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## **NATION BRAND, NATIONAL PRESTIGE, AND THE SOCIAL IMAGINARIES OF THE ADVANCED NATION IN SOUTH KOREA**

Jung-Yup Lee  
*University of Massachusetts Amherst*

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**NATION BRAND, NATIONAL PRESTIGE, AND THE SOCIAL IMAGINARIES OF THE  
ADVANCED NATION IN SOUTH KOREA**

A Dissertation Presented

by

JUNG-YUP LEE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

February 2021

Department of Communication

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Approved as to style and content by:

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Henry Geddes, Chair

---

Briankle Chang, Member

---

Jina E. Kim, Member

---

Erica Scharrer, Chair  
Department of Communication

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**ABSTRACT**

**NATION BRAND, NATIONAL PRESTIGE, AND THE SOCIAL IMAGINARIES OF THE  
ADVANCED NATION IN SOUTH KOREA**

FEBRUARY 2021

JUNG-YUP LEE, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA

M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Henry Geddes

The dissertation focused on how the discourses and institutions of nation branding and public diplomacy reshaped the social imaginary of the nation.

Following the trajectory of the nation branding discourse in South Korea in the first fifteen years of the 21st century, I examined different moments of the re-imagining of the nation by multiple agents with regard to nation branding and public diplomacy.

Firstly, I examined how the news media played a crucial mediating role in importing and disseminating the globally emerging discourse of nation branding in collaboration with private and public think tanks in the early and mid 2000s.

Secondly, I examined how the South Korean government instituted the media-promoted public agenda of nation branding as a highly visible official public policy by setting up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding in 2009. Lastly, I examined how the public diplomacy efforts by non-state agencies and their critiques from the online subculture and the media and publicity experts.

To complete this research, I collected and analyzed data from news media reports, policy-related documents by governmental agencies, and internet blogs,

online forums, and OP/ED columns. I adopted the political economy perspective to analyze the economic and political interests; the narrative analysis of the news media discourse; the political-economy and image analysis of the public service advertisement; and the discursive analysis of the public controversies on online forums and news media.

I discovered that the discursive practices of nation branding and public diplomacy conducted by different agencies converged into the idea of “national prestige” and the post-developmental reimagining of the advanced nation in terms of culture and civility. However, the different agencies reimagined the advanced nation in varied ways: in the news media discourse, it was imagined as a business-friendly and “lawful and orderly” nation; in the public policy discourse, it was imagined as a neoliberal “brand nation,”; in the online subculture discourse, it was imagined negatively as an opposite of the current status; and in the experts’ discourse, it was imagined as a culturally sophisticated, globally accepted nation.



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

IMF crisis, World Cup, Sewol ferry disaster and presidential impeachment. These are historical events which epitomized the drastic social transformation in South Korea for the last two decades. As a native South Korean, I have personally experienced and observed the historical turmoil. The experiences and observations of these events contributed to the initial formation and continued development of the main idea of the dissertation research. Let me begin this dissertation with a few snapshots of these historical events and reflect on how they informed this dissertation on the discourses and institutions of nation branding, national prestige, and the advanced nation for the last two decades.

Scene #1: In December 1997, in the midst of global financial meltdown, South Korea had no choice but to accept the reform program proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for a bailout. The financial crisis, usually called “IMF *wigi*” (literally meaning the “IMF crisis”) in South Korea, practically put an end to an era of rapid national economic growth and the state-led development in South Korea. IMF *wigi* in fact opened up the era of the neoliberalization of the whole society, characterized by rapid liberalization, market opening, financialization, privatization, labor flexibility, widening income and asset gap, intensifying competition, the highest suicidal rate among OECD countries, and the lowest birth rate in the world. IMF *wigi* happened partly due to the *seggyehwa* initiative introduced in 1993-4 by the Kim Young-sam government. *Seggyehwa*, literally meaning “advancing into the world,” was regarded as the “next step of

Korean development” (K.-Y. Shin, 2000, p. 431) and taken as an expression of the “national pride of successful economic growth” (p. 430). However, with IMF *wigi*, it turned into its opposite. The oppositional party and the news media called the bailout a “national disgrace,” invoking “the 1910 national disgrace” (Kyöngsul kukch’i) in which Korea was forcibly annexed to Japan and lost its state sovereignty. This description of “disgrace” and the sense that the country collapsed were so widely accepted and circulated as a taken-for-granted expression that the National Archives of Korea put the title on the article about the currency crisis, “The day of national economic disgrace with 55-billion-dollar debt” (Nam).

Scene #2: Approximately four and a half years later, in June 2002, South Korea co-hosted the 2002 World Cup soccer games with Japan. The South Korean team unexpectedly kept winning and ended up taking the 4th place. The news media lauded the achievement of the national team as well as the orderly cheering by the crowd in the street as the case for enhancing the international image and the nation brand of the country. The news media praised how the achievement in sports could generate economic effects by helping the growth of exports and GDP, boosting the consumer sentiment, restoring national confidence among the people, and enhancing the national brand image (Y.-s. Sin, 2002). The street cheering featured the chant of “Taehanminguk,”<sup>1</sup> the full official name of South Korea. It was by this moment that it began to be used on sports broadcasting and in many other

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<sup>1</sup> “Taehanminguk 대한민국” is the official name of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), literally meaning the “great people’s nation of Han.”

occasions. This was the moment when the state was approved by the majority of publics as an object of national and personal pride.

Scene #3: Nearly twelve years later, in the morning of April 16, 2014, a coastal ferry named Sewol flipped and sank while carrying more than 500 passengers to Cheju island. The drowning of more than 304 passengers in the sinking ferry, mostly high school students on a school trip, was broadcast nationwide on live television. National audiences painfully watched the scene on television in which the authorities were not able to provide any proper efforts of rescuing. The disaster traumatized publics and raised the question about the role of the state in protecting and saving the lives of the people. Despaired of the incompetence and irresponsibility of the government, the families of the victims and protesters shouted and cried, “*Ige naranya* 이게 나라냐?”, which means, “Is this a nation?” The sense that the disaster exposed how South Korea lacked a properly working “normal nation” was widely shared. The disaster was further linked to the downfall of “national prestige,” the international status of the country, so that one year later the appeal court judge put the ferry captain in life sentence, blaming him for, among others, driving “national prestige” down (C.-n. Cho, 2015).

Scene #4: About two and a half years later, in November and December 2016, the chant “*Ige naranya!*” continued in the street, being shouted and sung by millions of people in the street.<sup>2</sup> President Park Geun-hye was blamed for defrauding the

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<sup>2</sup> Kim Ho-ch’öl, a famous *minjung gayo* (people’s song) composer, adopting the chant, wrote a satire song, “*Ige Naranya*, SB 이게 나라냐, ㅅ ㅂ (Is this a nation,

government and abusing the power for her secret associate. She was impeached in the National Assembly in December and finally removed from office by the determination in the Constitutional Court in March 2017. As the chant and the song symbolized, the candlelight demonstration protested against the incompetent and irresponsible government and the corrupt President and asked for a properly working, “normal nation” (K.-i. Park, 2017; T. a.-k. Yi, 2012, p. 28). The candlelight demonstration and the subsequent impeachment stood out not only because it mobilized a historic number of people, but because they went on completely within the boundary of the constitutional and legal limit in an obsessive manner. The weekly protests were running completely peaceful without any violence. The news media frequently featured the scene in which many participants voluntarily collected garbage and cleaned up the street at midnight after the event of protest (Noh, 2016). The non-violent protest as well as the cleaned-up street by voluntary citizens might epitomize the image of a properly working “normal nation” and provide the source of national pride among South Koreans. A former human rights lawyer, Moon Jae-in of the oppositional Democratic Party was elected as President in May 2017, proclaiming to build “*Naradaun nara* (a decent nation)” (Moon, 2017, p. 15).<sup>3</sup>

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Mofo).” The song was frequently played through the PA speakers during the demonstration and widely sung along by protesters.

<sup>3</sup> “*Naradaun nara* 나라다운 나라” is one of the phrases which are used as a slogan to indicate the orientation of state management by the Moon government. The Korean phrase could be translated into English in various ways. In the official translation of the presidential speeches, it was translated into “a decent nation” (Moon, 2017, p. 15) and “a properly functioning country” (Moon, 2017, p. 23). Word by word, it can also be translated into a “nation of a nation-worth.”



Twenty years apart, these four snapshots of the historical events capture the ups and downs of the collective experiences and perceptions in contemporary South Korean society. Although they do not necessarily seem to be closely connected at first glance, they are marked by common threads which run through the two decades.

First of all, while these events are different events in nature — financial, festive, disastrous, and political — the perception of them converged into the idea of the state and the nation. While it seems natural to think of them at national level considering the size and significance of these events, it is striking that these snapshots ended up being certain images and imaginaries of the state and the nation. Clearly, the snapshots hint how all aspects of public life is understood from the perspective of the state and the nation.

Secondly, these events are typically perceived and described in affective terms of the pride and shame of the state and the nation. It suggests that publics have been deeply concerned about international recognition as well as self-awareness of the international status of South Korea.

Lastly, while the images and imaginaries of the state and the nation continued to be central to the public mind throughout modern South Korea, the snapshots suggest that a certain perception of the state and the nation emerged during this era out of old and fading images from the earlier era. Especially, a certain aspiration for a more desirable state and nation is a common theme. The underlying demand and aspiration for a better public life stands out through the imaginaries of

a functioning normal state, an advanced country, a nation of nation-worth, and a proud nation.

Bracketed by these historical events, the dissertation is an attempt to make sense of a broad social transformation in South Korea by following how the images and imaginaries of the state and the nation evolved with significant political and cultural implications. For this investigation, the dissertation takes the discourses of nation branding, national prestige, and an advanced nation as keywords which provide a potentially powerful access to the changes in contemporary cultural politics in South Korea. I will examine how these discourses traversed different institutional terrains such as the news media, government policy, and public talks.

Inspired by Charles Taylor (1990, 1995, 2002) and other scholars (Anderson, 2006, pp. 22-30; Crane, 1998, 1999; Gupta, 2007, p. 270; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998; Orgad, 2014; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b), I use the keywords such as national imaginary and state imagination to refer to the way in which national publics make sense of self and the world dominantly in terms of the state and the nation through discourses of nation branding, national prestige, and the advanced nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012; Valaskivi, 2016, more discussion will follow in the next chapter). To examine the changes and continuities of national imaginary and state imagination, I look at representations, narratives, rhetoric, and discourses in the news media, public policy, and public talks. I use the term discourse in a Foucauldian sense, defined as a body of specific knowledge governed by rules which make certain ways of thinking make sense and not others (Bacchi, 2000; 2009, more discussions will follow later in this chapter). Nation branding and related ideas of

national prestige and an “advanced nation” are discourses in this sense because of the ways they form certain ways of thinking and imagining and generate knowledge and imaginations about the state and the nation.

The English terms the state and the nation are already charged with complex historical meanings, but they are more complicated in South Korean historical context. The term *kukka* 국가 or *nara* 나라 in Korean can be translated into state, usually referring to institutions and systems of government. But it has a wider implication in South Korean context, encompassing the aspect of political community, which is captured by the English term nation as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983). The distinct use of the term 국가 in South Korea might epitomize the central position of the state in the national imaginary. The phrase “the state and the nation” frequently used in this dissertation is intended to match the Korean term 국가, where the two terms are closely bound together.

### **Nation branding, national prestige, and the “advanced nation”**

Nation branding is a set of discursive and institutional practices that aim to project a positive image of a country to the outside world by adopting business techniques of marketing and branding (Kaneva, 2011a, p. 118). It has been avidly disseminated and widely circulated by transnational business marketing/branding consultants and adopted by many governments around the world. Indeed, for the last two decades, nation branding has become a public policy fad across the globe from advanced capitalist countries like Japan and the UK to developing and transitional countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Southeast Asia. Thus, for

the last twenty years or so, we have seen nation branding slogans such as “Cool Britannia,” “Cool Japan,” “100% Pure New Zealand,” “Amazing Thailand,” “Malaysia Truly Asia,” “Vietnam, A Different Orient,” “I feel Slovenia,” “Latvia, the Land that Sings,” and so on. These countries adopted nation branding as a way to manage their appearance with the aspiration to promote their status in the globalizing world, launching various nation-branding campaigns, adopting nation brand slogans, and setting up related governmental organizations (Dinnie, 2008).

South Korea, among others, took nation branding seriously. Jumping on the bandwagon of nation branding at the time of co-hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, South Korea even set up a high-profile governmental institution, the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in January 2009. Not only being instituted as the key public policy agenda, the idea of nation branding became an underlying reference point to which the implementation of other key public policies was justified and legitimized. The instituted discourse of nation branding expanded to include broader policy issues such as multiculturalism, official development assistance (ODA), and public diplomacy. Moreover, it worked as an extensive public policy framework, gluing together different public policies. Major public policies by the Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2013) were justified in the name of enhancing the nation brand, such as the global promotion of *hansik* (Korean food), “resource diplomacy,” the export of nuclear power plants, “green growth,” the “Four Major Rivers Project,” and so on. Beyond the official public policy discourse, the term nation branding, in combination with the idea of “culture-advanced country” and a neologism “national prestige,” became a staple vocabulary in the news media

as well as in public discourses on a wide variety of political, social and cultural issues in South Korea. Most prominently, the Korean Wave, a wide popularity of Korean popular culture and popular music in East Asia and beyond, has been increasingly illuminated in terms of enhancing the nation brand. Domestically, labor disputes and political conflicts have been increasingly contrasted with national prestige. In sum, the matters of enhancing the nation brand, national image, and national prestige have provided a dominant framework that encompasses a wide range of national issues.

This dissertation follows the trajectories of the discourses and institutions of nation branding, “national prestige,” and an “advanced country” in South Korea since the early 2000s. Imported by the mainstream news media and public and private think tanks, nation branding operated as an externally oriented campaign for the improvement of national image toward tourists, capital investors, and entrepreneurs. However, it is notable that the campaign deployed in the name of the nation brand by the news media as well as by the government mainly targeted domestic publics rather than external audiences. The fact that neither logo nor slogan was adopted during the apogee of the nation branding campaign under the Lee government<sup>4</sup> might suggest the nation branding campaign was less about the outward projection of national image per se.

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<sup>4</sup> The nation brand slogan “Dynamic Korea” was devised for the 2002 World Cup event, but discarded by the Lee government. The tourism brand slogan, “Korea, Sparkling” was also abolished. The PCNB assured that it would devise a new nation brand logo and slogan, but it never realized. The new English-language nation brand slogan, “Creative Korea” was introduced as late as 2016. The slogan was blamed for plagiarizing the French nation brand slogan (Marshall, 2017) and became practically

The transnational phenomenon of nation branding drew attention from critical media and cultural studies as well as anthropology and international studies (Aronczyk, 2013; Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Browning, 2015; Dzenovska, 2005; Graan, 2010; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva, 2011b; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011; Valaskivi, 2013; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Some of these authors showed how nation branding contributed to the construction of specific national identities in favor of transnational capital and domestic politicians. Some others also focused on how nation branding was in line with the neoliberal rationality of international competitiveness, aiming to produce flexible, competitive subjects.

However, the existing critical literature has focused on the role played by transnational branding consultants and government officials in terms of the agency of nation branding, thereby neglecting the role played by the news media and publics. It was only recently that critical media scholars paid attention to the role played by the latter (for instance, Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Graan, 2010, 2013). Additionally, most critical literature focused on the “transitional” countries in Eastern Europe. While nation branding and other related discourses and practices such as soft power and public diplomacy have been in the list of buzzwords in East Asia, most academic works have come from public administration, business management, tourism, and marketing with practical, technical and administrative concerns. Moreover, while there exists some critical works on nation branding in Japan and China (de Kloet, Chong, & Landsberger, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2015; Valaskivi,

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obsolete. Allegedly, it was devised by the company associated with Ch’oe Sun-sil (Choi Soon-sil), a longtime confidante of President Park Geun-hye (H.-m. Kim, 2017).

2013, 2016), critical literature on nation branding in South Korea is almost non-existent.

In this study, I aim to contribute to critical cultural and media studies on nation branding, which emerged not just as a public policy framework, but as a reference point by which wider reforms of the state and the nation were envisioned from different social and political perspectives and positions. Following the discursive and institutional trajectories of nation branding, national prestige, and the advanced nation, I am asking a series of questions: Beyond being a technique of publicizing and managing the name and the image of a nation, how did the discourses of nation branding and national prestige (hereafter, NBNP) offer a new way of imagining a nation, especially an advanced nation? How new was the re-imagining of NBNP in the contemporary context of global neoliberalism? To what extent was it a continuation of the imaginary of the state, the economy, and the nation in the historical context of South Korean modernity?

Pursuing these questions, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the workings of the discourses of NBNP, especially in shaping and reshaping the collective social imaginaries of the state and the nation.

Theoretically informed by critical literature (introduced in the next section), I focus on two distinctive contexts within which the discourses of NBNP imagined and re-imagined the state and the nation.

On the one hand, my purpose is to contribute to an understanding of the workings of neoliberalism vis-a-vis the state and the nation. In the contemporary

context, I aim to examine the extent to which the discourses of NBNP as part of neoliberal rationality provided a new imaginary of the state and the nation. I aim to examine how the discourses of NBNP worked as an integral part of the construction of the neoliberal “competition state” (Cerny, 1997) in South Korea.

On the other hand, in the historical context, my purpose is to engage with the academic and intellectual discussions and debates about cultural modernity in South Korea. My focus here is to examine the workings of the discourses of NBNP in the re/shaping of the developmental imaginary of the state and the nation in South Korean modernity.

### **Theoretical and historical context**

To investigate the multi-faceted, internally-oriented implications and effects of NBNP in South Korea in a broader context, I situate the present dissertation within multiple streams of existing literature. My examination of the discursive and institutional practices of nation branding in South Korea addresses the academic discussions of 1) the imagined nature of the nation *vis-a-vis* the state and the economy, 2) the neoliberal transformation of the state as a competitive entity in the globalizing world, and 3) the changing nature of South Korea’s cultural modernity.

### **Imagined state, economy, and nation**

First, the dissertation conceives of the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP as offering new ways of imagining a nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012; Valaskivi, 2016), which are predicated on specific social imaginaries of the state and economy (Crane, 1998, 1999; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998; Taylor, 2002; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). I rely on the theories of the state that explain its significance not just in



terms of how it actually wields power and influence over society and economy, but also in terms of how it is conceived, imagined, and idealized, especially with regard to the economy.

The state is not a self-evident entity, a taken-for-granted center of power, or an institutional actor, but an effect of discursive and material practices (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Dean, 2010; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Gupta, 1995; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Lemke, 2001, 2002, 2007; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998, 2006; Rose, 1999, p. 35; Rose & Miller, 1992; Sharma & Gupta, 2006; Steinmetz, 1999). Referencing this body of literature, I examine the discursive and institutional practices of nation branding in the context of the discourses on the state which have informed the state imaginations in modern South Korea.

The dominant imaginary of the state has been constructed in relation to the national economy in the modern history of South Korea. Especially in the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the discourses of modernization and development shaped a specific form of the state, called the “developmental state,” whose historical role was defined as “development” in relation to the national economy. In the context of neoliberal globalization, political discourses on the state have exploded and variously reshaped the relation between the state and the economy in domestic and transnational settings. Quite a lot of academic books and articles have been written on the developmental state and the neoliberal transition of the state in South Korea. However, most works were on the institutional aspects from the political economy perspectives (for instance, Chang, Fine, & Weiss, 2012;

Chi, 2007; Lim & Jang, 2006; Pirie, 2012; Woo-Cumings, 1999), with rare works on the cultural constructions and the imaginations of the state (Among the exceptions, Kwon, 2014).

I regard nation branding as one of the latest forms of state imagination, which is flexibly connected with and translated into different state discourses on national image, national prestige, soft power, the advanced country, the “normal nation” and so on. It offers new ways of imagining the nation by putting a new emphasis on the articulation between the state and economy.

### **The rise of the neoliberal competition state**

Secondly, I situate the discursive and institutional practices of nation branding in the contemporary context of neoliberal globalization in South Korea. Many critical scholars agree that South Korea has turned into a neoliberal society, especially since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s (for instance, from the field of political economy, C.-j. Ch’oe, 2006; Chang et al., 2012; Chi, 2007; H.-Y. Cho, Surendra, & Cho, 2013; Lim & Jang, 2006).

For the last few decades, a new political rationality called neoliberalism emerged to readjust the state-economy relations and "reengineering the state" (Hilgers, 2012), especially by reconstituting the changing conditions called globalization. Neoliberalism, defined as the extension of the principles of market competition beyond the economy into the whole society (Brown, 2005, pp. 39-40), has constituted a dominant governing rationality in South Korea (for instance, Jun, 2012; H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; J. Song, 2010). In the neoliberal domination, commercializing logics overwhelm almost every aspect of personal, social, political

and cultural life beyond the business world. The logic of the brand stands as a dominant discourse and technique in this commercialization of society, extending its application to the state and the nation.

It is in this context in which NBNP emerged as a set of discourses and techniques of imagining and constructing the state as a competitive market entity and as a location manager for transnational capital. It envisions a new globalizing economy and world order, redefining national identity and shaping new citizenship in a neoliberal manner. The discourses of nation branding illustrate a concrete way in which the neoliberal transformation of the South Korean state and the economy has unfolded. The dissertation explores how nation branding has worked as part of neoliberal rationality, constructing a cultural version of the neoliberal “competition state” (Cerny, 1997, 2010; Fougner, 2006, 2008) in South Korea. Across the news media discourses and public policies, I examine how the dominant practices of nation branding re-imagined the state as a neoliberal commercial entity in the global market of competing images of nations in the name of the nation brand, national image, and national prestige.

### **South Korea’s cultural modernity**

Lastly, I situate the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP in a wider historical context of cultural modernity of South Korea. In other words, in order to understand the effect of the neoliberal competition state, we need to examine the continuity and the change of the social imaginary of the state and the nation in the historical specificity of South Korean modernity.

In this dissertation, I attend to how South Korean modernity has formed with the state and the economy at the center of national imaginaries in the discourses and programs of modernization and development. This “developmental modernity” seems to constitute a dominant social imaginary in South Korea even after the official demolition of the developmental state in the late 1990s. Additionally, we need to consider the Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity, in which the West has become the normative standard of modernization and development through sped-up imitations and adaptations. Notably, within the Western orientation of South Korean modernity, cultural and social aspects, along with political and economic aspects, have gotten increasingly emphasized in the official and public discourses of NBNP.

South Korea’s take on nation branding shows how it constituted a neoliberal “competition state” (Cerny, 1997) not just in terms of economy and technology but also in terms of culture and civility. It is usually regarded that nation branding represents public policies that aimed to enhance national image and reputation. At a deeper level, however, it articulates popular expectation, desire, needs and imagination: a popular aspiration for the status of an advanced country, a popular demand for a cultural status that matches the economic level of the country, a popular desire by the middle class for a nation with a higher standard of living that is equivalent to the “global standard” of Western advanced countries. It is notable that emphases are increasingly put on social and cultural aspects such as civility, manners, public behaviors, “global citizenship,” and so on, the reference of which comes from the comparison between the idealized West and South Korea.

I attend to the translation of the term nation brand into national prestige (국격 *kukkyŏk*) as the manifestation of the Western-oriented nature of NBNP. In the late 2000s, the technical discourse of nation branding was transformed into the discourse of national prestige, implying the dignity and class of a nation. This term took a conservative implication, based on a state-centered cultural and civilizational imagination. While it was frequently associated with developmental discourses of “the first-rate, advanced nation,” it also illustrated the reflexivity on the economy-centric developmentalism, imagining a “normal country” with a higher cultural and civilized status. A dominant state imagination of a “culturally advanced country” was developed in this vein with a growing attention to traditional as well as modern popular culture in regard to the international status of the nation. Most notably, the development of South Korean popular culture and popular music, the Korean Wave and K-pop, illustrates how culture is converted into resources for nation branding. In this sense, the political discourses of NBNP provide a new imagination of the state and the nation, an imagination that hinges upon Western modernity as the norm.

In this context, the idea of a “culture-advanced country” (*munhwa sŏnjinguk* 문화선진국) has emerged as a vision of modernity in South Korea. Now it is culture that is regarded as an indicator of modernity and civilization, and being advanced as a nation and in the international ranks of advanced countries. The discourses of NBNP emerged in the early 2000s along with the vision of a culture-advanced country. It is in terms of NBNP that a culture-advanced country as a truly advanced,

modern country is specifically presented and imagined beyond the status of an economically-advanced country.

Against this theoretical and historical backdrop, the dissertation begins by following the discourses of nation branding, which were propagated by transnational business consultants and embraced by national policy makers around the world. The dissertation takes the case of South Korea and focuses on how globally-circulating discourses of nation branding was adapted in the local context. In the examination of the localization, the dissertation highlights the processes of local adaptations and transformation of nation branding. It focuses on how the discourses and institutions of nation branding became connected with and converted into various existing and emerging discourses such as national prestige and the advanced nation among others. It also emphasizes how they were driven by various institutional actors such as transnational and domestic think tanks, the national news media, and domestic politicians and policy makers, and publics. In this way, this dissertation aims to understand the processes of transformation and conversion of discourses and institutions of nation branding, national prestige, and the advanced nation in a specific historical and contemporary-political context.

### **Research design**

Social imaginaries and state imaginations rely on rhetorical narratives and symbolic representations (Orgad, 2014, p. 41). Thus, in the methodological consideration, the study of social imaginaries and state imaginations can be carried out through the examination of rhetorics and discourses. In the examination of the social imaginaries of the state and the nation in South Korean modernity, I take the

public discourses of nation branding, national prestige (NBNP) as the main focus of the investigation. In this section, I discuss how to examine NBNP as discourses, and identify the data to collect and examine.

By discourse, I refer to “socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits upon what it is possible to think, write or speak about a ‘given social object or practice’” (McHoul & Grace, 1993 cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 35) (more discussion will follow later in this chapter). Discourse includes not just to public policy discourses produced by the government, but wider discourses disseminated by the news media as well as circulated among publics. In this study, I follow the trajectories of the discourses of NBNP, focusing on three critical moments created in their discursive circulation. First, I look at how NBNP emerged as the news media discourses in the early-mid 2000s. Then, I examine how it was established as official policy discourses in the late 2000s. Finally, I examine how public discourses of NBNP, facilitated by the media and public policy discourses, circulated among publics in various forms.

### **Data**

For the study of NBNP in South Korea, I focus on three distinctive moments of the circulation of the discourses with distinctive agencies in distinctive institutional settings.

The first moment is the emergence of the discourses of NBNP in the early-mid 2000s, in which the news media played a crucial role. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in November 1997, South Korea tried to recover from the economic collapse and regain confidence. The 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan turned out to be a crucial moment to announce the recovery. By that time, the talks of nation

branding emerged as a major public discourse in South Korea, greatly promoted by the news media.

The second moment is the institutionalization of NBNP in 2009 and its spread as a public policy discourse from the late 2000s to the early 2010s. The conservative Lee Myung-bak government, which declared a “business-friendly” administration, established the PCNB as the official governmental public policy agency for nation branding. It concentrated public relations and promotion activities around the time of hosting the G20 (or Group of Twenty) event in 2010, a meeting among the governments and central bank governors from 19 countries and the European Union. The PCNB heavily publicized the hosting of the prestigious international forum as an enhancement of the nation brand.

The last moment is the proliferation of the NBNP discourses among publics in the early-mid 2010s, when non-governmental organizations got engaged in various campaigns for the “promotion of Korea.” Especially, their activities of buying ad spaces on billboards in Manhattan and prestigious US newspapers drew great attention from the news media and publics. These campaigns helped raise the awareness of nation branding and public diplomacy among publics as well as stirred controversies about how to enhance nation image and national prestige.

These three distinctive moments are roughly in chronological order. However, my purpose is to illustrate the multifaceted and overlapping nature of the discourses in circulation with distinctive agencies in distinctive institutional settings, not to suggest a definite periodization or a linear development of the discourses of NBNP. According to the characteristics of these moments, I used



multiple sets of data which show the multidimensional, dynamic nature of the discourses of NBNP.

The first batch of the data was obtained from the news media archives. For the collection of the news media data, I used *Kinds* ([www.kinds.or.kr](http://www.kinds.or.kr)), a public news archive, funded and run by the Korea Press Foundation. I also used the *Naver News* ([news.naver.com](http://news.naver.com)), a commercial news archive as a supplementary tool for additional data.

I used the Kinds archive to search seven national newspapers (*Han'györe*, *Kyönghyang Sinmun*, *Hanguk Ilbo*, *Segye Ilbo*, *Munhwa Ilbo*, *Seoul Sinmun*, and *Kungmin Ilbo*), three economic newspapers (*Hanguk Kyöngje*, *Seoul Kyöngje*, and *Maeil Kyöngje*). I used the Naver News Archive to search *Tong'a Ilbo*, three weekly news magazines (*Han'györe 21*, *Sisa-in*, and *Sisa Journal*), and two online news (*Püresian* and *Ohmynews*). Additionally, for the two major nationwide newspapers that do not provide their data to external archives, I visited their individual websites ([www.joins.com](http://www.joins.com) for *Chung'ang Ilbo* and [www.chosun.com](http://www.chosun.com) for *Chosön Ilbo*) and used their own search tool. In this way, I covered all ten major nation-wide newspaper-based news media.

These newspaper-based, national news media continued to be the major source of news consumption for citizens through the Internet news aggregators such as *Naver News*, which has practically monopolized the circulation of news in South Korea. Most news came to be circulated and consumed through these news aggregators, rather than on the individual web sites by the news media themselves (W.-g. Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013; S.-m. Yi, 2007).

I did not include in the analysis news reports from broadcasting – that is, KBS, MBC, and SBS, three national television stations, and YTN, a cable television dedicated to news. The national television news programs were widely watched and remained influential during the period of the research, although both television and newspapers were quickly losing their audiences (W.-g. Kim et al., 2013; C.-h. Yi, 2012). However, television news programs were typically limited to short straight news reports, lacking in-depth analysis and op-eds. Moreover, television news programs were mobilized simply for the promotion of governmental policy, while some newspapers were actively and strategically engaged in setting political and policy agenda. Thus, newspapers seemed more adequate in this specific examination of the role played by the news media in terms of institutional and discursive shaping of governmental policy and public agenda.

From the news media archives, I searched news report data from 2000 to 2016. Major newspapers and magazines began to publish reports and opinions related to NBNP since the early 2000s, and the amount and depth of news media articles enormously increased in the late 2000s, especially around the launch of the PCNB in 2009 and the hosting of the G20 summit in 2010.

For the search, I used keywords such as “nation brand 국가 브랜드,” “national prestige 국격,” and “culture-advanced country 문화선진국.” Each search showed a large number of results: 8924, 9081, and 1136 respectively (including 438 overlapping articles). Due to the large quantity of articles, I actually examined articles with the three keywords in the title (876, 701, and 41 articles for each

keyword with a small number of duplicates). The yearly breakdown of the number of articles, which contain with the three keywords in the title, from seven national newspapers and three economic newspapers, shows the general trend. Out of these 1,500+ articles, I found about half of them were relevant to my research as many articles which contained those keywords were not substantively meaningful. For instance, many articles on “국가 브랜드” were not about “*nation branding*” or “*nation brand*,” but “*national brand*.” “Nation brand” and “national brand” are distinct jargons in marketing and branding as the latter concerns corporate brands (Thus, Hyundai, LG and Samsung are South Korea national brands, and Sony, Honda and Toyota are Japanese national brands). They are written in distinct words in English, but they share the same phrases in Korean. Many other articles were also short straight reports, and still others were duplicate articles supplied by the same sources from the government and other private and public institutions (for instance, Anholt’s and SERI’s annual Nation Branding Index were widely reported by most newspapers and magazines, but they were almost identical as they were copied from newswire articles and the press release). In this way, I ended up reading 6-700 articles with the keywords in the title at least once.

Reading the articles, I was able to get the sense of the general trend of how nation branding, national prestige, and advanced nation were covered in the news media. My use of news media materials is twofold. On the one hand, they were useful in the political economy analysis for grasping the institutional influence on NBNP, that is, to identify individual and organizational actors who had a stake in and how they were engaged in the shaping of the public policy of NBNP. Most of all,

news media articles gave a lead to a broader examination of public and private actors such as Simon Anholt, Philip Kotler, Guy Sorman, the Institute for Industrial Policy Studies (IPS), Hyundai Research Institute (HRI), Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), and so on. The articles also were helpful to identify the role of the news media organizations themselves in the promotion of NBNP through organizing conferences and launching media campaigns in cooperation with the government agencies and corporations.

On the other hand, for a closer analysis of the discourses revealed in news media articles, I took a closer reading of op-ed pieces, special reports, and feature and series articles. The series articles from several media-led campaigns for NBNP were helpful to grasp their perspectives and orientations. In the analysis of how the news media problematized NBNP and presented a solution to the presumed problems, I focused on how the news media constructed the narratives of the past, the present, and the future of South Korea. The following is the list of major news media campaigns related to nation branding, which I focused on for the analysis of the news media narrative of NBNP:

- 1997 The age of global standards (*Tong'a Ilbo*)
- 1998-2002 Global etiquette campaign (*Chosŏn Ilbo*)
- 2002 Let's find a new vision (*Han'gyŏre*)
- 2002 Upgrade Korea (*Chung'ang Ilbo*)
- 2005 Soft power, soft Korea (*Chung'ang Ilbo*)
- 2005 UP Korea (*Tong'a Ilbo*)
- 2005 Upgrade the prestige (*Chung'ang Ilbo*)
- 2007 Put new energy to the Brand Korea (*Han'gyŏre*)
- 2007 Enhance national prestige: Image Up Korea (*Han'guk Ilbo*)
- 2007 Toward soft power Korea (*Seoul Kyŏngje*)
- 2008 Enhance national prestige (*Maeil Kyŏngje*)
- 2008 Let's enhance national prestige (*Seoul Kyŏngje*)
- 2010 National prestige campaign (*Tong'a Ilbo*)

The second batch of the data is from materials produced by various governmental agencies in relation to NBNP. First, I gathered and examined all official documents publicly available from the PCNB. Included are official documents, press releases, websites, minutes of the meetings, white papers, and policy reports produced by the institution. I also obtained relevant documents from other related institutions by using keyword search from each document archive: the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), the Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Korea Food Foundation (KFF), and the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). I gathered the data from their individual websites as well as the Nation Archives of Korea ([www.archives.go.kr](http://www.archives.go.kr)), which put together and archived past governmental documents. They were supplemented by interviews of and writings by governmental officials (published as newspaper op-ed pieces, columns, and books and pamphlets).

These materials were used to understand general operations of the institutions and to figure out the institutional settings and procedures in which the public policy discourses of NBNP are produced to have effect.

Besides, I analyzed the public campaign advertising materials produced in association with the PCNB. As the PCNB concentrated on public relations and worked closely with the private corporations, these public campaign ads were produced by private corporations in collaboration with the PCNB. I pay attention to them because they greatly illustrate the institutional nature and the discursive features of the nation branding campaign. For the analysis of the ad narrative, I used

the “global etiquette” campaign ad, “*Saranghaeyo, Korea,*” produced by the LG Group and aired in 2010. The ad series, featuring visual representations of Korea and the West, illustrate how the neoliberal version of nation branding reshaped national imaginaries.

The last batch of the data is collected from multiple sources because the focus here is to follow the trajectories of discourses in circulation among publics. Informed by anthropologists (Appadurai, 1986; Marcus, 1995), I conducted a multi-sited research following the circulation and the movement of a specific discourse. To examine the circulation of the discourses of NBNP among publics, I focused on the campaign for the “promotion of Korea” or the “Korea publicity” by non-governmental actors, which was widely promoted by the media (including the news media), and celebrities, and publics. The campaign drew not only a big and mostly favorable attention from the media, but engendered controversies among publics. The scuffles around the Korea publicity campaign illustrates the nature of how the state and the nation got re-imagined among publics. The promotion of Korea is a relevant research object because it constituted an intersection between the official public policy by the government, the civilian campaign for the “promotion of Korea” by the non-governmental actors, a wide attention by the news media, and responses and debates among publics.

To examine the NGO activities for the promotion of Korea, I followed a celebrity individual, Sŏ Kyŏng-dŏk (a.k.a. Kyung-duk Seo), and an NGO, Volunteer Agency Network of Korea (Vank) because they were the most active and well-known activist groups in the field of the promotion of Korea. For data gathering, I

used their websites (in the case of Vank), as well as the media coverage and interviews because their activities heavily relied on media publicity (in the case of Mr. Seo).

Lastly, for examining public controversies over the promotion of Korea, which were produced and circulated among publics, I gathered data from online modes of public engagement with public affairs. Various online services provided platforms for the participation in and engagement with public issues. A good example is the candlelit protest against the decision by the Lee Myung-bak government for the import of US beef in Seoul in 2008. The massive demonstration was, especially among teenagers and youths, facilitated by various digital platforms such as text messaging, online forums (such as Daum Agora), and webcasting (J. Kang, 2017; K.-M. Kim & Park, 2011; K. Lee, 2017; S. Yun & Chang, 2011).

Out of these various online platforms, I used blog postings and online subculture communities for analysis. The reasons I used blogs are several. First, the blog platform gained a significant popularity in the late 2000s and the early-mid 2010s, although it was not the most popular. The platform was competitively promoted by large and small online services in South Korea. While the examination of all aspects of all online participation is beyond the purpose and scope of this research, blogs provided an efficient way of gathering data suitable to the exploratory nature of this research. Second, blogs are an open platform, freely accessible by publics, in contrast with closed platforms such as Cyworld (which was extremely popular around the turn of the century in South Korea, but in quick decline afterwards). Besides, due to its openness, it was more efficient for browsing

and searching with search engines (W.-g. Kim, Yi, & Yi, 2010). Third, as blogs are suitable for a personal and individual communication, despite the extent to which they are interactive and networked, they have a better chance to give a picture of individual perspectives on a particular issue in a more coherent way. Thus, it is more convenient to identify individual perspectives and personal voices better than other platforms such as internet forums. Lastly, blogs were often used not just to show what the bloggers thought but also to show (off) what they actually did in relation to direct action and active participation in a more vivid manner. Thus, blog postings were helpful to look into how bloggers, actively participating part of publics, were engaged in the public campaign for the promotion of Korea and Korean food.

To collect blog postings which made participation in or comment on the promotion of Korean food in the early-mid 2010s, I used Google search as well as native search engines built in three major blog services, Tistory (tistory.com), Naver Blog (blog.naver.com), and Egloos (egloos.com). These blog communities were the largest in South Korea and hosted so called “power bloggers” who were opinion leaders in the “blogosphere” (W.-g. Kim et al., 2010). I used keywords for themes (“nation brand,” “national prestige,” “advanced nation,” and so on), crossed with related specific topics (“*hansik*,” “Times Square,” “Tokto,” and so on), and examined top search results. The blog postings, which were collected, read, and used as illustrative examples in this research, were not necessarily by power bloggers. But they were rather neatly and articulately presented and written by more or less “active” participants (for instance, who personally visited the Times Square in New



York) than by average or “passive” bloggers (for instance, who used the blog platform for clipping news and blog postings) (W.-g. Kim et al., 2010).

The online communities I examined for the analysis of the criticism of excessive nationalism are DC Inside (디시 인사이드, dcinside.com) and Ilbe (일베, ilbe.com), two of the largest online communities.<sup>5</sup> They are equivalent to the English-language imageboard 4chan (www.4chan.org), a home for online subculture communities, famous for spreading prominent internet memes (“4chan,” n.d.). These online communities are vastly diverse and flexible and cannot be lumped together as a homogenous group, but a basic characterization might be necessary for the discussion.

DC Inside was established in 1999 as a forum for digital camera and photography and evolved into one of the largest online community websites with numerous sub-communities. These sub-communities host discussions and exchanges about specific topics on their own imageboards (called “galleries”). DC Inside became famous for generating and circulating jokes, buzzwords, neologisms, and internet memes. The main user base is known to be those in their 20-30s, the majority of which is male. The political orientation is hard to tell in a uniform way because different sub-communities show different and changing orientations, but using parody, satire, and cynicism, they usually show rebellious and defiant attitude

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<sup>5</sup> According to one online poll (C.-g. Hō, 2013), most popular online communities among office workers include Oyu (Onŭlŭi Yumō, that is, Today’s Humor, 25.7 percent), Ilbe (20 percent), DC Inside (17.3 percent), Ppomppu (16.6 percent), and Kliang (Clien, 9.5 percent). I chose DC Inside and Ilbe among others because their archives of the early-mid 2010s are conveniently available for keyword search.

toward the social establishment whether it is left of right, liberal or conservative ("DC Inside," n.d.).

