



THE EFFECTS OF CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICTS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THE  
CASE OF THE BAWKU EAST MUNICIPALITY

by  
Gamel A. M. Aganah

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Faculty of Social Sciences  
University of Tromsø, Norway

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## **Abstract**

Since the end of the Second World War, conflicts between states that dominated the international scene for decades are gradually being replaced by intra-state conflicts. These new wars have occurred in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. These intra-state wars take several forms; some of the common forms have included civil wars, revolutions, ethnic violence and conflicts, and gang violence. This has meant that most studies on conflicts do not deal with these new conflicts. This has made it imperative for new studies into this rather new phenomenon.

This study will be interested in looking at the effects of ethnic and communal violence in the form of chieftaincy conflicts on the socio-economic development of the affected local areas. The study will use the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict as a case study. I have adopted the insights of the economic theories of war and predation to theorize that the factions in the Bawku Chieftaincy conflict are rational economic players who are interested in the economic, social and political rewards that accrue to the victorious faction. The research also hypothesises that the chieftaincy conflict has negatively affected the socio-economic development of the Bawku East Municipality. The research will test this proposition by analysing the data from the research area.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## General Introduction

### 1.0 Introduction

Ghana appears to be an oasis of peace in an otherwise volatile sub-region. In fact, the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Global Peace Index (GPI) report for 2008 ranks Ghana as the most peaceful country in Africa, and the fortieth most peaceful (out of 140 countries) globally<sup>1</sup>. In deed, unlike most of its neighbours, Ghana has enjoyed relative national political stability and has not experienced recurring civil wars and violent national conflicts of the types that have occurred in neighbouring countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and more recently Cote d' Ivoire).

Ghana's reputation as a peaceful country is based on several peace-related indicators, a few of which are mentioned here. First, the country scores high marks on the democratization barometer.<sup>2</sup> In the year 2000, the country achieved a major milestone, when for the first time in its history it was able to go through a peaceful transition from one democratically elected government to another. Secondly, Ghana has not only played a pioneering role towards the establishment of major regional and continental bodies (like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU), but has also used its leadership tenure vigorously to help resolve some of the Africa's conflicts. Thirdly, as a result of its relative peaceful outlook, the country has become a major venue for peace talks and the signing of peace accords<sup>3</sup>. Fourthly, Ghana

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings/2008/> (Accessed: 26.05.2008). The Peace Index scores from 1 to 5 where 1 = most peaceful. Ghana scores 1.723. This ranking is based on analysis derived of a variety of indicator information. The indicators include data on levels of internal violence, internal and external levels of conflict, the security situation, politics and governance, economy, military expenditure and ease of access to weapons of minor destruction, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Such as the Accra Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties in August 18, 2003, and the Accra III Agreement from July 29 to July 30, 2004 signed by the warring factions in the Ivory Coast.



has won international acclaim for its role in international peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations.

However, the country has had its share of violent clashes. This fact is reflected in the score of 2 to 3 awarded in the EIU's qualitative assessment of the propensity for violence generally within the country.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, though violent clashes do occur in the country, they are not on a scale that is assessed to influence the general peace status of the entire country. The reason for this is that many of the violent conflicts that erupt are localized or are related to specific issues that do not attract the participation of the majority of the citizens.

The conflicts that occur in Ghana derive mainly from social and political discontent, and ethnic assertiveness or contestations. And take several forms: Political violence (including military takeovers or coup d'états<sup>5</sup>), demonstrations by opposition and/or pressure groups, and sporadic election violence between supporters of rival political parties.<sup>6</sup> Occasional violent clashes between and within different religious groups occur in several places across the country: for instance among several Muslim groups<sup>7</sup>, and between the traditional religious authorities and some Christian churches in Accra<sup>8</sup>. Football violence, which is associated with rivalry between and hooliganism by

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<sup>4</sup> EIU Report 2008. Scores: 1 is least propensity, and 5 is highest propensity

<sup>5</sup> Political violence has also occurred during military interventions. Ghana has experienced 5 such interventions since independence. During these takeovers the military and the police have used violence for political repression. Military and police brutality and excesses (in the form of beatings, torture, rapes and murders) are common during such periods.

<sup>6</sup> Such violence mostly occurs close to the general elections. Political violence in the country sometimes takes ethnic dimensions. For instance there were bloody clashes between supporters of rival political parties in Bawku during the 2000 general election along ethnic lines. Also at Asutuare, violence between supporters of NPP<sup>6</sup> and NDC<sup>6</sup> injured thirty persons. However, it was reported that political differences had only exacerbated conflicts arising from chieftaincy and irrigated land distribution disputes (GT, 31/2/01 cited in Tsikata and Seini, 2004; 28).

<sup>7</sup> Clashes have been reported between Muslim groups in Tamale in the Northern Region (GT, 6/12/97), Kumasi in the Ashanti Region (GT, 5/9/98) and Wenchi in the Brong-Ahafo Region (GT, 6/10/97) (cited in Tsikata and Seini, 2004; 26). Interestingly, violent clashes between Christian and Muslims of the magnitudes that have occurred in neighboring countries like Nigeria have not occurred in Ghana. Christians and Muslims have largely been able to co-exist peacefully in the country.

<sup>8</sup> The issue of contention has been with the ban on drumming and dancing which precedes the annual Homowo (Thanksgiving) Festival in the Ga Traditional State of the Greater Accra Region. Some churches operating in the city have persistently refused to observe the ban and have been attacked by organized Ga youth groups enforcing the ban.

supporters of rival football clubs, though rare, is not unheard of<sup>9</sup>. The most perennial and potentially violent forms of conflict are so-called ‘chieftaincy conflicts’.

Chieftaincy conflicts, which is focussed on in this thesis, is characterised by disputed claims between rival claimants to the traditional political office of ‘chief’ in a traditional area. Chieftaincy conflicts are often associated with ethnicity. It can be described as intra-ethnic when rival claimants to chiefly office come from different lineages within the same ethnic group. The dispute becomes inter-ethnic when the disputing factions come from different ethnic groups within a ‘traditional state’, as with the case of Bawku. In such cases the terms “ethnic conflict” and “chieftaincy conflicts” can be used interchangeably to describe the nature of the conflict. Because chieftaincy is also closely associated with custodianship of land, the dispute about who is the rightful occupant of the chiefly office is ultimately linked to disputes over control over resources like land, water, etc. Though chieftaincy conflicts occur in all parts of the country, those that have been accompanied by extreme violence have occurred in the Northern and the Upper East Regions, specifically in Dagbon and Bawku respectively.<sup>10</sup>

### **1.1 Statement of the Problem**

The predominant types of conflicts in Ghana are so-called “Chieftaincy Conflicts”, which are centred on the chieftaincy institution. Relatively, the institution has survived the impositions of both the colonial and the post-colonial regimes that have included them within the boundaries of the modern states (see Nukunya 1992, 77-78). The status of contemporary chieftaincy in Africa can be illustrated with the examples from Ghana.

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<sup>9</sup> On the May 9<sup>th</sup> 2001, 126 football fans died in a stadium stampede during a match between the country’s two topmost clubs.

<sup>10</sup> Examples of longstanding inter-ethnic conflicts across the country: Northern Region, there are conflicts between the Gonja and the Konkomba and between the Dagomba and the Konkomba. In the Volta Region, there are two of such conflicts, the Nkonya/Alavanyo conflict and the Nkwanta conflict between the Nawuri and the Adele. And in the Brong-Ahafo Region, the Nafana are in conflict with the Ntore. The Northern Region has witnessed the most violent inter-ethnic clashes in Ghana in the post independent period. The Pito War of 1981 and the Guinea Fowl War of 1994/95 have been the bloodiest. These wars were fought by more than two million people and claimed thousands of lives. The Guinea Fowl War between the Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja on one side against the Konkomba for instance is said to have claimed at least 2000 lives, destroyed 441 villages and displaced more than 178,000 people (see Julia Jonsson, 2007, 18; Toonen, 1999). Examples: over land - Peki-Tsito conflict in the Volta Region, the Nsuta-Beposo and Effiduase-Asokore conflicts in the Ashanti Region, and the Weija-Oblogo conflict in the Greater Accra Region.

The Chieftaincy institution was the highest indigenous governance authority within centralized pre-colonial state systems in Ghana. It was the embodiment of both political and religious authority. The situation was different in some less centralized societies in the northern parts of the country, where authority was not based on “chiefdoms”. For example in Bawku, the office of ‘*tendanaa*’ (overseer of the community land) was more of a religious (and economic) position than a political one. Political decisions in such less centralized social systems were largely the preserve of family or clan heads.

Historical circumstances and migration (especially of people from centralized to less centralized areas) affected the status of traditional authority systems in Ghana. The major transforming influences on the chieftaincy system from the nineteenth century included the modernization projects of European imperialism and transient British colonial political imperatives: colonial rule, Christianity, missionary and colonial education (see Busia 1968, Boafo-Arthur, 2002).

British colonial administration in Africa was based largely on the system of Indirect Rule, which is defined by the British Anthropologist Dr Lucy Mair (1936) as “the progressive adaptation of native institutions to modern condition” (quoted in Busia, 1968: 105). For the British, indirect rule, which had been applied successfully in Northern Nigeria, was the most expedient method for local administration in the Gold Coast (Ghana) where the existing indigenous state systems had recognizable organized, well-structured political and administrative hierarchies.

There were several advantages for co-opting the indigenous state system based on chiefs into the colonial administration. First, it helped to offset the acute lack of British (European) personnel to effectively administer their vast empire. Second, it provided a means of getting British colonial policies implemented through indigenous leaders, the chiefs, who enjoyed enormous loyalty from their people. As Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa III (2004; 6), the Paramount Chief of Akuapem Traditional area in Ghana, puts it, “the colonialist in Africa had no option than to rule indirectly through the chiefs ... due to the

lack of proper means of communication and the strong ethnic loyalty enjoyed by the chiefs”.

Whereas the imposition of indirect rule was not too difficult in centralized indigenous states, the identification of central political authority persons was more difficult in non-centralized societies with diffuse authority structure. In such places the British ‘appointed’ a chief from the local population, and gave them ‘warrants’ to act as chiefs. Such chiefs were known as ‘warrant chiefs’. Sometimes the office was given to an immigrant who the autochthonous inhabitants would consider to be a ‘stranger’ to the place (Osei-Tutu, WIP<sup>11</sup>). Such an arrangement, as this thesis will illustrate, could become contentious as to lead to violent conflicts.

Significantly, indirect rule had a double effect on the chieftaincy institution. On the one hand, British colonial control over finance, external and internal trade, foreign affairs, defense, jurisdiction and law and order meant that the role of the chief was limited to ceremonial, cultural and social matters (Dankwa, 2004; 6).<sup>12</sup> To accentuate this shift in the balance of power between the colonial and the indigenous state, British authorities imposed the title of ‘chief’ on all indigenous leaders. This measure, according to the colonial authorities, was to eliminate the practice whereby Africans translated their kingship titles as ‘king’ or ‘queen’, which equated African traditional leadership titles to British and European Court titles (Osei-Tutu, 2003: 241; and 2005: 137).<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, colonial legislation made it possible for the chiefs to exercise more authority over their subjects than was the case before the advent of colonialism. With

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<sup>11</sup> WIP (Work in progress): John K. Osei-Tutu (my supervisor) was kind enough to allow me to draw on insights from his ongoing research.

<sup>12</sup> Some powerful chief opposed the new arrangement. The first organized opposition to the British rule in the Gold Coast was initiated by chiefs, in the form of the Fante Confederation as early as 1868. King John Aggrey, the king of Cape Coast, in 1865 sent a delegation to England to give evidence before a Select Committee against Governor George McClean for usurping his powers (see Boafo-Arthur, 2002).

<sup>13</sup> In 1866, King Aggrey again sent a petition to the Governor expressing his opposition to British impositions in very strong terms. He noted: “The time has now come for me to record a solemn protest against the perpetual annoyance and insults that you persistently and perseveringly continue to practice on me in my capacity as the king of Cape Coast” (Webster, Boahen and Tidy (1980:160) in Boafo-Arthur, 2002).

regard to Ashanti, Dennis Austin (1970) notes “... the chiefs of the Ashanti Confederacy had been given considerable powers as a ‘Supreme Native Authority’. They had received generous subsidies from the central government, and acted as deliberating body for the whole of the confederacy area with substantive law-making powers” (quoted in Bofo-Arthur, 2002).

