What is "absent" in drug engagements?

imagination and the digital everyday living of young people with active drug use

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Preface

Stephan S. Sieland's PhD dissertation investigates the role of imagination and its relation to digital technologies in the everyday living of persons with active drug use. Based on empirical investigations with young adults, the study offers a theoretical-analytical framework (including a systematic rethinking of the concept of imagination) which enables in-depth insights into how the development of young people's imagination through digital everyday living engages them and keeps them engaged in the use of drugs.

The dissertation has been developed in the PhD program Social Psychology of Everyday Life. As an autonomous piece of work it is on the one hand engaged in its own research problems, interests and unique ways of developing knowledge and insight; on the other hand it contributes to the development of an emerging field of psychological research: the social psychology of everyday life. Research in the PhD program Social Psychology of Everyday Life investigates psychological phenomena as they unfold in person's everyday, social, cultural and material relations. The program builds on transdisciplinary developments of theory, knowledge and methodology rooted in research problems of societal life and connected to the everyday life of people. In this way the program is distinguished by a problem-orientated and transdisciplinary approach to social psychology in a broad sense.

To reflect on the significance of imagination in person's practice of everyday living has a long tradition in psychology, however it became nearly forgotten with the increasing dominance of the experimental statistical psychology in the 20th century. In recent years the situation is in transformation: A variety of different approaches including cultural-historical activity theory, discursive psychology and cultural psychology are systematically rethinking imagination and its central importance in human life. Stephan S. Sieland's project is embedded in this movement building on sociocultural and sociomaterial critical psychology and a body of interdisciplinary work ranging from praxis philosophy, anthropology, literary studies to Science and Technology Studies. Sieland roots his rethinking of imagination in a theory of action. This enables him to overcome a de-contextualized and individualistic notion of imagination and to develop a theory, which conceptualizes imagination as a central dimension of human subjectivity and agency, and as a process which unfolds not only in social and cultural, but also in material and digital relations. On this basis the thesis opens up new understandings of the activity of drug use: By showing how drug use is an imaginative and materially mediated activity, forming part

of the drug users' premises and engagements, it points a way to overcoming the dichotomies of agency that are so prevalent in the field.

This dissertation is a thoughtful piece of work offering a number of impressively thorough conceptual-empirical analyses that uniquely contribute not only to the psychological study of drug engagements and its internal relation to imagination and digital technology, but also to psychological studies of everyday material relations in general. The thesis synthesizes previously not interwoven theories with original empirical material, collected and analyzed by applying novel, creative and integrative methods. This facilitates to develop a highly engaging academic contribution, whose conceptual innovations not only call for further epistemic imaginative development of psychological theory and its premises, but also of its qualitative methodological potentiality.

Charlotte Højholt, Morten Nissen and Ernst Schraube
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Content

Acknowledgements

Over the past three years I have had the amazing opportunity to learn, explore, travel, write, read, discuss and engage in other activities that make research be research. I have had the support of many people who have made it possible to do serious work on topics that I am curious and passionate about at the same time. I am incredibly indebted to these people, and here is a huge thank you to you for being part of giving me a very privileged and unique time and experience.

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lucky to have had the supervisory dynamics of what feels like being in the midst of centrifugal and centripetal forces at the same moment.

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Presencing I: Research Problems and Departures

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand." *Albert Einstein*

"The great end of art is to strike the imagination with the power of a soul that refuses to admit defeat even in the midst of a collapsing world." *Friedrich Nietzsche*

Introduction

This project explores the digital everyday living of young people who are actively engaging in drugs. Questioning what is "absent" in such engagements is spurred by the curiosity about how the young people's *imagination* is implicated in their development of drug use and drug-related problems. If the imagination is somehow implicative in drug engagements its workings may not be completely present, visible or accessible in concrete drug-taking practices. I take it to be *absent*. Present is the consumption of the drug and the seemingly addictive, dependent and compulsive behavior patterns it causes. But addiction and dependency cannot possibly be what lures young people into experimenting with drugs in the first place. So, what did? And does this "what" continue to play a significant role in subsequent developments in drug engagements? In this project, the young people are not primarily regarded as "addicts". They are first of all approached as *persons* who are actively and constantly dealing with hopes and dreams in their living which drugs become a part of. To explore this perspective, I will argue, we need ask what is imaginatively "absent" in their present engagements with drugs.

The "absent" in the project title also refers to a scientific absence: the basic assumption that imagination has not been a well-researched topic neither in drug and addiction research nor in psychological theorizing and research practice. I will argue that the role of imagination in our daily living needs to be accounted for and conceptualized more thoroughly in psychology. The imaginative processes of relating our present here-and-now to absent then-and-there's are crucial for conducting our everyday living. Without the ability to create expectations, anticipations and hopes, we would be lost in the eternal immediacy of a continuous present. Without the ability to imagine the thoughts, feelings and imagination of distant and significant others, our social relations would be devoid of empathy, mutuality and joint ventures. Without imagination, our living would lose all animation and exuberance; and we would lose our ability to avoid, overcome or endure pain and suffering.

The investigated relation between imagination and digital everyday living in young people's drug engagements is embedded in wider socio-techno-historical transformations. Late-modern conditions have changed our every-

day living, infesting it with the dialectics of uncertainty and possibility. The technological development of media has been a driving force in these transformations. Today, the ubiquity of digital media and their exhaustive capacities of making present what would otherwise be absent in our living means that they are relentlessly co-constitutive of imaginative processes, no matter if it regards how we develop anticipations and hopes or how we coordinate our lives with others. In the tension between uncertainty and possibility it becomes a historically specific challenge and necessity to imagine and establish engagements in and across our lives. Due to these transformations, there is a specific historical relevance of researching how the relation between imagination and digital media is also implicated in young people's drug engagements in new and problematic ways.

In both psychological research and drug and addiction research, a basic aim of this research project is to expand our *epistemic imagination* on how to understand how the relation between imagination and digital media is implicated in (drug) engagements in everyday living. More than half a century ago, the philosopher of technology, Günther Anders (1961), asserted that the technological development in/of society has created a new dilemma: a growing gap between the production of technology ("Herstellen") and our ability to imagine its consequences ("Vorstellen"). By aiming at expanding our epistemic imagination, an ambition of this project is to contribute to minimizing that gap.

The subject matter: What is being researched and how?

The research will look at young people's activities with drugs as engagements *in* their everyday living. I will not only look at problematic aspects or approach drug activities as abstracted forms of addiction. Activities with drugs will be explored as concrete engagements in, and in relation to, everyday aspects of the young people's lives. When research is situated in everyday living, there are an infinitude of relations that can potentially be attended to. But the two interrelated dimensions that will be explored in detail are the young people's imagination and digital media. I will look at how this relation is implicated in engaging the young people in drugs; in how it can become a specific problem for them to disengage from drugs; and in how the young people deal with drug-related problems.

By attending to the young people's imagination, they are first and foremost approached as persons who are actively involved in everyday affairs and are working on attaining something in their lives. As a concept, the imagination is therefore deeply rooted in, and not separate from, everyday living. Young people's imagination connects their engagements with social and societal processes, and it connects their present to their past and their imagined futures. The imagination is simultaneously mediated by social processes, by texts, language, signs, and so on, but also by materiality. Digital media have added a new quality to the material aspect of young people's living and co-constitute processes whereby their imagination can be immensely expanded or infiltrated in contradictions. It is because the imagination is not just given in their lives, but has to be developed and worked on, and because it can guide and misguide them in explicit or taken-for-granted ways, that it should attract scientific attention and concern. Drug cultures and practices have essentially been digitized. Digital media have created a new visibility of and accessibility to drug-related presentation, created new means of coordinating drug-related activities, and new means of developing life interests and projects which drugs may become a part of. Not only are they immediately available to the young people – the young people can also construct their digital everyday living in personalized and customized ways which are not foreseeable without qualitative research.

This research will therefore in detail explore and analyze how young people experience how the relation between their imagination and digital media is implicated in their engagements with drugs. The empirical material has been developed through interviews with six young people (16-25y) who are undergoing treatment for drug-related problems. The aim is to understand their engagements and experienced problems in a wider sense than solely related to addiction. A central aim is to generate an analytical understanding of the nuanced and intricate ways in which imagination and digital media are implicated in the young people's developments of drug engagements and problems related to them. A common way of understanding drug problems is to understand it as a problem of agency. I will not entirely turn my back to this, but I will try to explore how such a problem of agency might be related to the two dimensions of imagination and digital media.

The relation of the empirical work to psychological theorizing in this dissertation is a two-way street. The empirical analyses provide detailed understandings of how imaginative processes and digital media in multiple ways

are implicated in establishing everyday engagements with productive and problematic aspects. The concept of imagination is important for psychologies that want to understand the everyday activities and processes of people as in constant movement towards something. The answer to the question of why people do what they do – or do not do – may well reside in what their activities are imaginatively related to and directed towards. Since a concept of the imagination in relation to everyday living of people is not very developed in psychology, thorough conceptual work is needed in order frame the central relations and processes in the empirical material. As well as the unfolding of qualitative empirical research from the perspectives of the young people will take up a significant part of this dissertation, so will a conceptual development of imagination. As I will explain below, I attempt to generate the theoretical and empirical knowledge based on a dialectical approach.

The critical departure from isolated and abstract understandings of "addiction"

Why is research needed that explores how young people's imagination and digital everyday living engage them in drugs? In order to answer this, I need to make the case for a psychological perspective. Psychological research is concerned with understanding problems in people's lives, of how problems develop and how this knowledge creates possibilities for people to overcome their problems. The psychological interest in the drug field is therefore also directed towards understanding the problems that people may experience in relation to the use of drug. Psychological understandings of problems, let alone of psychological processes in general, are far from unambiguous and are constantly under dispute, critique and development in and across the various subfields in psychology. This project draws on a social-psychological understanding of problems as processes situated in the concrete lives of people.

When drug engagements are perceived as problematic, it is not unusual to understand it as a problem of *addiction* or *dependency* where the person has lost his or her control to and is stuck with the addictive powers of the drug. In such a rendition, the problem of "the addict" has been abstracted as a more or less stable condition within the person. This project follows in the footsteps of prominent psychologists in the field who have worked on expanding and concretizing such abstracted understandings of problems related to drugs (see e.g. Alexander, 2008; Davies, 1997b; Orford, 1985; Peele, 1985).

And in the wider field, very few researchers would deny that drug engagements, in their addictive and non-addictive form, are complex activities composed of aspects ranging from biochemistry to culture.

Nevertheless, understandings that go in the direction of the abstracted and individualized still seem to be compelling. An example of this can be found in the newest edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-5). Although the definition in the DSM-5 extends over 20 pages, and concepts like addiction and dependency are resisted, it rests on this basic assumption:

> An important characteristic of substance use disorder is an underlying change in brain circuits that may persist beyond detoxification, particularly in individuals with severe disorders. The behavioural effects of these brain changes may be exhibited in the repeated relapses and intense drug craving when the individuals are exposed to drug-related stimuli. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 483)

It is not idiosyncratic to the DSM-5 to think about addiction as an intimate relation between the subject and an object, where addiction has been 'transmitted' from the substance to the person and the person's brain. This way of thinking is also widely disseminated in societal discourses and in lay self-understandings and prejudice. Even discussions on an epidemic of addiction are raised due to the spread of the 'phenomenon' onto other objects or activities like sugar, sex, internet, exercise, work etc. There is definitely more to it than just addictive properties of a given chemical compound.

Abstracting and isolating the activity and problem to a relation between person (or brain) and drug produces narrow approaches whereby crucial understandings of what engages people in drugs and why it can be a problem to disengage from drugs are missed. First, it foregrounds addiction as a behavior and backgrounds the *person* who is moving in time and space and is directed towards reaching something on short and long term. Second, it precludes that drug taking is accomplished and arranged concretely in the living of the person and can take different forms accordingly. People do not need to be constantly intoxicated or intoxication-seeking. As we will see in the empirical material, drugs are also absent in the young people's living because they are also preoccupied with other things. Even when drug use becomes so generalized and pervasive in everyday living, there is still a developmental history prior to that. And I would argue that in these severe cases, conflicts and problems are always in *relation to concrete circumstances* in that per-

son's living, and not in relation to the abstract circumstances of addiction. Third, abstract and isolated understandings may promote an idea of the addicted condition as total alienation where the relation between subject and object is emptied of the significance that initially brought them together. While I will not deny that the person may feel a degree of alienation, nor that activities with drugs may turn out differently than originally imagined, an assumption in this project is that part of the problem in disengaging from drugs is also related to the significance that made the person engage with them. And a last issue is that when the activity and problem are construed as related to the drug only, it closes off the relation from being mediated by other relations in a person's living, as for instance imagination and digital media.

Substituting drug addiction with drug *engagements*

For all these reasons, I chose to research drug *engagements* over addiction. At first glance, it may look like I wish to dematerialize the relation between person and drug. This is wrong. With the term, I wish to stress that the activity of the person *and* of the drug are united. We can engage ourselves in activities with objects, and objects can be engaging. The locus of agency is not reserved to the person, nor to the drug. Engagement carries the meaning that an activity takes up our attention and we gravitate towards it – much alike what addiction connotes. Being engaged is also its own contradiction in the sense that it engenders and presupposes *dis*engagements. In everyday living this can be a source of conflict when multiple engagements matter to the person. A last important meaning of engagements is that it inherently transcends the immediate relation between the parts that are engaged. The engaging quality emerges from "a promise" of that relation. Today, we know this as, for example, when you are engaged to another person, it promises wedlock. And in old times, a *gage* (or *wage*) could be a promised pay for carrying out work or a performance. In the context of drug use, "the promise" is not money nor matrimony. The engaging quality of the relation between person and drug stems from a (promising) relation beyond itself as well, or from a relation that is yet-absent. Engagements and imagination are intrinsically connected.

Specifying the empirical research problem

An aspect of the criticized abstract understandings, including the DSM-5, also needs to be appreciated. Concepts like addiction insist on a specific problem of agency and subjectivity, or of the person's experienced problems with disengaging or abstaining from drugs. Addiction signifies that people stick to or are stuck with the drug. If people's drug engagements are in conflict with something else, why do they not just quit? Although this project departs from a narrow understanding of this problem as a person-drug relation, it does not shy away from this aspect either.

What this project wants to explore is how such a problem may emerge – not from the drug alone – but also from how the engagements are related to two dimensions of the young people's everyday living: the psychological dimension of their imagination and the material dimension of their digital everyday living. By attending to the young people's imagination, the hope is to create insights into how drugs become engaging and keep on being engaging through their connection to the young people's life projects and self-experimentations. There is a specific quest in doing this as I have already noted. If we generate knowledge about what engages them in drugs in relation to their living, this may provide a wider understanding of why it can be difficult to disengage again. What is it that directs the young people towards drugs in their absence? What are they imagining to attain and resolve through drugs?

The relation between imagination and drug engagements is not approached as a linear process where the engagements lead to problems only. Engagements in drugs may as well be imagined as a solution to a problem, or as facilitating realizations of projects. Imagined solutions and realizations may in relation to other projects or at a later point in life turn out to be conflictual. This project wants to explore how such contradictory processes of imagination emerge, are stabilized and are attempted to be overcome by the young people.

More specifically, the project wants to explore how these contradictory processes are co-constituted by the young people's everyday interactions with digital media. Digital media have become an essential part of how young people live and develop their lives. If technology is merely regarded as a means to an end, their innocence would make psychological research into

their implications superfluous. However, technologies like digital media transform our everyday living in facilitating *and* problematic ways. This is a main reason for why there is a necessity for studying their implications for how drug engagements develop under new digital conditions of society. Research is also needed because these implications are not deductible nor predictable. Due to the technological specificity of digital media, young people have a great amount of freedom in personalizing their activities and in constructing their digital everyday living. The way in which mediated relations, experiences and activities become part of their lives is more labyrinthine than ever before. Digital media are ubiquitous and mobile. They integrate multiple media in a single device. They are increasingly equipped with access to the internet. A major concern is therefore that an immense amount of drug-related and drug-associated material and activities are infamously "one click away" (see Wax, 2002) with potential implications for young people's activities with drugs. This needs to be understood and researched in more detail.

Empirical research questions and how the empirical material has been produced

As this dissertation progresses, empirical and theoretical research questions will be proposed and refined. The development of the empirical research, however, will be guided by following two questions:

> How is the digital everyday living of young people implicated in the emergence of imaginative processes related to their drug engagements?

> How are these imaginative processes implicated in how drug-related problems are developed and dealt with?

The empirical material consists of interviews with six young people, aged between 16 and 25, who at the time of the interviews were undergoing treatment for experienced problems with drugs, mainly marijuana. In the interviews, I explore how the research participants perceive relations between digital media and drugs in their living. In the project, digital media are largely going to be defined by the participants' use of and interaction with technologies that they find relevant. Digital media can include anything from handheld and/or mobile devices like smartphones, tablets, MP3 players and laptops to more stationary devices like desktops, digital TVs and gaming con-

soles. The activities with these media are not limited to an interest in a specific platform or source. The activities can include anything from streaming of music, movies and TV shows, playing games and acquiring information to sharing and exchanging content on online fora and social media. The activities can be online and offline and can, for that matter, also include the coordination of events and even acquisition of drugs. I also hope to get insight into activities that I will be able to imagine in advance.

There are three basic relations between drugs, digital media and imagination that are being investigated in the young people's living. As I have mentioned earlier, drug engagements are not constantly present in the young people's living. They oscillate between being present and absent. I have already indicated, and I will argue for this later, that the relation between absence and presence is fundamental in imaginative processes. I am therefore particularly interested in how digital media co-constitute these processes in the young people's living. I think of this in two ways: 1) that *immediate interactions* with digital media can direct the young people's imagination towards engaging in drugs; and 2) that concrete drug engagements can be directed by something that the young people have been inspired by in previous and *distant interactions* with digital media. In these co-constitutive processes, I am not only interested in the 'content-side' of digital media. I will also explore the material sides of the digital media that appear to be relevant for the participants. The material side can provide insights into how concrete interactions with digital media are structured and carried out in everyday living.

Based in these micro-processes I want to inspect a second relation: if the micro-processes derive an engaging quality and a significance from being imagined as being part of or anchored in wider projects that the young people are in the processes of developing. Drugs can be engaging because the young people imagine to experience the material, intoxicating effects of drugs. But I also want to find out if and how there are other imaginative links which are also engaging. Drugs are material agents. Though, especially because of digital media, where presentations of drugs abound, they are also cultural agents that imaginatively can be built into engagements, projects and pursuits. The focus is, however, not only on digital activities that involve drug presentation. When imaginative processes are explored, digital activities do not need to be overtly related to drugs in order to become co-constitutive of the young people's projects.

Last but not least, the role of digital media in where the young people may experience drug-related problems and in how they are overcome are also explored.

Imagination and digital media in drug research

How have imagination and digital media been explored in drug research? The imagination is close to being an absent topic in drug and addiction research. In one example, the study on the "social imaginary" is synonymous with societal discourses on drugs (Mountian, 2013). In another study, the "imaginary" is investigated as the connection between subjectivity and discursive possibilities of psychopharmaceutical drugs (Jenkins, 2010). Besides underlining that these studies are in their infancy, I also wish to illustrate, with these two examples, the different meanings the concept of imagination or related to imagination can embody and why theorizing is necessary. There is a great amount of work done on the *cultural meanings* of drugs. Although there is an affinity here with imagination, I will argue that people's imagination in everyday living does not entirely map onto that (see chapter 1).

Since not much research has been done on imagination, the relation between imagination and digital media is consequentially missing. The relation between media and drug use is nonetheless a research topic that, among other things, is motivated by the technological development of new digital media and the emergence of the internet. Due to the overwhelming complexity of new digital media, new research in the area tends to zoom in on a narrow aspect of the relation between media and drugs, for instance the significance of a social medium like Facebook. The relation to actual drug engagements is often assumed or truncated as a one-sided, causal relation.

On this topic, I have observed some general lines of inquiry. One line concerns qualitative or quantitative *content analyses*. A connection to actual drug engagements is not researched, but assumed by a discursive frame or amount of exposure to drug-related content (Manning, 2013; Murguia, Tackett-Gibson, & Lessem, 2007; Strasburger, 2010). Another line of research concerns the *impact* of media on drug use. These studies are usually carried out experimentally or controlled, where the main purpose is to understand drug use as an effect of media (Boyer, Shannon, & Hibberd, 2005; Montagne, 2011). A third line investigates the participants' ability to *interpret* and *evaluate* (preselected) drug-related content (McCool, Cameron, & Petrie,

2003; Quintero & Bundy, 2011). Although connections to actual drug use are rarely researched, the studies are underpinned by the implicit assumption that if, for instance, young people can make critical evaluations and judgments, they will also make good decisions. A last line is the growing interest in how the internet and new digital media may assist *therapeutic intervention* (see Gainsbury & Blaszczynski, 2011 for a review).

Since studies like these typically focus narrowly on specific media platforms, they tell us very little about young people's living *with* digital media and how this is related to their engagements in drugs. This relation between digital mediation and concrete drug use is still unclear. As media sociologist, Paul Manning, has pointed out:

> More work needs to be done, particularly of an ethnographic kind, in terms of exploring the ways in which media representations of drugs and the understandings of drug consumption, constructed at the micro-level in the course of everyday life, may intersect. (Manning, 2007, p. 4)

In his follow-up book, Manning (2014) himself has not come much closer in his explorations. The challenge is still relevant. In this project, imagination is proposed as a way of exploring how digital media and actual drug engagements "intersect". By focusing on the digital *everyday living* from the young people's experiences, this project tries to overcome other challenges in the research as presented above. If the starting point for research is specific media platform or/and centers on drug presentations exclusively, we may overlook other important activities with digital media that matter to the young people. And we may overlook how the multiplicity of digital activities become co-constitutive, also in conflictual ways, of their imagination and drug engagements. Structuring the research from the young people's perspectives on their digital everyday living can help to overcome this.

Conceptual developments and theoretical research questions

A prerequisite for constructing and analyzing the empirical material is a conceptual clarification of the core relations that are being investigated. The central theoretical concept of this project is that of the imagination. The imagination is not approached as processes that are fictional and detached from our

living, but as processes that are centrally co-constitutive of our everyday engagements. In psychology, surprisingly little conceptual work has been made on this relation. Recent developments can be found in areas of cultural psychology (see e.g. Tateo, 2016; Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). In chapter 2, I will offer some possible explanations on why this might be the case. The relation between imagination and engagements in our living is the first understanding that needs conceptual clarification.

The next understanding concerns how imagination and materiality are related in engagements. This is a general conceptualization on how imaginative processes are internally related to and co-constituted by our (socio-)material world. Although this theorization is more general in character, explicating the material basis of imaginative processes is intended to help us grasp the implications of digital media as well. The question of how cultural-historical artifacts and semiotics *mediate* imaginative processes is also central in the recent developments in cultural psychology. I will build on this frame and also propose how it can be developed. The inclusion of materiality in psychological processes can be said to be new and old. The subject-object relation, e.g. as relations between stimulus and response or between mind and artifact(s), has a long history in psychology. Conceptualizing the more *complex agency* of materiality and technology, not only as object of *mediation* or *use*, but as objects that have transformative and contradictory implications for human life, is still at the beginning in psychological theorizing (Schraube, 2013).

A third understanding that needs to be developed is the contradictoriness of imagination. This aspect is necessary in order to understand how imaginative processes can be implicated in both developing and overcoming problems in the young people's living. Embracing the processes of imagination as contradictory may be more counterintuitive than the other two relations. At least, it is my contention that imaginative processes in our everyday living are being more appreciated for their creative, problem-solving, productive, innovative and expansive qualities. How they are involved in problematic aspects is less elucidated. In the theoretical chapters I will develop this contradictory tension of imagination in everyday living by conceptualizing the aspects as *expansive* vs. *restrictive*.

The theoretical work of the dissertation is therefore guided by the following research questions:

How can a conceptualization of imagination be developed that:

1. is internal to on-going practices of everyday living?

2. is internally related to materiality?

3. embodies both expansive and restrictive aspects?

The theoretical approach of the project

This project is primarily grounded in psychological approaches that try to understand psychological processes as connected to a person's concrete activities in development and as co-constituted by socio-materially and cultural-historically specific conditions in society. In the conceptual development of imagination, I will draw upon theories from areas of cultural-historical and cultural psychology that have proposed psychological understandings of imaginative processes in everyday living. I will also draw upon central concepts from German-Scandinavian critical psychology – not because it explicitly operates with a concept of imagination, but because it puts the conflicts and contradictions of our activities and subjectivity in everyday living in the limelight. I will also seek assistance from other approaches outside psychology in the theoretical development. A few scholars have, for instance, some very productive contributions to understanding the relation between imagination and materiality. And I will also visit the field of science and technology studies (STS) and dialectical thinkers. In the empirical analyses, different work on drug and addiction research from the fields of sociology and anthropology will be included. So, although the project is anchored in and contributes to psychology, it is also deeply transdisciplinary.

Outlining the chapters and basic steps of the argumentation

The progression of this thesis follows a dialectical structure of knowledge production, with an added twist from the social science studies of John Law. Overall, there are four parts, or acts, of *presencing* and ten chapters. The acts of presencing are a wordplay on the imagination which I describe as being *absent* – both in practice and theory – as referred to in the project title. The thesis procures steps of making that absence present: to produce and present

knowledge about the imagination. Does this sound gibberish? Well, it is not far away from how Law thinks science and knowledge production. As he understands social science, research is always in the process of making relations in our world absent by making others present (Law, 2004, 2007). One of my basic aims is to bring the absent imagination to the scientific present.

The progression of the knowledge production follows a dialectic logic (see also chapter 5). It starts by generating conceptual knowledge about relations in the empirical reality (in the second act of presencing). It then proceeds to examine these relations in their particularities (the empirical analyses in the third act of presencing) in order to a generate fuller, or more precise, conceptual understanding of the original starting point (the fourth, concluding act of presencing). Theory and practice are not *applied* to one another, thereby mirroring one through the other. They *displace* each other in the sense that theory can help us grasp empirical relations which in turn develop and refine conceptual knowledge.

Because the existing research on the relation between media and drug use only constitutes a small subfield in drug and addiction research, I will in the first chapter situate the project in relevant discussions in the wider research field. It will show what discussions the project builds on and also elucidate why the research on imagination and digital media is important. In chapter 2 to 4, I will develop the theoretical framework of imagination in everyday living. The imagination in everyday living is theorized according to principles of dialectics. In chapter 2, I will offer some explanations on why imagination has not had a very prominent position in psychological theory. In chapter 3, I will develop the dialectics of imagination where the first step is to conceptualize how imaginative processes and materiality are internally related in everyday engagements. This means that imaginative processes are co-constitutive of engagements, but also co-constituted by the world we engage in, including materiality. I will argue for an understanding of imaginative processes as distributed between activities of persons and of materiality. Thus, I argue that imagination is not only an aspect of our consciousness – it is also materialized. In the fourth chapter, I build on another principle of dialectics, namely that of contradictions. An undercurrent in the theoretical chapters is the accusation that theories on imagination tend to value imagination for its expansive and creative capacities. By drawing on the contradictory notion of action from German critical psychology – the "dual possibility of action" where agency embodies the possibilities of producing vs. reproducing conditions of living – I offer a reconceptualization of imagination that encom-

passes the contradictory aspects of expansive vs. restrictive processes of imagination.

In chapter 5 to 8, I unfold the analyses of the empirical material. The methodological reflections in chapter 5 serve to bridge the theoretical and empirical work as a mediating glue in the dialectic relation between theory and practice. Through this chapter, the project will become transparent, and the consistency of the project will be qualified. I will also in more detailed form explain the analytical strategies for working with the empirical material. The analyses reconstruct the temporal developments of how the research participants' drug engagements develop from the relation between their imagination and digital media. And the analyses will also go across the individual accounts to explore similarities of and variations in these developmental processes. Although a major line in the analyses is to explore how the relation between the participants' imaginative processes and digital media are implicated in intensifying their drug engagements (chapter 7), I will also show how these processes constantly produce the contradictory aspects of restrictiveness contra expansiveness in their living, i.e. producing and overcoming problems and conflicts. In chapter 8, I will attempt to analyze to which extent and how digital media are implicated in the participants' imaginative processes through which they are trying to overcome current or recent drug-related problems.

In chapter 9 and 10, I will draw the implications of the empirical analysis for understanding drug engagements and the conceptual frame of imagination respectively. Thereby I will finalize the inquiry 'full circle' in accordance with the dialectical logic. The conclusion will reflect upon where and for whom this research may or could have beneficial or relevant implications.

Chapter 1: Premises for Engagements in the Field of Drug and Addiction Research

There are two interrelated lines in this research. One is empirical and the other is theoretical. The empirical exploration of how the young people's engagements in drugs emerge from the relation between imagination and digital media in their living is anchored in wider discussions within in field of drug and addiction research. The purpose of this chapter is to present the discussions that are relevant to the development of this project. The relevance of exploring the two dimensions of imagination and digital media will also be argued for. In order to explore the relation between imagination, technology and engagements empirically, conceptual work is needed, which is unfolded in the following chapters. The conceptual work will dialogue more directly with psychological theorizing and will therefore temporarily depart from the field of drug and addiction research. It is therefore important to open the dissertation by laying out the foundation of the project within this field. The need for a psychological concept of imagination in everyday engagements also emanates from these discussions.

Introducing "premises" and the dichotomies of agency

The project investigates young people's activities with drugs as *engagements*. Engagements stresses that drug consumption implies more than mental states or conditions of *being* addicted. It involves an activity that carries a specific set of significances of how people engage in a socio-material world and living. *Premises* for engagements is going to be a central concept throughout the dissertation and will be treated theoretically in chapter 4. For now, it suffices to say that premises – vs. conditions or determinants – encapsulate those constituents that are included in a person's engagements in order to actualize them. I will use premises as a lens in this chapter in order to elucidate the differences in understandings in the research field of what constitutes activities with drugs. This is not without trouble. In the theoretical tradition that I will draw upon, premises are only premises because the person actively includes them in his or her activities. Premises are therefore also always contextual.

These two aspects do not always map well onto understandings within the field of drug and addiction research. Activities with drugs, especially when categorized as addiction, both practically and theoretically problematize the premises of agency. Autonomy potentially oscillates between the person and the drug, between activity and passivity (cf. Gomart & Hennion, 1999; Keis, Nielsen, & Nissen, 2016). And addiction is commonly understood as the uneven and problematic distribution of agency. The explanations for this – let alone the very ontology of addiction – are not agreed upon and are widely discussed (Fraser, Moore, & Keane, 2014; Keane, 2002; Valverde, 1998). Across the field, understandings of the activities with drugs, or of the premises for taking drugs, have a tendency to establish dichotomies. Throughout this chapter, I will present the dichotomies that this project tries to transcend. But first I will frame the understandings that the project builds on.

The premises for young people's drug engagements that this project brings into question are the interrelated dimension of imagination and digital media. The exploration of digital media contributes to understanding the importance of premises of drug engagements as *mediated*. This mediation takes the forms of *context* and *significance*. Digital media provide new contexts and environments in which drug consumption may occur or be coordinated with others. And young people may engage in drug-related presentations through media which imbues drugs with cultural significance and makes drugs not only material objects but also cultural objects. The study of the young people's imagination as premise intersects with the mediated aspect, but it also extends it. The imagination mediates the relation between the person and the drug, but it also connects the drug engagements with other actual or potential activities in the young people's living. Imagination as premise therefore grounds the research in the *everyday living* where drug engagements hold subjective significances for the young people's actual and imagined everyday projects. This requires an *emic* approach where understandings are generated from an 'insider' perspective of the young people's living and activities – as opposed to *etic* perspectives generated from the 'outside'. To stress that the premises are mediated does not mean that they are purely symbolic. The premises are also explored as mediated by material agencies. Inasmuch as drugs have material effects in terms of intoxication, digital media are simultaneously conveyors of symbols *and* material artifacts and contexts. And imagination is also co-constituted materially (see chapter 3). Last but not least, since the project is also concerned with the potential dilemmas that may emerge in the young

people's drug engagements, the project contributes to understanding how the premises become *problematic* in one way or the other.

In the following I will present the relevant discussion in the research and develop the dichotomies that the project endeavors to overcome. The dichotomies will emerge from, so to say, in between the approaches and models that will be presented. These dichotomies concern understanding premises for drug use as contextual vs. essentialistic; symbolic vs. material; and normative vs. a-normative, in terms of if drug use is perceived and researched as problematic or if that aspect is relativized.

The pharmacological model

Most scholars in the field would acknowledge that drug engagements are highly complex and consist of biological, psychological, social and cultural components. From here, scholars will typically focus on specific aspects in order to contribute to the bigger picture. And thus, they model an understanding of the phenomenon.

The study of the material agency of drugs has been conducted in depth by medical and pharmacological paradigms. Besides breaking down the chemical composition of specific drugs and how they are metabolized by the body and the brain (Johnson, 2011; Latt, Conigrave, Saunders, Marshall, & Nutt, 2009), the *pharmacological model*, as I call it, generally rests on terms that are commonplace, but also contested, within the field of research. The idea persists that the *inherent* capacities of drugs produce various forms of 1) *psychoactive effects* that reward the organism; 2) *tolerance* which means that the organism demands higher quantities to gain the desired effects of a certain drug; 3) addiction and *dependency* where the organism is dependent on the presence of the drug in the body; and 4) *withdrawal* where the body in the absence of a drug is subjected to symptoms of craving and abstinence and/or negative physical or mental responses like pain and sleep deprivation (cf. Keane, 2002). The different abilities of drugs in producing these aspects are scrutinized, categorized and classified in detail (see e.g. Nutt, King, Saulsbury, & Blakemore, 2007), often based on studies of the changes of behavioral patterns of lab rodents. The model that the pharmacological paradigm builds, generates an understanding that material properties of the drug cause addiction and drug-related behaviors.

Neuroscience and the biological disease model

The development of neuroimaging techniques from the 1970's and onwards has expanded the pharmacological model in various ways. The imaging techniques have offered detailed suggestions on how to understand how the interactions of drugs and the brain affect and reorganize cerebral cortices and cellular interactions between neurotransmitters and receptors. These imaging techniques have been applied to both animals and humans. As a model, this resembles the material model of the pharmacological paradigm. However, with the emergence of the neuroscience of addiction, the focus has also shifted from the properties of individual drugs to the material and neurobiological habitat of specific drugs, that is, to how neurotransmitters and receptors that are found naturally in the brain are manipulated and over time reorganized by drugs. The universality of addictive properties of drugs has also been challenged and put in relation to interactions with the neurobiology of the person. This creates a more differentiated picture since the approach is also motivated by questions like why some people cannot stop taking drugs while others can. The physician, Gabor Maté, posits that there is not a single neural "center for addiction". Based on various studies he summarizes three major networks that are involved. Very superficially put: The *opioid apparatus* involved in the regulation of attachment and emotionality; the *dopamine system* involved in incentive-motivation functions and reward-experiences; and parts of the prefrontal cortex involved in self-regulation, especially the orbitofrontal cortex (Maté, 2009). Irregularities existing within these neural circuits even before exposure to drugs have been suggested as reasons for why some people may be more prone to become addicted to drugs than others simply because their neurobiology reacts differently to drugs[1]. Maté (ibid.) further proposes that all forms of addictions share the same brain circuits and brain chemicals – no matter if they involve drug or non-drug engagements.

Although scholars like Maté are hesitant in calling addiction a disease, others have used these and similar findings as evidence for addiction as a neurobiological disease. This idea has especially been promoted by the American National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). Due to the fact that drug-

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[1] Mate (2009) refers to a study on rhesus monkeys (Morgan et al., 2002), where monkeys with less dopamine receptors developed more severe drug use than monkeys with more receptors.

induced changes of neural structures can be long-lasting, addiction is defined as a "chronic, relapsing brain disease" (NIDA, 2014, p. 5). Although NIDA is based in the US, its international significance – and so significance of the brain disease model – should not be disregarded. According to Nancy Campbell (2010), scholar of addiction history, NIDA funds up to 85% of the world's drug and addiction research.

Both neuroscience and the brain disease approach model an understanding of the material interactions between drugs and the neurochemistry of the brain as the premise for drug engagements. The brain disease model particularly specifies an existing or a drug-induced material pathology within given persons' neurobiological makeup as premise. The premise is therefore mainly material.

The ethnographic tradition: Theories from deviance to subculture

The most well-known ethnographic research of drug use has evolved around the Chicago School of Sociology in the 50's and 60's and in Britain in the 70's around the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham. In many ways, the ethnographic approach stipulates the premises for drug engagements in stark opposition to pharmacological and disease models. Taking the research 'into the streets' assumed that in order to understanding drug engagements, the specificities of contexts must be included. But more than that, the relation between drugs and persons is taken to be mediated by social and cultural meanings which persons subjectively relate to through their practices of drug taking. Although the theories of subculture and deviancy flourished from the 50's onwards, their roots go further back both in Britain and in the US. The field of drug research was only a part of these studies and was embedded in the general understanding of, for instance, young people's way of organizing and negotiating meaning, bonds and identity through subcultures as a solution to class inequalities and a resistance against conventional norms (Blackman, 2004).

In the US, the tradition developed over proponents like Robert Merton, Albert Cohen, Howard Becker and David Matza. Merton and Cohen developed their theories on deviance and subculture respectively within a structural-functionalist sociology. Deviant and subcultural activities were therefore explained by and tied to people in lower social classes of society. Becker and

Matza were critical towards this since the theories could not explain delinquent activities of the middle and upper classes in society (ibid).

