Programmatic and Territorial Coherence: The Nationalization of Electoral Politics in Brazil in Comparative Perspective

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Declaration

The author, Kazuma Mizukoshi, hereby confirms that the work presented in this thesis is his own. Where information has been derived from other sources, he clearly indicates this in the thesis.

Abstract

The dynamics of electoral politics in contemporary Latin America have changed considerably since the democratic transition period of the 1980s and 1990s. Some established parties have collapsed, even while parties on the Left and Right that proved less competitive in these early elections managed over time to expand support and increase their representation in national legislatures. How were they able to do so? The key to answering this question lies in their capacity to nationalize their support base by building a programme-based elite with mass linkages. The Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in Brazil has been among the most successful parties in drawing a nationwide swing of support. However, the principal arguments in the literature on party nationalization cannot account for such an equalizing swing of support because they mostly focus on variations between countries, not between parties. Hence it is important to take into account both elite and mass electoral preferences. For a party to succeed in nationalizing its support base, the left–right stances of individual politicians and supporters should be as collectively coherent along national issues between electoral districts as they would be within each district. This thesis develops this argument by focusing on the PT in Brazil. The empirical analysis draws on a series of elite and mass public opinion surveys conducted between 1997 and 2014.

Impact Statement

Most contemporary democracies have some form of representative system in which, instead of directly participating in politics, citizens delegate their sovereign power to representatives (which may include those elected to both executive and legislative offices) through elections. The questions for whom representatives act, and how citizens respond to them, are therefore central to the study of electoral politics. The dynamics of indirect exchanges between representatives and the represented shape the course of party and party system development. In this line of research, the issue of party (system) nationalization that I address in this project places geography at the centre of enquiry and raises the question of how substantial the effect of drawing territorial boundaries (eg, gerrymandering) is on political representation.

The concept of party nationalization is all about uniformity along two dimensions: equal shares and equal changes. *Equal shares* concerns how uniform the vote share of a political party would be across the country, whilst *equal changes* focuses on the uniformity of electoral swings over time. In this research project, I explore the conditions under which party nationalization is more likely, with particular reference to the case of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in Brazil. At least until the mid-1990s in the comparative study of Latin American politics, Brazil was viewed as one of the 'inchoate' party systems–meaning that electoral politics was by and large local in its institutions and focus. However, as discussed in this thesis, the PT managed to nationalize its electoral support. Why was the party able to perform in elections as it did?

The theoretical framework I develop to answer this question is in the tradition of political representation. As noted above, enquiries into political representation generally focus on two questions: for whom representatives act, and who the represented support. These questions help us frame an alternative theory of party nationalization. Party

nationalization, I argue, is more likely to occur if representatives act for national rather than local electorates, and if the represented support national rather than local representatives. Here the adjective ‘national’ suggests that there are two conditions to be met: programmatic and territorial coherence. That is, both representatives and the represented must be unified across the country with regard to coherent programmatic stances and preferences. I assess the value of this framework by developing verifiable hypotheses and testing them through an analysis of data from elite and mass public opinion surveys conducted in Brazil between 1997 and 2014.

The principal findings from this project have both academic and practical implications. Academically, in the literature on party nationalization, most scholars have placed a great emphasis on two system-level factors: political institutions and social cleavages. I argue that both institutionalists’ and structuralists’ claims are plausible if, and only if, both representatives and the represented would behave as institutional and structural conditions would predict. In practical terms, it is important whether national legislative seats are filled by representatives with a national or local focus. If electoral representatives only focus on their constituencies and hardly care about national issues, the legislature is likely be a cacophony of ‘micro’ voices, a situation that would undermine its legitimacy and limit its capacity to act for the nation as a whole.

Contents

Tables **10**

Figures **11**

Principal Acronyms **12**

Chapter: 1 The Puzzle of Party Nationalization **13**

The 'Pink Tide' after the Third Wave of Democratization 18

Political Parties: The 'What' of the Pink Tide 19

Vote Maximiser or Pure Partisan? The 'Who' of the Pink Tide 22

Party Nationalization: The 'How' of the Pink Tide 24

Four Patterns of Vote Increase in Elections 24

Measuring the Degree of Nationalization 27

The Nationalization of the Latin American Left 31

Making the Case for Party Nationalization 34

Why the Finning-in Pattern? 35

Why the Workers' Party in Brazil? 36

The Argument in Brief 41

Roadmap 43

Chapter 2: Theories on the Dynamics of Party Nationalization **48**

Neo-institutionalist Theories 53

Structural Theories 56

The Ecological and Epistemological Fallacies of Major Theories 58

Levels of Analysis and Inference 59

Cross-Level Inference 60

An Alternative Theory of Party Nationalization 63

Empirical Implications of the Left Turn 63

Electoral Trade-Offs in the Course of Party Development 64

Programmatic and Territorial Coherence and Party Nationalization 68

The Multilevel Modelling of Party Nationalization 70

Conclusion 73

Chapter 3: Programmatic and Territorial Coherence of Elites **75**

The Issue Dimension of Elite Alignment in Contemporary Brazil 78

Alignment of Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil 79

Methodological Challenges in the Analysis of Elite Alignment 81

Measuring the Alignment of Elite Preferences ... 83
The Dimensions of Elite Alignment in Contemporary Brazil ... 88
The Number of Issues Dimensions ... 89
National Dimension versus Local Dimension ... 91
Coherence of Elite Preferences ... 93
Coherence of Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil ... 94
Methodological Challenges in Analysis of Elite Coherence ... 97
Measuring the Territorial Coherence of Elite Preferences ... 99
Territorial Coherence of Elite Preferences ... 102
Robustness Tests of Findings from the BLSs ... 109
The Administrative, Parliamentary and Party Elites of Paraná ... 109
Model Estimation ... 111
Conclusion ... 112
Chapter 4: Elite Coherence and Party Nationalization ... 114
Operationalization of Variables ... 117
Equal Shares and Equal Changes ... 118
Elite Preferences ... 118
Institutional and Structural Factors ... 119
Explaining Party Nationalization with a Focus on Elite Coherence ... 121
Model Evaluation ... 121
Model Estimation ... 123
Empirical Implications of Elite Coherence for Party Nationalization ... 128
The Nationalization of Elite Alignment by the PT ... 129
The Regionalization of Elite Alignment by Conservatives ... 132
Robustness Tests of Principal Findings ... 133
Institutional and Structural Interactions ... 133
Subnational Dynamics ... 137
Conclusion ... 138
Chapter 5: Programmatic and Territorial Coherence of Voters ... 140
The Issue Dimension of Mass Alignment in Contemporary Brazil ... 144
Misalignment of Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil ... 145
Measuring the Alignment of Mass Preferences ... 146
The Dimensions of Mass Alignment in Contemporary Brazil ... 149

The Number of Issues Dimensions 150
National Dimension versus Local Dimension 151
Coherence of Mass Preferences 153
Coherence of Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil 154
Gaps in the Analysis of Mass Coherence in Contemporary Brazil 157
Measuring the Territorial Coherence of Mass Preferences 158
Territorial Coherence of Mass Preferences 162
Robustness Tests of Findings from the ESEB 167
Distribution of Mass Preferences in State Legislative Elections 167
Model Estimation 168
Conclusion 171
Chapter 6: Mass Coherence and Party Nationalization 173
Operationalization of Variables 176
Equal Shares and Equal Changes 177
Mass Preferences 178
Institutional and Structural Factors 179
Explaining Party Nationalization with a Focus on Mass Coherence 181
Model Evaluation 181
Model Estimation 183
Empirical Implications of Mass Coherence for Party Nationalization 186
The Nationalization of Partisans 187
The Weak Alignment of Anti-Partisans 189
Robustness Tests of Principal Findings 190
Institutional and Structural Interactions 190
Subnational Dynamics 194
Conclusion 196
Conclusion 198
Future Direction of Research on Electoral Politics in Latin America 201
The FMLN, PAN and UDI: Cases of Party Nationalization without Coherence? 201
The Linear Mixed Modelling of Electoral Variability 204
The Extent and Effect of Party System Nationalization in Latin America 206
Conclusion 207
Appendices 209

Appendix A: Supplementary Tables, Figures and Discussion for Chapter 1 210
Appendix B: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 220
Appendix C: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 4 233
Appendix D: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 5 236
Appendix E: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 6 247
Bibliography 248

Tables

TABLE 1.1: The Trajectory of Vote Shares (National Level) for the Left in Legislative Elections in Selected Latin American Countries (1989–2015) 21

TABLE 1.2: Illustrative Cases of Vote Increase through Party Nationalization 26

TABLE 1.3: Illustrative Measures of Equal Shares and Equal Changes 28

TABLE 1.4: Descriptive Information for Constituency-Level Electoral Results Dataset 29

TABLE 1.5: Standardized Estimates of Equal Share and Equal Change in Legislative Election Support for Selected Latin American Leftist Parties, 1989–2015 32

TABLE 2.1: A Hypothetical Example of the Effects of Aggregation 62

TABLE 3.1: Computation of Characteristic Vectors and Roots (or Eigenvalues) with Hypothetical Data 87

TABLE 3.2: Patterns in the Territorial Distribution of Elite Preferences in a Hypothetical Setting 97

TABLE 4.1: The Estimated Effects of Elite Preferences and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Shares and Equal Changes 125

TABLE 4.2: The Estimated Effects of Left-Right Stances and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Changes 135

TABLE 4.3: The Estimated Effects of Elite Preferences on Equal Shares and Equal Changes 138

TABLE 6.1: The Estimated Effects of Mass Preferences and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Shares and Equal Changes 184

TABLE 6.2: The Estimated Effects of Left-Right Stances and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Changes 192

TABLE 6.3: The Estimated Effects of Mass Preferences on Equal Shares and Equal Changes 195

Figures

FIGURE 1.1: Four Patterns of Vote Increase 26

FIGURE 1.2: Patterns of Vote Increase within Contemporary Latin American Leftist Parties 33

FIGURE 2.1: A Multilevel-Causal Model of Party Nationalization 72

FIGURE 3.1: The Trajectory of Party Positions on the Left and Right Scale, Based on Samples from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1990 – 2009) 81

FIGURE 3.2: The Number of Possible Factors to Bind Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil 91

FIGURE 3.3: The Contribution of Each Issue Dimension in Observed Factors 92

FIGURE 3.4: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors 107

FIGURE 3.5: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Issue Dimensions 112

FIGURE 4.1: Estimated R-squared for Equal Shares and Equal Changes Models 123

FIGURE 4.2: Marginal Effects of LEFT-RIGHT on Equal Changes, by Each Controlling Factor 136

FIGURE 5.1: The Number of Possible Factors to Bind Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil 151

FIGURE 5.2: The Contribution of Each Issue Dimension by Observed Factors 152

FIGURE 5.3: Party Identification in Contemporary Brazil (1987–2018) 156

FIGURE 5.4: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors 166

FIGURE 5.5: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors 169

FIGURE 6.1: Estimated R-squared for Equal Shares and Equal Changes Models 182

FIGURE 6.2: Marginal Effects of LEFT-RIGHT on Equal Changes by Each Controlling Factor 193

Principal Acronyms

ASP (BOL)	Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos
MAS (BOL)	Movimiento al Socialismo
MNR (BOL)	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
PC do B (BR)	Partido Comunista do Brasil
PCB/PPS (BR)	Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Partido Popular Socialista
PDC (BR)	Partido Democracia Cristã
PDT (BR)	Partido Democrático Trabalhista
PFL/DEM	Partido da Frente Liberal/ Democratas
PMDB (BR)	Partido do Movimiento Democrático Brasileiro
PP2003 (BR)	Partido Progressistas (created in 2003)
PR (BR)	Partido Republicanos
PRN (BR)	Partido da Reconstrução Nacional
PSB (BR)	Partido Socialista Brasileiro
PSDB (BR)	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PSOL (BR)	Partido Socialismo e Liberdade
PSTU (BR)	Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado
PT (BR)	Partido dos Trabalhadores
PTB (BR)	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
PDC (CH)	Partido Demócrata Cristiano
PSCh (CH)	Partido Socialista de Chile
RN (CH)	Renovación Nacional
UDI (CH)	Unión Demócrata Independiente
FMLN (ES)	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
ARENA (ES)	Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
PAN (MEX)	Partido Acción Nacional
PRD (MEX)	Partido de la Revolución Democrática
PRI (MEX)	Partido Revolucionario Institucional
FSLN (NIC)	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
PLC (NIC)	Partido Liberal Constitucionalista
PN (UR)	Partido Nacional
FA (UR)	Frente Amplio
AD (VEN)	Acción Democrática
COPEI (VEN)	Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente

1

The Puzzle of Party Nationalization

> 'The country (Brazil) does not yet have a *national* party system'.[1]
>
> \- Lima Júnior (1993: 151)

Are electoral politics in contemporary Latin America still local in organization and focus? The importance of this question lies in its paradoxical trajectories. First, often coupled with institutional and sociological 'barriers' (e.g. the selection and election of candidates relatively loyal to the local party leadership, the predominance of territorialized electoral campaigns, and the resilience of political clientelism), the regionalization of electoral politics has been a viable and practical solution for pragmatic politicians in some Latin American countries (Harbers 2010; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Mainwaring 1999; Morgenstern et al. 2014a; Polga-Hecimovich 2014; Su 2018). On the other hand, certain leftist parties that once served as minor opposition forces at the time of foundational or initial elections have expanded vote shares. Some were eventually capable of holding most (if not a majority) of legislative seats, at least since the 1990s. Although not yet rigorously demonstrated, theoretically implicit in this rise of leftist parties in legislative elections is the gradual (if not complete) nationalization of electoral support—meaning the growing equality of a party's vote share

[1] Emphasis added.

across electoral districts and its change over time. Here we find two guiding questions. First, to what extent are the contemporary Left nationalized in comparison to their conservative rivals? Are they all nationalized in the same way, or is there any pattern in the nationalization of their support base? Secondly, and more importantly, why were some leftist parties able to nationalize their support in this way?

These are not new questions, but few experts have addressed them directly and systematically. In the literature comprising the ‘left turn’, for example, many studies have focused on explaining why leftist candidates performed better in the presidential elections of some Latin American countries. The view that the electoral success of leftist presidential candidates cannot be explained by a single factor, but probably by multiple factors along party-, country-, or even regional levels, is increasingly shared by experts (Huber and Solt 2004; Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2008). Other specialists have sought to investigate leftist governments and their policies. Although the Latin American Left could be defined through their commitment to redistribution, these scholars understand that the policy outcomes of leftist governments have varied across countries and over time (Flores-Macías 2012). Nevertheless, despite the scale of increase in vote share, few experts have directly and systematically addressed why some leftist parties expanded their support base in legislative elections. This lack of scholarly attention to legislative elections is crucial because whether the national legislature seats deputies with a local or national focus can make a great difference in the subsequent policymaking process (Castañeda-Angarita 2013; Crisp et al. 2013).

Consequently, in this project I directly address the nationalization of leftist parties in contemporary Latin America. I argue in the introductory chapter that, of two ideal electoral strategies by the Left (defined as either ‘pure’ or ‘multiclass’), multiclass orientation is a defining feature of contemporary Latin American leftist parties (Przeworski and Sprague

1986). In this sense, although once founded upon a particular base of support, some leftists in Latin America can be seen as forming 'catch-all' parties (Kircheimer 1966; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Theoretically implicit in this trajectory of party formation and development by the contemporary Left is the convergence of their district-level shares around the national mean, to the extent that they are successful in the coordination of multiclass campaigns. Should these conditions be met, electoral volatility for legislative elections may be still high, as they gain and lose the support of new and core voters. If so, how can we empirically estimate such a variety of electoral support across districts and over time? For this purpose, I introduce in this project the concept of *party nationalization*, a framework for analysis patterned on electoral geography, defined as the equality of vote shares across electoral districts and vote changes over time.

Indeed, the empirical analysis of district-level vote shares in legislative elections (1989–2015) reveals that diversity rather than uniformity characterizes the nationalization of the contemporary Latin American Left.[2] First and foremost, some leftist parties (e.g. the Workers' Party [PT] of Brazil, the Broad Front [FA] of Uruguay, and to a lesser extent the Party of the Democratic Revolution [PRD] of Mexico) obtained relatively higher scores than their major rivals for both the equality of vote shares and changes over time[3] in the standardized scale (0–100, in which 0 means relatively localized and 100 relatively nationalized) of estimates from the weighted growth model. This standardized measure represents a slight modification of Mustillo's model (2017: 939) so as to weight the size of

[2] In the analysis undertaken in this project, the contemporary Latin American Left includes the Movement for Socialism of Bolivia, the Workers' Party of Brazil, the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El Salvador, the Party of the Democratic Revolution of Mexico, the Broad Front of Uruguay, and the Socialist Party of Chile.

[3] Here the term 'major rivals' refer to those who could hold a relatively similar share of votes vis-à-vis the leftist parties under analysis, including the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), the National Party of Uruguay (also known as the Partido Blanco), and the Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI).

electoral districts. On the other hand, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador and the Socialist Party (PSCh) of Chile have performed rather poorly compared to their conservative counterparts.[4] Furthermore, among leftist parties there exists a considerable degree of variation. The PT of Brazil, for example, scored nearly twice as high as the PSCh (Chile), illustrating a finning-in pattern of vote increase. These within- and between-country variations in the pattern of party nationalization provide us with an empirical basis for classifying the pattern of vote increase along the finning-in (e.g. PT of Brazil), the parallel-swing (e.g. FA of Uruguay), the unparallel-swing (e.g. PSCh of Chile), and the finning-out (e.g. Movement for Socialism [MAS] of Bolivia).[5]

I subsequently argue that of these possible four patterns (discussed in more detail below), we should focus on the PT of Brazil, which, unlike other leftist parties, has followed the finning-in pattern of vote increase. This claim stands on both empirical and theoretical bases. Empirically, based on the estimated result of party nationalization, the PT illustrates one of the most successful cases of expanded support across a country and over time. One empirical implication of this estimated result would be its significance for the policymaking process within the federal legislature of Brazil. Indeed, as government parties have relatively equal shares of votes in legislative elections across electoral districts, the amount of territorially targeted spending would decline (Castañeda-Angarita 2013). Furthermore, coupled with the bipartisan dynamics of Brazilian presidential elections, the nationalization of the PT might have contributed to the nationalization of the Brazilian party system as a whole. However, at least theoretically, the nationalization of the PT seems a least likely phenomenon given the supposedly candidate-centred dynamics of electoral politics in the

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[4] Those counterparts include the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) of El Salvador and the Independent Democratic Union of Chile (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI).

[5] I will discuss what the finning-in, parallel-swing, unparallel-swing, and finning-out patterns of party nationalization mean, as well as my classification process, in detail later in this chapter.

country. I argue that the combination of empirical and theoretical bases centres the PT as the crucial case of party nationalization in contemporary Latin America (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007). We must then ask why the PT could expand support across the country and over time.

The key to answer this question is, given my overarching focus on leftist parties, how territorially and programmatically coherent the left–right stances of politicians and supporters would be. *Territorial coherence* refers to how similarly politicians and supporters, affiliated with the same parties, place themselves on the left–right scale across a country. *Programmatic coherence*, on the other hand, is defined by how systematically associated left–right stances would be in relation to other issue dimensions. These concepts—territorial and programmatic coherence—in turn help us specify two conditions through which party nationalization most likely takes place. First, I argue that politicians must weight national rather than local issues so that their left–right stances can be strongly correlated (or aligned) with national issues. Thus, voters express their left–right stances to the extent that they identify with the parties which place greater importance on national rather than local issues. Second, in addition to the correlation of left–right stances and national issues, I emphasize that elite preferences must be as coherent between electoral districts as they are within each district. Mass preferences should also be consistent to the extent that they identify with (or support) a national rather than local party. If all these conditions are met, we can expect that the self-placement of politicians and supporters on the left–right scale can significantly explain the degree of party nationalization.

The remainder of this chapter develops as follows. First, I describe the subject of analysis—the contemporary Latin American Left—before discussing the implications of the left turn. Here I examine a sociological, rather than ideological, definition and argue that the defining feature of the modern Left in Latin America is their multiclass orientation, which represents an attempt to expand their backing beyond class-based support. As a measure to

empirically explore the implications of this multiclass strategy, I introduce the concept of party nationalization, which consists of two dimensions: equal shares and equal changes. Among the multiple approaches to empirically measure the degree of party nationalization, I utilize the tradition of variance-components modelling because other measures fail to differentiate electoral results into several components (e.g. equal shares and equal changes) given that they assume each component is empirically independent (As I will show, they are indeed dependent.) Armed with this measure, I will subsequently analyse the district-level electoral results of seven leftist parties (as well as their conservative rivals) in legislative elections between 1989 and 2015. Based on the empirical estimate of party nationalization for each party, I will discuss why the Workers' Party of Brazil can serve as an exemplary case of party nationalization in contemporary Latin America. Finally, I will briefly introduce my alternative theory of party nationalization.

The 'Pink Tide' after the Third Wave of Democratization

Witnessing a series of electoral successes by leftist parties in numerous Latin American countries, some residents and scholars have come to study differences among the contemporary Latin American Left (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Webber and Carr 2012). Certain leftist parties seem to have been founded in contexts quite different from those in Western European countries, for example (Webber and Carr 2012: 4). Furthermore, although most leftists have some degree of commitment to social transformation, others work relatively well within pre-existing neoliberal economic institutions in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts 2011: 3). I argue that, in addition to these historical and programmatic characteristics, the scale of vote increase that some leftist parties have achieved in legislative elections should have empirical implications important to the literature on party formation and development in contemporary Latin America, particularly the nationalization of electoral politics.

Political Parties: The 'What' of the Pink Tide

The outcome of the 1998 Venezuelan presidential election boils down to the victory of a revolutionary Bolivarian activist—Hugo Chávez—against Henrique Salas Römer, who was backed by the country's two established parties, Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, COPEI) and Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, AD). Although this victory itself would come as little surprise given the considerable degree of popular dissatisfaction towards the poorly functioning Puntofijo power-sharing system established in 1958, the scale and scope of the left turn surpassed experts' anticipation (Lupu 2015; Seawright 2012). Indeed, five years earlier, a Mexican political analyst described the state of politics in the region as follows:

> The Cold War is over, and Communism and the socialist bloc have collapsed. The United States and capitalism have won, and in few areas of the globe is that victory so clear-cut, sweet, and spectacular as in Latin America. (Castañeda 1994: 3)

After 1998, many experts came to understand that the Chávez election had begun to reveal some region-wide trends. Two years later in Chile, Ricardo Lagos won the presidency under the banner of the Socialist Party of Chile. Also, after a series of failed attempts the former Brazilian metalworker Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva finally defeated José Serra (the presidential candidate of the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party) in 2002. In fact, between 1998 and 2019, those who were elected to the presidency with some form of progressive mandate could count 19 successful elections in 12 different Latin American countries.[6]

[6] Argentina: Néstor Kirchner (2003), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007 and 2011); Bolivia: Evo Morales (2005, 2009, 2014, and 2019); Brazil: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002 and 2006), Dilma Rousseff (2010 and 2014); Chile: Ricardo Lagos (2000), Michelle Bachelet (2006 and 2013); Ecuador: Rafael Correa (2006, 2009, and 2013), Lenín Moreno (2017); El Salvador: Mauricio Funes (2009), Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014); Mexico: Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018); Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega (2006, 2011, and 2016); Paraguay: Fernando Lugo (2008); Peru: Ollanta Humala (2011); Uruguay: Tabaré Vázquez (2004 and 2014), José Mujica (2009); Venezuela: Hugo Chávez (1998, 2000, 2006, and 2012), Nicolás Maduro (2013 and 2018).

This regional trend has also drawn the attention of comparative political scientists (Queirolo 2013: 4). Although their studies are as varied as their interests, it seems possible to roughly classify them into two groups: cause-oriented and effect-oriented research projects. For the former, as their research has progressed, it seems increasingly obvious that no single factor has caused the left turn; persistent inequality, which worsened during the period of neoliberal reforms, would have increased the number of voters potentially susceptible to socialist or market-friendly programmes (Huber and Solt 2004). However, without taking into account country- and individual-level factors (e.g. the institutionalization of electoral competition, the weakened legitimacy of conservative candidates, or public opinion in favour of the Left), we could draw a quite superficial (and often misleading) conclusion because elite and mass incentives are diverse across countries and over time (Rodríguez-Garavito et al. 2008: 8–12; Levitsky and Roberts 2011: 7; Queirolo 2013: 101–102). This should result in a similar approach to the analysis of leftist governments' policy outcomes. Although the countries that have observed a left turn are all presidential systems, their respective degree of party system fragmentation varies. The degree of political and fiscal centralization has also differed between countries and over time. Some governments would, therefore, be more likely to face a number of (institutional or partisan) veto players. And to the extent that governments are required to convince those veto players, their policy outcomes might not turn out as intended (Flores-Macías 2012: 60).

Although these studies undoubtedly deepen our understanding of the left turn, I argue that scholarly attention has been skewed towards presidential elections or presidents (and their governments), leaving a key question of party development unanswered. That is, how did leftist parties expand their vote shares, especially in legislative (or lower house, in the case of bicameral systems) elections? The importance of this question lies in the scale of increase in vote shares and also its implication for the dynamics of political representation.

TABLE 1.1: The Trajectory of Vote Shares (National Level) for the Left in Legislative Elections in Selected Latin American Countries (1989–2015)

Party (Country)	Vote Share in the 1990s (First Year of the Period under Analysis, in %)	Vote Share in the 2000s (Last Year of the Period under Analysis, in %)
Broad Front (Uruguay)	9.8 % (1989)	43.8 % (2014)
Movement for Socialism (Bolivia)	15.8 % (2002)*	41.3 % (2005)
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)	41.2 % (1990)	57.6 % (2011)
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)	27.8 % (1997)	35.6 % (2015)
Workers' Party (Brazil)	7.9 % (1990)	12.6 % (2014)

Source: Release 13, Constituency-Level Elections Archive (Accessed on 23 Feb. 2020).
Notes: The first and last years of the period under analysis are shown in Table 1.3.
*The Movement for Socialism (MAS) did not run candidates under its party label until 2002, although its predecessor—Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos, ASP)—was founded in 1995 (Madrid 2011: 241). This is why 2002 is set as the first year of the period under analysis for the party.

Table 1.1 compares the vote shares of five leftist parties obtained in lower-legislative elections in the 1990s (left-hand column) and in the 2000s (right-hand column), respectively. Here it seems apparent that the leftist parties under analysis have expanded their vote shares up to approximately 30 percent in just 25 years. This expansion of electoral support naturally raises the question of how they managed to do so. The answer might come as little surprise to readers who believe that the strong coattail-effect of presidential elections would favour fellow legislative candidates, especially when such presidential candidates are widely popular (Borges et al. 2017: 664). However, this view has not been shared unanimously because, as implied from the so-called 'transformation' of the PT in Brazil, presidential and legislative

electoral results may not necessarily be correlated (Hunter and Power 2007: 664: Maciel and Ventura 2017: 118).

Theoretically implicit in debates between Borges and Hunter is that the dynamics of political representation could have differed somewhat in the context of legislative elections in some Latin American countries. Certainly, despite the considerable variation of policy outcomes that leftist governments have produced, leftists in power have kept their countries open to foreign trade and investment, just like their conservative or populist predecessors (Madrid et al. 2010: 140). Nevertheless, unlike the neoliberal populists of the 1990s who promised some form of anti-neoliberal reforms but turned their backs on the electorate once in power, the contemporary Latin American Left have sought to follow through on their election promises (Madrid et al. 2010: 141; Stokes 2001: 2). In this sense, as stated by Susan C. Stokes, exploring whether leftist parties represent the popular will in legislative elections and continue acting faithfully on the floor of national legislatures helps us understand the extent to which democracy in contemporary Latin America has been strengthened and deepened (Stokes 2001: xii).

Vote Maximiser or Pure Partisan? The 'Who' of the Pink Tide

Setting up the subject of analysis—leftist vote expansion—guides us in turn to seek out a defining feature of the Left. Or, more simply, who comprises the Latin American Left? Some scholars have sought a definition that is as broad as possible (Cleary 2006; Flores-Macías 2012; Panizza 2005; Queirolo 2013). Cleary questioned how scholars can understand such a region-wide phenomenon—the left turn—without broad concepts on the Left (2006: 36). He, in turn, defined the Left as 'a political movement with historical antecedents in communist and socialist political parties, grassroots social movements, populist social organizations, or other political forces' (ibid). However, without taking account of the critique that 'all differences are a matter of degree', defining the Left broadly risks the pitfalls of concept

misformation (Sartori 1970: 1044). This remark by Sartori is quite important here: the pattern of vote expansion by the Left may be varied to the extent that those leftist parties seeking to expand support beyond their core constituency define the characteristics of the Latin American Left. In this sense, as discussed in the literature, no single left would exist in contemporary Latin America (Castañeda 2006; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Panizza 2005; Petkoff 2005; Weyland 2009; Weyland et al. 2010). How, then, can we classify the Left?

My position is based upon a sociological approach and, as I will show later, I argue that four types would appear along two strategies: pure-class and multiclass orientation (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Pure-class orientation refers to an electoral strategy that seeks to stabilize support from core constituents, although those supporters need not be defined by a class cleavage. Historically in Latin American politics, leftist parties have drawn their support from the working class, although not all labour-based parties would be classified as such (Castañeda 1994: 20). In this sense, although leftist parties' electoral support may be stable within each district over time, it seems more likely to be heterogeneous between electoral districts given the sociodemographic distribution of workers. This could be the result of partisan mobilization and cause the fractionalization of the Left, as shown by the case of the Socialist Party of Chile (Drake 1978: 168; Gamboa and Salcedo 2009: 682). On the other hand, a multiclass orientation can be seen as an alternative that seeks to develop electoral strength well beyond narrowly defined class-based support. This implies that, although electoral volatility can be higher in each district, district-level vote shares would be more likely to reach the national average. The 'electoral-professional' Left (e.g. the PT of Brazil) would fit this type, whilst populist-like leftist parties (e.g. the FSLN[7] of Nicaragua, shown in Table 1.1) could also be included (Kircheimer 1966: 184-5; Levitsky and Roberts

[7] The FSLN has claimed this class as one of their support bases, in addition to urban labour, the peasantry, women, rural wage workers, and youth organisations (Gilbert 1988: 64; Vanden and Prevost 1993: 113–114).

2011: 12–13). If so, how can we empirically estimate such a variation of electoral support across districts and over time?

Party Nationalization: The 'How' of the Pink-Tide

To answer the above question, I introduce the concept and measure of party nationalization. The literature on party nationalization, dating back to the comparative study of parties and party systems in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), has developed gradually since the (re)democratization process of the 1980s and 1990s. As the literature has grown, it has been increasingly argued by comparative experts that the concept of party nationalization consists of two dimensions: the equality of vote shares across electoral districts, and of vote changes over time. I will adopt this conceptualization of party nationalization and apply it to the pattern of vote increase for certain Latin American leftist parties. Roughly four types can be identified: finning-in, parallel-swing, unparallel-swing, and finning-out. Following the definition and a discussion of the implications of party nationalization, I conduct an empirical analysis of this issue. The analysis reveals that, of the seven leftist parties under analysis, the PT of Brazil resembles the finning-in pattern of vote increase—one of the most nationalized cases.

Four Patterns of Vote Increase in Elections

The comparative study of party nationalization began as a research project in the 1950s and 1960s with the four distinctive works of Schattschneider and Stokes (Schattschneider 1954, 1960; Stokes 1965, 1967). Schattschneider, observing the salience of regional and personal issues for the electoral success of legislative candidates in the United States, emphasized the importance of aligning politicians and supporters along cross-territorial (or national) issues (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995: 63–66; Schattschneider 1954: 153). This attention to the territorial heterogeneity of electoral support was adopted by fellow experts to compose the first dimension of party nationalization. I define this aspect as *equal shares*, which can be

identified as the extent to which a political party obtains homogeneous vote shares across electoral districts during an election. On the other hand, another dimension of party nationalization—equal changes—was uncovered in the pioneering work of Stokes, which questioned the uniform movement of electoral support (Stokes 1967: 185). This attention to the uniformity of volatility (or support changes) between electoral districts has also attracted scholarly attention. I define *equal changes* as how equally the vote share of a political party in each electoral district changes over time.

Let us now return to the question of how some Latin American leftist parties could expand their support. We find that, along the two dimensions of party nationalization, four patterns become theoretically plausible: finning-in, parallel-swing, unparallel-swing, and finning-out (Mustillo 2017: 931). Table 1.2, for example, assumes four hypothetical parties in a country. All parties have the same share of votes in the first election (Y1), and to a lesser extent in the second election (Y2). However, although vote shares are relatively similar across the four parties in each election, the pattern of vote increase diverges. Party A (finning-in) has, for example, followed the extreme case of equal shares by receiving literally equal shares of votes across electoral districts in Y2. Party B (parallel-swing) is, on the other hand, another extreme case of equal changes because its district-level vote shares have increased equally by ten percentage points in Y2. Party C (unparallel-swing) and Party D (finning-out) fall somewhere between these extreme cases, although each pattern is still distinguishable. Party C has, for example, a relatively homogeneous share across districts in Y2 (standard deviation of 5.1), whilst the support of Party D is more heterogeneous (standard deviation reaches 20.7). Consistently, the vote share of Party C has changed (increased and decreased) by ten percentage points in all districts, but Party D has drawn more random swings across districts. Consequently, compared with Parties A and B, Parties C and D would

TABLE 1.2: Illustrative Cases of Vote Increase through Party Nationalization

	Party A (Finning-In)		Party B (Parallel-Swing)		Party C (Unparallel-Swing)		Party D (Finning-Out)	
	Y1 (%)	Y2 (%)	Y1 (%)	Y2 (%)	Y1 (%)	Y2 (%)	Y1 (%)	Y2 (%)
1	5	20	5	15	5	15	5	30
2	25	20	25	35	25	15	25	0
3	15	20	15	25	15	25	15	5
4	0	20	0	10	0	10	0	50
5	10	20	10	20	10	20	10	10
Average	11	20	11	21	11	17	11	19

FIGURE 1.1: Four Patterns of Vote Increase



be expectedly regionalized to some extent their district-level support changes quite differently between elections. Figure 1.1 depicts how each pattern differs.

Measuring the Degree of Nationalization

If the pattern of vote increase can be categorized into the above four classes, which pattern best illustrates the case of leftist parties in Latin America? Although some experts on Latin America have sought to address this question (or aspects of it), most research along these lines is still in progress. One of main hurdles is the proliferation of party nationalization measures. As shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A.1, there currently exist ten measures for equal shares and six measures for equal changes. It seems possible to measure each dimension—equal shares and changes—separately by using different measures (something undertaken by a number of experts; see Alemán and Kellam 2008, 2017; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Sagarzazu 2011; Siavelis 2014). Nevertheless, even if we can measure each dimension separately and obtain a similar estimate for some political parties, our conclusions may change if we estimate them with a so-called *bi*dimensional indicator (such as variance components or mixed models) (Mustillo and Jung 2016).[8] The estimated results of bidimensional measures in Table 1.3 serve as an example. Both Parties A and C have relatively similar estimates of equal changes. Nevertheless, they differed regarding the estimated degree of equal shares. Explicit in the difference is that Party A changed its support base so as to relatively homogenize its share in Y2, whilst Party C did not. In this sense, without measuring both dimensions simultaneously, it would not be possible for us to understand the dynamics of vote increase precisely.

Therefore, having demonstrated the reliability and validity of my proposed adjustment, I applied a bidimensional measure—the growth curve model—originally

[8] See Table 1.3 regarding different unidimensional and bidimensional indicators.

TABLE 1.3: Illustrative Measures of Equal Shares and Equal Changes

District (Registered Voters)	Party A		Party B		Party C		Party D	
	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2
1 (50)	5	20	5	15	5	15	5	30
2 (100)	25	20	25	35	25	15	25	0
3 (1,000)	15	20	15	25	15	25	15	5
4 (10,000)	0	20	0	10	0	10	0	50
5 (100,000)	10	20	10	20	10	20	10	10
Average	11	20	11	21	11	17	11	19
Unidimensional Measures (Equal Shares)								
Territorial Coverage	0.91	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.91	0.99
MAD	7.20	0.00	7.20	7.20	7.20	4.40	7.20	16.8
SD	4.50	0.00	4.50	4.50	4.50	2.75	4.50	10.5
VC	3.27	0.00	3.27	1.71	3.27	1.29	3.27	4.42
PNS	0.76	1.00	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.86	0.76	0.50
PNSw	0.90	1.00	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.75
PNSs	0.32	1.00	0.32	0.58	0.32	0.59	0.32	0.04
Unidimensional Measures (Equal Changes)								
Mean Swing		9.00		10.0		10.0		8.00
Correlation		NA		1.00		0.41		-0.90
Bidimensional Measures (Shares and Changes)								
M&P (Share)		**0.00**		NA		**10.6**		NA
M&M (Share)		**0.00**		NA		**8.44**		NA
M&P (Change)		**46.3**		NA		**47.7**		NA
M&M (Change)		**4.36**		NA		**0.18**		NA

TABLE 1.4: Descriptive Information for the Constituency-Level Electoral Results Dataset

Country	Electoral System	District (N)	Election	Party
Bolivia	Plurality*	68 (2002)	2002	MAS
		70 (2005)	2005	MNR
Brazil	PR	27	1990	PT
			1994	PSDB
			1998	PMDB
			2002	
			2006	
			2010	
			2014	
Chile	PR	60	1993	PSCh
			1997	PDC
			2001	
			2005	
			2009	
			2013	
El Salvador	PR	14	1997	FMLN
			2000	ARENA
			2003	
			2006	
			2009	
			2012	
			2015	
Mexico	Plurality	300	1997	PRD
			2000	PRI
			2003	
			2006	
			2009	
			2012	
Nicaragua	PR	17	1990	FSLN
			1996	PLC
			2001	
			2006	
Uruguay	PR	19	1989	FA
			1994	PN
			1999	
			2004	
			2009	
			2014	

Note: *For Bolivia, I employed district-level results by plurality voting because fewer districts (under the PR system) have lower variation in electoral support between districts, which *over*estimates the equality of vote shares and changes (Morgenstern 2017).

proposed by Mustillo, and modified it so as to weight the size of electoral districts (Mustillo 2017: 939).[9] Also, for the convenience of readers, I standardized original estimates so that a minimum score (0) indicates relatively heterogeneous or irregular patterns for equal shares and changes, respectively, as does the maximum score (100) for the relative equality of vote shares and changes across districts and over time.[10] The dataset that I collected for this empirical analysis included the following seven leftist parties and eight rightist parties, which contested legislative elections during the democratic period exceeding 0.5 of the V-Dem polyarchy index: the MAS and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) for Bolivia; the PT, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB) for Brazil; the PSCh and the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) for Chile; the FMLN and the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) for El Salvador; the PRD and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) for Mexico; the FSLN and the Constitutional Liberal Party (Partido

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[9] The purpose of this adjustment is to correct for the insensitivity of this measure to population data. In the comparative study of party nationalization, it has been relatively well established that both unidimensional and bidimensional measures might produce a biased estimate, to the extent that the population size of each district differs considerably (Morgenstern et al. 2014b: 189). This is because they normally estimate equal shares and equal changes based on district-level vote shares, not taking valid votes or district populations into account. Hence, it might be typical to see that some political parties with the same proportions of votes across districts can have identical estimates of equal shares and equal changes even if they obtain the same proportion of votes in different districts with different populations. Appendix A.2 presents a detailed discussion of this process.

[10] Like other variance-components models, this model does not have an upper limit. Furthermore, its original estimates are not easy to interpret because high values indicate the ‘regionalization’ of a political party, whether that is due to equal shares or equal changes (Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1330). Therefore, with the following equation, I have reversed the least and largest of original estimates and rescaled into a 0–100 scale, in which a high value means highly nationalized and vice versa.

$$\text{Standardized Equal Shares}_{\text{p}} = 100 \times \left\{\frac{(\text{Equal Shares}_{\text{p}} - \text{Equal Shares}_{\text{Min}})}{(\text{Equal Shares}_{\text{Max}} - \text{Equal Shares}_{\text{Min}})}\right\},$$

where $Equal\ Shares_p$ is the original estimate of equal shares for Party P, $Equal\ Shares_{Max}$ is the ‘least’ estimate of equal shares, and $Equal\ Shares_{Min}$ refers to the ‘largest’ estimate. The standardization of equal changes follows the same process.

Liberal Constitucionalista, PLC) for Nicaragua; and the FA and the National Party (or Partido Blanco) for Uruguay. Table 1.4 outlines basic information concerning the dataset.

The Nationalization of the Latin American Left

Although an 'eyeball analysis' of patterns of vote expansion by leftist parties may be hard to understand in terms of the different approaches employed by the Left to expand their votes, the empirical analysis of district-level votes revealed that there existed a clear difference along the degree of equal shares and equal changes. See, for example, Table 1.5. Some leftist parties in the dataset showed a higher degree of *both* equal shares and equal changes. The PT of Brazil obtained 95.1 for equal shares, the second highest score after the ARENA party (El Salvador), whilst its score for equal changes was the highest, at 100. This clearly indicates that, compared with the first election in the period under analysis, the variation of district-level vote shares had narrowed to some extent by 2014. It is thereby possible to label the PT as following the pattern of finning-in. On the other hand, although two additional parties—the FMLN and the FSLN—may be classified similarly, they scored ten points or so lower than the PT in either or both equal shares and equal changes. Empirically implicit in this lower performance is that the two parties might have been relatively similar in terms of long-term goals or charismatic leaders, respectively, but not in electoral practice (Allison and Martín Alvarez 2012: 98; Martí i Puig and Wright 2010: 86).

The second and third categories of the Left, on the other hand, exhibit a pattern of vote expansion with *either* equal shares or equal changes being relatively high. The FA of Uruguay, for example, obtained an equal-changes score as high as that of the PT. In contrast, unlike the PT, the FA performed poorly on equal shares. Explicit in this result is that, across electoral districts, the FA experienced an equal level of support swings to the party over time. However, such a pattern of vote swings did not lead to some degree of convergence, as in the case of the PT. In this sense, the FA would be an illustrative case of the parallel-swing. The

TABLE 1.5: Standardized Estimates of Equal Share and Equal Change in Legislative Election Support for Selected Latin American Leftist Parties, 1989–2015

Party	Equal Share	Equal Change
Bolivia		
MNR	79.1	91.4
MAS	0	5.5
Brazil		
PT	95.1	100.0
PSDB	92.2	85.7
PMDB	85.8	81.0
Chile		
PDC	60.4	47.6
PSCh	54.6	0
El Salvador		
ARENA	100.0	99.1
FMLN	89.6	97.4
Mexico		
PRD	35.5	71.0
PRI	67.5	6.7
Nicaragua		
FSLN	86.4	88.0
PLC	68.0	81.3
Uruguay		
PN	63.2	91.2
FA	49.1	97.4

Notes: The higher the score, the more likely a political party has equal shares and changes. In addition to the dataset, an R-script for the estimation of equal shares and equal changes is available through the Harvard Dataverse.[11] See the List of Acronyms for the full names of political parties.

[11] <Chapter 1-The Growth Curve Model for the Nationalization of the Latin American Left (Stata-Script)>

<Chapter 1-The Growth Curve Model for the Nationalization of the Latin American Left (Dataset)>

FIGURE 1.2: Patterns of Vote Increase within Contemporary Latin American Leftist Parties



PSCh (Chile), on the other hand, scored differently than the FA in both equal shares and equal changes. The Chilean Socialist Party had the lowest score of equal changes, whilst its score for equal shares placed it toward the middle of the standardized scale (0–100). This clearly indicates that, unlike the FA, the party's vote shares had changed quite differently across electoral districts. Furthermore, compared with the PT, such a pattern of somewhat random (or unparallel) swings had not narrowed by the end of the period under analysis. It would therefore be possible to argue that the PSCh (Chile) depicts the unparallel-swing pattern of vote expansion.