Cumulatively, the process of constructing the state (colonial rule in general and indirect rule in particular) subverted the indigenous socio-political and economic balance of power, which hitherto had placed reasonable limits on the chief’s powers. In effect chiefs’ new powers no longer emanated from the people and therefore the people could not check abuse of such powers. Thus, the new colonial arrangement alienated most chiefs from their subjects, and subjects from their chiefs. The result was a proliferation of social protests against chiefs who went against the will of their people. The methods used in these social protests included boycotts of the chief’s courts and the rise of ‘destoolment’<sup>14</sup> movements (see Osei-Tutu, 2000; and 1994).

Other factors, apart from the political transformations, put pressure on the position of chieftaincy in the colonial period: namely economic and educational changes. The main economic factor related to the chief’s position as the custodian of the community land. Due to the demand in Europe for cocoa, cotton and rubber (among others) from the nineteenth century, there was high demand for land for the plantation production of cash crops in the British colonies, especially the Gold Coast. This led to a creeping commoditization of land, and the position of ‘chief’, which had custodianship over the community land, became associated with enormous economic gains and accumulation of wealth. The office of ‘chief’ became more coveted, and both legitimate claimants and pretenders, competed to occupy it, sometimes resulting in disputes and violent clashes.

The fate of the chieftaincy institution was also complicated by the emergence of a new social class of the western educated, and generally Christianized, Africans. With education from the missionary and colonial schools, as well as from higher educational

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<sup>14</sup> The act of removing a chief from office

institutions in Europe and America many of these 'educated elite' found it difficult to submit to the authority of their chiefs, a majority of who were 'illiterate' (without formal education) in the colonial period. They saw themselves as the new generation of leaders for the modern period ushered in by colonial rule. In deed some took advantage of their status to compete for chieftaincy positions, claiming that their education made them better positioned to understand and deal with the colonial authorities. However, the colonial system, with a focus on indirect rule, did not offer opportunity for the educated elite, neither in local administration nor in the colonial bureaucracy. Thus the disillusioned educated elites became main drivers of the social upheaval against colonial rule and the indirect rule in the Gold Coast.

Clearly then, chieftaincy disputes in the Gold Coast could be attributed to the new political, social and economic transformation under British colonialism. Inuz Sutton puts the case succinctly: "indeed 'Native Affairs' in the Gold Coast was almost by definition chieftaincy disputes" (1984; 41).<sup>15</sup> Others have claimed a direct linkage: "Communal conflicts in Ghana have been traced to the colonial policy of indirect rule and the practice of elevating favoured chiefs without sensitivity to the multi-ethnic character of various territories" (Tsikata and Seini, 2004, 3). The important point to make though is that tensions associated with colonization and the making of the colonial state produced disputes within indigenous societies in many parts of colonial Africa from the second half of the nineteenth century (Osei-Tutu, WiP).

The attempt of the colonial state to co-opt indigenous authority produced tensions and conflicts, but it was the African ruled postcolonial state that posed the greatest threat to the very existence the chieftaincy institution. By independence the outlines of the modern states were formed. The boundaries demarcated by the respective European powers generally encapsulated disparate indigenous polities. Currently there are about 193 officially recognized chieftaincy-based 'traditional states' within the boundaries of Ghana (Osei-Tutu, 2005; 138). Clearly, this co-existence of the modern state (based on the

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<sup>15</sup> Indeed, there is ample documentation of chieftaincy disputes in the huge Native Affairs file in the National Archives in Ghana.

centralized presidency, parliament, as well as other national, regional and local government institutions) and the traditional states (based on the chieftaincy institution) produces its own tensions (Ibid).

Yet, in Ghana, successive post-colonial governments have had varied attitudes towards chieftaincy. For instance, in a bid to modernize the Ghanaian society the first socialist-oriented post-colonial government of the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) under Kwame Nkrumah tried to systematically curb the power and authority of the chiefs. The CPP government was bent on appropriating so-called stool lands controlled by chiefs and revenues accruing from it. The party claimed that all land in Ghana ought to be appropriated to the entire people. As Kwame Boafo-Arthur (2002) notes, the local government reforms from 1951 and 1952<sup>16</sup> "...were in fact, geared at subjugating the chiefs through the control of their economic livelihood-The land." However, the more liberal 1969 constitution and post-coup governments sought to consolidate the position of the chieftaincy institution. (See Dankwa 2004).

Generally, Chieftaincy disputes erupt when there are two or more rival claimants to a vacant 'stool' or 'skin', the symbols of kingship or chieftaincy in the 'traditional' state. The rival claimants to such traditional authority may either belong to different ethnic groups or to different lineages of the founding family.<sup>17</sup> These are exacerbated by direct as well as discreet political interventions in chieftaincy affairs. For instance, when governments support loyal claimants to chieftaincy positions against less amenable ones - has led to tensions between traditional rulers and government officials on the one hand, and between rival claimants to chieftaincy positions on the other hand. So too have attempts by wealthy pretenders to gain the position on the basis of wealth and influence in society. Currently, it is estimated that there are over 100 chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana, centred on ethnicity, succession to traditional political office and the struggle over land (Tsikata and Seini, 2004; 25).

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<sup>16</sup> Local Government Ordinances of 1951 and the State Council Ordinances of 1952

<sup>17</sup> John Kwadwo Osei-Tutu (2007: work in progress)

In Ghana, the struggle to become a “Chief” may turn violent: when the historical, political, economic and social circumstances around the establishment of the chieftaincy institution in a traditional state become contested; when the rules of succession become unclear; when successive national governments and political parties support one group against the other in a bid to serve their own parochial political interest; and when there are small and light weapons available to the factions in the dispute.<sup>18</sup> However, though chieftaincy conflicts are largely localized (as the disputes occur within the boundaries of the traditional state), and the associated violence hardly spills over into neighbouring traditional states, the conflict’s social, political and economic ripples become felt beyond the conflict zone (Osei-Tutu, WiP).

## **1.2 Objectives and Aims**

This study is about how localized violent conflicts can impact on the peace and socio-economic development of individuals, localities and countries. The main objective is to examine the violent politics of chieftaincy and ethnicity underlying the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, and how it affects the development of the Bawku East Municipality as well as to make recommendations to policy makers on the way forward.

The specific aims are to evaluate:

1. The effects of the chieftaincy conflict on economic activities (commerce, agriculture and industry).
2. The effects of the violence on livelihoods of people: seen in terms of the household poverty, employment opportunities and the provision of such social services as education, and health services.
3. Governance in terms of revenue collection and expenditure on security.
4. The effects of the violence on health and education.
5. To make recommendations on how the conflict can be resolved/managed peacefully on a permanent basis

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<sup>18</sup>John Kwadwo Osei-Tutu (2007: work in progress)



### **1.3 Hypothesis**

The Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict has adversely affected livelihoods and socio-economic development in the Bawku East Municipality.

### **1. 4. Review of the Literature and Related Works**

There are quite a few published works on the effects of conflicts on development in Ghana in general, but none on the effects of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict on the development of the Municipality. Recent literature on conflicts in Ghana has concentrated on the inter-ethnic and intra ethnic conflicts, since these are the dominant causes of violence in the country. A ‘governance deficiency’ has been cited by some of these works as the cause of the recurring ethnic and communal violence in many parts of Ghana. (Akwetey, 1996: Lund, 2003: Jonsoon, 2007). Akwetey for instance argues that the absence of adequate democratic institutions is to blame for the recurring violence. Avenues for expressing interest and demands are non-existent.

Christian Lund (2003), in an analysis of the longstanding ethno-political conflict between the Kusasi and the Mamprusi in Bawku, has argued that the politicisation of the Bawku conflict has affected government efforts to resolve the conflict. He asserts that a wide range of political- including party-political- and economic competition over chieftaincy, land, markets, names of places and other issues are cut to fit the ethnic distinction as conflicts over rights and prerogatives are rekindled accounting for the perennial violence.

Julia Jonsson (2007), in a CRISE working paper on Traditional leadership and ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana, claims that the link between development and conflict in the region, exist on different practical levels: In the discourse of actors, in the socio-economic grievances they perceive as important in the causation of the violence, through the effects of the fighting. She concludes that conflicts have disrupted the development of the region: destroyed its resources and development projects.

Kusimi, et al. (2006), in a paper on conflicts in Northern Ghana, have expressed the view that violent clashes in that part of the country affect economic development (destruction

of farms and produce; prevents cultivation of lands; disrupt economic activities; discourage investment, labour flow and tourism) (see also Brukum, 2007). They also assert that conflicts in the region affect educational levels and divert government's attention from tackling pressing national issues relating to development, to restoring peace and order.

In an article on the Guinea Fowl War<sup>19</sup> of 1994 in the Northern Region, Emmy Toonen (1999) asserts that the conflict affected inter-ethnic co-operation in the region. Though the situation has improved, she claims that the Konkomba are still too afraid to enter Tamale, the regional capital where the Dagomba are the majority. She also claims that medical and educational facilities in the region were also affected.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

My research on the effects of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict seeks to present empirical evidence that communal violence negatively affects the socio-economic development of local communities where they take place. This research will investigate the effects of the perennial violence in Bawku on the ability of the Municipal Assembly, the Local Council and the people of the area as a whole to mobilize resources to improve their well being. Apart from contributing to the knowledge base on effects of conflict, this research will provide a basis for policy making towards resolving and managing communal (ethnic and chieftaincy) conflicts.

### **1.6 Organization of the Study**

For purposes of analysis and easy comprehension of issues, this study is divided into six chapters. Each chapter deals with a series of relevant themes. Chapter one offers an introduction to the study. It provides information on the main themes of the study and justification for the research problem. The chapter will also look at the objectives of the study.

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<sup>19</sup> The Guinea Fowl War between the Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja on one side against the Konkomba covered an area of 50,000 square kilometers, engulfed nine districts and involved about two million people.

Chapter two is made up of two parts. The first part will provide definitions for the key concepts in the study and the relationships between these concepts. It will also look at the theoretical themes relevant to the study. The second part will focus on the methodological discussion of the study. It will discuss and justify the choice of methodology employed and describe the sources of data, data collection techniques, methods of data presentation and analysis and finally outline the challenges encountered on the field.

The third chapter will present a profile of the study area, its geographic, political, and economic characteristics. It will also look at the source of the chieftaincy conflict in the study area.

The fourth chapter will be used for the presentation of empirical data. It will discuss the demographics of the respondents and the effect of the conflict on such issues as security, migration, economic activities, revenue collection and expenditure of the Municipal Assembly on security.

Chapter five focuses on analysis of the empirical data. The first part of the chapter presents a model that illustrates the correlation between the cycles of violence, insecurity, and underdevelopment in the study area. Part two gives a detailed account of the effects of the conflict on the socio-economic development and household poverty. The final part will discuss the effects of underdevelopment and household poverty on the conflict of the Bawku East Municipality.

The final chapter will make a summary of the research findings and present various suggestions as to how the conflict can be resolved or managed successfully.

# CHAPTER TWO

## Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approaches

### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter comprises two sections; the first part focuses on the conceptual and theoretical issues underlying this study. The relevant concepts that will be used in the analysis - conflict, security and development - are described and the relationship between them established. This is followed by an introduction of Paul Collier et al's 'greed and grievance' theory, which will be applied in explaining the nature and effects of the chieftaincy conflict on the socio-economic development in the Bawku East Municipality.

The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the methodological issues in this research. It gives an outline of the data collection techniques used for the purpose of gathering data on the field for this research. The purpose being to explain how the fieldwork was undertaken, why specific data collection techniques were used and also how data collected were organized and analyzed. This will present the basis upon which the eventual findings can be assessed.

### 2.1.0 Key Concepts

#### 2.1.1 Conflict, Security and Development

As Johan Galtung (1996: 71) has stressed, incompatibility and a potential clash of goals (interest or values) are the basic motivations for conflict. In this study, *conflict* is understood as a collision of interest between different persons and groups who are motivated by the economic, political, cultural and social rewards they are likely to enjoy by having a kin as the '*Bawkunaba*' (Chief of Bawku).

The second concept relevant to my study is *security*, which is generally "associated with perceived threats to the survival of individuals and states..." (Buur et al, 2007, 12). In this work, the term security refers to the existence of conditions (of relative peace) within which people in Bawku can go about their normal daily political, social and economic interests and activities without any threats to their lives from violent episodes or

inhibitions (and coercion) from authorities. This understanding of the term conforms with current usage, which broadens the traditional usage of the term from its earlier preoccupation with the defense of states to include a reference to all kinds of threats and potential dangers to human survival. This new usage, which is referred to as the 'Human Security' view, has drawn attention to the need in the discussion on security to include issues such as environmental protection and degradation, poverty and disease, individual freedoms, as well as social-political and economic rights (Fischer, D., 1993:10).<sup>20</sup> The 1994 United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report also recognized seven areas that human security should be concerned with: namely, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

The third concept that is used in the analysis is *(sustainable) development*. Like most concepts in the social sciences, different scholars have defined development differently placing emphasis based on their individual areas of specialization. Johan Galtung (1996: 127-129) identifies three broad definitions of the concept of development in the scholarly literature. The first, refers to "the unfolding of a culture; realizing the code or cosmology of that culture." This is a cultural relativist understanding of the concept, and implies that development is construed differently in different cultures. The second definition sees development as "the progressive satisfaction of the needs of human and non-human nature, starting with those most in need". The emphasis in this definition is on the satisfaction of both human and non-human needs. The third definition stresses, "economic growth, but at nobody's expense". This definition identifies the most commonly accepted understanding of development as proposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. However, it includes a social justice clause – "but at nobody's expense" -, which leads us to what has become known as sustainable development concept: that development must meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs.

