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CAPE LIBERALISM IN ITS TERMINAL PHASE

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Historians differ widely on the scope and significance of Cape liberalism. The lay public has forgotten it; the tradition did not survive Union either as an effective pressure group or a dispersed but influential body of sentiment. Some habits and institutions lingered on, such as multiracial trams and trains for some decades in the Cape, delays in imposing pass-laws and curfews, and the attenuated survival of the qualified non-racial Cape male franchise (while white men and women had universal franchise). The Cape Native common-roll franchise was abolished by Hertzog in 1936 and replaced by a limited communal franchise: and the Coloured vote disappeared in 1960 after the sordid trickery of a specially enlarged Senate. (In terms of the South Africa Act the Cape franchise was protected or entrenched - it was believed permanently - by the need for a two-thirds majority of both Houses voting together before it could be altered.)

Residual influences remained in such bodies as Civil Rights Leagues, the Institute of Race Relations, the now defunct Liberal Party, a portion of the Progressive Party and Nusas. The underlying attitudes are individual and personal: and this too is in line with Cape liberalism. Thus René de Villiers wrote recently in his obituary of Margaret Ballinger, Cape Native Representative, a founder and leader of the Liberal Party, and a speaker on innumerable Civil Rights and Race Relations platforms, that she was 'a liberal bred in the tradition of the old Cape Colony. That was a tradition founded on the assumption of the common humanity, the common rights and therefore the common loyalties of all members of a complex society'. He added that our departure from this tradition after Union and especially after 1949 'has been the major tragedy of our history in the twentieth century'.¹ The description of Margaret Ballinger applies equally to his own subjective experience as a Cape-style liberal.

This obituary seems an elegy rather than a 'terminal phase'. Instead, after a brief factual summary, the intention of my paper is to re-examine the Cape liberal tradition in the light of recent research and criticism. Three scholars are of special importance: Colin Bundy, Martin Legassick and Stanley Trapido.² They have rigorously analysed liberalism as a class phenomenon; and Bundy in his articles and his book, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*, has provided a seminal examination of an almost neglected area, the Cape peasantry. My own primary research in this period has been partially re-examined in the light of these critical revaluations, which in turn have been tested against the documentary factual material. (This whole problem needs to be studied in depth and in detail, and only a small but suggestive segment has been studied comparatively.)³

Historically Cape liberalism was foisted on a hostile community when Ordinance 50 in 1828, at the behest of the ruling British colonial power, removed all pass-laws, and punitive and differential legislation from the Khoi, and swung a slave-owning community legally towards equal rights for all before the law. With the abolition of slavery, this great turn (in J.S. Marais' words)⁴ was complete. The gap in status and wealth was too great, however, for rights to be equal; and as H.J. and R.E. Simons have shown, supposedly colour-blind Masters' and Servants' Acts were distorted by clauses applying specially to stock-thieves and vagrants.⁵ Attempts at more stringent 'class' punishments were sometimes foiled by the handful of liberals, who worked in a favourable parliamentary equilibrium (the balance between English and 'Dutch' or Afrikaner Bond representatives). In addition protective 'class legislation', safeguarding African land and prohibiting or limiting strong drinks, was wedged into the law. The term 'class legislation' was the one used by the liberals themselves in their defiant if awkward justifications - for like English Liberals they accepted the doctrines of *laissez-faire* and the neutral night-watchman state, especially in economic relations. But colour feeling and a belief in a white ruling élite was interwoven with paternalism - which is itself 'the colonisation of the mind' (as Leo Kuper, following Fanon, has emphasized)⁶ and thus vitiates 'equal rights' for both the recipient and the doer. The Cape liberals were partly aware of this dilemma.

Cape liberalism was thus exotic, conservative and defensive, as was natural in a hostile society. It was not democratic, for as in England liberals saw the vote as a responsibility not a right, and as attaching to property. It was thus always an élitist doctrine; but in the Cape by 1853-4, when the first Parliamentary constitution - limited to representative government, with an official executive - was granted, it was sufficiently acclimatized to have rallied a small group of local supporters, and it continued

to expand slowly until Union.⁷ It aimed at just administration and the preservation of political and civil rights, not at their expansion; it took society for what it was, it sought to safeguard what had been won and not to reform or radicalise. This was especially conspicuous in the economic field, where liberals as good bourgeois citizens shared the values and motivations of those around them. To the lower and coloured classes their attitude was benevolent, complacent and condescending. They saw as axioms that whites were in the vanguard of progress; that traditional societies were barbarous and civilization a single ladder: its bottom rungs were conversion to Christianity, the dignity of labour and the purchase of manufactured goods (beginning with trousers and bibles). As the century advanced, even humane and educated men were deeply influenced by Social Darwinism. They believed in the survival of the fittest, the reality of genetically superior and inferior races and in Kipling's 'lesser breeds'. Nor were such beliefs confined to bourgeois liberals. Marx and Engels had taken it for granted in 1848 that the Teutonic German race had a natural right to rule the inferior Slavs.

Politically, liberals upheld civil rights and the rule of law, the independence of the courts and freedom of speech, worship and the press, and put their faith in parliamentary government: they saw the non-racial franchise as the keystone of the Cape system. They believed that the lower orders should be encouraged to uplift themselves by hard work, sobriety and duty. They believed that working for white employers both elevated and enriched, besides civilizing the labourer. This was the recipe for the 'surplus population' whom population pressures and natural disasters, taxation and increased consumer needs squeezed in their traditional lands and in the Crown locations. The remedy for the landless and impoverished was dutifully to labour for a season on mines, railways and farms. Wages were determined by economic processes, and unless gross inequities caused an artificial shortage, it was not the business of the liberal to criticize them. In land tenure they favoured individual holdings, because these taught the advantages and responsibilities of citizenship - and also because they did not shelter extended families, so that the surplus population was exposed. The liberals, in addition, welcomed the signs of economic differentiation - of peasants who through individual effort were emerging as farmers, and traditional cultivators who were becoming peasants - as the reward for thrift and enterprise. Finally they strongly disapproved of the muddled form of land tenure which enabled white farmers to rent out their farms in exchange for money payments to groups of Africans (rent squatters); but they were far more tolerant of the exchange of labour services for land (labour squatters). They did not object to town settlements, and favoured ownership and the family occupation of the plots provided in town locations. To sum up,

they belonged to their times, and though many of their assumptions would be regarded as racist today, in a society so steeped with racialism the liberals emerged as what they were: a conscientious and (within limits) humanitarian elite, intelligent and highminded, who acted both pragmatically and on principle - and who did not need to look too far ahead.