The last category of the Left has a characteristic pattern where *neither* equal shares nor equal changes increase. The MAS of Bolivia fits this category, where its estimated score of equal shares was 0.0, indicating that its pattern of vote expansion had rather increased the heterogeneity of electoral support across electoral districts. In addition to its low performance regarding equal shares, the MAS ranked lowest on the estimated degree of equal changes. Explicit in this result is that the MAS had experienced swings in support over time, but the range of vote increase differed considerably between electoral districts. This results from its role representing the highly territorialized interests of indigenous groups in the country (Harten 2011: 6, 83). This point is quite important in any attempt to understand why, in comparison to other leftist parties in the region, the MAS performed so poorly in both estimates of equal shares and equal changes. Historically in Bolivia, indigenous people make up a relatively large proportion of the population, but the indigenous population is also highly fragmented across departments (Madrid 2012: 38). Therefore, given this situation, the potential effect on party nationalization of expanding its support base towards urban areas might have been cancelled out to the extent that the MAS represented indigenous voters. Figure 1.2 shows the trajectories of vote expansion by these four leftist parties.

Making the Case for Party Nationalization

The preceding empirical analysis of party nationalization illustrated that Latin American leftist parties have managed to expand their electorate in various ways. I argue in this section that it is particularly important to address finning-in among the observed patterns of vote increase within the Latin American Left. Here I expand on two points: its implications for policy outcomes and for party systems. On the policy-outcomes side, it is posited that the level of nationalization or regionalization of the support base of the ruling parties would impact government spending patterns (that is, whether spending is targeted to a specific electoral district or not). On the party-system side, the nationalization of ruling parties could

affect the electoral strategies of the opposition and thereby the nationalization or regionalization of electoral competition as a whole. Subsequently, with regard to the finning-in Left (the PT of Brazil, the FSLN of Nicaragua, and the FMLN of El Salvador), I argue that the Workers' Party can serve as a model case, emphasizing the country's candidate-centred institutions.

Why the Finning-in Pattern?

In *Regional Differentiation and Political Unity in Western Nations*, Rose and Urwin (1975) argued that the varied distribution of support for the political party in power could impact the policymaking process. Note that the four leftist parties highlighted here for representing the typical patterns of vote increase have (or had) governed each country for a certain distinct period of time since the 2000s. Empirically implicit in the patterns of vote increase is that those which followed the finning-in pattern might have instituted nationally oriented spending priorities, whilst such an orientation may have been weakened due to territorial fragmentation among the support base of some government parties. Some comparative experts have addressed the effects of party nationalization and found an association between party nationalization and government spending approaches (Hicken and Stoll 2017; Hicken et al. 2016; Morgenstern 2017). Castañeda-Angarita, for example, demonstrated that the central government will spend more resources on non-targeted, nationally oriented projects if the governing parties have relatively equal shares of support across electoral districts, focusing on seven Latin American countries from 1990 to 2006 (2013: 785, 789). Crisp et al. subsequently found that the cross-district similarity implied from party nationalization could (although not necessarily would) drive a nationalized pattern of government spending (2013: 434, 446).

Another implication from the finning-in pattern of vote increase is that, as the possible priorities of government spending shift from territorial to cross-territorial issues, the pattern

of electoral competition between/among political parties in general might also facilitate the nationalization of a party system. Sartori noted in *Parties and Party Systems* that the interaction between political parties serves as the defining feature of party systems in the countries where they operate (1976: 39). In this sense, although we do not completely know the level of nationalization of all parties in contemporary Latin America, the pattern of electoral competition (or interaction) might have been nationalized to the extent that the country's major party/parties (especially the parties in government) successfully politicized national rather than local issues and led political debates in that direction. I acknowledge that the finning-in pattern of vote expansion would not necessarily lead to the nationalization of a party system, but it is reasonable to argue that other patterns may to some extent predict the regionalization of a party system through a failure to nationalize the dynamics of electoral politics. As long as the ruling or opposition parties are successful in politicizing national issues or are skilful in focusing political debates on nationally controversial issues, the nationalization of a party system is likely. Therefore, although research is still in progress, the finning-in pattern of expansion by leftist parties would imply that party systems might have been equally nationalized (Harbers 2010; Jones and Mainwaring 2003).

Why the Workers' Party in Brazil?

Of the three Latin American leftist parties that have exhibited the finning-in pattern of vote increase, which one should we focus detailed attention on? Here I emphasize a 'crucial case study' research design—highlighting how it is least likely to see party nationalization given historical and institutional contexts in Brazil—and argue that the PT is the best example for close analysis (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2007: 89-90). Selecting candidates for legislative elections is the first task of any political party; it must take place before submitting a list of candidates for designated public authorities. I argue that in Brazil (and many other major

Latin American countries[12]), the selection of candidates has been largely occurred through candidate-centred formal and informal rules so as to help individual candidates choose (and even change) party labels without a shift in their programmatic stances (Hazan and Rahat 2010: 6). Brazilian Electoral Code 9504, enacted in 1995 and modified slightly in 1997, describes how each party nominates its candidates for elected offices.[13] Nevertheless, few parties other than the PT[14] have their own rules to regulate the process of candidate selection beyond these legal requirements and simply state that 'state-level party conventions shall choose candidates for federal deputy' (Samuels 2008: 82). Furthermore, in contrast to other Latin American countries, legislative candidates have been responsible for raising funds to cover their own campaign costs because political campaigns are not publicly funded (Samuels 2008: 84–85). In this sense, rather than strictly scrutinizing candidates' programmatic stances or their loyalty to the national party leadership, this decentralized feature of candidate selection in Brazil has supposedly helped individual candidates (not parties) choose party labels and even change them so as to enhance individual (not partywide) electoral success (Samuels 2008: 85).

[12] The National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) of Chile has developed a relatively decentralized process, run by the National Council (Consejo General), which has been dependent on local party leaders (Navia 2008: 111). In the Chilean Socialist Party (PSCh), the relative control of 'small party *caudillos*' over the national party leadership has often resulted in the biased selection of candidates in favour of the *caudillos,* despite the fact that those candidates are least likely to be elected (Navia 2008: 108). In Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN) had supposedly developed as a confederation of state parties with local party militants, which were positioned sharply against the growing power of the state over the economy and the social policies of then-President Lázaro Cárdenas representing the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Although the party decided to open its candidate selection rules to a greater extent after 2000, 'PAN candidates were (…) no doubt party loyalists (…) but loyal to local militants who nominated them, not national party leaders' (Langston 2008: 152). The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), mainly a left-wing splinter of the PRI, has opened party primaries to all registered voters. This is why, of the three main parties in Mexico (the PRI, PAN and PRD), the PRD's candidates have been more likely to be loyal to local constituents (Langston 2008: 158).

[13] Lei das Eleições–Lei nº 9.504, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 30 Sept. 1997.

[14] For example, in the 'Candidate's Commitment to the Party's Principles (Compromisso Partidário do Candidato Petista)', the party requires all candidates to follow the national party leadership if elected (Bolognesi 2013: 51). Also, the party requires all candidates to have signatures from some members of the state- or municipal-party committee and also to have at least 20 percent of votes cast in state party conventions (Samuels 2008: 82–83).

Furthermore, especially since 1990, the effective number of electoral parties in legislative elections almost doubled in comparison to the standard of the previous decade. This has probably worked against the development of nationally competing parties. Certainly, the electoral engineering of a two-round system for presidential elections would have somewhat affected the pattern of electoral competition in legislative elections and drawn the attention of the public towards national politics. Nevertheless, the Brazilian presidential system, with multiple parties, has often led to policy deadlock, which in a representative democracy should be found between (not within) political parties (Schattschneider 1942: 60). José Sarney, for example, collaborated with three different coalitions during his tenure (1985–1990), whilst his successor—Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992)—formed four coalitions before he resigned in 1992 (Cheibub et al. 2004: 568). For interim President Itamar Franco (1992–1994), the number of coalitions that he formed totalled five in just two years (ibid). In this sense, given the degree of party system fragmentation, presidentialism has hardly managed to align politicians with party labels and instead has illuminated the resilience of pork barrelling and coalition-goods exchange (e.g. cabinet posts) by elites (Raile et al. 2011: 329).[15]

Moreover, Brazil's electoral system for lower-house elections—the open-list proportional representation system (or Open PR)—has supposedly functioned to enhance the candidate-centred dynamics of electoral politics. Electoral systems are in general meant to allocate seats not only to parties but also to candidates within each party. In this sense, Brazil's Open PR appears to have offered 'a number of incentives to antiparty behaviour on the part of individual representatives' (Carey and Shugart 1995: 417; Mainwaring 1991: 23). Under this electoral system, voters are offered two options: vote for a candidate, or vote for a

[15] Franco Montoro, a founder of the PSDB, clearly described that the country's presidentialism nurtured political clientelism, and this was probably why he pushed strongly for political reform to introduce some form of parliamentary system ('O eleitorado apontou rumos', *Folha de São Paulo*, 15 Nov. 1990).

party (Nicolau 2007: 3). Nevertheless, although seats are allocated toward parties by counting the total number of votes their candidates obtain, the allocation of seats to each candidate is dependent on how many votes they obtain regardless of their rank on a party list (Mainwaring 1991: 23). Votes for parties—that is, party votes—are only considered to decide how seats must be allocated between competing parties; they have no effect on deciding who wins (Nicolau 2007: 3). Therefore, as long as the assumption that candidates are supposedly office- and vote-seekers makes sense, such candidates would find it reasonable to invest more resources in intraparty rather than interparty competitions in order to maximize personal vote shares (Samuels 1999: 491).

Given the candidate-centred mechanisms for candidate selection and elections, it has been generally agreed upon by politicians and experts who study Brazil that what determines electoral success is not so much programmatic stances but rather access to political patronage or personal networks. In fact, historically in Brazil, direct contact with politicians (especially of the ruling parties) has been essential to secure public jobs (Graham 1968: 125–139; Mainwaring 1999: 182). For example, then-Minister of Administration Aluízio Alves estimated that about 1,700,000 people had been hired in federal public administration according to political criteria, whilst those who were hired through examinations numbered only 125,000 (*Estado de São Paulo*, 6 Nov. 1985).[16] Furthermore, some politicians have resorted to more controversial (and often fraudulent) strategies, including the enforced transfer of voters from one neighbourhood with a registered polling station to another, to increase their votes in elections. Flávio Pascarelli, an electoral auditor of the Regional Electoral Court of Amazonas, suggested that in the 2008 municipal election in Silves (203 kilometres from Manaus, Amazonas), the number of votes cast reached nearly 70 % of the

[16] 'Aluízio revela o caos total na administração', *Estado de São Paulo*, 6 Nov. 1985.

local population (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016: 440). This is roughly five percentage points higher than the threshold that Electoral Code 9504 set to trigger a recount.

Such a degree of political regionalism and personalism is not necessarily unique to contemporary Brazil, but Hagopian stated:

> … traditional politics survived the regime change, and traditional politicians—who had been bolstered by military policies and strategies that reinforced the structural bases of traditional politics[17] and kept alive the operation of patronage machines—were *strengthened* by the process of regime transition itself (Hagopian 1996: 249).[18]

Indeed, Lúcio Alcântara—then a federal deputy from Ceará affiliated with the Liberal Front Party (a successor of the National Renewal Alliance, which ruled during the 1964-1985 military regime)—clearly described the state of politics as follows: 'Political behaviour in Brazil is closely linked to the realization of material demands. Voters judge us for what we could provide physically, especially in the poorest region of the country' (*Folha de São Paulo*, 21 Feb. 1988).[19] Moreover, observing the rightward shift of the PMDB, former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso asserted that 'the party had changed and become a rubber stamp to obtain government jobs and a machine glued to the government' (Hagopian 1996: 236). Theoretically explicit in the resilience of political clientelism is that, as demonstrated by the cases of Brazilian conservatives in Chapters 3 to 6, one of the most

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[17] Hagopian defined the concept of traditional politics as 'a system of political organization that is authoritarian in the sense that political power is narrowly concentrated, access to decision making is restricted, channels of political representation are arranged hierarchically, and political competition is strictly regulated' (1996: 16).

[18] Emphasis added.

[19] 'Prática divide opiniões de congressistas', *Folha de São Paulo*, 21 Feb. 1988.

important dynamics of electoral politics was based on territorial or material concerns, and so political parties shifted to represent local rather than national electorates (Hagopian 1996: 16).

The Argument in Brief

Despite the historical and institutional factors that have supposedly worked against the nationalization of electoral politics in Brazil, the Workers' Party won growing support in legislative elections. How can one explain this outcome? I advance my answer to this question in two steps. First, I maintain that most conventional theories of party nationalization fall short when accounting for within-country variation. In the literature to date, scholarly debates have developed based upon two system-level factors: political institutions and social cleavages. Institutionalist accounts weight the types of political and electoral systems and the degree of decentralization in general. Presidentialism with an Open PR system, as in Brazil, contributed to the regionalization (not nationalization) of electoral politics. However, even if political and electoral systems are restrictive or candidate-centred, party nationalization would still be likely if decision-making is relatively centralized in the hands of the chief executive instead of the national legislature ('horizontal centralization'), or of national governments (including the legislature) over subnational governments ('vertical centralization') (Hicken and Stoll 2008).[20] Sociologists, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of functional cleavages (not necessarily singular divisions; religious cleavages in particular may be relevant in Latin American contexts) in this regard (Caramani 2004).

Although these system-level factors might explain the variations in party nationalization observed across countries, they do not apply to *within-country* variation, as noted above. This is largely because they fall short in taking into account so-called cross-

[20] According to Jones and Mainwaring, for example, unitary systems would motivate politicians to focus on national rather than local politics (2003: 149).

level inference. The most common form is probably ecological inference—the use of aggregate data to study individual behaviour (Achen and Shively 1995). For example, in the related literature, experts have often sought to estimate how ethnic, religious, or class-based voting could explain the degree of party nationalization, operationalizing the relevant variables with district- or national-level demographic data (Morgenstern et al. 2009). Also, institutionalists have explicitly or implicitly assumed the importance of political institutions because of their direct or indirect effect on 'a party's orientation' (or focus) toward the distribution of campaign resources (an indication of the prevalence of local or national interests) and the uniformity of elite preferences according to party labels (Morgenstern 2017). Implicit in these arguments is the following: to understand the full dynamics of party nationalization, we must seriously address the political preferences of individuals (e.g. politicians or voters). Nonetheless, despite their explicit or implicit reference to individual-level factors (e.g. political preferences), few experts have so far directly and systematically addressed this topic.

I argue that it is crucial to address the different distribution of elite and mass preferences, and accordingly I stress the growing salience of mass media in electoral politics as one of the relevant macro factors. The impact of mass media, especially television, has grown in Brazilian electoral politics since 1990 (Mainwaring 1995: 395-6; Sanborn and Panfichi 1996; Schneider 1991). Indeed, in the case of the Workers' Party, well-known publicist Duda Mendonça supposedly contributed to its development of a broad electoral strategy (including televised campaigns) as well as specific tactics for the 2002 general elections (Hunter 2010). Although Hunter's discussion focused on presidential elections, I contend that the development of professional electoral strategies by some leftist parties should have had important consequences in terms of links between politicians and voters in legislative elections. As I discuss in Chapter 2, the territorial and programmatic coherence of

left–right stances among politicians and supporters would be decisive for the patterns of vote increase that I previously identified. Here *territorial coherence* means how uniformly politicians and voters, affiliated with the same parties, share left–right stances across a country. *Programmatic coherence*, on the other hand, refers to how systematically affiliated left–right stances would be in relation to other issues. I argue that party nationalization could become likely if, and only if, elite and mass preferences are aligned coherently along national rather than local issues.

Roadmap

Despite the existence of historical and institutional contexts harmful to the rise of nationally competitive parties, how has the Workers' Party successfully nationalized its support? To answer this question, I develop an alternative theory of party nationalization in Chapter 2. I first review how comparative politics scholars sought to explain the dynamics of party nationalization, categorizing scholarly works into two groups according to their institutional or sociological orientation. For those who emphasize institutional factors, party nationalization is driven by the type of executive (parliamentary vs. presidential systems), electoral systems (the number of districts, district magnitude, and single-member district plurality [SMD Plural] vs. proportional representation [PR]), and political and fiscal centralization. On the other hand, those who stress socioeconomic factors have in turn attributed this process to the rise of functional cleavages. Although these explanations would make sense to explain *between*-country variations in party nationalization, I argue that they fall short when accounting for *within*-country variations. This is where my theoretical approach finds its originality and strength. Based on the electoral trade-offs and programmatic party structuration models of Przeworski and Kitschelt, I emphasize how territorially and programmatically coherent the left–right stances of politicians and supporters would be across a country where party nationalization obtains.

Chapters 3 to 6 are designed to examine the hypotheses that I propose in step-by-step fashion. In Chapter 3, I test key assumptions of my theory with a focus on elites: territorial and programmatic coherence on the left–right stances of Brazilian legislators. How coherently do federal deputies (and senators) share left–right stances with fellow politicians across the country? Also, to what extent do those left–right stances systematically correlate to their preferences with regard to other issues? The comparative study of elite opinion or party platforms has sought to answer these questions, but so far it has failed to do so because of methodological challenges. On the programmatic coherence of left–right stances, the moderation of elite stances on the left–right scale could impact our ability to compare how the left–right stances of politicians would be consistently associated with their preferences on other issues. And with regard to territorial coherence, few scholars have so far taken territoriality into account. This project is a first attempt to address those questions systematically, for which I employ data from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1997–2013) in principal components analysis and multilevel analysis. The principal findings from the analysis are that the left–right stances of PT politicians had been as coherently aligned along economic issues between regions as they would be within each region.

Chapter 4 subsequently explores how the observed degree of elite coherence could explain the degree of equal shares and equal changes. The dependent variables are the unstandardized (or original) scores of equal shares and equal changes, estimated from the weighted growth curve model that I specified in Chapter 1. At the same time, I employ the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1997–2013) to operationalize the independent variables of interest. These variables include elite preferences with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as the self-placement of elite samples on the left–right scale. Furthermore, for the control of institutional and structural factors, I employ the regional variance in district magnitude and the number of electoral districts, the regional variance in

the effective number of electoral parties, a regional authority index, and ethnic and class fractionalization. I specify two standard multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes (one for equal shares and another for equal changes), nesting sample responses at the regional level. The estimation of these models will reveal that both equal shares and equal changes would be more likely if politicians share some sort of leftist ideology.

Chapter 5, in turn, investigates the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences. It becomes clear by this chapter that the left–right stances of PT politicians are significantly associated with economic issues, whilst non-PT politicians are aligned along both national and local issues. What about mass preferences? Are they as programmatically and territorially (in)coherent as elite preferences? These are questions that have hardly been addressed in the comparative study of public opinion in contemporary Brazil. Many scholars have focused on analysing left–right stances and related psychological shortcuts (e.g. party identification), but no one has taken territoriality into account. It is also rare in the literature to find scholarly works that have focused on the so-called issue congruence of elite and mass preferences. This project, consequently, is the first attempt to fill this gap. I initially examine how the left–right stances of Brazilian voters would be associated with their preferences with regard to other issues, based on the principal components analysis of the Brazilian Electoral Study (2002 and 2014). Subsequently, I will analyse the extent to which mass preferences would be as coherently distributed between electoral districts as they would be within each district. These empirical analyses will show that the left–right stances of PT supporters would be as coherently aligned along economic issues between electoral districts as they are within each district.

Finally, I explore in Chapter 6 how well the observed variation of mass preferences explains the degree of party nationalization. For the operationalization of dependent variables, I use the unstandardized scores of equal shares and equal changes. These scores

indicate that a political party would be less nationalized if either or both scores of equal shares and equal changes are higher. The independent variables of interest, on the other hand, are mass preferences with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances. I also consider six additional variables in order to control for institutional and structural factors (the educational and income levels of mass respondents, district magnitude, the effective number of electoral parties at the district level, and ethnic and class fractionalization at the district level). I examine the same multilevel models I specify in Chapter 4. The estimation of these models reveals that the nearly 10 percent degree of variance in dependent variables could be explained by the independent variables under analysis. The estimated result of the Equal Shares model suggests that a northward geographical shift of electoral support would be quite important for equal shares, whilst the Equal Changes model indicates that mass preferences toward leftist ideology would strongly enhance the equality of support changes across the country.

I conclude this thesis by posing three questions that summarize the trajectory of this project. First and foremost, are electoral politics local in other Latin American countries? The importance of this question lies in the fact that some liberal and conservative parties have certainly become competitive in recent years (e.g. the National Action Party in Mexico or the Independent Democratic Union in Chile). Although these parties have supposedly managed to align voters according to party labels, I expect that they should be quite distinctive in terms of party nationalization to the extent that each party would exhibit a different degree of elite and mass coherence. Second, in addition to political parties, to what extent are Latin American party systems local? This question has gained growing attention from comparative political scientists. However, beyond the literature on party nationalization, scholarly debates come across as incompatible and misleading. I argue that scholars seem to agree on the meaning of party system nationalization, but what they empirically measure is quite

distinctive. Some scholars have, for example, examined how different the district-level effective number of electoral parties would be from the national mean (namely, district-centred measures), whilst others have sought to measure the sum of party nationalization scores of individual parties. Finally, as an extension of the second question, what implications does party system nationalization have for the institutionalization of party systems? Here I argue that the even-rootedness of political parties should impact party system institutionalization.

2

Theories on the Dynamics of Party Nationalization

> ‘Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government’.
>
> \- John Stuart Mill (1862: 310)

The above remark by John Stuart Mill comes from his 1862 letter to John E. Cairnes, in which he described how challenging, if not impossible, it would be to build a federation of Britain and its colonies by observing the form of direct colonial representation in the Parliament at Westminster. He continued: ‘The question then is whether the different parts of the nation require to be governed in a way so essentially different that it is not probable the same Legislature (…) will give satisfaction’ (Mill 1862: 333). This observation was, of course, made prior to the concept of party nationalization, but the reference to an insufficient habit of taking counsel together helps frame the discussion of the conditions under which nations, or more specifically politicians and voters, can be nationally united. As discussed in the introductory section of Chapter 1, some Latin American countries have found seats in their national legislatures held by politicians with a regional rather than national focus. However, as featured by the ‘left turn’, some parties have successfully increased their vote shares in legislative elections since the 1990s. Theoretically implicit in this fact is that some parties have successfully nationalized their support. As shown in Chapter 1, the PT of Brazil

has been the most successfully nationalized contemporary leftist party despite the resilience of political regionalism, personalism and clientelism in the country.

This finding, in turn, inspires us to ask why the PT performed as it did in lower-house elections. To answer this question, in this chapter I initially discuss how scholars have sought to understand the dynamics of party nationalization in comparative perspective. Two major frameworks are prominent in this regard. The first comes from (neo)institutionalism; all democratic countries in Latin America have presidentialist systems. The separate origin of executive and legislative offices in presidentialism has certainly helped legislative candidates focus on their districts rather than on national issues. Nevertheless, even if presidentialism encourages some form of local politicking by legislative candidates, party nationalization would be likely if electoral systems are based on closed-list proportional representation (or Closed PR) systems. Furthermore, even if countries adopt presidentialism together with open-list proportional representation (or Open PR) systems, party nationalization can be still likely if presidential coattails or political and fiscal centralization prevent a harmful degree of intraparty competition (Hicken and Stoll 2011; Harbers 2010).

A second framework derives from political sociology. Its primary assumption (as opposed to institutionalism) is that, although regime types or electoral systems are to some extent important, not all politicians (or voters) develop the political preferences and eventual behaviours that those institutions would predict. Rather, as discussed by Mill (1862) and later demonstrated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), democratic representation changes across countries and over time as the politically salient issues in a society shift. From this perspective, the nationalization of politics has therefore often been explained by the emergence of functional cleavages that encourage the national alignment of electoral support, although it could also territorialize political alignment (Caramani 2004). Such an alignment might have occurred in some Latin American countries when the working class rose to

political prominence and electoral importance in the early 20th century (Collier and Collier 1991). Nevertheless, the formal working-class sector had (and has) never been dominant in terms of its scale and weight in the political realm of many Latin America countries. If even socialist forces in Western Europe were forced to struggle to secure the majority of legislative seats (Przeworski and Sprague 1986), certainly in many Latin American countries labour voters themselves would not be enough for the Left to substantially increase its control over legislative seats. Therefore, if party nationalization could occur, it should be strongly driven by elite initiatives to mobilize support across multiple cleavage lines (Mainwaring et al. 2015).

Although the counterargument of political sociologists that not all politicians behave as institutionalists expected seems theoretically reasonable, their line of enquiry has never been free of problems. Indeed, the issue of so-called cross-level inference has risen (Achen and Shively 1995). Cross-level inference can be defined as the state of statistical under-identification, which increases when we are (practically or financially) forced to estimate individual behaviour (e.g. class voting) with aggregate data (e.g. demographic data at the geographical unit level, for example) (Richmond 1976). This approach would certainly make sense if trade unionists, Catholics, the elderly, or another group of individuals behave as their colleagues or fellow members would do within the aggregation unit of data (Goodman 1959). However, coupled with the development of survey methods in the social sciences since the 1950s, the assumption of unit homogeneity in individual behaviour has been proved unviable (Robinson 1950). Furthermore, especially in countries where representative democracies have been recently (re)installed (such as in Latin America), social and economic cleavages would be still subject to politicization. Otherwise, they could be politically dormant.

The inflexibility of (neo)institutionalists' framework to understand the potential variation in individual behaviour, and ambitious but incomplete enquiries by political

sociologists, have together resulted in incompatible findings on the dynamics of party nationalization. Morgenstern and his colleagues, for example, have maintained that the type of political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) would have few effects on equal shares, but several experts have demonstrated that it would indeed have such effects (Borges et al. 2017; Hicken and Stoll 2013; Mustillo 2017). Findings on the impact of the type of electoral system are even more complicated. Some scholars have found that the degree of party nationalization would change by the number of electoral districts (Morgenstern 2017), district magnitude (or plurality vs. proportional representation) (Tiemann 2012), or other restrictive legal measures (Lublin 2017).[21] Moreover, some scholars have clashed regarding the impact of social and economic cleavages as well. Morgenstern and his colleagues, for example, have argued that the peculiarly low level of equal changes for Chilean parties should be explained by the country's functional cleavages (and its unique electoral system) (Morgenstern et al. 2014a). However, although he only used equal shares as a dependent variable, Tiemann concluded that those cleavages had few effects on party nationalization (Tiemann 2012).

These apparently incompatible findings strongly indicate that politicians and voters would not necessarily behave as political institutions would predict, or in relation to socioeconomic cleavages alone. I acknowledge that these conventional explanations have been employed by scholars hoping to understand the dynamics of party nationalization with explicit or implicit reference to individual factors (e.g. motivations or preferences), but I argue that they have failed. No one has directly and systematically addressed the issue of cross-level inference in the literature. The explanandum is the degree of equal shares or equal changes operationalized at the district (or other territorial unit) level, whilst the substance of

[21] For example, requiring any ethnic parties to run candidates in elections 'should force the creation of more nationalized party systems' in countries with diverse ethnicities (Lublin 2017: 86). Also, spatial requirements for parties (e.g. opening local party branches or running candidates in all electoral districts) should work against regional parties and thereby force party nationalization (ibid).

explanations is all about individual preferences and behaviour. This project seeks to bridge the gap, adopting the multilevel framework of statistics. Party nationalization, I argue, should be likely if the following two conditions are met: first, the left–right stances of both politicians and their supporters are strongly associated with their preferences with regard to national rather than local or personal issues; second, individual left–right stances are as collectively coherent between electoral districts as they would be within each district. Once both these conditions have been met, the dynamics of electoral politics should be nationalized.

The rest of the discussion will be developed as follows. First, this chapter reviews scholarly works that have sought to understand under what conditions party nationalization would be most likely. Although we can find nuanced differences in each work, they can be sorted into either (neo)institutionalist or political sociology accounts. For those who have emphasized institutional factors, party nationalization is driven by the type of executive (parliamentary vs. presidential systems), electoral system (the number of districts, district magnitude, and SMD Plural vs. PR), and degree of political and fiscal centralization. On the other hand, those who stress socioeconomic factors have pointed to the rise of functional cleavages. Although these explanations would make sense to some extent, there is a critical gap between the level of analysis and causal inference, the consequences of which for scientific enquiry (especially party nationalization) I discuss. Subsequently, adopting the electoral trade-offs and programmatic party structuration models of Przeworski and Kitschelt, I put forward a multilevel framework of party nationalization based on two concepts: programmatic and territorial coherence. Finally, I discuss how important the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences would be to explain the dynamics of party nationalization.

Neo-institutionalist Theories

We find that all democratic countries in contemporary Latin America support presidentialism. Contrary to parliamentary systems, presidentialism allows executives and legislators to be elected separately. This defining feature of presidential systems shapes 'the nature of elections and representation in the assembly as well' (Shugart and Carey 1992: 7). Legislative candidates do not necessarily tie their fortunes to presidential races, although they could do so if they find any relevance for their own electoral success. Rather, as representatives of particular districts, they would be more loyal to the diverse interests of their own districts and represent them as effectively as possible (Shugart and Carey 1992: 168). Furthermore, if it is costly to develop programmatic campaigns due to the resilience of political personalism or clientelism, party leaders should concentrate their resources (including candidates and other organizational or financial resources) so as to launch an effective campaign on a particular issue or region. Such an investment cost would not be higher necessarily in presidential systems (Ziegfeld 2016), but it may well be in so-called 'inchoate' party systems in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador) where it was supposedly rare to find the development of nationally competitive parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 19–20).

However, even in presidential democracies whose party systems are relatively less institutionalized, party nationalization likely could be dependent on the type of electoral system. The translation of votes into legislative seats is different in proportional representation (PR) and single-member district (SMD) plurality systems. Consequently, in order to increase the number of legislative seats allocated to them, party leaders might think that it is reasonable to run as many candidates as possible across a country that has instituted a PR system. On the other hand, such an incentive would disappear in SMD plurality systems because it does not necessarily make sense to run candidates in districts where they have little chance of winning. But the allocation of seats to parties is not the only function of electoral

systems. 'How electoral formulas distribute a precious commodity, legislative seats, *among* the many candidates or prospective candidates seeking the commodity affects the extent to which individual politicians can benefit by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party' (Carey and Shugart 1995: 417).[22] The list type of electoral systems particularly matters here. Open-list systems, for example, should motivate individual candidates to build up their own powerbases, whilst closed-list systems would rather encourage them to align along party labels. Implicit in these debates is the concept that closed-list proportional representation (Closed PR) systems would be most friendly to party nationalization.

Nevertheless, analysing the effects of political and electoral systems on party nationalization with both cross-national and case study designs, some experts have drawn findings that are somewhat incompatible with what would be predicted. Morgenstern has shown that, contrary to predictions, the degree of equal shares was relatively low for political parties in *both* parliamentary and semi-presidential systems with at least 100 electoral districts (e.g. Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom) (Morgenstern 2017: 139, 163). Furthermore, a weak association was also found in some presidential systems with at least 24 electoral districts (e.g. Argentina, Colombia and the United States) (ibid).[23] On the other hand, with a focus on 17 Western European democracies from the World War II to 1996, Simón demonstrated that whether electoral systems were candidate- or party-centred was not statistically significant in terms of explaining the degree of equal shares across

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[22] Emphasis added.

[23] Except for Argentina and Colombia, between 1990 and 2010 all these countries used the 'first past the post' system. See Carey and Shugart (1995: 425) for Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. See also the Election Commission of India for India; Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) for Germany and Japan; and the Political Database of the Americas by Georgetown University (US) for Argentina and Colombia.

<The Election Commission of India (Accessed on 5 Aug. 2019)>.

<The Political Database of the Americas (Accessed on 5 Aug. 2019)>.

political parties (Simón 2013: 38). This result was later confirmed by Su, who, drawing evidence from Latin American cases, rather argued that the effect of electoral incentives was conditional on spatial registration laws (e.g. laws requiring parties to run a candidate in more than half of all districts in Guatemala and Honduras) (Su 2018: 202).

The nuanced differences in the above-cited studies strongly imply that, although the substance of institutionalist views would be theoretically plausible, it could be still an empirically imprecise basis on which to understand complex interactions between electoral systems and other political institutions. For this reason, beyond the static framework of political and electoral systems, a growing number of experts have turned their attention to more dynamic institutional factors: the distribution of decision-making authority within and between national and subnational governments. The assumption that underlies these works is that, even if political and electoral systems are restrictive or candidate-centred, party nationalization would be still likely if decision-making is relatively centralized in the hands of presidents over the national legislature ('horizontal centralization') or of national governments (including the legislature) over subnational governments ('vertical centralization') (Hicken and Stoll 2008: 1110). And, given the possible interaction of horizontal and vertical centralization, centralized authority in decision making has in fact been demonstrated as significant to explain the nationalization of electoral politics (e.g. the effective number of electoral parties) (Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011: 1110; Lijphart 1994).[24]

Nevertheless, this line of (neo)institutionalist analysis has never been free of incompatible findings. On vertical centralization, some experts have argued that

[24] Although the work of Hicken and Stoll (2008) would be a first attempt to determine if vertical centralization would be associated with party nationalization (and it is an influential work), readers should be careful in any interpretation of their findings becaise their definition of party nationalization was somewhat distinctive from the two-dimensional approach of Morgenstern and his colleagues, which is also the approach I adopt.

decentralization was negatively associated with party nationalization (e.g. the more decentralized a country is, the less likely party nationalization becomes). Harbers has, for example, made this case in a study of 16 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2010 and found evidence to support the above argument (Harbers 2010: 619). Golosov later confirmed it with a more comprehensive dataset of 80 countries between 1992 and 2012 (Golosov 2016b: 256). However, based a dataset of 17 Western European countries from 1945 to 1998, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas have reached a rather different conclusion, noting few significant associations between decentralization and the degree of party nationalization (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2011: 255–257). Morgenstern also found a poor relationship between decentralization and party nationalization, although centralized democracies would be slightly (but not so significantly) more nationalized than decentralized democracies (Morgenstern 2017: 142, 163).

Structural Theories

What is missing in the framework of (neo)institutionalists is the assumption that not all politicians (or voters) would develop preferences and behave as political institutions would predict. If democratic elections function to keep politicians accountable to voters, then elite preferences should be continuously *re*formed through the short- and long-term transformation of society. For example, some critical junctures had lasting effects on West European countries that fell along four cleavages: centre versus periphery, state versus church, owner versus worker, and land versus industry (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 1–67). It therefore seems reasonable to expect that, as (neo)institutionalists predict, the alignment of elite and mass preferences could be frozen (or constant across a country) to the extent that those cleavages are significant for both elite and mass alignment. However, as illustrated by ‘the wave of electoral volatility’ in the 1970s, frozen party systems can be *un*frozen following the rise of

new cleavages (e.g. post-material values) (Bartolini and Mair [1990] 2007: 59; Inglehart 1977).

Furthermore, even if society is made up of various formal and informal sectors organized along multiple conflicting interests, not all social and economic conflicts would be politically relevant. In other words, social cleavages become politically relevant only if they are politicized. This is another assumption missing in the framework of (neo)institutionalists. Let us again look at the trajectory of party systems in West European countries. Industrialization from the mid-18th century to 19th century had considerable implications for what citizenship would mean following the rise of the working class. The subsequent extension of suffrage to the working class, in turn, encouraged progressives to enter elections. However, 'the electoral progress of socialist parties was arrested as soon as they approached the magic barrier of numerical majority' (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 29). Facing such a numerical barrier in democratic elections, those progressives found the need to mobilize the support of the entire working population (not just manual workers) and to modify their ideology and programmatic platforms accordingly (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 41).

Consequently, for political sociologists, the key to understanding the dynamics of party nationalization is how nationally social cleavages are politicized. A landmark study adopting this line of argument is *The Nationalization of Politics* by Caramani (2004). His project was to investigate the extent to which the process of nation building, and subsequent state formation, had path-dependent effects on the development of party and party-system nationalization in West Europe. For Caramani and fellow experts, it would be obvious for the nationalization of politics to incorporate important numbers of people living in territorial peripheries into the symbolic communities of nations, and, in turn, for subnational-territorial cleavages to have been replaced with functional (e.g. owner versus worker) cleavages and also national identity (Caramani 2004: 32). I acknowledge that the structure of society differs

significantly across countries and over time; thus the politicization of those cleavages would not have similar effects on party nationalization in one country like they would have in others. But we can find more flexibility in structural theories than in institutionalists' accounts.

However, as (neo)institutionalists have countered, structural theories have never been free of incompatible findings. When we compare single-case research with cross-country research, we often find incompatible findings. Morgenstern et al., for example, stressed in their account of the nationalization of Chilean parties how the three sets of generative cleavages which had risen in Chile (the clerical/secular in the late 19th century, the urban worker/employer in the early 20th century, and the rural worker/employer in the mid-20th century) gradually transformed the previously territorialized party system into a programmatic and cross-territorial system (Morgenstern et al. 2014b: 756). Consistently in countries where territorial cleavages (e.g. urban/rural) would be salient (such as in Eastern Europe), the degree of party nationalization was supposedly low (de Miguel 2017: 77; Tiemann 2012; Zielinski 2002). Nevertheless, with a cross-national research design, Morgenstern and his colleagues reported that the expected effects of both functional and territorial cleavages (operationalized as party ideology and ethnic fractionalization) were not significant (Morgenstern 2017: 163; Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1335).

The Ecological and Epistemological Fallacies of Major Theories

I have so far reviewed the comparative study of party nationalization and found that two major frameworks—(neo)institutionalism and political sociology—have been developed to explain its dynamics. Multiple explanations have been put forward by scholars in each framework, and they have been continuously modified according to new findings compatible with each framework. Nevertheless, as we have seen, scholars have often clashed, even when

working within the same theoretical framework. Why does this happen? Among the potential causes of this problem, I argue that scholars should pay more attention to a gap found in the level of analysis and inference. More precisely, almost all analysts of party nationalization have relied on some form of electoral data aggregated at the subnational level, and yet the intended level of causal inference is directed at the individual level. This raises a serious problem of cross-level inference that is difficult to handle without taking the multilevel nature of causal inference into account.

Levels of Analysis and Inference

In answering the question of why there is little consensus within and between (neo)institutionalists and political sociologists, it should be stressed that almost all scholars have operationalized their dependent variables (either equal shares or equal changes or both) on the basis of electoral results at the subnational-unit level (e.g. districts or other administrative units). Morgenstern and his colleagues, for example, relied on a variance-components model developed by Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005). This is a model explaining the total variation of district-level electoral shares, based on the effect of clustering electoral results at the subnational-unit level (Morgenstern 2017: 59). Simón, on the other hand, focused on the nationalization of party systems, measured as the difference in the effective number of electoral parties at the national and district levels (Simón 2013: 30).

Interestingly, the level of inference seems mostly related to the individual level. The electoral incentives that Morgenstern and his co-authors stressed serve as a framework to infer how politicians would develop preferences to cultivate either personal or party votes, given the different arrangement of political and electoral systems (Morgenstern et al. 2009: 1327–1328). ‘Where there are many electoral districts, parties have to worry about many district constituencies (which, in turn) *influence their campaign behaviour*’ (Morgenstern

2017: 112).[25] For Simón, it seems important to address how individual politicians (and voters) would develop preferences differently. The question 'Do I compete under a national label or exclusively centred on my district?' was raised by Simón as a strategic dilemma that individual legislative candidates must face (Simón 2013: 28).

This inconsistency between the levels of analysis and inference can be also found in other scholarly works on interactions between electoral systems, other political institutions, and functional cleavages. Dependent variables (equal shares and equal changes) have been operationalized at the subnational-unit level without exception, although the subject of analysis (parties vs. party systems) and the following operationalization of party (system) nationalization has changed frequently (Harbers 2010; Golosov 2016a; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2011; Tiemann 2012). Nevertheless, they have explicitly or implicitly sought to infer how institutional or socioeconomic factors shape elite preferences to campaign for national policy issues. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, for example, supposed that '(most) politicians are office seekers', and they could therefore develop incentives to cultivate either personal or party votes differently according to the likelihood of their electoral success (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2011: 247).

Cross-Level Inference

The observed inconsistency in the levels of analysis and causal inference signals a problem—cross-level inference—that has been widely discussed in the comparative study of political methodology since the early 20th century (Cho and Manski 2008; Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Sprinz 2000). I argue that this problem could pose serious risks to the validity of causal inference on party nationalization. It could certainly be possible to claim that, in the literature, cross-level inference can be ignored if, and only if, it makes sense to assume that, within the unit of data aggregation (e.g. electoral districts or other territorial units) any

[25] Emphasis added.

individuals (e.g. politicians or voters) should act unilaterally as if they were randomly selected from the population (Achen and Shively 1995: 10, 13).[26] This is well-known among scholars as Goodman's assumption. However, this assumption sounds unviable. Let us focus on two conditions that violate the assumption of unit homogeneity. First, though institutionalists assume that individuals behave unilaterally within the same institutional design, individuals could behave differently to the extent that they have different socioeconomic backgrounds. Second, while structural theories assume that individuals with similar demographic backgrounds would act homogeneously, they could also act differently because of individual-level factors (e.g. exposure to different campaigns and political preferences).

Suppose a country wherein class cleavages serve as one of its fault lines and two parties (Party A and Party B) have mobilized the support of the working and middle classes. The column Country-Level Votes in Table 2.1 shows the number of working- and middle-class voters supporting each party. At the national level, the proportion of votes from the working class becomes 20 % for Party A and 80 % for Party B, and so does 60 % of the middle class for Party A and the remaining 40 % for Party B. If Goodman's assumption is viable, this country-level result should be mirrored at the district-level as well. Nevertheless, as another column (District-Level Votes A and B) shows, this may not be the case. Here the sum of the number of working-class voters who supported Party A in each district is of course the same as its national count, but their district-level shares are not constant. Only five percent of workers in District 1 voted for Party A, whilst more than a majority of workers supported the party in District 3. This depends on how successful Party B would be in

[26] Goodman's assumption (Goodman 1959) entails the supposition that the probabilities of supporting Party A (p) and Party B (q) by voters across electoral districts are as follows (1959: 612): wherever those voters would be in the j-th district, the individual probability (p_j and q_j) of voting for each party can be written as its mean (p and q, respectively): $E(p_j|X_j) = p$ and $E(q_j|X_j) = q$.

TABLE 2.1: A Hypothetical Example of the Effects of Aggregation

Country-Level Votes

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	30,000	90,000	120,000
B	120,000	60,000	180,000
Total	150,000	150,000	300,000

District-Level Votes A

District 1

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	3,000	45,000	48,000
B	12,000	30,000	42,000
Total	15,000	75,000	90,000
E(p)		.20	

District 2

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	9,000	36,000	45,000
B	36,000	24,000	60,000
Total	45,000	60,000	105,000
E(p)		.20	

District 3

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	18,000	9,000	27,000
B	72,000	6,000	78,000
Total	90,000	15,000	105,000
E(p)		.20	

District-Level Votes B

District 1

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	3,000	9,000	32,000
B	60,000	30,000	90,000
Total	63,000	39,000	102,000
E(p)		.05	

District 2

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	9,000	27,000	36,000
B	48,000	24,000	72,000
Total	57,000	51,000	108,000
E(p)		.16	

District 3

Party	Working	Middle	Total
A	18,000	54,000	72,000
B	12,000	6,000	18,000
Total	30,000	60,000	90,000
E(p)		.60	

Source: Achen and Shively (1995: 17–19)

attracting both working- and middle-class voters. For example, in District 1, Party B obtained 95 % of workers' votes, whilst the party performed poorly in District 3.

