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The 'Arguments Instead of Intuitions' Account of Thought Experiments: Discussion of The Myth of the Intuitive by Max Deutsch

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*After decades of receiving a lot of attention on the epistemological level, the so-called 'problem of intuitions' is now in the center of debates on the metaphilosophical level. One of the reasons for this lies in the unfruitfulness of the epistemological discussions that recently subsided without producing any significant or broadly accepted theory of intuitions. Consequently, the metaphilosophical level of discussion of the 'problem of intuitions' inherits the same difficulties of the epistemological level. The significance of Max Deutsch's book *The Myth of the Intuitive* is his effort to resolve these problems in a clear and persuasive way. He is not only trying to debunk problems behind the vagueness of the 'intuition-talk' by drawing important distinctions that usually go under the radar in the contemporary literature, but also develops his own account of philosophical methodology. In this paper I will present some of his arguments against the traditional view of intuitional methodology, as well as his own solutions to the presented problems. Regardless of Deutsch's insightful account of the 'problem of intuitions', I find that some difficulties in his own proposal are inherited from the unresolved issues of intuitions on the epistemological level.*

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The 'problem of intuition' in recent years became the center of many epistemological and metaphilosophical discussions mainly because of the rise of experimental philosophy (xphi) and many criticisms raised against the method of cases, i.e. the method of appealing to intuitions elicited by thought experiments as evidence for or against some philosophical theory. The so-called negative program within the xphi got the most attention since their theses are the most challenging ones. In

a nutshell, negative program advances argumentation that intuitions, as used in philosophical thought experiments and hypothetical cases, should not be trusted nor relied on as evidence. This, rather pessimistic view of philosophical practice led to the increasing number of metaphilosophical papers and books as a response to this “restrictionist challenge” (Weinberg et al. 2010). Generally speaking, there are two most developed ways to respond to the restrictionist challenge. The first is to defend intuitions viewed as a source of evidence and the distinctive way of doing philosophy within the analytic tradition. The second is to claim that xphi misconstrue the target of surveys since philosophers are not appealing to intuitions as evidence in thought experiments. Deutsch devoted his book to defend the latter view. The central idea he develops is that it is a *myth* that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence in thought experiments and that this myth needs to be debunked. Therefore, results of xphi’s surveys about untrustworthiness of intuitions as evidence are not troubling if the target of their surveys can be refuted. This is the strategy Deutsch advances as a part of his metaphilosophical account. In addition, he also elaborates his own view that it is arguments, rather than intuitions, that are the basis of any thought experiment and bearers of the evidential force. This is what I will call the *‘arguments instead of intuitions’* view.

I.

The first chapter of the book is devoted to xphi’s theoretical framework and distinction between its positive and negative program, as well as the analysis of results of recent xphi’s studies. Negative xphi program rises worry about the epistemic value of philosophical intuitions due to their susceptibility to the truth-irrelevant factors such as cultural background, gender, order effect, etc. Subsequently, they take a more negative stance toward the traditional philosophical method of appealing to intuitions and argue that intuitions cannot be trusted or relied on in philosophy as evidence. Positive xphi, on the other hand, is advancing more moderate conclusions that do not condemn the use of intuitions in philosophy.

In developing his ‘argument instead of intuition’ account as a way of responding to xphi criticism, Deutsch focuses on the two most discussed thought experiments, Gettier cases and Kripke’s Gödel case. For him, Gettier cases are somehow exceptional in a sense that if there is an appeal to intuitions anywhere in philosophy, then it is in Gettier cases. From xphi’s conclusion regarding intuitions, i.e. that not everyone shares Gettier’s intuition, it follows that, contrary to the established view in the last 50 years, Gettier has not refuted the JBT theory of knowledge since intuitions can not be trusted or relied on as evidence. Now, as Deutsch sees it, for this xphi’s argument to work experimentalists must assume not only that (i) philosophers are treating intuitions about cases as evidence, but also that (ii) intuitions are treated as es-

stantial or *only* evidence, which is a much stronger claim. Deutsch argues against both (i) and (ii) and concludes that negative χ phi critique fails to debunk traditional philosophical arguments that “do *not*, in any relevant sense, *depend on treating intuitions as evidence*” (20). In other words, χ phi fails to hit the target.

