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IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
SOUTH AFRICA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Identity, Democracy and Political Rights: South Africa in a Comparative Perspective

Introduction

In contemporary South African political discourse, notions of liberation, majority rule, non-racialism, and the restitution of indigenous rights are associated with the concept of democracy. This association seems natural enough when we consider that the majority of the population are indigenous people who have been subject for many decades to a racial system in which their political and civil rights were denied. The struggle of the African National Congress and its allies for a democratic and non-racial South Africa, a political system based on the principle of one person, one vote, came to embody the articulation of these concerns in a programme which managed to gain the support of a majority of the population in the 1994 elections.

Despite its ostensibly natural character, organising politically marginalised constituencies to fight an exclusionary system, this specific political articulation is relatively recent in origin. It first emerged in its present form in the early 1940s and did not reach a state of consolidation until the mid-1950s. Even after that, it has not remained fixed and will probably continue to undergo changes. Its initial advent should be seen against a background of disparate, partially overlapping and partially competing, modes of indigenous responses to the challenges posed by colonial rule. It is with these historical antecedents that this paper is primarily concerned. It sets out to explore the formation of indigenous identities associated with varying conceptualisations of rights, citizenship and democratic rule in a settler-colonial context. In addressing these issues the paper focuses on the first half of the 20th century, from the unification of South Africa in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer war to the rise of the national Party to power in 1948.

The approach pursued here is premised on the assumption that there are no natural or necessary relations between demographic-historical realities (putatively pitting an indigenous majority against a settler minority), on the one hand, and their expressions in the form of political programmes based on notions of majority rule and democracy, on the other. The relations that *are* established are the result of specific historical configurations, different from one instance to another, which do not reflect a universal democratic (anti-colonial) emancipatory logic. What democracy means, how is the collective which can be identified as the "demos" constructed, in which ways political rights are defined and struggled for and when does a numerical majority become the moral ground of a political strategy - these are all questions that have no ready-made answers; they need to be studied in their specificities.

The quest for historical specificity, though, should not be construed as a denial that anti-colonial political struggles have much in common across boundaries of time and space. On the contrary, specificity becomes meaningful only to the extent that it implies a unique combination of characteristics that can be found elsewhere in different forms. Without the assertion of a certain underlying commonality, historical specificity would be nothing more than a random aggregation of events. To focus more sharply on the relations between the specific and the general in the context of political identity and conflict in South Africa, the issue is examined here from a comparative angle. The last section of the paper discusses the

formation of indigenous discourses of political rights in the context of a similar (but not identical) type of colonial conflict in Palestine/Israel during the same period.'

The Historical Background

The 19th century was the scene of extensive processes of military conquest and state formation in southern Africa. These processes culminated in the later part of the century with the defeat and political incorporation of hitherto independent African states and chiefdoms into white-dominated structures. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century the Union of South Africa came into being as a unified political-administrative unit with an increasing degree of centralisation of the legislative, executive and judicial systems.

Unification did not mean homogenisation, however. People of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds were incorporated in the new state in a differentiated manner. The various citizenship categories created as a result of Union opened new terrains for struggle over the extent and terms of political incorporation, giving rise to conflicts between as well as within various black and white groups, themselves internally divided. The emerging picture was not that of a black-white dichotomy but rather a complex set-up involving strategic and tactical alliances among different forces, frequently cutting across racial boundaries (though rarely on an egalitarian basis).

In close relation and parallel to developments in the sphere of state formation were identity formation processes. These led to a certain degree of cultural interpenetration between people of different backgrounds. New groups labelled as "de-tribalised natives" came into being in the urban areas, maintaining rather loose connections with ethnically and regionally specific African traditions. The newly urbanised population eventually became a constituency for cultural and political movements articulating conceptions of a comprehensive African identity. These emerging identities coexisted, however, with and (at least initially) were overshadowed by locally-based indigenous identities. The strength of the latter was particularly notable in regions such as Zululand and the Transkeian Territories whose inhabitants retained a vibrant pre-colonial consciousness. The consolidation of a nation-wide indigenous identity was clearly evident, but it did not displace specific ethnic and regional identities which persisted well into the second half of the 20th century.

Another tendency which began manifesting itself around the same time was the rise of indigenous intellectual elites, consisting largely of mission-educated teachers, journalists, lawyers and clergy, especially strong in the eastern Cape and Natal. They played a crucial role in articulating the desire of Christianised Africans to complete their integration into British-dominated ideological and political structures. Though a minority among Africans, these people made important contributions to the shaping of an African national identity with the founding of the first newspapers and political organisations fighting for equal political and citizenship rights for all.

The demographic background for these developments was the massive increase in the number of people of disparate regional, ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds brought together within the same political and territorial boundaries. The biggest source of this increase were Africans whose numbers grew by at least five times during the late 19th century as a result of being forcibly incorporated into the recently-unified political structures. In 1891 the Cape

Colony had 847,542 "Aboriginal Natives" (55% of the total population) compared to only about 100,000 in the 1865 census.² In Natal, excluding Zululand, Africans comprised about 85% of the total population.³ In the Orange Free State Africans were 62.5% of the total,⁴ and similar figures obtain for the Transvaal.⁵ Overall, then, the picture is that of a clear African majority. By the turn of the century the relative proportions of people of different origins began to stabilise. The differences in this respect between the census of 1904 and that of 1911 are not large. By the time of Union, Africans had become 67% of the South African population, whites 21% and coloured people and Indians 11%.⁶

Responses to Colonial Challenges

Pre-conquest African societies had engaged in relations of trade, warfare and political manoeuvring with white-controlled colonies for many decades, but they had not fallen directly under colonial domination until the latter half of the 19th century. Indigenous people living in the Highveld republics of the Free State and the Transvaal entered tributary relations with settler authorities but generally managed to retain a large degree of autonomy to run their own affairs even as they resided within nominal white-defined state boundaries. Settler political institutions did not possess sufficient administrative, legal and coercive capacities to dominate indigenous people in an effective manner until the beginning of the 20th century. It was only with the emergence of a nation-wide political apparatus following the establishment of Union in 1910 that the process of the legal transformation of indigenous people into subjects of the South African state could be completed.

The incorporation of indigenous people into the new political structures marked the beginning of a shift in the locus of their organisation. In earlier times indigenous struggles focused on military and political resistance to colonial conquest. These extended from the Frontier Wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries in the eastern Cape through the clashes between Orange Free State settlers and the Sotho kingdom in the middle of the 19th century to the confrontation between British forces and the Zulu kingdom in the late 1870s and the annexation of the Venda chiefdoms and Pondoland in the 1890s. Even after that, the 1906 Bambatha rebellion in Natal was conducted in a similar spirit of resistance to colonial expansion. Armed uprisings in some rural areas, drawing in part on analogous historical foundations, erupted in a sporadic manner as late as the 1960s.

Since the turn of the 20th century, however, struggles for political rights within the framework of white-dominated state structures, rather than the reversal of conquest or the creation of independent African state institutions, became an increasingly salient feature of the political organisation of indigenous people. This tendency had first made its appearance in the eastern Cape in the late 19th century and its significance grew with the unification of the country. It was a particularly notable development in light of the fact that the dominant trend in white politics until the 1980s was exactly the opposite - the persistent attempt to purge state institutions of any direct indigenous representation.

The rise of this trend of incorporation to political prominence was not an inevitable response to colonial challenges, nor did it mean the obliteration of other responses. In addition to the attempt to reverse conquest altogether, at least two other responses asserting indigenous political rights were possible, based on different claims: (1) a claim that all people should be incorporated on an equal basis, rather than be evaluated on the basis of "civilisational"

criteria. In this approach a numerical majority might be translated into access to power which, in turn, might entail changes in the way institutions operate but without affecting the nature of the state itself; (2) a more radical claim that the majority status of the indigenous population entitles them to re-shape the state in their own image, rather than be absorbed into the system on terms defined by the white minority. In this latter response, the state should acquire an indigenous character in terms of its structures, modes of operation, criteria for citizenship, language, etc.

It is the argument of this paper that in the period discussed here indigenous assertions of political rights in the public sphere moved from a focus on limited incorporation to a focus on full incorporation (the latter corresponding to the current understanding of non-racial democracy). In this process, the sweeping rejection of colonial presence became increasingly marginalised, and attempts to define the new state in indigenous terms never took off the ground. The reasons for these developments will become clearer later on by comparing them to Palestinian-Arab responses to the challenge of the Zionist settlement project. In this latter case, indigenous responses centred on a complete rejection of the project and a struggle to define the state in terms drawn from indigenous sources. Full political rights to all were understood in the framework of a state with a pronounced indigenous Palestinian-Arab character (corresponding to an ethnically-defined form of democracy).

The comparative angle is not proposed here as a full-fledged study in itself. Rather, it is meant as a way of helping us focus on the specific features of the South African case. In what follows, a broad overview of major changes in public conceptualisations of identity, political rights and democracy in early 20th century South Africa is offered. This is followed by a brief presentation of the Palestinian-Arab case and the conclusions that can be drawn from the historical comparison.

Cape African Political Organisation

The African political organisations which came into being in the late 19th century put an emphasis on work within the existing colonial system, on terms set by the elitist though colour-blind Cape Liberal tradition. These organisations were active in particular in regions which were subjected earlier and more thoroughly to British political and cultural domination - the eastern Cape and Natal. Protest politics in the eastern Cape became a model for other parts of the country due to the privileged political status of Africans there. In other regions expressions of grievances were generally less organised as a result of the lack of direct access to the political system. Starting from cultural-educational concerns, public activities acquired a clearer focus on the political arena at the turn of the century, as expressed in the efforts of ministers, teachers and journalists to voice the grievances of their African constituencies over issues such as the Pass laws, franchise qualifications and state discriminatory practices.

