgia*, *guilt*. These

emotions do not represent the in-group members' emotional reaction to out-group members; instead, they represent the emotions that in-group members *think* the out-group members *can experience*, or the emotions that are typical of the out-group members' feelings. In other words, are the out-group members able to feel uniquely human emotions such as *admiration* or *regret*? The same process applies to the emotions attributed to in-group members. The infrahumanization paradigm postulates that primary emotions should be equally attributed to the in-group and the out-group because both groups are assumed to experience them, as both animals and humans can experience them. However, secondary emotions should be attributed to a greater extent to the in-group than to the out-group, because they are more human than primary emotions, and because the in-group should reserve the 'human essence' to itself. This is where the infrahumanization phenomenon is supposed to occur: in the significantly greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. Researchers further assume that by denying out-groups these essential human emotions, dehumanizing treatment is justified (Leyens, Désert, Croizet & Darcis, 2002; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, Paladino, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres & Vaes, 2003).

While the infrahumanization paradigm acknowledges that secondary emotions are not necessarily the 'essence' of human essence, as it were, they have chosen to focus on them because other aspects of human essence have already been researched in inter-group relations. As they put it, "because there is ample research demonstrating that individuals discriminate on the basis of intelligence, language, and sociability, we concentrated our attention on the emotional side of the human essence" (Leyens et al., 2000: 188). The infrahumanization paradigm offers a combination of two binaries in dehumanization: while infrahumanization phenomenon itself denotes a lesser humanity of the out-group members, the operationalization of the phenomenon has its roots in the human-animal binary. Given the emotional side of infrahumanization, although it does not relate to emotional reactions *per se*, one can argue that the operationalization of this phenomenon cannot involve the human-machine binary because machines cannot experience emotions and cannot be used as a model for infrahumanization.

Most research on infrahumanization has found that out-groups are indeed attributed less secondary emotions than the in-group, in line with the theory. For example, Peninsular Spanish people and Canarians infrahumanized each other (Leyens et al., 2001). However, in some cases infrahumanization does not occur, such as when the out-group is not relevant to the in-group (see Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, & Leyens, 2005), thus suggesting that relevance of the out-group may be a mediating factor in infrahumanization. Status and conflict have been argued not to play a part in infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2002, Demoulin, Leyens, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, Paladino, & Fiske, 2005). However, some research suggests that status may be a mediating factor, because when in-group and out-group are of equal status (e.g. French and Germans) there is no differential attribution of secondary emotions, (Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, unpublished manuscript). When in-group and out-group are of equal status, research has noticed an over-attribution of primary emotions to the out-group (Rohmann et al., unpublished manuscript), although this is not an indicator of infrahumanization as infrahumanization can only be inferred through the greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. Other research has found that lower-status groups such as Romanians do not infrahumanize out-groups (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Conflict between in-group and out-group has been argued to be irrelevant for infrahumanization, because infrahumanization is assumed to be driven mainly by people's need to identify with their in-group, and this identification may involve a comparison with the out-group at the level of the human essence, which triggers the process of infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2001; 2003).

At the theoretical level, there are certain points in the infrahumanization paradigm that deserve closer inspection. Firstly, the paradigm has argued that all groups, regardless of their status, are prone to infrahumanize all out-groups because of an inherent motivation to attribute the human essence exclusively to the in-group. Furthermore, the paradigm has postulated that infrahumanization is implicit and that it occurs 'subconsciously' (and research using the IAT method has supported this argument, e.g. Paladino et al., 2002). It could be argued that this formulation of infrahumanization resembles a 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice, as Tajfel (1969; 1981) might have put it, and just like any 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice it arguably runs the risk of overlooking the deliberate aspects of infrahumanization as

well as the ideological functions that it might perform in particular contexts (see Billig, 2002). By overlooking the 'waxing-and-waning' aspects of prejudice that Tajfel (1981) highlighted in his criticism of the instinctivist theories of prejudice, the infrahumanization paradigm may fail to explain why and when infrahumanization occurs. Although infrahumanization researchers have admitted that it is unlikely that all out-groups are infrahumanized (see Leyens et al., 2003), they have failed to specify the exact conditions when infrahumanization does occur, its mediators and moderators. As it has been formulated, the infrahumanization paradigm tends to overlook the cognitive and deliberate aspects of infrahumanization, as well as social constructionist accounts of prejudice (see for example Billig, 1985; 1991; 2002; Hopkins et al., 1997). The overlooking of the ideological and deliberate aspects of infrahumanization is arguably also evident in the language used to describe the infrahumanization phenomenon: participants 'perceive' the out-group as being less-than-human, they 'associate' the out-group with less-than-human attributes, or they 'attribute' a less-than-human essence to the out-group. As Tileagă (2007) has pointed out, dehumanization is also social practice, and it would be interesting to know how the perception of the out-group as being less-than-human might translate into discriminatory social practices against them.

Secondly, the infrahumanization paradigm has postulated that infrahumanization is closely linked to in-group bias, and that infrahumanization "integrates both in-group favouritism and out-group derogation" (Leyens et al., 2002: 705). However, in-group favouritism is not always tantamount to out-group hate and it has been suggested that these two concepts should be treated as two separate phenomena (Brewer, 1999). As Allport noted, "hostility toward out-groups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required (...) What is alien is regarded as somehow inferior, less 'good', but there is not necessarily hostility against it" (1954: 42). Infrahumanization researchers agree that in-group favouritism is not the same as out-group derogation, and that infrahumanization is not synonymous with in-group favouritism. They postulate that in-group favouritism should be expressed through a preference of positive emotions for the in-group, whereas infrahumanization should be expressed through the greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group (Demoulin et al., 2004b). However, given that in some cases negative secondary emotions have been rated as more human than the positive secondary ones

(Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), the in-group bias for secondary emotions may be sometimes obscured by their negative valence. On a related note, when examining in-group favouritism in inter-group prejudice, one should bear in mind the distinction between patriotism and nationalism (Billig, 1995), and examine if infrahumanization might be linked differently to the two phenomena. Secondly, if in-group favouritism is linked to infrahumanization, then one should examine (for example, through a qualitative approach) if the content of the in-group identity revolves around beliefs about the humanity of the in-group. For example, does the in-group construct its identity as being typically or uniquely human? Is the humanity of the in-group identity constructed in opposition to savagery, animality, or machinery? As Hopkins notes, "if we wish to understand the relationship between national identification and discriminatory action, we should investigate the construction, dissemination, and reception of different versions of the nation's boundaries, the concept of identity and the nation's relations with others" (2001:185), and the same argument could be made about the relationship between the construction of in-group favouritism and infrahumanization. Thirdly, while maintaining that infrahumanization is linked to in-group bias, the infrahumanization paradigm holds that conflict is not necessary for infrahumanization to occur. However, research has shown that when inter-group relations are not based on conflict, in-group bias and out-group prejudice are independent of each other (see Brewer, 1999). It could thus be argued that if infrahumanization is indeed a form of out-group prejudice, it may not necessarily be related to in-group favouritism in the absence of conflict. At the same time one might postulate that in the presence of conflict, all groups engage in infrahumanization, whereas in the absence of conflict, only high-status groups may infrahumanize.

Thirdly, infrahumanization has been linked to in-group identification, and it has been postulated that "people infrahumanize as a function of their identification with their in-group and to the extent that they look for an essential difference between their in-group and the out-group" (Leyens et al., 2003: 712), and that "people who do not identify with their group should not feel the need to perceive it as essentially superior" (Demoulin et al., 2004b: 264). Some research has found that while identification with the in-group increased the attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group, it did not decrease the attribution of secondary emotions to the out-group

(Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Paladino et al., 2002; Paladino et al., 2004). Other studies using a continuous measure of humanity of the emotions and looking only at the attribution of emotions to out-groups found that "stronger identification [with the in-group] was associated with greater attribution of emotion" (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006: 814), but details are lacking on the kind of emotions. In the case of equal status groups such as the French and the Germans in-group identification did not mediate or moderate infrahumanization, nor did identification at the common European level (Rohmann et al., unpublished manuscript). Other research has found that conflict moderated the effect of in-group identification and hence of infrahumanization, as only high in-group identifiers infrahumanized the out-group in a context of conflicting national groups such as the British and the Germans (Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003, unpublished manuscript). Thus, it could be argued that in-group identification *per se* does not translate into attributing fewer secondary emotions to the out-group, which suggests that infrahumanization may be, at least in some circumstances, an overhumanization or a *hyper-humanization* (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006) of the in-group rather than a *de*-humanization of the out-group *per se*. These empirical findings do not support the claim that "infrahumanization of the out-group implies both in-group favouritism *and* out-group derogation" (Leyens et al., 2003: 712, original emphasis). On a more technical note, it could be argued that a proper index of infrahumanization is needed, too, so that in-group identification should not be correlated separately with the secondary emotions ascribed to the in-group and the out-group, respectively, but rather with a relative measure of the two (an issue to which we will return later in the next chapters, see Chapter 4 for example).

Fourthly, the infrahumanization paradigm argues that infrahumanization is "a lesser form of dehumanization" (see Demoulin, et al., 2004b). If so, then one might expect that infrahumanization should indicate *lesser* prejudice and have *lesser* consequences for inter-group relations than dehumanization proper, and indeed the paradigm has focused on 'everyday' forms of infrahumanization. However, despite their claims that infrahumanization is a lesser form of dehumanization, infrahumanization researchers have often highlighted the similarity between this phenomenon and extreme forms of prejudice such as delegitimization and moral

exclusion, and have argued that infrahumanization is similar to the other two except that it does not involve extreme behaviours (Leyens et al., 2000; 2001; 2003). As they put it, "although infrahumanization theory clearly relates to the concepts of delegitimization and moral exclusion", it refers, in contrast, to "relatively normal inter-group situations" (Demoulin et al., 2004b: 269). But it would appear rather incongruous that a lesser form of dehumanization should be nonetheless compared to forms of prejudice that refer to conflict and genocide. This formulation of infrahumanization as a lesser form of dehumanization is somewhat at odds with Tajfel's (1981) conceptualization of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice: therefore it may be difficult to imagine infrahumanization as 'a lesser form of an extreme form of prejudice', as it were. At the same time, if infrahumanization is a lesser form of dehumanization, then it is unclear what would be a full form of dehumanization, how this might be measured, and how it might compare to infrahumanization itself. Thirdly, if infrahumanization has its roots in in-group bias, then it is unclear how in-group favouritism might relate to delegitimization or moral exclusion given that in the absence of conflict and in 'normal' inter-group situations in-group favouritism does not lead to out-group derogation (see Brewer, 1999). It could thus be argued that the infrahumanization paradigm might have benefited from comparing infrahumanization, as a lesser form of dehumanization, to depersonalization, in line with Tajfel's suggestion that depersonalization is less extreme than dehumanization.

Fifthly, the infrahumanization paradigm has stated that infrahumanization is based on an essentialization of the in-group in terms of humanness, and some research has found that "the best predictor of infrahumanization was the common variance of identification and essentialism" (Leyens et al., 2002: 712). Research on the structure of essentialist beliefs about social categories has found that essentialist beliefs are underlain by dimensions representing *natural kinds*, i.e. social categories are understood as having a biological basis, and *entitativity*, i.e. social categories are believed to be homogenous (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). But it is not clear whether the essentialization of the in-group in terms of a human essence follows a 'natural kinds' or an 'entitativity' pattern, and hence it is not clear to which of these two dimensions infrahumanization is linked. This may be important because, as Haslam et al. suggest, "the finding that essentialism is not unitary suggests that

theorists must be careful not to obscure the distinction, or to mistake one dimension for the whole" (2000: 123). Moreover, a discourse analytic approach to the essentialization of the in-group (Verkuyten, 2003) has found that groups such as ethnic minorities essentialize themselves when it is in their interest to do so, e.g. for political and ethnic mobilization, but do not essentialize themselves when it is against their interests, e.g. when they want to be considered Dutch citizens and be given equal rights. Therefore infrahumanization research might want to explore infrahumanization in those instances when it is in the in-group's interests *not* to essentialize themselves, e.g. when rejecting the majority's claim that they are a uniform group. While the infrahumanization paradigm has focused on the essentialization of the in-group, it is not clear whether the out-group is also essentialized, albeit in terms of a lesser humanity. This is relevant because research on essentialism has found that essentialist beliefs about out-groups are not always linked to prejudice against them (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). As Haslam et al. suggest, "essentialism is not a unitary syndrome of social beliefs, and is not monolithically associated with devaluation and prejudice" (2000: 113). This raises the issue as to whether infrahumanization is always tantamount to out-group prejudice, and whether, if it is functionally equivalent to prejudice, it may nonetheless occur sometimes without being based on essentialist beliefs about the in-group or the out-group.

At the methodological level, the infrahumanization paradigm provides a subtle and arguably robust measure of prejudice. The greater attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-group is found consistently in the research on infrahumanization. However, if infrahumanization is a minor form of dehumanization, it could be argued that the secondary emotions may tap into a dimension of humanity, which may not be at the very core of dehumanization. This possibility is not fully explored in the infrahumanization paradigm. Equally, alternative interpretations for the secondary emotions effect are not fully sought, although some alternative interpretations such as familiarity have been discounted in experimental research (Cortes et al., 2005).

What might be the consequences or functions of infrahumanization? It has been postulated that infrahumanization "is a sign of distinctiveness between the in-group and the out-groups" (Demoulin et al., 2004b: 266), because infrahumanization

refers to the in-group's human essence and essence are thought to explain differences between groups. Thus infrahumanization is assumed to function as in-group favouritism (Demoulin et al., 2004b), but in the light of the existing empirical research it may not necessarily function as out-group derogation. Infrahumanization has been found to function as a reduction of out-group empathy: research using a lost e-mail paradigm has found that the email expressing secondary emotions (e.g. *indignation*) elicited stronger intentions to help to sender and kinder responses than the email expressing primary emotions (e.g. *anger*) (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). This suggests that people may be more inclined to empathize and to behave altruistically when confronted with a more 'human' stranger. Similarly, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, research has found that in-group victims of the hurricane were attributed more secondary emotions than out-group victims, and that the tendency to attribute secondary emotions to out-group victims was correlated with intentions to help them (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007). Other research has found that awareness of the in-group's mass killing of an out-group increased the infrahumanization of the out-group members, which suggests that infrahumanization may help to morally disengage from an oppressed out-group and to diminish the sense of collective guilt (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Related research has found that homeless people, too, are infrahumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Overall, it could be argued that infrahumanization may lead to cognitive, moral and behavioural distancing from victims, be they victims of the in-group, of the social system, or of natural disasters, which raises the possibility that infrahumanization may sometimes be underlain by beliefs in a just world (see Lerner, 1977) and may fulfil system justifying functions (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kay & Jost, 2003). These potential functions have not been fully explored by the infrahumanization paradigm; instead, it has been argued that infrahumanization cannot function as system-justification because even low-status groups will attribute the human 'essence' to themselves even if they accept that they are not as intelligent or skilled as the higher-status groups (Demoulin et al., 2004b). However, it could be argued that the infrahumanization paradigm has overlooked how false consciousness might influence the attribution of 'human essence' to the in-group by low-status groups. False consciousness is a main component of system-justification, and has been elaborated on by system-justification theory (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, 1995). In inter-group relations, false consciousness refers to the low-status groups' (be they subordinate, dominated, or oppressed groups)

internalization, rationalization and acceptance of their low status. Infrahumanization is linked to in-group favouritism; by contrast, false consciousness is linked to in-group derogation (see Jost, 1995). Therefore, those low-status groups who experience false consciousness should, in theory, not engage in in-group favouritism and hence should not infrahumanize. Thus, false consciousness may mediate the attribution of 'human essence' to the in-group, or, if it does not, it might interact with the relative status of the out-group, e.g. low-status groups may not infrahumanize higher-status groups, but only groups lower in status than themselves. Therefore infrahumanization researchers may consider exploring false consciousness in future research.

2.5.2 The ontologization paradigm

Unlike infrahumanization, where the focus is on the in-group and on its bias in attributing the human essence to itself, in the ontologization paradigm the focus is on the out-group and the conditions that lead to its dehumanization. And while infrahumanization is assumed to be universal and contingent upon in-group favouritism, ontologization is assumed to be specific to certain groups and not contingent to any variables related to the in-group. But similarly to infrahumanization, the ontologization paradigm has built a model of out-group dehumanization on the animal-human and the nature-culture binaries. Ontologization, as the name implies, consists in the creation or attribution of a different 'ontology' to the out-group. This is supposed to happen when the out-group is considered (or ideologically constructed) as having failed to integrate in society (Pérez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001). Ontologization is defined as "an operation of classification whereby a minority is categorized not only as an out-group, but also as outside the social map of human identity" (Pérez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002: 53, my translation). The theory of ontologization has drawn mostly on the discrimination against the Gypsy minority, and holds that social groups which fail to become culturally assimilated are presumed to have a different essence from that of the majority. This presupposed different essence serves to explain the minority group's resistance to the majority's assimilation efforts, and their inability to become civilized and fully human (Pérez, Moscovici & Chulvi, 2002). The ontologization paradigm views ontologization the same as dehumanization, not as a lesser form of it, and sometimes uses the two terms interchangeably.

The ontologization paradigm has operationalized dehumanization in terms of natural or animal-like traits, e.g. *intuitive*, and cultural or human-like traits, e.g. *creative*. Similarly to the infrahumanization paradigm where a random set of primary and secondary emotions, varying from study to study, is used to differentiate between the in-group and the out-group, in ontologization the animal and human attributes are firstly generated by one group of participants as characterising animals more than humans, then a second group of participants identify which of these attributes describe the Gypsies (Pérez et al., 2001). But in the ontologization paradigm the differential attribution of traits has not been the only way to differentiate between the in-group and the Gypsies. In one study, participants first identified the "specifically human" characteristics that "make humans beings human beings" (without having to think about any target out-group), then they estimated how much the Gypsies differed from the non-Gypsies on the basis of the characteristics identified (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). The characteristics named by the participants were grouped into clusters, and it was found that Gypsies differed mostly from the majority in terms of *sociability, morality* (virtues), *aggression*, and *learning* (e.g. capacity to progress, education, ability to develop), but least in terms of *immorality* (vices), *biology, rationality*, and *feelings* (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). This method indicates that instead of using a strict dichotomy between human and animal traits (or emotions), it is possible to think about some specifically human dimensions or characteristics, on which the in-group and the out-group can be compared.

Chulvi & Pérez (2003) conclude that the Gypsies are represented as a "closed group, isolated, without respect for the rules of social life, and averse to social influence", insensitive to the pressure of social norms (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003: 8, my translation). Chulvi & Pérez (2003) argue that representing the Gypsies as *asocial* is tantamount to situating them outside the human species, somewhere between the animal and the human realms, and that their perceived unsociability is due to their seeming "resistance to cultural conversion" (2003: 8). It could be argued that the dimensions of *sociability, morality* and *learning* represent 'uniquely human' features, as Haslam et al. (2005) would classify them, while the dimension of *aggression* is rather a 'human nature' feature, which can be shared with animals. Thus, one might conclude that the ontologization of the Gypsies takes place at the level of the uniquely

human rather than human nature level, a fact also implied by the use of *cultural* vs. *natural* traits.

The ontologization paradigm has drawn solely on the prejudice against the Gypsy minority. Correlational and experimental research has shown that non-Gypsy participants in European countries (Spain, Romania, Britain) attribute more animal than human traits to the Gypsies (Pérez et al., 2001), but also less human traits to the Gypsies than to the in-group (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Moreover, the Gypsies are attributed more stereotypical characteristics in the condition where participants are told that despite the use of historical strategies to integrate them, the Gypsies have failed to integrate (Pérez et al., 2001). While focusing on a single ethnic minority can provide consistency and a historic argument to the theory of ontologization, it could be argued that this may inadvertently narrow down the scope of ontologization. In consequence, it is not clear whether ontologization is an idiosyncratic attitude of the majority toward the Gypsies, perhaps based on social representations of Gypsy nomadism, or whether other poor or nomadic groups (e.g. the homeless, travellers), or other discriminated minorities (e.g. sexual, religious) may be targets of ontologization if they are perceived as being untypical humans or as 'socially deviant' individuals. Nevertheless, research has indicated that other groups are represented in positive animal terms similarly to the Gypsies, such as *children, the elderly*, but also *cannibals, Pygmies*, and *savage tribes* (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). The association of children or old people with positive animal characteristics suggests that their dehumanization may imply a denial of rational autonomy, while the association of savage tribes with these characteristics may indicate a denial of culture. But it could be argued that groups such as the cannibals do not exist in real life, and that they are rather a European ideological construction (or misrepresentation) of certain foreign groups. Since neither children nor the elderly, but neither cannibals nor Pygmies can be considered as having failed to be culturally assimilated or socially integrated, it could be argued that their association with positive animal traits does not amount to ontologization and social exclusion as in the case of the Gypsies, although dehumanizing beliefs may underlie prejudices such as ageism. Using the ontologization paradigm, research has shown that other ethnic groups such as 'Black Africans' are ontologized by Swiss participants, being attributed more 'natural' than 'cultural' traits, all positive, while other groups such as 'Muslims' or 'East

Europeans' are not ontologized (Deschamps, Vala, Marinho, Lopes, & Cabecinhas, 2005). At the same time, the Swiss attributed more cultural traits to themselves than to Muslims, East Europeans and Black Africans. However, Deschamps et al. (2005) are not clear about why Black Africans might be ontologized, and they do not elaborate on the inter-group relations between this group and the Swiss.

At the same time, research has found that other groups are represented in animal but negative terms, such as *racists, Nazis, skinheads, terrorists, delinquents* (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). However, these groups are also represented in equal proportion by negative human terms, too, so it is rather unclear whether these groups are primarily represented as human or as animal. What is interesting, though, is that such groups may be considered as having failed to integrate socially and to adopt the correct norms of social behaviour, which makes their association with animal terms closer to the thesis of ontologization. This opens the possibility that the ontologization of the Gypsies, too, may be linked to their perceived delinquency, since Gypsies are generally viewed as criminals and thieves. For example, focus groups in a number of Central European countries have revealed that the Gypsies are associated with a 'lack of adaptability and flexibility in relation to the expectations and standards dominant culture', 'lack of work ethic', 'tendency towards criminality' and 'dishonesty and tendency to cheat' (Current Attitudes Towards the Roma in Central Europe, 2005). Therefore it could be argued that the ontologization of the Gypsies may be due to their perceived criminal behaviour, rather than to their failed cultural assimilation *per se* (although one could argue that delinquent behaviour bespeaks of a failure of social integration). However, one might argue that it is the ethnicity of the Gypsies that contributes to their ontologization, since delinquents in general are associated predominantly with negative attributes, be they animal or human (see Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). Therefore future studies might want to explore how delinquent behaviour might interact with ethnicity to produce ontologization.

The dehumanization of the Gypsy minority has been observed in other studies which have used interviews with majority members (Romanians) and a discursive analytic approach (Tileagă, 2005; 2006). These studies show that the talk about the Gypsies is more extreme than typical anti-immigrant or anti-alien prejudice, and that Gypsies are represented as being "beyond the moral order, beyond nationhood,

difference and comparison" (Tileagă, 2005: 603). It could be argued that such discourse about the Gypsies indicates the moral exclusion (cf. Opotow, 1990) or the delegitimization (cf. Bar-Tal, 1990) of this particular ethnic minority. Similarly to the findings of Pérez and colleagues, Tileagă's qualitative research shows that the Gypsies are perceived as being unable and also unwilling to integrate. The Romanian participants constructed the Gypsies as 'unadaptable': "they cannot integrate, they like the life they are living" (Tileagă, 2006: 27), and as 'uncivilized': the cause of their behaviour is "their lack of civilization (...) they are a lot behind the Romanian population in terms of civilization, culture" (Tileagă, 2006: 28). The Gypsies are described by one Romanian participant as "less hardworking, they think less for the future (...) there is no preoccupation for education and for their children" (Tileagă, 2006: 28), while another expresses the view that "I don't see the Gypsies integrating themselves among us, they don't like the civilized style (...) they don't want to go to school, they don't want at all to progress" (Tileagă, 2006: 34). Firstly, Tileagă's findings reinforce the thesis that the Gypsies are constructed as an asocial group unable to lead a civilized life, and they bring support to failed social integration as the explanation for their ontologization. Secondly, they suggest that the dehumanization of the Gypsies takes place at the level of 'uniquely human' attributes such as culture and civilization. Thirdly, these qualitative findings also indicate victim blaming among the majority members, and arguably fundamental attribution errors in their judgement of the Gypsies for their lack of integration.

What is it about the Gypsy minority that has made them a target of dehumanization? While Pérez and colleagues suggest that the Gypsies are dehumanized because they have failed to be 'culturally assimilated by the majority', it could be argued that ontologization is not necessarily a reaction following failed cultural assimilation, but rather a precursor to social exclusion and marginalization. At the same time, it should be noted here that the cultural assimilation envisaged by Pérez et al. (2001; 2002) is not necessarily the same as that envisaged by theories of multiculturalism and acculturation (see for example Berry, 1999, 2001; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997), although there may be similarities between the two. This is because the ontologization paradigm is not directly concerned with multiculturalism and acculturation strategies, and uses 'assimilation' and 'integration' rather interchangeably. What Pérez and colleagues mean by 'cultural assimilation' is

more similar to the strategy of 'integration' in the acculturation literature, in the sense that the minority may keep its cultural identity, but it should accept and abide by the norms and values of the dominant majority culture. However, given the discriminatory policies against the Gypsies in various aspects of life such as health, education, housing, etc. one might argue that the majority's strategies are more indicative of exclusion and marginalization, rather than of forceful cultural assimilation (see Barany, 1994). At the same time, given the diverse sub-groupings of Gypsies along professional, linguistic, or sedentary lines, one cannot speak of integration or exclusion all across the board, as some Gypsies are economically but not culturally integrated, while others are marginalized from both points of view (see Barany, 1998). Equally, the representation of Gypsies as a nomadic group is a misconstruction, as most Gypsies in fact live in settled communities (see Keil, Fenn, & Andreescu, 1994).

It would appear that the ontologization of the Gypsies rests on dehumanization at the level of culture in the sense of beliefs, values, norms and behaviours, where the Gypsies' different culture leads to a 'perceived lesser humanity' as Struch & Schwartz (1989) might put it. The idea of the Gypsies being dehumanized on the basis of their culture is also echoed by Keil, et al.: "to the extent to which a subordinate group's culture and social practices are seen as different in normatively critical ways from those of the dominant groups, the subordinate group will be taken to be less fully human than the dominant groups" (1994: 397). However, this naturally begs the question as to whether there are specific elements of the Gypsy culture that lends this group to being dehumanized, or whether all different minority groups are ontologized on the basis of their culture. While Pérez et al. (2001) argue that the Gypsies are ontologized because of their resistance to forced cultural assimilation, it remains unclear whether other Spanish ethnic minorities are ontologized if they are perceived as 'non-assimilated'. Some data shows that not all minority groups are ontologized, even if the majority expresses negative prejudice against it, as in the case of the Hungarian minority in Romania who has retained its cultural specificity and enjoys many minority rights (Marcu, unpublished manuscript). But ethnic minorities or immigrants who are perceived as not abiding by the majority's cultural and social norms are 'abnormalized', that is, they are constructed as having a different mentality and engaging in deviant behaviour (Verkuyten, 2001).

While the research on the ontologization of the Gypsies has mainly focused on the cultural differences between the Gypsies and the majority, it has somewhat overlooked the low economic status of the Gypsies as a possible explanation for their ontologization, although one could perhaps argue that the economic status of an ethnic group may reflect its cultural values, such as work ethic, and also the degree of its social integration. The socio-economic status of a group is very important because it can predict the content of the stereotype that others will have about it (see Glick & Fiske, 2001). Specifically, it will predict whether that group is competent or not, which in turn will make the group be associated with traits denoting competence, e.g. *intelligent, shrewd, logical, ambitious*, or lack of it, e.g. *incompetent, lazy, animalistic, stupid, unambitious* (Glick & Fiske, 2001). As the latter traits suggest, it may well be that poor groups are viewed as less human than rich groups because their incompetence is taken to reflect their less-than-human nature. Concerning the Gypsies, these have been "on the economic margin of every society in which they live" (Keil et al., 1994: 399), which also explains their lack of political mobilization.

As to the functions that the ontologization the Gypsies may perform, at one level it arguably rationalizes their cultural preservation in the face of forced assimilation. But given the century-long discrimination of the Gypsies, it could be argued that ontologizing the Gypsies justifies their treatment and social exclusion (cf. system justification theory, Jost & Banaji, 1994), in a similar way to the dehumanization of animals. Similarly to speciesism, ontologization provides the majority members with an ideology that naturalizes the differences between in-group and out-group and justifies their social exclusion, exploitation, and inhumane treatment. The Gypsies were victims of ethnic cleansing alongside the Jews during the Second World War. In Romania, for example, an estimated 25,000 Gypsies were deported to the Trans-Dniester region in 1942, where half of them died (Achim & Iordachi, 2004). The groups of Gypsies targeted for deportation were Gypsies who had a nomadic lifestyle, those who had criminal records, and those who did not have stable jobs (Achim & Iordachi, 2004). While at the political level this can be explained through the existence of a fascist regime at the time, it is telling that the general population mounted relatively little and ineffectual opposition to the deportations. When majority members did try to protect the local Gypsies from being

deported, they did so mostly because they needed them for the traditional jobs that the Gypsies performed (Achim & Iordachi, 2004), which is arguably similar to the finding that people humanize animals depending on their utility to them (cf. Opotow, 1993).

That the dehumanization of the Gypsies may function as a justification of their fate is also suggested by the existence of false consciousness in this group. False consciousness refers to "the holding of false beliefs that are contrary to one's social interest and which thereby contribute to the disadvantaged position of the self or the group" (Jost, 1995: 397), and is manifest in a group's legitimization and acceptance of its low status. False consciousness in the Gypsy minority has been inferred from their lack of political mobilization, inability to speak Romany, or denial of their Gypsy ethnicity at times of population census. As a Gypsy political activist notes, "a significant number of Roma deny their roots in an attempt to escape the social stigma associated with Roma identity. [...] This is well-reflected in the discrepancies between the estimated number of Roma and the lower results of official censuses" (Nicolae, 2007). False consciousness in the Gypsies can arguably also be inferred from their out-group favouritism towards majority group members who normally discriminate against them. For example, while both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Romania mostly characterized the Gypsies as *dirty, backward, disunited, thieves,* and *lazy*, the Gypsies characterized the Romanians as *honest, hard-working, intelligent, hospitable, kind-hearted,* and the Hungarians as *civilized, hostile, hard-working, hospitable,* and *kind-hearted* (Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice, 2001). In the same ethno-barometer, the Gypsy respondents chose *Romanian* as a better descriptor of their identity than *Roma* (Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice, 2001). False consciousness can also be inferred from the Gypsies' derogation of other Gypsies: for example, Gypsy musicians in Romania think of themselves as more *civilized* and *cultured* than other non-musician Gypsies from which they distance themselves (Beissinger, 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that false consciousness in the Gypsies might account for the Gypsies' lack of political mobilization and collective action (Barany, 1998; Keil et al., 1994), although their poor socio-economic status has also been considered as a contributing factor. A similar argument about poverty leading to false consciousness has been made about the poor, where false consciousness is expressed in the 'poor but honest', and classism, in the 'poor but happy' stereotypes (Kay &

Jost, 2003). As we have seen above, attributions of happiness and enjoyment of their fate are also made to farm animals (see Singer, 1990; Plous, 2003), and it may well be that the poor are dehumanized, beyond considerations of ethnicity. However, one could argue that the Gypsies' maintenance of their cultural heritage despite the majority's efforts of forceful assimilation (or marginalization, depending on how one might look at it) indicates that false consciousness does not exist in this group, at least not on a large scale. If the Gypsies really experienced false consciousness, then they would have been culturally assimilated by now. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that cultural maintenance is not necessarily a rational choice, but rather an acceptance of one's fate or a refuge in the face of wide exclusion.

2.6 Comparing infrahumanization and ontologization

What may be the similarities and differences between ontologization and infrahumanization? Firstly, despite their shared reliance on the human-animal binary, ontologization and infrahumanization theories differ in their key assumptions. While the infrahumanization theory rather resembles a 'blood-and-guts' model of prejudice, where all out-group are supposed to be infrahumanized, the ontologization theory is more specific about the conditions leading to ontologization and argues that only certain groups are ontologized. Ontologization views dehumanization as the in-group's reaction to the status, behaviour, or culture of the out-group, whereas infrahumanization views dehumanization as something inevitable and inherent in inter-group relations. The ontologization paradigm is also more explicit about the historical basis of ontologization, suggesting that over time evaluative prejudice becomes categorical, ideological prejudice, as in the case of the Gypsies (see Moscovici & Pérez, 1997). It could be argued that the ontologization theory is bottom-up approach to dehumanization, based on real instances of discrimination and social exclusion, whereas the theory of infrahumanization is rather a top-down approach to dehumanization that starts with a theory of an in-group bias in the attribution of the human essence. Given the grounding of ontologization in a real phenomenon of extreme prejudice and social exclusion, it may be argued that ontologization offers a more ecologically valid approach to dehumanization than infrahumanization. In this sense, ontologization is closer to the conceptualization of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice as suggested by Tajfel (1981).

Secondly, infrahumanization is assumed to be a 'lesser form of dehumanization', whereas ontologization does not make explicit claims about the level of dehumanization it implies. But given the wide discrimination and marginalization of the Gypsies ontologization is tantamount to full dehumanization. Therefore, it may be assumed that the Gypsies are also infrahumanized, although not all infrahumanized groups may be ontologized. It could be argued that the difference between infrahumanization and ontologization is not only in the degree of dehumanization they imply, but also in the functions they perform: while infrahumanization is a form of in-group bias in inter-group relations, ontologization functions as an ideology that justifies why certain groups are discriminated, marginalized, and as we have seen in the case of the Gypsies, deported and exterminated. However, some recent research on infrahumanization (e.g. Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006) has suggested that infrahumanization, too, might support and legitimate the unfair treatment of out-groups.

Thirdly, infrahumanization is measured through the attribution of more humanity to the in-group than to the out-group, whereas ontologization is inferred from the greater attribution of animality than humanity to the out-group. However, it could be suggested that ontologization, too, may be inferred from the greater attribution of humanity to the in-group than to the out-group. Studies on ontologization have found that apart from being attributed more animal than human traits, the ontologized groups (e.g. Gypsies, Black Africans) are also ascribed less human attributes than the in-group (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005; Deschamps et al., 2005). It could be argued that comparing the attribution of humanity and/or animality between in-group and out-group is a more useful way to measure dehumanization because the in-group can serve as a control.

Fourthly, similarly to infrahumanization, the ontologization paradigm has envisaged dehumanization as a matter of 'essence' where different essences, with different degrees of humanity, are attributed to the in-group and out-group. But unlike infrahumanization, though, where the focus is on the unique attribution of the human essence to the in-group, ontologization focuses on the out-group (the Gypsies), and on what makes it distinct from the majority. The attribution of a different essence to the Gypsies aims to maximise the differences between them and the in-group (Pérez et al.,

2001). Thus, the ontologization of the out-group is not contingent on how human the in-group perceives itself to be, although an operationalization of ontologization does sometimes involve a comparison between the humanity attributed to the in-group and that attributed to the out-group (e.g. Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). But, similarly to the infrahumanization paradigm, ontologization does not distinguish between the natural kinds and the entitativity dimensions of essentialization (Haslam et al., 2000), therefore it is not clear whether ontologization is linked to the perception (or rather ideological construction) of the Gypsies as a natural group, or as a homogeneous entity.

Finally, are infrahumanization and ontologization describing the same process of dehumanization or different phenomena? Are infrahumanized groups also ontologized and vice versa? Some research suggests that infrahumanization and ontologization may be different from each other. For example, while both the British and the Romanians ontologized the Gypsies, only the British infrahumanized them (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), suggesting that infrahumanization may be contingent on the status of the in-group. At the same time, these results suggest that groups which are ontologized may be also infrahumanized but only by certain groups. The present research aims to study both processes simultaneously to elucidate whether they perform different functions.

2.7 The functions of dehumanization

What functions might dehumanization fulfil? It could be argued that dehumanization is an extreme form of negative prejudice, and that groups which are dehumanized may also be delegitmized, morally excluded, and stigmatized. However, given the various binaries on which dehumanizing beliefs can rest, and the various groups to which dehumanizing beliefs can be applied, it could be argued that the functions of dehumanization may vary with respect to the binary used. Thus, the human-animal dichotomy may serve to legitimize the domination or moral exclusion of a particular group, whereas the human-machine binary may serve to express dislike against the group. At the same time, not all forms of dehumanization lead to discriminatory practices. For example, groups which are infrahumanized may not be delegitimized, because infrahumanization is 'a lesser form of dehumanization' (Leyens et al., 2000, 2003; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens. 2004).

Similarly, dehumanizing beliefs about a particular group may not necessarily translate into prejudice or social exclusion because they may simply fulfil a palliative function (see Bernard, Ottenberg, & Redl, 1965).

As mentioned before, dehumanization is not mere metaphor, nor just an issue of social perception, but also a *social practice* (Tileagă, 2007). Dehumanized groups such as the Gypsies and the poor are not only 'perceived' as being less than human, they are also denied equal opportunities and are marginalized by the social system (see Pérez, et al., 2001; Lott, 2002). Just like speciesism, dehumanization could be seen as an ideology that legitimizes social inequalities, and arguably has the ability of any ideology to "shape and distort the understanding of the world" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999), so that unequal power relations are not questioned nor challenged. Thus, similarly to speciesism, dehumanization can serve to justify the existing power balance between groups (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Also similarly to speciesism, dehumanization can be seen as a form of *delegitimization*, whereby out-groups are categorised into extreme negative social categories and excluded them from the realm of acceptable norms and values (Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990). From this perspective, delegitimizing the out-group serves to legitimize its oppression and inhumane treatment. Equally, dehumanization can act as *moral exclusion* (Staub, 1987) whereby individuals or groups are placed "outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving" (Opotow, 1990:1). Following this approach to dehumanization, it would appear that the dehumanization of the out-group takes place if certain structural relations exist between the in-group and the out-group, i.e. when the in-group dominates or exploits of the out-group. However, other approaches to dehumanization have found that the out-group can be dehumanized even in the absence of conflict or oppression by the in-group, which this opens the debate as to whether dehumanization is linked to certain social representations of the out-group, or to legitimizing ideologies.

From a different, and one might argue somewhat dated, perspective, dehumanization can be seen as a "particular type of psychic defence mechanism" which consists in "a decrease in a person's sense of his own individuality and in his perception of the humanness of other people" (Bernard et al., 1965: 64; see also

Leyens et al., 2003, for an interpretation of infrahumanization as a 'defence mechanism'). As a defence mechanism, dehumanization can be *self-directed*, where individuals stop perceiving themselves as human beings, or *object-directed*, where out-group members are dehumanized (Bernard et al., 1965). Through self-directed dehumanization individuals' sense of their own humanness is diminished, individuals are emptied of human emotions, and it could be argued that the self-directed dehumanization might be similar to the processes of depersonalization (as envisaged by the self-categorization theory, see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and of deindividuation, see Diener, 1977). Self-directed dehumanization helps insulate individuals from "painful, unacceptable, and unbearable feelings referable to their experiences, inclinations and behaviour" (Bernard et al., 1965: 66), such feelings being "fear, inadequacy, compassion, revulsion, guilt and shame" (1965:69). It could be argued that the self-directed dehumanization may be at odds with the infrahumanization theory which holds that all individuals and groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to themselves, as it suggests that individuals may diminish their sense of humanness in certain circumstances.

Bernard et al. (1965) postulate that dehumanization can have 'adaptive' as well as 'maladaptive' functions. In its adaptive function, the dehumanization of others occurs during processes such as autopsies, burials, surgery, dealing with natural disasters, where dehumanization "divests the victims of their human identities so that feelings of pity, terror, or revulsion can be overcome" (Bernard et al., 1965:67). Thus, dehumanization can be an everyday phenomenon which enables people to de-empathise with others in those circumstances when they cannot help them, and in this sense dehumanization has a palliative function and bears resemblance to the system-justification functions of stereotypes (see Jost & Banaji, 1994), or to beliefs in a just world (Lerner, 1977). However, when dehumanization leads to interethnic violence or to genocide, then dehumanization has a maladaptive function, and here "both superhuman and debased characteristics are ascribed simultaneously to certain groups in order to justify discrimination or aggression against them" (Bernard et al. 1965: 66). The distinction between 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive' dehumanization is quite interesting because it highlights that dehumanization is not necessarily an altogether negative phenomenon, and it suggests that dehumanization may be more prevalent in everyday life than previously thought (in line with the infrahumanization theory).

Bernard et al.'s (1965) suggestions about the 'maladaptive' functions of dehumanization bear resemblance to Bandura's (1999) view of dehumanization as a mechanism of *moral disengagement* (see also Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), where those who are dehumanized "are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, and concerns but as subhuman objects" (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996: 366). Moral disengagement means suspending one's moral agency and the regulatory self-sanctions that normally control humane behaviour (Bandura, 1999). From this perspective, dehumanization seems to function as a justification of the behaviour of the individual, the group, or the system, because "people enlist moral justifications for punitive conduct directed toward individuals who have been deprived of humanness, but they disavow punitive actions and condemn them on moral grounds toward individuals depicted in humanized terms" (Bandura et al., 1996: 366). Moral disengagement also resembles the process of delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990), to the extent that both use dehumanization as a moral justification for the social exclusion or the violence committed against individuals or groups. Although in Bandura's view moral disengagement through dehumanization is a negative phenomenon, one can envisage moral disengagement also having a palliative function, similar to the 'adaptive' function of dehumanization suggested by Bernard et al. (1965). In this sense, dehumanizing and morally disengaging from others whose fate one cannot change, such as war victims, fighting soldiers, or the homeless, can reduce the feelings of guilt or of frustration at not being able to help. For example, while at one level dehumanizing and morally disengaging from the poor may be interpreted as beliefs in a just world or a desire to maintain the existing power relations, ordinary people may dehumanize and morally disengage from war victims such as those in Darfur or Iraq because they may perceive themselves as being unable to help them.

A question that naturally arises and which has been tackled by research on dehumanization, such as the infrahumanization paradigm, is whether dehumanization is the same as prejudice, or whether it fulfils the same functions as prejudice. As regards its negative functions, dehumanization is arguably very similar to prejudice, it is in fact an extreme form of prejudice. However, it may differ from prejudice in its ability to produce moral distancing and to have palliative functions. For example,

ordinary people may dehumanize sex traffic victims or prostitutes not because they have an interest in oppressing them, but because it helps them morally disengage from an issue they cannot address themselves. Nonetheless, given the focus of the present research on inter-group relations, the palliative functions of dehumanization may not be relevant to the comparison with prejudice in this kind of context.

At the same time, is the human-animal binary, for example, the same as the negative-positive dimension of prejudice? Both the infrahumanization and the ontologization paradigms have argued that one can dehumanize without recourse to negative prejudice, as out-group members can be ideologically constructed or socially represented in positive animal terms. The ontologization paradigm has shown that the Gypsies, as well as other social categories such as children, the elderly, the young, cannibals, indigenous people, Pygmies, and savage tribes, are represented in terms of what is 'positive animal', whereas groups such as racists, Nazis, skinheads, terrorists, delinquents, and criminals are represented by both 'negative human' and 'negative animal' categories (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). This shows that considerations of humanness or of animality are not dissociated from the positive-negative dimension of prejudice. The infrahumanization paradigm, too, has argued that infrahumanization goes beyond considerations of negative prejudice, as both negative and positive secondary (uniquely human) emotions are attributed to the in-group in a larger proportion than to the out-group. Thus, dehumanization appears to go beyond considerations of valence and relate more to considerations of 'essence'. Similarly to animals or to machines, out-group members may be perceived or may be ideologically constructed as possessing (or lacking) certain features which disqualify them from being considered fully human, and these features may be other positive or negative. For example, *racism* is a negative but nonetheless a uniquely human feature, whereas *intelligence*, although positive, can be used to describe humans, animals and machines.

However, it could be argued that it may be impossible to separate completely the human vs. other (animal/machine/less-than-human) binaries from the negative-positive valence of prejudice and discrimination. For example, while the infrahumanization paradigm has contended that infrahumanization is independent of the negative valence of prejudice, some pilot studies have found that negative

secondary emotions are rated as more human than positive secondary emotions (Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006), while other studies have found that positive secondary emotions are perceived as more uniquely human than negative secondary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). Thus, it is rather unclear how considerations of humanness may be independent of considerations of positive valence (for a more detailed discussion on this, see chapter 4). Secondly, there is a tendency to construct humanness in positive terms (Deconchy, 1998). For example, Chulvi & Pérez (2003) found that humanness was represented mostly in positive dimensions such as *sociability*, *rationality*, *morality*, *emotions*, with only a few negative dimensions such as *aggression* and *immorality*. Thirdly, given the animals' inferior status, it is very likely that constructions of 'animal nature' may be less positive than those of 'human nature'. As we have seen, speciesism is negative prejudice against animals, and it could be argued that speciesist attitudes might influence the emotions and traits attributed to animals. Fourthly, it may be possible that the human vs. animal/machine/less-than-human dimensions may interact with the negative-positive dimension of prejudice. Thus, some groups which are considered inferior but which do not have a relationship of conflict with the in-group which are considered inferior and are in conflict with the in-group may be dehumanized in terms of positive animal attributes, while other groups may be dehumanized in terms of negative animal attributes, function of inter-group relations, history, conflict, etc. Conversely, not all groups which are the target of negative prejudice are also dehumanized. For example, Romanian majority members view the Hungarian minority in terms of negative human traits, whereas the Gypsy minority, in terms of negative animal attributes (Marcu, unpublished manuscript). It may well be that dehumanization and negative prejudice overlap in those instances where social exclusion and marginalization are at stake, as in the case of the poor or of specific ethnic minorities. However, in those cases where social exclusion or in-group bias are not at stake, dehumanizing beliefs may be positive, as in the case of the disabled or the elderly. To a certain extent, the intersection between dehumanization and negative valence may resemble the stereotype content model (see Glick & Fiske, 1996; 2001), in that positive dehumanized groups may be viewed as incompetent but warm (paternalistic prejudice), while negatively dehumanized groups, as incompetent and cold (contemptuous prejudice). Also similarly to the stereotype content model, the positive dehumanization of out-groups may constitute a form of subtle and ambivalent

prejudice, perhaps similar to aversive prejudice (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Fifthly, it may well be that the in-group is represented in positive human terms, while the out-group is represented in animal terms, both positive and negative. For example, studies have found a positive and significant correlation between the positive evaluation of human characteristics and their attribution to the in-group, while such correlation for the out-group (the Gypsies) was non-significant (Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). Finally, it could also be suggested that the same dehumanized group may be sometimes represented in a positive light, and at other times in a negative light, function of the in-group's ad-hoc interests. To conclude, it may not always be possible to separate dehumanization completely from the negative side of prejudice, and it could be suggested that instead of demonstrating that dehumanization is independent from the negative pole of prejudice, it may be more fruitful to examine the conditions where dehumanization and negative prejudice interact and the consequences they produce.

2.8 Objectives of the present research

Before examining the ways in which the present research aims to contribute to the existing research on dehumanization, it is necessary to specify how dehumanization is conceptualized here, given its potentially different definitions, functions and interpretations. The present research envisages dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice against out-groups, in line with the theorizing by Tajfel (1981) and Bernard et al. (1965), and in line with the theory of ontologization and with Tileagă's (2007) theorizing, the present research views dehumanization as a social practice of exclusion directed towards particular groups. The present research considers ontologization to be very close to the formulation of dehumanization as an extreme form of prejudice, but views infrahumanization as a lesser form of dehumanization, in line with its original formulation. However, while the present research considers dehumanization to be a phenomenon that goes beyond mere perception and categorization of out-groups as less-than-human and animal-like, it acknowledges that in experimental settings dehumanization is inevitably limited to perception and categorization (as experimental research sometimes is). The present research does not view the potential attribution of less humanity to the in-group than to the out-group as prejudice against the in-group, but instead would interpret this

phenomenon as a lack of in-group favouritism, and possibly as a form of false consciousness if other related variables support this interpretation.

The focus of the present research is on the antecedents and consequences of dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations. As we have seen, there are currently two research paradigms on dehumanization, infrahumanization and ontologization, respectively, which have adopted the human-animal binary in their theorization and operationalization of dehumanization. But how does each paradigm contribute theoretically to the knowledge on dehumanization in inter-ethnic contexts? Infrahumanization is assumed to be a lesser form of dehumanization, and to be a universal phenomenon stemming from in-group bias. Given the main tenet of infrahumanization that all groups are motivated to reserve the human essence for their in-group, and therefore to infrahumanize all out-group, it could be argued that the one should look for *moderators* of this phenomenon, i.e. those variables which increase or decrease the infrahumanization effect. However, the other paradigm, ontologization, suggests that only those groups which are perceived (or are ideologically constructed) as not socially integrated or culturally assimilated are ontologized, therefore one should explore the *mediators* of this phenomenon, i.e. those variables which explain the ontologization effect (see Baron & Kenny, 1986, for a detailed discussion of mediation and moderation). Failure to socially integrate or to culturally assimilate on the part of an ethnic minority should not automatically lead to ontologization unless the majority perceives that failure as a threat, either at the material or at the symbolic level, therefore the present research proposes to focus on perceived threat as a mediating factor of ontologization and hence of dehumanization. At the same time, ontologization itself may be moderated, for example in the interaction between material and symbolic threats. Furthermore, the findings on ontologization, as well as the critique on infrahumanization, raise the question whether infrahumanization, too, may be mediated by perceived threat, as well as by other factors such as group status or in-group identification. Therefore the present research undertakes to examine more closely which of these variables may mediate and moderate infrahumanization and ontologization. Also, the present research aims to examine in more detail whether infrahumanization and ontologization indicate the same phenomenon of dehumanization or different processes.

More specifically, given the ontologization's focus on the out-group, the present research draws on the ontologization of the Gypsy minority and proposes to investigate perceived threat from the out-group as an antecedent of ontologization and hence of dehumanization. The focus on perceived material and symbolic threat derives from the Gypsy minority's poor economic status and cultural difference from the majority. Perceived symbolic threat, which is assumed to stem from perceived (or ideologically constructed) cultural differences between in-group and out-group, and perceived material threat, presumed to be triggered by the out-group's poor economic status, may be mediators of ontologization. The present research recognizes that there may be other aspects of the majority's relationship with the Gypsy minority, such as perceived criminal behaviour, nomadism, or lack of a nation-state, which can play a role in their dehumanization. However, the present research chooses not to focus on these dimensions because they are not very common in inter-ethnic group relations, while a group's cultural values or its socio-economic status often play a part. By focusing on the more usual aspects of inter-group relations, the present research aims to be able to predict when dehumanization occurs. Secondly, the present research aims to explore the consequences of dehumanization in inter-ethnic relations, in particular how dehumanization may be linked to the delegitimization, social exclusion and to preferences for exclusory acculturation strategies for ethnic minorities. Thirdly, given the infrahumanization's focus on the in-group, the present research proposes to examine how groups of different statuses may engage in infrahumanization, will investigate this phenomenon cross-culturally in Britain and Romania.

Methodologically, each paradigm contributes to the study of dehumanization by operationalizing the human-animal binary, either in terms of primary and secondary emotions, as in infrahumanization, or in terms of human and animal characteristics, as in the ontologization paradigm. Both paradigms explore dehumanization quantitatively, mostly experimentally and correlationally, and both paradigms assume a clear-cut and non-dilemmatic boundary between the categories animal and human, which is reflected in their categorical distinction between primary and secondary emotions, and between animal and human attributes, respectively. However, neither paradigm delves deeply on how the human-animal binary might serve as a basis for dehumanization, as they overlook the ideological basis for the construction of animal inferiority. Similarly, neither paradigm explores the possibility

that the emotions and traits used in the operationalization of dehumanization may be conceptualized as belonging to a continuum of humanity rather than to mutually exclusive categories such as 'primary' and 'secondary'. As it was mentioned earlier in the chapter, humanity can be measured not only in terms of human uniqueness, but also in terms of human typicality. Therefore the present research undertakes to examine the possibility of operationalizing dehumanization continuously rather than strictly categorically, taking into account variability within the categories 'animal' and 'human', and the possibility of measuring dehumanization in terms of human typicality rather than uniqueness. Furthermore, the present research sets out to explore in closer detail the human-animal boundary as a cognitive and ideological basis of dehumanization within the context of inter-ethnic group relations.

The present research aims to explore dehumanization using both qualitative and quantitative methods. A qualitative approach can provide insights into the content of dehumanizing beliefs, as well as into the ideologies that support them, while a quantitative approach can enable the exploration of the mediators and moderators of dehumanization. Furthermore, the present research plans to employ an experimental approach in order to be able to determine these mediators and moderators, using both artificial and real groups. Using artificial groups can help pinpoint those elements about a group that can predispose it to dehumanization, such as perceived threat, which in the case of real groups risks to be an expression of prejudice rather than of threat *per se*. Using real groups, on the other hand, can show how the relationship between in-group and out-group in terms of status, for example, can shape dehumanization, and infrahumanization in particular. Also, the artificial and real groups may show a different overlapping between dehumanization and negative prejudice, as artificial groups may invoke less negativity than real ones.

The present research proposes to study the dehumanization of ethnic minorities in Britain and Romania, thus building on previous work on the dehumanization of ethnic minorities in these two countries (Marcu, unpublished manuscript) and in particular on the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). The cross-cultural setting can also inform the drawing of the human-animal boundary both cognitively and ideologically. While every culture distinguishes between the natural and the cultural realms, it is possible that different

cultures may draw the line differently between the two realms, as anthropological studies suggest (see Vandenberghe, 2003). As Britain and Romania are different not only culturally, but also at the level of ideology and public discourse with regard to animal rights and human rights, it is conceivable that animal and human essences might be constructed differently in the two countries. In fact, studies based on World Values Surveys have suggested that Britain is a postmaterialist society, characterised by a secular-rational orientation toward authority and holding self-expression values, whereas Romania is a materialist society: although it has a secular-rational orientation toward authority, too, it holds survival rather than self-expression values due to its underdeveloped economy (see Inglehart & Baker, 2000). And as postmaterialist values have been linked to animal rights and tolerance of sexual, cultural, ethnical and religious minorities, it is expected that the differences between Britain and Romania at the level of postmaterialist values might be reflected in the way animal and human essences are socially constructed, but also in the interpretation of cultural differences and in the expression of prejudice in inter-group contexts.

Differences in the levels of political liberalization and democratization between Britain and Romania are also likely to be reflected in the attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants, as well as in each society's expectations of acculturation on the part of these social groups. While Britain is a country with a long-established liberal democracy, Romania has been classified as a partial democracy after the fall of the Communist regime, and these differences in the level of democratization have consequences for the way 'nation' and national identity are constructed, and on the way ethnic minorities and new immigrants are expected to acculturate. 'Nation' has been conceptualized in two ways: as a citizenship relation where "the nation is the collective sovereign emanating from common political participation" and as an ethnic relation, where it rests on an implicit isomorphism between ethnicity and nationality (Verdery: 1996: 84). It has been suggested that while the 'citizenship' meaning of nation has its origins in liberal democracy, the 'ethnic' meaning of nation is most common in Eastern Europe, and is usually associated with nationalism (Verdery, 1996). Therefore it is expected that differences in how nation and national identity are conceptualized in Britain and Romania might affect the attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. At the same time, the level of immigration in each country may influence the construction of national

identity and of otherness: Britain is a high-immigration country, used to the presence of ethnic minorities and to political discourse regarding immigrants' rights and place in British society, while Romania has experienced immigration only on a small scale and only after the collapse of Communism. In fact, Romania is a country from where people migrate, either as asylum seekers or as economic migrants, whereas Britain is a country from where people migrate (or rather 'relocate', according to the media) mostly as "sun-seekers". These different histories of immigration may have consequences for the levels of perceived threat from ethnic groups and immigrants in the two countries, and subsequently on their dehumanization.

The economic situation of a country also plays a two-fold part: firstly, the availability of resources and the citizens' perceptions of their economic status influences their attitudes toward economic immigrants and asylum seekers. Resource stress or perceived scarcity of resources can influence people's attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Therefore, one might expect that Romanians would have more negative attitudes toward immigrants than the British as Romania is poorer than Britain, and given that "negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration would be especially prevalent when the economic situation in a country is poor or declining" (Esses et al., 2001: 395). Secondly, a stable and prosperous economy can lead to existential security, which in turn leads to postmaterialist values: while Western countries, including Britain, have been gradually changing their focus from material well-being to quality of life and self-expression due to increased existential security (Inglehart, 1990), former Communist Eastern European countries such as Romania have had to face the anxiety of social changes brought about by the transition from a politically repressive regime and a centralised economy to a system of democracy and a market economy.

Given their different levels of economic development, Romania and Britain also differ in their power status. Britain is an international power, able to influence politics worldwide, whereas Romania has a minor power status and has only recently joined the European Union[2]. If a group's sense or construction of its own humanness is related to perceptions of its power status, then we might expect dehumanization to

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[2] The present research was conducted in its entirety before Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007.

take different shapes in the two countries. Although the infrahumanization paradigm has argued that infrahumanization is not contingent on the status of the in-group, most of the infrahumanization research has been carried out on relatively high-status groups such as the Belgians, the Spanish or the Italians, whose countries enjoy a relatively high status in Europe and worldwide, therefore we do not know for sure how lower-status groups might attribute humanness to themselves. Secondly, research carried out in Britain and Romania has shown that, contrary to the British, the Romanians did not infrahumanize the out-groups (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), which suggests that low-status groups may not engage in infrahumanization perhaps because they may not be biased into attributing more humanness to their in-group. Therefore the present research aims to explore in more detail how the relative status of the in-group influences the dehumanization process.

Last but not least, the cross-cultural setting may offer an insight into prejudice suppression. Nowadays people in Western societies are aware of politically correct norms (see Crandall, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and often look for subtle ways of expressing their prejudice. Therefore one might expect that British participants will suppress prejudice more than the Romanian participants, and this may be reflected in a higher incidence of ambiguous prejudice such as animal but positive emotions or traits being attributed to out-group members. In Romania, on the contrary, we can expect more of an overlap between dehumanization and the negative side of prejudice.