Ilbe (short for 일간베스트 저장소 Ilgan Besütü Chöjangso, which means "Daily Best Storage") began as a spin-off site of DC Inside in 2010 against the moderation policy of DC Inside. Initially, it worked as "storage" of the "best" threads of DC Inside before they were removed by the moderators from DC Inside for violating the moderation policy of DC Inside. Later, it evolved into an online community on its own, separate from and independent of DC Inside. It became notorious for its populist, far-right-oriented subculture. It drew enormous negative media and public attention with its misogyny, hate speech, antisocial behaviors, cyber vandalism, and hostility toward ideas such as democracy. Cynicism, parody, and satire also thrive in Ilbe community, usually targeting leftists (in South Korean political context, mostly liberals) and attacking the socially weak (such as women, disabled people, etc.). Ilbe is known as a still more male-dominated community than DC Inside with the user base being younger ("Ilbe Storehouse," n.d.).

I searched the archives by using keywords such as "Sö Kyöngdök," "Tokto," and "*pibimpap*." I found 414 postings from DC Inside (2008-2016) and 99 postings from Ilbe (2010-2016). Not all postings are relevant to the keywords. After gleaning the titles and snippets of the postings, I finally read carefully several dozen postings and their comments and used them for analysis.

Additionally, in the examination of online subcultures, I referred to Namuwiki, the biggest subculture-based Wiki site in South Korea. Namuwiki in no sense abides by the principles of neutrality and objectivity of Wikipedia. Rather, it is

a subculture itself, pursuing playfulness, satire, and pun in the online community ("Namuwiki," n.d.). However, as still a wiki platform, Namuwiki is especially strong and rich in the description and archiving of popular cultures and subcultures in South Korea.<sup>6</sup>

It should be noted that these internet-based subcultures do not fit in with traditional political divisions between left and right, conservative and liberal (progressive), and so on. While they drew attention from the media and the public due to its antisocial behaviors such as misogyny and hate speech, they are also characterized by the pursuit of playful defiance against the presumed established power and vested interests perceived by the subculture communities in their own ways. They are engrossed in generating and circulating internet memes, buzzwords, puns and jokes, many of which have made a good point about critical issues in South Korean society and have been widely circulated in mainstream media and among wider publics.

### **Discourse analysis**

This study adopts and attempts to contribute to the analysis of public discourse by examining NBNP as discourses. Informed by a Foucauldian notion, discourse refers to “socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits upon what it is possible to think, write or speak about a ‘given social object or practice’” (McHoul & Grace, 1993 cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 35). In this sense, discourse has a power to construct reality by defining problems, and producing subjects and space

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<sup>6</sup> Namuwiki launched in 2015, but has roots in Rigveda Wiki (Enha Wiki) which started in 2007.

through constructing knowledge, especially in the forms of abstract concepts and categories (Bacchi, 2000, p. 48). The analysis of discourse begins with analyzing those binaries, key concepts, and categories embedded in rhetorics and discourses, and explicating the presuppositions, assumptions, or “conceptual logics” (Bacchi, 2009, pp. 5-7) that underpin the discursive formation. In this vein, this study investigates how the discourses of NBNP in South Korea have produced certain knowledges and imaginations about the state and the nation since the early 2000s. In methodological terms, the analysis of discourse in this study attends to a few points: discourse in discursive chains, discourse in institution, and discourse in contestation.

First, this study analyzes the discourse of NBNP not in isolation, but in the chains of other discourses (Hall, 1985, p. 104). As Stuart Hall points out, discourses are not closed systems. Rather, “a discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings” (Hall, 1992, p. 292). The discursive rise of nation branding needs to be examined in the context of the re-imaginings of the state and the nation in South Korea. I especially attended to how the nation branding discourse was translated into the national prestige discourse, and how they were deployed in association with other related and competing discourses such as soft power, public diplomacy, and culture-advanced country, which variously informed the re-imaginings of the state and the nation in South Korea in the early 21st century.

Secondly, this study attends to the political economy of discourse, that is, it examines discourse as a process in institutions (Fischer, 2003, p. 76; Hall, 1992, p.

292). While appreciating the constitutive power of discourse, I also attend to “the conditions of exercise, functioning, of institutionalization of scientific discourses” (Foucault, 1991, cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 37). The material effect of the discourse should be considered in relation to the “nondiscursive domains of institutions, political events and economic processes” (Bernauer, cited in Bacchi, 2009, p. 37). Moreover, the discursive and institutional practices are not confined to the apparatuses of the state, but also made in the area of civil society — the media, political parties, NGOs, interest groups, think tanks, academics, business interests, lobbyists, and so on — as of the formal institutions of the state” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 26). In this vein, I followed the circulation of the discourses of NBNP in different institutional settings, focusing on three critical forms of discourse: the news media discourse, public policy discourse, and discourse among publics. By following the trajectories of discourses within and across these institutional contexts, I highlighted the changes and continuities, uncertainty and complexity in the process.

Lastly, in this study, I examined discourses as the site of contestation, rather than of the unidirectional imposition of power. The discourse analysis might suggest one-way operation of power in which discourses are used by those who hold power upon those who lack power. However, it is necessary to theorize the possibilities for the challenges to dominant discourses (Bacchi, 2000, pp. 51-54). In this vein, rather than scientific and neutral, discourse is implicated not just in the legitimacy and authority, but the contestation and challenge of state power. Related to the second point above, the wider area of civil society is the site of contestation where tensions and contradictions are revealed, and the possibilities of challenge, resistance, and

discursive reshaping arise (Bacchi, 2009, p. 37). The discourses of NBNP, which were disseminated by the news media and think tanks, and instituted as public policy by the government, created a discursive space for publics in which dominant discourses were negotiated and challenged (Warner, 2002). Following Warner's (2002) discussion, "publics" are a reflexive social form constituted through discourse and the circulation of texts and are used in plural to emphasize the divergent formations vis-à-vis discourses.

### **Contributions of the study**

This study will contribute to an understanding of the global phenomenon of nation branding, theoretically and empirically, in at least three primary aspects.

First, this study will contribute to an expanding body of literature on nation branding and other related discourses and institutions in critical media and cultural studies. The critical attention to nation branding as a media- and communication-related phenomenon is increasing, but still falls short compared to its prominence in the administrative and promotional studies. Beyond the practical and technical concerns in marketing and publicity, the discourses and institutions of NBNP need to be regarded and examined as part of a larger body of representations and discourses, and examined as situated in a social, national, and global context. Critical media and cultural studies provide frameworks and tools to deal with the phenomenon of NBNP as discursive power to imbue collective imagination. Furthermore, discourse analysis and representation studies provide effective methods to analyze NBNP as social practices which offer a way of imagining and re-imagining the self, the state, the nation, and the world. Firmly rooted in critical

media and cultural studies, this study will expand knowledge of the emerging social practices of NBNP. In particular, incorporating a thoughtful consideration of institutional and historical context, this study will contribute to the deepening of discourse analysis and representation studies.

Secondly, this study will contribute to the understanding of the global spread of neoliberalism, especially in relation to the state and the nation. Rather than a totalizing force, neoliberalism needs to be examined as particularly situated practices and institutions at global as well as local levels. In this understanding, the study focuses on the centrality of the state and the nation and highlights the way in which the discourses of NBNP mediated the process of global neoliberalization. This study examines neoliberalism as discursive and institutional practices which offer new ways of re-imagining the state and the nation as competitive entities in the globalizing world.

Lastly, by situating the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP in a specific local context of South Korea, this study will contribute to a better understanding of the changes in Korean society in the early years in the 21st century, and contribute to the field of Korean studies. I characterize these years as the times when the people raised a fundamental question about what the state and the nation are and should be, and the discourses of NBNP offered not just a dominant way to redefine the state and the nation in neoliberal rationality, but opened up a discursive space around which different imaginations and reflections could be evoked about the role of the state, the identity of the nation, and the nature of modernity. This study will offer a glimpse into the extent to which South Korea is

being transformed into a neoliberal society and to which the neoliberalization is facilitated by and predicated on a developmental imaginary of state-centered, economy-obsessed, Western-oriented modernity.

### **Outline of chapters**

The dissertation is organized in the following manner.

In Chapter 1, I introduced the dissertation, laying out a relevant context and identifying the methods adopted in the study.

In Chapter 2, I provide the relevant body of literature on which this study is built on: the imagined nature of the state and the nation, the rise of a competition state in the global neoliberalization, and the global phenomenon of nation branding.

Chapter 3 locates the study in the historical and contemporary context in South Korea. In this chapter, I put the discourses of nation branding and national prestige (NBNP) in a broader historical context of national imaginaries of the modern state, economy, and nation, focusing on the continuity and transition between developmentalism and neoliberalism in South Korea. I explore the social imaginaries of modernization and development as an economy-centric discursive framework for the developmental state. The post-developmental transformation of the state is discussed as the discursive construction of neoliberal competition state, centered on the transnational and techno-economic imaginations of globalization and knowledge economy.

The following three research chapters describe how the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP played out in South Korea. I examine the shifting



institutional deployment of the discourses of NBNP, focusing on the agencies of the news media (Chapter 4), the government (Chapter 5), and publics (Chapter 6).

In Chapter 4, I focus on the agency of the major national news media in importing and disseminating the idea of nation branding along with domestic public and private think tanks. I also attend to how the narratives by the news media contributed to a specific re-imagination of the state and the nation. The examination of the news media highlights the institutional and discursive formation of NBNP beyond the official institution of government public policy, and better illustrates the wider discursive terrain in which multiple stakeholders were involved, often in contested ways, in the neoliberal re-imagination of the South Korean state and nation.

In Chapter 5, I examine how nation branding policy emerged under the Lee government, focusing on the policy activities by the Presidential Council for Nation Branding. The Council (PCNB) took the responsibility for coordinating public policies across different governmental departments and agencies and implementing various publicity-oriented activities in regard to nation branding. In coordinating and implementing the public policy for nation branding, the Council emphasized the key principle: the cooperation between government and business on the one hand, and between government and citizens on the other. I will focus on how this principle actually played out in the deployment of the public policies for nation branding.

In chapter 6, I examine how the official discourses and practices of NBNP have opened up a discursive space for publics. Focusing on the debates and controversies around the campaign for the “promotion of Korea” by the non-

governmental bodies and individuals, I examine how different social actors articulate and imagine different ideas of an “advanced nation” and cultural modernity.

In the conclusion chapter, I summarize the findings in the study, and reflect on the implications. I also discuss the limitations and gaps left by this study and the directions for future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review literature relevant to understand the phenomenon of nation branding as discursive and institutional practices. While the study is grounded on the traditions of critical media and cultural studies in terms of methods and theories, it is also greatly informed by academic discussions and theories from broader academic fields and disciplines such as anthropology, political science, international studies, globalization studies, development studies, and sociology.

Theoretically, I situate the phenomenon of nation branding at the intersection of the renewed imaginaries of the state and the nation, and the neoliberalization in the global context. My point of entry to a critical study of nation branding is the academic discussions about the imagined nature of the state. Through the literature, I explore the extent to which the idea of the state is central to the way in which the self, the nation, and the world are imagined. Then, I review literature on the state vis-a-vis global neoliberalism. I focus on how the ideas of “global governmentality” and the “competition state” can shed light on the neoliberalization of the state toward the rationality of international competitiveness. Built on these discussions, in the last section, I review relevant literature on nation branding as a set of discourses, practices and techniques from critical media and cultural studies and anthropology.

## **The imagined state, economy and nation**

First, the dissertation conceives of the discursive and institutional practices of nation branding as offering new ways of imagining a nation (Aronczyk, 2013; Kaneva, 2012; Valaskivi, 2016), which is predicated on specific social imaginaries of the state and the economy (Crane, 1998, 1999; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998; Taylor, 2002; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b).

Since the path-breaking work by Benedict Anderson, *The Imagined Communities* (1983/1991/2006), the intellectual tradition has developed to illuminate the modern emergence of enormous abstract structures and entities like the nation, the economy, and the state in terms of the collective working of shared ideas, representations, symbols, and imaginations.

Anderson defines the nation as a community, collectively imagined among members who do not know each other, but share a sense of “a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). He explains the emergence of this “fraternity” in a larger context of the rise of what he calls “vernacular print capitalism” (Anderson, 2006, p. 76). With the introduction of new print media such as newspapers and novels, people began to share the sense of living in the same temporality (Anderson, 2006, pp. 22-30; Gupta, 2007, p. 270).

Charles Taylor, inspired by Anderson, expands the idea of imaginary. The idea of “social imaginary” describes “the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor, 2002, p. 106).

He explains that the formation of Western modernity depended on the historical emergence of new social imaginaries which grew out of the perceived relations of reciprocity among equal individuals: those of the market economy, the public sphere, and the self-governing people. The concept of social imaginaries helps to understand the cultural and moral grounds of modernity which buttress the working of apparent grand structures and institutions as well as constitute the formation of communities and collective identities (González-Vélez, 2002, p. 349). In a similar vein, the imagination as a “social practice,” “a form of work,” and “a social fact” constitutes broader conditions for ways of modern lives, especially in the increasingly globalizing world (Appadurai, 1996, p. 31). More specifically to nation branding, Valaskivi shows how a certain circulation of the transnational idea of nation branding in the context of Japan formulated and reproduced a particular social imaginary of a nation among globally competing nations (Valaskivi, 2013, 2016; Valaskivi & Sumiala, 2013).

The idea of social imaginary helps understand the cultural formations of the large institutions and structures such as the state and the economy, the formations in which nation branding plays an important part in the contemporary context. Many authors further scrutinized how the institutional entities such as the state and the economy are constructed through cultural and imaginative works. Most notably, the idea of social imaginary helps to understand how the state actually wields discursive and institutional power by highlighting how it was imagined, rationalized, and idealized, especially with regard to the economy. In his discussion, Taylor (2002) implies that the social imaginaries of the state (as the citizen state)

and the economy (as the market economy) constitute crucial components of the nation building in Western modernity.

In the Western tradition of media and cultural studies that has mainly grappled with the issues of power and rule from a cultural perspective, the state has curiously been a relatively neglected theme. The state has usually been discussed as a powerful actor in culture and media policies, as an ideological institution for capitalist reproduction (which is, what Althusser called, the “ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs)), or as a powerful entity vis-a-vis the media and cultural industries. In other words, the state has been conceived of as a definite institutional entity, clearly demarcated from non-state domains such as civil society and the economy. The state was conceived of as a center of power, but, in many discussions, reduced to a certain person and group in power or to the bureaucracy. Ironically, critical media and cultural studies has engaged in the examinations of many taken-for-granted entities as cultural and discursive constructions, but the state has not been under the same scrutiny in terms of culture, discourse, representation, and imagination (compare this situation with the case of the "nation").

The dissertation is predicated on the discussion which regards the state not as a self-evident entity, a taken-for-granted center of power, or an institutional actor, but as an effect of discursive and material practices.

The state is a central concept when critical scholars, especially with postcolonial perspectives, conceptualize the question of modern power and how it works in capitalism. Anthropologists and sociologists, influenced by Foucauldian thought about knowledge/power and governmentality, have developed a

decentered concept of the state (Dean, 2010; Foucault et al., 1991; Lemke, 2001, 2002; Rose & Miller, 1992). They raised such questions as how and why the state emerges as central and how state centrality is produced and reproduced, and paid attention to the cultural process of symbolic and discursive production as well as the technical process of institutions, techniques, procedures and tactics. It is through these processes that the state effect is produced (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Gupta, 1995; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998, 2006; Rose, 1999, p. 35; Sharma & Gupta, 2006; Steinmetz, 1999). Mitchell (1999, 2002) locates the state in relation to modern forms of power. Following Foucault, he conceptualizes microphysical power not as held by state apparatuses and imposed upon the governed, but as dispersed throughout society in the forms of modern disciplinary techniques which produce individuals as subjects by setting the possibilities and limits of thoughts and conducts at minute levels of social life. At a macro level, the governmental form of modern power works on population as a new object of management by statistical knowledge and political technologies. While governmental power is not reducible to the state, it is at this macro level that power is structured, codified and “institutionally crystallized” in the formation of the state (Foucault, quoted in Jessop, 2006, p. 37). Moreover, the structural appearance of the state as objective, neutral, abstract, and external to its object is the real source of power and order by maintaining and reproducing the division between the state and non-state (Lemke, 2007). As Mitchell (1991) explains:

The state should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics

is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference (p. 95).

Many authors also illuminated the institutional entities of the state and the economy in terms of discursive construction and imagination. Especially, many have paid attention to the relation between the state and the economy in the examination of the appearance of the state as the authoritative center. Foucault's concept of "government" provided a useful theoretical idea in this aspect. Government refers to "the 'conduct of conduct,' a more or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of spatial levels" (Watts, 2003, p. 9). The concept of government allows us to understand how the object of the economy is constructed through representations, discourse, and knowledge, as well as through procedure and techniques and how the state emerged as a legitimate authority to accumulate the knowledge and procedure of the economy (T. Mitchell, 1991, 1998, 2006).

Mitchell (2006) argues that "the economy" was invented out of the post-war regime of expertise as a real domain separated from the state and society, as a "self-contained totality" of production, distribution, and consumption within a given territory (pp. 182-183). The reimagining of the economy as a natural object to be managed, adjusted, and intervened by the state was part of the realignment of government. It is in this context which the post-war national economies and nation-states were reimagined. The "national economy" was reimagined as geographically-based bounded entity, and then became the basis for the reimagining of the state as



the nation-state (Dean, 2010, p. 28; T. B. Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 7; Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 7). In other words, modern nation-states are not just imagined communities based on shared territory, language and public sphere (Anderson, 1983); they are discursive and technical effects of the construction of the abstract entity of the national economy.

We can identify further implications of the reimagining of the national economy and nation-state with regard to the examination of nation branding in the present. First of all, from a geo-political perspective, nation-states are effects of transnational discursive and technical practices (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 178), and the geo-political order is reimagined as a relation among comparable, but hierarchic nation-states and national economies. In this order, Western liberal democratic states are normalized as "fully developed" and "ideal" forms of advanced states. In turn, non-Western states are put into the international hierarchy in which "Western state become the norm against which other states are judged" (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 10).

Then, we can consider "development" from the perspective of transnational government (Watts, 2003, p. 12). The developmental discourse problematized "poverty" as a problem, and circulated a universal logic that provided an explanation and solution based on statistical representations and expert knowledge (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, pp. 20-21). Thus, transnational developmental discourse produced the effect of the "developmentalist Third World state," for which national development emerged as the primary mandate for the state to accomplish (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, pp. 20-21).

More broadly, the modern state was "no longer defined in terms of an historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic growth" (Lemke, 2001, p. 196). In other words, development of the national economy, mainly presented in terms of economic growth, became naturalized as a given sublime task of the nation-state (T. Mitchell, 1998, pp. 91-92).

Relatedly in terms of the economic formation of the nation, some scholars presented the idea of the "imagined economy" (Crane, 1998, 1999) or "economic imaginary" (Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). Crane examines the economic representations in China and emphasizes that they are constitutive of the formation of national identity. National economic narratives of suffering, accomplishment, and social cohesion provided an "imagined economy" (Crane, 1999, p. 216), a shared sense of economic destiny. He emphasizes that this sense of economic national identity enables a specific global economic integration which aggravates social inequality. In a similar vein, Wyatt illustrates how a specific "economic imaginary" of "emerging power" (Wyatt, 2005a, p. 467) enabled the uneven and unequal incorporation of the Indian economy into the global economy.

Throughout the modern history of Korea, the state has emerged in varying forms in different historical moments: as "absence" during the Japanese occupation, as an overwhelmingly violent force (massacres and tortures by military dictatorship), as a leader toward modernization through economic development and industrialization, or as an institutional entity that (failed to) provide(d) safety and protection for the people's lives in times of disasters (the *Sewol* ferry disaster). These varying emergences and presences of the state in modern history

have been central in shaping the normative basis of social imaginaries. The state imaginations in turn have been central in the collective understanding of the nation and the communal lives, and the individual perception of the self and others whether it is imagined as an enormous violence, an agent of modernization, the provider of protection and rescue, or lately, as a nation brand.

It is noted that the dominant imaginary of the state has been constructed in relation to the national economy in the modern history of South Korea. Especially in the geopolitical context of the Cold War, the discourses of modernization and development shaped a specific form of the state, called the “developmental state,” whose historical role was defined as “development” in relation to the national economy. In the context of neoliberal globalization, political discourses on the state have exploded and variously reshaped the relation between the state and the economy in domestic and transnational settings. Quite a lot of academic articles and books have been written on the developmental state and the neoliberal transition of the state in South Korea. However, most works were on the institutional aspects from the political economy perspectives (for instance, Chang et al., 2012; Chi, 2007; Lim & Jang, 2006; Pirie, 2012; Woo-Cumings, 1999), with rare works on the cultural constructions and the imaginations of the state (Kwon, 2014).

I regard nation branding as one of the latest forms of state imagination, which is flexibly connected with and translated into different state discourses such as national image, national prestige, soft power, the advanced country, the normal nation and so on. It offers new ways of imagining the state and the nation by putting a new emphasis on the connection between the state, the nation, and the economy.

**Neoliberal transformation of the state into a competitive entity in the  
globalizing world**

Second, I situate the discourse and practice of nation branding in the contemporary context of neoliberalization in South Korea. For the last few decades, a new political rationality called neoliberalism emerged to attempt at readjusting the state-economy relations and "reengineering the state" (Hilgers, 2012), especially by reconstituting the changing conditions called globalization.

Neoliberalism is usually understood as a "retreat of the state," exemplified by a series of public policy initiatives toward the privatization of public assets and national enterprises, the deregulation of private business activities, the reduction of public services and welfare, and the extension of market principles. Rather than a coherent and orderly implementation of ideological public policies, we can understand neoliberalism as entailing a wider change beyond the realm of public policies (Larner, 2000, p. 12). In this regard, neoliberalism is an emerging form of governmental rationality, aiming to establish market competition as the primary principle for organizing the whole society and requiring the state and individuals to be reorganized as enterprises to meet the normative imperatives of competitiveness, commercial rationale and risk calculation (Hilgers, 2012, p. 358).

In these terms, the neoliberal state is an entity that proliferates the market norms and the principle of competition beyond the market (Brown, 2005, pp. 39-40). We can conceptualize the nature of neoliberal state with varying foci. Here, I will focus on the discussions on the neoliberal state and global governmentality, which might be helpful in the examination of nation branding.

Some critical scholars mainly from international studies have developed the perspective called "global governmentality" that focuses on the transnational regime of states (Brown, 2005; Fougner, 2006, 2008; H. K. Hansen & Mühlen-Schulte, 2012; Larner, 2000; Larner & Le Hern, 2004; Larner & Le Heron, 2002; Larner & Walters, 2004a, 2004b; Löwenheim, 2008; Mühlen-Schulte, 2012). The "global governmentality" perspective expands the analytic scope from the national to the global, developing concepts such as "global economy" and "global governance." Moreover, in association with the "governmentality" analysis, they have paid attention to concrete aspects of technique, institutions, procedures, and tactics, as well as aspects of knowledge, discourse, and representations (Larner & Walters, 2004a, pp. 2-5).

These international studies scholars widely attend to neoliberal calculative techniques such as benchmarking, global standards, indicators, and indices, which are produced by transnational governance organizations (UNDP, OECD, IMF, World Bank, etc.) as well as private institutions (WEF, IMD, etc.). Just as national statistics constructed the national economy, these calculative, comparative, quantitative techniques materialize global imaginaries. It is within these global imaginaries that national economies are rendered comparable, and the global economic space is made imaginable as a space for global comparison and competition (Larner & Walters, 2004a, pp. 212-215).

From the perspective of global governmentality, Fougner (2006, 2008) focuses on state form, and especially develops the idea of the "competition state." Philip Cerny's idea of the "competition state" (Cerny, 1997, 2010) highlights

shifting state forms in accordance with the changing political rationality of the globalizing, neoliberal economy. He argues that nation-states, which put emphasis on civic association and social cohesion, are replaced by competition states which operate on quasi-enterprise association. The neoliberal competition state does not retreat, but expands its intervention and regulation for openness and marketization toward transnational competitiveness (Cerny, 1997, p. 251). While, at a global level, the neoliberal competition state is bound by the rules and regulations disseminated through transnational agents and institutions, it still operates strongly at a national level as a promoter of market competition by exposing national enterprises and citizens to the pressures of international competition (Cerny, 2010, p. 5).

From the perspective of the global neoliberal rationality of government, Fougner (2006, 2008) focuses on how calculative, comparative techniques such as benchmarking are disciplinary in reconstructing the nation-state as a market-competitive subject of the competition state. He examines how international competitiveness has been constructed as a governmental problem in which the state is framed as a competitive entity (p. 165). With regards to international competitiveness, the state is constructed in two different ways. On the one hand, international competitiveness designates "aggressiveness," the capacities of "national" enterprises to compete against foreign ones. In this term of aggressiveness, the task of the state is to enhance the capacity of the enterprises. On the other hand, international competitiveness implies "attractiveness," which is employed with reference to what "remain spatially immobile – such as the majority of the workforce, citizens, the people, society, and so on." In this term of

attractiveness, the tasks of the states are framed "as good landlords" from the perspective of "globally footloose firms and capital" (p. 174). He concludes that especially from the second notion of international competitiveness states are increasingly constructed "as flexible and manipulable market actors" (p. 177).

In a similar vein, many commentators also point out how various country indices, global competitiveness reports (such as those by IMD and WEF) and sovereign credit ratings (such as those by Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch) work as normalizing techniques with which the legitimacy and normalcy of the especially Third World states are constructed (Buduru & Pal, 2010, p. 460; Fougner, 2008, p. 303; Larner & Le Hern, 2004; Löwenheim, 2008, p. 256).

The global governmentality perspective helps us to understand the transformation of the state beyond the national frame. It conceptualizes the problems of rule and power at a global level, and shows how at that level the state is constructed as a manipulable, flexible, and competitive subject through the discursive and technical means. The perspective is potentially advantageous in grasping the transnational inequality and asymmetry in power between the Western and the Third World countries.

However, this perspective has at least two shortcomings. First, it is rigidly fixed on the division between the global and the national/local, and tends to assume the simple dichotomy between the West and the rest. Second, the state is conceptualized as a monolithic entity, blinding not just domestic but also translocal dynamics. It seems the perspective uses an inflexible application of the Foucauldian

notion of governmentality, so that the governable subject is fixed to the level of the individual state.

Scholars mostly from anthropology provide a more productive way to theorize neoliberalism and the state from a governmentality perspective. Aihwa Ong (2006, 2007) defines neoliberalism not as culture or structure, but "mobile calculative techniques" (2006, p. 13) that realign spaces and subjects in accordance with market-driven calculation (p. 3). She avoids understanding globalization and neoliberalism as totalizing logics, but instead, focuses on how the neoliberal market logic intersects with the existing logics of sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. This modular understanding of neoliberalism as "assemblage" (2007, p. 3) enables her to understand how neoliberal calculation fragments sovereign territories and re-gradates them along transnational, subnational, translocal lines. Moreover, it breaks up the national citizenship and realigns the gradated subjectivities of citizenship variously connected with the capacities in global markets (pp. 4-5). She adds that the neoliberal logic not only promotes market-oriented, entrepreneurial, competitive, self-improving, self-branding, creative, cosmopolitan, calculative subjects, but rearticulates them with patriotism, nationalism and other heterogeneous values. In this way, she and other anthropologists, focusing on the cases of governmentality in the Chinese context, show how government articulates with sovereignty in a non-Western context (Hoffman, 2006a, 2006b; K. Mitchell, 1997; Ong, 1997, 1999; Rofel, 2007).

In line with this modular thinking of neoliberal assemblage, Collier (2009) also shows how neoliberal government was redeployed to reinforce the state in



Russia or the response to neoliberalism led the mobilization of social welfare project in Brazil. Ferguson (2010), on the other hand, shows how neoliberal elements, as those in the basic income program, could work against neoliberal regime in South Africa.

In sum, these scholars provide sophisticated understandings of neoliberalism from a perspective of governmentality, avoiding sweeping claims which treat globalization and neoliberalism as overwhelming “tsunami,” as well as avoiding empty contentions that repeat the validity and viability of the nation-state in a conventional way.

There have been quite a lot of debates on whether South Korea has turned into a neoliberal society, especially since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s (for instance, from the field of political economy, C.-j. Ch’oe, 2006; Chang et al., 2012; Chi, 2007; H.-Y. Cho et al., 2013; Lim & Jang, 2006). But many agree that neoliberalism, defined as the extension of the principles of market competition beyond the economy into the whole society, has constituted a dominant governing rationality in South Korea (for instance, Jun, 2012; H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; J. Song, 2010). In the neoliberal domination, commercializing logics overwhelm almost every aspect of personal, social, political and cultural life beyond the business world. The logic of the brand stands as a dominant discourse and technique in this commercialization of society, extending its application to the state and the nation.

It is in this context in which nation branding and national prestige emerged as a set of discourses and techniques of imagining and constructing the state as a competitive market entity and as a location manager for transnational capital. It

envisions a new globalizing economy and world order, redefining national identity and shaping a new citizenship in a neoliberal manner. The discourses of nation branding illustrate a concrete way in which the neoliberal transformation of the South Korean state and the economy has unfolded. The dissertation explores how nation branding has worked as part of neoliberal rationality, constructing a cultural version of the “neoliberal competition state” in South Korea. Across the news media discourses and public policies, I examine how the dominant practices of nation branding re-imagined the nation as a neoliberal commercial entity in the global market of competing images of nations in the name of the nation brand, national image, and national prestige.

### **The global phenomena of branding and nation branding**

In this section, I introduce relevant discussions on nation branding as a set of discourses, institutions, and techniques from critical perspectives informed by critical media and cultural studies and anthropology. For this end, I start with the idea of branding, the business techniques out of which nation branding was developed. The basic assumption of nation branding is that the techniques of branding products and corporations are applicable to the state and the nation. Then, I review the literature on nation branding by identifying four interrelated themes: political economy, international politics, cultural identity, and citizenship.

### **Branding**

Branding is an advanced marketing technique that adopts names, symbols and design and applies them to products in order to stand out among the crowd of products in the competitive market (Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). Branding, almost

universally accepted in the world of business management, diverges from traditional marketing in its emphasis on image and reputation which enable the establishment of semiotic and emotional ties with consumers. According to van Ham (2001):

Branding acquires its power because the right brand can surpass the actual product as a company's central asset. Smart firms pour most of their money into improving their brands, focusing more on the values and emotions that customers attach to them than on the quality of the products themselves (p. 2).

In this advanced form, brands are defined as "clusters of functional and emotional values that promise a unique and welcome experience between a buyer and a seller" (Chernatony, quoted in Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). Business practitioners and critical observers of branding alike attend to branding in its aspect of producing "extra value" or "premium value" from the intangible and the symbolic.

Critical scholars examine the phenomenon of brands and branding within the context of a larger social transformation (Arvidsson, 2006; Banet-Weiser, 2012; Holt, 2006). Attending to the cultural aspect of branding, the aspect in which symbolic and affective practices are privileged, they view that branding is symptomatic of the overarching social and economic transformation especially with regard to the development of neoliberal globalization and information and communications technologies.

In his examination of the historical relations between branding and consumer culture, Holt (2006) argues that today's branding transcends "cultural engineering" of manipulative marketing communications and propagandistic public relations. Branding began as early as the late 19th century and soon developed by

American advertising agencies, but the contemporary development of branding is indebted to the development of sophisticated marketing and consumer researches in the late half of the 20th century. He argues that “branding is a distinctive mode of capital accumulation” in that it “generates profits by creating and then exploiting various sort of social dependency” (Holt, 2006, p. 300). The “postmodern branding revolution” (Jansen, 2008, p. 125) consists in its emphasis on the meaningful and affective nature through which brands come to exist in the social world of experience. The shift from producer-centered to consumer-centered perspective, or from modern to postmodern branding paradigm (Holt, 2006) is epitomized by a famous dictum in business management, “brands exist only in the mind of the consumer” (Kotler, quoted in Dinnie, 2008, p. 15).

Arvidsson (2006) relates the rise of branding to “a new economic logic” that has been related to various ideas such as “sign economy,” “flexible accumulation,” the aestheticization of the economy,” “knowledge economy,” “information economy,” “cognitive capitalism” or “informational capitalism.” These concepts highlight the increasing valorization of information, knowledge, design and style in the production of value. Arvidsson (2007) asserts that brands “are paradigmatic of the new informational mode of production” in which value creation is based on the immaterial, the intangible of affect and experience. Major textbooks on marketing and branding commonly emphasize the importance of “building strong brand identity” and “managing brand equity” by constructing long and stable relationship with customers through the symbolic and emotional dimension of brands (for instance, Aaker, 1991).

Indeed, brands are at the heart of the financialization of the global economy. The notion of “brand equity” epitomizes the immaterialization of the global economy accelerated by global reach of financial capital. Brand experts estimate that as much as 40 to 60 per cent of a company’s worth comes out of its brand equity (Jansen, 2008, p. 125). Anholt (2005) estimates that brand could be as much as one-third of the total value of global wealth. According to the measurement by Interbrand, a leading branding consulting agency, the intangible assets of the top 100 global brands are up to one trillion dollars, which is roughly equal to the combined gross national income of all the 63 “low income” countries defined by the World Bank.

Brand equity, the financial value of brand assets, suggests that the operation of contemporary capitalism is increasingly dependent on the intellectual property regime in which the immaterial, intangible value creation is crystalized in monetary terms. The phenomenon of brands and branding suggests that the “extra-economic” resources become the basis of economic value creation; in the same process, the economy is increasingly dependent on culture. In this context, it is no surprise that branding has become so pervasive that it is not limited to the business area; “the brand seems to have become the natural model for the organization of a whole range of different social formations” (Arvidsson, 2007, p. 9).

In South Korea, the term “brand” (which reads as “*bŭraendŭ* 브랜드” in South Korea) itself has been used as a loanword without matching original Korean word, and has become an everyday word in recent years. Indeed, branding has emerged as a dominating discourse, practice and technique, overwhelming almost every aspect

of personal, social, political and cultural life beyond the business world. The publishing industry poured out numerous books on “self-development” that encouraged individuals to “brand yourself,” “maximize your value” and “sell your brand” (H.-m. Kim et al., 2010; Seo, 2010; J. Song, 2010).

Considering the overwhelming sweep of branding, it is no surprise that places such as cities and countries are getting branding treatment to build powerful brand images and brand identities in the competitive global market. If the logic of the brand has become a dominant form of the way in which informational capitalism works, how can this logic be extended to the state and the nation?

### **Nation branding**

Nation branding has grown rapidly as a field since the late 1990s, represented by several books<sup>7</sup> and quasi-academic journals such as *Place Branding* and the *Journal of Brand Management*,<sup>8</sup> and as a burgeoning consulting practice led by global marketing and branding consulting firms. Growing out of business management of brands of products and corporations, the idea and practice of nation branding emerged in close relation with those of destination branding, place

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<sup>7</sup> Representative books include *Brand new justice* (2003) and *Competitive identity* (2007) written by Simon Anholt, a British consultant who claims that he first coined the term, nation branding. The nation-branding paradigm was inspired and advocated by Wally Olins, who has worked on corporate identity and branding in his book, *Trading identities* (1999), and Peter van Ham, who came from international politics. On the other side of the Atlantic, American professors at business schools also have influenced the establishment of the paradigm with related books: David Aaker (*Managing brand equity*, 1991), who is an expert on corporate brand strategy, and Philip Kotler (*Marketing places*, 1993), who is called “the Father of Modern Marketing” among his circle.

<sup>8</sup> The journal, *Place Branding* was launched in 2004 and was renamed as *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* in 2006. Simon Anholt was the first editor of the journal.

branding and the “country-of-origin effect” in the field of tourism studies and international marketing (Kotler & Gertner, 2003). Inspired by the business practices valorizing symbolic and cultural branding of products and services, nation branding emphasizes the growing importance of image, logo, design, symbol and reputation for countries just like for goods and services.

Nation branding is not simply a communication strategy dealing with symbols and logos. Kaneva (2011a) defines nation branding as broadly as “a compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms” (p. 118). It encompasses a range of discursive and institutional practices at the economic, political and cultural levels. Furthermore, nation-branding practitioners ambitiously aim to establish the paradigm of nation branding as a guiding principle for organizing the internal and external public policy for economic development, national planning and governance (Anholt, 2007, p. 23).

In the following section, I examine the basic arguments of nation branding by critically reviewing its core literature. Most literature on nation branding comes from the academic disciplines of business administration and international politics.<sup>9</sup> It is not surprising that most of them focus on the promotional and functional aspects of nation branding in which consultants and practitioners deal with the

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<sup>9</sup> Kaneva’s almost complete survey (2011a) shows that out of 186 samples of scholarly sources on nation branding from 1997 to 2009, 106 pieces came from marketing and business administration perspectives and 66 publications from international relations perspectives.

principles and techniques for the more effective and efficient implementation of nation branding.<sup>10</sup>

I subject these perspectives on nation branding to critical examination, informed by cultural perspectives. The critical cultural literature, coming from the fields of media and cultural studies, anthropology, and international relations among others, is relatively small but growing.<sup>11</sup> This critical literature commonly regards the rise of nation branding as a cultural practice sitting in the larger political structural context of neoliberal globalization. These authors raise the questions about the assumption underlying the dominant paradigm of nation branding.

The review focuses on four key aspects of nation branding: first, how it is entrenched within, and helps construct a specific global economic order; secondly, how it envisions a version of international political order by relating itself to such ideas as public diplomacy and soft power; thirdly, how it uses culture as an instrument for nation branding and redefines national identity for economic effects and; lastly, how it gives shape to a new form of governance by emphasizing public-private partnership and citizen participation.

### **The political economy of nation branding**

The basic argument of nation branding is that countries are competing for international attention to survive the market globalization. Nation branding

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<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of the review, I will focus on the literature which proposes core arguments of nation branding, especially publications by leading consultants Anholt (2005, 2007), Olins (2002) and van Ham (2001) as well as an introductory survey by Dinnie (2008).

<sup>11</sup> Kaneva's survey (2011a) identifies only 14 sources, but the literature has been growing rapidly since then. At this point of writing, I count ten times as many journal articles and dozen books.



advocates contend that the fierce global competition for internal and external markets makes it inevitable for nations and places to engage in the working and reworking of national image and reputation (Anholt, 2007, p. 1; Dinnie, 2008, p. 106). They argue that nations and places are basically playing the same game as other products and companies in that they are exposed to global market competition for political and/or commercial attention (Anholt, 2007, p. 125; van Ham, 2008, p. 129).

Cultural critics point out that nation branding is predicated on the neoliberal assumption that market globalization is an inevitable and natural process (Dzenovska, 2005; Jansen, 2008; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). Anholt (2005) asserts:

I believe that we have little choice in the matter. Because [.....] so much of the wealth of nations in the globalized economy derive from each country's ability to export branded goods, and because so much of the wealth to survive and prosper now comes from the "added value" of branded goods and services, the competitiveness of nations and the branding of countries is the only way forward; it has become an immutable law of global capitalism.

Assuming that the capitalist globalization is an objective, law-like movement from which no individuals and countries can be exempted, he valorizes nation branding as the only way to foster the necessary national competitiveness and to survive the global competition.

Based on this assumption in which neoliberal globalization is the law and competitiveness is its norm, the necessity and benefits of nation branding are presented exclusively in economic terms. In the context of market globalization, practitioners argue, nation branding is a necessary strategy for nations to attract tourists, inward investment and international talents, to boost exports (Dinnie,

2008, p. 17). Temporal further enumerates the potential benefits of nation branding as follows:

- Increase currency stability
- Help restore international credibility and investor confidence
- Reverse international ratings downgrades
- Increase international political influence
- Lead to export growth of branded products and services
- Increase inbound tourism and investment
- Stimulate stronger international partnerships
- Enhance nation building (confidence, pride, harmony, ambition, national resolve)
- Reverse negative thoughts about environmental and human rights issues
- Help diffuse allegations of corruption and cronyism
- Bring greater access to global markets
- Lead to an improvement in the ability to win against regional and global business competitors, and defend their own markets (quoted in Anholt, 2005, p. 141).

The list suggests that nation branding presupposes a specific understanding of globalization, which is constructed specifically from the perspective of financial capital. Nation branding assumes that countries are competing not just for economic gains but more specifically for improving international financial credibility ratings. In this vein, nation-branding practitioners offer the measurement of nation brands especially in terms of their financial value. For instance, the Anholt Nation Brands Index (NBI)<sup>12</sup> incorporates the financial valuation of nation brands, which enables “to put dollar value on the reputations of the countries in the NBI, giving the sense of the real contribution of the brand to the nation’s economy” (Anholt, 2007, p. 44). Measured with the methodology of “royalty relief,” the value of nation brand assets well exceeds the amount of GDP, led by the USA’s 18 trillion dollars (Anholt, 2007, p.

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<sup>12</sup> Later, it was revamped as the Anholt-gfk Roper Nation Brands Index in partnership with GfK Roper Public Affairs and Media.

45). The practice of indexing from the financial perspective transforms the nation-state into “calculative space,” which is “constituted by marketing data and decision making rather than conceived in terms of social relations or governance” (Jansen, 2008, p. 122).