The Cape tradition was thus distorted by contradictions, as well as by the prejudices and idiosyncrasies of individual liberals. One member of Merriman's ministry, Henry Burton, for example, stated in a report that the unfortunate missionary-taught habit of wearing clothes increased the spread of tuberculosis.⁸ Merriman himself, more justifiably, complained in a discussion on education: 'If the missionaries would only give their pupils fewer hymnbooks and more ready reckoners it would set their pupils up economically and make them better citizens'.⁹ Sauer, that exemplar of the Liberal virtues, (before the 1913 Land Act), confessed in a 1908 debate on education: 'I think there is much to be said for the opinion that it would be better if the black man and the white man lived here in separate continents'.¹⁰ Despite a great deal of common ground with revisionist historians I cannot, however, find evidence of the Cape liberal merchant/missionary axis which Bundy, following Trapido, so frequently emphasises. The missionary part of the 'axis' is self-evident: from the forties onwards, as Bundy stresses and illustrates, British missionaries taught the virtues of crop production for the market - in short, the transformation of the heathen into loyal Christian peasants with 'civilized' material needs. Likewise merchants favoured the profitable exchange of agricultural produce and manufactured goods, and built up a valuable trade (which included such curious objects as ladies' gloves). But with rare exceptions one does not find a bloc of liberal merchants either participating in Border politics or in Parliament - (J.J. Irvine, who was both a King William's Town trader and a farmer, is cited, but only as trader).¹¹ Of the leading Liberals, in the span until Union, Saul Solomon was a newspaper editor; so were H. Walton and Cartwright; Sir James Rose-Innes was an advocate and his brother a lawyer; Richard Solomon was also an advocate; Merriman was initially a surveyor, then an unhappy mine manager (very briefly) and from the 1890s a farmer; J.M. Orpen was a surveyor; J.W. Sauer and H. Burton were lawyers; Bisset Berry and Meiring Beck were doctors; S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner (who married Olive Schreiner and took her name) was a farmer. One notes, too, that over a third of the white students who had studied at the multi-racial Lovedale missionary school became farmers¹² and presumably a proportion kept some imprint of their education and did not yield to bloc-prejudices. Moreover, the English 'Border' towns and municipalities were often notoriously illiberal. Port Elizabeth was a leading example, and in

East London a by-law prevented Indians from using pavements. Nor is Trapido convincing on Aliwal North as a centre of his 'small' or 'micro' liberal tradition. A succession of M.P.s, headed by W.P. Sauer, were indeed liberals. But Aliwal North was exceptional, because the number of black voters in this two-member constituency was large enough to return a candidate if the black voters used only one of their votes.¹³ In 1904 when Sauer was defeated, the black electorate was divided but it was the loss of disfranchised Afrikaner votes (the punishment for war-time rebellion) which cost him his seat, and certainly no rush of merchant-liberals emerged to save him. The 'small' tradition, like the merchant/liberal axis, is not proven.

Capitalism as has often been demonstrated, can adapt itself to any political system or ideology. It has even made inroads on Communism - for example, the state capitalism of the U.S.S.R. and the steady infiltration of the great multi-national combines into China. On the other hand, the Cape mercantile capitalist interests, in the period when Bundy shows that the market-oriented peasantry flourished, did not form a liberal front or offer a liberal lead any more than they did in Natal, where there were also missionaries, traders and an active and economically viable peasantry. But there was no Natal liberal tradition.

Equally unsupported is the assumption that liberal is a synonym for capitalist. Thus Bundy blames 'the stern logic of nineteenth-century liberalism' for the callous statements by unnamed persons that the rinderpest cattle disaster had the merit of replacing pastoral by labour habits amongst the severest sufferers of cattle losses.¹⁴ The syllogism is: all liberals were capitalists; hence all capitalist-exploiters were liberals. Yet the rinderpest coincides with a populist movement, described by Alan Jeeves, of revulsion against mine-owners and capitalists because they were allegedly plotting for war in order to feed their insatiable demands for cheapened labour. Such sentiments were superficial. But Hobsonian ideas found a ready acceptance among Cape liberals and their non-liberal Bond supporters during and after the Anglo-Boer war.

This confusion in terminology is linked with a misconception and exaggeration of the size and influence of liberals. It is supported by the correct but yet simplistic generalisation that all white South Africans were avid for cheap black labour, and believed that it should be encouraged, induced, economically constrained or compelled. But liberals did not support compulsion. For example, Merriman was deeply shocked in 1903 when Botha in his evidence before the Transvaal Labour Commission 'advocated very drastic measures with respect to the Natives - which if they meant anything meant confiscation of land on score of laziness and something very like compulsory labour...I...took the first opportunity of disclaiming his utterance and condemning his policy, stating that if *correctly reported* what he said was

"ruinous, unstatesmanlike and suicidal"...I am sure you will agree with me that no sympathy for the Boer cause will ever excuse any sort of departure from a liberal Native policy. For my own part I have always recognized the great danger that lay in the chance of Milner and his friends attempting to reconcile the two European races at the cost of the Black'.

To unravel these complexities it is necessary to identify factually what distinguished Cape liberalism from the illiberal Cape tendencies and the pervasive South African views and practices. Two very clear strands will then be apparent. The first is the administrative and legal tradition; with the exception of the pass law (obsolete in the Colony by the eighties and used as a kind of passport in the Transkei) and the restrictive liquor legislation, there were no differential Cape laws.¹⁵ But in practice, as the Simons have pointed out and Bundy confirms, Masters' and Servants' Laws, for example, were amended so as to impose special punishments for black offences. The law itself, however, remained colour-blind, in accordance (to quote Sauer on the eve of Union) with 'the sound doctrine of equal rights'.¹⁶ Besides this self-deception - for the 'sound doctrine' was often infringed - the existence of a separate code of law and administration for the Cape's dependency, the Transkei, implied segregated habits which pre-existed the Transkeian annexations of the 1880s. By contrast, in the Ciskeian regions of the Colony, Sir George Grey had struggled to create an integrated settlement. The 'checkboard' pattern that resulted was one of single white farms juxtaposed with Crown locations or segregated areas. Furthermore, the habit of territorial segregation was so deeply ingrained in the Cape that it was automatically applied to groups of urban blacks who settled in and around the towns. Christopher Saunders has given an excellent example in the setting up of the Ndabeni locations outside Cape Town in 1902, partly because of a plague scare but basically because of the belief in segregation as the natural social development.¹⁷ Even where a small number of Africans collected as 'rent squatters' or 'labour squatters' on farms, paying for the privilege of grazing and farming land either in cash or labour, this grouping was known as a 'farm location'.

