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William O. Peterfi

University of Minnesota, Morris

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Findings on Disarmament

WILLIAM O. PETERFI
University of Minnesota, Morris

ABSTRACT — The author proposes a critical appraisal of current disarmament plans and their implications in present international affairs, especially, the 1964 draft treaties of the United States and the Soviet Union calling for a general and complete disarmament. By comparing and evaluating these two plans, the author hopes to prove his thesis that although disarmament is part of the overall peace effort, the attainment of disarmament will not necessarily establish peace. On the contrary, before any actual and feasible disarmament can be achieved, there must be established a peaceful international climate conducive to a general and complete disarmament.

Part One

"To disarm or not to disarm," is the question that might rightfully be asked by a latter day political scientist-, military expert-, statesman-, or just common man-turned Hamlet. Of course, the original question posed by the first Hamlet, "To be or not to be," is as relevant today as it was in the Shakespearean drama. Moreover, to many people the two questions comprise the real issue regarding the future of mankind: "If you do not disarm you simply will not be." Others would develop this idea to its logical conclusion by saying that mankind will not survive unless peace is established throughout the world and to establish peace the nations must disarm. Thus, the argument goes, disarmament is an absolute prerequisite to peace; there can be no peace without disarmament. Whether or not this line of thinking is correct is discussed in this paper.¹

The scope of disarmament can be divided into two dis-

The author holds the Doctor of Law and Political Science Degrees from Budapest University, 1950. Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in International Politics, Yale University, 1958-59. Visiting Scholar in Politics, U.C.L.A., 1959-60. Visiting Fellow in Politics, Princeton University, 1960-61. Between 1961-1965, he held teaching assignments at various colleges; since September 1965, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Morris; he is currently working on a book, entitled, *Peace Without Disarmament*.

¹ Because of the very extensive literature on disarmament, no attempt is made here to present even a limited bibliography. However, the present paper reflects, among others, the contributions of the following writers: Raymond Aron, Neville Brown, Richard A. Falk, Stanley Hoffman, Saul H. Mendlowitz, and Walter Millis (on war and war prevention); David Frisch, Arthur Hadley, Morton H. Halperin, Louis Henkin, Thomas C. Schelling (on various aspects of Disarmament); and John W. Burton, Grenville Clark, Amitai Etzioni, and Louis B. Sohn (on the prospects of peace).

tinct categories: first, general and complete or comprehensive disarmament; and second, limited arms reduction or control. The first category would include disarmament agreements involving all nations and all types of armaments; nations would be permitted only very limited arms for the maintenance of internal order by internal security forces. The other form of disarmament, limited in its scope, would consist of attempts at local agreements between two or more nations and would include only partial armaments limitations.

In a general and complete disarmament plan, which would be accomplished in various stages leading from less to more drastic and radical measures, all nations would adhere to a single treaty. General and complete disarmament is based on the assumption that there is an arms race which is general in its scope² among the present international community of major and lesser nations. Thus, since nations do not live in isolation, a military build-up in one country stimulates similar measures among its neighbors, and even the neutral nations have no choice but constantly to improve their military posture, and, as a consequence, to be drawn involuntarily into the arms race. Since the neutral nations are not members of military alliances, national self-interest and survival is an individual concern. Most of the present neutral nations have forces well beyond the level sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace and security. It follows from this argument, therefore, that any disarmament agreement to which only a few states accede, such

² An excellent introduction to the study of disarmament and arms control by Bull (1965), establishes a general terminology of the various meanings of disarmament and arms control, and offers a theoretical analysis of the subject matter. For practical purposes, Professor Bull's terminology is used in the present paper.

as the various regional agreements, cannot stop the arms race; nor can disarmament agreements that are limited to only one category, such as nuclear weapons, naval, land, or air forces, for each state will attempt to protect its own national interest and security, and thus will embark upon a weapon increase in the other military areas. In other words, the agreed-upon limitations in one branch of arms will alter the direction but not the pace of the armament race (Bull, 1966: 271).