Cultural critics further point out that nation-branding consultants not only naturalize the neoliberal global economy by mythologizing it as natural and inevitable reality to which nations should adjust (Aronczyk, 2009, p. 292); but they are actively constituting part of the constructed reality of financial globalization, operating as the “cultural circuit of capital” (Thrift, 2005). Nation branding consultants normalize and constitute capitalist globalization by disseminating specific managerial knowledge, constructing a specific image of world economic order, and facilitating the movement of financial capital at a global scale.

In the framework of nation branding, the role of nation-states is reduced to the management of image and reputation in order to foster competitiveness for a business-friendly environment to attract free-flowing global financial capital, technologies and elites (Kaneva, 2007, 2011a; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). As a governing technology of global neoliberalism, nation branding urges nation-states to participate in the global capitalist game of enhancing the rank of nation brands by internalizing neoliberal norms of global standards.

### **Nation branding and international politics**

Nation branding practitioners, especially those who are based in Europe, emphasize that the role played by nation branding is not limited to the economic aspect, but encompasses political and diplomatic aspects (Anholt, 2007; Olins, 2002;

van Ham, 2008). These practitioners are eager to show internal and external political benefits of nation branding. They attempt to link the idea of nation branding to such concepts as “public diplomacy” and “soft power” (Gilboa, 2008), arguing that nation branding is basically interchangeable with those concepts developed from international relations and international politics.

Soft power, the concept introduced by Joseph Nye, describes the ability of a nation to influence others not by military force and/or economic lure but by the attractiveness of a nation’s values, culture and policies (J. S. Nye, 2008, p. 94). He contends that soft power has become strategically as important as the hard power of military coercion and economic inducement with the rise of information communications technologies and the with the end of the Cold War (Gilboa, 2008; J. S. Nye, 2008). Nation branding consultants contend that nation branding is virtually equivalent to soft power in that both of them focus on image, reputation and attraction. Anholt writes:

Soft power [.....] is making people want to do what you want them to do. Nation branding is about making people want to pay attention to a country’s achievement, and believe in its qualities. It is quintessential modern exemplar of soft power (2005, p. 13).

In this regard, Anholt (2007) argues that nation branding is an essential component of the comprehensive art of statecraft. In fact, he and other practitioners are eager to recommend the recipes of nation branding and nation image management especially to under-developed countries as the overarching public policy strategy for national development. He argues that the soft power strategy of nation branding is the only viable option for “transitional” economies in the former

Second World and poorer countries of lower development, which lack hard power instruments of military forces and economic power (Anholt, 2005, p. 13).

Similar claims are raised about public diplomacy. Gilboa (2008) defines public diplomacy, “where state and nonstate actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies” (p. 58). From the perspective of international relations, it is presented “as an official policy translating soft power resources into action” (p. 61). While it is observed that public diplomacy and nation branding are distinguished in terms of their goals — the former aiming at foreign policy outcomes and the latter at commercial benefits (p. 68), nation branders contends that they are converging in that public diplomacy strategically adopts commercial techniques and practices to appeal to foreign public audiences (Anholt, 2007, p. 3; van Ham, 2008, p. 135).

Nation branding is now regarded not just as a communication technique adopted by countries, but a critical component of public policy that directs the overarching orientation of internal and external state management. In this vein, the idea of nation branding is increasingly linked with those of public diplomacy and soft power. It is contended that the convergence between nation branding and soft power or public diplomacy is inevitable because the role and position of modern nation-states have changed in the post-Cold War era in which ideologies receded. Nation branding posits a specific redefinition of the state and politics in the post-Cold War international order which is determined by the market logic. Van Ham (2001) argues that the nation brand, or the “brand state” in his own term, implies “a shift in political paradigms, a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power

to the postmodern world of images and influence” (p. 4). He suggests that “postmodern power, where soft power and public diplomacy have their place” (van Ham, 2008, p. 127) is suitable in the age of globalization in which the ideological confrontation gave way to market competition among nations. It is advised that “smart states” put their collective energy into building an assertive international images and reputations (van Ham, 2001, p. 3).

Furthermore, postmodern international politics is depicted as rather “peaceful and humanistic” landscape that consists of individual freedom and consumer power (Anholt, 2007, p. 125). It is soft power and public diplomacy which are the instruments of this postmodern international politics for gaining economic competitive advantage. And it is in this postmodern conception of world politics which nation branding is celebrated as the only weapon that is possibly wielded by the weak who are transitional, developing countries that “lie beneath” in the hierarchy of nations (Anholt, 2005, p. 13).

At least two aspects of the nation-branding’s take on the international politics can be put into critiques. On the one hand, the nation-branding practitioners’ ambitions and motivations. The nation-branding consultants repeatedly emphasize that nation branding cannot be equated with logos and slogans, and communications techniques such as PR, advertising and campaigns; they claim that it constitutes a core component of public policy by encompassing the agenda of international politics. By claiming the convergence between nation branding and soft power and public diplomacy, the nation-branding consultants locate nation-branding at the center of public policy agendas as the overarching

orientation of internal and external state management — therefore their own place as consulting authority for the new panacea of nation branding (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011, p. 192) especially over the countries which are put at the lower side of international hierarchy.

On the other hand, by dismissing modern nation-states and celebrating postmodern brand states, nation branding depoliticizes international politics. It presents the “brand state” pursuing “competitive identity” as a normative form of states in the age of postmodern power (Anholt, 2007; van Ham, 2001). International politics among brand states are depicted as dominated by soft power and public diplomacy where peaceful competition and equal exchange among nations characterize “postmodern power” (van Ham, 2008, p. 127).

### **Nation branding, cultural differences, national identity**

Advocates of nation branding, either from economic or diplomatic perspective, regard culture as an essential component of nation branding strategies. Just like branding in general, nation branding emphasizes the immaterial dimension of distinctive culture, symbols, logos, naming and design for strategic differentiation in the competitive global market. Practitioners of advanced modern branding, however, acknowledge that nation branding is not equivalent to symbolic manipulation and propaganda which directly aim to influence other countries because nation brands “are not directly under the marketer’s control” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 108).

While this poses problems to some marketers and branders of nations due to their complex nature ridden with history and traditions, it provides to others a rich

ground for cultural nation branding because “nation-brands possess far richer and deeper cultural resources than any other type of brand” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 14). In this light, nation branding is essentially a cultural practice aiming to carve out the culturally differentiated space for international economic and political competition. In this cultural perspective, nation brands are broadly defined as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences” (Dinnie, 2008, p. 15).

Nation branding deals with culture in ways in which cultural resources could contribute to the enhancement of national competitiveness. In this perspective, unique local and national culture is regarded as essential to the effective nation branding campaign. On the one hand, culture in the forms of either cultural heritage or modern popular culture makes immediate economic contribution to the national economy through tourism and cultural exports. The policy initiatives for promoting the creative industries such as “Cool Britannia” and “Cool Japan” represent the trend in which culture has entered the major realm of public policy (Clancy, 2009, p. 28; Jansen, 2008, p. 122).

On the other hand, culture makes “intangible” contribution to the national economy and international political influences by enhancing national prestige (Anholt, 2007, p. 113). Anholt (2007) argues that culture is useful in constructing “competitive identity” of nation brands simply because it is generally regarded as “not for sale.” Culture, representing “a country’s true spirit and essence” could mitigate the overtly commercial tone of branding. For instance, while Japan has been pejoratively projected as “automata,” its graceful heritage and “cool” modern



culture are effectively offsetting the stereotypical image. As culture is a truly unique feature of its country, it provides “all-important quality of dignity which, arguably, commercial brands can do without, but countries cannot” (Anholt, 2005, p. 136).

In these frameworks of nation branding, culture is effectively redefined as an essential instrument for nation branding from the perspective of global competitiveness. Culture is redefined as direct industrial resources for economic development. The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index features the category of “culture and heritage” as one of the six criteria measuring the value of nation brands (the other five are exports, governance, people, tourism, and investment and immigration). Culture is also conceived of as having symbolic consequences of constructing national image and reputation in the global economy and politics by enhancing nation prestige, dignity, quality and so forth (Anholt, 2005).

The redefinition of culture within the overarching policy orientation toward global competitiveness has implications to the way in which the question of national identity is raised in the nation-branding paradigm. If culture is essential to the formation of national identity through the shared cultural traditions and contemporary culture represented in the national media (Anderson, 1983; Aronczyk, 2007), the particular rendition of culture by nation branding entails a specific redefinition of collective national identity.

Its practitioners claim that nation branding is the project of representing the essence of national culture and reflecting “something fundamentally true about the place and people” (Anholt, 2007, p. 75). Dinnie (2008) suggests that “nation-brand development is firmly rooted in the reality and essence of the nation” (p. 135). In

this sense, they argue that nation brand and national identity are “virtually the same thing” (Anholt, 2007, p. 75).

However, as a concept developed in relation with the international marketing concept of “country-of-origin effect” (Dinnie, 2008, pp. 84-103), the genuine interest of nation branding is to present national identity in a tradable form which can be used as a “shortcut” (Anholt, 2005, p. 3) for an international purchase or investment decision. In this sense, Anholt (Anholt, 2007) argues that “nation brand is national identity made tangible, robust, communicable, and above all useful” (p. 75).

Some advocates, arguing that the historical formation of nations is not different from the contemporary practice of nation branding, attempts to present nation branding as an extension of historical project of nation building. Wally Olins (2002), a leading branding consultant, goes further to suggest that nation building be the symbolic construction of nations through the process of branding and rebranding. He argues that the process of historical nation building involved recreated national myths and traditions, reinvented representations and new symbolic systems that projected the regime changes in reality. Giving examples of France, Germany, Spain and Zimbabwe, he contends that the historical construction of nations by way of making up consistent and coherent images and narratives is what amounts to his conception of contemporary nation branding and rebranding.

Adopting the constructionist view of nation building in academic discussions (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Ranger & Hobsbawm, 1983) in his own way, Olins’s take on national identity reduces the historical-political process to a general process

of symbolic makeover. Van Ham (2001) distinguishes between modern and postmodern national identities. Whereas the modern national identity was deep-rooted in the historical-political context and often fell into antagonistic nationalism, the postmodern national identity is “cool brand” free from the deep-rootedness. This “new and improved” version of national identity and nationalism is presented as a solution to the global economic competitiveness:

In its ability to combine diverse motifs of heritage and modernization, domestic and foreign concerns, and economic and moral ideologies, nation branding is presented as a “2.0 version of nationalism, as a more progressive form of patriotism than its chauvinistic or antagonistic counterparts (Aronczyk, 2009, p. 294).

While some emphasize the “mining” of history, culture, geography, and national identity for external display (Anholt, 2007, p. 75), others equally focus on the internal effects of nation branding. Van Ham (2008) argues that “one of the key targets of the branding process today is internal,”<sup>13</sup> and emphasizes that nation branding strategy provides a sense of belonging and self-confidence. However, internal national identity formation, conceived within the nation-branding framework, is less about building political community or sharing cultural values than about sharing brand purpose which is similar to corporate identity.

He attempts to justify the practices of nation branding as a legitimate instrument for elites to shape national identities in the context of global competition for attention (Kaneva, 2011a, p. 121). From a cultural perspective, questions are

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<sup>13</sup> Comparing place branding and soft power, he argues that the former has the aspect of the internal identity formation while the latter lacks it (van Ham, 2008, p. 131).

raised about the way in which culture and national identity are conceived of in the nation branding paradigm.

First, nation branding treats culture and national identity as commodity and instrument for economic purposes. It treats them only in terms of their usefulness to the practices of nation branding management. Thus, it transforms culture and national identity into “intellectual property” (Jansen, 2008, p. 136) according to their economic utility and commercial value. The logic of nation branding ignores the internal value of culture and makes national identity, transformed into “competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007), subordinated to corporate interest.

Second, thus, nation branding presents national identity in an ahistorical and depoliticized way. In this logic, national branding as “nationalism 2.0” (Aronczyk, 2009, p. 294) or “national identity lite” (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011) seemingly emphasizes the historical process of national identity formation. Anholt (2007) contends that nation branding’s “use of its history, geography, and ethnic motifs to construct its own image” is a benign and peaceful version of nationalism. In this way, nation branding put national identity in the postmodern play of differences which erases historical and political implications (Halsall, 2008). While it reestablishes the significance of nation-states and nation identity as key agents, nation branding is only interested in its role in establishing a market position within the global economic competition (Aronczyk, 2008b), which cannot be clearer than in the redefinition of national identity as “competitive identity” (Anholt, 2007).

Third, nation branding constructs national identity in practical concerns; thus, the narratives mobilized in the identity formation are highly selective.

Commentators especially criticize that nation branding as a strategic display of national identity reorganizes culture and redefines national identity in an externally-directed fashion (Kaneva, 2007; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). Iordanova (2007) criticizes the orientalism of nation branding where exotic stereotypes are reproduced from the Western gaze. Moreover, the externally-oriented national identity produces the effect of ignoring the internal differences within the nation (Aronczyk, 2007, p. 122).

Finally, the way in which nation branding redefines internal national identity brings about normative effects on collective national behaviors. Nation branding is part of a continuing nation building project in the globalized, mediatized environment, focusing on the management of external image and reputation and enhancing internal national pride and social cohesion. The redefinition of internal national identity produces the effect of regulating collective life of the nation (Aronczyk, 2008a, p. 71). This normative, regulative aspect of nation branding is related to theme of the next section: the nation branding's governance of everyday life of individuals and citizen.

### **Nation branding, governance and citizenship**

In addition to the redefinition of national identity, nation branding has a further cultural implication in terms of internal cultural politics which has a regulatory and normative effect on citizenship. If culture not only designates cultural artifacts and heritage but also shared customs and collective behaviors, the lives of citizens themselves are regarded as a key source for nation branding.

Practitioners argue that for the successful implementation of nation branding, the “brand purpose” should be shared by “brand stakeholders.” The brand purpose is defined as shared visions and values of internal culture. The stakeholders of the nation brand in this context include not only various governmental departments, but private business sectors and citizens alike (Anholt, 2007, pp. 6-12). Anholt (2005) explains his idea about the governance initiative of nation branding:

The initiative has to be a major, nationwide, public-private partnership. The government, tourist boards, airlines, major brands and corporations have to agree on a common branding strategy (informed by a profound understanding and objective evaluation of overseas markets), and stick to it for many years (p. 130).

Adopting the idea of “governance,” a buzzword across the field of public administration (Anholt, 2007, pp. 15-19), the nation-branding paradigm emphasizes a public-private partnership and participation by “brand stakeholders” for a long-term commitment to the strategic nation branding. The implications of this argument are that the nation branding paradigm advocates the reorganization of the state public policy according to corporate principles. While Anholt elevates nation branding as a vital component for the long-term strategic plan for national development and indeed a new model guiding statecraft (Anholt, 2007, pp. 18-22), he suggests that the plan be set up according to principles which resemble corporate branding strategy which proved to be superior in the global competition. He argues for the reorganization of the states like private corporations:

[T]he fact is that governments now find themselves competing in ways that they are scarcely prepared to deal with, and inhabiting a world of global competition and mobile consumers where few of their traditional

approaches really work. This is a world that companies know well, and where they have learned how to survive and prosper (Anholt, 2007, p. 16).

By emphasizing the government-business partnership and the participation by brand stakeholders, what nation branding aims is to realign public policy to corporate principles and put the state functions to the service of enterprises. Anholt (2007) argues for setting up a governmental institution which works according to corporate principles in order effectively and successfully to execute the nation branding strategy with continuity and authority.

Critical media and cultural studies scholars characterize nation branding's claim for the public-private partnership within the larger context of neoliberal transformation of the state governance.

The corporate principle extends to the regulation of citizens' lives and behaviors. The practitioners contend that the working of nation branding presupposes the full engagement by national stakeholders including citizens (Anholt, 2007, p. 14). Anholt (2007) emphasizes that the shared purpose of nation branding should get unanimous support by the population enthusiastic about enhancing national image and reputation. The assumption of nation branding that citizens should embody specific customs and behaviors is well epitomized in the rhetoric like "the people are the brand" (Anholt, 2007, p. 75), "live the brand" (Anholt, 2007, p. 6; Aronczyk, 2009, p. 123), "brand ambassadors" (Dinnie, 2008, p. 72) and so on.

The emphasis on the participation by the ordinary citizens is frequently related with the notion of public diplomacy. Anholt (2007) argues that public

diplomacy implies that the “messenger” of the nation brand is a “substantial part of population” which “is motivated and energized through a benign national ambition, and instinctively seizes every opportunity to tell the world about its country” (p. 105). In this rationale, nation branding strategy urges citizens to internalize global standards and meticulously recommends that children should be taught “how to be welcoming to strangers” (Anholt, 2007, p. 108).

By emphasizing cooperation, participation and consensus for the single-minded purpose of nation branding, nation branding regards citizens as only a component of nation branding and aims to constitute them as competitive market subjects. Critical media and cultural studies scholars point out that, contrary to the participation claim, nation branding actually limits or excludes citizen participation. Widler (2007) criticizes that the nation branding’s analogy of nations with corporations makes citizens as equivalent with employees. Kaneva (2007) shows that the internal campaign for nation branding constructs citizens as consumers to whom “individual choice” and “practical everyday gains” are presented. Volcic and Andrejevic (2011) points out that the nation-branding rhetoric of “co-creation” encourages the citizen “to identify state and economic imperatives as their own” and puts the public interest in the hand of the private sector.

### **Emerging research trends**

While these four themes constitute ongoing streams underpinning the critical research on nation branding, I can identify in recent researches at least a few emerging trends which point out gaps in the existing literature and propose new research agenda.



First, some scholars point out that the existing researches on nation branding mostly focused on symbols, logos, representations, and discourses, relatively neglecting the aspects of material and institutional practices (Kaneva, 2016). This point does not necessarily imply that the material and institutional aspects were completely ignored in this stream of research, but the focus was relatively narrow and limited. In other words, the study of nation branding and other related practices should pay more attention to the complexity of institutional and material process in combination with symbolic, discursive, and representational aspects.

Secondly, while the media have been the natural focus in many critical researches on nation branding, it was treated in a rather simple way as an outlet of symbols, discourses, and representations. Scholars suggest that the multiple aspects of the media should be more examined, including technological and organizational aspects (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015). There emerged an increasing attention to the agency of the international and domestic media in terms of financial, material, and technological as well as symbolic circulation (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Kaneva, 2016).

Third, while the existing literature paid attention to the transnational nature of nation branding, especially focusing on the activities of transnational brand consultants (Aronczyk, 2008a; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011), the domestic aspects and effects were analyzed in a rather simplistic way. The domestic process of nation branding was treated as a black box, neglecting internal complexity and dynamics. For instance, the domestic analysis usually focused more on the static aspect of the government and the official public policy process, than on the dynamic involvement

by the domestic media, the domestic consultants and think tanks, the NGOs, and publics.

Fourth, the existing critical literature gives the impression that the business of nation branding has been implemented and imposed to build a certain national identity or to foster a certain citizenship in a rather successful manner. Yet, recent researches focus more on the complex, fragmented, and contradictory nature of nation branding campaigns. In this vein, recent researches have focused on the agencies of publics and non-governmental organizations in the process of nation branding and public diplomacy (Graan, 2010, 2013; Jordan, 2013).

Last, the critical literature on nation branding is characterized by the uneven geographical distribution of research. The majority of critical literature focused on the “post-Communist” countries in Eastern Europe (Poland, Latvia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Romania, Estonia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and so on).<sup>14</sup> Recently, critical literature has been greatly expanded in geographic scope, and examined nation branding in the context of Western Europe (Angell & Mordhorst, 2013; Christensen, 2013), Central Asia (Marat, 2009), and Middle East (Al-Ghazzi & Kraidy, 2013). Besides, critical works on nation branding in East Asia are increasing as the discourses and practices of nation branding have gained prominence among the public policy and marketing circle in East Asia over the last decade.

These works in the East Asian context are characterized by at least several traits as follows. First, these works mostly concentrate on the discursive and institutional practices in China and Japan as these two countries are the most

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<sup>14</sup> This trend is represented by a recent anthology, edited by Kaneva (2012).

powerful international players (de Kloet et al., 2011; Iwabuchi, 2015; Valaskivi, 2013, 2016).

Secondly, public diplomacy and soft power are as prominently examined as nation branding as these terms are the major concerns in the public policy circles in Japan and China (Chua, 2012; Cull, 2008; Heng, 2010; J. Nye & Kim, 2013; N. Otmazgin, 2016; N. K. Otmazgin, 2012; N. K. Otmazgin & Ben-Ari, 2012; J. Wang, 2011).

Thirdly, many works embed these practices of nation branding in the context of international politics and historical conflicts in East Asia. They can go back to Japanese imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century, but are still thorny issues, surfacing in the forms of territorial disputes, the conflicts around history textbooks, the “comfort women” of the Japanese imperial forces (Callahan, 2006; Gries, 2005). Besides, they are embedded in the contemporary nationalist tensions in East Asia, especially among Taiwan, China, South Korea, and Japan (J. Lee, 2018; S.-Y. Sung, 2010; Yang, 2008).

Lastly, the critical research on nation branding in East Asia is increasingly connected with the stream of the study of the circulation of popular culture in the region such as J-pop, K-pop, Japanese dramas and anime series, and Korean dramas. (Huang, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2002, 2012; S.-Y. L. Sung, 2015).

These emerging trends as well as the ongoing themes in the research of nation branding and other related practices greatly inform the present dissertation. Especially, the following themes provide a starting point for my development of the research: the incorporation of historical and institutional aspects to the analysis of

nation branding and national prestige, the focus on the institutional role played by the media in the establishing a national agenda, and the participation and involvement by the NGOs and publics in the process of nation branding and public diplomacy.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE NATIONAL IMAGINARIES IN SOUTH KOREA'S MODERNITY: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO COMPETITIVENESS

In this chapter, I provide the historical context of the rise of the discourses and institutions of nation branding and national prestige. Especially, I attend to how the social imaginaries of national development and modernization informed modernity in South Korea. In this discussion, I identify the defining characteristics of South Korean modernity as state-centered, economy-centered, and Western-oriented.

In the following section, I draw on literature on Western modernity, its dominant forms and its critiques. Then I discuss how the ideas of modernization and development were established as the defining discourses and programs in South Korea during the Cold War era. Next, focusing on the historical formation of the developmental state, I especially examine how the state and the economy have taken the center in the social imaginaries of national development and modernization.

Next, I examine the post-developmental transition to neoliberalism and the rise of the competition state in South Korea. In this examination, I consider how the neoliberalization of the state and the economy continued as well as changed the national imaginaries of development in the context of the globalizing economy. I especially focus on a series of state discourses which constructed the neoliberal competition state toward the rationality of international competitiveness.

In the last section, examining how the imaginary West continued to offer the normative standard and the universal model for South Korea, I confirm the Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity.

The discursive and institutional practices of nation branding and national prestige emerged against this backdrop of continuing as well as changing characteristics of modernity in South Korea: the state-centered, economy-obsessed, and Western-oriented characteristics.

### **Modernity**

Modernity, from a dominant point of view, refers to the ensemble of institutions, practices, norms and experiences which are distinctive from the tradition. Charles Taylor distinguishes two approaches to modernity: acultural and cultural (Taylor, 1995, p. 24). The acultural theory, which is the dominant understanding, conceives of modernity in such terms as the rise of reason, the progress of history, and the advancement of science and technology. Philosophically built on the ideas of Reason and Enlightenment, the acultural theory explains the social transformation in terms of the rise of individualism, industrialization and mobility, the building of nation-states, the spread of liberal democracy, and market economy (Luke, 1990, p. 212).

As Taylor points out, this acultural understanding of modernity presupposes the “Enlightenment package,” that is, “one single universally applicable operation” to be unpacked in a uniform pattern of progress of science, technology, and industrialization (Taylor, 1995, p. 28). In this acultural understanding of the

universal path to modernity, any and every culture and society is assumed to have to go through more or less the same transformations (Taylor, 1995, pp. 24-25).

Many scholars have criticized this dominant view of modernity, especially its linear formulation of temporality as Eurocentrism, privileging the particular experience of Europe or the West and imposing it on non-Europe or the non-West. Historically, it was through colonial rule that modernity spread from the West to the rest of the world. In this historical process, thus, the dominant form of modernity from the West established itself as the universal standard and norm which the non-Western world should follow.

Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) characterizes the epistemology of Eurocentric modernity as “historicism,” which presupposes global historical time in the structure of “first in Europe, then elsewhere” (p. 7). Thus, historicism:

posited historical time as a measure of the cultural distance (at least in institutional development) that was assumed to exist between the West and the non-West. In the colonies, it legitimated the idea of civilization. In Europe itself, it made possible completely internalist histories of Europe in which Europe was described as the site of the first occurrence of capitalism, modernity, or Enlightenment (p. 7).

Timothy Mitchell (2000) also calls into question the dominant narrative of modernity by criticizing its temporal logic. He points out that it understands history as having “only one unfolding time, the history of the West, in reference to which all other histories must establish their significance and receive their meaning” (p. 7). He emphasizes that the temporality of modernity as the uniform and singular history of the West reorganizes dispersed geographies into the various stages of Europe’s past (pp. 8-9). In this modern temporality, the past, laid out within the

space of the present and co-present in the homogenous space of now, is none other than the non-West colonies. In this definition of modernity as the “spatialization of time,” he suggests that we can understand “the West as the product of modernity” or modernity as being produced as the West, rather than modernity as the product of the West (p. 15).

In this way, the idea of modernity provides legitimacy for the superiority and dominance of the West over the non-West. In this sense, Walter Mignolo (2011), following Anibal Quijano, points out that “coloniality” (pp. 2-3) is the underlying logic of modernity and Western civilization. Escobar (1995) emphasizes that the colonial discursive regime perpetuates “the hegemonic idea of the West’s superiority” through the constructions of the “colonial/Third World subject” (pp. 8-9) as the object of knowledge and the exercise of power.

In a similar vein, Taylor (1995) criticizes the acultural understanding of modernity, especially its inability to deal with modernity in the non-Western context. According to him, modernity cannot be explained directly in terms of technological rationality, but in terms of the changes in background understanding, habitus, or “social imaginary” (p. 30). In this dimension of culture, a new option and possibility for change can emerge beyond the existing horizon. In this sense, Western modernity cannot be reduced to the universal, linear advance of individualism, science and technology, instrumental reason, progress and enlightenment and so on, and that it should be understood in the context of a larger change in moral order and social imaginary. He relativizes Western modernity by bringing up as an example the rise of the public sphere as a new repertoire beyond



the existing social imaginary. It was the changes in the understanding of secular time and the sense of contemporaneous that enabled the emergence of the public sphere (p. 30).

The strength of this cultural understanding of modernity is that it allows us to consider multiple paths to modernity or "multiple modernities" (Gaonkar, 2002, p. 12), which are not reduced to the universal narrative of historical time. Different cultures depend on different social imaginaries. Thus, for instance, the cultural forms such as the public sphere are, when introduced in non-Western contexts, "reconfigured both in meaning and function when placed within a social imaginary calibrated by an image of a moral order different from that of the West" (p. 12).

In sum, Taylor's approach relativizes Western modernity by identifying its specificities, and provides a new frame for understanding non-Western modernities. The latter should not be evaluated in terms of satisfying/not satisfying the criteria derived from Western experiences; rather the task is to understand how non-Western cultural forms are reconfigured in their own cultural context.

### **Modernization and development**

To examine the contemporary formation of modernity in South Korea in view of the discussion on the cultural theory of modernity, it would be fair to start with the discourse and the program of development and modernization.

In the second half of the twentieth century, in mainstream social sciences in the United States, the Euro-centric idea of modernity was reformulated into the scientific theory and the policy program of modernization and development. The US mainstream social scientists, supported by the US government, led the

dissemination of the discourse and the program of modernization and development throughout the anti-communist, liberalist bloc in the Cold War context (Escobar, 1992, p. 24; Leys, 2005; Luke, 1990, pp. 212-213).

The discourses and institutions of modernization and development continued the dichotomy between the modern and the traditional, based on which various aspects of non-Western societies are evaluated as to whether meeting the criteria of modernity or not (Dirlik, 2002, p. 35). In that way, the program of modernization and development was modeled after the historical experience of the Western societies and imposed on non-Western societies.

Moreover, the formulation of modernization and development is important in the sense that it was an explicit complex of “knowledge-power” between the academia and the government in the United States and was more or less systematically experimented and implemented in the so called Third World countries. Instead of emphasizing the European ideas such as enlightenment, civilization, and progress, as Timothy Luke (1990) points out, the discourse of modernization and development put forward such notions as development, economic growth, technological innovation, self-determination, democracy and so on, which were in a more neutral and scientific appearance, yet embodying “the cultural assumptions, political premises, and economic values of the United States” (p. 213) or “American myths” (p. 213). In the formulation of modernization and development, non-Western societies are diagnosed as being in different stages of development in terms of aggregate economic growth, extensive industrialization, democratization, and so on. The statistical indicators are devised to measure the

stages in development and to engineer the programs for the “takeoff” (p. 217).

However, as Escobar (1995) emphasizes, development is never severed from the colonial discourse in the sense that it is “regimes of discourse and representations” and “apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World” (pp. 9-10).

Under the anti-communist regime in the post-war era, it was the program of modernization and development that defined the nature of modernity in South Korea. Like many postcolonial societies, modernization and development epitomize the politics, economy and society in the post-liberation South Korea, especially since the 1960s when General Park Chung-hee seized the power in a military coup. The socio-economic program was received and deployed in a wholesale way, greatly shaping modernity in South Korea. In the modern history of South Korea, development and modernization have provided a template by which state public policies were legitimated, and economic activities and socio-cultural lives were predicated on.

Modernization and development can be understood as a social imaginary (cf. Watts, 2006, p. 48). In the following discussion, I characterize the social imaginary of development and modernization in South Korea as state-centered and economy-centered: the state, standing above society, led the development and modernization, and the economy became the most significant object of development and modernization. I also characterize the social imaginary of development and modernization rested on a certain image of the world in which the state strived to

“catch up” with advanced countries by harnessing the growth of the national economy.

### **The developmental state**

There are many theories that try to explain development and modernization in South Korea and East Asia in general in the late 20th century. Critical intellectuals in South Korea in the 1980s, who were influenced by the world-system theory and/or dependency theory, emphasized the outer limit of (under)development imposed by the imperialist center on the peripheral economy of South Korea. But they were faced with an explanatory conundrum when South Korean economy seemed to break through the supposed outer limit. Liberalists, on the other hand, explain it as a natural process of the evolutionary expansion of capitalist market principle. For instance, Daniel Chirot (2005), a truthful advocate of the original form of modernization theory, explains that South Korea has successfully implemented modernization because it followed the capitalist path to modernity pioneered by the West. However, this liberalist view is also in contradiction with historical reality, especially about the authoritarian state and state-led economic development. The South Korean economy was not developed according to the liberalist principle of free-market and free-enterprise in a straightforward way, but in a mercantilist fashion led by the “plan-rational” state (Cumings, 1999, p. 64; Pieterse, 2010, p. 23).

The prominence of the state is central to the understanding of modernity in East Asia and South Korea. The state played a major role in development and modernization, which constituted dominant social imaginaries among South Koreans since the 1960s, as in other post-colonial states. In modern South Korea,

the state is “capable of setting the direction of social and economic changes and molding the behavior of individuals and groups in society” and “therefore the most critical variable explaining virtually all major aspects of historical change in Korea” (H. Koo, 1993, p. 11). In this sense, the process of development and modernization is largely conterminous with state formation (K. J. Kim, 2007, p. 69).

The concept of the “developmental state” emphasizes the role played by the state in economic development and modernization in East Asia (Woo-Cumings, 1999). In this aspect, modernity in East Asia can be understood as a “state project” (Ong, 1997, p. 172), driven toward the national goal of techno-economic modernization by the nationalist state elite. The South Korean state under military dictatorship has been widely analyzed as a prominent case of the “developmental state” (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The concept highlights how the state took the leading role over the course of rapid economic growth and industrialization among East Asian capitalism (especially, Japan, Korea and Taiwan). The developmental state with a high level of capacity and autonomy did “get the price wrong” (Amsden, 1989), “govern the market” (Wade, 1990), or play a “transformative role” (Evans, 1995, p. 6) in the state-led economic growth and development.

State-centeredness, central to South Korean modernity, takes root in the continuum of a long-term historical imaginary in South Korea. It is debatable how far we can go back to find the root of state-centrism. Some go back to Confucian bureaucracy in the Chosŏn Dynasty (Woodside, 2009). In fact, it is suggested that throughout the history of Korea, the state have been central to the “politics of

vortex” in which every atomized individual in homogenous society was pulled upward toward a highly concentrated political center (Henderson (1968), quoted in K. J. Kim, 2007). At least, the centrality of the state in South Korea could go back to the Japanese colonial state in Korea, the Government-General of Korea (1910-1945) or the US Army Military Government (1945-1948), both of which were highly concentrated, bureaucratic, and repressive.<sup>15</sup> In any case, the dominant topological imagery is that the state stood above society, with overwhelming military and police force, well-equipped bureaucracy, and institutional apparatuses.

In the 1960s, the developmental state was established by modeling after the colonial regime of war-time mobilization. The developmental state has been explained by borrowing theoretical terms such as the “overdeveloped state” (C.-j. Ch’oe, 2002, p. 45) or imagined as “standing above civil society” (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002, p. 985). Within the historical context of state-centered social imaginary, the developmental state led the way to rapid economic growth. It led other parts of society toward developmental mobilization, disciplining and regulating population with coercive measures, as well as controlled finance and distributing monopoly and competition among big capital. The developmental state played a central role in the formation of the large capital-led, export-oriented national economy, which was constructed as the object of state intervention (Jessop & Sum, 2006b, p. 169).

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<sup>15</sup> Or it can go back to Manchukuo (1932-1945), a puppet state by Japanese Empire in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, which experimented a militarist state-driven, speed-oriented mobilization for modernization, which in turn inspired President Park Chung-hee for the bulldozer-like drive toward modernization (cf. Duara, 2004; Eckert, 2016; S.-c. Han, 2016).

The imagery of the state standing above society was reinforced in the geopolitical environment of the Cold War, which shaped and limited the national imaginary. The Cold War discourses of national security and regime competition against North Korea led to greater concentration of force and power on the state. The “security state” or “garrison state” (Em, 2016, p. 52) imposed violence on the population on the everyday basis and organized it as in a military-style mobilization. It was in this environment that the South Korean “developmental state” emerged as a way of national survival and winning over North Korea in the regime competition (Cumings, 1987; Pempel, 1999). The export-driven “catch-up” strategy, which the South Korean developmental state adopted for of “late industrialization” (Amsden, 1989), was made possible within the hierarchic international division of labor. In this setting, the US provided military and economic aids and opened the domestic market to industrializing countries with a strategic consideration in the Cold War environment.

State-centrism lies closely related with other enduring features such as authoritarianism, familism, collectivism and nepotism that were historically formed as well as central to explaining “social psychology” (H.-g. Song, 2003) or “cultural codes” (S.-b. Chŏng, 2007) of South Koreans during the rapid growth era. In this broader sense, state-centeredness in South Korea’s modernity not just concerns institutions, but refers to the central position of the state in thinking and behaving in everyday life and in the social imaginary among Koreans. Song (2003) points out, “In Korea, it is commonplace to think that nothing can be done without the state,”

and “the state stands central to every standard of judgement and pattern of behavior” (pp. 145, my own translation).

### **Development of the national economy**

Coupled with state-centeredness, what characterizes the formation of South Korean modernity is economy-centeredness. In fact, the developmental state established itself through the state-centered building, development and growth of the national economy. In that sense, state-centeredness and economy-centeredness cannot be separated in modern social imaginary in South Korea.

In terms of the social imaginary of modernity in South Korea, economy-centeredness can be examined in various aspects. First of all, economy-centeredness is apparent in the sense that development meant and was reduced to economic development (K. J. Kim, 2007, p. 25), or more precisely economic growth (Lie, 1998). Accordingly, all socio-economic institutions and programs were concentrated and mobilized for the development and growth of the national economy. Yi Sang-rok (2011) investigates how the idea of economy rose to top priority in the 1960s. He shows how polyphonic popular desires and needs were rendered into the “monotone of ex-backward modernization” (p. 129), and modern productive subjects were produced through disciplinary discourses and apparatuses. Ko Wŏn (2006) also shows how Saemaül Undong (New Village Campaign) in the early 1970s morally encouraged farmers into modern national subjects toward the “revolution of modernization” (p. 181). In this sense, modernity of South Korea meant a capitalist state project for the building of national economy (cf. Dirlik, 2002, pp. 35-36; Ong, 1997, p. 172).



Hwang Pyŏng-ju (2008) shows how the emergence of the notion of “economic development” in social imaginaries in the 1960s was possible by problematizing poverty. Based on the dichotomy between modern/premodern, advancement/backwardness, and civilized/uncivilized, the discourse of “ex-backward modernization” reconstituted backwardness exclusively as the problem of economic poverty. Backwardness was constructed as an evident matter of fact through the comparison techniques such as GNP and the narratives of the West such as travelers’ diaries and American popular culture. Through this problematization of poverty, the idea of economic growth and development of the national economy emerged as the most prominent concern, and in turn the state emerged to lead the way to development and modernization.

In this state project of the building of the national economy, the developmental state established itself in a special relation with the large industrial capital sector of conglomerates through the export-oriented drive. The state controlled the conglomerates not just by way of distributing the finance but by way of using violent measures. In the process, large conglomerates (*chaebŏls*) grew very rapidly and pursued a favored relation with the government by providing secret political money. For this *chaebŏl*-oriented economic growth, the state created a specific sociopolitical condition in which the military regime violently repressed labor in the name of national development, but in effect, in favor of *chaebŏls*. Kim Tŏk-Yŏng (2014) argues that the reduction of development solely to economic growth and, in turn, solely to the growth of *chaebŏls*, characterize the “reduced modernity” in South Korea.

At the socio-political level, the developmental state mobilized the population and repressed labor in the name of “national survival” and “national security” in the context of the post-Korean War regime competition against the Communist North Korea. The paternalist state discourse such as the “modernization of the Fatherland” articulated collective desire for survival and development.

In the capitalist state project of development, modernity was deemed a socio-economic reform for material improvement of standard of living (Chirot, 2005). On the one hand, the developmental regime was repressive in the sense that different ideas from state ideology for developmental mobilization were not allowed and suppressed with violent measures in the name of national security against communists. On the other hand, however, it was also hegemonic in the sense that it was based on popular desire for the escape from poverty and the raise of standard of living. This hegemonic project of modernity for development and modernization depended on the expectation of a “good life,” which was imagined on the basis of techno-economic rationality. Mahbubani (2013) comments on modernity, defined in Singaporean context, but also relevant in other East Asian countries:

Modernization means that you want to have a comfortable, middle-class existence with all the amenities and attributes that go along with it — clean water, indoor plumbing, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure, personal safety, rule of law, stable politics and a good education system (2013).

In the modern social imaginary of South Koreans, it was impossible to separate the improvement of economic life with the growth of the national economy. The developmental state established its role in the “embedded autonomy”

with society as “fostering economic transformation and guaranteeing minimal level of welfare” (Evans, 1995, p. 5).

Mignolo (2011) points out that this developmental promise of a good material life could not reach beyond the middle class due to the colonial restriction and the lack of necessary relation between the improvement of material life and modernity. Dirlik (2002) also indicates that “the power of developmentalism lies in its ever-receding promise that the good life is right around the corner,” but that promise of modernity is “not likely for the majority” (p. 43). While the promise of developmentalism is not sustainable, it is also true that its promise of “a good life” has worked quite effectively as long as it has been carried out on a relatively equal ground in South Korea until the mid 1990s. The developmental legacy does not lie in the state institutions themselves, but might remain in the way in which the population imagined and aspired their good lives mostly in developmental terms of standards of living.

Economy-centeredness is the dominant trait of South Korea’s modernity. It is not only the product of development and modernization since the 1960s and has affected how the population imagined their own lives and the world around them; it has also formed the basis of the enduring social imaginary among South Koreans and shaped the basis of the state project of development and facilitated it. Chŏng Su-bok (2007), for instance, regards “secular materialism” as one of the “fundamental cultural codes” among Koreans, which regards material wealth “of this world” as forming basis of a good life (pp. 110-115). Or, social Darwinist idea of taking extreme competition for survival for granted has been around at least for a century

in Korea since the late nineteenth century (Tikhonov, 2010). In fact, the economy-centeredness has been so dominant that it was almost impossible to think a good life imagined outside the developmental limit. Arguably, alternative voices, which fundamentally problematized economic growth and development, have been hardly influential even among the intellectuals, the political left, the civil movement, and the trade union. The status of a developed and advanced country, defined in terms of economic growth, has been an obsession among the intellectuals for decades. It was only recently that alternative voices emerged gained in a substantive way (which is at least partly examined and discussed in Chapter 6).

Like state-centrism, economic-centrism in Korea might go back to different historical eras, but it needs here to note that it constituted the core of developmental modernity, predicated upon material, secular, economic orientations which have defined the social imaginaries among South Koreans.

