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Title: "We are digging, we are seizing huge chunks of the municipalities
land" (Siyawugubha, Siyawugubha Umhlaba Ka Maspala)" Popular
struggles in Benoni, 1944-1952.

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"WE ARE DIGGING, WE ARE SEIZING HUGE CHUNKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES
LAND" (SIYAWUGUBHA, SIYAWUGUBHA UMHLABA KA MASPALA)"¹ POPULAR
STRUGGLES IN BENONI, 1944-1952.

P. Bonner

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The second world war transformed the face of South Africa like no other era since reconstruction. Unlike reconstruction however, the war years were no period of planned state initiatives or aggressive social engineering. State policy was reactive, tentative, piecemeal. State planning was informed by no broader vision with which to regulate and direct the massive social and economic transformations underway. All this left considerable space in which the major new force to appear in the political arena - the urban proletariat - could manoeuvre. Huge gaps opened up in the cities' ramshackle and improvised structures of social control. Real opportunities presented themselves to the new working class to shape and to mould the world in which it moved. However the very abruptness of these changes which injected such uncertainty, and incoherence into official policy making circles, also imprinted itself on the character of the new urban proletariat. The newly assembled urban communities were still too fluid, too diverse, too unformed to take sustained advantage of the state's fumbling indecision. Some important gains were won, and certain policy options foreclosed. However, the struggles of the urban masses were all too often, sectional, individual and introverted, and only incidentally and indirectly shaped or subverted state policy. A political movement with the programme and the tactics to take on this role did not emerge till the early 1950's, and then largely in reaction to the massive social engineering and political repression that accompanied the implementation of grand apartheid. By then the period of maximum opportunity had already passed by. It is to this period and these struggles that this paper draws attention. It focusses on the East Rand town of Benoni which was one of the major centres of wartime industrialisation on the Rand. It represents a preliminary attempt to order some of the data already collected and to define future directions of research.

Along with the rest of the Witwatersrand Benoni's industrialisation spurted spectacularly during World War II. New factories mushroomed:

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established industries expanded massively as they converted to wartime production. Dunswart Iron and Steel, for example, produced 1½ million mortars, and 60,000 bombs during the war, as well as special steel sections for shipping. Head Wrightson & Co.'s manufactured steel output increased by 150% as they produced armoured plate for armoured cars, petrol storage tanks, and portable box girder bridges. Standard Brass equipped an additional machine shop to cope with demand for shell cases, bombs, and field artillery components. Burmco produced 20,000 tyres, numerous tank tracks, bicycle tyres and other rubber goods. Delfos, at the instigation of the Director-General of Supplies became the first company in South Africa to install modern precision components. Until the late 1940s this trend persisted unchecked.² British companies who had previously found it uneconomic to enter 'colonial markets' joined together in 'mergers' to set up South African subsidiaries. When English Electric set up in Benoni in 1946 it was in the vanguard of a growing movement in which foreign manufacturers were breaking down the pattern which had previously left South Africa dependent on foreign imports for engineering and electrical supplies.³ As industrial land became more and more scarce in Johannesburg and left no room for expansion, other firms relocated to the East Rand. In 1947 Head Wrightson transferred the bulk of its Johannesburg operation to Benoni.⁴ In May the following year President Knitting Mills did the same.

Benoni's industrial development was neither unprompted nor unplanned. Led by Morris Nestadt, estate-agent and three time mayor, the council assiduously courted industrial investment, spurred on by the fear that the town's neighbouring low-grade mines would shortly close down. This they rapidly did in the years following the war, with familiar names like New Modder, Van Ryn, Witwatersrand Deep, and Modder Deep all giving notice of closure. Despite impassioned appeals to the government to reduce the mines' level of taxation and so prolong the life of the mines, their closure actually benefited Benoni.⁵ Electricity, water, labour and ultimately land were all freed for industrial and residential development, and a major fetter restricting other municipalities was broken away. The Benoni City Times proudly announced to its readers the great strides forward being taken. From 2 million to 28 million units of electricity consumed, from 6 to 73 transformer substations. From £5,8 million to £7,8 million worth of building improvements, and a lengthening queue of applicants for industrial land.⁶

The council, however, did not display quite the same resourcefulness and vigour in coping with the consequences of industrial growth. While some problems were dissolved by the war others assumed an even more intractable form. White unemployment, for example, vanished. From being the 'sump of the unemployed' in 1939 with one in seven white males out of work, Benoni was able to mop up large numbers of servicemen demobilised immediately after the war. In its place however there arose the problems of an acute shortage of housing, slum conditions, and white juvenile delinquency (the much reviled 'duck-tails', who were the subject of so much anxious comment at the time).⁸ The 'Coloured' and Indian communities fared even worse. Parktown's Coloured community was forced to endure massive overcrowding, and a shortage of basic social services such as hospitals and schools. Indians in the Asiatic section complained of overcrowding, bad sanita-

tion, the absence of basic social amenities and a shortage of schools.

The African community was worst hit of all. Between 1939 and 1949 the composition of Benoni's African population underwent radical change. From being a predominantly mine-based and mine-housed migrant population in the late 1930s (32,278 African mine workers, 23,200 non-mine in 1939), these proportions had been reversed in the course of the war (17,927 mine workers, 28,593 non-mine in 1950). It seems highly likely moreover that even these 1950 figures were skewed, for when the council conducted its own census for food in 1948, it found the African urban population to amount to a full 40% more.¹⁰ Thus, for Africans even more than for other sections of the population accommodation was at a premium. Families jammed into back yards in white suburbs, into rickety shanties on the smallholdings surrounding Benoni, into 'Twatwa', the town's African location, and into the Indian and Coloured townships nearby. Everywhere conditions were bad, but it was in the Asiatic section that social and economic privations and their associated social disorders were at their worst. It was here that the authorities were soon to confront their urban African 'problem' in its most intractable form.

Originally laid out in 1912, the Asiatic section soon attracted an African population that rented shacks from Indian and Chinese site-holders. In 1932 this tenant population stood at 600 but by 1936 it had shot up to 2,139. Numbers levelled off during most of the war, but the four years following the cessation of hostilities witnessed another explosive expansion. By July 1950, 5,003 Africans, 892 Asiatics¹¹ and 211 Coloureds were jammed into its insalubrious confines.¹¹ Living conditions were utterly squalid. The average size of a room was 10 feet by 10 feet and these were generally occupied by 5-10 people. In 1945, 1,791 tenants out of a total African population of 2,355 were crammed onto 59, 50 foot by 50 foot stands (the total number of trading and residential¹² sites at the time was 264). One stand alone housed 111 occupants.

