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'FORGET DEMOCRACY, BUILD HOUSES':
NEGOTIATING THE SHAPE OF THE CITY TOMORROW

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**'Forget democracy, build houses':
negotiating the shape of the city tomorrow**

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I regret to preface this paper with the disclaimer that it represents a preliminary draft, a first attempt to begin recording and analysing some years of involvement in local and regional negotiations.

On a recent cold Johannesburg winter morning, I gave as I often do a lift to two acquaintances of mine. As we drove towards our various places of work, Mrs Maseko - a domestic worker - spotted her cousin who happens to work at the same post office as Mandela, the other person in the car. We stopped to pick Happy up and as he greeted us, I asked him from where he had walked.

'From Langlaagte', he said, referring to a major station on the railway from Soweto to Johannesburg's Park Station, perhaps three kilometres from where we had stopped. I was struck by the importance to this man's daily life of the nature of the transport system, the location of his residence, and the location of his place of work. Rising at five - when the temperature on Soweto's southward slopes¹ can be lowered by wind chill to several degrees below freezing - Happy sets off to walk to the station in Naledi. After an indeterminate wait the train takes half an hour to reach Langlaagte, the closest station to the whole of northwestern Johannesburg - a suburban stretch which rolls away for many kilometres. To avoid further delays and greater costs, Happy - like many others - walks rather than ride the train further into town from where buses and taxis might provide alternative transport to work.²

¹ For northern hemispheroids, this footnote will inform you that cold is to the south in our part of the world, unlike yours.

² A more or less continuously built up area extends for considerable distances to all points of the compass around Johannesburg. While northern and southwestern extensions have recently become major lines of growth, particularly in the straggling segregated black residential areas, the older east-west axis associated with gold mining, coal mining and manufacturing could be considered as a unit and is generally known as the Witwatersrand, stretching 40 kilometers west and 50 east from the centre of Johannesburg. Together with newer eastern and western mining extensions, and with the major cores situated sixty kilometres to north and south, the whole metropolitan region is called the PWV - the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area. This

These are some of the disabilities which confront the citizens of the apartheid city.³ Overcoming those problems has long been among the avowed aims of the struggle against apartheid. Most ordinary people have probably made some kind of loose assumption that the coming of democracy would allow problems such as these to be addressed. But are democracy and physical planning at the required scale compatible? Can democracy contribute to easing the pain of daily life for ordinary South Africans?

The paper will touch upon the history of the apartheid city and the breakdown of the old system. It will describe some attempts to restructure the city to date, informed by participant observation in local-level negotiations on the future of the cities. Its central purpose will be to analyse the difficulties which have emerged in the course of those negotiations, among them the paradox of attempting to overcome apartheid in a postmodern period in which some of the key forces affecting cities globally are those of fragmentation, segregation and surveillance.

The focus will be upon the difficulties of civic movement involvement in negotiations.⁴ The civic movement, having borne a reasonable measure of responsibility for bringing local authority (and some would add, South Africa) to its metaphorical knees during the late 1980s, found itself faced with the difficult transition from resistance to development once it had succeeded in bringing the authorities to the negotiating table. While the centre piece of local negotiation has been the structure and powers of local government, the theme chosen to illustrate these difficulties in this paper will be conflict over alternative visions of the city of the future. From narratives of negotiation, conflicts between the visions of those in authority and those in opposition will be compared with conflicts between leaders and followers in the civic movement, between leaders and external advisers and between different sections of the movement. Some of the consequences both of different visions of 'the city tomorrow' and of the conflicts over those visions will be discussed and related to the social context of those conflicts. The implications for the power of the civic movement will be assessed.

Is this subject significant? The short answer is obviously yes, in that a large number of South Africans have participated in local level negotiations about local government in a great many places around the country - far more than have participated in 'political' negotiations of any other kind; in that the process is by no means complete, for 'new' local government is far from erection; and in that local authority tends to have tremendous influence on daily

region of over 100 local authorities covers about 10 000 square kilometers, of which perhaps half are built up, albeit often to densities familiar in California and Australia rather than in New York, Paris or Cairo. The population of the whole area was about 8 million in 1991; of which the central Witwatersrand portion contained over 2 million.

³ Similar disabilities confront the poorer citizens of many other cities of comparable income distribution and productive capacity elsewhere in the world, such as those of Brazil and Mexico, where popular movements have fought similar battles to some of those here; but these similarities will not concern us in this paper. See for example A Mabin, *Is this our future? Learning from Sao Paulo Urban Forum 2* (2) 1991, pp. 81-89.