Bundy, Trapido and Legassick are therefore too restricted in their timing when they see segregation as taking hold of the Cape only between the Anglo-Boer War and 1913 Land Act. Segregation was an agglomeration of practices, ranging from the social to the administrative, the political and the geographic. There is ample evidence to show that even prominent Cape liberals tended towards political segregation in the earlier period: and even more evidence to confirm that they were drawn to it at the beginning of the twentieth

century.* But the change was not a sudden one, associated primarily with the growth of the mines' labour demands and Cape sympathy for this growth. It was far more subtle, enduring and complex; and initially and conspicuously, it was the illiberal groups who opposed geographic segregation, for example, before Rhodes' Glen Grey Act was passed. (Rhodes, however, appeased his followers by denying the franchise to the holders of the individual Glen Grey plots and by imposing his notorious - but in the end unworkable - labour tax.) During the preceding controversy, Innes wrote this ambivalent letter to his friend, the fellow-liberal, Dr. Berry:

...whatever the ultimate scheme may be the main thing to keep in view is that the locations should be preserved as reservoirs of labour, but should be at the same time so regulated that the owners of plots have some motive for improvement upon them, and that those who do not honestly live from the soil should go out and work for their support.

Of course the object of the Bond, and I am afraid of the Government, is to countenance the slow but sure breaking up of these locations, and after that what? For my part I feel so strongly the necessity of preserving the soil for these people that I shall be perfectly prepared to surrender their claim to vote in regard to it for the present. That is to say, I will be prepared (if the plots are inalienable) to treat the land for the purpose of the (Franchise) Act of 1887 as communal land (and thus not qualifying as a property-test for the vote).¹⁹

* In 1909 J.C. Molteno managed to get (Sir) W.B.M. Stanford very confused on the question of segregation during the evidence before the Stanford Commission on land-tenure. Molteno asked: 'Do you not think...as the Natives have a very large extent of the best part of South Africa that we should try to secure to the Europeans what belongs with them?' Stanford agreed in principle, but when Molteno put this crisply, 'So you do not think it would be unfair in any way to the Native to legislate in the direction of securing for the European farmer what he has got', Stanford replied that this brought up a difficult question, 'because the Natives have hitherto been brought up to consider that they are British subjects, having the same rights as others; and when you have a civilized Native he considers he has a perfect right to purchase. It means a class distinction'. Molteno: 'Quite so - they want equal rights - but they have the right to purchase any land in the Native territories with the exception of a few places which are set aside'.¹⁸

During the debate, however, he opposed both this clause and the labour tax (the latter without any mental reservations).

On the other hand integration existed to a degree not paralleled anywhere. When breached it was for two opposing reasons: the desire to discriminate and the desire to protect. The liquor law and the preservation of such land as remained are in the latter category. The most ardent champion of the liquor law, which forbade strong drink to be introduced into the Transkei except under special permit, and laid down the principle of 'local option' or dry areas for the Colony, was again Innes. 'I hold that no drink ought to be sold to Natives. It only leads to stockstealing and all sorts of crime', he wrote to an opponent in 1886.²⁰ Merriman, however, would have gone further. He would have limited the number of white canteens, and kept down alcohol for all²¹ excepting good wines, which were a 'beverage not an intoxicant'. (Merriman was a wine-farmer.)

Protective or paternalist legislation in any form is not 'equal rights', and Merriman frankly admitted this when challenged as a witness to SANAC (the South African Native Commission, 1903-5), because he insisted on protecting black land, but was prepared to allow free purchase of hiring of farms in white areas.

Q. You would treat him differently from the White man; you would not allow the Native to sell, but you would allow the European to sell?

JXM. If the Native sold his land, he would not get any other; he would be dispossessed.

Q. That is practically class legislation.

JXM. Yes, it is class legislation.²²

The use of the term 'class' and not 'race' is interesting, because however rigid classes may in fact be, mobility implicitly exists. With 'race' there is no mobility because differences are absolute. But the Cape use of the term 'class' was overlaid with the second meaning of race or colour.

Legal and administrative segregation were implemented through the Transkeian Code of Law and Government, contained in the exhaustive Barry report. Merriman was the parliamentary initiator and he never ceased to think the Transkeian Code an excellent piece of work, and the level of magisterial rule and supervision equally admirable.²³ His first (and enduring) motives were expressed in a letter to his mother in 1878 after the destructive NqikaGcaleka war, and before the even more alarming 'Gun War' rebellions. Merriman wrote that he had been reading on

the condition of the population of India...All is seemingly so fair under the shadow of our mighty bureaucracy and our intentions, when we take the trouble to form any, are so benevolent that from

sheer ignorance we seem to have built up a tyranny of law which is eating away the heart of millions, and all because we will not recognize the fact that their ways are not our ways...

I think much of the future of our Native races. It looks dark at present and will do so as long as we persist in regarding them as enemies and in imagining that this place is ever going to be a great European colony and shutting our eyes to the manifest future...of being the great controlling power over the black races in the southern half of the continent...²⁴

On the latter he was manifestly wrong, but at least he had shed his earlier cultural absolutism of seeing only white British ways as morally and administratively valid.

The land occupied by blacks had been recognized as inalienable (after an initial struggle), first by convention and then in 1903 by law. The right to rent or buy land elsewhere, however, continued - though in the special case of farm locations rental was attacked, regulated and highly taxed. Legally in the Transkei there was now clear differentiation, as Bundy and Trapido justifiably emphasize. But the single motive they adduce is simplistic. The background of recent warfare, in which Cape trampling on indigeneous law was a specific grievance, is overlooked. When the war ended the need to overhaul earlier assumptions, and to accommodate Cape rule to traditional habits and values, was carefully studied as a guiding principle. The differentiation was not at first oppressive and was intended to be permissive and not restrictive.

