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*FROM REFUGE TO RESISTANCE: Botsabelo, Mafolofolo  
and Johannes Dinkwanyane:*

*Missionaries and Converts under the Authority of the Zuid-  
Afrikaansche Republiek, 1860-1876*

by Dr. P. Delius

## INTRODUCTION

In the 1870s the Transvaal witnessed an intensification of struggles over land and labour. This development was particularly marked in its eastern districts and was partly stimulated by the impact on the local and regional political economy of the discovery and exploitation of diamonds and gold. Also important was the changing nature of Z.A.R. control over, and intervention in, the countryside and the growing power of the Pedi polity. The latter had by the 1870s emerged as an alternative focus of power and authority to both the Z.A.R. and the Swazi kingdom. These factors shaped the disputes which culminated in the war between the Pedi and the Z.A.R. in 1876. This conflict in turn provided one of the pretexts for the British annexation of the Transvaal in early 1877.<sup>1</sup>

At the centre of the struggles in the eastern Transvaal was a Christian community led by the Pedi Paramount Sekhukhune's younger half-brother, Johannes Dinkwanyane. This community broke away from Botsabelo, the principal Berlin Missionary Society station in the Transvaal, in 1873. After a brief initial attempt to live within the sphere of authority of the Z.A.R., Dinkwanyane and his followers settled on the periphery of the Pedi domain. During the following years this group became increasingly prominent amongst those that rejected the basis of the demands made by officials and challenged the rights claimed by landowners. This community also came to represent an alternative for African Christians to settling or remaining on mission stations and an increasingly serious threat to the control of the missionaries over converts. The demands which were voiced with growing stridency by sections of the white community in this period that the Z.A.R. should intervene militarily to re-establish its authority over the region focused as much - if not more - on the activities and attitudes of Dinkwanyane as on those of the Pedi paramount.<sup>2</sup> It is striking for a period when African Christians in southern Africa are predominantly recalled as collaborators

that in the eastern Transvaal a Christian community was in the forefront of resistance.

Dinkwanyane has, in comparison to other nineteenth-century African leaders in the Transvaal, been the subject of a considerable body of historical comment and scholarship. Although this work contains valuable material it is marred by crude cultural determinism and by attempts to portray Dinkwanyane as an early Pedi nationalist. T.S. van Rooyen, for example, accounts for the secession of Dinkwanyane and his followers from Botsabelo in terms of their 'traditional ... spontaneous feeling of loyalty towards their former chief [Sekhukhune]'.<sup>3</sup> He argues that the historical dynamic of the community lay in a re-assertion of ethnic identity and he believes Dinkwanyane became the mouth-piece of the national aspirations of the natives of the north-eastern Transvaal.<sup>4</sup> The most recent and comprehensive account of Dinkwanyane's life sees it as a 'model of conflict between two ... cultures', and concludes that although

Johannes Dinkwanyane ... and George Washington have more differences than similarities, there is one central point of likeness - they both, in their own independent ways, wished to realise the nationalist aspirations of their followers.<sup>5</sup>

There is, however, little trace of explicitly nationalist concepts on the admittedly imperfect record of the ideology of this community and the suggestion that the actions of its leader and members were motivated by ethnic identification and allegiance is also open to question. To reject cultural determinism of this kind is, of course, not to argue that culture and ideology are epiphenomenal or without force. It does, however, lead to a determination to examine their effect and development in the context of the struggles generated within changing relationships of power and property. In large part this paper is devoted to the latter task.

#### BOTSABELO

The Berlin Missionary Society started work in the Transvaal in 1859. Initial attempts to establish a mission amongst the Swazi failed and the missionaries turned their attention to the Kopa, who fell under the control of the Lydenburg authorities. The Pedi polity was their next target. The first missionaries to settle within the Pedi domain were Alexander Merensky and Albert Nachtigal. In 1861 they established the station Khalatlolu west of the

Leolu mountains. In 1863 and 1864 two further stations were started. To begin with, the mission prospered under the protection of the paramount and assisted by the presence and activities of a pre-existing group of Pedi Christians. One of the missionaries' greatest successes was the conversion of a full royal, Kgalema (baptised Johannes) Dinkwanyane. However, mounting popular and chiefly hostility to the converts and the missionaries resulted in all three mission stations being closed by early 1866.<sup>6</sup>

The destruction of the Kopa chiefdom by Swazi warriors in 1864, and the abandonment of the mission stations within the Pedi domain, marked the end of the first phase of missionary enterprise in the Lydenburg district. In the second phase, the concentration of missionary effort was on developing Christian communities settled on mission stations in areas under at least partial Z.A.R. authority. Lydenburg Station, near the town of the same name and under the direction of Nachitgal grew slowly. By 1870 there were 97 inhabitants, mainly Pedi, the core of which had left Khalatlolu with Nachitgal. The station was also a focus for the *inboekseling* population in its area. Nachitgal retained rather more of Sekhukhune's trust than did Merensky. The paramount was concerned to receive warning of the movement of Swazi warriors and to retain at least one of the missionaries as a channel of communication with the officials of the Z.A.R. In order to maintain this connection, Sekhukhune permitted Jonas Podumo and other converts to travel within the Pedi heartland, to visit and tend to the needs of Christians who had failed to follow the missionaries into exile. Sekhukhune did not feel the need to mount another major offensive against Christians within his domain, although he remained concerned at the movement of Pedi to the stations and the fact that Botsabelo might provide the basis of a challenge to his authority.<sup>7</sup>

While Lydenburg Station gradually attracted adherents, Botsabelo (the place of refuge), under the guidance of Merensky, became the showplace of the B.M.S. in the Transvaal and became a model for missionaries and administrators. Sir Garnet Wolseley who found few places or people worthy of his praise during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, became quite extravagant in his admiration for Botsabelo and its founder. He confided in his diary

... it is a pattern for all South African mission stations: I wish there were a thousand like it elsewhere in the Transvaal, but then one would require a thousand men like Merensky and they are not to be had easily.<sup>8</sup>

Botsabelo, by the late 1870s must indeed have been an impressive place. It had a population of sixteen hundred, 'a fine church, certainly the finest in the Transvaal, stores, dwelling houses, workshops and a huge native

village'.<sup>9</sup> To this list could be added the station mill, wagon-building and repair works which catered to the needs of the surrounding Boer and African population. It came for a time to have the largest school in the Transvaal, and in the early 1870s the credit of the mission station was greater than that of the Z.A.R. It must have dwarfed Nazareth (Middelburg) (the nearest Boer town) and above the station 'situated on the summit of a high knoll and with a steep ascent to it on all sides' stood Fort Wilhelm, Merensky's answer to the Pedi capital, Thaba Mosego:

Walls fifteen feet high and two feet thick, pierced with loop-holes and built of iron stone, enclose a space of seven yards square; there are flank defences and a turret over the entrance, which give a clear view of the surrounding country.<sup>10</sup>