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<sup>20</sup> On non-military aspects of security see also Report from Tashkent Meeting, May 1990.

### **2.1.2 Relations between conflict, security and development**

The three concepts introduced above are closely related and mutually reinforcing. On the positive side, the absence of conflict (negative peace) can ensure the security of both the state and individuals. And, under conditions of peace and security people and states can direct their efforts and resources towards improving human life. Conversely, conflict (especially violent ones) creates insecurity, stretches the resources of the state, retards self-improving human activity, and leads to underdevelopment and poverty.

To put it more elaborately, both conflict and development have to do with the satisfaction of needs (human or non-human): development being the ability to meet such needs and conflict the effort to satisfy the needs of different parties. Therefore where the ability to meet needs is expanded (development) little effort would be used to satisfy individual needs. In times of conflict, competing groups and individuals use their energies unproductively to contain their opponents, rather than use them productively to improve life.

Also, security and development are related in the sense that being a public good, the imperative to maintain security competes with other public goods (as education, health and infrastructure) for public funds. Moreover, violent conflicts, as several studies have shown, beget insecurity, which is characterized by a break down of law and order, increase in crime rate and impunity (see Richani, 2007<sup>21</sup>, see also Hunt, 2008) Expenditures on security are therefore an essential component of the development process. For instance the usage of resources to strengthen a country's borders will check smuggling. Insecurity therefore becomes a drain on local and national resources at the expense of development and peoples' well being. Thus in the absence of any real threats to security, expenditures on security can be reduced significantly, allowing national and local (Municipal Assembly) governments to channel more resources to other public goods to improve the quality of life of people.

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<sup>21</sup> Conflict ridden regions are commonly associated with such crimes as rapes (Kosovo), abductions and kidnappings (Colombia and Iraq), drug trafficking (Columbia and Afghanistan) and armed robbery. On the effect of violent conflict in El Salvador and Guatemala see references to Susan Division's study in <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/Resources/RichaniRvsd2007.doc>

### **2.2.0 Theoretical Perspectives**

There are a number of theoretical explanations for the onset of violent conflicts. The most prominent of these are the political, the social, the psychological, and the economic theories of conflict respectively. The scope (resources, time and space, etc) of this research places severe limitations on any attempt to test all these theoretical perspectives in the thesis. Therefore I will adopt and apply the economic theory of conflict to the case of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict. Though economic theories have been applied mainly to civil wars, the explanatory insights they present may be usefully applicable to the analysis of the chieftaincy conflict in the Bawku Municipality.

#### **2.2.1 Economic Theory of Grievance**

In the economic theories of civil conflict, parties in the conflict are assumed to be rational economic players, that is, they are maximizing agents who are driven by the urge to maximize power in order to have access to the economic rewards of victory. The economic theories of conflict are made up of two main theoretical schools, the 'Classical Greed School' and the 'Greed and Grievance School'. In their initial formulation of the 'Greed Thesis', Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that objective political grievances have no direct link to the onset of conflict, for them it is rather the possibility of 'looting', that lead people to resort to violence (cited in Ballentine and Sherman, 2002; 2). Other proponents of this 'Classical Greed School' provide other variants of the Theory. Hirshleifer (1994) for instance has opined that people are guided by the idea of trade-off. For him people chose between production and appropriation, where the opportunity cost for appropriation is lower than that for production, violence will ensue (Cited in Cramer, 2002; 1847). For Azam (2001), though conflict and violence are dangerous activities, if their pay-off outweighs calculated risk, people will choose them (Cited in Cramer, 2002; 1847). Violence is therefore seen as a rational economic activity- a form of entrepreneurship (see also Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005; 360).

The 'greed theory' has been criticized for its emphasis on solely economic factors to the exclusion of the traditional causes of conflict. The critics argue that violence is complex

and can hardly be explained by a single theory (see El jack, 2003; 89: Flores, 2004:3). Scholars have formulated other theories as the social conflict and psych-cultural conflict theories in an attempt to account for social violence. But like the economic theories, most of these theories have tended to over emphasize one area to the detriment of all other areas, thereby weakening their arguments too. Writing in the eightieth century, Clausewitz recognized that violence (war) is caused by the interplay of different factors. He argue that “a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” (Quoted in Cramer, 2006; 4).

Collier and Hoeffler have modified their initial formulation of the ‘Greed Thesis’ to include social, geographic, historical factors, etcetera to make their theory more acceptable (See Collier et al. 2001, 4). One of the factors in the modified ‘Greed and Grievance theory’ is the lack of economic opportunities in the form of employment. According to Collier, the availability of a large pool of uneducated young men with limited opportunities increases the risk of a country experiencing a civil strife. He argues that “the willingness of young men to join a rebellion might be influenced by their other income-earning opportunities. If young men face only poverty, they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities” (ibid; 94). The lack of economic opportunities could also serve as an objective grievance to encourage young men and women to join in the rebellion in the hope that changing the existing order could lead to better political and socio-economic conditions established. This forms the basis of Gurr’s (1968, 1970) ‘relative deprivation theory’. This theory “captured people’s perception of discrepancy between their value expectation (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capacities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they get and keep).” (Cited in Cramer 2005; 4). Where such a discrepancy exist people are likely to be more rebellious.

Blatant economic inequalities can also make countries vulnerable to civil rebellion. Where people see that their economic woes are a direct result of a few elites sharing the bulk of the resources, it would be expected that such people would easily join in on a



rebellion. This is more so in countries where such inequalities coincide with religious, tribal or ethnic divisions. Inequality increases the discrepancy between people's value expectation and their value capacities. Other factors recognized by Collier and other greed and grievance theorists, which make countries vulnerable to civil rebellion, include a history of violence, geography, ethnic composition, and diaspora remittances<sup>22</sup>.

### **2.3.0 Choice of Methodology**

This study is based on three months of field research in the BEM<sup>23</sup>, which has been caught up in a protracted chieftaincy conflict since the 1950s. The purpose of the field research was to observe at first hand the effects of the conflict on the socio-economic development of the Municipality, and to sample views and perceptions on the ground on the effects of the conflict. For the purpose of this research, the researcher used both primary and secondary data. The principal method of collecting the primary data has been through in-depth interviews, the administration of questionnaires, focus group discussion and participant observation. These different methods were meant to complement and corroborate each other.

### **2.3.1 Qualitative Research**

The method best suited for this research into the Bawku Chieftaincy conflict is the qualitative approach. Unlike its quantitative opposite, the qualitative method “avoid(s) or downplay(s) statistical techniques and mechanics of the kinds of quantitative methods used in, say survey research or epidemiology” (Silverman, 2005: 6). Consequently, Martyn Hammersley has identified a common set of preferences shared by qualitative researchers. These include analysis of words and images rather than numbers, observation rather than experiment, meaning rather than behaviour and hypothesis-generating research rather than hypothesis testing. (See Silverman 2006: 56). Strauss and Corbin, (1990:17) describe qualitative research methodology as any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedure or other means of quantification...They further clarified that some of the data could be quantifiable but the

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<sup>22</sup> I will not elaborate on these factors because I think they have little implication for the study area.

<sup>23</sup> Bawku East Municipality

analysis is qualitative (cited in Hoepfl, 1997).

My choice of qualitative methods rather than quantitative data was informed by my decision to examine the effects of chieftaincy conflict on the development of the Bawku Municipality through households rather than through analysis of official figures of growth patterns, which, in any case, will either be difficult to come by or unreliable. The fieldwork involved the administration of questionnaires to members of households and focus group discussion. Also, I held open-ended interviews with officials of the Municipal Assembly and opinion leaders to sample their views on the effects of the chieftaincy conflict on the livelihoods of the people of the Municipality. Efforts to get some quantitative data to bolster my qualitative findings from the Municipal Assembly and the Police Department have proved futile.

Qualitative research is increasingly being used by many social scientists because of the growing recognition that ‘it is insufficient to rely on quantitative survey and statistics to understand human affairs. It has become important to attempt to delve deep into the subjective qualities that govern human behavior’ (Holiday 2002; 7). More so, in the social sciences, statistical quantitative statements are subject to different interpretations and may sometimes be used for political ‘spin’. Qualitative research however suffers from one serious defect; it has been argued that the researcher might select only those fragments of data which support his argument. Silverman (2006: 51) has suggested that some quantitative data could be incorporated into the qualitative research to ease all such concerns.

### **2.3.2 Selection of the Study Area**

This study focused on the BEM in the Upper East Region of Ghana. This Municipality has been the scene of one of the most protracted chieftaincy conflicts in the country. The conflict has been the cause of perennial violence in the Municipality. Bawku has long been an important trading center, and is still seen as the commercial nerve of the region. The Municipality clearly appears not to have benefited from its nodal location in the inter-regional trade, as unemployment, education, health etc are still major concerns

among its people. The Municipality was therefore seen as an ideal place for this study into the effects of chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana on local development, as the chieftaincy conflict appears to have adversely affected its development. The BEM was chosen as a case study to aid the researcher make inferences and generalization about the broader topic.

### **2.3.3 Preparation for the Fieldwork**

Prior to making the trip for the fieldwork, the researcher wrote a research proposal and prepared financial estimates that were approved by the Center for Peace Studies. He also conducted a background research into the conflict, its causes and dynamics and the development situation of the Municipality. Efforts were also made to find a research assistant in the research area so as to facilitate the fieldwork when the researcher got there. Efforts were also made to contact prospective respondents.

### **2.4.0 Primary Data Collection**

#### **2.4.1 Questionnaires**

Questionnaires were administered through a simple random sampling technique in selected neighborhoods in the BEM. These neighborhoods were also selected through simple random sampling to make the research as scientific as possible. Questionnaires were given out to literate respondents to answer by themselves with minimal guidance. An interpreter (A Research Assistant) was employed to translate the questionnaires to non-literate respondents. In all 40 people were interviewed. The respondents were selected on the basis of location, ethnicity, and gender. Thus, the break down of respondents was as follows: 10 Kusasi, 10 Mamprusi, 10 people from other minority ethnic groups and 10 women. The latter two groups were selected to afford me the opportunity to access the effects of the chieftaincy conflict on the livelihoods of minority groups in the BEM who are not directly involved in the conflict and also on women.

The questionnaire was divided into five sections. Sections A & B were intended to gain insights into the personal and household background of the respondents. Section C aimed at gathering information on the economic background of respondents and the effects of

the conflict on their economic lives. Section D was meant to sample views on the effects of the conflict on migration, and section E was aimed at sampling views from respondents on how the conflict can be resolved. I tried to make the questions very simple and straight to the point so that they would not need a lot time to be spent on them. The questions were also made simple for easy comprehension.

#### **2.4.2 Interviews**

The in-depth interviews were designed for key personalities who the researcher believed would have a good knowledge of the implication of the chieftaincy conflict on the development of the Municipality. The interview guide had questions that were strictly based on the objectives of the study for easy categorization. The basis of the questions primarily involved the careful reviews of the relevant theoretical framework and the objectives and hypothesis of the study. The researcher was able to interview the Coordinating Director of the Municipality; Mr. George Anaba, the Deputy Coordinating Director; Mr. David Na-ire, a hospital administrator; Mr. Mark Abugri, a teacher of a local primary school; Mrs Linda Asunda and an opinion leader in the area, Mr. Zingy Marley.<sup>24</sup> The researcher was however unable to gain audience with the Member of Parliament, the Municipal Chief Executive and the Bawkunaba among others. In spite of the above, I am convinced that the information acquired on the field is sufficient to give me a clear picture of the effects of the chieftaincy conflict. The interviews were semi-structured. This interview guide was used with flexibility regarding sequence and formulation. Modifications were made to questions when important issues beyond previous planning came up during the interviews.

#### **2.4.3 Focus Group Discussion**

Focus group discussions were also held to obtain data for this research. There were three separate focus group sessions each spanning a little over an hour. Participants for the first session were all Kusasi, and participants in the second session were Mamprusi. The third group was made up participants from the other minority groups in the Municipality. The focus group discussion afforded me the opportunity to gather different views from

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<sup>24</sup> Though 10 interviews were conducted, five respondents opted to remain anonymous.

different ethnic groups on separate occasion. I served as the moderator in these discussions and tried to make sure that no one person dominated the discussion.

