

Posfacio / Afterword

Five Philosophical Notes on “Migration” and its Metaphorology

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*you have to understand,
that no one puts their children in a boat
unless the water is safer than the land*
Warsan Shire “Home”¹

Introduction

After the sleepless night of the terror attack (SAADIA 2015) in Paris on the 13th of November 2015, just one day after a double bomb attack in Beirut², it seems more urgent than ever to critically analyze the migration debate, especially (in *notes [1] - [3]*) in order to **disentangle**:

- (1) the **debate on migration** rooted in the humanitarian need to help refugees and migrants seeking a safer and better life;
- (2) *real dangers* from **cultural extremism** against liberal democracy and an open society and its values;
- (3) *fear-driven culturalist answers* to the strategy of chaos, trying to convey very basic affective personal and political panic and fear reactions (KRUGMAN 2015) that might enforce unreasonable³ security measures and right-wing populist restrictions of liberties, instead of responsible, wise political action and personal civic courage to effectively and sustainably respond to certain immanent threats.

Therefore I first attempt to put migration into perspective as a **special case of European inconceivability** with a **critical metaphorology**, while breaking up the *rhetorical strategy of joining or (con-)fusing*: [A] *terror acts* creating real fear with [B] *the fact of migration and migratory movements* and its *challenges and opportunities* for open democratic societies. And by doing so I wish to contribute as well to [C] a necessary debate on *values of liberal and secular democracies*, whose laws foster and protect the equality of rights, regardless of gender, sexual orientation, color of skin, or religious and philosophical convictions of its citizens.

In *note [4]* I will consider migration not within the framework of nation-state borders/-lessness, economic reasons or causal links to concepts such as *domicide* (Porteous and Smith 2001), but within Villem Flusser's metaphor of **existential "groundlessness"**. Finally, in a brief *note [5]* I will merely sketch the idea of **"conceptual migrations"** in a recent example of "neuro" migrations to the humanities.

1. Shipwrecks with [EU] Spectators - Critical Metaphorology of Migration

Metaphors reach out to the “subsoil” (BLUMENBERG 2010, 5), or lowest strata, of thought, and the metaphor of *shipwrecking* can be seen as a “thought-image” of travel and change of life, be it individual or collective. What interests us first is that metaphors such as *shipwreck with spectator* seem totally inadequate to deal with the present death toll of shipwrecking people fleeing from Syria, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and other North African countries to Europe⁴, a reality which still tells us about existential struggles for a “better” life. Hans Blumenberg focuses on the existential metaphor of *shipwreck with spectator* that lies at the beginning of our western Enlightenment age, an important *topos* today for thinking about migration:

“Those rescued from shipwreck are astonished by their new experience of dry land. This is the fundamental experience of science, that it is able to establish things that stand firm and provide solid ground for further discoveries. It could have been otherwise, as it is shown by other ages’ belief in fantastic metamorphoses and marvels. The reliability of firm ground is something wholly new for humans who are surfacing out of history. Nietzsche compares what he calls his happiness to that of the shipwrecked man who has “climbed ashore, and now stands with both feet on the firm old earth – amazed that it does not rock.” Terra firma is not the position of the spectator but rather that of the man rescued from shipwreck; its firmness is experienced wholly out of the sense of the unlikelihood that such a thing should be attainable at all.” (BLUMENBERG 1997, 21-22)

Can migration be put into perspective as a ***special case of European inconceptuality*** – confronting the freedom of movement of its citizens with the possibility of free mobility of migrants crossing, diverging and politically transforming our view of borders, nation states and citizenship, as they enter the EU borders in the year 2015?

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There have been plenty of catastrophe and war metaphors, linked especially to contemporary political discourse, describing the present *human migration* to the European Union or inside the EU. There is even the concept of migration as an intentional “war” strategy (GREENHILL⁵ 2010). But let us start with the *animal metaphor* which refers to the migrants in Calais – trying to enter the UK (a non-Schengen territory) – as a “swarm of people” (David Cameron).