Two Xhosa-language newspapers, *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Native Opinion) founded in 1884, and *Izwi Labantu* (Voice of the People) founded in 1898, served to express African complaints and to organise meetings and delegations to protest the restrictions imposed on Africans.⁷ These activities were conducted to a large extent within the framework of white party politics, rather than as a part of an independent African project. A crucial change in this respect took place in 1902 when a group associated with the *Izwi Labantu* newspaper founded a new organisation, the South African Native Congress, which became the nucleus of the most

prominent 20th century African political organisations.⁸

In a statement to the British Colonial Office in 1903, the Native Congress expressed its loyalty to the Empire and appealed against the danger of disenfranchisement faced by indigenous people as a result of demands by settler leaders in Natal, the Free State and the Transvaal. The Congress was concerned to extend to other regions the limited colour-blind franchise already enjoyed in the Cape, and allow all those "fully qualified by education, property and domicile, to vote as free citizens".⁹ It expressed fear that the rights of indigenous people would be sacrificed to the imperative of "uniting Briton and Boer so as to present what is called a 'solid front' to an alleged 'black menace'"¹⁰, and it appealed to Britain to keep its Imperial obligations and protect "His Majesty's black and coloured subjects".¹¹

The statement reveals an interesting ambiguity in the manner the Congress envisioned its constituency. It was speaking for the rights of all "Natives" and the protection of their liberties, but at the same time it rejected the notion of indigenous unity against white rule as unrealistic and contrary to "traditional tribal disunity".¹² Furthermore, it made specific references to "intelligent Natives" who were willing to provide assistance to the Crown in maintaining law and order among the ignorant "mass of the people".¹³ The organisation of indigenous people, then, was not primarily seen as a vehicle for national liberation but rather as a means of gradual integration into the colonial state as imperial subjects, as "natives" became better educated and more "intelligent".

Under conditions of unchallenged colonial domination, the desire of indigenous elites to present themselves as representative of a large number of people, and thus enhance their position vis-a-vis outside authorities, seems to have clashed with their need to distinguish themselves as educated and civilised, and thus different from their raw and primitive fellows. If indigenous people had been all granted the same political rights, the more "civilised" among them would have lost their relative privileges. Of course, indigenous professions of submission to authority and acknowledgment of inferiority (as a group) should not be taken at face value. The Congress and other political forces operating in the context of colonial rule employed the weapons of the weak to bolster their case in the eyes of the powers that be. They may have calculated that a gradual approach, although falling short of political equality, was more likely to yield concessions than an all-out assault on the foundations of the system. Even if that indeed was the case, the use of an incorporationist political language to articulate rights had a significant effect on the overall terms in which struggles for indigenous demands were defined; not for independence or equality on their own terms, but rather for integration into pre-existing structures.

Religious Separatism and the Ethiopian Movement

A different focus for conceptualisations of rights was provided by religion. The rise of indigenous Ethiopian churches towards the end of the 19th century, coinciding with the conclusion of the period of direct colonial conquest, reflected a growing interest in African administrative and doctrinal religious independence from white control (or perhaps all external control, including that of the black American AME Church).¹⁴ The move signified a reaction to incorporation into colonial structures, and it was motivated by a desire to "go and teach our own people by ourselves".¹⁵ On the other hand, Ethiopianism was articulated in the language of Christianity, historically a European-centred religion which made its way into

southern Africa as part of the colonial enterprise.

The dual nature of religious symbolism and practice, plausibly playing a role both in the colonisation of consciousness and the emancipation from colonial subjugation, has become characteristic of indigenous South African religious movements throughout the 20th century.¹⁶ The drive towards separatist religious organisation powerfully asserted the need for independence from colonial rule, though it was different from the adherence to indigenous religions, still widespread in the countryside. The Ethiopian and Zionist Christian churches generally were open to all indigenous Africans, regardless of their ethnic and tribal origins. In that sense they consciously sought to transcend pre-colonial divisions and decisively act on the terrain created by colonial expansion and conquest.

The Ethiopian movement had a considerable political potential. It posed an alternative model to white supremacy, on the one hand, and to political incorporation into white-dominated structures, on the other. The idea that church organisation could be controlled by indigenous leaders made white authorities nervous. It was perceived as an anomaly, given the close identification between Christianity, colonial conquest and the subjugation of indigenous people. Consequently, the 1905 South African Native Affairs Commission castigated the idea as premature and irresponsible, and was anxious to discourage "those bodies which owe their existence to the discontent, or...to the very misconduct of men who...have severed connection with their parent [white] church, and own no competent central authority".¹⁷ Only churches which retained some form of allegiance to white authority were deemed by the Commission as acceptable.

The South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC)

The condemnation of religious separatism by the Commission was part of an overall evaluation of the question of indigenous organisation by the state. The first decade of the 20th century was a period in which political identities and institutions were re-shaped in light of the new realities created by the extension of British rule over the entire country. All forces began organising on the new political and administrative terrains. The South African polity consequently embarked on an investigative research effort which was informed by "the advisability of harmonising so far as practicable the direction of Native affairs in the various states of South Africa".¹⁸

Indigenous people, the object of state attention, were officially referred to in all-encompassing terms as "Natives", a term denoting "an aboriginal inhabitant of Africa, South of the Equator", including "half-castes and their descendants by Natives".¹⁹ The crucial defining feature of "natives" in official eyes was not their ancestry, colour, residence or social class as such, but rather their presumed historical links to the pre-colonial past in terms of claims to land, ethno-linguistic identifications and allegiance to traditional political institutions, whether these were held by the people in question or were long discarded by them (or their ancestors). The state maintained that indigenous people were all alike for purposes of administration and control, though it occasionally made allowance for the differences between educated elites and the traditional masses. In practice this distinction did no mean much as the former were few in number.

This approach was combined with SANAC's recommendations for a limited political

incorporation of indigenous people in order to allow them to express their views and ventilate their grievances. This was to be done "without conferring on them political power in any aggressive sense, or weakening in any way the unchallenged supremacy and authority of the ruling race which is responsible for the country and bear the burden of its government".²¹ Indigenous participation was to be based on separate voters' roll, selecting a small number of delegates regardless of the size of the constituency. That way, it was hoped, indigenous issues would be removed from the white party-political arena. Even this clearly restricted attempt to provide an institutional channel for expressions of discontent went too far to the liking of segregationists and the recommendation was abandoned.

The Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa came into effect in 1910. It retained the existing franchise requirements in the four provinces, denying thus the vote to non-white people in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal. Only in the Cape were coloured people and indigenous Africans allowed to vote, subject to high property and literacy qualifications, though they were denied the right to be elected to parliament. Only a "British subject of European descent" could become a member of parliament, whether the Senate or the House of Assembly²², contradicting the principle formally adhered to by the British of equal rights for all "civilised" persons in southern Africa.²³

The common predicament in which various black groups found themselves facing the prospects of Union encouraged joint action to address the situation. In 1909 a joint delegation of "representatives of the coloured and native British subjects" in South Africa, in coordination with Natal Indians, appealed to the British parliament to grant "equal political rights to qualified men irrespective of race, colour, or creed". They expressed fear that "the prejudice already existing in the Transvaal, Orange river Colony, and Natal, will be accentuated and increased" and extended to the Cape as well.²⁴ The intervention of a prominent white politician, W.P. Schreiner, a former Cape prime minister, on their behalf did not prevent the delegation from failing to reverse the "Act of Separation" (thus referring to the Act of Union), and the Act went into effect in 1910.²⁵

Faced with indigenous inability to make much progress by using the services of sympathetic white liberals, a meeting of African political organisations was called for in order to create a counterweight to the white political Union. In January 1912 the South African Native National Congress (to be renamed the African National Congress - ANC - in 1925) convened in Bloemfontein with delegates from all four provinces and the British Protectorates, representing chiefs as well as activists. In the call for the Congress, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, its future president, argued that the lack of indigenous unity was the greatest obstacle to progress. To be able to speak for the concerns of indigenous people there was need for cooperation. This meant putting an end to "the demon of racialism, the aberrations of the Xosa-Fingo feud, the animosity that exists between the Zulus and the Tongaas, between the Basutos and every other Native".²⁶ As all Africans were "one people", the Congress was to be "a National Society or Union for all the Natives of South Africa".²⁷

The draft constitution of the Congress set as its goals "the promotion of unity and mutual cooperation between the Government and the Abantu Races of South Africa", and "the maintenance of a central channel between the Government and the aboriginal races in South

Africa". It additionally defined its constituency as "native people", "black" and "native inhabitants".²⁷ All these terms denoted indigenous Africans to the exclusion of coloured people, thus basing the organisation on racial divisions which set Africans apart from other black people. The Congress saw its role as representing indigenous people in relation to government, implicitly acknowledging that the government itself is inherently a white institution to which Africans had no claim. Its focus was on unity among Africans and it regarded fragmentation on the basis of clan and tribe as a serious danger. To avert sectional affiliations from becoming divisive, an Upper House or a "Council of Chiefs" was proposed. This was a body in which chiefs deemed representative of the people in their areas of control were to sit in an advisory capacity, alongside the presidency and other committees which controlled the day-to-day activities of the Congress.²⁸