Deutsch substantiates his central thesis—the *myth of the intuitive*—with empirical and theoretical arguments. As he himself admits, he is doing this without any accepted theory of intuitions, the *no-theory theory of intuitions*, as he calls it. That way he “offers enough without offering too much” (29). The reason for this, according to Deutsch, is that accepting a theory of intuitions is not necessary for asking and answering questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Furthermore, any attempt to develop such a theory involves conceptual analysis of *intuition* in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions which ends up being a very difficult task because, ironically, every proposed analysis of intuition give rise to variety of counterexamples.

This looks like the right diagnosis of the current epistemological efforts to provide any plausible account of intuitions. So while epistemologists and metaphilosophers are endeavoring this futile, hard-to-settle task, Deutsch thinks that the best strategy for asking and answering some crucial questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy is to conduct empirical investigation of the actual practice via analyzing original texts where some of the most influential thought experiments were presented, with no-theory theory of intuitions. The rationale behind it is this:

It offers enough of an account because it allows for fruitful discussion of the argumentative role of intuitions. It offers not too much of an account because it does not invite the potentially endless cycle of counterexample-and-theory-revision endemic to many attempts at conceptual analysis. (29–30)

I am inclined to say that it is questionable whether this is a tenable move. Although I agree with everything Deutsch says regarding diversity of proposed accounts of intuitions, and unfruitfulness of the endeavor of analyzing the concept of intuition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions only for it to become the target of endless counterexamples, there are some problems with no-theory theory approach. Particularly problematic is his claim that “a theory of the (psychological) nature of intuitions is not required for understanding the role of intuition in philosophical argument” (26). The natural questions arise: ‘How can one conduct an empirical analysis with no accepted theoretical framework of the analysandum?’, or ‘How can he or she “recognize an intuitive judgment when he or she encounters one” (29), if they do not have some general insight of what they are encountering?’.

Although Deutsch is calling his no-theory theory of intuitions the ‘*examples-plus-commonality*’ theory, it is far from clear how this would help to answer previous questions because he is never explicit about what those commonalities would be. The most precise he gets is say-

ing that examples he has in mind are those like Gettier cases, where certain judgments about certain hypothetical situation are made, and that philosophers agreed that they are intuitive judgments. And when analyzing sufficient number of these examples, he is able to abstract commonality from them that is “relatively uncontroversial” (31). It seems that for Deutsch to establish the no-theory theory of intuitions and to investigate whether thought experiments are about intuitive judgments, it is enough to find examples where the uncontroversial usage of certain judgments is present.

However, the no-theory theory does assume that we have examples of intuitive judgments about which those party to the debate over their role can agree; that is, these parties can agree that the examples are examples of intuitive judgments. (30)

So, the commonality among those examples is that “examples are all judgments about hypothetical cases and thought experiments” (32).

Difficulty with this approach is that there is so much diversity in what exactly philosophers find intuitive in original examples of thought experiments which results in diametrically different accounts of what intuitions are, and consequently results in diversity of the usage of the term ‘intuitions’. Wide arrays of views of what intuitions are lies between the views that they are *sui generis* states (e.g. Bealer 1998, Pust 2000), inclinations to believe (e.g. Sosa 2007) or simply beliefs (e.g. Lewis 1983, Jackson 1998). Or, if we have in mind views regarding the justificatory status of intuitions, some philosophers hold that such justification is a priori (e.g. Bealer 1998, BonJour 1998) and others argue that it is a posteriori (Devitt 2011, Kornblith 2007). Moreover even the most ‘uncontroversial’ features of intuitions, that of being spontaneous or noninferential, are controversial for Deutsch. He is appealing to Rawls’s method, which supposed to depend on intuitions, and yet Rawls explicitly says that the relevant judgments are our *considered* moral judgments and, therefore, cannot be spontaneous. Consequently, it is difficult to see what is the rationale for Deutsch’s thesis that philosophers are not using intuitions in thought experiments, as he has no clear description of what precisely is that thing that philosophers are not appealing to.