*“This is very testing, I accept that, because you have got **a swarm of people** coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain because Britain has got jobs, it’s got a growing economy, it’s an incredible place to live. But we need to protect our borders by working hand in glove with our neighbours, the French, and that is exactly what we are doing.” David Cameron⁶ July 30th 2015 (my emphasis)*

Swarm behavior is often attributed to collective group behavior of *animals*; swarm refers specifically to *insects* such as ants, bees, locust, cockroaches, moths, beetles or butterflies, which use – as it has been named and artificially modeled – *swarm intelligence* to amplify their collective intelligent strategies by forming real-time synchronous systems.

What if – hypothetically – David Cameron didn’t have a discriminative, small-minded diminishment of migrants in mind, when *de-classifying* humans as “swarm of people”? What if he had thought of an alternative connotation of *swarms* in the sense of highly intelligent groups of decentralized, self-organized people, in which *swarm intelligence* enhances collectively “the wisdom of the many”, implying a trans-individual common strategy of migrants in order to survive and to continue their migration in pursuit of happiness and a better life, even if only for economic reasons?

“Swarms (...) allow users to continually update their intent in real-time, assessing how their views combine with the other participants to achieve an acceptable outcome. In this way, each participant in a swarm is not expressing a singular view, but is continually assessing his own personal conviction across the range of possible options, weighing his confidence and preference in real-time. With all

participants doing this in synchrony, the swarm quickly converges on solutions that seem to maximize the collective confidence and preference of the full group. We believe this is why swarms are able so efficiently capture the group's wisdom.“ (ROSENBERG 2015)

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Migrants as figures of the *other* also become metaphorically transported to the semantic field of *natural catastrophes*, e.g. of *flood* or *invasion* (WITTE 2015); in another extreme case, to stay with voices coming from the present British government, migrants are being pushed to the field of *illegality* and *crime*, by being described as “marauding” (Phillip Hammond, British Secretary of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs since July 2014).

What is introduced by the image of migrants as *marauding* (in relation to people or animals) is the idea of “groups going around a place in search of things to steal or people to attack”⁷ that carries meaning to a political strategy which seeks to justify a strict border control system inside Europe with a *politics based on basic affects, appealing to metaphorological substructures of thought*. Such strategy which normalizes *fear* as an operator goes to the extreme of pulling out of any responsibility for those people trying to cross the borders, leaving them either off shore in troubled waters or beyond increasingly higher EU fences, as in some countries at the moment. This not only strengthens the EU's outside borders, but overtly contradicts the Schengen philosophy of free movement inside the EU and hints at a difficult time for the Dublin regulations. This political metaphor-use has rightly been called “**toxic**” (SHARIATMADARI 2015) for an open pluralist debate on the complexities which migration confronts us with in multiple respects. The question arises: Is Great Britain – as a logical consequence – being actually overwhelmed by a kind of “tidal wave” of migration or even a “flood” (DAWAR 2015), an image of thought that appears in a more moderate form as a “stream”⁸ or “counter stream” of migration, for example in Everett Lee's 1966 “Theory of Migration”? What do these geologic water metaphors used in describing migrants and migrations convey as real or mapped meaning to the migration

debate, and which ethical standards in dealing with migration do they suggest? The water metaphoric has been re-appropriated for instance in a discourse by the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras on the 5th of November 2015, in which he states the necessity of helping refugees – for example by taking them out of refugee camps such as Lesbos’ – and distributing them to diverse EU member countries for a possible start of a better life, even if this might be seen only as a “**drop of humanity**” in an almost infinite “**ocean of necessity**”. However, responsible action towards migration (irrespective of migrants being accepted as asylum seekers or not) and war refugees might optimistically soon grow from a **drop** to a **stream** to a dynamic **river** of responsible action towards helping refugees/migrants in Europe: “Thirty in the face of thousands who have fled their homes in Syria and Iraq is **a drop in the ocean**, (...) (b)ut we hope that this becomes a **stream**, and then a **river** of humanity and shared responsibility, because these are the principles upon which the European Union was built.” (Alexis Tsipras⁹ 2015, my emphasis).

