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The Transformation of Moiloo's Reserve in the Western Transvaal: Politics, Production and Resistance in a Rural Setting, 1919-1986

Andy Manson and James Drummond

The rural revolts of the 1950s in South Africa have received a considerable amount of attention, ranging from contemporary and sometimes first hand accounts, journalistic investigations, to more recent scholarly analysis of the nature of rural protest, the role of political organisations and the significance of the urban/rural link afforded by the migratory labour system.¹ These separated instances of rural resistance have been seen in the context of a general upsurge in black political activity from the late 1940s in response to legislation intended to extend control over Africans and to limit or suppress organised political action. Rural protest was then perceived as a response to new state initiatives. The declining productivity and carrying capacity of the reserves were becoming apparent from the 1930s and by the 1940s it was clear that a new policy had to be applied to these areas. Hence the advent of betterment or rehabilitation, devised to check the obvious ecological crisis facing the reserves. Political life was to be reshaped through the 1953 Bantu Authorities Act which vested greater powers in chiefs and headmen compliant with state policy. Some commentators noted too the obvious shift in social relations attendant upon such economic and political restructuring - that it would "concentrate whatever resources remained in the reserves in the hands of a number of prosperous farmers at the expense of the bulk of the reserve population".² We do not, in general, question the accuracy of these propositions. However we believe that these events in the reserves until fairly recently, have been examined in isolation. They have been subject to sudden scrutiny and then faded all too frequently from the historians' notice. We believe that the full significance and impact of these revolts need examination in the context of the specific social and political relations appertaining in each region and the nature of state intervention. By focussing on internal conflicts and events among the Hurutshe from an earlier period we believe that the motives for the revolt, and the form it took, become clearer. Furthermore its importance in reshaping economic circumstances in the reserve and in determining future relations with the state become clearer from an analysis of developments in Moiloo's reserve in the 1960s and 1970s. This paper then situates the Hurutshe revolt in the wider context of politics and production in the reserve between 1919 and 1986.

Introduction - The Nineteenth Century

The Hurutshe settled in Moiloo's Reserve in 1848 under a capable chief Moiloo II, who led his community back to the Transvaal after twenty-five years of exile from their former homeland.³ Moiloo's followers were given 125,587 morgen of land by the frekker leader Andries Potgieter, provided they remained "loyal and obedient" to the new regime. The early years as vassals of the ZAR proved to be




Figure 1 Dinokana - Location Map

difficult. The Hurutshe were expected to provide labour to the Marico trekkers in lieu of tribute, and to assist Boer commandos in military engagements against the independent Tswana to the west. The first decade of Moiloa's rule thus was directed towards avoiding the harsh demands of Trekker overlordship.

Once relations with the ZAR had been placed on firmer foundation Moiloa's people set about restoring the material and social base of their society. Productive growth was founded on irrigation, the introduction of new crops, especially citrus and wheat and upon an increase in cattle holdings. The Hurutshe capital at Dinokana was particularly well provided with water from a natural fountain which flowed into a valley and formed the source of the perennially flowing Ngotwane River. At the end of Moiloa's rule in 1875, Emil Holub wrote that the

"Bahurutshe in Dinokana gathered in as much as 800 sacks of wheat, each containing 200 lbs, and every year a wider area of land is being brought under cultivation. Besides wheat they grow maize, sorghum, melons and tobacco, selling what they do not require in the markets of the Transvaal and the diamond fields.... They have become the most thriving of the Transvaal Bechuanas."⁴

Moiloa managed also to increase Hurutshe access to more land, either by purchasing farms adjoining the location, or by entering into agreements with local white farmers to run cattle on their land. Finally Moiloa welded his community together by a process of political involution (around the person of the chief) and by re-introducing important social institutions and practices into the community.

A period of division and conflict with the ZAR attended Moiloa's death, but the last 15 years of the century saw a continuance of agricultural production on one hand and a divergence of economic activities on the other. These new developments were due largely to increasing Hurutshe incorporation with the encroaching colonial economy in Griqualand West, British Bechuanaland and the Protectorate. They were also due to redoubled efforts in the ZAR to transform the state and activate its economy in response to demands from mine-owners and struggling burghers for labour and capital. The post-annexation ZAR state re-organised its administrative structure (created by the British) and entrenched and developed new forms of taxation and labour control.⁵ The Hurutshe consequently were subjected to tax demands on a scale never experienced in the earlier period of ZAR rule. New and closer markets for fuel and agricultural products, and the arrival of resident traders and concessionaires in the reserve further re-shaped the reserve's economy.

These new relationships with the wider economy cut across and restructured social relations and productive enterprises in Moiloa's Reserve. New avenues of economic gain were opened up for commoner families as the Hurutshe met their cash requirements principally as sellers and purveyors of rural merchandise. Chiefs tended to explore the possibilities of increasing their wealth, not

so much by increasing production themselves, but rather by manipulating traditional sources of authority to grant licenses to trade and permits to prospect. Between 1891 and 1913 Hurutshe chiefs accrued \$11 000 for concessions which were never taken up. Some of this wealth was re-invested in farms bought for the community by the chiefs, but a significant amount was appropriated for their own use.

