Non-state Actors in World Politics:

A case study on how transnational advocacy networks seek to influence the Arms Trade Treaty

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The responsibility for remaining errors rests with me.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AI	Amnesty International
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
ATT SC	Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee
CAC	Control Arms Campaign
ES	The English School of International Relations
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IS	International Secretariat
MSP	Military, Security, Policing
NGO	Non-governmental organization
- INGO	International non-governmental organization
NRA	National Rifle Association
Oxfam	Oxfam International
P5	Permanent five members of Security Council, United Nations
UN	United Nations
- UN FC	United Nations General Assembly First Committee
- UN GA	United Nations General Assembly
- UN GGE	United Nations Group of Governmental Experts
- UN OEWG	United Nations Open-Ended-Working Group
- UN SG	United Nations Secretary General
- UN SC	United Nations Security Council

Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 - *Topic*

The following thesis is an analysis of how transnational advocacy networks seek political influence in the United Nations, based on a case study of the ongoing campaign for an Arms Trade Treaty, *Control Arms* (2003-).

In the last decades the notion that the primary actors in the international system are the sovereign states, has become a significant debate in international relations.[1] Categorically, there are two sides to this debate, namely the empirical question of how much influence non-state actors have upon international relations, and the normative one which asks how much influence they should have.[2] This thesis will contribute to this debate by addressing a more narrow question in the former category, namely the question of *how* non-state actors try to influence international politics. Specifically, I will look at the three leading non-governmental organizations in an international civil network – Amnesty International, Oxfam International and IANSA – and their work in promoting an Arms Trade Treaty at the UN.

1.2 – *Background*

The Control Arms Campaign focuses on the international trade in arms, arguing that lack of controls on the arms trade is fuelling conflict, poverty and human rights abuses; the goal of the NGOs in this regard is to build support among governments for a global, legally binding treaty that will prohibit arms from being exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit human rights violations. Such a treaty would require countries to comply with international human rights and humanitarian law standards when authorizing weapons transfers.

Regarding the NGOs, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is an organization which essentially acts as coordinating office for 800 national and international civil organizations focused around the topic of gun proliferation and misuse.[3] Oxfam International is a confederation of 14 regional civil organizations dealing with sustainable development related issues.[4] Amnesty International is a global NGO centered around human rights.[5] All three are recognized by the United Nations as NGOs.[6] Both the informants and the textual sources used in this thesis originate from the international secretariats of these NGOs, which are located in Oxford (Oxfam) and

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[1] Compare Willetts (2001:426), Colás (2002:3-4), Bas Arts (1998:24)
[2] Example in Colás (2002:5).
[3] Source: http://www.iansa.org/about.htm
[4] Source: http://www.oxfam.org/en/about
[5] Source: http://www.amnesty.org/
[6] Source: http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/index.asp

London (AI, IANSA).

While the three NGOs started their work on the ATT in 2003, it was first addressed officially in the UN in December 2006, at which time the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89 "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms".[7] This thesis will focus on the time-line of 2008-2009, within which there have been two Open-Ended Working Groups on the ATT, in Mars and July of 2009, as well as two meetings of the First Committee, which is in October/November every year after the General Assembly General Debate. These are the main events for the NGOs that are working on the ATT, as confirmed by informants. Additionally, the UN Secretary General appointed a group of governmental experts to meet and discuss the ATT three times in 2008. Final negotiations on the ATT are scheduled for 2012.

Informants describe the complex structure of the Control Arms campaign as two structures imposed on top of each other, the campaign having been originally set up by the three largest organizations, Oxfam, AI and IANSA, and then having been broadened to include other NGOs along the way. This second and bigger constellation of NGOs is referred to as the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee (ATT SC), and consists of 16-18 NGOs working together on the ATT.[8] The number is unfixed, informants explain, as it varies who will participate and who will sign on to the different reports and policy documents. While the three larger NGOs handle most of the campaigning under the banner of the Control Arms logo, the ATT SC will guide the policy and set the direction of the ATT campaign. The Control Arms campaign is self-governing, and in terms of being a brand it represents only the three larger NGOs, but it will naturally overlap with the broader ATT campaign. Most informants claimed that the Control Arms NGOs are more influential in determining the direction of the ATT related work.[9]

1.3 – *Problem and research questions*

The theoretical foundations of this study can be described as a response to theory on international society, otherwise known as the English School of international relations. In uniting the opposing perspectives of neorealism and neoliberalism, the English School of international relations theory kept the notion from realism of states as primary actors in what they call international society, a view

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[7] Source: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/499/77/PDF/N0649977.pdf?OpenElement

[8] The Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee will often include: the Africa Peace Forum, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, Caritas Internationalis, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Instituto Sou da Paz, Nonviolence International, Project Ploughshares, Saferworld, Schweitzer Institute, Viva Rio, Women's Institute for Alternative Development, Source: http://armstradetreaty.org/att/aboutus.php

[9] According to inf #2, it is the ATT SC that makes the biggest decisions with regard to the direction of the campaign, but inf #1-3 and #5 agree that, for various reasons, the three largest NGOs have a bit more influence in the SC. Whenever some, but not all, informants are referred to, this does not imply that the othes disagree (unless specified), but merely that not all informants were asked; interviews 4-6 were much shorter than 1-3.

that has been prevalent in international relations over the last decades (Colás 2002:2). Put simply, the view is that since there is no super-state to police the dealings of individual states, realism portrays this sphere as anarchic; international society theory, on the other hand, maintains that while this description has merits, the international sphere is better characterized as a society wherein members – at least to an extent – follow rules and expectations.[10] The theory that is used in this thesis, notably that of Colás (2002), Bas Arts (1998) and Keck and Sikkink (1999), argue that conventional theory on international society lacks an understanding of the agency and influence of non-state actors in international relations.

The debate on state-centric theory serves as a backdrop to the question in this thesis. In order for the question of whether non-state actors should be considered players alongside states to be answered, it must be preceded by an understanding of *how,* and the conditions under which, civil actors operate. This study does not attempt to measure the extent of their political influence, nor does it purport to settle the overarching debate on state-centrism. The interrogative problem statement is: *How do transnational advocacy networks seek to influence international politics?* Derivative research questions are what their access to the arena is and whether they are received as legitimate actors, what kind of obstacles they encounter in the different stages of the process and what strategies they use to overcome them. Ultimately, the aim of this study is to gain a more clear understanding of the nature of their political influence in the international arena.

Specifically, this is a single-case case study using qualitative methods, and the strategy is to match the data collected from informants and internal documents with recent theory on the matter, to see if it is congruent or if the data can tell us something new. In doing this, I rely heavily on my informants, on the one hand, and on recent NGO-specific theory on the other. Findings will be somewhat limited by the reliance on informants and by the narrow scope of the time-line. The purpose is descriptive and aimed at understanding different types of political influence and, as such, the study is not aimed at causal explanation.

1.4 – *The structure of the study*

Chapter 2 will present and discuss the theoretical concepts of the study, focusing on the arena in which the actors operate, the concepts of political influence and regimes, as well as the general characteristics of transnational advocacy networks. The operational concepts will center around a typology of political influence as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998/1999). Chapter 3 will explain the methodological choices underlining this study, including problems related to field-work, the use of sources, validity, reliability and bias.

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[10]   Jackson and Sørensen (2007:132)

In chapter 4, the gathered data will be presented an analyzed in relation to the theoretical concepts. The aim of this chapter is to show how the network operates, their access to the arena in question and the challenges they face. The last and most extensive part of chapter four will deal with the typology of political influence as presented in chapter 2. Chapter 5 will highlight the results of matching the theory with the gathered data, to see what is congruent and what is anomalous; this will be discussed with regard to theoretical implications as well as validity, reliability and relevance to the field.

Chapter 2 – Theory

The following chapter will discuss the theoretical foundations of this study, starting with the debate on the role of non-state actors in international relations and on state-centrism in the traditional theory on international society (2.1). The central concepts of the study will then be defined, with emphasis on arena (2.2.1), political influence (2.2.2), regimes/treaties (2.2.3) and actor characteristics (2.2.4). Lastly, the concept of political influence will be broken down into operational concepts for the analysis chapter, using elements from regime theory, negotiation theory and NGO specific theory (2.3). The primary focus will be on NGO-specific theory and research, and while some elements from regime and negotiation theory will be used, these are downplayed in favor of theory that is focused specifically on the agency of non-state actors.[11]

2.1   - *International Society, state-centrism, international civil society*

The state-centric view in international relations is especially prevalent in neorealism, such as Waltz' balance-of-power theory (1979/1986). This theory subscribes to a structural version of the familiar doctrine of realism, namely that in the absence of system-wide authority, i.e. a superstate or its equivalent, law and order can only be found on a national level. So the central problem in his definition of structure is to ascertain what kind of law-like patterns one can devise from the seemingly lawless anarchy that dominates the international system; and, from there, construct predictive statements about favourable structures.[12] Waltz is firm on the topic of what should constitute a unit in the international system, disregarding NGOs and other transnational actors because, writes Waltz, when 'the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate' (Waltz, 1986:89). He paints a picture of international relations as consisting of states working mechanically to ensure their own survival, in what is ultimately a self-help system. Admitting that this is an oversimplification, he nevertheless insists that it is a useful one, and that 'survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have' (1986:85).

As discussed in the introduction, aspects of the description of the international sphere as anarchic is retained in the English School of international relations. This anarchy, however, still constitutes a *society,* in as much as the relationship between states is characterized by rules and

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[11]   The two-fold reason for this is, firstly, the complex nature of influence exerted by actors which are not formally recognized as parties to a negotiation, and secondly, for reasons of scope (partly because the NGO-specific theory already draws on many of the relevant aspects from regime- and negotiation theory, which would result in overlap). These theories, when applied to a setting such as the UN, would fit the point of view of states more than it would NGOs.

[12]   Unlike classical realism, the structural theory of Waltz need not assume any inherent quality in mankind, or even in political leaders. While structural realism is often compared to behaviouralism and subjected to similar lines of criticism, the comparison fails on the central point of assumptions about the human condition; this theory is not inherently reductive of human nature. Waltz must, however, make an assumption about the behaviour of units. His assumption is that units, or states, seek to ensure their survival, and that any other goals they might have are derivative.

expectations which – though they may be broken – are still acknowledged by states in general. While this treads a fine line between the polarity of neorealism and neoliberalism, it still leaves little room for transnational societies of international corporations and NGOs, whose roles are downplayed significantly. In operating in the space between the three concepts of realism, rationalism and revolutionism, the English School purports to explain international society in a thorough manner – philosophically, historically and juridically, as well as descriptively and normatively – through an analysis of it's actors (Wight 1991:7-8). The downside, of course, is the confusion and lack of clarity arising from combining several perspectives, and the oft criticized omission of political economy.[13] More important, in the context of this paper, is the recently rising criticism against the state centric view.

In his book, *International Civil Society,* Alejandro Colás argues for the relevance of 'voluntary, non-state, collective social and political agency' in international relations. He defines civil society as the social domain 'where modern collective political agency takes shape', and argues that these movements have displayed international characteristics from their inception (2002:1). The term *international civil society* is therefore a category explaining social and political agency on an international level. This understanding of the concept, he argues, will help us explain the agency of international civil societies , and it will also help to remedy what he calls the flaw in The English School, namely the inability of the concept of international society to properly account for non-state actors (2002:17/24).

It is not only the case, according to Colás, that international civil societies influence governments in international relations, they also play an integral part in shaping this society. As actors in this society, they both help in reinforcing state institutions and boundaries as well as undermining them (2002:170). Phenomena such as strike action, mass demonstrations, party-political activism and international solidarity campaigns, have effected change in governments. It is equally neglectful to understand them in a vacuum as it is to disregard them in international relations (2002:61/170). NGOs which are ultimately answerable to international citizenry and who are officially independent, such as Amnesty International, are often seen as a step toward an international society with completely global and non-excluding actors, but Colás points to the fact that they are mostly, at present, only pressure groups which do not contest 'overall legitimacy of a specific regime', but 'merely seek to alter a particular policy' (2002:62).[14] The term international civil society does not, in other words, imply a community of non-state actors working for the dissolution of the state system; as a phenomenon they might present a threat to state sovereignty indirectly, in as much as they operate across boundaries, but this is neither constant nor unidirectional, and according to Colás

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[13]   Jackson and Sørensen (2007:153-)
[14]   On a sidenote, he says that NGOs which are openly political with the intention of socio-political change, often have a problem of accountability; if international civil society is to be a space for progressive change, it is important that they have democratic legitimacy and are open about their political accountability (2002:63).

it can go both ways (2002:172). It is often their ultimate goal to appeal to the sovereign states in question, thereby in a sense legitimizing them. The paradoxical tension here is that social movements within the international civil society are often directed at national change, so they are in a sense caught between the national and the international, conceptually (2002:173).

Colás claims that most of the civil movements in the last century were essentially international (2002:59). This becomes evident, in his view, when one defines civil society as the space occupied by modern social movements. His argument seems to be that this space is present already in capitalist social systems (mainly because of class struggles, which in turn incite civil movements) and democracies. The importance of this interpretation, according to him, is not simply historical, but goes toward refuting the notion that the political influence of international civil society is at present more potential that actual; he claims to show that it has always been an actuality. Understanding international relations from a purely state centric view, then, would deny us understanding not only of international civil societies, but also of the role of states.

2.2 – Central concepts
2.2.1   - *Arena, UN*

In his book on *The Political Influence of Global NGOs* (1998), a multiple case study which assesses the extent of political influence of global NGOs on treaties signed in two different conventions about climate and biodiversity, Bas Arts distinguishes between national and international NGOs and the arena in which they operate, in the following manner: "First of all, the international community lacks a central authority which has top-down legislative and authoritative powers […]. After all, the nation states of the world are sovereign, which formally implies territorial integrity for all states, no interference in internal affairs by others, and legal equality for all […]. Therefore global policies are based on bottom-up co-operative arrangements – agreements, declarations, treaties – between states, in a more or less anarchic setting […]" (1998:21).

This has some disheartening consequences, according to Bas Arts, the first being that common initiatives are often 'broad, vague and weak compromises' (1998:21), and the second being that the discussions are aimed at unanimity in the decision-making, which in turn becomes characterized by the lowest common denominator; when several parties have a right to veto a proposal, the result is that those who want less, have the biggest impact on policy (1998:21). Lastly, the obvious point that national implementation of international policies is hard given state sovereignty; in the international sphere, there are usually few sanctions with which to punish those who break policy. On the other hand, giving some hope to the idea of political influence from the international, is the fact that 'the meaning and effects of national sovereignty and international

anarchy are relaxed by a great number of interdependencies among states, by international law and regimes as well as by international organizations', some of which have limited legislative powers (such as the European Commission)(1998:22). Trade measures will also serve as sanctions in some situations.

Bas Arts also points to the increased relevance in international relations of NGOs as a threat to state-centric theory, but unlike Colás puts emphasis on the formal recognition of some International NGOs (INGOs) in the UN; after article 71 of the UN Charter, it has been common for NGOs and INGOs to participate in in UN conferences and meetings, and though they formally have observer status, they are permitted to make oral statements, present written position papers and occasionally attend working groups in which there are negotiations between nations (1998:25). NGOs lobbying in the hallways and surrounding area are also common.

Bas Arts is more or less adopting the arguments toward the concept of an international society as opposed to an international anarchy; in this line of thought, as mentioned earlier, the realism argument about states only meeting societal demands when it is in their interest is met by facts which suggest otherwise: Treaties are made and upheld even though it is not always in the interest of the state, and states are often hesitant to enter into a treaty, knowing that it might prove against their interest in the long run. This suggests that they respect the rules which, on the view of the English School, constitute a society. It is only natural, then, that ES would have a considerable focus on the role of the UN in international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007:138). As an institution, the UN encompasses all the perspectives and debates within ES; realism is affirmed in the veto-system that is in place in the Security Council, in as much as it reflects a power-balance and the inevitable supremacy of big, military states.[15] In the General Assembly, on the other hand, all states are considered equal subjects under international law, which in turn constitutes the point of view of rationalism. Lastly, the recognition of individuals in the declaration of human rights would represent the cosmopolitan perspective of solidarism (2007:48-49).[16]

The concrete use of the term arena is, according to Bas Arts, appropriate in as much as there is 1) meetings between the relevant political players with regard to a specific policy issue 'usually in distinctive rounds' inside a given political organization such as the UN; 2) the politicians play a game with the aim of a specific outcome, 3); they all try to win, in the sense of 'furthering [their] interest and, hence, achieve [their] policy goals as best [they] can', through for example veto's in the case of decision-makers, or lobbying in the case of NGOs and 4); 'formal and informal rules of the game operate: who is in or out, how one can get in, which formal competencies players have, what the

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[15]   Though an object of much criticism, it would make no sense from a realist perspective to ignore the fact that some states really do have more power than others.
[16]   The debate between pluralism and solidarism is likewise explicitly present in all humanitarian interventions of a military nature that are undertaken or sanctioned by the UN. Furthermore, the argument can be made as to the declining influence of the UN on the dominant states, such as the US, and the frequency of unilateral decisions; this possibly suggest a return to state centrism and, perhaps, realism replacing rationalism as the dominant point in the triangle of ES.

domain of the game is, how conflicts are settled and decisions are made, how players should behave, which strategies to influence the outcome are legitimate (or not), what the relationship with players outside the arena is, etc.' (1998:55). Determining an actor's access to the arena in question is a necessary step in analysing their political influence; in a sense, it constitutes a limit on their options and strategies. This study will use Bas Arts' definition of political arena, meaning '*the formal meeting place of political players who struggle, debate, negotiate and decide on policy issues and, in doing so, are bound by given rules (although they may be changed by the players as well)*' (Bas Arts, 1998:55).

The limits of the metaphor is that it paints a picture of the rules as too static, but it is useful and precise when determining a single relation of political influence, for example in going from NGOs to the UN; it would be going to far, in Bas Arts' opinion, 'to see the NGO-state relationship at global level as one characterized by interdependence' (1998:56). As it is, states are the dominant formal policy- and decision-makers, rendering the opposing concept of "policy networks" less relevant in comparison to the concept of an arena. The ability of actors which are not always formally recognized as such, namely NGOs or networks of NGOs, to influence policy issues, is what is relevant here. The question is whether these actors are playing by the same rules as the formally recognized actors, i.e. states, and if not, how do they fit into this arena? What is their ability to manoeuvre in this setting, and how do they make use of it?

2.2.2   - *NGOs and political influence*

Bas Arts explains that the general definition of an NGO, as 'any organization which is not established by a government or group of governments' (1998:24), is too inclusive in that it would include sports clubs and terrorist groups. In stead, he opts for the definition of NGOs as non-profit pressure groups, as this suggests relevance to the political arena. The UN's definition of INGOs is any organization not established by intergovernmental agreements, which would include the Mafia. It is necessary to define INGOs as pressure groups trying to influence political decisions in international relations in order to meaningfully narrow it down and to capture the nature and goal of an NGO (1998:49). To further classify it, Amnesty International – for example – is not a sectional group, i.e. economic or recreational, but a promotional group that is issue-specific (human rights), as opposed to religious or political. According to his definitions and classifications, then, a global NGO such as Amnesty International would be defined as a *'promotional pressure group which seeks to influence political decision-making on certain issues at global level'* (1998:50).[17]

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[17]   This definition is adequate for single actors, such as Amnesty International, but not for transnational advocacy networks, which will be covered below and which is a more fitting description of the actors in the present study, namely several NGOs working together on the Control Arms Campaign and in the ATT Steering Committee.