Primary sources used in the research also included Municipal Assembly Reports, and development documents. The Bawku Municipal Medium Term Development Plan spanning the period 2006 to 2009 has especially been useful as it contains facts and figures on the Municipality as well as information on the economic, social and political agenda of the Municipal Assembly.

#### **2.4.4 Participant Observation**

To suppose that any researcher's presence in the field would not exert an influence on the data is unrealistic (Strong 1974 cited in Silverman, 2005; 29). I therefore decided to use my observation on the field as part of my data. I took particular note of infrastructure development in the Municipality such as the road network, health facilities, schools and housing. I also took note of settlement patterns. Participant Observation provided the possibility to observe what people do as compared to what they said. By involving myself in the social context in which people from the different ethnic groups interact, I was able to observe their daily routines and interactions. The information obtained through this process, in the form of informal conversations, personal reflection and analysis were formulated and recorded in field notes. Participant observation provided me the opportunity to collect additional data beyond what I could get from the interviews, focus group discussions, and questionnaires.

#### **2.5.0 Secondary Data Collection**

Analysis of secondary sources was used to complement the primary data. The secondary data involved an intensive research from books, journals, magazines, newspaper reports, radio interviews, articles, Internet materials and unpublished works related to the study. The essence was to review literature on the relationships between conflict and development that will assist the researcher in analyzing the effects of the chieftaincy conflict. The review of conceptual works served as both theoretical and empirical base for the analysis of data collected. The secondary sources are a rich source on the history

of the chieftaincy conflict in the Municipality.

### **2.6.0 Ethical Issues in the Research**

In conflict areas, information divulged for purposes such as research can compromise the security and safety of the respondents. As a result of the above, I made it a point to explain in detail the purpose of the research to each respondent, and made him or her understand that participation was on voluntary basis. The informed consent of each respondent was required for participation in this research. With the exception of a few respondents who consented to being named in this research, most opted to be remain anonymous. In order not to compromise the safety of my respondents I decided not to attribute politically sensitive claims directly to any respondent.

Every researcher has personal perceptions, beliefs and values that can influence the decisions making process during research and the data analysis process. Weber (1946) has pointed out that all research is contaminated to some extent by the values of the researcher. The conclusion and implication to be drawn from the study are also largely grounded in the moral and political beliefs of the researcher (cited in Silverman, 2000; 257). I certainly did have personal preconceptions about how the chieftaincy conflict in the BEM has affected its socio-economic development. As a result of the above, in order to conduct a scientific research, one needs to de-construct stereotypes and misconceptions so as to become open to new ideas.

### **2.7.0 Data Analysis**

Data analysis in this work was a continuous process as the study was qualitatively oriented. The data obtained was organized by creating categories. The process of coding, as part of the analysis, involves ‘generating concepts from and with our data’ (Coffey & Atkinson 1996; 26). Such issues as thinking creatively and conceptualizing the data, raising questions and providing provisional answers to the relationship among and within the data are vital in this process of coding (ibid). The coding was done with reference to my conceptual framework. In transforming the coded data into meaningful data, patterns, themes and regularities as well as paradoxes and irregularities were considered (ibid).

The data analysis aimed to answer the aims and objectives of this research (see chapter one, pages 9-10).

The analysis began with data reduction; this involved selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the raw data (Miles and Huberman, 1984; 21, cited in Silverman, 2000; 177). The process also involved making decision about the particular data that provided the initial focus of the study. The next stage was to draw conclusions from the coded data. Conclusion drawing means ‘beginning to decide what things mean, noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configuration, causal flows and propositions’ (Miles and Huberman, 1984; 229, cited in Silverman, 2000; 177). The conclusions were then verified; verification involved testing the provisional conclusion for ‘their plausibility, their sturdiness, and their “conformability” –that is, their validity’ (ibid).

### **2.8.0 Challenges**

During the fieldwork it was important that I build trust with the respondents, this was especially so considering the fact that the study area is a conflict zone. The process of trust building requires a degree of knowledge about the conditions prevailing on the ground. I visited the study area a couple of times to become conversant with the conditions before I started the actual fieldwork. I also spent a great deal of time visiting schools, the municipal offices, hospital and market places to familiarize myself with potential respondents. Obtaining access to information in a conflict area is not a task that can be successfully achieved in a day. There are always barriers in such places constructed ‘to keep the outsider at bay’ (Smith 1999; 138). There are some practices that communities use to resist the intervention and presence of the researcher. It requires time and patience on the part of the researcher to build the trust needed for a good research.

Before I embarked on my fieldwork I expected to face a number of other challenges mainly in relation with the gathering of data. However, there were challenges relating to my personal life as well as in my relation to family and friends, who I was meeting again after almost a year of sojourn in Europe. This meeting with family and friends had a toll

on my time and finances. However, I was able to take precautionary measures to limit the adverse effects of my personal challenges on my fieldwork.

I will now present some of the challenges I encountered in the field in relation to the various techniques I used to collect my data and the ways I tried to overcome such challenges.

Interviews: Before I emplaned to Ghana for my fieldwork, I had planned to interview some key personalities in the BEM. Though I had tried to make contact with most of these personalities before I got to the field, I was unable to meet with some of them. I was unable to interview the Member of Parliament for the Municipality, the Chief Executive and the Bawkunaba (chief of Bawku). But this notwithstanding, the respondents that I interviewed provided me with deep insights into the conflict and its implication for the socio-economic development of the Municipality.

Questionnaires: the challenges I encountered with regard to the administration of my questionnaires related to how to choose the respondents scientifically. I had planned to interview specified numbers of people from the various ethnic groups in the Municipality. However, when I got to the field I realized that most of the neighbourhoods, especially the Municipal centre, were ethnically mixed, a fact I probably should not have overlooked. What this meant was that if I was going to use the simple random sampling technique there was always the possibility that I was not going to get the specified numbers from the different ethnic groups. What I decided to do was to distribute 60 questionnaires instead of 40, and to afterwards separate them into the different ethnic groups, and then pick the specified numbers at random.

In addition to the above problem some people refused to participate in the research, citing time constraints, lack of knowledge of the conflict (either because they had recently arrived in the Municipality or are not directly involved in the conflict), or lack of interest. I had tried to make my questions very simple and straight to the point so that they would not need a lot time to be spent on them because I had anticipated the time factor. But this



notwithstanding some people still insisted they just did not have the time.

Participant observation: I had planned to find a suitable accommodation in the study area for the duration of the fieldwork, in order to see at first hand the interaction between the various ethnic groups, as well as to take notes of the social and economic infrastructure distribution in the Municipality. However, due to the lack of suitable accommodation, I stayed with my family in Bolgatanga, the regional capital, from where I commuted to the study area daily.

## **2.9 Summary**

This chapter has two main parts. The first part dealt with the conceptual and the theoretical underpinnings in the analysis of the nature and effects of the chieftaincy conflict on the socio-economic development of the area under study. Particularly, the relevant concepts - conflict, security and development - were described and the relationship between them was established. The 'greed and grievance' theory was also presented. An overview of the methodological techniques (quantitative) employed for the purpose of acquiring data for this research was given, and the different primary and secondary sources to be used at different levels of the analysis have been outlined. The challenges encountered in the research process, as well as how such challenges of field research were overcome have also been elaborated.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Study Area and Sources of the Chieftaincy Conflict**

#### **3.0 Introduction**


The first part of this chapter gives an overview of the study area, looking at its geographic, economic and political structures. This hopefully will enable readers put issues discussed in this research into perspective. The second part of the chapter discusses the sources of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict, looking at its genesis and how it has been played out over the years in response to political changes and interferences.

#### **3.1.0 Profile of the Bawku East Municipality**

The study area, Bawku East Municipality (BEM), is located in the Upper East Region (UER) of Ghana. BEM can rightly be tagged as ‘Borderland Municipality’ because of its location at the north-eastern most corner of the region where the country shares international borders with Togo and Burkina Faso. It is one of the nine administrative districts in the Upper East Region<sup>25</sup>. It covers a land area of about 121505 sq km and has an estimated total population of 205,849; giving it a population density of 169 persons per square kilometres. The population is 20 percent urban and 80 percent rural. Household sizes in the Municipality are fairly large. According to the 2000 population census report, on the average there are seven persons per household (Bawku Municipal Medium Term Development Plan 2006-2009).

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<sup>25</sup> There are 138 districts and municipalities in Ghana.



**Map 1: Map of BEM (Source: Municipal Assembly)**

### 3.1.1 Geographic Characteristics

Located within the interior continental climatic zone, the BEM, like most of Northern Ghana is characterized by two distinct seasons: a raining season spanning April to October, and a dry season from late November to early March. Generally, the climatic conditions render the Municipality susceptible to bush fires and soil degradation during the dry season. The Municipality is well drained by the White Volta and its tributaries as well as by other rivers. The vegetation is mainly of the Sahel Savannah type, consisting of open Savannah, with fire swept grassland separating deciduous trees with a few broad-leaved and fire-leached tree species. The entire Volta Basin as well as parts of the forest (including Morago West and Kuka) is protected under Local Authority and Municipal Assembly instruments.

### **3.1.2 Economic Characteristics**

BEM's economy is based on three major activities: agriculture, small-scale industries, and commerce. Agriculture, is the major economic activity and accounts for about 62% of total employment. The sector comprises mainly subsistence crop production, livestock and poultry farming. The main crops grown include millet, sorghum, maize, rice, groundnuts, watermelon and onions. The main livestock include cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys. Poultry keeping is also a thriving agro-activity.

Commerce is the second important economic activity in BEM, which is generally regarded as the commercial nerve of the Upper East Region. However its bustling commercial role transcends both the municipal and regional boundaries. The Municipality has a three-day market cycle<sup>26</sup> during which local agricultural produce (such as foodstuffs, livestock, and poultry) as well as manufactured goods are traded. Traders from other parts of Ghana buy livestock and foodstuffs and load them onto southbound trucks for redistribution in the major southern cities like Kumasi, Accra, Tema, and Cape Coast. In return, traders from Bawku deal in manufactured goods brought in from Techiman, Kumasi, Tamale, Accra, Takoradi and Tema. This illustrates Bawku's commercial importance in the economy of the country. Importantly too, BEM's strategic location at Ghana's border with Eastern Burkina Faso and Northern Togo as well as the easy crossing it provides into Mali and Niger has made it an important commercial node in the regional trade.

The third important economic activity includes one-man and family-run businesses. These are characterized by diverse small-scale industries; namely shea butter extraction, groundnut oil extraction, pito brewing, millet grinding, sorghum and maize processing for domestic use, dawadawa processing, weaving and dress making, and pottery.

### **3.1.3 Political Structures**

There are two-levels of political authority in BEM. The first is the Municipal Authority instituted by the state under the Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207, 1988) to

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<sup>26</sup> Market day falls on every third day

provide local administration. The second level of authority is the Traditional Authority, which encapsulates the chieftaincy institution. Though no major role is assigned to the Traditional Authorities under the municipal system of governance, its position is guaranteed in the Ghana's Constitution based on the support it wields among the people of the Municipality. This is especially so in the rural areas where the influence of central government and the Municipal Assembly tend to be minimal. Traditional authorities play several roles including allocations of land, settling disputes, maintaining law and order, and upholding traditional customs.

The Municipal Assembly, a sort of local parliament, is the highest political authority in the Municipality. Two-thirds of members are elected and one-third appointed by central government in consultation with local and traditional elites. An elected Presiding Member chairs it. Central government sometimes delegates part of its appointment powers to traditional authorities, in 2001 for instance the Kusasi Bawkunaba appointed seven members to the Assembly (Lund, 2003; 602). The Assembly works together with the political and public administration consisting of a government appointed Municipal Secretary and heads decentralized state departments (with their administrative apparatus). The Assembly is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Municipality, development decision-making, the provision of social services, preparation and submission of development plan and budget.

The Assembly has two main sources of revenue, from central government and locally generated revenues. Central government transfers come in the forms of grants-in-aid, ceded revenue and district assemblies' common fund. Grants-in-aid are monies earmarked for specific development. Ceded revenue is an amount meant to be collected from various enterprises by the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of the Municipality. The District Assemblies Common Fund is five percent of government revenue which parliament has directed to be made available to districts for development. Locally generated revenue is mainly from rates, fees, licenses and trading services.