Although it is disputed to which extent the American sociology of deviance and subculture had a direct influence on the British tradition (cf. Hunt & Joe-Laidler, 2016, p. 468), the research on subcultures continued on European soil through two different initiatives. One was the National Deviancy Conference in 1968 initiated by sociologists and criminologists including among others David Downes, Jock Young and Stan Cohen, and the other one was the formation of the CCCS in Birmingham in 1964 including scholars like Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Paul Willis. Where the premise for subcultural activity in the US was mainly societal, the cultural premise was emphasized in the British tradition. In general, the ethnographic tradition tries to look at the premises for drug engagements in a non-pathological way – or at least move pathology from the interiority of the person onto society – and also it tries to investigate what drug engagements look like from the perspectives and contexts of the drug-using persons. What the studies reveal is that the varying preferences of drugs from subculture to subculture are premised on the values, beliefs and worldviews that a drug symbolizes in the specific subculture more than premised on the material effects of drugs. In his 1975 paper *The Cultural Meaning of Drug Use* Paul Willis illustrates and argues for the primary significance of cultural meanings over material effects of drug use. In his study on hippie drug cultures, he notices how a drug like LSD is seen as key for passing through the symbolic barrier between "straight society" and the world of being "hip" which signifies freedom, lack of responsibility and stylishness. This passage is not intrinsically contained in the drug (Willis, 2006, p. 89). Willis argues that the materiality of the drug provides the key to the passage point – to the *perceived* changes of consciousness – but the significance of what is "passed into" is to be understood by cultural meanings and forms. In analyzing an empirical account of a research participant, Willis concludes:

> He feels *something* has happened, which he supplies a content for. The physiological basis of change could equally be interpreted in a thousand different *cultural* forms. (ibid.)

Although the ethnographic method is commonly connected with anthropology, anthropological studies had a relatively late arrival (in the 70's) at the drug scene (Singer, 2012). The anthropological studies started in the narrow

field of alcohol consumption, but has since expanded to include other drugs. In many ways, anthropology continues to research the cultural premises of drug engagements by providing highly situated and thick descriptions and developing the emic understandings from the insider-perspectives of people's drug use as opposed to the (often) *etic* perspectives in pharmacological and disease models from the 'outside' (Page & Singer, 2010). And recently, anthropological approaches are beginning to take up the concept and problem of addiction more actively (see e.g. Raikhel & Garriott, 2013).

New materialist approaches

Several dichotomies of drug-engaging premises already emerge from the pharmacological and neuroscientific models versus ethnographic approaches. One of the dichotomies that is being established is that the premises are either understood as essentialistic or as contextual. In the first two models, addiction becomes essentialized in the drug and/or in the brain. The ethnographic approaches argue that drug taking is carried out in specific contexts. Another dichotomy concerns the agency of the premise. The agency is emphasized either as stemming from the material composition of the drug and/or brain or from the subjectively experienced meanings that are symbolically mediated by culture. This could also be addressed as a dichotomy of passive/active: are the activities with drugs driven by the person or by the drug? When the present research raises the question of imagination as an aspect of premises, it invites a contextual exploration of drug engagements approached from the emic and the insider-perspectives of the young people. This concurs more with the ethnographic approaches. However, the research also strives to include a material aspect by incorporating digital media as premise and by recognizing that drugs may have marked material effects. In the ambition of overcoming these dichotomies, the research does not try to integrate the approaches in the sense of looking at e.g. the relation between brain scans and context. It contributes to the research approach of new materialist theories. These theories have also recognized these dichotomies and attempt to overcome them. But they approach the material agency as contextualized in 'exterior' socio-material spaces rather than essentialized in the 'interior spaces' of neurotransmitters and receptors.

Indeed, even though ethnographic approaches do include the materiality of the drug, they have also been subjected to the critique that they tend to

downplay the various material effects of drugs in favor of symbolism and cultural meanings. Howard Becker's famous claim that the experience of being stoned needed to be learned, was turned into a joke by a research participant in a study by Pearson & Twohig (2006): "That guy Becker should change his dealer!" (p. 103) – insinuating that Becker's research participants had been smoking some weak grass. Critiques like these have given social scientists a new interest in the agency of materiality. The approach is linked with the general movement of new materialism in social sciences, and it is therefore not only restricted to drug and addiction research. Fraser, Moore & Keane (2014) note that a fertile ground has been produced for this interest since, at the same time, "addiction science is moving away from a view of addictiveness as a quality internal only to drugs" (p. 11). However, the material agency is addressed differently in new materialism. The material agency is not perceived essentialistically and as semi-constant as in the pharmacological model, but as contextual, distributed and in fact as mediated by a multiplicity of agents. The premise is practically a hybrid of various human and non-human agencies, and thus, the intimate relation between drug and brain is opened up and intervened by other mediating material agencies in specific contexts. The approach draws on various theoretical inspirations from STS, Deleuzian philosophy and non-representational theory. STS scholars like Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion have shown how drug engagements, and addiction, are generated and accomplished by "subject-networks" whereby dichotomies like subject/object and active/passive are suggested to be repealed (e.g. Gomart & Hennion, 1999). In a similar way, Natasha Dow Schüll shows how addictive gambling emerges from the relation between persons and the material design of slot machines which is epitomized in her book title *Addiction by Design* (Schüll, 2012). Instead of only focusing on the material transactions between drugs and the brain, scholars like Cameron Duff and Peta Malins draw on Deleuzian and non-representational theories in order to investigate how the significance of context as affective "zones of intensity" is generated by assemblages of drugs, bodies and spaces simultaneously (Duff, 2007; Malins, 2004). The process ontology of such approaches means that addiction is not investigated as a neurobiological *being*, but as a bodily, non-essentialistic *becoming* and *not-becoming*.

The new materialist approaches reintroduce the material agencies into the premises of drug engagements, but it is a premise that is contextually generated from a multiplicity of materialities like spaces, drugs and bodies. While

the approaches are contributing to contextual and distributed understandings of how materiality is part of generating worlds of "strong sensation" (Gomart & Hennion, 1999, p. 221), the mediating significances of drug engagements, as voiced by ethnographic approaches, is backgrounded.

Hence, an emic understanding of people's imagination as premise for engaging in drugs still needs to be researched as part of the contextual analysis of the new materialist approach. The emic understanding may also provide knowledge about how and why people find themselves in the material assemblages of drug engagements in the midst of other everyday activities. The studies focus on the intensities of bodily affects, pleasures and passions generated in drug-taking contexts. However, the non-specificity of material agency and affect renders drug-taking activities as vague flows of materiality, affect and "bodies without organs" (e.g. Keane, 2002; Malins, 2004). Digital media and drugs may both be material agents, but as specific objects, they differ – even though studies have also tried to look at the similarities (e.g. Macdougall, 2012). Another critical point is that drug-taking people are not constantly in these settings. The essentialist model of addiction may provide an answer for why people gravitate towards these contexts due to craving and addiction. Yet, in their absence, the drug-contexts must somehow be *imagined* as a possible and significant present. Exploring how imagination (and digital media) from an emic perspective is implicated in these processes is one of the potential contribution of the present research.

Critical and deconstructionist/reconstructionist approaches

As I noted above, a tendency in new materialist approaches is to re-embrace the concept and production of addiction, although it is framed very differently than the pharmacological and disease models. This relates to another general critique of the ethnographic approaches: that they by and large trivialize the drug-related problems that pharmacological and neuroscientific brain disease models are trying to voice (cf. Fraser et al., 2014, p. 3; Weinberg, 2011, p. 301). Hence, another dichotomy is established: either the premise for drug-taking activities is characterized as problematic, or this normativity is dissolved in the relativity of contextual premises. Reversely, neuroscience has been accused of not sufficiently engaging in critical discussions on the con-

cept of addiction and thereby making its ontology self-evident (Decorte, 2011).

A strand of critical approaches attempts to deconstruct and reconstruct the problem of drugs and addiction. In these approaches, concepts and their ontologies – like addiction, drugs, dependency, craving and withdrawal – which the pharmacological and disease models are accused of naturalizing, are carefully taken apart. Not surprisingly, Foucauldian genealogy and critical discourse analysis form the spine of these, mainly poststructuralist, approaches (e.g. Martin & Stenner, 2004; Valverde, 2002). The contributions range from critiques of the "conventional wisdom" of addiction as a demonic power that has taken the control of the free will of people, over the production of addictive realities by expert and political discourses and professional documents like the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM), to the nuanced picture of the different forms that addiction can take. In a certain sense, the approach expresses an ambivalence towards addiction: on the one hand, the category and ontology of addiction are taken as problematic; on the other hand, the approach is concerned with the actual suffering of people in relation to their drug use.

One theorist who contests the reality of addiction is the psychologist John Booth Davies. Davies proclaims addiction as a myth, voiced in the title of his book from 1992, *The Myth of Addiction*. In the book, he dismantles the demonic projection of addiction by arguing for the relative ways in which, for instance, craving and withdrawal are actually experienced:

> The form taken by withdrawals, their severity, and the significance attached to them by the sufferer, depend on a variety of situational and cognitive factors in addition to straightforward pharmacological effects. (Davies, 1997b, p. 53)

In his follow-up book, Davies analyzes the discourses of addicts and withholds that any supposed shift in the principles underlying the activities of addicts is a myth. Addicts merely acquire a functional way of speaking and thinking when they try to deal with the problems that they encounter from their "unwise use of drugs" (Davies, 1997a, pp. 13-14). That entails moving the attribution of causes of behaviors from oneself onto the drug. In the end, who would find it necessary to admit anyone into drug treatment if they are not speaking of themselves as an addict?! Jokes aside, Davies builds his argumentation on problematizations of agency in general which is synonymous

with the Foucault-inspired contributions. He states that the addiction debate carries the idea that non-addicted activities are free and addicted are somehow not. And this is an impossible distinction to make (ibid.).

But it is not only the ontology of agency that is deconstructed within these approaches. The idea of what a *drug* actually *is*, is also scrutinized. How can we talk about addictive drugs if the ontology of the object is unclear? One source of inspiration comes from the text of Jacques Derrida, *Plato's Pharmacy*. Derrida relates the drug back to the Greek word *pharmakon*, which has the dual and ambivalent reference to medicine and/or poison (Derrida, 1968, p. 70). Helen Keane questions among many other things the 'nature' of drugs. She draws on the definition provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) that a drug is regarded as any substance that, when it is taken into the organism, may modify its perception, mood, cognition, behavior and motor functions (Keane, 2002, p. 18). Keane notes that chocolate, oxygen and water may produce these modifications as well, and she provocatively states that so does a bullet. The conclusion is that the establishment of a natural category of drugs is impossible. It will always depend on an institutional morality and judgment which have to be articulated (ibid.).

This seems to be an overall message from these approaches no matter if it concerns the category of drugs or addiction. Keis, Nielsen & Nissen (2016) thus observe that the field of addiction research is haunted by an "ontological uncertainty" as addiction is viewed as "one historical and culturally contingent way of problematizing people who are no longer recognized as autonomous and responsible subjects" (p. 244). The deconstructionist challenges of the commonsense understandings of categories like drugs and addiction may be seen as a pursuit of getting rid of the concepts all together and deny their ontology. Thereby, the same critique of problem-evasion in the ethnographic approaches could be directed towards the deconstructionist endeavors (Nissen, 2010, p. 231; Weinberg, 2011, p. 305). But in many cases, the reconstruction of the concepts through their historical, cultural, political and technological contingency paves the way for understanding how addiction is institutionally produced with real-life implications. It also provides understandings of how subjects through contingent concepts come to recognize and handle their experienced problems as *problems of addiction*. The ontological reservations, however, can result in an *ethical* uncertainty, too. In the spirit of governmentality, the care and concern for people is expressed in the pursuit of emancipating subjects from the governance of rigid discourse by introducing multiplicity via criticism. Simultaneously, such discourses provide *technolo-*

gies of the self that at times are approached in the pragmatic manner of 'if it works, it works' (cf. Nissen, 2002, 2010). The ontological reservations may thus produce a tension between the ethics of criticism and the a-normativity of pragmatism. The field of drug and addiction research thus struggles to overcome the divide between stigma and taboo[2].

The present project embraces the critical stance of the deconstructionist approaches insofar as it pursues to expand the understanding the problematic aspect of premises beyond an isolated and essentialist bio-material understanding. This does not imply to let potential suffering slip out of sight. But the problematic premise, as models of addiction are committed to designating, is reconstructed as emerging *in relation* to something else besides addiction as such – or, problems of addiction as such need to be understood in as more extensively interrelated with other aspects in the everyday living of 'the addicts'. This *problem-related* notion of premises for drug engagements is based on some fundamental insights provided by psychologist Bruce Alexander. For this reason, I will dedicate some space for his work here.

Alexander continues to use the concept of addiction, but he also deconstructs and reconstructs the concept through historical analysis. According to Alexander, drug or non-drug addictions emerge as a countermeasure to problematic circumstances and are thus related to something beyond themselves. In the beginning of the 70's, Alexander and colleagues built the now famous *Rat Park* as a critical response to the traditional experimental setup with caged rats in drug research. In these studies, Alexander observed that addiction is not drug-induced in rats (as usually concluded), but is related to the rats' isolation and stressful conditions. The Rat Park replicated the natural and social conditions of rats, and Alexander found that the rats in the park under different experimental conditions did generally not exhibit the same appetite for drugs as the isolated ones (Alexander, 2008, pp. 193-195). In his later work, Alexander magnifies these findings to a global perspective where addiction is emerging as a global phenomenon related to the free-market economy in which more and more people are being and feeling psychosocially dislocated (Alexander, 2008). Alexander also deconstructs the concept of addiction more generally. He notes that the medical understanding of addiction is too narrow to encompass the various forms and uses of addic-

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[2] I thank Morten Nissen who brought up this divide in one of our many conversations.

tions present in our society. He circumscribes the engagement at issue as "overwhelming involvement" and reconstructs four ways of using addiction, marked by the subscripts$_{1-4}$:

> Addiction$_1$: Overwhelming involvement with drugs or alcohol that is harmful to the addicted person, to society, or to both.
>
> Addiction$_2$: Encompasses addiction$_1$ and non-overwhelming involvements with drugs or alcohol that are problematic to the addicted person, society, or both.
>
> Addiction$_3$: Overwhelming involvement with any pursuit whatsoever (including, but not limited to, drugs and alcohol) that is harmful to the addicted person, to society, or to both.
>
> Addiction$_4$: Overwhelming involvement with any pursuit whatsoever that is not harmful to the addicted person or to society. (Alexander, 2008, p. 29)

The first way of using addiction, addiction$_1$, concurs with the disease model where people appear to "have lost their *souls*" (ibid., p. 31) to substances. In addiction$_2$, the understanding of addiction$_1$ is mistakenly expanded to identify socially unacceptable forms of involvements, even though people do not need to suffer or be addicted *per se*. Alexander argues that this mix-up still endures in medical and political discussions. The third and fourth forms of addiction are each other's flipsides. They may concern the same kind of involvement that in the third form is harmful, but in the fourth form it is not destructive and can be admirable in a given culture. Alexander invests his work in addiction$_3$ which he considers the globalized form of addiction. It is not limited to drugs. In that sense, it overlaps the modern rendering of the brain disease model which also includes more than just (mis)use of drug. However, Alexander diversifies the involvements of addiction$_3$ whereby he rejects that it can be discerned as a disease. The involvements range on a continuum from mild to severe conditions which diagnostic rules find hard to encompass. In the mild end of the continuum, the involvements may overwhelm the person occasionally for instance as in episodes of 'binging' separated by long periods of abstinence or in certain contexts where drugs are consumed overwhelmingly, but not in others. In the middle range, people may lead a double life where a separation between overwhelming involvements and ordinary living is accomplished. In the severe end, involvements can become too overwhelming and unconcealable (ibid., p. 35).

All in all, this part of Alexander's work strives to show the heterogeneity of addiction without trivializing the problems related to it. The heterogeneity does not get rid of the ambivalences presented above, and maybe it is not Alexander's ambition to do so either, although he seems to present firmer ontological claims than other deconstructionist contributions. In the concluding part, I will sum up how the current research project is situated in these general discussions and how it strives to contribute to them.

Situating the research project in the general discussions

By this presentation of general discussions, I have tried to outline a frame of drug and addiction research which this research project builds on. To summarize, the dichotomies of premises concern premises as essentialistic/contextual; material/symbolic; normative/a-normative. Although it has not been discussed that overtly, the dichotomous agency of passive/active is also centrally at play in the research field.

As a platform for discussing how the project attempts to overcome these dichotomies, we can start by elaborating on the central term which is used in the project. "Drug engagements" has affinities with the term "(overwhelming) involvement" used by Alexander. In the introduction, I have already presented the purposes of using *engagements*. One purpose is to open up the relation between person and drug to more premises which the person as being or feeling engaged to drugs. Related terms, like "drug use", tend to denote isolated activities only directed towards the drug. Still, engagements can transcend the active/passive dichotomy since activities become engaging through their relation to the activities of something else.

Another intention with engagements is to forge a connection to everyday living in relation to which it can acquire different meanings. The meaning behind *overwhelming involvement* helps here. Alexander (2008) draws on Jerome Jaffe who states that involvements become overwhelming when they pervade the "totality of life activities" of the person (p. 50). This promotes an understanding of drug engagements and their possible problematic aspects as related to everyday living. According to Alexander's addiction$_3$, the engagements can even take on various forms in everyday living. Problems related to drugs can therefore also take various forms. Emerging problems can therefore not be designated based on an abstract pattern of behavior. Understanding prob-

lems as related to drugs necessitates an emic perspective from the inside of people's living. If we simultaneously accept the general frame as dependent on how engagements are configured in everyday living, this can be a possible way of how the dichotomy of the essentialistic/contextual can be transcended. Yet, through Alexander it is still not totally clear how to transcend the normative/a-normative dichotomization of premises. When, for instance, overwhelming involvements traverse the boundary between admirable dedication and problematic involvements, it is demarcated by societal and/or individual *harm*. Although the harm descriptions surface in many places of the book, Alexander does not provide clear conceptualization of them. Thus, an ambivalence is still present between addiction$_3$ and addiction$_4$. However, there is a productive element in the ambivalence. It does not prejudge or stigmatize drug engagements from an abstract pattern of behavior. Reversely, it risks falling into relativizing the problem. Essentially, we can take this struggle between stigma and taboo as an expression of the diverse realities that drug engagements can take. From an anthropological perspective, Raikhel & Garriott have expressed this diversity as a tension between self-medication and self-invention:

> Thus, while addiction may indeed at times be an 'unhealthy selection of a chemical solution to discomforting experiences' … it may also be understood as a form of experimentation or invention at the level of life itself. (Raikhel & Garriott, 2013, pp. 27-28)

This project will attempt to deal with this by specifying that engagements have "expansive" and "restrictive" aspects in relation to everyday living (see chapters 4). The ambivalent – or open – approach to drug engagements is thus retained in order to explore how drug engagements become one or the other – or both.

The quotation also embodies the discussion of the dichotomous premise as either material or symbolic when it says that drug engagements can act as a chemical solution and a form of experimentation. The project attempts to transcend this either/or position by exploring the premises for drug engagements as mediated by the internal relation between digital media and imagination. It thus contributes to the re-actualized interest in material agencies which new materialist approaches have refashioned as contextualized and as multiply mediated. And it contributes to the ethnographic approaches that have demonstrated how subjective significances become premise for drug engagements through cultural mediation. However, this project intends to go a

step further. One move is to not just submerge the person in non-specific material relations of drugs and digital media. Drugs and digital media also bring specific and different material agencies into drug-engaging activities while digital media furthermore co-constitute a *mediated* level into the "level of life itself" (cf. quote above). Moreover, the new materialist and ethnographic approaches provide hyper-contextual analyses of concrete drug-taking practices. In order to grasp how drug engagements may become forms of self-experimentation and -invention – to use those words – a perspective is needed that includes how drugs in facilitating and problematic ways are a part of the projects that the young people are actively and constantly engaged in in their living. It is the ambition of this research project to further this understanding by exploring the *technologically mediated imaginations* as premises for the drug engagements of young people.

Presencing II: Theorizing the Dialectics of Imagination in Everyday Living

Overview.

The three chapters of this part of the thesis develop the concept of imagination. It is the first step in the dialectical structure of the dissertation. It sharpens the understanding of the central relations that are to be explored and analyzed in the empirical material. The development of the conceptualization of imagination itself follows some of the main principles in the dialectical method. In chapter 3, the two first theoretical research questions will be worked on: How imagination is internal to ongoing everyday engagements and how it is internally related to materiality. Conceptualizing the imagination as co-constitutive of engagements and as co-constituted by the world that is being engaged in, including materiality, is an argument for seeing imagination as related to everyday living and not seeing it as separated from it or in opposition to it. The internal relation to materiality is further an argument for how imaginative processes are not solely subjective and only emerging within the person. The processes are material as well. This is the foundation for later explorations and analyses of how imagination and digital media are related to and implicated in young people's drug engagements.

Besides internal relations, another principle of dialectics is the principle of contradictions. In chapter 4, the imagination will be conceptualized as contradictory, as implicated in restrictive and expansive aspects of everyday engagements. As I will argue, theories on imagination tend to favor the expansive aspect which is built into their conceptualizations, i.e., how it is involved in processes of creativity and overcoming constraints and conflicts, and less how it is involved in processes of developing problems and conflicts. In order to encompass this contradictoriness, I

will offer a reconceptualization of imagination. The contradictions of imagination will later help to explore and analyze how imagination and digital media are implicated in developing and dealing with problems in the young people's drug engagements.

Before venturing into these conceptualizations, I will first substantiate one of the major claims that this research project builds on: That the psychological theorizing of imagination in everyday engagements has been close to absent throughout the modern history of psychology. I will propose some explanations for this in the next chapter. Based on the scientific problems concerning theorizing the imagination that are highlighted in this chapter, I will argue for the need for thorough conceptual work on imaginative processes in everyday living.

Chapter 2: Where Did the Imagination Go in Psychological Theorizing?

In this first and short introductory chapter to the conceptual work of the project, I will propose some reasons for why imagination in everyday living has been a neglected topic throughout modern psychology. To claim that psychology has not dealt with the imagination is, of course, an act of splitting. In early philosophical foundations for the psychological study of imagination, Kant (1976) and Sartre (1940) have made important groundwork; in Lacanian psychoanalysis, "the imaginary" is part of the ego formation (Lacan, 1996); and Piaget (1999) linked the imaginative to inner, egocentric world of children's pretend play. Imagination in these approaches refers mainly to *inner* processes that to a greater or lesser extent are detached from everyday engagements. A very early contribution to understanding the centrality of imagination in everyday living comes from Lev Vygotsky's paper from 1930. Recent fruitful developments in areas of cultural psychology build on his legacy (Tateo, 2015; Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016) – and in the following chapters, I will also include aspects of this work in the conceptual development. Across these last initiatives, the same critique echoes (with mine) that psychology has become philistine and left the vibrant and aesthetic dimensions of subjectivity and being, like the imagination, out of sight – or at least only dealt with it in a subordinate or fragmented way. In this chapter, I will offer some of the possible reasons for why this could be and argue why we need to move on.

Preoccupation with pasts and backgrounds as premises for actions

Psychology and social sciences have taught us a lot about how people's biographical and social backgrounds become premises for their actions and orientations in life. Psychology has for a long time been concerned with development and upbringing in understanding the person (e.g. in psychoanalysis), with how people's self-narrations affect their way of living (narrative theory), with understanding how memory works (cognitive psychology), and so forth.

So, how we relate to our past, or how the past relates to us, has been, and is, a major explanatory backdrop for understanding the person and his or her actions. Likewise, in social psychology, research has been concerned with explaining "behavior" by looking at social backgrounds and positioning, social hertitage, and other distal or proximal "social factors" lurking in the background of a certain patterned behavior, e.g. group dynamics known from experimental social psychology. Implications of our pasts and backgrounds for our lives have thus been researched extensively. Implications of the *future* are less known. Although the imagination cannot be solely defined as being future-directed, it would not be possible to visualize a near or distant future without relating present activities and experiences with the absent, possible and virtual spaces of the imagination. The imagination may have been perceived of as being too intangible or hypothetic to be subjected to serious science. Or, our ways of imagining, expecting, hoping and anticipating are treated as effects of our previous experiences and only by dealing with these experiences can we change our future-orientations. Orientations towards the future may therefore have been subdued to a bi-product and not given authority on its own premises. Philosopher, Ernst Bloch, observes that perceptions of the individual (psyche) in psychology have shrouded its present in the "twilight pointing backwards" (Bloch, 1976, p. 10, own translation). The individual's present has been seen as overwhelmed by the past. In paradoxical terms, Bloch argues that we need to develop knowledge about the "ontology of the Not-Yet" (ibid., p. 12, own translation), and ontology that is not testable and has not testimony.

In discussing the invisible role of the future vs. history in national identity formation, anthropologist Liisa Malkki sums up the issue quite clearly:

> It is common to see the imagination of the future dismissed as daydreaming, fantasizing, or merely indulging in crackpot schemes; imagined futures deemed insufficiently 'realistic' are likely to be classed as utopian. The term 'utopia', deriving from the Greek word for 'no place', is often understood to refer to a pleasant fantasy with little purchase on 'real life'. History, on the other hand, presents itself as real: it has 'already happened,' we can give testimony about it, we can study how it comes to be made or narrated, silenced, monumentalized, struggled over or legitimated. We recognize that different categorical actors have different histories or different versions of history and its truths. But of the future we can say with certainty only that it does not yet exist – at least not empirically and tangibly. (Malkki, 2001, p. 327)

The imagination, and the future, should not be regarded as antagonistic to the past, background and history. But the *temporal bias* in psychology and social sciences in attributing more determinacy to the "factual" past than to the "fictitious" future may have contributed to the reprimanded position of future-oriented processes and alongside it, the imagination.

Psychology becoming a modern science

The separation between psychology and the imagination also has historical roots. The formation of psychology as a modern science popularly earns homage to the work of Wilhelm Wundt. It has undoubtedly been a confluent process. But it has nevertheless entailed a selection process of central phenomena to be researched and methods to be applied. Scholars who have researched these historical roots imply a divide in psychology "before-and-after" becoming a modern science – a divide at which imagination and psychology parted ways. As psychologist Carlos Cornejo (2015) notes:

> During the first part of 19th century the human sciences … embraced the non-intellectual faculties, primordially *fantasy*. As a consequence, the history of psychology (before its scientification) is indissolubly intertwined with the history of aesthetics. By the middle of 19th century, the introduction of quantification implied the massive abandonment of non-rational human dimensions: vital forces, empathy, tendencies, physiognomic sensibilities, intuition and fantasy, among others. While some of these were still developed in other disciplines – such as the emerging phenomenology and psychoanalysis – some others were radically abandoned. Such was the case of *fantasy*: It was transmuted into an intellectual process of representing and operating on unreal objects in front of the mind's eye – the *imagination*. The connection with vital feelings and aesthetics was lost. (pp. 1-2)

In this sense, the imagination, with its affective and aesthetic underpinning, was "outsourced" to other disciplines including literary theory and aesthetics, while psychology only kept remainders that seemed compatible with new scientific standards, albeit in perverted form. From here, a bifurcation of science and (the workings of) the imagination seemed to develop, although this was not the case before. Tracing these developments back to the works of Aristotle, philosopher Dennis Sepper notes that for nearly 2,000 years it has been accepted that no scientific knowing was possible without imagining:

> Yet, since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, modern science has come to be understood as a methodical rationality taking control of factual experience. As such, it has seemed not to need imagination. Imagination may well be used as a tool for conceiving new possibilities, but it must quickly give way to rational analysis and testing. In the final reckoning, science is indifferent to how and why theoretical and experimental innovations come about; only results count. Imagination is something for artists and children, not for the sober rationality of adults. (Sepper, 2013, p. 2)

So, the development of psychology into a modern science meant abandonment, or dethroning, of the imagination both in scientific processes and in the ordinary psychology in people's living, passions and aspirations. It is also implied that the imagination holds a more central position in other disciplines that psychology tried to break away from and more consistent theorizing is supposedly to be found in philosophy, literary theory, anthropology and aesthetics. Some of these will be drawn upon later in the chapter, although a full review would exhaust the project. The focus here is on psychology as a discipline. It is nevertheless reasonable to assume that theorizations in these disciplines are also truncated forms that suit the specific research area, as, for instance, how the imaginary is implicated in understanding stories and poetry mediated by language (e.g. Iser, 1993)

The imagination as oppositional to everyday life

Certain commonsensical understandings of the imagination, maybe reproduced in psychological theorizing, follow the abovementioned reasons: That the imagination is separated from ongoing practices of everyday living and confined to either less serious or extraordinary domains of existence. The imagination is a joyful lapse into fantasy, daydreaming and the playfulness of fictions from which the person has to come back from in order to deal with real-life tasks, planning and problem solving. If people are unable to return from such lapses or if their contents have become awry or too strange, the imagination may even be seen as implicated in psychopathologies (cf. Phillips & Morley, 2003).

As mentioned in the last quote by Sepper, the imagination may also be seen as privileged the naiveté of children's minds and games or the extraordinary insights and creativity of artists. Again, the imagination is not for the

common person and hers or his quotidian affairs, but is confined to the less obligating practices of play and aesthetics.

These notions resonate with elaborations in early psychology which I indicated in the beginning of the chapter. Freud (1972) attributed fantasy and imagination as governed by the primary processes of the principle of pleasure that over time is taken over by the secondary processes of the principle of reality or of fact. Even if an imaginative move from the not-yet-conscious to the conscious is possible in psychoanalysis, it would be a regressive move towards past constitution of the unconscious. As Bloch has written: "*in the Freudian unconscious, there is nothing new*" (Bloch, 1976, p. 62, own translation). For Lacan, "the imaginary" is part of the formation of the self, directed towards reality, but only the *impossibilities* of the real through images, as "desire", obscuring the real (Lacan, 1996; Žižek, 1997). Piaget (1999) saw imaginative pretend play of children as defying rules of reality that with maturation would be substituted by more objective and logical thinking. Even though there in later cognitive psychology have been more realist comprehensions of imagination (e.g. Byrne, 2016), they still rest on processes that are mainly confined to the "inner spaces" of the psyche.

The confusing part is that imagination *is* part of all these processes. But it is also more than them. Constructive contributions to this dilemma can found in anthropology, where e.g. Arjun Appadurai (1996) argues for a distinction between fantasy and imagination, the former referring to psychological activity not connected to everyday projects and the latter which is internally implicated in them.

Conceptual resistance and obscurity

Yet another reason why systematic and consistent theorizing of the imagination has been impeded may be that generally the imagination is veiled in conceptual vagueness or is used for very different understandings. I will outline three (mutually reinforcing) sources of unclarity.

One of these is probably the most common academic work: across various kinds of scientific work, the same concept is used, although it refers to different meanings. When used, the imagination may refer to the "simple" processes of evoking mental images or mental simulations (cf. Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009); to the creation of counterfactual thinking (Byrne, 2016); to the creation of (language-based) possible worlds (Bruner, 1986); to collec-

tive representations of nationality (Anderson, 2006); just to name a few. Already from this small ensemble, it is a crux to determine a common denominator for scale (from mental to the collective), for processes/functions (from evocation to creation of sense), or for modality (language vs. image).

Another unclarity stems from the use of different concepts for the same processes (that on top of that can end up having different meanings, cf. above). Already until now, different concepts like "the imagination", "the imaginary", "phantasy", "daydreaming", "creativity", and "play" have been employed. Sepper would agree with this confusion when he traces it even further back in history and writes:

> With the imagination, it often seems that there is no agreement at all about its most basic phenomenon and features…At first glance, what Plato called, *eikasia*, what Aristotle named *phantasia*, what the Latin middle ages parsed as various forms of both *phantasia* and *imaginatio*, what we divide into imagination, fantasy, and creativity seem to be basically the same thing – but just a little investigation opens questions and even chasms. (Sepper, 2013, p. 4)

Another aspect of this "word jumble" is the use of concepts that in part are imaginal, like "idealization", "ideology", and "narrative", but where the imaginal component remains implicit. It is quite impossible to understand the operations of the concepts without processes of imagination. If this point is, however, made explicit in the theorizing, the tendency is not to define the imaginal as active processes connected to the person. And it thus becomes indistinguishable from, or subordinated to, the prime concept.

Related to this last point, the final source of unclarity relates to the tendency of referring to the concept, without explicating what processes which are exactly being referred to. Sometimes reasons for this are argued for; other times we are left in wonder. For my own part, a frustrating experience I have had with this "theoretical/conceptual bracketing" was when I discovered the otherwise insightful book by Vincent Crapanzano called *Imaginative Horizons*. In the introduction, Crapanzano (2004) writes:

> While the chapters in *Imaginative Horizons* are all…concerned with the imagination and its frontiers, I do not offer a theory of the imagination. (p. 7)

A lot can be learnt about the imagination from this very enlightening book. But the central subject matter, the imagination, also becomes a wet piece of soap that slides in between "the imaginative", "representation", and "culture"

when one tries to grab it. The same is the case of the origin of "social imaginaries", developed by philosopher Charles Taylor (2004). Although Taylor shortly defines the concept, it pertains same slipperiness. To back up this contention, Sneath et al. (2009) have pointed to the same challenge in anthropological writings on the imagination (encompassing Crapanzano, Taylor, Appadurai, Anderson and others). They argue that "the imagination" has been used in a reminiscent fashion as "culture" once was: As an "overarching template for thought and action – a sort of totalizing backdrop of meanings required for human beings to make sense of the world" (ibid., p. 7). The idea is not to disqualify these otherwise important contributions, but it reminds us of how easily a concept like the imagination becomes synonymous with other concepts if not specified.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to explain how come imagination in everyday living has not been a major topic. The chapter also shows how diverse the meanings of concepts related to imagination can be. The project of developing psychological research based on imaginative processes in everyday living therefore needs detailed conceptual care in order to make clear what processes and relations are to be explored and how.

The approach to imagination in this project is a social psychological approach where imagination is seen as processes that the persons is actively involved in in relation to his or her everyday living. The contributions to psychological theorizing of imagination is to understand the person's imaginative processes as *dialectical*: the person's imagination as internally related everyday living, with a special focus on the material dimension of everyday living; and imaginative processes as inherently contradictory.

The concept of imagination is contested and complex. To develop the research, it is therefore pivotal to clarify and develop the conceptual foundation of the research project in detail: what relations and processes are important, and how can they be researched? Therefore, I could not agree more when Zittoun & Cerchia (2013) write: "imagination, to be better understood, needs to be considered in its specificities." (p. 315).

Chapter 3: Imaginative Processes as Co-Constitutive of Everyday Living and Reciprocated by Materialized Imagination

In the last chapter, I offered some possible reasons for why imagination has not been a prominent theoretical topic in psychology. It also shows why such a theorization is needed. In the next two chapters, a conceptual framework of imagination as process in everyday living will be developed. In the current chapter, I will argue for how imagination can be understood as co-constitutive process in everyday engagements and how it is co-constituted by the world we engage in, with a special focus on the relation to materiality. The theorization is grounded in dialectical thinking where two principles become key: internal relations (this chapter) and contradictions (next chapter). After explicating this in the beginning, the chapter is divided into two parts that respectively cover the co-constitutive and co-constituted aspects. Two lines of reservations pervade the chapter. One is that I claim that theories on imagination tend to favor an *expansive* aspect in their conceptualization. The other is that, although the theories come a long way in understanding how imaginative processes are related to our socio-cultural world (including materiality), I argue that we still need to take a more radical step towards conceptualizing how the agency of materiality is implicated in imaginative processes in everyday living. In order to make this move, we need to go beyond psychology and include concepts that can help us in that direction. Hence, in the second part of the chapter, I will start by analyzing the work of Vygotsky and the recent and comprehensive work by Tania Zittoun and Alex Gillespie. In order to 'voice' the agency of materiality, I will include the work on imagination of Marx Wartofsky and Elaine Scarry. The analysis is highly anachronistic, but it follows the argumentative structure of gradually decentering the agency of imagination from the person towards materiality. In the end, I will propose the concept of the *reciprocation of materialized imagination* as a way of integrating material implications for imaginative processes in everyday living. The contradictory aspect will be unfolded in detail in chapter 4.

Towards a dialectic ontology of the imagination as psychological process

Before specifying processes, aspects and functions of the imagination, the first step is to determine what kind of a phenomenon we are dealing with in order to clarify the perspectives from which the forthcoming analyses take form. As indicated in the last chapter, it is seductive to think of the imagination as highly subjective, privatized, individual. I will argue, not radically for the contrary, but for a dialectical ontologizing. Here, two principles of dialectics will form the ontological ground – internal relations and contradictions – although dialectics is much more than those two. I will start with the first.

Dialectics is normally referred to as a *method* in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, and a foundation of the method is the philosophy of *internal relations* (Ollman, 2003, 2015). Although it is described as part of a method, I interpret internal relations as reality claim, and therefore as ontology. It assumes that things are interdependent of each other through their relation. In contrast, external relation means that things are independent of the relation and would maintain their qualities if the relation were to be altered or even removed (Ollman, 2015, p. 10). The interdependency means that the ontology of internal relations is distributed rather than causal. The thing will undergo changes as relations to other things change, but since relations are *inter*dependent, it will not be one-sidedly defined or determined by the (changes of) relations. In this sense, relations are simultaneously *processes* and not 'factors' or 'entities' (ibid.).