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And another Latin saying that is inscribed in the emblem of the city of Paris, and has served as its motto since at least 1358, went viral again after the Paris attacks in November 2015, referring not to a shipwreck, but to survival in heavy and difficult times at existential seafaring:

«Tossed (ship in heavy sea), but not sunk / Elle est agitée par les vagues, et ne sombre pas»: **fluctuat nec mergitur** (BOUNOUT 2015).

2. “We Are Here Only an Observer” - Moral Responsibility of Being in/off the Route

After entering the topic of a possible absolute metaphor of migration with Blumenberg’s existential metaphor of *shipwrecking with spectator*, we quote the current Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orban, in a most recent reference to Hungary in the EU summit on the present migration crisis, after having introduced thousands of kilometers of border fence to

its neighbors Serbia and Croatia. Hungary, according to Orban, was “*not (...) on the migration route*” anymore and had become an outside spectator, a mere (distant) “*observer*” of the migration crisis:

“Hungary is no longer on the route. We are here only an observer,” Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Sunday at the start of a crisis meeting in Brussels. By fencing the border with Serbia and Croatia, Hungary has shifted the refugee route to the Western neighboring countries.”¹⁰ (my emphasis).

The problem of the spectator of the shipwreck leads to another thought-image of modern migration, that of a “**route of responsibility**”. The contingent avoidance of being on the route seems to make countries discard their responsibilities, drawing a distinction between the countries on the route which have to act and the passive “outside observers” which are, and wish to remain, left aside the issues raised by the migrants who are entering the heart of Europe. Do we – and that means all EU countries – all share the moral responsibility of facing the challenges of migration, or is migration just a local problem of the specific countries on the route defined by the Dublin Convention? Can there be simple transitory “pass-through” countries or outside “spectator” countries on the route of migration? Does it make any sense to put all the burden on the outer-frontiers of the actual EU and not see migration as a challenge for all EU member countries? Most positions on migration are influenced by frameworks of nation-state thinking in which migration becomes a specific problem of being *on or off the route* of migrant movements, and in which migration is seen as destabilizing a supposedly homogenous, peaceful national-state order or community. This seems rather shortsighted, since it invites to overlook ***the global interconnectedness of national states and transnational organizations*** such as the EU and the call ***for a) transnational spheres of moral responsibility and justice and b) a possible global right to freedom of movement***. Nation-state positions taken as absolute values in themselves diminish the notion of real pluralistic societies and distort the complex international causes of migration, which make people lose their homes by war – e.g. the Syrian war at the moment – and other

man-made *domicides*. It has been underlined that there is an asymmetry between the rights of immigration on the one hand and the rights of emigration on the other. **Emigration** – as „voting with one’s feet“¹¹ (HANNUM 1987) – has been called the “*highest form of freedom of movement*” (McADAM 2011); **Immigration** though seems not to convey the same legal acceptance of a possible freedom of immigration or open borders.

