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Can you trust someone you have never met?

Swift trust and self-disclosure in temporary teams

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Forord

Min masteroppgave utgjør siste del av et treårig deltidsstudium ved UiT Norges Arktiske Universitet/Handelshøgskolen. Studiet har vært gjennomført ved siden av jobb som purser i SAS.

I valg av tema for masteroppgaven har jeg valgt å se på en problemstilling som jeg selv har fundert over mange ganger, nemlig at vi som jobber som kabinansatte har i løpet av veldig kort tid delt livshistoriene våre med hverandre, selv om vi kanskje er totalt fremmede for hverandre når arbeidsdagen starter. Dette knytter oss tettere sammen, slik at vi vet hvem vi har med å gjøre og gir oss trygghet til å utføre det sikkerhetsrelaterte arbeidet vi er satt til å utføre.

Det har vært en svært lærerik prosess, som har gitt meg en dypere forståelse for hvorfor man velger å dele til dels svært privat informasjon til personer man ikke har møtt før.

Jeg vil rette en stor takk til alle som har stilt opp som informanter i dette arbeidet, og som dermed har bidratt til min økte forståelse av disse sammenhengene.

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Et masterstudium ved siden av jobb og familie har vært krevende, men svært lærerikt og interessant. Jeg takker min kjære mann og fire tålmodige barn for støtte og omsorg. Uten dere hadde oppgaven vært ferdig for lengst. 😊

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May-Britt Aronsen Sand

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1. Abstract

In this thesis I ask the question "can you trust someone you have never met". The background for this is the temporary nature of cabin crew teams which implies that it is not possible to rely on conventional trust, and to better understand how it still is possible to trust someone you have never met I have focused on factors that contribute to *initial trust* (or categorization) and *swift trust*. An important aspect is communication between team members, and especially self-disclosure. My main hypothesis is that self-disclosure serves as an accelerator in building trust swiftly, and by taking a closer look at self-disclosure and swift trust in temporary teams I have aimed to increase the understanding of the mechanisms behind the substantial degree of openness that seem to exist within cabin crew and its effect on trust development. All my informants have highlighted the swiftness of self-disclosure, i.e., that self-disclosure takes place very early in the relationship. Furthermore, I have identified reciprocation of such self-disclosure as crucial in building trust among cabin crew members, and that self-disclosure seem to accelerate swift trust.

Sammendrag

I denne utredningen stiller jeg spørsmålet «kan du stole på noen du aldri har møtt». Bakgrunnen for dette er midlertidigheten i sammensetningen av kabinpersonale, noe som innebærer at det ikke er mulig å belage seg på konvensjonell tillit, og for å bedre forstå hvordan det likevel er mulig å stole på noen du aldri har møtt har jeg satt søkelys på faktorer som bidrar til initiell tillit (eller kategorisering) og kjapp tillit. Et viktig aspekt er kommunikasjon mellom teammedlemmene, og spesielt betroelser. Min hovedhypotese er at betroelser fungerer som en akselerator for å bygge tillit raskt, og ved å se nærmere på betroelser og kjapp tillit i midlertidige teams har jeg forsøkt å øke forståelsen av mekanismene bak den utstrakte åpenheten som ser ut til å eksistere hos kabinansatte og dennes påvirkning på utviklingen av tillit. Alle mine informanter har trukket frem hvor raskt betroelser skjer, dvs. at betroelsene finner sted veldig tidlig i relasjonen. Videre har jeg identifisert gjengjeldelse av slike betroelser som avgjørende for å bygge tillit mellom kabinansatte, og at betroelser ser ut til å akselerere kjapp tillit.

2. Introduction

In this thesis I am asking the question "can you trust someone you have never met". The background for this is the forming of ad hoc, or temporary cabin crew teams. My main hypothesis is that «self-disclosure serves as an accelerator in building trust swiftly», and by taking a closer look at self-disclosure and swift trust in temporary teams I aim to increase the understanding of the mechanisms behind the substantial degree of openness that seem to exist within cabin crew and its effect on trust development. This openness is well known in the aviation industry, and as argued by several of my informants it is present to a much larger extent than in other types of jobs. "We are our own kind", as one crew member stated.

We give trust to strangers every day, even if we do not think explicitly about this. We can argue that we what we trust is skills and personalities. This essentially means that we judge the book by its cover, i.e., we trust someone based on reputation, stereotypes, and/or by having a trusting disposition.

My starting point is that the team relationship (cabin crew) can be of a very short duration, the work can be action-oriented, with teams that form and dissolve within as little as 30 minutes. Regardless of this, self-disclosure is not something to be avoided but rather something that should be undertaken when time permits as I argue that this may improve trust development.

Conventional trust typically takes time to build, but cabin crew are temporary teams assembled for one or more flights over a time period of 1-3 days. Regardless of this, there seem to be processes that help provide cabin crew members with development of trust (initial and swift trust). All cabin crew have basic training related to operating procedures and safety related aspects of a flight. However, no training or rules and regulations can cover all areas that can suddenly emerge in the air, leaving crew members to use their own common sense and judgement to adapt to the situation and act accordingly. They have to use the limited amount of resources available to them and that includes their crew members, with whom the knowledge about each other is limited too. One strategy to deal with this uncertainty, is to start talking:

"The crew met for briefing early in the morning. I had never seen any of them previously. I took a brief look at all of them, the appearance of the uniform, their faces, listened to the way they spoke, the tone of their voices and choice of words and their interaction with the rest of the crew, and felt at ease. On board the aircraft everyone followed procedures and checklists and did everything by the book. They were eager to do their job and they were experienced enough to take care of the smallest of things. After take-off we started chatting about all the basics, like 'where do you live?', 'what did you do before you started flying' 'do you have any kids' and all sorts of things. Due to turbulence we had to remain seated for another 10 minutes, leaving us about 20 minutes of conversation time. After those 20 minutes I had learned about her divorce, her fight with her spouse over custody of her children, her terminally ill uncle and intimate details of her new boyfriend. And I reciprocated, I shared more than I had planned for. I felt we had known each other for months. I felt sympathy, compassion, and a connection to this stranger, and last but not least, I felt trust. Even if I knew that we would soon be landing, and we would walk away and perhaps never meet again. And even if, chances are it would be in a long while and we would have forgotten most of the conversation and be strangers again"

Let us take this conversation to the office. A new workmate sitting next to you, you have never met before. How likely is it that this will happen in such a setting? "Not at all, not in a million years", most people that are *not* in the airline industry would say. As one colleague, who has a part time job as a driving instructor when not working as a flight attendant, said: "I started chatting to the office lady the same way I am used to after 30 years of flying. She looked at me like I was a mad person, ignored me completely and avoided me for the rest of the day. She eventually spoke to me when she had to, and now after a couple of years *we can talk about everything. I realized more than ever that we are "our own kind as cabin crew"*.

"Another morning I was sitting on the jumpseat with someone who did not speak to me at all. That person just looked out of the window, avoided eye contact at any prize and had only "yes" and "no" answers to all the questions I asked to establish a conversation. All my efforts at communicating were unsuccessful. However, that person did all he was supposed to do, by the book, nothing I could put my finger on, as being the chief of the cabin. Believe me, I tried HARD to find something I was dissatisfied with. Something to confirm the sneaking feeling of worry that he was not able to do his job. I could not find anything. He did a great

job. Back at the jumpseat he still did not talk. I knew absolutely nothing about him. I started to feel uneasy. That I could not trust him. I started to think he could not perform if an emergency would occur. I started doubting all his capabilities. Even his cognitive skills. I felt relieved when we all walked our separate ways."

This apparent difference in type and depth of conversations leads me to wonder why there seems to be such a difference? What mechanisms are behind this phenomenon, and how can we explain this? Why did the lack of conversation made me feel unsafe? What made me reveal more than I wanted to a stranger? How can you all of a sudden trust (or distrust) someone you have never met before?

In this thesis I will conduct in-depth interviews focusing on cabin crews' perceptions of trust, factors that may contribute to trust development, with an emphasis on the role of self-disclosure. To narrow the scope, this thesis will not focus on the role of leadership, team processes, what is an optimal team, nor evaluate how well the team performs. The focus is narrowed down to the role of trust in various guises.

A crucial aspect of cabin crews is that these are temporary teams that are formed and dissolved in a short timespan, which implies that conventional trust cannot work. Often cabin crew come together as total strangers at the pre-flight briefing without any specific knowledge about each other, other than their background and the role they are supposed to fill. The question then is whether you can trust someone you have never met. To better understand this and to be able to answer this question, we need to focus on a different type of trust than conventional trust. I attempt to better understand the processes that lead to initial trust and swift trust by asking my respondents about openness, obligations, expectations, motivation, and how my respondents react in the face of deviations from expected behavior.

The starting point for the issues studied here is similar to what can be observed in other types of ad hoc teams, such as emergency response teams and virtual teams. This is in particular with respect to the anonymity of the interaction with regards to self-disclosure.

1.1 Swift trust and temporary teams

Cabin crew teams are constructed by crew scheduling from a computer algorithm, based on a set of parameters such as working patterns, working time restrictions, aircraft qualifications, time off, and seniority, and does not take into account the different strengths and weaknesses of each individual crew member, personality types, or previous experience. The only absolute requirements are one captain onboard, a purser (or lead flight attendant), as well as (at least) minimum crew. This could make the team vulnerable as there is little or no pre-existing knowledge about the whole team, and sometimes no pre-existing knowledge about any of the crew members. To mitigate this vulnerability, building trust can be one instrument. Formal mechanisms of control another.

Even if this does not necessarily result in an optimal team in the normal sense, a safeguard is the combination of common training, standardized operating procedures (SOPs), standardized routines, and clearly defined roles. Although these safeguards are not control mechanisms as such, they provide colleagues with some categories that may act as anchoring points that define what constitute *normality* and that may build initial trust (i.e., prior to meeting). As a crew member you have to do the best from the resources available, and make the team work even if only for a 20-minute flight. Sometimes this is the only time available as cabin crew and cockpit crews are formed and dissolved within a few hours, and sometimes even minutes.

The short-lived nature of temporary teams, or swift starting action teams, limits the amount of time for traditional trust building which is typically argued to take time to build. A *temporary team* is a group of people who have not previously worked together as a team, nor will do so in the future. They have a short lifespan, usually only for the duration of the flight, and they have none or little previous knowledge about each other. I argue that they try to add more "strength" to the working relationship through increasing trust in each other by using self-disclosure strategies. This is done even if the duration of the teamwork may be as little as 30 minutes (e.g., a very short flight). This is in contrast with Meyerson et al (1996, p.191) who claim that "*(t)here is less emphasis on feeling, commitment and exchange and more on action, cognition, the nature of the network and labor pool, and avoidance of personal disclosure, contextual cues, modest dependency and heavy absorption in the task. That's what seems to give swift trust its distinctive quality*".

The interdependence in cabin crew team varies depending on the task that they perform, with some tasks less interdependent than other, albeit mostly interdependent work. It is shown in a study by Wong and Neustaedter (2017, p. 950) "*(f)light attendants move into and out of tightly and loosely coupled collaboration as they shift between performing their own tasks on flight and helping other flight attendants in normal routine tasks and emergency incidents*". Such interdependence is important when it comes to swift trust (Meyerson et al, 1996).

Meyerson et.al (1996) proposed the idea of swift trust and the article has been frequently cited, and they argue that "(i)t is not so much an interpersonal form as a cognitive and action form". I am proposing that the cognitive or categorization part of swift trust should be viewed in a different perspective, one we can call "initial trust", and that self-disclosure is an accelerator to building trust even quicker within the framework of swift trust. As Derlega and Chaikin (1977) claim, self-disclosure is higher in the beginning of the relationship than later.

Thus, by differentiating between initial trust and swift trust and adding self-disclosure, trust can build swifter and teams become less fragile as we make ourselves equally vulnerable by self-disclosing our private thoughts and feelings.

Since trust, the way it is traditionally viewed, takes time to build, and in aviation time is a luxury, it is quite a paradox that temporary teams can come together as total strangers and perform under unpredictable and everchanging circumstances due to weather conditions, stress, lack of time, demanding passengers, and personality differences, to name but a few. These are so called threats to a safe and successful flight operation and we need to trust that these threats are managed by the right people with the right expertise to do so. Threats and errors are unfortunately an inevitable part of a complex environment in high risk organizations such as the airline industry. High-reliability organizations (HROs) operates in hazardous environments where the consequences of errors are high, but the occurrence of error is extremely low (Baker et al (2006).

> "*Noticing and responding to small disturbances and vulnerabilities allow the organization to take action to correct those small problems before they escalate into crisis or catastrophe*" (Christianson et al, 2011, p. 2)

One way to respond is to use strict procedures, clearly defined roles for each member of the team, and checklists that always need to be adhered to. The airline industry uses so called *standard operating procedure*, or SOP. The SOP is a set of written instructions that describes in detail how to perform a process safely and effectively. SOP are universally recognized as basic to safe aviation operation.[1] The airline industry is a tightly coupled and the system is vulnerable to errors. Tightly coupled interactions are those that do not tolerate delay, are rigid and where it is difficult to substitute one action for another (Perrow, 1984). The consequences can be dire if procedures are not followed precisely and shortcuts are taken. The use of SOPs can be argued to constitute normality, where deviations from normality is detrimental both to flight safety and to trust development. The latter aspect is discussed by McKnight et al (1998) and will be discussed in detail below.

It should be noted that aircraft accidents are rare occurrences, and that successful flight operation is not restricted to the avoidance of an accident. Good interaction and good communication make the crew better suited to deal with unforeseen circumstances. However, it can also be related to the interaction between crew members, which may result in varying degrees of satisfaction among passengers and among crew.

1.2 Some background on working onboard an aircraft

Working in the skies used to be the most attractive and sophisticated job for women for decades. The competition for jobs was hard, and in 1967 TWA accepted fewer than three percent of its applicants — a lower acceptance rate than Harvard.[2]

Airlines started hiring flight attendants in the 1930's with the requirement to have a professional nursing background in order to provide for the comfort and safety of the passengers. The requirement of a nursing background was later replaced with, weight, height, and age restrictions.

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[1] https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2008/SAFO08021.pdf

[2] https://www.cntraveler.com/story/a-timeline-from-stewardess-to-flight-attendant?verso=true.