When I inscribe the study of imagination and materiality in a dialectic ontology it is precisely to understand the relation and processes between them as internal. It can help to transcend the proneness of imagination to becoming an extreme case of subjectivism or subjective idealism. In many ways, the ontology of the imagination presented here follows the dialectical analysis of "the ideal" by the philosopher, Evald Ilyenkov. The imagination and the ideal may even overlap semantically. In the book, *The Ideal in Human Activity*, Ilyenkov's mission is to free the concept of the ideal from the jails of either philosophical idealism or materialism and argues for a dialectics of the idealist and materialist entangled in "the ideal". Or, *artifacts* are simultaneously *ideal* and *material*. Ilyenkov argues against the crude opposition "of 'things outside the consciousness' to 'things inside the consciousness', of the 'material' to the 'ideal'" (Ilyenkov, 2009, p. 255). The molding together of the ideal and material happens in the processes of human activity:

> Since man is given the external thing in general only insofar as it is involved in the process of his activity, in the final product – in the idea – the image of the thing is always merged with the image of the activity in which this thing functions. (Ilyenkov, 2009, pp. 161-162)

The idea is never a 1:1 reflection of the thing or the material; it is the translation of the thing into activity-with-the-thing. Simultaneously, the idea emerges through activity that inevitably is submerged in material relations. The same dialectics between the ideal and material goes for understanding the imagination, I would argue. Processes of the imagination are neither to be conceived of as only existing in consciousness; nor are they mere reflections of material relations. They are internally related in activity. Conceptualizing this relation as *process* therefore requires the inclusion of the simultaneity of imagination as being *co-constitutive* of (activities with) materiality and being *co-constituted* by (activities with) materiality[3]. The two parts of this chapter basically covers these two aspects respectively. It should be noted that a background inspiration for this kind of thinking not only comes from dialectics, but also from ways of thinking about the relation between humans and technology in the broad approach of STS. In Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), Bruno Latour has popularized concepts like "symmetry" and "hybridity" (Latour, 1993, 2005) that (arguably) have affinities with internal relations. In principle, concepts like symmetry and hybridity invite analytical strategies not to predetermine sources of actions in heterogeneous relations between "humans" and "non-humans". ANT especially is primarily concerned with the production, distribution, and blocking of *agency*. But what can be learned from this approach in relation to the study of imaginative processes as distributed between person(s) and materiality is that the processes should not be automatically regarded as something that is already in the mind and then refined by the person by drawing in materiality. They should more be attended to as psychological processes that *lie in between* – and emerge from transactions between – the subjective and the material world.

In chapter 4, the theorization of imagination is inspired by the principle of *contradictions* from dialectics. It will be explicitly grounded in the contradictory notion of action from German critical psychology. But I will also briefly present it here. The principle of contradictions in dialectics refers to

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[3] The prefix "co-" emphasizes that these processes are constituted by many other possible relations.

how processes and changes develop from the contradictoriness of a relation or a system. This is opposed to a commonsense notion, where contradictions are applied to *ideas* or ways of thinking about things, relations and the world, but not to the things, relations or the world themselves (Ollman, 2003, pp. 17-18). In dialectical thinking, thus, contradictions are made ontological and are not an expression of 'flawed thinking'. In relation to imaginative processes, I will elaborate this contradiction as *expansive* vs. *restrictive* aspects of imagination. In a nutshell, we can say that the only reason why imagination would develop in an expansive direction is because it seeks to transcend its own restrictiveness; it moves towards problem-solving because of the problems it is implicated in developing. This is abstract and obscure, but I will go into detailed conceptualizations in chapter 4.

The imagination in everyday living I: The absent, the not-yet present, the not-yet conscious, and the not-yet actual

In this section, I will develop the initial conceptual frame of the imagination in everyday living. It is simple and naïve in the beginning, but will be substantiated continuously through this and the next chapter. Based on this frame, I will include other theories which have important things to say, and I will also show where we need to think further. This section provides the first steps for understanding how imagination is *co-constitutive* of everyday engagements – but this will also be unfolded in more detail in the next chapter. The second part of this chapter will conceptualize how imagination is *co-constituted* by materiality in everyday engagements. But first, how can we get a clearer overall understanding of how the imagination is implicated in and related to our everyday engagements?

I will start, and end, by determining the relation in more or less philosophical terms: that the imagination is the activity of *transgressing* something *present* by something *absent*, or reversed, transgressing something absent by something present. This sounds straight-forward – and vague. But I can reveal that a purpose of this mini-conceptualization is that it will be able to encompass both the internal relation to materiality and contradictions. I will return to that. Yet, it is not foreign that the imagination is somehow implicated in processes that involve absence and presence. John Dewey has in a similar fashion written:

> But the experience enacted is human and conscious only as that which is giv-
> en here and now is extended by meanings and values drawn from what is ab-
> sent in fact and present only imaginatively. (Dewey, 1934, p. 272)

Now, imagination does much more than bringing absent *meanings* and *values* into a present. I would argue that it is by the psychological processes of imagination that we not only become sub-jects, but also pro-jects. Our subjectivity not only emerges from being *under-thrown*, but also from being *thrown forth*. This thrown-forth-ness, or *projection*, inevitably happens in movement, in time and space, but it does not itself need to be oriented towards the future. It is multi-temporal. What is thrown forth is anything absent to the present, whether related to the past, (another) present or the future. It is the coming forth of a then-and-there[4] in the here-and-now. The here-and-now is immense because it is inescapably always present. The absent is exhaustive because it is everything else but the present. Absent is the moment we have just left. Absent is the next moment we are moving into.

The *transgressive* relation between absent and present stresses that absent and present interpenetrate and are transformed. From the subjective standpoint of the person, the imagination is the aspect of the present consciousness and activity that is directed towards, transgressed and transformed by the absent. The absent can be one of being and of becoming. Based on what is known, the imagination moves into the yet-unknown, thereby transforming knowledge into a pre-form of knowing. Based on the present, it moves into other actual but absent presences, thereby transforming the present into a fantomic co-presence. Based on the actual world, it moves from the conscious towards the not-yet-conscious and from the already-actual into the not-yet-actual. The imagination is also processes of movement and of fixity. It can inject movement into stagnant thoughts and systems, and it can instill fixity in a moving world – for good or for worse. We can admire people who with great tenacity and sturdiness dedicate themselves to a vision or a cause; we can suffer with those who are filled with anxiety over encountering repetitive experiences or events that have earlier caused their traumas. Imagined absences can be moving. They transform our present feelings and engagements. They can make the difference between hope and despair. And, what is absent to us, can be present and actual for others – even present

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[4] Or the there-and-now, the here-and-then etc.

where *no one* is present, like a home that awaits the presences of its inhabitant(s).

Below these philosophical remarks, imagination is anchored in and has implications for everyday engagements and living. The conglomerate of authors, including psychologists Zittoun and Jaan Valsiner, behind the book *Human Development in the Life Course*, argue for the same:

> A person is not a series of snapshots in time, but a constantly evolving organism, his or her past and his or her future are also constantly transformed – extended, reduced, reorganized, revised. *The development of a person during her life course is also the development of her imagination of her past, future, and alternative lives.* And such imagination has a fundamental role to play in the actual shape that a person's life course will take. (Zittoun et al., 2013, p. 54)

Where I put the transgressive relation between absent/present at the heart of imaginative processes, the book argues that imagination is what merges the AS-IS world with the AS-IF world, as it were, in human living and development (ibid., p. 79). This means that our engagements in life are not only guided or regulated by the here-and-now as-is world, but also by the there-and-then as-if world. The book further explains the guiding/regulating function of the as-if world by pointing out that it structures the present into a field of potential actions, which they call "as-could-be". This field is further differentiated into fields of "as-should-be" and "as-must-not-be". And the transaction between the latter two guides the field of as-could-be:

> The lively imagination about the future (AS-COULD-BE) becomes socially guided in the present through the AS-SHOULD-BE <> AS-MUST-NOT-BE oppositions. (Zittoun et al., 2013, p. 86)

Although the person's relating to the present through the imagination in this understanding is to some degree regulated by moral imperatives, the essence of its capacities is "to make it possible to free our thinking from the straightjacket of the present moment" (ibid., p. 77). The as-if world serves the purpose of overcoming constraints and encountering and handling of options, changes and losses in our lives that demand "examination of possible outcomes, links to past events and alternatives" (ibid., p. 63). It is not pointed out in the book explicitly, but I would argue that there is no predefined dominance in the relation between the present and the absent. In theory, the absent has the power to shape how we engage in and perceive the present, and

the present can equally shape what it is possible, or not possible, or relevant to imagine in the here-and-now.

The lesson taken from this short outline is that the imagination is more than just mental evocations: it is centrally implicated in the person's activities and development. The quotations above are very much minded on the *ontogenetic* role of imagination, as a kind of narrative construction connecting a person's biography to future trajectories. But this is too global, coherent and homogeneous to define imaginative processes. Even in the 'full presence' of social interaction, e.g. a conversation with a friend or a stranger, imagined absences are at work: although the conversation is explicit and on-going, you still imagine how that person feels or what the person is (really!) thinking. If you imagine him or her to be sad, cautious or keeping a secret below the surface, this may shape the way in which you relate to, engage in and develop the conversation. This is just one micro-example out of an infinite number. Imagination is therefore also implicated in the *microgenesis* of engagements (cf. Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, who also discuss a socio-genetic level). The literary critic, Jean Starobinski, sums up this activity-implicative concept of the imagination fairly well:

> The imagination is much more than a faculty of evoking images which double the world of our direct perceptions. … the imagination, because it anticipates and pre-views, serves action, draws before us the configuration of the realizable before it can be realized. (translated in Crapanzano, 2004, p. 19)

The quote zooms in on the microgenetic level, which is important. Yet, we can always discuss if the rendering is still too narrow in establishing a relation between imagination and action as a relation between "realizable" and "realized". Would it not also be possible to think that by imagining something, our mood and feelings change which shape our current engagements? Is what we imagine necessarily a "configuration of the realizable", and will the totality of that necessarily be "realized"? The pairing of absent/present may be less specific, but it is simultaneously wider and can encompass various aspects. Similarly, although AS-IS/AS-IF differentiation, as above, could be synonymous with present/absent, AS-IF connotes a hypothetical reservoir of possibilities and alternatives – which would only be a part of what is absent. All perspectives are important and productive in the sense that they anchor imagination in everyday living. However, for the purposes of this project, it also appears to grounded in a *specific* understanding of imagination: that imagination serves

the role of *opening up* the present to a field of possibilities and thus productively *expand* engagements. Assigning the imagination to the central role of breaking with reproductive dimensions of our living can be traced back to the contributions of Vygotsky, already in 1930:

> However, if the brain's activity were limited merely to retaining previous experience, a human being would be a creature who could adapt primarily to familiar, stable conditions of the environment. All new or unexpected changes in the environment not encountered in his previous experience would fail to induce the appropriate adaptive reactions in humans. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 8)

By maintaining the transgressive relation between absent/present, I will in the next chapter develop the contradictory understanding of imagination in everyday engagements: How it can be conceptualized as being implicated in expansive *and* restrictive aspects of engagements. For now, the initial grounding of imagination in everyday living as co-constitutive in everyday engagements has been presented. In the remainder of the chapter, I will go into more detailed analyses of how imagination can be understood and conceptualized as co-constituted by and internally related to the world we engage in, with a special focus on materiality.

The imagination and everyday living II: Reciprocation of materialized imagination

Where does this "absent" come from if not from a deep inner subjectivity detached from the outer world? We need to answer this question to help us analyze the implications of digital media for the imagination. The theories that are drawn upon so far all perceive the imagination as intertwined with the outer world, no matter if the focus is on the socio-cultural, material or technological world. On closer investigation, however, the understandings of the relation differ slightly. I will start this analytical discussion by first elucidating the conceptualizations provided by the theorists that have already been introduced: Vygotsky and mainly the latest and comprehensive work by Zittoun & Gillespie (2016). These theories have already come a long way. But I will argue that we still need to go even further in order to conceptualize the implications of materiality for imagination. I will therefore subsequently draw upon the work of Wartofsky (1979) and Scarry (1985) who both propose an even

more intimate, or internal, relation between imagination and materiality. As I have mentioned before, I see the argumentative structure of this part of the chapter as following a gradual decentering of the agency and constitution of imagination from the person towards materiality.

Materiality as "crystallized imagination"

In the article *Imagination and Creativity in Childhood* originally published in 1930 Vygotsky proposes a general conceptual frame for understanding the imagination. It is a very early and insightful contribution to a psychological theory of imagination. The theory is based on four stipulations on how the imagination and reality are associated and linked. I will distill the material aspect from these associations. The theory could also be called a circular theory. Elements of the cultural-historically specific world become part of the imagination which creates a new world or product – the latter which Vygotsky also calls "products of the imagination" or "crystallized imagination". But I will analyze these relations in detail.

The circularity of imagination and materiality can be summed up through the first and last association the Vygotsky proposes. The first says:

> Everything the imagination creates is always based on elements taken from reality, from a person's previous experience…imagination always builds using materials supplied by reality. (Vygotsky, 2004, pp. 13-14)

No matter how similar to or remote from reality these imaginative constructions are, their initial elements are always combinations of real elements. Vygotsky takes an example of the "chicken hut" image from a fairy tale by Alexander Pushkin: a hut that stands on chicken legs. The imaginative construction of a chicken hut does not correspond to, or would even defy the possibilities of reality. Irrespective of that its basic elements (chicken legs and a hut) do exist and are combined into the fantastical image of the chicken hut. Even though such images can reach higher and higher levels of complexity (and maybe even seem otherworldly), Vygotsky would claim that they are always products of the combination of elements from experienced reality. According to Vygotsky, imagination is always co-constituted by experienced reality. But imagination also "returns" to the world as a product, or as *crystallized imagination*. This is his last association:

> Once it [imagination] has been externally embodied, that is, has been given material form, this crystallized imagination that has become an object begins to actually exist in the real world, to affect other things. (ibid., p. 20)

It is obvious that Vygotsky is arguing for an internal relation between materiality and imagination. The first two associations account for how imagination is co-constitutive of materiality and co-constituted by materiality insofar as it is included in previous experience. He states that produced objects become real and affect "other things". But how, more specifically, do material objects affect and co-constitute the *processes* of imagination themselves?

Although Vygotsky argues for the imagination as a creative process, it is also important to him to argue for its cultural-historical specificity. He therefore goes on to determine his first *law* governing the operation of the imagination:

> The creative activity of the imagination depends directly on the richness and variety of a person's previous experience because this experience provides the material from which the products of fantasy are constructed. The richer a person's experience, the richer is the material his imagination has access to. (Vygotsky, 2004, pp. 14-15)

Vygotsky first writes that imagination *depends directly* on experience. Later in the text he clarifies that he argues for a "mutual dependence between imagination and experience" (ibid., p. 17). Nevertheless, in the quote, Vygotsky says that experience "provides" the material for imagination. Vygotsky struggles conceptually at this point. And because of that, he almost reproduces a critique that he is trying to transcend:

> Typically, imagination is portrayed as an exclusively internal activity, one that does not depend on external conditions, or, in the best case, *depends on these conditions only to the extent that they determine the material* on which the imagination must operate. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 30, italics added)

Of course, Vygotsky does not totally end up in this trap because he argues for imagination, not as "an exclusively internal activity", because it depends on the cultural-historical richness of experience. That the creative extent of the imagination depends on the richness and variety of experience hangs together with Vygotsky's argument that the cultural-historically specific environment of the person is an "external condition" for the imagination. Hence:

> Creation is a historical, cumulative process where every succeeding manifes-
> tation was determined by the preceding one. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 30)

Overall, it is hard to disagree. Vygotsky illustrates by drawing on the example
of a child born on the island of Samoa possessing the genius of Mozart. The
child would supposedly be able to expand a scale or create more complex
melodies, but it would be incapable of writing symphonies. Vygotsky's im-
plicit assumes what you could call an 'accumulative proportionality' between
the historically enriched and varied environment and creative extent of the
imagination. This makes sense on a historical scale. But how much does it tell
us about the relation between imagination and materiality in the concrete liv-
ing of a person? To be fair, Vygotsky's call for attention to the material envi-
ronment as a "much less obvious, and thus much more important" (p. 29)
condition of imagination, is in itself crucial. His nascent thoughts only get to
take up 1.5 small pages in the text. However, Vygotsky is going in the direc-
tion of conceiving materiality, as crystallized imagination, as having altering
capacities. The material or embodied form of imagination returns to reality
"as a new active force with the potential to alter that reality" (ibid., p. 21).
The question is nevertheless, what about the capacity to alter our imagina-
tion? In discussing the altering capacities of materiality, Vygotsky makes a dis-
tinction between objects of art and of technology:

> "Do they [works of art] not influence our internal world, our thoughts and
> feelings just as much as technical equipment influences the external world,
> the world of nature?" (Vygotsky, 2004, pp. 22-23)

Vygotsky actually attempts to overcome a division between materiality (art)
and subjectivity (thoughts and feelings). Still, he makes a split between ob-
jects: the emotional character of art can affect our inner world, whereas the
practical character of technology affects the external world. So, although
Vygotsky argues for a circularity between imagination and the material world,
he does not overcome a separation between crystallized imagination and im-
aginative processes especially when it comes to technical materiality. The con-
tinuity between imagination and materiality is clearest when it comes to how
imagination is *co-constitutive* of objects with the concept of crystallized imagina-
tion. When it comes to how the imagination is *co-constituted*, materiality – may-
be besides aesthetic objects – is merely at disposal as cultural-historically spe-
cific and accomplished tools.

Materiality as "resources" for the imagination

One of the most advanced and meticulous contributions of recent work on conceptualizing imagination is provided in the book by Zittoun & Gillespie, *Imagination in Human and Cultural Development*. Although it is a lot more detailed than Vygotsky's work, the theory offered by Zittoun & Gillespie mainly draws on his legacy. In this way, their work to a large degree reproduces the problems of the internal relation to materiality that I observe in Vygotsky's theory. As I will argue, even in the advanced contributions of this area of cultural psychology, there is still a tendency of attributing the agency in imaginative processes to the person and obscuring the activity of materiality, or of the environment more broadly speaking. My point of departure is the "looping model" of imagination by Zittoun which she has developed throughout current and prior collaborations (Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016).

Although examples of relations between imagination and materiality are spread out across the book by Zittoun & Gillespie, they also dedicate a shorter, but separate section to the question of materiality. Materiality is placed among other *resources* for the imagination like social representations, cultural elements, other people and past experiences (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, pp. 61-73), and in doing so Vygotsky's general notion of environment is broken down in different aspects. Resonating Vygotsky's circular model of the imagination, resources are placed as part of a "loop" where imagination is connected to lived experience in three ways: it is initiated by "triggers", it draws on "resources", and it returns to reality with a transformative "outcome" (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). The "loop" is used as a metaphor for the whole activity of the imagination that, according to Zittoun & Gillespie, implies a partial uncoupling from, or "looping out" of, the here-and-now, in line with the distinction between as-is and as-if experiences mentioned earlier. Much alike Vygotsky the contents of the imagination are seen as originating from semiotic processes that have previously entered our experiences and are part of our memory:

> Imagination is a semiotic process, and as such, it is enabled by culture. Socialization into a culture provides the individual with the cultural resources with which to dream, daydream, fantasize and explore possible futures. (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 56)

In continuance of Vygotsky, Zittoun & Gillespie conceive of the imagination as intimately interweaved with culture. Even where no specific source can be traced in experience, the imagination would still draw on "hyper-generalized" signs or images (Zittoun et al., 2013, p. 73). What is more, the so-called "loops" of imagination can operate on the interdependence of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic levels, interlinking (possible) acts of the imagination in concrete situations and in a person's life course within wider societal developments. Within these "loops", materiality co-constitutes imagination as one kind of resource among others. It is juxtaposed with implications of other resources, e.g. of the social. In this way, the material underpinnings of culture, signs, social representations etc., are disregarded. The general position of materiality in imaginative processes is as a resource with no distinguishing agency from other social or semiotic resources. Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) give a few examples on how they conceive of this (pp. 70-71). But we do not need to go into the details. The positioning of materiality as resource makes materiality synonymous with the general notion of *culture* which, as a resource, is predominantly referred to as *enabling* the acts of a person's imagination. This predominance is shown clearly in quotations like:

> Cultural elements can be *used* as symbolic resource in acts of imagination, to imagine alternative identities, situation and possibilities." (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 63, original italics)

> Culture offers us further catalysts or techniques to expand our imagination. People can use other people's experiences…or fictions as symbolic resources in order to do so. (Zittoun et al., 2013, p. 62)

Culture is naturally not just enabling. In the next chapter on restrictive aspects of the imagination, we shall also discuss Zittoun & Gillespie's concepts of how culture has borders and how it can also *constrain*. Nevertheless, the co-constitutive relation between the imagination and culture appears to be emphasized in *voluntaristic* terms: how the *person* employs culture as guiding contents and resources for the imagination.

A couple of reasons can be given to defend this emphasis. The first one might be a strong resistance against mechanistic stimulus-response assumptions of the imagination-resource relation. The looping model itself shades a linear input-output model (triggers → imagination → outcome) which Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) would definitely argue against. The re-

sistance against such interpretations can be explicitly detected when they address concerns in research for negative effects of new technologies and TV on the imagination embodied in the question: "Is it [technology and TV] not likely to 'affect' imagination?" (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 64). In answering whether media impoverish or enrich imagination, they pull towards a more nuanced understanding: "it depends what images are seen, by whom, and under which circumstances" (ibid.). Hence, distributing more agency onto artifacts, technologies and culture is hesitated, it seems. Another reason for this position could be that Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) fundamentally assume that the imagination is best understood through its potentially expansive and emancipatory capabilities:

> We believe that imagination is at the core of human freedom and agency, precisely because it allows navigating through these [coercive and contradictory] experiences, reflecting upon them, and defining one's own standpoint and experience. (p. 133)

But do culture and our environments not also affect us? Does culture not also fascinate, compel, capture our imagination as Vygotsky meant art does? Are conflicts, contradictions, dilemmas not also imposed on our imagination and push and pull it in certain directions? In the looping model these "affect"-aspects seem to be embodied in what is called "triggers" of the imagination. Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) propose four potential of such triggers: Ruptures in our lives or common sense (e.g. losing a job or moving country); under- and overstimulation (the mind wanders off or withdraws due to monotonous work or to escape overly stressful situations of pain and torture); task and problem solving (creating, inventing); and voluntary uncoupling (pp. 42-44). There is a varying degree of affect of the environment on these triggers:

> These triggers for imagining are more or less deliberately used by the person imagining, and more or less constrained or demanded by others or the social environment. (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 44)

The circumstantial triggers *initiate* the imagination, which operates on the potential conflicts of *triggers* in adaptive ways – the imagination is not co-constituted as conflictual *itself*. Culture is posited as the resource for this act and is not predominantly considered as a source that co-constitutes the contents and directionalities of the imagination in contradictory, conflictual or

dilemmatic ways. Triggers may entail conflicts, but imagination tries to re-solve them by employing culture as resource in the process.

Everything taken together, Zittoun & Gillespie offer a rich analysis of imagination that is related the socio-material world whether it relates to the resources it employs, the products it produces or the triggers that sets it in motion. But since they operate within an epistemic frame very similar to Vygotsky's, the problems that I raised in relation to Vygotsky still remain.

Imagination as "tertiary artifact"

With the last two conceptualizations, my intention is to radically decenter the agency in imaginative processes in order to voice the materially co-constituted aspects of imagination. As STS-scholars usually attempt to do, I will give ma-teriality a chance to "act back". The aim is to conceptualize a more forged re-lation between imagination and materiality. In this section, I will present the work of Wartofsky who conceptualizes imagination as "tertiary artifact". It is part of Wartofsky's ambition to "resurrect" imagination as part of human praxis – for whatever reason he sees it as dead. Wartofsky does not start his conceptualization in the creative processes of imagination (as Vygotsky), nor in the person and his or her life course (as Zittoun & Gillespie). Instead, he develops his theory from the cultural evolution of *artifacts*. That is why it can be argued that it offers a decentered perspective.

Before explicating what Wartofsky means with imagination as "tertiary artifact" we need to back-trace his argumentation first. Wartofsky (1979) ar-gues for a *historical epistemology* of modes of human perception. His first move is to define human perception as an *outward activity* and not as activity of inner processes. Perception is derived from and directed towards practical activities in/with environments. His second move is to define modes of perceptual ac-tivity as historically variable and not abstract and universal. And third that the production and utilization of *artifacts* are at the heart of these historical dy-namics:

> The *artifact* is to cultural evolution what the *gene* is to biological evolution.
> (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 205)

The genesis of perceptual activity is historical human praxis[5], the activity of producing and reproducing the conditions of living. The distinctively *human* about this activity and praxis is that "human beings do this by means of the creation of artifacts" (ibid., p. 200). Wartofsky goes on to distinguish three orders of artifacts. Simply put for the first two: "Primary artifacts" are understood as tools for intervening in the environment and the skills, conventions, organizations for doing so. Primary artifacts are thus not just understood as material objects, but also as modes of actions *with* the object (cf. Ilyenkov earlier). "Secondary artifacts" are the representations of the production, use and mastery of primary artifacts:

> Primary artifacts are those directly used in this production; secondary artifacts are those used in the preservation and transmission of the acquired skills or modes of action or praxis by which this production is carried out. Secondary artifacts are therefore representations of such modes of action, and in this sense are mimetic, not simply of the objects of an environment which are of interest or use in this production, but of these objects as they are acted upon, or of the mode of operation or action involving such objects. (ibid., p. 202)

Secondary artifacts allow for the preservation and transmission of production and uses of primary artifacts and are pivotal in the cultural evolution and historicity of artifacts. Neither primary nor secondary artifacts are thus neutral: they are objectifications of human needs and intentions in their concrete and represented forms, "already invested with cognitive and affective content" (ibid., 204). That is why, Wartofsky argues, human praxis and perceptual activity are formed by the specific historicity of artifacts. In an extreme example, this goes for perception of the 'natural environment' as well, as opposed to a humanly produced object: "the hunter, hearing a crack of a branch…transforms that very sound…into an artifact…of hunt itself" (ibid., p. 206). Perception and the directionality of activity are closely knit together, co-constituted by a historical constellation of artifacts and material surroundings. Wartofsky here suggests a clear internal relation between subjectivity and materiality. It is not a question of a person having an intention and then

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[5] Wartofsky's use of *praxis* covers how the person interacts with and intervenes in the environment: practical activity (causal efficacy), intentionality (conscious teleology), and physical and organic activity (p. 195). Praxis foregrounds the dynamic cultural historicity of how a person intervenes in the environment as opposed to static universal ways of intervening (cf. Nissen, 2012, p. 37).

goes looking for artifacts as *resources* for actualizing that intention – intentions, as perception and directionalities of actions, *emerge* from artifacts:

> More radically, I would claim that it is in the acquisition of these skills that intentionality or conscious teleology makes its first appearance in the world. (ibid., p. 204)

So, the first-order artifacts are objectifications of intentions and needs as tools and uses; second-order artifacts are the cultural mediations of the conventional uses and productions of primary artifacts; and the historically accomplished materializations of first- and second-order artifacts are the conditions from where perceptual praxis emerges. This model leaves little room for social change, let alone for imagination. That is why Wartofsky introduces a third order of artifacts, *tertiary artifacts*, that at the same time derive from, but are also relatively suspended from the (rigid) objectifications and conventions governing first- and second-order artifacts:

> We may speak of a class of artifacts which can come to constitute a relatively autonomous 'world', in which the rules, conventions and outcomes no longer appear directly practical. (p. 208)

At this point, Wartofsky makes a split between the ongoing and necessary "on-line" activities that involve primary and secondary artifacts, and the relatively autonomous "off-line" activities involving tertiary artifacts that suspend the obligatory needs, praxis and conventions of "on-line" activities. Tertiary artifacts simultaneously suspend *and* derive from first- and second-order artifacts and can be a source of changing or shaping "on-line" worlds. Wartofsky's analysis gets a bit murky in trying to explain how these suspensions and derivations are established.

In my reading of Wartofsky's text, I see two ways of in which suspensions may occur. One involves taking primary and secondary artifacts and suspending them relatively from their practical or representational functions in *actual* praxis. Thus, the artifact of hunting, as Wartofsky writes (ibid.), can be re-enacted in play and rituals where no animal or human is killed or injured (rehearsing, planning) (pp. 207-8). The suspension of actual praxis enables rehearsal and planning. But planning and rehearsals are only possible if they are modelled on and governed by structures and artifacts of actual praxis. Another example within this category of suspensions concerns mundane

artifacts, like a chair. A chair can be transformed into a tertiary artifact by mentally or physically suspending it from its practical function and conventional use. Instead of using it as a primary artifact for sitting, dining, working etc., it can be suspended from them and used as a 'ladder' (extending my height) to grab a book on top of the bookshelf. The suspension in the latter example allows *potentials* embodied in the *actual* artifact to emerge, potentials that are else blocked out by convention. The potentiality of this kind of artifact, can now be conventionalized as a new primary artifact. Thus, tertiary artifacts are the sources of rehearsing for and planning actual praxis, but also a source of transforming it. Tertiary artifacts are only accomplished, however, by emerging from the composition of actual praxis or from the material composition of an artifact, like a chair. I will discuss this emergent relation below.

Meanwhile, there is yet another way in which tertiary artifacts can give presence to potentials in actual modes of perceptual praxis. That is when imaginary or possible 'worlds' are already "embodied in actual artifacts, which express or picture this alternative perceptual mode" (ibid., p. 209). Given that they are *possible*, and not *actual*, means that they are already suspended from practical and representational functions in actual modes of perceptual praxis and thus they are already tertiary. Nevertheless, they embody a "mode of alternative perceptual praxis" (ibid.). It seems as if Wartofsky connects these kinds of tertiary artifacts with aesthetics and arts:

> Once the visual picture can be 'lived in', perceptually, it can also come to color and change our perception of the 'actual' world, as envisioning possibilities in it not presently recognized. (ibid.)

Tertiary artifacts of this kind readily embody a potential mode of perceptual praxis, or embody a "perceptual hypothesis" (ibid). That tertiary artifacts suspend actual praxis is clear. But how they derive from, or are co-constituted by, actual artifacts and praxis is complex, Wartofsky admits. He writes:

> Just as in dreams our imagery is derived from our ordinary perception, but transcends or violates the usual constraints, so too in imaginative praxis, the perceptual modes are dervied [sic] from and related to a given historical mode of perception, but are no longer bound to it. (ibid.)

But how can the "relative autonomy" between derivative processes and suspensions be understood more clearly? What is the co-constituting role of ma-

teriality in these imaginative processes? Wartofsky's readers are also left in an unsolved mystery as he writes: "It remains to be elaborated in a subsequent paper" (ibid.). But let's discuss his seminal ideas. The "off-line" activity, that makes artifacts emerge as tertiary through rehearsal and planning, "depends in its *formal* structures on the practical rules, rituals and modes of praxis which are represented in the 'on-line' models of this activity" (ibid.). The "formal structures" of these kinds of tertiary artifacts are, then, taken directly from the structures of primary and secondary artifacts. They are only autonomous because they are devised in a praxis different to the actual praxis in which they are conventionally and necessarily used. Imaginative processes are co-constituted by the qualities and material compositions of artifacts: the re-enactment of hunt is co-constituted by the tools and conventions of actual hunting; the transformation of the chair into a ladder is co-constituted by the actual quality and material composition of the chair. But it seems as if they only do so to the extent that people actively loosen them from their primary and secondary form in actual praxis. In relation to the artifacts of aesthetics and arts, Wartofsky makes a firmer claim that imagination is *embodied in* these kind of artifacts (ibid.). But would he generalize this notion beyond artistic and aesthetic artifacts? It seems as if he does not. Artifacts are conceptualized as objectifications of *intentions and needs*, already invested with *cognitive and affective content* (ibid., p. 204), but only artistic artifacts directly embody *imagination*. Wartofsky therefore practically makes a split similar to Vygotsky between expressive artifacts (art) and practical artifacts (technology)[6] – although Wartofsky, in opposition to Vygotsky, imbues practical artifacts with a subjective dimension of intentions, needs and affect.

In the following section I will radicalize the conceptualization even more. I will work towards the argumentation that imagination is not only embodied in the material artifacts of arts and aesthetics, but it in materiality in general. I will do this by developing the concept *materialized imagination*. I will also argue for the specific agency by which materialized imagination co-constitutes imaginative processes. For both purposes, I will develop the concepts through the theory by Scarry. And I will return to the core understanding of imaginative processes as the transgressive relation between absent and present.

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[6] Vygotsky, however, would more globally talk about artifacts as "products of the imagination" or crystallized imagination.

"Reciprocations" of materialized imagination

One may wonder why I seek help from Scarry, a literary critic, to address the agency of materiality. The agency of things has been articulated in various ways by STS-inspired scholars, as in the politics of technology (Winner, 1986), objects as evocative (Turkle, 2007), inscriptions in objects (Latour, 2005), technology as materialized action (Schraube, 2009), and even in environmental psychology as affordances of the environment (Gibson, 1979). Similarly, the recently cemented *turn to affect* in social science has dismantled the production of affective intensities as only related to humans and has distributed it across humans and technologies (Clough, 2000; Grosz, 2008; Massumi, 2002; Wetherell, 2012). However, Scarry's book *The Body in Pain* from 1985 can be seen as an early contribution to what has now formed into the approach of STS. And secondly, she explicitly theorizes how imagination is internally related to the production and agency of objects. Let us take a closer look at how.

In her book, Scarry defines objects as sites of two inseparable but not equal counterparts: projection and reciprocation. Projection refers to the 'human' processes of creating and interacting with objects and reciprocation refers to the agency by which the created object recreates the human. She uses the metaphor of the object as *lever* of these activities:

> *The object is only a fulcrum or lever across which the force of creation moves back onto the human site* and remakes the maker. (Scarry, 1985, p. 307, original italics)

The categories are analytical distinctions, but would in the act be "so entailed in one another that one can rarely be speaking of one without simultaneously speaking of the other" (ibid.). The term "reciprocation" is helpful in specifying the material agency of imaginative processes. But projection can strengthen the argument for how imagination is materialized more generally. The created object, Scarry states, takes two different forms: the imagined object and the materialized object. Projection is thus a double process of imagining and materializing, but Scarry also uses the term when people merely interact with objects. In the concept *projection* Scarry maintains a continuity between imagination and the materialized object, but proposes that this continuity may be obscured in the passage of the two moments:

In the first of these, the imagination's work is self-announcing while in the second she completes her work by disguising her own activity. (Scarry, 1985, p. 280)

The moment of materialization projects the imagination into the interior structure of the object, but also cuts off the 'umbilical cord', so to speak, and creates a freestanding object, where the imagination is re-corded in the object's interiority. Thus, the site of projection entails continuity between imagination and object and does not imply that objects are products of the imagination for their own independent sake. We can make this argument clearer by incorporating another of Scarry's statements that objects are projections, or objectifications, of *human sentience*, not merely replicating sentience, but *reciprocating* and recreating sentience. Irrespective of its specificities, the object "will be found to contain within its interior a material record of the nature of human sentience out of which it in turn derives its power to act on sentience and recreate it" (ibid.). And in doing so, acts of projections essentially "deprive the external world of the privilege of being inanimate" (ibid.). Scarry practically reverses Vygotsky's understanding of objects as affecting other things by claiming that objects are created to *recreate the body*. To some extent, the notion of objectification of sentience resembles Wartofsky's notion of perceptual praxis as co-constituted by artifacts. Scarry seems to take the objectification further by embracing affective and bodily aspects in the term 'sentience'. In the book, she focuses on the sentience of pain, but the term is stretched further to incorporate e.g. feelings of hunger and cold, vision and movement. Objects are then the materialized *modulation* or *recreation* of *actual sentience*. In Scarry's words:

A particular dimension of sentience will, by being projected, undergo an alteration in degree: the power of vision is amplified when supplemented by microscope and telescope, as the problem of hunger is diminished and regulated through strategies of artifice. (Scarry, 1985, p. 285)

From here, I will establish the concept of objects and materiality as *materialized imagination*. Scarry suggests that the materialization of modulated sentience in objects is necessarily discrepant from the actual (state of) human sentience. Without the discrepancy, there would be no point in creating objects. In the present object, the discrepancy warrants that there is simultaneously something yet absent or not-yet present. The microscope transgresses

and modulates normal vision, creating a visual acuity which is absent without it. *Objects, in spite of their actual presence, materialize absences of modulated activity or sentience* – absences that have imaginatively been projected into objects in their creation. Objects, therefore, materialize a transgressive relation between presence and absence. And that is why I conceptualize materiality as *materialized imagination.*

Materialized imagination insists that imaginative processes are not just connected to the person who then draws on or produces materiality. The processes of making absences present are materialized as well. People alone do not imaginatively modulate things. Things are inherently modulatory. According to Scarry, modulations of sentience can take the different forms of amplifications, eliminations or replacements. Objects can do so by taking forms that *overtly* and *covertly* resemble the original body part, sentient organ or activity. In their covert form, objects can modulate capacities that have no particular bodily locality (e.g. memory), but also capacities (e.g. movement) even though the material form has no precedence in the human body (e.g. the wheel). Thus, wheels and steam engines covertly embody and amplify *movement*; printed materials embody and amplify *mnemonic* capacities; chairs and pills covertly diminish and eliminate *pain*. In their overt form, telescopes and microscopes embody lenses that modulate *vision*; bandages and clothes resemble *skin* and replace severed tissue and regulate *body temperature* (for detailed analysis, see Scarry, 1985, pp. 281-284). Objects, as materialized imagination, are not simply replications of human sentience. Although a camera could be said to be imitating or replicating the human eye, the photo produced by the camera is a visual fixation of a moment and of a specific constellation of a scenario, visual perspective and body posture – which are all absent just before and after that moment. The picture and camera is a material modulation of continuous movement into a still moment.