As I see it, Deutsch cannot proceed with his endeavor just by examining thought experiments with no accepted background theory. For instance, if he wants to argue, as he does, that in Gettier cases there is no appeal to intuition that is then used as evidence, it would have to be clear in what *sense* intuition is not appealed to and used as evidence. Is it *sui generis* state, inclination to believe or simply belief or all of the above? So, if he claims that those things some philosophers refer to as ‘intuitions’ are nowhere to be found in original texts, it has to be that he is implicitly assuming *some* theory of intuitions, or at least some characterization of them. And this I find to be one of the methodological weaknesses of Deutsch’s strategy. In all honesty, the attempt to pro-

vide an account of intuitions in order to show that philosophers are not using intuitions would not have better standing. It would be seriously undermined since there is no agreement of what intuitions are, so that would not be helpful either.

II.

For now I will set aside this methodological worry and explore the way Deutsch is arguing for his main thesis in the book, i.e. the evidence claim about intuitions. This is the central task of the chapter 2.

(EC) Many philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence.

According to Deutsch, the reason for this misconstrual of the philosophical methodology and the view that philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence lies in the ambiguity of the term 'intuition' in (EC). To clarify this ambiguity he is advocating the distinction that corresponds to Lycan's (1988) *intuitings/intuiteds* distinction, which he formulates in the following way:

(EC1) Many philosophical arguments treat the fact that certain contents are intuitive as evidence for those very contents.

(EC2) Many philosophical arguments treat the contents of certain intuitions as evidence for or against other contents.

The difference consists in the following: either it is the *state* of having an intuition or the *content* of the intuition that is doing the justification of some proposition. Deutsch is claiming that a prevailing number of philosophers who are defending (EC) are defending it in (EC1) state-sense, while his stand is that the only sense in which (EC) can be true, is (EC2) content-sense.

When I deny that philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence, I mean to deny (EC1), not (EC2). According to me, very few philosophical arguments treat the fact that p is intuitive as evidence for p itself. (38)

In other words, it can be asserted that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence, if it means that the content of the intuition is used as evidence, not the fact that one finds something intuitive. The step from this claim to the rejection of the xphi's results is very clear. Xphi mishit the sense in which it is taken that philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence. Hence, their criticism does not affect philosophical method and in this misconception lies the myth of the intuitive, concludes Deutsch. He goes on and argues not only that philosophers who are endorsing (EC1) sense are mistaken when explicitly addressing the question of how philosophy should be done, they are also mistaken in characterizing their own methods. Now, Deutsch rightly emphasizes the vagueness among advocates of the method of appealing to intuitions regarding the sense of (EC) they are using. Some philosophers are not clear on that matter. And since this is an empirical question, i.e. whether philosophers use (EC1) or (EC2) sense of the evidence claim, we will

take a closer look at the Gettier case and see whether it can be said that it is a paradigm example of refutation by counterexample or, as some opposition to Deutsch would claim, appealing to intuitions as evidence.

The reader should bear in mind that Gettier cases are somehow specific, according to Deutsch, being an exceptional case where philosophers almost unanimously agreed that standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief is false (this too is an empirical question). Important question that Deutsch is addressing is how Gettier argues against the standard JTB theory of knowledge:

for every subject, S, and every proposition, p, if S justifiably and truly believes that p, then S knows that p.