Even if many EU leaders call for limits on migrants/migration, a philosophically sound argument for it (“why nation-states may be justified in imposing restrictive immigration policies if they so choose” (MILLER 2005)) is made difficult by the occupation of the debate on *limits for immigration* by right-wing thinkers and groups that try to link Islamic terrorism – e. g. Paris and Brussels attacks – with the necessity to close borders for migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. In fact, it is far from being settled how to understand **limits** to (im)migration. While some political players call for an absolute numerical limit on how many people a country is willing to take in – a view which has been critically interpreted as proposing a “Fortress of Europe“ – and try to figure out how responsibility should be distributed within the EU member states, many argue that the problem is located in a dysfunctional EU border control and in the illegal networks of traffickers (e.g. between Greece and Turkey). Still, others claim that the legal transit at the outer borders of the EU has to be secured and made possible in order to limit the speed with which migrants are allowed to enter the EU, so that the *right for seeking asylum* can be properly guaranteed. Nevertheless, the extreme case of absolute numerical limits on immigration, and not only the imposition of relative time-limits for organizational-logistical purposes of legal registration and humanitarian help, has to be seriously considered and debated as a conservative constitutional argument¹² in a democratic nation state. Indeed, it deals with the possibility that “*allowing an unlimited right of migration would have harmful consequences that outweigh the value of freedom of choice*” (MILLER 2005; CARENS 1987; HAMPTON 1995), and poses the question whether states are still allowed, today, to secure their borders with police – or even military – force against entering migrants.

For MILLER (2005), limits on immigration are also coupled with rights and duties of citizenship within the state one wishes to immigrate to, such as the acquisition of linguistic and other skills *“they require to function as active citizens,”* because *“democratic states must bring immigrants into political dialogue with natives.”* Here MILLER proposes a strategy that sees as unacceptable *“the emergence of a permanent class of non-citizens, whether these are guest workers, illegal immigrants, or asylum seekers waiting to have their applications adjudicated,(...)”*, since he understands *“democratic states as political communities formed on the basis of equality among their members, and just as this gives such states the right to exclude, it also imposes the obligation to protect the equal status of all those who live within their borders.”* (MILLER 2005, 205)

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On the other hand, the acceptance of migrants and asylum-seekers should be debated in relation to the philosophical position that can be called the “case for open migration” (KUKATHAS 2005), as imagined in the metaphor of the “**open door**”, an ethical *topos* that should be reanalyzed today. Especially in cases such as the Syrian refugees, who have lost the notion of national borders as formerly imposed from the outside (e.g. by colonial politics), the idea of “open borders” (FISK 2015) might still be the only freedom possible to live and search for a better life in a globalized economy and information society.

3. On the “Terra Incognita of the Spectator”

Martin Bachmann, categorized in the news after his heroic deed as “a German with a Kurdish migrant background” (BAUMANN 2015) – while I was writing this text – hindered a terror act on the 17th of October 2015. It was a politically motivated knife attack to the Cologne mayor candidate, the independent Henriette Reker, a former responsible for the integration of migrants in the city. Bachmann prevented the attack to the now elected mayor from being lethal, screaming whilst defending Reker and others that were injured by the terror act: “Why do you want to kill?” Afterwards, Bachmann underlined the motivation for his brave and fearless attitude:

“I came to Germany because of democracy and freedom and I am committed to defend these values. I am aghast that there are people with us here, for whom these values do not count anything. We must be vigilant.” (BACHMANN cit. in BAUMANN 2015)

We can take Martin Bachmann’s courageous act and his justification as an example of what Slavoj Žižek has in mind when he refers to the “opportunities” that the recent “wave” of migration presents Europe – and Germany in specific – with. It appears as a kind of theoretical and metaphorical therapeutics of “strengthening”, a remedy for the “core” of Europe that has been “weakened” by the European bureaucracy and the capitalist markets, and that, for Žižek, needs an “emancipatory project” against the “disease” of right-wing movements in the beginning of the 21st century:

“If we take migrants seriously and come to terms with them, it can be an opportunity for Europe, an emancipatory project, in which we strengthen the core of Europe. This is the only way to leave right-wing populists no chance.” ŽIŽEK (2015)

However, this philosophical *optimistic and metaphorical theoretical **spectator** view of the European shipwreck facing cultural extremism* connects and opposes metaphorical-theoretical debates and facts of migration, on the one hand, with/to right wing culturalist ideology, on the other. However, these are *not obviously linked by a causal nexus*, even if they are often presented as such: migration and right-wing movements in this metaphorical relation should ideally counterbalance each other.

