TOWARDS A LINGUISTICS OF HISTORY IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN SPAIN: THE IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HISTORIANS' LINGUISTIC VIEWS AND PRACTICES

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the way in which major Medieval and Early Modern Spanish historiographers' assumptions about language determined their ways of recounting the past. Departing from the idea that chosen principles in the philosophy of language influenced central decisions regarding the philosophy of history since Antiquity, I propose that the adoption of a particular way of understanding meaning (surrogational) was crucial to facilitating and maintaining almost unchallenged for centuries, the convenient possibility of fully and truthfully reporting what "really" happened. Such linguistic assumptions helped Power to determine what History was (or not), who was an historian or who was a "good" one, and to provide moral discourse in History with a sound foundation. These very possibilities articulated historiographical thought and praxis among influential Spanish historians from Lucas de Tuy to Juan de Mariana during the crucial period when Spain evolved from being composed of different kingdoms to a global empire[1].

KEY WORDS

Language, Philosophy of History, Historians, Meaning, Power.

CAPITALIA VERBA

Lingua, Historiae Philosophia, Historici, Significatus, Potestas.

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Haec Ysidorus dicit...

Closely related to philosophical convictions about the way meaning is produced, Roy Harris' statement on how insufficiently modern linguistics has been linked to history despite their deep-rooted connections may be applied to the study of Medieval and Early Modern Spanish historiography[2]. From a history of the concepts or Begriffsgeschichte´s point of view, Terence Ball reverses the situation but he also emphasises the role of language philosophers and linguists in ignoring or playing down the fact that recorded history is the story of almost continuous linguistic conceptual change: "This neglect seems at first sight surprising, considering that twentieth-century philosophy supposedly took a linguistic turn"[3].

In the Spanish context, Emilio Mitre's study of the state of the art in Medieval historiography concentrates on institutional changes, editions, new topics —criminality, everyday life, women, death—, and tendencies —regionalization, and up to date trends, but it does not even mention how the "linguistic turn" has affected the reflection on historical discourse from the mid-sixties[4]. Certainly, George Martin already tried to bring a theoretical semiotic perspective into Medieval historiography aimed at describing historical discourse as a sign[5]. He coined the term "referential hiatus" to refer to the human interval between words and things whereas God arranged things to signify spiritual truth. Based on the semantic model of the Holy Scriptures, which entrusted History with the category of literal, phenomenological and empirical truth, the Medieval historian's task was mainly mimetic:

> lograr la máxima transparencia entre el símbolo universal que era su precepto y el signo lingüístico con que estaba condenado a transcribirlo; ser lo menos posible autor, para no competir con el soberano Autor que inscribe su mensaje en las cosas; asegurar, desde su propio lenguaje, el tránsito al orden espiritual[6].

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1. Used abbreviation: BNE, Biblioteca Nacional de España.

2. "It must be admitted at the outset of this inquiry that few historians show any inclination to think that they have anything to learn from linguistics at all" (Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics of History*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004: 9).

3. Ball, Terence. "Conceptual History and the History of Political Thought", *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*, Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, eds. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998: 76.

4. Mitre, Emilio. "La Historiografía sobre la Edad Media", *Historia de la historiografía española*, Ignacio Gallego, ed. Madrid: Encuentros, 2004: 71-122.

5. Martin, Georges. "El hiato referencial. Una semiótica fundamental de la significación histórica en la Edad Media", *Teoría semiótica. Lenguajes y textos hispánicos (actas del congreso internacional sobre semiótica e hispanismo)*, Miguel A. Garrido, coord. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1986: I, 175-185.

6. To get the high transparency between the universal symbol that was his precept and the linguistic sign that he was doomed to transcribe; to be as little as possible author, not to compete with the sovereign Author who posts his message in things; to secure from their own language, the transit to the spiritual order (Martin, Georges. "El hiato referencial. Una semiótica fundamental...": 182).

Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized that most of the major subsequent contributions, such as those of Cruz Montero, Juan Carlos Conde or Corinne Mencé-Caster, which deal with language and history, going beyond positivist and descriptive views, benefit from the textual consequences of the "linguistic turn" but operate exclusively on a discursive or narratological level[7].

Cruz Montero adopts ideas from twentieth-century post-structuralists and narratologists and traces historically the debate to those authors of the past who treated history according to the principles of rhetoric. However, she only poses the problem in relation to the controversial opposition between literary and historical discourse and even admits that this polemic "is still open at the present"[8]. More relevant to us, for its theoretical insights and the link with ideology, is Juan Carlos Conde's excellent analysis of universal historiography under narratological views by Barthes, Genette and Ricoeur. The study, nevertheless, limits itself to a narrative dimension by presuming the Barthesian identification between language and discourse[9]. Following closely Genette, Corinne Mencé-Caster also proposes that Alfonsine historical writing and the principles ruling its intellectual organization or *mode de pensée* are essentially *transtextuelle* (linguistic). Still, though she assumes rhetoric to be *moins la dimension ornementale du discours que l'armature scripturale que ces procédés lui offraient pour "construire" son discours et lui conférer son identité stylistique et grammaticale* she considers it (along with the analysis founded on the *elocutio*) an instructive point of departure but not a fundamental anchor[10].

Obviously, I do not challenge the self-evident *existence linguistique* of a historical text as an integral part of the discourse; however, I also believe that Barthes, Foucault, and other narratologists cannot be fully understood without Saussure's double rejection of meanings coming from an independently aprioristic reality and

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7. I understand "linguistic turn" in a post-Saussurean sense. An influential number of subsequent theorists and critics presumed that language is the constitutive agent of human consciousness and the social production of meaning, and that our apprehension of the world, both past and present, arrives only through the lens of linguistic perceptions (See: Spiegel, Gabrielle M. *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*. New York: Taylor & Francis, 2005: 2).

8. Montero, Cruz. *La Historia, creación literaria. El ejemplo del cuatrocientos*. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1994: 8. The formal affinities between historical and fictional (literary) narratives had been well explored previously by Paul Ricoeur in *Temps et récit*, vol. II. For his part, Leonardo Funes remarkably points out that even when the present-day approaches of dissolving the limits between historical and literary discourse could seem anachronistic, they are really "a restitution of the historical horizon of the medieval cultural system, given that in that epoch (and until the 18th century) history was still a branch of the arts" (Funes, Leonardo. "Elementos para una poética del relato histórico", *Poétique de chronique. L'écriture des textes historiographiques au Moyen Âge (Péninsule Ibérique et France)*, Amaia Arizaleta, ed. Toulouse: Framespa-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2008: 241).

9. Conde, Juan Carlos. "Para una teoría de la historiografía de ámbito universal en la Edad Media: notas sobre su caracterización como relato", *Teoría y práctica de la historiografía hispánica medieval*, Aengus Ward, ed. Birmingham: Birmingham University Press, 2000: 167-191.

10. Mencé-Caster, Corinne. "Poétique de l'écriture de l'Histoire d'Espagne d'Alphonse X. Derminant rhétorique et écriture hypertetxuelle", *Poétique de la chronique. L'écriture des textes historiographiques*...: 198-200.

of language as a neutral medium of communication[11]. The same can be said of other anti-essentialist approaches which respond to, question, or go beyond the linguistic turn or the "extremes" to which some post-structuralists had supposedly turned. For instance, conceptual historians such as Reinhart Koselleck, linguistic turn revisionists such as Gabrielle Spiegel, or integrationist linguists such as Roy Harris not only recognise their debt to Saussure but declare the importance of the production of meaning when dealing with the relation between language and history[12]. As a result, since different post-linguistic turn approaches to history have revisited the issue of how deeply traditional historical discourse is grounded in a rapport between *res* (things) and *verba* (words), I consider that there is good reason to reexamine, from a modern philosophy of language perspective, the linguistic beliefs on which some primary classic Spanish historians based their discursive accounts of the past as well as some consequences of such views.