Deutsch's answer is by "presenting (alleged) counterexamples in the form of hypothetical cases, to the generalization" (42). In other words, Gettier did not use or appealed to intuitions in (EC1) sense as evidence against the JTB theory of knowledge in his famous cases. Instead, "Gettier refuted the JTB theory, if he did (...) by presenting counterexamples, full stop. Whether these counterexamples are intuitive for anyone is a separate, and purely psychological, matter" (46). Deutsch further develops his 'arguments instead of intuitions' view by introducing the condition that counterexample has to fulfill in order to be regarded as successfully refuting some theory. Since, obviously, not any counterexample will do, the condition of *genuineness* of the counterexample has to be satisfied. So, the real question that we should be asking ourselves is not whether the counterexamples are intuitive, but rather are Gettier cases genuine counterexamples. Only the latter matters in settling the issue of refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge.

Deutsch's main argument in support of his 'arguments instead of intuitions' view consist of the two following thesis: (i) there is "*no mention of intuitions or intuitiveness of any proposition* in Gettier's presentation" (43)—the 'lack of explicit terminology' thesis as I will call it—and (ii) Gettier refuted JTB theory because his counterexample are genuine—the genuineness of counterexample' thesis. Since both theses require careful reading and precise analysis of original Gettier case, here is the crucial paragraph from his 1963 paper.

But it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job. (Gettier 1963: 122)

Regarding the 'lack of explicit terminology' thesis, it is true, as Deutsch remarks, that Gettier does not explicitly use the term 'intuition' or its cognates alongside his conclusion that 'it is equally clear that Smith does not *know*' and so makes no explicit appeal to the premise of the form "It is intuitive that there is an F that is not G" (45). Additionally, Deutsch claims that being 'obvious' or 'clear', terms Gettier does use, is different from being intuitive. Those terms usually presuppose

that something is true, not that they are evidence for the truth of some claim. Nevertheless, he admits that the lack of explicit terminology is not conclusive evidence to debunk the myth of the intuitive. However, he then shifts the burden of proof to the opposition to provide the evidence that Gettier does appeal to intuitions in his cases. I do not find this move to be very pervasive, for he must provide some rationale behind this shift of the burden of proof. Not only that in this context the lack of explicit terminology is not conclusive evidence in favor of his claim, it does not contain any reason why the opposition should bear the burden of proof at this point. He has a long tradition of analytic philosophers who, rightly or wrongly, beg to differ so the reason to shift the burden of proof must be more substantiated. It is not like traditional philosophers were not aware that Gettier did not use the term 'intuition' explicitly. They did, and nevertheless continued to argue that it was the intuition about cases that refuted the JTB theory of knowledge. So, in order to reverse the dialectical situation and shift the burden of proof, Deutsch must present some new reason to do so. Moreover, just because one is not explicitly saying "it is intuitive that there is an F that is not G" in order to be qualified as using intuition as evidence, it does not follow that one is not using it implicitly. Unfortunately, Deutsch does not discuss this possibility in any detail.

III.

Deutsch is devoting a substantial amount of space to account for the second thesis, namely to develop an account of how Gettier refuted traditional JTB theory of knowledge, i.e. what makes Gettier cases and all similar thought experiments genuine counterexamples. Deutsch's opposition would address this matter by appealing to the intuitiveness of Gettier's counterexample, arguing that intuitions provide evidence for the refutation of the JTB theory of knowledge. Deutsch thinks this view is mistaken and argues that Gettier presented an argument of why his Smith character does not know. So, Deutsch's answer to this "evidence-for-the-evidence" question, to use his own words, is *arguments*. The conclusion of the Gettier argument is stated first: "it is equally clear that Smith does not *know*" (Gettier 1963: 122), and premises are presented after the semicolon, "for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job" (122).

