



UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

HISTORY WORKSHOP

AFRICANA LIBRARY

STRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE MAKING OF APARTHEID

6 - 10 February 1990

AUTHOR: Baba Z. D. Ngcokoto

TITLE: The day KTC became Cape Town's Beirut ; African Squatters' struggles in Cape Town 1983 - 1986

Dedicated to Stanley Jones and all those Comrades who fell in the KTC conflicts.

Introduction

Our central argument in this paper is that the recognition of African squatter's in settlements such as Crossroads and KTC as permanent urban residents demonstrates the victory of these squatter struggles and that of popular resistance against removals. They also challenge the wisdom of dividing the workers into 'legals' and 'illegals' in one country, for the purpose of reproducing 'the South African social formation as a whole and, at its very heart, to reproduce certain forms of control over labour.'

The squatters' struggles in Cape Town since the mid-1970s, demonstrate: a sense of collective action which is reinforced by their common plight as discarded people in the city; an embryonic consciousness about the necessity of alliances to strengthen and advance their struggles against removals; and, the fact that the state will skilfully exploit their weaknesses in order to divide and set them against each other. In South Africa there are few popular struggles that have made a landmark in history without the echoing sounds of guns and bullets. Those in monopoly of the state's coercive force, chase their fellow citizens during unrest periods as if a snake chasing a rat. They shoot to kill as though a hunter shooting a prey in the bush.

These events have led to the advent of what Lambert and Webster call 'militaristic voluntarism' of the youth² which has at times eclipsed organisational concerns and sandwiched trade unionists and community activists between their militarism and the terror tactics of the security forces. The behaviour of the youth outside progressive organisations at KTC squatter camp since 1985, is a living testimony in many people's minds, which demonstrates the validity of Lambert and Webster's observations.

To enable a broader understanding of the KTC struggles it is necessary to situate them within the current crisis which Bundy defines as involving 'a combination of strains and malfunctions so acute that existing institutions cannot resolve them. Old practises lose their validity and old beliefs cease to carry convictions'³. A combination of factors fused together to bring about this crisis: economic performance declined; opposition to the tri-cameral reform elections undermined the credibility of the state; and, the international community is gradually losing faith with apartheid.

Popular struggles against the Botha Reforms

If there was anything positive about the reform initiatives of 1983, it was that they served as an issue that unified the opposition forces across class divides and ideological polemics. Middle class organisations were vocal in their condemnation of Botha's co-option of the coloured and Indian puppets into the parliamentary process. These groups argued for the dismantling of apartheid and a start to the process of genuine negotiations with credible leaders of the people, as if the struggle was only against apartheid. Liberal organisations were also quick to condemn the exclusion of Africans in this process. UDF and

National Forum affiliates were actively opposed to the new reforms; trade unions opposed the new constitution because it sought to divide the workers into migrant and urban categories. Opposition was indeed broad and unifying at the simplest level. Low percentage polls at the tricameral elections indicate the success of the campaign against the new constitution: the official percentage polls were 30% for the House of Representatives and 20% for the House of Delegates; calculated by the UDF as a proportion of the total Indian and Coloured population over the age of 18, as recorded in the 1980 census; the adjusted figures showed that only 17.5% of the Coloured people, and 15.5% of the Indians, had voted.⁴

But this success varied from region to region. In the Western Cape, the campaign not only depended on the organisations' ability to mobilise their constituencies but also on the ability of the activists to theorise and to develop effective tactics and strategies. Debates were lively and creative at the time. The main strategies employed were: to isolate certain target areas for pamphleteering drives; hold meetings against reform and call for UDF support; encourage the youth to help blitz Mitchell's plain with UDF pamphlets as a focal point in the campaign since it was regarded by some ideologues as 'coloured homeland.' UDF then focused on this area for a motorcade [in which those with cars, the white left, were to drive around displaying UDF posters]; the media was also informed in advance through a press conference in order to give adequate publicity to the campaign. At some of the polls, some voters crossed the floor to join those singing freedom songs rather than voting.

The tactics of opposition to the community council elections were somewhat different from the basically middle class methods mentioned. There were no white left activists nor motorcades or pressmen for publicity. Elections took place in community halls, centres and administration board offices. When activists and their supporters entered the election venues singing freedom songs, the police were quick to label them as 'intimidators' and to instruct them to disperse. Others went to the tables and scrutinised the list of candidates as though they were to vote but complained that they did not see the name of Mandela whom they came to vote for. This infuriated community council candidates. Acrimonious exchanges would follow between candidates and activists. White policemen stood by, mutely, since they did not understand Xhosa. Only when the tension reached fever pitch did they intervene, but before they could ascertain what was happening, the crowd would break into a freedom song and follow the activists to other poll stations. In the case of Kwezi centre in Guguletu, the hall was left empty except for the pensioners who had no alternative but to vote since they had been carried to the polls in the councillor's cars, hired taxis and buses paid for by the administration board. Sometimes a comrade would ask for permission to use the microphone to address the people on the role of the community councils. Elated at the interest, the councillors would agree and ask, 'Have you already voted?' When the answer was 'Yes', the comrades had no difficulty in getting

hold of the microphone to explain that the councillors were 'puppets' and that a vote for them was to 'accept living in matchbox houses, squalid conditions' and so-on. Again, the white policemen looked on, without understanding. What was equally interesting was that some of the black policemen would instead of interpreting for the white policemen what the activists were saying, secretly inform one of the activists that one of the councillors was informing the police that a certain activist be arrested as he ran with his microphone after he fell victim of the same tactic. The activists would again sing freedom songs as they leave hiding the said activist among them.

At night these tactics were replaced by those of the 'suicide squads'. A member of one such squad explained: 'That night at about 11 pm [after the community council elections] we went to Khakhaza's house. We petrol bombed it after realising the shop could not burn. We first threw them [petrol bombs] through the front windows. When the house started burning, we ran to throw them at the back. That woman was lucky. I wanted to throw it into her face, but she was quick in closing the door.'⁵ Khakhaza's house was attacked because he was one of the leading community councillors in Guguletu.

This militancy is observed by L. Chisholm when she writes,

'As townships ignited one by one, ...forms of student and youth activities changed. They are fighting back, arming themselves and commandeering petrol stations and trucks to confront state armed forces.'⁶

Lambert and Webster call this the 'militaristic voluntarism...of the youth [which] eclipsed the organisational concerns [whereby] trade unions and community activists have found themselves sandwiched between the militarism of the youth and the terror tactics of the security forces.'⁷ These terror tactics were clearly demonstrated in the destruction of KTC in 1986. Those hard hit by these tactics of terror in the mid 1980s sought refuge in KTC. There were several reasons for choosing KTC: the streets in the township give easy access to special branch that picks up comrades in ungodly hours of the morning; Old Crossroads could no longer serve as a refuge base as Ngxobongwana was hosting vigilantes; KTC was experiencing a phase of political radicalism.

