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Chiefs, Concessionaires and Reserve Politics on the Tlaping Alluvial
Diamond Diggings at Taungs, 1919-1921: A Local Perspective on
Segregation and Class Interests.

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INTRODUCTION

Recent perspectives on segregationism in the first two decades of this century have suggested that by the end of the First World War segregation had become the accepted convention "within which solutions or resolutions of class conflict in South Africa were sought."¹ Segregation has also been seen as a set of policies associated with the response of a society undergoing the stresses and strains of industrialisation.² This debate has tended however to focus on the Rands mining industry and its responses to African proletarianisation in the period following the Anglo Boer War and the Reconstruction Government. Broadly speaking little work has been done of the most important component of this equation - the Reserves. At the last History Workshop William Beinart presented a paper which specifically addressed the question of rural Reserve political movements in the 1920's and suggested that "to characterise the Reserve districts of South Africa as merely isolated and economically depressed backwaters in the twentieth century is highly misleading." He goes on to say that even though they were undoubtedly economically depressed (and indeed continued to be so) they could be the scene of "innovative and important political and ideological developments." Brought under the spotlight were the particular character of rural & ^{migrant} organisation and ideas, the different class positions of large sections of the African rural community, and the importance of age and gender in the formulating and prosecution of popular political action.³ Helen Bradford has done a number of equally fascinating studies of other forms of rural agrarian protest in varied regional economies of the country outside of the Reserves, chiefly concentrating on those labour tenants on white owned farms in the Transvaal, the OFS and Natal.⁴ These studies have shown that there are important regional and local perspectives on the experience by rural Africans of the twin processes of accumulation and dispossession in rural South Africa in the 1920's. As suggested by Beinart, it would be highly misleading to suggest that "rural" was a uniform category.⁵ It would be equally misleading to put forward the notion that dispossession was chiefly the lot of rural South Africans, and accumulation that of rural whites. A number of studies have focussed on this issue in an earlier period to that spotlighted by Beinart and Bradford.⁶ White settler accumulation was varied and jagged and by no means egalitarian; it differed in intensity regionally and nationally and dispossession and proletarianisation was equally the lot of many rural Settlers as it was for Africans. This is not to say something astoundingly profound;

most commentators, both contemporary and modern, have suggested this pattern for South Africa's agrarian revolution.⁷ What is important however is to try and stitch these two accounts of the experience of rural change of Africans and Settlers together in such a manner as to avoid simplifying the issues to those rather static concepts of "capital, the state and wage labour." or of the "articulation of the capitalist mode of production with the (African) non-capitalist mode(s)", and to evaluate the nature and extent of their interaction, in both ideological and class terms.

The following sketch, which forms the substance of this paper, is an attempt to stitch together some such account for an area of the country which has received rather scant attention from social historians. It is centered on a freehold one thousand morgan farm "Tlapeng"(TF 13) which was included within the boundaries of the Taungs Native Reserve in former British Bechuanaland in 1894. Tlapeng was intended at the time to form part of a "buffer" line of farms between the border of the Transvaal and the boundaries of the Reserve in order to present further friction between the Transvaal Boers and the Thlaping groups which were settled there. Tlapeng (or Tlaping or Thlaping as it appears in some of the official correspondence) was one of the farms within those Reserves included in the Schedule to Proclamation B.B. No.220 of 1895 which stated that those Reserves "shall be and remain inalienable, save with the consent of Her Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for the Colonies."⁸ When British Bechuanaland was annexed to the Cape Colony, the Annexation Act No.41 of 1895, Section 17 provided that "no lands at present reserved by any law for the use of Natives in the said territories shall be alienated, or in any case diverted from the purposes for which they are set apart"⁹ The farm Tlapeng now part of the Taungs Native Reserve, was subsequently included in the Schedule to the 1913 Native Land Act as land within the Reserve. With the important exception other lands of ex-Chief Galishwe Gasibone, deposed and imprisoned for his part in the Langeberg Rebellion of 1896 who had his lands at Phokwane confiscated by the Cape Government (Act No.17 of 1897) the Taung Reserve therefore remained substantially intact.¹⁰ Nevertheless, increasingly through the 1900's and 1910's this Reserve was put under pressure from interested parties seeking to open up land within the Reserve for prospecting until in December 1915 the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr.F.Barrett informed the Magistrate at Taungs, Mr.A.C.G.Oakes, that the

Government had decided, as an "experiment" to proclaim 500 morgan of the 190,846 morgan Reserve, as an alluvial diamond digging.²¹ These 500 morgan fell on the farm "Tlaping". This essay addresses the nature of the various pressures from a number of different sources which led to this decision in 1919. It examines the responses of both the Reserve inhabitants and the digging community to the various problems raised by the existence of mineral treasures within the boundaries of a Reserve area, and the nature of the response of the various Government Departments to this dilemma. By means of this sketch it is hoped that our knowledge of the variety and diversity of local pressures and interest of early groups and class formation will be correspondingly advanced and a more nuanced view of rural class formation in this, the era of segregation, *correspondingly advanced.*

Part One

On the 5th March 1920 a small notice appeared in the Government Gazette giving note of the intention of Government to open Tlapeng, "portion of Tlouw Native Reserve, situated in the District of Vryburg" on the 24th of that month "where it shall be lawful for any person who is the holder of a diggers certificate to peg off one claim 30 feet by 60 feet."²² Less than three weeks later, in a state of absolute confusion, and with a delay of one day, the proclamation notice was read out by the Inspector of Claims Mr. H. Audas from the roof of one of the few buildings standing on the field, setting off between 6,000 and 7,000 diggers, nearly without exception all white diggers, in a mad rush across over two kilometers of extremely broken terrain, to the digging area.²³ Memorable though this moment must have been (Audas reporting subsequently that "a number of accidents from falls and collisions took place; those brought to my notice being one broken kneecap, two broken leg bones and about ten with sprained ankles and bad bruises. (Also) A motor vehicle left immediately after the rush with several injured persons and it was reported that one had died as a result of falling on one of his pegs which entered his body."²⁴) the most lasting impression of Tlaping in the minds of the Government officials was the state of insanitary chaos which followed as the 5,000 diggers and their 35,000 African labourers began the long, tedious and back-breaking work of digging and sieving the shall ^{aw} diamoniform gravel. Within three months Tlaping, as was the case with a large number of other diggings in the south-western Transvaal at this

junction was quickly worked out.²⁵ On the 30th of July, four months after the rush at Tlaping, Doyle's Prospect was proclaimed on an adjacent portion of Tlaping.²⁶ By early 1921 there were less than twenty diggers in total at work on either of these diggings, and on 15 September 1922, both Doyle's Prospect and Tlaping Alluvial Diamond Diggings were deproclaimed.²⁷ The "experiment" was considered over and a suitable postscript was provided by the Magistrate at Taungs in a letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs in November 1920:

Both Tlaping and Doyle's Prospect (he said) must be counted as failures. A few people did well but hundreds lost their money and many were impoverished. The conditions (he continued) under which the Europeans and Natives live(d) at these diggings are detrimental to the interests of both and bad in every way. The tendency is to drag down the European and cause the native to lose the wholesome respect he once felt for the white man and which is disappearing fast.

He continued along these lines :

I am quite sure that if the real views of the Natives could be ascertained, it would be found that they are wholly opposed to any further extension of alluvial diamond digging in the Reserve. On these diggings the Native does not live under the healthy conditions of his kraal like (but rather) they are huddled together at one or two sites allotted for locations and their shelters are hovels made of bits of tin and sacking.

Further aspects along the same theme continued to plague his mind:

Natives come to the diggings from all parts of the country, gambling (was) rife, stock thefts from the Natives in the Reserves occurred, (also) petty thefts from Europeans and Natives (were) frequent and brandy (was) plentiful.

The culprit in his mind was clearly the Government and not the diggers; "The Diggings are ill-regulated (he stated) and there is an absence of any proper system in their management and control." No private company, he complained, would be allowed to conduct mining operations employing thousands of Natives and making "no provision for the housing, feeding and medical treatment of the Natives, and having no sanitary arrangements"²⁸ P. Targett Adams, the Assistant Health Officer for the Union Public Health Department had similar themes on his mind after his visit to Tlaping on the 3rd and 4th of June 1920: "there is a present (he wrote), apparently always has been and may continue to be, a total lack of systematic management, pre-arrangement, and control of

sanitation and housing on all of these spontaneous and ephemeral settlements (on public alluvial diggings)."¹⁹ Spontaneous and ephemeral they may have been, but a familiar litany of complaints followed each new proclamation in the Transvaal (between 1915 and November 1918 some 21 separate public diggings were proclaimed, in 1920 a further 9. Between 1922 and 1924 a further 32.²⁰):

These diggings closely resemble similar operations in and about any suddenly established enterprise, industrially or .. militarily; thus you find a large number of individuals suddenly transported and encamped in the open .. in which no properly constructed shelter or sanitary convenience etc etc exists. Consequently the results are in practice found to be both dangerous to (the) health of the immigrant and also to the established community in the midst of which they happen to come.