At this point, Deutsch is presenting Jennifer Nagel's (2012) view, as the representative example of the opposition to the claim that Gettier presented explicit arguments in his cases. She argues that Gettier did not offer any account of knowledge in terms of necessary conditions (including one that would exclude justified belief that is luckily true), which Smith fails to satisfy, and so he is not explicitly stating why

Smith does not know that (e) is true. It is important in this discussion to emphasize that this is not 'either-or' choice. Namely, not all philosophers would argue that Gettier cases are only about intuitions as evidence, and not at all about arguments, as Deutsch seems to indicate in several places. For instance, Malmgren (2011) explains the way that argument is based on intuitive judgment in the Gettier case:

Let the 'Gettier judgement' be the intuitive judgement that I (and many with me) would make about this case, if asked the appropriate question—a judgement that we might express by saying: 'Smith has a justified true belief, but does not know, that someone in his office owns a Ford.' And let the 'Gettier inference' be the inference by which we get from this judgement to the belief that the target theory—the theory that knowledge is justified true belief—is false. (272)

Now, both Deutsch and Nagel's views are results of careful reading, word by word, and analysis of the original text. And yet, they cannot agree on whether Gettier appeals to intuitions or to arguments as evidence against the JTB theory. Nonetheless, they both agree that neither is presented in explicit way. How can we solve this dispute? Since it is not explicitly obvious that Gettier presented only an argument, and it is not explicitly obvious that he appealed to intuition, is it possible that this matter comes down to what seems intuitive to whom? It seems to me that it does, although this is not something Deutsch would agree on. In other words, this dispute is a matter of whether it seems intuitive that Gettier presented an intuitive counterexample, or it seems intuitive that he presented only an argument.

This is something along the lines of what Deutsch considers as a possible problem for his own account, namely the possibility that arguing for his 'arguments instead of intuitions' view as evidence in hypothetical examples, simply delays the question of the real 'evidence-for-the-evidence', and that carrying out reasons or arguments has to stop at some point. And at some point intuitions would enter anyway as regress stoppers at the end of evidential chain. So, even if the Gettier's counterexamples are not presented in terms of intuition as evidence, at some point the end of the chain of evidence for why counterexamples refuted traditional JTB theory of knowledge, or why they are genuine, lies in intuition. Deutsch recognizes this as the relocation problem and devotes chapter 3, 4 and 5 to account for it.

Deutsch rejects the proposed possibility and claims that it is never about intuitions but, rather, about *more arguments*. If Deutsch's opposition would insist that "it cannot be arguments all the way down" (122), and that, as the answer to the 'evidence-for-the-evidence' question, intuitions must come in at some point, Deutsch replies that "arguments [are] further down than the myth of the intuitive would have us believe" (123) and that evidential levels or chains of reasons are finite, as well as philosophical texts, and at some point must come to an end. That is why every argument takes at least one premise for granted—which Deutsch calls *philosophical starting points*—and im-

portant methodological note is that they “need have no special phenomenological or epistemological features” (124). In a nutshell, for Deutsch, regress stoppers are not intuitions viewed as ‘rock bottom’ evidence, but rather philosophical starting points, which are taken for granted, are not unified, and vary among philosophers.

I find this argument somehow problematic since he seems to be advancing the double standard of what qualifies as regress stopper. First he accounts for philosophical starting points and claim that “nothing unifies the claims that get taken for granted”, that “different philosophers have different starting points, and the starting points are as heterogeneous as can be (124)”. But later argues that “‘judgments about philosophical cases’ [i.e. intuitions about cases] names too heterogeneous a class for every judgment in the class to qualify as foundational in the sense required by foundationalist solutions to the regress problem” (127). In other words intuitions are too heterogeneous to be regarded as rock bottom evidence. But on the other hand, vaguely described ‘philosophical starting points’, which are a matter of choice for philosophers according to Deutsch, and are also not unified in any substantial way beside the fact that they are the “un-argued-for premises in a philosophical argument” which “need have no special phenomenological or epistemological features”, can count as regress stopper (124). As I see it, either there is no difference between intuitions (or intuitive judgments) and Deutsch’s description of philosophical starting points concerning this matter, or the difference between the two is very sophisticated.