The jimcrack shanties in which the African and poorer Indian tenants lived were breeding grounds of disease. Most of the rooms 'were old and filthy with no light and ventilation provided'.¹³ The only vestiges of privacy were provided by cloth covers which partitioned the sections of the room in which different families lived.¹⁴ Latrine buckets overflowed into the street. "Heaps of manure, sewerage in the streets and on the stands" made it a breeding ground for disease. Infant mortality stood at 33% during the first twelve months of life. Tuberculosis, pneumonia, and intestinal diseases were rife, their incidence ever increasing with the mounting pressure of population. In 1947 the Medical Officer of Health spoke dramatically but accurately of the encircling 'battalions of death'.¹⁵

These teeming warrens provided a congenial habitat for more than just the breeding of disease. A picturesque variety of illegal activities also flourished. Single women flocked to the relative freedom of 'Makuleng' (the Sotho name for the Indian section). The majority were from Lesotho.¹⁶ Others "were the unruly daughters (and sons) of location residents, a great number being the families of natives employed anywhere on the Reef, as well as Native soldier's families."¹⁷ Illicit liquor was brewed on a spectacular scale and prostitution was rife. Few seem to have disagreed with Advisory Board's member Harry Mabuya's judgement that it was "the best shebeen

in the world".¹⁸ 'Makuleng' predictably served as a magnet for the thousands of migrant labourers working on the neighbouring mines. Hundreds poured in on the week-ends and presented rich pickings both to the shebeen queens and to Twatwa's criminal underworld. Robbed, or otherwise divested of their earnings, black miners frequently became embroiled in fights which erupted each week-end.¹⁹

Other forms of criminality also flourished. The unregulated anonymity of the Indian section made it a nerve centre of criminal activity for the whole East Rand. Robberies were planned there and large quantities of stolen goods were stored there.²⁰ By the end of the war it had become a nightmare for Benoni's overstretched police and a 'mecca for criminals from all over the Rand', as the following table for January to September 1949 reflects.

	Indian Bazaar	Wattville, Emergency Camp and Old Location
Population	3,000	30,000
Assault to Harm	118	129
Liquor	1,114	1,330
Pass Laws	1,535	254
Concoctions Destroyed	31,239 galls.	15,671 galls.
Dagga Convictions	28	11
Public Violence	8	2

The council was not oblivious to these problems, nor was it unconcerned. For over a decade, with a brief respite during the early part of the war, it was bombarded with council reports, government memoranda, and press exposés, all of which recited the same litany of complaint. In 1936, a visiting delegation from India expressed horror and incredulity at the squalor they found.²² Successive reports by Benoni's Medical Officer of Health made the same points, buttressing them with dismaying statistical data about death and disease rates. In the 1944-5 report, for example, Anning sombrely warned "so long as the native section is housed largely in the slums of the Asiatic area and of the location, the whole of Benoni stands in continuous danger of the most serious epidemics of disease".²³

Anning was not alone. In April 1951, Matthewson, the newly appointed and reforming non-European affairs manager, demanded urgent action in dealing with this 'cancerous wedge', remonstrating with his own Non European Affairs Committee.

Are we really going on adopting a sort of laissez-fair attitude of doing nothing and taking the chance of the central government intervening and placing the responsibility for non action at our doorsteps?²⁴

Outside bodies were not slow to take up the refrain. Government Departments clamoured for remedial action. In June 1945 A de W Horak

of the Dept. of Social Welfare called for urgent action in removing Africans from the Asiatic section.²⁵ In September 1949 the Chief Inspector SAP Benoni highlighted the appalling crime statistics of the Asiatic area and threatened an enquiry by the Land Tenure Advisory Board "under the provision of Section 12(1)(e) of Act 28 of 1948".²⁶ Two months later the Native Commissioner for the area joined the fray, insisting on immediate initiatives on the part of the council.

Even more embarrassing from the council's point of view was the wider publicity generated by the appalling public squalor of 'Makuleng'. In May 1945 and again in early 1947, the Rand Daily Mail and the Star ran stories headlined 'Benoni's native slums', 'Benoni area a running sore'.²⁸ In May 1946 and again in January 1947 Benoni and District Chamber of Commerce and Industry joined in the chorus of denunciation. Describing the location as 'a cesspit of crime and insanitation' in his first quarterly report for 1946, Chamber President J. Duthie went on to admonish the council, "Publicity is the only solution. If this publicity is bad the council has itself to blame".²⁹

Benoni's carefully nurtured 'garden city' image was being seriously tarnished, and the council was becoming seriously alarmed. Unfortunately every initiative it took became almost immediately caught up in a tangle of legal and political complications. The council had been endeavouring to establish some measure of control over the location since the early 1930s. It experienced an early set back, as well as a taste of things to come, when the entire location regulations were declared ultra vires in a case brought by one of the location residents in 1930. It took three more years before the council was able to refine and promulgate a new set of negotiations. A central feature of the new location regulations was the way they sought to establish control over residence through a system of site, tenant and lodger permits. Between June 1934 and October 1936 the council blitzed the location in search of those living there without the appropriate authorisation. 3,025 luckless individuals were charged in the course of these raids. Massive liquor raids were also mounted to root out the shebeen queens and 'unattached' Sotho women which succeeded in netting a further 600 'offenders'.

The council's onslaught met with a considerable measure of success but only to the extent of displacing the problem rather than effacing it. As the campaign bit, hundreds of unauthorised residents sought sanctuary elsewhere and found it surprisingly close at hand - across 3rd Avenue in the Asiatic section. One of the distinctive features of Tswa, was that the location proper and the Asiatic section literally ran into each other. There was no open ground in between and no fence: the two areas simply melted into one another at the line of shops along 3rd Avenue. Harassed residents could therefore simply stroll across the street into the welcoming arms of the Indian landlords on the other side. The African population of the Asiatic section accordingly leaped up from 600 to 2,139 in the middle years of the decade.³⁰

In attempting to deal with this problem the council started out at an initial disadvantage: it had no idea what the precise legal status of the Asiatic section was. Its initial assumption was that the Asiatic section was part of the location and that Indian landlords could be prosecuted under Section 5(5) of the urban areas act for 'harbouring natives'. The council commenced prosecutions in 1936 and in so

doing entered into a decade of legal skirmishing which was ultimately to reduce it to a frustrated and furious impotence.

An appeal to the Supreme Court soon had council's counsel advising that they withdraw the case since there appeared to be a chance that the whole proclamation might be considered invalid.³¹ The council responded in 1937 by promulgating new location regulations which required the licensing of any site holder letting out premises to tenants. In 1938-9 it also succeeded in buying extra land for location housing and in raising a loan for 123 sub-economic houses from the Central Housing Board. Finally, in 1939 it secured the proclamation of Benoni under the Urban Areas Act, a measure which was directed primarily against single unemployed women.³²

Things seemed to be going the council's way. In 1940, 123 houses were ready for occupation. Another appeal brought on behalf of an Indian landlord called Mustapha against a charge of 'harbouring', was dismissed in the appeal court in November 1941. Following this, and an aggressive council attack on illegal lodging, the Indian stand holders reached an agreement with the council whereby they undertook voluntarily to limit the lodging population of the Indian section. 300 lodgers were removed, the expectation being that the majority would find accommodation in the newly completed houses in the new location.