At Tlaping this led to spectacular abuses: "promiscuous defilement" at the source of drinking water for the community, no latrines or provisions for the regulated disposal of excreta, or separation of the sexes, "either within the white or coloured encampments which now adjoin one another." Also he continued "natives encamped and lived amongst the white diggers, and deposit of excreta and filth within the immediate surroundings of both dwellings and workings was indescribably bad.." Housing was temporary in nature, to say the least, the "usual heterogeneous, and most flimsy and inadequate shelters" as found on all these alluvial camps in the new fields of the Transvaal. In most cases shanties constructed of tin and wood and canvas - the better "class" of housing, the zinc hut, being restricted to "professional" diggers. In the locations at Tlaping the type of building erected was a shack "the framework .. built up of any old piece of wood, in some cases covered with sacking only, in others with old tine lining covered over with sacking."²¹ No provision was made for either sex as regards sanitation, with "men, women and children .. in the habit of using the most convenient places available on the hill side."²² Only the absence of rain in this arid part of the country, stated an Inspector of the Native Affairs Department, prevented the sure outbreak of any sickness in the location, and ensured that the drinking water did not become contaminated and polluted from the defecation and urination that had been going on on the hillside since the location had been set up.²³ The sale of water at from 2/- to 3/- a barrel ensured that many labourers did not buy fresh water, drinking it from the claims in the case of rains, or having to carry it a long distance over rough terrain from the Harts River.²⁴ Food, and food

supplies were also inadequate in the locations. Generally speaking, workers fed themselves, with the employer accepting no responsibility; the result being that "the native feeds himself in the cheapest manner possible which naturally undermines his constitution, effects his efficiency and curtails his earning capacity."²⁵ Food was confined to mielie meal porridge, and meat when obtainable without purchase. The result was an increasing number of stock thefts in the Reserve from the date of proclamation.²⁶ Vegetables were a luxury and "practically never seen." Prices for store supplied goods at the diggings were prohibitive, the nearest alternative market being Warrenton, on the Vaal River, some 60 miles distant. Cases of scurvy were by no means uncommon, and disease and death from dysentery, diphtheritic croup and other "bowel disorders" regularly reported.²⁷

Clearly the diggings at Tlaping offered little evidence of measured and steady positive social and economic advantages to both digger and worker. It is difficult to estimate the returns of various classes of diggers at Tlaping, but a study conducted in 1920 by Mr. S.P. Joubert²⁸ estimated some of the costs of digging there. He divided the more quantifiable expenses of diggers into a number of different categories - pegging costs, registration fees, wages, water and equipment. He took the average volume of gravel within a Cape claim (30 foot by 60 foot, and at a thickness of 5 foot) which could be worked with an average size gang, estimated at five workers by him (some observers put this figure at as low as three), as 9,000 cubic feet of gravel. It was variously estimated that one worker could shovel 1,600 cubic feet of gravel in fourteen days. On the average then, a digger working on this scale worked out two Cape claims per month. In the Transvaal this figure was a little lower, but nevertheless the average digger went through a steady stream of new claims on this type of deposit, of which Tlaping was but one example; throughout the south western Transvaal diamondiferous gravel was found in these shallow red ground areas and this accounts, in part, for the shifting nature of this digging population.²⁹ At Tlaping it was reported that all the proclaimed area was pegged off at Proclamation.³⁰ Continuing with this average digger Joubert estimated the various costs to be: Pounds 25 a month for wages (at Tlaping wages wavered between 20s and 25s per week excluding food and quarters, but did decline to between 18s and 14s) of a five man gang, a registration fee (for a Digger's Certificate) of 5s on application, and 10s per month for two

claim licences, about Pounds 12 for tools (two large sieves, couple of small ones for washing, sorting table, picks, shovels and tubs), a pegging fee, for a professional runner to peg a claim cost Pounds 50, and water cost about Pounds 6 5s per month.³² On this basis a Tlaping digger who started digging there for the first time, for instance a returned soldier or bywoner, would pay Pounds 94.0.0 in this first month; if he pegged off a claim for himself, Pounds 44.0.0; if he was an experienced digger possessing tools and pegging for himself, Pounds 31.5.0; and if he dug and washed on the river bank Pounds 25.10.0. The average returns on digging in the Union in 1919 was about Pounds 57 per white digger per month; this figure was uncharacteristically high, chiefly because of the boom in diamond prices which set in from January 1919. In April 1920 this average had declined to about Pounds 42 per digger.³² However, as the official figures made clear, the chances of finding every month were extremely slight; in April 1920 out of 5,000 diggers (licensed) in the Transvaal, 1748 found diamonds and 3252 did not, but the lucky ones were also divided into 274 (5 percent) who had "great luck), 474 (10 percent) who just found enough to make a living, while 1000 (20 percent) who did not find enough to make a living.³³ These average figures do not however demonstrate precisely the earnings of particular fields; the Cape Barkley West deep alluvial gravels had a consistently higher average figure then, for instance, the shallow red ground of the Bynestepoort diggings in the Transvaal (in April 1920 Pounds 42 as against Pounds 16 per month).³⁴ The finds at Tlaping were inclined toward the lower end of this scale, on a par with most south western Transvaal diggings in this period.

In Tlaping we can isolate some of the more vulnerable classes of the white digging community which arrived in March 1920. New arrivals were particularly susceptible to having their capital quickly eaten up. These "diggers" (as we shall see) consisted chiefly of "adventurers from the cities", returned soldiers, and the small town proletariat of the Transvaal and the Cape.³⁵ Joubert estimated the approximate percentage of this class in the Union as at 43.3 percent in 1920 - but in this figure he included bywoners, landless tenant farmers and agricultural workers. Professional diggers - or born diggers, according to Joubert - constituted 40 percent of a diggings population.³⁶ The balance of the population could be called the diggings burgess class, who often possessed considerable influence on the diggings, and constituted the

properties section of the community; "These people possess fair and sometimes quite considerable assets which more than provide for their subsistence, e.g. farms, shops, water erven etc..".³⁷ Included in this important class were farmers who engaged a poor man, possibly a bywoner to work on a percentage.³⁸ Shopkeepers also constituted an important group within this class; large profits were reported from the holders of stand or trade licences on these diggings, and big sums crossed hands when these concessions were traded.³⁹ Storekeepers also benefited from the peculiar position they held as providers of easy credit to diggers, and many of them were deeply involved in "backing" diggers who had suffered temporary setbacks in digging operations.⁴⁰

Tlaping was, on the limited evidence available to us, a typical south western Transvaal digging camp. The vast majority of diggers there were of the gambling ilk, the "peculiar uncertainty of the present diamond "alluvial digging", stated one official, "speculative in character, become consequently attractive to those persons who delight in gambling.. and many "unsuitable and poor people came with 'the rush' at the end of March..".⁴¹ As claims on Tlaping were quickly worked out, the cry went out for more ground. Doyles Prospect was subsequently proclaimed and a similar fate befell those diggers working on it. By December 1920 it was reported that starving diggers, without funds, were regularly passing through the hands of the Magistrate "their vitality having been so undermined through feeding on mielie meal porridge only, this having been brought about through the Digger having put all his eggs into the one basket and not knowing when to stop."⁴² Professional diggers with experience of other camps in the Cape and Transvaal were more circumspect, pulling up their pegs and moving on to newer pastures which were beckoning in the Transvaal,⁴³ when claims became scarce, and the diamond price began to plummet in mid-1920.⁴⁴ The store-keeping fraternity - consisting of seven general dealers, two butchers, two bakers, two motor garages, three boarding houses, one mineral water supplier, two blacksmiths and four cafes, did an initial roaring trade at Tlaping, and subsequently also moved on.⁴⁵ Many of the holders of these stand licences had a long history of trading on the diggings in the area.⁴⁶ Hotel keepers in the nearby Tuangsstad and along the Kimberly to Vryburg railway line did equally well on the diggings.⁴⁷ None of this was anything spectacularly unique. A similar pattern was discernible on

the more well known digging camps, and at least one Inspector was of the opinion that in this respect if you had seen one digging camp you had seen them all.⁴⁹

The same thing went for the actual social relations of production on these fields. At Ilaping we have already described some of the conditions under which claim workers lived and worked, and although some officials blamed the negligence of the Natives Affairs Department (NAD) and the Mines Department (MNV) for these conditions it seems obvious that the fault lay a little closer to home.⁴⁹ Effectively, most diggers were strictly circumscribed by a tight cost structure in so far as the most important component of their working cost, namely, wages, went. They were unwilling to shoulder any expenditure as regards the accommodation and administration of their workers, Mr. Cook, Assistant Director of Native Labour in 1919 quoting the example of a Bloemhof digger who stated that it did not matter if his "boy" lived in a hole or perched in a tree as long as he got his labour.⁵⁰ Most Transvaal diggers, perhaps the majority at Ilaping, given its proximity to the Transvaal fields, were opposed to the setting up of separate locations for the workers - the most obvious justification being that they could be "tampered with there."⁵¹ This attitude was exacerbated by the persistent complaints of severe shortages of labour on the Transvaal and Cape fields. These cries reached some sort of crescendo in the ^{year} 1919, as the diamond price doubled and production from the alluvial fields soared.⁵² The subsequent appearance of large numbers of new diggers on these fields in the years 1918-1920 explains to some extent the persistence of this cry from "diggers" in general.⁵³ (See Tables I and II) Diggers, especially the smaller men who were unable to offer higher wages to attract labour and who were constrained by strict working costs, resorted to a myriad of alternative methods of working claims. One such spectacular example was the shareworker - a digger who worked on percentages with a worker who provided his labour free in return for 50 percent of profits made.⁵⁴ More common, however was the digger who employed workers on the expectation (or hope) of finding diamonds before the week was out; Mr. Walker, of the NAD, described this digger in his report on labour at Ilaping:

There is no denying the fact (he said) that the native is the backbone of the Alluvial Diamond Industry, (but) the Digger, who is generally a person of straw and impecunious, takes little or no interest in his employees' welfare; he expects his men to work

long and arduous hours and does not scruple to omit payment of wages should his week have been one of many blanks.

