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The Politics of Exhaustion and Migrant Subjectivities:

Researching border struggles in northern France in 2016-2019

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**The Politics of Exhaustion and Migrant Subjectivities:
Researching border struggles in northern France in 2016-2019**

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Abstract

Situated within critical border and migration studies, this thesis is a detailed ethnographic account of the 'border struggles' associated with the UK-France borderzone in northern France, where human mobilities meet state endeavours to control and regain a hold over migratory movement. Through an 'embodied encounter,' which draws on the voices and experiences of 75 migrant interlocutors and other interviewees with first-hand experience of the UK-France borderzone, the thesis generates a unique, in-depth understanding of how migration governance operates at the UK-France border.

It is argued that the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have not merely led to the re-localisation of the UK's physical border controls to an extraterritorial space; the 'border' has also entered into spaces of migrants' everyday life in the borderzone. Traditional spatial interdictions and restrictions emerging from *non-entrée* policies, reliant on tactics such as confinement, bordering fences, and deportation, have been successively complemented by more insidious, temporal, and corporeal biopolitical technologies of bordering. The latter consists of an array of tactics devised to render life governable and pliant, and bodies docile, with the premeditated intention to negate one's personal autonomy, agency, wellbeing, and self-efficacy. This 'politics of exhaustion' thus seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, and manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects. In this sense, exhaustion is understood as constitutive of bordering processes, as well as of the 'border' itself, but cannot be grasped within the biopolitical 'making live/letting die' dichotomy. Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution to advancing scholarly work which challenges this binary.

Moreover, rather than privileging an understanding power that is totalising, the thesis subsequently shifts its focus onto the heterogeneity of ways in which migrants respond to, and shape, through their ability and desires to move, the apparatuses of power, and the technologies of the politics of exhaustion. As such, the thesis allows for a gaze into the possibilities of articulating new subjectivities within borderzones characterised by stringent state control and biopolitical techniques, opening powerful ways to think of spaces for resistance, alternative subjectivities, and the performance of political belonging outside traditional notions of citizenship. In doing so, the thesis mobilises a

heterogenisation of the 'border', advancing scholarly work which understands the interlinkages between power and subjectivities as processual, ambivalent, and interwoven.

Lastly, given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the bodies and minds of racialised migrants, the thesis reverts back to this concept once more, arguing that a displacement of responsibility from state authorities onto the bodies and minds of migrants serves to depoliticise suffering. This, in combination with the partial absence, or invisibility, of clearly defined and identifiable 'human culprits' in the implementation of the politics of exhaustion, may give an illusion of an absence of intention to cause harm, thus sanitising and invisibilising violence whilst also producing an aura of legitimacy. The thesis thus contributes to an ongoing ontological shift within critical border and migration scholarship, by emphasising ways in which violence is constitutive of bordering technologies; something that has only intermittently figured within traditional migration studies to-date.

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Author's Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.

1. Introduction: Setting the scene for a research inquiry into externalised UK border struggles

1.1. Introduction

As Roxanne Lynn Doty (2013: 129) powerfully suggests,

> Deep tensions strain at the edges of the nation-state and the contemporary mobilities that continually contradict presumptions of stability and stasis, which underpin conventional notions of a world of sovereign entities which are willing and able to control movements across and within their territories.

Indeed, the past several years have seen a multiplication and heterogenisation of 'border struggles' across Europe and beyond, producing temporal and spatial locations where autonomous human mobility projects meet states' increasingly brutal control measures. One such site of struggle is the 'borderscape' (Perera, 2007) in northern France, where the United Kingdom's externalised border control strategy appears to be contingent upon the French state serving as an implementing actor. The violent and harm-inducing situation for migrants in transit in northern France has been persistent, if cyclically so, since the early 1990s. Encampments have sprung up and been flattened to the ground, individuals have come and gone, been dispersed, pushed back, and then returned. Women, men, and children have suffered violence and abuse, and some have tragically perished.

Arguably due to an insufficient acknowledgement of the complex dynamics which have co-constituted this situation, with a tunnel vision and an unrelenting narrative of 'illegal migration' and 'organised criminality' which need to be curbed at all costs, UK statutory funding has been injected time and again to increase securitisation measures and build walls and fences, while tacitly supporting the French state's uprooting and harassment of migrants. This is accompanied by the attempted depletion of the relentless grassroots solidarity and aid movements operating on the ground. In 2015, when the number of people on the move in the northern France area started to increase rapidly, then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron promised to 'work hand-in-glove' with France to stop the 'swarm of migrants' from reaching Britain (BBC News, 2015). The UK Government was thus quick to flex its 'sovereign muscle,' alongside its French counterparts, through enhanced forms of visible, spatial containment:

> Strong, visible and effective security [...] is a core part of our joint [UK-France] strategy. Besides its importance for border control, we believe that highly effective security reduces the incentive for would-be illegal migrants to travel towards Calais or to remain there. (Cazeneuve and May, 2015)

During the years that followed, the absence of constructive solutions to the situation in northern France has been striking. The UK and French state authorities have continued to privilege the harmful clampdown on human mobility, anchored in the aforementioned narrative of 'migrant illegality.' Needless to say, these dynamics at the UK-France border are situated within the wider context of European migration governance, which has far too often led to widespread human suffering across Europe, and is also closely intertwined with (post)colonial global dynamics. These aspects will be discussed briefly in the following sub-section, without attempting to provide an exhaustive account of the complexities of the European response to migration, nor of the racialised and (post)colonial linkages and continuities within which the UK-France border struggles are situated.

1.2. Broader context: Human mobilities meet contemporary European border regimes

The UK-France border struggles are situated in an era of accelerated globalisation and global mobility which has witnessed a concomitant growth in border control methods (Bosworth et al, 2018: 35). Predominantly White, prosperous liberal democratic countries located across Europe, North America, and Australasia have resorted to increasingly drastic measures to make their borders impenetrable to certain 'undesired' groups (Fassin, 2011a: 214; see also Bauman, 1998), while making the same borders 'hyperpermeable to desired groups and individuals, as well as certain goods and services' (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 455; see also Sparke, 2006). Indeed, we have seen the erection of a 'wall around the West,' (Andreas and Snyder, 2000) where people seeking to cross borders become 'illegalised' (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2016a). On one hand, contemporary neoliberal policies encourage the flow of goods across borders and boost the demand for cheap labour, whilst on the other hand, xenophobic immigration policies discourage the safe and legal movement of individuals across borders, subjecting them to a panoply of border enforcement tactics (Tellez et al, 2018: 2), and making borders 'disaggregated for different types of human traffic' (McNevin, 2013: 182).

Aimed to deter and exclude, many states have adopted policies of '*non-entrée*' (Hathaway, 1992: 40-41), which are oftentimes contingent upon a strong element of delegation of migration controls to a third country acting as containment state (Barbero and Donadio, 2019: 137). The latter is a well-studied and researched phenomenon invariably termed as 'extraterritorial migration control' (Dastayari and Hirsch, 2019: 435), 'deterritorialized control' (see FitzGerald, 2019: 4), and 'externalization' (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008: 249-269; Akkermann, 2018; Zaiotti, 2016; Loughnan, 2019b).

At the same time, the broader context is found within underlying structures of deeply cemented global inequalities, marked by Europe's history of colonialism, where some of the world's most disadvantaged groups of people are excluded and prevented from accessing their share of the world's resources and spaces of safety. Racialised populaces are trapped by borders and by the Western world's immigration rules within situations of war, conflict, and persecution, but also other forms of protracted crises such as deeply entrenched poverty or critical environmental crises (Jones, 2016; Andersson, 2014). Other driving factors of human mobility include polarised distributions of wealth, both within and between countries, unevenly distributed employment opportunities between regions and countries, conflicts and unrest in states of origin, as well as well-established industries facilitating unauthorised cross-border movements (McNevin, 2007: 671). Therefore, the current response to migration in Europe ought to come with an acknowledgement of a long legacy of past and present entanglement with countries and populations around the world, as well as an acknowledgement of the very intimate links between the current situation and the damages and injustices brought on by episodes in history such as colonisation, exploitation of resources, and different forms of domination. Nevertheless, migration towards Europe is instead situated in a space and time where (post)colonial and neoliberal migration governance leads to hardened borders; where autonomous and heterogenous migratory projects and migrant subjectivities are met with securitisation and exclusion, co-producing a heterogeneity of border struggles across the continent.

When compared with migratory movements in other parts of the world, or contrasted with migration figures during earlier periods of time in Europe, the current numbers of arrivals are nothing exceptional (Crawley et al, 2018: 14). Indeed, the arrivals in Europe in 2015 represented just a small proportion of those who were displaced around the

world during that year. The vast majority (86%) went to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2016) rather than making their way to Europe. Moreover, migration into and across Europe is, of course, nothing new; the end of World War II brought the largest migratory movements in European history, followed by large numbers fleeing Hungary in 1956 and more than three million people fleeing the Balkans in the early 1990s. The contemporary arrival of individuals via the Mediterranean Sea is nothing new, but has seen an intensification in human mobility since 2010 (Crawley et al, 2018: 15-17). Migration via this route is interlinked with, amongst other factors, the political instability which troubled North Africa following the 'Arab Spring,' which not only affected nationals of these countries, but also groups of people from other African nations who had been residing in North Africa. The descent of Libya into civil war further enabled militias and factions across the country to profit from smuggling into, through and out of Libya, contributing to the complexity of the situation (Crawley et al, 2018: 19).

Meanwhile, the route into Europe via the Aegean Sea saw an increase from 7,432 arrivals in October 2014 to more than 210,000 people in October 2015, understood as a result of a range of factors combined, including the war in Syria and instability in many other countries in the wider Middle Eastern and South Asian regions (Crawley et al, 2018: 21). The increased number of arrivals in Europe in the past few years has widely been framed as the 'European migration crisis.' Arguably, however, the real crisis we are witnessing is rather a preventable crisis of solidarity and hostile policies leading to widespread chaos along the European external and internal borders.

Upon arrival in Europe, many individuals intend to claim asylum, thus exercising their right under international law, first recognised in Article 14.1 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: 'Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution'. Following World War II, the international community recognised the need to create a legal framework for the protection of displaced individuals, which resulted in the 1951 Geneva Convention and its subsequent 1967 Protocol, signed and ratified by 142 states, including the United Kingdom. The Convention defines who ought to be considered a refugee and stipulates what rights asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to. It defines a refugee as someone who:

> […] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UN General Assembly, 1951)

This definition of who qualifies for refugee protection, as per the Convention, is arguably outdated given the wide range of new 'drivers' for displacement around the world have emerged, such as food insecurity and environmental change, state fragility, and protracted crises (see e.g. Andersson, 2014). In any event, a particularly important protection contained within the Convention is the prohibition of collective expulsion (ie. the principle of *non-refoulement*), which means that states cannot return individuals to a country where their safety and freedoms may be threatened. *Non-refoulement* is nowadays considered a customary, or *jus cogens*, norm of International Human Rights Law. The European Union's approach to handling asylum claims is stipulated in the set of EU laws dating back to 2005, comprising the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the so-called Dublin System (the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac fingerprints database). The stated aim of the CEAS was to ensure a joint approach to member states' asylum systems by setting out minimum procedures and standards both for processing and deciding asylum applications, as well as for the treatment of asylum seekers and recognised refugees.

However, the implementation of the CEAS varies greatly throughout the European Union, with some states failing to operate fairly and with effective systems, which has largely led to a patchwork of 28 (now 27) asylum systems with uneven results across the continent. Meanwhile, the Dublin Regulation, which first entered the force in 1997 and is complemented by the Eurodac database tracking individuals' movements, specifies that the responsibility for processing asylum claims would primarily lie with the state where a person first entered the EU (EUR-Lex, 2013). It is a widely held view that the Dublin Regulation, with revisions leading to the Dublin II Regulation in 2003 and the Dublin III Regulation in 2013, is a failed EU policy approach, mostly because it inevitably places disproportionate responsibility on first entry-countries such as Italy and Greece, leading to tensions between EU member states over how to handle arrivals and asylum applications. Moreover, the Dublin System has come under heavy criticism from civil

society groups, in that it denies the right of asylum seekers to choose where they have their asylum claim processed in accordance with their personal circumstances. This plunges large numbers of migrants into protracted displacement, trapped under horrific conditions encountered at EU 'Hotspots' on the Greek islands, in Italy, or at transit points and border closures. Those determined to carry on to their intended destination are caught up in convoluted journeys between European countries, taking treacherous routes, with some, as we shall see, ending up desperately trying their chances at the UK-France border. The French civil society organisation, La Cimade, sums up the problems inherent in the Dublin Regulation as follows:

> For many people in exile who seek asylum when they come to Europe, the word 'Dublin' brings to mind thoughts of a constant threat which might knock them down at any moment. [...] 'Dublin' puts them back into endless procedures, continual suspicion, and fear of being sent back to a country where they don't want to live. (La Cimade, 2019).

Despite the critical shortcomings of the system, a 2017 court ruling by the European Court of Justice ruled that the Dublin Regulation must be upheld, effectively granting states the continued right to remove asylum seekers and send them back to the first country of entry in the EU (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017). Attempts to restructure the CEAS system, with particular emphasis on the Dublin Regulation, have largely been stalled at the EU level due to important differences in approach between different member states. Certain states are calling for increased controls at external borders, whilst other countries are instead pushing for a 'fairer distribution of responsibility' for new arrivals between member states, including the proposal of new, mandatory quotas for responsibility sharing (see e.g. Morgese, 2019; Di Filippo, 2018, 2020).

It was not until September 2020 that the European Commission finally published its proposed New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission, 2020), which outlines new plans for a pan-European approach to asylum and migration. However, while the European Commission refers to the Pact as 'a fresh start to asylum and migration,' the proposals largely replicate or exacerbate past problems under a new guise. There is an overbearing focus on preventing access to EU territory, as though the success of the EU's approach to migration ought to be measured by its efficacy in 'keeping numbers down' (Joannon et al, 2020). At the time of writing, it is still unclear to what

extent the current proposals will be adopted by the EU and its member states, and in the meantime, the human realities on the ground across Europe are perhaps bleaker than ever, with continued drownings in the Mediterranean in combination with the obstruction of search and rescue vessels and criminalisation of solidarity. Likewise, large-scale human rights infringements continue to be inflicted against individuals trapped in detention-like camps at Hotspots and borderzones, resulting from a combination of insufficient resource allocation, combined with an unforgiving implementation of policies that regulate movement into and across Europe.

Thus, little to no concern is given to the thousands of asylum seekers who remain trapped on the Greek islands in unacceptable living conditions causing physical sickness, mental health problems, and increasing tensions, or to those experiencing violence, trafficking, and sexual slavery on European soil, or, as we shall see in this thesis, those who are hiding away in the woodlands and streets of Calais, Grande-Synthe, and in parks and streets of Brussels and Paris, with the hope of finding sanctuary in the UK or elsewhere. It is precisely within this wider context of a failed European approach to asylum and migration that the longstanding struggles at the UK-France border have been drastically exacerbated over the past few years, most notably since 2015, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

1.3. The hostile UK approach to migration and asylum

Within the broader European response to asylum and migration, the United Kingdom has continuously taken an individualistic approach, first by refraining from joining the Schengen Area of the European Union, and subsequently by ensuring the prevention of the arrival of prospective asylum seekers arriving at its frontier through bilateral agreements with France. Moreover, the UK put forward proposals within the EU in 2003 to externalise the EU's border management through 'transit processing centres' in non-EU third countries on key migration routes to the EU, in order for claims to be assessed 'in situ' before people arrived. Individuals arriving spontaneously, the Home Office suggested, should:

> [be] sent back to such centres for 'status determination;' those whose requests
> were approved would be resettled within the EU or the region, while the others

would be returned to their country of origin under 'new and strengthened re-admission agreements.' (Bialasiewicz, 2012: 851)

Although this was never implemented, it set the stage for a model of externalised border controls and offshore asylum processing which would later become the norm for the European Union.

The UK also continued its hard-line approach during the peak of the so-called 'migration crisis' in 2015 by keeping its borders tightly closed to those seeking asylum; a notable exception being the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme. In cooperation with UNHCR, this programme identifies 'those most at risk' among those who have fled conflict in Syria to neighbouring countries, in order to bring them to the UK (Home Office, 2017). However, the scheme was paused in March 2020 due to the global Covid-19 pandemic, followed by an announcement in November that it would resume in early 2021 (Bulman, 2020; Refugee Council, 2020). Whilst it is certainly commendable to participate in the resettlement of vulnerable individuals, this scheme potentially satisfies segments of UK society, but it is clear that this is also used as a pretext for keeping the border with France closely sealed and refusing entry for those arriving spontaneously at the frontier. The UK thus fails to play a much-needed role in the wider European response to processing asylum applications of those already on European territory.

Domestically, the issues of asylum and immigration have been politically contentious at least since the 1990s, when numbers of asylum applications increased sharply from 3,998 in 1988; to 11,640 in 1989; and 44,840 in 1991. The Labour government presented the 1998 White Paper 'Fairer, faster, and firmer' (Home Office, 1998), which constituted a hostile approach to asylum. In February 2003, then-Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an interview on the BBC News (2003) that he would reduce the number of asylum seekers by half within a few months, by ensuring pre-arrival controls, tightened asylum procedures and increased removals. Subsequently, during the 2010 General Election campaign, the Conservative Party pledged to bring down net migration to 'the tens of thousands' by 2015 (The Conservative Party, 2010: 21) by following a similar logic. Thus, both Labour and Conservative governments have put forward remarkably similar policies over the years that take a restrictive approach to asylum, fuelled by frequent claims within British tabloid media of a supposed 'immigration crisis' unfolding.

While unauthorised entry and overstaying had been criminal offences already under the Immigration Act 1971, then-Home Secretary Theresa May announced in an interview in May 2012 that she aimed to create a 'really hostile environment' for so-called irregular migrants on UK soil (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012), which marked the beginning of the UK's 'hostile environment' policies, meant to 'make the UK a less welcoming and less hospitable place to discourage people from coming to the UK, and if they were already in the UK, to discourage them from staying' (Dajani, 2020: 2). This set of policies introduced new measures to limit access to work, health care, bank accounts, housing, and so on for migrants with irregular status, and established a system of citizen-on-citizen immigration checks (Yeo, 2018). Most of these policy proposals were incorporated into law through the Immigration Act 2014 and were subsequently expanded through the Immigration Act 2016. Later, in 2017, this policy approach was renamed the 'compliant environment' but essentially remained the same (Yeo, 2018). The hostile environment policies comprise a wide array of internal manifestations of UK border control through a 'structurally embedded' border (Weber, 2013). This has been thoroughly dissected and analysed in academia (see e.g. Bowling and Westenra, 2018; Hiam et al, 2018; Dajani, 2020; as well as Goodfellow, 2019 for a profound deconstruction of UK immigration policy), and heavily criticised by activists, rights groups, and communities across the UK.

With the UK's European Union (EU) membership referendum on 23 June 2016, commonly referred to as the Brexit referendum, 52% of voters demanded a formal exit from the EU. The 'leave' campaign mobilised anti-immigration narratives and fears over a lack of sovereign border control as part of their campaign. This highlighted fear of immigration into the UK as one of the key reasons that large numbers of British citizens favoured leaving the EU, which likely co-created and further exacerbated the environment of anti-immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, and intolerance, fanned and encouraged by the right-wing media. Indeed, much of the debate was based on immigration and border control with media and parts of public opinion at the time being particularly hostile to immigration from EU countries and due to the so-called refugee 'crisis' in Europe. (see e.g. Canning, 2017; Goodfellow, 2019). Within this context, it is not surprising that successive governments have been so keen to 'bring down' net migration numbers and be seen as being 'tough' on immigration.

1.4. Offshoring through juxtaposed border controls

By the same token, it appears unsurprising that the UK openly promotes the offshoring of its borders as a corner stone of its border 'defence' (Ryan, 2010: 10), with France acting as its third-party containment state. The strengthening of the UK's border with France has been in the making ever since then-President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher signed the treaty for the Channel Tunnel in February 1986, followed by the signing of the Sangatte Protocol in 1992 and the entry into force of the Channel Tunnel Order of 1993, introducing juxtaposed border controls at the respective entry and exit points of the Channel Tunnel. At this point, the close collaboration between France and the UK for border control entered a new era (Cazeneuve and May, 2015). As the narrowest point of the Channel, the Calais-Dover route has the shortest ferry times, the highest number of ferry crossings, and the most regular trains via the Eurotunnel which opened in May 1994, linking Folkstone in the UK with Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais in northern France. This is, therefore, a logical/strategic common point for prospective asylum seekers looking to enter the UK, and the period between 1995 and 2000 saw an average of 700 individuals per month presenting themselves at the international terminal, based at Waterloo station in London at the time, with the total number of asylum applications peaking at 76,040 in 2000 (Select Committee on Home Affairs, 2001).

The extraterritorial arrangements on French territory to deny leave to enter were executed through the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, 2000 Additional Sangatte Protocol, and 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, and given effect in Britain through The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003 (UK Government, 2003). This externalisation constitutes a move described by the UK Government as 'fundamentally altering the way the UK operates at its border' (UK Cabinet Office, 2007). The first actual juxtaposed controls were introduced on French territory in 1994 (Vine, 2013: 3), meaning that immigration checks took place prior to passengers boarding a train or ferry rather than upon arrival in the UK. This means that the UK border has in practice been moved from Dover to seven locations in Belgium and France (Calais, Calais-Fréthun, Dunkirk, Coquelles, Paris, Brussels, and Lille), with British border controls taking place on French and Belgian soil.

The juxtaposed arrangements have been heavily criticised by rights groups arguing that this policy, in the absence of means to access the UK asylum system, contributes to a

breach of the UK's international legal obligations by 'circumventing the right to asylum, and as a result, also the protection against *non-refoulement*' (Refugee Rights Europe, 2020; see also Amnesty International, 2017). As a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, the United Kingdom has legal commitments to ensure the right to asylum, and protection responsibilities towards those seeking asylum. It is moreover obliged to refrain from returning (or *refouling*) individuals to a country where they may face persecution.

Nevertheless, the UK stands firm in refusing entry to prospective asylum seekers of undocumented individuals at its border with France. To put this into effect, it has deployed hundreds of UK Border Force (UKBF) guards to French territory, along with the opening of UK detention facilities (Short Term Holding Facilities) in Coquelles and Dunkirk in northern France (Bosworth, 2020; Timberlake, 2020b), and the application of select UK criminal law powers beyond its territory. In brief, these arrangements mean that individuals are at once prevented from reaching UK soil to seek asylum, and denied the possibility of presenting a UK asylum claim from outside the territory. This has, as we shall see, successively led to 'the emergence of a 'border zone' stretching from Calais and Grande-Synthe in northern France to the capitals of Brussels and Paris if not further afield' (Welander, 2020a: 33). Within this bottle-neck scenario, individuals become trapped in the UK-France borderzone, unable to lodge an asylum application in the UK without taking treacherous, life-threatening, and unauthorised journeys (King, 2016: 104), often stowed away on lorries or risking their lives on small boats and rubber dinghies. UKBF reportedly detected 30,180 attempts to enter the UK from March 2014 to the end of January 2015. However, these do not represent 30,000 individuals, but are likely to represent a smaller number of people who made repeated attempts at crossing (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 8).

Rather than seeking a humane and sustainable response to the situation at the border, the official response has largely revolved around additional border security measures, including new detection technology, increased dog searches, larger numbers of border guards, and a widened securitised zone (Reinisch, 2015: 517). Between 2010 and 2016, the UK Government spent the staggering sum of at least £315.9 million on border enforcement in northern France (Full Fact, 2017), reinforced by further security funding commitments in subsequent years. This is a strategy not only to externalise border

controls but also to export responsibility for policing and other matters to France, propped up by UK funding; lessening UK legal responsibility.

In a joint UK-France ministerial declaration in 2015, the announcement of a joint command and control centre in Calais was made, stating that it would 'bring together French policing assets, together with permanent desks for teams from the United Kingdom Border Force, National Crime Agency, and other agencies' (Cazeneuve and May, 2015). It was agreed that France would continue to allocate 'significant resources,' towards the deployment of police officers, gendarmes, and mobile units to ensure 'exceptional law enforcement capacity to the Calais region' (Ibid.). Additional resources from the UK would be used to secure the railhead through fencing, CCTV, infrared detection technology, flood lighting, and to strengthen security within the tunnel itself whilst also supporting Eurotunnel Ltd. to increase its security guards. In addition, the UK committed to providing increased resources in an integrated control room and 24/7 freight search teams to look for 'stowaways', amongst other measures (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 4).

In December 2018, in response to the heavy mediatisation of a rise in people crossing by small boat from northern France, then-Home Secretary Sajid Javid interrupted his holidays and created a big spectacle out of the crossing of a few hundred people arriving on small boats from northern France to the UK across the Channel (Marsh, 2018; Welander, 2019a). This was followed by an announcement that the Home Secretary would work with his French counterpart, Christophe Castaner, to 'increase [their] joint work to address the issue.' The two had reportedly agreed:

> [To] ramp-up cooperation [… to ensure] strong collaborative measures around prevention, monitoring, and patrols, with operations being run out of the […] UK-France Coordination and Information Centre in Coquelles [opened in November 2018]. (Home Office, 2018)

Desperate individuals' reliance on small boat crossings to reach UK territory continued to increase throughout 2019, with a notable peak during the spring and summer of 2020. This sparked heightened media attention and renewed policy debates in the UK, which, of course, also coincided with the final stretch of the Government's attempts to steer its Brexit plans. The Home Office, under the leadership of Home Secretary Priti Patel, has been taking a hard-line approach towards immigration throughout 2020, with a

heightened rhetoric of 'illegality.' At the Conservative conference in October 2020, for instance, she announced:

> I will introduce a new system that is firm and fair [...] We will make more immediate returns of those who come here illegally and break our rules every single week. And we will continue to examine all practical measures to effectively deter illegal migration. (Conservative Party, 2020)

Patel also appointed former National Crime Agency executive Dan O'Mahoney as 'Clandestine Channel Threat Commander' responsible for 'tackling illegal attempts to reach the UK' and 'making the Channel route unviable for small boat crossings' (Home Office, 2020), marking a reinforcement of the border as a site of criminality. This would be done in close collaboration with the French authorities, which would entail 'urgently exploring tougher action in France, including stronger enforcement measures and adopting interceptions at sea and the direct return of boats' (Ibid). Shortly thereafter, the Home Office admitted that it was considering using water cannons and nets to stop small boats from making the crossing. In a Daily Telegraph interview, O'Mahoney explained that nets could be used to clog boat propellers, thus causing boats to come to a standstill: 'It's that type of thing, yes. So, safely disabling the engine and then taking the migrants onboard our vessel.' Individuals would then be taken to oilrigs more than 5,000 miles away in the Ascension Island in the south Atlantic, where they would be locked up (Grierson, 2020). Indeed, rather than addressing the situation in northern France in a sustainable and humane manner, a major preoccupation for contemporary UK immigration control has been to increase border securitisation even further.

1.5. The making of the 'Forever Temporary' borderzone

As a direct result of the UK's border securitisation, a bottleneck scenario built up in northern France and the wider UK-France borderzone, with the continued arrival of individuals seeking to reach the UK but who remain blocked from doing so. The situation there has been described by some as a 'forever temporary' (Reinisch, 2015; Kremer, 2002); a nomenclature which highlights the absurd nature of a situation which is at once temporary and transitory, yet seemingly permanent, due to the repeated destruction and re-emergence of settlements, continued dispersals and returns, arrivals and departures of displaced people passing through this transit point. In order to provide further context for the subsequent chapters which explore the dynamics in the borderzone through the

analysis of extensive research findings, this section looks in further detail at different turning points in the area from the late 1990s to the emergence of the Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015.

Looking back at the years 1998-1999, settlements created by those blocked at the British border started appearing in the Calais area (King, 2016: 103). The number of displaced people sleeping in the streets of Calais and surrounding areas, with the hope of reaching the UK via the Eurotunnel at the Calais port and Dunkirk, thus started increasing gradually (Reinisch, 2015: 515). In 1999, the French government opened a warehouse in Sangatte run by the Red Cross, to use as a centre for migrants, one mile from the Eurotunnel entrance, in response to the growing number of people present in the area (Ibid.). It was envisaged that the Sangatte camp would be able to accommodate up to 600 people at any given time. By October 2002, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had established a permanent presence in the Sangatte camp, providing one-to-one legal counselling and advice. A transient population in excess of 3,000 people was estimated, with an average of 1,700 present in the camp at any given time, hence greatly exceeding its maximum capacity. The UNHCR and the Red Cross reported that that more than 80% of individuals in the area originated from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan (UNHCR, 2002). At the end of 2002, under significant pressure from the UK government, which saw the Sangatte centre as a 'pull factor' (King, 2016: 103), Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister for Home Affairs, announced its closure. This followed on from two unsuccessful legal proceedings initiated by Eurotunnel, the private operator, to have the centre closed down (Reinisch, 2015: 515). As part of an ensuing 'burden sharing agreement,' the UK agreed to take around 1,000 Iraqi Kurds and 200 Afghans under work visa arrangements, while France took responsibility for the remaining 300 Sangatte centre residents (Reinisch, 2015: 516).

In the early days of 2003, following the closure of the Sangatte camp, displaced individuals in the area moved out of the spotlight. However, squats and makeshift shelters, named by the communities living in them as 'jungles,' soon started to emerge, only to be periodically torn down again by French state authorities. Local volunteer groups provided hot meals and dry clothes throughout the period, whilst regular 'warnings' were issued about the deterioration of conditions in the area. Two main policy positions started to take shape in France during this period: the argument in favour of

providing people with shelter and basic care, and the opposing view that France should make conditions as inhospitable as possible, so as to deter new arrivals (Reinisch, 2015: 516). By 2009, a makeshift camp had emerged in the area, hosting 1,000 inhabitants. It was subsequently bulldozed, and 190 people were arrested (Barber, 2016). Then-UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson welcomed the closure with the following words:

> The measures that we have put in place are not only there to prevent illegal immigration, but also to stop people trafficking. We are working with the French, not only to strengthen our shared border, but that of Europe as a whole. (Reinisch, 2015: 517)

By July 2009, the group Calais Migrant Solidarity, affiliated with the 'no borders' networks, embarked upon efforts to document and call out human rights violations, also keeping a record of deaths of displaced people. From July 2009 to July 2012, the UNHCR provided legal aid and counselling to individuals in the area. However, in July 2012, the UNHCR's responsibilities were transferred to the French third-sector organisation France Terre d'Asile.

By December 2014, the UNHCR reported that the number of displaced people had risen to nearly 2,500 people, compared to around 500 during previous winters. The majority of these individuals were from countries affected by war or civil unrest, including Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Syria (Spindler, 2014). Most people were staying in improvised shelters propped up in the woodlands, or on abandoned industrial sites. Others stayed in squats or buildings rented by the No Borders activists (Wannesson, 2017b), set up small encampments in the town of Calais (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 3), or were hosted by citizens of Calais (Wannesson, 2017b). The European director of UNHCR described the situation in Calais as follows: 'The conditions are totally unacceptable and are not consistent with the kind of values that a democratic society should have' (Taylor and Grandjean, 2014). In January 2015, the French authorities eventually opened an official reception centre at 'Jules Ferry,' a former holiday camp site for children. The centre was run by the third-sector organisation La Vie Active (Wannesson, 2017b) and consisted of three large tents to begin with where overnight accommodation for women and young children was provided, in addition to food distribution, clean water, sanitation facilities, and medical care (Ramsden, 2015).

In March 2015, around 1,200 people were evicted from squats and small camps around Calais, and moved to the site by the Jules Ferry centre. This was precisely the site which would become the future 'Jungle camp,' as it started gathering increasing numbers of displaced people (Ibid.). In the same month, March 2015, the British Home Affairs Committee reported that:

> The migrants we met in Calais were overwhelmingly from regions suffering from war, internal conflict, and failure of the state, who would appear eligible to apply for asylum in Europe once they reach a safe destination. (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015: 7)

During the same month, Doctors of the World reported that there were more than 3,000 people in makeshift camps in the area. The organisation reported that the population is 'often young (15 to 25 years old), male, and travelling alone [with] growing numbers of women [and] children.' (Doctors of the World UK, 2015: 2) Critical concerns were raised in relation to the living conditions, which were described as 'absolutely inadequate.' Moreover, the medical NGO reported a range of health problems resulting from the poor living conditions, including skin conditions, respiratory problems, colds and flu, gastric problems, among others. Police violence was commonplace in the most visible camps in the northern France area, while those in Steenvoorde, Angres, Norrent-Fontes, and Tatinghem remained relatively protected and shielded from this form of abuse (Suel, 2017: 126).

In June 2015, the French Housing Minister, Sylvia Pinel, announced that the government would take measures to improve the conditions in the 'new Jungle.' This would include the installation of street lighting and water points (La Voix du Nord, 2015a). Around a month later, in July 2015, when the camp population had reached beyond 3,000 people (Whitehead et al, 2015), the first school was set up by volunteers and camp residents, providing a space to learn French, English, history, and geography (La Voix du Nord, 2015b). Over the next few months, the so-called 'Jungle' camp experienced a boom in social community spaces such as restaurants, churches, mosques, a library, and a learning hub, amongst others. Whilst romanticised by some, this camp soon received widespread media attention as the 'worst refugee camp in the world,' and came to host 10,000 individuals at its peak in 2016, with vast numbers of volunteers and activists arriving from Britain and wider Europe to establish and support different services. It is precisely

this point in time which constitutes the starting point for my engagement in the borderzone, and also serves as the birth of this research project.

1.6. On the need for a scholarly inquiry and the emergence of my research questions

My research project is situated precisely in the site that I refer to as the French-UK 'borderzone,' understood as stretching from the juxtaposed border controls in northern France to the capitals of Brussels and Paris, if not further afield. My theoretical and empirical engagement with, and interest in, the UK-France borderzone, is rooted in travels, encounters, experiences, and friendships across borders, and forms of activism that have deeply influenced my work and life, including deep immersion into the refugee situation at the Lebanese-Syrian border and camps where I conducted academic field research in 2015. Upon my return to Europe, bearing witness to the intensity and seemingly never-ending nature of the struggle at the UK-France border despite its deeply damaging impact on human lives, I was compelled to undertake this PhD research project. Puzzled by the seemingly contradictory and non-sensical, if not futile, state response to the migratory situation in the area, I set out to explore, through my PhD project, the ways in which the externalisation of the UK border and immigration control to France has contributed towards the production of violence, suffering, and self-reinforcing cycles of further 'securitisation' of the border.

An in-depth scholarly study of the UK-France border is a noteworthy and important case beyond its own local context, in several respects. Firstly, it constitutes a key contemporary example of what Barbero and Donadio (2019) have referred to as 'internal externalisation.' While subordinate relationships between a country in the global North and a counterpart from the global South typically spring to mind when discussing externalisation of border controls (e.g. Australia's outsourcing of bordering tactics to Indonesia and Italy's and the EU's reliance on Libya), a study which looks at the UK-France border brings about new important insights into the various technologies which are deployed as part of externalised border enforcement also between European states. This generates insights which ought to be of interest to scholars focusing not only on geographical locations such as the US-Mexico border, the land border between Spain and Morocco in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, but also those studying 'North-North cooperation' on bordering and migration management.

The UK-France border is moreover particularly fruitful as a case study due to the fact that many seemingly disparate border policing and migration management tactics witnessed across Europe appear to converge at this border. For anyone who has set foot amongst the migrant communities living in destitution in the Calais and Grande-Synthe area, it is clear that the intensity with which state authorities are seeking to hinder human mobility here is extremely stark in comparison with many other borderzones across Europe. This intensity allowed me as a researcher to clearly identify various bordering tactics and draw up a new conceptualisation under the term 'politics of exhaustion.' This conceptualisation, in turn, could be applied to various borderzones across Europe and beyond, and serve other scholars as a useful conceptual tool for diagnosing border struggles in different geographical locations. In particular, this helps advance an emerging body of scholarship that looks at how states are resorting to increasingly sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude and control, by influencing the choices and intention of people on the move; not only at the UK-France borderzone but also further afield.

As such, as part of my underlying rationale for choosing to focus my PhD thesis on the UK-France border specifically, was the understanding that my research findings would not just be relevant to the localised situation in Calais; they would have strong relevance to the study of the treatment of migrants, and the management of human mobility, across Europe, and beyond. Indeed, the case of the UK-France border, and my thesis itself, therefore has much broader applicability, and ought to be useful to other researchers elsewhere.

Within the existing literature, there has been some important work conducted in relation to the migratory situation in northern France, some of which was published throughout the course of my PhD project period. Notably, in *Les Migrants de Calais: Enquête sur la vie en transit,* Sophie Djigo (2016) provides a sociological and philosophical approach to the migratory situation in Calais, drawing on the voices, vocabularies, and viewpoints of migrants themselves. As such, she outlines the living conditions and the reception policies of the French states, which she describes as being in contradiction to the principles of democracy, liberty, and human rights. Well-renowned anthropologist Michel Agier and colleagues provide a detailed image of life in the former 'Jungle' camp in Calais in *The Jungle. Calais's camps and migrants* (Agier et al, 2019). In doing so, the authors emphasise

'the power of place' and humanity found within the camp and its inhabitants, whilst also covering matters of government policies as well as solidarity movement. The work also traces the links between the Jungle and the wider global migration context and broader societal changes which have been unfolding locally and globally. Meanwhile, Yasmin Ibrahim and Anita Howarth (2018) in *Calais and Its Border Politics* commence their work by tracing the history of the town of Calais, highlighting it as 'a space inscribed through migrant and refugee politics over time' (2018: 13). The authors subsequently review the timeline of camps in Calais from the perspective of contemporary politics and from the viewpoint of its historical trajectory. Following a review of British and EU policies, the book moreover examines the imaging and visualisation of 'the refugee' and 'the jungle,' interrogating how the media gaze produces camp inhabitants as objects (2018: 14). Eventually, the authors argue that 'periodic erasure seeks to affirm sovereign power and the production of bare life through the border politics of control and expulsion' (Ibid).

Furthermore, in the collection of texts and images from Calais and further afield, *Decamper: De Lampedusa a Calais, un livre de textes et d'images & un disque pour parler d'une terre sans acceuil,* Samuel Lequette and Delphine Le Vergos (eds) (2016) question the contemporary European migration politics, state powers, and humanitarian action alike. The book provides insight into the living conditions in the camps in northern France since 2002, when the Sangatte camp closed, giving the centre stage to refugees, volunteers, researchers, journalists, artists, and others immersed in the area. In her book chapter 'Calais, Patras, Subotica,' Sara Prestianni (2014) illustrates the phenomenon of smaller 'jungle' camps which cropped up in the northern France area following the closure of the Sangatte camp in 2002. Her work stands as a stark reminder of the cyclical nature of the migratory situation at the UK-France border and traces linkages to the wider migratory situation across Europe. Additionally, over the past few years, in particular during the aftermath of the demolition of the unique phenomenon presented by the Calais 'Jungle' camp, there has been an emergence of anglophone scholarly journal articles relating to the camp and the wider migratory situation, which includes accounts of volunteer movements (Sandri, 2018), autonomous accommodation, solidarities, and no-borders activism in the area (Rygiel, 2011; King, 2016; Mudu and Chattopadhya, 2016), the role of play and arts in resistance (McGee and Pelham , 2017; Esin, and Lounasmaa, 2020), and an analysis of the camp from biopolitical perspectives. Additionally, Oli Mould (2017) has suggested conceptualising the Calais 'Jungle' camp not

as an informal camp or state of exception, but as a 'slum of the UK's making,' while Jane Freedman (2018) argues that 'mismanagement' and 'inaction' of the French state is at the root of the situation of human suffering in the Calais area, suggesting that the state chooses to leave individuals in adverse conditions with the hope that they will effectively disappear.

These important contributions to the documentation and analysis of the migratory situation in northern France notwithstanding, little academic attention has been accorded to the specific nature of the technologies and tactics of bordering inherent in the externalisation of the UK border to France, and the impact thereof. My work hence aims to do something different than what others have sought to explore before. Indeed, upon my first visit to Calais, as I started thinking of this border from an ontological perspective, I found that existing theorisations within the broad and inter-disciplinary field of critical border and migration studies provided a helpful foundation and starting point for my research inquiry, but did not seem to fully account for the confounding dynamics found within the struggles, control technologies and forms of resistance which characterise the UK-France border in northern France; something I had witnessed through my first-hand exposure and engagement in the borderzone. I thus discovered a gap in academic work relating to the bordering technologies operating at the UK-France border and their entanglement with migrant subjectivities. This signalled a need to explore how bordering tactics may have evolved beyond spatial containment, interdictions, and non-entrée policies at the physical border, and to uncover the ways they are mutually constitutive with migrant resistance and defiance.

Through this project, I am joining a small inter-disciplinary body of emerging academic literature which dissects and challenges the UK's border policies in northern France (see e.g. Bosworth, 2016a, 2016b, 2020; Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016a, 2016b; Welander 2019a, 2020; Timberlake, 2020a; 2020b), whilst bringing a new theoretical lens through which the border struggles here can be understood and dissected. Following Martina Tazzioli et al (2015), I believe that further critical interrogation of struggles, and a more in-depth understanding of borders as a site of struggle, are greatly needed, and this will be my precise starting point, as outlined in greater depth in the following chapter.

1.7. Research questions and hypothesis, thesis structure and contribution to knowledge

A noteworthy gap within the scholarly literature has thus been identified, and this is what led me to embark upon this project aimed at examining the UK-France borderzone as an intensified site of political struggles over mobility and control. I ask the following overarching question:

> In what ways, and why, has the externalisation of UK border and immigration control to France led to the evolution of (violent) bordering tactics beyond traditional border control measures of spatial containment and interdiction/non-entrée, and how are these contested by migrant subjects?

In response to this overarching question, my hypothesis is that the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have not merely led to the localisation of the UK's physical border controls to an extraterritorial space; the 'border' has also entered into spaces of everyday life of migrants in the borderzone, which also entails a complex dialectical and interwoven relationship between autonomous mobilities and violent state control. To test this hypothesis, I developed three key research questions for investigation as part of an in-depth field research study and theoretical analysis; a process which is explained in greater detail in the subsequent chapter 3. The questions read as follows:

- What is the nature of the bordering tactics performed at the UK-France border to deter, control and exclude groups of people profiled as 'undesired'? How well do sovereign conceptions of power account for the current politics and struggles at the UK-France border?
- In what ways are migrant subjectivities subverting, resisting and challenging the control methods in the borderzone, and how are these subjectivities performed and (re)produced? (How) do these interact with the (re)production of bordering tactics?
- How is violence produced within the external dimensions of the UK's border, and how can the violent nature of the bordering tactics be understood and accounted for? Why might the present bordering technologies be privileged over other forms of migration government control in the borderzone?

The thesis is structured as follows. Having contextualised the UK-France border above, the following chapter discusses the theoretical framework which informs my analysis, allowing me to go on a journey through the ontological developments around the concept of 'border' and 'bordering' within the critical border and migration scholarship. Having thus situated my thesis within the wider field of study, I proceed to providing insights

into the methodological approach and the concrete methods deployed, also reflecting on questions of representation, subalternity, and reflexivity.

I then move on to presenting my field research, analysed through the lens of biopolitics, which allows me to shed light on an array of insidious technologies of migration governance upon which the externalisation of the UK border to French territory partly depends. To that end, I develop the conceptualisation of 'politics of exhaustion' within the context of the UK-France border. Through the voices of my interlocutors, I generate a unique, in-depth understanding of how migration governance operates at this border. I argue that the politics of exhaustion cannot be grasped within the biopolitical 'making live/letting die' dichotomy and notions of necropolitics, but rather requires us to move beyond this binary. Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution to advancing scholarly work which challenges precisely this binary, by providing insights into the ways in which biopolitical technologies in the context of migration governance can operate in ways which neither foster life, nor lead/amount to death. My contribution thus advances efforts of moving the critical border and migration scholarship out of the 'impasse' regarding whether/how biopolitics need to be substituted (e.g. through necropolitical or thanatopolitical theorisations) in order to make sense of seemingly contradictory and non-sensical biopolitical technologies.

In the subsequent chapter, I trace the contours of political subjectivities and forms of human agency in the borderzone, in order to demonstrate the complex interrelationship and co-constituent nature of bordering technologies and migrant subjectivities. I thus offer my empirical and theoretical analysis regarding the co-production of migrant subjectivities and control, and regarding the relationship between the politics of exhaustion and the autonomy of migration. Through this chapter, the thesis contributes to the autonomy of migration scholarship in important ways, by helping to move further beyond criticisms that this scholarship is 'romanticising migration' and 'glosses over' the relational and embodied aspects of border struggles. My typology on 'resistance in border struggles' demonstrates how many of the smaller acts taking place in borderzones – including certain very subtle, daily forms of resistance – are also inherently political and produce migrant subjectivities and performative politics outside of citizenship. Thus, through my embodied encounter in northern France, I propose an epistemological shift

away from Realist and other mainstream state-centric IR approaches, whilst also bringing together literatures of autonomy of migration and those relating to migrant citizenship.

Given the apparent brutality of the politics of exhaustion upon the bodies and minds of racialised migrants, I was compelled to return to this concept once more in the final chapter, where I interpret the politics of exhaustion as a form of invisibilised violence. Here, I argue that violence cannot be understood through the minimalist oppositions of direct/structural violence, biopolitical/necropolitical violence, but rather as an invisibilised form of violence dependent on a de-politicisation of suffering, a 'moral alibi,' and racial subjugation. Through this chapter, I thus contribute towards an ongoing ontological shift within critical border and migration scholarship, where the constitutive nature of violence in bordering technologies is emphasised. To-date, this has been largely missing within traditional migration studies, with some noteworthy exceptions of course.

My thesis ends with concluding remarks reflecting on the implications of the 'politics of exhaustion' on human lives, and the potential for resistance, as well as my own personal reflections in regards to a future research agenda. Overall, my work is a very timely and important piece of academic work, and the fact that I have approached my research questions not only as an academic, but also as an activist with longstanding policy-related engagement on the topic, has allowed me to contribute to knowledge in valuable ways.

2. An overview of scholarly perspectives on borders, migration, and bordering: Beyond a 'line in the sand' to biopolitics and the autonomy of migration

2.1. Introduction

There is a burgeoning and inter-disciplinary body of academic literature concerned with matters of migration, mobility, borders, and bordering tactics which saw an increased intensity since 2015 and the so-called European 'refugee crisis' (Bojadzijev and Mezzadra, 2015). It is within the broader academic field of critical border and migration studies that this thesis is situated; one which has received increased attention from scholars across academic disciplines through heterogenous attempts to make sense of the contemporary tensions between human mobility projects, the multiplication of forced migration phenomena, and the variety of ways observed in regards to states' mobility governance.

This chapter discusses scholarly perspectives on borders, migration, and bordering within a broader theoretical framework, which informs the analysis of my subsequent field research analysis and discussion. The chapter commences by addressing relevant ontological approaches to 'borders,' going beyond traditional territorial, geopolitical, and state-centric epistemologies and into critical understandings of the 'border,' most notably biopolitical and necropolitical perspectives. The subsequent section is concerned with academic literature which plunges deeper into matters of bordering tactics and, more precisely, the matters of bio(necro)political mobility governance. The third and final section of the chapter is concerned with the 'contested politics of mobility' (Squire, 2011) through the lens of the scholarly strand broadly understood as theorising the 'autonomy of migration.' As such, the chapter provides an overview of three strategically selected key debates within the vast, heterogenous, and ever-growing interdisciplinary field of critical border and migration studies, to serve as the theoretical foundation for the ensuing research questions and inquiry of the project. Meanwhile, it was acknowledged that an exhaustive summary of this field of study would be near impossible, and certainly outside the scope of this research project.

2.2. Border ontologies: The shift from a geopolitical traditionalist paradigm to biopolitics

Over the past several years, the proliferation of border controls beyond national territorial borders has led to critical rethinking of state power at their frontiers, with scholarly work expanding our understanding of the sites and practices which count as 'border control' (Burridge et al, 2017: 240-241). Indeed, the inadequacies of traditional understandings of borders as 'lines' or 'walls' have led many scholars to call for the articulation of new border vocabularies, imaginaries, and understandings, which better correspond to the complex de facto relationship between borders, territory, and mobility than the traditional geopolitical tradition (Balibar, 1998; Salter 2012; Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Etienne Balibar (2002: 76) highlights in his essay, 'What is a border?' the 'polysemy' and 'heterogeneity' of borders and notes that their 'multiplicity, their hypothetical and fictive nature' does not mean they are any less real. For Eyal Weizman (2007: 6), frontiers are not rigid or fixed, but rather elastic:

> The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state has splintered into a multitude of temporary, transportable, deployable, and removable border-synonyms – 'separation walls,' 'barriers,' 'blockades,' 'closures,' 'road blocks,' 'checkpoints, […] and 'killing zones.' (Weizman, 2007: 6; see also Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 8)

Others have emphasised that, not only are there various *types* of borders which different groups of people experience differently (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 4); borders, moreover, perform 'several functions of demarcation and territorialization – between distinct social exchanges or flows, between distinct rights, and so forth' (Balibar, 2002: 79). As such, Balibar (1998: 217-218) asserts that 'borders […] are no longer at the border, an institutionalized site that could be materialized on the ground and inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins.' This is not to say, however, that scholars are suggesting that the border is an anachronistic concept. Instead, scholars have called for a commitment to diagnose how political practices of borders change beyond the so-called 'territorial trap' (Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 3).