This optimism was short-lived. To begin with, virtually none of those expelled were qualified to live in the new location, and the housing remained empty. Then, early in 1942, the lawyer of an Indian landlord named Nagan Maripan found another loophole in the regulations and had a case against him dismissed on the grounds that there was no evidence that the Asiatic section had been de-proclaimed as a 'native location'. A further year was to elapse before the Native Affairs Department deproclaimed the area in question, and this was almost immediately followed by another appeal against a similar conviction, on a variety of technical grounds. By this stage it was becoming apparent that the council's efforts could not be staved off indefinitely by legal means, and Slood and Broido, the stand holder's attorneys, opened discussions with the council to reach a negotiated settlement. However the Council remained unmoved and for the third time in as many years pressed ahead with its programme to remove 'that cancerous wedge'.³³

While the council held the newly constructed houses in Wattville vacant until such time as it was able to embark on its strategy of clearing up the Asiatic area, other explosive pressures were building up in the old location itself. Although overcrowding was not as acute as in the Asiatic section, it was still extremely serious. When the location had been first established the council had sought to save money by encouraging site holders to erect their own houses. By far and away the majority of the houses in the location (979 out of 1,179 in 1944) were therefore privately built. Owners of these buildings enjoyed a greater freedom from regulations than those living in municipal houses, and virtually no restraint was exercised over the number of shacks which they built in their yards to accommodate lodgers.³⁴ By the early 1940s 1,900 lodger families had jammed into these premises. A certain section of the site-holders particularly along 13th street held themselves aloof from this practice. This was the respectable god-fearing end of town.³⁵ The rest were less fastid-

ious and became "professional boarding house keepers". It was quite common e.g. for 3-4 families to live in a single yard. In some cases as many as eight families jammed onto one 50 x 50 plot. Families sometimes comprised as many as eight to twelve people and often squashed into a single room. Because of the rich pickings to be had a lively property market developed in the yards. It was possible, under Benoni's leaky location regulations, to sell private dwellings by private treaty, and several stands changed hands in this way each month. Under these circumstances the prevailing spirit of communality began to break down and a certain entrepreneurial ethic started to seep into the location.³⁶

Disputes between lodgers and site-holders became increasingly common,³⁷ fifteen to sixteen reaching the location managers office each month. In some cases these were relatively trivial domestic affairs, over who should clean the yard, or the misbehaviour of children.³⁸ But as more and more families became increasingly desperate for accommodation they acquired a more mercenary character.³⁹ In November 1949 the location social worker reported that 'shortage of accommodation has given rise to a great deal of of bribery at higher rental'.⁴⁰ By May 1945 twenty families a month were being compelled to vacate their shacks by avaricious landlords.⁴¹

To the rent-racked lodgers of Benoni location the sight of seventy seven vacant houses in the new location was an open incitement, and pressure built up for their release throughout 1944. The case of Abram Ngubane provides a sense of some of the frustration that was felt. In March 1944 he made the latest of several applications for housing which stretched back to March 1940. Married and with three children, he complained of living in squalid conditions in a single room in 15th street. "I am a religious man" he said "and take pride in my family life, but under the present conditions I fail to see how I can give my family proper care". Ngubane was warmly supported by his employer, the compound manager, but to no avail. He was only one of 330 applicants living in the location as lodgers, of which at least 140 had lodged their applications prior to his. The Native Affairs manager therefore urged no precedent be made.⁴² There was in any case more than a trace of casuistry in the Native Affairs manager's reasoning. Even if Ngubane had been number one on the list he still would not have been offered accommodation. The houses in the new location⁴³ were reserved for tenants cleared out of the Asiatic section.

For the long suffering lodger who had placed his name on the housing waiting list ten years before, this must have seemed like the final indignity. Even if a family had been in the Asiatic section only six months they would automatically get preference. Indeed by the end of 1944, a number of families had moved from the location to the Asiatic area with precisely this in view.⁴⁴

Frustration boiled up in the early months of 1945. A few yards from the location 77 houses stood invitingly open. Inside its perimeter thousands of families jostled for space, with new arrivals streaming in each day. It required only the moment and (in this case) the man, to fuse these inchoate, individualised and introverted grievances into a social movement of formidable proportions. The moment came early in 1945 when the council resumed its offensive on the Asiatic area. In November 1944 the appeal of Arjan Singh to the

appellate division against his conviction for 'harbouring' Africans was dismissed.⁴⁵ Lawyers for the standholders now sought to reach a compromise settlement whereby they would eject a proportion of their lodgers in return for being able to keep the rest. The council eventually rejected this offer after consultation with the Commissioner for Immigration and Indian Affairs and on 23 May instructions were issued to take action against the worst properties under the slums and the Urban Areas Acts.⁴⁶ A confrontation was now looming, as the landlord's attorneys had already threatened the wholesale eviction of lodgers, if this piecemeal approach⁴⁷ was pursued but it was headed off from a quite unexpected direction. In an apparently unrelated initiative an Inspector of the Department of Social Welfare had been lodging complaints against the exorbitant rents being charged in the Indian area with the Benoni Rent Board since the beginning of the year. In the forty seven cases he had taken up rents had been reduced from an aggregate £73.15.0 to £23.8.6. The landlord community was incensed and retaliated by serving notice of eviction on the complainant lodgers. This action was sanctioned shortly after in the Benoni magistrate's court⁴⁸ on the grounds that the rental contract represented an illegal act.

During April a total of fifteen African lodgers were accordingly given notice and six were ejected from their shacks. The council was now on the verge of being overwhelmed by events. The six families ejected could or would not find alternative accommodation and simply camped out on the street opposite their old rooms.⁴⁹ The weather was freezing and the Council was quickly outfaced. Two days later, after consultation with the Native Affairs Department, three of the families that 'qualified' for accommodation⁵⁰ were allowed to occupy three of the new municipal houses.

Having opened the floodgates a fraction the Council was now unable to force them closed. Soon it was being swept helplessly along by a human tide of homeless families. Residents in the location were outraged. They accused the council of partiality towards the families of the Asiatic section, and of feeble capitulation. The six families, they insisted, had deliberately "staged a demonstration - and ... forced the hand of the council". From this point on, the home of the location manager was "besieged with women with babies in arms". Matters came to a head on 19th May. Several families which had been dumped on the streets by their landlords in the old location presented themselves at the location manager's house together with all "their goods and chattels". The following day when the location manager Brown made his routine round through the location, it was bubbling with discontent. 'Countless families' demanded he come and see the degrading conditions in which they were living. Advisory Board members were even proposing a march on the home of Councillor Walmsley, the Acting Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee. An increasingly harassed Brown headed off this proposal by promising a meeting between Walmsley and the location residents the next day. While this solved the immediate problem it opened up the breach in the council's marginal but decisive move. Walmsley was relatively inexperienced, having taken over the Acting Chairmanship of the Committee only three days before. The meeting he addressed was stormy and difficult to control. Even the elements seemed to conspire to embarrass the unfortunate Chairman. Snow had fallen the night before

and the homeless families were suffering bitterly from exposure. Confronted by a clamouring crowd of women, Walmsley was morally and physically cornered. His first reaction was to bolt and seek the advice of the Town Clerk. After hurried consultations, it was decided to release a further ten houses to the homeless families of the location. The number was totally arbitrary, and three homeless families remained in the evening when the noisy gathering dispersed. Despite the weather, Walmsley refused the issue of any further homes, but once again he was on the point of being morally and politically outflanked. Because of the cold, the social worker in the location placed the shivering families in the bicycle sheds and the Advisory Board offices. The same day a fourteen day old baby of one of the families contracted pneumonia. The council was now placed into an untenable position, which the Advisory Board moved quickly to exploit. Emboldened by legal advice, almost certainly from Lewis Baker the CPSA branch secretary and lawyer, that the council could only evict if it provided alternative accommodation, the Board advised the five families to seize five of the vacant homes. The dammed up flood of the homeless was about to break through. When the location superintendent visited the families that had taken possession of the houses on the night of 24th, he found 'everything peaceful', but only the women at home. What he failed to discover was that the men were attending a political meeting, which was in the process of resolving to storm the remaining vacant homes. Before the night was out every remaining house in the new location had been taken by lodgers from the old.