The origins of KTC squatters

The KTC squatter camp started in late January 1983 '...with a few families in make-shift shelters but it soon mushroomed into a new community housed in shelters built of "Port Jackson" branches, plastic and canvas. This was a form of protest by people who were determined to persist for as long as it took them to obtain houses and "legal rights" to be in Cape Town.'⁸

From interviews with some of those who started squatting at KTC

the following accounts were presented, 'I was approached in my capacity as an activist by Sis* Rina and Sis Sybil. They complained that their shelters were demolished by the Bantu Affairs Administration Board [BAAB] officials; that they had been on the waiting list for a long time and couldn't understand why their shelters were demolished while others had been allowed to build and stay there.'⁹

The people who were allowed to stay at KTC with the permission of the BAAB officials were those who had temporary permits since 'KTC was used as an official transit camp for people who had temporary permits as well as visitors from the bantustans in the 1970s'.¹⁰ According to Dr. M. Nash, there were at this time about a hundred dwellings at KTC for those who were on the waiting list for housing. During the demolitions, those transit houses were never demolished. The Urban Foundation appeared to provide rudimentary services such as water and the bucket system for sewage. Those people with permits were given full rights to be in Cape Town in 1981 and the transit camp was growing as more people got permits to stay.¹¹ This is what confused the women who came to see a youth activist to find out why their shacks had been demolished. As he himself was a lodger, he decided not only to help the women but to be part and parcel in the struggle for housing and the occupation of KTC land.

The activist introduced the women to other youth activists, the United Women's Organisation and the Western Cape Civic Association. Within a week, these organisations had called a meeting which was held in the church at Ny 78, opposite KTC. Several hundreds of people from Guguletu and KTC attended the meeting. The meeting resolved that KTC was an alternative place for them to build houses as the housing shortage was acute. Indeed, the Argus reported that, 'Since 1972 no houses have been built for Peninsula blacks in the established townships of Nyanga, Langa and Guguletu'.¹²

Within a few days after the meeting hundreds of people came from the 'hokkies' or outrooms of the townships to build plastic shacks at KTC. The Argus estimated the shelters to be more than 1000 by February 1983.¹³ Most of the people interviewed said they were Cape Town residents who had moved to KTC because their families' homes were overcrowded. Some went to KTC because they were tired of lodging in 'another man's house as if a boy'.¹⁴ Most of the youth interviewed had passes, and, in this respect qualified in every respect to be in Cape Town. This bears out the Argus' view that 'Most people in the squatter camp at KTC are legally in the Peninsula, even in terms of the governments barbed wire fence influx control legislation.'¹⁵

Another group of people who came to live at KTC were the new arrivals from Transkei who fled from Mr. Ngxobongwana's autocratic powers in 1983 as he was purging opposition in Crossroads. The majority of these people were presumably without passes because according to Dr. Nash, when Unibel and Modderdam squatter camps were destroyed 'Those who went to stay in

Crossroads did not have passes.¹⁶

KTC became a contested terrain for hegemony to exercise control over the area. There were people with traditional attitudes and others with urban consciousness especially the militant youth; oppositional politics from progressive organisations such as Cape Youth Congress [CAYCO], United Women's Organisation [UWO] Western Cape Civic Association [WCCA] and there were community councillors. This can be clearly demonstrated when one looks at the nature of their responses to repression.

Survival strategies 1983-1984

The earlier phase of KTC squatters' struggles, from February 1983 saw an embryonic alliance between different groups with different origins and experiences fighting for their sectional interests under the umbrella of Cape Town's women, youth and civic organisations. There were people with rural backgrounds as well as city backgrounds grappling with issues that confronted them and gave them new experience. Experience is used here as 'an occurrence or episode as it is lived by the participants, the subjective texture of objective actions'¹⁷ Firstly the activists from the organisations mentioned above, who were working as an informal committee, saw that the number of people who were moving to KTC was growing quickly. They therefore called a mass meeting of the KTC people so as to form a co-ordinating committee which could organise this growth. This committee, comprised of 'legals' and 'illegals' conducted negotiations with the BAAB officials. The mandate given to it was that 'people wanted houses to live in whether they were "legals" or "illegals"; that it was the duty of the government to build them houses'¹⁸.

A few activists were opposed to the strategy of negotiations with the Western Cape Administration Board (WCAB). The majority of these activists came from UWO, which was a non-racial organisation. Some of them were ANC members before it was banned. The fact that ANC was banned had little effect on the praxis of these activists as it was not an offence to propagate the ideas enshrined in the Freedom Charter, which is ANC's guiding document for dismantling apartheid in South Africa. These women did not hesitate to propagate the ideas of the Freedom Charter in their speeches at KTC. This explains the fact that the majority of women at KTC were members of UWO. The second group of activists were members of the WCCA. That the civic leadership was comprised of individuals influenced by both black consciousness ideas and the Freedom Charter had little effect on KTC as the former group never took KTC squatter struggles seriously. In any case, they are a minority group in Cape Town. The third group was the youth activists from different organisations such as Azaso, Cosas, high school SRCs, Cayco and drama groups in the township. All these activists were Charterist inclined. That as it may, the activists who provided direction in the KTC campaign at this stage were those from the WCCA as it was felt that the housing problem was to be addressed by the civic. They argued that the WCAB was acting on the instruction of the state to implement and supervise policies determined by parliament; that a negative answer from

the WCAB would be detrimental to the unity already achieved as it would have the effect of making other people lose hope in the campaign which was only starting; that the committee should consider negotiations only when it has demonstrated the strength of its followers. This position did not seem favourable to the majority of the people. So the mandate had to be carried.

The committee reported back to KTC people that the WCAB's response was that: it was illegal for them to squat; they should have consulted first with their 'leaders' i.e. the community councillors; not all of them had a right to be in Cape Town; they should as soon as possible, leave the place if they did not want to be arrested. The KTC people refused to be intimidated by the WCAB. They resolved to: continue squatting; seek support from other progressive organisations; and to publicise their campaign.

At dawn, the following day KTC was raided. The wood and plastic shelters were destroyed by the WCAB officials who were accompanied by the armed police and their dogs. People watched passively as their belongings were thrown together into various heaps and then set alight by the WCAB officials. People including some activists, disappeared into the bush for fear of being arrested. When the WCAB officials realised that none of the squatters' belongings could be retrieved from the fire, they left the place under police escort in their vans. It was then that the people, under severe shock and confusion started to regroup. They were caught defenseless as they had no strategy about how to respond to a raid.

From the above-mentioned raid onwards, activists and some members of the committee started to demonstrate their skills. Volunteers were dispatched to charity organisations to request help such as food, blankets, plastics, etc. and to rally support from progressive organisations, whereby they could be allowed to address meetings about the plight of KTC squatters. Township activists were encouraged to come and sleep at KTC. It was Mildred Lesea's belief a former organiser of Sactu in Cape Town who was a member of UWO, that 'if you want to win people to your side; you better be with them in their struggles'.