In people's activities with objects, the modulatory absences materialized in objects can be made present. This is the basic way of understanding materiality as materialized imagination. But there is another layer to this absence which relates to co-constitutive activities of objects. This is what Scarry calls "reciprocation". Reciprocation designates the power or quality by which objects recreate the person on the other side of the "lever" of action. The ways in which objects reciprocate human living is not arbitrary to, but directed by what (imagination) is originally projected into them. But reciprocation does *more* than what is possible by projection alone. This is the reason for Scarry to say that projection and reciprocation are not equal counterparts

(although internally related). The power by which objects reciprocate ordinarily *exceeds* projection. The excessive form of reciprocation is therefore *also* absent activities of projection:

> Thus the normative model must be one in which the total arc of action has in its second half a largesse not present in the first half; the total act of creating contains an inherent movement toward self-amplifying generosity. (Scarry, p. 318)

The normativity refers to the fact that excessive power of reciprocation is "almost omnipresent" in objects and is not per se a judgment of if excess is good or bad (ibid.)[7]. If we think reciprocation in the context of digital media, it simply means that the few movements and clicks with our fingers on a keyboard of a computer or smartphone reciprocate by potentially "moving" our bodies, vision, hearing, emotions from one end of the world to another, through different genres, different times, which else would only to a certain extent be possible through extensive and expensive travelling, meticulous research at libraries, visits to cinemas and museums and so forth. Of course, digital media excessively reciprocate our sentience in many other ways. But the example sufficiently illustrates how the site of projection (finger tapping on a keyboard) produces a largesse or excess of consequences on the site of reciprocation (extended and intensified vision, hearing, movement and affect). Reciprocation helps us voice and put into motion the co-constituting agency of objects that are else silenced and paralyzed by less insisting concepts like culture and materiality as mediation and resources.

Discussion: How imaginative processes are reciprocated by materialized imagination

In the examples above, we see how objects can reciprocate our activities and sentience. But how do we go on from here to understand how materiality (or materialized imagination) reciprocates *imagination*?

A definite strength of Scarry's conceptualization of projection and reciprocation is that it merges the internal relation between materiality and imagination into the processes where they are performed simultaneously. A risk, in my view, in Vygotsky's circular model and Zittoun & Gillespie's looping

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[7] Scarry specifies four possible forms of excess. See Scarry (1985, pp. 315-317).

model is that they easily fall prey to a separation of 'external conditions' and 'inner processes' of imagination. In Wartofsky's theory, imagination emerges internally from artifacts, but tertiary artifacts still presuppose a separation from ongoing praxis by suspending first- and second-order artifacts. The implications of Scarry's theory is that it is hard to distinguish between the product of imagination and the produced imagination in practice. And furthermore, reciprocation draws analytical attention to the parts of an actual or imaginative activity that is performed by materiality. But let's go into a detailed discussion on the material aspect of imagination.

We have seen the continuity between imagination and materiality where an imagined relation between present and absent is being projected into the materialization of a given object. But how does this process, in turn, amount to reciprocations of imagination? Scarry's theory practically follows and *iterative* model. According to Scarry, the purpose of imagination and reciprocation is not only to alter the external world or the human body, but: "…to alter the power of alteration itself, to act on and continually revise the nature of creating" (ibid., p. 324). Scarry names this aspect the imagination's "nonimmunity from its own action" (ibid.). In the specific way that reciprocation 'remakes the maker' it recreates the connective nodes from which (new) imaginative projections iterate:

> An existing object, by recreating the maker, itself necessitates a new act of objectified projection: the human, troubled by weight, creates a chair; the chair creates him to be weightless; and now he projects this new weightless self into new objects, the image of an angel, the design for a flying machine. (ibid., p. 321)

This has similarities to previously presented theories. It resembles Vygotsky's circular model and Zittoun & Gillespie's looping model. Although, with Scarry's concept of reciprocation we get a clearer idea of how objects and technologies not only transform the external world (cf. Vygotsky), but also the 'internal world' and the very conditions of the imagination itself. And furthermore, materiality is not just employable resources (cf. Zittoun & Gillespie) – it reciprocates through the imagination materialized in it. Read through Wartofsky we can say that the reciprocation of the chair becomes a tertiary artifact at the instance where the human, recreated as weightless, permutes to the site of projection and projects the imagination of an airplane. The chair could, of course, also reciprocate in other directions. But the point is that the emergence of the imaginative projections would appear arbitrary or freely

created if the processes of reciprocation were neglected. Or the processes would be isolated by thinking that the airplane itself was the resource for imagination. In this way, I read in Scarry's work a more radical understanding of the distributed agency in imaginative processes than presented by the previous authors: The connective node of weightlessness emerges as a *hybrid* of the person's activity with the chair and the chair's recreation of the person. This node, then, seems to reciprocate and alter the imaginative processes of the person who initially just wanted to create a chair, but now seemingly sets out to create airborne artifacts. Nevertheless, the fictitious example shows how the reciprocation of the chair is active in the new imaginative projection of the airplane.

If we accept the generality of objects as materialized imagination with the capacity to reciprocate, it also has implications for the understanding of imagination all together. The materially reciprocated aspect of imaginative processes makes us rethink imagination in even more mundane ways. I will develop this thinking in a critical dialogue between Scarry and Wartofsky.

If materialized imagination applies to any object, then they materialize imagined modulations of actual or original sentient states or conditions – unless an absent modulation is acted upon and thus made present. In this sense, an object – concretely present to our perception or in our thinking (let alone, in our imagination!) – already holds specific (sets of) reciprocating absences. For Wartofsky, objects would have to have a third-order character in order to let such absences emerge as imagination; in the first and second order, co-constituting potentials of the imagination are blocked out by rules and conventions. But the concept of reciprocation – the *object's* recreation of the person – challenges this rigid and socially governed ordering. Going back to the mundane example of a chair, and building on Scarry, we can argue that the chair, in its perceptual or imagined presence, would readily reciprocate and recreate the standing or walking person as a 'potential sitter' due to the imagination materialized in it. As such, Wartofsky would not disagree with such constructing abilities of objects – it is central in his theory that historically accomplished artifacts generate a given mode of perceptual praxis. Wartofsky would hardly agree, though, that this was an example of an artifact of *the imagination*, since the coupling of chair and sitting would correspond to the conventional use of a chair. It would therefore maintain its first- and second-order status. The chair would only become tertiary, imaginative, if it would generate absences that would *diverge* from conventions, like recreating

the person/chair as a 'ladder-climber' or 'airplane-builder'. Convention seems to oppose imagination. This oppositional assumption is widespread and even Dewey – whom I drew upon earlier – explicitly formulated something similar:

> The peculiar quality of the imaginative is best understood when placed in opposition to the narrowing effects of habituation. (Dewey, 1934)

If the question was to understand the "peculiar quality" of imagination, maybe Dewey is right. But if the question is how imagination is internally related to every engagements and materiality, that direction would *narrow our* understanding. The concept of the imagination developed in this project does not cherish such a dichotomy. The divergence from convention necessitates imagination, but convention and habituation do not expel imagination. Returning to the perceptually present or imagined chair, I would argue that its materialized imagination still reciprocates the imagination of the person, recreating her or him as a 'yet-absent sitter', *although* it corresponds to convention. In its presence, it co-constitutes a specific absence. Just imagine that you come home, from work or elsewhere, and you have planned to go to the kitchen as a 'food-maker'. But the sight of the chair in the living room restructures your intention by reciprocating your imagination and eliciting a "I could *sit* there…" or maybe even more forcefully a "Why *shouldn't* I sit there for a while?!". The reciprocation of the chair has not broken any conventions, but its recreation of your body to a 'yet-absent relaxed body' has reciprocated your imagination and intervened in the course of actions. Similarly, drugs can reciprocate that 'yet-absent alteration of mood and perception' or that 'yet-absent pursuit of Bukowskian creativity and destruction' (cf. Nissen, 2002, p. 45) – imaginative aspects that would be strangled in a concept like habituation. By twisting the understanding in this direction through the concept of reciprocation of materialized imagination, I am advocating for a concept of imaginative processes, not as acts of decoupling from or suspensions of ongoing practices, but as deeply enmeshed in the continuity of activities and engagements. And this last point becomes crucial in the next chapter on the contradictoriness of imagination.

Summing up the conclusions

The main argument of this chapter has been that imagination is central in everyday engagements, internally related by being co-constitutive of engagements and being co-constituted by materiality as an aspect of everyday engagements. In the first part, I have argued that imagination is not separate from our living. In our living, presences develop out of absences and absences out of presences on microgenetic and ontogenetic scales. Imaginative processes in everyday living will be conceptualized further in the next chapter on restrictive vs. expansive dimensions of imagination. In the second part of the chapter, I have through detailed analyses argued for understanding the material implications for imaginative processes as *reciprocations of materialized imagination*. Through the gradually decentering analysis of materiality as "crystallized imagination", "resources" for imagination and imagination as "tertiary artifact", I have argued for a generalized understanding of materiality as materialized imagination, holding – in its perceptual or imagined presence – absences that can be actualized imaginatively or in concrete activities. Reciprocation adds another layer to the co-constitution of absences. Not only do objects hold absences that can be presenced; their ability to make absences present *exceeds*, and is therefore also absent in, the person's ability of doing so alone. Reciprocation thus conceptualizes that excess by which materiality co-constitutes the processes of imagination. I have also paved the way for an understanding of imagination as a process that involves more than creative activities, more than uncoupling from experience, more than suspension of ongoing activity and conventions. This becomes important in the next chapter where I unfold the contradictory aspects of imagination.

Chapter 4: From Expansive towards Restrictive Aspects of Imaginative Processes

In this chapter, the theoretical development of imagination continues, grounded in the second dialectical principle, that of contradictions. I will argue that if we want to understand imagination as central in everyday engagements, a conceptualization is needed that can encompass its implications in the conflictuality of engagements: In short, as a source of conflicts and of overcoming conflicts (which may produce new conflicts). In order to make this maneuver, I will draw upon central concepts of action and subjectivity from the German roots of critical psychology[8]. Although critical psychology in this tradition essentially theorizes the person as an anticipatory subject, it does not explicitly conceptualize imagination, but for the same reason, it is neither antagonistic towards it. The contradictoriness of action, or the "dual possibility" of action, is at the heart of critical psychology: Of expanding possibilities in order to reach longer-term pursuits, or acting under given possibilities and restricting pursuits of longer-term interests. I will argue how theories on imagination are more aligned with the former expansive aspect and have difficulties in embracing the latter. In order to incorporate the contradictory aspects, I will reconceptualize the fundamental processes of imagination and propose how they can be thought to be implicated in the restrictive aspect of engagements. A prerequisite of this theoretical development is to make a more intimate link between imagination and concrete engagements. It is only in relation to concrete engagements that imagination can be analyzed as expansive vs. restrictive. The concept of *premises* therefore becomes crucial in this chapter. Many of these concepts are already part of the nomenclature of critical psychology. But since my understandings at some points slightly differ from them, I will start the chapter by explicating how I will use them and discuss them as the chapter develops.

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[8] Throughout the world, there are many different approaches that are called "critical psychology" (see e.g. Teo, 2014). The school that I draw on is exclusively the one that developed around Freie Universität in Berlin in the 70's and was later carried on in Scandinavia. Critical psychology in the forthcoming refers to this tradition.

Primer on auxiliary concepts: Premises and engagements as expansive and restrictive

Premises. From this point on in the dissertation, I will more consequently begin to talk about imagination as *premise* for engagements. This is the route to conceptualizing the restrictive vs. expansive aspects of imagination. But premises also close a potential and misleading gap between imagination and ongoing activities. In Zittoun & Gillespie's theory, for instance, something can "trigger" a temporary uncoupling of imagination from ongoing situations, or ongoing praxis is suspended in the form of tertiary artifacts, according to Wartofsky. A connected purpose is to avoid a strict linearity or causality between imagination and engagements. Initially, this can seem misguided. Etymologically, the word *premise* comes from *prae-mittere*, meaning "to send forward" or "put before". In that sense, it could refer to something temporally preceding engagements and thereby causing them. But premise also means the ground that someone or something simultaneously stands on. And so, spatial properties and simultaneity are embedded in the semantics of the word. A premise thus refers to the ground from where engagements are "emitted", but in such a way that it is still incarnated in them. The ground is not left (behind) – the engagement becomes grounded. Premises refer to those subjective and objective circumstances, elements or features that concretely co-constitute the actualization of engagements. They do so by becoming actualized in the engagements to some extent – like a piece of paper that turns into origami. The premises for meeting a friend in a café are the simultaneity of co-presence and the spatial arrangement of the café. But the premises are also the prior agreement between the two of you, the spatial-temporal and technological possibilities of meeting in that locality, and the imagination about the meeting, and also the imagination that extends beyond the meeting (e.g. the wish to stay in close contact). To make the break away from strict linearity and causality clear, premises are moldable in comparison to determinants: They may be transformed in the course of actualization, although they may also appear to define engagements more sturdily in some cases. The vague contra definite stature of premises in turn means that they are not necessarily clearly or wholly identifiable to the person, or not the least, taken for granted.

Engagements. In the introduction, and shortly in chapter 1, I presented the understanding of activity that *engagement* is meant to encompass. Engagement could on the face of it be synonymous with activity. But my intention is to encapsulate a specific *quality* of activity. As I have written, engagements emerge from a relation between two or more parts. Derived from the Old French *engagier*, it carries meanings of the verbs "to bind" or "to pledge". These transitive verbs presuppose a relation to something or somebody else. But as I wrote in the introduction, the engaging quality not only emerges from the immediate relation, but from "a promise", from something that is yet-absent in the relation(s). Engagement also invites understandings of how a person *relates* to her or his activities in such relations. We can also call this an *affective* dimension of relating. Engagements emerge from a certain affective investment and commitment and dedication to the "promise". This dimension emerges, of course, from imagination as premise. We can also extend the meaning of binding to also incorporate the emotionality of a person's *attachment*[9] to and felt relevance of engagements – that engagements can create feelings of belonging, and of longing in the absence of engagements. Attachment thus refers to a felt form of relating whose affectivity is spatial-temporally extended beyond more transient and immediate affects in transactions with our surroundings, like sudden feelings of fear, joy, or laughter elicited in the immediacy of a situation.

There is also a historical dimension to engagements. In times where we are facing a key challenge of "inventing ourselves" (Rose, 1996), the "boundness" of activities, feelings and life projects is not given and has to be established – through engagements. The challenge of establishing engagements presupposes its own negation: The establishment of *disengagement* accompanied by the sentiment of *detachment* and irrelevance. In everyday living, engaging in one area may imply disengaging in others and vice versa. The tension is an essential challenge, and is therefore also conflictual.

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[9] Attachment as a concept has a strong tradition in psychology, especially in psychodynamic attachment theories. It is not applied in that sense in this project. Instead of thinking of attachment as a person's patterns of relating to other people based on early child-parent relations, attachment in engagements may also emanate from a future promise. I will also use the word in a more extensive way, not only in the sense of belonging to another person, attachment can also be developed to a diversity of people, things, settings and atmospheres. The concept will reappear in the empirical analysis via Gomart & Hennion (1999).

Expansive and restrictive aspects. A further specification of engagement is that it has expansive and restrictive aspects. These aspects stress specific forms of *relations* between engagements and our living overall and the societal conditions we live by. The expansive aspect relates to engagements that allow us flexibly to adapt to, influence and transform conditions of our living in such a way that engagements support our hopes or pursuits thereof. It thus means to expand and create new possibilities or new hopes even in times of deep crisis and life transitions. The restrictive aspect refers to a "narrowing in" of engagements followed by created or extended suffering or conflict in our living. The narrowing in can be understood as a kind of rigid one-sidedness of engagements that reproduce conflictual circumstances. The narrowing in can be a temporary or long-lasting counteraction to conflictual or dilemmatic circumstances. Or it can be a gradual narrowing in that eventually conflicts with other engagements – or disengagements. It is not implied that conflicts are per se problematic and by all means have to be eliminated (they may be productive). But in the restrictive aspect the relation between current engagements and (long-term) hopes and pursuits of possible hopes is somehow disturbed. In the respective section, I will by means of theory elaborate on the different ways this disturbance can become subjectively manifest.

The imagination as premise for expansive engagements

By drawing on scholars like Vygotsky, Zittoun & Gillespie and also Wartofsky and Scarry, the theory building in this project argues for the processes of the imagination as central for human engagements and agency. However, by doing that, we have to acknowledge and incorporate aspects of agency – e.g. the "dual" aspect as I do below – in order to thoroughly develop that argumentation. Else, imagination is only central to specific aspects of engagements. In analytically subdividing engagements in expansive and restrictive aspects, I inscribe the theory in what critical psychologist, Klaus Holzkamp, coined the "dual possibility" of action (Holzkamp, 1983; Osterkamp & Schraube, 2013)[10]. The understanding of the concept is not unanimous and it goes through modifications from the initial work by Holzkamp (1973) and

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[10] Normally translated as "generalized" and "restrictive" agency. Instead of "generalized" I prefer to use "expansive" to make a conceptual bridge to theories on imagination where that term is often used.

Osterkamp (1975) and is being continuously extended and reworked (e.g. Markard, 2011; Nissen, 2012; Tolman & Maiers, 1991). The application of the dual aspect will be pragmatic with the purpose of developing the theory of the imagination as premise for engagements. And it will thus not do justice to the extensive theory developed from the German roots of critical psychology. In this literature, the categories are often discussed up against each other, or in connection with each other, because they form the contradictoriness of action. In the following they will be elaborated in different sections to support the progressive conceptualization of imagination. This may promote an idea that the aspects are separate. But the argument is still that they in practice are connected as contradictions.

Releasing contradictions from a society

As noted, the dual aspect refers to the different possibilities of acting on the relation between engagements, conditions of one's living and pursuits in one's development of living. Expansive vs. restrictive aspects have to be understood in that concrete interrelatedness in a person's living and cannot be seen as articulations of specific situations, personal traits or categories of behaviors. In German critical psychology the categories are historically specific and inscribed in a critique of capitalist society where power struggles and the opposition between societal and individual interests saturate the most private spheres of a person's living (see e.g. Maiers, 1991, p. 45). Since the categories are not intended to embody the same political critique in this project, parts of the nomenclature of critical psychology will need to be reformulated. In fact, the Scandinavian continuation of German critical psychology has seemed dissatisfied with the singular notion about *the society* which stipulates interests that contradict those of the individual (Mørck & Huniche, 2006; Nissen, 2000a). What the present project does embrace is that the dual possibility is a challenge funneled down to and infiltrated in the individual's living by contradictory developments in society. The contradictions can, of course, appear as an opposition between *a* person and *a* society, when, e.g., a person wishes to start or continue to take drugs which is obviously contradicted politically by the enforcement of law. But contradictions may also merely relate to experiencing conflicting impressions about drug use on e.g. digital media. Such experiences can be analyzed as political, as expressions of ideologies. But they can also be seen as conflictual simply because they are mutually exclusive.

Nevertheless, it is in the midst of conflict and contradiction that the expansive and restrictive possibility emerges.

The expansive possibility in critical psychology

In condensed form, the expansive possibility in critical psychology generally refers to "the human capacity to gain, in cooperation with other, control over each individual's own life conditions" (Holzkamp, 2013a, p. 20). What makes it expansive is that the gained control over life conditions helps the person overcome circumstances that may impede the realization of his or her interests and goals in life. It is expansive because transformation or transgression of contradictory conditions implies an opening up of (new) possibilities of acting and engaging[11]. According to Holzkamp (1983, p. 335) the expansive frame is manifest as *potentiality* in first person, characterized by perceived possibilities of transforming conditions. Perceiving potentiality can be closely related to what I specified above as *flexibility* of engagements. But it is important that flexibility is not understood as an uncritical bending the person out of shape at any cost – potentiality and flexibility is still engaged, or bound to, personal interests. At first glance, this condensation may appear as a psychology of a selfish, asocial individual. But that is not the case at all. Transformations of conditions do not need to be done by the individual in isolation: They can also be transformed by the help of others, e.g. friends, family or professionals, and still be within an expansive frame. In this frame interests and goals are defined as long-term in contrast to short-term gains. And interests and goals would in the expansive frame have a collective scope or resonance with interests and goals of other people (a commonality/generality as expressed in the German "verallgemeinerte"). Other people would therefore not be seen as "instruments" in a person's realization of own interests.

Perceiving potentiality is related to a way of thinking, which is called "Begreifen" in German (Holzkamp, 1983). To fathom what the term implies, it has been translated into "comprehensive thinking" (Maiers, 1991, p. 45) in-

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[11] There is a risk of conceptual confusion because, in critical psychology, the *expansive* move from restrictiveness to potentiality is also described as a movement that *transgresses* restrictiveness which I have specified as the fundamental process of imagination. I have considered to use "to transcend" for these *expansive* movements. But I have by and large kept "to transgress" in order to show the different aspects of imaginative processes.

stead of the more literal translation "conceiving". This still does not manage to capture the essence. "Begreifen" means that the perception of problems and conflicts is expanded beyond the immediate appearance of them in practice and comprehended as interrelated with, or mediated by, historically specific societal conditions and contradictions (e.g. Holzkamp, 1983, p. 388) and how these are constelled in the specific life context(s) of the person. Comprehending such interrelations is the first step towards potentiality: Of expanding the knowing of what needs to be acted upon and what can be transformed. These interrelations rest on a critique of *a* capitalist society (cf. previous section). The productive scope of the concept, however, is the general movement away from individualizing and "psychologizing" problems to seeing or comprehending problems as linked to the contradictory socio-material arrangements of our living. Or, to expand from *one-sided* to *many-sided* understanding of a conflict (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 401). Applying "Begreifen"[12] to the project's concern with drug-related problems means to investigate such problems, not as anchored in the person, but as interrelated with contradictions in, or one-sided aspects of, the young people's imagination and digital everyday living – without having to subject technology and imagination to the detour of capitalist analysis.

But how is imagination involved in expansive aspects of engagement? This question will be discussed next. The theories on imagination in the last chapter can help us with that question and can thus supplement the activity theory in critical psychology. But, as stressed before, this chapter embodies and unfolds the critique that these theories are mainly dedicated to the expansive aspect.

The expansivity of imagination

Let us first remark again that the critical psychology developed over Holzkamp does not have an explicit conceptualization of the imagination in the dual possibility of engagements. But this does not rule out that there are future-oriented processes and "absences" present in the theory. For instance, it demands imagination of a person to pursue the realization of his or her interests and goals. It implies that something is absent and yet to be realized. For these processes Holzkamp (1983) generally uses the term *anticipation*,

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[12] The German capitalized word will be used since the noun is hard to translate properly. The same goes for its pairing with "Deuten" later in the thesis.

which acts as a guideline that judges if our activities are in line with or threaten our interests. Anticipation also produces anxieties by the uncertainties and insecurities implied in pursuing transformations in our living. But let us remind ourselves that the purpose of drawing on the dual possibility is not 'forensically' to try to collect evidence for the existence of the imagination in critical psychology. No, the aim is to provide an analytical frame to understand the imagination as premise for aspects of engagements. Still, we can ask: How is it possible for the person to move from the immediacy of perception to "Begreifen"? How can the person develop potentiality from actuality? How is it possible to transgress the immediacy of conflicts with interrelatedness? An answer could be *by imagination*.

These expansive processes are of central interest in the earlier presented theories on imagination. As Zittoun et al. (2013) write:

> Instead of simply reproducing what is around them, or following constraints, they [people] actually have a unique capacity to alter their relationship to the world – which we have called imagination – a process central in the making of unique life melodies. (p. 71)

This function of imagination is resonant in other theories. Without the creative capacities of the imagination, we would, according to Vygotsky (2004), only be able to reproductively adapt "to familiar, stable conditions of the environment" (p. 8). Starobinski fitted the imagination into the gap between the actual and possible by stating that the imagination "draws before us the configuration of the realizable before it can be realized" (translated in Crapanzano, 2004, p. 19). And Wartosky's tertiary artifact is what introduces possible or alternative perceptual modes to actual perceptual modes of praxis. These contributions echo the answer to how the person transgressively moves through "Begreifen" to imagining potentiality that can expand engagements. Previously I defined this as the transgressive relation between present and absent. "Begreifen" and potentiality presuppose such absences. The possible and potential in perception can only have that status if they are somewhat discrepant or absent from the actual. We can understand the movement into "Begreifen" as what Zittoun calls "expansion of experience" (Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016) and Vygotsky would call "broadening" of experience (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 17). It seems as if Holzkamp more sees this expansion as a question of expanding *understanding*, *knowing* of and *insight* into conditions of our living; to see how my activities

are linked to the limits and possibilities of historically specific societal conditions (what he also calls "social self-understanding"). But knowing and insight imply that we expand our understanding in the direction of "matter of fact"-thinking ["Tatsächlichkeit"]: How our activities are *actually* linked to wider societal conditions – and of course this can expand our understanding of possibilities *under* given conditions. But possibilities in this sense appear more as given *options* or *alternatives* that we can choose from. *Potentiality*, on the other hand, is an expansion that points to that which is yet "beyond the fact", the yet-not actualized. Potentiality implies a yet-absent transformation *of* conditions. Given possibilities and potentiality are therefore not the same. In the expansive frame in critical psychology, a concept of the imagination is missing in the person's move towards expanded understanding, but especially and more evidently in the transgression of the actual conditions by potentiality, or of the present by the absent. If we rest our understanding on Vygotsky (2004), the movement towards expansion and potentiality is ascribed the *combinatory* operations of imagination. By virtue of imagination we have the ability to *dissociate* our experience into elements that undergo *alterations* and eventually become *associated* in unified sequences or images (pp. 26-28). And it is via the mutual dependence of imagination and experience that expanded comprehension and potentiality emerge:

> If, in the first case, imagination is based on experience, in the second case experience itself is based on imagination. (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 17)

The combinatory operations of the imagination can thus be seen as implicated in the emergence of potentiality from the actual. But besides generating potentiality, Vygotsky also states that imagination generates *correspondences*, which is closer to the meaning of perceiving interrelations in critical psychology. The combinatory operations of imagination can broaden our experience by combining our (present) experiences with other (distant) experiences. Imagination can thus produce images or sequences that *correspond* to real phenomena although they go beyond our immediate experience:

> It is only because in these cases my imagination operates not freely, but directed by someone else's experience, as if according to someone else's instructions, that we can obtain the result we get in this case, that is, the fact that a product of the imagination corresponds to reality…When we read a newspaper and find out about a thousand events that we have not directly witnessed, when a child studies geography or history, when we merely learn

what has been happening to another person by reading a letter from him – in all these cases our imagination serves our experience. (ibid.)

The movement towards the expansive frame of "Begreifen" is therefore not possible without imagination: Imagination can establish correspondences and interrelate our immediate perception with distal (societal) conditions, and transgresses the actual by (absent) potentiality by imagining the realizable before it can be realized (to re-quote Starobinski.)

We can summarize how the imagination is implicated in expansive engagements in two regards, then. The first concerns expanding our understanding: How 'my problems', or engagements, are linked to wider socio-material arrangements. It works in the direction of developing absences that *correspond* to actual linkages between engagements and (present/absent) socio-material arrangements. The second involves expanding the actual with *potentialities*. It works in the direction of developing absences that embody transformations of the actual. We can, however, not forget a third dimension. What make engagements expansive, in critical psychology, is the extent to which potentiality supports the realization of our goals and interests. We cannot think of interests and goals without imagination.

The role of technology in the expansive processes?

From here, this project overall also wants to contribute to the critical psychological understanding of expansive processes: How technology, including digital media, is implicated in creating imagined correspondences and potentialities, and not least so-called life interests, as part of expansive aspects of imagination.

The implications of technology and more broadly materiality was never clearly articulated by Holzkamp (cf. Schraube, 1998, p. 11). In critical psychology the expansive processes of "Begreifen" are seen in connection with the development of "social self-understanding" (Holzkamp, 1983, 2013b). In brevity, it refers to the dialogical, or intersubjective, processes by which a person moves from an individual point of view to a more generalized point of view. But what happens when technology enters and reciprocates this process? Do we not also "dialogue" with things, technologies and the worlds of information, fiction, art and aesthetics? To capture and freeze this perspective, only to return to it later in the project, I will introduce the concept *inter-*

objectuality. The concept builds on already established concepts. *Intersubjectivity* denotes the dialogical spaces where understandings and perspectives are exchanged and negotiated between people (ibid.). This happens in face-to-face interactions as is well known in symbolic interactionism (e.g. Blumer, 1969). Today, this also increasingly happens in "face-to-interface" interactions where a technology mediates the dialogue between two or more peoples (see also Thompson, 1995, p. 81). *Interobjectivity* critically departs from intersubjectivity in two respects. For Moghaddam (2003) the concept should point to the shared versus different understandings and meanings of people and groups. For Latour (1996), the concept should capture where interaction between people is framed by objects, which culminates in his reassembling of the "social" as heterogeneous assemblages or networks of humans and non-humans (Latour, 2005). *Interobjectuality* builds on Latour's understanding. It is meant to draw attention to the transactional relations not only between person and object(s) but also *between objects*. We know related concepts like "intertextuality" (the indexing in a text of another text) and "remediation" (a media product refashioned in/by a new medium). But interobjectuality specifies that the transactions *between objects* can make something emerge which has another quality than the objects alone, or which generates conflict (more on this in the yet to come section on "restrictive" aspect of engagements). In theorizing perception, Holzkamp was on the track of interobjectual transactions:

> Things are actually also in physical-material interaction amongst each other. Thus, the thing is not perceived in isolation, but perceived in a constellation of interactions with other things. – Also the instances of things, that are the result of the affect of the interaction with other things, belong, like the things themselves, to the real outer world independent of someone's perception. (Holzkamp, 1973, p. 24, own translation)

Holzkamp does not relate this to the dialogical development of social self-understanding, but to perception. He may well have focused on physical interactions, like the constellation of the colors yellow and blue emerge as the instance of (perceptibly) green color. However, the initial purpose of introducing *interobjectuality* here is to present the possibility of understanding how the "dialogue" *could* be extended to include technology and materiality and how this could be transformed by the internal transaction between *multiple* objects. If this seems too abstract or detached from the subject matter of this project, I can say that the analytical interest in the relation between drugs and

digital media in the perception and imagination of young people, is essentially interobjectual.

The internal relation between imagination and materiality (and technology) also challenges "Begreifen" in another way. It challenges the connotation that the dialogical movement in the expansive direction is undertaken via abstractions and concepts. "Begriff" in German is translated into "concept" in English. But do we not also dialogue or hear, feel, see correspondences and potentialities via "percepts"? Would it be implausible to imagine that our engagements are permeated and directed by absent images, songs, motion, moods and many other sensori-affective percepts? Is this not essentially the work of imagination? This is also a question to the empirical analyses later: How do percepts form the imagination as premise for (expansive) engagements? This leads us to the elaboration of *premises*.

Imagination as **premise** *for engagements*

As we remember, *premise* as a concept was introduced to denote the subjective and objective elements that at the same time co-constitute the actualization of engagements and are actualized in engagements to some extent. In relation to imagination as premise, we can abstractly formulate it as how absences actualize and are actualized in expansive engagement. The concept of premises is helpful in two regards in relation to imagination. First, it helps us analytically to zoom in on the concrete relevance and implications of imagination for a person's engagements. We can ourselves imagine that you in this moment can imagine a myriad of things that you could do. But not all will be forming the premise for your current or proximal engagements. Premises help zooming in those processes of imagination that have concrete implications for engagements at a given moment. Second, premises therefore unite imagination and engagements and do not separate them as in "now I am in imagination; now I am in action" (cf. the "gap" I wrote about p. 77, 83). Imagination should not be confined to eternal space of that which has yet-not happened, eternally preceding engagements and never catching up with engagements. Thinking about the imagination as premise we attend to how the absent in specific ways becomes *presenced* in engagements, how it shapes them and how it changes with them by continuously being a part of them – like how the paper gives presence to, is still present in, and is changed by origami.

Premises is also a concept in critical psychology. Here, premises are inserted in between the individual and society. It is meant to change the perspective from the person as being determined by societal conditions to the person as actively taking a specific constellation of societal conditions as his or her concrete possibilities for or hindrances of activities (Markard, 2011, p. 172). Premises also include personal conditions and preconditions. Insofar, the usage of premises in critical psychology overlaps with my understanding: it pursues to avoid direct causality and it zooms in from a great variety of potential premises on those which are relevant and brought concretely into the act.

> Only when particular meanings/possibilities to act are made into premises for real actions can the interest-based actions become reality. (Holzkamp, 2013b, p. 287)

Where the understandings of the concept depart is in what we can call the subjective and emergent quality by which premises become composited into engagements. Holzkamp writes:

> In other words, on the basis of their life interests as they actually experience them, the individual has to permanently try, in view of the given meaning structures, to extract premises for her/his actions from which intentions to act/actions result which are consistent with these interests…in each case the subject her/himself has to select the meanings s/he believes to be relevant in order to solve the problem and deduce the adequate premises to possibly arrive at pertinent intentions to act/actions. (ibid., p. 293)

The impression that Holzkamp leaves us with is that premises are "deduced", "extracted" and "selected" in a preparatory, reflexive manner by the person. And since Holzkamp sees premises as forming the person's *reasons* for action, it seems to imply that the person explicitly has to clarify and consciously know premises and their relation to life interests before they can be taken into the act. But I want to add the quality of premises as emergent, vague and moldable. As Morten Nissen writes:

> But they [premises] also have tacit dimensions and hidden preconditions which maybe in particular appear as significant when participation develops. (Nissen, 2000b, p. 43, own translation)

We can use Nissen's quote to expand our understanding of the quality of premises by coupling it with John Shotter's concept of "knowing of the third

kind" (Shotter, 1993), a knowing from *within* a concrete situation as engagements are unfolding, a knowing that in a sense organizes or guides two other kinds of knowing: The factual knowledge of *knowing that* and the practical knowledge of *knowing how* (Shotter, 2005, p. 152). Knowing of the third kind organizes factual and practical knowing since it becomes manifest as embodied anticipations of 'what comes next' in a situation and thus guides what practical and factual knowledge should be employed. That it is anticipatory means that, as premise, the third kind of knowing is *already* imaginative. But it is *felt* and emergent rather than explicitly and consciously known prior to engagements. It is decisive that *knowing from within* is not the same as pre-judging and pre-paring. It emerges in the on-going simultaneity of unfolding engagements and socio-material environments. Shotter uses the concept in the context of social interaction to explain how joint action is made possible by a mutuality of people's third kind of knowing. But there is no indication that it cannot encompass material and technological aspects of situations and environments that, too, are essentially *felt* (cf. McCarthy & Wright, 2004). The presence of a smartphone, may create a felt anticipation of someone calling or of calling someone.

As this example illustrates, when even imagination forms premises, it is internally related to and reciprocated by materiality. But such reciprocations of imagination do not need to be reflexively deduced or extracted in order to enter into engagements as premises. They can do so in tacit, felt and emergent ways. Additionally, premises are "constituted" but are also "moveable" (Nissen, 2000b, p. 42) and moldable so that they may themselves be presenced and transformed in the course of actualization. The presence of the smartphone may initially make anticipations of a phone call emerge, but it may also be transformed into another imaginative premise, e.g. browsing on the web.

Premises, thus, fill in the processual gap between imagination and actualization. Produced objects or actualized engagements can misleadingly be conceived of as substituting or finalizing imagination (cf. Vygotsky, 2004, p. 24), as when a given totality of the imagined becomes actualized, as, for instance, when an imagined visual scenario is turned into a corresponding painting. Imagination as premise, then, captures processes by which the absent affects presently unfolding engagements or *how the absent is presenced in engagements*. In fact, as I wrote in the beginning, engagements are always prem-

ised on a "promise", by absences, by something beyond themselves. But how, more exactly?

Specifying the imagination as premise for **expansive engagements**

Synonymously with my use of premises, Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) propose three aspects of the relation between imagination and agency where the imaginative activity can be more or less articulated. In their view, the elementary agency of imagination is to uncouple from proximal experience, providing relaxation, emotional change and in extreme cases necessary escapes from stressful and suppressing situations. More deliberately people can recourse to imagination for inspiration or solving a task at hand or for overriding demands of the immediate situation by for instance imagining happy outcomes of anxiety-provoking events. And finally, when activities are pursued individually or collectively in the light of imagined and achievable futures (pp. 131-133). What this proposal suggests is that the imagination is premising engagements as *telos*[13] on micro-, onto- and sociogenetic levels – as imbuing engagements with purpose and directionality and with ways of overcoming implicated challenges. Viewed from critical psychology, we have to be aware that the imagination as expansive premise in the dual possibility mainly operates within an ontogenetic and a *teleological* frame: My activities are pursuits of attaining or sustaining (longer term) life interests. But we can be more specific about the imagination as expansive premise. Let us anyway critically develop it from the teleological and ontogenetic frame.