An Alternative Theory of Party Nationalization

At this point, it should be clear to readers that addressing the issue of cross-level inference, or directly analysing elite and mass preferences, could probably provide us more accurate evidence to understand why some Latin American leftist parties expanded their vote shares as they did. For this purpose, in this section I open with a discussion of the theoretical implication of the left turn. Here I argue that the finning-in pattern of vote increase especially would imply expanding support bases well outside of core supporters across a country (thus equalizing vote shares across a country in an election), whilst maintaining the backing of those who previously voted for a party across a country over time (thus equalizing support changes across a country over time). At the same time, however, such an electoral strategy for support expansion may theoretically disappoint core supporters by moderating traditional party brands and platforms. If so, under what conditions can a political party achieve both equal shares and equal changes simultaneously? The key to answering the question lies in the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences.

Empirical Implications of the Left Turn

At the outset of building a multilevel theory of party nationalization, it might be useful for readers to remember the empirical implication of the left turn in contemporary Latin America. As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the phenomena that motivated this research project is how substantially the Left managed to increase their vote shares in national legislative elections. An analysis of district-level electoral results revealed both within- and between-country variations in the pattern of vote increase. First and foremost, despite institutional and historical contexts unfriendly to the rise of nationally competitive parties, some leftist parties have performed better in both equal shares and equal changes than their

conservative counterparts. Second, some leftist parties have successfully drawn equal shares and equal changes in ways that can be labelled finning-in (or nationalized), whilst others have showed a quite contrasting pattern of party regionalization. An empirical analysis of electoral results demonstrates that Brazil's PT was most successful in following the finning-in pattern of vote increase.

Empirically implicit in this observed pattern of vote expansion by the Left (especially the PT) is that, given the diversity of leftist parties, some leftists should have skilfully managed both to expand their support bases well outside of core voters and still maintain a level of traditional partisan support. Chapter 1 discussed how the defining feature of the contemporary Latin American Left is their multiclass orientation. Indeed, as shown by Table 1.4, those parties that were classified as finning-in (the PT, the FMLN of El Salvador, and the FSLN of Nicaragua) scored a high degree of equal shares—indicating that district-level vote shares converge at the national mean. At the same time, these leftists performed better on equal changes—indicating that those who supported the leftists previously would vote for them again in subsequent elections. However, such an empirical implication would not make logical sense without further theoretical discussion of the so-called dilemma of the Left (Przeworski and Sprague 1986).

Electoral Trade-offs in the Course of Party Development

Politics are by and large about the process of collective decision making and, in this sense, can be democratic to the extent that the process—comprised of setting an agenda and deciding the outcome—arises through rule by 'the people' (Dahl 1989: 107). The collective meaning of 'people', however, naturally raises a question. For example, in *The Social Contract* ([1762] 1968), Rousseau explicitly supported an older vision of 'a people', understood as sufficiently small in population and territory (like city-states) to ensure that they could gather, set agendas, and reach conclusions. On the other hand, by observing the

creation and development of so-called nation-states since the 17th century,[27] John Stuart Mill dismissed this vision and argued that the principle of self-government would no longer be viable (Mill 1862: 55). As the boundaries of nation-states expanded, the form of democratic government had in turn been transformed by replacing the existing legislative branch with a house of representatives and giving a specified subset of the general population a certain degree of rights to participate in politics.

This is how, even though a certain degree of core values could be seriously devalued (e.g. voting equality and inclusion),[28] elections became the process through which the policies that office-seekers promised to realize would be subject to popular evaluation (Dahl 1989: 221–222). Here, then, political offerings and support become the heart of political representation. And not surprisingly, electoral politics have never ceased to draw scholarly attention. Yet as is common in many disciplines, the scope and scale of the literature seem to have enlarged as our enquiry has progressed (Stokes 1999; Montero and Gunther 2002; Linz 2002).[29] One continuing subject of debate is what, and for whom, politicians offer, and how voters respond in turn. Schumpeter certainly emphasized that democratic elections were meant to enhance the 'contestability' that could be defined as the openness of electoral races to challengers (Schumpeter 1943: 210). And, as a by-product of contestability, competitors would be more likely to be responsive to voter preferences unless they no longer seriously sought electoral office.[30]

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[27] This reference is based on a vision that designates the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as signifying the rise of nation-states and international systems.

[28] This is how, however, a modern representative democracy is distinctive from any form of ancient democracy through which Athenians, for example, had ruled (Dahl 1989: 218–219).

[29] As Schattschneider observed, 'Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties' (Schattschneider 1942: 1).

[30] I therefore assume that, whatever the nature of the electoral offices, office seekers are vote seekers.

However, to the extent that elections become increasingly competitive through the addition of new parties, it somewhat ironically seems more challenging, especially for established parties, to remain politically responsive to loyal supporters. In other words, as another by-product of enhanced contestability, democratic elections should continuously motivate political parties (or, more precisely, individual politicians) to mobilize new supporters for their ambitious goals and even for their survival. In this sense, as most systematically discussed by Anthony Downs (1957), politicians are vote maximisers (hereinafter I refer to this as the Downs model). The Downs model supposes that 'each political party is a team of men who seek office solely in order to enjoy the income, prestige, and power'; therefore '(it formulates) policy strictly (and at best) as a means of gaining votes' (Downs 1957: 137). 'Thus, their social function—which is to formulate and carry out policies when in power as the government—is accomplished as a *by-product* of their private motive—which is to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office'(ibid.).[31]

A counter vision, elaborated by Donald Wittman in 1973, emphasizes that political parties are rather policy-driven to serve their fundamental function in a representative democracy (hereinafter the Wittman model). The Wittman model clearly points out that voters have various issue preferences. For that reason, a voter would prefer a political party as long as s/he agrees with its particular policy stance. However, such a voter might change party preference to the extent that her/his stance changes on a particular issue (Wittman 1973: 491). This seems critical because, as clearly implied from the case of Brexit, issue preferences may not necessarily align along partisan lines.[32] One theoretical implication of

[31] Emphasis added.

[32] Even within a party, elite and mass preferences might be quite different depending on the policies/issues in question. In this sense, political alignment would not be stable, but rather cyclical (or dynamic). Suppose that there exist three parties, A, B, and C, competing with each other to secure the majority of legislative seats. Voters clearly find that they prefer Party A to Party B in terms of Policy A, Party B to Party C in terms of Policy B, and Party C to Party A in terms of Policy C. In this situation, without developing issue preferences, voters cannot decide for which party to cast their ballots.

the Wittman model goes further. Although different majorities may certainly prefer different issues, it would be uncertain (or less certain) for parties which set of issues would bring them an electoral majority. In this sense, 'The problem is not how (a party) will be able to obtain a majority but *which majority* it will choose' (Wittman 1973: 491–492).[33] Explicit in this is the concept that '(some parties should prioritize) some other objectives besides just winning the election' (Wittman 1973: 492).

Here the issue of an electoral dilemma would arise. As inferred from Downs, to secure electoral majorities, some parties would have to turn their backs on loyal partisans in certain situations. However, as Wittman clearly pointed out, such a hyper-partisan strategy would never be viable without stable partisan support.[34] *Paper Stones* by Przeworski and Sprague has systematically addressed this issue, making their case focused on Western European countries (Przeworski and Sprague: 1986). They argued that labour-based parties became competitive in some European countries, but this did not mean an electoral victory for workers (Marx and Engels [1848] 1967: 147; Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 30). Rather, given the socioeconomic structure of Western European countries, socialist parties were forced to moderate their platforms and mobilize the support especially of the middle class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 55). This is why Przeworski and Sprague stressed the stability of partisan support in drawing cross-class support (or 'carrying capacity,' to use their word) (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 69).

This attention to the electoral dilemma and consequent (potential) intraparty conflicts has been shared by Gibson (1992), although he focused on conservative political parties. In

[33] Emphasis added.

[34] For example, many socialist parties had never won a majority of popular votes by merely mobilizing the support of the working class in Western democracies (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 30). However, the substance of the Wittman model seems consistent with the argument of Przeworski and Sprague in which they also addressed the issue of the intraparty conflicts—either to maximize votes or maintain partisan votes—that socialist parties had to face.

contrast to the socialist electorates analysed by Przeworski and Sprague, the core constituencies of conservative parties—social and economic upper classes—have been numerically marginal in comparison to the working and middle classes, which together comprised the core supporters and allies of socialists. In this sense, the so-called resilience of the Right in contemporary Latin America would strongly imply that a conservative party should have well expanded its support base outside of its core constituencies (Gibson 1996: 19).[35] This does not mean that class-based mobilization would be analytically less important. Rather, without regard of the Left or the Right, it would strongly inspire us to ask under what conditions a political party could *penetrate* the strongholds of rivals and mobilize the support of non-partisan voters, while at the same time *maintaining* the support of traditional partisans.

Programmatic and Territorial Coherence and Party Nationalization

The key to overcoming the electoral dilemma of political parties is, as discussed in the literature, the carrying capacity of those parties—that is, whether they could expand support outside of core voters largely depends on the strength of their ties with core partisans (Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 69). I endorse this argument and reframe it to fit the context of party nationalization. I argue that if some Latin American leftist parties have drawn both equal shares and changes across districts and over time, it should have been largely dependent on how *evenly* rooted in society those parties were. Here the argument of Przeworski and Sprague requires another concept, coherence, to understand evenness.

Coherence is an empirically measurable concept to investigate how closely politicians and voters are united in response to each policy area (e.g. economy, regime character, economic nationalization, and religion in contemporary Latin American contexts) (Hawkins and Morgenstern 2010: 145–147; Rosas 2010: 84–85). As Kitschelt et al. emphasized, the coordination (or coherent alignment) of politicians along programmatic issues is important

[35] Emphasis added.

for programmatic party structuration. I extend this argument to state that the programmatic and territorial coherence of both elite and mass preferences (especially left–right stances) matters for party nationalization. *Programmatic coherence* indicates how strongly the left–right stances of politicians and their supporters are associated with their preferences in response to each policy dimension. *Territorial coherence*, on the other hand, measures whether the left–right stances of individual politicians and supporters are as collectively coherent between electoral districts (or other territorial units) as they would be within each district. I argue that party nationalization should be more likely if certain conditions are met, as listed below.

First, I argue that politicians should emphasize national issues so that their left–right stances are more likely to be correlated with their preferences over national rather than subnational issues. Here national issues could include anything at the country level (e.g. the best model of government or the economy), but they would exclude those that are essentially attributable to individuals or subnational politics (e.g. past political experiences). This includes mass preferences with respect to voters' preferred parties. I acknowledge that elite and mass preferences would be aligned along regionalism, personalism, and clientelism. Nevertheless, a theoretical implication of such alignment is the regionalization of electoral politics. For party nationalization, as a first condition, the left–right stances of politicians and voters must be associated with national issues.

Second, in addition to the correlation of left–right stances with national issues, I argue that the left–right stances of individuals (e.g. politicians and voters) must be as collectively coherent between electoral districts (or other territorial units) as they would be within each district (or other territorial unit). Mass preferences are also required to be coherent to the extent that preferred parties have more politicians aligned along national rather than subnational issues. Again, I acknowledge that elite and mass preferences could be strongly

aligned along some regional issues (e.g. the 2017 Catalan independence referendum). However, even if elite and mass preferences are relatively coherent within a particular region, they would be differently aligned in other regions. It is therefore required for party nationalization that the left–right stances of individual politicians and voters are as collectively coherent between electoral districts (or other territorial units) as they would be within each district (or other territorial unit).

If, and only if, the above conditions are all met, I argue that the equality of vote shares across districts and of changes over time should be higher. Without the first condition, it does not make sense that political parties that emphasize local rather than national issues could have nationally homogeneous support across districts (Hawkins and Morgenstern 2010: 145). Nor, without the second condition, does it seem possible to understand why elite and mass preferences that are territorially heterogeneous would nationalize electoral support (Ziegfeld 2016: 246). Both programmatic and territorial coherence would not be sufficient to explain the dynamics of party nationalization, but they seem at least necessary.

The Multilevel Modelling of Party Nationalization

With this theoretical framework, I develop a model—the multilevel model of party nationalization—which contrasts with the institutional and structural theories that have dominated the literature on party nationalization. The key independent variable of my model is the left–right stances of individual politicians and their supporters. Suppose that politicians and supporters, affiliated with the same parties, share left–right stances with their colleagues throughout a country.

$$Political\ Preference(x_k|X_k) = x. \qquad \text{Equation 2.1}$$

As shown by Equation 2.1, we assume here the perfect partisan alignment of elite and mass preferences. In other words, the political preference of Individual X (e.g. politicians or voters)

in District *k* is equal to the mean of individuals across a country. To the extent that the assumption is reasonable, we can rely on the parameter β_1, estimated from an ordinary regression model, to evaluate the effect of individual preferences on the equal shares and equal changes of Party *x* in Country *Y,* as shown by Equation 2.2:

$$Party\ Nationalization = \beta_0 + x\beta_1 + \varepsilon. \qquad \text{Equation 2.2}$$

However, as discussed repeatedly in this chapter, I assume that the left–right stances of individuals (e.g. politicians or voters) are not necessarily as collectively coherent between electoral districts as they would be within each district. Equation 2.3 formally expresses this assumption:

$$Political\ Preference_{ik} = [\beta_{00} + \pi_{0k}] + \varepsilon_{ik}. \qquad \text{Equation 2.3}$$

The parameter β_1, shown in Equation 2.2, must therefore be re-estimated as the average effect β_{1k} of an individual left–right stance (*j* = 1, …, *J*) in District *k* on the degree of party nationalization. Equation 2.4 specifies this as follows:

$$Party\ Nationalization = [\beta_0 + \pi_{0k}] + x_{1jk}[\beta_1 + \pi_{1k}] + \varepsilon_{jk}. \qquad \text{Equation 2.4}$$

This is a basic random-intercept and random-slope model in which $[\beta_1 + \pi_{1k}]$ is a random slope to capture the effect of individual preferences on the nationalization of a party with which individual politicians and voters are affiliated. The slope may be constant as ordinary regression assumes, but it seems more likely to be varied as individual left–right stances would differ within and between electoral districts (Gill and Womack 2013: 9).

In this sense, 'Multilevel models are a powerful and flexible extension to conventional regression' to estimate the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences and its impact on party nationalization (Gill and Womack 2013: 4). Figure 2.1 illustrates the substance of the multilevel model of party nationalization. It begins with

FIGURE 2.1: A Multilevel Causal Model of Party Nationalization



the individual responses of politicians and voters, sampled from elite and mass opinion surveys, with regard to their left–right stances. Here those responses are assumed to be varied within each clustering unit (regions for the analysis of elite surveys and electoral districts for mass surveys in this project). Subsequently, at the second level, the model will estimate the between-unit variation of individual left–right stances. Here I assume that the variability of mass preferences between territorial units can become greater than the extent of their difference within each territorial unit. If the left–right stances of individual politicians and

their supporters are relatively coherent within each clustering unit, then they could be so between clusters as well. However, even if individual left–right stances are relatively coherent within each clustering unit, they would not necessarily be so between clusters. Such an assumption of unit heterogeneity (against the unit homogeneity posited by institutionalists and structuralists) is the key to understanding the dynamics of party nationalization.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have put forward a multilevel theory of party nationalization. For this purpose, by reviewing the comparative study of party nationalization, I have initially discussed how unfriendly (or less friendly, at best) political institutions would be to the formation and development of a nationally competitive party in Latin America. Representative democracy has existed under more or less multiparty presidential systems in the region since (re)democratization. Certainly, some established parties have survived the political and economic turmoil of the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, some countries (especially Brazil) have witnessed a high degree of party system fragmentation since (re)democratization. Some institutional and structural factors (e.g. decentralization, the weakness of functional cleavages) have been proposed as a viable source of party and party system regionalization in Latin America, but such explanations have not necessarily been demonstrated.

This scientific 'deadlock' is undoubtedly consequential for the literature in that it constrains theoretical validity. I have argued in this chapter that one of the factors that supposedly causes such a deadlock would be a gap between the level of analysis and inference, although other conceptual and methodological issues (e.g. the definition and operationalization of party nationalization and key independent variables) could also play a role. With few exceptions, scholars have operationalized the concept of party nationalization

with electoral results aggregated at the subnational level (e.g. electoral districts or regions). Nonetheless, they have often referred to elite and mass preferences or other individual-level motivations (e.g. electoral incentives) to understand the dynamics of party nationalization. We can certainly estimate the effect of individual preferences on political behaviour with aggregate data in some ways, but such an attempt may be more likely to result in either over- or underestimation. This is because, as I have discussed, not all individuals (e.g. politicians or voters) behave as their colleagues do even if they live in the same electoral district and share socioeconomic backgrounds.

Consequently, I have emphasized the importance of directly addressing the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass stances on the left–right scale and its effect on the dynamics of party nationalization. Let me formulate two hypotheses here:

HYPOTHESIS-1: The more the left–right stances of individual politicians are coherently aligned along national issues, the higher the degree of party nationalization would be.

HYPOTHESIS-2: The more the left–right stances of individual voters are coherently aligned along national issues, the higher the degree of party nationalization would be.

The next two chapters focus on demonstrating the first hypothesis. Chapter 3 addresses a key assumption—programmatic and territorial coherence—and, in Chapter 4, I examine the extent to which the observed coherence of elite stances on the left–right scale would be associated with party nationalization. Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the empirical analysis of mass preferences and their effect on party nationalization.

3

Programmatic and Territorial Coherence of Elites

> ‘Democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties’.
>
> - Elmer E. Schattschneider (1942: 60)

To what extent are the left–right stances of politicians consistently associated with their preferences regarding other issues? In turn, how coherently do Brazilian politicians share left–right stances with colleagues across the country? These are the questions which I will address in this chapter. In the comparative study of elite opinion surveys or party platforms in contemporary Brazil, at least until the mid-1990s, the alignment of elite preferences had supposedly been clear along political and economic lines (Kinzo 1993; Power 2000). This would not be surprising because, in the early years of the post-transition period, many politicians still had some form of direct experiences working with the military regime, and also the country’s economy had been under the growing threat of hyperinflation. Nevertheless, as years passed following the democratic transition and due to the relative success of the Real Plan (Plano Real) in controlling hyperinflation, elite alignment might have diversified so that a unidimensional measure (e.g. the left–right scale) could not necessarily capture what was originally intended (Madeira and Tarouco 2011; Power 2008).

If so, to what extent is the self-placement of Brazilian politicians on the left–right scale associated with their preferences regarding other issues? To answer this question, I have

conducted a principal components analysis of selected sampled politicians (federal deputies and senators) from Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLSs) over the 1997–2013 period. The selected samples consisted of 320 federal deputies and senators from ten Brazilian parties who answered questions on political and economic issues. Furthermore, I included questions on the past political experience of the sampled politicians and their family members in order to see how important personal or local attributes, which had been demonstrated resilient in the Brazilian politics, would be (Hagopian 1996). And finally, the self-placement of elite samples on the left–right scale was included in the dataset. The principal components analysis of elite responses revealed three factors important for elite alignment in contemporary Brazil. The first factor was largely composed of variables on the best economic model and the self-placement of politicians on the left–right scale. On the other hand, two additional factors reflect more local issues to the extent that they were comprised of variables that concern past political experiences. This result would demonstrate that, at least for some (if not all) parties, elite alignment would be strongly based on national issues.

The next question which I will address is the territorial coherence of elite preferences, given the observed dimensions of elite alignment in contemporary Brazil. This comprises the second condition of my theory of party nationalization: the territorial coherence of elite preferences. I argued in Chapter 2 that, without closely looking at the coherence of elite preferences across electoral districts (or other territorial boundaries), we cannot understand why some parties would be more nationalized than others *even if* they operate in the same country (thus sharing institutional and sociodemographic contexts). Nevertheless, probably except for the 1993 work of Kinzo, the comparative analysts of elite opinion in contemporary Brazil have hardly taken territoriality into account in any analysis of elite coherence. I acknowledge how important the contributions of these works would be, but the lack of scholarly attention to territoriality is critical for this project. Politicians would not necessarily

be as coherently aligned along observed issue dimensions (or factors) between electoral districts (or other territorial units) as they would be within each district.

Consequently, instead of relying on the extant literature or making a somewhat unreasonable assumption about the territorial coherence of elite preferences, I have conducted a multilevel analysis of elite responses using 323 selected samples from the BLSs (1997–2013). I specified a two-level binomial model for variables with binary response categories (17 out of 19 variables) and a two-level ordinal model for the two variables with multiple response categories (economic and left–right issues). The clustering unit of elite responses was regions, and the coefficient of interest was the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC ranges from 0 to 1, in which 0 indicates that no proportion of observed variation among elite responses is explained by the effect of clustering at the regional level. The results of the multilevel analysis showed that elite samples from the PT were as coherently aligned along economic and left–right issues between regions as they were within each region. Non-PT politicians, on the other hand, were seen to be more heterogeneous, aligned along both national (economic or left–right issues) and traditional (past political experiences) issues.

Explicit in these findings is that the left–right stances of PT politicians have been coherently aligned along economic issues across the country, whilst this would not be the case for other parties. If that is the case, to what extent could such a finding be verified even if we use a different set of elite surveys? For this purpose, I have designed a robustness test with another elite survey: Administrative, Parliamentary, and Party Elites of Paraná (APEP). I compiled a subnational dataset with a focus on all variables, asking questions similar to those in the dataset that I compiled from the BLSs, and I ended up with 102 elite samples who completed questions on political, economic and left–right issues. I followed the same model-specification procedure as with the analysis of the BLSs and estimated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) here as well. The multilevel analysis of this subnational dataset

showed that, as expected, selected PT samples were again demonstrated to be relatively coherent along economic issues, whilst non-PT selected samples were not.

My discussion in this chapter will be developed in two stages. First, I review the comparative study of elite opinion surveys and party platforms in contemporary Brazil and discuss how scholars have understood issue dimensions important for elite alignment in this country. The review will show that, at least during the early years of the post-transition period, the left–right spectrum of politics supposedly worked to align politicians along political and economic issues. Such elite alignment, however, might have supposedly waned to some extent since the mid-1990s. If so, how aligned are Brazilian politicians? To answer this question, I then conduct the principal components analysis of 320 selected samples from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1997–2013) and show that left–right stances would be strongly associated with economic issues. Subsequently, I address the issue of the territorial coherence of elite preferences in contemporary Brazil. For this purpose, I specify two-level binomial and ordinal models and estimate how important it would be to cluster elite responses at the regional level. The estimation will show that PT politicians would be as coherently aligned along economic and left–right issues between regions as they would be within each region.

The Issue Dimension of Elite Alignment in Contemporary Brazil

To what extent are the left–right stances of politicians consistently associated with their preferences regarding other issues? So far in the comparative study of elite opinion surveys and party platforms in Brazil, the consensus has been that the left–right spectrum of politics worked to align politicians along political and economic issues until the mid-1990s. However, as years passed following the country's transition to democracy and also as a result of the stabilization of the country's economy, elite alignments seem to have diversified. Some

experts would recognize this as a sign of elite *de*alignment. If so, how aligned are politicians in contemporary Brazil? I argue that moderation on the self-placement of politicians on the left–right scale may not necessarily indicate dealignment.

Alignment of Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil

Scholars endeavouring to understand the policy stances of politicians in contemporary Brazil have come to recognize that the self-placement of politicians on the left–right spectrum—one of the reasonable estimates to understand the alignment of politicians across a country—would not necessarily turn out as they might expect. In fact, some scholars have argued persuasively that one key political dimension on which to assess politicians' alignment is their association with the military regime (Power 2000: 37). Madeira and Tarouco, for example, maintain that many politicians who worked for the authoritarian regime organized right-wing political parties (e.g. the Liberal Front Party and the Progressive Party) shortly after regime transition in 1985, whilst those parties that were the successors or splinters of the official opposition party (the Brazilian Democratic Movement) during the authoritarian regime were classified as the centre (e.g. the PSDB and the PMDB). Progressive forces, which were not allowed to organize any political organizations until the early 1980s (such as the PT), were placed on the left of the political spectrum (Madeira and Tarouco 2011: 175). In contrast, several experts have focused on an economic dimension—state interventionism versus capitalism (Rodrigues 2009: 25). Support for state interventionism was supposedly high among leftist politicians around the early 1990s, whilst the Centre-Right and the Right had been in support of capitalism (Kinzo 1993: 77).

Furthermore, some analysts have concluded that politicians (especially those on the Left) had been relatively loyal to their parties' ideological and programmatic platforms. For example, during the 49th session of the Chamber of Deputies (1991–1995), 67.8 percent of the federal deputies who were elected in the 1990 general election remained with the parties

with which they had been affiliated throughout the session (Schmitt 1999: 140). Although this figure may indicate relative stability of party affiliation by Brazilian politicians, the proportion of deputies engaged in party-switching varied more considerably across the left, centre and right programmatic blocks. Federal deputies who remained with their parties amounted to 81.2 % of those affiliated with any leftist parties, and so did 80.1 % of those who were from the centre block (Schmitt 1999: 141). In contrast, the right block had more party switchers, with 44.5 % of federal deputies leaving the party with which they were initially affiliated over the course of the legislative session (ibid). In this sense, although some experts emphasized how frequently Brazilian politicians changed party labels, the extent of programmatic consistency broadly reflected left-right alignment (Mainwaring 1991: 29-33; Novaes 1994: 113).

However, among the scholarly works focused on the 2000s or later, there is far less consistency in the conclusions reached concerning the policy stances of Brazilian politicians and their implications for electoral politics. For example, in the several expert surveys that were conducted in 2007 and 2010, the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB) has been recognized as being generally somewhere between the centre and the right of the political spectrum (Tarouco and Madeira 2015: 36). However, if we look at the PTB platform drafted before the 2002 general election, it turns out that the party referred to some words as frequently as leftist parties did (e.g. the welfare state, the working class) (Tarouco and Madeira 2013: 159). Whether the PTB would resemble the Left or the Right may depend on the type of measurements employed (e.g. expert surveys or manifestos), as shown by Figure 3.1, but it seems reasonable to conclude that the overall policy stances of politicians have somewhat blurred between (and within) political parties since the mid-1990s (Power and Zucco 2012: 24). The figure clearly shows that the distance between the left and right blocks had narrowed throughout the period of analysis (1990-2009). Explicit in such a change

FIGURE 3.1: The Trajectory of Party Positions on the Left and Right Scale, Based on Samples from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1990–2009)



Source: Power and Zucco (2012: 24)

is that Brazilian politicians, whoever they would be the Left or the Right, had been more likely to place themselves around the centre of the political spectrum.

Methodological Challenges in the Analysis of Elite Alignment

The recent scholarly debates on the programmatic stances of Brazilian politicians naturally raise the question of how relevant the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ would be in contemporary Brazil. On this question, some scholars have argued that, coupled with the increasing similarity of programmatic stances between political parties and also the degree of party system fragmentation, the practice of ‘personal’ (or ‘descriptive’, to use the word employed by Boas and Smith) rather than ‘partisan’ representation would have been strengthened (Boas and Smith 2019; Bolognesi et al. 2019). Boas and Smith, for example, found that territorially targeted spending schemes (such as university quotas for underrepresented groups) would be

more likely to reflect the congruence of elite and mass preferences rather than programmatic issues (Boas and Smith 2019: 318). Theoretically implicit in this finding concerning the pattern of electoral geography is the growing regionalization of electoral support, to the extent that the distribution of supporters would vary demographically across electoral districts.

However, it is also true that what we can know with a measurement (such as the left-right stances of politicians) depends on the characteristics of the measurement itself. Its implication for elite alignment is that, if Brazilian politicians associate other issues differently with the terms Left and Right, left-right stances would be aligned along multiple issue dimensions (not only a single issue dimension). Madeira and Tarouco, for example, have argued that the results of the Comparative Manifesto Project[36] (CMP) show that a considerable percentage of the phrases employed in the manifestos published by major Brazilian parties could not be properly classified along the traditional left–right scale (Madeira and Tarouco 2011: 183). They wrote: 'If this interpretation is correct, the high rate of unclassified phrases may be the result not only of the inadequacy of the categories used by the CMP to study the Brazilian case, but also of the excessively wide character of the party programs in Brazil'. Such broadness of understanding the Left and Right by Brazilian politicians raises a critical question as to how they understand the terms. Are political and economic issues still significantly associated with left-right stances? Or is there any other issue relevant for elite alignment? Also, which party would be aligned along political and economic issues, and which one is not?

[36] This is a project that aims to investigate the policy stances of over 1,000 political parties since 1945 in over 50 countries. It allows scholars to access both original and coded electoral manifestos online.

<Manifesto Project (Accessed on 30 Mar. 2020)>

Measuring the Alignment of Elite Preferences

To answer these questions, I sought to determine how the policy stances of politicians (especially federal deputies) in contemporary Brazil would be aligned by employing the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLSs). This is a project that provides scholars with access to legislators' (incumbent federal deputies and senators) opinions with regard to their stances on both political and economic issues (e.g. preferences toward the type of political and electoral systems, the relevance of political parties vis-à-vis their own attributes in elections, and state interventionism versus capitalism) and other issues such as past political experiences (Power and Zucco 2012). Although another project—Parliamentary Elites of Latin America, based at the University of Salamanca (PELA-USAL)—has also regularly surveyed elite opinions across 19 Latin American countries since 1994, its Brazilian wave only covers three legislative sessions: the 52nd session (2003–2007), the 53rd session (2007–2011), and the 54th session (2011–2015) of the federal Chamber of Deputies. In contrast, as of early 2019, the BLSs covered the entire period of the post-1985 democratic regime, from the 48th session (1987–1991) to the 54th session (2011–2015) of the Chamber of Deputies.[37] This broad coverage allows us to examine the longer period in which the PT had been both an opposition party (before 2002) and the ruling party (after 2003).

The empirical analysis of the policy stances of Brazilian legislators has been developed in two steps. First, among all questions (310 in total) on the BLSs questionnaires, I selected those which had been consistently asked in all seven waves (1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013). These questions included FIDELITY ('Should parties whip votes?'), BELIEVE ('Do you think that the members of Congress should vote with their party or according to their personal beliefs?'), EFFORTS ('Importance of party vis-à-vis personal

[37] The latest version of the BLS, released on 12 Sept. 2020, covers the 55th session (2015–2019) as well (Power and Zucco 2019).

efforts to win elections'), MILITARY ('Are you in favour of the inclusion of the constitutional provision that gives the Armed Forces the right to intervene to ensure internal order?'), past political experiences,[38] and LEFT–RIGHT ('Ideological self-placement'). These questions are all relevant in the Brazilian context. The question on past political experiences helps us understand how personal backgrounds—a pillar of traditional politics in Brazil—would be associated with the distribution of elite preferences, constituting one dimension of issue stances (hereinafter, the 'traditional' dimension) (Hagopian 1996: 18). Other questions, except for LEFT–RIGHT, are more political, largely involving political issues relevant in Brazilian politics (Power 2000).

However, as recent scholarly debates suggest, we might not be able to fully understand any changes in legislators' opinions without taking other issues (especially economic issues) into account (Madeira and Tarouco 2011: 175; Rodrigues 2009: 24). This is why I limited analysis to the period from 1997 to 2013 so that we could add another question, ECONOMY ('What is the best economic system for Brazil?') to constitute the third analytical dimension (hereinafter, 'economic' dimension). This meant dropping two legislative sessions, the 48th session (1987–1991) and the 49th session (1991–1995), from the period under analysis, but including the economic dimension allowed inclusion of further questions regarding political and traditional dimensions. The political variables DECREE ('Presidential decree authority is needed in Brazil') and SWITCH ('Party switchers should lose their mandate') were added, for a total of six questions. CLIENTELISM ('Do you agree that voters demand clientelist behaviour?') and LOCAL INTERESTS ('When there is a conflict between the interests of your region and those of your party, how do you generally vote [at roll-call]?') were added to the traditional dimension, increasing the number of

[38] These experiences include service as a city councillor, state deputy, senator, federal deputy, mayor, governor, cabinet minister (of the federal government), and state secretary. The question concerning the past political experiences of interviewees' family members or relatives had also been asked consistently in all waves.

questions in this dimension to 11. This procedure of variable selection yielded 320 observations (incumbent federal deputies and senators) from the total 1,146 observations. Table B.1 in Appendix B.1 includes basic information concerning this subset, including the series number, question wording, and scale used for each question under analysis.

Second, I employed the technique of principal components analysis to determine how Brazilian legislators would be aligned along the three issue dimensions (political, economic and traditional), as well as their self-placement on the left–right scale. The term (elite or party) 'alignment' implicitly assumes that the policy stances of politicians could change systematically if they share some form of political identity (e.g. party affiliation), if their electoral districts are located in the same region, or if their personal backgrounds (e.g. past political experiences) are similar. Some issues (e.g. economic reforms such as nationalization or deregulation) could be inevitably associated with others (e.g. political reforms including decentralization) for some politicians but not for others. This is why, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is important to initially look at which issues (or, more precisely, the policy stances of Brazilian legislators) would be associated (or correlated). I expect here that when we look at all selected elite samples without regard to their party affiliation, probably political and economic issue dimensions would be associated so as to align elite preferences in systematic ways. Let us call these political and economic dimensions a *national* dimension. And to the extent that it could be defined by political and economic issues, the left–right spectrum can be also regarded as national. However, I assume that the third dimension—traditional—may be independent of political, economic and left–right issues. In this sense, it would be reasonable to call it a *local* dimension.

How likely, then, would the national and local alignment of Brazilian legislators be? This is the question which the technique of principal components analysis—one form of factor analysis—can answer. Appendix Table B.1 shows 19 variables of interest. Although it

might be possible to determine how sample responses to a selected variable would be correlated with responses to other variables, this is not a viable approach because there are 361 entries in the correlation matrix of 19 variables. Furthermore, even if we could expect that both political and economic dimensions might be roughly correlated, we do not know which issues in each dimension would be strongly associated. Given the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the data, principal components analysis helps us simplify the complex matrix of variables under analysis and find relevant variables that can be eventually associated (Royce 1963: 522). The substance of principal components analysis is to estimate the correlation matrix of variables under analysis so that the estimated degree of correlation between each variable should reflect a proportion of variance explained by a factor(s) common across the variables under analysis (Kline 1994: 29). But what exactly does it mean that some proportion of variance in the variables under analysis could be explained by something common across the variables?

Principal components analysis deals with this question by identifying two pieces of information concerning the correlation matrix of interest: characteristic vectors, and characteristic roots (Dunteman 1989: 16–22).[39] Let me simulate how a principal components analysis identifies these two characteristics by using a hypothetical dataset with three variables of interest (Variables A, B and C). Four steps are required to understand what proportions of variance in the three variables could be explained by a common factor. The first step is, as shown in the upper layer of Table 3.1, to estimate correlation coefficients and create a correlation matrix of these variables. The row 'Total' is the sum of correlation

[39] Characteristic vectors, often called eigenvectors, are a scaled form of original vectors, describing the best fitting line to variables in question. Characteristic roots (or eigenvalues), on the other hand, suggest the distances between the best fitting line and original individual scores, computing the sum of the squares of the distances. Suppose two hypothetical points on the x-y plane: A = (2, 1) and B = (1, 2). In this case, a characteristic vector is equal to the slope of the equation y = x (though its length is rescaled to 1 in principal components analysis). Characteristic roots are then calculated as the sum of squares of the distances between the slope (which is 1) and two points (A and B).

Table 3.1: Computation of Characteristic Vectors and Roots (or Eigenvalues) with Hypothetical Data

Step 1 (Correlation Matrix)

	A	B	C
A	1.00	0.85	0.35
B	0.85	1.00	0.40
C	0.35	0.40	1.00
Total	2.20	2.25	1.75

Step 2 (First Vector)

	A	B	C
A	1.00	0.85	0.35
B	0.85	1.00	0.40
C	0.35	0.40	1.00
Total	2.20	2.25	1.75
V_1	**0.64**	**0.65**	**0.51**

Step 3 (Second Vector)

	A	B	C
A	0.64	0.55	0.18
B	0.54	0.65	0.20
C	0.22	0.26	0.51
Total	1.40	1.46	0.89
V_2	**0.63**	**0.66**	**0.40**

Step 4 (Third Vector)

	A	B	C
A	0.63	0.56	0.14
B	0.54	0.66	0.16
C	0.22	0.26	0.40
Total	1.39	1.48	0.70
V_3	**0.65**	**0.69**	**0.33**

	Factor 1
F. Loading A	0.63 (40%)
F. Loading B	0.66 (44%)
F. Loading C	0.40 (16%)
Eigenvalue	1.00 (33%)

coefficients for each variable. The second step is to estimate a first vector, based on the correlation matrix. V_1 is the quotient of Total (2.20, 2.25, 1.75) in Step 1 divided by 12.96—the square root of the sum of squared Total in Step 1. This procedure basically corresponds to V_2 and V_3, although entries in the matrix of Steps 2 and 3 turn to correlation coefficients multiplied by V_1 (for Step 2) and V_2 (for Step 3), respectively. The square root of the sum of squared Total (0.42, 0.48, 0.11) in Step 3 is an eigenvalue that tells us that 33 percent of the variance in *all* variables could be explained by Factor 1 (Child 2006: 47–8; Kline 1994: 5–6, 30–33; Lorenzo-Seva 2013: 4). Further, by multiplying V_2 with the eigenvalue, we can determine the proportion of variance in *each* variable explained by Factor 1 (Kline 1994: 5–6, 30–33). Therefore, for the analysis of elite preferences employing the BLSs, it is important to identify how many factors would exist to account for variance in the selected variables, and also to understand what variables would contribute most in each factor.

The Dimensions of Elite Alignment in Contemporary Brazil

How many factors can be identified for the policy stances of Brazilian legislators, and with regard to the observed factors, which variable's variation would be largely explained by them? To answer these questions, I have analysed the survey responses of the 320 sampled elites who I selected from the BLSs (1997–2013), with regard to 19 questions on both political, economic, and traditional dimensions and self-placement on the left–right scale.[40] I initially sought to identify the number of factors relevant for elite alignments. Scree plotting (a technique for determining the number of factors to retain in a factor analysis or a principal components analysis) showed the proportion of variation among *all* elite responses explained by detected factors and revealed that there were three factors along which elite preferences were relatively aligned. Furthermore, a subsequent analysis of factor loadings—the

[40] Although it is normally regarded as preferable to have a larger set of samples, the sample size utilized here is large enough to conduct a principal components analysis (Guilford 1956; Kline 1994: 73).

proportion of variance in *each* variable explained by the detected factors—showed that the first factor was largely composed of cross-territorial issues, whilst the other two factors were a mixture of cross-territorial and territorial issues. This finding clearly meets the first condition discussed in Chapter 2: that elite preferences should be associated along national issues for there to be nationalization of electoral politics.

The Number of Issue Dimensions

The number of component factors can be very large, especially when we are dealing with numerous variables, although it must not become larger than the number of variables under analysis. The question to be asked, therefore, is which factor should be extracted (or identified as relevant). Although the aim of principal components analysis (or factor analysis in general) is to simplify the complex matrix of correlations, the identification of too few factors is also likely to blur the difference between first- and second-order factors (Kline 1994: 74). However, if we decide to pick just two or less of any possible factors in the correlation matrix, it would be difficult to interpret what the detected factors mean precisely. As stated previously, then, the question to be asked is 'How many of these factors it is worth taking out?' (Cattell 1966: 246).

Some rules of thumb regarding the retention of relevant factors are to examine the size of eigenvalues and also the steepness of a slope by plotting eigenvalues (or the proportion of explained variance). Regarding the size of eigenvalues, Kaiser suggested a 'greater-than-one' criterion (Kaiser 1960). He argued that picking factors with eigenvalues larger than one could help analysts interpret what those factors mean exactly (Kaiser 1960: 145). However, although Kaiser's solution is mathematically precise, this very preciseness may preclude the identification some factors that are theoretically important (or non-trivial, according to Cattell 1966: 248–249). Some factors could remain important if they increase the proportion of explained variance, even if their eigenvalues are less than one (Cattell 1966:

247–248). This is why, in deciding on the number of factors to extract, I have taken both Kaiser's and Cattell's approaches into account.

The principal components analysis of the policy stances of 320 selected elite samples demonstrates that there are at least three important factors that significantly explain variance in all the variables under analysis.[41] Of the 19 possible factors that correspond to the number of variables, the first and second factors (hereinafter, Factor 1 and Factor 2) returned estimated eigenvalues of 2.0 and 1.0, respectively. This estimated result clearly meets Kaiser's 'greater-than-one' solution. The third factor (Factor 3), in contrast, falls slightly short of the 'greater-than-one' criterion, returning an estimated eigenvalue of 0.9. Given the poor performance of Factor 3, those who take the mathematical criterion seriously may argue for dropping this factor.

However, such a conclusion, I argue, would be too deterministic to accept without further analysis on the basis of Cattell's solution–scree plotting. Indeed, by plotting the proportion of variance explained by factors, it turned out that Factor 3 would be at least as important as Factor 2. Figure 3.2 shows the proportions of variation explained by the top ten factors (of the total 19 factors). It seems relatively clear that there exist two points at which the steepness of the slope changes: between Factor 1 and Factor 2, and between Factor 3 and Factor 4. Though we do noy know yet at this stage that how these factors would be different in their components, this finding clearly indicates that, coupled with the size of the second factor's eigenvalue, Factor 3 should be the subject of the analysis.

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[41] An R script on a statistical command to perform principal components analysis, as well as a dataset titled 'Chapter 3-Principal Components Analysis (R-Script)' and 'Chapter 3-Principal Components Analysis (Dataset)', are available at Harvard Dataverse.

<Chapter 3-Principal Components Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 3-Principal Components Analysis (Dataset)>

FIGURE 3.2: The Number of Possible Factors to Bind Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil



National Dimension versus Local Dimension

What variables, in turn, define those factors (Factors 1 to 3) that we have detected? A subsequent analysis of factor loadings revealed that Factor 1—the most important factor—strongly loaded on (or explained the variance of) LEFT–RIGHT and ECONOMY, whilst Factors 2 and 3 were largely comprised of ECONOMY, SENATOR, FEDERAL DEPUTY, and GOVERNOR. Figure 3.3 shows the variance of *each* variable explained by different factors. Dashed red lines in each plot indicate the expected average value of all factor loadings under analysis. It was striking that, on Factor 1, LEFT–RIGHT had more than the 30 % of its variance explained by the factor; the explained variance of ECONOMY was smaller (20 %) but still significant. These variables clearly indicate that the left–right stances of some Brazilian politicians had been significantly associated with economic issues, making

some politicians (especially on the Left) strongly aligned along this dimension since the 1990s (Carreras et al. 2015: 682). In this sense, although we have not yet rigorously tested its implication for the pattern of electoral geography, it would be reasonable to argue that Factor 1 represents some of the national (re)alignment predominant among certain Brazilian politicians.