The response was positive. That evening, plastics and wooden bars were brought for people to rebuild their shelters. The youth volunteered or was encouraged to do this kind of work as digging required young men. The committee's shelter, large enough for 8-12 people, and those for women, were the first to be built. Others followed later. By midnight KTC was like Dingaan's Kraal: the committee's shelter was in the centre surrounded by women's or families' shelters with young children; activists and other young people's shelters were on the outside, as they were expected to be on guard at night. Some members of the UWO brought their jointly cooked food to be shared by the squatters. The informal sector of Section 4 was also profiteering by being in the neighbourhood. People bought offal of sheep, goats or cattle at 10c a piece depending on the amount required to cook or fry.

Indeed that night, and a few days that followed were symbolised by the spirit of comradeship and sharing. Activists from UWO and Cayco advertised their organisations and propagated their ideals. The youth speakers were not hesitant in their propagation of the ideals of the Freedom Charter. People responded positively, singing church or freedom songs.

However, the above mentioned unity and harmony did not last long. KTC became a victim of subsequent daily dawn raids that continued for several months into the winter rainy season.¹⁹ In some cases tear gas, police dogs and batons were used to disperse and arrest the KTC squatters. The state's resolve not to tolerate squatters settlement at KTC was clearly demonstrated in Minister of Plural Relations and Development Dr Koornhof's statement that 'Neither I, nor this government, will allow another uncontrolled squatter camp like Crossroads to develop.'²⁰ Five days later, after this statement, KTC was again raided. This time the KTC squatters were on guard as they devised a better strategy of resistance. The previous week's demolition of the shelters demonstrated that even if the WCAB officials were seen from a distance by their guards, there was little they could do to save their shelters. Since then, the KTC squatters would only start rebuilding at night. These shelters were different from those of the past and the defence strategy was equally effective. The shelters were built such that they could be undone within a few minutes. This time the bars were not buried deep down in the ground so that they could be easily pulled off the ground; the plastic were also treated with caution as it was only sand thrown on top of their bottoms instead of burying them in the ground; there were groups of volunteers with different tasks such as saving the bars, plastics, utensils etc. These volunteers would hide them in the place that was secured as a safe place for keeping them until it was safe to bring them back to rebuild at night. The pass-holders agreed not to produce them so that there should be no distinctions made between 'legals' and 'illegals' and the struggle was one i.e. houses and a place to live. Cape Times reported that: 289 people-47 of them children were arrested; about 150 of them pleaded not guilty; about 80 of them were led in groups of 10 until Commissioner L. Van Wyck read the names of the rest out in court, because of 'lateness of the hour'; a second charge of not producing the pass on request, was put to the first 50 cases²¹. The majority of the Committee Members were among those arrested.

Meanwhile the WCAB officials and their surrogates i.e. the community councillors were sowing seeds of division among the KTC squatters. This is what the committee tried to avert before the raid. When the 'Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr. Piet Koornhof, announced... that rudimentary services would be provided at 2,500 sites at the KTC squatter camp and adjacent to it,'²² the activists were more worried about his statement threatening that neither he nor his government would tolerate another uncontrolled squatter camp like Crossroads. They knew that the arrests and deportation of 'illegals' meant that the service sites were for 'legals'. They were equally disappointed

by the opportunism of the 'legals' who only showed their faces at their convenience and disappeared into the townships as they had friends and relatives to sleep at. The 'illegals' were equally aware of how different their situation was. KTC was their home with nowhere else to go. To avert the divisions that were awaiting the KTC squatters, the committee, in a joint meeting with UWO and WCCA activists decided that a list of names be kept and that the first people to get the sites should be those who always slept at KTC. This seemed to be a better tactic as the majority of people who were sleeping at KTC and getting arrested were those who were desperate for the houses.

Two weeks later when the influential committee members were released, they were too late to continue preserving the unity they sacrificed for. Two squatter camps were in existence. The WCAB officials knew very well that the raids and demolitions were not enough to stop people from squatting as the estimated backlog of housing in African Townships was 6,000 in Cape Peninsula alone.²³ They sought to achieve their desires by sowing the seeds of division in KTC. After several visits at KTC, they warned the 'legals' that they were wasting their time in mixing with 'illegals'. Soon after that the KTC people were divided into 'Camp A' which was a mixture of 'legals' and 'illegals' and 'Camp B' which comprised of 'legals' only. The latter group formed its own committee as the majority of the committee members remained with 'Camp A'. There were now two committees and two camps on one site, operating independently.

The WCAB soon summoned the two committees to its offices in March. They were told that out of the 2,500 sites, the first 200 were going to be given to the 'legals' as the government was unable to arrange 2,500 sites at once and was not in a position to give priority to 'illegals'. The 'A Camp' committee rejected this while the 'B Camp' committee accepted the offer with enthusiasm. Two days later, 'Camp A' was raided and those without passes were arrested. In protest, the 'legals' refused to produce their passes and they were also arrested. 'Camp B' was given a breathing space this time since it was comprised of 'legals' only. Those who were left behind in 'Camp A' lost leadership and became further divided. A third group, called 'Camp C', was formed as 'legals' again broke away from 'Camp A'. The latter was then left with 'illegals' only.

The WCAB officials then came to give sites to the legals, 'Camp B and Camp C' each having 100. There developed tension within 'Camp A' Committee as it was still comprised of 'legals' and 'illegals' whilst its constituency was comprised of 'illegals' only. The members of the Committee who were 'legals' later observed that they were excluded from attending meetings which were held at night by the 'illegals'. When WCAB officials raided the camp, around the first week of March 1983, the 'illegals' came out of their shelters with "knobkerries" and iron bars to resist the demolition of their shelters. The police used tear gas to disperse them and they ran into the bush to escape the fumes. Since then, KTC became an object of arrests and raids.

Although this incident impressed the 'legals' who were in the 'Camp A' Committee, making them more loyal to it, the 'illegals' continued to exclude them and were by then consulting lawyers without the knowledge of the 'legals'. When they approached the 'illegals' who were Committee members, asking to be informed about developments as Committee members, they were surprised to be told, 'Comrades it does not help you to stay with us. You are having passes, and we have none. You are fighting for one thing, houses and we are fighting for two - houses and passes. Is it not better for you to join the other people with passes because it seems that you are retarding our struggle?'.²⁴ After this it became an accepted reality that there were three groups operating independently at KTC. The activists in the Youth, feeling betrayed by the 'illegals' in 'Camp A', disgusted by the conservatism and sectional interests of the 'legals' in both Camps B and C lost interest in KTC struggles.

It was as if Dr. Koornhof was kept to date about the developments at KTC squatter camp. Less than two weeks after the splits at KTC, he announced that no more than the original 200 sites would be made available at KTC. The remaining thousands of people would have to wait while the government created a new township at Driftsands,²⁵ now known as Kayalitsha.

After this, opposition was at its weakest. There were no longer any activists from the 'legals' to encourage the illegals by refusing to produce passes and thus risking arrest. The WCAB officials also knew who their victims were; they constantly raided, demolished the 'illegals's' shelters and arrested those who failed to escape.