The Sergeant of Police at Doyles Prospect reported innumerable complaints concerning wages and "that several Diggers had absconded without paying their Natives and that today warrants were out for (their) apprehension..".⁵⁵ Targett Adams followed Walkers thinking on this issue: "A definite rate of wages for native labourers is sorely needed (at Tlaping), and more authority and control exercised in seeing that the natives are fairly treated and protected against these rascally employers, who occasionally abscond leaving his native employees unpaid..".⁵⁶ One other point needs mentioning here: the unprecedented influx of diggers to Tlaping in March 1920 created a massive local labour shortage which was only filled by the arrival of many labourers from outside of the Reserve area. Many of these workers, some with families, others single migrants from other parts of the country, were closely associated with the alluvial diggings of the south western Transvaal and constituted a floating labour pool for diggers: the Pass Officer at Bloemhof described them as:

"a fairly large roving population who come here to work on the alluvial diamond diggings. These come from the Cape, a very large percentage being Xhosa from Kaffraria, and Sesotho from Basutoland."⁵⁷

In early 1915 it was estimated that 95 percent of the labour working on those diggings along the border of the Transvaal were drawn from Taungs itself.⁵⁸ This percentage declined in 1920. However an important development, the direct result of the labour shortage, was the appearance, from about July 1919 of large numbers of Reef Africans on the alluvial fields of the Transvaal.⁵⁹ Increasingly in this period injections of "foreign" Africans was noted. This was an important theme on the Tlaping diggings:

Where "strangers" (or Matabeles" as they are called) are brought upon these fields (Tlaping) trouble is likely to occur, both by reason of their close proximity to their white employers, dishonest or bad treatment by the latter, or the interference with, thievery, and assaults of the so-called "Matabeles" upon the local Kaffirs. Assaults and thefts are bitterly complained of by both the Chief and his Councillors.⁶⁰

Ethnic conflicts overlaid competition for increasingly scarcer work and created a unique situation at Tlaping where migrants from outside the Reserve were utilised to pressure down wages which were demanded by the Tlaping workers in the Reserve.⁶¹

This brief examination of the social relations of production on the Tlaping diggings illustrates some of the drawbacks which the proclamation of this field within the Reserve had. These are perhaps well summarised by Walker in his report on Scurvy on Doyles Prospect in December 1920:

So far as the Natives are concerned (he wrote) this Alluvial Diamond Digging Industry, if it can be considered as such, brings little or no profit to them.

The conditions under which they live, he continued, are "not conducive to improving their systems much less their minds..".

It is thought that this Department (NAD) should think twice before acceding to any requests to open further ground in the Native Reserve, the employer through an influx of labour offers a smaller wage although the cost of living has not decreased, stock-thefts naturally increase as the labourer finds it difficult to make both ends meet, his system becomes impoverished, his earning capacity is considerably lessened and finally he becomes a source of anxiety to the State was well as an expense.⁶²

Given all these negative points, which were well known and commented upon by contemporaries⁶³, including the fact the digging community was notoriously neglectful of their duties towards their African workers and that they were unmoved by appeals as to the advantages of separate locations and living areas, highly ambiguous as to attitude toward the pass system and police supervision, and not averse to utilising "doubtful" methods of working, how to account for the fact that Tlaping was ever proclaimed? We need then to look at some of the local pressures working on the various officials at the time. We need to examine the extent to which local wants meshed with national priorities and the extent to which pragmatism rather than principle was an important element in this thinking.

PART TWO

Whilst Proclamation 88, Number 220 of 1895 and the Annexation Act Number 41 of 1895 provided that the Taungs Reserve would remain inalienable and the Cape Government had stated that "They (were) prepared to assure their Majesty's Government that they (would) not introduce legislation for altering the existing arrangements or law .. as to land in the Native Reserves", nevertheless within four years an Act was passed in the Cape Parliament namely the Precious Stone Act, Number 11 of 1899, which inferred that the British

Bechuanaland Reserves, for the purposes of prospecting could be considered as Crownland.⁶⁴ Section 125 of that Act enacted that in practice digging operations could take place on the Reserves, and provided for compensation for such surface damage. It is unclear at this stage as to whether this provision was explicitly formulated by the legislature of the Colony in the specific interests of the digging community along the Vaal River - a community which was well-established and politically articulate in the 1890's. What is more clear though is that the provisions of the Precious Stones Act of 1899 must have drawn on similar settler ideological well-springs as those which informed the treatment by the Cape Government of the Native Reserves of British Bechuanaland following the 1897 Langeberg Rebellion by certain Thlaping politics.⁶⁵ We will encounter this idea again in 1914 when diggers pointedly refer to these Reserves as "locations", and to the African communities on this land as "squatters" on Crown land.⁶⁶ In 1907 the Mineral Law Amendment Act number 16 of 1907 referred to the British Bechuanaland Reserves as Crown land for the purposes of the Act (Section 50) and reference was made to payment of compensation for surface damage from prospecting or digging.⁶⁷ The action of the legislature in this instance is a little easier to follow; from 1901 we know that a great amount of pressure was placed on the Cape Government by a flourishing digging community along the River, and their interests championed by an important body, the Vaal River Diggers' Union (VRDU) formed at Windsorton in 1904.⁶⁸ A number of applications were made by interested parties for permission to prospect in the Taungs Reserve; for in February 1901 a Kimberley Syndicate applied for a permit to prospect for coal there. The Attorney General, clarified the position as regards prospecting in the Reserves: the only reservations in favour of the Crown within these Reserves were gold, silver, platinum and precious stones, and the Crown could therefore only regulate prospecting licences on the Reserve for this type of prospecting and for which the Crown was obliged under the Act of 1899 to grant licences.⁶⁹ In respect of other minerals, in this case coal, the Government had no power to limit the issue of licences, he advised that the Resident Magistrate should ascertain the wishes of the "Chief and the people; then the Bona-fides of the applicant, and only grant licences on such conditions."⁷⁰ But licences granted under this scheme were seen by one of the African chiefs in the Reserve, Molala Mankuroane, as the thin edge of the wedge of dispossession. In October 1902 Reverend J.S.Moffat reported an interview with Molala, who "complained of prospecting for coal on the Taungs Native Reserve", by Mallett and Bowen, James West of Kimberley and de Kock of Mafeking. Molala suspected (and so did Moffat) that prospecting within the Reserve was "aimed at disturbing the Natives by mining and if that fail(ed) by worrying them into rebellion as in the case of Galishwe.." and that these Europeans were encouraged in this attitude by Gerald Donovan, a "champion land grabber."⁷¹ Moffat was of opinion that Taung, then and now should have been treated as a "Native Territory" and not as a Reserve.⁷² Considerable unrest among the Bathlaping

at Tuangs followed this incident and this contributed to the circulation of rumours that prospecting was the cause of some chiefs in the area moving from the Taungs district to the Transvaal, south east of Vryburg.⁷³

A licence to prospect for gold was granted in 1902 to Mr. Brophy but it appears that a number of prospectors tried to gain entry to the Reserve on the pretext of prospecting for coal.⁷⁴ In April 1906 Molala interviewed the Prime Minister at Cape Town with regard to the right to prospect for precious minerals and precious stones on the Reserve; he was assured that "all applications had to be referred back (from the Mines Department) to be submitted to the Chiefs (and) if coal were found in payable quantities negotiations with Molala would take place as to development (but) the land would not be taken away from him."⁷⁵ Molala was understandably worried about the fact that prospecting for base minerals could go on in the Reserve without reference to him and that this was the real cutting edge for dispossession. It does appear as if the Cape Government supported Molala's fears on this issue, for in 1906 an application from Mr. H.R. de Noon to prospect for coal on the Taungs Reserve was refused by the Surveyor General of the Cape. After scratching around for some reason for this refusal the Resident Magistrate was informed (reluctantly) that this had been done because of opposition from Molala who had opposed the application on the grounds that the Reserve was already inadequate and prospecting might lead to land loss and occupants would be removed and "press on others". Also the inevitable mining regulations would be burdensome - an oblique reference to the treatment of Africans in the Barkley West locations - and that the mining population would bring evil and crime.⁷⁶

The 1907 Act, it is probable, was passed with the purpose of clarifying this dilemma, and to take power out of the hands of sympathetic officials. The Imperial Authorities were not consulted prior to the promulgation of Act 16 of 1907, nor was their attention drawn to the fact that this act "contemplated the issue of mineral leases and thus alienation".⁷⁷ When this point was brought to the notice of the Colonial Office, however the Cape Ministry, assured the Colonial Office that "no hardship (would) be allowed to fall on the inhabitants of these Reserves from the provisions of the ..Act", and in a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, The Earl of Crewe, "expressed his

confidence that the Native policy consistently adopted by the Colony (afforded) an adequate guarantee that no hardship (would) be allowed to fall on the inhabitants of these Reserves from the provisos of the new Act."⁷⁸ The Cape Government therefore laid down strict conditions under which prospecting in the Reserves could take place in a Cape Government Notice number 396 of 1909.⁷⁹ Prospecting for precious stones was effectively forbidden by decree in the Reserve then as a result of Colonial office pressure in 1908; the provisions of this Cape Government Notice were extended with launching of Union.⁸⁰

In 1911 a new salvo was fired by prospectors when Mr.C.Wahl applied to the Resident Magistrate at Taung for the right to prospect for base minerals in the Taungs Reserve. Mr.Withers, the RM there, prefaced this application with a note stating his attitude quite clearly to the question of prospecting there: "I have not consulted the Natives regarding this application (he said) but I know that they are strongly opposed to any prospecting being carried on within the limits of this Reserve. I would respectfully suggest that prospecting on the Taungs Reserve (he continued) be prohibited."⁸⁰ The Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr.E.Barret nevertheless instructed him to ascertain the feelings of the "Natives" in this regard, and on the 17th and 18th of July 1911 a series of mass meetings were held in the Taungs and Manthe areas of the Reserve. Not surprisingly the RM reported that "all the Natives present unanimously objected to any prospecting being permitted on the Reserve." At all the meetings, the RM continued, "I was implored by the Natives present to point out to the Government that if prospecting operations are permitted on the Reserve, which in all probability would result in a portion of the territory being proclaimed an Alluvial Digging, they are bound to suffer as it would be a means of introducing into their midst many undesirable characters and consequently the comfort and safety of their wives and children would be placed in jeopardy."⁸¹ It is important to note the reasons advanced by the RM as to his opinion why the Africans on the Reserve should have objected to this move: any Residents within the proclaimed area would be compelled to remove and "then the question arises as to where they are to be located", was his first reason; secondly, any compensation offered to the "natives" although it would in all probability be accepted, "(would) not pacify the native.. (rather) the fact that his home had been broken up and the ground occupied by him and handed over to a white man (would) always rankle in his mind and his confidence in the

Government bound to be shaken." This reasoning is interesting as it probably draws on local knowledge of the Reserve politics: in May 1911 for instance it being reported that a "combined conspiracy" was afoot among all the Bechuana tribes including those within the Protectorate, to rise against the Government and that the Chief Lethlogolie's frequent visits to Taungs in this month were for this purpose. Also a smouldering dispute within the Reserve between the Chiefs Malala Mankuroane and Moshesh Kgantlapane over rights to grazing land for their respective followers, probably fuelled by an increased pressure on land and resources, had made the issue of any further alienation of Reserve land a potentially inflammable issue in Taungs. In May 1910 a boundary line had for the first time been drawn between the two chiefs by Special Commissioner J.B.Moffat, to the satisfaction of Moshesh and bitter opposition of Malala.⁸² The RM drew on this knowledge when advancing his third justification for his position:

My experience (he stated) is that if the principles of the Bechuanas are to be raised it can only be done by segregation, by that I mean there must be some means by which the territory which has been set apart for occupation by them should be so roped in that any European wishing to carry on business or settle within that area can only do so on the express permission of the Government.