### **Post-developmental transition to neoliberalization**

In this section, I follow the way in which a series of state discourses shaped the post-developmental transformation of the state and the economy since the early 1990s. I have two points to emphasize in this discussion. On the one hand, these grand state discourses, with the normative imperative of “international competitiveness” as a dominant discursive frame, facilitated the neoliberal transformation of the state and the economy. The neoliberal normative imperative of international competitiveness dominated political discourses and public policies, facilitating the transformation of the developmental state into the neoliberal competition state, a competitive entity in the global economy.

On the other hand, these top-down state visions and discourses were predicated on, as well as continued and reinforced by, the state-centered and economy-centered nature of collective national imaginary in South Korea. The neoliberal rationality of international competitiveness put a new layer on, rather than replaced, the developmental rationality. The ideas of competition and survival have been central to collective national imaginary of development. Moreover, neoliberalization was driven by the state in the language of national interest and national survival. The continued state-centered and economy-centered nature of collective national imaginary characterizes the process of neoliberalization in South Korea.

### **Neoliberal competition state**

The transformation of the South Korean society can be understood as a rapid transition from a developmental regime to a neoliberal one. By the late 1980s, the developmental state became ineffective and unsustainable due to great domestic and international structural changes (H.-y. Cho, 2000). First, the collapse of the Soviet and the end of the Cold War heralded a new phase of geopolitics. In this changing geopolitical environment, the United States put pressure on South Korea to open market for goods and service. Second, the June Uprising and the subsequent Great Labor Action in the summer of 1987 made it unsustainable to repress labor to maintain low-wage policy in favor of export-led economic growth. Last, large South Korean conglomerates began to grow into major global capital and demanded neoliberal deregulation and market liberalization (H.-y. Cho, 2000; Jessop & Sum, 2006a). The transformation geared toward double movement toward liberation: the

one from the authoritarian political repression and the other from the state's tight grip of the business into a neoliberal "advocacy of free enterprise" (Harvey, 2005, p. 37).

The South Korean national economy, until then firmly nationally bounded relatively closed except for exportation, began to be reconstructed within this changing international and domestic setting. The techno-economic master narratives of globalization and the knowledge-based economy (KBE) provided a sweeping discursive frame to reconstruct the national economy and reposition the South Korean state, emphasizing the normative imperative of international competitiveness (Jessop, 2002, p. 133). It was in this context that successive South Korean governments from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s presented and promulgated a series of top-down grand state visions and strategies with slogans such as "New Korea," "*segyehwa*," "Rebuilding Korea," "Knowledge-based Nation (KBN)," "Northeast Asian financial hub country," and so on. These series of top-down state visions constructed and re-imagined the South Korean economy and state in the emerging space of globalizing economy.

The Kim Young-sam government (February 1993-February 1998), the first civilian government in South Korea, proclaimed the grand state vision of *segyehwa*, literally meaning "world-ization" (Armstrong, 2007, p. 4). It marked the beginning of South Korea's aggressive take on globalization beyond the developmental strategy of "catching-up." The state vision of *segyehwa* defined the global economic conditions as "limitless competition" (Y.-s. Kim, 1994), which in turn demanded the bounded national economy to be liberated and exposed to international

competition. In this discursive frame, the South Korean state repositioned itself as the facilitator to foster international competitiveness of the national economy. The narratives of information technology and the “new economy” were also emphasized as a way for restructuring the national economy to a higher level. The neoliberal policy measures such market opening, financial liberalization, deregulation and labor flexibility were widely introduced in the name of meeting the global standard.

The *seggyehwa* drive toward international competitiveness was legitimized as an imperative to survive, to continue economic growth and to become a “top-tier advanced nation (*illyu seonjin gukga*)” in the world (Y.-s. Kim, 1995b). The Kim Young-sam government pursued the membership of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and the 10,000 dollar mark of GNP per capita as the symbolic evidence of South Korea’s “top-tier advanced” status.<sup>16</sup>

As the progress of political democracy and the confidence in economic growth created national optimism, the *seggyehwa* discourse aimed to orient “all aspects of national life” toward globalization (G.-W. Shin, 2006, p. 212). It urged Korean people to be “a Korean in the world” and to live up to the “global standard” by paying attention to world affairs, looking for travel abroad, and engaging in computer skills and intensive English learning (Y.-c. ō. Kim, 1999, p. 30).

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<sup>16</sup> In fact, the pursuit of the OECD membership and the mark of 10,000 dollar of GNP-per-capita contributed to the financial crisis in 1997. The Kim Young-sam government hastened to abolish the Economic Planning Board, the headquarter of developmental planning, in order to facilitate the gaining the OECD membership within his presidential term. The government also tried to maintain the exchange rate at a higher level to adjust the 10,000 dollar mark.

The financial meltdown in November of 1997 made a deep impact to every corner of the Korean society. The financial crisis and the intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) overdetermined the conservative-neoliberal transformation ventured in the mid 1990s. The crisis constituted a critical conjuncture in which the existing ideas of the nation-state and the national economy were put into serious question and a fundamental transformation of the Korean economy and society was demanded. The IMF intervention marked a turning point where the drive toward neoliberalization was unidirectionally pushed as social resistances against neoliberal reform, especially by labor, were effectively muted.

The Kim Dae-jung government (February 1998-February 2003), newly elected in the aftermath of the crisis, launched the “Rebuilding Korea” campaign (제 2 의 건국운동)<sup>17</sup> and drove a nationwide reform of the state, economy and society. Kim Dae-jung, known to be an advocate for fair market competition, tried to balance economic growth and the provision of “productive welfare.” He declared the “parallel development of democracy and the market economy” as the governing principle (D.-j. Kim, 1998, p. 13). However, demanded by the IMF as a condition for the relief bailout loan as well as by neoliberal bureaucracy and the domestic big business sector, the actual policy orientations and implementations were geared toward the neoliberal direction, in favor of establishing market principle. In fact, the extensive neoliberal reform programs, so called the “IMF plus package,” were inserted by the neoliberal force in Korea rather than one-sidedly imposed upon by

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<sup>17</sup> Literally, it can be translated into English as the “Second Nation-Building Movement.”



the IMF and the US government, the package which included the complete opening of financial market to foreign investors, the accelerated liberalization of the trade of goods and services, the privatization of public enterprises, and the labor market reform by introducing flexible layoffs and labor dispatching (Chi, 2007, p. 8). In other words, the radical neoliberal reform was chosen and aggressively sought after rather than simply imposed on (C.-j. Ch'oe, 2006, p. 138).

The post-crisis reform towards neoliberalization was driven in the name of establishing global standards and enhancing international competitiveness, which were deemed essential to overcome the crisis and to accomplish the ultimate goal of getting into the rank of "world's first rate nation" (C. Sö & Kim, 2013, pp. 168-170).

As a way of enhancing international competitiveness, the Kim Dae-jung government pushed technology-related policy, including IT policy and cultural policy for the post-crisis economic boost for the next developmental step of the national economy. The Kim government declared the vision of the "knowledge-based nation" as a state program for "Rebuilding Korea." Kim presented it as "transforming the industrial nation which is based on materials into the knowledge-based nation which is based on creative knowledge and information" (D.-j. Kim, 1998, p. 422). It was a statist version modified from the "knowledge-based economy," the vision of which was recommended as a new engine for economic growth and transformation by various transnational organizations including the World Bank, the UNESCO and the OECD (S.-t. Hong, 1999, p. 33; P.-j. Kim, 2007, p. 266).

The subsequent liberal Roh Mu-hyun government (February 2003-February 2008) brought the project of the “Northeast Asian economic hub country” into the central state reform agenda. The Roh government defined the international reality of South Korean economy as a “nutcracker situation” between superpowers and proposed the project as a future economic growth engine. While the state project of the Northeast Asian economic hub country caught up with the geo-economic trend of the regional integration of the national economy and put in mind the geo-political issue of North-South Korean relations, it implied the deepening of the full-scale market-oriented reform and financial liberation of the South Korean society and economy (K.-K. Lee, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 2003). In the same vein, the Roh government also pushed the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, among others, under the pretext of enhancing international competitive capacity of South Korea by exposing financial and service sectors to advanced competitors and securing the US market for industrial products such as automobiles and mobile phones (C. Sö & Kim, 2013, pp. 171-172).

The subsequent conservative Lee Myung-bak government (February 2008-January 2013) drove the full-scale neoliberalization without reserve. With the catchphrase of “Global Korea,” the “corporate state” of the Lee government took aggressive, pro-business moves in the name of achieving the status of an “first-rate advanced country” (Kalinowski & Cho, 2012, p. 246; T.-c. u. Kim, 2010, p. 263). The public policies discourses under the Lee government, which set the backdrop for the discursive and institutional practices of nation branding and national prestige (NBNP), will be closely examined in the subsequent chapters.

## **Continuity and change**

Through the examination of the state discourses and visions from the early 1990s to the 2000s, we can identify several points that could give insight to the discussion of NBNP in the following chapters. I highlight these points especially focusing on the historical continuity and change in terms of social imaginaries of the state and the economy.

First of all, the grand state visions and the policy frameworks from “New Korea” to the “Global Korea” declared by the consecutive governments commonly showed neoliberal orientation. To different degrees, they drove the neoliberal policies such as market opening, financial liberalization, privatization of public goods, labor flexibility, and deregulation of business. These policies transformed South Korean society into a neoliberal one in quite a short period. The whole societal area was reorganized toward a “corporate society” (T.-c. u. Kim, 2010), dominated by the principle of market competition. This does not mean, however, that the “developmental legacy” was cleared away and “fair” principle of market competition was established in South Korea. Rather, the neoliberal principle of market and competition was superimposed on the existing customs and practices such as bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, cronyism, excessive governmental regulation, collusive links between politics and business and so on. This combination resulted in an unprecedented gap between the rich and the poor, widening rent-seeking practices among the rich, and precarious life conditions for the poor.

Second, it was the post-developmental state that led the process of the rapid neoliberal transformation, accelerating the incorporation of South Korea into the global financial order. The “neoliberal competition state” repositioned itself as an agency to drive the neoliberal reform of the whole society (K.-i. Yi, 2008). In fact, the rapid neoliberal transition was enabled by the powerful, often top-down and authoritarian, initiatives by the state with developmental legacy. We can identify the continuity from the developmental, strategic competition state to the neoliberal competition state (Cerny, 1997). The South Korean developmental state was already closely tied to the world capitalist regime with the outward export-oriented project of economic development. Without any alternative political forces, it is not allowed to imagine the South Korean state breaking from “path dependency” (K.-i. Yi, 2008, p. 38).

While the developmental state itself was dissolved in the 1990s and transformed into the state orienting toward market integration into global economy, the state remains central to social imaginary in South Korea. Political scientist Ch’oe Chang-jip (2006) emphasizes the continuity of the state form during the liberal transition:

It seems that democratization in Korea did not bring about a change in the perception or attitude of the Korean people as well as the structure and the operation of the state. In other words, a high degree of continuity has been maintained in relation to the nature of the state. The notion that there is little change in the perception and attitude among the citizens means that even after the democratization, strong state-centered attitudes and values and statism-nationalism still remains the dominant ideals. The result is that the state that exercises widespread influence over society through its well-developed bureaucratic administration system remains under democracy (my own translation pp. 99-100).

Third, we can also understand the rapid neoliberal transformation in terms of the effectiveness of the normative principle of international competitiveness, which emerged as a dominant discursive framework. The neoliberal discourse of international competitiveness dominated political discourse and state public policy, constructing the state as a competitive entity within the neoliberal global order. While the “aggressive” version of international competitiveness continued throughout the grand state visions, the “attractive” one gradually developed alongside, facilitating the imagining of the state as a competitive entity, as the manager of territorial assets of national economy for the global economy. While supporting export-led economic growth represents the international competitiveness in the former take, successful attraction of transnational capital investment represents the priority of the state.

Fourth, the imagery of the economy became more central not just to the function of the state but also to all aspects of life. In that sense, economy-centrism became more dominant feature of social imaginary in neoliberal South Korea. National security became less significant as a national task as the developmental difference between North and South became too wide to compare; instead, national economic growth was reinforced as the supreme national task especially in the context of globalizing world economy. In relation to collective economic life, it is notable that the neoliberal transition toward international competitiveness was driven in the languages of the nation such as national interest, national survival, enhancing national capacity, national reform, reinforcing national competitiveness, and so on. In this discursive frame of geography, the global economy was imagined

from the national economic perspective. For instance, *seggyehwa* was imagined as the advance of Korean firms and Koreans into the world, and the FTAs were promoted in the geographical imagination of the “expansion of economic territories” of the nation (C. Sö & Kim, 2013, p. 174). We can identify the continuity from the developmental discourse in the sense that the neoliberal emphasis on international competitiveness was imagined with the imagery of national economy at the center. Further, the imagination of the prospect of South Korea as a “first-rate, advanced country” has underlay the series of grand state visions. The status of an advanced country has been idealized and imagined as an ultimate collective goal of the nation.

Fifth, the goal of becoming an advanced country has been predicated on technological discourses such as information and knowledge economy. In the state discourses, technological advancement in ICT, automobile, and so on dominated the imagination of the present and future nation. Technological advancement was regarded as crucial for a techno-economic leap forward beyond the developmental catching-up. The growth and expansion of national economy became dominated by techno-economic imagination, predicated on the techno-centric idea of linear development and progress.

Last, the imagination of a technologically advanced, international competitive country is bound by the Western-oriented modernity. The normative imperative of international competitiveness urged the acceptance of global norms and standards, which were in practice set on the basis of the Western criteria. The Western perspective in effect dominates the assessment of international competitiveness and national capacities.

### **Post-developmental social imaginaries in Western-oriented modernity**

In the discussion of this section so far, I examined how South Korean modernity has formed with the state and the economy at the center of the social imaginaries in the discourse and program of modernization and development. This “developmental modernity” seems to constitute a dominant social imaginary in South Korea even after the official demolition of the developmental state in the late 1990s. Thus, any post-developmental social imaginary is necessarily engaged with developmental modernity.

State-centrism and economic-centrism, which are crucial to developmental modernity, are still central to social imaginary among South Koreans. They are also key elements in the questions and debates about the current status and future direction of South Korean modernity in the twenty-first century. To put it in a simplified way, we can identify two contrasting positions concerning South Korean modernity.

The first one affirms the modern development of South Korea especially in terms of its economic accomplishment. From this position, modern Korea in the second half of the twentieth century has marched successfully toward the universal progress of human civilization, characterized by market capitalism, democratic institutions, and individualism (Y.-h. Yi, 2007). This position, represented by the South Korean “New Right,”<sup>18</sup> diagnoses that South Korea successfully achieved industrialization as well as democratization (with the emphasis on the former), and

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<sup>18</sup> In the mid 2000s, they emerged as a powerful voice in the public sphere, shaping conservative public agenda for the Lee Myung-bak government.

proposes that the next task is “advancedness” (*sŏnjinhwa* 선진화, which literally means being/making advanced) (S.-i. Pak, 2006), the last stage of the universal model of modernity. They contend that the urgent task for South Korea is to widely reform political systems and institutions, and social and cultural customs, which were deemed “backward” and not in sync with the advanced business world, and thus, standing in the way to economic growth and *sŏnjinhwa*. In sum, this position continues the developmental narrative of economic growth with “ever-receding” promise of improvement. This position represents the politics of the so-called “industrialization generation” who went through rapid economic growth in the 1960s to 1980s.

The second position regards South Korean modernity as “distorted” and falling short of the universal standard. This position acknowledges past economic growth but criticizes state-centrism and economic-centrism and the consequential state-conglomerates alliance, which is deemed to have made South Korea deviate from the “normal” course of modernity and stand in the way to *sŏnjinhwa* and “true” modernity. State-centrism and collectivism have organized the whole life around the state, and deterred individualism and social differentiation, the organizing principles of modernity (T.-y. Kim, 2016, p. 15). Economy-centrism has reduced modernization to economic growth, and the whole life to abstract economic indices (T.-y. Kim, 2016, pp. 138-144), resulting in South Korea’s “reduced modernity” (T.-y. Kim, 2014). To achieve the status of true modernity, this position contends, South Korea needs to improve in terms of “universal values” such as individualism, human rights, equality, democracy, environment and ecology, and so on (T.-y. Kim, 2016, p.



211). This position is widely shared by the “democratization generation,” younger than the “industrialization generation,” who observed and experienced the widening of democracy and individual freedom since the 1990s.

In real politics, these two positions are in stark antagonism to each other, especially on the historical and current issues such as the authoritarian regime and the big capital (*chaebŏl*) system. It is obvious that while the first position is business-oriented, the second prioritizes welfare, equality, and democracy. Despite this obvious antagonism, we can identify a convergence between them concerning the past, present, and future of South Korea. First, both acknowledge South Korea’s remarkable economic development in the past. Second, they evaluate the current status of South Korea as falling short of the desired level of modernity. Last, most importantly, both positions aspire to South Korea’s attaining of an “advanced” status in terms of “universal” values of modernity although they appreciate different aspects of the universal. More generally, both positions implicitly and explicitly imagine the West as the universal model of modernity.

At this point, one is reminded how the discourse and program of modernization and development were predicated on the Western ideal. Thus, in addition to state-centeredness and economy-centeredness, we need to consider the Western-oriented nature of South Korean modernity. The idea of “compressed modernization” (Chang, 1999), which describes the historical formation of modernity in South Korea, epitomizes not just the speed at which it achieved economic development, but the way in which it attempted to “catch up” “advanced” or “developed” Western countries. Further, it implies that the West has become the

normative standard of modernization and development for South Korea through sped-up imitations and adaptations.

Notably, in the Western orientation of South Korean modernity, cultural and social aspects, rather than political and economic aspects, have gotten increasingly prominent across different positions. Although the two positions emphasize different social and cultural aspects, they commonly emphasize such social and cultural aspects as civility, manners, public behaviors, “global citizenship,” and so on, the reference of which usually comes from the comparison between the idealized West and South Korea. In this context, the idea of a “culture-advanced country” (*munhwa sŏnjinguk* 문화선진국) has emerged as a vision of modernity in South Korea. Now it is culture that is regarded as an indicator of modernity and civilization and being advanced as a nation and in the international rank of advanced countries.

It is in this context of the rise of the vision of a “culture-advanced nation” in which the discursive and institutional practices of NBNP emerged in the early 2000s. It is in terms of the nation brand and national prestige that a culture-advanced country as a truly advanced, modern country is specifically presented and imagined beyond the status of an economically-advanced country.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE RISE OF THE DISCOURSES OF NATION BRANDING AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE**

In this chapter, I examine how nation branding has emerged as a dominant political discourse in South Korea during the first decade of the 2000s. In the midst of the rising concern about the international status and national image among the news media and political elites, nation branding became an essential part of the major political vision for state management. The Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2012) set up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in January 2009 and instituted the idea of nation branding as the key public policy agenda. Indeed, the idea of nation branding became a discursive framework, in reference to which the implementation of other key public policies was justified and legitimized. Beyond the official public policy discourse, the talks of nation branding, in combination with a neologism “national prestige,” became a staple vocabulary in the news media as well as in the popular political discussion on a wide variety of political, social and cultural issues in South Korea.

The emergence of nation branding and national prestige into the policy discourse did not happen within a vacuum. In this chapter, I examine the rise of nation branding and national prestige (NBNP) in a larger discursive and institutional context in which the imperative of political, economic, social and cultural reforms have been increasingly cast in light of enhancing the nation brand and national prestige. In the course, the emerging discourses of NBNP imbued a new

way of imagining the state and the nation from a business standpoint as a competitive entity in the global economy.

I especially attend to the institutional and discursive role played by the mainstream national news media, along with domestic public and private think tanks, in importing and disseminating the idea of nation branding since the early 2000s. The examination of the news media highlights the discursive and institutional formation of NBNP prior to the official institution of government public policy in the late 2000s, and better illustrates the wider discursive and institutional terrain in which multiple actors were involved, often in contesting ways, in the reconfiguration of the state and the nation in South Korea.

My focus on the role played by the domestic news media addresses the ongoing academic discussions and debates in terms of the agencies of nation branding.

First, the existing critical literature has greatly focused on the agency of transnational branding consultants in the proliferation of the discourses and techniques of nation branding. (Aronczyk, 2008b; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). For instance, the idea of the “transnational promotional class” highlights the role played by diverse transnational experts and professionals in marketing, branding, and advertising whose profit-seeking interests have been driving the boom of nation branding around the world (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 38). While the presence of transnational consultants has been apparent in the practices of nation branding, the agencies of diverse domestic actors, including the news media, have played a critical role in disseminating and establishing the discourses and institutions of nation

branding in South Korea. The chapter aims to keep track of the domestic actors, especially the news media, which played a critical role as agencies of nation branding and to examine the domestic dynamics of the political economy and the cultural politics of nation branding.

Second, I especially focus on the distinctive role played by the news media as a crucial actor for the promotion of nation branding in discursive as well as institutional terms. While the media has been the natural focus in many critical researches on nation branding, it was treated in a rather simple way as an outlet of symbols, discourses, and representations. It was only recently that the critical literature has taken notice of the multiple aspects of the role played by the media (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Kaneva, 2016). This literature suggests that the agency of the media should be addressed in terms of financial, material, and technological as well as symbolic circulation.

Situated in the academic context, this chapter examines the agency of the news media in establishing nation branding in two distinctive aspects.

First, I examine how the idea of nation branding was imported and domesticated in the early 2000s, by keeping track of diverse actors and their institutional and discursive practices. With the rising concern about the international status and image of the nation, the news media introduced and mediated the idea of nation branding among political and business elites. They set nation branding at the center of public policy agenda, relying on the authority of Western experts and working with domestic think tanks and governmental agencies. The idea of nation branding grew out of a marketing concept into a

political discourse on the state with larger implications along with related terms such as soft power, public diplomacy, the attractive nation, and the advanced country. The news media especially contributed to the political visibility of the idea of nation branding as they translated it into “nation prestige.”

Here, the use of the term “agenda setting” is rather descriptive than analytic although the examination of the role played by the news media in the institutional and discursive formation of nation branding and national prestige is partly informed by the theory of agenda setting in mass media (those of agenda building and policy agenda setting for that matter, Rogers & Dearing, 1988). Agenda setting theory refers to “the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media” (Kleinnijenhuis & Rietberg, 1995). In the sense that the theory emphasizes how the media shapes the perceptions on public issues, this chapter shares the core assumptions underlying agenda setting theory of agenda.

However, it does not aim to apply agenda setting theory, that is to test the media effects by examining the correlation between the salience of agenda in the news media reports and the perceptions among publics or voters (agenda setting theory) or among public policy makers (policy agenda setting theory). Rather, this chapter attempts to explore a wider formation in a historical context, focusing on the agency of the news media in institutional, political economic and discursive terms. Thus, this chapter focuses on how the news media institutions mediated various actors such as transnational consultants, governmental and private research institutes, and politicians and facilitated the circulation of emerging discourses of nation branding and national prestige among elites.

Second, following the examination of the institutional role by the news media, I analyze how the media discourses of nation branding and national prestige form a particular social imaginary of the state, the economy, and the nation. I especially attend to the historicized form of narratives of the past, the present, and the future of the nation (C.-i. Kang & Sŭng-hyŏn, 2011; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). The news media narratives problematized the nation brand deficit in economic terms, and presented the state-wide reform for enhancing the nation brand and national prestige as a solution to continuing economic growth. While evoking collective discontent and anxiety about the weak international status, the news media discourses brought up as nation branding resources the national pride in the rapid economic growth and the transnational popularity of Korean popular culture. I examine how the historicized narratives of the nation directed toward a particular re-imagination of the nation as standing at the threshold of entering the ranks of first-class, “advanced” countries, competing on the world stage.

Based on the examinations of the process and narratives of nation branding, the chapter concludes with the discussions of the nature and implications of the news media’s drive for NBNP. The campaigns attempted not just to align the state as a neoliberal manager of the national economy, but to mobilize the national citizen as responsible for enhancing the nation brand. The news media campaigns for NBNP, setting the ultimate national goal of entering the rank of the advanced countries, constantly evoked the international framework of comparison and imposed the Western measures of global standards on the behavior of citizens in terms of culture and civility.

Before entering the main subject, it is necessary to situate the South Korean news media within the historical context. The South Korean news media became liberated from the tight control by the state after the 1987 Great Democratic Struggle. Since the 1990s, the direct involvement in the news media has been greatly reduced; conversely, the major news media has increased their influence on the political process and the formation of public opinion. In particular, the three major conservative newspapers (*Chosŏn Ilbo*, *Chung'ang Ilbo*, and *Tong'a Ilbo* — collectively called “Cho-Chung-Tong”) have increasingly exercised great power. Despite the increasing influence of broadcasting media,<sup>19</sup> the three conservative newspapers have exercised excessive political power. Compared to “Cho-Chung-Tong,” the influence of liberal-progressive newspapers — *Hangyŏre*, *Kyŏngnyang Sinmun*, and others — has been minuscule.

The power of “Cho-Chung-Tong” comes from their close networks and relations with large conglomerates (*chaebŏls*) and the conservative political party. *Chung'ang Ilbo* used to be an affiliation of the Samsung Group, the largest conglomerate, and became formally separated by clearing the equity relationship in 1999. However, it is no denying their close relationship, tied through marriage (C. Kim, 2016). *Chosŏn Ilbo* and *Tong'a Ilbo*, family-owned newspaper companies, formally independent from the state and large capital, have been strengthening their

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<sup>19</sup> For the news broadcasting media, major players had been two major public broadcasters (*KBS* and *MBC*), one commercial broadcaster (*SBS*, established in 1990), and one cable news broadcaster (*YTN*, established in 1995). Four general programming broadcasters newly opened in 2011, which were licensed to the three conservative newspapers (“Cho-Chung-Tong”) and one economic newspaper (*Maeil Kyŏngje*).



ties with conservative politicians and *chaeböls* through marriage and human networking (Y.-i. Kim, 2005). “Cho-Chung-Tong” have shared conservative political interests as many of their senior journalists entered politics through the conservative parties (M.-J. Park, Kim, & Sohn, 2000, p. 101). Economic newspapers have either been owned by the *chaebol* coalition (in case of *Han’guk Kyöngje*) or have exclusively defended the interests of large corporations. In this regard, the conservative news media have been the actual player in the political power process. They were in fierce conflict with the liberal governments (the Kim and Roh governments) and put efforts to support the conservative presidential candidate in the presidential election in December 2007. The conservative news media are considered to have played a crucial role of “making” conservative presidents (M.-J. Park et al., 2000, p. 101) in the next two elections.

From a broader historical perspective, the news media have played an important role in the imagination and the formation of the nation-state through deploying public campaigns for enlightenment and education. Going back to the early 20th century, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (1904) participated in the Patriotic Enlightenment Movement by organizing the National Debt Redemption Movement (C.-m. Kang, 2019; M.-g. Kang, 2013). After the liberation, the public enlightenment campaigns for development and modernization continued to be considered part of the inherent role of the media. An exemplary case is the Gold Collection Movement led by KBS in January-March 1998 in the aftermath of the financial crisis (“The IMF Economic Crisis and Gold Collection Movement,” 2017). In this historical context, it

is a common practice for the news media to take lead in the public campaign to enlighten and mobilize publics.

### **South Korea's struggle for international recognition**

Throughout modern history, South Koreans have been conscious about gaining international recognition. However, gaining international recognition has been a long shot for South Korea, which remained occupied by Japan for the first half of the twentieth century and best known for a long time for the Korean War in the early 1950s.

It was only recently that South Korea started to carry out effective policy actions in terms of international recognition. Until the 1980s, South Korea had been a relatively unknown, closed, and isolated country from the world, except for its high level of dependence for economic growth on international trade with the US (export) and Japan (import). South Korea had been known to the world for its negative images associated with the Korean War, the division of the nation, the image of poverty, and the military dictatorship.

The Olympic Games in Seoul in the summer of 1988 marked a crucial turning point at which South Korea asserted its international presence as a newly industrializing and democratizing country. The Olympics indeed marked a “coming out party” (Bridges, 2008; Manheim, 1990) for South Korea in which it took a chance on the enhancement of its international status. Subsequently after the Olympics, South Korea (the Republic of Korea) was admitted to the United Nations

simultaneously with North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in 1991, and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet and China.

The news media emphasized the Olympics not just as a celebration of economic accomplishment and democratization, but an international breakthrough in terms of national image. One newspaper column valued the successful hosting of the Olympics in diplomatic terms in which South Korea dusted off the image of an “unstable, divided country” and “war-torn, poor country” (S.-h. Hong, 1999). Another newspaper article summarized the economic benefits of the Seoul Olympic Games such as rising investment, employment, tourism and so on, and emphasized its long-term effect of producing the image of a “capable country” (Paek, 1996).

The public concern about the international image and status of the country increased throughout the 1990s. The official state visions such as the “New Korea” and *segeyhwa* (Korea's take on globalization), declared by the Kim Young-sam government in 1993-1994, were predicated on the national awareness and aspiration for the nation's presence on the international stage. Since the mid 1990s, improving “national image” (*kukka imiji* 국가이미지) began to be put on the list of public policy agenda and regarded as a crucial part in enhancing national competitiveness to the level of the “advanced, first-class country” which since has become an underlying priority for the public policy in South Korea.

Indebted to the economic boom for a decade, South Korea gained a membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, which was widely known in South Korea as a “club among world's most advanced countries” (Ŭ.-s. Kim, 1996). This development was widely regarded as

South Korea's entering the rank of "advanced, first-class countries" in the world, and an optimistic and euphoric mood dominated South Korea.

However, a hurried market opening and liberalization which the government aggressively drove with the purpose of gaining the OECD membership led to a disastrous financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was perceived as a "national disgrace" that ruined national confidence and pride built on past economic development (I.-s. Kim, 1997). Indeed, Koreans regarded the bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the loss of economic sovereignty, equivalent to "Kyöngsul Kukch'i" (1910 national disgrace) in 1910 when Korea lost its sovereignty to Japan.

The subsequent Kim Dae-jung government called for harnessing the drive for enhancing national competitiveness to overcome the national crisis and regain international status. The 2002 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, was regarded as a chance to enhance the international status and national image of the country just as the 1988 Olympic Games were presumed to have done. The successful co-hosting of the event and especially the showing of South Koreans' passionate street cheering were regarded as giving a positive impression to the world that South Korea was a young, dynamic, and successful country (cf. Jeon & Yoon, 2004; Joo, 2006; H. Lee & Cho, 2009).

Besides the co-hosting of the World Cup, in the early 2000s, there emerged a couple of stories of global breakthrough achieved by South Korea: the international market success of the export of South Korea-originated high-value products such as Hyundai vehicles and Samsung mobile phones and the growing popularity of South

Korean popular culture throughout East Asia, the so called “Korean Wave.” Put together, these moments were constructed as contributing to gaining global status and competitiveness of South Korea. In the following, I will show how the news media called for a heightened drive for enhancing national image and the national brand of South Korea.

### **The rise of nation branding**

#### **Nation branding as a Western-originated idea**

In this historical context, the idea of nation branding emerged as a major political discourse and a public policy agenda since the early 2000s. The South Korean news media brought up the issue of nation branding by referring to globally circulating knowledge and expertise. The first talk of nation branding in South Korea came with the names of Western experts. These Western experts played a crucial role in getting the idea of nation branding introduced both in public discourse and in the actual process of public policy in South Korea.

In 2001-2002, a few news media introduced Peter van Ham’s article, “The rise of the brand state,” published in *Foreign Affairs*, and brought attention to the issues of nation branding and national image. *Han’guk Ilbo*, a national newspaper, in two editorial pieces, paid attention to the significance of national image and symbols and their political management (S.-j. Kim, 2001; S.-h. Yi, 2001). A newly established internet news press, *Pŭresian (Pressian)*, published an abridged translation of van Ham’s article, and emphasized the nation brand as crucial on the way to the rank of the advanced countries (S.-s. Yi, 2002).

In the same year, *Maeil Kyōngje* (*Maeil Business Newspaper*) invited Philip Kotler to South Korea, widely praised as the “father of marketing” in the business management circle. Marketing consultant and professor of the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, Kotler preached cutting-edge business techniques such as customer relationship management (CRM) and the importance of branding elements such as names, logos and slogans. Although his speech did not necessarily focus on nation branding, the newspaper highlighted the part of his speech in which he mentioned the importance of building Korea-originated global brands (C.-h. Kim, 2001).

Another Western figure central to the promotion of the idea of nation branding was Guy Sorman. Having passed as an expert on Korea, this French intellectual has published books, written columns on South Korea, and frequently visited South Korea since the early 1990s. Invited to an international symposium held by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) in 2000, which represented the big business interest in South Korea, he emphasized the utility of culture for enhancing the brand of Korean exports. In his speech, he urged the South Korean government and business to build a strong national cultural image to secure international competitiveness in the world market (C.-k. Yun, 2000).

Arguably, the most significant figure was Simon Anholt, who influenced the development of nation branding in the transnational circuit as well as in South Korea. British brand consultant and author of *Brand New Justice* (2003), Anholt was credited for the coinage of the term nation branding. He caught instant attention in South Korea with the first publication of Nation Brands Index (NBI) in 2005.

Presented as a way to measure and rank the image and reputation of countries, Anholt's NBI was widely reported across the news media, which made a fuss about the low rank and weak "nation brand power" of South Korea (ninth out of eleven countries in the first quarter report, and twentieth out of twenty-five in the second quarter report) (Kong, 2005; O, 2005).

The publications presented a full-fledged idea of nation branding in the form of index and ranking, measured by "scientific" data collection and analysis. These publications were notable by their emphasis not just on the importance of national image, but their assumption that the nation brand and nation image were measurable by Western expert knowledge and the implications that they were manageable by policy intervention.

These Western figures frequently visited South Korea as evangelists advocating for the need for nation branding. Some of them, as well as branding consulting firms such as Interbrand, got involved in the public policy process related to nation branding and beyond.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, we can understand the development of nation branding in South Korea as the process in which the news media mobilized the authority of Western transnational brand consultants in scientific and rationalized knowledge and expertise on nation branding. The news media's attention to Anholt's NBI could illuminate their utilization of Western authority in promoting nation branding. In fact, a similar nation branding report, with similar "scientific" methods and ranked

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<sup>20</sup> Commissioned by the Korea Tourism Organization, Simon Anholt devised a tourism brand campaign, "Sparkling Korea" in 2006, which turned out to be a huge failure.

representation, was published by a domestic institution as early as 2002, but did not attract as much attention by the media as Anholt's NBI.

### **Domestic think tanks and nation branding**

While the Western experts propagated the idea of nation branding, it was multiple domestic agents which actively promoted it in South Korea, including public policy think tanks and the news media. These agencies actively imported and successfully domesticated the Western-originated idea of nation branding.

One of the first domestic agencies to promote nation branding was the Institute for Industrial Policy Studies (IPS). As a public policy think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MoCIE) (reorganized to the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) in 2008), it had been working to develop the idea of the international competitiveness of the nation and business. Since 1999, it has published "The National Competitiveness Report," based on a worldwide survey. It was advertised as comprehensive and prestigious as the IMD's and the WEF's reports on international competitiveness. Since 2002, the IPS has extended its research to cover nation branding by publishing its calculation of the "national brand value (NBV)." This calculation expanded the previous "national competitiveness" by taking into consideration additional intangible factors such as "national image" and "national brand strategy." Based on this calculation, the IPS reported that South Korea ranked ninth among sixteen countries surveyed. IPS avidly promoted the idea of nation branding and their own brand of nation branding report: the IPS held the annual Korea Brand Conference since 2002 and Cho Tong-sŏng, the IPS director and dean of the Business School at Seoul National University,



contributed to various news media, trying to propagate the idea of nation branding and their own calculation of NBV (T.-s. Cho, 2002a, 2002b; M.-k. Chŏng, 2002).

Subsequently, a number of private think tanks, university research institutes, government agencies, and the national news media worked together to host a series of events and to publish policy reports related to nation branding. For instance, the Hyundai Research Institute (HRI), affiliated with the Hyundai conglomerate, published a series of reports on national image and nation branding (Hyundai Economic Research Institute, 2002, 2006), in which the HRI especially argued for the nation branding campaign driven by the public rather than the government. The National Brand Management Institute at Sungkyunkwan University, commissioned by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), published a report on nation branding in 2003 (“Strategies for the Enhancement of the Nation Brand Value through Culture”). Based on a worldwide survey, the report measured the national image of South Korea in the world and suggested culture-inspired public policies (National Brand Management Institute, 2003). Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), also affiliated with the MoCIE, established the Center for Nation Brand Management in 2006. It composed the “Korea Brand Map” to locate the Korea’s brand image and launched the campaign of “Premium Korea” (H.-j. Yi, 2007).

These agencies greatly contributed to the domestication of the idea of nation branding. However, the influences of their activities were limited as their circulation was mostly limited to business newspapers and expert circles. A wider circulation of the idea of nation branding was indebted to NBI by Simon Anholt rather than NBV

by the IPS, although both claimed their production of expert knowledge through neutral and scientific methods. As discussed above, the differentiated influence could be due to the intellectual authority ascribed to the Western expertise.

### **The news media and the discourse of nation branding**

Since 2005, the idea of nation branding has rapidly proliferated through the concerted engagement by government institutions and agencies, the news media, and private think tanks. In the face of impending presidential election in 2007, the news media and think tanks attempted to increase their political influences by presenting grand political visions and “state management strategies,” in which nation branding emerged as a crucial agenda. The term nation branding began to earn a wider public appeal beyond the expert circle and business newspapers. Although nation branding drew a certain interest from the incumbent government, it was prepared as the national agenda for the next government, which was expected to be conservative, by the conservative news media and think tanks.

The national mainstream news media actively promoted the discourse of nation branding, set forth by Western experts and domestic think tanks. The news media widely reported the nation branding publication by Simon Anholt and supported the promotion of nation branding with op-eds. The nation branding promotion by the news media far exceeded the conventional media activities such as publishing news reports and op-ed columns. The mainstream national news media across the political spectrum published a long-term series of reports and analyses related to nation branding. Many of them launched nation branding-related

public campaigns, working closely with government agencies and private actors engaged in the business of nation branding.

Through these all-out efforts for setting nation branding as a public agenda, the news media greatly expanded and popularized the idea. Before examining the narrative of nation branding, I attend to the institutional agency of the news media in popularizing the idea of nation branding. Nation branding, a rather technical jargon in marketing, enriched its meanings in relation to existing and emerging political ideas on the state and nation. In the course of the news media campaigns and events, nation branding became variously associated with other related ideas such as the “attractive nation” and “soft power,” translated into a more intuitive neologism, “national prestige,” and connected to a renewed image of an “advanced nation.”

### **Attractiveness and soft power**

With the rising concern about the international image and status of the nation, the news media and think tanks suggested various concepts to articulate the public concern.

Most notably, the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) published a public policy report, “Attractive Korea: Strategy for Entering the Rank of 10 Most Advanced Countries by 2015” (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005a). The SERI, affiliated with the largest conglomerate in South Korea, Samsung Group, has been the most influential private think tank. The SERI played a major part in the institutional establishment of nation branding at the governmental level, when it was involved in the launch of PCNB in January 2009 under the Lee Myung-bak

government. Especially, the SERI took the responsibility of devising a new nation brand index, aiming to replace the NBI by Anholt.

The 2005 report continued the SERI's ongoing efforts to articulate the grand state vision and state management strategies, emphasizing international competitiveness from a business-centered perspective.<sup>21</sup> The report continued to emphasize innovation and knowledge, human capital, market environment and openness to "upgrade the system." The report simply adopted the term of "attractiveness" to replace the former slogan for the state vision, "GNP per capita of twenty thousand dollars," and repackaged the market-friendly plan for state management oriented toward international competitiveness. The notion of "attractiveness" that the report suggested originated from the business idiom as in "investment attractiveness" or "competitiveness to attract foreign direct investment" (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2003); thus, it focused less on the issue of national image than capital investment. Regardless, the idea of "attractive Korea" became a buzzword within the public policy circle and widely circulated by the news media (Son, 2006).

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<sup>21</sup> Since the late 1990s, SERI has published a series of comprehensive public policy reports on the matters of "state management," including "State Strategy and Reform Agenda in the 21st Century" (1998), "Realities and Policy Methods of National Competitiveness" (2002), "Agenda for State Affairs and State Management" (2003), and "The Road to Twenty Thousand Dollars of GNP per Capita" (2004). These massive and comprehensive policy reports contributed to placing the concept of "national competitiveness" at the center of the state vision and put forward keywords such as "business-friendly country," "growth engine," "innovative capacities," "selection and focus," "competition and openness" and so forth, which were widely adopted as the guiding vocabularies of public policy under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments.

While the SERI introduced the idea of “attractiveness” into the discourse of state management from the perspective of transnational capital, approximately at the same time, the same term was also developed from another direction, more in relation to the ideas of “soft power,” national image and nation branding.

