


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## With respect for the core business: the impact of party ideology on the odds of government participation among regionalist parties

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### Abstract:

*An increasing number of regionalist parties have participated in regional or national executive office. This article examines the specific conditions under which this party type increases its odds of successful cabinet entry – with a focus on ideological party change. Their programmatic profile is mapped before and after government entry by applying quantitative content analysis on coded electoral manifestos. The binary logistic regression analyses provide empirical evidence that regionalist parties that compromise on their territorial core business are more likely to enter (regional) government. Regionalist parties are also more likely to cross the threshold of (regional) governance when they operate in more decentralized countries and when they are a larger electoral factor in the regional political arena. Other relevant control variables, such as economic growth, national electoral score and party age, do not generate a significant effect on the odds of government participation.*

**Key words:** *regionalist parties; government participation; party ideology; quantitative manifesto research; western multi-level democracies; comparative research*

### Introduction

Over the past few decades, regionalist parties have gradually gained electoral strength across Western multi-level democracies. Nowadays, they are often well represented at the regional and increasingly also at the national policy-making level (Müller-Rommel 1998: 17). An increase in electoral vote share then creates opportunities for government entry. In several parliaments, regionalist parties are pivotal for a stable democratic majority (Stefuriuc 2009: 93) although, in contrast with ‘established’ and ‘state-wide’ party families, the regionalist party type questions the territorial integrity of the state *as such* (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 505). They put forward staunch demands for self-government and several disquieting high-impact cases are reported in the popular media.

Secessionist upheaval in Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders challenges trusted models of political decision-making (Tronconi 2015: 579). Nonetheless, their radical strive for regional autonomy does not seem to prevent these parties from actively participating in regional and even national government constellations (Deschouwer 2008). But while

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regionalist parties primarily adhere to their own sub-territory within the State (Deschouwer 2003: 213), political studies on parties and coalition governments have been dominated by a State-centric bias (Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013: 76); the so-called “methodological nationalism” (Schakel 2013: 212). In order to address this research gap, this study explicitly combines traditional areas of party research (e.g. party ideology, party change) with rather new research domains (e.g. multi-level governance).

Political parties that cross the threshold of governance manage to implement their ideas into reality and thereby deeply shape the daily lives of all citizens (Dandoy 2014: 629). Since the ideological fundamentals of regionalist parties challenge the constitutional status quo of the state, their potential impact on political outcomes is not to be underestimated. Hence, getting a better insight in the programmatic strategies that governing regionalist parties apply may advance our appraisal of the real influence that this party type has on our society.

In particular, parties that aspire to co-govern will need to adjust their own profile in order to successfully connect with potential coalition partners (Laver and Budge 1992). The prospect of government entry confronts parties with a difficult trade-off: on which issues and to what degree are they prepared to compromise in order to enter government? And is a party’s readiness to give in bigger at the regional than at the national policy-level?

A vast body of literature has researched coalition formation dilemmas from the viewpoint of ‘traditional’ and ‘established’ party types (e.g. Kluver and Sagarzazu 2015: 333). Often described as ‘centrist’ parties, the latter are more likely to become governing partners, since they face smaller programmatic differences to overcome (Bawn and Topcu 2012: 433). The opposite is true for ‘peripheral’ parties, which are typically located at the ends of the political spectrum (Alonso et. al. 2015: 851). The regionalist party type is an example of this category of peripheral parties.

Consequently, it seems inevitable that radical parties that want to become more engaged in the political system will need to devote attention to mainstream issues and moderate their stances (Schumacher et. al., 2015: 1040). Indeed, manifestos of incumbent parties should be similar (Louwse 2009: 17). Even beforehand, an “anticipation” effect is at play here: (regionalist) parties prepare for cabinet by timely adapting and giving in on various topics because they have to create ideological convergence with potential coalition partners and draft a collective government agreement on a variety of policy issues (Dandoy 2014: 629). After entering government, we can speak of a “contagion” effect (Van Spanje 2010: 563): (regionalist) parties need to loyally defend the whole government record and are held accountable for the policy outputs by the public (Dandoy 2014: 629). They compete with their coalition partners by adopting each other’s policy positions (Van Spanje 2010: 563). The literature has observed programmatic moderation from two dominant theoretical perspectives, i.e. by measuring salience (issue emphasis) and position (centrist or radical). Both theories are incorporated in this study to assess regionalist parties’ manifestos. Rather than looking at policy issues individually, these are grouped into broader ideological clusters that resemble the main dimensions of party competition.

Binary logistic regression models are constructed to compute the probabilities (i.e. odds ratios) of successful government entry among regionalist parties. Here, party ideology is regarded as the main independent variable and government entry as the main dependent variable. Various control variables, as they render relevant from the literature, are included into the model in order to identify net treatment effects. The results confirm

our expectation that government incumbency compels regionalist parties to give in on their territorial core business.

## **Theoretical framework**

### ***Territorial roots***

Regionalist parties are defined in this research as “*parties that refer to geographically concentrated minorities which challenge the working order, even the democratic order, by demanding recognition of their cultural identity. Regionalist parties articulate discontent at the constitutional status quo of their ‘territory’, advocating anything from cultural autonomy to national independence*” (Müller-Rommel 1998: 17). Their primary concern is to reach a form of territorial self-governance (De Winter and Türsan 1998: 204). The programmatic core business of regionalist parties is shaped by their decentralization claim. Massetti and Schakel (2016: 432) add a territorial characterization: regionalist parties are only present, as organizations or in terms of electoral activity, in a specific territory of the state. In other words, regionalist parties are also ‘regional’ (i.e. non-statewide) or, more precisely, they are a sub-set of regional parties. And even though regionalist parties move their positions on the territorial axis in just one direction (Alonso 2012; Massetti and Schakel 2013: 797), within this decentralization side they differ substantially, hereby ranging from radical to moderate opinions (De Winter and Türsan 1998), and from secessionist to autonomist standpoints (Mazzoleni 2009: 199).

While many party families’ (evolving) ideology has been researched quantitatively and systematically across time and space (e.g. Bouteica and Devos, 2016: 298; Harmel and Janda, 1995), regionalist parties are still a blind spot here. Indeed, most of the literature on political parties in multilevel democracies focuses on the established, state-wide parties (Field and Hamann 2015: 900). Only recently, regionalist parties are regarded as a distinct party family (Swenden and Maddens 2009), let alone that their programmatic profile has been studied yet at an aggregated level.

Most academic research that deals with ideological party change is grounded in the literature of party competition. In this study, we draw on the prior works of Elias, Szocsik and Zuber (2015: 839) and Wagner and Meyer (2017: 84) in order to identify three main dimensions of party competition for further empirical analysis: a socio-economic (left-right), territorial (centralization-decentralization) and liberalism-authoritarianism (migration, security, fabric of society) axis. The second dimension is particularly relevant here since territorial demands constitute the ideological core business of our research object – i.e. the regionalist party type.