There is a distinction between the notions NGO, INGO and global NGO, in so far as the first is national, the second is rooted in two or more countries, where as the latter is inherently global in it's focus. It is common for NGOs to be involved with international issues to some extent or other; thus, the term global NGOs is introduced to apply to NGOs which are inherently directed toward international issues and policy making on a global scale. This does not mean that the global NGO cannot be rooted in only one or more countries; the essential criteria is that the NGO is active at the global level (1998:51). This is a case study focusing primarily on Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam, which are global NGOs in the international sphere with international member representation, and with an inherently global agenda, so in using the term NGO when referring to AI, Oxfam or IANSA, it will hereafter refer to a global NGO (in the following chapters, this paper omits the prefix global for reasons of brevity).[18]

"*Political influence* has been defined as the achievement of (a part of) one's policy goal with regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation, which is (at least partly) caused by one's own and intentional intervention in the political arena and process concerned. This implies that one's policy goal would not have been achieved – or would have been achieved to a lesser extent – if one had not intervened. Therefore the so-called *counterfactual* would have been different." (Bas Arts, 1998:301).

Bas Arts separates the concept of policy from politics in the sense that 'the term politics refers to both process and product, whereas the term policy refers only to the product itself' (1998:19). The concept of *political influence* is highly problematical, both theoretically and methodologically. Conceptually separating power from influence is the first challenge, and delineating the resulting definition of influence, the second. On first glance, power would mean the same as influence, namely the ability of actor A to influence decision-maker B. However, in terms of a specific policy decision, it is entirely possible for an NGO actor to influence a policy equally or more efficiently than, for example, the USA – without there being any doubt that the latter is the more powerful actor. Bas Arts therefore introduced a notion of permanence separating power from influence, where after political power refers to the more or less permanent ability to influence policy making, and political influence is only episodic (1998:58). As for the second problem, it has to do with whether the influence is measured in an NGOs opportunity to present their case, in the actual adopting of their recommendations or demands in the policy, in the formation of the treaty itself or if it is to be measured in the carrying out of the treaty by the nations in question.

In legitimizing the measurement with the use of a counterfactual qualification, Bas Arts is in a

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[18] Bas Arts also distinguishes between pressure groups and protest action. The former operate inside the limits of formal politics; they make use of their formal position, such as oral statements in the UN, to advocate their cause, as well as general lobbying directly to decision-makers (1998:51). Protest groups, on the other hand, operate outside the formal arena – meaning in the press, through campaigns, protest marches and similar action. Amnesty International, for example, is mostly a pressure group, but occasionally a protest action group; this study will focus primarily on their capacity in the former arena.

sense begging the question; the point of it is to make the analysis of political influence falsifiable, but as the counterfactual can't be measured in and of itself, he is back where he started. Who knows how it would have been had the NGO not been a part of the process? This presupposes that the NGO is the only one lobbying for a certain set of goals. In the cases where there is overdetermination, i.e. several actors of disparate power voicing roughly the same agenda, all that can be offered in terms of proof are probabilistic assessments based on a significant overlap between policy outcomes and the written intentions of the NGO in question. Since this thesis is not concerned with the extent of their influence, reasoning based on counterfactual assessments will be of limited relevance. As it relates to the concept of political influence, it is still an implication that the last sentence of the above quote should read that 'the so-called *counterfactual'* would *probably* have been different.

2.2.3   - *Treaties, regimes*

As a regime, the Arms Trade treaty is *intended* to be an example of 'hard law', meaning that in addition to representing a set of obligations, there should also be sanctions toward non-conforming behaviour; i.e. an example of treaties which are signed in the context of international organizations, and which are legally binding to its members. An important distinction is between legally-binding conventions and treaties, and non-binding legal documents such as 'resolutions, declarations and recommendations', where the former is generally referred to as 'hard law' and the latter as 'soft law' (Bas Arts, 1998:62). According to Young, in his book *Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance*, 1998, the goal of the process of regime formation, whether it has to do with soft or hard law, is to reach 'agreement on packages of mutually acceptable provisions suitable for expression in documents that are treated as constitutive contracts' (Young, 1998:4). These provisions are essentially translated into social practices.

According to Young, regimes are almost always made through negotiation between two or more actors upon the terms of a constitutive contract; this negotiation, however, is often decided by side-agreements (secret or not), informal deals, tacit understandings and other informal elements. These are often not only part of the negotiation, but sometimes crucial to it's successful implementation (1998:11). Furthermore, the procedural elements of the negotiations are made all the more important by the exploratory element of the negotiations, in so far as it is often unknown to actors what they can expect to get out of the bargaining; – it often involves, according to Young, creative components (1998:12). Consequently, the negotiations involved in creating a regime are best described as dynamic, open-ended and multidimensional. Because of this flexibility, in adopting Bas Arts' use of the term arena for an explanation of the UN as a setting, it is with the qualifying assumption that the rules of the game and the negotiations are open to manipulation by both state and

non-state actors with regard to the final outcome, i.e. the Arms Trade Treaty.

Young differentiates the different phases of a regime formation: a*genda formation, negotiation and operationalization* (1998:2).[19] Most research, writes Young, is centered on the negotiation phase, thereby perhaps neglecting the agenda forming and the operationalization stages. Put simply, Young defines the agenda forming phase as covering the processes through which 'an issue initially finds its way onto the international political agenda and rises to a sufficiently prominent place on this agenda to justify the investment of time and political capital needed to embark on explicit negotiations' (1998:5). Important questions in this respect would be who participated the most in framing the issue, though Young states that it is often not entirely in the control of actors; it is often affected by outside events, compromises and dissent (1998:10).[20]

Methods used in the context of negotiation, he says, are bargaining with threats, committal tactics and promises, as well as deal-making skills and entrepreneurial techniques (1998:15). The aim is generally not, as in legislative settings, to put together winning coalitions, but rather 'the negotiation stage of regime formation aims at building consensus among as many participants as possible' (1998:13). Young puts emphasis on the complexity of actor intentions in this regard: "Governments simply do not act as rational utility maximizers, even when there is little internal opposition to the initiatives they take. Rather, they tend to adopt causes, like the Norwegian government's espousal of a regime for the Barents Region, and then to advocate these causes in a determined manner in their dealings with others' (1998:14). Adding to this, Young writes that there are often different factions in a state working for opposite goals, leading to a two-level game. Also, pressure groups can cause governments to act in a 'contradictory or inconsistent manner in the negotiation process leading to regime formation at the international level' (1998:14). This can in turn lead to non-state actors becoming actors in the negotiation process, leading to provisions that governments would not introduce. The interplay between non-state actor's expectation of a regime and that of nation's interests is a central part of the problematic involved in the ATT, as discussed in chapter four.

2.2.4   - *Actor characteristics, advocacy networks*

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, working in collaboration on the book *Activists Beyond*

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[19]   Regimes can fail at any points in the process, he says, and the reasons for failure can be manifold, ranging from lack of attention, priority and closure, and '[e]ven signed agreements sometimes become dead letters' (1998:2). Consequently, different propositions have to be made for the different stages in order for regime formation theory to be sound; it is not empirically viable to assume a uniform process, or a universal set of prerequisite conditions, throughout the process (1998:4).

[20]   The last stage in Young's theory of regime formation, operationalization, is less relevant to this study as the ATT has yet to arrive at this stage (post 2012). The operationalization phase adds to the already negotiated documents a set of 'procedural arrangements or programmatic activities at the international level' (17). It varies from regime to regime whether it is put in force immediately, or whether there is to be a transitional period. Also, it varies whether the regimes are such that they require legislative politics or agency politics (i.e. soft law or hard law) in their operationalization. Regime formation is at an end, writes Young, once internal operationalization is in practice (19).

Borders (1998) and articles based on this work, such as *Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics* (1999), both of which will be discussed here, argue for the relevancy of advocacy networks as opening new channels of influence besides the market influence and the influence of states. In the present context, their work will be used to further define the role of transnational advocacy networks in international relations; specifically, to define the role of NGOs with regard to their goals, methods and strategies, both internally and externally. Keck and Sikkink also discuss the conditions under which such networks can be most effective. Later on, their findings regarding the exact nature of network influence will be discussed in relation to the findings of this case study. Since the actors in the present study are three NGOs working together in a campaign (Control Arms), on the one hand, and playing the leading roles in an even bigger network of NGOs (the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee) on the other, this is a necessary addition to the more isolated definitions from Bas Arts in terms of actor characteristics.

Keck and Sikkink define transnational advocacy networks as 'networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation', as opposed to economic actors and firms and alongside, but not opposed to, purely epistemic communities such as scientists and experts (1998:1). Their primary significance is that by building 'new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, they multiply the channels of access to the international system' (1998:1). Additionally, they make 'international resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles' in a way that transforms the practice of national sovereignty (1998:2). They argue that the reason this phenomenon is to a large extent overlooked in theory, is that *values* are a motive which falls outside the accustomed categories. "*A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services*" (1999:89).

Central to their argument is the notion that the high value-content of their issues are a prerequisite of their influence, along with their ability to frame the question or issue by bringing new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates, and by serving as sources of information and testimony (1998:3). The goal is to 'change the behaviour of states and of international organizations' which are, more often than not, more powerful than them (1999:90). In order to do this, they must seek to maximize their influence or leverage over their targets (1998:3). Keck and Sikkink note that they operate within a "political space" internally as well, as different actors come together in the network with different social, cultural and political backgrounds. This entails a certain amount of negotiation with regard to coming up with a joint enterprise, something that is especially relevant to the example used in this case study in as much as it applies both formally and informally to the relationship between the NGOs in question (1999:90). The notion of transnational advocacy

networks does not always equate to national or international NGOs, of course, as it is a broader term, but they often play a prominent or exclusive role in these networks. In the case of the Control Arms campaign, the three most prominent NGOs would be AI, Oxfam and IANSA – what Keck and Sikkink refer to as the core actors – but the network would include all their contacts and all the NGOs involved in the ATT SC, as well as a number of other NGOs who have contributed in one way or another. Networks are, according to Keck and Sikkink, 'forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange', presumably to emphasize the non-hierarchical nature you would find in firms and governments (1999:91). The notion of advocacy is added because the actors plead a cause, or the causes of others, so that they are not easily analyzed by a standard concept of "interest" (1999:91).

Keck and Sikkink define a campaign as 'sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network […] develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal' (1998:6). The process of integrating the various elements into a whole with a "common frame of meaning" is usually undertaken by the core actors, and will often be a challenging task because of cultural and structural diversity within the network (1998:7). They put a lot of weight on the notion of "negotiation of meaning" and its relation to the evolution of tactics within a campaign, stating that this allows them to 'recognize that cultural differences, different conceptions of the stakes in a campaign, and resource inequalities among network actors exist' and that, at the same time, they can identify critical roles that actors fill (1998:8). In framing the issue, campaigns are limited by the rules of the area in which they are to be carried out. For example, the Control Arms campaign must frame the issue in a manner that works for both the different factions in the campaign itself, as well as for the target audience, which in this case will be government officials at the UN and in capitals. Keck and Sikkink refer to the dual goals of this framing as "strategic portrayal" (1998:8).

Groups in these networks, they write, are constantly exchanging information (1998:10). Additionally, they try to organize the gathering and flow of information in a way that best suits the campaign, or in a way that will constitute a base for their campaigns. Their ability to 'generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively, is their most valuable currency' and is also 'central to their identity' (1998:10). For the core actors this entails recruiting allies with access to relevant information, writes Keck and Sikkink, adding that since different ways of issue-framing sometimes requires different kinds of information, this will often result in disputes over framing and can therefore be a source of change within the network (1999:92). They use two terms to deal with such frames, the first one being *frame alignment,* meaning the rendering of events or occurrences as meaningful, which in turn organizes experience and guides action (1999:95). *Frame resonance* 'concerns the relationship between an organization's interpretive work and its ability to influence

broader public understandings', the latter encompassing the duality of strategic portrayal, as mentioned above (1999:95).[21] This is not merely relevant at the outset; old problems will often be framed in new ways, to reach other venues or overcome new challenges.

Writing about under what conditions these networks have the most influence, they put emphasis on issue- and actor characteristics as important parts of the explanation (1999:99). The first term refers to the impact a certain issue is likely to have with its audience, and the second one refers to the strength, density and leverage of the network (1998:26). With regard to issue characteristics, their conclusion is that issues with clear causal chains leading from a responsible party to a victim have bigger success than 'irredeemably structural' problems. The appeal lies in what they call "normative logic" (1998:27). Also, issues which involve legal equality of opportunity have had success, such as slavery and woman suffrage, as this appeals to a juridical and institutional logic (1998:28). With regard to actor characteristics, networks must be dense in the meaning of having many, strongly connected actors with reliable information; they must have member representation and institutional leverage in the targeted countries (1998:28-29). Actor characteristics apply to their targets as well, who must be 'vulnerable either to material incentives or to sanctions from outside actors, or they must be sensitive to pressure because of gaps between stated commitments and practice' (1998:29). In this sense, leverage has two sides – on the one hand is the access to leverage, on the other is the vulnerability.

2.3 – Operational concepts

2.3.1   - Forms of influence

Regarding how transnational advocacy networks work, Keck and Sikkink develops a four point typology, consisting of *information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics* and *accountability politics* (1999:95). Since they lack power in the traditional sense (I..e military, financially, formally or institutionally), they must use these forms of persuasion to achieve their goals. Information politics covers the 'ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact' (1999:95). This information covers not only facts, but also testimonies, and usually frames the question in simple terms of right and wrong; it must also be framed in such a way that it identifies responsible parties and proposes credible solutions (1999:96). Keck and Sikkink add that testimonies, once their story has gone through layers of interpretation and is finally published, by media or NGOs directly, are often altered significantly. They point to the way in which NGOs have helped to legitimize the use of testimonies, and that they are often used in conjuncture with statistics in order to give the presentation a human interest angle (1999:96). As they often rely upon the media

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[21]   A more specific characterization of strategies will be discussed in 2.3, below.

to disclose their findings, it is paramount for them to 'cultivate a reputation for credibility with the press' and present them with appropriately framed material (1999:96). The emphasis of NGOs on information politics is echoed in Manno (1994), who explains how (environmental) NGOs can translate the technical language of the issue into the language of politics (1994:107).

Symbolic politics are defined as the 'ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away' (1999:95). Simply put, they must use symbolic events, often the juxtaposition of two events, to launch a new interpretation of values; an example used by Keck and Sikkink is the juxtaposition of 'the coup in Chile, the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and civil rights', which in turn, because of transnational activism, gave birth to the human rights movement (1999:97). Leverage politics covers the 'ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence', where powerful actors usually mean governments or international financial institutions (1999:95). Identifying points of leverage, they write, is often the most important strategic step in a campaign (1999:97). They divide the concept in two, the first being material leverage, which usually involves "issue-linkage" such as convincing some nations to cut off the economic aid to another because they are violating human rights, thereby essentially linking human rights to money (1998:23). Moral leverage, they write, 'involves what some commentators have called the 'mobilization of shame', where the behavior of target actors is held up to the bright light of international scrutiny' (1999:97). This is of course most effective with states that are concerned about their prestige. Accountability politics are defined as 'the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorsed', a dynamic which is in response to governments saying one thing, but doing another in practice; having this gap exposed can be embarrassing to governments (1999:95/1998:24).

According to Young, the categories of tactics that are used in regime formation come in three different sets, corresponding to the previously mentioned stages: The tactics used with regard to agenda formation is simply to influence the framing of the problem. During negotiations, threats and promises are the most pronounced tactics. In the last stage, tactics of 'administrative or bureaucratic politics' are the most important (1998:21). Young writes that 'agenda formation is a time for focusing on the big picture' (1998:21), while negotiations are focused upon the phrasing of written agreements and operationalization upon domestic concerns, which in turn might not coincide with international considerations. Keck and Sikkink operate with similar stages, but from the point of view of a network's political influence (slightly paraphrased here): 1) issue creation/agenda setting, 2) influence on the discursive position of states, 3) on institutional procedures, 4) on policy change in target actors, 5) on state behavior (1999:98). The first stage requires networks to generate attention for new issues, which in turn often involves 'a modification of the 'value context' in which a policy

debate take[s] place' (1999:98). The second stage is about getting states to change their policies, to support international declarations or to make more binding commitments (1999:98). Stage three is where NGOs attempt to facilitate change in several states, institutions or even, as is the case here, regime change; Keck and Sikkink quickly point out how policy change should not be confused with actual change in behavior, which does not always follow (1999:98). Meaningful policy and behavioural change, they write, is more 'likely when the first three types or stages of impact have occurred' (1999:98).

Table 2.1

Agenda formation	Negotiation	Operationalization
1: Issue creation	2: Influence on state's position	5: State behaviour.
2: Influence on state's positions	3: Institutional procedures	
3: Institutional procedures	4: Policy change	

It is important to note that Young's account of the stages of regime formation do not directly overlap with Keck and Sikkinks account of network influence, as shown in the above figure.[22] The reason for this is related to the difference in focus between the role of states and the role of transnational advocacy networks vis-a-vis a specific regime/treaty. By way of example, network's will seek to change state's policies, as well as institutional procedures, both during what Young would describe as the agenda formation phase and the negotiation phase.

2.3.2   - *Operational concepts*

In the preceding chapter, the theoretical debates underlying the role of non-state actors in international relations have been outlined, starting with the debate on state-centrism and international civil society, moving on to international civil society. Colás argues that the inability to account for non-state actors is a serious flaw in traditional transnational theory, neorealism and in the English School. The social movements of the previous century, he argues, were essentially international and as such are cases where non-state actors were significantly influential both in the national and international sphere (2.1). Next, the concept of an arena was defined and discussed in relation to the UN, adopting some elements from Bas Arts while mitigating them with the notion from regime theory of negotiations as more dynamic and open-ended than this picture would suggest (2.2.1). In 2.2.2, NGOs and the concept of political influence were defined and delineated from the concept of political power. 2.2.3 explained some aspects of treaties using regime theory, and 2.2.4 discussed actor characteristics under the concept of transnational advocacy networks, further explaining the agency of non-state actors such as AI, IANSA and Oxfam working together.

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[22]   This figure is just an overview, not in any way an explanatory model.

The operational concepts used in the analysis (chapter 4), will primarily be the four point typology of Keck and Sikkink as discussed in 2.3, meaning *information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics* and *leverage politics,* along with the definition of stages employed in both their theory and some aspects of Young's account of regime formation and negotiation. The definitions of arena, political influence, treaties and transnational advocacy networks, and their related hypotheses, will be discussed in relation to the data and revised where this is needed. In 4.2, the typology will be used to analyze the strategy and methods of the NGOs in question, as well as indicate where this typology fails in accurately representing the gathered data. This approach will hopefully lead to a clearer understanding of how transnational advocacy networks influence world politics, what their options are in achieving a policy goal at the UN, what kind of problems they encounter and what measures they apply to overcome them. Chapter 5 will sum up the findings and discuss what implications they have for theory.

Chapter 3 – Method

In the following chapter I will explain my methodological choices; discuss some problems related to field-work, bias and sources; explain how the method relates to the problem statement and the structure of the analysis; and, lastly, discuss the reliability and validity of the employed method. In 3.1, the choice of method and sources will be presented, and in 3.2 the reliability and validity will be discussed.

3.1.1   - *Qualitative, iterative approach, single-case case-study*

This study is to be regarded as interpretative social research, as it is a single-case case-study based on qualitative methods. Corbin and Strauss (1998) define qualitative research as 'any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification' (1998:10-11). This can entail research about people's lives, experience, behaviors and emotions, as well as about 'organizational functioning, social movements, cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations' (1998:11). While some elements of quantification can be found, the authors maintain that the bulk of the analysis is interpretative. Methods associated with qualitative research, such as interviews and observation, are not exclusive; data gathered by these methods will often be quantified later in statistical analysis. Thus, they are referring to a 'nonmathematical process of interpretation, carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme', where data might consist of interviews, documents, films and even, in some cases, quantified data (1998:11).