Botsabelo provides a striking if particular example of a missionary domain and of the phenomenon of the missionary landlord which became an important feature of rural society in the Transvaal.<sup>11</sup> In his later published account of his career in the Transvaal Merensky gives an extended account of his thinking and goals at the time of the establishment of the station. Having been a missionary within a powerful African polity, he now found that he was in charge of the destinies of a community living together on land belonging to the mission society. It was clear to him that this station should develop into an 'institute'. He defined an institute as a mission station located on B.M.S. property, the form of administration being determined by the fact that the mission society both claimed rents from the inhabitants and through its missionary representative governed the community through mutually agreed codes of law and discipline. Merensky, with the benefit of hindsight, goes on to recall his awareness at the time of the potential difficulties facing such a community. Firstly, the missionary would, on occasion, have to enforce the laws of the State and represent the interests of the landowners, the mission society, against the wishes and perceived interests of the station tenants. Secondly, the missionary would have to tread a perilous path between the need to secure a return for the landlord and the possibility of endangering his effectiveness in developing a Christian community.<sup>12</sup> While much of the latter thinking suggests prediction after the event, many of the conflicts which emerged in Botsabelo in the ten years after its founding need to be viewed in the light of these factors. The starkest example of their effect prior to 1880 is to be found in the departure of Johannes Dinkwanyane and 335 followers from the station in 1873.

From the foregoing the importance which Merensky attached to the role of missionary as landlord is clear and the question of the ownership of land remained central to the development of the community. The basis for the station

was the purchase by Merensky of the farm 'Boshoek' from a land agent for £75 in 1865. The farm, while no more than ten miles from Middelburg was surrounded by land which though owned by Boers remained unoccupied by them. As the B.M.S. was not permitted corporate rights within the Z.A.R. this and subsequent land purchases were registered in the name of Merensky. When 'Boshoek' was surveyed, 700 hectares were added as a gift from President Pretorius. Shortly thereafter, Merensky succeeded in purchasing the neighbouring 'Van Koller's Plaas', some 3 800 hectares for £225, which provided areas of fertile land and wood and winter grazing. Subsequently, two further farms totalling some 5 261 hectares were purchased and by the early 1870s, prior to the rise in land values in the eastern Transvaal, Merensky had accumulated a total of 11 395 hectares (28 450 acres) for £538. Under his successor, Botsabelo reached over 40 000 acres.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the vast extent of these lands much of the soil was unsuited to maize and sorghum production and there was little winter grazing. Some tenants in consequence cultivated the Middelburg town lands. Merensky decided against selling or granting title to the land to the inhabitants; as only usufructuary rights to the land were granted, he delegated the responsibility for apportioning the land to the community's leaders. In the main, he also ensured that the tenants did not contribute directly to the land purchases. This practice was breached, however, in 1875, when the tenants were directly involved in the purchase of a £350 farm to be used for winter grazing.<sup>14</sup>

The initial population of the station was made up of the 115 men, women and children who had left the Pedi domain with Merensky in 1864, and 120 Kopa who decided to follow Ramapodu and seek security under missionary protection after the destruction of Boleu's stronghold by the Swazi and under continuing threat of attack from the Ndzuzndza Ndebele under Mabhogo. Of the two groups the Pedi initially contained the higher proportion of Christians but the Kopa had had long experience of being required to meet the demands of Boer, Pedi and Ndebele for tribute and labour. These numbers were swelled by the arrival of more converts from the area to the north after the closure of the remaining missionary stations by Sekhukhune in 1866. There continued to be a steady movement of individuals to the station from both amongst the Boers and from the domains of effectively independent African societies. While Christian conviction played a role in this movement, Botsabelo also indeed represented a place of refuge. Merensky generally refused to accept *inboekselings* onto the station, although some had in fact accompanied the converts from Ga Ratau and others settled on the outskirts. Merensky's reasons for this appear to have been his wish to retain the cultural homogeneity of the population and his desire to avoid offending surrounding Boer society or weakening his own control over the station. By February of 1866, the population had grown

to 460; by 1869 it was 1 020 and by 1872 it was 1 108.<sup>15</sup>

While Sewushane, Mantladi and other early and prominent converts played a central role as assistants to the missionaries in the specifically religious life of the community, Merensky made use of a highly modified form of chiefship for the temporal administration of Botsabelo. Johannes Dinkwanyane and Ramapodu who were both of royal descent, were installed as principal agents of control and representation. This was not of course simply on the whim of Merensky. Ramapodu brought his followers to the station, and Dinkwanyane's rank would no doubt have been recognised in any event by the converts from the heartland of the Pedi polity. These leaders were delegated the power to allocate land to their subjects and to settle disputes among them. They were not, however, allowed to retain fines. These went into the coffers of the Mission Society. Merensky, aside from his position of religious leadership, remained responsible for settling disputes between tenants and outsiders, presided over particularly intractable or serious cases, and of course, retained ultimate authority over the distribution of land. Merensky observed in this highly modified form of traditional authority a mechanism of control and discipline. He was, however, to discover that it could be double-edged.<sup>16</sup> But it is also understandable that Merensky, in whose person the lines of temporal and spiritual authority were merged, should have brought chiefship to the mind of others. To Wolseley he was 'a great chief more than a mere teacher of the gospel' and a 'paramount chief' at that.<sup>17</sup>

The B.M.S. followed the Moravians in using church discipline as an instrument of social control on mission stations and this fusion of spiritual and temporal power made the missionary landlord a figure of formidable authority. The lives of the tenants on Botsabelo were regulated by *Platzordnung* (station regulations) which Merensky viewed as a combination of 'God's Law' and Pedi practice. The missionary interpretation of 'God's Law' included very particular notions of property and the moral dangers of idleness and improper dress. Amongst those aspects of Pedi practice considered incompatible with it were initiation, bridewealth payments, rain-making, witchcraft, divination and, of course, polygyny. While the missionaries and their African helpers maintained church discipline, the chiefs also played an important part in the administration of the *Platzordnung*. Recourse was only made to the missionaries in grave or intractable cases and/or those requiring the interpretation of God's Law. The penalties to which tenants who breached these laws were subject ranged through fines and flogging to banishment from the community.<sup>18</sup> Merensky gave a visitor the following impression of the operation of discipline on the station: a new arrival was

... made clearly to understand the laws of

the community, that idleness will not be allowed and will be visited by expulsion, that theft will be punished by lashes and expulsion too; drunkenness, the first offence a flogging and the next a still more severe flogging and expulsion into the bargain.<sup>19</sup>

Cultural breaches could also lead to eventual expulsion from the station and Merensky prided himself on having stamped out polygyny and bridewealth amongst the tenants.<sup>20</sup>

In the early years of the station's existence most of its inhabitants were forced to scatter among the surrounding farmers to work for grain. Others traded their beads, metal goods and war axes for food. Women also made pots which they exchanged for sorghum and maize. While the community survived in this fashion, lands were cleared, irrigation channels were dug and orchards of fruit trees were planted. In 1868 the gardens and fields of the tenants produced 3 000 bushels of grain and the harvest of 1869 allowed Merensky to rejoice that 'Botsabelo which a few years previously was stricken by hunger is this year the corn store for the entire region'.<sup>21</sup>