⁴ J Seekings, *Civic organisation in South African townships*, in G Moss and I Obery (eds) *South African Review 6* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1992), pp. 216-238.

life - which is precisely why it became the focus of so much contention during the past decade. If there is to be 'democracy' in South Africa, the local level will have a great deal to do with its quality and effects. On the other hand, the ways in which these questions are posed will inevitably influence their wider significance.

The construction and the breakdown of urban apartheid

The history of urban South Africa is, amongst other things, one of fragmentation of urban space, attempted segregation of state-defined groups in the population into those spaces, and surveillance and control of some of those spaces.

A substantial literature describes that fragmentation, segregation and surveillance.⁵ Less well addressed is the decline of these aspects of urban apartheid during the late seventies, and more particularly the eighties: the fraying of the Group Areas Act, the failure of the pass laws, and their eventual repeal between 1986 and 1991.⁶

Part of the 'reform' of apartheid consisted of the creation of the black local authorities as separate entities from the 'proper' towns and cities, and the massive rejection of these forms of local governance by their inhabitants. Rent boycotts and the beginnings of organised township movements followed.⁷

The crisis in the mid-eighties precipitated negotiation between the authorities and the civic movement towards the restructuring of the cities - negotiation which resulted in agreement by the authorities to concede demands such as writing off enormous rent arrears (half a billion rand in the Soweto case alone), the transfer of rented houses to their occupants, creation of negotiating fora to negotiate future local authority structures, etc.⁸ What has happened as negotiations in that tradition have proceeded is the focus of this paper.

Thus in the 1970s surveillance and control began to break down; in the 1980s, segregation, never complete, began to dissipate; in the 1990s a key issue facing the cities is overcoming the fragmentation of space, with its implications for decreasing segregation and increasing the efficiency of the cities.

⁵ Among the works are AJ Christopher, *The Atlas of Apartheid* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1994); A Mabin, Origins of segregatory urban planning in South Africa, *Planning History* 13 (3) 1991, pp. 8-16; J McCarthy and D Smit, *South African City: Theory in Analysis and Planning* (Johannesburg: Juta, 1984); J Western, *Outcast Cape Town* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1982); S Parnell, *Johannesburg slums and racial segregation in South African cities, 1910-1937* (unpublished PhD thesis, Univ of Witwatersrand, 1993).

⁶ Though there are exceptions: cf. AJ Christopher, The final phase of urban apartheid zoning in South Africa, 1990/1, *South African Geographical Journal* 74 (1) 1992, pp. 29-34.

⁷ Seekings, *op. cit.*; M Swilling and K Shubane, Negotiating urban transition: the Soweto experience, in R Lee and L Schlemmer *Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives 1991* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 223-258.

⁸ Swilling and Shubane, *op. cit.*

During this period a new approach began to emerge. Rather than simply continue to slug away with the old weapons against the decaying but still very much intact edifice of apartheid local government, the 'movement' would bring in new weapons. Among them would be just the same types of weapons which the regime used to defend itself: for example, hiring some of the very same consultants who had informed the old regime in order to tilt the public debate on resolving the crisis which rent boycotts had created.⁹ Even the adoption of such tactics did not bring the establishment to the table, but it certainly raised their level of concern - both points being illustrated in Johannesburg National Party Management Committee's Marietta Marx being at a conference organised by IDASA on the subject in November 1989, and in her telling that conference that Johannesburg could not negotiate with non-statutory bodies like the civics.¹⁰

The De Klerk regime had an effect on government attitudes to negotiation, however. By the end of 1989 TPA could be seen seeking to negotiate, and after the adoption of further skilful tactics on the part of the civics, negotiations began and led to a conclusion in the second half of 1990.¹¹ What kind of connection with the ordinary residents of Soweto did the 'representatives' enjoy while negotiation proceeded? Regular report backs did indeed occur, but were very variably attended and indeed organised.

Thus when the negotiations concluded in a final meeting on 30 August 1990 and in the signing of the Soweto Accord on 24 September 1990, there was anxiety among the leadership as to whether the deal could be sold in Soweto.