Chapter 3   Of animals and humans: Constructions of human-animal boundaries

Contents of Chapter 3

3.1 Introduction

We have seen in Chapter 2 that the human-animal binary has been the mostly used one in the operationalization of dehumanization. Both infrahumanization and ontologization have modelled the dehumanization of out-group members on the human-animal dichotomy. However, neither of these research paradigms has thoroughly reflected on how the human-animal boundary is drawn or why it might serve as such a robust resource for dehumanizing out-groups or for legitimizing their unfair treatment. Regardless of whether the distinction between humans and animals is understood as categorical or continuous, it is often implied to be both consensual and unaffected by ideological factors, such as speciesism. Equally, neither infrahumanization nor ontologization researchers have reflected on the ideological underpinnings of the human-animal distinction, and how this might serve as a model for the process of dehumanization itself. In the present study I was concerned with the cognitive and ideological ways in which people construct the differences and similarities between humans and animals. I focused on how humans configure animal nature so that it comes to support justifications of discrimination against animals, and by extrapolation, against out-group members.

3.2 Humans, animals, and speciesism

As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, defining what human essence and animal essence are is not a pure scientific exercise, but rather one influenced by ideology. Given the humans' dependence on animals for food, clothing, cosmetics, renewable energy, and scientific experimentation, it is foreseeable that humans' construction of the human-animal binary might be underlain by speciesist ideology. In this study I explored the human-animal boundary as an ideological construction that can be made up and contested in dialogue, and I examined how the motives underlying speciesism might be similar to those underpinning the dehumanization of humans. As Plous has remarked, "just as racism, sexism, and other prejudices share a similar mindset, many of the psychological factors that underlie speciesism serve to reinforce and promote prejudice against humans. These factors include power, privilege, dominance, control, entitlement, and the need to reduce cognitive dissonance when committing harmful acts" (2003: 510).

How might the construction of human-animal differences be understood as ideological work? As Garner (2003) points out, ideological discourse is dominated by anthropocentrism that reflects humans' power and domination over animals. Philosophers such as Ryder (1971) and Singer (1990) call this anthropocentric ideology *speciesism* and describe it as a lived ideology, suggesting that it may contain contrary propositions (see Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988). Indeed, animals are sometimes anthropomorphised as being like humans and sometimes dehumanized as being unlike humans (see Opotow, 1993). Humans may dehumanize the animals they eat, while simultaneously anthropomorphizing their pets to shore up their interests in protein-rich food and inter-species companionship respectively. Thus, it may well be that the ideology of speciesism contains contrary themes and ideological dilemmas, which raises the issue whether dehumanization, too, might contain them.

While humans are generally credited with being rational and sentient beings, science has traditionally been sceptical about attributing mental states to animals (Rollin, 2000). While both scientific and ordinary common sense have always denied mental life to animals so as to avoid potential moral implications, science has done so also because it believes itself to be objective and therefore entitled to transgress moral considerations. As Rollin put it, "science insulated itself from the moral implications of its own activity with animals not only by denial of animal mentation but by another mainstay of scientific ideology—the claim that science is value-free, and thus can make no moral claims and take no moral positions, since moral judgements, too, are unverifiable" (2000: 110). In Rollin's view, while science has been disdainful of anthropomorphic attributions to animals, it has itself been acting on some sort of reverse anthropomorphism by extrapolating from animals to humans in animal research serving to model human behaviour. For example, most research on human painkillers is conducted on animals, although animals themselves do not benefit from protection from pain. The fact that science has turned a blind eye to this obvious paradox can only be explained in terms of ideology.

3.3 Cultural and postmaterialist values

Although most societies and most humans are speciesist, to a certain extent cultural values can shape the ways that animals are imagined to be. For example, cows are viewed as holy in Hindu culture but pigs are seen as unclean in Muslim and Jewish cultures. Some religions, such as Jainism and Buddhism, prescribe vegetarianism for all. However, in Christian and secular societies, vegetarianism represents a personal choice. Some societies have even tentatively extended the concept of 'rights' to animals, and in some Western countries people can be prosecuted for cruelty against animals. However, one might remark that abattoir workers or pest control agencies seem to be exempt from being charged with such cruelty offences.

Growth in concern about animal rights has been understood as a particularity of 'postmaterialist' capitalist societies (Franklin, Tranter & White, 2001). Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997; 2000) holds that value-orientations in advanced industrial societies change in response to increased *existential security*, i.e. freedom from worry about material survival, which allows individuals more time for spiritual fulfilment. As people become liberated from immediate material worries, they dedicate more time to thinking about social groups who had historically experienced discrimination (such as disabled people, women and ethnic minorities), environmental politics and animal welfare. While postmodernity and postmaterialism bring about existential security, they have also been credited with triggering *ontological insecurity* (Franklin, 1999), i.e. a sense of loss and anxiety brought about by the fragmented and ever-changing nature of social relations and means of production. In extending rights to animals, postmaterialist values seem to help in breaking the dichotomy of culture-nature and in achieving a hybridisation of the two in what Latour (1991) would call "a work of translation". From this perspective, humans and animals are not separate entities, but interrelated organic elements of an ecosystem. However, postmaterialist values and the increased knowledge about the humans' relatedness to other species do not always moderate speciesist attitudes. As Singer remarks, "the moral attitudes of the past are too deeply embedded in our thought and our practices to be upset by a mere change in our knowledge of ourselves and other animals" (1990: 212).

In Britain, a postmaterialist society in Inglehart's terms, the movement for animal rights started in 1824 when the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded, the first ever animal welfare society in any country. Interestingly, a founding member of the Society was William Wilberforce, who was also involved in the anti-slavery movement, which suggests that people who are against animal cruelty may also be against racism and other related forms of human prejudice. In other countries, such as Romania, the animal rights movement has taken shape only very recently, in the 1990's. While vegetarianism is quite common in Britain and has a long history, in Romania the Romanian Vegetarian Society was founded only in 1991, and while in Britain vegetarianism is linked to animal issues, whereas in Romania it is linked more to health reasons.

3.4 The present study

As it was highlighted in chapter 2, the concept of 'rights' can help understand the drawing of the boundary between animals and humans. Humans enjoy rights on the basis of their rational autonomy and sentience, whereas animals do not enjoy rights even though they are sentient beings and even though some animals may have more rational autonomy than certain categories of human beings such as the severely mentally disabled or foetuses. To better understand variation in the construction of the human-animal boundary, the present study proceeded by prompting dilemmas about life-and-death issues involving humans and animals among focus group participants in Britain and Romania. As Billig et al. (1988) have suggested, contrary themes are necessarily invoked when people argue and discuss everyday issues. Issues regarding human life such as abortion and euthanasia are relevant here because they raise the following points: where does humanness begin? Does a foetus have human rights? Should a terminally ill, dying human be killed to avoid further suffering? When two conjoint twins have unequal chances of survival, should they be separated to save the life of one of them, or would this be tantamount to killing the weaker one?

The present study aimed to examine constructions of the animal-human boundary in two countries at very different points on the postmaterialist spectrum. Following Singer (1990), it was predicted that both materialist and post-materialist values would support speciesism but in different ways. Singer argues that humans' speciesism has long-standing roots in humans' attempts to justify their domination and exploitation of animals. Thus while speciesism is traditional and long-standing, it is also the height of modernity. As a result, both materialist and post-materialist societies may be able to claim that their cultures' speciesism is inevitable but for different reasons. One might argue that the dehumanization of animals serves both system-justifying and palliative functions. Indeed, not all humans are cruel and intent on causing harm to animals, but they may nonetheless dehumanize them to be to cope with the knowledge of their suffering.

Informed by current issues within each country, six questions pertaining to animal and human life were drawn up for each country. The questions about human life were the same across the two national groups and pertained to euthanasia, abortion and the separation of conjoint twins with unequal chances of survival. A question about animal experimentation was used for both national groups. The Romanian sample answered two other questions about the euthanasia of stray dogs in Bucharest (the Romanian capital) and the reduction of unnecessary suffering during the killing of animals at abattoirs. The British participants answered two questions about fox hunting and the culling of uninfected animals during the foot-and-mouth epidemic in 2001 (see *Appendix I a* for the British interview schedule, and *Appendix I b* for the Romanian one). The questions about animals differed in the two countries in order to reflect the animal issues specific to each country. Thus, although the questions were not identical, they were functionally equivalent as it is often the case with cross-cultural research (see Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2000).

Dilemmatic issues were chosen as questions in order to engage participants into thinking about real life situations. As Billig et al. (1988) have pointed out, thinking and debating rest on contrary themes and on tensions between equally important issues. A

qualitative method was chosen because it has more ecological validity than laboratory-conducted studies, and because it can show the active nature of thinking about moral dilemmas. Given the potentially ideological natures of beliefs about human and animal nature, focus group interviews are more able to capture the 'waxing and waning' and the categorization and particularization of speciesism than simple questionnaires. For example, instead of asking people to respond on a 1 to 7 Likert scale if they agree with animal experimentation, a qualitative approach can reveal whether people agree with this statement generally or only in certain circumstances, and whether they distinguish between different kinds of animals used for research. Unlike a quantitative approach, a qualitative, discursive approach has the ability to reveal the contrary themes surrounding speciesism, and to reveal instances when participants contradict themselves or among themselves. The qualitative approach was deemed suitable also given the possibility that human nature may be at times constructed as similar to and at other times as different from animal nature in order to justify various ideologies or ad-hoc purposes.

It was predicted that 'animal nature' would be a dilemmatic construction in these focus groups because people usually use animal-derived produce for their daily lives, can experience sympathy and pity for animals' plight, and include some animals in their homes as pets. We expected that, given the wider spread of postmaterialist values in Britain than in Romania, British participants would be more likely to extend the scope of justice to animals and that different justifications of speciesism would arise in both societies.

3.5 Method

3.5.1 Participants

Twenty-one Romanians and twenty-one British people participated. The nineteen female and two male Romanian participants were students at a high-school in Bucharest (age range = 17 to 19 years, $M = 17.80$ years). The ten male and eleven female British participants were recruited via posters on a university campus (ages range = 18 to 42

years, M = 24.80 years). All British participants were of British nationality, while in term of ethnicity they were 17 English, 1 Black African, 1 Chinese, 1 Pakistani and 1 Indian.

3.5.2 Procedure

The Romanian participants were recruited at a high-school in Bucharest, and the British participants were recruited on a British university campus. The Romanian participants were approached through their teacher in class, and invited to participate in a focus group study about "animal rights and human rights". The British participants were recruited through a poster announcing that participants were required to take part in a debate on current issues, and were rewarded £10 each for taking part in the debate. Each focus group was composed of seven participants, and the discussions were moderated by the researcher. Participants were sat in a circle, and a tape recorder was placed in the middle. The interviewer read out each question and invited the students to comment and express their point of view, and then moderated the ensuing debate. The interviewer tried to challenge the participants on the opinions they expressed in order to point out any inconsistencies or paradoxes in their responses. The focus group interviews were conducted in Romanian and English, respectively. In Romania the focus group interviews lasted between 40 and 50 minutes, while in Britain, between 60 and 70 minutes. The participants were debriefed at the end of the each focus group discussion.

3.5.3 Analytic strategy

The Romanian focus group interviews were translated into English. The analysis was informed by thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998), where themes represent "specific patterns found in the data in which one is interested" (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 57). Within this analytic framework, themes can be based both on the *manifest* content of the data, which is directly observable, as well as on *latent* content, which is implicitly referred to (Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & Yardley, 2004). At the manifest or semantic level, themes are based on explicit meanings, which the analyst usually takes at face value. However, at the latent level, the themes draw on wider influences such ideologies, culture, history, etc., which means that the interpretative work moves from description to theorization (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The thematic analysis can be *inductive*, i.e. the themes are closely

linked to the data and do not fit into a pre-existing coding frame, or they can be *theoretical*, i.e. the themes are driven by existing theory and by the researcher's analytic interest (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Given the aim of thematic analysis to "describe how thematic contents are elaborated by groups of participants, and to identify meanings that are valid across many participants" (Joffe & Yardley, 2004: 66), thematic analysis was considered particularly suitable for analysing the data obtained from the focus group interviews.

As the research aimed to examine the meanings people attach to animal and human existence within different cultural and socio-economic contexts, there was a specific focus on the construction of the categories of 'humans' and 'animals' in talk. Given the focus of the analysis on the latent content of the data and on ideological constructions, the approach shared many assumptions with discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and Foucauldian discourse analysis (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). Similarly to discourse analysis, the present study assumed that ideologies such as speciesism would be enacted in discourse, and that the participants, as non-vegetarians, would have a stake in expressing their beliefs about animals. In line with discursive psychology, the present research considered that "psychological activities such as justification, rationalization, categorization, and attribution are understood as ways in which participants manage their interests" (Willig, 2001: 91). Given its considerations of postmaterialism, societal level of analysis, and its cross-cultural aspect, the present research also shared the assumptions of Foucauldian discourse analysis that culture provides individuals with certain ideologies and discursive resources, and that discourses play a part in the legitimization of power relations and social arrangements (see Willig, 2001). Thus, the present thematic analysis was conducted within a constructionist framework, with the focus not on motivation or individual psychologies, but rather on the "socio-cultural contexts and structural conditions that enable the individual accounts that are provided" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 85). However, unlike discourse analysis, the present analysis did not focus on language *per se*, nor on its function as social action. Thus, the interpretation of the present data bears resemblance to 'thematic discourse analysis' and to 'thematic decomposition

analysis' (e.g. Stenner, 1993; Taylor & Ussher, 2001), in the sense that patterns in the data were identified as socially produced, but no 'pure' discursive analysis as such was conducted (see Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Each transcript was read carefully and patterns in the data were noted. Data was categorised into codes, which represented sequences of the data that appeared interesting to the analysis, and which referred to "the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon" (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). Related codes were spliced, and themes were formed. The analysis was not *linear*, but rather *recursive* (see Braun & Clarke, 2006), as it involved a constant moving back and forth between the data itself and the themes that were constructed. It should be pointed out here that the themes did not 'emerge', as it were, because they did not have a concrete existence in the data, but rather they were constructed during the interpretative work. The themes were mainly based on the latent content of the data, because the analysis went beyond the simple surface meaning of the data and tried to "identify the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations – and ideologies – that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 84). The themes were theory-driven and they sought to reflect instances of speciesism and influences of postmaterialism. The themes found can be assumed to illustrate social representations (Joffe & Yardley, 2004), in our case, social and ideological representations of what constitutes humanness and animality.

3.6 Results

Overall, four main themes were constructed from both the British and the Romanian data, some of them reflecting similarities, and others, differences, between the British and the Romanians. In the paragraphs that illustrate dialogues or debates between participants, different letters are used to distinguish participants' entries from one anothers'. However, there is no focus on individual points of view but rather on the dialogues themselves.

3.6.1 Rational Autonomy

Humans' rational autonomy was often spontaneously invoked by participants attempting to demarcate animals from humans. Humans were explicitly described as those who "have reason, which distinguishes them from animals" (Romanian focus group [RFG] 1, 170) but categorical distinctions were readily challenged, in which the dilemma was often resolved by resorting to incontestable ideologies such as religious dogma:

A: "Humans are thinking creatures."

B: "How do you know animals are not?"

A: "They communicate, too, but not like humans."

C: "Humans are superior creatures as God put them at the centre of his creation, the centre of animals, of nature, everything."

B: "But that doesn't mean that humans should take advantage..." (RFG 3, 154-163).

As it can be noted, participant C intervened to resolve the apparent dilemma but religion did not act as incontrovertible because participant B contested it. In discourse analysis, this form of argument is referred to as a 'bottom-line argument', i.e., one that invokes something that often works as a 'fundamental' and that cannot be challenged or is difficult to challenge.

Reason was also used to justify why animals were inferior, and why they were used in scientific experiments:

A: "To me it seems correct to test on animals certain diseases that appear both in humans and in animals rather than to test them on humans. Because, ok, the mentality nowadays is that animals are considered inferior to humans, and then...

Interviewer: "Why do you think they are considered inferior?

A: "Because they lack reason...

B: "And because we like it there to exist someone we can take advantage of...

C: "First of all, the issue of reason...the issues of philosophy say that humans are the ultimate goal, and therefore we humans can use any means to reach our ends... (RFG 2, 201-212).

As the excerpt above indicates, lack of reason is used to morally disengage from animals and to legitimize experimenting on them. The cynical remark of the participants' shows that the animals' presumed lack of reason is not so much a scientific exercise, but rather an ideological construction motivated by humans' needs of domination and power. It could therefore be argued that the dehumanization of groups, too, may occur because 'we like it there to exist someone we can take advantage of'. The last participant's point about the 'issues of philosophy' and humans being the ultimate goal is another example of a bottom-line argument, where philosophy is invoked to closed down an argument likely to bring up uncomfortable truths about animal use. The exchange illustrated above shows how rational autonomy in animals can be denied when it is in the humans' interest to 'reach their ends', and arguably shows how dehumanisation can function as delegitimization (cf. Bar-Tal, 1989; 1990), and as system-justification (cf. Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Rational autonomy was used also to make distinctions among humans themselves, and those who lacked this capacity were sometimes explicitly constructed as lacking human essence:

"When people get Alzheimer's, (...) they are basically stripped of them being a human being" (British focus group [BFG]1, 37-38).

Thus, contrary to Regan (1997), these participants attended to variability in humans' rational autonomy and used it as a basis to selectively allocate humanity. This often justified the withholding of human rights, such as the right to life of disabled unborn children:

"You cannot know if that child will have a conscience or just be a vegetable" (RFG 3, 291-92).

or disabled children who were already born:

"There's no use in that [disabled] child being in a wheelchair, being on a respirator, ventilator" (BFG 2, 523-25).

and the right of terminally ill patients to decide when to die:

"The patient may be considered as not being in his full mental faculties (RFG1, 405).

As this last excerpt shows, it was not the case that humans who lacked rational autonomy were constructed as unworthy of life but rather that they lacked the ability to make rational decisions about the beginning or continuation of their own lives. However, the withholding of rights to choose life or death presumes that the speakers themselves possess rational autonomy and so can adjudicate such matters for others and presumably themselves. Thus, rational autonomy provides a basis for both demarcating humans from animals and for demarcating humans who can and cannot speak for themselves on matters of life and death.

However, awareness of humans' distinct rational autonomy could also be used to argue against cruel treatment of animals who do not have a voice:

"I just think that animals don't have a choice. We choose whether they're gonna live or die, which is really bad" (BFG 3, 81-82).

"But the pig is still a being, it's got life, and...I don't know, human rights are more important but only because humans have reason, which distinguishes them

from animals, but nevertheless, because of this, does it mean we shouldn't offer them any…facilities, so to speak?" (RFG 1,169-72).

As these quotations indicate, some participants implied that humans should be responsible towards animals precisely because they have more agency than them, and it could be argued that these participants expressed group-based guilt for humans' mistreatment of animals. Just as in research on inter-group relations (e.g. Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003), the Romanian participant in the extract above arguably experienced group-based guilt and the dilemma of privilege because she perceived her in-group, the humans, to be unfairly advantaged in comparison to animals by being naturally endowed with reason and autonomy. By wanting to 'offer facilities' to animals she means to extend rights to animals because it becomes apparent that lack of reason should not automatically deprive other creatures from protection against cruelty.

Morality also seemed to be a criterion for similarities between animals and humans. Immoral humans were judged as less worthy than animals, as in this exchange between Romanian participants about the traditions of knifing pigs at Christmas:

A: "Anyway, the animal, at least the domestic one, cannot be regarded like a human. The moment I buy it with money, it means it is my property. Even if it is a creature…You pay for it, you have rights over it.

B: "I remember from the 3rd grade, from the geography classes. They said clearly: domestic animals are our source of food. From the beginning, their role was decided. They are on earth to serve our needs, period.

C: "Why do we make differences? Why not cats and dogs? Let's say they are inferior. It is a gradual inferiority. I can say that for cats I find more compassion than for humans, humans can let you down, whereas cats…

B: "In this case, you can grow attached even to pigs…

C: "Yes, we have this mentality that pigs are dirty, that pigs are pigs…Rather, pigs are more humanlike than piglike.

D: "Tradition started from the humans' desire to show their superiority to animals... (RFG 2, 166-183)

There are a few issues at stake in the dialogue above. Firstly, we can see how animals are reified, and one might think of the same argument applying to human slaves: "even if it is a creature...you pay for it, you have rights over it". The domestic animals seem to be more reified than other animals because of their position of subordination relative to humans, although one participant challenges this: "why not cats and dogs?". Secondly, it can be noted how the 'role' of domestic animals, 'decided from the beginning', acts as a rationalization and justification of their fate. The use of the passive voice, 'their role was decided', eliminates the naming of who might have taken this decision. Thirdly, the supposed gradual inferiority of animals might suggest that the dehumanization, too, might involve gradual differences between groups, similarly to the theorization of ontologization as a principle of social classification.

Fourthly, humans can be 'piglike' because they 'can let you down', which suggest that immoral humans can be considered worse than animals. Humans' immorality appears to strip them off of their human status, and it could be argued that immoral behaviour can lead to dehumanization. This idea is also echoed by some British participants talking about animal experimentation:

A: "I'm not entirely decided one way or the other either, but I would prefer to see convicted criminals having been tested on rather than animals.

B: "I agree with you on that.

A: "But then you get into the whole human rights. But, you know, humans just know they're supreme beings, so they think they've got the right to use whatever they want.

Interviewer: What is it about convicted criminals that they should be tested on, rather than animals?

A: Well, not just petty thieves, things like that, but if people are causing harm to other people and killing and raping and all that sort of stuff, then I don't think

they belong in civilized society so to speak, they're a danger to other people. Yet, because we've brought down the whole death penalty and stuff like that, we look after them, we put them in jail, we feed them and that, so, you know, I mean...(BFG 3, 51-66).

As it can be seen, people engage in criminal behaviour do not belong in "civilized society", although society does treat them in prison by feeding them and protecting their rights. It could be argued that dehumanization may be an emotional reaction to human immoral or criminal behaviour, but also a rationalization of their actions: if they were really human, they would not have engaged in crimes. Given the widespread stereotypes of the Gypsies as thieves and criminals (see chapter 2), it could be argued that their dehumanization, too, may hinge upon their social representations as immoral, and therefore as *asocial* beings (cf. Chulvi & Pérez, 2003). Last but not least, in both the Romanian and the British discourses we find awareness of humans' sense of superiority and enjoyment in taking advantage of smaller forms of life.

3.6.2 Sentience

While rational autonomy made humans distinct from animals, sentience was often invoked as the basis of similarity between humans and animals. When asked whether they believed animals had feelings or emotions, these two Romanian participants responded:

A: "Yes, they are instinctual but have feelings nonetheless.
B: "At the end of the day, our feelings are instinctual, too. It's a feature that makes us resemble animals" (RFG 2, 246-48).

It is interesting here how instinct was brought up as a common ground between animals and humans. However, in some research on dehumanization, instinct has been used as a demarcation line between in-group and out-group, where dehumanized out-groups were considered primitive or instinctual (see for example Jahoda, 1992; 1999). It would be interesting to see how instinct may be used at different times to construct the presupposed

'animal' essence of the out-group, and at other times to justify the 'natural' behaviour of the in-group, such in-group bias or group competition.

Furthermore, when asked by the researcher whether they thought that "if animals were proven to have feelings, or emotions, similar to those of humans, this would make us change our attitude towards animals, to stop the experiments, the suffering, the killing", the participants responded:

A: "Yes, if we knew this, maybe…

B: "We already know they have them.

C: "Come on, now we can say that even plants have feelings!

A: "How could a plant express its feelings?!

B: "First of all we have to think of the soul, every soul no matter to whom it belonged and no matter how bad that human or animal were, has emotions and feelings and so forth." (RFG 2, 255-265).

We can see in the excerpt above how some participants hesitate and deny that animals have feelings, whereas another admits that animals have sentience and that judgements of character, as it were, should not undermine considerations of sentience. It would be interesting to know whether attributions of sentience might go beyond negative prejudice. Might one imagine these Romanian participants saying "no matter how bad Gypsies / criminals / homeless people are, they have a soul, and emotions, and feelings, and so forth"? It is possible that the sentience of these social groups might be more contested than animal sentience, because humans are not 'innocent' beings, but rather rational ones capable of knowing good from bad.

If the participants accepted that animals possessed sentience, they nonetheless considered animal sentience to be less than that of humans, and that this limited emotional range was used to justify their exploitation. It could be argued that in some instances dehumanization may involve considerations of degree rather than of kind, as it can be seen in the following exchange between British participants below:

A: "But don't you think that's pretty hypocritical because the animal's parents, for example, might get really sad when the baby animal dies.

B: "Yeah, I think you've to look at it…if they actually do or not, because animals don't have the same kind of…like, you know, frontal cortex, emotional attachment as humans do, like self-awareness issues, so they may feel the loss, I guess, but in a different way, but it becomes quite philosophical, doesn't it? Does the way that we have attachment with ourselves…we put that above the way animals have attachments to each other, which we as humans tend to do." (BFG 1, 46-54).

The downgrading of animal sentience echoes Plous's remark that one way to dehumanize animals is to "deny that animals feel pain in the same way that humans do" (2003: 519). Equally, the second participant denied the possibility of self-awareness in animals, possibly in order to reduce their feelings of guilt over animal experimentation. As Plous noted, "another common way people reduce conflict over their use of animals is to acknowledge that animals feel pain, but to deny that animals are intelligent or self-aware" (2003: 521). It may not be surprising if the dehumanization of human groups draws on the same arguments about the out-groups' presumed higher resistance to pain and lack of self-awareness. As it was pointed out in chapter 2, the Hungarian judge who denied full compensation for two Gypsy men in the wrongful-arrest suit argued that the two men had "more primitive personalities than the average, therefore, the psychological damage they suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested". Therefore, one should take into account the possibility that dehumanization in its more subtle forms might involve considerations of 'lesser humanity' rather than total denial of humanity in the target of dehumanization.

Sentience served as a rhetorical basis for treating animals with respect in discussions about animal experimentation in Britain:

"You can take that to a more basic level, as well, and argue about the discomfort and pain the animal might feel by being tested on. That no living creature has the right to undergo that treatment" (BFG 1, 60-62).

Thus, while the participants denied moral status and decision-making to animals and humans lacking in rational autonomy, they nonetheless agreed that animals had moral standing on the basis of sentience. However, sentience was not a 'bottom-line' argument against the exploitation of animals for human ends. The type of animal seemed to matter. Regarding animal experimentation for example, one participant justified it on the basis of her dislike of rats and one could argue that portraying animals as unpleasant acted as a form of moral disengagement:

"It's on rats that they [experiment], and I agree, I really don't like rats" (RFG 1, 244-245).

Just as in-groups may be included in the scope of justice more that out-groups, intimate animals (i.e., pets) were protected more than animal strangers from animal cruelty (see Opotow, 1993), in what Billig (1985) might have called instances of particularization and of categorization:

"There's no way you're gonna test on my dog 'cause to me there's that emotional attachment [...] If I was emotionally attached to an animal I would be against [animal testing], but just thinking, oh, yeah, some monkey out there I don't know anything about, I would think that's ok" (BFG 1, 163-164, 177-179).

"If that rabbit were mine and I had feelings for it and if I noticed that it had feelings for me, too, I would never agree with these experiments on it. And why not...there are many people who have hamsters, mice, even bugs, there are many who have snakes and all manner of creatures..." (RFG 2, 237-240).

Similarly, humans who were attributed a lack of humanizing rational autonomy were described as feeling primary emotions, e.g. happiness. However, this was a basis for positive descriptions of such persons and their interests:

"This malformation [Down's syndrome] doesn't prevent those children from being happy. They may be even happier than us in their own world" (RFG 2, 377-378).

This participant somehow echoes the stereotype of the poor as being 'poor but happy' (Kay & Jost, 2003). Although the participant as well as society at large may not have an interest in constructing the mentally disabled as 'disabled but happy', it could be argued that such complementary beliefs about the mentally disabled, as well as their dehumanization, might have a palliative function, as envisaged by Bernard et al. (1965).

3.6.3 Speciesism

In the focus group discussions, speciesism was characterized by mutually supporting claims that humans were ontologically superior to animals and that humans' interests took precedence over animals' interests. These claims could even be invoked to describe animal exploitation as unavoidable or even noble in some cases, e.g. animal testing:

"I think that you have to test on something. There are certain things that you cannot test on humans" (BFG 2, 21-22).

"I agree with these experiments because this way lives can be saved, humans are prevented from getting ill, there are certain noble causes, so to speak" (RFG 2, 224-25).

To support speciesist ideologies, participants cited the authority of religion, philosophy or tradition:

"The issues of philosophy say that humans are the ultimate goal, and therefore we humans can use any means to reach our ends" (RFG 2, 211-12).

"It does make sense to test things on animals before humans if you believe that a human life is worth more than an animal life, which I happen to" (BFG 2, 29-31).

"Humans have always regarded animals as a means...through which they can reach their goals. Humans have always been superior, animals have been given to them to help them" (RFG 2, 218-20).

"Humans are superior creatures as God put them at the centre of his creation, the centre of animals, of nature, everything" (RFG 3, 160-61).

On the one hand, these citations of 'the issues of philosophy,' the intentions of a God and the superiority of human beings evidence the plethora of ideological justifications that humans can use to defend speciesism. On the other, the citations suggest the vulnerability of speciesism to attack in that they acknowledge their need for defence. Indeed, some participants contested the validity of speciesism quite explicitly in their talk:

"I would prefer to see convicted criminals having been tested on rather than animals. But then you get into the whole human rights. But, you know, humans just know they're supreme beings, so they think they've got the right to use whatever they want" (BFG 3, 51-57).

Speciesist talk is dilemmatic and here the participants expressed contradictions that make up common sense ideologies about human-animal similarity. Human rights appear at first incontrovertible and then as the consequence of human arrogance. Of course, two categories of 'human' are at play here; the 'human rights' which might save the prisoner from experimentation and the humans who 'know they're supreme beings' and who might adjudicate whether this prisoner or the prisoner's animal counterparts are

to be the subjects of experimentation. However, in spite of their evident difficulty, participants often constructed a possible rational answer to the dilemmas between fulfilling human interests and avoiding animal cruelty that could be reached by 'weighing up' the evidence on each side, as in the case of animal experiments, for example:

A: "It has been shown in time that [animal experimentation] is a pretty efficient option, even if it would appear slightly cruel or brutal. But, in the end, if we were to think about animal suffering, this wouldn't be too correct and it's not normal…"

B: "But what could we do? Experiment on plants? Ultimately it is the only solution."

A: "The best guinea pig is the rat (sic), it breeds extremely quickly and can have many offspring."

B: "Yes, but not only rats, there are many experiments carried out on monkeys, especially as regards the brain. I mean, because they are very similar to humans, and some [experiments] are very cruel."

A: "Yes, but it is less costly to do it on rats than on monkeys…"

B: "Yes, but with rats you can't do experiments researching the human brain. Or something indeed vital for humans."

C: "Rats bring disease and carry microbes and rabies, I mean, I agree they should be used for experiments, anyway, mother-nature is not affected by a tiny mouse."

D: "I don't agree, because I don't think we have the right to decide whether that creature is important or not, if it deserves to live or to reproduce, we don't decide that". (RFG1, 222-67).

Here we see participants weighing up the material as well as the moral costs and benefits of animal testing and we find that one efficient strategy to justify the inevitable cruelty of animal testing is to portray animals as pests. Note the complexity of the argument and how certain lines of reasoning are introduced and then effectively resisted. There seems to be a form of utilitarianism underlying these exchanges, which appears to be a standard and accepted basis for weighing moral dilemmas. However, not all

participants endorsed the view that animals should be sacrificed for the benefit of humans. The same dilemma regarding animal experimentation was echoed by the British participants:

"If we didn't use animals to test on, how would we find new cures for medicine and stuff? What is the other option? So there's a lot of benefits and there's a lot of disadvantages, but you've just got to weigh up the two. I think there's a lot of abuse and exploitation and stuff going on..." (BFG 2, 55-58).

But as can be seen in the following exchange, the participants perceived the dilemmas associated with speciesism and with humans' power over animals:

A: "I agree [with animal experimentation], we are superior beings and we have to test medicine on somebody else to see if they are good.

B: "And if aliens come and kidnap you and do experiments on you to test whatever they need in order to evolve, would that seem logical to you because they are superior?

C: Do you want, as a human, if you believe in medicine, shouldn't you test them on yourself, as a human?

D: "We've got a responsibility, we can't test on animals because it would mean....Because it doesn't say anywhere that humans are superior and that they should use animals and test on them and evolve because of them...Because those animals are creatures, too, and have the same right as us to populate the earth, right?" (RFG 3,110-23).

Here the participants questioned the authority of speciesism, with phrases such as "it doesn't say anywhere that humans should use animals", and "if aliens do experiments on you, would that seem logical?", showing the lack of any fundamental ideology to which humans can appeal to justify their speciesist beliefs and behaviour and thus highlighting the inherently dilemmatic nature of speciesism. At the same time, phrases such as "we've got a responsibility, we can't test on animals" could be interpreted as

expressions of group-based guilt, which arises when members of an advantaged group acknowledge their responsibility and mistreatment of a disadvantaged out-group (see Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 2002), especially when the in-group's advantage seems unfair and beyond the in-group's control.

Constructing similarities and differences between humans and animals appears dilemmatic to the participants, as in this excerpt regarding animal experimentation:

A: "This could be looked at from a different viewpoint: as you believe that animals are similar to humans, isn't it the same thing...doesn't it have the same implications as the testing on humans?

Interviewer: "Would you like to develop this idea?

B: "If we considered that humans are similar to animals, then we wouldn't be allowed to do experiments on animals anymore, that would automatically become immoral. If we consider ourselves superior, and at a great distance even from the most evolved of them, then we could conduct experiments on animals, but these wouldn't be relevant anymore." (RFG 3, 172-182).

As it can be seen, similarities between humans and animals are necessary if we need to extrapolate from animals to humans in medical research, but at the same time these similarities involve moral considerations for the animals' well-being and interests to be free from pain. The participants seem to be aware that humans' beliefs of superiority over animals may stem from scientific knowledge as well as from necessity, and that the focus may shift from differences to similarities between animals and humans according to context and humans' needs.

Speciesism has been described as the putting of humans' interests before animals'. Yet, attaching a lower value to animals' interests does not imply that those interests have no value whatsoever. Even where the priority of humans' interest was most boldly asserted, awareness of animals' interests was evident in views that it is normative, rather than logical, to prioritize humans' interests:

"You first have to think about human not animal rights" (RFG 1,186-87).

that an animal's death was a lesser wrong than a human's death:

"There's one thing for a lab mouse to die, another, for a human to die" (RFG 3,147).

and in the recognition that animal research required justification:

"I think if there is any possibility of medical gain, then I think animal testing is justified" (BFG 3, 41-42).

Thus British participants acknowledged the horror of culling animals to prevent the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in 2001 even when they did not disagree with such culling:

"Even though it was awful...the way it was handled was wrong. I think it had to be done because it was better to save us and a lot of people" (BFG 2, 264-65).

Finally, participants often tempered their utilitarianism by calling attention to examples of animal research that were not necessary for humans' welfare and which were unjustified. Here participants often drew a distinction between medical research and cosmetics research, with the former being justified in terms of necessity and worth:

"To conciliate both animals and humans, it is necessary to do certain experiments but only if strictly necessary, not for luxury or other purposes" (RFG1, 276-77).

"I don't agree with cosmetics, that's more of a vanity thing, but if it's for medicine, it's for a worthy cause" (BFG 1, 8-10).

In some instances, participants were aware of humans' speciesist attitudes and of their unjust treatment of animals, as in the case of fox hunting:

> "We do uphold traditions, but you can't use that as a way to justify an outdated practice. And, also, they could do it without foxes, they could put something out there that runs about, like a little machine, runs about, they could go around and stop it, but they don't 'cause they like seeing, you know, the chase, this thing ripped apart, it's like a mad conquer over this thing, they shred and they go and drink afterwards". (BFG 1, 262-266).

or in the case of horse racing, which was questioned by the British particiapnts:

> A: "I just think that if it's the fences that are causing the deaths, why have the fences? Why can't they let them just run the race? It's just this issue, is horse racing a good thing or not? I always just assumed that, yeah, it's a sport, it's fun, nobody gets harmed, and then I realised that the fences caused so much harm to horses.
>
> B: "I suppose that those people who watch it are only interested in who comes first, doesn't really matter how the horses run.
>
> A: "It just seems unnecessary to have that aspect of race. But then again it's the old bit, it's the Grand National, that's part of the make-up of the Grand National."
> (BFG 1, 296-305).

The Romanian participants were aware of humans' speciesist attitudes and sometimes critical of the humans' exploitation of animals:

> A: "Humans are aware of their superiority and therefore torture all the other around them.
>
> B: "Not only animals... (RFG 2, 156-159).

As this exchange shows, not only animals but also humans such as ethnic minorities may be 'tortured' and dehumanized.

3.6.4 Maintaining the status quo

Thus far there have been certain similarities in the Romanian and British data. In this final section, we attend to the differences in the ways that the participants in each country appealed to their own country's particular economic situation to justify the exploitation of animals. The Romanian participants were aware of the link between material development and social values and tended to agree that animals were better treated in Western European countries. However, in their own country, improvements in human rights took precedence over improvements in animal rights:

"I think that in the end somewhat the facilitation of human rights ultimately determines a better life for animals, too. But the causal chain, so to speak, starts with humans: if humans have more rights and manage their money better, then with time there will be solutions for animals, too" (RFG 1, 198-201).

For the Romanians, improving animal rights at home were perceived as a means of improving an inter-group situation in that it increased the chances of European Union membership, as in the case of the culling of stray dogs:

"In my opinion, they should put [dogs] in a dog shelter, it is true, many financial resources are needed for such a thing, but, for us to get into the European Union, I think this is the best measure, not killing them" (RFG 1, 25-27).

"Because no Western country...we have aspirations to enter the EU and we kill them with the stick and fire! In England, or Germany or France such problems are not solved like that." (RFG 1, 59-61).

Against these modernizing Westernizing agendas, concepts like "tradition" and "national identity" were invoked to justify the status quo in Romania, including the killing of

animals. One participant focused on the Romanian tradition of knifing pigs before Christmas:

"This is a matter of tradition as well, because in our country pigs have always been cut in the traditional way" (RFG 1, 153-54).

Again, rational autonomy, in the form of decision making, was introduced to justify the maintenance of traditional forms of animal cruelty:

"At the beginning all peoples had something animalic in them. The differences between humans and animals were quite small. In time, we become civilised, but, still, certain traditions should be kept. And if humans, be they Romanian, Swiss, Belgian, want the pig to be cut or injected, they should be able to decide this" (RFG 2, 138-142).

There were echoes of Bhiku Parekh's insightful observation that "although we can draw up a list of universal moral values, not all societies have the required moral, cultural, economic and other resources to live up to their demands" (2000: 133). Caught between the dilemma of tradition and Westernization, some Romanian participants concluded that Romania would modernize, but slowly:

"For the third millennium, it's clear that this is what should be happening in order for us to evolve. But, as regards their application, I don't think that this will be possible, in our country, for a long time" (RFG 1, 207-10).

Interestingly, civilization and human progress were constructed in terms of humans' attitudes towards animals, where cruel attitudes were viewed as indicators of a lower degree of civilization. This discussion was present in the Romanian participants' talk about the culling of stray dogs:

"I think that animals, especially dogs as we are talking about them, haven't become an important element in Romanian society as they are abroad. So far we have never thought that we need well-organised methods." (RFG 2, 84-86).

and in the reduction of animal suffering at the abattoir:

A: "I think it's a step forward, this law...

Interviewer: "A step forward, toward what?

A: "Toward...in a way, linked to humans' conscience, because if they don't think about doing good to these animals, about their rights, then why would they think about human rights?" (RFG 1, 174-180).

"I think the decision was taken so that we don't come across as a barbaric people, I mean, it's a pretty cruel tradition." (RFG 2, 149-150).

The Romanian participants seem to be aware of their in-group's lower-status relative to other European countries, and sensitive to discussions about animal rights that would show them as an 'uncivilized' people. Arguably, the Romanian participants may suspect that given their in-group's record on animal rights, they may be dehumanized by other European, 'civilized' countries. This construction of the in-group as being less civilized than others with better human and animal rights records opens the possibility for self-dehumanization of the in-group in those particular circumstance where comparisons with higher-status groups may be at stake.

The accounts of the difficulties of securing animal rights might lead one to suspect that British participants would endorse them more obviously than Romanians did. Phrases like *organic, vegetarian* and *against animal testing* were part of the British discourse but not the Romanian one. In the course of the focus groups, one British participant declared herself to be a vegetarian and others advocated cruelty-free cosmetics and organic products. Participants often voiced the opinion that such postmaterialist values ordinarily shaped consumer behaviour:

"There'll be a lot of people who are concerned about animals rights and don't want to use products tested on animals 'cause they don't feel personally....whatever, they've decided they don't want to. So they look at the product and it says "against animal testing" or "this product is not tested" (BFG 3, 140-43).

In contrast to the Romanian participants, who saw ethical treatment of animals as evidence of modernization, the British understood such practices as a return to tradition:

"If they went back to traditional, natural, even organic farming methods, you have to respect the land, they'd have the space to go around, they wouldn't need all these injections to prevent the illnesses" (BFG 1, 384-87).

Ironically, the British invoked tradition not to justify the exploitation of animals, like the Romanians did, but to propose less cruel alternatives to farming.

Not only modernity and tradition but also poverty and wealth were used in each country to justify the status quo. In Romania, the participants used existential insecurity to legitimise the exploitation of animals:

"Shelters [for dogs] don't seem to me a good solution in our country because we are a poor country, we hardly feed ourselves, let alone dogs" (RFG 2, 40-41).

"From my point of view, that decision [culling stray dogs] was wise, because we don't have resources for other options. Castration and shelters would have cost money. But as we don't have money for health, education, and for street children, to spend money on dogs would have been ridiculous" (RFG 2, 63-66).

"And nobody says that you should be purely brutal in the act of getting food, because ultimately that's what it is, but in our country there are more important problems that require greater attention than this" (RFG 1, 133-35).

"I don't know if this [the euthanasia of dogs] is a very good measure, but I know for sure that it is in line with our resources" (RFG 2, 32-33).

For the British participants, consumption appeared to be the unstoppable force that limited changes in animal welfare:

"There is a greater demand for cheaper food and all the *economy* brands, and the effect it's had on farmers, quite badly, they kind of tried to take shortcuts, like when they feed the animals their own brains and stuff, which led to BSE" (BFG 1, 377-80).

"Do you think we're actually to blame as consumers, partially, for these epidemic patterns? We're constantly saying we want food cheaper and the people who are gonna make it cheaper are the farmers, and they're gonna cut corners and this is why I think things like these may be happening" (BFG 3, 320-23).

This is not to say that the British participants endorsed consumption patterns that limited animals' welfare, only that they constructed them as barriers to changing the status quo:

"The whole sort of foot and mouth incident and everything like that just highlights the complete lack of respect that business seems to have for nature nowadays. Everybody is taking the short-term viewpoint of business, it's just the viewpoint of you making your profits for the end of year results" (BFG 1, 391-95).

3.7 Discussion

What are these British and Romanian participants telling social psychologists about how we should configure the human-animal boundary in our theories of inter-group relations? First, they show the contested nature of both that boundary itself and its relationship to exploitation. Rational autonomy makes (most) humans unlike (most) animals but sentience makes us all appear to be much more alike and almost equal in the rights we should enjoy. In line with Billig et al's perspective, these essential differences and similarities fall out from, and are not epistemologically prior to, ideological concerns. Second, as in other domains of liberal ideology, our participants were caught on the horns of a dilemma between believing in their own groups' superiority and more important interests, and in believing that cruelty against other living things was wrong. While theories of dehumanization tended to assume that animals provide a good blueprint for ill-treated out-groups because animals have fundamentally different natures from humans, these data show how humans' shared consensus about human-animal differences can lead them to infer that they should treat animals well. As one participant put it, "humans rights are more important (...) because humans have reason, which distinguishes them from animals, but nevertheless does it mean we shouldn't offer them any...facilities, so to speak?" (RFG 1, 169-171).

It could be argued here that speciesism served to justify the system (cf. Jost & Banaji, 1994) because it provided the participants with an ideology that could rationalize the existing power relations between humans and animals. At the same time, speciesism provided the participants with readily available solutions to the dilemmas that they encountered when thinking about animal exploitation for human needs. While both British and Romanian participants endorsed speciesist views and used them to justify the exploitation of animals and to draw the human-animal boundary, they used their societies' differing economic conditions in very similar ways to suggest the impossibility of improving animal welfare. Complicating Inglehart's theory, both characteristics of materialist and post-materialist societies provided means of justifying the status quo. At the individual level, both poverty and consumerism seemed to force humans to make choices that would harm animals, while at the societal level, they both engendered

lifestyles and cycles of consumption detrimental to animal welfare. It would thus appear that postmaterialist values cannot totally override deeply embedded and all pervasive speciesist attitudes, maybe because, as Garner (2003a) argues, the moral pluralism of liberal ideology conceives animal rights as a moral *preference* rather than as a moral *obligation*.

If the human-animal boundary is dilemmatic, then what are the implications for the operationalization of the concept of dehumanization? Categories such as 'human' and 'animal' seem to be more fluid than the ideologies that shape them or the social inequalities that these ideologies protect. Firstly, the dilemmatic construction of the categories 'animal' and 'human' along such dimensions as rational autonomy and sentience suggests not only that these should be viewed as ends of a humanity continuum (cf. Demoulin et al., 2004a) but also that one continuum may be not enough. Also, even if emotions and traits are placed on a humanity continuum, their places on this continuum may not always be the same, but may vary as a function of context or rhetorical purposes. Secondly, could the dehumanization of out-groups be dilemmatic too? The dehumanization of out-groups may be an ad-hoc phenomenon that varies as a function of the in-group's interests. One could argue that just as animals can experience both dehumanization and anthropomorphization, so the dehumanization of out-groups may be a spontaneous and localized phenomenon, justifying particular ideologies or serving certain ad-hoc purposes, something that research on dehumanization might want to explore. If it is shown that dehumanization is context-dependent, this might be explained in terms of system-justification, for it could be argued that just like speciesism, dehumanization may not linked to the perception of the out-group's attributes *per se*, but to the in-group's interests of power and domination. Given that the most excluded animals from the scope of justice were the pests, it is possible that dehumanized groups are perceived as posing threat to the in-group and be seen as vermin to society, and future research on dehumanization might want to explore the link between perceived threat and dehumanization. At the same time, given the ideological aspects of speciesism, it could also be argued that dehumanization, too, serves to justify the system and to legitimize the social exclusion of certain groups, such as the Gypsies. In this sense, dehumanization

might be a form of moral exclusion or delegitimization, in line with Opotow's and Bar-Tal's theorization.

Interestingly, neither emotions nor traits emerged as the salient point of difference between animals and humans in this talk. This suggests that while dehumanization can be successfully operationalized in terms of emotions and traits in experimental settings, these may play little part when people try to resolve human and animal dilemmas in everyday life. At the same time, the lack of emotions and traits in the talk about animals suggests that dehumanization may be measured indirectly, through semantic constructions which may be equivalent to traits and emotions: e.g. "animals do not have reason" may be the equivalent of 'irrational', while "animals can feel the pain but not in the same way" may be tantamount to 'insensitive'. The dehumanization of animals can also be inferred from other ideological constructions, such as the rights that animals were thought to be entitled to, the greater easiness with which the participants accepted the animal culling during the foot-and-mouth epidemic compared to euthanasia of terminally ill humans, etc. Similarly, the dehumanization of humans was achieved through constructions such as humans' attitudes towards animals, e.g. culling stray dogs "may seem barbarous", "this suffering of animals that would somewhat be reduced, through this anaesthesia or something, is (...) humane". Overall, these findings suggest that, firstly, the theorizing of dehumanization needs to move beyond mere trait association tasks and examine what dehumanization *does* to the target. Secondly, they suggest that dehumanization may be successfully examined in talk (see Tileagă's discursive analytic approach to the dehumanization of the Gypsies, 2005; 2006), and therefore discourse analysis may be used to complement the existing experimental approaches to dehumanization. A discursive analytic approach has the semantic and ideological flexibility to show when dehumanization occurs, even if, say, secondary emotions are not used, and has the ability to show *why* people dehumanize others, and whether they experience moral dilemmas when they do so, in other words it can highlight the 'waxing-and-waning' aspects of dehumanization (see Tajfel, 1981; Billig, 2003). However, what such approach may not be able to do is to indicate infrahumanization, given this phenomenon unique reliance on primary and secondary emotions, and its reliance on

implicit and '*unconscious*' associations between target (in-group vs. out-group) and the types of emotions. Thus, it may be impossible to observe infrahumanizaiton in talk which is by its very nature explicit.

To conclude, the present study offers insights into the psychological processes that accompany the drawing of the human-animal boundary. By showing its dilemmatic aspects, the present study challenges the essentialization of the categories human and animal and draws attention to the ad-hoc nature of these two categories. The dilemmas surrounding the human-animal boundary were resolved by resorting to resources such as speciesist views, tradition, religion, lack of postmaterialist values, existential insecurity or consumerism. Speciesism generally excluded animals from the scope of justice by making humans argue that animals are essentially inferior to humans and that their role on earth is to serve humans' needs. At the same time, this study suggests that dehumanization may be dilemmatic, too, and that the dehumanization paradigm should also take into account the psychological processes associated with the particularization of dehumanized groups, as well as discursive analytic approaches.

3.8 Progression to the next study

The focus groups discussions on the animal and human dilemmas also reflected different ways of conceptualizing humanness. The dilemmas pertaining to human life arguably revealed beliefs about what is typically human, such as being physically 'normal', having physical independence, moral agency and the ability to express choice, a healthy mental state and a certain degree of quality of life. By contrast, the dilemmas surrounding animal issues revealed beliefs about what makes humans unique, e.g. rational autonomy, secondary emotions, but elements of 'human typicality' such as moral agency were also used to differentiate humans from animals, thus complicating the distinction between human typicality and human uniqueness. However, while uniquely human elements may be used to distinguish between humans and animals, elements of what is typically human may be used to differentiate between human individuals or between humans groups. Therefore aspects of human typicality will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 4   Operationalizing dehumanization in empirical research:
Results from two cross-cultural studies

Contents of Chapter 4

4.1 Overview

As it was discussed in Chapter 2, the human-animal binary has underlain much of the conceptualization and operationalization of dehumanization, and this binary was explored in greater detailed in Chapter 3. And although the qualitative research on the drawing of the human-animal boundary, described in Chapter 3, has been informative for the cognitive and ideological bases of dehumanization, the dehumanization of out-groups themselves will be examined quantitatively in the following studies. This is because a qualitative approach does not lends itself easily to experimental settings, which are arguably necessary for identifying the antecedents of dehumanization as well as to exploring the mediators and moderators of dehumanization and other correlates such as in-group identification.

The present research will adopt the operationalizations used by the infrahumanization and ontologization paradigms, i.e. the differential attributions of secondary emotions to in-group and out-group, and of human and animal traits to in-group and out-group, respectively, because these are relatively well established, lend themselves easily to being operationalized, and will make the present results comparable to previous research. But before applying these operationalizations, the present research will challenge their underlying psychological and methodological assumptions. As it was mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, humanity can be measured not only in terms of human *uniqueness*, but also in terms of human *typicality* (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), which opens the possibility of measuring dehumanization in terms of human typicality rather than human uniqueness, and the possibility of operationalizing dehumanization continuously rather than strictly categorically, taking into account variability within the categories 'animal' and 'human'. This chapter will first examine whether the human and the animal emotions and traits are conceptualized as belonging to humanness continua rather than to mutually exclusive categories. Secondly it will examine whether the humanity and the positive valence of the target emotions and traits are independent or related dimensions. Thirdly, it will assess whether the human typicality of the emotions and traits is culturally variable or consisted across Romania and Britain. Finally, this chapter will address the methodological concerns relating to the operationalization of dehumanization in empirical research.

4.2 Categorical vs. continuous operationalization of humanness

It is important to engage with the issue as to whether humanness and animality are discrete categories or ends of the same continuum because the conceptualization of humanness as an all-or-nothing category or as a continuum may have implications for measuring the phenomenon of dehumanization. In other words, are the dehumanized individuals and groups strictly non-human, or are they just less-than-human or less typically human than the in-group? The analysis of the focus groups discussion of human and animal dilemmas showed that the boundary between humanness and animality is not clear-cut and essentialized, but rather fluid and open to ideological and contextual influences. Moreover, they also suggested variability within the categories *human* and *animal*: pets are less animalic than vermin, while mentally or physically disabled people are less human than fully healthy people. Therefore it could be argued that we should conceive of humanness, as well as animality, in continuous rather than categorical terms. The continuous conceptualization of humanness has been brought to the fore by recent research on the attribution of humanness to targets (Haslam et al., 2005), which suggested that we can measure humanness in terms of typicality rather than uniqueness, and that dehumanization might involve the denial of what is typically human rather than of what is uniquely human. Indeed, it could be argued that while the boundary between humans and animals may be drawn along human uniqueness lines, such as *rational autonomy*, the boundary between human groups may involve considerations of human typicality, as lesbian and gay people, ethnic minority members and various other socially excluded individuals such as nomadic Gypsies or mentally disabled individuals may be judged as 'less typical' exemplars of the human category (see Kahneman & Miller's norm theory, 1986). Thus, the dehumanization of human individuals or groups may involve beliefs about what is *typical* and *normative* of humans rather than beliefs about the human uniqueness of the targets in question.

Whether dehumanization involves a denial of human uniqueness or of human typicality, and whether the *human essence* comprises human uniqueness or human typicality, has been a point of debate in some dehumanization research. The infrahumanization paradigm has argued that infrahumanization involves the reservation of the human essence to the in-group, and the denial of uniquely human features to the out-groups, such as secondary emotions (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000; 2001;

2003). However, other research has challenged the conceptualization of the human essence in terms of uniquely human features such as secondary emotions, and has argued that we can conceive of humanness as being composed of both *human nature* and *uniquely human* attributes (Haslam et al., 2005). Human nature is understood as those characteristics central and typical of humans, which may include characteristics that are common to animals and humans. Uniquely human characteristics, on the other hand, are exclusively human and include attributes relating to culture, civility, social learning and symbolic capacities that make humans distinct from animals. In this sense, the uniquely human traits are very similar to the secondary emotions and the cultural traits. It is worth noting here that the dimension of *rational autonomy* that emerged from the qualitative study described in Chapter 2 somewhat corresponds to the uniquely human aspect of humanness, whereas the dimension of *sentience*, to the human nature component. Haslam and colleagues used personality traits based on the Five-Factor Model in their operationalization of human nature and of uniquely human attributes. The target traits that they used in their studies were not divided into *animal* and *human*, but were instead rated on 7-point scales in terms of their being an aspect of human nature, being uniquely human, and being desirable or positive. Haslam et al. (2005) found that human nature characteristics referred to cognitive flexibility, warmth and emotional responsiveness, while the uniquely human characteristics involved morality, self-control, intelligence, openness and sociality. Haslam and colleagues found that the human nature traits were indeed essentialized, whereas the uniquely human traits were not, and argued that a denial of human essence, as envisaged by the infrahumanization paradigm, should take place at the level of human nature and not at the level of human uniqueness, contrary to the stipulation of the infrahumanization theory. However, as the focus groups discussions suggested, the boundary between what is uniquely human and what is human nature may not be clear-cut and uncontested, as Haslam et al.'s study might imply. Instead, it could be argued that how individuals perceive and construct certain features as uniquely human or as relating to human nature may vary as a function of specific contexts or legitimizing myths, e.g. the human nature of the in-group may be constructed in different ways from that of the out-group. Therefore it could be argued that while we may not be able to draw a clear line between what is human nature and what is uniquely human, it is nonetheless useful and ecologically valid to measure humanness continuously rather than categorically.

The issue of categorical vs. continuous measurement of humanness, be it in terms of emotions or traits, is important because it could be argued that humanness is not a discrete category but rather one with a graded structure and with 'fuzzy' boundaries (see Barsalou, 1985). For example, a person with Down's syndrome may be considered less typical of the human category than a 'normal' human. Equally, a homosexual person would be judged as less typical than a heterosexual one (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). A categorical approach to what is human is in line with the *classical view* of conceptual structure, where all exemplars of a category share properties necessary and sufficient for the exemplars to belong to the category (Medin, Proffitt, & Schwartz, 2000). In contrast, a continuous operationalization of humanness is arguably more in line with the *prototype view*, which holds that categories are not discrete, and that exemplars of categories can be judged as more or less typical instances of the category (Medin et al., 2000). In this sense, category membership can be graded, and the more typical members have more characteristic properties than the less typical ones, as indicated by the work of Eleanor Rosch and others. From this perspective, emotions and traits could be judged as being more or less typically human, rather than necessary and sufficient features of humanness.

In most research on dehumanization, humanness and animality have been conceptualized and operationalized rather in line with the classical view of categories, given their usage of mutually exclusive categories such as *primary* vs. *secondary* emotions (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000; 2001; Gaunt, Leyes, & Demoulin, 2002), and *natural* vs. *cultural*, or *animal* vs. *human*, attributes in the ontologization paradigm (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001). And although the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through emotions) has used the human-animal binary in the operationalization of infrahumanization, it has envisaged infrahumanization as indicating that the infrahumanized target has a less-than-human essence than the in-group, thus linking the phenomenon to a continuous conceptualization of humanness. The categorical classification of emotions into *primary* and *secondary* has not taken into account potential gradual differences *within* these two categories, focusing instead on the differences *between* the two categories. Similarly, the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through traits) has reflected little on how the boundary between *animal* and *human* might be drawn other than categorically.

When operationalizing the differences between primary and secondary emotions, research on infrahumanization has adopted a continuous conceptualization and measurement of the humanness of the emotions. For example, ratings on a 7-point humanity scale from 1 (*not uniquely human*) to 7 (*uniquely human*) have indicated that primary emotions scored significantly lower on the humanity dimension than secondary emotions (Vaes, Castelli, Paladino, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Similarly, 4-point scale ratings of emotions ranging from 1 (*completely common to both humans and animals*) to 4 (*completely unique to humans*) have indicated that secondary emotions were rated as more unique to humans than primary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). However, these studies limited their approach to the continuous measure of infrahumanization to pilot studies and did not measure the infrahumanization process *per se* in a continuous way. Therefore it is not known whether a continuous operationalization of infrahumanization would have produced results convergent to those from the categorical operationalization.