He then went on to relate his experience of alluvial diamond digging on the river:

If any portion of that area is proclaimed a public digging the Government is powerless to prohibit any undesirable from taking up his abode on such digging, and in the heart of the Reserve we may have men and women who would by their conduct tend to demoralise the Native, and all the good work we have done in the past will be rendered nugatory.. if digging operations are permitted in this Reserve the Natives will be deprived of the land which has been reserved for them and their rights will be interfered with."⁸³

Barret was convinced by this reasoning, quoting with obvious satisfaction the Prime Minister, Louis Botha's assurance to Chief Lekoka Montsiwa that the Government had no intention of interfering with the rights of Africans on reserved lands.⁸⁴ General Smuts, then Minister of Mines, agreed to the principle of closing the Taungs Reserve to prospectors but with an eye on his political constituency he refrained from publishing the Regulation.⁸⁵ Smuts

did a similar thing with a Bill drafted by his Department to bring all legislation in the Union as regards alluvial digging for Precious Stones into line. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that Smuts' strategy was not to alienate a rapidly growing political constituency on the newly opened Transvaal fields, which consisted chiefly of farmers from the south western districts.⁶⁵ Another important consideration in Smuts' thinking was the growth of a "passive resistance movement" amongst coloured and Indian licenced alluvial diggers in the Barkley West River diggings in 1911 increasingly directed through the auspices of the African Political Organisation and other local bodies, such as the Coloured Diggers Protection Association, which grew out of agitation directed at the VRDU's campaign against all non-white licenced diggers on the River. The rights of African licenced diggers on the River were at stake in this agitation.

Whatever Smuts' reasoning was, for the Taungs residents this delay resulted in the granting of an increasing number of prospecting licences on the Reserve for base minerals. But as was pointed out, it was difficult in practice to distinguish between prospecting for precious stones and for base minerals.⁶⁷

In April 1912, the RM hastily telegraphed the Secretary for Native Affairs asking if he had the power to limit the number of prospecting permits to 10 in total. He was informed that he had no authorisation to do so.⁶⁸ Smuts obviously hoped that unofficial restriction would be sufficient to keep the number of prospectors down, his reasoning being explained by Barret to the RM in September:

The Minister of Mines and General Hertzog do not consider that the time has yet arrived to justify (the closing of the Reserve to prospecting as) such an extreme step .. might hamper legitimate mining development; but, it is desired that in order to prevent the rights of Natives being unduly infringed you will exercise especial care in granting permission to persons to prospect on the Taung Reserve.⁶⁹

The passage of the 1913 Land Act however committed Smuts and Botha to a policy preserving the integrity of the Reserves and in that year Proclamation 271/1913 was published prohibiting all prospecting on the Reserve. It may also be that by 1913 the full implications of having these unregulated and ephemeral camps situated largely in areas outside of the boundaries of the local authorities became known.⁷⁰ But perhaps the most weighty reason was the extension of

prospecting operations, on a large scale, in the south western Transvaal in these years.⁹¹ Indeed, in 1913 prospecting took place on a number of farms squeezed between the border of the Reserve and the Transvaal boundary, including the farms Killarney, Home Rule and Kopje Enkel.⁹² This brought the Reserve community into direct geographical contact with a digger community and resulted in great conflict. Many of the Reserve males (and a number of women) had had by this time experience of working on the diggings, some in the Transvaal, others in Barkley West,⁹² but this experience was made less repugnant by the proximity of the Reserve where at critical periods they returned to from the scattered diggings (as frequent complaints from the diggers testified).⁹³

The Killarney proclamation was not a success and soon resulted in late 1913 in the collection of a motley crowd of diggers on the farm from a number of far-distant camps. Many diggers were reported to be stranded there not having the means to transport their families away. The shallow gravel on the farm had been quickly exhausted and the diggers cast an envious eye at the gravel run which snaked across the Harts River bed onto the adjoining Tlaping within the borders of the Taungs Reserve. Soon, a flurry of correspondence to the Mines Department occurred. Petitions were sent to the Prime Minister and meetings held on the fields. A Deputation was sent to see Mr. F. S. Malan at Cape Town headed by the Chairman of the Doyle's Prospect Diggers' Committee which returned with the news that the Minister would consider throwing open the Reserve if the permission of the inhabitants could be gained.⁹⁴ Mr. Nel the Chairman of the Diggers' Committee led a deputation across the boundary to interview "the Chief" (it is unclear whether this was Molala or Moshesh, a point which will become clearer later) who refused to give permission.⁹⁵ Angry meetings were held on both sides of the boundary fence; the atmosphere was described as electric, and rumours floated around concerning "the strike (on the Rand), the rising of the Swazis, Indians and Zulus..", that the Taungs "natives (had) risen and that several European women at Kopje Enkel had been murdered" (which resulted in a posse of burghers from Christiana and Schweizer Reneke rushing off to the farm), and diggers anxiously "demanded to know if the Government intended arming the inhabitants of the place so as to enable them to protect their wives and children in the event of trouble..".⁹⁶ The atmosphere on the Killarney diggings contrasted superbly with the written logic

of the petition sent to Malan, which set out the reasons as to why the Reserve should be thrown open, the ground in question was useless for agricultural purposes and incapable of supporting even "very little stock" and in short:

..a portion of ground useless for grazing and farming (would) be rendered productive of good towards all concerned and the Revenue derived in this way from Tlaping, in the event of proclamation, would go towards the expenditure which is necessary from time to time on the Reserves.⁹⁷

Also, at Killarney, where there was a large population of diggers and "natives" if proclamation took place these people would remain in the district to the "benefit of business people and to the benefit of the natives who instead of wandering about the country looking for work will be enabled to remain virtually in their Reserves." Unfortunately for the Killarney diggers, the basis for this request was the fact that in 1913 Gideon du Preez, a digger at Killarney had found diamonds on Tlaping in payable quantities which therefore justified proclamation of the farm.⁹⁸ This was of course an illegal act, as prospecting for precious stones in the Reserve was forbidden. It appeared as if a stalemate had been reached, at least in the minds of the officials, until an urgent telegram reached the office of the NAD from the RM at Taungs stating that on the 19th of May 1914 120 diggers from Killarney had illegally rushed the farm Tlaping.⁹⁹

Herbert Rees, Inspector of Claims at Barkley West, was hastily despatched to Tlaping, and his report of the 20th May confirmed the picture, that 120 diggers had rushed the place and pegged claims but only 5 diggers were in fact working their claims.¹⁰⁰ On the same day he, and the RM had an "excited" meeting with about 150 diggers at Killarney, "most of whom (he reported) were evidently determined to force matters." Rees attempted to convince these diggers of the errors of their ways by straight moral persuasion:

I explained as fully as I could the law of the land in connection with working on a prohibited area. I entered very fully into the rights of the Natives under the Annexation Act (and) the earnest efforts of the Government in the Natives Land Act to segregate the Natives and made a very solemn appeal, as their friend and one who had always done his best for them, to refrain from taking the Law into their own hands.¹⁰⁰

Rees might have saved his breath as the diggers gave the Government 8 days to accede to their demands. Their case, subsequently presented to Rees, was substantially different to that put forward in the Petition to the Prime Minister. Firstly, that the Government "having allowed prospecting to take place at Tlaping and diamonds in payable quantities being found, "was duty bound to proclaim the place an Alluvial diamond digging, more particularly as Section 124 of Act 11 of 1899 clearly (stated) that for the purposes of the Act, Native Reserves in British Bechuanaland (should) be considered as Crown Lands." This demand was of course in line with earlier settler legislation, as we have seen. The second point related specifically to the material circumstances of the digging community:

That Killarney Diggings are now worked out and in consequence there (was) great distress and poverty in the Cape. Many families are now starving and (now) that payable diamondiferous ground (was) in sight only a few hundred yards away which if they were allowed to dig would be the means of giving food and employment to hundreds of men, women and children.¹⁰²

That they were not able to work at Tlaping consequently prevented them from covering their expenses and the majority of them were therefore unable "to afford the expense of transporting themselves, their families and chattels to pastures new."¹⁰³ The Inspector of Claims was forced to admit the validity of both these arguments. His reports, he said, had gone to show that prospecting had taken place at Tlaping and the results would have warranted proclamation in other circumstances. He also reported a "good deal of distress at Killarney", this point being underscored by the inability of 38 of those diggers sentenced for rushing the Reserve to pay the 10s fine imposed, and having to go to goal for a week.¹⁰⁴