FIGURE 3.3: The Contribution of Each Issue Dimension to Observed Factors



In contrast, the interpretation of Factor 2 is as easy as Factor 1. ECONOMY has the second largest factor loading, meaning that nearly 15 % of variance in this variable could be accounted for by the factor. Two political issues, FIDELITY and DECREE, were also

consistently well above the expected average value of the proportion of explained variance (5 %). Implicit in these findings is that, probably based on policy stances on economic issues, some politicians (especially on the Left) have showed a strong commitment to their parties, which may have popular presidents or presidential candidates. However, Factor 2 implies that there might be another interpretation quite contrary to what we discussed above. In fact, the largest factor loading was given to SENATOR—the past experience of selected samples who served as a senator. Although this variable may not itself necessarily indicate something different, when coupled with two additional variables focused on past political experiences it might be reasonable to argue that Factor 2 would also loosely reflects the policy stances of those who are in the established political class in contemporary Brazil. In this sense, probably more clearly than Factor 1, Factor 2 would represent some sort of political tension between national (or programmatic) and local (or traditional) dimensions. Factor 3 could be interpreted similarly to Factor 2, although we see a minor change in the order of factor loadings.

Coherence of Elite Preferences

Although national versus local dimensions have been shown as significant in aligning legislators in contemporary Brazil, we must ask how coherent elite preferences are across electoral districts. This is the question that the comparative study of elite-opinion analysis has addressed incompletely because analysts often refer to the concept of coherence but rarely take territoriality into account. What is critical for the analysis of party nationalization is that elite preferences would not necessarily be as coherent (or incoherent) *between* electoral districts as they are *within* those districts. Coherence, I argue, should thereby be defined as follows: whether the stances of individual politicians with regard to the same issues are as collectively coherent between electoral districts (or other territorial units such as regions) as they are within each district (or other territorial units such as regions). Given the

conceptualization of territorial coherence discussed in Chapter 2, I adopt the technique of multilevel modelling to examine the 323 sampled elites selected from the BLSs. The analysis will show that the territorial coherence of elite preferences varies among party labels. As noted in Chapter 2, the responses of sampled PT elites were highly coherent with regard to economic and left–right issues—constituting the first factor of elite alignments in the country. In contrast, although some major conservative parties were also found to be relatively coherent, elite alignment among conservatives seems to reflect tensions between the representation of national (or programmatic) and local (or traditional) dimensions.

Coherence of Elite Preferences in Contemporary Brazil

The principal components analysis of selected sampled elites revealed that some legislators would be aligned along economic and left–right (or national) issues, but others would not be. If that is the case, to what extent do those elites share some kind of programmatic ideas or visions with their colleagues across the country? This is the question that had hardly been addressed by comparative politics analysts until the mid-1990s, even though they had focused on other issues to analyse elite preferences that would be readily (but often misleadingly) measurable (e.g. elite alignment based on self-placement on the left–right scale) (Limongi and Figueiredo 1995). Of course, this does not mean that analysts rarely paid attention to the issue of elite coherence in contemporary Brazil; rather, they seem to have largely taken elite *in*coherence for granted. Sartori, for example, argued how anti-partisan Brazilian politicians would be under the extreme degree of party system fragmentation in the country, implying that few politicians would accept any form of party discipline (Sartori 1993: 11). Lamounier, for his part, questioned the relevance, given the supposedly low degree of party cohesion, of working with any measure of party systems (such as the effective number of electoral parties) (Lamounier 1994: 44). These two scholars focused on the concept and measurement of party system fragmentation, largely assuming the incoherence of elite preferences.

The work of Limongi and Figueiredo would be the first to directly address elite coherence, arguing that the existence of some important variables presumably harmful for party development (e.g. presidentialism with multiple parties, federalism, and Open PR) would not necessarily drive the internal incoherence of elite preferences (Limongi and Figueiredo 1995: 498). The question they raised would make sense to the extent that politicians do not necessarily behave as political institutions predict. However, for the empirical analysis of elite coherence, it also seems obvious that we need a more explicit definition of what coherence means (Adcock and Collier 2001: 531). Since the work of Limongi and Figueiredo (1995), elite coherence (or party discipline, the term that is often used interchangeably by scholars) has been defined as the proportion of party members (including politicians and activists) who share some sort of vision or ideas with their colleagues or the party leadership (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1998; Nicolau 2000; Rodrigues 2009). Although this conceptualization of elite coherence is still open to further debate as a criterion (or threshold) to determine which parties are coherent, it did lead to a further expansion of the literature on the issue.

First, among comparative experts, it has been generally understood that both the Right and the Centre-Right would be relatively incoherent. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, for example, focused on the National Constitutional Assembly (Assembléia Nacional Constituinte, ANC) called for by Constitutional Amendment No. 26 in 1985. They analysed roll-call voting at the ANC and found that, of the 1,011 roll-call votes appearing in the database compiled by Ames and Power (1990), the 25 percent or more of ANC members voted against the winning majority (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1998: 111–113). They also found that an ANC member, on average, voted against the majority of their party in 28 % of controversial votes (ibid.: 119). On the other hand, in comparison to the average proportion of defection, ANC members from the PMDB voted against the majority of fellow ANC

members in nearly 35 % of roll-call votes—showing the highest defection rate of the 12 Brazilian parties under analysis (ibid.: 118).[42] Moreover, albeit to a lesser extent, centre-right parties showed some degree of defection among their ANC members (ibid.: 121). The internal incoherence of the Brazilian Right, a conclusion reached by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, was later supported by further analysis covering the roll-call votes that took place during the 48th, 49th and 50th sessions of the Chamber of Deputies (1987–1999) (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998: 83, 90).

Second, in contrast to these conservative parties, it is the Left and the Centre-Left where the policy stances of politicians have been supposedly disciplined and coherent. The previously cited work by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán found the lowest rate of defection for the PT's ANC members voting against the majority of party representatives. The PT's ANC members defected in just nine roll-call votes out of 93 roll-call votes in total (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1998: 120). This modest proportion (10 %) contrasts with the PMDB, for example, whose ANC members voted against party leadership in nearly 35 % of all roll-call votes. By employing the record of roll-call voting in the 48th , 49th, and 50th sessions, Limongi and Figueiredo consistently found that, on average, nearly 97 % of PT deputies voted with party leaders, but only 86 % of PMDB deputies did so (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998: 75, 83, 90). The defection rate (14 percent) for the PMDB sounds like something of an underrepresentation if we compare it with the finding of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (1998), but this gap seems largely attributable to the particular roll-call votes these scholars focused on for analysis. In this sense, the analysis of elite coherence may still be subject to (often arbitrary) scholarly choices. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to conclude that, despite the

[42] The difference between the average defection rate and the PMDB defection rate seems marginal, but readers should note that the PMDB secured the majority of ANC seats (305 of 559) (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1998: 110). In this sense, the average defection rate could overrepresent PMDB members. We might better understand how large the defection rate of the PMDB would be by comparing it with the defection rates of leftist parties.

different research designs employed by Mainwaring and Limongi, there would exist a certain gap in elite coherence between the Left and the Right, as often discussed by Brazilian experts (Almeida and Moya 1997; Kinzo 1993; Nicolau 1994).

Methodological Challenges in the Analysis of Elite Coherence

Although our understanding of the coherence of elite preferences in contemporary Brazil has certainly developed to some extent since the mid-1990s, the enquiry is still in progress because few scholars except for Kinzo (1993) have seriously taken territoriality into account.[43] I argue that the decisive quality of this lack of scholarly attention largely depends on the validity of the assumption, implicitly or explicitly assumed by experts, that elite preferences should be as coherent (or incoherent) between electoral districts as they are within each district. But such an assumption, I argue, can be easily violated. Look at Table 3.2, which shows the simulated distribution of elite opinions among two hypothetical parties, Party A and Party B. These parties have exactly the same number of federal legislators. Let

TABLE 3.2: Patterns in the Territorial Distribution of Elite Preferences in a Hypothetical Setting

What is the best model of the economy in your country?									
Party A					**Party B**				
District	State	Hybrid	Capitalism	SD	District	State	Hybrid	Capitalism	SD
1	10	10	10	**0**	1	30	0	0	**14**
2	10	10	10	**0**	2	0	30	0	**14**
3	10	10	10	**0**	3	0	0	30	**14**
Country	30	30	30	**0**	Country	30	30	30	**0**

[43] Citing Kinzo (1993), Rodrigues argued that the pattern of elite coherence—the coherent Left and the incoherent Right—would come across clearly across different Brazilian states (or electoral districts) (Rodrigues 2009: 26).

us ask them what they think is the best model of the Brazilian economy. The hypothetical question I choose here has been actually asked by the PELA-USAL and the BLSs. I therefore prepared three possible answers: state interventionism, capitalism, or a hybrid model of the two. The numbers in each cell are the number of legislators supporting either state interventionism, capitalism, or the hybrid model.

A comparison of Party A and Party B clearly indicates that, although Party A appears as coherent as Party B at the country level, they do not cohere at the district level. Party A is equally divided along the economic issue at the country level, with one-third of all 90 deputies preferring either state interventionism, capitalism or the hybrid model. So, too, is Party B. It is therefore not surprising to see that the internal coherence of each party, measured as the standard deviation of elite preferences, is highest at the country level (SD = 0). However, when we compare the district-level distribution of Party A with that of Party B, the above description is no longer viable. Party A perfectly replicates the country-level pattern of preference distribution at the district level, with its legislators equally divided between state interventionism, capitalism and the hybrid model. If, and only if, this is the case, we can reasonably assume that elite preferences should be as coherent (or incoherent) between electoral districts as they are within each district. And Table 3.2 clearly shows that Party B does not meet this condition because its district-level pattern of preference distribution does not follow the country-level pattern.

I acknowledge that these two patterns of territorial distribution of elite preferences, as illustrated by Party A and Party B, are extreme, and that therefore most cases would probably fall somewhere in between Party A and Party B. However, it is critical to leave the distributional patterns of elite preferences unexplored because the varying distribution of elite preferences, I argue, should matter for party nationalization. Consider again the district-level entries of Party B in Table 3.2. All legislators in District 1 are in favour of state

interventionism; all legislators from District 2 prefer the hybrid model; and in District 3 all legislators support capitalism. Such a pattern of preference distribution that is unique to each district (or other territorial units) could indicate how significantly locality functions in the dynamics of electoral politics. The nationalization of electoral politics, I argue, can be achieved if, and only if, the distribution of elite preferences at the country level is relatively closely replicated at the district (or other territorial unit) level. This is why, instead of using a single-level framework, I employ a multilevel regression model to see how territorially coherent elite preferences would be.

Measuring the Territorial Coherence of Elite Preferences

The empirical model that I employed in the analysis of elite coherence comprises two-level binomial and ordinal regressions with only a random intercept[44] (that is, an unconditional model). Binomial regression is generally regarded as suitable for the analysis of variables with binary response categories, and I specified this regression model for the analysis of sampled elite responses for all variables except ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT, as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.1. I chose regions (not electoral districts) for the Level-2 unit of data aggregation because no information was available to identify which electoral district (or state) each selected sample elite came from. Equation 3.1 shows the formal expression in which $Elite\ Preference_{ik}$ describes the response of the i-th sampled elite (i = 1, …, 323) whose electoral district belongs to the k-th region (k = 1, …, 5).

$$Elite\ Preference_{ik} = [\beta_{00} + \pi_{0k}] + \varepsilon_{ik}. \qquad \text{Equation 3.1}$$

Before estimating the parameters of the multilevel model as predicted by Equation 3.1, it is useful to review the basic information on the Level-2 unit (regions) so that we can

[44] With the random intercept, the multilevel model supposes that the answers of selected elite samples can vary *within* the clustering unit (or regions). Also, as this is an exploratory model, it does not have any independent variable (thus no slope there).

make an intuitive prediction regarding how likely or unlikely it would be to assume that elite preferences should be as coherent between regions as they are within each region. The North of Brazil consists of seven states (equal to electoral districts): Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins. Its total population ranks it as the fourth largest of Brazil's five regions (North, Northeast, Centre-West, South and Southeast) as of 2010, with 15,864,454 inhabitants (8.3 % of the national total population), of whom 11,664,509 residents (73.5 % of the total regional population) came from urban areas and 4,199,945 (26.5 % of the regional total) were from rural areas (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica).[45] In terms of religiosity, of the total regional population, 60.6 % identified as Roman Catholic, while 28.5 % identified as Pentecostal Christians (ibid).[46] This is a good representation of the national mean (64.6 % of the national population identified as Roman Catholics and 22.2 % as Pentecostals). However, the average monthly income of all workers aged 14 years and over was well below the national mean (R$2,214): R$1,640 (equal to US$400) as of 2019 (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).[47]

The Northeast region of Brazil is a northern region with a population three times larger than the North, but its standard of economic development—based average monthly income—is even lower. The Northeast consists of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia, where 53,081,950 people (27.8 %

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[45] For the national and regional populations, see População nos Censos Demográficos, segundo as Grandes Regiões e as Unidades da Federação (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020). For urban and rural populations, see População residente, total, urbana total e urbana na sede municipal, em números absolutos e relativos, com indicação da área total e da densidade demográfica, segundo as Grandes Regiões e as Unidades da Federação (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

[46] For the regional population's religious denominations, see the tables ending in 4.1 under each region in Características gerais da população, religião e pessoas com deficiência (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

[47] For the average monthly nominal income, see Rendimento médio nominal, habitualmente recebido por mês e efetivamente recebido no mês de referência, do trabalho principal e de todos os trabalhos, por sexo (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

of the national population) lived as of 2010. And, of the regional population, 38,821,246 residents (73.1 % of the total) lived in urban areas, with 26.9 % (14,260,704) in rural areas (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). In terms of religiosity, 72.2 % of the regional population identified with Roman Catholicism and 16.4 % associated themselves with Pentecostal Christianity (ibid). Its average monthly income of all workers was R$1,532 (US$374), which was well below the national mean (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

In contrast, with a regional population even smaller than the populations of the South and Southeast regions, the Centre-West is on average one of the wealthiest regions in Brazil. The region includes Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Distrito Federal. The total regional population was the smallest among the five regions, at 14,058,094 (7.4 % of the national population). Nevertheless, the urban share of the population was well above that of other regions (88.8 %) (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The regional distribution of religious denominations followed the national mean: 59.6 % of the regional population was Roman Catholic as of 2010, and 26.8 % were Pentecostal Christians (ibid). However, the average monthly income of all workers living the region was well above the national mean: R$2,464 (US$601) as of 2019 (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

The South of Brazil—Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul—is another wealthy region, although its population size is well below that of the northern regions. As of 2010, 27,386,891 people (14.4 % of the national population) lived in the region, and of the regional population, 23,260,896 residents (84.9 % of the regional total) lived in urban areas and 4,125,995 (15.1 % of the regional population) were in rural areas (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). Here, 70.1 % of the regional population identified with Roman Catholic Christianity, and 20.2 % were Pentecostal Christians (ibid). The average

monthly income of all workers in 2019 was slightly lower than the Southeast but as high as the Centre-West, at R$2,437 (US$594) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

The Southeast looks quite different in terms of demography, particularly in comparison to the inland-northern states of Brazil. The Southeast region consists of four federal states: Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Although the territory is much smaller than the inland regions of Brazil, its predominantly urban regional population was 80,364,410 (42.1 % of the national population) as of 2010 (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). Although the Roman Catholic share of the regional population had declined by 10 % from the 69.2 percent of 2000, Roman Catholics were still predominantly represented, as were the 24.6 % of the population that identified with Pentecostal Christianity (ibid). Moreover, the Southeast's average monthly income of all workers was the highest among the five regions as of 2019: R$2,525 (US$616) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

Territorial Coherence of Elite Preferences

Given the demographic characteristics of each region, to what extent are elite preferences likely to be as coherent between regions as they are within each region? Table B.2 in Appendix B.2 shows the number and proportion of sampled elite responses to the 19 selected survey questions, with standard deviations calculated at the national (NSD) and regional (RSD) levels.

First and foremost, it is relatively clear from Table B.2 that there exists a general pattern with regard to the distribution of elite responses between national (political, economic and left–right) issues and local (traditional) issues. The standard deviations of elite responses to questions on political, economic, and left–right issues were lower than 70 at the national

level, whilst the standard deviations on questions on traditional issues were higher than 70 at the national level. Explicit in this descriptive statistic is that, although such a threshold of standard deviations (NSD = 70) is somewhat arbitrary, elite responses with regard to political, economic and left–right issues were relatively aligned along the national mean, whilst they were not aligned for many traditional issues. The only exceptions are EFFORTS and FAMILY, which both had NSDs (EFFORTS = 103.0 and FAMILY = 2.0) that ran counter to the pattern found in the majority of political and traditional variables.

Consistent with the distribution of elite responses at the regional level, we can also see a significant difference among variables. Many questions on political issues, for example, evidenced a relatively lower degree of standard deviation at the regional level: FIDELITY (8.5–17.0), BELIEVE (2.0–9.0), DECREE (1.5–11.0) and MILITARY (1.0–4.5). This was also the case with ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT: ECONOMY (4.0–17.6) and LEFT–RIGHT (2.6–10.5). In contrast, many variables on traditional issues had similar or slightly higher standard deviations at the regional level. For example, the regional standard deviations of elite responses with regard to CLIENTELISM fell somewhere between 7.5 and 29.0, whilst LOCAL INTERESTS had a narrow range of standard deviation (4.0–17.5). Except for FAMILY, this pattern can also be found in other questions on traditional issues: COUNCILLOR (6.0–23.0), MAYOR (9.5–34.0), STATE DEPUTY (2.5–15.5), GOVERNOR (11.5–44.0), STATE SECRETARY (0.5–29.0), FEDERAL DEPUTY (10.5–45.0), SENATOR (10.5–46.0) and MINISTER (11.5–44.0).

Explicit in this descriptive statistic is that elite responses regarding many political, economic, and left–right issues were as coherently distributed within each region as they were between regions. However, especially on traditional issues, the distribution of elite responses at least to some extent reflected regional patterns. This observed difference provides us with further information on the dynamics of elite alignment in contemporary

Brazil. Some politicians (although we do not know yet with which political parties they affiliate) certainly differed in their past political experiences from their fellow politicians in other regions. Such a difference could, in turn, have affected how they responded to other questions on political, economic, and left–right issues to the extent to which they started their political careers in different regions. In contrast, other politicians seem to have shared visions on political, economic, and left–right issues relatively similar to their colleagues across the country. If that is the case, to what extent do we find a similar result from the multilevel model of elite responses? Would the clustering unit of analysis (regions) be significant in explaining overall variance in elite responses? Although Table 3.3 does not show the territorial distribution of elite responses along party affiliations, to what extent can we identify a different pattern of territorial distribution across political parties? I will address these questions later in this section.

To answer the two questions I raised previously, I specified binomial and ordinal multilevel regression models with random intercepts and estimated the intraclass correlation (ICC), as calculated below:

$$Elite\ Preference_{ik} = [\beta_{00} + \pi_{0k}] + \varepsilon_{ik};$$

$$ICC = \frac{\pi_{0k}}{(\pi_{0k} + \varepsilon_{ik})}. \qquad \text{Equation 3.2}$$

The theoretical basis of the ICC rests on the tradition of variance components analysis (Fisher 1954), and it has been widely applied in the medical sciences (Bartko 1966; Bartlett and Frost 2008; Carrasco 2010; Hartl and Jones 2001). Although ICC terminology often varies in different disciplinary contexts (e.g. concordance, reliability or heritability), the substance of the concept is constant across disciplines. The ICC coefficient shows the proportion of observed variance in the outcome (e.g. elite response) that is attributable to the effect of clustering at a certain level (in this case, clustering elite responses at the regional level).

Equation 3.2 clearly indicates that the ICC coefficient is calculated by dividing the random effect variance, π_{0k}, by the total variance—the sum of random effect variance (π_{0k}) and residual variance (ε_{ik}) (Gelman and Hill 2007: 258). The ICC coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, indicating how significantly individuals' scores within a cluster (here, sampled elite responses in each region) are correlated (0 = no variance between regions and 1 = significant variance between regions) (Finch et al. 2014: 24).[48]

For the interpretation of the estimated ICCs, we have to set a practical guideline to evaluate which party would be territorially coherent. Here I propose two criteria: whether estimated ICCs are smaller than 0.10 *and* whether estimated ICCs are smaller in the variables that comprise the factors we observed previously. On cut-off points of ICCs in general, so far in the literature there exist few rules of thumb. In the medical sciences, for example, the general consensus is that an ICC above 0.90 would indicate an excellent correlation (Koo and Li 2016: 158). Some psychologists have argued that an ICC above 0.70 would be the minimum acceptable level of correlation, although many scholars do not explicitly discuss why a cut-off point could not be higher (or lower) than 0.70 (Grawitch et al. 2003: 47; Lance et al. 2006: 207). Given these on-going scholarly debates, I acknowledge that cut-off points may vary according to discipline. Nevertheless, most scholars would agree that an ICC smaller than 0.10 indicates very poor correlation—meaning that few proportions of observed variation in the outcome (e.g. elite responses) are explained by the effect of clustering at a certain level (region). Consequently, I set the cut-off point for estimated ICCs at 0.10, and I argue that any parties whose ICCs are below 0.10 can be considered to be territorially

[48] All estimations were based on an adaptive Gaussian Hermite approximation of the likelihood with 10 integration points. An R script on a statistical command to perform multilevel analysis, as well as its dataset, is available at Harvard Dataverse.

<Chapter 3-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 3-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (Dataset)>

coherent. In addition to this general criterion, the second one—the ICC is smaller in variables that comprise the observed factors—provides a more case-oriented rationale. The principal components analysis of selected sampled elites identified three factors that align politicians. In this sense, it would make more sense to carefully look at which party would be relatively coherent along the variables comprising those factors.

Look at Figure 3.4, which shows the sum of estimated ICCs along factors. The dashed line in the figure suggests a threshold (ICC = 0.10) to investigate whether elite preferences would be coherently distributed along the clustering unit (or regions). Let us look at the estimated result factor-by-factor. On Factor 1, it is clear that the estimated ICCs of the PT, PSB, PSDB, PMDB and PP1993 were well below the threshold. Note that Factor 1 was largely composed of LEFT–RIGHT and ECONOMY. In this sense, coupled with the pattern of elite alignments implied by the results of the principal components analysis, it might be reasonable to argue that the PT, PSB, PSDB, PMDB and PP1993 would be relatively territorially coherent along cross-territorial issue dimensions (e.g. self-placement on the left–right scale and economic issues). It makes sense to find the PT in this category because, as discussed in Chapter 2, party nationalization should be more likely if left–right stances are territorially coherent. Furthermore, in addition to LEFT–RIGHT and ECONOMY, the ICC of the PT was smaller than 0.10 on 12 other variables ranging from political to traditional issues (see Table B.3 in Appendix B.3). Such a degree of coherence, I argue, should boost the nationalization of its support base.

However, in contrast to the PT, it is also clear that the estimated ICCs of the PSB, PSDB, PMDB, and PP1993 were relatively smaller in Factor 2 as well. This clearly indicates that, among these parties, elite alignment would face more tensions between national and local dimensions. Remember that Factor 2 was demonstrated as composing of SENATOR and LEFT–RIGHT through the previous principal components analysis. Here the variable of

FIGURE 3.4: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors



Note: The Progressive Party, PP1993, was founded in 1993 by the merger of the Social Labour Party and the Renovating Labour Party. PP1993 dissolved in 1995 to form the renewed Brazilian Progressive Party, later renamed to the Progressive Party again (thus PP2003), with the Progressive Reform Party.

interest is SENATOR, asking sampled elites about their past experiences serving as a federal senator. In the federal republic of Brazil, the federal Senate (Senado Federal) represents the interests of the federation units (26 states and the Federal District, under the 1988 Constitution) (Câmara dos Deputados).[49] Furthermore, the federal Senate can also influence subnational governments, especially in financial terms (e.g. authorizing foreign financial

[49] Because each state and Federal District shall elect three senators for eight-year terms, there exist 81 senators; half are elected through the plurality system in every four years.

<The Federal Senate (Accessed on 13 Apr. 2020)>

transactions of interest, establishing overall limits on the amount of public debt, foreign and domestic credit transactions, and so forth) (Article 52, Sections V-XV, 1988 Constitution).[50] Given that the PSDB and PMDB descended from the regime's official opposition party (the Brazilian Democratic Movement), it is not be surprising to find that their legislators include more established politicians than the PT so that such political careers would shape their political preferences accordingly.

Furthermore, the estimated ICCs of the PSB and PMDB were demonstrated as lower than the threshold in Factor 3 as well. On this factor, the principal components analysis showed that elite responses in this group were largely correlated (or aligned) along ECONOMY, SENATOR and GOVERNOR. Such elite alignment indicates that the PSB and PMDB might face more severe tensions between national and local interests than others. Probably few subnational offices would be more powerful than governors in any federal system, and Brazil is no exception. For example, the governors of the two most developed states in Brazil, Minas Gerais and São Paulo, dominated national politics during the post-1889 period until the 1930 coup d'état, but their influence on national politics would probably have lasted longer to the extent that the traditional style of politics (featuring political clientelism, personalism and regionalism) survived despite reformists' efforts to modernize political institutions. The military regime sought to address some of the challenges inherent in traditional politics, whilst members of the established political class continued to serve as state governors (Hagopian 1996: 254). And as the transition from authoritarianism to democracy advanced, 'governors re-emerged as powerful political players, and the electoral cycle accentuated the influence of state-based political interests' (Samuels and Abrucio 2000: 58). Appendix Table B.3 reports estimated ICCs for variables along parties under analysis.

[50] The 1988 Constitution with Amendments through 2014 (Accessed on 13 Apr. 2020).

Robustness Tests of Findings from the BLSs

The multilevel analysis of responses by 323 selected sampled elites from the BLSs revealed that the PT elites were relatively coherent along some of cross-territorial issues (LEFT–RIGHT and ECONOMY) across regions. Implicit in this finding is that the left–right stances of PT politicians were strongly associated with economic issues across the country. This would not be necessarily the case for other major parties, to the extent that representing local rather than national interests would come across as influential for personal electoral success. Indeed, for those aligned along Factors 2 and 3, the estimated ICCs of SENATOR and GOVERNOR suggest how strongly past experiences of serving in these powerful positions were associated with the policy stances of some (especially conservative) politicians. In this section, I seek to determine how verifiable these findings would be if I employ a different elite survey, one conducted in a southern state of Paraná. This verification check shows a relatively consistent result with the previous analysis of the BLSs, although the estimated ICCs of selected parties grew to the extent that the number of clustering units (municipalities) increased.

The Administrative, Parliamentary and Party Elites of Paraná

For this verification check, I employed a subnational elite survey (the Administrative, Parliamentary and Party Elites of Paraná, APEP) that sampled 64 (national and subnational) legislators, 72 (national and subnational) administrative officials, and 16 party members in Paraná between 2004 and 2006. Paraná is one of the southern states where as many people lived in urban areas as in other southern states (for example, 85.3 % of the state population lived in urban areas as of 2010, with the remaining 14.7 % in rural areas) (Censo 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica).[51] Moreover, whereas 70.1 % of Southerners

[51] For the state and regional populations, see População nos Censos Demográficos, segundo as Grandes Regiões e as Unidades da Federação (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

self-identified as Roman Catholic Christians, 69.6 % of Paraná residents did so, with 22.2 % self-identifying as Pentecostal Christians (ibid).[52] As of 2019, the average monthly income of all workers in the state was R$2,414 (US$589), which was close to the regional mean of R$2,437 (US$594).[53] Thus Paraná well reflects the regional context of the South, and in this sense, the empirical analysis of APEP data would allow us to determine if the findings from the analysis of national elite surveys (the BLSs) can be replicated in such a regional context. As shown by Table B.4 in Appendix B.4, I selected all the variables in the APEP questionnaire that were similar to those in the BLSs.

Table B.5 in Appendix B.5, together with the description of the South subset from the BLSs, shows the count, proportion and region-level standard deviation (RSD) of 102 selected sampled elites from the APEP. Elite responses on economic issues, and to a lesser extent on left–right issues, showed standard deviations similar to the BLSs, although the responses on political issues were more skewed so that standard deviations became much larger. On ECONOMY I, elite responses were relatively divided between support for, and opposition to, the claim that capitalism would be the best model for Brazil. This resembles the case of the BLSs, in which 44.6 % of 56 selected sampled elites from the South were in favour of capitalism, but 41.1 % supported some form of a hybrid between capitalism and state interventionism. The distribution of elite responses regarding ECONOMY II (those in favour of economic liberalism or state interventionism) are also consistent with the BLSs. Moreover, as we observed with the BLSs, sampled elites were more likely to identify with either the Centre-Left or the Centre. However, the standard deviation on DEMOCRACY I (democracy is the best model for Brazil) was much larger than for MILITARY in the BLSs, as was

[52] For the state population along each religious denomination, review Table 3.21.4.1 under the state name of Características gerais da população, religião e pessoas com deficiência (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

[53] For the average monthly nominal income of the state, see Rendimento médio nominal, habitualmente recebido por mês e efetivamente recebido no mês de referência, do trabalho principal e de todos os trabalhos, por sexo (Accessed on 9 Apr. 2020).

DEMOCRACY II (whether Brazil should be democratic). This may be because, by asking for elite views regarding military intervention, MILITARY might have *in*directly asked if democracy would be better for the country.

Model Estimation

Given the regional context of Paraná, to what extent does the multilevel analysis of responses by 102 selected sampled elites from APEP produce an identical or similar result to what the analysis of the BLSs revealed? Two points should be stressed here. First, without regard to the Left and the Right, the estimated ICCs of the selected political parties under analysis generally became larger to the extent that the clustering unit of analysis increased from 5 (the number of regions) in the analysis of the BLSs to 40 (the number of municipalities in Paraná under analysis). This hardly seems surprising because the more the number of clustering units increases, the more likely clustered samples (political elites in this case) would be homogeneous *within* the clustering units (e.g. municipalities) but may be heterogeneous *between* them.

Nevertheless, as a second point, we cannot dismiss the finding of some degree of consistency between the estimated ICCs of the BLSs and of the APEP. Look at Figure 3.5, in which the PT, for example, had an ICC coefficient for economic issues (described by a blue bar) well below of the threshold (ICC = 0.10). Note that, based on the principal components analysis of selected samples from the BLSs, the political preferences of PT samples were coherently aligned along economic issues and left-right stances. Consequently, if not completely mirrored at the district-level, the members of the PT would be relatively as similarly aligned even in the local context of Paraná as the analysis of the BLSs showed. This finding, coupled with the empirical analysis of the BLSs, guides us in turn to ask how substantial such a different degree of elite alignment would be to party nationalization. Table B.6 in Appendix B.6 describes estimated ICCs for each variable under analysis.

FIGURE 3.5: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Issue Dimensions



Conclusion

Which issue dimensions are important to categorizing politicians (especially federal deputies) in contemporary Brazil? On the dimension of elite alignment, how territorially coherent are elite preferences across the country? These are the questions I have addressed in this chapter. On the issue of policy dimensions, the principal components analysis of 320 selected sampled elites from the BLSs revealed three factors along which elite preferences and responses were significantly correlated. I argued that the first factor would reflect relatively cross-territorial (or national) issues, whilst the second and third factors somewhat reflect tensions between politicians who identify with cross-territorial (or national) and personal (or local) issues. Subsequently, by specifying binomial and ordinal multilevel models, I have addressed the territorial coherence of elite preferences. The clustering units of both multilevel models were regions, and I computed the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to determine the

proportion of variation among the outcome (elite responses) explained by the effect of clustering at the regional level. A multilevel analysis showed that the left–right stances of PT politicians were as coherently aligned along economic issues between regions as they would be within each region. Furthermore, PT elites held relatively coherent views regarding other issues, including some political and even traditional issues. On the other hand, the selected sampled elites from other parties came across as facing national and regional conflicts. What implications does this difference in elite alignment, and the additional difference of territorial coherence, between PT and non-PT politicians have for the degree of party nationalization? This question guides the next chapter.

4

Elite Coherence and Party Nationalization

> ‘Workers have the capacity to mobilize vast democratic and transforming movement of society, *capturing* and *translating* them into concrete and tangible alternatives for the desires of the majority for change’.[54]
>
> - ‘The Presidential Election and the Candidacy of Lula’ (PT 1989)

Although many comparative analysts have sought to understand the dynamics of party nationalization, few scholars have considered how individual-level factors (e.g. elite and mass preferences), as well as system-level factors (e.g. institutional or structural factors), could explain them. Given the theoretical inflexibility of previous works, in this chapter, I seek to investigate the effect of left–right stances (and related cross-territorial issue stances) by Brazilian politicians on party nationalization.

I argued previously that the more the left–right stances of individual politicians are as coherently aligned along national issues between territorial units as they would be within each unit, the more likely the political party under whose ticket they run for elections is to increase the equality of vote shares across territorial units and of vote changes over time. I specify two multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes to test this hypothesis. I then use the unstandardized score of equal shares as a dependent variable for one of them

[54] Emphasis added.

(hereinafter I call this model the ‘Equal Share’ model), and so the unstandardized score of equal changes for another model (hereinafter I call this model the ‘Equal Change’ model). The independent variables of interests are 19 survey questions, selected from the BLSs, with regard to political and economic issues, and also past political experience, as well as left–right stances. The models will also have variables to control for institutional and structural factors.

The estimated result of the Equal Share model will reveal the interesting combination of variables on programmatic stances, related to leftist ideologies, and local political experiences as a city councillor to drive the homogeneous expansion of electoral support. The estimated coefficient of a variable on political clientelism, for example, strongly indicates that anti-clientelism, shared coherently by elites, would drive the homogenization of electoral support across electoral districts. Consistently, a variable on the past experience of serving as a city councillor suggests that, for the parties which have many politicians with established records as a city councillor, the degree of equal shares would rise. Implicit in these findings that party nationalization, measured as equal shares, is not necessarily a project driven by those with the experience of national politics. Rather, even if few politicians have involved national politics previously, party nationalization can be likely if they share some form of political preferences and aligned uniformly across a country.

The estimation of the Equal Change model provides further evidence to develop the above discussion. Both variables on anti-clientelism and local political experiences will suggest that electoral support would increase (or decrease) similarly across electoral districts if elite samples support anti-clientelism and also have prior experience serving as a city councillor. Implicit in this result is that the parties, whose politicians have served as a city councillor, are also relatively successful to maintain electoral support there if they manage to consolidate their programmes and platforms along anti-clientelism and related-leftist

ideologies. Other variables also provide further evidence. The estimated result of a variable on economic preferences, for example, shows that the more likely the elite samples support state dominance over the market economy, the more likely the parties with which they affiliate would have higher scores for equal changes. Also, the left-right stances of selected sampled elites suggest that equal changes would be more likely if elite samples place themselves on the left of the political spectrum.

If so, how well does these findings stand out when we control the interactive effect of institutional and structural factors, and also when we use a different dataset? For this purpose, finally in this chapter, I will conduct robustness tests. Here I will initially explore why institutional and structural factors were statistically insignificant in the analysis of the BLSs. The answer, as I discussed in Chapter 2, may not be surprising to the extent that individuals (e.g. politicians or voters) would behave independently of institutional or social contexts. But, to what extent is such an assumption viable? To answer this question, I have specified two interactive models with random intercepts and slopes to test if the effect of left–right stances on equal changes would be conditioned by institutional and structural factors. The estimated result of these models reveal that left–right stances still have significant effects on equal changes even in these interactive models, though the effects are somewhat conditioned by institutional and structural factors. Subsequently, I seek to verify the principal findings from the analysis of the BLSs with the subnational survey APEP. For this verification check, I will basically follow the procedure that I develop for the analysis of BLSs. This follow-up analysis of the APEP confirms what we observe from the analysis of the BLSs.

The subsequent discussions in this chapter will be developed as follows. I initially work to demonstrate my first hypothesis with a focus on a national dataset compiled from the BLSs (1997–2013). Given the dataset, I specify multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes. Once discussed this process of data handling, I estimate the specified multilevel

models. The estimation of these models indicates that anti-clientelism and the previous experience of subnational politics would work together to explain the dynamics of equal shares in contemporary Brazil. Consistently, a political party is found with a higher degree of equal changes if its politicians place themselves on the left of the political spectrum. I will, in turn, verify these principal findings by checking the interactive effects of institutional and structural factors and employing the subnational survey APEP. This robustness test will show that left–right stances still have significant effects on equal changes, though they are somewhat conditioned by institutional and structural factors. Also, it will be shown that left–right stances are as significant in the analysis of the APEP as they are based on the national survey BLSs.

Operationalization of Variables

This section discusses the operationalization of dependent, independent, and controlling variables. The dependent variables are the *un*standardized (or original) scores of equal shares and equal changes for selected Brazilian political parties, meaning that lower scores would indicate a higher degree of equal shares and of equal changes. Here, to enhance the comparability of estimated results, I have focused on the six major Brazilian parties (the PP2003, the PT, the PMDB, the PR, the PSB, and the PSDB) whose vote shares in the 2014 legislative election exceeded 5 percent respectively (Morgenstern et al. 2014b: 189). Independent variables of interest, on the other hand, are the responses of 152 elite samples from the BLSs (1997–2013) over political, economic, and traditional (or past political experiences) issues, as well as the self-placement of these samples on the left–right scale. Control variables cover the regional variance of both district magnitude and numbers, the degree of political and fiscal decentralization, the average effective number of electoral parties at the regional level, and also the regional average of both class and ethnic fractionalization.

Equal Shares and Equal Changes

The dependent variables in this chapter are the *un*standardized (or original) scores of equal shares and equal changes derived from the weighted growth curve model that I have discussed in Chapter 1. Though standardization would help us compare the degree of party nationalization among selected parties, it does not necessarily ensure that estimated results are comparable to unobserved cases because we could obtain different standardized scores according to the number of political parties under analysis. Here, instead of relying on standardized scores, I have decided to work with original scores from the weighted growth curve model. Also, to enhance the comparability of estimated scores on equal shares and equal changes, I have focused on the political parties which have relatively similar vote shares in the 2014 lower-house election (the final year of the period under analysis) (Morgenstern et al. 2014b: 189). Here I placed a threshold on the size of vote shares as 5 percent or more, removing small parties whose scores of equal shares and equal changes may be overestimated. The estimated scores for six Brazilian parties range from 4.3 to 36.9 for equal shares and from 9.7 to 35.7 for equal changes—meaning that lower scores indicate higher equal shares and equal changes (or a higher degree of party nationalization). Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 provides estimated scores for all parties under analysis.

Elite Preferences

The independent variables of interest are the issue stances of elite samples selected from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1997–2013) with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues as well as the self-placement of elite samples on the left–right scale. Variables on political issues, as described by Table B.1 in Appendix B.1, include FIDELITY ('Should party whip votes?'), DECREE ('Presidential decree authority is needed'.), BELIEVE ('Do you think members of Congress should vote with their party or according to their own personal beliefs?'), SWITCH ('Party switchers should lose their mandate'.), and MILITARY ('Are you in favour of the inclusion of the constitutional provision that gives the Armed

Forces the right to intervene to ensure internal order?'). These are the variables with a dichotomous response category (e.g. 'Yes' or 'No' with regard to each question). The variable ECONOMY is about the preferences of the elite with regard to capitalism, state interventionism, or something in between the two economic models (e.g. the hybrid). This variable has four response categories, ranging from 1 (support for pure market economy), 2 (support for equal state and private sector), 3 (support for state sector dominant over private sector), and 4 (support for total state control).

Variables on a traditional issue, on the other hand, cover CLIENTELISM ('Do you agree that voters demand clientelist behaviour?'), LOCAL INTERESTS ('When there is a conflict between the interests of your region and those of your party, how do you generally vote at rollcalls?'), COUNCILOR ('Have you been a city councillor?'), STATE DEPUTY ('Have you been a state deputy?'), SENATOR ('Have you been a senator?'), FEDERAL DEPUTY ('Have you been a federal deputy?'), MAYOR ('Have you been a mayor?'), GOVERNOR ('Have you been a governor?'), MINISTER (Have you ever held ministerial office at federal cabinets?'), STATE SECRETARY ('Have you ever been a state secretary that has a portfolio under state governments?'), and FAMILY ('Have any relative of yours held one of those eight positions above in the last 50 years?'). Like variables on political issues, these variables also have binary response categories ('Yes' or 'No' for each question). Finally, the variable LEFT–RIGHT has been operationalized as a categorical variable with multiple response categories from 1 (the left) to 10 (the right).

Institutional and Structural Factors

The control variables in this chapter are district magnitude, the number of electoral districts, political and fiscal decentralization, the effective number of electoral parties, and ethnic and class fractionalization. The first two variables target to control the effect of electoral systems. They have been widely used in the literature to explain the degree of party nationalization

(Bochsler 2010b; Choi 2010; Coppedge 1997; Cox 1997; Golosov 2016a, 2016b). Following this line of discussions, I have used the variance of district magnitude within each region and also the number of electoral districts in each region.

Besides the effects of electoral systems on party nationalization, as discussed in Chapter 1, the degree of political and fiscal decentralization is another control variable. Note that ‘decentralization gives parties and voters both incentive and opportunity to mobilize and respond to locally defined issues, leading to the development of unique party systems at the state level, with fewer competitive linkages to the federal arena’ (Thorlakson 2007: 71). This is what Hicken and Stoll called ‘vertical centralization’ (Hicken and Stoll 2008: 1110). Hence, I will control the potential effects of vertical centralization by relying on the Regional Authority Index (or RAI) developed by Hooghe and his colleagues (Hooghe et al. 2016).

Furthermore, as well as vertical decentralization, the degree of horizontal decentralization should be considered. Horizontal centralization has been defined as the extent of decision-making power in the hands of presidents vis-à-vis the national legislature (Hicken and Stoll 2008: 1110). The more legislative seats are distributed to political parties with various disciplines and platforms, the more likely the ruling party cannot pass proposed bills at rollcall votes without support from other (and often programmatically distant) parties. To capture such a potential effect of ‘horizontal centralization’, I employ regional variance in the district-level effective number of electoral parties.

The last set of control variables concerns the fractionalization of society along with ethnic and class cleavages. As discussed in Chapter 2, not all politicians (or voters) would behave as electoral and political institutions would predict.[55] If class (and ethnic) cleavages are dominant over territorial cleavages, they could motivate politicians to act along with the

[55] I acknowledge that, even if territorial (or non-functional) cleavages predominate, political (re)alignment could remain homogeneous across territories to the extent that highly centralized parties (or states) would exist.

cleavages. To control such a potential effect of social cleavages, the degrees of ethnic and class fractionalization are operationalized as a decreasing transformation of a well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (Herfindahl 1950; Hirschman 1945). Table C.2 in Appendix C.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables in this national dataset.

Explaining Party Nationalization with a Focus on Elite Coherence

Given the dataset, to what extent does elite coherence come across as significant to explain the degree of party nationalization? Also, which variable would be most influential: those on political, economic, or traditional issues, left–right stances, or control variables? To answer these questions, I have specified a standard multilevel model with random intercepts and random slopes for equal shares and equal changes respectively (thus, Equal Share and Equal Change models). The estimated result of the Equal Share model reveals that anti-clientelism, as well as the past experience of local politics, is strongly associated with the homogeneous expansion of electoral support. Consistently, the Equal Change model demonstrates that the more likely politicians are to place themselves on the left of the political spectrum, the more likely their political party is to obtain a higher degree of equal changes. The estimates of R-squared show that the fit of both models to the dataset under analysis is relatively high.

Model Evaluation

Let us initially evaluate how well the specified multilevel models (Equal Share and Equal Change ones) with random intercepts and slopes would fit to the dataset that I compiled with the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (1997–2013).[56] One measure for this purpose is R-squared

[56] An R script on a statistical command to perform multilevel explanatory analysis is available as below.

