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Sergey N. Borisov

Viktor P. Rimsky

HERMENEUTICS OF TRANSLATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE

ABSTRACT

The philosophical definition of violence today is “incomplete” and leaves a “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of “violence” was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of “power”, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do we find “traces” of this concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek *δύναμις*, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force (movement, ability, function); in its turn, “force” lost relation to “violence” (*βία*) and “necessity”. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one’s “own decision”, freedom, something that “prevents desire” and contrary to “common thinking,” as well as the absence of “good”. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and of one’s own “desire”. Force remains in the shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode.

KEYWORDS

hermeneutics, possibility, force, power, reality, action, violence, necessity, coercion, Aristotle, V. Rozanov, I. Ilyin, M. Heidegger

Initially, we turned to the hermeneutics of Aristotle’s texts in the existing Russian translations, trying to give our own understanding of violence in the modern philosophical context because of its categorial insufficiency. Philosophical categorization presupposes an initial definition of the phenomenon to be interpreted, but the existing conceptual forms turned out to be “insufficient”. These forms left a certain “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept of “violence”, giving rise to an obvious semantic and conceptual uncertainty in understanding violence.

Sergey N. Borisov: Professor, Department of Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Science, Belgorod State Institute of Arts and Culture, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Belgorod State National Research University; borisov_sn@bsu.edu.ru.

Viktor P. Rimsky: Professor, Department of Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Science, Belgorod State Institute of Arts and Culture, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Belgorod State National Research University; rimskiy@bsu.edu.ru.

It was intuitively clear that the categorical links “human beings – violence”, “violence – being”, “violence – non-violence” are implicitly contained in the historical and philosophical categorical context. Not only in the Russian but also in Western public (and scientific) discourse, *the problematic field of violence* was burdened primarily with *political and ethical meanings*: political apology or ethical critique of violence. In post-Soviet philosophy, after the victory of the first Russian “velvet” revolution in August 1991 in the area of the Garden Ring and the White House, and the suppression of the first subcultural “colored” (“red-brown”) revolution in 1993, “violence” turned out to be conceptually connected with “non-violence” and ethical exposure of these concepts (Гусейнов 2011: 9). In this respect, the concept of violence by A.A. Guseinov was a representative for those times. It was developed in the spirit of the ethics of non-violence, containing certain formal and logical contradictions. He rightly connected “violence” and “non-violence” with “force”, distinguishing them (ibid: 79). Guseinov interpreted “non-violence” as “positive, constructive force” and “violence” as “destructive and self-destructive force”. In addition to the concepts of “violence” and “non-violence”, there was a positive presence of the concept of “force” (as marginal one), which unfortunately resided in the space of ethical connotations. And it remained unclear: are “violence” and “power” always “evil”? Is “nonviolence” a “force” or not?

There has clearly revealed some unconscious political rationalizations, which are often found in ethical doctrines of violence and non-violence. To show all the contradictions in the definitions of the concept of “violence” through the concept of “non-violence”, a concept that is even more burdened with metaphorical, existential, political and ideological meanings, is fraught not only with the danger of “moralizing”, but also with a radical going beyond boundaries of scientific and philosophical categorizations.

We tried to proceed from the meanings of our native Russian language, but here we also found out that in common usage the term “*nasilie*” often carries a “negative assessment load”, but its language meanings are not exhausted – in living and historical languages it is becoming more and more difficult. In *Vladimir Dahl’s Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language* we will find an understanding of such terms as *nasilit, nasilovat, nasilivat*, which imply the following meanings: to force, to compel, to force something, to constrain. There are also terms *nasilie* and *nasilstvo*: *coercion, captivity, need of force, illegal and arbitrary action*. And also: *arbitrariness, life under oppression, control or keep in submission by force (violence)* (Даль 1905: 1218). We have singled out those meanings which already initially contain some *intuitive philosophical connotations*. First, it is obvious that negative assessments do not prevail here. Second, there remains the meaning of “coercion” and “unfreedom” (captivity). Third, there is a connection with *everyday resentment* and “constraint”, “*illegality*” and “*domination*” (life under oppression), and, finally, with pragmatic *management*. As we can see, the “great and mighty” Russian language as the “house of being” (Heidegger) contains many concealed meanings and at the same time it opens up a large space for our categorization.