*Tong’a Ilbo*, a major national news media, promoted the idea of “attractive nation” in association with the term, soft power. The 21st century Peace Foundation, affiliated with *Tong’a Ilbo*, held a conference on June 2, 2005, titled, “Attractive Nation: Future Strategy for Soft Power.” At the closed-door conference, about two dozen university professors (majority of whom came from political science at Seoul National University), private institute researchers, journalists, government officials and one business man<sup>22</sup> participated in the discussion on state strategy for enhancing the international status of Korea. The idea of “attractive nation” or “attractive state” was developed by the professors at the SNU who combined their own idea of the “network knowledge state” and Joseph Nye’s idea of “soft power” (S.-b. Kim & Ha, 2006). The conference especially focused on the contribution by the Korean Wave and the IT development to the enhancement of South Korea’s international “attractiveness” (21segi P’yŏnghwa Porŏm, 2005). Compared to the SERI’s proposition of “Attractive Korea,” which was embedded in the interest of

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<sup>22</sup> The sole businessperson who was invited to the conference was Kim Yŏng-min, president of SM Entertainment, a leading company of the Korean Wave.

transnational financial capital, the idea of “attractive nation” brought to the fore the cultural appeal in the enhancement of the international status of South Korea.<sup>23</sup>

The term soft power earned a wider circulation than the related term attractiveness. The term, soft power, was used to conjure up the “soft” side of the state, especially the cultural aspect, as opposed to the “hard” side, that is, military and economic capacities of the state. The term was used in a simple and casual way in which the term “soft” was immediately associated with culture. In 2005, the SERI’s report, “The Road to Soft Power” (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005b) emphasized “soft industries” including cultural, fashion, advertising, and design industries as leading economic growth in the 21st century. It argued that South Korea had potential to lead the trend, based on the specific combination of the presumed collective sensibilities such as *chǒng* (정; affection) and *sinparam* (신바람; excitement), traditional culture (“culture archetypes”), and advanced information technologies and infrastructure.

An article from *Han’guk Ilbo*, sponsored by SK Corporation, regarded cultural value as the resource of soft power, and emphasized that “cool” popular cultural products could create a positive and friendly nation brand, which in turn could contribute to making Japanese soft power (“Looking back at Japan 3: Soft Power Powerhouse Japan,” 2004). In 2007, in a series, “Toward Soft Power Korea,” *Seoul*

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<sup>23</sup> The Korean word for attractiveness could be either *yuin* (유인; lure or draw) or *maeryŏk* (매력; charm or appeal). Only the latter has a strong affective connotation, meaning the “power to pull people’s mind and heart.” Both “attractive Korea” and “attractive nation” used the term *maeryŏk* for attractiveness instead of *yuin*, emphasizing the affective aspect of the term.

*Kyŏngje* also emphasized collective sensibilities, knowledge, culture, and creativity as resources of soft power, and suggested a set of wide social reform for an advanced nation (H.-u. Ch'oe, 2007). It is noticeable that the soft power discourse focused on the reform of the domestic system, rather than external projection of national image and power.

The attention to the ideas of attractiveness and soft power illustrates a widening concern about the international status and image of the nation. The terms were frequently associated with the nation brand and invoked the necessity of nation branding, especially from a cultural term.

### **National prestige and the advanced nation**

The idea of nation branding expanded its implication in association with such ideas as soft power and attractiveness, but it was in association with the idea of national prestige that it was widely disseminated. Since 2005, the term, national prestige or *kukkyŏk* 국격, was frequently used side by side with, or in place of, the term nation branding. The news media effectively translated the business marketing jargon of nation branding and national image into a tongue-in-cheek neologism in Korean language, *kukkyŏk*. The translation into *kukkyŏk* or national prestige marked a significant discursive moment for the development of nation branding. It was not a simple linguistic translation, but a crucial discursive expansion with wider implications.

The term, *kukkyōk*, means the prestige, dignity, class, or grace of a nation-state.<sup>24</sup> While the term was a neologism that was rarely used in Korean until the mid 2000s, the meaning of the term was intuitive for Korean speakers as it was easily associated with the term *inkyōk* (인격; the class or character of a person, or personality). The term *kukkyōk* was easily understood as the abbreviation of *kukka ūi p'umkyōk* 국가의 품격, literally the prestige, dignity, or grace of a nation-state.<sup>25</sup>

In 2007, *Han'guk Ilbo*, a national newspaper, featured a series of special articles and launched campaigns for national prestige and nation branding, "Image-Up Korea: let's raise national prestige." The series, composed of over thirty articles, raised a wide range of issues related to national image. The series introduced the efforts to enhance national prestige by advanced countries and made a comprehensive suggestion for national reform. It is worth noting that the campaign was launched in collaboration with, and sponsored by, the Korean Foundation and the SERI.

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<sup>24</sup> *Kukkyōk* has conventionally been translated into "national prestige" in English.

<sup>25</sup> The term *kukkyōk* had not been used frequently, but there existed noticeable precedents. Kim Chin-hyōn, former editor-in-chief of *Tong'a Ilbo* newspaper and then the Minister of Science and Technology, used this term in his book, *Where is Korea headed: The second independence movement for national prestige, national power, and advancedness* (1993). *Maeil Kyōngje* also adopted the term when it launched the year-long campaign for "Vision Korea: Practicing the 21st century" in 1997. It declared that the campaign aimed to "build a new dignity of the state [*kukkyōk*] by changing everything from government, politics, institutions, and business to every individual of the population" ("Vision Korea, Practice the 21st Century," 1997). The wider use of the term might be related to and influenced by the book, *The Dignity of the Nation* 國家の品格, a huge bestseller in Japan. The book was written by a Japanese conservative writer, Fujiwara Masahiko 藤原正彦 in 2005 and translated into Korean in the next year.



The series focused on the problems regarding the poor national image that were presumed to undermine the international competitiveness of South Korea. The series attributed it not just to the ineffective use of public relations by the government, but widely to the institutions, customs and behaviors of the whole nation, including corruption, poor institutional system, pervasive street demonstration and labor strikes, lack of ethnic tolerance, and the overseas behaviors of “ugly Koreans” (Y.-s. Yi, 2007). The series then paid a visit to seven countries — Japan, the US, the UK, Germany, China, Russia, and Hungary — and introduced the efforts to enhance national image by each government. The series concluded with a set of comprehensive suggestions for enhancing national image, such as “setting up the institutional system for the management of the national brand and image,” “becoming global citizen,” “reviving the dynamism,” “eliminating the image of instability,” “promoting the Korean Wave content,” “strengthening the image of digital power,” and “promoting tourism.”

Similar campaigns for national prestige followed, at the time of the institutional launch of nation branding (“Enhance National Prestige” series by *Maeil Kyōngje* in 2008, and “Let’s Enhance National Prestige” series by *Seoul Kyōngje*, 2008), and at the time of hosting the international event of G20 summit in Seoul in 2010 (“National Prestige Campaign” by *Tong’a Ilbo*, 2010).

These campaigns illustrate how the term national prestige became central to the news media’s efforts to build the public agenda of nation branding. In the process, the news media widened the nation branding agenda, encompassing government reform, social control, and especially the moral qualities of citizens

within the framework of the dominant economic discourse of international competitiveness.

With the rise of the discourse of national prestige, the image of the advanced nation took widened implications. Becoming an advanced nation had been an ultimate national goal at least since the state project of *segyehwa* in the mid 1990s, but national prestige was imagined as a necessary condition for realizing the goal of becoming an “a, first-class” nation. In the context of the campaigns for national prestige, the advanced, first-class nation was imagined not just as a country developed in economic terms of GNP per capita or trade values. It was also imagined as advanced with in wider terms including governance and civility, specifically defined in narrow terms of business interest.<sup>26</sup>

In 2007-2008, the political agenda and policy recommendations of nation branding by the news media took a concrete shape, encompassing wide domestic reform plans and international public relations. The official public agenda of nation branding by the PCNB in 2009 took up most of the political agenda promoted by the news media. Some propagators of the agenda of nation branding in the news media went straight into the government. Indeed, the news media’s promotion of nation branding was part of their ongoing attempt to increase political influence and shape state management.

The discussion so far focused on the institutional agency of the news media in the rearrangement of political discourses and the establishment of the discourses

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<sup>26</sup> This aspect of actual public policy will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

of NBNP as the central political agenda. In the following section, I will further examine the narrative of the media discourses of NBNP and identify their wider political implications.

### **The narrative of the news media's nation branding campaign**

In this section, I examine how the news media's campaign for NBNP constituted a specific narrative of the state and the nation. The news media's narrative centered on the notion of global competitiveness of the nation, predicated on a specific economic metanarrative of globalization. Existing literature shows how economic narratives contribute to the imagination of the nation state (Cameron & Palan, 2004; Crane, 1999; Deshpande, 1993; Wyatt, 2005a, 2005b). In this analysis, I focus on how the discursive construction of national competitiveness was predicated on a particular economic narrative about the past, present, and future of the nation-state of South Korea.

The news media discourse on NBNP glorified rapid industrialization and economic development out of poverty as a source of national pride. Fussing about the low international ranks in the nation brand and image, the news media discourse ascribed the present economic crisis not to the business sector, but to the government, political parties, labor, and the citizen. The news media urged the whole nation to make efforts to create a business-friendly climate in order to enhance the national brand and national prestige. The news media portrayed the business as leading the road to the ultimate national goal of becoming an advanced nation. The IT industry and the cultural industry were highlighted as enhancing the

nation brand and national prestige and envisioning the future of technologically- and culturally- advanced South Korea, as is analyzed in the following section.

The news media's nation branding campaign illustrates how the discourses of NBNP contributed to constructing the nation as a neoliberal competitive entity. The news media problematized the poor international image of South Korea in economic terms, presented a specific neoliberal solution to address the problem, and regulated the population as resources for the goal of achieving the status of the "culture-advanced country" by enhancing the nation brand and national prestige.

### **The past glory: the miracle of rapid economic growth**

The media discourses of NBNP shed light on the past of South Korea in a particular way. The history of modern South Korea was portrayed as a self-made success story of overcoming the extreme poverty from the wreckage of war and achieving the "unprecedented" rapid economic growth, often called the "Miracle of Han River." This particular story exclusively focused on the rapid economic success, while relatively disregarding the dark side of extremely rapid economic growth and the political achievement of a democratic regime. The rhetoric such as "unprecedented" or "miracle" evoked the economic development as the source of national pride, especially when the "New Right" claimed to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the "state foundation" (e.g. K.-y. Chŏng, 2008; "Korea to be a new starting point for 60 years," 2008; Y.-o. Yu, 2008). For instance, a renowned economics professor, Chŏng Kap-yŏng, clearly linked the economic success and national pride in his column, "The hero of a successful history":

Let's open the world map. Except for a few countries belonging to the OECD, how many countries are more affluent than we are? If you look for a country

that has achieved democratization as well as the economy, it gets smaller. If you are looking for a country that has succeeded in industrialization and democratization in the least developed countries since the 1960s, Korea is the only one.

Koreans should not just be enthusiastic about the Olympic gold medal, but be proud of our 60 years of history! There are so many reasons we should straddle our shoulders on the world stage. In a recent *Tong'a Ilbo* survey, only 64.9% of Koreans rated "Korean history as proud." Positive appraisals are up 10 percentage points higher than five months ago, and it is fortunate that 72.9% of the younger generation are proud of it. But how can we build confidence in the future if we disregard ourselves and evaluate our past history negatively (K.-y. Chŏng, 2008).

In the media discourses which glorified the past, certain historic figures were illuminated in terms of the nation brand and national prestige. For instance, in the campaign article, *Seoul Kyŏngje* featured a survey in which Park Chung-hee (who seized power through a military coup and ruled South Korea from 1961 to 1979), Chŏng Chu-yŏng (Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai Group), and Yi Pyŏng-ch'ŏl (Lee Byung-chul, the founder of Samsung Group) were chosen as the top contributors to the enhancement of the nation brand and national prestige (C. Son, 2008). These figures had been celebrated as the protagonists who led industrialization and achieved the economic miracle, but, in the article, they were retrospectively related to the nation brand and national prestige. It illustrates how the news media related the past glory of rapid economic development with the nation brand and national prestige from the economic, business-centered perspective.

The glorifying of the past economic success in the nation branding campaign needs to be understood in relation to the rise of the "New Right" in the 2000s. The New Right emerged as a political and intellectual project for the conservatives to

regain political power from the “leftist” governments (the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun governments) and to establish a conservative government. They started a movement against the so-called “self-depreciating” view of history and for the positive rewriting of the history of the proud state foundation. Assuming the teleological view of history, the New Right appraised the successful industrialization of the “*Taehan min’guk*” (대한민국; Great Nation of Korea)<sup>27</sup> as the triumph of the capitalist market economy (Y.-h. Yi, 2007). The nation branding campaigns partly shared the New Right’s view of history, predicating on a particular national imaginary which centered on the nation’s past economic success.

### **The present crisis: Problems, responsibilities and solutions**

Political scientists Kang Chŏng-in and Chŏng Sŭng-hyŏn (2011) characterize the languages in modern Korean politics as those of national decay, solution and reform, and the future imagery of a developed country. The news media discourse of nation branding used similar languages: problems and crisis, responsibilities and solution, and the future of a “truly” advanced country.

The news media diagnosed the present status of South Korea as a crisis, failing to inherit the glorified success of industrialization and to proceed to the road to “*sŏnjinhwa*” (becoming advanced). It is notable that the news media’s definition of the crisis depicted the current status of Korea through various numerical

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<sup>27</sup> “대한민국” is the official title of South Korea. It can translate into the Great Nation of Democratic Korea. This title had not been used beyond official governmental occasions until the 1990s. But since the early 2000s, especially during and after the 2002 World Cup, the title *Taehan min’guk* became a vernacular vocabulary, especially in the media discourse, in South Korea.

representations of the national economy. The news media articles frequently cited indexes such as GDP, export volume, and trade value as shorthand for the international status and economic achievement. These figures indicated that South Korea ranked 13th in terms of GDP and the 11th in terms of trade volume mostly in the first decade of the 2000s.

In contrast to the international economic status as one of the largest economies in the world, according to the diagnosis by the news media, South Korea was suffering a poorer international recognition than it deserved. The poor marks in international rankings and indexes related to national competitiveness and nation branding were regarded as an epitome of the present crisis that plagued South Korea.

Especially, the NBI reports by Simon Anholt triggered the sense of crisis, in which South Korea marked at 25th in 2006 and 32nd in 2007 in terms of the nation brand, falling behind China, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, and Argentina (H.-u. Ch'oe, 2007; K.-s. Ch'oe, 2006; "Korea brand falls short of its economic power; the problem is national prestige," 2008). The report shocked the political elites and the public, who believed to have achieved a spectacular economic growth and successfully overcome the recent economic crisis in the late 1990s.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> In fact, the seemingly lower rank of the South Korean nation brand than its size of the national economy might not be something to fuss about, considering that it would not be surprising if Western countries with smaller economies (such as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and so on) marked a higher score by the measure of international image, recognition, and reputation. Yet the news media rarely raised this point.

## **The Korea discount**

The concern about international recognition was apparent in such terms as the “Korean discount.” Initially designating the under-valuation of the Korean stock market, the term epitomized the way in which the problem of the nation brand deficit was conceived of from the economy- and business-centered viewpoint. It was explained that the products originating from South Korea did not get the right price due to the poor national image and recognition. Due to the Korean discount, for instance, Samsung cell phones and Hyundai automobiles were sold at a lower price than their similar quality competitors. *Kyŏngnyang Sinmun* cited the IPS’s survey, “Nation brand map” and reported:

When asked how much they are willing to pay for a same product or service, the respondents answered that they were willing to pay 155 dollars for German ones, 148.7 dollars for Japanese ones, and 148.6 dollars for American ones compared to 100 dollars for Korean one (B.-y. Chŏn, 2007).

The news media frequently brought up a famous anecdote: Samsung was frequently misrecognized as a Japanese company, which was actually not bad for selling the products because of the high nation brand value ascribed in Japanese electronic products:

That is why even global enterprises such as Samsung and LG do not display the nation brand, that is “Made in Korea,” when advertising their products overseas. It is understandable because it is in the way of their exports (S.-w. Kim, 2005).

This anecdote suggests that the South Korean business, especially large export-oriented conglomerates, had a high stake in the promotion of the nation brand.



The term Korean discount represented the perceived gap between the nationally based but transnationally growing business and other parts of the society. Accordingly, the problems of the Korean discount and the deficit of the nation brand were ascribed not to the business, but to other parts of the society: the inefficient government, backward political parties, violent and militant labor unions, and uncivilized citizens.<sup>29</sup> The latter was deemed to undermine the deserved value created by the business and thus weaken national competitiveness and undermine the nation brand value, and ultimately get in the way to the rank of advanced nations. Accordingly, the government and other parts of society should learn from business:

The government is to blame for the [low] nation brand that contributed to the “Korea discount.” We cannot help but to think that the lack of international public relations led to the failure to favorably appeal to the people around the world. Although the status of our nation has improved through the events such as 1988 Olympic Games, 2002 World Cup, and Pusan APEC, it is reported that the foreigners, especially businesspeople, are reminded of negative terms such as “North Korea nuclear threat” and “hardline labor unions” when they think of Korea. These negative images have crucially weakened the nation brand. It is urgent to turn it into positive images. The government, at least, should not be an impediment to the corporate business activities. It should devise strategies to enhance the nation brand to a premium brand. It is a good way to benchmark corporate brand strategies adopted by national enterprises with world top 100 brand names (S.-w. Kim, 2005).

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<sup>29</sup> The blaming of the government, politics, and labor resonates with the famous statement made by Lee Kun-hee, chairman of Samsung Group, in 1995, who graded Korean politics as fourth class, its government as third class, and its business as second class. The news media repeatedly reminded his statement. For instance, see two op-ed columns in *Maeil Kyōngje* and *Kyōnghyang Sinmun*, which are regarded as representing pro-business conservatives and progressive liberals respectively (“Lee Kun-hee's aggressive deregulation appeal,” 2007; C.-s. Pak, 2006).

The news media blamed the inefficiency of the government and the excessive economic regulation by the government not just for hampering the business freedom of the nationally based business, but for turning away foreign capital investment. The physical violence in the National Assembly was to blame for degrading national prestige by being the object of international ridicule of the backwardness of South Korea. The street demonstrations and militant labor struggles were also to blame for driving away foreign capital investment by reinforcing the anti-business image of South Korea ("Advanced Korea in the 21st century is difficult to achieve with 20th century country image," 2008; H.-j. Cho, 2005; T.-k. Cho, 2009).

The news media also problematized behaviors of citizens as lacking "civil consciousness" and blamed them for undermining the nation brand and national prestige. The PCNB and the SERI published that South Korea ranked at 18th in terms of the nation brand, but at 27th in terms of "citizenship" among 30 OECD countries. The news media widely reported the publication, specifically blaming the lack of civility for undermining the nation brand. In this vein, *Maeil Kyōngje* launched a campaign for "G20 global citizenship," asking to "raise civil consciousness if we want to be treated in the world" (H.-h. Chōng, 2009).

The news media launched campaigns that urged ordinary citizens to follow public etiquette and keep public order in the name of the nation brand and national prestige, including keeping traffic signals, treating fellow citizens kindly, showing generosity to foreigners, and so on ("To enhance the quality of Korean power," 2008).

The news media especially pointed fingers at behaviors of “ugly Koreans.” The Korean tourists in Southeast Asia were accused of the behaviors such as excessive drinking at the airport, underage prostitution, disregarding locals, and so on. Lacking “global citizenship,” these behaviors were blamed for making the nation “shameful” and detrimental to the nation brand and national prestige (“We Need to Take Action on Ugly Overseas Tourism,” 2007). The news media even pointed out the labor exploitation and maltreatment of immigrant workers as the problems of the nation brand and national prestige (“Foreign labor exploitation is a matter of national prestige,” 2012; S.-r. Son, 2008).

### **The nationwide reform and social capital**

In this way, the news media raised concerns about the nation brand and national prestige in wider terms of politics, government, labor dispute, and the citizen’s behavior. In this context, it is notable that the news media often brought up the notions of social capital and social trust as a key to the nationwide reform toward the status of an advanced country.

The low marks of nation brand value and national prestige were explained in terms of lacking social capital and social trust. The comprehensive concept of social capital was used variously to encompass the perception of governmental and corporate corruption, the degree of trust toward the government and among citizens, and the social community networks of citizens. As a kind of “capital,” like human capital and material capital, social capital is conceived of as contributing to productivity and economic growth. The idea of social capital has been actively promoted by the World Bank as a new developmental panacea for solving various

problems such as economic growth, poverty, crime, environmental issues, and so on (Fine, 1999; C.-y. Kim, 2008).

The news media discourse actively utilized the notion of social capital in association with NBNP. The notions of social capital and social trust operated as the mediating concepts for the abstract ideas of the nation brand and national prestige, providing concrete imagery for national reform agenda. The news media promoted the idea of social capital in conservative terms of maintaining and reinforcing law and order. For instance, working with the Ministry of Justice, *Maeil Kyŏngje* launched a campaign for “establishing law and order” in the name of “enhancing national prestige of Korean power” (P.-d. Chŏn, 2008; “To enhance the quality of Korean power,” 2008). In the campaign, the newspaper blamed “the trend of ignoring law” as well as labor struggle not just for being “illegal” but for undermining social trust and further national prestige.

The news media mobilized social capital and social trust for disciplining and conservatively controlling civic life. The NBNP campaigns, centered on social capital and social trust, oriented toward conservative social control, especially the control of political opponents and labor, and social regulation of the mundane civic norms. The campaigns ignored the historical formation of Korean modernity. The national problems of the nation brand deficit and the ugly Koreans phenomenon were not discussed and analyzed in depth within a historical understanding, but presented in fragmented and caricatured ways. It illustrates the nature of nation branding campaigns that aimed to control, regulate, and mobilize the population, rather than to facilitate deliberative discussions on these social issues.

### **The future of a “truly” advanced country**

The political discourses of NBNP constructed a particular future imagery of South Korea as a member of the (imaginary) “advanced countries’ club.”

Since the 1960s, the future imagery of becoming an advanced country has been a major part of the dominant political discourse of development in South Korea (C.-t. Kim, 2014, p. 172) in the sense that modernization has been conceived as becoming a developed, advanced, industrial country (Hwang, 2008, p. 256). The vision of becoming an “advanced, first-class country” has continued to be the ultimate goal set by political elites since the declaration of the “New Korea” in the early 1990s. Notably, since the 1990s, the imagery of becoming an advanced country was reinforced as the advance of the nation implied the international competitiveness of the nation in the world stage.

The image of an advanced country has been represented mainly in economic terms, especially in terms of national income. The national income index was used to signify the advanced status of South Korea. The Kim Young-sam government set the goals of increasing GNP per capita to 10,000 dollars and obtaining the membership of the OECD as the signposts of becoming an advanced country (both were achieved in 1996 at the expense of the financial crisis in the next year). In 2003, the Roh government also set up the goal of GNP per capita of 20,000 dollars as a state agenda (as suggested to the government by the SERI) (“Roh asks to renovate the country to open up the era of 20 thousand dollars,” 2003).

The government and the news media perceived that the elusive goal of becoming an advanced country was near at hand in economic terms, considering the

size and volume of the South Korean economy. Especially, particular future-oriented industries were conceived of as providing a concrete shape to the future image of advanced South Korea. For instance, technology-oriented industries such as the IT industry (represented by Samsung Electronics) were regarded not just as the future engine for continued economic growth,<sup>30</sup> but also as envisaging the desirable future of advanced economic development. The world-leading IT industries, reinforced by the futuristic image, provided not just a source of national pride, but a national sense of being competitive and taking the lead in the world.

The cultural industries, leading the Korean Wave, also emerged as envisioning the competitive and advanced Korea in economic terms. The Korean Wave was cast on in terms of its economic effects. In 2004, *Segye Ilbo* cited the study by the HERI and reported the tangible and intangible effects of the “Yonsama” phenomenon was estimated to generate as large as 3 trillion won<sup>31</sup> in Korea and Japan. In 2005, *Yonhap News* cited the study by the IPS and reported that the overall economic effects of the Korean Wave all over East Asia (including Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) was estimated as high as 4.5 trillion won (Hong, 2005).

Aside from the point that the calculation of the figures was on a vague and exaggerated ground, and the measurement was widely inconsistent across the

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<sup>30</sup> Since the 1960s, science and technologies have been emphasized as essential to reach the advanced level of economic development (Hwang, 2008; K.-b. Kim, 2008). The strong emphasis on science and technologies can be found in the slogan, “being late in the industrialization, let’s take the lead in the way to informatization” under the Kim Young-sam government, and the state vision of “knowledge-based nation” under the Kim Dae-jung government.

<sup>31</sup> Since the financial crisis in 1997, the rate between the Korean won and the US dollar exchange rate has been fluctuated between 1,000-1,200 won per dollar.

reports, the nation branding discourse cast on the events and phenomena exclusively from the economic and monetary terms. The monetary calculation of the nation brand had effects on the conversion of “intangible” and not necessarily economic phenomena into calculable economic entities.

These industries were conceived of as going beyond the developmental strategy of “catching up” and leading the way to “world class” Korea. Products such as mobile phones and the popular culture projected the prestigious nation brand (“Korean premium”). In this context, national prestige and prestigious nation brand was equated with the market premium value (high value added) created by prestigious national brands.

Further and more importantly, the Korean Wave was cast in the cultural terms beyond the economic terms of future growth engine. The Korean Wave was celebrated as the first historical instance for Korean culture to spread widely in the world. With the development of the Korean wave, the state vision was frequently presented as entering the rank of “*munhwa sŏnjin’guk*” (문화선진국; culture-advanced countries). The news media emphasized the Korean Wave as a road to becoming a “truly” advanced country. The advancement of the nation was increasingly conceived of not just in terms of achieving high levels of economic and technological development and scale, but in terms of having refined culture.

In this context, since the 2000s, the imagery of an advanced nation has expanded to include not just economic status of the nation, but comprehensive political, social, and cultural terms. Nation brand index as well as other international indices and rankings published by various transnational private and public

institutions contributed to this expansion of imagery of an advanced nation.<sup>32</sup> These international indexes and rankings provided a rationale for wider social reform oriented toward the future of a “truly” advanced nation.

The image of the culture-advanced nation was also projected in terms of civic norms of public behaviors and manners, which were narrowly defined as abiding by law and order. The successful hosting of the 2002 World Cup football was cast on in terms of its economic effects, but was highlighted in terms of projecting the image of public order to the world. Against this backdrop, the public behaviors of citizens were projected as a great improvement and achievement, illuminating a bright future of the nation as a true advanced country.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I examined how the news media institutionally and discursively engaged in the promotion of nation branding and national prestige as the national public agenda, which got elevated to the status of the central public policy agenda by the next government. Since the late 1990s, the news media have made serious attempts to provide grand state agendas, manifesting their own stake in the political process of state management. As one of the recent attempts, the discourses of nation branding and national prestige exemplify how the news media played a crucial role in the post-developmental transition to neoliberal governance

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<sup>32</sup> They include Human Development Index (HDI) by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI), Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) by World Economic Forum (WEF), World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) by International Institute for Management Development, among others.



in South Korea. The process illustrates how the news media actively mediated the interest of big capital in the promotion of the state agenda of nation branding.

As a conclusion of the chapter, I will sum up and discuss the implications of the news media's institutional and discursive engagement in the promotion of NBNP and discuss the social imaginary of the nation-state provided by the discourses of NBNP in a wider context of the social transformation of South Korea.

First of all, the chapter examined the domestication of the transnational discourse and institution of nation branding by domestic players. It was transnational practitioners in the business of marketing/branding consultation that invented and disseminated the idea of nation branding since the late 1990s. They were quick to introduce the idea and technique of nation branding to national and local governments across the world. The governments in Eastern Europe, in particular, were quick to adopt and apply nation branding as part of their transition to global capitalism. The existing critical studies of nation branding mostly emphasized the role played by the transnational practitioners. They introduced and disseminated neoliberal rules and market-oriented norms through the technique of nation branding which rendered the nation-state as a market entity. By contrast, I emphasized the domestic dynamics of nation branding and identified multiple domestic players which were involved in the introduction and dissemination of the transnational idea of nation branding. The introduction of nation branding in South Korea was less of a process in which transnational brand managers took advantage of the national government and prescribed a neoliberal prescription of managing the nation brand; it was a process in which domestic elites proactively adopted and

promoted nation branding as a state management agenda. The public and private think tanks and the major news media were quick to introduce the idea of nation branding, to circulate among government and business elites, and to translate and popularize in relation to a neologism of national prestige. The news media played a mediating role in the institutional and discursive domestication of nation branding among experts, government, and publics in favor of the interest of capital.

It should also be added that I do not disregard the role played by the transnational branding experts all together, but evaluate their role in South Korea from a different perspective. Their involvement in the institutional process of nation branding seemed limited in South Korea although the transnational branding consultants landed some branding contracts with the governmental agencies and local governments. Rather, they were more significant in terms of their sheer presence and status in the discourse of nation branding. In the domestication of nation branding, the international authority and global status of the discourse and their transnational agencies seemed crucial for the domestic players such as the news media and the policy experts. The news media summoned the Western media, Western intellectuals, and Western experts as the authoritative source of speaking the language of nation branding. It seemed that the intellectual and symbolic authority of the Western intellectuals, experts and the media were indispensable to the domestication of nation branding; but they were instrumental and selectively appropriated by the domestic agency of nation branding. The actual institutionalization of nation branding worked for the benefit of the domestic

players — conservative politicians, bureaucrats, news journalists, and the capital, as we will see in the next chapter.

Secondly, the news media's promotion of nation branding predominantly operated in favor of the interest of large capital and for the neoliberal discipline of the state, the nation, and the citizen. The news media narratives of nation branding prioritized the building of a business-friendly environment to attract foreign investment and tourists and to continue the export-led economic growth, favoring domestically-based but globalized large conglomerates. The neoliberal political nature of the campaign is apparent in its condemnation of labor as detriment to international competitiveness and its mobilization of the citizens in favor of business. By urging the government to manage the whole nation in the prospect of enhancing international competitiveness and the overall nation brand value, the campaigns constructed the state as a neoliberal manager of the competitive brand-state. The priority put on the business sector suggests that the discourses of NBNP were aligned with the neoliberal reorganization of the government and the population. In line with the normative imperative of international competitiveness, the news media's call for nation branding put priority on attracting transnational capital and tourists and creating a business-friendly climate. The nation branding campaigns, in this sense, attempted to regulate and discipline the citizens with respect to the neoliberal globalization in the name of a continued economic growth of the national economy.

It should be added that the news media's promotion of nation branding spoke mostly to the incoming government, rather than to the soon-to-be-retired

liberal government. As early as 2005, the next government was strongly expected to be a conservative one led by a successful businessman-turned-politician. It was the Lee Myung-bak government that greatly instituted and drove the nation branding campaign, which will be examined in the next chapter.

Thirdly, the news media's campaign for nation branding can be contextualized with regard to the re-imagination of the post-developmental state and nation following what seems the end of the developmental era in South Korea. The news media's narrative of nation branding drove a particular rendering of the post-developmental imaginary of South Korea toward the neoliberal orientation. What is striking in this aspect is that the discursive construction of the neoliberal brand-state is predicated on a particular geographic imagination of South Korea's standing in the global stage. The news media discourses invoked the imagery of an "advanced nation" through the affective activation of collective developmental sentiments. It fed on the national confidence on the past achievement of rapid economic growth and the national pride on the present global success of Korea-originated manufactured products and popular culture. While the developmental "catching up" mobilization for economic growth had fed on the collective national desire for "survival," the neoliberal construction of the competition state thrived on the developmental desire for the prestigious status of the "top-tier, advanced country" standing in the world stage not just in terms of economy but also culture and civility.

Additionally, the globalized re-imagination as an advanced country put South Korea in the framework of perpetual comparison with the West as an invariable

point of reference. The news media discourses of NBNP depended on the invocation of the Western authority and the “advanced” nature of the Western knowledge and expertise. Moreover, the news media campaign selectively mobilized the aspects of culture and citizenship in the name of global standards from the perspective of the Western (investors’) standpoint and thus reinforced and perpetuated the Western-centered perception of international hierarchy. The news media campaign for NBNP exposed the paradox of Korean modernity in which the collective anxiety, discontent and insecurity underlie national pride and confidence.

The last point I raise in this chapter concerns the increasing importance of the idea of culture with regard to nation branding and national prestige. The news media’s discourses of NBNP obviously centered on the economy and favored business, but they entailed increasing attention to the idea of culture. The attention to culture, especially in relation to the imagery of an advanced nation, not only assumed the developmental idea of West-centered, staged progress from the economy to culture, but also was based on the reflection on the one-sided emphasis on the economy. The attention to culture was accelerated by the rising popularity of the Korean Wave and K-pop, Korean modern popular cultural products in Asia and around the world.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONTINGENCIES OF THE PUBLIC POLICY OF NATION BRANDING

In this chapter, I examine how nation branding policy unfolded under the Lee Myung-bak government, focusing on the policy activities by the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB). The Council took the responsibility for coordinating public policies across different governmental departments and agencies and implementing various publicity-oriented activities with regard to nation branding. In coordinating and implementing the public policy for nation branding, the Council emphasized the key principles: the cooperation between government and business on the one hand, and the participation by citizens on the other hand. The principles of cooperation and participation sound positive and ideal, implying potentially democratic values. However, these policy statements cannot be taken literally without questions. That is, what do they really mean when they are applied to the government-led campaign for nation branding? What forms did cooperation and participation take? How were the values realized in the actual deployment of the public policy for nation branding? I will examine the deployment of the public policies for nation branding, focusing on how these principles actually played out and what implications they had in a wider social and cultural context in South Korea.

In the first section of the chapter, I examine previous governmental efforts to institute the concerns about the international image of the nation before the term nation branding got currency. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, public

policy toward national image has developed until it was shown in full shape with the establishment of the PCNB in 2009.

Then I examine the major task of the PCNB which put together and coordinated related policies that had been scattered across different governmental departments and agencies. The PCNB was defined as the “control tower” of related public policies that were executed by respective departments and agencies. In this setting, I get a glimpse of a wide range of public policies that were related to nation branding and coordinated by the PCNB: from international aid and the promotion of Korean popular culture to domestic public campaigns for “multicultural Korea” and “global citizenship.” In this examination of the public policy for nation branding, I will focus on how the government-business relation on the one hand and the government-citizen relation on the other hand were conceived of and arranged in the public policy scheme for nation branding.

In addition to the coordination of the related policies that had been executed by respective departments and agencies, The PCNB actively deployed a range of promotion and publicity activities, especially in preparations for the upcoming international event of G20 Seoul Summit in 2010. In the second part of the chapter, I will examine public campaigns for nation branding developed under the commission of the PCNB, including the public campaign ads and the public participation campaign. In particular, I take a close look at the public service ad campaign operated by the PCNB in tandem with the big business companies on the one hand, and the citizen participation programs which utilized digital communications on the other. In this examination, I will make two points of

observation. First, I will focus on how the nation branding campaigns were predicated upon a particular government-business relation in which the government mobilized the business on the one hand, and the governmental authority was utilized for business benefit on the one hand. Second, I will focus on how marketing and branding techniques of “participation” were utilized for the “co-creation” of the nation brand in the post-developmental mobilization of publics.

In the concluding section, I will discuss how the nation branding policy constituted the re-imagination of the nation as a brand in which the state was constructed as a quasi-enterprise entity. I argue that the policy campaign for nation branding was part of the neoliberal program of governance that aimed to construct the space of the competitive brand-nation and produce the subjects of brand-citizens in the context of neoliberal globalization.

### **The institutional establishment of nation branding**

In response to the aggressive promotion of the nation branding agenda by the business sector and the mainstream news media, which we have examined in the previous chapter, The Lee Myung-bak government (February 2008-January 2013) pushed the public policy initiative for nation branding. In his speech on August 15, 2008, President Lee declared that he would “raise Korea’s nation brand value to the level of advanced countries within his presidency,” and “establish a governmental organization to promote Korea’s nation brand” (PCNB, 2013a). Accordingly, the PCNB was set up in January 2009 at the Ministry level. The government announced that the PCNB was the world’s first and the only



governmental institution that was dedicated to the integrated task of nation branding (C.-i. Yun, 2010).

### **The public policy for “national image”**

The PCNB was not the first governmental institution devoted to the promotion of the nation brand and national image in South Korea. Even before the term “nation branding” was introduced in the early 2000s, the government was gradually concerned about the promotion of national image.

It is fair to note that the government exerted efforts to promote nation image with the hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988,<sup>33</sup> but it was in the early 1990s that the nation image promotion was taken seriously and systematically as part of a larger national reform when the Kim Young-sam government pushed the policy initiative for *seggyehwa*, Korea’s take on globalization. For the enhancement of the external national image, the government set up the Committee on Overseas Public Relations in 1995. It was acknowledged that given the rapid economic growth and political democratization, the international recognition of Korea stayed low due to unstable national security and a series of disasters (such as the collapse of Sŏngsu Taegyo bridge, one of the Han’gang river bridges in 1994, and the collapse of Samp’ung department store building in Seoul in 1995). The Committee, presided by the Prime Minister, was set up to coordinate the work of disseminating information

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<sup>33</sup> It should be noted that the “politics of gaze,” that is, the implementation of the promotion of national image entailed violence especially under the military regime facing the 1988 Olympics. Preparing the event, the regime wiped out the shack in Seoul, especially, the shack visible on the road from the airport to downtown Seoul (H.-n. Pak, 2016).

internationally and managing national image among government departments (Bureau of Public Information, 1995).

Subsequently in 1997, the Korea International Broadcasting Foundation launched Arirang TV, an English-language satellite broadcasting station, aiming at fostering a good international image of Korea through broadcasting. It was called a “spearhead” of Korea’s globalization and expected to function as “Korea’s friendly face toward the global neighbors” (Y.-s. Kim, 1995a). Arirang TV embarked on its overseas broadcasting to the Asia-Pacific region in 1999 and its worldwide broadcasting to Europe, Africa and the Americas in 2000.

Despite the grand policy claim for Korea’s globalization, the governmental efforts for enhancing national image were regarded as insufficient. One governmental document pointed out that the overseas publicity functions were uncoordinated as they were scattered around different governmental departments and agencies such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Korea Foundation (K.-h. Chŏng, 1998). The major shortcoming was the fact that the matter of national image was limited to overseas public relations.

The government’s efforts to improve national image advanced when Korea co-hosted with Japan one of the biggest world events: the 2002 FIFA World Cup. In preparation for the event, the government planned to set up a slogan for the World Cup which symbolized the country in English (K.-h. Yi, 2007a). In December 2001, with the international event several months ahead, “Dynamic Korea” was selected as

the English slogan to publicize Korea to the world (K.-h. Yi, 2007b).<sup>34</sup> The slogan was used during and after the event for the promotion of national image.

In this atmosphere, the government attempted to institute a systematic pan-governmental campaign for enhancing national image by setting up the Council on National Image (CNI) in July 2002. The Council was an intra-governmental coordinating board, presided by the Prime Minister and composed of ten cabinet members. The Action Council on National Image, which supported the Council, was presided by the Ministry of Public Relations and composed of ten Vice-Minister level officials (K.-h. Yi, 2007b).

For the next few years, the Council proposed comprehensive plans for enhancing national image. In 2002, the Council included wider diplomatic and economic concerns into the national image agenda. For instance, the Council suggested to repair systems and customs according to global standards by enacting the Animal Protection Act and regulating “dog eating,” arranging protection of foreign sex workers, tidying up utility polls, billboards and road signs, and the like (P.-s. Kim, 2002).

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<sup>34</sup> Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), the public broadcasting organization, conducted an online poll to select the slogan on its website. With 6,084 participants to the poll, “Dynamic Korea” took the most votes with 24.6 per cent, followed by “Fantastic Korea” (24.5 per cent), “Peaceful and Safe Korea” (21.4), “Experience Korea” (17.3), and the “Hub of Asia” (12.2). Based on the result of the online poll as well as international and local expert opinion, the Blue House led the deliberation on selecting the slogan for the World Cup. As a result of the deliberation, “Dynamic Korea” was selected as the basic slogan with the “Hub of Asia” as the sub (K.-h. Yi, 2007a). Subsequently, the Interbrand, a leading transnational marketing and branding consulting company that also worked for the emblem for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, worked on the emblem for the slogan for the World Cup Organizing Committee (National Strategy Institute, 2006).

The Council decided to expand Official Development Assistance (ODA) from 59 million dollars in 2002 to 72 million dollars in 2003 and to resume contribution to the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), which had been suspended due to the financial crisis in 1997. It also aimed to increase the world's first-class products from 220 items to 500 items by 2005, and to produce more Korean brands among the world's best 100 corporate brands.

In November 2005, the Council planned to develop the National Image Index of Korea (NIIK), an index to measure national image for its systematic management. The Council announced that it would measure five elements of nation image – natural and geographical environment, politics, economy, culture and society – in terms of three criteria of human resource, system and process, and content. The measurement would reflect existing internationally authoritative indices such as the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) published by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by the Transparency International (TI), sovereign credit ratings evaluated by major credit rating agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, which were in great circulation with transnational authority (P.-s. Pak, 2005).