Accordingly, this article seeks to highlight how main Medieval and Early modern Spanish historiographers' assumptions about meaning influenced their thoughts about their task —mainly expressed in prologues, prefaces, dedications—, and their practice of creating signification retrospectively from the *res gestae*. In addition, by reevaluating such texts from the perspective of modern approaches to the philosophy of language, we will better discern their rhetorical nature and many of the ideological implications.

Everything that I state will be observations of general tendencies rather than universal norms, and the epistemological paradigm in which I inscribe this group of historians is not limited to them. My goal is not either to single out historical mistakes by using current knowledge and methodology. For instance, if I call attention to Lucas de Tuy's statement that Aristotle was born in Spain, it is not to question its veracity or even to exhaust the ideological use of such an account. I do so first in order to emphasise that the decisions leading to consider such an assertion as a truth were eminently linguistic. Additionally, I attempt to initiate a discussion on the reasons why these aprioristic linguistic decisions were never treated as options but as incontestable and taken for granted facts far removed from any philosophical debate. I believe that by pointing out linguistic-based conflicts and ruptures in the discourse of the influential historians, who were essential to build the mainstream Spanish historiographical narrative, it will be easier to outline later the strategies of control behind some of their practices. My remarks are based on several premises. First, I accept as a starting point that basic options in the philosophy of history were grounded on basic options in the philosophy of language before Aristotle's celebrated definition of history[13]. In other words, mainstream historians in the

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11. "In the historical discourse of our civilization, the process of signification is always aimed at "filling out" the meaning of History. The historian is not so much a collector of facts as a collector and relater of signifiers" (Barthes, Roland. "The Discourse of History", *The Postmodern History Reader*, Keith Jenkins, ed. London: Routledge, 1997: 120-121).

12. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Social History and Begriffsgeschichte", *History of Concepts*...: 30-31; Spiegel, Gabrielle M. *Practicing History*...: 2-3; Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics*...: 123-133.

13. Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics*...: VII.

Spanish tradition initiated by Isidore (who followed Aristotle) did not embrace —even unconsciously— a philosophy of history and then a philosophy of language to complement it, but rather the other way around[14].

Along with this premise, I claim that these authors adopted or followed a way of understanding the creation of meaning, intertwined with ideology, which best fit their praxis, authority, and purposes. This philosophy of language, traditionally called "realistic" (although I will use Harris's term "surrogational"), views the meanings of words as standing for things in the external world or ideas in the mind independently from language[15]. Surrogational semantics, the hegemonic form *par excellence* since Plato in the West, does not necessarily exclude other views, —for instance, the arbitrary way of relating words and things may also be read in Isidore— but it relegates them to a lower level or deviously neutralises their consequences. Thus, language is seen as a natural category of representing things, which makes it very suited to serve the crucial intention of typical history-writing in Medieval and Early Modern Spain: to present the story of what happened *historia rerum gestarum* as what actually happened *res gestae*; or to put it in philosophical terms, to render constructed meaning as truth[16].

The procedure can be already traced to the *Liber regum* (12th century), considered the first chronicle in a peninsular romance language (Aragonese). As Mencé-Caster argues, the anonymous author put into use syntactic and discursive strategies to create continuity, discontinuity or causality (i.e., between the Visigothic and the Hispanic kingdoms), and eventually to display contemporary events as naturally given. Yet, these writing traits rest on a universe of believes that *est lui-même tributaire des univers qui lui préexistent et qu'il prétend supplanter, en donnant au vraisemblable (une version possible de l'histoire) la figure du vrai (la seule version possible)"*[17].

Presenting an instrumental and conventional code of communication as entirely referential and realistic became an easy way of talking about absent and past acts without questioning or making them look uncertain or ambiguous. Furthermore,

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14. This adds a linguistic implication to statements that, in the past, attempted to offer a philosophical approach to the problem, such as: "The substantive quality of the fact in itself, the adjective qualification that determines its historicity, are themes whose conception falls within the eternal problematicity of the philosophic" (See: Benito, Eloy. "La historiografía en la Alta Edad Media española: ideología y estructura". *Cuadernos de Historia de España*, 17 (1952): 76).

15. Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics*...: 3-4. This linguist uses the more complete denomination "surrogational" because this view of meaning treats words as surrogates for something else: things (reocentric semantics), or ideas (psychocentric semantics), making it possible to talk of things in their absence (Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics*...: 4-5, 69). Surrogationism attributes a primarily referential function to language, in the sense of being based on referential values rather than differential values among signs or contextual circumstances. Language is mainly a mirror, a surrogate of reality; it comes after reality which pictures and stands for, but does not create or constitute.

16. "Whether historians achieved true explanation by such a methodology is a matter of philosophic debate, but normal historians believed that they established a pattern that is more than mere contiguity or contingency" (Berkhofer, Robert. "The Challenge of Poetics to (Normal) Historical Practice", *The Postmodern History Reader*, Keith Jenkins, ed. London: Routledge, 1997: 143).

17. Mencé-Caster, Corinne. "Rhétorique et idéologie dans le Liber regum". *e-Spania*. 9 June 2010. Université Paris-Sorbonne. 17 May 2013 < http://e-spania.revues.org/19472>.

this view of meaning led to the ultimate ideological sophistication of justifying the actual existence of metaphysical realities such as God, Virtue, Good, and Evil as historical agents. As a result, I maintain that the surrogational conception of language, along with the world-views encapsulated in it, constitutes one of the key devices enabling much of the ideological support that historical discourse performed for entities related to Power in Medieval and Early Modern Spain[18]. Leaving aside the most concrete services such as the legitimization of dynasties (e.g., the Trastamaras) kingdoms (e.g., Castille versus Leon or other European kingdoms), political systems (e.g., the modern state), or expansionism (e.g., the *reintegratio Hispaniae*, *Tingitania*), Surrogationism is also fundamental in two primary ideological operations that require substantializing language to stand for abstractions[19]. First, this view of meaning helped maintain social and political stability by preserving (e.g., through providentialism) the "metaphysical optimism" which allowed individuals to feel transcendentally safe within the Creator's design[20]. Second, by means of what David Quint has defined as "narratives of power", rulers were able to defend themselves from their critics, to enhance their image and to implement their will[21].

In Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Aristotle's *De interpretatione* provided the most influential theory on how language works and how meaning is produced. This treatise adopted a more refined surrogational pattern than Plato's. According to Aristotle's theory, Forms do not exist separately in "another place", but the human mind stores the impressions of things, and these are identical for everyone. Words stand for ideas in the mind instead of representing things in the external World, and although the relation between sounds and impressions is arbitrary (*ad placitum*), it is natural (*naturaliter*) between impressions and things[22]. This is the semantic view behind the celebrated and overtly linguistic distinction between poetic and historical statements in the *Poetics*: the historian's words mirror particular past events as they actually were, while the poet's words reflect universal events as they could be or should have been[23].

A similar connection between language and history can be found in writings of the patriarch of Spanish historiography, Isidore of Seville. For Isidore, a Christian, language was a divine creation. His authoritative and renowned *Etymologies*

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18. The ideological purposes behind essentialising language are better understood when discourse deals with "the conditions under which the world presents itself as real, about the way institutions and historical practices become regimes of truth and of possibility itself" (Spiegel, Gabrielle M. *Practicing History...*: 11).

19. The *Begriffsgeschichte* also relates ideological control to linguistic abstraction through the concept of "Ideologisierbarkeit", explained by "the increasing susceptibility of concepts to abstraction from their concrete social and historical referent" (See: Hampsher-Monk, Iain. "A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History. An Introduction", *History of Concepts...*: 2).