<Chapter 4-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 4-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (National Dataset)>

<Chapter 4-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (Subnational Dataset)>

(or the coefficient of determination). Unlike other measures for model evaluations (e.g. Akaike Information Criteria), R-squared directly estimates the proportion of the dependent variable that can be predicted by the independent variable(s) under analysis (Draper and Smith 1998; Kvålseth 1985). Consequently, ranging from 0 (no variance explained by independent variables) to 1 (almost all variance explained by independent variables), R-squared helps us evaluate how much the independent variables of interest can explain the variation of the dependent variable (Gelman and Hill 2007; Rights and Sterba 2018).

Nevertheless, the computation of R-squared for multilevel models is not as straightforward as any other single-level fixed model (e.g. standard multivariate regression models with ordinary least square estimation). For single-level fixed models, R-squared can be expressed as the ratio between the residual variance of the model of interest and the residual variance of the null model, which has no independent variables (Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013: 135). What makes the computation of R-squared difficult for mixed models, however, is that we have to take the residual variance of random effects as well as the residual variance of fixed effects.

Consequently, following the work of Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013: 137), R-squared in this chapter was computed as follows:

$$R^2_{\mathrm{LMM}} = \frac{\sigma_f^2}{\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_\gamma^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2}. \qquad \text{Equation 4.1}$$

Where R^2_{LMM} describes R-squared for linear mixed models. The equation suggests that R^2_{LMM} can be estimated as the ratio between the residual variance of fixed effects (σ_f^2) and the sum of the residual variance of fixed and random effects ($\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_\gamma^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2$).

The estimation of R-squared shows that both Equal Share and Equal Change models would relatively fit to the BLSs dataset. In Figure 4.1, the dots indicate estimated R-squared

and ribbons suggest upper and lower confidence intervals. For the Equal Share model, the 24.8 percent of variance in its dependent variable was explained by the fixed effects of independent variables in total. The Equal Change model, on the other hand, showed a better fit: nearly the 50 percent of variance in its dependent variable was explained by independent variables.

FIGURE 4.1: Estimated R-squared for Equal Share and Equal Change Models



Note: Variables from CLIENTELISM to ECONOMY indicate the variables that could explain the variation of shares and equal changes most significantly.

Model Estimation

Given the goodness-of-fit of each model, which independent variable would be more likely to explain the variation of the dependent ones (equal shares and equal changes)? Are there any patterns consistent with the hypothesis that I suggested in Chapter 2? The results for the

Equal Share model are presented in Table 4.1. All significant variables that explain the variation of equal shares are derived from the traditional dimension, but we should be careful to interpret *how* they are associated with the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient of CLIENTELISM, for example, indicates that the standard deviation of vote shares between regions reduces by 6.6 if politicians *do not* think that voters (or at least their supporters) demand any benefit in exchange for their votes. This result seems consistent to what we have observed through the principal components analysis of elite preferences. Some parties (especially the PT) observed that politicians were aligned along economic and left–right issues, whilst others would be less likely to do so, to the extent that the past political experiences of individual politicians were also associated with programmatic stances. In this sense, it would not be surprising to see that the more personal resources based on past political experiences would be important for electoral success, the more heterogeneous electoral support would be between territorial units (Kitschelt 2000: 854). The estimated coefficient of FEDERAL DEPUTY supports this argument, indicating that the homogeneity of vote shares would rise by 7.1 if elites had never served as a federal deputy.

However, the estimated coefficients of COUNCILLOR and MINISTER suggest that negative associations between past political experience and equal shares are not necessarily universal to any elected office. COUNCILLOR, for example, returns a coefficient as significant as CLIENTELISM, but it shows that the standard deviation of vote shares between regions becomes smaller by 5.5 if politicians *have* previously served as a councillor. Also, the estimated coefficient of MINISTER tells us that the more politicians previously worked for federal governments, the more likely the parties with which they affiliated would have homogeneous support across regions. What does this result imply? One conclusion, which I develop further in the next section, is that equal shares depend on how *evenly* rooted in society political parties are. The dynamics of electoral competitions for federal deputies

TABLE 4.1: The Estimated Effects of Elite Preference and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Shares and Equal Changes

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	Equal Changes Coefficients (SD)
FIDELITY	-3.03 (2.52)	-1.09 (1.83)
DECREE	-2.55 (1.85)	-0.03 (1.35)
BELIEVE	-1.76 (2.47)	1.03 (1.80)
EFFORTS	-3.40 (2.51)	-2.47 (1.83)
SWITCH	-4.35 (2.21)	-3.45* (1.61)
MILITARY	0.99 (1.92)	2.23 (1.40)
ECONOMY	0.12 (1.33)	-3.14** (0.97)
CLIENTELISM	-6.65** (2.10)	-5.04** (1.53)
LOCAL INTERESTS	4.01 (2.47)	4.34* (1.80)
COUNCILLOR	-5.50** (1.86)	-3.88** (1.35)
STATE DEPUTY	2.32 (1.81)	0.96 (1.32)
SENATOR	1.85 (3.28)	-1.33 (2.39)
FEDERAL DEPUTY	7.12* (3.53)	4.37 (2.57)
MAYOR	3.42 (2.39)	2.14 (1.74)
GOVERNOR	-1.12 (3.63)	0.84 (2.64)

TABLE 4.1 ***Continued***

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	**Equal Changes** Coefficients (SD)
MINISTER	-9.51*	-4.37
	(3.67)	(2.67)
SECRETARY	1.58	2.89*
	(1.91)	(1.39)
FAMILY	3.21	4.69***
	(1.79)	(1.30)
LEFT-RIGHT	-0.72	1.13*
	(0.75)	(0.54)
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)
DISTRICT NUMBER	-0.98	-0.33
	(0.67)	(0.48)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES	-0.49	-0.64
	(0.84)	(0.61)
REGIONAL AUTHORITY INDEX	-1.55	-0.52
	(1.01)	(0.73)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	27.82	10.16
	(19.56)	(14.23)
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION	-74.46	-16.78
	(54.81)	(39.88)
R-squared	0.25	0.50
N	183	183

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

have certainly motivated some politicians (especially on the right) to focus on subnational rather than national issues, and hence to coordinate district-specific rather than cross-district campaigns. On the other hand, other parties would have leveraged their successful experience of subnational elections to expand party organizations across the country and eventually to

develop some form of national campaigns according to their party labels. Electoral support, hence, would be as homogeneous between electoral districts as they would be within each district.

The estimated result of the Equal Change model, on the other hand, provides evidence to strengthen this argument. As we have seen from the estimated result of the Equal Share model, CLINTELISM and COUNCILLOR are both significant and associated with equal changes in the same way. This indicates that vote shares would increase (or decrease) more similarly between regions if politicians have anti-clientelist views. Consistently, if elites previously served as councillors, the parties with which they affiliated would be more likely to unilaterally increase (or decrease) electoral support across the country. What is empirically implicit from this result is that some political parties that are successful in subnational elections also would have been successful to keep supporters aligned along their party platforms (clientelism would be one of the issues that those parties would address) over elections.

The estimated result of other variables provides further evidence to support this line of argument. The estimated coefficient of FAMILY, for example, indicates that electoral support would equally change to the extent that politicians had few relatives who had previously held elected office. So would be SECRETARY, though its effect and significance were lower than family experiences. The variable LOCAL INTERESTS also shows that changes in electoral support would be more homogeneous across regions if elites in the selected sample expressed a desire to act along party rather than local interests at rollcalls. Only the estimated result SWITCH seems to contradict this trend, indicating that tolerance to party switching would enhance equal changes in support. However, this does not necessarily reflect that programmatic stances are insignificant. Indeed, both ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT clearly indicate that electoral support would increase (or decrease) systematically

across the country if politicians emphasized state interventionism and also placed themselves on the left of the political spectrum.

Now it seems reasonable to conclude that, with a focus on elite preferences, the dynamics of party nationalization can be explained quite differently between the Brazilian Left or Centre-Left (such as the PT) and the Brazilian Right or Centre-Right (such as the PMDB or the PSDB). As shown by the principal components analysis of elite preferences, PT politicians were nationally aligned along programmatic issues (economic and left–right). The PMDB and the PSDB, on the other hand, were less likely to nationalize elite alignment to the extent that traditional issues, as well as programmatic issues, were important for them. The multilevel analysis of explanatory models reveals the decisiveness of such a different pattern of elite alignment for party nationalization. Leveraging the successful experience of subnational elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Brazilian Left seems successful in its expansion of party organizations and electoral support across the country. The Right, on the other hand, would rather focus on regionalizing (or personalizing) their support bases.

Empirical Implications of Elite Coherence for Party Nationalization

The pattern of electoral geography between the Brazilian Left and Right, shown by the multilevel analysis of explanatory models, seems consistent with scholarly debates on the dynamics of electoral politics in contemporary Brazil. The Workers' Party (PT) is well known for its commitment to protect workers' interests as declared in its party registration statement. On the other hand, as shown by the 'Letter to the Brazilian People' issued in 2002 by then-presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the party had moderated its policy stances by the early 2000s. The growing successful experience of subnational elections in the early 1980s and 1990s, as well as repeated electoral defeats in presidential elections, was often employed to explain such a transformation in the party platform. The analysis in this

chapter shows that such an adaptation by the PT contributed to nationalize its support. Contrarily, conservative parties have supposedly had few incentives to invest their resources to develop (and adopt) their party platforms alongside changing circumstances. The regionalization of electoral support through political clientelism has been continuously dominant among conservative politicians.

The Nationalization of Elite Alignment by the PT

Upon registering as a legal party, the Workers' Party drafted 'The Manifesto of Foundation (Manifesto de Lançamento)' and 'The Programme (Programa)' in 1980.[57] In 'The Programme', the party discussed its political goals along with seven action plans: (1) the freedom of party and union organizations, (2) the end of repression towards the working class (especially via the National Security Law), (3) the improvement of harsh working conditions (including ineffectively administered policies on the minimum wage and unemployment), (4) the improvement of access to healthcare and education, (5) land reform, (6) opposition to imperialism and economic globalism, and (7) the protection of the discriminated (including women, Afro Brazilians, and Indigenous people) (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1980, 'Programa'). The 'Manifesto de Lançamento' summarized the substance of the 'Programa', most frequently referring to three words: workers, PT (or party), and fights (or struggles).[58] For the PT, at least around its foundation, 'participation in elections and parliamentary activities (would) be subordinated to the objective of organizing the (…) exploited and (…) their struggles' (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1980, 'Manifesto de Lançamento').

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[57] These documents are available online. Each document can be found under the title 'Documents of PT's Foundation (Documentos de Fundação do PT)'.

<Encontros Nacionais do PT–Resoluções (Accessed on 01 May, 2020)>

[58] I conducted a so-called term-frequency and inverse-document-frequency (or TF-IDF) analysis of both documents with a *cleanNLP* package in R (Arnold 2017).

The PT, however, seems to have found that, as a means, elections would be important to achieve its overarching goal. First, from 1980 to 2014, resolutions from its national meetings had come to more frequently mention campaigns (or other election-related terms) instead of movements. For example, with the standardized term-frequency measure to see which word showed up most frequently in resolutions,[59] it turned out that movements had been one of words that most frequently appeared in 'Manifesto', 'Programme', and other resolutions which had been approved by the 1989 national meeting. Even if these resolutions mentioned campaigns, they did so to make sure that a 'campaign (…) must support and be closely linked to social struggles ongoing in the country' (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1989, 'As Eleições Presidenciais e a Candidatura Lula'). However, especially from 1990 to the early 2000s, movements were mentioned less frequently in the party's resolutions. Rather, elections (or more precisely, 'winning elections') seem have been the foremost political goals for the PT.

Consistently, especially since the mid-1990s, resolutions more frequently mentioned people rather than workers. The estimation of the standardized term frequency, based on resolutions, showed that, at least between 1980 and 1989, workers had been more frequently mentioned than people. This seems quite consistent with the commitment of the party, as declared in 'Manifesto' and 'Programme', to protect workers' interests. However, since the mid-1990s, the PT seems to have broadened its appeal to mobilize the support of a broader

[59] The standardized term-frequency (or STF) measure can be calculated as follows:

$$Standardized\ Term\ Frequency = 101 - Original\ Rank_w$$

The concept of term-frequency describes the number of counts, but the count measure would be highly sensitive to the length of documents so that it could make the comparison of term frequency across documents incomparable if each length is quite different. Hence, in this chapter, I decided to work with the rank order (1st, 2nd, and so on) of each word. $Original\ Rank_w$ describes the rank of word W as it frequently appears in resolutions. The standardized term-frequency can be computed as the difference of the original rank from 101. So, if a term were to be ranked as the highest frequency, its standardized term-frequency would be 101–1 = 100 and vice versa.

set of voters. Indeed, in later resolutions, people were mentioned as frequently as workers. Furthermore, in addition to its traditional ally (the Communist Party of Brazil), the PT had sought to establish an alliance with the Centre-Left or the Centre (such as the PDT, the PCB-PPS, the PSB, the PMN, or the PSTU) (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1998, 'O Fim de um Ciclo'). This would be how, coupled with the moderation of the party's programmatic stances, its electoral campaigns came to gradually focus on national and broader contexts (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2001, 'Resoluções').

Why, in turn, did the PT shift its electoral strategy? The growing successful experience of subnational elections, as observed from the multilevel analysis, would be a viable factor endogenous to the party. 'As the party grew and won power at the municipal and state levels, it confronted new demands for pragmatic approaches to problem solving and greater pressure to broaden its campaign appeals' (Samuels 2004: 1015). Another factor would be the bipartisan dynamics of Brazilian presidential elections, requiring the majority of votes casted. 'Such a requirement puts at greatest disadvantage those candidates who are furthest from the political centre' (Hunter 2007: 449). Furthermore, the process of internal leadership contestation, highly institutionalized and open, would probably function to make the party's leaders accountable to demands for vote-seeking strategies (Keck 1992: 239). This course of party development by the PT would entice the party to increase its supporters in communities where the party opened its local branches (Samuels and Zucco 2018: 97). The PT had been particularly successful in communities where civil society was already dense, but even without organized civil society associations—as often characterized the Northeast of Brazil—the party managed to increase its electoral support by strategically investing its resources in opening local branches in the strongholds of their conservative counterparts (Van Dyck and Montero 2015: 127; Samuels and Zucco 2018: 99).

The Regionalization of Elite Alignment by Conservatives

Shown by the estimated results of the Equal Share and Equal Change models, the regionalization of electoral support was strongly associated with elite preferences (especially of the Right) towards clientelism and their past political experiences especially as a federal deputy. It was clear from the principal components analysis of elite preferences that some right-wing Brazilian political parties (such as the PSDB, the PMDB, and the PP2003) observed that their politicians were aligned along both programmatic and traditional dimensions (e.g. economic issues and past political experience). I discussed how such elite alignment would end up with the regionalization of electoral support to the extent that political accountability, as illustrated by the PT, would hardly work to unite various voices among politicians. This problem itself would be probably universal to any political parties without regard to left–right stances, but it has been quite often observed among the Brazilian Right.

For example, Fernando Barros (a consultant of electoral marketing for the PFL-DEM) produced three 30-second commercials and broadcast them in Bahia starting in August 2002 (*Folha de São Paulo*, 30 August 2002, 'Super-ACM ataca com luvas de boxe'). All of them *only* featured Bahian political chieftain Antonio Carlos Magalhães (popularly known as ACM), who had sought to return to Brasília in that year. One of the three 30-second commercials featured the personality of Magalhães, initially dressed in a white suit and a tie with the state colour of Bahia, without any reference to the uniformity of his campaign with his fellow candidates across the country (*Folha de São Paulo*, 30 August 2002, 'Super-ACM ataca com luvas de boxe'). And in the 2002 legislative election, the PFL-DEM (with which Magalhães affiliated) indeed obtained the most votes: 2,488,818 of 5,956,123 valid votes (41.8%) in Bahia, which was well above of the party's national mean (16.0%). Implicit in the

remarkable performance in Bahia is how important candidates' attributes (especially of Magalhães) would be.

Robustness Tests of Principal Findings

The estimated results of the multilevel models for national datasets, based on the BLSs, suggest further questions to be explored. First, under what conditions could institutional and structural factors affect the degree of party nationalization? I argue that would do so indirectly by interacting with variables on elite preferences (especially left–right stances). Second, though my hypothesis with a focus on elite coherence was relatively demonstrated with the dataset that included selected samples from the national elite survey BLSs, to what extent could the analysis of a subnational elite survey reveal identical (or similar) results? The multilevel analysis of selected samples from APEP shows that the degree of equal changes increases if elites support commitment to state interventionism over capitalism.

Institutional and Structural Interactions

One of key findings from the multilevel analysis of selected elites from the BLSs is that, contrarily to some variables on elite preferences, neither institutional nor structural factors were statistically significant to explain the degree of equal shares and equal changes. This may be because I have developed a single-case research design to explain the variation of equal shares and equal changes within a country (e.g. Brazil), whilst some form of cross-country designs commonly have been used for the analysis of system-level factors (Caramani 2004; Morgenstern 2017). This argument would be theoretically reasonable to the extent that not all individuals (including politicians and voters) behave as political institutions or social contexts would predict. If so, to what extent do institutional and structural factors condition the effect of elite preferences on party nationalization?

Previous multilevel models cannot answer the question simply because it assumes that there exists no such interactive effect of institutional and structural factors with elite preferences on equal shares and equal changes. Consequently, I have specified multilevel models with interactive effects. These interactive models predict that variables on elite preferences, which were demonstrated as significant by the previous models, could explain the degree of equal shares and equal changes even if there exist interactive effects by institutional and structural controls.

The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4.2. Let us focus on LEFT–RIGHT here, which was demonstrated as statistically significant for the Equal Change model in the previous analysis. Table 4.2 describes regression coefficients and standard deviations estimated from the interactive model for LEFT–RIGHT. One might think that a unit-increase in left–right stances would not be associated with an increase in equal changes when the conditional effects of control variables exist. However, we cannot necessarily come to this conclusion because the effect would largely depend on how different institutional and structural contexts of each region would be (Brambor et al. 2006: 74).

For this purpose, I sought to illustrate the marginal effect of left–right stances on equal changes across observed institutional and structural factors. Figure 4.2 shows estimated results. The solid red line (or dot) in the figure is the marginal effect of left–right stances, whilst shared areas (or whiskers) are the confidence intervals of marginal effects. The dashed line in the figure, on the other hand, indicates where the estimated marginal effect would disappear. Here it is visually clear that, even if we control the interactive effect of institutional and structural factors on equal changes, we can still find the significant marginal effect of left-right stances. Furthermore, given the significance of interactive effects by institutional and structural factors, we can conclude that most controlling variables would have somewhat indirect (not direct) effects on party nationalization.

TABLE 4.2: The Estimated Effects of Left–Right Stances and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Changes

	A	B	C	D	E	F
LEFT–RIGHT	3.22***	1.86*	2.32***	-0.15	3.87	14.23
	(0.61)	(1.10)	(0.85)	(9.55)	(2.34)	(11.81)
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE (or DM)	0.00					
	(0.01)					
DISTRICT NUMBER (or DN)		-0.47				
		(0.97)				
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES (or ENP)			-1.56			
			(1.51)			
REGIONAL AUTHORITY INDEX (or RAI)				0.04		
				(2.12)		
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION (EF)					-4.27	
					(22.01)	
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION (CF)						31.06
						(63.14)
LEFT–RIGHT*DM	0.00					
	(0.00)					
LEFT–RIGHT*DN		0.21				
		(0.20)				
LEFT–RIGHT*ENP			0.24			
			(0.35)			
LEFT–RIGHT*RAI				0.15		
				(0.47)		
LEFT–RIGHT*EF					-2.03	
					(4.90)	
LEFT–RIGHT*CF						-13.21
						(13.76)
R-squared	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
N	183	183	183	183	183	183

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * < 0.1

FIGURE 4.2: Marginal Effects of LEFT–RIGHT on Equal Changes by Each Controlling Factor



Subnational Dynamics

Another question to be addressed is that, when we employ a subnational elite survey instead of a national one, how differently estimated results look like. For this purpose, as I did in Chapter 3, I employ the subnational elite survey Administrative, Parliamentary and Party Elites of Paraná (or APEP). Note that, in contrast to the Brazilian Legislative Surveys, the APEP sampled 64 (national and subnational) legislators, 72 (national and subnational) administrative officials, and 16 party members in Paraná between 2004 and 2006. I have specified standard multilevel models as similar as I did for the analysis of the BLSs. An important change made to these models is that they do not have any variables to control for institutional and structural factors because information was not available to operationalize these factors at the municipal level (see Table B.4 in Appendix B.4 for operationalization and also Table B.5 in Appendix B.5 for the descriptive statistic of territorial distribution).

The estimation of these subnational models shows that, given the analysis of the APEP, elite preferences towards leftist ideologies had effects on equal changes similar to the analysis of selected samples from the BLSs. Table 4.3 presents the results of these estimations for five independent variables under analysis. On equal shares, no variables come across as statistically significant and also showing similar effects on the degree of equal shares. This suggests that, given the small boundary of clustering units (municipalities for this subnational analysis), the territorial coherence of elite preferences would not have distinguishable effects on equal shares among political parties.[60] However, at least for the degree of equal changes, the subnational model suggests that elite preferences towards state interventionism are strongly associated with the high degree of equal changes. This confirms

[60] The gap between levels to operationalize dependent and independent variables might have masked some effects of elite preferences on equal shares. Here, the dependent variable was operationalized as in the analysis of the BLSs (thus the aggregation unit was states), whilst the clustering unit of the multilevel models for APEP was municipalities.

TABLE 4.3: The Estimated Effects of Elite Preferences on Equal Shares and Equal Changes

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	**Equal Changes** Coefficients (SD)
DEMOCRACY I (Is democracy the best model?)	-1.54 (6.21)	4.52 (4.65)
DEMOCRACY II (Is Brazil democratic?)	1.38 (4.75)	-1.91 (3.39)
ECONOMY I (Is capitalism the best model?)	-2.43 (1.74)	-2.63* (1.22)
ECONOMY II (Are you in favour of economic liberalism?)	1.73 (4.07)	0.27 (0.81)
LEFT–RIGHT	-3.00 (1.51)	0.04 (0.91)
R-squared	0.08	0.10
N	69	69

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

what we have observed with the BLSs.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to test how well elite preferences could explain the degree of equal shares and equal changes. I expected in Chapter 2 that the more the left–right stances of individual politicians would be as coherently aligned along national issues between territorial units as they would be within each unit, the more likely the political party under whose ticket they run for elections would increase the equality of vote shares across territorial units and of vote changes over time. I initially sought to test this hypothesis by developing an explanatory dataset with selected samples from the BLSs. I have specified two multilevel models with random intercepts and slopes. The estimated results of these models revealed that anti-

clientelism was strongly associated with the high degree of equal shares. Also, past political experiences as a councillor were also significantly associated with the dependent variable.

Explicit in these results was that leftist programmes, sharply branded against clientelism, and also party efforts to open local branches in municipalities helped leftist parties penetrate regions (such as the North and Northeast) where conservatives had been dominant traditionally. Furthermore, the estimation of the Equal Change model showed that those who had homogeneously expanded their electoral support were also successful in maintaining electoral support over time. Elite preferences towards anti-clientelism and also state interventionism were clearly significant, and most elite samples from the leftist parties were relatively loyal to party leaders. How about mass preferences? How, and to what extent, are the left–right stances of individual voters as collectively coherent between electoral districts as they would be within each district? I will address this question in the next chapter.

5

Programmatic and Territorial Coherence of Voters

> ‘(Political) representation means acting for the interest of the represented in a responsive way to them’.
>
> - Hanna F. Pitkin (1967: 209–210)

The previous chapters have so far sought to explain the dynamics of party nationalization with a focus on elite preferences, but how about mass preferences? Are there any variations in the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences as the principal components analysis of elite preferences has shown? If so, which party would be most successful at aligning supporters along its party line? The importance of these questions—the focal of analysis in this chapter—lies in the following two facts. First, despite the growth of comparative studies on public opinion and voting behaviour in contemporary Brazil, it is still rare to find scholarly works that have directly taken territoriality into account. Some scholars have for example sought to understand how developed party identification (or party preferences) would be in contemporary Brazil, whilst others have sought to explain why Brazilian voters have developed party identification in a certain manner (Balbachevsky 1992; Borba et al. 2018a; Carreirão and Kinzo 2004; Gimenes et al. 2016; Izumi 2019; Kinzo 2005; Lavareda 1989; Maciel and Ventura 2017; Meneguello 1995; Okado et al. 2018; Oliveira 2011; Paiva et al. 2016; Pereira 2014; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2018). These works, however, have never asked if mass preferences would be as coherent between electoral districts as they would be within each district.

Furthermore, though party nationalization strongly indicates the national alignment of *both* elite and mass preferences, no scholar has explored if the territorial distribution of mass preferences would be as coherent between electoral districts as elite preferences would be in contemporary Brazil (Schattschneider 1960). Even Carreirão and his colleagues, whose work addressed the issue of so-called issue congruence, have never taken territoriality into account for their analyses (Carreirão and Melo 2014; Carreirão et al. 2019). Here the analysis of issue congruence begins with mass preferences and asks the extent to which mass preferences correspond to elite preferences (Powell 2004: 274). Such correspondence between elite and mass preferences may be possible by chance as political parties cannot (and do not) respond to all the issues raised during elections, or even once they become the ruling party. Or, as illustrated by a benevolent dictatorship, party-voter congruence could be intentionally developed by enforcement. However, at least in democratic countries where elections would be relatively fair and transparent, issue congruence cannot be achieved without institutionalized arrangements by politicians to act on behalf of the electorate (Pitkin 1967: 209–210).

Such a congruent alignment of elite and mass preferences for party nationalization is clear and straightforward. If politicians share left–right stances and are thereby coherently aligned along national issues, their supporters should have some form of shared vision and they should be coherently aligned across the country as well. To demonstrate this fundamental assumption of the second hypothesis, in this chapter, I develop the following design. First, I will compile a dataset based on the nationwide mass survey Brazilian Electoral Study (Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro, or ESEB). The questions of interest are political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances. And, given the selection criterion, I will show that the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB are suitable for our analysis. Besides the coverage of interested issues, using the 2002 and 2014 waves would help us

understand the territorial coherence of political preferences by PT supporters whose profile had increasingly diversified since the 2000s. The working dataset compiles 571 observations from two waves (2002 and 2014) and include 9 questions in total for political, economic, traditional, and left–right issues. Then, I conduct the principal components analysis of mass preferences and then move on to a multilevel analysis.

A principal components analysis of survey responses reveals a pattern of mass alignment quite similar to what we have observed with the elite survey. Scree plotting shows that at least five factors can explain the observed variation of survey responses with regard to all questions under analysis. These factors explain about 80 percent of observed variations in survey responses. Of the five, two factors will show the salience of economic and left–right issues to align selected sampled voters. This is quite consistent to elite alignment as we have found in Chapter 3 that the left–right stances of politicians were also significantly associated with economic issues. Contrarily, other three factors will show that some selected sampled voters (especially those supporting non-PT parties) would be aligned along traditional issues as well.[61] This result is similar to what we have found on the alignment of non-PT politicians. These findings clearly indicate that the left–right stances of some Brazilian voters are significantly associated with economic issues, whilst local issues (e.g. direct contacts with politicians) are also important for mass alignment in the country.

If so, how (in)coherent is the political preferences of PT and non-PT supporters? To answer this question, I specify the binomial and ordinal multilevel models that only include random intercepts and estimate intraclass correlations (or ICC). The substance of the intraclass correlation is to measure the extent to which the proportion of observed variations

[61] Traditional issues in this chapter (and next one as well) anything related to political clientelism, which has been demonstrated as significant for the alignment of voters especially by conservative politicians in the previous chapter.

in survey responses could be explained by the effect of clustering them at the state (or electoral-district) level. If the ICC is 0, this means that survey responses are relatively uniformly distributed across electoral districts. On the other hand, if the ICC is close to 1, we could expect that there would exist significant patterns specific to each district. The estimated result of the multilevel models reveals two patterns to be discussed. First, it is PT supporters whose political preferences are as coherently distributed between electoral districts as they are within each district. This pattern is salient in relation to economic and left–right issues. This is quite consistent to the result that PT politicians are also significantly aligned along economic and left–right issues. The supporters of non-PT parties, on the other hand, will rather show that their preferences are as heterogeneously distributed between electoral districts as they are within each district.

Then, I use a different dataset to verify the above findings. For this verification process, instead of voting intentions in federal legislative elections that I used for the previous analysis, I employ voting intentions in state-legislative elections. If voters do not split their votes between national and state legislative elections, we will find some degree of similarity from the analysis of the local working dataset. On the other hand, if the electorate votes differently between national and state legislative elections, such a result may indicate that state elections are subject to different dynamics than national elections. Here I will again specify random intercept binomial and ordinal multilevel models and estimate the intraclass correlation. The estimation of these multilevel models shows some form of partial alignment–i.e. no parties will have ICCs lower than 0.1, with regard to all variables consisting of the observed factors. Nevertheless, if we relax the criteria that the ICCs must be lower than 0.1 *and* they must be so in relation to all variables consisting of observed factors, the political preferences of some parties' supporters would be as coherently distributed between electoral districts as they are within each district.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I review the comparative study of public opinion and voting behaviour in contemporary Brazil. To date, some experts on Brazil have concluded that left–right stances would not be significantly associated with the political preferences of voting intentions for many (if not all) voters. Only voters who are highly educated and politically informed can properly place themselves on the left–right scale. However, as discussed in detail later, a recent study has questioned if the above conclusion on left–right stances has been demonstrated properly. The substance of this counterargument is that, without taking the so-called issue of interpersonal comparability into account, we could draw misleading conclusions. This is quite important for the analysis of survey responses subject to each evaluation or opinion. The principal components analysis of mass preferences will provide us with a solution to this issue by measuring one’s issue stance. Following a discussion of the technique, I perform the principal components analysis with the 2002 and 2014 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Study. The analysis shows five factors to be discussed, two of which are based on economic and left–right issues. Subsequently, I shift to an analysis of territorial coherence. Here the questions I would like to answer include whether mass preferences are as coherently aligned between electoral districts as they are within each district, and also if mass preferences are as aligned as elite preferences. Unanswered in the comparative study of public opinion in Brazil, I seek to answer these questions by conducting a multilevel analysis of mass preferences.

The Issue Dimension of Mass Alignment in Contemporary Brazil

Upon exploring the extent to which Brazilian voters share left–right stances with fellow citizens across the country (or the territorial coherence of mass preferences), I have initially sought to examine how such stances would be associated with other issue dimensions (or the programmatic coherence of mass preferences). The principal components analysis of the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (or BLSs) found that the most important factor for elite

alignment would largely load on a national dimension (economic and left–right issues), whilst two additional factors demonstrated some combination between national and local dimensions. How about mass preferences?

Misalignment of Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil

Scholarly efforts to understand the policy stances of the Brazilian electorate have often concluded that the self-placement of less-educated persons on the left–right scale would not be associated with their preferences with regard to other issues or voting intentions. Carreirão and Kinzo certainly argued that Brazilian voters who expressed leftist preferences would also vote for leftist parties (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004: 153). Nevertheless, they emphasized that such a mass preference would not necessarily reflect a programmatic stance associated with party platforms or discipline (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004: 154). This may be because Brazilian voters, especially of those who are less educated, would not understand the proper meaning of the Left and Right (Oliveira and Turgeon 2015: 585). Consistently, probably coupled with the extreme degree of party system fragmentation in contemporary Brazil, young voters who became eligible to vote after the 1990s would be more likely to be politically indifferent in contemporary Brazil (Tarouco and Madeira 2013: 161). Hence, mass alignment has been supposed to have changed randomly along district-specific or personal factors (Borba et al. 2018a: 110; Borba et al. 2018b: 15–16).

However, such a conditional effect of political sophistication (especially by education) on the formation of public opinion would not be necessarily supported by all experts. Izumi, for example, sought to answer whether left–right stances by Brazilian voters and their political preferences (or voting intentions) would be associated even if those voters are less educated (Izumi 2019). She argued that, according to the self-placement of Brazilian voters on the left–right scale, we could not conclude its relevance without taking so-called interpersonal comparability into account (Brady 1985; Izumi 2019: 31; King et al. 2004).

Interpersonal comparability (or incomparability) refers to the possibility that the respondents of mass surveys understand the meaning of questions differently and answer as they understand. Izumi employed the Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey scaling technique to directly address this issue of interpersonal comparability (Izumi 2019: 35). The technique assumes that Brazilian voters would know the relative order of political parties on the left–right scale, though they may not exactly know where those parties should be placed (Izumi 2019: 35). Izumi found with this scaling technique that the different levels of political sophistication have few effects on mass alignment (Izumi 2019: 51). These scholarly debates naturally raise the question as to how we should measure the programmatic stances of voters.

Measuring the Alignment of Mass Preferences

To address the issue of interpersonal incomparability, I use the technique of principal components analysis. Almeida, for example, argued that we need an index that is based on a series of questions to uncover a voter's left–right (or policy) stance (Almeida 2001: 122). Note that, given the issue of interpersonal incomparability, survey responses cannot be compared between respondents if they understand survey questions differently. Implicit in this issue is that, even if survey responses cannot be compared between respondents, this might be possible *within* respondents unless each respondent answers questions completely randomly. For example, a respondent is more likely to answer a question (e.g. What is the best form of government?) according to their opinion, and this individual bias may direct how they then answer subsequent questions. Figuring out the extent of such a bias allows us to indirectly understand how the left–right stances of individual respondents would be in average associated with their preferences with other issues. This is the question that a principal components analysis can answer. The substance of a principal components analysis, as discussed in Chapter 3, is to estimate the correlation matrix of variables under analysis and find relevant variables that can be associated eventually (Royce 1963: 522). In this sense, as

well as rescaling (another approach discussed by Izumi), the principal components analysis could be a practical solution to address interpersonal incomparability.

I have compiled the working dataset, based on the Brazilian Electoral Study (Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro, or ESEB). The ESEB is the Brazilian counterpart of the worldwide Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Project (or CSES), specifically designed to include questions relevant to the Brazilian context. The Centre for Studies on Public Opinion (or CESOP) at the University of Campinas kindly allowed me to access to its digital archive containing questionnaires and raw data from all waves (2002–2018) of the ESEB. Other mass-survey projects (e.g. AmericasBarometer or Latinobarómetro) have also conducted similar public opinion surveys. However, the Latinobarómetro has never asked questions on 'traditional' issues (e.g. mass preferences with regard to clientelism, constituting a pillar of traditional politics in Brazil), which would be one of interested variables for our analysis of party nationalization (Hagopian 1996: 18). On the other hand, the Brazilian wave of the AmericasBarometer only covers the period after 2006, which is shorter than the ESEB (2002–2018). Given the limitations of other mass surveys, the ESEB allows us to create a working dataset that includes all interested variables and also covers the broader period in which the PT ran for elections as the opposition (2002) and as the ruling party (2006–2014).

On the questions of interest, among all questions on the ESEB questionnaires, I sought to pick the ones through which we could best understand mass preferences or stances with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances. Possible questions on political issues, for example, could include those about the quality of democracy as well as party identification (or party preference), whilst economic questions should focus on state versus market issues. The 3rd category—traditional issues—is devoted to questions about political clientelism (e.g. 'Did any candidate contact you to vote for them during the last electoral campaign?'). This resulted in six questions for political issues, and

one question each for economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances, respectively. And, finally, I included the self-placement of mass samples on the left–right scale into this working dataset. Subsequently, among all waves of the ESEB from 2002 to 2018, I sought to work with those whose questionnaires had consistently asked all these questions as listed above. This selection criterion was met by the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB.

The dataset has questions about different political issues, including SATISFACTION ('Are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Brazil?'), DIFFERENCE ('Some people say that it makes a big difference who governs Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?'), INFLUENCE ('Some people say that your vote greatly influences what happens in Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?), GOVERNMENT ('Democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?'), IDENTIFICATION ('Is there a political party that represents the way you think?'), and PREFERENCE ('Is there a political party that you like?'). Among these variables, the response category of GOVERNMENT was different in the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB.[62] Consequently, by fixing to the 2014 wave, I rescaled this question so as to obtain an identical scale. A question on a state-market issue was ECONOMY ('The government must say everything that companies have to do. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?'). This variable was also rescaled, downsizing the response category of the 2014 wave (which was 10) so as to fit the 2002 wave.[63] Also, for the operationalization of mass preferences with

[62] The question as to how desirable democracy would be as a form of government, for example, had five response categories in the 2002 wave: agree a lot, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and disagree a lot. On the other hand, in the 2014 wave, the question only had three response categories: agree, neither agree nor disagree, and disagree.

[63] The question on government intervention over the market, for example, had five response categories in the 2002 wave: agree a lot, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree a lot. On the other hand, in the 2014

regard to clientelism, I found CONTACT relevant (‘During the electoral campaign, did a candidate or person from any party contact you to ask for your vote?’). LEFT–RIGHT was the last variable to operationalize the self-placement of selected samples on the left–right scale. Table D.1 in Appendix D.1 shows basic information (including the series number, question wording, and scale of each question under analysis).

Here I expect that both political and economic issues could align voters coherently across the country, whilst traditional issues (illustrated by CONTACT) would rather work to territorialize (or localize) mass preferences. In this sense, political and economic issues can together constitute a *national* dimension to the extent that these issues indicate systematic variations in mass responses to these questions. The comparative study of public opinion in contemporary Brazil has failed to demonstrate the validity of this assumption because most scholars have designed explanatory (not exploratory) research to only understand associations between the dependent and independent variables of interest, leaving possible other associations among unexplored variables (Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011; Moisés 1995; Moisés and Carneiro 2008; Moisés and Meneguello 2013; Baquero 2000; Ribeiro 2011). The self-placement of mass samples on the left–right scale could also compose the national dimension to the extent that the concept of the Left and Right would reflect political or economic issues. On the other hand, to the extent that CONTACT could find a random or different pattern of response distribution from political and economic variables, it can compose a *local* dimension.

The Dimensions of Mass Alignment in Contemporary Brazil

How differently would Brazilian voters be aligned along national and local dimensions? Also, with regard to estimated factors, which variable would be more contributing to

wave, the question had the response category of 1 – 10 in which 1 described a preference towards market liberalism and 10 for government intervention.

constitute those factors? To answer these questions, I have analysed the survey responses of the 571 mass samples, which I selected from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB.

The Number of Issues Dimensions

The principal components analysis of the policy stances of 571 selected mass samples illustrated that at least five factors are meaningful. Figure 5.1 is the scree plot of overall variance explained by top 9 factors. The estimated shares of variance explained by the first five factors are 21.7 % (Factor 1), 17.9 % (Factor 2), 15.1 % (Factor 3), 12.7 % (Factor 4), and 10.6 % (Factor 5).

Eigenvalues for these factors are 1.3 (the 1st factor or Factor 1), 1.1 (the 2nd factor or Factor 2), 0.9 (the 3rd factor or Factor 3), 0.8 (the 4th factor or Factor 4), and 0.6 (the 5th factor or Factor 5). These scores tell us that, if we firmly stick to the so-called 'greater-than-one' criterion that I discussed in Chapter 3, only Factor 1 and Factor 2 would be candidates for extraction. If the components of Factors 3 to 5 were not significantly different from the ones of Factors 1 and 2, such a conclusion to drop factors with eigenvalues less than 1.0 would make sense.

However, as discussed in the following section, it seems too deterministic to accept such a conclusion (Cattell 1966: 248–249). Indeed, the scree plot of observed factors shows that an actual cut-off point would be somewhere between the 5th and 6th factors because Factor 5 could still bring further information to understand the overall variation of survey responses.[64] Explicit in this initial finding is that all factors could bring nuanced information contributing to deepen our understanding of mass alignment in contemporary Brazil.

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[64] An R script on a statistical command to perform principal components analysis is available at Harvard Dataverse.

<Chapter 5-Principal Components Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 5-Principal Components Analysis (ESEB 2002)>

FIGURE 5.1: The Number of Possible Factors to Bind Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil



National Dimension versus Local Dimension

Figure 5.2 shows the estimated variance of *each* variable along factors. Dashed red lines in each plot indicate the expected average value of all factor loadings under analysis. Let us initially discuss Factor 2 and Factor 3 in detail. These are the factors with which the more than 80 % of variance in ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT was explained. This clearly indicates that, as both ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT were significantly loaded on by the 1st factor from the principal components analysis of the elite survey BLSs (1997–2013), the left-right stances of selected mass samples are also significantly associated with their economic preferences.

<Chapter 5-Principal Components Analysis (ESEB 2014)>

FIGURE 5.2: The Contribution of Each Issue Dimension by Observed Factors



On the other hand, the additional three factors (Factor 1, Factor 4, and Factor 5) are demonstrated as some form of combinations between national and local dimensions. It is especially striking that nearly 50 % of CONTACT–a variable on the past experience of direct contact made by electoral candidates– was loaded on by Factor 1. Furthermore, IDENTIFICATION and PREFERENCE also to a lesser extent have their estimated variance explained by this factor. Explicit in this finding is how significantly direct contact with politicians (or candidates) would affect whether those contacted would develop specific political preferences. This would illustrate how important this factor would be to align mass preferences among selected samples.

Factors 4 and 5 bring further information, following this line of discussion. Factor 4, for example, identified DIFFERENCE and INFLUENCE as the variables whose variations were significantly explained by the factor. However, the estimated variance of CONTACT also exceeded the expected average value of all factor loadings. Consistently, for Factor 5, CONTACT slightly fell short of IDENTIFICATION, which was the variable most significantly explained by the factor. In this sense, in contrast to Factor 2 and Factor 3, these factors would illustrate some form of mass alignment subject to local or regional contexts.

Coherence of Mass Preferences

The principal components analysis of mass preferences reveals that some voters are aligned along national and programmatic issues (e.g. political, economic, or left–right issues), whilst others are subject to local and traditional issues (e.g. direct contacts by politicians or party members). Implicit in this finding is that mass alignment is relatively different between political parties. The key to addressing this issue lies in party identification. The more likely the politicians of preferred parties are to be aligned along national and programmatic issues, the more likely their supporters would be aligned in the same way. On the other hand, if

politicians think that their electoral success is not dependent on party or programmatic issues but solely on personal attributes, their supporters would also be aligned quite differently between electoral districts. How about Brazilian voters? This is the question rarely addressed in the comparative study of public opinion in contemporary Brazil. I seek to fill this gap by closely analysing the territorial coherence of mass preferences with binomial and ordinal multilevel regression models only with random intercepts. The estimation of these models reveals that PT supporters are coherently aligned, but the supporters of non-PT parties are not.

Coherence of Mass Preferences in Contemporary Brazil

So far in the comparative study of electoral behaviour in advanced industrial democracies, party identification has been at the heart of scholarly efforts to understand the dynamics of voter alignment ((Dalton et al. 2002: 38). Here we can find two paradigms derived from scholarly perspectives on the stability of party identification: political identity and political learning approaches. The former approach begins with the concept of social identity (e.g. religiosity or ethnicity) and argues that, like religious or ethnic affiliations, the observed support of an electorate towards a particular party could explain why they have a stance with regard to a specific issue (e.g. social programmes or taxes). Sympathy toward or support for a party, in turn, has supposedly been subject to whom the party represents—the vision around which an electorate would consolidate during their socialization process (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002: 26). The political learning approach, on the other hand, predicts that such a vision may be updated more frequently than we expect by observing what preferred parties say and do over time (Achen 1992; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Key 1961). Implicit in this theoretical framework is that the stability of party identification would be subject to whom preferred parties *currently* (not used to) represent (Lupu 2015: 21).