Tribalism as a Contested Terrain

The continued importance of traditional leadership created a terrain on which the state, political organisations and community members in the Native Reserves vied with each other over the backing of chiefs. The state sought ways to incorporate chiefs into the machinery of control so as to strengthen its political domination over indigenous people by employing (traditionally) legitimate means of rule. This was attempted in the Native Administration Act of 1927 which was meant to harmonise and streamline the entire administrative machinery at all levels. The Act was modelled on the practice, first established in Natal in the late 19th century, of investing the Governor with the position of a Supreme Chief who "exercises in and over all Natives...all political power and authority", including the power to appoint chiefs, amalgamate or divide tribes and otherwise invent and temper with traditional forms of rule.²⁹ The Natal model was later extended to the entire country (except for the Cape) in the South Africa Act of 1909, making the Governor General the Supreme Chief of all indigenous people in Natal, Transvaal and the Free State.³⁰

The 1927 Act established an administrative hierarchy from the Supreme Chief through Chief Native Commissioners, regional, district and local Commissioners, Location Superintendents, Chiefs and Headmen.³¹ All of the above, except for the latter two categories, were white. The entire machinery was governed through legislation by proclamation, a system which acted to remove "to a great degree questions of Native administration from the arena of [white-parliamentary] party politics".³² The Governor-General, and through him the lower levels in the hierarchy, were given the power to control all political activity in indigenous areas and to take all steps they "consider necessary for the protection, control, improvement, and welfare of the Natives, and in furtherance of peace, order and good government".³³

In this mode of rule, indigenous people living in the reserves were subject to a specialised administrative apparatus and were excluded from having any direct say in the legislation affecting them or in the operation of state departments. This was part of the segregationist program applied by successive South African governments during the period. There was more to segregation and tribalism than white (indirect) control, however. These policies also satisfied indigenous forces who wanted to preserve customary law and traditional forms of rule by chiefs, with minimal outside interference. This implied a very different conceptualisation of indigenous political rights than that pursued by Congress and other incorporationist forces. Although chiefs were subsidised by the state, and therefore were not completely independent, at a deeper level tribal sentiments signified a rejection of white

colonial rule rather than an attempt to find a place within it.³⁴

Traditional rule held a resistance potential inasmuch as it was based on a claim to the land and a consequent opposition to dispossession. The persistent political significance of the land question led to a series of peasant revolts which, due to their fragmented, small-scale and disorganised nature, were generally short-lived and ended in failure. Although the concern with land was general throughout the South African countryside, its manifestations were always localised as claims to the land were invariably linked to specific territories, rather than to indigenous rights in the abstract. As a result, rural causes were infrequently taken up by urban-based political organisations and their potential was largely untapped, at least until the late 1950s.³⁵

Traditional rule was most legitimate in those areas which were conquered in more recent times and which maintained large and dense concentrations of indigenous communities, with only few pockets of white settlement. This applied to the Transkei and Zululand in particular. In these territories chiefly rule was less disrupted by settler encroachments on land, and could therefore provide more solid foundation for an accommodation on relatively equal footing between the state, represented by the Department of Native Affairs, and chiefs. The ability of chiefs to manoeuvre between their dependence on the state and their power over their constituencies varied in time and space, but generally allowed them to play a dual role: agents of external domination as well as representatives of the population. Even as chiefs assumed positions within the state administrative apparatus, they continued to conduct court cases, collect tribute from followers and be guardians of the communal tenure of land. They thus maintained many attributes of autonomous rule which provided a symbolic basis for separatist politics.³⁶

Resistance and Identity in the Countryside

Localised resistance politics in the countryside persisted alongside the operation of national political movements such as the ANC during the period. People in rural areas, especially those maintaining less regular contacts with the cultural and political centres of the country, frequently adhered to tribal, ethnic and regional identities, leaderships and organisations with a pronounced pre-colonial bent. These were perceived as a means of confronting threats to indigenous moral economy, centred as it was on access to communal land. The increasing loss of land and the growing compulsion to enter colonial and settler-dominated labour markets were a danger not only to material welfare of people but to their entire socio-cultural fabric. Much of indigenous resistance was phrased in terms of clinging to pre-colonial identities and forms of rule³⁷, but it is important to realise that it actually emerged in response to colonial conquest and socio-economic incorporation. Traditional symbols were frequently joined with new identities and modes of organisation to provide legitimisation for defiance politics. Christianity in its Ethiopian manifestations provided one such basis for independent action.³⁸ The Israelite movement of the eastern Cape, although not explicitly political, expressed strong rejectionist sentiments, opposing white domination and state authority in a mixture of indigenous and Christian prophetic symbolism.³⁹ The refusal of its members to pay taxes and obey orders to move from their camping grounds, relying on a divine order to challenge authority, culminated with the Bulhoek massacre of 1921 in which about 200 unarmed believers were killed by government troops.⁴⁰

Traditional and Christian religious images combined with modern trade unionism and Pan-Africanism in the shape of the Industrial and Commercial Union - ICU - in the 1920s, a union which accepted white members but prohibited them from holding any office.⁴³ This was especially the case in regions in which the legacies of the pre-colonial past were particularly vivid. The battle cry of *Ama Melika ayeza* (the Americans are coming) became a popular idea in the Transkei, a territory with the densest concentration of indigenous people in South Africa. It conveyed a vision of a technologically-sophisticated mighty black race from overseas who were to come from the sky in their aircraft fleet, destroy white domination and liberate Africans from their oppression. This was one of a series of apocalyptic revelations articulated by the movement associated with the Garveyite leader Wellington Buthelezi and local diviners, all promising some climactic action annihilating all but the devout, identified in some versions by their ICU membership cards.⁴⁴

The clear rejection of white presence and the symbolic return to the idyllic and supposedly unviolated pre-colonial past was deployed in more realistic campaigns as well, focusing attention on socio-political power and on issues of wages, prices, labour conditions, taxation and land ownership.⁴⁵ Visions of the past and the future were articulated with present concerns to mobilise people. The centrality of land in indigenous consciousness and the power of historical memories of independent rule predisposed rural political struggles to be phrased in rejectionist terms. This implied opposition to the entire notion of incorporation, rather than its acceptance as inevitable and a struggle for equal rights within the new political frameworks. The diminishing viability of subsistence production in the reserves gradually undermined, however, the prospects of locally-based separatist resistance and directed renewed attention on the national level where incorporationist tendencies became ever more powerful since the 1920s.

Rural-Urban Identities and Contradictions

There was an inherent tension between the centralised dynamics of national politics and the fragmentary dynamics of localised struggles. The embeddedness of rural resistance in local and regional practices proved to be its strongest asset, but it also almost invariably led to its demise. To succeed in effecting a meaningful change of social relations in a centralised political system, South African rural movements needed to transcend their confinement to their original boundaries and make an intervention at the national level. To do that effectively proved extremely difficult when the mobilising power of such movements was premised on localised identities. This contradiction turned out to be a major stumbling block for indigenous political activity, aggravated by the consciously trans-ethnic and trans-tribal stance of the major urban-based movements. The desire to build comprehensive African organisations led to the choice of English rather than any of the vernacular languages as the main medium of indigenous political life, thus creating a gap between urban and rural constituencies which was not easy to bridge over.

A rare combination of rural and urban appeals was evident in the operation of the Universal Negro Improvement Association - UNIA - the pan-African movement led by Marcus Garvey.⁴⁶ Like the ICU and some of the independent Ethiopian churches, the support for the Garvey movement was based in part on its ability to project power and promise deliverance through association with larger forces. The call "Africa for the Africans" had an enormous unifying potential as it resonated with the universal concerns of all segments

of the indigenous population. Despite widespread popular support, the movement did not survive. Its millenarian tendencies and dependence on the glorified but problematic figure of Garvey led it to neglect its organisational capacity. The expectations it generated for spectacular change could not have been fulfilled and a resulting frustration was inevitable. More importantly, the relations between pan-African racial identity and more circumscribed identities were never thought out. The adherence to a global identity did not make more other bases for identity disappear. Without elaborating how different levels of identity could be articulated, pan-Africanism remained an empty shell with much emotional appeal but little political impact.

Struggles conducted in the rural areas continued to affect a large number of people, but they generally remained hidden from public and scholarly views which paid more attention to the development of urban-based movements.⁴⁵ The latter advanced notions of a comprehensive trans-ethnic African identity which continued to face competition from localised identities. Even long-term urban African migrants (but not the permanently urbanised population) frequently maintained a base in the countryside in which they invested their savings and to which they eventually went back, or at least planned to return as permanent home. The organisation of work in the gold mines and residential patterns in the mining compounds and the townships on an ethnic basis were factors in the inhibition of the development of broad national identities.⁴⁶

The tensions between centralised and local identities affected national political organisations as well. The African National Congress was plagued by ethnic divisions, a problem decried by many of its leaders such as Sol Plaatje who complained in 1931 that the "failure of our race to unite is due to the failure of its leaders to unite. The demon of tribalism is the great stumbling block to our unity".⁴⁷ The impact of ethnicity was not necessarily obstructive of nationalism. Ethnicity provided building blocks for the construction of a comprehensive African identity, promoting pride in African history within the context of a regeneration of tradition on new foundations.⁴⁸ Pixley Seme, president of the ANC, thus appealed for African national unity by his invocation of the images of Shaka Zulu, King Sobhuza of Swaziland and the Xhosa prophet Ntsikane, all ethnically-specific symbols.⁴⁹ Only when ethnicity was constructed as a direct alternative to nationalism (as was the case with apartheid homeland policies later on), did a clash between the two become inevitable.