### ***Creating convergence***

These days, regionalist parties are often well represented in parliament (i.e. legislative branch), and an increasing number have also taken up responsibilities in government (i.e. executive branch). The prospect of government participation inevitably triggers a process of ideological convergence: parties aspiring to enter the executive branch have to mutually connect with potential coalition partners (Dandoy 2014: 629). This suggests a “preparation” or an “anticipation” phase during which regionalist parties adapt their programmatic

profile in order to increase their odds of successful cabinet entry. While regionalist parties are described as peripheral actors (Tronconi 2015: 579), their mainstream, state-wide competitors are usually located at the centre of the political spectrum (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 342). But the latter will be reluctant to engage in negotiations with parties with whom there is insufficient common ground for a joint agreement. Consequently, those regionalist parties that gain access to executive office may only form a specific subset – e.g. the more moderate ones (Elias and Tronconi, 2011: 505) since those have a larger coalition potential (Schamp & Bouteca, 2018: 143). We test this through a **first hypothesis**:

*Regionalist parties that participate in government are ideologically different from regionalist parties that remain in opposition.*

Programmatic party change can be observed from two important conceptual perspectives. From a *salience* point of view, creating ideological convergence means increasing the emphasis on those topics that the mainstream parties primarily adhere to, while downplaying those issues that belong to the regionalist parties' own core business (Budge and Farlie 1983; Greene 2016: 809). Very similar to the political life cycle of green parties (Adams et. al. 2006: 513), regionalist parties operate as policy entrepreneurs in the political arena. They originated as niche players and single-issue parties, but over time they went through a process of issue-diversification (Adams and Ezrow 2012: 1272). Hepburn (2009: 477) uses the metaphor 'from niche to normal' to describe this longitudinal development that many non-statewide parties, inter alia regionalist parties, went through. This programmatic transition is accompanied by a change in electoral strategy (Adams et. al. 2006: 513): whereas niche parties typically respond to their core voters (i.e. stressing territorial demands), mainstream parties respond to the median voter (i.e. dealing with a broad range of other issues).

Consequently, peripheral actors who become more involved in the political system need to "anticipate" future office prospects and go through such a transition. In addition, once regionalist parties are in the cabinet, they need to defend the collective government record as they are held accountable for all the policy outputs by the public. In line with the existing "contagion theory", we therefore also acknowledge that parties seeking to compete with their opponents will in turn have to look like them (Van Spanje 2010: 563) – this especially true among coalition parties. In other words, throughout the legislature regionalist parties' scope of attention also gets "contaminated" by the various issues that their coalition partners also mark as a policy priority. We conclude that it is this interplay of "anticipation" and "contagion" effects that will cause significant adaptations in the issue salience of governing regionalist parties.

The territorial dimension is only a marginal phenomenon in Western politics. Previous scholars estimate its overall salience in electoral manifestos at 2-3%, and up to 5% in multi-level democracies where regionalist parties compete (Libbrecht, Maddens & Swenden 2013). The decentralization side of this dimension challenges the constitutional status quo of the state; a debate that traditional, state-wide parties typically want to avoid (Toubeau and Wagner 2016: 340). Instead, the latter parties focus on the two other dimensions – i.e. socio-economic and liberalism-authoritarianism. Hence, regionalist parties that aspire to govern are expected to downplay their core business and to put more emphasis on their secondary issues. We test the presence of both salience strategies through the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis two:** *Regionalist parties devote less attention to territorial issues once they cross the threshold of governance.*

**Hypothesis three:** *Regionalist parties devote more attention to socio-economic and liberal-authoritarian issues once they cross the threshold of governance.*

Programmatic party change can also be observed from a *positional* perspective. We acknowledge that both the anticipation and contagion effect are at play here. For peripheral actors just as for the regionalist party type, becoming an acceptable government coalition partner generally means moving away from radical opinions towards more centrist standpoints on the different ideological dimensions of party competition (Elias and Tronconi 2011: 505). Ideally, this takes place during an “anticipation” phase beforehand in order to increase the odds of successful cabinet entry. Moderation of policy stances has been repeatedly demonstrated among established, state-wide parties in government (Bawn and Topcu 2012:433; Schumacher et. al. 2015: 1040), and there is partial empirical evidence that the logic of this argument also applies to the regionalist party type (Field and Hamann 2015: 900; Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013: 76). Next, parties are also likely to become more centrist after a spell in executive office (Schumacher et. al. 2015: 1040), which then points to a “contagion” effect.

We expect such a programmatic moderation to take place on the three ideological dimensions. As regionalist parties are clearly all located at the decentralization side of the territorial dimension (cf. supra), a centrist move would be most visible here. Such a transition is highly probable since sticking to tough territorial demands is difficult to reconcile with being a stable and credible partner in government. Furthermore, ideological moderation on socio-economic and liberal-authoritarian issues would be much appreciated by potential (mainstream, state-wide) coalition partners because they generally consider these issues as pivotal. Regionalist parties regard these dimensions as of secondary importance, which in turn allows them to be more flexible here. We test the presence of both positional strategies through the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis four:** *Regionalist parties moderate their positions on the territorial issues they address once they enter into government.*

**Hypothesis five:** *Regionalist parties moderate their positions on the socio-economic and liberal-authoritarian issues they address once they enter into government.*

### **Context matters**

Various other party- and country-related variables may exert an influence on the odds of successful cabinet entry among regionalist parties. At least four are included in our research model as control variables. To begin with, the specific institutional architecture of the country – i.e. the degree of decentralization – may temper or intensify the empirical relationship between ideological party change and government incumbency among regionalist parties. For example, state-wide parties have often “accommodated” territorial demands to put a brake on regionalist parties’ electoral growth (Swenden and Maddens 2009). In that way, the mere existence of regionalist parties as full-fledged political actors in the electoral arena already presupposes their partial success; i.e. their achievement to have brought about

decentralization reforms and the establishment of regional electoral arenas (Masseti and Schakel 2016: 432). Decentralized countries then provide more opportunities for political entrepreneurs to establish new regionalist parties that successfully cross the threshold of governance [1].

Party size is a second, affiliated control variable: larger parties are more likely to be involved in the negotiation talks (Ceron 2016: 797). Regionalist parties that obtain a larger electoral score are more likely to enter into government [2]. Party age [3] and economic climate [4] may also play a role here. Indeed, while a young party will stick to its guns and keep a narrow ideological focus, it tends to broaden its scope of attention as the party grows older and becomes more actively involved in the political system (Wagner and Meyer 2013: 1246). This will then increase its odds of government participation. Finally, economic conditions have also shown to predict a party's profile and its incumbency status; e.g. Greene (2016: 809).