Perhaps the closing chapter of KTC 'squatters' embryonic opposition to removals was that demonstrated by the 'Concerned Citizens' visit from the white areas. Rev. Sid Luckett explains how this came about: 'I knew that the Women's Movement for Peace was having a meeting in protest against the demolitions. I rushed to St. Saviours Church in Claremont to inform them that KTC was about to be raided again so that they could come and see with their own eyes what was taking place.'²⁶

It appears that the above mentioned meeting was attended not only by those who were members of the Women's Movement for Peace, but also by some members of parliament. Those who had no cars were given lifts and many white women and men descended on KTC. They not only surprised the KTC people with their enthusiasm but also served as a rallying factor. People from houses nearby KTC came out and started to follow the flashy cars to KTC. Those activist who had lost hope came out of their hovels to revitalise the spiritless 'illegals' who were sitting down, surrounded by barbed wire, awaiting their hour of doom.

KTC was soon ringing with freedom songs. The whites entered the camp of the 'illegals' and this helped to unify everybody in KTC as the 'legals', who had been given sites, joined them. The

African people appeared more relaxed in the presence of whites as they saw this as a kind of protection from police attack. This was specially so when they observed the presence of the parliamentarians - Ken Andrew, Di Bishop and Helen Suzman. Since these whites were in some way - directly or indirectly - involved in the making of the government's influx control laws, it was reasoned that they must have some influence with the police.

Then police came. They were not in the least hesitant in breaking the weak chain of non-racial protest around the KTC people. While this chain may grow and become characteristic of the daily battles with the state forces as long as the crisis continues, on this occasion it was no match for the police. They told the crowd that their gathering was illegal and that they should disperse. The freedom songs became louder and louder, as if to give the people more spiritual power. Indirectly, the statements of the police were making the people more defiant. Then Mr. Ken Andrew, an MP, appointed himself as mediator between the people and the police. But he was not successful. He came back and persuaded the protesters to disperse as the police were threatening to tear gas the crowd if they persisted with their protest. But the KTC people had other plans: 'We circled the whites and sang as vigorously as we could so that they couldn't hear what he was saying. We wanted them to be with us when the police tear gassed so that they can also experience what the tear gas feels like'.²⁷ Half the crowd of about 300-400 strong managed to get across the fence and escape the teargas while others were trapped by the barbed wire as they tried to flee. Indeed, some whites at least experienced, for the first time, how refreshing the air is when polluted by tear gas. As people scattered, running away from arrests, some women seem to have lost track of their children. One of them screamed at the police demanding to know where her child was. They told her that she was a mad woman and arrested her for illegal squatting without answering her question.

On 9th May, spotlights were erected in the area to prevent the rebuilding of shelters under cover of darkness. At dawn on the 17th May, all squatters in the area were arrested. Those 'legals' willing to wait for houses in Khayalitsha were taken to the disused beerhalls in Nyanga and Langa. These beerhalls were burnt down in the 1976 uprisings against Bantu Education. They are now the memorials of the students' unrest in South Africa, symbolising 'the year of fire the year of ash.' Since then, except for a small group of people who started coming back, KTC did not experience any significant challenge to the police until 1985.

Consolidation: The UDF, the Community Council and KTC

A significant development in 1984 was that of the UDF campaigns. In the Western Cape, UDF became more popular among the African townships and had more to gain with Oscar Mpetha as President. He was seen as a unifying symbol not only among working class but across class divides: the conservatives would come to UDF mass meetings in the township to "listen to this old

man who has sacrificed his life to politics; democrats supported him as a "charterist"; trade unions supported him as a worker who was sometimes called a "veteran trade unionist".²⁸

UDF's strength lay in its opposition to the community council elections. People identified and supported the campaign as the councillors were linked to the never-ending deterioration in their social and economic conditions. This campaign as explained above was a success if one used the community council elections as an indicator.

However successful as they were, UDF campaigns meant little to the squatters who returned to KTC in the second half of 1983. By this time, police violence, brutality and repression had made the squatters turn to the community councils in the hope that they may provide some relief. It seems that by this time the "legals" without sites were tired of squatting as their shacks would be demolished and told to go to Khayalitsha. They were also tired of lodging with friends and relatives. One by one they approached Mr Sighaza, a member of the Community Council to ask for a site. He gladly gave them sites for which they paid a rand. Slowly, observers saw KTC mushrooming into a new community of zinc shelters. Those who did not know about Sighaza just came and built their zinc shelters and Sighaza would also come and instruct the newcomer to demolish the shack unless the builder was prepared to pay him his one rand and show him his/her pass. The story spread like wildfire and KTC grew. The life stories of the KTC squatters, Mncedisi and Suksuk give us more insight not only into the relatively short-lived strategy of the BAAB to boost the Community Council at KTC but also into how misleading the use of the term "illegals" can be. Both of these men said that they had passes.

"We squatted with 'Camp A' because they were our home boys and we did not like to see them suffering in Cape Town. When we got work, it was difficult for us to continue fighting with them because if the police come, while we were at work we would lose our things. We went to Sighaza and gave him R10 for a site."²⁹

Marks and Rathbone have observed that "to deny these migrants the appellation of working class because their consciousness was still partially formed and informed by their very recent experience of contracting rural options, the onslaught of African peasant production and social and political decay in the countryside... is... a curiously mechanical, (and) Eurocentric view"³⁰ Certainly there was a growing sense of solidarity of a working class sort among these migrants, though fed by homeboy ties. It is not clear, however, whether Sighaza granted sites only to those with passes and whether his charges for sites were stable or varied.

The squatters of KTC near NY 78 seemed to have been given a breathing space by the existence of the Community Councillor who

not only charged them a rand or ten rand, but also recruited more people to come and build if they had passes as he was going to see to it that the WCAB provided them with adequate housing.³¹ But those of Memani at the edges of KTC near Nyanga were to experience frequent harassment by WCAB officials and police throughout 1984. J. Cole has noted that, "Until May, not a week went by without a raid on the approximately 250 squatters."³²

The Informal Sector

An important development at KTC in this period of relative freedom from police and WCAB raids was the growth of the informal sector. There seem to be five main informal sector activities that are income generating for the unemployed and unemployable at KTC: drug peddling; shebeening, backyard mechanics, selling of meat, vegetables and fruit. Those involved in the first two can be regarded as unemployable. They are also KTC's informal "middle class" as they have large incomes from these activities. I have observed both types of activity closely.

One day I went to a dealer who runs drugs not only for KTC but also for the townships as well as some of the Coloured areas. Within five minutes, she supplied seven independent customers. What took her time was the counting of the money, since she sells strictly on a "cash and carry" basis. The first customer wanted twenty "parcels" at R11,00 each. Two old women came for twelve parcels, three Coloured people wanted a bag which cost R950,00, the seventh bought two parcels. We were then sent away because business was hotting up and told to return in twenty minutes time. Her turnover was R1324 in 20 or 30 minutes. She pays R500 per bag from Emampondweni in Transkei. Since we had come to interview her about her experience at KTC and she had been too busy to talk to us, she gave us R5 each as a consolation.