The fate of the Killarney diggers was sealed by the arrival of a force of over 100 S.A.M.R. to prevent the repetition of the events of 19th May.¹⁰⁵ Two important points emerge from this rather dramatic episode. Firstly, the hidden hand of the speculator behind this episode was once again detected by the Mines Department in the person of Mr.F.S. "Matabele" Thompson, well-known land speculator and farmer in the Harts River valley from the earliest days of colonisation.¹⁰⁶ Thompson stated Rees, "who knew the chief well and stands high in the estimation of the natives might be asked to interview the Chief(?) on the subject" of throwing open the Reserve. Thompsons plan was to sweeten

the pill by extracting a promise from the Department that "a half share of all the licences be paid by the Civil Commissioner to the credit of the Natives in return for permission to throw open 500 morgen of the Reserve."¹⁰⁷ The Mines Department refused to countenance this attempt by Thompson to, in effect, redistribute public property, and it seems probable that Thompson secured the withdrawal of permission to work the ground from Molala because of this point. It is not possible at this stage in my research to throw more light on the involvement of Thompson in this episode but Thompson's involvement with the diggers and on behalf of Molala in the later period leaves one with no doubt that he intended his pocket to be served.¹⁰⁸ The second point to be noted was the determination of the NAD to prevent the throwing open of Tlaping and in this they were supported by most members of the Cabinet,¹⁰⁹ although the move was by no means a popular one.¹¹⁰ The NAD may well have been convinced of the wisdom of such a move by the fact that Bathlaping workers at Killarney on the night preceeding the illegal rush had held meetings and decided to decamp to Taung to prevent the diggers from working the farm.¹¹¹

The attitude of the digging community is also very revealing of the kinds of pressures the Government was up against in its segregation programme. At a public meeting at Killarney on the 27th of May (the day set aside for the expiry of their deadline) a Committee of Diggers was elected to draft a letter to the Prime Minister in order to explain their attitude to the Reserves. The subsequent statement, signed by many prominent Transvaal diggers, is most revealing:

In our humble opinion (the statement ran) we consider Taungs Native Reserve Crownland.. and as such very different to other Native Reserves in South Africa. As Basutoland, for instance, which is a large and fertile country where thousands of natives are employed in farming pursuits. But in this part of Bechuanaland (Tlaping) we consider the native population nothing more or less than squatters, who depend for a living on various resources from outside industries.

They also made it quite clear that they felt they were used by interested parties in the episode and at the inexplicable volte-face by the "natives" who had initially seemed amenable to proclamation was part of this conspiracy. But more importantly they embroidered on the theme of dispossession and indigency as reasons why they as diggers should have the right to open access to Crown

Land on which the "natives" were squatting. The case of people being on the River, they stated:

..is certainly owing to the terrible long droughts and severe depressions that has prevailed for so many years in South Africa, and if the poor man could follow the plough and the wives rear chickens, the population on the diamond diggings would soon be decreased and we know that farming can only be carried on with a certain amount of capital which we have a chance of acquiring on these fields.²²²

The diggers who drafted this petition had a firm grasp on the kind of ideological appeals which would catch the Governments' ear; it is equally clear that they themselves were not farmers temporarily on the fields to attempt to recoup capital,²²³ although the constituency they were representing in most likelihood were.²²⁴ The leaders of this movement were professional diggers, many of them possessing limited amounts of capital and capable of large digging operations, for example H. Williams, C. Kolemenn, A. van der Merwe and W. H. Skardon.²²⁵ They were closely involved with early local digging politics on the Transvaal diggings in the 1910's, and many were elected representatives on local Diggers' Committees. Some, like H. Williams and A. van der Merwe were instrumental in launching the Transvaal Alluvial Diamond Diggers' Union in late 1918, but the extent of their personal influence can already be detected in an earlier period at Tlaping.²²⁶

The latter part of 1914 was a rather sensitive period for the Government, with the nervousness created by the 1914 strikes on the Rand and the collapse of the international diamond market, which resulted in the withdrawal of buyers representing the Diamond Syndicate from the diggings, together with large-scale movements of African workers consequently repatriated from the diggings back to their homes in the Taung, Vryburg, Kuruman and Mafeking Reserves.²²⁷ This in part helps to explain the reluctance of the Government to countenance the rushing of Tlaping; digging operations in the Transvaal and the Cape were severely disrupted by the Rebellion in August 1914, and the German South West African campaign in the next. Many diggers, more obviously in the Transvaal, were pro-rebel and this did not advance their case much, although the Government, through the Mines Department, did initiate relief schemes to get impoverished diggers back on the land, or into the employ of farmers.²²⁸ Throughout the duration of the war the Government remained reluctant to reopen

the question of prospecting in the Reserve. We can only hint at the kinds of considerations which supported this attitude; increasing population and stock pressure within the Reserve, more especially following the disastrous 1915/1916 season, together with completion of the fencing of white owned farms on the boundary of the Reserve - many of these farms being utilised for grazing purposes by Reserve inhabitants¹¹⁹ - and the removals of Bathlaping families from these farms back into the Reserve¹²⁰, raised the land question very dramatically in the minds of the chiefs and headmen in the Reserve.¹²¹ An example of this is provided by an incident involving the recruiting within the Reserve for the Overseas Native Labour Contingent in late - 1917; delegates to the 1917 Bloemfontein Conference of the South African Native National Congress (ANC) were reported to be fomenting unrest amongst the "natives of Bechuanaland" by spreading rumours that "under the Land Act the Government were going to take away the Taungs Reserve from (Molala) and his people. "A variation of the Land Act canard, wrote the Officer Commanding the SAMR at Vryburg, was been spread by emissaries from the Free State to the effect that the Government intended to take away the Taungs Reserve and throw it open to prospectors."¹²² Consequently, Molala refused to allow any of his young men to be recruited for the NLC. In August 1917 these rumours were strengthened by the appearance of a rebel Dutchman from the Free State in the Taungs Reserve who was using natives from that Province to stir up the Bechuanaland and Basutoland Natives. "We have been informed (he wrote) that the English are being beaten by the boers and that the former are going to seize all the Natives cattle and turn their land under the new Land Act..". Jantje Deering, in the Kuruman (Moroetwan Reserve) was reported to be collecting his people and to have gone into a state of rebellion as a result of these rumours.¹²³

Evidence given by residents within the Taungs Reserve in 1916 confirm the general impression gained from these reports as to an increasing shortage of grazing land in the district as farms on the border of the Reserve were taken up by white settlers under the land settlement schemes.¹²⁴ This was especially true of those farms in the Phokwani district confiscated from Galishwe Gasibone in 1897, which had not been occupied for a number of years but which were now being fenced and cleared of African "squatters". Gasibone followers had to compete for grazing and cultivation land within the Reserve,

and this increase the pressure on available land there. For the first time officials began to talk of a shortage of land and conflicts between the Chiefs became sharper. It is unclear from what point the earnings gained from migrancy by Reserve inhabitants became critical to the livelihood of families resident there: but indirect evidence gained from the records of the Pass Officer at Bloemhof and at Barkley West confirms a dramatic increase in the magnitude of migrancy to the diggings in these two districts in late-1918 and 1919.¹²⁵ One could perhaps suggest that this increase was not entirely due to the increase in digging operations in the Transvaal, as the increase in numbers of African migrants was quite unprecedented, whereas the increase in diamond production was not.¹²⁶ The importance of cash earnings from the diggings therefore appears to have become increasingly vital from the disastrous 1915/1916 season. Cattle losses in the 1917/1918 saw the appearance of large numbers of new migrants on the books of the Pass Officer at Bloemhof from the Taungs district. In the October 1920 womens store boycott at Taung Martha Twasing, wife of Mpore (a headman at Mochuding, within the Reserve) stated that "In this district we (now) depend on stores as we do not get nothing out of the ground."¹²⁷ Clearly then the basis of the Reserve economy had shifted and although a lot of work still needs to be done on this issue, we can say that the importance of cash earnings to reserve families was growing in the war years. Traditional leaders within the Reserve had opposed the opening of the Reserve to prospecting in the period preceeding the war and up to at least August 1917 this opposition was based on the need to preserve the integrity of the Reserve land. By early 1919 we can discern a definite shift in the attitudes of the Reserve Chiefs, Molala Mankuroane and Moshesh Kgantlapane, to this question of prospecting on the Reserve and of the virtues and grances of the alluvial digging industry within their country.

Part Three

The alluvial digging industry reached maturity in the years following on the troubles of 1915 -1918. Between 1910 and 1918 the centre of gravity of the industry shifted from the old Barkley West gravels, to the shallow gravels of the south western Transvaal and British Bechuanaland. The greatest extent of the shallow gravel lay in the region of Taungs and Mafeking, directly within the bounaries of the British Bechuanaland Reserves.¹²⁸ The question whether

these Reserves were to be opened to digging was thus bound to become a tricky political question, this more especially as the abnormally high price paid for alluvial diamonds from January 1919 attracted a large new population to the diggings. This is reflected in the value of alluvial diamonds produced in the Transvaal: between 1910 and 1918 these diggings produced diamonds to the value of two and a half million pounds but from 1919 to 1921 produced a further two and a half million.¹²⁹ A similar leap is apparent in the numbers of diggers - both licenced and unlicenced.¹³⁰ Some of the ramifications of this development should perhaps be dealt with very briefly: in late 1918 the Transvaal Alluvial Diamond Diggers Union was launched at Bloemhof, the centre of the Transvaal digging industry, to represent the interests of the white digger community. Like the VRDU at Barkley West, the TADDU was broadly populist¹³¹ focus looking after the interest of the "small, independent digger", but in practice (and in personnel) putting forward the aims and aspirations of a new generation of capitalising diggers.¹³⁰ We have already drawn attention to this stratum within the digging community in the 1914 Killarney rush episode. (see above) The very profitable year of 1919 (which resulted in the imposition of a 10% across the board profit tax on all diamonds sold) saw the growth of the TADDU as a very real pressure group on the Transvaal fields; a similar thing was apparent on the Barkley West diggings, with the VRDU gaining important leverage on the community there.¹³¹