Segregation and Incorporation at the National Level

As the social bases for exclusionary resistance politics in the countryside gradually eroded during the 1920s, there was a rapid increase in the urban African population which proved to be a constituency for incorporationist identity and state politics. To counter that, the state devised an elaborate segregationist legal and administrative apparatus to contain indigenous people within state structures (and thereby effect their incorporation) on a separate basis. White liberals, a noticeable but small minority operating in the framework of parliamentary politics, advocated an opposite course of gradual political incorporation. They could find common ground with prominent elements among the African urban-based political organisations. Both groups of people conceptualised indigenous identity as distinct, yet part of a comprehensive South African collective. In their eyes, membership in the national collective entitled Africans to political participation, the precise terms of which were subject to debate.

From the perspective of the white government, "Natives" were different from other South Africans in that their history and culture made them unable to participate in "civilised" political life. No distinctions between ethnic and regional segments among indigenous people were made in this respect, and the machinery of control was applied to all of them. Segregationist policies aimed at extending the racially-exclusive franchise throughout the Union by abolishing the special status of Africans in the Cape Province. In 1926 the Hertzog government put forward several Bills seeking to abolish the non-racial vote in the Cape and in its place give Africans all over the country the right to elect separately white representatives to the House of Assembly. In addition, Africans would be entitled to a Union Native Council (partly elected, partly nominated) to regulate their own affairs. Subsequent years saw intense debates over these Bills until they were adopted in 1936 in a version which had Africans indirectly (through chiefs, local councils, and Native Advisory Boards) elect four white senators to the Upper House of parliament and twelve African members to the new body of the Native Representative Council.³⁰

The campaign against the abolition of the African Cape franchise brought together people of different political backgrounds in the All African Convention - AAC - of December 1935.³¹ The AAC condemned the Native Bills and campaigned against segregation in political representation. It argued that this policy led to the consolidation of divisions and the creation of "two nations in South Africa, whose interests and aspirations must inevitably clash in the end and thus cause unnecessary bitterness and political strife".³² The Convention rejected the denial of common citizenship to Africans and asserted their right to participate in governing their own country, without being subject to the tutelage of their fellow white citizens.

The AAC called for full political rights to all and specifically rejected the notion that African interests were to be realised in the reserves. The policies of segregation and tribalism were "diametrically opposed to the facts of the South African situation", since "where the interests of the racial groups are inextricably interwoven, the attempt to deal with them separately is bound to defeat its own objects". The way forward was to adopt a policy of political identity which will ensure "the ultimate creation of a South African nation in which, while the various racial groups may develop on their own lines, socially and culturally, they will be bound together by the pursuit of common political objectives".³³ The more deferential tones which characterised early African appeals to the benevolence of the government and the Crown did not disappear from the resolutions of the Convention, but were considerably weakened. Political incorporation on equal terms, but not social assimilation, became the major demand of the movement, thus finding common ground with some white liberal conceptualisations of the situation.³⁴

The determination of Africans to oppose segregation did not amount to a strong enough political challenge. An unprecedented white front, with minor dissensions, united to pass the Bills in parliament. The white supremacist National Party supported the removal of Africans from the common voters' roll, though its leader claimed that the continuing ability of Cape Africans to elect members of parliament on a separate basis contradicted the principle the Bill meant to uphold: "The natives in the country will make use of the representation that they have to obtain more and better representation in our European legislative body. Out of that will come an agitation... for an extension of a representation of natives, and a conflict between Europeans and non-Europeans in the country, such as has not existed up to the present".³⁵

Even a would-be liberal as General Smuts, then minister of Justice, supported the Bill as an extension of the successful system of native representation in the Bunga - the Transkeian General Council.⁵⁶ Only a few liberals such as J.H. Hofmeyer, Minister of the Interior, opposed the Bill (but not segregation in principle) because its central feature was "to give to the natives an inferior, a qualified citizenship...which bears the added stigma that whatever may be the advance of the native in civilisation and education, to all intents and purposes he is limited for all time to three members in a House of 153".⁵⁷ In a revealing passage, Hofmeyer ascribed the Bill to the fear of all whites of "being drowned in a black ocean" and being subject to "race mixture and miscegenation".⁵⁸

The power of white racial fear was indeed behind the Bill. To counter it Africans needed to mobilise their own sense of racial identity (as indigenous people or as all non-Europeans). A major failing of the AAC, despite its broad representative character, was that it did not lead to mass campaigns involving the majority of Africans who did not have much to gain from retaining a system of suffrage from which they were excluded anyway. To facilitate concerted action, the AAC adopted in December 1937 a Constitution with a view to the formation of a unified organisation, asserting that "the African races of South Africa as a national entity and unit should henceforth speak with one voice, meet and act in all matters of national concern...a Central Organisation shall be formed with which all African religious, educational, industrial, economic, political, commercial and social organisations shall be affiliated".⁵⁹

Despite the commitment of the AAC to a policy of political unity and mobilisation it did not develop as a mass organisation. The political energies of most African activists were directed at the new terrain created by the formation of the Native Representative Council - NRC. ANC leaders decided to contest the elections to the NRC and therefore ceased working with the Convention.⁶⁰ The first elections based on the new system of representation took place in 1937. Although an advisory body and not a legislative one, The NRC was taken seriously by Africans as perhaps a future house of parliament. These were the only elections at the national level in which Africans participated, though only adult male tax payers could vote. The electorate voted for several seats on the NRC and for the four white senators representing Africans in the Cape, Natal, Transkei and Transvaal together with the Orange Free State.⁶¹

Voting to the Council was indirect. Voting units consisted of chiefs, headmen, local councils, native advisory boards, or boards of management, each voting as a unit on behalf of the people under their jurisdiction. The voting strength of each unit was equal to the number of taxpayers it represented. The striking aspect of the operation of the Council, given these procedures, was that it involved directly and indirectly an unprecedented number of indigenous people in political campaigns. By 1946 the NRC had effectively ceased to function as a result of the frustration of its members with their inability to affect state policy in any way. As Professor Z.K. Matthews, relying on African public opinion, explained, "this experiment in political segregation has been given a fair trial by the African people during the last decade...the time has come for them to recognise that the experiment had failed and to embark upon a boycott of the scheme".⁶²

The Rise of African Nationalism

The suspension of the Native Representative Council marked an important transition in

African political organisation. It paved the way for the growth of a mass-based African consciousness and weakened, though by no means eliminated, the bases for local and regional politics based on particular identities and loyalties to traditional leadership. The various urban-based African political organisations differed in their ideologies, social bases and strategies, but shared an appeal to all Africans, regardless of ethnic affiliations. A new incorporationist strategy was thus gaining ground among Africans. It expressed a quest for incorporation of all South Africans on an equal basis, and was sustained by the powerful assertion of African identity.

The distinctive feature of African nationalist policies of the 1940s was not the call for equal rights as such, but the new assertiveness that underwrote it. The new era of international relations and the anti-Nazi campaign exposed the anomaly of the South African state which practised racial discrimination at home while fighting for democracy abroad. In *Africans' Claims in South Africa*, a document adopted by the ANC 1943 convention⁵³, the Congress proclaimed that "the African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights such as are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa". It further demanded "the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote and be elected to parliament, provincial councils and other representative institutions"⁵⁴, and the abolition of the entire legal apparatus of racial discrimination and control. The substance, comprehensiveness and tone of these demands were unprecedented.

The following year saw a step towards the adoption of Africanist principles as the foundation for indigenous organisation in South Africa. The ANC Youth League issued a manifesto in which for the first time the goals of struggle were explicitly defined as those of national liberation and self determination.⁵⁵ In elaborating on the meaning of African national identity, Anton Lembede, a prominent member of the Youth League, invoked the historical memory of "the glorious achievements of our great heroes of the past, e.g. Shaka, Moshoeshe, Hintsa, Sikhukhumi, Khama, Sobuza, and Mosilikazi".⁵⁶ It is significant that all these people worked and identified themselves in their times with specific groups rather than with the general African collective. Furthermore, some of them showed greater readiness to wage military campaigns against other Africans than against colonial forces. At the same time as they were appropriated by Africanists as heroes, they were also claimed by specific ethnic movements in and outside of South Africa. The relations with the African heritage were thus much more complex than was acknowledged by African nationalists.

Echoing themes first raised by Marcus Garvey, the Youth League defined Africa as the "Blackman's Continent".⁵⁷ It saw a place in the country for other groups but denied them any leadership role in the struggle for national liberation. As South Africa was "a country of four chief nationalities...three of which (the Africans, Coloureds and Indians) suffer national oppression"⁵⁸, cooperation between those excluded by white domination was called for, though organised on separate bases. Nationalism superseded tribal identities, even while drawing on the historical legacies of struggles waged in the name of pre-national concerns. With the emergence of nationalism, tribalism became "the mortal foe of African Nationalism", the latter of which was calling for a "relentless war on Centrifugal tribalism".⁵⁹

The Africanist transformation of the ANC, driven by the Youth League, was completed by the adoption of a new program in 1949 in which "National Freedom" was declared the

foremost goal of the Congress.⁷⁰ The rejection of white domination, and the radicalisation of the ANC, did not stand in contradiction to incorporation. On the contrary, they asserted the right to full participation on a basis of equality in all state structures. Dr. Xuma, president of the ANC, called on the eve of the 1948 elections on Indians, coloured people and Africans to "organise their respective communities", not to fight whites but to fight "the policy of discrimination and differentiation" in order to attain "common citizenship for all races".⁷¹ The 1949 program of action which signified the triumph of Africanism (and of democratic principles as commonly understood) called for "direct representation in all the governing bodies of the country" and "the abolition of all differential institutions or bodies specially created for Africans".⁷² This policy has remained the fundamental goal of most African political organisations to this day.