Migration and migrants are thus metaphorically put into a strange counterweight position to parties/movements in Europe that wish to exclusively determine national or religious “identities” and national culture. In the debate around critical views of *multiculturalism* (ERIKSON and STJERNFELT 2012; STJERNFELT and ERIKSON 2009; 2015) and *culturalism* in general, the lack of universal values both from radicalized Muslims as well as from extreme rightists and national conservatives hints towards a political myth and *national ontology of culture*, in which, in both cases, a group value is attributed to a predominant and

teleological “culture“ which, when critically scrutinized, shows to lie in an open confrontation with *universalist* – not necessarily only historical European enlightenment – *values*, such as *free speech* (ERIKSON and STJERNFELT 2015) or a *plural and secular society* bound by the respect of common laws independent of cultural and religious self-definition:

“Culturalism has an entire range of categories in common with nationalism; indeed, nationalism in reality constitutes a subvariant of culturalism, in which a single culture provides the basis for the state. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the present nationalist renaissance in European politics makes use of culturalist ideas to a great extent.” (ERIKSON & STJERNFELT 2009, 1)

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Culturalism as an ideology shouldn't be confused with concrete cultural expression nor with the attempt to build communities and foster an understanding of values in open societies between different peoples and different cultures through works of arts, books, music, theatre, dance, design and other cultural expressions. The reaction of the Italian Prime Minister thus comes without surprise, when he emphasizes the importance to invest in access to culture for our youth as a collective response and prevention of terrorism or small-minded culturalism: “They imagine terror, we respond with culture. They destroy statues, we love art. They destroy books, we are the country of bookstores” (RENZI 2015; 25.11.2015). Even if I am not sure whether this kind of “culture clash” of “us” and “them” and its pre-supposed learning stimulus in Renzi's political declaration will bear fruit, the idea reminds me of us being linked to a universal library¹³ as a strange metaphor and thought-image of migration, as one among many possible movements in continuous imaginary and conceptual *migrations-homes* and even *migration-utopias* with which *we live by*. This library image conveys universal values of mankind, shown in writers such as Elias Canetti or Jorge Luis Borges, but in the end is actually unable to be completely understood from or circumscribed to the perspective of one of the culture-galleries and its histories of reading and moving inside the infinite library:

“The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite and perhaps infinite number of hexagonal galleries. (...) *The Library is a sphere whose exact centre is any one of its hexagons and whose circumference is inaccessible.*” (Borges 1964, 62-63)

4. On “Taking Up Residence in Homelessness” (Willem Flusser)

This note will deal with the Prague-born Willem Flusser and his autobiographical Brazilian deceptions/discoveries entitled “Taking up Residence in Homelessness / Wohnung beziehen in der Heimatlosigkeit” (FLUSSER 2002), in which Flusser explains his point of view of being inhabited by several homelands and not being able to affix his way of thinking and modes of being to one single or “original” home. As he has been raised in and has interacted with several cultures, he developed the possibility of being able to think in and of being woven into the fabric of various languages – a possibility that calls for a permanent cultural effort of multiple translations of a differentiated and synthesized modern identity, which is unable to single out or select a singular and unified “higher” cultural root:

“It goes against my own nature, but, having been seduced by my own topic, “Home and Homelessness,” I now intend to make the secret of my homelessness a little clearer. I was born a citizen of Prague, and it seems that my ancestors lived more than a thousand years in the Golden City. I am a Jew, and the saying “Next year in Jerusalem” has been with me since my youth. For decades, I was involved in an experiment to synthesize Brazilian culture from a larger mix of Western European, Eastern European, African, East Asian, and Indian cultural phenomena. I live in a village in Provence, and I have become woven into the life fabric of this timeless neighborhood. I was raised in the German culture, and I have been involved in German cultural life for several years. In short, I am homeless, because there are so many homelands that make their home in me. (...) In this respect, I have two experiences that contradict one another. All of the people to whom I was mysteriously bound in Prague were murdered. All of them. The Jews in gas chambers, the Czechs in the Resistance, the Germans on the Russian front. All of the people to whom I

was mysteriously bound in São Paulo are living, and I am still in contact with them.” FLUSSER (2002, 95)