Similarly, in *Border as Method,* Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013: 3) assert that the 'multiple (legal and cultural, social, and economic) components of the concept and institution of the border tend to tear apart from the magnetic line corresponding to the

geopolitical line of separation between nation-states.' Thus, scholars have differentiated between 'paper borders' referring to the pre-border limits performed through visa control, and 'iron borders,' which are the actual physical border controls (van Houtum and Lacy, 2020: 4). Meanwhile, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 1-2), through the lens of New York City taxi drivers, look at how 'linguistic' and 'social' borders figure into the composition of the labour force. What follows is that critical border and migration studies need not only speak of the proliferation of borders, but also their heterogenization (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 3). As such, a more reflective, and what Nick Vaughan-Williams (2015: 6) refers to as 'consciously self-critical' approach to border studies, has emerged within academia, which could be broadly understood as constituting a heterogenic and inter-disciplinary strand of critical border and migration studies.

Within this context, in an article from 2009, Noel Parker and Vaughan-Williams sought to lay the foundation for precisely a movement towards an agenda for critical border and migration studies. The inspiration and motivation for their programme of discussion was what they perceived as the continued privileging of the aforementioned pervasive 'territorialist epistemology,' despite an increasingly complex relationship between borders and territory (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 583). Nonetheless, the authors recognise the critical shift which had been taking place in border studies, and it was upon the emergence of such literature that their agenda was located; seeking to build on the same with the aim of 'free[ing] the study of borders from the epistemological, ontological, and methodological shackles of an ultra-modernistic, 'territorialist' Western geopolitical imagination' (Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 586).

This shift within critical border and migration studies has led to the emergence of critical scholarship on migration governance, largely influenced by the writings of Michel Foucault (1998, 2003, 2007), who articulated a paradigmatic account of biopolitics, shifting our focus away from defence and territory towards the relationship between populations and government (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 7). Indeed, the impact of Foucault's work on border and migration studies today is evidenced by the rapidly growing body of work relating to biopolitics and borders (Walters, 2015: 2), which is also where my theorisation of the politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone sits, as we examine in the following chapter. Before further delving into this sub-field of scholarly work, the following passages will firstly trace the contours of Foucault's work on

biopolitics in order to foreground the critical migration scholarship, but, importantly, also without claiming to provide an exhaustive account, or analysis, of Foucault's work.

While the notion of biopolitics pre-existed the scholarly work of Foucault, it is the latter which is perhaps most commonly associated with the term. Breaking with earlier naturalist and politicist interpretations of the concept, Foucault provided an analysis of the historical process, which culminated in the emergence of 'life' as the central concern of political strategies of government (Lemke, 2011: 33). As for Foucault's (1978) work, amongst the first places where the concept of biopolitics first appeared, the first volume of *History of* Sexuality served to conceptualise biopolitics as a specific modern form of power and a 'transformation in the order of politics' (Lemke, 2011: 34). In the words of Foucault (1978: 142-143):

> For the first time in history... biological existence was reflected in political existence [...] But what might be called a society's 'threshold of modernity' has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.

The concept would later reappear throughout three years of lectures at the *College de France*, throughout 1976–1979 (namely in *Society Must be Defended, Security, Territory, and Population,* and *The Birth of Biopolitics)*, and was interchangeably used with the term 'biopower.' According to Foucault (1978: 139), political technologies were organised around two poles; the human body as a machine, and also around the population as the 'species body' (see also Lemm and Vatter, 2014). From this perspective, scholars of critical border and migration studies understand biopolitical modes of mobility governance not only as attempts to discipline and control individual 'bodies,' but also through the management of, and intervention in, the population in its entirety (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 7). This hence takes us beyond viewing the 'border' as merely a demarcation of sovereign territory, as viewed through the traditional geopolitical lens, to an understanding of mobility governance as a means to enhance mobility and circulation, and to optimise the population by sifting and excluding perceived risks to the health of the population as a 'species body' (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 7).

In accordance with Foucault's (2004) theorisations of 'governmentality,' this emerged out of a crisis of sovereignty. Governmentality has populations as its object, and includes

various institutions, procedures, actions, and reflections (Fassin, 2011a: 241). Foucault proposes a three-fold definition for the term. Firstly, it 'has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.' Secondly, it designates the power of 'government,' which has driven the formation of governmental apparatuses and bodies of knowledge. Thirdly, it serves to describe 'the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries' (Foucault, 2007: 108-109). Foucault introduced this concept partly as a critique of the 'circular ontology of the state asserting itself and growing like a huge monster or automatic machine' (Ibid: 354). As Rose (2007: 54) argues, I have within the parameters of this thesis, mobilised biopolitics more in terms of a 'perspective than a concept,' focusing on 'attempts by authorities to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence.'

In a similar manner, Thomas Lemke (2011: xi) refers to biopolitics as an 'interpretive key,' which focuses on 'how the production and protection of life is articulated with the proliferation of death.' Vaughan-Williams (2015: 10) notes that biopolitics, thanks to its diversity as a 'rich and agile […] register for understanding seemingly contradictory practices in the field of contemporary European [sic.] border security and migration management beyond the limits of extant approaches.' Along similar lines, William Walters (2015: 4) emphasises that one must caution against deploying governmentality as a 'ready-made framework that merely needs to be applied to migration research,' as this risk becomes a filter rather than a lens, which could, in turn, 'make for a rather monochromatic view of power relations and somewhat predictable kinds of analysis' (Ibid). In a similar vein, my thesis takes inspiration from the critical and experimental 'ethos of inquiry,' which Foucault practiced (Walters, 2015: 4), rather than treating governmentality as a fixed template, which can be simply applied to the project.

This resonates with Andrew Neal (2009), who suggested that 'we should not allow Foucauldian concepts to become disciplinary when Foucault did not think twice about abandoning them' (cited in Walters, 2015: 4). Indeed, I understand the concept of governmentality as a tool to diagnose 'unexpected, paradoxical, heterogenous, and perhaps unstable combinations of rationalities and techniques' (Walters, 2015: 5). That said, one of the concepts directly borrowed from Foucault, which will feature heavily in my thesis, is that of 'technologies of power' or 'political technologies.' For Foucault, these

are technologies which 'determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject' (Foucault, 1982). Within the context of theorising the politics of exhaustion as a means to govern conduct in a subsequent chapter, this becomes highly relevant.

Meanwhile, it should be noted here that the application of the Foucauldian frame of biopolitical governance within critical border and migration studies has not been without its critics. As a result, the critical scholarship on migration governmentality has taken several turns, including a *thanatopolitical* shift through the approach of Giorgio Agamben, and the *necropolitical* turn through the lens of Achille Mbembe. Indeed, a strand of critical border and migration scholars has resorted to utilising the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2005) in an attempt to account for the role of sovereign power and the negative, or deadly, dimensions of contemporary biopolitical bordering practices; the introduction of 'thanatopolitical' dynamics to complement the 'vitalist' approach of Foucauldian biopolitics.

I will now trace the contours of Agamben's work, again without a pretence at going into any deep or lengthy analysis thereof. For Agamben, the 'construction of sovereign power assumes the creation of a biopolitical body. Inclusion in political society is only possible [...] through the simultaneous exclusion of human beings who are denied full legal status' (Lemke, 2011: 54). Reaching back through medieval to Roman juridical conceptualisations of sovereignty, and building on Carl Schmitt's work in which the theory of the contiguity between the state of exception and sovereignty is theorised, Agamben proposes a legal theory to explain the 'no man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life' (Agamben, 1998: 1). Whilst scholars have focused on the 'sovereign/subject relationship' derived from Foucault (Owens, 2010: 571), Agamben, following Schmitt, instead defines the 'sovereign' as 'he who decides the exception' (Agamben, 2005: 1). Agamben traces the 'state of exception' back to the French Revolution and the subsequent *Chartre* of 1814, which granted the sovereign the powers to 'make regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the law and the security of the State' (Agamben, 2005: 11), and suggest that '[t]he sovereign, having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law' (Agamben, 1998: 15). In other words, Agamben explores and accounts for the existence of a sphere of human activity not subject to law, known as the 'state of

exception' (Humphreys, 2006: 677). He discusses legal traditions and their corresponding scholarship in relation to the state of exception, suggesting that the topographical opposition (inside/outside), which these scholars and philosophers propose, is insufficient to account for the state of exception. Instead, he proposes:

> In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other, but rather blur with each other. (Agamben, 1998: 23)

In praxis then, the state of exception opens a space for political decision and enables the sovereign to act outside the existing legal system, not being bound by any external overarching control. Therefore, it is situated in an 'ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political,' (Fontana, 1999: 16, cited in Agamben, 2005: 1) and the sovereign hence is the authority with the ultimate power of decision to surpass the norm and create a legal void, otherwise known as a 'state of exception.' Following this, Agamben emphasises that others, when theorising the state of exception, have placed too much insistence on the 'confusion of powers' (the acts of the executive and the legislative powers respectively). Instead, he asserts, what is ultimately at stake in the state of exception, is the separation of 'force of law' from the law itself. Agamben elaborates, 'That is to say, in extreme situations, 'force of law' floats as an indeterminate element that can be claimed [...] The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law' (Agamben, 1998: 38-39).

In line with Agamben's theoretical discussion, the state of exception is the paradigm which provides a site for what he refers to as 'bare life' and 'homo sacer,' two oft-cited concepts within critical border and migration studies aimed at making sense of the lethal and dehumanising, rather than vitalist, aspects of biopolitical bordering technologies. Drawing on early strands of political theory, including Aristotle's concept of man as a political animal, Agamben (1998) elaborates the notion of sovereignty as power over human life. Contrary to Schmitt, Agamben states that the main border of separation to conceptualise is not the difference 'between friend and enemy' (Schmitt, 1996: 28), but rather the difference between political life (*bios*) and bare life (*zoē*). This expounds on the difference between the mere existence of humans and the legal status afforded to humans (Agamben, 1998: 7; Lemke, 2005: 5). Agamben (1998: 8) suggests that the sovereign draws its power from its exceptional power to exclude an individual from the political

community, through the 'ban' which confines the person to 'bare life' (biological existence as opposed to political life with rights) as 'homo sacer.' Paradoxically, however, this exclusion is necessarily also an act of inclusion; the excluded person becomes included in the political community through her exclusion (Ibid. 1998: 7).

As such, 'homo sacer' is excluded from both human and divine law, as it 'takes the form of a double exception, both from the *ius humanum* and from the *ius divinum*' (Agamben, 1998:82). This double exclusion means that the killing of 'homo sacer' is neither classified as sacrifice nor killing, which attributes to 'homo sacer' as an exceptional status. Thus, in Agamben's analysis of 'Homo sacer,' sacrality becomes indissociable from sovereign power, in that '*homo sacer* belongs to God in the form of un-sacrifice ability and it included in the community in the form of being able to be killed' (Agamben, 1998: 82). By extension, the violence perpetrated against 'homo sacer' opens up a 'sphere of human action,' which is neither the sphere of sacrifice, nor a sphere of profane human activity. 'Homo sacer' is confined to bare life, a form of existence without political agency. It is here that Agamben highlights the links between 'homo sacer' and the sphere of sovereign decision, the latter which 'suspends law in the state of exception and thus implicates bare life within it' (Agamben, 1998: 83).

Furthermore, for Agamben, the 'Camp' is not so much a concrete place or spatial concept, but rather the symbol for the border between 'bare life' and political existence (Lemke, 2011: 56). As such, this concept does not just refer to places like deportation centres or the Nazi concentration camps of the Second World War. Rather, it is any space where 'bare life' is found. In Agamben's words, 'the camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule' (Agamben, 1998: 168-169, emphasis in original). A number of scholars within critical border and migration studies have hence used Agamben to supplement the Foucauldian account in order to make sense of the life-taking dimensions of biopolitical bordering tactics, namely the deadly and dehumanising effects thereof. Such a conceptualisation, I will argue, is insufficiently nuanced as a lens for theorising the UK-France borderzone, as we shall see.

That said, the application of Agamben's work has become popular within critical border and migration studies, as it has allowed for an analysis of 'the logic according to which contemporary biopolitical border security practices attempt to produce forms of subjectivities that are amenable to being governed' (Vaughan-Williams 2015: 8). As such,

Agamben has been mobilised by critical border and migration scholars to develop an approach to biopolitical border security and enable understandings of the seemingly unforgiving implementation of border control tactics in contemporary Europe and throughout other regions. Numerous scholars have mobilised the Agambenian concept to explore sovereign power, camps, borderlands, and transit points as 'state of exception' and the wide-ranging vulnerabilities that refugees and migrants are exposed to, in particular when they are in states of 'irregularity' (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004; Diken, 2004; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Nair, 2010). Such texts stress the limits to migrants' agency, while some, but not all, go as far as arguing the impossibility of politics from a position of 'bare life' (see McNevin 2013: 184). Here, migrants see their status as human beings taken away from them in extraterritorial 'abject spaces,' where international and national law is somehow suspended (Isin and Rygiel, 2007). Alison Mountz (2011) explores ports and islands as such spaces of suspension, while Rajaram et al (2004) analyse detention centres as productive of 'bare life.' Along similar lines, Nira Yuval-Davis et al (2019) propose the concept of 'borderscopes' to illustrate grey zones of exclusion locally and globally (see also Dajani, 2020: 3). Meanwhile, Nick Dines et al (2015) interrogate the role of the island of Lampedusa in producing a borderzone of 'bare life.'

While Agamben's work provides a foundation for theorising the thanatopolitics of the contemporary bordering regimes and tactics, the notion of *necropolitics* was to later emerge with the work of Achille Mbembe (2003), theorising the necropolitical effects of governmental processes. For Mbembe, the notion of necropower emerges from the position that sovereignty lies in the power and capacity to 'dictate who may live and who must die' (2003: 11). Arguing that biopolitics is insufficient as a concept if we are to account for subjugation of life to the power of death in contemporary contexts, necropolitics is an instrumental concept to reconfigure relations between resistance, sacrifice, and terror (2003: 39-40). Accordingly, necropower is in addition to the life-enhancing biopolitical function (Lee and Pratt, 2012: 891) and refers to 'the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations' (Mbembe, 2003:14). Understood as a function of the modern state with indirect or direct murder of racialised others, Mbembe refers specifically to the cruelty found within situations for slaves on colonial era plantations, and describes how they were 'kept alive but in a *state of injury,* in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense

cruelty and profanity [...] Slave life, in many ways, is a form of death-in-life' (2003: 21, emphasis in original).

2.3. Escape and control: The autonomy of migration and border struggles

The Agambenian paradigm has been critiqued by scholars for its control bias and for privileging sovereign power and control over migrant agency. Hence, scholars have been advocating for a deeper understanding of border struggles and their relationship with 'control,' often based on empirical research which evidences resistance, agency, and political activity amongst migrants. Such work includes for instance Patricia Owens (2010), Ernesto Laclau (2007), and Nadia Latif (2008), to name but a few, who have sought to 'de-exceptionalize the exception' (Honig, 2009:1; see also Sigona, 2015: 5). Along the same lines, Andreas Kalyvas (2005: 115) asserts that:

> Agamben can no longer localise the contingency of political and social struggles. His approach [...] assumes an almost totalistic, agentless history, and though it is concerned with politics and its eclipse, it is itself quite unpolitical.

Meanwhile, Reece Jones (2012: 686) argues that the 'theorization of sovereign power precludes meaningful resistance, because any perceived threat can be neutralized through the use of the exception, a time and space where power relations are replaced by violence relations.' According to Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones (2020: 292), this could help produce the very effect such literature critiques in the first place, through 'a de-politicisation of this very relationship, which is naturalised, devoided *[sic.]* of historicity, and situated far apart, outside history.'

In particular, in response to scholarship deploying Agamben to understand the dynamics of borders and mobility, another key perspective has developed within critical border and migration studies. It derives its central premises from Autonomous Marxist thought that emerged in Italy in the 1960s, and its standpoint straddles academia and activist milieus (McNevin, 2013: 184). Rejecting the 'control bias' of the Agambenian approach to biopolitical border security, the strand of scholarship which has been identified as the 'autonomy of migration' scholarship claims that the shift based on Agamben's theories is

> [E]mpirically and politically problematic because it privileges sovereign power and control over political struggle and contestation, fails to account for the role of migrant agency in shaping and resisting contemporary border regimes, and tends to flatten and generalize across diverse border sites and migrants' experience. (Vaughan-Williams 2015: 8)

The emergence of the autonomy of migration scholarship can be traced back to the extensive writings of Yann Moulier-Boutang, who promoted a reversal of dominant narratives that viewed mobility through the state-centred lens of 'capture' and the coherence of state institutions (Moulier-Boutang, 1998; see also Casas-Cortes, 2015: 895-896). Instead, he argued that the focus should be on the primacy of migration, particularly within the history of the development of capitalism. Following these claims, numerous scholars and activists have gathered around the concept of autonomy of migration, which indeed represents a shift away from the apparatuses of control and onto 'the multiple and diverse ways in which migration responds to, operates independently from, and, in turn, shapes those apparatuses and their corresponding institutions and practices' (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 895).

Whilst also emphasising the biopolitical nature of sovereign power, the autonomy of migration is particularly concerned with the political terrain between power, resistance, and the tensions between mobility and control, often using empirical examples to highlight strategic acts of resistance and refusal amongst irregular migrants, paying attention to the subversive quality of migrants and their movements (McNevin 2013: 192). Rejecting the image of borders as impenetrable walls or as *fortress*, antiracist activist movements in Germany around the year 2000 coalesced around the notion of autonomy of migration (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 898; Bojadžijev and Karakayalı, 2010), whilst autonomy of migration scholars have sought to question the traditional presumption that migration policies are determined by states and the institutions of border control (Bojadžijev and Karakayalı, 2010) and shed light on migrants' capacity to render borders porous (Scheel, 2013: 279), as well as to conceptualise borders not merely as devices which serve to exclude, but which also produce the differential inclusion of migrants (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). Indeed, Peter Nyers (2015) asserts that the autonomy of migration perspective was:

> designed to liberate research and activism on migration from some of the prevailing frameworks […] Autonomy of migration is, at once, a research program with its own distinct analytical tools and conceptual framework, and also a political project that is connected to anti-racist social movements for refugees and migrant rights. (2015: 26)

The analytical value of taking mobilities as the starting point for analysis, and the importance of representing the subjective diversity of migration, are emphasised by

autonomy of migration scholars. For Manuela Bojadžijev and Serhat Karakayalı (2010), this approach to critical border and migration studies traces:

> [T]he crossing of borders, the traversing of territories, the enmeshing of cultures, the unsettling of institutions (first among them nation-states, but also citizenship), the connecting of languages, and the flight from exploitation and oppression— [we are] interested, in other words, in investigating what migration teaches us about the conditions of contemporary forms of sociality, and that which goes beyond them.

According to the autonomy of migration perspective, migrants' transformative force precedes and can subvert the sovereign power and bring about new social relations. Indeed, along these lines, scholars critique Agamben and associated scholarly work due to its lack of emphasis on, or understanding of, migrant agency. In *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century,* for instance, Dimitris Papadopoulos et al assert:

> [Agamben] fails to understand the agency of the excluded; he cannot grasp their involvement in immanent processes of social change. That is, the excluded are cast as another characteristic of modern sovereignty; they may pose a local or political problem about the extension and limits of sovereignty, but – from this perspective – they do not figure as a possible constituent force which can trigger transformations on the part of sovereignty. (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 7)

As such, Papadopoulos et al highlight how the sovereign order can be undermined by everyday acts of resistance among migrants. The scholars moreover refer to 'imperceptible politics,' not in the sense of invisibility, but rather as ways to evade being categorised in accordance with the logic of sovereignty. Accordingly, imperceptibility 'is made up of everyday, singular, unpretentious acts of subverting subjectification and betraying representation' (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 61), meaning that irregular migration is constituted by conflicts and actors which:

> cannot be conceived within the existing framework of citizenship [...] we see this as the moment where subaltern social groups put so much pressure on the modern state, that the state cannot respond by expanding its inclusion practices; instead a fundamental transformation of the state's own structure is initiated. (Ibid: 14)

Meanwhile, Nicholas De Genova (2010) suggests that the large scope of 'irregular migration' witnessed in the world today is, in and of itself, a 'permanent and incorrigible affront to state sovereignty and the power of the state to manage its social space' (De Genova 2010: 39). Papadopoulos et al (2008) moreover explain how the autonomy of migration scholarship has sought to change the perspective from viewing migrants as

'people forced to respond to social or economic necessities' to instead being viewed as 'active constructors of the realities they find themselves in or of the realities they create when they move.' As such, this theoretical perspective sees migration as autonomous, meaning 'against a long history of social control over mobility, as well as a similarly oppressive research in the field of migration studies – migration has been, and continues to be, a constituent force in the formation of sovereignty.' Mezzadra (2011), through the concept of 'gaze of autonomy,' refers to a relational understanding of power and the role of mobility movements in the constitution and transformation of borders and border regimes. This, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, is highly relevant to my thesis, in which I analyse field research findings through the lens of migrant subjectivities, resistance, and agency.

Meanwhile, De Genova (2009: 461) emphasises the ontologically pre-existing nature of agency and subversion prior to the powers that are mobilised to contain and subordinate it:

> Migrant labour's sheer subjective (productive and creative) force within the processes of capital accumulation nevertheless precedes and exceeds any of the powers mobilised to contain and subordinate it. Hence, migrant workers – as subjects – remain an incorrigible constituent power within capital and the constituted 'sovereign' power of the state.

Kim Rygiel (2011: 807) explores the emergence of 'the camp' (migrant and refugee camps, detention centres, shanty towns) as 'dominant spaces for governing population movements,' and seeks to challenge existing geographical imaginings by proving the camp is one of agency and politics rather than an abject space of exception. Rygiel thinks about camps as 'proto-urban' spaces of citizenships, thus suggesting a move away from the Agambenean reading of camps, which, according to Rygiel (2012: 812), has 'led to a certain idealization and a historicization of camps.' The portrayal of migration as a creative force or even as 'irreducible force' (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2008) has been criticised for exaggerating its potential for transformation.

In any event, scholars from this standpoint highlight the subversive potential of migrants to undermine sovereign power, rather than being passive victims without agency, as mentioned. Indeed, accordingly, migration is understood as a *shaping force* within social, cultural, and economic structures, rather than being isolated from them. Papadopoulos et al (2008: 203) further assert that the perspective 'subverts the liberal discourse of the

new migrant as a useful and adaptable worker, as well as the logic of victimisation prevalent in NGO paternalistic interventionism.' Heather L. Johnson (2014) similarly argues that relations of violence in border struggles do not mean that displaced people are unable to, and do not, in practice, exercise different forms of agency: 'Indeed, persistent contestations of the sovereign power and the exceptionality of the Camp are perceptible throughout their everyday strategies and activities' (2014: 149).

Papadopoulos et al (2008: 202) assert, '[t]o speak of the autonomy of migration, is to understand migration as a social movement in the literal sense of the words, not as a mere response to economic and social malaise.' The scholars continue, 'The autonomy of migration approach does not, of course, consider migration in isolation from social, cultural, and economic structures. The opposite is true: migration is understood as a creative force within these structures' (Ibid). Nonetheless, the regulation of mobility *follows* the mobility of migrants according to this perspective, indeed emphasising the primacy of migration over efforts to assert control over it. De Genova (2017: 24) stresses the importance of taking an approach concerned with the 'autonomous dynamics of human mobility on a global scale and the formations of state power and sovereignty that react to the exercise of an elementary freedom of movement through diverse tactics and techniques of bordering.'

Meanwhile, Mezzadra (2011: 121) holds that the autonomy of migration approach calls for the use of 'a different gaze.' Indeed, it means to look at movements and mobility conflicts in ways which prioritise 'the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations, and the behaviours of migrants themselves' (Ibid). As such, Mezzadra suggests that the emphasis should be on the fact that migrants *act* like citizens even when they are not, irrespective of their legal status (136-137). As we shall see, this is highly relevant for my thesis, in particular as part of the theorisations of migrant subjectivities in chapter 5. Indeed, migration is conceptualised as always preceding a politics of control that is aimed at hindering movement. Similarly, De Genova (2017c: 11) suggests that 'state tactics of bordering have been abundantly shown to be convulsive reaction formations, responding always to the primacy of the sheer autonomy of migration.' Autonomy of migration scholars generally take inspiration from the work of Antonio Negri and arguably give greater emphasis to the 'positive' and vitalist notion in Foucault. As Vaughan-Williams (2015: 8) suggests:

> Thus, according to the AoM perspective, the mobility of people is reinterpreted as ontologically prior to any attempts by border security authorities to control them – 'Escape comes first!' – and sovereign regimes prompted by the constitutive creativity of migrants will always ultimately be outwitted and rendered porous.

The notion of 'escape comes first' runs in the vein of Gilles Deleuze's affirmation, 'Resistance comes first' (Deleuze 1988, 89), that is to say, the primacy of subversion, as it highlights the *primacy* of mobility over control. On this note, scholars of the autonomist tradition have, at times, been criticised for the *level of abstraction* with which they describe migrant agency (see e.g. Nyers, 2015: 30) or for *romanticising* migration and migrants themselves. Indeed, Papadopoulos et al made claims such as suggesting that migration's 'target is not relocation, but the active transformation of social space' (2008: 211).

This appears to attribute a political transformative ambition to migrants, which is not always there. The autonomy of migration scholarship has also been criticised for adopting a homogenous and 'disembodied' image of 'the migrant,' as any account of mobility struggles must reflect that 'the experience of migration and border controls is always embodied, relational, and situated within and across various contexts, identities, and contested histories' (Nyers, 2015: 30, see also Sharma, 2009; and Scheel, 2013b). In response to this, Stephan Scheel (2013b), amongst others, have thought to develop the concept of autonomy of migration *beyond its romanticisation*, arguing that it should be understood through the lens of the 'irreconcilable conflict between migration and the attempts to control and regulate it by migrants' practices of appropriation of mobility and other resources' (279). As Scheel states, by reading autonomy in this way, we acknowledge that moments of excess and uncontrollability of human mobility always occur relationally within a conflict with governance and techniques of mobility management, rather than being misread as completely self-determined and untouched by the effects of governmentality (Ibid).

Following the divide between the Agambenian approach and that of the autonomy of migration scholarship, scholars have subsequently proceeded to contrast, and bridge, the two perspectives. Vaughan-Williams (2015), for instance, believes that the contrasting of these two perspectives have led to a conceptual crisis with critical border and migration studies. Therefore, Vaughan-Williams proposes an approach, via Roberto Esposito, which sees borders as an immune system. He argues that we must consider Esposito's concept

of (auto)immunity, in order to understand the European border crisis and its paradoxical humanitarian government, where the protection of life necessitates the incorporation of anything threatening in small doses, in order to develop immunity to it.

Tazzioli (2018: 20) takes a different stance, highlighting how the temporalities of migration 'are not completely autonomous, insofar as they are to a large extent the outcome of the limits and conditions imposed by migration policies' (see also McNevin, 2011). Meanwhile, Anne McNevin (2013) does so in order to highlight a 'reductive reading of power that underwrites Agamben's work *and* that of certain figures amongst the Autonomy of Migration scholars' (McNevin 2013: 185). Drawing on field work amongst irregular migrants in Germany in 2009, the scholar introduces the concept of ambivalence as a basis for a different theorisation of migrants' struggles, suggesting that ambivalence acknowledges 'the transformative potential of claims based in human rights' (McNevin 2013: 185) and which takes into account the 'haphazard, short-term instrumental and dislocated dimensions' (Ibid: 193). McNevin thus highlights the importance of an approach to contemporary border and migration studies, focusing on the *ambivalence* of power and contestation, offering an 'alternative theorisation of irregular migrants' political claims that starts from the notion of ambivalence' (McNevin, 2013: 195). According to McNevin:

> [N]eat lines drawn between cause and effect rarely illuminate the complex interrelationships that generate social change. Surely, the view that human mobility is the springboard of social transformation that *precedes* sovereign control is just as reductive as the view that sovereign power is the sole origin and arbiter of citizen and human subjects. At the heart of both approaches are ontological assumptions that orient understanding of human potential towards 'lack' in one case and 'abundance' in the other. (McNevin2013: 193)

In a similar vein, Scheel (2013b) argues that the study of 'embodied encounters' or 'situated reading of autonomy' (2013b: 283) allows the autonomy of migration to escape the trap of excessive abstractness and transcend the question of structure vs. agency, highlighting that migration is always relational and embodied (2013b: 279-280). Sarah Green suggests that that the 'border' is not only about separation, but also about relations and 'border as such cannot be taken for granted in understanding the difference borders make to peoples' lives' (2010: 261). Meanwhile, Nyers (2015: 28) highlights how the 'relationship between migrants and borders is not a straightforward encounter of

exclusion, but involved complex and ambiguous negotiations, contestations, and refusals.' Mezzadra (cited in Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 899) states that:

> The autonomy of migration approach, in this regard [...] does not lead to downplaying the role of power relationships within this field; rather, it is intended to open up a new angle on these very relationships, emphasizing resistance and struggle as their constitutive elements. We are not far from Foucault's theory of power, in this general sense.

It is precisely within this approach to autonomy of migration where my thesis is situated; studying embodied encounters in the UK-France borderzone in order to contribute to academic literature on border struggles with the border as its critical vantage point, and exploring the complex and intertwined relationship and the *ambivalence* between human mobilities and state control. Thus, the following two chapters of this thesis precisely analyse these complex contestations, contributing to the scholarly literature through extensive empirical research on one site of Europe's border struggles. Relevant to my work is also a strand of scholarship which engages with the theories and concepts from the perspective of 'acts of citizenship.' Here, Nyers (2015) theorises migrant citizenships which are both formal and performative, and in essence, different from the conventional notion of citizenship, which take the perspective of migrants 'from below' (23). As such, the scholar contributes new perspectives to traditional questions within the political sciences in relation to what counts as political activity, who is a subject, and who is a member of the political community. Indeed, this is particularly relevant to one of my subsequent chapters which examines the production of subjectivities in the UK-France borderzone, as we shall see. Here, we ask not the question of 'who is a citizen?' but rather how subjects *constitute* themselves as citizens (Nyers, 2015: 33), which, as we shall see, is particularly relevant to the analysis in chapter 5. There, I will explore micro practices of agency, resistance, and subversion in the borderzone which alter the way we might think about what it is 'to be political' and highlights an 'ambivalence' (McNevin, 2013) or 'ambivalent condition' (Squire, 2011) enacted not only through the politics of control and exclusion, but also through politics of mobility and subversion.

The dialectical interrelationship between control and agency will also be discussed, suggesting that they are not static binaries, but rather interrelated and co-constitutive elements (co)producing the borderzone. Following this, McNevin (2013) argues that both the Agambenian and autonomy of migration approach tend to rely on a necessarily

reductive reading of power, and therefore the notion of ambivalence introduced by McNevin (2013: 185) serves to hold together the various tensions we encounter when studying migrants' struggles, whilst also being generative of potential for transformations.

As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 3) assert, borders are 'not merely geographical margins or territorial edges. They are complex social institutions, which are marked by tensions between practices of border enforcement and border crossings.' This leads us neatly to the aspect of border enforcement, as well as the theoretical perspectives on political technologies of bordering, which will be the focus of the next section.

2.4. The (bio)political technologies of bordering

Particularly relevant to this research project is the shift within critical border and migration studies to a standpoint which understands the border as 'increasingly fractured throughout society,' which is incompatible with traditional understandings of 'inside and outside' (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6). Along with this decentring has been a shift towards theorisations of borders as a set of *practices* with performative effects (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6) through a sociological lens, which gives more space to the examination of everyday (micro)practices, allowing for increased complexity. In particular, when it comes to theorising and understanding the proliferation and multiplication of borders in relation to 'irregular migration,' scholars have been seeking to examine bordering practices and technologies in 'borderzones' from a multi-dimensional perspective (Squire, 2011: 2), as well as spatial displacements of the border. Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos (2010) propose the concept of 'border regime' to better capture the notion of the border by placing the agency of migrants in the conceptualisation of borders through an ethnographic analysis. Others have privileged the term 'borderscapes' (Perera, 2007) or 'multi-sited' approach to bordering (Brambilla, 2015; Brambilla and Jones, 2020). Meanwhile, Anssi Paasi (1999: 670) suggests that the border ought to be understood as 'practices and discourses that 'spread' into the whole of society.'

Indeed, scholars have highlighted new practices and sites which constitute bordering work, including in churches (Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2017), advertising campaigns (Watkins, 2017), detention centres (Hiemstra and Conlon, 2017; Bosworth, 2020), and

through the indirect outsourcing of bordering to aid organisations (Williams, 2017). For Ponzanesi and Blaagaard (2011: 3), borders are:

> moving from physical (the gate to European territories and citizenship) and symbolic (the myth of Europe and its idea of superiority) to material borders (the marked body of foreigners, immigrants and asylums seekers), which become 'border' figurations (construction of otherness, foreignness, alienness).

Meanwhile, Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist (2014: S124) discuss how a 'migration infrastructure' serves to condition and mediate mobility through 'systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors.' Mezzadra and Nielsen (2013: 186) also emphasise the constitutive role of multiple layers and actors in the making of borders, such as 'government agencies (including police, customs, intelligence, diplomatic corps, and military), NGOs, intergovernmental, and international organizations, epistemic communities, activists, media, and the migrants […].' Meanwhile, Tsianos and Karakayali (2010: 374) highlight:

> The most common manifestation of the border in Europe is not to be found along the geographical border line of the Schengen area, but rather in the records on the laptops of the border police; in the visa records of the European embassies […] in the online entries of the Schengen Information System (SIS), where the data on persons denied entry to the Schengen area is administered; in the Eurodac, the data system administered by the European Commission, where the fingerprints of asylum seekers and apprehended illegal migrants are stored.

Furthermore, Balibar (2009: 203) highlights the dislocation of borders *within* territories: 'wherever militarized police operations are waged against illegal aliens' (203). He also emphasises their transportation beyond the borderline: 'externalizing the camps […] on the territory of neighbouring 'client' states, who would agree to act as auxiliary immigration officers' (Ibid). Due to the heterogeneity of forms, sites, and practices which constitute contemporary borders, Burridge et al (2017) have proposed reconceptualising borders as 'polymorphic,' which allows us to grasp the manners in which borders take on a multiplicity of forms at the same time.

Along similar lines, Saskia Sassen (2005: 525) has referred to the complex transformations of borders as 'the actual and heuristic disaggregation of 'the border.'' Brambilla and Jones (2020: 296) adopt a 'multi-sited' approach to the borderscape to ensure that it allows one to also take into account 'protests, resistances, activisms, and struggles that pervade borders' (see also Brambilla, 2015). Thus, the 'border' is no longer taken as a given foundation for political and scholarly analysis, but rather becomes 'a site

of interrogation in its own right' (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 6). Meanwhile, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 7) argue that 'borders are equally devices of inclusion that select and filter people and different forms of circulation in ways no less violent than those deployed in exclusionary measures.' The scholars therefore developed theories of 'differential inclusion' in their work on the 'border' as a methodological viewpoint. Within this broader ontological, epistemological, and methodological shift, the centrality of practices and performativity has been given increased attention by scholars in the field, representing a paradigm shift from studying the 'border' to interrogating the notion of 'bordering practice,' within what Chris Rumford (2009) referred to as 'border work.' It is precisely the analytical vantagepoint of borders as a set of *practices* which is particularly relevant to the theorisation of the politics of exhaustion, which is concerned with precisely how states are seeking to govern mobility in a multiplicity of ways, through a heterogeneity of biopolitical and necropolitical mechanisms for 'getting hold over migrants' lives and movements' (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020: 5). Indeed, this is a preoccupation with which a range of critical migration and border studies scholars have sought to investigate.

Moreover, an increasing body of work is concerned with technologies of immigration control and the heterogeneity of bordering strategies. As Nassar and Stel (2019: 44) contend, migrants often face 'an unpredictable, hybrid form of governance that emerges at the continuously shifting interface between formal and informal forms of regulation.' Furthermore, the critical migration scholarship has shown that the control of mobility is not merely carried out through arrest, detention, and interdictions, but also through new and heterogenous bordering practices.

A technology of bordering theorised by Tazzioli (2017; 2019a) is the governing of migration *through* mobility. For Tazzioli, migrants across Europe are facing containment through forced mobility; their geographies are 'diverted and decelerated,' (2017: 30) and as such, they are controlled and excluded. Tazzioli highlights how migrants' movements are 'controlled, disrupted, and diverted not (only) through detention and immobility, but by generating effects of containment keeping migrants on the move and forcing them to engage in convoluted geography' (Tazzioli, 2019a: 1). Leonie Ansems de Vries and Elspeth Guild (2018: 1) have followed down a similar path, as they refer to the notion of 'forced, obstructed, and circulatory mobility' being used as a common migration

management tactic across Europe; something which is indeed clearly identifiable in the context of northern France. Lorena Gazzotti and Maria Hagan (2020: 3) similarly report an absurd use of dispersals in the context of Morocco, where migrants would be dispersed to the south of the country, only to then make their way back in a few days (or even hours). Similarly, Fiorenza Picozza (2017: 239) highlights the common phenomenon of 'Dublined' migrants who experience being stuck in transit 'spending between five and ten years struggling to settle.' According to Tazzioli and De Genova (2020), kidnapping of migrants has also emerged as yet another bordering tactic, as part of the authorities' need to 'persistently experiment with new tactics for the deployment of violence, and thereby also constantly engage in renewed gambits of legitimation' (2020: 6). The scholars draw attention to 'the heterogeneity of modes of migrant confinement, which are not reducible to detention as such, and may entail coercive forms of mobilisation rather than immobilisation as measures that serve the ends of governing the lives of border crossers' (2020: 9).

The temporal dimension of borders is of significant importance in these types of theorisations of the border. Mezzadra and Neilsen (2013: 13) emphasise 'the necessity to analyze the border, not only in its spatial, but also in its temporal, dimensions.' They highlight the need to take into account 'the temporal thickness and diversity that is not fully discernible within an analysis that systematically privileges spatial qualities' (2013: 133). Along these lines, some have worked on dissecting technologies of temporal management, such as technologies to speed up processes through biometrics (Walters, 2002; Amoore, 2006; Feldman, 2012; Scheel, 2018), through detention and dispersals (Gazzotti and Hagan, 2020), and through the aforementioned use of forced mobility, which serves to convolute journeys (Tazzioli, 2017, 2019a). Moreover, Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli (2017: 171) argue that the 'government of people's freedom of movement does not only operate through sheer blockage– as, for instance, in incarceration, detention, or encampment; it also works through mechanisms of spatial and temporal suspension of people's lives.' As such, the notion of temporal borders enables a deepened understanding of the diverse strategies that are constitutive of the border. Linked to this are biopolitical techniques and tactics devised to render life governable and pliant, with the premeditated intention to curb autonomous migratory

movements through the influencing of decisions and intent management. This is precisely where my work is situated, and where the major contribution of this thesis will be made.

Within the small but growing body of scholarly work addressing biopolitical techniques of intent management and the influencing of conduct, Nicolay B. Johansen (2013) argues, within the context of refused asylum seekers in Norway, that in cases where the state finds difficulties in removing or deporting individuals from the territory, authorities confine them to miserable conditions as part of a 'funnel of expulsion,' with the hope that they will eventually give in and decide to leave Norway voluntarily. As such, everyday practices and arrangements are designed to slowly erode people's resilience and their ability to persist and survive. Similarly, Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering (2014) contend that technologies of 'intent management' are utilised in the context of Australian border control, where 'new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to shape individual decision-making to promote 'voluntary' compliance with migration management goals' (2014: 17). This echoes what Rose (2000: 324) refers to as the 'technologies for the conduct of conduct.'

Along similar lines, Behrouz Boochani, a Kurdish scholar and writer who was held in detention in the Australian-run detention centre on Manus Island for years, noted that 'the system in these prisons has been created so that incarcerated refugees experience an unbearable amount of pressure, reach the point of hopelessness, and finally decide to return to their country of origin' (Boochani, cited in Loughnan, 2019a). My work aims to complicate, and contribute to, this body of literature in a number of ways. First of all, my project will be elaborating a new framework, the 'politics of exhaustion,' for grasping how technologies, or 'techniques of governmentality' (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020) that are at play at Europe's borders, have become increasingly sophisticated and are deterring, controlling and excluding by inflicting exhaustion upon migrants' bodies and psyches as a way of controlling intention. The use of intent management through physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion is a bordering tactic which remains heavily under-theorised. In doing so, I moreover emphasise the centrality of *violence* within seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift which understands violence constitutive of bordering technologies and has been largely absent in traditional migration studies, albeit with some important contributions (Brambilla and Jones, 2020: 288).

2.5. Theorising violence and borders

The centrality of violence within the bordering tactics addressed in this project calls for a brief theoretical overview of the concept, once again without making pretence at providing an exhaustive theoretical discussion. The etymological roots of the word 'violence' come from the Latin words *violentia* and *violentus*, meaning 'vehement.' This is what Simon Springer and Philippe Le Billon (2016: 1) believe may come from the notion of 'deprived of mind.' However, the origins of the word remain unclear, as it also has connections with the French word *vouloir*, which is related to the Greek *Bia*, meaning 'force' or 'constraint' (Springer and Le Billon, 2016). Lacking a single agreed-upon definition, violence could be understood as a highly confounding concept (Springer and Billon, 2016: 1).

The past couple of decades have also witnessed what James Tyner and Stian Rice (2015: 2) refer to as 'an upswing in the geographic writing – and theorizing – of violence.' Such endeavours have included efforts aimed at deepening our understanding of violence, not only in terms of its consequences, but also theories of the 'act' or 'event of violence (Ibid). As part of this work, Tyner and Rice (2015: 2) highlight academic efforts at addressing the philosophical distinction between 'killing' and 'letting die.' For example, Mary Anglin (1998) explores violence produced by structures of dominations, which impede people's prospects for survival, and Tania Murray Li (2009) analyses the harmful impact of biopolitics in rural Asia, which has led to the dispossession of large numbers of people from access to land, while neoliberal policies have simultaneously curtailed programmes that could help sustain the same populations, making them a 'surplus' population.

While there tends to be a privileging of what Slavoj Žižek (2008) refers to as 'subjective' physical violence, namely a type of violence carried out by a clearly identifiable actor, Kirsten Simonsen and Lasse Koefoed (2020) argue that a more nuanced and broader understanding of violence is required. They refer to 'symbolic violence,' (Galtung, 1990) which works through 'humiliation and affects dignity, sense of worth and value, and integrity' (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020). The authors explain that 'symbolic violence' is related to and from parts of systemic violence, but refers specifically to the 'violence of language,' through which the latter cements relations of domination, often through Othering and Orientalist discourses. A vast body of academic work on violence has also

sought to demonstrate how the traditional binary between direct and structural violence are sometimes mutually constitutive, seen as a dialectical relationship.

For instance, Tyner and Rice (2015: 9) demonstrate how the threat of direct violence in the context of Democratic Kampuchea made possible the enforcement of harmful policies and 'administrative violence,' while concurrently, these same policies facilitated the foundation for direct violence. As such, the 'taking of life' was dependent on, and central to, the 'disallowal of life' in this case study. While challenging the binary relationship between direct and structural violence, this work also questions the moral differentiation between 'killing' and 'letting die.' Tyner and Rice (2015: 9), once again referring to the case of Democratic Kampuchea, highlight how the political leaders had an awareness of the harm caused by their policies and practices, whilst also having the opportunity to stop them, but chose not to, and also had the capability to prevent harm being done. For these reasons, the authors argue, the deaths resulting from this 'administrative violence' through policy suggests that they should be considered as immoral, direct 'killings.'

Springer and Le Billon (2016:1) argue that,

> [We] can find the ignominious expression of violence in virtually every facet of our everyday existence. Sometimes, it comes in the form of an overt appearance, where we can easily recognize its horrifying effects and deadly consequences. In other instances, it is hardly recognizable at all, hidden beneath ideology, mundanity, and the suspension of critical thought, where we have to look very closely through the lens of theory to appreciate how a particular set of social relations is imbued with violence.

This assertion certainly highlights the need to go beyond traditional concepts of violence and seek a broadened conceptualisation, which are not always overt in appearance, but perhaps mundane and not immediate in their harmful consequences. Moreover, the scholars highlight that violence ought to be seen as 'a processual and unfolding moment, rather than as an 'act' or 'outcome'' (2016: 2). According to Tyner and Rice (2015: 4), violence is 'any action or inaction that affects the material conditions of another, and in so doing, reduces one's potential to survive. To put it another way, *violence is any action or inaction that increases vulnerability'* (emphasis in original).

Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (2004: 2) highlight how violence 'defies easy categorization.' Therefore, they propose the deployment of the concept of a 'continuum of violence' (see also Cockburn, 2004), which ranges from everyday small-scale matters to catastrophic forms of violence, such as genocide. Through their work, they strive above all 'to 'trouble' the distinctions between public and private, visible and invisible, legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence, in times that can best be described as neither war nor peacetime in so many parts of the world' (2004: 4). They argue that:

> [V]iolence can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality - force, assault, or the infliction of pain - alone. Violence also includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth, or value of the victim. The social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and meaning. (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 1)

The notion of structural violence was first highlighted in Johan Galtung's (1969) article *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*. Galtung differentiates between direct violence, which occurs when there is an identified actor perpetrating the violence, and structural violence, when no actor is identifiable. Galtung (1969: 170-171) adds that:

> [...] whereas in the first case, these consequences can be traced back to concrete persons or actors, in the second case, this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and, consequently, unequal life chances.

Later, Paul Farmer (2010: 354) argues that 'structural violence' 'cause[s] epistemological jitters' due to the difficulties in defining it. Farmer himself defines it as 'violence exerted systematically – that is, indirectly – by everyone who belongs to a certain social order [...] In short, the concept of structural violence is intended to inform the study of the social machinery of oppression.' On a separate occasion, Farmer (1996: 261) asks:

> Can we identify those most at risk of great suffering? Among those whose suffering is not mortal, is it possible to identify those most likely to sustain permanent and disabling damage? Are certain 'event' assaults, such as torture or rape, more likely to lead to late sequelae than are sustained and insidious suffering, such as the pain born of deep poverty or of racism? Under this latter rubric, are certain forms of discrimination demonstrably more noxious than others?

Tyner and Rice (2015) assert that while Galtung's conceptualisation has been influential, it comes with several conceptual challenges. For instance, it focuses on outcomes rather than processes (Tyner and Rice, 2015: 2; see also Gupta, 2012: 21). In addition, the

theoretical separation of 'direct' and 'indirect' violence has also been dissected by Tyner and Rice (2015), who argue that this limits our dialectical understanding of violence and advocate for a process of abstraction and separation. Meanwhile, Rob Nixon (2011: 2) describes 'slow violence' as 'a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, and attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all.' He continues to emphasise the importance of paying attention, not only to violence as 'events' or 'actions' that are spectacular and sensationally visibly, but also to forms of violence that are 'neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales' (Ibid).

Claire Thomas (2011: 1834-1835) highlights the dangers of utilising euphemisms rather than calling an act of violence for what it is, stating that it risks 'glossing over the damage done or the gruesome nature of the act' (2011: 1834), and risks hiding the fact that the act does harm to individuals, making a potentially brutal act sound 'normal,' 'clean,' or simply an unavoidable part of life, and of the foundational relations between states. Therefore, we need to construct a proper discourse on violence which emphasises that 'the effect of violence is always felt by individuals' (2011: 1834), whether it is taking place between states, at the individual level, or otherwise. As Thomas (2011: 1835) outlines, we ought to acknowledge that 'violence does harm to individuals, whether that be a just war, rape, or a car bomb, and if we build a discourse based on euphemisms, it is all too easy to forget this. On the other hand, she also notes, 'But if we expand the concept to also include social injustice, we talk about everything and nothing' (Thomas, 2011: 1836). In this project, it will be argued that violence must be understood as a personal matter, because it is always necessarily linked to the harm caused to a person (Thomas, 2011: 1834).

The relationship between violence and power is also of immediate relevance to this research project. Hannah Arendt (1970: 87) famously wrote that:

> every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence – if only because those who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the government or be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to substitute violence for it.

She furthermore suggested (1970: 56) that from a political perspective, it is not sufficient to simply think of power and violence as being the same, as they are in fact opposites: 'where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent,' she argues (Ibid). In this sense, '[v]iolence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance.' For Arendt, the implication of this is that the opposite of violence is *not* nonviolence: 'to speak of non-violent power is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it.' (Ibid)

Along similar lines, Springer and Le Billon (2016: 1) clarify that 'certainly violence can be said to involve a particular relation of power, but violence is not tantamount to power.' Meanwhile, Judith Butler (2004: 231) has suggested that 'violence is done in the name of preserving western values,' thus saying that violence performs an 'ordering function' (Shepherd, 2007: 250), which organises politics and power in a way which preserves an image aligned with western values. She adds: 'Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary' (Ibid). As Springer and Le Billon (2016: 2) highlight, critical theory has introduced a range of levels of analysis of violence, including accounts which see the body or corporeal as the key site of analysis (see Fluri, 2011), analyses of 'symbolic violence' (see Bourdieu, 2001), and forms of violence hidden behind cultural values (see Tyner et al, 2012).