## Data and Methodology

The universe of regionalist parties is gradually expanding as they have gained electoral strength across Western multi-level democracies over recent decades (Müller-Rommel 1998: 17). Massetti and Schakel (2016) publicized a comprehensive list of 227 regionalist parties across 16 countries throughout the post-World War II period. Their overview is used as a starting point for the case-selection in this study.

Government participation is the main dependent variable in this comparative research. It is operationalized as a binary variable (value "1" or "0") per year and per policy-level: either "in" or "out" of government. For both the regional and national policy-making level, this variable was mapped for the whole life cycle of the regionalist parties included in this study (cf. *infra*). Drafting this comprehensive overview required extensive historical in-depth research. Up until now, only fragmented overviews of this matter existed. They are now brought together and completed in one summarized table (cf. Appendix A).

However, since a dichotomous variable does not leave much room for nuance, many situations in which regionalist parties operated in a grey zone are given a "0"-value. For example, several Spanish regionalist parties, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Coalición Canaria (CC), or the Canadian Bloc Québécois, have provided vital parliamentary support to the national government, although these moments are not coded here as "1". Only when a party was a full-fledged formal coalition partner and constituted an integral part of the government the case is given a "1"-value.

On the other hand, this sharp distinction makes group membership (i.e. participation in government: yes or no) mutually exclusive so that it can be clearly assessed how this dependent variable relates to a set of independent predictors (i.e. party ideology and other control variables). This approach will allow us to determine the probability of an outcome (i.e. government participation among regionalist parties) based on a set of given inputs (e.g. programmatic change and/or inertia).

### ***Coded electoral platforms***

The hypotheses (cf. supra) requires shedding light on both the “salience” and “position” side of the medallion. Regionalist parties’ varying programmatic profiles are investigated here by conducting a large N-analysis. A well-known method to map such programmatic party change is through analysing electoral platforms (Budge et. al. 2001). These official party documents are widely acknowledged as a reliable and well-established tool to estimate party ideology (Pogorelis 2005: 992). Therefore, we opt to conduct quantitative content analysis on regionalist parties’ manifestos.

The long-standing Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) and the more recent Regional Manifestos Project (RMP) provide two readily available datasets of coded party programmes. MARPOR inventories national programmes whilst RMP solely includes regional ones. Both projects apply the same logic, methodology and coding scheme. From Massetti and Schakel’ s list, 48 regionalist parties appear in either the MARPOR and/or the RMP dataset, accounting for respectively 167 and 129 coded electoral manifestos that are suitable for further statistical analysis (cf. Appendix A and B).

RMP is still a fairly recent project and currently limited to three investigated countries (Italy, Spain, Great Britain). Yet, it includes an important subset of regionalist parties that are also present in the MARPOR dataset. Therefore, the MARPOR data is used to test the hypotheses at hand and the RMP data is used to check whether the national figures can be underpinned with regional data.

The main independent variable, i.e. party ideology, is operationalized in this study by constructing three ideological clusters (socio-economic, territorial and liberalism-authoritarianism) out of the detailed MARPOR/RMP coding scheme. Each cluster represents one dimension of party competition: they are actually regroupings of codes into broader issue categories (cf. Appendix C). We apply the same ‘socio-economic’ (20 issues) and ‘liberalism-authoritarianism’ (16 issues) clusters that Bakker and Hobolt (2013) already constructed for their programmatic research. Earlier factor analyses proved that these issues tend to frequently appear together in party platforms (Cole, 2005: 203). We add a ‘territorial’ cluster to the analysis which is comprised of (merely) two relevant issues from the coding scheme. Yet, these codes capture the institutional and decentralization aspects of politics. As such, the territorial cluster represents the ideological core business of the research object at hand – i.e. regionalist parties.

In the MARPOR- and RMP- dataset, each code actually represents percentages of the party programme devoted to a certain issue. The three ideological clusters do not include all the available codes from the scheme but there surely is a ceiling in what parties can discuss: an increased emphasis on topic A tends to decrease attention for topic B and/or C. Thus, the three values of salience for each party are to some extent correlated as a result of how they are computed.

For position scores there is no such limit. While salience scores are the sum of the relative frequencies, position scores are computed by splitting the issues within each cluster into bipolar categories. The method of measurement is well-established in manifesto research and was developed by the founders of the MARPOR-project themselves (Budge et. al. 2001). This approach was repeatedly applied by other authors to conduct similar research (e.g. Fagerholm 2016: 304; Van der Brug 2004: 209). The results this method has produced are proven to be solid and successful (Mikhaylov et. al. 2012: 78).



Within each cluster the total weight of both poles is re-balanced so that both sides count equal. For socio-economic positioning, the standard right-left 'RILE' scale is applied as it was developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et. al. 2001; Mikhaylov et. al. 2012: 78). Positions are measured on a -100/+100 scale, however, nearly all the cases fall within the -50/+50 scale, which makes it actually a more accurate point of reference. Territorial position equals to decentralization salience minus centralization salience; RILE position is right emphasis minus left emphasis (so: '-' is left whereas '+' is right); liberalism-authoritarianism position is liberal frequency minus authoritarian frequency (so: '-' is authoritarian-orientated whereas '+' is liberal-minded).

As a net result the main independent variable, i.e. party ideology, is operationalized here by six ratio scale variables. The three salience scores are expressed in percentages while the three position scores are expressed in figures preceded by minus or plus. The six values are computed for every respective coded electoral manifesto in the MARPOR- and RMP- dataset.

### ***Calculating rates of success***

The relationship between the main dependent and independent variable displays a non-linear pattern. By performing a binary logistic regression both (a) the data can be transformed into a more linear relationship by calculating log-odds.

Various contextual factors may influence the relationship. Therefore, included in the regression model is a set of relevant control variables, as they render relevant from the literature (cf. supra). First, electoral strength is operationalized in terms of obtained (a) national and (b) regional electoral scores. The percentages were collected from official government websites. Second, the degree of institutional decentralization is made tangible by using the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et. al., 2016). Third, national economic growth is taken into account by invoking the OECD database (percentages of GDP). Fourth, party age is included by calculating the number of years since a party's foundation.

## **Results**

### ***Descriptives***

Merging the MARPOR data on electoral manifestos with the collected historical data on government participation produces some interesting descriptive statistics about the main dependent variable. For example: Regionalist parties only exceptionally entered federal governments. Only 7.2% (12/167) of their national party programs were presented when the party was in national government while nearly half (42.5%: 71/167) were publicized in years when the regionalist party took part in regional government. Actually, only in Belgium (VU/N-VA, FDF/Défi, RW) and in Italy (LN) have regionalist parties been in this latter scenario. Remarkably, there is one regionalist party in the dataset (the Walloon RW) that did participate in the national government but never took part in the regional government.