However, the infrahumanization paradigm has revisited the strict categorical distinction between primary and secondary emotions, and has indicated that emotions can be conceptualized as belonging to a humanity continuum. Research on the dimensions of "uniquely" and "non-uniquely" human emotions found that emotions can be perceived as belonging to a continuum of humanity rather than to the mutually exclusive categories of *primary* and *secondary* (Demoulin, Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, & Dovidio, 2004a). In their study, Demoulin and colleagues investigated lay conceptualizations of emotions and conceptualized the 'uniquely human' dimension "as a graded property rather than as a categorical property, that is, some emotions will be called 'uniquely human' not in an absolute sense, but in comparison to other emotions that possess relatively less 'uniquely human' features" (2004a: 77). They asked participants from 3 countries, Belgium, Spain and United States, to rate a total of 448 emotions for 13 characteristics on 7-point scales. They then computed the humanity scores of the emotions based on their average on the dimensions of *visibility, cause, morality, cognition, duration, age,* and *culture,* which constituted the 'humanity' factor. They also computed the emotions' positivity based on average ratings on the dimensions of *desirability* and *acceptability* which represented the 'valence' factor. Demoulin and colleagues concluded that

emotions can be viewed along two bipolar factors: primary-secondary, and positive-negative, respectively, and that no emotions should be considered 'uniquely human' or 'non-uniquely human' in an absolute sense. However, it is not clear from Demoulin et al.'s study whether these two bipolar factors representing humanness and valence, respectively, are related or not. Besides, this approach does not take into account ambiguities which may arise from emotions occurring in the middle of the humanity continuum, an issue which has not been addressed by researchers on dehumanization.

Other recent infrahumanization research has conceptualised the humanity of the emotions as a continuum and used the extent to which the target emotions were considered as uniquely human as a continuous predictor of the extent to which they are attributed to the out-group (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Participants indicated the extent to which they believed the out-group members were likely to feel the given emotions on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*) and the results indicated that the humanity of the emotions predicted their attribution to the out-group. Thus it would appear that operationalizing infrahumanization continuously rather than categorically can capture the infrahumanization phenomenon. However, in the study cited above infrahumanization was not measured through the differential attribution of humanity to in-group vs. out-group, but only through the attribution of emotions to the target out-group. Thus, in the absence of the in-group, which arguably acts as the control, the results cannot be fully compared to previous research on infrahumanization which relied on the in-group vs. out-group paradigm. Nevertheless, they suggest that infrahumanization can be measured continuously as well as categorically.

As for the operationalization of ontologization (dehumanization through traits) and the measurement of traits[1], research has found that traits, too, can vary along dimensions of humanity and positivity. For example, a study examining the structure of *natural* and *cultural* traits found that natural traits were used more often to describe animals than humans, were perceived as more hereditary than learned, and were perceived as established very soon in the process of socialization (Aguiar & Lima,

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[1] Here traits are envisaged as general personality traits, such as *intuitive* or *selfish*, without being necessarily based on the five-factor model, although more recent research has explored the use of FFM traits in the operationalization of humanness and hence of dehumanization, see Haslam et al, 2005.

2001, unpublished manuscript). In contrast, the cultural traits were more used more often to describe humans than animals, were perceived as more learned than hereditary, and were seen as being established later in the process of socialization. These results are very similar to those obtained by Demoulin et al. (2004) and suggest that traits, like emotions, can be used as a valid measure of dehumanization. Infrahumanization researchers have chosen to focus on emotions not necessarily because emotions are the main feature of humanness, but because emotions are easy to operationalize in terms of primary and secondary, and also because other aspects of humanness such as language and intelligence had been studied before (see Leyens et al., 2000).

While it would appear that traits can be placed along a humanity continuum, studies on the ontologization of the Gypsies have operationalized dehumanization in categorical terms, in terms of the differential attribution of human (or cultural) vs. animal (or natural) traits, limiting the continuous measurement of humanity to pilot studies (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001). One pilot study employed a within-participants design, and requested participants to name positive and negative attributes characterising animals more than humans. In the second pilot, the 12 animal-like and 12 human-like attributes obtained in the first pilot were judged by another group of participants who were required to identify which of these 48 attributes best described the Gypsies, and also whether these attributes were positive or negative. Then 20 attributes that best described the Gypsies were selected as target traits in the main study, 10 of these being more characteristic of humans than of animals, 5 positive and 5 negative, and 10 more characteristic of animals than of humans, equally divided into negative and positive (Pérez et al., 2001). This example illustrates the imposition of the animal-human binary to what might have been a continuous measure of humanity, perhaps because the ontologization paradigm has not yet engaged with the issue regarding the categorical vs. continuous measure of humanity and hence of dehumanization. Other studies using traits as a measure of dehumanization also employed a categorical distinction between human or cultural and animal or natural characteristics (Deschamps, Vala, Marinho, Costa Lopes, & Cabecinhas, 2005; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Examples of cultural traits are *competent, intelligent, honest* and *civilized,* while examples of natural ones are *intuitive, spontaneous, simple* and *free.*

Therefore, given the graded structure of categories and the flexible boundaries between humans and animals, I decided to employ a continuous measure of the humanness of emotions and traits. This was in line with the qualitative study on the human-animal boundary, which had indicated that the human-animal boundary is not clear-cut, and that people may have ambiguous and post-hoc representations of the cognitive and emotional abilities of animals. The implication of this operationalization is that the dehumanized targets would not necessarily be viewed as non-human but rather as less-than-human and perhaps less human than the in-group.

4.3 Humanity and positivity: independent or related dimensions?

In general, the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through emotions) conceives of the negative-positive aspect of the emotions as being independent from the humanity of the emotions, with studies indicating no difference of valence between the secondary and the primary emotions (e.g. Leyens et al., 2001). However, in some other studies on infrahumanization, the valence of the emotions has been found to moderate the humanity ratings of the emotions, as positive secondary emotions were rated as less human than negative secondary emotions (see Vaes et al., 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). However, the existing research is rather mixed, as other studies have found that positive secondary emotions were perceived as more uniquely human than negative secondary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). Nonetheless, the valence of the primary emotions does not moderate their perceived humanity, as negative secondary emotions were still perceived as more unique to humans than both positive and negative primary emotions (Viki & Abrams, 2003). Other studies which operationalized infrahumanization in a continuous way found a non-significant correlation between the humanity and the valence of the emotions, $r = -.05$ (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), which may suggest that the valence of the emotions may have less impact on the humanness of the emotions if their humanness is assessed continuously instead of categorically. The relative lack of positive and strong correlations between the humanness and the positive valence of the emotions suggests that infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) is not tantamount to negative prejudice.

In the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through traits) however few questions have been raised on the relationship between the humanity of the traits and their valence. Most studies on the dehumanization of the Gypsies have used equal numbers of positive and negative human traits, and equal numbers of positive and negative animal traits. In some research (Deschamps et al., 2005), only positive traits, both human and animal, were used. Overall, the current results on the relationship between the humanity and the valence of the emotions and traits are rather mixed, and it is therefore difficult to speculate on how valence might impact on dehumanization.

One aspect that few researchers have taken into account is whether valence, like humanity, may be conceptualized and operationalized as a continuum (but see Demoulin et al., 2004). Thus, instead of traits and emotions falling into the mutually exclusive categories of *negative* and *positive*, these could be measured along a valence continuum ranging from very negative to very positive (e.g. from 1 to 7, or from 0 to 100). Since a valence continuum has never been operationalized within the dehumanization paradigm, it is difficult to envisage what impact it may have on the dehumanization process itself.

4.4 Study 1: Cultural agreement on the human-animal dichotomy

This study explored the collective agreement within each country (Britain and Romania) on the existence of humanness continua among the emotions and traits, respectively. This study was level-oriented (see Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2000), as it aimed to examine whether both the British and the Romanian participants envisaged humanity in a continuous sense. At the same time, the study acknowledged the possibility that the humanity of the emotions and traits may not be exactly the same in Britain and Romania.

4.4.1 Design

The study had a within-participants and a forced-choice design. The participants were asked to judge whether the target emotions and traits were either more typical of animals or more typical of humans, and also whether they thought each term was positive or negative (see *Appendix II a* for the English version of the pilot questionnaire, and *Appendix II b* for the Romanian version).

4.4.2 Participants and procedure

30 male and 38 female British participants were recruited in the psychology department and in various venues on campus (M age = 22). In Romania, 27 male and 30 female students participated in the pilot study (M age = 21.56).

4.4.3 Materials

In this study, 12 emotions were selected from previous studies on infrahumanization (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000): *rage, pleasure, aversion, fear, joy, satisfaction, compassion, contempt, guilt, admiration, regret* and *pride*. Previous research has assumed the first six to be primary, and the second six to be secondary. 20 traits were also included as targets in this study, being selected from previous research on ontologization (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), but their choice was also influenced by the results from the focus group study which had suggested *rational autonomy* as a key difference between humans and animals. The traits were chosen to reflect a continuum of humanness, ranging from more specific to humans to common to humans and animals: *creative, hypocrite, greedy, efficient, intelligent, selfish, prejudiced, logical, friendly, ruthless, simple, wild, dependent, affectionate, loyal, brutal, dirty, free, obedient,* and *instinctual*.

4.4.4 Results

Each emotion was given a humanness score and a positive valence rating based on the *percentage* of participants who rated the emotions as typical of humans, and as positive, respectively, see Table 4.1 below.

Taking the 12 emotions as targets, their humanness and positive valence were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .27, ns, in Britain, and r (1, 10) = .09, ns, in Romania (cf. Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Comparing the two countries, the British and the Romanian humanity ratings of the emotions were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .66, p < .05, as well as the positive valence ratings, r (1, 10) = .86, p < .001, indicating that there was overall cross-cultural agreement on the human typicality and positive valence of the emotions.

Table 4.1 The percentage of participants rating the emotions as typically human and as positive in Britain and Romania

Emotions	Britain		Romania	
	Humanness typicality %	Positivity valence %	Humanness typicality %	Positivity valence %
guilt	97.10	25.00	61.40	66.70
regret	95.60	27.90	94.70	63.20
compassion	94.10	100.00	84.20	96.50
contempt	89.70	22.10	94.70	7.00
admiration	89.70	94.10	96.50	100.00
pride	83.80	91.20	84.20	57.90
joy	83.80	98.50	38.60	100.00
satisfaction	79.40	100.00	75.40	98.20
pleasure	75.00	100.00	61.40	98.20
rage	67.60	11.80	54.40	12.30
aversion	60.30	23.50	78.90	7.00
fear	38.20	30.90	21.10	22.80

Similarly to the emotions, a humanness score and a positive valence score were computed for each trait based on the percentage of participants who rated the traits as typical of humans, and as positive, respectively, see Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 The percentage of participants rating the traits as typically human and as positive in Britain and Romania

Traits	Britain		Romania	
	Humanness typicality %	Positivity valence %	Humanness typicality %	Positivity valence %
hypocrite	98.50	7.40	100.00	1.80
creative	95.60	100.00	91.20	100.00
intelligent	91.20	100.00	64.90	100.00
prejudiced	91.20	5.90	100.00	24.60
greedy	80.90	16.20	50.90	7.00
selfish	80.90	11.80	87.70	5.30
logical	77.90	94.10	98.20	96.50
friendly	69.10	97.10	17.50	100.00
ruthless	63.20	20.60	75.40	1.80
efficient	55.90	100.00	84.20	100.00
brutal	54.40	5.90	64.90	5.30
affectionate	52.90	98.50	17.50	98.20
dependent	48.50	42.60	49.10	28.10
loyal	29.40	98.50	5.30	100.00
simple	26.50	64.70	50.90	87.70
obedient	25.00	77.90	14.00	77.20
dirty	25.00	7.40	17.50	1.80
free	16.20	97.10	33.30	98.20
instinctual	4.40	91.20	5.30	71.90
wild	1.50	76.50	5.30	24.60

As the ratings from both countries indicate, the humanity of the traits was continuous rather than categorical, with the more human traits at the higher end of the humanity continuum. The results also indicate that there was high agreement within each country on the humanness of the more human traits such as *hypocrite* and *creative*, whereas less human traits received less agreement, e.g. *wild, obedient*. In Romania, *intelligent* was rated as typical of humans as *brutal*, which somehow makes it difficult to differentiate between the two. This result is indicative of cross-cultural variations in human typicality ratings.

Taking the 20 traits as targets, their human typicality and positive valence were negatively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = -.27, ns, in Britain, and r (1, 18) = -.21, ns, in Romania, which suggests that the ratings of human typicality were not contingent upon their positive valence. Comparing the two countries, the British and the Romanian humanness ratings of the traits were positively correlated, r (1, 18) = .80, p < .001, as well as their positive valence ratings, r (1, 18) = .94, p < .001, indicating high cross-cultural agreement on their humanness and positive valence.

To conclude, this study indicated that there was cross-cultural agreement on what is typically human and what is positive, and that humanity is not the same as positivity.

4.5 Study 2: The human typicality of each target emotion and trait

The first study indicated that people can perceive certain emotions and traits as being more typical of humans than others. The fact that the emotions and traits were not categorized by all of the participants as either typical of humans or of animals arguably suggests that there is no clear-cut, unambiguous and unanimous agreement on the distinction between animal-like and human-like traits or emotions. Thus, while most people agree *creative* is typical of humans and *wild* typical of animals, there are many other traits and emotions which are more ambiguous and therefore fall in the middle of a humanness continuum, such as *greedy* in Romania and *affectionate* in Britain.

Therefore the second study decided to examine how typical of humans and of animals, respectively, each trait and emotion was, on a more detailed continuous scale. This study explored the perceived humanness of the target emotions and traits within the human and animal categories, respectively. Thus, while the first study assumed *animal* and *human* to be the logical opposites of each other, the second one looked at variations within each category as a function of context, i.e. animal vs. human.

Some Romanian data for this study was collected on the internet. Regarding internet data collectiom, some meta-analytic research suggests a high degree of convergence between web-based and lab-based data (Krantz & Dalal, 2000). Although collecting psychological data on the internet presents certain disadvantages, such as danger of multiple submissions, self-selection of participants, no help being available from the experimenter, impossibility of full debriefing, to mention just a few, web-based research has some advantages, too, e.g. lack of experimenter effects, greater self-disclosure in the absence of interviewer, variety of participants, greater convenience to the participants, lesser need of prejudice suppression, etc. (for a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons of internet research, see Birnbaum, 2000, 2004; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). To counteract potential multiple submissions, the IP addresses of the participants were checked. The researcher's email address was included in the web survey to enable participants to receive feedback, ask for help, or comment on any problems they may have encountered.

4.5.1 Design

The study had a between-participants design. The participants were randomly allocated to either the 'animal' or the 'human' condition, and were instructed to rate how typically animal / human each emotion and trait was on a 1 (not at all typical of animals / humans) to 7 (very much typical of animals / humans) scale. The between-participants design was adopted because a trait which may be considered highly typical of humans may not necessarily be highly untypical of animals, such as *intelligent*. As the research by Haslam et al. (2005) suggested, human nature may overlap with animal nature to a certain extent, and therefore human typicality may not necessarily be the opposite of animal typicality. This study aimed to assess if this was the case. The positive valence of the emotions and traits was also measured using a 7-point scale, in both the animal and human conditions, on a scale from 1 (negative) to 7

(positive). (See *Appendix II c* for the English version of the questionnaire, and *Appendix II d* for the Romanian version.)

4.5.2 Participants and procedure

One hundred and thirty eight British nationals took part, 68 females, 69 males, and 1 person who did not identify their gender, *M* age = 23.68. 110 were of English ethnicity, the others of different ethnicities. 116 were students, and 22 were employed people of various professions. Most of the participants were students of management, economics, mathematics and engineering. 64 participants took part in the *animal* condition, and 74, in the *human* condition. The participants were recruited on campus, and were randomly allocated to one of the two conditions.

One hundred and twenty-six Romanian nationals took part, 81 females and 45 males, *M* age = 21.52. Of these, 109 were students, and 16 were employed. 38 completed the questionnaire on the internet, while the rest completed it in class, under supervision. 62 participated in the *animal* condition, while 64, in the *human* condition.

4.5.3 Results

A mean animal typicality score and a mean human typicality score was calculated for each emotion based on the animal and human typicality ratings, respectively. Similarly, positivity scores were calculated from the positivity ratings in the animal and in the human condition, respectively. In each country, an independent-samples *t*-test was carried out on the typicality of each emotion, with the experimental condition (animals vs. humans) as the between-participants factor. There were differences in the typicality ratings between the two conditions for most of the emotions, see Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below for the means, the standard deviations, and the associated *t* values and significance levels:

Table 4.3 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the emotions in the animal and human conditions in Romania ($N = 126$) with the associated t and p values

Emotions	Typicality						Positivity					
	Human		Animal				Human		Animal			
	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	M	SD	M	SD	t	p
pride	**5.84**	1.42	**3.54**	1.83	**-7.84**	**.001**	3.78	1.85	3.72	1.58	-0.18	.857
joy	5.68	1.40	5.85	1.48	0.65	.516	6.53	0.89	6.30	1.18	-1.20	.229
pleasure	5.62	1.46	5.36	1.80	-0.90	.368	5.68	1.34	6.01	1.20	1.46	.147
satisfaction	**5.57**	1.41	**4.43**	2.12	**-3.54**	**.001**	6.28	1.17	5.90	1.30	-1.71	.089
rage	5.37	1.63	5.03	1.59	-1.20	.234	1.92	1.24	2.03	1.27	0.50	.622
admiration	**5.25**	1.54	**2.87**	1.75	**-8.07**	**.001**	**5.87**	1.16	**5.23**	1.56	**-2.56**	**.010**
fear	5.00	1.54	5.50	1.50	1.84	.068	3.18	1.40	3.22	1.69	0.15	.880
regret	**4.90**	1.83	**2.41**	1.42	**-8.53**	**.001**	4.39	1.66	3.98	1.68	-1.35	.177
contempt	**4.82**	1.78	**2.30**	1.44	**-8.68**	**.001**	1.96	1.17	2.06	1.11	0.48	.632
compassion	**4.78**	1.53	**3.52**	2.03	**-3.90**	**.001**	5.42	1.56	4.95	1.44	-1.74	.084
guilt	4.18	1.55	3.70	1.84	-1.57	.117	4.07	1.72	3.95	1.73	-0.41	.682
aversion	**4.13**	1.48	**3.46**	1.87	**-2.16**	**.033**	2.90	1.36	2.62	1.43	-1.10	.274

Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions.

Table 4.4 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the emotions in the animal and human conditions in Britain ($N = 138$) with the associated t and p values

Emotions	Typicality						Positivity					
	Human		Animal				Human		Animal			
	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	M	SD	M	SD	t	p
pleasure	**5.71**	1.64	**5.03**	1.39	**-2.62**	**.010**	6.25	0.84	6.29	0.66	0.31	.759
pride	**5.64**	1.27	**4.03**	1.83	**-5.94**	**.001**	4.94	1.54	5.18	1.49	0.93	.353
guilt	**5.58**	1.42	**2.32**	1.36	**-13.67**	**.001**	**3.01**	1.54	**3.54**	1.50	**2.05**	**.043**
regret	**5.51**	1.51	**2.00**	1.12	**-15.61**	**.001**	3.24	1.33	3.60	1.51	1.45	.150
admiration	**5.44**	1.43	**2.90**	1.59	**-9.82**	**.001**	5.47	1.08	5.35	1.06	-0.62	.534
joy	**5.41**	1.40	**4.50**	1.50	**-3.71**	**.001**	6.51	0.74	6.45	0.66	-0.50	.619
compassion	**5.36**	1.39	**3.15**	1.52	**-8.83**	**.001**	6.23	0.89	6.29	0.73	0.46	.649
satisfaction	**5.13**	1.57	**4.50**	1.61	**-2.34**	**.021**	5.85	1.00	6.01	1.03	0.95	.345
fear	**5.10**	1.89	**6.03**	1.16	**-3.48**	**.001**	2.80	1.42	3.04	1.44	1.02	.309
rage	5.05	1.53	4.90	1.82	0.52	.606	1.87	1.11	2.06	1.17	0.95	.344
contempt	**4.89**	1.30	**2.73**	1.46	**-9.18**	**.001**	2.48	1.36	2.57	1.50	0.38	.707
aversion	**4.57**	1.46	**3.82**	1.50	**-2.93**	**.004**	3.15	1.26	3.31	1.07	0.81	.420

Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions.

It is worth noting here that standard deviations are rather large relative to the means. However, instead of this being a shortcoming, i.e. suggesting that the mean may not be a good representation of the data, it could be argued that the data points' distance from the mean suggests variability and lack of consensus regarding the human or animal typicality of the emotions. The variability in the participants' ratings suggests that there is no precise agreement on how exactly typically human or animal an emotion is, and that it may be more difficult to draw the line between what is typically human and what is typically animal than current theories might envisage.

What is also interesting to notice in the results is that the *majority* of the emotions were rated as more typically human than as typically animal, despite some of them being non-significantly so. This might suggest that emotions, be they primary or secondary, may be related to what is typically human rather than to what is uniquely human.

As regarded the positive valence of the emotions, there were very few significant differences between the two conditions, see the tables above. This arguably shows that the positive valence of the emotions varies little as a function of human or animal context. In Britain as well as in Romania, the human typicality ratings and the positive valence of the emotions from the 'human' condition were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .49 in Britain, and r = .40 in Romania, ns. Similarly, the animal typicality ratings and the positive valence from the 'animal' condition were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .09 in Britain and r = .34 in Romania, ns. Thus, similarly to the first study and in line with previous research, the humanity and the positive valence of the emotions seemed to be independent, although it should be borne in mind that given the small number of items, N = 12, these correlations are not necessarily conclusive. The correlation between the human typicality and the animal typicality scores of the emotions was not significant in either Britain or Romania, r (1, 10) = -.15, and .44, respectively, ns. In other words, the more human the emotions were, they were not necessarily less animal. The human positive valence and the animal positive valence scores were very highly correlated, r (1, 10) = .99, p < .001 in Britain, and r (1, 10) = .98, p < .001 in Romania, suggesting that the ratings of positivity were independent of condition.

Comparing the two countries, the British and the Romanian human typicality scores of the emotions were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .44, ns. However, the British and the Romanian animal typicality ratings of the emotions were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 10) = .86, p < .001. This suggests that there was more cross-cultural agreement on the animal than on the human typicality of the emotions. At the same time, the positive valence scores from Britain and Romania were highly correlated, r (1, 10) = .91, p < .001, in the *human* condition, and r (1, 10) = .93, p < .001, in the *animal* condition.

As for the traits, a mean animal typicality and a mean human typicality score were calculated for each trait based on the animal and human typicality ratings, respectively. Similarly, positive valence scores were calculated from the positivity ratings in the animal and in the human condition, respectively. In each country, an independent-samples t-test was carried out on the animal-human typicality of the traits, with the experimental condition (animals vs. humans) as the between-participants factor. This revealed significant differences for the typicality ratings between the 2 conditions for the majority of the traits, but few significant differences for the positivity ratings, see the tables below for the means, standard deviations, associated t values and significance levels:

Table 4.5 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the traits in the animal and human conditions in Britain ($N = 138$) with the associated t and p values

Traits	Typicality						Positivity					
	Human		Animal				Human		Animal			
	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	M	SD	M	SD	t	p
creative	**5.58**	1.21	**3.28**	1.59	**-9.62**	**.001**	6.20	0.86	6.21	0.72	0.12	.907
intelligent	**5.52**	1.09	**4.96**	1.05	**-3.05**	**.003**	6.33	0.83	6.06	0.97	-1.79	.076
prejudiced	**5.39**	1.21	**2.38**	1.47	**-13.10**	**.001**	**1.79**	0.89	**2.23**	1.25	**2.32**	**.019**
hypocrite	**5.25**	1.31	**2.01**	1.23	**-14.72**	**.001**	1.89	0.90	2.06	0.90	1.10	.270
selfish	**5.22**	1.30	**4.04**	1.45	**-5.03**	**.001**	1.97	0.87	2.03	0.89	0.39	.699
logical	**5.10**	1.21	**3.60**	1.60	**-6.20**	**.001**	5.40	0.95	5.40	0.99	0.01	.996
friendly	**4.95**	1.24	**4.53**	1.12	**-2.10**	**.037**	6.29	0.77	6.21	0.98	-0.53	.600
greedy	4.91	1.40	5.04	1.36	0.54	.589	1.83	0.96	2.12	1.10	1.63	.106
affectionate	4.89	1.38	5.31	1.24	1.87	.064	5.91	0.87	5.95	0.93	0.22	.824
dependent	**4.40**	1.40	**4.95**	1.41	**2.27**	**.025**	4.00	1.27	4.23	1.45	1.01	.314
efficient	4.39	1.27	4.45	1.49	0.26	.795	5.79	1.00	5.82	0.83	0.20	.846
loyal	**4.31**	1.38	**5.42**	1.15	**5.08**	**.001**	5.98	1.02	6.14	0.90	0.93	.355
instinctual	**4.05**	1.37	**6.12**	0.93	**10.46**	**.001**	4.64	1.16	4.96	1.30	1.55	.124
obedient	4.00	1.31	4.21	1.47	0.92	.358	**4.20**	1.11	**4.68**	1.28	**2.38**	**.019**
free	**3.90**	1.65	**4.90**	1.28	**3.99**	**.001**	5.27	1.34	5.26	1.37	-0.02	.984
ruthless	3.89	1.44	4.15	1.67	0.99	.322	2.53	1.25	2.60	1.37	0.34	.738
brutal	**3.60**	1.32	**4.70**	1.70	**4.16**	**.001**	**1.86**	1.05	**2.31**	1.12	**2.42**	**.017**
simple	**3.25**	1.21	**4.45**	1.56	**4.96**	**.001**	3.57	1.33	3.68	1.25	0.50	.615
dirty	**3.14**	1.20	**3.71**	1.35	**2.62**	**.010**	1.97	1.15	2.00	0.96	0.15	.883
wild	**3.06**	1.36	**5.78**	1.11	**12.68**	**.001**	3.35	1.26	3.71	1.21	1.73	.085

Note: In bold, the means, t and p values for the significant differences between the two conditions.

In Britain, the human typicality and the human positive valence of the traits were positively but non-significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .25, ns, whereas in Romania these were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .50, p < .05. The significant correlation in Romania may have consequences for the process of

ontologization, as it may be difficult to separate ontologization from the positive-negative side of prejudice.[2]

Table 4.6 Ratings of typicality and positivity of the traits in the animal and human conditions in Romania (*N* = 126) with the associated *t* and *p* values

Traits	Typicality						Positivity					
	Human		Animal				Human		Animal			
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*p*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*p*
creative	**6.06**	1.20	**2.72**	1.89	**-11.83**	**.001**	**6.35**	0.86	**5.50**	1.80	**-3.39**	**.001**
intelligent	**5.73**	1.19	**5.22**	1.47	**-2.10**	**.037**	6.42	0.97	6.25	1.13	-0.87	.384
logical	**5.26**	1.63	**2.29**	1.63	**-10.22**	**.001**	**6.04**	0.98	**5.04**	1.81	**-3.80**	**.001**
free	5.26	1.51	5.45	1.45	0.70	.484	**5.96**	1.19	**5.40**	1.54	**-2.26**	**.026**
hypocrite	**5.20**	1.67	**1.67**	1.09	**-14.03**	**.001**	1.85	1.08	1.93	1.06	0.38	.701
affectionate	**5.20**	1.32	**5.67**	1.31	**2.02**	**.046**	6.04	1.17	6.24	0.95	1.02	.307
selfish	**5.18**	1.57	**3.91**	1.72	**-4.32**	**.001**	2.68	1.74	2.55	1.56	-0.44	.662
greedy	**5.10**	1.83	**5.74**	1.38	**2.19**	**.03**	**1.96**	1.52	**2.80**	1.80	**2.82**	**.006**
friendly	**5.10**	1.37	**5.66**	1.36	**2.26**	**.025**	6.35	0.86	6.41	0.86	0.39	.696
prejudiced	**5.01**	1.72	**1.62**	0.97	**-13.62**	**.001**	**3.55**	1.83	**2.45**	1.34	**-3.82**	**.001**
efficient	**4.90**	1.25	**4.19**	1.95	**-2.40**	**.02**	6.06	1.26	5.81	1.23	-1.09	.278
dependent	4.76	1.51	4.48	1.61	-1.01	.315	3.35	1.79	3.54	1.89	0.57	.566
instinctual	**4.26**	1.61	**6.17**	1.12	**7.69**	**.001**	4.51	1.43	4.69	1.79	0.62	.539
brutal	4.10	1.71	4.68	1.57	1.97	.052	1.78	1.21	2.16	1.39	1.63	.105
ruthless	3.98	1.72	3.46	1.67	-1.71	.091	2.31	1.17	2.50	1.61	0.72	.471
simple	3.81	1.42	4.13	2.14	0.98	.327	4.63	1.37	4.48	1.70	-0.55	.585
loyal	**3.68**	1.58	**5.96**	1.32	**8.77**	**.001**	5.85	1.33	6.12	1.14	1.22	.224
obedient	**3.32**	1.43	**4.87**	1.31	**6.29**	**.001**	**3.26**	1.53	**4.11**	1.87	**2.78**	**.006**
dirty	**3.12**	1.57	**4.39**	1.60	**4.47**	**.001**	**1.71**	1.11	**2.65**	1.82	**3.44**	**.001**
wild	**2.95**	1.58	**5.93**	1.31	**11.53**	**.001**	**2.21**	1.32	**2.85**	1.80	**2.25**	**.026**

Note: In bold, the means, *t* and *p* values for the significant differences between the two conditions.

Similarly to the ratings of emotions, the standard deviations were rather large relative to the means. This would suggest great variability of typicality ratings within each condition, be it animal or human, and therefore little consensus on how typically human or animal each trait was. But instead of this being a drawback, it could be argued that the present results reflect how difficult to draw human boundaries may be.

The animal typicality and the animal positive valence of the traits were positively but non-significantly correlated in both countries, *r* (1, 18) = .38 in Britain, ns, and .38 in Romania, ns. Thus, in the *animal* condition, the animality and the positivity of the traits proved to be independent dimensions in both countries. The human typicality and the animal typicality ratings were negatively but non-

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[2] The same study was replicated in Hungary and in Spain and in neither country was the human typicality of the traits significantly correlated with their positive valence.

significantly correlated in both countries, r (1, 18) = -.42 in Britain, ns, -.32 in Romania, ns. Although these correlations were based on only 20 items, the present results may suggest that as the traits increased their human typicality, they did not necessarily decrease their animal typicality, which is in line with Haslam et al's (2005) postulation that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal. The human positive valence and the animal positive valence were positively and significantly correlated in both countries, r (1, 18) = .99 in Britain and .95 in Romania, p < .001, suggesting that the ratings of positivity of the traits were independent of the research condition, be it *animal* or *human*.

Comparing the results from the two countries, the British and the Romanian human typicality scores of the traits were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .86, p < .001, as well as the animal typicality scores, r (1, 18) = .92, p < .001, which suggests that there was cross-cultural agreement on the human typicality and the animal typicality of the traits. Similarly, the British and Romanian human positive valence scores were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 18) = .93, p < .001, as well as the animal positive valence scores, r (1, 18) = .96, p < .001. This indicates that there was also cross-cultural agreement on the positive valence of the traits. Again, one should bear in mind that these correlations are based on only 20 items.

4.6 Comparing the results from the two studies

The second study indicated that although we may distinguish between human and animal typicality, there is a lot of variation *within* the categories *human* and *animal*. Thus, it may not be enough to associated certain features with animals and others with humans, one may need to examine how these features vary in terms of their typicality within each category. The second study brings support to the argument that traits as well as emotions can be seen as varying along a continuum of human typicality, with, for example, *creative* and *intelligent* at one end and *dirty* and *wild* at the other. The relatively large standard deviations for the ratings of typicality, for both emotions and traits, suggest that the there may be little clear-cut cultural consensus on how typically human these attributes are, and that the boundaries of humanness may be difficult to draw.

Comparing the results on the emotions from the two studies within each country, the humanness ratings of the emotions from Study 1 and Study 2 were positively but non-significantly correlated in Britain, r (1, 10) = .49, ns, and negatively but non-significantly correlated in Romania, r (1, 10) = -.15, ns. This could be due to the different measures used for assessing the emotions' human typicality. However, the humanness ratings of the emotions from Study 1 and the animal typicality ratings from Study 2 were negatively but highly significantly correlated in both countries, r (1, 10) = -.83, p = .001, in Britain, and r (1, 10) = -.89, p < .001, in Romania. These results suggest that there was more agreement between Study 1 and Study 2 on the animality rather than on the humanness of the emotions, and raise the question as to whether emotions are a salient feature in discriminating humans from animals.

However, as regarded the traits, the human typicality ratings from Study 1 and those from Study 2 were positively and significantly correlated in each country, r (1, 18) = .85, p < .001 in Britain, and r (1, 18) = .59, p < .01 in Romania. Conversely, the humanness ratings from Study 1 were significantly but negatively correlated with the animal typicality ratings from Study 2, r (1, 18) = -.65, p < .01 in Britain, and r (1, 18) = -.85, p < .001 in Romania. These results suggest that traits may be a more robust measure of dehumanization as there was generally more agreement on their humanness ratings. They also suggest that people may think differently about traits and emotions, which may have consequences for their ecological validity in the operationalization of dehumanization.

As for the positive valence, the positivity ratings of the emotions from study 1 and the positivity ratings in the *human* condition from study 2 were positively and significantly correlated in each country, r (1, 10) = .98 in Britain, and .96 in Romania, p < .001. The positive valence ratings from study 1 also correlated positively and significantly with the positivity ratings from the animal condition in study 2, r (1, 10) = .97 in Britain and .96 in Romania, p < .001, thus suggesting that there was more consensus on the emotions' positivity than on their human typicality. The positive valence ratings of the traits from study 1 correlated positively and significantly with the positivity ratings from the *human* condition in study 2, r (1, 18) = .96 in Britain and .95 in Romania, p < .001, as well as with the positivity ratings from the *animal*

condition in study 2: r (1, 18) = .96 in Britain and .96 in Romania, p < .001. These high positive correlations between the results from the two pilots would suggest that there is general agreement on the humanity and positive valence of the traits.

4.7 Operationalizing dehumanization in the present research

In the infrahumanization paradigm, the infrahumanization of the out-groups was inferred from the differential attribution of secondary emotions to out-group and in-group. In the research on the ontologization of the Gypsies, it was only the Gypsies, and not the in-group, that were attributed traits which had been previously derived from the Gypsy stereotype content, e.g. *intuitive, noisy* (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001). However, I adapted the ontologization process and modelled it on infrahumanization. Thus, in the present research the ontologization of the out-groups will reside in the differential attribution of traits to out-group and in-group. This has been operationalized successfully in previous research, e.g. Deschamps et al., 2005, Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005. The present study acknowledges that with experimental target groups the lack of history between in-group and out-group may make the use of the term *ontologization* rather inappropriate. However, the term *ontologization* will be kept to differentiate the dehumanization in terms of traits from infrahumanization, which is dehumanization in terms of emotions.

In contrast to most previous research on dehumanization, the present research will measure dehumanization continuously rather than categorically. Thus, each emotion and trait will be attributed a human typicality rating based on the results from the second study. Furthermore, for each participant a humanity score will be calculated for the emotions attributed to the out-group and in-group, respectively. Each target emotion or trait that the participants has ascribed to the target, be it in-group or out-group, will be given a human typicality weighting. Then these weightings will be added up and divided by the number of emotions or traits, respectively, that the participant ascribed to the target. For example, if a British participant selected only the emotions *compassion, rage* and *contempt* for the in-group, their humanity scores were added up and divided by 3 as in the equation below:

Humanity of emotions to in-group = Σ in-group-compassion *5.36 + in-group-rage *5.05 + in-group-contempt *4.89 + ... / N emotions attributed to in-group = 15.30 / 3 = 5.10

This means that the less typically human emotions or traits the participants ascribe to the target out-groups, the more they dehumanize them. The same procedure will be followed for the positivity of the emotions and traits, for out-group and in-group, respectively. The processes of infrahumanization and of ontologization, respectively, will be inferred from the overall mean level of humanity attributed to in-group and out-group.

The traits and the emotions used as targets in the pilot studies were all included in the studies on dehumanization despite the fact that some traits, for example, had been found to be no more typical of humans or of animals. Given that each emotion and trait was allocated a score of humanity, on a continuous scale, it was deemed unnecessary to exclude those items which failed to be more typical of either animals or humans.

Finally, as a word of caution, it is perhaps worth remembering that what infrahumanization and ontologization measure is the attribution of humanity in terms of emotions or traits, respectively, to out-group and in-group. One can only infer the process of dehumanization from the differential attribution of humanity to in-group and out-group. To reduce the possibility that "dehumanization is what dehumanization tests measure", to paraphrase E.G. Boring, I will introduce other measures of prejudice and will expect *convergent validity* (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991) between the measures of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice, e.g. blatant and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

4.8 Progression to the next study

While this chapter has focused on the operationalization of dehumanization in experimental research, the following chapters will explore dehumanization in experimental settings with artificial and with real groups, and will return to the issues raised in Chapters 2 and 3, with a particular focus on the role of perceived threat.

Chapter 5   Cultural differences and poverty: Two antecedents of the dehumanization of artificial groups

Contents of Chapter 5

5.1.1 Introduction

As it was mentioned in the extensive review of dehumanization theories and research in chapter 2, the researchers working on the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through traits) suggest that only those ethnic minorities which are perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the majority will be dehumanized, such as the Gypsies (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001). This raises the issue as to whether cultural differences between in-group and out-group might be a factor leading to dehumanization. Indeed, research has shown that culturally different ethnic groups are 'abnormalized' by ethnic majority members because their different values, beliefs and norms are viewed as deviant from normative basic human values (Verkuyten, 2001). While 'abnormalization' may not be tantamount to dehumanization, it nonetheless implies that perceived deviation from assumed normative humanness can be used as a motive for discrimination. In-group members may discriminate against and potentially dehumanize culturally different out-group members simply because they perceive dissimilarities in terms of beliefs (see Rokeach's belief congruence theory, 1960; 1968), and differences in their hierarchy of basic values (Struch & Schwartz, 1989).

While explanations for the dehumanization of the Gypsies have focused on the perceived failure to culturally assimilate, it is conceivable that their poor socio-economic status can contribute to them being dehumanized. Recent research using fMRI scans have shown that homeless people elicited no more prefrontal cortex activation than equivalently disgusting objects, suggesting that homeless people are dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). A group's economic status can predict the content of that group's stereotype (Glick & Fiske, 2001), and in particular it will predict whether that group is competent or not, which in turn will make the group be associated with traits denoting competence, e.g. *intelligent, shrewd, logical, ambitious,* or lack of it, e.g. *incompetent, lazy, animalistic, stupid, unambitious* (Glick & Fiske, 2001). As the latter traits suggest, it may well be that poor groups are viewed as less human than rich groups because their incompetence is taken to reflect their less-than-human nature. For example, research conducted on the traits attributed to the poor and to the middle-classes has shown the poor are viewed as less *intelligent, moral, friendly, capable,* while at the same as more *stupid, dirty, lazy,* and *violent* than

the middle-classes (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001), which suggests that the poor may be dehumanized and morally excluded (Lott, 2002). Arguably, the attributions for the causes of poverty bear the mark of fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) in the sense that the poor are held responsible for their poor economic status while situational explanations, such as discrimination, are discounted. Therefore it is possible that the dehumanization of certain ethnic minorities may rest not so much on ethnic prejudice as on the social representations of poverty and the character of the poor. Nevertheless, there may be alternative explanations for the dehumanization of the poor. It could be argued that similarly to the culturally different groups' apparent 'deviance' from the norm (Verkuyten, 2001), poor people are viewed as less typical or less normative of the category 'human' (see Kahneman & Miller's norm theory, 1986). Given that category norms can be used as explanations for inter-group differences (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), it may be that the dehumanization of the poor and of the culturally different functions as an explanation for their divergence from the norm.

However, culturally different, as well as poor ethnic groups may be dehumanized only to the extent that their cultural differences or poverty pose a threat to the in-group, thus opening the possibility that perceived threat may be a mediator of dehumanization. Going back to the focus groups discussions described in chapter 3, these indicated that when animals were perceived as vermin, such as rats, foxes, stray dogs, or foot-and-mouth infected cattle, they were most likely to be dehumanized, morally excluded and ultimately killed. Although the dehumanization of humans is not the same as that of animals, the threat that vermin and pests invoke raises the question as to whether the dehumanization of human groups, too, may rest on perceptions of threat.

The concept of perceived threat has figured in research on prejudice against ethnic minorities and immigrants, and in particular in the integrated threat theory of prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, & Renfro, 2002). Perceived threat can be of two kinds: symbolic or cultural threat, and material or realistic threat. Perceived symbolic threat is invoked by ethnic minorities or immigrants whose values, beliefs and norms are viewed as different

from those of the majority, and as violating the in-group's traditional values, or values which the in-group views as basic and culturally universal (Verkuyten, 2001). It is a threat to the in-group's worldview (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999, Stephan & Stephan, 2000), presumed to stem from the in-group's ethnocentrism and belief in its moral rightness (Stephan et al., 1999), which can lead to negative attitudes and discrimination (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). As for perceived material threat, this is induced by perceptions of economic competition between in-group and out-groups (see LeVine & Campbell's realistic group conflict theory, 1972) and by fears relating to the economic and material well-being of the in-group. Research has shown that groups perceived as being poor are more discriminated against and more socially excluded than out-groups perceived to be rich (e.g. Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong, 2001; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). It is important to stress here that threat is largely *perceived* and that it does not reside in real competition for resources. It should also be highlighted here that both types of threat can be invoked simultaneously by the same group (e.g. McLaren, 2003; Falomir-Pichastor, Munoz-Rojas, Invernizzi & Mugny, 2004), and indeed some studies have found positive and significant correlations between the two types of threat (e.g. $r = .45$, McLaren, 2003; $r = .67$, Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; $r = .84$, Renfro, Stephan, Duran, & Clason, 2006).

Given these theoretical premises and empirical findings on dehumanization, cultural differences, poverty, and perceived threat, I decided to explore whether perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group and an out-group's poor economic status might lead to dehumanization. To this purpose, I set up a vignette experiment using artificial ethnic minorities as targets which were described as either culturally similar to the in-group, or as culturally different. Furthermore, the target groups were described as either rich or poor. By using artificial groups I was able to manipulate the description of the target groups and thus to predict whether cultural differences or poverty can play a part in dehumanization. Artificial immigrant groups have been used before as targets in research on perceived threat and prejudice (e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Although experimental designs suffer generally from criticisms with regard to their supposed lack of external validity, they are nonetheless very useful tools in process-oriented research which tries to

identify the causes of particular phenomena and to test specific hypotheses (see Mook, 1983; Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998).

As for dehumanization, this was measured through the different attribution of emotions (infrahumanization) and traits (ontologization) to in-group and out-group. The researchers working on the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through emotions) argue that all groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-group and to deny it to the out-groups (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000; Demoulin et al., 2004b). However, the researchers working on the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through traits) suggest that only those ethnic minorities which are perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated by the majority will be dehumanized (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001). It was therefore expected that these two measures of dehumanization might produce different results.

5.1.2 Research hypotheses

In this study I aimed to find out whether cultural differences between ethnic minorities and in-group or the ethnic minorities' low economic status may make these groups vulnerable to dehumanization. Furthermore, I explored whether dehumanization can be explained in terms of the perceived threat, be it symbolic or material, that ethnic minorities invoke. It was therefore hypothesised that:

1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions)

2. the culturally different target groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar ones

3. the poor target groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the rich ones

5.2 Method

5.2.1 Design

The study had a 2 (culturally similar vs. culturally different ethnic minority) x 2 (rich vs. poor ethnic minority) factorial design within each national sample, with both factors as between-participants factors. The participants were randomly assigned

to one of the four conditions. In Britain, the cell sizes varied from 28 to 31, while in Romania, from 33 to 35.

5.2.2 Participants and procedure

One hundred and eighteen, 77 females and 41 males, British nationals, M age = 20.14, age range = 16 to 56, participated in the study. All were of English ethnicity, 114 of which had been born in Britain. One hundred and thirty-five, 95 females and 40 males, Romanian nationals took part in the study, M age = 21.93, age range = 19 to 37. All participants were of Romanian ethnicity.

The questionnaire was introduced as part of a study exploring cultural diversity in the country. Some fifty-four questionnaires were administered in class under supervision, while sixty-seven others were distributed to students in two restaurants on campus. Some British undergraduate psychology students who took part in the study received one course credit for their participation. The participants were debriefed after completing the questionnaire and were not rewarded in any way.

5.2.3 Materials

Four vignettes were designed for this study, describing an ethnic minority. For the British sample, a fictitious ethnic minority, the Moravians, was chosen so as to enable the manipulation of its description (cf. the Sandirians, Esses et al., 2001). The Moravians are inhabitants of the province of Moravia in the Czech Republic, but statistics do not indicate them as being a sizeable minority in Britain.

In Romania, a real but very little known ethnic minority, the Ceangăi[1], was chosen for the same purpose. In two of the vignettes, the target ethnic minority was described as culturally similar to the in-group, and either rich or poor, while in the other two vignettes it was described as culturally different from the in-group. and either rich or poor. A sample vignette will be presented here (see *Appendix III a* for an

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[1] The Ceangăi minority is of Hungarian origin and has been living in Romania since the 13th century AD, on the border between Transylvania and Moldavia. In the national census of 2002 it numbered only 1266 members. Their name comes from the Hungarian *csángó*, meaning "wanderer, person who breaks away from the community". They have maintained their language, an archaic form of Hungarian, as well as their Catholic religion and their customs.

example of the British version of the questionnaire, and *Appendix III b* for an example of the Romanian version). The italicized text in brackets represents the other versions of the targets' cultural status and economic status manipulations:

Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. [*The Moravians are very religious, and, unlike the English, they usually display their religious beliefs in public.*] On average the Moravians have two children per family. [*On average the Moravians have five children per family.*] They consider it normal for women to enter education and to have jobs outside the home. [*They do not encourage women to have jobs. They consider it normal for women to look after the home.*] Moravians value individual freedom. [*The Moravians value family relationships.*] They rely on public institutions to solve matters of justice. [*They do not trust and do not rely on public institutions to solve matters of justice.*] Just like with the larger British population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. Statistics show that many Moravians enter high education and have high career aspirations. The Moravians usually get jobs in the economic and banking sectors. They rarely have problems with unemployment. [*Statistics show that few Moravians enter high education and few of them have high career aspirations. The Moravians usually get jobs in the lower sectors of the economy. They often have problems with unemployment.*]

5.2.3.1 Prejudice measures: manipulation checks, symbolic and material threat, dehumanization, delegitimization, blatant prejudice, and resource allocation to in-group and out-group

5.2.3.1.1 Manipulation checks

A manipulation check item, ranging from 1 (very different) to 7 (very similar), assessed the perceived similarity of the target out-group to the in-group: *please indicate how similar you think the Moravians [Ceangăi] are to your national group [Romanians].*

5.2.3.1.2 Symbolic and material threat

Five 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Stephan & Stephan's (1999) and from McLaren's (2003) symbolic threat scales assessed whether the out-group was perceived as posing a symbolic threat to the in-group, e.g. *the values held by the Moravians are not compatible with those of British citizens*. Items 2 and 4 were reverse-coded. Separately, five other items measured whether the out-group was perceived as posing a material threat or not to the in-group, e.g. *the presence of Moravians in putting pressure on the British transport system*. Items 3 and 5 were reverse coded. High scores indicated that the in-group perceived threat from the target out-group.

5.2.3.1.3 Dehumanization: infrahumanization (emotions) and ontologization (traits)

The participants were instructed to choose five emotions that they expected the target group to typically feel, and, later in the experiment, five emotions for their in-group. The emotions they had to choose from were: *compassion, rage, contempt, pleasure, guilt, aversion, fear, admiration, regret, pride, joy,* and *satisfaction*. The participants were also requested to choose seven traits that best described the target group, and, later in the experiment, seven traits for their own group. The traits they had to choose from were: *creative, hypocrite, simple, wild, greedy, efficient, dependent, affectionate, loyal, brutal, intelligent, selfish, dirty, free, prejudiced, logical, friendly, ruthless, obedient,* and *instinctual*.

5.2.3.1.4 Delegitimization

As a scale of delegitmization was not available, a new scale was constructed that tried to measure this form of prejudice, where delegitimizing means placing the target outside the realm in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (Opotow, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). Five 7-point Likert scale items operationalized delegitimization as the refusal of extending equal rights to the out-group, e.g. *if they commit crimes in Britain, Moravians should be sent back to their country of origin instead of being sent to a British prison*. Items 1 and 4 were reverse-coded. High scores indicated that the in-group perceived symbolic threat from the target out-group.

5.2.3.1.5 Blatant prejudice

Five 7-point Likert scale items measured blatant prejudice (see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). These items expressed desire for social distance from the target out-group, e.g. *I would not like a family of Moravians [Ceangăi] to move into my neighbourhood*. Items 2 and 5 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated the desire for social distance from the target out-group.

5.2.3.1.6 Resource allocation to in-group and out-group

A five-item scale was constructed in order to measure in-group favouritism in the allocation of resources to in-group and out-group. These items were constructed as dilemmas, e.g. *if ten people from your national group and ten Moravian people were in need of NHS hospital beds, and only thirteen beds were available at the local hospital, how do you think the thirteen beds should be allocated to the two groups?* and *if ten Ceangai children and ten Romanian children were in need of school places, and only fifteen were available in the local school, how do you think the fifteen school places should be allocated?* The number of items was made deliberately unequal in order to induce a dilemma for the participants. The participants had to assign a quantity to in-group, and one to out-group, thus deciding who would get more. The quantity allocated to the in-group was considered to indicate the percentage of in-group bias, with high scores indicating a high level of in-group bias.

5.2.3.2 Ideological measures: postmaterialism, in-group identification and social dominance orientation

Five 7-point Likert scale items adapted from MacIntosh's (1998) postmaterialism scale assessed perception of one's country as a postmaterialist society, e.g. *Britain [Romania] is a country where people have a say in how things are decided at work and in their communities*. Items 3 and 5 were reverse-coded. High scores indicated the belief that one's country is a postmaterialist society.

Seven 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Rutland and Cinnirella's (2000) scale for English in-group identification measured in-group identification, e.g. *to what extent do you feel pleased to be English [Romanian]?* High scores indicated a high level of English or Romanian in-group identification, respectively.

Sidanius, Levin, Liu and Pratto's (2000) Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 7-point Likert 16-item scale items measured the social dominance orientation of the participants, e.g. *superior groups should dominate inferior groups*. Items 9 to 16 were reverse-coded. High scored indicated a high level of social dominance orientation.

5.3 Results

When analysing the data I explored: (1) whether the experimental manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the culturally different targets and the poor targets were more dehumanized than the culturally similar and the rich targets, respectively; (4) whether the prejudice measures were influenced by the experimental manipulations; (4) and whether perceived threat mediated dehumanization. These analyses will be described in turn in the following sections.

5.3.1 Manipulation checks: perceived similarity between the target out-group and the in-group

In each country two-way ANOVAs with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables were conducted on the perceived similarity between the target minority and in-group as assessed by the manipulation check item. In Britain, the culturally similar out-group were judged as more similar to the in-group than the culturally different out-groups, $F(1, 110) = 81.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .43$, $Ms = 5.04$ vs. 3.14. The analysis also revealed a main effect of the targets' economic status, $F(1, 110) = 11.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$, whereby the rich out-groups were judged as more similar to the in-group than the poor out-groups, $Ms = 4.44$ vs. 3.74. There was no significant interaction between the targets' culture and economic status, $F(1, 110) = 1.76$, ns. In Romania, the analysis found only a main effect of the targets' cultural status, $F(1, 122) = 33.62$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .21$, indicating that the target groups culturally similar to the in-group were perceived as more similar to the in-group than those culturally different from the in-group, $Ms = 4.78$ vs. 3.42. There was no main effect of the targets' economic status, $F(1, 122) = 0.91$, ns, and no significant interaction, $F(1, 122) = 0.01$, ns.

5.3.2 Ideological measures: postmaterialism, in-group identification, and social dominance orientation

The scale of postmaterialism proved to have inadequate reliability in Britain, Cronbach's alpha being .49, but increased to .60 after items 3 and 5 were deleted from the scale. The inter-item correlations ranged from .18 to .53, the mean inter-item correlation[2] being. 34. In Romania, too, the scale was unreliable, the Cronbach's alpha was .24, and the mean inter-item correlation .10, without item 5. Therefore, this scale was not retained for further analyses[3].

The measure of in-group identification was reliable in both countries, the Cronbach's alpha was .85 in Britain. In Romania the seventh item failed to load on the factor, and was therefore excluded from the scale. The remaining 6 items had a Cronbach's alpha of .76. A two-way ANOVA with the targets' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on in-group identification scores in each country. The results indicated that the level of in-group identification was not affected by the experimental manipulations in either country, all Fs (1, 114) < 0.3, ns, in Britain, and all Fs (1, 131) < 1.4, ns, Romania.

The SDO (social dominance orientation) measure was reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha was .90 in Britain, and .84 in Romania. Given that SDO measure had the same content in both countries, a three-way ANOVA with nationality (British vs. Romanian), the targets' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on SDO. The Romanian participants expressed a higher level of SDO than their British counterparts, Ms = 3.23 vs. 2.62, F (1, 245) = 26.09, p < .001, η^2 = .10. There were no other main effects, nor any significant interactions, all Fs < 2.6, ns. In Britain, there was a positive and significant correlation between the levels of in-group

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[2] Mean inter-item correlations will also be reported here because they can be used as another index of reliability, given that a high number of items can artificially increase the alpha coefficient (see Cortina, 1993; Field, 2005).

[3] The British scored higher than the Romanians on the item *In [Britain / Romania], people are given a say in important government decisions*, Ms = 3.55 vs. 2.27, F (1, 251) = 50.31, p < .001. However, the Romanians agreed more than did the British with the items *Free speech is not protected in [Britain / Romania]*, Ms = 4.45 vs. 3.50, F (1, 251) = 24.99, p < .001, and *In [Britain / Romania], people are more concerned about survival than about individual self-expression*, Ms = 6.11 vs. 4.33, F (1, 251) = 131.37, p < .001, as indicated by a one-way ANOVA.

identification and SDO, r (1, 116) = .24, p < .01, for a two-tailed hypothesis, while in Romania there was a negative and non-significant correlation between the levels of in-group identification and SDO, r (1, 133) = -.11, ns.

5.3.3 Attributions of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group

As I explained in Chapter 4, the humanness of the emotions and traits used in this study was measured continuously on a 1-7 scale. This gave each emotion and trait a weighting of 'humanness'. In this experiment, for each participant a humanness score was calculated for the emotions and the traits attributed to the out-group and the in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion or trait selected by the participant for the target group (in-group or out-group) with its humanness score, adding them up and dividing them by the total number of the emotions or traits selected for that group. The same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to in-group and out-groups. For example, if a Romanian participant selected the traits *creative, friendly* and *loyal* for the in-group, the humanness attributed to the in-group by that participant was calculated as:

Humanness of the traits attributed to the in-group = Σ (in-group-*creative* x 6.06 + in-group-*friendly* x 5.10 + in-group-*loyal* x 3.68) / N traits attributed to in-group = 14.84 / 3 = 4.94.

The positivity attributed by the same participant to the in-group was calculated as:

Positivity of the traits attributed to the in-group = Σ (in-group-*creative* x 6.35 + in-group-*friendly* x 6.35 + in-group-*loyal* x 5.85) / N traits attributed to in-group = 18.55 / 3 = 6.18

For each national sample, mixed-design ANOVA's were conducted separately on the humanness of the emotions and traits. The between-participants factors were the target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group vs. out-group) was the within-

participants factor. The dependent variables were the humanness of the emotions and traits attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions, and traits, respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the dependent variables.

5.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions

In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 7, $M = 4.76$, and to the in-group, from 2 to 10, $M = 6.18$. The assumption of sphericity was met, and more typically human emotions were overall attributed to the out-group than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.36$ vs. 5.32, $F (1, 114) = 4.80$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$, contrary to the infrahumanization hypothesis. Furthermore, there were no main effects of the targets' cultural or economic status on the attribution of typically human emotions, and no significant interactions, all $Fs (1, 114) < 3$, ns. Also, more positive emotions were overall attributed to the out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.13$ vs. 4.60, $F (1, 114) = 29.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .20$. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution of positive, $F (1, 114) = 5.81$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$, as the rich out-groups were attributed more positive emotions than the in-group, $Ms = 5.21$ vs. 4.43, $t (1, 58) = 5.44$, $p < .001$, while the poor[4] out-groups were attributed equally positive emotions as the in-group, $Ms = 5.06$ vs. 4.75, $t (1, 58) = 2.25$, $p = .028$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025).

In Romania, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 7, $M = 4.94$, and to the in-group, from 4 to 9, $M = 6.93$. There was no infrahumanization of the out-groups, as equally typically human emotions were attributed to out-group and in-group, $Ms = 5.26$ vs. 5.27, $F (1, 131) = 0.05$, ns. Overall, more typically human emotions were attributed when the out-group was rich rather than when it was poor, $Ms = 5.31$ vs. 5.22, $F (1, 131) = 9.17$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Subsequent t-tests indicated that while equally human emotions were attributed to in-group in the two conditions, $Ms = 5.30$ vs. 5.24, $t (1, 133) = 1.70$, ns, significantly more human emotions were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, $Ms = 5.32$ vs. 5.20, $t (1, 133) = 2.86$, $p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level).

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[4] By 'rich' and 'poor' out-groups I mean the groups which were described as rich and as poor, respectively.