In seeking to broaden the concept of violence beyond the traditionalist international relations tradition, we must nonetheless also be careful not to end up with a construct of violence which can encompass virtually any and every form of human invective (Jenkins, 1998: 124; see also Thomas, 2011). Therefore, Thomas (2011: 1834) develops a composite definition which lays the foundations for my project, which analyses the external aspects of the UK border through a lens of violence. She proposes a definition of violence in international relations as 'an intentional act designed to cause harm, which is direct and physical or psychological. It is instrumental, a tool in order to achieve a particular aim.' As Thomas highlights, such a definition is helpful to the study of international politics, given its relatively narrow scope which facilitates fruitful analyses of real-life events without risking to cause confusion or broadening the term too widely. Another aspect rendering this particular definition useful is its ability to be applicable to any actor, irrespective of whether their actions are considered legitimate or illegitimate,

so long as they are understood to cause harm to an individual. This, in turn, allows us to analyse 'each case in its own terms' (Thomas, 2011: 1835).

In the subsequent chapters, this conceptual foundation of violence allows for an exploration of how violence is performed, experienced, and contested in the UK borderzone. Whilst making the case for an increased interrogation of violence within critical border and migration studies, Brambilla and Jones (2020: 288) highlight certain attempts made to advance the understanding of the intersections of borders and violence, both within critical border studies, as well as within interdisciplinary work on violence and conflict. These efforts include the work of Jones (2012; 2016) on migration and the violence of borders, Harsha Walia's (2013) work on 'border imperialism,' the work by Henk van Houtum (2010) on what he refers to as 'the global apartheid of the EU's external border regimes,' the work by Henk van Houtum and Freerk Boedeltje (2009) on the increase of border violence, and Henk van Houtum and Rodrigo Bueno Lacy (2020) on the EU's 'deadly bordering regime.' Brambilla and Jones (2020) specifically study the intersections of borders, violence, and conflict to foster a better understanding of how these converge together.

The following chapters of this thesis serve to contribute to an advanced understanding of the role of a form of 'invisiblised' and 'sanitised' state violence in the context of the border-migration nexus. We learn from M. Gabriela Torres (2018) that state violence is defined broadly by social scientists, with definitions ranging 'from direct political violence and genocide to the redefinition of state violence as the neoliberal exit of the state from the provision of social services and the covert use of new technologies of citizen surveillance' (2018: 381). Within the scholarship, there are different forms of state violence represented (including genocide, political violence, and juridical violence), and Torres (2018) suggests that there is an emerging trend prompting us to also consider structural inequalities and the incorporation of new technologies of violent governance. Here, my thesis will be making a contribution through the embodied encounters in the UK-France borderzone, as we shall see in chapter 6.

Overall, my thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge by engaging directly with the empirical, taking the border as its starting point. This helps us to expand our

understanding and theorisation of the complex tensions, dialogues, and interactions which take place between the autonomous movements of migrants on the one hand, and the state apparatuses of governmentality and sovereign control on the other. Indeed, it has been argued that '[o]nly from the subjective viewpoint of border crossings and struggles can the temporal thickness and heterogeneity of the border be discerned' (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 166). It is precisely from such an engagement and viewpoint which my contribution to knowledge emerges. As such, I have chosen 'border struggles' as my epistemological vantage point, and proceed to asking the following overarching question:

> In what ways, and why, has the externalisation of UK border and immigration control to France led to the evolution of (violent) bordering tactics beyond traditional border control measures of spatial containment and interdiction/non-entrée, and how are these contested by migrant subjects?

In the interest of preventing any doubt, it should be noted here that the primary focus of my study is directed at the United Kingdom's approach to border and immigration control, characterised by its juxtaposed border arrangements with France, with the latter acting as an implementing partner. In the following chapter, I outline my methodological approach to exploring this research endeavour.

3. Methodology: Pursuing ethnographic *Bricolage* with 'struggles' as epistemological vantage point

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, relevant strands of debates within critical border and migration studies were explored, thus setting the scene for the research inquiry of the thesis. In this chapter, I discuss the epistemological and ontological positioning of my thesis, before addressing my methodological choices, as well as my reflections relating to ethnography-inspired and multimethod field work across multiple locations in the UK-France borderzone, more specifically in Calais, Paris and Brussels; all of which are major migratory nodal points for migrants seeking to eventually cross the UK border (Map 1). I introduce the various field research methods adopted and how the field work has been carried out in practice. Importantly, I also reflect on my criticality and questions of representation, subalternity, and reflexivity in the context of conducting field work and in the phase of analysing research findings, while writing up the project itself.

Map 1 | Research Locations across the UK Borderzone

In pursuit of the exploration of my overarching research question, I am directing my attention to the situation for individuals on the external side of the UK border. As discussed in detail in the introductory chapter (section 1.6), I considered that an in-depth scholarly study of the UK-France border ought to be a noteworthy and important case beyond its own local context. Indeed, this borderzone constitutes a key contemporary example of the externalisation of border control between European states, allowing for an analysis of the technologies deployed as part of such externalised border enforcement. Moreover, the UK-France borderzone is a particularly fruitful location for field work on these issues, given the intensity with which many seemingly disparate border policing and migration management tactic are implemented, and made to converge, on a daily basis here.

This assessment regarding the utility of selecting the UK-France border as my case study – combined with my pre-existing policy knowledge of UK-France migration cooperation, as well as my wide pre-existing contacts network among activists, volunteers and migrants with first-hand experience of the area – led me to select this as my chosen case study.

In doing so, I wish to contribute to a heightened understanding of 'border struggles' and the dynamics when sovereign power, or 'control,' meets human mobility and migratory projects. As Vicki Squire (2011:3) highlights, public understanding of 'irregular' migration is limited, so while there is increased support for studies looking at numbers and impact on states of irregular migration (as well as in origins and routes), there is much less understanding of the actual experiences and expectations of the individuals themselves. I agree with Squire that 'migrant strategies, experiences and claims […] are critical to our understanding of irregular migration' (Ibid), and I have therefore sought a method which is largely based on these experiences and claims. Thus, the project does not engage in research around statistics and similar matters, but rather the political struggles (or border struggles) which are both unfolding and constituting the borderzone between the UK and France. As such, I seek to provide a 'bottom-up' or local perspective on one aspect of the global migration regime, selecting the UK borderzone as my 'site of intervention' where power relations and discourses meet with the lived experiences of displaced people seeking to exercise mobility (see Johnson, 2014: 15).

3.2. Epistemological and ontological positioning

Taking a constructivist perspective on the border, which, after all, is a relational space, I seek to explore the overarching research puzzle and three specific research questions. My starting point has thus been the lived realities and struggles on the ground and the effects of the bordering tactics, in an approach that borrows certain elements from Grounded Theory and privileges the voices and lived experiences of so-called 'irregular migrants' themselves. This allows me to produce work which sees matters 'from the view of people on the move, from people who live in the borderlands, from people who make opportunities, not violence, at the edges of the state' (Brambilla and Jones, 2020: 299). As such, I follow an articulated need 'to shift the attention to 'the geopolitical margins of the state'' (Tazzioli 2019a: 9) and analyse how micro practices and administrative measures may impact the lives of migrants. In doing so, I am inspired by Cynthia Enloe, who suggested the following:

> To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable. Really? ... It presumes *a priori* that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so naturally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are *kept* there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer. (1996: 188, Emphasis in original)

Based on this, I found that ethnographic field work would best allow me to privilege the lived realities and on-the-ground effects of violence in the UK border zone. Overall, I consider ethnography a central research method to conducting research about the world from the viewpoint of its social relations, and indeed in particular for a project such as this. As such, I distance myself, through this work, from the classical paradigm of border studies and the theme of security. Rather, my work understands the border as a site of struggle, following Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 18), who emphasise their use of the border as an epistemological viewpoint, because this allows for 'an acute critical analysis, not only of how relations of domination, dispossession, and exploitation are being redefined presently, but also of the struggles that take shape around these changing relations.' Along the same lines, I take the struggles in the UK-France border as my epistemological vantage point, and by selecting ethnography as the overarching methodological approach, I am able to see the border through the experiences of those who have experienced being trapped in the borderzone themselves.

I seek to draw upon the narrative and voice of people on the move to account for the everyday political agency of displaced people, and the ways in which this shapes politics of mobility. By doing so, I also challenge the realist and other mainstream narratives of the International Relations discipline by highlighting some of the individual and everyday acts which are often hidden or deprived of meanings and political implications, rather than 'uncritically adopt a statist perspective conceptuali[zing] irregularity as a 'problem' related to the 'illegitimate' behaviour of migrants' (Squire, 2011: 6). By focusing attention on the struggles of mobility in a borderzone, the project would, along the lines of Squire (2011: 5), also contribute to a shift which allows us to think about politics more dynamically. This approach showcases the experiences and voices of individuals who have somehow become the outcasts of globalisation. As Arundhati Roy writes,

> I think of globalisation like a light which shines brighter and brighter on a few people and the rest are in darkness, wiped out. They simply can't be seen. Once you get used to not seeing something, then, slowly, it's no longer possible to see it. (Roy, cited in Nixon, 2011: 1)

This project seeks to shed light on those who have been 'wiped out,' and ultimately claims that a different approach to human mobility can, and *must*, be possible.

In conducting my field research and analysing its findings, I am faced with the challenge of ensuring that I do not assimilate or contribute to the cementation of the fixed modern ontologies and claims of social relations which I initially set out to challenge. As discussed by Ansems de Vries et al (2017), even post-structuralist critique at times struggles to 'fracture modern framings,' and despite questioning them, it often falls back again on more familiar ontological assumptions. This has been the case for me in this project, and although I have sought to adopt a critical ontological approach, there are times when I've fallen back into the familiar, and I see this work as a learning process to explore matters of fracturing fixed ontologies, which I will take with me on my continued journey.

Inspired by a feminist sociological approach, I emphasise the importance of starting one's analysis of power from individuals' everyday lived experiences rather than by commencing with abstract categories (Smith, 1987). Along these lines, I believe that mobility must always be understood as embodied and relational, and therefore, following Jennifer Hyndman (2012: 243), I would seek to 'displac[e] attention on borders to the crossers of borders themselves; and in a related vein [shift] focus from state-defined

subjects (as objects of analysis) to emerging techniques of governance and/or government(ality).'

3.3.Ethnography and its critics

The methodological approach of this research project is hence ethnography-inspired field work, consisting of a triangulation of qualitative interviews and conversations with migrant interlocutors, interviews with key external interviewees, as well as participant observation. According to Karen O'Reilly (2005: 3), ethnography is:

> [...] iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing on a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human agents, within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly written account that respects the irreducibility of human experience, that acknowledges the role of theory, as well as the researcher's own role, and that views humans as part objects/part subjects.

By way of background, prior to the 2000s, there was an overall preference for quantitative research methods within the wider field of political science (Schatz, 2009: 1). The theories upon which methods are based upon are grounded in a realist ontology where 'the existence of a reality [is] external to the observer' (Ibid: 3). From there onwards, however, a range of qualitative methods started entering the field of study, including ethnography (Ibid: 2), which allow for an exploration of the representations of migrants' view points and self-reported experiences. According to Edward Schatz (2009), there are four main ways in which ethnographic work brings value to the study of political science. First off, the methodology allows the researcher to put into question 'generalizations produced or meanings assigned by other research traditions' (10). Secondly, the micro-level evidence gathered through ethnographic work can enlarge our understanding of the 'political' (Ibid). Thirdly, the ethnographic methodology allows for 'epistemological innovations,' where the researcher notices 'constitutive processes that capture dynamism. And rather than concentrating on macro-structural factors, she seeks to carve out a space for human agency' (Schatz, 2009: 110). Lastly, the researcher can remain grounded in the empirical findings rather than fleeting out into abstractions and disputes over theory; it 'keep[s] the researcher in touch with the people affected by power relations' (Schatz, 2009: 12).

Bueger and Mireanu (2015: 119) similarly call for closeness to the empirical through 'proximity.' Whilst not dismissing the importance of theoretical work, the authors rather

suggest that strong abstractions require empirical research (120). For Bueger and Mireanu (2015: 126), proximity brings 'us closer to the problems and practices, and offer strengthened ties to the objects of research.' It is through such an approach that my ethnographic-inspired field work allowed for an exploration of different notions of subjectivity, power, violence, and politics, through which alternative understandings have been possible.

It should be acknowledged here that the ethnographic research and writing approach is not without its critics. Ethnography has been widely criticised as being structuralist, Orientalist, masculinist, and so on, above all due to its links with social and cultural anthropology. The latter has been widely critiqued for perpetuating the 'same/other' binary of the logocentric western tradition, or one that sees words and language as fundamental expressions of a given external reality. According to Nasrullah Mambrol (2017), anthropology does so by:

> [...] upholding a privileged position whereby the dominant codes of western culture, including patriarchy and imperialism, survey, classify, and govern the cultures of the east, the third world, of people of colour, women, and those of different sexual preferences.

However, as Wanda Vrasti (2013: 61) argues, I believe that ethnography can equally be used as a critical research approach, and can allow the researcher to 'correct the dehumanized (people-less, story-less, and emotionless) face of IR research and write user-friendly texts that transcend the boundaries of our profession' (61). Indeed, it allows us to challenge some of the existing, unquestioned methods of 'understanding' the world. Vrasti further argues, based on insights from Allaine Cerwonka (2007), that when:

> [...] recognizing that this is a man-made translation of social reality with no claims to scientific reliability, ethnography can afford to travel back and forth between the part and the whole, experience and text, fieldwork and theory, certainty and epiphany in ways that other methods cannot and which, in the end, can only add to the credibility and authenticity of this genre. (Vrasti, 2013: 61)

Moreover, anthropology itself, in which ethnography has its roots, seems to have undergone efforts to achieve distance from Eurocentric assumptions, which arguably informed previous ethnographic writing. Hence, using ethnography can be understood, as expressed by Ruth Behar (2003: 16), as being 'conscious of the contradictions of such knowing and the history of shame that precedes and marks all of our efforts.' Along these lines, ethnography is currently being re-written by feminist, postcolonial, and social

constructivist scholars, and my project seeks to be part of such efforts to draw on what aforementioned scholar Vrasti has referred to as ethnography's 'radical promise' (Vrasti, 2008: 281). As the same scholar further argues:

> [E]thnography [can be] a critique of the way in which knowledge is commonly produced and communicated within social science research. Rather than obsessing over questions of research design, ethnography is an exercise in being truthful about the distance we travel from research questions to finished manuscript, with all its doubts, epiphanies and improvisations. (Vrasti, 2010: 79)

3.4. Bricolage and 'embodied encounters'

In response to continued calls for critical methods and methodological frameworks, Claudia Aradau et al (2015) proposed a 'performative and experimental approach to methods' (2015: 15). Borrowing a few perspectives from critical security studies, they view methods not only as tools to bridge a gap between theory and practice, but rather to understand the practice of critical methods as 'engaging in a more free and experimental interplay between theory, methods and practice' (2015: xi). In accordance with this, through this research project, I am able to adopt the idea of method as an experiment, allowing me to intervene in complex and thorny situations of displacement, legal limbos, and violent state practices. Aradau et al depart from the rigidness of traditional separation of theory and method, from which 'theory is the starting point where the epistemological, ontological and normative questions and perspectives are established,' allowing for 'a more experiential move to and from, of improvisation' (2015: 7). The scholars refer to this as a 'bricolage,' which 'focuses on experimenting with combining theories, concepts, methods, and data in unfamiliar ways to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely invisible' (Ibid: 8). Through this critique of classical methods, it is argued that methods should be understood as 'active and particular rather than passive and universally applicable […] neither are they necessarily fixed to certain theoretical positions' (Ibid: 8). Along similar lines, my methodology was not entirely fixed, but rather left room for some adaptation along the way. I did not separate theory, methodology, and methods entirely, but instead let them evolve and intertwine throughout the research. This allowed me to challenge the conventional, 'top-down (from theory to methodology to method, or from abstract to concrete)' approach to research with a more experimental 'bricolage' (2015: 7).

As McNevin (2013: 199) emphasises, theory production must be grounded in concrete migrant struggles if we are to make theoretical advances on existing gaps between analytics and subject formations. Through a grounded empirical inquiry, she argues,

> we may have a chance of glimpsing new iterations of the political. It is through this kind of reflexive research that we might, in turn, develop new concepts, registers, and maps that can better articulate the modalities of agency at stake in the political claims of irregular migrants and their relationship to existing normative orders. (2013: 199)

This resonates with e.g. Scheel (2013b), who advocates for the study of 'embodied encounters,' which places migrants' struggles at the centre of analysis. This, he argues, enables the researcher to 'embrace a radical constructivism that highlights the dialogical and contested nature of the performances by which these phenomena are brought into being in the first place' (2013b: 286). For Scheel (2013b), an embodied encounters approach is crucial not least because of individuals' 'varying access to resources, the different degrees of racist and sexist discrimination they have to endure, and, finally, the particular design and composition of the governmental regimes within and against which they struggle.' This, he argues, requires a 'situated reading of autonomy, as it implies the adoption of 'politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situation' […]' (Scheel, 2013b: 283). This is precisely the approach that I have taken in this project, which has the potential to support the development of a political questioning of the current thinking and writing on migration (Ibid).

3.5. Positionality, reflexivity, and representation

The field work of this study inevitably required me to engage in reflexivity around questions of representation, subalternity, and privilege. I remained deeply conscious of the wider relational frameworks within which I was operating (racial, socio-economic, historical, post-colonial, etc.). This was not only in the context of conducting field work in the borderzone, but also in writing up the project itself. When starting this research project, I was fully conscious of my privileged position as an external observer, as a European passport holder, protected by my 'Whiteness' and my access to the justice system, with the means of travelling freely in and out of the borderzone without having to experience the most brutal forms of its violence. No matter how connected one feels to the cause of those trapped in European borderzones, and irrespective of the empathy that one develops for the individuals encountered, one has to acknowledge that one will

always remain an outsider, who may never truly be able to understand what others are experiencing.

Moreover, as a researcher in a context such as this borderzone, I am aware that any action taken in solidarity as a co-participant shows that the risks are almost negligible compared to those facing structural border violence, racial discrimination, and other forms of injustice. An important motivator for my PhD study was the strong inclination I felt to instrumentalise the aforementioned privileged position and protection I inhabit, in times of profound injustice and disturbing forms of violence. I wanted to use all available strategies and channels to question and challenge borders and policies that produce unimaginable forms of violence, inhumane practices, and further injustices. I wholeheartedly wish that my exploration of the dynamics in the British borderzone will be received as an acceptable account by those who are trapped within its ceaseless violence, by means of the project's attempted nuance, grounding, and relentlessness.

Inevitably, I am also faced with reflections associated with the idea of speaking on behalf of 'the other' as part of the 'crisis of representation.' There is an undeniable danger that the discussion of matters such as 'migrant agency' within a privileged academic context risks disempowering, misrepresenting, and stereotyping 'migrant voices.' Postcolonial insights lend a helpful lens towards addressing this. As Edward Said (1978: 272) reminds us,

> The real issue is whether there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representor. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe), then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is *eo ipso* implicated, intertwined, embedded, and interwoven with many other things besides the 'truth,' which is, in itself, a representation.

I have done my best to allow my interviews with displaced people to lead the narrative of the ethnographic study. I do not claim to 'represent or speak on behalf of' any of my interlocutors. Instead, their accounts have given me unique insights and knowledge. This has allowed me to propose a new framework for the harmful technologies of border control in the context of Britain's externalisation to France as part of this thesis, and to outline my understanding of migrant subjectivities produced, and the forms of violence in the borderzone. My interlocutors have offered a framework for thinking of sovereign power, border violence, and human agency. I believe that the act of anchoring my

research project primarily in the accounts of displaced individuals' own experiences, based on self-reporting, is an inherently political act aimed at providing a space for participation in the debates and discussion. Any co-option performed by my project cannot undermine this. Overall, the project invites voices of 'illegalised migrants' to enter the sphere of academia, thus contributing in an incremental manner towards what (I hope) will become the democratisation of academic research in the future.

That said, there are clearly questions and tensions between individuals' voices and stories, the representation of such voices, and the eventual analysis thereof. As Victoria Canning (2017: 5) notes, the 'portrayal of lives and experiences are, rightly, contentious ventures in the social sciences,' and require us to deal with the questions of power which are inherent in academic research. Therefore, it is important that the position of the researcher, including my Whiteness, is also considered, and to allow the voices of my interviewees to lead the research in order to prevent this project from becoming a voyeuristic gaze into their realities, which, according to Canning (2017: 5), has 'the capacity to objectify rather than empower.' I have been aware from the outset that this is an inevitable risk, but considered the urgency of the situation and the lack of academic inquiries into the external violent aspects of the UK border with France as more necessary than ever to have allies amongst White people, those protected by citizenship rights, and other paperwork drawing the line between 'legal' and 'illegalised' human beings. Critical allies are perhaps now more important than ever. As Johnson (2014) highlights in her book, *Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence*, it is common that observers of various types choose to discount or ignore the words and aims of displaced people and often view them as being overly subjective, biased, or manipulative stories for their own gains. Therefore, it is crucial to undertake this type of research and to be led by the views and voices of my interlocutors, thus addressing the asymmetry between the representatives of sovereign states, decision makers, and individuals who seek to navigate their rules.

I do not wish for this project to become what Canning (2017: 6) refers to as a 'springboard for voyeuristic sympathy,' or something that would further strengthen the impression of irregular migrants as vulnerable, disempowered groups of people who need a 'White saviour.' I recognise and understand that there is a very fine line between highlighting the voices of my research interlocutors and my own academic and theoretical

interpretation, but I have achieved this balance to the best of my abilities and with the best of intentions. Over the years, I have also ensured in-depth exposure to the borderzone, its individuals, and related activist work. I am also keen to avoid what Squire (2014: 12) has referred to as the 'lure of naïve humanism,' where analyses of human agency risks being over or understated, and where migrants' political acts are 'romanticised' (Squire, 2014: 17) and migrants are depicted either as a type of idealised or supreme human on the one hand, or as an objectified powerless human on the other (Ibid.).

Ultimately, what I have sought to do in this project is broaden the audience exposed to the voices of those trapped in the UK borderzone, and bring the concerns of activists and aid groups into a critique of the UK's state response to human mobility. As such, this project explores and examines the effects of the UK's outsourcing of border controls to France, and the forms of violence, harm, and suffering that this produces. I seek to avoid speaking through this project on behalf of the displaced individuals who are faced with such state violence, but rather serve as a means for silenced voices to be heard and a broader critique of the state to be put forward collectively. As such, in line with Alexandria Innes (2015), I am not claiming or hoping to 'give a voice to the voiceless;' rather, I am emphasising the importance of *listening* (Innes, 2015: 39-40). Indeed, agency and voice are not something you have only when these are given to you by Western scholars; rather, these are inherent in every human being.

Lastly, the type of field research I undertook undeniably involved a level of 'politicization' of both myself as a researcher and my research work, because:

> In the course of the research, the boundary between participant observation and observant participation will inevitably blur. Ultimately, researchers will realize that the knowledge they produce and, consequently, they themselves are part of the struggles they investigate. (Scheel, 2013b: 286)

I am hence not neutral to the struggles which unfold in the UK-France borderzone; my work might therefore be described as a militant investigation within critical scholarship, as I investigate the techniques of power and violence inherent in this border, as well as the human practices and struggles that unfold around it, with the view of proposing an alternative to the current situation.

3.6. Terminology

The project explores the everyday lives of migrants at the UK's doorstep, which includes a vast array of individuals, most of whom would currently be lacking any form of legal status or statutory protection. This includes refused asylum seekers; individuals having gone under the radar since entering Europe; 'Dubliners' (Picozza, 2017), that is to say individuals with an open asylum case in another country; and asylum seekers with an ongoing case in France, Germany, or elsewhere. For want of a better term, I refer interchangeably to these individuals as 'individuals,' 'migrants,' 'displaced people,' 'people on the move,' or 'interlocutors.' I seek to refrain from state-centered terminologies as analytical categories (see Scheel, 2011). What my research interlocutors all have in common is that they have left their country of origin at some stage and are currently seeking sanctuary in Europe, most notably with the hope of reaching the UK while doing so. Many of the interlocutors would have been on the move for several months (if not years), completing unfathomable journeys to reach Europe and often being bounced around between European countries after that. Indeed, many would have experienced difficulties due to the Dublin Regulation, a system which means they would oftentimes be returned by one EU state to another, if they had given (or been forced to give) fingerprints, and thus being entered into the asylum system. While there is nothing in international law which requires a person to claim asylum in the 'first safe country,' the Dublin Regulation stipulates which EU member state is responsible for a claim.

The mainstream definition of 'irregular migration' refers to 'those who enter a nation-state without authorization,' whilst it can also be used to refer to 'those who breach the terms of their residency within a nation-state, such as those who work without permission' (Squire, 2011: 4). Meanwhile, I refuse the term 'illegality' when speaking of human mobility, as a state-centric concept which criminalises people on the move and inscribe on them 'culpability' (Ibid.; see also De Genova, 2002). At times, I may instead refer to 'illegalised migrants' (Tazzioli, 2019a; Kalir, 2019) to stress the process by which some individuals are given an illegal status by the state authorities and thereby become deportable (Kalir, 2019: 33), 'undocumented migrants,' or 'individuals in legal limbo.' When referring to the UK-France 'borderzone,' I refer broadly to what Squire (2011:14) defines as 'physical or virtual sites marked by the intensification of political struggles

over the condition of irregularity;' in this case, stretching from Calais in northern France to Brussels and Paris, if not further afield.

Moreover, in the methodological 'neutrality,' migration becomes a 'problem' for state actors to handle as best they can. I argue that it is not, but rather a natural phenomenon, which has been framed as a problem challenging the remits and limits of state sovereignty and the nation state as the foundational political unit. Indeed, irregular migration is only 'a condition that is produced *irregularly* through the (re)bordering practices of national, international and/or transnational agencies,' (Squire, 2011: 7) rather than a neutral phenomenon.

The entirety of this project relates to the notion of 'borders.' However, it should be noted that it is not my aim to reach a definition of what 'border' means. Indeed, following Balibar (2002: 76), my project problematises the notion of 'border' and acknowledges the difficulty in defining the concept:

> The idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by definition, absurd: to mark out a border is precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border, to assign boundaries or borders. [...] The theorist who attempts to define what a border is in danger of going round in circles, as the very representation of the border, is the precondition for any definition.

3.7. Methods

3.7.1. Overview of methods and locations

In concrete terms, my PhD adopts a multi-methods approach based on extensive field research into, and exposure to, the dynamics of the UK-France border. In order to most adequately address the overall research puzzle and specific research questions, I have combined informal conversations and participant observations with more structured qualitative interviews, as outlined below in greater detail.

In regards to the research locations, given that the thesis explores and analyses the struggles produced at the UK's doorstep in northern France (with a particular focus on Calais), most of my interviews, conversations, and participant observation took place there. My choice to also conduct interviews in Brussels and Paris derived from my understanding that individuals circulate between these locations in their anticipation of

reaching the UK or finding sanctuary elsewhere. I wanted, on the one hand, to explore whether this was an accurate assumption, and I also anticipated that interlocutors in these locations would be able to provide a perspective not only on the situation in Calais itself, but also on the experiences which individuals encounter when circulating in the wider borderzone. This is part of the exploratory approach of *bricolage* that I adopted for the project. Symbolically, these three locations are also three 'nodal points' in the UK borderzone, given that these locations are hosting the UK's juxtaposed border arrangements.

While it is not realistic nor desirable to expect an ethnographic research project carried out from an interpretivist epistemological position to be guided by positivist measures of 'validity,' 'objectivity,' and 'reliability,' it is nonetheless important to ensure that one's research is guided by a framework to provide direction and 'trustworthiness.' Indeed, a project of interpretivist nature could not, and indeed is not designed to, achieve observational objectivity or produce a 'single truth;' rather, it acknowledges that the researcher is part of the production of knowledge in the first place. Nevertheless, an interpretivist research project must not assume that its epistemic positioning reduces the importance of rigour and using a systematic approach. Therefore, my project takes detailed measures to ensure such trustworthiness, in line with the framework proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985: 290):

> How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including self) that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of?

Whilst positivist inquiries may be guided by the more conventional terms 'internal validity,' 'external validity,' 'reliability,' and 'objectivity,' my research project has instead been guided by notions of 'credibility,' 'transferability,' and 'confirmability.' Indeed, Decrop (1999) highlights that natural science-derived notions of 'corroboration' and 'validation' need to be reassessed within qualitative research projects, with triangulation of sources serving as a useful method. He suggests that qualitative findings are strengthened when several sources converge on the given findings, 'or at least, do not oppose them.' (160) Accordingly, I designed my research project around the three aforementioned distinct and complementary types of field data: qualitative interviews and conversations with migrants; qualitative interviews with external interviewees; as well as participant observations. As such, the project draws its trustworthiness from the

method of 'triangulation,' which allows researchers to analyse and compare and discuss findings across sources (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 283). In line with what is proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), I moreover kept field journals, which included not only notes from interviews and observations, but also a log of day-to-day activities, as well as a personal log containing reflexive and introspective notes 'about the state of one's mind in relation to what is happening in the field,' including 'commentary on the perceived influence of one's own biases,' as well as a section for additional questions and ideas to follow up on. Lincoln and Guba (1985) moreover note that one must safeguard against 'going native,' or in other words, over rapport. Furthermore, safeguards are needed against distortions arising from bias, such as 'wrong first impressions' or 'slavish adherence to hypotheses formed earlier.' The best way to safeguard against such is to be aware that such biases may arise, and to correct them when they do.

3.7.2. Interviews

My field research included 50 in-person interviews, group interviews, and conversations with 'migrant interlocutors'. These interviews took place in person in London, Calais, Paris, Brussels (see Map 1), and over Skype with undocumented individuals trapped 'on the other side' of the UK border. As mentioned above, individuals seeking to reach the UK typically circulate between these three key locations during their transit; jumping on lorries in the Calais port and in parking lots in Belgium; and taking rest in Paris before coming back to Calais or Brussels again to try their chance. Therefore, it made sense for me to interview individuals across these locations, which also served as confirmation that the aforementioned circulation is indeed very common. However, it should be noted that it was not my intention to research the conditions in Brussels and Paris; the interviews and conversations with individuals based there were always focused on their experiences in Calais. Meanwhile, seven of the interviews took place in London with people who had previously spent time in displacement in Calais over the past few years. An overview of these interviews is provided in Appendix 1.

Additionally, the research was complemented with 25 interviews with 'other interviewees,' namely volunteers, academics, activists, and NGO workers carrying extensive, immersive experiences of the situation among displaced people in the area; see also Appendix 1. These interviews took place in person in London, Calais, Paris, Brussels, and via Skype.

During my fieldwork, I was accompanied by interpreters who enabled me to conduct interviews in Amharic, Arabic, Persian, and Tigrinya. I also conducted additional interviews in English and French. This allowed me to include individuals from the main country groups present in the area: Afghan, Ethiopian (including Oromo), Eritrean, Iranian (including Kurdish), Iraqi (including Kurdish), and Sudanese.

Given the need for interpreters to accompany me during parts of the research project, it was important to think about effective recruitment of interpreters, as well as ensuring their appropriate and ethical conduct as part of my research project team. I developed a code of conduct, which the interpreters signed prior to deployment and adhered to for the duration of the research project. This code of conduct included matters relating to risk mitigation and security matters, ensuring confidentiality, code of conduct in the field, data handling, and any other matters which the lead researcher required. Interpreters also had to familiarise themselves with the exact language and wording used to explain the aims and objectives of the study and not deviate from this language at any time. The interpreters were also required to abide by instructions from the lead researcher (myself) at all times and without exception. Such instructions could relate to the discontinuation of an interview due to psychological distress and harm experienced by a research subject, or other potential security risks identified by the lead researcher. They also had to agree to withdraw from any situation which appeared to escalate into aggression and/or topics that appeared to cause high levels of grief and/or anger. They were also required to not interfere with, or steer, the lead researcher's recruitment of participants for the qualitative interviews with refugees.

My knowledge and analysis of the (micro) practices and methods undertaken in northern France were also informed by, and benefited from, my longstanding engagement with the complex situation in the region as part of my role as Executive Director of Refugee Rights Europe, a human rights organisation created as a response to the hopelessness in Calais in January 2016. This has provided me with considerable knowledge and understanding of the situation at hand, whilst also signifying that I have a particular perspective on the matters. I have also drawn on some of the secondary sources published by Refugee Rights Europe and other civil society actors to illustrate some of the points made throughout this thesis. Undoubtedly, it also means that I have a specific perspective and come with my specific assumptions and prior understandings of matters.

Based on my brief prior encounters with individuals there, I was conscious of the raft of challenges that such field research would come to encompass. All interviews were anonymous, in order to protect the respondents' anonymity and for confidentiality and safety purposes. All respondents gave informed oral consent (see Appendix 2) for their inclusion in the research, and were given the choice of whether a laptop would be used to take verbatum interview notes or not. Audio was not recorded for any of the interviews, in the interest of avoiding gathering biometric data of the respondents, who are in a very precarious situation. Firstly, I was aware that it would be a challenge to gain the trust of individuals in this level of precarity. I also knew that there was a certain degree of 'interview fatigue' and overall scepticism regarding the prospects for positive change, meaning that individuals might see very little point in taking part in my interviews. Moreover, I suspected from the outset that it would be very difficult to hold any lengthier types of interviews with people in such a desperate and fragmented situation, and that I would certainly not be able to bring a voice recorder. Therefore, I had to adapt my methods accordingly if I were to undertake this type of academic research. First of all, I would need to go beyond basic premises of 'doing no harm' (see Davies et al, 2017), given the extremely precarious situation my interlocutors were in. Furthermore, I would need to adopt a flexible interview structure which I was able to memorise, and I would need to be adaptable in terms of note-taking, memorising, and other methods of recording answers. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions, and lasted between 20 minutes and an hour. Some interviews turned into group interviews, and it was not always entirely easy to discern 'who said what' within a group of interlocutors. Other interviews ended abruptly due to e.g. the arrival of police officers, the start of a food distribution, or other factors. Some interviews yet again turned into conversations instead. The interview and conversation notes were 'triangulated' with my field observation notes, as well as with my interviews with interviewees from civil society and activist groups (see below).

At times, my interlocutors were more interested in discussing slightly different matters than the ones I had planned to explore through my research questions. In those cases, it was important to let my interlocutors primarily guide the discussion and ensure that the themes and issues that mattered most to them could take centre stage. I was flexible enough to make the research possible, without losing sight over the overarching research

questions and the importance of following a systematic approach in this type of academic research.

Amongst such topics were conversations around the kinds of lives people had been in before ('we used to have roof top parties on the weekend' or 'I was a successful interior designer'), their ethics and values ('I am a good person, I never steal, and I don't smoke'), and sometimes, their preoccupation with everyday hurdles rather than wanting to reflect on and discuss the systematic violence my research focused on ('they started asking us for a ticket on the train; this makes it difficult to go to Paris, that's the big problem here').

The semi-structured interview schedule which I adopted included the following questions:

- Where are you from? When did you leave your country?
- How long have you been here [in Calais]? Where were you just before this? Can you tell me about your journey here?
- Are you happy to be in France? Have you applied for asylum here in France? When/why not?
- Where are you staying at the moment? How is it there?
- Are the French police officers helpful to refugees? How were they in Italy (and/or other countries)? [Ask further follow up questions as required]
- Can you tell me about the support you've received from the French state? Who has been most helpful to you here in France / during your journey?
- How does the treatment by police and other authorities make you feel? How do you and your friends usually react when you see/meet police and other authorities here?
- Do you feel safe here in France? Have you experienced any violence here in France? If yes, can you tell me a little more about this experience? Can you explain why you think this happened? [If no experiences of violence: Have you witnessed anyone else experience violence here? Etc]
- Do you know why the European authorities wanted to take your fingerprints when you arrived in Europe [in Italy /Greece /Spain]? What do you think about that?
- Where are you hoping to go from here, and why? What will be the next step of your journey? (How are you planning to reach your final destination?)
- Do you know why the border to Britain is so difficult to cross? What do you think about that?
- What things have you done to try to improve your own situation? Have you looked for help or advice from anyone?

Furthermore, believing that activists and aid groups (whether voluntary or salaried) operating in the area would also have important contributions to make, I complemented the interviews with displaced people with qualitative interviews with such interviewees. I believed they would be well-placed to outline different manifestations of power in the

borderzone, where they operate on a daily basis, in close proximity to the displaced populations. Such qualitative interviews would also be somewhat easier to conduct, given their more secure, protected status and existence, compared to that of undocumented individuals. Initially, I had planned to carry out structured focus groups with volunteers and aid organisation representatives present in the area to be recruited through a structured outreach drive. I wanted to favour this method as focus groups allow for an organic exploration of issues for common understandings and points of disagreements within groups of actors.

Thus, I drafted a focus group schedule which contained the following focus group questions relating to the first research question:

- What are the main challenges facing refugees and migrants here?
- Are there any challenges that are more applicable to certain demographic groups?
- How do these challenges affect your work with aiding refugees in the area?
- Have you attempted to speak to the authorities about these difficulties, and if so, was there an outcome?
- What are your main concerns for the refugees and migrants here?
- What effects do you think these aforementioned issues have on refugees and migrants in the area?
- How do the authorities (e.g. police officers) usually interact with refugees and migrants in the area?
- Do you think there is a differentiated approach vis-a-vis children and women?
- What do you think the authorities are trying to achieve with their approach?
- Do you think their approach is working towards achieving those aims?

However, as I started to approach volunteers and aid groups, it became increasingly clear that it would be difficult to carry out these in an organised, planned and collective manner. I therefore adopted a 'snowball method' and conducted the interviews on an individual basis, rather than as a focus group. While some of the benefits and added value of focus groups were lost, most of the interviews went in-depth on the research questions and therefore resulted in rich research material.

Through the project, I seek to understand not only how displaced individuals are exposed and subjected to violence through the sovereign states' border control practices, but also whether and how their own actions, agency, and responses are co-constitutive of the same bordering tactics. This allows me to illustrate how displaced people negotiate the forces, structures, and practices that seek to control their mobility, building on the idea that individuals at Europe's borders have their own voices, acting on resistance and

agency, but often go unheard amidst reports on their precarity, lack of human rights, and being subjected to violence and hardship. I aimed to explore the potential myriad of ways in which individuals, despite their challenges, engage in conscious and subconscious acts of subversion and resistance to control. In acts of defiance and agency, the latter is explored as meaningful and transformative in the everyday context. This research question is explored in the same set of interviews as the aforementioned research question, so I therefore added several questions to the interview structure.

In relation to the second research question, I constructed the following questions for activists and aid groups:

- How do refugees and migrants typically react to the authorities' approach?
- What impact does this approach appear to have on refugees in the area?
- Do you think there is a difference in reactions between different demographic groups?
- Have you ever spoken to refugees and migrants about their views on the French authorities? If so, what did you gather from that conversation?
- Can you think of any examples where refugees and migrants have resisted state authorities?
- Can you think of any examples where refugees and migrants have broken the law?
- Do you have any concerns about the impact of refugees and migrants on the local community or the safety of volunteers or local people?

3.7.3. Participant observation

The aim of participant observation is two-fold, according to O'Reilly (2005: 96). Firstly, it allows the researcher to familiarise themselves with matters from the vantagepoint of those being researched. Secondly, over time, the participation of the researcher tends to make the people being researched to become more used to the presence of the researcher. James P. Spradley (1980: 58) outlines different levels of participation which are selected depending on the particular research questions and the context within which one operates: passive, moderate, active, or complete. The approach I took during my field work was a moderate approach to participant observation, whereby I struck a balance between observing and participating. At times, I was able to record in writing my observations, what I saw and heard in the various contexts. Other times, it was important not to take notes as an official researcher, but rather interact informally with the individuals in the borderzone. Such informal interactions included things such as spending time in the encampments and areas where individuals were staying, conversing

with people informally over a cup of tea in a café, joining individuals as they were going into shops to buy essentials, and so on. This moderate approach was very useful to my research, in that it gave me deeper insights and understandings which I wouldn't have obtained through interviews only, or from an even further distance, whilst it also allowed me to remain relatively emotionally distant and able to engage in analytical reflectivity (O'Reilly, 2005: 54-55). At the same time, this kind of presence allowed me to interact informally with individuals and make them feel more comfortable with my presence, which subsequently aided me with the recruitment of participants for the informal and formal interviews.

My field observations throughout the research period mainly took place in the following specific areas of each research location:

- **Calais**: Rue de Moscou; Place de Norvège; Rue des Garennes, Rue des Huttes and the surrounding area; the site of the former 'Jungle' camp; the area around the Calais hospital; as well as an industrial area located east of the town centre.
- **Paris**: Avenue de la Porte des Poissonniers; the area around Porte de la Chapelle; the area around Canal St Denis; Stalingrad; Jaurès.
- **Brussels:** Parc Maximilien; Gare du Nord; and the nearby Canal side area.

3.7.4. Ethics

A wide range of ethical issues arise when conducting ethnographic studies within violent and complex situations at borders. When the main interlocutors are illegalised individuals without any form of legal status or protection, the ethical considerations are even more pertinent. In this section, I outline the key ethical considerations and steps which I took prior to, during, and after my field resrach.

First, it was crucially important to ensure full and informed consent of everyone involved, and to also guarantee full anonymity. This was particularly important when interviewing displaced individuals in a state of limbo, and also when engaging volunteers and aid workers who could face repercussions in their work (should their views and opinions become publicly known). This led me, along with data protection experts and the Ethics Committee at the University of Westminster, to opt not to collect biometric data of individuals in the form of voice recordings and/or photos showing faces or eyes.

Secondly, I found that there were a number of ethical considerations linked to the idea of building trust with the interlocutors in an ethical way without raising expectations that I would be able to help with their individual cases. When trust is established, it is likely that researchers may hear or see things of deeply sensitive and confidential nature, and they typically become a 'sounding board' for some of the respondents who have very few alternative outlets for their grievances. John van Maanen (1988) describes ethnographers as 'part spy, part voyeur, part fan, part member,' and this inevitably raises several questions regarding ethics and integrity of the researcher. On multiple occasions, it was difficult to leave people behind after the interviews. Overall, it is a heart wrenching activity to 'come and go' and to leave people behind in their desperate predicament. This is illustrated by numerous notes from my field journal, such as the following illustrative example: 'At the end of the interview, the respondent got really angry when I was about to leave, and said that people always just come and go.'

Thirdly, there is the related question of 'giving back' to the research site, which might prove difficult due to the transient and ever-changing nature of the locations under study. Undeniably, unconstructive feelings of recurring guilt plagued me throughout the research project. I have had to remind myself of the possible impact which could be generated through a strengthened body of evidence and analysis relating to the policies that lie at the root of the situation in the UK borderzone.

Due to the multiple ethical issues which were identified ahead of the research study, I developed a risk register, participant information sheets, interview structures, and other tools. All of these items were cleared by the Ethics Committee at the University of Westminster.

3.7.5. Use of illustrations

Being acutely aware of the knowledge production inherent in the depiction of spaces and subjects through the act of drawing of a map, I chose to depict my research locations through very minimalistic charts. What one chooses to include or exclude from any given map can have significant ramifications upon knowledge production, representation and our interpretations of a particular phenomenon, event, or space. In particular, it should be noted that the map I had created of the former Calais 'Jungle' camp had a solitary aim of depicting the demolitions of space, rather than providing insights into the infrastructures and community phenomena which grew out of the camp, living spaces,

communal spaces, and manifestations of political subjectivities and human agency. There are a number of excellent projects dedicated solely to this. For instance, Sarah Shearman (2016), Project Fuel (2019), and Architecture for Refugees (2016), are notable projects that have undertaken in-depth cartographic and ethnographic work relating to the space of the former Calais 'Jungle' camp.

A number of photos have been included throughout the thesis. Once again, I am acutely conscious of the production of meanings that comes with depicting spaces and phenomena through photography. It is not within the scope of this thesis to delve into this in any deep manner, but it should be noted that the photos I have carefully selected amongst an extremely vast bank of images available to my research project have been chosen at the *end* of the project to illustrate certain aspects contained within the analysis of my research findings. As such, the photos themselves have not informed the analysis, but rather the other way around; they were selected afterwards to further strengthen the illustration of some of the matters brought to light in the thesis.

The photos were taken by a variety of actors, including individuals with real-life experience of displacement, people working with organisations to support migrants in the area, professional photographers, and myself. Hence, the photos are not, in any way, claiming to all-inclusively represent how migrants trapped in the borderzone are experiencing their situations. Others have carried out excellent projects aimed at precisely addressing these matters; see for instance Mohseni et al (2017) for an overview of a student-led research project hosted by the Migration Research Group at King's College London in July 2016 in the former Calais 'Jungle' camp. The researchers provided residents of the camp with disposable cameras to record their daily lives in the camp from their own perspectives, which resulted in a research report, article, and public exhibition. See also Lequette and Le Vergos (2016) for an extensive photographic account of the Calais area accompanied by text narratives and a music disc.

3.7.6. Limitations

Matters of state violence and agency are, of course, highly complex concepts, and there are inevitable limits to what could be included within the scope of this research project. Firstly, while it is important to situate this thesis in relation to gendered violence due to the deeply deplorable and unacceptable fact that sexual and gender-based violence is part of the migratory experience for many women and girls, as well as for some men and boys,

this has not been the main focus of the research. In interviews, women were not asked specifically to narrate their experience of sexual and gender-based violence, primarily due to the fact that I do not have the ability to provide any form of meaningful follow-up support they may need following potential re-traumatisation, which such disclosures could provoke. Moreover, it is very likely that they would not want to divulge to me such highly sensitive and painful information. However, this is not to deny the extent to which women have been (and continue to be) targets of multiple forms of discrimination and violence throughout their time in displacement, and often in new host countries due to a lack of adequate protections and safeguards afforded to them.

On a similar note, it is not possible for this project to encompass any extensive reflections on the potential changes that will result from the UK's Brexit referendum and ultimate decision to leave the European Union as the final arrangements are yet to be confirmed at the time of writing. Inevitably, more changes will follow than what has been captured in this project, and this will undoubtedly have ramifications on the nature and extent of the violence produced throughout the UK border. It will be interesting to follow up with further research inquiries to explore the impact of the exit of the UK from the European Union and the realities of individuals in the borderzone, and of the politics of exhaustion.

Importantly, I wish to elaborate here on why I chose not to include interviews with individuals representing governmental organisations and state bodies, including police officers operating on the ground in the borderzone as well as decision-makers serving the UK Government. First of all, within the scope of the PhD thesis, certain choices had to be made to ensure its feasibility. After careful consideration of how to best answer the research questions of this particular thesis (namely how the bordering tactics at the UK-France border have moved beyond traditional control measures of spatial containment and into the sphere of everyday lives of migrants, and how these are contested by migrant subjects), I deemed it to be most important to ensure a very solid and credible engagement with migrants in the borderzone themselves. This is also an appropriate approach to take, in the vein of the autonomy of migration, and critical border and migration studies more broadly. Thus, I made a conscious methodological choice to privilege the voices of an often silenced/unheard and 'illegalised' group of people, by focusing my field work on gathering their perspectives and experiences in relation to the

impact of bordering tactics, and in relation to how they seek to contest the restriction of their mobility.

Secondly, I deemed it to be outside the scope of this project to meaningfully engage with an additional group of interviewees, not least from an access-related perspective. I based this decision first of all on the fact that, over the years, I have been submitting countless 'Freedom of Information' requests relating to the UK Government's involvement in the policing and securitisation operations, funding and policies relating to northern France; nearly all of which have been rejected upon the basis of allegedly safeguarding 'national security' interests. This has led me to deem it somewhat unrealistic to be able to obtain fruitful exchanges with government officials regarding the underlying reasons for the UK's bordering strategy and methods relating to its border with France. Indeed, I expect it to be implausible to obtain insights which go beyond what can be readily found in officially published government documents and similar sources.

As regards French CRS and border police officers implementing the politics of exhaustion in northern France, I have indeed sought interactions and small conversations with them during my field research and participant observation, and I have been exposed first-hand to their tactics of intimidation and harassment not only of migrants but of aid groups and external observers like myself. I have found that there appears to be a strict reluctance, if not outright prohibition, on police officers releasing any meaningful information relating to their lines of command, instructions and accountability mechanisms. As part of a future research study, I would like to seek official permission to interview willing CRS and border police officers in order to explore these underlying aspects of the politics of exhaustion further (see also the concluding chapter for further reflections on future research agendas). This, in itself, would be a significant undertaking which I believe would require creative and persistent efforts to find the right 'connections' in order to secure such permission; requiring a longer time frame and more singular focus on the police than I could afford to dedicate during my field research period of the PhD.