> «*Women were typically grounded between ages 32 and 35, while airlines that employed male flight attendants required they also be no older than 32-35—at the time of hire, that is*»[3]

Marital status was also of utmost importance, as you could not be married. An ad from United Airlines in 1967 went like this: «*Marriage is fine! But shouldn't you see the world first?*». In 1968, federal courts struck down rules forbidding marriage and age requirements, and in 1971 the Supreme Court ruled that airlines could not discriminate against men.[4]

Deregulation of the airline industry came about in the US in 1978 (Airline deregulation act of 1978), and in Europe in three rounds (1987, 1993 and 1997) leading to an increase in competition, lowering fares and increasing operation.[5] This necessitated a substantial reduction in costs. Aviation started to change, and the glamour was soon to be gone. Offering state-of-the art service and luxury was soon to be replaced by selling everything you could possibly sell, like onboard drinks and food, choice of seating, blankets, pillows and even lottery tickets.

A more effective use of aircrew and scheduling was needed to become more competitive, and the ground time for airplanes was reduced significantly. Before deregulation, ground time for an airliner could be several hours. Now, the turnaround process is normally completed in 25 minutes. This has led to a decrease in the time available for aircrews to prepare for each flight, and a system that is vulnerable in regards of errors. As the airline industry is highly regulated, with routines and procedures that exists for every task you do to minimize errors, it is always important that the crew adhere to these regulations and procedures. Crews are working interdependently with each other and teamwork is essential.

Looking into literature about aviation, there is a lot of information related to cockpit crews and the processes going on inside the cockpit, such as decision making, communication under

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[3] https://www.cntraveler.com/story/a-timeline-from-stewardess-to-flight-attendant?verso=true (Retrieved on 04.07.2020 kl 17.35).

[4] https://www.cntraveler.com/story/a-timeline-from-stewardess-to-flight-attendant?verso=true (Retrieved on 04.07.2020 kl 17.35).

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_96_950

stress, leadership, situational awareness to name but a few. When it comes to cabin crew, very little research exists. Cabin crew work seems to the average passenger as only a service providing occupation. Not many get to witness the cabin crew in action when it comes to hijacking, child births, firefighting, or evacuation, and very few crew members have had to deal with such abnormal situations. Opposite to any job on the ground, where you can call for assistance from the fire department, the police, or paramedics in the air there is no one to call for help. The cabin crew has to take care of the situation until the pilots have been able to make an (emergency) landing.

Most cabin crew go through the entire career without having to use the full range of their training, but if an emergency situation were to occur, it is of utmost importance that the crew can perform as a team in order to ensure the best possible outcome. In other words - you have to make the best out of the situation no matter what the circumstances are.

1.2.1 Hierarchy and organization

Working on board an aircraft is dominated by a strong hierarchy where the captain has sole authority of its crew and the aircraft. The purser/lead flight attendant has a delegated authority from the captain, also known as the commander, to oversee the cabin, its crew, and passengers. *Chain of command* is the hierarchy of authority that decides who is in charge and must be strictly adhered to at all times. Not following orders is defined as mutiny, also onboard an aircraft.

The purser/lead flight attendant has high seniority, meaning he or she has been working as cabin crew for many years. For most legacy carriers, such as SAS, Lufthansa, KLM, BA, etc., a purser typically has completed extensive training in leadership and procedures as well as having been through a selection involving a variety of personality tests.

A normal working day consists of checking in prior to the first flight of the day, and then proceed directly to pre-flight briefing. A briefing is a short meeting where the entire crew is gathered, normally also together with the pilots.

The purser briefs his/her team about today's flights on which aircraft type, how many passengers and any passenger related information that is relevant, safety related aspects, and

special requirements for the destination(s). Furthermore, the service programme is repeated, and the different roles are distributed among the crew. The roles are pre-determined and depends on where in the aircraft the person works. The positions have names after each of the aircraft's doors. The doors are the most important area of responsibility for the crew member in case of an evacuation. The positions are usually 1R, IL, 2R, and 2L, where L = left and R = right. The purser always has the same position (1R), and he/she has the responsibility for the forward door, right-hand side. For an aircraft with only three cabin crew, such as a Boeing 737-700 with around 140 seats, the purser is responsible for both forward doors. As soon as the positions are distributed and the different areas of responsibility have been clearly identified, the briefing is over and the crew proceeds to the aircraft.

The time perspective from check-in to boarding is around 25 minutes. The briefing is set up to take (no more than) 10 minutes, which means that there is not a lot of time to create a team. Leading a team that is put together on a flight-by-flight basis like this can be demanding. You may not know until the time of briefing who you will work with, because of last-minute changes, and very often you do not know (at least some of) the crew from before. There are numerous examples of people who have 20-30 years of experience with the same company, who have never flown together previously.

The working duties and responsibilities onboard the aircraft is foremost to be able to evacuate the aircraft in case an emergency. The most crucial is that an aircraft must be capable of being fully evacuated of passengers and crew within 90 seconds, with only half of the emergency exits available.[6] Commands, crowd-control and the ability to make the right decisions at the right time are essential, and for an evacuation to be undertaken successfully, the cabin crew must work together as an efficient team. Communication is naturally crucial, and ability to trust the other team members may facilitate efficient communication.

The crew are trained in different roles and the standard procedures of the specific airline they work for, both through the common (safety and procedure) training that every cabin crew

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[6] Part 25.803 and Appendix J to Part 25 of the EASA Joint Aviation Requirements and the U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs): https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/CS-25%20Amendment%2018_0.pdf

member follows prior to "getting wind under their wings" as well as through on-the-job training. A substantial portion of the (service related) training is undertaken while working onboard. These factors, together with a well-defined command structure, may assist in establishing trust initially (and even prior to meeting) and may also act as "signals" on what is a normal situation. This again may affect the ensuing development of swift trust.

Crews are not working in fixed systems, so there are usually new crew formations for each flight. In most airlines of some size, chances are that you are working together with people you have never met before. Due to the limited time available for conventional build-up of trust, cabin crew start working together as if they already know each other. Furthermore, one particularity of working as cabin crew is that they come together as a team, but due to the seating positions and responsibility areas called "stations", they work as two teams. One in the aft and one in the forward section of the aircraft. This makes it more a dyadic relationship when it comes to self-disclosure and trust-building apart from the initial meeting and briefing. Cabin crew working in the forward section only get to judge swiftly (by using categorization and previous knowledge from similar situations) who their colleagues are in the aft, and the same applies for the aft working crew members. Still the entire crew might chat over a cup of coffee in between serving, but the conversation is usually superficial as there are many involved, making the setting unnatural for personal disclosure. Sometimes the relationship between forward and aft working crew members does not evolve beyond this, as the cabin crew disperses and new crew forms.

However, at other instances the crew work together for 2-3 days, and as working positions always rotate between crew members (apart from the purser) you get to work with and know a new crew member each day. My expectation is that on the final day, everyone has rotated around all the different stations, worked together, and disclosed private information, so the team has reached its final and most optimal stage. At this stage the conversation with all crew members present becomes a little more personal, higher on the breadth scale but still low on the depth scale. However, it does not get better than this. Everyone knows something more about each other, and they assume they know the same things. This builds an illusion of trust building for the team, thus the crew act as if trust is permeating the entire group.

1.3 Communication and trust

Trust development in teams, both in a cabin crew team and an entire flight crew is important. Most communication in this thesis is regarded as taking place in a dyadic setting, due to the nature of the aircraft (its seating positions).

To be a well-functioning cabin crew team, both in normal and even more so in emergency situations, trust is vital. Since the time available for each crew to build trust is very short, conventional trust building mechanisms will not serve any purpose. Instead I will use the research undertaken on swift trust as the framework for this thesis.

One of the contributors to build and sustain trust, is communication. Not only as a means of sharing information about work duties, but more on a deeper level to build cohesion and trustworthiness. This is quite a paradox as trust on a deeper level takes a lot of time to build. This leads me deeper into exploring swift trust and self-disclosure.

2 Theoretical framework

In this chapter I will discuss the theoretical framework for my hypothesis *self-disclosure is an accelerator in building trust swiftly in temporary teams.*

The chapter is organized the following way: I start out by giving a brief introduction to the concept of trust, and some of the different approaches to understanding trust. I then move on to discuss the central part of my thesis, namely the notion of swift trust. Finally, I consider the role of self-disclosure.

I focus on two types of trust that is established quickly – *initial trust* and *swift trust*. Swift trust is a notion that has surfaced, in particular for the case of temporary systems (or temporary teams). Swift trust becomes important to understand when there is not enough time to build *conventional trust*, which typically happens over time. It is argued that "trust does not have the luxury of time", as is the case in for instance swift starting action teams (see, e.g., Wildman et al, 2012). Still there may be trust among team members, but a different type of trust, or perhaps more accurately, a different process leading to trust. Initial trust is related to categorization, which is a process that happens prior to the team members get to know each other (McKnight et al, 1998).

More importantly, although there is a substantial body of research on the relationship between trust and self-disclosure, the role of self-disclosure as an accelerator for (swift) trust does not seem to be well-studied in the literature.

2.1 Trust

The importance of trust in a multitude of relationships is abundantly clear, and also so in settings where several people need to work together to achieve a common goal in team settings.

> "*Trust has been described as "the chicken soup of social life", meaning that it seems to be something that cures and prevents all kinds of social problems, just as mum made chicken soup when we went down with a cold or flu, or any other illness for that matter.*"   (Kenneth Newton) [7]

Another quote signifying the importance of trust (or distrust, for that matter) is the Russian proverb "*Doveray, no proveray*" (or Trust, but verify) that was frequently used by president Ronald Reagan under disarmament talks between USA and the Soviet Union. Stalin also mentions the importance of (dis-) trust: "A healthy distrust is a good basis for working together".

In our global and fast paced world, trust seems more important than ever. Without trust, society as we know it simply would not exist. Trust is a key element in order for us to interact with other people, and trust can be viewed as glue, lubricant and a foundation for our society (Grimen, 2009, p.11, own translation). Trust is also recognized to have a positive effect on both coordination and control in organizations (see, e.g., Shapiro, 1987).

Trust is vital to all human relationships, such as families, working relations, communities and the entire society. Speaking of society, the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551 BC–479 BC) said the following about trust:

> "*There are three things that are necessary for a successful government: Weapons, food and trust. If in risk of losing one of these, the ruler should first give up weapons, then food. Trust must be guarded until the very end, because "without trust we cannot stand*". (Grimen, 2009, p.11, my translation).

Trust between team members and within any team environment is crucial to what makes the difference between a group of individuals working together in service of their objectives and a high-performing team" (Brent and Dent, 2017, p. 82).

Researchers have conceptualized trust as both a dynamic state (Rousseau et al., 1998) and a personality trait (Rotter, 1980). Rotter (1967, p. 651) defines interpersonal trust "as an

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[7] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.454.4512&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=6.

expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon".

Trust can be seen in both a cognitive and affective form (McAllister, 1995). Cognitive trust is based on previous knowledge or reputations and affective trust is based on the feelings and liking. Sometimes trust is formed upon the basis of both. Cognition-based trust is trust based on "good reasons" for trustworthiness, understood as basing trust on some kind of a priori knowledge. The level of knowledge necessary for trust is not total knowledge, as this would imply no need for trust, nor total ignorance as this would imply that there is no basis to base trust on (Simmel, 1964; Luhmann, 1979). Affective-based trust consists of emotional ties between people. McAllister's (1995) main hypothesis is that interpersonal trust is based on both these types of trust. His findings suggest furthermore that cognition-based trust precedes affect-based trust.

> "*trust operates between the known and unknown in predicting future outcomes; If you know nothing, you cannot make a rational decision to trust or distrust. The more you know, the more you can make a reflected judgment based on your expectations and willingness to be vulnerable.*" (van Heesch and Søreide, 2018, p.5)

Trust can be trust directed at specific person(s), or cabin crew members in my context, the entire team or crew, or the organization. Trust can also be based on personality characteristics of the trustor such as a general tendency to be trusting, or on previous experience with a team member, based on second-hand information, or the fact that a person possesses the correct certificates and/or training. The latter is important in the present setting, in which cabin crew all receive the same formal and practical training.

Trust enables us to take risks, and one can argue that "(t)rust is based on the expectation that one will find what is expected rather than feared" (McAllister, 1995, p. 25; Deutsch, 1973). Thus, part of the essential aspect of trust is the connection to the issue of vulnerability, and people's willingness to accept to place themselves in a vulnerable situation *vis a vis* other people. This is clearly seen in Rosseau et al. (1998, p.395) who see trust as "*a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the*

intentions or behavior of another". In other words, it all depends upon the trustee if trust can be given; the trustor has to accept to be in a vulnerable position and can only hope that the trust was worth giving. Robinson (1996, p. 576) defines trust as "a person's expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that another's future actions will be beneficial, favorable or at least not detrimental". Lewicki et al (2006) in their survey notes that more complex views on trust identifies three intentional subfactors; cognitive, affective and behavioral intentions.

Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) define trust as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other person will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party". Mayer et al. (1995) claim that the willingness, or propensity to trust others, depends on socio-economic factors such as personality types, cultural background, education and life experiences. Essentially, Mayer et al (1995) argue that for trust to be a meaningful concept, there has to be some kind of risk. The cognitive subfactor basis for trust in effect reduces the uncertainty, so that the trustor can with a lesser degree of uncertainty, know what how the trustee will act in future interactions.

Rubin (1975, p. 163) defines the essence of trust in the following way: "When another person reveals himself to you, you are likely to conclude that he likes and trusts you. He has, after all, made himself vulnerable to you, entrusting you with personal information that he would not ordinarily reveal to others."

Mayer et al (1995, 2007) make a distinction between three dimensions that can contribute to trust: an individual's *ability*, *benevolence* and *integrity*. These dimensions, or characteristics, arguably play different roles at different stages in the trust process. They argue that time plays a role, and that ability and integrity can be judged more quickly than benevolence. The importance of each of these three characteristics may differ between situations. A higher degree of dependence implies that benevolence is more important to build trust. This corresponds to the findings in Kramer's (1994) study.

The literature on (conventional) trust typically makes a distinction between *rational-based* trust and *relation-based* trust. The former is a type of trust based on "rational assessment, calculations and stereotypes with respect to the role more than the person", whereas the latter

is an "…affect-based experience of team members where positive interactions, stable patterns, openness and good intentions foster a high degree of confidence and care in relationships" (Moldjord and Iversen, 2015, p. 232).

In relation to the rational-based view of trust, this can be interpreted the following way: "When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him" (Gambetta, 2000, p. 4).

Moldjord and Iversen (2015) call the former aspect *role trust*, and the latter *vulnerability trust*:

1. Role trust-where there are certain characteristics/stereotypes in the role or membership of a group and an expectation that someone will act according to the responsibility of that role
2. Vulnerability trust is affect-based and based on openness in the group

They argue that high performing teams, such as aircrews, need both in the start-up phase of their existence. It can be argued that clarity within the group, characterized by such aspects as rank, previous performance, and similarity of training plays a significant role in diminishing member vulnerability and therefore increases trust.