In experimental research, according to Bryman (2004), it is ideally the case that the research hypotheses are deduced from theory and then tested.[23] The initial deduction of hypothesis from theory, followed by the induction of conclusions back into theory, is part of the positivistic foundation of quantitative research. According to Holliday (2007), one of the main differences is to be found in the open-ended process of qualitative research. Where Bryman makes a point of quantitative research as devising hypotheses from theory and then subjecting them to test (e.g. experiments), qualitative research will start off with deciding what subject is interesting, explore the subject in the field and then let 'focus and themes emerge', devising research instruments in the course of the process (2007:6). This is especially apparent in the case of the qualitative method of *grounded theory* as developed by Strauss and Glaser, where theory is derived from data (Corbin & Strauss, 1998:12). The grounding of concepts in data and the creativity of researchers are the main

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[23]   Bryman offers the following main steps as an *idealized* picture of how quantitative research is done, in sequence: theory, hypothesis, research design, devising measures of concepts, selecting research sites, selecting research subjects, administering research instruments, processing data, analyzing data, findings/conclusions and the writing of finding/conclusions (Bryman 2004:63).

characteristics of this method, and – aside from when the object is to expand existing research – the research will start on what would be the middle of Brymans idealized sequence of quantitative research (see above) and move backwards toward theory (Bryman 2004:63; Corbin & Strauss,1998:13). The advantage, according to Corbin & Strauss, of building rather than testing theory, is that the resulting theory is more likely to resemble reality than a method which devices it's hypothesis beforehand on intuition or speculation (1998:13-15).

The precise nature of the dynamics of the political influence that is in question in this study can't be determined quantitatively, as the variables are assumed to be grounded in 'meaningful social and cultural settings' (Hønneland, 2000:7). The intention of actors and the policy goals in question are all grounded in normative frameworks, and the problems they encounter are presumably only to be understood within a social setting using interpretative methods. If the questions asked were related more to the *extent* of their political influence and the frequency in which certain methods were used, a quantitative approach might have been better suited, either in lieu of a qualitative one or as a supplement, but in order to devise correct assumptions about the nature of this influence, their methods and – more importantly – how this could be turned into measurable concepts for a quantitative approach, a qualitative investigation would still have to come in advance. The goal here is to understand the political influence that occurs in this scenario – an activity that should precede it's measurement.

As was shown in the theory chapter, this project borrows some aspects of Bas Arts' *The Political Influence of Global NGOs* (1998), which is a hybrid, a form of study described by Bryman where in 'qualitative research is conducted within a quasi-experimental (i.e quantitative) research design' (2004:61). Writing about the outset of his research project, Bas Arts points out that there was little theory to be found on which he could find concepts, hypotheses and clues to the design of the study (1998:30). This assessment still holds some relevance; although there have been significant advances in NGO theory the last decade, it is far from exhaustive and certainly not canonized. Bas Arts wanted to assess the political influence in a large number of cases in the manner of a semi-quantitative evaluation, but was forced to do exploratory research – interviews and participant observation – in order to formulate a valid proposal. He had to continuously adjust the conceptual and technical design throughout the research, in what he describes as an iterative approach. This approach, he says, 'is inspired by the iterative thinking in mathematics, by which the outcome of one phase of analysis becomes the input of a next phase until there is (some) congruence in outcomes over several phases' (1998:31). The creative interplay between design, implementation and report of the study are constantly revised against each other until consistency (presumably meaning validity and reliability) is achieved.

Bryman compares this kind of procedure to Strauss' grounded theory approach, as discussed

above (2004:67). The end result for Bas Arts was a qualitative multiple-case study with strong undertones of quantitative evaluation, though without numerical precision. He maintained his evaluative objective, but restricted his sampling to a few cases and used sources of data more commonly associated with qualitative research (Bas Arts, 1998:32-33). In short, his research drifted into a qualitative one based on what he deemed most suitable in the course of the project, and while his pretensions to generalization and precision were mitigated, he nevertheless retained his goal of assessing the "to what extent" question (1998:37).[24] My own experience mirrored that of Bas Arts in many respects, having to continuously reframe my project whenever my initial assumptions about the subject matter were mistaken. The initial hypotheses drawn from theory and written down before the field-work was undertaken, were not wrong in the sense that they were disproven by the facts – they were irrelevant to what was actually taking place, in some places completely missing the issue. This has led to several changes in the type of theory used, the framing of the initial problem statement and in the use of sources.

This study has adopted the concept of an iterative qualitative approach, though with the omission of the quantitative pretensions of Bas Arts and the post-modern elements of grounded theory. Regarding the former, this study aims for an understanding of political influence and how it is achieved, and will for scope and resource related reasons not venture into a comparative study of the extent of political influence over several cases. Regarding the latter, while a lot of the characteristics of grounded theory are to be found in this iterative approach, a significant portion of the data is covered by contemporary theory and my goal is to expand upon existing theory more than to create my own. The criteria for interpreting the findings will be determined by the theory used, and the methodological approach will in part be what Yin describes as "pattern-matching" (1994:25-26); even though the study has only a single case, it will serve to either match or not match propositions from the given theory (alternately, it might affirm only one of two rival theories). The study is descriptive and aimed at understanding, not causal explanation.

3.1.2   - *Choice of case, field-work, sources, triangulation*

The choice of the Control Arms Campaign and the Arms Trade Treaty as a case was not in any way based on random sampling, but rather on information obtained when working as an intern at the Northern Regional Office of Amnesty International Norway; I worked there in the fall of 2008, hoping perhaps to get some insight into the lobbying/activism business for what was then to be a study on the UN and humanitarian interventions. A chance encounter and discussion with a lobbyist

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[24]   He essentially preserved the duality of analysing the quality of the political influence in depth, and also that of assessing the quantity or extent of the influence (it should be noted in relation to this that the cases were quite broad in terms of the number of actors involved, and that the timeline was five years).

from New York during the AI biannual meeting led to the choice of the Control Arms Campaign as material for a case-study; apparently it stood apart from any other initiative they had made in the UN in terms of being 1) an NGO initiative, 2) hugely successful and 3) a cooperation between several NGOs. Having already worked on Amnesty International Campaigns in the capacity of intern, I mistakenly thought it would be easy to get access to information and informants.

The value of this case, as opposed to other campaigns in the same time-period, is that it could arguably constitute what Flyvbjerg (2006) calls a *paradigmatic* case, as delineated in contrast to an extreme, revelatory or critical one. The different types of case studies are defined and categorized differently by various authors, but this study uses the definitions of Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2006). According to Flyvbjerg, a paradigmatic case is one that has metaphorical and prototypical value (Flyvbjerg, 2006:232). This is hard to determine beforehand, however, as the prototypical case will be the case that defines the criteria for what is prototypical.[25] In this circularity, some degree of intuition-based choice is unavoidable. The case analysis itself and its relation to other cases will be the final justification of this assessment – it cannot be made in advance. The motivation for this choice of case and methods are to get a firm analytical grip on the exact dynamics of the political influence in question, as well as the problem areas and applied solutions that the actors encounter and make use of. Due to it's apparent successful nature, this campaign should be paradigmatic in terms of political influence. The control arms case can be said to be an extreme case, if one makes the – for that matter, plausible – assumption that activism is not generally this successful on the decision-making level of the United Nations. There are, however, various campaigns with similar degrees of success. Yin defines the revelatory case as one where 'the investigator has access to a situation previously inaccessible to scientific observation' (1994:41), which is not likely to be the case here. Neither is it a critical case, meaning that I cannot logically generalize from the truth value here to something being true or false for all possible cases of this nature.

The most valuable source of information were undoubtedly the informants, and, as mentioned before, these were also the hardest to come by. The original idea was to travel with the lobbyists to the July '09 Open Ended Working Group at the UN, but this fell through on account of them not finding the time. Subsequently, I spent months trying to set up interviews during the October/November '09 First Committee meeting at the UN, but the appointments fell through yet again. In December 2009 I had made so many calls to the lobbyists at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International in London, that their campaign coordinator gave in and set up interviews for me with the key people working on the campaign and the ATT Steering Committee in the three major NGOs. Due to cancellations on their part during my week in London, I could only make three

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[25] " As with the critical case, we may ask, How does one identify a paradigmatic case? How does one determine whether a given case has metaphorical and prototypical value? These questions are even more difficult to answer than for the critical case precisely because the paradigmatic case transcends any sort of rule-based criteria. No standard exists for the paradigmatic case because it sets the standard." (Flyvbjerg, 2006:14)

interviews in person, while the rest had to be conducted over the phone.

Yin (1994), lists the following advantages and disadvantages of using interviews as part of the collecting of evidence for case studies (along with documentation, archival records, observation and artefacts): They are advantageous in so far as they are targeted directly on the topic and are insightful in the sense that they provide 'perceived causal inferences'; disadvantageous in the sense that they are dependant on the quality of questions, biased in response, dependant on subjects memory and lastly, in so far as the 'interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear' (1994:80). His suggestions are that one makes sure that questions are not leading; for example, if the interviewer is in fact familiar with the situation he is asking about, he might ask purposely naive/unassuming questions so as not to lead the interviewee into confirmation (1994:85). More generally, his advice is to use corroborating sources, both in the sense of interviewees from different "camps", and other sources of data than interviews (1994:85). While I made a point of following his advice, it sometimes proved more problematic; questions that were pointedly unassuming often had to be clarified, resulting in more leading questions, and a lot of the obtained information is of such a nature that it is either hard or impossible to verify with outside sources. The following table shows the selection of informants:

Table 3.1

Informant	Position/NGO	Type	Transcript	Anonymity	Length
Informant #1	Military, Security & Police Researcher, Amnesty Int.	In person	Yes	Yes	1-2 hours
Informant #2	Program Officer, IANSA	In person	Yes	Pending Transcript	1-2 hours
Informant #3	Campaign Coordinator, Amnesty Int. / Convener, ATT Steering Committee	In person	Yes	Yes	1-2 hours
Informant #4	Advocacy Officer, Amnesty Int.	Phone	No	Pending Permission	30 minutes
Informant #5	Campaign Manager, Oxfam Int.	Phone	No	Yes	30 minutes
Informant #6	Campaigner, Amnesty Int.	Phone	No	Pending Permission	30 minutes

I will rely mostly on the three longer interviews, as I was able to use a recording device and therefore won't have to rely on memory.[26] Another reason is that the phone interviews were conducted impromptu - in as much as I was called by them, and was therefore slightly unprepared – and in two cases cut short. I have kept the anonymity of my sources, as was agreed upon in the interviews; I was given permission by everyone to refer to their position in the NGO, and by some to use their name provided they had seen a final draft before it was handed in (which is not the case at the moment).[27]

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[26] Unfortunately, the page-limit of this thesis precludes the inclusion of transcripts.

[27] Since the informants are representatives for the organization, they are likely to want to present it in a certain fashion. Some questions are designed to get behind what Bas Arts call the disproportionate ego-perception of NGOs, meaning their tendency to

One of the strategies used during the interviews, was not to interrupt the informants in order to maintain the structure of my questions, but instead to let them talk as much as possible in their own line of thought. This led to some unexpected information that would not have been obtained through direct answers to the previously determined questions. Although I remained flexible and didn't stick to the exact order of questions, the information obtained from informants #1-3 is largely consistent with the following categories of questions:

- **Set 1: *Orientational questions:*** These dealt with anonymity, the presence of a tape recorder, the informants position in the NGO, their length of employment and various tasks.

- **Set 2: *Questions about preparatory work:*** These questions dealt with their strategies and methods in preparatory work before UN meetings, including campaigning, research, network cooperation and questions about the nature of their influence.

- **Set 3: Q*uestions about UN meetings*:** Same as the above, but focused on their methods at the UN meetings.

- **Set 4: *Information:*** These questions were about any additional relevant information on political influence, as well as additional documents and the possibility of corroborating sources.[28]

This project will rely heavily on the informant's answers to these questions, meaning their own perception of what their goals, strategies and methods are. There is little to corroborate their view, apart from the findings of other studies which have interviewed lobbyists in similar, but not identical, settings. In the present study, the findings of Keck and Sikkink will serve this purpose, though the cases used by them are different. While the exclusive input of informants is indispensable in achieving an understanding of how they work, this reliance can also be considered a limitation. Informants were sometimes unsure about how forthcoming they should be, and whenever questions were misunderstood and had to be clarified, this would sometimes result in more leading questions.

The second point in my triangulation of sources is document analysis, and the primary sources here are the reports written by the different NGOs, their "Action Circular" and a series of confidential, internal strategy documents (in the form of correspondence) given to me under the condition that I omit some state-specific information. Additionally, there are the UN resolutions, drafts and so forth, as well as the UN transcripts of member nation's statements at meetings; these, however, are not as informative in terms of how the NGOs work. The secondary sources are drawn from theory on the matter. There are many problems related to these textual sources, chief among which are the lack of objectivity in advocacy related material combined with their exclusivity, which entails that there are no outside-sources to corroborate their content. Additionally, NGOs tend to

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overestimate and misrepresent their own political capacity and influence (1998:301). This raises some ethical concerns, and when pressing on issues related to for example internal problems, it is imperative that the trust of interviewees is not betrayed. Therefore, I will present them with the collected data before it is submitted, so that they can object to any misrepresented facts.

[28]   The full list of questions is contained in the appendix.

update their online material retroactively, without keeping a history of previous editions of documents. Consequently, it is difficult to trace the developments backwards in time. In terms of sources and triangulation, it would seem that my intern-ship could be construed both as a source, in terms of participant observation, and as a bias – this will be discussed below (3.2). I will of course not use any documents that are in breach of the non-disclosure agreement in the employment contract from my intern-ship. I will use only public documents and documents given to me by informants with explicit permissions as to their use.

3.1.3   - *Design, problem statement, limiting the unit of analysis*

Robert K. Yin, in his book *Case Study Research, Design and Methods,* describes the research design of case studies in five especially important components: "1. a study's questions, 2. its propositions, if any, 3.its unit(s) of analysis, 4. the logic linking the data to the propositions, and 5. the criteria for interpreting the findings" (Yin, 1994:20). Since this case study is to a certain extent exploratory, the initial hypotheses and research questions were revised several times and are now limited to the interrogative problem statement and the broader questions covered in the introduction. The propositions are essentially covered in the theory chapter, and regarding the logic linking the propositions to the data, the analysis will be structured and guided by the different forms of political influence that were discussed in the theory chapter. The propositions from theory will then also constitute the criteria for interpreting the findings. The main strategy is to answer the problem statement by comparing the propositions from theory (2.3) with the data from informants and document analysis (chapter 4), revising the theory as needed (chapter 5).

According to Yin, one of the central points of research questions and hypotheses is to limit the unit of analysis, meaning what constitutes the case, be it an individual, a neighbourhood or an organization (1994:21). In this case, it is limited by the choice of actors, on the one hand, being Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam International, the topic of an Arms Trade Treaty and a time-line of two years, from 2008 to 2010, focusing on the bigger meetings at the UN in this period (essentially the Open Ended Working Groups and the First Committee meetings of '08 and '09). The unit of analysis is therefore the dynamics of the political influence of these actors in this setting, within this given time-frame.

3.2 – Validity and reliability

3.2.1 *- Validity, generalization*

The precise role of reliability and validity is also subject to discussion when it comes to qualitative case studies. According to Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2006), it is a misunderstanding that case studies (whether qualitative, quantitative or both) are not subject to the same rigor and scientific standard as other studies. Flyvbjerg writes that 'the value of the case study will depend on the validity claims that researchers can place on their study and the status these claims obtain in dialogue with other validity claims in the discourse to which the study is a contribution' (2006:15). Yin breaks the validity of case studies down into three different categories, *construct* validity, *internal* validity and *external* validity (1994:33). The internal validity of a case study is less relevant when it is descriptive and exploratory, as it deals with showing that the causal connections in question are in fact dependent and not merely spurious. As for construct validity, it is essentially the question of whether you are measuring what you say you are measuring; in this context, it could mean checking to see if what the informants claim to be their methods are indeed what they are doing, or checking to see if what they claim as accomplishments are really their doing, and not arising coincidentally. According to Yin, the method of triangulation of sources, in this case the various textual sources and informants, will ideally lead to a convergence of multiple sources of evidence, thereby increasing the construct validity of the case study (1994:31). Secondly, he maintains, one should keep the chain of evidence clear in such a manner as to allow an external reader (colleague, etc.) the opportunity to trace conclusions back to their premises and the original sources (in this case, tape-recordings of interviews and so on) (1994:99). Lastly, he suggests having the case study report reviewed by key informants, which is also my intention at the time of writing.

Though my primary aim is to describe the nature of political influence, the phenomenon is inescapably causal in nature and, as such, causal inferences will occasionally be described or implicitly assumed. As the interrogative problem statement entails a descriptive answer, the validity of the study does not, however, depend on a causal relationship between one factor and another. As was already discussed in the theory, Bas Arts definition of political influence is a causal one, to which he applies the notion of a counterfactual approach in determining it's validity. While I will touch upon this in my analysis, my goal as such is not measurement of the extent of political influence as much as analysis of the forms in which it is conducted. In the type of case studied here – i.e. a descriptive one - Yin suggests pattern-matching as a way to ensure internal validity through the use of theory – this was described above, in 3.1.[29]

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[29] On a related note is the issue of what kind of causality one can expect to find. Borrowing some terms from Black (1999), the causality that is present in qualitative studies such as this one, is molar as opposed to micromeditative (1999:13). By this is is meant that any causality involved is sure to include a host of variables which, although they have a place as apparent identifiable contributors in the causal chain, are in reality indirect and operative only on the macro level. This is, however, basically what make up manifest

The third form of validity is to do with the possibility of generalization, a controversial point in the case of single-case case-studies. The possibility of generalization from a paradigmatic case study is subject to debate. According to Flyvbjerg, 'the strategic choice of case may greatly add to its generalizability as a case study' (2006:226). In the example of the critical case, the generalizability is obvious. Case studies are, according to him, especially useful in falsification; using Popper's famous example, he explains how case studies often reveal the so called "black swan", which might have appeared white had there not been an in-depth analysis (2006:228). In the event that this is a paradigmatic case, the hope is that the analysis will highlight the general characteristics of the general political dynamics in question. In a sense it could then be viewed as a prototype for these kinds of cases. It is hard to know this beforehand, though, as stated before, because of the intuition involved in choosing paradigmatic cases. It is important to note that it is hard to know in advance whether one's case is extreme, critical and/or paradigmatic; it would depend not only on discoveries in the data gathering and analysis, but also on the theory applied; if one finds propositions in the theory that the case falsifies, for example, it is suddenly critical in relation to that theory, or if it significantly deviates without any logical connection, it is an extreme case. Flyvbjerg also argues that formal generalization is not the only valuable form of knowledge; purely descriptive case studies can also contribute to scientific innovation, and in the process of testing theory in terms of seeing which theory will best explain the case at hand (2006:227).

Yin makes a distinction between two types of generalization, which to him explain the external validity of the case study (1994:36). Additionally, it addresses the misunderstanding that case studies are not suitable for generalization, which according to him is based on implicitly using survey research as a point of contrast. This is a false comparison in as much as survey research relies on *statistical* generalization, whereas the case study largely relies on *analytical* generalization, in much the same way that experiments do: 'In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory' (Yin, 1994:36). But this generalization is not automatic, according to Yin, and the findings need to be replicated in further studies; in other words, he is slightly more critical to the potential for generalization than Flyvbjerg. The main point of Yin is that one can generalize to theory, in stead of from one case to another case. In either case, though, it is clear that there is potential for generalization in a single-case study; the exact level of generalizability contained in this study will be discussed in chapter five.

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human behavior. On the other hand there is the micromediation level of causality, which is the actual causal level in a microscopic sense (Black, 1999:13). The point of this, in this context, is that molar causality, although it can 'often accurately represent reality in a way that is intuitively or obviously meaningful [...] the outcome variables are usually contingent on other conditions, [and] they tend to be best described in probabilistic terms' (Black, 1999:13). In other words, because of the holistic nature of the causal variables involved, it is almost impossible to find definite causal relations.