Regionalist parties' median electoral score is obviously much lower at the national level (1.63%) than at the regional level (20.51%) while their median party age in the dataset is 17 years. The Spanish Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) holds the maximum of (nine) consecutive inventoried manifestos during regional government participation, while the

Italian Lega Nord (LN) accounts for a maximum of (four) successive coded platforms during national government participation. One fifth (21%: 35/167) of the manifestos belong to (14) regionalist parties that never governed in the years that their coded party platforms were included into the MARPOR- dataset. Actually, seven of those regionalist parties (e.g. Flemish Interest in Belgium) effectively never gained access to the executive branch. The other seven parties (e.g. the British Plaid Cymru and the Spanish Chunta Aragonista) did take up (regional) government responsibility, however not in years that their coded party platforms are included in the dataset.

Do those regionalist parties that make it into government vastly differ from those which solely remain in opposition (H1)? If this were the case, it would actually pose an endogeneity problem with regard to our research object. When looking at the mean values for the variables on party ideology (cf. Table 1), we see no statistically significant distinction between both subsets. While there are only minor differences in issue emphasis, governing regionalist parties also do not consistently hold more moderate positions than oppositional ones. This means the first hypothesis is rejected. Among the control variables, two of them do generate a significant difference: governing regionalist parties are clearly larger parties (25.38% vs. 14.3%) at the regional level and they are also way older (30.87 years vs. 15.31 years) than their oppositional counterparts.

**Table 1: Descriptive (MARPOR) statistics : Governing vs. Oppositional Regionalist Parties (with N=167)**

(Independent) Variable	Governing	Oppositional
Territorial salience (%)	12,86%	10,06%
Social-economic salience (%)	26,26%	29,86%
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%)	30,01%	34,69%
Territorial position (- or +)	(+)12,81	(+)10
Right-Left position (- or +)	-8,46	-10,65
Liberalism-Authoritarianism position (- or +)	(+)14.9	(+)5.5
Electoral score - regional (% votes)	25,38%	14,30%
Electoral score - national (% votes)	3,25%	3,83%
Economic Growth (% GDP)	2,27%	2,13%
Party age (years since foundation)	30,87	15,31
Regional Authority Index score	26,39	29,33

*Source: Author based on his own calculations.*

### **Regression analysis**

Nevertheless, for the subsequent analysis the subset of oppositional regionalist parties is filtered out of the investigated data. This is in order to determine the pure and net treatment effect of ideological party change (or: persistence) on the odds of successful government entry exclusively among the subset of governing regionalist parties. The remaining 132 electoral manifestos are split between 61 cases out of (“0”) government and 71 in (“1”) government. Unfortunately, the number of coded manifestos publicized during *national* government participation alone is too low for a statistical regression analysis; yet for isolated *regional* government participation it is sufficiently high.

**Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=132**

	(Independent) Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Block 1</b>	Territorial salience (%)	-0,163	0,087	3,548	1	<b>0,06</b>	0,849
	Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%)	0,006	0,084	0,005	1	<b>0,944</b>	1,006
	Social-Economic salience (%)	0,091	0,09	1,027	1	<b>0,311</b>	1,095
<b>Block 2</b>	Electoral score - national (% votes)	0,322	0,176	3,349	1	0,067	1,38
	Electoral score - regional (% votes)	0,061	0,04	2,338	1	0,126	1,063
	Regional Authority Index score	0,209	0,091	5,251	1	0,022	1,232
	Economic Growth (% GDP)	-0,128	0,209	0,373	1	0,541	0,88
	Party age (years since foundation)	0,025	0,016	2,452	1	0,117	1,025
	Constant	-7,831	5,812	1,816	1	0,178	0

**Source:** Author based on his own calculations.

In this regression analysis (cf. Table 2), “Block 1” consists of the main independent variables (i.e. party ideology) while “Block 2” includes the control variables. From a **salience** point of view (Hypotheses 2 and 3), the basic model generates a *negative* effect of territorial salience on government participation (beta coefficient=-0.163, p=0.06). This effect grows stronger when the control variables from Block 2 are added (Sig. two-tailed decreases from p=0.095 to p=0.06). In other words, regionalist parties that decrease their emphasis on territorial topics increase their opportunities to effectively enter (regional) government, whereby this relationship intensifies when we control for the five variables in Block 2. Thus, the second hypothesis is accepted.

Simultaneously, the socio-economic effect is *positive* and the relationship improves (Sig. two-tailed lowers from p=0.43 to p=0.31) while the liberalism-authoritarianism relationship shows no clear direction and weakens (Sig. two-tailed increases from p=0.37 to p=0.94). This means that the evaluation of the third hypothesis is nuanced: more attention for socio-economic topics increases the odds of government participation while liberalism-authoritarianism issue salience doesn’t generate any impact. At this stage, none of the main independent variables generates a significant relationship (whereby p<0.05). But this is not a necessity here: the laws of statistical inference do not strictly apply as the investigated sample approximates the whole population – i.e. all regionalist parties that ever participated in government.

The correct interpretation of Table 2 requires some additional explanation. The initial data displayed a non-linear relationship (cf. supra). Table 2 then displays log odds: the data are transformed so that probabilities can be calculated as if it were a linear relationship. In a logistic regression the B-values are the regression coefficients. These are the predicted changes in odds (plus or minus) to fall within one of the two groups (“in” or “out” of regional government) for every unit of change in the respective independent variable. Alternatively, the Exp(B)- values are odds ratios which vary between >1 or <1: they indicate whether the respective independent variable increases or decreases when the dependent variable goes up one level. Exp(B) is similar to B: when B is positive, then Exp(B) is >1. Standard Errors, Wald z values and Degrees of Freedom are also displayed in Table 2.

The classification rate of this model, i.e. the ratio of correct predictions whether a party is expected to be “out” (0) or “in” (1) regional government based on the included independent variables, raises from 72% (Block 1) to 87% when Block 2 is added. In the case of random guesswork, the successful prediction rate would be 50%. Furthermore, the

Nagelkerke R square increases from 18% (Block 1) to 49% when Block 2 is included. Finally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is applied to calculate the Chi square value (=7.4), while the p-value here is >0.05 (which in this case is actually an indicator of good model fit).