The extent of perceived vulnerability depends on a range of different factors. For instance, people have a propensity to trust others that are similar to them in regard to age, sex, clothing, culture and religion (Grimen, 2009, p.15). Furthermore, if the trustor finds the trustee reliable and with good intentions, the more confidence he will have regarding cooperation (Das and Teng, 1998).

The definitions of trust are many and somewhat unclear, but making yourself vulnerable to the actions, behavior or intentions of another seem to be dominating the field of research. In other words: Trust serves the purpose of solving issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations (Meyerson et al., 1996).

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The traditional view is that trust takes time to build. Brent and Dent (2017, p. 84), argue that "…(l)ike many aspects of leading and building teams, it takes time and effort to ensure trust is established between all team members including the leader". The argument put forward by Brent and Dent (2017) is what typically is thought to be the essence of trust, namely that it takes time to build.

Lack of trust is associated with a higher amount of stress, low perceived task performance, lower satisfaction, and relationship commitment. (Costa et al, 2001).

The following figure taken from Rousseau et al (1998) illustrates trust development:

Figure 1: *Trust development (Rousseau et al, 1998)*

This corresponds well to the majority of the theoretical discussions on trust development, although some argue that there may be personality characteristics, such as a predisposition to trust others, that enables early trust that is not calculative.

Another view on trust is as a substitute for control, in the sense of being a positive attitude towards others' intentions. As argued by Rousseau et al (1998), control is needed when trust is not present, for instance through a detailed formal contract that guides behavior.

2.2   Initial trust, swift trust, and temporary teams

"*Together Everyone Achieves More*" (Brent and Dent, 2017, p.1).

When trust does not have the luxury of time, how can we explain for instance how military groups put their lives at stake trusting someone having their back? Medical teams put together for the first time for a complicated brain surgery, or a flight crew meeting each other for the first time yet delivering from the first minute?

2.2.1 Temporary teams

Before moving on to a thorough discussion of initial and swift trust, I will briefly discuss what we understand by teams and specifically temporary teams.

One definition of a team is: "A team is not a group of people who work together. A team is a group of people who trust each other" (Brent and Dent, 2017, p.82). Another definition of a team is due to Thompson (2008): "[a] team is a group of people who are interdependent with respect to information, resources, knowledge and skills and who seek to combine their efforts to achieve a common goal". The essential aspect of any definition of a team is that effort is coordinated, that a team creates more value than the individuals separately, and in addition, that team members typically have complementary skills. For the airline industry, we will see that the latter is not necessarily the case.

In traditional teambuilding you have the possibility of utilizing each other's strengths and weaknesses and put together the best team based on this. Mathieu and Rapp (2009) argue that it is the very first minutes in a team that will be the foundation of how well the team will perform. They furthermore claim that it is useful for all the team members to know each other's strengths and weaknesses.

The teams we will be focusing on, are so called *temporary teams*, or ad-hoc teams. They can be found among film crews, medical teams, on ships and in the air, like cabin and cockpit crew.

Temporary teams are, according to Goodman and Goodman (1976, p. 494) "a set of diversely skilled people working on a complex task over a limited amount of time*"*. Ben-Shalom et al

(2005) argue that this kind of temporary groups can be thought of as the equivalent of a "one-night stand" in organizations: "They have a finite life span, form around a shared and relatively clear goal or purpose, and their success depends on a tight and coordinated coupling of activity."

2.2.2 Initial trust and swift trust

The general idea of trust is that it takes time to build. However, there are times when total strangers come together as a team and perform and act as if trust is present (Meyerson et al, 1996). This can be explained by looking at other forms of trust called *initial trust* and *swift trust*.

Most scholars see swift trust and initial trust as being part of the same process without distinguishing these two with respect to the time frame, while others differentiate between those two. Van Heesch and Søreide (2018) argue that "...(s)wift trust has embraced a too broad and inconsequential perspective of trust formation" and adds that swift trust relies only partly on categorization while "immediate trust" is based on cognitive categories alone. Cognitive categorization happens subconsciously (Kahnemann, 2011). It can be argued that the time frame distinguishes initial trust from swift trust, as initial trust is often said to incur within the first few seconds. The time frame for swift trust can be somewhat larger.

Meyerson et.al (1996) proposed the idea of swift trust in a frequently cited article - cited around 2800 times on Google Scholar. They claim: "It is not so much an interpersonal form as a cognitive and action form". Like van Heesch and Søreide (2018), I am proposing that the cognitive or categorization part of swift trust should be viewed as a separate process, one we call *initial trust.* In addition, I am proposing that self-disclosure is an accelerator to building trust even quicker.

The short lived nature of temporary teams limits the amount of time for traditional trust building, but in spite of the short time available, I want to explore the idea that flight attendants do not deal with each other solely as roles, but are trying to add more strength to the working relationship by using self-disclosure strategies even if the flight only lasts 30 minutes. This is in contrast with Meyerson et al (1996) who claim "…(t)here is less emphasis

on feeling, commitment and exchange and more on action, cognition, the nature of the network and labor pool, and avoidance of personal disclosure, contextual cues, modest dependency and heavy absorption in the task. That's what seems to give swift trust its distinctive quality".

My proposal is that the relationship can be of a very short duration, the work can be action-oriented, with teams that form and dissolve within as little as 30 minutes.

Conventional trust is normally seen as repeated interactions over time leading to an establishment of expectations of actions. This is sometimes called the developmental approach to trust, in which the baseline of trust is zero and where trust takes time to develop (Lewicki et al, 2006). However, as argued by several authors, the trust baseline may be at moderate to high level. Kramer (1994) shows that MBA students that have no history of interacting show remarkably high levels of trust. If the baseline of trust is low, we can call this a case of *distrust* (van Heesch and Søreide, 2018).

There are at least two avenues of research that attempt to explain moderate and high levels of initial trust. McKnight et al (1998, 2006) explain the findings of moderate to high levels of initial trust with reference to three different factors: 1) personality factors, 2) institution-based structures, and 3) cognitive processes. *Personality factors* refer to a type of "faith in humanity" effect, in that some individuals are more predisposed to trust others based certain personality characteristics. *Institution-based structures* refer to that "the necessary impersonal structures are in place", such as *situation normality* and *structural assurances* (McKnight et al, 1998). Situation normality refers to the belief that since the situation is normal, the likely outcome is success, whereas structural assurances refer to the belief that certain factors are in place such "as promises, contracts, regulations, and guarantees" (McKnight et al, 1998, p. 478). *Cognitive processes* in McKnight et al (1998) refer to three categorization processes that facilitate the development of trusting belief: i) unit grouping, ii) reputation categorization, and iii) stereotyping. Unit grouping means that individuals who are grouped together and share the same goals and values tend to have a positive attitude towards each other, which then quickly leads to high levels of trust. Reputation categorization is based on the belief that individuals with good reputation are trustworthy, where reputation may be based on professional competence, or on benevolence, honesty, and predictability. Stereotyping is

categorization based on generalization at some level of other individuals, be it at a broad level (e.g., gender) or more specialized levels (e.g., type of occupation). Expectations and stereotypes are "imported" from similar experienced settings to swiftly build trust.

Another approach is that of Meyerson et al (1996). They focus on temporary groups that come together to perform complex and skilled interactions, where the team members form *swift trust* based on some of the following factors (see, e.g., Lewicki et al, 2006): i) role-based interactions, ii) efforts to minimize inconsistency and uncertainty in the role-based interactions, iii) role-based behavior based on professional standards and procedures, iv) recruitment of similar type individuals (with similar reputations), and v) the team members engage in tasks of moderate levels of interdependence.

Meyerson et al (1996) suggest that (moderate) interdependence in swift trust is important, and I argue that the degree of interdependence is sufficiently high in cabin crew for swift trust to be important. Many of the tasks performed by cabin crew are interdependent, but some of the tasks require independent work. Thus, the requirement of Meyerson et al (1998) that tasks are at moderate levels of interdependence is present in the setting I consider. Wong and Neustaedter (2017) show that flight attendants work in both tightly and loosely collaboration, depending on the task.

What seem to be at stake here are issues of *trust* and *risk*. Trust always involves an element of risk because of the inability to monitor others' behavior, to have complete knowledge about their motivations, or because of the general uncertainties related to social life. In Popa (2005) she argues that temporary groups introduce uncertainty, and that this uncertainty generates a cognitive stress. In such a situation, Popa (2005) argues that people in temporary teams will attempt to reduce this uncertainty through active social communication.

Berger and Calabrese (1975) indicates that when strangers meet, they would attempt to reduce uncertainty, or alternatively increase the predictability, of how themselves and others they interact with behave.

2.2.3 Swift trust in temporary teams

In Meyerson et al (1996, p. 170) temporary systems are such that "swift judgments about [trust and] trustworthiness can't be avoided, because they enable people to act quickly in the face of uncertainty".

From the outside it can seem like the group have a history of working together and that they have previous knowledge about each other, but in most cases, they have never worked together before, perhaps not even seen each other before. Temporary groups are usually fast-paced, meaning they must accomplish their goals quickly before they dissolve again. They must work together as if trust is present, as there is no time to figure out who can be trusted or not (Iacono and Weisband, 1997).

In temporary teams, speed at establishing trust is even more important than in more long-lasting teams. Members of temporary teams have diverse skills and knowledge but there usually is not enough time to find out each other's core competencies. This implies that you cannot utilize the groups weaknesses and strengths, and therefore you cannot create the optimal team.

As Meyerson et al (1996) claim that trust is imported based on earlier experience, Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) argue that in virtual teams it is the early pattern of communication behavior that initially creates trust, and that social communication strengthens trust. In Meyerson et al (1996) swift trust is based on "surface level cues", and they argue that trust in temporary systems is a result of presumptions, not experience acquired over time. Swift trust also requires clear role divisions. If roles are not clear or if team members act inconsistently, trust will not develop.

Swift trust is considered to be highly cognitive. As Meyerson et al. (1996, p. 191) argue, swift trust relationships have "less emphasis on feeling, commitment, and exchange and more on…cognition…and heavy absorption in the task". Furthermore, swift trust is action-oriented because a need for action is why the group was formed (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1998; Meyerson et al, 1996). These characteristics are what make swift trust distinct. Therefore, Meyerson et al (1996) identify two interrelated issues that arise when temporary group members make trust decisions, which includes how to mitigate vulnerability and risk. The

vulnerability may be partly mitigated by ensuring, for instance, role clarity within the group and similarity in training, which therefore tends to increase trust.

Individuals interacting within temporary systems without any pre-knowledge could turn to a cognitive categorization process and make the trustee fit into a stereotypical character (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005; Myers et al., 2012). This implies leaning on the cognitive categorization perspective (e.g. stereotyping, labelling, schemas etc.). From Ben-Shalom et al (2005) we know that members of temporary groups form stereotypical impressions of others based on a type of categorization (*category-driven information processing*).

Meyerson et al. (1996) suggest that strangers build trust faster by dealing with each other through roles than through personal relationships, which may take a long time to develop. Thus, an ability to rapidly establish a common understanding of each other's responsibilities and tasks (i.e. role clarity), represents a form of (swift) trust building suited for temporary teams, as demonstrated also in a recent study of liaison officers in emergency operation centers in Australia (Curnin et al., 2015).

Virtual teams share the same characteristics as temporary teams, and it is likely that this also applies to cabin crew teams. Most, if not all, airlines, have an everchanging rotation of their crew, and the teams are never working together on a permanent basis. They come together for the specific flight, perform towards a common goal, and then dissolve to never exist again as the exact same team. The entire existence of this team is formed around a certain time frame and a certain goal. On board a commercial aircraft there are two teams within the team. One is the cockpit crew and the other one is the cabin crew. They do however share the same goals; the safety of the passengers, its crew and the aircraft, efficiency, and productivity (Chute et al, 1995). The frequent changing of team composition in airline crews, limits the anticipation of skills, knowledge, strengths and habits within the team, according to Ku et al (2014).

2.3 Categorization factors

2.3.1 First impressions

As human beings we will always have a strong urge to understand our surroundings and making sense of our very existence. In order to conquer, explore, acquire wisdom-or perhaps

even more important: to interact wisely with our environment so we can detect danger early enough to ensure our survival, also known as self-preservation, we need to trust our surroundings. Meeting people for the very first time it is important to figure out if they want to harm us or do us good. These so-called "first-impressions" are rapidly formed and mostly subconscious and can facilitate the process of finding someone trustworthy or not (Bar et al, 2006).

First impressions are formed quickly and can be long-lasting and determine how communication and relations develop over time and will influence the future of both the relation and communication long after the initial meeting. First encounters, impressions formed during those encounters, and the relational decisions generated therein have a strong and lasting influence on relationships (Sunnafrank and Ramirez, 2004).

Time critical situations and tasks with high complexity requires immediate trust. Our brain uses mental structures (schemata) to organize the impressions(stimuli) into categories, a process called categorization.[8] This happens very quickly and subconsciously based on very little information, sometimes just a glimpse. The immediate trust based upon schemas and categorization takes place within 60 seconds, a short glimpse. This is what we call *initial trust*.

First impressions are often formed by the visual input from face appearances and can be formed within the first 39 milli-seconds according to Bar et al. (2006). In another study by Willis and Todorov (2006), judgements of attractiveness, trustworthiness, aggressiveness, likeability, and competence were made after a 100-millisecond exposure. These first-impression judgements were highly correlated with judgments with no time constraints. Also, increasing the exposure time did not increase correlations, which suggests that a 100-millisecond exposure is sufficient to form a first impression. Furthermore, Sunnafrank and Ramirez (2004) suggest that first impressions have a long duration, and that impressions made after only three-minute first encounters determine the long-term nature of relationships.

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[8] https://www.britannica.com/science/schema-cognitive

In Sprecher et al (2012) it is argued that "initial impressions of others are often positive because limited information can lead to the assumption of similarity".

> «*First encounters, impressions formed during those encounters, and the relational decisions generated therein have a strong and lasting influence on relationships. Enduring effects from first encounters are obvious in situations when negative impressions produce decisions to avoid or severely restrict further contact with another*» (Sunnafrank and Ramirez, 2004, p. 361)

These first impressions and categorizations are often the basis upon which we form trust.

This trust we call *initial trust*:

> "*Initial trust between parties will not be based on any kind of experience with, or firsthand knowledge of, the other party. Rather, it will be based on an individual's disposition to trust or on institutional cues that enable one person to trust another without firsthand knowledge*" (McKnight, Cummings and Chervany, 1998, p. 474).