20. See: Benito, Eloy. "La historiografía en la Alta Edad Media...": 61.

21. See: Kagan, Richard L. *Clio and the Crown*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009: 6.

22. Aristóteles. *Tratados de lógica (Órganon)*, ed. Miguel Candel. Madrid: Gredos, 1988: II, 35-36.

23. Aristóteles. *Poética*, ed. Valentín García. Madrid: Gredos, 1974: 1451a, 21-38. As Roy Harris points out: "It is not that one of them pays attention to the truth while the other ignores it, but that the poet is concerned with a different level of truth from the historian" (Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics...*: 49).

assumes that words have a "force" (*vis*) which can be grasped through etymological interpretation, so "for when you have seen whence a word has originated you understand the thing more quickly"[24].

Such was the main purpose of his encyclopedic work, namely, to show where words come from in order to understand their "force", and eventually to attain knowledge of the things themselves and of God: "Etymology may power Isidore the search engine, but his motivation is to (know and show how to) implant and harvest Truth from Words"[25]. In line with the views of our article, John Henderson also points out the ideological goals of Isidore´s "powerbook": "Isidore´s lexicographical, indexical, sign-fixated world nevertheless serves a specific Iberian catholicizing politics within a durable Mediterranean cultural habitus"[26]. In any case, in exchange for a linguistic universalism in which encyclopedic definitions remained valid and comprehensive for all of Christendom, he needed to consider words as cosmetic containers of timeless meanings and Surrogationism allowed him to do just that.

As for History, Isidore endorsed the Christian, temporal, and *auctoritas*-based historiographical model articulated by Eusebius in which History becomes the expression of God's will[27]. Nevertheless, he makes the distinction among *historia*, *argumentum* and *fabula* under the above linguistic suppositions so that, when he writes history, he conceives his duty as truthfully connecting words and things by basing his conclusions on authoritative primary sources of information: "A history (*historia*) is a narration of deeds accomplished; through which what occurred in the past is sorted out [...] And in history, "plausible narration" (*argumentum*) and fable differ from each other. Histories are true deeds that have happened"[28]. In fact, Isidore opens his *History of the Goths* by relating "with truth" the word "Goths" to "protected" (*tecti*) based on the fact that "any nation that has harassed Roman power so much [...] whose times we must briefly set forth in succession, and, drawing our information from the chronicles, 'we must relate their names and deeds'"[29]. Finally, following Aristotle, Isidore also binds History to the natural order (*ordo naturalis*). In

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24. Isidorus Hispalensis. *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, eds. Stephen A. Barney, William Lewis, Jennifer Beach, Olivier Berghoff. Cambridge (UK)-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006: I, 29. In his study, Martin also resorts to the Isidorian (and Ciceronian) traditions, whose terms (*historia* and *fabula*) were glossed during the Middle Ages by emphasising truth in the former: "The firmness and convergence of the definitions, the categorical nature of the distinctions, could well hide from us the complex imaginary construction they are based on, and that, under the term of history, organises the relation of three notions: language, things and truth" (Martin, Georges. "El hiato referencial. Una semiótica fundamental...": 176).

25. Henderson, John. *The Medieval World of Isidore of Seville. Truth from Words*. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2007: 210.

26. This scholar is referring specifically to the construction of the Visigothic era as the continuation of the late Roman imperial rule with a political purpose (Henderson, John. *The Medieval World of Isidore of Seville...*: 7).

27. See: Conde, Juan Carlos. "Para una teoría de la historiografía de ámbito universal en la Edad Media...": 180-181.

28. Isidorus Hispalensis. *The Etymologies...*: I, 41, 44.

29. Isidorus Hispalensis. *History of the Kings of the Goths, Vandals, and Suevi*, eds. Guido Donini, Gordon B. Ford. Leiden: Evert Jan Brill, 1966: 3.

both cases, the *ordo* is not something imposed *a posteriori* by language but rather the sequential reflection of the natural/divine order of things[30].

The model of Historiography's dependency on surrogational semantics described above is more Western than specifically Spanish; it may be seen, for instance, in Thucydides, and sometimes has continued to be replicated until today. Its endurance and influence has caused tensions even among current theorists such as Koselleck, well-known for conducting a rather extensive critique of historico-philological criticism because, according to him, it disregards that historical reality only exists in shapes of language[31]. Nevertheless, the surrogational pattern enjoyed a remarkably well-defined progression among the major historians who created the mainstream Spanish historiographical discourse during the long time that elapsed between Isidore and Juan de Mariana's work at the end of the sixteenth century, despite the "tensions" caused by the repressed challenge from humanist historiography resulting from the influence of rhetoric and historical philology in the sphere of history-writing.

The basic assumptions behind this package can be tracked from Isidore to Lucas de Tuy, Jiménez de Rada, Alfonso X, López de Ayala and others, with Pablo de Santa María bridging the gap to the fifteenth century: *Y estos nombres fueron puestos a cada una destas tierras por ciertas causas e razones, según San Isidro en las Etimologías las pone* [...]"[32]. His son, Alfonso de Cartagena, exploited internationally its possibilities and was the decisive transitional figure between the abovementioned authors and the historians under the Catholic Monarchs and the Habsburgs. Into this latter category we can include the *letrados* Sánchez de Arévalo, Alfonso de Palencia, Diego Rodríguez de Almela and Hernando del Pulgar, aristocrats such as Diego de Valera, humanists such as Nebrija or Lucio Marineo, or the later historians Florián Ocampo, Ambrosio de Morales and Juan de Mariana. To this extent, the texts of these authors

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30. "And for that reason, histories are called "monuments" (*monumenta*), because they grant a remembrance (*memoria*) of deeds that have been done. And series (*series*) is so called by an analogy with a garland (*serta*) of flowers tied together one after the other" (Isidorus Hispalensis. *The Etymologies...*: I, 41).

31. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Linguistic Change and the History of Events". *Journal of Modern History*, 61/4 (1989): 661-666. Remarkably, in his insightful linguistic reconsideration of *Begriffsgeschichte*, Hans Bödeker echoes claims that the theory of the concept is inaccessible because it remains properly unexplained in terms of linguistic philosophy. The main problem is the distinction between concept and word, since for Koselleck concepts are nothing more than words with a special historical meaning, thus making the distinction a matter of degree of incorporation of the context (qualitative). Sometimes concepts are used as units of the expressive side of language, very much a special class of words. On the other hand, concept is also defined as a unit of the content side of language. As a result, Bödeker concludes "some of Koselleck´s expositions on the concept of *Begriffsgeschichte* give the impression that a concept has referential qualities only [...]. More clearly among others than Koselleck, the danger of a problematic realistic ontology appears which fixes objects as entities [...] To be more precise, there is a risk of *Begriffsgeschichte* losing its cognitive function of recognizing historical reality as a structure of consciousness —tied to language, which affords accessibility— and thus of object-construction as well" (Bödeker, Hans E. "Concept-Meaning-Discourse. Begriffsgeschichte reconsidered", *History of Concepts...*: 60-62).

32. And these names were put to each of these lands by certain causes and reasons, according to Saint Isidro, who puts it in the Etymologies [...] (de Santa María, Pablo. *Suma de las crónicas*. BNE. Ms. 1279, f. 121b).

that I will employ to exemplify the surrogational model do not necessarily explain it more accurately than other texts of the time. Nonetheless, while still recognizing the differences among these historians, we can see a clear textual continuity in their use of sources, ideological and narrative patterns (e.g., *laus Hispaniae, Neo-Gothicism*) and intertextuality as well as an almost unanimously admitted debt to and admiration for Isidore.[33] But the more compelling reason for my choices is the relevant role that, in my opinion, these historians played in the hegemonic discourses of legitimization for kingdoms, modern state and empire building, political propaganda, moral instruction, and even the representation of America's "reality" for Europe.