Many experts have followed this line of discussions and sought to understand the alignment of voters in contemporary Brazil. One of the consensuses shared by those experts is that party identification is not as institutionalized in Brazilian contexts as in advanced industrial democracies (Kinzo 1992; Meneguello 1995). Some experts have attributed such a low degree of party identification to the legacy of the military regime (1964–1985). The bipartisan dynamics of electoral competitions, that only allowed the 'authentic' ruling and opposition parties (the ARENA and the MDB), had somewhat helped voters find which party would rule or be the opposition, but the party identification that Brazilian voters used to have with these parties had been supposedly different from the standard of US or European politics (Reis 1988: 80). In this context, what was important for voters would be *who* would run for office. The importance of candidate attributes for party identification has been demonstrated even in contemporary Brazil (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004: 147; Silveira 1996: 33).[65] Furthermore, in post-democratized Brazil, the increasing number of political parties running in elections confused voters (especially those who were less educated or young) in regard to what differences these party labels would make (Borba et al. 2018a: 110; Borba et al. 2018b: 4, 15–6; Kinzo 2005: 73).

However, despite the above context of the Brazilian party system, many experts also found that the Workers' Party (PT) had been relatively successful in increasing its core supporters (so-called *petistas*) at least between the 1990s and the early 2010s. Figure 5.3 shows the trajectory of mass partisanship along major parties in contemporary Brazil, compiled from IBOPE (1987) and Datafolha (1990–2018). The proportion of voters who expressed identification with the PT hovered around 5 % in the late 1980s, but leading up to 2002, it increased by more than 15 %. This growth is quite different from other Brazilian

[65] This importance of candidate rather than party attributes would be strengthened further by the use of mass media for electoral campaigns, in which each candidate would be more likely to emphasize individual performance or contributions (Kinzo 2005: 68).

parties (except for the PSDB), which never regained the observed share of party identification subsequent to the late 1980s. Furthermore, though the PT experienced downward shifts in 2006 and 2014 given the allegations of nationally broadcasted corruption scandals, its share of party identification had risen again in 2010 and 2018. Explicit in this trajectory is that support for the PT would not be as unstable as other parties, though it can certainly change by observing what the party leadership would say and do. Also, despite the observed loss of support by the PT in 2006 and 2014, no parties seemed to benefit from the PT's decline.

FIGURE 5.3: Party Identification in Contemporary Brazil (1987–2018)



Sources: IBOPE (1987) and Datafolha (1990–2018)

Gaps in the Analysis of Mass Coherence in Contemporary Brazil

Implicit in the distinctive trajectory of PT and non-PT partisans, observed in Figure 5.3, is that the territorial coherence of mass preferences would be also quite different between political parties. If politicians were to emphasize local issues or material benefits in exchange for votes, voters would also develop territorialized preferences. On the other hand, if politicians share some form of vision and coordinate cross-district campaigns, mass preferences would be as coherent between electoral districts as they are within each district. But, to what extent do Brazilian voters share visions or political preferences with fellow citizens across the country? This question has rarely been addressed by experts on Brazilian politics, with the singular exception of Maciel and Ventura (2017). They argued that the PT had traditionally performed well in elections in large cities, but it has been successful also in smaller municipalities since the 2000s (Maciel and Ventura 2017: 106). Similar to Samuels and Zucco's findings, they emphasized that successful experiences in state and municipal elections have positively affected the growth of the party (Maciel and Ventura 2017: 117; Samuels and Zucco 2018).

Second, given the territorial coherence of mass preferences, to what extent are they as territorially coherent as elite preferences? This question falls under the issue of so-called 'issue congruence', standing on the field of political representation (Miller and Stoke 1963). Issue congruence, or substantive representation to use the concept developed by Pitkin (1967), is the concept of beginning with elite preferences and asking if representatives advance policies that reflect popular preferences (Pitkin 1967: 209–210). A growing number of comparative analysts have designed cross-national studies since the work of Miller and Stokes (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Miller et al. 1999; Powell 2000), and this 'wave' of an 'explosion of comparative substantive representation studies' has recently reached Latin America (Carreirão and Melo 2014; Carreirão et al. 2019; Luna and Zechmeister 2010).

Nevertheless, as common to any fields in their founding stages, no one has yet taken territoriality into account for the analysis of issue congruence. This project is thereby a first attempt to fill this gap.

Measuring the Territorial Coherence of Mass Preferences

To capture how territorially coherent mass preferences would be, I use two-level binomial and ordinal regressions only with random intercepts (in other words, an unconditional model). The binomial regression is suitable for the analysis of variables with binary response categories, and I specified this regression model for the analysis of sample responses with regard to IDENTIFICATION, PREFERENCE, and CONTACT. The rest of the variables, listed in Table D.1 in Appendix D.1, were specified by two-level ordinal regression models. On the other hand, I chose electoral districts for the Level-2 unit of data aggregation.

Upon the estimation of interested parameters, it would be useful to describe for readers the different demographic characteristics of each state (or electoral district), the Level-2 unit. The North—including Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins—was discussed in Chapter 3 as one of the less populated regions in Brazil, but demographic characteristics are also quite different between each state. The most populous state (Pará) had 7,581,051 residents (47.8 % of the regional total population), whilst only 450,479 residents (2.8 % of the regional total population) resided in the least populous state (Roraima) (Sinopse do Censo Demográfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). Consistently, though nearly 70 % of the regional population were, on average, urban residents, each state shows a considerable difference in the distribution of residents between urban and rural areas. The proportion of residents living in the urban areas of Amapá, for example, was well above of the regional average (89.8 % for Amapá and 73.5 % for the North) in 2010, but 31.5 % of residents in Pará resided in rural areas (ibid). The proportion of Roman Catholics is also relatively different between each state, though the

regional average was 60.6 %. Tocantins had the highest proportion of Roman Catholics (68.3 %), whilst Rondônia fell short of the regional average (47.6 %) (ibid). And, finally, the average monthly income of each northern state shows some degree of difference even within the underdeveloped region (the average monthly income of the North was R$1,821 in 2019, equal to US$444). The average monthly income of Roraima, for example, was R$2,241 (US$547) in 2019, but it was just R$1,468 (US$358) in Pará (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

The Northeast is another region in where demographic characteristics are quite different between states. The total population of the nine states (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe) was 53,081,950 (27.8 % of the national population). Among the regional population, 8,796,448 residents (16.6 %) were in Pernambuco as of 2010, whilst only 2,068,017 residents (3.4 %) resided in Sergipe (Sinopse do Censo Demográfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The proportion of the urban population is also relatively different between each state. Though the regional average was 73.1 % in 2010, 80.2 % of the Pernambuco population lived in urban areas. Maranhão, on the other hand, had only 63.1 % of its population in urban areas (ibid). The distribution of Roman Catholics also shows that north-eastern states were quite heterogeneous. The regional average of the Catholic proportion was 72.2 % in 2010, but 85.1 % of residents in Piauí were Catholics, as were only 65.3 % of the Bahian population (ibid). Finally, likewise with the North, the Northeast included great variations in income distribution between each state. The regional average monthly income of all workers was R$1,531 (US$373) in 2019. Pernambuco scored the highest income level of R$1,702 (US$415), whilst the average monthly income of Piauí workers was just R$1,361 (US$332) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

In the Centre-West, on the other hand, the demographic characteristics of each state followed some sort of centre-periphery pattern. The most populous state in the Centre-West, Goiás, had 6,003,788 residents (42.7 % of the regional population) in 2010, whilst the other three states (Distrito Federal, Mato Grosso, and Mato Grosso do Sul) had less than 3,000,000 residents (3,035,122 for Mato Grosso, 2,570,160 for Distrito Federal, and 2,449,024 for Mato Grosso do Sul) (Sinopse do Censo Demográfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). Consistently, the degree of urbanization followed the similar pattern. The average proportion of urban residents in the Centre-West was 88.8 % in 2010, but Distrito Federal had 96.6 % of its residents in urban areas. On the other hand, the proportion of urban residents was less than 90.0 % in other three states (90.3 % for Goiás, 81.8 % for Mato Grosso, and 85.6 % for Mato Grosso do Sul) (ibid). The religious structure of the Centre-West seemed also to follow a similar pattern of interstate differences. Though an average of 59.6 % of residents in the Centre-West were Roman Catholics as of 2010, the proportion of Roman Catholics in Mato Grosso was well above this regional average (63.4 %). However, less than the 60.0 % of people were Roman Catholics in the other three states (56.6 % for Distrito Federal, 58.9 % for Goiás, and 59.4 % for Mato Grosso do Sul) (ibid). Finally, the average monthly income illustrates this centre-periphery pattern most significantly. Distrito Federal, for example, marked R$3,845 (US$938) in 2019, whilst the average monthly income of other three states had fallen to between R$2,062 (US$503) and R$2,257 (US$550) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

The Southeast is another region that followed the centre-periphery pattern of demographic distribution, but to a lesser extent. The Southeast is the most populous region, counting 80,364,410 residents (42.1 % of the national population). Of the regional population, 41,262,199 people were in São Paulo. Other three states— Espírito Santo, Minas

Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro—were in turn the home of less than 20,000,000 locals each (3,514,952 for Espírito Santo, 19,597,330 for Minas Gerais, and 15,989,929 for Rio de Janeiro) (Sinopse do Censo Demográfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The degree of urbanization, on the other hand, shows a somewhat different pattern. The regional average proportion of urban residents was 93.0 % in 2010. Both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were well above this regional average (96.0 % for São Paulo and 96.7 % for Rio de Janeiro). Other two states (Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais) were, contrarily, slightly below the regional average (83.4 % for Espírito Santo and 85.3 % for Minas Gerais) (ibid). As to the proportion of Roman Catholics, Minas Gerais would be the centre of the Southeast. The Southeast had 59.5 % of its regional population as Roman Catholic in 2010, whilst the proportion of Roman Catholics in Minas Gerais exceeded 70.0 %. However, in the other three states, the proportion was less than 60.0 % (53.3 % for Espírito Santo, 45.8 % for Rio de Janeiro, and 60.1 % for São Paulo) (ibid). Finally, likewise with the pattern of urbanization, the average monthly income of each state exhibited a division between the southern and northern states of the Southeast. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, for example, marked R$2,721 (US$664) on average as of 2019, while the average monthly income of Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais had fallen between R$1,888 (US$460) and R$2,030 (US$495) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

Lastly, the South would be probably the region wherein the demographic characteristics of each state were relatively similar in comparison to other regions. The regional population was 27,386,891 (14.4 % of the national population) in 2010. The population of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul was 10,444,526 and 10,693,929 for each, amounting to 39 % of the regional population. Santa Catarina certainly fell short of this proportion (22.8 %) (Sinopse do Censo Demográfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia

e Estatistica). The degree of urbanization, on the other hand, was quite similar. Santa Catarina, for example, had 84.0 % of its population in urban areas, and so did Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul (85.3 % for Paraná and 85.1 % for Rio Grande do Sul) (ibid). Consistently, the proportion of Roman Catholics was quite similar between southern states. Nearly 70.0 % of the regional population was Roman Catholic as of 2010, and this proportion well reflected the state level. Paraná, for example, had 69.6 % of its population as Roman Catholic, and Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina also had around 70.0 % of their residents as Roman Catholics (ibid). Finally, the average monthly income of southern states was also relatively similar in comparison to other states. Paraná, for example, marked R$2,414 (US$589) as of 2019, and so did Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina (R$2,468 for Rio Grande do Sul and R$2,426 for Santa Catarina) (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Divulgação Trimestral - 2º trimestre 2019).

Territorial Coherence of Mass Preferences

Given the variation of demographic characteristics between states, to what extent are mass preferences as coherent between states (or electoral districts) as they are within each state? Table D.2 in Appendix D.2 shows the count and proportion of sample responses along the nine selected survey questions, and also suggests standard deviations calculated at the national (or NSD) and state (or SSD) levels.

Let us focus initially on the standard deviations of each survey response at the national level. Here we find that the territorial distribution of survey responses with regard to ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT is quite different from the rest of political issues. The standard deviation of ECONOMY at the national level was relatively small, showing 32.5. And so was LEFT–RIGHT with 36.7 for its national deviation. SATISFACTION also appears as 51.8, though this score would be slightly higher than ECONOMY and LEFT–

RIGHT. On the other hand, the standard deviations of survey responses with regard to other questions were higher than 70. Explicit in this descriptive statistic is that mass preferences had, on average, followed national alignment on economic and left–right issues, whilst they came across as different from the mean on other political and traditional issues.

Consistently, though not yet rigorously tested, we also find that there exists a significant variation in the distribution of survey responses within each state. The standard deviations of ECONOMY at the state level, for example, falls somewhere between 0.5 and 8.1, whilst LEFT–RIGHT has a slightly broader range of standard deviations (0.4–10.7). This indicates that survey responses were as similarly distributed within each state as they were between states. On the other hand, other variables showed somewhat different patterns of distribution. One might think that some of these variables (such as IDENTIFICATION, PREFERENCE, and CONTACT) might be as similar as ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT, but they are not. Remember that all the variables listed here had marked standard deviations higher than 70 at the national level. Explicit in this descriptive statistic is that survey responses with regard to these questions are not as coherently distributed within each state as they were between states.

The observed pattern of territorial distribution, especially on ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT, is quite consistent to what we found through the descriptive analysis of survey responses from the elite surveys BLSs (1997–2013). ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT had scored a relatively lower degree of standard deviations at the national level (59.1 for ECONOMY and 34.2 for LEFT–RIGHT) compared with other variables under analysis. On the other hand, as with mass preferences, there exists a significant variation in the territorial distribution of elite responses at the regional level. However, the gaps of estimated standard deviations at the national and regional levels are relatively smaller for ECONOMY and

LEFT–RIGHT. Implicit in this is that economic and left–right issues drive the national alignment of both elite and mass preferences.

Then, to what extent can we find a similar result from the multilevel model of mass responses? Would the clustering unit of analysis—states (equal to electoral districts)—be significant to explain the overall variance in elite responses? Furthermore, though Table D.2 in Appendix D.2 did not show the territorial distribution of mass responses according to party affiliation, to what extent can we find a different pattern of territorial distribution between political parties? Like in Chapter 3, I have specified two-level binomial and ordinal regression models with random intercepts only and estimated the intraclass correlation (or ICC) for all variables under analysis. Note that the ICC coefficient shows the proportion of observed variance in the outcome (e.g. mass responses) that is attributable to the effect of clustering at a certain level (e.g. clustering at the state level) and it was calculated as below:

$$Mass\ Preference_{ik} = [\beta_{00} + \pi_{0k}] + \varepsilon_{ik}$$

$$ICC = \frac{\pi_{0k}}{(\pi_{0k} + \varepsilon_{ik})}. \qquad \text{Equation 5.1}$$

Equation 5.1 clearly suggests that the ICC coefficient is indeed calculated by dividing the random effect variance, π_{0k}, by the total variance—the sum of the random effect variance (π_{0k}) and the residual variance (ε_{ik}) (Gelman and Hill 2007: 258). The ICC coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, indicating how significantly individuals' scores within a cluster (e.g. sampled mass responses in each state equal to electoral districts) are correlated (0 = no variance between districts and 1 = significant variance between districts) (Finch et al. 2014: 24). All estimations are based on an adaptive Gaussian Hermite approximation of the likelihood with 10 integration points. An R script on a statistical command to perform binomial and ordinal multilevel regression is available online , as well as its dataset, titled

‘Chapter 5-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (R-Script)’ and also ‘Chapter 5-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (Dataset)’.[66]

For the interpretation of the estimated ICCs, I follow the criterion which I set up in Chapter 3: whether estimated ICCs are smaller than 0.1 and whether estimated ICCs are smaller in variables to compose the factors that we observed previously. An ICC smaller than 0.1 indicates completely poor correlation—meaning that the few proportions of observed variations in the outcome (e.g. mass responses) are explained by the effect of clustering at a certain level (e.g. states). In addition to this general criterion, the second—ICC smaller in variables to compose the factors that we observed—provides us with a more case-oriented rational. Remember the principal components analysis of selected mass samples, through which we found five factors to align voters along national (political, economic, and left–right issues) and local (traditional) issues. In this sense, it would make more sense to carefully look at which party’s supporters would be relatively coherent along the variables composing these dimensions.

The estimated result of the binomial and ordinal regression models reveals a division between PT supporters and non-PT supporters.[67] Figure 5.4 shows estimated ICC coefficients, cumulated along observed factors in the principal components analysis. The dashed line in the figure describes the threshold (ICC = 0.1) which I set up previously in Chapter 3. Let us initially focuses on the parties whose estimated ICCs were well below of 0.1 for Factors 2 and 3. These parties include the PT and PC do B, which are all understood

[66] An R script on a statistical command to perform multilevel analysis is available at Harvard Dataverse.

<Chapter 5-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 5-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (ESEB 2002)>

<Chapter 5-Binomial and Ordinal Multilevel Analysis (ESEB 2014)>

[67] The working dataset includes PARTY—voting intentions at the 2002 and 2014 legislative elections—to operationalize party affiliations.

as the Left or the Centre-Left in contemporary Brazil.[68] Note that, as I discussed previously, these are the factors along which the political preferences of selected sampled voters are relatively aligned along economic and left-right issues. The multilevel analysis of the ESEB clearly indicates that, given the observed dimension of mass alignment, PT (and PC do B as well) supporters would be aligned coherently across the country.

FIGURE 5.4: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors



On the other hand, the territorial distribution of survey responses from non-PT supporters would be quite different. These selected samples mostly supported the Right (including the PFL-DEM, PMDB, and PSD), though the PCB/PPS and PROS could be

[68] I did not count the parties whose ICCs could not be estimated, though they look aligned coherently along Factors 2 and 3. These parties include the PP2003, PR, PSB, PSC, PSDB, and PTB.

placed on the centre-left of the left-right spectrum. Their response patterns seem clearly following the geographical boundary of electoral districts. The estimated ICCs of Factors 2 and 3 were, for example, well above of the threshold. And so was for other factors (Factors 1, 4, and 5) which would more clearly illustrate territorialized mass alignment. This would suggest that, to the extent that the political preferences of non-PT supporters would be aligned quite differently across the country, they would emphasize local issues or other factors specific to individual candidates to vote for in legislative elections. Table D.3 in Appendix D.3 reports estimated ICCs for each variable.

Robustness Tests of Findings from the ESEB

How verifiable are these findings if we, in turn, employ a different dataset? For this purpose, instead of voting intentions in national-legislative elections, I used voting intentions in state-legislative elections. The descriptive static of mass preferences will show some degree of similarity to what we already found with the national dataset. However, the multilevel analysis of mass preferences will indicate that the dynamics of support mobilization in state elections would be different from national elections. It does not necessarily indicate that the national alignment of supporters is impossible. Such alignment seems possible, but it would not be based on the same issues along which mass preferences are aligned in national elections.

Distribution of Mass Preferences in State Legislative Elections

For this verification process, I have changed the variable to operationalize party affiliations from voting intentions in federal legislative elections to state legislative elections. However, the descriptive statistic of survey responses seems consistent to what we found. Table D.4 in Appendix D.4 shows the count and proportion of sample responses along the nine selected survey questions. Let us initially focus on the standard deviations of survey responses with regard to each question at the national level. Here, as well as IDENTIFICATION, both

ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT had marked a relatively low degree of standard deviations: 38.3 for ECONOMY and 39.9 for LEFT–RIGHT. Contrarily, other variables with regard to political and traditional issues performed rather poorly. Explicit in this descriptive statistic is that, whether national or state legislative elections, the political preferences of some voters were relatively aligned along the national mean.

On the other hand, we can also find a significant variation at the state level. Both ECONOMY and LEFT–RIGHT had a relatively narrow range of standard deviations: 0.4–6.5 for ECONOMY and 0.3–8.0 for LEFT–RIGHT. However, the rest of variables showed two patterns. One would be featured by a narrow range of standard deviations. PREFERENCE, and to a lesser extent SATISFACTION, would fall in this pattern. This clearly indicates that mass preferences with regard to these variables were relatively coherently distributed within each district, but not across the country. Another pattern showed the opposite, depicted by the broad range of standard deviations at the state level. This pattern was shown by DIFFERENCE, INFLUENCE, GOVERNMENT, and CONTACT. Explicit in this pattern is that mass preferences were rather heterogeneously distributed both within and between states.

Model Estimation

I have subsequently sought to estimate the territorial coherence of mass preferences, based on binomial and ordinal multilevel models with random intercepts only. The estimation of these models reveals somewhat different results from the previous analysis based on voting intentions in national legislative elections. Look at Figure 5.5, which shows estimated ICCs, cumulated along observed factors. First and foremost, on Factors 2 and 3, the PT did not score ICCs smaller than 0.1. Some readers might conclude based on this finding that, given the importance of district-specific issues in state-level elections, it seems unsurprising that PT supporters would *not* have been aligned coherently between electoral districts.

FIGURE 5.5: Estimated ICCs, Cumulated along Factors



However, even if they were not completely aligned, as they would be in national elections, we cannot underestimate the possibility of partial alignment. Here partial alignment indicates that the intraclass correlation of survey responses would be lower than 0.1 for *at least* one (but not all) variable, which would be the component of the observed factors. Consequently, if the estimated ICCs of CONTACT, IDENTIFICATION, *or* PREFERENCE were lower than 0.1, this implies that mass preferences would be partially aligned along Factor 1 and Factor 5. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to conclude that partial alignment would be made along Factor 4 if the estimated ICCs of DIFFERENCE, INFLUENCE, *or* CONTACT were 0.1 or lower. Consistently, if the estimated ICCs of ECONOMY *or* LEFT–RIGHT were 0.1 or lower, we could expect that mass preferences

would be partially aligned along Factor 2 and Factor 3. Which pattern, in turn, would fit to which party?

Based on this relaxed criteria, it is clear from Table D.5 in Appendix D.5 that the supporters of the PT, as well as of the PROS and PSD, would be partially but coherently aligned along Factors 1 and 5. Note that these factors were demonstrated as predominantly consisting of three variables on party identification, party preferences, and the past experience of direct contacts made by electoral candidates (IDENTIFICATION, PREFERENCES, and CONTACT). It is true that how these variables would be associated (positively or negatively) with each other may be dependent on which party selected samples would support for. Some voters might increase (or decrease) their preferences toward the preferred parties if they were to be contacted by the politicians of those parties. Others, on the other hand, may maintain their preference even if they were not directly contacted by any politicians. What is important here is that, though mass preferences were not coherently aligned along all these variables (CONTACT, IDENTIFICATION, and PREFERNCE), they were aligned according to at least one of those variables.

Consistently, it turned out that the supporters of the PT (and of the PSDB as well) were partially but coherently aligned along Factor 4. Note that, as shown by Table D.5 in Appendix D.5, this factor had strongly loaded on DIFFERENCE, INFLUENCE, and CONTACT. This, as I discussed in this chapter, clearly indicates that mass evaluations on the two important aspects of democracy—who governs the country would matter and also how influential one's vote would be for what will happen in the country—were significantly associated with voters' experiences of being contacted directly by politicians or party members. Here, again, we do not know yet how these variables would be associated. Some voters, for example, may not like to vote for any candidates but those who get in touch with them during electoral campaigns. Contrarily, even if they do not have direct contact with

politicians, others might be able to find why they would cast ballots as they do. What we can conclude here is that, at least along one of the three variables, mass preferences were as coherently aligned between electoral districts as they were within each district.

Implicit in these findings is that, as discussed by Morgenstern et al. (2017), economic and left–right issues themselves do not necessarily drive the national alignment of voters. Rather, the nationalization of voters is more subject to party efforts to intentionally mobilize electoral support along specific issues. If there exist nationally broadcasted issues (e.g. recessions or corruption scandals) and if parties find these issues relevant for their electoral success, we might be able to see some degree of cross-district support. On the other hand, if individual politicians or candidates find that their electoral success is relatively independent of nationally broadcasted issues, their support would be rather heterogeneous across the country.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to test the key assumptions of the second hypothesis—the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences. If elite preferences are as coherently distributed between electoral districts as they are within each district, mass preferences would also show a similar pattern. This is the issue which rarely has been addressed in the comparative study of public opinion in contemporary Brazil. I have sought to fill this gap by conducting two empirical analyses: a principal components analysis and also a binomial and ordinal multilevel analysis. The principal components analysis of survey responses, compiled from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB, showed five factors significant to align mass preferences. Two of them had significantly loaded on economic and left–right issues, whilst the other three factors were some combination of national and local issues. Given the alignment of Brazilian voters, how coherent would mass preferences be

across the country? The following analysis of territorial coherence, based on multilevel models, found that PT supporters were as coherently aligned along economic and left–right issues between electoral districts as they were within each district. The supporters of non-PT parties, on the other hand, were rather heterogeneously aligned between electoral districts. This principal finding, in turn, was partially verified by another dataset, based on voting intentions in state (instead of national) legislative elections. In turn, how consequential is the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences for party nationalization? This is the final question that I address.

6

Mass Coherence and Party Nationalization

> ‘One consequence of the development of the national dimension of polities is likely to be the creation of a national electorate and a national majority’.
>
> - Elmer E. Schattschneider (1960: 93)

It is now clear that the mass alignment of mass preferences varied between PT and non-PT supporters, but how about its effect on party nationalization? I address the question in this chapter. Initially, in the following section, I discuss the operationalization of dependent and independent variables of interest. Note that, in Chapter 2, I discussed mass preferences should be programmatically and territorially coherent if party nationalization is likely. Consequently, as I did for the analysis of elite preferences, I use the unstandardized (or original) scores of equal shares and equal changes for dependent variables. If these scores are close to zero, it indicates that a party’s vote share at the district level would be equally distributed across districts and also would change equally across districts over time. The independent variables of interest, in turn, are mass preferences with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances. Here I operationalize these variables with survey questions selected from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Study (Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro, or ESEB). On the other hand, for the control of institutional and structural factors, which have been emphasized in the literature to date to explain party nationalization, I will use six variables: the educational and income levels of survey

respondents selected from the ESEB, district magnitude, the effective number of parties at the district level, and ethnic and class fractionalization at the district level.

I subsequently move on to statistical estimation. As in Chapter 4, to address the issue of cross-level inference, I specify two-level standard regression models with random intercepts and slopes. It will emerge from the estimation of R-squared that the nearly 10 % of variations in equal shares and equal changes can be explained by the independent variables under analysis. This result shows the slightly lower fit of mass models than elite models (whose R-squared would be 0.25 for the Equal Share model and 0.50 for the Equal Change model in the analysis of the elite survey BLSs). However, it can still bring relevant information for us to understand the dynamics of party nationalization in contemporary Brazil. First and foremost, the Equal Change model demonstrates that the more likely respondents are to place themselves on the left of the left–right scale, the more likely the political parties for which they intend to vote in legislative elections obtain a higher degree of equal changes. Second, the more likely respondents are to believe that the party in power makes a difference for Brazil, the more likely the political parties for which they intend to vote in legislative elections are higher in both equal shares and equal changes. Further, the lower the district magnitude, the higher the degree of equal shares and equal changes. And, finally, it is interesting to find that regionalized parties would in general fail to attract those who had been dissatisfied with the (federal) government.

The principal finding of this chapter is that, when the left–right stance of survey respondents is strongly associated with national and programmatic issues rather than subnational and personal issues, the self-placement of mass respondents on the left–right scale can significantly explain the dynamics of party nationalization. In other words, leftist voters are more likely to support nationalized parties (e.g. the PT), whilst rightist voters are more likely to support regionalized parties (e.g. the PSDB or the PMDB). This does not

necessarily imply that the Left is always associated with party nationalization, but it clearly indicates that party nationalization only happens when elite and mass preferences are as coherently distributed between electoral districts as they are within each district. The Brazilian Left, especially the PT, is relatively successful in mobilizing cross-district support, whilst their conservative counterparts are rather skilful in territorializing (or regionalizing) their support base. Another important implication from the explanatory analysis is that the electoral support of those who nationalize support seems stable and resistant to fast-changing circumstances. For example, among those who voted for nationalized parties, some answered no-preferred party in surveys (but they finally supported those nationalized parties).

Subsequently, in this chapter I seek to verify the estimated effect of left–right stances on equal shares and equal changes. I initially investigate the interactive effect of six control variables—the educational and income levels of mass respondents, district magnitude, the effective number of parties at the district level, and ethnic and class fractionalization at the district level—on equal shares and equal changes. To what extent would the estimated effect of left–right stances on equal changes stand out as significant when controlling for other alternative explanations? To answer this question, I specify six interactive models along six control variables. The estimation of these models reveals that the self-placement of mass respondents on the left–right scale has a conditional but still significant effect on equal changes. Left–right stances, for example, have a significant reductive effect on equal changes if mass respondents are relatively well educated, whilst the variable also has a limited enhancing effect on equal changes in districts with the mid-size of effective parties and also a moderate degree of ethnic fractionalization.

I run another robustness test to see if the left–right stances of mass respondents could significantly explain the degree of equal changes even when we employ voting intentions in state-legislative elections to operationalize party affiliations. The estimated model for equal

shares shows that no variable would be significant to explain the degree of equal shares. In other words, the dynamics of subnational elections would not be necessarily associated with the dynamics of support expansion across the country. However, another model for equal changes indicates that this would not be the case for equal changes. The estimation of the model shows that, even if some voters are somehow dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country, they are still likely to vote for political parties with a higher degree of equal changes. Consistently, if mass respondents place themselves on the left of the political spectrum, equal changes are higher. Such a salient effect of partisan voting on equal changes was found in the previous analysis as well.

The rest of the discussions in this chapter develop as follows. First, I describe the data. In this case, I rely on the Brazilian Electoral Study (2002 and 2014). Here dependent variables are operationalized as the unstandardized scores of equal shares and equal changes, whilst the independent variables of interest are mass preferences with regard to political, economic, traditional, and left–right issues. I also include six more variables to control for institutional and structural factors. Subsequently, I specify standard multilevel regression models with random intercepts and slopes. Notably, these models can explain the nearly 10 % of variance among dependent variables, respectively. The estimation of these models reveals that the northward shift of electoral support is significantly important for equal shares. Furthermore, it is also clear that such a northward shift would be significant if, and only if, mass respondents place themselves on the left of the political spectrum. Conservative support, on the other hand, is rather strongly associated with regionalization.

Operationalization of Variables

How significantly could mass coherence explain the degree of party nationalization? To answer this question, I employ the Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB). My focus is mass

preferences with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as stances on the left–right scale. These issues may include various topics (e.g. the best model of government or direct contact with politicians) but should be asked in a consistent way across waves. This selection procedure results in six questions on political issues, and three questions on left–right stances, economic, and traditional issues, from the 2002 and 2014 waves. 367 mass samples completed all these questions. Furthermore, to control for institutional and structural factors, the working dataset includes six control variables.

Equal Shares and Equal Changes

Dependent variables are operationalized as the unstandardized scores of equal shares and equal changes, laid out in Chapter 4. Standardization helps us to compare the degree of party nationalization among the selected set of parties under analysis. However, the empirical implication of our analysis, I believe, would extend well beyond the Brazilian parties under analysis. In this sense, unstandardized scores enhance the comparability of estimated results. The unstandardized scores of equal shares and equal changes tell us that, if the estimated scores of equal shares and equal changes for a political party are close to zero, the party would be relatively nationalized. On the other hand, it suggests the regionalization of electoral support if estimated scores are higher (there exists no upper limit here).

The estimation of these scores is based on the weighted growth curve model, which I discussed in Chapter 1. Also, to enhance further the comparability of estimated results, I have decided to focus on the major Brazilian parties. For this purpose, as in Chapter 4, I place a threshold on the size of vote shares as 5 % or more, removing small parties whose scores of equal shares and equal changes may be overestimated. This selection procedure results in six Brazilian parties, whose degree of party nationalization varies as follows: 4.3 to 36.9 for equal shares and 9.7 to 35.7 for equal changes. Table E.1 in Appendix E.1 provides estimated scores for all parties under analysis, as well as the descriptive statistics of other variables.

Mass Preferences

The independent variables of interest are the issue stances of mass respondents, compiled from the 2002 and 2014 waves of the ESEB. As in Chapter 4, I specifically focus on survey questions with regard to political, economic, and traditional issues, as well as left–right stances. The questions on political issues include SATISFACTION ('In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Brazil?'), DIFFERENCE ('Some people say that it makes a big difference who governs Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?'), INFLUENCE ('Some people say that your vote greatly influences what happens in Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?'), GOVERNMENT ('Democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?'), IDENTIFICATION ('Is there a political party that represents the way you think?'), and PREFERENCE ('Is there a political party that you like?'). The question on economic issues is ECONOMY ('The government must say everything that companies have to do. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?'). The question on traditional issues finds CONTACT as relevant ('During the electoral campaign, did a candidate or person from any party contact you to ask for your vote?'). And, finally, I have included LEFT–RIGHT which is the self-placement of respondents on the left–right scale.

Among these questions, I have rescaled GOVERNMENT, IDENTIFICATION, PREFERENCE, ECONOMY, and CONTACT because these questions had different response categories in the original question forms of the ESEB (2002 and 2014). GOVERNMENT, for example, had five response categories (1 = disagree a lot, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither disagree nor agree, 4 = agree, 5 = agree a lot) in the 2002 wave, whilst there only existed three different response categories in the 2014 wave (1 = 'Democracy is always better than any other form of government'., 2 = 'Dictatorship is better than democracy in some

situations'., 3 = 'Neither democracy nor dictatorship is better'.). I have rescaled this question so as to have three response categories (1 = 'Dictatorship is better than democracy'., 2 = 'Neither dictatorship nor democracy is better'., And 3 = 'Democracy is better than dictatorship'.). Both IDENTIFICATION and PREFERENCE are binary variables, but they had different binary categories (0 and 1 for the 2002 wave, and 1 and 2 for the 2014 wave). Hence, I have fixed the 1-to-2 scale of the 2014 wave and changed the 2002 scale to fit this. ECONOMY, on the other hand, had five response categories in the 2002 wave, whilst it had ten response categories in the 2014 wave. I have therefore sought to rescale the question so that it could have the following five response categories: 1 = disagree a lot, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither disagree nor agree, 4 = agree, and 5 = agree a lot. And, finally, I have rescaled CONTACT so as to have the same binary response categories (1 = yes and 2 = no).

Institutional and Structural Factors

The control variables in this chapter are the educational level of respondents, the average monthly household income of respondents, district magnitude, the effective number of electoral parties at the district level, and ethnic and class fractionalization at the district level. On the educational level of mass respondents, I found that EDUCATION ('Up to which degree did you study?') would be relevant but should be rescaled. The question was asked in the 2002 wave with 21 response categories, whilst there existed only ten response categories in the 2014 wave. Consequently, I have rescaled it so as to have the following five response categories: 1 = illiterate or never attended school, 2 = up to the 4th grade of elementary school, 3 = up to the 8th grade of elementary school, 4 = up to the 3rd grade of high school, and 5 = up to postgraduate degree). INCOME had been also asked with different response categories in the 2002 and 2014 waves, and was thus rescaled as follows: 1 = under R$724, 2 = from R$725 to R$1,449, 3 = from R$1,450 to R$3,620, 4 = R$3,621 to R$7,240, 5 = R$7,241 to R$10,860, 6 = R$10,861 to R$14,480, and 7 = over R$14,481).

The rest of the control variables would be operationalized consistently as in Chapter 4. The only exception is that, instead of calculating the variance of original scores (e.g. the effective number of electoral parties at the district level) at the regional level, I sought to directly measure each variable at the district level. This operationalization of institutional and structural factors would help us directly address the heterogeneity of Brazilian states. District magnitude, for example, shows that the electoral district of the lowest magnitude only has eight seats for the Chamber of Deputies.[69] These districts are relatively concentrated in the North and Northeast (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Rio Grande do Norte, Roraima, and Sergipe), where 67.0 % of all districts have only eight seats. On the other hand, the South and Southeast have more electoral districts, which have more than 30 legislative seats. These districts include Minas Gerais, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo. There is a relatively similar pattern (the North-South division) for the effective number of electoral parties. Here, in the 2002 legislative election, Bahia was the electoral district which had the smallest number of effective parties (its effective number of electoral parties, ENP, was 4.4). On the other hand, the largest number of effective parties was obtained by Rio de Janeiro (its ENP was 11.2).[70] And, finally, I have also computed the degree of ethnic and class fractionalization at the district level.[71] Here we find that both the South and Centre-

[69] Information on district magnitude was drawn from the Repositório de dados, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) in Brazil.

<Repositório de dados, TSE (Accessed on 02 June 2020)>

[70] Today, the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (or CLEA) provide secondary data in which the district-level effective number of electoral parties is included. I decided to work with the secondary data.

<Party Nationalization Measures, CLEA (Accessed on 02 June 2020)>

[71] I have used the 1998, 2002, 2006, 2011, and 2014 waves of Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). On ethnicity, the PNAD had asked whether samples would be *branca* (white), *preta* (black), *parda* (brown), *amarela* (yellow), *indígena*, or not prefer to declare. Also, on class structures, the PNAD had asked if samples would work in *agrícola* (agriculture), *indústria de transformação* (manufacturing), *indústria de construção* (or construction), *outras atividades industriais* (other industries), *comércio de mercadorias* (or commodity trading), *prestação de serviços* (the service sector), *serviços auxiliaries da atividade econômica* (the auxiliary service sector), *transporte e comunicação* (transportation and communication), *social* (the social

West are relatively heterogeneous for both ethnic and class structures in comparison to the other three regions.

Explaining Party Nationalization with a Focus on Mass Coherence

I subsequently analyse the extent to which the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences explains party nationalization, specifying the same multilevel models as seen in Chapter 4. The model for equal shares shows that the parties (e.g. the PT), which had originally been competitive in the South and/or Southeast, have in turn nationalized their support bases by expanding support in the North and/or Northeast. On the other hand, from the estimation of another model on equal changes, we see that the more likely voters are to place themselves on the left of the political spectrum, the higher the degree of equal changes becomes.

Model Evaluation

Upon the estimation of interested parameters, I have initially sought to examine how the specified models would fit the working dataset that I compiled with the 2002 and 2014 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Study. Here, following the work of Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013: 137), I have calculated R-squared as follows:

$$R^2_{\mathrm{LMM}} = \frac{\sigma_f^2}{\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_\gamma^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2}, \qquad \text{Equation 6.1}$$

in which R^2_{LMM} describes R-squared for linear mixed models. The equation suggests that R^2_{LMM} can be estimated as the ratio between the residual variance of fixed effects (σ_f^2) and the sum of the residual variance of fixed and random effects ($\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_\gamma^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2$). The estimation of

sector), *administração pública* (or public administration), and *outras atividades, atividades mal definidas ou nao claradas* (or other, non-defined sectors).

<PNAD, IBGE (Accessed on 02 June 2020)>

R-squared revealed that, as shown by Figure 6.1, the specified multilevel models for equal shares and equal changes (hereinafter, ‘Equal Share model’ and ‘Equal Change model’) could both contribute to explain the nearly 10 % of variations in dependent variables. The estimated R-squared would not be as high as it was for the analysis of elite preferences and its effect on party nationalization. Nevertheless, it could still help us understand how the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences would be important for party nationalization. Then, which variable would be most significantly associated with equal shares and also equal changes?

FIGURE 6.1: Estimated R-squared for Equal Shares and Equal Changes Models



Note: Variables from DISTRICT MAGNITUDE to DIFFERENCE indicate the variables that could explain the variation of shares and equal changes most significantly.

Model Estimation

Table 6.1 shows the regression coefficients and standard deviations of all independent variables under analysis. The estimated results reveal the importance of mass preferences.[72] In the Equal Share model, district magnitude has the most significant and positive effect. Explicit in this result is that a political party would be more likely to have the similar shares of votes in electoral districts where district magnitude is small. On the other hand, other variables which are statistically significant derive from political dimensions: DIFFERENCE and IDENTIFICATION. DIFFERENCE suggests that equal shares would be higher if respondents believed that who governs the country matters, whilst IDENTIFICATION indicates that equal shares would be higher if respondents thought that no party existed that truly represented their views.

The results also show that there is some degree of possible tension between partisan and non-partisan voters. In the analysis of elite preferences and their effect on party nationalization, we found that successful experience in subnational politics was significantly associated with a higher degree of equal shares. Such a successful experience would be to some extent associated with mass evaluations with regard to DIFFERENCE. Some voters developed visions or stances about politics in general through their daily exposure to local politics. Such a vision would have a sense of partisan orientation, though we cannot confidently conclude yet that which orientation (the Left or the Right) would be more

[72] An R script on a statistical command to perform multilevel explanatory analysis is available at Harvard Dataverse, as well as its dataset, titled 'Chapter 6-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (R-Script)' and also 'Chapter 6-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (National Dataset)'. The R script also contains statistical commands for the post-hoc analysis of elite preferences and their effects on party nationalization, based on voting intentions in state-legislative elections.

<Chapter 6-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (R-Script)>

<Chapter 6-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (ESEB 2002)>

<Chapter 6-Multilevel Explanatory Analysis (ESEB 2014)>

TABLE 6.1: The Estimated Effects of Mass Preferences and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Shares and Equal Changes

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	Equal Changes Coefficients (SD)
SATISFACTION	0.59 (0.45)	0.73* (0.43)
DIFFERENCE	-1.33** (0.67)	-1.50** (0.63)
INFLUENCE	-0.23 (0.72)	-0.42 (0.67)
GOVERNMENT	1.04 (0.85)	0.31 (0.80\0
IDENTIFICATION	-3.07* (1.83)	-2.40 (1.72)
PREFERENCE	-0.24 (1.89)	0.93 (1.79)
ECONOMY	0.25 (0.40)	0.56 (0.38)
CONTACT	0.39 (1.36)	-0.31 (1.29)
EDUCATION	-0.38 (0.67)	0.57 (0.63)
INCOME	0.50 (0.61)	-0.08 (0.58)
LEFT–RIGHT	-0.17 (0.18)	0.34** (0.17)
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES	-0.33 (0.31)	-0.69** (0.29)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	2.75 (8.64)	15.53* (8.15)
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION	23.25 (26.40)	27.90 (24.91)

TABLE 6.1 ***Continued***

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	Equal Changes Coefficients (SD)
R-squared	0.11	0.11
N	367	367

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

associated with a higher degree of equal shares. However, as implied by IDENTIFICATION, not all voters were partisans. Some had certainly casted ballots for the parties which had been relatively nationalized, but they did not identify with them.

It is statistically significant that this possible tension between partisans, anti-partisans, and non-partisans has varied effects on the degree of equal changes as well. We can find through the Equal Change model that, as well as DIFFERENCE and DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, four more variables are significant: SATISFACTION, LEFT–RIGHT, EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES, and ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION. DIFFERENCE and DISTRICT MAGNITUDE have negative coefficients as with the Equal Share model. This clearly indicates that the degree of equal changes is higher in electoral districts with a smaller district magnitude. The effective number of electoral parties and ethnic fractionalization could also bring further context—indicating some degree of fragmentation (or fractionalization) to drive changes in support across the country. On the other hand, SATISFACTION and LEFT–RIGHT clearly suggest the varied effects of partisans and anti-partisans on equal changes. LEFT–RIGHT, for example, shows that voters support nationalized parties if they place themselves on the left of the left–right scale. Contrarily, some supporters showed dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, but continued to support a political party that had been relatively nationalized.