The methodological choices made within this PhD ought not to be misinterpreted as a disregard for the complexities facing police officers and policy making officials within the context of the border politics, nor is it my intention to ignore the perspectives of actors

serving the state authorities who are most certainly grappling with a challenging and deeply complex policy making environment and engrained policy lines relating to the UK's seldom questioned juxtaposed border arrangements. That said, I am confident that my decision to conduct an in-depth ethnographic study amongst migrants themselves – a truly 'embodied encounter' – enabled me to produce an important piece of research which helps to move critical border and migration studies, and specifically the autonomy of migration scholarship, forward. This is where my key contribution lies. I have produced the largest anglophone academic field research study and counter-mapping of the UK-France borderzone to-date, where I found ways, against many 'odds' and transcending many hurdles, to speak to a total of 75 individuals who carry immersive experience of the borderzone. My underlying policy expertise relating to the juxtaposed border control arrangements between the UK and France, and UK-France cooperation on migration more broadly, has moreover enabled me to situate my field research study solidly into its broader policy context.

There are a number of additional limitations, which arise specifically from the selected methodology. For instance, research participants/subjects may have an interest in giving certain answers over others, and that they may choose to withhold certain information due to the vulnerability of their situation. They may also alter their behaviour during field observations due to the presence of the research team if they wish to come across in a certain way; a phenomenon typically referred to as the Hawthorne Effect. Moreover, one must be cautious of the risk of the so-called 'individualistic fallacy,' bearing in mind the potential 'logical error to draw conclusions about groups based on data gathered with the individual as the unit of analysis.' (McIntyre, 2005: 43)

4. The politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone: A (bio)political technology in the government of migration

4.1.Introduction

As outlined in the introductory chapter, the relatively widespread, if intermittent, political and media attention directed at the migratory situation at the UK-France border has been slower to take root within academia, albeit with some important exceptions discussed in a previous chapter. As mentioned, some academic literature based on ethnographic field research in northern France did of course pre-exist this thesis, being largely anchored in Francophone academia with academics such as Michel Agier, Philippe Wannesson, and Sophie Djigo. There have been important contributions also from critical border and migration scholars who have directed their gaze at Calais, alongside other research locations (Tazzioli, 2017; 2019a), including work looking through the lens of the autonomy of migration in the context of Calais (Rygiel, 2011). Others have highlighted human agency and resistance, such as Natasha King (2016; 2019) in her exploration of solidarity and No Borders movements in the area, or Elisa Sandri (2018) exploring the 'voluntarism' which emerged out of the so-called Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015-2016.

Furthermore, Ibrahim and Howarth's (2018) work is dedicated to analysing Calais and its border politics through multiple theoretical lenses. (See chapter 1 for a more extensive overview of academic literature relating to Calais and the borderzone). In any event, little academic attention has been accorded to the specific nature of the political technologies (Foucault, 1977) and 'tactics of bordering,' (De Genova, 2017b) as well as the border struggles inherent in the externalisation of the British border, and the human impact thereof. This, precisely, is the focus of this chapter, in which I address the first research question regarding the nature of the bordering tactics performed at the UK-France border, how violence is produced within these tactics, and how well sovereign conceptions of power enable us to interrogate and understand the nature of the struggles here.

In this chapter, I draw heavily on the analysis of the 75 field interviews and participant observations, as I focus on strategies of deterrence and exclusion. I diagnose the research findings from a perspective of violence and control, and outline technologies and tactics

aimed at 'intent management,' (Weber and Pickering, 2014) or what Nikolas Rose (2000: 324) refers to as 'technologies for the conduct of conduct.' By tracing lines between harmful practices and the slow exhaustion of human lives, the chapter constructs the concept 'politics of exhaustion', consisting of seven broad categories of practices and methods that co-constitute and produce the control tactics in the borderzone: (1) recurrent and ritualised direct violence; (2) humiliation, dehumanisation, and racialisation; (3) withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability; (4) dispossession; (5) shrinking and defoliation of living spaces; (6) forced (im)mobility; and (7) uncertainty, undercurrents of threat, and omnipresence of death (see typology in Table 1).

Table 1 | Politics of exhaustion: A differentiation

Politics of exhaustion: A differentiation	
Recurrent and ritualised direct violence	The administration of beatings, rubber bullets, tear gas exposure (including its indiscriminate use), and regular pepper spraying, to the extent that these practices could be considered ritualised violence. Moreover, recurrent direct violence includes traumatising events, such as the intentional and unnecessary destruction of mobile phones.
Humiliation, dehumanisation, racialisation	Recurring verbal abuse, often including racial slurs, shouting, heckling, and otherwise abusive or degrading language. Dehumanisation is also experienced through acts such as shoe confiscation, shoving, and commanding of obedience during nonsensical evictions through manifestations of power. Additional dehumanising rituals include ruthless slashing of tents and confiscation of belongings in front of their dispossessed owners.
Withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability	The withdrawal or denial of state care, coupled with the hampering of third sector alternatives, contribute directly to the production of preventable vulnerabilities among the displaced people in the area. Impunity for interpersonal violence, the free roaming of traffickers and smugglers, and an overall sense of 'lawlessness,' puts everyone at heightened risk; notably, minors and women.
Dispossession	Regular destruction and confiscation of tents, sleeping bags, and blankets, as well as other basic necessities such as drinking water, mobile phones, and personal paperwork, risk taking their tolls on one's mental (as well as physical) health and their ability to resort to internal coping mechanisms. Charitable supplies are depleted and require constant renewal, which also has an exhausting effect on volunteers and aid workers.
Shrinking and defoliation of living spaces	The continual shrinking of people's access to space is carried out through erecting fences, razor wire, and spikes, specifically targeting people's resting spots and communal spaces. This form of 'hostile architecture' also includes the tactic of defoliation, where trees and other greenery is cut down to lay bare settlements, thus removing any pretence at privacy and community.
Forced (im)mobility	On one hand, individuals are confined or detained when attempting to move forward, as authorities ensure their continued immobility, while on the other hand, forced *mobility* through dispersals, removals, and deportation is also used to exhaust people by convoluting their journeys and delaying recourse to an effective solution to their predicament.
Uncertainty, undercurrents of threat, and omnipresence of death	Sheer uncertainty and undercurrents of threat permeate people's daily existence. Even in the absence of physical violence, individuals are waiting anxiously for violence to recur, leading to constant hiding and caution. The risk of death, and the lack of accountability in cases of death, contribute further to anxieties and undercurrents of threat.

I shall then argue that this heterogenous array of technologies, which hold together under the term 'politics of exhaustion', would seem to have the potential of producing meaninglessness, emptiness of existence, loss of hope, and debilitation; thus constituting a plausible strategy aimed to deter, exclude, and control individuals at the UK's doorstep. This new concept[i] sheds light on the gravity of the violence and harm produced through the external aspects of the UK border, and therefore arguably merits similarly high levels of scrutiny as the internal manifestations of this border, commonly referred to as the 'hostile environment.' As such, the chapter contributes to an emerging body of academic literature, which explores 'new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to shape individual decision-making to promote 'voluntary' compliance with migration management goals' (Weber and Pickering, 2014: 17). This challenges the binary reading of biopolitics and helps us to better understand forms of biopolitical government techniques, which do not directly foster life nor directly kill, but rather insidiously grind down the autonomy, agency, and resilience of migrants in the borderzone. Moreover, the chapter lays the foundations for the analysis in chapter 6, where a deepened understanding of *violence* is sought and elaborated. Let us now delve into the chapter.

4.2. Tracing techniques of government

The following sub-sections outline technologies of biopolitical control through which migrants' lives and movements are governed, and at first sight, appear to be disparate and isolated practices. However, when taken as a whole, under the concept politics of exhaustion, these techniques illustrate that the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have not only led to the localisation of UK border controls to an extraterritorial space, but also led to the development of corporeal and temporal technologies of bordering devised to gain a hold over mobility and life itself.

4.2.1. Recurrent and ritualised direct violence

Individuals in the borderzone experience beatings, tear gas exposure, and pepper spraying on a regular basis, to the extent that it could constitute ritualised violence. The sight of broken limbs, as well as scarred faces and hands, were commonplace during my field work. In other cases, broken teeth, smashed glasses, and runny eyes from tear gas were witnessed. Overtly violent forms of physical police brutality in the Calais area are relatively well-documented and known (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Refugee Rights Europe, 2016, 2017, 2018b; Human Rights Observers, 2020), and emerged consistently

throughout my interviews. Most migrant interlocutors and other interviewees spoke to me at length about various types of direct violence which they had experienced or witnessed, throughout the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp and in the years to follow. Indeed, nearly all of the interlocutors were able to share accounts of violence and abuse at the hands of state officials, such as national police, the general reserve (known as Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, CRS), and the national gendarmerie, sometimes operating 'undercover' in civilian clothing in the area. While significant parts of this violence take place during episodes of trespassing and attempts at unauthorised border crossings, there are countless accounts of violence which take place in unrelated contexts in the area. A therapist working in Calais to support migrants' resilience described the treatment by the CRS as 'grotesque' (Interviewee nr. 62b) and explained:

> People come here with so many layers of trauma, which are then compounded by the grotesque treatment by the CRS – indiscriminate violations of their basic human rights. People are shocked; some say it's worse here than in Libya, because they had an expectation they'd be treated better here. (Ibid)

The use of tear gas, pepper spray, or other agents has been a common feature throughout the years. One of the women I interviewed explained:

> Sometimes police would stand and talk to us normally, and suddenly take out the spray. Sometimes they would beat people randomly, it could be a boy or a girl. (Interlocutor nr. 51b)

Another interlocutor interviewed in Calais also explained that the use of tear gas and pepper spray is sometimes randomised and ritualised, often used in contexts where it does not appear warranted: 'If you are in a lorry, they can spray. But we don't know why they are spraying here [by the food distribution].' He added with emphasis: 'We don't want to stay here in France.' During the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, one long-term volunteer recounted the seemingly indiscriminate use of tear gas:

> I've seen people being tear gassed – during the south eviction, for example – and they were holding the tear gas cans - - they're not supposed to shoot them straight at people, but I've seen them doing that. When they were trying to get people down from the roofs, they were five meters away and launching the tear gas cannister right at them. There was one time they held it at me as well. [...] I've also seen them shooting tear gas grenades onto the top of plastic shelters, they were so hot they would melt through and would start directly. (Interviewee nr. 65)

A former camp resident ironically recounted the authorities' use of tear gas during the time of the camp:

Tear gas...it was a lovely smell. We became so addicted. Every single night, we had to smell that. We didn't know why. They don't need to find an excuse to use tear gas, but they used the fights between people in the camp as their excuse. They also used rubber bullets. So many people got hurt by the rubber bullets. They had to go to the First Aid caravan, and the guy there was struggling with that kind of damage for a long time. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

Respondents reflected on the various forms of violence experienced in the area. For instance, a Sudanese man in his late forties, whom I interviewed in December 2018, commented on the police behaviours:

They enjoy doing that [being violent] to the migrants, especially when nobody is watching; no NGOs, no French people. They must be supported by high levels and know they are not going to be punished. When you have free power, you can do stupid things. I didn't hear about any police being punished or prosecuted for anything or given a bad treatment. There is really bad treatment for migrants in Calais. People are afraid of speaking about it; they are not in a power position to speak against the police. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

Meanwhile, a young woman from East Africa recounted an incident which had stuck with her and, in fact, made her vomit from anxiety at the time:

They were beating someone really badly and it was a woman, so then she [...] said 'I'm a woman, I'm a woman!' They stopped beating her when they knew it's a woman. French police are good with women, unless [they] think you're a man. [When] it's dark and we are all wearing the same things, they don't know. (Interlocutor nr. 51b)

Meanwhile, a Sudanese man in his late forties, whom I interviewed in December 2018, suggested:

Police. Let me tell you the truth, [they are] very rude, and I am saying this with evidence. A young man, underage, they beat him badly and I took him to the hospital. That guy was very scared [of going] to hospital because he thought the police would come and take him. [...] This is one of many circumstances. A lady said she was beaten very bad inside a [police van], after she tried to smuggle herself. They closed the door and started beating her very badly. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

A Sudanese interlocutor explained:

We escaped from our country because of bad treatment, and suddenly, we find ourselves facing that again; and this has made us doubt whether we're still in Africa or we're in Europe, and what the difference is. Over there the police will treat you like that, because of corruption, and they are poor, but here in a civilized country, what do you have to offer... (Interlocutor nr. 5)

The deployment of police dogs was also brought up by several interlocutors. Allegedly, the dogs would sometimes be released on migrants without muzzles. One Afghan man had been bitten near his crotch, and an Egyptian minor who had been in the area for more than a year (at the time of the interview), showed me where he had been bitten on his thigh. The police had also beaten his knee during the same episode; the knee was bloody at the time of the interview. Moreover, the recurrent direct violence includes deeply upsetting, and potentially traumatising, events such as the brutal smashing of mobile phones. A mental health professional working in the area suggested:

> Smashing of phones severs people's connections and disorientates – it's a deliberate attack on people's resources and sense of security – it's a tool of war. We're told things like, 'I can't speak to my mother anymore'... (Interviewee nr. 62a)

A recurring trend during my interviews was an expression of disbelief and shock regarding the police treatment in France. A Sudanese man in his late thirties, for instance, explained sarcastically:

> The first three days I wasn't sure I am in France. The second day in Calais, I went with the guys to try [to reach the UK] and let's just say the police wasn't so friendly. They gave me a warm welcome by beating my back which made me unable to walk for a week. That is how they welcomed us. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

During a group conversation with Iranians in December 2018, I was told that they had no idea why the police was being so violent towards them. An Eritrean teenager said that in Italy, he 'knew what to expect,' but in France, he was not expecting this level of violence. (Interlocutor nr. 18) Several interviewees suggested to me that it seems like the police violence is worse when no volunteers or aid groups are around. For instance, a long-term volunteer from the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp suggested:

> I don't think volunteers see the worst of it. The worst incidents would happen when there was nobody else there, so when someone was trying to walk to the Eurotunnel for example, there is a huge stretch there where they are alone, no one around. There was a guy who had been beaten incredibly badly when there was no one around, it just changes a lot. Outside the main town centre, there's lots of open space, lots of space and not many people around, so I guess that's where the worst violence takes place. (Interviewee nr. 65)

Another British volunteer similarly suggested:

> My hunch is that... the presence of [Europeans] is likely to moderate police behaviour and I have sensed this on occasion in Calais. [...] I would go down and

> see the guys under the bridges. The CRS frequently passed by, but didn't approach us. They probably don't want to be observed too closely. (Interviewee nr. 34)

Yet another interviewee shared the following reflections:

> During the day, I don't think [...] the police are overtly hostile all the time, at some point it's a case of people just doing their job. But at night, when nobody is watching, there seems to be a sense of exceptionalism, they feel they can get away with anything, that's when the violence occurs, and that's when they are taking people's things. [On the one hand] there is a sense of the duty and the remit of power, that this is 'the right thing to do' - that happens during the day – but during the night it changes. (Interviewee nr. 39)

The same interviewee also expressed a level of understanding for the difficulties facing individual police officers: 'They are asked to deal with a challenging situation, I understand that' (Ibid). Another interviewee recalled: 'During the eviction of the south part of the camp, I remember seeing the police officers on the hill, and one was just crying. [...] It felt like he felt they weren't going to do this...' (Interviewee nr. 37) Similarly, a long-term volunteer told me:

> I've definitely seen CRS being emotionally affected. I've seen them cry and seen them being punished for that. One guy during the south eviction was crying and he was taken by the collar and put into a van and not let out again. Also, they really avoid looking you in the eye. They are probably trained to do that, and sometimes you can see that they are quite shaken. A lot of them are so young. There's a bit of a joke in France that they're not the sharpest knives in the drawer, and I think a lot of jokes could turn them into bullies. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Returning now to the experiences of migrants in the area, a group of Sudanese men I spoke to told me with disbelief that a 70-year-old Sudanese man had recently been kicked so badly by the police, he had to be taken to the hospital. Thus, direct violence also affects older people, as well as underage children in the area. A young Afghan man brought up the latter during our interview in December 2018, saying that the police were very violent and that he had seen them kicking the refugees, even 'the young ones.' In the past, he recalled, if you told them you were a minor, they would let you go and not hurt you. 'But not now. They even detain you, even if you're a minor.' (Interlocutor nr. 42) Another Afghan man said the police had recently hit his 16-year-old friend. A Sudanese minor recounted his experiences of police abuse and dangers in Calais:

> Calais... it was too bad... it was the worst of all. It was too difficult and the worst of all of them [European locations he had passed through]. I slept on the hill behind the gas station. The police arrived at 4am and they started to spray us, gas in our faces and sleeping bags, even if they found someone walking on their own, they could beat you even if you didn't do anything specific [...] The treatment by police

made me feel so upset and so disappointed. I hadn't expected this in Europe at all. They don't want any refugees in Calais […] When the police catch you, they take you. They would beat you if you try to resist. One time, I tried to resist them in Calais, and they took me from the group and took me to a room, very cold. There was nothing inside and they opened the window and left me like that for 24 hours. Nothing, no food or water, even the toilet was inside the room itself. (Interlocutor nr. 75)

A former Calais 'Jungle' camp resident commented on the use of violence against women and children:

They knew that, inside that camp, there were many children and women. And this is another question: those vulnerable people – do they not have a right to live? Unaccompanied minors, single mothers, and children themselves. Where are their rights? Human rights apply only for White people. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

4.2.2. Humiliation, dehumanisation, racialisation

My research findings suggest that individuals in the borderzone also face continuous verbal abuse, which includes racial slurs, shouting, heckling, and otherwise abusive or degrading language. Dehumanisation and humiliation are also experienced through acts such as shoe confiscation, shoving, and the commanding of nonsensical obedience during evictions as manifestations of power. Ruthless slashing of tents and confiscation of belongings in front of their dispossessed owners are additional dehumanising rituals deployed in the area, which is also further discussed in sub-chapter 1.2.4. A Sudanese interlocutor in his late thirties commented:

They are trying to make us give up our goal. […] They [would do] everything they can - to make us give up. For example, beating people, taking their clothes off, putting the people in basements – naked – or taking shoes from people to make them walk for more than two hours without shoes in the winter. Threatening people they would deport them if they didn't give their fingerprints there. Even though they were sure [we] didn't want to stay in France. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

Similar accounts of verbal abuse by the authorities was highlighted by a British social worker, who recounted: 'We would see people being shoved, humiliated, insulted.' (Interviewee nr. 66) Similarly, one of my interviewees, who had a longstanding engagement with the borderzone through academic and activist work, explained:

What I first think of is the situation when the riot police came in to the camp – there were about 200 of them. I just remember how the officers were laughing – they were confiscating things in [the camp residents'] shops. While doing that, they would take a can of coke and drink in front of the shop owner; humiliating people. It made me so angry the way they were laughing in people's faces […] It

felt like it was about power – the police showing the shop owner that he was not worth anything. (Interviewee nr. 31)

Throughout my research, I have heard countless accounts of verbal abuse perpetrated by police officers against migrants. One Sudanese interlocutor explained: 'They are so bad, so rude, especially to the migrants. They are joking when they [use violence].' (Interlocutor nr. 47) A 19-year-old Afghan youth interviewed by Refugee Rights Europe (2017: 21) also similarly reported: 'At night time, two people came in a car and fought me and shouted bad things at me. Suddenly, they showed their ID cards, and they were actually police.' Another Sudanese man, in his mid-thirties, explained:

> Inside the port of Calais, they caught me from one of the lorries and they [swore] at me and were saying bad words. I think they just sometimes try to torture you, even with their words – they assault you by words. (Interlocutor nr. 36)

The research interviews suggest that the humiliating verbal abuse and rituals are having dehumanising and racialising effects upon individuals in the area. Along these lines, therapists working in the area reported from their many conversations with young people in the area, one of them recalling:

> They say 'we're not treated like humans here.' They find that the violence here is very particular; this is unacceptable and worse than anywhere else, comparable to Libya. This has been spoken about many times. We don't initiate those conversations, only if they initiate it themselves. It's the sense of being treated like sub-humans: 'How can we survive here? This is for animals.' (Interviewee nr. 62b)

A long-term volunteer working with women and children in particular, having also conducted interviews in the area, suggested:

> A lot of people normalise the abuse; many people use animal concepts, saying things like 'they treat us like dogs' and 'we're not animals.' Yeah, I suppose the most common narrative I've heard is feeling degraded due to the lack of justice: police have said brutal things or been aggressive or violent, and then police would be laughing at them and there will be no follow-up. One guy had his phone stolen and was pepper sprayed, and reported this to the police but there was no follow up. People are made to feel a strong lack of power on a daily basis. They are detained in police stations and being denied food, water, access to a phone, and so on. They're constantly being laughed at... so yeah, they usually wouldn't describe it as psychological abuse themselves, but the feelings that come out of this seem like that. People feeling degraded, patronised, humiliated, dehumanised. (Interviewee nr. 74)

Along similar lines, an Iranian interlocutor explained: 'We've never lived like this before, this is not us! We're starting to hate ourselves. All of us had very prestigious jobs back

home, we're not animals.' (Interlocutor nr. 13a) An Afghan man spoke about dignity, and how he had been treated with respect and dignity in Germany, but not here. He just wanted people to treat him like a human. (Interlocutor nr. 20) A Sudanese interlocutor, who had spent more than nine months in the Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015-2016, summarised his views and experiences of various degrading treatment by state officials in the area. He explained how he had felt when the police insulted or hurt him, emphasising his views on the role of racism in the degrading practices:

> I felt weak, vulnerable, unwelcome, a victim. *Not white*. We don't have the same rights. The rights that apply for them [white people] don't apply for us. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

Similarly, an Ethiopian man in his mid-twenties told me: 'They are doing this because we are black. We are not white. That's why we are sleeping on the ground here in Europe.' (Interlocutor nr. 30) A support worker recounted an episode of racial abuse by police, directed at one of the minors he was supporting at the time:

> I remember one incident during Easter 2017. Six of the boys said they were going out to play football - one was 15 years old - and they didn't come back for long. Gradually, they came back, the youngest with his eyes streaming. It was an incredible angel, he couldn't understand why he had been beaten and tear gassed, and another boy had had to spend the night in the 'urgence' [A&E]. The police had called him a 'black bastard.' He had replied 'I am black, and I'm proud to be black.' (Interviewee nr. 34)

In Brussels, the issue of racialisation also emerged from interviews. This is depicted in Figure A, showing a group of young migrants from African countries being lined up in deeply disturbing and dehumanising ways. These stark accounts are compounded with recurring racialised verbal abuse, intimidation and discriminatory treatment by civilians across research locations, as well as violent attacks by groups of racist and fascist groups coming to the Calais area in particular. There are reportedly national xenophobic movements operating (Agier et al, 2019: 117), and strong support for Front National in Calais, with the emergence of anti-migrant groups including Sauvons Calais, Calais Libre, and Calaisiens en Colere (King, 2016: 106), and in parallel, widespread reports of far-right aggression against the displaced people in the area. One Sudanese interlocutor, who resided in the Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015-2016, claimed:

> More than 20 people got killed [during my time in the Calais Camp] and no one tried to figure out by who. There were groups of fascists around the Jungle and we

think the police knew about them very well, but they were saying they didn't know anything about that. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

A human rights report from Calais in October 2017 tells the experience of an Eritrean teenager who had seen a group of French citizens moving around the area with a lug wrench in order to frighten displaced people in the area. His 17-year-old peer had allegedly been abducted by a similar group who forced him onto a van, drove for approximately one hour, then beat him and left him there on his own (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017). One of my interlocutors, an Iranian artist, recounted:

> Once there were about 15 people near the [Jungle] camp, they kicked us and one of my ribs broke. I went to legal centre and complained, and then went to police station. I recognised one of the men; the people who had kicked us was police dressed up in civil clothing – that's what we think at least. There are so many other refugees that were treated this way but they don't go to complain because they don't have the paperwork. They think they would be arrested and they would have fingerprints in France, so no one else did that […] There was also a big racist group quite active around December 2015, and January or February 2016, they would go around the camp. Us refugees would move in groups to stay safe. I made a mistake being on my own one night, and was beaten. They were always there, I knew that […] What was the goal of the racists? It's hard to think what was going on in their head. But they might think people are taking over the city and maybe they're unhappy with how the system works in the city. Unwanted guests. (Interlocutor nr. 43)

Widespread accounts of racialised violence have been reported by human rights groups, including in the aforementioned Refugee Rights Europe report from October 2017, which stated that physical and verbal abuse was common amongst respondents. Verbal abuse would typically include animal sounds, shouting of racial slurs, and giving the finger. One 29-year-old Eritrean woman explained to the research team: 'On the road, they always make monkey chants whenever they pass me by' (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017). A 29-year-old Eritrean man reported separately: 'They shout monkey noises at me and give me the middle finger.' (Ibid)

In addition to racial and verbal abuse, the report moreover outlines incidents of physical violence, such as the throwing of glass bottles from moving vehicles, spitting, and throwing objects from houses. A 20-year-old male respondent from Afghanistan is cited in the report as follows: 'They throw stuff at us from the window. Once, someone threw a flower pot at me' (Ibid). A Sudanese minor recounted a similar experience of racial abuse during one of my field interviews: 'Even the people living there are racist. Sometimes, when we were walking in the city centre, some people would throw water on

you.' (Interlocutor nr. 75) One Pakistani interlocutor recounted one time when a woman in a car almost ran him over on the road; he thought it was done on purpose, as she didn't stop by the zebra crossing and had also shouted, 'Go back to your country.' My interlocutor himself had then put his hand on his chest, bowed, and said, 'Thank you, ma'am,' and crossed the road (Interlocutor nr. 49). The same phenomenon has been reported by human rights groups, where there are documented attempts on running into refugees with cars on the main road. Interviewed by Refugee Rights Europe, one 19-year old male from Eritrea explained that some people had tried to hit him with a car, and one time captured him, put him in their van, and drove him to the police station, where he was detained for four days (Refugee Rights Europe, 2017).

The racialised abused perpetrated in the UK-France borderzone inevitably brings to mind Mbembe's (2017) *Critique of Black Reason,* in which he theorises Black reason as discourses and practices, which equate Blackness with 'nonhuman,' as a means to uphold forms of oppression. It moreover resonates with Alexander G. Weheliye (2014), who develops 'racializing assemblages' and draws attention to the centrality of race within notions of the human. The convergence of race, racialisation, white supremacy, and dehumanisation in the UK-France borderzone is an area which requires further research in relation to the UK-France borderzone, and I encourage scholars to direct further attention to this as part of a forthcoming research agenda.

Thus, as seen in this section, dehumanisation is an inherent feature in the politics of exhaustion, and one which would recur in my conversations with the interlocutors and interviewees over time. In order to engage in dehumanising activities, it has been suggested during interviews that officers should distance themselves from the realities of the displaced people in the area in order to carry out these dehumanising practices. Three interviewees suggested that this is ensured through the rotation of CRS fleets. One interviewee, who was present as a long-term volunteer for the entire period of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, explained:

> The CRS fleet would rotate every three weeks, or at least they are there for – I would say – no longer than a month at any time. People ask how they can go home to their families at night after what they've done – but in fact, they all stay in one hotel together. They are in the hotel and don't interact with anyone else. I think they are rotated like that so they won't get too emotional. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Another British interviewee similarly outlined this issue:

Something I remember was that the police was on rotation, at least the CRS, there were different groups from different department, and they would treat people in different ways. Someone said to me, 'These are from Marseilles and they are not as bad as the Calais ones.' It seems that they took a different approach; some would even say hello, while others would be much more hostile in their appearance and basic interactions. (Interviewee nr. 39)

Figure A | Dehumanisation in Maximilian Park, Brussels (Anonymous)

4.2.3. Withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability

The withdrawal of state care, coupled with the hampering of third sector alternatives, is an inherent component of the politics of exhaustion, and one which contributes directly to the production of additional vulnerabilities among the displaced people in the area. These deliberately abject conditions resonate with the notion of 'active neglect,' elaborated by Claire Loughnan (2019a) in the context of Australian externalisation. 'Active neglect' is defined by Loughnan (2019a) as the removal of government support services combined with the erosion of hope and wellbeing amongst refugees and asylum seekers, through unfulfilled promises and refusals. In a similar vein, Thom Davies et al (2017) write about the violent consequences of state (in)action (2017:1) in informal

makeshift camps in Europe, including the camp in Calais in 2015, and argue that *inaction* can be used as a means of control through the infliction of suffering. Thus, in line with Loughnan (2019a) and Davies et al (2017), the 'active neglect' or 'violent state inaction' in the context of northern France can be understood as a strategic practice, through which the state *intends* to produce suffering and/or control people. It plays a critical role within the wider government technology of the politics of exhaustion. The extremely precarious conditions in the borderzone have surprised and shocked many who arrived in Europe with the hope of finding sanctuary. One of my Sudanese interlocutors recalled:

> When I first arrived, I was like, so surprised, because how can people live in a place like this in Europe! We don't even have this in Africa, and France is a country [where] there is everything available, electricity and everything, why don't they have a nice place to keep people in? I guess they don't want them to stay here, so they make them go by making life hard. No one cares for them. (Interlocutor nr. 64)

Another Sudanese man, in his late thirties, similarly explained how he felt strong disbelief upon arriving in Calais from Paris, one day in late 2015:

> I had been staying under a bridge in Paris. The police advised me to go to Calais: 'Go to Calais, you can find a camp there'. And that's how I found out about Calais. Then I went to Calais. I thought that maybe I would be very surprised by an amazing place. But instead, I became so shocked; I was thinking, 'Is that really Europe?' Then, Europe showed us the other face of Europe. We didn't see a civilised developed country; we were somewhere worse than Africa itself. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

In the following sub-sections, research findings have been analysed and shed light on various aspects of the withdrawal of care and manufacturing of vulnerability through appalling possibilities for shelter and living conditions, the denial of medical care, hampering of aid and volunteer activities, and the co-production of a 'lawless land,' where sexual and gender-based violence, as well as other forms of abuse and harm, are prone to thrive.

4.2.3.1.   *Safety, shelter and living conditions during the Calais 'Jungle' era*

During the existence of the so-called Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015-2016, which, at its peak, hosted nearly 10,000 individuals, the effects felt from the denial of adequate state care were countered (to some degree) as camp residents, volunteers, and activists came together to build communal spaces, ranging from restaurants and cafes to places of

worship, schools, and libraries, and barber shops. The camp residents had access to regular distribution of hot and cold food items, clothing, tents, sleeping bags, phone charging facilities, and Wi-Fi. The vacuum left by the state's 'active neglect' (Loughnan, 2019a) was thus partially filled by an immense influx of donations, financial aid, and grassroots volunteerism (see e.g. Sandri, 2018). The semi-permanent shelters and community sphere provided some form of place to rest and recover, while the successively growing grassroots aid structures provided the beginnings of a foundation for solidarity and support.

The Calais 'Jungle' camp therefore symbolised the antidote of the absence of state services. Understood within the framework of the politics of exhaustion, it is unsurprising that the camp had to go, as it acted as a counter-weight to any aims of exhausting individuals in the area, both mentally and physically. This will be further explored in the next chapter. That said, it is certainly not my intention to romanticise the Calais 'Jungle' camp, which was a wholly inadequate place for individuals to reside. Largely a 'lawless land,' it was a dangerous place in many respects. Women and children in particular were exposed to immense safety risks in the absence of any safeguarding structures, left largely unprotected from sexual and gender-based violence. Overall, it was also far from adequate in terms of living standards, water and sanitation, medical care, safety, and security for every camp resident who found themselves there. Indeed, looking back at the time of the big Jungle camp, one British long-term volunteer suggested:

> These were really appalling living conditions; they were just so astronomically below the 'Sphere standards.' When I first arrived, the toilets were just overflowing from day one, and it wasn't until Médecins du Monde sued the state that they put some toilets in and started emptying them. (Interviewee nr. 65)

A research study by Surindar Dhesi et al (2017) from the Calais 'Jungle' camp similarly details the acute lack of sanitation facilities, safe food provision, water and shelter, thus illustrating the extreme shortfall of agreed international standards for refugee camps. The scholars thus emphasise the 'hidden materiality of bodily injury' caused by these exceptionally poor conditions. The safety and security were also a main issue which emerged from my interviews with former camp residents. One of my Sudanese interlocutors, who spent time in the Calais camp in 2016, explained:

I didn't feel safe, there was fire in some places and at night, and people would fight. It wasn't safe. Inside the camp, they don't have any police; they are not responsible for the camp. In the city, you could call the police if you needed help, but when fire started in some place, it takes long time for fire fighters to come. Why? I don't know. The fire fighters would need the police to check the place before they could come in, so it took too long. (Interlocutor nr. 64)

Interlocutors have also likened their situation to one of war and conflict. A Sudanese interlocutor looked back at his time in the Jungle and suggested:

How could I feel safe? When the authorities don't care about the children and women, vulnerable people, older people, how I could I trust that they would treat us well? So many people came to the Jungle and had been in the hospital: a leg broken, an arm broken, or some head problem. Some of them were beaten by police, and others in the city centre by the fascist groups. And others were injured under the train. I felt like we were in a battle. It is not normal life for the human beings. Like someone who was fighting for his freedom. We are in the 21st Century and we are still looking for freedom. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

4.2.3.2. *Safety, shelter and living conditions post-'Jungle'*

Following the dramatic final demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' camp in October 2016, as outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis, living conditions deteriorated rapidly. Individuals who had been dispersed across France to reception centres started returning soon after the demolition, and went into hiding in the woodlands and forests nearby the old camp site. Some would also go to Paris and Brussels, whilst others joined other small camps in the northern France area.

Overall, individuals were relying on grassroots distributions of tents, blankets, and sleeping bags, as well as the distribution of regular meals. Sheltering options made available by the French state through the '115' emergency number for destitute individuals in France, is (in principle) also available for undocumented migrants. However, the service has been described by French civil society as oversaturated and far beyond capacity (in the winter time in particular) (see e.g. FEANTSA, 2017). Several of my interlocutors explained that they had tried calling, but were denied a place to stay. One Afghan man told me that he had tried using the service, but had been asked to leave again:

I was ill and called 115 and was put into the accommodation, in a shared room. There was a bunk bed with a Kurdish guy at the bottom, but I didn't feel comfortable sleeping on the top bunk. So, I went to a different room. There was a security person there; a tall guy who said I had to leave the room. I said I was ill

and needed to sleep. He said offensive words and then four security guards came and threw me out at 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning. (Interlocutor nr. 60)

Another interlocutor, an Iranian man, confirmed that the emergency shelter was indeed open for people to stay at night, but with very limited capacity, and couldn't see any point in going there, because if he did, his tent might get confiscated overnight, which he wouldn't want to risk by going to the shelter. (Interlocutor nr. 44a) Others would seek shelter in abandoned buildings, or squats, but did not necessarily find sanctuary there for long, as illustrated through this statement by a young Pakistani man:

Sleeping in jungle [woodlands around Calais], it's not good, it's so cold. Many people go to a broken house where there are many mice and bacteria, but at least it's open. Yesterday I was sleeping there, but then security came and closed it off. (Interlocutor nr. 49)

In December 2018, an Iranian interlocutor commented with disbelief on the improvised living space in which he was inhabiting (see also Figure B):

Women, children, sick… there are families with children here… That poor woman with a 3 or 4-year-old child, how can they tolerate this? We have people here who have a broken leg, who have a cold, or don't feel well and can't walk… they will freeze from the cold. Illness, sickness… (Interlocutor nr. 45a)

Figure B | Living conditions in Calais, December 2019 (Author's photo)

On a different occasion, as part of a group interview, an Iranian man said:

> The cold is coming, the winter is coming, what do you think they [the authorities] will do? Will they continue to take our tents and sleeping bags? I'm someone who doesn't want to be negative, but I can't stop thinking about the winter coming. I might not be here, but for the people coming after. There are quite a lot of young people who have been rejected elsewhere. (Interlocutor nr. 13b)

Water and sanitation in the area is largely inadequate, and reports of CRS police spraying water tanks with pepper spray and slashing plastic containers have been reported. In Brussels and Paris, two locations to which migrants from the Calais area tend to go for 'rest,' the manufacturing of vulnerabilities is particularly striking as well. One of my interlocutors, a Sudanese man in his early thirties, told me when I asked about his time in Paris:

> I did not [feel] very safe, actually. Because even sometimes under la Chapelle bridge when you leave your stuff, you never find it again. If you want to go to the toilet, you can [lose] your things. Even the police in the early morning, sometimes they came and like told you 'go from here,' even though we were just sleeping under the bridge in la Chapelle. They would arrest some people, sometimes people run, sometimes police [would take] our sleeping bag and tell us to go. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

During one of my fieldwork visits, as I approached Porte de la Chapelle, an area where undocumented individuals are concentrated, either being pushed there by the authorities or by following in the footsteps of their peers, I noticed a large semi-permanent settlement which I had not seen before during previous visits. Tarps were attached to tree branches and propped up by improvised pillars. I was surprised that the authorities would let these structures remain and be left untouched during their regular evictions. As I came a little closer, however, I understood that this was not a settlement of migrants; it was a homeless community of French 'sans-abri.' Thick smoke was rising from a man's crack pipe, syringes and needles scattered on the ground, and a few women with frail physique were clad in short skirts and high boots, signalling passing cars to sell their bodies. This is the environment in which displaced individuals are finding themselves in Paris, living right next to another scene of human tragedy, being pushed to the fringes of society where the delineation between the two communities is sometimes blurred and fragile, not least in the public *imaginary*.

An activist in Paris for several years highlights how the presence of drugs threatens the safety of the undocumented migrants in the area. She explained how dealers would offer

the first hit free of charge, then increase the cost to some five euros, and by the time the individuals is hooked, the price has multiplied, depleting the now-desperate individual of any money they had saved for their continued journey in Europe, or far worse, pushing them into illicit activity, sex work, or human trafficking. (Interviewee nr. 4)

4.2.3.3.   Medical care and impact of Covid-19

The access to medical care for individuals in the area is a complex matter. Many of the people I spoke to over the years were reluctant to seek care at the local hospital as they feared they might be forced to have their fingerprints taken or even be handed over to the police. Others allegedly had tried to seek help but had not been well received at the hospital. One Afghan man, for instance, explained to me that as a result of having been shot in his knee back home, with subsequent surgery in India, the knee was now acting up but he had not been able to receive care at the hospital. He also said that he was experiencing stomach problems, and waved a doctor's prescription at us which he said he could not afford to collect at the pharmacy due to the high cost. (Interlocutor nr. 23a) Another Afghan man in the same group explained that he suspected that he had bladder stone, but he just got a tablet of paracetamol when he presented himself at the hospital, so he had given up on trying to access medical care. (Interlocutor nr. 23b) Meanwhile, a member of a team of therapists operating in the area highlighted the issues related to the lack of access to psychiatric support for undocumented individuals:

> The hospital won't accept anyone if they don't claim [asylum] here, so the state psychiatric support is not accessible. [...] Lack of access to specialist support for this population has reached critical levels. (Interviewee nr. 62b)

The manufacturing of vulnerability has become particularly tangible during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is of course plaguing the camps and settlements in northern France since the spring of 2020. In this context, the struggles for displaced people in the borderzone have only worsened. As many of the volunteer and aid groups on the ground have had to pause or cease their operations due to the health crisis, and in the absence of adequate state-led alternatives, large numbers of displaced people have seen their support being reduced drastically (BBC, 2020). The migrants in the area are exposed to an insanitary climate, coupled with stress and exhaustion caused by the ongoing uncertainty and daily police raids aimed at evicting informal living spaces. From mid-April 2020 onwards, the French authorities intermittently took a number of steps to

address the Covid-19 situation in the area, including daily buses taking people to accommodation centres, some provision of water and soap, Covid-19 information sheets, and so on. However, organisations operating on the ground report that the measures are largely inadequate, and included forced dispersals without adequate information, which led individuals to continue to return to the informal settlements after having stayed in state accommodation for a couple of nights.

4.2.3.4. *Hampering aid, protection and volunteer support*

Over time, aid and food distribution activities have been hampered intermittently, and in the striking absence of state care, this leaves individuals in the area in an incredibly vulnerabilised form of existence. Food distribution areas have regularly been fenced off or blocked off with boulders, while volunteers and activists have faced harassment, fines, and overall hampering of their activities. A British church minister with longstanding engagement in the Calais area provided an example to illustrate this:

> We've been at food distributions where the CRS [police] have turned up and forbidden the distribution from taking place. We had a box of ready meals and started walking towards the line of CRS wearing our official vests marking that we belong to an association. They started beating our hands until we dropped the box with food. (Interviewee nr. 50)

Another interviewee, a British social worker employed by a youth organisation in Calais explained:

> I have experienced violence, and witnessed it, I have been shoved. A police officer raised his baton and went to swing and I said, 'Stop it, fucker'. […] The criminalisation in France of the same type of work I would do at home is hard to get - going from having been an agent of the state in the UK protecting people from harm, to suddenly being criminalised for protecting children from harm of agents of the state in France. (Interviewee nr. 66)

The Human Rights Observers in northern France are continuously documenting harassment of volunteers and activists in the area, evidencing the high levels of criminalisation of solidarity. Figure C depicts a standard, recurring type of stand-off at a food distribution point between volunteers and aid groups on the one hand, and CRS riot police on the other.

Figure C | Stand-off in Calais, October 2017 (Author's photo)

4.2.3.5.   Co-producing a 'lawless land'

The approach to human mobility in the UK-France borderzone is one of criminalisation and securitisation. Paradoxically, however, this place is also largely a 'lawless land', as far as the human security of migrants is concerned. Within this, there are certain groups who are at particularly heightened risk when exposed to the dangers presented by organised mafia activities, sexual violence, trafficking, and fascist abuse. Minors are largely left to fend for themselves, despite relentless work of organisations on the ground, such as the Refugee Youth Service amongst others. Sexual violence and exploitation of male youth was reported by several interlocutors and interviewees. For instance, during an interview with a Pakistani man, it was revealed that 'two gay European men, one Italian and one French, would come and take guys [from the informal settlements] and pay them 50 euros for a night. They would come with a van.' (Interlocutor nr. 49)

One Sudanese minor recounted some very different experiences highlighting the dangers involved in spending time in this lawless land of the border zone where mafia operates:

> Sometimes when we tried to get inside the truck we found Kurdish people and they would threaten with knife or gun to get off the truck. I didn't see anyone getting killed but I have seen so many getting stabbed by knife by Kurdish. They have stabbed so many Eritrean people. (Interlocutor nr. 75)

One of the long-term volunteers involved in a major shelter building project similarly explained the impact of lawlessness during the time of the big Jungle camp:

> For volunteers – well, there were basically gangs in the camp as well, and yeah, I've had a knife pulled on me before and there's been situations where female volunteers have felt physically threatened or being in an awkward situation. […] Someone also tried to throw a rock at my head once. It was a side effect of the police surrounding the camp but never coming in and not enforcing the law in that stretch of the land. People might have their things stolen but didn't go to the police; they wouldn't do. It meant that the worst people sometimes had the most power there. (Interviewee nr. 65)

During many interviews and conversations with volunteers and aid workers in the area, it transpired that the situation with mafia in the nearby Grande-Synthe was very complicated. Groups would be worried about handing out information and supporting people, so some groups would turn to information dissemination via Facebook instead of operating on the ground. Evidently, there is a vast problem with organised crime, and no resolve. The absence of safety structures and meaningful intervention has moreover produced a context in which gender-based violence is widespread, and nearly always left unreported and with full impunity for the perpetrators whilst the French and British authorities remain focused on the securitisation of borders. A long-term volunteer explained that:

> A primary problem for women was sexual violence. […] I remember a woman was asked to do sexual favours for a smuggler to get to the UK, I'm pretty certain that was the type of thing that was going on. (Interviewee nr. 65)

The same has been corroborated by other interviewees and interlocutors, including the following statement hesitantly shared by a former long-term volunteer in the Calais 'Jungle' camp:

> There was sexual violence and rape in the camp, that women and transgender women faced, and where intervening was very, very difficult because it was [linked to] mafia structures and you were dealing with easily explosive situations and you would put yourself in danger as well. (Interviewee nr. 35)

The safety concerns in the camp were heightened due to the absence of formal refugee assistance by UNHCR and large NGOs or state protection. There was an 'unofficial' women and children's centre, spearheaded by an extraordinary woman and former fire fighter named Liz Clegg, alongside a number of other volunteer-led initiatives in Calais where young volunteers would work tirelessly with the women and girls in the camp. However,

due to the lack of formal safeguarding structures, it was overwhelmingly challenging, and women and girls faced heightened risks and exposure to violence as a result. As such, the state approach to the human beings in the border zone create conditions of possibility for the proliferation of sexual and gender-based violence.

Among the women I interviewed during my field work, it became clear that some amongst them were deeply traumatised by their experiences in the borderzone. During the time of the camp, some of them had stayed at the official Jules Ferry centre operated by *La Vie Active* and which housed up to 400 women and children in Calais. *La vie Active* aimed to provide a safe and secure space for women and children (see e.g. La Vie Active, 2020). The women explained to me that they were scared of going outside the Jules Ferry area because of fear of 'rape, robbing, beating or taking our stuff.' Meanwhile, they also struggled to sleep in their tents at night because intrusion and attempted rape were so common that it was simply not an option.

My interlocuters explained that there was security at the gate to the Jules Ferry area, but according to the women 'they did nothing' when men trespassed. On a couple of occasions, the women themselves had challenged the police and said they 'have to stop these boys from entering'. In response, a police car came and circulated at night, and the police also brought dogs. But the women stayed awake all night to protect themselves, as they found this the best method for staying safe. Most nights, they would tend to stay out until around 5am and 'go for chance', i.e. attempt to board UK-bound lorries, and then try to sleep during the day when the risk of rape was lower. My women interlocutors spoke of the Ethiopian and Eritrean women who usually lived inside the camp rather than the Jules Ferry centre. One of them said:

> They were raped and beaten and they still kept trying. Sometimes they came to [Jules Ferry] to cook and shower. Sometimes we 'went for chance' together. We would meet in the forest. (Interlocutor nr. 51a)

But even whilst 'going for chance,' my interlocutors reported that women might be raped in the forests. They explained that they would usually ensure to find a group of boys they trusted, and only follow those boys. But they recounted what had happened to other women and girls at the time:

> Sometimes the Eritrean girls were raped by [unknown] men if they didn't have enough boys with them to protect them. The other men would beat the boys and

> chase them away and then rape the girls. These are human beings, oh my God. (Interlocutor nr. 51a)

My interlocutors continued on the same topic and explained that some of the women and girls became pregnant and some went to hospital when they miscarried. One of them exclaimed: 'Some of the boys seem like they treat the girls like a piece of meat. And this is during the day, imagine the night!'. (Interlocutor nr. 51a) As the conversation continued, one of the younger women started crying and shaking:

> I still have nightmares about the dark forest and what could happen to me there. When I am alone, I think about this and it makes me so scared. (Interlocutor nr. 51b)

Another woman in the group added: 'But for us, we always stayed with nice boys who protected us.' (Interlocutor nr. 51a) Meanwhile, one of my French interviewees told me horrific accounts from another small camp in the northern France area:

> We had rape cases. It was the smugglers. At that time in June 2016 there were about 250 people in the camp there, and women, yes, we had accounts of women rape. [...] I was with a translator, she had a nervous breakdown due to what she had heard from the women, and when she got back to the hotel she had to leave. She had a breakdown. It was very violent with the smugglers coming at night raping women and they could not protect themselves. She couldn't even translate at that time. It's a form of state violence because they let it happen. (Interlocutor nr. 63)

The experience of women travelling with a husband or family member appears to be somewhat different, but nonetheless deeply traumatising in different ways. In a report based on qualitative interviews with Kurdish women in the Dunkirk area, Frances Timberlake (2019) reports that the women she interviewed 'unanimously felt the most prevalent threat to be the police' which indicated a reversal of the state's role from being a protector to that of an aggressor (Timberlake, 2019).

This sub-section has analysed what I call the manufacturing of vulnerabilities, and the production of deliberately abject conditions. This resonates with what Squire (2015) refers to as the 'abjectification' of migrant 'others', and moreover brings to mind what Mbembe (2003: 21) refers to as spaces of 'death-in-life' and 'state of injury', and what Jill M. Williams (2015: 18) identifies as a 'bionecro enforcement machine' in the context of the US-Mexico border. Also drawing on Mbembe's necropolitics, Elizabeth Lee and Geraldine Pratt (2012: 891) discuss how abject conditions can be produced through mundane practices and take the shape of what Berlant (2007: 745) refers to as slow

death, namely a 'a physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population' in everyday life. What also springs to mind is Jasbir K. Puar's (2017) theorisation of how the state of Israel brings Palestinians into biopolitical being by making them 'available for injury'. All of this resonates with the production of vulnerability in the UK-France borderzone, which is indeed one of the components of the politics of exhaustion.

In discussing vulnerability, I refer to the work of Tyner and Rice (2015: 3) who outline three 'coordinates' of vulnerability: 'the risk of exposure to crisis, the risk of inadequate capacity to cope with crisis, and the risk of severe consequences' (see also Watts and Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994). Based on these three coordinates, the authors conclude that, where exposure is high and coping capacity decreases, and there are serious risks for harm, populations are most vulnerable (Ibid). From this standpoint, I argue that the withdrawal of care in an already precarious situation amongst individuals with already compromised coping structures in the UK-France borderzone, high levels of vulnerability are co-produced. As such, the withdrawal of the state, according to the logics of the politics of exhaustion, is not merely a lack of willingness to intervene, provide support, and bring 'order' to the situation. Rather, it must be understood as producing vulnerabilities part of a wider strategy to exhaust.