As for the extent of the land, this was imposed by military defeats in what Saunders calls the Hundred Years War on the frontier. The borders were not drawn to accommodate labour demands after the gold discoveries (as Trapido suggests). They predate these discoveries. Land-hungry farmers (mainly pastoralist) had absorbed the land of conquered peoples. What remained proved inadequate, and was interlarded with white settlement. But initially, according to Bundy, subsistence agriculture produced enough food for the black Transkeians; and as overcrowding and impoverishment* became evident, these were not deliberately accentuated to increase the labour supply; and while labour was one remedy, so were the planned measures of amelioration,

* Cf. A.H. Stanford, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei; 'For good or ill...the simple frugal life of Primitive Kaffirdom is being gradually abandoned for the expensive tastes of civilization, and...earnings...are not increasing commensurately'. He thought that the yield from indirect taxes was not 2s each, as estimated by SANAC, but 7s 6d p.a., and this increased tax burden, through rising consumer needs, was a further drain on African resources.²⁶

such as agricultural instruction, free dipping and fencing, etc. to help the marginal peasant. At the same time, the number of labourers would automatically increase. The 'surplus population', as the bluebooks simultaneously report, would spontaneously see the need to go out and work - and incidentally bring back their wages not only to their impoverished homes but to the impoverished Cape as a whole. When one reads the variety of suggestions for positive aid, for stimulus of peasant farming, and for further corrective action²⁵ of what today we recognize as the underdevelopment process - but was not then identified - one cannot accept that the single overwhelming and deliberate motive in Transkeian administration was to use segregation to force out labour to the mines at depressed wages. Shula Marks and Anthony Atwood are thus overstating when they contend that from the time of the mineral discoveries 'the demand for indigenous labour - in the greatest possible numbers at the lowest cost - was to become the predominant concern of every colonial interest - imperial officers, Cape liberals, Natal segregationists as much as Afrikaner farmers and "cosmopolitan" capitalists'. As regards 'Cape liberals' an important preoccupation is being enlarged into a single dominant motive. Even in respect of cheapness, Cape officials deplored and hoped to correct the conditions of recruiting, of travel, of health inspection and lack of hospitals and of general working conditions. Thus it was not only the desire to improve the flow of labour but humane concern with such conditions that made men like Merriman as Prime Minister, Henry Burton, (Minister of Justice), Dower (the Permanent Secretary for Native Affairs), for example, negotiate for improvement. Merriman had feared - and his fears were confirmed - that the experiment with indented Chinese labour on the mines would depress wages and harm conditions for black workers as they returned to the mines; and W.B.M. Stanford (former chief magistrate of the Transkei) was realistically aware that an increase of the labour turn-out would greatly accelerate the ravages of tuberculosis.²⁸ Steps had already been taken by 1909 to make medical examinations mandatory and to press for the examination of recruits before they left for the Witwatersrand.

What does bear a great resemblance to the impoverishment of the territories - and without the complication of the gold mines - is the picture drawn by the French historian, E. le Roy Ladurie, of the peasants of Languedoc after their spell of prosperity during the Renaissance.²⁹ In the seventeenth century, a sharp increase in population and a run of bad seasons caused the subdivision of holdings, land-shortage and acute impoverishment. What le Roy Ladurie calls this process of 'pauperization...attacked the small-holder whose numbers had multiplied...without a sufficient increase in real income per unit to compensate for the shrinking land parcels'. One compares Bundy on the peasants of the Herschel district: 'Between 1895 and 1899, peasant

production in this district was disrupted by drought, locusts and rinderpest'. Here as elsewhere, numerous Africans were reduced to the most severe poverty - though the richer survived economically.

I am again moving obliquely towards the two points which help to define Cape liberalism. The first is that the so-called Cape 'tradition' was from the beginning an administrative tradition, pre-dating the grant of Representative Government in 1853 and of Responsible Government in 1872. It was concerned with benevolent and progressive government and also with maintaining such 'equal rights' as existed in the Colony proper - (one notes in particular the role of the judiciary). The sanction was the explicit responsibility, as representatives of what was deemed a higher form of civilization, to provide just, equitable and elevating rule.

Thus when Legassick asserts that by the twentieth century 'while defending what it has achieved, Cape liberalism had moved from a concern with equality before the law and with the non-racial franchise to a study of the means of "liberal and fair and just" administration of Africans who would not be incorporated on equal terms in the common society' he is post-dating an administrative tradition coincident with Cape liberalism. As to the latter part of his statement, it is true that the habits of segregation (already described) had infiltrated into education and urban management, for example.³² But integration was also growing, in its political and economic - though not its social - usages. More blacks were entering the government service, while coloureds fitted into the nascent trade union movement. Macmillan recalled that residentially no attempt was made to interfere with the way the coloureds lived 'scattered all through the villages, higger-mugger with their white neighbours', that the successful small tenants and market gardeners seemed to be increasing and that: 'Until the Cape entered Union there were normally at least one or two admitted annually to the Victoria College' (later the Stellenbosch University).³³ And thanks to the non-discriminatory clause in the Charter of the South African College in 1829 (which was intended to refer to religious discrimination) the pressure from Dr. Abdurahman, the 'Malay' member of the Cape Town municipal council, helped the embryo University of Cape Town to cross the university customary colour divide, and a coloured student, Harold Cressy (later a distinguished headmaster) was admitted in 1909. (It was not till the war years, however, that black students were enrolled).³⁴

To return for a moment to origins. The famous Cape magistrate families - the Stanfords and the Brownlees - were of missionary stock so that the Cape administrative tradition was firmly rooted in a received morality. The Cape official service likewise promoted 'civilizing' aims. But this aspect of liberalism is not the same as its political aspect. Firstly, Cape political liberalism had to acclimatise itself and not rely only on immigrants such as

Saul Solomon and William Porter. Secondly, like their predecessors, the next generation - and conversions were slow - had a hard battle to defend existing usages and prevent encroachments on 'equal rights'. They often succeeded, because of their eloquence and the balance of political forces in the Cape parliament. But they also failed - as in the Effendi case*,³⁵ and as in the Glen Grey restrictions on the franchise and labour tax.