Liquor is an obvious source of income not only for KTC but also for the majority of women in African townships. KTC is an exception in that even during the week there are shebeens that are open throughout the night. As long as there are people to buy food and drink, the shebeens stay open.

What makes motor mechanics prosper is that these backyard mechanics are jack-of-all-trades. They can fix engines, spray paint and panel beat the bodies of cars. This means that they do not only repair cars but "remodel" stolen cars to look totally different and they get large "shares" for doing this. The success of this racketeering is considerable when one considers how many unemployed people in the township have cars and money to run them.

Militancy and changing consciousness

By 1984 the youth had started to assert its position through militant actions. 1985 saw enormous changes in the consciousness of the squatters at KTC who had come under the influence of UDF activists and the progressive youth. This was visible in the way they were running their lives as a community and challenging corrupt leadership. Consciousness is used here as "the way in

which experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms"³³ One such example is the establishment of "Peoples Courts" at KTC in the late 1985 as an institution to handle the problems of KTC.

The youth was to put a lot of its energy into the People's Courts and soon they had the effect of a semi-government in Cape Town's townships: as people took their cases there and its rulings were observed by the greater township community. This recognition was partly due to the nature of the severe punishments the courts gave to offenders. One particular example is that of a man who raped the eight year old child of his girlfriend while the latter was at work. The girlfriend reported him to the "People's Court" at KTC. The "Pick-up-Squad" went to fetch him from Section 2, Guguletu. According to Mr. S who was the "magistrate" presiding over the case,

"The people just listened and burst out in shouts of 'Necklace!' for punishment. Realising the danger of this as an activist, in the case of the government discovering that I was present when this punishment was given, I had to motivate for a milder one. The accepted one after a long disagreement was 300 lashes."³⁴

According to Mr J., the offender screamed and defecated when he was lashed; he was unable to walk and was using his hands and knees to clean his excrement. Two weeks later, he came back to apologise and said he was grateful that he was not given over to the government and that he had not been necklaced.

Among the youth were activists who saw their role as changing the attitudes and developing the political awareness of the youth and then recruiting them into progressive organisations. One of the means of attracting the youth to these organisations was through mass funerals in which the political youth played a leading part. Martin Hall observed that the "funerals of those killed in confrontations regularly attracted large crowds of mourners and open advocacy of the outlawed African National Congress."³⁵ The result of this was that activists found it relatively easy to recruit the youth into organisations. The youth of KTC chose to affiliate en masse to CAYCO. So every youth in KTC was in theory a CAYCO member but in practice, their individual actions were often shocking and would contradict CAYCO principles. Recruitment was easy, but changing attitudes was not something to be achieved within a day. Meanwhile freedom songs and propagating the banned ANC and its leaders are the daily political food of the youth of KTC. Bill Freund observed this when he wrote: "in the market place of opposititon, what is particularly remarkable is the revival of an untheorised and uncritical anti-apartheid line trying to forge unity through as little examination of this society as possible"³⁶

The elders of KTC, likewise, were to express their understanding of the world through Masincedane's alliance with the WCCA. In theory, Masincedane is the supreme body of decision making in KTC on issues that affect the daily lives of the KTC population. But in practice, they are a negotiating body that meets with government officials in order to win their right to live in Cape Town. They have little influence on the youth, which in theory accepts them as a negotiating body, but in practice is trying to change their world view to a more progressive one.

Crisis of Control for Memani and Sighaza

By the beginning of 1985, KTC had become a major problem for Memani and Sighaza. Memani had been claiming that KTC was his land and that people were to consult with him before erecting shacks at KTC. This claim was acknowledged by those who were to build near Nyanga East on the edges of KTC as this was the area where he had total control. According to an Urban Foundation planner, Memani charged R60 for the right to build on his ground.⁵⁷ Both he and Sighaza were no longer able to levy fees on new arrivals as the youth disregarded them. They would label Sighaza as a "sellout" and Memani as a "chief" who wanted to imitate Ngxobongwana.

As early as 1983, the UDF Township Area Committee meetings were held at KTC. The youth played an important role in propagating UDF through songs and pamphleteering in the area. When Memani arrived, the youth would distribute UDF pamphlets in his constituency without consulting him. He was troubled by this as he saw UDF as supporting his enemy, Ngxobongwana who was President of the Western Cape Civic Association, an affiliate of the UDF. He started to complain that there were UDF people who wanted to have control over KTC. He also seemed troubled by Ngxobongwana's threat that he was going to send his people to chase him out of KTC, as KTC was also his land. As a result he went to Oscar Mpetha to ask why UDF was supporting Ngxobongwana. Mpetha raised this in a UDF Executive Meeting and it was decided that a delegation of four, of which I was one, should arrange a meeting with him and his Executive.

When we entered his ground, it was surprising if not shocking to realise that there were people who were on guard at the edges of the ground. They were well armed though it was difficult to ascertain the nature of their weapons as they hid them under their blankets. In front of Memani's zinc shack which was two rooms, there was a prayer meeting. Some people were praying and others were crying about their plight. In the house, Memani introduced nine of the men as his committee members. What came out of the meeting after long deliberation was that he also supported UDF but was unhappy about the youth who would just distribute pamphlets without informing him. Oscar Mpetha made them clear that UDF was not taking sides in their fights with Old Crossroads as it needed their participation in the struggle against a system that made them squatters in their own land. Memani and his committee agreed that he would raise the issue of joining UDF with his people and the UDF delegation agreed that he

would be informed of other UDF activities.³⁸

However, UDF did not inform the Youth about the decision. As a result, distribution of pamphlets continued without consultation with Memani. On the other hand, Memani did not stop his allegations that UDF was supporting his enemy (Ngxobongwana). When people from his camp started to challenge his control, he labelled them as "sellouts". This made his opponents concerned about the allegations and they consulted the Masincedane Committee at KTC. Masincedane decided that they had to solve their problem within their camp and return to Memani. This was exploited by Memani who organised the youths to burn the houses of "sellouts" i.e. his opponents. One house was set alight by the youth who when questioned by activists confessed that they were sent by Memani. This was to bring about his downfall as people were infuriated by this and went straight to his house to "face him". He saw them coming and got into his car and ran away. His house was then set alight. Since then he has not been seen again at KTC. His group then united with Masincedane, where they are to date.³⁹

By this time, according to Urban Foundation estimates, there were about 7000 dwellings and about 60,000 people living at KTC. The only sanitation provided were pit latrines, which were grossly inadequate for the number of users. People walked far and queued for a long time at the taps to fill their buckets with water, often late at night.