The Council also appointed five world-famous Koreans as honorary ambassadors in four different fields – culture and arts (classical music singer Cho Su-mi and film director Kim Ki-dŏk), sports (professional golfer An Si-hyŏn), “world-class products” (vice president Yun Jong-yong of Samsung Electronics), and science and technology (professor Hwang U-sŏk). The meeting also decided to reinforce the

Action Council and to install the Committee on National Image Development, an advisory board composed of civil experts on public relations (H.-Y. Kim, 2005).

The development of the official policy toward national image suggests that the plans were not limited to the repair of national image and the establishment of national slogan; the Council took charge of the establishment of visions and strategies as well as the comprehensive policy suggestions in regard to national image issues. It shows that the diplomatic and international political economic issues and internal reforms encompassing laws, systems and customs were viewed from the perspective of the national image enhancement.

However, despite the great breadth and depth of the plans written on paper, the Council was not able to implement most of its proposed policies. Established in an “on-the-fly” manner by the time of hosting the mega international event, the Council fizzled out without consistent policy implementation and visible performance outcome. The Council was criticized as “mere nominal” for its inactivity and the lack of action strategies. In fact, the Council meetings were held only twice, in 2002 at its launch and in 2005 for the preparation of the 2006 World Cup (T. Kim, 2006; N.-h. Yi, 2004).

The lack of policy implementation despite a rather comprehensive plan was partly ascribed to the problem of the organizational structure within the government, where cooperation and coordination were hard to expect.

### **The establishment of the PCNB**

Against this historical backdrop, the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) was established with a strengthened status in the governmental

organization. It was set up as a Presidential Council at the Ministry level, elevated from the status of the CNI, which was set up as a Prime Minister's Council. In fact, the new government strategically established or reorganized five Presidential Councils, including the PCNB, which played a central role in propelling the core policy agenda of the new government.<sup>35</sup>

The PCNB claimed that it was the world's first governmental organization on nation branding. It was a dubious claim suggesting Korea's obsession with the "world's first,"<sup>36</sup> but it was clear that it was promoted from the previous organizations.

Despite this institutional promotion from the previous government, however, the status of the PCNB was ambiguous and contingent on domestic politics. The character of Euh Yoon-dae (Ŏ Yun-dae), Chairperson of the PCNB, illustrated the ambiguity. On the one hand, he symbolized the elevated status of the organization; he was known as a powerful insider of the new-elected President, Lee Myung-bak. He was a professor in business management and served as president of Korea University, which President Lee attended. The high-profile figure contributed to the elevation of the status of the organization. On the other hand, as powerful as he was,

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<sup>35</sup> The other four Councils were the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness, the Presidential Council on Green Growth, the Presidential Council for Future and Vision, and the Presidential Committee on Regional Development.

<sup>36</sup> Precedent examples are identified in Britain where the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (2002) and the following-up Public Diplomacy Board (2006) dealt with the task of nation branding in relation to public diplomacy.

he took the position almost by accident, as he was dropped from the nomination of the Minister of Education and Science.<sup>37</sup>

A year later, he was appointed as Chairperson of the PCNB. The anecdote hints that the PCNB was established as a trophy for the powerful insider rather than according to the consistent purpose for the enhancement of the nation brand.

In this arrangement, the agenda of nation branding was able to carry more weight than before. Set up as a pan-government, co-operative body, the PCNB claimed to assume the role of “control tower” for nation branding, taking charge of the coordination among related government departments and between government and business (The Ministry of Culture, 2009).

However, it is important to understand the role and the status of the Council in a balanced way. The PCNB was misunderstood as a “powerful” organization taking responsibility for nation branding policy that the Lee government ambitiously drove. In fact, however, the “control tower” role of the PCNB implied that its role was limited to putting together and coordinating mostly pre-existing governmental policies in relation to nation branding. Most policies put together under the name of nation branding continued to have been implemented by individual executive governmental bodies.

As a coordinating body, the Council was composed of 16 heads or personnel of relevant governmental departments involved in nation branding and 31 experts

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<sup>37</sup> He was unofficially nominated as the first Minister of Education and Science under the Lee government but was dropped hours before the official announcement due to the suspicion that his wife speculated in real estate (H.-u. No, 2008).

on nation branding from civil society and academia (The Ministry of Culture, 2009).<sup>38</sup> The institutional arrangement reflected the special emphasis on the cooperation between government and business. In addition to the coordinating role, the Council carried on its own projects for nation branding such as holding public forums, contests and campaigns. For this task, the Council was staffed with about 30 employees and was allocated a small budget of 8 billion won.<sup>39</sup> Additionally, the Council asked eight large conglomerates to send their working-manager-level employees to the Council with salary on their part. This unusual organizational arrangement symbolized the status of the Council as a cooperative body between government and big business.<sup>40</sup>

The contingent nature of the PCNB is apparent throughout its institutional existence. For one thing, the PCNB subsisted only under the Lee government for four years. For another, the focus of the organization dramatically shifted with the

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<sup>38</sup> The 16 Council members representing the governmental departments and agencies included the Minister of Strategy and Finance (MOSF); Minister of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST); Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT); Minister of Justice (MOJ); Minister of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS); Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST); Minister of Knowledge Economy (MKE); Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM); Minister of the Prime Minister's Office; Chief of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC); Mayor of Seoul; Secretary to the President for Executive Planning and Management; Secretary to the President for Speech and Records; President of Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA); President of Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA); and the CEO of Korea Tourism Organization (KTO).

<sup>39</sup> Eleven public servants were dispatched from the relevant governmental departments, and five employees from the relevant governmental agencies. The Council independently recruited six employees specializing in promotions and research.

<sup>40</sup> They were Kolon, Asiana Air, Korean Air, Posco, SK Telecom, Hyundai Motors, LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics. Hanhwa joined the next year (C.-i. Yun, 2010,23).



change of the head. In the first term (January 2009-July 2011, Chairperson Euh), the PCNB mainly focused on the preparation for the impending G20 Seoul Summit, emphasizing the government-business cooperation and the citizen participation for nation branding. In the second term (July 2011-October 2012), the PCNB focused on the promotion and commodification of traditional Korean culture. The shift in focus to traditional Korean culture was partly due to the personal interest of the new Chairperson, Lee Bae-yong (Yi Pae-yong), who was a professor in Korean history.

### **The policy activities for nation branding**

In this institutional arrangement, the PCNB set up a set of extensive plans, ranging widely from public diplomacy to the Official Development Assistant (ODA) to the domestic campaign for global citizenship.

The PCNB referred to the fact that Korea's nation brand lagged behind at mere 33rd according to the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI) of 2008. It is notable that the diagnosis of the nation brand problem in terms of dichotomy between economic and non-economic aspects. The PCNB diagnosed that despite its "hard edge" of economic size and technological advancement, Korea's international status stayed at a lower position due to insufficient activities and publicity on "soft edge." The PCNB set the goal of enhancing Korea's ranking from 33rd to 15th by 2013.

The PCNB put together pre-existing and new policies and rebranded them into five major policy focal areas under the banner of nation branding. The five areas were identified as: (1) "contributing to the international community," (2) "promoting advanced technology and products," (3) "promoting culture and

tourism,” (4) “embracing multicultural and foreigners,” and (5) “cultivating global citizenship” (Choi & Kim, 2014, p. 354; PCNB, 2013a).

In addition to this coordinating task, the PCNB also carried out their own roles of PR and communications with regard to nation branding and the role of devising the index and criteria for evaluating the nation brand. In fact, the publicity and communications activities seemed central to the organization as the substantive nation branding policies were executed by the respective governmental departments and agencies. Considering the various roles which the PCNB assumed, in practice, it operated as an intra-governmental agency for publicity and promotion in relation to nation branding.

### **Five areas of nation branding policy**

In this section, I give a glimpse at a range of public policy put together under five areas for nation branding policy and consider the nature of the policy in terms of the relation between government, business, and citizens.

The first focal area for nation branding policy emphasized the international contribution and responsibility and included various international cooperation plans.

Previous overseas volunteer programs were integrated and rebranded as “World Friends Korea.”<sup>41</sup> The policy assumed that Korea’s international volunteer services were underestimated in light of reality that Korea was sending over four

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<sup>41</sup> The plan suggested the integration of government-sponsored international volunteering activities to a single brand. They were Korea Overseas Volunteers (KOV) Program by KOICA under MOFAT, Korea University Volunteer Program (KUV) by MOEST, Korea IT Volunteer Program by KADO under MPAS, Korea Techno Peace Corps (TPC) Program by KICOS under KOEST.

thousand volunteers abroad, third largest number next to the US and Japan. However, due to the lack of integrated brand, the contribution had not been appreciated. Accordingly, modeled after Peace Corps (US) and JICA (Japan) (PCNB, 2009e), the existing volunteering activities were bundled and rebranded as “World Friends Korea.”<sup>42</sup>

Also emphasized were the expansion of developmental assistance (ODA) and the participation in international peacekeeping operations (PKO). Acknowledging the insufficient contribution to the international community, the policy suggested to increase the ODA to the level of OECD average.

It is striking that the policy emphasized the difference in the ODA program between Korea and other advanced countries. Highlighting Korea’s unique experience of turning from an aid-recipient to a donor country, the policy proudly emphasized that Korea could pass on intangible know-hows for economic development as well as material aids. Often called the “economic Korean wave,” the policy included the exportation of Korean model of economic development in the name of the “Knowledge Sharing Programs” (KSP). The KSP was advertised as offering comprehensive consulting for economic development. Especially, the policy

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<sup>42</sup> The programs were also expanded and diversified: the existing volunteering activities, usually youth-based, IT-centered, were reorganized, but also the WFK included “advisers program” and “senior experts program,” which recruited those with expert knowledge and experience within various public and corporate fields. The latter programs were explicitly linked to the international development assistance programs as they aimed to provide expert knowledge of public administration and policy consulting to developing and underdeveloped countries. The plan assumed that the overseas volunteering activities would enhance friendly and giving image of Korea and potentially open the way into the respective overseas markets (PCNB, 2009e). Especially, current public servants were encouraged to participate in the programs.

promoted the exportation of the *Saemaül* campaign as a successful model of modernization.<sup>43</sup>

The first area of nation branding emphasized international cooperation and assistance, but we can identify underlying motives behind the policy. Underlying was the self-pride on the past achievement of rapid economic development and the self-confidence on the advanced level of economy and technologies, discussed in the previous chapter. Further underlying was economic ambition to open up business opportunities for Korean enterprises in large-scale civil engineering and construction as well as in various other industries such as information and education.

For instance, with regard to developmental support and consulting, the plan especially emphasized the merit of the e-learning system. Highlighting the advanced information technologies and the experience of education information system, the policy explicitly aimed to export the Korean e-learning system and further establish it as the global standard in the global education industries (PCNB, 2009c).

The business-centered approach to nation branding was more explicit in the second policy focal area, which was branded as “advanced technology and design Korea.” It emphasized the overcoming of “Korea discount” and the promotion of Korea-originated products and brands for “premium Korea” (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 68-69). This focus area basically featured various support schemes for the Korean small-to-medium-sized business home and abroad by putting up the established

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<sup>43</sup> The KSP was launched in 2009 with Vietnam as the first country to get developmental consulting.

national image of technological advancement. For instance, the plan included the promotion of select high quality products by utilizing the brand and logo, “Advanced Technology and Design Korea” (AT & D Korea) (PCNB, 2009a).

In the third policy focus on culture and tourism, the PCNB policy scheme emphasized the dissemination of Korean culture and the use of cultural resources for tourism.

Major policy efforts in this focal area of culture and tourism included the dissemination of Korean language and Korean alphabet (*han'gŭl*). The PCNB coordinated the reorganization of previously-scattered efforts for the international education of Korean language and culture into the single brand of Sejong Hakdang (the King Sejong Institute). It aimed to make it as prominent as those institutions such as the British Council (UK), Goethe-Institut (Germany), Confucius Institute (China), or Alliance-Française (France).

In addition, the PCNB was directly involved in the efforts to enlist *sŏwŏn* (private Confucian academies in the Chosŏn Dynasty) and Buddhist temples as the World Heritage sites of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 124-138).

Especially in its second term with the historian Lee Bae-yong as Chairperson of the Council, the PCNB greatly focused on the promotion, branding, and commodification of traditional culture. This focus on traditional culture was on promoting and publicizing the presumed excellence of Korean culture, the value of which was assumed to have not been known to the world.

The fourth and fifth focal areas, “embracing multicultural family and foreigners” and “cultivating global citizenship,” were more directly related with the issues of nation image and reputation than the previous aspects, and thus involved various public campaigns targeting the domestic public. These campaigns aimed to educate and mobilize the domestic public toward the building of internationally-friendly, business-favorable socio-cultural environment, especially in the preparations of the G20 Seoul Summit.

Concerning the policy support for multicultural families, assumed by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the PCNB deployed public campaigns and media publicity that aimed to educate the domestic public toward multicultural families. For instance, the PCNB helped to produce a public service advertisement video material featuring “Rainbow Singers,” which were composed of children from multicultural families, helped to launch a television program, “We are Koreans” on MBC (PCNB, 2013a, p. 166). It is noteworthy that the campaigns did not include immigrant workers as the subject of understanding and hospitality.

Concerning the policy for global citizenship, the PCNB was involved in the launch of a series of public campaigns urging the domestic public to learn global etiquette and behave in globally proper manners. Most of these campaigns were executed by related government departments and agencies: MCST, Korea Tourism Organization (KTO), Visit Korea Committee, Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corp. (KOBACO) and so on, but some public service advertisements for global etiquette were produced under the commission of the PCNB in cooperation with private enterprises (that is, the private parties bore the production cost and advertising

expenses) (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 152-159). These campaign ads will be examined in detail in the next section. Before turning to them, I would like to add a few comments on the nature of the public policy of nation branding.

First, the PCNB extended the framework of nation branding quite widely, coordinating a wide range of public policies from ODA to global citizenship. It is worth noting that many of these policies had been promoted by the news media and considered in the policy framework under the CNI in relation to nation image.

Second, the nation branding policies were planned and operated from the perspective of business: while the first three aspects explicitly and implicitly aimed to support the domestically-based business and promote exports, the remaining two were more or less involved in attracting transnational business and capital by providing a socio-cultural climate that were deemed friendly to international business and capital.

Last, the public policy on nation branding was keen on mobilizing citizen volunteers or making especially the youth involved in nation branding. Overseas volunteer programs, branded “World Friends Korea,” naturally involved a lot of citizen volunteers of various ages. Additionally, concerning the promotion of traditional Korean culture, the nation branding policy plan recruited and supported the youth activities for the conservation of UNESCO world heritage sites (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 139-145). The PCNB adopted various open prize contests, and recruited citizens under various names such as communicators, reporters, and bloggers for the promotion and publicity activities of the nation brand of Korea. The aspects of the government-business relation and the citizen participation will be further

discussed in the examination of the publicity and promotion activities for nation branding in the next section.

### **Publicizing and communicating nation branding**

In addition to substantive policies that were coordinated by the PCNB and executed by the respective governmental departments and agencies, the PCNB took responsibility for publicity and communications in relation to nation branding. In these terms, the PCNB covered various policy activities including overseas as well as domestic, conventional as well as unconventional publicity activities.

The PCNB policy report book, published in 2013, shows how much weight was given to these publicity and communications activities. The report summed up the outcome of their policy performance through four years before its termination months later. In this 350-page report (excluding appendix), the PCNB spared almost half of the book to the publicity and communications activities in great detail while summing up in 70 pages all the substantive nation branding policy activities that were executed by other governmental bodies (PCNB, 2013a).

In this section, I examine the actual policy activities of publicity, communications and promotion of nation branding by the PCNB. I focus on three activities: first, the development of the nation brand index in cooperation with the SERI; second, the PCNB's publicity activities, exemplified by the public campaign ads produced by LG Group; third, various "participatory" publicity programs, which induced citizens' involvement in nation branding, especially through digital communications technologies. In this examination, I consider how the PCNB



conceived and conducted the government-business cooperation and the citizen participation.

### **SERI-PCNB NBDO**

The PCNB made the development of the nation brand index one of its duties. In cooperation with the SERI, the PCNB developed and published the result of the nation brand index since 2009 (It was discontinued with the abolishment of the PCNB with the launch of Park Geun-hye government in 2013). Dissatisfied with the NBI developed by Simon Anholt, the Council aimed to replace it with their own brand of nation brand index to indicate the changing position of South Korea more effectively.

The nation brand index, called the SERI-PCNB NBDO (nation brand dual octagon), aimed to measure the dual aspects of nation brands — substance and image — in eight categories — economy/corporations, science/technology, infrastructure, policy/institution, heritage, modern culture, people, and celebrities. (D.-H. Lee, 2013; C.-u. Yu, 2013, pp. 82-86).

The SERI-PCNB NBDO conceptualized that the nation brand was composed of the dual aspects of “substance” and “image.” The SERI argued that as existing nation brand indexes such as Anholt’s NBI (The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index) measured only “image” and “soft” aspect of nation brands through surveys, they only reflected subjective perception of the nation brand and lacked objectivity. Thus, the newly developed index combined a “soft,” “image” aspect, and a “hard,” “substance” aspect. For the former, the index conducted a worldwide survey of about 13,500 “opinion leaders” from 26 countries (D.-H. Lee, 2013). For the latter, it

incorporated extensive 125 “hard” statistical data already published by organizations including international competitiveness indices by IMD and WEF, other statistical data from the World Bank, UNESCO, and others. The index also divided the items of measurement of nation brands into eight categories. The SERI insisted that the “octagon” of the eight categories referred to David Aaker’s brand identity model and Machiavelli’s state theory, but did not mention Simon Anholt (T.-h. Yi, 2009). However, it is highly likely that the “octagon” was devised in reference to the “hexagon” in the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (the hexagon is composed of the following six elements: export brands, foreign and domestic policy, investment and immigration, tourism, culture and heritage, and people).

The formulation of the SERI-PCNB NBDO took a neutral look, based on technical expertise, but it illustrates the business-oriented bias of nation branding. It is notable that the SERI took the lead in the composition of the index. As was examined in Chapter 4, the SERI, as a subsidiary of Samsung conglomerate, presented the grand state vision in the direction of the interest of big business. The formulation of the nation brand index is a continued intervention into the state strategy by the SERI, following reports such as “Attractive Korea: Strategy for Entering the Rank of 10 Most Advanced Countries by 2015” (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2005a). Especially, the “substance” side of the dual measurement in the nation brand index points to the continuity between the previous reports which emphasized the “substantive” aspect of international competitiveness.

The SERI-PCNB index also confirmed the continued perception that South Korea was undervalued in terms of the nation brand (image) in comparison to its

substantive value. The annual reports continued to identify non-economic areas such as culture, heritage, government and policy and people as weak points in comparison to a higher mark by economy, corporations, and technology. This dichotomy continued to suggest that the nation brand problem came from the non-economic sectors, not from economic sectors. Thus, the index further implied that the nation branding policy was not limited to campaigns and public relations of national image, but oriented toward a wider social reform from the business point of view, as examined in Chapter 4.

The PCNB announced that during its tenure, South Korea achieved a gradual, but impressive improvement in terms of nation branding ranking. The SERI paper reported that South Korea marked 13<sup>th</sup> in terms of substance and 17<sup>th</sup> in terms of image in 2012, a gradual increase from 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> in 2009 (D.-H. Lee, 2013). South Korea's position in this ranking is significantly high marked in comparison to other major related indices (22<sup>nd</sup> by IMD's, 19<sup>th</sup> by WEF's, and 27<sup>th</sup> by NBI's index), which the PCNB disregarded as not suitable to South Korea. It is interesting that the Council report (PCNB, 2013b) emphasized a different aspect of the same data. The report did not mention the numeric ranking at all. Instead, the success of the performance by the PCNB is illuminated in terms of a different index: it proclaimed that South Korea passed the mark of the OECD average (100) in both terms of image (101) and substance (103) of the nation brand by 2012. The report added that the figures indicated a significant improvement from 2009 (89 to 101 on image and 97 to 103 on substance). Moreover, the gap between the two aspects was significantly narrowed (8 to 2).

The SERI-PCNB NBDO turned out to be a convenient tool for the PCNB. Rather than depending on the Western authority of well-known indices, the PCNB devised their own index as a nation brand measurement at the SERI's suggestion. This notable decision to replace the Western authority by a Korean alternative, Samsung, suggests a domestically oriented, politically-embedded nature of the public policy for nation branding. The SERI, with the power of Samsung Group in the background, exerted a significant influence and authority among South Korean elites but not necessarily outside South Korea. The invention of their own index suggests the domestic-oriented nature of nation branding in South Korea despite the PCNB's declaration that it would raise the index as an internationally recognized indicator. In fact, the SERI terminated the publication of the index as the PCNB was abolished in 2013. Moreover, the invention of its own indicator for the nation brand suggests an increased control over how South Korea was represented in the nation branding ranking. Moreover, holding the indicator in hand also suggests control over how the PCNB and the South Korean government performed was represented. Not necessarily implying a manipulation, the SERI and the PCNB were able to make expedient use of the scientific- and neutral-looking index in a flexible and convenient way to their own advantage.

### **Public campaign ads on nation branding**

In terms of international publicity, the PCNB aired spot commercials on international media such as CNN, Euronews, BBC, and so on, publicizing the "advanced technology and design Korea" (PCNB, 2013a, p. 299). The Council also hosted the international nation branding public event called the "Korea Week." The

showcase public events were aimed to facilitate the bilateral international economic cooperation and cultural exchange.<sup>44</sup> Also included in the international nation branding activities by the PCNB were the hosting of annual nation branding convention event since 2011 and the setting up a publicity booth at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

However, the majority of the PR activities by the PCNB targeted domestic citizens, rather than overseas audiences, especially in the first term when it devoted its activities to the preparation of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit. In 2009 and 2010, a series of public service advertisements were aired under the commission of the PCNB. Notably, these public service ads were commissioned by the PCNB, but actually produced by major private conglomerates.<sup>45</sup> These campaign ads, produced in Korean language and mostly aired on domestic media, suggest the domestic focus of the nation branding campaign. The PCNB boasted these ad series as successful outcome of their activities (PCNB, 2013a, pp. 320-326).

Among these campaigns, Asiana Airlines produced a couple in-flight public campaign ads. These short animation ads aimed to educate Korean tourists going abroad on the proper behaviors on the plane and in places like museums. Korean Air followed by airing a public service advertisement on global etiquette on the three major television networks (KBS, MBC, and SBS). This ad campaign also

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<sup>44</sup> These events were held in Viet Nam (2009), Indonesia (2010), Kazakhstan (2011), France (2011), and China (2012).

<sup>45</sup> The included Samsung, Hyundai Motor Company, LG, CJ, SK, Korean Air, Posco, Asiana Airlines, Woori Bank, Korea Development Bank, and KB Financial Group. The list looks similar to that of the companies that dispatched their employees to the PCNB.

featured global etiquette in various situations (for instance, using “please” when placing order in the restaurant). The ad ended with the onscreen message “You are little Korea,” evoking Korean tourists as representatives of the nation (Y.-k. Kim & Chŏn, 2010).

While these airline companies were natural fit for the public campaign for global etiquette, other public campaign ads covered wider themes in relation to nation branding, encompassing the contribution to the international community (Samsung Group, POSCO), the celebration of the successful hosting of G20 (Woori Bank, KDB), the nation pride of Korea (DB Financial Group, Hyundai Motors Group), and global etiquette (LG Group, CJ-affiliated tvN). These themes also suggest the domestic nature of the nation branding campaign, mobilizing nationalistic pride and aiming to educate domestic audiences on globally-desirable etiquette.

Probably, the most successful was the public campaign ads by LG Group. LG Group produced a series of public campaign ads in regard to nation branding. Early 2010, the PCNB released a “global etiquette” campaign ad in collaboration with the LG conglomerate Group (in this context, “collaboration” meant that LG got the ads produced and covered the expenses). Indebted to the success of the campaign ad in attracting public attention, LG Group continued to release three additional campaign ads, focusing on “multiculture” in 2010-2011 (LG Group Blog Administrator, 2012).

In the following section, I analyze the “global etiquette” campaign ad by LG. This ad is interesting not just because it was well received by advertising experts as well as the general public, but also it could provide an interesting case that suggests

intertwined relations between the government and the private sector concerning nation branding.

### **“Saranghaeyo, Korea”**

This advertisement was aired to raise the public awareness for “global etiquette” and the hospitality toward foreign visitors with the G20 Seoul Summit near at hand. The event, a gathering of financial ministers and central bank governors of 20 major economies, was publicized on a large scale by the government as “a crucial opportunity to enhance Korea’s nation brand and national prestige” (PCNB, 2009b). This ad was aired for two months on major television networks.

The computer-graphic-based animation featured various Korean and Western characters from famous Korean and Western masterpiece paintings. These characters were in contact with each other in different imaginary situations. The 40 second ad is composed of five main scenes as the following:

Scene #1: The ad begins with a bird-eye-view on an old Chonsŏn town. The camera zooms in and cuts to a gentleman and a lady in modern European costumes looking at the map of Korea (Figure 1). They are from *A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte* (1884) by Geoges-Pierre Seurat. A group of gentlemen wearing Korean traditional costumes and Confucian hats approach and ask, “May I help you?” (The dialog is muted but is shown on screen as a caption in both English and Korean. This applies also to the other following scenes of encounters). They are from *Appreciation of Painting* (late 18th century) by Korean painter Kim Hong-do. Then they look at the map together and one of them points the way with his folding fan. The couple nod with gratitude and go their way.

Scene #2: The couple are watching Korean traditional wrestling (Figure 2). The scene is from *Ssirŭm* (late 18th century) also by Kim Hong-do. A boy hawker is back-stepping and bumping into a bearded man in a postman uniform. The man is from *Portrait of the Postman Jeseoph Roulin* (1888) by Vincent Van Gogh. The boy bows saying, “I’m sorry,” and the postman responds with a gesture of appreciation.

Scene #3: Two young ladies are riding horses led by a young man and they are all in Korean traditional costumes (Figure 3). The scene is from *Yŏnso Tapch'ŏng* (Youths go spring picnic) (late 18th century) by Korean painter Sin Yun-bok. He picks up a flute and gives back to a boy in a Western uniform, saying "Here you are." The boy is from *The Fifer* (1866) by Édouard Manet. They bow to each other in a polite manner.

Scene #4: A gentleman in Korean costume is holding the door for two women in "ethnic" costumes carrying baggage with both hands (Figure 4). He says, "After you, ma'am," and they pass through nodding their heads with gratitude. The man is from *Two Lovers Under Moonlight* (late 18th century) by Sin Yun-bok, and the women are from *Tahitian Women on the Beach* (1891) by Paul Gauguin.

Scene #5: In the transitional shot, a Korean phrase, "For Korea to be loved by the people of the world" is shown, synchronized with the narration (Figure 5). Then the camera cut to two gentlemen smiling with each other. The one is from *Self-portrait* (late 17th century) by Yun Tu-sŏ, and the other is also from *Self-portrait* (1889) by Vincent van Gogh. Then the camera cut to the two getting on a boat. The image of getting on a boat themed from *Boat-riding on the River* (late 18th century) by Sin Yun-bok. An onscreen message "*Saranghaeyo, Korea*" shows on top, and the logos of the PCNB and LG show side by side on the bottom (Figure 6).

Throughout the ad, theme music plays. The main melody is played by *gayagŭm*, Korean zither, accompanied by Western percussion and bass. From scene #4 to the end, a female voice narrates over theme music, saying "Your impression is Korea's impression. For Korea to be loved by the people of the world. *Saranghaeyo, Korea*. This campaign is brought by the Presidential Council on Nation Branding and LG."





Figure 1: "May I help you?" (screenshot from "Saranghaeyo, Korea" ad)



Figure 2: "I'm sorry" (screenshot from "Saranghaeyo, Korea" ad)



Figure 3: "Here you are" (screenshot from "Saranghaeyo, Korea" ad)



Figure 4: "After you, Ma'am" (screenshot from "Saranghaeyo, Korea" ad)




Figure 5: “For Korea to be loved by the people of the world” (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)



Figure 6: End title (screenshot from “Saranghaeyo, Korea” ad)

The ad is interesting in many aspects. First of all, the ad is interesting in terms of the production. For Korean viewers, the ad looked and sounded familiar, not just because it featured characters from the familiar Korean and Western masterpiece paintings that they learned from the high school textbooks, but because it modeled after a well-received ad series for LG products that also featured masterpiece paintings.

In 2007-8, the LG Group launched a series of ads. Those ads parodied famous Western and Korean masterpiece paintings within which LG products such as television, air conditioner, shampoo, notebook computer, mobile phone, and so on, were “placed” in a PPL (product placement) style. The ad series were successful and highly praised within the advertising community and regarded as contributing to the premium image for LG products and brands (Y.-k. Kim, Pak, & O, 2009).

The public service ad for nation branding by LG was developed on the basis of the themes and visual templates of the LG brand advertisements. HS Ad, an in-house ad agency for LG Group, which had produced the LG corporate branding campaign ads, took charge of the production of the public campaign ad for nation branding. Thus, the seamless continuity between the corporate brand ads for LG and the public service ad for the nation brand Korea is striking in terms of overall themes and visual elements. The continuity is also apparent in terms of sound. The nation brand ad adopted one of the signature theme music pieces of LG brand advertisements. It slightly changed the original mid-tempo chamber music style piece by adding Korean traditional instruments.

Even the awkward phrase in the public service ad, “*Saranghaeyo, Korea*” was a direct adaptation from a famous signature phrase for the LG brand, “*Saranghaeyo, LG.*” The phrase “*saranghaeyo*” literally means “I love you,” but the LG Group had used the expression “*saranghaeyo, LG*” in their long-lasting corporate branding campaign.

As a result of all these intertextual and institutional continuities, the nation branding ad looked and sounded like a typical LG corporate brand ad. This effect may or may not be intended, but reveals a specific relation interwoven through the practices of nation branding between the government and the private conglomerate.

The PCNB claimed to be the “control tower” for nation branding, but in fact, it depended on private conglomerates for its human, financial, and creative resources. It asked major conglomerates to dispatch their marketing staffs and to produce public service advertisements for the nation branding campaign. In this way, the government asserted its public authority without expanding the organization.

Moreover, the nation brand and identity depended on, and were seamlessly conflated with, the corporate brand and identity. The private conglomerates provided corporate resources to the governmental work with a national cause. For the production of the public service advertisement discussed above, the LG conglomerate utilized their resources in a time-saving and cost-efficient way because they used their in-house ad agency and utilized their own pre-existing creative templates. It was a profitable business for LG because they not just inscribed their corporate brand in the nation brand but also earned the reputation for “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) (Y.-k. Kim & Chŏn, 2010; Y.-k. Kim et al.,



2009; C.-y. Yun, 2013). In this way, the LG-produced nation branding campaign ad illustrates an interwoven relation between the government and business.

The ad is also notable in terms of how it represented South Korea and the world and educated citizens on global etiquettes. It is based on a familiar theme of the encounter between the West and the East (Korea) in a witty way. The tradition and culture of Korea seemed on a par with those of the West in this face-to-face encounter. The ad gently evoked the participation and hosting of the G20 Summit as something for Korean citizens to be proud of. Thus, the appeal of the ad hinged on how it evoked the public of the developmental aspiration for the status of an advanced country.

The characters coming out of famous masterpiece paintings interact with each other in polite manners following globally-accepted etiquette. They also seem to exchange Korean greetings such as bowing for a couple of times, but the manners and expressions mostly follow the Western customs of politeness. Aired on Korean television networks, the public service ad apparently aims to educate the Korean public to learn a global (Western) way of being hospitable and polite, especially in preparation for the international event of the G20 Seoul Summit.

It is also worth pointing out that the famous paintings originated in Western Europe although the G20 encompassed various countries, not just Western European countries, but also the BRICs and other mid-to-large economies (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia). The “world” according to the ad was configured exclusively to the West, tailored to the developmental aspiration of South Korea. Reminding the aspiration, the ad

attempted to persuade the citizens to learn global etiquettes within the hierarchic imagination of South Korea and the world.

### **Digital media and citizen participation**

The PCNB adopted a wide variety of promotion and publicity campaigns, which notably involved citizen participation and the use of digital communications. Especially, The PCNB utilized various online and digital media platforms as a “cost-efficient” method of publicity and promotion (C.-i. Yun, 2010, pp. 120-121).

First of all, for the publicity of Korea’s positive image, the PCNB set up its own website (Koreabrand.net), blogs (at Naver.com and Daum.net), and other online channels (YouTube, twitter, Facebook, etc.) in multiple languages (PCNB, 2013a, p. 251).

More notably, the PCNB recruited internet users, especially college students, to produce online content that promoted Korea’s positive image. For instance, as part of the effort for “public diplomacy,” the PCNB operated “World Students in Korea” program from 2009, in which international students residing in Korea were selected to write blog posts on their own languages about various aspects of Korea on their own blogs (PCNB, 2013a, p. 247).

Later in 2010, the PCNB also launched the “Korea Brand Bloggers” program in which Korean web users (called as “Korea brand blog supporters” and later “Korea brand content reporters”) were recruited to publicize Korea’s various aspects on their own blogs and/or contribute to the PCNB publicity website (PCNB, 2013a, p. 264). The PCNB provided the bloggers or reporters with a small amount of writer’s fee as well as an access to various events and camps to experience Korean

culture and society such as visits to industrial facilities and historic places (PCNB, 2009d).

The PCNB also organized online contests and events in collaboration with major global or domestic commercial online services such as Flickr, YouTube, and Pandora, and encourage net users to participate in nation branding. For instance, in 2009, the PCNB launched the “Korea image making campaign,” in collaboration with Flickr.com, encouraging net users to upload images and photos positively representing Korea. The PCNB argued that the campaign successfully changed the search result of the keyword “Korea” on Flickr, reducing North Korea-related images from 72 percent to 39 percent (PCNB, 2009b).

For another example among many others, the PCNB held a series of “UCC” (user-created content) contests on the YouTube channel. Under the broad theme of “Experience Korea,” the PCNB asked domestic and international net users to upload their own video clips on the YouTube, describing “Digital Life in/with Korea,” “My Korean Food Recipe,” “My vacation in Korea,” “My G-20 Agenda,” “Hangul in the World,” and so on (PCNB, 2013a, p. 274).

Within the marketing and business circle, such ideas as “consumer participation marketing,” “customer participation marketing” and “consumer-business collaboration” emerged as a leading trend (Ku & Na, 2009). Especially the rise of digital media technologies was regarded as facilitating the “participatory” trend of marketing in the age of “marketing 3.0” (Kotler, Kartajaya, & Setiawan, 2010).



It is notable that the PCNB quickly picked up the buzzwords in the rising marketing trend, “participation” and “digital,” in the publicity and promotion for nation branding. The PCNB was able to adopt cutting-edge marketing techniques (aside from how successful they were), indebted to its organizational structure as a government-business collaborative body (C.-i. Yun, 2010, p. 127). Through these marketing techniques, the Council was able to boast that they induced citizens’ voluntary involvement and contribution to nation branding. In its comprehensive report in 2013, the PCNB included small details about the digital participation of citizens (about 70 pages out of 350 page-report) (PCNB, 2013a).

In the “participation marketing” campaign, the Council adopted business marketing tools to mobilize citizens for nation branding. The adoption of participation marketing illustrates the changing mode of citizen mobilization in government-led campaigns from the developmental mobilization of the past. Moreover, the PCNB conducted citizen participation marketing through digital media in a cost-effective way by passing the actual work of promotion on to the staff from business and to participating citizens and residing foreigners.

Branding mobilizes affective attachment and emotional loyalty of the consumer (Arvidsson, 2005). Nation branding appropriates citizen participation in a commercial way in the sense that the nationalist, patriotic passion is converted into collective loyalty to the nation brand.

The nation branding campaign through the participation marketing tools depended on the social conditions in which the “participants,” who were usually college students seeking jobs, were situated. A number of public institutions and

private organizations have offered idea contests and prize contests that usually involved digital media activities such as blogging and video production. Many young college students in South Korea have been eager to participate in these contests to add a line on their résumé and to increase their job opportunities (Y.-r. Kim, 2009; Ku & Na, 2009, p. 113). In this context, the participation marketing tools were in fact used to exploit digital, “free labor” of participants for commercial purpose in the guise of voluntary and active participation of the public (Arvidsson, 2005).

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I examined the public policies for nation branding, focusing on the policy activities by the PCNB and investigated the nature of nation branding in South Korea. The PCNB took the role of coordinating substantive policies that respective governmental departments and agencies executed and the role of communicating and publicizing the governmental public policies for nation branding. The public policies for nation branding were governed under the guidance of the principles of the government-business coordination and the participation of the citizens. Based on the examination so far, in the concluding section, I will discuss a few points about the nature and implications of the public policy for nation branding.

The public policy for nation branding needs to be understood in the sociopolitical context of the advance of neoliberalization and provides a clue to understand the post-developmental contingency of neoliberalization in South Korea. Neoliberalism, among other dimensions, could be conceptualized as a set of institutions and norms which put the whole society to serve on the imperative of

market competitiveness under the premise of globalization beyond one's control. In the mandate of neoliberalization, the state is asked to be revamped as a brand-state in the global market. The Lee Myung-bak government, led by a former CEO for a conglomerate, openly advocated neoliberal ideology by proclaiming business-friendly policies. He accelerated the process of neoliberalization through promoting outright deregulation, liberalization and privatization.

The PCNB was established as a governmental institution at presidential level, symbolizing a serious commitment by the Lee government to nation branding and a brand-state, which the business sector spearheaded by the news media and think tanks have demanded for years. The PCNB coordinated to reorganize and straighten out the existing public policy actions with regard to nation branding, which were taken care of by various governmental departments and agencies: including dispatching volunteers overseas, providing ODA, promoting Korean culture and Korean studies overseas, executing national image ads, providing supports to multicultural families, educating Korean tourists on global etiquettes, and so on.

These policy actions for nation branding aimed to promote and support Korean business overseas as well as attract foreign investment and tourists by providing a favorable socio-cultural climate. Nation branding seems to symbolize the transformation of the state toward a neoliberal governance that constructed the business-friendly space of the competitive "brand-state" in South Korea.

Considering that the policy actions listed above were in fact nothing completely new and already in operation by respective governmental departments and agencies, what really changed with the establishment of the PCNB was that they

were rebranded and paid more attention than before. In that sense, the main focus of the PCNB was on the publicity and promotion of governmental policies on nation branding and of the impending global event, the Seoul Summit of G20 in 2010. In terms of the aspect of publicity and promotion, the PCNB included in their work the development of the nation brand index, and the production of public service ads on global etiquettes, and the recruitment of college students, domestic and international, for the publicity of Korea through digital media.

It is notable that these publicity activities were highly dependent on the mobilization of big business such as Samsung (for the SERI-PCNB NBDO index), LG Group, and other *chaeböls* (for public service ads and digital publicity). However, the appearance of the mobilization of big business by the government may be at the same time the continued intervention by *chaeböls* into the state management and nation branding with their own stake. The PCNB in effect worked as if it was a publicity or advertising agency run by big business for the government in the name of the cooperation between the government and business. The PCNB highly depended on big business for financial and creative resources while big business pushed corporate claims in the nation branding campaign. The mobilization of big business was not through a forced pressure by the government, but through the sharing of interest in the name of cooperation.

The PCNB's publicity and promotion activities also reveal how they attempted to mobilize citizens for nation branding. In practice, the PCNB made its efforts for the international event, G20, and attempted to mobilize and educate citizens on global etiquettes for the event. It implies that the nation branding

campaign was more domestically oriented than globally conscious. In the attempt to mobilize citizens, the PCNB did not adopt developmental methods of coercion. It did not even use admonishing and didactic tone adopted by the nation branding campaign by the news media. Rather, the participatory events centered on a voluntary method of using digital media and the public campaign used advertising-styled persuasion. The nation branding campaign addressed individual citizens for voluntary participation in nation branding and aimed to produce the subject of “brand-citizens” with motivations for self-improvement and competitive personal branding in the neoliberal context.

Underlying the construction of neoliberal brand-citizens was the national imaginary of South Korea as an advanced country, standing side by side with the Western developed countries in the global stage in the G20 Summit. In particular, the public service ads, commissioned by the PCNB and produced by LG, projected the aspiration for the status of an advanced country by placing the Western and Korean paintings side by side. The campaign ads urged the citizens with the aspiration for an advanced country to follow the global standard and norm, symbolized in global etiquettes.