In 1870, Botsabelo, despite drought and swarms of locusts produced 3 460 bushels of grain over and above the legumes, gourds and melons grown and consumed. The tenants also accumulated stock through the sale of their labour and the exchange of their produce. By 1872 the station residents had 700 head of cattle and an equivalent number of sheep and goats. It is probable that the quantity of stock owned by tenants increased relatively rapidly in the 1870s. Until the development of the eastern Transvaal gold-fields after 1872 there was a very limited local market for grain. From 1873, however, there was a virtually insatiable demand for grain in the region which the tenants of Botsabelo played an important part in meeting.<sup>22</sup>

The tenants had other important sources of subsistence and surplus. Dinkwanyane and his followers were given permission by President Pretorius to purchase arms and ammunition and they were well-placed to exploit the teeming herds of game that moved from the highveld into the middle-veld and lowveld in the winter. This abundance of game also enabled hunters to profit from the high prices for skin and feathers which prevailed in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Some members of the community travelled further afield in search of greater reward. Jacob Makuetele, for example, appears to have used Botsabelo as a base from which to continue and probably even to extend his earlier activities as a hunter. In 1870, Makuetele, his brother Silas, and a number of companions set off to the north to hunt elephants, and Makuetele appears to have travelled regularly deep into the northern elephant-hunting regions. Other individuals used Botsabelo as a base for trading expeditions: one tenant, for example, travelled regularly to Zululand and

occasionally to Swaziland trading ostrich feathers. The wagon-building and other workshops at Botsabelo also employed and trained carpenters, wheelwrights and smiths, who could then and later find wider employment for their skills repairing the wagons, ploughs and guns of their fellow tenants and Boer and African neighbours. The wagons which numbers of tenants owned by the 1870s also allowed them to participate in transport riding.<sup>23</sup>

Tenants also sought work in the Transvaal and, increasingly after the opening of the diamond fields, further afield. Men from Botsabelo had their first experience of the diggings as a result of an attempt on the part of the B.M.S. to share in the diamond windfall. An expedition of twenty-five men was despatched from Botsabelo with a wagon, provisions and equipment provided by the Society, to mission-owned lands near Kimberley to search for diamonds. The plan was that as the Society had provided the capital and the men had provided the labour the anticipated profits would be shared. These profits, unfortunately for all, were small. After five months of diligent labour and the discovery of no more than eight small diamonds, the venture was abandoned.<sup>24</sup>

Despite this disappointment, men continued to make their way to the fields although it was wages rather than diamonds which were now the principal goal. The missionaries, like the neighbouring African chiefs, did not relinquish control over, or supervision of their subjects who were participating in migrant labour. Each group of men going from Botsabelo to the diamond fields was placed under the supervision of a Christian leader. Men went to the fields for four to eight months, after which time they were recalled to Botsabelo lest the decadence of the diggings caused them to waver from their Christian faith.<sup>25</sup> Merensky took additional measures to prevent the undermining of the Christian conviction of migrants by the diamond fields:

At that time ... [only] our sound and steady men went to the mines, those who we could be reasonably sure could withstand drink and other vices during the course of their lives there.<sup>26</sup>

It is not surprising that such disciplined and controlled workers were much in demand at the fields. Those, however, considered unfit by the missionaries to travel to the fields were debarred from earning the highest wages available and from participating in the accumulation of stock which they made possible.

Aside from the dominance of the protestant ethic on Botsabelo and the consequent importance attached by the missionaries to industry as an index of Christian faith and a condition of residence, the fact that many of the tenants had been stripped of their grain, stock and fire-arms prior to their arrival provided a powerful incentive to additional thrift and effort. Merensky was concerned to



ensure that part of the habit of industry was the sale of produce or labour. This was partly achieved by 'Obliging man, woman and child to wear clothing: the wearing of clothing has a very good effect, as it makes the people work to buy the clothes'.<sup>27</sup> The missionaries also made direct demands on the produce and labour of the tenants on station lands. Rent in kind was a tithe of 10 per cent of the sorghum, maize and later wheat crop of the residents. In 1868 the tenants wrote to the B.M.S. Director Wangemann to inform him of how they had 'given grain and how ... they had heard that God loves those that give joyfully. They had given one hundred and fifteen *muids* (two hundred and thirty bushels) of grain'.<sup>28</sup>

In 1870, a bad year, those under the authority of Dinkwanyane alone contributed over 260 bushels of grain and the total tithe was 346 bushels, worth roughly £100. Over and above the fines imposed on the tenants by the chiefs and missionaries, residents had to find ten shillings to pay for Christian marriage and 2s. 6d. to pay for a child's baptism. In the four founding years of Botsabelo, Merensky calculated that the tenants had contributed in the region of £1,200 to Mission funds.<sup>29</sup> Aside from these sources of revenue, Botsabelo also had

... a large and flourishing store where the natives supply themselves with all they require and from which the Boers and others in the neighbourhood also obtain what they want. By this means and the tithes of the natives' produce, the station is a rich one.<sup>30</sup>

The *Platzordnung* also stipulated that tenants should provide unpaid labour for the erection of church and school buildings. The demands which these activities made on the labour time of the tenants were by no means slight. In the period up to 1873, three churches were built of increasingly impressive proportions. The last was amongst the largest in the Transvaal. Long hours of labour were required for the quarrying and transportation of stone, and the forming and baking of clay bricks. In 1871 work was begun on a school building which, when it was completed, was reputed to be the largest in the Z.A.R. Once again stone had to be provided, the building required 40 000 bricks and the missionaries were bemused that the tenants could find labour irksome which was so obviously in their interests. In addition to these obligations, the tenants were subject to other demands on their labour, which Merensky eventually regularised into the form of one day of unpaid labour per month. On these days, the work ranged from construction to road-building and bridge repair and probably also included the cultivation of the missionaries' lands. Tenants were obliged to provide their own food and implements. School children also found that labour formed an important form of their curriculum.<sup>31</sup>

Merensky was unequivocal in his determination that his

tenants should recognise their status as subjects of the Z.A.R. and that they should fulfil the obligations which this position entailed. He adopted this stance despite the fact that the authority of the Z.A.R. over the area in which Botsabelo was situated was at best tenuous, and the Ndzundza Ndebele under Mabhogo and his successors remained firmly of the opinion that they had prior claim to demand tribute and loyalty from the tenants and, at the very least, hunting rights over the station lands. These claims were given short shrift by Merensky. His position was that

Although we lived on the frontier we had bought our land from the Boers, had come to an arrangement with their government and wished to be their subjects. I made it very clear to my people that as Christians we could not serve two masters, both Mapoch and the Boers. This would only be possible through total deceit.<sup>32</sup>

Merensky thus denied the residents on Botsabelo the options of recognising the authority of neither or both; strategies which were variously adopted by neighbouring Africans and Boers. The extent to which Merensky was influenced by the fact that his ultimate authority was based on a property right which in turn ultimately depended on the authority of the Z.A.R., also emerges from this quotation.