For Flusser, the freedom that the migrant acquires through his journey (in Flusser’s case caused by an imposed exile) is different from a romantic journey that, at the core, is devoid of existential difficulties and existential homelessness. The mode of freedom given to the migrant entails a specific form, it is an “elective affinity”¹⁴, not the biological or native freedom of an amplified social responsibility beyond the existential thrownness of being born in a certain country, time or culture without being able to choose so:

“These are the dialogic threads of responsibility and of answering for another. Is the freedom of the migrant, this “spirit” who belongs nowhere, a solipsistic freedom devoid of responsibility? Has he attained his freedom at the cost of being with others? Or is solitude devoid of responsibility not, rather, the migrant’s fate (just as the Romantic poets described it)? (...) It was my birth that threw me into my first homeland, without anyone asking me if this was something I wanted. The chains that bound me there to my neighbors were, for the most part, placed on me. In my now hard-won freedom, it is I who ties the binds that connect me to my neighbors, in cooperation with them. The responsibility that I have toward my neighbors is not something that has been imposed upon me, but rather that I have accepted for myself. Unlike the one who is left behind and who remains mysteriously chained to his neighbors, I am instead bound to them by my own free will.” (FLUSSER 2002, 94-95)

The question inherent to Flusser’s interesting approach to taking up residence in homelessness is whether one can attain a more conscious notion of home. It comes close to the Kleistian idea of a second innocence; of having been expelled from the Garden of Eden in the first place, traveling and migrating around the world, and just after all the effort and pain of the existential journey forgetting the “original” home to see if a second kind of home, a conscious migrant home, more open to the idea of migration and existential homelessness, would be possible as *immigration into a home*:

“The secret codes of homes are not made of conscious rules, but rather spun from unconscious habits. What characterizes the habit is the fact that one is not conscious of it. The person without a home must first consciously learn the secret codes and then forget them, to be able to immigrate into a home.” (FLUSSER 2002, 95).

Nevertheless, for Flusser this *becoming conscious about home* is not only an enthusiastic endeavor, since it de-sacralizes or even banalizes the sanctuaries of the native inhabitants:

“The disappointment with Brazil was the discovery that every home is nothing more than the sacralization of the banal, whether one is born into it or one is involved in its synthesis. Whatever its shape, home is nothing more than a place to live surrounded by mysteries. If one wants to preserve the hard-won freedom of homelessness, then one must withstand participating in this mystification of habits. In the case of my Brazilian experience, I have to preserve the connections that I established there, because I am responsible to my Brazilian neighbors, just as they are responsible to me. However, I have to establish other connections outside Brazil, and I have to integrate my Brazilian experience into my new connections. Brazil is not my home. Instead, “home” is the people to whom I am responsible.” (FLUSSER 2002, 99)

Thus Flusser introduces two other metaphors related to the migrant. The migrant as window and mirror:

“The migrant is a man of a coming future world without homes. (...) He is both a window and a mirror: natives can see the world through him and, at the same time, they see themselves, if only in a distorted view. (...) The loss of the original, barely acknowledged mystery of home opens him up to a different sort of mystery: to the secret of being with the Other. His problem is this: How can I overcome the prejudices that lie inside the mysteries that I have carried with me? How can I break through the prejudices of my neighbors who embody mystery? How will I join together with them to create beauty out of ugliness? In this respect, every person without a home is—at least, potentially—the clear consciousness of all natives as well as a messenger of

the future. Thus, I believe that we migrants must accept this function as our profession and our calling.” (FLUSSER 2002, 102)

5. Notes on Conceptual [“Neuro-“] Migrations to the Humanities

Finally, I shall consider now the metaphor of *conceptual migrations*, referring to concepts that can be seen as disciplinary war machines and to their nomadic mobility, which can originate interdisciplinary transformations across the sciences: This brief note will merely sketch a recent example of “neuro” migrations to disciplines of the humanities (such as, for example, “neuroaesthetics”, “neuroethics”, “neuro-enhancements” or “neurotheology”, among others).