3.2.2 *- Reliability, Bias*

Reliability in qualitative studies entails an openness about your process, making sure to document procedures and decisions in such a way that they could be repeated (Yin, 1994:38). This is also given a large role by Holliday, who describes rigor in qualitative research as showing the workings of the research, putting weight on the importance of transparency (2007:21). Consequently, to ensure reliability one must take care to meticulously state the methodological choices and use of sources in order that the points of access to the information can be recreated, and to maintain clarity and transparency in all the interpretative decisions that are made. The general way to ensure reliability, writes Yin, is to make as many steps as operational as possible 'and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder' (1994:37). He gives an analogy from book-keeping, wherein one makes calculations in a manner so that an auditor could repeat the procedures and arrive at the same results.

The end goal of reliability, writes Yin, is both to minimize errors and bias (1994:36). As stated earlier, I worked as an intern for Amnesty International Norway in the fall of '08. While this could be seen as a form of participant observation, it must be noted that the campaign work I helped with then was exclusively local and national, and as such is of limited relevance to the issues raised in this study. Among the relevant experience taken from this intern-ship, would primarily be insight into how campaigns are executed on the micro-level and how the structure of the organization operates; that is to say, the somewhat hierarchical ladder from the international secretariat, to the national headquarters and down to the local branches – seen from below, as it were. I was not involved in any UN-directed work, and mostly did smaller tasks in relation to a campaign they had toward making the Norwegian state implement measures against violence toward women in refugee centers. This could conceivably give rise to bias when researching the same organization that I previously worked for, but it is not the main goal of this study to discuss whether or not they should have (more or less) political influence in the UN. This is certainly an interesting question, particularly in light of the normative debates in the English School as regards solidarism, pluralism and sovereignty; it is also a question to which my own answer, in writing this, would be very much undecided.

The main thing, according to Yin, is to have an attitude where you are open to contrary findings (1994:59). This is especially important when researching a non-profit organization; one is likely to ascribe them normative qualities that no organization can live up to in an environment often drenched with Realpolitik and practical compromise. Flyvbjerg tries to counter what he thinks is a false belief about case studies: "The bias toward verification is general [in science], but the alleged deficiency of the case study and other qualitative methods is that they ostensibly allow more room for the researcher's subjective and arbitrary judgement than other methods: They are often seen as

less rigorous than are quantitative, hypothetico-deductive methods." (Flyvbjerg, 2006:16).

According to Flyvbjerg, meta-studies on case studies have shown that they lean more toward falsification than verification, owing largely to the nature of field-work; the case study, apparently, forces on the researcher circumstances that run counter to his or her preconceived notions. Moreover, one is more likely to be confronted by the context of the field, i.e. interviewees, who might correct subjective mistakes (Flyvbjerg, 2006:235-236). Furthermore, the detachment from context can be a detriment in quantitative studies as opposed to in-depth, qualitative studies, where the researcher will often have his preconceptions corrected by the environment or the subjects he is researching (2006:236). This was certainly the case with my field-work.

The preceding chapter has detailed the methodological choices made in this study, starting with methodological theory on single-case studies, the qualitative, iterative approach and the concept of pattern-matching (3.1.1). Next, the choice of case was discussed in relation to paradigmatic cases, along with problematical aspects of my field-work and an overview of my use of sources (3.1.2). 3.1.3 presented the design of the study and the limiting of the unit of analysis. In 3.2.1, problems regarding validity and case studies were discussed, with focus on the problem of generalization in single-case studies. Lastly, issues relating to reliability and bias were discussed with regard to my role and the general attitude toward transparency and contrary findings.

Chapter 4 – Analysis

This chapter contains a presentation and an analysis of the main points in the gathered data, starting with general information on campaigning and advocacy, NGO access in the UN, NGO cooperation and external opposition, **4.1**. These are the required presuppositions to an understanding of the various ways in which transnational advocacy networks seek political influence at the UN, the typology of which is discussed in **4.2**, along with anomalous data. Their work in both the preparation before and in their presence at the UN will be presented and discussed in terms of goals, problems and methods for overcoming these problems, as well as in relation to the various hypotheses from theory.

4.1 – Campaigning and Advocacy

4.1.1   - *Further notes on structure of analysis*

Regarding the use of the stages discussed in regime theory, it would be intuitive to use these on the ATT process as a whole; starting perhaps with agenda formation as occurring sometime between 2000 and 2006, and negotiations as occurring either in the major UN meetings between 2006-2012 or simply in the final meeting in 2012. In this study they will be used on a smaller scale. The strategies and forms of influence falling under the heading of agenda formation, will be understood as any work done before a major event at the UN; provided that there has been changes in either the agenda, the challenges to the agenda, the position of actors or a change in actors interest. Correspondingly, what falls under the heading of negotiation (compare table 2.1 in chapter 2.3.1), will be applied to the NGO work done in direct relation to the bigger UN meetings.[30] The main reason for this is that from the point of view of NGOs, agenda formation corresponds to the campaigning initiatives taken when preparing for their presence at the UN (all the more so as there are different diplomats present every time, and the same process has to be repeated), and negotiation tactics correspond more or less to the direct lobbying toward diplomats/government capitols that is undertaken during the month-long UN meetings.[31]

Initial attempts at structuring the material in relation to the various stages discussed by both regime-, negotiation- and NGO theory failed for these and other reasons. Keck and Sikkink, being

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[30]   While this is compatible with the theory of Keck & Sikkink, it is more at odds with regime theory, wherein the natural thing would be to use a macro-perspective and put all the work done so far on the ATT, between 2003-2010, either wholly in the agenda formation phase, or wholly in the negotiation phase, depending on whose perspective you adopt (i.e. NGOs or states). In the UN, as of 2010, the work done by the Open-Ended Working Group is refered to as preparatory negotiations, and negotiations as the single meeting planned for 2012. Put simply, the classification becomes problematical given the time-frame of this study and the unit of analysis.

[31]   This is one of the main reasons that this study will put emphasis on NGO specific theory as opposed to regime- and negotiation theory; the latter might be more useful in a study with the scope, resources and time to cover the whole length of a treaty formation (made all the more difficult by the fact that NGO employees will have quit and new ones been hired, making access to informants impractical).

familiar with this problem, uses the word *stages* of network influence as interchangeable in their text with that of *types* of network influence; the reason they chose the former as a primary term was because stages, or types, 1-3 sometimes help facilitate stages 4-5 (1998:26). As discovered during the data-gathering, NGOs constantly refresh their position and so repeat the stages at either the same or a new level/setting. A fitting example of this is to be found in an case from Keck and Sikkink - though used by them in a different context - where they discuss the development of campaigns regarding violence against women: These networks started out framing the debate as a human rights debate, which required 'privileging lawyers and legal expertice' to an extent they were not prepared to, and so they reframed it into a question of health (1998:198). In sum, while both an intuitive and accessible way of handling the data, these stages are not representative of the findings and, as such, the material will instead be presented thematically and typologically.

4.1.2   - *Additional information on informants; employment, tasks*

When asked what they were tasked with doing in relation to either the Control Arms Campaign or the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee, inf#1 produces research, 'some of which is empirical, about arms transfers, trading, tracking', which forms part of his wider research and responsibilities covering military, security and policing issues at AI. This role also has policy and advocacy work attached to it; specifically attending government meetings, and to 'liaise with governments in terms of detailed policy work'.[32] He then added that there are two different kinds of research, one which is empirical about arms transfers and their impact, and another which is about national regulations and rules, the policy positions of different states, and so on, which is separate.[33]

Inf#2 replied that since he is the program officer at IANSA, he is the main contact for ATT and CAC work, and even though his role is quite varied, a lot of his time is spent working on ATT related work such as management- and campaign meetings. Inf#3 said that she is fairly new to the role, having only been at *this* post since the preceding summer, and that her tasks have been event-oriented around the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN in July, as well as the UN General Assembly. In this respect she has ' been devising advocacy strategy, dividing and implementing advocacy strategy at both of those', as well as having the coordinating responsibility for the Amnesty International delegation of lobbyists. Additionally, she is the convener of the working group of the ATT Steering Committee.[34] Inf #4 is the Advocacy Officer at Amnesty

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[32]   When asked whether this was more to do with preparatory work than hands-on advocacy, he replied that all the research is campaign oriented, and that everything will be 'seeking to feed into the Control Arms Campaign, which is probably the largest part of my work'.

[33]   Hereafter, informants will be referred to as Inf#1-inf#5 in lieu of initials, as they are shared in one case and, furthermore, might be too revealing given the positions in the NGO. Regarding these positions, they are not entirely exclusive to the informants (in all cases but one) and can therefore be included while still keeping reasonable anonymity. In any case, I was given permission to refer to their position in the NGO.

[34]   Informants #1-3 confirmed that they have all participated in agenda formation before the UN meetings, campaigning and

International Sweden, and has previously worked as a lobbyists at the New York office. She is currently working on this as well as other campaigns in a regional capacity. Inf #5 is the Head of Control Arms at Oxfam International; she has been working on the campaign in various capacities since it's inception, and as the Campaign Manager since 2006. Inf # 6 is a Control Arms campaigner at AI, who has been working on and off on various campaigns 'for a few years', and who has frequently been to New York for events at the UN.

4.1.3   - *Campaigning and advocacy*

Even though all informants agree that the two are necessarily linked, they still operate with a clear distinction between *lobbying or advocacy,* on the one hand, and *campaigning* on the other. In explaining the use of these terms, inf#1's says that campaigning is regarded as getting popular mobilization in order to create political influence, whereas actually using that weight he would consider to be lobbying or advocacy. Their general meaning seems to be that campaigning is directed at mass mobilization, whereas advocacy or, as they more commonly refer to it, *direct lobbying* is directed at government officials.

On the relationship between campaigning and direct lobbying, inf#3 says that they are 'much more heavily focused on direct lobbying than it used to be' and that while they were more focused on international campaigning at the outset, they 'got to a point where governments agree that there should be an ATT, so they agreed to come to the table, and now what's important is the substance of it, ensuring that the detail is going to achieve the things that we want to see from an ATT'. She adds that the relevant venue for changing the detail of a treaty is high level advocacy, and that this 'phasing of the process' is done partly on account of limited resources, or 'distribution of organizational priorities', and partly based on what, she says, makes sense. According to inf#2, the members of IANSA themselves – as opposed to the secretariat – are split between capital targeted lobbying and campaigning. The two activities are closely tied, he says, and 'there might be sixty groups that did kind of grass roots campaigning, marches, post cards, petition campaigns, but then there's probably another sixty that had seminars, met their local politicians, they understand the policy, and they speak on a kind of higher level to specific targets as opposed to a general public campaigning initiative'.[35]

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lobbying during the meetings and that they have participated to some degree in the research leading up to them.

[35]   Regarding the bigger campaigning initiatives, such as the million faces petition, inf #2 points out that it got a lot of media attention when it was presented to Kofi Annan. The problem with these kinds of media-related campaigning initiatives, he says, is that it's impossible to measure how effective they are. They regard it as a relative success, however, since it played an important role in drawing attention toward the issue, something that he says is hard to do these days 'with nuclear stuff, climate change everywhere' and the ATT being a rather slow and technical process that does 'not affect people in the north too much'.

4.1.4   *- Network access to arena, Visibility*

A necessary condition for understanding NGO influence at the UN is figuring out how much access they have to this arena; political influence is dependent on access to the relevant political arena. In talking about their general situation at the UN, inf #2 and #3 say that they basically make do with what they can get from day to day, and that they 'just kind of go into an empty meeting room, and use one of them' (inf#2). They will put up stands in the hallways, projectors displaying videos, and various events. While they have no formal position, they will find ample venue to promote their cause; and most states, he says, are quite accommodating when approached by an NGO representative. Inside the governmental meeting venues, there is seeting along the side and in the back for NGO members to sit on, inf#3 says, 'and a lot of the time it's about working the room, making sure you're capturing the right people, NGOs sometimes go around and speak to governments at their desk, just crouching down by their desk'.

There is some competition between the CAC and other NGOs regarding booking space, inf#3 says, and she adds that they rely heavily on IANSA and Oxfam who have better facilities and coordinators within the UN framework and the UN facilities management. The main challenge here, she says, is that there is 'a hell of a lot of bureaucracy involved, you have to go through about four different compartments to organize catering and you know, get security to agree that it's OK to do this 'n that'. This is one of the reasons, she says, why they spend a whole month in New York whenever there is a meeting. In OEWG and UNFC meetings, inf#1 says, there will be a point at which the meeting is at an end, in the afternoon, where the meeting will be 'suspended and the NGOs will be given an allotted time to speak, and that's the only point at which we're able to intervene formally in a meeting'.

All informants mention visibility in the UN area as an important priority and as requirement if their methods are to be effective. Inf#1 gives an example of the first committee of the General Assembly, 'where there's dozens and dozens of issues on the agenda [...], they will be dealing with everything from stockpiles to weapons in outer space, nuclear disarmament, to all kinds of things'. They are "jostling for bandwidth" he says, and he attributes the success of their cause in the October First Committee meeting to the visibility of the campaign. During this month long meeting, he says, their issue will get discussed for a relatively short time, so it's essential to get the most out of side meetings and government meetings; this presupposes visibility in the UN.

Historically, explains inf#1, the campaign has used everything from media stunts 'all the way through to you know, if you like, the most basic tool in the lobbyists toolkit is having coffee with somebody'. The NGOs are able to book a room during, for example, lunch time, where they can have meetings and present reports. How many delegates show up at their meetings, he adds, depends on

everything from how provocative the subject is to the quality of sandwiches made available; generally, he says, there will be anything from 50-100 delegates and that they are getting attention.[36]

Inf#1, #4 and #6 all talked about the importance of places such as the Vienna Café and the various lounges/cafeterias, explaining how meaningful interaction with the diplomats is often spontaneous, and that they therefore place great importance on being constantly prepared and educated on the action circulate and country-specific strategies. The quality of the catering, explains inf#4, is often just as important as stands and events. In sum, though they for the most part have to improvise and make due with what is available at any given time, and though they are not always given formal recognition, they have ample venue to promote their cause and are accepted and respected by most states as participants, often being mentioned in their statements in plenary.[37] Their access to this arena is more indirect than that of states, confirming Bas Arts statements on the definition of an arena, but they are in no way denied access, nor are they lacking in opportunities to be heard (see 2.2.1). Because the interaction in this arena is spontaneous for lobbyists, if follows that they need to be very well informed; this is related to information politics, as discussed in 4.2.1.

4.1.5   - *Network cooperation, internal and external opposition*

With regard to cooperation with the other NGOs, inf#3 was asked whether they make decisions together or if AI – as arguably the biggest NGO in the ATT SC – makes decisions unilaterally and then give the other NGOs the option to either get onboard or make objections. She replied that it was a mixture of both, and that AI was there to ensure that the ATT is effective in preventing human rights abuses, while Oxfam has a development focused agenda, for example, so they would naturally develop and pursue their own objectives first. This is mitigated by regular campaign management meetings between the Control Arms partners and with the ATT SC on a weekly basis, she says, adding that the many events during the year require constant coordination. Her job as both campaign coordinator for AI and convener of the ATT SC, is to 'divide the gap of advocacy strategy, ensuring that all of the NGOs are feeding into the strategy' which will then be implemented in New York. In terms of *strategic portrayal*, they are focusing on the internal aspect as well as the external one; trying to achieve frame resonance both within the network itself and towards recipients (Keck and Sikkink 1998:8).

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[36]   Another tactic they use, according to inf#3, is to organize big meetings with the whole NGO delegation and certain governments, where they get forty or fifty people asking for an audience with the government; this allows them, in turn, to get an engagement where difficult questions can be asked. They will also put other governments in the room at the time, which she says can be useful. Side events are also used, where they bring speakers to the UN in order to raise their issues and to illustrate why, she says, they are calling on the governments to take certain action. Generally, she says, they try to always make themselves visible by putting up photo selections, holding receptions with drinks, all of this to 'invite the diplomats along'.

[37]   Essentially this is up to the member states to determine in preparatory commissions of negotiation, most likely in the "prepcoms" of 2010 if it becomes an issue. See Bas Arts (1998:108) for various examples of treaties where NGOs were given and were not given formal recognition in resolutions.

Inf#1 confirms that there tends to be strategy coordination before the bigger UN meetings, which has 'increasingly tended to be not just the three large NGOs, but it tends to be working groups from the ATT steering committee'. When asked if there is any friction between the NGOs in the build-up, he says that it's important to distinguish between strategy and goals. According to him, the ATT SC successfully sketched out a set of goals very early on, the Global Principles, that all the NGOs signed up to and have as 'a shared vision', stating that while there are many points in this set of principles that are controversial for governments, there is little contention within the NGO community.[38] Inf#2 says that there are often, if not always, slight disagreements with "positioning", associated materials that someone will not sign on to on account of disagreement over facts, disagreement over the accuracy of some reports, and issues around 'who should go, why they should go, not between ourselves, but people from around the world'. He says that NGOs are quite good at 'arguing amongst themselves', adding that it would be odd if there were no active discussions. These were all just minor issues, in his opinion, and he couldn't think of anything noteworthy. Inf #1 and #2 both said that it came down to the NGOs having a slightly different focus.

Inf#3 stated that she was unsure about how frank to be in an interview like this, and went on to say that inevitably there are disagreements about policy. It's difficult, she says, when you have so many stakeholders involved, noting that an effect of this is that they have conversations that 'go on and on and on and wastes a lot of time, going around in circles about trying to devise a political action or come up with our perspective on resolution texts etc.'. Adding to this is the restructuring of the campaign, both with regard to Control Arms and the ATT SC, with problems coming up in terms of the clarification of roles that will be played by the different parties in working groups and boards. She distinguishes between these problems as related to decision-making, and says that there are also problems with regard to facts, 'so for example publication of statistics where one organization uses statistics that another doesn't think are valid' which causes disagreements. Inf#3 emphasized that they make sure to have strong joint objectives, so that each NGO can pursue their own objectives without it disturbing cooperation.

According to inf #1, while there is general agreement upon goals, there are frequent arguments about strategy, and in the case of the last big meeting (i.e October '09) it was primarily to do with negotiation strategy vis-a-vis the US position on the treaty. But, he says, they ended up having a coordinated view, a joint statement and a joint lobbying position, as replied inf #2 and #3. He further adds that the NGOs 'weren't clearly split along NGO lines', and that the conflict was mainly between individuals.[39] Inf #1 at first replied that there was no clear hierarchy of influence

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[38] He adds that many new issues have come up after the initial formulation of the principles, but that none of these have entailed friction between the NGOs; it is mostly a matter, he says, of them having a different focus. When pressed on the matter, he said that 'obviously sometimes people disagree', and that the process of drawing up such a document is 'a little complex', but that the set of principles is 'pretty stable'.

[39] This is analogous to findings by Manno, who writes that 'personalities will often play as much, if not more of a role in international environmental negotiations than the organizations and positions the individuals represent' (1994:108).

between the NGOs in settling these disputes or deciding policy, but then said that the smaller NGOs often look to the three larger NGOs for a lead. In the end, according to all three informants, it is the bigger, richer organizations that 'have more say because they have more stuff, capacity, etc., so they can do more work' (inf#1).[40]

Keck and Sikkink point out that transnational advocacy networks operate within a political space internally as well as externally, which entails that coming up with a joint enterprise will require internal negotiation (1999:90)(2.2.4). As pointed out, the political space in this case is two-fold as it pertains both to the different official political aims of the NGOs involved and the cultural backgrounds of their members; the assumption being that for the core actors to continuously develop a "common frame of meaning" would be especially difficult (compare Keck and Sikkink 1998:7-8). This did not seem to be the case, though they did run into some contention as regards credibility and political ties, as discussed below (4.2.1). The CAC seems to have successfully framed the issue, achieving frame resonance with regard to themselves and the arena (i.e. the two-fold nature of "strategic portrayal", compare 2.2.4), despite problems in the process.