Natural disasters, the South African War and the early years of Crown Colony rule temporarily disrupted these developments and activities but production picked up again from about 1904 (after the virulent East Coast Fever had abated). Greater land-holdings, a wider market, a larger degree of rural capitalisation and the withdrawal of Boer competition in the post-war Marico accounted for this rise in productivity. For example in 1905 the Hurutshe produced 23 000¹⁰ out of 25 000 bushels of wheat grown by Africans in the Transvaal. In 1910 the Marico Native Commissioner's report mentioned that

"cattle are each year improving their quality by introducing a better class of bull.... All kinds of stock retain their condition during the whole year. Wheat is grown on irrigable lands at Dinokana and Schuilpads. At these two places the Natives are improving their methods of farming and using better class machinery and manuring the lands."¹¹

Even after the passing of the 1913 Land Act the Herrmannsburg Missionary to the Hurutshe was able to record that "our people still now have enough space for agriculture and animal husbandry for years to come."¹² Land pressure was further forestalled by the decision of the Beaumont Commission to add 92 000 morgen to the reserve, most of which was finally incorporated under the terms of the 1936 Land Act.¹³

By the end of the second decade of this century a more progressive peasantry - more commoditised and technologically advanced than before - was emerging. On the other hand chiefly authorities found that the Crown Colony, Transvaal and Union governments curtailed the range of rights and dues, which they had been able to exercise in the preceding decades.¹⁴ Although some chiefs increased agricultural production to resolve this deteriorating position, others did not. In this emergence of an increasingly prosperous class of local farmer and threatened chiefly authority was the source of later social conflict.

"A Model Native Area"

In the 1920s and 1930s there was little abatement in productivity in Moiloo's Reserve. For example, in 1930 the Moiloo Reserve Local Council applied for and received a grant of £1550 from the Minister of Native Affairs for agricultural improvements. These measures included the construction of dams and irrigation furrows, the erection of a dairy hut to facilitate the marketing of cream, the purchase of stud bulls, the provision of a fumigation outfit to protect citrus trees against disease, and the sinking of a number of boreholes, as well as the maintenance of roads in the reserve.

Commenting on these developments the local Native Commissioner stated that the "Reserve bids in a fair way to become a model native area."¹⁵

Further, in 1936 the Moiloa Reserve Local Council (Dinokana) applied for permission to erect a citrus packing shed in order to facilitate the export of oranges. Unsurprisingly officials of the Departments of Agriculture and Native Affairs continued to maintain an interest in improving agricultural methods and output throughout the period.¹⁶ Agricultural shows, described as a "most successful initiation" were held in Dinokana just after the war, affording opportunities for exhibiting livestock and agricultural products which were used to justify further claims for expenditure. Demonstration plots (for men only) were set up in 1948 for the intensive growing of vegetables. The plots were rented out at ten shillings per annum by the Reserve Council.¹⁷ A Native Farmers Association was formally constituted in 1942, consisting of 48 members. The Association arranged for loans to be made available for the purchase¹⁸ of agricultural implements, and for trading and business ventures. From a survey made by the ethnographer P.L. Breutz in the early 1950s Drummond has concluded that "in the period up to 1957 Dinokana was still a comparatively strong rural economy".¹⁹ This assertion is supported by air photographs taken in 1957 which "show a prosperous rural economy with a dense patchwork landscape of cultivated fields".

Politics in Moiloa's Reserve, 1919-1957

As the previous section has noted, new opportunities were created, especially for progressive Hurutshe farmers and some local chiefs, by the expansion of the economy from the 1920's to the 1940's. By the end of the second decade this group had begun to view certain chiefs as an obstacle to their continued progress. Accordingly they attempted firstly to dominate chiefs whose interests were incompatible with their own or secondly to establish an alternative power structure to the chief's traditional Council in order to voice their grievances and express their interests.

In 1919 the "progressives" first began to intervene in local Hurutshe government. In this year two individuals, Michael Moiloa and Joseph Moiloa, were described as the "prime movers" in an attempt to control the new Hurutshe regent Alfred Moiloa at Dinokana. They presented a document which incorporated an oath and terms under which the new chief should govern.²⁰ At this stage the Native Commissioner was quick to reprimand the two, the Native Affairs department being sensitive to segregationist principles conferring special rights upon legitimate authorities in the reserves.

It would be apt at this point to discuss Michael Moiloa, one of the "prime movers", as it is around this individual that the interests of this group coalesced, and Michael himself became their leading spokesman and actor. In 1919 Michael was 38 years old. From an early age he had embraced the Lutheran faith, had attended the

mission school to standard eight, and had become a warden in the Hermansburg Mission. Just before the S.A. war he had earned himself the reputation of a moral crusader against drinking by Africans in the reserve. Together with his father and the local missionary's wife he had been active in harassing a local trader, Southwood, who ran a liquor den from the back of his shop, the suggestively named "Red Room", where brandy was dispensed freely, especially to the chiefs, several of whom ran up large debts with Southwood.²¹ By 1919 Michael was becoming a significantly prosperous citrus farmer²², and was bringing more and more land under cultivation.

In 1924 there is further evidence that Michael was trying to establish himself as an alternative focus of power. In this instance he contradicted the instructions of the Hurutshe regent at Dinokana giving the right to an individual named Ephraim to build next door to him. Later Michael ploughed around Ephraim's house and refused to answer the chief's summons. "This is not the first time", explained Alfred, "when I sent for him he did not come."²³ In forwarding the regent's complaint to the SNA the Zeerust Native Commissioner added that Michael:

is a man of whom I have reason to hold a very mean opinion, and one who surreptitiously makes trouble. As he is the leading man among the mission station, he has ... influence.... I am particularly anxious to make an example of a leading man in this stad because this is not²⁴ the first instance of dumb defiance to the chief's authority.