In other words, there is no pre-knowledge, no affective dimension, only a cognitive sub-conscious evaluation. The cognitive process, through categorization, is a disposition to trust (such as faith in humanity) and institution-based trust (a type of situation that feels safe, some kind of safety nets or safety structures).

We have argued that trust takes time to build. However, in some cases there is no time available, yet there seems to be some sort of trust any way. At least people act as if trust is present. In a field study of combat units at war, Ben-Shalom et al (2005) observed two parallel processes related to swift impression-making in settings relevant to my study, i.e., in temporary settings. The team members had limited room for developing expectations based on first-hand information, and therefore initially imported expectations of trust based on other settings. This was done through making use of "category-driven information processing" which then helped form stereotypical impressions.

When it is impossible to control each other's actions and behaviors, team members have to trust each other, and by doing so, they are making themselves vulnerable. Looking at it this way, trust becomes a tool to focus on the task itself instead of monitoring each other or

having to worry about the safety of the individual or the team, especially when the degree of uncertainty is high (Ben-Shalom et al, 2005).

2.3.2 Importing expectations

Part of the categorization process is to import expectations from other (previous) experiences. This can be related to McKnight et al (1998) as part of the explanation of why there may exist moderate to high levels of initial trust. This is discussed in further detail above. Ben-Shalom et al (2005) also stress the importance of using category-driven information processing, in which team members import expectations from previous situations. This is highly relevant for the situation I study, as the work environment and procedures are, if not identical, very similar. This makes importing expectations from previous situations more relevant.

2.3.3 Uniform

Another part of categorization is the use of uniforms, which establishes an identity for the bearer and those who work with him/her, and it signals to others that the bearer has a similar background, the same training, focus on the same things, and the same basic (company) values, to others with the same uniform.

It is also argued that visual ques such as rank or uniform, can be said to stimulate and influence the acceleration of initial trust.

Joseph and Alex (1972, p. 719) argue that the uniform is "…a device to resolve certain dilemmas of complex organizations – namely, to define their boundaries, to assure that members will conform to their goals , and to eliminate conflicts in the status set of their members". Essentially, the uniform is a group emblem, it reveals and conceals status, it is a certificate of legitimacy, and it suppresses individuality.

2.3.4 Role clarity and SOPs

Role clarity and standardized operating procedures can play an important role in explain the high levels of initial trust as well as the speed with which trust is established in the present

setting. This is highlighted by several authors, including Meyerson et al (1998): "when there is no time to engage in the usual forms of confidence-building activities that contribute to the development and maintenance of trust, providing clarity of the individual's specific role as identified in swift trust may be an alternative form of trust building suited to temporary organizations". Thus, people are dealt with more in terms of their roles rather than as individuals. In this thesis, I will however argue that by using self-disclosure people are not only dealt with in terms of their roles.

As is reported by all informants, this role clarity is crucial. As stated by Curnin et al (2015, p. 31), "Consequently, during the first meeting role clarity was crucial in terms of developing swift trust as the soldiers had to trust that the other soldiers they worked with had a clear understanding how to perform their own job".

Curnin et al (2015, p. 31) further stress this importance: "In a model of factors contributing to swift trust, individual-related characteristics based on experience and competency highlighted that specialist knowledge was a contributing factor to developing swift trust. It appears that clarification of the person's specialist knowledge and therefore subsequent role in the team resulted in an acceptance of that person's competency and ultimately the formation of trust building".

2.4 Communication and the importance of self-disclosure for swift trust

"*We talk about everything under the sun. We call it 'jumpseat confessionals.' Our life is a bit strange. We are thrown into a situation with people you probably have not met before and probably will not again so lot of the people that I work with that I will never ever see again in my career. There is a certain kind of anonymity when we are talking to each other, so people tend to disclose lots of personal information.*" - P3, Female, Lead/Cabin Crew member (Wong and Neustaedter, 2017, p. 952)

What is central to the ensuing discussion is the paradox of observing substantial self-disclosure even in the face of interaction with someone you do not expect to meet again (or at

least not very frequently). This is a paradox as self-disclosure is typically a result of acquired intimacy, resulting from long-term relationships.

We can resolve this paradox by connecting this to *anonymity* and the "stranger on the train"-phenomenon, in which the cost of self-disclosure can be perceived to be lower in the face of an anonymous recipient as the recipient will not have access to the same network of friends and colleagues as the discloser. Anonymity, which implies that you are not identifiable to the other person, ensures that private information will be disclosed to your own network of friends and colleagues. Thus, there is no apparent cost of self-disclosing even very intimate information (Derlega and Chaikin, 1977).

After dealing with self-disclosure, I will try to connect self-disclosure to swift trust.

2.4.1 Self-disclosure

"*We maintain a barrier around ourselves which is based on non-disclosure. This barrier is opened when we self-disclose, thus making us more vulnerable to our surroundings.*" (Derlega and Chaikin, 1977, p. 104)

Self-disclosure is defined by Greene, Derlega and Mathews (2006) as "a deliberate or voluntary activity whereby people reveal information, thoughts, feelings about themselves to at least one other person during an interaction". Revealing your motives, intentions, goals, values, and emotions, can increase liking and feelings of intimacy (Offermann and Rosh, 2012).

Self-disclosure is the verbal transmission of information about oneself (Derlega and Chaikin, 1977). Self-disclosure is important for both building and maintaining relationships between strangers and acquaintances (Collins and Miller, 1994). As persons continue to communicate with each other, their uncertainty about each other decreases. Decreases in uncertainty lead to increases in intimacy level of communication (Berger and Calabrese, 1975).

> "*A self disclosure is any message about the self that a person communicates to another. Consequently any message or message unit may potentially vary in the*

degree of self disclosure present depending upon the perceptions of the message by those involved (in the transaction)" (Wheeless and Grotz, 1977, p.76)

An early perspective about self-disclosure (Derlega et al, 2008) is *social penetration theory* which was proposed by Altman and Taylor (1973). It has also been called the "onion theory", as it describes the different layers of information that is gradually revealed as the relationship between partners progress and becomes closer-from superficial to more personal. The information-seeking process is initially centered on acquiring general knowledge about the new acquaintance. At this stage, people might view a person as a potential friend or partner or feel reserved and only exchange superficial information (Derlega et al, 2008).

Steel (1991) argues that an "individual's concept of and ability to self-disclose is in part a product of trust". Thus, the vulnerability involved in self-disclosure implies that you trust the receiver.

Derlega et al (1976) found that strangers reciprocate disclosure more than friends in social settings, and Altman (1973) claims that the norm of reciprocity is weaker in the later stages than at the very beginning of the relationship.

Individuals have different interpersonal skills, and those who are attentive and responsive to what others are saying, are "high openers" (measured by the Opener scale). They are more likely to engage in intimate conversation and encourage other to do the same. Low openers, on the contrary, were not very willing to self-disclose (Derlega et al, 2008).

Social penetration theory is based on self-disclosure, as it describes the process of moving a relationship, whether work relationships, friendships or romantic relationships, from superficial to a deeper level (Carpenter and Greene, 2015).

Self-disclosure is a transaction at cognitive, emotional, and behavioral levels between a discloser and a discloser recipient. Self-disclosure serves the purpose of assessing the interest, trustworthiness, and suitability for starting a close relationship (Derlega et al, 2008). Self-disclosure can differ in many aspects, depending on how much information is being revealed versus protection of one's privacy, how truthful the information is, the content and uniqueness of the disclosure, to name a few of the characteristics (Derlega et al, 2008).

Affinity, or liking and feeling positive toward another, is central to dyadic relationship formation and maintenance: «During initial encounters, strangers choose various strategies or sets of strategies from their repertoires, so first meetings is a most fruitful arena for studying affinity-seeking interaction» (Martin and Rubin, 2009).

A study by Berger (1973) revealed that during the course of interaction between strangers, the amount of demographic (low intimacy) information asked for and given was highest during the first minute of interaction. This is similar to Altman (1973) who suggests that disclosure reciprocity may be stronger early in a relationship than later in the relationship. In Jourard (1960) there is an indication of a *dyadic effect* when it comes to the level of intimacy of self-disclosure. In particular, he finds that those who disclose most also reported that they received a reciprocal, high level of disclosure from others.

When two persons face each other after a long period of separation, they may have to go through a certain amount of biographic- demographic scanning behavior in order to update their knowledge of each other.

Researchers have found that trust is antecedent to the willingness of wanting to disclose oneself (Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Wheeless and Grotz (1977) also finds that individualized trust is related to self-disclosure, as opposed to generalized trust. Both are outcomes of communication in relationship development. Communication builds trust, and disclosing personal information even more so, as mentioned by Derlega and Chaikin (1977). Trust is of vital importance as disclosing sensitive information is making the disclosure vulnerable and includes risks and uncertainty when personal information is revealed to someone you do not know. The information could be revealed to an unwanted third-party (Derlega et al, 2008).

When strangers meet, their primary concern is one of uncertainty reduction or increasing predictability about the behavior of both themselves and others in the interaction (Berger and Calabrese, 1975).

The impressions we tend to form about other people are largely based on the information they are disclosing about themselves. Participants in a self-disclosing communication may view the speaker as similar to themselves, and based upon this, viewed as predictable and understandable. Anxiety can be reduced, and comfort increased when listeners expectancies

are confirmed. This is not necessarily true for all communication, and sometimes negative communication might bring more uncertainty and anxiety. Negative communication might be personal problems and vulnerabilities or the need for having to defend oneself (Lazowski and Andersen, 1990).

Self-disclosure is related to social exchange and social penetration theory, and relationships proceed from non-intimate to intimate areas of exchange. Social penetration theory emphasizes the time dimension, whereas this is not crucial in social exchange. The uniqueness of social penetration theory is the joint effect of both verbal and non-verbal communication in the process of getting to know each other. Worthy, Gary and Kahn (1969) suggests being on the receiving end of self-disclosing information is rewarding because this means that one is trusted, and the more intimate self-disclosure the more rewarding is this for the receiver.

Cozby (1973) argues that although higher the level of intimacy in the self-disclosing information, there is a cost attached to being afraid that information that should be kept private is being revealed. This is similar to the finding by Rubin (1973, p. 163): "When another person reveals himself to you, you are likely to conclude that he likes and trusts you. He has, after all, made himself vulnerable to you, entrusting you with personal information that he would not ordinarily reveal to others".

Essentially and as pointed out by Germain and McGuire (2014, p. 360), "(e)ncouraging openness, honesty, and disclosure in swift trust situations requires individuals to become vulnerable and engage in risk-taking behavior".

Altman and Haythorn (1965) investigates the pattern of self-disclosure among pairs of subjects who were isolated in a small room for 10 days. This implies that there is a high mutual dependency between the subjects. The control group spent most of the time together but had access to "the outside world". This is the low dependency group. High-dependency dyads disclosed more intimate information and had a more active pattern of social interaction than the control group. A lack of dependency, as is the case with interaction with a stranger with little likelihood of future interaction, removes the self-disclosure constraints and, in fact, causes increased disclosure. This is like the *stranger on the train*-phenomenon mentioned above.

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In an experimental study, Altschuller and Benbunan-Fich (2008) find that disclosure is the most significant contributor to trust within *ad hoc* emergency response teams.

2.4.2 The importance of reciprocity and the degree of self-disclosure

According to social penetration theory self-disclosure can exist on two dimensions: *Breadth* and *depth*. Breadth can be solely on the superficial level, where you can share information about your favorite sports team and only that, or you can go in to a variety of subjects that can be equally superficial, like restaurants you prefer or vacation spots. However, if you start talking about personal things like sharing stories about what happened on that specific vacation, you are scoring higher on the other dimension of depth, according to Derlega and Chaikin (1977). Depth is the level of intimacy that you are disclosing.

You chose your position on both the breath and the depth scale, depending on the kind of relationship and contact you wish to build or maintain with others. In order to have a genuine and intimate relationship you need a high score of breadth and depth.

Discloser reciprocity is a process of mutual disclosing, and it is a key element in social penetration theory. When disclosing, reciprocity is expected, meaning that if you reveal some kind of intimate details, then it is expected that the person being disclosed to will do the same, on the same level. It will not be very successful if you are talking about a date that went wrong or family matters if the person sitting next to you is only willing to share with you that pizza is his or hers favorite food.

This can be illustrated in the following stylized figure:

Figure 2: *Self-disclosure and swift trust*.

Reciprocity can be perceived as a type of situation normality, as discussed in McKnight et al (1998). If you reciprocate with the same breadth and depth as the discloser, this may accelerate the process of generating swift trust. If, however, the reciprocation is less than expected, there is a negative effect on trust formation.

One way to gain information about someone, is to start by giving them information about yourself first. Derlega and Chaikin (1977) claims that openness is matched with openness, as the norm of reciprocity is important. Furthermore, they state that we may end up revealing more intimate information than we really want to, because the other person reveals intimate information. It is the same with concealment or even silence, as one of the respondents in the interviews I conducted for this study mentioned: "If I talk a lot about myself and the other person seems totally uninterested, or is not even replying, I shut down completely and we are not talking anymore".

The feeling of exclusivity is important. According to Rubin (1973 p.163) it is important to be selective of whom you are disclosing to, meaning that you are "choosing" your listener carefully, making him/her feel she is being trusted and liked more than others. This can lead

to the feeling of being pushed to reveal more of yourself than you are comfortable with. One way of keeping control of the conversation is to avoid the "depth" dimension, and instead focus on breadth, in that way you are giving the appearance of contributing equally in the conversation (Jones and Archer, 1976).

Self-disclosure can backfire, that is when you reveal either too much or the timing is wrong. Offermann and Rosh (2012) mentions the example of a chairman revealing information about unconfirmed projects or "confidential information" to his staff. They felt trusted by this act. Leaders who disclose themselves to fellow coworkers can build trust, greater teamwork and cooperation, according to Offermann and Rosh (2012). However, the board viewed this as oversharing and lack of discipline. Revealing too little can result in people being suspicious and uncertain, as you have no information about that person, according to Offermann and Rosh (2012).

2.5 Self-disclosure and swift trust – a short summary

My main hypothesis is that self-disclosure may act as an accelerator for swift trust development. Swift trust is of special importance when the team involved is assembled as a temporary team, as conventional trust takes time to build. There is a certain paradox in self-disclosing when in company with a (temporary) team member that you do not expect to meet again frequently, or not at all. You would expect to observe a sufficient level of friendship prior to self-disclosure of intimate details. This is related to the risk that you face when trusting in another individual (trusting that he/she will not relay this information to others). However, there is a certain guarantee when disclosing information to "a stranger" in that this stranger cannot easily relay this information to someone you know, resulting in a lower perceived risk of being subject to leaked intimate information (i.e., this reduces the cost of self-disclosure, as the cost is partly associated with the risk of the information being made available to others).