Regarding external opposition in both the preparation phase and at the UN, inf#1 explains how it is a problem for them that some governments treat NGOs as a single block of actors, and that some have quite a 'detailed and disaggregated view of the NGO community', in that some governments like Oxfam, some like AI and so on, while others won't distinguish and treat them all as a single actor. This is a general problem, and in terms of specifically the ATT, he cites Egypt as the most vocal opponent. According to inf#1, there's a block of states behind Egypt who are opposed to the ATT, all of them abstaining from voting. Zimbabwe is currently the only one voting no, having changed their vote a few times, but according to him it is unclear to everyone else whether this vote was simply a mistake on their part 'or if it was the other way around'.[41] Among the abstaining states behind Egypt, he adds, some are merely unsure about the nature of the ATT and the process leading up to it, while others are fundamentally opposed to it. Voting no, however, is perceived as a drastic thing to do in the UN, and often states will obstain 'when what they mean is we think this thing stinks'. Behind Egypt, he says, are 'Venezuela, Cuba, quite a lot of the Arab League, Russia is still pretty skeptical, China is very quiet, so there's a kind of silent group of states, block of states [...] who tends to speak out through Egypt'.

According to inf#2 sympathetic governments will cooperate in what he describes as beneficial

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[40]   Inf #2 had rougly the same thing to say about the relationship between strategy and goals, adding that developing the common goals takes a bit of discussion, but that it's dispensed beforehand and that everyone is in agreement when taking it to the UN. According to inf #2, the three NGOs are clear on not ignoring the other organization's concerns when applying their own focus in presentations toward government representatives. There is no real contradiction here, he adds, saying that 'if you take guns away from the world, you'll probably see an increase in people's human rights, because then they'll not be attacked and killed and living in bad conditions because they're scared of being robbed'.
[41]   Inf#2 explains that only Zimbabwe votes no, and that everyone thinks they'll change their position once it gets down to the final vote, and that there is also speculation that this might be an anti-colonial sentiment on their part toward the UK.

groups of supportive states, who will work out strategies to promote their views among the other states. There will, however, be some points on which the NGOs will not agree with even the progressive states, he points out. Regarding opposition from nations, inf#3 says that they are more inclined to ignore the NGOs rather than publicly oppose them, but that they speak against their principles when addressing the sympathetic nations.

Regarding opposition from other interest groups, inf#1 cites the NRA as the most vocal opponent of the ATT besides states, along with other domestic gun control NGOs.[42] According to inf#1, they are opposed to it for fraudulent reasons; the ATT is explicitly avoiding any control restrictions on domestic circulation of arms, he says, so it's irrelevant to their causes. Nevertheless, they think it will become a much bigger problem for them now that the US is coming aboard; the NRA and affiliates, he says, are already using phone polls in the states, and in spite of their focus on domestic policy they are given equal access with the Control Arms NGOs in the UN. [43]

As mentioned before, NGOs have an opportunity to formally intervene when a meeting is at an end. In these situations, he explains, the UN is scrupulous about giving equal time to the Control Arms NGOs and the NRA and sports shooters associations, where each is given half an hour to present their case. According to inf#1, this is not fair as they represent a massive global movement whereas the NRA is a national gun control lobby. [44] Inf#3 says that gun lobbies have a lot of presence at the UN and that they publish articles and blogs 'rubbishing what we say'. She also laments the fact that pro gun lobbies are given an equal time to present their case in the main chambers of governments.[45] Inf#4 and #6 both cite experience with opposition from gun control lobby organizations such as the NRA, generally saying the same things as inf #1-3. Inf#4, having worked at the New York office, claims that threats are frequent and that the ATT is one of their more controversial issues.

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[42]   National Rifle Association, an NGO that works to protect the Second Amendment in the US Bill of Rights, i.e. promotion of firearm ownership rights.

[43]   When asked if he thought they were funded by other lobbying actors who had interests in arms dealing, inf#1 replied that they have seen no evidence for that, and that while it might be the case, he thought the NRA were just 'fundamentally and ideologically opposed to any kind of restrictions on weaponry' and that they are 'very well organized and well funded'.

[44]   Inf#2 had mostly the same thing to say about the NRA, but – in representing IANSA – did not want to be quoted directly in talking about them. According to inf#1 and #3, IANSA is villified by the NRA to the extent that threats are made. Inf#2 does say that while the NRA is the largest voice, there are lobbyists from the weapon industry as well, though usually not in the UN – they will lobby governments in separate meetings

[45]   When asked if she too felt that they are wrongfully adressing export issues as domestic NGOs, she replied that while this is the argument they use, the NRA public liaisons will reply that the ATT adresses restrictions on the sale of guns which will threaten the right to bear arms. While this is certainly not the facts of the ATT, she says, it seems that some of them genuinely believe it to be.

4.2 – Typology on political influence

As presented in 2.3.1, Keck and Sikkink have developed a four point typology to account for the political influence of transnational advocacy networks, understood as forms of persuasion (or, in some cases, socialization) and consisting of *information politics*, *symbolic politics, leverage politics* and *accountability politics* (1999:95). These tools of analysis will be applied to the gathered data (4.2.1 – 4.2.3), pointing out anomalies (4.2.4) and which methods the informants themselves deem more influential (4.2.5).

4.2.1 – *Information politics and credibility*

In terms of the typology of Keck and Sikkink, the largest part of the gathered data can be categorized in terms of information politics. My findings regarding the role of information and the problems relating to it are, however, not completely congruent with their typology. The aim of this section is to see how much of my gathered data can be understood using their description of this type of influence, which is centered around the effective use of information at the right time and in the right venues, the appropriate framing of issues and credibility (1999:95-96)(compare 2.3.1). Though I rely primarily on informants as sources, I was given prints of a significant portion of AI's internal correspondence from September-November of 2009, with permission to use most of it; some portions were marked as confidential, having to do with country-specific strategies, and I was instructed not specifically name persons from either the NGO or governments. Granting these exceptions, it was left to my own discretion.

Inf#3 explains how the general idea of the material they prepare is to get a plausible idea across of how the global principles of a treaty would have to be to ensure human rights, and how it has to be in order to properly work. Their main concern at the OEWG of July '09, says inf#1, was centered around 'the issue of the scope of what states were willing to accept as the scope of weaponry to be included in an arms trade treaty'; i.e., if it was going to be just the seven categories of the UN register on conventional arms, with additions, if ammunition, parts, components and production machinery were to be included. Their strategy was to get a number of NGOs to prepare their research on the human rights implications of the above mentioned arms, to 'really nail down the scope of the issue' and prepare documents, briefings and reports about the necessary scope of the treaty, i.e. 'the way that different kinds of equipment are implicated in human rights violations' to make the case that they need to be included within international controls. This echoes what Keck and Sikkink describe as showing that a state of affairs is 'neither natural nor accidental', in so far as it is caused by the use of these arms in human rights violations, as well as the importance of identifying responsibility, in

this case lack of international regulation, and, lastly, proposing credible solutions (1999:96).

In terms of producing politically usable information, IANSA are responsible for collating everything that's being said in the UN by states, which results in regional papers that can be used for reference (such as consistency of arguments, etc.). This is especially relevant, according to inf#2, when states are asked to submit their views on the ATT to the UN Secretary General. This will feed back into their members in capitals, who can then confront their government representatives about what was said or promised earlier. When asked whether they used Amnesty reports to this end, he replied that they used them as tools, especially useful when representatives speak to their governments. It's a useful reference, he says, so they 'can say things like, you know, this Amnesty report says that in Guinea, these weapons are being transferred there and they're used for killing people, with this ATT it wouldn't have happened'. He further feels that since it would have Amnesty International written on it, this would add credibility.

Credibility is a huge concern according to all informants, especially with regard to being politically neutrals. Concerning political affiliations, inf#1 said that to his knowledge, none of the NGOs involved in the Campaign are affiliated to a political party, have a political purpose or are political think tanks. He then adds that AI's distance from political parties is 'more than some others' in the sense that they 'don't get any funding from any government', whereas a number of organizations (presumably from the ATT SC) are funded substantially by different governments.[46]

Inf#2 replied that 'of course it involves politics in dealing with governments', but that there is no political agenda behind what they're doing and that their 'bottom line is saving lives'. He points to the ATT's Global Principles, claiming that they are not political or politically motivated, but more about falling in line with international law and sustainable development. While there are certain governments that support them more than others, this does not, according to him, entail that they take instructions from these governments. He adds that the ATT process is perceived as led by the UK, being one of the countries that the NGOs are largely in agreement with, but that even in this case the NGOs will voice their disagreements. As far as government affiliation goes, he says that while the Control Arms campaign is managed by Oxfam, AI and IANSA, the Control Arms brand is being used by NGOs all over the world, many of which will be national and in some cases closely aligned to national parties.[47]

Inf#3 points to some crossover with individuals, who hold positions both in the ATT SC NGOs and in their respective governments; sometimes even doubling as government- and NGO

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[46] To his mind, this is an interesting kind of "feedback", not neccessarily in terms of influence, but it is the case 'that you have NGOs lobbying goverments [...] from whom they are also recieving funds'. In some cases, he says, those funds have been given to them by the same government specifically for ATT lobbying, which to him constitutes an interesting "loop". Inf#1 did not think it was a serious question of objectivity or credibility, saying that one should not 'overstate the influence that a certain funding brings', but repeats that the perceptions of governments and what their strategies are in funding NGOs, who then lobbies them, is an interesting question.

[47] He mentions NGOs from Argentina as an example, adding that he is not certain if they are directly influenced or not, and that in any case 'you don't get many national parties that are going to say 'we want to break international human rights law, we don't want to follow humanitarian law and we want to undermine sustainable development'.

delegates in UN meetings.[48] According to her, this is a matter of contention within the coalition, as some NGOs – unnamed here – 'and Amnesty has quite different perspectives on that conflict of interest'. The examples become numerous when applied to people who have at some point worked for the government, but are now working for NGOs; as far as she knows, however, the crossover is more with individuals rather than organizations. Inf#5 also touched upon this subject, claiming that people with government ties were more often than not an asset rather than a problem, and that she did not perceive this as a significant threat to their credibility. Inf#3 confirmed that they are perceived as being too close to the UK government, describing this as a damaging accusation. Knowing the mechanisms within the campaign, she says, they're 'absolutely not, we're apolitical, but it's inevitable that we'll have closer relationships with some governments than others'. [49]

Keck and Sikkink describe information as what binds networks together and as essential for their effectiveness (1998:18). This information must be actionable and useful both to their own members – who are often scattered around the world – and to the final recipients. A significant part of a network's influence in a state-dominated setting arises from the exclusivity of their information (1998:19). According to informants 1-3, they have a monopoly on ATT related information in the UN setting, where diplomats are generally unenlightened on the subject. How this information is received, however, depends on the country's relation to or opinion of the NGO, and therefore it is a question of credibility.

When asked what it is like to mix research and lobbying, or research and activism in general, and whether their reports and material is regarded by recipients as pure research or whether it's perceived more in terms of activism, inf #1 replied that to his mind this mixture is a strength. It is quite helpful, he says, to be able to bring 'the minute detail information about the actual nature of the problem and what is actually happening there' to a lobbying environment, or to the UN, where 'they more often than not lack this information'. I had assumed at the outset, before the field-work, that their credibility would be scrutinized on account of the dramatization of facts that is often associated with activism. This, however, did not seem to be the case, and mostly their credibility issues were related to bias toward certain states.

According to Keck and Sikkink, the credibility of a network's information hinges on it being well documented and reliable, which is often in conflict with their use of this information to gain attention – to this end it must be 'timely and dramatic' (1998:19). In characterizing their work as both journalistic and academic, inf#1 says that the information is academic in the sense that it's always

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[48] Inf#3 gave examples that are omitted on her request.

[49] Another big concern, according to inf#3, is getting caught up as pawns in government games. They are very careful about this, that they are not being used, adding that they are 'wary of how we then take what's going on and in this sort of microcosm, we're having sort of confidential discussions with governments all of the time, what we do with that information, what we make public, what we don't, how we respond in the media, when do we use our particular tools'. She also cites the example of how they recently issued a press release calling on the UK government not to bend to the US demands about the provision. The UK government were absolutely furious, she says, because 'it was about taking a sort of internal diplomatic issue outside, that we were trying to use as a campaigning technique'.

motivated by a campaign and that they are honest about the fact that they have an agenda, while on the other hand, it is journalistic 'in the sense of having to be true and accurate'. He puts emphasis on the fact that the truth of what they see happening has to be what forms the controls they recommend. It's also journalistic, he says, in the sense that they are not 'afraid to name names, if a government is doing something you'll say so, if a company is doing something, as long as we can stack it up with evidence, we will say so'. Whether they name individuals is more difficult, and he says it's not always their policy to do so. Truthfulness and accuracy are especially important because when dealing with specific transfers of governments and companies, he says, if you get the facts 'about what happened on that particular day wrong, you'll get sued', and so the standards of accuracy and credibility are paramount.

Their research is a mix of statistical research, inf #1 says, mostly in terms of gathering statistics that are already there, but they've produced research about 'the humanitarian and epidemiological impact of particular weapons, types, numbers of deaths and injuries' noting that these are 'quite powerful things'. The bulk of the research is done by the international secretariat staff, and is not decentralized to member countries; they also use consultants around the world, and when asked about their background he replies that they are not required to come from academia. It's more about their level of expertice, he says, and their access to specific information.[50] He explains how their general attitude is to gather as much expert information as possible that is relevant to the topic of the campaign in question.[51]

According to Keck and Sikkink, an 'important part of the political struggle over information is precisely whether an issue is defined primarily as technical – and thus subject to consideration by "qualified" experts – or as something that concerns a broader global constituency' (1998:19). This is why, they say, the clear and powerful messages 'that appeal to shared principles' often have more impact than that of experts (1998:19). Inf #2 said that some reports are more loosely written and more sensationalist than others, pointing to the fact that while a lot of campaign materials consist of mostly pictures and rhetorical points, some material, such as the global principles booklet, are 'forty pages of dense text'. It depends, he says, on how the information is to be used; for some occasions, it is more suitable with facts and broad statistics, in others it's more about getting the message across in a brief and effective way.

Inf #3 had a different characterization of their research in that she sees the data gathering in

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[50] He says that 'they're not necessarily Ph.Ds', but that the campaign has profited greatly from a core of expertice about the mechanics of the international arms trade, which has come from a whole range of disciplines, he says, from 'people who understand and know about transportations or logistics, people who know about weapons, and people who know about public health, epidemiological, drawing upon a number of different disciplines' (inf#1)

[51]"That was really important, the level of expertise, for other kinds of campaigns, legal expertise is absolutely critical for campaign for international criminal court, military engineering expertise for the landmines campaign, because they were bringing evidence to the table about the, you know, for example, in the cluster munitions campaign, bringing evidence about failure rates, something the Norwegian parts of that campaign did, kind of engineering evidence that the governments can count on, that we have the data. So their experise has been really important for us." Inf#1

campaigns with long term goals as academic, in terms of building data over time, but that the use of this data is largely journalistic and that it comes down to using it in the manner that is most useful. [52] This is consistent with Keck and Sikkink's statement that "reporting facts" does not 'fully express the way networks strategically use information to frame issues' and that they 'call attention to issues, or even create issues by using language that dramatizes and draws attention to their concerns' (1998:19-20).

In talking about the role of information at the UN, inf#2 says that there are a variety of reason for sending well-prepared and educated NGO representatives to the UN. Part of it, he says, is to 'keep the people there, the governmental representatives there up to date with what's going on, and the NGOs are also an institutional memory, you know these people in the UN change every year'. Another reason, he says, is human interest stories and testimonials; if you talk about someone who's family has been shot to death or bombed by a tank, he says, 'that's a different kind of pull' – i.e. to factual information in statistical form. Instead of flipping pages of writing, he adds, it's better to present people who have survived attacks from conventional weapons, conveying to the governmental representative that 'look, you're a Liberian, I'm a Liberian, my family's been shot to death, we need to stand up...'. It's these kind of human tragedy stories, he says, that prove very useful, often more so than factually oriented reports.

Usually, however, inf#2 says that government representatives will need to look at 'numbers and money and what it means to their economy and what they currently do, the impact on their current trading in arms'. According to Keck and Sikkink, the linking of testimonial and technical/statistical information are part of what characterizes NGO networks, and a method they have helped to legitimize (1998:21). Use of individual cases as testimonials and the dramatizing of factual information are crucial in increasing an issue's salience in a political setting, but, judging by my informants, they seem to be too risky in the absence of facts.

An invaluable part of the NGO influence at the UN, says inf#2, is that they have expertice they make available to governments, whose resources do not permit them to get this expertice. When presented with knowledge on an issue, says inf#2, 'if they don't have alternatives, that's what they tend to go along with, maybe not all of them, but it forms the basis of their own kind of opinions'. This is why, he says, for IANSA, it's a priority to give it's members knowledge about why the ATT is relevant to them in their own countries and how it can help, a knowledge which facilitates the influence they have when talking to governmental representatives. Speaking from a position of

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[52] Another effective method, inf#2 says, is whenever the Secretary General calls for consultations 'usually when he puts out a call for consultations he'll get twelve, you know, I think when we did it there were over a hundred, the most ever state's submissions'. He attributes this to IANSA handing out templates for these submissions to members in different governments; this way, it's not demanding on governments time as the real work is prepared by the NGO and they are only required to read it, sign it and send it in. In the opinion of inf#1, it is often the more "ephemeral" materials that change a government officials mind, and he claims it is often more effective to have 'a presentation that you can then e-mail to them afterwards, you know, that might be more influential than a big fat report that you smack on their desk'.

knowledge, he says, is the only way to be persuasive, and simply walking 'along with flyers and posters, [...], people look at it and say, oh well you know, OK, but when you get someone talk to you and say, we really wanted to do this with human rights law, because this and this, being undermined in this way, not all these government people know about that'.

Information politics as a type of political influence seems to give an accurate understanding of the network's behaviour in the case at hand; in framing the issue and presenting politically usable information; in having a monopoly or exclusivity of information; and in maintaining the most useful balance between technical expertice and human interest testimonials. Credibility in the case of the ATT, however, seems to have been centered around concerns regarding political neutrality and bias toward certain countries, more than towards maintaining credibility with the press, which is what Keck and Sikkink highlight as the most important feature (1999:96). The dramatization of facts seems to be construed as a strength, rather than as a potential problem of credibility. And given the setting in the UN, the suitability of particular categories of information seem to be evaluated on a person-to-person basis, rather than pertaining to the campaign as a whole.

4.2.2 – *Symbolic and accountability politics*

The use of symbolic and accountability politics are not as prevalent in this case as one would assume it to be in most cases, owing perhaps to the global and bureaucratic nature of the issue. It has already been stated how the network sometimes uses testimonials and stories in a symbolic fashion, rather than statistics, in order to convince diplomats. There is no clear juxtaposition of symbolic events in this case, as there is in the cases of Keck and Sikkink; it is rather a myriad of small examples all feeding into the same agenda in a manner more akin to information politics. Inf#1 explains that while it is generally the case that the advocacy agenda dictates the direction of the research – he had previously said that preparatory research is derived from advocacy objectives-, it is also true that some of the research is procured indirectly through country specific crisis work. Citing a recent experience in Conakry, Guinea, he said that while they sat out to look at the recent massacre that's happened there, they ended up gathering a lot of information about the international systems of training that's being supplied to specific units involved in the massacre, and 'a lot about the ongoing training of youth militias by South African and Israeli private security companies'. Apparently the same thing occurred several times during the cluster munitions campaign, especially with reference to Lebanon; he adds that the cluster munitions treaty, sadly, would probably not have come to pass if not for that war. Arguably, it acted as a symbol, facilitating political influence. This kind of data will be used, he says, to try to advocate for the inclusion of relevant international regulatory systems in the arms trade treaty. They use these examples to show the tragedies that occur when the arms trade

is handled in a privatized fashion, without international and government enforced regulations. Given that the real consequences are immeasurable (their words), these examples are characterized by informants #1 and #2 as symbolic (albeit not using that exact term).