However, as no out-group was infrahumanized relative to the in-group, one cannot conclude that the poor groups were infrahumanized. What the results suggest, though, is that the poor out-groups were not perceived as being as human as the rich ones, see Fig 5.1 below:

Fig 5.1 Attribution of typically human emotions in Romania

Relatively equally positive emotions were attributed to out-group and in-group in Romania, Ms = 4.65 vs. 4.63, F (1, 131) = 0.10, ns. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 131) = 8.13, p < .01, η^2 = .06, as more positive emotions were attributed to the out-group than to the in-group in the 'culturally similar' condition, Ms = 4.71 vs. 4.44, t (1, 67) = 2.61, p < .025, but equally positive emotions were attributed to the out-group and in-group in the 'culturally different' condition, Ms = 4.60 vs. 4.80, t (1, 66) = 1.59, ns, (Bonferroni-adjusted level of .025). Also, more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group when the out-group was culturally different than when it was culturally similar, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.44, t (1, 133) = 2.70, p < .01, see Fig 5.2a below. Furthermore, more positive emotions were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, Ms = 4.90 vs. 4.41, while equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.65 vs. 4.60, F (1, 131) = 6.66, p < .05, η^2 = .05, see Fig 5.2b below:

Fig 5.2a Attribution of positive emotions in Romania as a function of the targets' cultural status

Fig 5.2b Attribution of positive emotions in Romania as a function of the targets' economic status

Overall, the results from the two countries indicate that the target out-groups were not infrahumanized (dehumanized in terms of emotions). Nonetheless, the poor out-groups were perceived in a less positive light than the rich out-groups. The humanness of the attributed traits was examined next.

5.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits

In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 10, $M = 4.84$, and to the in-group, from 2 to 9, $M = 6.60$. All out-groups were dehumanized by means of traits, as more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, $Ms = 4.77$ vs. 4.49, $F(1, 114) = 88.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .43$. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution of human traits, $F(1, 114) = 20.28$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .15$, as more typically human traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, $Ms = 4.61$ vs. 4.38, $t(1, 116) = 4.48$, $p < .001$, Fig 5.3 below. The targets' cultural status did not significantly moderate the attribution of typically human traits, and there were no significant interactions between the targets' cultural and economic status, all $Fs < 1$, ns.

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
Fig 5.3 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in Britain[5]

While the out-groups were generally dehumanized, more positive traits were nonetheless attributed to the out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.12$ vs. 4.32, F (1, 114) $= 54.16$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .32$. Furthermore, more positive traits were attributed to the culturally similar than to the culturally different out-groups, $Ms = 5.30$ vs. 4.90, t (1, 116) $= 3.36$, $p < .01$, while equal positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, $Ms = 4.57$ vs. 4.74, t (1, 116) $= .17$, ns, F (1,114) $= 4.53$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$. At the same time, more positive traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, $Ms = 5.24$ vs. 4.96, t (1, 116) $= 2.41$, $p < .025$, whereas equal positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the rich and poor out-groups conditions, $Ms = 4.18$ vs. 4.46, t (1, 116) $= 1.52$, ns, F (1, 114) $= 7.86$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$, see Fig 5.4 below. Thus, in Britain, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized and viewed in a less positive light than the rich ones, while the culturally different out-groups were no more dehumanized than the culturally similar ones, but were viewed in a less positive light than them.

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[5] As all the target out-groups were dehumanized, the in-group was not included in the graph.

Fig 5.4 Attribution of positive traits to out-groups in Britain

In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 4 to 7, $M = 4.99$, and to the in-group, from 4 to 10, $M = 7.06$. All out-groups were dehumanized, as more typically human traits were attributed overall to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 5.00$ vs. 4.70, $F(1, 131) = 88.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .40$. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, $F(1, 131) = 4.60$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .03$, as the culturally similar out-groups were attributed more typically human traits than the culturally different ones, $Ms = 4.77$ vs. 4.64, $t(1, 133) = 2.52$, $p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). The targets' economic status also moderated the attribution of traits, $F(1, 131) = 18.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$, as more typically human traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, $Ms = 4.83$ vs. 4.58, $t(1, 133) = 5.06$, $p < .001$. There was no significant interaction between the cultural and the economic statuses of the out-groups, $F(1, 131) = 0.40$, ns, see Fig 5.5 below:

Fig 5.5 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in Romania

In Romania, relatively equally positive traits were attributed to out-groups and in-group, Ms = 4.86 and 4.94, respectively, F (1, 131) = 0.55, ns. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 131) = 13.62, p < .001, η^2 = .09, indicating that the culturally similar out-groups were attributed more positive traits than the in-group, Ms = 5.10 vs. 4.80, t (1, 67) = 2.58, p < .025, while the culturally different ones were ascribed less positive traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.64 vs. 5.04, t (1, 66) = 2.62, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level), see Fig 5.6a below. The targets' economic status also moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 131) = 10.50, p < .01, η^2 = .07. This indicated that while the rich out-groups and in-group were attributed relatively equally positive traits, Ms = 5.10 vs. 4.84, t (1, 67) = 1.78, ns, but the poor out-groups were attributed significantly less positive traits than the in-group Ms = 4.64 vs. 5.04, t (1, 66) = 2.67, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level), see Fig 5.6b below:

Fig 5.6a Attribution of positive traits in Romania as a function of the targets' cultural status

Fig 5.6b Attribution of positive traits in Romania as a function of the targets' economic status

To sum up, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones in each national study. But the hypothesis according to which the culturally different groups would be more dehumanized than the culturally similar ones was supported only in Romania. The results suggest that poverty may be a more consistent factor in dehumanization than cultural differences. Furthermore, the dehumanization of the out-groups was more evident in terms of traits rather than emotions, which raises questions as to the equivalence of the two measurements of dehumanization.

In Britain, although the out-groups were generally dehumanized by means of traits, they were attributed more positive traits than the in-group. In Romania, despite the overall dehumanization of the out-groups, equally positive traits were attributed to in-group and out-group. These results suggest that discriminations in terms of human typicality or in terms of positive valence are not the same phenomenon. Furthermore, correlation analyses indicated that the positive and the human sides of the emotions attributed to each target were positively and significantly correlated: for the out-group, r (1, 116) = .68, in Britain, and r (1, 133) = .70, in Romania, p < .001; for the in-group, r (1, 116) = .69, in Britain, and r (1, 133) = .64, p < .001. As regarded the positive valence and the human typicality of the traits, these were also positively and significantly correlated: for the out-group, r (1, 116) = .65, in Britain, and r (1, 133) = .67, in Romania, p < .001; for the in-group, r (1, 116) = .21, p < .05, in Britain, and r (1, 133) = .39, p < .001, in Romania. The correlation between the human and positive sides of the traits attributed to the out-group was greater than the correlation between the human and the positive traits attributed to the in-group, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 4.26, p < .001 in Britain, and Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 3.24, p < .001 in Romania. These asymmetries would suggest that the motivation to attribute human traits to the in-group went beyond their valence. It is not clear, however, why this asymmetry occurred with the traits but not with the emotions.

5.3.4 Prejudice measures: perceived threat, delegitimization, blatant prejudice and in-group bias in resource allocation

5.3.4.1 Symbolic and material threat

Regarding symbolic threat, In Britain, items 2 and 4 were recoded, and item 5 was excluded from the scale because it loaded on a second factor. The Cronbach's alpha for the remaining four items was .60, the mean inter-item correlation being .23. Similarly, in Romania, items 2 and 4 were recoded and item 5 was excluded. The Cronbach's alpha was .54, and the mean inter-item correlation being .23. Given the low reliability coefficients, it was decided to exclude the symbolic threat scale from further analyses in both countries. As for material threat, in Britain, items 3 and 5 were recoded, and the Cronbach's alpha was .70, the mean inter-item correlation

being .33. In Romania, items 2 and 5 were recoded, and the Cronbach's alpha was .64 without item 5, the mean inter-item correlation being .30.

In each country two-way ANOVAs with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on the level of perceived material threat posed by the target minority. In Britain, more material threat was perceived in the case of poor ethnic minorities than in the case of rich minorities, Ms = 3.11 vs. 2.70, F (1, 114) = 4.02, $p < .05$, η^2 = .03. However, in Romania, there were no significant main effects, all Fs < 1, ns. Thus, the research hypothesis according to which the ethnic minorities described as poor would invoke more perceived material threat than those described as rich was supported only in the British study.

5.3.4.2 Delegitimization

In both countries items 1 and 4 were recoded. The Cronbach's alpha was .62 in Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .25) and .71 in Romania (the mean inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's explored the effects of the targets' culture (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) on the level of delegitimization of the target minority in each country. There were no significant main effects and no interactions in either country, all Fs (1, 114) < 2.60, ns in Britain, and all Fs (1, 131) < 1.55, ns in Romania. Thus, neither the cultural status, nor the economic status of an ethnic minority played a part in the delegitimization of the target ethnic minorities in either country.

5.3.4.3 Blatant prejudice

In both countries, items 2 and 5 were recoded. The Cronbach's alpha was .81 in Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .48), and .68 in Romania (the mean inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent factors was conducted on the level of blatant prejudice against the target out-group for each national sample. There were no significant main effects and no interactions in either country, all Fs (1, 114) < 2.7, ns in Britain, and all Fs (1, 131) < 2.2, ns in Romania. These results indicate that the participants were not more likely to feel prejudice against the poor or the culturally different out-groups.

5.3.4.4 In-group bias in resource allocation to in-group and out-group

Seven British and eight Romanian participants did not complete this scale, therefore their scores were replaced with means. The Cronbach's alpha was .81 in Britain (the mean inter-item correlation being .50), and .68 in Romania (the mean inter-item correlation being .31). Two-way ANOVA's with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different from in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on the level of in-group bias in the allocation of resources to in-group and out-group. In Britain there were no main effects and no interactions, all Fs (1, 114) < 0.90, ns, nor in Romania, all Fs (1, 131) < 1.10, ns. These results indicate that neither the targets' cultural status, nor their economic status led to more in-group bias in the allocation of resources to in-group and out-group.

5.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization

In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other variables, an index of dehumanization was computed for each participant. This represented the difference (or distance) in humanity between in-group and out-group, and was computed by subtracting the humanity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was computed separately for emotions (infrahumanization, or Δ Human emotions) and traits (ontologization, or Δ Human traits). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores for in-group and out-group. Similarly, two other composite variables were computed which represented the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. These were computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions (Δ Positive emotions) and traits (Δ Positive traits).

In both countries, infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was positively and significantly correlated with the differential attribution of positive emotions and traits to out-group and in-group. The fact that infrahumanization correlated positively and significantly with in-group identification only in Britain may suggest that only the British participants perceived their group as superior to the target

out-groups. Ontologization (dehumanization through traits) correlated positively and significantly with most of the dependent measures of prejudice in both countries, which suggests that ontologization is more clearly related to prejudice. Interestingly, ontologization and infrahumanization were non-significantly correlated, which further suggests that they are different phenomena.

Table 5.1 Correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice measures in Britain ($N = 118$)

	Δ Human emotions	Δ Human traits	Δ Positive emotions	Δ Positive traits
Material threat	-.04	.26**	.07	.24**
Delegitimization	-.06	.23*	-.10	.27**
Blatant prejudice	-.09	.23*	-.02	.30**
In-group bias in resource allocation	-.11	.006	-.10	.12
In-group identification	.19*	-.003	.17	.35**
SDO	-.06	.05	-.10	.06

$*p < .05; **p < .01$[6]

Table 5.2 Correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice measures in Romania ($N = 135$)

	Δ Human emotions	Δ Human traits	Δ Positive emotions	Δ Positive traits
Material threat	-.007	.04	.11	.15
Delegitimization	.19*	.23**	.30**	.34**
Blatant prejudice	.25**	.26**	.38**	.38**
In-group bias in resource allocation	.002	.30**	.12	.31**
In-group identification	.06	.04	.18*	.26**
SDO	-.08	.03	-.006	.06

$*p < .05; **p < .01$

To analyse the possible mediators of dehumanization, the composite variables representing infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits), respectively, were used as criterions in the regression analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores for in-group and out-group. Mediation analyses were carried out in

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[6] Throughout the present research, to enable consistency and easy interpretation, correlations significant at the .05 level will be marked with one asterisk, correlations significant at the .01 level will be marked with two asterisks, and correlations significant at the .001 level will be marked with 3 asterisks.

line with the suggestions by Baron and Kenny (1986), and Preacher and Hayes (2004). The regression analyses that examined the mediators of infrahumanization and ontologization, respectively, were informed by the results obtained in the ANOVA's on infrahumanization and ontologization, and on the other dependent variables such as perceived material threat and the positive emotions and traits attributed to in-group and out-group. The dependent variables selected as potential mediators of dehumanization were only those on which the cultural or the economic status of the out-group had significant main effects.

In Britain more material threat was perceived in the case of poor out-groups, and the poor out-groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones, therefore it was decided to analyse whether perceived material threat mediated the ontologization of poor out-groups. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' economic status on ontologization via perceived material threat was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 1.33$, ns, therefore material threat did not mediate the ontologization of the poor out-groups in Britain, see the table below:

Table 5.3 Material threat does not mediate the dehumanization of poor groups in Britain ($N = 118$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.12	.09	
Economic status	.27	.06	.38***
Step 2			
Constant	-.27	.11	
Economic status	.24	.06	.35***
Material threat	.06	.03	.20*

Note: $R^2 = .15$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .19$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$). *$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$

However, dehumanization mediated perceived material threat from poor groups, Aroian's $z = 2.05$, $p < .05$, see table 5.4 below:

Table 5.4 Dehumanization mediates perceived material threat from poor groups in Britain ($N = 118$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	2.31	.32	
Economic status	.40	.20	.18*
Step 2			
Constant	2.39	.32	
Economic status	.21	.22	.09
Δ Human traits	.73	.31	.23*

Note: $R^2 = .03$ for Step 1 ($p < .05$); $\Delta R^2 = .04$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$). *$p < .05$.

The fact that dehumanization (through traits) mediated perceived material threat reinforces the finding that dehumanization is not a reaction to threat, and secondly it suggests that perceived threat may be a consequence rather than an antecedent of prejudice.

In Britain, the poor out-groups were more dehumanized and were also attributed less positive traits than the rich ones. Therefore the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group (Δ Positive traits) was explored as a potential mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' economic status on ontologization via the attribution of positive traits to out-group was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 1.51$, ns, see the table below:

Table 5.5 Positive traits do not mediate the dehumanization of poor groups in Britain ($N = 118$)

	B	$SE\ B$	B
Step 1			
Constant	-.12	.10	
Economic status	.27	.06	.38***
Step 2			
Constant	-.02	.10	
Economic status	.23	.06	.33***
Δ Positive traits	.06	.03	.21*

Note: $R^2 = .15$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .04$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$). *$p < 05$; ***$p < .001$

However, dehumanzation (Δ Human traits) was found to mediate the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group, Aroian's $z = 2.07$, $p < .05$, see table 5.6 below. This result, together with the findings on the mediation of perceived material threat, suggests that dehumanization can be an antecedent of prejudice, rather than a consequence of it.

Table 5.6 Dehumanization mediates the attribution of positive traits to poor groups in Britain ($N = 118$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-1.63	.34	
Economic status	.57	.22	.24**
Step 2			
Constant	-1.54	.34	
Economic status	.36	.23	.15
Δ Human traits	.79	.33	.23*

Note: $R^2 = .06$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .05$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$). * $p < 05$; ** $p < .01$

In Romania, the culturally different out-groups were attributed less human traits but also less positive traits. The difference in the attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group (Δ Positive traits) was explored as a potential mediator of the dehumanization of culturally different groups. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the out-groups' cultural status on ontologization via the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group was significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 3.50$, $p < .001$, meaning that Δ Positive traits mediated ontologization, see the table below:

Table 5.7 Positive traits mediate the dehumanization of the culturally different groups in Romania ($N = 135$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	.09	.11	
Cultural status	.14	.07	.18*
Step 2			
Constant	.30	.09	
Cultural status	-.01	.06	-.01
Δ Positive traits	.20	.02	.64***

Note: $R^2 = .03$ for Step 1 ($p < .05$); $\Delta R^2 = .40$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). *$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$

However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, i.e. the possibility that the criterion may predict the mediator, another regression analysis was conducted with the targets' cultural status as the predictor, Δ Positive traits as the criterion, and dehumanization as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the out-groups' cultural status on Δ Positive traits via dehumanization (Δ Human traits) was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 1.94$, $p = .052$. It would thus appear that the culturally different groups were dehumanized because they were viewed in a negative light.

In Romania, the economic status of the target out-groups also had a main effect on ontologization and on the attribution of positive traits to out-groups. A regression analysis included the economic status as predictor, ontologization as the criterion, and Δ Positive Traits as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the out-groups' economic status on ontologization via the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group was significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 2.95, p < .01$.

Table 5.8 Positive traits mediating the dehumanization of the poor out-groups in Romania ($N = 135$)

	B	SE B	B
Step 1			
Constant	-.11	.10	
Economic status	.27	.06	.35***
Step 2			
Constant	.06	.08	
Economic status	.15	.05	.19**
Δ Positive traits	.18	.02	.59***

Note: $R^2 = .12$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .44$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, another regression analysis was conducted with the targets' economic status as the predictor, Δ Positive traits as the criterion, and ontologization as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of the out-groups' economic status on Δ Positive traits via ontologization was significantly greater than zero, Aroian's $z = 3.96, p < .001$, see table 5.9 below. Given this feedback, it cannot be safely concluded that Δ Positive traits mediated the ontologization of poor groups, but the results suggest that dehumanization can be an antecedent of prejudice.

Table 5.9 Dehumanization mediates the attribution of positive traits to poor out-groups in Romania ($N = 135$)

	B	SE B	B
Step 1			
Constant	-.92	.33	
Economic status	.66	.21	.27**
Step 2			
Constant	.70	.27	
Economic status	.13	.18	.05
Δ Human traits	1.97	.23	.62***

Note: $R^2 = .07$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .34$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

To sum up the findings on the mediating role of perceived threat, neither in Britain nor in Romania did perceived threat mediate dehumanization. Thus, the dehumanization of poor and of culturally different artificial out-groups is not a result of perceived threat. On the contrarty, the dehumanization of poor targets predicted perceived material threat against them, in Britain, as well as the attribution of less positive traits, in both countries, thus suggesting that dehumanization can be a precursor to prejudice.

5.4 Discussion

How has this vignette experiment contributed to the existing knowledge of dehumanization? I will examine here how this experiment has addressed the research hypotheses, discuss alternative interpretations for the results, examine this experiment's contribution to threat theories, briefly examine the cross-cultural results on the ideological measures, and conclude with the directions for the next study.

The premises of this study were the suggestions that culturally different ethnic groups can be 'abnormalized' (Verkuyten, 2001) and dehumanized (Pérez et al., 2001) by majority members, and the belief that a group's poor economic status can lead to it being attributed dehumanizing traits (Lott, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006). Secondly, studies on attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities have shown that perceived threat, be it symbolic or material, can predict negative prejudice against these groups (e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Stephan et al., 1999), thus opening the possibility that perceived threat could mediate dehumanization.

So what has this study shown? It has found that ethnic groups culturally different from the in-group can be more dehumanized than those culturally similar to the in-group. This finding was supported only by the Romanian data, but it nonetheless corroborates the research on the 'abnormalization' of immigrants and the dehumanization of culturally non-assimilated ethnic minorities. Also, this study has found that poverty can indeed predispose ethnic groups to being dehumanized, as in both Romania and Britain the poor groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones. Thus, both he research hypotheses were supported by this experiment. Concerning the

findings on the dehumanization of the culturally different groups, the results from the Romanian sample support the hypothesis according to which perceived dissimilarity between in-group and out-group at the level of values can lead to the dehumanization of the out-group (see Struch & Schwartz, 1989). However, given that the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group totally mediated the dehumanization of the culturally different out-groups in Romania, it could be argued that the dehumanization of the culturally different out-groups was not due to their cultural status *per se*, but to how positively they were viewed by the in-group. The fact that the culturally different targets were dehumanized only in Romania might be due to the fact that the target group was presented as an ethnic minority rather than as an immigrant group. As an ethnic minority living in the country for hundred of years, the target group may have been expected to have already culturally assimilated. Alternatively, the lack of dehumanization of the culturally different groups in Britain may indicate that the British participants were more tolerant of cultural diversity than their Romanian counterparts, or more aware of norms of prejudice suppression regarding cultural discrimination (see Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The fact that the British participants dehumanized all the out-groups while nonetheless attributing them more positive traits than to their in-group is also indicative of norms of social desirability. Thus, prejudice suppression may be more likely in postmaterialist than in materialist societies.

The finding that the poor groups were more dehumanized than the rich ones was also in line with the research hypotheses, and thus supports recent research which has found that the poor are dehumanized (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Given that the greater dehumanization (through traits) of the poor target groups was not mediated by but instead mediated perceived material threat, it could be argued that dehumanization was not a response to the threat perceived from the poor groups, but rather to their status as poor. It may be that representations of poverty (see Lott, 2002; Cozzarelli et al., 2001) and of the character of the poor, e.g. being lazy, can lead to poor people being viewed as less typically human. Their dehumanization can ultimately justify their moral and social exclusion, as for example in the case of the homeless and of the Gypsies. An alternative interpretation would be that poor people may be considered less 'typically human' and as violating norms of human behaviour, and thus the

dehumanization of the poor would function as an explanation for the poor's deviance from middle-class 'norms' (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001).

However, given that all the target groups were dehumanized (through traits), the present findings raise the question as to whether cultural differences and poverty are in fact moderators of dehumanization rather than predisposing factors. In other words, they may increase or decrease the strength of dehumanization but may not explain why it occurs. Arguably, there may be three alternative explanations for the overall dehumanization found in this experiment. Firstly, the results suggest that merely being an ethnic minority can make a group vulnerable to dehumanization because the status of being a minority can induce beliefs of deviance from the norm. As experimental research has shown, not only typicality beliefs, but also group size can affect judgements of normativity and explanations for 'deviance' (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Thus it could be argued that at least in certain circumstances minority groups may be dehumanized simply because their minority status implies deviance from human typicality. Secondly, dehumanization may be due to the use of artificial groups, which arguably elicited prejudice through their description as ethnic minorities. It may be that artificial groups are more likely to be dehumanized than real groups, a possibility which this research will consider in the next experiments (see chapter 7). Thirdly, instead of focusing on the lesser attribution of human typicality to the out-groups as 'the effect to be explained', one could alternatively analyse the greater overall attribution of more typically human traits to the in-group, and it could be argued that dehumanization (through traits) may function as a form of in-group favouritism.

But there are problems associated with this explanation, too. First, the greater attribution of human typicality to the in-group was not significantly correlated with in-group identification in either country (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above). Second, although more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group, more positive traits were attributed to the out-group in Britain and equally positive traits were attributed to in-group and out-group in Romania. Besides, the correlation between the human typicality and the positivity of the traits attributed to the out-groups was greater than the correlation between the same factors regarding the in-group (see section 5.3.3.2 above). Thirdly, the ontologization paradigm (dehumanization through

traits) does not stipulate that dehumanization is a form of in-group bias, whereas the infrahumanization paradigm (dehumanization through emotions) makes this claim. Indeed, the index of infrahumanization was positively and significantly (although not highly) correlated with in-group identification in Britain. In this sense, the present findings are more in line with the infrahumanization theory which postulates that groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-group and to deny it to the out-groups. Interestingly, this hypothesis was supported by the operationalization of dehumanization in terms of traits rather than emotions. On this point, the present experiment did not support the tenet of the infrahumanization paradigm according to which individual are motivated to attribute more human emotions to their in-group than to the out-groups.

In this experiment the scale of perceived symbolic threat did not achieve adequate internal reliability, therefore it was not possible to test whether perceived symbolic threat mediated the dehumanization of culturally different groups. However, the scale of perceived material threat was reliable in both national samples and further analyses were possible. Perceived material threat did not mediate the dehumanization of poor groups in Britain, somewhat contrary to the existing research on perceived threat which holds that perceived material threat is a predictor of prejudice in inter-group relations (e.g. Stephan et al., 2000). On the contrary, it was the dehumanization of the poor groups that mediated perceived material threat, thus indicating that dehumanization can be an antecedent of perceived threat and prejudice. Moreover, this result casts doubt on whether perceived material threat is indeed related to perceptions of competition for resources, or may in fact be a justification for prejudice against groups. The roles of perceived material and symbolic will be further explored in the next chapters.

Concerning the ideological measures of in-group identification and SDO (social dominance orientation), overall these were not correlated with the two measures of dehumanization, except for the index of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) which was positively, significantly but weakly correlated with in-group identification in the British sample. However, in-group identification was positively and significantly correlated with the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group in both Britain and Romania. These

results suggest that in-group identification may be more related to the positive-negative dimension of prejudice rather than to the human one. Also, they suggest that dehumanization may not necessarily be related to out-group derogation or downward group comparison, nor to the need to maintain group inequality.

The present results also suggest ideological asymmetry between the British and the Romanian participants. The Romanian participants expressed significantly higher levels of SDO than their British counterparts. Also, in-group identification and SDO were significantly and positively correlated in Britain, but negatively and non-significantly correlated in Romania. From the perspective of social dominance theory (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), the different valences in the correlations between in-group identification and SDO in the two countries are indicative of *anisotropic ideological asymmetry* between members of dominant and of subordinate groups. Although the British participants were not a dominant group relative to the Romanians, they may have perceived their in-group as having a relatively high status and therefore felt motivated to identify with it. Conversely, the Romanian participants may have perceived their group as a relatively low status one and consequently distanced themselves from it.

Furthermore, according to the infrahumanization theory, infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) should be related to in-group identification (e.g. Demoulin, et al., 2004b). In the present experiment, in-group identification was positively and significantly correlated with infrahumanization but only in the British sample, while in the Romanian sample the correlation was positive but non-significant. This suggests that only the British may have perceived their group as being superior to the out-groups, which ties in with the findings on the ideological asymmetry between Britain and Romania. Moreover, previous research has found that only the British participants engaged in the infrahumanization of out-groups (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Thus, while infrahumanization may be related to out-group derogation in both high-status and low-status groups (e.g. it correlated positively with the attribution of less positive emotions to out-groups), it may be linked to in-group favouritism only in the high-status groups.

To conclude, the present experiment contributes to the existing research on dehumanization by showing that perceived cultural differences between groups as well as perceptions poverty can lead to the dehumanization of ethnic minorities. However, given that all groups were dehumanized, the present experiment also raises the issues as to whether dehumanization can function as a form of in-group favouritism, and also whether cultural differences and poverty function as moderators of dehumanization. The rather mixed results on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits) raise the issue as to whether infrahumanization and ontologization are equivalent phenomena.

5.5 Progression to the next study

As the measure of perceived symbolic threat failed to achieve adequate internal reliability, I decided to reformulate the scale of symbolic threat in more threatening terms and to explore its potential mediating role in dehumanization in a follow-up experiment. Given that the culturally different groups invoked more dehumanization, I decided to include a scale that specifically measured perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group. Furthermore I explored endorsement of multicultural ideology as an antecedent to dehumanization, and the endorsement of particular acculturation strategies for the out-group as correlates of dehumanization. These will be described in the next chapter.

Chapter 6   Perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group:

A mediator of the dehumanization of artificial groups

Contents of Chapter 6

6.1.1 Introduction

In Experiment 1, through the use of artificial ethnic groups as targets, I showed that being culturally different from the majority or being poor can predispose an ethnic minority group to being dehumanized. I had hypothesised in Experiment 1 that one might explain dehumanization in terms of perceived threat from the out-group. However, I was not able to show this because the scale of perceived symbolic threat failed to reach adequate internal reliability, in both Britain and Romania. Furthermore, all target groups were dehumanized, and perceived material threat was not found to mediate dehumanization. These findings raised the issues as to whether perceived threat does indeed play a part in dehumanization, and whether simply being different and 'deviant' from the norm may be an antecedent to dehumanization. Therefore, I deemed necessary to replicate Experiment 1 in order to include a measure of perceived differences between in-group and out-group, and to construct a more reliable scale of perceived symbolic threat. Last but not least, I explored whether the dehumanized ethnic targets are more likely to be excluded and segregated by means of the acculturation strategies that the majority would endorse in their case.

Values, alongside stereotypes and emotions, have been theorized to be a determinant of inter-group attitudes (see Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). Prejudice against groups at the level of norms, beliefs and values can also be viewed as a form of subtle prejudice, also termed *symbolic racism* (see Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003; McConahay & Hough, 1976), which has been argued to emerge due to the changing norms of political correctness (see Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The suggestion that prejudice can be caused by perceived differences between in-group and out-group at the level of values was also put forward by the *belief congruence theory* (Rokeach, 1960). Moreover, perceived differences between in-group and out-group in terms of norms and beliefs has been assumed to lead to the dehumanization of the out-group (Struch & Schwartz, 1989) because the humanity of a group has been assumed to be reflected in the basic values that its members endorse, where basic values encapsulate the goals that out-group members strive to achieve and the behaviours that they consider desirable (see Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).

However, it is not clear whether the dehumanization of a group on the basis of its different values rests on category norms and typicality judgements, or whether a group's values can indeed reflect how 'human' that group is. It is possible that a group's values, norms and beliefs may be indicative of how 'civilized' a group is, although it could be argued that what is considered 'civilized' may vary as a function of context, culture, and ad-hoc goals (see Larrain, 1994). As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, *primitive* has been considered the polar opposite of a variety of concepts, including *Western, civilized, advanced, prosperous, modern* (Berndt, 1968) and it may well be that a dehumanized group's values, beliefs and norms are not perceived as 'civilized', 'advanced' and 'modern' as those of the in-group. Nevertheless, it may be argued that constructing the dehumanized group's values as uncivilized and as less human than those of the in-group may be as much a consequence as an antecedent of dehumanization.

In the present experiment I also explored the link between the perceived entitativity of the out-group and its dehumanization. Essentialist beliefs about social categories have been found to function as explanations and rationalizations of the existing social order (see Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Keller, 2005). Theories of psychological essentialism (e.g. Campbell, 1958; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; 2002) and of entitativity (e.g. Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997) have highlighted that "the degree of entitativity of social groups is likely to be a key determinant of social attribution" (Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2001: 106), and in the present experiment social attribution is envisaged as the attribution of typical humanness to the target out-groups. At the core of essentialistic beliefs is the assumption that social categories such as ethnic groups have an essence, and this assumption is also found in the ontologization theory, which holds that certain ethnic minorities such as the Gypsies have a different essence and hence a different ontology from that of the majority group (Pérez et al., 2001). Therefore, I expected that essentialist beliefs and dehumanization would be correlated.

In this experiment I also introduced measures of the acculturation strategies that host society members might prefer for the target groups. This was done in order to measure whether the targets' cultural and economic status, and ultimately their dehumanization, might influence the degree to which these groups would be socially

excluded. The measures of integrationism, assimilationism, segregationism, exclusionism and individualism were constructed largely in line with theories of acculturation (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995), and specifically in line with the *interactive acculturation model[1]* (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). I also investigated whether preferences for acculturation orientations would vary according to the cultural and economic status of the target groups (see Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). I hypothesised that perceptions of out-group entitativity might influence the endorsement of particular acculturation strategies, as essentialist beliefs about ethnic minorities have been found to relate to lower endorsement of multiculturalism among majority members (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004).

6.1.2 Research hypotheses

In the present experiment I examined the roles of perceived cultural differences, perceived material and symbolic threats, and perceived entitativity of the target out-groups in dehumanization. I formulated the following specific hypotheses:

1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions)

2. the culturally different target groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar ones

3. the poor target groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the rich ones

4. exclusionary acculturation strategies should be more preferred in the case of the culturally different targets and in the case of the poor targets

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[1] According to this model, a preference for *integrationism* indicates an acceptance of the immigrant out-groups' culture, while a preference for *assimilationism* indicates the desire that the out-groups should abandon their culture in favour of the host society's culture. *Segregationism* implies that out-groups are allowed keep their culture as long as they do not mix with host society members, while a preference for *exclusionism* indicates outright intolerance for out-groups, regardless of whether they keep their own culture or adopt the host society's culture. Endorsement of *individualism* indicates that host society members do not perceive themselves or out-group members as members of particular ethnic groups, but as individuals, therefore individualists should prefer colour-blind rather than culture-specific ideologies.

6.2 Method

6.2.1 Design

The study had a 2 (culturally similar vs. culturally different ethnic minority) x 2 (rich vs. poor ethnic minority) factorial design within each national sample, with both factors as between-participants factors. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. In the British sample, the cell sizes varied from 20 to 23, while in the Romanian one, from 32 to 40.

6.2.2 Participants and procedure

One hundred and forty-eight, 110 females and 38 males, Romanian nationals, *M* age = 21, age range = 19 to 37, participated in the study. Eighty-four, 38 females and 46 males, British nationals, *M* age = 22, age range = 18 to 44, also took part in the study. The participants were recruited on university campus and were told they were taking part in a study exploring the experience of cultural diversity in their country. The participants were debriefed after completing the questionnaire.

6.2.3 Materials

The same vignettes and targets groups as in Experiment 1 were employed in the present experiment (see Chapter 5). However, instead of the targets' economic status being described in words, their economic status was stated in numbers purportedly representing the targets' average household income, per annum in Britain, and per month in Romania (see *Appendix IV a* for the British version of the questionnaire, and *Appendix IV b* for the Romanian version). In the 'rich out-group' condition, the targets' income was higher than the national average, while in the 'poor out-group' condition, the targets' income was lower than the national average, see the extract below. The italicized text in brackets represents the targets' economic status in the 'poor' condition:

National Statistics show that the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a. [*£17,000 p.a.*], compared to the national average household income of £23,200 p.a., thus suggesting that the Moravians are not putting a strain on the social welfare system [*thus suggesting that the Moravians are putting a strain on the social welfare system*].

6.2.3.1 Prejudice measures: manipulation checks, perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group, material and symbolic threat, dehumanization, perceived out-group entitativity, blatant prejudice, and preferred acculturation strategy for the out-group

6.2.3.1.1 Manipulation checks

2 manipulation check items, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), assessed the perceived similarity of the target out-group to the in-group: *how similar you think the Moravians [Ceangǎi] are to the your national group [Romanians]?*, and the perceived burden they posed on the system of social benefits: *do you think that the Moravians [Ceangǎi] have a negative impact on the national economy?*

6.2.3.1.2 Perceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group

Five 7-point Likert scale items were developed to assess the perceived cultural differences between in-group and target out-group, e.g. *The Ceangǎi's way of thinking is not compatible with that of the Romanians.* This scale drew on studies suggesting that the greater the discrepancy in basic values between in-group and out-group, the less human the out-group is likely to be perceived (e.g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Items 2 and 3 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated high perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group.

6.2.3.1.3 Material and symbolic threat

The same scale for perceived material threat as in Experiment 1 was used in this experiment (see Chapter 5). Items 2 and 5 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated high levels of perceived material threat. As for symbolic threat, for this experiment five new items were constructed in order to measure perceived symbolic threat from the target out-group. Instead of simply measuring whether the out-group's values and beliefs were *different* from those of the in-group, it measured whether the out-group's values and beliefs *posed a threat* to the Romanian / British society, e.g. *the Ceangǎi's cultural beliefs represent a danger for Romanian society.* Items 2 and 4 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated high levels of perceived symbolic threat.

6.2.3.1.4 Dehumanization

Dehumanization was measured the same as in Experiment 1. However, unlike Experiment 1 where the emotions and traits were listed separately, in the present experiment the emotions and the traits were mixed in the same list, and the participants were asked to choose 12 features that they thought best described the target (out-group, and in-group, respectively). This change was made in order to make the infrahumanization process subtler[2]. At the same time, this rearrangement allowed the participants to choose whether they represented the target groups (out-group and in-group, respectively) in terms of emotions or traits, and consequently whether they found it easier to dehumanize in terms of traits rather than emotions, or vice-versa.

6.2.3.1.5 Perceived out-group entitativity

For this experiment a scale of perceived entitativity of the out-group was constructed, which meant to test the hypothesis that groups which are dehumanized are also perceived as being more entitative. Five 7-point Likert scale items assessed whether the out-group was essentialized, and were adapted from Verkuyten and Brug (2004), and Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000), e.g. *the Ceangăi are very similar to one another in they way they think and behave.* Items and 2 and 5 were reverse-coded and high scores indicated high perceived out-group entitativity.

6.2.3.1.6 Blatant prejudice

The same scale of blatant prejudiced as the one used in Experiment 1 was included in the second experiment. Items 2 and 5 were reversed, and high scores indicated the desire for social distance from the target out-group.

6.2.3.1.7 Preferred acculturation strategy for the out-group

Ten 7-point Likert scale items measured the participants preferred acculturation strategy for the out-group, in line with theories of acculturation (Berry, 2001; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001) and with the *interactive acculturation model* (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). The orientations of assimilationism, integrationism, segregationism, exclusionism and individualism were measured for

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[2] The emotions and the traits were mixed following suggestions from Professor J-P. Leyens.

two domains each: cultural and economic. One item measuring integrationism at the cultural level was: *I think that the Ceangăi should maintain their culture of origin but at the same time adopt Romanian culture.* One item measuring integrationism at the economic level was: *When a job is available, employers should be as likely to hire a Moravian as a British candidate, and this regardless of the cultural habits of the Moravians.* High scores indicated preference for that particular acculturation strategy.

6.2.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification, SDO, and endorsement of multicultural ideology (EMI)

The same scales for in-group identification and SDO as those used in Experiment 1 were employed in the second experiment. The items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). High scores indicated a high level of in-group identification and of social dominance orientation, respectively.

Ten 7-point Likert scale items adapted from Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver's (2003) scale of multiculturalism assessed the participants' endorsement of multicultural ideology (henceforth, EMI), e.g. *British people should recognise that British society is made up of different cultural groups.* Items 3, 5, 6, 7, and 10 were reverse-coded, with high scores indicating endorsement of multiculturalism and tolerance of cultural diversity.

6.3 Results

When analysing the data I explored: (1) whether the experimental manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the culturally different targets and the poor targets were more dehumanized than the culturally similar and the rich targets, respectively; (4) whether the prejudice measures varied as a function of the experimental manipulations; (4) whether perceived threat mediated dehumanization; (5) and whether dehumanization could predict the endorsement of acculturation strategies preferred for the out-group. The analyses will be reported in turn in the following sections.

6.3.1 Manipulations checks: perceived group similarity and perceived pressure on the economy

In Romania, the two manipulation checks items, perceived similarity to the in-group, and perceived pressure put by out-group on the economy, were negatively and non-significantly correlated, r (1, 146) = -.09, ns. A two-way ANOVA with the out-groups' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables, was conducted on each of the two manipulations checks items. The out-groups described as culturally similar were judged as more similar to the in-group than the out-groups described as culturally different, Ms = 5.08 vs. 3.56, F (1, 143) = 35.61, $p < .001$, η^2 = .20. The poor target groups were perceived as putting more pressure on the economy than the rich ones, Ms = 3.03 vs. 2.32, F (1, 143) = 7.12, $p < .01$, η^2 = .05.

In Britain, the two manipulation checks items were negatively and non-significantly correlated, r (1, 82) = -.21, ns. The out-groups described as culturally similar were judged as more similar to the in-group than the out-groups described as culturally different, Ms = 5.22 vs. 3.25, F (1, 80) = 43.54, $p < .001$, η^2 = .35. However, the rich out-groups were also perceived as more similar to the in-group than the poor ones, Ms = 4.76 vs. 3.71, F (1, 80) = 12.42, $p < .01$, η^2 = .13. Also, the poor groups were perceived as putting more pressure on the economy than rich groups, Ms = 3.23 vs. 1.90, F (1, 79) = 18.75, $p < .001$, η^2 = .19. To sum up, the manipulation checks indicate that the experimental manipulations were successful in both countries.

6.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification, SDO, and EMI

The measure of in-group identification was reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha being .76 in Romania and .88 in Britain. A two-way ANOVAs, with the out-groups' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables, were conducted on in-group identification. In Britain, there were no main effects of the targets' economic and cultural status on in-group identification, all Fs < 2, ns. However, in Romania there was an interaction between the cultural and the economic statuses of the out-groups which had a significant effect on in-group identification, F (1, 144) = 4.30, $p < .05$, η^2

= .03. This meant that when the out-group was culturally different, in-group identification was higher when the out-group was poor than when it was rich, $Ms =$ 5.83 vs. 5.27, t (1, 77) = 2.31, p = .024 (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025), whereas when the out-group was culturally similar, equal in-group identification was expressed in the rich and poor conditions, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.24, t (1, 67) = 0.58, ns. This result would suggest that the Romanian participants were more motivated to identify with their in-group when, by comparison to the out-group, they perceived their in-group to be culturally superior and more successful. There were no other main effects for the in-group identification, both Fs < 2.20, ns. Thus, it would appear that in Romania in-group identification may be a covariate of the dependent measures of prejudice, and it should be included in the analyses exploring the effects of the experimental manipulations (e.g. conducting ANCOVAs instead of ANOVAs).

The SDO measure was reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha being .84 in Romania and .90 in Britain. Given that SDO measure had the same content in both countries, a three-way ANOVA with nationality (British vs. Romanian), the targets' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on SDO. There were no main effects of the targets' cultural and economic statuses on the levels of SDO in either country, all Fs < 1.50, ns. There was only a main effect of nationality, F (1, 224) = 17.90, p < .001, η^2 = .07, indicating that the Romanians expressed higher levels of SDO than did the British, Ms = 2.83 vs. 2.32 (similarly to the findings from Experiment 1).

As for the endorsement of multicultural ideology (EMI), this measure was reliable in both countries, Cronbach's alpha being .71 in Romania and .80 in Britain. A three-way ANOVA with nationality (British vs. Romanian), the targets' cultural similarity to in-group (similar vs. different) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as independent variables was conducted on EMI. There were no significant main effects of the targets' cultural or economic status on EMI, all Fs < 1, ns. The British and the Romanians endorsed multiculturalism rather equally, Ms = 4.86 vs. 4.75, F (1, 224) = 0.88, ns. However, the Romanians were more in favour of multiculturalism when the target was rich than when it was poor, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.62, F (1, 224) = 7.05, p < .01, η^2 = .03. These results would suggest that EMI may not be an independent measure of prejudice as it seems to be contingent upon the economic status of the target out-

groups. However, more studies are needed to determine whether this is a chance result, or whether it is a phenomenon specific to relatively poor countries such as Romania. The implications of this result is that in Romania EMI, just like in-group identification, may be a covariate of the prejudice measures, which should be taken into account in those analyses exploring the effects of the experimental manipulations. Running ANCOVAs instead of ANOVAs can increase the experimental control by taking into account the confounding variables, thus producing a better measure of the effect of the experimental manipulation (see Field, 2005).

Most of the individual factors in prejudice were significantly inter-correlated. Only in Britain was in-group identification positively and significantly correlated with SDO, r (1, 82) = .23, p < .05, and with EMI, r (1, 82) = -.39, p < .001, the correlations being non-significant in Romania, r (1, 146) = -.11 and .03, ns, respectively. However, SDO was negatively and significantly correlated with EMI in both countries, r (1, 146) = -.38, p < .01, in Romania, and r (1, 82) = -.50, p < .001, in Britain. Looking at the correlations by experimental condition, in Romania in-group identification correlated negatively and significantly with SDO when the target out-groups were culturally similar to the in-group, r (1, 67) = -.29, p < .05, but non-significant when the out-groups were culturally different from the in-group, r (1, 77) = .001, ns. In Britain, in-group identification correlated negatively and significantly with EMI when the out-groups were culturally different, r (1, 82) = -.53, p < .001, but non-significantly when the out-groups were culturally similar, r (1, 82) = -.27, ns.

6.3.3 Attributions of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group

Similarly to Experiment 1 (see Chapter 5), for each participant an average 'humanness' score was calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the out-group and in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion / trait selected by the participant for the respective group (in-group or out-group) with its humanness weighting (see Chapter 4), adding them up and dividing them by the number of the emotions / traits attributed to the target (in-group or out-group). The same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to in-group and out-groups.

In each country mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the attribution of typically human emotions and typically human traits. The between-participants factors were the target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group vs. out-group) was the within-participants factor. The dependent variables were the typically human emotions, and respectively traits, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted separately for the attribution of positivity. In the analyses of dehumanization in Romania, in-group identification and endorsement of multicultural ideology, which were found to vary as a function of the experimental manipulations, were not included as covariates because neither of these measures correlated simultaneously with the humanness (be it in emotions or traits) attributed to the out-group or to the in-group.

As to whether the participants were more likely to choose emotions rather than traits, or vice-versa, to represent the target group (out-group and in-group, respectively), see the table below for a summary of the mean emotions and traits chosen per target. Given that there were 20 traits but only 12 emotions to chose from for each target, the percentages of emotions and respectively traits were calculated that the means represented, e.g. out of 12 emotions, the percentage of emotions chosen for the out-group on average was 27% in Romania. As it can be seen in Table 6.1 below, the participants were more likely to choose traits rather than emotions.

Table 6.1 Means and percentages of emotions and traits ascribed to the out-group and in-group, respectively in Romania (N = 148) and Britain (N =84)

	Romania		Britain	
	Mean	Percentage	Mean	Percentage
Out-group emotions	3.28	27%	3.57	30%
In-group emotions	2.92	24%	3.47	29%
Out-group traits	8.82	44%	7.60	38%
In-group traits	9.20	46%	8.14	40%

6.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions

In Romania, although the total number of emotions chosen for the out-group and the total number of emotions chosen for the in-group were normally distributed, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 1 to 10, and to the in-

group, from 1 to 7. Eight participants ascribed only 1 emotion for the out-group, and seventeen participants, only 1 emotion for the in-group. It is possible that some participants chose few emotions because the emotions were mixed with the traits, and the participants may not have focused on the emotions. Those participants who ascribed only 1 emotion per target, be it out-group or in-group, had their scores replaced by means.

The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.29, F (1, 144) = 11.41, p = .001, η^2 = .07, thus supporting the infrahumanization hypothesis. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 144) = 7.39, p < .01, η^2 = .05, as equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and out-group in the 'rich out-group' condition, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.36, t (1, 75) = 0.58, ns, whereas more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group in the 'poor out-group' condition, Ms = 5.40 vs. 5.21, t (1, 71) = 3.92, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level = .025). In other words, only the poor out-groups were infrahumanized, see Fig. 6.1 below. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.50, ns.

Fig. 6.1 Attribution of typically human emotions
to rich and poor groups in Romania

As for the positive emotions in Romania, again the scores of those participants who had only ascribed one emotion per target were replaced by means. A mixed-design ANOVA, where the assumption of sphericity was met, revealed that overall equally positive emotions were attributed to in-group and out-group, Ms = 5.11 vs.

5.11, F (1, 144) = 0.005, ns. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 144) = 6.27, p < .05, η^2 = .04, indicating that more positive emotions were attributed to the culturally similar than to the culturally different out-groups, Ms = 5.30 vs. 4.94, t (1, 146) = 2.53, p < .025 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.50, ns. Thus, in Romania the targets' economic status played a part in their dehumanization, while their cultural status influenced the attribution of positive emotions. These results would suggest that dehumanization was not influenced by the positive valence of the emotions.

In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 1 to 6, and for in-group, from 1 to 7. Eight participants ascribed only 1 emotion for the out-group, and four participants, only 1 emotion for the in-group. Those participants who ascribed only 1 emotion per target, be it out-group or in-group, had their scores replaced by means. In the mixed-design ANOVA on the attribution of typically human emotions the assumption of sphericity was met. Overall more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.35, F (1, 80) = 4.66, p < .05, η^2 = .06, thus supporting the infrahumanization hypothesis. The targets' cultural status moderate the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 80) = 5.30, p < .05, η^2 = .06, as equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and out-groups in the 'culturally similar' condition, Ms = 5.39 vs. 5.38, but more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group in the 'culturally different' condition, Ms = 5.40 vs. 5.32, t (1, 39) = 2.76, p = .009 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.10, ns. Thus, in Britain only the culturally different targets seemed to be dehumanized, see Fig. 6.2 below.

Fig. 6.2 Attribution of typically human emotions to culturally similar
and culturally different groups in Britain

As for the attribution of positive emotions in Britain, again the scores of those participants who had only ascribed one emotion per target were replaced by means. A mixed-design ANOVA, where the assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that overall equally positive emotions were attributed to the out-group and the in-group, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.08, F (1, 80) = 3.89, ns. The targets' economic status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 80) = 5.69, p < .02, η^2 = .07. This meant that equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group and poor targets, Ms = 5.21 vs. 5.17, t (1, 40) = 0.29, ns, but more positive emotions were attributed to the rich targets than to the in-group, Ms = 5.45 vs. 4.94, t (1, 42) = 3.14, p = .003, (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). Furthermore, the between-participants effects indicated that more positive emotions were attributed to the culturally similar targets than to the culturally different ones, Ms = 5.60 vs. 5.00, F (1, 82) = 15.40, p < .001, η^2 = .16.

Thus, contrary to Romania, in Britain the targets' cultural status played a role in their infrahumanization, while both their economic and cultural status influenced the attribution of positive emotions. To sum up, the results on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) in the present experiment generally support the infrahumanization hypothesis as in both countries more human emotions were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-group. However, in Romania only the poor out-groups were infrahumanized, whereas in Britain only the culturally different out-groups were infrahumanized. These results suggest that infrahumanization may not be an expression of in-group bias but rather of out-group derogation.

6.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits

In Romania, the total number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 5 to 15, and to the in-group, from 6 to 13. The assumption of sphericity was met, and the mixed-design ANOVA indicated that overall more human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 4.97$ vs. 4.74, $F(1, 144) = 74.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .34$. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of traits, $F(1, 144) = 13.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$, as more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group when the out-group was culturally different than when it was similar, $Ms = 5.00$ vs. 4.93, $t(1, 146) = 2.28$, $p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). At the same time, more typically human traits were attributed to the culturally similar than to the culturally different targets, $Ms = 4.82$ vs. 4.67, $t(1, 146) = 3.22$, $p < .01$. Thus, while all out-groups were ontologized, the culturally different ones were even more so, see Fig. 6.3 below. There were no other main effects or interactions, all $Fs < 3.5$, ns.

Fig. 6.3 Attribution of typically human traits to out-groups in Romania

As for the positive traits in Romania, a mixed-design ANOVA, where the assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that relatively equally positive traits were attributed to the out-group and the in-group, $Ms = 5.07$ vs. 4.97, $F(1, 144) = 1.43$, ns. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive traits, $F(1, 144) = 6.96$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .05$, as equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the culturally different out-group, $Ms = 4.97$ vs. 4.84, $t(1, 78) = 0.99$, ns, but less positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the culturally similar out-group, $Ms = 4.95$ vs. 5.31, $t(1, 68) = 2.99$, $p = .004$ (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance $= .025$). There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all $Fs < 3.50$, ns.

As for dehumanization in Britain, the assumption of sphericity was met, and overall more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 4.75$ vs. 4.58, $F(1, 80) = 27.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .26$. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, $F(1, 80) = 4.86$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .06$, indicating that equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and the culturally similar out-groups, $Ms = 4.73$ vs. 4.63, $t(1, 43) = 2.12$, $p = .04$, whereas more human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the culturally different out-group, $Ms = 4.77$ vs. 4.53, $t(1, 39) = 5.07$, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025). Thus, only the culturally different out-groups were ontologized in Britain, see Fig. 6.4a below. The targets' economic status also influenced the attribution of traits, $F(1, 80) = 4.31$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$, as equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and the rich out-groups, $Ms = 4.73$ vs. 4.63, $t(1, 42) = 2.09$, $p = .04$, whereas more typically human traits were ascribed to the in-group than to the poor out-group, $Ms = 4.77$ vs. 4.53, $t(1, 40) = 5.10$, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level = .025). In other words, only the poor out-groups were ontologized, see Fig. 6.4b below.

Fig. 6.4a Attribution of typically human traits to culturally similar and culturally different groups in Britain

Fig. 6.4b Attribution of typically human traits to rich and poor groups in Britain

As for positive traits in Britain, a mixed-design ANOVA where the assumption of sphericity was met, indicated that overall more positive traits were attributed to the out-group than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.08$ vs. 4.38, $F(1, 80) = 56.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .41$. The targets' cultural status moderated the attribution of positive traits, $F(1, 80) = 8.39$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .10$, as more positive traits were attributed to the culturally similar than the culturally different out-groups, $Ms = 5.45$ vs. 4.72, $t(1, 82)$

$= 5.49, p < .001$, whereas equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two experimental conditions, $Ms = 4.46$ vs. 4.29, $t (1, 82) = 0.94$, ns (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level $= .025$). The targets' economic status also moderated the attribution of positive traits, $F (1, 80) = 18.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$, as more positive traits were attributed to the rich than to the poor out-groups, $Ms = 5.31$ vs. 4.89, $t (1, 82) = 2.71$, $p = .008$ (Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance $= .025$), whereas equal positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, $Ms = 4.19$ vs. 4.58, $t (1, 82) = 2.16$, $p = .034$. Thus, in Britain, the groups which were particular targets of ontologization were also attributed less positive traits.

To sum up the present results on ontologization, this experiment found that while more human traits were generally attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, the culturally different target out-groups were a particular target of ontologization in both Romania and Britain, a finding which is in line with the hypothesis of ontologization. At the same time, the poor out-groups were a target of ontologization, but only in Britain. The present results tie in with the results from Experiment 1, which had found that the culturally different groups as well as the poor ones were a particular target of ontologization.

6.3.4 Prejudice measures: material and symbolic threat, blatant prejudice, and preference of acculturation strategies for the target out-group

Most of the dependent measures had reliable scales, apart from the perceived out-group entitativity, which had very low reliability in both countries and was therefore excluded from further analyses, see the table below for a summary:

Table 6.2 Summary of the internal reliabilities and the mean inter-item correlations of the scales

	Romania ($N = 148$)		Britain ($N = 84$)	
	Cronbach's alpha	Mean inter-item correlation	Cronbach's alpha	Mean inter-item correlation
Cultural differences	.64	.27	.85	.53
Material threat	.65 (3 items)	.38	.66 (4 items)	.33
Symbolic threat	.65	.28	.74	.39
Blatant prejudice	.67	.30	.78	.42
Out-group entitativity	.51	.21	.41	.16

In Romania, ANCOVAs (and where appropriate, MANCOVAs) were conducted out on the dependent variables, with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different) and the targets' economic status (rich vs. poor) as the independent factors, and with Romanian in-group identification and EMI (endorsement of multicultural ideology) as covariates. In-group identification and EMI were not correlated with each other, thus they did not decrease the power of the M / ANCOVA tests (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, to be included as covariates, in-group identification and EMI needed to be correlated with the respective dependent variables (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It was found that in-group identification correlated with no measures of prejudice, whereas EMI correlated with all of them. Therefore only EMI was included as a covariate in the analyses of prejudice measures in Romania. In Britain, two-way ANOVAs were carried out on the dependent variables, with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different) and the targets' economic status (rich vs. poor) as the independent factors. In Britain, in-group identification, SDO and EMI were not included as covariates because these three variables had not been influenced by the experimental manipulations.

6.3.4.1 Perceived cultural differences between out-group and in-group

In Romania, an ANCOVA was conducted with the targets' cultural status (similar vs. different) and the targets' economic status (rich vs. poor) as the independent factors, EMI as covariate, and perceived cultural difference between out-group and in-group as the dependent variable. EMI did not have a significant main effect, F (1, 143) = 3.82, ns. The culturally different targets were judged as more culturally different from the in-group than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 4.03 vs. 3.19, F (1, 143) = 26.38, p < .001, η^2 = .17. There was no main effect of the targets' economic status, and no significant interaction between the factors, both Fs < 1.

In Britain, a two-way ANOVA indicated that the culturally different targets were judged as more different from the in-group than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 3.99 vs. 2.49, F (1, 80) = 49.87, p < .001, η^2 = .38. Also, the poor groups were judged as more different from the in-group than the rich ones, Ms = 3.47 vs. 3.00, F (1, 80) = 4.86, p < .05, η^2 = .06. There was no significant interaction between the targets' cultural and the economic status, F < 1. Thus, while in both countries the culturally

different groups were perceived as more different from the in-group than the culturally similar ones, in Britain the poor groups were also perceived as more different than the rich ones.

6.3.4.2 Perceived material and symbolic threat

In Romania, the scale of perceived material threat had only three items as two items were excluded in order to improve the reliability of the scale. An ANCOVA with EMI as covariate indicated only a main significant effect of EMI on perceived material threat, $F(1, 143) = 21.13, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$. There were no main effects, nor any significant interactions, all $Fs < 1$. The parameter estimates indicated that for every 1 unit increase in EMI there should be 0.57 units of decrease in perceived material threat.

As for perceived symbolic threat in Romania, the ANCOVA indicated a main effect of EMI, $F(1, 143) = 14.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$, meaning that for every 1 unit of increase in EMI there would be a 0.40 units of decrease in perceived symbolic threat. There was also a main effect of the targets' cultural status after the effect of EMI was controlled for, $F(1, 143) = 12.79, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$, meaning that the culturally different targets invoked more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones, $Ms = 3.07$ vs. 2.44. There were no other significant effects or interactions, both $Fs < 1.50$. To test the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, i.e. the assumption that the overall relationship between the covariate and the DV is true for all groups of participants, the ANCOVA was rerun with a customized model, including EMI as a covariate and the targets' cultural status as the fixed factor. The analysis indicated a significant main effect of EMI, $F(1, 144) = 16.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$, but no longer a main effect of the targets' cultural status, $F(1, 144) = 0.48$, ns. Importantly, the analysis indicated no significant interaction between EMI and the targets' cultural status, $F(1, 144) = .01$, ns, which means that the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was not broken. Thus, it was concluded that only the endorsement of multicultural ideology predicted perceived symbolic threat.

In Britain, one item was excluded from the perceived material threat scale in order to improve its reliability. The culturally different groups invoked more material threat than the culturally similar ones, $Ms = 3.02$ vs. 2.64, $F(1, 80) = 4.24, p < .05, \eta^2$

= .05. Also, the poor groups invoked more material threat than the rich ones, Ms = 3.02 vs. 2.65, F (1, 80) = 4.00, $p < .05$, η^2 = .05. There was no significant interaction between the independent factors, $F < 1$. As for symbolic threat, the culturally different targets invoked more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones, Ms = 2.69 vs. 2.11, F (1, 80) = 8.56, $p < .01$, η^2 = .10. There were no other significant effects or interactions, both Fs < 2.