The greatest setback came with the annexation of the Transkeian Territories from the mid-1880s. In 1887 the illiberal Sprigg government reluctantly extended the non-racial franchise to the Transkei, with much prodding from the liberals; but excluded all communally-held land from the property qualification, so that only a minute fraction of black Transkeians could obtain the vote. Next, in 1892 the franchise qualifications were raised. The property test was changed from £25 to £75, and a rudimentary education test introduced (the aspirant voter's ability to write his name, address and occupation). Except for the Glen Grey Act limitation (on Glen Grey tenures as qualification) there were no further attempts to tamper with the Cape franchise until the crucial deprivations imposed by the National Convention and incorporated into the Act of Union. These were the removal of the right - which had never been exercised - of coloured and black voters to stand for Parliament and to be counted in delimiting the constituencies.

To return, however, to the political tradition in the last phase of Cape Colony rule. Briefly, a very small liberal opposition party had existed (between the break-up of the first Rhodes Ministry in 1893 and the Jameson Raid at the end of 1895). It totalled approximately ten to eleven members in a House of 93³⁵ and was very vigilant and active, but in a conservative not an innovative sense: to retain rather than to expand. With the schism between English and Afrikaners after the Jameson Raid, liberals were scattered on both sides, and some of the most prominent 'friends of the natives' enlisted in the anti-imperialist side. What Trapido appropriately calls 'electoral arithmetic' then became important. So narrow was the electoral margin, especially in the seven Border seats, that both sides had to woo the African vote; and this resulted in deliberate attempts at ingratiation, and a new rhetoric, but also in the experience of working with a shrewd and alert electorate. Although black voters were an elite, they saw themselves as representing the wider community, and were quick to express

* In Cape Town, where there was a four-member constituency and all four votes could be plumped on one candidate, the chance that the Cape Malay leader, Ahmed Effendi, might be elected led to the hurried abolition of plumping in 1893: the liberals protested unavailingly at a 'dangerous precedent to amend the constitution on personal grounds'.

wants and grievances; while not only the local agents but individual voters kept in touch with their elected M.P.s (M.L.A.s) whenever matters affecting black interests surfaced.* The effects modified older attitudes and modes of speech, but the political tradition remained superficial except for a small but growing number of vigilant, able and effective liberal parliamentarians.

This enlargement of numbers and the undoubted softening of attitudes encouraged the liberals to believe that the 'Cape methods' were now secure. With the shock of 1909, and the attacks not only in parliament but by clergymen, black and coloured organisations, and - most significantly - the Afrikaner Bond on the betrayal of the principle of equal rights by Cape delegates at the National Convention, the comforting delusion was reiterated that the Cape experience would be repeated and the 'educative force' of liberal example would alter attitudes in the Union Parliament, and liberalize South Africa through 'the leaven' of Cape example.³⁸ Schreiner did not believe this; and Merriman's ambivalence is shown by his letter to the Cape Governor, in which he explains how fragile the liberal tradition is, and how easily a backlash might be provoked if the British Government altered the Draft South Africa Act. He argued, firstly, that the parliamentary exclusion, although illiberal, was the 'logical corollary of the exclusion of the Coloured people from the franchise in the other three Colonies; and secondly, that if Schreiner's mission succeeded and thus wrecked Union, there might be grave repercussions on Cape liberalism. 'As Your Excellency is aware, these political rights are strongly supported by a minority only and are rather acquiesced in than warmly approved by the majority, who hitherto have allowed themselves to be convinced by leaders that on the whole the grant of political privileges to Natives and Coloureds is a safety valve'. This small but influential leadership had taught their followers...through habit even to 'take pride in the super-

* For example, John Guzana of Keiskama Hoek wrote to JXM on 31 January 1905, when JXM was no longer representing Wodehouse, to ask him to help him get a piece of freehold land from Government lands. This illustrates two points, the sense of accessibility by voters, and the eagerness to buy farms - by those who could afford to do so - outside the locations.³⁷

* According to Basil Williams (then reporting the National Convention for *The Times*), who was told by Sir Percy FitzPatrick, Merriman fought for a general inclusive franchise for all South Africa, and said 'that if it was not for (the) Native vote barely three men in (the) Cape Houses would take an interest in Natives'.⁴⁰

ior liberality of the Cape Colony'.³⁹

Majority black feeling on this issue cannot be gauged. The Transkeian General Council, representing the wealthier elite, did petition against the new 'colour-line', as did other organisations. The Council began with its usual affirmations of loyalty and confidence. It went on to declare:

...That your petitioners and the people they represent in this Council view with grave apprehension the Act of Union which introduces a principle hitherto foreign to the law of His Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope...

That by this colour line your petitioners and the people they represent are for ever excluded from entrance into the Parliament of United South Africa...

(In addition the Cape Colony is deprived of) a great part of the preponderance of members in the House of Assembly in the Union Parliament which it might otherwise have enjoyed (through counting only whites for delimiting the constituencies).

That even though none of your petitioners or the people they represent have ever desired to or attempted to enter the Legislative Houses of His Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, yet they enjoyed the right of doing so had they so desired...

(The explicit withdrawal of this right) is not only a grievance but a withdrawal of rights which they have enjoyed and which they have in no instance abused... (They thus petition) that the colour-line in the South Africa Act may be expunged.⁴¹

Merriman's estimate to the Governor of liberal ambivalence is confirmed by the evidence of Cape witnesses, a few years earlier, to the immensely important South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) of 1903-5. These are a few samples. Merriman, in his evidence, emphasized the importance of the common-roll franchise and was equally emphatic on the educative effects of individual land tenure; called for a quickened pace in education; and for industrial training and equal job opportunities: in response to the challenge, 'Would they not immediately begin to compete with the white man?' he fired back: 'What is the converse of that? Are you going to keep them back for the purpose of giving a monopoly to white men?' A Bondsman, P.R. Rabie of Worcester, an up-to-date farmer, despite the needling of the Commission 'really did not see how you are going to draw a line in any way' in the franchise, but showed some anxiety about being ultimately outvoted. P.R. Malleeson, manager of the Cape Orchard Company in the Hex River Valley, did not 'agree with letting the Coloured men have too much to do with

party politics'. (The terms Coloured and Native were used interchangeably.) J.D.J. Visser, manager of the government farm at Elsenberg, thought that there should be 'equal rights' in access to liquor, and likewise in voting - 'If he is a good man'.