A useful way to illustrate this model and to outline some of its ideological implications within the aforementioned group of historians is to articulate their linguistic assumptions in relation to the major possibility facilitated by surrogational semantics, namely, the operational. Next, I will deal with the other two resulting possibilities: the discriminatory and the applicational. This primary possibility, which I call "operational", rests on the undisputed supposition that it is possible to grasp and narrate what really happened, that is, the total truth of the events from the past[34].

According to this view, there are stories waiting to be reported and, though it is a difficult and arduous mission to uncover them, they can be told undistorted by an honest historian working diligently with God's sponsorship: "And therefore, I, Pero López de Ayala, with God's help, I understand it as continuing so the most truly I could from what I saw"[35]. Difficulties usually turn into excuses, thereby enlarging the *captationes benevolentiae*. For instance, Diego Enríquez del Castillo blames the problems on the "disloyal knights" who stole his original papers in Segovia, so that

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33. For example, Juan de Mariana (like Isidore) not only accepts that Tubal, the grandson of Noah, was a primeval inhabitant of Spain (Mariana, Juan de. *Historia general de España*, Joaquín Ibarra, ed. Madrid: Joaquín Ibarra. 1780: I, 13), but he edited some works of Isidore himself in 1599, and the *Chronicon Mundi* of Lucas de Tuy in 1608. For the medieval assimilation and ongoing productivity (Tuy, el Toledano, Alfonso X...) of the Isidorian model, see: Funes, Leonardo. "Elementos para una poética del relato histórico", *Poétique de la chronique. L'écriture des textes historiographiques*...: 244-250.

34. See: Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics...*: 77. Along these same lines, I agree with Funes on "that the procedure for expanding the functionality of the historical texts —of the didactics in the broad sense to the legitimation of a power and the consolidation of a vision of the past— is paradoxically related to the fictionality and that the construction of this truth is the closest to misrepresentation and falsehood, does not diminish the primacy of the requirement for veracity that sustains them, only complicates and enriches it" (Funes, Leonardo. "Elementos para una poética...": 272).

35. López de Ayala, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey don Pedro y del Rey don Enrique, su hermano, hijos del rey don Alfonso Onceno*, ed. Germán Orduna. Buenos Aires: Seminario de Edición Crítica y Textual "Germán Orduna", 1994-1997: I, 97. "And from other writings that, read with effort on parchments and skins, with more work I collected, I have endeavoured honestly, to the best of my ability, to build the history of Spain" (Ximenii de Rada, Roderici. *Historia de rebus Hispanie sive historia gotica*, ed. Juan Fernández. Turnhout: Brepols, 1987: 7). Martínez de Toledo, author of a biography of Isidore, also invokes the Virgin Mary's intervention when writing the *Atalaya de las Crónicas*, a compilation that he expects to finish truthfully: "With the help of our Lord God, without which nothing can be begun, arranged or finished" (Alfonso Martínez de Toledo. *Atalaya de las crónicas*, ed. James B. Larkin. Madison: The Hispanic Seminar of Medieval Studies, 1983: 2b).

now he has to rely on memory; and Martínez de Toledo explains his limitations with the theory of the four humors: *emendando e corrigendo según mejor se les entendiere e vieren, que non pudo de mi salir más sangre que la exigencia de la conplisión demandó*[36]. However, the basic premise, founded on an explanation of meaning in terms of reference to events and objects from the non-linguistic world, is never questioned[37].

The unproblematic possibility of reporting the truthful events derives really from an epistemology —allowed by surrogationism— that sanctions objective knowledge, and makes the historian's task just an extension of the general knowledge of things[38]. Frequently, factual knowledge even incorporates God's plans or the accurate intentions of ancestors. For example, López de Ayala's self-attributed reputation of being able to correctly interpret the motivations of historical personalities is well-known. On the other hand, Alfonso de Cartagena in the *Anacephaleosis* knows for a fact that both Castile's independence from Leon and the later union to the same kingdom are the result of divine design, thus the *reintegratio monarchiae Hispaniae* (later used for Castille and Aragon) obtains the most reputable sponsor possible[39]. The Divinity, then, ends up acquiring a double function: extradiegetic —that is, the historian's sponsor—, and diegetic —an historical actor: "See as the powerful who after they will see in the reading of this Chronicle, wherever they look upon, they will see the works of God and his power"[40].

It is no wonder that, in this context, the problem of sources is normally avoided in the reception of oral and written texts as documentary representations of reality[41]. Our authors widely overlook the fact "that no history ever agrees entirely with what is said prior to or during the events", as well as the contradictions and distortions derived from writing down, copying and revising oral tradition[42]. Here, in order to guarantee their reliability, they commonly borrow the old Herodotean hierarchy grounded on the direct correspondence between facts and words. This hierarchy works under the surrogational presumption that both the *de visu* testimonies of authors and witnesses, as well as first hand oral reports close to the events (*ex auditu*),

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36. Enríquez, Diego. *Crónica del Rey don Enrique el cuarto*, ed. Aureliano Sánchez. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1994: 132; Martínez de Toledo, Alfonso, *Atalaya...*: 1983: 3a.

37. Even though Alfonso de Cartagena admits that historical truths always have "a mixture of falsehood and scum", he implies that by "purifying and filtering" (*acrisolar*) it would be possible to come up with the truth (Cartagena, Alfonso de. *La anacephaleosis de Alonso de Cartagena*, ed. Yolanda Espinosa. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1989: 1098).

38. See: Alfonso X. *Primera crónica general de España (Estoria de España)*, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal. Madrid: Gredos, 1977: 3.

39. Cartagena, Alfonso de. *La anacephaleosis de Alonso...*: 1124.

40. Galíndez de Carvajal, Lorenzo. *Crónica del Rey don Juan el segundo*, ed. Cayetano Rosell. Madrid: Atlas, 1953: 274.

41. As Benito Ruano points out with regard to the sources in Medieval history, although the origin of knowledge, the precondition of credibility, and the reason to suffice authenticity are multiple and uneven, most of the time the collectors do not worry about it methodologically (Benito, Eloy. "La historiografía en la Alta Edad Media...": 85).

42. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Linguistic Change and the History...": 662-665.

are linguistically unprocessed historical matter[43]. This is the case, for example, of the anonymous author of the *Crónica del emperador Alfonso VII* (*Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris)*, who justifies the use of "actual facts as I learned them and heard from those who saw them" versus the typical written sources[44].

Faith and *auctoritas*, in different ways, sustain what is in fact more a linguistic than historical way of dealing with the topic: "And I beg that those who read this Chronicle, that they testify to what is written herein, because I saw with my eyes the majority, and for the rest, there was very true and full information of prudent men very worthy of faith"[45]. In line with his aristocratic agenda, López de Ayala relates *de visu* and close oral testimonies, faith, and *auctoritas* as having a high social origin. Nevertheless, he never explains why lords and knights and even those "others", allegedly non-noble, deserve his trust:

> *Lo entiendo continuar así lo más verdaderamente que pudiere de lo que ví, en lo qual non entiendo decir sinon verdad: otrosi de lo que acasesce en mi edad é en mi tiempo en algunas partidas donde yo non he estado, é lo supiere por verdadera relación de Señores é Caballeros, é otros dignos de fé é de creer, de quienes lo oí, é me dieron dende testimonio [...]*[46].

Ultimately, "the truth" (Ayala's version of it) is a matter of what a "select majority" believe, as we observe in the case of the killing of Gutier Ferrandez by King Pedro I. Contrary to the opinion that the King ordered Ferrandez's death for meeting don Enrique's supporters in Tudela, *empero la verdad es este segund que todos lo sabían, que Gutier Ferrandez fue muerto por seer atrevido en dezir al rrey algunas cosas, ca commo quier que las dixiesse a buena entençion, pero el rrey auia enojo del por ende*[47].