6.3.4.3 Blatant prejudice

In Romania, an ANCOVA with EMI as covariate revealed no significant main effects of the targets' cultural and economic status, both Fs < 1.50, and only a main effect of EMI, F (1, 143) = 15.83, $p < .001$, η^2 = .10. The parameter estimates indicated that for every 1 unit increase in EMI, there would be 0.46 units of decrease in blatant prejudice. In Britain the poor target groups invoked more prejudice than the rich ones, Ms = 2.56 vs. 2.12, F (1, 79) = 6.10, $p < .05$, η^2 = .07. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, both Fs < 4, ns.

Overall, there were positive and significant correlations between the dependent measures of prejudice and the three individual factors in prejudice, see Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below. Perceived symbolic and material threat were positively and significantly correlated at r (1, 82) = .62, $p < .001$ in Britain, but at r (1, 146) = .39, $p < .001$, in Romania. The difference between the correlations coefficients in the two countries was significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.26, $p < .05$.

Table 6.3 Correlations between the prejudice and ideological measures in Romania (N = 148)

	Cultural differences	Material threat	Symbolic threat	Blatant prejudice
Cultural difference	-	-	-	-
Material threat	.38***	-	-	-
Symbolic threat	.35***	.39***	-	-
Blatant prejudice	.22**	.40***	.51***	-
In-group identification	.09	.10	.13	.02
SDO	.13	.21*	.03	.22**
EMI	-.17*	-.36***	-.32***	-.32***

$*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001$

Table 6.4 Correlations between the prejudice and ideological measures in Britain (N = 84)

	Cultural differences	Material threat	Symbolic threat	Blatant prejudice
Cultural difference	-	-	-	-
Material threat	.45***	-	-	-
Symbolic threat	.59***	.62***	-	-
Blatant prejudice	.36**	.48***	.51***	-
In-group identification	-.16	.01	.17	.10
SDO	.12	.38***	.44***	.42***
EMI	-.04	-.26*	-.26*	.22

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

6.3.4.4 Preferred acculturation strategy for the out-group

The two items making up each acculturation strategy (cultural and economic domains) were averaged to create a composite variable. In Romania, a two-way MANCOVA was carried out on the five acculturation strategies. The between-participants independent variables were the targets' culture (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor), with in-group identification and EMI as covariates. In-group identification was included in the analysis because it correlated positively with segregationism. The analysis indicated a main effect of in-group identification on segregationism, F (1, 142) = 5.57, p < .05, η^2 = .04, meaning that for every 1 unit increase in in-group identification there should be a 0.24 units increase in preference for segregationism. There was also a main effect of EMI on all acculturation strategies except integrationism. Concerning assimilationism, F (1, 142) = 45.40, p < .001, η^2 = .24, the effect of EMI meant that for every 1 unit increase in EMI, there should be a 0.80 units decrease in preference for assimilationism. In the case of segregationism, F (1, 142) = 23.70, p < .001, η^2 = .14, for every 1 unit increase of EMI it is expected a 0.62 decrease in segregationism. Regarding exclusionism, F (1, 142) = 14.60, p < .001, η^2 = .09, for every 1 unit increase in EMI one should expect a 0.41 units decrease in exclusionism. As for individualism, F (1, 142) = 6.77, p < .05, η^2 = .05, for every 1 unit increase in EMI there should be 0.30 units increase in preference for individualism.

After the effects of in-group identification and EMI were partialled out in Romania, individualism was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for the out-group when the out-group was culturally similar to the in-group than when it was

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different, Ms = 6.37 vs. 5.91, F (1, 142) = 5.63, $p < .05$, η^2 = .04. There were no other main effects of the targets' cultural status on the other four acculturation strategies, all Fs < 3.50, ns. Integrationism was more preferred when the out-group was poor than when it was rich, Ms = 6.02 vs. 5.68, F (1, 142) = 4.36, $p < .05$, η^2 = .03, and so was assimilationism, Ms = 3.20 vs. 2.56, F (1, 142) = 4.86, $p < .05$, η^2 = .03. There were no main effects of the targets' economic status on the other acculturation strategies, all Fs < 1, ns.

To test the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes, the MANCOVA was rerun with a customized model, including in-group identification and EMI as covariates and the targets' cultural and economic statuses as fixed factors. There was a main effect of in-group identification on segregationism, and a main effect of EMI on all acculturation strategies except integrationism. The targets' cultural and economic status, however, no longer had a main effect on the acculturation strategies. Importantly, there was no significant interaction between either of the covariates and the targets' statuses. These results suggest that the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was not broken, and that in-group identification and endorsement of multicultural ideology were the main predictors of preferences for acculturation strategies in Romania.

In Britain, a two-way MANOVA with the targets' culture (similar vs. different from the in-group) and economic status (rich vs. poor) as the between-participants factors was conducted on the five preferred acculturation strategies. Segregationism was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for the culturally different out-groups than for the culturally similar ones, Ms = 2.21 vs. 1.85, F (1, 80) = 4.74, $p < .05$, η^2 = .06. By contrast, individualism was more preferred as an acculturation strategy for the culturally similar than for the culturally different out-groups, Ms = 6.23 vs. 5.81, F (1, 80) = 4.32, $p < .05$, η^2 = .05. Individualism was also more preferred for the rich than for the poor groups, Ms = 6.26 vs. 5.79, F (1, 80) = 5.49, $p < .05$, η^2 = .06, and so was integrationism, Ms = 5.71 vs. 5.25, F (1, 80) = 4.37, $p < .05$, η^2 = .05.

To sum up the present results on the preferences for acculturation strategies, in Romania the main predictors of these preferences were in-group identification and endorsement of multicultural ideology. In Britain, however, the targets' cultural and

economic statuses influenced the host majority's preferences for acculturation strategies for the targets. This revealed that the culturally different groups were more likely to be segregated, while the culturally similar targets were more likely to benefit from a colour-blind attitude to acculturation. At the same time, the rich groups were more like to benefit from integrationist and individualist attitudes to acculturation than the poor groups.

Similarly to previous studies (e.g. Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001), there were positive correlations between integrationism and individualism, on the one hand, and among assimilationism, segregationism and exclusionism, on the other hand, see Table 6.5 below. These two sets of positive inter-correlations support the suggestion that acculturation orientations may be two-dimensional, involving either an acceptance of the out-groups' culture, or a rejection of it (cf. Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001), and may correspond to either an endorsement or rejection of multiculturalism.

Table 6.5 Correlations among the five acculturation orientations in Romania (N = 148) and Britain (N = 84)

	Integrationism		Assimilationism		Segregationism		Exclusionism	
	RO	**UK**	**RO**	**UK**	**RO**	**UK**	**RO**	**UK**
Integrationism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assimilationism	.15	-.23*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Segregationism	-.18*	-.35***	.34**	.44***	-	-	-	-
Exclusionism	-.30**	-.36***	.31**	.08	.34**	.38***	-	-
Individualism	.37**	.37***	-.10	-.19	-.22**	-.29**	-.34**	-.17

$*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.$

6.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization

In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other variables and to explore the mediators of dehumanization, an index of dehumanization was computed for each participant because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of average humanness attributed to in-group and out-group, respectively. The new variables represented the difference in humanness between in-group and out-group, and were computed by subtracting the humanness attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group, separately for emotions (infrahumanization) and traits (ontologization). By similar means, two other composite variables were computed which represented the differential attribution of

positivity to in-group and out-group, denoted Δ Positive emotions and Δ Positive traits.

Table 6.6 Correlations between dehumanization, positivity, and the ideological measures in Romania ($N = 148$) and Britain ($N = 84$)

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK
Δ Human traits	.46***	.26**	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive emotions	.50***	.57***	.37***	.16	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.51***	.33**	.60***	.23*	.71***	.64***	-	-
In-group identification	.17*	.06	.17*	.07	.17*	-.09	.30***	.03
SDO	.07	-.01	.10	.19	.19*	.07	.19*	.12
EMI	-.08	-.11	-.16	-.09	-.17*	.07	-.24**	.05

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

The overall lack of correlation between the measures of dehumanization and SDO and EMI, respectively, suggests that these ideological measures may not predispose people to dehumanize others. For the correlations between dehumanization, positivity, and the prejudice measures, see Table 6.7 below:

Table 6.7 Correlations between dehumanization, positivity and the prejudice measures in Romania ($N = 148$) and Britain ($N = 84$)

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK
Cultural difference	.20*	.34**	.34***	.21	.24**	.36**	.28**	.43***
Material threat	.14	.12	.23**	.12	.36***	.24*	.27**	.47***
Symbolic threat	.25**	.20	.25**	.16	.38***	.23*	.38***	.42***
Blatant prejudice	.24**	.24*	.26**	.35**	.23**	.27*	.26**	.34**
Integrationism	-.05	-.03	-.01	-.27*	-.12	-.04	-.08	-19
Assimilationism	.03	.15	.12	.22*	.16*	.09	.19*	.14
Segregationism	.14	.14	.20*	.36**	.20*	.18	.19*	.28**
Exclusionism	.16*	.02	.10	.22*	.24**	-.07	.15	.02
Individualism	-.09	-.26*	-.14	-.19	-.20*	-.17	-.25**	-.30**

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

In order to explore the prejudice measures as mediators of dehumanization it was necessary to take into account the main effects of the experimental manipulations had on these measures. Regarding infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), in Romania the ANOVA analyses had indicated that only the poor groups were infrahumanized. But the poor groups did not invoke more threat, either material or symbolic, nor more blatant prejudice or perceived cultural differences, nor were they more dehumanized through traits. At the same time, even though infrahumanization was positively correlated with the differential attribution of

positive emotions to in-group and out-group, the ANOVA had indicated only a main effect of the targets' cultural status on this variable. Therefore, no mediation analysis on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was possible in Romania.

In Britain, the ANOVA analyses had found that the culturally different groups were infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions), whereas the culturally similar ones were not. At the same time, the culturally different groups invoked more perceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group, more material threat, and more symbolic threat than the culturally similar ones. The culturally different groups were also attributed less positive emotions than the culturally similar ones. However, in Britain, infrahumanization did not correlate with either material or symbolic threat, so these variables were excluded from mediation analyses. Instead, infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) was significantly correlated with the perceived cultural difference between the out-group and the in-group, blatant prejudice, and the differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group (Δ Positive emotions). However, the ANOVA had revealed no main effects of the experimental manipulations on blatant prejudice, therefore this variable was excluded, too. Also, a preliminary regression analysis indicated that the targets' cultural status did not significantly predict Δ Positive emotions, therefore this variable was not considered as a mediator of infrahumanization.

Thus, the only potential mediator of infrahumanization in Britain was perceived cultural differences between out-group and in-group. The mediation analysis indicated that perceived cultural differences mediated the infrahumanization of culturally different groups, Aroian's $z = 2.14$, $p < .05$, see Table 6.8 below. To test for the possibility of feedback in mediation chains, i.e. the possibility that the dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression analysis was carried out with perceived cultural difference as the criterion, cultural status of the out-group as the predictor, and infrahumanization as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that infrahumanization did not mediated the perceived cultural differencea, Aroian's $z = 1.56$, ns. Given this result, it can be concluded that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-groups mediated the infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) of culturally different groups in Britain.

Table 6.8 Perceived cultural difference between in-group and out-group mediated the infrahumanization of culturally different groups in Britain ($N = 84$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.09	.06	
Cultural status	.08	.04	.25*
Step 2			
Constant	.02	.05	
Cultural status	.04	.02	.07
Perceived differences	-.09	.06	.30*

Note: $R^2 = .06$ for Step 1 ($p < .05$); $\Delta R^2 = .06$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$); * $p < .05$

As for ontologization (dehumanization through traits), in Romania all groups were dehumanized, in particular the culturally different groups. At the same time, the targets' cultural status had main effects on perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group, and on the attribution of positive traits (Δ Positive traits), therefore these variables were examined separately as potential mediators of dehumanization. It was found that perceived cultural differences mediated the dehumanization of culturally different out-groups, Aroian's $z = 2.62$, $p < .01$, see Table 6.9 below.

Table 6.9 Perceived cultural difference mediated the ontologization of culturally different groups in Romania ($N = 148$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.08	.09	
Cultural status	.20	.05	.30***
Step 2			
Constant	.13	.06	
Cultural status	.08	.03	.20*
Perceived differences	-.08	.09	.26**

Note: $R^2 = .09$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .06$ for Step 2 ($p < .01$); * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

However, dehumanization also mediated the perceived cultural differences between out-group and in-group, Aroian's $z = 2.33$, $p < .05$, therefore it may not be safe to conclude that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of culturally different groups in Romania. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is more likely that perceived cultural differences mediated dehumanization rather than the other way around because the target groups were artificial and the participants had no a-priori dehumanizing beliefs about them, thus

their perceived cultural differences could only have been informed by the experimental manipulation.

Next I analysed whether the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of culturally different targets in Romania. Indeed, Δ Positive traits mediated the dehumanization of culturally different targets in Romania, Aroian's $z = 3.59$, $p < .001$, see Table 6.10 below.

Table 6.10 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group mediated the ontologization of culturally different groups in Romania ($N = 148$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.84	.28	
Cultural status	.48	.18	.22**
Step 2			
Constant	.10	.15	
Cultural status	1.92	.23	.05
Δ Positive traits	-.84	.28	.59***

Note: $R^2 = .05$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .31$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

However, dehumanization also mediated the effect of the targets' cultural stauts on Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 2.53$, $p < .05$. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the positive side of the traits mediated the dehumanization (through traits) of culturally different groups, see Table 6.11 below.

Table 6.11 Dehumanization mediated the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and to culturally different groups in Romania ($N = 148$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.08	.09	
Cultural status	.20	.05	.30***
Step 2			
Constant	.12	.04	
Cultural status	.17	.02	.18**
Δ Human traits	-.08	.09	.56***

Note: $R^2 = .09$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .30$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

The culturally different groups were the only ones to be dehumanized (through traits) in Britain, and they also invoked greater perceived cultural differences, material and symbolic threat, and less positive traits. However, of these potential mediators only Δ Positive traits correlated significantly with the index of dehumanization,

therefore only this variable was explored as a mediator. The regression analysis indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' cultural status on dehumanization via Δ Positive traits was not significantly greater than zero, Aroian's z = 1.30, ns, therefore the positive valence of the traits did not mediate the dehumanization (through traits) of culturally different groups in Britain.

The poor target out-groups were also dehumanized (through traits) in Britain, and they invoked more perceived cultural differences, material threat, blatant prejudice, and less positive traits than the rich targets. However, the index of dehumanization correlated significantly only with blatant prejudice and Δ Positive traits, therefore only these two variables were considered as mediators. A regression analysis conducted with the targets' economic status as the predictor, blatant prejudice as the mediator, and dehumanization as the criterion indicated that the indirect effect of the targets' economic status on dehumanization via blatant prejudice was not significantly different from zero, Aroian's z = 1.76, ns. Therefore blatant prejudice did not mediate the dehumanization of the poor targets. A second regression analysis was conducted with Δ Positive traits as the mediator, but it revealed that Δ Positive traits did not mediate the dehumanization of the poor targets, Aroian's z = 1.30, ns. Thus, the targets' economic status was the only predictor of the dehumanization (through traits) of poor groups in Britain.

6.4 Discussion

How has this study further the knowledge of dehumanization? I will examine here how this study has addressed the research hypotheses, discuss alternative interpretations for the results, examine this study's contribution to threat theories and dehumanization theories, and conclude with the directions for the next study.

The premises for this experiment were the findings from Experiment 1 which had found that all artificial groups were dehumanized, regardless of their cultural or economic status, although the targets' cultural and economic status moderated dehumanization, making the culturally different groups and the poor groups particular targets of dehumanization. I hypothesised that the target groups were dehumanized merely by being different from the in-group, and therefore explored perceived

differences between in-group and out-group as a mediator of dehumanization. Also, I aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1.

So what did Experiment 2 reveal? Firstly, it indicated that, while overall all the targets were dehumanized, the poor groups and the culturally different groups are a particular target of dehumanization, thus supporting the results from Experiment 1. However, the results are more mixed than in the previous experiment. In Romania, all groups were dehumanized (through traits), the culturally different groups more so than the culturally similar one. However, in Britain, only the culturally different groups were dehumanized (through traits), and only the poor groups. The second experiment produced significant results regarding the emotions measure of dehumanization: in Romania only the poor targets were infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions), while in Britain, only the culturally different targets were infrahumanized. Overall, these results show that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group, as well as the out-group's poor socio-economic status, can predispose a group to being dehumanized.

Secondly, as to what may have mediated dehumanization, the present experiment found that the infrahumanization of culturally different groups in Britain was mediated by the perceived cultural differences between in-group and target out-groups. However, no mediation analysis was possible in Romania regarding infrahumanization. Furthermore, the dehumanization (through traits) of the culturally different groups in Romania was also mediated by the perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group. But in Britain, there were no mediators of the dehumanization of the culturally different and of the poor targets, respectively. Overall, these results are in line with Rokeach's (1970) belief congruence theory and with Struch and Schwartz's (1989) postulation that perceived differences at the level of values and beliefs might lead to the dehumanization of out-groups. Overall, though, the two measures of dehumanization correlated with perceived cultural differences, with perceived material and symbolic threats (mostly in Romania), as well as with some of the preferred acculturation strategies.

Regarding the role of perceived material and symbolic threat in dehumanization, the present experiment found that neither measure of perceived

threat correlated with the indices of dehumanization in Britain, although the culturally different groups invoked more symbolic threat and the poor groups invoked more material threat. In Romania, the measures of perceived threat were positively and significantly correlated with the indices of dehumanization, but only EMI (endorsement of multicultural ideology) had been found to be a predictor of the two types of threat[3]. The results so far suggest that perceived threat may not play a part in dehumanization.

As to how the present results support the infrahumanization hypothesis, in Romania, only the poor groups were infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions), whereas in Britain only the culturally different groups were infrahumanized. Thus, the present results do not fully support the hypothesis according to which all groups would be infrahumanized (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000). They also do not agree with those from Experiment 1, where there was no infrahumanization of the out-groups in either national sample. One possible explanation for the different results on infrahumanization in the present study is that, differently to Experiment 1 where the economic status was expressed in terms of the jobs occupied by the target group, in experiment 2 the economic status of the out-groups was expressed in numbers purportedly indicating the annual average household income of the targets. This may have influenced the process of infrahumanization. Another possible explanation (and arguably a more plausible one) is that in Experiment 2, contrary to experiment 1, the target emotions were mixed with the traits. The participants were asked to choose the *characteristics* instead of the *emotions* that they thought best described the out-group / in-group, and it may be argued that the present experiment employed a more subtle measure of infrahumanization than Experiment 1.

Regarding the preferences for acculturation strategies, the present results are in line with previous research which indicated that pro-multiculturalist attitudes such as individualism and integrationism were more strongly endorsed for the 'valued' groups, such as the culturally similar or rich groups, than for the 'devalued groups', such as the culturally different or poor targets (see Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001).

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[3] This is because EMI had been found to vary function of the experimental manipulations and had to be included as a covariate in the ANOVAs on perceived material and symbolic threat, respectively.

Equally, anti-multiculturalist attitudes such as segregationism were more endorsed for the culturally different than for the culturally similar target groups. The preferences for acculturation strategies were predicted by the targets' cultural and economic status, individual variables such as SDO and EMI, and by perceived material and symbolic threats.

Concerning the results on the ideological measures, the present results mirror those from Experiment 1, as the correlation between SDO and in-group identification was negative and non-significant in Romania, but positive and significant in Britain, in line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (Mitchell & Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001). The correlation between EMI and in-group identification was significant and negative in Britain, but non-significant in Romania. Previous research had found that endorsement of multiculturalism correlates negatively with in-group identification among host society members (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Although in this experiment the Romanians were not a minority group relative to the British, the different pattern of correlations between in-group identification and EMI rather mirrors that between in-group identification and SDO. It could perhaps be argued that the results on EMI are in line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis, and suggest that the British viewed their group as a dominant one, whereas the Romanians viewed their group as a subordinate one.

To conclude, the present experiment found that the poor groups and the culturally different groups are a particular target of dehumanization, thus supporting the results from Experiment 1. Moreover, perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated dehumanization, which in turn predicted blatant prejudice against the dehumanized groups. Perceived threat was not found to play a part in dehumanization. These results suggest that dehumanization may not be a reaction to perceived threat, but rather to the perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group.

6.5 Progression to the next study

The present experiment revealed that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of the target groups. Perceived threat was not found to play a part in dehumanization, partly because the necessary mediation analyses could not be conducted. An alternative explanation may be that the artificial targets used in the experiment did not induce as much threat as real groups might have. Therefore I decided to improve the threat measure and to combine the two types of threat into a single scale. Furthermore, I decided to study the dehumanization of artificial groups in conjunction with the dehumanization or real groups, to examine whether the relationship between perceived threat and dehumanization is different in the two cases.

Chapter 7   **Dehumanization of real and artificial groups:**

Prejudice or rationalization of their status?

Contents of Chapter 7

7.1 Introduction

In the previous two experiments I found that artificial out-groups were overall dehumanized, but that their dehumanization was not mediated by the threat they invoked. While the artificial out-groups were generally dehumanized in both Britain and Romania, they were not infrahumanized in either country. This raised the possibility that the infrahumanization phenomenon may not be applicable to artificial groups. Indeed, using a minimal group paradigm, Demoulin, Cortes, Viki, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Paladino, et al., (2002) found that infrahumanization did not occur in the non-meaningful condition, and argued that mere categorization is insufficient to produce infrahumanization (see also Demoulin, Rodriguez-Torres, Rodriguez-Perez, Vaes, Paladino, Gaunt, et al., 2004b). However, while the infrahumanization research usually uses real groups as targets, artificial groups such as extraterrestrial aliens can be infrahumanized (see Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). As for the dehumanization through traits, this has never been studied with artificial groups, although traits have been applied to artificial groups such as the Sandirians (Esses et al., 2001) or aliens (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990).

Given that the artificial target groups in the previous two experiments were generally dehumanized, the results raised the possibility that dehumanization may also function as a rationalization of the targets' status (cf. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Just as participants ascribed gender-typical traits to artificial groups performing gender-specific roles, such as the Ackmians and the Orinthians in Hoffman and Hurst's study (1990), it could be argued that attributing less typically human traits (or emotions) to the target artificial groups may have functioned as a rationalization of their status as poor or as culturally different from the in-group. In this sense, dehumanization may be contingent upon social representations of poverty and of culturally different groups, or upon ideologies that justify the social exclusion of marginalized groups.

However, even though the dehumanization of artificial groups might indicate a rationalization of their status as described in the experimental manipulations, in the case of real groups dehumanization may include emotional as well as social and historical elements. This is because real groups are linked to the group to which the

participants belong in terms of power, social status, history, culture, etc., and in some cases the out-group may serve as a point of reference for the in-group's ethnic or national identity. Equally, if the dehumanization of artificial groups indicates a socially-conditioned propensity for categorizing groups according to their cultural and economic status, or, alternatively, ideological representations of cultural differences and of poverty, the dehumanization of real groups may indicate justification for their discrimination, or legitimization of their status relative to that of the in-group.

Alternatively, it may be argued that the dehumanization of the artificial groups, in particular of the poor and of the culturally different ones as it was observed in the previous two experiments (see Chapters 5 and 6), was driven by the threat they induced, even though perceived threat was not found to be a mediator of dehumanization (in some cases no mediation analysis was possible). However, in the case of real groups it may be difficult to establish a clear cause-effect relationship between perceived threat and dehumanization, because perceived threat may be a consequence as much as an antecedent of dehumanizing beliefs, i.e. one is more likely to perceive threat from a dehumanized than from a non-dehumanized group. In the case of real groups, unlike artificial ones, it may be more difficult to disentangle the relationships between prejudice, perceived threat, and dehumanizing beliefs.

Therefore, given the potential role of perceived threat as consequence rather than antecedent of dehumanization, I decided to use real groups along with artificial ones. I hypothesised that perceived threat should play a role in the dehumanization of artificial groups, whereas both prejudice and perceived threat should be antecedents of the dehumanization of real groups. I also took into account the possibility that in the case of real groups dehumanization may in fact predict the perceived threat from them and blatant prejudice against them. Moreover, in the case of artificial groups perceived threat might predict blatant prejudice against them, whereas in the case of real groups, it could be blatant prejudice that predicts perceptions of threat from them. Thus the present study I took into account the possibility that with real groups dehumanization should stem from both prejudice and perceptions of threat.

7.1.1 Threatening groups: results from a an exploratory threat study

First I conducted a pilot study in both Romania and Britain in order to find out which real groups would invoke high versus low levels of material and symbolic threat, and be suitable target groups for examining dehumanization. In both Britain and Romania 21 groups representing ethnic minorities and immigrant groups were selected as targets. This pilot study was presented to the participants under the guise of a study on "how information is deduced". The participants were told that previous studies had found that some groups weakened the country's economy and had a negative effect of the country's way of life. The participants were required to 'guess' which of the target groups had been found by the assuming previous studies to weaken or strengthen the economy (material threat), and to have a negative or a positive effect on the country's way of life (symbolic threat). Each target group was rated on a 7-point Likert scale, with low ratings indicating more perceived threat from that group. The study had a within-participants design, and the order of the threat questions was reversed for half of the participants. Ten of the target groups were the same, e.g. Chinese, Gypsies, Kurds, Jews, while the other eleven target groups were different for each country, reflecting the local ethnic make-up and immigration history (see *Appendix V a* for the British version of the pilot questionnaire, and *Appendix V b* for the Romanian version).

7.1.1.1 Design

A single item measured perceived material threat: "please guess which of the following groups were found to weaken or strengthen the British/Romanian economy, and to what extent". The answers for each target group were measured on a 1 to 7 point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly weakens" to "strongly strengthens". Another single item measured perceived symbolic threat: "please guess which of the following groups were found to have a negative or a positive impact on the British/Romanian way of life, and to what extent". The answers for each target out-group were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from negative to positive.

7.1.1.2 Participants and procedure

Sixty-six Romanian nationals, 23 women and 43 men (*M* age = 26.69, age range = 18 to 47 years) took part, as well as eighty-nine British nationals, 45 males

and 43 females, 1 gender data missing, (M age = 20, age range = 18 to 28). In each country, half of the participants answered the material threat question first, the other half, the symbolic one first.

For practical reasons, all the Romanian participants completed the questionnaire on line, and were recruited through internet forums and through the researcher's network of Romanian acquaintances. 40 British participants were recruited on various campus locations (M age = 19.83) by being invited to take part in the study, while 49 completed the questionnaire on line (M age = 20.16). All participants were told they were taking in part in a study that investigated the way information is deduced, and were required to guess which of the target groups had been found to have a negative effect on the country's economy and on the country's way of life.

7.1.1.3 Results

High ratings indicated a positive effect on the economy and the country's way of life, whereas low ratings indicated a negative effect and therefore perceived threat. In Romania, the group that was perceived as most strongly strengthening the Romanian economy were the Germans, $M = 5.96$, whereas the group perceived as most strongly weakening the Romanian economy were the Gypsies, $M = 1.38$. The group perceived to have the most positive effect on the Romanian way of life were the Germans, $M = 5.90$, whereas the group viewed as having the most negative effect were the Gypsies, $M = 1.49$.

In Britain, the group that was perceived as most strongly strengthening the British economy were the Chinese, $M = 5.10$, whereas the group viewed as most strongly weakening the British economy were the Gypsies, $M = 2.25$. The group that was perceived as having the most positive effect on the British way of life were the Australians, $M = 5.22$, whereas the group viewed to have the most negative effect were the Gypsies, $M = 2.39$. The Chinese invoked less material than symbolic threat, t (1, 87) = 3.09, $p < .01$, the Australians invoked less symbolic than material threat, t (1, 87) = 2.27, $p < .05$. The Gypsies invoked equal material and symbolic threat, t (1, 87)

= 1.34, ns, in Britain, and t (1, 64) = 0.75, ns, in Romania, and so did the Germans, t (1, 87) = 1.59, ns, in Britain, and t (1, 64) = 0.39, ns, in Romania[1].

Thus, the Gypsies were the group that invoked the most threat of both forms in both countries. In Romania the Germans were the group that posed the least threat, but in Britain, no single least-threatening group emerged. Given the need for a certain degree of comparability between Britain and Romania, it was decided to choose the Germans as the non-threatening target group for both the Romanian and the British participants. The Germans were 5th in terms of strengthening the British economy (M = 4.73), and also 5th in terms or having a positive effect on Britain's way of life (M = 4.48). In other words, the Germans did not represent a high threat for the British. In each country, the Gypsies invoked more material threat than did the Germans, Ms = 2.25 vs. 4.73, t (1, 88) = 16.77, p < .001, in Britain, and Ms = 1.38 vs. 5.96, t (1, 64) = 20.82, p < .001, in Romania. Also, the Gypsies invoked more symbolic threat than did the Germans, Ms = 2.39 vs. 4.48, t (1, 88) = 12.85, p < .001 in Britain, and Ms = 1.49 vs. 5.90, t (1, 64) = 20.78, p < .001, in Romania.

Taking the 21 target groups as units of analysis, the material and the symbolic threat were very significantly positively correlated in Romania: r (1, 18) = .96, p < .001, as well as in Britain: r (1, 18) = .91, p < .001. These results suggest that groups which invoked material threat also invoked symbolic threat, and vice versa. However, given that the pilot study used a within-participants design, the high correlation between the material and symbolic threats items might indicate carry-over effects. Given that half the participants (in each country) answered the material threat question first, and the other half, the symbolic threat question first, correlations were conducted on the material and symbolic threat questions that were answered first in an attempt to counteract potential carry-over effects. Material and symbolic threat were

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[1] Comparing the online to the pen-and-paper participants in the British study, an independent samples t-test indicated no significant differences in the levels of perceived material or symbolic threat for any of the target groups except the Gypsies, who invoked more material threat to the online participants than to the pen-and-paper ones, Ms = 2.04 vs. 2.52, t (1, 87) = 2.31, p < .05. Given the lack of systematic differences between the two sub-samples of British participants it could be argued that they are equivalent. At the same time, the pen-and-paper participants did not express lower levels of perceived threat which would have indicated prejudice suppression. The lack of differences suggests that the online Romanian responses may not be very different from the responses people would have given in a pen-and-paper format.

still very significantly positively correlated: in Romania: r (1, 18) = .95, p < .001, and in Britain, r (1, 18) = .87, p < .001[2].

To conclude, the findings from the threat study suggest that while some research in certain societies has distinguished theoretically and empirically between material and symbolic threat, in the present countries and with the present target groups the two threats seemed to co-occur. Although there is the possibility that one type of threat might be the side effect of the other, it is beyond the purpose of the current study to establish which threat is driving the other. Thus, both material and symbolic threat will be combined in a single scale (cf. Florack et al., 2003). In the previous two experiments, symbolic and material threats were measured with separate scales, but both had rather low internal reliabilities.

7.1.2 Implications of the exploratory threat study for the current experiment

Given the results of the perceived threat exploratory study, I decided to employ the Germans as the non-threatening group, and the Gypsies as the threatening group, in both countries. Although in Britain the Germans did not rank top in terms of having a positive effect on the country's economy and way of life, they were chosen as target group in order to enable the comparison between the two countries. In Britain[3], the Germans have been used in other studies as a target of infrahumanization (Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004; Viki, Winchester, Titshall, Chisango, & Pina, 2006), of prejudice (e.g. Barrett, Wilson, & Lyons, 2003), or of national comparison (e.g. Hopkins & Moore, 2001; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). Generally, research indicates that Germans are a disliked out-group for the British, and are stereotypically perceived as *aggressive* and *hardworking* by the English (Barrett et al., 2003), and as *arrogant, loud, industrious, rude, greedy, aggressive, efficient* and *ambitious* by the Scottish (Hopkins & Moore, 2001). As for Gypsies, previous research has indicated that they are a target of dehumanization in both Britain and Romania (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005).

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[2] The present threat study was replicated in Hungary and Spain, revealing that the Gypsies were the highest threatening group and the Germans the lowest threatening group in both countries. Material and symbolic threat were very significantly positively correlated, r (1, 18) = .90, p < .001, in Hungary, and r (1, 18) = .91, p < .001, in Spain.

[3] No data from Romania regarding stereotypes of the Germans was available at the time of this study.

As for the artificial target groups in the present study, these were described as in the second experiment, except that the third experiment no longer had the 2 (culturally similar vs. different) x 2 (rich vs. poor) factorial design. Instead, the culturally similar out-group was also described as rich, while the culturally different one was also described as poor. Thus, the experimental manipulations "culturally similar x poor" and "culturally different x rich" were dropped in order to make the artificial out-groups comparable to the real ones, which simultaneously elicited the two types of threat, material and symbolic. On the negative side, the combination of the two threats into a single one made it somewhat impossible to know which of the two factors, cultural status or economic status, might influence dehumanization. However, on the positive side, combining the two types of threat into one arguably achieved higher ecological validity as they better mirrored the real out-groups.

7.1.3 Research hypotheses

The present study examined the following hypotheses:

1. all target groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions)
2. the culturally different and poor artificial groups will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the culturally similar and rich artificial groups
3. the Gypsies will be more dehumanized (through traits) than the Germans
4. the Gypsies as well as the poor and culturally different artificial groups will invoke more threat and blatant prejudice than the other target groups

7.2 Method

7.2.1 Design

The design of the study had a 2 (real vs. artificial out-group) x 2 (high-threat target vs. low-threat target) format. Thus it was a combination of experimental and survey designs. The real groups were the Germans and the Gypsies in both Britain and Romania. The artificial groups were the Moravians, in Britain, and the Abkhaz[4], in Romania.

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[4] In the previous two experiments the Romanian artificial group was the Ceangăi, which is a real but very little know ethnic minority in Romania. However, in order to mirror better the artificial group in Britain, in the present experiment the Romanian artificial group was changed to being an immigrant group.

7.2.2 Participants and procedure

One hundred and ninety-seven British nationals, 106 females and 91 males, *M* age = 25.78, age range = 16 to 74 years, participated in the experiment. 99 participants took part in the artificial group conditions (51 in the low-threat, and 48 in the high-threat group condition), while 98 participated in the real group conditions (47 in the Germans condition, and 51 in the Gypsies condition).

One hundred and ninety-seven Romanian nationals, 121 females and 76 males, *M* age = 21.51, age range = 18 to 45 years, participated in the study. 93 participants took part in the artificial group conditions (48 in the low-threat, and 45 in the high-threat group condition), while 104 took part in the real group conditions (51 in the Germans condition, and 53 in the Gypsies condition).

The participants were recruited on campus and in various other locations, e.g. pubs, students' accommodation, and received a questionnaire that was introduced as part of a study exploring cultural diversity in their country. The participants were debriefed.

7.2.3 Materials

Two vignettes were used in this experiment in the artificial group conditions, and they were identical in content to the vignettes used in Experiment 2. In order to mirror better the real groups which had been found by the pilot study to induce material and symbolic threat simultaneously, the artificial groups were described either as culturally similar to the in-group *and* rich, or as culturally different from the in-group *and* poor (see *Appendix V c* for the British version of the vignette, and *Appendix V d* for the Romanian version). In the analysis, the 'culturally similar and rich' targets were termed 'low-threat' targets, and the 'culturally different and poor' targets were termed 'high-threat' targets. In the real group conditions, there was no experimental manipulation, the participants being merely required to focus on the particular target group (see *Appendix V e* for a British version of the questionnaire, and *Appendix V f* for the Romanian version).

7.2.3.1 Manipulation checks

2 manipulation check items ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) assessed the perceived similarity of the out-group to the in-group: *how similar you*

think the Moravians [Abkhaz] are to the British [Romanians]?, and the burden they posed on the system of social benefits: *do you think that the Moravians [Abkhaz] have a negative impact on the national economy?*.

7.2.3.2 Dehumanization

Dehumanization was measured in similar ways to Experiments 1 and 2, including traits and emotions measures. In Experiment 2 the target emotions and traits were mixed in the same list. Due to this, few emotions were chosen as features describing the target (in-group or out-group), therefore in the present experiment the traits and emotions were listed separately, similarly to Experiment 1.

7.2.3.3 Prejudice measures: perceived threat and blatant prejudice

Twelve 7-point items measured perceived threat, but in this experiment the material and symbolic threat items were combined in a single scale. The threat items were the same as in Experiment 2, with two new items being added. Six items related to material, and other 6 to symbolic threat. Items 4, 5, 8, 9 and 12 were reverse-coded in both countries, with high scores indicating highly perceived threat.

The same 7-point scale of blatant prejudice as the one used in experiments 1 and 2 was used, with one additional item being: *I would not mind if a German [Moravian, Abkhaz, Gypsy] joined my family by marriage.* Items 2, 3 and 5 were reverse-coded, and high scores indicated a desire for social distance from the target out-group.

7.3 Results

When analysing the data I explored: (1) whether the experimental manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the poor and culturally different artificial targets were more dehumanized than the rich and culturally similar artificial targets; (3) whether the Gypsies were more dehumanized than the Germans; (4) whether the Gypsies and the poor and culturally different artificial targets invoked more perceived threat and blatant prejudice than the other two targets; (5) whether perceived threat or blatant prejudice mediated dehumanization. The analyses will be reported in turn in the following sections.

7.3.1 Manipulation checks

A MANOVA with the threat status of out-groups as the between-participants factor, and the two manipulations checks items as the dependent variables was conducted in the artificial target conditions. In Britain, more negative impact on the national economy was invoked by the poor and culturally different than by the rich and culturally similar out-group, $Ms = 3.41$ vs. 1.98, $F(1, 97) = 30.05$, $p < .001$. Also, the rich and culturally similar out-group was seen as more similar to the in-group than the poor and culturally different one, $Ms = 5.17$ vs. 3.14, $F(1, 97) = 55.13$, $p < .001$. The two manipulation check items were negatively and significantly correlated, $r(1, 97) = -.50$, $p < .001$, indicating that the more similar the out-group was perceived to the in-group, the less negative impact it was perceived to have on the economy.

In Romania, more negative impact on the national economy was invoked by the poor and culturally different artificial target than by the rich and culturally similar one, $Ms = 3.77$ vs. 2.33, $F(1, 90) = 15.37$, $p < .001$. As for the perceived similarity between out-group and in-group, there was no significant difference between the two artificial targets, $Ms = 4.35$ vs. 4.04, $F(1, 90) = 0.88$, ns. The two manipulation check items were negatively and significantly correlated, $r(1, 90) = -.28$, $p < .01$, indicating that the more similar the out-group was perceived to the in-group, the less negative impact it was perceived to have on the economy.

7.3.2 Attribution of humanness and positivity to out-group and in-group

Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2 (see Chapters 5 and 6), for each participant an average 'humanness' score was calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the out-group and in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion / trait selected by the participant for the respective group (in-group or out-group) with its humanness weighting (see Chapter 4), adding them up and dividing them by the number of the emotions / traits attributed to the target (in-group or out-group). The same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to in-group and out-groups.

Mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the attribution of human emotions and traits in each country. The between-participants factors were the target out-groups' cultural status (similar vs. different from the in-group) and

economic status (rich vs. poor). Target group (in-group vs. out-group) was the within-participants factor. The dependent variables were the typically human emotions, and respectively traits, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions, and traits, respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the dependent variables.

7.3.2.1 The attribution of typically human emotions and positive emotions

In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 7, M = 4.98, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 9, M = 5.26. The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.36 vs. 5.31, F (1, 193) = 12.54, $p < .001$, η^2 = .06, in line with the infrahumanization hypothesis. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 193) = 9.10, $p < .01$, η^2 = .04, as in the real targets conditions more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.30, t (1, 97) = 4.18, $p < .001$, whereas in the artificial targets conditions equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the artificial out-groups, Ms = 5.34 vs. 5.33, t (1, 98) = 0.30, ns. There targets' threat status also moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 193) = 19.68, $p < .001$, η^2 = .09, as in the low-threat targets conditions equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the low-threat out-groups, Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.36, t (1, 97) = 0.72, ns, but more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups in the high-threat out-group conditions, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.27, t (1, 98) = 5.60, $p < .001$. Thus, the high-threat groups were infrahumanized. The low-threat groups, i.e. the Germans and the rich and culturally similar artificial out-groups, were overall attributed more typically human emotions than the high-threat groups, Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.32, F (1, 193) = 6.04, $p < .05$, η^2 = .03, as indicated by the between-participants effects. Examining in more detail the real groups, the Germans were attributed equally typically human emotions as the in-group, Ms = 5.35 vs. 5.38, t (1, 46) = 1.04, ns, whereas the Gypsies were attributed less typically human emotions than the in-group, Ms = 5.25 vs. 5.38, t (1, 50) = 4.90, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.1a below. As for the artificial groups, the low-threat targets were attributed relatively equally typically human emotions as the in-

group, $Ms = 5.37$ vs. 5.32, t $(1, 49) = 2.28$, $p = .027$, whereas the high-threat targets were attributed less typically human emotions than the in-group, $Ms = 5.30$ vs. 5.37, t $(1, 46) = -2.90$, $p = .006$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of $.0125$), see Fig. 7.1b below.

Fig. 7.1a Attribution of typically
human emotions to real groups
in Britain

Fig. 7.1b Attribution of typically
human emotions to artificial groups
in Britain

To sum up the British results on the emotions measure of dehumanization, only the Gypsies and the high-threat artificial target were infrahumanized. At the theoretical level, these results suggest that infrahumanization may be due to the perceived threat from the out-group.

As for the attribution of positive emotions in Britain, equal positive emotions were overall attributed to out-groups and in-group, $Ms = 4.85$ vs. 4.91, F $(1, 193) = 0.71$, ns. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F $(1, 193) = 16.49$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$, indicating that in the real targets conditions, more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 4.96$ vs. 4.61, t $(1, 97) = 3.44$, $p < .025$, whereas in the artificial targets conditions, more positive emotions were attributed to the out-group than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.09$ vs. 4.86, t $(1, 98) = 2.22$, $p > .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of $.025$). The targets threat status also moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F $(1, 193) = 22.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$, as more positive emotions were attributed the low-threat targets than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.12$ vs. 4.84, t $(1, 97) = 2.89$, $p < .025$, whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the high-threat targets,

Ms = 4.98 vs. 4.58, t (1, 98) = 3.66, p < .025. There was a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, F (1, 193) = 4.29, p < .05, η^2 = .02. This indicated that less positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the equivalent artificial group, Ms = 4.85 vs. 5.39, and less positive emotions were attributed to the Gypsies than to the equivalent artificial group, Ms = 4.37 vs. 4.79. At the same time, more positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.85 vs. 4.37, and more positive emotions were attributed to the non-threatening artificial group than to the threatening one, Ms = 5.39 vs. 4.79.

In Romania, the number of emotions attributed to the out-group varied from 2 to 7, M = 5.23, and those ascribed to the in-group from 2 to 11, M = 5.27. The assumption of sphericity was met, and, overall, equally typically human emotions were attributed to in-group and out-group, Ms = 5.27 vs. 5.26, F (1, 193) = .006, ns. However, more typically human emotions were overall attributed to the out-groups than to the in-group in the real targets condition, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.22, while more typically human emotions were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups in the artificial targets condition, Ms = 5.31 vs. 5.23, F (1, 193) = 16.43, p < .001, η^2 = .08. More typically human emotions were overall attributed in the low-threat targets conditions than in the high-threat ones, Ms = 5.30 vs. 5.23, F (1, 193) = 11.87, p < .001, η^2 = .06. There were no other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 3.60, ns. Concerning the real groups, paired-samples t-tests indicated that the Romanian participants attributed equally typically human emotions to the Gypsies and to the in-group, Ms = 5.22 vs. 5.22, t (1, 52) = 0.05, ns, whereas they attributed more typically human emotions to the Germans than to the in-group, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.21, t (1, 50) = 3.96, p < .001 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.2a below. As for the artificial groups, although they were overall attributed less typically human emotions than the in-group, paired-samples t-tests indicated that the low-threat targets were attributed relatively equal humanness as the in-group, Ms = 5.27 vs. 5.35, t (1, 46) = -2.17, p = .035, and the same was true for the high-threat targets, Ms = 5.19 vs. 5.28, t (1, 43) = -2.00, p = .052 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.2b below.

Fig. 7.2a Attribution of typically human emotions to real groups in Romania

Fig. 7.2b Attribution of typically human emotions to artificial groups in Romania

To sum up the results on infrahumanziation (dehumanization through emotions) in Romania, the artificial targets were both infrahumanized, regardless of their threat status. But as regarded the real groups, the Romanian participants attributed equally typically human emotions to their in-group and the Gypsies, but more typically human emotions to the Germans than to their in-group.

As for the attribution of positive emotions in Romania, relatively equal positive emotions were attributed to in-group and out-group, $Ms = 4.54$ vs. 4.59, $F (1, 193) = 0.56$, ns. However, the targets' threat status moderated the attribution of positive emotions, $F (1, 193) = 14.16, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07$, indicating that more positive emotions were attributed to the non-threatening out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 4.88$ vs. 4.56, $t (1, 98) = 3.10, p < .025$, whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the threatening out-groups, $Ms = 4.52$ vs. $4.29, t (1, 97) = 3.34, p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). There was also a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses on the attribution of positive emotions, $F (1, 193) = 11.09, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. Thus, more positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the in-group, $Ms = 4.87$ vs. 4.30, but more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, $Ms = 4.43$ vs. 4.01. Furthermore, the artificial out-groups were ascribed more positive emotions than the real out-groups, $Ms = 4.76$ vs. 4.43, $F (1, 193) = 18.63, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$.

The low-threat targets were attributed more positive emotions than the high-threat ones, Ms = 4.88 vs. 4.29, F (1, 193) = 15.36, $p < .001$, η^2 = .07.

7.3.2.2 The attribution of typically human traits and positive traits

In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 10, M = 6.76, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 15, M = 7.36. More typically human traits were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-groups, Ms = 4.78 vs. 4.47, F (1, 193) = 204.79, $p < .001$, η^2 = .51. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of traits, F (1, 193) = 7.27, $p < .01$, η^2 = .04, as more typically human traits were attributed to the artificial than to the real targets, Ms = 4.50 vs. 4.43, t (1, 195) = 2.21, $p < .05$, but equally typical human traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.76, t (1, 195) = 1.59, ns.

The targets' threat status also moderated the attribution of traits, F (1, 193) = 75.10, $p < .001$, η^2 = .28. This indicated that more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group when the out-group was threatening than when it was not, Ms = 4.82 vs. 4.74, t (1, 195) = 3.40, $p < .01$, while more typically human traits were attributed to the low-threat targets than to the high-threat ones, Ms = 4.61 vs. 4.32, t (1, 195) = 8.30, $p < .001$. Thus, the high-threat groups were more dehumanized than the low-threat ones. Regarding the real groups, the Germans were attributed equally typically human traits as the in-group, Ms = 4.63 vs. 4.74, t (1, 46) = 2.28, p = .027, whereas the Gypsies were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.23 vs. 4.86, t (1, 49) = -13.97, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.3a below. As for the artificial groups, the low-threat ones were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, Ms = 4.60 vs. 4.73, t (1, 49) = -3.26, p = .002, and so were the high-threat ones, Ms = 4.42 vs. 4.78, t (1, 46) = -9.56, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.3b below.

Fig. 7.3a Attribution of typically human traits to real groups in Britain

Fig. 7.3b Attribution of typically human traits to artificial groups in Britain

As for the attribution of positive traits in Britain, these were ascribed equally to in-group and out-group, Ms = 4.63 vs. 4.69, F (1, 193) = 0.40, ns. The targets' reality status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 193) = 17.47, $p < .001$, η^2 = .08, as more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the real out-groups, Ms = 4.67 vs. 4.39, t (1, 97) = 2.69, $p < .025$, whereas more positive traits were attributed to the artificial out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 4.98 vs. 4.60, t (1, 98) = 3.00, $p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level).

The threat status of the out-groups also moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 193) = 33.15, $p < .001$, η^2 = .15, indicating that more positive traits were attributed to the non-threatening out-groups than to the in-group, Ms = 5.15 vs. 4.63, t (1, 97) = 4.43, $p < .025$, whereas more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the threatening out-groups, Ms = 4.64 vs. 4.22, t (1, 98) = 3.52, $p < .025$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level). There was also a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, F (1, 193) = 5.24, $p < .05$, η^2 = .03. This indicated that the Germans were attributed less positive traits than their artificial equivalent group, Ms = 4.88 vs. 5.42, and the Gypsies were attributed less positive traits than their artificial counterpart, Ms = 3.90 vs. 4.54. The Germans were attributed more positive traits than the Gypsies, Ms = 4.88 vs. 3.90, and the non-threatening artificial group was attributed more positive traits than the threatening one, Ms = 5.42 vs. 4.54.

In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 4 to 11, $M = 7.15$, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 15, $M = 7.69$. More typically human traits were attributed overall to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 4.87$ vs. 4.68, $F (1, 193) = 56.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .22$, but the targets' threat status moderated the effect of human traits, $F (1, 193) = 30.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .13$. This indicated that equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and the low-threat out-groups, $Ms = 4.95$ vs. 4.90, $t (1, 98) = 1.28$, ns, but less typically human traits were attributed to the high-threat out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 4.47$ vs. 4.80, $t (1, 97) = 8.93$, $p < .001$.

More typically human traits were attributed in the low-threat than in the high-threat targets condition, $F (1, 193) = 98.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .34$, $Ms = 4.92$ vs. 4.64. This meant that the low-threat out-groups were ascribed more typically human traits than their high-threat counterparts, $Ms = 4.90$ vs. 4.46, $t (1, 195) = 11.46$, $p < .001$, while the in-group, too, was attributed more typically human traits in the low-threat than in the high-threat condition, $Ms = 4.95$ vs. 4.80, $t (1, 195) = 3.40$, $p < .01$. Thus, similarly to the British results, the high-threat groups were more dehumanized than the low-threat ones, in line with the research hypothesis.

As regarded the real groups, the Germans were attributed relatively equally typically human traits as the in-group, $Ms = 4.95$ vs. 4.88, $t (1, 49) = 1.44$, ns, whereas the Gypsies were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, $Ms = 4.37$ vs. 4.68, $t (1, 51) = -5.84$, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-corrected significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.4a below. As for the artificial groups, the low-threat targets were attributed less typically human traits than the in-group, $Ms = 4.84$ vs. 5.02, $t (1, 46) = -3.78$, $p < .001$, and so were the high-threat targets, $Ms = 4.56$ vs. 4.94, $t (1, 43) = -6.86$, $p < .001$ (Bonferroni-corrected significance level of .0125), see Fig. 7.4b below.

Fig. 7.4a Attribution of typically human traits to real groups in Romania

Fig. 7.4b Attribution of typically human traits to artificial groups in Romania

As for the positive traits in Romania, these were attributed equally to in-group and out-group, $Ms = 4.51$ vs. 4.52, $F(1, 193) = 0.07$, ns. However, the threat status of the out-groups moderated the attribution of positive traits, $F(1, 193) = 24.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$, as more positive traits were attributed to the low-threat out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 5.12$ vs. 4.67, $t(1, 98) = 3.58$, $p < .01$, whereas less positive traits were attributed to the high-threat out-groups than to the in-group, $Ms = 3.99$ vs. 4.40, $t(1, 97) = 3.43$, $p < .01$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level of .025).

There was also a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, $F(1, 193) = 20.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$ for the within-participants effects. This meant that when the out-group was low-threat, there was no difference in the positive traits given to real and artificial out-groups, $Ms = 5.15$ vs. 5.09, but when the out-group was threatening, the Gypsies were attributed less positive traits than the artificial high-threat group, $Ms = 3.25$ vs. 4.70. The Germans were attributed more positive traits than the Gypsies, $Ms = 5.15$ vs. 3.25, and the low-threat artificial group was attributed more positive traits than the high-threat one, $Ms = 5.09$ vs. 4.70.

7.3.3 Prejudice measures: perceived threat and blatant prejudice

7.3.3.1 Perceived threat

As regarded perceived threat, in Britain an exploratory factor analysis on the perceived threat scale investigated whether there were distinct factors relating to material and symbolic threat. The analysis found three factors explaining 45.68%, 9%, and 8.53% of the variance, respectively. Most of the items loaded on the first factor (cf. Renfro, Stephan, Duran, & Clason, 2006). A second factor analysis with Oblimin rotation and asking for a 2-factor solution revealed two factors, the first one explainng 45.70% of the variance, and the second one, 9%. According to the Pattern Matrix, most threat items loaded on the first factor, with some of the reverse-coded items loading on the second factor and some loading negatively on the first, see table 7.2 below. The two factors were correlated at -.38. Items 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 were recoded, and the resulting scale had an internal reliability of .89. The inter-item correlations ranged from .11 to .68, and the mean inter-item correlation was .40.

Table 7.1 Factor loadings of the items pertaining to material and symbolic threat in Britain (N = 197)

	Component	
	1	2
1. The Germans get more from this country than they contribute. **M**	**.68**	
2. The presence of Germans spoils the traditional British countryside. **S**	**.63**	
3. The Germans' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society. **S**	**.68**	
4. The Germans are not squeezing British people out of council housing. **M**		**.72**
5. The Germans' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life. **S**		**.84**
6. The presence of Germans on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people. **M**	**.70**	
7. The Germans' family values have a negative impact on British society. **S**	**.66**	
8. When the Germans make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits. **M**	**-.59**	
9. The Germans' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society. **S**	**-.35**	
10. The Germans are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits. **M**	**.82**	
11. The Germans are taking advantage of Britain's economy. **M**	**.73**	
12. The Germans' way of life is not destroying the traditional British way of life. **S**	**-.74**	

Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. KMO measure of sampling adequacy = .89, p < 0.001. The letters M or S in bold indicate the type of threat, material or symbolic.

Given the lack of a clear empirical distinction between material and symbolic threat, the present threat items were averaged to create a composite scale of perceived threat. A two-way ANOVA with the targets' reality status (real vs. artificial) and threat status (low-threat vs. high-threat) as the independent factors was conducted on perceived threat. The high-threat groups invoked more perceived threat than the low-threat ones, Ms = 3.56 vs. 2.67, F (1, 193) = 46.82, p < .001, η^2 = .20, in line with the

research hypotheses. The real groups invoked more threat than the artificial ones, Ms = 3.37 vs. 2.87, F (1, 193) = 14.48, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .07$. There was a significant interaction between the reality and the threat statuses of the targets, meaning that the Gypsies invoked more perceived threat than the artificial high-threat group, Ms = 3.95 vs. 3.18, whereas the Germans did not invoke more threat than the artificial low-threat group equivalent, Ms = 2.80 vs. 2.56, F (1, 193) = 4.25, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

In Romania, a factor analysis on the threat items with Direct Oblimin rotation revealed three factors explaining 35.83%, 12.53% and 10.28% of the variance, respectively. Rerunning the analysis and asking for a 2-factor solution revealed two factors explaining 36% and 12.53% of the variance, respectively, which were correlated at -.31. Most items loaded on the first factor, with some of the reverse-coded items loading on the second, see table 7.3. Items 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 were recoded, and the resulting scale had an internal reliability of .82. The inter-item correlations ranged from -.09 to .62, and the mean inter-item correlation was .27.

Table 7.2 Factor loadings of the items pertaining to material and symbolic threat in Romania (N = 197)

	Component	
	1	2
1. The Germans get more from this country than they contribute. M	.79	
2. The presence of Germans spoils the traditional British countryside. S	.79	
3. The Germans' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society. S	.74	
4. The Germans are not squeezing British people out of council housing. M		.65
5. The Germans' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life. S		.81
6. The presence of Germans on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people. M	.43	
7. The Germans' family values have a negative impact on British society. S	.69	
8. When the Germans make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits. M	-.47	
9. The Germans' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society. S	-.39	.50
10. The Germans are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits. M	.82	
11. The Germans are taking advantage of Britain's economy. M	.73	
12. The Germans' way of life is not destroying the traditional British way of life. S		.68

Note: Highest loading for each component shown in bold. KMO measure of sampling adequacy = .89, $p < 0.001$. The letters M or S in bold indicate the type of threat, material or symbolic.

In Romania, a two-way ANOVA with the out-groups reality (real vs. artificial) and threat status (high vs. low) as the independent factors was conducted on perceived threat. The real and the artificial groups invoked similar levels of perceived threat, Ms = 3.30 vs. 3.34, F (1, 193) = .14, ns. However, the high-threat groups invoked more threat than the low-threat ones, Ms = 3.90 vs. 2.74, F (1, 193) = 82.46, $p < .001$, η^2 = .30, in line with the research hypotheses. There was also a significant interaction

between the targets' reality and threat statuses, indicating that the Gypsies invoked more treat than the high-threat artificial group, Ms = 4.22 vs. 3.58, whereas the Germans invoked less threat than the low-threat artificial target, Ms = 2.36 vs. 3.11, F (1, 193) = 29.53, $p < .001$, η^2 = .13.

7.3.3.2 Blatant prejudice

Concerning blatant prejudice, in both countries, ANOVAs with the targets' reality status (real vs. artificial) and threat status (high vs. low) were conducted on the blatant prejudice scores. In Britain, the blatant prejudice scale had an internal reliability of .86. The high-threat groups invoked more prejudice than the low-threat ones, Ms = 3.80 vs. 2.64, F (1, 193) = 50.16, $p < .001$, η^2 = .20, in line with the research hypotheses. The real groups invoked more blatant prejudice than the artificial ones, Ms = 3.55 vs. 2.90, F (1, 193) = 15.19, $p < .001$, η^2 = .07. There was a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, indicating that the Gypsies invoked more prejudice than the high-threat artificial group, Ms = 4.43 vs. 3.18, while the Germans did not elicit more prejudice than the low-threat artificial group, Ms = 2.66 vs. 2.62, F (1, 193) = 13.53, $p < .001$, η^2 = .07.