On the other hand, those who argue in favor of limited arms control say that in the absence of an international climate conducive to general and complete disarmament, at least some limited reduction in arms should be introduced and pursued. It is submitted that general and complete disarmament under the present international conditions would be too big a risk, not only for the smaller nations but for the great powers as well. The lesser risk connected with a limited arms control and reduction, it is argued, would be more acceptable to all the nations of the world. The advocates of limited arms control then present a wide variety of proposals as first steps to a general and complete disarmament: international control of atomic power; the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; the so-called "open skies" proposal for the prevention of surprise attack; the control of fissionable material; and nuclear weapons testing control.

During the some 130 meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee extending over the past years, several plans have been presented, discussed, and rejected by the various participating powers.³ Only one plan has been put into effect so far, the limited nuclear test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963, since joined by some one hundred other nations. This treaty actually has no direct bearing upon disarmament because it does not limit nuclear weapons in any way; it only prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons and devices in outer space and under water.

Part Two

The history of the disarmament movement since the end of World War II can be divided into two periods; the first period between 1946-1959, resulting in a variety of limited arms control and reduction measures, and the second period since 1959, which is characterized by demands for a general and complete disarmament (McVitty, 1964: 1). The shifting emphasis from arms-control measures to general and complete disarmament came in the wake of the great pressure exerted by the lesser powers in the United Nations because of the fear of nuclear proliferation, and culminated in a unanimous decision of the General Assembly of 1959 calling upon governments

³ Most of the disarmament plans have been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, Great Britain, France, and some of the unaligned powers contributed their own proposals. The People's Republic of China made public their plan for disarmament in 1963, well before their first nuclear explosion. Besides the plans submitted by various governments, there are also plans elaborated by private citizens and students of international affairs, the most notable of which is the Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, "Draft Treaty for Establishing World Disarmament" (Clark and Sohn, 1964).

to "make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament" (United Nations, 1964:37). It was during this second period that the so-called "Statement of Agreed Principles For Disarmament Negotiations" (the McCloy-Zorin Agreement of 1961) between the United States and the Soviet Union set forth some general guidelines for a comprehensive disarmament treaty.⁴ The establishment of these "general principles" was the result of the previous American and Russian limited disarmament and arms-control plans. On the basis of the McCloy-Zorin agreement, both countries proceeded to formulate their own draft treaties for general and complete disarmament. The first plans of 1962 have been continuously modified, and the latest proposals of 1964 form the basis of discussion in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Subcommittee at the present. These two plans form the basis of my investigation of the whole complex problem of disarmament here. By comparing the two draft treaty proposals, I will attempt to unfold the basic issues and problems of a general and complete disarmament.

The justification of both the Russian and American plans is the assumption that "war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems" (World Law Fund, 1965: 1 and 29).⁵ To carry out their objectives, both plans call for an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) to work within the framework of the United Nations and to be responsible for the execution of the plans. The plans differ, however, on veto powers: The Soviet plan provides for a veto by any permanent member of the Security Council during the entire process of disarmament. On the other hand, the American plan would "ensure that the IDO and its inspectors would have unrestricted access *without* veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification" (World Law Fund, 1965: 30). To this issue I will return later. With regard to the time-table, the Russian proposal calls for completing the entire process of disarmament in a period of five years and in three different stages. The American proposal, on the other hand, while agreeing to a three-stage process does not have an overall timetable; it has time limits for the first two stages but none for the third, which would depend on the successful completion of Stages I and II. Thus, the Soviet plan favors rapid disarmament on the ground that it might eliminate a period during which violations of imbalances might occur between the participating nations whereas the American de-

⁴ These can be summarized in the following: (a) Disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. On the basis of that the Statement calls for the elimination of armed forces, conventional and nuclear and proposes stages for the implementation under strict and effective international control.