The town council was now totally bewildered. The Native Commissioner declined to become involved. The public prosecutor refused to lay a charge. The town solicitor confirmed that the squatters were not liable to criminal prosecution, and Lewis Baker thoughtfully forwarded £71,7,0 rent for the houses in question. The only option that remained open to the council was to prosecute the squatters individually after serving them notice, but this would have left them responsible for finding the evicted squatters alternative accommodation. Councillors gave vent to their feelings by accusing the Advisory Board of bad faith and double dealing at a special native affairs committee, and by engaging among themselves in acrimonious recriminations. Councillor McDowell resigned from the committee after Councillor Dingwall had publicly commended the squatter actions in council, and referred provocatively in her letter of resignation to his desire 'to obtain some of these houses for some of his own native employees' in the location. The Town Clerk rounded on the location superintendent for inviting Councillor Walmsley to address the location meeting in the first place. But besides bickering, there was little they could do. The Advisory Board threatened strong resistance to any attempts to evict, and the council balked at the prospect of an even more serious loss of face if they began evictions and then "through force of public opinion, Government pressure or threat of riot" were forced to back down.

Much of the council's housing strategy now lay in ruins. With the new location occupied there were no longer any houses in which lodgers evicted from the Asiatic area could be placed. The public Prosecutor was therefore requested to suspend prosecutions first for one and then four months. The landlords of the Asiatic area breathed a sigh of

was the kind of single-minded attention that the council could have well done without.

The body set up by Mabaya to tackle the problem was the African Housing and Rates Board. Formed in July 1945 it sponsored the lowering of rents in the Asiatic area and in the location.⁶¹ Its main acknowledged source of inspiration was the Benoni Rent Board which early in 1944 had drastically lowered rents in the Asiatic Area. Mabaya claimed to be working in co-operation with the Rent Board although the Rent Board itself denied this was so, and directed most of his efforts at persuading lodgers in the Asiatic area to pay rents at the level fixed previously by the Board.⁶² Taken by itself this was a limited if not entirely senseless line of attack. At the time of the previous Rent Board hearings the local magistrate had noted that the Rent Board had no jurisdiction, because the lodgers had entered into an illegal contract.⁶³ This left the landlords free to apply for court orders of ejection. However, Mabaya had another card up his sleeve. According to Ma Thibela "he was in fact working with James Mpanza who also started the same movement in Orlando. He was advised I think to start Tent Town ... Mabaya used to go to Mpanza in Orlando and he would report back on his visit".⁶⁴

Certainly Mabaya's tactics bore the same stamp. Towards the end of 1945 he encouraged lodgers in the Asiatic area who were members of his African Housing and Rates Board to withhold payment of rent. The landlords responded by issuing a flood of summonses and on December 4th the first order of ejection was granted. Large scale evictions were imminent.⁶⁵ It seems unlikely that Mabaya had not anticipated this action or that he had not taken legal advice, for his next move was finely judged to plunge the council in the worst possible legal and political tangle. On the 5th or perhaps the 6th December Mabaya took the family of one of his members, Mr Sello, to open land outside the location boundary where he told him to build a shack. Council officials visited Sello the next day and instructed him to leave, only to be met with the blank response that "he had no place to stay". The next day four more families were erecting tents and shacks. A squatter invasion was underway.⁶⁶

Council officials tried frantically to stem the tide but were caught up immediately in a maze of rival legal and administrative jurisdictions. They tried to charge the still small squatter community with trespass, but found there was no charge. They tried to prosecute under the building bye laws of the municipality, but found that 'a tent was not a structure'. They tried to invoke emergency regulations which had been used to remove a squatter camp in Alberton two years before but found the Native Affairs Department resolutely opposed. The Benoni squatters, unlike those in Alberton, mostly worked in their home municipality the NAD argued, and "If such squatters were simply thrown out of the municipal area, the individuals employing them would suffer accordingly".⁶⁷ Moreover, the only area to which they could be removed were the already highly congested Trust farms, and the Department refused to sanction that.⁶⁸ To cap everything, it was discovered that the squatters were squatting in a wedge of territory belonging to Brakpan, which placed the council's locus standi in doubt.⁶⁹ Mabaya and his lawyers had clearly done their research well.

As the authorities dithered the numbers of squatters swelled from a

trickle to a flood. Landlords in the Asiatic area started using 'private police' (probably 'Russians') to evict tenant families, without even resorting to the niceties of law, and by 31st December 111 families had set up tents or shacks in the new squatter area.⁷⁰

It was at this point that the council threw in the towel. The issue of control was now assuming an overriding priority as Mabuya set up his own committee to administer the camp and levied a 2/6d fee on each new arrival for membership of his African Housing and Rates Board.⁷¹ On 31st December the council consequently abruptly changed tack. It decided to set an area aside in the location which would be serviced by sanitation and water on which its own 'Tent Town' would be erected. A rent of 10 shillings a month would be charged. Those not voluntarily moving from the 'old' camp to the new could face legal action. Prosecutions of Indian landlords would be massively stepped up.⁷² The line of reasoning that underlay this reluctant shift of stance is most clearly spelled out in a memorandum penned somewhat later by a council official. "If the perpetuation of slum conditions is the price of securing the necessary control," the native affairs manager bluntly admitted, "it would appear to be fully justified."⁷³

Just how much of a threat to social order did the camp really represent? To begin with, it seemed as if it might be the focus of overt political resistance. At some point around this time, according to Ma Ntlongwane, "the ANC approached us about our housing problems that there was going to be a big meeting where all your grievances will be aired." Little seems to have materialised from this Market Street meeting in Johannesburg, apart from the participants having their names taken down by the police, but on 6th January another ANC meeting was held at Tent Town in Benoni. Here Selope Thema's suggestion that the ANC⁷⁴ sponsor a deputation to Pretoria was enthusiastically adopted.

The deputation did not leave for Pretoria until the 8th. Meanwhile, spurred on by the meeting, a demonstration of women inhabitants of the camp descended on the municipal offices on the 7th. The Town Clerk's mounting frustration with the situation now found an outlet with the hapless location superintendent, Mr Brown. Did he know of the impending demonstration at the municipal offices, the Town Clerk demanded? To which Brown had to answer, "no". "It was his job to know of such events beforehand". Brown was then rudely⁷⁵ admonished, upon which he undertook to set up 'intelligence police'. However, the Town Clerk's fury was at least partly misplaced. What was ultimately to prove far more serious than the lack of intelligence was the lack of concrete action on the council's alternative camp and the absence of communication with the residents of illegal Tent Town. Only now, after the women's demonstration, was it decided to purchase 50 tents with which to accommodate those currently in Tent Town, and to offer to buy Tent Town residents tents for £3.