In Romania, the blatant prejudice scale had an internal reliability of .75. The real and artificial groups invoked similar levels of prejudice, Ms = 2.93 vs. 3.11, F (1, 193) = 1.43, ns. However, the high-threat groups invoked more prejudice than the low-threat ones, Ms = 3.58 vs. 2.47, F (1, 193) = 56.05, $p < .001$, η^2 = .22, in line with the research hypothesis. There was also a significant interaction between the targets' reality and threat statuses, indicating that the Gypsies invoked more prejudice than the artificial high-threat group, Ms = 3.89 vs. 3.25, whereas the Germans invoked less prejudice than the low-threat artificial group, Ms = 1.96 vs. 2.96, F (1, 193) = 30.32, $p < .001$, η^2 = .13.

To assess whether perceived threat mediated blatant prejudice in the case of artificial groups, and whether blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat in the case of real groups, mediation analyses were conducted separately for real and artificial groups, with the groups' threat status as the predictor and with perceived threat and blatant prejudice being in turn dependent variables and mediators, respectively. In Britain, in the case of artificial groups, perceived threat mediated blatant prejudice,

Aroian's $z = 2.92$, $p < 0.01$, but blatant prejudice also mediated perceived threat, Aroian's $z = 2.55$, $p < .05$, therefore the results are rather inconclusive. As for the real groups in Britain, blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat, as predicted, Aroian's $z = 5.64$, $p < .001$, but perceived threat also mediated blatant prejudice. Aroian's $z = 5.44$, $p < .001$, therefore no clear conclusions can be drawn from these results.

In Romania, in the case of artificial groups, no mediation analysis was possible because the targets' threat status and blatant prejudice were not significantly correlated. As for the real groups, blatant prejudice mediated perceived threat, Aroian's $z = 4.59$, $p < .001$, but perceived threat also mediated blatant prejudice, Aroian's $z = 4.55$, $p < .001$, therefore the results from Romania are inconclusive, too.

To sum up, the British and Romanian results supported the hypothesis according to which the artificial group described as poor and culturally different from the in-group would invoke more perceived threat and more prejudice than the other artificial group described as rich and as culturally similar to the in-group. The results also supported the hypothesis according to which the Gypsies would elicit more perceived threat than the Germans. Regarding the differences between the British and the Romanian results, in Britain the real groups overall invoked more perceived threat and prejudice than the artificial ones, whereas in Romania the real groups and the artificial ones elicited similar levels of perceived threat and prejudice. The Germans invoked the same level of threat as the low-threat artificial group in Britain, but in Romania the Germans invoked less threat and less prejudice than their artificial counterpart. A closer look at the data indicates the Romanians perceived less threat from the Germans than did the British, $Ms = 2.36$ vs. 2.78, $t (1, 96) = 2.30$, $p < .05$, while the Romanians and the British perceived similar levels of threat from the Gypsies, $Ms = 4.22$ vs. 3.95, $t (1, 102) = 1.54$, ns.

Perceived threat and blatant prejudice were significantly and positively correlated, $r (1, 195) = .74$, $p < .001$ in Britain, and $r (1, 195) = .66$, $p < .001$ in Romania. In the case of artificial groups, it could be argued that perceived threat is due to the information in the experimental vignette; however, in the case of real groups, it is possible that perceived threat may be an expression of prejudice. It was decided to examine the correlations between perceived threat and prejudice separately

for real and for artificial groups. In Britain, the correlation between perceived threat and prejudice for artificial groups was r (1, 97) = .60, p < .001, but r (1, 96) = .80, p < .001 for real groups, the difference between the two correlation coefficients being significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.80, p < .01. In Romania, the correlation between perceived threat and blatant prejudice for artificial groups was r (1, 91) = .51, p < .001, and r (1, 102) = .72, p < .001, for real groups, the difference between the two correlation coefficients being significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.34, p < .05. The results from the two countries suggest that in the case of real groups it is more difficult to disentangle perceived threat from prejudice.

7.3.4 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization

In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other variables, an index of dehumanization was computed for each participant, as in the previous two experiments. This represented the difference (or distance) in the human typicality attributed to the in-group and the out-group, and was computed by subtracting the human typicality attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was computed separately for emotions (infrahumanization) and traits (ontologization). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores for in-group and out-group. Similarly, two other composite variables were computed which represented the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. These were computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions, Δ Positive emotions, and for traits, Δ Positive traits. See the table below for the correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice:

Table 7.3 Correlations between the dehumanization and the prejudice measures in Britain (*N* = 197) and Romania (*N* = 197)

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO
Δ Human traits	.32***	.39***	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive emotions	.74***	.63***	.30***	.47***	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.55***	.35***	.40***	.62***	.64***	.59***	-	-
Perceived threat	.43***	.30***	.36***	.39***	.46***	.38***	.59***	.54***
Blatant prejudice	.45***	.32***	.42***	.36***	.43***	.38***	.54***	.51***

*** p < .001

The rather moderated correlations between dehumanization and perceived threat and blatant prejudice suggest that dehumanization is not the same thing as prejudice (although it could also be argued that the different measurement of dehumanization and prejudice may account for the observed moderate correlations).

The correlation between ontologization and the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group was higher in Romania than in Britain, as indicated by a Fisher's r to z transformation $= 2.97$, $p < .01$. This may be due to the fact that the positivity and the humanity of the Romanian traits were positively and significantly correlated, r (1, 19) $= .50$, $p < .05$, as indicated by the previous pilot study on the humanity and positivity of emotions and traits (see chapter 4). However, these results do not necessarily indicate that ontologization is an effect of positivity: in Britain there was a significant and positive correlation between ontologization and the positivity of the traits, even though the human and the positive sides of the traits were non-significantly correlated in the pilot study.

Given that previous analyses had found differences between real and artificial groups, such as significantly different correlations between perceived threat and blatant prejudice between real and artificial groups, it was decided to analyse the correlations between the two measures of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice separately for real and artificial groups, in each country, see the two tables below:

Table 7.4 Correlations between the dehumanization and the prejudice measures for real (N = 98) and artificial (N = 99) groups in Britain

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial
Δ Human traits	.32***	.26**	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive emotions	.74***	.73***	.28**	.26*	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.57***	.50***	.33***	.43***	.60***	.62***	-	-
Perceived threat	.45***	.33***	.42***	.21*	.43***	.41***	.60***	.53***
Blatant prejudice	.50***	.29**	**.50*****	.22*	.47***	.30**	.65***	.34***

$* p < .05$; $** p < .01$; $*** p < .001$. Significant differences in correlation coefficients are in bold.

As it can be noted in the table above, in the British sample the correlations between the measures of dehumanization and perceived threat and prejudice were overall greater for the real than for the artificial groups, although not significantly so. As regarded infrahumanization, the correlations with the other measures were not significantly different for real and artificial groups. For ontologization, only the correlations with blatant prejudice were significantly different for real and artificial groups, Fisher's r-to-z transformation $= 2.25, p < .05$.

Table 7.5 Correlations between the dehumanization and the prejudice measures for real ($N= 104$) and artificial ($N = 93$) groups in Romania

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial	Real	Artificial
Δ Human traits	.34***	.37***	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive emotions	.65***	.66***	.53***	.40***	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.38***	.36***	.63***	.64***	.60***	.56***	-	-
Perceived threat	.34***	.25*	.42***	.34***	.51***	.14	**.69***	.23***
Blatant prejudice	.37***	.22*	.43***	.22*	.44***	.27**	**.63***	.27***

$* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001$. Significant differences in correlation coefficients are in bold.

As it can be seen in the table above, in the Romanian sample the correlations between the measures of dehumanization and perceived threat and prejudice were overall greater but not significantly greater for the real than for the artificial groups

Regarding the potential mediators of dehumanization, the indexes of dehumanization were used in regression analysis. Mediation analyses were carried out in line with the suggestions by Baron and Kenny (1986), and Preacher and Hayes (2004). The regression analyses that examined the mediators of dehumanization were informed by the results obtained in the ANOVAs conducted on infrahumanization and ontologization, and on the other measures of prejudice, i.e. perceived threat, blatant prejudice, and the differential attribution of positive emotions and traits to in-group and out-group. The variables selected as potential mediators of dehumanization were the ones on which the threat status of the out-group had a main effect. The main predictor of interest is the threat status of the out-group. Given that dehumanization may play different functions in real and artificial groups, separate analyses were

carried out for real and for artificial targets. Given the high correlation between perceived threat and blatant prejudice, it was decided to analyse these two potential mediators separately.

Regarding infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), in Britain the ANOVA analyses had found that the high-threat out-groups were infrahumanized whereas the low-threat ones were not. At the same time, the high-threat groups invoked more perceived threat and more blatant prejudice than the low-threat ones. Therefore it was decided to examine whether perceived threat and blatant prejudice may mediate the infrahumanization of high-threat groups. The differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group (Δ Positive emotions) could not be explored as a possible mediator of infrahumanization, because a preliminary regression analysis indicated that the threat status of the group was not a predictor of positive emotions.

Regarding perceived threat and the infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) of real groups in Britain, a Sobel test indicated that perceived threat mediated their infrahumanization, Aroian's $z = 3.37$, $p < .001$, see Table 7.6.

Table 7.6 Perceived threat mediated the infrahumanization of the real groups in Britain ($N = 98$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.08	.06	
Threat status	.11	.04	.27**
Step 2			
Constant	.01	.04	
Threat status	.08	.02	.03
Perceived threat	-.08	.06	.43***

Note: $R^2 = .07$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .13$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, i.e. the possibility that the dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression analysis was carried out with perceived threat as the criterion and infrahumanization as the mediator. Infrahumanization was found to mediate perceived threat. Aroian's z = 2.22, $p < .05$, see Table 7.7, therefore it cannot be concluded that perceived threat mediated the infrahumanization of real groups in Britain.

Table 7.7 Infrahumanization mediated the perceived threat from the real groups in Britain ($N = 98$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	1.63	.29	
Threat status	1.16	.18	.55***
Step 2			
Constant	.98	.18	
Threat status	1.80	.45	.46***
Δ Human emotions	1.63	.29	.33***

Note: $R^2 = .30$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .10$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); *** $p < .001$

As for blatant prejudice, this was found to mediate the infrahumanization of real groups, i.e. the Gypsies, Aroian's $z = 3.67, p < .001$, see Table 7.8.

Table 7.8 Blatant prejudice mediated the infrahumanization of the real groups in Britain ($N = 98$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.08	.06	
Threat status	.11	.04	.27**
Step 2			
Constant	-.01	.04	
Threat status	.06	.01	-.02
Blatant prejudice	-.08	.06	.51***

Note: $R^2 = .07$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .18$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

However, infrahumanization was equally found to mediate blatant prejudice, Aroian's $z = 2.33, p < .05$, therefore it cannot be concluded that the infrahumanization of real groups in Britain was mediated by blatant prejudice, see Table 7.9.

Table 7.9 Infrahumanization mediated the blatant prejudice against the real groups in Britain ($N = 98$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	.89	.42	
Threat status	1.77	.26	.57***
Step 2			
Constant	1.46	.24	
Threat status	2.96	.63	.47***
Δ Human emotions	.89	.42	.37***

Note: $R^2 = .33$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .13$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$); *** $p < .001$

Similar regression analyses were conducted on artificial groups in Britain. Perceived threat was not found to mediate infrahumanization, Aroian's $z = 1.65$, ns. Similarly, blatant prejudice did not mediate the infrahumanization of artificial groups, Aroian's $z = 1.26$. In Romania, the ANOVA analysis had found that only the artificial

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groups were infrahumanized, and that the targets' threat status did not play a part in their infrahumanization. Furthermore, the targets' reality status did not moderate either perceived threat or blatant prejudice, therefore a mediation analysis was not deemed applicable.

As for the second measure of dehumanization, the dehumanization through traits, in Britain it had been found that the high-threat groups were more dehumanized than the low-threat ones. The mediation analysis examined whether perceived threat, blatant prejudice, or the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group mediated the dehumanization of high-threat groups. In Britain, in the case of the real groups, perceived threat did not mediate dehumanization, Aroian's $z = 0.98$, ns, neither did blatant prejudice, Aroian's $z = 1.60$, ns, nor did Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 1.67$, ns. Conversely, the dehumanization of the real groups (Gypsies) did not significantly predict perceived threat nor blatant prejudice, the targets' threat status being the main predictor of these two prejudice measures.

As for the artificial groups in Britain, perceived threat did not mediate their dehumanization, Aroian's $z = 0.92$, ns, neither did blatant prejudice, Aroian's $z = 1.15$, ns. Δ Positive traits was found to mediate the dehumanization of artificial groups, Aroian's $z = 2.92, p < .01$, but dehumanization also mediated Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 2.37, p < .05$, therefore it cannot be concluded that Δ Positive traits was a mediator of dehumanization. However, given that these were artificial groups, the participants could not have had any a-priori dehumanizing beliefs about the target groups. Therefore it may be likely that the positive attitudes they formed about the artificial target groups during the experimental manipulation may explain why they dehumanized the target groups.

Concerning the artificial groups in Romania, perceived threat did not mediate their dehumanization, Aroian's $z = 1.91$, ns. Blatant prejudice and Δ Positive traits were not significantly predicted by the targets' threat status, so no mediation analyses were possible in their case.

Regarding real groups in Romania, perceived threat did not mediate their dehumanization, Aroian's $z = 1.72$, ns, and conversely dehumanization was not found to be a significant predictor of perceived threat. However, blatant prejudice mediated

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the dehumanization of real groups, i.e. the Gypsies, Aroian's $z = 2.24$, $p < .05$, see Table 7.10 below.

Table 7.10 Blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization of the real groups in Romania ($N = 104$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.46	.12	
Threat status	.38	.08	.45***
Step 2			
Constant	.25	.10	
Threat status	.07	.03	.30*
Blatant prejudice	-.46	.12	.23*

Note: $R^2 = .21$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .03$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$); * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$

However, dehumanization did not mediate blatant prejudice, Aroian's $z = 1.84$, ns, see Table 7.11. The absence of feedback in the mediation chain indicates that the dehumanization of the Gypsies was due to the prejudice against them.

Table 7.11 Dehumanization does not mediate blatant prejudice against the real groups in Romania ($N = 104$)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	.04	.35	
Threat status	1.93	.22	.66***
Step 2			
Constant	1.71	.24	
Threat status	.57	.28	.59***
Δ Human traits	.04	.35	.17*

Note: $R^2 = .44$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .02$ for Step 2 ($p < .05$); * $p < .05$; *** $p < .001$

Δ Positive traits was also explored as a mediator, and was found to mediate dehumanization, Aroian's $z = 3.97$, $p < .001$, but dehumanization, too, mediated Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 3.68$, $p < .001$, therefore it cannot be concluded that Δ Positive traits mediated the dehumanization.

To sum up, no significant mediators of dehumanization were found for either the real or the artificial groups in either country. Only the dehumanization of real groups, i.e. the Gypsies, was found to be mediated by blatant prejudice in Romania. This is in line with the hypothesis of this study which stipulated that in the case of real groups, other factors than perceived threat such as prejudice are likely to play a part in the dehumanization of real groups.

7.4 Discussion

How has the inclusion of real groups alongside artificial ones contributed to the understanding of the relationship between perceived threat, blatant prejudice and dehumanization? I will examine here how this study has addressed the research hypotheses, discuss alternative interpretations for the results, examine this study's contribution to threat theories and dehumanization theories, and conclude with the directions for the next study.

The premises of this study was the hypothesis that the dehumanization of artificial groups may function as rationalization of the out-groups' poor and culturally different status, whereas the dehumanization of real groups may be an expression of prejudice. Also, I had hypothesised that perceived threat may mediate and explain the dehumanization of artificial groups, whereas in the case of real groups, it is their dehumanization that might mediate and explain the perceived threat from them.

So which groups were dehumanized? Concerning the artificial groups, these were generally dehumanized (through traits) in both countries, but the high-threat ones (poor and culturally different from the in-group) were more dehumanized than the low-threat ones (rich and culturally similar to the in-group), as indicated by the lower attribution of typically human traits. The findings on the dehumanization of artificial groups are very similar to those from the previous two experiments which had revealed that poor groups and culturally different groups are a particular target of dehumanization. This suggests that poverty and cultural differences are indeed antecedents of dehumanization. However, similarly to the previous two experiments, the artificial groups were dehumanized (through traits) regardless of their threat status, which raises alternative interpretations for the dehumanization effect. Firstly, it could be argued that the dehumanization of artificial groups may rest upon judgements of human typicality (see Chapters 5 and 6), and that the in-group may implicitly be assumed to represent the human norm. Secondly, it could be argued that as the artificial targets were presented as minorities, they may have elicited certain social (or ideological) representations about minority groups, and their minority status may have induced a lesser attribution of human typicality than the in-group. Thirdly, it may be argued that the dehumanization of the artificial groups functioned as a form of in-group favouritism. This interpretation would be in line with the infrahumanization

thesis (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000) which stipulates that individuals are motivated to 'reserve' the human essence to their in-group and to deny it to out-groups. Last but not least, it may be argued that the high-threat artificial groups were more dehumanized than the low-threat ones because of the threat they induced, although perceived threat was not found to mediated their dehumanization. As for the infrahumanization measure (dehumanization through emotions), this indicated that the artificial groups were overall infrahumanized in Romania, while in Britain only the high-threat group was infrahumanized (attributed less typically human emotions than the in-group), which suggests that the two measures of dehumanization were rather similar.

However, as regarded the real groups, the Gypsies and the Germans, only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) in both countries. This finding is in line with the existing research on the dehumanization of the Gypsies (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). Given that the pilot study had found the Gypsies to be a threatening group at both the material and symbolic levels, it is perhaps not surprising that they were also dehumanized. The Gypsies were also dehumanized through emotions (infrahumanized) but only in Britain. However, the fact that the Germans were not dehumanized, neither through traits nor through emotions) raises issues as to the functions of dehumanization. Firstly, the results from the real groups bring support to the ontologization thesis (dehumanization through traits) according to which only those groups perceived as having failed to be culturally assimilated would be dehumanized (Pérez et al., 2001). It may well be that the dehumanization of the Gypsies functions as a rationalization of their low socio-economic status. The findings on the dehumanization of the Gypsies also suggest that real groups and artificial groups elicit rather different responses.

Secondly, it could be argued that dehumanization is not a form of in-group favouritism, at least not in the case of real groups, otherwise, the Germans would have been dehumanized. Although other studies have found the Germans to be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) by groups such as the Italians (Paladino et al., 2004) or the British (Viki et al., 2006), in the present survey neither the British nor the Romanians infrahumanized the Germans. The Romanian participants even attributed the Germans more typically human emotions than to their

own group, thus suggesting that infrahumanization may function differently in relatively lower-status groups such as the Romanians (see the findings on the ideological asymmetry between the British and the Romanians in Chapters 5 and 6), and suggest that the Germans were perceived as a higher-status group, hence their 'over-humanization'.

What mediated the dehumanization of artificial and real groups, respectively? Concerning the artificial groups, neither perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice mediated their dehumanization (either through traits or emotions) in either country, which brings support to the interpretation that their dehumanization functioned as a rationalization of their status (poor and culturally different from the in-group). As for the real groups, in Britain neither perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice mediated their dehumanization (through traits), whereas in Romania blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization (through traits) of the Gypsies. This is in line with that Tajfel's (1981) conceptualization of dehumanization as being an extreme form of prejudice, and suggests that ontologization may go beyond issues of cultural assimilation (although in this study perceived failed cultural assimilation was not measured as a potential mediator). Interestingly and contrary to the research hypotheses, in the case of real groups dehumanization did not predict perceived threat, nor blatant prejudice, in neither country, which suggests that dehumanization may not be an antecedent of these measures of prejudice. However, regarding the emotions measure of dehumanization (infrahumanization), the mediation analyses indicated that in Britain, where only the Gypsies were infrahumanized, perceived threat mediated their infrahumanization. In a separate analysis, blatant prejudice mediated the infrahumanizatin of the Gypsies. However, the infrahumanization of the Gypsies also mediated perceived threat and blatant prejudice, respectively, therefore the results are rather unclear. Nonetheless, they do suggest that the dehumanization of real groups may be motivated by different factors than the dehumanization of artificial groups.

As to the present findings on perceived threat, these are rather interesting and relevant to the integrated threat theory (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2000). Firstly, the pilot study on the threatening and non-threatening groups indicated that groups can elicit (or not) the two types of threat rather simultaneously, and that the two types of perceived threat, material and symbolic, are very highly related.

Secondly, when the material and symbolic threat items were included together in a single scale, as in the present study, the different items failed to load on two distinct factors, thus suggesting that while it is possible to distinguish *theoretically* between the two types of threat, it may be difficult to distinguish between the two *empirically*. These results tie in with previous research which had found that the material and symbolic threat items loaded on a single factor (Renfro et al., 2006) and that only when they were combined in the same vignette did material and symbolic threat manipulations produce negative attitudes (Stephan et al., 2005). It is possible that one type of threat may drive the other, although it was beyond the scope of the present research to investigate this. It could also be argued that perceived threat is not so much a matter of perception but rather an expression or justification for prejudice. Overall, the present findings suggest that perceived threat should perhaps be operationalized as a combined measure of both material and symbolic threat.

To conclude, the present results suggest that, in line with the previous two experiments, poverty and cultural differences are antecedents of dehumanization at least in the case of artificial groups. However, given that, overall, perceived threat and blatant prejudice were not found to play a mediating role in dehumanization, the dehumanization of both artificial and real groups may also function as a rationalization of the targets' relative socio-economic status. In the case of real groups, dehumanization may function as a rationalization of their relative socio-economic status, but also of their relative power status, given their relationship with the in-group.

7.5 Progression to the next study

The present study found that not all real groups are dehumanized, only those perceived as having a negative effect on the country's economy and way of life. The lack of mediation from perceived threat suggests that dehumanization may go beyond prejudice and reflect a rationalization or a legitimization of the out-groups' status. Given that the pilot study revealed a kind of group hierarchy, with the Gypsies at the bottom and with the Germans and other groups at the top, it may be that dehumanization functions as explanations for the groups' relative status in group hierarchy. Therefore the present research will next examine the relationship between dehumanization and perceptions of power and of group status in the case of real groups.

Chapter 8   Perceived low group status: An explanation for dehumanization

Contents of Chapter 8

8.1.1 Introduction

In the previous three experiments with artificial groups (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7), I had found that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group and the targets' poor economic status predisposed the artificial groups to being dehumanized. As for the real groups, the questionnaire survey described in Chapter 7 revealed that the Gypsies were dehumanized by the both the British and the Romanians participants, whereas the Germans were not dehumanized by either group of participants. The Germans were not infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions), and the Romanian participants even infrahumanized their own group relative to the Germans. These results suggest that the British may have viewed their group as equal in status relative to the Germans, whereas the Romanians may have viewed their group as equal or lower in status relative to the Germans, while both the British and the Romanians viewed the Gypsies as a lower-status group. In this final experiment I examined whether perceptions of group status and perceptions of the out-group's legitimacy might explain the dehumanization of real groups such as the Gypsies.

How might perceived group status explain why a group is dehumanized? Status denotes "the prestige and honour publicly ascribed to particular positions and occupations within society" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999: 380). In inter-group contexts, group status is associated with differences in power, influence, and access to or allocation of resources. Moreover, group status involves beliefs about status, and judgements of social worth of the individuals or groups in question. As the status construction theory suggests (Ridgeway, 1991), certain nominal attributes, such as ethnicity, gender, or profession, can acquire status value if the members of that particular category are associated with certain attributes, e.g. access to resources. Dehumanization has been suggested to be related to social classification and stratification (Moscovici, 1979; Pérez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002), as well as to beliefs about the 'essence' of groups, therefore it may well be that dehumanization is more linked to perceptions of group status than the existing theories of dehumanized have stipulated.

But status itself involves a process of social comparison between in-group and the out-groups. And as it has been noted, "relative group status refers to the value or

prestige typically accorded to one social group or category compared to another" (Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 2002: 269-270). However, for social comparisons to take place between groups, there needs to be a certain degree of similarity between the groups involved, or a certain degree of perceived legitimacy of the relationship between the two groups. Therefore it could be argued that one cannot separate considerations of relative group status from considerations of either similarity between groups or the legitimacy of the relationship between them.

As for legitimacy, this has been defined as "a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just" (Tyler, 2006: 375), with status hierarchies and inequalities of status lending themselves to being legitimized (Zelditch, 2001). Legitimacy is largely *perceived*, in the sense that is constitutes "an individual's *subjective* appraisal that the social hierarchy defining the relative status of different groups is fair in that it is based on actual differences in ability or effort between those groups" (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001: 783, emphasis added). Beliefs about status and the perceived legitimacy of status differences are inextricably linked, because without their social validity and apparent widespread acceptance, status beliefs would be undermined (Ridgeway, 2001). Legitimacy has also been defined as one of the bases of social power, where social power refers to the ability or the potential of an individual or a group to induce or prevent change in another individual or group (Raven, 1999; French & Raven, 1958). Unlike other sources of social power such as reward or coercion, legitimacy, although dependent on the influencing agent, is assumed not to require surveillance by the influencing agent, thus suggesting that legitimacy can be accepted and internalized by the individuals or groups subjected to change. Legitimate power is assumed to be based on a structural relationship between the source of the influence and the target, and to involve beliefs about obligation, commitment, contract, etc. as well as feelings of obedience (Raven, 1999). For the influencing agent, occupying a position of power may be enough to influence the target, thus exercising 'authority pressure' (Cialdini, 1988).

How might group status influence the process of dehumanization? The infrahumanization paradigm holds that both high-status and low-status groups engage in infrahumanization, and that the status of the out-group is not a moderator or a

mediating factor (Leyens et al, 2001; Leyens et al, 2002; Demoulin et al, 2005), because all human groups are assumed to be motivated to reserve the human essence to their in-group. For example, research has shown that Italian participants infrahumanized the Germans relative to their in-group (Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004), while Belgian and Italian participants associated secondary emotions more with their in-groups than with North-African targets (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2006). However, some other research suggests that status may be a mediating factor, because when in-group and out-group are of equal status, i.e. French vs. Germans, and Germans vs. French, there is no differential attribution of secondary emotions, (Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, unpublished manuscript). While the infrahumanization research has established the infrahumanization effect, it has not delved deeply on how beliefs about group status or legitimacy might moderate the phenomenon (arguably because it has envisaged infrahumanization as a form of in-group bias). As for the ontologization paradigm, although it views dehumanization as reflecting beliefs about group stratification, it, too, has failed to take into account beliefs about group status or legitimacy, choosing to focus instead on issues related to cultural assimilation and social integration.

Given the possible impact of perceived legitimacy of status differences in inter-group relations, I proposed to examine the roles that perceived group status and perceived legitimacy of the out-group might play in dehumanization. I retained perceived threat from the out-group as a variable because it was expected to influence perceptions of legitimacy. However, unlike the previous three experiments where threat was conceived as symbolic and material, in the current study threat was conceived as threat to the in-group's social identity (e.g. Tajfel, 1982; Grant & Brown, 1995; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Voci, 2006). I set up a vignette experiment using the Gypsies and the Germans as target out-groups, and I manipulated threat under the form of political pressure from the out-group on the in-group, formulated as a policy put forward by the out-group and likely to be adopted by the in-group's government. In the high-threat condition the out-group's proposed policy involved changes on the part of the in-group to accommodate the out-group's requirements. In the low-threat condition, the out-group's policy required few changes on the part of the out-group.

8.1.2 Research hypotheses

If dehumanization is linked to social comparisons between in-group and out-group, then we would expect the relative status of the groups and the perceived legitimacy of status differentials to have an influence on dehumanization. If the out-group is lower in status than the in-group, it is likely to be dehumanized, regardless of perceptions of legitimacy. However, if the out-group is higher in status than the in-group, we would expect it to be dehumanized only if its high status is perceived as illegitimate. I expected that perceived threat would influence the perceptions of legitimacy: the more threatening the out-group, the less legitimate it should be perceived. I also hypothesised that the Germans would be rated as a high-status group, whereas the Gypsies as a low-status one. I examined the following hypotheses:

1. both groups will be infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions)
2. the Gypsies will be more dehumanized than the Germans (through traits)
3. the Germans will be dehumanized only if their authority is perceived as illegitimate

8.2 Method

8.2.1 Design

The study had a 2 (Gypsies vs. Germans) x 2 (high threat vs. low threat) factorial design. In Romania, the cell sizes varied from 34 to 53, and in Britain, from 21 to 23.

8.2.2 Participants and procedure

One hundred and seventy-one Romanian nationals, 97 females and 74 males males, and 2 participants who did not declare their gender, M age = 30.13, age range = 18 to 67, participated in the study. All of them were of Romanian nationality, 165 of Romanian ethnicity, 5 of Hungarian ethnicity and 1 of Turkish ethnicity. In Romania, 87 participants completed the 'Germans' questionnaires (53 in the high-threat condition and 34 in the low-threat one), and 84 participants filled in the 'Gypsy (Roma)' questionnaires (40 in the high-threat condition, and 44 in the low-threat one).

Eighty-six British participants, 53 females and 33 males, M age = 26.33, age range = 18 to 61, took part in the study. 65 participants were of English ethnicity, the remaining 21 being of various ethnicities. 54 were university students and 32 were people of various professions. In Britain, 42 participants completed the 'Germans' questionnaires (21 in the high-threat condition and 21 in the low-threat one), and 44 participants filled in the 'Gypsy (Roma)' questionnaires (21 in the high-threat condition, and 23 in the low-threat one).

The participants received a questionnaire that was introduced as part of a study exploring perceptions of group equality in their country. Some of the questionnaires were completed online, while others were administered to students in class under supervision. Those student participants were recruited in class, and through snowball sampling. Some British participants took part in exchange for a course credit. To counteract potential multiple submissions, the IP addresses of the participants were checked. The researcher's email address was included in the web survey to enable participants to receive feedback, ask for help, or comment on any problems they may have encountered.

8.2.3 Materials

Four vignettes were designed for this study, two of them referring to the Germans and the other two to the Gypsies (Roma). A sample vignette from the 'Gypsy condition' will be presented here representing the low-threat version of the threat manipulation (see *Appendix VI a*, for an example of the British version of the questionnaire, and *Appendix VI b*, for an example of the Romanian version). The italicized text in brackets represents the high-threat version of the threat manipulation:

A recent report from the EU monitoring organization European Diversity in Education has highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) pupils in schools. [*It has found that exclusion is particularly bad in Britain / Romania.*] The European Roma Rights Office has used this report to recommend [*persuade*] the European Commission to propose a new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU and the EU accession countries. If adopted by each EU member state and accession country, this directive will not be binding, but will give local education authorities the option and flexibility [*If adopted by each EU member state and EU accession country, this*

will require the local education authorities] to reserve special school places to Roma pupils, to offer Romani language schooling to Roma pupils, to offer free access for Roma pupils to compulsory and post-compulsory education where affordable, including higher education, and to introduce topics addressing Roma culture and history. The directive has been formulated in such way that if it is passed, it will not require additional funding from the taxpayer, nor will it reduce the number of school places available to non-Roma children. [*However, if the directive is adopted, it will require additional funding from public money, and will also reduce the number of school places available to non-Roma children.*] It is also unlikely to put an additional burden on any under-staffed state schools. [*Some British / Romanian politicians have expressed concern that it will also put an additional burden on some under-staffed state schools.*]

In the 'Germans condition', the participants were told that the German Parliament had used the report to persuade the European Commission to propose a new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU. Their motive was to 'promote the German model of multiculturalism'.

8.2.3.1 Ideological measures: in-group identification and social dominance orientation

In-group identification and social dominance orientation were measured exactly as in Experiments 1 and 2. High scores indicated a high level of in-group identification, and of social dominance orientation, respectively.

8.2.3.2 Prejudice measures: manipulation check, perceptions of the out-group, and dehumanization

8.2.3.2.1 Manipulation check: the perceived likelihood of the out-group's suggested policy

Three items ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) measured the perceived likelihood of the out-group's suggested policy of being implemented, e.g.

How likely do you think it is that this directive will be adopted by the British [Romanian] government?

8.2.3.2.2 Perceptions of the out-group

Seven items ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) assessed the perceived legitimacy of the target out-group, e.g. *How legitimate do you think it is for the Germans [Gypsies] to initiate this directive?* None of the seven items was reverse-coded.

The participants also completed open-ended measures of perceptions of group status. They were informed that 'some groups are more advanced than others' and were required to rank nine target groups on seven indicators of status, e.g. *being economically developed.* The ranking varied from 1 to 9, where 1 indicated the most advanced group, while 9, the least advanced group. The groups included the Gypsies, the Germans, the Romanians, the British, plus five 'filler' groups, e.g. French, Moldovans.

8.2.3.2.3 Dehumanization

Dehumanization was measured similarly to the previous experiments, using the same target emotions and traits as in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The traits were listed before the emotions, and the participants selected traits and emotions to represent the target out-group and the in-group.

8.3 Results

When I analysed the data, I explored: (1) whether the experimental manipulations had been effective; (2) whether the ideological measures had been affected by the experimental manipulations; (3) whether the Gypsies were more dehumanized than the Germans; (4) whether the Gypsies were perceived as less legitimate and lower in status than the Germans; (5) whether perceived threat or perceived legitimacy mediated dehumanization. The analyses will be reported in turn in the following sections.

8.3.1 Manipulation checks: perceived likelihood of out-group's policy

The measure of likelihood was reliable, $\alpha = .70$ in Romania, and $\alpha = .80$ in Britain. A three-way ANOVA, with the participants' nationality (Romanian vs. British), and the targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as independent variables, was conducted on perceived likelihood scores. The Romanians perceived the implementation of the out-groups' policy as more likely than did their British counterparts, $Ms = 3.67$ vs. 3.15, $F (1, 248) = 9.28$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$. The implementation of the out-group's policy was perceived as more likely when the threat invoked by the policy was low rather than high, $Ms = 3.63$ vs. 3.19, $F (1, 248) = 6.98$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$. There was also a significant interaction between nationality and threat status, $F (1, 248) = 7.49$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$, indicating that when the threat was high, the Romanians perceived the implementation as more likely than did the British, $Ms = 3.67$ vs. 2.70, $t (1, 132) = 4.10$, $p < .001$, whereas when the threat was low, the Romanians and the British perceived the implementation of the policy equally likely, $Ms = 3.66$ vs. 3.61, $t (1, 120) = 0.26$, ns. There were no other significant effects of ethnicity and no other significant interactions, all $Fs < 1.50$, ns.

8.3.2 Ideological measures: in-group identification and SDO

The in-group identification scale was reliable in Romania, $\alpha = .88$, and in Britain, $\alpha = .88$. Two-way ANOVAs, with the out-groups' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as independent variables, were conducted on in-group identification scores in each country. In Britain, there were no significant main effects and no interactions for in-group identification, all $Fs < 2$, ns. However, in Romania there was a main effect of the out-groups' threat level, $F (1, 167) = 18.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$, meaning that the Romanian participants identified more with their in-group when the out-group's proposed directive was threatening for their in-group than when it was not, $Ms = 5.54$ vs. 4.73. There were no other main effects or interactions. These results suggest that in Romania in-group identification should be included as a covariate in the analyses of the other dependent variables, e.g. conducting ANCOVAs instead of ANOVAs, in order to increase the experimental control.

As regarded SDO, the scale was reliable in Romania, $\alpha = .82$, and in Britain, $\alpha = .90$. A three-way ANOVA, with the participants' nationality (Romanian vs. British), the targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as

independent variables, was conducted on SDO scores. The Romanians expressed higher levels of SDO than did the British, Ms = 3.35 vs. 2.48, F (1, 249) = 48.35, p < .001, η^2 = .16. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2. In Romania, SDO and in-group were negatively and non-significanly correlated, r (1, 169) = -.09, ns, (similarly to the findings from the experiments 1 and 2). In Britain in-group identification and SDO were positively but marginally significantly correlated, r (1, 84) = .21, p = .057. However, despite the marginal statistical significance, the correlation coefficient in Britain is in line with the correlation coefficients from Experiment 1, r = .24 and Experiment 2, r = .23.

Given that in-group identification, as well as its relationships to other group-related variables, may vary as a function of the threat to the social identity of the in-group, it was decided to analyse the correlations between in-group identification and the other variables by threat condition, see the table below:

Table 8.1 Correlations between in-group identification and the dependent variables in Romania (N =171) and in Britain (N = 86) as a function of the targets' threat status

	In-group identification			
	Romania		Britain	
	High threat	Low threat	High threat	Low threat
SDO	-.08	-.02	.44**	.00
Perceived likelihood	.03	.20	.08	.04
Perceived legitimacy	-.06	-.01	-.13	-.03
Human emotions out-group	-.02	-.21	-.18	-.19
Human emotions in-group	.41***	.12	.05	.16
Positive emotions out-group	-.04	-.03	-.20	-.21
Positive emotions in-group	.43***	.29*	.05	.27
Human traits out-group	.14	.02	-.11	.04
Human traits in-group	.14	.14	.17	.28
Positive traits out-group	.05	-.09	-.35*	-.25
Positive traits in-group	.36***	.40***	.45**	.34*

*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001.

As it can be seen in the table above, in-group identification and the positive traits attributed to the in-group were positively and significantly correlated regardless of the targets' threat status, and also regardless of the participants' in-group status, suggesting that the relationship between in-group identification and in-group favouritism may not be strengthened nor weakened by out-group threat, in either low-status (Romania) or high-status groups (Britain). Interestingly, SDO and in-group

identification were significantly and positively correlated in Britain only in the high-threat condition, and given that both SDO and in-group identification were measured after the threat manipulation, it could be argued that the relationship between the two variables functioned as a defence against the out-group's threatening policy. This result supports the suggestions that SDO may vary as a function of social threat (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) and that rather than being a general psychological orientation, SDO reflects support for specific forms of dominance and inequality that are salient in specific contexts (e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007).

8.3.3 Attributions of humanness and of positivity to out-group and in-group

As in the previous experiments, for each participant a 'humanness' score was calculated for the emotions / traits attributed to the out-group and in-group, respectively. This was calculated by multiplying each emotion / trait selected by the participant for the respective group (in-group or out-group) with its humanness weighting, adding them up and dividing them by the number of the emotions / traits attributed to the target (in-group or out-group. The same procedure was used for calculating the positivity of the emotions and traits, respectively, attributed to in-group and out-group.

Mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted separately on the attribution of human emotions and traits in each country. The between-participants factors were the targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies), and the targets' threat status (high vs. low). Target group (in-group vs. out-group) was the within-participants factor. The dependent variables were the typically human emotions, and respectively traits, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group. Similar analyses were conducted separately for the attribution of positivity, with the positive emotions, and traits, respectively, attributed to the out-group and to the in-group as the dependent variables. In Romania, in-group identification was not included as a covariate because it correlated significantly only with the typically human emotions and traits attributed to the in-group.

8.3.3.1 The attribution of typically human and positive emotions

In Romania, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 8, $M = 4.94$, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 9, $M = 5.23$. The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that relatively equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the out-group, $Ms = 5.22$ vs. 5.19, $F(1, 167) = 1.17$, ns. However, the target' ethnicity moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, $F(1, 167) = 6.59$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .04$: equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, $Ms = 5.22$ vs. 5.25, $t(1, 84) = 0.70$, ns, whereas more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, $Ms = 5.22$ vs. 5.13, $t(1, 81) = 2.54$, $p = .013$ (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level $= .025$). Thus, only the Gypsies were infrahumanized. The Germans were attributed more typically human emotions than the Gypsies, $Ms = 5.25$ vs. 5.13, whereas equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, $Ms = 5.23$ vs. 5.22, as indicated by the between-participants effect, $F(1, 167) = 5.69$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .03$, see Fig. 8.1 below.

The targets' threat status also moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, $F(1, 167) = 4.17$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .02$, as more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group when the out-group was threatening than when it was not, $Ms = 5.25$ vs. 5.19. Furthermore, there was no interaction between the out-group's ethnicity and threat status, $F < 1$, ns.

Fig. 8.1 Attribution of typically human emotions in Romania

As for the attribution of positive emotions in Romania, the assumption of sphericity was met. The analysis indicated that overall more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.52 vs. 4.07, F (1, 167) = 30.71, $p < .001$, η^2 = .16. The targets' ethnicity moderated the attribution of positive emotions, F (1, 167) = 23.63, $p < .001$, η^2 = .12. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 4.54 vs. 4.46, t (1, 84) = 0.71, ns, whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.52 vs. 3.70, t (1, 81) = 7.19, $p < .001$. At the same time, more positive emotions were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, as indicated by the between-participants effects, F (1, 167) = 21.75, $p < .001$, η^2 = .12, Ms = 4.46 vs. 3.70, but equal positive emotions were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.54 vs. 4.52. There were no other main effects or significant interactions, all $Fs < 3$, ns.

In Britain, the number of emotions ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 6, M = 4.83, and those attributed to the in-group from 2 to 8, M = 5.01. The assumption of sphericity was met. Overall, more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 5.37 vs. 5.32, F (1, 82) = 8.03, $p < .01$, η^2 = .09. The targets' ethnic status moderated the attribution of typically human emotions, F (1, 82) = 26.50, $p < .001$, η^2 = .24. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 5.36 vs. 5.40, t (1, 41) = 1.60, ns, whereas more typically human emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 5.38 vs. 5.24, t (1, 43) = 6.06, $p < .001$. Thus, similarly to Romania, only the Gypsies were infrahumanized, see Fig. 8.2 below. There were no other significant effects or interactions, all $Fs < 1$. The Gypsies were also attributed less human emotions than the Germans, Ms = 5.24 vs. 5.40, as indicated by the between-participants effects, F (1, 82) = 18.12, $p < .001$, η^2 = .18.

Fig. 8.2 Attribution of typically human emotions in Britain

As for the attribution of positive emotions in Britain, the assumption of sphericity was met. The analysis indicated that overall more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, $Ms = 5.05$ vs. 4.50, $F(1, 82) = 23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .22$. The out-groups' ethnicity moderated the attribution of positive emotions, $F(1, 82) = 8.73$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .10$. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance $= .025$) indicated that equally positive emotions were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, $Ms = 5.01$ vs. 4.81, $t(1, 41) = 1.18$, ns, whereas more positive emotions were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, $Ms = 5.09$ vs. 4.20, $t(1, 43) = 6.30$, $p < .001$. The Gypsies were also attributed less positive emotions than the Germans, $Ms = 4.20$ vs. 4.81, $F(1, 82) = 4.70$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .05$. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, both $Fs < 1$, ns.

To sum up, in both Romania and Britain the Gypsies were infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) and were also attributed less positive emotions than the in-group and than the Germans[1]. The infrahumanization of the Gypsies was not moderated by perceptions of threat. In Romania the correlation between the human and the positive emotions attributed to the Gypsies was $r(1, 82) = .67$, $p < .001$, while for the Germans it was $r(1, 85) = .80$, $p < .001$, the difference between correlation coefficients being non-significant, Fisher's r-to-z transformation $= 1.72$, ns. In Britain, the correlation between the human and the positive emotions attributed to the Gypsies

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[1] In Romania, a secondary analysis using the primary vs. secondary emotions dichotomy indicated that the Germans were attributed equal secondary emotions as the in-group, while the Gypsies were attributed less secondary emotions than the in-group. In Britain, a similar analysis revealed that the British participants attributed more secondary emotions to the Germans than to their in-group, whereas they ascribed more secondary emotions to their in-group than to the Gypsies.

was r (1, 42) = .70, p < .001, while for the Germans it was r (1, 40) = .51, p < .01, the difference between correlation coefficients being non-significant. Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 1.36, ns.

8.3.3.2 The attribution of typically human and positive traits

In Romania, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 2 to 11, M = 6.97, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 13, M = 7.49. The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that more typically human traits were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.93 vs. 4.66, F (1, 167) = 88.80, p < .001, η^2 = .35. The out-groups' ethnic status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, F (1, 167) = 97.20, p < .001, η^2 = .37. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.91, t (1, 86) = 0.43, ns, whereas more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.41, t (1, 83) = 11.90, p < .001. Thus, only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits), in line with the research hypothesis, see Fig. 8.3 below.

The targets' threat status did not moderated the attribution of typically human traits, F (1, 167) = 2.65, ns. More typically human traits were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.91 vs. 4.41, while equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.89 vs. 4.95, F (1, 167) = 61.30, p < .001, η^2 = .30. However, there was a significant interaction between the out-groups' ethnicity and threat statuses, F (1, 167) = 4.08, p < .05, η^2 = .02. This indicated that when the target out-group was the Gypsies, more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group in the high-threat than in the low-threat condition, Ms = 5.01 vs. 4.90.

Fig. 8.3 Attribution of typically human traits in Romania

As for the attribution of positive traits in Romania, the assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that, overall, more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.86 vs. 4.22, F (1, 167) = 46.70, p < .001, η^2 = .22. The out-groups' ethnic status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 167) = 70.26, p < .001, η^2 = .30, indicating that equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.93, whereas more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.92 vs. 3.51. There was also a main effect of the out-groups' ethnicity for the between-participants effects, F (1, 167) = 70.50, p < .001, η^2 = .30, which indicated that more positive traits were attributed to the Germans than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.93 vs. 3.51, but equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group in the two conditions, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.92. There were no other main effects or interactions.

In Britain, the number of traits ascribed to the out-group varied from 3 to 18, M = 6.79, and those attributed to the in-group from 3 to 10, M = 7.01. The assumption of sphericity was met, and the analysis indicated that more typically human traits were overall attributed to the in-group than to the out-group, Ms = 4.73 vs. 4.42, F (1, 82) = 94.90, p < .001, η^2 = .54. The out-groups ethnic status moderated the attribution of typically human traits, F (1, 82) = 49.10, p < .001, η^2 = .38. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that equally typically human traits were attributed to the in-group and to the Germans, Ms = 4.70 vs. 4.62, t (1, 41) = 1.80, ns, whereas more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group

than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.80 vs. 4.23, t (1, 43) = 12.93, p < .001. Thus, only the Gypsies were dehumanized in Britain, see Fig. 8.4 below. The Germans were attributed more typically human traits than the Gypsies, Ms = 4.62 vs. 4.23, while the in-group was attributed equally typically human traits in the two conditions, Ms = 4.70 vs. 4.80, F (1, 82) = 23.30, p < .001, η^2 = .22. There were not other significant effects or interactions, all Fs < 1, ns.


Fig. 8.4 Attribution of typically human traits in Britain

As for the attribution of positive traits in Britain, the assumption of sphericity was met. Overall, equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the out-groups, Ms = 4.84 vs. 4.62, F (1, 82) = 2.49, ns. The out-groups' ethnic status moderated the attribution of positive traits, F (1, 82) = 21.17, p < .001, η^2 = .21. Paired-samples t-tests (with Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance = .025) indicated that, equally positive traits were attributed to the in-group and the Germans, Ms = 4.73 vs. 5.15, t (1, 41) = 1.94, ns, whereas more positive traits were attributed to the in-group than to the Gypsies, Ms = 4.95 vs. 4.09, t (1, 43) = 4.98, p < .001. The Gypsies were also attributed less positive traits than the Germans, Ms = 4.09 vs. 5.15, whereas the in-group was attributed equally positive traits in the two conditions, Ms = 4.94 vs. 4.73, F (1, 82) = 13.54, p < .001, η^2 = .14. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 1, ns.

To sum up, in both Romania and Britain the Gypsies were attributed less typically human as well as less positive traits than the in-group and than the Germans. The dehumanization of the Gypsies was not to be moderated by perceptions of threat

from them. The hypothesis according to which the Germans would be dehumanized if they are perceived as illegitimate was not supported in either country. In Britain, the correlation between the human typicality and the positive valence of the traits attributed to the Gypsies was r (1, 42) = .30, p < .05, while the human typicality and the positive valence of the traits attributed to the Germans were correlated at r (1, 40) = .77, p < .01. In Britain, the difference between the two correlations was significant. Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 3.18, p < .001. In Romania, the correlation between the human typicality and the positive valence of the traits attributed to the Gypsies was r (1, 82) = .70, p < .001, while for the Germans it was r (1, 85) = .48, p < .001. The difference between the two correlations was also significant in Romania, Fisher's r-to-z transformation = 2.18, p < .05. These results firstly suggest that the attribution of typically human traits to the out-groups was not necessarily dependent on their positive valence. Secondly, the asymmetry between the correlations in Romania and Britain suggests that the overlap between human typicality and positive valence may not be dependent only on the out-group's status, but also on that of the in-group.

8.3.4 Prejudice measures: perceived likelihood of out-group's policy and perceptions of the out-group

Although in Romania in-group identification varied as a function of the targets' threat status, in-group identification was not included as a covariate in the analyses on the dependent variables because it did not correlate with any of the dependent variables.

The scale of perceived legitimacy of the out-group was reliable in both countries, α = .89 in Romania, and α = .86 in Britain. A three-way ANOVA, with the participants' nationality (Romanian vs. British), the targets' ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies) and threat status (high vs. low) as independent variables, was conducted on perceived legitimacy scores. The targets were perceived as more legitimate when they induced low rather than high threat, Ms = 4.26 vs. 3.58, F (1, 249) = 13.11, p < .001, η^2 = .05. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, all Fs < 3, ns. Thus, the targets' ethnicity did not play a part in the perceptions of legitimacy, only their threat status. Therefore, the hypothesis according to which the Germans would be perceived as more legitimate than the Gypsies was not supported.

Regarding the perceived status of the out-group, the responses were coded into "out-group is a low-status group" if the participants ranked their in-group higher than the target out-group, and "out-group is a high-status group" if the participants ranked their in-group lower than the target out-group. Thus, the data was categorical and not ordinal. Given that there were three categorical variables, ethnicity (Germans vs. Gypsies), threat level (high vs. low), and out-groups' rated status (higher vs. lower than in-group), loglinear analysis was used to analyse the data (see Field, 2005). The assumption that all cells have expected frequencies greater than 1 was met. Loglinear analysis was conducted separately on each of the seven status items.

In Romania, for all seven questions pertaining to the out-groups' status the analysis indicated that the highest-order interaction ethnicity x threat level x out-groups' status was not significant. Among the two-way interactions for all seven questions, only the interactions between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status were found to be significant. Overall, the results indicated that the threat level induced by the out-groups' proposed policy did not have an effect on, nor did it moderate, the status ratings of the target out-groups. The interaction between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status indicated that the Germans were rated as a higher status group than the in-group, whereas the Gypsies were rated as a lower status group than the in-group, see the table below with the chi-square values for the interactions between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status, and the associated effect sizes (z) and odds ratios for all seven status items. As it can be seen from the odds ratios, the Gypsies were much more likely than the Germans to be considered a lower-status group relative to the Romanians.

Table 8.2 Chi-square, odds ratios and effect sizes of the interactions between ethnicity and rated status for each status item in Romania ($N = 171$)

Items	N	$\chi^2 (1)^*$	z	odds**	
				Gypsies	Germans
1. Being technologically advanced	167	219	6.37	n/a	n/a***
2. Contributing positively to European culture	166	110.72	7.69	76	0.013
3. Being economically developed	166	201.34	6.60	n/a	n/a
4. Being a model to other groups	163	160.32	8.17	377	0.003
5. Making contributions to scientific development	162	182	6.27	950	0.001
6. Having modern and liberal values	161	133.06	7.74	136.54	0.007
7. Being able to influence other groups or countries	162	177.15	6.81	1290.90	0.0007

$* p < .001$. ** The odds ratios indicate low likely each group was to be considered a lower status group. *** The odds could not be calculated because one of the values was 0 (the Gypsies did not receive any ranking as a higher status group).

In Britain, similarly to Romania, for all seven questions pertaining to the out-groups' status the analysis indicated that the highest-order interaction ethnicity x threat level x out-groups' rated status was not significant, thus indicating that the out-groups' threat level did not have an effect on the status ratings of the target groups. Also similarly to Romania, there was a significant interaction between the out-groups' ethnicity and their status ratings, for all items except item 6. However, differently from Romania, in Britain there was also a main effect of status rating for all seven items. This indicated that all out-groups were consistently rated as lower in status than the in-group. For item 2, pertaining to the groups' contribution to European culture, there was an additional significant interaction between the out-groups' threat status and the status ratings. This indicated that while the Gypsies were rated as low-status group, the Germans were rated as a low-status group when they induced a high threat to the in-group, but were rated as a high-status group when they invoke a low threat to the in-group, see the table below with the chi-square values for the interactions between the out-groups' ethnicity and their rated status, and the associated effect sizes (z) and odds ratios for all seven status items. In many instances the odds ratios could not be calculated because the Gypsies did not receive any rankings as a higher-status group.

Table 8.3 Chi-square, effect sizes of the interactions between ethnicity and rated status for each status item in Britain ($N = 86$)

Items	N	$\chi^2 (1)^*$	z	odds** Gypsies	odds** Germans
1. Being technologically advanced	80	32.34	3.42	n/a	n/a***
2. Contributing positively to European culture	80	21.73	3.19	17.12	0.06
3. Being economically developed	79	24.98	3.08	n/a	n/a
4. Being a model to other groups	79	35.60	3.56	n/a	n/a
5. Making contributions to scientific development	81	20.86	2.86	n/a	n/a
6. Having modern and liberal values	79	3.41, ns	1.75	2.63	0.38
7. Being able to influence other groups or countries	80	21.32	2.89	n/a	n/a

$* p < .001$. ** The odds ratios indicate low likely each group was to be considered a lower status group. *** The odds could not be calculated because one of the values was 0 (the Gypsies did not receive any ranking as a higher status group).

Thus, the results indicate that in both countries the Gypsies were considered a low-status group. But while in Romania the Germans were rated as a group higher in status than the in-group, in Britain the Germans were rated lower in status than the in-group[2]. This data corroborates the findings from the previous experiments, such as the findings on the ideological asymmetry, which had suggested that the British thought of themselves as a high-status group, whereas the Romanians thought of themselves as a low-status group.

Furthermore, by averaging the scores on the seven status items, a new variable was created that indicated the average status of the target out-group, be it Germans or Gypsies, with higher values indicating a higher perceived status of the out-group. The seven status items had a reliability index of .97 in the Romanian sample (mean inter-item correlation = .82) and of .66 in the British sample (mean inter-item correlation = .22). Direct comparisons between Romania and Britain indicated that the Romanian participants regarded the Germans as higher in status than did the British participants, $Ms = 1.94$ vs. 1.41, $t (1, 127) = 18.85$, $p < .001$. However, both the Romanians and the British equally regarded the Gypsies as low in status, $Ms = 1.04$ vs. 1.04, $t (1, 126) =$

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[2] Incidentally, the Romanian participants mostly rated the British as a higher-status group than themselves, whereas the British participants mostly rated the Romanians as a lower-status group than their in-group. However, given the present study's focus on the prejudices against the Gypsies and the Germans within each country, the data on the Romanians' and British' ratings of each other were not analysed.

-0.17, ns. This new variable, termed *Perceived high out-group's status* to indicate the direction of correlations, was found to correlate negatively and significantly in both countries with the indices of dehumanization, ontologization and infrahumanization, respectively, see Table 8.4 below. Thus, the lower the perceived status of the target out-group was, the higher the difference in humanity and positivity between in-group and out-group.

Table 8.4 Correlations between the perceived out-group's status and the indices of dehumanization in Romania ($N = 171$) and Britain ($N = 86$)

	Perceived high out-group status	
	Romania	**Britain**
Δ Human traits	-.63***	-.55***
Δ Human emotions	-.20**	-.42***
Δ Positive traits	-.56***	-.61***
Δ Positive emotions	-.36***	-.38**

**$p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. 4 missing data in Romania and 5 missing data in Britain were replaced with the mean status rating of the respective target.

In Britain, the higher in status the out-group was perceived, the higher the level of perceived legitimacy of the policy suggested by the out-group, r (1, 84) = .27, $p < .05$, while in Romania this correlation was not significant, r (1, 169) = 0.02, ns. The perceived status of the out-group correlated significantly and negatively with in-group identification but only in Britain, r (1, 84) = -.32, $p < .01$, suggesting that the higher in status the participants perceived the out-group, the less they identified with their in-group. At the same time, the perceived status of the out-group correlated significantly and negatively with the human traits, but not with the human emotions, attributed to the in-group, see Table 8.5 below:

Table 8.5 Correlations between the perceived out-group's status and the humanity and positivity attributed to the in-group and out-group, respectively, in Romania ($N = 171$) and Britain ($N = 86$)

	Perceived high out-group status	
	Romania	**Britain**
Human traits in-group	-.17*	-.23*
Positive traits in-group	-.10	-.37***
Human emotions in-group	-.01	-.12
Positive emotions in-group	-.002	-.11
Human traits out-group	.67***	.53***
Positive traits out-group	.69***	.57***
Human emotions out-group	.25**	.44***
Positive emotions out-group	.48***	.39***

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. 4 missing data in Romania and 5 missing data in Britain were replaced with the mean status rating of the respective target.

There are certain issues arising from these sets of correlations. Firstly, as one might have expected, the higher in status the target out-groups were perceived, the more humanness they were attributed, both in terms of traits and emotions. But, at the same time, the higher in status the participants perceived their own in-group, the more human traits they attributed to it. Given that the human traits ascribed to the in-group also correlated positively and significantly with the level of in-group identification, it would appear that the humanness given to the in-group may be a function not only of in-group bias but also of relative in-group status. Secondly, the lack of significant correlations between the out-group's status rating and the human emotions attributed to the in-group does not support the tenet of infrahumanization theory according to which infrahumanization is linked to in-group bias or favouritism. Instead, it would appear that the in-group bias is expressed by means of traits rather than emotions, although in-group bias has never been a focus of the ontologization theory itself.

8.3.5 Correlates and mediators of dehumanization

In order to measure the correlations between dehumanization and the other variables, indexes of dehumanization were computed for each participant, similarly to the previous three experiments. This represented the difference in humanity between in-group and out-group, and was computed by subtracting the humanity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was computed separately for emotions (infrahumanization, Δ Human emotions) and traits (ontologization, Δ Human traits). These composite variables were used as criterions in the correlation analyses because it was not be possible to use simultaneously the two sets of scores for in-group and out-group.