According to Derlega and Chaikin (1977), greater disclosure has been given to total strangers in many cases, which can be explained by the fact that there is a guarantee of anonymity and the fact that you know that this person does not have a direct access to your friends and family, so that the information will be safely kept between the two of you. Furthermore, they

argue that the obligation to reciprocate is greater early in the relationship. However, there seems to be a potential outcome that the receiver of information may withdraw rather than reciprocate if the information is judged to be extremely intimate. To sum up, Derlega and Chaikin (1977, p. 103) argue that «the extent of control one maintains over this exchange of information contributes to the amount of privacy one has in a social relationship».

This is supported by Altman (1973) who notes that the norm of disclosure reciprocity may be stronger early in a relationship than in later stages of the relationship. Similarly, in Sprecher et al (2012), where it is argued that receiving disclosure from another implies that you gain knowledge about this individual, which again reduces uncertainty. This reduction in uncertainty may arguably lead to higher levels of trust.

By self-disclosing private information, you put yourself in a vulnerable position. If the recipient of this information perceives this information to be information he/she would not normally reveal to others, then it is likely that the recipient feels trusted. A common response in such a situation is "…to demonstrate to the other person that his affection and trust are well placed" (Rubin, 1973, p. 163). Thus, such disclosure increases trust, and as a logical extension to this argument, early disclosures leads to even swifter build of trust or put differently, accelerates trust development.

2.6 Tentative model

Based on the theoretical framework presented above, we can illustrate the relationship between a set of factors that influence initial trust and swift trust:

Figure 3: *Research model.*

The research model is based on McKnight et al (1998) and Meyerson et al (1996). The categorization, or initial trust, is primarily based on expectations that you have prior to meeting someone (e.g., importing expectations from previous situations which again can be related to stereotyping and reputation, or institution-based factors). Swift trust is more closely linked to behavior that confirm or weaken prior expectations, such as self-disclosure, role-based behavior or efforts that to minimize inconsistency.

For the specific case of the relationship between self-disclosure and swift trust, I refer to figure 2 above.

In the analysis in the next chapter, we will get back to these relationships in more detail based on the response from the informants.

3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The goal of my thesis is to investigate the establishment of swift trust in the case of airline cabin crew, where the establishment of the cabin teams is determined in an *ad hoc* manner. It is often the case that someone you work with on, for instance, flights the next 3 days, is someone you never work with again. The processes behind the establishment of swift trust is not clearly understood in this setting, neither with reference to theory nor in terms of causal relationships, and it is reasonable to expect that the context I consider and the conditions under which cabin crew work will have a crucial impact on the establishment of swift trust. Consequently, I have chosen an explorative, intensive research design to be able to both test and revise hypothesis as the research progresses.

Research design is a plan for how the investigation can be conducted. The design describes guidelines for how the researcher envisages to undertake the project, that is, what the research should focus on, who are potential informants, where the investigation is to be undertaken, and how it should be undertaken (Thagaard, 1998).

The goal of this chapter is to explain the choice of research design and method I have made for the analysis in this master thesis, as well as provide an explanation for how the investigation is conducted in practice.

A crucial and main delineation of research design is the division between quantitative and qualitative research design. One could think of these two mindsets as different paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). Quantitative research design is typically a deductive method, in which one starts with theories, develops hypothesis', and tests these hypothesis' against data from the phenomenon that one wishes to study. The main focus is on explaining (causal) relationships based on data gathered while maintaining a distance to the source of the data (Tjora, 2012). This is not an approach that I consider to be instructive to understand the processes that explains how trust is established, nor the importance of communication to establish trust.

The qualitative research tradition is more oriented towards an inductive method, where the focus is on exploring the topic or phenomenon through an approach driven by the empirics. The search light is on understanding phenomenon and relationships, and this is done through

a closeness to the "source" of the data (for instance, the informants or interviewees). Tjora (2012) argues that qualitative studies typically relate to an interpretive paradigm, with a focus on the informants' perception and attitudes. The interplay between theory and empirics is, in other words, a central feature of qualitative research design.

I would like to shed more light on how trust exists initially and develops further in temporary teams where the traditional view of trust development is not appropriate. In particular I would like to better understand how self-disclosure and reciprocity may help accelerate trust development. This requires a more open approach to the research question. Qualitative analysis is better equipped to expand on the informants' attitudes to a topic and what contributes to create these attitudes (Tjora, 2012), and is consequently better suited in the setting I consider in which it is crucial for me to understand how the informants think about the issues raised. It will often be the case that personal experiences that may be uncovered through a dialogue between the researcher and interviewee to a lesser extent would be possible to identify prior to the interview, and which therefore could not have been specified as questions or statements in a questionnaire. These depth interview situations are therefore often termed *inter-subjective* (Tjora, 2012, p. 24) due to the interactive nature of the "data generation process".

A consequence of the interaction between the informant and the researcher is that these types of analysis may to a larger extent be coloured by the researcher's interpretation of the dialogue; that is, what we call *researcher subjectivity* (Tjora, 2012). This an issue that needs to be taken into account when we analyse and considers the results in a qualitative study. In my study, I am clear at the outset on my own role and relationship to the informants and to the issues studied. Although there is a challenge in the fact that I am closely related to the issues studied which may influence my interpretations of the informants' responses, it is also a benefit in that I can more easily put myself in the informants' place. Through the interview process and my dwelling into relevant theory, I have nevertheless adapted my understanding of the processes leading up to swift trust. The research process thus has somewhat changed my initial understanding of the phenomenon. I have also attempted to be explicit about the coding process and have attempted to let it be very close to the data generated from the interviews.

I consider an explorative research design to be more appropriate to shed light on and understand the processes that contributes to a well-functioning team and what contributes to the development of trust. The study is undertaken through depth interviews of seven informants. This gives me the opportunity to investigate if there are any patterns in how the respondents perceives the different aspects of working as cabin attendants, how trust is formed and develops, and what is crucial to achieve and give trust. In relation to my main research topic it has been important to have an open approach to the topic, as I do not have any clearly defined hypothesis I wish to test. Conducting depth interviews is therefore considered to be a more fruitful approach than, for instance, conducting a survey.

In my study, the respondents express their opinions on both themselves and their experiences, but also about the team as such and their observations about the interaction between other team members. This implies that the respondents also are informants (i.e., not only conveying information about themselves).

The role of theory in qualitative studies can related to the identification of interesting topics within the field of study, or as a starting point for further analysis and theory development. A common qualitative research process involves an indictive approach, in which theory is developed further based on the input from the data collected. For instance, as in the research tradition *grounded theory* (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), in which one perceives the development of theories to be the result of a circular interplay between the generation of data and the development of concepts and theories (Tjora, 2012).

Established theories and explanatory models within the different fields of study will influence which phenomenon one perceives and not perceives as a researcher. One can think of these different explanatory models as a type of flashlights, where the light from the flashlight determines which aspects one takes into account. We often call this the researcher's sensitivity (Tjora, 2012).

This is also related to Kuhn's thoughts that researchers are influenced by the theoretical framework in which one operates: "…*judgments are nonetheless tightly constrained during normal science by the example of the guiding paradigm*", but when there is a paradigm shift one is "released" from these.

We can also relate this to the *hermeneutical circle*. The basis for all analysis is the knowledge one already possesses, and one uses this *pre-knowledge* of a topic when one starts to attempt to understand the phenomenon we wish to study. The basis of the hermeneutics is that all insights are based on an interpretation of what we observe.

3.2 The quality of the analysis

A crucial issue to consider the quality of the analysis in relation to all types of research where empirics and data are involved, is to evaluate the following three important factors:

1. Reliability,
2. Validity
3. Generalizability

Reliability is related to the possibility of replication and is a way of saying something about how good the measurement is. We understand this to mean that a reliable conclusion is one which other researchers also would reach if conducting the study based on the same premises. To analyse the data I have gathered through the interview process, I have grouped the topics of the interviews into main themes related to personality characteristics, knowledge and skills, and communication. As I have learnt more about relevant theory, especially related to self-disclosure and reciprocation, I have gone back to the transcripts and reinterpreted the findings in light of theory. This has enabled me to more accurately pinpoint the most important factors affecting trust development, and better understand the phenomenon.

A crucial point to ensure reliability is to make the choices and interpretations be as *transparent* as possible, so that the relationship between the data (empirics), the analysis and the results are as objective as possible. I address this issue by describing the "data" accurately, and by seeking a high degree of transparency when it comes to using the data in the analysis. Transparency greatly increases the quality of the analysis and the ensuing results. Throughout the analysis I choose to use quotes from the informants to illustrate and exemplify the analysis and results. Furthermore, I have allowed all informants to read and comment on the transcripts of the interviews.

Reliability, however, is not related to whether the analysis in fact measures what one intends to investigate. To consider this, one would evaluate the study's or conclusion's *validity*. The validity tells us whether the study measures what it sets out to measure. Validity requires reliability (that is, it is a necessary condition for validity), but reliability is not a sufficient condition. This is also called *internal validity*. Internal validity deals with whether there is clear causality between the dependent variable and the independent variables (i.e., whether *x* in fact affects *y*). I have addressed this issue through transparency about the process which generates the results presented, and I have also tried to identify other factors that may influence the causality (if that has occurred). An ideal approach would potentially use triangulation, or using more data sources, but with the limited time frame in which this study is undertaken, this has not been an option.

Generalizability is associated with the degree to which the results of the analysis can generalized to the entire population, or to what extent the results are representative for the target population. We can also call this the *external validity* of the analysis. Even if generalizability is an aim for the majority of the quantitative research conducted, this is not necessarily so for qualitative research. In this research tradition, the focus is more on overall understanding and deep knowledge. In the analysis I also refer to a number of other studies that support the data gathered in the interviews. This strengthens the external validity of my study.

Tjora (2012) discusses three different type of generalization: i) naturalistic, ii) moderate, and iii) conceptual. *Naturalistic generalisation* is understood to mean that the reader himself/herself evaluates the potential for transferability of the research based on the researcher's thorough reporting of all relevant facts of the study or case. When we use the term *moderate generalisation*, we are closer to the quantitative understanding of generalisation, apart from the fact that the generalisation is limited to certain specific situations. Conceptual generalisation is the development of theories and concepts based on the specific case, but where these theories and concepts may also be relevant for other types of cases.

In my analysis, the insight generated may not necessarily be possible to generalise to all similar situations. However, the insight may at least be moderately generalisable as a form of

conceptual generalization through the identification of some theoretical (causal) relationships. This may have validity in other situations. It is not clear whether the results in my analysis can be extended to other airlines where cultural differences and norms may be different.

In qualitative studies, the role of the researcher will often involve more interaction with the informants (the data generators). In this study, I investigate aspects of my own working environment with colleagues of mine as informants. This implies that I as a researcher possesses thorough knowledge of the issues dealt with in the study. This allows me to ask entirely different questions than those an outsider would be able to ask, but it also implies that I, in the role of the researcher, may be more pre-disposed in relation to the topics studied. To make this less prevalent, I have chosen a research design with depth interviews which allows the informants an opportunity to raise issues and thoughts that I have not necessarily thought of.

In addition, there is an issue of strategic response from the informants. By this we understand that the informants would like to portray themselves in a positive light (Thagaard, 2009). This may be amplified by the fact that the informants know me. This may affect the value of the information gathered and will be discussed in further detail below.

The quality of the information gathered from the depth interviews is critically dependent on the trust between the informant and the researcher (Tjora, 2012). Since all of the informants are people I know from before, I deem this trust to be established prior to the interviews are conducted. This allows me to obtain more and better information about topics/issues that are perceived to be sensitive.

3.3 Research ethical considerations

The most important elements associated with research ethics is to regulate the relationship between the researcher and the object or person(s) that is the focus of the study.

One crucial element is my own role in relation to both the situation studied and in relation to the informants.

All the informants are colleagues of me, apart from one informant. This implies that all informants, apart from one, are persons that I know from before, and to varying extent have worked with. Furthermore, 3 of the informants would be in a working position as air hosts/hostesses which imply that they would be below me in rank. These factors may have both positive and negative effects on the value of the information gathered through the interviews.

There is a danger that the informants would like to portray themselves in a good light by answering in a way which corresponds to how they think is expected of them. This is, in part, because I would be their «boss», and in part because I know most of them from before. I have attempted to address this by selecting some informants that are more senior than me (worked longer with SAS) who also works as air pursers. It does not appear that the type of position gives any systematic differences in the response from the informants. Part of the reason for this may be that the questions asked in the interview is not viewed as sensitive when the informant would be in a normal working relationship together with me.

The fact that all informants, apart from one, are people I know from before, may make it easier for the informants that the information they provide is not distributed to other parts of the organisation. Thus, it may make it easier for the informants to open up. The information provided by the single informant that I did not know beforehand is not substantially different from the information provided by the other informants, which I interpret to mean that the fact that most of the informants know me does not influence the quality of the information greatly.

Another crucial point is to ensure that one does not portray the results in an inaccurate manner, and that conclusions that are drawn are based on correct facts and a scientifically correct analysis that follows from a scientific approach. Furthermore, those who participate in the study are entitled to be correctly cited. In addition, it is important to take care of privacy protection in the process of gathering data. This may be achieved, for instance, by not attributing specific observations to a single individual (or firm). This can, however, be problematic when dealing with interviews such as in the present study. Part of this problem may be mitigated or dealt with by taping the interviews, or by allowing the respondents to read through citations and interpretations that the researcher does based on the interviews to

ensure that the informants are not wrongly cited or that the researcher perceives the "date" different to what the informants intended.

In relation to informed consent it is important to be open about the goal of the study, and not hide the purpose of the study for those who are subjects. This can be solved by having an orientation prior to the interview for all those involved, be it firms or workers, about the intentions with the interviews and thesis.

At the same time, the fact that the informants are aware that their behaviour and response to questions is observed, may in fact affect the behaviour through an observational effect (or the Hawthorne-effect). Even if newer studies on this effect have found that the long-term observational effects, there is still support for this type of effect (Levitt and List, 2007).

3.4 Choice of research design

Choosing the research design is decided on in an early stage of the research process, in which I as a researcher decide on *which issue(s)* I would like to focus on, *who* I should use as informants (either as interviewees or as respondents in a survey), and *how* I will go about conducting the research. It is essentially a description of the "data generation process". The design should address the 3 main quality components of an empirical study discussed above.