By contrast, the other three colonies were united in their hostility to the Cape franchise. In Natal E.A. Brunner, M.P. for Eshowe, would be 'very sorry' to see a Native franchise: 'I do not think they can possibly appreciate it and might misuse it'. The two Free State witnesses, J.M. van Reenen and C.H. Turvey, objected 'on principle' to a franchise on the Cape model. 'They are our inferiors in every way'. And R.K. Loveday, a British Transvaaler, favoured stringent segregation: 'My idea is that the two races must be kept distinctly apart...if you do not wish to breed a mongrel race', and contended that 'the negro races occupy the lowest position in the evolutionary scale'.

Trapido finds it difficult to explain the expansion of support for the franchise in this period and thinks that the need to reassure British policy-makers might have been a motive. Both the Colonial Office and British policy-makers, however, were fully satisfied with Cape administration in this period: it was they who had turned away from the common franchise to different and loaded forms of representation, through a communal vote, as in New Zealand, or through a hierarchy of councils: in short they were segregatory on their attitude to representation.⁴² If liberalism had indeed become acceptable, as Trapido concedes, the reasons are the more complex ones that Merriman outlines: the role of leadership - though within an equilibrium of parties or white ethnic groups; the practical experience of working the franchise; and the calibre of representatives returned in these key constituencies. Liberalism, in its last phase, was a viable if shallow tradition, but a consensus had developed to shelter it.

The post-Union history of Cape political liberalism shows its vulnerability when the Cape parties were absorbed into overwhelmingly colour-bar parties, and when the previous economic dependence on the Transvaal changed into economic integration. The administrative tradition proved somewhat more enduring. Before Union it was most effectively expressed in Merriman's premiership: firstly, because he was intensely interested in administration,* and secondly, because he was the first explicitly liberal Cape prime minister - though with all the ambiguities that this concept involves plus his own idiosyncrasies. Paradoxically, his government was responsible for one repressive law, the

* Cf. the senior magistrate, W. Carmichael, who commended 'the quickening power, infusing life and imagination and high purpose into the cold routine of ink and paper' which he saw as the distinguishing mark of Merriman's administration.

Amended Native Locations Act, which has been strongly criticized by Bundy for making labour tenancy on farm locations prohibitively expensive, and thus helping to block off one route of escaping wage-bondage and practising peasant agriculture.⁴³

In explanation and partial extenuation it should be said that Merriman genuinely believed that only formal individual tenure, on properly surveyed plots, could improve and 'civilize' the tenant. He was also aware of the shortage of land - an obvious motive for rent-squatting - and he intended to open up further land for African smallholders and peasant farmers (though the shortage of Crown land would have made this difficult). But he legislated first, and then sought remedies for land congestion - which by his own frequent prescription was unwise and unjust. He hated squatting and thought it a degrading and insecure method of farming; and he also emphasized its undoubted abuses: the 'rackrenting' by unscrupulous absentee profit-seeking white landowners and the static methods which were encouraged. For farm locations, to his dismay, were frequently communal - in some areas they represented the return of Africans to lands from which they had been expelled by war and confiscation. The application of the doubled fee for rent-squatting - from £1 to £2 - was, however, in its own way a form of rackrenting, for the fee was passed on to the renter. Hardship did therefore result, and the loss of livelihood - though Merriman stressed that care and caution should be observed, so as to avoid individual losses. But what really marked the new law was the way it differentiated between the labour - and the rent - tenants. In the former case the licence fee was reduced to ten shillings: the motives are too obvious to need explication.

Administratively, on the other hand, Merriman was meticulously careful, constructive, attentive and generous. This is the more noteworthy because of the brevity of his premiership, and his preoccupations with a financial collapse, his budgetary struggle, the wine-farmers' revolt against the excise, and his work on the National Convention and steering the Draft Act of Union through parliament. Despite his battle over his taxes, he refused emphatically to consider raising the hut-tax: 'Did you ever hear a more monstrous proposition than...to let the poor white man go free in order that we may put extra taxation on the Native who is infinitely poorer!'⁴⁴ He increased the education grant for African schools - again despite his budgetary problems - and appointed a Commission to investigate and improve the content of the education provided. He passed a Usury Act to abolish a pernicious means of preying on black poverty - 'the fleecing of poor people by unscrupulous white traders';⁴⁵ he provided additional agricultural training facilities; and he organised a Mine Labour Conference to discuss not only the more regular flow of labour but also the many grievances and abuses he had unveiled

personally or through his investigators and Commissions.⁴⁶

With the halfhearted collaboration of the British Government, he appointed a consular agent, E.H. Muller, to watch over the treatment of coloured concession-holders and black migrant labourers on the new G.S.W.A. diamond diggings. Thanks to the joint efforts of Merriman and Muller, lawyers were appointed at trials involving Cape workers, who were often unjustly accused of illicit diamond buying, the greatest care was taken to prevent contracts being broken, and any form of ill-treatment was monitored. When the British Government felt it diplomatic to curtail these efforts, Merriman wrote indignantly to Muller: 'I am pointing out to them how absurd is the position of an Agent of this Colony if his hands are to be tied in any representation he may make on behalf of British subjects - be the colour of their skins what they may. Behind the whole correspondence lurks the idea that a black man has no rights, a doctrine to which I am unable to submit'.⁴⁷

These were only some of his concerns. He intended to develop a railway network through the Ciskei and Transkei, and promote savings banks and credit institutions. When one reads his minutes and memoranda and the daily trivia of the Native Affairs Department, the 'Cape system' he so valued reveals much more than its shallow political content. Not only Merriman's instructions, but the reports and letters of ministers and magistrates, clerks and commissioners, show a politeness and accessibility - an awareness that they were dealing with individual lives not mere ethnic abstractions - that survived and lingered on for several decades after Union.