⁵ The complete text of both the United States and the Soviet Union plans are in *Current Disarmament Proposals as of March 1, 1964*, published by the World Law Fund, New York, 1965. Whenever reference is made to either plan, the text will be quoted from this source.

sire for slower progress would be a kind of built-in guarantee against possible violations. The Russian plan calls for an advance agreement to the total program and timetable that would not allow a halt in the process by any nation claiming violation by others. The American plan, to be able to avoid difficulties during the process, advocates the slow approach "by a sort of trial and error" (McVitty, 1964:4).

Both plans agree on international inspection of the disarmament process through the IDO. However, the Soviet plan would exempt from inspection all permissible armaments during the various stages. The American plan differs here from the Soviet counterpart insofar as it includes inspection of not only the armaments being reduced or abolished but those being retained during the various stages as well.

The first stage under the Russian plan calls for the "simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories," the reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments, production of arms, and military expenditures (World Law Fund, 1965:5); only an agreed upon strictly limited number of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, and anti-missile missiles that are located exclusively in their own territory would be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the third stage. The American plan proposes a 30 per cent proportional cut in all types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. In the American concept this approach would provide a greater safeguard for verification of the disarmament process in its various stages than the Russian plan.

In Stage II, the Russian plan calls for further decrease in the military personnel (from 1,900,000 to 1,000,000 for each country) as well as in armaments and production. In addition, "the states parties to the treaty shall undertake to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction" within 24 months (World Law Fund, 1965: 15). The second stage under the American plan would begin "upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date" (World Law Fund, 1965: 46). An additional reduction of 50 per cent of all remaining armed forces and weapons after Stage I is proposed by the U.S. plan, which would also include similar measures for the production of armaments. With regard to nuclear weapons, the American plan provides that the parties to the treaty "would submit to the IDO a declaration stating the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials" (World Law Fund, 1965: 49). These fissionable materials would then be reduced to "minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentage" (World Law Fund, 1965: 49). While the Soviet plan calls for the elimination of foreign bases in Stage I, the United States proposes the dismantling and conversion to "peaceful uses" of certain agreed military bases and facilities, only in Stage II. Finally, the U.S. plan would establish a United Nations Peace Force within the first year of Stage II, after verification of Stage I had success-

fully been concluded. The Soviet plan provides for a similar establishment only during Stage III. Moreover, it actually would not be a separate force but would be made up from the so-called "police units" of the states that would be made available to the Security Council. On this issue there is again a great difference between the two proposals. The argument behind the U.S. approach is that there is no need for police force in Stage I because the nations would each retain enough power to defend themselves against any breach in the disarmament process. The U.S. proposal would begin to build up this police force during Stage II so that in Stage III it would emerge strong enough to possess "sufficient Armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it" (World Law Fund, 1965: 57). The Soviet proposal would build this police force on the basis of "national contingents" that would remain under the command of their respective military authorities. In Stage III, when they would be put at the disposal of the Security Council, the units' command would be "composed of representatives of the three principal groups or states existing in the world on the basis of equal representation" (World Law Fund, 1965: 24-25). The use of a veto by any permanent member of the Security Council would obviously prevent the successful operation of this kind of UN Force as it is envisaged by the Soviet plan.

Other features of Stage III of the Russian proposal are complete elimination of the remaining armed forces, conventional armaments, military production, military establishments, and military conscription and training, complete destruction of the nuclear weapons and means of delivery that had been provided for in Stage I. As a consequence, the nations would retain only the so-called police force (militia) equipped with light firearms on a proportional basis as prescribed in the treaty.

The American Stage III is similar to the Soviet's with regard to the elimination of the remaining nuclear and conventional armaments, military personnel, and production, but it also calls for the complete dismantling of the remaining military bases.

On the important question of financing inspection and control by the IDO during the three stages, there seems to be no great difference between the two plans. It would be financed proportionately by all participating nations. The sole difference is that the Soviet plan calls for an advance assessment of the scale of payments by the nations whereas the American plan would allow the IDO nations to determine the scale.