This different effect of political preferences between partisans and anti-partisans would be also consistent with findings from the multilevel analysis of elite preferences. I discussed in Chapter 4 how the Left (e.g. the PT) had most significantly benefited from swing votes across electoral districts. Explicit in this result is the finding that those who had voted for leftist parties in a previous election *continued* to support the same parties. The estimated result of LEFT–RIGHT in this chapter clearly supports this argument. On the other hand, as discussed in detail later, those who expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy might have ceased to identify the ruling party (e.g. the PT) but never changed to identify with oppositions (e.g. the PSDB). Such a division might have been strengthened by the moderation of leftist party discipline and platforms, and also probably by perceptions of corruption scandals among the ruling party PT. However, even if they were to leave their preferred party, they would hardly turn to support another party.

Empirical Implications of Mass Coherence for Party Nationalization

One of the key implications from the estimated results is that the parties which had previously been in competitive in the South and/or Southeast have in turn nationalized their support by penetrating into the North and/or Northeast. Some readers might think that, if only the North and Northeast matter, all parties (on both the Left and Right) competitive in those regions should have nationalized. But this is not the case because, as we have seen in Chapter 5 (and Chapter 3 as well), the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences differed greatly between the PT and non-PT parties. In this sense, it seems more accurate to state the importance of *how*, rather than *where*, a political party develops its campaign. If the left–right stances of politicians and their supporters are relatively associated with national issues, it is more likely to see the nationalization of electoral support. On the other hand, as we have observed in the previous analysis, the territorial coordination of elite

and mass preferences would drive the regionalization of electoral support. The Brazilian Right had followed such a course of party development.

The Nationalization of Partisans

The findings of the multilevel analysis have two important implications for the nationalization of electoral politics in contemporary Brazil. One is that political parties that are relatively successful in expanding their support base from the South and the Southeast to the North and the Northeast are more likely to end up with a higher degree of equal shares. Remember that, in Chapter 3, the North was discussed as one of the less-populated regions in contemporary Brazil. It seems therefore unsurprising to find that, of the seven states in the North (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins), four states (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, and Roraima) are allocated the lowest number of legislative seats (the district magnitude is 8). Furthermore, two more states (Rio Grande do Norte and Sergipe) in the Northeast are also allocated the lowest number of legislative seats. Consequently, of the nine states in total with the lowest district magnitude, 66.7 % are in the North and the Northeast. The estimated coefficient of DISTRICT MAGNITUDE clearly indicates that political parties which had been relatively competitive in these less-populated states would develop a higher degree of equal shares.

Readers might think that, if the North and the Northeast are the key to equally expanding electoral support across the country, all parties which would be relatively competitive in these regions might have been nationalized. However, I argue that this would not be the case because we have already found that there existed great variations in the programmatic and territorial coherence of both elite and mass preferences in contemporary Brazil. I have discussed in Chapter 3 that the political preferences of PT politicians would be as coherently aligned along national issues (e.g. economic and left–right ones) between regions as they would be within each region, whilst many non-PT politicians were aligned

along both national and subnational issues. This pattern for the distribution of elite preferences was, in turn, found through the multilevel analysis of mass preferences as well. Consistently, the following regression analyses in Chapter 4 and in this chapter demonstrate the significant effects of elite preferences with regard to anti-clientelism and also popular beliefs that who governs would matter regarding equal shares.

Furthermore, as another point, the mobilization of support by northern voters would be driven by cross-district electoral campaigns rather than territorialized campaigns. This seems particularly clear by looking at the estimated effect of DISTRICT MAGNITUDE in the Equal Change model. It would be useful for readers to describe again what equal changes mean. Equal changes refer to how equally the vote share of a political party in each electoral district changes (increases or decreases) over time. The direction of support changes may be either downward or upward. Hence, if a political party decreases (or increases) 10 points in all electoral districts during the last legislative election, the party can be seen as perfectly nationalized. Though the reality of electoral politics should find the ups and downs of electoral support across districts, it has been widely recognized by scholars of Brazilian politics that the PT had been relatively successful in increasing its vote shares in the North and Northeast, especially after securing the presidency in 2002. If so, given the degree of equal changes marked by the PT, some degree of equality in vote increase must have been observed in (not all but at least many) other districts in the country.

Some readers might think that such a degree of equal changes–making the PT crucial as discussed in Chapter 1–would have been driven by the personal popularity of the party's charismatic founder, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Consequently, they might argue that the nationalization of the PT should have been due to political personalism rather than the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences with regard to national and programmatic issues (e.g. economic and left–right ones). This kind of argument has been

generally supported by the comparative study of so-called *lulismo*—some form of personal sympathy for Lula shared by his followers (Oliveira 2011; Rocha 2018). I acknowledge that, given the popularity of Lula in contemporary Brazil, some degree of a coattails effects could be observed in legislative elections so as to eventually nationalize PT's support (Borges et al. 2017). However, I argue that this would not be *the* story of party nationalization by the PT. Supporters of Lula (*lulistas*) have been so far recognized as lacking any programmatic orientation (Oliveira 2011: 120; Singer 2009: 10). Nevertheless, the multilevel analysis of mass preferences demonstrated that LEFT–RIGHT was significantly and positively associated with the degree of equal changes. Explicit in this result is that those who voted for PT candidates in legislative elections were at least able to understand why they voted as they did.

The Weak Alignment of Anti-Partisans

Another important implication from the multilevel analysis of mass preferences is that anti-partisans, especially against PT administrations since 2003, would cease to positively identify with any party but still support the nationalized. The concept of anti-partisanship captures some form of popular dislike against a particular party, and in the contemporary context of Brazilian politics, it has been often analysed with a focus on the PT. Paiva et al. (2016), for example, sought to understand the dynamics of so-called anti-PT sympathy by looking at the 2002 to 2014 waves of the ESEB. They found that those who came from the middle strata of society (e.g. the well-educated, the well-paid, and also urban residents) showed a relatively strong rejection of the PT (Paiva et al. 2016: 651–653). These anti-PT voters had also come across as ideologically Centre-Right or Right (Paiva et al. 2016: 655). And it seems unsurprising to see that one of the political parties these anti-PT voters strongly supported was the PSDB—the main rival of the PT in presidential elections since 1994 (Ribeiro et al. 2016: 620).

Nevertheless, though we cannot exactly predict for which party these anti-partisans would vote in legislative elections, it seems reasonable to claim that non-PT parties hardly benefited from anti-partisanship (e.g. an increase in their partisan supporters). This does not deny that non-PT parties could mobilize the support of anti-PT supporters in legislative elections by, for example, opening up new local branches as the PT did (Samuels and Zucco 2018: 97). However, such support would not necessarily translate into the development of voting intentions for non-PT parties to the extent that anti-partisanship would be for these anti-partisans to merely distinguish between the ruling and opposition parties (Samuels and Zucco 2018: 97, 113). Implicit in the dynamics of anti-partisanship is that, as often discussed in the comparative study of public opinion in Brazil, anti-PT voters would not be necessarily subject to any attempts by non-PT parties to mobilize their support (Carreirão and Kinzo 2004: 136; Kinzo 1992; Lavareda 1989; Meneguello 1995; Reis 1988). Some of those who had dissatisfied with the functioning of the democracy in the country might have shifted their support, but more than the handful of them would remain to support the nationalized.

Robustness Tests of Principal Findings

How, in turn, would principal findings from the previous analysis be verifiable? To answer this question, I initially examine the extent to which the effect of left–right stances would be significant even when we control for the interactive effect of institutional and structural factors. The analysis will reveal that, though limited to those who have completed secondary education, left–right stances maintained a significant effect on equal changes. Furthermore, it will also come across as significant that the effect of left–right stances would be significant even when we use voting intentions in state (not federal)-legislative elections.

Institutional and Structural Interactions

Do northern voters share left–right stances as similarly as their counterparts in southern regions, or do they show significant variations? The multilevel model that I have previously

specified cannot answer this question simply because it assumes that there exists no such interactive effect of institutional and structural factors with mass preferences on equal shares and equal changes. Consequently, I have specified multilevel models with interactive effects. These interactive models predict that variables on mass preferences, which were demonstrated as significant by the previous models, could explain the degree of equal shares and equal changes even if there exist interactive effects by institutional and structural controls.

Results shown by Table 6.2 show that, even conditioned by institutional factors, we can still find the limited but significant effect of left–right stances on equal changes. Figure 6.2 illustrates such a marginal effect of left–right stances on equal changes. Here red lines in each plot depict the average effect of LEFT–RIGHT on equal changes, whilst shaded areas are confidence intervals. It seems clear that, though limited to voters with specific backgrounds, LEFT–RIGHT has a reductive effect on equal changes among those who completed at least secondary education. Also, it turned out that LEFT–RIGHT had a significant effect in districts with a relatively medium-sized set of effective parties in elections.

These findings are consistent with the estimated results of elite preferences on equal shares and equal changes. As shown by Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4, the left–right stances of politicians have a significant negative effect on equal changes in regions where the variance of district magnitude is smaller. Such a northward shift of electoral support seems, on the other hand, strongly associated with the increase of partisans who are relatively well educated. In this sense, it would be reasonable to conclude that the nationalization of electoral support by the PT had been strongly based on the programmatic and territorial coherence of both elite and mass preferences (and not the coattails effect of presidential elections alone).

TABLE 6.2: The Estimated Effects of Left–Right Stances and Institutional and Structural Factors on Equal Changes

	A	B	C	D	E	F
LEFT–RIGHT	0.05	0.90	1.33	1.01	-0.55	0.02
	(0.33)	(0.66)	(0.97)	(4.41)	(0.68)	(0.41)
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE (or DM)	-0.12**					
	(0.05)					
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES (or ENP)		0.02				
		(0.49)				
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION (or EF)			20.53			
			(13.81)			
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION (or CF)				15.11		
				(34.72)		
EDUCATION					-1.18	
					(1.27)	
INCOME						-0.73
						(1.05)
LEFT–RIGHT*DM	0.01					
	(0.01)					
LEFT–RIGHT*ENP		-0.06				
		(0.07)				
LEFT–RIGHT*EF			-2.04			
			(1.93)			
LEFT–RIGHT*CF				-0.82		
				(5.21)		
LEFT–RIGHT*EDUCATION					0.23	
					(0.17)	
LEFT–RIGHT*INCOME						0.12
						(0.14)
R-squared	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
N	367	367	367	367	367	367

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

FIGURE 6.2: Marginal Effects of LEFT–RIGHT on Equal Changes by Each Controlling Factor



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Subnational Dynamics

Another question I sought to answer in this verification process, is the extent to which principal findings from the previous analysis of the ESEB could be confirmed by another working dataset based on voting intentions in state-legislative elections (or the subnational dataset). For this purpose, as I did in Chapter 4, I have specified two standard multilevel models.

The estimation of these subnational models shows a similar effect of mass preferences on equal changes. No variable is significantly associated with the degree of equal shares in the subnational dataset, implying that mass alignments in state-level elections would be to some extent different from national elections. This would be consistent to the principal components analysis of the subnational dataset in Chapter 4. But, as Table 6.3 shows, despite

TABLE 6.3: The Estimated Effects of Mass Preferences on Equal Shares and Equal Changes

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	**Equal Changes** Coefficients (SD)
SATISFACTION	0.63 (0.45)	0.92** (0.45)
DIFFERENCE	-0.17 (0.63)	-0.77 (0.63)
INFLUENCE	-0.61 (0.71)	-0.38 (0.71)
GOVERNMENT	0.32 (0.93)	-0.58 (0.93)
IDENTIFICATION	-0.31 (1.65)	-0.25 (1.53)
PREFERENCE	-0.42 (1.59)	2.49 (1.57)
ECONOMY	0.16 (0.42)	0.43 (0.41)
CONTACT	0.44 (1.31)	1.46 (1.34)
EDUCATION	0.67 (0.63)	0.76 (0.63)
INCOME	-0.38 (0.59)	0.09 (0.59)
LEFT–RIGHT	-0.01 (0.19)	0.31* (0.18)
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES	0.08 (0.33)	-0.09 (0.31)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	-3.61 (11.14)	1.87 (9.63)

TABLE 6.3 ***Continued***

	Equal Shares Coefficients (SD)	**Equal Changes** Coefficients (SD)
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION	-48.77 (34.35)	-41.95 (31.56)
R-squared	0.03	0.08
N	337	337

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

the possible difference of mass alignments between national and subnational elections, some voters would cast ballots in a similar way for both.

Look at the estimated coefficients of SATISFACTION and LEFT–RIGHT shown by the table. These are the variables that were demonstrated to be statistically significant in the national dataset, and here they prove significant again. Explicit in this finding is that leftist supporters were more likely to support nationalized parties (e.g. the PT), whilst conservatives (e.g. the PSDB or the PMDB) had not benefited from popular dissatisfaction in order to drive the national swing of electoral support. Consequently, it would be reasonable to conclude that the issue congruence of elite and mass preferences along left–right issues would drive the nationalization of electoral politics.

Conclusion

I have discussed in this chapter whether the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences can explain the degree of party nationalization. The estimation of multilevel models showed that the more district magnitude would decrease, the more likely a political party could find a higher degree of equal shares. Explicit in this result would be that a northward shift of electoral support would be quite important for equal shares in Brazilian

contexts. However, this does not indicate that all parties that had been competitive in northern states must have been nationalized. I argued that such a northward shift would be important to the extent that both elite and mass preferences would be programmatically and territorially coherent. The estimation of the Equal Change model showed that the Left had indeed benefited from the national swing of support, whilst conservative support had rather changed quite differently across the country. The following process of verification demonstrated that what we had found through the analysis of the ESEB, compiled with voting intentions in federal-legislative elections, would be verifiable even when we included interactive effects and also even when we employed voting intentions in state-legislative elections.

Conclusion

> 'My problem is, implicitly, to what extent the fractionalization of parties belongs to the process of ideologization of politics'.
>
> - Sartori ([1976]2016: 91)

> 'When clear and careful measurement of concepts is possible, as it is in this case (of party and party system nationalization), it forms a fundamental building-block of good social science'.
>
> - Jones and Mainwaring (2003: 140)

> 'These three features (solid organizations, party roots in society, and legitimacy) are relatively proximate causes of PSI (party system institutionalization)'.
>
> - Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova (2018: 25)

The primary goal of this project was to address the electoral success of the modern Left in Latin America. In Chapter 1, I discussed how the dynamics of electoral politics changed in the region after the 1980s. While some well-established parties saw a rapid decrease in their vote shares, the (re)democratization of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of the Left, which had been minor forces at least around the time of their founding elections. This naturally raises the question on how the modern Left expanded their support, eventually becoming capable of securing legislative seats and also the presidency. I also show that the Workers' Party (PT) of Brazil has proven to be the most successful case in the region. In Chapter 2, I argued that the key to answering this question lay in the capacity of the PT to nationalize their support base, aligning both elite and mass preferences. The empirical analyses, presented in Chapters 3 and 4, outline statistically significant evidence of this by analysing the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite preferences and its impact on

party nationalization. In terms of elite preferences, PT politicians were coherently aligned along economic and left–right issues, whilst non-PT politicians were not. This variation in the coherence of elite preferences was indeed associated with the degree of party nationalization. Consistently, the empirical analyses presented in Chapters 5 and 6 also demonstrate that the programmatic and territorial coherence of mass preferences was quite different between the PT and non-PT parties, which resulted in different degrees of party nationalization among them.

The findings of this study will definitely help us to expand our understanding of electoral politics in contemporary Latin America. However, some important questions remain unanswered. First, by focusing on Brazilian parties as the main subject of enquiry, the empirical evidence I presented may not be easily generalizable to the other cases of party nationalization. If one analyses constituency-level electoral results in Latin America, it is possible to identify other patterns of party nationalization (see Chapter 1): finning-in, parallel-swing, unparallel-swing, and finning-out. Although this project focuses on the 'finning-in' pattern, what about other patterns of vote increase? Why are they heterogeneous in their support expansion between districts and over time? We might expect that a further analysis of other cases such as the FMLN in El Salvador (finning-in), the PAN in Mexico (parallel-swing), and the UDI in Chile (finning-out) would help us understand the nuances of programmatic and territorial coherence.

The study of party nationalization should also address the issue of party 'system' nationalization. Not by chance, the growth of scholarly attention to party nationalization has been followed by a rising literature on party system nationalization. In the comparative study of party system nationalization thus far, scholarly debates have generally developed according to three dimensions: the structural, territorial, and temporal variation of electoral outcomes. Though all dimensions concern some form of uniformity in electoral results, the

uniformity of what differs among them (for the structural variation, electoral competition; for the territorial variation, support distribution; and for the temporal variation, electoral change). Given the theoretical focus, various measurements have been developed to examine a specific dimension of interest. Whilst the three-dimensional approach to conceptualize party system nationalization helps us understand the dynamics of party system development, adopting unidimensional process to measure each dimension independently raises a serious measurement problem.

A more refined concept (and measurement) of party system nationalization will allow us to move on to the next stage of research: the effect of party system nationalization. For example, Mainwaring and co-authors have emphasized the stable pattern of electoral competitions as a defining feature of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring et al. 2018: 19, 23–24). Here, given the focus of the literatures of party system nationalization and institutionalization, we can raise a question. That is, to what extent do the territorial and temporal stabilization of electoral support (e.g. high equal shares and changes) for major parties relate to the degree of party system institutionalization? The key to answering this question lies in the capacity of major parties to build up the national alignment of elite and mass preferences. Mainwaring and Torcal have, for example, argued that programmatic or ideological linkages would provide the basis of stable party–voter linkages (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 204), whilst Mainwaring and his co-authors have later argued that strong roots in society (through partisan mobilization) would facilitate the institutionalization of party systems (Mainwaring et al. 2018: 26). In this sense, to the extent that party (system) nationalization can be explained by programmatic and territorial coherence, party system nationalization would be expected to explain party system institutionalization.

Future Direction of Research on Electoral Politics in Latin America

To what extent is the alternative theory of party nationalization that I developed in this project generalizable to other patterns of support expansion in contemporary Latin America? Also, given the variation of party nationalization, to what extent would a party system be nationalized? Answering these questions, I seek to outline future three research designs that draw upon my principal findings. First, by reviewing some scholarly works on the FMLN of El Salvador (finning-in), the PAN of Mexico (parallel-swing), and the UDI of Chile (finning-out), I argue that the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences should be quite distinctive between these parties. Second, by extending the variance-components models of Morgenstern and Mustillo, I put forward a three-level linear mixed model to examine party system nationalization. And, finally, it will be discussed how the programmatic and territorial coherence of electoral support would affect the institutionalization of a party system.

The FMLN, PAN, and UDI: Cases of Party Nationalization without Coherence?

The PT was discussed as the illustrative case of finning-in, but there exist other patterns of vote increase. For example, in contrast to the PT, some Latin American parties of the Left and Right could be classified into either the semi finning-in (the FMLN in El Salvador), the parallel-swing (the PAN of Mexico), or the finning-out (the UDI of Chile). Explicit in such variation is that not all parties, even classified into some form of the partisan Left and Right,[73] necessarily fall in the finning-in category as the PT. What makes them distinctive? The key to answering this question lies in the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences. Remember the two hypotheses that I proposed in Chapter 2. I argued that, to nationalize electoral support across a country, elite and mass preferences must be

[73] The partisan lefts and rights that I have examined by their degree of party nationalization in Chapter 1 include the PT (Brazil), the ARENA (El Salvador), the FMLN (El Salvador), and the FA (Uruguay). However, the PAN of Mexico and the UDI of Chile would also serve as illustrative cases.

coherently aligned along national rather than local issues. It seems therefore theoretically reasonable to have similar expectations here, to the extent that elite and mass preferences would be coordinated along subnational issues. Also, even if elite and mass preferences are relatively aligned along national issues, party nationalization would be less likely if they are not as coherent across electoral districts as they would be within each district.

The FMLN of El Salvador would be one of the possible cases developing a national but incoherent linkage along with abstract goals. Indeed, given five insurgent-origin organizations with independent organizational structures (e.g. a process to independently elect leaders), some degree of disunity has erupted among the FMLN especially since the party began to participate in democratic elections. As one of the organizations based on insurgent groups in Latin America, upon the founding of the FMLN, party elites would be supposedly unified along with a long-term goal of social transformation (Béjar 1996: 64). Nevertheless, each organization 'maintained its own statutes, conserved its own organic structure, produced its own financing and independently elected its leaders. Militants maintained discipline to their organization and *not to the FMLN*'[74] (Zamora 2003: 52). Furthermore, despite efforts to accommodate the programmatic nuances of each organization, 'the arrival of peace made clear that it was the presence of a common external enemy and military necessity that had created incentives to maintain the alliance (of distinct insurgent organizations)' (Allison and Martin Alvarez 2012: 98). In this sense, rather than coherent along with the broad set of programmatic issues from politics, economy, and culture, FMLN politicians would be expected to be nationally but incoherently aligned.

Another possible case of incomplete party nationalization, illustrating the parallel swing, would be the PAN of Mexico. Given the dominance of the PRI over most of the 20th

[74] Emphasis added.

century, the PAN emerged as the political vehicle of opposition forces on the Right in 1939. However (or probably because of the country's electoral systems favoured the dominant PRI), unlike other partisan rightist parties in the region, its survival rather than success in elections has been of practical concern for the PAN (Greene 2016: 167). Such an incentive to survive would in turn motivate strict control over the recruitment of new party members, if not a sole factor. Indeed, 'until 1996, prospective members had to be sponsored by an existing activist in good standing and then get approval from both the local party as well as the National Members' Registry that was controlled by the twenty- to thirty-member National Executive Committee. (Furthermore,) activists were also required to pass an exam on the party's history and basic principles that typically required a preparation course' (Greene 2016: 169). This would be how the party could maintain its politicians and supporters aligned along with its platform on one hand. However, as a side effect, such a pure-partisan strategy would probably prevent the PAN from rapidly expanding its support base outside of its strongholds.

The Chilean conservative party UDI would be the last case of incomplete party nationalization, illustrating the finning-out pattern. Voter alignment in Chile has demonstrated the resilience of traditional socioeconomic and religious cleavages, as well as the salience of the pro-democracy versus pro-authoritarianism divide since its (re)democratization (Valenzuela et al. 2018: 155). Though electoral support towards major parties can become relatively stable (Mainwaring 2018: 58), such stable alignment does not necessarily indicate the programmatic and territorial coherence of elite and mass preferences and the consequent nationalization of electoral support. Rather, as Luna described, 'more intra-district homogeneity, as well as inter-district differences regarding the types of linkages are observed in Chile' (Luna 2014: 149). And, in comparison to the FMLN or the PAN, this would explain why the UDI has been distinctive in its efforts to make party–voter linkages

specific to local contexts. Such local politicking seems have strengthened its local strongholds, eventually building up a patchwork-like base of support across the country (namely 'segmented' programmatic linkage, to use the word of Luna).

The Linear Mixed Modelling of Electoral Variability

The second question I could not address in this project regards the nationalization of party systems. Here, so far in the literature, scholars have identified at least three 'dimensions' of electoral variability: the structural variation of electoral competition at the national and district levels (Sartori 1968), the territorial variation of vote shares by major parties between electoral districts (Schattschneider 1960), and the temporal variation of vote shares between elections (Butler and Stokes 1969).

The first dimension—structural variation—places party systems at the centre of the enquiry. The concept of party systems can be defined by patterned interactions in the electoral competition among parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4; Sartori 1976: 39). In this sense, the nationalization of party systems concerns the question of how likely the dynamics of electoral competitions are to differ at the national and district levels (Cox 1997, 1999; Chhibber and Kollman 1998; Kasuya and Moenius 2008; Sartori 1968: 280). If every party fields candidates in a single district, for example, the gap between the effective number of electoral parties at the national and district levels becomes greatest. On the other hand, if every party competes in all electoral districts, the geographical pattern of electoral competition may be nationalized.

The second dimension (or territorial variation), on the other hand, focuses on electoral districts and asks how equal the vote shares of major parties would be across electoral districts. Given the focus, party systems can be understood as nationalized if the vote shares of major parties in each district converge around the national mean (Bochsler 2010; Caramani 2004; Kawato 1987; Morgenstern 2017; Mustillo and Mustillo 2012; Sundquist 1973: 332–

3). This is another dimension of party system nationalization, though it is conceptually different from the first dimension. Even if every party runs candidates in every district, party systems could be highly regionalized if their vote shares differ significantly across electoral districts (Rose and Urwin 1975: 24). On the other hand, if major parties secure exactly the same share of valid votes in each district, party systems are classified as highly nationalized.

The final dimension addresses the issue of temporal variation in electoral support. The vote shares of major parties in each district may oscillate even just in a single electoral cycle. Such a short-term oscillation often has been described as 'swing', especially in the UK context (Butler and Stokes 1969: 303). On the other hand, short-term swings can be seen as a part of long-term oscillations around the national mean (Converse 1969: 462). With this temporal focus, party system nationalization indicates how the territorial distribution of electoral support is stable over time and, even if it changes, whether it moves unilaterally across electoral districts (Alemán and Kellam 2008; Bartels 1998; Brady 1985: 33; Morgenstern 2017; Mustillo and Mustillo 2012).

It is now clear that, though we can find some features common to measurements within each dimension, the substance of these measurements is quite different across these different dimensions of party system nationalization. Implicit in such a distinctive approach is the idea that the three dimensions of party system nationalization—structural, territorial, and temporal variation—should be empirically, as well as theoretically, independent. Further, even if these are mutually dependent so as to make some degree of noise for estimation, the resulting conclusions should be valid to the extent that such noises appear random (Babbie 2001: 144–5; Carmines and Zeller 1979: 14–5). Potential interactive effects between each dimension, therefore, should be viewed as random errors. But how likely would this assumption be?

Conventional measurements, I argue, are more likely to result in imprecise (and often misleading) conclusions to the extent that the issues of addition or conflation violate the independence assumption. How can we in turn estimate the degree of party system nationalization more precisely? The key to this question lies in a three-level linear mixed model (or 3-Lv. LMM), which is an extension of the variance components model by Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) and also a linear mixed model by Mustillo and his colleagues (Mustillo 2017; Mustillo and Jung 2016; Mustillo and Mustillo 2012).

The 3-Lv. LMM, or any other LMM variants, assumes that, as originally proposed by Stokes (1965), the total variation of electoral outcomes can be partitioned into several systemic forms along clustering units. Structural, territorial, and temporal variation are the key components of interest, though there exist other forms of electoral variability (Mustillo and Jung 2016: 344). In other words, in contrast to the independence assumption of conventional measurements, the 3-Lv. LMM assesses each dimension of party system nationalisation to provide a basis to cluster observations so that those observations can be viewed dependently (not independently) within each dimension (Demidenko 2004).

The Extent and Effect of Party System Nationalization in Latin America

Once armed with the alternative concept and measurement of party system nationalization, we can step forward to the enquiry of the extent and effect of party system nationalization. Of the various possible implications, what I would like to raise here is so-called party system institutionalization. Though Mainwaring and Scully (1995) identified four features of party system institutionalization (stability in electoral competitions, strong party organizations, strong roots in society, and legitimacy), Mainwaring has later argued that stability in the pattern of electoral competitions would be ‘the’ defining feature of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring et al. 2018: 23). Furthermore, as well as the stability of electoral competitions, ‘[other defining features] include stability in parties’ programmatic

and ideological positions and other party linkages to society as a defining feature of (party system institutionalization)' (Mainwaring et al. 2018: 24).

If so, though Mainwaring would not take party nationalization into account, there exists no reason to doubt that the variation of party system institutionalization must be highly associated with how coherent elite and mass preferences would be across a country and the resulting variation of party system nationalization. By relying on the nationalization of electoral politics at the system-level as an independent variable, we could probably understand the variation of party system institutionalization more clearly. Certainly, Mainwaring and Torcal argued that 'programmatic or ideological linkages are at the root of stable linkages between voters and parties, (and) linkages between voters and candidates are more personalistic in most post-1978 competitive regimes than in the advanced industrial democracies' (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 204). Nevertheless, the degree of party nationalization (affected by the type of elite and mass linkages) was found as great even within and between Latin American countries in Chapter 1. Then, to what extent would the observed variation of party system nationalization be associated with the potential variation of party system institutionalization in contemporary Latin America? Answering this question, I believe, should help us move the enquiry of electoral politics forward.

Conclusion

I have so far sought to summarize what I could not address (or I have tried but failed to completely answer) in this thesis project. Especially among the limitations that I have to acknowledge, the relatively limited set of cases (Brazilian political parties) might have led to the overestimation of elite-mass linkages and resulting effects on party nationalization. Furthermore, by focusing on party nationalization, I could not address the issue of party system nationalization. Under what conditions have some political parties rather become less

nationalized (and even localized) their support, whilst others have increasingly nationalized? And, given differences in the degree of party nationalization, to what extent could a party system be nationalized? These are the questions which, I believe, could pave new research approaches in the comparative study of electoral politics in contemporary Latin America. Indeed, though not rigorously demonstrated yet, some of the modern Left and Right might have developed quite distinctive types of programme-based elite–mass linkages that are influential on the degree of party nationalization. Furthermore, standing on the variance-components tradition of measurement for party nationalization, an alternative three-level model was proposed to scale up the enquiry of party nationalization to party systems more systematically. Once armed with such a measure, we can move forward to see the extent and effect of party system nationalization properly, for example, on another aspect of electoral politics (e.g. party system institutionalization).

Appendices

If readers want supplementary materials—including a district-level electoral dataset, explanatory datasets for a series of regression analyses, and statistical scripts, please contact the author. Otherwise, readers should be able to replicate most analyses, conducted in this thesis, by looking at the following appendices and links appeared in each chapter.

Appendix A: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 1

Appendix A.1

TABLE A.1: Major Indices of Party Nationalization

	Indicator	**Relevant Research**
ES	Territorial Coverage Index	Caramani (2006: 41)
	Mean Absolute Deviation	Rose and Urwin (1975: 24)
	Standard Deviation	Caramani (2004: 61)
	Variability Coefficient	Caramani (2004: 62)
	Party Nationalization Score	Jones and Mainwaring (2003: 161)
	Weighted Party Nationalization Score	Bochsler (2010: 162)
	Standardized Party Nationalization Score	Bochsler (2010: 164)
EC	Swing	Butler and Stokes (1969: 303)
	Correlation	Converse (1969: 462)
	Relative Nationalization	Aleman and Kellam (2017: 129)
Both	Variance-Components Modelling	Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005: 25)
	Multilevel Modelling	Mustillo and Mustillo (2012: 426)
	Growth-Curve Modelling	Mustillo (2017: 939)

Note: The term, ES, refers to equal shares, and so does EC to equal changes.

Appendix A.2

The issue of so-called measurement validity, together with case selection, constitutes an essential part of causal inference. It helps us understand under what conditions any indices do not measure what analysts have intended and even produce misleading conclusions (Althauser and Heberlein 1970). This is why, as discussed by Adcock and Collier (2001), any measurement especially in social sciences should be validated along the questions as to how well they capture the meaning of concepts to be operationalized (content validation) and how coherently they return estimated scores in relation to alternative measurements and hypotheses (convergent validation), and how similar the estimated scores of those indicators are with alternatives (convergent and nomological/construct validation).[75] So should be the measurements of party nationalization as well. In this section, I will investigate how reliable and valid the weighted growth-curve modelling for which I have modified the original model of Mustillo (2017).

Measurement Theories

The robustness test of measurement validity—technically called measurement validation—largely involves three domains[76] in relation to (systematic) concepts, alternative indices, and causal inference; and of them, so-called content validation is to see if the estimated scores of indicators appropriately capture the meaning of the concepts that scholars seek to operationalize. Content validation starts with clarifying and specifying the content of concepts to be operationalized (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 19). Thereby, it can be seen as a type of literature reviews with a specific focus on the way of concept formation, and such a

[75] Some scholars framed this issue as involving the type of 'validity' (Carmines and Zeller 1979), and so did others by referring to the type of validation (Adcock and Collier 2001). Although there certainly exists a nuance of meaning between the two sides, scholarly debates had been relatively converged around the three types which would be supposedly essential for measurement validity.

[76] Each type of validation is integrated together to support measurement validity as a whole; thereby, the process of measurement validation could direct us to have invalid measurements if any of them would be ignored (Morgan et al. 2001: 729).

review effort seems highly demanding especially in a newly developing subfield of a discipline (e.g. party nationalization in comparative politics) in which the risk of conceptual stretching would step in (Sartori 1970: 1033). “We cannot measure unless we know first what it is that we are measuring” (Sartori 1970: 1038).

The second type of measurement validation—so-called convergent validation—is to see if indicators in use would return similar scores with alternative indices. Convergent validation can be seen as an extension of criterion-based validation, which is a process to validate measurements conditional on another indicator[77] (or a criterion) normally by observing the correlation of interested indicators and the criterion (Adcock and Collier 2001: 540). Though widely applied in social sciences,[78] the interpretation of estimated correlation coefficients should be made carefully because the validity of indicators can be only tested ‘in relation to’ an external criterion, not anything else (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 17). And obviously in social sciences, coupled with confusion or disagreement with the content of concepts, few indicators would be available to play such a criterion (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537). Rather, without reference to a particular indicator as a criterion, it would make more sense to simply compare interested measures with multiple alternatives and find similarity/difference (Adcock and Collier 2001: 540). Otherwise, given theoretical confusion or disagreement, it would not necessarily be easy to theoretically justify why a particular indicator should be employed as a criterion (ibid).

[77] And, according to the type of criterion-related evidence, the validation process can be used to predict the change of a subject in comparison to its past state (e.g. the Scholastic Aptitude Test taken in high school to predict freshmen’s grades in college) or concurrently compare an aspect of a subject with other ones (e.g. letting college freshmen taking the SAT and the end-of-year exam and seeing if each result would be correlated) (Morgan et al. 2001: 729-30).

[78] Mainwaring and his co-authors had, for example, compared several measures of democracy to classify regimes in Latin America between 1945 and 1999 (Mainwaring et al. 2001: 668).

The final process of measurement validation—construct validity—is to investigate the extent to which interested indicators can return similar results for the analysis of hypotheses seeking to explain something of interest but with a quite different research design. Or stated differently, construct validation is an attempt to replicate other scholarly works with the measurements of interest (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 23). Suppose a researcher who would like to confirm the construct validity of an indicator of equal shares –a dimension of party nationalization – in advance of empirical analysis on what would cause the phenomenon. A straightforward strategy for her/him is to see if, given her/his own dataset, the interested indicator of equal shares could support the results which other scholars had found with different datasets.[79] If no consistency were to be found, it would signal that those indicators would capture something else but not of interest to her/him at all (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 24). Furthermore, as a form of safeguarding, construct validation can be expected to detect any results which could not be found through content and convergent validation processes. Bollen has, for example, taken this point as an advantage by testing the construct validity of Jackman's, Cutright's, and his own indicators on democracy (Bollen 1980: 383-4).

Measurement Validation

With the three ways of measurement validation, I will in turn investigate which indicator of party nationalization would be suitable for this project. On the type of content validation, it would be helpful for readers to briefly discuss the two dimensions of party nationalization again: equal shares and equal changes. Equal shares were conceptualized to describe the extent to which a political party would obtain homogeneous vote shares across electoral districts in an election, and so did for equal changes to see if the change of support for a political party would be consistent across electoral districts and years. It seems no doubts

[79] Given the risk of circularity, if a scholar used a hypothesis to validate the construct of measure(s), s/he cannot use the measure(s) to evaluate the same hypothesis (Adcock and Collier 2001: 543).

from this conceptualization, and a later discussion on case selection as well, that the unit of analysis is a political party, though so-called party 'system' nationalization has also gained the growing attention of scholars recently (Cox 1997; Golosov 2015; Kasuya and Moenius 2008). Currently, as discussed in Appendix A.1, there exist 10 indicators for equal shares, and so does 6 indicators for equal changes.

Though the listed indicators have been all developed to understand the degree of equal shares and/or equal changes, it should be stressed here that they do measure something slightly different even if experts explicitly or implicitly intend to measure the same subject. Look at Table A.2.1, which shows the estimated results of each indicator, given the four hypothetical parties that were introduced in Chapter 1. The territorial-competition indices are intended to capture either the competed or uncompleted districts in where a party fields candidates. These indices are relatively insensitive to the up-and-down of vote shares. This insensitiveness is also to a lesser extent found among the deviation-based indices as shown by Party B whose estimated scores were consistent across years despite the fact that its vote share has increased in the following election Y2. Among these indicators, the party nationalization score of Jones and Mainwaring (2003) was found as most insensitive. Nevertheless, some of them showed improvement by inserting weights on the size or number of districts. Contrarily, though the gap was a bit larger than expected, variance-components indices returned scores to reflect what I initially intended to be reflected (Parties A, C, and B as the most, moderate, and least likely cases of party nationalization). Furthermore, weighting the estimated scores of the variance-components reduced the observed gap and returned almost consistent scores for Parties A, B, and C as the weighted party nationalization score did.

From this result of convergent validation, by inserting weights, bidimensional measures would not only be relatively more reliable to minimize standard deviations but they

TABLE A.2.1: Application of Party Nationalization Indices to Simulated Data

District (Registered Voters)	Party A		Party B		Party C		Party D	
	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2	Y1	Y2
1 (50)	5	20	5	15	5	15	5	30
2 (100)	25	20	25	35	25	15	25	0
3 (1,000)	15	20	15	25	15	25	15	5
4 (10,000)	0	20	0	10	0	10	0	50
5 (100,000)	10	20	10	20	10	20	10	10
Average	11	20	11	21	11	17	11	19
Unidimensional Measures (Equal Shares)								
Territorial Coverage	0.91	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.91	0.99
Mean Absolute Deviation	7.20	0.00	7.20	7.20	7.20	4.40	7.20	16.8
Standard Deviation	4.50	0.00	4.50	4.50	4.50	2.75	4.50	10.5
Variability Coefficient	3.27	0.00	3.27	1.71	3.27	1.29	3.27	4.42
Party nationalization score (or PNS)	0.76	1.00	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.86	0.76	0.50
Weighted PNS	0.90	1.00	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.75
Standardized PNS	0.32	1.00	0.32	0.58	0.32	0.59	0.32	0.04
Unidimensional Measures (Equal Changes)								
Mean Swing		9.00		10.0		10.0		8.00
Correlation		NA		1.00		0.41		-0.90
Bidimensional Measures (Shares & Changes)								
M&P (Share)		0.00		NA		10.6		NA
M&M (Share)		0.00		NA		8.44		NA
M&P (Change)		46.3		NA		47.7		NA
M&M (Change)		4.36		NA		0.18		NA

Note: Here I employed an *un*weighted variance-component model because the weighted model did not converge successfully, whilst I used a weighted alternative.

would be also able to capture equal shares and changes more appropriately. If so, whether these indices are weighted or not, the estimates of variance-components indices should be replicated well across scholarly works which used any variant of variance-components models. For this purpose, as a basement work for comparison, I focused on the 2017 work of Mustillo which sought to explain under what conditions a political party could be nationalized (in terms of equal shares) after democratization. The main contribution of this work is that (1) parties could hold equal shares when "they are jointly programmatic and in government, and the party system is less fragmented; (2) the political system is centralized and a presidential election is concurrent; and (3) society is less ethnically fragmented" (Mustillo 2017: 930). Although Mustillo had showed supporting evidence on the basis of the *un*weighted M&M index and his own dataset, to what extent is it replicable with the weighted M&M index?

To answer this question, from Mustillo's dataset, I have initially made a namely Latin American subset by looking for the political parties which were present in Table 1.4 of Chapter 1. This procedure is important to enhance the comparability of estimates as Mustillo's dataset included 64 political parties from 19 countries in South Europe and the Americas (Mustillo 2017: 930), whereas my dataset had only covered 54 political parties from 14 Latin American countries only. The Latin American subset included 21 political parties from 9 Latin American countries as shown by Table A.2.2. Secondly, I re-ran the structural equation model which Mustillo specified to make Table 3 in his work (Mustillo 2017: 942). Overall, as shown by Table A.2.3, estimated results confirmed that Latin American parties would become nationalized when (a) they are jointly programmatic and in government and party systems are less fragmented, (b) a presidential election is concurrent, and (c) society is less ethnically fragmented. These results strongly show that the weighted measures of equal shares and changes worked as almost similar as the unweighted, though

TABLE A.2.2: The Descriptive Statistics of Mustillo's and My Datasets

Mustillo (2017)			Author		
Country	Party	Year	Country	Party	Year
Argentina	PJ	1983-1991	Argentina	PJ	1985-1991
	UCR	1983-1991		UCR	1985-1991
Brazil	PDT	1986-2002	Brazil	PDT	1990-2002
	PMDB	1986-2002		PMDB	1990-2002
	PSDB	1990-2002		PSDB	1990-2002
	PT	1986-2002		PT	1990-2002
	PTB	1986-2002		PTB	1990-2002
Ecuador	PRE	1984-1990	Ecuador	PRE	1984-1990
	PSC	1979-1990		PSC	1984-1990
El Salvador	ARENA	1994-2003	El Salvador	ARENA	1997-2003
	FMLN	1994-2003		FMLN	1997-2003
	PDC	1994-2003		PDC	1997-2003
Honduras	PLH	1985-2001	Honduras	PLH	1993-2001
	PNH	1985-2001		PNH	1993-2001
Mexico	PAN	1997-2009	Mexico	PAN	1997-2009
	PRI	1997-2001		PRI	1997-2001
Nicaragua	FSLN	1990-2011	Nicaragua	FSLN	1990-2011
Peru	APRA	1980-1990	Peru	APRA	1985-1990
Uruguay	FA	1984-2004	Uruguay	FA	1989-2004
	PC	1984-2004		PC	1989-2004
	PN	1984-2004		PN	1989-2004

Note: If readers want a complete dataset, please contact the author.

readers should be cautious to interpret them. (d) First, as discussed by Mustillo (2017: 943), the parties that are neither programmatic nor in government tend to nationalize rather than the parties that are only either programmatic or in government. (e) Second, even if society is more fragmented, political parties could be more nationalized. Figure A.2.1 shows a Do-file for estimation with Stata (Stata Corp 16.1).

TABLE A.2.3: Estimated Results

	Equal Shares	
Variables	Unweighted (Mustillo 2017)	Weighted (Author)
Initial Nationalization	0.15	1.08***
	(0.12)	(0.06)
Governing Party	5.16***	-2.23***
	(0.54)	(0.42)
Programmatic Party	1.65	-1.87***
	(1.64)	(0.38)
Governing*Programmatic	-3.72**	2.39***
	(1.80)	(0.46)
Effective number of parties	1.99***	0.11
	(0.35)	(0.16)
Concurrent	-1.68**	-0.31***
	(0.70)	(0.12)
District magnitude	0.11	0.04**
	(0.08)	(0.02)
Decentralization	-2.07	0.62
	(1.31)	(0.48)
Ethnic fractionalization	3.26**	-3.01**
	(1.31)	(1.42)
Ethnic concentration	-1.50***	0.21
	(0.55)	(0.19)
Initial vote shares	0.07**	0.03*
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Change in vote shares	0.14***	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Second wave	0.62	-0.30
	(0.52)	(0.41)
CD	0.824	0.973
N	24	24

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. CD is the coefficient of determination.