The idea of supporting the chiefly authority at any cost was, by the mid 1920's, beginning to gain currency in the circles of the Native Affairs department. In 1925 the NAD ethnologist G. Lestrade began to research the laws and customs of the Hurutshe, and his work has been singled out as being of crucial importance "in legitimising both the conception and implementation of segregationist policies during the '20's and early '30's."²⁵ With this kind of specific focus on the Hurutshe it is hardly surprising that the Hurutshe chieftainship and its legal institutions were consistently bolstered by the local Native Commissioners during this period.

In 1929 the N.C. reported again that Michael had crossed the chief. After visiting Michael the N.C. reported that "he (Michael) expressed the opinion that if a decision adverse to his point of view were to be given it would cause a great deal of trouble among the tribe."²⁶ By this time the N.C. was referring to two clearly defined groups, "Alfred's adherents and Michael's faction" who "have very conflicting ideas".²⁷

In fact Michael's supporters had by this time found a more suitable institution through which to advance their concerns. The idea of local councils had been mooted by the Native Commissioner as early as 1921, following the principles laid down by the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The Act was something of an anomaly within the general segregationist trend of the period, in that it attempted to extend the transkeian system of councils modelled on the Glen Grey Act of

1894.²⁸ It was to be superseded by Native Administration Act which restored local powers in the hands of traditional leaders. In 1928 Michael Moiloo and some supporters, principally Johannes Moiloo, informed the N.C. Zeerust that "the natives were desirous that a local council be formed to comprise the whole district of Marico in order that there should be co-operation."²⁹ The local authorities were prepared to accept the idea provided chiefs now played a central role in the affairs of the councils. Due to objections from a Hurutshe community at Braklaagte, which resented being joined in a same body with the Dinokana faction from which it had broken away in 1908, the formation of the council was delayed. Finally in November 1929 the Moiloo Reserve Local Council formally was gazetted.³⁰

The Reserve was divided into several wards, each of which sent representatives nominated by the tax or quitrent payers in each ward. Those candidates who could best present themselves as articulate representatives were the most likely to receive nomination. There was no limit on the number of representatives from each ward. The Council therefore was a perfect body for those who wished to exploit its potential.³¹ In 1930 Michael Moiloo and Simon Mothoagai were nominated to represent Dinokana in Ward 2. This contrasted with Ward 1, where two chiefs, Lucas Mangope and [Israel] Gopane, had been nominated. The N.C., noting that "neither of the two (Dinokana chiefs) were elected as Ward Representatives" proposed that the Governor-General be asked to nominate the two chiefs as additional representatives. Michael in fact³² encouraged the nomination of Chief Alfred Moiloo of Dinokana, and the proposal was accepted. Thus although some tension existed between the progressives and traditional chiefs it would be wrong to see this as a consistent feature of political alliances and positions. Over certain issues their interests converged and Michael probably recognised the need to collaborate with the Hurutshe chiefs, particularly if he was to maintain good relations with the state. Moreover the continuance of communal tenure allowed chiefs to control land distribution, which was a strong card in the chiefs' hands. The chiefs at Motswedi and Gopane moreover, clearly were engaging in commercial agriculture to an increasing degree in the first three decades of the century, and were aligning themselves more closely with the more successful small capitalist producers.

A glance at the minutes of the Local Council indicates the range and nature of the concerns of this body. On the one hand the chiefly representatives tried to use the council to regain control over traditional dues. One of their first moves was to attempt to use council funds to travel to Johannesburg³³ to examine the receipts of Hurutshe men employed in the mines. Those who had failed to pay tax could thus be more easily tracked down. As the council drew its revenue mainly from this local tax, any improvements in tax collection would place more money at the disposal of the council representatives. Some funds, as the N.C. suspected, might be directly appropriated by the chiefs.³⁴

The progressives on the other hand exploited the council to improve agriculture and encourage entrepreneurial activities in the reserve, of the kind previously mentioned. For example disbursements were made for the construction of dams, furrows, windmills, boreholes, a dairy hut and private citrus nursery, and for the fencing of plots. One of the Council's first acts was to set up a citrus nursery on demonstration plots in 1931. As a prominent citrus grower Michael Moiloo was a major beneficiary of this scheme.³⁵ As in Pondoland, both chiefs and progressive farmers "drew the greatest benefit from agricultural expenditure (in the reserve)."³⁶

Abraham Moiloo Assumes Control 1932

The struggle for dominance, both within the council and over wider Hurutshe society, intensified when Abraham Moiloo assumed chieftainship in Dinokana in 1932. Abraham was by then 22 years old. He had attended the local school to standard five level before spending two years at Tiger Kloof and was by 1932 "fit ... to take over the chieftainship."³⁷ Having observed for thirteen years the slow erosion of the chief's powers at Dinokana under Alfred's regency, a large section of the villagers, now looked to the young chief to restore the traditional order.³⁸ This Abraham did by tightening control over his adherents. His advisors backed him in his efforts, though not all the measures he adopted could have met with general approval.