### **3.1.4 Socio-Cultural Makeup**

The BEM is an ethnically diverse community with several ethnic groups living side-by-side. The ethnic composition is as follows: the Kusasi, the largest ethnic group in the Municipality, constitute 45 percent of the population, the Mamprusi make up 25 percent, the Mossi 15 percent, and the Huasa 10 percent. Others ((Bosanger, Frafra, Kasena, Bisa, Dagomba) are 5 percent of the population (2000 population census). It is important to add that these figures are contested because of the implications they have for the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. One such (apparently politically coloured) estimate is that the Kusasi alone constitute about 95 percent of the population (Ndebugre, Joy FM, 2007). Kusasi oral traditions suggest that the Kusasi were the original settlers and therefore consider themselves as the indigenes of the area. The Mamprusi, according to these narratives arrived in the area in a number of waves of migration from Gambaga in the Northern Region but in small groups (Rattray 1932: 375).

### **3.1.5 Ethnicity and Division of Labour**

The initial Mamprusi migrants settled in what has become the town centre and engaged in commerce. They established the town as a military post to protect the trade routes with the north. They were later joined by other waves of Mamprusi migrants and other migrants as the Mosi and Hausa from Northern Nigeria, as well as other migrants from other parts of Northern Ghana. Most of these migrants were engaged in trading goods between the north and the south of the country. A few of these migrants however ventured into the countryside to farm. The Kusasi remained in the countryside engaging mainly in subsistence farming (cultivating cereals and rearing animals).

### **3.2.0 Sources of Conflicting Chieftaincy Claims and Political Interferences**

The two dominant ethnic groups have been engaged in a bitter chieftaincy conflict for over five decades (Lund, 2003:589). This chieftaincy conflict has its genesis in the colonial period. Historically, the Kusasi did not have the institution of chieftaincy, instead they had a religious leader; the 'Tendaana'<sup>27</sup>, who was the custodian of the land and performed religious duties on behalf of the community. Rattray (1932) notes that

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<sup>27</sup> Also called 'Tendaan' among the Tallensi studied by M. Fortes (1940: 255)

“...in the old days the Kusasi only knew the ‘Tendaana’ who was their political and spiritual head” (quoted in Tonah 2007:207). According to Manoukian (1951) “the function of the ‘Tendaana’ was religious rather than secular and he had a task of ensuring the prosperity of the community by obtaining the goodwill of the earth” (Quoted in Bonbande in Tonah 2007:198).

The issue of contention arose with the introduction of the Indirect Rule by the British. According to J.G.K. Syme, a British District Commissioner of the Kusasi area “the British suddenly arrived in Gambaga and then they came to Kusasi asking for chiefs. They had found them in Gambaga and expected to do the same in Kusasi, where however they were not much in evidence” (quoted in Tonah 2007: 207). The British appointed as chief one among the politically more organized Mamprusi who had experience of the institution from where they had migrated to the area. The Mamprusi leaders that the British colonial authorities consulted were also descendents of the ‘Nayiri’ (overlord) of Nalerigu, with whom the British had already struck an acquaintance. The ‘Nayiri’ was thereafter given the responsibility of ‘kingmaker’ for the Bawku area. This meant that the British had delegated de facto oversight authority over Bawku to the Nayiri, a situation the Kusasi opposed vehemently, and marked the beginning of tensions between the two groups.

Hostilities between the two ethnic groups peaked in 1950s when after the death of the Mamprusi ‘Bawkunaba’, the Kusasi decided to ‘enskin<sup>28</sup>’ their own chief, as the chief of Bawku, ignoring the ‘Nayiri’. At the same time the Nayiri also enskinned a Mamprusi as the ‘Bawkunaba’, but the Kusasi prevented him from returning to the town (Ndebugre, Joy FM 2007). This situation compelled Governor Lord Listowel to set up a committee to look into the two claims. The Committee found that the Kusasi chief had being customarily elected and installed. Lord Listowel therefore concluded that the Kusasi was the legitimate chief of Bawku. The Mamprusi did not accept the Governor interpretation of the committee’s findings. For them the two terms, chief of Kusasi area and chief of Bawku were not identical. They therefore sought an order from a divisional court to

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<sup>28</sup> Enskinning is the election/appointment and enstallment of a chief in the Northern parts of Ghana

quash the decision of the Governor. The court granted the order. The Kusasi appealed against that ruling at the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Governor that the two terms were interchangeable and that the Governor General had clear powers to vary the findings of the committee. (See Bonbande in Tonah 2007; 207-208)

The Kusasi Bawkunaba remained in office until the overthrow of CPP government in 1966. From then on the conflict became political, with each faction in the conflict supporting political parties that they perceive to be sympathetic to their cause. The Mamprusi appealed to the new government of the NLC<sup>29</sup> to rectify what they saw as wrong done them by the previous administrations. Chieftaincy Amendment Decree 1966, NLCD 112, was passed deskinning/destooling among other chiefs, the Kusasi Bawkunaba, and enskinning instead a Mamprusi. The situation persisted in this way, despite frequent appeals by the Kusasi to subsequent governments until the coming into power of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). The new government passed a new law that reversed NLCD 112, thus reinstating a Kusasi as the Bawkunaba under the Chieftaincy Act 1983, also known as PNDC Law 75.

This act of the PNDC administration alienated the Mamprusi, but gained it wide support among the Kusasi. The Mamprusi rallied behind the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), calculating that an NPP government would restore the Bawku chieftainship to them. Thus when the NPP came to power following its success in the 2000 presidential and parliamentary polls, there was wide expectation among the Mamprusi and suspicion among the Kusasi that PNDC 75 would be revisited. The expectation of the Mamprusi was however not realized as the NPP chose not to alter Chieftaincy Law 1983 (PNDC Law 75).

To some observers therefore the Bawku chieftaincy conflict appeared to be definitely settled. But recent events such as the calls for rejuvenating and consolidating the Mamprusi leadership, an appeal for financial contribution for the purpose of acquiring arms, the refusal of the Mamprusi to recognize the Kusasi Bawkunaba as the chief of

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<sup>29</sup> National Liberation Council



Bawku as well as recent violent clashes say otherwise. The position of most Mamprusi as far as the Bawkunaba is concerned is epitomized in the words of a retired Justice B. Yakubu, himself a Mamprusi, "I must state that to us Mamprusi, Bawku has no chief, and no-one can coerce us into recognizing any bastard as a chief" (Quoted in Lund 2003:601). According to the Northern Advocate therefore "Bawku is still volatile" (Lund 2003:603).

Closely associated with the chieftaincy conflict in Bawku are disputes about land ownership. Land ownership here is tied to the right to rule. The custodian of the land is seen as the custodian of the chieftaincy institution. The Kusasi claim to the land tends from the fact that they were the first to settle on the land. They argue that the land is the property of the Tendaana and since they have always been the Tendaanas, they are the custodians of the land. The Mamprusi on the other hand argue that the land belongs to the Nayiri and that the Kusasi Tendaanas had at best been caretakers of the land for the Nayiri, who had always provided protection for Bawku allowing the acephalous Kusasi to cultivate the land in peace. This dispute over land has meant that many contested lands cannot be cultivated. In recent times, Mamprusi have been driven away from their farmlands in Zabzugu. The Municipal Assembly had to take control over these lands to avert any clashes.

### **3.3.0 Summary**

This chapter has given an overview of the geographical setting of the study area, its economic characteristics, political structure and socio-cultural make-up. This is important if one is to gain an insight into how the conflict in the Municipality has affected the people, in terms of their geographic and economic opportunities for gaining a sustainable livelihood. The chapter also looked at the ethnic composition in the Municipality and the sources of the chieftaincy conflict.

# CHAPTE FOUR

## Empirical Findings

### 4.0 Introduction

In this chapter I present the field data from the study area. For purposes of providing clear oversight, the data is presented systematically under a number of themes: the effects on general security; impact on investments into the municipal economy; the cost of maintenance of security and the effects of insecurity on other aspects of the municipal economy. Where necessary, these themes will be further divided into sub-themes so as to enable me present the data in a systematic fashion. A look at the demographic characteristics of the respondents precedes the presentation of the empirical data.

### 4.1 Demographics of Respondents

A total of 40 questionnaires were administered, 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants, and three focus group discussions were held with the different ethnic groups. Below is a summary of the distribution of respondents categorized in terms of age, gender and percentages, followed by their economic backgrounds.

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents

Age Group	Male	Female	Percentage
19-45	24	5	41.4
46-60	18	9	38.6
61 and above	10	4	20
Total	52	18	100

Source: Field Survey, 2007

Note: The total above does not include the 10 key informants

Table 2: Economic Background

Profession	Number	Percentage
Farmer (Agriculture)	18	22.5
Trader (Commerce)	24	30
Industry	11	13.75
Other	14	17.5
Unemployed	13	16.25
Total	80	100

Source: Field Survey, 2007

Knowledge of the economic background of the respondents will help provide a picture of the employment situation in the Municipality, and also aid in the interpretation of the data given by each respondent. The economic background of the sample shows that majority of the citizens of the BEM are engaged in agriculture and commerce. The two sectors employ almost 53 percent of the respondents. Interestingly, more respondents are engaged in commerce (30 %) than in agriculture (22.5%), this contradicts the official statistics from the Municipality Assembly (see economic characteristics in chapter three). This is probably due to the fact that most of the respondents were selected in the municipal capital, Bawku, which doubles as the commercial capital of the Municipality. A significant percentage of the respondents (17.5%) are teachers, nurses, accountants, and administrators. ‘Others’ also included students, fishermen and a hunter. 16.25 of percentage respondents are unemployed.

#### **4.2.0 Security Situation in the Bawku East Municipality**

##### **4.2.1 The Perception of Security**

The security of a people to a very large extent depends on their perception of how secure they feel when going about their daily activities. Individuals will define their lives based on perceived threats to their security, real or imagined. In collecting data in the field, I sought to determine the perception of security among the people of the Municipality. The data indicates that security is a major concern in the Municipality. The Municipal

officials interviewed underscored how important the security issue is. They held that one of the main reasons for stationing the Air-Borne Force<sup>30</sup> in the Municipality is to reassure the people that the central and local government authorities are on top of the security situation. The officials also held that they were aware that some residents had acquired arms to protect themselves, their families and their properties because of fears of the security situation. 32 out of the 40 respondents to the questionnaires, representing 80 percent of the respondents said they thought the chieftaincy conflict had made security a problem in the Municipality. 15% thought otherwise, whilst 5% respondents said they could not tell.

#### **4.2.2 Crime Rates**

The data suggest that the chieftaincy conflict has led to an increase in crime rates in the Municipality. Arson, looting, killings and gun battles are common during the perennial violence associated with the chieftaincy conflict. In the latest violent outbreak, which started on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2007 during the ‘Saamanpiid’ festival<sup>31</sup>, it was reported that thirty-three people were killed and 159 houses burnt (Ghanaweb, 2008 January 07)<sup>32</sup>. Police reports also indicate that “a number of houses belonging to both groups had been burnt and there was mass violence, anarchy and indiscriminate firing (of guns) in the town...” (Graphic Online, 2008, February 08)<sup>33</sup>

It is not uncommon to find people using the violence as a camouflage to settle personal scores, and to rob and to perpetuate crimes, which they otherwise could not indulge in, in times of peace. 35 respondents out of the 40, representing 87.5% of the respondents to the questionnaires said they thought that the protracted chieftaincy conflict has had a negative effect on crime rates in the Municipality. It has led to the increase in armed/unarmed robbery, motorcycle theft, cattle theft, and destruction of properties, general lawlessness and smuggling of goods such as textiles, motorcycles, electronics and

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<sup>30</sup> The Air-Borne Force is a rapid response unit for the entire Upper East Region.

<sup>31</sup> The Saamanpiid festival is celebrated annually by the Kusasi, to thank God and the ancestral spirits for a successful farming season.

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=137193>

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.graphicghana.com/default.asp?sourceid=&smenu=1&twindow=&mad=&sdetail=1609&wpag e=1&skeyword=&sidate=&ccat=&ccatm=&restate=&restatus=&reoption=&retype=&repmin=&repmax=&rebed=&rebath=&subname=&pform=&sc=2364&hn=graphicghana&he=.com>

firearms.<sup>34</sup> The smuggling of firearms into the Municipality through the porous borders leads to another major security concern, the proliferation of firearms.

#### **4.2.3 The Proliferation of Firearms**

The proliferation of small firearms in Ghana in general and the conflict-ridden BEM in particular is a major concern and a grave threat to the peace of the Municipality and to the Ghanaian society as a whole. Most unregistered weapons in Ghana are smuggled into the country from neighboring countries. As a border town, the BEM has been one of the main destinations of such smuggled weapons. FOSDA (Foundation for Security and Development in Africa) cites the arrest of a sixteen-year-old boy who on February 1, 2001 attempted to smuggle shorts guns into Bawku.<sup>35</sup>

Unlicensed weapons in the Municipality do not only come from across the borders, some are brought from the southern part of Ghana where there is a thriving illegal industry in the manufacture and trade of firearms. According to Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Ghana has a long-standing and socially embedded gun-making tradition. He claims that some local blacksmiths now possess the requisite know-how to copy imported AK-47 assault rifles. (p. 79)<sup>36</sup>. Such locally manufactured weapons find their way into the BEM and to other troubled spots in the country.