Both the TADDU and the VRDU were deeply involved in pressurising the Government to recognise alluvial digging as an industry rather than the past-time of marginalised and indigent poor-whites. Thomas Halliwell, one of the founder members of the VRDU and prominent digger at Windsorton epitomised this class of producer. He considered that "the digging population (was) a distinct asset to the country; from the point of view of revenue (where it), put (money) back into circulation from mineral wealth from land that in many cases (had) little farming value; and as a consuming centre for farming products and other commodities produced and manufactured in the country to my mind (he continued) the order of recognition of the industries of this country, i.e. first, the agricultural farmer, secondly, the Mining industry, viz. gold, diamonds and base minerals, including alluvial gold, diamonds and tin, all the foregoing being the products of the ground."¹³¹ He placed the pastoral farmer (stock raiser) after the diamond and gold producer. Halliwell was but one example of

this increasingly self-confident group of diamond producers on the fields of the Transvaal and the Cape in the 1918/1919 period who were members of the diggers Unions. It was this class of producer who came to dominate the local political arena in the various digging camps and who increasingly dictated the nature and pace of accumulation there. Joint pressure from the TADDU and the VRDU led to the passage of the 1919 Precious Stones (Alluvial) Amendment Act which extended the Cape system of administration on the Transvaal fields by means of the issuing of diggers' certificates to prospective diggers through state funded diggers' committees.¹³² Consideration of the influence of these unions is beyond the scope of this paper, but we need to be aware of the manner in which the digging community, through its rapid growth was becoming a powerful lobby group in the districts concerned.¹³⁴

Increasing pressure from this quarter was noticeable in mid-1919; in July the (first) annual congress of the TADDU passed a resolution calling the opening of Tlaping to digging. This was not the first salvo to be fired in the post war years, on the 5th June 1919 Mr. E.J. Sydney and his partner, Mr. T. Bawd^{en} applied for a mineral lease on the farm Tlaping. Interestingly, they attached a number of voluntary provisos to their application - that they would not allow any interference with the Africans on the farm; that they were prepared to pay a certain percentage of the finds to the Government for disposal to the benefit of "the natives"¹³⁵. Needless to say, their application for turned down on the same grounds as those refused before the war. Bawden and Sydney had an accomplice within the NAD, Mr. F.C. Clark, who had suggested the addendums to their formal request. On the 21 July he informed them that their schemes were bound to go nowhere as more powerful interests were in the market and had failed:

I fear (he said).. that you have little chance of securing prospecting rights in the Tlaping Reserve (as) an application on behalf of the Comrades of the Great War for returned soldiers has recently been refused, and the Government is evidently afraid of the effect on the Native population of allowing prospecting or mining on the Bechuanaland Reserves.¹³⁶

A letter from the Secretary of the "Comrades of the Great War" addressed from Johannesburg had reached the NAD on the 14th July through the offices of the Commissioner for Returned Soldiers, Union Defence Force, Pretoria. It contained a petition from 60 soldiers who had returned from Overseas Service:

We are all old diggers (ran the petition) who have answered the call and done our duty to King and Country. Now that we have returned from Active Service, some of us partially disabled, we wish to go back to our old occupations, but having been out of touch with diamond digging for some considerable time, we naturally do not know where to make a start. As far as we can see we have arrived too late to get any decent ground..as all the ground has been taken up by men, the majority of whom think it is a great honour to have shirked their duty and are making thousands of pounds, as returns from Home Rule will prove.

The petition continued in a similar vein, stating that they were mostly formerly digging at Killarney, and "if we had remained at Killarney we would have been in the thick of it at Home Rule, but we preferred to do our duty". Not surprisingly they asked for the "special" opening of Tlaping to them as deserving cases for Government assistance:

What we propose is that the Government throw open Tlaping to Returned Soldiers, and that the number of claims allotted each soldie be in accordance with length of service (i.e. 4 years and over 5 claims, 3 years and over 4 claims, etc, etc)

The claims licence money (they continued), tax on diamonds etc, will handsomely pay the natives...It is certainly a far better proposition than farming, and will give much quicker and bigger returns. Then again it will cost the Government nothing, whereas it now costs Pounds 1200 to Pounds 1500 to put men on farms...¹³⁷

Like the petitioners of an earlier time, they dwelt on the insecurity and gambling element in agricultural pursuits; "Most of us are men who intend going farming when we have made sufficient (from digging). We want to buy out farms and we do not wish to be saddled with a debt of Pounds 1200 to Pounds 1500. Besides there is always the possibility of losing one's cattle and sheep through disease, in which case the Government will be the losers.."¹³⁸ This petition received the stamped approval from the Commissioner of Returned Soldiers who forwarded it to the Secretary for Mines and Industries. The Inspector of Claims at Barkley West, Mr. Audas, was then deputed to report on the scheme; he could find no rationale for preventing the working of the "undoubtedly" rich deposits on Tlaping especially in the light of the high diamond prices; "I consider (he stated) that the Government should open a portion of the Tlapin location as a trial, and if this could be worked without hinderence to the Natives then the area could be extended."¹³⁹ Most of the

"natives" living in the locality of the diggings, be noted, were diggers' labourers and were mostly employed at Home Rule, and in the Transvaal diggings, "These natives I know are in favour of the diggings being opened as they would benefit by having work near their homes.." Clearly this was a new development: the subsequent feasibility survey of Tlaping by Audas and the Bloemfontein Inspector of Mines, Mr R.B.Frood, was short and to the point. Tlaping was a payable proposition, and this had been a well known fact for a number of years; but as Frood stated these were not the real questions in this case. Rather, these were those "connected with the justification, or otherwise, for infringing on the integrity of a Native Reserve, and of the compensations to be given and safeguards exercised in case of infringements":

In both the main questions of Principle and Policy involved (he continued) and in the subsidiary questions of compensation, it appears to me that the NAD is most intimately concerned, and that it will be impossible for the Miners Department to do anything itself.²⁴⁰

The NAD attitude was that the interests of the natives had to be safeguarded - at least this had been so previous to 191, as we have seen. But had the interests of the "natives" changed over these years?

On the 22nd of August 1919 John O'Brien and Bernard Brophy requested permission to meet with the Minister of Native Affairs to discuss digging on Tlaping. Their boldness was a direct result of having secured a "concession" from Moshesh Kgantlapanne, Chief at Mantie within the Taung's Reserve, for the right to act as managers of a limited (restricted) alluvial digging there. The agreement, signed on the 16 of August, contains some interesting pointers to the kinds of pressures Moshesh was experiencing at Taung's in 1919. His reasons for granting this prized contract to O'Brien (a former ^{employee} of the De Beers Mining Company's Kimberley closed location, and now a digger at Home Rule) and Brophy (a storekeeper within the Reserve, and speculator) ^{were directly} associated with the pressures on the Reserve economy of the necessity of migrant work away from the Reserve for men:

"Our crops have been poor and were it not that a number of my people have been employed of late years on the Alluvial Diggings, of Killarney, Italie and Home Rule, which are close to my Reserve distress amongst us would have been very acute. A number of our able bodied men found employment on the (Rand) mines, and elsewhere far from their homes, but in most cases their money is squandered before they return and their dependents therefore reap very little benefit therefrom.

The acute labour shortage was also responsible for the employment of all classes of labour on these alluvial diggings: "On the Alluvial Diggings, as well as the able bodied men, the blind, maimed and feeble find jobs which are a blessing to themselves and their dependents."¹⁴¹ This decision was a fundamental break with the past and gives ^{us} an important pointer ^{to} the periodisation of the ^{collapse of the Reserve economy in this area}

Moshesh did not however give the concession unconditionally. He attached a number of conditions to his signature:

- 1) That no intoxicating drinks be supplied or given natives on my Reserve
- 2) That no labourers other than my people be employed without my consent.
- 3) That no animals other than my peoples be allowed to graze on the Reserve except with my permission.
- 4) That no wood be cut without my permission.
- 5) That headmen or men appointed by me to act as such, be employed to assist in policing the prescribed area.
- 6) That no women be employed on the diggings without my consent.
- 7) That no fresh trading rights be granted without my consent,

Mosiesu was protecting his vested rights with these conditions; large profits were being made on private farms in the Transvaal from the rights of landowner to control the issue of licences for wood, grazing, and trading within the proclaimed areas. His attempt to preserve a labour area only for Batlaping was however unprecedented, as was his ^{suggestion to} ~~use of~~ Batlaping overseers to enforce this. Brophy's and O'Reilly's concession really set the ball rolling in the latter part of 1915. On the 22 October, Mr F. R. "Matabele" Thompson, produced an ^{signed between} agreement ^{between} himself and ^{Paramount} Chief Molala Mankurane, Taungs Reserve, granting to Thompson and his heirs sole rights of his interests within the Taungs Reserve to prospect and work all minerals on a number of conditions. Molala's claim to Paramountcy within the Reserve revived the still-smouldering boundary dispute between Molala and Mosiesu, which as we have seen emerged in 1910. ¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the SNA was of the opinion that the "wily Molala" was using Thompson as a tool to forward his campaign ^{to be} recognised as Paramount Chief within the Reserve. Thompson's concession from Molala differed in tone and content to that of Brophy and O'Reilly's. Thompson and his heirs were granted sole rights within the Taungs Reserve to prospect and work all minerals on a number of conditions:

- a) Molala to receive half share of all licence money and a quarter of the nett profits derived from stands and site rents and any other monies (water, grazing and wood).
- b) An area of one morgan square was to be marked off as where diamond digging could take place. Once worked out a further area to be demarcated.
- c) There would be no restriction on Thompson's digging operations as regards the water used for mining or digging purposes.
- d) Thompson will be the first prospector and the owner of the digging Reserve (ie the 200 owners and 100 discoverers claims). He could therefore claim "for men, and both prospectors and owners' claims shall be worked on the basis of (Molala) receiving ten percent of the nett profits" after all Thompson's expenses were met.
- e) Molala guaranteed that there would be no interference with those of his people who chose to work for the diggers: "The question of wages (he stated) will be left to work out as between masters and servant."

Thompson's concession was granted on a similar basis as that given to Brophy and O'Brien by Mosiesu; ". Mr Thompson and myself have known each other since boyhood days and in him I have full confidence." ¹⁴⁵ Molala recognised that the diamond diggers were increasing their pressure on the Government and "that sooner or later (he would) have to yield to their wishes."