In English, some semantic work was done earlier by H. Arendt, who wrote: “It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does not distinguish among such key words as ‘power’, ‘strength’, ‘force’, ‘authority’, and, finally, ‘violence’ – all of which refer to distinct, different phenomena and would hardly exist unless they did. (...) *Force*, which we often use in daily speech as a synonym for violence, especially if violence serves as a means of coercion, should be reserved, in terminological language, for the ‘forces of nature’ or the ‘force of circumstances’ (*la force des choses*), that is, to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements” (Arendt 1970: 50, 52, 53, 54). However, we were embarrassed here by the technological and instrumental understanding of violence and its identification solely with power. Even Foucault, despite his Nietzschean passion for “power”, demarcated “violence” and “power” (Фукко 2006: 180), recognizing as the main sign of violence the objectification of any influence as opposed to free, subjective existence.

In the aspect we are interested in, H. Hofmeister quite consistently tried to connect the interpretation of violence with the concept of “force”, starting with the problematization of the meaning of the concepts presented in “The German Dictionary of the Brothers Grimm”, and ending with the Indo-European and ancient origins. He wrote, noting the connection between violence and “force”, which “acts as violence only under certain conditions”: “The German word ‘violence’ (*Gewalt*), which is derived from the Indo-Germanic root *val* – ‘to be strong’ – implies ‘to have the ability to dispose’. Initially, i.e. in ancient German language, the word ‘violence’ was not a legal term: it was used in an area of freedom where there was no place for law. Later on, ‘violence’ was used to translate such Latin notions as *violentia* (riot, unrestraint), *vis* (power, might) and *potestas* (power, potential, domination). Since in the Middle Ages the word *potestas* was most often translated by the German word ‘power’, ‘violence’ received a stronger meaning *violentia*” (Хофмайстер 2006: 31–32). Here, there appear some different meanings from the Russian ones: might (although *moshch* in Russian also means both *might* and *ability to do something*) and, most importantly, *potential*. The latter is very important, because it is from this categorical *point of view of potentiality*, the path of violence into the *reality* of human existence begins.

Thus, we find ourselves in difficulty, because we intuitively feel the generic load of the concept of “power”, which is constantly being either marginal or *philosophically excluded*. The new appeal to Russian linguistic thesauruses has shown that in the *Vladimir Dahl’s Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language* the spectrum of meanings of the term “power” turns out to be wider, including also “violence” (Даль 1909: 152–154), and even more diverse than in the dictionary of the Grimm brothers: it contains both numerous connotations related to “natural forces and causes” and “vital forces”, and spiritual ones – *sila dukhovnaja* (spiritual force), *sila uma* (mental force), *sila voli* (willpower), *sila nravstvennaja* (moral force), *moch* (might), *moguta* (ability), *sposobnost* (potential). And, equally important, it points to the ontological aspects of “power”: ways, means, essence of the concept, etc. There are also very important meanings of

“power” – *vlast* (might), *mogushchestvo* (potency), *vlijanje* (influence), *vladychestvo* (domination), *vojsko* (army), *armija* (forces), *rat* (warrior host); this suggests that power itself may include power phenomena, which also constitute a wider class of phenomena than violence in general, and the more so legitimate violence.

As a generic concept of “power” in relation to “violence” I. A. Ilyin for the first time clearly indicated in his “apprentice” article “Concepts of Law and Power (Essay of Methodological Analysis)” (1910), which also received European recognition. In this article, he gave a subtle philosophical concept of “force”, different from Hegel’s one in the *Philosophy of Right*, but based on the history of philosophy (although he also allowed for the Kantian logic) (В. П. Римский, О. Н. Римская, Мюльгаут 2018). I. A. Ilyin noted the ontological status of the power of *Kraft* in contrast to the gnoseological *Macht*, relying on Leibniz, Spinoza and Fichte (Ильин 1994). The *ontology of power* as an ability, i.e. *potency*, he clearly ascended to Hegel, and through his works to Aristotle.