We hereby undertake to use our best endeavours to ensure that our respective constituencies (including the people of Greater Soweto) comply with the terms of the said agreement ...¹²

Nevertheless, the deal - the Soweto Accord - led to a major development in local negotiation. The fifth provision - the creation of a negotiating forum concerned to negotiate the future of local government in the area around Johannesburg - led the TPA into pushing the White Local Authorities and forcing the BLAs into a metropolitan Chamber in which the future of the central Witwatersrand would be negotiated (the CWMC).

Conflict existed on the civic side too. The Alexandra Civic Organisation did not participate in the Chamber initially. The reason for this has been articulated by a Soweto civic leader as being ... 'The Chamber was essentially established not as a metro initiative, but from the understanding that the problems of Soweto couldn't be solved on its own. There was little

⁹ As in the case of *The Soweto Rent Boycott: a Report by Planact* (Johannesburg: Planact for the Soweto Peoples Delegation, 1989).

¹⁰ IDASA discussion forum, Berea, Johannesburg, 23 November 1989: 'Johannesburg and Soweto - can there be a common future?'

¹¹ Swilling and Shubane, op. cit.

¹² Soweto Accord, 24.09.1990. A copy of the agreement may be found in *History in the Making* 1 (2) 1990, pp. 29-38.

discussion with ACO initially about this strategy ... ACO was also strongly in the camp that favoured no constitutional debates ...¹³

But sufficient agreement existed for the CWMC to come into being in April 1991. Now the curtain rose on a new period of struggle, one in which the civic movement would have to find the ability to engage on how to right the ills of the material situation.

Restructuring the apartheid city?

A large literature records an emerging consensus over the need to restructure the apartheid city and some of the dimensions of that restructuring.¹⁴ Whether or not the compacting of the city, its densification, the development of activity corridors and the use of all these measures to integrate that which physically has been divided, represent appropriate measures, there has certainly been considerable support for these ideas.

But to what extent are these ideas really able to contribute to practical redevelopment of the city in ways which will allow the lives of people like Happy to accord with his name?

And to what extent do these ideas accord with the desires and expectations of ordinary individuals and communities? And if they do, with what consequences for the distribution of revenue and expenditure and the host of other features of current South African city forms?

The first halting steps towards restructuring the apartheid city have been taken since 1990, in the context of negotiation between forces still in power and the opposition, representatives of those long excluded from power by apartheid. As the period of transition away from apartheid opens, and as the complexity and difficulty of transformation become increasingly apparent, questions arise as to the prospects of accomplishing a change in the geography of the apartheid city in the post-apartheid era.

The Soweto Accord had provided for the extension of the key division in negotiating structures in the Chamber, namely the political level (the Chamber itself) and the Joint Technical Committee. It also provided that the JTC should oversee a number of 'working groups' which would look into aspects of the provision of services and their restructuring. The five named in the accord were economic, social, constitutional, institutional and physical. Most began to operate during July 1991, and by the end of the year a large array of subgroups called 'task teams' had come into being under the auspices of each working group. Perhaps most significantly literally many hundreds of people were now involved in the process of negotiation.

The reality of those negotiations deserves some description.

¹³ Chris Benner interview with PM, 22.06.94.

¹⁴ D Dewar, 1983 articles; Smit and Todes, 1988 paper; Hindson, Mabin and Watson, 1992 work for National Housing Forum; etc.

On the brow of a hill overlooking the original central business area of Johannesburg, after a century still the financial heart of southern Africa, stands a forbidding modernist citadel designed to dwarf the approaching pedestrian. This grey edifice is the 'civic centre', headquarters of the largest local authority in the region and workplace for many of its 23 000 employees. On any work day between late 1991 and early 1994, in the panelled committee rooms which bear the traditions of long-established white, male, settler authority, multiple meetings could be found taking place between apparently unlikely associates.¹⁵ Typically - if such a term be allowed - a small group of mostly casually dressed, mainly earnest and most often male young people (of varied colour) at one end of a table, faced a much larger and apparently less differentiated crew of uniformly besuited, generally older, and overwhelmingly white men (admitting of a few exceptions - usually some assertive, tremendously well dressed and obviously highly competent women). The latter grouping consisted of local authority officials from a variety of levels, mostly working for Johannesburg but also some surrounding and higher level authorities; in each meeting they would be drawn from particular sections of the bureaucracy - now treasury, here public health, there general administration, and of course planners. They found their opposites in the small core of organisers and workers, whose corps can be numbered on the hands, who staff the civics - both responsible for the very process of negotiation represented in these multiple meetings and seemingly vital to the resolution of the crisis which (the 'official' side feared) threatened to engulf urban South Africa. Those civic staff sat together with their 'advisers', usually able NGO staff (and sometimes volunteers) who often dominated proceedings with their creativity, political acumen and super confidence in their own greater grasp of the stakes as well as the moral bankruptcy of their opposites.