The amending process of the plans further illuminates the difference between them. According to the Russians, any amendment would require a two-thirds majority of the Conference, which is the larger body of the IDO comprising all states to the treaty and includes the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States would leave determination of the amending process until after the treaty had come into force and when the parties "would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the treaty" (World Law Fund, 1965: 58). Throughout the various stages, the

U.S. plan provides that any differences in the interpretation of their treaty proposal be subject to referral to the International Court of Justice.

Part Three

Both plans, it appears, leave unsolved three major problems, all of which must be solved if disarmament is to be a success: first, the difficulty of having all nations accede voluntarily to a disarmament plan; second, the lack of a necessary guarantee of security to all nations during the various stages of actual disarmament; and, third, the overall problem of the nature of a disarmed and warless world. On all three of these issues, neither plan offers convincing and satisfactory approaches and guarantees.⁶

Both disarmament proposals provide for a mechanism, the International Disarmament Organization (IDO), that would become a part of the United Nations, and would include as its members all the participating nations. In the Russian plan, this membership feature is necessary because the treaty, before going into effect, must be agreed upon and ratified by all participants. In the American plan, membership would become a requirement only in Stage II and could not be undertaken until "all militarily significant states had become parties to the treaty" (World Law Fund, 1965: 29).⁷

Of course, not all nations of the world are presently members of the United Nations, and this fact alone suggests the enormity of the first problem. Since, according to both plans the principles of the UN Charter would be applicable, those nations denied membership will not be willing to adhere to any disarmament plan unless admitted to UN membership and allowed to participate in the preparation of the final draft. Consequently, a draft treaty prepared and adopted by all present member nations of the UN would have to be modified to be acceptable to those nations which are not members.⁸ The provisions of the present draft treaties inviting all nations to join will probably be unsatisfactory to those which have had no influence in preparing it. Thus, the first step in disarmament should start with the reorganization of the present United Nations.⁹ All the nations of the world should be

⁶ Marion McVitty reached similar conclusions in her evaluation of the two plans by proclaiming that "the disparity between the two official disarmament plans is less important than the mutual failure of the two governments to complete them" (McVitty, 1965: 40). What makes both plans unacceptable and unworkable is basically the lack of provisions for the definiteness of the state of affairs in the international community of nations in a so-called "disarmed and warless world."

⁷ Neither plan identifies what is meant by "militarily significant states."

⁸ Hedley Bull objects to the present bilateral approach of disarmament negotiations and proposals between the United States and the Soviet Union. He argues that if, for example, France and The People's Republic of China would participate in disarmament discussions it would perhaps be easier to achieve progress (Bull, 1965: xxxviii-xxxix).

⁹ John W. Burton in his *Peace Theory-Preconditions of Disarmament*, questions the whole concept of the UN, by proclaiming that the Charter "does not reflect the concept of peace," because it proposes the elimination of war through the peaceful settlements of disputes and provides collective action against

admitted to UN membership. The problems of the People's Republic of China and the divided nations of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam should be settled.¹⁰ Clearly, any disarmament plan would present unsurmountable difficulties if these nations did not participate in the preparation of it. Under both of the present plans, the IDO will be responsible for the execution of the disarmament process. Thus, all nations participating in disarmament will have to become members of it. The IDO is supposed to be put under the control of the United Nations and if states presently non-members of the UN would join in general and complete disarmament, a conflict of interest might very well arise out of the membership in the IDO and non-membership in the UN.

Another problem arises out of the absolute control through the veto power, of the Permanent Members of the present Security Council. It is very likely that unless this veto power is abolished, the middle and lesser powers of the world will be reluctant to trust their future to the good will of the super-powers. The American suggestion of a two-thirds majority rule in all stages of the disarmament process would more likely be acceptable to these powers. Also, the U.S. proposal for the settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice would increase the feeling of security of the lesser participating powers. But the vagueness in design and the basic differences in approach in the two plans with regard to admission of states to the IDO makes both plans totally inadequate even before actual disarmament could be attempted.