Abraham's first move was to try to consolidate control over the outlying Hurutshe community at Braklaagte. The attempt by this community to maintain its independence from the Dinokana Hurutshe from whom they earlier had separated is a long and confused legal and administrative saga. Abraham did however achieve success in his endeavours for in December 1936 his civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Braklaagte faction was affirmed by the government.³⁹

Abraham also reduced his own council of close advisors (Khuduthamaga) from seventeen members to seven. One of those excluded was Michael Moiloo. When he objected to his exclusion Abraham retorted that Michael was subject to Boas Moiloo, uncle and close advisor to the young chief. The government was obliged to accept this condensation of power because Abraham claimed precedence for such a practice from the time of his grandfather, Ikalafyn, a fact which was confirmed by Lestrade.⁴⁰

Immediately thereafter Abraham began to tighten up levies on migrants, taking one pound p.a. from each migrant. He also ensured that marriage fees (5 shs) were collected on a stricter basis. Fines for non-payment of dues were imposed and offenders hunted down. When questioned by the magistrate about these activities Abraham countered that "I always collect money from my boys returning home and found it like that from my forefathers."⁴¹ Mfengu communities which had settled in the reserve in 1907 on separate plots were ordered to relocate in Dinokana, where they could be subject to closer direction by the chief, and Hurutshe resident on private farms abutting the reserve similarly were ordered to re-establish themselves within the reserve. Although the

SNA viewed Abraham's measures "with much displeasure" he was reluctant to discipline him, particularly when "the tide of (state) policy was flowing towards a more substantial role for chiefs."⁴²

By the end of the 1930's local officials could no longer accept Abraham's activities and began to criticise him openly. In 1939 the N.C. reported the "impossible conduct of chief A.G. Moiloa" and requested the SNA to discipline him for overstepping his authority. The N.C. had been especially incensed on this occasion by reports that Abraham had assaulted a white bus driver in the reserve. Furthermore Abraham's opposition to the HMS was now becoming manifest to the point where its activities were being openly undermined. His report concluded that:

As Linokana is an important centre and as the chief's attitude makes proper administrative control impossible, I can suggest nothing short of summary dismissal.⁴⁴

However chiefs still figured prominently in the government's plans for maintaining rural order. The Chief Native Commissioner (Northern District) felt that dismissal would be "both impolitic and unwarranted" and likely "to cause the Department considerable embarrassment in its administration of the tribe."⁴⁵ What the N.A.D. did decide was to remove Abraham's jurisdiction over the Hurutshe at Braklaagte and the previous order according Abraham this right was cancelled by the Governor-General in 1940.⁴⁶ The withdrawal of control was considered by Abraham and most of the Hurutshe at Dinokana as a serious loss of authority.

Unfortunately records throughout the 1940's are sparse and we can only pick up the thread of the conflict again in the 1950's. By the end of the Second World War important elements in the S. African state recognised that the carrying capacity of the reserves needed to be increased and that a radical programme of rehabilitation needed to be introduced to the reserves. This led the state to "play an increasingly interventionist role in the countryside".⁴⁷ The structure for such a role was laid by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 which in broad terms "aimed at Balkanisation along ethnic lines and the exercise of more effective political control in Black areas".⁴⁸ The tribal councils were to be abolished and a hierarchical structure of "Bantu authorities" set up in their stead. Chiefly authorities were of course looked to to form the essential construct of the system. However there was less ambiguity now about state support for chieftainship - recalcitrant chiefs or chiefs who blocked progressive economic development of the reserve, particularly through resistance to betterment, would be replaced by compliant authorities. The schisms and long standing differences which characterised traditional leadership structures in the countryside made it acceptable and possible to shore up alternative authorities. In addition the Fomlinson Commission of 1954 envisaged the need for heavy investment in the reserves, though Verwoerd altered this suggestion by permitting capitalist development only on the margins of the reserves. In seeking to raise productivity within the reserves, the government desired to hand the control and management of rural

resources to a more progressive class of local capitalist. Areas where long standing social and economic relationships, maintained by chiefs who controlled land in communal tenure and strongly enforced customary law, were viewed as obstacles to further progress. This, it seems, was the situation at Dinokana in Moiloa's Reserve in the mid-1950's. Even more significant however was the fact that Michael's followers provided both an alternative collaborationist base around whom opposition to Abraham could be moulded and a potential leadership which would be conducive to development of the reserve along the lines envisaged by the state. Government intervention did not therefore create a division in Hurutshe society, rather it exploited differences which had emerged over the preceding three decades.

Thus by 1954 Abraham's position was becoming intolerable as he confronted a two-pronged assault upon his position. He bitterly accused his brother-in-law Johannes Moiloa and Michael for undermining his authority by inciting people to appeal against his judgements and by cultivating land without his permission. He also accused Johannes of being in league with the Rev C. Meyer of the Hermansburg Mission. Seeking the ultimate stigmatisation of his opponents in the eyes of the authorities, Abraham alleged that Johannes "organised certain tribesmen who called their party Ipelegeng (help yourself). This party affiliated itself to the Communist Party. Its aim was to have a new chief Johannes Moiloa, to rule over my people."⁴⁹

But the Chief Commissioner rejected these allegations. "Johannes Moiloa", he wrote to the SNA, "is a very active member of the Moiloa Reserve Board Council and he has been outstanding in his endeavours to assist the department.... The Native Commission reports that he has always found him loyal and reliable."⁵⁰ Before the end of 1955 Abraham had closed the Lutheran church and boycotted its centenary celebrations and had spoken out against the Bantu Authorities Act, the Bantu Education Act and the suggested removal of the Hurutshe "black spots" of Braklaagte and Leeufontein. He was described as a "thorn in the flesh of the Department" (of Native Affairs) and was placed under investigation, "with a view to requesting the department to remove him from the chieftainship and banish him from Zeerust."⁵¹ A subsequent inquiry conducted by the Native Commissioner for Pilanesberg found Abraham "guilty" of eighteen charges of misconduct.⁵² These accusations, it is important to note, were not post hoc justifications for his later deposition.