The current model fit can be enhanced by removing those excessive independent variables that clearly didn't generate a significant effect in the first place. Consequently, if the "liberalism-authoritarianism" and "socio-economic" salience variables are omitted, the model fit improves ( $R^2= 0.47$ ;  $\text{Chi}^2 = 4.9$ ;  $\text{Df}=8$ ;  $\text{Class. Rate} = 82\%$ ). The detected negative effect of territorial salience now becomes highly significant (Sig. two-tailed decreases from  $p=0.06$  to  $p=0.008$ ). Including the five control variables (Block 2) makes the effect between territorial salience and government participation stronger and more robust. In other words, regionalist parties that *decrease* their emphasis on territorial topics in their electoral manifestos increase their probabilities to enter regional government ( $B=-0.194$ ;  $p=0.008$ ). This is another solid confirmation of the second hypothesis: it proves that regionalist parties that aspire to govern compromise on their (primary) ideological dimension in order to connect with potential coalition partners.

The latter parties are generally mainstream, state-wide competitors which primarily focus on the two other ideological dimensions of party competition. Here, we see that an *increase* in socio-economic salience among regionalist parties results in higher odds of government participation ( $B=0.091$ ). This is in line with the third hypothesis. Yet, regionalist parties do not alter their attention for liberalism-authoritarianism topics to improve their prospects of successful cabinet entry. A possible explanation for this can be found in the literature on "sub state nationalism" (Freeden 1998) and "identity politics" (Smith 1996). These authors have highlighted that the territorial and liberalism-authoritarianism issue dimensions are highly intertwined in the case of stateless regionalist and nationalist parties ("SRNPs"). When regionalist parties have to give in on their territorial core business, their associated cultural-identity demands are under pressure as well. Consequently, the lack of an effect on this latter dimension may be due to simultaneous dynamics of increasing and decreasing salience which neutralize each other in the end. In sum, the evaluation of the third hypothesis is nuanced (increase in socio-economic salience, no change in liberalism-authoritarianism salience).

In addition, two control variables (i.e. national electoral score and RAI score) also show a significant effect in relation with the main dependent variable (whereby  $p<0.05$ ). This means that regionalist parties that have a higher electoral score at the national level are more likely to enter into regional government ( $B=0.341$ ;  $p=0.048$ ). And if a regionalist party operates in a more decentralized country it will enjoy more opportunities to participate in regional government ( $B=0.167$ ;  $p=0.036$ ). The results are reported in Table 3.

**Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=132**

	(Independent) Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Block 1</b>	Territorial salience (%)	-0,194	0,073	7,132	1	<b>0,008</b>	0,823
<b>Block 2</b>	Electoral score - national (% votes)	0,341	0,173	3,911	1	<b>0,048</b>	1,407
	Electoral score - regional (% votes)	0,061	0,038	2,567	1	0,109	1,063
	Regional Authority Index score	0,167	0,079	4,42	1	<b>0,036</b>	1,181
	Economic Growth (% GDP)	-0,118	0,201	0,345	1	0,557	0,889
	Party age (years since foundation)	0,024	0,015	2,617	1	0,106	1,024
	Constant	-3,689	2,283	2,611	1	0,106	0,025

Source: Author based on his own calculations.

The same regression analysis is now also performed for the **positional** perspective (cf. Table 4) in order to address the fourth and fifth hypothesis. Analogously, only the governing regionalist parties are examined (N=132) in order to identify the net treatment effect of ideological party change (or: persistence) on the odds of (regional) government participation. Here, the binary logistic regression analysis generates its best model fit when in Block 1 “liberalism-authoritarianism position” is omitted ( $R^2=0.515$ ;  $\chi^2=5,5$ ;  $Df=8$ ; Class. Rate=83%). The basic model generates a *positive* effect of socio-economic (“RILE”) moderation on government participation ( $B=0.128$ ). In other words, regionalist parties that develop a less leftist (=a more centrist) party stance increase their odds of cabinet entry. Including the five control variables (Block 2) weakens its statistical significance (Sig. two-tailed increases from  $p=0.012$  to  $p=0.126$ ) but this does not harm the observed empirical relationship as such. Recall that the laws of statistical inference do not strictly apply here as the investigated sample approximates the whole population (cf. supra). Thus, the evaluation of the fifth hypothesis paints a nuanced picture: socio-economic moderation increases the odds of government participation while positional change in liberalism-authoritarianism topics doesn’t generate any impact.

On the other hand, there is *negative* and statistically significant territorial effect on cabinet entry: regionalist parties that put forward a less decentralist discourse significantly increase their odds of regional government participation ( $B=-0.165$ ;  $p=0.02$ ). This confirms the fourth hypothesis. Including the five control variables (Block 2) in the model even further strengthens this negative territorial relationship (Sig. two-tailed decreases from  $p=0.048$  to  $p=0.02$ ).

In addition, with regard to the control variables, in more decentralized countries it is significantly more probable for regionalist parties to enter regional government ( $B=0.167$ ;  $p=0.036$ ). Furthermore, older regionalist parties are more likely to participate in regional government ( $B=0.025$ ;  $p=0.113$ ). The results are reported in Table 4.

**Table 4: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (position). With N=132**

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Block 1</b>	Territorial position (- or +)	-0,165	0,071	5,42	1	<b>0,02</b>	0,848
	Right-Left position (- or +)	0,128	0,084	2,343	1	0,126	1,136
<b>Block 2</b>	Electoral score - national (% votes)	0,044	0,235	0,036	1	0,85	1,045
	Electoral score - regional (% votes)	0,036	0,038	0,906	1	0,341	1,037
	Regional Authority Index score	0,167	0,08	4,321	1	<b>0,038</b>	1,182
	Economic Growth (% GDP)	-0,088	0,205	0,184	1	0,668	0,916
	Party age (years since foundation)	0,025	0,016	2,512	1	0,113	1,026
	Constant	-1,986	2,515	0,623	1	0,43	0,137

**Source:** Author based on his own calculations.

### Supporting regional data

Thanks to the fairly recent Regional Manifesto Project, we can now check whether the national figures can be underpinned with regional findings by conducting the same analysis on the RMP- data. From the relevant regional electoral platforms (cf. supra), again half of them (52.7%: 68/129) were publicized in years when the respective regionalist party was

part of the regional government, while only two (1.6%) were presented when the party was in the national government. Both manifestos actually belong to the same Italian party LN (cf. Appendix B).

Analogously, government participation is operationalized as a binary variable again, which does not leave much room for nuance. For example, several Spanish regionalist parties provided coalition support to the central government in the past, although without appointing their own national ministers. Instead, CC managed to divert important financial resources from Madrid to the relatively poor archipelago of the Canary Islands. Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Convergència i Unió (CiU) and ERC managed to decentralize former national policy domains to the autonomous regions of Catalonia (e.g. university education) and Basque Country (e.g. fiscal autonomy). In other words, regionalist parties often opted to trade national parliamentary support for financial or institutional benefits for their own region. These cases are not coded as “1” but as “0” in the dataset, however.

Three quarters of the (74.4%: 96/129) regional manifestos belong to regionalist parties that ever participated in a regional and/or national government. Again, only these party platforms are used for the regression analysis.