The State of Emergency

The effect of the state of emergency on KTC was to transform the squatter camp into a transit area for activists "on the run" from the emergency regulations. KTC was preferred to the townships because it was difficult for the police to get into KTC as the roads are narrow and its population is always on the lookout. It is also more difficult for vehicles to reach the middle without being directed by someone who knows the place. The police also find it difficult to get addresses of the people they are looking for. As ANC flags flew at mass funerals in the townships, at KTC, grenades and guns became the customary form of defence against the fathers and the police. This is what Bundy describes when he says, "young black Africans have displayed an extraordinary tenacity, determination and new courage ...".⁴⁰

The "fathers" and the "witdoeke"

The post reform government has developed new strategies of repression to crush the extra-parliamentary opposition forces in the country. In the case of Cape Town, the origins of this strategy cannot be understood without uncovering the conflict between the youth and Ngxobongwana's committee in New Crossroads, a conflict which was fuelled and used by the state to its own advantage. The conflict began when the residents of New Crossroads collected money and gave it to the committee to be used for bail for those who had been arrested in the rent boycott protests at the beginning of 1985. When they won the case and the residents claimed their money, the committee was unable to

account for all of it. The youth was in the forefront in the challenge to the committee. The committee responded by avoiding the issue and accusing the youth of a "lack of discipline" in challenging their elders. This resulted in violent clashes between the youth and the "fathers". The former sought support from and refuge at KTC when persuaded by the "fathers". By this time the "fathers" were saying that they were tired of being dictated to by undisciplined youth to whom they referred as "comrades". This was soon to be exploited by the police who would at times call upon comrades to come out and fight. As this crisis escalated, the KTC people defended themselves and fought back against the fathers and the police. This anger culminated in the killing of Sighaza, the Community Councillor, on Christmas eve. It happened that as the people of KTC were about to bury a victim of apartheid on Christmas eve, they saw Sighaza in his car, near the graveyard.

"They ran to him, blocked his car and lifted it up as he was about to leave. They took his gun before he was able to shoot and put Sighaza in the boot of his car. After the funeral, he was burnt in his car."⁴¹

Sighaza was heard to say to his people, "If I die, the first person to know will be that man," and he would point to Bra Ntsiki a KTC squatter and member of the WCCA. On the evening of Sighaza's death, people heard screams of revenge: "Our leaders cannot die alone". The next morning, Bra Ntsiki was dead and his shelter burnt down. His body was so badly mutilated that it was difficult to identify. Some people wept, others fainted, but some were strong and called for a meeting at Zolani Centre, Nyanga.

It was Christmas day 1985. Slowly and quietly the youth made its way to Zolani Centre. Today no freedom songs were heard. At Zolani Centre there were many issues raised. People from site C, Khayalitsha, wanted the meeting to discuss their harassment by the 'fathers'. Those from Langa wanted to discuss the killing of their friends who pick-pocketed comrades. The KTC youth became impatient. Anger took control of their feelings. They walked out and went back to KTC.

By midday, while others were feasting to celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ, others were dying. Several houses were on fire. These were the houses of Sighaza and fellow community Councillors, three of whom were necklaced for their 'past deeds'. By this time the most common slogan in the area was 'Mazif'izinja' [Dogs must die]. No member of the Community Council has set foot at KTC since Sighaza's death. Some people left KTC of their own accord and the youth occupied their houses. Some of those half-burnt houses were rebuilt and occupied by the youth.

This escalated tension between the youth and the 'fathers'. On one occasion a hand grenade had to be thrown in front of them to

prevent them from entering KTC. Tension between the youth and the 'fathers' reached a bursting point by the early 1986. Throughout January there were outbursts of battles between the youth and the 'fathers'.

KTC soon became a place of refuge for Cayco youths who were escaping from UDF and Azapo infightings in Paarl and those who were harassed by the 'fathers' from New Crossroads. The township youth from Guguletu equally found KTC a convenient place of escape from the Special Branch that was 'cleaning' the township of ANC 'terrorists'.

Between December 1985 - May 1986, not a single month passed without KTC being surrounded so that not a single person could get out without being searched by the police. For an observer, it was as if crossing the border from one country to the other as those allowed to go through were having their belongings carefully searched.

At night people would hear gun exchanges between police and the KTC people. It was during this period, around May 1986 that the rumours started to spread that the vigilantes, with the help of the police were planning to attack KTC. Amidst these rumours of attack and counter defence, the Masincedane Committee sought to call on the courts to prevent further attacks on KTC. In their affidavits Committee members said, 'vigilante leader, Sam Ndima, said that squatter camps with the exception of Old Crossroads would be flattened unless all the so-called "comrades" whoever they might be, were previously evicted ... KTC [is] armed and for that reason the police would raid KTC to disarm its residents before the vigilantes were to move in.'⁴² This clear statement supported by dozens of affidavits indicates the existence of an alliance between the conservative 'fathers' who wore bands of white cloth around their foreheads or arms and were known as 'witdoeke' and the repressive wing of the state, the police and the army. This did not only create fears that KTC would one day be attacked, but also had an effect of cementing the relationship between the militant youth and the old people. This relationship resulted into popular control which made it difficult for strangers to freely move around KTC.

Popular Control

KTC's popular control in Cape Town's African townships was a response to the material conditions rather than a planned strategy. A combination of factors fused together to transform the KTC people to become militaristic combatants, who, for a short while governed not only KTC but also Nyanga, Guguletu and Langa townships. Their popular control lasted until KTC was destroyed on the 9th of June 1986.

In 1985 as there was no peoples court in Guguletu, a shebeen owner's son was reported to the 'Youth Brigades' in Nyanga by his girlfriend's parents. They were unhappy that he kept their daughter away from them for three days. The boyfriend, knowing

the severity of the punishment awaiting him if he lost the case, requested an activist to accompany him and to also plead his innocence. 43

On the day of the hearing, the activist made the mistake of challenging the 'Youth Brigades' extension of jurisdiction to Guguletu. This infuriated the 'Youth Brigade' court and he was given twenty five lashes on his buttocks. The accused got fifty. After this, the said activist and two others put their energies into setting up a people's court in KTC. When it was in operation, several Cayco members participated in its proceedings. It was agreed that its jurisdiction be restricted to KTC; that those who belonged to progressive organisations be reported to their organisations for disciplinary actions against them; that the old people's case be taken by the WCCA. In short, the activists who founded the People's Court at KTC saw it as a structure for disciplining the youth that was operating outside progressive organisations.

The fact that the activists who founded the KTC 'People's Court' were members of Cayco meant that they could not always be present at its proceedings as they had to also attend Cayco meetings. An unemployed youth who won the KTC people's sympathies as a result of birdshot that blinded him during police confrontations took over the leadership of the KTC People's Court. He extended its jurisdiction throughout the townships and to all groups regardless of age. Shopkeepers were expected to contribute either food or cash to keep it functioning.