In contrast it is evident that Abraham from his side was exploiting these issues to revive support for the chieftainship, and for his own position which was being threatened. Moreover by mid-1955 he had found support from an unexpected quarter. Previous analyses of the Hurutshe revolt have credited the ANC with only a belated entry into the affair. The usual explanation for this is that the movement either had little interest in rural areas or, though concerned with rural resistance, that or its organisational base was too weak to extend its activities beyond its essentially urban

stronghold.⁵³ In addition, according to Hooper, who personally travelled to Johannesburg to speak to Luthuli in order to gain ANC assistance, the leaders were pre-occupied with the treason trial at this time, although they did attempt to make "contingency arrangements".⁵⁴ Further distortion has arisen from the state's subsequent attempts to implicate and incriminate the ANC.⁵⁵ There clearly was an ANC presence in the reserve from about 1955 though little groundwork had been laid down by the organisation. Furthermore, although the evidence is sparse, Hurutshe migrants probably offered a close though concealed link between urban politics and the rural matrix from which they were drawn. In the latter half of this year Abraham spent several weeks away from the reserve consulting with Hurutshe migrants in Johannesburg. No information was obtainable regarding this contact but Abraham's subsequent attitude and actions suggest he liaised closely with several prominent Hurutshe ANC individuals resident in Johannesburg. By April 1956 the SAP Commissioner sent a lengthy confidential memorandum to the SNA detailing the careers of two of these men, Kenneth Mosenyi and Nimrod Moagi,⁵⁶ and informing him of their close connection to Abraham. It was probably more than just a relationship of convenience for in the ANC's resistance to betterment and the Bantu Authorities Act Abraham undoubtedly perceived both the ideological message and an organisational structure which could be harnessed for his struggle to maintain the traditional rural order in Moiloo's reserve.

By May 1956 Richter, the newly-arrived Native Commissioner in Zeerust, accused Abraham of "interfering with the Police, the messenger of the Court, the Postal Officials, the Churches and local farmers."⁵⁷ One of the main official objections to Abraham found clear expression in this correspondence. The Commissioner of Native Affairs in Potchefstroom and Richter wished to remove Abraham "so we can declare Moiloo's reserve a betterment area, but with Abraham in the reserve he will mobilise people against it.... It is clear too that he is under the influence of Mosingyi and Nimrod Moagi, instead of experienced men like Michael Moiloo."⁵⁸

This then was the situation by the end of 1956 four months before the Reference Book Unit arrived to issue passes to women in the reserve. Abraham's resistance to passes for women and his determination to support the women of the reserve have been fully documented.⁵⁹ The affair should be seen however in the context of his long-standing struggle with the class of small capitalist producers, who by the early 1950's were in a close alliance with the state. Abraham's tragedy was that by the end of 1957 he had clearly won the total support of the small peasant producers who rallied behind the chief in defence of their rural resources, but he completely lost control of the Hurutshe chieftaincy at Dinokana. This kind of attraction to chieftaincy by rural communities under stress has been explored by Beinart in the context of the Eastern Cape. Chieftaincy "provided the kind of institution and set of symbols behind which rural people could unite at a local level and stake claims to land and communal rights."⁶⁰

Post-1957

Events in Moiloa's reserve after 1957 reveal even more clearly the workings of an alliance of class interests that were to determine politics and production in the reserve. Abraham was deposed and fled to Bechuanaland. His uncle, Boas Moiloa, was considered unfit to rule because of his "close collaboration with the African National Congress even long before Abraham was deposed."⁶¹ Subsequently Boas himself was banished from the district. Most of the other chiefly figures associated with Abraham, such as Simon Molife in Dinokana and Lekolani Moiloa at Leeuwfontein, similarly were stripped of their representative positions.

On the other hand, in Dinokana, one Marks Moiloa, nephew of Michael and a member of the reserve council, was appointed as a temporary chief. When he fell ill shortly thereafter the crisis in leadership was solved by the appointment in September 1958 of Michael Moiloa himself.⁶² Michael's appointment was vehemently opposed in the Reserve. In May 1959 a deputation approached the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Zeerust and requested the convening of a tribal meeting to determine the strength of support for their deposed chief. However the leader of the deputation was described by the N.C. as "having sided with the rebellious (sic) element" and for this reason their request was turned down.⁶³ Ultimately however Michael lost control in Dinokana and early in 1960 he asked to give up the chieftaincy. His departure occasioned a further crisis. The government, having intervened so decisively in the affairs of the Hurutshe, was determined not to restore to power any elements associated with the old order. P-L Breutz and N.P. van Warmelo as authorities on Hurutshe ethnology, were brought in to find an acceptable chief with some relation to the ruling family. Eventually a chief from Braklaagte⁶⁴ Israel Moiloa, was brought in to fill the chieftaincy in Dinokana.

Chiefs who had sided with the state and whom the authorities regarded as receptive to political and economic restructuring of the reserve were entrenched in positions of authority. Chief Lucas Mangope was earmarked to head the Bahurutshe Regional Authority, the first of its kind in the Transvaal. He died before he could assume this position but his son Lucas took up the appointment. In 1961 L.M. Mangope became deputy of the Tswana Territorial Authority. Similarly Chief Edward Lencoe was appointed a member of the Motswedi Tribal Authority and Chief Gopane of the Gopane Tribal Authority. In 1971 the Tswana Territorial Authority was advanced to the next stage of self government through the formation of an Executive Council and Legislative Assembly, and in 1972 the new territory of Bophuthatswana became self governing.