The descriptive statistics from the RMP data between the two subsets (i.e. governing versus oppositional regionalist parties) display a very similar pattern as to what the MAR-POR data already taught us (cf. Appendix D). Again, the first hypothesis is rejected since no significant differences between both subgroups are detected with regard to the six variables on party ideology. Only two differences are worth mentioning here. First, the average territorial salience among regionalist parties is much lower in the RMP- dataset. Probably this is due to a natural division of competences between the central and peripheral level across Western multi-level democracies. Most institutional affairs require constitutional change, which is by definition located at the national policy-level and increases the attention thereof in national party programmes. Second, on average regionalist parties hold more centrist positions in the RMP- dataset. This may be due to the fact that, within their own region, regionalist parties find themselves more at the heart of the political spectrum. Here they are a larger political actor and they are more likely to form an integral part of the government.

Binary logistic regression analysis is repeated for the subset of governing regionalist parties (N=96) in order to determine the net treatment effect of ideological change on the odds of government participation. Again, the number of coded electoral manifestos publicized during *national* government participation is too low for regression analysis, yet for isolated *regional* government participation it is sufficiently high.

Analogously, the basic model consists of the main independent variables (Block 1) while Block 2 includes the control variables (cf. Appendix E). Once more, from a salience point of view a *negative* territorial effect is found. However while not significant, it does confirm the second hypothesis once more ( $B=-0.13$ ;  $p=0,348$ ). *No* clear effect was found for the two other main independent variables in Block 1, i.e. “liberalism-authoritarianism” and “socio-economic” emphasis. This means that the third hypothesis is rejected here. Therefore, one could argue that regionalist parties are apparently less flexible in changing their regional manifestos than their national ones. Possibly, this is because they are a larger political actor at the regional level of government, which puts them in a stronger bargaining position.

Regarding the control variables, the regional findings are very similar to the national ones (cf. supra). Again, both regional electoral score and RAI score generate a significant effect. In other words, (1) in decentralized countries regionalist parties enjoy more

opportunities to enter regional government ( $B=0.13$ ;  $p=0.02$ ) and (2) a greater regional electoral score results into higher odds of regional government participation ( $B=0.05$ ;  $p=0.10$ ).

Finally, the regression analysis is also performed for the **positional** perspective (cf. Appendix E). A *negative* territorial relationship is found, although not significant ( $B=-0.061$ ;  $p=0.419$ ), which is yet another confirmation of the fourth hypothesis. For the fifth hypothesis the evaluation is nuanced again, but now the effect runs in the opposite direction: while socio-economic positioning doesn't generate any impact, taking up a more centrist stance on "liberalism-authoritarianism" issues has a *positive* effect on the odds of regional government entry ( $B=-0,072$ ;  $p=0.067$ ). It confirms our general impression that regionalist parties are highly flexible on their secondary ideological dimensions.

The control variables "RAI score" and "regional electoral score" once more show a significant effect. Regionalist parties in more decentralized countries are more likely to enter regional government ( $B=0.177$ ;  $p=0.007$ ). Likewise, regionalist parties that obtain a higher share of the regional vote significantly increase their opportunities for regional government participation ( $B=0.065$ ;  $p=0.023$ ).

## Conclusions

This paper has investigated how regionalist parties can increase their odds of government participation through adaptation of their programmatic profile. Their coded electoral platforms were analysed from a salience and a positional point of view. Movements on three important ideological dimensions of party competition were mapped; i.e. socio-economic, liberalism-authoritarian and territorial issues – whereby the latter category forms the core business of the regionalist party type.

Binary logistic regression analyses performed on available MARPOR and RMP data generated a significant and robust negative territorial effect: regionalist parties that decrease their emphasis on territorial topics and/or take up a less decentralist stance in their electoral platforms increase their probabilities to enter (regional) government. For their two secondary ideological dimensions the empirical relationship with government participation is nuanced. Concerning socio-economic issues, regionalist parties that increase their salience or adopt more centrist (left-right) positions tend to increase their chances of (regional) government entry. For liberalism-authoritarianism topics, however, we observe no change in issue salience and only a slight positional moderation once they cross the threshold of government.

Various control variables were included into the regression analyses. While economic growth, party age and national electoral score only display a weak impact on the odds of government participation, the RAI score and regional vote share generate a significant relationship. In other words, regionalist parties enjoy more opportunities to effectively enter (regional) government when they operate in more decentralized countries and when they are a larger political actor at the regional level.

This quantitative research has shown us how regionalist parties ideologically adapt once they cross the threshold of government. More specifically, they compromise on their own territorial core business. We acknowledge that there is an anticipation effect (before) as well as a contagion effect (during).

Yet, while there are numerous cases of governing regionalist parties available at the peripheral policy-level, there are only few examples at the central policy-level. This is

an important limitation of this quantitative research: a more qualitative approach is better suited here to investigate party dynamics at the latter level more in-depth. Is there really a low appetite among regionalist parties to co-govern at the national level? Are they simply preoccupied with holding executive power in their own region? Or is the low number of available cases rather due to the limited opportunities provided to them by their state-wide political opponents?

Complimentary qualitative research could unravel more in specific what the main incentives are that drive regionalist parties to cross the threshold of governance. What triggers regionalist parties to modify their programmatic profile over time? Most likely, regionalist parties are confronted with the same strategic trade-off between policies, office and votes as all other party types.

This study was a first systematic attempt to lay out a couple of general programmatic trends among regionalist parties in cabinet. Consequently, an important limitation of this study is that it makes abstraction of country-specific circumstances. In that respect, it is important to highlight the relatively high number of Spanish cases in this dataset. Although their inclusion does not alter the nature of the overall findings, country-specific analyses could verify whether the identified general trends do effectively uphold in different contexts. Furthermore, some policy domains are typically located at the peripheral (e.g. culture) or at the central (e.g. defence) level of government. For example, if territorial issues are by definition more frequently situated at the national level this has to be taken into account when interpreting the results above. Therefore, a more fine-grained analysis per policy domain could bring nuance to these initial and general findings.

