



# Towards New International Cryptographic Standards

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# Towards New International Cryptographic Standards

## Designing and Breaking Cryptography

Léo Perrin

**Cosmiq TEAM**

Inria, Paris, France


FIC 2020, Lille




We (the **Cosmiq** team) are working on the foundations of cryptography.

- 1 What kind of algorithms do we study?
- 2 Why do we design new ones?
- 3 What kind of flaws do we find in other ones?


# What is Cryptography?




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
# What is Cryptography?



# What is Cryptography?



# How Is It Used?






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
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
# How Is It Used?



# How Is It Used?



# How Is It Used?



## What Do Primitives Do?

A **cryptographic primitive** is a **basic building block** ; it has a very simple API but very sophisticated inner workings!

### The block cipher

For any  $k$ -bit long key  $\kappa$ ,  $E_\kappa$  is a **permutation** of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .

Typically,  $n \in \{64, 128\}$  and  $k \in \{128, 256\}$ .

To ensure **security**: no matter how many pairs  $(x, E_\kappa(x))$  are known, it is impossible to recover  $\kappa$ <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Except by trying all possible  $\kappa$  which has  $2^k$  possible values.


How are the **primitives** used in practice chosen?

# Life Cycle of a Cryptographic Primitive


**Fundamental Research**




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
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
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
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
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
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


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





# Breaking the Pipeline



# Breaking the Pipeline



# Breaking the Pipeline



Primitives we designed  
Primitives we attacked

**Primitives we designed**  
Primitives we attacked

# Post-Quantum Public Key

The screenshot shows the NIST CSRC website. At the top, there is a search bar labeled "Search CSRC". Below the header, the text "Information Technology Laboratory" and "COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER" is visible, along with the CSRC logo. A green "PROJECTS" button is highlighted. The main heading is "Post-Quantum Cryptography", followed by social media icons for Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. Under "Project Overview", it states: "NIST has initiated a process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. Full details can be found in the [Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization page](#). The [Round 2 candidates](#) were announced January 30, 2019. [NISTIR 8240](#), Status Report on the First Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process is now available." To the right, a "PROJECT LINKS" sidebar contains links for "Overview", "FAQs", "News & Updates", and "Events".

Quantum computers will **break** current public key algorithms

⇒ we need new algorithms!

## Cosmiq Involvement

3 Cosmiq candidates made it to the second round! (**Bike, Classic McEliece, and Rollo**)

# Lighthweight Secret Key

The screenshot shows the NIST CSRC website. At the top, there is a black header with the NIST logo on the left and a search bar labeled "Search CSRC" on the right. Below this is a blue banner with the text "Information Technology Laboratory" and "COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER" on the left, and the CSRC logo on the right. A green button labeled "PROJECTS" is positioned below the banner. The main heading is "Lightweight Cryptography" in a large, bold font. Below the heading are social media icons for Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. A "Project Overview" section follows, containing a paragraph of text. To the right of the overview is a "PROJECT LINKS" sidebar with three items: "Overview", "News & Updates", and "Events".

**NIST** Search CSRC

Information Technology Laboratory  
**COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER** CSRC

PROJECTS

## Lightweight Cryptography

f G+ t

### Project Overview

There are several emerging areas (e.g. sensor networks, healthcare, distributed control systems, the Internet of Things, cyber physical systems) in which highly-constrained devices are interconnected, typically communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in concert to accomplish some task. Because the majority of current cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms do not fit into constrained devices.

PROJECT LINKS

- Overview
- News & Updates
- Events

IoT devices cannot handle the (low!) **complexity** of current symmetric ciphers.

⇒ we need new algorithms!

## Cosmiq Involvement

3 Cosmiq candidates made it to the second round! (Saturnin, Sparkle, Spook)

Primitives we designed  
**Primitives we attacked**



# Breaking SHA-1

SHA-1 is a **hash function**.

## Collision Resistance

For a hash function  $H$ , it should not be possible to find messages  $x$  and  $y$  such that

$$H(x) = H(y).$$

## Cosmiq Involvement

It is possible **in practice** to find **meaningful** messages  $a||x$  and  $a||y$  where  $a$  and  $b$  are meaningful and such that

$$H(a||x) = H(a||y)$$

**G. Leurent**, T. Peyrin. *From Collisions to Chosen-Prefix Collisions – Application to Full SHA-1*. Eurocrypt 2019.

## Finding Weird Patterns in Russian Standards

questioned is the S-box  $\pi$ . This S-box was chosen from Streebog hash-function and it was synthesized in 2007. Note that through many years of cryptanalysis no weakness of this S-box was found. The S-box  $\pi$  was obtained by pseudo-random search and the following properties were taken into account.

[...]

No secret structure was enforced during construction of the S-box. At the same time, it is obvious that for any transformation a lot of representations are possible (see, for example, a lot of AES S-box representations).

### Cosmiq Involvement

The designers of Streebog and Kuznyechik **are lying**. The probability that a **random** S-box is as **structured** as theirs is  $< 2^{-1000}$  ( $\approx$  winning the “loto” 60 times in a row).

Scientific publication: **X. Bonnetain, L. Perrin, S. Tian**. *Anomalies and Vector Space Search: Tools for S-box Analysis*. Asiacrypt 2019.

# Conclusion

Cryptography is an **active** research area motivated by concrete needs for **standard** algorithms.

## Conclusion



Cryptography is an **active** research area motivated by concrete needs for **standard** algorithms.

**Thank you!**

*Delenda Russian Algo*


# Appendix

## Saturnin



# The TKlog Structure

$$\pi : \begin{cases} \mathbb{F}_{2^8} & \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \\ 0 & \mapsto \kappa(0) \\ \alpha^{17j} & \mapsto \kappa(16 - j) & \text{for } 1 \leq j \leq 15 \\ \alpha^{i+17j} & \mapsto \kappa(16 - i) \oplus (\alpha^{17})^{s(j)} & \text{for } 0 < i, 0 \leq j < 16 \end{cases}$$



## Definition

```
p(x){unsigned char*k="@`rFTDVbpPB
vdtfR@\xacp?\xe2>4\xa6\xe9{z\xe3q
5\xa7\xe8",a=2,l=0,b=17;while(x&&
(l++,a^x))a=2*a^a/128*29;return l
%b?k[l%b]^k[b+l/b]^b:k[l/b]^188;}
```

165 ASCII characters that fit on 7 bits: this program is 1155-bit long.

<https://codegolf.stackexchange.com/questions/186498/>

proving-that-a-russian-cryptographic-standard-is-too-structured

Let  $P(S)$  be the bitlength of a C implementation of  $S \in \mathfrak{S}_{2^n}$ .

### Definition (Kolmogorov Anomaly)

The **Kolmogorov Anomaly** of  $S$  for C is the opposite of the  $\log_2$  of the probability that a random S-box has a C implementation at most as long as that of  $S$ .



# Estimating the Kolmogorov Anomaly

How to estimate it?



- $(\leq 1155)$ -bit C programs implementing 8-bit permutations
- $(\leq 1155)$ -bit strings
- $\mathfrak{S}_{2^8}$

For  $\pi$ , we get:

$$\frac{\#(\leq 1155)\text{-bit C prog.}}{|\mathfrak{S}_{2^8}|} \leq \frac{\#(\leq 1155)\text{-bit strings.}}{|\mathfrak{S}_{2^8}|} = \frac{2^{1156} - 1}{256!} \approx 2^{-528},$$

meaning that the Kolmogorov anomaly of  $\pi$  for C is at least 528.