Economic Decline 1957-1986

After 1957 there commenced a process of rapid economic transformation of the reserve. The potential for the concentration of productive activities in the hands of a local capitalist class consisting of chiefly families and a salaried bourgeoisie was

greatly increased, whilst smaller peasant-based production declined considerably. For example in 1959 Chief Lucas Mangope applied for permission to construct a malt factory to convert sorghum to malt to sell to the Reef Municipalities to brew beer. The proposal was strongly supported by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner but floundered⁶⁵ due to a shortfall of capital to establish the factory. It was however the kind of activity the state sought to encourage. In the early 1960s a prominent farmer, Piet Mohalelo, (who by his own admission was a "spy" for the police in the 1957 unrest) produced up to ninety bags of wheat annually which he sold to the Wheat Board in Zeerust at an average of two pounds fifty a bag. He also grew cabbages, beans and peas and employed from ten to twenty labourers depending on the season.⁶⁶ In 1962 Mohalelo was featured in an article in Bantu (the journal of the Native Affairs Department) entitled "Fertile Dinokana", in which he was held up as an example of a progressive reserve farmer.⁶⁷ Mosenyi⁶⁸ described Mohalelo as "one of the men who took power after 1957". According to Mosenyi there were "more than thirty" substantial wheat producers in Moiloa's Reserve who were organised as a branch of the African National Veld Conservation Society which, amongst other activities, attempted to increase yields of wheat.

However other reasons combined to stunt the activities of all categories of producers in Moiloa's Reserve. The disturbances themselves curtailed farming for two years and many people fled their homes for Bechuanaland, some never to return. There was a severe drought between 1962-1966 and a simultaneous outbreak of disease among the villagers' fruit trees, which were an important source of food as well as providing some cash income.⁶⁹ The fact that neighbouring Botswana received independence in 1966 was also a blow to the economy since this was accompanied by the strict enforcement of the previously open and fluid border between Moiloa's Reserve and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In turn, this reduced available agricultural resources since previously Dinokana farmers had maintained cattle posts near Kanye in Botswana. Influx control limited the possibilities for capital accumulation which could be in-vested within the reserve. Finally in the 1970s "black spot" removals and influx control added over 13,000 people to the reserve's population, leading to overcrowding, the erosion of pastures and a fall in crop yields. The area of cultivated land around Dinokana fell from 470 hectares to 206 hectares between 1957 and 1984, a decline which in all probability, was matched elsewhere in the reserve.

Increasing numbers of small peasant producers thus abandoned the land to enter migratory labour, and the reserve was transformed from an essentially peasant economy to a labour reserve economy, a pattern characteristic of all rural economies being incorporated into the South African economy, though the intensity and ranges of this process occurred differentially over time and region. Simkins' periodisation of the period of "rapid decline" of the reserves in the years between 1955-1969 would thus appear to be substantiated in the case of Moiloa's reserve.⁷¹




Figure 2 Dinokana - Simplified Land Use

The ensuing crisis engendered by the state's attempts to "develop" the reserves and by the extension of influx control and forced removals, called for yet a further response, usually under the rubric of "homeland development". The Bophuthatswana government, in attempting to proclaim its independence by pursuing a policy of "national" self-sufficiency, established in 1978 the para-statal Agricultural Development Corporation of Bophuthatswana (AGRICOR). The goal of this body was to promote broadly-based economic and social development in rural communities through the formation of agricultural projects. With its rich groundwater resources Molloa's reserve offered a good site to reconstruct agriculture in an area where it was perceived to have collapsed. In the early 1980s a rice project was started at Dinokana, a scheme which meshed well with Bophuthatswana's attempts to form ties with Taiwan at this period. One hundred and twenty local producers were thus organised on a co-operative basis to farm rice under Taiwanese guidance on 45 hectares of tribal land. In 1984 another project was established, this time under Israeli direction, to establish a vegetable growing project near Dinokana. Although initially aimed at a local market AGRICOR soon switched to a broader market when the profits from the sale of cheap vegetables could not begin to match the costs of the project.⁷²

Although too early to tell, "the issue of whether any development has taken place is a moot point".⁷³ In time the production of foodstuffs may increase. However the interim effect has been to concentrate resources in the hands of a state controlled body aided by foreign investors frequently looking for quick-fix solutions. Stripped of vital water supplied to feed the extensive computerised irrigation systems used by the projects and of some of their best land, the vestigial independent Hurutshe farmers have cut back production. Mohalelo, now embittered and in an increasingly desperate position, struggles to find the wages to pay his workers who can earn more on the projects. Some of the former successful producers probably left the land and, under Mangope's patronage, found a niche in the homeland structures. What precisely happened to this class of "progressive farmers" whose expectations were raised in the late 1950's, remains to be investigated.

This position has been challenged, albeit feebly, by the local villagers. Women have attempted to smash the irrigation system and the chief (a supporter of the projects and M.P. for the ruling party) had his house bombed in 1986. More recently, villagers stole crops from the Agricor project, and also have attempted to plough on lands now used by the rice project. Opposition to the homeland state is recognised as being at a fairly high and sustained level in Dinokana and some of the surrounding villages.