Hegel in his historical and philosophical lectures wrote, highlighting a special, actually original place in the Aristotelian discourse of the categories of *potency* (dynamis, ability, possibility, strength) and *energy* (act, realization of force, activity, necessity, expediency, reality): “To proceed, there are *two leading forms*, which Aristotle characterizes as that of *potentiality* (*δύναμις*) and that of *actuality* (*ἐνέργεια*); the latter is still more closely characterized as *entelechy* (*ἐντελέχεια*) or free activity, which has the end (*το τέλος*) in itself, and is the realization of this end. These are determinations which occur repeatedly in Aristotle, especially in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, and which we must be familiar with, if we would understand him” (Hegel 1894: 138). Although Hegel further reduces the hermeneutic tension of the “dynamis” concept: “With Aristotle *δύναμις* does not therefore mean force (for force is really an imperfect aspect of form), but rather capacity which is not even undetermined possibility; *ἐνέργεια* is, on the other hand, pure, spontaneous activity. These definitions were of importance throughout all the middle ages” (ibid: 138–139). I. A. Ilyin, criticizing the Hegelian understanding of “power”, both in his early article and in the book “On Resisting Evil by Force” (Ильин 1996), developed his own meanings of force and violence, coercion and non-resistance, etc.

All of this allowed us to join thesis of H. Hofmeister: “Power is not violence and authority, but in turn, neither violence nor authority can be thought of without power” (Хофмайстер 2006: 34, 36). And then he had interesting references to antiquity, to Aristotle.

The understanding of the phenomenon of violence in ancient culture and philosophy, in our opinion, should be preceded by the understanding that the usual meanings of many concepts used by modern researchers in their interpretation, were developed in the modern era. It should be taken into account that they are a kind of background for perception of this problem when analyzing and interpreting other historical epochs and cultural and civilizational worlds. In our case, it was necessary to identify cultural paradigms and philosophical images of violence not so much to reveal their authentic meaning inherent in antiquity, as to *find the boundaries of the meaning field* of the phenomenon

itself outside its cultural and historical variability, taken in its universality as an *archetypical meaning* in human life.

In the classical antique polis, we have completely new, *syncretic cultural practices of regulating the “zoon”, the “naked life” of a person*, the practice of integrating it into the “*bios*”, *into the good, “nomothetic” solidary life of the polis*, which do not exclude “polytheistic” forms of violence (freely accepted legitimate violence) and the authoritative control of the life of “free multitude,” which implies the emergence of moral-legal and religious-moral public forms of freedom and polis solidarity, “solidarity practices,” as conditions of personal “practices of self” (Foucault), new forms of man’s cognition of himself and self-control. In classical antiquity, the basic principles of opposing the practices of *legitimate violence* to “practices of self”, non-violence in the face of a universal “person” of the state and incipient legal violence are affirmed, which retains its cultural and cognitive value today. Not abstract “non-violence”, but legitimate *practices of power* tame *illegal violence*.

A symbolic event that influenced the ancient understanding of violence and non-violence in human life and the ancient polis was the execution of Socrates, who not only became a personified archetype and image of ancient thought (*voûç*), conscience and freedom, but also a “sacred figure of violence”, along with Jesus Christ, in the history of Western culture and philosophy. Socrates could have avoided death, as it was customary in the “legal practice” of the ancient polis, by persuading the court to expel himself from the polis: “Exile? for perhaps you might accept that assessment” (*Apol.* 37c) (Платон 1997). And he chooses death and rejects expulsion by “free decision”. Why? Because for a free citizen of polis to be in exile meant not only the loss of some sentimental “motherland” or “fatherland” (female and male versions of the policy nomination, which bothered Heidegger so much), not just the acquisition of the status of a metic with no rights in the “other’s polis”, and not even a return to “naked life”, but the transformation into a *homo sacer* (Agamben), which could not even be sacrificed, but anyone could have simply killed him. This is how Socrates perceived his possible “exile”, who had not left his “homeland”, had not left his “homeland”, preferring to constantly fly from “naked life” (private) to *βίος*, “political life” (public), annoying the Athenians as a gadfly, and urging them to return to the path of “self-care” (*Apol.* 30b, 30e, 36e–d).