Recognising the authority of the Z.A.R. entailed meeting demands for tax and labour. In 1868, for example, 60 bushels of the Botsabelo grain crop were handed over to Z.A.R. officials. The tenants of the station were, in the late 1860s and early 1870s virtually unique amongst tenants on private land and notional subjects of the Z.A.R. in paying tax at all. They also suffered from demands for labour made by the authorities at Nazareth and elsewhere. Men from Botsabelo were obliged to supply labour to maintain postal services, to transport State property and prisoners and to supply warders for the town gaol. This labour was infrequently and poorly paid and particularly in the cases of trips through the disease-ridden lowveld to Delagoa Bay, could involve considerable personal risk. As with tax, tenants on the mission lands were obliged by their missionary landlord to meet labour obligations which other subjects of the Z.A.R. shirked or actively resisted. It also seems probable that Merensky retained the good favour of at least a section of the Boer community through his ability to supply and direct labour.<sup>33</sup>

The 1870s produced a welter of legislation in the Z.A.R. aimed at controlling and taxing Africans. The labour legislation of the 1870s appeared particularly ominous for the future of the mission stations and the new exactions pressed very heavily on tenants on mission lands. One interpretation of the laws was that no landlord could retain more than five families on his land which in theory threatened the continued existence of stations like

Botsabelo. This theoretical danger seemed about to be realised on 8 November 1871 when a Boer commando led by a Veldcornet who claimed authority from General S.J.P. Kruger arrived at Wallmansthal Mission station intent on dividing up the tenants among the local farmers. The missionary, Knothe, managed to secure a stay of execution and despite sporadic threats, the integrity of this and other mission stations was maintained. At Botsabelo, Merensky followed the advice of the local Landdros and placed all the tenants under contract to him.<sup>34</sup>

#### MAFOLOFOLO

Botsabelo, having weathered the immediate threat represented by the 1870 law, was, in 1873, confronted by a new crisis. From early that year, Johannes Dinkwanyane, supported by Timotheus Maredi, Salomon Mootlane and David Mpyane, pressed Merensky for permission to move off the station. A complex of reasons lay behind both this development and Dinkwanyane's support amongst the tenantry, but any understanding of or explanation for this turn of events needs to be located in the structure of exaction and control on Botsabelo and the changing role of the Z.A.R.

By the early 1870s, the growing population on Botsabelo and the poor quality of much of the land had led to some pressure on resources of arable land and some tenants were dependent on access to Nazareth (Middelburg) town lands for their crops. Their access to this land was threatened both by their lack of title and by their inability to fence against Boer cattle which trampled their crops. The increasing numbers of stock held by tenants also made the need to gain access to winter grazing still more pressing. Up to 1874, access to grazing could be secured but only at the expense of long and wearisome hours of labour service to Boers who owned land in the bushveld. After 1874, the increased demands made on winter grazing by highveld Boers resulted in Botsabelo tenants being virtually excluded from access to it.<sup>35</sup> The effects of these pressures were exacerbated by the growing awareness among the tenantry of the limited extent of their own rights to station land. This awareness, in turn, informed questioning of the levels of control and surplus appropriation maintained on the station. In 1873, Dinkwanyane expressed some of this sense of frustration to Nachtigal

Do we have no land [place]? ... Have not we continually worked for Merensky and so served him? ... We helped to build the mill and were not paid and the school and churches.

Further we have worked the land for him in the form of the tithe.<sup>36</sup>

From the early 1870s and probably before, men from Botsabelo encountered Christians at the diamond fields and elsewhere who came from mission stations in the Cape and Natal where discipline was less stringent and demands for rent were less oppressive. This comparative perspective both reinforced the questioning of missionary demands and equipped the tenants with arguments demonstrating that Botsabelo did not represent the only or ideal form of Christian living. Tenants used the example of other stations to deny the necessity of unpaid labour and the level of rent. Merensky met these arguments with the stipulation that all who avoided labour rent would have to pay an additional cash rent of twelve shillings per year.<sup>37</sup> But the rejection of missionary authority went still further, as Dinkwanyane asked Nachtigal 'Where is it written down that the congregation must live on the land of their spiritual leader?'<sup>38</sup>

It seems unlikely that, as Merensky would have us believe, this comparative insight provided the substance of the discontent. It did, however, provide a language of argument to the tenantry. Probably as important as the effect which the development of the diamond and gold-fields had at the ideological level, was the demand for produce and labour which they stimulated. Unpaid labour, the grain tithe, and controls over movement probably became still more irksome with the development of high prices for produce and high wages for labour and when surrounding African and Boer producers were able to compete free of some of the constraints under which the mission tenants laboured.

The recognition of the authority of the Z.A.R. enforced by the missionaries on their tenants exacerbated these stresses. The extent to which the state directly impinged upon the lives of the tenants was increased by the labour and tax laws passed and partially implemented in the early 1870s. While the collection of tax remained far from efficient and confusion reigned amongst officials as to how to apply the legislation, in 1874 (after the departure of Dinkwanyane) the Botsabelo tenants paid over £150 in taxes to the State. Being subject to this level of taxation must have been particularly vexing to a community which had been almost alone in meeting any of the State's demands for tax. Finally, the legislation and the circumstances which gave rise to it encouraged demands by officials and burghers of the Z.A.R. for labour from mission station inhabitants at precisely the time when alternative markets for the tenants' labour developed.<sup>39</sup>

It was against this background of heightened dispute and discontent that Dinkwanyane and Merensky came into conflict. The substance of the dispute between the two men was clearly the extent of chiefly authority permitted on the station. However, it was in part conducted specifically over

Dinkwanyane's insistence that the women of the community should no longer be allowed to grow their hair but should shave it according to 'traditional' practice. Merensky denied Dinkwanyane's right to enforce his opinion on his followers. This argument raised wider, if partly unstated questions about the extent to which the missionaries' demands for a radical restructuring of the social organisation of the tenantry were justified. By the early 1870s residents on Botsabelo were invoking the example of mission stations on which custom, particularly in relation to the payment of bridewealth, was nowhere near as comprehensively denied. It is possible that the accumulation of stock made possible in this period encouraged the demand that bride-wealth should be permitted, and it is also possible that it was essential to secure women from neighbouring communities to meet the demand for wives which existed amongst tenants.<sup>40</sup>

The terms of the debate and subsequent additions to the *Platzordnung* also suggest that the concern for custom reflected an increasing unease that life on the station was breaking down the control exercised by men over women and parents over children. Equally, chiefship on Botsabelo, while drawing on traditional legitimacy was a pale imitation of even subordinate chiefship within the neighbouring African political systems. While Dinkwanyane retained a degree of control over the allocation of land and dispute settlement, much of the tribute in grain and labour and the income in fines which would have accrued to him as a traditional chief by-passed him and ended up in the coffers of the B.M.S. or the Z.A.R. This latter aspect of the dispute was implicitly recognised by the later attempts of the missionaries to ensure that ten per cent of the revenue accruing from the taxation of tenants was retained by the chiefs. There also appears to have been increasing competition and conflict between Dinkwanyane and those who achieved religious leadership within the community, principally Sewushane and Kathedi. The latter also acted as Merensky's personal aides.<sup>41</sup>