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## APPENDIXES:

### Appendix A: Regionalist parties from the marpor dataset

PARTY	FULL NAME	COUNTRY	NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (CMP)	REGIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
VU	Volkunie	BEL	14 + 1 in cartel with ID21	1981-1985 and 1988-1995 and 1999-2002 (Flanders) and 1989-1997 (Brussels)	1977-1979 and 1988-1991
FD	Front Democratique Francophone	BEL	10 + 2 in cartel with PRL	1989-2004 and 2014-2019 (Brussels)	1977-1980 and 2004-2007
RW	Rassemblement Wallon - Walloon Rally	BEL	6	Only in opposition	1974-1977
N-VA	Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie - New Flemish Alliance	BEL	3	2004-2019 (Flanders)	2014-2019
VB	Vlaams Belang - Flemish Interest	BEL	10	Only in opposition	Only in Opposition
BQ	Bloc Quebecois	CAN	8	Only active in general elections	Only in Opposition
LDT	Ticino League	CH	1	1995-2019 (Ticino)	Only in Opposition
MCG	Geneva Citizens' Movement	CH	1	2013-2019 (Geneva)	Only in Opposition
EE	Basque Left - Euskadiko Ezkerra	ESP	5	1979-1980 and 1991 (Basque)	Only in Opposition
PAR	Aragonese Regionalist Party - Partido Aragonés	ESP	6	1987-1993 and 1995-2015 (Aragon)	Only in Opposition
PNV	Basque Nationalist Party - Partido Nacionalista Vasco	ESP	13	1978-2009 and 2012-2019 (Basque) and 1999-2003 (Navarre)	Only in Opposition
EA	Basque Solidarity - Eusko Alkartasuna	ESP	6	1991 and 1995-2009 (Basque) and 1999-2003 (Navarre)	Only in Opposition
PA	Andalusian Party - Partido Andalucista	ESP	6	Only in opposition (Andalucia)	Only in Opposition
CHA	Aragonist Council - Chunta Aragonesista	ESP	2	2015-2019 (Aragon)	Only in Opposition
UPN	Navarrese People's Union - Unión del Pueblo Navarro	ESP	2	1991-2015 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition
GBAI	Gerao Bai - Future Yes (= PNV+ in Region of Navarre)	ESP	1	2015-2019 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition

PARTY	FULL NAME	COUNTRY	NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (CMP)	REGIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
FAC	Asturias Forum - Foro Asturia	ESP	1	2011-2012 (Asturias)	Only in Opposition
EH Bildu	Basque Country Unite - EH Bildu	ESP	2	2015-2019 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition
BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc - Bloque Nacionalista Galego	ESP	5	1987-1990 and 2005-2009 (Galicia)	Only in Opposition
ECP	En Común Podem (in Catalonia)	ESP	2	Only in opposition (Catalunia)	Only in Opposition
CQ	Coalicio Compromis - Compromis-Equo	ESP	1	2015-2019 (Valencia)	Only in Opposition
EM	En Marea = ANOVA + Podemos + EU (Galicia)	ESP	2	Only in opposition (Galicia)	Only in Opposition
CPE	Compromís–Podemos–És el moment (=since 2016 : „A La Valencianna“)	ESP	2	2015-2019 (Valencia)	Only in Opposition
CC	Canarian Coalition - Coalición Canaria	ESP	8	1993-2019	Only in Opposition
CIU	Convergence and Union - Convergència i Unió (=CDC+UDC)	ESP	10	1980-2003 and 2010-2015	Only in Opposition
CDC	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia - Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya	ESP	1	1980-2003 and 2010-2017	Only in Opposition
ERC	Catalan Republican Left - Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	ESP	13	1984-1987 and 2003-2010 and 2016-2019	Only in Opposition
AMA	Amaiur (=predecessor GBAI = EA+Aralar)	ESP	1	NA	Only in Opposition
DL	Democracy and Freedom - Democràcia i Llibertat (=CDC+ in 2015)	ESP	1	1980-2003 and 2010-2017	Only in Opposition
BP	Bavarian party	GER	1	1954-1957	Only in Opposition
SSW	South Schleswig Voters Union	GER	1	2012-2017 (Schleswig)	Only in Opposition

PARTY	FULL NAME	COUNTRY	NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (CMP)	REGIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
LN	Lega Nord	ITA	7	1994-2019	1994 and 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 and 2018-2019
SVP	South Tyrolean People's Party - Südtiroler Volkspartei	ITA	2	1948-1959 and 1970-2019	Only in Opposition
ALD	Autonomy Liberty Democracy (Aosta Valley) - Autonomie Liberté Démocratie	ITA	1	Only in opposition	Only in Opposition
VdA	Autonomy Progress Federalism Aosta Valley (=Valdostan Union in national elections)	ITA	1	1949-1966 and 1974-1990 and 1992-2019	Only in Opposition
PC	Plaid Cymru	UK	1	2007-2011	Only in Opposition
SNP	Scottish National Party	UK	4	2007-2019	Only in Opposition
SF	Sinn Fein - We Ourselves	UK (NIRE)	3	1998-2003 and 2007-2017	Abstention
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party	UK	1	1998-2002 and 2007-2019	Only in Opposition
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>168</b>		

**Appendix B: Regionalist parties from the RMP dataset**

PARTY	FULL NAME	COUNTRY	NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (RMP)	REGIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION	NATIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION
PA	Partido Andalucista	ESP	2+1	Only in opposition (Andalucia)	Only in Opposition
PAR	Partido Aragonés Regionalista	ESP	5	1987-1993 and 1995-2015 (Aragon)	Only in Opposition
CHA	Chunta Aragonesista	ESP	5	2015-2019 (Aragon)	Only in Opposition
AIC	Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias	ESP	1	Only in opposition (Canarias)	Only in Opposition
CC	Coalición Canaria	ESP	4	1993-2019	Only in Opposition

PARTY	FULL NAME	COUNTRY	NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (RMP)	REGIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION	NATIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION
PRC	Partido Regionalista de Cantabria	ESP	5	1990-1991 and 1995-2011 and 2015-2019 (Cantabria)	Only in Opposition
UPL	Unión del Pueblo Leonés	ESP	2	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
CIU	Convergència i Unió	ESP	6	1980-2003 and 2010-2015	Only in Opposition
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	ESP	5	1984-1987 and 2003-2010 and 2016-2019	Only in Opposition
CUP	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	ESP	2	2015-2017	Only in Opposition
JUNTSxCAT	Junts per Catalunya	ESP	1	2017-2019	Only in Opposition
CQ	Coalició Compromís	ESP	1	2015-2019 (Valencia)	Only in Opposition
ECP	En Común Podem (in Catalonia)	ESP	1	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego	ESP	7	1987-1990 and 2005-2009 (Galicia)	Only in Opposition
EM	En Marea = ANOVA + Podemos + EU (Galicia)	ESP	1	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
UM	Unió Mallorquina	ESP	3+1	1987-1995 and 2007-2009	Only in Opposition
BLOC	Bloc per Mallorca	ESP	1	2007-2011	Only in Opposition
PR	Partido Riojano	ESP	3	1991-1995 (La Rioja)	Only in Opposition
UPN	Unión del Pueblo Navarro	ESP	6	1991-2015 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition
HB	Herri Batasuna	ESP	2 (Navarra) + 2 (Pais Vasco)	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
EH	Euskal Herritarrok	ESP	1 (Navarra) + 1 (Pais Vasco)	2015-2019 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition
NABAI	Nafarroa Bai	ESP	2 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
EH BI	Euskal Herria Bildu	ESP	1 (Navarra) + 2 (Pais Vasco)	2015-2019 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition
GBAI	Geroa Bai	ESP	1 (Navarra)	2015-2019 (Navarra)	Only in Opposition