As discussed in the theory chapter, there has been a tendency to pursue a theoretical separation of 'killing' and 'letting die'. Our analysis of the ways in which the politics of exhaustion produces vulnerability has shed light on the inadequacy of viewing the two as a binary opposition. The forms of harm discussed in this sub-section are all, to some degree, avoidable. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the authorities are aware of these, and would have the resources to prevent large degrees of this suffering. Hence, this suggests that the politics of exhaustion comprises an intentional production of avoidable vulnerabilities and serious forms of harm which such vulnerability facilitates. Through the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion, and its key aspect found in the 'manufacturing of vulnerabilities', I would also argue in favour of a non-binary understanding of *violence*, seen from a non-traditional empiricist epistemological position which does not separate 'direct' and 'indirect' forms of violence. This will be discussed again in further detail in the final chapter of the thesis.

4.2.4. Dispossession

According to my field research findings, dispossession in the area comes in various forms. The regular destruction of living spaces entails the confiscation and/or slashing of tents and sleeping bags as well as blankets, along with other basic necessities such as drinking water, mobile phones, and paperwork, or anything else that may have been left behind in the shelters. It is clear that such acts of dispossession are taking their toll on people's mental as well as physical health whilst challenging individuals' internal coping mechanisms further. Indeed, beyond the production of physical vulnerability which this creates, violent acts of dispossession also appear to be experienced as taking a hard mental and emotional toll on the individuals in the area.

The most tangible and dramatic form of dispossession is found in the regular evictions of living spaces, which, ever since the demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, have emerged as a routine practice conducted at regular intervals, often every 48 hours or so. The activist group Human Rights Observers reported that the number of evictions doubled in Calais in 2019, increasing from 452 for the duration of 2018, to 805 in the first 10 months of 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019: 2). During these raids, living spaces of vulnerable individuals in Calais and Dunkirk are evicted by heavily geared CRS officers, who use tear gas or pepper spray whilst confiscating tents, sleeping bags, and other personal belongings. Whilst some individuals are seemingly randomly detained during this ritual, others would be allowed to return to the same living space hours later, only to face the same process again, some 48 hours later. An Iranian interlocutor discussed the police treatment during these evictions in December 2018:

> The French police treat us really badly - if we want to go [somewhere], they hit us […] whatever we do, they catch us, collect our tents, they tear our tents, when we want to go somewhere, they harass us. They have gathered us in one place, and as soon as we want to just move away from where we are, they catch us […] Police hit and kick the tents with a baton [during the evictions] and one guy got hurt on the head; some have kids in the tents. (Interlocutor nr. 45a)

Another Iranian man, interviewed on the same occasion, further elaborated:

> They come out from here [points to the dirt road], and first they chase the African guys, so the Africans take their tents and come over here, then we pack up our tents, we stand in a line here on the street, and the police looks at our faces. If they see any new faces, they take them to the detention centre. They stay in detention for a few days and then they are released again. It doesn't make any sense. The rest of us have to stand in a row and not move. They walk around and take tents

that no one had time to [rescue]. If you don't pack it up, the police would take it and destroy it, but if you manage to pack up first, you can just put it back. So, it doesn't make any sense. [...] If they don't want us here, why don't they just get rid of us once and for all? I think they're trying to make us tired so we choose to return home or choose to go somewhere else. Otherwise, it wouldn't make any sense for them to be doing what they are doing. (Interlocutor nr. 45b)

Evictions have continued to be carried out in a ritualised manner over the years. In a report published by grassroots groups in Calais, the groups reported that 822 evictions had been carried out in Calais and 71 in Grande-Synthe from January-November 2020. The report moreover outlines the details of a large-scale eviction which took place in late September 2020 as follows:

On the 29th of September 2020 from 5:30 a.m. until the late afternoon, French police forces evicted over 800 displaced people living in one of the informal camps in Calais. More than 30 police vehicles were present and around 40 buses, bound for centres throughout France. Almost as many were already back on the streets just 48 hours later: without shelter, without tents and without sleeping bags, as their living quarters had been destroyed during the eviction operation. This operation was described by the Prefect as the biggest eviction since the eviction of the former Calais Jungle camp in 2016. Evictions such as this are a recurring reality at the Franco-British border. (Project Play, 2020: 2).

Research findings gathered over the years clearly suggest that authorities are not necessarily trying to capture individuals *per se,* or force them to register in France.[ii] Rather, in accordance with the supposed logic of the politics of exhaustion, these tactics are devised to prevent stabilisation and settlement, prevent access to a resting place, community spaces, and in general, spaces where human dignity and well-being can take root. That said, the routine evictions are not the sole occasions when acts of dispossession and confiscation occur. The confiscation of personal belongings is a topic that emerged consistently throughout my years of field research. One interlocutor explained to me:

Some [police] are taking stuff off the guys, they took 300 euros from a guy as well as his two mobile phones. He is still here [...] I saw a lot of things done wrong by the police, [...] this is why I don't want to stay here [...]. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

This kind of confiscation is not only affecting individuals in a material way; it also appears to reduce people's sense of dignity and sense of self-worth, making daily life seem increasingly hopeless. In this sense, acts of dispossession and confiscation converges with the previously discussed notion of dehumanisation. Mental health experts who specialise in this area explained:

[...] disruption of sleep, destruction of tents, and confiscation of basic necessities, even drinking water, is taking its toll on people's mental as well as physical health, in worrying ways, appearing to have tipped many people beyond their ability to draw upon their own coping mechanisms, into mental health conditions which can lead to long-lasting damage. (Lloyd et al., 2018)

On a separate occasion, these professionals suggested that the act of dispossession are designed to break people down, noting that it represents a loss of agency when things, which have been looked after so carefully all along the journey, are suddenly treated as disposable, and can be taken away from you at the blink of an eye through a brutal manifestation of power. In the same vein, there have been countless stories of individuals being dispossessed of their shoes. The aforementioned mental health professionals called this act 'the ultimate degradation, because without shoes, you can't even walk without being reminded of your pain.' A British church authority, who has been active in Calais since October 2015, recounted an incident which took place during the period of the Calais 'Jungle' camp:

One morning, we saw a group, about a hundred yards from the flyover where you came into the camp. They had been stopped by the CRS and stripped off their shoes and made to walk back into the camp. The guys had been on their way to the supermarket, but had to turn back to the camp when their footwear was confiscated. Of course, you can't go and shop in socks – and this was not in great weather – it must have been late winter or early spring. We saw countless men coming into the camp in their socks. (Interviewee nr. 50)

A former Calais 'Jungle' camp resident, reflecting on the same practice of shoe confiscation, suggested:

They take off the shoes to make them suffer and struggle. They mean to make the people suffer and struggle more. Maybe they [think it would make people] go away from the border and keep that border safe [...] Is there anything in the law that allows the police to take the clothes off, [as well as] people's dignity? Same [treatment] as for the animals. They want to make them feel like animals, not human beings. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

A French interviewee also brought up a similar memory from the time of the Jungle camp:

Police would remove people's shoes, and throw them outside the camp [...] And some said they were being beaten up inside the police vans in the forest, then they would just tell them to find their way back. I don't think this has changed much, because I heard about it again now [in late 2019]. This is a recurring thing – the police violence. (Interviewee nr. 63)

In response to the continued acts of dispossession and confiscation, which are thus an inherent part of the politics of exhaustion, aid groups on the ground are working

ceaselessly to counteract the damage by providing tents, sleeping bags, mobile phones, and other essentials to the individuals in the area, and in the process, they are constantly being stretched to their limits. The charitable supplies are continuously depleted and require constantly renewed donations to survive. One Afghan man told human rights researchers on the ground in Calais this April: 'The police take the tents away all the time and the volunteers don't even have time to replace the tents as fast as the police takes them.' (Interlocutor nr. 60) A young Pakistani man similarly expressed disbelief in relation to the continuous confiscation of tents:

> It's not good. Every two days, [police] come to the jungle [settlements] and take tents, breaking everything, hitting people, with their foot. Police is working here for British people. Police coming and hurting us too much. Why are they taking the tents, why taking everything? One day police is taking tents, and then again I am asking for a new tent. (Interlocutor nr. 49)

Shoes and clothing items would also at times be depleted. One of my French interviewees reported in the winter of 2019 from her latest visit to Calais:

> My God, my heart was bleeding when I saw this guy, he was Sudanese, and he was wearing flip flops in the middle of winter and when he asked for shoes and clothes, he was told they don't have any more. (Interviewee nr. 63)

This process inevitably also has an exhausting effect on volunteers, among whom the notion of exhaustion would come up recurringly in many interviews and conversations. One of the long-term volunteers I interviewed described the general sense of exhaustion felt during her engagement in the area: 'We were all burned out at the end of summer.' (Interviewee nr. 35) Another long-term volunteer similarly explained:

> There were times when exhaustion was the norm, where everybody was so overworked that we stopped seeing it in each other, before we realised that this might happen. People were just becoming less and less efficient to the point of not being able to function. Some became unstable, emotionally, and realised that they needed a lot of help as well. Exhaustion has many faces. (Interviewee nr. 32)

While the forms of dispossession and confiscation discussed in this sub-chapter are clearly very closely linked with the production of vulnerability which was discussed in section 1.2.3, I argue here that cruel acts of dispossession, carried out right in front of the victims, constitute their own category within the politics of exhaustion, for these are brutal acts which reportedly have mental and emotional effects on migrants and volunteers in the area, serving as a form of degradation and abuse. Similar tacit state violence has been reported elsewhere in Europe, with a particularly striking example in

Greece, where prospective asylum seekers had their clothes stripped off before they were sent back across the border to Turkey (Brazelle, 2020). In Belgium, displaced people have reported their mobile phones stolen by police (Refugee Rights Europe, 2018a; RTBF, 2018), while at the Croatian border, prospective asylum seekers are reportedly being stripped and having their documents burned (Geddie et al, 2020). In northern France, however, the dispossession is often experienced repeatedly, and alongside other exhausting practices over a period of time, for as long as individuals remain in the area.

4.2.5. Shrinkage of access to space and defoliation of privacy

As part of state actors' attempts to ensure an uprooting of individuals from the area through evictions, they also continuously seek to shrink people's *access* to space in the first place. This was extremely tangible during the gradual shrinking of space during the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp. At first, a so called 'safety zone' along the motorway was carved out in January 2016, which meant that camp residents and volunteers had to work relentlessly to move shelters away before the bulldozers moved in to clear the land (see Figure D). Subsequently, a court ruling authorised the French state authorities to proceed and demolish the southern part of the camp, which was home to several hundred individuals, including many family units. This inevitably led to the containment of all camp residents within a much more confined space, the northern part, which sparked heightened tensions and allowed for fires to spread more quickly and generally created an increasingly difficult and exhausting daily existence in the camp. See Map 2 for an illustration of the gradual demolition of the camp.

The final destruction of the camp, and its flattening to the ground in October 2016 (BBC News, 2016; Ansems De Vries and Welander, 2016b; The Guardian, 2016) sent a clear message that the space for people to stay in the area was now completely closed and sealed off. One long-term volunteer explained to me:

> 1,500 kids were left on their own unsupervised, like in the 'Lord of the Flies'. They were walking around their burned homes; the people who were looking after them were supposed to be *La vie Active*. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Figure D | Moving shelters prior to demolition (Rob Pinney)

Following the demolition of the camp, settlements and encampments would soon start to crop up across the area, only to be closed down again by the authorities weeks or months later. However, rather than pushing people out of the area, this merely led to individuals going into further hiding and moving to alternative spots. This futile cycle of closing of spaces has continued to be reproduced ever since the demolition of the camp until the time of writing, in November 2020.

As such, fences, razor wire, and spikes have been erected across Calais, targeting people's preferred resting spots and communal spaces such as food distribution points, sending a clear signal that these spaces are no longer inhabitable (see e.g. Help Refugees, 2019). The use of spikes to make a space inhabitable has also been seen in the so called 'hostile architecture', an urban design strategy often used to make a space impossible for homeless individuals to use (see e.g. Kerrigan, 2018).

A further development was reported to me in 2019, when state actions aimed at shrinking access to space started to also be accompanied by *defoliation*. The woodlands where migrants were setting up tents and shelters, were largely cut down or trimmed, laying bare the settlements and providing even less of a pretence at privacy and possibility for

community space to grow. The narrowing of space and the tactic of defoliation are part of the politics of exhaustion in northern France and would arguably contribute to a further sense of hopelessness and impossibility over time.

Map 2 | Stages of Demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' Camp

The demolitions of the former Calais 'Jungle' camp (2015-2016)

1 'Safe zone' demolished in January 2016	**4** Container camp	**7** Main commercial street
2 Southern part of camp demolished in March 2016	**5** Jules-Ferry Centre	Water
3 Northern part of the camp demolished during the final clearance in October 2016	**6** Main entrance under motorway bridge	Green space

4.2.6. Forced (im)mobility

The politics of exhaustion at the UK-France border moreover comprises the technologies of immobility and confinement, as well as the tactic of forced *mobility*. Looking firstly at the various situations of immobility in which migrants are trapped, the first mode of this technology takes the shape of capture during attempted border crossings, to prevent individuals' access to UK territory, in line with the juxtaposed border arrangements. Immobility is also enforced through arrests and detention; often taking the shape of short periods spent in detention in the police station or in the short-term holding facility in Coquelles, followed by the release of the individuals shortly thereafter. The detention of individuals has been described as oftentimes being done at random during evictions, or other encounters between police and migrants. During my field work in April 2019, I visited a Sudanese man held in detention in the *Centre Administratif De Rétention* in Coquelles, Calais, who explained that several individuals in the centre had recently gone on hunger strike protesting their detention, with a number of detainees having attempted suicide just a few days prior to our conversation. He furthermore explained his own predicament of forced (im)mobility:

> They want me to give my fingerprints and ask for asylum in France but I think they just want to have a fast process and send me back to Sudan. But I want to go to the UK where I have family members. […] I have not eaten for several days. I am exhausted and my morale is going down every day.

The situation of my interlocutor sheds light on the two interlinked notions of immobility and forced *mobility* all at once. On the one hand, he was at the time of the interview deprived of his liberty and clearly immobile. However, on the other hand, what he was trying to resist was the act of forced *mobility*, through deportation back to his country of origin. That is to say, individuals in the area are both regularly confined or detained when attempting to move forward towards their intended destination or simply to move around, as authorities ensure their continued immobility, while at the same time, many face acts of forced mobility which prevents access to territory, asylum systems, and stability.

Looking further at the notion of forced *mobility,* many interlocutors whom I interviewed during the period 2016-2019 spoke of being caught by the police and then driven to remote locations where they would be released, left to cover the way back on foot. Others explained that they had been removed to other European countries under the Dublin

Regulation following their capture and short period of detention, only to jump on a train or other forms of transport to make their way back to the Calais area (see also Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016b). Amongst the countless examples, an Eritrean youth in his early twenties explained that he had been on the move for four years, and within this time he had been sent back to Italy from France several times, because he has fingerprints there. (Interlocutor nr. 18) A man from Sudan in his late forties, whom I interview in December 2018, commented on the forced mobility caused by the Dublin Regulation and related processes:

> Some guys came [to Calais] from Italy and asked for asylum in France, and [the authorities] sent them back to Italy, and Italy gave them no assistance and asked them to leave Italy. After that, they [came] back to France. France won't give them papers, so now they try to go to the UK but they are stuck. [...] If the authorities say they don't know this - it is impossible to not know. They don't care. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

This resonates with the extensive work of Tazzioli (2017, 2019a), whose concept of mobility as a technology of government in the contemporary European context of migration is extremely relevant to this notion of the politics of exhaustion. For Tazzioli, migrants across Europe are facing containment through forced mobility; their geographies are 'diverted and decelerated' (2017: 30) and thus they are controlled and excluded. Tazzioli highlights how displaced individuals' movements are 'controlled, disrupted and diverted not (only) through detention and immobility but by generating effects of containment keeping migrants on the move and forcing them to engage in convoluted geography' (Tazzioli, 2019a: 1). Ansems de Vries and Guild (2018: 1) have followed down a similar path, as they refer to the notion of 'forced, obstructed and circulatory mobility' being used as a common migration management tactic across Europe; something which is indeed clearly identifiable in the context of northern France. Gazzotti and Hagan (2020: 3) similarly report an absurd use of dispersals in the context of Morocco, where migrants would be dispersed to the south of the country only to then make their way back in a few days or even hours. Similarly, Picozza (2017: 239) highlights the common phenomenon of 'Dublined' migrants who experience being stuck in transit 'spending between five and ten years struggling to settle'.

The result of being subjected to repeated dispersals are, according to Gazzotti and Hagan (2020: 8), 'not only geographically disorienting, but dispossesses those who experience it in many intimate ways. Dispersal not only depletes migrants' time and energy, but also

deprives and dispossesses them materially and financially [...]'. This is of course directly relevant to the practices of forced mobility in northern France, where individuals are constantly uprooted, forced to move, dispersed and driven out of the area, only to make it back to the same locations a few days later. Such forced mobility also takes place in a smaller scale, through the uprooting and evictions which force migrants to move around and circulate in the Calais area itself, and find new sleeping spots when old ones are closed off or regularly patrolled by CRS police. Combined with the other control tactics mobilised in the area, forced (im)mobility is an effective method which appears to contribute to both physical and psychological exhaustion among people on the move; exhausting people by convoluting their journeys and delaying their recourse to a solution to their predicament.

4.2.7. Uncertainty, undercurrents of threat, and the omnipresence of death

Migrants' daily life in the UK-France borderzone is permeated by a constant sense of uncertainty, confusing and contradictory police routines, and undercurrents of threat and violence. Even in the absence of physical violence, individuals are waiting anxiously for the violence to come, leading to a sense of uncertainty, constant hiding and caution. One of my interviewees, who has been carrying out academic and arts-related projects with displaced people in Calais since 2016, brought up the notion of 'undercurrents of violence', shedding light on this phenomenon:

> Even when there was no physical violence, there was the waiting for the violence to come. Always hiding, hiding stuff, themselves, their true identity. [...] It must be draining and exhausting, it's insidious violence. Uncertainty is a form of violence in this context. People seem really stressed in times where everything seems calm. (Interviewee nr. 25)

During the time of the existence of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, uncertainty was also ever-present amongst its residents. A Sudanese interlocutor explained to me:

> During the first-time eviction [of the 100-metre safety strip], they were saying if there is no problem here and people are more calm in the Jungle, no one is going to get evicted. But suddenly they came at 5 or 6 in the morning and we found more than 35 French police officers telling everyone to leave. They didn't even explain to anyone why they had to leave. If you didn't follow, then they might arrest you or beat you and put you in the jail. We know we are illegal there; we are not stupid. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

Further down the line, a Sudanese youth explained to me on a morning in August 2018 that he had been caught off guard earlier that morning because a sudden police raid did not follow the usual pattern:

> The police came [unexpectedly] today. They took everything, my tent, and clothes. My friend had brought me that tent from Belgium. I was away to have breakfast [at La Vie Active] and brush my teeth because I didn't think they would come today. The police come all the time, but for two days they didn't come, so I thought it would be OK. And then everything was gone, my bag, everything. We cannot trust any person here. (Interlocutor nr. 8)

These examples show that, while the previously discussed acts of dispossession and evictions of living spaces are two key tactics utilised by the authorities to produce exhaustion, there is another layer to these practices, namely the sheer uncertainty and undercurrents of threat which permeate people's daily existence in the area and exacerbate suffering further. A group of Iranian men in their twenties and thirties discussed the same phenomenon during a group interview in December 2018, with one of them telling me that:

> We are in constant fear not knowing when they will take [our tents]; if you go to the town it's 50-50 certainty you will get caught or not, so you are always unsure. They take people to detention for a few days and then release them again; it doesn't make any sense. (Interlocutor nr. 45c)

Also in connection to the evictions, seemingly randomised arrests and detention would unfold as well. None of the individuals I have interviewed over the years have appeared to have had any idea of what the actual criteria or immediate reasons were for such arrest; the police appear to be following a random practice. A Sudanese interlocutor discussed these rituals with me in Calais in August 2018:

> Blue and white cars come and catch you. You spend 2-4 days in prison, then you might be sent to a big prison and then to a lawyer. They ask 'Why are you here...' You will stay maybe 7 days sometimes 2-3 weeks in that prison. Then they release you, give you a paper to leave France and let you out. (Interlocutor nr. 8)

A long-volunteer brought up the sense of uncertainty and unpredictability experienced in the area, sharing his interpretation of it as follows:

> I imagine one thing [the authorities] were trying to achieve with people in the camp was to make us feel confused and tired. Like the point was to make things completely unpredictable, and this really wears you down. I did live in the camp as well, so I did see [unexpected police behaviours] happening and at night it would be very different than during the day. And yeah, they drove us into exhaustion. (Interviewee nr. 65)

The prevailing sense of uncertainty appears to also have been severely exacerbated by the lack of information and guidance. As the same long-term volunteer noted:

> There was an incredible lack of information; I know that OFII [l'Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration] would occasionally come to the camp and tell people about their options and tell them how to go to CAOs but overwhelmingly, there was such a lack of information, such a void. People would just be relying on rumours and sometimes they were wildly inaccurate rumours that were spreading. There was a rumour that they might open the border at some point, so we'd have to tell people there's no way they're going to do that. With the south eviction there was a moment where 15-year-old kids, who were going to CAOs, thought they were going to England. It also happened with kids going to CAOMIEs but there wouldn't be a translator with them so they would just assume that it might be that they were going to England. (Interviewee nr. 65)

A Sudanese interlocutor similarly highlighted the lack of understanding of one's rights, possibilities and potential solutions:

> There is very poor information about the situation. They need someone with experience in law, and it is not clear for us when they give us documents in French – the information is very poor. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

Another prevalent underlying threat is the omni-presence of potential death. At least 197 deaths took place at the border between 1999 and 2017 (Agier et al, 2019: 139), while the Institute of Race Relations (2020) report that nearly 300 border-related deaths in and around the English Channel occurred since 1999. However, these numbers were likely much more elevated, given that deaths of undocumented individuals tend to go unreported. In March 2019, a 19-year-old Ethiopian boy named Kiyar lost his life in a lorry in Calais, having tried desperately to go to the UK where he had family members. One of the grassroots groups wrote on their Facebook page at the time, along with a close-up photo of Kiyar's face:

> This is Kiar. He was 19 years old and the first person to die at the Calais border this year [2019]. His name joins the list of countless others who have died here trying to reach safety. [...] Last week, volunteers and Kiar's friends gathered to hold a vigil [that] was held to commemorate his life. [...] Please take a moment to look at his face. To think about the injustice of an avoidable political situation. An unfair circumstance that forced him to take such a risk with his own life, in the pursuit of seeing family and friends, community and protection.

Other reports highlight deaths in roadside accidents, drowning in the port, and deaths due to suffocation or being crushed to death inside lorries. In the winter of 2019, a Nigerian man died of suffocation in his tent, having lit a fire inside the tent to keep warm

at night. In 2020, when increased attention was directed at the crossing of small boats from northern France to the UK, at least five individuals tragically drowned whilst attempting to make the crossing: a young Sudanese man and a Kurdish-Iranian family whose lives were tragically lost on separate occasions whilst crossing the channel. (InfoMigrants, 2020; BBC News, 2020) An Ethiopian interlocutor in his mid-twenties told me in October 2018 that one of the boys from their group had been found dead in the port only a week earlier. The interlocutor was horrified that no one was able to tell them what had happened. 'It's because we're black. They don't care,' he speculated. (Interlocutor nr. 30) Meanwhile, a long-term volunteer who served in the Calais 'Jungle' camp recalled:

> I can remember a few times where camp residents died trying to get to the UK. Sometimes it was a 'hit and run' accident, and it was never...I can't remember a single time where they were hit by car or lorry and the person was found or held responsible, ever. [...] There's the graveyard where people who'd died would be buried and there would be services, there would be vigils in the town centre. It's one of those things, whenever it got colder the likelihood increased and increased and increased, it felt it was hanging over the place; there was always another death around the corner. People took tremendous risks and the more the border is militarised and the more the British and French governments spend on security, the more people took risks and more people died trying. Also, someone fell in the water in the port. They didn't identify the body until 3 months later. (Interviewee nr. 65)

Based on these research findings, it is therefore unsurprising that many of my interlocutors appeared to feel the omnipresence of death, as well as a strong sense of uncertainty and undercurrents of threat in their day-to-day existence. This, one could plausibly assume, would be contributing to further mental and emotional exhaustion and disillusionment. A British interviewee, who has been active in the area since 2016, suggested:

> As a result of the police violence, refugees there are constantly on edge. You're supposed to feel safe with authorities, but it's the total opposite; they are constantly hiding, on the move, carrying their stuff around. There's no normality in it, as a result of how they're treated by the authorities – but it's actually not just how they're being moved around but also how the NGOs are not getting permission to bring food, and their living condition and stuff being taken away. It's all negative really. (Interviewee nr. 70)

Also reflecting on deaths in Calais, one Sudanese man trapped in the border zone suggested:

Whenever there [are] more challenges to [reach the UK], people will be more desperate. They will do more things to try [to reach the UK]. We will find more people dying. English don't care, French don't care, Europe don't care. (Interlocutor nr. 45c)

Another Sudanese man discussed the occurrence of death during the time of the Calais camp, and suggested:

You can say, according to estimates while we were in the Jungle, more than 25-30 people died under the train. And 30-35 they froze on a truck. What happened? Nothing. Because they were not white. So many people get killed between the Calais centre and the camp and they drop them in the sea and no one knows how they died. In the lake, in the forest. For example, a young Afghan guy, they found him in the forest. His body. What did the police do – nothing! The strange thing is, during that time, we heard that in Paris, a police officer had *pushed* a French girl and all the media was talking about that. You can look at the difference – the young Afghan guy was killed and no one mentioned it; he just wasted his life and no one even investigated how he died, but they did investigate the police who pushed that girl. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

4.3. Theorising the politics of exhaustion as biopolitical technology of government

In this chapter, I have traced how bordering practices, or political technologies, have converged in the UK-France borderzone over space and time. Seen from the perspectives and collective experiences over several years' time through the voices of my interlocutors, the contours of a politics of exhaustion takes shape as a set of temporal, corporeal, and spatial tactic aimed to deter, control, and exclude, which stretches the UK border far beyond its spatial arrangements.

While many of the methods and practices outlined in these sections are echoed as migration control practices in migratory contexts across Europe, my field research suggests that these have all been caused to converge in the context of northern France, and sustained over time, they are therefore best understood collectively as constituting an entire strategic state approach, rather than constituting isolated and *ad hoc* undertakings by state actors. This mode of biopolitical governing of migration, in that it neither serves to foster life *nor* directly kills or permits killings, demonstrates that a binary reading of biopolitics ('making live/letting die') is insufficient when theorising the biopolitical migration governance unfolding in the UK-France borderzone. Neither is Mbembe's notion of negative biopolitics, that of necropolitics, sufficient to make sense of the politics of exhaustion, which does not amount to death, but rather, constitutes an

exploratory approach to governmentality. In fact, this insidiously seeks to render life pliable and human mobilities governable, in order to re-gain a hold over 'unruly' autonomous migration.

Through the voices of my interlocutors, it has become clear that the accumulation of these practices, as experienced by displaced individuals in the area, contribute toward the production not only of physical ailments, and what Puar (2017) refers to as the 'mass debilitation of bodies,' but also emotional and psychological harm, which can have powerful effects on a person's capacity to resist. Indeed, the field research findings analysed in this chapter have illustrated how the politics of exhaustion eliminate many possibilities for wellbeing, rest, and stability. It risks producing a sense of meaninglessness and emptiness of existence (Johansen, 2013: 265) through (micro) practices and methods designed to debilitate. Regarding precisely the effects of the politics of exhaustion, I heard countless accounts of the detrimental impact this approach has on migrants in the area. For instance, one of my interviewees, who was working in the Calais 'Jungle' camp for nearly its entire duration, suggested:

> There was a really rapid deterioration of mental health of displaced people who are forced to live in those conditions. Infinite numbers of mental health problems [...] I saw it more than people told me. When they talk about it, it's in a jokey way - - in terms of witnessing it, you see it in [manifestations of] anger, hostility, self-harm, substance abuse. You see it in people who are clearly very depressed; you see it when they have become apathetic and have lost hope. Self-destructive behaviours. It's so shocking there, people have made really horrendous journeys, but when they get to Europe, the bedrock of human rights, tolerance and acceptance – you get here [and you're faced with] neglect and abuse, which is deliberate from the European governments. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Another example is the following account shared with me by a British social worker, who has extensive experience working with the youth in the area:

> [Some of the youth] would normalise the abuse they were experiencing [in the borderzone] and tolerate it and blame themselves. There were destructive behaviours - - someone in a situation without control can tend to start asserting 'control on themselves' through destructive behaviour. The Afghan kids were more prone to self-harming, burning cigarettes on their skin, to handle the pain inside. Eritreans and Ethiopians would refer to alcohol more. Drinking, fights - drink quite serious amounts - and get into fights where they would be beaten up, indirectly inflicting pain on themselves. (Interviewee nr. 66)

Indeed, the accumulation of the practices experienced by migrants in northern France, often repeatedly and for extended periods of time, are radically malignant in their

outcomes. In a parallel context of refused asylum seekers in Norway, Johansen (2013) argues that when the state finds it difficult to remove or deport individuals, authorities instead seek to confine them to miserable conditions as part of a 'funnel of expulsion,' with the hope that they will eventually break and decide to leave Norway voluntarily. Similarly, in the context of the border zone in northern France, the politics of exhaustion appears to be designed to attack people's resilience and ability to persist and survive the most adverse of situations. This also calls to mind Weber and Pickering's (2014) work on technologies of 'intent management' in the context of Australian border controls, and what Rose (2000:324) refers to as 'technologies for the conduct of conduct'. Weber and Pickering argue that 'new forms of border governance are emerging that seek to shape individual decision-making to promote 'voluntary' compliance with migration management goals' (2014: 17).

Along similar lines, Behrouz Boochani, a renowned Kurdish scholar and writer who was held in detention in the Australian-run detention centre on Manus Island for years, noted that 'the system in these prisons has been created so that incarcerated refugees experience an unbearable amount of pressure, reach the point of hopelessness, and finally decide to return to their country of origin' (Boochani, cited in Loughnan, 2019a). The same logic of 'intent management' (Weber and Pickering, 2014) could indeed be assumed to constitute an underlying purpose and intention of the politics of exhaustion. Eric Fassin et al (2014) have theorised the notion of 'auto-expulsion,' by which Roma individuals are met with conditions that make life unbearable, and which makes them so worn out, that they remove themselves. This resonates strongly with the notion of the politics of exhaustion at the UK-France border. It is noteworthy in this context that the practices comprising the politics of exhaustion are oftentimes anticipatory of transgression, rather than applied as punishment, for unauthorised border crossings.

Thus, I have demonstrated how the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have not merely led to the localisation of the UK's physical border controls to an extraterritorial space; the 'border' has also entered into spaces of everyday life in the borderzone. Traditional spatial interdictions and restrictions emerging from *non-entrée* policies, reliant on tactics such as confinement, bordering fences, and deportation, have been successively complemented by more insidious, temporal and corporeal biopolitical technologies of bordering. However, far from being a homogenous bordering technology

or fully coherent strategy, the politics of exhaustion is a fragmented approach in which disparate tactics and (micro) practices converge and intersect in the production of exhaustion of migrants' bodies and minds. This biopolitical migration government technology thus seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, and manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects. In this sense, exhaustion can be understood as constitutive of bordering processes, and of the 'border' itself. In brief, this array of tactics has produced an embodied experience of the border, whereby the border is inscribed on the bodies and minds of migrants so that they carry it with them. All of this therefore suggests a re-thinking of Foucauldian biopolitics beyond the binary of making live/letting die, in order to allow for an understanding of technologies deployed within the government of migration, which makes little sense from a reductive reading of governmentality.

4.4. Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has built and drawn on literature that examines new technologies for border control and externalised border enforcement, focusing not only on overt forms of exclusion through traditional border security measures, but also by influencing the intent or conduct. In doing so, the chapter has contributed first of all to an emerging body of scholarship that examines the manner in which states are resorting to increasingly sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude, and control, by influencing the choices and intention of people on the move. Far more seldom acknowledged than the internal dimensions of British immigration control, the external dimensions found in the politics of exhaustion constitute a detrimental approach to mobility governance and merit the same levels of scrutiny and critique as the domestic British 'hostile environment.'

Moreover, it should be emphasised that the UK border manifests both as formal expressions of sovereign power through visible juxtaposed controls and border walls, but also as biopolitical technologies through the influencing and persuasion techniques which are, according to Leanne Weber et al (2019: 16), 'typical of contemporary democratic governance in other spheres.' Therefore, it appears as though there is a convergence of sovereign power and governmentality of biopower here, or what Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) refer to as an 'assemblage of power.' To take this further, the next chapter explores how such assemblages of power, characterised by a high degree

of heterogeneity, interact with the forces of autonomous migration, and indeed, explores the processual dialogue between the two. Indeed, the politics of exhaustion will be further problematised in the next chapter, as we direct our gaze at migrant subjectivities, acts of resistance, and agency within this site of border struggles, where the seemingly antithetical notions of state power and migrant subjectivities are understood as being deeply entangled.

5. Capture, escape, exhaust, persist: Production of migrant subjectivities in the UK-France borderzone

5.1.Introduction

An East African woman whom I interviewed in London in the spring of 2019 spoke to me at length about the exhaustion brought on by the border practices in northern France. Upon arriving in the UK, following several years in displacement (including a lengthy period of time in the UK-France borderzone), the exhaustion caught up with her. She stated the following:

> I just slept and slept and [the detention centre staff] thought I was dead. I slept all day and night. They came and woke me up, because they thought I was dead. I couldn't eat for three days, so the doctor came to examine me [...] I was sleeping or daydreaming, so the breakfast, lunch, and dinner was just sitting there waiting for me. I was so exhausted. (Interlocutor nr. 51b)

Evidently, she had nonetheless persisted the emotional, psychological, and physical effects of the politics of exhaustion, and is today living a relatively safe and stable life in the UK, having been granted refugee status, or 'Leave to Remain.' Her story, amongst many others, is testament to the strength of migrant subjectivities and capacity for resilience that is evident in spite of the harsh deterrence policies, and the gravity of the harm produced through the externalisation of the UK border. It is precisely these aspects which this chapter will be addressing, through an analysis of further field research findings.

Indeed, the situation at the UK's border with France, and the longstanding struggle between 'mobility projects' and 'border control' which converge there, inevitably raises critical questions relating to the relationship between state power and individual agency. To merely provide a representation of migrants in the borderzone as being fully entrapped within the grip of the politics of exhaustion, or within sovereign and biopolitical control, is to overemphasise, if not sensationalise, the situation and to oversimplify migrants' diverse experiences. In doing so, I would moreover risk falling into the Agambenian approach to biopolitical border security, where the strongly articulated 'control bias' has been described by Vaughan-Williams (2015: 8) as 'empirically and politically problematic, because it privileges sovereign power and control over political struggle and contestation, [and] fails to account for the role of migrant agency in shaping

and resisting contemporary border regimes.' This shortcoming, the scholar argues, 'tends to flatten and generalize across diverse border sites and migrants' experience' (Ibid).

Therefore, and in line with my second research question, this chapter turns to examining how migrant subjectivities in this borderzone are performed, and how they give shape to a form of counter-exhaustion by subverting, resisting and challenging the control methods. Through the field research findings, I explore the resilience, motivations, understandings, and tactics of people trapped at the UK-France border, and examine how the bordering tactics, referred to as the 'politics of exhaustion' in the previous chapter, are also resisted, contested, and (re)appropriated in the borderzone through displaced individuals' struggles for mobility and survival. As such, I trace here the contours of political subjectivities and forms of human agency in the borderzone, through the experiences recounted by my interlocutors and interviewees (see Table 2). I then discuss the complex interrelationship and co-constituent nature of bordering technologies and migrant subjectivities, as well as the relationship between the politics of exhaustion and the autonomy of migration; between control and resistance. Through such theoretical engagement with my research findings, I am able to argue that neither control or agency ('escape') should be privileged as our level of analysis, as state power and migrant subjectivities are best understood as mutually constitutive and not dichotomous.

This chapter thus uses the 'gaze of autonomy' (Mezzadra, 2011) and seeks a relational understanding of power, as well as of the role played by mobility movements in the constitution and transformation of borders and border regimes. As discussed in chapter 2, which provided a journey through theoretical approaches within critical border and migration studies, the autonomy of migration scholarship suggests that the sovereign order can indeed be undermined by everyday acts of resistance among migrants. As seen, migrant imperceptibility 'is made up of everyday, singular, unpretentious acts of subverting subjectification and betraying representation' (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 61), meaning that irregular migration is constituted by conflicts and actors which 'cannot be conceived within the existing framework of citizenship' (Ibid: 14). Therefore, in addressing the agency-control dichotomy, which is often found within academic literature relating to critical border and migration studies, I also draw on theorisations from scholarly work dedicated to exploring forms of *performative* migrant citizenship and (political) subjectivities *beyond* formal citizenship.

Table 2 | Forms of resistance in border struggles: A differentiation

Forms of resistance in border struggles: A differentiation	
Pretence at stability, normality, and dignity	The creation of spaces where 'everyday life' can temporarily be anchored, with some pretence at 'normality.' This includes the creation of community spaces, where community relations and friendships can take root. Reliance on daily or weekly routines, including anything faith-based, creating or seizing opportunities to learn and develop, and participating in performative and expressive arts projects, are all classified under this category.
Everyday acts of resistance	Both conscious and mundane processes of 'everyday resistance' can be understood as an enactment of political subjectivity outside of formal citizenship. These include acts of refusal of state provisions, appropriation of destruction prior to demolitions, going off the radar and into hiding, deciphering and avoiding police routines, navigating the 'system' strategically, and creating strategic interpersonal relationships with volunteers and police officers.
Re-humanisation and counter-narratives	To counter dehumanisation and racialisation processes, counter-narratives and self-portrayal are of significant importance. This includes caring for one's physical appearance, such as clothing and hair, challenging prejudices held by volunteers and police, both through acts and speech, including by assuming leading or supporting roles within humanitarian work, and the exercising of humour and playfulness within seemingly damned situations. It also involves mourning and honouring the deceased.
Activism, political mobilisations, and autonomous housing	Forms of (overtly) political mobilisations, through which subjects *constitute* themselves as citizens, irrespective of their legal status, include public protests and manifestations, meetings or other forms of communications with policy makers and political leaders, media engagement, and the inhabitance of abandoned buildings (squatting).

5.2. Pretence at stability, normality, and dignity

The first manifestation of migrant subjectivities, resistance, and defiance to emerge clearly from the research interviews with my interlocutors and interviewees, was the act of creating spaces where everyday life can temporarily play out with some pretence at 'normality.' Moreover, the act of building community relations and friendships, with fellow migrants or volunteers, is another aspect of this, as are the reliance on routines, opportunities to learn and develop, exercising humour, and taking part in performative and expressive arts projects. Acts aimed at producing a space where a pretence at

stability, normality, and dignity can emerge are hence a recurring theme in the UK-France borderzone, and this is precisely the focus of this sub-section.

5.2.1. 'Lieux de vie': where life can be temporarily anchored

As seen in the previous chapter, which explored the politics of exhaustion, the living conditions in northern France have been consistently extremely precarious in the absence of formal sheltering arrangements. Nonetheless, over the years, informal living arrangements in defiance of evictions and demolitions by the state authorities have emerged and re-emerged; where migrants have created their own living spaces in the absence of formal UN or state-run camps or centres, sometimes with the solidarity from activists and grassroots groups. The most noteworthy example of this phenomenon, albeit not the only one, was the so-called Calais 'Jungle' camp of 2015-2016, which stretched across a vast piece of industrial wasteland in the La Lande area of Calais, sometimes now referred to as 'the big Jungle' to distinguish it from the smaller informal camps and settlements, or 'jungles,' which cropped up in the area before and after its existence. As outlined in the previous chapter, the camp, which, at its peak, is estimated to have hosted nearly 10,000 individuals, saw the emergence of countless communal spaces, restaurants, cafes, churches and mosques, schools, libraries, and several busy barber shops where one could get a haircut, hot shower, or a neatly maintained beard.

As such, an overwhelming array of '*lieux de vie'* (directly translated as 'places of life' and understood as 'living spaces') cropped up with relentless energy and determination across the wasteland. (see Figures E and F) Despite its precarity and inadequacy in terms of standards and its sheer lack of safety and protection for certain groups, as seen in the previous chapter, many of its former residents have spoken very highly of their time in the camp to me, because this godforsaken place also provided many with a space where solidarity and unexpected manifestations of dignity could take root. One of the Sudanese interlocutors who took part in my research summarised the forms of *life* in the camp as follows:

> We would invite people we didn't even know to have a talk and chat with a simple cup of tea or coffee. [We'd] make our own food and cook together. We would cook our normal food belonging to our culture to try to adopt the life [we had] before, when we were in our own country. We would build shelter and pretend that shelter was a bedroom. We would have another tent as a living room, and then have a place [where we could] eat and talk and the place we could sleep. (Interlocutor nr. 6)

Another former camp resident, also from Sudan, similarly recalled:

> When I was in the Jungle, we were a group, a community, and we had our own kitchen and our own tents. One of us had organised the kitchen stuff and we could register with him. It made me feel better. I also spent time in the Jungle books library, where they would teach, and there were volunteers. (Interlocutor nr. 64)

A French academic interviewee suggested:

> I think, maybe, the community, it calms people down, and many have strong faith and I think that helps people, too. To have community, to have fun, to have people to talk to, it all helps. (Interviewee nr. 63)

Throughout and during the camp, there was also a possibility for communities to thrive and for friendships to take root. As one interviewee put it:

> We had happy times, we received everyone [in our shelters] and smiled without complaining about the muddy environment and the misery [we were] living in. We were staying there to build friendships, invite [each other] for cups of tea. We could have really strong friendships, and that's what's not normal about that place, the Jungle, and you can't find that anywhere else. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

A long-term volunteer had observed something similar, and suggested the following:

> It seemed like friendships were so crucial. It's so unlikely, for example, between people speaking so many different languages, to make friends. Some Afghan guys had never seen black people before, and yet you had a lot of friendships that crossed those barriers quite easily because there was this great thing, they had this thing in common – wherever they were coming from, they're now here and this is how everyone is living here […] I never actually thought about it as a survival strategy, but making that human connection is probably a survival strategy. Isolation, in general, kills the spirit a lot more than we probably realise. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Figure E | Lieux de vie in the Calais 'Jungle' camp, 2016 (Natalie Stanton)

Figure F | Kitchen in the Calais 'Jungle' camp, 2016 (Natalie Stanton)

Within this context, there was seemingly also a strong desire to ensure one's living space was dignified and one's own. In relation to this topic, the same long-term volunteer, suggested:

> People would do things like personalising their shelters and tents; making a home. I saw that everywhere. I think that really matters when you live in a place like that. When everyone lives in the same box made of plastic and wood, making little gardens and fences and making it your own space is important. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Within the logics of the politics of exhaustion, which was explored in the previous chapter, it is no surprise that a space like the Calais 'Jungle' camp had to go, and was therefore successively shrunk with its complete flattening to the ground in October 2016. However, according to my interlocutors and interviewees, the creation of spaces where communal life can take root have continued to be carved out by migrants over the years, which followed the final demolition of the camp. Indeed, the research interviews seem to indicate that individuals tend to come together and form loose communities, even whilst in transit and extreme precarity. Very few individuals interviewed had left their country of origin with a travel companion; they would usually have met somewhere along the journey and stuck together, forming strong bonds with one another. In relation to this topic, one long-term volunteer suggested:

> Thinking of community... I don't know if we recognised it enough – the really strong importance of community links – friendships, advice, food, sharing clothes, and stuff like that. That's probably the biggest form of support for people in the area. During evictions [in Grande-Synthe], a family would be moved to an accommodation centre two hours away, but they [...] would come back straight away, because they felt isolated and far from people who could support them – people here survive by having other people around. (Interviewee nr. 74)

Another long-term volunteer described the strong space of community relations among Eritreans he was working with in Calais during the years after the demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' camp:

> I went down an evening under the bridges. 'We're about to eat,' they told me. [They were in] an area where you can't stand up, it's only 1.5 metres high, so we sat round in a circle eating and they were sharing the food they'd brought from the food distribution. There's an incredible sense of community there [...] Someone will be washing their hair while someone else is pouring water for their friend so they can wash their hair. You have people sitting around fires. There's mutual supporting [...] What depresses me is people walking around on their own, and there will always be some. It always saddens me seeing people on their own.

The same interviewee added, 'I think it's the community thing that sustains people, and the incredible support of the associations.' (Interviewee nr 34) Similarly, a Sudanese man who spent several months in Calais prior to his arrival in the UK, recalled the ways in which he had sought to resist feelings of despair:

> It is horrible, actually, but you have no choice. What can you do? You have to just keep the hope and keep wishing to go to a better place. Sometimes there were volunteer people– 'normal people' – who came with food and drink and gave you hope. Sometimes they came and brought tea and biscuits in the morning, and they came and brought it and sat and talked to you, and sometimes I felt okay. It was good to sit and talk to them, so you could feel okay. You feel you get more energy to carry on towards your goals. Without that, I think… I don't know. (Interlocutor nr. 38)

In August 2018 during my field work, my Eritrean interpreter was invited to 'hang out' with a group of Eritrean youth who had created an improvised 'living room' for themselves in some bushes in the industrial area. They had found an abandoned sofa and an armchair, and had brought cans of beer. 'Get comfortable, grab a beer,' they had said to their unknown guest. 'They seemed to be a lot happier by being close to each other,' my interpreter commented afterwards. A British long-term volunteer and researcher specialising in support for youth and children also spoke of the strong sense of community and solidarity between boys and young men as follows:

> Young people are often very affectionate and caring with each other in Calais. Maybe it's a sense that they've been through a lot together, they might have travelled on a boat together or been in Libya together, and that comes out in the way they look after each other. (Interviewee nr. 33)

Other external observers have specifically used the term 'tenderness' when commenting on the community relations and friendships witnessed in the area:

> They care for each other and show tenderness, they care of each other's interests […] If someone new comes along, they invite them [to join the group]. There is a sense of relational wellbeing. (Interviewee nr. 62a)

Another interviewee explained what happens when someone goes to the hospital after a serious accident:

> Usually several of their friends are already there [when I arrive]. They're sending the message that 'We're not going to forget you, you're in hospital and we're coming to see you.' […] One of them took the other's hand, and started combing his hair and putting oil onto his head […] The other day we went to see another guy; he's now out of psychiatric hospital, as he had a breakdown. It was wonderful

seeing [another boy] taking his hand. These are some very human gestures that I see all the time; emptying water over people's head, visiting hospital. [...] People are looking out for each other in very human ways. (Interviewee nr. 34)

During one of my field visits, my interpreter and I were interviewing an Iranian father. In the meantime, he left his 5-year-old son to play with some of the young African guys outside. He commented: 'They're so amazing, so kind, and really look after [the child] and keep an eye on him.' We watched them playing football and noticed that their behaviour was particularly gentle and caring with the child, also seemingly making efforts to make him feel special; pretending that he scored goals, and putting on a whole spectacle for him. When he left with his father, they shouted, 'Bye Ronaldo!' as he skipped away.

As Squire (2011: 11) writes elsewhere, 'acts of solidarity and collective mobilization are all diverging dimensions of a politics of migration that constitute irregularity as an ambivalent and contested condition, but which can be appropriated or re-appropriated in various ways.' This moreover resonates with Sigona's (2015) concept of 'campzenship,' which captures a 'situated form of political membership' within refugee camps (2015: 1), showing that the Agambenian 'space of exception' lens is certainly an unsatisfactory analytical tool for grasping the complexities of migrant subjectivities in the UK-France borderzone.