Reviewing the Major Trends of the Period

The first half of the 20th century was the scene of struggle over the terms of political incorporation between conflicting parties. The state adopted segregation as its goal and moved towards the disenfranchisement of coloured people and Africans as people with the right to representation as individuals. It sought instead to create intermediary structures which were supposed to represent people as members of collectives rather than as individual citizens. Tribal authorities and the Native Representative Council were attempts to give black elites a share of control, on a segregated basis, in return for a share in the responsibility for maintaining law and order. These arrangements did not amount to true political separation since "no segregationist is prepared to surrender ultimate control, whatever limited measures of political self-government he might be willing to concede to the Bantu".⁷³

The focus of African political organisation shifted over the period. Initially it revolved around attempts to gain limited and indirect access to white-dominated structures, alongside the retention of political autonomy building on pre-colonial foundations in the Native reserves. Since the 1930s political struggle was increasingly focused on direct incorporation on equal terms and the abolition of specialised institutions and legislation which set Africans apart and prevented them from exercising rights to citizenship. These goals were combined towards the end of the period with a growing dose of African nationalism. It should be noted, however, that the Africanist rhetoric did not amount to a claim that indigenous people (or blacks in general) should have privileged citizenship rights or access to power. The underlying political thrust was that of a democratic programme in which no distinctions between citizenship categories were to be made on the basis of race, culture or origins. In this sense, it is difficult to regard it as a full-fledged nationalist programme.

Indigenous political trends fighting for incorporation on equal terms in state institutions had the rapidly growing African population of the cities as their social base. In slums and townships a new culture developed, reflecting the needs and aspirations of the African urban masses. These people were becoming free from the hold of traditional authority structures. Naturally enough, they had great affinity with movements which addressed their concerns as permanently urbanised people, seeking a say in determining their life chances in their new places of residence. The move to the cities did not mean a complete separation from the rural areas and the identities and modes of organisation that characterised them. It did represent an important shift, however, the implications of which were becoming more pronounced with the growing significance of the permanently urbanised African population.

Although the emerging urban African culture did not acquire an unambiguous political character, it contributed to the formation of a nationally-based African identity and political orientation. The increased centrality of the cities in the rapidly urbanising South African society allowed the African population there to dominate the scene of national politics, despite their numerical minority status. They did not abandon their ethnic roots and frequently maintained family and other links with the rural areas. The living circumstances shared by people of various ethnic backgrounds, and their common exposure to the unifying force of the state, predisposed them to act in unison to assert their rights. With little or no basis (and consequent claims to land and power) in the countryside, they had to operate on the urban terrain, knowing full well that this was where their destinies were to be determined.

The adoption of democratic principles associated with notions of majority rule was not an inevitable outcome of the processes of identity and state formation in South Africa. It was only in the 1940s that the numerical majority of indigenous people started to form the basis of a new political strategy in which all citizens were to be incorporated on an equal basis. The growth of indigenous national consciousness was a prerequisite for that development. The continued viability of pre-colonial identities and modes of organisation militated against the transformation of demographic realities into bases for political mobilisation. To organise on pre-colonial foundations meant to give up the new national-political terrain of the South African state. To tackle the state effectively, or even to gain access to it, a national indigenous identity, and a political organisation founded on it, needed to be formed. It was only when the mass base possessed by traditional authority structures could be combined with the national focus of new indigenous political forces that the struggle for democracy and liberation could have taken off.

The relations between indigenous capacities to organise struggles for national liberation and the extent to which pre-colonial foundations could form a basis for political action are explored in the next section. The discussion will centre on a comparison of responses to colonial challenges offered by Palestinian-Arabs and black South Africans, two indigenous groups which in the period concerned stood in similar demographic relations to settler populations.

The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Framework

The framework for political developments in the period opened by the takeover of the country by the British during the First World War was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. The declaration, issued by the British Foreign Office, proclaimed British support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", without prejudicing the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".²⁴ It was based on two crucial assumptions. First, it recognised the right of "the Jewish people" to the territory. It was thus based on the abstract and general rights of the extra-territorial Jewish people, rather than the concrete rights of a specific territorially-based Palestinian Jewish community. Secondly, the statement did not recognise the existence of an Arab, or a Palestinian-Arab, *national* community in the country. Rather, it referred to a plurality of non-Jewish communities, defined by religion, who resided in the territory but had no identifiable legal and historical relation to it.

The legal framework established by the Balfour Declaration, later ratified by the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine in 1922, was crucially important in that it created the terrain on which the Jewish-Zionist and the Palestinian-Arab national movements conducted their conflicts and formed their institutions with a view to gaining eventual control over the country. The creation of a British administration, even if only for the express and limited purpose of preparing the country for independence, allowed a degree of mediation between the conflicting parties, neither one of which enjoyed political dominance.

Indigenous Palestinians began organising on an Arab nationalist basis in the form of the General Syrian Congress in 1919 which expressed its opposition to Zionist demands that "Palestine be made a National Home for the Jews, and that Jews be allowed to immigrate to any part of our country, as they have not the least claim thereto". The Congress went on to distinguish Zionism from Judaism by asserting that "our brethren the Jews, who originally inhabited the country, shall have the same rights and be subject to the same obligations as ourselves".⁷⁵

In Palestine itself, the Muslim-Christian Associations which were established in various cities in 1918 protested the implications of the Balfour Declaration and called on the British to take indigenous rights into consideration and refrain from determining the future of the country without the consent of the Arab population.⁷⁶ They regarded the country as Arab in terms of its inhabitants, land ownership and the language commonly spoken by the people.⁷⁷ In a petition on November 1918, the Associations identified themselves as "Arabs, Muslims and Christians" and claimed Palestine as "the Holy Land of our Fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors", a country "which had been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages who loved it and died in defending it". At the same time that they rejected the idea of a Jewish national home in the country, the petitioners asserted their desire "to live with our brothers the Jews of Palestine in peace and happiness and with equal rights".⁷⁸ In these statements, the acknowledgement of the rights of Jews as minority individuals within the larger Arab national-political framework, was coupled with the rejection of a separate Jewish political identity.

The Zionist Organisation, speaking in the name of a minority in the country seeking to establish their position, adopted a language which emphasised the supposed benefits to Arabs from increased Jewish presence. It declared that "the two brother nations, Jews and Arabs, working together in peace and harmony, are destined to bring about the cultural and economic revival of the awakening peoples of the Near and Middle East".⁷⁹ As local Zionist officials made clear, however, such cooperation was possible only within the framework of Jewish demographic and political predominance. They saw no room for an Arab national home existing alongside the Jewish national home. Their argument was that only after a large number of Jews had entered the country and built up its civilisation and culture could the population be deemed fit by experience and political judgement to rule themselves by a representative government.⁸⁰

The British largely adopted this logic. The rationale for their policies was articulated by Balfour who argued in an internal Foreign Office memorandum that there was no symmetry between Jewish and Arab rights as "Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land".⁸¹ Herbert

Samuel, British High Commissioner for Palestine, made similar points. In a report submitted in 1921 he counterposed "the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish race throughout the world in relation to Palestine" with "a full protection of the rights of the existing population". Fourteen million Jews have a right to ask "that this home [Palestine] should possess national characteristics in language and customs, in intellectual interests, in religious and political institutions", though the degree to which these aspirations could be fulfilled "is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants".⁶²

This definition of the situation, echoing Zionist arguments, was the crucial element in dispute and the source of the problem as far as Palestinians were concerned. The Zionist movement, the British government and the League of Nations, all operated in the framework of the western discourse of the "Jewish Question" as an international issue of prime importance as far as the question of Palestine was concerned. Palestinian-Arabs, in contrast, regarded the rights and privileges of the local inhabitants of the specific territory of Palestine/Israel as the focus of consideration. From their perspective there were no fourteen million Jews (overshadowing the 700,000 Arabs in the territory) with national rights to the country, but at most the 100,000 who actually resided there at the time.

The point Arab representatives contested most fundamentally was the introduction of a totally foreign element, in their view, into the picture. They regarded Zionism as an external element with which no reconciliation was possible "because the immigrants dumped upon the country from different parts of the world are ignorant of the language, customs, and character of the Arabs, and enter Palestine by the might of England against the will of the people...Nature does not allow the creation of a spirit of cooperation between two peoples so different, and it is not to be expected that the Arabs would bow to such a great injustice".⁶³

The circumstances in which indigenous Palestinian-Arabs found themselves were anomalous as compared to the legal status of Arabs in other countries; their demographic majority was not translated into commensurate political power, even if only a potential one. This was due to the special position of the Jewish community under the Mandate. Democracy as a form of majority rule was rejected by the Zionist movement and by the British. As the Jewish nationalist leader Z. Jabotinsky argued in his 1923 article, 'The Morality of the Iron Wall', since "the civilised world" has recognised that Jews all over the world are in principle citizens of the country who have the right to return to it, the local population should not be allowed in the name of democracy to block their return. Democracy should be premised on the existence of two national groups: the Arab one which is residing in the territory itself, and the Jewish one which was forcibly removed from the territory in ancient times and is now seeking to return. The latter among the two groups is larger, thus making Zionist principles compatible with democracy as majority rule.⁶⁴

Similar arguments for group rights were advanced by leaders of the Zionist Labour movement who regarded parliamentary majority rule as inherently incompatible with the ability of the Jewish community to maintain its independence of language, education, settlement, family and national institutions.⁶⁵ The suspension of democracy was defended by Ben-Gurion who argued in 1924 that "any political program adopted now must logically correspond to the current balance of forces. Such a program would of necessity work against us. We have to evaluate the various forces not only according to their current [demographic, political] weight

but with a view to the future".⁶⁶ This line of thought was implicitly accepted by the British authorities who devised political arrangements premised on the existence of a Jewish community whose political autonomy should not be submerged by the Arab majority.