There is no doubt that pressure was increasing for the extension of digging operations to Tlaping in the latter part of 1915, and we have already noted that ~~the appearance of~~ the League of Comrades of the Great War and the TADDU (as well as the VRDU) were pushing for this. However the Government initially rejected these petitions on the grounds that the NAD had not seen fit to modify its standpoint that prospecting in the Reserves was the main end of African dispossession and demoralization. The NAD's attitude was close to the wedge that ~~of the~~ ^{at Tlaping, in Kachungland,} London Missionary Society in November 1914

the Reverend Tom Brown, Chairman of the South African Committee of the LMS ^{urged} P.S. Malan not to allow Tlaping Native Reserve to be opened to diamond digging. "as to do so would not be to the benefit of the natives of the Reserves, nor any one except to the financial benefit of a few Europeans. If even a portion (he continued) of the Reserve were to be proclaimed it would not be long before the whole Reserve would be overruled" ¹⁴⁶ "we need scarcely to remind you (he concluded) that already there is a great deal of unrest among the Natives owing to the fear that the Government is attempting to drive them into the waterless and uninhabitable parts of the country, and I fear that if "diggings" are ~~done~~ opened up in the Tlaping Reserve the old fear will be revived that the Reserve is to be taken away from them." ¹⁴⁷ Both the NAD and the missionaries purported to speak on behalf of the African Reserve inhabitants; now that Molala and Moshele had both given their apparent approval to the throwing open of Tlaping the NAD especially was put in an awkward position.

the NAD ^{was convinced that there was more} granting of ^{than met the eye} of these concessions ^{to the}
Molala Mankwane, it appears, had no ideological problems with digging on the Reserve at all; he was however concerned to strictly regulate digging in his interests of his ^{own} pocket. In 1914 Thompson would have secured his signature if it could have been guaranteed that Molala receive a half share of the licence monies, and some return from actual digging operations. ¹⁴⁸ Molala's financial interests were also apparent in his later dealings with Thompson. ¹⁴⁹ But Molala had a further aim in mind than mere financial reward- he utilised the claims of the digging community and that of speculators to forward his local claims to

to Paramountcy within the Taung's Reserve. If the Government recognised the terms of Molala's concession to Thompson (to grant sole rights within the Reserve for all minerals) the implication would be that ^{Moshesh} had subordinate rights to him. The roots of the conflict lay in the destruction of the Tlaping politics by Colonial forces in the period 1871 to 1877. ¹⁵⁰ Molala's claim to Paramountcy of the Bathlaping was based both on the assumption that at the time of the Annexation the Imperial Government recognised his father, Mankuroane as Paramount Chief of Taung's, and that Kgantlapane, ^{Moshesh's} father, was ^{only a headman of} ~~always subordinate~~ Mankuroane, placed at Mantle by him. ¹⁵¹ But, as Power pointed out, the Imperial Government never recognised Molala as Paramount; the letter of his appointment as Chief in 1877 expressly stated ^{so that} ^{Also} the position at the time of Annexation was that Kgantlapane was exercising independent jurisdiction at Mantle, as Chief of the Baga-Maidi clan of the Bathlaping. ¹⁵² In view of the conditions agreed upon at Annexation and the terms of the Annexation Act, the position could not be altered. ¹⁵² Subsequent developments, such as the drawing up of an official boundary line between the two followings, and frequent violations of the line ^{only highlighted the conflict between the two} ~~only highlighted the conflict between the two~~ "Chiefs". Whatever the rights or wrongs of this Colonial dispensation, it is necessary for our purposes to note the manner in which Reserve politics intersected with the interests of the white settler community on the Reserves border. Thompson's concession campaign offers an interesting spotlight on this issue. Thompson was a late arrival in the race to secure permission to prospect on the Reserve. His application was received only in late September 1894, 4 months after Sydney's application for a mineral lease within the Reserve, 3 months after the Comrades of the Great War, and one month before Brophy and O'Brien's concession from Moshesh. ¹⁵³ Thompson's application was however based on the assumption that Molala was Paramount Chief of the "Bathlaping at Taung's", and therefore he had the sole right to give permission within the Reserve; Moshesh's concession was therefore invalid. Thompson's case is a nutshell:

It may be stated (he said) by some applicants that Moshesh Kgantlapane was willing to open Tlaping but this territory was within the Taung's Reserve (and) Moshesh is only a sub-headman living at Mantle. He has no territorial rights. His father's people were immigrants

32.
from the Free State, just opposite Bloemhof and when driven out by the Free Staters sought refuge ~~at~~ from Molala's grandfather..(who settled them at Mantie). 154

Thompsons agreement, submitted on the 22 October 1915 was with Molala, the "only Paramount Chief": "His father Mankuroane who was Paramount Chief in my younger days(wrote Thompson) was the only one from whom the British first got the title and who agreed to come under British Rule.. The Native Affairs (Department) can bring forward no objections saying that the "Natives will be upset". The entire population speaking through the Chief and the Regent and ~~the~~ ^{High} Apparat and the ten Councillers have no objection (to his concession). 155
Thompsons conscious manipulation of tribal lore in his own interests is manifest and he certainly utilised his own standing as ~~the~~ ^{the first} British Inspector of Native Locations in Griqualand West to try and pressurise the officials of the Union Department of Native Affairs into ~~questioning their standpoint~~ ^{questioning their standpoint} Barrett ~~the~~ ^{the} advice to Malan, the Minister of Native Affairs was studiously correct. 156

Kgatlapanane (Mosmesa's father) was recognised as chief by the Commission of 1895 and the Cape Government from 1905 and has been recognised as so ever since and Mosmesa and Molala's area are separated by Parliament. Tlaping falls within Mosmesa's area and therefore Beoplys and O'Briens concession takes precedence. The estate Molala had was not even surface rights to Tlaping is merely using Thompson.. to secure recognition of his claims to Paramountcy.. ~~the~~ ^{the} rights ~~are~~ ^{are} however reserved to the Crown by ~~the~~ ^{the} Proclamation 220/10,5 British Bechuanaaland. 156

Thompson received a firm rebuttal from the Mines Department as to his attempt to be recognised as first prospector ¹⁵⁷ and from the Native Affairs Department ~~regarding~~ ^{regarding} his alliance with Molala ¹⁵⁸. He subsequently turned to less academic means of extracting the concession from the Government; when news leaked out of the imminent proclamation of Tlaping in early December 1915, Thompson wrote to the Minister of Native Affairs that Molala had determined on one of three courses: a) to go with his headmen to discuss the whole question of the division of his Reserve and the acknowledgment of a sub-chief as having the right to grant the Government without his consent the opening of his Reserve for Diamond Digging ¹⁵⁹ with the Governor General. b) to discuss the matter with Malan and to come to some amicable arrangement and c) to at once enter action against the Government in the Supreme Court for a declaration of rights. 160. ~~the~~ ^{the}

Thompson traded on the frequent disturbances which had resulted from the earlier boundary dispute between Molala and Moshesh: "I have to tell you there are going to be difficulties and increasing trouble (in the Reserve as a result of this action)... I beseech you to come to some agreement before it is too late. I am ready to assist the Government in every way (and) it can be arranged amicably if you really wish. It will not cost a fraction. On the other hand if you turn a deaf ear to this the responsibility does not lie with me..."¹⁶¹

Thompson's campaign secured the temporary suspension of the Tlaping proclamation and in the interim (January to March) the Government decided what to do with Thompson and Molala's claim: Barrett wrote to Malan on the 3rd of January in somewhat guarded terms - "As you are aware Chief Molala has not legally a leg to stand on, but it seems fairly obvious that he is largely under the thumb of Mr Thompson who might for his own ends ^{persuade the} old man to carry out the veiled threat referred to... It seems somewhat difficult to determine (he continued) whether this is merely bluff, or whether Chief Molala does seriously contemplate attacking Chief Moshesh and his people or resorting to other measures of violence."¹⁶²

The M at Taung was ^{less equivocal:} "Thompson actuated entirely by selfish motives. He hoped to make mint money out of his concessions. His interference in tribal matters Taung's natives mischievous and should be discouraged..."¹⁶³ On the 13th of January Thompson played his last card, as it appeared as if Molala was not prepared to resort ^{to the actual} violence intimated earlier in the year. He sent a compromise agreement to Malan suggesting that the matter could be resolved if 3 conditions be accepted:

- a) The Chief Molala should be recognised as Paramount Chief at Taung.
- b) That half licences and rents should be paid over to the natives.
- c) That Moshesh and Molala should conjointly receive 50 claims each. Molala by virtue of his authority to receive a greater proportion (of the area) than Moshesh.

If the matter were not resolved in this way, Thompson continued, three things would result; Molala would apply for an interdict to halt the proclamation, "nullness on the Reserve" would result and the confidence of the natives in all the Reserves of South Africa would be shaken., and thirdly, Molala would ^{withdraw all his workers} from the Lime Works within the Reserve and the alluvial diggings, which

would cause a "serious deadlock in the labour market of the district." 164

The reply of the Minister was dismissive, perhaps finally realising the hollow of the threats alluded to by Thompson. 165 In a final note ^{to the Minister} ~~from~~ Thompson referred back to the principles behind the proclamation of a Native Reserve area without the permission of the "natives":

With full submission and respect Sir, (he stated) I warn you that the opening up of the Taungs Reserve without the consent of its Chief and tribe is going to cause a great revulsion and is going to shake the confidence of all the native Chiefs and people from Kuama's ~~Reserve~~ Protectorate to Zululand Western Territories, Basutoland and in the Colony. 166

But Malan was satisfied that he had in fact received the permission of the Chief and his people. On the 20th of November ¹⁶⁶ Malan ^{had} met with Moshesh and his Councillers ^{in the} Taungs Reserve to consider the throwing open of Tlaping. Moshesh's one request was that " ~~the diggings should be~~ If the diggings are proclaimed they will not be a public diggings. If so (he continued) I fear disturbances will occur." 167