Deutsch analyses the possibility of intuitions being regress stopper via foundationalist criterion of what qualifies something to be a foundational judgment. In this regard he considers two possibilities, basic perceptual and self-verifying judgments, and dismisses the possibility that judgments about cases, i.e. intuitive judgments, could qualify as either of the two. First, I am puzzled as to why Deutsch dismisses the possibility of intuitive judgments being self-verifying judgments without any further explanation. Or the way that perceptual judgments are not heterogeneous in a sense that intuitions are. Second, Deutsch argues that intuitions cannot be unified on the ground of being spontaneous or noninferential judgments, but gives somewhat dubitable explanation of why this is to. Namely, Deutsch thinks that intuitive judgments might seem as nonreflective, or spontaneous, or noninferential because we are taking the wrong perspective on thought experiments. The inventor of any given thought experiment “took a considerable amount of ingenuity, careful thought, and inference” (98) to arrive at the judgments which are then often described as intuitive. This claim seems to be controversial on several levels, but I will focus just on one of them. I think it is wrong in this context to assume the correctness of the first person perspective, because the amount of work and careful thought one invested in constructing the thought experiments is beside the point. What is relevant here is whether such thought experiments

elicit nonreflective and noninferential judgments, which are then used as evidence. Whether thought experiments elicit intuitions and the amount of work philosopher has to do in order to construct them are two separate questions. And the amount of careful thought and effort that is putted in their construction does not say anything of whether they elicit intuitions. And to additionally claim that Gettier himself, for instance, did not intuit that Smith character does not know requires some empirical confirmation, which Deutsch does not provide.

Third, it is doubtful whether Deutsch's account of philosophical starting points would pass this foundational criterion that he imposes on intuitive judgments. And if intuitions, as heterogeneous group, must pass such criterion, so should Deutsch's heterogeneous group of philosophical starting points. It seems that Deutsch is willing to accept un-argued-for premises in philosophical arguments, and if he does not explain why the latter is acceptable while the former is not, I do not see any substantial difference to justify his rejection of intuitions. Moreover, it does not seem plausible to maintain that these un-argued-for premises in philosophical arguments need not to have epistemological features, as Deutsch argues. The chain of epistemic reasons of the given argument end in those premises, so they certainly have to have some epistemic merits. My point is that if intuitions are too heterogeneous group and cannot be unified in a way to qualify as evidential starting points, the same should apply to the Deutsch's proposal of philosophical starting points, which are also heterogeneous group. The difference should be elaborated in more details, especially since he does not discuss the way that intuitions are heterogeneous—which can be ascribed to the fact that he does not have a theory of intuitions. It could be that Deutsch is not evaluating philosophical starting points via foundational criterion, but instead appeals to the possibility of coherentist solution to the regress problem. He is proposing solution to the relocation problem in term of hypothetical claim:

(...) if some form of coherentism about inferential justification is true, then it is something other than resting on rock bottom evidence that justifies our inferences. Some premises are justified not by inference from further premises but instead by their coherence with other premises—if coherentism is true, that is. (127)

Deutsch is maintaining that if coherentism is true, then the demand of foundational justification could be avoided. Unfortunately, Deutsch is not arguing that coherentism is true, nor is he providing any reason why we should accept his coherentist solution rather than foundational one, so his 'arguments instead of intuitions' account of thought experiments is still facing the relocation problem. Furthermore, Deutsch is trying to make it immune from problems regarding the truth-irrelevant factors that (supposedly) affect philosophical intuitions.