The hermeneutics of the texts of ancient philosophers makes it possible to draw a conclusion (В. П. Римский, О. Н. Римская, К. Е. Мюльгаупт 2019) that the concepts of “violence” and “coercion” (or similar in meaning categories and images) are often used by them as synonyms and not only axiologically, but also ontologically. “Non-violence” as such is virtually absent in their texts, but close meanings could probably be defined in the analysis of the phenomenon that “freedom” was in antiquity. Special translation and interpretation procedures are needed to avoid modernizing ancient meanings, but this is only possible in a special, separate study.

The reference to Aristotle’s philosophy is of the greatest interest to us in terms of philosophical and ontological understanding and theoretical resolution

of the dichotomy of violence and non-violence. Aristotle was credited with being the first in ancient philosophy to consider the category of “power” as “ancestral” to both “violence” and “non-violence” (a point that was actually missed by both Hegel and contemporary authors). Why is it in Aristotle’s philosophy that the problem of violence arises in ontological terms? It is because it is in the life of polis that ethic and legal and political practices act for the first time as an effective force regulating violence and *asserting non-violence in the solidarity life of “free multitude”*.

This is how Aristotle, or rather *Russian translations and interpretations of Aristotle*, found themselves in the hermeneutics of violence and non-violence, violence and power.

Let us start actually with the first “Russian Aristotle”, or rather with the Russian reading of Aristotle, which made a contribution to the young V. V. Rozanov after the publication of his treatise “On Understanding”, still not recognized as hermeneutic and invaluable. In a letter to N. N. Strakhov dated February 15, 1988, Rozanov writes: “For the last 2 years, looking at different works, (...) I came to the conviction, perhaps, to the guess that the root of the case, the key to solving a lot of issues, which for me – either to solve or not to live, lies with Aristotle” (Розанов 2001: 153). N. N. Strakhov, in his correspondence, was somewhat sceptical about Aristotle’s Russian relevance and topicality, although Rozanov’s translation was perceived as some cultural act, having assisted in its publication. And, nevertheless, already in the 1913 note to N. N. Strakhov’s letter of February 23, 1988, as if continuing the dispute, Rozanov notes: “And I still think that Aristotle cannot be replaced by anyone” (ibid: 9).

It also contains a very remarkable opinion of Rozanov about the place of *dynamis* and *energeia* in Aristotle’s category: “[T]he concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in their Latin terms *potentia* and *actus* (I do not really understand only *actus*; in my work, I always spoke about the potential and reality; it is true that it corresponds to my ‘forming existence’, but we did not reach it in *Metaphysics*) are the key to understanding the most complex and deepest systems of philosophy. In them, as in mysterious symbols, the whole system of thought is expressed, and it became clear thus-and-so (the main thing is the change)” (ibid: 154). And in the next letter of March 2, 1988, about his translation and interpretation of Aristotle, he continues his thought: “I want to get acquainted with his works in order to get acquainted with his notions of *potentialities* (this is the most important thing), which he was the first to introduce into philosophy and has probably already developed well” (ibid: 160). In the preface to the publication of the translation of *Metaphysics* Rozanov wrote: “Amazing thing: after two millennia, which separate us from the time of Aristotle’s life, science is worried about the concept, as recently acquired, and, of course, more scientifically arranged, but which, however, was first discovered by Aristotle: we understand the concept of physical energy, which now replaces so long dominant concept of force and was first established by Aristotle in immortal terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, possibility and reality, tension and action.” (ibid: 25) No one has really appreciated this Rozanov’s hermeneutics of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*

yet, although it is very important for the actual understanding of the ancient meanings of the phenomenon of violence, among other things.