An occasional air of confrontation between the two predominant groupings has usually been softened to some extent by the presence and active participation of some who fall, in quite literal senses, between the two 'sides'. These were closer in age to the suits-and-ties, in dress somewhere between the groups, and in speech closer to the civic/NGO team. They came from NGOs not quite so close to the civics, from potential funding organisations and from professional consultancies which have somehow secured a toe hold in the process. Occasionally they included academics. Their contributions might eagerly be seized upon by the civic/NGO team, and not purely because of some degree of sympathy between this middle minority and the more powerful representatives of the disenfranchised. More significantly, the latter group ran desperately short of capacity to engage successfully in the process which they helped to unleash.

What the civic movement confronted in the enormous numbers of meetings which they had, despite thin numbers of available and able representatives in this context, to attend, was a phalanx of expertise and time capacity which they found impossible to match. Yet the course of discussions and decisions, not only at the lowest committee levels but through the meeting which bring the most senior officials together and, finally, the political leaders from the various parties, remained substantially determined by the civics.

The worrying point, from the civic side, was that even by early 1992 there was a perceptible

¹⁵ The following paragraphs are based on participant observation in the processes described between August 1991 and April 1993.

decline in the extent to which the civics determine the agenda. When negotiations began in 1989, in the context of a state of emergency, massive boycotts of rents on public housing and service charges generally in the townships, and a mounting debt on the part of the authorities responsible for service provision in those townships, all the creative thinking seemed to come from the civic side. Indeed, in the extension and broadening of negotiation from issues related to ending the boycotts to the nature, structure and operation of local government, the incumbent white minority authorities seemed to be bowled over by the force of civic argument. It seemed that this emancipatory movement, which sought to represent the township masses, stood at the point of taking power at the local level from existing authorities.

But, as Nederveen Pieterse reflects, modern emancipatory movements have been best at saying no to oppression, while not terribly well prepared to handle the intricacies and problems of development.¹⁶ Faced with those complexities, movements have been known to fade in strength in reasonably dramatic ways. On occasion it might be electoral defeat after a triumph in the early stages of (restored) democracy, as with the *Parti do Trabalhadores* (PT) in Sao Paulo, Brazil. In Johannesburg, where the relationship between existing authority not yet out of power and the popular challengers is now primarily shaped in the repetitive rounds of meetings in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, the unpreparedness and lack of expertise of the popular movement - in this case the civics - begins to show.

As Nederveen Pieterse suggests, there is also a problem of unpreparedness among emancipatory movements related to the shift from modern to postmodern¹⁷, connected to the difficulties of democratisation of the 'total ideologies which seek to define and master the foundations of the social'¹⁸ so often associated - and certainly so in South Africa - with emancipatory movements with their roots in the fifties and sixties.

These difficulties began to emerge in the Chamber context almost as soon as working groups and task teams began their work. The difficulties were compounded by the effects of civic leaders and staff, and their advisers, spending more and more time in meetings with authority representatives, and less and less in communities.

Agreements were made in the Chamber in such a way that only the technical people and 1 or 2 executive committee members really understood the issues. We allowed the Johannesburg City Council to set the pace and were mostly having to respond in a reactive way, rather than being proactive. We were then forced into a situation of having to 'sell' agreements to our constituency

¹⁶ J Nederveen Pieterse, *Emancipations, modern and postmodern*, *Development and Change* 23 (3) 1992, p. 5.

¹⁷ Nederveen Pieterse, pp. 31 ff.

¹⁸ E Laclau *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1992) p. 169.

and the Soweto public, rather than them being involved.¹⁹

The Soweto Accord specifically named the Physical Development Working Group as one which 'shall be charged to establish task teams urgently to investigate and make recommendations for implementing solutions about issues' (clause 10 (d)). The intentional vagueness of the purpose of the Working Group left the definition of its task wide open to debate; but it did not take long for the PDWG to agree on its role, which it defined as developing the planning framework which would allow it to reshape the physical environment of the central Witwatersrand.