The PCNB’s public policy for nation branding, especially policy actions for the publicity and promotion, illustrates how the productions of the space of the neoliberal brand-state and the subject of the neoliberal brand-citizens was predicated on the post-developmental imaginary of the nation as standing in the rank of the advanced countries.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE “KOREA PUBLICITY” CAMPAIGN AND ITS DISCONTENT

A print ad, placed on the *New York Times* in March 12, 2014, caused a little scuffle in the public discursive space in South Korea. The ad (Figure 7) featured Shin-soo Choo (a.k.a. Ch'u Sin-su), a South Korea-born Major League Baseball player. Breaking 130-million-dollar deal with the Texas Rangers in 2013, he became a celebrity in South Korea and in Texas, but not necessarily elsewhere. In the ad, he is not in his usual baseball helmet and uniform which baseball fans are used to, but in a casual outfit without a baseball cap. In this way, it is not likely that he is recognized by the majority (especially, considering the ad is on the *New York Times*). Instead of holding a baseball bat, he is grabbing a dish full of food in his left hand and a pair of chopsticks in his right fingers. With a piece of meat between the chopsticks, he seems to suggest that readers try a certain kind of food. From the headline of the ad, "Bulgogi" with a question mark, it is highly likely that the food is *pulgogi (bulgogi)*, a Korean-style grilled dish made of beef marinated in sweet soy sauce.

# BULGOGI?

Hi, I'm Choo Shin-soo.  
I'm an outfielder for the  
Texas Rangers.  
Spring's here and I'm  
ready to play!  
And do you know  
what got me through  
training? Bulgogi.  
Try some at your favorite  
Korean restaurant.  
It's delicious!

A photograph of a man with dark, wavy hair, wearing a blue button-down shirt. He is smiling and looking towards the camera. He is holding a white plate with a serving of Bulgogi (marinated beef) in his left hand. In his right hand, he holds wooden chopsticks with a single piece of Bulgogi held between them. The background is a plain, light gray color.

[www.ForTheNextGeneration.com](http://www.ForTheNextGeneration.com)

**Figure 7: A Korean food ad titled “Bulgogi,” which appeared on the *New York Times*, March 12, 2014 (Image from the article, No, 2014).**

The next day, a Korean news agency *Newsis* favorably reported the appearance of the ad (No, 2014). The report relied almost exclusively on the press release package provided by Mr. Seo Kyoung-duk (Sŏ Kyŏng-dŏk) who had this ad run on the *New York Times*. In the report, which were widely reproduced across mainstream media in South Korea, Mr. Seo expressed his intention: “Mr. Choo, who has a lot of fans in the United States, came out as an advertising endorser. With him, I want to introduce *pulgogi* to New Yorkers in a more familiar way.” Donating his “talent” to the ad for free, Mr. Choo also commented, “I agree with the purpose of publicizing our Korean food to the world. As a Korean, I appeared on the ad to provide support.” The news report also featured three images — the original copy of the ad, the image of the page A8 of the *New York Times* where the ad was printed, and the photo of the two gentlemen.

For many South Koreans, the message of the ad seemed obvious. An ethnic Korean, who made a great success in the world’s best stage and won respect as a national pride by many South Koreans, was promoting a favorite Korean food *pulgogi* to the people of the world on the world’s prestigious newspaper. Associating Koreanness to many “bests” of the world, this ad definitely aimed to make South Koreans feel good about and be proud of their food, their country, and themselves. The appearance of the ad itself on the *New York Times* became a news item widely reported in most news media in South Korea.

It was a business as usual for the news media to widely and favorably report this kind of publicity stunt deployed by Mr. Seo and others. This publicity had been called “*kukka hongbo* 국가 홍보” (the “promotion of Korea,” or the “Korea



publicity”)<sup>46</sup> in South Korea, and it could be conceived more broadly of as part of the “public diplomacy” by non-government actors. The news media had been reporting Mr. Seo’s publicity stunt as a goodwill and patriotic act for years by then.

In the next few days, the situation changed sharply as critical remarks on the ad spread on the internet. It started with a few pieces of news reports or rather, blog postings by the US news media. Luis Clemens, editor for race and identity of *NPR*, followed the ad that he found “weird” and “disorienting” (Clemens, 2014). He wrote that he was not able to understand why the ad was advertising a generic Korean food rather than a specific brand or a restaurant, and followed the clues to make sense of the ad. In the process, he was led to the website, [ForTheNextGeneration.com](http://ForTheNextGeneration.com) only to find English phrases written obviously by a non-native speaker and a more confusing hotchpotch of South Korea-related information such as K-pop, Korean food, history, territory, and the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games. He was finally able to locate the ad in the context of a series of ad campaigns that promoted Korean food and culture that Mr. Seo had been running for several years. He also found that the ad was sponsored by Chicken Maru, a Korean fried chicken franchise, which was also a mystery to him.

The ad was also spotted by Jon Tayler of *Sports Illustrated*, who got interested in this ad because it featured a highly paid baseball player. In his online report, he called this ad “bizarre” (Tayler, 2014), suggesting its poor quality and

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<sup>46</sup> The phrase “*kukka hongbo* 국가 홍보” literally means “country-publicity” or “country-promotion.” In this study, I translate it into English as the “promotion of Korea” or the “Korea publicity.”

messy communication. A few days later, David Gianatasio of *Adweek* found this ad as “the year’s oddest celebrity endorsement” (Gianatasio, 2014).

These cynical remarks, in turn, drew serious attention in South Korea. These articles were deemed as significant news reports by the “influential news media of the United States” (McPherson, 2014) although they were as casual as personal blog postings by news reporters. Many news media as well as blogs and online community forums discussed these articles, and they added critiques in rather direct and heated languages than those suggestive articles. Some blogs and community board postings advocated the sincerity and patriotism of Mr. Seo despite shortcomings (for instance, K’urosurod (2014) and Kōlpidi (2014)). Yet many others joined the harsh criticism of his ad campaign for its narrow-sighted, nationalistic, self-centered, and unprofessional amateurism. Examples are found in the discussion forum on reddit.com (“Choo Shin-soo bulgogi advertising. What do you think about this ad?,” 2014), and the discussion that followed the online news article on huffingtonpost.kr (P. Kang, 2014).

Notably, the criticism raised by the Western news media reporters drew wider public attention in South Korea even though some domestic writers have already raised similar criticisms on the issues of the Korea publicity campaign by the non-state actors. Moreover, the effects of the criticism by the Western reporters published in the US media websites were amplified and resonated by writers and reporters for the domestic news media. Especially, the criticism was relayed by those writers with broader transnational experiences and cosmopolitan

perspectives -- an American residing in Korea, and Korean correspondents residing abroad.

For instance, Joe McPherson of *ZenKimchi*, a Korean food blog, criticized the nationalist blindness of the ad, the Korean media, and the public. He wrote in the online edition of *Chung'ang Ilbo*:

These ads are confusing and ridiculous to Americans. The main problem of the Korea publicity by Seo and other “brand experts” is that the target of the publicity is not foreigners. They want to say to Koreans, “We're doing this.” The Korean media would spotlight the Korea-related ads in *New York Times* or Times Square. An idiot can have an ad run on the *New York Times* if he has money. This kind of nationalism does not help the Korea publicity. If you are a true public relations expert, you need to thoroughly analyze the target and the market and calculate the investment effects and risks. One word can describe this kind of ad: embarrassment. As a foreigner who loves Korea, I do not understand why Korea continues to spend money to make such a campaign (McPherson, 2014).

Jane Han, New York correspondent of the *Korea Times*, an English-language newspaper, blamed the ad for making a Korean sports hero “laughingstock.” She called the ad a “PR catastrophe” (J. Han, 2014), failing to understand the PR barrier beyond confined cultural customs. Pak Chŏng-yŏn, reporter of *Chaeoedongp'osinmun* (the *Overseas Koreans Newspaper*), residing in Cambodia, wrote in *Ohmynews*, a leading online news media:

Mr. Seo's ads were made from Koreans' perspectives and lacked the consideration of foreigners who do not have sufficient understanding of Korean culture..... The Korea publicity, which started from the sense of cultural superiority and self-centered worldview, can risk a disgraceful calling of an underdeveloped country and generate the sneer from the international society (C.-y. Pak, 2014).

The controversy around the Korea publicity campaign by Mr. Seo suggests the extent to which publics were concerned about the international image of South

Korea seen from the external perspective in line with global standards. While the news media, celebrities, and the public had almost unanimously supported the Korea publicity activities and ad campaigns by Mr. Seo and the like, there were raised some questions and critiques against Mr. Seo's Korea publicity campaign for several years. However, with the Choo's *pulgogi* ad controversy, the perception of the Korea publicity campaign suddenly fell from "national pride" to a "disgrace" (C.-y. Pak, 2014) and "shame" (S.-d. Sin, 2014). The controversy around this ad campaign illustrates that the examination of the national image promotion should not be limited to the governmental public policy nor to the news media campaign for nation branding which I covered in the previous chapters.

In this chapter, I examine the public engagement with and the debate around the promotion of the nation brand and national image. Especially, I focus on an aspect of public diplomacy, performed by non-state organizations and individuals in the name of the "promotion of Korea" or the "Korea publicity."

First, I examine how non-state actors deployed the Korea publicity campaign, the public engagement with the nation image and brand promotion. The Korea publicity campaign emerged as nationalistic responses to the regional politics in East Asia in the context of increasing global exchanges and technological availability. Since the late 2000s, in response to governmental policy initiatives, the campaign has concentrated on the promotion of Korean food. In this discussion, I examine the nature of the public engagement with nation branding and how it articulated the collective desire for the international recognition of the excellence and legitimacy of South Korea by the world.

Next, I examine the public debate and critiques around the Korea publicity campaign. The critiques pointed out the problem of the campaign in terms of its excessive nationalism and the lack of professionalism and expertise in advertising and public relations and the mismanagement of communication messages and methods. They suggested that a more effective publicity should focus more closely on the target audience of the world, rather than asserting its own cultural legitimacy and supremacy. The critiques further suggested that the publicity should follow adequate universal cultural codes and professional protocols in line with the global standard.

Lastly, in the concluding section, I discuss the Korea publicity and its criticism within wider public discourse toward the advanced nation. I discuss how the Korea publicity campaign and its criticism were differently predicated on the imagination of Korea as an “advanced” nation, recognized and respected by the outside world. The Korea publicity campaign imagined that being advanced should be recognized by the West. The critics were drawn to the imagination of an advanced nation as embodying global standards and proper business codes.

### **The non-state actors for the Korea publicity**

Since the early-mid 2000s, the discourses of nation branding and national prestige have become prevalent in South Korea. Under the Lee Myung-bak government (2008-2012), nation branding was instituted with the establishment of the PCNB, and it became a public policy priority. Nation branding and national prestige became a discursive framework for public policy against which other major public policies were legitimized. Indeed, side by side with the public policy drive, the

ideas of nation branding and national prestige became prominent in the public discursive space as well.

In this broad public policy setting for nation branding and national prestige, NGOs and individuals, independent of the government, also exerted voluntary public diplomacy efforts. In fact, the public diplomacy by non-state actors or the non-governmental effort for the Korea publicity had a longer history: the campaign for providing (correct) information about (wrongly known) Korea to the world had developed before, and independently from, the government campaigns for nation branding by the Lee government.

The non-governmental campaign for the Korea publicity emerged as voluntary individual and civic activism, triggered by the regional politics in East Asia. Around the year 2000, conflicts over historical and territorial issues deteriorated between Korea and Japan as the Japanese government attempted to revise history textbooks in order to glorify the past imperialist Japan, denied apology and compensation over “comfort women” issue, and claimed sovereignty over Tokto (Dokdo) islets (called Takeshima in Japan). Japan and Korea also competed over the name of the sea between them (the Sea of Japan or East Sea) in the international stage (Bong, 2013). Moreover, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences promoted the “Northeast Project,” which included an attempt to incorporate the ancient kingdom of Koguryō (Goguryo) in Northeast Asia exclusively into Chinese history (Gries, 2005). The Korean government responded to these provocations by Japan and China on the history and territories through diplomatic and policy measures, but the nationalist sentiment of anger and

resentment grew among Korean publics. It was in this atmosphere in the early 2000s that voluntary individuals and civic activists intervened in these issues. Most notable among them who engaged with the publicity activities were the VANK and Mr. Seo Kyung-deok.

The Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK) was founded in 1999 by Mr. Pak Ki-t'ae (Park Ki-tae) as an online-based collaborative network of volunteers (prkorea.com). The VANK claims to have up to 75,000 members, who are called volunteer "cyber-diplomats" (T. a.-ŭ. Song, 2015, p. 212). It has carried out a campaign to find out and correct "errors" in a wide variety of Korea-related information in textbooks, libraries, maps, and websites (Wikipedia, the World Factbook by the CIA and so on) around the world. For instance, they sent letters to those who were in charge of those documents and records and pressured to change the names "Takeshima" or "Liancourt Rocks" to "Tokto" and to change the name of the "Sea of Japan" to "East Sea." Notably, a majority of the VANK members were composed of middle to high school students, who were eager to use "collective intelligence" to locate erroneous information on the Internet all over the world (T. a.-ŭ. Song, 2015).

Mr. Seo earned considerable media and public attention by conducting a public service ad campaign on famous newspapers and billboards. Most notably, he had a series of full-page opinion ads concerning the Tokto issue placed in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Wall Street Journal* since 2008. He also had a video-format advertisement run on the electronic billboard in Times Square on March 1, 2010, the anniversary of the March 1st Movement against the Japanese

occupation in 1919 (I.-s. Kang, 2010). Financially sponsored among others by a popular music singer, Kim Chang-hun, famous for his generous donations for cause, these ads affirmed that Tokto belonged to South Korea, not Japan (C.-h. Kim, 2010). These ads refuted Japan's territorial claim for Tokto ("Do You Know" ad in 2008)(C. a.-h. No, 2008), blamed the "error" (sic) of the newspaper for using the name "Sea of Japan" instead of "East Sea" ("Error in NYT" ad in 2009) (No, 2009b) (Figure 8), and promoted South Korea and Tokto as tourist attractions. The 2012 Tokto ad, sponsored by Gmarket<sup>1</sup> (S.-h. Pak, 2012), argued for Tokto being South Korean territory, likening to Sicily being Italian territory and Hawaii being American (Figure 9).




Figure 8 "Do You Know?" ad in 2008 and "Error in NYT" ad in 2009 (Images from the articles, C. a.-h. No, 2008; No, 2009b, respectively)





**Figure 9: "Visit Dokdo" ad in Times Square in 2010 (image from I.-s. Kang, 2010) and "Connect" ad on the NYT on March 1, 2012 (C.-h. Chŏn, 2012)**

Along with the historical and territorial issues in Northeast Asia, Mr. Seo turned to promoting Korean food in his ad campaign in the late 2000s, by the time the South Korean government took the promotion of Korean cuisine as one of the major public policy agenda. Especially, in relation to the public policy effort for nation branding, the government launched the Korea Food Foundation (KFF) and pushed the drive for the global promotion of Korean cuisine (한식 세계화 추진 *hansik segyehwa ch'ujin*). In the context of the rise of nation branding, the project of Korean food promotion was regarded as contributing to national economic wealth

and national pride. Thus, the project was widely supported by the news media and drew attention from the general public.

The governmental campaign for the promotion of Korean food received a positive response among publics as it was regarded as enhancing national pride and national image. It was regarded as an apolitical, national issue that transcended partisan interests. In the public opinion survey by Korea Research in 2009-2010, 92 percent of the respondents agreed on the necessity of the global promotion of *hansik* (H.-c. ō. Yi, 2014). Around the year 2010 when the nation branding campaign was at its height, it was regarded as a great national cause to spread good images and information of Korea across the world. Deeply embedded in the developmental as well as neoliberal imperatives, the best way to deliver it passed as commercialization and industrialization.

Mr. Seo's ad campaign found extra boost when he was featured in the most popular television show in South Korea at that time, *Muhandojŏn (Infinite Challenge)* on Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). The reality-television-inspired show set various challenging goals for the show members to competitively but comically accomplish or to work out together. In 2009, the show set the goal of promoting Korean food and received sponsorship from the MoFAT and the Korean Food Foundation (Chŏngch'aekkonggam, 2011). The show invited Mr. Seo for the consultation of their tasks. Over a few episodes, the show followed how the show members along with Mr. Seo managed to conceive and produce a print ad to promote *pibimpap*. They finally had the ad published on the *New York Times*, in A23, December 21, 2009. Titled "how about bibimbap for lunch?," the ad featured a

picture of *pibimbap* garnished with egg and various colorful vegetables. Then it listed 17 Korean restaurants located in Koreatown on 32<sup>nd</sup> street in Manhattan (Figure 10).

The next year, the show members made efforts to produce a video ad on the outdoor billboards at Times Square. It incorporated a variety of Korean traditional and modern cultural elements (*samulnori* performance, *puch'aech'um* dance, *t'alch'um* dance, *t'aekwondo*, and a percussion performance, *Nanta*) to give shape to Korean food, *pibimpap*. The 30-second ad ended with the phrase, “the taste of harmony, bibimbap,” epitomizing the concept of the ad, and then the phrase “the taste of Korea,” with the shot of the show members pausing in a funny gesture (Figure 11). The ad was run every 30 minutes until the end of the year, totally about 500 times. This ad was directed by Mr. Ch'a Ŭn-taek (Cha Eun-taek), one of the most prominent music video and ad directors in South Korea. Mr. Seo also participated in the production as a Korea publicity expert. It featured 200 dance major students, exhibiting various traditional Korean dances and performances.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> The video ad is available to watch on the official YouTube channel of the KFF, “the Taste of Korea” (The Taste of Korea, 2010).

How about

# BIBIMBAP

for lunch today?

Bibimbap is a dish mixed of cooked rice with various vegetables, beef, garnishes and fried red pepper paste. It is said that this dish came from the customers of memorial service and rural villages. This dish is very convenient to provide, just mixing of cooked rice with various vegetables, namul and red pepper paste together.



Korean Restaurants Information in Manhattan

Downtown	Midtown	Uptown
Cho Ga / 212-596-5846 Do Hee / 212-414-3284 Doa Sun / 212-477-9506 Gena / 212-412-7101 Kori / 212-534-0908 Lotus Korean Cuisine / 212-565-0090 Seomanso / 212-228-1224 Woo Lee Dae / 212-525-8200	Bami / 212-582-4466 Gohm Mi Oak Restaurant / 212-899-4113 Hanbat Restaurant / 212-679-5586 Hwang / 212-736-0089 KumGangJin / 212-967-0909 Man Do Bar / 212-279-3075 New York KomJang House / 212-947-8482 Seoul Garden / 212-736-9002	ME / 212-666-7603  When you go around 32nd street between 5th and 6th, you can also taste all the Korean delicacy at Korean Town.

Figure 10: "Bibimbap" ad on the *New York Times* (Image from the article, Hyön-jun Kim, 2010)



Figure 11: Screenshots of “Taste of harmony, bibimbap” ad (Images captured from The Taste of Korea, 2010).



These ads were almost unanimously praised by the news media as well as in blogs, online forums, and social media for creatively showing the excellency and diversity of Korean food and culture. For instance, a blogger, specialized in advertising, praised the colorful and dynamic video quality of the ad and expressed a patriotic feeling in the blog posting titled, “Extraordinary creativity” (Kwanggoin, 2014). For another, *Medius*, an online news media, published a blog-style article, “Why is *Muhandojön’s pibimpap* ad great?,” which praised the artistic achievement and the patriotic implication of the ad:

The *pibimpap* video ad, which was created with pure patriotism and enthusiasm, with help by civil experts, genuinely expresses a thirst and affection for our own thing. Hundreds of participants played their own roles and put together to express the message of harmony hidden in *pibimpap*, which seemed to bring us back together in the time when we are scattered like sand (Ch’aimi, 2010).

The popularity of and the attention to the video ad is illustrated by the fact that many Koreans residing in or visiting the Manhattan area bothered to visit Times Square to see this ad on the electronic billboard in person. Many of them took photos and videos on their own of the billboard running the ad,<sup>48</sup> and they posted them on their own blogs, community forums, and on their YouTube channel. Typically, they added to the photos and videos how they felt patriotic and proud of their country when they visited the venue. For instance, Hō Su-jin, a member of “Young Hyundai Global Reporters,” a community group of college student interns

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<sup>48</sup> These media cultural practices of making use of digital technologies and networks are called “*chiktchik* 찍찍” and “*chikk’aem* 찍캠” in South Korea, which were the abbreviation of “*chikchōp tchigŭn sajin*” (photo taken in person) and “*chikchōp tchigŭn yōngsang*” (video taken in person) respectively.

managed by Hyundai Motors, visited Times Square and wrote a blog posting of the photos of Korea- and Hyundai-related advertisements, including the *pibimpap* video ad (S.-j. Hō, 2010). Rokimsa, a power blogger writing its everyday life in New York, visited Times Square, waited for 30 minutes to watch the *pibimpap* ad, and posted photos of its own taken with pride (Rokimsa, 2010).<sup>49</sup>

In 2013, Mr. Seo followed up to have a series of print ads on Korean food placed in the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. These ads promoted representative Korean cuisines such as *makkoli* (*makgeolli*), *pibimbap* (*bibimbap*), and *kimch'i* (*kimchi*) that were among those items chosen for the global promotion of Korean food by the government. These ads featured television and film celebrities such as Song Il-guk, Yi Yōng-ae, and Kim Yun-jin, who were born in South Korea but more or less gained international fame.<sup>50</sup> They willingly appeared in the ads free of charge for the cause (Figure 12).

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<sup>49</sup> On YouTube, there are many video clips of the *pibimpap* ad in Times Square. They are also taken and uploaded on their own by Koreans who resided in or visited New York at the time the video ad was running on the billboard. For instance, cocoaya777 (<https://youtu.be/VmiNLGIs0nA>), mintmochaa (<https://youtu.be/aHuj1rAGlos>), jy3186 (<https://youtu.be/nFlgRjqatas>), Yujin Bae (<https://youtu.be/hyBZZO8fVGw>), and so on.

<sup>50</sup> Song Il-guk (a.k.a. Song Il-gook or Song Il-kook) is a South Korean actor who earned fame when he played the leading role in the Korean historical serial drama *Jumong*, televised on MBC in 2006.

Yi Yōng-ae (a.k.a. Lee Young-ae) is a South Korean actress who emerged as one of the most famous *Hallyu* (Korean Wave) stars when she played the leading role in the enormously successful Korean historical serial drama *Tae Chang-gŭm* (or *Dae Jang Geum*), televised on MBC in 2003-2004 and exported to gain popularity in East Asia and Middle East afterwards.

Kim Yun-jin (aka Kim Yunjin) is a South Korea-born, American actress, who earned fame for her role on the American television series *Lost*, televised on NBC in 2004-2010.



**Figure 12: "Bibimbap" ad featuring Yi Yŏng-ae, shown side by side with the front page of the New York Times in 2013 (Image from the article "Yi Yŏng-ae, nyuyokt'aimsŭ pibimbap kwanggoe 'chaenŭnggibu' [Yi Yŏng-ae, 'Talent Donation' in New York Times bibimbap advertisement]," 2013)**

Riding on the successful and acclaimed ad campaign, Mr. Seo brought the Korean food ads to other places around the world such as Pataya (Thailand) (J.-y. Kim, 2013), Shanghai (China), Tashkent (Uzbek), Seoul (South Korea) and so on (No, 2013; S.-j. Yu, 2013) (Figure 13). The video ad was also aired overseas via Arirang TV, an English-language broadcasting run by the South Korean government (Han-ju Kim, 2010).





**Figure 13: Mr. Seo pausing in front of "Bibimbap?" ad featuring Yi Yǒng-ae on the billboard in Qipulu, Shanghai, 2013 (Image from the article, No, 2013)**

### **The public support for the Korea publicity**

The non-state actors such as VANK and Mr. Seo were widely supported and praised by the mainstream media as well as by publics. Through their prominent activities, they also gained a wide popular participation and sponsorship, as well as the financial support by the government. When the Lee government tried to slash the budget to support the VANK, it was harshly criticized by the media and had to

restore it. The news media and publics often contrasted the government's behavior with the donation by a popular singer Kim Chang-hun (a.k.a. Kim Jang-hoon), who had generously supported the VANK and Mr. Seo (Y.-h. Ch'oe, 2008). Mr. Seo's campaign ads for promoting Korea and Korean food gained wide media and public attention and found broad support and praise. The *pulgogi* ad featuring Mr. Choo was a follow-up of the series of ads with Korean celebrities endorsing Korean food.

To understand the positive response to and favorable support from publics for the campaign, two major conditions should be considered which characterize the non-state activities for the promotion of Korea.

On the one hand, the non-governmental promotion of Korea resorted to nationalist sentiment, stimulated by regional conflicts in East Asia such as history textbooks, "comfort women" and territorial disputes in the 2000s. It also reflected an emerging sense of national pride and self-confidence expressed in the 2002 World Cup event.

The campaign itself often became a focus of heated exchange in the international politics in the region. For instance, the *pibimbap* print ad in 2009 became an object of a quarrel with the provocation by a Japanese journalist, Kuroda Katsuhiko. Having resided in Seoul over 30 years working for the right-wing *Sankei Shimbun* and written many books on Korea including Korean food, he caused a little stir by making a remark with regard to the *pibimbap* ad. In his column for *Sankei Shimbun* on December 26, 2009, the far-right journalist wrote that the food was likened to "lamb head, dog meat" because it looked colorful and beautiful when set, but looked strange and squashy when mixed up to eat. He thus showed skepticism

about the global success of the food (H.-s. Kim, 2009). The four-character Chinese idiom, “lamb head, dog meat” (*yangduguyuk*, read in Korean), is used for the case of exaggerated packaging and even hypocrisy, a similar expression to “crying out wine and selling vinegar.” When his column was reported in the Korean news media, many Koreans took his remark as disregarding Korean food and insulting Korean identity. His former remarks were freshly recalled which referred to Tokto as “symbol of patriotism” and Japanese comfort women as “chose [to be one] out of poverty” (“Chuhan il öllonin hansik hŭmjimnaegi [Japanese journalist resident in Korea Scratching Korean food],” 2009). Kim T’ae-ho, program director of the *Muhandojŏn* show stung back at him, blaming his “ignorance” (No, 2009a). The controversy escalated as Kuroda claimed in his next column that he had received a call to threaten to kill him (T.-g. Song, 2010).

The non-governmental campaign for the Korea publicity helped and was helped by this rising nationalist sentiment in the context of East Asian geopolitics (Takahara, 2007). The governments occasionally attempted to utilize the nationalist sentiment among publics, but they were usually cautious and even reluctant to resort to popular nationalism in the matter of formal diplomacy. The nationalist public often regarded the official line of diplomacy, the so-called “quiet diplomacy”<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> “Quiet diplomacy” in South Korean context refers to the diplomatic policy line in which keeping a low profile and exerting back channels and personal contacts is regarded as the best method of the management and the resolution of international conflicts. It especially refers to the official diplomatic line concerning the Tokto issue. As South Korea maintains the “substantial ownership and effective control” of the islets, it argues, it is South Korea’s best interest not to respond to the provocations by Japan. However, quiet diplomacy was often caught up in controversies. For instance, in 2006, when Japan attempted to conduct maritime

by the government, as passive and half-hearted. Instead, the public praised the non-governmental efforts for the Korea publicity by the VANK and Mr. Seo and contrasted them with the official quiet diplomacy.

On the other hand, the changing media environment provided a fertile soil for “net nationalism” in East Asia (Takahara, 2007). Since the early 2000s, news articles have been consumed more on the online platform than on paper. Moreover, online news service was monopolized by *Naver*, a monopoly operator for online search engine and portal service.<sup>52</sup> As most news providers (newspapers, broadcasters, and internet news) depended on the *Naver News* service by *Naver* for web traffic and online revenue, they competed to draw attention with soft and “tabloid” news items which could induce more “clicks” (C.-g. Yi, 2007). The subordination of news to *Naver* and the “ghettoization of journalism” exacerbated around 2010 (W.-g. Kim et al., 2013).

The news featuring the Korea publicity were suitable news items for the news providers to exploit in this media environment as their appeal to nationalist sentiment and their potential for light consumption. Many news articles of the Korea

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surveys around Tokto waters, the liberal Roh government seriously reexamined the diplomatic line (Ch’a, 2006). A public opinion survey revealed that 93 percent of the respondents agreed to quit the quiet diplomacy line (S.-g. Im, 2006). The government was not consistent with the Tokto issue and caused a stir when Lee Myung-bak visited the islets in 2012 for the first time as South Korean president (M.-k. Kim, 2012).

<sup>52</sup> *Naver* has enjoyed an absolute market monopoly position since the early 2000s. By 2012, *Naver* had a share of 72 percent in the search engine market. South Korean internet users used 45 pages on *Naver* when they did 55 pages elsewhere. South Koreans spent 36 percent of internet time on *Naver* (C.-h. Yi, 2012). Most news consumption on the web has been on and through *Naver*. *Naver News* service explained 40 percent of online news circulation by 2007 (S.-m. Yi, 2007).

publicity were exploited by the news media. Numerous online news services reproduced and duplicated news, and the legacy news media (newspapers) even produced news solely for consumption on the web, not meant for print publication.

The non-governmental activities for the Korean publicity, especially by Mr. Seo, took advantage of this changing media environment. At first glance, their activities proclaiming “civilian diplomacy” seemed to target international audiences, but in fact centered on the domestic news media and audiences at least in equal measure. His press kit included the original ad materials accompanied by other materials such as actual photos of the newspapers and scenes (see figures 12 and 13). His story was well circulated on the web, not necessarily in print, first by the news wires (such as *Yŏnhap News* and *Newsis*) which were supplied the press kit by Mr. Seo, then by numerous news media which duplicated and reproduced the original stories by the news wires, and then by numerous bloggers and online forums.

### **Controversies over the Korea publicity**

While the promotion of Korea by the non-state actors drew positive responses from the news media and publics in general, it also caused controversies and sparked criticism, cynicism and ridicule. The VANK’s internet activism was rarely put to criticism by the news media and publics perhaps because it was mostly perceived as pure and just activism by righteous youth. On the contrary, Mr. Seo’s ad campaign was frequently put under fire: especially a series of Tokto ads (Figures 8 and 9), and a series of Korean food ads (Figures 10-13).

In this section, I examine how publics criticized Mr. Seo's ad campaign for the Korea publicity. I identify two different modes of criticism: the one is the criticism of his excessive nationalism and the other of his lack of professionalism in public diplomacy, advertising and public relations.

For the examination of the former, the criticism of excessive nationalism, I looked into the remarks generated and circulated in two of the largest online subculture communities, DC Inside and Ilbe. They generated satirical and cynical remarks which ridiculed and criticized Mr. Seo's excessive nationalism. Moreover, subcultural criticism often went beyond the online subculture communities and spread widely across the news media and among publics. Their neologism, witty remarks, and sharp satire were widely shared and circulated, reflecting subcultural responses to the contemporary social issues in South Korea

For the examination of the latter, the criticism of the lack of professionalism in public diplomacy, advertising and public relations, I focused on the op-ed columns by news reporters and experts for the mainstream news media. Focusing on expert opinions in this matter does not mean that they did not criticize excessive and emotional nationalism. Rather, the criticism of excessive nationalism underlies the critical remarks by journalists and experts on Mr. Seo's "unprofessional" practices of public relations and public diplomacy.

These two aspects are closely related and cannot be separated in a clear-cut way. The distinction between the two aspects of criticism has an analytic purpose. They are followed by a more comprehensive discussion. Put together, the examination of the criticisms enables to locate Mr. Seo and the controversies around

his campaign in a wider context of the discourses and imaginations of the state and the nation in South Korea.

### **Criticism of excessive nationalism**

In the subcultural game of playfulness, Mr. Seo and his campaign for the promotion of Korea was not just put into criticism but became an object of ridicule and mockery and provided rich materials for internet memes, jokes and buzzwords.

His ad campaign was mentioned for the first time in 2008 when the “Do You Know” Tokto ad (Figure 8, left) was published in the NYT. At the time, a DC Inside user, Misuda, posted a clipping of a news report on his campaign on the sub-community imageboard without any specific criticism or mockery.<sup>53</sup> Consecutive Tokto-related ads, including the “Visit Dokdo” ad in 2010 (Figure 9, left), drew mixed responses with some advocating and others being suspicious of the effect and hidden intention. On the one hand, for instance, a DC Inside user identified !!!!! commented on a television talk show featuring Mr. Seo positively as “a meaningful program as the National Liberation day is approaching.”<sup>54</sup> Another user, identified as Tokto, gave respect to Mr. Seo for his effort to advertise the Tokto issue by contrasting it with the neglect of the issue by the National Assembly.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, citing an expert opinion critical of Mr. Seo’s campaign on the Tokto issue, a DC

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<sup>53</sup> Misuda (2008, July 10). Kim Chang-hun, nyuyokt'aimjŭe 'toktonŭn han'gukttang' chŏnmyŏn kwanggo sirŏ [Kim Chang-hun carries a full-page advertisement in the New York Times, “Tokto is Korean terrority”]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=suda&no=507329>

<sup>54</sup> !!!!! (2008, August 10). Murŭp'p'aktosa miribogi [Previewing a knee-jerkdosa]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=kanghodong&no=21502>

<sup>55</sup> Tokto (2008, August 12). Sŏgyŏngdŏgiran min'ganinŭn [A civilian Sŏ]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=stock&no=4626328>

Inside user Tchoyöjunŭnhyöna ridiculed him of misrepresenting Tokto for a tourist destination. The user continued to denounce Mr. Seo as “an exemplar of stupid patriotism.”<sup>56</sup> Other postings in 2011 blamed Mr. Seo for his commercial intention behind the Tokto ads,<sup>57</sup> and called his activities as a “selling patriotism.”<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile, “Bibimbap” ads produced by the *Muhandojön* team in collaboration with Mr. Seo in 2010 (Figures 11 and 12) have generally been acclaimed within online subculture communities, not quite different from the responses from the blogosphere. One DC Inside posting, written by the user Ann, titled “Yes, that’s the way to promote Korea,” praised the team and Mr. Seo for exerting efforts to promote Korean culture.<sup>59</sup> Another DC Inside user Ttugimcyu showed an expectation about the ad and a wish to see the ad in Times Square in person.<sup>60</sup> Yet another posting by Kŭraesö praised the ad for its colorfulness and quality.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Tchoyöjunŭnhyöna (2010, August 11). Toktogwanggo, punjaengjiyögüro pich'ige hanŭn yökhyogwaman [Tokto advertisement, only adverse effect that makes it appear as conflict zone]. Retrieved from [https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=etc\\_program&no=1465984](https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=etc_program&no=1465984)

<sup>57</sup> Rhrh (2011, April 17). Kim Chang-hunül kkoktugaksiro iyonghanŭn Sö Kyöngdök [Seo Kyung-duk, who uses Kim Jang-hoon as a puppet]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=499966>

<sup>58</sup> Balkiri (2011, August 12). Toktoga kukchejaep'ansoe kal kyönguüi kaep'ibonŭn saram [When Tokto goes on to the International Court]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=history&no=542096>

<sup>59</sup> Ann (2010, December 8). Kŭrae, irön'göl haeya chintcha taehanmin'gugül allinŭn'göji [Yes, that’s the way to promote Korea]. Retrieved from [https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=news\\_new&no=55070](https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=news_new&no=55070)

<sup>60</sup> Ttugimcyu (2010, November 2). Mudo hansikhongbo kwanggo tchingnŭndago ham [Mudo Korean Food Promotion Advertisement]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=yjs&no=64896>

<sup>61</sup> Kŭraesö (2010, November 26). Urinara pibimpap kwanggo [Korean pibimpap advertisement]. Retrieved from <https://gall.dcinside.com/board/view/?id=Gdragon&no=121421>



Then, it was the “Bulgogi” ad featuring Shin-soo Choo in 2014 (Figure 7) that led to an explosion of criticism of excessive nationalism and patriotism in the online subcultures, especially in Ilbe community. An Ilbe posting by P'üroyagup'aeninde cited the blog posting by the *NPR* reporter, mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, and asked, “Is it exposing the bottom? I’ve seen it since the *pibimpap* ad came out,” and commented, “It is embarrassing that it seems to expose [our psychological] complex.”<sup>62</sup> A comment to this posting lashed, “Stop *kukppong* marketing!”<sup>63</sup><sup>64</sup> A user Hyeryöng'i showed a feeling of hatred toward Mr. Seo and ridiculed, “[He] thinks he is such a great patriot.”<sup>65</sup> An agreeing comment mentioned, “Now, it is funny just to see another “Do you know,” hahaha,”<sup>66</sup> and another comment ridiculed by simply asking, “*Pulgogi? Kimchi? Pibimpap? Do you know?*”<sup>67</sup> A user Paprdoxx commented, guessing the hidden intention, “I don’t think the ad was made for Americans to see.”<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> P'üroyagup'aeninde (2014, March 18). Sögyöngdök kyosu tüdiö padak türönanün'gönya? ch'amna pibimbap kwanggohal ttaebut'ö arabwatta. [Is it revealing the bottom? I’ve seen it since the *pibimpap* ad came out]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506>

<sup>63</sup> Kukhoeüiwönhuboja (2014, March 18). [Comment to the posting]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/3177428506>

<sup>64</sup> *Kukppoing* marketing designates a hidden marketing plot which aims to appeal to excessive and emotional nationalism and patriotism. More discussions of *kukppoing* follow.

<sup>65</sup> Hyeryöng'i (2014, March 24). Kkolbogi sirün saekkiriyugap.jpg [A fella whose face I don’t want to see]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405>

<sup>66</sup> Kanadaramabababa (2014, March 25). [Comment to the posting]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405>

<sup>67</sup> Praengküraempadü (2014, March 26). [Comment to the posting]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/3213276405>

<sup>68</sup> Papardoxx (2014, June 15). Sasilsang Ch'ushinsu anti [Practically dismissing Ch'u]. Retrieved from <http://www.ilbe.com/view/6007957435>

To make sense of the seemingly sudden rise of criticism of Mr. Seo's ad campaign, it is necessary to put it in the context of a wider rhetorical terrain in the online subcultures. The ridicule and mockery of excessive nationalism had become one of the popular plays widespread among subcultures since the early 2010s. It was partly a reaction to thriving nationalism on the internet, which greatly helped to boost Mr. Seo's campaign. The online subcultures ridiculed and mocked excessive nationalism as well as its commercial exploitation by the news media and corporations. These online subculture communities coined playful, tongue-in-cheek, and to-the-point neologisms such as "*kukppong* 국뽕," "*du yu no* 두 유 노 do you know," and "*haeoebanŭng* 해외 반응 overseas reactions," and widely circulated as internet memes beyond the subcultures.

The buzzword *kukppong* is known to be a combined word of *kuk* (which means the nation) and *ppong* (short for "*hiroppoing*," Japanese/Korean slang for methamphetamine). Thus, *kukppong* designates the behaviors intoxicated with excessive emotional nationalism and patriotism. The term became a widely circulating buzzword since the early 2010s,<sup>69</sup> mocking excessive nationalism and narcissistic celebration of the grandeur and greatness of the nation of Korea. The criticism of *kukppong* culminated in January 2014 with the commercial, which E1, LPG energy company, launched ahead of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The television commercial for the subsidiary company of the SK conglomerate featured

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<sup>69</sup> It is not easy to pin down exactly when the term *kukppoing* was first used among subcultures, but the item for *kukppong* appeared in *Namuwiki* as early as 2008 ("Kukppong (r1 edition)," 2008).

Yuna Kim, the world champion of figure skating from South Korea. The punchline of the commercial, “You are not Kim Yuna, you are the Great Nation of Korea,” became controversial. The commercial was blamed as “*kukppoing* marketing” for resorting to “forced patriotism” with commercial intention behind (S.-y. Pak, 2014). Criticism around this commercial reflected the changing attitude of publics, appreciating individual achievement and distancing from excessive nationalism. Amidst torrential criticism, the company had to shut down the commercial.

The term began to be in great circulation in 2012 when it was used to mock the behaviors of news reporters who excessively and obsessively attached to South Korean singer Psy of globally viral hit song “Gangnam Style” (H.-p. y. Kim, 2014). The term was used in combination with other related cynical neologisms and internet memes such as “*du yu no*” and “*haeoebanŭng*.”

The phrase “*du yu no*”<sup>70</sup> became a famous internet meme for sarcastically mocking the obsessive pursuit of recognition from foreigners, especially from the advanced Western countries. It became widespread when a video clip went viral around 2013, which featured an exchange between a South Korean reporter and the spokesperson of the US State Department. During the US State Department briefing on North Korea’s missile tests in October 2012, a South Korean news reporter from *Yŏnhap News* asked the spokesperson, “I’m wondering if you know a Korean singer

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<sup>70</sup> When in use for internet meme, the phrase “*두 유 노*” (read as “*du yu no*”), a Korean transliteration, was usually used rather than the corresponding English phrase “do you know.” The Korean transliteration might reveal that this phrase was uttered by Koreans in a didactic and awkward way and carry the implication of mockery (“*Du yu no [Do You know]*,” n.d.).