Therefore, we were surprised by Aristotle's new translations, which reduce the flexibility of the ancient Greek language, which is related to Russian and German, to a primitive modernizing analytic approach. So, for example, A. V. Markov, quite consciously, not only limits the meanings of Aristotle *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, but simply distorts them, as well as other categories: "Therefore, let the reader not be surprised that I often translate 'logos' as 'formula' (and 'proportion' sometimes, in Kubitsky's case it is 'definition'), 'atom' as 'individual', 'genesis' as 'production'; I explain 'art' as 'cooking' several times; I translate 'energy' only as 'reality', and after the poets and prose writers of the Russian XX century I prefer the word 'existence' to the word 'essence'" (Аристотель 2018: 8). It is natural that Markov's translation of Aristotle *Metaphysics* received fair criticism from specialists (Юнусов 2018). Trying to actualize Aristotle's dictionary and preserving its identity at the same time, as if bringing it closer to the language of "Mandelstam and Pasternak, Platonov and Nabokov", Markov does not understand that it is impossible to combine the innovative Nabokov language or avant-garde Pasternak language with the consciously archaized style of Platonov or Mandelstam. As it is difficult to combine the actualization of Aristotle language with the restoration of its archaic primordial meanings.

M. Heidegger will speak and write on the actualizing reading of Aristotle with the simultaneous restoration of the original identity (but only after Rozanov for almost thirty-five years!). Heidegger's "romance with Aristotle" began early: even at the time of his studies at the theological faculty. But it was in lectures at the faculty of philosophy that he urged students to turn to Aristotle from the present and to return to the ancient meanings of his concepts, which did not mean, however, some modernization of ancient philosophy. Rather, it meant archaizing modern (relevant) philosophy, searching through the restoration of the original meanings a specific philosophical language lost by modernist philosophy and translation modernization. And then he translates *δύναμις*, meaning in modern German *Vermögen, Kraft, Fähigkeit* (ability, power, opportunity), as *das bestimmte Verfügenkönnen über; Bereitschaft zu ...* (a certain ability to control; readiness for ...) (Хайдеггер 2012: 210). One can be amazed at how bizarre Heidegger translations are, but at the same time he solved the mystification tasks of constructing his adequate philosophical language by reading the thesaurus of the philosophy of antiquity, but he did not impose any modernizing meanings or avant-garde translations on the ancients language.

No, we are surprised by another fact: how the Greek *δύναμις*, used for the traditional translation of the Aristotelian interpretation of the category of *opportunity*, has lost the connotations of *power* (movement, ability, function); in turn, "power" has lost touch with "violence" (*bia*) and "necessity". An appeal to the categorization of violence and power by Aristotle, we believe, should begin with reading his treatise *Physics* (Аристотель 1981a), where we find such an initial categorical disposition and connection *δύναμις* as *power with motion*. An appeal to the treatises *On the Heavens* and *Metaphysics* (Аристотель 1981c;

1981b; 2006) allows us to expand the Aristotelian connotations *δύναμις* not only as “opportunities”, but also as “forces”, and in the interpretation of *ἐνέργεια* to get away from its understanding as only “reality”, connecting both with “action”, “necessity”, and with “violence.” At the same time, supposedly “outdated” Russian translations do not bother us.

In his treatise *On the Heavens* Aristotle, criticizing the Pythagorean “string theory”, writes: “But if the moving bodies are so great, and the sound which penetrates to us is proportionate to their size, that sound must needs reach us in an intensity many times that of thunder, and the *force of its action must be immense*. Indeed the reason why we do not hear, and show in our bodies none of the effects of *violent force*, is easily given: it is that there is no noise” (*De Cael.* II, 9, 291a, 2-7; italics ours). And further he makes a conclusion that none of the “stars” “moves neither as an animal, nor violently, *by force*” (II, 9, 291a, 2-7; II, 14, 296 b, 25-30; italics ours). Strength and violence are discussed here in an inseparable connection with “naturalness” as well as with “necessity”.

But what meanings does Aristotle put into “violence” and “forced movement”? The movement “as an animal” obviously presupposes some kind of “organicity”, “self-movement”, but “violence” means “unnaturalness” and “coercion”. This is also confirmed by other texts.