This whole procedure continued the link to written sources that already existed in Antiquity but was reinforced when Christianity included God's word as history, and as such "the standards of writing were set in a way that could not be approached

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43. John Toews considers one of the premises related to the linguistic turn the belief that "the experience that generates the revising and transforming procedures of creative consumption is never "raw" but always already constituted in meaning (Toews, John. "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn. The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreductibility of Experience". *American Historical Review*, 92 (1987): 885). On the other hand, a solid defense of language as the site of history's enactment can be found in Joan Scott. According to this historian, historical experience cannot be separated from discursive formations, since in effect historical experience is a linguistic event itself (Scott, Joan. "The Evidence of Experience". *Critical Inquiry*, 17 (1991): 792-795).

44. Pérez, Maurilio. *Crónica del emperador Alfonso VII: Introducción, traducción, notas e índices*. Leon: Universidad de León, 1997: 61.

45. Galíndez de Carvajal, Lorenzo. *Crónica del Rey don Juan el segundo*...: 278.

46. López de Ayala, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey don Pedro...*: I, 88 (I try to explain it such as most truly I can, according what I saw, and I just want to say truth; at the same time, I wish to explain events from my time that I cannot see, but that I know by real explanation from Lords and knights and another ones that merited confidence, whom I heard and game testimony [...]).

47. López de Ayala, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey don Pedro...*: II, 28 (However the truth is this second that everyone knew it, that Gutier Ferrandez was killed for being bold in saying some things to the king, because although the told it from a good willing, the king's would have become angry for this).

in any other domain of representation"[48]. Who, for example, could question the fact that the words of *Genesis* corresponded to actual and independent historical events? In fact, if the historian's very account aspired to be a post-dated surrogate for an eye-witness or *ex auditu* testimony, the written sources had to be capable of containing truth. That was absolutely necessary with the *res gestae* that were not contemporary with the author. Consequently, when Isidore reminds us that "[a]mong the ancients no one would write a history unless he had been present and had seen what was to be written down since what is seen is revealed without falsehood", he is taking for granted that what is written down can accurately and fully record what was seen and heard[49].

History became a part of *grammatica*, Clio with her scroll its muse, but in the same way as *de visu* and close oral sources, faith and *auctoritas* (also labeled as tradition) were there, as López de Ayala acknowledges, to underpin the written testimonies within the surrogational construct:

> *Diremos dende algunas cosas, especialmente lo que dice la Crónica antiga, é segund que se falla en otros libros antigos que fablan dello, e son auténticos, é aún segund que fincó por remembranza de generación en generación fasta hoy*[50].

Alternatively, Galíndez mixes faith, authority, social class, as well as oral and written sources in a curious fashion. He accepts as truth the written testimony from Fernán Pérez de Guzmán because *es de creer vió todos los auctores desta Crónica* and *fue varón noble, prudente y verdadero*[51]. Guzmán's source is also *más auténtica* because Queen Isabella, who was chosen by God, thought so[52].

Only with the issue of intertextuality "resolved" in terms of truth, could Jiménez de Rada in his prologue praise writing as the foundation of History, and regard the research from his writings along with what came to his memory, as a "faithful narration"[53]. Written sources may be more or less reliable but, thanks to surrogational semantics, their rhetorical or narrative nature is rarely problematic. Even when humanist historians chose the authorities closest in time to the events, selected texts in the original language, and used more reliable textual methods (which sometimes created discontinuities in the surrogational model), most of them

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48. Harris, Roy. *The Linguistics...*: 66.

49. Isidorus Hispalensis. *The Etymologies...*: I, 41.

50. "We will say some things, especially what the old Chronicle confirm and according what is stated by other old books devoted to this and that have credibility, and, also, according what was remembered generation by generation until current days" (López de Ayala, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey don Pedro...*: I, 57). Furthermore, Michel Garcia has shown how the priority that Ayala grants to written sources is not unproblematic since he closely controls both the selection of the existing documents and their presentation, using for instance the rhetorical devise of the paraphrase to express how they should be interpreted (Garcia, Michel. "La poétique de la chronique castillane au XIVe siècle", *Poétique de la chronique. L'écriture des textes historiographiques...*: 293-295).

51. "it is to believe that he saw the authors of this Chronicle and he was a noble, wise and true man".

52. Galíndez de Carvajal, Lorenzo. *Crónica del Rey don Juan el segundo...*: 274.

53. Ximenii de Rada, Roderici. *Historia de rebus Hispanie...*: 5.

accepted surrogationism in essence, including Euhemerism[54]. Actually, truth often came to be a matter of scholarly accumulation, as in the case of Florián de Ocampo, for whom the problem disappears simply by the addition of Arabic sources:

> *que tornadas otra vez a cotejar estas Corónicas con las Historias de las otras gentes, nadie de las naciones muy diligentes tengan su relación más entera ni verdadera que la tendrán de sí los Españoles en este libro de V.M.[55].*

When dealing with different versions of the same facts, something common in the *Compendios*, historians such as Diego Rodríguez de Almela or Diego de Valera try to reconcile alternative interpretations. In order to achieve this, they refer to existing facts perceived as historical truths rather than by arguments over the nature of narratives as such, even when their choices are clearly subordinated to royal and/or moral agendas[56]. This includes establishing the most realistic version (verisimilitude) based on different and "decisive" factors. Those involve invoking God's approval[57]; the use of the Aristotelian happy medium in controversial issues —e.g., Ocampo uses both names, Eusebio Cesariense and San Eusebio, to avoid taking a position in the polemic about Eusebio´s arianist past[58]; or the saddest option, in line with the Orosian *moesta mundi* tradition, to invoke the moral argument. Circumventing the issue by enclosing it in a more essential and undeniable truth is frequent too:

> *[...] e ell estando alla en el mandado, tomol el rey Rodrigo ala fija por fuerça, et yogol con ella; e ante desto fuera ya fablado que avie el de casar con ella, mas non casara aun. Algunos dizen que fue la muger et que ye la forçó; mas pero destas dos cualquier que fuesse, desto se levantó destroymiento de Espanna et de la Gallia Gothica[59].*

Ultimately, according to Alfonso de Cartagena, to historicise consists of matching forgotten or discordant discourses (*verba*) with the truth (*res*) "to reach the truths of our history, some buried under oblivion, others surrounded by a covering of

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54. See: Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular del siglo XV*. Madrid: Gredos, 1970: 146.

55. "That, when someone could compare another time these Chronicles with the Histories written by other people, nobody from the very diligent nations have explanations more complete or more truly than the Spaniards could have from this book belonging to His Majesty" (Ocampo, Florián de. *Crónica de España*, ed. Benito Cano. Madrid: Benito Cano, 1791: X).

56. Rodríguez de Almela, for example, campaigning to reinforce the Catholic Monarchs' power over that of the nobility, follows a shorter version of the rebellion of a group of noblemen against Alfonso X instead of the thirty eight long chapters provided by the *Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla* (Rodríguez de Almela, Diego. *Compendio historial*, ed. Concepción Armentero. Murcia: Asamblea Regional de Murcia, 2000: 85).

57. Tuy, Lucas de. *Lucas de Tuy, Chronicon Mundi*, ed. Emma Falque. Turnhout: Brepols, 2003: 85.

58. Ocampo, Florián de. *Crónica de España*...: XV.

59. Alfonso X. *Primera crónica*...: 307-308 (And being in place, the king Rodrigo took the daughter by force, and he lay with her. For this reason, according it is just explained, he should married to her, but it was not done yet. Someone tell that it was the women who forced him, but whatever it was, the consequence was the destruction of Spain and the Gothic Gallia).

discordant writings"[60], normally under the auspices of political power and more efficiently as the latter gained strength and authority[61]. If, from the Derridean perspective, historical texts are conceived as scenes of struggle between opposing tendencies resolved artificially and politically through an act of linguistic domination[62], in our authors the unquestioned correspondence to extralinguistic reality is the ultimate source of unity and order that makes it possible.