As for accountability, it has played a significant part in their strategies toward some specific countries. It is of limited use, according to informants #1-3, in that countries will simply deny, ignore or otherwise disregard their accusations. The question of how the resulting formulation of the ATT is framed, is relevant to it's status as a hard law treaty, inf#1 explains, and it is intended as a legally binding treaty as opposed to an agreement. Making a treaty that countries respect is not done automatically, he says, citing the example of Russia who is already obligated to a treaty that says they are to take into account human rights criteria in considering arms transfers – he says 'it's fair to say that Russia export controls interpret that provision very liberally'. Their main concern at this point forward, is that it will end up as what Young describes as a dead letter (1998:2), a point on which inf#5 elaborated at length, essentially saying that since NGOs have extended experience in trying to make states live up to their obligations to international laws and treaties, they are painfully aware of the necessity of a strong and specific ATT. With states that care little about normative ramifications, the treaty must ensure that sanctions 'hit where it hurts'.

One of the documents given to me by informants was a draft for a pamphlet called "Stopping the Terror Trade; how human rights rules in an arms trade treaty can help deliver real security", and which used five symbolic examples, or cases, to show the consequences of not having such a treaty. Case one was a military attack on peaceful demonstrators in Conakry, saying among other things that armored vehicles drove into crowds, firing with live ammunition and tear gas; some of which were provided by private security companies with ties to the UK, the other cases being unsystematically similar.[53] These graphically illustrated cases are examples of what Keck and Sikkink describe as symbolic politics, in that they draw upon testimonials and stories, present a juxtaposition of symbolic events and in that they are clearly meant to provoke reaction from audiences that are far away. Furthermore, they give an interpretation of this juxtaposition as all being related to the issue, i.e. the absence of an ATT (Keck & Sikkink 1998:22/201). Unlike in the examples of Keck and Sikkink, however, there were no particular events that were linked conceptually to an issue as a symbol, but rather multiple events on a smaller scale.

4.2.3   – *Leverage politics*

As mentioned in 2.2.2, Bas Arts argues that while a non-state actor can have more influence on a certain policy than for example the USA, this does not entail that the non-state actor is the more

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[53]   A finished version of the pamphlet can be read at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/006/2009/ en/c84983b5-14ac-4eee-a389-d21979aa6d77/act300062009en.pdf

powerful actor; he separates the notion of power from influence on the grounds that the former involves a degree of permanence, while the latter is episodic (1998:58). If non-state actors are to accomplish this influence on a certain policy, they must induce other, more powerful actors to act on their behalf (or on the behalf of the issue). According to Keck and Sikkink, the way in which they do this is by linking issues to things that compel the more powerful to action, such as economic interest, health or environmental concerns – i.e. material leverage – or in terms of shame or public image – moral leverage (1999:97).

With regard to the latter, referred to by the informants as "shaming", inf#1 explains how they are one of the few NGOs doing empirical research that has in the past driven the Control Arms agenda in 'in terms of exposing specific arms transfers and saying, this is what is happening, these are the people involved, this is how the arms trade operated, this is it's mechanics, this is how it should be controlled'. According to him, the history of conventional arms control is basically the history of scandals, noting the UK as an example and that they sold arms to Iraq, also mentioning the US. Their strategy is exposure to the reality of the problem, he says, and it's these kinds of scandals that he thinks have led to an increased focus on border controls; this kind of exposure, he says, is more important than legal and policy research, although those too are necessary.[54]

It's their policy, inf#1 says, to name countries that have violated human rights, something that will be both a problem and a strength at the UN, where the environment is such that it is generally not accepted. Since Amnesty will often do this (though not so often in the case of the Control Arms campaign), there is always an environment of implied threat; governments will often 'rebut what they think we're going to say about them', he adds, citing an example with Myanmar. The skeptical states will often come to rebut, with the most vocal opponent at the moment always being Egypt. As mentioned in information politics, their emphasis on credibility is due in large part to what they refer to as "naming". An example of this can be found in their report on the People's Republic of China, entitled "Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses – The flow of arms accelerates" (Amnesty International, 2006). This report argues that China, being one of the world's major arms exporters, has not entered any multilateral agreements which set human rights related criteria to the transfer of arms, and has in several cases sent military equipment to countries 'with a record of gross human rights violations'.[55] In inf#1's opinion, however, actually exposing a country's transgressions is not as effective as the threat of exposure. In other words, the implied threat of "shaming" is more effective than actual "shaming" with regard to moral leverage.

Inf#2 also mentioned implied threat of bad publicity as one of their persuasion tactics vis-a-vis nations, pointing out that they don't threaten directly – they simply use the media to voice their

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[54] The reasons they are among the only ones doing this kind of research, which incidentally "saddens" him, is that it's specialized and resource intensive. He adds that they, of course, draw upon the global network of NGOs to facilitate this research.
[55] Available online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/030/2006/zh/be25c03a-d42b-11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/asa170302006en.pdf

opinions. Citing the examples of China during the Olympics and the December '09 meeting in Copenhagen, he says that it's a question of using opportunities. States 'don't want to be named and shamed' he says, and this has sometimes been used as a "powerful tool" and as an explicit strategy; usually, however, that's not the case, he says, and explains how it is more difficult with for example Egypt, because the only press they would fear 'would be Egyptian press, and considering that's state controlled, they've got it tied up in many respects'. In another example, the NGOs made it clear to the UK that if they allowed the consensus provision to go in in their dealings with the US, the NGOs 'would not be happy with that', but that it went in anyway.

The first is a fitting example of what Keck and Sikkink describes as the vulnerability of target actors being a key point in terms of moral leverage; stating for example that countries who aspire to belong to a normative community of nations are more susceptible to network pressure (1998:29). Inf#1 states that a lot of the governments that are skeptical to the ATT, are 'governments where there is no civil society or very limited civil society', or states where democratic considerations 'are not ones they have to worry about'. This means that the NGO influence is more limited. Getting states to influence other states, intelligently deploying strategic items and using well connected lobbyists will not work as well on some states, he says, but they will still try.

Regarding their country-specific strategies, inf#1 says they have individual strategies for 'most of the big players'. He cites three major examples of such tactics, the first being about states existing obligations and showing that states already have obligations under their national laws or under international law, to demonstrate that they are not signing up to something new; this will work with some states, but sometimes it will fail on account of their existing obligations 'not being all that great'. Another way is to appeal to their strategic interest, with states starting to realize in some cases that 'a more responsible arms trade environment is going to address some of their security concerns as well as some things that they might be concerned about, like human rights and sustainable environment, sanctity of humanitarian law, you try to convince a state that an ATT is going to help stop destabilizing build-ups in their region'. Inf#1 uses the example of Russia, that 'if you can convince them that it's going to help stop buildups in their region, that's something Russia is actually concerned about'. Additionally, he says, they will try to convince them that their arms industry will have market access to responsible arms traders within the regime, in which case 'they will listen more carefully to what you have to say'.

In short, they appeal to strategic interest, economic interest and lastly, to public image; with some states, he says, it's a question 'of showing up their arguments to be cynically motivated'. In this case, if a state is vocal about being opposed to an ATT, the NGO members will show publicly what their actual trading behavior is and point out the states are breaking arms embargos, trading to

massive human rights violators and 'getting rich of it'. This is what motivates their opposition, he says, and 'not some kind of idealistic thing about the difficulties of small states implementing complex agreements – if you show that, instead, it's because they want to continue their irresponsible arms trading, then you can begin to isolate their influence'. These are all examples of what Keck and Sikkink describe as issue-linkage, though it runs slightly contrary to most examples; the issue is not necessarily being linked to something the state would perceive as negative, but is rather framed in terms of a potentially profitable outcome.

Inf #2 points out that it's not always about influencing that government so much as getting governments to influence other governments; at the moment, he says, there 'is a move to try and influence African governments to put pressure on China' on account of them being important commercial clients and because they have a legitimacy within the Chinese government that progressive European governments, and NGOs, lack. This is a common manner in which weaker actors can find leverage against stronger actors, in the theory of Keck & Sikkink, namely in appealing to another strong actor to try and get it to influence the first one (1998:23).

While inf#3 agrees that the implied threat of bad publicity is a part of their influence over states, she too maintains that it has it's limits. Having worked on terrorism for a number of years, she says, what struck her as amazing was how open governments were to NGOs, giving them access and relying on their expertice. There is a genuine respect for the role that NGOs play, she says, owing largely to the fact that the ATT was an NGO initiative to begin with. A consequence of this, she says, is that it's not just about 'playing bad cop, threatening to show up governments, while there's obviously an element of that, but I think having the support of the organizations is a big carrot for them as well'. In the October meeting, inf#1 says, they booked and shared venues with the government of Côte d'Ivoire, a circumstance he describes as lucky because it was a contrast to the 'usual suspects', namely 'the progressive European governments' which often helps the NGOs, he says, and because it sent a stronger message to have a country currently under UN arms embargo supporting the ATT with them. This was also beneficial to the image of Côte d'Ivoire, in the sense of useful association, so the benefit was mutual.[56] In lending states support and supplying them with information, the network actors increase their political influence; furthermore, this seems to be somewhat at odds with actively using moral leverage and accountability politics.

As we shall see, their internal documents support this interpretation, especially with regard to their emphasis on using supportive states as instruments in furthering their policy goals. Identifying points of leverage, says Keck and Sikkink, is 'a crucial strategic step in network campaigns', along with

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[56]   In talking about the practicalities of finding a venue, inf#3 says that 'NGOs sometimes go around and speak to governments at their desk, just crouching down by their desk'. She adds that it's 'all about optics', explaining that it's sometimes very useful for a government to be percieved in deep consultation with a certain NGO, while other times it's 'really not, and they don't want to meet out in broad daylight as it were'.

'securing powerful allies', e.g., getting a group of states to pressure a state over which they as a network have no direct influence (1999:97). In an internal, six-page CAC document entitled "DRAFT PROJECT PLAN – UN First Committee 2009", which is distributed to lobbyists a few weeks before the meeting, they are given instructions on 1) their aim for that meeting, 2) internal objectives, 3) the text of the resolution, 4) key lobby targets, 5) key messages and 6) methods for achieving all of the above.

The network had obtained a confidential draft of the resolution that was to be announced at the first committee, which set out to reframe the OEWG meetings of 2010 into preparatory committees or "prepcoms", and could therefore make changes in their approach accordingly. Their goals and worries are neatly summed up in bolded text saying that a '**weak ATT would be worthless**'. The "draft project plan" gives some specific notes on how lobbyists are to approach their government representatives/Foreign Ministers in capitals, which warns the lobbyists that 'they [gov.rep.] may not have seen the resolution at this points, so need to tread carefully and lead with what must be in the resolution, NOT our analysis with what's wrong with current draft'. This suggests that the network has good access to information, something that would be indispensable in identifying points of leverage and preparing a strategy to use them.

Essentially, their project plan details their strategy of 'lobbying prior to 1st Cttee in key states in order to influence the resolution and substantive debates', as well as lists the key states who author the resolution (UK, France and USA), the supportive states that they deem the most influential (16 states including Norway and Côte d'Ivoire). Their stated strategy is to use the latter states to pressure the former to change the text of the resolution, mostly focusing on the UK. Judging from the text, their strategies are very much focused on the countries which to some extent already support the ATT, and, writing about the skeptics and opponents, they say the following: "There is a risk that some in this group will move from abstain to no. We will continue to lobby as much as we can, but recognising that our influence is fairly limited".

As for the specific methods they outline, one of them is to facilitate a small group of "progressive states" that are prepared to 'stand up to disappointing resolution and take joint leadership role with other states in calling for robust language'. Furthermore, it says they are pursuing the idea with a number of states (Mexico, Norway, Ghana, NZ) but that 'none seem keen to "stick necks out" if would involve criticising the UK [sic]'. Several ambassadors are listed as potential contacts, and they are instructed to get government representatives from supportive states to voice their opinions 'out strongly in plenary'.[57] Under the heading "Lobbying strategy", they outline a few concrete goals in terms of key targets, the first being that the US, previously a key blocker of the

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[57]   In terms of execution, the document ends with a recommendation on getting these things across the first two weeks, before the resolution draft is widely circulated to states – previous experience having indicated that their influence is limited once it is circulated – and that the third and fourth week be used to 'get in the vote'. This is in accordance with the phases sketched out in their action circular, which is discussed below in 4.2.4.

process, does not stall progress toward negotiations. Secondly, it says that they must 'also prioritise targeting **key supportive or progressive States**' [their formatting], in order to get them to attend the meetings, hold bilateral meetings with other such states to encourage partnership, build on the OEWG contributions and be ready to oppose a weak wording of the treaty.

In the present case, the transnational advocacy network seems to have employed the various methods Keck and Sikkink describe as forms of leverage politics, though not in a manner completely analogous to their use of the term. According to informants, while they exert moral leverage in the form of "shaming", they tend to downplay it for the reasons that is 1) poorly received in the UN, 2) less effective than implied threats and 3) in that they prefer to appeal to mutual benefit vis-a-vis states (for example in that states look to them for help and image-related positive association, and they are given access and influence). They also acknowledge the limits to leverage politics as pointed out by Keck and Sikkink, namely that leverage is dependant on the vulnerability of targets (i.e. on whether these states aspire to belong to a community)(1998:29). In their strategies toward key targets they employ issue-linkage to 1) a state's obligations – not in the sense of accountability politics, but in showing that they are not proposing something new – 2) strategic interests and 3) public image; which can be shaming, but with the added intention of limiting the shamed actors influence with other states, thereby isolating it's influence. Their preferred strategy of exerting leverage seems to be reshaping the alliances among actors; the primary way in which they approach this is to get groups of supportive states to influence more powerful actors.

4.2.4 – *Anomalous data on political influence*

4.2.4.1 - *Synchronized UN/Capital lobbying*

A significant portion of the data collected on their methods and the manner in which they seek political influence at the UN are not easily analysed in the typology of Keck and Sikkink. The most significant of these – in the sense that informants talked extensively about it – was the dual focus on UN diplomats and capitals from and in 'larger and more complicated governments' (inf#1).[58] While it could arguably be understood as a mix between leverage and information politics, it does not fit the explanation of these types as sketched out by Keck and Sikkink.

When asked what kind of strategy they have for making causes relevant in the UN and what specific methods they use to get attention, inf#1 replied that direct lobbying in capitals is the most important strategy in the UN. According to him, whenever they are trying to influence the larger and more complicated governments, and in some cases also with smaller governments, there's 'a

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[58] It should be noted that it is hard for me, based on the recorded audio, to make out if they are saying capital or capitol, i.e. the distinction between houses of legislature and the capital city. In their correspondence, they use both interchangeably and inconsistently. This distinction does not alter the argument, but readers should be aware that quotations might be inaccurate.

perception that you can just turn up at the UN and influence delegations; it's the easiest thing in the world for a delegation to say, well, we're just waiting for instructions from the capital, but a lot of the times that's actually true, and unless you lay the groundwork in capitals, then you're influence is going to be very negligible once you get to the UN'. So they set up the structure of the campaign with a priority on reaching as many influential capitals as possible, he says, and this will start long before the first day of the meeting; the network of MSP (military, security, policing) coordinators in each AI section will set up meetings with government officials to disseminate reports and present the content of the action circulate, which is essentially an advocacy strategy document. This lobbying in capitals, he says, will be backed up by campaigning actions, media stunts, reports, press releases, internal briefing documents and so forth.

There's a continuous debate within the organization, according to inf#1, about how much funding to spend on popular mobilization and getting 'a massive load of people to the UN' and how much to spend on direct lobbying toward capitals. In his perception, in-capital lobbying is much more important than a big UN presence, mostly because government representatives that they are trying to influence in the UN will be receiving constant instructions from their capitals, even during the course of a particular meeting. Since this is how governments work, he says, the organizations must adapt and work simultaneously in both places. In a sense they duplicate the manner in which states work toward the UN, making sure that their political influence is more or less equally distributed in both the domestic and the international arenas.

Inf#2 said the same things as inf#1 in terms of there being a priority on the relationship of governmental representatives in the UN and lobbying work in capitals/capitols. He explains that even though decisions most often come from the capitols, it's generally better if the government representatives at the UN understand the issues. Additionally, there's an advantage to having IANSA members talk to government representatives, an opportunity they often will not get elsewhere, he says, and which will give them experience and help them build up relationships and possibly the opportunity to talk to them back in their countries – he refers to this as long term capacity building, noting that there is a circularity involved. Inf#3 also pointed to the prophylactics of sending people into the capitals with the action circulate in advance of confrontations in the UN, as a top priority. It's the diplomats who say they need to check with capital and that they don't know what their country is doing, she says, who are perhaps the most common problem. She adds that this is more of a tactic for some organizations than for others, stating that for Amnesty, who has a large network with 40 sections being active on the ATT and in regular meetings with their governments, this is an effective strategy.

From the point of view of the lobbyists at the UN, they tend to use their member-base strategically in reaching out to diplomats. According to inf#3, they coordinate it so that there are

different regional groups of lobbyists, from different organizations, who target diplomats within different world regions. This, she says, is to make sure that 'we're getting kind of a good spread, we identify key target countries to put more pressure on, having deviced material beforehand, and arguments that we can use for particular governments to try and persuade them to change their policy'. In the case of key countries, she says, they have government specific strategies, adding that this is usually handled by organizational representatives from the sections within that country, since they will ideally have developed a direct relationship. Inf#2's description of how they work to prepare the bigger meetings in the UN matches this description. He notes that IANSA is a big global network, with nine hundred members around the world, so in most cases they will have members in especially relevant nations - he cites Kenya as an example - working on the ATT and who are indispensable at the UN meetings. If Kenya is a top priority country, they will look at their members in Kenya and see who works for the ATT, get them to the meeting to talk to their government representatives at the UN.

Their internal action documents support these explanations, and show that this is a heavily prioritized strategy. In a document (e-mail) entitled "Action Request on the ATT ahead of the UNGA First Committee and materials for MSP coordinators", military, security and policing lobbyists at regional AI offices in the capitals of target countries are given instructions on the finer points of what they are expected to approach the 'relevant officials in [their] Ministries of Foreign Affairs' about, as well as template letters and information on that country's specific role in the ATT, or in the types of transgressions covered by an ATT. Furthermore, the document requests that once these meetings have taken place, the MSP staff present in the UN are to receive feedback on the outcome of the meeting so that it can be incorporated into their strategy. This and related documents all contain an attachment updating them on the current draft of the resolution, it's flaws from the network's perspective, and what changes they are currently lobbying towards, as well as a short paraphrase of the main goals of the ATT.

From the dates, it is apparent that these e-mails, starting about two months before the UN meeting, culminate in what they call an "action circular" the last week before the event, which is essentially their final instructions regarding UN/capital lobbying and what they want to achieve.[59] This action circulate originates from the Amnesty Int. Secretariat, and is sent out to all AI sections, MSP coordinators, campaign coordinators, press officers, staff/volunteers, as well as the ATT SC members and the CAC staff, covering most if not all of the network. Starting with a background, it details the general aim and objectives, the advocacy action plan, key messages, lobbying strategy, states official positions, recommended actions, public awareness strategy, policy reference material,

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[59] The document described as the action circular is entitled: "An effective Arms Trade Treaty: "The World Can't Wait": Achieveing a strong resolution for negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty at the 64th UN General Assembly, 2009 (ACT 30/0072009)". The document is internal (http://intranet.amnesty.org/cp/).

coordination of events and, lastly, templates to letters that are to be sent to ministers of foreign affairs.

The action circular divides lobbying in home capitals into three phases, the first being before the first committee; here they are instructed to influence the draft resolution and state's statements. This phase contains speculation on how the UK will work on the draft, in terms of who they will meet with in bilateral and multilateral meetings. It is vital, it says, that '*as many AI sections and their NGO partners as possible lobby key officials in their home capitals as soon as possible* and keep pressure on their governments to ensure that all UN delegations receive good instructions from their capitals in sufficient time to engage in the discussions on the draft resolution [...]'. The next phase covers the first weeks of the FC, and deals with 'locking down the draft resolution language'. Here they are asked to stay prepared for last minute changes that obstruct their vision of an ATT (in retrospect, the US-introduced consensus provision was precisely such a change). Phase 3 deals with week 3-4 and is concerned with gathering votes (there is little specified in the text under this heading). This phasing of the process seems to combine the agenda formation and negotiation stages of Young (1998:21) with stages 2-4 in Keck and Sikkink (1999:98)(table 2.1); while the network follows the states in terms of how these work, their focus is different. They seem to draw upon all the different strategies simultaneously in any given stage, differentiating only in terms of specific goals.