In late 1873, Dinkwanyane and 335 followers with their possessions including, and partially loaded onto, two wagons left Botsabelo. The dominant explanation for this exodus in the existing literature - that it was the consequence of a re-assertion of primordial ethnic feeling and political loyalty - seems more than a little misplaced. The major prop for this argument appears to be that it was primarily those who had fallen under the authority of Dinkwanyane and not those who had been subject to Ramapodu who departed. It is thus suggested that the division between those who withdrew and those who remained coincided with a division between 'Pedi' and 'Kopa'. Yet part of the explanation for this differential participation in the withdrawal may well lie in the effect of the experiences of the Kopa at the hands of the Lydenburgers, the Pedi paramountcy, the Ndzundza Ndebele and the Swazi prior to their settling on Botsabelo. The attacks, threats and demands which the Kopa

suffered in this period probably deeply imprinted upon their thinking the dangers of being without a powerful defender. Added to this was their experience of the way the missionaries had invoked the authority of the Z.A.R. against them when some members of the community displayed a desire to move off the station, probably to more fertile land, shortly after having settled there. By the time of the departure of Dinkwanyane, Ramapodu and his followers appear to have been reconciled to the B.M.S. as their best possible defender, and worth the cost entailed in exaction and control. Many had become full participants in the Christian community, and the exodus of 1873 probably eased some of the pressure on resources which had been developing on the station and ensured that the missionaries lent a rather more sympathetic ear to the complaints of their tenants. Ramapodu also now emerged as the most powerful political leader amongst the tenantry.<sup>42</sup>

Beyond this, however, is the point that the impelling ethnicity - if it existed at all - was as much the creation of Botsabelo as it was of prior Pedi cultural and political tradition. The sphere and content of Dinkwanyane's authority was in large part determined by the development and administration of the mission station. The group that left with him, while primarily composed of individuals from the heartland of the Pedi polity was, in terms of any concept of ethnic homogeneity, diverse (as, of course, was the Pedi polity itself). A leading supporter of Dinkwanyane was one Andreas e Mofzia who had fled *inboekseling* status within Boer society for clientship within Pedi society. Also important amongst Dinkwanyane's supporters were a group of Koni who had moved from the Elandspruit area, settled briefly within the core area of the Pedi domain and then moved to Botsabelo. While the core of the followers of Dinkwanyane may have been drawn initially from Thaba Mosego and its environs, the degrees of common ethnicity between those who departed was certainly no greater than that which bound most of the tenants who lived on Botsabelo. Almost all fell within a broad north Sotho/Pedi cultural tradition and almost all (including the Kopa) came from societies which had been at some point subject to the Maroteng paramountcy. The community on the station was in fact in many ways representative of the process of the creation and recreation of communities which was a continuing feature of the aftermath of the *difaqane*, and Boer settlement in the Transvaal. The arguments as they stand, collapse the vital distinction between cultural heritage and political affiliation, which much of the nineteenth-century history of the eastern Transvaal clearly demonstrates.<sup>43</sup>

The aim of Dinkwanyane was not simply to escape Botsabelo but, as importantly, to enable himself and his followers to purchase land in their own right. Land-ownership offered the possibility of divesting Christianity of the institutional framework deemed appropriate for it by Merensky. While the desire to purchase land showed the intention of

staying within, or at least on, the margins of the area of authority of the Z.A.R., it was probably hoped that land-ownership would ensure the moderation of State demands for labour and tax. Both the desire of this group to purchase land and their expectations of the consequences of its acquisition may have been shaped by their awareness of the experience and practice of *kholwa* (Christian Africa) communities in Natal, and of communities in the western Transvaal. The desire to stay within the sphere of control of the Z.A.R. was shaped by the desire of these tenants to remain practising Christians. They also wished to settle close to the labour and produce markets of Lydenburg and the gold-fields.<sup>44</sup>

The favoured area for settlement was Elandspruit, the former home of the Koni, to the east of Lydenburg. The land was fertile, game remained abundant and the terrain was rugged and so relatively easy to defend. The owner of the land, D.J.G. Coetzee, anticipating handsome returns, readily agreed to its settlement on condition that the community initially paid for their winter grazing, killed a limited amount of game and, in the coming years, hired or bought the farm. The Landdroos of Lydenburg, A. Jansen, took a rather different view; his attitude being shaped by the confusion surrounding the right or otherwise of Africans to purchase land, and the possibility that in the rugged terrain of Elandspruit, Dinkwanyane would be inclined to evade his obligations to the State. It also seems likely that the counsels of the missionaries played an important role in shaping his attitude. Merensky wrote to him informing him of Dinkwanyane's intentions and through much of 1873, the strategy he adopted was influenced by the belief that it would be in the best interests of all if the authorities at Middelburg and Lydenburg dissuaded Dinkwanyane from leaving Botsabelo.<sup>45</sup>

The mounting frustration of the members of this group at the refusal of the State to permit them to buy this land was forcefully expressed to Nachtigal: 'You whites have taken our land from us and now we are not allowed to be landowners. But tell us by what right (law) can this be denied to us?'<sup>46</sup>

The future of Dinkwanyane and his followers by the latter half of 1873 seemed bleak. Dinkwanyane gave the following account of his predicament and options in an appeal to Nachtigal and Merensky:

I cannot and will not remain on Botsabelo, I am not permitted to go to Elandspruit and there is no government land available close to here. We are desperate. If you do not take pity upon us and if you do not help us, we have no other option but to go to Sek. [Sekhukhune]. But we cannot go there as we would have to live without the word of God.<sup>47</sup>

The appeal was in part that Nachtigal should allow them to settle on one of his farms or that Merensky should

register a farm for them in his name. Neither missionary was prepared to extend them this assistance. By August of 1873, however, Merensky began to moderate his position in the belief that if Dinkwanyane were forced to remain on the station he would do more damage to missionary authority than if he departed. Merensky wrote to President Burgers suggesting that while Dinkwanyane should not be permitted to settle on private land, he should be allowed to settle on government land. Finally after discussing the problem with Nachtigal, Burgers, in the absence of suitable government land, gave permission for Dinkwanyane to settle on the farm 'Vrishgewaagd' belonging to 'Heer Schultz', eight miles west of Lydenburg on condition that 'he behaved himself'. On 4 October 1873, the first party of 230 people left Botsabelo for their new home.<sup>48</sup>