In May 1986, one shopkeeper approached a group of activists and complained to them, "I called you because I wanted to know whether you are working together with the comrades in a blue combi. Well, they are not violent, but ma-an! The kind of weapons they carry! Last night they came here. Jumped over that fence and came to knock through my window! They told me they were sent by comrades from KTC People's Court to come and ask for bread. Luckily, I was having two boxes of bread here so I gave it to them. You know, they've been doing this for some time, so I thought I must let you know. You know I lend my cars to the comrades when they want to use them. But those ones, they also want money. A lot of money on top of the bread I give them." He did not look at the activists while he was talking to them as he had tears in his eyes. They promised that something was going to be done to stop them.

Each time the activists tried to intervene in the KTC People's Court they were told it was non-aligned to any political organisation and that only regular members should mitigate in the proceedings of the case. The activists were indeed sandwiched. This directionless militancy coincided with the old people's fears of an attack. In addition to obtaining a Supreme Court interdict to prevent an imminent attack on KTC, they also resolved to arm themselves for defence purposes.

Methods of Defence

"Let us use our money to buy arms."⁴⁴ This was the statement of an elderly person in one of the caucus groups that supplied arms to the youth and leadership of the squatter camps. The manner in which these arms were distributed is complicated. According to those interviewed, there were activists whose task was to constantly observe militants and to discover what the historical background of such militant individuals were. If their backgrounds met the criteria of the caucus, (these criteria were not easily obtainable), they would recommend their names to the group that would accept that they be given arms if there were no further objections. Any objection from the core group would disqualify the arming of any militant. The terms were that any such militant should be disciplined, ready to sacrifice, vigilant in his actions and prepared to return the arms immediately after the action for which they had been issued. It is difficult to ascertain where the arms came from but the following statement will give us more insight into this issue: "One AK 47 with 3 magazines of ammunition and 6 grenades costs a bag of dagga."⁴⁵ From discussion with Mr V, it appeared that this dagga was exchanged with Coloured people who had such arms.

Another method was that of calling mass meetings at KTC to inform the people about a possible onslaught so as to prepare them for defence. At such meetings, resolutions would be taken to consult lawyers to prepare interdicts against police and vigilantes, to guard KTC day and night and to protect the leadership. From then onwards, the alliance between the youth and the elders was cemented. However, the youth, in carrying their duties, overstretched their powers beyond guarding KTC and its leadership. For example, during their duties they would send some of the guards to the nearby shebeens and shops to demand liquor and money. Their patrons also silently gave in to their requests. Taxis were similarly transporting them to their destinations free of charge. Strangers who used KTC as a short-cut to different parts of the township were stopped and asked who they were so as to determine whether they were spying for the 'fathers', police or vigilantes. These young militants would, after realising the innocence of the suspects, apologise and inform them that they were doing this because 'Beirut' was under threat of attack. Indeed, KTC became known as 'Beirut' among the township youth who frequented KTC. But in the end, their defence methods were no match against the police and vigilante attack.

Vigilantes

The state's attempt to intervene in urban politics through the creation of right wing gangs was a significant development in the mid 80s. In the buses, trains and taxis to the working class areas, people asked questions about this issue. Their comments were examples not only of the nature of their experience but also of their consciousness. Some comments indicated reactionary despair,

"Agh! We blacks will never be free! On the one hand we say we want our country back

from the white man. Look now what's happening. We are killing ourselves, the vigilantes are against the comrades. Blacks are so stupid, it is no wonder our struggle is so long."

Others were moralistic, perhaps church-inclined when they saw this struggle as an indication of the impending Doomsday and quoted from the Bible, "Nations will revolt against nations, children against their parents. Oh! my people! Jesus is coming, let us give ourselves to God!"

But there were also those who expressed their frustrations with capitalism through oppositional structures such as trade unions, youth, women and civic organisations where they developed a deeper political understanding of oppression and exploitation. This both widened and deepened the base of opposition as well as the general political consciousness in the townships. As the troubles escalated and the working class continued to challenge oppression and exploitation it found allies among the middle classes. This eventually resulted in a crisis of control for the government not because they lacked the ability to crush opposition, but, as N. Haysom observed, "limited by potential publicity and hindered by legal considerations in their ability to perpetrate the deliberate terror and violence needed to combat popular organisations"⁴⁶, the state found the conservative elements to be an alternative base for achieving their aims of controlling the townships and curbing the influence of the popular organisations.

The strategy was to draw the community organisations' attention away from the hard issues and to counter the attack from the right. Haysom describes the vigilantes as "murderous gangs, intent on intimidating, injuring or killing anti-apartheid activists."⁴⁷ The state's success in recruiting vigilantes was equalled only by their success in portraying their deployment against comrades as "black on black" violence in the media. The phrase is associated with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, government officials and state controlled media. The shallow and cynical use of the phrase to explain the work of vigilantes who attacked KTC cannot hope to conceal the true nature of the vigilantes as the ruthless and murderous allies of the government in its attempt to repress and crush opposition to its policies and practices. The destruction of KTC, revealed the involvement of the police and army to all those who were there.

The destruction of KTC.

On the 9th June 1986 KTC became the centre of world attention. Even people from Guguletu were taken by surprise when they saw the smoke from KTC clouding the sky. The vigilantes had attacked and destroyed KTC. Anyone who observed the actions of the vigilantes (the witdoeke of Old Crossroads) will tell you how they worked with the police. Anyone who observed the destruction of KTC will not hesitate to tell you that, far from being "black-on-black" violence, this was a complex strategy worked out by the

state with the assistance of the conservative vigilante groups recruited from Site C at Khayalitsha and Old Crossroads.

On the morning of 9th June 1986, as the vigilantes advanced from the direction of Nyanga, with two casspirs behind them, the KTC people, reinforced by residents of Guguletu, marched towards the vigilantes. KTC people wanted to prevent them from destroying KTC and entering the township. As the KTC columns moved forward, the two casspirs, not the vigilantes, charged and fired tear gas to disperse them. Some fell and broke their legs as the crowds stampeded and trampled over each other to save their lives. While those who had not fallen regrouped, they heard the screams of those who were under fire. Each time the KTC people tried to push back the vigilantes, the police would fire tear gas at them. As people saw flames shoot up among the KTC houses, they heard the sound of machine gun fire. This time not only the people but also the army and the police were wondering what was taking place. The vigilantes too, were shocked and began to shout: "Phumani! Phumani! Bayadubula!" "Get out! Get out! They are shooting!"

In the middle of KTC, at the edge of the Masincedane shelters, there were people with balaclavas charging the police and vigilantes. It was difficult to ascertain why they had such courage, but the sound of machine gun fire at intervals and the withdrawal of the vigilantes was enough. By noon, the whole Guguletu area seemed to have been taken by surprise. As people were heading for KTC, the KTC people were fleeing their area. Those with cars loaded them with more than they ever thought a car could carry; those with vans or trucks offered them to people helping the fleeing KTC residents. They loaned their vehicles but refused to drive into KTC themselves. Instead they asked that their vehicles be returned before sunset, "Please, comrades", they pleaded.