Although I do, at the outset, have some preliminary ideas about which factors contribute to the development of swift trust both based on my own experience and on theoretical contributions, all relationships are not entirely clear. My presumption is that self-disclosure is a trait that can be interpreted as normality, and that deviations from normality may negatively affect trust building. Furthermore, based on my own experience, reciprocity in terms of disclosing information is important for trust development. In addition, I believe that there may be certain factors, such as standardized training, use of uniforms, and standardized operating procedures that contribute to high initial levels of trust. The intention of my study is to identify new relationships, to clarify the more exact relationship between relevant factors and swifts trust, to develop new hypothesis and new insights, and gain knowledge about other colleagues' experiences from their working environment and their interpretations of these experiences.

The research is conducted through depth interviews. The research design is thus an explorative design. In-depth interviews with a limited, but broadly put together set of informants, will provide me with the opportunity to gain such insight. The intention with the in-depth interviews has been to get the respondents to describe the working environment and the interaction between member of the cabin crew. Thus, the respondents inform me on issues that are not necessarily only directly related to how they feel and interpret the situation. For this process I have developed an interview guide (see appendix 1), as well as an information sheet that was distributed to the informants (see appendix 2).

There are both strengths and weaknesses to this approach. The use of interviews and qualitative data based on a strategic sample entails challenges in relation to generalisability, or external validity. A qualitative approach would also imply that the relationship between the researcher and the object of the study (the informants) may affect the results, or perhaps primarily the reliability of the study.

The crucial aspect of the data collection has not been to gather data that can be the basis for analysis where the results can be used to generalise to other populations in a normal sense (that is, as one would attempt in quantitative studies). The research design here is of more explorative, but still aims at providing a deeper knowledge and a deeper understanding of the phenomenon "trust in teams". It may therefore contribute to a form of conceptual generalisation, in this study regarding swift trust and the implications of this for ad hoc teams, in which the knowledge may still have value in similar contexts.

The information gathered through interviews will be analyzed using content analysis of the transcribed interviews.

Given the chosen research design, there will be a back-and-forth relation between the data and theory in the analysis and the interpretation.

3.5 Data collection process

3.5.1 Sample

To inform my research process, I have attempted to put together a sample that is
representative through controlling for factors such as experience, age, sex, company, as well
as type of work position, that may have an impact on the information gathered and need to be
controlled for.

I have therefore recruited informants of both sexes, with a varying degree of experience both
inside and outside of the airline industry, of different age, and persons who both work as
regular cabin attendants and as air pursers (head of cabin). It is a strategic sample of
informants, where I, however, have attempted to achieve a certain heterogeneity with respect
to age, experience (both in an airline and "on the ground"), and position in the airline (purser,
air stewards, air host/hostess). The sample is not representative in a quantitative
understanding, but by controlling for factors that I would initially expect to potentially have
an impact on the information, the goal of this study is to generate insights from this sample
that may be generalized to sufficiently similar situations. My presumption is that age and
experience might play a role in how easy it is to establish trust, but this may also influence
what type of co-worker is needed to establish trust (e.g., an older person may find it easier to
trust another person of similar age, or someone with more experience than a younger person).
I also presume that rank may influence trust building, as an important role for a high-ranking
cabin crew (purser) is to establish the team and the working environment for that particular
(temporary) team. I also want to check whether male and female cabin crew experience the
phenomenon I want to study differently.

There is a total of 7 informants: 3 men and 4 women. The informants are from 24 to 55 years
old, they have between 4 and 33 years of experience in SAS, and work both as air pursers
(head of cabin) and as air hosts/hostesses. In addition, there is one informant with experience
from Norwegian, both as head of cabin and pilot. Those who work as pursers have between
21 and 31 years of experience. Those who work as air hosts/hostesses have between 4 and 33
years of experience. The informant from Norwegian was recruited to control for company
specific factors, that is, if SAS's SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) plays a major role for
the information gathered. I also considered interviewing cabin crew from Widerøe AS, but for
the majority of their production the issue of teams (and therefore, trust in teams) in the cabin

is not an issue as they typically operate smaller aircrafts in which often only one cabin crew is required.

A practical challenge with respect to the selection of the informants and conducting the interviews, specifically due to the type of jobs of the involved informants, with rota work which involves spending nights away from home, as well as the fact that many commutes to Oslo for work. This has limited the number of potential informants somewhat. I have asked several others to be informants, but many have been unable to participate due to time constraints. One would therefore either have to conduct the interviews over a longer time period or take a more pragmatic approach to the selection of informants. I have chosen a more pragmatic approach, albeit taking into consideration that I would need a certain degree of heterogeneity.

This may create a skewness in the sample, and consequently reduce the degree to which the results here may carry over to other, similar situations (i.e., reduce the external validity). However, the sample is relatively broadly put together in relation to age, experience, and position, which should mitigate the skewness problem. In addition, from the way the teams are put together (on board), it is rarely the case that you work with the same people very often.

Furthermore, as none of the informants lack work experience or have recently started working for SAS, it may be the case that they are socialised into the role more than new employees have been. However, for the purpose of my study, this should not pose much of an issue, as anecdotical evidence shows that the process of socialisation is reasonably rapid.

3.5.2 Interviews

I conducted the interviews over a two-week period towards the end of February and beginning of March 2020. All informants where informed about the intentions behind the interviews, the topic of the master thesis, as well as how the personal information would be dealt with prior to agreeing whether to partake in the project. When being interviewed, everyone was asked if they objected to the interviews being recorded for assistance in the transcribing of the interview. No one objected to this. For the purpose of recording, I used the digital solution provided by the University of Oslo's *Nettskjema*. All recordings have been deleted upon

completion of the thesis work. Permission to such recordings have been applied for from NSD, and permission has been granted (see appendix 3).

Upon completion of all the interview process, the interviews have been transcribed, and the transcribed interviews have been used in the coding and analysis of the information.

The interviews were conducted in similar settings to avoid differences in the informants' responses due to external factors. The interviews were primarily conducted in my own home, with as little distraction from other factors as possible. Two of the interviews were for practical reasons, however, done outside my home. Even in these interviews I attempted to mimic a similar setting to those conducted in my own home. The main focus for me was to ensure that the informants felt comfortable in the interview setting, so that they felt they could talk without interruption and talk freely. This was important to ensure that outside factors did not influence the information I obtained.

The duration of most of the interviews were approximately 2 hours. I started out by following the interview guide closely but adapted the practical interview process in terms of sequence of questions over time as I learnt which questions worked best and which did not provide much relevant information. Even though changing the interview process like this may affect both the internal and external validity, I made sure to follow the main topics of the interview guide.

4 Data and Analysis

*«We become a small community when the (aircraft) door closes».*

In this chapter I will use the information provided by the respondents in the interviews to analyse the fundamental research question of whether self-disclosure may act as an accelerator for swift trust. I will give an account of the most important aspects that are discussed in the interviews, as well as clarify the different informants' understanding and assessment of these.

The quote above is something that was expressed by several of the respondents and is central to understanding how important it is to have trust in one's colleagues. When the aircraft door closes, all aspects of cooperation have to work well for the flight to be completed in a good manner, and you are not in a position to avoid dealing with one of your colleagues if you do not think that the cooperation and communication with this person is not working well. This is contrary to the situation in many other types of work "on the ground". The team is the small community, and each team member has a well-defined role to play.

The central issue I want to address is the fundamentals for establishing and accelerating swift trust and investigate the role that communication and especially self-disclosure plays in this process. Communication is of importance to confirm or dismiss the "hypothesis" that someone is worthy of one's trust, and in addition other factors may contribute to building trust. These factors can be visual impressions, personality, as well as the use of SOPs, checklists, routines, uniforms, rules, expectations, and common training.

4.1 The basic research model

To repeat the research model presented in the theoretical framework in chapter 2 (Figure 3):

Disposition to trust
(personality factors)

Role-based
behavior

Reputation

Categorization
(initial trust)

Swift trust

The team
works well

Stereotyping

Institution-based trust

Self-disclosure

Efforts to minimize inconsistency

The dependent variable in this case is whether the team works well, and although there are several other factors that contribute to a good team, I narrow the focus to *initial* and *swift trust*. Initial trust deals with how individuals have trust in others even without having met, whereas swift trust is the trust development when people meet. Thus, my focus is on the two first phases – *initial trust* and *swift trust*, and not on whether a team works well or not as such, even though the reason for wanting to obtain a better understanding of the processes leading up to a good team is how this can lead to an improvement in flight safety.

The relationship between the factors that provide initial trust may influence the possibility of generating swift trust. For instance, common training and standards may act as a basis for strengthening trust when people first meet since "we all know what to do", and if people do not behave according to the expected (or normal) this may undermine trust. This would be a deviation from normality (McKnight et al, 1998). Furthermore, first impressions may both act as a "device" to strengthen perceived stereotypes, or to give an indication of deviation from normality, and thus influence the development of swift trust.

4.2 Common factors

In all the interviews there are a range of factors that are common for all informants. These can be categorised by factors or aspects that contribute in a positive manner for the development (or appearance) of trust and that may accelerate the development of trust, and factors or aspects that make it difficult or impossible to establish trust. The information that I have collected through the interviews can be categorized according to positive and negative factors.

These factors are closely related to the main themes of the interviews, and the main intention of using these factors is to collect certain aspects that are important to (almost) all informants and use them to construct some broad categories that will be the basis for the analysis.

In the category *positive factors*, the common traits are related to aspects dealing with categorization which again has implications for initial trust (knowledge of the SOP/routines, common training), to situation normality as discussed in the theoretical framework (follow routines and SOP, self-disclosure and reciprocity of information sharing), as well as personality characteristics. Personality characteristics is related to stereotyping, which may affect initial trust. Following routines and SOPs is related to role-based behavior, which has an impact on swift trust.

In the category *negative factors*, the common traits are similar to the positive factors, but with the opposite "sign". These are factors that imply a deviation from situation normality, and consequently, may result in less trust development, both initial trust and swift trust. Building swift trust may be negatively affected by deviation from normality. When you do not act according to SOP, you essentially choose a type of role-based behavior which is detrimental to trust development.

These factors can be structured according to different categories, such as the importance of *standards and procedures*, *communication and openness* or *self-disclosure*, as well as *personality characteristics*. The personality characteristics may be connected to the initial trust phase (or categorization phase), and the discussion of personality characteristics is interwoven in the discussions related to standards and procedures, work experience, and communication. This will be the three main categories that I will discuss in greater detail in the analysis below. I will also consider the informants attitudes towards what trust is, and how trust is established. In the analysis, all direct quotes are my own translation from Norwegian to English.

4.3 A trusting team is a good team?

«You are not stronger than the weakest link»

Theory suggests that trust is essential for a well-functioning team, and lack of trust can be associated with higher levels of stress, low perceived performance, as well as lower satisfaction and commitment to the relationship (Costa et al, 2001).

When considering trust in the present setting it is important to stress that this capture both trust between individual team members, and trust in the team. When trust in one team member is absent it may have a negative impact on trust in the team, and whether the team can complete their task.

In order to understand trust better, I decided to ask the respondents what constitutes a good team. The respondents mention a range of aspects that I will look more closely at below. A central point is associated with the essential aspect of being able to *trust* each other. Being able to trust each other entails that you expect that everyone comes to work with the necessary knowledge required for conducting their work tasks, and, in particular that everyone knows and follows the *standard operating procedures* (SOP) that have been developed for every work task. These are gathered in two different manuals; operating manuals A and B – OM-A and OM-B). The respondents' understanding of what constitutes a good team also relies closely with *communication*.

It is the purser's responsibility to make the team work. One respondent (purser) reported: «At the briefing, you set the standard. At that point you may meet people that you have never met before, and at that point you have to get the team to work together». The speed of establishing teams is further exemplified by the following quotes from one of the other informants: «…well, it is a fact that we create a team and create relationships very quickly», and «We have to bond in a very short time span – we only have a few minutes, but we are quite good at this».

It is not the definition of what constitutes a good team that is the topic of this thesis, but what I am particularly interested in is some of the factors that contributes to creating a good team. Specifically, the focus is on *trust* and *communication*.

4.4 What is trust, and why and how is trust established so swiftly?

Trust is defined somewhat differently by the informants, but the essential element is often related to being seen and a mutual concern for one another, and that you are ensured that the person knows how to perform their job. This can be related to what Ben-Shalom et al (2005) term the use of "category-driven information processing". Trust is also the feeling that you can share even quite personal information. The latter is related to standard definitions of trust, in which trust is associated with some kind of vulnerability (see, e.g., the discussion in Meyerson et al, 1996).

«You feel that those who do not trust in you becomes very uptight and very focused on those things, and almost follows you around». The latter part of this quote is in fact a representation of mistrust. When monitoring takes place, this is a case of there not being trust in place. Such monitoring behavior has a negative impact on both cognitive and affective trust (Webber, 2008). Put another way, one could argue that trust is a substitute for control through other mechanisms (Rousseau et al, 1998). The rules and standard operating procedures in place also seem to make it easier to trust in people, and thus reducing the need for other types of control mechanisms: «At work trust is easier, since we have a set of well-defined rules we work from».

It is recognized by all respondents in this study that trust is typically established very quickly within the cabin crew. A common representation of this can be exemplified by the following quote: «The trust you experience within 5 minutes onboard can take a long time in other situations. Quite fascinating».

Common for many of the informants is that (similar) personality is reported to be important, as this is a factor that makes it easier to connect with others, and that trust is established already at briefing.

One informant states that humour may be one factor that facilitates trust quickly, but also the fact that the type of people working in the cabin are likely to be quite similar when it comes to personality. Even tough people may have quite different life experiences, these factors nevertheless typically results in trust being established quickly. This respondent argues that this is different in other types of work/social situations, as trust typically takes time to build.

Another informant reports that trust is established already at briefing, where you get a feeling very quickly with regards to whether the personal chemistry is present: «Trust you is established first and foremost at briefing. You see quite quickly how the chemistry is. You get mutual trust established, and it happens quite quickly, really. Within the first few minutes of briefing».

This informant argues that the same type of categorization or schemas is used also in other settings, through "reading" the person you meet also in the shop, for instance, and that you can get an indication on whether this person can be trusted quite quickly.

Yet another informant reports that it is a gut feeling that guides her in deciding on trustworthiness. Another informant tells that trust is established quickly because "we are all employed in the same company to do the same job" and that "we have the same foundation with the same training". This is something which can be said to be related to the initial trust or categorisation phase.

One interesting observation and analogy is the following: "You may compare the formation of the team to a snowflake. It may be very difficult to control the snow in Tromsø relative to the snow somewhere in Canada, but you know a snowflake when you see one. The same goes for forming a team. You *know* the person already when you meet them first". This can be related to the literature on how quickly first-impressions are formed and is relevant for initial trust (or categorization).