Truth-irrelevant variability in the intuition that *p*, where this is understood as variability in whether different groups of people have or lack the intu-

ition that p , will not matter in the slightest. If there is a cogent and compelling argument for p , then p may perfectly well be regarded as true and taken as evidence for or against the truth of other, related propositions. (75)

If we agree with Deutsch that in thought experiments philosophers are not using intuitions, but rather arguments as evidence for p , then it follows that philosophers are not very proficient in argumentation, or that they simply refuse to accept a good argument for the truth of p . If cogency and compellingness of argument for p is all that is needed for p to count as true, then either we have very few such arguments—which would be very unfortunate since philosophers do that for a living—or there is something else that prevents philosophers to accept something to be the evidence for or against some theory. For if a philosopher sets forth an argument for p , and given the fact that philosophers do not agree about much else beside the fact that traditional JTB definition of knowledge is false, then our ability to construe a good argument is very poor. Of course, pervasiveness of arguments, or the absence of it, can lie at the philosophical starting points, which are very heterogeneous group, as Deutsch argues. But this would not be an accurate interpretation of argumentative practice among philosophers since more often than not these starting points are taken for granted among the opposition, and philosophers proceed evaluating and rebutting the arguments.

There is one more important thing that should be stressed regarding Deutsch's claim that arguments in thought experiments might elicit intuitive judgments, but that those do not have any evidential strength. Additional arguments, that support those intuitive judgments do.

Judgments about thought experiments can be given argumentative support, even if the judgment is intuitive. Arguments for the truth of some intuitive judgment are arguments that reveal that the content of the judgment may qualify as evidence (...). (75)

No defender of the intuitional methodology would deny that intuitive judgments elicited by thought experiments are not often reinforced by supplementary arguments. The disagreement is whether the former has any evidential force.

As I see it, we are faced with two horns of a dilemma: either philosophers have different intuitions or they are bad in argumentation. I would argue that the latter is less preferable option. For one thing, variability in intuitions existed in philosophical discussions even before the arrival of the $xphi$ and that did not present any problem. For instance, internalists and externalists regarding the problem of justification in epistemology, just to mention one example, engaged in their exchange of arguments in spite of having different intuitions as starting points. That did not present any problem for the ongoing discussions or exchange of arguments. If any of the thought experiments should count against the externalism and reliabilism, it should have been the Lehrer's Truetemp case (1990) and BonJour's Norman

case (1984). If those thought experiments really are arguments used as evidence for internalism and against reliabilism, as Deutsch is suggesting, why philosophers did not unanimously reject reliabilism as a false theory? Is it because those are not very good arguments or not well construed thought experiments? These would be the only viable options if we accept Deutsch's view that thought experiments are not about intuitions. However, this certainly is not the accurate verdict since no one would argue that those are not good thought experiments. So the plausible explanation of the continuance of the disagreement would be the difference in philosophers' starting intuitions regarding the concept of justification. I am puzzled as to why these variations did not present any problem until xphi conducted surveys which revealed that folks do not share philosophers' intuitions. In other words, philosophers were fully okay with not having same intuitions with each other, but fully concerned about their methodology when realizing that folks are having the same variation.

And although Lehrer's Truetemp case is a good thought experiment that received a lot of philosophical attention and is substantiated with additional arguments against externalism, there are still a vast number of externalists. This is a good indicator that essentially it all comes down to the initial intuitions philosophers have as a starting point. And philosophers are ok with diversity in that respect. But I do not think they would be ok with the other horn of a dilemma, namely that there are no good arguments in philosophy, or that they do not accept a good argument as evidence for p even if they see one.

As we can see, the trouble with intuitions is on both sides of the camp. Epistemological and metaphilosophical accounts of intuitions are, in one way or another, flawed and the level of obscurity and ambiguity in using the term 'intuition' is deeply troubling. Consequently, any attack on intuitions and intuitional methodology stands on equally troubling grounds. It is not enough simply to argue that philosophers are not using intuitions as evidence in their philosophical texts on the ground that one simply does not find any appealing on intuitions in thought experiments, or that philosophers do not explicitly use the term 'intuitive'. What is needed is some plausible empirical analysis of it. And it seems that empirical analysis comes down to intuitions, or what philosophers would say Gettier cases are about, intuitions or arguments.

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