Conclusion

The ferocity of the Hurutshe resistance to passes for women and the degree of intra-Hurutshe conflict has surprised most commentators of this event. This paper argues that the reason for this lies in the emergence of class antagonisms that found sudden and violent

expression in the events of the mid-1950's. We have tried to delineate the emergence of these divisions from the 1920's and to account for state intervention on behalf of the Hurutshe capitalist farmers and rural bourgeoisie. It was only after the crushing of the revolt and the destruction of the integrative character of chieftaincy in Dinokana that the state could promote its ambitions for rural change in Moiloa's Reserve. This was done in collaboration with a chiefly class of entrepreneur which doubled as a local authority prepared to play a key role in the creation of the bantustans and later the homelands of South Africa. As it turned out the policy of improvement based on betterment never came to full fruition although "betterment planning" was being implemented as recently as the early 1980's. This gave rise to the final transformative phase in the reserve's history - project farming and agribusiness.

This paper has shown that the transformation of African rural production in Moiloa's Reserve was determined by several factors: specifically the circumstances shaping the material conditions in this region, the degree to which capitalist penetration had transformed rural economic and political structures before the adoption of the major political and socio-economic measures associated with the creation of the modern South African state, the shifting nature of segregationist ideology and state alliances with social forces in the countryside, and finally the ambiguous and changeable nature of political alliances and interests within the reserves. These observations are not new. They have been subtly explored in a number of rural contexts in South Africa.¹ What we have done is to provide a chronological focus on a hitherto unexplored region in order to provide another piece in the mosaic of rural history and the trajectory of rural change.

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Mmabatho 1990.

¹ See for example, G. Mbeke, South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt, (Harmondsworth 1963); C. Hooper, Brief Authority (London 1960); J. Fairburn "Zeerust a Profile of Resistance" in Africa South vol.2, no.3(1958); J. Fairburn, "The Sekhukhueland Terror", Africa South, vol.3, no.2(1968); C. Bundy, "Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960", in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds.), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, (London 1987); T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, (Johannesburg 1983), Chapter 11; A. Manson, "The Hurutshe Resistance in Zeerust, 1954-1959", Africa Perspective, 22(1983), Chapter 11; A. Manson, "The Hurutshe Resistance in Zeerust, 1954-1959", Africa Perspective, 22(1983); M. Cheskelson, "Rural Resistance in the 1940s and 1950s", Africa Perspective, B. Hirson "Rural Revolt in South Africa, 1937-51", ICS Postgraduate Seminar Paper, (1976); W. Beinart and C. Bundy, "State Intervention and Rural Resistance", in M. Klein (ed), Peasants in Africa, (Beverly Hills 1980).

- 2 Chaskelson, "Rural Resistance", p.48.
- 3 These events are recorded in A. Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District of the Transvaal, 1848-1913", Ph.D. (in preparation), U.C.T.; A. Manson, "The Life of Chief Moiloa II of the Hurutshe 1795-1875: Chiefly Power in an Age of Reconstruction", unpublished paper, History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987.
- 4 E. Holub, Seven Years in South Africa, vol II (Johannesburg 1972), p. 416.
- 5 These developments are fully explained in Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico", Chapter Three, and in "The Life of Chief Moiloa II", pp. 18-19.
- 6 See S. Trapido, "Reflections on Land, Office and Wealth in the South African Republic, 1850-1900", in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds), "Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa", (London 1980); C. van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, vol I, (Johannesburg, 1982), pp. 1-3.
- 7 See Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District", pp. 195-200.
- 8 Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District", pp. 211-213; Transvaal Archives (T.A.) Sc 16-13, Report of the Select Committee re: Petition of the Transvalia Land Exploration and Mining Company", pp. 1-3.
- 9 For fuller picture see Manson, "The Hurutshe in the Marico District", pp. 253-256.
- 10 Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual Reports, 1905, p. 91 Appendix no. 12.
- 11 Blue Book on Native Affairs 1910, VI7-1911, pp. 38-39.
- 12 Hermannsburg Missions-berichte, No 3, 1915, p. 82.
- 13 See UG19-1916, Report of Natives Land Commission, 1916, vol I, p. 45; UG23-1918, Report of Natives Land Committee, Western Transvaal.
- 14 A greater official control over trading and the introduction of a more uniform policy regarding trading in African areas in the Transvaal was introduced after a quarrel between the Hurutshe chief Israel and the new Native Affairs Commissioner in the Marico in 1904 over a trader in Moiloa's reserve. See I.A. SNA vol 46 C Griffith to Acting SNA, 7/2/1905; I.A. FKP vol 96, Article 45, 1904.
- 15 NTS vol 8537, M.C. Zeerust to Secretary for Lands, 8/7/1936.
- 16 For example, an increased crop production scheme was initiated in

1942 which involved the provision of seeds, fertilisers and agricultural equipment at 55% of the purchase price. NTS vol 7507, SNA to Assistant N.C. Zeerust, 11/8/42.

¹⁷ NTS vol. 7343, Senior Agricultural Officer to Director of Native Agriculture, 23/6/48.

¹⁸ NTS vol 7248, 214/326, Assistant N.C. Zeerust to SNA Pretoria, 9/12/41. See attached constitution of Linokana Native Farmers Association.

¹⁹ J. Drummond, "Changing Patterns of Agricultural Land Use and Agricultural Production in Dinokana Village, Bophuthatswana", Paper to 26th Congress of International Geographical Union", Sydney University, 1988.

²⁰ T.A. NTS vol 1146 r44/162, Acting Native Commissioner (N.C.) Zeerust to SNA, 19/2/19.

²¹ T.A. SNA 1125/02, W. Southwood to G. Lagden, 28 June 1902; statements of A. Mills, W. Mills, 25/2/04.

²² Interview with Morara Molema, by J. Drummond, Mafikeng, 18/2/88.