Similarly, two other composite variables were computed which represented the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. These were computed by subtracting the mean positivity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group. This was done separately for emotions, Δ Positive emotions, and traits, Δ Positive traits. See Table 8.6 below for the correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the other measures of prejudice:

Table 8.6 Correlations between dehumanization and the ideological and prejudice measures in Romania ($N = 171$) and Britain ($N = 86$)

	Δ Human emotions		Δ Human traits		Δ Positive emotions		Δ Positive traits	
	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK	RO	UK
Δ Human traits	.30***	.36**	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive emotions	.72***	.71***	.41***	.26*	-	-	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.48***	.44***	.72***	.55***	.60***	.47***	-	-
In-group identification	.28***	.21*	.01	.13	.28***	.27*	.23**	.43***
SDO	.06	-.03	.10	.22*	.08	.05	.01	.22*
Perceived likelihood	-.14	.04	-.07	-.13	-.19*	-.08	-.20**	-.12
Perceived legitimacy	-.26**	-.01	-.17*	-.30**	-.34***	-.11	-.37***	-.34**
Perceived high out-group status	-.20**	-.42***	-.63***	-.55***	-.36***	-.38***	-.56***	-.61***

$* p < .05$; $** p < .01$; $*** p < .001$. In bold, the significantly different correlation coefficients between Romania and Britain.

As it can be seen in the table above, in both countries infrahumanization (Δ Human emotions) was positively and significantly correlated with the differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group, which suggests that infrahumanization may be linked to the positive-negative side of prejudice.

In both countries, Δ Human emotions was positively and significantly correlated with in-group identification, in line with the hypothesis that infrahumanization is linked to in-group favouritism and in-group identification (e.g. Demoulin et al., 2004b). However, the lack of significant correlation between Δ Human traits and in-group identification in both countries suggests that dehumanization is not related to in-group bias, but is rather on the status of the out-group.

The correlations between perceived legitimacy and the two measures of dehumanization suggest that the more legitimate the out-group was perceived, the less dehumanized it was. However, it was not possible to explore the mediating role of perceived legitimacy in dehumanization, neither in Romania nor in Britain, because in neither countries was the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups predicted by their ethnicity. Instead, perceived legitimacy was predicted by the threat status of the out-groups. However, it could be argued that, given the impact of the out-groups'

ethnicity on dehumanization, the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups is likely to be an effect of dehumanizing beliefs rather than vice-versa.

Nonetheless, given that in the present study only the Gypsies were dehumanized, it could be argued that ethnicity acted as a mediator of the dehumanization of the present target groups. As to what may have mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies, the present study cannot explore the mediating role of perceived legitimacy. Instead, it can explore the *moderators* of the Gypsies' dehumanization, i.e. those factors that decrease or increase their dehumanization, by examining the correlations between the indices of dehumanization and the ideology and prejudice measures. Correlations were preferred to median splits, and although they do not conform to proper moderation analysis which involves interactions between independent factors in ANOVA (see Baron & Kenny, 1986), it can be argued that the correlates of the Gypsies' dehumanization indicate how much more their dehumanization is increased (or decreased) in the presence of other factors, see Table 8.7 below.

Table 8.7 Correlates of the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania ($N = 84$) and Britain ($N = 44$)

	Δ Human traits		Δ Human emotions	
	Romania	**Britain**	**Romania**	**Britain**
Δ Human emotions	.36**	-.06	-	-
Δ Positive traits	.67***	.27	.50***	.07
Δ Positive emotions	.33**	-.24	.68***	.69***
In-group identification	.08	-.12	.32**	.06
SDO	.22*	.34*	.10	-.14
Perceived legitimacy	-.50***	-.21	-.31**	.19
Perceived high out-group status	-.28*	.16	-.21	-.16

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

As it can be seen in the table above, the higher levels of SDO the participants expressed, in both countries, the more they dehumanized (through traits) the Gypsies, in line with the hypothesis that ontologization can act as a principle of social classification (Pérez et al., 2002). Interestingly, in the case of the Germans, SDO correlated positively and significantly with their dehumanization (through traits) only in Britain, r (1, 84) = .33, $p < .05$, not in Romania, r (1, 169) = -.16, ns. This may be explained by the fact that the British participants had rated the Germans as lower in

status than themselves while the Romanian participants had rated them as higher in status than their in-group.

In Romania, the dehumanization (through emotions) of the Gypsies was also 'moderated' by in-group identification, suggesting that the more the participants identified with their in-group, the more likely they were to dehumanize the Gypsies. However, the correlations between Δ Human emotions and Δ Positive emotions in both countries suggest that the positive valence of the emotions may have mediated infrahumanization. This possibility will be explored through mediation analyses.

Regarding the mediators of infrahmanization (dehumanization through emotions), in Romania, the ANOVAs indicated a main effect of the targets' ethnicity on infrahumanization and also on the attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group. A stepwise regression was carried out, with the out-groups' ethnicity as the predictor, Δ Human emotions as the criterion, and Δ Positive emotions as the mediator. The analysis indicated that Δ Positive emotions mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on Δ Human emotions, Aroian's $z = 4.22$, $p < .001$, see Table 8.8 below.

Table 8.8 The differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Romania ($N = 171$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.13	.07	
Ethnic status	.11	.05	.17*
Step 2			
Constant	-.05	.04	
Ethnic status	.21	.02	-.07
Δ Positive emotions	-.13	.07	.74***

Note: $R^2 = .03$ for Step 1 ($p < .05$); $\Delta R^2 = .49$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). *$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$

However, given the possibility of feedback in mediational chains, i.e. the possibility that the dependent variable may cause the mediator, another regression analysis was carried out with Δ Positive emotions as the criterion, ethnic status of the out-groups as the predictor, and Δ Human emotions as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that Δ Human emotions mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on Δ Positive emotions, Aroian's $z = 2.16$, $p < .05$, see Table 8.9 below.

Table 8.9 Infrahumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive emotions to the in-group and the Gypsies in Romania ($N = 171$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.69	.26	
Ethnic status	.74	.16	.33***
Step 2			
Constant	.48	.12	
Ethnic status	2.46	.19	.21***
Δ Human emotions	-.69	.26	.68***

Note: $R^2 = .11$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .45$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). ***$p < .001$

Therefore, it cannot be concluded that Δ Positive emotions mediated the infrahumanization of the Gypsies. Given the high correlation between the index of infrahumanization and Δ Positive emotions in Romania, it may be difficult to separate the human and the positive sides of the emotions.

In Britain, the ethnic status of the out-groups played a part in their dehumanization, whereas their threat status played a part in their perceived legitimacy. Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups could not be analysed as a mediator of dehumanization.

However, the differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and out-group, Δ Positive emotions, had also been influenced by the out-groups' ethnic status, therefore Δ Positive emotions was explored as a mediator of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions). The analysis indicated that Δ Positive emotions mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on infrahumanization, Aroian's $z = 2.81, p < .01$, see Table 8.10 below.

Table 8.10 The differential attribution of positive emotions to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Britain ($N = 86$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.22	.06	
Ethnic status	.18	.04	.49***
Step 2			
Constant	-.18	.04	
Ethnic status	.11	.03	.30***
Δ Positive emotions	.11	.01	.62***

Note: $R^2 = .24$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .35$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). ***$p < .001$

However, infrahumanization was also found to mediate the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on Δ Positive emotions, Aroian's $z = 3.93$, $p < .001$, see Table 8.11 below. Thus it cannot be safely concluded that Δ Positive emotions mediated the infrahumanization of the Gypsies in Britain.

Table 8.11 Infrahumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive emotions to the in-group and the Gypsies in Britain ($N = 86$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.46	.36	
Ethnic status	.67	.23	.31**
Step 2			
Constant	.50	.29	
Ethnic status	-.12	.19	-.06
Δ Human emotions	4.32	.52	.74***

Note: $R^2 = .10$ for Step 1 ($p < .01$); $\Delta R^2 = .41$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

As for the mediators of dehumanization through traits, in Romania there had been only a significant main effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on dehumanization, as only the Gypsies were dehumanized. The out-groups' ethnic status also had a main effect on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), and on the attribution of positive traits to the in-group and out-group. Firstly, Δ Positive traits was analysed as a possible mediator. A regression analysis was conducted with the out-groups' ethnicity as the predictors, Δ Human traits as the criterion and Δ Positive traits as the mediator. A Sobel test indicated that Δ Positive traits mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies, Aroian's $z = 6$, $p < .001$, see Table 8.12 below.

Table 8.12 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania ($N = 171$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.57	.09	
Ethnic status	.56	.06	.60***
Step 2			
Constant	.29	.05	
Ethnic status	.18	.02	.31***
Δ Positive traits	-.57	.09	.55***

Note: $R^2 = .36$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .22$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). ***$p < .001$

However, Δ Human traits also mediated Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 6.58$, p < .001, see Table 8.13 below , therefore it is impossible to conclude whether Δ Positive traits mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania.

Table 8.13 Dehumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies in Romania ($N = 171$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-1.67	.39	
Ethnic status	1.54	.19	.53***
Step 2			
Constant	.45	.27	
Ethnic status	1.958	.19	.15*
Δ Human traits	-1.96	.21	.62***

Note: $R^2 = .28$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .25$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). *$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$

In Britain, similarly to Romania, the out-groups' ethnic status had a main effect on both dehumanization (Δ Human traits) and Δ Positive traits, so Δ Positive traits was analysed as a possible mediator of dehumanization. Δ Positive traits mediated the effect of the out-groups' ethnicity on Δ Human traits, Aroian's $z = 3.17$, $p < .01$, see Table 8.14 below.

Table 8.14 The differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies mediates the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Britain ($N = 86$)

	B	SE B	β
Step 1			
Constant	-.36	.10	
Ethnic status	.45	.06	.61***
Step 2			
Constant	-.21	.10	
Ethnic status	.33	.07	.45***
Δ Positive traits	.09	.02	.35***

Note: $R^2 = .37$ for Step 1 ($p < .001$); $\Delta R^2 = .10$ for Step 2 ($p < .001$). ***$p < .001$

However, Δ Human traits also mediated Δ Positive traits, Aroian's $z = 3.41$, p < .001, thus making it impossible to conclude whether Δ Positive traits mediated Δ Human traits, see Table 8.15 below.

Table 8.15 Dehumanization mediates the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and the Gypsies in Britain (N = 86)

	B	$SE\ B$	β
Step 1			
Constant	-1.70	.44	
Ethnic status	1.28	.28	.45***
Step 2			
Constant	-1.10	.44	
Ethnic status	.53	.32	.19
Δ Human traits	1.68	.44	.44***

Note: R^2 = .21 for Step 1 (p < .001); ΔR^2 = .12 for Step 2 (p < .001). ***p < .001

8.4 Discussion

So how has the present vignette experiment contributed to understanding the dehumanization of the Gypsies? I will examine here how this experiment has addressed the research hypotheses, how it has informed theories of dehumanization, and conclude with the directions for future studies.

The premises of this experiment were the findings from the previous study (see Chapter 7) which had indicated that the Gypsies were dehumanized, in both Britain and Romania, whereas the Germans were not. I hypothesised that, given the lack of mediation from perceived threat in the dehumanization of the Gypsies, their dehumanization may be explained in terms of perceptions of relative group status. In this vignette experiment I tried to manipulate the status of the Gypsies by giving them a higher power status, to examine whether this would influence their dehumanization.

So what has this experiment shown? It found that the Gypsies were dehumanized (both through traits and emotions), while the Germans were not, in both Britain and Romania. The Gypsies were also rated as a lower-status group relative to the Romanian and the British participants. Regarding the perceived legitimacy of the out-groups, the results from both Romania and Britain indicated that the out-groups' ethnicity did not play a part in the perceptions of legitimacy. Instead, the out-groups were perceived as more legitimate when their proposed changes were non-threatening than threatening to the in-group. Thus, the perceptions of legitimacy were not moderated by the out-groups' ethnic status, which meant that I could not explore whether the perceived legitimacy of the Gypsies played a part in their dehumanization. Looking at the patterns of correlations between the dehumanization

of the Gypsies and the other prejudice measures, I was able to observe that the dehumanization (through traits) of the Gypsies correlated negatively and significantly with their perceived legitimacy, in both countries. The ontologization of the Gypsies was not moderated by perceptions of threat from them, suggesting that ontologization (or at least the ontologization of the Gypsies) is not linked to perceived threat, similarly to the findings from the previous experiments. Given that the Gypsies were a real group, and that their dehumanization is a well-observed phenomenon (see Pérez et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005; Moscovici & Pérez, 2007), it could be argued that the dehumanization of the Gypsies prevented them from being perceiving in a legitimate light. This suggests that dehumanized groups may be denied a legitimate voice when it comes to formulating policies that promote their rights. and that higher-status and more 'legitimate' groups should have the duty to promote the rights of the dehumanized minorities.

The present results contribute to the existing research on dehumanization by suggesting that dehumanization can lead to the moral and social exclusion of certain groups. They also indicate that not all groups are dehumanized, and that dehumanization does not necessarily function as a form of in-group favouritism. Relevant to this point is the fact that although the British participants rated the Germans as lower in status than themselves, they nonetheless did not dehumanize them. It could perhaps be argued that the British participants' ratings of the Germans as being lower in status than their in-group reflected in-group favouritism rather than beliefs about the Germans' humanness. This suggests that being relatively lower in status than the in-group does not automatically predispose a group to being dehumanized. Also relevant is the fact that dehumanization (through traits) was not significantly correlated with in-group identification in either country.

As for the findings on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions), the present experiment indicated that the Gypsies were infrahumanized in both countries, and that the Germans were not. The results on the lack of infrahumanization of the Germans tie in with the results from the previous study (see Chapter 7), and they fail to support the infrahumanization thesis according to which all out-groups are infrahumanized. Although the British participants rated the Germans as lower in status than themselves they did not infrahumanize them, thus suggesting that relative

status is not necessarily a predictor of infrahumanization. Overall, the index of infrahumanization (Δ Human emotions) was correlated with in-group identification, thus bringing support to the postulation that infrahumanization is linked to in-group favouritism (Demoulin et al., 2004b). However, the infrahumanization of the Gypsies was significantly correlated with in-group identification only in Romania, thus raising questions as to the role that in-group identification plays in infrahumanization. The present results suggest that infrahumanization may function in similar ways to ontologization, in the sense of being contingent on certain features of the out-group, such as relatively low status, rather than on in-group bias. Also, the results suggest that when a low-status group is at stake, infrahumanization is not necessarily a 'lesser form of dehumanization', but rather a full expression of dehumanization, especially as the Gypsies were also dehumanized through the traits measure.

As for the threat manipulations, the Romanian participants perceived the changes likely in the threatening condition, whereas the British participants perceived them likely in the non-threatening condition. Arguably this indicates that the Romanians, as a lower-status group, perceived themselves powerless, whereas the British, as a higher-status group, perceived their group powerful and able to resist the threatening changes. In Britain, the higher the participants were in SDO, the less likely they perceived the out-groups' proposed changes, and the less legitimate they perceived the out-groups, whereas in Romania such relationship, although also negative, was not significant. Also, only in Britain was SDO positively and significantly correlated with the index of dehumanization (through traits) and with the differential attribution of positive traits to the in-group and the out-group. These findings would suggest that, in line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (see Sidanius Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), the British participants may have perceived themselves as a dominant group, whereas the Romanian participants, as a subordinate group.

As regards the correlates of dehumanization, there are a few things worth discussing. Firstly, the indexes of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and ontologization (dehumanization through traits) are significantly and positively correlated in both countries, suggesting that the two forms of dehumanization are related. However, given the small correlation coefficients, it can

be argued that infrahumanization and ontologization are not exactly the same phenomenon. Secondly, both infrahumanization and ontologization are positively, significantly and highly correlated with the differential attribution of positivity to in-group and out-group. This suggests that the process of dehumanization is closely linked to the positive-negative dimension of prejudice. Thirdly, the index of infrahumanization correlated positively and significantly with in-group identification in both countries. These results bring support to the infrahumanization's hypothesis that the more individuals identify with their in-group, the more they should feel inclined to infrahumanize the out-group. The index of ontologization, however, was not significantly correlated with in-group identification, which suggests that ontologization may not be contingent on in-group favouritism.

8.5 Conclusions

To sum up the present results, dehumanization seems to be linked to perceptions of relative group status rather to in-group identification, perceived legitimacy, or perceived threat to social identity. Given the presents results, I would suggest that infrahumanization researchers should reformulate the infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) theory to reflect the fact that only certain groups are the target of infrahumanization, and to focus on the conditions that lead certain stigmatized groups such as the Gypsies to being infrahumanized. At the same time, I would suggest the ontologization researchers to explore the dehumanization of the Gypsies as a legitimization of their stigmatized status in society, and as a justification for their social exclusion.

Chapter 9   General discussion and conclusions

Contents of Chapter 9

9.1 Key issues of the present research

The focus of the present research has been the dehumanization of ethnic groups in the context of culturally diverse societies. The aim was to identify the factors that predispose ethnic minority and immigrant groups to being dehumanized by majority members. In this sense, potential antecedents of dehumanization such as cultural differences between in-group and out-group, the out-group's poor socio-economic status, perceived threat (material or symbolic), and the relative power status of the out-group were at the core of the investigation. At the same time, the present research was concerned with whether dehumanization may function as a form of in-group favouritism or whether it is contingent upon certain features of the out-group, e.g. poverty or low status. Also, given the influence of postmaterialist values, economic development, relative power status, immigration experience, multicultural ideology, and Western norms of prejudice suppression, the present research was conducted in Romania and in Britain.

However, the focus of this study was not limited to inter-group relations. In order to understand the process of dehumanization itself, the present research also included investigations of the human-animal paradigm, which has been at the core of dehumanization research in recent years. The human-animal binary was revisited for two main reasons: firstly, to examine how the constructions of similarities and differences between humans and animals may help the operationalization of dehumanization in quantitative research, and secondly, to explore how the ideologies shaping humans' perceptions of animals and their relationship with them may inform theories of dehumanization.

Last but not least, in the present research I attempted to include a continuous measure of dehumanization, based on judgements of the human typicality of target emotions and traits. Measuring emotions and traits in terms of how typically human they are takes into account the ambiguous and shifting nature of the human-animal boundary, as highlighted in the focus group studies.

9.2 Summary of the main findings

9.2.1 Humans, animals, and speciesism: A blueprint for dehumanization

Most of the current research on dehumanization such as the infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) and the ontologization (dehumanization through traits) paradigms have employed the human-animal binary as a model for the theorization and operationalization of dehumanization. However, little attention has been generally paid to how the differences and similarities between animals and humans are constructed as a function of ideology, and how ideas about the animals' presumed inferiority might influence beliefs about human and animal nature. Equally, most of the dehumanization research has overlooked how prejudice against animals might serve as a model for prejudice against dehumanized humans. Given that "the very act of 'treating humans like animals' would lose its meaning if animals were treated well" (Plous, 2003: 510), I re-examined humans' treatment of animals to understand why animals are often placed in positions of inferiority and exploitation. In this sense, I revisited the ideology of speciesism (e.g. Singer, 1990), which is a set of beliefs that place human life above animal life, and I attempted to draw parallels between the beliefs about animals inferiority and those directed at dehumanized groups, and between speciesism and dehumanization as ideologies that justify the exploitation and moral exclusion of certain social categories.

The human-animal distinction is not clear-cut or value-free. Humans' position of power can influence humans' knowledge and perceptions of animals (see Chapter 3). I defamiliarized the categories *animal* and *human* and to take into account the power relationship between humans and animals as well as humans' production of knowledge about animals. Focus group discussions with 42 participants from Romania and Britain showed that *rational autonomy* was used as a dimension to make human distinct from and superior to animals, while *sentience* was used to explain the similarities between animals and humans and to acknowledge that animals had interests to stay alive and be free from pain. While most of the participants put humans' interests above those of animals, they nonetheless acknowledged that the exploitation and killing of animals was morally wrong in certain circumstances. The participants' reflections on how animals should be entitled to protection from harm on

the basis of their ability to feel pain, distress and suffering, suggest that dehumanization, as an extreme form of prejudice, may rest on the denial of primary rather than secondary emotions. Theoretically, this raises question as to whether the denial of secondary emotions to out-groups is a precursor to dehumanization or just a form of in-group bias that is unrelated to dehumanizing ideologies. If so, then studying secondary emotions cannot be an effective tool in the understanding of dehumanization. Secondly, the moral dilemmas reflected in the participants' debates over animal use and exploitation suggests that the dehumanization of animals is not an all-or-nothing, automatic phenomenon, but rather one that involves motivation, emotions, cognition, and ideology. I want to argue that dehumanization, too, is driven by specific needs, interests, and ideologies, and therefore social psychologists should take into account its cognitive aspects, as Tajfel (1981) would have advised. Thirdly, just as animals can be classified into pets, farm animals, laboratory animals and vermin, it may well be that dehumanized groups can vary in the degree to which they are dehumanized: some may be more morally and socially excluded than others, depending on their status relative to the in-group, the threat they invoke, and the benefits of exploiting them.

The ideology of speciesism, i.e. the belief that humans are inherently superior to animals and therefore entitled to exploit them, underlay the dehumanization of animals and it should be informative to the dehumanization paradigm, too. Firstly, speciesism brings to the fore the motives to dominate and exploit the 'other'. Just as speciesism legitimizes the use of farm animals for food and of laboratory animals for medical experimentation, dehumanization may legitimize the exploitation and domination of lower-status and powerless groups, such as the Gypsies and the poor. Secondly, speciesism justified the killing of animals perceived as pests, e.g. foxes, stray dogs, rats. Given these underlying motives of perceived threat and disgust, it could be argued that the dehumanization of humans, too, might rest upon feelings of disgust and of perceived threat, as in the dehumanization of the homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Therefore future studies should explore how these motives of domination and of perceived threat (and perhaps others that underpin speciesism) drive the dehumanization of vulnerable, stigmatized and shunned social groups.

9.2.2 Attributions of human typicality to in-group and out-group: A valid and reliable measure of dehumanization

Generally, in previous research on dehumanization, dehumanization has been assessed categorically, through the differential association of in-group and out-group members with animal-like versus human-like attributes (e.g. Deschamps et al., 2005), or with secondary versus primary emotions (e.g. Cortes et al., 2005). As the focus group discussions revealed that the distinctions between animals and humans are not clear-cut, and also in light of the research on *human nature* and *human uniqueness* as components of humanness (Haslam et al., 2005), I decided to employ a continuous measure of dehumanization. Thus, the target emotions and traits used in the present research were rated in terms of their human typicality and also in terms of their animal typicality (in a between-participants study) on 1-7 Likert scales, in both Britain and Romania (see Chapter 4). The positive valence of the emotions and traits was measured similarly on a 1-7 Likert scale, in each country. I contrasted the ratings of human typicality and those of animal typicality, and found that what is typically human is not necessarily un-typically animal, as for some emotions and traits there were no significant differences in the ratings between the *human* and *animal* conditions. Nevertheless, for most of the traits and emotions there were significant differences between the two conditions, in each country. There was a positive and highly significant correlation between the human typicality ratings of the target traits between Romania and Britain, thus suggesting that in each language and culture the target traits could be seen as varying in their human typicality. As for the emotions, the animal typicality ratings from the two countries were positively and significantly correlated, whereas their human typicality ratings were not, thus suggesting that emotions may relate more to animal than to human typicality, and less to human typicality than the traits. Thus dehumanization was operationalized in terms of how much human typicality was attributed to the in-group and to the out-group, respectively, and it was calculated separately for the emotions and the traits. As there were significant results on dehumanization in all of the eight experiments, in particular with regard to the human typicality of the traits, I would argue that such measure is a valid and reliable way of assessing dehumanization. By using such measure one can examine how the target is viewed as being less human than the in-group without necessarily being attributed more animality.

9.2.3 Antecedents of dehumanization: cultural differences, poverty, and relative group status

The series of 4 experiments replicated across Britain and in Romania examined the effects of an ethnic group's cultural differences from the in-group, its poverty and its relative power status on its dehumanization. The moderating roles of each of these factors will be examined in turn. The experiments with real and artificial groups did not employ a categorical measure of dehumanization such as human vs. animal attributes, but a continuous measure of human typicality (see Chapter 4).

Firstly, the experiments using artificial groups indicated that those groups described as culturally different from the in-group were more dehumanized (through traits) than the groups described as culturally similar to the in-group (in Romania, Experiment 1; in both countries, Experiments 2 and 3). It was also found that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group mediated the infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) of culturally different artificial groups in Britain, and the dehumanization (through traits) of culturally different artificial groups in Romania (Experiment 2). These findings bring support to the ontologization (dehumanization through traits) hypothesis (e.g. Pérez et al., 2001; Pérez et al., 2007) which stipulates that those groups perceived as having failed to culturally assimilate will be dehumanized in the sense that a different, less-than-human essence will be attributed to the them to explain their failure. Similarly, the results on the dehumanization of the culturally different groups support previous research which has shown that immigrants holding different values and beliefs are viewed as deviant from the norm and are 'abnormalized' (Verkuyten, 2001). Equally, the present results corroborate research which has found that perceived differences between out-group and in-group in the hierarchies of basic values can lead to the dehumanization of out-groups (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Thus, it is arguably safe to conclude that perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group can be an antecedent to dehumanization. Moreover, the fact that among the real groups only the Gypsies were dehumanized brings support to previous findings on their dehumanization (cf. Pérez et al., 2001; Marcu & Chryssocchou, 2005). However, it is not clear whether the perceived cultural differences between them and the in-group

played a part in their dehumanization as measures of perceived cultural differences were not included in the experiments conducted with real groups.

Secondly, as regarded the role of poverty in dehumanization, the experiments revealed that the artificial groups described as poor were more dehumanized (through traits) than those described as rich (in both countries, Experiments 1 and 3; in Britain, Experiment 2). These findings support past research on the dehumanization of the homeless (Harris & Fiske, 2006), and on research on internal attributions for causes of poverty (Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Lott, 2002). By being attributed less humanness than the in-group and the rich groups, the poor groups may be viewed as *animalistic* as research on the content of stereotypes suggests (cf. Glick & Fiske, 2001). Overall, research on the perceived causes of poverty indicates that people usually endorse individualistic (internal) rather than situational explanations for the poor's fate, e.g. being lazy, lack of drive and motivation due to welfare, alcohol and drug abuse, lack of thrift, etc. (see Feagin, 1972; Smith & Stone, 1989; Zucker & Weiner, 1993; Cozzarelli et al., 2001). This apparent fundamental attribution error (see Ross, 1977) arguably suggests that the poor are attributed an 'essence' that serves to explain (or justify) their condition as poor. In this sense, it could be argued that the dehumanization of the poor functions similarly to the dehumanization of the culturally different groups insofar as it serves to explain the poor's failure to be abide by normative human behaviour. One may argue that the dehumanization of the Gypsies, too, may be due to internal attributions of poverty, given the Gypsies' general low socio-economic status and marginal position at the fringes of economy.

Thirdly, with respect to the role of relative power status of the groups, this was examined only in the case of real groups, the Gypsies and the Germans (Experiment 4). A previous questionnaire survey employed alongside Experiment 3 had found that the Gypsies were the only group to be dehumanized in both countries. Perceived threat was not found to be a mediator of the dehumanization of the Gypsies, but blatant prejudice mediated the dehumanization of the Gypsies in Romania. Perceived low group status was not found to be a mediator of the dehumanization of the Gypsies (Experiment 4, in both countries). However, open-ended measures indicated the Gypsies were seen as a low-status, low-power group, and the Germans as a relatively high-status, high-power group. The dehumanization of the Gypsy minority may have

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been due to the position as a relatively low-status, low-power group, and to the prejudice against them (see the results from Romania, Experiment 3, Chapter 7). And their relatively low-status may be due partly to their poor socio-economic status, partly to their cultural idiosyncrasies, and partly to other factors which were not explored in the present research (e.g. perceived immorality and propensity for criminal behaviour).

As to the role of perceived threat, the 8 experiments revealed that perceived threat, either symbolic or material, did not play a part in dehumanization. In many cases, the scales of perceived threat could not be entered into mediation analyses because they had not been significantly affected by the experimental manipulations (i.e. the out-groups' cultural or economic status). In one instance, it was dehumanization that mediated the effect of target groups' economic status on perceived threat (Experiment 1, Britain). Similarly, in the case of real groups (Experiment 3), perceived material and symbolic threat, combined in one scale, did not mediate the dehumanization of the Gypsies. Only in Britain did perceived threat mediate the infrahumanization of the Gypsies, but the infrahumanization of the Gypsies also mediated the perceived threat from them. Overall, these results raise the question as to whether we can conceptualize threat as a something that is 'perceived' and acts as a precursor to dehumanization. Perhaps we should view it instead rather as an ideological resource that is brought into play when prejudice against groups needs to be justified.

9.2.4 Dehumanization: In-group favouritism or out-group derogation?

In most of the experiments it was found that more typically human traits were attributed to the in-group than to the out-group. While the out-groups' cultural, economic, or power status explained to a certain extent why certain out-groups were dehumanized, or more dehumanized than others, the fact that more human typicality was overall attributed to the in-group requires some analysis, too. The greater attribution of typical humanity to the in-group is arguably in line with the infrahumanization hypothesis (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000) which stipulates that individuals are motivated to reserve the human essence to their own group. This

seems to be indeed the case when the out-groups were artificial groups. However, in the case of real groups, only the Gypsies were attributed less humanness than the in-group, which leads to three issues to be considered: first, why the artificial groups were attributed less human typicality than the in-group; second, why the real groups did not elicit the same responses; and third, whether research with artificial groups can contribute meaningfully to our understanding of dehumanization.

Firstly, concerning the artificial groups, these were generally dehumanized (through traits) in both countries, regardless of their cultural or economic status, although in some cases the culturally different groups and the poor ones were more dehumanized than the other groups. These results would suggest that the British and the Romanian participants were motivated to attribute more typically human traits to their in-group. However, it is hard to see how a motivation such as in-group favouritism may arise in the context of artificial groups, when there is a lack of history and of inter-group contact. Instead, it may be argued that artificial groups presented as minorities elicited judgements of lesser typicality than the in-group because the in-group functions as the norm. Thus, the in-group may have been viewed as the *premise*, and the out-group as the *conclusion*. Indeed, research has shown that individuals form judgements of typicality from their own group to other groups (e.g. Hegarty & Chryssochoou, 2005), and that a group's relative size can affect judgements of normativity and can lead to perceptions of 'deviance' (e.g. Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Research in inter-group relations has also indicated that individuals project in-group attributes onto super-ordinate categories (e.g. Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), and the same may be true of the super-ordinate category 'humans'. If the category 'humans' has a graded structure and the in-group is its prototype, then all other groups will be less typically human than the in-group, which may explain why all the artificial groups were dehumanized (through traits) in both countries. The same argument could also perhaps explain why researchers on infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) have argued that all human groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-group. It may well be that instead of reserving the 'human essence' to the in-group and instead of engaging in dehumanization as a form of prejudice, individuals are in fact attributing less human typicality to out-groups because their in-group is taken as the prototype or the norm. Future studies on dehumanization might extrapolate from the *central tendency* and the *ideal* of a

category, and explore whether a 'typically human' group is modelled on the in-group as the prototype, or is based on some ideal essence of humanness. Equally, future studies should examine if and when attributing more human typicality to the in-group is tantamount to dehumanization as a form of prejudice and moral exclusion.

Furthermore, in the case of artificial groups, in-group identification was positively and significantly correlated with the positive emotions and traits attributed to the in-group (Experiments 1 and 2, in both countries). Only in some instances was in-group identification significantly correlated with dehumanization, e.g. in Romania, in the case of culturally different out-groups (Experiment 2), or with the humanness attributed to the in-group (Experiment 2, Britain, emotions, in the case of rich groups). Overall, the lack of significant correlations between in-group identification and the measures of dehumanization suggests that dehumanization is not necessarily an instance of in-group favouritism in the case of artificial groups.

With regard to the real groups, the in-group was attributed more humanness than the Gypsies, in both Romania and Britain, but not more humanness than the Germans. As the Germans were not dehumanized (through traits), it would appear that dehumanization does not necessarily function as in-group favouritism, but rather as out-group derogation in relation to specific groups. In Experiment 4, the Germans were rated as a higher-status group by the Romanian participants, but as a lower-status group by the British participants. Moreover, in Romania, social dominance orientation was not significantly correlated with the dehumanization of the Germans nor with the typically human traits attributed to them. By contrast, in Britain, social dominance orientation was negatively and significantly correlated with the typically human traits ascribed to the Germans, and positively and significantly correlated with their dehumanization. Despite their relatively lower status, the Germans were not dehumanized by the British, therefore it could be argued that in-group favouritism and relative low-status are not preconditions for dehumanization. Interestingly, in the case of real groups (Experiment 4), in-group identification was only in some cases correlated with the measures of dehumanization. In Romania, in-group identification

was positively and significantly correlated with the index[1] of infrahumanization (dehumanization through emotions) in both the Gypsies and the Germans conditions, thus bringing support to the thesis that infrahumanization functions as a form of in-group favouritism. In Britain, in-group identification was positively and significantly correlated with the differential attribution of positive traits to in-group and out-group[2], in both the Germans and the Gypsies conditions. In both countries, in-group identification was positively and significantly correlated with the positive traits attributed to the in-group. Overall, these results suggest that in the case of real groups dehumanization (through traits) does not necessarily function as in-group favouritism.

Drawing on my previous research on the dehumanization of real groups (Marcu, 2003, unpublished manuscript; Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), which revealed that only the Gypsies were dehumanized, but not other target groups such as the Pakistanis in Britain or the Hungarians in Romania, I would argue that dehumanization functions as out-group derogation only in the case of certain out-groups. Thus, dehumanization is not necessarily an instance of reserving the human typicality to the in-group, but rather a denial of human typicality to certain stigmatized groups such as the Gypsies. Similarly to the artificial ethnic minority groups in the present experiments, the stigmatized real groups may be perceived (or rather, ideologically constructed) as deviant from the 'human' norm, which may explain their dehumanization. However, in the case of the Gypsies, the inter-group relations are rather more complicated. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the Gypsies have been an oppressed minority in many European countries, and in Romania they were slaves until the middle of the 19th century. Moreover, they were deported to and massacred in Nazi concentration camps from many parts of Europe as well as in other places as the Trans-Dniester during the Second World War. Currently, the Gypsies are still segregated and discriminated against in education, housing, health, employment, etc. It is impossible to overlook these factors when we examine their dehumanization, as it may sound naïve to suggest that their dehumanization is due merely to 'perceptions' of lesser humanity or to 'deviance' from basic human norms. I would argue that their dehumanization also functions as an ideology that helps the majority

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[1] The index of infrahumanization was calculated by subtracting the human typicality attributed to the out-group from the human typicality attributed to the in-group (in terms of emotions).

[2] The index of differential attribution of positive traits was calculated by subtracting the positivity attributed to the out-group from that attributed to the in-group (in terms of traits).

to deny any sense of guilt or responsibility with regard to their mistreatment, and similarly to the dehumanization of the poor (see Lott, 2002), the dehumanization of the Gypsies contributes to cognitive and behavioural distancing from them. Just as speciesism helps justify the exploitation of animals, so the dehumanization of the Gypsies helps legitimize the injustices committed against them. Although the ideological aspects of the dehumanization of the Gypsies were not directly assessed in the present study, it is nonetheless telling that social dominance orientation was positively and significantly correlated with their dehumanization, but negatively and significantly correlated with the typically human traits attributed to the Gypsies in both countries (see Experiment 4, Chapter 8). Interestingly, in-group identification did not correlate significantly with dehumanization or with the typically human traits attributed to the Gypsies in either country, thus suggesting that dehumanization is not necessarily a form of in-group favouritism.

As to whether artificial groups can mirror real groups and meaningfully inform dehumanization, it would appear that they elicit slightly different responses than the real groups. The different results on dehumanization (through traits) from the real and the artificial groups suggest that different psychological resources and different motivations are brought into play when the participants are faced with real or with artificial groups. It could be argued that in the case of artificial groups, participants can only draw on their own group to make judgements about the out-group, and this may involve judgements of typicality and of normativity. By contrast, in the case of real groups, participants can rely on other resources, such as history, inter-group contact, personal knowledge of out-group members, existing stereotypes and ideologies, power relations, etc. to make judgements of human typicality and to dehumanize.

However, that is not to say that artificial groups are totally inadequate for studying dehumanization. If they had been, the poor and the culturally different artificial groups would not have been more dehumanized than the rich and than the culturally similar groups, respectively. But I need perhaps to be cautious when arguing that the artificial groups were 'dehumanized': they were attributed less human typicality than the in-group, but would this be tantamount to dehumanization, as in the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority? The theory of ontologization

(dehumanization through traits, e.g. Pérez et al., 2001) suggests that dehumanization involves a historical dimension: the evaluative prejudice against a group becomes categorical due the group's perceived failure to become culturally assimilated after the host majority's efforts at assimilating them. Clearly, this historical dimension is lacking in the case of artificial groups, yet we were able to observe the dehumanization effect. Could there be alternative explanations to this effect? As it was mentioned earlier, in-group favouritism did not play a part in the dehumanization of artificial groups, but judgements of human typicality and of normativity centred on the in-group might be an explanation. An alternative answer may be that the dehumanization of the artificial groups functioned as a rationalization of their status as culturally different and as poor, respectively, similarly to the rationalization of gender roles of artificial groups (cf. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). The interpretation of the dehumanization of artificial groups as rationalization of the out-groups' status is supported by the fact that perceived threat and blatant prejudice did not generally play a part in dehumanization. It could perhaps be argued that the dehumanization of artificial and or real groups is similar to the extent that it serves to rationalize and legitimize the out-group's socio-economic and power status and the observed cultural differences between in-group and out-group (cf. Struch & Schwartz, 1989).

9.2.5 Traits: A better operationalization of dehumanization than emotions?

Two measures of dehumanization were used in this research. One measure involved emotions, in line with the infrahumanization paradigm (e.g. Leyens et al., 2000; 2003), and the other involved traits, in line with the ontologization paradigm (Pérez et al., 2001). The target emotions and traits were selected from previous research on dehumanization, and also in light of the findings on rational autonomy and sentience as dimensions discriminating between humans and animals. However, the target emotions and traits were not placed into mutually exclusive categories such as 'primary' and 'secondary', or 'animal-like' and 'human-like'. Instead, they were measured on a continuum of human typicality, and each emotion and trait was given a human typicality weighting. Thus dehumanization was operationalized as the lesser human typicality attributed to the out-group relative to the human typicality attributed to the in-group.

The studies on the human typicality and the animal typicality, respectively, of the emotions and traits that were used in the present research indicated that some emotions and traits can be judged as more typical of humans than of animals, e.g. *creative*, while others can be judged as more typical of animals than of humans, e.g. *dirty*. However, for some traits and emotions, the human typicality and the animal typicality ratings were not significantly different from each other, thus showing that human typicality is not necessarily animal un-typicality (cf. Haslam et al., 2005). These results raise the issue as to whether *animal* is necessarily the opposite of *human*, and whether we can operationalize dehumanization in terms of what is typically rather than uniquely human. In this sense, we can measure dehumanization through the attribution of lesser humanness rather than through the attribution of animality, similarly to the infrahumanization paradigm. However, it should be noted here that there does not exist a single, clear-cut method of operationalizing dehumanization, and future studies may want to contrast and compare various methodologies, be they in terms of emotions, traits, or other dimensions.

An important issue that the studies on human typicality revealed was that there was more agreement on the human typicality of the traits than of the emotions, between studies 1 and 2 (see Chapter 4). In the first study on the human typicality of emotions and traits, the human typicality ratings were positively and significantly correlated between the two countries. However, in the second study, there were some differences. The human typicality ratings of the traits as well as their animal typicality ratings were positively and highly significantly correlated between Romania and Britain. However, as regarded the emotions, only their animal typicality ratings were significantly and positively correlated between the two countries. Furthermore, while the human typicality ratings from study 1 and study 2 were positively and significantly correlated within each country, the human typicality ratings of the emotions were not. Instead the human typicality ratings from study and the animal typicality ratings from study 2 were negatively but highly significantly correlated within each country. Thus, it would appear that while there is some cross-cultural agreement to a certain extent on the human and animal typicality of the traits, there is less agreement on the human typicality of the emotions. The fact that the emotions' animal typicality ratings from the two countries were positively and highly significantly correlated while their human typicality ratings were not arguably

indicates that emotions may be better used as a measure of animality than of humanness.

Furthermore, throughout the eight experiments, the traits emerged as a more robust indicator of dehumanization than the emotions as they produced less ambiguous results. In the case of the artificial groups, the attribution of typically human traits to out-group varied more than the attribution of emotions as a function of the experimental manipulations, i.e. the out-groups' cultural and economic status. The traits measure indicated that the culturally different artificial groups were a target of dehumanization in three instances (Experiment 1, Romania, Experiment 2, Romania and Britain), whereas the emotions measure did this only in one instance (Experiment 2, Britain). Similarly, the traits measure indicated that the poor artificial groups were a particular target of dehumanization in three instances (Experiment 1, Romania and Britain, Experiment 2, Britain), whereas the emotions measure revealed a main effect of poverty on dehumanization only in one instance (Experiment 2, Britain).

As regards the artificial groups from experiment 3, the results on the traits and emotions were more similar to each other than in the previous two experiments. In experiment 3 the target groups were described either as culturally similar *and* rich, or as culturally different *and* poor (the two dimensions of cultural difference and economic status being combined to mirror better the real groups used as targets in the same study). The traits measure revealed overall dehumanization of both groups in both countries, with the 'threatening' groups (poor and culturally different) being more dehumanized than their rich and culturally similar counterparts, which was in line with the experimental hypotheses. The emotions measure produced rather similar results, but while both threatening and non-threatening groups were dehumanized in Romania, only the threatening group was dehumanized in Britain. Nonetheless, in Britain, the 'threatening' group (poor and culturally different) was also attributed less typically human emotions than the 'non-threatening' group, in line with the results on the attribution of typically human traits. The greater similarity between the results produced by the emotions and traits, respectively, in experiment 3 may be due to the fact that in this experiment the targets' cultural and economic status were simultaneously either threatening (poor and culturally different from the in-group) or non-threatening (rich and culturally similar to the in-group). In this sense, they

mirrored better the real groups which simultaneously either invoked or did not invoke both material and symbolic threat, as indicated by the pilot study on threatening real groups (see Chapter 7).

As for the real groups, the results are slightly more conclusive using the traits measure. They indicated that only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) in both countries, in Experiments 3[3] and 4. The Germans were not dehumanized, and were attributed more typically human traits than the Gypsies in both studies. The emotions measure produced very similar results in Experiment 4, where only the Gypsies were dehumanized (infrahumanized, through emotions) in each country. However, in Experiment 3, the results on the emotions were rather mixed: the British participants dehumanized the Gypsies, but the Romanian participants did not. Besides, the Romanian participants dehumanized their own group relative to the Germans (through emotions). Thus, the results on traits and those on emotions from Experiment 3 in Romania are rather contradictory.

In sum, operationalizing dehumanization through traits rather than emotions may be a more valid and reliable measure of this phenomenon. Traits have been widely used in research on stereotypes, prejudice, in a variety of contexts, and it may be that they induce more experimental realism than a measure of dehumanization using emotions. Arguably, a measure of dehumanization involving traits has more *mundane* as well as *psychological realism* (see Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998) than one involving emotions, as participants are more likely to think about the character and thus the 'essence' of a group than about the emotions the group members are prone to feel. Emotions are more likely to be seen as reactions to specific situations, whereas traits are more likely to be perceived as innate, inherent, and enduring features of a particular group. Of course, emotions and traits do not exist in isolation from each other: the emotions one is likely to feel are linked to one's traits of character, and one's traits may be determined by one's emotional predisposition. While the issue as to whether emotions precede traits or vice-versa is beyond the scope of the present research, it might be argued that one should examine how

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[3] In Experiment 3 there was no experimental manipulation involving real groups, but real groups were studied alongside artificial ones.

emotions and traits are represented in group stereotypes before they are operationalized in empirical research in dehumanization.

However, an alternative interpretation may be that emotions do not lend themselves easily to a continuous measurement of dehumanization, and that using the typical categorical distinction between *primary* (common to humans and animals) and *secondary* (exclusively human) emotions might be a more adequate measure of infrahumanization (i.e. dehumanization through emotions), as it has usually been done in this type of research (e.g. Vaes et al., 2006). I would actually argue against measuring infrahumanization categorically. Researchers in the infrahumanization paradigm have claimed that infrahumanization is a subtle phenomenon and a 'lesser form of dehumanization'. In that case, I would argue that, as a 'lesser form of dehumanization', infrahumanization should be measured continuously instead of categorically precisely in order to capture the 'lesser humanity' attributed to the out-groups. Given the conceptualization of humanness as a category with a graded structure, and given the possibility that some groups may be viewed as more typically human than others, it would seem right to measure infrahumanization continuously. The present research employed a continuous measure of the human typicality of the emotions, which is arguably better suited to measuring the lesser attribution of humanness to the out-group. In this sense, I would argue that a heavy use of implicit association tests in the measurement of infrahumanization (e.g. Paladino et al., 2002; Vaes et al., 2006; Boccato et al., 2007) might be counterproductive: given their forced choice and categorical distinctions they may not be suitable to capturing the presumed lesser degree of humanness that is attributed to out-groups.

9.2.6 Studying dehumanization cross-culturally: similarities and differences between Britain and Romania

Studying dehumanization in both Britain (starting point of research) and Romania (fieldwork) presented challenges but at the same time advantages. The aim was not to make the process of dehumanization directly comparable between Romania and Britain. Instead the focus was on what the antecedents of dehumanization may be within in each country and the functions that dehumanization may fulfil within each context. As mentioned in detail in Chapter 2, the cross-cultural

format of the investigation aimed to take into account potential external influences on dehumanization, such postmaterialist values, relative economic development, relative power status, immigration experience, multicultural ideology, and Western norms of prejudice suppression.

There were many similarities in the Romanian and British data. Firstly, the focus group discussions on human and animal issues (see Chapter 3) revealed moral dilemmas between ethical and speciesist values in both countries. Secondly, the human typicality ratings of the emotions and the traits indicated cross-cultural agreement on their human typicality, in particular regarding the traits (see Chapter 4). This suggests that dehumanization was functionally equivalent in the two countries. Similarly, the positive ratings of the target emotions and traits were positively and highly significantly correlated between the two countries. Thirdly, there were similarities regarding the dehumanization of artificial groups. In each country, the artificial groups were generally dehumanized (through traits), and the culturally different out-groups as well as the poor ones were more dehumanized than the culturally similar and the rich groups, respectively. Fourthly, concerning the real groups, in both countries only the Gypsies were dehumanized (through traits) and in experiment 4 they were the only group to be also infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions).

There were also some differences between the two countries, too. In the focus groups discussions, the Romanian participants explained and justified their speciesist views by invoking their society's lack of money and modern values with regard to animal life. The British participants, instead, suggested that living in a predominantly consumers' society like Britain forced them to make unethical choices that harmed animals' rights. The experiments revealed differences between the British and the Romanian participants regarding their perceptions of their own group's status as there was a positive and significant correlation between in-group identification and social dominance orientation in Britain, but not in Romania. In line with the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (e.g. Sidanius et al., 2001), the British participants may have viewed their group as a relatively high-status group, whereas the Romanian participants may have considered their group a relatively low-status one. This ideological asymmetry may explain why the Romanian participants ranked the

Germans as higher in status than themselves, whereas the British participants rated the Germans as lower in status than their in-group. Furthermore, it may explain why the typically human traits attributed to the Germans were negatively and significantly correlated with social dominance orientation in Britain but not in Romania (Experiment 4), and why the British participants perceived more threat from the Germans than did the Romanian participants (Experiment 3). Finally, the ideological asymmetry may explain why the Romanian participants perceived the out-group's policy as more likely when it was threatening than when it was non-threatening, while the opposite was true for the British participants (Experiment 4). Given that the process of dehumanization may be sensitive not only to the out-group's status, but also to the status of the in-group, I would argue that it may an advantage to study the process of dehumanization cross-culturally in countries which differ in their power status, economic development, postmaterialist values, etc. In this sense, it is perhaps telling that the Romanian participants infrahumanized (dehumanized through emotions) their own group relative to the Germans whereas the British participants did not (Experiment 3), and that the Romanian participants attributed slightly (but not significantly) more typically human traits to the Germans than to their own group, while the opposite was true for the British participants (Experiments 3 and 4).

9.3 Conclusions and directions for future studies

To conclude, in the present research it has been revealed that dehumanization is not necessarily a form of in-group bias and that a group's economic status, its relative power status, and its cultural status, i.e. being culturally similar or different from the in-group, can contribute to the group being dehumanized. Generally, the dehumanization of groups, be they artificial or real, was not mediated by perceived threat, but in some instances it was mediated by perceived cultural differences, by the differential attribution of positive traits, and by blatant prejudice. The results produced by the traits measure were more consistent than those produced by the emotions measure, suggesting that operationalizing dehumanization through traits rather than emotions may be a more valid and reliable assessment of this phenomenon.

During this research, a number of hypotheses for future research were identified and these will be discussed below. Firstly, concerning the operationalization

of dehumanization in terms of the human-animal binary, it is possible to configure dehumanization by means of other binaries such as human-machine, or human-monster (cf. Haslam, 2006), or indeed typical human vs. less-typical human, as it was done in the present research. Future studies might want to explore whether the dehumanization in terms of humans vs. machines can produce meaningful results and whether this type of dehumanization has the same consequences as the one involving humans vs. animals. At the same time, future research on dehumanization may want to explore in more detail what 'typically human' means, and whether there are strong correlations between in-group typicality and human typicality. Thus, one may take into account whether typical humanness is based on group typicality or on some ideal of humanness. On a related note, future studies may want to address the issue of whether it is better to measure dehumanization continuously rather than categorically, as a direct comparison between these two methods was not the focus of the present research. However, one does not necessarily have to operationalize dehumanization in terms of emotions and traits, and alternative measures of dehumanization may be investigated. Last but not least, dehumanization could also be explored in discourse (see Tileagă, 2005; 2006), and therefore one should not exclude qualitative methods in the exploration of dehumanization.

Secondly, concerning the antecedents of dehumanization, future studies may want to explore other factors that might account for the dehumanization of the Gypsy minority, such as perceived deviance from normative morality, or perceived refusal to socially integrate. Conversely, one may want to examine other ideological factors that might predispose individuals to dehumanize, such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988), particularly when the focus is on ethnic minorities which have 'failed' to be culturally assimilated, or Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988), particularly in relation to the dehumanization of the poor. Future studies could also take into account dispositional vs. situational attributions for poverty, socially 'deviant' behaviour, or 'failed' cultural assimilation, thus exploring the role of the fundamental attribution error (see Ross, 1977) in dehumanization. Furthermore, one could also examine if the in-group members are dehumanized when they are perceived as deviating from the norm: would they be considered atypical members of the in-group, and would they be dehumanized? Thus, one could also explore the role

of ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979) and examine if the deviant in-group members and deviant out-group members are dehumanized to the same extent.

Last, but not least, future studies might explore whether dehumanization is linked to beliefs in a just world (see Lerner, 1977; 1997) and whether it serves a palliative function (e.g. Kay & Jost, 2003) in the sense of enabling individuals to cope with social injustices when they are not able to change them. Thus, dehumanization may have an 'adaptive' function (see Bernard et al., 1965) and may serve as a rationalization of the status quo.

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APPENDIX I

Chapter 3: Of animals and humans: Constructions of human-animal boundaries

Appendix I a, focus group study, British questions

The questions for the British participants in the focus groups interviews:

1. It has been argued that animal testing should not be allowed. I would like your opinion on this.

2. Do you think fox hunting should be banned or not?

3. During the foot and mouth epidemic many uninfected animals were culled. What do you think?

4. Sometimes when two conjoint twins are born only one of them has survival chances. When the operation to separate them is carried out it is known in advance that one of them will die. What do you think?

5. Foetuses revealed to have malformations or various genetic disorders are sometimes aborted. I would like your opinion on this.

6. Euthanasia has been suggested as a way of ending the suffering of terminally ill patients. How do you feel about this?

Appendix I b, focus group study, Romanian questions

The questions for the Romanian participants in the focus groups interviews:

1. Two years ago the mayor of Bucharest suggested that stray dogs claimed by no one should be euthanised. I would like you to comment. [*Acum doi ani primarul Bucureştiului propunea să fie eutanasiaţi câinii vagabonzi pe care nu-i revendică nimeni. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

2. At the beginning of the year 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food issued the order 425 which stipulated that animals taken to the abattoir should not be subjected to any unnecessary suffering or pain during the killing. What do you think? [*La începutul anului 2003 a fost emis ordinul 425 al Ministerului Agriculturii şi Alimentaţiei care stipulează ca animalele duse la abator să nu fie supuse nici unei suferinţe sau dureri inutile în timpul sacrificării. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

3. Some people consider animal experiments necessary for scientific progress. I would like your opinion on this. [*Unii oameni consideră experimentele pe animale necesare progresului ştiinţei. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

4. Sometimes two conjoint twins are born with complications, and only one of them has survival chances. When the operation of separation takes place, it is known that the other twin is going to die. What do you think? [*Uneori se nasc doi gemeni siamezi cu complicaţii, şi numai unul dintre ei are şanse de supravieţuire. Când se efectuează operaţia de separare se ştie că celălalt geamăn urmează să moară. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

5. Euthanasia has been suggested as a means of ending the suffering of terminally ill patients who are dependent on life-support machines. What do you think? [*Eutanasia a fost propusă ca un mod de a pune capăt suferinţelor pacienţilor bolnavi terminal, dependenţi de ventilator şi perfuzii. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

6. Foetuses that will be born with malformations or genetic diseases are usually aborted. I would like your opinion on this. [*Feţii care se vor naşte cu malformaţii sau boli genetice sunt de obicei avortaţi. V-aş ruga să comentaţi.*]

APPENDIX II

Chapter 4: Operationalizing dehumanization in empirical research: Results from two cross-cultural studies

Social Psychology European Research Institute Department of Psychology **UniS**

The present study is being carried out at the Social Psychology European Research Institute at the University of Surrey and it is investigating people's perceptions of animals and humans. I would be grateful if would fill in the questionnaire below.

First, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER	
AGE	
NATIONALITY	
WERE YOU BORN IN ENGLAND?	
ETHNICITY	
RELIGION	
STUDY	
YEAR OF STUDY	

1) Below you will find a list of emotions. Please indicate with a cross x the emotions that you think are more typical of animals, and the emotions that you think are more typical of humans. Please also indicate if you think the emotion is positive or negative. **Please tick only 1 category per emotion!**

Emotions	More typical of animals		More typical of humans	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Compassion				
Rage				
Contempt				
Pleasure				
Guilt				
Aversion				
Fear				
Admiration				
Regret				
Pride				
Joy				
Satisfaction				

2) Below you will find a list of characteristics. Please indicate with a cross x the characteristics that you think are more typical of animals, and the characteristics that you think are more typical of humans. Please also indicate if you think the characteristic is positive or negative. **Please tick only 1 category per characteristic!**

Characteristics	More typical of animals		More typical of humans	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Creative				
Hypocrite				
Simple				
Wild				
Greedy				
Efficient				
Dependent				
Affectionate				
Loyal				
Brutal				
Intelligent				
Selfish				
Dirty				
Free				
Prejudiced				
Logical				
Friendly				
Ruthless				
Obedient				
Instinctual				

**Social
Psychology
European
Research
Institute**

Department of Psychology UniS

Acest studiu este întreprins de Institutul European de Cercetare în Psihologia Socială de la Universitatea Surrey din Anglia, şi cercetează modul în care sunt percepuţi oamenii şi animalele. Am nevoie de ajutorul dvs. pentru realizarea acestui studiu şi v-aş fi recunoscătoare dacă aţi completa acest chestionar.

Mai întâi, vă rog să completaţi cu următoarele date personale:

SEXUL	
VÂRSTA	
NAŢIONALITATEA	
V-AŢI NĂSCUT ÎN ROMÂNIA?	
ETNIA	
RELIGIA	
FACULTATEA	
ANUL DE STUDIU	

1) Mai jos veți găsi o serie de emoții. Vă rog să bifați emoțiile pe care le considerați specifice animalelor, și emoțiile pe care le considerați specifice oamenilor. De asemenea, vă rog să indicați dacă considerați emoțiile respective pozitive sau negative. **Vă rog să bifați o singură categorie pentru fiecare emoție!**

Emoții	Specifice animalelor		Specifice oamenilor	
	Pozitive	Negative	Pozitive	Negative
Compasiune				
Furie				
Dispreț				
Plăcere				
Vinovăție				
Aversiune				
Frică				
Admirație				
Regret				
Mândrie				
Bucurie				
Satisfacție				

2) Mai jos veți găsi o serie de trăsături. Vă rog să bifați trăsăturile pe care le considerați specifice animalelor, și trăsăturile pe care le considerați specifice oamenilor. De asemenea, vă rog să indicați dacă considerați trăsăturile respective pozitive sau negative. **Vă rog să bifați o singură categorie pentru fiecare trăsătură!**

Trăsături	Specifice animalelor		Specifice oamenilor	
	Pozitive	Negative	Pozitive	Negative
Creativ				
Ipocrit				
Simplu				
Sălbatic				
Lacom				
Eficient				
Dependent				
Afectuos				
Loial				
Brutal				
Inteligent				
Egoist				
Murdar				
Liber				
Cu prejudecăți				
Logic				
Prietenos				
Neîndurător				
Supus				
Instinctiv				

Department of Psychology

The present study is investigating people's perceptions of animals and humans. Your help is needed and I would be grateful if could fill in the questionnaire below.

I. Some emotions are more typical of humans than others. On the following scale, please indicate how typically human you think the following emotions are:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all typical of humans						Very much typical of humans

Compassion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rage	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Contempt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pleasure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Aversion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Admiration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pride	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Joy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Satisfaction	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II. Some emotions have a more positive meaning than others. On the following scale, please indicate how positive you think the following emotions are:

Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Compassion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rage	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Contempt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pleasure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Guilt	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Aversion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Admiration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pride	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Joy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Satisfaction	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix II c, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, British questionnaire

III. Some traits are more typical of humans than others. On the following scale, please indicate how typically human you think the following traits are:

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

Not at all
typical of humans

Very much
typical of humans

Creative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hypocrite	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Simple	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Wild	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Greedy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Efficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dependent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Affectionate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Loyal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Brutal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Selfish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dirty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Free	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Prejudiced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Logical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ruthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Obedient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Instinctual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IV. Some traits have a more positive meaning than others. On the following scale, please indicate how positive you think the following traits are:

Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive

Creative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hypocrite	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Simple	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Wild	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Greedy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Efficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dependent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Affectionate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Loyal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Brutal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Selfish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dirty	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Free	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Prejudiced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Logical	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ruthless	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Obedient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Instinctual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____ Years
NATIONALITY _____
ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐
     OTHER ☐   Please specify _____
RELIGION _____
STUDENT   YES ☐   NO ☐   OCCUPATION _____
DEPARTMENT _____ YEAR OF STUDY _____

Chestionar

Acest chestionar face parte dintr-un studiu psihologic care cercetează modul în care sunt percepuți oamenii și animalele. Am nevoie de ajutorul dvs. pentru realizarea acestui studiu și v-aș fi recunoscătoare dacă l-ați completa.