Gradual/partial actualization of hopes. We can rename what Holzkamp called *life interests* as hopes. Hopes carry feelings like optimism and the avoidance of its opposites in pessimism attached to anxieties and fears. Hopes are the most obvious premise in expansive engagements that imagination comprises. It is the beacon, albeit absent, in the near or distant future towards which current engagements are directed and projected. Holzkamp remains open in specifying life interests, usually writing about them as securing or enhancing "quality of life" (Holzkamp, 2013b, pp. 286-7). The openness, however, ends in abstraction. Imagined projections and hopes, instead, draw at-

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[13] I will develop *telos* consequently throughout the conceptual development and empirical analysis. However, the application can be problematic, as I have realized throughout the research period. See therefore a critique on p. 314-315.

tention to the aesthetic and semi-concrete ways in which we are directed towards absent futures and how we populate and consolidate them with images, sensations, atmospheres etc. of engagements that, among others, are derivative of culture and personal biography (Appadurai, 1996; Wulf, 2014; Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). Nonetheless, absences like hopes form teleological premises in this case, there need not be a tremendous identity between presently imagined hopes and actual engagements given their temporal discrepancy. The temporal discrepancy can in many cases be explained by current circumstances that conflict with a person's attainment of hopes. Within the expansive frame, we saw that imagination serves the expansion of perception in "Begreifen" of actual circumstances and the translation of them into potentialities. Besides premising engagements teleologically (future- and purpose-directed), when imagined potentialities become premises, or composited into engagements, we can specify that potentialities are turned into *approximations* – as a gradual movement from actuality over potentiality towards actualization. We can think of it as premises that are *partially* presenced in current and ongoing engagements. This gradual and partial presencing of absences or hopes can take many forms. It could be presenced simply affectively in a person's zeal and investment in engagements that have particular relevance for approximating hopes. Or concrete activities like drug taking can be seen as expressing a partiality of a person's hope of approximating the living of an artist and achieving artistic creativity and inspiration – while it simultaneously can be seen as a *distancing* from the fear of living a conventional and mediocre life. Imagined hopes are multiple and do not only relate to a given "endpoint" of our living. Hopes can be related to many and different aspects of living.

Transforming hopes and potentialities. Within the expansive frame, Holzkamp did not, to my knowledge, write much about changing life interest in the midst of conflict; neither how experiences could develop or change our life interests. But it is not difficult to imagine that in the course of pursuing hopes we change or expand our imaginative horizons and modulate our hopes and approximations. In fact, Appadurai (1996) called the "work of the imagination" a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity due to the dynamics of (electronic) media and spatial mobility in modernity. We constantly have to develop and rework our imagination because of the rapid changes in experiences and environments and of uncertain futures. Similarly, dilemmatic

life events and situations, like ruptures and crises, can demand a reconfiguration of imagined possibilities and hopes, as suggested by Zittoun & Gillespie earlier in the chapter. Or, we can think of imagination as premise for transforming potentialities and hopes simply when 'things do not turn out as imagined' in processes of approximation and actualization, or when we through conversations or interactions with digital media chance upon something valuable that 'we haven't imagined before'.

Microgenetic premises. Since the expansive frame of imagination as premise mainly operates on an ontogenetic level, critical psychology does not provide us with much theory about the *microgenetic* level. Imagination as expansive premise is not as such limited to the teleology of future interests or hopes. Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) show the microgenetic unfolding of imagination in diverse situated activities such as in school, sports, cooking, music and science. Zittoun & Gillespie suggest that the imagination on this level expands experience and enriches situated activities. For instance, a rehearsing musician modelling his guitar playing on a famous musician can feel the pleasure of perfecting his expression. And the expansion of experience can point to new possibilities and "carve out new paths of activity" (ibid., p. 89). It is plausible to interject that absences that are presenced in microgenetic premises are structured as *micro-approximations* by the teleological premise of imagined hopes, i.e. a musician's rehearsal serves the long-term hope of becoming a better or a professional musician. But we can also reverse that statement and claim that the microgenetic unfolding of imagination as premise can give emergence to, modulate and challenge the ontogenetic imagination. Our imagination can be reciprocated in unexpected microgenetic ways in dialogues with other people, in watching movies or surfing the internet. And the premises of drug taking and a 'live fast, die young' philosophy can substitute the premises of steady income and tedious rehearsing for becoming a musician. Or, the imagined possibility of becoming a musician can be substituted by other possibilities all together.

So, I have tried to sketch out some of the possible ways of how the absent can become presenced as expansive premises: It does so by teleologically directing engagements towards known and identified hopes and by turning relevant potentialities into gradual and partial approximations presenced in various forms in processes of actualizing hopes. However, we can also point out other *telic* premises that still (expansively) direct engagements, but where interests, goals or hopes are not as clearly defined as in teleological premises:

Imagination as teleonomic premises. This category of premises refers to the more open-ended processes of the imagination that can be connected with exploration, experimentation, curiosity and discovery. Where teleology is defined as directedness towards goals (or hopes), teleonomy can be defined as "a planned activity that functions as a goal-directed way without knowledge of the goal" (Engelsted, 1989, p. 28; cf. Chimirri, 2015). We can also say that it is where the imagination becomes its own uncertain premise: As engagements directed towards that which has 'not yet happened' *and* is 'not yet imagined'. It could range from the musings of self-experimentation: 'If I should be something completely different than I am today, what would I be?' to the more critical, e.g. kicking a serious drug addiction, of wanting to change life for the better without knowing what that better would/could be. Evidently, premises here are more vague and emergent and will not be clearly definable as approximations since their potentialities can point in many directions and are not ordered by an overarching hope or goal. Although a more global teleonomic condition of the imagination could result in existential crisis, the seeking and searching premises of engagements hold the expansive potential of transgressing the border between the known and unknown, of self-transgression and of self-discovery. And hopes and potentialities that 'we could not have imagined before' may emerge. As such, imagination as teleonomic premise can overlap with the knowing of the third kind: A felt directedness with un(der)determined goals. In a sense, teleonomy reverses teleology. Instead of unfolding potentialities and premise them as approximations like an umbrella under one hope, teleonomic premises are open and give imaginative presence to potentialities of yet unknown hopes. Teleonomic premises can therefore also be seen as the premises for *expanding imagination itself.* It is again important to emphasize that such an expansion of imagination is not just an activity of the person but also of materiality and technology. Images can expand imagination by compressing major events or complex relations that are else not fathomable or imaginable (cf. Schraube, 1998, pp. 137-140); movies and art can be open-ended, so as browsing the web can.

Imagination as autotelic. We can engage in activities like daydreaming, fantasizing, play and the creation of 'otherworldy' worlds which do not seem to have any purpose beyond themselves. In these cases, the imagination is not (just) its own premise, but *its own purpose* (cf. Appadurai, 1996, p. 7), a kind of

finality. Similar processes as in teleonomy (curiosity, experimentation, exploration) drives it, but for its own sake, without any outspoken purpose for how we develop our living and hopes. As addressed in the beginning of this chapter, it is probably because of this quality that the imagination has been ignored or chastised in social sciences. Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) do not call the imagination *autotelic*, but they would claim that even these imaginative activities will return to our everyday living with an outcome, like relaxation, recreation and joy and in more critical situations relief from strenuous demands or even escape from unbearable conditions. But if we have to understand imagination as autotelic within the expansive frame of engagements, we can suggest that autotelic imaginative engagements do not need to serve any other purpose as they unfold. But what they may in unforeseeable ways become a potential and thus teleonomic or -logic premise for engagements later in life – or in somebody else's life – like a travel around the world would at one point in life appear as pure fantasy, but at a later point become possibility due to changes in life and circumstances. Of course, they end up in redundancy and impossibility as well, and are forgotten. There is an unwarranted paradox looming in thinking of the imagination as premise for expansive engagements when it is autotelic, namely because it can be (mis)understood as a *detachment* or withdrawal from engagements, as immersion in distant worlds instead of in current engagements. And what is created in this detachment may or may not serve some other purpose *later* in life. But imagination as autotelic can also become premise for and transform our relation to and immersion in current engagements. If we prepare food, we can imagine being up against a miniature army of ill-tempered vegetables that we need to fight. Or smoking a series of joints can be done in the imagined co-presence of actual or fictional characters or even in imagined atmospheres, scenarios and places. Although autotelic premises may seem to contradict the expansive frame in their lack of serving longer-term hopes or of creating potentiality, hopes and potentialities are not immune to autotelic processes of imagination.

Summing up: Imagination as expansive premise for engagements

To arrive at a preliminary conclusion, then, we can propose analytical aspects of how the imagination is implicated as absent premise for expansive engagements. On an ontological level the imagination is implicated in the development of hopes and imbuing engagements with teleology. As "Begreifen", imagination is involved in expanding our perception of how conflicts are ac-

tually linked to wider socio-material arrangements of our living and in developing imagined possibilities and potentialities to overcome contradictory conditions. And when composited into engagements as premises, potentialities become approximations that are gradually and partially presenced in processes or actualization of hopes. I have also argued for more open-ended processes by which imagination becomes absent premise for expansive engagements. I have called these processes teleonomic and autotelic characterized as emergent and vague directedness, similar to knowing of the third kind, without a known or certain goal. In lack of a definite goal, the absent premises are *quasi-approximations* pointing in multiple directions towards that which has not-yet-happened and is not-yet-clearly-imagined. Yet, the expansive quality lies in the potential transgression of the border into not yet known potentialities and hopes and reconfigurations of them, and thereby expanding the premise for imagination itself.

Nevertheless, it still remains open to explore 1) how premises become expansive for the person via reciprocations of digital media, i.e. how digital media reciprocate processes of developing hopes, expanding perception of conflicts, of imagining potentials and of compositing potentials into engagements as approximations; and 2) in more detail analyze how such approximations affect and are presenced in engagements of the person's everyday living. These are theoretical and analytical terms. Translated into the empirical field of interest, I want to explore in detail how the young people's imagined hopes and potentialities of dealing with drug-related problems emerge from their digital everyday living. And I want to explore how this emerging imagination concretely forms absent premises as hopes and approximations in the young people's disengagement from and transgression of drug-related problems.

Confronting "romantic" tendencies: Turning imagination into its own contradiction

The theories on imagination that I have used contribute significantly to helping us understand expansive processes in everyday engagements, how the person develops hopes and overcomes conflicts and constraints in his or her pursuits of hopes. But understanding engagements within the dual possibility of critical psychology also imposes a critical stance: How is the imagination implicated as premise for *restrictive* engagements? To some extent, this critique

is also taken up by Sneath et al. (2009) namely formulated as "the 'Romantic' tendency to ascribe positive connotations to the imagination" (p. 9) in favor of the negative and dystopian potentials of the imagination. Sneath et al. may here be thinking of imaginative practices that are still highly creative, but with detrimental effects on other people, like terrorism and torture. While this would be an interesting area of research, it does not entirely map the pursuit in this project. Imagination as premise for restrictive engagements, as I will shortly elaborate, has as its central concern how the imagination is implicated in *developing* conflicts and contradictions in a person's experiences and living. But the expansive and possibilistic assumptions of imagination are built into the very core of the theories we have used so far. For Vygotsky, it would be the creative construction of new forms by the *combinatory* operations of the imagination; for Wartofsky, tertiary artifacts co-constitute *possible* or *alternative* perceptual praxes to actual ones; for Gillespie and Zittoun, the imaginative looping out of experience is also an *expansion* of experience. To some extent, these are deliberate delimitations in the theories. Vygotsky was concerned with the role of creativity in development. Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) are concerned with the expansive instances of imagination where there is a clear uncoupling from immediate perception (p. 41). Nonetheless, it means that in order to encompass restrictive aspects of engagements, the conceptual foundation of the imagination needs to be formulated in a way where this aspect can be included. This is the purpose of the following section.

Towards a minimalist reassembling of the imagination and its specificities

How do we develop a conceptualization of imagination that in its core operations and specificities does not exclude possibilistic and expansive dimensions, but nor builds on them exclusively? And how do we do this without reducing the complexity of imagination? As already evident from this chapter, the imagination is not easily tamed or pinned down conceptually. And in attempts to delimit it, it will usually surface in other places. The heuristic that is applied in reassembling the conceptual foundation of imagination is to develop what I call a "minimal abstraction". By minimal abstraction I mean to refer to the *minimal activity that imagination can perform* in any process which it is involved in. When, for instance, a relation between absence and presence can be abstracted from processes, it shows that imagination is involved. I will

elaborate my propositions over the next pages. Even though I will attend to the *minimal* activity of imagination, the intention is not to exclude it from taking on more emergent and complex forms.

Backtracking the argumentation of the chapter, the minimal abstraction that I will propose now is framed within a dialectic ontology of imagination: Imagination is both *co-constituted* by engagements in and with sociomaterial arrangements and is *co-constitutive* of engagements in and with them. The following abstractions, then, cannot be attributed the person only, but should be seen as emerging from the transactional nexus of human and non-human, to borrow from the vocabulary of Latour (2005). I will propose four tenets. The first one of the minimally abstractable activity of imagination is as follows.

> **#1** The first minimal activity of imagination is *the transgression of the perceptually present by the perceptually absent*. The activity can be further specified as *absencing* and *presencing*. Absencing is the process of subsuming the perceptually present under what is absent; presencing as the process of, to some extent, compositing the absent into processes of actualization.

The processes are described as *transgressive* to underscore that the absent and present are mutually permeable. A danger with such a term is that it can be understood negatively as an act of violence (cf. Foust, 2010), as a negation of the one by the other. But it is the more neutral "boundary-crossing" meaning of the word that is applied here. Why is absent/present preferred over other presented pairings like possible/actual and as-if/as-is? As such, these pairings are also productive. But by using "possible" the abstraction becomes laden with productive and future-directed processes. So, where would we place imaginative processes that relate to the past or a (distant) present or to impossibilities? Concerning the as-if/as-is pairing, it can be interjected that the imaginative processes get confined to the hypothetical space of as-if. And if acted upon, would it then be a negation of itself? Would as-if not be transformed into as-is? Of course, it could be argued that the borders between them are fluid. That is why I highlight the *transgressive* relation between absent/present. Another reason for resisting as-if as minimal abstraction is that the imagination can also be implied in understanding and grasping actualities, as we saw in processes of "Begreifen". Understanding how experienced conflicts are linked to *actual* (= as-is) societal and socio-material arrangements implies imagining beyond that which is immediately perceptible.

The minimal abstraction of absencing/presencing also challenges (and is challenged by) other specifications of the imagination that have been drawn on throughout this chapter. If we apply this abstraction to Wartofsky's ordering of artifacts, it follows that the imagination is also operating on the first- and second-order artifacts and not only on the third. If we read it through Scarry's concept of reciprocation, and the concept of materialized imagination, in their freestanding form, objects hold absences that recreate and reciprocate us, irrespective of such ways of reciprocating follow conventions or not. As mentioned earlier, the chair readily materializes an absent form of sitting that may reciprocate and transgress my present doing and be presenced if actualized. In Vygotsky's conceptualization, we could say that the transgression of absent and present is a kind of *combinatory* act between the two. However, the implication of the combinatory operations, as described by Vygotsky, is the production of novel forms and broadening of experience. Transgression does not make such a promise – it may end up in convention, as seen above. In relation to the looping model by Zittoun & Gillespie, the imagination is a *decoupling* from immediate experience – it loops in and out of present experiencing. Transgression, in turn, also implies a merging of the absent and present – of bringing distant or absent 'things' *into* perception. Such operations resemble processes of *apperception.* Now, Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) deliberately exclude such processes from their model:

> Our conceptualization does not include apperception and the ways in which imagination might infuse the direct perception of the immediate situation. (p. 130)

Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) describe instances where there is a clear uncoupling from the immediate situation as "more prototypical" of the imagination (p. 41). The minimal abstraction argues for a wider understanding of imagination. Ongoing activities in immediate situations can indeed become more engaging, exciting, enlivened and intensified when they are transgressed by imagination – or to the contrary, become more disengaging if transgressed by 'negative absences'. The minimal abstraction can thus encompass processes "involved in everything from the basic perceptions of objects to our engagements with entirely immaterial knowledge" (Sneath et al., 2009, p. 12).

There is also a hesitation in *transgression* towards assuming that an expansion of experience necessarily follows imaginative processes. It is, of course, possible to claim that the present is *expanded* by the absent, or vice versa. I think expansion is still a too unclear term and can be misunderstood

in a progressionist way as *accumulation* of experience. If I, for example, imagine society as a capitalist devil, it can be discussed if this is necessarily an expansion of experience, or if it is rather a redundancy of experience. A more open term could be *modulation*: That transgression implies a modulation of the present via the absent or of the absent via the present. I will from here go on to the second tenet of the minimal abstraction.

> **#2** In the minimal activity of imagination transgressive processes of absencing/presencing operate *aesthetically*, not understood as artistic, but as *sensory-affective projections*.

This is a precision of transgression inspired by mainly Wartofsky and Scarry. That imagination operates aesthetically is a contraction of the alternative *perceptual* praxis generated by tertiary artifacts (Wartofsky) and the recreated human *sentience* projected into and reciprocated by objects (Scarry). Aesthetics is used here in a non-romantic way, but draws on its etymological roots, *aisthetikos* and *aisthanesthai*, which bring together the meanings of perception and feeling. One purpose of this understanding of aesthetics is not to privilege one single sense modality in the minimal abstraction as just the evocation of *images* (cf. Starobinski's quote). As I asked earlier, can we not also imagine via other percepts like sounds, smells and bodily sensations or an interaction of those (cf. Pink, 2009)? Aesthetics can capture those multi- and intermodal processes.

Another purpose is to underscore that such transgressions are often penetrated by feelings or affects. If a person experiences (or imagines) a scenario that generates an imagined song or soundtrack it is likely to establish a given atmosphere and mood. Vygotsky made the claim more global by saying that "every construct of the imagination has an effect on our feelings" (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 19). He also reversed it by claiming that experienced feelings and moods have a tendency to cluster together "impressions and images" (ibid., p. 18), or what I call percepts, that resonate with such moods of the person although the percepts may not be similar by any objective or external criterion. The affective dimension of aesthetics, then, helps us connect with the felt manifestations of the different kinds of *telos* of imagination discussed in the last section. And it may help us explore how the imagination as premise can co-constitute and modulate our felt relation and attachments to engagements and our living. If I keep imagining society as the devil, it will probably keep me disengaged from it (although I can never escape from it).

A third purpose of determining transgressive processes as aesthetic is to insist on the 'semi-concrete' sensory-affective operations of the imagination as opposed to abstract and conceptual ones. It is not to separate e.g. imagination from rationality[14], but it is to secure that the imagination is not overridden by language-based theoretical constructs like *narrative* and *discourse* from mainly social constructionist epistemologies grounded in the linguistic turn in social sciences. It does not mean that we cannot imagine language. But I would argue that language would be constituted in modalities as a concretely 'heard' voice and tone or 'seen' writing on a paper.

Another specification that was introduced in the second tenet is *projection*. I have already flirted with the term in varying forms throughout the dissertation. It is *not* to be confused with the psychoanalytical understanding of the term as a defense mechanism. As I have written earlier, our subjectivity also emerges from processes of being *thrown forth*, from that which is being *pro-jected*. Besides, Scarry also uses the projection as the inseparable process from reciprocation. The concept seems helpful to encapsulate the conglomerate of content, form, mode and activity of which the imagination is comprised. When just talking about the imagination it is easy to think of it as a singular faculty or process. But there is also *the* imagined: The subjective repertories of content and form. Talking about the subjective side as content/form of the imagination would not be enough. It would decouple imagination from activity, or *praxis* as in Wartofsky's theory. Projection seems to be adept at denoting an activity that is outward and simultaneously embodies imagined content/form. Life *projects* and projections thus hang together.

The more difficult task at hand is to specify further how transgressive projections work – how do the absent/present transgress and modulate each other? By pointing out combinatory operations Vygotsky very meticulously defined the micro-processes of the imagination. With caution, other *modulatory* processes can be proposed which range from adding to reducing complexity: Substantiation, substitution and subtraction (for similar suggestions see Tateo, 2015). Let's take a mundane activity like cooking from a recipe. A present recipe lists a number of ingredients and procedures that point to the presencing of an absent dish. If I take the recipe as premise it reciprocates me as a 'dish-maker', as a set of procedures and as a constellation of different materialities. But the present recipe can also be transgressed by other absenc-

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[14] See for instance Tateo (2015) and Sepper (2013) for discussions on how imagination and rational thinking in science are mutually dependent.

es that may emerge from other recipes, cooking programs or conversations with friends. *Substantiating* as modulatory process entails adding ingredients or procedures. So, although the original recipe will be changed in expression, e.g. by the tastes of other spices, it will still be present throughout the course of actualization. *Substituting* entails exchanging present ingredients for (yet) absent ones, e.g. potatoes on the recipe for carrots, and thus it implies negation of that which is present in the recipe in the course of actualization. *Subtracting* implies a process of simplification where listed ingredients or procedures are left out of actualization. As such, one could say that these processes *are* creative and render the minimal abstraction flawed at its pursuit of providing a conceptual foundation that is not biased towards productive and expansive understandings. But if the recipe is transgressed identically each time it is put into action – e.g. by substantiating it with the same spice – it will not be any more creative than any other act. It may appear as creative on the micro-level. But over time, the imaginative processes may also just be implicated in how things are 'usually done'.

Concepts like the three "subs-" above, inevitably add an undesirable static to the more fluid and animated processes of the imagination. But perhaps they can create a greater sensitivity towards the ways in which the imagination emerges as premise for engagements. It is again essential to underline that these modulations are internally related to materiality and are not inner, cognitive operations by the person only. Just imagine that you use Google to search for a specific recipe. The search projected into the search engine will be reciprocated by an overload of different recipe sources that amongst them contain variations and complementarity. The processes of substantiation, substitution and subtraction already emerge from this complexity although you originally only wanted to specify *one* recipe. And now to the third tenet:

> **#3** Transgressions of the present emerge from (and give emergence to) absent *complexes of projections.*

This is a more speculative proposition for the minimal abstraction of the imaginative processes. What it suggests is that while the talk of *the* imagination as if it refers to a singular content, form or process, a multiplicity of absent projections is always at work. Let's take a minimal (autotelic) example that potentially contradicts the proposition. You look at a white piece of paper. You imagine that the white color is substituted by green. So far it follows the

minimal abstraction: The present (white piece of paper) is transgressed (substituted) by the absent (the percept of green) and it is presenced (here, in writing). In this description, the projection is singular (only green) and thus contradicts #3! However, would it be unreasonable to suggest that the 'singular' projection of the percept green emerges from complexes of *other* absent colors, but for one reason or the other green is more predominant percept in that situation? Semioticians would probably agree. We can think further with another example. If you ask a friend where he would like to travel on his next vacation, you may get an answer like, let's say, 'Bermuda!' It appears to be a singular projection into the future. It may even be experienced so by your friend. What is suggested is that what here appears as a singular pick of destination is actually emerging from complexes of other, even competing, absent projections of possible destinations – other projections that would surface if for instance the prospect of going to Bermuda is challenged. So, what seems to be a single projection hides the fact that it emerges from a complex of ordered projections. Complexes do not need ordered in accordance with conscious decision-making or rational choice, but could be so because of a felt relevance, an embodied directedness, or an extended knowing of the third kind.

The third proposition of the minimal abstraction is an argument for understanding imagination as heterogeneous – or, as Zittoun & Gillespie (2016) put it, as "fundamentally dialogical. It is a layering up of social representations, images from modern media, the voices of others, and personal meanings" (p. 71). The term, *complexes* of projections, is inspired by Valsiner's theorizing of social representations. Drawing on Serge Moscovici, Valsiner (2013) similarly argues for understanding social representations as made up of complexes, resembling *cognitive polyphasia* meaning the "co-existence of mutually incompatible presentations within the same complex" (p. 2). Complexes are continuously ordered and reordered hierarchically according to shifting conditions and situations. This has nothing to do with a shortcoming of the human psyche, but it reflects the paradoxical nature of our social world (ibid.). We can apply this understanding to the imagination as emerging from and continuously reordering and modulating complexes of projections. And the last tenet:

> **#4** Multiple variations of imaginative processes should incarnate the minimal activities in #1-3, but not negate them.

The minimal abstraction may seem anemic and pale compared to the diversity and variety by which the imagination emerges and intervenes in our lives, not to mention the passions and anxieties that can accompany it. The point has been to generate a conceptual foundation that not only can be bend towards an expansive understanding of a person's engagements, but also towards restrictive understandings (see the next sections). Many variations are then open to empirical investigation. But some variations have already been presented. For instance, that the emergence of the imagination can be understood and investigated in small scale situations over a person's ontogenetic development to society – the microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic levels (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). I have also proposed that the transgression of the absent and present can emerge as autotelic, teleonomic and teleological in a person's life, and furthermore, that such emergences can have clear or vague subjective manifestations. But the conceptual foundation should be open to many more variations, for instance on spatial-temporal dimensions. Many of these are already covered in the work of Zittoun & Gillespie (2016). One spatial-temporal axis could concern the "space-time coordinates" by which absences transgress, or displace, the present. By means of our imagination we can travel through the past, present and future of proximal or distant places. Another spatial-temporal axis could concern the *saliency* vs. *futility* of imagined projections in our lives. On microgenetic levels, imaginative projections may shortly emerge from concrete engagements only to fade away again. Or they may emerge as more salient bodies with the potential of lasting longer and affecting the ontogenetic development of imagination. We can likewise think of more context-bound emergences of imagination as we can think of it as more stable vs. developing over time and space. These examples are just to illustrate the conceptual elasticity that the minimal abstraction is intended to serve while still acting as a conceptual foundation. From this conceptual platform, I will in the final section of this chapter discuss how the imagination is implicated as premise in restrictive engagements.

The imagination as premise for restrictive engagements

The theoretical chapters have so far argued for the centrality of the imagination for engagements in everyday living. they have argued against a subjectively isolated notion of the imagination and therefore for the imagination as

emerging from and having implications for ongoing engagements in a person's everyday living. A detailed understanding has been provided for how imaginative processes emerge as an internal relation between the person and the world in which the person engages, with a special focus on the material dimension of everyday living. From the vantage point of regarding the social world of our living as inherently conflictual and contradictory, a main objective of this project is to critically explore how the imagination is woven into this conflictuality – not just as counterpart that expands engagements beyond constraints and conflicts, but how it is part of the development and maintenance of conflict in a person's living. This is where the question arises of how the imagination is implicated in restrictive aspects of engagements as premise – how the imagination is essentially contradictory.

Building on the **restrictive** *aspect from critical psychology*

A preliminary understanding of restrictive aspects of engagements was presented earlier. Before it is discussed theoretically, this understanding can be recaptured. Instead of expanding engagements with potentiality for approximating or developing hopes, restrictive aspects can characterize engagements that maintain and reproduce the conflictual state of circumstances. Or they can be characterized by a one-sided or excessive narrowing in of engagements resulting in disengagements from everyday relations that become critically involved in producing conflictual and dilemmatic circumstances for the person. It would be easy to say that engagements become restrictive because the person is *lacking* imagination or, in the other extreme, dwells in totally unrealistic imagination. While this is possible, it does not need to be the case. More centrally, restrictiveness emerges when the relation between (long term) hopes and current engagements is one way disturbed or hindered. Additionally, engagements that maintain circumstances or are narrowed in isolate the person from acting upon hindrances and disturbances. *Restrictive* is also meant to state or describe the subjective side of the feelings of being 'stuck' or 'trapped' or being saturated by a corrupted sense of freedom.

     Restrictive is also used as a core term to denominate the other part of the dual possibility of action in the German roots of critical psychology. In short, it characterizes the possibility of acting *under* given societal conditions and pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term life interests (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 368; Maiers, 1991, p. 44). Hence, conflictual circumstances are upheld and not transgressed and expanded beyond. The under-

standing of restrictiveness in this project draws upon this understanding of reproducing and maintaining dilemmatic circumstances. Yet, it also departs from the meaning of restrictiveness in critical psychology which links restrictive aspects to oppressive capitalist power relations and arrangements – as was pointed out in the discussion on the expansive aspect. This project also emphasizes another dimension of restrictive aspects. The *narrowing in* of engagements adds a temporal dynamic of how engagements can develop into being restrictive. Although the restrictive frame is commonly described in critical psychology as securing the status quo instead of giving it up for the pursuit of expanded disposal over life conditions, the dynamics of narrowing in of engagements is not excluded. Disposals can be expanded or secured, but also *reduced* (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 370). We can think of this reduction as being imposed upon the person from without, like when rights taken away from a group of people in society, or when political reforms have unequal and distributed repercussions. But an idea behind the aspect of narrowing in is to grasp the temporal processes by which restrictiveness develops from or in relation to a person's ongoing engagements. If we take an example of work and career, the narrowing in of engagements could in this context mean that the work-life balance is being gradually pushed in favor of work, i.e. work and career-related engagements take up more time (and space) in our living. As such, this does not need to initiate, end with, or be related to conflicts with engagements in other life interests. But it may also be at the cost of other important areas of living that we then more and more disengage from. Put simply (and abstractly), the distance between first and second priority in one's living becomes greater. On the one hand, this could be viewed as expanding engagements, when viewed from a career pursuit: Dedicated engagements in one's career can create new higher-level possibilities in that context. In this sense, narrowing in of engagements is a necessity in our current society in order to create focus and direction in our living. And it would be quite opposite of reducing disposals over conditions. But on the other hand, other important areas of one's living may at some point down the line suffer and become neglected. Or they may change so that the pursuits involved in processes of narrowing in are not fit for dealing with these gradual or sudden transformations of circumstances.

So, what does restrictive, and expansive, refer to in this context? A cross-contextual interpretation could be that expansive engagements in one's career can lead to restrictive engagements in other life contexts, like in family

or in one's health. The contradiction here would be that engagements that are expansive in one area produces restrictive engagements in other areas of living. Another and more global interpretation could be offered. If these cross-contextual relations produce conflicts that the person is not able to transgress and expand beyond, then the person would be living within a restrictive framework overall. Without saying that one interpretation is true or false, the restrictive aspects that I want to emphasize or demarcate here in connection to the narrowing in of engagements are when 1) the persons is not able to transgress conflictual states in expansive ways and thereby is 'caught' in a stagnant and dilemmatic mode of contradictoriness and ambivalence; and 2) when engagements are *excessively* narrowed in to a point where they are seen one-sidedly as the 'only way' of pursuing hopes, but actually conflict with them, or to the point where the excessiveness eventually detaches engagements from hopes. We can explicate the restrictive aspect further by drawing on what critical psychology proposes as ways of thinking within the restrictive frame.

The subjectivity of restrictive aspects

Where "Begreifen" or comprehensive thinking is characteristic of the way of thinking within the expansive frame, "Deuten" or *interpretive thinking* is the characteristic way of thinking within the restrictive frame in critical psychology (Holzkamp-Osterkamp, 1975; Holzkamp, 1983; Maiers, 1991). "Deuten" means a perception, or interpretation, that is closely connected to, and therefore not extends majorly beyond, our immediate perception. "Deuten" is the involution of "Begreifen". It blocks the perception of how experienced conflicts are interrelated with contradictory socio-material arrangements of our living (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 383). And it implies that potentiality, or the perceived transformability of conditions, is subsumed under, or hidden by, *facticity*:

> Possibilities, where they are perceived, appear in such 'facticity'-thinking always only as *possibilities under 'factitious' conditions beyond disposal*, that is, subsumed under the blind facticity through which they can be eliminated. (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 386, own translation)

Holzkamp describes that the thinking that is caught in facticity and in the immediacy of perception loses the "epistemic distance" (ibid., p. 388) that is necessary for perceiving interrelations between one's existence and wider so-

cietal conditions and socio-material arrangements. The origin and cause of conflicts are convolved and individualized. "Deuten" is thus a "personalized way of thinking" (ibid., p. 390) since it isolates the person's existence from its social (and socio-material) interrelatedness. The person can act upon instances that are *interpreted* as the core problem, but will miss the mark and eventually fail. Applied to the present research project, "Deuten" would imply to perceive drug-related problems as originating in *my* problems with drugs. One small step towards epistemic distance would be to perceive drug-related problems as interrelated with the restrictiveness of *my* imagination. But a fuller step would be to understand how *my* imagination is co-constituted restrictively by the contradictoriness or one-sidedness of *my* digital everyday living which is also shared by others.

In the dialogue between Holzkamp (1973, 1983) and Osterkamp (1975), "Deuten" is developed as a *defensive* handling of conflicts since these are not resolved in the restrictive aspect[15]. They are only eliminated *in thinking*, but will remain contradictory in emotion (Holzkamp, 1983, p. 403). A more detailed account of defensive ways of handling conflicts can be found in Osterkamp (1975, pp. 288-290). To summarize shortly, restrictiveness emerges when the perception of interrelations, potentiality and pursuits of life interests are hindered and blocked by isolation, facticity and undermining of the attainability of life interests.

Traces of restrictive aspects in the theories on imagination

Let's return to the topic of the imagination. At first glance it may seem paradoxical to assume that imagination can act as a restrictive premise: Isn't the imagination suspended when thinking is dominated by facticity and blocking of potentialities? I will try to argue to the contrary. From here, the question follows: How can imaginative processes be implicated in the development of restrictive aspects? The last part of this chapter will be dedicated to this question.

If we take a look at the literature on the imagination that has been drawn on so far, a general assumption underpins it: The imagination is not

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[15] This is developed through a re-interpretation of the psychoanalytical defense mechanism ("Abwehr") where conflicts are situated in contradictory societal conditions instead of in the contradiction between society and human drives and urges.

entirely free; it is mediated by and developed through specific historical modes and conditions. The imagination, then, is also constrained, limited and bounded. Assumptions like that open up for a critique of the imagination – as giving it a restrictive signature does. Although the critiques in the literature do not depart majorly from each other, let us go a bit more into detail. Shared for Vygotsky, Wartofsky and Zittoun & Gillespie is that although the imagination is implicated in expansive processes, it is also *constrained*. As was pointed out earlier, Vygotsky claims that the creative extent of the imagination is proportional to the richness of the environment. Wartofsky claims that derivative processes of the imagination understood as tertiary artifacts are only relative to historically accomplished artifacts and perceptual modes of praxis. Zittoun & Gillespie are more detailed about the constrained aspect although it is not their primary focus. By drawing on the central concept from Crapanzano (2004) they point to "imaginative horizons" as the culturally defined space of possibility. Imaginative horizons are socially shared and culturally developed and frame what is possible for the individual to imagine and what is not. As they put it, "a Neolithic cave dweller could not have imagined space exploration as we do" (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 57). General for their theory is that the cultural elements that a person employs as imaginative resources have the double aspect of enabling and constraining imagination on ontogenetic as well as on microgenetic levels. Such constraints can be that e.g. films about India only give a constrained portrayal of how it is to be in India (ibid., p. 52). Cultural elements can also reduce complexity of possibilities: "other resources constrain our imagining (e.g., when we use the news about regional conflicts to reduce the range of possible holidays)" (ibid., p. 71). The example is simple but interesting. In the interest of this project, we can emphasize a person's "use" of news in the teleonomic sense of exploring possible holiday destinations or as justifying choices. But we can also from the perspective of distributed agency emphasize the redundancy of complexity (or "subtraction" as was presented in the last section) by how the news media can *affectively* reciprocate the person. By this I mean how the person is imaginatively recreated as a tourist in fear and danger and thus how the news media can reciprocate processes of a person's *distancing*, or disengagement, from some destinations and maybe *approximation of,* or engagement in, others. As I will return to shortly, the restrictiveness of the example from a critical psychological perspective also emerges from the facticity of the person-media-imagination interaction: The place in question *is* imagined *as* the news shows it to be. Zittoun & Gillespie also invite to a critical analysis of the re-

pressive conditions or power-politico constraints imposed on individual or collective imagination:

> Political powers that suppress access to potential resources for imagining, or censor engagement with even implausible imaginary experiences, actually undermine people's very capacity to imagine alternative futures. (ibid., pp. 127-128)

If such repressive conditions are expanded beyond merely constraining other people's *imagination*, a restrictive frame of imagination could cover imaginative projects that entail inflicting harm and suffering upon others. In the book *The Dark Side of Creativity* the editors have collected writings on how imaginative projects become morally objectionable in contexts of exploitation, manipulation and crime (Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010). And yet another example that challenges the 'romantic bias' of imagination is the anthology on how imagination is implicated in psychopathologies (Phillips & Morley, 2003).

Zittoun & Gillespie could possibly more systematically elaborate many more aspects on how they see the imagination is constrained. In the manner that they do, they seem to put the weight on the *borders* of imagination in the critical discussions: The point or vista that imagination cannot expand beyond. Within this border, the imagination still operates expansively, as the root of agency and freedom with the possibility of pushing the borders. As will be argued, constraints are part of restrictions of the imagination, but what if the expansive signature is changed with a restrictive one altogether in a discussion with critical psychology? How can we stipulate a conceptual frame for empirically investigating the imagination as premise for developing restrictive engagements?

Imagination as restrictive premise for engagements

Imagined interrelatedness and futures as constrained. We can start by situating the constrained imagination, as a border or horizon, within the restrictive aspect. As touched upon above, constraints upon the imagination can restrict the person's capacity to project him- or herself into alternative, long-term futures on an ontogenetic level. Hence, the person may feel compelled to engage in myopic pursuits when constrained imagined futures are composited as premise into engagements. The constrained imagination can

also be seen as implicated in the failure to perceive and imagine how one's engagements and conflicts are linked to wider socio-material arrangements. If I cannot imagine that my unhappiness is related to something else than myself, my imagination is constrained to the self-imagery of inadequacy and the interrelation with wider socio-material arrangements are subtracted. In terms of the defensive handling of conflicts we can see this as for instance a gradual elimination of contradictions that create the feeling of unhappiness. Transgressing unhappy feelings with imagery of being cursed or damned by black magic as premise for engagements isolates oneself from contradictory conditions in one's living and becomes restrictive since it hinders imagining potentialities in expansive ways.