²³ T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Alfred Molloa to N.C. Zeerust, 18/11/24.

²⁴ T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, N.C. Zeerust to SNA, 27/11/24.

²⁵ S. Dubow, "'Understanding the Native Mind': The Impact of Anthropological Thought on Segregationist Discourse in South Africa, 1919-1933", History Workshop paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984, p. 12.

²⁶ T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, N.C. Zeerust to Magistrate's Office, Zeerust, 31/10/29.

²⁷ T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55.

²⁸ P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa (Los Angeles 1970) pp. 100-102.

²⁹ T.A. NTS 37/360, Molloa Reserve Local Council (Marico) N.C. Zeerust to SNA, 31/7/28.

³⁰ T.A. NTS vol 37/360, Proclamation No 280 of 8/11/29.

³¹ The ANC had accepted the fact of the councils and the possibility of using them to advance the organisation's interests. As they became packed increasingly with chiefs their potential usefulness waned. See Walshe, African Nationalism, pp. 100-101.

- 32 T.A. NTS vol 37/360, N.C. Zeerust to SNA, 1/5/30.
- 33 T.A. NTS vol 37/360, SNA to N.C. Zeerust, 12/8/30.
- 34 T.A. NTS vol 1146 r44/162 N.C. Zeerust to Magistrate Zeerust, 18/9/30.
- 35 Interview with Morara Molema, by J. Drummond, Mafikeng, 18/2/88.
- 36 W. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 1860-1930, (Johannesburg 1982), p. 156.
- 37 T.A. NTS vol 1146 r44/162, N.C. Zeerust to SNA, 14/11/30.
- 38 Abraham's main backers were four Hurutshe headmen - Simon, Petrus and Richard Mothoagae and Sebegi Tiro.
- 39 See Government Notice No 1818, Schedule B of 4/12/36.
- 40 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Magistrate Zeerust to SNA, 21/2/34.
- 41 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Magistrate Zeerust to SNA, 8/1/35. See also R.M. Zeerust to SNA, 10/12/35.
- 42 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, (Johannesburg 1987), p. 37.
- 43 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Ass. N.C. to Chief Native Commissioner, 25/10/39.
- 44 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Ass. N.C. to C.N.C., 25/10/39.
- 45 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/55, Chief Native Commissioner to N.C. Zeerust, 6/11/39.
- 46 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, SNA to Chiefs and Headmen, Marico, n.d.
- 47 J. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, (Johannesburg 1983), p.261.
- 48 C. Bundy, "Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960", in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, (London 1987).
- 49 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, A. Molloa to SNA, 21/6/55.
- 50 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Chief N.C. to SNA, 12/12/55.
- 51 T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Chief N.C. Potchefstroom to SNA,

12/12/55.

⁵²See "Report of Commission of Inquiry into Unrest ... in Dinokana", House of Assembly Annexure No 229 December 1957.

⁵³See T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, pp. 274-278; A. Manson, "The Hurutshe Resistance in the Zeerust District of the Western Transvaal, 1955-1959", Africa Perspective, No 22 1983; M. Chaskelson, "

⁵⁴Interview with C. Hooper, by J. Drummond, Mirfield, England, 11/1/90.

⁵⁵This emerges strongly from the Commission of Inquiry report.

⁵⁶T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Commissioner SAP Pretoria to SNA, 19/4/56.

⁵⁷T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Richter to SNA 22/5/56.

⁵⁸T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, N.C. Zeerust to Chief N.C. 14/9/57.

⁵⁹T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Chief N.C. Western Districts to SNA, 3/10/58.

⁶⁰W. Beinart, "Chieftainship and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa ca:1900-1950", Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol.19, no.1(1985).

⁶¹T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, N.C. Zeerust to Chief N.C., 14/9/57.

⁶²T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Chief N.C. Western Districts to SNA, 3/10/58.

⁶³T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Bantu Affairs Commissioner Zeerust to SNA, 19/5/59.

⁶⁴T.A. NTS vol 326 r40/65, Chief N.C. to Bahurutshe chiefs, 11/4/61. The problem with accepting Israel was that it legitimated the Braklaagte faction whom the state had long wished to present as a "black spot" group who had illegally moved from Dinokana. Israel's decision to return to Dinokana, rather than rule from Braklaagte, resolved this knotty point.

⁶⁵NTS vol.1343 r 3226/162, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner Western District to Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 26/02/59.

⁶⁶SAIRR Archive, UWL, interview with P. Mohalelo by A. Manson, Dinokana 03/12/82.

67 Bantu, 1962.

68 SAIRR Archive, UWL, Interview with K. Mosenyi by A. Manson, Itsoeseng, 18/1/83.

69 Interview with P. Montshosi, by A. Manson, J. Drummond, Dinokana, 18/6/87.

70 See Drummond and Manson, 1990, The Evolution and Contemporary Significance of the Bophuthatswana-Botswana Border, in D. Rumley and J. Minghi (eds), The Geography of Border Landscapes, Routledge, London.

71 C. Simpkins, "Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969, JSAS, vol.7(1981).

72 For a fuller account see Drummond, "Changing Patterns in Dinokana", pp.5-8.

73 Drummon, "Changing Patterns... in Dinokana", p.12.

74 See Mafikeng Mail, 1986.

75 Interview with Agrigor project manager, by J. Drummond, Lehurutshe, 5/8/88.

76 See for example W. Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 1860-1930. (Johannesburg 1982); Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles: S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth Century Natal, (Johannesburg 1986).