The Boundaries of Indigenous Identity

The Third Palestine Arab Congress which convened in Haifa in December 1920 was the first congress to confront the specific character of the national struggle in the context of British-ruled Palestine. The Congress called on Britain to establish a "national government in Palestine responsible to a representative council, to be elected by the Arabic speaking people who were living in Palestine at the outbreak of the Great War".⁶⁷ It emphasised the national unity of Muslims and Christians as *Arabs and* modelled its demands on the example of Iraq and Trans-Jordan, thereby refusing to acknowledge any special status to Palestine as a result of the Jewish presence.

The rejection of Zionism by the Palestinian-Arab national movement was clear, but the assertive principle in which name it was rejected was more ambiguous. In March 1921 the Executive Committee of the Congress submitted a deputation to a British conference held in Jerusalem and Cairo in which it asserted the right to speak as "a true representative of Palestine" since it enjoyed support of "all the live aspects of the nation...from Dan to Beersheba".⁶⁸ The nation was geographically-bound, not restricted by any ethnic criteria and not extended to include members of the Arab ethnic group from beyond the boundaries of the country. The deputation went on to deny any political role for religious differences.

At the same time, the Executive asserted that "there can be no question that Palestine belongs legally to the Arabs. They inherited it from their ancestors and have been occupying it for more than twenty centuries. The Jews saw, knew and accepted this fact".⁶⁹ The nation which had been defined in territorial terms acquired thereby an ethnic character. From being the possession of "the people of Palestine" it turned to be the property of a segment of that people (though admittedly the majority segment). As the document continues, arguments phrased in terms of universal principles of national heritage and historical rights give way to accusations against Jews in particular, appealing to the real or imagined anti-Jewish sentiments of the British. Jews are rejected as the "most active advocates of destruction", who harbour "pernicious motives...towards civilisation",⁷⁰ sentiments expressed in Jewish promotion of Bolshevism and attested to by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

The demands made by the Executive at the end of the document reflect again a territorial non-ethnic nationalism, calling for the formation of "a national government...which shall be responsible to a Parliament elected by the Palestinian people who existed in Palestine before the war".⁷¹ This document, indicative of the political tone of the entire period, serves to demonstrate the ambiguities in Palestinian definitions of identity and political rights.⁷² It is crucial to note, though, that the different definitions never explicitly included the majority of Jews of immigrant origins.

The contestation over the boundaries of Palestinian identity was particularly pertinent to issues of self-government and political representation. Within the general political insistence on a representative government as a legitimate form of majority rule, the Arab leadership rejected a proposed Legislative Council which was to be an advisory body subordinate to the

government and operating within the framework of the Mandate. Only half of the Council members were to be elected (on a confessional basis), and the rest were government officials. The leadership felt that such an arrangement would be based on the Balfour Declaration which they continued to reject. Consequently, a boycott campaign was launched and only 20% of the Arab electors were selected, rendering the Council idea inoperative.

Further attempts were made by the government in the same year to involve Arabs in governing the country by establishing an Arab Agency which would have "a position exactly analogous" to that of the Jewish Agency with regard to the interests of their respective constituencies.⁹¹ Unlike the Zionist Organisation, the proposed Arab Agency would not have had any international status and explicit settlement purposes. Its establishment would have created political parity under conditions in which Arabs were more than 80% of the population. The proposal was rejected with the argument that the Arabs as "owners of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal which tends to place them on the same footing with the alien Jews. In addition, the name of Arab Agency would make them feel they are strangers in their own country".⁹²

Advisory bodies of the nature proposed by the British were rejected by the Arab leadership as substitutes for independence, rather than as national structures helping prepare the ground for it. In view of this consistent opposition, the British concluded in November 1923 that they "have no alternative but to continue to administer the country in conformity with their undertakings, even though they have to forgo the assistance that they had hoped to obtain from the Arab community".⁹³ As a result, Mandatory Palestine was ruled by a state bureaucracy not limited by any representative institutions conveying the opinions and demands of the population as a whole.⁹⁴

Religion, Politics and Revolt

Palestinian-Arab national identity co-existed with, but also was challenged by, the use of Islamic symbols in political discourse. In a 1935 religious edict (*fatwa*) calling on peasants not to sell land to Jews, Palestine was referred to as the "holy country...to which the nocturnal journey [*isra'*] and from which the ascension to heaven [*mi'raj*] of your prophet Muhammad" took place, a country which therefore "should forever remain tinged with the colour of Islam".⁹⁵ In less obviously religious vein, in August 1936 the first communiqué by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, commander of the Arab forces during the 1936-39 Revolt, included verses from the Qur'an and called on people to take up arms "in defense of the first *qiblah* [Jerusalem in early Islam] and the second of the Noble Holy Sanctuaries".⁹⁶ The frequent references to holy war (*jihad*) during the Revolt were another indication of the appeal of Islamic terminology at the popular level, though without acquiring a dominant position at the official level.

The official goals of the Revolt were expressed by the memorandum submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission by the Arab Higher Committee.⁹⁷ The Committee asserted in that document that it acted "on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine" who were deprived of "their natural and political rights", faced with the Jewish National Home which was liable to lead "to the destruction of the Arabs as a national and cultural entity in the country".⁹⁸ Arabs were affirmed as "the legitimate owners of the country"⁹⁹, and the call for majority rule was asserted in the demand for "an independent national government, constitutionally elected,

in which shall be represented all sections of the population".¹⁰²

An identical tone was also evident in the testimony of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the foremost Palestinian-Arab leader, to the Commission¹⁰³ in which he asserted that the Jews in the country "will live, as they always have lived in Arab Countries, with complete freedom and liberty as natives in the country".¹⁰⁴ In response to queries by the Commission, however, al-Husayni confirmed that Palestine could not absorb and digest the 400000 Jews already living there. When the chairman suggested that this meant that "some of them would have to be removed by a process kindly or painful as the case may be", al-Husayni asserted in an elusive manner: "We must leave all this to the future".¹⁰⁵ The professed willingness to incorporate all residents equally, was thus undermined by the insistence on the essential Arab nature of the country, unmodified by the historical realities of Ottoman and British rule and by the changing demographic circumstances due to Jewish immigration and settlement.

With the conclusion of the Second World War the international community directed its attention to the question of Palestine, seeing it as linked to the European Jewish refugee problem. This linkage was strongly opposed by Palestinians who felt they were made to bear a burden not of their own making. As leading activist Jamal al-Husayni put it, "every Jew who enters Palestine is a further step towards our dispossession".¹⁰⁶ Arab spokesmen based their own case "on the natural right of a people to remain in undisturbed possession of their country and on the natural desire to safeguard their national existence".¹⁰⁷ Al-Husayni coupled the demands for the creation of a sovereign Arab state and the cessation of Jewish immigration with a guarantee that Jews will have the same privileges and rights as Arabs and their status will be similar to that of American or British Jews.

The recognition of the rights of Jews as individuals was not accompanied by an acknowledgment of their rights as a collective. The official Palestinian-Arab position was thus a mirror image of the Zionist position which advocated a Jewish, rather than a secular and non-ethnic state.¹⁰⁸ Both parties subordinated their understanding of democracy to ethnic imperatives. Arab activists interpreted democracy as majority rule which was consistent with a state with an Arab ethnic character. Being a majority whose relative numerical strength was in decline they were opposed to any delays in the application of democratic principles. In contrast, as a fast growing minority Jewish activists demanded that the same principles be suspended until Jews became a majority of the population, or else in more conciliatory vein that communal parity and power-sharing be established regardless of numerical proportions.¹⁰⁹ Neither side seriously considered an arrangement in which political power, land and immigration issues be decided upon in a non-ethnic manner, independently of the supposedly essential Arab or Jewish nature of the country.

Judged by the principles of democracy as commonly understood, indigenous Palestinians had a stronger case as they based their claims on the prevailing demographic realities rather than on future prospects as their Zionist counterparts did. Their case for an Arab state, rather than a *civil* state representative of all its citizens, was less sound. Professed guarantees of equal rights for Jews¹¹⁰ were undermined by official demands that land and immigration policies be based on ethnic grounds. On the other hand, although the Zionist case for the suspension of democracy was untenable, the argument that the Jewish community acquired a distinct corporate national character that had to be accommodated in any future dispensation was quite convincing. Political disputes are not settled on the basis of the merits of conflicting

arguments, unfortunately. Palestinians were less successful in getting international support for their cause, their capacity to mobilise resources was lower and consequently their ability to achieve their goals was eroded throughout the 1940s. As a result, when the final showdown took place in the war of 1947-48 they lost the military and political initiative and were consequently dispossessed of their national heritage.

COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS

The comparison between indigenous political strategies in the two cases make clear that numerical majorities do not necessarily lead to similar conceptualisations of rights and advocacy of majority rule. For most of the period discussed here indigenous South Africans strategies focused on a quest for incorporation into settler-dominated structures, on the one hand, and localised and increasingly fragmented attempts to throw the colonial yoke altogether, on the other. Only towards the end of the period did African activists started to consolidate a sense of political identity potentially capable of uniting masses of the indigenous population in action based on their numerical majority in the country as a whole (though the actual mobilisation did not make much progress until the 1950s or even the 1970s). Even then, the assertion of democratic principles was seen as the means in which name political incorporation could be effected.

Indigenous Palestinian-Arabs, in contrast, from their earliest encounters with the settler political project asserted their right to the country as a whole as their historical birthright. They did not seek incorporation into settler-dominated structures but rather fought for a system in which their numerical majority and indigenous nature would be translated into political power with a pronounced ethnic character. Even when they expressed willingness to accommodate settlers in their vision of a future political arrangement, they insisted that such arrangement retain Arab features in terms of ethos, language, identity, historical connections and the composition of the population. Democracy was seen as the means to achieve these ethnic-defined goals, rather than a way to ensure incorporation.

Conceptualisations of democracy and majority rule are contingent on the identification of a group with a majority status. Overall, indigenous people in Palestine/Israel exhibited less internal diversity and stronger sense of a unified identity than indigenous people in South Africa. Palestinian-Arabs entered the period of the British Mandate with a coherent sense of themselves as a distinct group, united by their language, ethnic heritage and territory. They shared the first two with other Arabs in the neighbouring countries and they were divided by a fourth factor, religion, between Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, their nationalism was consolidated during the period, based on two crucial components which they had in common among themselves, and shared with no others: the specific territory of Palestine (despite the fact that it was sometimes vaguely defined) and the shared exclusion from the Jewish-Zionist project. Within a short period of time it became clear to all involved that a unique sense of identity had developed among Palestinian-Arabs, though not without its points of contact with other groups (such as Syrians, Arabs in general and Muslims in the region and elsewhere, but not Jewish settlers).

Indigenous people in South Africa, in contrast, had not possessed at the beginning of the period discussed here a unified sense of themselves as a group. There were, rather, many indigenous South African groups, divided by language, religion, region and political

affiliation. There was little to unite them in the pre-colonial period, and they were conquered in a piecemeal fashion by colonial forces, in a process stretching throughout the 19th century. When they entered the political arena of the territorially-unified South Africa, they did so at different rates and within different regional constellations of forces. As a result, the process of constructing a grassroots-based, solid national identity which could supersede regional and ethnic identities, and form a foundation for a cross-ethnic and a cross-racial national movement, was much more problematic. Africans were internally split on many grounds, and they were also distinct in their consciousness, history and legal status from the other black groups of coloured people and Indians.

In addition to the initial heterogeneity of South Africans relative to Palestinian-Arabs, certain elements of the cultural attributes of settlers and colonial powers managed to penetrate, and to some degree colonise black consciousness. Christianity in particular became both a medium for the articulation of grievances and a language of mobilisation for political struggle. While some strong separatist sentiments were expressed through the independent Ethiopian African churches, it was very significant that they operated on a terrain constructed by colonialism. Indigenous systems of beliefs could not have provided a unifying resistance ideology, precisely because pre-colonial identity, as well as political, realities were fragmented.

To address the new situation of common political incorporation in the white-dominated state, it was necessary to create innovative modes of organisation. In a sense, traditionally-based national politics premised on the assertion of indigenous political rights were a contradiction in terms. Whereas indigenous Palestinians could refer back to their recent history in which they were the indisputable majority with unchallenged claim to their territory, indigenous South Africans had to invent such a past, or else operate without such powerful unifying symbols. It was only with the rise of the Africanist tendency of the 1940s that these symbols could be created as part of the general rise of struggles for independence in the continent. Earlier attempts to resort to tradition were localised in nature, largely reflecting withdrawal to specific geographical and socio-political niches rather than attempts to transform society as a whole in indigenous image.

A related dimension of the difference in the consolidation of political identities in the two cases was the character and operation of leaderships. In Palestine/Israel indigenous political leaders could fall back on a rich tradition of political, governing, parliamentary and protest activity. They did not derive their experience from, nor were they trained by, settlers. Their political culture was truly indigenous, not in the sense of not having been exposed to external influences but in the sense of not owing anything, directly or indirectly, to settlers in this respect. In South Africa, indigenous elites were very frequently mission-educated, they organised their local activities in the vernacular but on a nation-wide basis usually ran their affairs in English. Furthermore, they initially enjoyed the support and guidance of white liberals, missionaries and politicians, who were possessed with a genuine desire to impart the benefits (or so they perceived it) of white civilisation.

These forces acted to promote, even if indirectly, political dynamics that militated against conceptualisations of indigenous rights to majority rule as they were based on cultural affinities between coloniser and colonised. Needless to say, indigenous activists could articulate strongly nationalist and exclusionary messages in English, using Christian symbols,

but they were testifying in doing that to the deep impact of some elements of colonial and settler cultures. Even when these elements were transformed and used as weapons against colonial rule, they had an inevitable effect on the terms within which struggles were waged. No such adoption of Zionist or Jewish symbols and cultural features into Palestinian-Arab political culture was necessary or even possible. Islam, Christianity and the Arabic language were all indigenous forces capable of investing political struggles with powerful ideological and organisational meanings without any need to borrow from the Jewish or Zionist modes of operation. In this respect, then, indigenous people in Palestine were able to maintain their cultural and political independence to greater extent than indigenous people in South Africa and were consequently less open to any compromises on principles of majority rule.

In addition, the nature of the colonial state played an important role. In Palestine/Israel the state was controlled by an external power, the British Empire. It saw its role as maintaining order, but not on necessarily on settler terms. Its commitment to providing a secure framework for the development of the settlement project had constantly to be balanced by the need to defend indigenous interests, if only in order to prevent large-scale political instability. Settlers constructed their own institutions, in which they could pursue their own policies; the state itself operated under different parameters, including its regional interests and international obligations. It did not perceive its role as that of managing indigenous people on behalf of settlers. After its initial attempts to construct unified representative institutions failed, the state left the handling of relations between the national communities to the communities themselves. In thus created space for the development of indigenous political structures which formed the institutional basis for assertive conceptualisations of democracy and majority rule. The temporary mandate of the colonial state gave the efforts of both sides to accumulate political power and prepare for the eventual struggle for control over the country a clear focus and sense of urgency.

In South Africa, the state was controlled to a large extent by settlers. Even when it was part of the British empire, it was run by officials who shared the settler goal of securing white domination. The state was not neutral in this respect. Whether through direct incorporation (as in the Cape), through indirect rule (through traditional chiefs in the reserves), or through segregated institutions, it took upon itself the responsibility of creating political and administrative structures to govern indigenous people. The South African state, unlike the British Mandatory state in Palestine/Israel, made a distinction between citizens and subjects. Both groups were incorporated in the political system but on differentiated and discriminatory bases. The state was not external to the society but deeply implicated in indigenous-settler relations. As a result, it instituted the norm of *incorporated but unequal* in relation to the indigenous population.

The form of state affected indigenous political organisation as it defined the terms within which struggles were waged. Paradoxically, the hardening of segregationist attitudes which deprived indigenous people of direct access to the state also made the consolidation of indigenous political identity more likely. By removing the political privileges enjoyed by minority segments among the indigenous population and restricting the autonomy wielded by local leaderships in the rural areas, avenues of indigenous incorporation and accommodation were closed off. This left political forces no choice but to organise to assert their rights in full; compromises and limited measures became unviable. Although the fight for democratic principles and majority rights promised to be long and arduous, it increasingly became clear

that nothing short of that will work. Indigenous politics in the aftermath of the Africanist turn of the ANC opened a new stage in which democracy became the major goal of struggle.

Notes

1. This comparison draws on material from my book *The Violence of the Origins: class, identity and state in Palestine/Israel and South Africa to 1948* (Middletown, CT, forthcoming).
2. D.H Houghton and J. Dagut (eds), *Source Material on the South African Economy* (Cape Town, 1972), V.1, pp. 31-2; 291.
3. *ibid*, p. 294.
4. *ibid*, p. 299.
5. *ibid*, pp. 288-90.
6. Houghton and Dagut, *Source Materials*, V.2, p. 146.
7. For examples of the tone of the former paper see Karis T. and G. Carter (eds), *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964* (Stanford, 1972), V.1, pp. 12-17.
8. A. Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu! The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912* (Cape Town, 1984), pp. 5-16.
9. See statement by Executive of the South African Native Congress in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, p. 22.
10. *ibid*, p. 27.
11. *ibid*, p. 29.
12. *ibid*, p. 28.
13. *ibid*, p. 28.
14. See the testimony by Rev. Brander of the Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion to the South African Native Affairs Commission in *ibid*, pp. 39-42.
15. *ibid*, p. 41; Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu*, pp. 23-29.
16. See J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago, 1991) for the example of the religious dimensions of the colonial encounter among the southern Tswana people.
17. South African Native Affairs Commission, *Report of the Commission with Annexures* (Cape Town, 1905), V.1, p. 63.
18. *ibid*, p. 11.
19. *ibid*, p. 13.
20. *ibid*, p. 96.
21. G.W. Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795-1910* (London, 1918), p. 525; p. 531.
22. For the origins of the slogan "equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi" coined by Cecil Rhodes see R.E. Van der Ross *The Rise and Demise of Apartheid* (Cape Town, 1986), pp. 22-3.
23. Petition to the House of Commons, 1909 in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, pp. 55-56.
24. Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu*, pp. 197-227.
25. 'Native Union' in *Imvo Zabantsundu*, October 1911 in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, p. 72.
26. *ibid*, p. 73.

27. Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu*, pp. 274-75; see also the 1919 Constitution of the Congress in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, pp. 76-82.
28. P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa* (Craighall, 1970), pp. 205-206.
29. Natal Native Administration Law, 1887, in Eybers, *Selected Constitutional Documents*, p. 254.
30. *ibid*, p. 553.
31. H. Rogers, *Native Administration in the Union of South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1933), pp. 12-13.
32. *ibid*, p. 22.
33. *ibid*, p. 25; see the specific powers of the different levels in *ibid*, pp. 259-265; for a survey of the entire apparatus handling relations between the state and indigenous people see H.J. May, *The South African Constitution*, 2nd edition (Cape Town, 1949), pp. 310-375.
34. See S. Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism and the State in 20th century Natal* (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 15-41 for the relations between the colonial state, the Zulu monarchy and chiefs.
35. C. Bundy, 'Land and Liberation: Popular Rural Protest and the National Liberation Movements in South Africa, 1920-1960', in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in 20th Century South Africa* (London, 1987), pp. 254-285.
36. See E. Mda, 'The Extension of the Council System into the Transkeian Territories', in *Report of the National European-Bantu Conference* (Cape Town, 1929), pp. 86-95 for the operation of the Bunga - the Transkeian system of chiefly rule, and W. Beinart and C. Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1987), pp. 106-137 for the case of the Mpondomise chieftaincy.
37. See Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence*, and C. Hamilton, *Authoring Shaka: Models, Metaphors and Historiography* (Baltimore, 1993) for the example of Zulu identity.
38. For its rapid spread over the period see E. Brookes, *The Colour Problems of South Africa* (Cape Town, 1934), Appendix 1, pp. 193-201 and S.M. Mokitini 'African Religion', in E. Hellmann (ed) *Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1949), pp. 556-572.
39. And perhaps influenced by Garveyite pan-Africanism as well as speculated in Hill and Pirio, 'Africa for the Africans': The Garvey Movement in South Africa, 1920-1940', in Marks and Trapido, *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism*, pp. 213-214.
40. R. Edgar, *Because They Chose the Plan of God: the Story of the Bulhoek Massacre* (Johannesburg, 1988).
41. See ICU revised constitution in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, pp. 325-326; H. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924-1930* (Johannesburg, 1987), pp. 123-127.
42. Bradford, *A taste of Freedom*, pp. 213-245; Hill and Pirio, 'Africa for the Africans', pp. 238-242.
43. See Bundy's discussion of the Transkei anti-dipping movement in Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*, pp. 191-221.
44. Hill and Pirio, 'Africa for the Africans'; A. Copley, *Class and Consciousness: The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa, 1924 to 1950* (CT, 1990), pp. 183-188.

45. Beinart and Bundy, *Hidden Struggles*.
46. See T.O. Ranger, 'Race and Tribe in Southern Africa: European Ideas and African Acceptance', in R. Ross (ed) *Racism and Colonialism*, (The Hague, 1982), pp. 141-142 for an overview of tribalism in the Johannesburg mines and W. Beinart, 'Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: the experiences of a South African migrant, 1930-1960', in Marks and Trapido, *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism*, pp. 286-309 for the rural-urban links in the identity in a migrant worker.
47. Quoted in Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism*, p. 213, who also brings examples of leaders who promoted their own ethnic group even as they were serving as Congress officials.
48. Cobby, *Class and Consciousness*, pp. 82-88.
49. See his 1932 pamphlet in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.1, pp. 313-315.
50. As specified in the Representation of Natives Bill; see May, *The South African Constitution*, pp. 351-358.
51. A thorough but politically skewed history of the AAC and its transformations in the 1940s is found in I.B. Tabata, *The All African Convention: The Awakening of a People* (Johannesburg, 1950).
52. Resolutions of the AAC, Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, 1973, V.2, p. 31.
53. *ibid*, p. 32.
54. See in particular R.F.A. Hoernlé, 'Race-Mixture and Native Policy in South Africa', in I. Schapera (ed) *Western Civilisation and the Natives of South Africa* (London, 1934), pp. 263-281 with the distinction he makes between political equality and social mixture.
55. Speech by D.F. Malan in Union of South Africa, *Joint Sitting of Both Houses of Parliament on Representation of Natives Bill* (Cape Town, 1936), pp. 706-707.
56. *ibid*, pp. 893-894.
57. *ibid*, p. 1085.
58. *ibid*, p. 1089.
59. Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.2, p. 64.
60. Tabata, *The All African Convention*, pp. 30-43.
61. M. Roth, 'Domination by Consent: Elections under the Representation of Natives Act, 1937-1948', in T. Lodge (ed) *Resistance and Ideology in Settler Societies* (Johannesburg, 1986), pp. 144-167.
62. Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.2, p. 233; for the entire affair see *ibid*, pp. 224-261.
63. *ibid*, pp. 209-223.
64. *ibid*, p. 217.
65. *ibid*, pp. 300-308.
66. Article in *Inyaniso*, 1945 in *ibid*, p. 315.
67. *Basic Policy of the Congress Youth League*, manifesto in *ibid*, p. 327.
68. *ibid*, p. 329.
69. *ibid*, p. 330; see also in a similar vein Tabata, *The All African Convention*, pp. 101-110.
70. *ANC Programme of Action*, in Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, V.2, p. 337.
71. Statement in April 1948, *ibid*, p. 278.
72. *ibid*, p. 337.

73. Hoernlé, 'Race Mixture', p. 264.
74. Preamble to the Mandate in League of Nations, *Mandate for Palestine*, Cmd 1785 (London, 1922), p. 2.
75. in M. Mogannam, *The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem* (London, 1937), p. 119.
76. M. Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York, 1988), pp. 107-109.
77. A.W. Kayyali, *Palestine: A Modern History* (London, 1979), pp. 57-58.
78. in A. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939* (Ithaca, 1979), p. 86.
79. Palestine, *Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization*, Cmd. 1700 (London, 1922), p. 154 (also known as The Churchill White Paper).
80. See the statement of Dr. Eder, Acting Chairman of the Zionist Commission in Palestine, *Disturbances in May 1921*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Cmd. 1540 (London, 1921), p. 57 (also known as The Haycraft Commission Report).
81. Memorandum addressed to Lord Curzon, 11/8/1919 in D. Ingrams, *Palestine Papers 1917-1922, Seeds of Conflict* (London, 1972), p. 74.
82. Quoted in Esco Foundation, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies* (New Haven, 1947), pp. 275-76.
83. Palestine, *Correspondence*, p. 28.
84. Z. Jabotinsky, 'The Morality of the Iron Wall', *Ha-umah*, 7 (4), pp. 469-475 (originally 1923).
85. Y. Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs 1882-1948, A Study of Ideology* (Tel Aviv, 1985), pp. 178-184.
86. D. Ben-Gurion, *We and Our Neighbors* (Tel Aviv, 1931), p. 73.
87. Quoted in Mogannam, *The Arab Woman*, p. 127.
88. Colonial Office, *Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem*, March 12th to 30th 1921 (London, 1921), p. 142.
89. *ibid*, p. 145.
90. *ibid*, p. 146.
91. *ibid*, p. 150.
92. Similar themes run through other official statements of Palestinian-Arab positions; see in particular The Palestine Arab Delegation, *The Holy Land - The Moslem-Christian Case Against Zionist Aggression* (London, 1922) and Palestine, *Correspondence*.
93. Palestine, *Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency*, Correspondence with the High Commissioner for Palestine, Cmd. 1989 (London, 1923), p. 5; for the role of the Zionist Organization as a public agency entitled to assist the British administration in its National Home efforts, represent the interests of the Jewish population and facilitate Jewish immigration to the country see Articles 4 and 6 in League of Nations, *Mandate for Palestine*, p. 3.
94. Response by M.K al-Husayni, president of the Arab Executive, to the British High Commissioner in November 1923, quoted in Lesch, *Arab Politics*, p. 187.
95. Palestine, *Proposed Formation*, p. 12.
96. For an account of the various failed attempts to form consultative and representative bodies see His Britannic Majesty's Government, *The Political History of Palestine under British Administration* (Jerusalem, 1947).
97. U. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine* (Leiden, 1987), p. 241.

98. In N. Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism* (London, 1982), p. 55.
99. Arab Higher Committee, *A Memorandum Submitted to the Royal Commission* (Jerusalem, 1937).
100. *ibid.*, p. 5.
101. *ibid.*, p. 11.
102. *ibid.*, p. 13.
103. Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions*, Colonial No. 134 (London, 1937), pp. 292-299.
104. *ibid.*, p. 298.
105. *ibid.*
106. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, *Hearings in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1946), p. C8.
107. *ibid.*, p. C2.
108. For which see statements by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion in *ibid.*, pp. A2-45 and B1-42 respectively.
109. As Dr. Magnes of *Ihud* group suggested in *ibid.*, pp. E1-40.
110. As in the testimonies of Ahmad Shukayri and Albert Hourani in *ibid.*, pp. 196-132.