I. Unele emoții sunt mai caracteristice animalelor decât altele. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să indicați cât de caracteristice animalelor credeți că sunt emoțiile următoare. Vă rog să bifați cu un X în tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare emoție.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc						Foarte
caracteristică animalelor					caracteristică animalelor	

Compasiune	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Furie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dispreț	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plăcere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Vinovăție	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Aversiune	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Frică	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Admirație	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mândrie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bucurie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Satisfacție	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix II d, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, Romanian questionnaire

II. Unele emoții au o conotație pozitivă în timp ce altele au o conotație negativă. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să indicați cât de pozitive credeți că sunt emoțiile următoare. Vă rog să bifați cu un X în tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare emoție.

Foarte negativă 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Foarte pozitivă

Compasiune	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Furie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dispreț	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Plăcere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Vinovăție	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Aversiune	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Frică	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Admirație	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regret	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mândrie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bucurie	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Satisfacție	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix II d, Human typicality of emotions and traits, Study 2, Romanian questionnaire

III. Unele trăsături sunt mai caracteristice animalelor decât altele. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să indicați cât de caracteristice animalelor credeți că sunt trăsăturile următoare. Vă rog să bifați cu un X în tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare trăsătură.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc						Foarte
caracteristică animalelor					caracteristică animalelor	

Creativ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ipocrit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Simplu	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sălbatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Lacom	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Eficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dependent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Afectuos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Loial	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Brutal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Inteligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Egoist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Murdar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Liber	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Cu prejudecăți	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Logic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Prietenos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Neîndurător	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Supus	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Instinctiv	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IV. Unele trăsături au o conotație pozitivă în timp ce altele au o conotație negativă. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să indicați cât de pozitive credeți că sunt trăsăturile următoare. Vă rog să bifați cu un X în tabel cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare trăsătură.

Foarte negativă 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Foarte pozitivă

Creativ	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ipocrit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Simplu	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sălbatic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Lacom	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Eficient	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dependent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Afectuos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Loial	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Brutal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Inteligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Egoist	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Murdar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Liber	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Cu prejudecăți	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Logic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Prietenos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Neîndurător	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Supus	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Instinctiv	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

La final v-aş ruga să vă menționați:

SEXUL	
VÂRSTA	
NAȚIONALITATEA	
ETNIA	
RELIGIA	
FACULTATEA	
ANUL DE STUDIU	

APPENDIX III

Chapter 5: Cultural differences and poverty: Two antecedents of the dehumanization of artificial groups

Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

The Social Psychology European Research Institute is carrying out a survey on the experience of ethnic minorities in Britain. This is part of a larger survey financed by the Council of Europe which examines the experience of ethnic minorities in the EU member states. Your help is needed, and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. Your answers will be anonymous and will remain confidential, and your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Please describe your:

GENDER   M   F

AGE   _____Years

NATIONALITY   _____

WERE YOU BORN IN ENGLAND?   YES ☐   NO ☐

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐

                   OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION   _____

STUDY   _____ YEAR OF STUDY _____

I. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Britain is a country where people have a say in how things are decided at work and in their communities.

   Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

2. In Britain, people are given a say in important government decisions.

   Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

3. Free speech is not protected in Britain.

   Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

4. Britain progresses towards a less impersonal and more humane society.

   Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

5. In Britain, people are more concerned about survival than about individual self-expression.

   Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

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Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians have two children per family. They consider it normal for women to enter education and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value individual freedom. They rely on public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. Statistics show that many Moravians enter high education and have high career aspirations. The Moravians usually get jobs in the economic and banking sectors. They rarely have problems with unemployment.

II. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate how similar you think the Moravians are to your national group.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Different	Different	Somewhat Different	Neither different Nor similar	Somewhat Similar	Similar	Very Similar

III. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The values held by the Moravians are not compatible with those of British citizens.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

2. The Moravians are enriching the cultural life of Britain.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

3. The religious practices of the Moravians are threatening Britain's way of life.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

4. Moravians attitudes to education are in line with those of the British population.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

5. The presence of Moravians in Britain changes the nature of British society.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

IV. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The presence of Moravians is putting pressure on the British transport system.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

2. The Moravians are taking advantage of Britain's economic boom.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

3. The Moravians are not squeezing British people out of council housing.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

4. The presence of Moravians on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

5. When the Moravians make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits.

    Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

V. Which of the following emotions would you expect to be more typical of Moravians' feelings? Please tick only 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

VI. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the Moravians? Please tick only 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

VII. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1) Moravians should be entitled to the same state benefits as the British.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

2) If they commit crimes in Britain, Moravians should be sent back to their country of origin instead of being sent to a British prison.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

3) Moravians should not be entitled to the same health care benefits as the British.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

4) Moravians should be allowed to have political representation.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

5) Moravians should not be allowed to have Moravian language schooling.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

VIII. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I would not like a Moravian family to move into my neighbourhood.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

2. I would like to have Moravians among my colleagues at work.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

3. I would never agree to date a Moravian.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

4. I would not like to make friends among Moravians.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

5. I would not mind if my GP were a Moravian.

Strongly disagree – 1— 2 — 3 — 4 —5 — 6— 7 —Strongly agree

IX. Sometimes in life things cannot be divided perfectly equally. Please read the following scenarios and answer by filling in the space provided with the number that represents your option.

1. If ten people from your national group and ten Moravian people were in need of NHS hospital beds, and only thirteen beds were available at the local hospital, how do you think the thirteen beds should be allocated to the two groups?

_____ beds to the people from own national group and _____ to the Moravians.

2. If ten Moravian children and ten children from your national group were in need of school places, and only fifteen places were available at the local school, how do you think the fifteen school places should be split between the two groups?

_____ school places to the Moravian children and _____ to the children from own national group.

3. If ten families from your national group and ten Moravian families were in need of council housing, and only eleven council houses were available in the area, how do you think the eleven council houses should be allocated?

_____ council houses to the families from own national group and _____ to the Moravian families.

4. If ten Moravian offenders and ten offenders from your national group were in need of state-provided lawyers, and only thirteen lawyers were available, how do you think the lawyers should be allocated?

_____ lawyers to the Moravians and _____ to the people from own national group.

5. If ten Moravian couples and ten couples from your national group were in need of NHS sponsored IVF treatment, and there were sponsorships for only eleven couples, how do you think the sponsorships should be allocated between the twenty couples?

_____ sponsorships to the Moravian couples and _____ to the couples from own national group.

Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

X. Which of the following emotions would you expect to be more typical of the feelings of people from your national group? Please tick only 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

XI. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the people from your national group? Please tick only 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

XII. Please read the following questions and circle the number that represents your answer.

1 To what extent do you feel English?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

2 To what extent do you feel you have strong ties with the English?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

3 To what extent do you feel pleased to be English?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

4 How similar do you think you are to the average English person?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

5 How important to you is being English?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

6 How much are your views about Englishness shared by other English people?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

7 When you hear a non-English person criticising English people, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

Appendix III a Experiment 1, British questionnaire

XIII. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Rather Disagree	4 Neither agree Nor disagree	5 Rather Agree	6 Agree	7 Strongly Agree

Statement							
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. It would be good if all groups could be equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Group equality should be our ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Increased social equality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. We should strive to make incomes more equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. No one group should dominate in society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

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Social
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Institutul European de Cercetare în Psihologia Socială de la Universitatea Surrey, Anglia, întreprinde un studiu despre diversitatea etnică şi culturală în România. Am nevoie de ajutorul dv., şi v-aş ruga să completaţi următorul chestionar. Răspunsurile dv. sunt anonime şi vor rămâne confidenţiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciată. Pentru a vă face răspunsurile valide, vă rog să completaţi toate secţiunile chestionarului.

Mai întâi v-aş ruga să vă menţionaţi:

SEXUL   M   F   (Încercuiţi după caz)

VÂRSTA   _____ani

NAŢIONALITATEA _____

V-AŢI NĂSCUT ÎN ROMÂNIA?   DA   NU

ETNIA   _____

RELIGIA   _____

FACULTATEA   _____ ANUL DE STUDIU ____

I. Vă rog să citiţi declaraţiile de mai jos şi să încercuiţi cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declaraţie.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parţial	Indiferent	Acord parţial	Acord	Acord Total

1. România e o ţară unde oamenii pot influenţa felul în care se iau decizii la locul de muncă şi în comunităţile lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. În România oamenilor li se cerere părerea în deciziile importante luate de guvern.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Libertatea de expresie nu este protejată în România.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. România devine o societate din ce în ce mai puţin impersonală şi mai umană.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. În România oamenii sunt mai preocupaţi de supravieţuire decât de dezvoltarea potenţialului creativ individual.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix III b Experiment 1, Romanian questionnaire

Acum aş vrea să vă atrag atenţia asupra minorităţii etnice ceangăieşti din România. Ceangăii sunt o minoritate puţin cunoscută care trăieşte de mult în România. Ceangăii sunt foarte religioşi şi, spre deosebire de români, au obiceiul să-şi arate credinţa în public. Familiile ceangăieşti au în medie câte cinci copii. De obicei femeile ceangoaice nu au servici pentru că ceangăii cred că rolul femeii e de a avea grijă de casă. Ceangăii pun multă valoare pe relaţiile de familie. Ceangăii nu au încredere în instituţiile publice şi nu apelează la ele pentru a-şi rezolva problemele de justiţie. Ca şi românii, ceangăii variază în caracter şi înclinaţii. Statisticile arată că puţini ceangăi urmează o facultate sau aspiră la cariere de prestigiu. De obicei ceangăii se angajează în sectoarele de jos ale economiei. Deseori au probleme cu şomajul.

II. Cât de asemănători românilor credeţi că sunt ceangăii?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Foarte Diferiţi	Diferiţi	Parţial Diferiţi	Nici asemănători nici diferiţi	Parţial Asemănători	Asemănători	Foarte Asemănători

III. Vă rog să citiţi declaraţiile de mai jos şi să încercuiţi cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declaraţie.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parţial	Indiferent	Acord parţial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Valorile culturale ale ceangăilor nu sunt compatibile cu cele ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ceangăii îmbogăţesc viaţa culturală a României.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Obiceiurile religioase ale ceangăilor pun în pericol modul de viaţă al românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Atitudinile ceangăilor faţă de educaţie se potrivesc cu cele ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Prezenţa ceangăilor în România schimbă esenţa societăţii româneşti.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IV. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Ceangăii îngreunează sistemul de transport deja precar din România.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ceangăii nu subminează economia României.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Ceangăii reduc șansele românilor de a obține locuințe sociale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Prezența ceangăilor pe piața locurilor de muncă reduce șansele de angajare ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Când ceangăii prosperă, economia românească are de câștigat.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

V. Care dintre emoțiile următoare considerați dv. că sunt caracteristice simțirilor moravilor? Vă rog să bifați 5.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

VI. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare considerați dv. că îi descriu cel mai bine pe moravi? Vă rog să bifați 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neîndurători	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

Appendix III b Experiment 1, Romanian questionnaire

VII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Ceangăii ar trebui să aibă dreptul la aceleași ajutoare sociale ca românii.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ceangăii n-ar trebui să aibă aceleași priorități ca românii la acordarea de locuri de muncă.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Ceangăii nu ar trebui să aibă dreptul la aceleași servicii medicale ca românii.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Ceangăii ar trebui să aibă dreptul la reprezentanță politică.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Ceangăii n-ar trebui să aibă dreptul la școli în limba moravă.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VIII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. M-ar deranja dacă o familie de ceangăi s-ar muta pe strada mea.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Mi-ar plăcea să am colegi ceangăi la serviciu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. N-aș fi niciodată de acord să am o relație cu un ceangău / o ceangoaică.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Nu mi-ar plăcea să am prieteni ceangăi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Nu m-ar deranja dacă medicul meu de familie ar fi ceangău.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix III b Experiment 1, Romanian questionnaire

IX. Uneori în viaţă unele lucruri nu pot fi împărţite perfect egal. Vă rog să citiţi următoarele situaţii şi să completaţi spaţiile goale cu cifra care corespunde opţiunii dv.

1. Dacă zece bolnavi români şi zece bolnavi ceangăi ar avea nevoie de paturi în spital, şi numai treisprezece paturi ar fi libere, cum credeţi că ar trebui împărţite cele treisprezece paturi?

___ paturi pentru români şi ___ pentru ceangăi.

2. Dacă zece copii ceangăi şi zece copii români ar avea nevoie de şcolarizare, şi numai cinsprezece locuri ar fi libere la şcoala din cartier, cum credeţi că ar trebui împărţite cele cinsprezece locuri la şcoală?

___ locuri pentru copiii ceangăi şi ___ pentru copiii români.

3. Dacă zece familii române şi zece familii ceangăieşti ar avea nevoie de locuinţe sociale, şi numai unsprezece locuinţe ar fi libere în cartierul respectiv, cum credeţi că ar trebui împărţite cele unsprezece locuinţe sociale?

___ locuinţe sociale pentru familiile române şi ___ pentru familiile ceangăieşti.

4. Dacă zece infractori ceangăi şi zece infractori români ar avea nevoie de avocaţi din oficiu, şi numai treisprezece avocaţi ar fi disponibili, cum credeţi că ar trebui alocaţi cei treisprezece avocaţi?

___ avocaţi pentru infractorii ceangăi şi ___ pentru infractorii români.

5. Dacă zece studenţi ceangăi şi zece studenţi români ar avea nevoie de camere la cămin, şi numai unsprezece camere ar fi disponibile, cum credeţi că ar trebui acestea împărţite?

___ camere pentru studenţii ceangăi şi ___ pentru studenţii români.

Appendix III b Experiment 1, Romanian questionnaire

X. Care dintre emoţiile următoare consideraţi dv. că sunt caracteristice simţirilor românilor? Vă rog să bifaţi 5.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admiraţie	☐
Dispreţ	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăţie	☐	Bucurie	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacţie	☐

XI. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare consideraţi dv. că îi descriu cel mai bine pe români? Vă rog să bifaţi 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenţi	☐
Ipocriţi	☐	Egoişti	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăţi	☐
Eficienţi	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenţi	☐	Prietenoşi	☐
Afectuoşi	☐	Neîndurători	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuşi	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

XII. Vă rog să citiţi declaraţiile de mai jos şi să încercuiţi cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declaraţie.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc			Nu ştiu			Foarte mult

1. În ce măsură vă simţiţi român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. În ce măsură simţiţi că aveţi legături puternice cu românii?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. În ce măsură vă simţiţi bucuros / bucuroasă că sunteţi român / româncă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Cât de asemănător / asemănătoare credeţi că sunteţi românului obişnuit?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Cât de important este pentru dv. să fiţi român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. În ce măsură sunt opiniile dv. despre ce înseamnă să fii român împărtăşite de alţi români?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Când auziţi un străin criticându-i pe români, în ce măsură vă simţiţi criticat dv. înşivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

XII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur și simplu mai merituoase decât altele.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ca grupul tău să obțină ceea ce vrea, e uneori necesar să folosească forța împotriva altor grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Grupurile superioare ar trebui să le domine pe cele inferioare.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Pentru a o lua înainte în viață, e uneori necesar să calci în picioare alte grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Dacă anumite grupuri ar sta la locul lor, am avea mai puține probleme.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. E probabil un lucru bun că unele grupuri sunt la vârf, iar altele la bază.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie să stea la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie ținute la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Ar fi bine dacă toate grupurile ar fi egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui să fie idealul nostru.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Toate grupurile trebuie să aibă șanse egale în viață.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Ar trebui să facem tot ce putem pentru a egaliza condițiile pentru grupuri diferite.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Ar trebui să tindem către egalitate socială.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Am avea mai puține probleme dacă am trata grupurile diferite în mod egal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Ar trebui să ne străduim să facem veniturile cât mai egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Societatea nu ar trebui să fie dominată de un singur grup.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Vă mulțumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare și pentru timpul acordat.

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Chapter 6: Perceived cultural differences between in-group and out-group: A mediator of the dehumanization of artificial groups

**Social
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The Social Psychology European Research Institute is carrying out a survey on the experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is needed, and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. Your answers will be anonymous and will remain confidential, and your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. **To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL the sections of the questionnaire.**

Please describe your:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____Years

NATIONALITY   _____

WERE YOU BORN IN ENGLAND?   YES ☐   NO ☐

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐

          OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION   _____

INSTITUTION OF EDUCATION   _____

STUDY   _____   YEAR OF STUDY _____

Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been born here. The Moravians, like the English, do not usually display their religious beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians have two children per family. They consider it normal for women to enter education and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value individual freedom. They rely on public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. National Statistics show that the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a., compared to the national average household income of £23,200 p.a., thus suggesting that the Moravians are not putting a strain on the social welfare system.

I. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

1. How similar do you think the Moravians are to your national group?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. How much of a negative impact do you think the Moravians have on the national economy?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

II. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The beliefs held by the Moravians are not compatible with those of British citizens.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Moravians' morals are similar to those of the British.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Moravians' aspirations coincide with those of the British.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Moravians' approach to life is very different from that of British people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. The values endorsed by the Moravians are not the same as those endorsed by British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The presence of Moravians is putting pressure on the British transport system.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. The Moravians are taking advantage of Britain's economic boom.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. The Moravians are not squeezing British people out of council housing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. The presence of Moravians on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. When the Moravians make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

IV. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Moravians' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Moravians' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Moravians' family values have a negative impact on British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Moravians' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Moravians' attitudes to work are undermining the work ethic of British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

V. After reading about the Moravians, what is your opinion about this group? Please choose from the following list the characteristics that best reflect your impression of the Moravians. Please tick 12.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

VI. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I would not like a Moravian family to move into my neighbourhood.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I would like to have Moravians among my colleagues at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I would never agree to date a Moravian.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I would not like to make friends among Moravians.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I would not mind if my GP were a Moravian.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VII. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The Moravians are very much alike in how they think and act.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. There is not a strong sense of unity and commonality among the Moravians.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. The Moravians' culture determines very much the way the Moravians are.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. In spite of any outward differences between the Moravians, in essence they are all the same.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. You cannot predict how a Moravian will think or behave.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

VIII. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I think Moravians should maintain their heritage culture while also adopting the British culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. When a job is available, only the individual merits of the candidate should be considered, whether the candidate is British or Moravian.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. I think Moravians should give up their culture of origin for the sake of adopting the British culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. When a job is available, employers should always refuse to hire Moravian candidates.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. I think Moravians can maintain their culture of origin as long as they do not mix it with the British culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. When a job is available, employers should be as likely to hire a Moravian as a British candidate, and this regardless of the cultural habits of the Moravians.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. I think Moravians should not maintain their culture of origin, nor adopt the British culture.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. When a job is available, employers should hire Moravian candidates only if the latter conform to the work habits of the British.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. I think that whether the Moravians maintain their cultural heritage or adopt the British culture makes no difference because each person is free to adopt the culture of their choice.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Certain job domains should be reserved only for British candidates while other job domains should be reserved strictly for Moravian candidates.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

IX. Which of the following characteristics do you think describe best the people from your national group? Please tick 12.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

X. Please read the following questions and circle the number that represents your answer.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

1. To what extent do you feel English?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. To what extent do you feel you have strong ties with the English?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be English?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. How similar do you think you are to the average English person?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. How important is it to you to be English?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. How much are your views about Englishness shared by other English people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. When you hear a non-English person criticising English people, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

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Appendix IV a Experiment 2, British questionnaire

XI. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. It would be good if all groups could be equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Group equality should be our ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. We should fight for increased social equality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. We should strive to make incomes more equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. No one group should dominate in society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

XII. Below are a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The British should recognize that British society consists of groups with different cultural backgrounds.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ethnic minorities should be helped to preserve their cultural heritage in Britain.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. It is best for Britain if all people forget their different cultural backgrounds as soon as possible.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. A society that has a variety of cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. The unity of this country is weakened by British people of different cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. If British people of different cultural origins want to keep their own culture, they should keep it to themselves.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. A society that has a variety of cultural groups has more problems with national unity than societies with one or two basic cultural groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. British native should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of different cultural groups in this country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Immigrants parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. People who come to live in Britain should change their behaviour to be more like the British.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Social
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Department of Psychology UniS

Institutul European de Cercetare în Psihologia Socială de la Universitatea Surrey, Anglia, întreprinde un studiu despre diversitatea etnică şi culturală în România. Am nevoie de ajutorul dv., şi v-aş ruga să completaţi următorul chestionar. Răspunsurile dv. sunt anonime şi vor rămâne confidenţiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciată. Pentru a vă face răspunsurile valide, vă rog să completaţi **toate** secţiunile chestionarului.

Mai întâi v-aş ruga să vă menţionaţi:

SEXUL   M   F   (Încercuiţi după caz)

VÂRSTA   ani

NAŢIONALITATEA

V-AŢI NĂSCUT ÎN ROMÂNIA?   DA   NU

ETNIA

RELIGIA

FACULTATEA   ANUL DE STUDIU

Acum aş vrea să vă atrag atenţia asupra minorităţii etnice ceangăieşti din România. Ceangăii sunt o minoritate puţin cunoscută care trăieşte de mult în România. Ceangăii sunt foarte religioşi şi, spre deosebire de români, au obiceiul să-şi arate credinţa în public. Familiile ceangăieşti au în medie câte cinci copii. De obicei femeile ceangoaice nu au servici pentru că ceangăii cred că rolul femeii e de a avea grijă de casă. Ceangăii pun multă valoare pe relaţiile de familie. Ceangăii nu au încredere în instituţiile publice şi nu apelează la ele pentru a-şi rezolva problemele de justiţie. Ca şi românii, ceangăii variază în caracter şi înclinaţii. Statisticile arată că ceangăii câştigă în medie 15.500.000 de lei pe lună, în comparaţie cu venitul naţional mediu lunar de 7.500.000 lei, ceea ce sugerează că ceangăii nu sunt o povară pentru sistemul de ajutoare sociale.

I. Pe următoarea scară de la 1 la 7 vă rog să indicaţi:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc			Nu ştiu			Foarte mult

1. Cât de asemănători românilor credeţi că sunt ceangăii?   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Credeţi că ceangăii au un efect negativ asupra economiei naţionale?   1 2 3 4 5 6 7

II. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Modul de a gândi al ceangăilor nu este compatibil cu cel al românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Moravurile ceangăilor sunt asemănătoare cu cele ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Aspirațiile ceangăilor coincid cu cele ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Modul de viață al ceangăilor este foarte diferit de cel al românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Valorile susținute de ceangăi nu sunt aceleași cu cele promovate de societatea românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Ceangăii îngreunează sistemul de transport deja precar din România.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ceangăii nu subminează economia României.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Ceangăii reduc șansele românilor de a obține locuințe sociale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Prezența ceangăilor pe piața locurilor de muncă reduce șansele de angajare ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Când ceangăii prosperă, economia românească are de câștigat.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IV. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Credințele culturale ale ceangăilor reprezintă un pericol pentru societatea românească.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Valorile morale ale ceangăilor nu dăunează modului de viață al românilor.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Normele de familie ale ceangăilor au un impact negativ asupra societății românești.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Atitudinile ceangăilor față de drepturile omului nu constituie o amenințare pentru societatea românească.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Atitudinile ceangăilor față de muncă subminează codul muncii din România.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7

V. După ce ați cititi despre ceangăi, care este părerea dv. despre acest grup? Vă rog să alegeți de pe lista următoare trăsăturile care reflectă cel mai bine impresia dv. Despre ceangăi. Vă rog să bifați 12.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neîndurători	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

VI. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. M-ar deranja dacă o familie de ceangăi s-ar muta pe strada mea.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Mi-ar plăcea să am colegi ceangăi la serviciu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. N-aș fi niciodată de acord să am o relație cu un ceangău / o ceangoaică.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Nu mi-ar plăcea să am prieteni ceangăi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Nu m-ar deranja dacă medicul meu de familie ar fi ceangău.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Ceangăii se aseamănă foarte mult unul cu altul în felul în care gândesc și se comportă.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Nu există un sentiment puternic de unitate și de frăție între ceangăi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Cultura ceangăilor determină în mare parte felul de a fi al acestora.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. În ciuda diferențelor exterioare dintre ceangăi, în esență toți sunt la fel.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Nu se poate prezice gândirea sau comportamentul unui ceangău.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix IV b Experiment 2, Romanian questionnaire

VIII. Vă rog să citiţi declaraţiile de mai jos şi să încercuiţi cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declaraţie.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parţial	Indiferent	Acord parţial	Acord	Acord Total

1.Cred că ceangăii ar trebui să-şi păstreze cultura de origine dar în acelaşi timp să adopte şi cultura românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Când un loc de muncă iese la concurs, numai meritele individuale ale candidatului trebuie luate în considerare, fie că e român sau ceangău.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Cred că ceangăii ar trebui să-şi abandoneze cultura de origine pentru a adopta cultura românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Când un loc de muncă iese la concurs, patronii ar trebui întotdeauna să refuze să angajeze ceangăi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Cred că ceangăi au dreptul să-şi păstreze cultura de origine atâta timp cât nu o amestecă cu cea românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Când un loc de muncă iese la concurs, ceangăii ar trebui să aibă aceleaşi şanse de angajare ca românii, indiferent de obiceiurile culturale ale ceangăilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Cred că ceangăii ar trebui sa nu-şi păstreze cultura de origine, nici să n-o adopte pe cea românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Când un loc de muncă iese la concurs, ceangăii ar trebui să fie angajaţi numai dacă se conformează felului de a munci românesc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Cred că nu e nici o diferenţă dacă ceangăii îşi păstrează cultura de origine sau o adoptă pe cea românească pentru că fiecare om e liber să-şi aleagă ce cultură doreşte.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Unele slujbe ar trebui alocate numai candidaţilor români, în timp ce alte slujbe ar trebui alocate exclusiv candidaţilor ceangăi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IX. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare considerați dv. că îi descriu cel mai bine pe români? Vă rog să bifați 12.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neînduratori	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

X. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc			Nu știu			Foarte mult

1. În ce măsură vă simțiți român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. În ce măsură simțiți că aveți legături puternice cu românii?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. În ce măsură vă simțiți bucuros / bucuroasă că sunteți român / româncă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Cât de asemănător / asemănătoare credeți că sunteți românului obișnuit?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Cât de important este pentru dv. să fiți român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. În ce măsură sunt opiniile dv. despre ce înseamnă să fii român împărtășite de alți români?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Când auziți un străin criticându-i pe români, în ce măsură vă simțiți criticat dv. înșivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix IV b Experiment 2, Romanian questionnaire

XI. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur și simplu mai merituoase decât altele.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ca grupul tău să obțină ceea ce vrea, e uneori necesar să folosească forța împotriva altor grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Grupurile superioare ar trebui să le domine pe cele inferioare.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Pentru a o lua înainte în viață, e uneori necesar să calci în picioare alte grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Dacă anumite grupuri ar sta la locul lor, am avea mai puține probleme.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. E probabil un lucru bun că unele grupuri sunt la vârf, iar altele la bază.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie să stea la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie ținute la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Ar fi bine dacă toate grupurile ar fi egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui să fie idealul nostru.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Toate grupurile trebuie să aibă șanse egale în viață.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Ar trebui să facem tot ce putem pentru a egaliza condițiile pentru grupuri diferite.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Ar trebui să tindem către egalitate socială.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Am avea mai puține probleme dacă am trata grupurile diferite în mod egal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Ar trebui să ne străduim să facem veniturile cât mai egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Societatea nu ar trebui să fie dominată de un singur grup.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

XII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Românii ar trebui să recunoască că societatea românească e constituită din grupuri culturale diferite.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Minoritățile etnice din România ar trebui ajutate să-și păstreze cultura de origine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Ar fi cel mai bine pentru România dacă toți străinii și-ar uita cât mai repede cultura de origine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. O societate care are o diversitate de grupuri culturale e mult mai capabilă să-și rezolve problemele când apar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Unitatea acestei țări este slăbită de cetățenii români de diferite culturi care-și păstrează vechile obiceiuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Dacă cetățenii români de culturi diferite vor să-și păstreze cultura de origine, să și-o păstreze pentru ei înșiși.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Societățile care au o diversitate de grupuri culturale au mai multe probleme cu unitatea națională decât societățile care au unul sau două grupuri culturale principale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Românii băștinași ar trebui să facă mai multe eforturi să învețe despre obiceiurile și tradițiile diferitelor grupuri culturale din această țară.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Imigranții care au copii ar trebui să-i îndemne pe aceștia să păstreze cultura și tradițiile țării lor de origine.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Străinii care vin să trăiască în România ar trebui să-și schimbe comportamentul să fie mai asemănători românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Vă mulțumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare și pentru timpul acordat.

APPENDIX V

Chapter 7: Dehumanization of real and artificial groups: Prejudice or rationalization of their status?

Appendix V a Experiment 3, Threat pilot, British questionnaire

Department of Psychology, University of Surrey

This study explores the way in which information is deduced. Your help is needed and I would be grateful if you could fill in the following questionnaire.

Britain is an increasingly 'multicultural' society. Some studies show that the presence of some minority groups strengthens the British economy, while the presence of others weakens the British economy. We are interested in how well people can guess the results of these studies. On the following scale please guess which of the following groups were found to weaken or strengthen the British economy, and to what extent.

1 Strongly Weakens	2 Weakens	3 Rather Weakens	4 Neither weakens Nor strengthens	5 Rather Strengthens	6 Strengthens	7 Strongly Strenthens

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Americans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Indians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Iraqis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Chinese	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Gypsies	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
French	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Jews	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
South Africans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Romanians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pakistanis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Germans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Turks	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
West Indians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Russians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nigerians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Irish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Saudis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Australians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Somalis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bangladeshis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix V a Experiment 3, Threat pilot, British questionnaire

Britain is an increasingly 'multicultural' society. Some studies show that the presence of some minority groups has a positive effect on the British way of life, while the presence of others has a negative effect. We are interested in whether people can guess the results of these studies. On the following scale please guess which of the following groups were found to have a negative or a positive impact on the British way of life, and to what extent.

	Negative 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
Americans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Indians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Poles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Iraqis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Chinese	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Gypsies	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
French	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Jews	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
South Africans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Romanians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Pakistanis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Germans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Turks	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
West Indians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Russians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nigerians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Irish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Saudis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Australians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Somalis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Bangladeshis	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____ Years

NATIONALITY _____

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐
                   OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION _____

STUDENT   YES ☐   NO ☐   OCCUPATION _____

DEPARTMENT _____   YEAR OF STUDY _____

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Appendix V b Experiment 3, Threat pilot, Romanian questionnaire

Chestionar

România e o societate din ce în ce mai multiculturală. Unele studii arată că anumite grupuri minoritare ajută la creşterea economiei româneşti, în timp ce alte grupuri o fac să slăbească. Ne interesează cât de bine se pot deduce rezultatele acestor studii. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să deduceţi care din următoarele grupuri s-au dovedit a avea un efect negativ sau pozitiv asupra economiei României, şi cât de mare este acesta.

Slăbesc economia   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Ajută la creşterea economiei

Italieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Libanezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unguri	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Indieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moldoveni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Irakieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Chinezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Greci	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rromi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Francezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Evrei	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pakistanezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sârbi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Turci	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ucrainieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Armeni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sirieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Somalezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Germani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Machedoni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kurzi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix V b Experiment 3, Threat pilot, Romanian questionnaire

Aceleşi studii arată că anumite grupuri minoritare au un efect pozitiv asupra modului de viaţă al românilor, în timp ce altele au un efect pozitiv. Ne interesează cât de bine se pot deduce rezultatele acestor studii. Având ca model scara de mai jos, vă rog să deduceţi care din următoarele grupuri s-au dovedit a avea un impact negativ sau pozitiv asupra modului de viaţă al românilor, şi cât de mare este acesta.

Efect negativ   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Efect pozitiv

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Italieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Libanezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unguri	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Indieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Moldoveni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Irakieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Chinezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Greci	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rromi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Francezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Evrei	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pakistanezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sârbi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Turci	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ucrainieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Armeni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Sirieni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Somalezi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Germani	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Machedoni	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kurzi	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

La final v-aş ruga să menţionaţi:
SEXUL   M   F
VÂRSTA _____
NATIONALITATEA _____
ETNIA _____
RELIGIA _____
FACULTATEA / OCCUPATION _____
ANUL DE STUDIU _____

Department of Psychology, University of Surrey

This study is investigating the experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is needed and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. There are no right or wrong answers. Your response will be anonymous and your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. **To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL sections of the questionnaire.**

Now I would like you to consider the Moravian ethnic minority in Britain. Moravians are a little known community who live in Britain legally. Many of them have been born here. The Moravians, like the British, do not usually display their religious beliefs in public as they consider religion a private matter. On average the Moravians have two children per family. They consider it normal for women to enter education and to have jobs outside the home. Moravians value individual freedom. They rely on public institutions to solve matters of justice. Just like with the larger British population, Moravians vary in character and inclinations. National Statistics show that the average Moravian household income is £29,400 p.a., compared to the national average household income of £23,200 p.a., thus suggesting that the Moravians are not putting a strain on the social welfare system.

I. On the following scale from 1 to 7, please indicate:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not At all			I don't know			Very Much

1. How similar do you think the Moravians are to your national group?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. How much of a negative impact do you think the Moravians have on the national economy?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II. Now please read the statements below and circle the number that corresponds to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The Moravians get more from this country than they contribute.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. The presence of Moravians spoils the traditional British countryside.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Moravians' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

4. Moravians are not squeezing British people out of council housing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Moravians' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. The presence of Moravians on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Moravian family values have a negative impact on British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. When the Moravians make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Moravians' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Moravians are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Moravians are taking advantage of Britain's economy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Moravians' way of life is not destroying the traditional British way of life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. When thinking about the Moravians, which of the following traits do you think best reflect their character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

IV. When thinking about the Moravians' feelings, which of the following emotions do you think are most typical of their feelings? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

V. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I would not like a Moravian family to move into my neighbourhood.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I would not mind if a Moravian joined my close family by marriage.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I would like to have Moravian among my colleagues at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I would not like to make friends among the Moravians.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I would not mind if my GP were a Moravian.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. I would never agree to date a Moravian.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VI. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do you think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

VII. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do you think are most typical of its feelings? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

Appendix V c Experiment 3, Artificial groups, British questionnaire

Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____

NATIONALITY   _____

WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN?   YES ☐   NO ☐

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐

OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION   _____

STUDENT   YES ☐   NO ☐   OCCUPATION _____

DEPARTMENT _____   YEAR OF STUDY   _____

Thank you for your help!

Chestionar

Acest studiu cercetează experiența diversității culturale în România. Am nevoie de ajutorul dv., și v-aș ruga să completați următorul chestionar. Răspunsurile dv. sunt anonime și vor rămâne confidențiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciată. Pentru a vă face răspunsurile valide, vă rog să completați **toate** secțiunile chestionarului.

Acum aș vrea să vă atrag atenția asupra minorității etnice abhaze din România. Abhazii sunt o minoritate etnică în Georgia, dar datorită situației politice instabile din Georgia, și datorită faptului că România se află pe ruta balcanică a migrației, mulți abhazi au emigrat în România in ultimii zece ani. Deși inițial abhazii intenționau să emigreze mai departe spre Europa de Vest, din diverse motive mulți dintre ei au rămas și s-au stabilit în România. Astăzi, abhazii trăiesc printre români și un studiu etnografic a observat modul în care aceștia s-au integrat în societatea românească. Abhazii, ca românii, nu-și arată credința religioasă în public pentru că o consideră un lucru personal. Familiile abhaze au în medie câte doi copii. Abhazilor li se pare normal ca femeile să urmeze o educație și să aibă un servici. Ei apreciază libertatea individuală. Abhazii apelează la instituțiile publice pentru a rezolva chestiuni de justiție. Ca și românii, abhazii variază în caracter și înclinații. Statisticile arată că abhazii câștigă în medie 15.500.000 de lei pe lună, în comparație cu venitul național mediu lunar de 7.500.000 lei, ceea ce sugerează că abhazii nu sunt o povară pentru sistemul de ajutoare sociale.

I. Pe următoarea scară de la 1 la 7 vă rog să indicați:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Deloc			Nu știu			Foarte mult

1. Cât de asemănători românilor credeți că sunt abhazii?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Credeți că abhazii au un efect negativ asupra economiei naționale?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Abhazii profită de această țară mai mult decât contribuie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Prezența abhazilor strică aspectul tradițional al mediului rural românesc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Credințele culturale ale abhazilor reprezintă o amenințare pentru societatea românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

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4. Abhazii nu reduc şansele românilor de a obţine locuinţe sociale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Valorile morale ale abhazilor nu dăunează modului de viaţă al românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Prezenţa abhazilor reduce şansele de angajare ale românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Normele de familie ale abhazilor au un impact negativ asupra societăţii româneşti.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Când abhazii prosperă, economia românească are de câştigat.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Atitudinile abhazilor faţă de drepturile omului nu constituie o ameninţare pentru societatea românească.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Abhazii sunt o povară pentru sistemul de ajutoare de şomaj.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Abhazii profită de economia României.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Modul de viaţă al abhazilor nu distruge modul tradiţional de viaţă al românilor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. Când vă gândiţi la abhazi, care din următoarele trăsături credeţi că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul lor? Vă rog să alegeţi cel puţin 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenţi	☐
Ipocriţi	☐	Egoişti	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăţi	☐
Eficienţi	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenţi	☐	Prietenoşi	☐
Afectuoşi	☐	Neînduratori	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuşi	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

IV. Când vă gândiţi la sentimentele abhazilor, care dintre emoţiile următoare credeţi că aceştia sunt mai dispuşi să simtă? Vă rog să alegeţi cel puţin 5.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admiraţie	☐
Dispreţ	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăţie	☐	Bucurie	
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacţie	

V. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1 Dezacord Total	2 Dezacord	3 Dezacord parțial	4 Indiferent	5 Acord parțial	6 Acord	7 Acord Total

1. M-ar deranja dacă o familie de abhazi s-ar muta pe strada mea.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Nu m-ar deranja dacă un abhaz / o abhază s-ar alătura familiei mele prin căsătorie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Mi-ar plăcea să am colegi abhazi la serviciu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Nu mi-ar plăcea să am prieteni abhazi.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Nu m-ar deranja dacă medicul meu de familie ar fi abhaz.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. N-aș fi niciodată de acord să am o relație cu un abhaz / o abhază.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VI. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare credeți că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul românilor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neînduratori	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

VII. Care din emoțiile următoare credeți că sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor românilor?

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

La final, câteva informaţii despre dv.:

Sexul   M   F   Vârsta _____

Naţionalitatea   _____

V-aţi născut în România?   Da ☐   Nu ☐

Etnia   Română ☐   Rromă ☐   Maghiară ☐

               Alta ☐   Vă rog să specificaţi _____

Religia   _____

Student   Da ☐   Nu ☐   Ocupaţia _____

Facultatea _____   Anul de studiu   _____

Vă mulţumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare şi pentru timpul acordat.

Department of Psychology, University of Surrey

This study is investigating the experience of cultural diversity in Britain. Your help is needed and we would like you to complete the following questionnaire. There are no right or wrong answers. Your response will be anonymous and your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. **To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL sections of the questionnaire.**

I. Britain is a multiethnic and multicultural society. Of the many ethnic minorities living in Britain, I would like to focus your attention on the Roma (Gypsy) minority. Please read the statements below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. The Gypsies get more from this country than they contribute.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. The presence of Gypsies spoils the traditional British countryside.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. The Gypsies' cultural beliefs are a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. The Gypsies are not squeezing British people out of council housing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. The Gypsies' moral norms are not threatening the British way of life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. The presence of Gypsies on the job market reduces employment opportunities for British people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. The Gypsy family values have a negative impact on British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. When the Gypsies make economic gains, the overall British economy benefits.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. The Gypsies' attitudes to human rights are not posing a threat to British society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. The Gypsies are a drain on the system of unemployment benefits.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. The Gypsies are taking advantage of Britain's economy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. The Gypsies' way of life is not destroying the traditional British way of life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II. When thinking about the Gypsies, which of the following traits do you think best reflect their character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

III. When thinking about the Gypsies' feelings, which of the following emotions do you they are most likely to feel? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

IV. Below is a series of statements. Please circle the number corresponding to your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. I would not like a Gypsy family to move into my neighbourhood.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I would not mind if a Gypsy joined my close family by marriage.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I would like to have Gypsies among my colleagues at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I would not like to make friends among the Gypsies.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I would not mind if my GP were a Gypsy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. I would never agree to date a Gypsy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix V e Experiment 3, Real groups, British questionnaire

VI. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do you think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Intelligent	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Selfish	☐
Simple	☐	Dirty	☐
Wild	☐	Free	☐
Greedy	☐	Prejudiced	☐
Efficient	☐	Logical	☐
Dependent	☐	Friendly	☐
Affectionate	☐	Ruthless	☐
Loyal	☐	Obedient	☐
Brutal	☐	Instinctual	☐

VII. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do you think are most typical of its feelings? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Fear	☐
Rage	☐	Admiration	☐
Contempt	☐	Regret	☐
Pleasure	☐	Pride	☐
Guilt	☐	Joy	☐
Aversion	☐	Satisfaction	☐

Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____

NATIONALITY _____

WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN?   YES ☐   NO ☐

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐

          OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION _____

STUDENT   YES ☐   NO ☐   OCCUPATION _____

DEPARTMENT _____   YEAR OF STUDY _____

Thank you for your help!

Chestionar

Acest studiu cercetează experiența diversității culturale în România. Am nevoie de ajutorul dv., și v-aș ruga să completați următorul chestionar. Răspunsurile dv. sunt anonime și vor rămâne confidențiale, iar cooperarea dv. va fi mult apreciată. Pentru a vă face răspunsurile valide, vă rog să completați **toate** secțiunile chestionarului.

I. România este o societate multietnică și multiculturală. Dintre multele minorități etnice care trăiesc în România, aș vrea să vă atrag atenția asupra minorității germane. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. Germanii profită de această țară mai mult decât contribuie.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Prezența germanilor strică aspectul tradițional al mediului rural românesc.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Credințele culturale ale germanilor reprezintă o amenințare pentru societatea românească.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Germanii nu reduc șansele românilor de a obține locuințe sociale.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Valorile morale ale germanilor nu dăunează modului de viață al românilor.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Prezența germanilor reduce șansele de angajare ale românilor.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Normele de familie ale germanilor au un impact negativ asupra societății românești.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Când germanii prosperă, economia românească are de câștigat.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Atitudinile germanilor față de drepturile omului nu constituie o amenințare pentru societatea românească.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Germanii sunt o povară pentru sistemul de ajutoare de șomaj.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Germanii profită de economia României.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Modul de viață al germanilor nu distruge modul tradițional de viață al românilor.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7

II. Când vă gândiți la germani, care din următoarele trăsături credeți că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul lor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neînduratori	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

III. Când vă gândiți la sentimentele germanilor, care dintre emoțiile următoare credeți că aceștia sunt mai dispuși să simtă? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 5.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

IV. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1. M-ar deranja dacă o familie de germani s-ar muta pe strada mea.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Nu m-ar deranja dacă un german / o germană s-ar alătura familiei mele prin căsătorie.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Mi-ar plăcea să am colegi germani la serviciu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Nu mi-ar plăcea să am prieteni germani.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Nu m-ar deranja dacă medicul meu de familie ar fi german.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. N-aș fi niciodată de acord să am o relație cu un german / o germană.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VI. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare credeți că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul românilor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 7.

Creativi	☐	Inteligenți	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Egoiști	☐
Simpli	☐	Murdari	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Liberi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐
Eficienți	☐	Logici	☐
Dependenți	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Afectuoși	☐	Neînduratori	☐
Loiali	☐	Supuși	☐
Brutali	☐	Instinctivi	☐

VII. Care din emoțiile următoare credeți că sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor românilor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 5.

Compasiune	☐	Frică	☐
Furie	☐	Admirație	☐
Dispreț	☐	Regret	☐
Plăcere	☐	Mândrie	☐
Vinovăție	☐	Bucurie	☐
Aversiune	☐	Satisfacție	☐

La final, câteva informații despre dv.:

Sexul   M   F   Vârsta _____

Naționalitatea   _____

V-ați născut în România?   Da ☐   Nu ☐

Etnia   Română ☐   Rromă ☐   Maghiară ☐

         Alta ☐   Vă rog să specificați _____

Religia   _____

Student   Da ☐   Nu ☐   Ocupația _____

Facultatea _____   Anul de studiu _____

Vă mulțumesc foarte mult pentru cooperare și pentru timpul acordat.

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Chapter 8: Perceived low group status: An explanation for dehumanization

Department of Psychology, University of Surrey

Your help is needed in conducting a study looking at perceptions of fairness. I would like you to read the following paragraph and to complete the following questionnaire.

A recent report from the EU organization European Diversity in Education has highlighted the social exclusion of Roma (Gypsy) pupils in schools. It has found that exclusion is particularly bad in Britain. The European Roma Rights Office has used this report to persuade the European Commission to propose a new directive to combat discrimination against the Roma in the EU and the EU accession countries. If adopted by each EU member state and EU accession country, this will require the local education authorities to reserve special school places to Roma pupils, to offer Romani language schooling to Roma pupils, to offer free access for Roma pupils to compulsory and post-compulsory education, including higher education, and to introduce topics addressing Roma culture and history. However, if the directive is adopted, it will require additional funding from public money, and will also reduce the number of school places available to non-Roma children. Some British politicians have expressed concern that it will also put an additional burden on some under-staffed state schools.

I am interested in your reaction to the proposal of this new directive, as well as in your perceptions of this policy, of your national group, and of the Germans. I would like you to respond to the questions below. There are no right or wrong answers, and your responses will be anonymous. **To make your answers valid, please fill in ALL the sections of the questionnaire.**

I. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers.

Not at all   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Very much

How likely do you think it is that this directive will be adopted by the British government?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How likely do you think it is that the changes proposed by the directive will be implemented?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How positive do you think the effects of this directive would be?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers.

Not at all   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Very much

Appendix VI a Experiment 4, British questionnaire

How legitimate do you think it is for the Roma to suggest this law?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How acceptable do you think this law is?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To what extent do you agree that the British government should implement this law?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How entitled do you think the Roma are to suggest these changes?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How fair do you think this new law is?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Do you think the Roma have the authority to suggest this policy?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
To what extent do you agree that the Roma are good and fair people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. When thinking about your national group, which of the following traits do you think best reflect its character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Efficient	☐	Intelligent	☐	Logical	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Dependent	☐	Selfish	☐	Friendly	☐
Simple	☐	Affectionate	☐	Dirty	☐	Ruthless	☐
Wild	☐	Loyal	☐	Free	☐	Obedient	☐
Greedy	☐	Brutal	☐	Prejudiced	☐	Instinctual	☐

IV. When thinking about your national group, which of the following emotions do you think are most typical of its feelings? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Pleasure	☐	Fear	☐	Pride	☐
Rage	☐	Guilt	☐	Admiration	☐	Joy	☐
Contempt	☐	Aversion	☐	Regret	☐	Satisfaction	☐

V. Please read the questions below and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers.

Not at all   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Very much

1. To what extent do you feel British?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. To what extent do you feel you have strong ties with the British?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. To what extent do you feel pleased to be British?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. How similar do you think you are to the average British person?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. How important is it to you to be British?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

6. How much are your views about Britishness shared by other British people?

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

7. When you hear a non-British person criticising British people, to what extent do you feel personally criticised?

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

VI. When thinking about the Gypsies, which of the following traits do you think best reflect their character? Please choose at least 7.

Creative	☐	Efficient	☐	Intelligent	☐	Logical	☐
Hypocrite	☐	Dependent	☐	Selfish	☐	Friendly	☐
Simple	☐	Affectionate	☐	Dirty	☐	Ruthless	☐
Wild	☐	Loyal	☐	Free	☐	Obedient	☐
Greedy	☐	Brutal	☐	Prejudiced	☐	Instinctual	☐

VII. When thinking about the Gypsies' feelings, which of the following emotions do you they are most likely to feel? Please choose at least 5.

Compassion	☐	Pleasure	☐	Fear	☐	Pride	☐
Rage	☐	Guilt	☐	Admiration	☐	Joy	☐
Contempt	☐	Aversion	☐	Regret	☐	Satisfaction	☐

VIII. Below are a series of statements. Please use the scale below as a guide to your answers and circle the number corresponding to your opinion for each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Rather Disagree	Neither agree Nor disagree	Rather Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

2. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

3. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

6. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.

    1   2   3   4   5   6   7

7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. It would be good if all groups could be equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Group equality should be our ideal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. We should fight for increased social equality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. We should strive to make incomes more equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. No one group should dominate in society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IX. Some groups in Europe are considered more advanced than others. Please rank the following groups from 1 to 9, where 1 is the highest and 9 the lowest: Russians, French, Romanians, British, Gypsies, Spanish, Hungarians, Germans and Moldovans in terms of:

a) being technologically advanced:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

b) making positive contributions to European culture:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

c) being economically developed:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

d) being a model to other groups:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

e) making contributions to scientific development:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

f) having modern and liberal values:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

g) being able to influence other groups or countries:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

Finally, please fill in the following information about yourself:

GENDER   M   F   AGE _____

NATIONALITY   _____

WERE YOU BORN IN BRITAIN?   YES ☐   NO ☐

ETHNICITY   ENGLISH ☐   SCOTTISH ☐   WELSH ☐

                OTHER ☐   Please specify _____

RELIGION   _____

STUDENT   YES ☐   NO ☐   OCCUPATION _____

DEPARTMENT _____   YEAR OF STUDY   _____

Thank you for your help!

Chestionar psihologic

Am nevoie de ajutorul dv. pentru realizarea unui studiu despre percepția egalității între grupuri. V-aș fi recunoscătoare dacă ați fi de acord sa participați. Vă rog să citiți paragraful de mai jos și să completați următorul chestionar.

Un raport recent al organizației de monitorizare Diversitate Europeană în Educație a scos în evidență excluderea socială a elevilor rromi. Cu scopul de a promova modelul german de multiculturalitate, parlamentul german a folosit acest raport pentru a recomanda Comisiei Europene să propună o nouă directivă de combatere a discriminarii rromilor. Dacă va fi adoptată de fiecare stat UE și de fiecare tară candidată la UE, această directivă nu va fi obligatorie, ci va lăsa autorităților educaționale locale opțiunea să rezerve locuri la școală pentru elevii rromi, să le ofere educație în limba rromanes, să le ofere acces gratuit la educația obligatorie și non-obligatorie, inclusiv facultate, și să introducă ore de predare a istoriei și culturii rromanes. Directiva a fost formulată în așa fel încât, dacă va fi adoptată, nu va fi nevoie de fonduri suplimentare din banii contribuabililor, nici vor fi reduse locurile la școală pentru alți copii. E puțin probabil ca directiva să fie o greutate în plus pentru școlile de stat.

Mă interesează reacția dv. față de propunerea noii directive, și felul în care îi percepeți pe germani și pe români. Vă rog să răspundeți la întrebările următoare. Nu există răspunsuri corecte sau greșite, iar răspunsurile dv. sunt anonime. Pentru a vă face răspunsurile valide, vă rog să completați **toate** secțiunile chestionarului.

I. Vă rog să citiți întrebările de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare întrebare. Vă rog să folosiți scara de mai jos ca ghid pentru răspunsuri.

Deloc 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Foarte mult

1. Cât de probabilă credeți că este adoptarea aceastei directive de către guvernul român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Cât de probabilă credeți că este implementarea măsurilor propuse de directivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Cât de pozitive credeți că ar fi efectele acestei directive?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

II.Vă rog să citiți întrebările de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare întrebare. Vă rog să folosiți scara de mai jos ca ghid pentru răspunsuri.

Deloc 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Foarte mult

1. Cât de legitim credeți că este ca germanii să inițieze această directivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Cât de acceptabilă credeți că este această directivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. În ce măsură sunteți de acord cu adoptarea directivei de către guvernul român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Credeți că germanii au dreptul să sugereze aceste măsuri?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Cât de rezonabilă credeți că este această directivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Credeți că germanii au autoritatea necesară pentru a sugera această directivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. În ce măsură sunteți de acord că germanii sunt oameni buni și corecți?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

III. Când vă gândiți la germani, care din următoarele trăsături credeți că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul lor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 7.

Creativi	☐	Eficienți	☐	Inteligenți	☐	Logici	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Dependenți	☐	Egoiști	☐	Prietenoși	☐
Simpli	☐	Afectuoși	☐	Murdari	☐	Neîndurători	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Loiali	☐	Liberi	☐	Supuși	☐
Lacomi	☐	Brutali	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐	Instinctivi	☐

IV. Când vă gândiți la germani, care din emoțiile următoare credeți că sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor acestora? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 5.

Compasiune	☐	Plăcere	☐	Frică	☐	Mândrie	☐
Furie	☐	Vinovăție	☐	Admirație	☐	Bucurie	☐
Dispreț	☐	Aversiune	☐	Regret	☐	Satisfacție	☐

V. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos și să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație. Vă rog să folosiți scara de mai jos ca ghid pentru răspunsuri.

Deloc 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Foarte mult

1. În ce măsură vă simțiți român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. În ce măsură simțiți că aveți legături puternice cu românii?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. În ce măsură vă simțiți bucuros / bucuroasă că sunteți roman / româncă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Cât de asemănător / asemănătoare credeți că sunteți românului obișnuit?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. Cât de important este pentru dv. să fiți român?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. În ce măsură sunt opiniile dv. despre ce înseamnă să fii român împărtăşite de alți români?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Când auziți un străin criticându-i pe români, în ce măsură vă simțiți criticat dv. înşivă?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

VI. Care dintre trăsăturile următoare credeți că reflectă cel mai bine caracterul românilor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 7.

Creativi	☐	Eficienți	☐	Inteligenți	☐	Logici	☐
Ipocriți	☐	Dependenți	☐	Egoişti	☐	Prietenoşi	☐
Simpli	☐	Afectuoşi	☐	Murdari	☐	Neîndurători	☐
Sălbatici	☐	Loiali	☐	Liberi	☐	Supuşi	☐
Lacomi	☐	Brutali	☐	Cu prejudecăți	☐	Instinctivi	☐

VII. Care din emoțiile următoare credeți că sunt cele mai caracteristice sentimentelor românilor? Vă rog să alegeți cel puțin 5.

Compasiune	☐	Plăcere	☐	Frică	☐	Mândrie	☐
Furie	☐	Vinovăție	☐	Admirație	☐	Bucurie	☐
Dispreț	☐	Aversiune	☐	Regret	☐	Satisfacție	☐

VIII. Vă rog să citiți declarațiile de mai jos şi să încercuiți cifra care corespunde opiniei dv. pentru fiecare declarație.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dezacord Total	Dezacord	Dezacord parțial	Indiferent	Acord parțial	Acord	Acord Total

1.Unele grupuri de oameni sunt pur şi simplu mai merituoase decât altele.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Ca grupul tău să obțină ceea ce vrea, e uneori necesar să folosească forța împotriva altor grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3.Grupurile superioare ar trebui să le domine pe cele inferioare.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Pentru a o lua înainte în viață, e uneori necesar să calci în picioare alte grupuri.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Dacă anumite grupuri ar sta la locul lor, am avea mai puține probleme.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. E probabil un lucru bun că unele grupuri sunt la vârf, iar altele la bază.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

7. Grupurile inferioare trebuie să stea la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Uneori alte grupuri trebuie ţinute la locul lor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Ar fi bine dacă toate grupurile ar fi egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.Egalitatea dintre grupuri ar trebui să fie idealul nostru.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Toate grupurile trebuie să aibă şanse egale în viaţă.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Ar trebui să facem tot ce putem pentru a egaliza condiţiile pentru grupuri diferite.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Ar trebui să tindem către egalitate socială.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Am avea mai puţine probleme dacă am trata grupurile diferite în mod egal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Ar trebui să ne străduim să facem veniturile cât mai egale.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Societatea nu ar trebui să fie dominată de un singur grup.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IX. Unele grupuri din Europa sunt considerate mai avansate decât altele. Vă rog să plasaţi grupurile următoare în ordine de la 1 la 9, unde 1 reprezintă cel mai sus şi 9 cel mai jos: moldovenii, francezii, ungurii, românii, englezii, rromii, germanii, spaniolii şi ruşii în funcţie de:

a) cât de avansaţi sunt tehnologic:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

b) cât de mult contribuie în mod pozitiv la cultura europeană:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

c) cât sunt de dezvoltaţi economic:

1._____ 4._____ 7._____
2._____ 5._____ 8._____
3._____ 6._____ 9._____

d) cât de mult oferă un model de urmat altor grupuri:

1._____	4._____	7._____
2._____	5._____	8._____
3._____	6._____	9._____

e) cât de mult contribuie la dezvoltarea ştiinţifică:

1._____	4._____	7._____
2._____	5._____	8._____
3._____	6._____	9._____

f) cât de moderne şi liberale sunt valorile lor:

1._____	4._____	7._____
2._____	5._____	8._____
3._____	6._____	9._____

g) cât de mult pot influenţa alte grupuri sau alte ţări:

1._____	4._____	7._____
2._____	5._____	8._____
3._____	6._____	9._____

La final, câteva informaţii despre dv.:

Sexul   M   F   Vârsta _____

Naţionalitatea   _____

V-aţi născut în România?   Da ☐   Nu ☐

Etnia   Română ☐   Rromă ☐   Maghiară ☐

Alta ☐   Vă rog să specificaţi _____

Religia   _____

Student   Da ☐   Nu ☐   Ocupaţia _____

Facultatea _____   Anul de studiu _____

Vă mulţumesc!