Here is a detailed Aristotelian understanding of naturalness: “The necessity that each of the simple bodies should have a *natural movement* may be shown as follows. They manifestly move, and if they have no proper movement they must *move by constraint*; and the constrained is the same as the *unnatural*. Now an unnatural movement presupposes a natural movement which it contravenes, and which, however many the unnatural movements, is always one. (...) The same may be shown from the fact of rest. Rest, also, must either be *constrained* or *natural*, constrained in a place to which movement was constrained, natural in a place to which movement was natural. Now manifestly there is a body which is at rest at the centre. If then this rest is natural to it, clearly motion to this place is *natural* to it. If, on the other hand, its rest is constrained, what is hindering its motion? Something, perhaps, which is at rest; but if so, we shall simply repeat the same argument; and either we shall come to an ultimate something to which rest where it is natural, or we shall have an infinite process, which is impossible. (...) For to traverse an infinite is impossible, and impossibilities do not happen. So the *moving thing* must stop somewhere, and there rest *not by constraint* but *naturally*” (*De Cael.* II, 14, 300a, 20–30; 300b, 5–7; italics ours) (Аристотель 1981c). But the Russian word *eststvennoe* (natural) carries the meanings of “existence”, “being”, “what *exists*”, and the opposite *protivoeststvennoe* (unnatural) means “what does not exist”, “*non-existent*”, which obviously leads us to negative attributes of violence, to its non-existence, *not-being*, and *destruction*.

In this sense, unnaturalness is again associated with an action, activity or movement, the nature of which is revealed by the reading and interpretation of *Metaphysics*: “We call the necessary (1) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live (...). The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes

and hinders contrary to impulse and choice. For the compulsory is called necessary (...). And compulsion is a form of necessity (...). And *necessity* is held to be something that *cannot be persuaded* (as a Fate) – and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement which accords with choice and with reasoning (...). For as regards the *compulsory* we say that it is necessary to act or to be acted on, only when we cannot act according to impulse because of the compelling force, – which implies that necessity is that because of which the thing cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards the conditions of life and of good, when in the one case good, in the other life and being, are not possible without certain conditions, these are necessary, and this cause is a kind of necessity” (*Met.* V, 5, 1015a, 20–34; 1015b, 1–8; italics ours).

Violence is understood here as such a necessity, which is connected with the suppression of freedom (“one’s own decision”), something “hindering desire” (“realization of one’s own will”) and contrary to “common sense”, as well as the absence of “good”. Violence is not only presented as “necessity” in the ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and “desire”. And “necessity” acts as fatal and inevitable, like the goddess of Destiny or Destiny itself. Further, Aristotle (in Book V, Chapter 12) considers “suffering” in connection with “ability” or “opportunity” (*dynamis*) as “scarcity”, “deprivation” and “lack of ability”. It is unclear why the translator chose to translate *dynamis* here as an “possibility” rather than a “power”? Power remains in the shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and violence loses the resulting opposition in ontological meaning.

Let us turn to Chapter V of *Metaphysics*, translated by P. D. Pervov and V. V. Rozanov, and compare them. And here we will see the meanings already revealed by us earlier. “(I)t *has something*, sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if *privation* is in a sense having, everything will be capable by *having something*, so that things are capable both by having something, i.e. a principle, and by having the privation of the positive principle, if it is possible to have a privation; and if privation is not in a sense having, things are called capable homonymously); and a thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other, has a capacity or principle which *can destroy it*. Again, all these are capable either merely because the thing might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. (...). *Incapacity* is *privation of capacity* – i.e. of such a principle as has been described – either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already have it” (*Met.* V, 12, 1019 b, 5–20; italics ours). The used phrases “desroy”, “privation of capacity” again turns out to be close with *nasilie* (violence) as something that is *ne/sushchee* (something that does not exist), *nebytie* (not-being) and *gibel* (death). Once again, there is a certain “not-being”, but there is no power as a characteristic of being, which is necessary not even for the second position, but for the first one in this categorical pair of power – violence.

These meanings and the need for “power” as coming from possibility to reality arise further (*Met.* Book IX, Chapter 1). Aristotle himself refers to these

meanings (*Metaphysics*, V, 12), but the translator again does not use the word “сила” (power) persistently, although Stagirite writes: “We have pointed out elsewhere that ‘potentiality’ and the word ‘can’ have several senses” (*Metaphysics*, IX, 1, 1046a, 5). Whereas *moch* (or *moshch*) in Russian means “power” (*vozmoch* – to be able to do something, and *prevozmoch* – to overcome, to pass to the reality). Such a reading, which implies the power of a stronger category of force, makes it obvious that the dialectics of force and violence are revealed through the opposition of ability/inability; violence/non-violence.