Merensky's eventual, seemingly philosophical, acceptance of the exodus was shaped by his conviction that the 'people will soon realise that they would not have it as good anywhere else as on our stations'.<sup>49</sup> In a letter to Nachtigal in September of 1873 Merensky expressed his opinion of the departure and future of Dinkwanyane in a German proverb. He wrote, 'When a donkey achieves good health it goes and dances on the ice and breaks a leg'.<sup>50</sup> Merensky, insecure in his own powers of prediction, set out to ensure that the condition of the ice was treacherous. On top of his various attempts to ensure that this group was denied access to the land they desired, once permission for their departure had been given Merensky felt it was his duty to inform the Landdros of Middelburg that Dinkwanyane and his followers intended leaving with their guns. This official thereupon demanded a tax of ten shillings per gun and threatened to use force to ensure payment. Merensky's parting act boded ill for future relations between the missionaries and their former tenants.<sup>51</sup>

The sojourn of this group at 'Vrishgewaagd' was short-lived. They had in the course of 1873 been forced to meet the various and increased State demands for tax, including purchasing the new £1 pass. On top of this they were forced to pay ten shillings per gun. Having arrived at their new home they found themselves pressed almost immediately by new demands. The Government post had to be transported to Delagoa Bay and the Landdros of Lydenburg ordered Dinkwanyane to send men to act as porters. Dinkwanyane, newly departed from Botsabelo, felt unable to order his followers to undertake the certainly hazardous and possibly lethal trip to the coast in the summer months. As a punishment for this recalcitrance, the Landdros confiscated three guns from the community. This action was more than the community would tolerate and they abandoned the farm for a spot further north at the junction of the Waterval and Speckboom Rivers which became known as Mafolofolo.<sup>52</sup>

While relations between this group and the officials of the Z.A.R. thawed slightly in 1874, they never again formally recognised the authority of that State.



Increasingly, Dinkwanyane and his followers proclaimed themselves to be subjects of Sekhukhune. This overt statement of allegiance to the Pedi polity served a number of purposes. The group, having been denied the right to purchase land, or gain access to the land of their choice, now invoked the claims of the Maroteng paramountcy to ultimate authority over the land to deny the rights of the Z.A.R. to control or dispose of the land. This also enabled them to deny the demands for tax and labour which officials of the Z.A.R. claimed from those within the sphere of authority of the State. Dinkwanyane and his supporters could also now invoke the possibility of the potential military strength of the Pedi polity against those who wished to enforce claims to their labour, land or produce.<sup>53</sup>

These claims to being the subjects of the Pedi polity were not spurious. It appears fairly clear that Dinkwanyane recognised the ultimate authority of Sekhukhune and that the latter accepted his wayward brother and followers as his subjects. This relationship is, however, discussed at length elsewhere. The essential point is that Dinkwanyane was far from being a pliant agent of his brother's ambitions. Having failed to preserve his effective independence as a nominal subject of the Z.A.R., Dinkwanyane set out with much the same ambition to survive with his followers on the periphery of the Pedi domain now invoking the authority of that polity against the claims of the Z.A.R. This was not the third option he had outlined of taking refuge within the Pedi domain, however, but a fourth which was designed to evade precisely that alternative.<sup>54</sup>

Despite their rejection of the missionary as landlord and of the authority and demands of the Z.A.R., the continuing commitment of this group to Christianity never seems to have been in doubt. Even the missionaries, ready to detect and denounce deviation, conceded that

... the word of God and Christian discipline and morals rules [the community]. Open sins like drunkenness and debauchery were punished, nobody took a second wife and the people did not become involved in witchcraft or initiation ceremonies. A service was held every Sunday, Johannes often preached himself ... hours for prayer were set aside and there were other Christian meetings. A teacher tended to the children, school was held each day and the children were assembled for a special service on Sundays. Dying children or catechists were baptized but otherwise the authority of the church [B.M.S.] was not violated, nobody performed Holy Communion.<sup>55</sup>

It seems probable, however, that bridewealth payments were permitted and the missionaries also accused Dinkwanyane of increasingly behaving in the fashion of a traditional

chief. Presumably the substance of this accusation was that he assumed powers and enforced rights that had fallen within the missionaries' sphere of authority on Botsabelo. Dinkwanyane, in fact, was prepared to risk an open rupture with Sekhukhune by refusing to allow his daughter to participate in a female initiation ceremony convened by the paramount.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the fact that Christianity continued to play a central role in the lives of the members of this community, Dinkwanyane's repeated requests for a missionary were refused. Merensky had originally encouraged the belief that if stringent conditions were met, a request for a missionary to tend to the religious life of this group would be sympathetically received. These conditions included the requirements that the community should reside on hired or purchased land and should be in a position to provide a substantial portion of the living of the missionary. Merensky's colleagues were, however, of a different persuasion. Nachtigal and Knothe were insistent that only the utmost firmness would prevent further secessions and would persuade Dinkwanyane and his followers to return to Botsabelo. In 1873, the Transvaal synod of the B.M.S. placed the community under strict discipline, in effect excluding them from participation in the formal religious life of the mission. After the removal of Dinkwanyane to Mafolofolo the response of the B.M.S. to requests for a missionary was that a community in open rebellion against the State could expect no religious recognition and assistance. The fundamental condition laid down for any formal re-intergration into the church was that this community should recognise the authority and meet the demands of the Z.A.R.<sup>57</sup>

Relations between Dinkwanyane and the missionaries, distinctly tense by 1874, were virtually severed by the end of 1875. In 1874 Merensky took long leave in Germany and Nachtigal was delegated the task of keeping limited contact with Mafolofolo. With Nachtigal's hostility to the community and their awareness of his role in ensuring their religious isolation, the relationship fairly rapidly degenerated into one of open hostility. Conflicts with the missionaries at Botsabelo over the ownership of stock and stores of grain did little to improve matters, although sporadic attempts at reconciliation did occur. In the end, however, it was not the unfounded fears of the missionaries that Mafolofolo would act as a magnet for their converts which fatally prejudiced any possibility of a resolution of the conflicts. Mafolofolo offered the possibility of a Christian life without the attendant heavy demands for tithe, labour and tax. While the subjects of Dinkwanyane and of the Pedi polity were not spared demands on their labour or their produce, these demands, in the main, were considerably lower than those that had to be met by those recognising the authority of the Z.A.R. and the claims of missionary or other landlords.<sup>58</sup>

As the relationship deteriorated, the missionary records suggest that members of the community at Mafolofolo began to enunciate a profound criticism of the role of the missionaries. They argued that they were

... enemies [of the converts] for they teach you that you must be subordinate to the Boers; and although they [the Boers] cannot enforce their laws, the missionaries assist the Boers to place you under their yoke.<sup>59</sup>

During 1874 and 1875 there was a steady trickle of families from Botsabelo to join Dinkwanyane, and an exodus from Lydenburg mission station. By the end of 1875, the latter had been deserted by all but its *inboekseling* adherents. Mafolofolo also attracted Christians who had declined to leave the Pedi domain to settle on the mission stations. The alternative focus for the Christian community which Mafolofolo came to represent appeared to the missionaries - and to Nachtigal in particular - to constitute a profound threat to the B.M.S. Just as the Pedi polity had emerged as an alternative to the Z.A.R. and the Swazi kingdom for the Africans of the north-eastern Transvaal, so Mafolofolo, in part drawing on the prestige and power of the Maroteng paramountcy, appeared to be in a position to mount a challenge to the authority of the Berlin Mission. Indeed, by 1875 Nachtigal had reached the conclusion that 'it will also be best for the mission if a foot is placed on the necks of the blacks'.<sup>60</sup>