Imagined facticity as substituting imagined potentiality. Maybe the most counterintuitive way of thinking about the imagination as premise for restrictive engagements is to perceive *facticity* as imagination. If circumstances appear as given and not transformable that must mean the absence of imagination! But no. If we take the perspective of critical psychology, facticity does *not* correspond to the actual. People will always have some possible scope of changing and influencing circumstances. This means that facticity as such is also imagined. It involves the transgression of the actual with an absence that is saturated by facticity. This is another reason for the skepticism towards the definition of the imagination as the connection between as-is and as-if modes of experiencing presented in the beginning of the chapter: Facticity is the relation to the world that is majorly imagined *as-it-is* and not *as-if-it-could-be*. When facticity forms the premise, it blocks out potentialities from engagements. Imagined facticity can also block pursuits in the sense that hopes are translated into *wishful thinking*: Changes are wished for, but the actualization thereof is perceived as *impossible* and therefore is not pursued (see Bloch's "abstract utopia" as a reversal hereof below).

Imagined facticity is one aspect that shows how imaginative processes operate within borders or horizons in *non-expansive* ways without contradicting the principle of the minimal abstraction: The present is still transgressed, but by facticity and not potentiality. The point is not that transgressions need to be simple and overly concrete, like not seeing hands-on possibilities for improving influence on e.g. working conditions. It could include many inter-transgressive layers or complexes of the feelings and imagined projections of being a 'cog in the wheel', 'a pinball' etc. that constitute the fabric of imagined facticity as premise for restrictive engagements.

Spatial-temporal rigidity and durability of imaginative projections. The minimal abstraction of the imagination was intentionally formulated without spatial or temporal dimensions. But if we have to grasp the restrictive aspect, those dimensions are key. In order for imagined projections, like a 'cog in the wheel', to form restrictive premises for engagements it presupposes that they are composited into engagements with a kind of longevity. They need to resist changes across time and space. If we think of the imagined projection of being a 'cog in the wheel', this could actually develop in an expansive way. If it allows the person to perceive the conditions of his or her existence as linked to a greater societal machinery and from there imaginatively substantiate the projection with potentialities of transforming this link, then it would develop into expansive premises for engagements. If, on the other hand, the 'cog in the wheel'-projection transgresses the present factitiously *as-it-is* and rigidly remains like that across time and space, it will develop as a restrictive premise for engagements. It can carefully be thought of as a *reproductive* imagination[16] where projections and transgressions have an identity cross time and space. Dewey's opposition of imagination and habituation was earlier criticized. And this is another reason for the critique. If the imagination is only attended to for its creative qualities, more habituated or reproductive aspects of it disappear.

However, premises are not just restrictively reproduced in the same way over and over again. They can also be developed – in a seemingly (and only seemingly!) expansive ways – into complexes that fortify the one-sided rigidity of restrictiveness. If the 'cog-in-the-wheel'-projections is continuously being substantiated by similar projections, like 'the pinball' or 'a pawn in the game', complexes of a person's imagination are being extended and thickened, but in a restrictive way. If these relations are seen in connection with Vygotsky's dialectic between imagination and feeling, the affective restrictiveness of engagements can be elucidated. Vygotsky proposed that imagination generates feelings and that feelings can cluster what we call imaginative projections. It means that a projection like the 'cog in the wheel' can *resonate* feelings of being trapped while also *generate* such a feeling. Furthermore, other af-

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[16] Not so much in a Kantian way of supporting perception of things (Johnson, 1987; Kant, 1976), but as an imaginative transgression of the present by absences in identical ways contrary to the productive and creative ways of the expansive frame.

fectively resonant projections can be clustered into what we call complexes of imaginative projections. If we think of it as simultaneous processes of resonating and generating, an intensifying spiral of imagination and affect can emerge. This spiral, in turn, may solidify moods and feelings in engagements in one-sided, narrowed-in and restrictive ways across time and space. The imagination/feeling complexes can be complexified even more: Not only imaginative projections can be clustered, feelings can also become clustered in mutually substantiating complexes of affect (cf. Illouz, 2009, p. 385).

Processes of narrowing in: Excessive engagements generated by strong attachments to imaginative projections. The rigidity just described refers to instances when being trapped is felt negatively by the person. We can imagine that such narrowing in of affect and imagination can imply a gradual detachment and disengagement from practices that such feelings are linked to. But the picture can also be reversed. Engagements may gradually become excessive and one-sided because the imaginative projections transgressing them may feel overly saturated with relevance for the person. This is what I describe as developing *strong attachment*. It could concern actual or pursued aspects of one's living without which life would seem to lose its essential meaningfulness. This could be seen as great spirit, passion and tenacity (cf. the discussion on Alexander p. 38). But it can be analyzed as restrictive when it becomes one-sided in the sense that it (also) serves to block out something conflict-ridden or to eliminate contradictions in one's living. Conflicts can also be developed *from* excessive engagements – for instances if initial hopes gradually become decoupled and discrepant from engagements. It produces a paradoxical subjectivity, an *abstracted telos*, where hopes are felt as immensely relevant but abstracted from concrete engagements. In some sense it is similar to Bloch's "abstract utopias" as opposed to "concrete utopias" that are grounded in *real* possibilities (Bloch, 1976; Nissen, 2013). It becomes restrictive because of the abstracted relation between engagements and imaginative projections. And it is restrictive because the strong attachments make engagements 'the only possible way of living' and blocks out expansive transgression of substantiating hopes and potential engagements.

Dilemmatic excess of imaginative projections. The last proposition of understanding imagination as restrictive premise for engagements involves a contrary movement to the narrowing in of imagination and engagements. It relates to situations where imagination emerges as *polytelic* – where a multiplic-

ity of equally (un)important imagined directionalities creates a dilemma of which directedness should be approximated and actualized. Scarry suggests in passing that imagination inherently can be the source of the problem due to its own *largesse*:

> This inherent largesse may manifest itself in a wholly benign form (e.g., the excessive reciprocating action within the single object) or instead in a form (e.g., the numerical excessiveness of objects) that, though essentially benign, is also problematic, and hence must itself be subjected to the problem-solving strategies of imagining. (Scarry, 1985, pp. 323-324)

In the looping-model, Zittoun & Gillespie write that imagination can be triggered by events or life transitions and works its way towards a solution. Scarry implies, to the contrary, that problems may not only be exterior to the imagination, but can be *consequences* of its inherent largesse (ibid.). This is a much more contradictory rendering of the imagination: "The source of the problem is also the source of the solution" (ibid., p. 324). One way of understanding this excess as restrictive, could be to think of it in continuation of the last section: as the abundant production of "one imagined world" which is being excessively invested in and imaginatively expanded in detail. But where this case would exemplify a strong uni-directionality, what I aim at explicating here is dilemmas emerging from multiplicity. If we think of a person's directionality as accomplished by a hierarchical ordering of a complex of imagined projections, dilemmas emerge if such complexes are *flattened*. Relevancies of imaginative projections would then compete and conflict with each other. These processes operate oppositely of one-sidedness. Where the one-sidedness of strong attachment can lead to excessive engagements, the excess of felt importance of mutually exclusive imaginative projections can lead to dilemmatic stagnation of engagements. This draws the attention to the fact that complexes consist of a multiplicity of imaginative projections that internally are affectively polyvalent in potentially contradictory ways.

Summing up the conclusions

In the previous chapter, the purpose was to develop a conceptual frame for how imagination is central for everyday engagements and how it is co-constituted by and emerging from material aspects of everyday living. In this

chapter, contradictory aspects of imaginative processes have been conceptualized based on the conflictual understanding of activities in everyday living in critical psychology. The contradictory aspects of imagination as expansive vs. restrictive cannot be fathomed by looking at imagination alone. They need to be seen in the concrete ontogenetic developments of the person and how the person's engagements are related to societal conditions and possibilities of approximating imagined pursuits. Even though the restrictive vs. expansive aspects have been treated separately in this chapter, they should rather be approached as connected, but in a contradictory way. The restrictive aspect could in short be seen as a hindrance of moving towards the expansive aspect, and the expansive aspect transgresses the restrictive aspect. And there is also the possibility of understanding the contradiction in a simultaneous way as when expansive aspects of imagination also produce restrictive aspects. I have also stressed that restrictive aspects encompass more than the fact the that imagination is also always *constrained*. It is common for all the theories that I have drawn upon that psychological processes are mediated and bounded by socio-culturally specific conditions, circumstances and artifacts. But the restrictive aspect refers to the development, reproduction and maintenance of conflictuality in a person's living. And I have therefore argued how the development and transgression of conflicts are related to imagination and proposed the initial concepts that can help us think in that direction.

A prerequisite for understanding and analyzing the contradictory implications of imagination, is to establish a concrete connection between imagination and engagements. I have proposed that the concept of *premises* can be useful in doing exactly this. Based on the critique that there is a tendency to theorize imagination in expansive terms, I have advocated for a minimalist conceptualization of basic imaginative processes which can be unfolded to encompass restrictive aspects too.

Grounded in the theoretically developed understanding of the dialectics of imagination, the next part of the dissertation will empirically investigate young people's engagements in drugs. I will explore how the two dimensions of imagination and digital media form premises for their drug engagements, and how their digital everyday living is implicated in processes that develop restrictive aspects of their imagination, how they block movements towards expansive aspects, and how they co-constitute processes that transgress and overcome restrictive aspects.

Presencing III: Empirical Analysis of Digital Reciprocations of Imaginative Processes in Young People's Drug Engagements

Overview:

In this part of the dissertation, the second dialectical step – the empirical grounding of the conceptual work – is unfolded. The previous act of presencing has developed the theoretical framework of the thesis. While it proposes a line of thinking about imagination in everyday engagements into psychological theorizing, it also lays out the conceptual foundation of the empirical analyses of how the relation between young people's imagination and digital everyday living is implicated in their drug engagements and in their development of and dealing with drug-related problems. In the next four chapters in the third act of presencing, these relations are explored and analyzed empirically guided by the empirical research questions. Mainly interviews with six people aged between 16 and 25 constitute the core material.

The methodology is presented in the next chapter. It will serve as a link between theory and empirical work. It will also make the research processes and approaches transparent and argue for the consistency of the research all together, even though all processes did not fan out as planned.

Over the three chapters that follow, I analyze how the young people's drug engagements have developed from the relation between their imaginative processes and their digital everyday living. In chapter 6, I analyze how drugs become engaging through being a part of the actual and imagined living and projects of the young people. I will argue that from the

perspective of the conflicts that the young people are trying to deal with, and of the imagined projects they are in the process of developing and actualizing, aspects of the drug engagements and imagination can be interpreted as forming premises for expanding their everyday engagements.

Chapter 7 is a detailed analysis of how the digital everyday living of the young people is implicated in narrowing their imagination in on and intensifying drug engagements. I will show how these intensification processes still embody premises that expand engagements, but also develop premises that restrict engagements in relation to conflicts that pre-exist, develop from or coincide with the intensified engagements in drugs. Drugs keep on being engaging because of what they imaginatively 'promise', but also because of the imaginative processes that are being suspended. I will analyze how this contradiction emerges from and is being stabilized and promoted by the young people's digital everyday living in various ways. The central insights consist of how the intensification processes are not only emerging from how the youngsters actively imagine 'themselves'; they also emerge from imaginations that are materialized in their digital everyday living.

In chapter 8, I will analyze how the digital everyday living is implicated in how the young people imaginatively transgress and deal with current or recent problems related to their drug engagements. I will start by clarifying the processes of suspending imagination. After that, I will follow the processes by which the conflictuality of the contradictory imagination is being realized and subsequently dealt with.

Chapter 5: Methodology – Messing up Methods and Cleaning up. Researching the Relation Between Person and Technology in Drug Engagements

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the research has developed and how methodological reflections can qualify the methods and processes of generating the empirically grounded knowledge. There is a specific reason for placing this chapter not only before the empirical analysis, but also *after* the conceptual work. Methods are not simply chosen from an abstract or disciplinary criterion as, for instance, 'psychology employs methods *x, y, z*' or 'method *g* is prototypical for qualitative methods'. Instead, the cohesiveness is developed from *within* the research project as a whole. This means that methods should be developed or employed according to their *sensitivity* towards *investigating the object of research*. The object in this project is established empirically by formulating a problem related to the concrete living of the research participants. But it is also established theoretically by the conceptual development in the chapters 2 to 4. Chosen methods should then also be sensitive to conceptual understandings of the object and problem. The methodological principle that I build on here is also known as *object-adequacy*. Object-adequacy can be regarded as a form of objectivity and a guiding thread for the consistency of the research. I will explain the principle in more detail and also discuss the methodological implications for the way in which I have constructed the field of research and the conceptual groundwork. After that, I will step-by-step explain how the methods and procedures were originally imagined and how they turned out. This is important in order to make the research *transparent*. The transparency of procedures and methods lays out the foundation for discussing the object-adequacy of the actual conduct of empirical work. This I will discuss subsequently, but I will also argue for the advantages of the actual research design. Finally, I will address some ethical issues related to the research. But before all this, I will shortly present the tapestry of this whole chapter, which is inspired by Law, whom I also introduced in the very beginning of this dissertation.

The world is a mess – so are methods

When I started developing the research proposal, I had a rather clear idea of what I was supposed to do methodologically and how. When I began to work more intensely with research design and the actual empirical work, many of the things that were originally clear were gradually substituted with doubts and changes of plan. Luckily, in the same period I finally got the chance to read an article by Law, which I had wanted to read for a long time. Law's article gave me the confidence that my project was not totally inadequate and that I could do something with it despite the fact that reality had shattered my original plans. The article *Making a Mess with Method* (Law, 2007) follows a poststructuralist argument that the social world is essentially a *mess*. This statement could be interpreted as a call for scientific research to 'un-mess' the social world with stringent methodological orderings, abstractions and operationalization. However, Law argues that scientific endeavors are likewise subjected to this messiness. The plurality, multiplicity and flux of the social world make objects of scientific research not only "moving targets" but also "shape-shifting targets" (ibid., p. 598). Any claim of linear or coherent processes from desk-work over methodology to empirical research and 'un-messing' conclusions is thus a fiction, according to Law. Methods cannot un-mess the messy ontology of the social world, so to speak. I will not go so far as to leaving the current research in a concluded pile of methodological mess – my ambition is to clean up as much as possible. But Law's text consoled me in the mess that I was experiencing insofar as he points out that the mess is a general condition of doing research in a social world, and thinking otherwise would be a sign of denial and a silencing and Othering of other parts of the social world that do not fit into the coherent picture (cf. the tension between absence/presence in research mentioned in the introduction). Sometimes I prefer to call the mess, that I encountered throughout my empirical work, a *protest of practice*. The protest is essentially productive because it challenges our thinking, prejudgments and one-sided imagination. Noticing the protests makes us aware of the fact that the empirical world cannot simply be hooded by theory and methodology. The development of knowledge depends on interactions between them, including the mutual displacements of empirical material, theory, and methods. I consider *methodology* as the meta-level where these interactions and displacements can be articulated and discussed.

Object-adequacy as methodological principle

When doing research in the tension between mess and ordering, a methodological principle like object-adequacy can help us guide and qualify the research. In very condensed form, object-adequacy refers to the selection or development of methods that are adequate to researching the *theoretically informed understanding of the object of research*. Although I present this principle as something esoteric, the thinking behind it pervades many disciplines of science, also when synonymous terms are used. It is used as both a form of objectivity (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 269) and of validity. Sociologist, Norbert Elias, proposed object-adequacy as a way of appraising knowledge beyond discussions on 'true' or 'false' knowledge (Elias, 1970). Since much of the work so far in this thesis draws on critical psychology, I will present the understanding of object-adequacy through Holzkamp's argumentation. But I will also draw on Holzkamp because object-adequacy in his version of critical psychology is part of a wider argumentation for how the scientific self-understanding of psychology has been in conflict and how it should develop. It therefore has a wider scope than just qualifying methods.

Holzkamp's discussions on object-adequacy (see e.g. Holzkamp, 1983) should be seen in relation to his critique of the scientific self-understanding that psychology has developed. He observes that psychology in its scientific development has taken the standard experimental design from natural sciences and applied it to the study of psychological functions and phenomena (Holzkamp, 2013b). The problem that he sees is that, by taking this design per default, empirical research construes psychological processes in a way that does not reflect actual-empirical processes. It ultimately moves psychology away from its subject matter which is being subsumed under the stringency of methods. Holzkamp has not been alone in this kind of critical thinking. The authority given to methods as worshipped warrants of the path to truth has elsewhere been critically labelled "methodolatry" (Brinkmann, 2015, p. 411). Object-adequacy argues that authority should primarily be given to the object instead of squishing it by claimed superiority of particular methods. Holzkamp goes through some basic argumentative steps to show how psychology has 'gotten it wrong'. First of all, the experimental design is built on a stimulus-response model by dividing empirical *factors* in dependent and independent *variables*. Next, he criticizes that the psychological processes observed in the lab – as the preferred research context of the standard experimental

design – are treated as independent from the everyday lives of research partic-ipants and of researchers. Holzkamp regards this as a misconception of ele-mentary psychological processes: People's activities are not conditioned in a causal sense, neither are they in isolated settings – activities in one context is always interconnected with other contexts. People are actively participating in their living and have *reasons* for their actions; and the reasons originate from specific socio-historical conditions that people can act upon and transform as meanings and premises for their activities. For Holzkamp this results in the argument for studying people's subjective reasons for conducting their every-day living as the subject matter of psychology (Holzkamp, 2013b). There is no need to go deeper into this argument in order to understand the purpose of object-adequacy as methodological principle: The research problem is an actual-empirical object; theory should help us to sharpen our understanding of the object; methods should help us research the theoretically informed re-search object empirically. But this is premised on the principle of *adequacy* be-tween object, theory and methods. At first sight, object-adequacy could be seen as the broom and soap that cleans up the mess that Law 'creates'. But in fact, it is not so. Law actually goes on, from his understanding of the social world as messy, to suggest ways of handling and researching the messiness (Law, 2007, pp. 602-604). The mess remains in Law's research and instead he starts messing with methods (read: developing methods that are sensitive to mess). In that sense, I would argue that he indeed is trying to develop a method that is adequate to the (messy) constitution of his subject matter.

Object-adequacy, as for instance in Holzkamp's argumentation, could be regarded as a critique from qualitative camps against the understanding and development of knowledge in 'hard sciences'. To the extent that this is true, it is also unjust. Such a critique would seem to forget the rigorous dis-cussions on validity forms which accompany even rigid statistical-experimental research designs. In fact, one form of validity – *construct validity* – seems to have similarities with object-adequacy: The evaluation of the extent to which the applied method and operationalization is capable of measuring the (understanding of the) researched construct (Gregory, 2007, p. 131; Hoyle, Harris, & Judd, 2002, p. 31). The questions go in the same direction: 'If we want to measure *memory* or *intelligence*, (how) are our methods capable of this?' The argument for object-adequacy (vs. construct validity) as methodo-logical principle would be that it implies a more comprehensive inclusion of theoretical and epistemological frames. No matter if we look at intelligence or memory, these constructs are embedded in wider assumptions about the psy-

che: Is intelligence innate, is it situational and culturally specific, is it moldable? The way I understand Holzkamp's critique and argument is that these foundational questions are impossible to engage in when the standard design, for instance, is essentially constructed as a stimulus-response setup. It will never be adequate to the actual-empirical constitution of psychological processes that he argues for.

The way that I am going to discuss object-adequacy in relation to the project is as follows. I will first discuss it in relation to my empirical research questions because they embody the object that I am researching. Next I will expand the discussion by incorporating the epistemic implications of the theoretical development by which I have specified the understanding of the subject matter. And after that I will relate the discussion to the more general question on how to conduct research on the relation between persons and things (technologies) in which the former two points are embedded. In the end of the section, I will outline implications and challenges for making research methods adequate.

Object-adequacy of the research project

The guiding line for discussing object-adequacy is first of all the empirical research question(s) of the project. To recap the questions:

> How is the digital everyday living of young people implicated in the emergence of imaginative processes related to their drug engagements?
>
> How are these imaginative processes implicated in how drug-related problems are developed and dealt with?

If we focus on the first and general question, the object of research could be determined by the central nouns: young people's drug engagements, imaginative processes, digital everyday living, and so on. But I would say that the object is even more specific. Some may prefer a concept like *unit of analysis* for making this specification. One way or the other, I understand the object as the consequential *relation* or *interaction* between these nouns because "implications" are explored. What the question actually says is that the project is interested in investigating the *interactive relation* between young people and their

digital everyday living and how this has implications for how imaginative processes *emerge*. The methodological question is then how *interactive relations* and *emergences* can be investigated empirically. The interest of the project is not just a phenomenological study of the young people's *experiences* of digital media, imagination and drug engagements. The interest in imaginative processes, however, implies an interest in a subjective side which excludes a purely interactionist design. How to combine the interactive level of people and digital technologies with the subjective level of the manifestations of imaginative processes?

If we reflect on the interactive level, the research interest is in a specific kind of relation. As follows from the dialectic understanding of internal relations both persons and the digital everyday living are *actively implicated* in the emergence of imaginative processes: Persons imagine and objects reciprocate. The interest is therefore not in quantifiable correlations where x amount of technology-exposure is correlated with 1) a y amount of imaginative processes and 2) with z amount of drug engagements or consumption. When the implications of young people's digital everyday living are in focus, the interest is in the *qualitative* relation between them. The interest is, then, not one-sided as in how the digital everyday living has an *effect* on young people's imagination and drug engagements or, reversely, how young people *use* their digital living as they please. The subjective level is crucial when it comes to researching imaginative processes. Although it has been argued that imagination does not exclusively involve 'inner' processes, it is difficult to investigate them without subjective accounts. If we imagine that the researcher would just observe interactions between people and digital media, the concrete interactions with digital media could give a hint about imaginative processes. If, for instance, a person would listen to a song, musical elements like lyrics, style and atmospheres could be objectifications that co-constitute processes of the imagination. But just as much as imaginative processes are not detached from the world of artifacts, they are not 1:1 reflections of artifacts (cf. Ilyenkov, 2009). And as Vygotsky (1978) acutely has pointed out, the *field of attention* does not correspond directly to the whole *field of perception*. The subjective level is necessary in pointing out the elements that reciprocate imaginative processes. And it is necessary in understanding how these imaginative processes are related to drug engagements – a relation that is not readily observable.

The subjective level does not stand alone. It is still to be related to the interactive level. Technologies are also taken to be "actors" – they reciprocate the relation. If the research question is only investigated via subjective ac-

counts, the reciprocations would become synonymous with subjectivity and thus collapse the interactive relation. Adequate methods should then be sensitive towards the activities of both research participants *and* digital technologies. Hence, they involve subjectively centered and decentered perspectives.

The interest is further to explore imaginative processes related to drug engagements as *emerging* from this relation. In social theory, *emergence*, as social theorist Roger Sibeon describes it, is usually used to describe phenomena whose properties "are not manifest in any of its constituent parts, properties that arise by virtue of the relation between or interaction among the parts" (Sibeon, 2004, p. 76). Emergence, then, presupposes that imaginative processes are neither completely available in the research participants' head, nor are they directly transferred into their heads by digital technologies. In social theory, then, emergence denotes a special quality of phenomena. But emergence can also be used to denote the *processes* and *development* of phenomena from interactions of parts. That imaginative processes *emerge*, then, can also mean that the imagination is not only *being*, but also *becoming*. Hence, a temporal aspect can also be incorporated in the concept of emergence. But it is not a temporal becoming of a specific teleology or directionality. Processes are seen as open-ended, moving between the temporary and manifest, the vague and vivid, the partial or complete, the singular and multiple, etc. In this perspective, emergence is *rhizomatic* (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Apart from the sensitivity towards interactive relations, methods adequate to emergence should also embody a temporal sensitivity.

Reflections upon possible methods

As an interim reflection, what methods could possibly be adequate to the ways in which the object is unfolded until now? Well, researching the *digital everyday living* of young people would implicate to situate the research in the concrete living with digital technologies of the young people. Going into people's everyday living is related to *field research* associated with anthropology where typical methods are variations of ethnography and participant observations. These methods enable the study of subjectivity simultaneous with the concrete interactions with things including technology. Field research is normally conducted over a period of time which also enables research in the emergent aspect of imaginative processes. It is therefore not coincidental that ethnography has been embraced as research method in STS. Its aptness of

"following the actor" (cf. Latour, 2005, p. 12), no matter if human or non-human, seems sensitive towards studying the distributed agency of people and technology. In STS, as in other fields, ethnography is also being pushed. Conventionally situated in one site or practice, ethnography is confronted with the multiplicity of contexts that people and objects move between in everyday life. Hence, STS-scholars like Donna Harraway and Bruno Latour have established the importance of *multi-sited* ethnography (Marcus, 1995, pp. 103-104). The multi-sited approach could warrant promise for this present study. The research is not just interested in the interactions between people and things/technologies. When the technologies in question are simultaneously *media* they co-constitute the co-presence of multiple sites: The concrete site of person-technology interaction and the digital sites that the technologies bring into that concrete site. Even qualitative methods for 'just' studying the digital sites already have a tradition known as "virtual ethnography" (see e.g. Hine, 2000). This is not an exclusive list of methods that could be argued for as object-adequate. But before discussing more concrete methods, another aspect of developing object-adequacy is to generate a sensitivity towards theory.

Including the conceptual dimension in object-adequacy

The interactive and emergent relations that I have discussed above have also been specified conceptually through the theorization of imagination. As I have addressed the imagination as *absent*, we can ask in the same rhetoric: How do we make the absent *empirically present*? Here it would be appropriate to retort that it is necessary to engage in dialogues with the research participants, so that they can articulate and make present what is seemingly absent and imaginative. But I want to go even further and ask: Dialogue, how? This question is an implication of the conceptual work. One of the conceptual specifications was how to understand the relation between imaginative processes and reciprocations of digital media and how this relation is composited into (drug) engagements. I suggested to use the concept *premises* for zooming in on those concrete aspects of imagination and reciprocations that are being approximated and/or distanced in the young people's drug engagements. Schematically, the relation could look something like this: Imagination<premises>reciprocations. Researching premises obligates methods on investigating *concrete* drug engagements, i.e. how concrete drug engagements are premised on imaginative processes and reciprocations of digital media.

Premises were further specified as not implying a strict causality or linearity, as in reciprocations → imaginative processes → premises → engagements. Through premises, the person brings imagination and reciprocations together in the actualization of engagements. Premises are simultaneously moldable in the process of actualization. On top of that, they do not need to be clearly identifiable to the person, although premises are never independent of the person's activity or imagination. They may emerge with the directed but vague quality of *knowing of the third kind* which was described as the embodied and felt directedness of the person. There is a possibly tacit aspect of premises which has to be adequately researched empirically. If we think dialogue in terms of verbal exchanges, there needs to be an argument for the congruity between language and tacit aspects of subjectivity. And more. The issue does not only relate to tacit subjectivity; it also relates to the aesthetic, or sensory-affective, aspects of imagination and reciprocations. It would be possible to argue that tacit subjectivity is only tacit until it is put into language, and so, the tacitness could be communicated and made intersubjective. But what about subjective aspects that fundamentally escape language or are corrupted by the translation into language? As I argued by drawing on Wartofsky and Scarry, I stipulated the second tenet of the minimal abstraction of imaginative processes as the *aesthetic transgression* of the absent and present. According to Wartofsky the imagination as tertiary artifact involves the emergence of alternative *perceptual* praxis, and according to Scarry reciprocation is understood as the recreation of human *sentience*. By this I suggest that investigating imaginative processes and reciprocations empirically implies methods that are sensitive to aspects that are subjectively manifest in percepts and aesthetics – without necessarily being tacit, although they might also be. And if the consequence has to be taken even further, it raises another question: How do percepts – e.g. a sound, a picture, a 'feltness' – become premises for engagements?

Discussing the relation and interaction between language and perception is immensely complex and could easily result in a theoretical dissertation on its own. The shortcut I will make in order to focus on methodology is to point to approaches that recognize the implications of different modalities for processes of signification and experiencing (and thus imagining). These approaches include semiotics (e.g. Chandler, 2007) – especially the Peircean tradition – studies in multimodality (Jewitt, 2011), and sensory ethnography (Howes, 2003; Pink, 2009) although the interest is also present in many other

approaches including the (methodology of) affective turn (Knudsen & Stage, 2015) and the phenomenology of embodiment (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). It would be too simple to state that these approaches argue that language constitutes a *disembodied* subjectivity, and that perception and affect constitute an *embodied* subjectivity. Mostly, they try to overcome this dichotomy. But the basic premise is that subjectivity cannot be entirely translated into language. If we take a very simple example of someone imagining a forest, the imaginative projection would most likely be co-constituted by percepts like shapes, colors, shades, scents, gradients, spatial extensity, maybe even atmospheres. There would as such not be any problem in referring to and sharing that imagination by saying the word "forest". But it would be stripped of the aesthetic richness and possible significances of the particularities. Even if more words would be used to describe the imaginative projection, there will still be a qualitative difference between the concepts and the referenced percepts. Valsiner (2006) has described this difference as two lines of signification – *schematization* and *pleromatization* – as processes by which experience and understanding is made simple or complex respectively. Mediating the imaginative projection of the forest in the word "forest" is a schematization which makes the complexity and richness of the projection redundant, where if the concept "forest" were to be mediated by a depicted forest in its perceptual and aesthetic richness, the concept would be pleromatized. If any subjective aspect can be schematized and pleromatized, verbal dialoguing would then only suffer on the object-adequacy of complexity. Imaginative processes can then be shared and exchanged, albeit in reduced form. However, if imaginative processes would be excluded by verbal forms, because they either emerge in everyday engagements where they are hardly acknowledged (at least in verbal form) or because research participants would find it almost impossible to articulate them verbally, then the object-adequacy of verbal dialoguing would be diminished all together. And this could be the case when the processes of imagination and reciprocations are understood in aesthetic terms.

Anthropologist, Sarah Pink, has taken these issues seriously and also discussed the implications for methodology (Pink, 2009). In essence, Pink's work is intended to help the research interested in the *sensory everyday living*. It builds on the central understanding that people do not only engage in and relate to everyday living through language. Our actual and imagined engagements are always *emplaced* (ibid.). Emplacement is a relational concept that refers to the multi-sensorial relation between a person's mind, body and environment. Making methods adequate of researching emplaced aspects is then

by means of "accounting for the relationship between bodies, minds and the materiality and sensoriality of the environment" (ibid., p. 25). This does in no way exclude verbal accounts. But Pink suggests that moving the empirical attention away from language as the central object, gives the possibility of emplaced aspects to become present. As she writes about research participants, they:

> …refer to the sensoriality of their experiences not only verbally through metaphor, but through gestures, actual touching, sharing scents (e.g. perfumes, sprays and other products), sounds (e.g. playing music, demonstrating a creaking door), images (e.g. showing photographs) and even tastes (e.g. offering the researcher food or drink to try). (ibid., p. 82)

In this way, Pink suggests that dialoguing can be carried out through other routes than primarily verbal ones. Exchanges can involve variations and combinations of bodily interactions, a multiplicity of artifacts, verbal accounts and so forth. The attention to emplacement as the relation between a person's multi-sensory subjectivity and material environment can thus qualify the object-adequacy of methods employed to study the aesthetic processes of imagination and reciprocations.

Challenges of supposedly adequate methods

Based on this discussion on object-adequacy, a proposed research method for investigating the research question could be summarized on a very general level: A multi-sited ethnographic design where the researcher over a given time period observes and participates in the concrete interactions of young people with their digital everyday living in order to explore how these are implicated as imaginative premises for the concrete drug engagements; the participatory approach would be cultivated by the perspective of emplacement where special attention is paid to aesthetic interrelatedness between the young people's imaginative processes, digital reciprocations and premises for drug engagements. But before venturing into specifying this suggestion, a number of challenges should be mentioned.

The first concern that arises in relation to the question on *how* to participate in the digital everyday living of research participants. One characteristic of digital media is that they to a large extent are mobile. So, they are not easily pinned down to one locality. This creates an uncertainty about when

and where to participate. Another characteristic is the relatively small size of the technologies. If interactions with smartphones constitute a significant part of the digital everyday living of a young person, the smaller-screened technologies will make it difficult for the researcher to participate in those interactions without being too intrusive. Especially if it is coupled with the dynamics of mobility, "following the actors" could turn out to be an invasive affair. This concern is intensified when considering the research population. It is reasonable to assume that at least some of the young people engaged in drugs would experience themselves to be in a marginal position. The invasiveness of methods could feed into a felt stigma among these participants. This issue could be counteracted by developing trust and familiarity between research participants and researcher. That would require time and initially other 'softer' approaches.

An alternative way of dealing with the issue would be to reduce the participation to only necessary and central digital activities. Another issue emerges here, which goes beyond the particular research group. How can more relevant digital activities be filtered from less relevant activities? Since digital media are regarded as being ingrained in the everyday living, many digital activities will not be related to drug engagements. This links back to the issue concerning the when and where to conduct the research. The concrete drug engagements could delimit the practice of participation to investigate what digital and imaginative premises form those exact engagements. The methodological concern in this solution is that the research could be too closely related to a stimulus-response model: That drug engagements follow directly from certain digital activities and imaginative processes. The scope would be too narrow to be sensitive towards digital activities and imaginative processes that emerge at a distance from the immediacy of concrete drug engagements. All these concerns have also led me to considerations on the possibilities of utilizing the technologies themselves as research *methods* and not only as part of a research *object*. All digital activities leave virtual traces and are as such already documentation. Possibilities of logging digital activities could give new access to the digital everyday living than through direct face-to-face participation. This would be easy if the young people would only interact with a single device. But it is very likely that a multiplicity of devices constitutes the digital everyday living of young people. On top of that, logging techniques primarily work when activities are on online-activities. Other activities – like listening to music, watching a movie, writing a note – would not be

documented. Besides, logging all digital traces uncritically have ethical challenges and could be met with resistance from research participants.

So, although I above have stipulated criteria for qualifying object-adequacy of methods, it is still unclear how the empirical material should be generated and what the material should consist of. Through what material can imaginative and digitally reciprocated aspects of premises for drug engagements be documented and researched?

Transparency: How the method and empirical work *imaginatively* and *actually* developed

The aim of going into these and the following reflections on methodology is to create transparency in the development of research. Transparency can be regarded as a specific *scientific* standard no matter if we are talking hard or soft sciences, although the function may differ. In general, the purpose of transparency is to let the critical reader be able to 'repeat' the research process either mentally or practically (Olsen, 2002). In positivist persuasions, transparency serves standards of science like *replication* and *reliability* (c.f. Hoyle et al., 2002). In qualitative persuasions, transparency helps to argue for the internal consistency of research and to make the argumentative steps – including missteps – and the conditions under which the empirical material, analyses and conclusions are generated, explicit. This implies arguing for consistencies – which I have already commenced by stipulating criteria for object-adequacy in this project – and illustrate inconsistencies. This is the foundation for critical reflection and further development on part of the researcher and of potential readers. And this is why I dedicate space for these methodological reflections and recollections here, including 'mess' and arguments for 'sanitation'.

What I imagined – prototyping Interactive Digital Diaries as method

Based on the reflections developed from the discussion on object-adequacy my initial idea for a research design was experiment with and create a method that I call "Interactive Digital Diaries". The ambition was to use digital media

as a central platform for conducting the research and organizing material. Besides this, it would function as a way of combining reciprocating digital sources with the research participants' subjective perspectives, which would all unfold via a multi-modal dialogue between research participants and researcher. The diary-form would add a temporal dimension to the empirical material. In order to make the design and idea concrete, I will describe it in more detail. I will underline that this did *not* end up as the core material of the empirical research. But it helps to explicate the methodological reflections and developments. From p. 133, I will describe what ended up as the core material.

The design and processes. Using digital technologies as method was also conceived as a way of going into the 'field' of the digital everyday living of the young people: To be closer to the site of activities of interest. The idea was further to create a research environment in which the young people would feel at home. Gathering that many of them would take social media as a familiar digital habitat, I figured that being connected with them over a platform like Facebook would be appropriate. The idea was to have a closed and secure connection with each of the participants separately. They would be instructed to document and share digital activities that were related to or associated with drugs. This could be done by sharing links, files, screenshots, pictures that they copied or took with their smartphone or anything. In this way, the aesthetic forms of artifacts that the participants would connect with drugs would be shared as a starting point of the exchange. The processes of sharing should be rather easy, and the intention with starting the dialogue with the material(ity) was to create the possibility of grounding it in the preverbal, aesthetic processes and not just in language. Posting and sharing these experiences would give the researcher the opportunity to be sensorially engaged in the material and ask the participants further questions about significances, imaginative processes and so forth. Each posted experience would then have a dialogical string attached which could include verbal exchanges or connections to other experiences. The idea was to do this on a daily basis over a period of time, for instance 7-10 days. The participants would also be asked to document what their daily drug consumption approximately looked like. The final product would be a digital diary with logged interactions based on concrete multi-modal material. The idea was further to make an interview with each participant afterwards to discuss the meanings and significance of the diary and how it could best be understood as premises for their drug engage-

ments. The purpose of letting the participants share was to circumvent some of the issues raised above. For one, it would remove the potential intrusiveness of face-to-face ethnography. Second, it would remove possible ethical concerns and resistances in logging all the participants' digital activities. Letting them choosing what to share could give them a sense of security and control. Third, by letting the participants chose what they would feel would be relevant for them to share, the issue of filtering and selecting activities would be resolved.