“Since the proclamation of the Decade of the Brain in the 1990s, the neurosciences worked a triumphant success without precedent. Far beyond the boundaries of the natural sciences, explanatory models arising from brain research are currently invading the fields of social sciences and the humanities. There is scarcely a science discipline resistant to the attempts of being modernized by the “neuro-“ prefix, leading to the epidemic emergence of novel neuro-disciplines such as neurospirituality, neurotheology, neurophilosophy, neuroethics, neuroeconomics, neuromarketing, neuropsychanalysis, neuroanthropology, neuroeducation and neuroesthetics, to name but a few.” HASLER (s.d.)

A specific philosophical task must be followed when reflecting upon the foundations of **enhanced humanities**, as a consequence of research on conceptual migrations: a metaphorology of concepts like “Neuro-”, which transcend disciplinary borders and change the proper idea of the discipline in question in the humanities. I work with the ideas of (conceptual) machines and *conceptual migrations* in which prefixes like “Neuro-” can be seen as indicators of new conceptual frameworks as well as interdisciplinary strategies and practices (POMBO 2004,73-104) of a) **importation**, in which the import is made according to the interest of the importing discipline; b) **crossing**, which deal with practices and strategies having their origin in a particular

discipline, radiating to others, invading other areas, circulating and by that revealing themselves as interdisciplinary problems; c) **convergence** of perspectives determined by the analysis of a determined object in a restricted area without structural modification of the involved disciplines; d) **decentration/deviation/polycentrism**, originated by problems that cannot be reduced to traditional disciplines. The new problems treated could be of technological origin or derived from a post-normal science situation in which we have to deal with technical uncertainty (methodological uncertainty; epistemological uncertainty (ignorance); societal uncertainty (limited social robustness)) or even with man-made problems that did not exist before, problems that by their inherent complexity cross and migrate from one discipline to the other. And I would also add e) **disciplinary take-over/complete absorption**, in which concepts and their metaphysical and epistemic frames can operate a substantial transformation of thought in a variety of disciplines in the humanities. This is the reason why I want to focus on the current example of conceptual “Neuro-” migrations to the humanities. These are important for evaluating the values, scopes and the epistemological limits (the possible cognitive biases) of *brain*-enhancements, *mind* interventions, *mood* alterations, and their enhancement and control of the imagination of traditional disciplines such as philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, politics, policy making and education:

“At present, various disciplines described using the prefix ‘neuro’ (...), are attempting to supplant the concept of the mind. Basically, what is happening is that the knowledge accumulated over decades of psychological and neuropsychological study is being presented as a novelty under new names (...), neuropsychology is perfectly capable of covering all aspects of the study of the mind-brain relationship. Why then is there currently a tendency to fragment it into other disciplines? Is it to give the impression that new branches of knowledge have come into being alongside psychology and neuropsychology? Often the appeal exerted by innovations, especially to the layman, can be attributed purely to their novelty. Today, new fields of research characterized by a short circuit between the traditional spheres of knowledge—such as economy, ethics, politics, and even theology—and

the discoveries made regarding how the brain functions are appearing on the scene.” (LEGRENZI and UMILITÁ 2013, VI)