Thus, we can find all the meanings we are interested in from Aristotle, among which the category of *dynamis* can be interpreted as a force, and the category of power as violence (*bia*) which is associated with the categories of opportunity and necessity. Possible power as an ability in the context of naturalness (*prirodnost*) and necessity is put into the context of naturalness (*estestvennost*) as strength and unnaturalness as violence; they are two *equally possible* aspects of being. Unnaturalness is such a being, which is connected with necessity as *coercion*, distortion of natural, natural good or some “capturability” of force. As a result, there is a collision between “action” (*energeia*, power) and “counter-action” (violence) as a “natural” or “free” force and an “usurped” force, violence itself as an usurpation of “own decision”.

Of course, the “Russian reading” of Aristotle should be supplemented with new translations and actualizing interpretations, similar to what Rozanov did in his time, and, if it is possible, to what Heidegger did in the twenties of the last century, as well as the retrospective analysis of the Greek text through the use of the modern thesaurus, “clouds” of actual today’s meanings, texts and authors. So Walter Benjamin, who has once again become popular today with his concept of “divine violence”, raises the question whether Aristotle’s play of power and opportunity has something that does not include violence and is absolutely “non-violent”.

And Aristotle answers him: “Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, while they are the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one state and another; for it would thereby admit of more than one. If, then, there are certain *eternal and unmovable* things, *nothing compulsory or against their nature* attaches to them” (*Met.* V, 5, 1015b, 9–15; italics ours). Only God is not subject to violence as he is the most “simple”, “simple force”, “primary power” and “first cause”: “And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this *is* God” (*Met.* XII, 7, 1072b, 25–30). God as a true being is violent/non-violent absolute. There remains one step to Walter Benjamin (Беньямин 2012: 8) with his “divine violence”.

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Sergej N. Borisov, Viktor P. Rimski

Hermeneutika prevođenja i razumevanje nasilja

Apstrakt

Filozofska definicija nasilja danas je „nepotpuna“ i ostavlja „jaz“ između fenomena i pojma. To je slučaj usled činjenice da je pojam „nasilja“ (bio) uključen u opštu filozofsku kategorijalnu liniju na čudan način. U domaćem i Zapadnom diskursu problemsko polje nasilja sadrži pre svega politička i etička značenja. Problem se intuitivno rešava apelovanjem na pojam „moći“ za koji se ispostavlja da je filozofski izubljen u modernoj filozofiji. Samo u izuzetnim slučajevima pronalazimo „tragove“ tog filozofskog pojma. Među njima su Aristotelova dela koja se moraju osloboditi modernih izobličavajućih tumačenja. Dakle, u prevodima Aristotela, grčko *δύναμις*, koje se tradicionalno koristilo za prenošenje kategorije mogućnosti, izgubilo je svoje značenje sile (kretanje, mogućnost, sposobnost, funkcija); zauzvrat, „sila“ je izgubila svoju vezu za „nasiljem“ (*βία*) i „nužnošću“. Nasilje se tako shvata kao oblik nužnosti koji je povezan sa potiskivanjem „sopstvene odluke“, slobode, nečim što „sprečava želju“, i u suprotnosti sa „uobičajenim mišljenjem“ i kao odsustvo „dobra“. Nasilje je predstavljeno ne samo u ontološkom smislu, već i egzistencijalno, kao suprotnost „dobru“ i nečijoj vlastitoj „želji“. Sila ostaje u senci „nužnosti“ kao „mogućnosti“, „potencijalne energije“ i „kretanja“, i nasilje gubi opoziciju koja nastaje u ontološkom modalitetu.

Ključne reči: hermeneutika, mogućnost, sila, moć, realnost, akcija, nasilje, nužnost, prisila, Aristotel, V. Rozanov, I. Iljin, M. Hajdeger