Now, even assuming that the membership and veto problems have been eliminated by a more realistic approach acceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union, there still remains a second problem, the supervision of the various Stages and the guarantees against possible violators. Perhaps one of the greatest problems of any disarmament plan will be the question of the detection of violations and the punishment of violators at any given step of disarmament.¹¹ Both plans agree on strict inspection and "enforcement" of the entire disarmament process; nevertheless, the ways and means of detecting a violation and determining punishment differ so profoundly as to make both systems wholly unworkable.

aggression, "both of which presuppose as inevitable a state of circumstances in which there cannot be a condition of peace." Burton, 1962: 131.

Among the many critics of the United Nations advocating a general reorganization of the UN, the contributions of Clark and Sohn are outstanding. The importance of the reorganization of the United Nations and the inclusion of all nations which are presently outside of the UN is being proposed as a first step in the establishment of peaceful international cooperation among nations by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn in their major work: *World Peace Through World Law*.

¹⁰ A short, very thoughtful, analysis of the implications of China, especially since her nuclear capability, is found in Arthur S. Lall's article, "The Political Effects of the Chinese Bomb," in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1965: 21-24. The general aspects of China in contemporary world affairs are discussed by Morton Halperin in his *China and the Bomb*.

¹¹ A profound analysis of the problem of control is presented in the standard study on *Strategy and Arms Control*, by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin.

If any nation would succeed in evading the fulfillment of any part of disarmament, this could lead to the overthrow of the existing balance between the nations. As Arthur T. Hadley pointed out:

Since the critical function of arms control is first to stabilize the balance of terror and then to reduce the elements in the balance itself, current arms control and disarmament proposals can be examined to see whether they contribute to this goal. The question is not, Does an arms control plan effectively "disarm" a nation? but, Does it make all-out war less likely, or reduce the destructiveness of any war that might occur? If it does not, or if it leaves the situation basically unchanged, the plan is neither in the national nor in the world interest. (Hadley, 1965: 72)

As mentioned above, according to the U.S. plan any detected violation would bring that particular stage to a complete halt while the violation remains uncorrected. It appears that under the U.S. plan, the only means for the correction of a deliberate violation would be the force of world opinion. In the Russian plan, depending upon the nature of the violation and the state involved, action could be taken or prevented by the use of the veto. Thus, the abrogation of the draft treaty at any stage by any major nation would probably stop the disarmament process and lead to a renewal of the arms race.

A common feature of both disarmament proposals is the very vague and negative character of the so-called disarmed and warless world. If the Soviet draft treaty is carried out, no nation would be able to wage war and the relations among nations would be completely controlled by the United Nations. However, the plan does not provide any concrete means for the solution of international disputes which might arise after the attainment of general and complete disarmament. War, as a means of national policy, would be outlawed and all disputes would have to be settled peacefully in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. A police force, established by the IDO and controlled by the Security Council, would maintain international peace and security. However, the Russian concept of international police force, based upon the national police forces (militia) and controlled by the three groups of nations, the East, the West, and the Unaligned Bloc, would obviously render this IDO force inoperative. The international police force proposed by the United States does not seem much better in this respect. The U.S. draft treaty calls for an independent international police force under the United Nations which would have real power after the completion of disarmament. This force could be used any time whenever the United Nations members and the Security Council so decide. However, as long as the veto remains, its use would be very limited, if not impossible indeed.