The PDWG also established three issue-oriented task teams to investigate land, housing, and engineering services, and a fourth team charged with the responsibility to formulate a new 'planning framework' for the central Witwatersrand. A fifth team, on transport, took longer to bring into existence, since the objective of drawing in major actors in the transport field whose organisations were not members of the Chamber took years rather than months to realise.

Developing and realising a new vision

A first skirmish in this new war of attempting to exert direct influence over the ways in which the authorities actually intervened in development blew up over proposals to develop the 'Rietfontein' area south of Ennerdale and west of Orange Farm. This large area of several thousand hectares had been identified for development as 'low cost housing' and/or 'orderly urban settlement' in the reports of a task group of consultants set up by the TPA in 1988.²⁰ The TPA had hired consultants to work out proposals for its development at a number of scales.

The Soweto Civic identified the Rietfontein proposals as a perpetuation of apartheid and began to oppose it in the CWMC. So vital did this issue become that the negotiations deadlocked at all levels. In October 1991 the Joint Technical Committee agreed to investigate. At a special joint meeting of the JTC and PDWG 12 November 1991 the official consultants faced the civics and their NGO and academic allies. But the presentation had hardly begun before a deal was brokered in the corridors outside and the TPA agreed to put the development on ice as long as a new investigation of land availability was undertaken.

The land availability study provides an example of how easily the process of physical development became removed from the lives of the people whom the civics claimed to represent. Even the new jargon of 'land availability' had the effect of reducing community participation in matters which were supposed to improve their access metropolitan life.

In an attempt to assist the civics to steer and supervise the work of consultants, a 'working

¹⁹ C Benner interview with PM 22.06.94.

²⁰ P Hendler, *Living in apartheid's shadow: residential planning for Africans in the PWV region 1970-1990*, *Urban Forum* 3 (2) 1992, pp. 39-80.

party' including civic representatives was set up in the early stages of 1992. But direct civic representation on the body controlling the study could hardly overcome the multiple degrees of removal from the civic membership which the process implied: with civic leaders sitting in the CWMC itself; their technical team in the JTC; a smaller group of them in the PDWG; a fraction again in the LTT; little control over the performance of the consultants. This removal from the actual work being conducted was reproduced in later exercises.

Not that this removal was not recognised. In an attempt to build some worthwhile participation into the process the civics persuaded the Regional Services Council to put up extra money for more, civic appointed, staff to work on the land investigation. A painstaking but difficult process of investigating community preferences regarding what constituted 'well-located urban land' followed. But at the end of the process the final workshop intended to bring together several communities failed achieve its real objective - community participation in shaping the criteria for identification of suitable land for new development.

Nevertheless, the process of planning was altered by this involvement, and the civics could claim credit for shutting down the unacceptable Rietfontein development - but not for the actual delivery of any new land.

A further important aspect of the public results of the land availability study, released in August 1992, including the ways in which it had been possible to jerk public debate into a new realm, had not been lost on civic representatives. Thus as time passed, they began to insist on a new approach to policy formation in the CWMC. This new approach came to bear chiefly on the process of shaping a new planning framework at metropolitan scale.

The officials who had initiated this process in the PDWG in 1991 started with the idea that new planning instruments needed, but due to inputs requested by the civic representatives the process rapidly moved onto the terrain of new vision.

Early Civic thinking, as refracted through technical discussion, was put to the Planning Framework Task Team on 20 February 1992:

We don't need a spatial model of how we want the region to look in 10 or 20 years time ... It is contended that the central processes at work in the PWV are at odds with our implicit vision of the future ... (which assume) continuation of the processes which have predominated over the last generation in South Africa, not processes now emerging ...

How can we structure a process to generate an agreed vision for the future of the Central Witwatersrand, for debate in the CWMC?

We need public debate about alternative models ... we need suitable research ... we need a process in which parties to the chamber and their constituencies are brought into debate early ...

What we seek is a vision/model of processes of change, not a model of a spatial product (though the processes will point in the direction of certain

spatial results).²¹

The translation of these ideas into a policy output got underway after the suspension of the Chamber brought about by renewed conflict over the continuing rent boycott between April and June 1992. In its early stages, the process of producing and 'Interim Strategic Framework' for the metropolitan areas required resources beyond civic capacity, and thus led to Johannesburg Council officials with more capacity than anyone else heading off to prepare drafts. What was interesting about those drafts was that they illustrated more than anything just how deeply ingrained some of their ideas of the city were - precisely the ideas of city structure which the civics wanted to challenge.