The meaning missed, added, or changed in translation was also considered by our authors an unimportant detail for conveying the complete *res gestae*. This *modus operandi* was facilitated by overlooking the fact that different languages shape different worlds:

> Languages do not simply store experiences that outlast the specific situation; we realise that particular languages delimit these very experiences. As a consequence of their own concreteness, these languages allow experiences to be formulated only in certain ways and not otherwise[63].

For example, the word "Hispania" is repeatedly used as a synonym of "Spain" in these Medieval and Early Modern historical texts without any second thought, but with the linguistic and ideological implication of the existence of an entity (thing) that continues fulfilling a providential destiny through the ages[64]. This caused "tensions" for some humanists such as Peter Martyr d'Anghiera or Antonio de Nebrija:

> *Esto no es verdad en modo alguno, comenta Nebrija, ni son lo mismo Baetica y Andalucía, Tarraconensis y Aragón. Lo cual, sin embargo, no le impide referirse a continuación al rey de Portugal como Rex Lusitanorum, a los navarros como Vascones y a los castellanos como Hispani[65].*

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60. Cartagena, Alfonso de. *La anacephaleosis de Alonso...*: 1100.

61. "Despite this, one's attention is drawn to the way that the multiple judgement of the events, that is reflected in the writings from the first three quarters of the 15th century, merge into one almost uniform one as the power of the monarchy is asserted, the historian transforming its political ends into new visions of the past and the present" (Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular...*: 281-82).

62. Toews, John E. "Intellectual History...": 896.

63. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Linguistic Change and the History...": 657.

64. In the Spanish context, Martin exemplifies and takes these practices back to the *Historia legionensis*, written between 1109 and 1118 to historically support Leon's imperial aspirations. Concretely, this critic sees the use of the double toponyms (old Roman names and the contemporary ones) by the anonymous historian as one discursive devise that hides political antagonisms, the different kings' will to power as well as the objective of presenting "Hispania" as a territory or kingdom whose unity must be restored (Martin, Georges. "'Toponimia' y 'avidez de los reyes': doble lexicalización de los territorios hispanos en La *Historia legionensis* (llamada *silensis*)". *e-Spania*, 13. June 2010. Université Paris-Sorbonne. May 2013 < http://e-spania.revues.org/21740>).

65. Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular...*: 189. Maurilio Pérez González, the modern editor of the *Crónica del Emperador Alfonso VII*, provides a useful glossary with terms such as *plebs, parentes, patres, principes* whose meanings changed over time without further consideration by many authors.

In spite of that, Juan de Molina, translator of Marineo Siculo's *Crónica de Aragón*, still understands his commission —after showing a long-established surrogational fear of rhetoric— as the truth-based and unproblematic continuation in Spanish of Siculo's archival task: *Sacolo [su trabajo] con toda verdad y fieldad de los muy auténticos originales questan en el archivo de Zaragoza, Barcelona y otras partes*[66]. Finally, in his Spanish translation from Latin, Mariana almost has to apologise for using old-fashioned Castilian terms from his sources that better suit his account: *Algunos vocablos antiguos se pegaron de las cronicas de España de que usamos, por ser más significativos y propios, por variar el lenguaje, y por lo que en razón de estilo escriben Cicerón y Quintiliano. Esto por los Romancistas*[67].

The dilemma of memory also seems *imperceptible* to our authors. Jiménez de Rada, Alfonso X or López de Ayala reiterate in their Prefaces the consecrated formulae about needing to preserve the memory of the past[68]. But they all avoid the delicate question of the difference between historians' accounts and memories, even when they implicitly invoke it, like the anonymous author of the *Crónica del emperador Alfonso VII*:

> Puesto que la historia del pasado, escrita por los historiógrafos y transmitida por medio de la escritura para recuerdo de la posteridad, renueva los antiguos hechos memorables de los reyes y emperadores [...][69].

Other crucial aspects, such as the social status and political bent of the historian, are not taken into consideration with regard to the purported truth[70]. Finally, supervised history-writing from an official chronicler is not incompatible either with the vision of history as a lamp of truth (*lux veritatis*). As Kagan has shown in the case of official historians, the trust coming from the prince and the title that went with it, "subsequently metamorphosed into authorial authority and ultimately into truthfulness"[71].

The constructed possibility of fully and truly reporting what happened in the past (operational possibility) enables and works together with "the discriminatory possibility", also linguistically rooted, which allows someone to decide what is

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66. Marineo, Lucio. *Crónica de Aragón*, ed. Juan de Molina. Barcelona: Ediciones El Albir, 1974: f. III.

67. "Some old words stuck in the chronicles of Spain that we use, being more significant and acurates, by changing the language, and according the style in which Cicero and Quintilian wrote. This by the romancists" (de Mariana, Juan. *Historia general de España*...: I, a1).

68. Ximenii de Rada, Roderici. *Historia de rebus Hispanie*...: 6; Alfonso X. *Primera crónica*...: 3; López de Ayala, Pedro. *Crónica del Rey don Pedro*...: I, 97.

69. "Because the history of the past, written by historians and transmitted through writing to memory of posterity, renews the old milestones of kings and emperors" (Pérez, Maurilio. *Crónica del emperador*...: 61).

70. "It is decisive for the historian's selection whether he belongs to the political, religious, social, or economic entity whose history he portrays, identifying himself more or less critically with it, or whether he is looking on from outside, writing, as it were, *apolis*, as Lucian demanded" (Koselleck, Reinhart. "Linguistic Change and the History...": 662).

71. Kagan, Richard L. *Clio*...: IV, 294.

history and what is not (in a disciplinary and discursive sense), who can be considered historians, and more commonly, how to discriminate among them.

As an extension of the general knowledge of things, definitions of history that underscore truth are the most noticeable. Again, events themselves are repeatedly privileged over their narration, and the discussion about the writing of history shifts almost invisibly from historical verification to the undisputed linguistic possibility of relating events truthfully:

> E porque la Historia es luz de la verdad, testigo del tiempo, maestra y ejemplo de la vida, mostradora de la antigüedad, recontaremos, mediante la voluntad de Dios, la verdad de las cosas [...][72].

The semantic criteria of truth are reinforced by the presumed fact that historical events are somewhat similar to the process of the self-objectification of God's thought, in the same way as the Spirit in Hegelian philosophy[73], and in this way a particular historian may assume a prophetic and omniscient viewpoint. Indeed, behind Sánchez de Arévalo's statement that other historians lack sufficient intelligence to envisage the divine plan rests the assumption that he is able to do so[74].

Discursively, the surrogational view of meaning endorses the exclusion of certain texts from the realm of history because they do not portray things as they actually happened. In other words, when Isidore named Dares Phrygius instead of Homer as the true recorder of Troy's *res gestae*[75], he is not only giving priority to written records (he thought that Dares was the real author of the *Daretis Phrygii de excidio Trojae historia*) but implying —consistent with the tenets of Aristotle— that historical discourse had a semantics of its own, which allowed a hard-and-fast and universal distinction between historical and non-historical accounts.

Similar reasoning leads to discrimination between good and bad historians, or even between historians and other authors, on the grounds that *verba* do not relate truthfully to *res*. Alfonso de Palencia calls himself a cultivator of truth (*cultor veritatis*) and declares his intention to "destroy with truth itself" the writings of others, whom he considers only "adulators"[76]. Even so, despite his constant use of irony and other rhetorical devices —Palencia was in fact a disciple of the famous rhetorician Jorge de Trebisonda— the semantic assumptions behind his remarks are exactly the same as those of his rival Enriquez del Castillo: *Diré sin dubda ninguna lo que vieron mis ojos, las cosas que sucedieron, la causa de donde emanaron, e también del fin que ovieron*

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72. "It is true that the post of chronicler like that of the witness and scribe, is not to judge or explain the events, more singly to recount how they came about" (del Pulgar, Hernando. *Crónica de los señores Reyes Católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón*, ed. Cayetano Rosell. Madrid: Atlas, 1959: 229).