Let me give just one example: *neuroethics* (CLAUSEN and LEVY 2015). A double task is attributed to this upcoming discipline, based upon the distinction made by ROSKIES (2002) between the *ethics of neuroscience*, which applies traditional ethical principles used to monitor research around the world (such as respect for persons, concerns for welfare, and justice), and the *neuroscience of ethics* (GREENE 2013). An alternative approach to neuroethics is endorsed by NORTHOFF (2009), who focuses on the *fact-norm circularity* of neuroethical concepts, which beg for epistemological clarification. Another possibility would be RACINE (2010) and his *pragmatic* neuroethics, as well as BLANK’S (2013) *policy approach*, which introduces questions related to moral action and policy making that have become important. Others still argue for a new research field in the contact zone of (neuro-)science, health, medicine, society and policy making, dealing with the new epistemological (RAMOS-ZÚÑIGA 2014; 2015), ethical and societal problems posed by neuroethics and by its *conceptual migration* to the fields of the humanities.

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(Endnotes)

1 Excerpt from the poem “Home,” by Warsan Shire

2 “Isis claims responsibility as suicide bombers kill dozens in Beirut“. The Guardian (12.11.2015). Online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/12/beirut-bombings-kill-at-least-20-lebanon>.

3 As KRUGMAN (2015) puts it: “A much bigger risk, in practice, is that the targets of terrorism will try to achieve perfect security by eliminating every conceivable threat – a response that inevitably makes things worse, because it’s a big, complicated world, and even superpowers can’t set everything right.”

4 “We know that 10,000 desperate migrant people have been rescued by Italian coastguards and the navy since last Friday. It is time to recognize that the Italian, Greek and Spanish maritime rescuers urgently need much more EU solidarity and support.” The Guardian (16.04.2015), “Europe’s shame over migrant boat people”. Online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/16/europe-shame-migrant-boat-people>.

5 In the documentation of an actual accusation of the German chancellor and vice-chancellor of treason (<http://www.institut-fuer-asylrecht.de/26561.pdf>) it becomes clear that the idea of an “intentional war plan” is supposed as if migrants would use their migration as a forced migration war strategy into the EU and Germany. The inherent metaphor of “weapon of mass migration” is presented as being ideologically and theoretically underlying the accusation, using the study of Kelly M. Greenhill (2010). Weapons of Mass Migration. Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy.

6 See: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/30/calais-migrants-make-further-attempts-to-cross-channel-into-britain> and <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/30/david-ferman-migrant-swarm-language-condemned>

7 See: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/marauding>.

8 “Migration tends to take place largely within well defined streams.” (LEE 1966, 54).

9 TSIPRAS, A. (2015), cit. in “Refugee crisis: Greece carries out first relocation of migrants to Luxembourg,” The Telegraph (05.11.2015): <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/11974019/Refugee-crisis-Greece-carries-out-first-relocation-of-migrants-to-Luxembourg.html>.

10 Translated from the German Handelsblatt (25.10.2015), according to DPA/Reuters: “Gipfeltreffen zur Flüchtlingskrise, Slovenien befürchtet “Ende der EU”“. Retrieved online on the 26.10.2015: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/gipfeltreffen-zur-fluechtlingskrise-ungarischer-premier-sieht-sein-land-nur-noch-als-beobachter/12495706-2.html>.

11 “There is no doubt that the right to ‘vote with one’s feet’ – whether to escape persecution, seek a better life, or for purely personal motives having nothing to do with larger political or economic issues – may be the ultimate means through which the individual may express his or her personal liberty.” Hannum, H. (1987). *The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

12 See SCHOLZ, R. (2015). “Wir verteidigen Europas Werte. Asylrecht kennt Obergrenze,” Focus.de (17.10.2015), retrieved online: http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/wir-verteidigen-europas-werte-asylrecht-kennt-obergrenze_id_5016673.html

13 “The best definition of a home was a library.” Elias Canetti, *Auto-da-Fé*.

14 “Thus, I recognized what makes patriotism (whether local or national) so devastating: it anoints the human ties that bind and thus neglects the ties that we accept freely; it privileges family ties to elective affinities, the real or imagined biological relations to those of friendship and love. I fell into a fever of freedom: I was free to choose my neighbor.” (Flusser 2002)