Recruitment. Many concerns went into the questions of who and how many to get engaged with in the empirical research and how. I settled on an age group of people between 18 and 25 years of age, because they could still be considered "young people" who maybe are experiencing or have experienced emerging problems in relation to drug engagements. And further, getting informed consent would be less troublesome. Then, how to get in contact with this group? I decided to take the full consequence of trying to involve digital media as research tool. So, I figured that I could possibly establish contact to young people through the biggest online portal related to drug issues in Denmark, netstof.dk. A reason for this was that young people who would be visiting this portal would probably already be experiencing conflicts in relation to drugs, and they would furthermore also already use their digital everyday living to deal with them. The people that I would get in contact with would therefore already be going through processes that I wanted to explore further. The contact would be established through a pop-up message on the homepage, shortly informing about the ongoing research project, and interested people could click on it and be directed to leave their contact details with me. For people that were not interested, a button could be pushed and the message would not pop up again. The people at netstof.dk were thrilled and offered me their support. I went home from a meeting, thrilled too. But then the dilemmas started to surface in my thoughts…

Dilemmas. The first dilemma emerged in relation to how I could make sure that potential participants, that I had never met in person, would understand how to participate in the project. There were to be a communicative void between the pop-up message on netstof.dk and the actual interactive digital diary. I started working on a homepage that should be simple and engaging. But the generic interface, including presentational videos by the researcher and

examples on what to share, produced the insecurity that I might miss the particular interests of the participants and essentially make them feel as if the project was not about them. So how could I include the young people and not alienate them? What if they could not relate to my examples because they were out of sync with what was relevant in the young people's digital everyday living? In order to try to synchronize my thoughts with the experiences of young people I decided to make a group interview (see below). Related to these issues, another growing concern was how to present the project and myself in a way that generated trust and alliance. If the young people would participate, they would in principle engage with the researcher as a stranger. How to break down this boundary so that the participants would feel they were in safe hands if they had to bring up experiences that were personal, troublesome and painful?

In fact, there seemed to be a general challenge in creating mutual knowledge and understanding not only related to personal contact, but also to the project: Would the participants understand how to share their digital everyday living in the project, and did I know enough about that living in order to make the method sensitive towards it? I was simultaneously worried that the method itself would create an empirical picture of each participant that was too narrow and shallow; that it would reduce a deeper knowledge about the person and other life circumstances that would be of significance to their concrete media and drug engagements and experienced problems. These uncertainties related to mutual trust and understanding led to the conclusion that I had to meet the participants before engaging in the interactive digital diary. It would also give me the possibility of drawing on their insights and preferences as inspiration for how this digital method could be materialized. Maybe they even had better ideas.

The issues did not only emerge from the practical and emotional dimensions of the method. An ethical dimension also became evermore present: How could I guarantee the privacy and anonymity of the participants? This was especially related to going into their 'digital habitat' on social media. If the participants somehow should connect with me through their existing accounts or profiles, this would leave a digital trace to friends that this person had a new contact or joined a new forum etc. This could be circumvented by creating a new and purely anonymous profile. But this would entail that the participants had to shift between profiles which could remove the ease and convenience of just sharing a digital impression. This also cemented the felt necessity of meeting the potential participants first. After this, I could draw

on the experiences and expand the number of participants while continuing to do the research with the 'core group' of participants.

What actually happened

Group interview. Above I have referred to some of the things that actually happened and ended up constituting the empirical material of the research. One of these was the group interview. The interview was conducted in December 2014 with the purpose of making my thoughts more concrete and congruent with realities that I wanted to explore.

The group interview can easily be confused with a focus group interview, but there are some elementary differences. The purpose of a focus group interview is normally to create a specific combination of participants in order to explore the *group dynamics* among the participants in relation to a given topic. The group interview is not as much interested in how participants position others or themselves, but it is interested in exploring similar or differing opinions within a group on a given topic (Damgaard, 2016).

The argument for doing a group interview was to find an economical way of cross-checking experiences among the participants and thus find overlaps and variations. I contacted a friend who was working in a drug-treatment facility in Copenhagen (U-turn) and asked if he could help me arrange the group interview with some of the young people whose treatment and development he was engaged in. Three guys agreed and on the day of the interview two of them, Frank and Simon, showed up. My friend also participated in the interview to be the warrant of a secure atmosphere. He also functioned in the double role of protecting the young people from questions that might be too invasive and of supporting me with questions if I should lose track or clarity. The interview itself was divided into three parts. The first part was a general exploration of Simon's and Frank's digital everyday living. The next part explored the more specific relation between media and drug use in their lives. And in the last part I wanted to invite the participants to come up with their suggestions on how they would construct a research design if they were to explore this topic with young people like themselves. The middle part ended up taking so much time that we never got around to the last part. I had constructed this middle part as a categorical exploration of different kinds of media activities. The categories included: Movies and TV shows, information

(articles, documentaries, apps and professional help), music, social media and micro-blogs, and games. Each category was explored one at the time. First by hearing Frank's and Simon's spontaneous reactions to them; next supported by the method *photo elicitation*. Photo elicitation is a well-known method within the field of visual methodologies (see e.g. Pink, 2009). It can have many purposes, but my intention was first of all to inspire aspects of the abstract categories, in case the participants had not yet thought of them or forgotten about them. The photos were preselected and shown on a Prezi-presentation after the participants had shared their experiences in one category. Another reason for running the Prezi-presentation parallel to our conversation was to create the possibility of gathering around a 'common third' if the face-to-face dialogue would feel too confrontational in our first encounter. This was the dialogical structure as it progressed from one category to the next.

Below this structure, I tried to keep my attention on potential conflicts that these media activities might be part of inflicting. This could involve contradictory messages or felt annoyances or irritations. I also paid attention to signs of emerging imaginative processes that would be revealed in the shared experiences. The lessons learnt from this group interview were that my assumptions about digital activities were not totally off. One of the bigger surprises, however, was the reserved activity on social media. This could be just very particular to Frank and Simon, but it nourished the doubts that I was already feeling in regards to the original research method. The interview provided optimism with regards to the resonance between my research interests and the digital living of the young people. Still, more groundwork on the concrete method was required.

Individual interviews. In the early spring of 2014 I decided to conduct a series of individual interviews based on the assumption that it would be better to establish a relation in person before engaging in the interactive digital diary as method. I contacted U-turn again, this time one of the other psychologists since my friend did not work there any longer. Besides convenience, the reasons for including young people who were already undergoing treatment was that they would experience drug-related problems that they were trying to deal with. Being in this process could possibly help the project along in comparison to a group where problems would not be acknowledged or would be denied. I requested to establish contact with approximately eight young people between 18 and 25 years of age. Out of these eight persons six of them where interested in participating in the research, including Simon and Frank

from the group interview. I regarded these preliminary interviews as part of the empirical material with these six persons as the core empirical source that could inspire research with other potential participants. The interviews were conducted at U-turn since it offered known and familiar surroundings for the participants.

As I both wanted openness and directionality in the interviews, I made a semi-structured approach, again divided into three parts. In the first part, I would typically ask the participants to describe a relative 'normal day' in their lives. I would also ask them what kind of dreams they had for their near future. This served a double purpose: First, to get an impression of their daily living, and second, to get an impression of imaginative processes (hopes and dreams) that were gradually emerging in general. The next part consisted of their immediate responses to if and how they perceived a relation between drugs and media in their living. The different categories from the group interview were still in my head, but the purpose was to let the dialogue take the shape of free-form in order to follow the stories of the participants. Furthermore, I also tried to get them to talk about the significances of the different modalities of media activities and material form of the technologies (being aware of the research interest in reciprocations). It was not always that easy to do since most of the participants provided descriptions of an overwhelming multiplicity of media activities. From their descriptions, I also tried to spot signs of imaginative processes emerging from these media interactions and forming premises for their drug engagements.

It would be reasonable to ask why I would not ask the participants directly about their imaginative processes. Well, one reason for not doing this was to give the total empirical material the chance to protest; to protest against the general assumption of the research project that imagination may be central even in drug engagements. Maybe it is; maybe other things are more important. My strategy, then, was to be guided by the participants' accounts, and if imaginative processes would emerge in the interview I would follow them. Signs of imaginative processes would consist of articulated *absent aspects* of drug engagements, i.e. aspects that were articulated as being associated with, or approximated and distanced through, concrete drug engagements. In this sense, the activities of getting intoxicated by the drug would need to be substantiated by other aspects not directly present in such intoxications. Another reason for this approach was that I assumed that imaginative processes needed to be explored indirectly due to the many different un-

derstandings that imagination as a concept can be attributed. The thorough theoretical work on imagination in this project is indeed a response to the multiplicity of understandings. The chances that the participants would attribute a different meaning to the concept than I would could lead to great confusion. I would bring it up as a research interest in later parts of the interviews – again, to give the participants the chance to protest. At various points the confusion became evident. To give an example, it was clear that one of the participants, Karen, in a particular situation understood imagination as something false, wrong or fictive (and she was not the only one). She was talking about the romantic in suffering and artistic creation in relation to engaging in drugs, when I tentatively brought in the concept of imagination in order to see how she would relate to it:

> Interviewer: You say 'romantic' – I am juggling with a concept about imagination. So, things I imagine if I smoke... [Karen breaks in]

> Karen: Yes [inaudible] because it is never romantic when you are in the situation.

> Interviewer: What was your imagination about at that time [when Karen started experimenting with drugs]?

> Karen: Hmmm...I don't know, actually...

The different understandings of the concept lead to a breakdown in the dialogue. But Karen provides splendid accounts of her previous imaginative processes when I afterwards cued her in the direction of "the creative" aspect (as we will see in the analysis). These and other experiences confirmed that a better way of exploring the abstract concept of imagination was to follow the concrete hints such as the "romantic" and "creative" in Karen's case, although it was also possible to develop a somewhat common understanding of imaginative processes throughout the interview.

The purpose of the third part of the interview was to explore dilemmas and conflicts in relation to media activities and drug engagements in case none would have been brought up during the interview. In the immediate post-interview setting I inquired on the interests in and possibilities of continuing the research collaboration with the participants on interactive digital diaries. This was the generic approach. The interviews with Frank and Simon differed a bit because I had already had one interview with them. This gave

me the opportunity to follow up on some central aspects that came up in the group interview.

Field notes. Immediately after each interview session field notes were recorded. The field notes documented impressions from the interviews that would not be easy to fixate in the audio recordings of the interviews and in transcriptions. This would include significant non- and extra-verbal communication, emotional states and impressions from pre-/post-interview conversations. Besides serving as documentation, the field notes also functioned as initial analyses of the interviews: What had I learnt from the interviews and what was still unclear and needed further elaboration and questioning?

Prototypes of digital methods. Two prototypes of the interactive digital method were made. One with Karen and one with Simon. The material is prototypical because the execution of them were primarily experimental in order to customize them according to the experiences made.

Follow-up interviews. In the summer of 2016 I contacted all the participants again, thanking them for their contributions to the project. Here I also offered a follow-up meeting to talk about the participants' experiences of participating in the study. Only Karen accepted meeting up again.

The concluding challenge. Despite what was previously being imagined as forming the empirical material of the research, the above-mentioned products ended up not only being the core material, but the total empirical material on which the research is based. What hindered me was primarily that – *none of the participants seemed thrilled about continuing the research on social media.* Alternatives were suggested, but each participant seemed to have a different preference. The method would therefore spread across many different media like e-mail, SMS and MSN (chat). Next, there were different preferences for the temporal duration of the study. Some were fine with a week, another only wanted to participate for three days, and a third wanted to do it over a month, but with less but more qualitative entries. And lastly, some seemed not to see the point in doing the digital method, but were happy to meet up again for another interview. This confused me. In what ways would it be best to handle all these differences. How would I coordinate all the data across different media platforms? Would it make sense only to make the diary over three days? How

about privacy and securing the data on so many different platforms? What did it mean that actually no one wanted to participate on social media? And so forth.

The next challenge was that I was surprised about the richness of the very few interviews that I by then had. Although I could see some overlaps in media activities, there was a huge variation across the interviews concerning media activities and the (initially not very clear) role of imagination in the participants' drug engagements. If I had to use the interviews as a basis for the ongoing research, I had the feeling that I needed to order and analyze them more in order to know how I could use them to direct subsequent methods. I simply needed to know the material better before I added more material.

The last challenge emerged from the digital prototypes that I made with Simon and Karen. They both responded immediately after the interviews, sharing images and comments related to their imaginative processes and drug engagements. I was thrilled about the energy and the prospects of what was to come. However, after these energy spurts, the dairies 'died out'. After the first digital dialogue, I only heard once more from Simon and I 'lost' Karen. I realized that I had found myself in a new dilemma when it comes to digital research: How to keep the engagement going when the relationship is only face-to-*inter*face? I realized that it would be necessary to have clear agreements on when to stay in contact. After the first exchanges, I kept quiet to give space to the participants to find the right moments for them to share things with me. I did not want to be intrusive. But the opposite thing must have happened: My absence or passivity in the communication led to disengagement. And the initial prototypes must have succumbed to other more insisting engagements in the everyday living of the participants and my research at hand. The point is that all these challenges meant that the empirical material did not grow any further. During the course of my confusion and 'mess', I apologized to netstof.dk that I needed more time to think about a proper way of carrying on with the empirical research. I did not receive any response which could mean that they would just await my return or that they were disappointed. In my mind, I had a feeling that I had let them down.

In the table below there is an overview over the participants and the empirical material which the whole research project is based on.

Empirical Material in Overview							
	Simon	**Frank**	**Oscar**	**Neil**	**Karen**	**Ellen**	SUM
Group interview	1h30m						**1h30m**
Interviews	1h30m	1h10m	1h29m	1h.13	1h27m	1h04m	**7h53m**
Prototype: Interactive digital diary	2 probes 3 days				1 probe 1 day		
Field notes	1 page	1 page	1.5 pages	1.5 pages	1.25 pages	1.75 pages	**8 pages**
Follow-up interview					1h30m		**1h30m**

In the following table, some more participant information is provided. I did not get the precise age from everyone. Therefore, most of them are approximate ages inferred from data from the interviews.

Participant information						
	Simon	**Frank**	**Oscar**	**Neil**	**Karen**	**Ellen**
Age	Ca. 22	Ca. 23	Ca. 20	Ca. 24	23	16
Primary drug	Marijuana	Marijuana	Marijuana	Marijuana	Marijuana Alcohol	Poly-drug
Engagement	Reducing	Reducing	Clean (2 months)	Clean (2 months)	Reducing	Reducing

Discussing object-"inadequacies" (and how they are overcome)

The discrepancies between what I imagined and what actually happened in the collection of empirical material can be discussed as pointing to object-*in*adequacies of the employed research methods – besides being exemplary of the dilemma involved in coordinating imagination and actuality! In this section of methodology, I will take up this discussion as a critical reflection, but

also a foundation for arguing for how the method still can be considered as object-adequate on central areas. The discussion will focus on the areas of *interactivity, aesthetics of imagination,* and *emergence.*

Methods as object-inadequate or as displacing the object?

As I have shown above, the core of the empirical material consists of interviews. What are the implications of this in relation to the object-adequate criteria I discussed in the beginning of the chapter? Overall it can be said that although interviews can take many forms according to different research purposes, the fundamental *data* that is collected is the self-reports of participants. In this way, the research project relies on the *experiences* and the *subjectivity* of the participants. If you are doing a phenomenological study, this is exactly what you want. But what if the research object is the *interactive relation* between persons and digital everyday living? Subjectivity would only concern one part of that relation. How could the activity of the digital everyday living be included in the empirical material? This will be discussed in more detail below. However, if we halt at this point for a moment, we could also ask how the outlined discrepancy can be handled. One way could be to conclude that the method is inadequate, and then the majority of analyses and conclusions would be flawed. Another way could be to say that the *method has displaced the research object*. Instead of researching interactive relations, subjectivity and experiences have become the object of research. Object-adequacy could then be established by reformulating the research questions and research field accordingly. But this process would imply that significant parts of the research interests and problem would have to be abandoned, e.g. how imaginative processes are internally related to societal development including materiality and technology and how this relation forms premises for young people's drug engagements. So, I am not going either of these ways. Instead I will stay loyal to the problem field and research questions and work with the material as it has developed. I will not deny object-inadequacies in the details, but I will simultaneously argue why the empirical material does embody advantages for studying the research questions. Before this can be done, the apparent object-inadequacies need to be elaborated further.

Interactive relations: The internal relation of imaginative processes and reciprocations of digital everyday living

The discussion on interviews vs. interactive relations has already been initiated, but it can be substantiated. One issue is that while interviews can reflect the subjective level, the interactive level is somewhat truncated, since the interview method only includes the digital everyday living insofar as it is subjectively accounted for by the participants. These accounts are still from the perspective of the first person of the participants. The activities and reciprocations of digital everyday living may not be as clearly accountable as experiences. Another issue relates to the locality of the interviews. By conducting the interviews in U-turn, the participants are removed from their actual everyday living outside the treatment facility. The participants are separated from the co-constituting sources of interaction. To a certain extent this can be subjected to the same critique as that which lab studies are subjected to: What happens and what is said in the locality needs to have a correspondence to the concrete everyday living that it is removed from. Both these issues mean that the interviews as methods for researching the interactive relation between the participants and their digital everyday living contorts this relation in favor of the subjective level over the interactive level. The concrete and specific reciprocations and activities of the digital everyday living are therefore marginalized. The distance created by the research method to the concrete everyday living is also implicated in the study of how digital reciprocations of imaginative processes form *premises* for the young people's drug engagements. Premise as a concept denotes those elements that are composited into the actualization of concrete engagements. Some aspects of premises may be articulable while other aspects may be obscure. By being distanced from the young people's concrete drug engagements, the empirical material is technically not sensitive to the concrete and presumably obscure aspects of premises. The analyses rely on the subjective accounts when extracting these relations and aspects.

The aesthetic transgressions of imaginative processes

Although the interview setting is a multi-sensory event, the main vehicle of the dialogue and what is eventually being documented are verbal exchanges.

The analysis of the sensory-affective aspects of the participants' everyday living and imaginative processes are dependent on the participants' translation of these into language. As long as the material would just be a schematized form of pleromatizing imaginative processes it would be reasonable to assume that this would suffice to create knowledge and mutual understanding of important imaginative processes only at the cost of experiential richness. It is not impossible to refer verbally to pleromatized absences. If we return to the example of the forest that a fictive research participant imagines, we may ask about the significance of the forest and get a response like 'that's hard to put into words...!'. It may even be elaborated with 'it carries an atmosphere that is very enticing'. It would draw the attention to something of importance, but the concrete aspects of what is significant and moving about those absences remain bleak and unspecific by language. The interviewer and researcher may have no problem imagining an atmospheric forest, but it is not straightforward whether that imagination generates an understanding of the participant's imagination. Yet again, other aspects may not even surface in verbal dialogue. And language could also estrange the understanding or even deter the attention from more inarticulate aspects of subjectivity. The default setup of interviews in this setting invites data that can be talked about and backgrounds data that is emplaced and slips away from language. The categories and concepts of language may have advantages in the intersubjective exchanges, but it is not necessarily adequate in researching the percepts and aesthetic processes of imagination.

The temporal aspects of emergence

Another criterion relates to the temporal aspect of researching imagination as an emergent process. With most of the research participants only one interview was conducted per person. An objective temporal dimension is therefore not included in the empirical material in the same ways as if more interviews had been conducted over a given period of time. The temporal aspect of emerging imaginative processes then needs to be reconstructed from the situated accounts given by the participants. In this way, the interview is more sensitive towards studying the participants' *memories* and *recollections* of how their imaginative processes have emerged. There will be little dispute in lay and theoretical understandings that memory is imprecise. It is a cornerstone in narrative psychology that *life stories* are considered to be constructions with the potential of being reconstructed for instance in therapy (White, 1998).

Psychologist Daniel Kahneman has for many years researched in the relation between experience and memory and found them to be discrepant in various ways (e.g. Kahneman, 2011). So, if we expect to rely on the memory of the participants in order to study emergent processes, it may not be adequate since emergent imaginative processes may be experienced differently than remembered. However, it does also depend on the question that is posed. When Kahneman compares experience and memory, the adequate question would be: Does memory *correspond* to experience? When the answer is 'most of the time, no', it could lead to the conclusion that experience should be trusted more than memory. More adequate methods for researching emergent processes of the imagination over time would then be methods similar to *experience sampling* (c.f. Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). However, if memory answers the question of what is the important interpretation of past experiences, then many of the sampled experiences would be insignificant to the person at a later time. So even though the interviews may not be adequate to encapsulate the temporal aspect of emergent processes of the imagination, the recollections of the participants may in turn highlight aspects of the past that are important to their self-understanding at the point of the interview. With this last sentence, the arguments for the adequacies of the empirical material have already begun.

Cleaning up: Relating subjective accounts to the confessions of tortured things

Time has come to clean up the mess that was generated in the research process and made transparent above. Besides discussing object-adequacy of the concrete empirical material, the argument will also recourse to discussions on more abstract levels, including the methodological discussion on how to research the relation between people and technology. With material that mainly consists of interviews it is necessary to argue for the importance of subjective accounts in the study of psychological processes, let alone imaginative processes, in everyday living. And the challenge of expanding subjective accounts to include the relation to technology needs to be addressed.

The importance of accounts in the first person and two pillars of subjectivity critique

Going back to one source of the concept object-adequacy, Holzkamp's own methodological proposition for researching psychological processes is to structure it from the standpoint of the subject (Holzkamp, 2013b). This means a systematic inclusion of the first-person perspective of research participants. It is at the basis of his argument for psychology as the *science of the subject*, which I will return to after introducing two pillars of subjectivity critique. Basing psychological research on subjective 'data' has had mixed positions in the history of psychology. The founding father of modern psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, saw techniques of introspection as essential in understanding the consciousness and voluntarism of psychological processes, although he subjected introspection to rigid experimentalism as a critique of the relatively free-structured introspection used by previous philosophers (Hergenhahn, 2005, p. 244). The first pillar of subjectivity critique comes from the rejection of introspection, or subjectivity more broadly, mainly by the 'strong sciences' like behaviorism. Behaviorism was nourished in Russia parallelly to Wundt's scientific endeavors, and flourished later in the United States under prominent scientist, John B. Watson. Following a strict ideal of objectivism, behaviorism stripped psychology of subjectivity both in content and data: Behavior is caused and shaped by environmental stimuli, and consciousness is an epi-phenomenon at most without properties of exerting influence over behavior (ibid., p. 367-370). Hence, Wundt's introspection and voluntarism were radically rejected. Although Watson was fascinated by Freud's psychoanalysis, Freud's 'surrender'[17] to studying the unconscious through very detailed explorations of patients' subjectivity, was incompatible with behaviorism both in terms of method and in terms of the unobservable mechanisms of the unconscious (Rilling, 2000). Freud contributed in whole new qualitative dimensions to the study of subjectivity in the history of psychology. Throughout this history, however, subjectivity continues to clash with the critiques from positivist sciences where scientific facts are considered objective in *third person* – i.e. independent of the particularities of subjectivity – when they are observable, measureable and testable.

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[17] 'Surrender' because he had to give up his original endeavor (and conviction) to study the psyche neurologically as well due to the lack of technological means of doing so (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).

A critique of subjectivity is also present in the development of psycho-analytical and psychodynamic theories which can be considered a part of the second pillar of critique. More than a rejection, this critique is sympathetic. It involves the acknowledgement of the paradoxical conditions of subjectivity in both being fundamental in experiencing, meaning-making and agency and being *subjected*. The subjectivity of others (and oneself) is simultaneously taken seriously and criticized in order to liberate it from subjection. In psychoanaly-sis, the subject is subjected to the drives and defense mechanisms of the un-conscious, but subjectivity is the primary way of getting in touch with these processes. It is expected that such attempts are met with defensive strategies and what subjects express can therefore not be taken at face value. Hence, the notion of the "defended subject" exists in psychoanalytical research (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000), which embodies this subjective paradox. For the same reason, philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1970) places Freud's psychoanalysis among the hermeneutics that he calls the hermeneutic *school of suspicion* (p. 28). Be-sides Freud, this school includes the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche. The critique takes different forms depending on the theoretical underpinning. In short, for Marx the suspicion concerns the consciousness disguised by hegemonic ideology and for Nietzsche it is perspectivism. More than a skep-ticism towards subjectivity, suspicion seeks critical intervention which sets it apart from other hermeneutics, if not also phenomenology and humanistic psychology – e.g. the client-centered therapy of Carl Rogers (1961). Ricoeur explains:

> This hermeneutics is not an explication of the object, but a tearing off of masks, an interpretation that reduces disguises. (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 30)

From these inspirational sources of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche the subjectivi-ty critique has zig-zagged in and out of psychology and in and out of different theoretical developments including critical theory, the poststructuralisms of Foucault and Žižek, and social constructionism.

Critical psychology and the science from the standpoint of the subject

The German-Scandinavian development of critical psychology also build on this second pillar of subjectivity critique. The development embodies the en-deavor to break psychology free from bourgeois ideology and to make a sci-

entific move from third person to first person epistemology. The subjectivity critique is, for example, evident in expansive and restrictive aspects of the dual possibility of agency, which I have drawn upon in the theoretical development of imagination. It is the epistemological move towards structuring research from the first person that is helpful in arguing for the adequacy of interview material in investigating imaginative processes as emerging from interactions between persons and technology.

At first sight, it may seem contradictory to start in subjectivity to study a *relation*. But this is indeed what Holzkamp argues for if a psychology strives to study and understand the relation between persons' everyday living and society. Holzkamp's way of arguing for this starts with the understanding of that relation. As I have written before, this relation is not a causal neither an arbitrary one. There are no human actions without societal conditions, but these do not determine actions. A person can act under them or transform them. Thus, "objective societal structures of meaning change from determinants of actions to mere *possibilities to act*" (Holzkamp, 2013d, p. 47). In turn, these possibilities to act are related to the concrete constellation of societal conditions in the everyday living of the person. Insofar as we regard possibilities as subjectively experienced, *subjectivity is already grounded in the relation to the constellation of societal conditions*. Subjectivity should therefore not be seen as solipsistic or individualistic in this perspective, but as relational and societally *grounded*. It is by means of this groundedness that Holzkamp explores human consciousness and experience by making people's *reasons for actions* the flagship for understanding why people do what they do. The English translation, "reasons", loses the connection with groundedness, which is more closely connected in the German word "Gründe". Nevertheless, even though reasons are grounded in societal conditions, they only appear and are given in first person, as "my" reasons (Holzkamp, 2013c, p. 43) – they only *become* "reasons" in first person. While Holzkamp argues for this in relation to reasons for actions, the general relational understanding of subjectivity and the first-person givenness of psychological processes can be expanded beyond reasons. Pain is inflicted by something, but it only attains the quality of pain when it is experienced in first person; something may amuse us, but the quality of amusement emerges when someone experiences it. Although these psychological processes are considered relational, *their ontology is subjective – they only exist because they are subjectively experienced*. This can argue for the need for subjective accounts if they are to be investigated adequately. The same thing can be argued for in relation to imaginative processes: Although imagination

is internally related to the world (including materiality and technology), the quality of imaginative processes is experienced in first person and is adequately investigated through subjective accounts. It should be stressed that the subjective accounts in this line of argumentation are just the *starting point* of research which should open up the exploration of the starting point's relation to the wider world. In this way of thinking it can be argued that interview methods meet some adequacy when exploring young people's imaginations. But it meets challenges when the methodology necessitates to go beyond that starting point.

First of all, when the subjectivity of others is researched, their first-person perspective can never be accessed directly. The participants of a dyadic relation are condemned to a mutual second-person perspective. I can ask about your imaginative processes, but I will only learn about them as "your" processes from "my" perspective. Left with the primary vehicle of language in the interviews, creating sensitivity towards the aesthetic processes of imagination remains a challenge in this second-person perspective. Next, how are subjective accounts put in relation to the wider world including the digital everyday living? Can we expect participants to make these links and can they do this extensively? Can a detailed understanding of the relation between persons' imaginative processes and digital everyday living be generated from subjective accounts? It is for instance a consequence of the restrictive aspect of imaginative processes – in the way I have argued – that these aspects are characterized by lack of epistemic distance, of perceived interrelatedness between persons' subjectivity and technology, of perceived potentiality. In this way, subjective accounts are partial and other parts of the relations of interest are left in obscurity. This relates to the third challenge: How is the critique of subjectivity possible if research is structured from the standpoint of the subject? Holzkamp offers some solutions. But I will also gradually push him in the background in order to focus on discussing object-adequacy concerning the relation between imagination and digital everyday living.

Researching relations by starting in subjectivity

If the first challenge is addressed, structuring research from the standpoint of the subject does not mean that the researcher can simply take the *subjective accounts* as 'data' in the first person. Holzkamp sees the *dialogical character* of verbal communication as key (Holzkamp, 2013b, p. 329). The common aim in

the dialogical setting of the research dyad is to develop *social self-understanding*. This development is basically implicit in the move from restrictive to expansive agency, as I have called it earlier. It essentially means that the researcher learns about the research participant's problems *in* his or her conduct of everyday living, and that the problem is transcended and understood in better ways so that new potentialities are being developed. In valuing the verbal character of this dialogue, Holzkamp identifies the problem of tacit knowledge, which relates to the second challenge above: Presupposing that something is not clearly understood, means that something is not obvious or self-evident. Furthermore, as follows from the restrictive frame of thinking, when a person's perception is characterized by facticity and isolation, potentialities and interrelatedness are necessarily not within perception and are tacit or suppressed[18]. Still, Holzkamp believes that verbal dialogue has the potential to transgress this:

> When one designates '(self) understanding' as the epistemic interest of subject science it is presupposed that there actually is something to be 'understood' that is not self-evident or obvious, but needs joint scientific efforts to be brought to light and be voicable as knowledge. (ibid., p. 330)

One of the orientation points in the dialogue is to create a relation of "formless statements into scenes of *conduct of everyday life*" (ibid., p. 339) and thereby concretizing the constellations of conditions and meanings that are relevant in the problem area. This can be understood as the *establishment of a relation* to life circumstance from the subjective standpoint. From here, pockets of tacit knowledge may emerge and can be identified by the forms of facticity and isolation as in the restrictive frame. To address the third challenge, Holzkamp sees these points as the first step of *critique*, as exposing and naming these forms (cf. ibid, p. 333).

These would be Holzkamp's suggestions in a nutshell. The productive dimensions are that Holzkamp suggests that *relations* between persons and their everyday living can be somewhat adequately researched through the interview as dialogue by insisting on concretizing statements in the everyday living. This would also include the technologies of digital everyday living. The notion of imaginative processes as internally connected to *resources* provides

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[18] At the point in Holzkamp's (2013b, p. 332) text, he refers only implicitly to the restrictive frame. He uses other concepts like "centred views" and "irreversibility" of standpoints meaning the impossibility of integrating the other's standpoint as an aspect of one's own.

an analytical strategy of voicing the co-constituting technologies which Zittoun & Gillespie (2014) show in their article. The awareness of the material basis of imagination can transcend the isolation of "my" imagination in both interview and analysis. Holzkamp's suggestions are also productive when the dialogue and analysis aim to create understanding of *restrictive* and *expansive* aspects of imagination as *premise* for young people's drug engagements. Until now this question – the second part of the research question – has not been addressed in terms of object-adequacy. But through Holzkamp it is possible to make interview and analysis sensitive towards these aspects by attending to the verbal forms of facticity and isolation. This attention can even be expanded to the additional conceptualizations that I proposed as restrictive aspects of imagination: E.g. imagined future(s) and interrelations as constrained, imagined facticity, spatial-temporal rigidity of imagination, the narrowing in of imagination.

Some problems still remain, though. Holzkamp 'fixes' the problem of tacit subjectivity by assuming that it can be verbalized. While this is true to some extent, it does not solve the problem of adequacy in relation to aesthetic processes of the imagination. And next, researching *relations* through the route of subjectivity is productive in expanding the current standpoint of the subject. But how far can the partiality of a first-person perspective be pushed towards 'fullness'? Will there not always be an object, or a subject, at the other end of the relation which is not entirely accessible to that one person? What are we going to do if we want to understand how *digital technologies* hinder and expand – how they *reciprocate*, that is – imaginative processes, and not only how a person's *thinking* is characterized by facticity or potentiality? In the rest of the section I will discuss these issues with the aim of qualifying further object-adequacy of the interview material.

Researching imaginative processes through the torture of things and their confessions

Ernst Schraube recognizes the limits of studying the relation between persons and things from the first-person perspective only:

> To study psychological phenomena from the standpoint of the subject cannot be construed of descriptions of first-person experiences and ways of acting in the world. This would be a one-sided 'psychologism' …, which does

not distinguish between subject and society and assumes that the world can only be explained psychologically. (Schraube, 2010, p. 101, own translation)

Schraube points out the challenge that while reasons, fear and other subjective aspects exist in a first-person ontology, objects, artifacts and technologies exist in a third-person ontology. Although they are the *objects* for subjects, they also exist independently of subjectivity. So how do we bridge that gap in research? For one, if we study objects, we still do so through our own experiences with them. And next, we cannot 'dialogue' with them in the same way as we can with people. How can we get objects to talk back? How do we bring them into the confessional?

This methodological challenge mirrors the general challenge of making the relation perceptible in everyday living. Well, what is the problem? Do we not see ourselves as surrounded by objects? The trick that objects play on us is seemingly to create a smokescreen of paralysis which hides their *activities*. The problem is by now more widely recognized in the field of social technology studies and has been rendered in different ways. Scarry tries to revive the apparently dead objects by the concept of reciprocation and by observing that the object veils the imagination behind its own creation. But the challenge is even more intricate. Bruno Latour identifies the crux in the ability of objects and technologies to *blackbox* their activities and co-production:

Why is it so difficult to measure, with any precision, the mediating role of techniques? Because the action that we are trying to measure is subject to blackboxing, a process that makes the joint production of actors and artifacts entirely opaque. (Latour, 1999, p. 183)

The way I understand blackboxing is that it not only operates on the surface of things; the surface itself blackboxes other activities too. So, in order to illuminate the opacity is not only a shift of attention in experience. To take an example: If we look at the simple operation of clicking on a link on a homepage. We open a new homepage. Normally this would be taken for granted by tacitly thinking 'my intention was to open a new homepage, and I pressed the link to do it. The result coincides with my intentions, so therefore *I* accomplished it, not the *device*.' If we shift the attention in this phenomenological account, there could be a change in perception: 'The homepage *translated* my click on the link into *providing* a new homepage.' The agency and reciprocation would in this account be redistributed onto the technology. Job done? No. The condensed production of the experienced relation between click/link/new homepage, albeit with perceived redistributed agency, is still

the surface-activity which makes other activities opaque. There is no immediate subjective access to how that click leaves traces, how these are stored, how they are distributed, how they are put into algorithms, how the algorithm targets my future (online) activities, and so forth. So, objects do not expose their secrets cooperatively. They deflect rather than reflect.

Does this mean, then, that the hermeneutics of suspicion should be upscaled? Research participants can for sure provide the researcher with exposing insights. However, the epistemic resistances of objects imply that parts of the relation with objects remains opaque. Instead, a suspicion can be turned *towards objects* – by *torturing them to confession*. The necessity of the recourse to torture (metaphorically!) is articulated by Anders as a countermeasure for the epistemic (and practical-existential) dilemmas that artifacts embody. In the article *'Torturing things until they confess': Günther Anders' critique of technology*, Schraube (2005) reviews the thinking and method of Anders. Schraube illustrates how Anders would take the point of departure in people's experienced conflicts with technology and then jump to a rigorous dissection, or torture, of the things until they will bleed out their confessions (again, metaphorically). This implies dismembering them analytically, taking them apart. Some means of torture are accomplished historically by articulating the 'silent biographies' of things and thereby deciphering the materializations of politics and activities from the different material and practical forms throughout their genesis. Anders takes a prognostic route from the technological confessions in order to minimize the gap between imagination and production, which is the central crisis of modern life that Anders structures his work from (ibid.). The work of Anders amounts to a revelatory and shrewd analysis of technologies and their implications unimaginable in their production and appropriation processes.

The methodology means to depart from the subjective accounts and going into the torture of things. However, Schraube (ibid.) raises the critique that Anders rarely returns to the involved and affected people whose imagination Anders ultimately wishes to expand. Hence, Schraube (2005) calls for a "double-sided analysis" (p. 84) where people's perspectives are included in the processes of dealing with and producing technologies. Consequentially, interviews cannot stand alone if the interactive relation between people and technologies needs to be researched adequately. An independent critique of things is somehow needed. Reversely, the critique of things can act as the critique of subjective accounts (not of subjects!). The confessions of tortured

things can construe the prosthetic complementation of subjective accounts that reach their epistemic limitations in grasping the interactive relation between persons and the reciprocation of artifacts. It basically means that when imaginative processes are articulated in the interviews, irrespective of expansive or restrictive aspects, the task is to unearth how digital media co-constitute and reciprocate these processes. The research participants may articulate this rather explicitly or at least index the material basis which appears to them as significant for their imagination. In these cases, a specific relation is designated which can be subjected to further torture. In other cases, this designation may not directly take place which means that the material basis of imaginative processes must be analyzed from other indexes that the research participants may provide. The aid that the researcher to a larger degree than the research participants may have in accomplishing this operation is the aid of *theoretical concepts* as torture instruments. Concepts like "materialized imagination" and "reciprocations" are meant to lure objects into the confessional and push the interviews towards greater object-adequacy. The concepts are not closed circuits or absolute in a Kantian sense (Jensen, 1999). They are theoretically informed and can make analysis sensitive to relations in practice. And they are sensitive to modifications through the knowledge that practice provides.