By this time the council was once more already being overtaken by events. The next day, before any of these decisions could be communicated, the ANC sponsored delegation set out to Pretoria. It consisted of two Transvaal ANC Executives (Bopabe and Ramohoane) and two leaders of the African Housing and Rates Board (Mabuya and Lesinya). Upon arrival they were granted an immediate audience with the Under Secretary of Native Affairs, Rodseth. The interview that followed graphically illustrated the degree of muddle and confusion

into which the authorities had sunk as they confronted a developing urban African crisis. With a minimum of consultation (certainly none with either the Native Commissioner of Benoni or the Benoni Town Council) Rodseth informed the deputation that the council was buying tents and would shift the residents of Tent Town to a new municipal camp. This fortunately was correct. He then went on to commit a monumental blunder by informing them - incorrectly - that Tent Town dwellers would get first preference with the seventy-one new houses being constructed by the council (of which thirty-one were finished and were being held vacant for lodgers evicted from the location or cleared out of the Asiatic Area).

When Brown learnt of this news he must have experienced a strong sense of *déjà vu*. Unfortunately even this reached him too late, as on the morning of the 9th he had already allocated ten houses to nearby lodgers from the location. The two events could not have been more perfectly synchronised to produce the maximum chaos and dissention. As a jubilant deputation reported back to its constituents on the afternoon of the 9th the new householders passed them by with their keys to take possession of their new dwellings. Unable to resist poking a few jibes at the by now somewhat smug and self-congratulatory inhabitants of Tent Town, they shouted "You are being fooled - we have been given the houses". The Tent Town dwellers were predictably incensed, and within a few hours all the new houses had been stormed, including those that were unfinished and without roofs.⁷⁷ For a mortified council, the situation seemed to be sliding further and further out of control. Not only had they lost all their second batch of houses, but the ANC seemed poised to take the credit for the new squatter encampment. The prospect was in view of a co-ordinated campaign of political mobilisation among Benoni's black communities. But this was to overestimate the ANC of the time and the community it served. For the ANC this had been a sortie into uncharted territory. A large and growing proportion of Tent Town dwellers were new arrivals from the country and this was a stratum to which it was not particularly well attuned. The leadership on the whole was much more comfortable with the established residents in the towns. Moreover, it was precisely this group of its traditional followers whose support it was in danger of losing as a result of its championing of the Tent Town residents demands. Residents of Benoni location felt strongly that it was the long-established lodgers that deserved preference in the allocation of housing, not newly arrived upstarts from the country or the Asiatic area. As a letter from the Benoni Location Residents Committee put it "We particularly condemn those outsiders who, not knowing the true circumstances of the case, support and back the tent dwellers".⁷⁸ The same tension perhaps underlay the absence of the local chairman of congress, Advisory Board member Moutloutsi, from the Tent Town meeting of January 6th,⁷⁹ a meeting of which he claimed not even to have been informed. Sensing this feeling, the ANC now beat a tactical retreat. Its next meeting, which took place on the 13th January, was held in the location. The resolution passed by the one thousand residents who supposedly attended, was the neutral demand that more houses be built.⁸⁰ The divisive issue of allocation was not mentioned at all.

From this point on the ANC gradually faded from sight. It jointly sponsored a march through Benoni along with the CPSA, trade unions and

vigilance associations in protest against shortages of food in May 1946, but there is very little other record of its activities until the Freedom Day campaign of May 1st, 1950.⁸¹ The task of linking local grievances to national political issues was instead taken up by the CPSA. For a time "well patronised" meetings were held by the East Rand branch of the CPSA every Sunday in the location, but from the end of 1946 even these seem to have largely petered out. Communications to the council increasingly took the form of letters from the branch secretary, rather than that of resolutions from mass meetings.⁸²

The space left by the national political parties was filled by local protectors and patrons, who rallied constituencies of a much more sectional character. Leaders of ethnic gangs like the Russians represented one form of these. Lawyers and lawyer's clerks were another. Squatter leaders like Mabuya constituted a third. The threat posed by these bodies was not of an overt political kind. It rather took the form of relatively depoliticised challenges to the structure of control. Harry Mabuya, for example, refused to join the ANC or the CPSA, and seems to have been little pre-occupied by wider political issues.⁸³ On the other hand he represented a powerful rival focus of patronage and authority to that of the council and the Native Affairs Commission and repeatedly frustrated their efforts at control.

The particular community Mabuya rallied were the squatters in Tent Town. More specifically it was the women squatters on whom he relied for support. Indeed the squatter movement in Benoni was in many ways a women's movement. It was frequently women who took the initiative to move to the encampment and it was them who most vociferously campaigned for new houses to be built. Ma-Thibela, who 'set up tent' in the area in 1948 remembers this of the move:

(At the time) my husband was boss boy at Modder B. mine ... I told him that our children needed a change of environment, that they cannot grow like we did, and that we should learn to struggle like other people. At first he was hesitant. He didn't understand what I meant by learning to struggle and leaving his job, but ultimately he agreed, and we bought a tent and came over this side. The thing that made me do this was the mine policy that if a wife left her husband she had to leave the quarters and fend for herself.

She therefore went herself to buy a tent from Mabuya (for £15) in the first of a series of moves which eventually won her a new house in Wattville.

Women were at the centre of squatter politics. Since their husbands were usually at work in the factories all day, it was they who took the lead in organising the demonstrations for housing which the native commissioner so dreaded. These were often accompanied by Mabuya. Ma-Thibela recalls the Tent Town women marching down the road to the Native Commissioner's office singing:

"Siyawugubha, siyawugebhula umhlaba ka Maspala"
("We are digging, we are seizing huge chunks of the municipalities land.")

and "we have our 'tsotsi' with us: he is not behind"
(a reference to Mabuya).

In these demonstrations, and when campaigning for Mabaya during Advisory Board elections, the women also wore a uniform - a red and black 'doek', (black for 'the black suffering people', red 'for blood').⁸⁴

Lastly, in the actual administration of rent town women residents were prominent. On the executive committee of the African Housing and Rates Board sat Ma Msibi (Mabaya's cousin),⁸⁵ Ma Ntlokwane, Ma-Senusi, Mr Mhlambi (the secretary) and Mr Lesenya. Ma-Ntlokwane was later to top the polls in the Emergency Camp's Advisory Board elections, a most unusual event at the time.⁸⁶ The African Housing and Rates Board ran every aspect of the camp's life, from providing food through the Mabaya Township Trading Co-operative Society Ltd⁸⁷, to holding church services for the inmates in the morning and the evening, to policing the encampment during the week (the job of women) and during the week-end (the job of men).⁸⁸ It was a highly effective form of self-rule.

It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to view Mabaya as a vanguard of women's liberation or even as a great democratic leader. Mabaya, it is true, commanded great devotion from his followers. "He was our Moses" says Ma Ntlokwane. "He was like a priest". However, there was nothing particularly democratic about his rule. He led from the front, and it was his courage in standing up to the authorities that evoked so much respect. The executive committee of the African Housing and Rates Board were selected by Mabaya, and it was his ideas that held sway.⁸⁹ Political brokerage was also closely associated with commercial entrepreneurship in Mabaya's personal style. His financial resources (and particularly his access to a lawyer) allowed him to undertake political initiatives. The political following this gave him enabled him to extend and diversify his entrepreneurial base (of this more details later). It is perhaps questionable whether any other style would have worked. What Mabaya's illiterate and recently proletarianised followers were seeking were some basic amenities and a measure of security. Wider programmes and political rhetoric had much less appeal. These were the province of the 'Galejane' of the towns (the clever's/⁹⁰ rascals) of whom migrants and new arrivals were justly suspicious. It was only once certain amenities had been secured that these new arrivals began to widen their political horizons. It was only then, and very gradually that the political parties began to extend their appeal. In the meantime it was Mabaya who most fitted to the situation's needs. It was he who less directly and less formally than the ANC, provided the authorities with their most serious challenge.