4.5 Initial trust/categorization

The development of initial trust is affected by a number of factors, as illustrated in figure 3. Among these are stereotyping, which may be a result of common training, and the use of a common uniform. It may also be affected by institution-based factors, such as a common knowledge of standard operating procedures and routines. Personality characteristics (e.g., a disposition to trust) may also play a role. We consider the broad sub-categories of standards and procedures, and work experience in this section.

4.5.1 Standards and procedures (skills and knowledge)

«*We follow procedures*»

Within the airline and air travel industry, a central and crucial feature is procedures and routines. Most, if not all, aspects of the industry are guided by detailed manuals, with all from technical and safety related procedures to procedures associated with the service programme onboard.

This aspect is related to the categorisation part, or the initial trust, of the swift trust-process. Theory suggests that aspects such as common training, uniforms, established routines and pre-flight communication all may provide each one with the "tools" to being able to have or establish initial trust. For instance, Meyerson et al. (1996) suggest that strangers build trust faster by dealing with each other through roles than through personal relationships. This is based on a categorization of each of the co-workers from observing a set of common factors.

One informant expresses that it is crucial that you are well-drilled on what to do, for instance in an emergency, and that for there to be trust you need that everyone follows the SOP. If one of the cabin crew ignores some elements of the SOP, for instance that the purser does not check the emergency equipment on board (this is the purser's responsibility), this weakens his trust that the purser is capable of handling an (emergency) situation.

The importance of following SOP for establishing trust is often stated the following way by the informants: «Immediately when someone starts taking short-cuts and does not follow SOP, then you don't know how to relate to that person, and you cannot trust that person».

Another states that he is always clear and concise on the fact that «we all follow procedures », and that he makes this clear at the time of briefing. It is also important for the team to work that everyone follows procedures and do not take short-cuts.

Yet another is not focused on details and tries to give people a chance to prove that they know their job. The briefing is primarily focused on to safety related issues, and she states at the briefing that «I assume that you all know your job». She feels that this results in them

growing with the task. At the same time, she does not trust in people that show that they do not know their job (SOPs, routines, and procedures).

Another talks about the SOP and procedures as tools that ensures that everyone knows what they have to do. As one informant put it: "Standardization of the training increases trust", and another that "pre-determined routines and roles gives security and trust. You know what comes next". When people start doing things their own way, it does not work well. The security lies in the fact that we have procedures, and that you have to trust that people know their job. She claims that the training is not very thorough, but that it covers «all the necessary things related to the positioning of the emergency equipment, procedures and that kind of things», but that the «software» in relation to service and that kind of thing comes with hands on training. One informant stated this the following way: «We have common pillars, with formal training and we know what to do». Another put emphasis on "Trust is easier to get onboard, because in my other jobs we haven't had the same training".

Another feels that following procedures implies that one can have trust in each other, and that she tries to keep up to date on the rules and procedures and makes sure that she follows the procedures that she should follow. She also states that «I have to be able to trust that my colleagues also do this». These procedures and the standardization of training is also important to build trust. «If someone repeatedly does not follow the SOP, then I start having doubts about what other things they also do wrong ». Thus, the standardized training and procedures results in role clarity, as long as people do not act inconsistently relative to these standards.

One could also argue that standardization makes other control mechanisms less needed as standardization increases trust.

4.5.2 Work experience

«Age has nothing to say – only personality»

Theory predicts that by recruiting from a common, narrowly defined labor pool, this may lead to higher levels of initial trust (Meyerson et al, 1998). This may also result in more similar

personality characteristics. The finding with regards to work experience is that this is of lesser importance than, for instance, personality characteristics.

One could expect that previous work experience, and thus indirectly age, may have an influence on how well one does one's job, and through this how much trust other places in you. In addition, there may be differences in how easy one thinks that it is to communicate with colleagues who are either older or younger than oneself.

The informants in this study has between 4 and 33 years of experience in SAS, and prior to working for SAS most have held other jobs that are to varying degrees relevant for the work they do in SAS. Approximately half of the informants have several years of experience as purser (head of cabin). None of the informants are thus inexperienced. I am, however, interested in the informants' attitudes towards the importance of experience both in relation to how well the team communicates and towards trust.

One informs that there is difference in the level of trust based on age, and bases this on substantial experience in cooperating both with «older» and «younger» crew in both SAS and in other jobs. It is not always the eldest that knows best. «Age has nothing to say – only personality». It is the personality that determines with whom one would «go to war with», and which is the relevant factor in relation to work related tasks. However, age may have something to say when it comes to the more social elements of a conversation at work (you may have more in common with someone in your own age group).

Another experiences that it perhaps is easier to trust someone «new who is old», and experiences that people who are older than herself but still have less experience in SAS than her is given more trust automatically based on age. At the same time, she feels that she more often is told what to do as opposed to a colleague who is older (but with shorter tenure in SAS). It can seem that people assume that people with higher age also has more experience. She also says that experience can be achieved in different ways and that it is important to get to know each other to find this out, and not to automatically assume based on age. This also creates trust.

Yet another reports that she feels that it is easier to trust someone with experience, and that someone aged 18 or 19 is not fit to perform this job. She also feels that having experience and

having drilled procedures over time is a plus and will surface «in that kind of situation». She also feels that it is easier to disclose information with someone with a similar age to herself, and that one naturally talks about other things with the younger colleagues. You are at different points in life. She will, however, be open regardless, but perhaps with different issues.

Another says, somewhat insecurely, that age seldom has anything the matter when it comes to trust. The important thing is personality. At the same time, it is perhaps easier to disclose information with people your own age since you share the same reference points.

Yet another states that those who are easiest to cooperate with are those with more experience. The youngest colleagues do not see the same things as older colleagues do, and then I have to correct and direct them more. «The perfect colleague is someone my own age, I would say ». At the same time, younger colleagues may have substantial experience from the industry, so that you have a lot to talk about. In relation to sharing personal information, I feel that it is easier with colleagues my own age. He also feels that it is easier to obtain and to give trust to older colleagues.

Another feels, like several others, that it is personality and not age that matters when it comes to trust. When it comes to experience, it is his perception that the younger/new colleagues are well trained and know their job well, whereas several of the more experienced colleagues may not necessarily know "the little things".

«You have respect for those who have worked a long time, but regardless, safety is our first priority».

4.6 Swift trust & self-disclosure

My main research hypothesis is that self-disclosure acts as an accelerator for developing swift trust. In relation to openness or self-disclosure, the theory suggests that symmetry in terms of information exchange is important for this relation to hold (e.g., Derlega and Chaikin, 1977). This is, in particular, of importance for acceleration of the process leading up to swift trust.

This can, in part, be illustrated by the following figure (from chapter 2):

Although the initial hypothesis is that self-disclosure leads to an acceleration of the development of swift trust, it may be the case that deviations from normality (for instance, in the form of non-reciprocation) can result in undermining the effect of initial trust (based on categorization). The latter point is stressed by some of the informants, where they state that «Those who are silent and uninterested are people I cooperate poorly with. Because then, who are you? How can I possibly know who I work with?». In such a case, it can be argued that non-reciprocation both affects swift trust and may result in a "revision" of the process of stereotyping.

4.6.1 Communication

«Wow, I learnt quite a lot in a very short time»

Communication is vital for a well-functioning team. From Chidester & Vaugn (1994), we know that both cabin crew and cockpit crew complain about how often such briefings are omitted. In Chute & Wiener (1996, p.3): Even "… before the crew board the aircraft, the stage is set for poor communication."

Communication is also important for initial trust. The importance of first impressions, as discussed by e.g., Sunnafrank and Ramirez (2004) needs to be mentioned in this respect. This

primarily takes place before and during the pre-flight briefing. In the responses from the informants there is substantial focus on openness and communication, and the importance of this for developing trust.

The timing of the typical communication process, which involves different aspects of self-disclosure can be illustrated in the following manner:

Time horizon	Activity	Characteristics
(5-10 minutes)	**Briefing**	Observe and evaluate each other explicitly and implicitly. Place each other in a category. («*Categorization*»)
(Less than 5 minutes)	**On the way to the aircraft**	Talk to get to know each other, and seek to confirm/dismiss first impressions
	Onboard	Observe and talk together. Observe if people follow SOP (which can contribute to increased trust).
(Right before take-off until sign-off)	**On the jumpseat**	First more private conversation where you try to get to know each other better.
(From around 20 minutes to around 6 hours on «short-haul»)	**Underway**	Further conversations and observations. Cooperation starts/one helps each other on board.
(Sign-on until landing)	**On the jumpseat**	Last phase. Even more intimate conversation (at this point one has observed and cooperated underway).
	Leaving the aircraft	Everyone goes their separate ways. The relationship is «paused», or ceased if you never fly together again.

Table 1: *The communication process*.

All the informants have stressed the importance of communication, both for the development of trust and for the team to work well. Communication is in different phases, and of different types, ranging from the pre-flight briefing to the small-talk when sitting in the jump seat prior to take-off and landing.

One informant states that "… communication is vital for us to be able to do our tasks" and that "… we are like a group of friends immediately after briefing". Another points out an important aspect in relation to the importance of self-disclosure, that "… it is easier to relate to people that tells you things".

The small talk while on the jumpseat may be crucial for developing swift trust more rapidly than otherwise. One informant reports that if you talk very little, or not at all, while being seated together, it might result in doubts about whether the person next to you is actually part of the team and capable of doing his job (for instance, in the case of an emergency), and may make it more difficult to develop swift trust. However, this particular informant also recognizes that the lack of small talk may be a consequence of the person being a little introvert or just having "a bad day". I argue that this is related to Popa (2005) where a hypothesis is that temporary teams attempt to reduce uncertainty by communicating.

In terms of communication, there seems to be agreement that the "cycle" is short. Communication is typically established very quickly, and as one informant reports: "When we have closed the doors, it is only us and we talk and talk, and nothing (outside the aircraft) else matters", and "what happens onboard stays onboard". However, communication also ceases quickly. When the flight or work cycle is finished and the team has dissolved, the conversation and the person is typically forgotten. However, even if the specifics of the conversation is typically forgotten, there is a certain kind of learning in that you import trust from previous situations (see, for instance, Meyerson et al, 1996, and Ben-Shalom et al, 2005).

You meet new crew members every day and the cycle repeats itself, and you do not get stuck in the conversations that you have had. When the flight is over, the conversation is also over.

4.6.2 Self-disclosure and reciprocity

«We have someone in the office (in my other job). In the beginning, I think she felt that I shared a little too much. She was a little out of balance by my degree of openness».

«Openness as teambuilding is good».

My main research hypothesis is that self-disclosure is may act as an accelerator for establishing swift trust. All the information gathered from the informants supports the notion that self-disclosure is an important factor to establish swift trust in the working environment of cabin crew. The importance of reciprocity is also highlighted by almost all of the informants.

The degree of self-disclosure experienced by cabin crew seems to be much higher than "on the ground" (that is, "normal" jobs). This is reported by all of the informants that have held other jobs. One informant stated that we are like "hobby psychologists" for each other, and we share a lot of things that may be very intimate information. Most of the informants report that they typically share a lot of private information, but that there is a fundamental difference between sharing information with someone who reciprocates and someone who do not want to share. In the case of non-reciprocation, this can be related to the vulnerability which then is introduced in the relationship, and ultimately the cost associated with disclosing private information (see, e.g., Derlega and Chaikin, 1977).

Most informants say that they evaluate whether they can trust the other person with private information (or more specifically, how private information they can share). Some are more cautious as to what to share. Some feel that you can share pretty much everything, but it may depend on the age of the other person (in relation to oneself) and/or the personality of the other person. It seems that there is a clear tendency towards a high degree of openness, which may be illustrated by the following quotes:

«You tell pretty much everything, especially if you know them from before – and you feel that you know them very well if you have flown with them only once before», «I have a feeling that we can talk about everything», «Openness is probably more common in our job (than elsewhere)», «…well now, we have been sitting here talking and I have never met you before, and now I have told you things I haven't told anyone else before», and «On board, there are some people you manage to tell your entire life story to in no-time, like on a short flight from Oslo to Bergen» (a 45 minute flight).

The relatively short time it takes to disclose private information can be related to Derlega et al (1976), who argue that people feel that there is an obligation to reciprocate early in a relationship. Furthermore, this is also highlighted by McKnight et al (1998).

Openness that is not reciprocated may leave a feeling of being vulnerable with respect to the other person (not sharing information) potentially sharing intimate details with "outsiders". Furthermore, non-reciprocity may also result in lack of trust in the other person. One informant reports that this sometimes makes him feel that there may be something wrong, which again may result in the person not acting properly, for instance, in the case of

emergency. Openness, or self-disclosure, is reported to be positive for building trust, because being told about private things implies that the other person trusts you, which you then again feel a need to reciprocate. Furthermore, «if a colleague does not ask about me then I assume that that person does not like me. Then you become «introvert» and you don't want to talk to that person more than is strictly necessary».

The importance of reciprocity is highlighted by all informants. One states that "it is so strange when someone does not share private information", and another said that "it so lovely to have someone talk freely so that I do not have to dig for information, because then we share equal amounts of information". Furthermore, «it is easier to relate to people who tells you things».

One way of highlighting the importance of reciprocity is the following: «Those who are silent and uninterested are people I cooperate poorly with. Because then, who are you? How can I possibly know who I work with?», and «It is easy to think that those who do not share and is completely silent maybe has too much on their minds, and that they are not 100% focused as they should be». Additionally, «In an emergency, I believe I would automatically choose someone else (who shares information), even if the one not sharing probably would do the job just as well».

The content of these quotes is equivalent to the following quote (which come from a field study on combat units in Israel): "*When you don't know, it worries you. You don't know what his capabilities are, what he knows....You ask him: What can you do, what are your capabilities? ...You study him, learn to know him a bit, you must do that.*" (Ben-Shalom et al., 2005, p.73).

Part of the reason for expensive self-disclosure is argued by some informants to be related to the fact that everyone are away from their families for days at a time, and that they are working in very close proximity to each other: "We are away from the family, we are on a trip together. The sentiment is a little like being at band camp", and "We are "on top of each other" all the time, on approximately 2 square meters".

4.7 Summary of findings

Based on the findings in my analysis, I find that all my informants are in agreement when it comes to the importance of reciprocating self-disclosure. This is in line with the findings of, e.g., Derlega and Chaikin (1977). This is also stressed by Sprecher et al (2012). When there is reciprocation, the informants feel that it is easier to trust the recipient, and thus that the process of trust development is accelerated by self-disclosure. My findings related to the importance of self-disclosure is similar to the findings of Altschuller and Benbunan-Fich (2008).