During 1875 and early 1876, Dinkwanyane's rejection of the legitimacy and authority of the Z.A.R. widened in scope. The settlement gradually took on the appearance of a *Felsenburg* (rock fortress) and one that appeared formidable even by the standards of Thaba Mosego and Fort Wilhelm. Built beside the sheer Speckboom River gorge, the entire settlement was surrounded by a high stone wall which followed and elaborated on the natural rock outcrops. Within this outer wall was a further fortress and the caves and crevasses of the enclosed rock formation provided the final lines of defence. At the centre of the settlement was a church large enough to house the entire population.<sup>61</sup> The mountain slopes which surrounded the fortified village was covered by terraced gardens, and while the immediate area of settlement may not have been especially fertile, the alluvial soils of the Waterval River valley were amongst the richest in the eastern Transvaal. Dinkwanyane's son Micha later recalled how his 'father dug furrows there and led water onto the corn lands from the Waterval River' and Nachtigal records that Dinkwanyane bought a plough.<sup>62</sup> Aylward commented:

I have seen many very pretty and highly creditable bits of cultivation in Kaffirland, especially in the beautiful valley of the Speckboom, where, after passing Johannes'

stronghold, the river amongst lovely scenery, flows through a rich and fertile valley to the plain.<sup>63</sup>

The documentary record is, however, silent on the extent to which the community was able to realise its stated ambition of taking advantage of the growing labour and produce markets in the region. While the surrounding area was sparsely settled by white farmers the land was legally owned by a variety of seasonally and permanently absentee landlords. To the latter categories of owner, the land provided winter grazing, wood, game and possibly limited supplies of labour. All these resources became increasingly scarce and valuable in the 1870s. The mineral discoveries in the region also resulted in rising land prices and increased land speculation.<sup>64</sup>

Thus at precisely the moment that landowners took a renewed interest in their property and were increasingly dependent on access to the resources available in the bushveld, Dinkwanyane and his followers challenged their rights in the area. They hunted game and cut trees on the neighbouring farms. No doubt with a sense of irony of the reversal of roles, they prohibited Boers from carrying guns or grazing their cattle in the environs of Mafolofolo, and transgressors found their cattle and their arms confiscated. Nachtigal's hostility to Dinkwanyane's settlement was heightened by the actions of his followers in driving this missionary's cattle from his winter grazing farm 'Winterhoek' on the Speckboom River on the grounds that he had not asked or received the permission of the Pedi paramount to pasture his stock there. Dinkwanyane confronted objections to this behaviour with the assertion that the land fell under the sway of Sekhukhune and not the Z.A.R. The neighbouring farmers' dislike of the Mafolofolo was further fuelled by the fact that Tsonga and other groups who had lived as labour tenants on their land left and joined the community.<sup>65</sup>

In October of 1875, the acting Landdros of Lydenburg visited the settlement to order Dinkwanyane to count the inhabitants in preparation for the payment of tax within four weeks. He was not permitted to see Dinkwanyane, and the forty armed men who barred his path told him that they would pay no heed to his orders

... the reason being that they lived on land belonging to Sekoekoenie and could not see how our government had any right to demand taxes from them, and when it was necessary that their people or men should be counted, then they would join Sekoekoeni and let him do the counting.<sup>66</sup>

In the following year - 1876 - the relationship between this community and local officials, missionaries, farmers and landlords deteriorated still further. The demand that the power of the Pedi polity should be broken, which led to

the outbreak of war in 1876, was in fact, principally directed against the Mafolofolo settlement. In April 1876, with war looming, Dinkwanyane despatched a letter to the Landdros of Lydenburg which was forwarded through Nachtigal and which gives some sense of his view of events. It also gives a powerful and moving expression to many of the themes developed in this paper.

To the office, to all the people ... I will address you Boers, you men who know God; do you think there is a God who will punish lying, theft and deceit? I ask you now for the truth, I pray for the truth because I also speak my whole truth. I say: the land belongs to us, this is my truth, and even if you become angry I will nonetheless stand by it. See that other people ... blacks ... have settled around here, but they are not so clever as to sell the land because they are ignorant, but you were all too clever ... Your cleverness has turned to theft. When I say your cleverness has turned to theft, I say it in relation to the land, because you came to this country, you knew God's word but ate everything up ... and said nothing to anybody, only flogged [people]. Your theft has now come into the open. Other men came here who were not of your kind who taught the people about this ... And I state and I mean; those who have bought land let them take their money back. [Let] these words [be read] before all the people so that they can hear the same. I am Johannes the younger son of Sekwati.<sup>67</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In July of 1876 President Burgers led the largest army thitherto assembled by the Z.A.R. into the field against the Pedi polity. From the Republic's point of view the campaign was an almost unmitigated disaster. But amongst its few successes was the storming and partial destruction of Mafolofolo on 13 July. This was, however, a partly pyrrhic victory. The Swazi warriors who led the assault found that once again their Boer allies failed to render them effective assistance and the regiments suffered heavy losses before the defences of Mafolofolo were finally breached. The Swazi army, with the experiences of its disastrous attack on the Pedi capital in 1869 to warn it of the dangers which lay ahead, thereupon quite the campaign.

With its departure the zest of the Z.A.R. commandos for battle diminished still further and it evaporated entirely when they confronted the reality of attacking Thaba Mosego. It was not until November of 1879 that an Imperial army led by Sir Garnet Wolseley and with extensive Swazi assistance finally put an end to Pedi independence.<sup>68</sup>

Johannes Dinkwanyane, wounded in both arms and the chest, died seven hours after the battle for Mafolofolo ended. Within days of his death different versions of his last words were circulating in the eastern Transvaal. The Berlin missionaries were told by his followers that he had instructed them not to abandon the spot but to fight on, and that he had urged them not to waver from their Christian faith. An alternative version which had wide currency amongst the white community was that he had rejoiced that he had met his death at the hands of a black rather than a white. In the following months some of the remnants of the community settled in the heartland of the Pedi polity. Others remained to the south and continued to deny the rights of the Transvaal State and local farmers to land, labour and tax, until the conquest of Thaba Mosego in 1879. Yet others settled on mission stations. In the longer term former members of the community continued to be one vital cutting edge in the spread of Christian belief in the region. One section led by Johannes' son Micha Dinkwanyane was in the forefront of African land purchase in the eastern Transvaal. The descendants of this community have also suffered particularly severely in the removals of the 1960s and 1970s, having once again been denied their right to their land.<sup>69</sup>