#### **4.3.0 Effects of Insecurity on Investment and Development**

As observed in chapter two, security has a direct impact on the levels of investment. The violence associated with the chieftaincy conflict in the BEM affects investments in the different sectors of the municipal economy. I present the data on the effects, sector by sector.

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<sup>34</sup> attempts to obtain official crime figures from the police were unsuccessful

<sup>35</sup> <http://www.fosda.net/?q=node/142>

<sup>36</sup> <http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:->

DZSf\_MDsU0J:www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/b\_series\_pdf/AA/Part%2520I%252003%2520Ghana.pdf+the+anatomy+of+the+arms+trade,+Emmanuel+Kwesi+Aning&hl=no&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=no

### **4.3.1 Agriculture**

The violence resulting from the chieftaincy conflict adversely affects production, marketing and investment in agriculture, the dominant economic activity in the BEM. During outbreak of violence in the Municipality, farmers, especially those engaged in the cultivation of perishable foodstuffs such as watermelons and onions suffer heavy losses. Watermelons and onions are cultivated by irrigation and need constant tending. When violence breaks out, most farmers are forced to abandon their crops because they fear being either attacked or because of the curfew instituted by the government/security apparatus. Furthermore, the transportation networks are also disrupted during violent clashes and farmers are unable to transport their foodstuff to the market places. These results in the foodstuffs getting rotten on the farms, the markets are deprived of these produce, scarcity sets in while their prices soar in the Municipality and the country as a whole. Violence and insecurity in the Municipality has also resulted in most financial institutions unwilling to grant loans to farmers to invest in production because the violence and insecurity increases the risk factor of such loans.

The officials from the Municipal Assembly interviewed claimed that, the conflict results in many young people relocating to other places; increasingly leaving farming in the hands of the elderly whose output is low. For Mr. Ziggy Marley, most young people would rather invest their time, energy and resources on other ventures as commerce, which allows them to have liquid capital most of the time. Liquid capital could serve as their tickets out of the Municipality in times of escalating violence. Such capital, he said, is also safer from looting, robbery and burning.

The dispute over land ownership also affects agriculture production negatively. The inability of the two factions in the conflict to reach an amicable solution over several contested farmlands, such as those at Zabzugu, has deprived many farmers of their livelihood. It became evident from the focus group discussion that Mamprusi and other minority farmers who have their farms at the outskirts of the town, among Kusasi villages have been greatly affected by the perennial violence. During violent clashes they are unable to visit their farms, and so most of them have had to give up farming altogether.

Though none of the respondents have their farmlands at Zabzugu, most of them claimed that their relatives do and the dispute over those farmlands have left them unemployed.

### **4.3.2 Commerce**

Commerce, the second most important economic activity in the BEM has also been negatively affected by the chieftaincy conflict. The officials from the Municipal Assembly asserted that, commercial activities as a whole is negatively affected by the perennial violence in the Municipality. The Assembly finds it very difficult to attract potential investors. Such activities as looting, robbery and the general lawlessness, which bring businesses to a standstill during violent clashes, scare away potential investors. The officials also cited the out migration of business people to other parts of the country as a direct effect of the perennial violence in the Municipality.

Restricted movement, disruptions in businesses, the loss of capital through burning of houses and shops, and limited and selective business transactions (this means that people will normally not do business with members of the other side, this limits the market available to each trader) were all cited by various respondents as effects of the violence which are disincentives to business in the Municipality.

### **4.3.3 Industry**

Industry in the BEM has also been negatively affected by the chieftaincy conflict. As observed under economic activities in chapter three, the economy of the Municipality is characterized mainly by small-scale industries in such areas as shea butter extractions, groundnut oil extraction, pito brewing, and millet grinding among a few others. The officials from the Municipal Assembly held that industries in the Municipality have generally suffered from lack of investment. Indeed the small-scale industries in the Municipality have also been unable to attract substantial capital investments to enable them to expand. The unstable business environment makes it even more difficult to encourage the establishment of large-scale industries. However, though the respondents attributed the lack investment in large-scale industries in the Municipality to the

chieftaincy conflict, this lack of large-scale industries is not unique to BEM. It is a fact that the entire northern part of the country generally lacks large-scale industries.

The service industry in the BEM has also been affected by the chieftaincy conflict. Whereas the service industry is doing relatively well in most parts of the Upper East Region, and Ghana in general, the industry is clearly faring poorly in the Municipality (particularly the hotel industry). In the words of Mr. David Nai-ire, the Deputy Coordinating Director “the hotel industry is absent in the BEM”, except for a few ‘guest houses’ with sub-standard facilities. The problem is that buildings belonging to members from either faction in the conflict are frequently the targets for arson during violent clashes. This makes people in the Municipality reluctant to invest large sums of money to put up hotels. Although properties of outsiders and members of other ethnic groups are not targeted for destruction during violent clashes, neutral respondents claimed that they do not feel it is safe to commit large sums of money to such undertakings.

#### **4.3.4 Revenue Generation and Collection**

Revenue collection is an important component of every organization’s ability to perform its functions optimally. In addition to funds received from central government in the forms of the ‘District Assembly Common Fund’, ‘Grants-in-Aid’, and ‘Ceded Revenue’, the Municipal Assembly relies on revenues generated internally through the collection of levies, property taxes, and duties to finance its budget. Revenue generation and collection is another important aspect of the municipal economy that has been adversely affected by the chieftaincy conflict.

Officials from the Municipal Assembly held that the ability of the assembly to collect revenues has been severely affected by the protracted chieftaincy conflict. The Coordinating Director of the Assembly, Mr. George Anaba’s for instance claimed that, “the Mamprusi regard themselves as royals and to them royals do not pay taxes”. This claim was confirmed by some of the Mamprusi respondents. Some Kusasi also refuse to pay since paying the taxes in the face of the Mamprusi refusal might be construed as accepting the Mamprusi claim of over lordship. The general economic decline in the



Municipality as seen above, also negatively affects revenue collection and mobilization in the Municipality, as there are few productive ventures to tax.

Smuggling is a major leakage in the Municipality's revenue mobilization efforts. The fact that a lot of goods are smuggled into, out and through the Municipality means that a substantial amount of revenue that central government and the Municipal Assembly could have realized through duties are lost.

#### **4.4.0 Insecurity at a High Cost**

##### **4.4.1 Budgetary (national/municipal) Allocations to manage the conflict**

A number of security measures have been put in place to respond to the perennial violence from the chieftaincy conflict and to reassure people to go about their normal daily lives without fear. Some of these measures include the stationing of a rapid response Air-Borne Force and a significantly larger police force in the Municipality. These measures mean that central government and the municipal authorities have had to channel more resources into maintaining the military and police presence.

The Municipal Assembly spends GH¢250<sup>37</sup> every month on the Air-Borne Forces. In addition, BEM pays their communication, health, and fuel bills. The central government pays the wages of these forces. This expenditure overstretches the Municipal budget. I was unable to obtain the amounts central government spends on the security of the area. In Ghana, security issues are normally not divulged to civilians, but Masahudu Kumateh has estimated government expenditure on law and order in the three northern regions, to be about GH¢648 million since 2002<sup>38</sup>. Such high expenditures put a strain on the ability of government and the Municipal Assembly to provide other essential public goods as schools and hospitals. The taxpayer is also required to do more to meet these expenditures.

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<sup>37</sup> GH¢ 1= \$ 1 US

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.ghanaiian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=6119>

On the individual level however, people seem not to have made any significant expenditures on security. At least that was what most of the respondents claimed. No respondents admitted to owning a firearm. This is probably due to the fact that very few have licensed firearms in the Municipality. Out of 40 respondents to the questionnaires, 36 representing 90 percent of the sample population answered no to the question “have you spent any money on you personal security (or for the protection of your property), whilst only 4 or 10 percent of the sample population answered yes. All four respondents said they had employed the services of private security men to protect their properties. Most of the respondents from the focus group discussion said they had not personally spent any money on their security. They were generally of the opinion that that is the duty of the state and the municipal authorities.

#### **4.4.2 Lives Lost**

The perennial violence also claims several lives. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of January 2008 it was reported that twelve people were killed in a single night of violence (peaceonline, 2008, January 03).<sup>39</sup> Respondents also claimed that lot of deaths are either not reported or are played down by the authorities to reduce the tensions. They however maintained that in every major violent out break, more than a hundred lives are lost.

#### **4.4.3 Property lost through arson, destruction etc**

Properties running into several millions of Ghana Cedis are lost annually through the violence. Arson, looting and gun battles are perpetuated during clashes between the feuding factions. These destroy the properties of many people from both factions. 29 respondents to the questionnaires, representing 72.5 percent of the sample population, claimed they have either personally lost property through the perennial violence or have relatives who have lost properties. In the wake of the violence, which took place at the close of 2007, it was reported that over 15shops and 159 houses were burnt. (Ghanaweb, 2008 January 07)<sup>40</sup> Public facilities are however not targeted in these clashes.

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<sup>39</sup> [http://www.peacefmonline.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=11375&Itemid=35](http://www.peacefmonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11375&Itemid=35)

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=137193>

#### **4.5.0 Other Effects of Insecurity in the BEM**

##### **4.5.1 Migration**

The general insecurity has a direct impact on the demography of the Municipality. To escape the perennial violence and its negative consequences, many people, especially the youth, are forced to relocate to relatively more peaceful parts of the country. Most of the respondents in the focus group discussions claimed that they have been forced to flee the Municipality at least once in the past because of violent clashes. Some held that they had returned to the Municipality only recently, because of the long absence of any violent clash. (The last clashes before this fieldtrip were in 2000/2001). Fresh clashes at the end of 2007 and early 2008 will probably have forced most of these people to flee once more. Most respondents also claimed that they know of several people who have fled the perennial violence to settle permanently in nearby towns and in the big cities of Accra and Kumasi.

##### **4.5.2 Relocation of Economic Activities**

It also became evident from the fieldwork that not only do people relocate to other places, but they relocate their businesses and other economic ventures to more peaceful parts of Ghana as well. For instance two industries, Asontaba Bricks and Tidita Bricks, both brick factories that have been relocated to the regional capital, Bolgatanga (Marley, 2008). Most respondents also held that, the perennial violence have not only made it risky to do business in the Municipality, but also ensures that few people have money to spend. This significantly affects businesses in the Municipality as demand for goods and services go down, many businesses are left with little option but to relocate.

##### **4.5.3 Social Services**

The perennial violence in the Municipality has also affected healthcare delivery and education. The health effects of the violent clashes include deaths, injuries, ill health and psychological disorders among the residents of the Municipality. The situation places a lot of stress on the limited health infrastructure and personnel. Mr. Mark Abugri, an administrator at the Bawku Presbyterian Hospital, claimed that during the outbreak of violence, scores of people are rushed to the hospital with several degrees of injuries as

cutlass wounds, guns wounds and injuries from poisoned arrows. Most of these he claimed either die or are maimed.

The escalation of violence also limits access to health facilities. During such times, the disruption in the transportation network means that many people are not able to access health facilities when they need to do so. In addition, health workers are unable to go to work during such times for fear of exposing themselves to the violence. In the ongoing violence, it has been reported that most of the staff at the Bawku Presbyterian Hospital have deserted their post for safety (myjoyonline.com; 2008, May 05)<sup>41</sup>. Most health workers also refuse posting to the Municipality. Some of those already there frequently request for transfers to other places.

It also became evident from the fieldwork that the conflict negatively affects education in the Municipality as well. Mrs. Linda Asunda, a teacher of a local primary school asserted that anytime violence erupts schools are closed down because of the fear that the violence might spread there. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of February 2008 it was reported that the chieftaincy conflict in the Bawku Township had extended to the Bawku Secondary School forcing the school authorities to close it down (myjoyonline.com; 2008, February 18)<sup>42</sup>. Schools may remain closed for several months as the violence continues. A range of factors affects children's ability to continue their education. The most common of which are the shortage of family income due to the loss or disruption of their livelihood, insecurity for the children in the schools, out-migration or death of a sponsor, or children may be required to work in place of adults who have migrated out of the Municipality, or died to help support the family.