5.2.2. Routines and creative manifestations

A significant number of community spaces sprung up in the Calais Camp. For instance, there was the 'Jungle Books' library, and various schools, a youth space for play and creativity, and various projects giving space for creative manifestations. In relation to these topics, an academic-activist interviewee suggested to me that:

> During the camp, people were living a daily life, their narrative was almost completely focused on their humanity – they would talk about lessons, learning, they would build shops, restaurants, do something that makes sense for them. The situation or circumstances were far from ideal but they were making the best of it. People were holding on to hope by creating a life by doing things that all human beings are doing, like cooking food, washing clothes, all of those things, in a different context of course. [...] People were also playing instruments, playing sports. (Interviewee nr. 31)

Recalling the role of the 'Jungle Books' library, one of the former Sudanese camp residents reflected as follows:

> In my opinion, it was a [source of] light for all of the jungle. It was the place [where] you [could] find promises in the books; to read a story or learn a new language. This means hope and light in the dark. That is where people tried to spend time for themselves. We tried to have entertainment through reading or learning, or discussing with each other. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

The act of creating and performing daily routines was also an issue that emerged from many of my interviews and conversations with migrant interlocutors. This would include taking up roles within the camp (which is discussed in greater detail under sub-section 5.4.4. below), keeping to regular meal habits and religious routines, and participating in arts activities. For some, it also involved doing exercise. A long-term volunteer explained to me:

> There was a gym as well – from July 2016, so for the last few months. That was a really cool place. You know, often boxing is used to get through to young people who might have frustrations and going through difficult times, as a way to vent anger and frustration. […] The gym was a really good example of using those same ideas in a refugee camp. A really helpful way to express frustration, I think. (Interviewee nr. 65)

Meanwhile, music and theatre were a recurring element in the Calais 'Jungle'. Sometimes this would just take the shape of camp residents coming together, often alongside activitists and volunteers, to listen to music and throw a party. Other times, formal music projects would visit the camp and invite participation in more structured activities. One of the former residents recalled:

> A [music] group came because they believed the music could change something, even though music cannot change political opinion. They did mention they were going to try and make an album. It was nice entertainment. Even the theatre dome was entertaining the people and getting the stress out of the people to be honest. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

One of the individuals behind the theatre dome and its related activities suggested:

> The assumption that people were solely in need of help - this was something we tried to alter as a perception. People need necessities to survive but in order to feel like a person you need more than that, something that allows you to reflect, demonstrate awareness of yourself… an expression of what you've been through […] We wanted to provide a space for people to feel like people and not just give them things to survive until the next day. […] We hoped to help build the notion of agency, freedom of expression […]. (Interviewee nr. 37)

Similarly, a team member of a group of art therapists working in the camp and during its aftermath shared her perspective:

There's theory of art making along with dreaming, community, family, rituals, faith, spirituality, and the arts within the same 'body of coping'. […] People making music together, also spontaneously, not just formally. […] Dancing…all these things are about coping and resilience; we saw huge amounts in the camp… Imagination, imagining something other than the camp. (Interviewee nr. 62a)

With the destruction of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, fewer spaces for creative projects and daily routines are possible, but not entirely absent. Individuals in the area would find their own ways of accessing books and continue to learn English or French via their phones or books, even in the absence of a home. (See figure G)

Figure G | Books (Abdul Saboor)

Groups would continue to work relentlessly to create a space of calm through youth activities, sports, weekend excursions, and art therapy activities, both outside nearby the informal settlements and also within an indoors space provided by the Secours Catholique day centre. During one of my visits to the latter, I interviewed an Iranian man who suggested that the arts activities there had some positive effects on people:

> It's not really about doing art, and not necessarily about becoming an artist. But about leaving the violent situation [they] are in. Having tents taken away, police violence, and so on. Coming here, people can feel some dignity. (Interlocutor nr. 43)

In the same space of the day centre, a fashion show was staged in December 2018, where the dehumanising narratives surrounding migrants in the area were challenged. This is examined further in another section below.

5.2.3. Keeping the faith

For many of my interlocutors, although of course not all, religion and faith appear to constitute a key factor driving the creation of a sense of stability and normality. During the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, in the absence of official structures for worship, Christians from East Africa built a church in the southern part of the camp, where people could join together in a community and worship. By the same token, several mosques sprung up throughout the camp, which again served as both community spaces and a place for prayer. A French academic interviewee recalled:

> During my time in the camp it was Ramadan, we had 'iftar' [breaking of fast] there, it was amazing. Fasting was so hard there, but people managed to do it, despite everything. It was really nice during Ramadan because you had the mosque. And the Eritrean community, they had the church in the camp where they could go and pray. (Interviewee nr. 63)

In the aftermath of the demolition of the camp, which saw the destruction of places of worship, individuals have continued to find ways to join together in faith communities. For instance, East African individuals have now set up a space where they meet for worship, a space originally intended for playing *boules.* (See Figure H) A British support worker told me during his interview that they meet there on Sundays to worship together:

> I like to join the community there for worship on a Sunday. Sometimes there have been 90 or more people there. (Interviewee nr. 34)

Figure H | Place of worship in Calais, October 2018 (Alex Holmes)

An art therapist similarly noted about the aftermath of the camp: 'We've found that people's spirituality and faith is huge, faith in humanity.' The same interlocutor spoke of how individuals would hold on tight to pieces of cardboard and fold them up and hide them during evictions; these were improvised prayer mats. (Interviewee nr. 62a) A Sudanese minor, whom I interviewed in London, explained to me that his time in the borderzone (in the aftermath of the camp) was characterised by strong religious faith:

> How I stayed strong? After Allah, my friends were always supporting me and told me, now, you're struggling, but once you reach UK, you will find a good way to live. I would be praying, and be with my friends. (Interlocutor nr. 75)

Another illustration of the role of faith for many in the borderzone was when a young man from Libya entered the day centre in Calais, dressed up and wearing perfume, ready for the Friday prayers. He told me he was just about to walk three kilometres to a mosque and he seemed peaceful and purposeful, despite having been given a notice by the French state that he needed to leave French territory immediately. This was moreover after 13 hours in detention. An interlocutor with longstanding engagement in the area also

recalled strong religious faith as seemingly fundamental to some individuals' coping strategies:

> Someone I know well has been 'trying' [to reach the UK] for several months. Last week after returning from Belgium with his cousin – who has been refused asylum by the Swiss – they found themselves on a lorry going the wrong way. When I next saw him, he told me that he would only succeed in getting to the UK when God decided it was the right time for him to succeed. 'My time to succeed is already written in the book... it is not yet my time.' (Interviewee nr. 34)

Based on the above analysis of research findings, I understand the Calais 'Jungle' camp as a poignant example of the power of migrant subjectivities and human agency. The camp was built as an informal shantytown where life and agency were suddenly possible, in defiance of state efforts to force individuals in a space of precarity, and allowed individuals to subvert official rules of the state. This sub-section has suggested that the emergence of the Calais 'Jungle' camp enabled an imagining of agency and inclusion outside of the framework of rights and citizenship. In setting up the camp and all of its detailed social functions, political agency outside the realm of official status or citizenship started to take shape.

Migrant subjectivities have also been further enabled through creative grassroots projects, which have sprung up in the area over time. As McGee and Pelham (2017: 22) suggest, in their work analysing 'sports and play' projects with migrant youth in the Calais area, such grassroots efforts 'not only stand in tension with the violent border sovereignties of neoliberal states, but open up the inchoate possibility for political struggle and refugee-centred claims-making over the right to inhabit the 'exceptional' space of the camp.' Indeed, the dynamics highlighted in this sub-section clearly rebut the notion of 'bare life' and refuse the reading of migrants in the area as some form of 'homo sacer,' who are excluded from political life. I would here also refer to McNevin (2007: 670), who argues that irregular migrants' 'assertion of entitlement as right-bearing subjects, despite irregular status, contests the exclusivity of citizenship as a measure of political inclusion.' While I wouldn't advocate for the discounting of the value of struggles for citizenship by any means, the focus on migrant struggles and migrant subjectivities draws our attention to potential for rights-based struggles which go beyond citizenship.

Within this context, Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis S. Tsianos (2013) propose the concept of 'mobile commons,' which describes the 'world of knowledge, of information,

of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of social relations, of services exchange, of solidarity and sociability that can be shared, used and where people contribute to sustain and expand it' (2013: 190). As Nyers (2015: 32) comments, this might constitute a different world from that of citizens, but importantly, it is not separated from it. Here, we would ask how migrant subjects *constitute* themselves as citizens, irrespective of their legal status. At the same time, however, I have shed light on a state of ambivalence and an interplay of control and agency, as many of the actions taken in the borderzone are both produced and productive of both agency and control. The destruction of the Calais 'Jungle' camp (see Figure I) was a stark reminder of this entanglement of agency and control, and the processual fragility of acts of defiance and resistance within asymmetrical power relationships.

Figure I | Eviction of the Calais 'Jungle' Continues (Rob Pinney)

5.3.Everyday acts of resistance

Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 13) highlight the importance of 'the set of everyday practices by which migrants continually come to terms with the pervasive effects of the border, subtracting themselves from them or negotiating them through the construction of networks and transnational social spaces' (see also Rodriguez, 1996). The field research has discovered a range of ways in which individuals in the borderzone are

resisting, contesting, appropriating, and co-producing the border struggles there. As seen in the earlier theoretical chapter, Johnson (2014) was among those who argued that agency must not only be conceived of as the realisation of a certain desired end goal, as this definition would be too limiting, in particular from a starting point of 'agency that begins from the exceptional space of the subaltern' (2014: 29).

Similarly, Lee and Pratt (2012: 900) analyse everyday politics and subjectivity as 'moments that have the potential to destabilise sovereign or state determinations of boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and produce new solidarities and ways of living with others.' Based on this, smaller acts of agency and resistance can be seen to constitute contestation of 'the shape and meaning of the space of the border, even if this is to produce a greater degree of restriction, a firmer politics of closure or a more steadfast refusal' (Ibid). This sub-section looks at both conscious and mundane processes of 'everyday resistance,' which, as Hall (2015: 856) rightly asserts, are concepts that are well encapsulated in the work of Lefebvre and de Certeau, and also gained traction with the work of Scott (1985). In his book *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance,* Scott (1985) looks at how peasant and enslaved societies are responding to domination, and argues that oppression and resistance are in constant flux, and that due to the focus of political scientists and other analysts on major, visible 'events' or collective action, we risk missing more subtle and invisible, albeit also very powerful, forms of 'everyday resistance' such as foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, feigned ignorance, and sabotage (Ibid.).

Within the context of border struggles, small everyday acts of refusal, negotiation, and denial could, in this sense, be understood as an enactment of political subjectivity outside of formal citizenship, shedding light on performative notions of agency and migrant defiance of state control. I now will proceed in highlighting some noteworthy instances of precisely everyday resistance in the below sub-sections.

5.3.1. Refusing state provisions, appropriating destruction

An example which could be interpreted as a form of 'everyday resistance' in the UK-France borderzone is the refusal of migrants to eat food provided by state authorities. It was highlighted to me that, in March 2018, when the French government first took over

food distribution activities in Calais from grassroots groups and volunteers through the contractor La Vie Active, many migrants chose to actively refuse the government-funded food. Some of my interlocutors told me that this was because they did not want to accept food from the same hands that were abusing them. Others said they refused to take the food, because they were worried this would make the grassroots volunteers' work redundant, and they feared that life in the borderzone would be so much worse without the presence of the volunteers. Here, we can understand 'migrant struggles' as referring to daily strategies, refusals, and resistances through which migrants enact their (contested) presence – even if they are not expressed or manifested as 'political' battles demanding something in particular (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008). These two meanings highlight the heterogeneity of migrant conditions and the diverse ways in which migrant subjectivity is manifested.

Perhaps in a similar spirit, during the various stages of demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' camp throughout 2016 (in January, March, and October), some individuals chose to burn down their own shelters rather than allowing the French state to demolish them. An interviewee elaborated on this by stating the following:

> When you had a demolition with a police line moving in, and they [were] destroying shelters, someone would burn down their shelter rather than letting the police destroy it. That's why people set their own shelters on fire. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Another interviewee similarly recalled:

> People began setting their houses on fire. I think it was a weird kind of ownership [along the lines of]: 'My house is going to be destroyed, but if anyone is going to destroy it, I'll fucking destroy it myself' [...] There was also a man standing on the roof of his shelter with a sign saying, 'I'm searching for freedom in Europe but I found none.' He was standing like a statue on his roof. He must have thought, 'What have I got left – a piece of paper and a pen – I'll stand on my roof.' (Interviewee nr. 37)

Other forms of symbolic, silent resistance took the shape of hunger strikes and the sewing of lips. However, this will be discussed further down in a subsequent section, as I believe these could be interpreted as a more active form of resistance and direct political activism. For now, I would argue that these forms of actions lead us to see migrants in the borderzone as agents whose (non)utterances need to be taken into account for our theorising of migrant subjectivities, resistance, and agency. In theorising 'escape routes,'

Papadopoulos et al (2008) emphasise that these are not only routes taken across deserts, seas, and escaping detention centres, but also:

> [T]he everyday lived experience of moving: migrants' strategic and off-the-radar efforts at locating new paths for their journeys and for living; attempts at developing contacts for jobs, housing, health care; the affective responses migrants have to their denigration and exploitation; their experience of the lived spaced, of work, of the streets […] It is within the rich density of their lives – lives that are of their making – that escape routes are found and traversed.' (cited in Sharma, 2009: 470)

This appears to be of high relevance to the types of 'off-the-radar' efforts and everyday resistance highlighted in this section. Here, I also refer to McNevin (2007), to argue that the forms of migrant subjectivity and claims made by individuals in the UK-France border zone 'represent key contemporary sites of the political, challenging long-standing assumptions about who belongs and to what they belong.' (2007: 658)

5.3.2. Navigating the system

Another dimension which emerged from the research was ways in which migrants asserted their agency by strategically navigating the system and certain components of the politics of exhaustion. For instance, people would learn and memorise the routines of the police and evictions, so that they could make sure to take down their tents and grab their belongings early in the morning before an eviction would be due to start. Therefore, they would either hide their belongings in the woodlands, or as many would do, carry everything around in bags during the day. One of my interviewees suggested that the act of hiding was not restricted to belongings only; people would also strategically hide their own presence, only to re-emerge when deemed strategically sound to do so:

> People are always hiding, hiding their stuff, themselves, their true identity. They would be living in that kind of way, but still enact strategic visibility when there was, for instance, food distribution. (Interviewee nr. 25)

An Ethiopian man explained how he would use the 'weapon of silence' (albeit he did not use this term himself) when caught and interrogated by the police: he would simply refuse to utter a single word, even when they brought in one translator after the other to try and make him speak. Eventually, they would release him again. (Interlocutor nr. 30) Others explained to me that upon arrival in Europe, they had destroyed the skin on their fingertips by drenching them in alcohol and then rubbing them against the concrete ground until they were bleeding and the skin came off. This, they thought, would help

ensure they could circumvent the Dublin system and make their journey to the UK easier. These examples resonate with Nyers (2015), who argues that 'these identities, communities, and practices of escape strive to be 'imperceptible' to sovereign powers' (30). Meanwhile, some of the Eritrean interlocutors who took part in a group interview in August 2018 explained how they had sought to afford themselves some protection by creating positive relationships with individual police officers, who would then be more likely to leave them alone, and with volunteers, who might give them an extra advantage here and there. Regarding the police officers, one of them explained:

> There's a difference between the police [officers] – the black police treat us a bit better, and one of them I got to know, she's a lady […] The police is now seeing us differently. They know we are here getting away - trying to escape from danger [in Eritrea] – the police have asked about what Eritrea is like and trying to know about our culture. We are peaceful [in Calais] and there's an established relationship – they will not bother us anymore. (Interlocutor nr. 24a)

Another interviewee explained that some individuals would agree to be transferred to French reception and accommodation centres, 'Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAO),' as they knew they would be given three weeks of rest during the statutory period of deciding whether they wanted to apply for asylum in France or not (which, generally, they knew they wouldn't do):

> They would take the three weeks [of rest in the centre] and then go back to Calais, navigating the system in a way that benefited them, but not signing for asylum in France. (Interviewee nr. 31)

This could be understood as a manner in which individuals are utilising the system that oppresses them; to serve their own needs and ultimately support them in their aims. Along similar (albeit more drastic) lines, one interlocutor from Sudan told me that he and his friends sometimes found it appealing to be put under arrest in the police station in Coquelles for a night, because it meant they would receive food and a dry place to sleep before being released again. (Interlocutor nr. 6) While I would caution against generalising this view, and against romanticising individual agency as this arguably carries limited meaning unless it is accompanied by long-terms struggles for structural change, it is nonetheless clear that the dynamics in the borderzone are far from a situation of 'bare life' where migrants are under a totalistic grip of the state's control. Rather, the borderzone ought to be understood as a space of contestation, subversion, and co-production of the border control tactics. As such, this sub-section has demonstrated ways

in which the borderzone can act as a space of politics and performative subjectivities. Migrants' acts should therefore not be misunderstood as passive compliance, but in fact are better understood as 'self-interested acts of survival' (Gajparia, 2016: 158) or subtle forms of 'everyday resistance' (Scott, 1985).

Relatedly, there is a topic which I chose not to proactively explore with my interlocutors; namely, their ways of seeking new ways to try to cross the border. Suffice it here to say that this would likely include acts such as seeking new parking lots where UK-bound lorries were suspected to be taking a pit stop, travelling to other parts of France and Belgium to 'try' from there, opening a small section in a fence to access areas that have been closed off, and in some extreme cases, individuals tried swimming across the channel. This suggests that presumptions that hardened borders and increasingly harsh control measures would halt mobility and smuggling would appear misguided; instead, such approaches have proven to merely 'alter the spatiality [...] in terms of routes, tactics, danger, cost' (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 459).

5.3.3. Women's everyday resistance, in spite of all

In the previous chapter, the despicable levels of violence, abuse, and harm facing women within the context of the lawlessness of the UK-France borderzone were examined briefly. Meanwhile, the research interviews also uncovered staggering levels of resilience and defiance among the women I had the privilege to interact with. Very few of the women portrayed themselves as victims, but rather highlighted how they had navigated different situations. For instance, one of my interlocutors recounted having resisted a rape attempt alongside one of her friends:

> We were going behind the fence [of Jules Ferry] to [relieve ourselves]. One time, there was a man there who tried to rape us, but my friend and I beat him up and pressed his face down onto the ground where we had urinated. That's what he deserved. I am so lucky I was not on my own, because it would have been difficult to fight him. (Interlocutor nr. 51a)

One of my interviewees, who works specifically with women in the area, explained that there were several ways in which migrant women can resist or get support which men don't have access to. For instance, she explained that women will be able to get support from aid organisations and be treated a bit better by the police than men would. She continued to explain that:

> [There was] a more subtle form of coping strategies seen among women by making use of their awareness that they could get access to more material support through the grassroots groups' assumption that they are more vulnerable [than men], and they would make use of this to get the necessary level of support for their families. (Interviewee nr. 74)

The women I interviewed during the field research told me about other subtle ways in which they exercised acts of defiance against risks of sexual and gender-based violence (although they did not express these acts in such terms). Two women told me they would usually wear adults' incontinence pads so that they wouldn't have to relieve themselves outside, where risks of an attack were higher. Although, sometimes, they explained, they couldn't change it for a very long time, so it would give them a very bad rash. They moreover relied on what they referred to as 'nice guys' from their country of origin, who would help shield them with a large blanket while they changed their incontinence pad or went to relieve themselves (Interlocutor nr. 51a). Women interviewed by an aid worker in Dunkirk expressed additional forms of arrangements with previously unknown men in order to secure some level of protection:

> I met him through a friend on my journey. He offered to accompany me and act as my husband. I couldn't travel alone [...] We pretend that we're married. When people ask why we don't sleep close next to each other, I just say it's because we're not in a private place, we don't have privacy. (Timberlake, 2019)

As demonstrated through the various illustrations drawn from this study of embodied encounters, migrant subjectivities manifests 'in a series of mostly silent struggles' (Scheel, 2013b: 282). Here, I also come to think of Naila Kabeer's (1999) assertion that agency is 'not only acquired through decision-making, but can be acquired through bargaining and negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion, and resistance,' shedding light on the truly diverse nature of migrants' forms of everyday resistance in the UK-France borderzone.

5.4. Re-humanisation and counter-narratives

In the previous chapter, which theorised the 'politics of exhaustion,' I argued that a key component of this bordering technology are acts of de-humanisation and racialisation. In defiance of such processes, migrant subjectivities in the borderzone are seen to resist and refuse in various ways, striving for their own re-humanisation through powerful counter-narratives. It is with these dynamics which this sub-chapter is concerned.

5.4.1. The 'Halaq' and a dignified appearance

When clothes and personal belongings are confiscated through police raids and other moments of 'capture,' most individuals have few other choices than to rely on oftentimes ill-fitting, discarded hand-me-downs which once belonged to a European counterpart. This has been reported to contribute to a decreased sense of dignity and sense of individuality. Therefore, many of my interlocutors emphasised the different ways in which they would look after their favourite pieces of clothing, and other ways to 'feel good' about themselves. One would often observe individuals hand-washing their clothes and sitting for several hours to wait for the clothes to dry, draped over a fence in Calais, or on park bench in Paris. Keeping up a dignified appearance was arguably easier at the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp. One of my Sudanese interlocutors commented on ways in which camp residents would do so:

> We would cut our hair, showering every day; wearing nice clothes and look smart. And we would be pretending we are not there anymore. We made that life [resemble] normal life. To escape through your mind and think you are not there anymore. The imagination has no border. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

A long-term volunteer similarly recalled something similar from the time of the camp:

> In summer 2016, you would see people walking around the camp, fresh and washed. People took a lot of pride in their own appearance and the appearance of their space in general. That probably made them feel normal in an abnormal setting. There were lots of barbers, everyone had very manicured beards. The barbers were busy. Everybody had great hair. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Even in the aftermath of the camp, individuals have found ways of maintaining a dignified appearance. One of my interviewees recalled a time when she was visiting migrants in the woodlands:

> One day we were sitting around the fire and talking and a young teenager comes. He steps on a cardboard and brings out his completely white sneakers. One guy explained he had had a shower in the lake and wanted to put on his super white sneakers [for the occasion]. There are no showers; they shower in the lakes which is of course not ideal but they had to do it somewhere so they would use the lake. And how they would still manage to keep their belongings so clean, I don't understand; it's more than I can myself. (Interviewee nr. 31)

When visiting a day centre in Calais, one encounters an improvised barber shop: two chairs in front of mirrors nailed to the wall, a sign saying 'Halaq' (Arabic for 'barber'), and a table holding razor machines, scissors, an assortment of different combs, as well as

perfume and aftershaves. Some of the young men would self-identify as suitable for the barbering job, put on an apron and cut or shave other people's hair. The men would look themselves closely in the mirror while having their hair styled, seemingly very conscious of their looks and external façade. On one of my visits, there was new equipment in the barber corner; thus, there was a long queue, and one could smell the perfume in the air. One of the guys told me he was cutting his friend's hair like the North Korean leader. During the same visit, a seemingly inebriated young man suddenly took off his cap and asked me, 'Do you think I should get a new haircut? I have been thinking about it, what do you think?' Later that day, another man in his late 20s similarly asked me, seemingly out of the blue, 'Do you think I should get a haircut? What do you think would look better, like this – or like that?' These matters seemed to be of significant importance to the interlocutors; perhaps it was a way to normalise an entirely abnormal form of existence. One of the art therapists I interviewed reported: 'They do their hair with huge love and attention; they really seem to care what they look like.' (Interviewee nr. 62a) Along the same lines, one of my interviewees who has spent ample time working with young migrants in the borderzone and in the UK suggested:

> There would be attempts to maintain and change their hairstyle; so, there was a sense of dignity in that. They were attempting to normalise their situation and continuing to grow and be teenagers in an environment that is really inhibiting. (Interviewee nr. 33)

5.4.2. Portrayals and perceptions

Individuals would keep their appearances up, and also send photos back home, portraying their lives as a seemingly normalised existence. This is something I have witnessed several times during my participant observations, where individuals would pose in front of the Calais town hall or with friends or volunteers and then send off the photos to family or post on Facebook to get new 'likes.' This was also an observation raised by one of my interviewees:

> When they take pictures of themselves in Calais, they do it with a nice landscape, and nice clothes and smiling. 'I will send it to my family, I don't want them to see how I am living,' they've explained to me. The mobile is very important, and the way they show themselves. (Interviewee nr. 63)

Others, however, said they would not do so until they were in a better place. An Iranian man, for instance, said: 'We don't even tell our family about the way we live here […] What

picture am I supposed to send them?! I don't want my family to be worried about me.' (Interlocutor nr. 45d) There were also many other ways in which migrants in the area sought to construct a dignified portrayal of themselves, other than just through physical appearance. During the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, parts of the community sought to bend the police officers' view of them as criminals. One long-term volunteer recalled:

> There was one amazing moment in the southern part [of the camp], when camp residents were inviting police in for tea while they were intimidating people and trying to make them leave their shelters. Especially the Sudanese community did this, it was amazing to see. It de-escalated the situation. If that's what it's intended to do, then it worked. (Interviewee nr. 65)

Countless times during my field work, individuals would highlight to me and my interpreters that they were worth more than the precarious situation in which we encountered one another. I remember in particular, during a group interview with five Iranian men, my interpreter said discretely to me: 'They are very concerned that we would see them as different to us; they don't want us to think that they are always [living] like this.' For the remainder of the interview, and our encounter, for that matter, the men kept bringing up details about their jobs in Iran, and the fact that one of them had a rooftop on their house where they would host parties on the weekend. One of them said:

> After a while, you forget who you are and the civilisation you had; you move backwards. We had expertise, education, jobs. When we are hungry and walk past the restaurant, we don't steal or take anything from anyone. We respect everyone. (Interlocutor nr. 45d)

They also went out of their way to serve us food and drink underneath their improvised tarp in minus degrees. They lit up a fire in the fire pit and offered to heat up milk to drink, while toasting a dry baguette over the fire. When we declined the offer to have a banana, one of them smiled and said: 'It's food for refugees, right?' When they learned I am Swedish, one of them started talking about the football player Zlatan Ibrahimović, emphasising that 'his father wasn't Swedish – they were refugees,' and he smiled. By the time we left, they appeared relatively happy that we had obtained a good impression of them, and asked us to come back again for food another time. It was very tangible that they had gone to lengths to try and reverse the dehumanising portrayal they were experiencing whilst sleeping rough in the woodlands of Calais, accompanied by near-daily police harassment. Another Iranian interlocutor explained to me on a different

occasion, that during his time in the Calais 'Jungle' camp, he also felt the need to challenge the perceptions which he thought volunteers were holding about camp residents:

> Generally, the western perception of refugees and people in the Jungle [seems to be one of] uncivilised people needing some help and they felt they needed to help and give us food; it was a patronising and top-down approach [...] It hurts being looked down on, especially when it comes from the volunteers. (Interlocutor nr. 46)

In order to challenge what he perceived as a negative portrayal of migrants amongst some volunteers, my interlocutor had joined the Jungle Books library, which allowed him to do 'human activities.' He explained further:

> It makes you feel civilised when you are part of this kind of art and education projects [...] And for anyone to feel equal, it helps when someone comes to just be your friend, rather than coming to help. This is better. (Interlocutor nr. 46)

In another more formalised endeavour to challenge perceptions of migrants in the area, local Calaisians, volunteers, and other interested individuals were invited to a 'fashion show' at the Secours Catholique day centre in December 2018. Titled 'Humans in the Jungle Style,' the event started off with a welcome address from one of the day centre managers, during which he explained:

> It's a way to think differently about these men and women who are often stigmatised. We want to show that these are human beings. They can be a wealth for our society if we let them stay. We told ourselves we would work with a seamstress to work with abandoned clothing with complementary textiles from exiles' countries of origin. It's an opportunity to speak about Calais, because these people are often - always - forgotten since the demolition of the bidonville [Calais 'Jungle' camp]. We mustn't forget them.

The day centre manager projected a photo onto a screen in the hall, depicting a couple of migrant youth wearing shorts over long trousers. He continued to recall:

> We, with our prejudices, thought they wore their clothes like this for practical reasons – we thought it might help them run after the lorries faster, or keep them warm at night. But the guys simply told us, 'It's our style!' And it is with these guys in mind, that we invite you here today. They are not necessarily with us, but it was thanks of them that we are here; their story, their creativity and their idea. Remember them. (Dec 2018, freely translated from French)

This also brings to mind Cigdem Esin and Aura Lounasmaa's (2020) perspective on a series of projects run in the Calais 'Jungle' camp between November 2015 and September 2016, under the University of East London civic engagement and impact schemes. The projects sought to open a relational space with camp residents through a space in which

migrants themselves were the storytellers who'd 'negotiate their positioning within racialised power imbalances' and enable them to challenge migrant representation. This, the scholars argue, enables migrant agency and can empower and facilitate social change and spaces of resistance: 'When refugees are denied their right to claim/speak/act, the act of narrating becomes a vehicle for social change' (2020: 391).

5.4.3. Humour and the 'Game'

Another oft-cited way in which individuals in the borderzone might find resilience is through the use of humour. One longterm support worker suggested:

> Every single individual has their own coping or resilience strategy – the most striking for me was humour. People would be mocking of the system, mocking of the police, even mocking of themselves as a way to lessen the gravity of it or the seriousness of the situation. [They'd be] distancing [themselves] from it, laughing at the control dogs - laughing about 'who puts off the sniffer dogs', stuff like that. They'd be laughing at living in the jungle, making animal related jokes. It always struck me that it [might have been] a way to distance oneself from the reality of it. (Interviewee nr. 74)

As such, humour might have been one way through which individuals refused their designation as 'illegal', or as 'animals.' Another support worker similarly found that that: 'there were huge amounts of humour, even when you didn't understand each other. There was a bit of clowning here and there.' (Interviewee nr. 62b) In addition, some would speak about their efforts to cross the UK border as a 'Game.' One interviewee explained: '[People were] making it into a game. That's why people would try five times a night.' The same interviewee continued to explain: 'We had people caught by the same police several times, and it would become a joke with the police officers. [...] People therefore called it the Game. It was a game. A territorial struggle.' (Interviewee nr. 37)

One of the Sudanese minors I interviewed also joked about similar scenarios, saying that he did no sports during his time in Calais, 'but I ran from the police, yeah, that was my sport [*laughter*]'. (Interlocutor nr. 75)

5.4.4.   We'll take the lead, we know better

Within the context of the Calais 'Jungle' camp in 2015-2016, unorthodox forms of 'aid' developed. Many of the grassroots initiatives became entangled with migrants' self-organising and self-help as several distribution points and services such as first aid and the point of first arrival were taken over by camp residents themselves. A group of community leaders from different country groups also emerged within these dynamics. A longterm volunteer recalled:

> People were making businesses, working in them, working in general. They were doing all kinds of stuff, basically volunteering alongside [the rest of us]. Camp residents were taking care of things like the library, churches, mosques; they would take on responsibilities, looking after their community in their own way. (Interviewee nr. 32)

One interlocutor from Sudan shared his views on how these types of initiatives came to life:

> People started deciding what they needed and not just take what was given to them. [...] We built a barber shop, a mosque and church to respect everyone's religion and we had our own restaurants, and also, we had our own 'shower things'. Then [we wouldn't have to] wait anymore for the White guys to offer [these things] to us. Those things we can do on our own; we don't need others to clean our body because we can do it. And then we started to make our own food, cooking. We were inviting White people to eat with us. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

The importance of migrant agency appears to also have influenced many of the grassroots initiatives in the area to a significant degree. One longterm volunteer suggested to me:

> [The aid in the camp] used to be so undignified and so [patronising], so starting the static distribution points involving members of the community as volunteers was so important. The mobile distribution of food was also important; you'd take orders and it comes as an order [to people's homes]. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Similarly, a long-term volunteer who was in charge of significant segments of the food distribution in the camp explained:

> We developed a line-free distribution method early on, to avoid escalating frustrations, and to make sure that we also avoided feeding into mafia structures and [other] power structures. We did it face-to-face, in a more humane way. And we did surveys asking people what they would prefer to eat, making it more engaging. (Interviewee nr. 35)

Another interviewee also highlighted the importance in migrant-led working, to counter some of the dehumanisation experiences by people in the area:

> Constant race-based dehumanisation obviously gets you down, so you need to mix it up with things that reinforce your identity. This included things like participation within voluntary projects or groups, like the fire-fighting team, and when people who took on civil society roles as you would call it. So, they were taking responsibility for fires, first aid, shelter building, these kinds of altruistic acts. (Interviewee nr. 39)

As such, we have seen that struggles in the borderzone refer 'not only to organized movements and political actions but also to social practices and behaviors that can be fundamental preconditions for such movements and actions but are often assigned to the realm of the prepolitical' (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013: 265). This will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter.

5.4.5. Grievable lives

In the previous thesis chapter, a constant and underlying threat of potential death was highlighted as an important factor impacting negatively on the minds of migrants in the area, as part of the politics of exhaustion. While the Institute of Race Relations (2020) report that nearly 300 border-related deaths in and around the English Channel occurred since 1999 until November 2020, these numbers are likely to be much higher, given that deaths of undocumented individuals tend to go unreported. These deaths, and their wider circumstances, bring to mind Butler's (2006: 20) oft-cited question regarding the *grievability* of life:

> The question that preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is, Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, What makes for a grievable life?

In the UK-France borderzone, just like elsewhere across Europe's borderlands, there is a ticking death toll which continues to unsettle the fragile notion of Europe as a land of rights, democracy and freedom. Racialised migrant bodies continue to be inscribed with otherness, dispensability and what Butler might so have referred to as precisely 'ungrievability'. Lives lost become mere numbers, a means to an end, and an alleged measure of effective migration management. Within this context, I find it highly relevant to emphasise another aspect which emerged from the field research interviews; namely individuals'' collective acts of grieving lost lives.

Indeed, in response to the deaths in the UK-France borderzone, efforts to collectively grieve, bury, or repatriate bodies to their families have emerged over the years. In the

'Cimetière du Nord' in Calais, there is a specific section for unidentified individuals and those who were unable to be repatriated for different reasons. Some of them carry the names of those who left us behind, whilst others are marked merely by numbers. (See Figure J). A long term volunteer spoke to me about what happens when a person dies at the border, and the ways in which non-governmental organisations support the families and friends of those who deceased, to enable their dignified mourning, burial or repatriation:

> The procedure for when a migrant is killed at the border for the most part doesn't involve French officials. Organisations such as Médecins du Monde and Secours Catholique help to make practical arrangements for burial or repatriation, after contacting the relevant embassy. The family is usually contacted by friends of the deceased who are then put in touch with embassy officials and NGOs in Calais about their wishes. The cost for either process is shared between NGOs, and a small sum is usually raised for the family as well. There are certain cultural mediators or community elders through whom this is done, such as Imams. (Interviewee nr. 32)

The same interviewee continues explaining what the burial ceremony may look like:

> A varied community gathers at a funeral, people of many faiths and nationalities, both migrants as well as volunteers and other NGO workers. Sometimes poems are read, with the funeral often being in the local press. (Ibid.)

A collective of organisations operating in northern France have thus come together to form the 'Groupe décès' (décès meaning 'death' or 'passing'), which gathers each time there is a fatality, in order to organise funerals, potential repatriation of the body, fundraising for related costs, and ensure appropriate communications around the tragedy. Mourning and grieving also takes place at the individual level, and in more informal ways in the borderzone. For instance, a longterm support worker shared some of the ways in which this can occur:

> This year I have been caught up with the deaths of two young people; both Eritrean. I guess I probably had the most poignant good Friday of my life. I drove and spent the afternoon in the moratory to see the dead boy and his friends. [...] Earlier this year, in January, [another] boy was killed and his friends came to [see us]. [...] The guy had a brother living in Germany, so the friends went to meet the brother coming off the train [in Calais]. Eventually we found him, and I had three Eritreans in our mini bus with me. As soon as they saw [the bother] they started wailing. That was how they dealt with the death, they were just wailing in the back of the car. They went into the house, and when they met other friends, the wailing started again. [...] It was probably a very healthy way of dealing with a death, especially driving through the dark Calaisian streets. (Interviewee nr. 34)

Figure J | Calais North Cemetery (Author's photo)

In memory of the tragic death of a boy named Kiyar, highlighted in the previous chapter, a group of migrants, also joined by activists, organised a public manifestation during which they mourned those who have been killed at the border, combined with a political call to action to stop future deaths. See figures K and L. Overall, the different forms of collective and individual acts of grieving and mourning the dead in the UK-France borderzone can be understood as important migrant subjectivities, which serve to re-appropriate the humanity and *grievability* of migrant lives. In *Frames of War*, Butler (2009: 38) writes*:*

> The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous significance. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the sovereign law to do so.

In Calais and the surrounding area, mourning of lives which have been rendered ungrievable by the state is thus also of political significance in itself.

Figure K | Demonstration against border deaths (Andreas Beissel)

Figure L | Remembering those who perished (Andreas Beissel)

5.5. Activism, political mobilisations and autonomous housing

As highlighted in an earlier section of this chapter, the Calais 'Jungle' camp provided a context in which individuals were able to exercise agency in multiple ways. Some would represent themselves as a community figure, first-aid volunteer or fire fighter, others became business owners running cafes, restaurants, and shops. Thus, the informal camp created a space for self-representation, which, in some ways, may have served to defy technologies of control and denial of political subjectivities. Aside from such 'humanitarian action' and volunteering, other forms of more overtly political mobilisations have unfolded in the area over the years. Firstly, the No Borders movement, and Calais Migrant Solidarity, for instance, have been present in Calais for decades and have continuously sought to join together with migrants in joint activism over the years (see e.g. King, 2016; Rigby and Schlembach, 2013). The work of Calais Migrant Solidarity and the No Borders network is rooted in direct action alongside migrants, with the overarching aim of bringing down the border, rather than alleviating the symptoms thereof. This is summarised in the following passage on their website:

> Solidarity strives to be an equal relationship. We fight alongside each other. As the famous quote says, because 'your liberation is bound up with mine.' The borders certainly hit some people much harder than others. But they are an affront to all of us, and one part of a sick system that attacks us all. The problems in Calais will not be covered by a million blankets. (Calais Migrants Solidarity, 2015).

Over the decades, No Borders has also been involved in autonomous housing through squatting, alongside migrants which could be understood as a practice of resistance and a form of migrant subjectivities. Pierpaolo Mudu and Sutapa Chattopadhyay (2016) suggest that 'Squatting not only reasserts people's rights to an autonomous and dignified life while trapped in France, but also actively subverts British border controls by supporting those who attempt to cross the border clandestinely.' Meanwhile, Deanna Dadusc (2019) argues that squatting allows migrants to '[reject] humanitarian solutions [and continue] to create radical home spaces through squatting, enacting a politics of inhabitance beyond citizenship' (2019: 593). Similarly, Dadusc et al (2019: 521) suggest that 'the solidarities and collaborations between undocumented and documented activists challenge hitherto, prevailing notions of citizenship [...] These radical spaces enable possibilities for inhabitance beyond, against, and within citizenship.'

However, through my field work, the actions of No Borders and the solidarist acts of squatting and ensuring radical inhabitance did not figure explicitly in the interviews, but nonetheless constitute an interesting area for further research and exploration. That said, it remains unclear to me whether the acts in early March 2016 of twelve Iranian Calais 'Jungle' camp residents, who launched a hunger strike and sewed their lips together, was conducted in collaboration with No Borders, and likewise for demonstrations, which took place in December 2015, against the so-called 'wall of shame' being constructed across Calais with British tax money, and another demonstration in January 2018 in response to high levels of police violence recoded by Human Rights Watch.

By the same token, in early 2019, a migrant-led movement called *Collectif Appel d'Air* emerged from the informal settlements in the Calais area, joining together with activists, potentially including the No Borders network, to stage demonstrations in the Calais town centre and by the port. When I spoke to two of the men who were actively involved in *Collectif Appel d'Air* in early 2019, they spoke of Europe's colonialism and exploitation of African resources, and said it was time to 'give back.' They had already been running a migrant-run blog for over a year, called 'Refugee Voices,' and were currently trying to get in touch with the *Gilets Noirs* movement in Paris. Overall, they told me they felt really good at the time of their latest demonstration, because they felt like they were standing up for themselves and had support from groups and citizens as well (See Figure M) Another protest involving migrants was one in response to the shooting of the two-year-old Iraqi Kurdish girl Mawda, who was killed by a police bullet during a police chase in May 2018 (Schneider, 2019). According to one of my interviewees, this migrant-led demonstration was:

> [A] totally spontaneous protest of people from the [Grande-Synthe] gymnasium [which was housing migrants at the time], who came out and blocked the motorway. It was [a manifestation of] anger and rage; I think it was an assertion of resistance. They were making themselves to be listened to.(Interviewee nr. 74)

Similarly, in April 2019, a group of Sudanese youth, whose friend was being held in detention at the time, was thinking of staging a demonstration against deportations to Sudan, which were commonplace at the time and caused great distress. Another person asked if we could send some letters together to the French government about the deportations, which, indeed, we did, before we had to part ways. Migrants' self-mobilisation in the aforementioned contexts points to a demand to be recognised as

rights-bearers, despite their lack of legal status or citizenship. In the words of McNevin (2007: 672), this type of 'radical contest of the political is the flip-side of extreme vulnerability.' Both their actions and words (or intentions) illustrate the potential of political claims by migrants in the borderzone. This certainly stands in contrast with the notion of 'bare life' and migrants being reduced to a space where politics and subjectivities are impossible.

Figure M | Appel d'Air Demonstration (Andreas Beissel)

Various forms of activism were highlighted throughout the experiences of my interlocutors and interviewees, as the northern France area has seen action and protest under different guises over the years, including demonstrations, court cases, press conferences, and associative fora (Lequette and Le Vergos, 2016: 212). During the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp, some of its residents came together to meet with visiting British members of parliament to raise their grievances and recommendations. An interviewee explained to me: 'We met Jeremy Corbyn, Alf Dubs, and many different MPs, and we spoke to them, we said that this is not a good situation.' They also took action and sent letters to the UK Government regarding the need for constructive solutions. One Sudanese interlocutor explained to me:

> We suggested an asylum processing centre – we sent a letter to Prime Minister Cameron – we suggested a legal centre – but he didn't respond. And that is making the smugglers more wealthy and stronger. My idea was to open a centre and they could work individually or could send asylum seeker applications from there, and in the UK, the Home Office could check if that person needs protection or not, and we would be happy if they could just say no and we will not try to come. If the answer is no, [the person] could find another place, without putting himself or other people at risk. (Interlocutor nr. 5)

Here, it is interesting to look at how migrant subjects *constitute* themselves as citizens, irrespective of their legal status. Rather than focusing on status and institutions, we can see here acts of citizenship, where the emphasis lies on constitutive politics rather than institutional politics, and everyday struggles rather than representational politics (Nyers, 2015: 33). As Bojadžijev and Karakayali (2010) also suggest, 'Many of the social conflicts initiated by migrants are, after all, not about becoming citizens, but about insisting that they are citizens already.' By the same token, Calais 'Jungle' camp community leaders also joined meetings with the local authorities alongside grassroots groups, and made political claims that the camp must be allowed to remain. They did so without formal legal status, outside of the traditional reference frame for legitimate political practice (McNevin, 2007: 656), thus making transformations in our understanding of political belonging. The fact that the authorities agreed to meet with, and listen to, the community leaders as actors in their own right, signal that there are alternatives to the traditional understanding of political belonging, and for making political claims.

This resonates with what McNevin (2007: 664) refers to, in a separate context, as an 'implicit recognition' of non-citizens and, if taken a bit further, what Monica W. Varsanyi (2006: 240) has explored as 'a *de facto* consent for the formal membership of irregular migrants.' Indeed, individuals who are formally outside of citizenship were nonetheless making political claims despite being excluded from formal political entity, and not necessarily demanding formal citizenship *per se*, but merely access to other rights. This resonates with McNevin's (2007: 655-656) observation that migrant workers in the United States with insecure legal status were nonetheless able to form new political subjectivities through campaigning for legislation relating to wake payment, as they 'brought claims upon a political community from which they were excluded, yet they did not argue for a right to formal citizenship' (see also Gordon, 2005).

5.6. Theorising migrant subjectivities and the defiance of the politics of exhaustion

With this chapter, I set out to explore my second research question, regarding ways in which migrant subjectivities are performed in the borderzone, in what ways they (co)produce the bordering dynamics and how they are subverting and challenging the control methods, and thus giving shape to a form of counter-exhaustion. Through the field research findings, I have explored the resilience, motivations, understandings, and tactics of people trapped at the UK-France border, and examine how the bordering tactics, referred to as the 'politics of exhaustion' in the previous chapter, are also resisted, contested, and (re)appropriated in the borderzone through displaced individuals' struggles for mobility and survival.

While the Agambenian approach, with its strong 'control bias' and overall disregard for migrant agency, is an inappropriate framework for grasping the complex migrant subjectivities and resistance seen in this chapter, I was simultaneously careful not to fall into the traps for which the autonomy of migration scholarship has been criticised, namely that of over-romanticising the capacity of migrants to challenge state control, and for describing migrant agency with a high level of abstraction (see e.g. Nyers, 2015: 30). Therefore, I sought to anchor my work deeply into the lived experiences recounted to me by interlocutors and interviewees; indeed, through 'embodied encounter' (Scheel, 2013b), the chapter contributes to scholarly literature with insights into dynamics through which migrant subjectivities are produced, in ways which go beyond the polarised binary of helpless victims versus autonomous heroes, which tends to characterise current academic, policy, and media narratives. Also, following Scheel (2013b), I stress that human mobility always occurs relationally within a conflict with governance and techniques of mobility management, rather than misreading it in this chapter as completely self-determined and untouched by the effects of governmentality.

In analysing the field research findings, I argue that political subjectivities are produced in the UK-France borderzone through a wide array of practices and through the enactment of agency. The different ways in which this unfolded were classified under four main headings as part of the differentiation of migrant subjectivities in the borderzone. These are: (a) pretence at stability, normality, and dignity, which involved the carving out of community spaces, inter-personal relationships, routines and activities; (b) everyday

acts of resistance, which involved the strategic navigation of the systems of control; (c) re-humanisation and counter-narratives, which involved attention being given to one's appearance and portrayal, as well as grieving and mourning; and (d) activism, solidarity, and autonomous housing, both as part of initiatives led by others and migrant selves (see also Table 2). This array of migrants' practices and methods echo what Johnson (2014: 175) referred to as 'the ever-present capacity for action and voice that the space of the Camp seemingly denies.'

The analysis of these practices moreover helps to increase our understanding of the complexity of agency for these groups in relation to mobility control and bordering tactics deployed by the sovereign states; enabling us to make sense of a shift in what it means to be *political* in the context of border struggles. Many of these acts can be seen as performative of political agency or subjectivity, and do not require the actor to be a citizen, a person with legal status as 'refugee,' or anything else in order to make these claims to agency (see Lee and Pratt, 2012: 900; see also Butler and Spivak, 2007; Nyers, 2008). Indeed, political subjectivity was understood in this chapter as a performative dynamic rather than merely a legal form or as grated through citizenship or official protection status. As such, the forms of agency and subjectivities analysed in this chapter indicate certain transformations in political belonging, problematising the binary of the inside/outside, and can open a space for an imaginary, which sees beyond the understanding of political community as belonging narrowly to citizenship within a nation state. While the dominant lens through which much academic work has viewed the notion of political belonging has tended to be based on the state/citizen/territory constellation as a reference framework for legitimate political practice, as McNevin suggests, 'this framework cannot always account for political claims asserted by particular kinds of non-citizens' (2007: 656).

Thus, my work builds on the strand of scholarship, which engages with the theories and concepts from the perspective of 'acts of citizenship,' where migrant citizenships can be both formal and performative, and in essence, different, from the conventional notion of citizenship, and which take the perspective of migrants 'from below' (Nyers, 2015: 23). The chapter has thus contributed towards a comprehensive articulation of the modalities of agency which are at stake in the struggles of 'illegalised' migrants at European borders,

utilising the UK-France border as an example, also opening up academic analysis to considerations of how the borderzone can be understood as a 'shifting ground of contestations and resistances' (Squire, 2011: 8).

In interrogating the forms of human agency and migrant subjectivities found in the UK-France borderzone, I highlighted various ways of 'being political' within the UK borderzone, but it also needs to be stressed that the borderzone itself can be understood as a condition produced when control practices and tactics meet 'autonomous migrations' (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). I argue that we ought to understand the borderzone as a space where dialectical interrelationships between human mobility and the tactics of migrants on the one hand, and bordering tactics of the state power on the other, lead to a 'recalibration' (Weber et al, 2019: 15) of the power dynamics in the borderzone.

In this sense, human agency and sovereign control, the latter of which includes increasingly cruel tactics, are best understood as mutually constitutive elements. Human agency and resilience are used in the borderzone to 'disrupt imposition of state power' (Weber et al, 2019: 16) through the different methods and techniques I identified, thus co-producing a borderzone which is not only a site of insecurity, but also a space of 'contested and unsettled governance' (Ibid). Indeed, as Squire (2011: 8) has argued in the context of migrant irregularity elsewhere, these situations and conditions are 'produced both through the movements and activities of national, international and/or transnational agencies *as well as* through the movements and activities of migrants' (emphasis on original). The role of NGOs and aid groups was also discussed in terms of *being political*, and although these play a critically important role in the borderzone, it was clear that, outside of their intervention, migrants themselves are continuously negotiating and reconstituting their own roles, agencies, and abilities to continue. As such, migrant subjectivities are intertwined with the politics of exhaustion, the latter which continuously struggle to deter, control, and exclude individuals from exercising their human mobility. As Scheel (2013: 285) suggests: 'borders and migration are not performed unilaterally, neither by people on the move nor by the agents of control, but in and through the interactions between them.' What follows then is that the dialectical interrelation between the autonomous migration and bordering technologies are performative dialogues which constitute borders and migration (Scheel, 2013: 289).