Psy and his song “Gangnam Style.” *Do you Know?*” [emphasis added]. While other reports were laughing in a grin, she answered, “No, but I bet you my daughter does. She loves Korean pop”<sup>71</sup> (H.-p. y. Kim, 2014). Korean journalists continued to ask the same question “*Do you know Gangnam Style?*” to Hollywood actor Matt Damon and producer Quincy Jones and so on when they visited South Korea in 2013. The journalists’ behavior of unilaterally demanding recognition of Korea were enormously blamed among and beyond the subculture communities. Since then, the phrase “*du yu no*” generated a number of internet memes, flexibly combined with a series of South Korean celebrities and cultures (such as Psy, Yuna Kim, baseball players Hyunjin Ryu and Shinsoo Choo, Samsung Galaxy smartphones, Korean food such as *kimchi*, *pibimbap*, and *pulgogi*, K-pop girl group Girls’ Generation, and so on).

It is hard to miss that Mr. Seo is one of the firsts who began to use the phrase “Do You Know” in his ad for publicizing the South Korean ownership of Tokto islets on the full-page of the *New York Times* as early as 2008 (Figure 8, left). The ad was rediscovered and retroactively ridiculed.

“*Haeoebanŭng* 해외반응” literally means the reactions from overseas on Korea-related issues and events (“*Haeoebanŭng* [Overseas reactions],” n.d.). This term came into currency at the time of the launching of the websites which dedicated to providing the translation of overseas reactions. These websites translated news and magazine articles, but, more importantly, community boards and social media comments concerning Korea-related issues and events. These

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<sup>71</sup> The video clip is available on YouTube: <https://youtu.be/3qNx3nGySzg>, last accessed October 13, 2018.

websites such as *gasengi.com* (2010 to present) and *gesomoon.com* (2007 to 2017) thrived especially when there were international sports events such as the World Cup, the Olympics, and the WBC (World Baseball Classic) by providing immediate translation of the comments from communities and social media from China, Japan, the US and so on.<sup>72</sup>

The phrase *haeoebanŭng* is plain and simple and does not imply criticism or derision in itself, but significant is the fact that it was clearly recognized as a “problem” and shared as a buzzword within online subculture communities. The phrases *haeoebanŭng* and *du yu no* illustrate how subcultures and increasingly publics realized the overly consciousness of others’ gaze as problems and became critical of obsessive demands for overseas recognition.

Put together, these neologisms such as *kukppong*, *du yu no*, and *haeoebanŭng* suggest how the promotion of Korea by the government, the news media, and non-state actors drew positive attention and support as well as increasingly negative attention and criticism. The criticism of Mr. Seo’s excessive nationalism in his campaign for the Korea publicity can be well understood in the context of subcultural rhetorics such as *kukppong*, *du yu no*, and *haeoebanŭng*. The “Bulgogi” ad featuring Mr. Choo happened to come out in March 2014 at the peak of such criticism. Within the subculture communities, Mr. Seo became the name representing *kukppong*. He was recognized as a person who forced the recognition of Korea in a way that could not be easily understood and accepted by the presumed

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<sup>72</sup> These websites got less popular and defunct as real-time translations became available on such social media platforms as the YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and so on.

audience. It was the news media and experts here that more strictly criticized Mr. Seo's promotion of Korea for being incomprehensible and unacceptable to the professional level and global standards.

### **The lack of professionalism**

The second aspect of the criticism of Mr. Seo's Korea publicity campaign is that of the lack of professionalism in public relations and advertising communications and public diplomacy. Mr. Seo did not have any educational and professional background and experience in advertising and public relations before he launched the advertisement campaign. However, he was recognized as an "expert" for his public service ad campaign in the promotion of Korea and was able to serve as a member of the advisory board at the PCNB.

The mainstream news media did not lend much space to the criticism of Mr. Seo's ad campaign. As discussed above, the mainstream media often resorted to nationalist sentiment for inducing more clicks and views on the internet in order to generate online revenue for profit and for survival. Mr. Seo's campaign for the Korea publicity had continuously provided news items with nationalist flavor as well as gossip quality to draw light but wide public attention, which fit in with this media environment.

Serious criticism and public discussion of Mr. Seo's publicity campaign were rare and limited; they were raised occasionally by some journalists, professors, and experts. The mainstream news media responded only when the campaign caused controversy and consequently became a sensational news item itself.

The criticism of the lack of professionalism can be summarized in two points. On the one hand, the criticism directed against the lack of a basic understanding of the communications of advertising and public relations. As early as 2008, Sŏ Hwa-suk, journalist of *Han'guk Ilbo* raised a rare criticism of the Tokto ad (“Do You Know” ad of 2008, Figure 8, left):

The full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* may be a topic in Korea, but it does little to encourage public opinion in America. Sometimes it can make a bad impression on the matter. Because the advertisement is what an absurd opinion chooses when it cannot be reported on the newspaper (H.-s. Sŏ, 2008).

First of all, advertising and public relations should have a proper understanding of the target audience. However, although the Tokto ad seemed to address international, American audiences, in fact, it might have aimed at domestic audiences as target. The similar criticism and suspicion have been raised against Mr. Seo by the subculture communities, the suspicion that he aimed to appeal to Korean audiences so that he sustained his “*kukppoing* marketing” (S.-y. Pak, 2014). Moreover, she pointed out that the medium of advertising might not be able to elicit trust, but it could lead to mistrust and suspicion among readers. She argued that the obvious historical and real-world fact of Tokto belong to South Korea did not need a buying of advertisement space from the authoritative newspaper. Instead, she asked for more proper ways of informing the reader and the citizen of the world and gaining international public trust. Directly writing to the newspaper could be more trustworthy and effective method; supporting the Korean studies and researches related to Korea could work better from a long-term perspective. Implicitly criticizing the clumsiness of the ad campaign, she argued for a proper, systemic, and

professional way for the promotion of Korea. Rather than directly bashing the excessive nationalist sentiment of the ad, she implicitly criticized the amateurism of Mr. Seo's campaign which lacked the basic understanding of the modes of communications of ads and public relations.

Similarly, Ch'oe Chin-bong, professor in Journalism at the Texas State University, criticized the "Bibimbap" print ad in 2009 (Figure 10), when it became a hot topic. He suggested that for enhancing the nation brand and national image, buying an ad space was not as effective as organizing systematic public relations by experts. He suggested, for instance, that the government should support Korean professors and experts residing in the US and other countries to develop their own localized public relations (C.-b. Ch'oe, 2009).

These views mainly raised the question about the effectiveness and validity of the ad campaign from the standpoint of expertise in journalism, advertising, and public relations. From this position, Mr. Seo made mistakes which went against the basics of advertising and public relations. As an amateur lacking professional knowledge, he was seen as gaining fame and profit by relying on nationalist sentiment, according to the suspicion raised from the subculture communities. These critiques warned against excessive nationalism carried out at the expense of expertise.

On the other hand, while trying to acknowledge the good intention and efforts by Mr. Seo and other non-state actors, the writers worried that amateurism had adverse and negative effects on the official diplomacy by the government and ultimately national interest.



The official diplomatic policy by the government was “quiet diplomacy” with regards to the issues such as Tokto, Koguryŏ, and North Korean defectors. South Korea has exerted a substantive ownership and effective control over Tokto with sufficient historical evidence supporting the Korean sovereignty of the islets. Thus, concerning the Tokto issue, the government’s official policy was not to respond to the provocation by the Japanese counterpart, who aimed to make the islets look like a disputed territory and be recognized as such in the international governing bodies.

Kim Tong-sŏk, president of the Korean American Civic Empowerment, a US-based non-profit, grassroots political organization for the Korean American community, pointed out that the ad could generate adverse effects by giving an impression that Tokto might be a disputed territory. He argued that the Tokto issue was a matter between the concerned parties, that is Japan and Korea, not a universal issue with a humankind appeal, like the human right issue such as “comfort women.” Thus, he suggested that the public diplomatic efforts by civil society for the Tokto issue should be in line with the overall governmental policy for national interest (T. g.-s. Kim, 2010).

In fact, this issue was not limited to the non-state actors because the government as well as the mainstream news media were sensitive to the popular nationalist sentiment and inconsistent with their positions with regard to “quiet diplomacy.”

The mainstream news media has been raising a nationalist voice and criticizing “quiet diplomacy” for not attending to public opinion since the mid 2000s. They criticized the government when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(MOFAT) allegedly pressured to stop the ad campaign run by Mr. Seo and sponsored by Mr. Kim (M.-k. Kim, 2010; k. Yi, 2013). Moreover, the President Lee Myung-bak visited Tokto on August 10, 2012 for the first time as the incumbent president of South Korea. The news media criticized this move for not just jeopardizing the Korea-Japan relations but also ending the principle of “quiet diplomacy” and publicizing Tokto as a disputed territory to the world, in order to raise the approving rate of the lame duck president by appealing to nationalist sentiment (K.-m. Yu, 2012).

The point of the criticism of the advertisement was that the ad was not convincing to the readers and citizens outside Korea and could not produce intended effects. For example, the Tokto ad of 2010 (Figure 9, left) was criticized for presenting Tokto as a tourist destination. However, it was apparently misleading to advertise the rocky islets, uninhabited with no regular traffic back and forth, as a tourist destination. The ad for blaring Tokto for tourism was not just disrupting the principle of quiet diplomacy, but also it was not supported by any official governmental policy for tourism.

Moreover, the Tokto ad of 2012 (Figure 9, right) was also criticized for being ignorant, self-centered, and insensitive to their post-colonial history because it was a relatively recent and violent history when Bali, Sicily and Hawaii were incorporated to Indonesia, Italy and the US respectively. This attitude of insensitivity and ignorance was blamed for giving a bad impression, rather than enhancing the national image of South Korea.

The criticism of the lack of professionalism by a few journalists and experts was limited and isolated and did not resonate widely. However, the situation dramatically changed with the “Bulgogi” ad of 2014, introduced earlier in the chapter. Just as the subculture communities poured out criticism and ridicule of the excessive nationalism and the ad, the mainstream media joined by publishing op-ed columns by journalists and experts as well as by contributing to the circulation of the subcultural criticism to wider audiences.

### **The explosion of criticism**

In the criticisms of the Korea publicity campaign, a couple of observations are striking. One is concerning “when”: the criticism exploded both in the subculture and in the mainstream media when the “Bulgogi” ad came out in March 2004. The other is concerning “who” and “whose voice”: it was the Western journalists who initiated to raise critical voices against the “Bulgogi” ad, and then it was Korean journalists and experts with global life experiences who added their voices. Despite some criticisms in the mainstream media and harsh derision within the subculture communities, Mr. Seo’s ad campaign was not put into criticism and under scrutiny until some Western journalists and a Western expatriate residing in Korea raised questions about the “Bulgogi” ad. The timeline of the events in context clearly shows how the criticism of the “Bulgogi” ad spread and how the Western journalists, among different actors, provided a crucial tipping point.

The “Bulgogi” ad was published in the *New York Times* on March 12, 2014. It was right after the closing of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, during which sports nationalism as well as the criticism of its “*kukppong*” culminated.

The next day (considering the time difference between South Korea and the US, it was half a day later), the Korean newswires *Yŏnhap News* (K.-h. Wang, 2014) and *Newsis* (No, 2014) favorably reported the ad featuring the interview with Mr. Seo. The news reports were supplied to most news media outlets, including the largest news aggregate platform *Naver News*. These news reports circulated to draw some favorable comments in the blogosphere and the subculture communities in general.

On the day the ad appeared on the *NYT*, Jon Tayler from the *SI* posted a short comment on his blog and expressed his curiosity and confusion (Tayler, 2014). On March 13, a South Korean internet news site, *CBS Nocut News* reported Tayler's posting as well as Mr. Seo's ad (C.-r. Im, 2014). The report was simple and straight and not necessarily critical of the "Bulgogi" ad. The news report did not circulate widely either. At this point, there seemed little or no criticism of the ad.

The situation sharply changed with the blog posting by Luis Clemens of the *NPR* on March 14 (March 15 in Korea Standard Time), two days after the original *NYT* ad (Clemens, 2014). Then, on March 16, Clemens's critical remarks were reported in detail in the English language newspaper, *Korea Herald*. This news article was published in Korean as well as in English (H.-n. Park, 2014b). The news article was also published at the same time in *Naver News* (H.-n. Park, 2014a). It began to circulate in the online communities such as blogs and subcultural online forums. The blogosphere was relatively less critical of Mr. Seo's "Bulgogi" ad. Some blog postings advocated the ad and retorted to Clemens's article as "American-centric" and "arrogant" (Alivehs, 2014). The subculture communities began to

respond to the ad and the news report by *Korean Herald*. They were mostly critical of the ad, blaming for the messy communications and showing their embarrassment with excessive nationalism.

Then, on March 18, *Kuki News* reported the Clements's remark as well as the reaction to it in the online communities (T.-p. i. Kim, 2014). *Kuki News* is the online unit of the national newspaper *Kungmin Ilbo*, dedicated to the production of online news content for *Naver News* and other news service platforms. This article was published in *Naver News* and drew more than one thousand comments, most of which were critical of the "Bulgogi" ad. In turn, the article widely circulated in the subculture communities, blogs, and online forums, drawing a lot of attention and criticism. In the next week, small and big news media rushed to publish news reports and opinion pieces by journalists and experts, reacting to the blog postings by Clemens and Tayler as well as an article at *Adweek* (Gianatasio, 2014).

The titles of the pieces below suggest the extent to which the mainstream news media was critical of Mr. Seo's Korea publicity (J. Han, 2014; M.-h. Kang, 2014; P. Kang, 2014; McPherson, 2014; C.-y. Pak, 2014; S.-d. Sin, 2014):

Han, Jane. (2014, March 19). 'Bulgogi' ad makes Choo laughingstock. *Korea Times*.

McPherson, Joe. (2014, March 23). The ad that ruins the image of Korean food. *Joins*.

Sin, Sŏng-dae. (2014, March 23). Choo Sin-soo's *pulgogi* ad is a shame, not a publicity for Korea. *Deilian [Dailian]*.

Kang, Pyŏngjin. (2014, March 23). Why is Choo Sin-soo's *pulgogi* ad blamed?. *Huffpost Korea*.

Pak, Chŏng-yŏn. (2014, March 25). Choo Sin-soo's *pulgogi* ad... frankly terrible. *Omainjusŭ [Ohmynews]*.

Kang, Mi-hye. (2014, March 25). If it had listened to the PR expert's advice two years ago...Lack of strategy in PR Korea?. *The PR*.

The timeline of the controversy around the “Bulgogi” ad illustrates the way in which news was produced and circulated in the online environment in South Korea. The “Bulgogi” ad was circulated and amplified in the circuit of online news content producers, online news platforms, and online publics in a circular, self-referring fashion. Mr. Seo provided a news item which could appeal to nationalist sentiment and get attention online. The news media effortlessly produced an online news article based on the press release provided by Mr. Seo and distributed it on the online news aggregators such as *Naver News*. The online publics excitedly responded with excessive nationalism. Usually, this would have completed a cycle.

What is striking in the timeline is that it was the blog postings by the Western journalists that triggered the deluge of criticism of the ad campaign. In the “Bulgogi” ad case, a new cycle was opened up as Western journalists reacted to the ad. In fact, “overseas reactions” by the Western media were themselves news items suitable for generating excited attentions and heated responses. This time, the news report elicited cynical criticism, which also generated a lot of comments and discussions within the subculture communities and the blogospheres. In turn, the online public responses themselves became news items by the online news media. In this amplified circulation, the news media followed and published many columns and opinions on the ad.

The observation of the unfolding of the controversies around the Korea publicity reveals how the desire for international recognition, especially by the West, has driven the formation of public discourses in South Korea. The non-state actors focused their activities on providing and disseminating what they deemed

was correct information about Korean history and territory. They also devoted their efforts to promoting what they deemed was excellent and proud Korean culture such as food culture. The campaign was widely supported by South Korean publics because their campaign resorted to nationalist sentiment and the public desire for international recognition. However, the responses by the Western journalists confirmed that the ad campaign looked weird and unidirectional to the Western eyes and did not seem to follow the norms and standards. Thus, they seemed to reveal that the Korea publicity could not achieve the said purpose of winning international recognition and enhancing the nation brand.

The criticism of the Korea publicity campaign also took international recognition seriously. The online subculture communities not only criticized the ad but also felt embarrassed about and ashamed of the obsessive desire of excessive nationalism. The “overseas reactions” from the Western journalists confirmed the subcultural criticism. In addition, the feelings of embarrassment and shame illustrate how the subcultures were conscious about the significance of international recognition and the potential harm of the misplaced campaign on it.

The experts and journalists who participated in the criticism of the ad campaign also confirmed the significance of winning international recognition and enhancing the nation brand and national image from the West. They seem to suggest a better and proper way of earning it. They suggested that the international recognition of Korea and Korean culture could not be achieved by advertisements but by proper practices of advertising and public relations. They implied that the professionalism in advertising, public relations and public diplomacy should begin

by understanding the target audience, in this case, the Western audience, and by meeting the global business norms and standards.

### **International recognition and the imaginaries of an advanced nation**

It seems that one of the most important keywords in understanding the Korea publicity campaign and its criticism is the term “international recognition.” What did “international recognition” mean to the campaign and its criticism? How was “international recognition” conceived and constructed in different ways by different actors? The varied constructions of international recognition suggest how national imaginaries were rebuilt in different ways by different actors in the changing conditions of globalization and infinite competition among nations. The varied rebuilding of national imaginaries was predicated on the varied sense of how South Korea was like and a certain public desire for what South Korea should be like, conceived through the construction of the external gaze. The Korea publicity campaign and the controversy around it illustrate how the formation of national imaginaries was predicated on the external, Western gaze, or international recognition, presumed in different ways by different actors.

In this section, I will discuss different ways in which the campaign and its criticism conceived of international recognition and reimagined the nation, especially as an advanced nation. I will sum up and discuss how the three different perspectives — the Korea publicity campaign, the subculture communities, and the group of journalists and experts — conceived of international recognition and how they imagined and re-imagined the nation. Especially, I will examine how contested were the national imaginaries of South Korea as an advanced nation.



The Korea publicity campaign gained wide public support by resorting to rising nationalist sentiment since the early 2000s. Undergirding the popular support for the campaign was the sense of national pride of the economic achievement, the rise of corporate national brands, and the expanding popularity of popular culture. The Korea publicity campaign led by Mr. Seo among others was regarded as helping enhance national prestige and win international recognition.

In the campaign, international recognition was constructed from a self-fulfilling way. It was assumed that winning national prestige was equated with winning international recognition and the latter was simply equated with attracting a high level of attention from the international media and the public. Moreover, it was simply assumed that appearing in the high-profile media, even if by buying highly visible ad spaces, might guarantee high exposure and high attention from the Western media and the Western public. This assumption was based on the self-righteous, nationalist conviction of the self-evidence of legitimacy and excellence, which was shared by the non-state actors for the Korea publicity and the supporting public. It was assumed that the self-evidence of legitimacy and excellence was not well recognized due to misunderstanding, obstruction and distortion, and the advertisement and public diplomacy of the Korea publicity would help to wipe out them. Thus, in the Korea publicity campaign, international recognition was constructed in an imaginary way on a self-fulfilling nationalist desire.

The nationalist construction of international recognition, as a particular reaction to the geopolitical situation of globalization and infinite competition, reflected a certain public desire for what kind of country South Korea was and

should be. Implicit in this desire was the re-imagination of the nation as recognized for its legitimate, excellent and advanced status in terms of political, economic, technological, cultural, as well as historical aspect.

The Korea publicity campaign quickly came under fire and criticized as *kukppong* once its arbitrary and self-fulfilling construction of international recognition and self-contained reimagination of the nation were exposed by actual Western journalists who did not have a stake in South Korea.

In their criticism of the Korea publicity campaign, both the subculture communities and the media and expert group shared the criticism that the campaign was based on a naive nationalist sentiment and focused on self-satisfying publicity and advertising.

The subculture communities widely used the expressions such as *du yu no*, *haeoebanŭng*, and *kukppong* to critically satirize the obsessive seeking of international recognition of what were deemed as the achievements of South Korea especially from the Western media. However, the cynical reactions did not indicate that the subculture communities did not care about international recognition or *haeoebanŭng*. Rather, they had been so eager to pay attention to what overseas online media and communities had to say about Korea that they had been drawn to the subcultural websites dedicated to translating “overseas reactions.” From the perspectives of the subculture communities, the Korea publicity campaign did not make visible Korea’s excellence and pride, but the self-centered nationalist self-portrait of Koreans who could not see themselves objectively. In contrast to nationalist knee-jerk reaction, the subculture was self-conscious and self-reflective

to the extent that they felt ashamed of what the self-celebrating advertisements which did not think through an objective lens would look like.

It is not clear what specific imaginary of the nation the subculture communities shared with regard to their criticism of the Korea publicity campaign. However, we can have a glimpse of it through a new coinage “*Hell Chosŏn*,” which became a buzzword in South Korea in the mid 2010s. The buzzword *Hell Chosŏn* described a state of despair of South Korea, especially experienced by the younger generation, as full of inequality, unfairness, unemployment, gender discrimination, extreme competition, and everyday power abuse (S.-W. Koo, 2015).<sup>73</sup> The hellish status of South Korea was emphasized as premodern and uncivilized, especially when it was combined with another buzzword *migae* (uncivilized).

The subcultural reactions were to some extent predicated on the same dichotomy between the advanced and the backward, the civilized and the uncivilized, and the West and hellish Korea. In the subcultural criticism of the Korea publicity campaign, in combination with the imagery of *Hell Chosŏn*, the nation of South Korea was imagined as lacking a normal quality expected to any advanced modern nation (K.-i. Pak, 2016; U.-c. a. Yi, 2016). The premodern, uncivilized imageries of the nation conjured up by the subculture communities were completely opposite to those of advanced nations, idealized in particular ways by the nation

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<sup>73</sup> Chosŏn is the old name for Korea until the early twentieth century. The expression of *Hell Chosŏn* referred Korea (South Korea) to premodern state of Chosŏn. The term originated from the online subcultural disparagement of premodern Korea (Chosŏn) against the nationalist self-aggrandizing celebration of Korean history and expanded its connotation to designate the contemporary state of miserable suffering experienced by South Koreans, especially by the younger generation.

branding policy, the national prestige discourse, and the Korea publicity campaign. To the subcultural perspective, the blind pursuit of national prestige and the begging of international recognition by the Korea publicity campaign was the exact shameful component of *Hell Chosŏn*.

Sharing the criticism of the Korea publicity campaign with the online subculture communities, the group of journalists and experts took international recognition seriously rather than cynically. The group of journalists and experts, who shared a certain understanding of global capitalism and cosmopolitan perspectives, criticized the Korea publicity campaign run by Mr. Seo for lacking professionalism. The campaign, from the experts' perspective, lacked proper understanding of advertising, public relations and public diplomacy and generated adversary effects on the official governmental efforts on diplomacy and nation branding.

For the expert group, the critical task for South Korea to gain international recognition was to obtain global citizenship as a legitimate partner to exchange dialog in the global community. For this international recognition of global citizenship, it was deemed crucial to embody universal rules and global norms, universally acceptable for professional interaction and business transactions in global capitalism. Thus, international recognition meant to be accepted as a normal partner in dialog by the Western media, professionals and business.

By criticizing clumsy communications of the Korea publicity campaign, the group of journalists and experts envisioned South Korea as a normal participant in global capitalism, measuring up to global standards and norms, on par with other

advanced countries. The imaginary of a normal, advanced nation came to this group seriously and at hand, not cynically as to the subculture communities, because the issues of global standards and norms were not alien to this group which lived itself in cosmopolitan sensibility and international business.

In this section, I examined how the Korea publicity campaign and the two critical perspectives constructed international recognition differently and suggested how they reimagined the nation and envisioned an advanced country through it. The examination suggests how contested the idea of international recognition as well as the imaginaries of the nation with regard to the aspiration for an advanced nation. Additionally, it suggests how South Koreans are sensitive to the external view of them, and especially obsessive about the Western view. The excessive consciousness of the external view underscores the anxiety about an uncertain position between a developing and developed country within the global capitalist order.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I examined how publics were engaged with and contested the aspect of nation branding or public diplomacy in South Korea. I critically examined the Korea publicity campaign by the non-state actor, and its criticism raised by the online subculture communities and the group of journalists and experts. The controversy around this ad campaign illustrates that the examination of nation branding should not be limited to governmental public policy nor to the news media campaign. It suggests how publics were concerned about international recognition with regard to the national imaginaries of an advanced nation.

Reflecting the emerging sense of national pride and self-confidence, the Korea publicity campaign emerged as nationalistic responses to the regional and global politics. Asserting the legitimacy and excellence of Korean history and culture, the public engagement by the Korea publicity campaign articulated the collective desire for the international recognition of Korea by the West. It was through the construction of international recognition that the national imaginary of an advanced country was imagined and reimagined.

The online subculture communities raised criticism about excessive nationalism and ridiculed the obsession for international recognition in South Korean society. They did not seem drawn to the national imaginary of an advanced country, but to a bleak national portrait in the middle of hellish competition and hopeless collapse. The subculture communities found the “overseas reactions” to the Korea publicity embarrassing and exposing the hellish reality of South Korea.

The group of journalists and experts criticized the problems of the campaign for the lack of professionalism in public relations and advertising communications and public diplomacy. The criticism suggested that the publicity should follow adequate universal cultural codes and professional protocols in line with the global standard. From this perspective, winning international recognition should be the logical consequence of professional practices by meeting up the global business norms and standards. The perspective suggested the imaginary of an advanced nation through earning normalcy in global capitalism.

In this chapter, I examined the unfolding of the Korea publicity campaign by the non-state actor and the controversies around it in a wider context of public

discourses in South Korea. The examination revealed how the desire for international recognition, especially by the West, has driven the contested formation of public discourses centered on the imaginaries of an advanced nation in South Korea.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine how the discourses and institutions of nation branding and national prestige reshaped the social imaginaries of the nation in South Korea since the early 2000s until the mid 2010s. I followed the trajectory of the nation branding discourse and traced how it was converted, transformed, and articulated with other actors, discourses, and institutions. In doing this, I examined different moments of the re-imagining of the nation of South Korea (rather than Korea) as an advanced nation by different social actors.

#### **Summary: nation branding and the social imaginaries of the advanced nation**

In Chapter 4, I examined how the news media played a crucial mediating role in importing and disseminating the discourse of nation branding. In the late 1990s, Western business consultants turned the techniques in marketing and business management into a globally-circulating governance discourse of nation branding. In the early and mid 2000s, the South Korean news media in collaboration with private and public think tanks, embraced and localized the discourse of nation branding.

In the chapter, I showed how the news media discourse connected the marketing-oriented discourse of nation branding with the self-consciousness about the international status of the nation, that is, “national prestige.” Through this discursive conversion, the news media successfully promoted nation branding as a discourse for neoliberal national reform.



Mainstream news media, strongly linked to the conservative political party and sharing interest with big conglomerates, promoted nation branding as a state discourse for advocating business interest as well as for accommodating a conservative government in the presidential election in 2007. They launched a series of massive public education and enlightenment campaigns with series articles, features, and op-ed columns. I analyzed how these news articles and columns constructed a particular national narrative of the past, the present and the future of Korea through the lens of nation branding. The news media narrative depicted South Korea as experiencing a unique historical process of the double achievement of industrialization and democratization. From this developmentalist perspective, South Korea is standing in the world at the threshold of being in the rank of advanced countries. Thus, the narrative set *sŏnjinhwa* (being advanced) as the national goal and the global standards as a way to realizing the goal. Nation branding in practice worked toward prioritizing business, controlling labor and society, and disciplining the conduct and behaviors of citizens. In this operation of nation branding, the state was repositioned as the neoliberal manager to reorganize the whole society for the benefit of business.

The social imaginary of the nation provided by the news media discourse of nation branding geared toward a particular vision of the advanced nation led by the neoliberal corporate state. Thus, the discourse of nation branding by the news media played a significant role in the ongoing neoliberalization of South Korea. At the same time, the neoliberal imaginary of the nation, depending on the

developmental (post-developmental) ideal of *sŏnjinhwa*, showed a historical continuity in South Korean modernity.

In Chapter 5, I examined how the conservative government instituted the media-promoted agenda of nation branding as a highly visible official public policy by setting up the Presidential Council for Nation Branding (PCNB) in 2009. The discourse of nation branding, promoted by the news media, was elevated to the status of official state agenda, providing a general discursive framework for other public policies. To examine the official public policy practices of nation branding, I analyzed official documents, meeting minutes, advertising and promotional materials, and website pages of the PCNB and other related governmental departments and agencies. Additionally, to get a wider sense of the public policy practices, I also used interviews, books, columns and other writing written by those who were related with the PCNB.

Contrary to its ambitious rhetoric and grandiose appearance, the PCNB has not gone beyond its symbolic gesture of proclaiming nation branding as a state project. The Council's roles were quite limited to regularly presiding over meetings among working-level Ministries and other governmental agencies in charge of actual governmental affairs, and mainly organizing communications and promotional activities toward domestic citizens rather than foreign audiences. Closer look at the organization and activities by the Council revealed that its focus was on the advertising and promotion toward domestic citizens with quite a small organizational size and a limited budget. I especially focused on two of the communications and promotional activities by the PCNB. The one was a series of

public service advertisements which aimed to educate citizens on global etiquettes. One of the ads, called “*Saranghaeyo Korea*” was analyzed at length. Juxtaposing Korean and Western art works, the advertisement evoked national cultural pride, symbolizing the aspiration for the international status of South Korea standing in the world on a par with the Western advanced countries. The political economy analysis revealed the corporate-dependent nature of the nation branding campaign as the ad was produced by a particular conglomerate (LG) in line with its corporate brand identity. The other was the mobilization of young citizens for online campaigns for nation branding. Utilize the trend of “digital participation marketing,” it illustrated how neoliberal orientation of the state to create a corporate-oriented brand space and to encourage brand citizens to serve the nation brand.

In Chapter 6, I turned to the engagement by publics with nation branding, whose discursive space was opened up by the news media and the government. I focused on the controversies and debates around the “Korea publicity” campaign, a form of public diplomacy led by various non-state actors. I followed the trajectories of a series of public service ads which were produced and run by a non-state actor for public diplomacy. These ad images, featuring Korea-born celebrities, were put up on prestigious newspapers and metropolitan billboards and drew considerable attention as well as generated controversies. Data were collected for the analysis of the ads and their criticism by online subculture, journalists, and marketing experts, across different platforms including news media reports, online blog postings, subculture forums, and op-ed columns by journalists and marketing experts at home and abroad.

The analysis in this chapter showed how the desire for “international recognition” accorded by the West has driven public discourses and shaped the social imaginaries of South Korea as an advanced nation. The non-state actors for the Korea publicity and their criticism constructed international recognition differently. The former, driven by a nationalist desire, attempted to win international recognition by aggressively promoting and advertising legitimacy and excellence of Korean history and culture. For the latter, the self-celebrating nationalism in the Korea publicity campaign was regarded not only as ineffective but also detrimental to win international recognition. Instead, it should be won through the professionalism in advertising and publicity and the embodiment of universal rules and norms in international business.

The different constructions of international recognition by the West led to different reimaginings of an advanced nation by different social actors. In Chapter 4 and 5, I discussed how the advanced nation was reimagined as a business-friendly and “lawful and orderly” nation in the news media discourse, and it was as a neoliberal “brand nation” in the public policy discourse. In contrast, the Korea publicity campaign articulated a self-content nationalist imagination of an advanced nation with legitimate history and excellent culture. In the online subculture discourse, reflexively distanced from nationalism, it was imagined negatively as an opposite of the current status of *Hell Chosŏn*. In the discourse of cosmopolitan journalists and publicity experts, it was imagined as a culturally sophisticated, globally accepted nation, internalizing the global standards of universal codes of behaviors and civility. The analysis suggested how different social actors

reimagined the nation and envisioned an advanced country through different measurement of international recognition.

### **Critical media studies, neoliberalism, and South Korea's modernity**

In the analysis of the discursive circulation of global phenomenon of nation branding in the local context of South Korea, I made an academic intervention into and potential contribution to at least three primary areas of debate.

The first area I engaged with is the critical media and cultural studies where researches on nation branding and public diplomacy are expanding. I examined the travel and localization of the transnational discourse of nation branding in South Korea, informed by critical media and cultural studies, with various operations of the media in critical focus. In the analysis, I addressed a few issues present in this research stream in critical media and cultural studies.

First, my study highlighted the domestic dynamics of the cultural politics of nation branding. In Chapter 4, I described how the transnational discourse and technique of nation branding was imported and localized by private and public think tanks and the mainstream news media. In the process, I examined how the news media's discourse of nation branding mediated the interest of large conglomerates as global actors and facilitated that of the conservative political party. In Chapter 5, I looked into how the government used the rhetoric of the nation branding and national prestige for its domestic political interest and for the interest of business. In Chapter 6, I examined how different social actors adopted the languages of the nation brand, national prestige, and international recognition in the contestation for the envisioning of the direction of the nation.

The focus on the domestic cultural-political dynamics is contrasted with the emphasis by some existing researches on the role played by transnational consultants of nation branding (Aronczyk, 2013; Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Jansen, 2008). The case of nation branding in South Korea exhibited that the “transnational promotional class” (Aronczyk, 2015) played a limited role and even was invoked at the convenience of domestic actors. My study is in line with some other critical studies of nation branding which focused on what is going on in the domestic cultural politics, especially among elites, in the name of nation branding and public diplomacy (Graan, 2013; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). I contributed to this stream of research by examining a wider range of cultural politics, not limited to elite politics but to encompass popular politics raised by non-state actors as well as online and subculture publics.

Second, relatedly, my study also addressed the question whether the orientation of nation branding is internal or external. While it sounds obvious that most nation branding campaigns look outward and aim to project a positive national image toward foreign audiences, it should not be taken for granted that it has inherently outward orientation. Many researches, including mine, attended to the inward orientation of nation branding, seeking political legitimacy, class control, citizen discipline, and nation building (Graan, 2013; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011; Skilling, 2010; Valaskivi, 2016; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011)}. However, nation branding was not inherently inward oriented either. It seems that the internal/external orientation was contingent to domestic political and geopolitical conditions in which a particular state and government was hinged on. Thus, the

internal/external orientation of a particular nation branding campaign should be examined on a case-by-case basis rather than in accordance with a predetermined pattern. More importantly, the two orientations were not exclusive but intertwined in the actual process: the external projection of the nation became an important factor in the domestic cultural politics by which ruling elites attempted to win cultural hegemony and the publics were stimulated to mobilize nationalistic passions, populist discontents, and reformist political agenda.

Third, focusing on the effects of the internal-external dynamics on domestic cultural politics, I highlighted the multiple roles played by the media, which were relatively underdeveloped in nation branding research in critical media and cultural studies. In Chapter 4, I focused on how the news media mediated and facilitated the localization of the discourse and technique of nation branding in South Korea with their institutional and discursive capacities. In Chapter 5, I critically examined the public service ad images in combination with the political economy analysis. In Chapter 6, I featured various traditional and electronic media forms, including the news media reports, ads on newspapers, blogs, online forums, and advertising billboards. I focused on how these media provided platforms on which images and talks with regard to nation branding and public diplomacy traveled across borders quickly. It was in this technological infrastructure of the old and new media that the nationalist sentiment as well as its criticism were escalated within the self-referring feedback loop. My study, focusing on the multiple roles played by the media, corresponds to the recent call and attention to the media as technologies and organization as well as representation for the implications for the analysis of nation

branding campaigns (Bjola & Pamment, 2018; Bolin & Miazhevich, 2018; Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2015; Budnitsky & Jia, 2018; Ingenhoff & Klein, 2018; Jacobsen, 2018).

The second area I aimed to engage with is the study of neoliberalism with regard to the state and the nation. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined how nation branding facilitated the discursive construction of the nation as a space for international competitiveness and the state as a “competition state” or a neoliberal manager for business and capital. The news media’s discourse and narrative of nation branding urged and “educated” the state, the nation, and citizens to “advance” toward global standards of politics, business, and civil behaviors. The public policy of the government for nation branding constructed a “brand state” which continued favorable relations with business and capital and mobilized “brand citizens” which embodied the normative imperatives of international competitiveness.

The observation in these chapters confirmed the broader understanding of neoliberalism as the normative imperatives to reorganize the whole society, including the state and nation, according to the principle of market competitiveness (Brown, 2005). However, the other important point I aimed to make in the analysis of neoliberalism was not to understand it as a sweeping, totalizing logic, but as a messy process with many contradictions and loopholes, and as particularly situated practices (Hoffman, 2006a, 2006b; K. Mitchell, 1997; Ong, 1997, 1999; Rofel, 2007). My dissertation illustrated how the public policy for nation branding was poorly planned and executed “on the fly” with little significant effects as a result. I also found that the policy was embedded in private interests and ambitions of



politicians, bureaucrats, and business. Thus, the neoliberalism of nation branding was not executed in a clear-cut way but was entangled in a murky reality of bureaucratic incompetence and often conflicting political interest.

The contingency of neoliberalism in South Korea was striking with regard to the conceptual framework of social imaginaries (Taylor, 2002). From the perspective of social imaginaries, nation branding needs to be understood not as a monolithic idea/ideology and practice of the neoliberal doctrine, but a set of heterogeneous ideas and practices which are entangled with existing ones in society (cf. Ong, 1999). Avoiding the understanding of neoliberalism as a sweeping logic, I focused on how the neoliberal logic of nation branding intersected with the existing developmental logics in South Korea. In terms of social imaginaries, the deployment of nation branding in South Korea illustrated that neoliberalism hinged on, rather than excluded, the very ideas of the state and the nation as well as the economy. The social imaginaries offered by nation branding were obviously leaning toward neoliberalism in which market competitiveness was prioritized, but they were not completely alien to the developmental social imaginary where the ideas of the state, the economy and the nation were central. For instance, the discourse of nation branding oscillated between developmental “aggressiveness” and neoliberal “attractiveness.” Moreover, neoliberal competitiveness centered on the “competition state” (Cerny, 1997, p. 251) and depended on the developmental imaginary of the hierarchical international order. The rupture and the continuity with developmental imaginary is central to the understanding of modernity in South Korea, which is the next discussion topic.

The third area of engagement is the study of modernity in South Korea. Focusing on the centrality of the notions of the state and the economy in South Korean modernity, I found that, in line with nation branding, the ideas of national prestige, international recognition and the advanced nation not just revealed the continued Western-oriented nature of modernity in South Korea but also became the crucial discursive sites for the contestation of the social imaginaries of the nation's modernity.

The prospect of South Korea's modernity is ambivalent. On the one hand, the emphasis on the aspects of culture and civility in modernity indicated a degree of reflexivity of the economy-centered development and modernization. On the other, the reflexivity of developmental modernity seemed quite insufficient and superficial in that culture and civility were within the Western-oriented hierarchy and even mobilized for economic growth and development. In that sense, South Korea's developmental modernity is not seriously challenged, if often questioned, which is evidenced by the general silence and indifference in South Korea to climate change and environmental issues beyond lip service.

### **Limitations and suggestions**

There are several limitations to this study.

First, my analysis was mostly limited to representations, narratives, and discourses related to nation branding (Chapters 4 & 5). The analysis primarily aimed to follow the trajectory of fast-moving, quick-transforming discourse of nation branding. For this purpose, my data were limited to quickly surveying the "surface" of the discursive circulation. In that sense, it was inevitable to some extent,

but it would have unfolded a more complete picture of the discursive arrangement with an in-depth research of those who were actually involved in each discursive and institutional process (in the bureaucracy and the business world).

Secondly, the research of the reaction to the Korea publicity on the internet and within the online subculture (Chapter 6) was selective in terms of data collection, sampling and analysis. Although the study did not intend to conduct a full-fledged online ethnographic research, a more detailed strategy could have been learned from online audience studies for a fuller picture of the online activities: for instance, basic questions were not answered but speculated due to the lack of ethnographic research, such as “who they are,” “what they do online and in real life,” “what they think about social issues in general,” and so on.

Thirdly, the key ideas of a “culturally” advanced nation and cultural modernity were underdeveloped. While the idea of an “advanced nation” was predicated on the developmental imaginary, the ambivalent aspects of a “culturally” advanced nation were not fully investigated with regard to the direction of South Korea’s modernity. This might be related to the limited examination of the idea of “culture” and the cultural aspects in relation to nation branding.

The first future research suggestion is related to this last point of limitation. The rise of Korean popular culture, spearheaded by K-pop, would be a fertile ground to investigate the deployment of nation branding and public diplomacy and the unfolding of the ideas such as national prestige and the “culturally” advanced nation.

Secondly, based on the insights learned from the examination of the case of South Korea, the research can be expanded to include the international politics of

nation branding, public diplomacy, and soft power in East Asia and Southeast Asia. One possible direction is the changing national image and the increasing soft power of South Korea (cf. Chua, 2012). Another direction is relevant to examine the shift and turmoil in regional geopolitics due to the rise of China as superpower, the remilitarization of Japan, the nuclear armament of North Korea, and the increasing strategic significance of Southeast Asia.

The third suggestion is historical research. The notion of nation branding itself was short-lived and tied to neoliberalism, but the notion can be connected to the history of international relations and contribute to the study of propaganda and cultural diplomacy during the Cold War era and beyond.

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