The key problem posed by Mabaya's Tent Town to the council was that it represented a rival source of authority and administration, an unregulated area where 'control ... is now vested in [the inhabitant's] so called leaders'.⁹¹ Attempts to stifle the illegal settlement by setting up a municipal Tent Town dismally failed. There was simply not enough space in the municipal area to absorb those crowding into Mabaya's camp. In July 1946 the Native Affairs Manager reported the existence of eighty tents and seven shacks.⁹² Towards the end of the year the rate of growth began to accelerate. In November the Native Affairs Manager recorded a total of 137 tents and shacks, which reflected an increase of thirteen tents and one shack in the space of a week.⁹³ By June illegal Tent Town was 'now creeping round the rear

of municipal Tent Town'.⁹⁴ Towards the end of 1948 the rate of increase experienced another sudden spurt, and by the middle of the year Mabuya's Tent Town was accommodating 4,000 people housed in 820 tents and shacks. Municipal Tent Town by contrast boasted a meagre fifty seven tents.⁹⁵

The council's hands were also tied by its inability to stem the inflow at source. Tents literally sprang up overnight, the inhabitants of which were invariably "reluctant to furnish any information as to where they came from or the method in which they obtained tents". Harry Mabuya was at least partly the answer to both these riddles. Among his other activities he ran a daily bus service to the small- holdings at Putfontein, on which numerous families worked for farmers and squatted.⁹⁶ Many of these families "were really suffering. You would find some being expelled, and others not happy with their conditions". Mabuya used his trucks to ferry such people clandestinely to Tent Town at night, travelling to 'Rietpan, Kempton park, Putfontein' and elsewhere.⁹⁷

Upon or before arrival they would join the African Housing and Rates Board and pay their 2/6. If they wished they could buy a tent from Mabuya. At the very beginning of Tent Town Mabuya instructed the Rates Board secretary Mhlambi to buy surplus tents at the local army camp. These they were able to buy very cheap and sell at a profit.⁹⁸ Later Mabuya purchased at a Jewish store in Benoni, in the course of which the price of tents gradually inflated as they came in shorter and shorter supply.⁹⁹

Other squatters arrived by other means. The late 1940s was a time of mine closures around Benoni. Many of these sought work in Benoni and looked for accommodation in Tent Town. Ma-Thibela learned of Tent Town from some families who had been dismissed from Modder B. mine and had found refuge there.¹⁰⁰ In September 1947 the Native Commissioner for Benoni 'came across' a number of workers whose contracts were finished and who were 'en route' to Benoni Tent Town.¹⁰¹ This influx was impossible to stop. Under the 1939 Urban Areas Act contract workers from the mines were entitled to seek work in urban areas without getting prior permission.¹⁰²

The Benoni council tried to clamp down on this inflow when it took over certain influx control functions in 1949, but was persistently frustrated in this effort until 1952. To begin with, and to the fury of the council's officials, the Native Commissioner persisted in issuing passes to miners, when the Councils office had refused. His answer, when attacked by council's native affairs manager, was that this was his department's reading of the regulation and to do otherwise would risk challenges in court.¹⁰³

The council's problems were compounded by the large scale forging of passes. Some of the principal practitioners were African clerks who worked for attorneys in Benoni. According to N.M. who once worked for a Benoni attorney passless blacks

used to come to the lawyer who said he did not know how to do them. I must see a plan. He was so clever. I used to go to these boys who used to do them, and they were so fond of me. One was called Steenkamp. I would say to him, 'Look there is one boy who has no pass and he is a good boy.' He would say, 'Bring hom hier so ek sal hom reg maak'. He would fit it and charge the boy £10. I would take £5 to the

office. The boy would give me £6 after all those efforts. From there I was the famous man of making passes. ["G", the lawyer] said you are making a lot of money and I want a third of what you make, but he said don't write on my books the receipts or the inspectors will find them - the I used my own exercise book. I would make hundreds of pounds. I was now known as a lawyer rather than a servant because I had an office.

Sadly for N.M., the market broke down in 1954. Steenkamp got greedy. One day "he got friendly with another boy called Frank - that boy put Mr. Steenkamp into a mess - he was arrested".¹⁰⁴ Press reports document that Steenkamp got off but the racket was at an end.¹⁰⁵

The last group to flood into Tent Town were single Sotho women, or Sotho women whose husbands were working on the mines or on the farms. Council reports estimated a high proportion of the total female population as being 'Basotho'.¹⁰⁶ This reflected the massive social strains afflicting Basutoland in the 1930s and 1940s which had caused a massive exodus of single Sotho women.¹⁰⁷ Such single Sotho women presented major problems of control to all the municipalities of the Reef. A substantial proportion engaged in beer brewing and prostitution they became focus of rivalry between competing "Russian" gangs.¹⁰⁸

Benoni found this influx impossible to regulate. In 1938 the Benoni municipality had secured proclamation under the Urban Areas Act with the explicit purpose of expelling these "idle and unattached" Sotho women. However the fact that women did not have to carry passes made the regulation extremely difficult to administer. Under the regulation residents could only be evicted if they had entered the area after 1938. However, as the Native Affairs Manager reluctantly admitted

the average native has now got wise to the date of promulgation and when questioned he readily answers he came here before 1938.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, in the odd cases where they slipped up it was remarkable how "readily these Basutho women could find themselves 'husbands' on the spot when asked by the location office".¹¹⁰

By the beginning of 1948 the council's quest for control, and for a viable housing strategy, had been thoroughly subverted from below. Instead of realising its initial goal of progressively transferring the wretched lodger shanties in the Asiatic Area, to the model houses of Wattville, it was confronted with a municipal tent town of fifty nine tents, an illegal tent town of 6,000 souls, and a lodger population in the old location and the Asiatic section which was even more congested than before. By June 1949 lodger numbers in the Asiatic area had risen to 2,336, while that in the location had grown even more.¹¹¹ By mid 1950 both sections were literally bursting at the seams with 5,003 crushed into the Asiatic section alone.¹¹²

As the council re-assessed the situation, it tried to cope with these problems in two separate ways. Firstly, housing loans were secured for a further 350 houses in Wattville.¹¹³ Secondly, plans were set afoot to establish a municipal controlled Emergency Camp. In

May 1948 Benoni and Brakpan were proclaimed under emergency regulations promulgated the previous year. These provided for the removal of squatter settlements, provided the municipalities made available alternative accommodation.¹¹⁴ The necessary facilities were ready by February 1949 and by July 1,115 sites were occupied by 6,500 people.¹¹⁵ The council was now poised to re-establish control. Residents could finally be obliged to pay rent to the council; liquor brewing, lodging, trading and a host of other activities could be governed by emergency camp regulations.¹¹⁶ But yet again forces of popular opposition exposed gaps on both of its flanks.