The conflict has also affected recruitment of teaching staff/teachers to BEM. Upon graduation from the Teachers College in the Municipality, most the new teachers often opt to be posted elsewhere because of the perennial violence. Similarly, most teachers from other areas refuse to take up posting to the Municipality. The explanation for this

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<sup>41</sup> <http://www.myjoyonline.com/health/200805/16237.asp>

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/200802/13573.asp>

reluctance to be stationed in BEM is that many teachers have become victims of the conflict. During the 2001 violence, a teacher who had rented an apartment in a house belonging to the then Member of Parliament for the area lost all his belongings when the house was burnt down. The teacher had to take a transfer out of the Municipality.

#### **4.5.4 Development of Infrastructural Facilities**

The development of infrastructural facilities in the Municipality has clearly been affected by the violent clashes. The ability of the government and the Municipal Assembly to provide infrastructural facilities has been affected by the violent conflict. The Co-ordinating Director was of the view that because of the high expenditures required to maintain security, the Assembly is unable to commit adequate resources to the provision of infrastructural facilities. It is also difficult to get central government to provide the resources needed for such facilities because it already spends a lot of resources on the security of the Municipality. A cursory look at such facilities as roads, clinics and schools in the Municipality shows that most of these facilities are badly worn out and need renovation and replacement.

#### **4.6.0 Summary**

The empirical data has shown that the chieftaincy conflict in the BEM, which sometimes results in violent clashes, has led to lawlessness and general insecurity. Crime rates and the proliferation of firearms are on the increase as a result of the conflict. These lead to the out migration of the most productive youth and the relocation of many businesses to other places. Agriculture, commerce, industry and other sectors of the Municipal economy are also adversely affected by the violent conflict. This reduction in businesses and other economic activities affects government and Municipal Assembly income generation and collection efforts. This is against the backdrop of increased expenditure required to maintain security in the Municipality.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Analysis of the Data: Double Causation in the Bawku Conflict**

#### **5.0 Introduction**


In this chapter, I use the empirical data to analyse the mutual impact of the chieftaincy conflict and development on each other in the BEM (Bawku East Municipality). The chapter is in three parts. Part one presents a model that illustrates the correlation between the cycles of violence, insecurity, and underdevelopment in the BEM. Part two gives a more detailed account of the effects of the conflict on the socio-economic development and household poverty of the BEM. Part three examines the flipside of the correlation, showing the impact of underdevelopment and household poverty on the conflict.

#### **5.1.0 Conflict-underdevelopment model**

As indicated in part I of chapter 2, there is a close relationship between peace and development on the one hand, and conflict and insecurity on the other hand. Underlying the two relationships is what Collier et al (2003:1) describe as a “double causation [which] gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles”. This means that a condition of peace and security encourages investment in productive ventures that gives employment and enhanced livelihood to individuals as well as communities. Thus peace and security stimulate socio-economic development. Conversely conflict begets insecurity, discourages investment and production, and leads to underdevelopment and poverty. Current research (Collier et al., 2003; Kuzuhide K, 2006, Cramer, 2006) on conflict and development shows that violent conflicts and underdevelopment mutually affect and reinforce one another. For instance, Collier et al. (2003; 1) have concluded that violent conflict “retards development, but conversely, development retards war [conflict]”. In other words, violent conflict has an impact on the national, local as well as domestic economies of a conflict area. Justino puts it more succinctly: “violent conflict will affect the levels of poverty in any given economy, as well as the dynamics of poverty along the lifetime of the conflict and in post-conflict context (2007: 6)”. Conversely, retarded

economic development can lead either to violent conflicts or to the escalation of existing conflicts. How do these observations relate to the conflict in BEM?

The model below, which is derived from the empirical data, illustrates the vicious cycle produced by the conflict in the BEM.



**Model 1: Conflict-underdevelopment cycle**

As the model illustrates, the protracted chieftaincy and inter-ethnic conflict creates insecurity, discourages investment, encourages capital flight and disrupts productivity. In sum, it undermines the long-term planning for sustainable development as well as increases poverty in Bawku. Consequently, the situation breeds agitations and frustrations among the peoples. Above all, these frustrations drive individuals and interest groups to ethnic-based solidarities in a bid to defend what they consider to be their ‘birthrights’. This revives ethnic rivalry and deepens ethnic consciousness among the different groups, each of which recruits their youth to perpetrate the violence. A vicious cycle of violence has emerged over time because other extraneous forces (political support for one group and/or role of migrated financiers) complicate the issues.

### **5.2.0 Impact of violent conflicts on household economies**

The following analysis of the data will illustrate that the violent conflict affects household poverty in BEM in four ways: through economic effect, through human capital effect, through population displacement effect and income mobilization effects.

#### **5.2.1 Economic Effects**

As sections 4.3.0 to 4.3.4 of the empirical data chapter depicts, the chieftaincy conflict affects all the main sectors of the municipal economy negatively. Agricultural production is adversely affected because of the dispute over farmlands, disruption of transportation networks, and the inability of most farmers to go to their farms. These disruptions of agricultural production have far reaching consequences for household economies in the Municipality because the sector accounts for about 62% of total employment.<sup>43</sup>

Also, trading which is the second most vital component of the municipal economy has been negatively affected. The insecurity associated with the perennial violence has made the Municipality unattractive to business people who otherwise may have liked to establish businesses there. Furthermore many businesses that were operating in the Municipality have relocated to relatively more peaceful parts of the country. The businesses that have remained in the conflict zone are one-man businesses that deal in cross-border trading that yields minimal profit, and are unable to attract any significant investment for expansion. These small-scale commercial ventures therefore lack the capacity to provide employment for a vast majority of the youth of the Municipality. This means that the Municipality has been unable to take advantage of its nodal location to attract businesses, and thus provide employment for its citizenry.

Another aspect of the municipal economy that is affected by the conflict is investments in industry. As noted earlier (see page 45) many industrial units have relocated to more peaceful areas. For instance, the owners of the Asontaba Bricks and Tidita Bricks have relocated their companies to the regional capital, Bolgatanga. Generally, the small-scale

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<sup>43</sup> Bawku Municipal Medium Term Development Plan 2006-2009



industries that have not relocated are unable to attract investments for expansion, because of the insecurity. Financial institutions are reluctant to give out loans to entrepreneurs in the BEM due to the huge risks involved. As a result industries in the Municipality have not been able to expand to give employment to more people. Thus, generally, the potential vast market that the free movement of goods and people across the border promises has not been able to attract industries that can provide employment to the people as well as enhance the economy of the Municipality.

### **5.2.2 Loss of Assets**

The perennial violence in BEM breeds arson, lootings, gun battles, and robberies. The violence targets assets of both factions indiscriminately. For instance in the wake of the violence which took place at the close of 2007, it was reported that 159 houses<sup>44</sup> and 15 shops<sup>45</sup> belonging to individuals on both factions were burnt down. In fact, properties amounting to several millions of Ghana cedis (US dollars) are lost annually through the violence in Bawku. In a similar vein Justino's has found that "violent conflicts result in the destruction of houses, land, labour, utensils, cattle and livestock" (2007; 7).

Though public facilities have not been targeted for destruction during the violence, people temporarily lose the use of such facilities. Thus whenever violence erupts in BEM people are unable to access such facilities as schools, hospitals, clinics, libraries, and entertainment centres, for fear of exposing themselves to danger. Generally, these lose of assets as well as the inability to use public facilities affects the quality of life of households in the Municipality.

### **5.2.3 Disruption or loss of Livelihoods**

The perennial violence affects the livelihoods of the people of the Municipality in several ways. First it affects the livelihoods of farmers in the sense that when violence breaks out most farmers are unable to visit their farms to harvest their crops. Thus most of their perishable crops go rotten. Moreover, access to markets is a major problem during such

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<sup>44</sup> <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=137193>

<sup>45</sup> [http://www.peacefmonline.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=11375&Itemid=35](http://www.peacefmonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11375&Itemid=35)

violent periods. Farmers who are able to harvest their crops are faced with the problem of getting their produce to the markets because the transportation network is also disrupted. Above all the ubiquitous disputes over farmlands have cost many people their livelihoods. For instance Mamprusi farmers whose farmlands are located in the Kusasi-dominated Zabzugu farming district have to give up farming altogether because of the outstanding dispute over those farmlands. Generally, the land dispute discourages displaced farmers who wish to return to subsistence farming from doing so.

Also, people from both factions have their stores and wares destroyed through arson and looting by rioting youth. These indiscriminate attacks on businesses have left many business people indebted. These disruptions and loss of livelihoods have dire implication for poverty in the Municipality: the poor are pushed to the fringes of survival and many more people who were hitherto not poor, have been pushed into poverty.

Also, the insecurity and general lawlessness associated with the outbreak of violence in the Municipality has forced many people to seek refuge in other parts of the country. Most of the *refugees* leave behind their sources of livelihood, and therefore would have to start setting up new businesses when they arrive at their new destination. It should be noted at this point that, due to time and financial constraints, this research was unable to assess the effects of the relocation on the livelihoods of the *refugees*. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that having to start life all over again could have a negative effect on the livelihoods of such people.

#### **5.2.4 Human Capital Effects**

Levels of education and health status are important determinants of the availability of human capital in any one place to contribute to productive activity. The violent conflict in the BEM negatively affects both education and health. It has not only disrupted education but has also inhibited the efforts of government and other institutions to bridge the education gap between the Municipality and other parts of the country. In the BEM, children's ability to continue their education is often affected by a range of factors. The most common are the shortage of family income due to the loss or disruption of their

livelihood, insecurity for the children in the schools, out-migration or death of a sponsor. Sometimes children may also be required to work to boost household earnings. In addition, the violent conflict has also affected recruitment of teachers in the Municipality. Above all, the School calendar is also frequently affected by the conflict. Anytime violence erupts schools have to be closed down because of the fear that the violence might spread to the schools. Schools remain closed for the duration of the violence, which can run into several months.

The negative effects of the conflict on education in turn reflects the high level of household poverty in the BEM because it prevents the people from acquiring the necessary education which, as Justino puts it, “is one of the most important mechanisms shown to aid households out of poverty traps” (2007; 11).

Healthcare delivery is also negatively affected by the chieftaincy conflict. The violence often leads to deaths, injuries, ill health and psychological disorders among the residents in the Municipality. It also limits access to health facilities because the violent clashes disrupt transportation network and many patients are unable to access health facilities at the appropriate time. In addition, health workers refuse posting to the Municipality, and those who are already there request to be transferred to more peaceful places.

While the negative effective of the conflict on education and health affects the quality of labour in the Municipality, the quantity of labour is also affected through the direct loss of lives. The perennial violence leads the loss of several lives. While some are killed directly in the violence, some sustain injuries, or are afflicted by diseases, illnesses or poverty and may die after the violence subsides. This latter group is often not included in the official figures of deaths caused by the violence. However it is important to include ‘collateral’ mortalities in the statistics as effects of the violence. This unnecessary loss of lives also affects the availability of labour in the Municipality.

### **5.2.5 Population Displacement Effects**

The violent conflict in the BEM also leads to out migration and/or displacement of large numbers of individuals and their families. People are forced to become *refugees* in other places because of the general insecurity in the Municipality. The *refugees* are effectively cut-off from their livelihoods. In one research Justino found that conflicts cut off vast numbers of people from economic opportunities and lead to a vicious cycle of displacement and poverty (2007; 13).

The youth are the most visible perpetrators of the violence as well as the main victims of such violence. Most of them who have become frustrated by the constant threat to their lives and their livelihoods have relocated to other municipalities. This out migration of the youth of the Municipality has affected the age structure of the population. The population is increasingly dominated by the aged and other dependents, affecting the dependency ratio. This increasingly 'dependent population' adversely affects productivity. The out-migration and displacement of people also affects the human resource base and the other parameters of development in the Municipality.

The settlement of citizens of the Municipality in other places has become an important component in the conflict. Many respondents attested to the fact that some of these refugees have actively been involved in financing and refuelling the conflict. People living outside the Municipality may have less interest in peace because they do not have to suffer any of the awful consequences of renewed conflict. As Collier (2000; 14) notes, non-resident financiers of conflicts "sometimes harbour romanticized attachment to the group of origin and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging."

### **5.2.6 Revenue Mobilization Effects**

The ability of the Municipal Assembly to raise revenues has also been affected by the conflict, while spending on security increases its expenditures. The general indiscipline and lawlessness, which have become associated with the chieftaincy conflict, hamper the Municipality's income generation efforts. Many people fail to live up to their tax obligations, but the Municipal Authorities are not able to use the security apparatus to

enforce their by-laws because of the fear that such use of force might result in violent clashes. Coupled with the above is the fact that the budgetary allocation to manage the conflict is astronomical. Both the government and the Municipal Assembly have to spend a significant portion of their budget to maintain security in the Municipality. This affects their ability to provide other essential public utilities.