<b>PARTY</b>	<b>FULL NAME</b>	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>NUMBER OF CODED MANIFESTOS (RMP)</b>	<b>REGIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>NATIONAL GOV. PARTICIPATION</b>
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco	ESP	7	1978-2009 and 2012-2019 (Basque) and 1999-2003 (Navarre)	Only in Opposition
EE	Euskadiko Ezkerra	ESP	2 (Pais Vasco)	1979-1980 and 1991 (Basque)	Only in Opposition
EA	Eusko Alkartasuna	ESP	3 (Pais Vasco)	1991 and 1995-2009 (Basque) and 1999-2003 (Navarre)	Only in Opposition
SNP	Scottish National Party	UK	5	2007-2019	Only in Opposition
PC	Plaid Cymru	UK	5	2007-2011	Only in Opposition
SA	Stella Alpina	ITA	2	2006-2019	Only in Opposition
UV	Unión Valdôtaine	ITA	2	1949-1966 and 1974-1990 and 1992-2019	Only in Opposition
ALPE	Autonomie Liberté Participation Écologie	ITA	1	2017-2019	Only in Opposition
RV-VAV	Renouveau Valdôtain - Vallée d'Aoste Vive	ITA	1	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
UVP	Unión Valdôtaine Progressiste	ITA	1	1973-1974 and 1978-1979 and 1983-1988 and 2014-2019	Only in Opposition
DF	Die Freiheitlichen	ITA	5	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
UFS	Union für Südtirol	ITA	3	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
STF	Süd-Tiroler Freiheit	ITA	2	Only in Opposition	Only in Opposition
SVP	Südtiroler Volkspartei	ITA	9	1948-1959 and 1970-2019	Only in Opposition
PATT	Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese	ITA	2	1993-2004 and 2014-2019	Only in Opposition
LN TR	Lega Nord Trentino	ITA	2	2018-2019	1994 and 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 and 2018-2019
LN LV	Lega Nord - Liga Veneta	ITA	2	1993-1995 and 2000-2019	1995 and 2001-2006 and 2008-2011 and 2018-2019
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>129</b>		



**Appendix C: Regrouping codes from MARPOR/RMP coding scheme**

Party - ideology : Three main dimension of party competition					
Socio - Economic		Territorial		Liberalism-Authoritarianism	
Left	Right	Decentralisation	Centralisation	Liberalism	Authoritarianism
market regulation 403	free market economy 401	de-centralization 301	centralization 302	freedom and human rights 201	political authority 305
economic planning 404	economic incentives 402			democracy 202	national way of life : positive 601
corporatism/mixed economy 405	protectionism : negative 407			anti-growth economy : positive 416	traditional morality : positive 603
protectionism - positive 406	economic growth : positive 410			environmental protection : positive 501	law and order 605
Keynesian demand management 409	economic orthodoxy 414			culture : positive 502	multiculturalism : negative 608
controlled economy 412	welfare state limitation 505			national way of life : negative 602	social harmony 606
nationalization 413	education limitation 507			traditional morality : negative 604	
marxist analysis : positive 415	labour groups : negative 702			multiculturalism : positive 607	
equality : positive 503				underprivileged minority groups 705	
welfare state expansion 504				non-economic demographic groups 706	
education expansion 506					
labour groups : positive 701					
<b>Right-Left position („RILE“)</b>					
left emphasis	right emphasis				
anti-imperialism 103	military : positive 104				
military negative 105	freedom and human rights 201				
peace 106	constitutionalism : positive 203				
internationalism : positive 107	political authority 305				
democracy 202	free market economy 401				

Party - ideology : Three main dimension of party competition					
Socio - Economic		Territorial		Liberalism-Authoritarianism	
Left	Right	Decentralisation	Centralisation	Liberalism	Authoritarianism
market regulation 403	economic incentives 402				
economic planning 404	protectionism : negative 407				
protectionism : positive 406	economic orthodoxy 414				
controlled economy 412	welfare state limitation 505				
nationalization 413	national way of life : positive 601				
welfare state expansion 504	traditional morality : positive 603				
education expansion 506	law and order 605				
labour groups : positive 701	civic mindedness : positive 606				

**Appendix D: Descriptive (RMP) Statistics: Governing versus Oppositional regionalist parties (with N=129)**

(Independent) Variable	Governing	Oppositional
Territorial salience (%)	4,40%	4,06%
Socio-economic salience (%)	39,27%	33,47%
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%)	27,72%	25,59%
Territorial position (- or +)	(+)4,37	(+)4,06
Right-Left position (- or +)	-9,98	0,23
Liberalism-Authoritarianism position (- or +)	(+)0,28	-7,85

**Appendix E: RMP binary logistic regression (salience and position).**

**Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=96.**

	(Independent) Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Block 1</b>	Territorial salience (%)	-0,13	0,14	0,88	1,00	<b>0,35</b>	0,88
	Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%)	0,09	0,06	1,97	1,00	0,16	1,09
	Socio-Economic salience (%)	0,03	0,06	0,30	1,00	0,59	1,03
<b>Block 2</b>	Electoral score - regional (% votes)	0,05	0,03	2,59	1,00	<b>0,11</b>	1,05
	Regional Authority Index score	0,13	0,06	5,23	1,00	<b>0,02</b>	1,14
	Economic Growth (% GDP)	-0,16	0,20	0,68	1,00	0,41	0,85
	Party age (years since foundation)	0,02	0,02	1,78	1,00	0,18	1,02
	Electoral score - national (% votes)	0,14	0,30	0,21	1,00	0,65	1,15
	Constant	-7,37	4,09	3,24	1,00	0,07	0,00

**Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (position).With N=96.**

	(Independent) Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>Block 1</b>	Territorial position (- or +)	-0,061	0,08	0,653	1	0,419	0,94
	Lib-Auth Position (- or +)	-0,072	0,04	3,356	1	0,067	0,931
<b>Block 2</b>	Electoral score - regional (% votes)	0,065	0,03	5,2	1	<b>0,023</b>	1,067
	Regional Authority Index score	0,177	0,07	7,398	1	<b>0,007</b>	1,193
	Economic Growth (% GDP)	-0,284	0,19	2,187	1	0,139	0,753
	Party age (years since foundation)	0,03	0,02	2,079	1	0,149	1,031
	Constant	-5,162	2,4	4,627	1	0,031	0,006