To conclude this chapter, I have demonstrated here how the control methods of the politics of exhaustion, which seek to produce conditions of abjectification, marginalisation, and precaritisation, are contested and resisted by displaced people who exert their agency and defy control. It is neither 'escape' or 'control' that comes first, and there is no uncontested binary between the two. Instead, an 'ambivalent condition' (Squire, 2011) is enacted in the borderzone, not only through the politics of control and exclusion, but also through politics of mobility and subversion. As such, this chapter of the thesis has permitted the tracing of performance of borders, also illustrating the 'stubborn incorrigibility of human life against the myriad forces that would seek to enforce its precarity and disposability' (De Genova, 2017a: 10), shedding light on small openings for transformative potential political subjectivities, without discounting migrants' vulnerabilities and the powerful reassertion of traditional territorial claims through both sovereign and biopolitical manifestations.

6. (In)visibilised state violence, (de)politicisation of racialised migrants' suffering, and the (de)construction of a 'moral alibi'

6.1. Introduction

Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated that the UK-France migration governance technology has become increasingly sophisticated and serves to deter, control, and exclude by inflicting exhaustion upon migrants' bodies and psyches as a way of controlling intention. The use of intent management through physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion is a bordering tactic which has, to date, remained under-theorised; by shedding light on this phenomenon, I am able to emphasise the centrality of *state violence* in this chapter within seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift, which understands violence constitutive of bordering technologies and has been partly absent in traditional migration studies.

Indeed, given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the bodies and minds of racialised migrants, this chapter reverts back to this concept once more. I turn my attention here to the third research question; namely, interrogating how the violent nature of the external dimensions of the UK's border can be understood and accounted for, and why the present bordering technologies represented by the politics of exhaustion might be privileged over other forms of migration government control in the borderzone. Indeed, it would feel insufficient, not least from an ethical standpoint, to simply conclude (as I did in the previous chapter) that the violent dynamics in the UK-France borderzone are a dialectical and ambivalent relationship and a mutually constitutive process between sovereign power of control and human mobility and subversion, without bringing back to the fore the gravity of the violence and human suffering produced within this inherently asymmetrical power relationship. Thus, in this chapter, I commence by theorising the politics of exhaustion *as state violence*, drawing upon conceptualisations of violence previously seen in chapter 2 of this thesis. I later theorise how this state violence is 'sanitised' and 'invisibilised' through the following interlinked processes: (a) the displacement of state responsibility onto migrant bodies; (b) a partial absence of human 'culprits' and an accompanying depoliticisation of

suffering; (c) the production of a 'vanishing point;' and (d) by upholding a narrative of migrant illegality.

Having designated the politics of exhaustion precisely as *state violence*, and casting doubt upon its logical underpinnings, I then proceed to unequivocally call into question the very legitimacy and standing of the UK and French Governments in regard to their undertakings in the borderzone. As such, I seek to destabilise the purported hegemonic legitimacy of the bordering tactics in the UK-France borderzone by defining it as state violence. Thus, I contribute to the challenging of what Barak Kalir (2019: 21) refers to as taken-for-granted 'progressive, democratic, and liberal values to mark the (self-proclaimed) moral position of Western states.'

6.2. Politics of exhaustion as state violence

As seen in chapter 2, which took us on a journey through relevant scholarly literature and theoretical concepts, the past couple of decades have witnessed what Tyner and Rice (2015: 2) referred to as 'an upswing in the geographic writing – and theorizing – of violence.' These endeavours have included efforts aimed at deepening our understanding of violence, not only in terms of its consequences, but also theories of the 'act' or 'event of violence itself (Ibid). Moreover, we saw that scholarly studies and theorisations of state violence propose an array of definitions and approaches (Torres, 2018). In this section, I will build the aforementioned argument that the politics of exhaustion ought to be designated as state violence, for which the UK and French governments must be held accountable, and the legitimacy and legality of their actions must be scrutinised. In doing so, I contribute to theorisations of violence, within critical border and migration studies, which cannot rely on binary understandings of 'structural' versus 'direct' violence alone, but rather requires a dialectical understanding of the relationship between different forms of harmful practices.

6.2.1. Hard-to-discern violence

The previous chapter on the politics of exhaustion (refer to Table 1) shed light on the 'direct,' or 'subjective,' physical violence (Žižek, 2008) which is delivered during episodes of evictions, apprehension, and other moments of police brutality. However, as emphasised, this only represents one of seven key components of the biopolitical bordering technology found in the politics of exhaustion. Meanwhile, violence is inherent

in *all* of the seven components of the politics of exhaustion, some of which may appear seemingly benign when viewed in isolation from the rest. These include: 'direct' or 'subjective' physical violence (Žižek, 2008); 'symbolic violence' (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020); 'violence of language' (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020); 'systemic' (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020) and 'structural' (Galtung, 1969) violence; 'slow violence' (Nixon, 2011); as well as emotional and material violence. Table 3 depicts the ways in which these forms of violence manifest within the politics of exhaustion.

Table 3 | Politics of exhaustion as state violence

Politics of exhaustion as state violence	
Recurrent and ritualised direct violence	• 'Direct' or 'subjective' violence (Žižek, 2008) causing physical harm: beatings, rubber bullets, administration of pepper spray. • Sometimes accompanied by emotional abuse: destruction of possessions such as mobile phones. • Would at times involve the indiscriminate use of violence: e.g. misuse of tear gas, including in closed spaces or in ways which appear to be disproportionate.
Humiliation, dehumanisation, racialisation	• 'Symbolic violence' (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): humiliation tactics during evictions and apprehensions, affecting individuals' sense of dignity, self-worth and value, and integrity. • 'Violence of language' (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): heckling and racialised abuse, through which relations of domination are cemented, often through Othering.
Withdrawal of care and the manufacturing of vulnerability	• 'Structural violence' (Galtung, 1969): acts of withdrawing and denying humane living conditions and basic rights, including the absence of access to water, sanitation and food. • 'Systemic' violence (Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): by means of creating a context within which individuals experience increased vulnerabilities and are put at heightened risk of inter-personal abuse, mafia violence and exploitation.
Dispossession	• 'Symbolic violence' (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): humiliation tactics during evictions and apprehensions, affecting individuals' sense of dignity, self-worth and value, and integrity. (As above) • Assaults on personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 1) through confiscation of shoes, mobile phones, and other personal affects.
Shrinking and defoliation of living spaces	• 'Symbolic violence' (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): here in the shape of acts making impossible to form community relations; the prevention of pretence at privacy through defoliation; denial of dignity and rest. • 'Structural' violence (Galtung, 1969): acts of withdrawing and denying humane living conditions (as above).
Forced (im)mobility	• 'Structural violence': Violence is built into the structure and "shows up as unequal power and consequently unequal life chances" (Galtung, 1969: 170-171) • Violence performed as an 'ordering function' (Shepherd, 2007: 250) which organises politics and power.
Uncertainty, undercurrents of threat, and omnipresence of death	• 'Slow violence' (Nixon, 2011): Underlying uncertainty about the future; is not necessarily enacted through single events or actions but rather incremental over time. • 'Symbolic violence' (Galtung, 1990; Bourdieu, 2001; Simonson and Kofoed, 2020): impunity and lack of investigation into migrant deaths entail a sense of unworthiness of migrant lives.

Through the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion, I have demonstrated here that the theoretical separation of 'direct' and 'indirect' violence limits our dialectical understanding of violence within the context of the study of border struggles in critical border and migration studies. Moreover, I argue that the politics of exhaustion, as a technique of biopolitical migration government, ought to be understood as a form of state violence in itself. This is, not least, because the politics of exhaustion comes with a *temporal dimension* where protracted and successive harm through the combination of the different tactics is induced over time and leads to staggering levels of harm. Indeed, it appears as though the politics of exhaustion co-produces a downward spiral of debilitation and hopelessness, having far-reaching impact on individuals' safety, health, and wellbeing.

Thus, by tracing lines between these undeniably harmful practices and the slow exhaustion and 'bleeding away of life' (Lee and Pratt, 2012: 902), I argue that, when taken together, a geography of time, space, and infliction of suffering on bodies and minds becomes apparent. Indeed, following Loughnan (2019a), I argue that '[t]he gradual yet unremitting effect of [certain] policies render them hard to discern as violence,' but they constitute state violence nonetheless, and should not be understood merely as an unintended consequence or by-product of an unavoidable policy line.

This makes visible the inherently violent approach undertaken in the UK-France borderzone and enables us to call for liability and accountably by the UK and French governments. To support this point, I draw again upon my field research interviews, many of which have shed abundant light on the harm-inducing effects of the politics of exhaustion, and which suggest that the responsibility for the harm caused by the politics of exhaustion has been moved onto the bodies of migrants themselves.

6.2.2. Displacement of responsibility onto migrants' mind and bodies

Throughout my field work, the effects of the bordering tactics in northern France was a recurring theme, reaching back to the time of the Calais 'Jungle' camp and throughout its aftermath. A long-term volunteer who spent several months serving in the Calais 'Jungle' camp told me:

> We've seen a rapid deterioration of mental health of people who are forced to live in these conditions. A big one […] I saw it more than people told me […] You see it in anger, hostility, self-harm, substance abuse. You see it in people who are clearly

very depressed; you see it when they have become apathetic and have lost hope…
self-destructive behaviours. It's so shocking – people have made really
horrendous journeys, but when you get to Europe, the bedrock of human rights,
tolerance, and acceptance, you get here and all you get is neglect and abuse, which
is deliberate from the European governments. (Interviewee nr. 32)

Another interlocutor with long-term engagement in the borderzone suggested, 'This is
about trying to squeeze life out of people' (Interviewee nr. 39). In October 2018, a team
of mental health experts and art therapists whom I interviewed raised alarms regarding
the mental health situation in Calais. The professionals reported having seen an increase
in clear signs of 'depression, anxiety, and hopelessness as people became trapped and
ensnared in a cycle of rejection from countries across Europe, and in the case of northern
France, at the border, with no obvious way out of their predicament' (Lloyd et al, 2018).
The experts, who have been operating in northern France since 2015, argue that there is
often an alarming combination of individuals' complex layers of trauma from their
country of origin and/or their journey, which is then compounded with the continuous
and sustained abuses and a lack of recourse to support, which can make displaced
individuals more at risk to themselves, as well as to other people in their surroundings.
They have reported the following:

> Being in an enhanced state of sensory sensitivity for prolonged periods can have
> a long-term impact on the body and may tip people into paranoia,
> overwhelming anxiety, anger, hyper-vigilance, and aggression […] Disruption of
> sleep, destruction of tents, and confiscation of basic necessities, even drinking
> water, is taking its toll on people's mental as well as physical health in worrying
> ways, appearing to have tipped many people beyond their ability to draw upon
> their own coping mechanisms, into mental health conditions which can lead to
> long-lasting damage. (Lloyd et al, 2018)

Similarly, in Brussels, I interviewed an individual who was heavily involved in support
activities, not only in Brussels, but across the borderzone. He suggested:

> People get tired and can't think straight, so I think they act in ways they normally
> wouldn't. For example, they would know that acting aggressively will not be in
> their own favour, but due to exhaustion, they lose their rational thinking and
> temper. (Interviewee nr. 27)

Many others highlighted the misuse of alcohol and drugs as a result from suffering in the
borderzone. The aforementioned therapists also suggested that this was linked to the
escalation of mental health issues in the area, as well as a large increase in alcohol abuse.
They reportedly could often smell the alcohol on the people at one of the food distribution
points, with drugs also seemingly present. What was worse, they said, was that there was

no one in the area who was properly equipped to handle the situation. (Interviewee nr. 62b)

One of my Sudanese interlocutors similarly explained:

> People might [turn to] drugs or alcohol – they stay here and they feel hopeless. It destroys their humanity to stay in this situation. You can just imagine having a tent in plastic. (Interlocutor nr. 47)

Meanwhile, in Brussels, an Afghan man I interviewed in Maximilian Park about his time in Calais and the wider borderzone, spoke very intensely about being on the brink of 'going mad' and of wanting to 'kill himself,' just like so many others have uttered, too. (Interlocutor nr. 7)

In Calais, a mental health professional shared the following concerns:

> People are exhausted and unable to cope. There are disassociations, people are struggling to be present, and have quickly fluctuating moods. People are expressing more hopelessness, depression, anxiety – everybody feels stressed, generally, but there are also many examples of people's stress shifting into something more serious [...] It leads to risky behaviours, particularly for the teenagers. There's a rise in the number of deaths because of the lorries. [...] There's sexual promiscuity and young people putting themselves at risk of exploitation. We've seen that – there's definitely an increase in all of this. It's as though they were thinking, 'what's the point, I might as well get on a boat and cross the Channel [despite the risks]. (Interviewee nr. 62b)

An academic operating in the borderzone similarly expressed to me during an interview that the conditions enforced upon people at the border 'definitely have a very huge effect on people's well-being.' The same interviewee continued to describe the border zone as a 'very conflictual space [...] People have been there for a year, two years, and where they don't have shelter, it's surprising that they haven't broken down. Some do.' (Interviewee nr. 25)

Something that stands out very clearly from these research findings is that the responsibility for the harm caused in the borderzone can be understood as *having been shifted onto migrants themselves*, onto their bodies and minds, due to the successive breakdown of their coping mechanisms. This, Loughnan (2019a) argues, does not just help with 'sanitising' the state violence, but also 'invisibilising' it. Along similar lines, Luca Mavelli (2017: 15) argues that the displacement of responsibility, where the source of harm inflicted is not immediately identifiable and/or diffusely shared between various

different actors, moreover contributes to a process of the *depoliticisation of suffering.* This will be developed further in the next sub-section.

6.2.3. Absence of human 'culprits' and depoliticisation of suffering

In accordance with the work of Weber and Pickering (2011), the absence, or invisibility, of clearly defined and identifiable 'human culprits' in the implementation of state violence (in this case, the politics of exhaustion) may give an *illusion of the absence of intention to cause harm* (Weber and Pickering, 2011: 94). Mavelli (2017: 16) refers to this as the construction of 'suffering bodies as 'victim[s] without a perpetrator'' (see also Ticktin, 2011: 5), and asserts that when there is an occasional presence of a perpetrator, the state tends to place blame for migrants' suffering on either criminal networks, or on the natural environment. Indeed, this is backed by academic literature, which has explored how blame can be shifted to the natural environment. For instance, Doty (2011: 600) highlights the context of the US-Mexico border as, 'the importance of geographic space in the process of obscuring official state responsibility for the moral consequences.' Squire (2017) makes a similar argument, looking at how official responsibilities are evaded and deflected in the context of irregular migration. This creates a depoliticisation of suffering, due to the fact that the source of harm inflicted is not immediately identifiable and/or diffusely shared.

Moreover, Mavelli (2017: 16) argues that the depoliticisation of suffering among individuals viewed as 'migrant Others' also tends to entail an act of blaming migrants themselves *for their own suffering.* All of this resonates loudly with the UK government's narrative in relation to those in the borderzone, and those trying to cross the border: by blaming migrants for being 'irresponsible' and 'taking unnecessary risks.' While the official narrative here clearly fails to take into account and acknowledge the wider European context facing migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the political causes of suffering (Mavelli, 2017: 16), which have forced or prompted individuals to flee their homes in the first place, it appears to serve the purpose of depoliticising suffering and constructing a 'moral alibi' (Doty, 2011) for state violence that has been perpetrated. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013: 202) have argued, the struggles of migrants 'who lose their lives every day in the attempt to cross borders worldwide [...] are structurally erased by the rhetoric of migration governance and management.' This, the scholars argue, needs to be 'politically denounced for its complicity with some of the most violent forms of

contemporary necropolitics' (Ibid). Mavelli (2017) takes matter of depoliticisation of suffering a step further and argues that the aim of such blame shifting, onto migrants themselves, follows the logic of 'biopolitical care for the emotional well-being of the British population: a way of exempting it from responsibility for the recurrent tragedies' (2017: 17).

The responsibility for the politics of exhaustion can also be partly evaded by framing harmful and violent practices as mere 'administrative matters.' Indeed, as Tazzioli and De Genova (2020: 6) suggest within the context of their work exploring how kidnapping is used by states as a tactic of border enforcement, 'ordinary criminal law and border policing and migrant detention are insulated as merely 'administrative' and discretionary matters.' According to scholars, this makes it particularly difficult to ascertain whether such tactics and techniques can be understood to operate within the rule of law (Ibid). Similar reflections apply to the situation in the UK-France borderzone where certain components of the politics of exhaustion take the shape of administrative matters, including detention, the routine implementation of eviction orders by CRS officers, and so forth. Such aspects of the politics of exhaustion could therefore be understood as 'effectively outside the purview of the law altogether' (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020:7; see also De Genova, 2017d). This lawlessness surrounding state tactics then compounds the already prevalent sense of the borderzone as a 'lawless land,' where mafia violence and inter-personal abuse is perpetrated against vulnerabilised individuals with impunity.

6.2.4. 'Vanishing Points' and the abnegation of responsibility

The sheer lack of accountability for the state violence perpetrated in the UK-France borderzone calls for a further discussion regarding the underpinnings that enable this impunity. I argue here that the UK-France borderzone represents a convenient space for the UK and French states to avoid accountability by constituting a 'vanishing point' (Gregory, 2007; Mountz, 2013). This concept refers to a site 'where sovereign and bio-power coincide' (Gregory, 2007: 206) and where international law is 'decentred, without a unitary sovereign ground to guarantee its powers' (Ibid: 209). In this regard, Mountz (2013: 32) highlights how states tend to use 'offshoring' of border and immigration management to create vanishing points in response to the arrival of asylum seekers. This resonates with the ways in which the UK government is wielding sovereign powers

beyond its territory, without assuming responsibilities for the human insecurity, which results from its practices.

As we saw in the introductory chapter, along with the UK Government's extension of its border and immigration control onto French territory, comes extraterritorial powers to deny individuals entry anchored in the juxtaposed border arrangements emerging from the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, and later, bilateral agreements (given effect in Britain through The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) Order 2003). Moreover, the UK has deployed hundreds of UK Border Force personnel to France and Belgium, to its Short-Term Holding Facilities and other functions; all of which are sites where UK criminal law powers apply. Due to the powers wielded by the UK here, one could convincingly argue that UK human rights' responsibilities would also apply; yet this is, as we know, far from the case. Instead, a 'grey zone,' or indeed, 'vanishing point,' has emerged, where migrants 'are under UK control, but without the equivalent human rights protections' (Refugee Rights Europe, 2020: 6). This serves to produce an 'abnegation of responsibility carried about by states that – though formally part of an international system – act in their own interest that allows violence, exploitation, and abuse and precarity to flourish over the protection of human life and rights.' (Mountz, 2013: 32)

It is precisely within this space, the 'vanishing point' of the UK borderzone, that the politics of exhaustion can be deployed with minimal accountability. This sheds light on how powerful states are able to obscure, to an important degree, their own violence (see Springer, 2016). Here, I also refer to Mountz (2013: 32), who argues that, 'On sovereign territory, states are more likely to uphold legal responsibility and international commitments. Being adrift between sovereign powers and territories leaves migrants and asylum seekers at greater risk.' Along the same lines, I argue here that that the juxtaposed border controls and the outsourcing of violent practices to the British borderzone are essential to the continued practices of British statecraft, in that they provide a 'moral alibi' for any responsibilities of the British government for human rights violations, deaths, and human suffering. Arguably, the UK is privileging the politics of exhaustion over more overtly violent border control measures as the latter might 'jeopardis[e] its humanitarian self-image and human rights commitments' (Johansen, 2013: 258). Nonetheless, the fact that this form of UK state violence is taking place within

'vanishing points,' with the accompanying abnegation of responsibility, the politics of exhaustion is state violence all the same.

6.2.5.   Narrative of illegality

Furthermore, it could be argued that the borderzone is also a space for discursive production; a productive site for exclusionary discourses' (Martin and Mitchelson, 2009: 459). In this vein, I argue that the depoliticisation of suffering and the abnegation of responsibility, as well as the UK Government's sense of legitimacy and 'moral alibi,' are supported by the discursive construction of the migrants as 'illegals.' This is done both through political and public narratives of migrant illegality, as well as through the politics of exhaustion itself. The latter, through its breakdown of the mental and emotional wellbeing of migrants in the borderzone, has the potential of achieving the fixing of self-fulfilling representations, which resonate with the discourse of the 'illegal migrant.'

Turning our attention firstly to the discursive construction of migrants as 'illegals,' it should be noted here that it is not my intention to present an in-depth discourse analysis or trace the discursive construction of 'migrant illegality' in the UK media and policy narratives. This has already been done by many others (see e.g. Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008; Taha, 2019), and would moreover be outside the scope and methodology of this thesis to go into such a study in that type of meaningful manner. Suffice it here to briefly examine, in a non-exhaustive manner, the way in which the UK Government refers to the migrants in the UK-France borderzone, in order to precisely illustrate their 'illegalisation' as well as their conflation with matters of organised crime.

For instance, even in 2009, then-UK Home Secretary Alan Johnson welcomed the closure of a makeshift camp in Calais with the following words:

> The measures that we have put in place are not only there *to prevent illegal immigration,* but also to *stop people trafficking*. We are working with the French, not only to *strengthen our shared border,* but that of Europe as a whole. (Cited in Reinisch, 2015: 517. Emphasis added)

The discourse of illegality and combatting security threats continued, and if anything, *intensified*, over the coming years. In September 2014, the French Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, and the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, released a joint statement on the two states' agreed 'steps to *combat illegal migration,*' which would lead

to the establishment of a comprehensive action plan to enact the following: reduce the number of irregular migrants [...]; strengthen port security to deter *illegal crossings* [...] and address public order issues arising from the number of *illegal migrants* in Calais; increase operational cooperation to *fight against the smuggling* of migrants [...]; ensure that all measures taken will *deter illegal migrants* from congregating in and around Calais.' (Cazeneuve and May, 2014, emphasis added) Similar language was used in a joint ministerial declaration on UK/French co-operation released in August 2015, which called for the development of 'an integrated plan to *deter illegal migrants* and *defend the approach* to the Port of Calais' (Cazeneuve and May 2014, emphasis added). In February 2019, speaking of the few hundred asylum-seeking Iranians who arrived in the UK by boat in winter 2018-2019, Steve Rodhouse, Director General of Operations of the National Crime Agency, highlighted to the Home Affairs Committee about the 'efforts that our agencies together have made to *tackle that threat* [emphasis added].'

The arrival of prospective asylum-seekers is hence treated as a threat, which would then logically require a securitised response. In the Seventh Report of Session 2016–17 regarding Migration Crisis of the Home Affairs Committee, we read that the '[m]ovement of *illegal migrants* [emphasis added] within continental Europe has been facilitated by the removal of passport checks at internal borders, following the Schengen Agreement in 1985' (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: 33) and '[m]any of the *illegal migrants* [emphasis added] [in Calais] are assisted by criminal gangs' (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: 8) and 'Libya is now the biggest source of *illegal migrants* trying to reach Europe [emphasis added],' and this, according to the Committee, must be *stopped at all costs* (Home Affairs Committee, 2017: 27). There are countless examples of language of the illegality of migrants in the UK-France borderzone. Suffice it here to suggest that by framing the matters as a strategy to legitimately address illegality of non-citizens, as an act to exercise sovereignty and 'taking back control over our borders,' this is 'widely taken to be inherently 'legitimate' as an exercise of the state's sovereignty' (Tazzioli and De Genova, 2020: 6).

What is even more pertinent to the focus of this thesis, is the way in which the politics of exhaustion can be understood to co-produce *de facto* situations of self-fulfilling situations of migrant deviancy and violence, used to justify the harm-inducing politics of exhaustion,

deterrence, and exclusion. Ruben Andersson (2014: 111-112) discusses in his extensive ethnographic work how individuals, when subjected to border control practices and methods, often turn to more suspect behaviours and begin to act in ways that confirm the redeployment of the same measures which produced the deviant behaviours in the first place. Jef Huysmans (2006: 58) has similarly suggested that:

> [T]he increase of border controls at [borders] [means that] some refugees will have to rely on human traffickers, who can smuggle them into countries of the European Union. This reinforces the image that refugees are not genuine refugees, but economic immigrants illegally entering the country and claiming asylum when caught.

In the UK-France borderzone, subjecting migrants to the politics of exhaustion, along with a depoliticisation and displacement of the causes of suffering, helps to sustain the narrative of 'migrant illegality.' Indeed, the 'illegality' assigned to the individuals in the UK-France border zone, and sometimes their own acts of amplified deviance, can be mobilised by the state to present 'an obvious need to repel such deviance that, in turn, re-affirms the legitimacy of state responses' (Pickering and Lambert, 2002: 77). This further supports securitisation and predispositions toward a violent response in the borderzone, through what Arendt (1985: 446) referred to as 'guilt through punishment,' as discussed below:

> Common sense reacted to the horrors of Buchenwald and Auschwitz with the plausible argument: 'What crime must these people have committed that such things were done to them!'

With these words, Arendt illustrated how public acceptance of, and support for, state violence is generated through state actions themselves. If 'these people' hadn't committed terrible wrongdoings, then why would democratically elected state authorities inflict such horrific violence upon them? David Keen has applied this concept extensively to the context of the US-led war on Iraq in 2003. He suggests that, 'Given a certain level of trust in – and deference towards – the US Government and the US President, guilt could, to some extent, be inferred from punishment' (Keen, 2008: 91). As such, he argues that an 'aura of legitimacy for violence' can also be generated by violence itself. I would suggest that the same could be understood to apply within the context of 'migrant illegality' in the UK-France borderzone. In a parallel example, De Genova (2017a) has similarly explored ways in which states create *de facto* situations of *deportability* of migrants, while Arendt

once asked, 'How can the refugee be made deportable again?' (1985: 284). This question appears more pertinent than ever in the context of northern France today.

It should be noted that I make no pretence in this thesis of going into a theoretical discussion of when and how asylum and migration was 'securitised' in Europe or in the UK in the first place. Certainly, it appears to be a widely accepted understanding that this is the case, as eloquently discussed by scholars like Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Balzacq.[iii] Here, I merely seek to emphasise how certain border practices can be understood as *co-producing* migrant subjectivities and situations of insecurity by provoking desperation, violent resistance, and unauthorised border crossings, which, in turn, serve instrumentally to justify continued securitisation of border zones and state aggression against displaced people in the first place. It is not my aim either to discuss the legitimacy or effectiveness of such resistance or violence here; I am merely keen to highlight how these responses are appropriated by state discourse to deepen and widen the ongoing state violence and rights violations perpetrated against migrants.

Lastly, in relation to the narratives underpinning the perceived legitimacy of the politics of exhaustion, it must be emphasised here that the racialisation of migrants is inherent in this process as well. As De Genova (2017c: 21) argues, 'the very figure of migration is always already racialized, even as dominant discourses of migration in Europe systematically disavow and dissimulate race as such.'

Indeed, Kalir (2019: 27) also suggests that the oppression of 'illegalised migrants' in Western states is generally 'met with little political and public resistance […] because it widely resonates with deeply ingrained perceptions about the need to protect the territory of White people, or what we call 'White spaces,' from any 'invasion' by racialized Others.' This resonates with Foucault's deployment of race within his work on biopolitics, where violence against those 'contaminating' the population would be legitimised (Kalir, 2019: 28). On that note, I would call for a deeper exploration of the racialisation of migrants in the UK-France borderzone, which was not possible within the scope of the current thesis.

6.3. The notion of 'intentionality'

I wish to now return to the concept of *intentionality*[iv] in relation to the politics of exhaustion. Here, I draw on Tyner and Rice (2015: 3), who propose three criteria to ascertain intentionality, namely whether the perpetrators of state violence: '(1) are aware of harmful policies and practices that might disallow life; (2) have the opportunity to stop or remedy these policies and practices; and (3) have the financial – or political – ability to prevent harm.' As I proceed to interrogating whether the UK Government holds responsibility for the state violence in the borderzone, produced through the politics of exhaustion, I argue that the answer to the three questions would be necessarily affirmative. Indeed, countless reports have been published in regard to the situation in the borderzone, and the harmful impact of the state policies and practices. For instance, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Doctors of the World UK, and Refugee Rights Europe, amongst others, have traced the harm produced through the official state policies in their reports, many of which have also been submitted to parliamentary inquiries and hearings over the years. These accounts, combined with wide-ranging media coverage over the years, make it impossible to argue that the authorities should somehow be unaware of the harmful impact of their policies and practices which disallow life.

Secondly, there is an array of proposals regarding how the policies and practices could be remedied, provided by civil society actors through campaigning and the aforementioned parliamentary inquiries. The opportunity to stop and remedy the practices is hence readily available to the state authorities, yet the political will to do so is lacking.

Thirdly, the UK and French Government have the financial ability to prevent harm. In fact, the amounts spent by the UK Government on arrangements and practices related to the politics of exhaustion during the timeframe of 2010-2016 amounted to at least £315.9 million (Full Fact, 2017); an extortionate amount which could instead have been allocated to the humane processing of asylum claims, the provision of dignified reception conditions, and other forms of support for the migrants in the borderzone. The three criteria of intentionality presented by Tyner and Rice (2015) are therefore met, suggesting that intentionality underpins the practices and methods in the borderzone. This implies that responsibility for the state violence produced in borderzones must be assumed by the UK and French authorities, who conversely place blame elsewhere and

frame the former as being unintentional ('collateral damage'), and/or as being socially produced due to the *illegality* of migrants.

Having argued that there is a strong case for the *intentionality* behind the harm in the borderzone, I nonetheless believe it to be fruitful to also consider the utility of cutting across the dichotomy of 'intended versus unintended harms' (Weber and Pickering, 2011: 94). Here, it is asserted that, irrespective of the intent behind some of the more seemingly benign forms of practices and methods, one must look at whether state practices are essentially *malignant in their outcomes* (see e.g. Roberts, 2008: 20). Based on the field research seen in this thesis and on the countless reports from civil society and media over the years, it is difficult to see how the UK-France bordering technology could be understood as constituting anything but precisely practices which are malignant in their outcomes.

Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere (Welander, 2020a; 2020b), contrary to the façade of legitimacy and legality of the UK-France cooperation on border control in northern France, the externalisation of the British border to France arguably mirrors more than is usually acknowledged in regards to the inhumane production of harm in the context of the externalisation within the subordinate relationships between states of the global North and their global South counterparts. In terms of its malignancy, it is arguably not far removed from the deeply deplorable 'letting die' approach in the Mediterranean and in Libya, which leaves individuals in deeply violent and harmful conditions and plunges migrants into a fate of death, or the brutal forms of violence at the Spanish-Moroccan borders in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Indeed, the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone is a disturbing illustration of hard-to-discern state violence in the context of border struggles, and the accompanying negation of responsibility and accountability by powerful states.

6.4. The fallacy trap of the UK-French approach to human mobility

The harmful state violence notwithstanding, given the extortionate sums of funding which go into the politics of exhaustion, one would expect the state authorities to ensure an evaluation of the 'effectiveness,' in relation to the states' intended outcomes, of the politics and practices underpinning it. However, while the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration provided the Home Office with an evaluation of the

juxtaposed border arrangements (2013) and of the Home Office's response to in-country 'clandestine' arrivals ('lorry drops') and irregular migrants arriving via 'small boats' (2020), there is yet to be a serious discussion about the logics behind the broader approach, namely the deployment of the politics of exhaustion. In order to constitute veritable scrutiny, such a policy evaluation ought to look closely at the intended outcomes and weigh these up against the staggering financial and human, as well as international law-related, costs of such an approach. If the UK Government were to do so, there could be hope of a different reality for the women, men, and children trapped in the borderzone.

Indeed, it is only through a veritable process of seeking to truly understand the broader dynamics and root cases of the situation in northern France that the UK Government would be able to acknowledge the reality unfolding in the borderzone. In doing so, I argue that serious doubts regarding the logical underpinnings of the politics of exhaustion as a deterrence method would be uncovered; shedding light on a policy 'fallacy trap'. This argument, again, is based on many interviews and conversations over the years, which unequivocally suggest that the violent environment in northern France paradoxically appears to drive people further into their pursuit of reaching the UK. Indeed, one interviewee suggested:

> The way that [the state] deals with people tends to be extrapolated to the entire country; so [the migrants we work with] seem to think that the entirety of France is that unwelcoming and violent. And unfortunately, that's very much not true, but it's hard to convince someone that the rest of the country is nice, when all of their evidence points to the contrary - - so, absolutely, their interactions with state officials will be extrapolated to the whole country. For example, I have lots of friends who are in the UK now -- they love taking photos with the police in the UK because they are generally quite friendly, compared to the French. They think it's hilarious that they're friendly. (Interviewee nr. 32)

A British social worker reflected on the effects of the politics of exhaustion on the intentions and ambitions of youth and children:

> Children are not stupid; they're children, but they don't want to be here [in northern France]; they want to go to the UK. To walk home is a walk of shame that is just not within them. You've come this far; are you going to quit after 100 days? [...] They are led to believe that the French are keeping them out of the UK, and the UK is carrying a benign aura. [For the youth], British values and beliefs push people to come here. I work with kids who will get a message from a friend who sends photos of their school and football kit. A lot of the pull factors are also about family life. (Interviewee nr. 66)

Another interviewee similarly suggested the following:

> I don't think the approach is working. Most people obviously try to come to the UK, and the violence [in Calais] is a driver above all; it pushes people to try to get to the UK; their experience of state violence here makes them think everyone in France is [unwelcoming]. (Interviewee nr. 39)

Another theme that emerged from the field research was that many interlocutors (although far from all) were under the impression that the French were keeping them in France, for various reasons, and that the British had little to do with the border closure and violence unfolding in the borderzone. One Afghan man, for instance, said:

> It is the French who don't want us to go, because they get free money from the British or the UN if they have more refugees. It is also good for young people who can get jobs here [pointed at the volunteers, believing that they were salaried]. (Interlocutor nr. 20)

An Iranian man similarly believed that the French government was keeping them in the borderzone; using them to get money (Interlocutor nr. 13a). An Eritrean 24-year-old man thought the French government has chosen to put up all the fences; he thinks the UK Government is good and that the French are 'really evil' (Interlocutor nr. 17). A group of Sudanese young men held similar opinions; they thought very highly of the UK Government, and they emphasised that the British police was probably better than the French (Interlocutor nr. 59a). Indeed, while the British government seems to conceptualise the border zone practices as measures to remove any perceived 'pull factors' drawing individuals to Britain, my field interviews cast serious doubt upon this reasoning.

Some individuals exposed to the politics of exhaustion may certainly give up, being drawn into a 'funnel of expulsion' (Johansen, 2013), and thus re-direct their journeys. Others would fall into the depths of substance abuse and further deterioration of mental and physical health, experiencing deep emotional effects of the brutal mobility governance in the borderzone. However, migrants evidently resist and carry on, as illustrated through the many ways in which migrant subjectivities worked in defiance of the politics of exhaustion to continue their struggle, until they, one day, they might make it to their envisaged destination. A Sudanese man explained:

> Because we had reached a point, there was no way we could go back. Even if you think you *should* go back, where are you going to go, and how? You feel that you've reached a point where there is no way to look back – you just have to carry on. You

don't know what's waiting for you, so you just keep going, because you don't have choice, as I said. (Interlocutor nr. 38)

An independent support worker in Maximilian Park, who worked very closely with the youth there, shared reflections on the wider approach to deterrence in Calais and Brussels alike:

> I think the tactics are designed to scare people, and give them constant uncertainty, but these kids have unfortunately experienced much worse situations – like in Libya – so this doesn't really put them off in the end. (Interviewee nr. 27)

A similar sentiment was expressed by a support worker who has been involved in the situation in Calais since October 2015 and is still supporting significant activities in the area:

> When dealing with men who have spent the last 18 months [in displacement], they're not going to be phased by [intimidation tactics such as shoe confiscation]. They are just going to be inconvenienced. You just got the sense that they had been inconvenienced and they had to go find more shoes. (Interviewee nr. 50)

Another interviewee spoke of the same dynamics, suggesting the following:

> The theme and narrative running through are determination, so the approach by the authorities won't work because of this tenacity of determination. 'I must do this, I can do this, I will do this' […] The tenacity of the refugee community amazes me; they have endured so much, and they still endure. It seems they persist no matter what new things the police put in place. (Interviewee nr. 34)

Countless others whom I have interviewed, spoken to, or encountered during participant observations, have expressed the sentiment of very strong determination to defy the politics of exhaustion, suggesting that the logics underpinning this approach as a deterrence tactic might be a fallacy. Interlocutors would utter words like, 'It's the UK or death,' or 'I'd rather die than give up my goal,' and 'I have nothing left to lose, just look at my life!' When asked, several of my interlocutors, from a variety of countries and age groups, were of the impression that the best way forward was to continue to try and cross the border, not least due to the violent handling by the French authorities. Indeed, it appears, based on many interviews and conversations in the borderzone, that individuals who have been on the move for months, if not years, and who may have endured and survived some of the most heinous forms of violence and abuse along their journeys, are unlikely to be phased by the politics of exhaustion. Rather, they will be pushed deeper

into risk-ridden forms of existence and border crossings, at a very high cost to their own health and wellbeing, and with staggering risks involved.

Indeed, given the tight securitisation of the UK border, new irregular routes would emerge. As Alison Mountz and Nancy Hiemstra (2012: 456) have highlighted, 'smuggling and enforcement practices develop symbiotically.' Therefore, presumptions that hardened borders and increasingly harsh control measures would halt mobility and smuggling would appear misguided. Instead, such state measures have proven to merely 'alter the spatiality [...] in terms of routes, tactics, danger, cost' (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2012: 459) rather than arriving at any solutions. Over the research period, starting in the winter of 2018-2019, human smuggling businesses shifted some of their attention from freight traffic to boat crossings across the channel; a trend which later peaked in 2020, and was to become a major preoccupation of the Home Office under Home Secretary Priti Patel (Home Office, 2020b).

Indeed, as mentioned in a previous chapter, migrants would constantly seek new ways to try to successfully cross the border. This would include seeking out new parking lots where UK-bound lorries were taking a pit stop, travelling to other parts of France and Belgium to try from there, cutting through fences and razor wire, and in some extreme cases, individuals even tried swimming across the channel. This resonates with a noteworthy body of research, which indicates that increased enforcement does not deter people (see e.g. Koser, 2000; Hiemstra, 2013, Mountz, 2013; Nadig, 2002; Nevins 2010). That is to say, harsh deterrence measures 'prove damaging, disruptive, and unsustainable' (Mountz, 2013: 43). Instead, by challenging and circumventing the integrity of the border, migrants in the UK-France borderzone are undermining the state's ability to exert its control. In Johnson's (2014: 129) words, they 'thus become a challenge to state security, both in contesting the inviolability of borders and in challenging the sovereign power to define, code, and classify.'

To sum up this sub-section, there appears to be a discrepancy between the UK Government's assumptions regarding their tactics in the borderzone on the one hand, and migrant individuals' perceptions of the situation on the other. Moreover, as De Genova (2017c: 18) rightly asserts, the root causes for people to embark upon heterogenous migratory projects tend to be 'disarticulated from the European political and economic interests implicated in producing and sustaining their fractured presents.'

6.5.Concluding remarks

Given the brutality of the politics of exhaustion and its harmful impact upon the bodies and minds of racialised migrants, as seen in a previous chapter of this thesis, I reverted back to the concept once more. I interrogated how the violent nature of the external dimensions of the UK's border could be understood and accounted for, theorising the politics of exhaustion *as state violence*. I argued that the displacement of responsibility from state authorities onto the bodies and minds of migrants serves to depoliticise suffering within the context of the politics of exhaustion. This, in combination with the partial absence, or invisibility, of clearly defined and identifiable 'human culprits' in the implementation of the bordering technologies, may serve to give an illusion of the absence of intention to cause harm, thus producing an aura of legitimacy and moral alibi. This, in turn, helps the governments of the UK and France to sanitise and invisibilise the violence inherent in this form of externalised border control.

As such, its current approach to the UK-France borderzone may be more easily justified than more drastic and overtly unlawful measures, such as blanket returns and *refoulement,* mass detention, physical torture, or sending individuals directly to their death. Instead, the politics of exhaustion helps liberal democratic states to 'sanitise' and 'invisibilise' (Loughnan, 2019a) the harm and violence inherent in their externalised border control. This resonates with what Tazzioli and De Genova (2020: 6) have referred to as state practices which persistently 'experiment with new tactics for the deployment of violence, and thereby also constantly engage in renewed *gambits of legitimation.*' (Emphasis added)

In this chapter, I moreover explored the notion of *intentionality* through three criteria laid out by Tyner and Rice (2015) and suggested that the UK must be understood as intentionally participating in the state violence in the UK-France borderzone. Also casting doubt upon the logical underpinnings of the politics of exhaustion in the sub-section on the 'fallacy trap,' it was furthermore argued that the bordering technologies of exhaustion do not merely produce unbearable conditions or auto-expulsion (Fassin et al, 2014), but they also produce subjectivities which serve to strengthen a narrative of migrant 'illegality' which, once again, helps to legitimise state violence in the borderzone. Lamentably, the displacement of responsibility and depoliticization of suffering moreover obscures critically important questions of the causes for domination, violence,

and injustice at European borders, replacing these conversations with narratives of criminality and 'blame' upon migrants themselves for their exclusion and suffering.

The chapter contributes to an advancement of our understanding of the ontological and empirical intersections between borders and violence, which is something that remains understudied within critical border studies. As Brambilla and Jones (2020: 291) have asserted, it is by focusing our attention on 'the articulated tensions – embedded in borders – between movements and processes that control and restrict movements that we can gain a better insight into the functioning of violence.'

7. 'Inconclusion': A temporarily permanent, forever temporary 'border struggle'

Within the context of the multiplication and heterogenisation of 'border struggles' across Europe and beyond, where autonomous human mobility projects meet states' increasingly brutal control measures, the focus of this thesis was the 'site of struggle' found in the UK-France borderzone. Right at the UK's doorstep, a violent and harm-inducing situation for migrants in transit has seen thousands of women, men, and children, in search of sanctuary, come and go over the decades, subjected to violence and abuse, with their informal settlements flattened to the ground by heavily geared riot police. The UK Government's tunnel vision in regards to this situation, and its unrelenting narrative of 'illegal migration' and 'organised criminality' needing to be curbed at all costs has prompted the UK to inject extortionate amounts of funding into securitisation measures and to enable the construction of walls and fences on the coastline, whilst tacitly supporting the French state's uprooting, harassment, and abuse of migrants in the area.

When encountered with migrant subjectivities and the unrelenting, incorrigible force of human mobilities, the French and UK state authorities have continuously responded with even firmer control measures. This brings to mind Arendt's theorising of the relationship between power and violence, which suggests that:

> [E]very decrease in power is an open invitation to violence – if only because those who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the government or be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist the temptation to substitute violence for it.' (Arendt, 1970: 87)

Through the voices and experiences of my 75 interlocutors and interviewees who generously shared with me some of their first-hand experiences of, and reflections about, the UK-France borderzone, it has been argued in this thesis that the juxtaposed border arrangements between the UK and France have not simply led to the re-localisation of the UK's physical border controls to an extraterritorial space and the bolstering of visible, physical and spatial interdiction, deportations, and official *non-entrée* policies. In addition to such developments which serve to strengthen traditional bordering methods, it was argued that sovereign power manifestations have been successively complemented by more insidious, temporal, and corporeal biopolitical technologies of bordering,

particularly since 2015, when the borderzone saw renewed autonomous human mobilities appear. It could thus be argued that migrants in the borderzone are 'driving border management practices to become much more flexible' (Casas-Cortes et al, 2015: 894).

In any event, it was precisely this intense border struggle, characterised by the morphing of biopolitical techniques of migration government with sovereign manifestations of power – as well as their encounters, tensions, and entanglements with migrant subjectivities, resistance, and agency – which served as the starting point for my research engagement in the borderzone. Indeed, the year 2016, when the so-called Calais 'Jungle' camp had come to host several thousand migrants, symbolising the incorrigibility of human mobilities and the unrelenting state technologies of control, the conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion emerged, and my PhD journey began.

7.1. Key research findings, main arguments and contribution to knowledge

Overall, this thesis constitutes a timely and important piece of academic work, where an ongoing, real-life contemporary European border struggle meets academia. My ethnographic work, comprising 75 interviews and conversations as well as participant observation over several years' time in the UK-France borderzone, contributes to the interdisciplinary scholarly field of critical border and migration studies.

The fact that my work on the politics of exhaustion has been cited and built on, not only in academia but also within the realms of policy and practice, is testament to its utility as a conceptual tool.[v] The fact that I approached my PhD research questions not only as an academic, but also as an activist with longstanding policy-related experience relating to the UK-France border, has allowed me to contribute to knowledge in valuable ways. I have generated a unique, in-depth account and theorisation of how migration governance, and the associated migrant resistance, operate within border struggles.

I have also argued that an in-depth scholarly study of the UK-France border is an important case well beyond its own local context in Calais. First of all, this border struggle

constitutes a noteworthy contemporary example of 'internal externalisation' (Barbero and Donadio, 2019), allowing me to advance scholarly work on the distinct yet intersecting biopolitical technologies of mobility governance which are deployed as part of externalised border enforcement between European states. This generates insights which would be of interest to scholars across different European locations, but also those studying the biopolitical technologies at play at the US-Mexico border, the land border between Spain and Morocco in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as Australian bordering tactics and the EU's approach to cross-Mediterranean migration.

Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the UK-France border is a particularly fruitful site of study, given that many of the seemingly disparate border policing and migration management tactics witnessed across Europe are converging here in stark and seemingly relentless ways. This intensity allowed me as a researcher to clearly identify different kinds of bordering tactics, and propose a new framework for understanding biopolitical bordering technologies, through the term 'politics of exhaustion.' Once again, this concept can be applied to many other borderzones in Europe and beyond, and serves as a useful conceptual tool for diagnosing border struggles in different geographical locations. As such, my work helps to advance an emerging body of scholarship that looks at how states are resorting to increasingly sophisticated (micro) practices and policies to deter, exclude and control, by influencing the choices and intention of people on the move; with applicability not only in the context of the UK-France borderzone but more broadly to critical border and migration scholars further afield.

In my thesis, I made a number of key arguments. In the chapter 4, I developed the argument that the UK-France 'border' has gone from being exclusively based on sovereign power manifestations symbolised by walls, control points, and overt spatial interdictions, towards also entering into spaces of everyday lives of migrants in the borderzone – through an insidious 'politics of exhaustion.' The latter consists of an array of tactics devised to render life governable and pliant, and bodies docile, with the premeditated intention to negate migrants' personal autonomy, agency, wellbeing, and self-efficacy. This politics of exhaustion, as a biotechnological migration management technique, seeks to curb autonomous migratory movements, influence decisions, and manage intent through the physical, mental, and emotional exhaustion of its subjects.

I demonstrated that the use of such intent management through exhaustion is a bordering technology which has, to date, remained under-theorised. Thus, I have built upon, and contributed to, emerging bodies of academic work which look at new and increasingly sophisticated forms of bordering tactics aimed at influencing the choices and intention of people on the move. In this same chapter, I moreover understood *exhaustion* as constitutive of bordering processes, and of the 'border' itself, and argued that this phenomenon cannot be grasped within the biopolitical 'making live/letting die' dichotomy and notions of necropolitics, but rather requires us to move beyond this binary. The conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion thus helps us to understand forms of migration government techniques which do not directly foster life nor kill, but which rather insidiously grind down the autonomy and agency of people on the move.

Thus, the thesis makes a significant contribution in advancing scholarly work which seeks to move the application of biopolitics in migration studies beyond its theoretical 'impasse,' concerned with whether/how biopolitics need to be substituted (through e.g. necropolitical or thanatopolitical theorisations) in order to make sense of seemingly contradictory and non-sensical bordering technologies.

Having thus dissected the technologies of biopolitical control through which migrants' lives and movements are governed – that is to say, the biopolitical technologies in the government of migration aimed at producing governable mobile subjects – the subsequent chapter turned my gaze towards the autonomous mobilities of migration. Thus, in chapter 5, I argued that my thesis would be an incomplete encounter with the UK-France borderzone unless the notion of migrants' struggles, and forms of human resistance against the modes of control, were explored and analysed. The production of subjectivities in the borderzone were therefore the focus of the fifth chapter, shedding light on the dialectical relationship between control and resistance.

I argued here that my analysis of the field research findings, which saw manifestations of subjectivity ranging from smaller, everyday acts of resistance to larger, pronounced political activities and the outright circumvention of control, helped gain a critical understanding of the complexity of agency. This was done precisely by looking through the lens of migrants who are 'fracturing' (Ansems De Vries et al, 2017) sovereign power and claiming political subjectivity in relation to the strict controls and bordering tactics

of sovereign states. This resonates with a body of academic work which has focused on the 'ambivalence of irregularity' (see Squire, 2011; Nyers, 2011) where 'irregularity' or 'campzenship' (Sigona, 2015) 'can be engaged both by a politics of control and by a politics of migration or movement' (Squire, 2011: 9). The analytical frame I proposed in the chapter differed starkly from Agambenian approaches to critical border and migration studies, in that it viewed the borderzone as a relational site of political struggle (Squire, 2011: 15), rather than simply a site of biopolitics and state control. Through this chapter, the thesis contributes to the autonomy of migration scholarship in important ways, by helping to move further beyond criticisms suggesting that autonomy of migration scholars are romanticising migration and glossing over the relational and embodied aspects of border struggles. My proposed typology on 'resistance in border struggles' demonstrated how many of the smaller acts taking place in borderzones – including daily forms of resistance – are also inherently political and co-produce migrant subjectivities and performative politics outside of official forms of citizenship. As such, I shed light on small openings for transformative potential political subjectivities within this space, without discounting their vulnerabilities and the powerful reassertion of traditional territorial claims, which are manifested through the politics of exhaustion.