When the Chamber had restarted in June 1992, new ideas on the shaping of policy were vigorously debated, leading to workshops and the creation of a new 'policy output' process proposed by the Civics. This was an attempt to regain the initiative in negotiation especially over hard issues.

In the context of this new 'policy output process', conflict over how to go forward allowed the civics to propose the appointment of *their* suggested consultants to produce something which would really push the debate on urban form and structure into a new terrain.

Council officials and professionals involved still thought of this as a framework, while the civic side increasingly thought of it as a vehicle to produce controversy. The process proved to be enormously successful from this latter point of view, but ultimately the problem was that the civic side then found it very difficult to use the resulting document²² to take control of the planning process since it remained too vague - and to date the physical results of planning, such as provision of infrastructure, have been less affected by the process than the intellectual debate on the future of the city.

At the same time the highly technical nature of the process led to further alienation of the civics membership from the process in the CWMC. As one civic official commented, after a series of workshops in the communities meant to communicate the results of the ISF exercise,

The people say, 'but what does it mean? When do we get the houses?'²³

At the end of the day the civic representatives have altered the terms of debate, but the people on the ground have not really been able to influence this process - and little democracy has been realised in the effort to reshape the city.

Some civic activists express disappointment as a result:

²¹ CWMC papers, Outline of presentation re visions/models of growth for the Central Witwatersrand by Alan Mabin 20.02.1992, Agenda of the PDWG 05.03.1992.

²² Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, *Interim Strategic Framework Document 2: Policy Approach* (Johannesburg: CWMC, 1993).

²³ AM interview with TM, 07.07.94.

In the past we'd hold regular workshops and meetings and mass meetings around issues in the Chamber ... now we don't'.²⁴

The experience of negotiating the physical future of Johannesburg illustrates the particular difficulties associated with the emerging empowerment of a long-subjugated set of social movements in South Africa, an emergence which brings movements whose goals and methods were formulated firmly in the modernist period into sharp difficulties associated with the alterations which postfordism and postmodernism have wrought in the cities. A secondary point is that the case in question is not merely of idiosyncratic and exceptionalist interest, but that there are aspects of the difficulties of emancipation in that context which speak to experience in other parts of the world.²⁵

Some conclusions

The story of conflict over shaping postmodern, not to mention postapartheid, urban forms in the Johannesburg area is, thus far, one of conflict between elites. While those elites have been responsive in varying degrees to other constituencies, the degree of that responsiveness has, in most cases, remained minimal.

How can ordinary people and even organised communities of ordinary people influence the pattern of the future? How can they influence the ways in which public money is spent on the physical infrastructure which shapes the toils of daily life, and the ways in which differential rights come to attach to different people as owners and controllers of property? The process thus far does not provide the answer. A lot of thinking lies ahead on the relations between technical and political roles and between those roles and the position of individuals in the poorer communities.

Meanwhile, one civic leader noted recently that 'Forums have taken on a life of their own, and the process has gone further and further away from the people'.²⁶

Times change. So do people's collective projects, priorities, paradigms. But the same is true for the broader processes and structures that determine shifting patterns of hegemony and incorporation, and for the search for autonomy and a decent existence they invariably engender. As patterns of domination reshape themselves in the wake of changing priorities and justifications, so do the foci and strategies of emancipatory movements or indeed all social action seeking to define liberation, equality, social justice.²⁷

²⁴ CB interview with PM 22.06.94.

²⁵ A further local issue is that since we have a good chance of no local elections for a long time to come, similar processes will be determining the physical fate of our cities for a long way ahead.

²⁶ Chris Benner interview with PM, 22.06.94.

²⁷ M Doombos, 'Foreword' (to issue on Emancipations, modern and postmodern), *Development and Change* 23 (3) 1992, p. 1.

The central purpose of this preliminary paper has been to analyse the difficulties which have emerged in the course of those negotiations, among them the paradox of attempting to overcome apartheid in a postmodern period in which some of the key forces affecting cities globally are those of fragmentation, segregation and surveillance. In doing so questions have been raised concerning the possibilities of democracy in planning for the future of local and larger urban communities. Questions of this type have no present answer, and may never have. Yet they remain worth asking. And in any event, as Sharon Zukin put it in commenting on Mike Davis's *City of Quartz*:

... the most satisfying story about postmodern urban forms is a story about real people and power.