Under recommended actions, the action circular urges lobbyists to use the tools provided to make a strong case with the relevant governments officials, and to include 'relevant illustrative examples of the need for an ATT that will require effective risk assessment and control mechanisms at the national level' to prevent violations against international human rights law and humanitarian law, etc. They are then pointed to examples that are especially suitable in the relevant regions. Additionally, they are asked to make sure that the government official sends instructions to the mission at the UN regarding the points on which they came to an agreement, and that their representatives in the UN are instructed to attend ATT meetings (whether official or CAC related). The lobbyists are also instructed to encourage government officials to make explicit reference to CAC related material in their statements to the UNGA, suggesting that the network is also using this as an opportunity to self-promote.

In this section a strategy was described in which the network takes a synchronized approach toward UN and capital lobbying, an approach that does not fit with the explanation of types seen in Keck and Sikkink. The network essentially mimic states: Since diplomats at the UN receive orders from capitals, the network ensures that their influence has an equal presence there; additionally, they track the various stages of states' work on a draft resolution to keep up with last minute changes and lobby for their ideal version. This work in capitals is not limited to lobbying, but is supported by campaigning as well, and both aspects require a large network with substantial resources. A benefit of

their approach, is that lobbyists working in the UN build contacts with government representatives from countries, which in turn enable them to partake in capital lobbying later on. Additionally, the NGOs deploy their members strategically, based on regions, so that NGO representatives from target countries are used in talking to that country's diplomats at the UN. The importance of this strategy is confirmed by textual sources, which also suggest that lobbyists in capitals are equipped with precise, country-specific information, are tasked with updating the NGO personnel at the UN on the states' position and are simultaneously self-promoting the CAC text.

4.2.4.2 - *System of incentives, reshaping alliances*

Another important strategy for them which is not easily reconciled with the typological categories of Keck and Sikkink, is to continuously *frame the agenda or issue* in such a way as to appeal to governments interests and creating a system of incentives. This is a form of multivariate issue-linkage that is not covered by the examples Keck and Sikkink use in their explanation of material leverage, which – if one is to go by their examples – is primarily explained as a singular relation of material leverage, i.e. in facilitating a link between an issue and something a target actor is concerned with (such as a threat to their strategic or financial interests). Essentially, one of their strategies in the case of the ATT is to convince states that it would be in their advantage to *not* be left outside the fold, and in doing this they must create an image of the ATT as representing something that is beneficial as opposed to restrictive. This hinges on their ability to get powerful actors onboard, which relates back to leverage politics in that their primary way of doing this is to induce sympathetic governments to act on their behalf. Informants #1 and #2 mention it as a top priority, although it's something that is challenging for the network to control.

Inf#1 explains how it is very difficult to pinpoint states views, as there's often a large discrepancy between their states opinions and their real opinions, and their positions will often have to be deduced from hints in spoken interventions at the debates. Sometimes Egypt adopts the US arguments in their statements, that they just don't want a treaty that is too weak and will therefore undermine the possibility of adequate arms controls, which – according to inf#1 – is not really what they think. Other times they will talk about the difficulty of more states implementing such a complex agreement, and, he says, they will also talk about the necessity of having a level playing field. Many NGO lobbyists, he adds, are starting to think that the negotiations will change the center of influence from the General Assembly to the veto-countries [P5], even though it will remain a General Assembly process. Everyone is looking to them already, he says, since they are the world's largest arms traders as well; if they manage to get these nations aboard, it would create an 'internal marked bound by a set of rules which are the ATT'. This will enable the NGOs, he says, to convince

skeptical countries that dealing outside of that marked regime will be entail a commercial and strategic disadvantage. This is why it's important to get the US onboard, in as much as they will facilitate such a regime and Britain, France, Russia, China and other states will perhaps follow on account of the these incentives.[60]

In order to build the incentives they are talking about, reducing the incentive of operating outside the regime and increasing the commercial and strategic incentives of operating within the regime, inf #1 and #3 both point out how it has to be a legally binding and universal treaty. Inf#1 refers to what he calls the geometrics of this kind of treaty, saying that since it's a regulatory and not a ban treaty – like the one for cluster munitions and landmines – you are seeking 'not to prohibit an activity, but to regulate it, so the incentives for operating outside of it are much greater'. Another difference, he says, is that you are talking about a significantly more comprehensive set of activities than were ever involved in the the other treaties. The global arms trade, he says, is a huge and internationally strategic 'thing in a way that the cluster munitions or landmines are not', explaining that while these are tactically important for militiaries, they are not on the level of state's international strategic interests to the same extent.

Since there are currently financial incentives to operate outside an ATT, the universality of it's coverage is much more important. This is why, inf#1 says, they have to get as many states as possible on board, and since it represents a threat or gain to a number of interests, economically, strategically, militarily, 'and because you are talking about a regulatory treaty in stead of a ban treaty, it's going to be a much much more complex process with a lot more dimensions'. Whereas the cluster munitions and landmines treaties are only controlling one thing, essentially, this treaty will have to define 'everything that's involved, define all the kinds of transfers that might be controlled and how, to define a set of criteria along which those might be controlled, to define the mechanics of how they are applied, to define implementation and cooperation assistance, to implement that, that's of the order of complexity of an international trade agreement, and we all know how complex those are'. This is why, he says, the challenge is much greater.

This form of issue linkage is multivariate, on the one hand, and speculative, on the other; regarding the first, because it targets many countries in a number of different ways, and regarding the second, because the outcome is uncertain and hard to directly influence. As discussed above with leverage politics, their focus is to reshape the alliances among actors by getting groups of supportive states to influence more powerful actors. And as with leverage politics, this case seems to suggest that the network benefit more from positive appeals to states' interests rather than shaming and similar tactics. The goal is to frame the ATT as an internal marked bound by the treaty's rules, allowing the network to make the argument that countries left outside the fold will suffer. The

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[60] The question remains, he adds, what Russia and China really think about the ATT – this will determine whether or not they will see such an effect.

challenge then is to maintain the principles that they want to see in the phrasing of the resolution, given the complexity of the phenomenon it encompasses and the financial threat it represents to the p5 countries (who are simultaneously the biggest arms exporters and the most influential actors).

4.2.4.3 - The US-introduced consensus provision; an example

An example of both the synchronized capital/UN lobbying, the "system of incentives" approach and the way in which they attempt to reshape alliances among states, can be found in the network's response to the US introducing a consensus provision to the treaty. Informants agree that the biggest challenge they had at the First Committee in October '09, was the issue of the US signing on to the ATT with the consensus provision. Both the meaning, content and consequences of this consensus provision, says inf#1, were the subject of a heated debate among governments and NGOs. This development gave rise to concern, primarily because historically, he says, consensus provisions tend to 'kills progressive treaties', since any country can then stall and weaken the formulation of the final treaty. This echoes what Bas Arts said about the consequences of the international community being anarchic; that common initiatives will often be weak compromises and that veto-based resolutions often result in a situation where those who want less, have the biggest impact on policy (1998:21, as discussed in 2.2.1).

This concern was balanced by the need to get more powerful actors onboard with the treaty. Having the US onboard, explains inf#1, would be 'such a big prize, strategically'. Consequently, there was a lot of heated discussion, he says, internally in the NGOs and in governments, about whether to accept this or try to change it at the expense of the US. This became a problem of framing the issue correctly, in so far as 'if you're really going to go hard on this and say, this is totally unacceptable, we are going to denounce the process if this consensus provision goes in, how do you communicate that to both the governments and the public'. Inf#1 explains how this would be 'a hard sell', i.e. not accepting the process because of how the meetings would be run in two year's time, which would presumably seem trivial and petulant to outsiders. Furthermore, it could prove to be a minor problem in the end, since formal aspects such as the consensus provision could still be changed in the subsequent years; it would not necessarily be the end game, he says, if the provision went in now. A certain problem, however, was that skeptical states would then be focused on protecting that provision. In the end, the meeting was characterized by strategic arguments around negotiation rather than the actual ATT, and government landed on whichever sides of the debate, he says, even within the EU block, which is rare.

Inf#2 also brings up the US vote as a major point of contention at the last meeting. In his mind, it is very useful to have them onboard as they are 'huge arms exporters, therefore they have a

lot of influence'. He explains their provision as demanding consensus was included into the negotiating treaty, meaning the meeting when the final text is settled. The meaning of consensus here is a bit unclear, he explains, because in the UN it does not entail that everyone agress so much as that there is no disagreement.[61] According to inf#3, the Control Arms campaign at the time interpreted this provision to mean that any state would be given a veto on the formulation of the ATT, which would lead to the lowest common denominator being the general tone of the treaty, which would then be very weak; or worse, that the countries will simply remove from the treaty the aspects that are not in their interest. She adds that this was just their interpretation, and that the meaning was and remains unclear as to what the provision in fact will entail.

Although they did not explain in detail how they dealt with this challenge, their methods are apparent from documents pertaining to the consensus provision. In the internal correspondence from October 2009, the challenge of the US consensus provision is discussed at length. An e-mail entitled "MSP Coordinators; update from UNGA First Ctte – resolution developments, "consensus" and upcoming rapid action", dated mid-october and sent to the same recipients as the action circular, describes the in-capital lobbying as hugely successful, mostly because the UK changed the resolution on account of supportive states speaking vocally about necessary changes in plenary, as per lobbying instructions. In this document, the provision is described as a threat which might 'derail or significantly stall the process, forcing supportive States to take the process outside the UN'. Discussions between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband led the network to believe that the UK would be forced to capitulate on the matter, and that if they did not, the US would work to 'effectively wreck the process'. Most supportive states were talked into it, the document says, barring the EU countries who were largely vocal against it (possible exception in France, who they say is 'in a potential difficult position as part of the Permanent 5'). Writing about the UK, they say that they 'have since welcomed in public the USA's policy shift on the ATT, albeit privately reckognising that they have had to compromise on the issue of consensus [...]'.

Attached to this letter are instructions to restart capital lobbying in what they refer to as a "rapid response request", wherein all the lobbyists are given 'detailed recommendations on language and tactics' that they can 'wield with governments when discussing the issue'. Essentially, these arguments are technical and historical, demonstrating that the consensus provision has no precedence and that it is not the common way of handling such negotiations, invoking a distinction between "the broadest possible agreement" and "absolute consensus", and that going along with this would threaten any future progressive treaties in the UNGA. It also invokes previous statements on other matters by states which essentially warn of the same danger. A follow up to this document was sent

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[61]   He did not explain what he thought this indicated.

out the next week, 22/10/2009, containing details of specific action requests for target states, meaning those who 'may be persuaded to abstain on operative paragraph 5 and record their reasons for doing so (paragraph 5 being the consensus provision), as well as a transcription on the states' opinion of the paragraph, as gouged since the document of the week before. Additionally, there was a model letter enclosed that lobbyists could send or present to government officials, specifically noting that it was *not* to be sent to skeptic states, the co-authors of the resolution draft or to the countries with whom the network lobbyists were still in active discussion in New York.

In the following week, on the 29th of October '09, another update was sent out, stating that a number of states had come together for a series of informal meetings, naming themselves "Friends of a Better OP5" (Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Mexico, Ireland, Austria, Liechtenstein, New Zealand), discussing how they could alter the consensus provision. After 'a variety of twists and turns', the documents says, 'German diplomats in Washington had a meeting with US government officials [...] in an attempt to broker some amended language for OP5 without losing US support'. The document then mentions confidential sources as affirming that the paragraph was changed to a more abstract formulation, effectively not tying the consensus to decision-making any more, but that no one was sure what this meant, i.e. if it was a success or a worsening of the situation.

As mentioned in 2.2.3, Young claims that the aim of negotiations are generally not, as in legislative settings, to put together winning coalitions, but rather building consensus (1998:13). Writing further on this, he claims that the 'preferred coalition among those negotiating the terms of a constitutive contract is the coalition of the whole', and that the 'political dynamic arising from this feature of institutional bargaining is one that centers on consensus building and therefore on the crafting of constitutive contracts that are agreeable to all but not lacking in substance' (1998:13-14). As we have seen, this issue is more complicated in the case of the ATT, and while the positions of states on this matter remain unclear, it seems that the hypotheses of regime theory are not directly applicable to the position of transnational advocacy networks in this case. A possible reason for this is a focus on the underlying issues of the case as opposed to it's relation to national interest. Interestingly, this is how Young describes countries: As focusing more on causes than being rational utility maximizers (1998:2)(compare 2.2.3). He further writes that pressure groups can cause countries who are unclear on their position to act in an inconsistent manner, thereby exerting influence and becoming actors which in turn might lead to provisions that governments would not introduce. This seems to be in part confirmed by the networks relationship with the UK, as described above.

The challenge of the consensus provision gives an example of how the network operates, in as much as it raised problems pertaining to the framing of the issue (having the US onboard was a strategic "prize", but not at any cost, and denouncing the process on account of a single provision

would be hard to justify). Their internal correspondence on this matter shows that synchronized UN/capital lobbying was used to meet this challenge, specifically in order to influence the phrasing of the resolution, and that the network constantly updates their lobbying instructions based on their access to information. The focus of their lobbying seems to be to reshape alliances among actors, in order to get supportive states to lobby more powerful actors on their behalf, and to reframe the issue in such a way as to increase the incentives of coming onboard with the ATT.

4.2.5   – *Informants' perceptions on priorities, effectiveness and influence*

When asked which actors and methods were the most effective at the UN, the answers varied a bit (and they were not entirely consistent with previous statements). Inf#1 distinguished between national NGOs and international NGOs, saying that 'certainly IANSA, Amnesty, Oxfam to some extent, have, or constitute a global network, and then that network is massively enriched by all the other national NGOs' who they draw upon for specific assistance. To his mind, it is a question more of coordination and agility rather than influence; national NGOs or, correspondingly, NGOs without a membership, he says, can often make decisions much faster than global NGOs can, since the latter are bound by a democratic structure to consult with their membership, or to be bound by their policies that are agreed upon democratically. As a global network, he feels that they bring with them more influence to a lobbying situation in the UN, and that governments and NGOs both feel that the INGOs move too slowly on their own and therefore benefit from national NGOs. The INGOs will have sections in their member countries, and play a different role to the national NGOs in that they address the international setting with the weight of a global membership behind them. This, he feels, allows their arguments and evidence to 'influence a while range of governments'.[62] .

About the effectivity of methods, he – like the other informants - says that any campaign has to mobilize the full spectrum of tactics available. They simply need to tread a balance between and combine, he says, visibility and legitimacy.[63] With something 'as big as this, as multi-dimensional as this, were what you're talking about are the fundamental interests, strategic interests of all the states, I think you have to have a popular movement behind it'. The legitimacy, then, is tied to genuine mobilization of people. Well connected lobbyists, he says, are something they have on top of that, along with well timed and informed reports, good sets of arguments deployed at 'precisely the right

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[62]Adding to this, he says that some NGOs are particularly influential in some countries, and that national NGOs – provided their country of origin are one of the powerful or bigger countries – can carry significant weight in the international setting. The UK government, being one of these governments, has been very influential in the ATT setting, he says, 'stewarding the process through the United Nations'. While national NGOs or NGOs that are particularly influential in the UK might have had an influence on how the process runs or what the treaty will contain, he insists that, on the other hand, 'it it's an international environment where every state has their own vote, so I think there's also something about how we play slightly different roles'.

[63] He explains that while some NGOs have visibility but are lacking in legitimacy, meaning that while they have influence with governments and visibility in the press and in the UN, they do not have geniunely popular movements behind them. This will often succeed, but can also 'come back to haunt them'. In this setting, legitimacy is understood in a democratic sense.

time with precisely the right diplomats'. But these are not as convincing without the popular mobilization. You might succeed with only one of these in campaigns that don't touch upon the core strategic or economic interests of states, he says, but not in the case of the ATT.

Inf#2 puts importance on having a large, multi-cultural presence in the UN, as it gives the impression that it's a global campaign, stating that diplomats react to seeing different faces, races and colors. The huge network of IANSA, he says, is a key part in facilitating the lobbying and the presence in meetings. The statements of inf#1 and #2 match the conclusions from Keck and Sikkink regarding actor characteristics as a prerequisite for the success of a campaign, specifically regarding network density, described as having strongly connected members with reliable information, representation and institutional leverage.[64]

Inf#2 adds that the political influence of the NGOs in the UN is hard to gauge, but that it is significant. The only way to budge a state that's 'really dug in', he says, is to get huge public support, but most states are not 'dug in'. Most states, he says, will react to their agenda (the ATT) as a good thing, he says, they 'just need to know why they think it's a good thing'. The key role of the NGO then, is to provide researched and easily accessible information. While not many states would say that the killing of innocent people and the destroying of their homes is a good thing, he explains, they might still reply that they already have regional agreements to deal with that sort of thing; these are the people who need further convincing, and they 'are in a position to do that'. He also claims that the influence is undeniable in that there wouldn't be an ATT initiative as we know it without the NGOs, who have been involved with it from the start, adding that states will refer back to IANSA, AI and Oxfam in their statements, which is "telling" of the influence they have.

According to inf#3, the effectiveness of methods should be understood the other way around, where popular mobilization, media and activism in the media, while indispensable, is not as influential as direct lobbying in the UN. To her mind, the direct lobbying is what counts at the end of the day. She also felt that there wouldn't have been an ATT without the NGO involvement, adding that their influence is different in the different phases of the process, but that it was absolutely indispensable at the beginning. In steering it in the right direction, she says, the direct lobbying is crucial; in this phase of the process, however, they might still fail in getting their message through.

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[64] Compare with 2.2.4, or Keck and Sikkink (1998:26)

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

In the following, the main points of evidence will be summarized in relation to the problem statement and research questions (5.1) and the theoretical suppositions (5.2). Findings will be reviewed in terms of reliability and validity, as well as relevance to the field and future studies (5.3).

5.1   - *Remarks on design and structure*

The topic of this study has been the analysis of the different ways transnational advocacy networks seek political influence, defined as the achievement of specific policy goals, in the United Nations. This is a contribution to the overarching debate in theory on International Society of whether non-state actors should be considered players alongside states.[65] In order for this question to be answered, it must be preceded by an understanding of how, and the conditions under which, civil actors operate. This study is focused on how non-state actors perceive themselves as influencing the international arena, and not how they are perceived by others. As such, it does not seek to penetrate what Bas Arts refers to as the disproportionate ego-perception of NGOs, meaning their tendency to sometimes overestimate and misrepresent their own political capacity and influence (1998:301).

In chapter two, the theoretical concepts of the study were delineated, centering on the arena in which the transnational advocacy network operated in this case, the concept of political influence and regimes, using elements from regime theory and a multiple case study by Bas Arts (1998), and the general characteristics of transnational advocacy networks as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998/1999). The latter's description of a typology of how networks seek political influence was applied as the operational concept and primary tool of analysis. Chapter three showed the methodological choices of this study, including problems related to field-work, the use of sources, validity, reliability and bias. The method used in this study is a qualitative, iterative approach, with the object of matching the data with patterns from theory to see if it fits, or if the data can tell us something new.

Chapter four presented the gathered data and analyzed it in terms of the theoretical and operational concepts discussed in chapter two, thereby showing how the CAC network operates, their access to the arena in question and the challenges they face. In analyzing their strategy and methods for achieving political influence, the emphasis was on the typology presented by Keck and Sikkink. The object of this chapter is to highlight the results of this pattern-matching, both in terms of congruent and anomalous data, and discuss them with regard to theoretical implications, external validity, reliability and relevance to the field.