Furthermore, I demonstrated that there is a dialectical interrelationship between the politics of exhaustion and migrant subjectivities. In this way, the autonomous practices of migrants and the heterogeneity of ways in which they challenge the border regime in the UK borderzone, have co-produced the evolution of an experimental approach to bordering, amounting to the politics of exhaustion. At the same time, the autonomous forces of migration within the borderzone also require continuous reformulations in response to those bordering tactics. Hence, the research clearly demonstrated how the two are intertwined in a dialectical, co-constitutive, processual relationship.

Through my analysis of the rich field research findings, I thus highlighted that that there is not simply a static binary between control and resistance. Rather, we should understand the UK-France borderzone as a site where interrelated and co-constitutive elements (co)produce the border, with a state of *ambivalence* running through both, making their separation impossible. Indeed, as suggested by Tazzioli and De Genova (2020: 6), the autonomy of migration and migrant resistance means that state authorities

need to 'persistently experiment with new tactics for the deployment of violence, and thereby also constantly engage in renewed gambits of legitimation.'

As such, my analysis of the multiplicity of struggles, contestations, and resistances, as well as powers at play in the UK-France borderzone, have contributed to an emerging and growing body of critical migration scholarship, which neither take borders as a given, nor speak to binaries of resistance and control, but rather refuse a disciplinary division which separates studies of border security from studies of human mobility. In brief, the field of scholarly work upon which my thesis builds shows that borders are, as articulated by Brambilla and Jones (2020: 293), 'continuously constructed, de-constructed, and re-constructed through multiple socio-spatially ambiguous processes of b/ordering, which disrupt the modern, state-centric geopolitical order as well as its essentialized, fixed, and unconventional understandings of borders.'

Subsequently, in chapter 6, the dialectical and ambivalent relationship between control and resistance was scrutinised further. I argued that it would be insufficient, at least from an ethical standpoint, to simply conclude that the dynamics in the borderzone are dialectical, without bringing back to the fore the brutality of the state violence and human insecurity produced within this processual and starkly asymmetrical interrelation of power. Through this chapter, I emphasised the centrality of *state violence* within the seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift which understands violence constitutive of bordering technologies, which is something that has been partly absent in traditional migration studies.

Through my theorisation of the politics of exhaustion as state violence, I suggested that this violence was being 'sanitised' and 'invisibilised' through a number of interlinked processes. Firstly, this invisibilisation and sanitation takes place through the displacement of state responsibility onto migrant bodies themselves. Linked to this is the partial absence of human 'culprits' and an accompanying depoliticisation of suffering among racialised, migrant Others. I moreover argued that the borderzone had seen the production of a 'vanishing point' (Gregory, 2007), where sovereign and biopolitical powers converge and where responsibilities for human insecurity is typically abnegated.

Lastly, the chapter argued that the borderzone is also a space for discursive production, which serves to uphold a narrative of 'migrant illegality.' Indeed, the politics of

exhaustion, through its breakdown of the mental and emotional wellbeing of migrants in the borderzone, has the potential of achieving the fixing of self-fulfilling representations, which resonate with the discourse of the 'illegal' or 'deviant' migrant. I argued that this continued discursive production of migrant illegality, coupled with the aforementioned depoliticisation of suffering and the abnegation of responsibility, equips the UK Government's with a sense of legitimacy and 'moral alibi' for its violence.

In sum, through the designation of the politics of exhaustion as state violence in this chapter, I was able to emphasise the centrality of violence within seemingly more benign bordering practices, thus contributing to an ongoing ontological shift within critical border and migration scholarship, which understands violence as constitutive of bordering technologies; something that has only been partly featured in traditional migration studies. As Confucius once said, 'the beginning of wisdom is to call things by their proper name' (cited in Kalir, 2019: 19), and as such, this chapter sought to destabilise the purported hegemonic legitimacy of the bordering tactics in the UK-France borderzone by defining it as state violence.

7.2. Reflections on my methodological *Bricolage*

As I outlined in chapter 3, which discussed my methodological choices and approaches within this thesis, I have been inspired by a feminist sociological approach, through which I emphasise the importance of starting one's analysis of power from individuals' everyday lived experiences rather than by taking abstract categories as the starting point (see e.g. Smith, 1987). I found inspiration in the work of Aradau et al (2015), who proposed a 'performative and experimental approach to methods.' (2015: 15) where methods are not only viewed as tools to bridge a gap between theory and practice, but rather serve as something which would allow the researcher to engage more freely in an experimental approach exploring the interplay between theory, methods, and practice (2015: xi).

Accordingly, I adopted the idea of 'method as an experiment,' allowing me to intervene in the very complex and thorny situation in the northern France area, which is characterised by displacement, legal limbos, and violent state practices. The result was a method of *Bricolage,* which, according to Aradau et al (2015: 8), allows the researcher to bring out otherwise invisibilised relations by experimenting with theories, concepts, methods, and data in new ways. Indeed, my methodology was not entirely fixed, but instead left room

for some adaptation along the way. This also resonated with what Scheel (2013b) has referred to as the study of 'embodied encounters,' which takes migrants' struggles as the centre of analysis and entails a radical constructivism.

Reflecting back on my approach of methodological *Bricolage* and 'embodied encounters,' I believe that these methodological choices served me well. They allowed for an experimental research journey through the UK-France borderzone, where the voices of my interlocutors and interviewees served to guide me through my theorisation of the politics of exhaustion, my exploration of migrant subjectivities and resistance, and my analysis of violence as being constitutive of bordering technologies. Overall, I believe that my methodology itself makes an important contribution to academic study; both in relation to the specific geographical location of the Calais borderzone, and also in relation to theorisations of the functions and ontology of the 'border.' Given my starting point being the 'struggles,' this has allowed me to be part of a scholarly shift pushing away from the International Relations position of state-centric approaches, where 'the territorial state has ever reflected a universal reality in which the state has been the central or exclusive spatiopolitical identify' (McNevin, 2007: 662). Instead, I have gone into a direction where our analytical focus is situated within the struggles 'on the ground.'

Throughout my research journey and this thesis, I have emphasised that I do not claim to 'represent' or 'speak on behalf of' any of my interlocutors or interviewees. Instead, their accounts have lent me unique insights and knowledge, and for this, I am indebted to all of the participants in this study. Their insights have allowed me to propose a new framework for conceptualising the harmful technologies of border control in the context of the UK's externalisation to France, and to further our understanding of migrant subjectivities within border struggles, as well as theorisations of violence in the context of the government of migration. The act of placing 'illegalised' migrants' voices and self-reporting at the centre of my research was a political act aimed at carving out a space for participation of my excluded migrant counterparts in academic debates and theorisation. I strongly believe that this is a modest contribution towards what hopefully will be the further democratisation of academic research in the future.

7.3. New trajectories?

Having visibilised the politics of exhaustion as state violence, arguing that the suffering in the UK-France borderzone is certainly avoidable, I will here argue briefly that new policy trajectories are urgently overdue. The strategy of border enforcement through exhaustion criminalises the border crosser rather than the structural conditions within which they find themselves, amounting to an inhumane and perverse form of border enforcement which disregards the cost in human lives and which moreover ignores the long-standing effects on those who do survive and one day make it to the UK or elsewhere.

Through the policies and practices currently implemented in northern France, namely the politics of exhaustion, we are witnessing a detrimental cycle of violence, control, and appropriation, followed by manifestations of resistance and re-appropriation at the detriment of any reasonable, long-term solutions. Underpinning the politics of exhaustion in the borderzone are law-reserving practices designed to enforce the UK's longstanding control and exclusion practices. These practices, in light of the findings and theorisations within my thesis, are in dire need of revision by state leaders and policy makers.

While it is outside the scope of this thesis to elaborate any detailed policy proposals, suffice it to say that the UK Government ought to first and foremost revise their existing approach to individuals' access to the UK asylum system, whether through humanitarian visas or asylum travel documents, access to asylum procedures at all border points, or by making available other types of safe and legal routes to the territory. The autonomy of migration means that individuals will continue to arrive at the UK border by their own means, outside of formal arrangements and without the required permissions. It must be acknowledged that these individuals are rights holders under international and European human rights law, as well as international refugee law, and the UK-French border arrangements must guarantee that those rights are upheld under all circumstances. A good place to start would be by ensuring that individuals are treated in a humane and rights-compliant manner, with dignified reception conditions, legal advice, and protection from all forms of violence.

That said, the prospects for finding new trajectories relating to the UK-France borderzone appear far from sight and, indeed, very bleak. This is not least in the context of 'Brexit' and the accompanying demonisation of migrants within media and policy narratives, the

prevailing hostile approach to immigration with its concomitant focus on 'border security,' and the focus on preserving and reviving the notion of a 'British nation state.' Moreover, following Huysmans (2006), it would appear as thought the UK Government's insistence on pushing and fanning a narrative of migrant illegality and criminality would inevitably make constructive dialogue difficult:

> [R]epresenting immigrants and refugees, either through metaphors indicating a flood or a mass, or through images of criminality, suggests that communication or negotiation is difficult, if not impossible. How does one communicate with a mass of people? Should one negotiate with criminals? (2006: 59)

Indeed, the current state of affairs in the UK brings to mind McNevin's (2007: 669) reflections on sovereign territorial borders, the scholar suggests that 'a commitment to border policing provides explicit recognition of the continued significance of sovereign territorial borders and the priority (and possibility) of protecting the community of citizens they contain.' She further argues that 'Border policing thus forms part of those ongoing practices through which sovereignty is produced' (Ibid). Hence, in order to shift the current policies into new, humane directions, it is likely that new perspectives on the inside/outside of citizenship and political community would first need to be advanced from their current status quo.

As I have highlighted earlier, the broader context of the politics of exhaustion in the UK-France borderzone ought to be understood as situated within deeply cemented, underlying global inequality structures, where some of the world's most disadvantaged, racialised groups of people are excluded and prevented from accessing their share of the world's resources, opportunities, and conditions for a safe and dignified life. The politics of exhaustion in the UK borderzone, stretching from northern France to the capitals of Brussels, Paris and beyond, is arguably part of a global project of human classification, of exclusion and control, where people end up trapped in transit or in countries of origin, due to borders and the Western world's arbitrary and exclusionary immigration rules. To resist the continuation of this trajectory, we must, first of all, reaffirm our common humanity, as argued by Agier (2013) and many others.

7.4. Future research agenda

Indeed, I have argued above and elsewhere in this thesis, that the contemporary British approach to migration represents a continuity of historical modes of racial subjugation

which previously affected colonised people, carried out through its tactics to deter, control, and exclude, and is also reflected in the widely studied paradigm of 'hostile environment.' This resonates with Tazzioli and De Genova's (2020: 13) assertion that border violence is 'overwhelmingly perpetrated against racially subordinate populations, [and] are inextricable from the centuries-old sociopolitical order predicated upon a global post/colonial regime of white supremacy.' While I have sought to bring these intricate entanglements into the thesis, I believe I am nonetheless guilty of reproducing what David Moffette and William Walters (2018) have referred to as a 'flickering presence' of race in studies of biopolitics and governmentality. Admittedly, my work does not go far enough in bridging the debate and ensuring that race is addressed beyond 'infrequent appearances' (Moffette and Walters, 2018: 95). This is an area for further research, which could build on this thesis as part of a future research agenda, looking at race, racialisation, and White supremacy within the violence producing practices of the politics of exhaustion. This could include looking at the beliefs and attitudes of the actors who implement the politics of exhaustion on a day-to-day basis, to test a hypothesis regarding the presence of deeply engrained structures of racism contributing to the fuelling of the brutality through which the politics of exhaustion is implemented, supported, and left unquestioned.

Moreover, as discussed earlier in this thesis, a useful addition to my field work would have been a series of interviews with police officers and other officials operating in the borderzone, as well as policy makers addressing the situation at the state policy level in the UK. This is something I aim to achieve as part of future research endeavours, given that such research components laid outside the scope of this particular research project concerned with the voices and experiences of 'illegalised' migrants; voices that are far too often unheard and unprivileged.

7.5. Postscriptum

As I was just completing this thesis for submission in late November 2020, news reached me of the tragic death of yet another person in the borderzone. His friends, or 'travel companions' to use their own words, issued a statement (see Figure N) with the support of the associations forming part of the 'Groupe décès' (the latter which was introduced in chapter 5). In their deeply felt statement, Mohamed's travel companions expressed grief,

and mourned not only the death of their friend, but also called out the brutality of the border and the absence of legal passageways to the UK:

> On the 19th of November 2020, on the A16 road, a young 20-year-old Sudanese man lost his life and his dreams. He was our compatriot, our brother, our friend […] Our hearts, our consciences, and the conscience of humanity cry out as we think of his 20 years of life. Here is an echo of our cry, that of the displaced people of Calais: 'We do not know what to do, we would like to enter the UK legally, we dream of a life of dignity, of a human life. The circumstances weaken us, but our hearts are strong, and hope pushes up to cross borders. […]' As you know, we are here out of necessity, after having gone through many sufferings on the road. The police and governments must understand this. (Figure N)

This death, and the related statement, coincided with the UK and French governments' announcement of a new bilateral agreement on 28 November 2020, in which Home Secretary Priti Patel and French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin 'reaffirmed their commitment to make this route unviable' (Home Office, 2020b). The two state parties signed an 'enhanced agreement,' which focuses on increasing the number of interceptions of small boats on the channel, and a doubling of the number of gendarmes, French police, patrolling the beaches in northern France, with the aim to 'significantly enhance law enforcement operations against illegal immigration' (Ibid). There would also be:

> [An] enhanced package of cutting edge surveillance technology - including drones, radar equipment, optronic binoculars, and fixed cameras [to] allow the French to be more efficient in searching and clearing areas faster and helping ensure officers are deployed in the right place at the right time, as a result increasing the number of migrants and facilitators detected and prevented from entering the water. (Ibid)

The continued use of extortionate amounts of statutory funding to operate the politics of exhaustion and exclusion reminds me of what one of my Iranian interlocutors desperately expressed, seemingly full of disbelief as he gazed over the dozens of tents propped up on an industrial wasteland in Calais, in sub-zero degrees in December 2018:

> This is tax that the British people are paying. It is British people's right to know where their money is being spent. It is being spent like this. These are our living conditions. This is the money you are investing to keep us living in under such conditions. This is the money you are investing for us to live like this. That's it. (Interlocutor nr. 45a)

While it is not possible to tell for certain where these latest policy developments will lead us, we do know that the incorrigible force of human mobility will continue to challenge

the control methods of sovereign states; as Mohamad's travel companions noted, the circumstances weaken people, but their hearts are strong, and hope pushes them to cross borders (Help Refugees, 2020). Sooner or later, one would hope that governments are able to listen, understand and seek new trajectories. For those of us unable to watch the current dynamics unfold, it is important to remember that borders which kill can be challenged in the same way that people throughout history have refused to accept the system of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid, allowing us to continue to seek a more just future. On that note, I would like to end with a quote from one of my Sudanese interlocutors, who asked me to try and pass on the following message to the UK Government. I told him I would try. His voice was filled with determination and resolve as he suggested:

> Just try to […] respect refugees and see us as human beings – the same as you. One is not better than the other, we are all the same in the end, so accept the situation and listen to us about why we don't want to stay [in northern France] and why we want to go [to the UK] – everyone has a reason. Thank you. (Interlocutor nr. 64)

Figure N | Collective tribute to Mohamed Khamisse Zakaria

COLLECTIVE TRIBUTE TO MOHAMED KHAMISSE ZAKARIA: THE END OF A DREAM

On the 19th of November 2020, on the A16 road, a young 20-year-old Sudanese man lost his life and his dreams. He was our compatriot, our brother, our friend.

Mohamed died after being hit by a car, as he tried to escape police teargas aimed at him from the back of a lorry, the vehicle of his choice in order to reach England as quickly as possible. Like his friends back home, Mohamed left his family who remain trapped in a refugee camp in Darfur, Sudan and courageously tried his luck in Europe. All his compatriots felt rejected in France, so for Mohamed, this country was not an option for claiming asylum. He was racing towards another destination, which ultimately became a sad and grim fate.

Mohamed Khamisse Zakaria is mourned by his parents in Sudan and by us, his friends, here on the border with the United Kingdom. We called his parents to tell him of his death. We heard the desperation of a mother. The associations and organisations were at our side. Mohamed brings us all together. We all harbour within us the same desire to live that he had.

Our hearts, our consciences and the conscience of humanity cry out as we think of his 20 years of life. Here is an echo of our cry, that of the displaced people of Calais: "We do not know what to do, we would like to the enter the UK legally, we dream of a life of dignity, of a human life. The circumstances weaken us, but our hearts are strong, and hope pushes up to cross borders. As you know, our country is experiencing war and injustice at the hands of governments. As you know, we are here out of necessity, after having gone through many sufferings on the road. The police and governments must understand this. Why chase us down the motorway when detectors and security personnel are already sifting through every truck entering England?"

O absent yet so present,
By means of your voice, the greatness of your soul,
The breath of your lips comes to us,
From our hands are born lines,
Filled with the colors of freedom, peace and justice

Mohamed's traveling companions

Appendices

Overview of interviews, group interviews, conversations

Code	Type	With	Location	Date	Language	Category
1	Interview	Somali man, 20s	Paris	08/06/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
2	Group interview	Four Afghan men, 20s and 30s	Paris	08/06/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
3	Conversation	Two Cote d'Ivoirian men, 20s	Paris	08/06/2018	French	Migrant interlocutor
4	Interview	Activist and support worker, woman	Paris	09/06/2018	English	Other interviewee
5	Interview	Sudanese man, 30s	London	04/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
6	Interview	Sudanese man, 30s	London	08/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
7	Interview	Afghan man, 20s	Brussels	09/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
8	Interview	Sudanese man, 20s	Calais	17/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
9	Conversation	Ethiopian man, 20s	Calais	17/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
10	Conversation	Three Sudanese men, 20s	Calais	17/08/2018	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
11	Conversation	Ethiopian male, minor	Calais	17/08/2018	Amharic	Migrant interlocutor
12	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Calais	17/08/2018	English	Other interviewee
13	Group interview	Five Iranian men, 20s and 30s	Calais	18/08/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
14	Conversation	Iranian man, 40s	Calais	18/08/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
15	Conversation	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	18/08/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
16	Interview	Eritrean man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
17	Interview	Eritrean man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	Tigrinya	Migrant interlocutor
18	Interview	Eritrean man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	Tigrinya	Migrant interlocutor

19	Conversation	Ethiopian man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	Amharic	Migrant interlocutor
20	Conversation	Afghan man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
21	Conversation	Eritrean man, 20s	Calais	18/08/2018	Tigrinya	Migrant interlocutor
22	Conversation	Sudanese man, teens	Calais	19/08/2018	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
23	Group interview	Six Afghan men, 20s	Calais	19/08/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
24	Group interview	Seven Eritrean men, 20s	Calais	19/08/2018	Tigrinya	Migrant interlocutor
25	Interview	Academic, woman	London	24/08/2018	English	Other interviewee
26	Group interview	Three Afghan men, 20s	Brussels	24/09/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
27	Interview	Activist, man	Brussels	24/09/2018	English	Other interviewee
28	Conversation	Two Sudanese men, 20s	Paris	28/09/2018	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
29	Conversation	Two Sudanese males, teenagers	Paris	28/09/2018	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
30	Conversation	Ethiopian man, 20s	Calais	04/10/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
31	Interview	Academic, woman	Skype	11/10/2018	English	Other interviewee
32	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	London	12/10/2018	English	Other interviewee
33	Interview	Long-term volunteer and youth worker, man	London	14/10/2018	English	Other interviewee
34	Interview	Support worker, man	Skype	19/10/2018	English	Other interviewee
35	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	19/10/2018	English	Other interviewee
36	Conversation	Sudanese man, 30s	London	14/11/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
37	Interview	Performing arts professional, man	London	14/11/2018	English	Other interviewee

38	Interview	Sudanese man, 30s	London	25/11/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
39	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	30/11/2018	English	Other interviewee
40	Group interview	Three Iranian men, 20s	Calais	01/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
41	Interview	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	01/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
42	Interview	Afghan man, teen	Calais	14/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
43	Interview	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	14/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
44	Group interview	Three Iranian men, 20s	Calais	14/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
45	Group interview	Five Iranian men, 20s and 30s	Calais	14/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
46	Interview	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	14/12/2018	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
47	Interview	Sudanese man, 40s	Calais	14/12/2018	English	Migrant interlocutor
48	Group interview	Five Ethiopian men, 20s	Brussels	29/12/2018	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
49	Interview	Pakistani man, 20s	Calais	22/02/2019	English	Migrant interlocutor
50	Interview	Support worker, man	London	28/02/2019	English	Other interviewee
51	Group interview	Two East African women, 20s and 30s	London	18/03/2019	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
52	Interview	Sudanese man, 20s	Calais	22/03/2019	English	Migrant interlocutor
53	Interview	Activist, man	London	24/03/2019	English	Other interviewee
54	Conversation	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	04/04/2019	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
55	Group interview	Four Ethiopian men, 20s	Calais	04/04/2019	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
56	Interview	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	04/04/2019	Persian	Migrant interlocutor

57	Interview	Iranian man, 30s	Calais	05/04/2019	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
58	Conversation	Ethiopian man, 30s	Calais	05/04/2019	English	Migrant interlocutor
59	Group interview	Four Sudanese men, teenagers and 20s	Calais	05/04/2019	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor
60	Conversation	Afghan man, 20s	Calais	06/04/2019	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
61	Interview	Iranian man, 20s	Calais	06/04/2019	Persian	Migrant interlocutor
62	Group interview	Three art therapists, women	Calais	24/04/2019	English	Other interviewee
63	Interview	Activist and academic, woman	London	05/05/2019	English	Other interviewee
64	Interview	Sudanese man, 20s	London	13/05/2019	English	Migrant interlocutor
65	Interview	Long-term volunteer, man	Skype	13/05/2019	English	Other interviewee
66	Interview	Youth worker, man	London	16/05/2019	English	Other interviewee
67	Interview	Volunteer and academic, woman	Skype	29/05/2019	English	Other interviewee
68	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	31/05/2019	English	Other interviewee
69	Interview	Long-term volunteer, man	Skype	01/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
70	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Calais	17/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
71	Conversation	Support worker, man	Calais	18/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
72	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	19/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
73	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	23/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
74	Interview	Long-term volunteer, woman	Skype	23/08/2019	English	Other interviewee
75	Interview	Sudanese male, minor	London	30/08/2019	Arabic	Migrant interlocutor

Oral Consent Form *(for qualitative interviews with migrant interlocutors)*

Date of interview:
Location:
Respondent nr:

The interpreter reads each of the following statements aloud to the respondent in their native language and awaits their answer. Researcher to circle 'Yes' or 'No' for each question.

<u>Taking Part</u>

I have been shown a participant information sheet outlining information about the research.

Yes / No

I have understood the information about the research. Yes / No

I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research. Yes / No

I agree to take part in the research. Taking part in the research will include being interviewed, and my responses will be linked to my respondent number. Yes / No

I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the interview at any time during the interview, and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part.

Yes / No

I understand that some of the questions can be upsetting and personal, and it will be my choice whether I answer them or skip to the next question. Yes / No

I understand that my participation will not result in any immediate benefits for myself, for my family, friends or community. There is therefore no benefit in providing information which is untrue, as this will not generate any support or desired outcomes. Yes / No

I understand that by agreeing to take part in this study, I agree to give truthful responses to all questions. Everything I say will be true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and good faith.

Yes/No

<u>Use of the information I provide</u>

I understand that no personal details or any identifiable information will be asked of me. Yes / No

I understand that the answers I give may be used in the research outputs, and my words may be quoted anonymously in the research outputs. Yes / No

I understand and accept that there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes or imminent danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires the researcher to report a matter to competent authorities. Yes/No

I understand that notes and/or a transcript of my answers will be stored in a locked cabinet on University premises and in the University secure server and destroyed at the end of the research project.

Yes/No

Oral Consent Form *(for other interviewees)*

Please circle 'Yes' or 'No' for each question:

<u>Taking Part</u>

I have been shown a participant information sheet (2pp) outlining information about the research.

Yes / No

I have understood the information about the research. Yes / No

I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research. Yes / No

I agree to take part in the research. Taking part in the research will include being interviewed and/or being part of a focus group with other respondents.

Yes / No

I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the interview at any time during the interview or focus group and I do not have to give any reasons for why I wish to withdraw.

Yes / No

I understand that some of the questions can be upsetting or sensitive, and it will be my choice whether I answer them or skip to the next question. Yes / No

I understand that my participation will not result in any immediate benefits for myself, for my organisation or the voluntary sector. Yes/No

<u>Use of the information I provide</u>

I understand that no personal details or any identifiable information will be revealed to anyone except the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the researcher's supervisory team.

Yes / No

I understand that the answers I give may be used in the research outputs, and my words may be quoted anonymously in the research outputs.

Yes / No

I understand and accept that there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes or imminent danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires the researcher to report a matter to competent authorities. Yes/No

I understand that this consent form and any other documents containing personal data, as well as a transcript of my answers, will be stored in a locked cabinet on University premises and in the University secure server and destroyed at the end of the research project. Yes/No

Participant nr:

Location and date:

Participant Information Sheet *(for interviews with migrant interlocutors)*

This is an academic research project that seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of the experiences of refugees and displaced people in the border-zone between the United Kingdom and France (Calais, France and Paris, France). It is conducted by PhD student Ms Marta Welander from the University of Westminster, London, which operates as a charity and a company limited by guarantee (Reg no. 977818 England).

The research project looks at the relationship between states' border practices (such as police violence and tightened border controls) and the lived experiences of refugees and displaced people.

Taking part in the research will include being interviewed. While we will not be taking any personal details or other identifiable information, we will be recording and writing down your answers to the questions. You will be asked questions about your experiences in Europe, your goals and your views on border controls and police practices.

We will write down your answers to the questions with pen and paper or on a laptop. Your answers will be accessible to the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the researcher's supervisors at the University of Westminster. Your responses will be kept securely anonymously in electronic and hard copy format in accordance with the university's strict ethical guidelines. Any documents will be deleted five years after the study has ended. There will be no photos taken.

What you say might be used anonymously in the research outputs and you might be quoted anonymously. Taking part or declining to take part is entirely your choice. Participation is voluntary, and you can choose to stop the interview at any time and you do not have to give any reasons for why you no longer wish to take part. Some of the questions can be upsetting and personal. It is your choice whether you would like to answer them, skip to the next question or stop the interview.

Participation will not result in immediate benefits for you, for your family, friends or community. We will not be able to help you with your asylum application or current living situation, and we will not be able to give you any financial remuneration for your participation. There is therefore no benefit in providing information which is untrue, as this will not generate any support or desired outcomes. We will be able to tell you about different refugee support organisation operating in the research location at end of the study, in case of interest.

Lastly, there are circumstances where the law requires us to report a matter to competent authorities. For instance, if you tell us anything that makes us concerned about the safety of children, or a serious crime committed, we would have an obligation to speak to someone about this, but we would not say how we found out this information so no one will know it came from you. There are a few other circumstances we would need to report, but we would let you know beforehand.

You are now welcome to ask the researcher any questions you may have.

Participant Information Sheet *(for interviews with other interviewees)*

This is an academic research project that seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of the experiences of refugees and displaced people in the borderzone between the United Kingdom and France (Calais, France and Paris, France). It is conducted by PhD student Ms Marta Welander from the University of Westminster, London, which operates as a charity and a company limited by guarantee (Reg no. 977818 England).

The research project looks at the relationship between states' border practices (such as police violence and tightened border controls) and the lived experiences of refugees and displaced people. You will find further details about the project on the following page of this document.

Taking part in the research will include being part of a focus group, discussing various themes and questions, and/or being interviewed individually.

Through the focus group and/or interview, you will be asked questions about your observations relating to refugees' experiences in Europe, observations of state practices, as well as your views on border controls, police practices and state support for refugees. We will be recording and writing down your anonymous comments and answers to the questions.

Your anonymous answers will be transcribed on a computer. Your answers will be accessible to the researcher, the interpreter (if applicable) and the researcher's supervisors at the University of Westminster. Your responses will be kept securely in electronic and hard copy format in accordance with the university's strict ethical guidelines. Any documents will be deleted five years after the study has ended. There will be no photos taken.

What you say might be used anonymously in the research outputs and you might be quoted anonymously. Taking part or declining to take part is entirely your choice. Participation is voluntary, and you can choose to stop the interview at any time and you do not have to give any reasons for why you no longer wish to take part.

Some of the questions can be upsetting and sensitive. It is your choice whether you would like to answer them, skip to the next question or remain silent.

Participation will not result in immediate benefits for you, your organisation or the refugees you work with. We will not be able to help your beneficiaries with their asylum application or current living situation, and we will not be able to give you or your organisation any financial remuneration for your participation. We will be sharing the research outputs with your organisation at end of the study, in case of interest, and we hope that the study will raise awareness about the issues facing refugees in France.

Lastly, there are circumstances, such as the commission of crimes by any actor, or imminent harm or danger facing a child or vulnerable individual, where the law requires us to report a matter to competent authorities. You are now welcome to ask the researcher any questions you may have.

اطلاعات برای شرکت کننده گان (برای مصاحبه های کیفی با پناهندگان)

این یک پروژه تحقیق آکادمیک است که به دنبال درک عمیق از تجارب پناهندگان و آوارگان در منطقه مرزی بین انگلیس و فرانسه (کاله در فرانسه و پاریس در فرانسه) می باشد. این پروژه تحقیق توسط دانشجوی دکترا خانم مارتا ولاندر از دانشگاه وست مینستر لندن انجام می شود، که به عنوان یک موسسه خیریه و سازمان محدود به تضمین (شماره ثبت ۹۷۷۸۱۸ انگلستان) عمل می کند.

توجه این پروژه تحقیقاتی به بررسی رابطه بین شیوه دولتها از حمایت مرزها (مانند خشونت پلیس و کنترل قوی مرزها) و تجارب روزمره پناهندگان و آواره گان می باشد.

شرکت در این تحقیق شامل مصاحبه شدن می باشد. ما هیچ گونه اطلاعات شخصی یا اطلاعات قابل شناسایی از شما نمی پرسیم. سوالات درباره تجارب شما در اروپا، اهداف و نظرات شما در مورد کنترل مرزها و شیوه های رفتاری پلیس خواهد بود. ما پاسخهای شما به سؤالات را یادداشت میکنیم.

پاسخ های شما برای محقق، مترجم (در صورت وجود) و سرپرستان محقق در دانشگاه وست مینستر قابل دسترسی خواهد بود. پاسخ های شما به صورت کاملا ناشناس در قالب الکترونیکی و کپی با توجه به دستورالعمل های دقیق اخلاق دانشگاه حفظ خواهد شد. هیچ عکسی گرفته نخواهد شد.

آنچه شما می گویید ممکن است به صورت ناشناس در نتایج تحقیقات مورد استفاده قرار گیرد و شما ممکن است به صورت ناشناس نقل قول شوید. هیچ کس متوجه نخواهد شد که شما در این پروژه تحقیقی شرکت کردید.

حق انتخاب برای شرکت کردن یا رد کردن در این تحقیق کاملا با شماست. مشارکت داوطلبانه است و شما می توانید هر زمان که خواستید مصاحبه را متوقف کنید و مجبور نیستید دلیلی برای اینکه نمی خواهید در مصاحبه شرکت کنید بدهید.

برخی از سوالات ممکن است ناراحت کننده و شخصی باشند. انتخاب با شما است که آیا میخواهید به آنها پاسخ دهید یا نه، به سوال بعدی بروید یا مصاحبه را متوقف کنید.

مشارکت در این تحقیق منافع فوری برای شما، خانواده تان، دوستان و اجتماعتان نخواهد داشت. ما قادر نخواهیم بود به شما در مورد درخواست پناهندگی یا وضعیت فعلی زندگیتان کمکی بکنیم. ارائه اطلاعاتی که صحت ندارد هیچ مزیتی نخواهد داشت، زیرا این امر هیچ گونه حمایت اضافی یا نتیجه مطلوبی را ایجاد نخواهد کرد. و لطفا توجه داشته باشید که ما نمی توانیم برای مشارکت در این تحقیق به شما کمک مالی بدهیم. در صورت تمایل، ما می توانیم در پایان مصاحبه در مورد سازمان های مختلفی که از پناهندگان حمایت میکنند به شما اطلاعات بدهیم.

در آخر، شرایطی وجود دارد که قانون ما را ملزم می سازد که مشکلاتی را به مقامات سر رشته گزارش دهیم. به عنوان مثال، اگر چیزی به ما بگویید که ما را در مورد امنیت بچه ها نگران سازد و یا جرم جدی که کسی مرتکب شده است، ما مجبور هستیم با کسی در این باره صحبت بکنیم، اما به آنها نخواهیم گفت که این اطلاعات را چگونه پیدا کردیم، بنابراین کسی نمی فهمد که اطلاعات از شما آمده است. چند موقعیت دیگری هم وجود دارد که ما باید گزارش دهیم، اما همیشه قبل از این کار به شما اطلاع می دهیم.

اکنون شما می توانید هر سوالی از محقق دارید بپرسید.

ورقة معلومات للمشارك (للمقابلات النوعية مع اللاجئين)

مشروع بحث أكاديمي يسعى للحصول على فهم عميق لتجارب اللاجئين والنازحين في المنطقة الحدودية الواقعة بين المملكة المتحدة وفرنسا (كاليه ، فرنسا وباريس ، فرنسا). يقوم بإجراء البحث السيدة مارتا فيلاندر ، وهي طالبة دكتوراه من جامعة وستمنستر في لندنReg no. 977818 England.(، وهي تدير مؤسسة خيرية وشركة مسجله عنوانها)

يهدف المشروع البحثي إلى التعرف على العلاقة بين الممارسات التي تمارسها الدول على حدودها (مثل عنف الشرطة وتشديد الرقابة على الحدود) والتجارب التي عاشها اللاجئين والنازحين.

المشاركة في البحث تكون من خلال إجراء مقابلة. خلال المقابلة لن نأخذ منك أي معلومات شخصية أو أي معلومات تحدد هويتك, ولن يتم التقاط أي صور. سنسألك فقط عن تجاربك في أوروبا وأهدافك وآرائك حول ممارسات الشرطة والرقابة على الحدود. ثم سنقوم بكتابة إجاباتك عن هذه الأسئلة.

الباحثة والمترجم (إن وجد) والاساتذة المشرفين على البحث في جامعة وستمنستر هم فقط من يستطيعون الإطلاع على اجاباتك. إذ سيتم الاحتفاظ بإجاباتك بشكل آمن ومجهول لا يحدد شخصية صاحب الإجابات, وستُخزن بشكل إلكتروني وبشكل مطبوع وفقاً للتعليمات الاخلاقية الصارمة المُتبعة في الجامعة.

قد يقتبس ما ستقوله في المقابله أو يُستخدم لا غراض البحث إلا أنه سيُعرض بشكل مجهول لا يحدد شخصية صاحبه , لن يعرف أحد بأنك شاركت معنا.

المشاركة أو عدم المشاركة هو اختيارك بالكامل. المشاركة طوعية، ويُمكنك أيقاف المقابلة في أي وقت بدون تقديم أي مبررات عن أسباب عدم رغبتك في استمرار المقابله.

قد تكون بعض الأسئلة مزعجة وشخصية. إلا أنه لديك الحرية الكاملة في عدم الإجابة عليها أو تجاوزها وحتى ايقاف المقابلة.

لن يتمخض عن المشاركة أي منافع مباشرة لك أو لعائلتك أو لأصدقائك أو للوسط المحيط بك. لن نكون قادرين على مساعدتك في طلب اللجوء الخاص بك أو الوضع المعيشي الحالي. لا فائدة من تقديم أي معلومات غير صحيحة ، لأن ذلك لن يولد أي دعم إضافي لك أو أي عوائد. كما يرجى ملاحظة أننا لن نتمكن من إعطائك أي مكافأة مالية لمشاركتك. سنكون قادرين على إخبارك بمعلومات عن المنظمات التي تدعم اللاجئين في نهاية المقابلة ، في حالة رغبتك بذلك.

أخيراً ، هناك بعض الحالات التي يطلب فيها القانون منا إبلاغ السلطات المختصة بمسألة ما. على سبيل المثال ، إذا أخبرتنا بأي شيء يتعلق بسلامة الأطفال ، أوعن جريمة خطيرة ارتكبها شخص ما ، في مثل هذه الحالات سنكون ملزمين بالتحدث إلى شخص ما حول هذا الأمر ، لكننا لن نخبرهم عن الطريقة التي حصلنا من خلالها على هذه المعلومات حرصاً منا على أن لا يعرف أحد أننا حصلنا عليها منك. ثمت بعض الحالات الأخرى التي تحتاج إلى إبلاغ ، لكننا سنخبرك بذلك مسبقاً.

الآن إذا كان لديكم أي أسئلة يمكنكم أن تسألوا الباحثة.

የተሳትፎ መረጃ ገጽ
(ለስደተኞች ጥራት ያለው ቃል መጠይቅ ለማድረግ)

ይህ በዩናይትድ ኪንግዲም እና በፈረንሳይ (ካሊስ ፤ፈረንሳይ እና ፓሪስ፤ ፈረንሳይ) መካከል ባለው የድንበር-ሰፈራ ክልል ውስጥ የሚገኙ ስደተኞችን እና ተፈናቃዮችን ተሞክሮዎችን በጥልቀት መረዳትን የሚፈልግ የትምህርት ጥናት ፕሮጀክት ነው። ይህ የሚካሄደው በ ለንደን በ ዌስትሚኒስተር ዩኒቨርሲቲ የዶክትሬት ተማሪ የሆነችው ወ/ት ማርታ ወላንደር ሲሆን ይህም በጎ አድራጎት እና ዋስትና የተገደበ ኩባንያ ሆኖ ይሰራል (ምዝ. ቁጥር 977818 እንግሊዝ)።

የጥናቱ ፕሮጀክት በአክባቢው የድንበር ልምዶች (የፖሊስ ብጥብጥ እና ጥብቅ የድንበር ቁጥጥሮች) ፤የስደተኞችን እና የተፈናቃዮችን የህይወት :የኑሮ ልምዶችን ይመለከታል።

በጥናቱ ውስጥ መሳተፍ ቃል መጠይቅ ማድረግን ያካትታል፡ ምንም ዓይነት የግል መረጃዎችን ወይም ሊታወቁ የሚችሉ መረጃዎችን አንወስድም፡ በአውሮፓ ስላለው ልምዶች፤ ግቦችዎ ፤ ስለ ድንበር ቁጥጥር እና የፖሊስ አሠራር ያለዎትን አስተያየት በተመለከተ ይጠየቃሉ። ለጥያቄዎች መልሶችዎን እንጽፋለን፤

መልሶች ለአስተርጓሚው (የሚመለከተው ከሆነ)፤ ጥናት ለሚያደርገው እና በ ዌስትሚኒስተር ዩኒቨርሲቲ ላሉት ተቆጣጣሪዎቻቸው የሚዳረስ ይሆናል፡ ምላሾችhe በዩኒቨርሲቲው ጥብቅ የስቶ-ምህባር መመሪያዎች መሠረት በኤሌክትሮኒክ እና በወረቀት ወይም ሃርድ ኮፒ ማንነትዎ እና ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ በሆነ መልኩ እንዲሆኑ ይቀመጣል፡ ምንም ፎቶ አይነሳም።

የምትናገረው ነገር ማንነትዎ የተጠበቀ በሆነ መልኩ በጥናት ውጤቶቹ ላይ ሊገለገሉ ይችላል ፤እና ማንነት የተጠበቀ ሆነው ሊጠቀሱ ይችላሉ። ማንም እርስዎ እንደተሳተፉ አያውቅም።

ተሳትፎyour መቀበል ወይም አለመቀበል ሙሉ በሙሉ የእርስዎ ምርጫ ነው። ተሳትፎ በፈቃደኝነት ነው: እና ቃል መጠይቁን በማንኛውም ጊዜ ለማቆም መምረጥ እና ለምን መሳተፍ እንደማይፈልጉ ምክንያቶችን መስጠት የለብዎትም።

እንዳንድ ጥያቄዎች የሚያረብሹ እና የግል ሊሆኑ ይችላሉ። ለጥያቄዎቹ መልስ መስጠት በሙሉ የእርስዎ ምርጫ ነው: ወደሚቀጥለው ጥያቄ ይሂዱ ወይም ቃል መጠይቁን ያቁም።

መሳፍክ ለእርስዎ፤ ለቤተሰብዎ፤ ለጓደኞችዎ ወይም ለማህበረሰብዎ ፈጣን ጥቅሞችን አያስገኝም። በጥገኝነት ማመልከቻ ላይ የእርስዎን ወይም የአውን የኑሮ ሁኔታ መርዳት አንችልም። ምንም ተጨማሪ ድጋፍ ወይም ገቢዎች ስለማይፈጥር፤ እውነት ያልሆነ መረጃ መስጠት ምንም ጥቅም የለውም። በተጨማሪም፤ ለሚሳተፉብት ምንም ዓይነት የገንዘብ ክፍያ ልናደርግ እንደማንችል እንገምedል። ፍላጎት ካላዎት በቃል መጠይቁ መጨረሻ ላይ ስለተለያዩ የስደተኞች ድጋፍ ድርጅት ልንንግርህ እንችላለን።

በመጨረሻም ሕግ ጉዳዮችን ችሎ ላይ ላላቸው ባለስልጣናት ሪፖርት ለማድረግ የሚያስፈልጉ ሁኔታዎች አሉ። ለምሳሌ፤ ስለ ህጻናት ደህንነት የሚያሳስብ ማንኛውም ነገር ቢነግሩን፤ ወይም አንድ ሰው ከባድ ወንጀል ቢፈጽም ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ለሌላ ሰው የማነጋገር ግዴታ አለብን ነገር ግን ይህን መረጃ እንዴት እንደምንገኘው አናውቅም። ስለዚህ ማንም ቢሆን ከእርስዎ የመጣ መሆኑን ማንም አያውቅም። ሪፖርት ልናደርግባቸው የሚገቡ ጥቂት ሌሎች ሁኔታዎች አሉ፤ ነገር ግን አስቀድመን እናሳውቅዎታለን።

አሁን ሊኖርዎት የሚችሉ ማንኛውም ጥያቄዎች ሁሉ ጥናቱን ለሚያያድርገው ዘንድ መጠየቅ ይችላሉ።

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End Notes

[i] In 2016, I wrote about the politics of exhaustion alongside Leonie Ansems de Vries in the context of the demolition of the Calais 'Jungle' camp (Ansems de Vries and Welander, 2016a, 2016b). The concept 'Politics of Exhaustion' has previously featured in the work of Dominic Pettman (2002). His work *After the Orgy: Toward a Politics of Exhaustion* identifies and examines the dynamic tensions of various apocalyptic discourses, in order to highlight the complex constellation of exhaustion, anticipation, panic, and ecstasy in contemporary culture. This is entirely unrelated to my work and has in no ways inspired or informed my proposed conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion in the context of human mobility.

[ii] Others, such as Travis Van Isacker (2019), have suggested that the evictions and bussing of people to accommodation centres across France constitutes a 'carrot-and-stick domicide' where the destruction of informal settlements and accompanying offer of state accommodation are a strategy to drive migrants towards a detain/deportability situation. Meanwhile, Tazzioli (2017: 30) explores how migrants in Calais and in Paris were approached by the local Prefectures and France Terre d'Asile, being encouraged to come to asylum accommodation ('centres de répit') with the promise of receiving assistance and protection, once they arrived, some were returned by force to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.

[iii] Jef Huysmans (2006) for instance emphasises that while an increased emphasis has been placed on the nexus between migration and asylum and security since the attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States, these developments were present long before 2001, and are linked to the European integration process which started in the mid-1980s and culminated with the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' in the treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. Didier Bigo (2002) similarly argued back in 1998 that 'immigration had been framed as a threat by EU actors' which arguably paved the way for further enquiry of securitisation theory to address EU immigration policy. In attempting to explain the reasoning behind the process of securitisation of migration, Huysmans (2006) suggests that '[m]igration and asylum become a factor in a constitutive political dialectic in which securing unity and identity of a community depends on making this very community insecure.' As such, leaders can sustain an image of a complete, harmonious political unit which appears to only experience any form of conflict, violence or disintegration if *external* factors disrupt it. Here, Huysmans draws on the work of R. B. J. Walker (1993) who suggested that a 'constitutive dialectic relation' is at work in security framing, that is, creating a unity in the plural world requires the claiming of an 'inside' by separating it from and 'outside'.

[iv] It is not the intention of this thesis to go into an in-depth academic discussion or theorisation of 'intentionality.' Many others have done so, in particular in the context of sociology and psychology, but also more broadly within the social sciences, including in the International Relations discipline. Approaching intentionality primarily from a sociological perspective, Bertram Malle et al (2001) emphasise that considerations of intentions and intentionality permeate human social life and that, indeed, '[t]heories and research programs on the role of intention and intentionality in social cognition are distributed over many scholars, traditions, and disciplines.' (2001: 24) The scholars argue that intentionality is a foundation for social cognition, amongst other reasons because it 'brings order to the perception of behaviour in that it allows the perceiver to detect structure – intentions and actions – in humans' complex stream of movement.' (2001: 2) Meanwhile, within the broad academic body of literature examining the philosophical foundations of International Criminal Law, Jaroslav Větrovský (2018) also discusses the complexities of intentionality. He emphasises the difficulties in ensuring adequate interpretation of intentionality, despite the relatively clear wording contained within the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, where Article 30(1) provides that a person is criminally responsible and liable for punishment only if a criminal act (*actus reus*) was committed

with intent and knowledge (*mens rea*). Within the International Relations discipline, scholars such as Alex Prichard (2017) have explored the concept of 'collective intentionality,' arguing, through the notion of radical pluralisation, that contemporary theories of collective intentionality enable us to think about anarchy in the international sphere in new and challenging ways. Meanwhile, within this PhD thesis, it was not my intention to contribute to the advancement of the broad inter-disciplinary body of literature dealing with this concept. Nor do I claim to have developed scholarly thinking on this matter; instead, I adopted an understanding of intentionality as proposed by Tyner and Rice (2015). The scholars have developed a robust framework which lends itself particularly well to my work, in proposing three criteria to ascertain intentionality in the context of state violence. The scholars argue that intentionality is present when policy makers: '(1) are aware of harmful policies and practices that might disallow life; (2) have the opportunity to stop or remedy these policies and practices; and (3) have the financial – or political – ability to prevent harm' (2015: 3). I adopted this particular definition advanced by Tyner and Rice as an analytical tool allowing my research project to shed light on, and draw attention to, the UK Government's *awareness* of the harmful impact of its policies, as well as its seeming *unwillingness* to seek other alternative policy lines, despite its *ability and opportunities* to do so. I have also within the thesis emphasised, following Weber and Pickering (2011:94), that it is sometimes necessary to cut across the dichotomy of 'intended versus unintended harms' when examining state violence in the context of bordering tactics, in particular in contexts where one is unable to ascertain the underlying logic of certain policy choices or decisions. I therefore argue in this thesis that, irrespective of the intent behind some of the more seemingly benign forms of practices and methods resorted to in borderzones, it is at times more fruitful and instructive to look at whether such state practices are essentially *malignant in their outcomes* (see e.g. Roberts, 2008: 20).

[v] Scholars have deployed and developed the concept of 'politics of exhaustion' in various directions and within multiple geographical contexts. For instance, focusing on 'illegalised' migrants in Brussels, Belgium, Robin Vandevoordt (2020) draws on ethnographic work alongside the civil society movement 'Citizen Platform for the Support of Refugees,' demonstrating how the Belgian state has consciously produced a humanitarian crisis as part of a broader 'politics of exhaustion.' Robin Vandevoordt and Larissa Fleischmann (2020) moreover drew on my work in their account of grassroots initiatives supporting migrants in Belgium and Germany, highlighting how those initiatives are navigating different but interwoven temporalities. Fleischmann (2020) moreover cited my work in her account of practices of solidarity which she found to be intertwined with questions of power. These are just a few examples of cases where the notion of politics of exhaustion has been borrowed by other scholars within critical border and migration studies. Moreover, in 2019, I was requested to deliver a podcast episode specifically dedicated to my conceptualisation of the politics of exhaustion as part of the human rights podcast series 'Declarations,' run out of the Centre for Governance and Human Rights (CGHR) at the University of Cambridge. In 2020, I was similarly asked to present the politics of exhaustion to other scholars in an online seminar regarding grounded transmobilities. Furthermore, my ability to successfully conduct field research in the highly complex environment of the UK-France borderzone prompted professional researchers carrying out a research project for the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to seek my advice on the recruitment of interviewees among 'illegalised' migrants in the area, seeking my guidance on how to best approach their own research study in a similar vein.