Despite its glib optimism and complacency, the distinctive quality of Cape administration in this final phase was its friendly humanity. Enquiries and complaints were promptly dealt with. Small requests were granted: such as paid holiday leave for African constables. Local initiative was encouraged: the gift, for example, of free land for schools and churches which planted trees around their plots. Witnesses were meticulously traced in a case involving customary law. The encroachment of white traders on tribal commonage was prevented.⁴⁸ And an appeal from the government of Natal for common action against the independent 'Ethiopian' church was instantly refused: Dower, the Secretary for Native Affairs, replied that the Cape could not treat doctrines as seditious without legal evidence, and that freedom of speech was highly prized by blacks. 'It would be out of the question to enforce the proposed restrictions against an enlightened and politically influential man like Rev. Dr. Rubusana...it would be no less unjust to take from the humblest Church member his birthright as a British subject'. The Ministry supported this stand, Merriman adding characteristically that Christianity itself was once seen as a menace to the temporal power.⁴⁹

Cape complacency shows in the almost mandatory remark in

bluebooks on how much progress has been achieved in the past thirty-five years. Self-congratulation is juxtaposed with regret that so much remains to be done, and that many areas show signs of regression and were noticeably poorer than they used to be. Yet Stanford notes the 'perfect immunity from crimes of violence' which whites in the Territories enjoy; other magistrates comment on the decline of stock-theft; and on the hotly argued question of drink restriction, it appears that in some locations where drink is permitted drunkenness has not increased but the reverse is true in some 'local option' (dry) areas.⁵⁰

One magistrate notes the 'very limited scope for material advancement allowed by present conditions to the industrious and progressive Native...The careful and energetic individual who had amassed some wealth but not sufficient to enable him to pay the high price required for a farm is with reason dissatisfied with his small plot of ground in the location' and additional land should be opened to him. An official commission confirms this.⁵¹

The characteristic Cape ambivalence shows in attitudes to migrancy. On the one hand, the Stanford Commission on land tenure advises against ejecting relatives from overcrowded locations: 'The Commission will be slow to recommend drastic change in advance of the sentiment of the people in matters intimately affecting the condition of their social life', and think it morally and socially healthy for migrants to return to their home base. This stresses the function of the location as a labour reservoir.⁵² On the other hand, migrancy was also, under certain conditions, seen as what Fagan (in the Fagan Report) describes as a 'bridge'; for in town areas, where workers had been congregating for several decades, the non-party Committee on Native Affairs (which Merriman set up) recommended the permanent settlement of Native 'labouring classes' where they could have a home life and live in decent surroundings; there was a growing tendency for such permanent settlement near labour centres, 'and it would be a serious step and one opposed to our traditional Native policy', to adopt any measures which might have the effect of 'retarding the material progress of the Natives concerned'. There was the less reason 'to discourage such schemes of Native proprietorship' because they tended toward segregation: 'a policy which has been definitely recognized in regard to urban areas, and one which, within certain limits and with certain safeguards, it is the opinion of the committee is in the interests of both races to foster'.⁵³ Similarly Stanford asked for permanent status for the peasants and market-gardeners who had established themselves outside the towns on the commonage.⁵³

A tart comment in some magistrates' reports advises that the farm labour problem would be solved if better wages were paid and decent housing offered. Wages were indeed low. Coloured farm-servants, cattleherds and shepherds earned

about twelve shillings a month with keep (at a very meagre level). (The cash equivalent today is about R24,00). Coloured artisans, however, earned 4s 6d to 5s a day, which overlapped with the lower level of white artisans' wages. Coloured payment on wine farms could be as high as 3s 6d to 4s a day with food, wine 'tots' and quarters; ostrich farms paid 14s 3d a week and white foremen and head shepherds (presumably poor whites) earned only 18s a month (worth about R32,00 today). In the Eastern Province agricultural wages for Africans were lower than in the west (for coloureds and the increasing number of African migrants): the average was about £1 10s a month but the calculations are complicated by the labour-squatting system, where wages were lower and very arbitrary. Mine wages were £2 12s 2d a month - about the same as the Cape railways. De Beers paid more and were preferred to the gold mines. The link between debt, impoverishment and migrant labour is clearly evident in the bluebooks, with their tale of rising numbers leaving annually for work - 67 825 in 1908 and 79 377 in 1910.⁵⁴

By the late nineteenth century Social Darwinism was a pronounced ideological and anti-intellectual influence, which left its imprint on the Cape. Thus E.H. Muller gratuitously prefaced a memorandum for the Cape Labour Conference by stating that South Africa presented 'the greatest experiment in labour relations...ever known...Two races - widely divergent in the average capacity of their individuals and the development of their social organisation - must know how to live together'. Among the whites a 'repugnance (existed) against risking any undue familiarity with the Native by working side by side with him on equal terms...it is perhaps fortunate that the bar of colour exists between them; in respect of marriage or too free an intercourse...might result in social embitterment...(and) a premature fusion of races'⁵⁵

Merriman was ironically aware of the anomaly of social segregation, which crystallized the axiom of white mastership underlying late Victorian and Edwardian Cape liberalism. In a letter to H.G. Wells, who had rather harshly compared Cape practices with those in the southern states of the U.S.A., he wrote:

It is not too much to say that there is no colony under the British flag where such liberal and just treatment in the matter of the franchise, the ownership of land, and that of education is accorded to an alien race as in the Cape Colony, where the care of such matters has for a generation been entrusted to the local Parliament on whose shoulders rests the responsibility for any failure in administration. Of course the social difficulty remains and as far as one can see will always remain. The colour line is strongly drawn in all social matters as it is in every part of the world, India included, where the Teutonic and Coloured races come in contact, nor does it show any appreciable signs

of becoming less strongly marked. Herein lies the great danger in the future of this insoluble problem. Aristocracies are seldom permanent.

...Fortunately liberal treatment, however distasteful it may be to our fine social antipathies, seems to promise a better solution than arbitrary violence or mere race assertion...56

When Merriman's premiership ended the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei wrote to him: 'It will be a satisfaction to you to know that the Natives in these territories...were never in a more loyal and contented condition than at the present time'. Allowing for the superficiality - for how contented are the very poor? - and for the anxiety for the future that Stanford had observed, this tribute seems merited. Despite all its contradictions, the Cape liberal tradition, both in politics and administration, had reached its greatest extension and development just before it was engulfed in Union.