The rational behind his granting of a concession to Brophy and O'Reilly becomes clearer when we examine the reasons for this desire that the diggings be closed to the general public: "I have (had) some experience of public diggings (he said). We can even claim our daughters as our own... a concession should be granted only to certain individuals and provision should be ^{concerning} made ~~as~~ stock so they (diggers and our own) don't get mixed up." Matlile of Mantle, a headman of Moshesh, was a little more harsh: "Our experience of diggings is a bad one. We have had a number of thefts as a result of the diggings at home Rule... (and) we lost a lot of cattle that is why we are against the Public Diggings. At home Rule there are a lot of nooligans and people were killed but the murderers were not discovered." 168 Malan's report of the meeting differed substantially from that of Moshesh and his Councillers. Malan came back to Pretoria stating that the matter had been easily settled: Proclamation would take place under three conditions, namely that the area to be proclaimed (500 morgan) would be demarcated and fenced off, secondly, half of the licence fees would be paid into the Bechuanaland Native Fund ^{to} ~~and~~ be used for the purposes of protecting the interests of the natives, and thirdly, that proper police supervision would be ensured to prevent friction

between all concerned. ¹⁶⁵ Moshesh, he reported, tried to demand that only his "Kaffirs" be used as labourers on the Flaping diggings, but he continued, "I stand (that) by limiting the area you limit the number of diggers, and if you decide to throw open I will have it fenced off, but) I cannot make any regulations.. as to limiting the other natives from other tribes." ¹⁷⁰ Malan also rejected the claims of Molala stating that Molalas people want to remain neutral and ^{Continuing with the idea that Taungs (and Flaping) was Crown Land, the Mines Department refused to recognise the "concession" of Brophy and O'Brien; no discoverers and owners claims were granted and no prospecting took place on Flaping. This latter development was the result of continuing pressure on the Mines Department (of which Malan was also minister) by the TADDU and the League of Comrades of the Great War and the promoter, the Commissioner for Returned Soldiers. ¹⁷¹}

Moshesh's view of the agreements entered into in November with Malan were encapsulated in a "national Petition from the Batlapin of Maiti for their Chief concerning the Diggings at Flaping" presented to the M.A.D on the 9th of December 1913. The rules and regulations put forward included:

- a) When the Flaping diggings are worked there should be no permission given to the Xhasas and their tribesmen to work..(only) Batlapins and their Basutos.
- b) There should be a rule that no tea meeting, no concert, nor any entertainment be held at night.
- c) That no beer, Secwana or Brandy should be drunk or sold at the diggings.
- d) That no native woman should work for another native man or be hired by him.
- e) Any woman or women going to the Flaping diggings for work is bound to work for white men only.
- f) The government should choose six Becwanas of Maitis (Moshesh's) tribe as Policemen. ¹⁷²

Subsequent meetings between the representatives of the Mines Department and the digging community reveal that a number of these "rules and regulations" were ~~to~~ unofficially ~~accepted by the diggers~~ and unconditionally recognised by the digging community: "The Committee (noted the M at Taungs) agreed that the Natives wishes be granted and that labour should be drawn from the Taungs Location only.. (the diggers) would not ~~bring~~ ^{bring} ~~bring~~ labour on the diggings if the supply of their requirements was guaranteed by the Headman of the Location. In the event of outside natives being brought onto the the diggings (the committee continued) ..each tribe be placed in

a separate ^{compound} ~~location~~. Any digger found supplying drink to natives should have diggers' certificate cancelled. and no unmarried woman not employed on the diggings should be allowed to remain there." ¹⁷³ It seems probable that it was necessary to affect some local compromise between the digging community and the Mosles to secure Mosles's approval for the ^{proclamation} ~~announcement~~ of Tlaping. ¹⁷⁴

These negotiations prior to the opening of Tlaping ^{therefore} show ^{the} degree to which the M.A.D. and to a certain extent the digging community and the general public, were ^{in their actions} constrained by a very definite ^{discourse} that the Africans within the Reserves were subject to the customary control of the ^{traditional} ~~local~~ authorities ~~and~~ who had to be convinced of the wisdom and necessity of an alienation of rights, before such would be countenanced. It is also interesting to note that the Reserve authorities were mobilised by ethnic fears of ^{rival} ~~other~~ tribes within "their" traditional ^{territory} ~~reserves~~. AND that they saw the resolution of such fears ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ terms of segregationist ideology. Tlaping was not proclaimed under any special regulations and the informal agreements between the digging representatives transacted on the 6th of December 1915 soon collapsed under the sheer pressures of numbers. The rush to Tlaping was quite unprecedented and a severe local labour shortage soon saw the influx of thousands of "foreign" Africans into the Batlaping Reserve. ¹⁷⁵ Moslesu and his councillors raised the problems associated with this at a meeting in May 1927 with the M.A. M., and the Superintendent of Natives at Taung, to consider the extension of digging to Doyle's Prospect (the adjoining portion of Tlaping). One of Moslesu's headmen, Tuuna, stated the problem directly:

The Matabeles (foreign natives) who are not the owners of the (Taung) Reserve are causing trouble. At the beginning (of digging) we asked that they should be separated from the Batlapins and it was not done. Now they are stealing our stock. ¹⁷⁶

Another ~~asked~~ asked "How is it that the Matabeles are defeating it (the Government)? They are stealing our stock and the Government cannot drive them away."

Ralenon, a commoner at Tlaping asked the question: "How is it that if the Reserve is ours, the Government should prevent any Natives we don't want from coming in because they are destroying our stock?" ¹⁷⁷ Moslesu's demand was that the

Matabeles ^{many of whom} were not working, should be cleared off the diggings. ¹⁷⁸ Many

complainants also directed attention at the low rates of pay on the diggings. Others raised the unsatisfactory relations of production between worker and employer:

We say the diggings can be extended (stated Thuna) if the diggers will pay 30/- a week to labourers because foodstuff is very dear. Some of the white men say they don't find diamonds yet they want the diggings extended. We don't want poor men who will not pay the labourers. ¹⁸⁰

Tota Satiiba, one of Moshes's Councillors, was of the opinion that "if the labourers are well paid the diggers may be allowed to dig within the ground fenced but that there should be no further extension. The digging people spoil the pri- (of labour) ^{because} as they don't wish to pay the people well. They say they will pay so much and then run away with the boys money..", ¹⁸¹ These conditions, stated Moshes, were the result of the Government ignoring the wishes of the inhabitants of the Reserve prior to proclamation. No further ground would be opened this time if the ^{demands were not met with} and this included pay for Batulaping workers of 25/- per week. ¹⁸² On the 11th of June 1920 these demands were considered by the Doyles Prospect Diggers Committee Chairman in conference with Moshes, and eight of his councillors:

We want to protect the natives (stated Rood) in regard to strange natives as far as our powers allow.. We shall ask the Government to give us full powers. We shall ask for the introduction of passes. The Government can then appoint an official or we can appoint one and keep a check on natives in the locations.

In regard to diggers running away with labourers pay.. we will do all we can to prevent this and have the defaulting diggers prosecuted..

As regards Moshes's demand for 25/- a week for pay, Rood promised that the diggers would pay the best prices they could. "Any good boy gets 20/- per week and many are not worth 15/-.. (it) is impossible to fix a standard wage..". When questioned by Moshes Rood promised "something definite": "We are prepared to pay a fixed wage of 20/- a week for able bodied boys." ¹⁸³ This time the Moshes and his councillors were not prepared to accept assurances however they wanted definite regulations:

The Matabeles must have their own location. ^(stated Moshes) Now I have seen what they have done, I want them all removed. They have done considerable damage, about £60 up to the present.. If Doyles Prospect is proclaimed the foreign natives must be removed..

other natives must be allowed on Doyle's Prospect. We mean the Xosas. We do not object to any Natives of Bechuanaland. We do not want Zulus, Xosas or Shangeans

The representatives of the diggers were more than willing to accede to these demands, Rood stating that "There is nothing unreasonable in the conditions. The question of removing the natives is in the hands of the Government. If the Chief will supply sufficient labour we are content." ¹⁸⁴ Rood only objected to the wages demanded by Moshesh. ¹⁸⁵ On the 27th of August these demands of Moshesh were published in the Government Gazette:

- 1) No native or coloured person shall be allowed to have in his custody any wine or spirituous or partly spirituous liquor, with the exception of Kaffir beer, nor can he make it without permission
- 2) No assembly of natives or coloured persons, for drinking or dancing in any native location shall take place after sunset.
- 3) No native shall employ any native females as a servant or servant.
- 4) No native shall be allowed to reside on any proclaimed area within the jurisdiction of the Taung's District Diggers Committee for any period exceeding 4 days, unless he produces proof to such Committee that he is being employed in a lawful manner on any such proclaimed area.
- 5) The Taung's District Diggers Committee shall frame and keep a Register of natives employed by the claimholders on the diggings under its jurisdiction, and may call upon a claimholder to furnish such information. ¹⁸⁶

There is no record of Moshesh's opinion of these regulations ^{following} their promulgation, and we may perhaps conclude that they were worked to the satisfaction of all concerned. The close co-operation of the (now) Taung's Diggers Committee and Moshesh Kgatlaphane may also have resulted in the refusal of the TADDU and the VRU to ^{affiliate themselves} ~~acceptance~~ this Diggers Committee members to these Unions. ¹⁸⁷

Part Five: Conclusion.

This essay does not mean to suggest that the eventual compromise which emerged from these local conflicts was the result simply of the interaction of traditional ~~is~~ authorities in the Reserve and the Settler community, at HOME Rule, Killarney or the surrounding district. In November 1920 Mr J. D. Ngoje of SANNC was reported to be visiting the Taung's district, and the Tlaping diggings. In the same year a local branch of SANNC, the British Bechuanaland and Griqualand West

West Native Congress, was ~~active on~~ ^{active on} the Barkly West and Bloemhof diggings, agitating for higher pay and better working conditions for those permanent workers in the diggers locations. ¹⁸⁸ This popular history has not yet been noted in any historical work, much less studied. ¹⁸⁹ But this ^{attempts to} essay deals with another no less interesting facet of the history of alluvial digging in the ^{the} early twentieth century. It tried to ^{some of} unmask ^{the interaction between} ~~another layer of~~ ^{traditional} Reserve authorities and the State, and of settlers and diggers in this area.