73. See: Benito, Eloy. "La historiografía en la Alta Edad Media...": 55.

74. See: Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular...*: 92-93.

75. Isidorus Hispalensis. *The Etymologies*...: I, 42.

76. Palencia, Alonso de. *Crónica de Enrique IV*, ed. Antonio Paz. Madrid: Atlas, 1973. 3-5.

[...][77]. In this respect, Ocampo comments on ancient Greek historians, preferring Thucydides over Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus "for his much truth, good style and diligence"[78] are, also, the principle behind blacklisting traditional Spanish "bad historians" such as Bishop Don Pelayo, Pedro de Corral, or Fray Bauberte[79].

The same semantic-based premise of truth generated further distinctions among historians embedded in traditional arguments about discourse, and whether it was too rhetorical, long, short, inventive or legendary. The discriminatory linguistic principle also extended to religion —in order to write history accurately the historian needed to be better a Christian—, and even to country of origin. Whatever his motivation, hiring a Spaniard as Royal Chronicler was Nebrija's recommendation to the Catholic Monarchs, as he did not consider it quite safe to rely on foreigners for historical truth: "And because History is the light of the truth, witness to time, master and example of life, indicator of antiquity, we will tell, through God's will, the truth of things"[80]. As a final point, the surrogational craving of *veritas* pushed historians, almost at the same time they tried to move further away from poets, towards those who reputedly owned "the most truthful" narrative of events, especially after the rise of the *letrados* in the fifteenth century: the lawyers. Both the humanist Juan Luis Vives in *De disciplinis* and Galíndez de Carvajal, a *letrado* historian himself, pointed to the same phenomenon at the time: "I do not think, however, that the objectivity of history can be trusted with absolute security to foreigners, and less to the Italians, who are only greedy for glory"[81].

As noted earlier, this view of language as a naturally representational category emphasises a concept of discourse as a mere duplicate of an aprioristic natural order of things. Time played a fundamental role in imposing a linguistic-based discursive order which, nonetheless, was permanently presented as a reflection and thus existing on a phenomenological level. Temporal aspects such as linear order, sequence, continuity, and their narratological effects were no more than mirror images of reality. Accordingly, writing —perceived only as a mere container of a past reality— and time were the perfect surrogational cocktail allowing history: *Cronica antiqua series intepretatur, et dicitur a cronos, quod est tempus uel series, siue longum, et*

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77. "I will say without any doubt what my eyes saw, the things that happened, the cause of which they emanated, and also the purpose they had" (Enríquez del Castillo, Diego. *Crónica del Rey*...: 132).

78. Ocampo, Florián de. *Crónica de España*...: III-IV.

79. Bishop Don Pelayo (twelfth century) became the archetype of the bad historian accussed of distorting the truth and inventing facts; for this reason, Mariana called his *Chronicon* "fabulis foedum" (Benito, Eloy. "La historiografía en la Alta Edad Media...": 91). To Pérez de Guzmán, Pedro del Corral, author of *Corónica Serracina*, "That could be better called a truffle or a clear lie", was definitely, rather than a historian, one of the *hombres de poca vergüenza que relatan más cosas extrañas y maravillosas que verdaderas y ciertas* whom he had criticised earlier" (Pérez de Guzmán, Fernán. *Generaciones y semblanzas*, ed. José A. Barrio. Madrid: Cátedra, 1998: 60). Finally, Juan de Molina considers Marineo a better historian than Fray Bauberte (author of the previous *Chronicle of Aragon*) because the latter "forgetting the truth he abused the pen and made a windy shot in the dark" (Marineo, Lucio. *Crónica*...: fol. iii).

80. Cited by: Hinojo, Gregorio. *Obras históricas de Nebrija: estudio filológico*. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1991: 126-127.

81. Galíndez de Carvajal, Lorenzo. *Crónica del Rey don Juan el segundo*...: 274; for Vives, see: Kagan, Richard L. *Clio*...: 6.

scripter continer opera nobilium hominum[82]. Again in this case, as Berkhofer mantains: "what is presented as (f)actuality is a special coding of the historians' synthetic expository texts, designed to conceal their highly constructed basis"[83]. And even Koselleck, who opposes the post-structuralist concept of time as total linguistic creation, and stands for a natural time pre-ordained by nature, has argued that "all chronologies are products of certain cultures and are, in this respect, relative. This is also true for the Christian chronology, which has been largely universalised"[84].

In fact, Christianity supported the change from a cyclical view of temporal events to a linear one in order to guarantee Jesus Christ's birth and its promise of mankind's improvement as an unrepeatable event. Additionally, it strengthened the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysicalisation of time by adding a transcendental end to its unidimensional movement. The model, materialised in an Augustinian philosophy of history, was perfected by St. Jerome's chronology of the Ages and again "further strengthened at the turn of the sixth century into the seventh by Isidore of Seville"[85]. The way to history's ultimate meaning was in reality sequential and a *continuum*, reproducing without difficulties the teleological and evolutionary progression of God's providential plan[86].

Among the narrative possibilities of surrogational linear time the following elements stand out: the accumulative vision of history, the myth of the beginning and the end, and the insertion of *res gestae* into a dual process of progress and decadence. For example, Jiménez de Rada connects history to the depiction of accumulated behaviors and the transmission of certified events and meanings that can be projected into the future, thanks to the "presence" conferred by language:

> Because of death, they could not subsist the knowledge that they had been accumulating about the behaviour of the creatures little by little with the help of divine revelation [...], and through the force of efforts of managed to transmit to their descendents the proven facts and the meaning of the figures and, taking

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82. Tuy, Lucas de. *Chronicon...*: 10.

83. Berkhofer, Robert. "The Challenge of Poetics...": 149. Martin also conceives time not like an empirical dimension but *comme facteur structurant de représentations événementielles* and the events of medieval historical discourse as a construction. Though this circumstance is more distinct in legendary accounts such as the *Legend of los Jueces de Castilla* whose *function du temps* he analyses in relation to different ideological goals, this critic makes clear that the practice is deeply embedded in the historical mentality (Martin, Georges. "Contribution à une modélisation de l'événement en fonction du temps dans le récit historique médiéval", *Le temps du récit*, Geneviève Champeau, Mercedes Blanco, eds. Madrid: Annexes aux Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, 1989: 9 and 19).

84. Koselleck, Reinhart. "Time and History", *The Practice of Conceptual History*, Todd Samuel, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002: 106.

85. Patrides, Constantinos A. *The Grand Design of God*. London: Routledge, 1972: 21.

86. "Yet these sources are clearly not continuous, nor is conscious human experience of time continuous [...] Rather, the source of the assumption that the past is in some sense continuous is a literary one" (Kellner, Hans. "Language and Historical Representation", *The Postmodern History Reader*, Keith Jenkins, ed. London: Routledge, 1997: 128).

the spirit as a guide, they covered the present and anticipated the future through inquiries[87].

As for the obsession with a referential and unitary origin with its legitimizing purposes can already be observed in Lucas de Tuy and other later medieval historians, although Tate also emphasises its use by humanists[88]. Consistently, the Arab conquest of Spain caused by the degeneracy of the Goths (mainly don Rodrigo), or the reign of Enrique IV *el impotente*, are implanted for political purposes in a pattern of decadence that has a counterpart in don Pelayo or the renascence during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella[89]. As Koselleck has underlined in his historical analysis of the concept of decline, it is usually offered as metaphor of sickness to describe political disintegration[90]. Accordingly, Alfonso de Palencia presents the corruption, lack of unity, and decline of Enrique IV's reign by repeatedly using the medical metaphor of disease (*mal*) for which Isabella's proclamation as heiress to the throne becomes medicine or remedy[91].