### **5.3.0 The Effect of Household Poverty on the Conflict**

According to the theory of grievance (see chapter two), the lack of economic opportunities in the form of employment, and inequality are some of the determinates of violence. The willingness of young people to join in violence might be influenced by their other income-earning opportunities. Also people are more likely to resort to violence if they think that their lack of opportunities is a result of a few people monopolizing the bulk of the resources. Though both of these determinates are prevalent in the BEM, none of the respondent attributed the conflict directly to them. This is not surprising because Collier (2000; 2) findings also show that people would normally refer to only objective grievances (such as historical injustices and government interferences) as the main causes of a conflict in which they are engaged in, because “it is good for public relations”. If Collier assertion is anything to go by then it is understandable why respondents in BEM, who have a stake in the conflict, failed to cite any of these.

### **5.3.1 Social and Economic Discontent**

The impact of household poverty and inequality on the chieftaincy conflict can be unravelled by examining such motives as social discontent and the search for new opportunities. The BEM has a high rate of unemployment. Agriculture, which is the highest employer, has been adversely affected by irregular rainfall patterns and dwindling soil fertility. This means that a majority of the people in the Municipality are faced with difficult socio-economic conditions. Commerce and industry, the other major sectors of the municipal economy, also perform poorly, employing only few people. The majority of the people are therefore left discontent with their social and economic lot. The inability of the government, municipal and local authorities to solve this discontent leave the majority of the people frustrated and susceptible to aggressive behaviour. For, as Tedd

Gurr observes, “if frustrations are sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain, to occur” (1970; 37)<sup>46</sup>.

### **5.3.2 The Search for New Opportunities**

The chieftaincy conflict in the BEM can be seen as a struggle by each faction to upset the socio-political and economic order established under colonial rule, and perpetuated by the postcolonial state, and to replace it with a new order that offers better opportunities for membership of the individual groups. The opportunities that existed before the onset of the conflict in the 1950s failed to meet the basic aspirations of the majority Kusasi. The Kusasi struggle appears therefore to have been a rejection of the minority Mamprusi monopoly over key offices as well as control over commerce in the area. This explains why the Kusasi exploited PNDC Law 75 (that restored the chieftaincy to the Kusasi) to appropriate both political power and economic opportunity: seizing lands cultivated by the Mamprusi farmers, and by dislodging Mamprusi and other minority traders from market stalls in the Bawku central market (Lund, 2003; 597-598).

For the Kusasi, therefore, violence became a useful tool in their search for new and better opportunities. They continued to employ the use of violence to protect their newly won opportunities as well as to win further opportunities that still remain in the hands of the Mamprusi and other minority groups. On their part, the Mamprusi resorted to (peaceful and violent) methods to regain political and economic predominance. After political and judicial processes failed to restore the chieftaincy position to them, they resorted to violence.

### **5.4.0 Application of the ‘Greed and Grievance’ theory to the Bawku Case**

Following the propositions of the ‘Greed and Grievance theory’, the feuding factions in the Bawku conflict are to be seen as rational economic players who are striving for economic rewards that are attached to the occupancy of the chieftaincy institution. With

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46 Tedd Gurr provides a process from discontent to violence: “primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent; second the politicization of the discontent, and finally the actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivations in collective violence”(Gurr, 1970; 13).

the advent of political modernization under British colonial rule, the office of the ‘Tendaana’ (custodian of the land) was abolished. The custodianship of the land was now given to the appointed chief, whose position had hitherto been only a political one. In addition, the British colonizers delegated localized judiciary powers to the chieftaincy office. This made the occupant of the ‘skin’ (symbol of chiefly office) very powerful. The appointed chief was therefore well positioned to influence local development pattern. The institution of chieftaincy therefore became coveted and an object of contention to be competed for and controlled between Kusasi and the Mamprusi. That explains why “the acephalous Kusasi society would frame their plight in terms of a chieftaincy structure, instead of going against chiefs in general” (Lund, 2003; 594).

The lack of economic opportunities in the form of employment is one of the main factors in Collier and Hoeffler’s later modification, the ‘greed and grievance theory’ (see chapter two, page 18). The lack of employment opportunities in the BEM can also be said to have exacerbated the conflict. Despite the high level of cross border trade, the level of unemployment is very high in the Municipality especially among the youth (Bawku Municipal Medium Term Development Plan 2006-2009). This lack of economic opportunities has largely made the youth of the area from both factions disillusioned, and they have often sought to ensure that traditional governance in the Municipality is controlled by their kin in the hope that when economic opportunities come they would be in a better position to access them. The result of this appeal to group solidarities is that the youth of both factions in the conflict are easily recruited by interest groups and financiers who have an interest in the continuation of the conflict. This explains why it is the youth who are most visible on the frontlines of the cycle of violent confrontations.

#### **5.5.0 Summary**

This chapter has examined the mutual impact of the chieftaincy conflict and socio-economic development in the BEM. These have been discussed in three parts. The first part presented a model that illustrates the correlation between the cycles of violence, insecurity and underdevelopment. The second part looked at the effects of the conflict on the socio-economic development and household poverty of the BEM. The last part

considered the impact of underdevelopment and household poverty on the conflict. It has become clear from the analysis that the chieftaincy conflict breeds violence and insecurity which impacts negatively on investments in agricultural production, commerce and industry in the Municipality. Many people also have their assets destroyed and their livelihoods disrupted by the perennial violence. It has also become evident that the chieftaincy conflict has adversely affected health care delivery and education in the Municipality. The above negative effects of the conflict have ensured that many more people are pushed into poverty. The analysis has also shown that the lack of development and household poverty in the Municipality are important consideration in the chieftaincy conflict. The lack of development results in social and economic discontent and drive individuals and interest groups to ethnic-based solidarities in a bid to compete for limited resources. This revives ethnic rivalry and deepens ethnic consciousness among the different groups. A vicious cycle of violence emerges over time as the different groups see one another as competition and other extraneous forces as political support and the role of non-resident financiers are brought to play. It is important to note at this stage that though underdevelopment and household poverty do not always lead to conflict, they can become major components in a conflict that might have been introduced by other factors, fuelling and refuelling the conflict, as the Bawku case shows.





## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **Research Findings and Recommendations towards Resolution/Management of the Conflict**

#### **6.0 Introduction**

This study of the Bawku chieftaincy conflict has two main aims: first, to investigate the effects of the perennial violence on the socio-economic development of the Municipality and, second, to make recommendations on how the conflict can either be resolved peacefully or managed and contained. The data has been analyzed to ascertain the effects of the cycle of violence. An underlying assumption in the thesis is that the recurrent violence has negatively affected the socio-economic development of the Municipality. This hypothesis has been tested by examining the impact of the violent conflict on household poverty, commerce, agriculture, industry, health, education and governance. In this concluding chapter the research findings are summarized and recommendations towards the resolution of the conflict are made.

#### **6.1 Summary of Research Findings**

The findings, which are presented below, meet the aims and objectives of the research.

(1) The finding with respect to the general effects of the chieftaincy conflict in BEM are that (a) all aspects of individual and communal livelihoods in the Municipality have been negatively affected; (b) the conflict has led to the militarization of the youth, indiscipline, political chaos and insecurity; (c) the violence and insecurity has in turn retarded the socio-economic development of the Municipality.

(2) With regard to the municipal economy the research found that (a) production in agriculture, commerce and industry have been adversely affected; (b) disputes over farmlands, disruption in transportation networks, and the inability of many farmers to cultivate their farms during periods of violence outbreaks has negatively affected agricultural production; (c) the general insecurity has made the Municipality unattractive to business people. Thus many businesses have relocated to relatively peaceful parts of the country; (d) the violence discourages heavy investment in all three economic sectors;

(e) the economic sector is generally dominated by small-scale family ventures that employ only few people, leading to high unemployment rates (16.25% of respondents are unemployed) in the Municipality; (f) the poverty level has worsened.

(3) The violent conflict has led to the loss of assets, valued at several millions of Ghana cedis. The destruction of assets has (a) affected people on both sides indiscriminately through arson, lootings, and gun battles (b) aggravated household poverty in the Municipality through the loss of livelihoods and displacement of many people; (c) disrupted the educational and health sectors as resource persons (teachers and health workers) turn down postings to the Municipality. Since education and health are important determinants of poverty, this disruption contributes to the entrenchment of poverty in the Municipality.

(4) The resultant insecurity diverts the attention of government and the Municipal Assembly from tackling pressing developmental issues relating to the restoration of peace and order. Meagre state resources are spent to maintain peace and order, and to give immediate social relief to victims of the perennial violence.

(5) The research also found that the endemic household poverty and inequality in the Municipality has on its part affected the dynamics of the chieftaincy conflict. (a) The lack of opportunities has engendered social and economic discontent among the people. (b) Core litigants and interest groups appeal to ethnic solidarities to mobilize followings among their people to make claims for new opportunities. (c) The Kusasi seek to apply violence to upset the Mamprusi dominance in local politics and economy; and the Mamprusi are also using violence to reestablish their former dominance.

### **6.2.0 Recommendations**

How can the negative effects of the conflict in the BEM be resolved peacefully or be managed in a prudent manner to mitigate its effects? The recommendations made in this section are based on my research findings as well as on suggestions made by some of the

respondents. Before advancing my recommendations, however, I will like to describe the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management.

### **6.2.1 Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management**

Though related, there is a clear theoretical and institutional distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management regimes. Conflict resolution refers to attempts by outsiders to intervene in and resolve a dispute or a conflict. Conflict resolution normally involves listening to and providing opportunities that meet the needs and interest of the feuding factions in a conflict, such that each faction in the conflict becomes satisfied with the outcome. Conflict management refers to the various means by which individuals and societies are able to cope with conflicts without interventions from external forces. In conflict management individuals and groups in conflict neither give up their positions on the conflict nor do they compromise on them. They just find mechanisms through which they can tolerate each other within the parameters of the conflict.

### **6.2.2 Recommendations from Respondents**

Respondents gave varied and divergent views on how the conflict can be managed or resolved successfully. Their recommendations are: (a) the need for effective dialogue by the various stakeholders; (b) the equal distribution of farmlands and other resources; (c) the rightful ‘owners’ should be allowed to occupy the ‘Skin’; (d) political parties should stop interfering in the chieftaincy conflict; (e) the Regional House of Chiefs or the National House of Chiefs are the appropriate authorities to resolve the conflict; and (f) the need for education and understanding. Some pessimists among the respondents argue that the conflict cannot be resolved and recommended that the two sides should be allowed to fight until one faction emerges victorious and asserts dominance.

### **6.2.3 Recommendations based on the Findings**

(1) The following recommendation should enable the feuding factions to contain the conflict so that they can go about their normal political and socio-economic daily routines without the danger of further violent outbreaks: (a) a fair distribution of farmlands and other resources; (b) expanding access to education for all groups ;(c) the need for both

factions to the conflict to display tolerance and understanding; (d) the need to enter into effective dialogue (e) both sides must make compromises and concessions, one way of achieving this will be to consider power sharing.

(2) To resolve this conflict there will be the need for government, political parties, the Municipal Assembly and all stakeholders to: (a) show a high sense of morality and refrain from exploiting ethnic sentiments for electoral favours (b) empower the Regional House of Chiefs or the National House of Chiefs to lead mediations on resolving the conflict (c) reduce the role and power of the chief, so that calculated risk of perpetuating chieftaincy violence will become greater than their 'pay-off'.

### **6.3.0 Postscript**

Some concluding observations should to be made about conflicts in Ghana. The first is that Ghana's violent conflicts, unlike the conflicts in neighboring countries, are little known outside the country because they are not of the kinds that attract the gaze of the international media. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous chieftaincy conflicts have reduced the general peaceful outlook of the entire country as the EIU Global Peace Index report indicates.

The second observation is that a specific conflict can either have different motivations or can be exploited for different purposes. Leaders can draw ethnic sentiments into political conflicts, just as social grievances can be colored with political interpretations. Thus, as my research shows, the Bawku Chieftaincy conflict (like other conflicts everywhere) is caused by a combination of several dynamics and local contestations. And, the BEM conflict degenerates into perennial outbreaks of violence when fuelled by a complex set of political, social and economic factors.

The third observation is that the BEM conflict has affected livelihoods negatively. It has led to loss of life and property as well as to a displacement of persons. Successive governments have allocated more resources (fiscal and personnel) to maintain security. This increase in government spending has reduced the resources available for the

improvement of conditions of life of the people in general. This has resulted in mass poverty; unemployment and inequalities of income and of opportunity

Finally, in seeking to resolve the conflict therefore, a combination of several factors will equally be needed. It is my belief that the implementation of the recommendations will play a crucial role in managing the conflict and, eventually, lead to its resolution permanently.

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