After the establishment of the Emergency Camp one faction of Russians moved in in force. Battles flared up between Russians and Xhosa, Russians and Zulu, and between rival factions of Russians based in the Asiatic section and Tent Town. Another paper would be required to do justice to these events. Suffice it to say that from 1949 to 1952 anarchy reigned - so much so that Mabuya's sponsored slate of Advisory Board candidates was forced to join forces with the Council.¹¹⁷

A second problem surfaced in 1949 which again can only briefly be touched on in a paper of this length. In June of that year an Inspector of the Peri-Urban affairs department ordered seventy families illegally squatting in the small holdings of Brentwood Park to vacate. The order was stayed until mid 1950 because the majority were employed in industry in Benoni and because there was no alternative accommodation. However the case was taken up once again in June 1950. These few families in Brentwood park were only the tip of the iceberg. Hundreds were accommodated on small holdings all round Benoni. The threatened squatters in Brentwood Park responded by calling in two separate black lawyer's clerks, the one working for Attorney Slomowitz (who was in turn associated with Mabuya) and the other employed by Attorney Selikman. It was Selikman's clerk, Monare, who carried the day on this occasion. Monare summoned all the squatters on the smallholdings in the vicinity of Benoni to a Saturday meeting, and collected 30 shillings from each of the assembled throng.

Carrying back 'a sackful of money' he asked Selikman to search out suitable land to squat. It would appear that Selikman discovered that if the squatters settled on land proclaimed for the Apex industrial township they could not be moved until provided with alternative accommodation.¹¹⁸ On 30th June the squatters began their move. Within a month there were 600 settled. Within ten months this number had risen to 18,000. All squatted exactly within the industrial townships borders (something which puzzled local observers and made them smell a rat). Consequently none could be moved.¹¹⁹ Benoni was now finally forced to confront the consequences of its industrialisation but in a rather unexpected manner. Squatting would not cease so long as Benoni's industries expanded, for the overwhelming majority of squatters were working in Benoni. By settling on the newly proclaimed industrial township the squatters had check-mated the council. Now industry could not find the land on which to build until accommodation for the squatters had been found. Herein was to be the genesis of the modern township of Daveyton, which finally solved Benoni's black housing problem.

This paper hopes to have shown that the challenge from below in this period has been often understated. It also intends to suggest

that these struggles were not easily harnessed into a co-ordinated national movement. This change only occurs in Benoni around 1952 almost immediately after the squatter movement had ended.

NOTES

1. Line of a song sung by women from the squatter settlement of Tent Town when marching on the Native Officer. Interview, Christina Thibela hereafter referred to as Ma-Thibela, Wattville, 4 May, 1985.
2. Benoni City Times, 8 February, 1946; ibid. 9 April, 1948; ibid. 30 April, 1948.
3. Benoni City Times, 13 July, 1945.
4. Benoni City Times, 31 May, 1946; ibid., 14 June, 1946; ibid., 12 February, 1947, p. 71., ibid. 28 May, 1948. NEAC., January-December, 1947, special meeting.
5. Benoni City Times, 7 April, 1944; ibid., 9 February, 1945; ibid., 4 May, 1945; ibid., 14 December, 1945; ibid. 3 March, 1950.
6. Benoni City Times, 22 September, 1944; ibid., 2 August, 1946; ibid., 9 August, 1946; ibid., 30 January, 1948.
7. Benoni City Times, 19 May, 1939, ibid., 6 October, 1937.
8. Benoni City Times, 14 February, 1943; ibid., 12 March, 1948; ibid., 9 April, 1948; ibid., 4 March, 1949; ibid., 14 July, 1950.
9. NEAC; January-December, 1944, meeting 15 May, 1944. Letter, A Hood, Secretary, APO to Council 12 May, 1944; ibid., 14 March, 1946; Petition, p. 83.
10. Benoni City Times, 14 July, 1939; ibid. 8 July, 1949; NEAC Minutes, meeting 15 April, 1947, 153 d.
11. J Cohen, "A Pledge for Better Times : The Local State and the Ghetto, Benoni, 1930-1938". Honours dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1982, 55; NEAC Minutes, meeting 6 June, 1945, Town Clerk's Report 2 June, 1945, 168; ibid. meeting 11 July, 1950, 52.
12. NEAC Minutes, Report of the NEAC Manager 12 January, 1945, 14; ibid., 6 June, 1945, Town Clerk's Report 2 June, 1945, 168-9; ibid., meeting 26 June, 1945,. A de W Horak Welfare Officer to Town Clerk 21 June 1945, 231-2.
13. NEAC Minutes, meeting 9 February, 1945, Report of the 'Native Social Worker', 48.
14. Interview, P Pheko, Benoni, 20 March, 1985.
15. Public Health Committee Minutes, meeting 16 January, 1947, Annual Report of the MOH January, 1944-5, 27 (a) ; ibid. Annual Report of MOH for 1945-6, 175.

16. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 June, 1944, Letter, District Commandant SAP Boksburg 14 March, 1944, 229; ibid., special meeting 14 January, 1946, draft letter Town Clerk to Secretary for Native Affairs, 34.
17. NEAC Minutes, meeting 9 February, 1945, Report of 'Native Social Worker', 48.
18. NEAC Minutes, 8 September, 1947, Notes of an Interview with H.D. Mabuya and others, 358.
19. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 June, 1944, Letter, Acting District Commandant, SAP Boksburg, 230; ibid. 9 February, 1945. Report of the Manager of NEA 12 January, 1945, 47-8.
20. Ibid.; Benoni City Times, 20 February, 1948.
21. NEAC, meeting 8 June, 1944, Letter, Acting District Commandant, SAP(Boksburg) 17 May, 1944, 230; ibid., meeting 7 October, 1949, Letter, Chief Inspector SAP to Town Clerk 27 September, 1949, 539-40.
22. J. Cohen, 'A Pledge for Better Times', 36. (See also Benoni City Times, 24 February, 1950 for the impressions of another Indian delegation).
23. Public Health Committee Minutes, meeting 16 January, 1947, Annual Report of the MOH January, 1944-5, 27 (a). See also Benoni City Times, 6 April, 1945, 27 April, 1945, 156-161.
24. NEAC Minutes, meeting 13 April, 1951, Report of the Manager NEA, 326.
25. Ibid., meeting 26 June, 1945, letter A de W Horak, Social Welfare Officer to Town Clerk, 21 June, 1945, 231-2.
26. Ibid., meeting 7 October, 1949, Letter, Chief Inspector SAP to Town Clerk 27 September, 1949, 539-40.
27. Ibid., meeting 11 November, 1949, Letter, Native Commissioner Benoni to Town Clerk (n.d.), 590.
28. Ibid., meeting 17 May, 1945, 131, ibid., meeting 10 March, 1947, letter Native Commissioner, 5 March, 1947, 108.
29. Benoni City Times, 24 May, 1946. See also first quarterly report for 1945 in Benoni City Times, 25 May, 1945.
30. J Cohen, 'A Pledge for Better Times', 41-3, 46-56.
31. NEAC Minutes, meeting 6 June, 1945, Town Clerk's Report, 2 June, 1945, 156.

32. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 January, 1946, report Manager NEA 9 January, 1946, 15.
33. NEAC Minutes, meeting 10 November, 1944, Town Clerk's Report, 362-3; ibid., meeting 6 June, 1945, 156-7.
34. NEAC Minutes, meeting 9 February, 1945. Report of the Manager NEA, 3 February, 1945, 53.
35. Interview, PM and CM Makuta, Roma, Lesotho, 9 April, 1985.
36. NEAC Minutes, meeting, 9 February, 1945. Report of the Manager NEA, 3 February, 1945, 53-4.
37. e.g. NEAC Minutes, meeting 12 April, 1945, 100; ibid meeting 17 May, 1945, 117 .
38. Benoni City Times, 8 July, 1949; interview 6.
39. Benoni City Times, 23 May, 1952; ibid 3 August, 1952, and see footnote 40.
40. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 November, 1949. Report of the Non-European social worker, 571.
41. NEAC Minutes, meeting 17 May, 1945, Letter, Town Clerk to Native Affairs Committee, 4 May, 1945, 122.
42. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 April, 1944, 118-19.
43. NEAC Minutes, meeting 10 November, 1944, Report by Town Clerk, 361-3, 372.
44. NEAC Minutes, meeting 12 January, 1945, 47.
45. NEAC Minutes, meeting 10 November, 1944, 355.
46. NEAC Minutes, meeting 6 June, 1945, Report by Town Clerk, 2 June, 1945, 157-161.
47. Ibid., Letter, Messrs Slood and Broido, 2 June, 1945, 157-161.
48. NEAC. Minutes, meeting 17 May, 1945, Extract The Star, 25 April, 1945, 131; ibid. special meeting, 31 December, 1945. Chairman's Report.
49. Ibid., Town Clerk to NEAC 3 May, 1945, 128-9.
50. Ibid.
51. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 July, 1945, Report Manager NEA, 244-8; ibid., special meeting 29 May, 1945, 148-151; ibid. meeting 17 May, 1945, 122-3; Benoni City Times, 8 June, 1945.

52. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 29 May, 1945, 148; ibid., meeting 14 June, 1945, 236; ibid. special meeting 26 June, 1945, 228; ibid. special meeting 6 June, 1945 letter N McDowell to Walmsley 4 June, 1945.
53. Interview, Ma-Thibela; D Humphries and D G Thomas, Benoni, Son of my Sorrow, Cape Town, 1968, 113-4.
54. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, Annexure "B". Notes of an interview with the Native Affairs Commissioner 15 April, 1947, 354
55. Interview B.
56. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 April, 1944, letter, Secretary Benoni, African Pauper Relief and Social Welfare Society to NEAC, 20 March, 1944, 122-3; Interview D Hapane, Benoni, 2 March, 1985. Interview C Sibandze, Wattville, 20 April, 1985.
57. NEAC Minutes, meeting, 8 June, 1944; Native Advisory Board Minutes, 17 May, 1944. Interview, Ma-Thibela.
58. Ibid.
59. See note 56.
60. NEAC, Minutes, special meeting 29 May, 1945; interview Ma-Thibela; interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
61. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 January, 1946, letter Benoni location Residents Committee to the Chairman 3 January, 1946, 25.
62. Ibid., NEA Manager's comments, 27; ibid., special meeting 31 December, 1945, Chairman's Report on Tent Town.
63. Ibid.
64. Interview, Ma-Thibela.
65. NEAC, Minutes, special meeting 31 December, 1945, Chairman's Report on Tent Town, 382.
66. Interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
67. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 15 April, 1954, 153 E.
68. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 31 December, 1945, Letter, Native Commissioner to Town Clerk, 27 December, 1945, 386.
69. Ibid., Chairman's Report on Tent Town.
70. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, 350-1.

71. Ibid., Annexure "B" Notes of Interview with Native Affairs Commissioner 15 April, 1947: interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
72. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 31 December, 1945, 384.
73. NEAC Minutes, meeting 9 July, 1945, 179.
74. Interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi; NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 February, 1946, Native Advisory Board Minutes, 15 January, 1946, 531.
75. NEAC, Minutes, 14 January, 1946, memorandum of meeting at Town Clerks Office 7 January, 1946, 16-17.
76. Ibid.
77. NEAC Minutes, 11 January, 1946, Chairman's Report, 28-30.
78. Ibid., letter 3 January, 1946, 25-6.
79. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 February, 1946, Advisory Board Minutes, 15 January, 1946, 53.
80. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 February, 1946, Letter, Secreatry ANC to Council 14 January, 1946, 56.
81. Benoni City Times 31 May, 1946: NEAC Minutes, meeting 10 June, 1946, Letter, East Rand Branch CPSA 27 May, 1946; Benoni City Times 5 May, 1950.
82. e.g. NEAC Minutes, 9 April, 1946 Letter, East Rand Branch of CPSA to Council 2 March, 1946; ibid. meeting 8 September, 1947, Letter, L Baker (Secretary) East Rand CPSA 28 August, 1947.
83. Interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi; NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, Annexure "B" Notes of interview with squatters committee, 357.
84. Interview Ma-Thibela; interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
85. Ibid.
86. NEAC Minutes, meeting 12 July, 1949, 275.
87. NEAC - inutes, meeting 8 September, 1947. Annexure "B", notes of interview with squatters committee; interview Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
88. Ibid.
89. Interview Ma-Thibela.
91. NEAC Minutes, meeting September, 1947, 425.

92. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 July, 1946, 313.
93. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 29 November, 1946.
94. NEAC Minutes, 14 July, 1947, Report of inspecting officer 27 June, 1947, 293.
95. NEAC Minutes, meeting 17 August, 1948, Report Acting Overseer, Municipal Location, 31; Benoni City Times, 13 August, 1948.
96. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, Annexure "B" interview with squatter leader, 357.
97. Interview, Ma-Thibela.
98. Interview, Ma-Ntlokwane and Ma-Senosi.
99. See note 96.
100. Interview, Ma-Thibela.
101. NEAC Minutes, special meeting 16 October, 1947, 426.
102. Benoni City Times, 4 May, 1951. NEAC Minutes, meeting 14 May, 1951, 385.
103. Ibid.,
104. Interview AB, Daveyton, 8 May, 1985.
105. Benoni City Times.
106. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, Annexure "B" Interview with NAD representatives and Native Affairs Commissioner 16 January, 1946, 26; ibid., special meeting 16 April, 1947, 153d.
107. This will be dealt with at length in a separate paper. However the level of social conflict within families is clearly reflected in the 8 000 drop in the female population of Basutoland between 1936 and 1946 Colonial Annual Reports, Basutoland, 1946, 6, 15-17.
108. Again, this will be dealt with in a separate paper but e.g. see S Majara, Liakhela.
109. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 January, 1946, Report Manager NEA 9 January, 1946, 15: ibid. 9 April, 1946, 149.
110. NEAC Minutes, meeting 16 January, 1946, 71.
111. NEAC Minutes, meeting.
112. NEAC Minutes, meeting 11 July, 1950, 52.

113. NEAC Minutes, meeting 9 August, 1946, 242; Benoni City Times, 10 November, 1950.
114. NEAC Minutes, meeting 8 September, 1947, Letter, Native Commissioner, Benoni, 7 August, 1947; ibid., meeting 14 May, 1948, 173.
115. Benoni City Times, 4 February, 1949.
116. NEAC Minutes, meeting 12 July, 1949, Emergency Camp, Superintendent's Report, 262; ibid., meeting 13 September, 1949, 502.
117. NEAC Minutes.
118. Conversation, M, Johannesburg October, 1985.