FIGURE A.2.1: Stata's Do-file for Replication

```
/// STATA Command for TABLE A.2.3
        sem (InitialNat -> EndNat, ) (InitialVP -> EndNat, ) ///
        (change -> EndNat, )  (Ideology -> EndNat, ) (governB -> EndNat, )
        (govb_ideo -> EndNat, ) ///
        (ENP -> EndNat, ) (concurr -> EndNat, ) (magavg -> EndNat, )
        (PdecTM -> EndNat, ) ///
        (ethnicF -> EndNat, ) (eciDB -> EndNat, ) (second->EndNat,)
        (europe->EndNat,), ///
        vce(cluster country) nocapslatent
        estat gof, stats(residuals) ///
        SRMR should be near 0, and CD near 1
```

Appendix B: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 3

Appendix B.1

TABLE B.1: The Description of Elite Survey Questions under Analysis

Serial Number	Variable	Label	Scale
28	FIDELITY	Should parties whip votes?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
33	DECREE	Presidential decree authority is needed in Brazil.	1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree
53	BELIEVE	Do you think that members of Congress should vote with their party or according to their own personal beliefs?	1 = According to the party, 2 = According to his/her beliefs
56	EFFORTS	Importance of party vis-à-vis personal efforts to win elections	1 = Party efforts, 2 = Personal efforts
74	SWITCH	Party switchers should lose their mandate.	1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree
78	CLIENTELISM	Do you agree that voters demand clientelistic behaviour?	1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree
79	LOCAL INTERESTS	When there is a conflict between the interests of your region and those of your party, how do you generally vote?	1 = Votes party interest, 2 = Votes local interest
153	COUNCILLOR	Have you been a city councillor?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
154	STATE DEPUTY	Have you been a state deputy?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
155	SENATOR	Have you been a senator?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
156	FEDERAL DEPUTY	Have you been a federal deputy?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
157	MAYOR	Have you been a mayor?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
158	GOVERNOR	Have you been a governor?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
159	MINISTER	Have you ever held ministerial office (federal cabinet)?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
160	STATE SECRETARY	Have you ever been a state secretary (portfolio under state governor)?	0 = No, 1 = Yes

TABLE B.1 ***Continued***

Serial Number	Variable	Label	Scale
161	FAMILY	Have any relative of yours held one of those eight positions above (153 – 160) in the last 50 years?	0 = No, 1 = Yes
181	MILITARY	Are you in favour of the inclusion of the constitutional provision that gives the Armed Forces the right to intervene to ensure internal order?	0 = Against, 1 = For
186	LEFT-RIGHT	Ideological self-placement	1 = Left, 10 = Right
216	ECONOMY	What is the best economic system for Brazil?	1 = Pure market economy, 2 = Equal state and private sector, 3 = State sector dominant over private, 4 = Total state control

Appendix B.2

TABLE B.2: The Territorial Distribution of Elite Preferences

Variables	N	NE	SE	S	CW	NSD
Political Dimension						
1) FIDELITY						
No	19 (5.9%)	27 (8.4%)	38 (11.9%)	11 (3.4%)	3 (0.9%)	
Yes	36 (11.3%)	59 (18.4%)	62 (19.4%)	45 (14.1%)	20 (6.3%)	
RSD	**8.5**	**16.0**	**12.0**	**17.0**	**8.5**	**62.0**
2) BELIEVE						
Parties' discipline	31 (9.9%)	52 (16.3%)	48 (15.0%)	35 (10.9%)	14 (4.4%)	
Own beliefs	24 (7.5%)	34 (10.6%)	52 (16.3%)	21 (6.6%)	9 (2.8%)	
RSD	**3.5**	**9.0**	**2.0**	**7.0**	**2.5**	**20.0**
3) EFFORTS						
Party efforts	11 (3.4%)	12 (3.8%)	16 (5.0%)	14 (4.4%)	4 (1.3%)	
Personal efforts	44 (13.8%)	74 (23.1%)	84 (26.3%)	42 (13.1%)	19 (5.9%)	
RSD	**16.5**	**31.0**	**34.0**	**14.0**	**7.5**	**103.0**
4) DECREE						
Agree	23 (7.2%)	37 (11.6%)	39 (12.2%)	24 (7.5)	10 (3.1%)	
Disagree	32 (10.0%)	49 (15.3%)	61 (19.1%)	32 (10.0%)	13 (4.1%)	
RSD	**4.5**	**6.0**	**11.0**	**4.0**	**1.5**	**27.0**
5) MILITARY						
Against	31 (9.7%)	42 (13.1%)	54 (16.9%)	32 (10.0%)	16 (5.0%)	
For	24 (7.5%)	44 (13.8%)	46 (14.4%)	24 (7.5%)	7 (2.2%)	
RSD	**3.5**	**1.0**	**4.0**	**4.0**	**4.5**	**15.0**

TABLE B.2 ***Continued***

Variables	N	NE	SE	S	CW	NSD
Political Dimension						
6) SWITCH						
Agree	37 (11.6%)	64 (20.0%)	65 (20.3%)	43 (13.4%)	15 (4.7%)	
Disagree	18 (5.6%)	22 (6.9%)	35 (10.9%)	13 (4.1%)	8 (2.5%)	
RSD	**9.5**	**21.0**	**15.0**	**15.0**	**3.5**	**64.0**
Economic Dimension						
1) ECONOMY						
Market economy	23 (7.2%)	38 (11.9%)	47 (14.7%)	25 (7.8%)	10 (3.1%)	
Hybrid	24 (7.5%)	40 (12.5%)	35 (10.9%)	23 (7.2%)	9 (2.8%)	
State dominant	8 (2.5%)	7 (2.2%)	17 (5.3%)	8 (2.5%)	4 (1.3%)	
Total state control	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	
RSD	**10.2**	**17.6**	**17.5**	**10.4**	**4.0**	**59.1**
Traditional Dimension						
1) CLIENTELISM						
Agree	43 (13.4%)	72 (22.5%)	79 (24.7%)	40 (12.5%)	19 (5.9%)	
Disagree	12 (3.8%)	14 (4.4%)	21 (6.6%)	16 (5.0%)	4 (1.3%)	
RSD	**15.5**	**29.0**	**29.0**	**12.0**	**7.5**	**93.0**
2) L. INTERESTS						
Party interest	10 (3.1%)	26 (8.1%)	39 (12.2%)	24 (7.5%)	7 (2.2%)	
Local interest	45 (14.0%)	60 (18.8%)	61 (19.1%)	32 (10.0%)	16 (5.0%)	
RSD	**17.5**	**17.0**	**11.0**	**4.0**	**4.5**	**54.0**

TABLE B.2 ***Continued***

Variables	N	NE	SE	S	CW	NSD
Traditional Dimension						
3) FAMILY						
No	23 (7.2%)	40 (12.5%)	52 (16.3%)	27 (8.4%)	16 (5.0%)	
Yes	32 (10.0%)	46 (14.4%)	48 (15.0%)	29 (9.1%)	7 (2.2%)	
RSD	**4.5**	**3.0**	**2.0**	**1.0**	**4.5**	**2.0**
4) COUNCILLOR						
No	45 (14.1%)	66 (20.6%)	69 (21.6%)	34 (10.6%)	18 (5.6%)	
Yes	10 (3.1%)	20 (6.3%)	31 (9.7%)	22 (6.9%)	5 (1.6%)	
RSD	**17.5**	**23.0**	**19.0**	**6.0**	**6.5**	**72.0**
5) MAYOR						
No	48 (15.0%)	69 (21.6%)	84 (26.3%)	44 (13.8%)	21 (6.6%)	
Yes	7 (2.2%)	17 (5.3%)	16 (5.0%)	12 (3.8%)	2 (0.6%)	
RSD	**20.5**	**26.0**	**34.0**	**16.0**	**9.5**	**106.0**
6) STATE DEPUTY						
No	43 (13.4%)	48 (15.0%)	60 (18.8%)	36 (11.3%)	14 (4.4%)	
Yes	12 (3.8%)	38 (11.9%)	40 (12.5%)	20 (6.3%)	9 (2.8%)	
RSD	**15.5**	**5.0**	**10.0**	**8.0**	**2.5**	**41.0**
7) GOVERNOR						
No	48 (15.0%)	76 (23.8%)	94 (29.4%)	53 (16.6%)	23 (7.2%)	
Yes	7 (2.2%)	10 (3.1%)	6 (1.9%)	3 (0.9%)	0 (0.0%)	
RSD	**20.5**	**33.0**	**44.0**	**25.0**	**11.5**	**134.0**

TABLE B.2 ***Continued***

Variables	N	NE	SE	S	CW	NSD
Traditional Dimension						
8) S. SECRETARY						
No	28 (8.8%)	53 (16.6%)	79 (24.7%)	41 (12.8%)	15 (4.7%)	
Yes	27 (8.4%)	33 (10.3%)	21 (6.6%)	15 (4.7%)	8 (2.5%)	
RSD	**0.5**	**10.0**	**29.0**	**13.0**	**3.5**	**56.0**
9) FED. DEPUTY						
No	11 (3.4%)	9 (2.8%)	5 (1.6%)	5 (1.6%)	1 (0.3%)	
Yes	44 (13.8%)	77 (24.1%)	95 (29.7%)	51 (15.9%)	22 (6.9%)	
RSD	**16.5**	**34**	**45**	**23**	**10.5**	**129.0**
10) SENATOR						
No	39 (12.2%)	76 (23.8%)	96 (30.0%)	47 (14.7%)	22 (6.9%)	
Yes	16 (5.0%)	10 (3.1%)	4 (1.3%)	9 (2.8%)	1 (0.3%)	
RSD	**11.5**	**33.0**	**46.0**	**19.0**	**10.5**	**120.0**
11) MINISTER						
No	53 (16.6%)	81 (25.3%)	94 (29.4%)	54 (16.9%)	23 (7.2%)	
Yes	2 (0.6%)	5 (1.6%)	6 (1.9%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	
RSD	**25.5**	**38.0**	**44.0**	**26.0**	**11.5**	**145.0**

TABLE B.2 ***Continued***

Variables	N	NE	SE	S	CW	NSD
Left–Right						
1) Self-placement						
(Left) 1	2 (0.6%)	4 (1.3%)	10 (3.1%)	6 (1.9%)	1 (0.3%)	
2	2 (0.6%)	4 (1.3%)	5 (1.6%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.6%)	
3	4 (1.3%)	15 (4.7%)	22 (6.9%)	8 (2.5%)	3 (0.9%)	
4	16 (5.0%)	16 (5.0%)	21 (6.6%)	16 (5.0%)	4 (1.3%)	
5	26 (8.1%)	36 (11.3%)	26 (8.1%)	15 (4.7%)	9 (2.8%)	
6	4 (1.3%)	4 (1.3%)	9 (2.8%)	4 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
7	1 (0.3%)	3 (0.9%)	2 (0.6%)	3 (0.9%)	2 (0.6%)	
8	0 (0.0%)	3 (0.9%)	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.3%)	2 (0.6%)	
9	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.3%)	2 (0.6%)	1 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	
(Right) 10	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.6%)	2 (0.6%)	0 (0.0%)	
RSD	**8.2**	**10.5**	**9.1**	**5.5**	**2.6**	**34.2**

Appendix B.3

TABLE B.3: Estimated ICCs

	System (N = 323)	DEM (N = 54)	PDT (N = 16)	PMDB (N = 58)	PP1993 (N = 5)	PP2003 (N = 29)	PR (N = 9)	PSB (N = 14)	PSDB (N = 44)	PT (N = 50)	PTB (N = 12)	Others (N = 10)
FIDELITY	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.248	0.996	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.103	0.000	0.000
BELIEVE	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.038	0.996	0.109	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.103	0.000	0.000
EFFORTS	0.000	0.000		0.274		0.000		0.000	0.000	0.080		
DECREE	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.482	0.000
MILITARY	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.386	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SWITCH	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.168	0.194	0.000	0.000
ECONOMY	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.243	0.650	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.327	0.000
CLIENTELISM	0.000	0.000	0.328	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.997	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.000	
L. INTERESTS	0.026	0.000	0.000	0.083	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.260	0.213		0.000
FAMILY	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.231	0.000	0.000	0.631	0.084
COUNCILLOR	0.017	0.000	0.744	0.000	0.000	0.151	0.000	0.705	0.451	0.000	0.000	0.000
MAYOR	0.000	0.000	0.756	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.292	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
STATE DEPUTY	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
GOVERNOR	0.006	0.000	0.328	0.019		0.000		0.000		0.000	0.000	

TABLE B.3 ***Continued***

	System (N = 323)	DEM (N = 54)	PDT (N = 16)	PMDB (N = 58)	PP1993 (N = 5)	PP2003 (N = 29)	PR (N = 9)	PSB (N = 14)	PSDB (N = 44)	PT (N = 50)	PTB (N = 12)	Others (N = 10)
S. SECRETARY	0.044	0.051	0.409	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.997	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.283	
F. DEPUTY	0.037	0.000	0.745	0.000	0.000	0.276	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.183	0.000
SENATOR	0.105	0.000	0.233	0.000	0.000	0.096	0.000		0.000	0.140	0.253	
MINISTER	0.000	0.042		0.000		0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000		
LEFT–RIGHT	0.000	0.126	0.107	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.227

Appendix B.4

TABLE B.4: The Description of Elite Survey Questions under Analysis

Serial Number	Variable	Label	Scale
89	DEMOCRACY I	Is democracy the best form of government?	1 = Always 2 = Sometimes
90	DEMOCRACY II	Do you think Brazil is democratic?	1 = Yes 2 = No
99	LEFT RIGHT	Ideological self-placement	1 = Left 7 = Right
126	ECONOMY I	Must capitalism be accepted as the best?	1 = Strongly agree 2 = Agree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 4 = Disagree 5 = Strongly disagree
127	ECONOMY II	Are you in favour of economic liberalism?	1 = Support economic liberalism 2 = Partially support state interventionism 3 = Support state interventionism

Appendix B.5

TABLE B.5: The Territorial Distribution of Elite Preferences

Paraná (APEP)		**South (BLSs)**	
Variables	**Counts (%)**	**Variables**	**Counts (%)**
Political Dimension		*Political Dimension*	
1) DEMOCRACY I		1) MILITARY	
Always	95 (93.1%)	Against	32 (57.1%)
Sometimes	7 (6.9%)	For	24 (42.9%)
RSD	**44.0**	**RSD**	**4.0**
2) DEMOCRACY II			
Yes	86 (84.3%)		
No	16 (15.7%)		
RSD	**35.0**		
Economic Dimension		*Economic Dimension*	
1) ECONOMY I		1) ECONOMY	
Strongly agree	3 (2.9%)	Pure market economy	25 (44.6%)
Agree	31 (30.4%)	Equal state and private sector	23 (41.1%)
Neither agree nor disagree	19 (18.6%)	State sector dominant over private	8 (14.3%)
Disagree	36 (35.3%)	Total state control	0 (0.0%)
Strongly disagree	13 (12.7%)		
RSD	**12.0**	**RSD**	**10.4**
2) ECONOMY II			
Support liberalism	3 (2.9%)		
Partially support interventionism	81 (79.4%)		
Support interventionism	18 (17.6%)		
RSD	**33.8**		

TABLE B.5 ***Continued***

Paraná (APEP) Variables	Counts (%)	South (The BLSs) Variables	Counts (%)
Left–Right		*Left–Right*	
1) Self-placement		1) Self-placement	
(Left) 1	4 (3.9%)	(Left) 1	6 (1.8%)
2	14 (13.7%)	2	0 (0.0%)
3	36 (35.3%)	3	8 (14.3%)
4	30 (29.4%)	4	16 (28.6%)
5	13 (12.7%)	5	15 (26.8%)
6	1 (1.0%)	6	4 (7.1%)
(Right) 7	4 (3.9%)	7	3 (5.4%)
		8	1 (1.8%)
		9	1 (1.8%)
		(Right) 10	2 (3.6%)
RSD	**12.6**	**RSD**	**5.5**

Note: No identical questions on traditional issues (for example, past political experience) were included in the APEP questionnaire.

Appendix B.6

TABLE B.6: Estimated ICCs

	System (N=137)	PP03 (N=6)	PDT (N=7)	PT (N=11)	PTB (N=5)	PMDB (N=23)	PR (N=5)	DEM (N=14)	PSB (N=12)	PSDB (N=21)
DEMOCRACY	0.00		0.00			0.00			0.00	0.00
BRAZIL	0.00			0.00			0.00	0.00		0.00
CAPITALISM	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.53	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.62
INTERVENTIONISM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.48	1.00	
LEFT-RIGHT	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.40

Appendix C: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 4

Appendix C.1

TABLE C.1: The Degree of Party Nationalization along Parties under Analysis

Party	Equal Shares	Equal Changes
Progressive Party	4.3	27.0
Workers' Party	20.7	11.9
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party	36.9	35.7
Republican Party	3.9	9.9
Brazilian Socialist Party	15.0	9.7
Brazilian Social Democracy Party	25.9	29.3

Appendix C.2

TABLE C.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mode/Mean	SD	Range
EQUAL SHARES	20.04	11.08	3.93 – 36.88
EQUAL CHANGES	20.31	10.50	9.72 – 35.67
FIDELITY	1		0 - 1
DECREE	2		1 - 2
BELIEVE	1		1 - 2
EFFORTS	2		1 - 2
SWITCH	1		1 - 2
MILITARY	0		0 - 1
ECONOMY	2		1 - 4
CLIENTELISM	1		1 - 2
LOCAL INTERESTS	2		1 - 3
COUNCILLOR	0		0 - 1
STATE DEPUTY	0		0 - 1
SENATOR	0		0 - 1
FEDERAL DEPUTY	1		0 - 1
MAYOR	0		0 - 1
GOVERNOR	0		0 - 1
MINISTER	0		0 - 1
STATE SECRETARY	0		0 - 1
FAMILY	1		0 - 1
LEFT RIGHT	4		1 - 10
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	187.26	201.84	9.92 - 478.69
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS	5.45	2.32	3.00 - 9.00

TABLE C.2 ***Continued***

Variables	Mode/Mean	SD	Range
REGIONAL AUTHORITY INDEX	20.09	0.92	19.50 - 21.50
EFFECTIVE PARTY NUMBER	2.34	1.84	0.37 - 9.80
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	0.47	0.08	0.29 - 0.58
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION	0.86	0.03	0.79 - 0.90

Appendix D: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 5

Appendix D.1

TABLE D.1: The Description of Mass Survey Questions under Analysis

Serial Number		Variable	Question	Scale
02	14			
p19	Q15	SATISFACTION	In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Brazil?	1 = Not satisfied at all 2 = Not so satisfied 3 = Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4 = Satisfied 5 = Very satisfied
p20	Q7	DIFFERENCE	Some people say that it makes a big difference who governs Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?	1 = Make no difference 2 3 4 5 = Make great difference
p21	Q8	INFLUENCE	Some people say that your vote greatly influences what happens in Brazil, but others do not. How do you think about it?	1 = Does not influence at all 2 3 4 5 = Influence a lot
p22	PC6	GOVERNMENT	Democracy has some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?	1 = Do not agree 2 = Neither agree nor disagree 3 = Agree
p31	Q16	IDENTIFICATION	Is there a political party that represents the way you think?	1 = Yes 2 = No
p35	Q16A	PREFERENCE	Is there a political party that you like?	1 = Yes 2 = No
p108b	PC12B	MARKET	The government must say everything that companies have to do.	1 = Disagree a lot 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither disagree nor agree 4 = Agree 5 = Agree a lot

TABLE D.1 ***Continued***

Serial Number		Variable	Question	Scale
02	14			
p04	Q17	CONTACT	During the electoral campaign, did a candidate or person from any party contact you to ask for your vote?	1 = Yes 2 = No
p50v1	Q12	LEFT-RIGHT	How do you place yourself on the left-right scale?	0 = Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 = Right

Appendix D.2

TABLE D.2: The Territorial Distribution of Mass Preferences

	North					Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
Political Dimension																										
1) SATISFACTION																										
1	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	7 (1.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	13 (2.3%)	5 (0.9%)	16 (2.8%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
2	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	8 (1.4%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	`15 (2.6%)	11 (1.9%)	4 (0.7%)	4 (0.7%)	8 (1.4%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	20 (3.5%)	10 (1.8%)	69 (12.1%)	6 (1.1%)	11 (1.9%)	4 (0.7%)	6 (1.1%)	8 (1.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	
3	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	6 (1.1%)	22 (3.9%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
4	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	10 (1.8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	8 (1.4%)	11 (1.9%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	7 (1.2%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	15 (2.6%)	8 (1.4%)	40 (7.0%)	18 (3.2%)	5 (0.9%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	6 (1.1%)	1 (0.2%)	
5	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.2%)	5 (0.9%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	6 (1.1%)	29 (5.1%)	7 (1.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
SSD	**0.8**	**2.5**	**0.7**	**4.2**	**0.5**	**1.0**	**2.4**	**3.2**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**2.8**	**1.4**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**1.5**	**5.6**	**1.8**	**18.7**	**6.1**	**2.8**	**1.5**	**2.1**	**3.0**	**2.2**	**0.5**	**51.8**
2) DIFFERENCE																										
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
3	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	12 (2.1%)	6 (1.1%)	24 (4.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
4	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	6 (1.1%)	5 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	8 (1.4%)	7 (1.2%)	24 (4.2%)	5 (0.9%)	6 (1.1%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	
5	0 (0%)	8 (1.4%)	3 (0.5%)	18 (3.2%)	2 (0.4%)	6 (1.1%)	23 (4.0%)	28 (4.9%)	13 (2.3%)	9 (1.6%)	13 (2.3%)	11 (1.9%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	33 (5.8%)	17 (3.0%)	120 (21.0%)	20 (3.5%)	20 (3.5%)	9 (1.6%)	10 (1.8%)	10 (1.8%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	
SSD	**0.8**	**3.1**	**1.2**	**7.0**	**0.8**	**2.3**	**8.7**	**10.4**	**5.0**	**3.4**	**4.7**	**4.2**	**1.0**	**0.7**	**1.0**	**11.1**	**5.4**	**43.3**	**6.7**	**7.5**	**3.4**	**3.8**	**3.8**	**1.4**	**0.8**	**137.3**
3) INFLUENCE																										
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	10 (1.8%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
3	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	11 (1.9%)	2 (0.4%)	12 (2.1%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	

TABLE D.2 ***Continued***

	North					Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West			NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
4	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	7 (1.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	7 (1.2%)	22 (3.9%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
5	0 (0%)	8 (1.4%)	2 (0.4%)	18 (3.2%)	2 (0.4%)	7 (1.2%)	24 (4.2%)	31 (5.4%)	12 (2.1%)	9 (1.6%)	13 (2.3%)	12 (2.1%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	4 (0.7%)	39 (6.8%)	20 (3.5%)	127 (22.2%)	26 (4.6%)	21 (3.7%)	9 (1.6%)	10 (1.8%)	12 (2.1%)	7 (1.2%)	2 (0.2%)	
SSD	**0.8**	**3.0**	**0.7**	**7.0**	**0.8**	**2.8**	**9.0**	**11.8**	**4.6**	**3.5**	**5.1**	**4.7**	**0.7**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**14.0**	**6.8**	**46.2**	**9.7**	**7.9**	**3.5**	**3.8**	**4.6**	**2.7**	**0.8**	**154.8**
Political Dimension																										
1) GOVERNMENT																										
1	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	6 (1.1%)	7 (1.2%)	34 (6.0%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	9 (1.6%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	
3	2 (0.4%)	6 (1.1%)	2 (0.4%)	19 (3.3%)	3 (0.5%)	7 (1.2%)	29 (5.1%)	33 (5.8%)	13 (2.3%)	11 (1.9%)	20 (3.5%)	11 (1.9%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	50 (8.8%)	27 (4.7%)	133 (23.3%)	30 (5.3%)	25 (4.4%)	12 (2.1%)	12 (2.1%)	14 (2.5%)	6 (1.1%)	2 (0.4%)	
SSD	**0.9**	**2.5**	**0.9**	**8.7**	**1.4**	**3.3**	**13.2**	**14.6**	**5.7**	**5.2**	**9.2**	**4.8**	**1.2**	**1.9**	**1.9**	**21.5**	**11.1**	**53.5**	**13.2**	**11.1**	**5.7**	**5.4**	**6.4**	**2.5**	**0.9**	**205.0**
2) IDENTIFICATION																										
1	2 (0.4%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	15 (2.6%)	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	26 (4.6%)	27 (4.7%)	12 (2.1%)	8 (1.4%)	13 (2.3%)	9 (1.6%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	41 (7.2%)	19 (3.3%)	91 (15.9%)	24 (4.2%)	15 (2.6%)	9 (1.6%)	7 (1.2%)	9 (1.6%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	
2	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	5 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.9%)	10 (1.8%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	8 (1.4%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	18 (3.2%)	16 (2.8%)	85 (14.9%)	10 (1.8%)	13 (2.3%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (1.1%)	6 (1.1%)	5 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	
SSD	**1**	**0**	**0**	**5**	**1.5**	**2.5**	**10.5**	**8.5**	**4.5**	**2.5**	**2.5**	**2.5**	**1**	**2**	**1.5**	**11.5**	**1.5**	**3**	**7**	**1**	**3**	**0.5**	**1.5**	**1**	**1**	**71.5**
3) PREFERENCE																										
1	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5)	19 (3.3%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	25 (4.4%)	28 (4.9%)	13 (2.3%)	10 (1.8%)	14 (2.5%)	10 (1.8%)	4 (0.7%)	4 (0.7%)	6 (1.1%)	42 (7.4%)	20 (3.5%)	97 (17.0%)	27 (4.7%)	17 (3.0%)	10 (1.8%)	9 (1.6%)	9 (1.6%)	6 (1.1%)	2 (0.4%)	
2	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	6 (1.1%)	9 (1.6%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	7 (1.2%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	17 (3.0%)	15 (2.6%)	79 (13.8%)	7 (1.2%)	11 (1.9%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	6 (1.1%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	
SSD	**1**	**1**	**1**	**9**	**1.5**	**1.5**	**9.5**	**9.5**	**5.5**	**4.5**	**3.5**	**3.5**	**2**	**2**	**2.5**	**12.5**	**2.5**	**9**	**10**	**3**	**4**	**2.5**	**1.5**	**2**	**1**	**100.5**
Economic Dimension																										
1) ECONOMY																										
1	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	13 (2.3%)	7 (1.2%)	23 (4.0%)	5 (0.9%)	9 (1.6%)	2 (0.4%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	

TABLE D.2 ***Continued***

	North					Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	10 (1.8%)	6 (1.1%)	28 (4.9%)	7 (1.2%)	10 (1.8%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
3	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (1.1%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	16 (2.8%)	2 (0.4%)	40 (7.0%)	10 (1.8%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	6 (1.1%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	
4	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	11 (1.9%)	6 (1.1%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	11 (1.9%)	11 (1.9%)	42 (7.4%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	
5	1 (0.2%)	7 (1.2%)	1 (0.2%)	10 (1.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	13 (2.3%)	21 (3.7%)	8 (1.4%)	6 (1.1%)	5 (0.9%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	9 (1.6%)	9 (1.6%)	43 (7.5%)	9 (1.6%)	4 (0.7%)	5 (0.9%)	5 (0.9%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	
SSD	**0.5**	**2.6**	**0.7**	**3.3**	**0.8**	**1.2**	**4.8**	**7.0**	**2.8**	**2.0**	**1.0**	**1.4**	**0.7**	**1.0**	**1.0**	**2.5**	**3.0**	**8.1**	**2.6**	**3.4**	**1.5**	**1.4**	**1.7**	**1.0**	**0.5**	**32.5**
Traditional Dimension																										
1) CONTACT																										
1	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	9 (1.6%)	10 (1.8%)	6 (1.1%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5%)	18 (3.2%)	13 (2.3%)	32 (5.6%)	13 (2.3%)	7 (1.2%)	5 (0.9%)	5 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	
2	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	3 (0.5%)	15 (2.6%)	3 (0.5%)	7 (1.2%)	22 (3.9%)	27 (4.7%)	9 (1.6%)	7 (1.2%)	20 (3.5%)	10 (1.8%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.7%)	41 (7.2%)	22 (3.9%)	144 (25.2)	21 (3.7%)	21 (3.7%)	7 (1.2%)	8 (1.4%)	12 (2.1%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	
SSD	**1**	**1**	**1**	**5**	**1.5**	**3.5**	**6.5**	**8.5**	**1.5**	**1.5**	**9.5**	**3.5**	**0**	**2**	**0.5**	**11.5**	**4.5**	**56**	**4**	**7**	**1**	**1.5**	**4.5**	**1**	**0**	**131.5**
Left–Right																										
1) Self-placement																										
0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	6 (1.1%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	6 (1.1%)	7 (1.2%)	12 (2.1%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.9%)	4 (0.7%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
3	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	12 (2.1%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
4	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	9 (1.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
5	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	5 (0.9%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	9 (1.6%)	7 (1.2%)	37 (6.5%)	3 (0.5%)	10 (1.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	
6	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	11 (1.9%)	1 (0.2%)	22 (3.9%)	5 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	

TABLE D.2 ***Continued***

	North					Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
7	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	14 (2.5%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
8	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.7%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	11 (1.9%)	3 (0.5%)	14 (2.5%)	6 (1.1%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	
9	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	15 (2.6%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	0 (0%)	
10	0 (0%)	2 (0.4%)	2 (0.4%)	13 (2.3%)	2 (0.4%)	5 (0.9%)	13 (2.3%)	13 (2.3%)	4 (0.4%)	8 (1.4%)	2 (0.4%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.4%)	8 (1.4%)	6 (1.1%)	35 (6.1%)	9 (1.6%)	4 (0.7%)	4 (0.7%)	2 (0.4%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	
SSD	**0.4**	**1.2**	**0.6**	**3.6**	**0.6**	**1.4**	**3.6**	**3.5**	**1.3**	**2.3**	**1.1**	**1.4**	**0.6**	**0.5**	**0.8**	**3.8**	**2.4**	**10.7**	**2.4**	**2.9**	**1.6**	**1.1**	**1.1**	**0.7**	**0.4**	**36.7**

Appendix D.3

TABLE D.3: Estimated ICCs

	System (N = 571)	DEM (N = 36)	PC do B (N = 13)	PMDB (N = 65)	PP2003 (N = 27)	PPS (N = 11)	PR (N = 35)	PROS (N = 10)	PSB (N = 32)	PSC (N = 8)	PSD (N = 24)	PSDB (N = 80)	PT (N = 110)	PTB (N = 22)	PV (N = 21)
SATISFACTION	0.039		0.699		0.048			0.126	0.001		0.213		0.193	0.341	0.527
DIFFERENCE	0.049		0.000	0.236	0.334	0.699				0.708	0.160				
INFLUENCE	0.014				0.227	0.255		0.000					0.001	0.312	
GOVERNMENT	0.063									0.996		0.158			0.369
IDENTIFICATION	0.033		0.307				0.573					0.415			0.048
PREFERENCE	0.069	0.136		0.186	0.553		0.977					0.241	0.165		0.355
ECONOMY	0.078	0.147	0.016	0.203				0.767					0.059		
CONTACT	0.031								0.375	0.997	0.148	0.205			0.249
LEFT–RIGHT	0.106	0.405		0.498		0.694					0.788		0.047		

Appendix D.4

TABLE D.4: The Territorial Distribution of Mass Preferences

	North						Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RO	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
Political Dimension																											
1) SATISFACTION																											
1	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)	7 (1.1%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	6 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	14 (2.2%)	6 (0.9%)	20 (3.1%)	4 (0.6%)	8 (1.3%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	15 (2.4%)	14 (2.2%)	7 (1.1%)	5 (0.8%)	10 (1.6%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	36 (5.7%)	12 (1.9%)	50 (7.8%)	15 (2.4%)	17 (2.7%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	9 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	
3	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	9 (1.4%)	4 (0.6%)	12 (1.9%)	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
4	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	9 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	9 (1.4%)	10 (1.6%)	8 (1.3%)	5 (0.8%)	9 (1.4%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	15 (2.4%)	8 (1.3%)	45 (7.1%)	19 (3.0%)	8 (1.3%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	
5	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	7 (1.1%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	5 (0.8%)	21 (3.3%)	10 (1.6%)	6 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
SSD	**1.5**	**1.9**	**1.0**	**3.1**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**1.0**	**4.7**	**4.2**	**2.2**	**2.1**	**3.2**	**2.3**	**1.5**	**0.7**	**1.2**	**10.9**	**2.8**	**15.0**	**6.2**	**4.3**	**3.1**	**0.8**	**2.7**	**1.5**	**1.7**	**68.1**
2) DIFFERENCE																											
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
3	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	14 (2.2%)	5 (0.8%)	20 (3.1%)	6 (0.9%)	6 (0.9%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
4	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	16 (2.5%)	6 (0.9%)	25 (3.9%)	9 (1.4%)	10 (1.6%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
5	4 (0.6%)	6 (0.9%)	6 (0.9%)	16 (2.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.8%)	24 (3.8%)	25 (3.9%)	17 (2.7%)	8 (1.3%)	20 (3.1%)	12 (1.9%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	43 (6.8%)	20 (3.1%)	94 (14.8%)	31 (4.9%)	28 (4.4%)	16 (2.5%)	2 (0.3%)	14 (2.2%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	
SSD	**1.5**	**2.2**	**2.3**	**6.1**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**1.9**	**8.7**	**9.0**	**6.2**	**2.8**	**7.0**	**4.4**	**1.6**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**14.9**	**6.7**	**33.2**	**10.7**	**10.3**	**6.0**	**0.8**	**5.0**	**0.6**	**2.3**	**144.5**
3) INFLUENCE																											
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.8%)	6 (0.9%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	
3	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	17 (2.7%)	2 (0.3%)	15 (2.4%)	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	
4	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	9 (1.4%)	5 (0.8%)	18 (2.8%)	8 (1.3%)	9 (1.4%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
5	5 (0.8%)	6 (0.9%)	5 (0.8%)	19 (3.0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.8%)	27 (4.2%)	29 (4.6%)	19 (3.0%)	12 (1.9%)	20 (3.1%)	13 (2.0%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	50 (7.8%)	21 (3.3%)	104 (16.3%)	36 (5.7%)	27 (4.2%)	19 (3.0%)	1 (0.2%)	18 (2.8%)	4 (0.6%)	5 (0.8%)	
SSD	**2.0**	**2.2**	**1.9**	**7.4**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**1.9**	**10.2**	**10.8**	**7.0**	**4.7**	**7.7**	**5.0**	**1.2**	**1.6**	**1.5**	**18.2**	**7.1**	**37.5**	**13.1**	**9.5**	**7.4**	**0.5**	**7.0**	**1.5**	**1.9**	**165.3**

TABLE D.3 ***Continued***

	North						Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RO	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
Political Dimension																											
4) **IDENTITY**																											
1	4 (0.6%)	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	13 (2.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	22 (3.5%)	24 (3.8%)	12 (1.9%)	7 (1.1%)	13 (2.0%)	9 (1.4%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	40 (6.3%)	15 (2.4%)	69 (10.8%)	25 (3.9%)	17 (2.7%)	10 (1.6%)	1 (0.2%)	8 (1.3%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	
2	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	8 (1.3%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	12 (1.9%)	13 (2.0%)	13 (2.0%)	6 (0.9%)	19 (3.0%)	7 (1.1%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	38 (6.0%)	20 (3.1%)	79 (12.4%)	26 (4.1%)	27 (4.2%)	11 (1.7%)	1 (0.2%)	12 (1.9%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	
SSD	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**2.5**	**0.5**	**1**	**1**	**5**	**5.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**2.5**	**5**	**0.5**	**5**	**0.5**	**0**	**2**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**2.5**
5) PREFERENCE																											
1	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	19 (3.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	25 (3.9%)	26 (4.1%)	15 (2.4%)	9 (1.4%)	14 (2.2%)	12 (1.9%)	5 (0.8%)	3 (0.5%)	4 (0.6%)	47 (7.4%)	19 (3.0%)	74 (11.6%)	30 (4.7%)	22 (3.5%)	13 (2.0%)	1 (0.2%)	10 (1.6%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	
2	2 (0.3%)	8 (1.3%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	9 (1.4%)	11 (1.7%)	10 (1.6%)	4 (0.6%)	18 (2.8%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	31 (4.9%)	16 (2.5%)	74 (11.6%)	21 (3.3%)	22 (3.5%)	8 (1.8%)	1 (0.2%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)	
SSD	**1.5**	**3.5**	**0.5**	**8.5**	**0.5**	**1**	**2**	**8**	**7.5**	**2.5**	**2.5**	**2**	**4**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**8**	**1.5**	**0**	**4.5**	**0**	**2.5**	**0**	**0**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**50.5**
6) GOVERNMENT																											
1	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	6 (0.9%)	6 (0.9%)	24 (3.8%)	5 (0.8%)	6 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	
3	7 (1.1%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	19 (3.0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	33 (5.2%)	32 (5.0%)	19 (3.0%)	13 (2.0%)	30 (4.7%)	13 (2.0%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	5 (0.8%)	68 (10.7%)	29 (4.6%)	114 (17.9%)	44 (6.9%)	38 (6.0%)	18 (2.8%)	2 (0.3%)	18 (2.8%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (0.9%)	
SSD	**3.3**	**2.2**	**1.7**	**8.5**	**0.5**	**0.9**	**2.8**	**15.3**	**13.9**	**7.7**	**6.1**	**13.7**	**5.6**	**2.2**	**1.9**	**2.2**	**29.7**	**12.5**	**46.1**	**19.1**	**16.7**	**7.9**	**0.9**	**8.1**	**1.2**	**2.6**	**230.6**
Economic Dimension																											
1) ECONOMY																											
1	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	18 (2.8%)	9 (1.4%)	29 (4.6%)	11 (1.7%)	17 (2.7%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	7 (1.1%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	
2	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.8%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	10 (1.6%)	7 (1.1%)	28 (4.4%)	9 (1.4%)	16 (2.5%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	
3	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	18 (2.8%)	3 (0.5%)	20 (3.1%)	9 (1.4%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
4	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	13 (2.0%)	5 (0.8%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	14 (2.2%)	6 (0.9%)	31 (4.9%)	9 (1.4%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	
5	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	3 (0.5%)	11 (1.7%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	11 (1.7%)	20 (3.1%)	13 (2.0%)	6 (0.9%)	13 (2.0%)	6 (0.9%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	18 (2.8%)	10 (1.6%)	40 (6.3%)	13 (2.0%)	5 (0.8%)	7 (1.1%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	
SSD	**1.2**	**1.7**	**1.0**	**3.7**	**0.4**	**0.8**	**0.7**	**4.5**	**6.3**	**4.0**	**2.0**	**4.6**	**1.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**3.2**	**2.4**	**6.4**	**1.6**	**6.5**	**1.7**	**0.5**	**1.7**	**0.6**	**0.8**	**38.3**

TABLE D.3 *Continued*

	North						Northeast									Southeast				South			Centre-West				NSD
	AC	AM	AP	PA	RO	RR	AL	BA	CE	MA	PB	PE	PI	RN	SE	ES	MG	RJ	SP	PR	RS	SC	DF	GO	MS	MT	
Traditional Dimension																											
1) CONTACT																											
1	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	12 (1.9%)	13 (2.0%)	12 (1.9%)	8 (1.3%)	7 (1.1%)	6 (0.9%)	4 (0.6%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (0.9%)	30 (4.7%)	15 (2.4%)	36 (5.7%)	17 (2.7%)	12 (1.9%)	12 (1.9%)	0 (0%)	7 (1.1%)	2 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)	
2	3 (0.5%)	6 (0.9%)	5 (0.8%)	15 (2.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	22 (3.5%)	24 (3.8%)	13 (2.0%)	5 (0.8%)	25 (3.9%)	10 (1.6%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	48 (7.5%)	20 (3.1%)	112 (17.6%)	34 (5.3%)	32 (5.0%)	9 (1.4%)	2 (0.3%)	13 (2.0%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	
SSD	**0.5**	**1.5**	**1.5**	**4.5**	**0.5**	**1**	**3**	**5**	**5.5**	**0.5**	**1.5**	**9**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**9**	**2.5**	**38**	**8.5**	**10**	**1.5**	**1**	**3**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**96.5**
Left–Right																											
1) Self-placement																											
0	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (1.1%)	6 (0.9%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	9 (1.4%)	6 (0.9%)	13 (2.0%)	1 (0.2%)	8 (1.3%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	
1	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
2	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	6 (0.9%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
3	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
4	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	9 (1.4%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
5	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	6 (0.9%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	16 (2.5%)	5 (0.8%)	32 (5.0%)	6 (0.9%)	15 (2.4%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	
6	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	13 (2.0%)	2 (0.3%)	18 (2.8%)	8 (1.3%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
7	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	9 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	11 (1.7%)	2 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
8	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	5 (0.8%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)	8 (1.3%)	5 (0.8%)	16 (2.5%)	8 (1.3%)	5 (0.8%)	2 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	
9	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	1 (0.2%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	13 (2.0%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	
10	2 (0.3%)	3 (0.5%)	2 (0.3%)	10 (1.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	3 (0.5%)	11 (1.7%)	16 (2.5%)	9 (1.4%)	9 (1.4%)	2 (0.3%)	5 (0.8%)	4 (0.6%)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	11 (1.7%)	8 (1.3%)	22 (3.5%)	12 (1.9%)	5 (0.8%)	5 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	5 (0.8%)	
SSD	**0.8**	**1.1**	**0.8**	**3.0**	**0.3**	**0.4**	**0.9**	**3.2**	**4.5**	**2.5**	**2.6**	**1.8**	**1.6**	**1.2**	**0.5**	**0.7**	**4.9**	**2.6**	**8.0**	**3.3**	**4.2**	**1.5**	**0.4**	**1.2**	**0.9**	**1.4**	**39.9**

Appendix D.5

TABLE D.5: Estimated ICCs

	System (N = 637)	DEM (N = 34)	PC do B (N = 21)	PMDB (N = 81)	PP2003 (N = 14)	PPS (N = 21)	PR (N = 45)	PROS (N = 9)	PSB (N = 30)	PSC (N = 12)	PSD (N = 26)	PSDB (N = 81)	PT (N = 87)	PTB (N = 31)
SATISFACTION	0.025	0.077	0.283		0.285	0.431			0.013		0.167	0.202	0.113	0.287
DIFFERENCE			0.179				0.147	0.269			0.314			
INFLUENCE	0.028			0.043		0.237	0.237	0.613	0.992					0.152
GOVERNMENT	0.030	0.047	0.031	0.138		0.214	0.814		0.804		0.262	0.145	0.147	0.465
IDENTITY		0.224						0.035		0.786	0.073			
PREFERENCE	0.037							0.035		0.365	0.073	0.140	0.156	
ECONOMY	0.051	0.038		0.119				0.206			0.229		0.143	
CONTACT	0.037	0.281	0.895			0.168			0.203	0.642	0.419	0.200	0.033	
LEFT–RIGHT	0.077			0.015	0.489			0.570		0.037	0.141	0.034	0.224	0.503

Appendix E: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 6

Appendix E.1

TABLE E.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mode/Mean	SD	Range
EQUAL SHARES	20.04	11.08	3.93 – 36.88
EQUAL CHANGES	20.31	10.50	9.72 – 35.67
SATISFACTION	3		1 – 5
DIFFERENCE	5		1 – 5
INFLUENCE	5		1 – 5
GOVERNMENT	5		1 – 3
IDENTIFICATION	1		1 – 2
PREFERENCE	1		1 – 2
ECONOMY	4		1 – 5
CONTACT	2		1 – 2
LEFT RIGHT	7		0 – 10
EDUCATION	4		1 – 5
INCOME	3		1 – 7
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	41.17	23.09	8.00 – 70.00
EFFECTIVE PARTY NUMBER	10.01	2.46	4.36 – 16.98
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	0.50	0.08	0.19 – 0.61
CLASS FRACTIONALIZATION	0.85	0.03	0.71 – 0.89

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