While the residents of KTC were fleeing, the "balaclavas" were running in groups of two, three or four, not afraid to go into the most devastated areas. One of them came and cooled down the people by saying, "Do not be afraid, comrades, take out the clothes. We are around, we will tell you when they come this side." It was difficult to tell who these people were and in the panic, nobody asked who they were. By evening, it was quiet at KTC as if nothing had happened. The majority of people fled during the day and took refuge in the nearby houses. Hundreds were injured, some badly; several were killed.

Conclusion

The struggles of 1983 brought the KTC squatters into confrontation with the repressive organs of the state and exposed them to the frustrations, tensions and the difficulties of working together as a community with common interests in spite of the differences in their backgrounds and experiences. The militancy of the 'illegals' who challenged the police with sticks supported Bozzoli's observation that, 'the economic identification is not the last word, but merely the first... it is the political, social, cultural and ideological character of

classes which renders them real and recognisable social categories'.⁴⁸

When Memani broke away from Ngxobongwana who lived like a chief financed by the poor, little did he realise that the people who supported him would not tolerate his behaving like a chief also. It was the political influence and the militancy of the youth in the KTC community that had not only defied Memani's behaving like a chief but Sighaza's behaving like a shark and demanding payment for a site. Bill Freund observed this when he wrote, 'It is this youth in these townships cut off from rural life, not the migrant workers and compound dwellers who have formed the most militant and intense resistance to the state in recent years'.⁴⁹

The KTC struggle is the case in point. There is no indication that the state has dropped its strategy of supporting the right wing vigilantes in an attempt to curb the influence of progressive, young militants. And there is no reason to believe that we have witnessed the last of KTC type battles.

Explanatory notes

- * Beirut is the name used by the youth to indicate the militancy of fighting apartheid supporters at KTC.
- * Bra is an appellation used in Xhosa out of respect for a man older than the speaker but younger than his/her father.
- * KTC stands for Khakhaza Trading Store that originally belonged to a community councillor after which the KTC squatter settlement derives its name.
- * Masincedane means "Let us help one another".
- * Sisi is a title in Xhosa for a woman who is older than the speaker but younger than his/her mother.
- * Youth Brigades were a People's Court at Nyanga, formed in 1985. It started as a group of concerned youth who wanted to stop tsotsis from switching street lights off at night and rob people. When they arrested and punished the tsotsis concerned, their popularity surged like fire. People took their cases to them. However the arrest and punishment of the Sogiba daughter who was a Community Councillor spoilt their reputation. They were given severe punishment for being rude and defying the 'Youth Brigades'. This led to the arrest of nine of their leaders and later charges by the South African Court. Since then their reputation ebbed down.

Footnotes

1. Freund, B. 1984; 53 "Forced Resettlement and the Political Economy of South Africa", ROAPE No 29, July.
2. Lambert, R. and Webster, E. 1988: 35 'The Re-emergence of Political Unionism in Contemporary South Africa?' in Cobbet, W & Cohen, R (eds) Popular Struggles in South Africa, World Press.
3. Bundy, C. 1986: 8 'South Africa on the Switchback', New Society.
4. Collinge, Jo-Anne, 1986: 253 'The United Democratic Front' in South African Review Three.
5. Interview with Mr F. August 1988. The majority of these people were still young (under 20 years). Their impatience with Apartheid has made them leave South Africa to join the ANC in exile.
6. Chisholm, L. 1986: 17 'From revolt to search for alternatives' in WIP No 42.
7. Lambert, R. and Webster E. in Cobbet and Cohen (eds) 1988 op. cit.
8. Student's Union for Christian Action 1983: P.2 [Suca] 'KTC: testimony of our silence'.
9. Interview with G. August 1988. This comrade has a credible involvement in youth politics in Cape Town. He is a founder member of CAYCO. Went to KTC as he was tired of being a lodger in a friend's house. He was arrested in a number of raids at KTC. Though he had a pass, he refused to carry it as he thought it was creating divisions between them and those without. He stopped his involvement with the KTC youth when the 'People's Courts' took control of the area in 1986.
10. Interview with Dr. Margaret Nash Dec. 1986.
11. Ibid.
12. The Argus 19-2-83.
13. The Argus 18-2-83.
14. Interview with KTC elders Nov. 1986.
Whilst all five elders claimed to be legally in Cape Town, it was not easy to believe them as they were different from the urban elders in a number of ways: they hated the 'People Courts' as it was dominated by the youth whom they thought has lost respect of African customs. This statement from one of them captures their attitude 'Himaa-ke nyana. Thina asifundanga. Khawusixelele wena mntu wasesikolweni, utheti ukuthi ilungile le nqubo, ukuba ndinatyiwe phantsi

- ndibhexeshwe, yimiphunzana engaka?' [Wait my son. We are illiterate. Tell us since you are educated. Do you think this kind of thing that is happening is right, to be laid down on my stomach and thrashed by bastards of his age?' He asked this pointing a finger to his son who was about 14-16 yrs old.
15. The Argus 19-2-83.
 16. Dr. Nash op cit.
 17. Marks, S. and Rathbone, R. 1982: 35 Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa, Longman.
 18. Interview with George op cit.
 19. Mager, A. 1988: P.2 'The History of KTC 1983 to mid 1987' mimeo.
 20. Cape Times 19-2-1983.
 21. Cape Times 26-2-83.
 22. Cape Times 19-2-83.
 23. Cape Times 21-2-83.
 24. Interview with G, op cit. G was a member of the KTC Committee that held negotiations with the BAAB officials in 1983.
 25. Cape Times 31-3-83
 26. Interview with Rev, Sid Lucket Dec. 1986.
 27. Interview with Miss. THOPS Aug. 1988.
 28. Cape Herald, 30-7-1983.
 29. Interview with M. and S., November, 1986.
 30. Marks and Rathbone, op cit P.26.
 31. Interview with G, op cit.
 32. Cole, J. 'Crossroads 1975-1985', BA Hons. Thesis UCT, 1986 p81.
 33. Marks and Rathbone, op cit, p8.
 34. Interview with S.J. November, 1986.
 35. Hall, M. 1986: 1 Resistance and rebellion in Greater Cape Town 1985 Centre of African Studies, Western Cape Roots and Realitie
 36. Freund, B. 1986: 119 'Some unasked questions in politics: South African Slogans and debates', in Transformation 1.

37. Interview with Christine Glover of the Urban Foundation, Nov. 1986.
38. Western Cape UDF delegation 1984.
39. Interview with G op cit.
40. Bundy, C. 1986, P10 'Schools and Revolution' in New Society.
41. Interview with Mr S. Nov. 1986.
42. Affidavit in Supreme Court Case no. 5317/86. Sipika, A.
43. Interview with D. November, 1986.
44. Meeting with some of the KTC activists.
45. Discussion with Mr 'V' Nov. 1986.
46. Haysom N. 1986: 7 Mabangala, Wits University.
47. Ibid.
48. Bozzoli, B. in Marks and Rathbone, R. op cit P.7.
49. Freund, B. 1986, op cit.