NOTES

1. *Race Relations Journal*, (March 1980).
2. C. Bundy's seminar articles are: 'The emergence and decline of a South African peasantry', *Af. Aff.*, v, 71, no. 285, (October 1972); 'The response of African peasants in the Cape to economic changes, 1870-1910: a study in growth and decay', ICS no. 16, SA v, 3 (1971-2); and his chapter, 'The Transkei Peasantry, c. 1890-1914: Passing through a period of stress', 202-31, in R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, (1977). These are subsumed in his book, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry*, (1979). M. Legassick's most relevant article is: 'The Rise of Modern South African Liberalism: Its Assumption and its social base', African Studies Seminar, University of Sussex, 9 March 1973. S. Trapido's relevant works are: his unpublished thesis, 'White Conflict and Non-white Participation in the Politics of the Cape of Good Hope, 1853-1910', Ph.D., University of London, 1970, and 'Liberalism in the Cape in the 19th and 20th centuries', ICS *ibid.*, 1971-2, and 'African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884-1910', *J. Afr. H.* ix, 1, (1968).
3. Cf. William Beinart's unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 'Peasant Production, Underdevelopment, and the Traditionalist Response in Pondoland, c. 1880-1930'.
4. J.S. Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937*, 157.
5. H.J. and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950*, 17 ff.
6. L. Kuper, *Race, Class and Power*, (1974), 31.
7. For further detail on origins, see P. Lewsen, 'The Cape Liberal Tradition - Myth or Reality?', *Race*, xifi, 1, (July 1971).
8. Attorney-General (Minister of Justice). Merriman sent him on a long inspection of the Transkei. His report in GH 27/27 is enclosure 3.9.1909.
9. JXM, on 7 April 1908, during the discussion on the Education Report, A1 of 1908, 68.
10. Hansard 1909, Second session, during the debate on the report of the Education Commission, 518 ff.
11. Trapido, 'S.A. Liberalism', 62 cites Irvine; so does

- Bundy, in his book, 74, 82-3, etc.
12. Figures from J. Stewart, *Lovedale: Past and Present*, (1887), which includes short biographies of all past students.
 13. Aliwal North in 1905 had 824 white and 628 black voters. SANAC report, 43.
 14. Bundy, 'The Roots of Rural Poverty...', 202-3.
 15. Simons lists a few additional discriminations. See H.M. Wright (ed.), *Sir James Rose Innes: Selected Correspondence (1884-1902)* on relative absence of legal discrimination, letter to *Cape Mercury*, 8 August 1887, 59-61.
 16. Hansard 1909, Second session, 93.
 17. C.C. Saunders, 'The Creation of Ndabeni: Urban Segregation, Social Control and African Resistance', paper for University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop Conference, 3 July 1978.
 18. In proceedings of Stanford Commission, Votes and Proceedings of House of Assembly, App. 2, 1908-9, 87.
 19. Innes, *Correspondence*, JRI to W.B. Berry, (17 July 1893), 111.
 20. *Ibid.*, to T. Bailey, 3 May 1886, 38.
 21. Evidence to SANAC, 11, 403.
 22. *Ibid.*, 396.
 23. *Cape Argus*, 22 June 1878 and 23 July 1880 (Merriman's proposals); C.C. Saunders, 'The Annexation of the Transkeian Territories (1872-1895)', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 1972, 231-42, 258-74.
 24. *Merriman P.*, JXM to J. Merriman, 20 October 1878, *Corresp.* 1, 46.
 25. See for example G19 of 1909, NA 691 of 1909, G26 of 1910.
 26. A2 of 1909. Stanford's summing-up.
 27. S. Marks and A. Atmore, 'The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century', *J. of Imp. and Commonwealth H.*, 3, 1, (October 1974), 125.

28. See Dower's report, G 19 of 1909.
29. E. le Roy Ladurie, *The Peasants of Languedoc*, transl. by J. Day, (1976), 63, 236, 252, 132.
30. Bundy, *S.A. Peasantry*, 154.
31. Legassick, 'S.A. Liberalism', 3; 'The Making of South African "Native Policy", 1903-1923: The Origins of Segregation', ICS 1972.
32. For education, see M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson (eds), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol. 1, (1969), 261-2.
33. W.M. Macmillan, *My South African Years*, (1975), 111 ff.
34. H.M. Robertson, personal information.
35. Innes, *Correspondence*, JRI to E.H. Walton, 29 July 1893, 112.
36. Merriman P., JXM to W.G. Stanford, 10 November 1903, *Corresp.* iii, 407; Jabavu's description, cited by Trapido, 'African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884-1910', *J. Afr. H.*, ix, 1, (1968), 88-9.
37. Merriman P., J. Guzana to JXM, 3 January 1905, asking for advice on buying a farm.
38. Hansard 1909, Second session, 88 and 167.
39. Merriman P., draft, JXM to Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, June 1909, *Corresp.* iv, 136.
40. Basil Williams P., Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss. Africa S. 133, 21 October 1908, 71.
41. N.A. 691/1909, 14 May 1909, Cape Archives.
42. Legassick, 'The Making of S.A. "Native Policy"'. ^
43. Bundy, *South African Peasantry*, 134 ff.
44. Hansard 1908, Second session, 329, 342.
45. Education Commission A1 of 1908; Usury Act, debates in Hansard, First session, 1908, 177. Twelve percent was made the limit of interest.
46. G.H. 22/17.
47. Merriman P., copies, JXM to Muller, 18 January 1910 and

1 February 1910 and 25 February 1910; *Corresp.* iv, 163.

48. N.A. 1026 and 1027, Cape Archives.
49. GH 27/27, 17 February 1908, Cape Archives.
50. See G 19 of 1908, as example.
51. G 26 of 1908 comments on growing indebtedness and impoverishment.
52. Stanford Commission, A2 of 1909.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Figures on Wages are taken from S.T. van der Horst, *Native Labour in South Africa*, (1942). The average English unskilled wage, according to F.G. Masterman, *The Condition of England*, (1909), was £1 per week, and women 10s.
55. GH 11/115, H 695 of 1909, Cape Archives.
56. *Merriman P.*, draft, 1906.