Most informants also suggest that first impressions, for instance, as it happens during pre-flight briefing, is important for "confirming" the categorization (or initial trust). This is in line with Bar et al (2006). Most of the informants also state that the process of self-disclosure happens very early in the interaction, which is in line with, e.g., Jourard (1960), Altman (1973) and Berger (1973).

The perception of what constitutes normality, or more importantly, deviations from normality, is perceived as very important for trust building by all informants. This is in line with McKnight et al (1998). Many of the informants state that colleagues who deviate from standard operating procedures or other well-established routines typically implies that the acceleration of trust is either slowed down or even trust is lost.

This is illustrated by the upper part of the following figure:


Figure 4: *Revised relation between self-disclosure and trust.*

It is, furthermore, a possibility that deviations from normality (in the sense of McKnight et al, 1998) has an indirect (negative) effect on initial trust. This may be due to the fact that the informant revises the stereotyping process, which may affect the next round of temporary teamwork.

The fact that individuals choose to self-disclose private information to people they have never met before can be related to the "stranger on the train"-phenomenon, in which the anonymity of the interaction works as a guarantee that the information is not conveyed to others that you know as the person receiving the information is not part of you circle of friends and colleagues. This is similar to the case of ad hoc emergency response teams and that of virtual teams where the same type of anonymity is present. However, in my setting the person you disclose to is a colleague that may meet other colleagues that the discloser knows. This leaves somewhat less anonymity, and some of the informants did indeed express concerns about the potential spreading of private information.

5 Concluding remarks

For teamwork where tasks are sufficiently interdependent, there is a need to ensure that the others complete their tasks in an appropriate manner. For this to happen you can either make sure that you have adequate control mechanisms in place which governs the actions of each team member, or you can rely on trust.

In this thesis I have asked the question "can you trust someone you have never met". Conventional trust is normally perceived to take time to build. For the setting that has inspired this study which is the trust development in temporary teams in cabin crew, it is not an option to rely on conventional trust. My main hypothesis in this thesis is that self-disclosure serves as an accelerator in building trust swiftly, and by taking a closer look at self-disclosure and swift trust in temporary teams I wanted to increase the understanding of the mechanisms behind the openness that seem to exist among cabin crew. This openness, or self-disclosure, seem to be present to a much larger extent than in other types of jobs as argued by several of my informants. "We are our own kind", as one crew member stated.

The trust building process is argued to consist of two elements: the initial trust (or categorization) phase, and the swift trust process. The former is related to trust that is present based on factors such as stereotyping, reputation, and institution-based factors, which is present prior to actually meeting the other person(s). The latter is trust that is based on experiences that you gain after you meet the other person(s), and may be related to, e.g., the behavior of the person (does he/she act in accordance with expectations), and self-disclosure.

I found that all informants agreed that self-disclosure is a mechanism for accelerating the swift trust process, and all agree that non-reciprocation of openness is detrimental for building trust. All informants also agreed that the process of trust building is typically very short, in that everyone makes up their mind quickly as to whether someone can be trusted. One of my main findings is thus that you can actually trust someone you have never met.

Since the initial trust process partly relates to stereotyping, one possible avenue for future research could be to investigate whether cultural or social differences may hamper the process of categorization and thus make it more difficult to build trust in temporary teams. The degree to which someone self-discloses may also be affected by cultural differences. Steeper

authority gradients, understood as larger perceived differences in authority between senior and junior team members, may also affect the degree to which people self-disclose. Ultimately, this may affect trust development. This may either lead to less efficient teams, or it will necessitate more formal control mechanisms. This is a topic that is under-researched, and of interest to achieve increased flight safety. After all, safety is crucial for every airline, regardless of nationality or culture, in order to remain successful and trustworthy.

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7 Appendices

APPENDIX 1

Intervjuguide

Can you trust someone you have never met? Initial trust and

psychological contracts in temporary aircrew

1. Introduksjon av meg selv og masteroppgaven

2. Informere om anonymitet, tidsbruk og hvordan intervjuet vil foregå.

Lydopptak: intervjuet tas opp, før det skrives ut i tekst. Ved transkribering vil all data fullstendig anonymiseres, og lydopptaket slettes øyeblikkelig etter at intervjuet er transkribert

3. Opplyse om at det igjen er frivillig og at det er tillat å trekke seg både før, underveis og etterpå.

4. Be intervjuobjektet fortelle om seg selv og jobben:

- hvor lenge har du jobbet som kabinansatt?

- hva gjorde du før

- hvilken stilling har du nå (AP/AH) og hvilken stillingsprosent?

Jeg vil nå gå inn på noen tema som omhandler tillit, samarbeide og forventninger. Da er det fint om du selv tenker gjennom hendelser eller episoder du husker best.

TEAM

- Hvordan mener du at det team aller helst bør fungere?

- Hvordan synes du teamsamarbeidet oftest fungerer?

- Hvilke egenskaper mener du det er viktig at medlemmene tar med seg inn i et teamsamarbeid?

- Hva tenker du din egen rolle i teamet er? (Limet, humørspreder osv)

- Hvordan er de personene du lettest samarbeider med?

TILLIT

- Hva tenker du om ordet tillit?

- Får du lett tillit til de du jobber med? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke

- Føler du at det er lettere å få tillit til noen mer enn andre?

- Føler du de har tillit til deg?

- Når tenker du denne tilliten oppstår og hvor raskt?

- Har du noen gang gitt tillit som er blitt misbrukt?

ÅPENHET

- Føler du ofte du deler informasjon som er personlig til kollega? Evt hvorfor ikke?

- Føler du at denne åpenheten blir gjengjeldt? Hva føler du når det bare går én vei?

- Har du noen gang opplevd at ting sagt i fortrolighet er blitt fortalt videre?

- Gir åpenheten en styrke til teamet?

FORVENTNINGER

1. Hvilke forventninger og krav har du til de andre medlemmene i teamet?

    • Hvorfor har du disse forventningene/kravene?

2. Om dere har fløyet sammen før, har du opplevd at forventningene har endret seg?

    • Hvorfor tror du at disse forventningene har endret seg/ikke endret seg?

3. Oppfatter du at de andre teammedlemmene er klar over dine forventninger?

4. Hva tror du de andre i teamet forventer seg av deg?

Spørsmål 4: Jeg vil be deg tenke på en hva som ville skuffet deg i et samarbeid med en annen. Hva hadde den om andre parten ikke gjort/eller gjort for at du opplevde (evt. hadde opplevd) skuffelse.

    • Oppfølgingsspørsmål: Opplever du disse forventningene i relasjonen med de andre i teamet?

Spørsmål 5: Nå vil jeg at du ser for deg at det kommer en ny person inn i teamet. Hva ville du sagt til denne personen om hva som var forventet for at han/hun skulle fungert i teamet?

    • Oppfølgingsspørsmål: Ble du informert om disse forventningene når du kom inn som nytt medlem i teamet?

FORPLIKTELSER

1. Hva legger du i begrepet forpliktelse? Hvordan ville du definert forpliktelse?

2. I hvilken grad føler du slik forpliktelse (evt. ansvar) ovenfor de andre i teamet?

   • Hva innebærer denne forpliktelsen?

   • Hvorfor føler du deg forpliktet?

   • Hvorfor tror du andre føler seg forpliktet?

3. I hvilken grad har forpliktelsen til teamet endret seg underveis?

   • Hvordan?

   • Hvorfor?

MOTIVASJON

1. I hvilken grad hadde du et ønske om å bidra (var du motivert) til teamsamarbeidet før du ble med i teamet?
   • Har dette endret seg? I så fall, hvordan og hvorfor?

2. Hvordan oppfatter du stemningen i teamet?
   • Hva tror du at det kommer av?

3. Hvordan vil du beskrive «god nok» innsats i teamet?
   • Hva kan man gjøre utover det som er «godt nok»?
 • Forventer du at du eller andre yter mer enn det som er «godt nok»? Hvordan og hvorfor?

OVEROPPFYLLELSE

1. Kan du fortelle om én/flere situasjon(er) der du synes teamet fungerte ekstra godt? (Dere leverte over forventning)

a. Hva skjedde?

b. Hvorfor og hvordan skjedde dette?

c. Hva var konsekvensene av dette?

d. Hvilke strategier ble brukt?

e. I hvilken grad mener du at denne oppnåelsen var avtalt på forhånd?

BRUDD

1. Kan du fortelle om én/flere situasjon(er) der du synes teamet fungerte/leverte under forventning? Eller evt. om en situasjon der du opplevde at et eller flere teammedlemmer ikke presterte som forventet?

      a. Hva gjorde at det fungerte dårlig?

      b. Hva var det andre gjorde som du oppfattet som negativt?

      c. Med hvem skjedde dette?

      d. Hva var konsekvensene av dette?

2. Hvordan ble denne episoden håndtert?

3. Hvordan taklet du denne episoden?
4. Hvordan tror du uheldige episoder kunne vært unngått?

5. Hvordan håndterer du situasjoner der samarbeidet har gått i stå?

TEAMETS LEVEDYKTIGHET

1. I hvilken grad ønsker du å jobbe med dette teamet igjen?

a. Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?

2. Har du opplevd å være del av et team der du (ikke) ønsket å jobbe videre i det samme teamet?

a. Hvorfor følte du det slik?

AVSLUTNING

1. Er det noe du ønsker å tilføre?

2. Har du noen spørsmål?

3. Repetere informasjon om anonymitet

4. Tilby kopi av data hvis ønskelig

5. Tusen takk for at du tok deg tid – dette er veldig verdifulle data ifm. masteroppgaven

APPENDIX 2

Vil du delta i forskningsprosjektet
"Can you trust someone you have never met? Initial trust and psychological contracts in temporary aircrew"

Dette er et spørsmål til deg om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet er å gjennomføre intervjuer i forbindelse med informasjonsinnhenting knyttet til en masteroppgave i ledelse. I dette skrivet gir vi deg informasjon om målene for prosjektet og hva deltakelse vil innebære for deg.

Formål

Motivasjonen for valg av problemstilling er en genuin nysgjerrighet i forhold til de ulike faktorene som spiller inn når team dannes og tillit etableres uten at man har noen som helst kunnskap om hverandre. I luftfarten blir man daglig en del av et team som (normalt) aldri har jobbet sammen før. Man er nødt til og man ønsker å stole på at teamet fungerer godt sammen, og at alle gjør jobben sin under normale omstendigheter og under eventuelle nødsituasjoner. Spørsmålet er hvordan klare og forhåndsdefinerte roller bidrar til at tillit utvikles, og hvordan kan det forklares at man etter et knapt 10 minutter langt bekjentskap deler personlig informasjon som normalt sett ikke ville blitt delt før etter flere uker? Jeg vil se på antakelsen om at eksistensen av initiell tillit og psykologiske kontrakter skaper mer forutsigbarhet i en bransje som er under stadige endringer, økende krav fra omgivelsene, og endrede betingelser for de ansatte.

Det vil gjøres intervjuer med 6-7 personer innen SAS i forskjellige stillingskategorier og erfaring i kabinen.

Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet?

UiT – Norges Arktiske Universitet er ansvarlig for prosjektet.

Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta?

Rekruttering vil foregå gjennom en rettet henvendelse til en diversifisert gruppe ansatte. Dette for å forsøke å få et bredt nok utvalg.

Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?

Hvis du velger å delta i prosjektet innebærer dette at du stiller deg til disposisjon for meg for å gjennomføre et intervju, hvor spørsmålene vil være knyttet opp mot arbeidssituasjonen i kabinen i forhold til blant annet teambygging, tillit, forventninger og motivasjon. Det vil gjøres lydopptak av intervjuet. Formålet med lydopptaket er utelukkende til hjelp for å transkribere intervjuene, og opptaket vil bli slettet etter at dette arbeidet er gjort.

Hvis ønskelig kan du få se den transkriberte versjonen, samt det av uttalelsene jeg vil benyttet i masteroppgaven.

Det er frivillig å delta

Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykke tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle opplysninger om deg vil da bli anonymisert. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger

Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene om deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

- Det er utelukkende meg og veileder som har tilgang til informasjonen som samles inn.
- Det vil ikke samles inn personopplysninger.

De som deltar i undersøkelsen vil ikke kunne identifiseres i det som publiseres.

Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet?

Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 29. mai 2020. Opptaket av intervjuet vil bli slettet ved prosjektslutt.

Dine rettigheter

Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg,
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få slettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og
- å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger.

Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?

Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke.

På oppdrag fra UiT – Norges Arktiske Universitet har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer?

Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:

- UiT – Norges Arktiske Universitet ved May-Britt Sand (maybritt.sand@gmail.com) og veileder Svein Tvedt Johansen (svein.t.johansen@uit.no).
- Vårt personvernombud: Joakim Bakkevold (personvernombud@uit.no).
- NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller telefon: 55 58 21 17.

Med vennlig hilsen

Prosjektansvarlig   *Eventuelt student*

(Forsker/veileder)

Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet *[sett inn tittel]*, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

☐ å delta i intervju

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet, ca. juni 2020.

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

APPENDIX 3

NSD Personvern
27.01.2020 15:53

Det innsendte meldeskjemaet med referansekode 412574 er nå vurdert av NSD.

Følgende vurdering er gitt: Det er vår vurdering at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet vil være i samsvar med personvernlovgivningen så fremt den gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet den 27.01.2020 med vedlegg, samt i meldingsdialogen mellom innmelder og NSD. Behandlingen kan starte.

MELD VESENTLIGE ENDRINGER
Dersom det skjer vesentlige endringer i behandlingen av personopplysninger, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. Før du melder inn en endring, oppfordrer vi deg til å lese om hvilke type endringer det er nødvendig å melde: nsd.no/personvernombud/meld_prosjekt/meld_endringer.html Du må vente på svar fra NSD før endringen gjennomføres.

TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET
Prosjektet vil behandle alminnelige kategorier av personopplysninger frem til 30.06.2020.

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG
Prosjektet vil innhente samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Vår vurdering er at prosjektet legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 og 7, ved at det er en frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utvetydig bekreftelse som kan dokumenteres, og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake. Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER
NSD vurderer at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om: - lovlighet, rettferdighet og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykker til behandlingen - formålsbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samles inn for spesifikke, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke viderebehandles til nye uforenlige formål - dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet - lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet DE

REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER
Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet vil de ha følgende rettigheter: åpenhet (art. 12), informasjon (art. 13), innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), underretning (art. 19), dataportabilitet (art. 20). NSD vurderer at informasjonen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13. Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER

NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1. f) og sikkerhet (art. 32). For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og eventuelt rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET
NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!
Tlf. Personverntjenester: 55 58 21 17 (tast 1)