As I just illustrated, the temporal template outlined above offered invaluable ideological applications (applicational possibility)[92]. For instance, when Cartagena had to defend the Castilian kings' rights to the Canary Islands in his *Allegationes* (1437), he did so with the surrogational power of historical narrative to make the events appear continuous, in support of the main legal argumentation. As the legitimate successor of the Kingdom of the Goths, which also controlled the North African region known as Mauretania Tingitana, Juan II had the right to exert control (*dominium*) over all the lands owned by infidels in Africa, including the *Fortunatas Insulas*. To Cartagena, the Arab invasion had never been a loss but a mere reduction of power and sovereignty. For this reason, don Pelayo was actually

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87. Ximenii de Rada, Roderici. *Historia de rebus Hispanie...*: 5.

88. Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular...*: 132. To Nigel Love: "Some Historians tend to adopt a manner of speaking in which the collection of materials whose ancestry we are reconstructing, no matter how complex and variable, always at some remove appears to go back to a single ancestral object whose story we find ourselves telling. History emerges as an artifact of the particular synchronic analysis taken as a starting point" (Love, Nigel, "Language, history and Language and History", *Language and History. Integrationist Perspectives*, Nigel Love, ed. New York: Routledge, 2006: 4).

89. According to Beryl Smalley, the problem of decay has its roots in its identification with change and the parallel between the ages of the world and the lives of men. "It was easy to tell the tale of decline, easy and quite enjoyable; historiographers reveled in doling out blame. Changes for the better, on the contrary, called for explanation: how could they happen in a period of decline?" (Smalley, Beryl. *Historians in the Middle Ages*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1974: 95).

90. Koselleck also considers both concepts, "progress"and "decline", as something relative and not universal: "The progress of modernity, despite its universal claim, reflects only a partial, self-consistent experience and, instead, masks or obscures other modes of experience for understandable reasons" (Koselleck, Reinhart. "Progress and Decline", *The Practice of Conceptual History*, Todd Samuel, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002: 219, 234-235).

91. de Palencia, Alfonso. *Crónica...*: 256.

92. An excellent showcase of how temporal narrative order was used to present time as an indisputable and objective criteria to induce hereditary rights (succession) or even claim territories (Tierra de Campos by Leon) can be seen in Martin's analysis of the *Legend of the Jueces de Castilla* (Martin, Georgess. "Contribution à une modélisation de l'événement en fonction...": 11-14).

don Rodrigo's heir. Cartagena's legalistic arguments were partially based on the linguistic conception of history as a sequential *continuum*; consequently, Spaniards were recovering (*recuperare*) the islands instead of occupying them (*occupare*)[93].

Nevertheless, the combination of the temporal projection to the past and the future embedded in the linear model, and the surrogational justification of abstract "realities" such as Virtue, Good, and Evil make morality the major factor in the applicational possibility. Chronology was, then, an essential weapon at the service of the exemplary purposes of history: *Los fechos de Espanna faze manifiestos en este libro, en guisa que cada cual pueda saber por él muchas cosas venideras*[94]. A language view that conceded the natural and unproblematic transfer of meaning from an earlier linguistic system to a later one could more easily endorse the traditional moral purpose of history. Surrogationism allowed "good", "evil", "prudence", or "magnificence" to remain semantically firm because what they stood for did not alter from one generation to the next. Echoing the position of Titus Livius or Tacitus with regard to Latin, Sánchez de Arévalo and Mariana took for granted that the language of their time was the perfect linguistic tool to describe and judge what occurred in the past. This aspect did not go unnoticed by Tate in his examination of Sánchez de Arévalo's *Compendiosa Historia*, though he limits himself to pointing it out:

> Se supone que un rey visigodo del siglo VII es capaz de responder a los mismos principios éticos que los monarcas castellanos del XV, siendo consideradas las acciones de ambos como orientación significativa para los futuros gobernantes de la Península[95].

Not only was *virtus* the same as *virtud*, but someone in the present could learn how to behave virtuously from someone who had lived several hundred years before[96]. As Alfonso de Palencia exposes, this universal pattern had a trans-temporal, trans-geographical and even trans-cultural dimension:

> Because the example of the Prince, propagating the plague of tyranny, has not only introduced the contagion among the Spaniards, but also all over the world has opened such a wide path to evil, since the most remote epochs down to the present [...][97].

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93. Cartagena, Alfonso de. *Diplomacia y humanismo en el s. XV. Edición crítica, traducción y notas de las Allegationes super conquesta Insularum Canariae contra portugalenses de Alfonso de Cartagena*, Tomás González, Fremiot Hernández, Pilar Saquero, eds. Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 1994: 102-104.

94. Alfonso X. *Primera crónica*...: 2.

95. "It is assumed that a Visigoth king of the 7 th century was able to respond to the same ethical principles that the Castilian monarchs of the 15th century, being considered the actions of both as meaningful guidance for future rulers of the Peninsula" (Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular*...: 91).

96. For a view of the analogical application of historical structures in time as "language preformulated and linguistically transmitted alternatives" see: Koselleck, Reinhart. "Linguistic Change and the History...": 653-656.

97. Palencia, Alfonso de. *Crónica*...: 5.

The whole possibility was due more to what Lucas de Tuy assumes (that "good things" and "bad things" will be the same) than to what he actually reveals in his writing: *Hoc etiam considerat rex honestus, ut quicquid egerit, siue bonum fuerit siue malum, eo quod scripture perpetuo commendatur, ab hominum memoria non recedat*[98]. Under the presumption that words always have exactly the same meaning, our historians had *carte blanche* not only to tell us what our ancestors did, but to pass judgment on their characters as well. Two centuries after the fact, Juan de Mariana's moral reasons for the execution of Álvaro de Luna, with his conclusive "justice was done", are a good example of it[99]. Finally, basing themselves on these judgments (e.g., the sins of Witiza or don Rodrigo), historians could interpret and make sense of *res gestae* (namely, the Arab invasion) in ways consistent with their ideology and conditioned purposes: *E digamos agora onde le vino esta cata et este mal e por qual razón*[100]. Along the same lines, according to Tate: *En la Anacephaleosis, la Reconquista se hunde o florece según que el vicio o la virtud prevalezca entre los castellanos*[101]. It was only in that way, by meaning the same in time to stay operative, that metaphysical vices and virtues became surrogational historical forces after God.

This work has provided a positive response to John Toews' question as to whether a theory of relational, constitutive meaning can be useful as a clarification for traditional historiographical practice[102]. In order to illustrate so, the article has presented a short outline of the ways in which some of the most influential early Spanish historians' assumptions about language impacted their ideas about history and their praxis in writing accounts of the past. The choice, mostly unconscious, of a surrogational semantics sustained and kept working unchallenged for centuries what I have called the operational possibility in history-writing, as well as the other two resulting possibilities that I have identified: discriminatory and applicational. These possibilities offered to the political powers and to the Church immeasurable opportunities for ideological dissimulation, legitimization, and justification during the crucial period when Spain evolved from being composed of different kingdoms to a global empire.

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98. Tuy, Lucas de. *Chronicon*...: 4.

99. Mariana, Juan de. *Historia general*...: II, 403-404.

100. "And we will say right now from where he received this experience and this evil and by what reason" (Alfonso X. *Primera crónica*...: 314).

101. "In the 'Anacephaleosis', the Reconquist sinks or flowers according to vice or virtue prevails between the Castilian" (Tate, Robert B. *Ensayos sobre la historiografía peninsular*...: 99).

102. Toews, John E. "Intellectual History...": 886.

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