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[65]   Keck and Sikkink, (1998:210).

5.2 - The political influence of transnational advocacy networks

5.2.1   - *Concepts and definitions*

The theoretical definitions of central concepts as presented in 2.2 of the theory chapter, seem to be largely congruent with the data gathered in this case; consequently, redefining these concepts is not part of the goal in this study. The applied definitions of arena, political influence, regimes and the characteristics of transnational advocacy networks, as well as their related suppositions, all seem to be applicable to the findings.[66] Divergence from theory occurred primarily in relation to the typology of political influence, in terms of the manner in which they seek political influence, as well as in the hypotheses relating to the prerequisites for a campaign to be successful.

Regarding Bas Arts' concept of an arena (1998:55), informants confirmed his statements regarding their semi-formal status at the UN; they are permitted to make statements, can observe meetings and occasionally make formal interventions in the debate. Their access to this arena is still significantly less than states', whom they must influence to realize policy goals on their behalf rather than directly. In addition to the formal rules, informants mention informal rules (an example being the practice of shaming and naming transgressions by individual countries, which is poorly received). Though there are numerous challenges involved, the CAC network still has an opportunity to promote their cause and to be heard. The definition of political influence supplied by Bas Arts is sufficiently general to cover it's use by informants, who, incidentally, also refer to counterfactual reasoning in the explanation of political influence, albeit in different words – i.e., they claim that if they had not been involved, there would not have been an ATT.[67]

Regarding treaties and regimes, my research matches the considerations of Young regarding the distinctions between hard law and soft law, the threat of resolutions becoming "dead letters" and informal elements being of equal importance to official positions; based on the account given by informants, the creation of regimes seems to be an open-ended and multidimensional process both from the point of view of NGOs and states. Regarding the stages of regime formation, they seem to be less relevant when applied to transnational advocacy networks. The agenda formation phase is continuous through negotiations, for example, and as outsiders the networks are not limited by the formal stages of the process in the same way as states are. From the point of view of transnational advocacy networks, the stages of regime formation are repeated every time there is a challenge to the current framing of the debate – because of this, the macro-perspective employed by Young (1998) seems unsuitable. In this regard it must be noted that the findings of this study are limited by the short time-line, which may contribute significantly to this issue.

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[66]   Bas Arts (1998:55/301), Young (1998:4) and Keck and Sikkink (1999:89), respectively.
[67]   Informants #2 and #3, specifically.

Keck and Sikkinks account of the characteristics of transnational advocacy networks is confirmed in its general aspects, meaning in the sense that their definitions of these networks seem to be an accurate representation of how they open up new channels of influence by building new links among actors, and are – or at least profess to be – characterized more by a focus on values and causes than by interest, as well as them being tied together by a common discourse and dense exchanges of information. While they claim that these networks are characterized by horizontal patterns of communication and exchange (1999:1), the structure of their work seems to be better characterized by a top-down process, from the international secretariats down to individual lobbyists. This is not to say that there isn't reciprocity or feedback, but that they rely heavily on central coordination to organize their work on strategically framing the debates. Furthermore, due to the reliance of their strategies on resources and broad membership, the secretariats of the bigger organizations (AI, IANSA, Oxfam) have more influence than other members of the network.

It was confirmed that these networks rely on their access to and use of information, and that they place importance on frame alignment and frame resonance (Keck and Sikkink, 1999:95), meaning the rending of events as meaningful guides to action and finding a portrayal of events that suits both themselves, internally, and their targets, i.e. states or diplomats. Regarding this strategic portrayal, the network seems to have continuously come up with a joint enterprise and a common frame of meaning (frame resonance) with regard to themselves and the arena in which they operate, though not without difficulty and credibility related issues. In working out this common frame, they are presented with the difficulties of the multiple NGOs having a different focus, as well as difficulties with regard to their stated political neutrality, being accused of having closer ties to particular governments.

5.2.2 - *The typology of political influence, anomalies, new findings*

While the typology of Keck and Sikkink – consisting of information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics and leverage politics – proved a useful tool in the analysis of political influence in this case, it failed to properly account for some central aspect of how the transnational advocacy network operated. To understand the nature of their political influence on the international level, theory should be able to account for these anomalies and include them in a picture of how non-state actors work, the conditions under which they can be successful and the extent of their influence. It is outside the scope of this project to determine how such a theory would be, or to work out an entirely new typology for political influence. By way of conclusion, it will suffice to show the implications these anomalies have for current theory on transnational advocacy networks.

A significant portion of the CAC network's influence can be understood as information

politics, as demonstrated by the manner in which they frame the issues and present politically actionable information, both internally and externally. Maintaining an optimal balance between technical and statistical information and the use of expertice, on the one hand, and the more human interest related testimonials on the other, is something the informants in this case emphasize. This is analogous to the descriptions in theory.[68] Arguably, the cornerstone of their political influence is in having a monopoly on certain types of information; they raised the issue, and so states look to them for information. While Keck and Sikkink describe this as an important part of a network's influence, the case of the ATT indicate that this also hinges on a good relationship with states. *Put plainly, they can only make good use of this type of influence if they are on speaking terms with key governments, which, in turn, tend to preclude the use of antagonistic tactics*. Whereas theory puts emphasis on how transnational advocacy networks have to maintain credibility with the press, this also holds true on a more diplomatic level; they must not appear to have bias toward particular countries, thereby excluding them from others.[69] Informants did not seem to be worried about the normative issues related to the dramatization of facts, indicating that they did not see this as a problem of credibility.

The use of symbolic and accountability politics are less prevalent in the ATT campaign, largely for the same reasons as mentioned above. In some of their reports, they use events in a symbolic fashion to show the consequences of an arms trade that is handled in a privatized fashion, without international regulation; there is no juxtaposition of symbolic events in this case that matches the examples in theory,[70] but rather a myriad of smaller events, suggesting that this is not the core of their influence in this matter. Accountability politics are of limited use, according to informants, in that states will choose to simply ignore them or otherwise disregard their accusations. In working on the ATT, they are naturally very conscious of this phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon of states not following their international commitments and signed resolutions, as it relates to the operationalization stages of the ATT itself and particularly the exact phrasing of the resolution.

Leverage politics are prevalent, though for the most part in a different manner than is described by Keck and Sikkink. Informants explain how antagonistic tactics such as moral leverage in the form of shaming are, in effect, a double-edged sword. Though they have used such leverage on occasion, they prefer to either leave it implied or not to use it in this arena, as naming transgressions by particular nations are poorly received in the UN. Instead, they appeal to mutual benefit vis-a-vis states, lending them credibility by association and being given increased access in return. This practice is circular in that for states to benefit from association with the networks, the networks must have a positive image with states to begin with. As with information politics, this hinges on credibility and them not being perceived as partial to some countries. In addition to this, the

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[68] Keck and Sikkink (1999:96), and Manno (1994:106)
[69] As shown in 4.2.1 in this paper.
[70] Keck and Sikkink (1999:96)

informants confirm the notion from theory that leverage is dependent on the vulnerability of the country being leveraged; in most cases it must belong to, or aspire to belong to, a normative and democratic community of states, as well as be sensitive to international media. When they use the form of issue-linkage described in the theory[71], it is generally to 1) show that what they are proposing is not something new, thereby downplaying the concessions states would have to make, 2) explain that it is in a state's interest, in the sense that it will prevent harmful things happening within the country and 3) public image, which is the conventional antagonistic type of leverage, where they intend to limit that country's influence with other states by isolating it.

As was shown in chapter four, an important way in which they seek influence over the process is to target key countries in a synchronized fashion, simultaneously at the UN and in their capitals. With regard to influence in the UN setting, informants describe this as their most important strategy. This strategy of attaining political influence is not easily subsumed into the typology, and it does not fit with the descriptions of Keck and Sikkink of how transnational advocacy networks work. This is not to say that it is directly inconsistent; simply that it warrants an extension either of types, or a redefining of what is associated with those types. It was shown in 4.2.4.1 how networks essentially *mimic states*; since it has been their experience that diplomats at the UN will either refer to their capitals for instructions – or at least pretend to do so in order to prevent getting "cornered" – networks ensure that they are represented there as well. Moreover, their lobbyists in capitals are kept constantly informed on minute details about the process, and are, correspondingly, tasked with keeping the UN lobbyists updated on reactions in capital.

The benefit of this approach is that states are exhausted of options in terms of evading the issue – they can no longer simply say that they are waiting for instructions from their capital. Another advantageous result is that this is self-reinforcing. They can use this mechanism as a dynamic way of educating the network's staff and increasing their contacts in governments; since the network will deploy lobbyists strategically based on regional representation – NGO lobbyists from Kenya will ideally be the same ones that are lobbying that country's officials – they can make contacts on-site at the UN which will facilitate their access to the capital at a later stage.

Another way in which they seek to influence the policy is to continuously *frame the agenda or issue* in such a way as to appeal to national interests and creating a system of incentives associated with the ATT. While related to both information and leverage politics, this form of issue-linkage is multivariate as opposed to singular, and dependent upon a good relationship with states and on good channels of information as regards their position. It is debatable whether one should consider it a macro-strategy, a distinct type of influence or merely a goal; informants, however, tended to describe

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[71]   Keck and Sikkink (1999:97)

it as a strategy. The basic premise of this strategy is that they frame the issue in such a way as to convince states that it would be harmful to their financial, strategic and community-based interest if they were left outside the fold. This entails creating an image of the ATT as representing something beneficial as opposed to restrictive, and as an internal marked bound by the rules of the ATT. For this to be convincing and appealing, however, they must secure some of the more powerful actors as parties to the ATT. In order to sway the more powerful actors, their primary strategy is to reshape alliances and to induce groups of smaller, more progressive states to influence them on their behalf. Some statements by informants indicate that they are willing to concede the speculative nature of this approach, owing to the – for them – obscurity of a state's *real* position and intentions, along with the general difficulty of influencing the larger countries in matters that affect their financial interest.

As an example of the various types of influence described in the above, the introduction of a consensus provision by the US gives unique insight into how these networks try to influence policy. Specifically, it exemplified how the lobbyists used by the CAC network in their synchronized advocacy in the UN and capitals are informed on a day-to-day basis on current threats to the goals, and how the issue needs to be framed to address those threats. It indicated how they have good channels of information, on the one hand, and their selective, country-specific use of this information, on the other. This relates not only to the information that originates with them, but also information from governments – such as drafts of the resolution in-progress.

In sum, rather than trying to force the position of states with conventional leverage, the networks seem to prefer the access and influence given to them by maintaining good relations. Their relationship to the formal actors in this arena is, in a sense, that of playing advisors to the king; this enables them to influence actors through reshaping alliances and by reframing the debate in such a manner that the ATT seems profitable, essentially putting the concept of national interest in a different context. While they have a clear and joint set of goals internally, they are nevertheless selective about the information and arguments they use toward states; using specifically tailored arguments on those from whom they want specific things and generally keeping their cards closer to the chest. This is evidenced by their internal documents and emphasized by their reluctance to speak outside the stated policies of their respective organizations.

5.2.3   - *Relevance of case to theory; anomalies, characteristics, stages*

In addition to findings which are incongruent with theoretical descriptions of how non-state actors work to achieve political influence, the data sheds light on issue and actor characteristics. As mentioned earlier, the Control Arms Campaign, along with related work on the ATT, is considered a success; while the precise genealogy of the issue is not part of this study, most seem to agree that

non-state actors brought this issue up and have shepherded it through preparatory negotiations. They have yet to reach the finish line, but it is already clear that the campaign was not a failure from their end in that an overwhelming number of countries voted for the resolutions. In terms of evaluating a campaign's success, theory on the matter suggests that it lacked the necessary prerequisites in terms of issue characteristics; this is echoed by informants, who claim that an international bureaucratic process is hard to sell to the general public, on the one hand, and of a high order of complexity on the other. Simply put, the ATT is lacking in issue salience.

Since this study explores how they work to achieve political influence, and has not undertaken any measurement of the extent of their political influence, this matter is hard to gauge; it is, however, possible to make some considerations based solely on the nature of their work and the campaign in question. Keck and Sikkink argue that issues pertaining to bodily harm (e.g. violence against women) and legal equality of opportunity (e.g. women's suffrage), are especially resonant in the international community (1998:205). While an ATT relates to the former in the strictest sense, it still lacks the issue salience of the cases they mention and has more in common with what they describe as "irredeemably structural" problems, which are cases that lack a clear causal chain leading from a responsible party to a victim (1998:27).[72] This suggests that what the case lacked in terms of issue characteristics it made up for in actor characteristics. A possible explanation can be found in the strength and density of the network, the effectiveness of the channels of information and in the priority on strategies on the level of what informants call direct, high-level lobbying.

It would seem that the emphasis in theory on dividing regime formation into clearly defined stages (Young 1998:2), is a dead-end when applied to the transnational advocacy network analyzed in this case. Over all, it is more relevant to talk of different levels of political influence on which they are working simultaneously; by way of example, they are constantly trying to frame the issue to properly meet new challenges, corresponding to agenda formation, regardless of whether these challenges originate in the negotiation or operationalization phase. As tools of analysis, stages can not account for the way in which transnational advocacy networks structure their campaigning and advocacy. While informants were talking specifically about the ATT, it seemed like their preferred way of organizing the campaign was to ensure popular mobilization early on, and then to focus more on high-level lobbyism once this was secured. But they continuously used tactics relating to both, and it does not correspond meaningfully to the stages discussed either in Young's regime theory or the NGO-specific theory of Keck and Sikkink.

In conclusion, while a good portion of the data gathered on political influence in this case are congruent with the typology and the description in theory of central concepts, it is not exhaustive of a transnational advocacy's options or, indeed, their common practices in the UN arena. The strategies

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[72] As mentioned in 2.2.4.

and methods used to achieve political influence in this case suggest that a complete theoretical account of transnational advocacy networks, one that aims to be useful for the analysis of NGOs in the UN setting, needs to have categories that can more precisely account for these strategies. While it is possible, for example, to analyse the synchronized UN and capital lobbying, as well as their attempts at creating a system of incentives, in terms of leverage and information politics, the findings warrant a different and, at minimum, more inclusive explanation of these types.

5.3 – Methodological considerations and relevance to field

As mentioned in the chapter on method, this case was chosen on the grounds that it would be a paradigmatic example of how NGOs operate as actors in the UN.[73] In a way, it is written as a critical case, i.e. a black swan, in as much as it deviates from established theory in some aspects. This theory, however, makes no pretensions toward absolute universality. The argument here is simply that these findings merit inclusion into theory, not that theory on the matter has to be rewritten. A significant limitation in this context is the study's reliance on the informants own perception of their NGO's influence, which makes it hard to determine the reality behind their assertions and, consequently, whether this can truly be considered a paradigmatic example. The general limitations of interviews as a source, as discussed in 3.1.2, should be understood as reflected in my findings. The use of internal documents help to validate them, but in the end, these come from the same source. On the other hand, the only reasonable way to find out how they work is to ask them. If it were practically possible, one could also interview diplomats at the UN as a control group, but as they are targets of this influence and are presumably not familiar with the internal strategy, this would only reflect the end-result of their methods and not the whole process.

As has been stated several times, the goal of this study is not a measurement of the extent of political influence, but an analysis of the forms in which it is attempted. An understanding of how transnational advocacy networks operate makes a future study of the extent of their influence more feasible, as these types can be used in measurement. It is likely, however, that some of these types are unique in terms of intrinsically belonging to campaigns being directed at international organizations such as the UN, if not unique to the ATT campaign. Hopefully, this analysis has highlighted some general characteristics of the political dynamic involved in this *and* similar cases. The only pretension to generalization this study makes are analytical generalizations toward theory, as described by Yin (1994:36), and the final confirmation on the potential for generalization can only be made in future research with a broader scope.

An account of non-state actors in international relations remains an unexplored issue, whose

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[73]   (Flyvbjerg, 2006:232)

relevancy increases along with such phenomena as globalization. Colás, Bas Arts, Keck and Sikkink all point to the prevalence of either lacking or misleading theory on the matter; while there has been significant research on the interplay between domestic concerns and international change, and vice-versa, there is little theory in terms of international civil society's influence on the international arena.[74] According to the neorealism of Waltz, non-state actors should be disregarded because when 'the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate' (1986:89). While the latter might be true, it seems that transnational advocacy networks are quite apt at reinventing the language in which states talk about the issues.

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[74]   Examples: Bas Arts, 1998:30, Colás 2002:3-4, Keck and Sikkink, 1998:4.

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Chapter 7 – Appendix

Interview questions:
  Set 1: Orientation
Question 1.1: Would you like to remain anonymous/fine with tape recorder/read transcript?
Question 1.2: What is your position in NGO x?
Question 1.3: What are you tasked with doing in relation to the Control Arms Campaign?
Question 1.4: How long have you worked on the Campaign (in what different capacities)?
   - Have you participated in setting the agenda for the NGOs lobbying in the UN?
   - Have you participated directly or indirectly in campaigning at the UN?
   - Have you participated in the research leading up to reports on the matter?

Set 2: Agenda formation / Research   *[if applicable to interviewee]*
Question 2.1: Describe how you work to prepare the bigger meetings in the UN.
- How did/does your NGO work in terms of concrete preparations before the bigger
  meetings in the UN?
- What are the usual methods used to gain attention for a cause, prior to the UN?
- Is this work centered around the reports?
Question 2.2: Do you perceive this campaign to be apolitical in nature?
Question 2.3: Can you describe some of the more common problems you experience in this part of
  the process?
- Was there much internal disagreement on the development of goals?
- Where there pressures from interest groups outside the NGO?
Question 2.4: What are the typically used solutions to these kinds of problems?
Question 2.5: Are your reports perceived by recipients as pure research, or as activism?
Question 2.6: Are the NGOs involved united in the goals and expectations from the UN, or do they
  want and/or expect different outcomes?
Question 2.7: What parties would you say, if any, were the most influential in determining the
  agenda (in terms of goals, priorities, message, methods) prior to presentation at the
  UN? NGO x, y or z.
Question 2.8: What methods do you perceive as having the most influence? I.e. The reports, media
  activism, direct lobbying toward diplomats, etc.

Set 3: UN – Campaigning / Negotiations / Operationalization   [if applicable to interviewee]
Question 3.1: How would you describe your strategies to make causes relevant in the UN? What
  specific methods do you use to get attention in the UN?
- How are reports presented in the UN? I.e. Is it formalized meetings, one-way
  presentations or debates, etc.
- Do you have a role in concrete negotiations vis-a-vis the content of a treaty? Do
  you seek to influence national delegates to talk on your behalf?
Question 3.2: Can you describe some of the more common problems and challenges you experience
  in this part of the process? (As NGO or as individual)
- Is there much internal disagreement within the campaign crew, or among the different
  NGOs, on how to achieve goals in the UN?
- What kind of opposition, if any, do you get from interests groups / nations /political
  wings with different opinions on the treaty?
- How would you describe your strategies toward the US, it being the most influental nation
  to oppose this treaty?
- And after they decided to back it, how do you relate to the issue of veto?]
Question 3.3: What are the typically used solutions to these kinds of problems?
Question 3.4: Will reactions received in the UN-setting have retroactive effect on goals/agenda?
Question 3.5: What are you expectations regarding the outcome of a arms trade treaty?
- What kind of plans have you made or would you make for the follow up if such a
  treaty was made, in terms of operationalization and implementation of goals?
Question 3.6: How do you perceive your NGOs influence in the UN?
- What would you say were the biggest challenges in terms of getting through?
- Which methods do you consider the most effective in achieving goals in the UN?

Set 4: Additional information / Corroborating sources
Question 4.1: Is there anything you would like to discuss that you think might be relevant in
  relation to the political influence of NGO x on the UN?
Question 4.2.: Do you have any documents that might be relevant to my study?
Question 4.3: Do you think NGO x should have a formal position in the UN?
Question 4.4: Do you have any good advice regarding further data collection (webpages, so forth)?