The peaceful settlement of international disputes in a disarmed world would remain unsolved (Hedley, 1961: 73-77). It appears that the conduct of international affairs would in a way be built upon a "balance of national power" rather than based upon "enforceable world law" (McVitty, 1965: 34). Both plans would thus continue the old pre-disarmament international system of the bal-

ance of power, mutual deterrence, and sovereignty of nations. If there is no basic change in the international system, the states will have no reasons to change their attitudes toward it either. In the absence of a definite and workable new system the compliance of nations to the new requirement will rest on the old proven principles of national self-determination and self help. It appears to me that both the United States and the Soviet Union are in a way proposing old cures to old maladies (Millis and Real, 1963: 195-196). However, a word of caution is due here, especially with regard to the Soviet proposal. Speaking of the Russian approach to the security of nations in a disarmed world, a Soviet expert, G. Andreyev, writing in the Moscow published *International Affairs*, offers the following assurances to all nations:

The very principle of settling the disarmament issue *precludes* (italics mine) the possibility of advantages and privileges to anyone. Once all states disarm, once not a single state has a war machine at its disposal, this will preclude any possibility of threatening the security of any state or group of states (Andreyev, 1961, 6: 7).

In the defense of their plan, the Soviets spare no efforts in letting the world know that "to abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission of Communism" (Inozentsev, 1961, 11: 15). As a matter of fact, another Soviet writer, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, gives a very simplified analysis of the causes of war and the reasons leading to peace:

The only source of a war threat today is imperialism. The states of the Socialist community, the peoples of the neutralist countries and the working people in the imperialist states themselves strive to counteract the latter's inherent tendency to give rise to wars. The balance between the forces of war and of peace now makes it very difficult to start a world war and decreases the probability of other types of wars being launched. As imperialism becomes weaker and the influence of the world Socialist system on international relations increases, the possibility of armed outbreaks occurring will steadily decrease. This makes the task of excluding world war from society a feasible one even before the complete victory of Socialism has been achieved and despite the preservation of capitalism in part of the world. With the victory of Socialism all over the world, the social and national reasons for starting wars of any type will finally be eliminated (Galkin, 1961, 11: 29).

If this above statement has any bearing upon the question of disarmament, it is its conclusion which clearly contradicts the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament in admitting that wars will actually not end after disarmament but only after the victory of Socialism "all over the world." But if that is the Soviet belief then disarmament, at least from the point of view of the non-Socialist countries becomes remote indeed. The ideological differences between the West and East appear to be too wide to dispel the basic mistrust between the two groups of nations.

In conclusion, then, the reasons why the present U.S.

and USSR disarmament proposals are inadequate to achieve their proposed goal might be summarized as follows. First of all, because of the ideological split among them the present division among nations would not disappear in a disarmed world. The Soviet system of disarmament takes full cognizance of this fact by providing equal joint control of the international police force by the Unaligned, the Western and the Eastern bloc of nations. In this regard, the Russian concept is much more realistic than the American plan, which does not want to recognize such basic divisions of the world. But these very divisions preclude a workable agreement. Thus, as a first pre-disarmament move, the creation of an international climate conducive to disarmament is essential. The present pending issues, such as the German Peace Treaty, the divided nations, the reorganization of the United Nations, the admission of all nations to the UN, the veto in the Security Council, nuclear testing, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, overpopulation, economic aid to underdeveloped nations, technological sharing and the opposing military alliances in the world must be solved before any serious attempt at disarmament can be made. The present concepts of the nations-state system, sovereignty, and national self-determination of nations, must be reappraised and the rule of law in international relations established.

In the final analysis peaceful cooperation among nations can be established only if the nations really want to disarm and live in peace with each other. If the Soviet Union and the United States cannot reach an agreement on the admission of the People's Republic of China now, if they are not capable nor willing to agree on a peace treaty with Germany, it seems absurd to envision the feasibility of an even more difficult general and complete disarmament and peaceful cooperation among nations afterwards.

As the two mightiest nations of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in the establishment of a world without fear and suspicion. If these two nations could eliminate the presently existing mistrust towards each other and propose feasible solutions of the outstanding issues of international politics, the confidence of the lesser nations in their leadership and sincerity could become a most valuable down-payment to an eventual general and complete disarmament.

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