## NOTES

1. See P. Delius, 'The Pedi Polity under Sekwati and Sekhukhune, 1828-1880', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1980, Chapter 6.
2. Ibid., Chapter 8.
3. T.S. van Rooyen, 'Die Verhoudinge Tussen die Boere, Engelse, en Naturelle in the Geskiedenis van the Oos-Transvaal tot 1882', *Archives Year Book*, XIV, 1 (1951).
4. Ibid., 242.
5. D.W. van der Merwe, 'Johannes Dinkwanyane, 1842-1876', *South African Historical Journal*, 8 (November 1976), 15-31, in particular 31; see also B.V. Lombaard, 'Bydraes tot Bronne oor Johannes Dinkwanyane', *Historia*, X, 1 (1965), 4-16.
6. See Delius, 'The Pedi Polity', Chapter 5, for a detailed discussion of these events.
7. *B.M.B.* (1868), 248-352; *B.M.B.* (1869), 261; *B.M.B.* 1870, 374.
8. A. Preston, ed., *The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley* (Cape Town, 1973), 147.
9. E.F. Sandeman, *Eight Months in an Ox Wagon* (London, 1880), 157.
10. Ibid.; see also Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 198-215 and 217-279.
11. S. Trapido, 'Landlord and Tenant in a Colonial Economy: the Transvaal 1880-1910', *Journal of African Studies*, 5, 1 (1978), 26-58, in particular 38-42.
12. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 205-7.
13. Ibid., 202 and 264-6.
14. Ibid., 203, 207, 228; *B.M.B.* (1876), 259.
15. Ibid., 204, 207, 216, 247, 248; *B.M.B.* (1870), 356; *B.M.B.* (1873), 353-5.
16. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 207, 221, 248-9, 272-4.
17. Preston (ed.), *Sir Garnet Wolseley*, 145.
18. Wright, *German Missions*, 13; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 260-61, 272-4, 298, 411-2.

19. Sandeman, *Eight Months*, 158-9.
20. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 257-8.
21. *B.M.B.* (1868), 338; *B.M.B.* (1869), 357; *B.M.B.* (1870), 371.
22. *B.M.B.* (1873), 355; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 279.
23. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 220-21, 263; *B.M.B.* (1871), 415; *B.M.B.* (1873), 352-6; Preston, ed., *Sir Garnet Wolseley*, 145.
24. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 291-2.
25. *B.M.B.* (1872), 197; *B.M.B.* (1873), 352-3.
26. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 292.
27. Preston, ed., *Sir Garnet Wolseley*, 145.
28. *B.M.B.* (1868), 346.
29. *B.M.B.* (1870), 199, 371; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 258.
30. Preston, ed., *Sir Garnet Wolseley*, 145.
31. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 231-5, 241-2, 259-60, 274-7.
32. *Ibid.*, 211-2; see also 207 and 246.
33. *B.M.B.* (1868), 338; T.A., LL 3, Merensky to Jansen, 11.4.1871; LM 1, Merensky to Landdros, 11.6.1873; Merensky to Landdros, 5.9.1873; State Secretary to Landdros, 1.5.1874.
34. *B.M.B.* (1870), 369-70; *B.M.B.* (1871), 403, 413, 416; *B.M.B.* (1876), 259. For a fuller discussion of the background to this legislation and the changing nature and effect of Z.A.R. State see P. Delius, 'Pedi Polity', Chapter 6.
35. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 296-7; *B.M.B.* (1875), 169-71; T.A., S.S., 172, R.921/74, Grützner to Meintjies, 1.6.1874; R.922/74, Meintjies to State Secretary, 2.7.1874, and Petition signed by Coetzee and 17 others, 30.6.1874; U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 106 and 109.
36. U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 110; see also B.M.A., Abt 3, Fach 4/8, Tagebuch Lydenburg, 19.12.1875.
37. *B.M.B.* (1875), 136; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 276-7, 296-7.



57. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 298; U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 93, 106-8, 109-10; B.M.A., Abt 3, Fach 4/8, Nachtigal to Wangemann, 13.5.1873; Tagebuch Lydenburg, 19.2.1875, 20.2.1875, 10.6.1875; B.M.B. (1875), 145-6.
58. B.M.B. (1875), 145-6, 149, 180-81.
59. B.M.B. (1875), 149.
60. B.M.B. (1875), 184; see also B.M.B. (1876), 302-5.
61. B.M.B. (1876), 305; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 309.
62. U.G. 32-18, Minutes of Evidence of the Eastern Transvaal Natives Land Committee, Evidence of Micha Duikwana [sic], 25, 15.10.1917.
63. Aylward, *Transvaal*, 148.
64. B.M.B. (1875), 144, 168; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 264-6.
65. T.A., S.S. 187, R 807/75, Nachtigal to Landdros, 7.4.1875, R. 1373/75, Nachtigal to State President, 28.6.1875; B.M.A., Abt 3, Fach 4/8, Tagebuch Lydenburg, 26.5.1875; *Transvaal Argus and Potchefstroom Gazette*, 14.4.1876.
66. S.S. 194 R.2319/75, Schulze to State Secretary, 1.10.1875.
67. S.S. 207, R.810/76, Dinkwanyane to Landdros, 9.4.1876. The letter was translated by Nachtigal and is in his handwriting.
68. Delius, 'Pedi Polity', Chapters 8 and 9.
69. *Ibid.*, 347.

38. U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 109.
39. B.M.B. (1875), 145-8; B.M.B. (1876), 259.
40. B.M.B. (1875), 135-7; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 295-9.
41. Ibid., Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 411-3; T.A., S.S. 172 R.921/74, Grützner to Meintjies, 1.6.1874; T.A., A.419/8, Translation, Regulations of Botsabelo, n.d.
42. van Rooyen, 'Verhoudinge', 176-7; Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 210-11 and 248-9.
43. B.M.B. (1875), 138 and 153; see also P. Delius, 'Pedi Polity, Introduction, for a fuller discussion of some of these points.
44. B.M.B. (1875), 176; van Rooyen, 'Verhoudinge', 229; Etherington, *Preachers and Peasants*, 122-3; U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 116.
45. B.M.B. (1875), 138-9; T.A., LL 4, Merensky to Landdros, 26.5.1873; S.S., 159, R.1107/73, Joubert to State Secretary, 22.7.1873: this document suggests that the owner of the farm was M. Schoeman; U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 107-8.
46. U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 106.
47. Ibid., 114.
48. Ibid., 112, 114-5; T.A., LM 1, Burgers to Merensky, 8.9.1873.
49. U.A., Tagebuch A. Nachtigal, 2, 116.
50. Ibid.
51. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 299.
52. B.M.B. (1875), 143; T.A., LL 2, Jansen to Uitvoerende Raad, 26.11.1873; LL 20, Landdros, 14.1.1874; S.A. 169 R.444/74, Breytenbach to Burgers, 10.3.1874.
53. B.M.B. (1875), 143.
54. P. Delius, 'Pedi Polity', Chapter 8.
55. Merensky, *Erinnerungen*, 301.
56. B.M.B. (1875), 144; B.M.A., Abt 3, Fach 4/8, Tagebuch Lydenburg, 4.6.1874.