Sensitizing interviews to the perceptual relation between persons and technology in imaginative processes

With the suggestions on how to bring objects to confess in interview methods, the methodological black box of voicing percepts and aesthetic processes of the imagination still prevails. How can the interview method more adequately be qualified to research these aspects of imaginative processes? Pink offers some possibilities in her book *Doing Sensory Ethnography*. Pink essentially reinterprets the verbal exchanges in the interview setting as an emplaced and a multisensory encounter between research participant and researcher. Besides language, this encounter is constituted by bodies and material environments which can be brought into and complement verbal exchanges and intersubjective interactions. Paying attention to these dimensions at times blurs the distinguishing lines between interviewing and participant observations (Pink, 2009, p. 83). One of the advantages of interviews that Pink highlights is that it allows for a focused way of discussing the life and experiences of the research participant within a circumscribed time (ibid., p. 87). Overall, Pink

sees three potential ways in which the interview can generate knowledge about sensory subjectivity:

> Interviews can thus produce knowledge on different levels: through verbal definitions of sensory experiences; when the 'interviewee' introduces a range of other embodied ways of knowing into the interviews process; and through the sensory sociality of the interview process and context itself. (ibid., p. 86)

We have already touched upon the first one. The interview relies on the verbal descriptions of percepts and aesthetic processes. The next involves embodied expressions and incorporation of materiality although these are not put into words. And the third is the general attention to the extra- and non-verbal aspects of the exchange. For example, in the second interview with Simon, Simon tries to explain the wider imagination that he places his drug engagements within. He explains how it relates to a living where extremes are examined in contrast to the mediocre and routinized living. In the midst of trying to put this oppositional relation into words, he expresses it by 'drawing' a sinus wave with his hand and finger to express the former and by 'drawing' a straight, horizontal line for the latter. This acts as an embodied 'summary' of the imaginative tension which forms a specific premise for his drug engagements. It also acts as an embodied reference point which I, as the interviewer/researcher, could draw on later in the interview through my own gestures. The challenge is that it needs documentation. So it was necessary for me to document it verbally after Simon had finished this part of his explanation:

> Interviewer: You almost made a graph yourself: the plain and the oscillation [interviewer imitates the gestures].

However, these aspects may not emerge easily. The interview setting and invitation may be interpreted by the research participant as a focus on 'talk'. Furthermore, talking or referring to the perceptual and aesthetic subjectivity may not be common practice and thus be impeded. Pink also recognized the multisensoriality of interviews as a *potential* which the researcher/interviewer is responsible for:

> For the multisensory potential of the interview to be achieved researchers need to be open to these possibilities, to ensure that research participants know that they are not necessarily expected to sit still and talk, but rather in-

> vite them to gather everything they need in order to communicate about their experiences. (ibid.)

In the interviews, I wanted to take this potential even further than mere 'invitation' to talk about the sensory manifestations of imagination. I also experimented with a more directive and guiding approach inspired by practices in counselling (e.g. Hall, Hall, Stradling, & Young, 2006; Singer, 2006; Singer & Pope, 1978). The general strategy was to take abstract accounts and make the participants concretize them in terms of perception. In its extreme it could look something like this: If a participant would express that an atmosphere was central to what appeared to be imaginative processes, I would ask "What does the atmosphere *taste* of?". This would rarely yield a great response, obviously, but it illustrates the logic. In the same manner, I also experimented with a method that I call *rapid associations*. It follows the same concretizing logic, but it would be repeated successively at high speed, often interrupting the word flow that the participant had initiated when it moved away from the description of percepts. This approach is grounded in the assumption that while we speak, our words compress an else perceptually dense subjectivity. In everyday conversation, we do not indulge in articulating this in detail since conversation would simply be exhausted from it. This is practically a perceptual twist of what ethnomethodologists have coined the *indexicality* of verbal accounts (Heritage, 1984, p. 135) rather than of psychoanalytical *free association* (c.f. Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). And the rapidly guided associations should act to break down that indexicality. The idea is not to create an introspective exercise. The idea is first of all to provoke the percepts to appear in the form of language or otherwise and thus qualify the interviews as more object-adequate. Second, with the relational notion of subjectivity, the practice of articulating the concrete, sensory-affective aspect of imaginative processes could grant a route to the co-constituting sources, including digital media. And reversely, the reference to material sources and artifacts can empower the research participant to elaborate on the aesthetic manifestation of imagination. If, for instance, a participant associates drug engagements with "nice music", the aesthetic specificities of what makes music nice in that context helps to specify the aesthetic processes of imagination.

Methodic and analytical strategy

When arguing for the ways in which the utilized method qualifies as approximations, at least, of object-adequacy, methodic and analytical strategies are inevitably also revealed. Here they are presented collectively and coherently.

The purpose of the interviews is first and foremost, in the most open way, to learn from the research participants about the experiences and problems in their lives related to their digital everyday living, imagination and drug engagements. The interviews have been semi-structured, but also open to the directions that the participants would point out. When exploring the interactive relation between the young people's imaginative processes and their digital everyday living and its implication for their drug engagements the aim has been to explore it as far as possible through the interviews – through the dialogues with the participants. Given that I generally only had one interview per participant, there will be limits to how much understanding of this relation that can be generated within the interviews. The analysis of the interviews then acts to substantiate this understanding.

The semi-structured approach in the interviews is also combined with a more guiding and directive approach when references to imagination emerge in the interviews. In its different forms this approach is characterized as *concretization*. With Holzkamp's words, the ambition is to give seemingly "formless" statements shape by directing them towards the concrete everyday living. More specifically they are continuously guided towards co-constituting digital media in everyday living and towards sensory-affective manifestations. Both directions of concretization are intended to 'point towards each other': The sensory-affective manifestations towards co-constituting digital media and vice versa. This is grounded in the general assumption that the presented imagination is co-constituted materially – hence the search for their materializations and objective sources. This strategy should further perform the transgression of restrictive aspects of the imagination: When imaginative processes become isolated as "my" imagination or become one-sided it is not only a matter of ways of "thinking"; it also reflects a way in which imaginative processes are materialized as premises for restrictive engagements in the digital everyday living of the participants.

Investigating the second research question is more specific and involves strategies for exploring how imagination becomes premise for restrictive and expansive aspects of the participants' drug engagements. The strategy was originally to trace them from the conflicts and contradictions that the participants experienced through their digital everyday living. Since this turned out to be too difficult to articulate for one reason or another, the analytical attention needed to be shifted towards other *forms* of articulation that could indicate restrictive and expansive aspects. This is mainly accomplished in the analysis where the tracing of imaginative premises for restrictive engagements is based on accounts that express constrained hopes and potentials, facticity, one-sidedness and so forth.

The strategy for developing the analyses in the following chapters is to unfold a logic which is guided by the empirical research questions. This implies a restructuring of the temporal aspect of how the participants' imaginative processes are implicated in the development of drug-related problems and their resolution through the participants' digital everyday living. It involves the following steps: To situate the participants' relation to drug engagements within their imaginative processes as premises; to trace how digital media are implicated in the emergence of imaginative processes; to analyze how the participants' imaginative processes and digital media contribute to the narrowing in of drug engagements as an expression of restrictive aspects of drug engagements; and finally how drug-related problems are overcome by expanding imagination through digital media. The temporal reconstruction aims at analyzing the individual ontogenesis of the participants in combination with cross-sectional focal points, that is commonalities and variations across the interviews. I will elaborate. It is important to present the participants as *whole* persons to the greatest possible extent in order to elucidate the expansive/restrictive significance of their imaginative processes in their living. The theoretical developments of these concepts imply that single situations or engagements cannot be pointed out as either expansive or restrictive. The analysis depends on specific constellation between interests/hopes, engagements and conditions which is why the ontogenetic aspect of imagination is pivotal. Analytical focal points will also be established according to processes that the interviews have in common – although these common aspects also have variations. In combining the individual idiosyncrasies and commonalities, the analysis strives to ground the empirical research solidly in the varied and complex realities of the participants while simultaneously laying out the groundwork for abstracting and generalizing from the idiosyncratic accounts.

The logic of the analysis is thus to structure it bottom-up from the empirical material and not top-down as a mere *application* of theoretical concepts. But the empirical analysis and theoretical concepts are not unrelated. For one, the generation of the empirical material is already theoretically informed. And second, the purpose of the empirical material is to push and modify theoretical concepts and understandings. Where it is relevant, the analysis will help to clarify and voice the 'protests' that the empirical material may utter against theory. Figuratively speaking, theoretical concepts help to focus the analytical lens in practice, but also risk their own destruction or modification in doing so. The empirical protests may not directly lead to modifications, but may also cry out for help from other concepts which can refine understandings where necessary. Essentially, this is a dialectical method(ology) and inquiry. If theory is translated to 'the whole' and practice to 'the part', the following quotation sums up the logic:

> Dialectic research begins with the whole, the system, and then proceeds to an examination of the part to see where it fits and how it functions, leading eventually to a fuller understanding of the whole from which one has begun. (Ollman, 2003, p. 14)

Put in other words, the knowledge production takes form through the *mutual displacement of theory and empirical material.*

Ethical issues

To round up this chapter on methodology, some awareness of ethical issues should be raised. All the research participants have participated in the study under informed consent. The information is provided in verbal and written form. Prior to the interviews the participants were informed about the purpose of the project, how the contributions would be treated by me analytically and anonymously, and how their contributions may end up in publications beyond the dissertation, for instance in journals or at conferences. The participants were informed that they could withdraw their contribution at any time during the research period. The informed consent would be signed after each interview in order for the participants to get a sense of the relation between me and them. This was arranged so to minimize conflicts if discomfort would emerge during the interview. I also ensured them that they could contact me

any time if doubts, issues or interests in the work would emerge after the interview. All participants signed without any problems.

In conducting the interviews, I strived to be as aware of the possibly fragile situations some of the participants might find themselves in. All the participants were undergoing treatment at the time. Some in the beginning, and some in the final stages. Without having a more personal relation to the participants, I would have little chance of knowing how they would react towards aspects of my research interest. But I was specifically vigilant of a general aspect that in principle counteracts some of the processes of healing that the participants were undergoing. Various therapeutic approaches in U-turn are inspired by narrative therapy. A technique in narrative therapy is to 'thicken' the healing story of the client and make the problem story 'thin' (see e.g. Hoegsbro & Nissen, 2014; Nissen, 2013). When I in the interviews also wanted to explore the participants' imaginative premises *for* engaging in drugs, I practically contribute to a potential thickening of the problem story which is supposed to be thinned. Hence, in the interviews this attention demanded that I proceeded carefully and empathetically in the exploration. I would express my deeply felt respect to the participants for the courageous developments they were undergoing and encouraged them to tell me if my questions would touch upon sore and fragile spots.

The interviews have been conducted under written and informed consent. All the names have been anonymized. The interviews were carried out in Danish, but the transcribed material used here has been translated into English. Although there has not been any need for verbatim transcriptions – the interviews should not be used for discourse analysis or the like – I still wanted to keep the translations very close to the original formulations of the research participants. However, this created a dilemma between my loyalty to the empirical material and my loyalty to the research participants. While many of the conversations were in plain Danish and would not appear particularly strange when transcribed, they nevertheless appear as less eloquent when this plain-ness was to be translated into English. A possibility could have been to rewrite the transcriptions to fit better into English – which I have only done some places – but this would again mean that the transcripts would be further detached from the original interviews. I have settled on a middle ground. The risk still exists that I am mispresenting them as persons, and that would be very unfortunate. I was actually generally impressed by their abilities to reflect upon themselves in their transformative processes. I hope the reader will keep this in mind.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to explicate the methodological foundation of the research project. It has been framed by the metaphors of creating a mess and cleaning up. This process reflects very much my own experiences with engagements in the research and empirical field. The strategy of the chapter has therefore not been to sweep inconsistencies and dilemmas under the carpet, but to present them as conditions of the general knowledge production of the project. The scientific qualification of the project has thus followed the two lines: Discussing *object-adequacy* and creating *transparency*. Although I have demonstrated some of the object-*in*adequate aspects of the interview method, I have also demonstrated how they can be dealt with through interviews and at least with the support of analysis.

On the basis of these discussions the empirical analysis will be unfolded over the next three chapters. The first analytical chapter will situate the participants' drug engagements within their world of imagination and how this world has been developed through their digital everyday living. The next chapter will analyze how the relation between digital media and imaginative processes develop an intensification and a narrowing in of the participants' drug engagements. And the last will explore how the problems and dilemmas arising from this intensification are dealt with through the participants' reworking of their imaginative processes through digital media.

Chapter 6: The Emergence of Imagined Meta-Projections from the Digital Everyday Living of Young People Engaged in Drugs

To start the empirical analyses off, this chapter will create insight into how drugs become engaging for the research participants by becoming part of imagined projects that the participants are, or have been, in the process of developing. In order to create a logic in analyzing the participants' imaginative processes, I have established an *object*, or lens[19], through which the various processes of each participant could be made intelligible. "Imagined meta-projections" as an object, or lens, helps to understand how drugs are part of imagined directionalities in the participants' living. But in this first analytical chapter, it will also function to present the individual participants and how drugs are specifically significant to them. In the majority of the chapter, I will analyze how drugs become engaging through this imaginative dimension. Towards the end, I will analyze how this imaginative dimension has emerged from interactions with and reciprocations of (digital) media. Last, I will discuss how these movements can be understood as expansive vs. restrictive aspects of imagination.

Establishing the analytical object: Imagined meta-projections

Neil has stopped smoking cannabis for two months and agreed to share his experiences with me in an interview. Towards the last third of the interview the conversation turns to potential conflicts he might experience in relation to his current abstinence:

> Neil: And again, when I do experience a sunny day then I do want to smoke in contrast to a day where I don't need to go outside, I don't have to meet anyone and the weather is bad.

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[19] In Danish, the noun "objektiv" means a lens.

At first glance I could have accepted this as a normal account of craving cued by a familiar scenario. But I wanted to put that assumption to the test. I said to Neil that I imagine that he would get this feeling and then would have to push it away do to his abstinence. I then asked him to tell me what happens in that short interval:

> Neil: It will probably be something like, I'd start with associating it with the possibilities that there would be.

> Interviewer: Like?

> Neil: Would be like 'Wow, right now I could meet up with these and these and these people, in these and these settings' – maybe even unrealistic settings. I used to live in the Philippines, for example – I worked with diving and stuff like that – where I also used to smoke a lot, and was together with the locals and we had good times. We just walked about in swim shorts all day long, got high, had good times, diving. And I know I cannot – I am not there. I'd surely associate it a bit with that also. I'd associate it with Roskilde Festival, all the best experiences I have had. And then it would probably turn into something more realistic, like, 'right now I could meet up with a friend and go to Christiania, and just sit in the grass or at Månefiskeren [a cafe on Christiania], and maybe there even is a concert, listen to some music' and stuff like that. Or I could go out and paint graffiti. And it is all crazily connected to smoking because it would be the main activity to smoke. But the best, possible side-activities to smoking. And then it would turn into something like, 'Well, I am probably not going to do that', and then what to do?, you know? And then it would possibly go in the direction that I would like to get drunk instead.

Neil offers a surprisingly thick description. What looked like a classical conditioning of craving cued by the environment has bracketed a wealth of simultaneous processes within a split-second. As we jointly un-bracketed the experience the reconstructed event showed itself to be saturated by imaginative processes of possibilities and impossibilities. Of course, for Neil these imaginative processes need to be resisted as forming premises for engaging in taking drugs due to his present abstinence. But according to his account they did form premises earlier. My probing into un-bracketing Neil's craving experience did not come as a coincidence, however. It was led by an assumption generated previously in the interview. Through my talk with Neil, I got the impression that his engagement in smoking cannabis, and his associations and expectations to it, were not arbitrary. Neither were they solely structured around the drug itself, i.e. getting high. Rather, what recurred was a complex

of expectations, atmospheres and activities that seemed organizing for his engagements in smoking marijuana. Although Neil stresses smoking as the main activity, smoking is engaged to what Neil calls "side-activities" that in the described moment are absent and thus imagined.

This could also just be an illustration of the fragmented and multiple ways in which excuses for getting high find their way into the addicted person's mind. But the internal relation between all the imagined possibilities and impossibilities, plus Neil's own descriptions, point to an organizing principle, although not always clearly and coherently expressed or experienced. Neil's engagements in smoking cannabis appear to be structured by what I analytically would call an *imagined meta-projection*: An overarching projection formed by complexes of projections internally related to each other through the meta-projection. If the imagined meta-projection in Neil's case should be forced into a concept, for Neil the closest would probably be "good times"[20] although his descriptions are often more sensory, atmospheric and geographical than conceptual and abstract. It was the emergence of imaginative processes that seemed to point to an overarching logic that inspired the un-bracketing of the craving-scenario in the interview: Neil did not just experience a sunny day; it was a sunny day that potentialized aspects of his meta-projection including absent atmospheres, people, activities etc. that actually had happened and were desired to happen. All these absences seemed to be embodied in the emerging feeling of craving in that given scenario. Besides pointing back in time as memories, then, the sunny day made a field of potentials emerge where atmospheres, people and activities were connected through and imagined to be actualized through smoking cannabis.

Imagined meta-projections as producing relevance of drug engagements

Starting off with Neil as a case of imagined meta-projections could seem like a one-off. But similar complexes emerged from the interviews with the other five persons who participated in the study. Although they also differed in quality, content, subjective manifestation and saliency, the emergence of meta-projections across the interviews suggests that Neil's case is not stand-

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[20] In Danish, the term that Neil often used was "hygge" – a word hard to translate as "cozy" or "good times" do not totally capture the essence.

alone. In the table below, the different meta-projections are listed for each participant by concepts that I have settled on:

Participant	Imagined meta-projection
Neil	"Good times"
Simon	"Romantic self-destruction"
Karen	"Romanticized artistic suffering"
Ellen	"Slum"
Oscar	"Cool"
Frank	"Underworlds"

On a phenomenological level the coherence, labelling and meta-quality of these projections varied. For Simon and Karen, and partially Frank, they were brought up more explicitly and consequentially in the interviews and elaborated through my questioning and guidance. In the interviews with Neil, Ellen and Oscar we gradually developed the meta-projections from the at first sight disparate experiences associated with drugs that they shared with me. Through this meta-level of imagination, we get a sense of the logic and relevance of the participants' engagements in drugs. In the interview material developed with Simon we went into detailed accounts of his meta-projection. To provide a model or prototype for the analytical discussion of imagined meta-projections as a relevance-producing frame for the participants' engagements in drugs I will start by going into depth with his example.

Approximations and distancing in Simon's "romantic self-destruction"

"Romantic self-destruction" surfaced the first time in the group interview with Frank and *Simon*. Upon my question on what connections they experienced between their approach to drug taking and movies and TV series in which drug taking was either explicitly represented or not, Simon answered:

> Simon: There is one [movie] called Waking Life. And there is another movie made in the same style, but is directly about drugs, where Waking Life is about dreams. But I first saw Waking Life, I felt that it was a very good trip movie because it is so visual and stuff like that. But it moves a bit in…that otherworldly-ness… From the beginning, I had the feeling that when I got stoned, I learned something about myself, and it was as if putting on a different set of glasses so that you look at the world a bit differently. And by put-

ting on these glasses I could learn something about myself. And you notice other details. And Hunter S. Thompson was precisely a kind of inspiration in his, I mean, aggressively living on his self-destruction and making it life itself. He always drew his energy from that [inaudible]. Another thing we have talked about with all this self-destruction.

Interviewer: So, you make a connection between drugs and self-destruction and some kind of idea?

Simon: Yes…it is a big part of such a thing, I mean, a form of self-realization in order to discover what is possible, what you can leave behind of responsibility and just say, okay, now I will pull up roots and venture into the world alone.

And later in the interview in elaborating further on self-destruction:

Simon: This self-destruction, it is about going against the conventional and be…it is so easy to be [inaudible, but something with "citizen"]. It is more demanding to break away from that.

Simon's meta-projection is far more detailed than this. But the citations already show some key elements. First, we can note that the material effects of the drug of "getting stoned" are related to something beyond themselves for Simon. Getting stoned is connected to the concretely transgressive change of perception, but it is more widely related to the philosophical/existential pursuit of self-actualization via self-destruction and breaking down the conventional. Referring back to Ilyenkov in chapter two what is here imagined is not just "the thing", i.e. the (effects of the) drug, but the activity-with-the-thing which includes the connection between the concrete activity of getting stoned and learning something about oneself simultaneously. And this is further embedded in the general tension between engaging in self-destruction and in the conventional as Simon puts it. The imagined meta-projection, then, articulates the relation between drug use and other actual or imagined engagements for Simon. To draw on previously established concepts, the imagined meta-projection forms a double-sided telos in drug engagements: Directionalities that are *approximated* (self-realization via self-destruction) and directionalities that are *distanced* or transgressed (the conventional) by the approximated directionalities. This dynamic becomes more intelligible when the meta-projection is seen in relation to life projects and concerns. In Simon's case, he is an aspiring writer. Hence, the experienced and imagined possibilities that drug engagements open point in the direction of questioning the immediate

surface of life, as in "you notice other details" (from citation above). It can be interpreted further by suggesting a tension in Simon's living between creativity and shallow reproduction where the former entails self-destruction and the latter the conventional. The drug also plays a part in creating the directionality that is imagined to be approximated. Self-destruction, including the material effects of the drug, is also *imagination in the making* which Simon expresses as "discover what is possible". Imagination here is both directionality and open-ended processes.

Even from this short analysis it is possible to see how the imagined meta-projection unites drug taking and the aspiration of becoming a writer in Simon's living – while simultaneously positioning itself in opposition to the conventional. But these are also continuous processes of directedness and discovery of engagements and disengagements from imagined ways of living.

The next key element becomes evident in Simon's first passage. It is how the imagined meta-projection is co-constituted by *multi-sited transactions*. The three sites that Simon refers to here are the movie *Waking Life*, Hunter S. Thompson's way of living and discussions in a group in U-turn, alluded to in the "we" in the last sentence of the passage. The first two sites are co-constituted by different kinds of media where the group is a face-to-face site where such media experiences among other issues can be shared and form the basis of discussions (it is said so in the group interview). Hence, the imagined meta-projection is mediated by the different sites, but the imagination also mediates between them. Although Simon in the passage only mentions two media references (besides the unarticulated movie resembling *Waking Life*) the digitally layered substantiation of the *activity*-with-the-drug, i.e. activities supporting the creative and transgressive pursuits in self-destruction, is immediately indicated. *Waking Life* and Hunter S. Thompson do not have an overt connection, but are clustered together by imagination. This is similar to what Vygotsky writes on the ability of the imagination to cluster together disparate images under a common emotion or affect. And, as will be explored, digital media co-constitute a radical possibility of this clustering.

But Simon's meta-projection is not one-sided. While romantic self-destruction is a distancing to the conventional it embodies another distancing in its extremity. In the group interview I asked Frank and Simon if they had experiences with media presentations – not necessarily directly related to drug taking – that made them understand their drug use better. Simon first re-

ferred to Bob Dylan's *When the Ship Comes In* and put it in relation to a song he wrote himself.

> Simon: There are super-many references to that feeling of being lost. I mean, "Lost at Sea" is probably what it is called. And for me it has become a terminology which is also connected to the lack of control over oneself – that you no longer fancy it [the drug] or no longer can control, but you still need it.

In the second interview with Simon he hesitantly summarized this fear of losing control in the category "junkie". He describes it more as a *feeling* that he both identifies with and wants to keep at bay. The meta-projection, thus, does not just delineate an oppositional field of the conventional vs. romantic self-destruction. It also constitutes a conflictual field where the (creative) potentials and energies in self-destruction risk self-obliteration by loss of control. Self-destruction embodies both passion and fear.

Imagined meta-projections such as "romantic self-destruction" in Simon's life substantiate the actual activity of taking drugs with activities connected to a wider frame of directionalities that Simon either distances himself from or approximates based on ontogenetic concerns and projects. Meta-projections do not directly translate into premises for engaging in drug use. What I mean is that every time Simon smokes cannabis he does not pursue to actualize self-destruction in its imagined *totality*. But seeing premises as partial approximation of imagined meta-projections points to the specific logic and relevance of such engagements. When Simon experiences learning something about himself from smoking cannabis or twisting the common perception of the world it draws it relevance from the meta-projection, especially when that meta-projection among other things is co-constituted by Hunter S. Thompson who exemplified a living where drug taking and writing does not negate but presuppose each other. Activities-with-the-drug become engaging for Simon through their relation to the absent and imagined self-destruction; they reversely become disengaging when they imaginatively relate to the dystopian self-destructive form (losing control) of "junkie".

Sketching out imagined meta-projections among the other participants

Imagined meta-projections emerged in the interviews with the other participants too. This will be sketched out in the following in order to present the

participants and to create an analytical frame of the personally felt relevance of drug engagements of each participant.

Karen – "romanticized artistic suffering". Karen is still smoking marijuana, but has an ambition to cut down. When she initially got engaged with drugs, however mostly alcohol at that time, she expressed that she had developed a romanticized perception of artistic suffering. Talking about when she was about sixteen she says:

> Karen: This thing about being the suffering artist – I drank a lot of coffee, went to bodegas and talked to the bums, loved Bukowski…
>
> Interviewer: Oh yeah, he is dangerous.
>
> Karen: I know!
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> Interviewer: Tell me more about that universe. I find that interesting.

Karen continues:

> Karen: I was super suffering[21] when I was younger. It wasn't all too easy for me either when I was younger. My mom drank a lot. My father [inaudible]. I have some bad experiences. And it wasn't something that I told everybody, it was very private. But, you know, I think I liked to be suffering, and I wasn't feeling well. … But I was seeking this artistic way of living. Also, I went to K.u.b.a., a production school, and there were artistic types, I attended the writing lab. And everyone there were, we were all these seeking and outgoing types; we were people who had stopped our educations, between 16 and 24 years old, some more mature than others. But yeah, I was seeking that very much, I think. It was almost romantic, yes.

As a meta-projection "romanticized artistic suffering" synthesizes both imagination and biography for Karen: The imagined project of becoming a writer and painful past experiences. Karen revolves it around the double meaning of passion *as* suffering and passion *for* something as she refers to both "at lide" and "lidenskab" in Danish. The meta-projection, then, embodies affective resonance and imagination. For Karen, intoxicants relate partially to the meta-projection. Alcohol seemed to be the main substance interacting with the

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[21] To be suffering ("at være lidende") in Danish means living on the sentiment of suffering.

meta-projection as exemplified in her reference to the writer Charles Bukowski. Cannabis seems to act to subdue the suffering:

> Karen: I think I really have ugly, ugly, ugly sides. And it is precisely what I use weed for, to close myself down, and the world, because I can't bear to face it sometimes.

In this context, the suffering exceeds the romantic and artistic, and drugs as such. The part involving suffering is in Karen's description populated, or substantiated, by fictional characters that are not necessarily engaged in drug use, but who somehow are dealing with suffering. An early 'companion' was Remus Lupin, from the *Harry Potter* books, whom Karen describes as a suffering person. The books followed her from the age 6-16 and simultaneously opened her eyes for reading books and probably writing. She mentions other characters such as Zuko from the *Avatar* series and adds Rust (Cohle) from the TV show *True Detective* as the latest fictional character of that significance.

> Karen: I feel a connection to them. I get them.

There are characters in Karen's imagined meta-projection that are more related to the suffering while others e.g. Bukowski link suffering and drugs to artistic pursuits like writing. In the interview, we did not explore in detail what the meta-projection was in opposition to. But she did express a distancing towards some of the common possibilities offered by society regarding job and education:

> Karen: [Working] 8-17, I have difficulties with that. I think it is something that is difficult, yeah 8-17, gosh, sitting in front of a computer. I think everyone has this idea about doing something rewarding[22]. … I am not an idiot. But this whole institution-thing is very difficult for me, you know, with people and that way of learning. I am actually really good with books, I am good at concentrating, but I can't bear the social parts[23].

And in envisioning her life without marijuana she expresses anxieties that her smoking practices seem to distance her from:

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[22] "Givende" in Danish. Bordering on purposeful, worthwhile, I am not sure if this could be more directly translated as "giving"

[23] "Social parts", translation: She uses "fællesskab" which translates into "community". But I think she refers to the wider social organization of schooling.

Karen: When I think about a life without weed, I think about a grey infinity that stretches out before me – like a flat, grey concrete slab. It doesn't even stop at any point, it just disappears into something.

Neil – "good times". If we return to Neil, we can find an imagined meta-projection that emerges in a slightly different way. Where the meta-projection in Karen's case seems to be mainly a clustering of fictional characters and their emotional conflicts and developments, "good times" as Neil's meta-projection emerges as complexes of atmospheres, moods and settings in so-cial contexts. When I asked Neil to elaborate his positive expectations to smoking cannabis – the "pro list" as he had called it – he answered:

Neil: You want to have a good time, you want to be in good company, and you want to be happy and be energized, and you want to converse about things you like, good times.

From Neil's descriptions, I had the impression that the expectations were more imagined as disparate percepts than an overarching concept as for in-stance Simon and Karen expressed it. Instead, Neil ordered the percepts in a list of pros and cons[24]. The meta-projection of the "good times"-atmosphere is in a partial sense paradoxically linked to one of Neil's major interests which is physical activity:

Neil: I often link that feeling I want the most from smoking to having a good time. And perfectly, I would associate it with a lovely grass meadow and the sun is shining, and you have a very good time. Or you are outside and doing something physical, you use your body and stuff like that. And that is a total-ly misplaced association to smoking, because it would be the fewest of times that those two things would meet.

Being curious on how that association has developed in this specific manner I asked:

Interviewer: So how did it arise?

Neil: Yeah, it's very interesting. I don't know. I think it is because that is what you want the most. It is what I always want the most. No matter what time, what day, that is what I want the most. And somehow I have gotten it into my brain that smoking is the best thing in the world. And that is what I urge,

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[24] Probably a technology he had developed in treatment as it is typical for approaches like Motivational Interviewing (Rollnick & Miller, 2008)

that is what I am entitled to. And these two things have somehow gotten stuck together. Because when I feel cravings – what I don't do often anymore in comparison to earlier where it was a necessity every day – then that is what comes closest to describing that craving. And how those two things are associated, that's a good question.

Neil's answer kept puzzling me. First because of the vague perception he expresses of the constitution of the paradoxical link and yet he describes it as having a great strength in forming premises for smoking. And second because his description of what he is imagining to get out of smoking resonated a lot with his depictions earlier in the interview of drug presentations in 'stoner movies' that he was once watching. How come he did not make this connection? However, shortly after, as we continue to discuss his pro list, Neil suggests a multi-sited emergence of the meta-projection after all:

Neil: I associate weed with a lovely, sunny – probably in Denmark – day with flowers and trees in bloom, and the grass is beautiful and a clear sky, maybe a few white clouds and the sun [inaudible] in warm, shorts-and-t-shirt weather. I connect that with smoking. And maybe it is because these have been the best experiences I have had with smoking, when you have been together with the guys in Kongens Have [a park in Copenhagen] or something like that, or at Roskilde [the festival], just sitting and talking the whole day, getting high, having a good time in these perfect settings. But I also connect it with this music and these movies [that we talked about earlier in the interview] that are pro-smoking. Then, these three things are connected.

We see again how the complex of settings and atmospheres of Neil's meta-projection are co-constituted by the multi-sited experiences where some are more directly linked to media than others. The passages taken together, it reversely shows how the single-site experience of a sunny day interacts with aspects of the complex and makes them emerge as imagined activities related to smoking cannabis – experienced by Neil as craving. Hence, approximating the imagined settings and atmospheres on Neil's pro list previously formed the premise for his engagements in drug use repeatedly although, according to his description, smoking cannabis actually distanced him from the pro list most of the times.

During most of the interview we tried to go into detail with these associations. As a result, I did not manage to get a clear picture of what Neil tried to distance himself from through his meta-projection, which was more clearly articulated in the interviews with Simon and Karen.

Ellen – "slum". Ellen presents a case where it was even less obvious if and how her imagination played into her engagements in drugs in a meta-projective way. It was only towards the end of the interview that it was expressed to some degree. Here I explored how she felt that digital media might create conflicts in relation to her current attempt to abstain from cannabis and other drugs (not yet including alcohol):

> Ellen: I was on Facebook, on a Sunday afternoon, I had been out and had a hangover. Somebody had sent a photographer out to shoot photos of the nightlife in Copenhagen [photos she saw on Facebook]. And then I felt the urge to go out also. But it is difficult on a Sunday afternoon. You do want to see what other people are doing and the other places I haven't been to. I would like to see what it is about. Then I felt like going out which was also annoying.
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> Interviewer: What did the photos look like?
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> Ellen: They were dark – black and white, I think. Different things. Some had taken pictures of some vomit – then I didn't really feel like going out [laughter]. And one person was sitting in an elevator with a bottle and sleeping. Pictures of girls that where all [makes mocking sounds]. Lots of things.
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> Interviewer: And which pictures gave you the greatest urge to go out?
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> Ellen: There was a photo with a wall in the background which was painted over with graffiti. It looked like a slum-place. I like such things the best. Lots of people in front of it, I guess.
>
> Interviewer: What does the graffiti put into motion?
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> Ellen: That's...slum. I like slum. There are always funnier people there. Not all that bullshit with bouncers 'you are wearing the wrong shoes, pal'. It's open. There are also a lot of drugs, and maybe that is why I also have taken so many, it is so easily accessible.

Ellen's attraction to "slum" ties together many disparate associations to drugs that Ellen presented throughout the interview. As the quotation shows, "slum" seems to connect drugs with a specific social and geographical milieu consisting of dark, underground settings and places (in contrast to Neil's sunny descriptions) and a specific "open" mentality. Besides frequenting actual places of similar atmosphere, like Christiania and Nørrebro, attractions to the raggedy and trashy places and people were also articulated by Ellen in re-

lation to digital media. Although claiming not to follow a lot of popular culture, the teen drama *Skins*, which sets in (rough parts of) Bristol, is one that Ellen followed intently. But music seemed to be of greater importance. Ellen mentions, amongst other genres, metal and grunge and says:

> Ellen: In the style of music I listen to they are very fond of drugs.

Ellen's identification with this milieu is also related to people's mentality, as mentioned. She associates these people with being "happier", "relaxed", "open-minded" and that "the open-minded person is probably more intoxicated". Ellen's meta-projection "slum" forms a distancing tension to what she calls "conservative" people or "conservative" living. Upon talking about *Skins,* I asked her to say more about these "places" that she articulated interest in. And she brought up the distancing:

> Ellen: I don't like conservative people. And you don't find a lot of them there [referring back to places like Inner Nørrebro]. There is more space for people, [in] such a place. I like that.

As such, the graffiti-picture on Facebook can be analyzed as interacting with parts of Ellen's meta-projection, generating her to imagine the possibilities of going out and exploring those and similar places. It did not form a concrete premise for her actions, but it nevertheless co-constituted a conflict in the feeling of being annoyed.

Oscar – "cool". In the interview with Oscar it was equally vague in how far it was possible to construct his imaginative workings around drugs in a meta-projective way. When we tried to dig into it, Oscar expressed:

> Oscar: I don't think I have got one thing that I can compare it to. It [drug use] was more connected with different kinds of activities. Everything became 'oh, it could be cool if I also smoked a joint while doing this', no matter what I then did.

This may simply suggest that the meta-projective frame of imagination does not make the relevance of drug use for Oscar intelligible. The microgenetic imagination of imagining how the material effects of the drug would alter activities would then seem to produce the relevance. Another way of analyzing it could be to suggest that the general character of Oscar's drug use has made

the perceptible link to meta-projections vague or even decoupled, as he ponders immediately after:

> Oscar: I think maybe I have forgotten about my imagination concerning smoking because it became such a big part of my everyday life.

The reason for maintaining that drug engagements in Oscar's living still are (or were, since he had been clean for two months) transgressed by imagined meta-projections is hinted when he describes when the occasional smoking cannabis smoking at parties during public school changed to more regular engagements in high school. Here, smoking joints became part of an imagined project and pursuit:

> Oscar: I think my teenage rebellion was to smoke cigarettes and joints. Because, I was actually allowed to do a lot of things, and I never felt the need to cross the line. Now, in the therapy group we have talked about, the first time we were there, we talked about weed and lifestyle. And I could identify with that. In the beginning, it is the gateway to a community, it is the way you get to meet some people.

Oscar elaborates a bit later on the significance of meeting new people and becoming part of a new community at that time in his life:

> Oscar: I think one of the reasons why I got into that community of smoking joints was because I went from public school with a lot of friends and then to a high school with few students, the high school wasn't too big. There were all in all 600 students distributed over three years, so 200 per year. And we were 50 of these 200 who already knew each other. So I already had many friendships. And I think I wanted to break out of that, it was maybe not the right thing for me to continue on that school because I needed to meet some new people. My entry into meeting new people was then this new group of friends who had that in common that they smoked a lot of joints. And through that I got introduced to this lifestyle. It wasn't like I hadn't tried smoking joints before with my other friends. But they did it a lot. And I think that I perceived this thing about smoking joints as something pretty cool, it was a cool thing to do.

Since the concept "cool" resurfaced many times during the interview, it led me to assume that it could have a meta-quality, especially as it was part of what Oscar initially approximated through this community while trying to distance himself from an already known group of friends. It was not easy to

clarify the relation between "cool" and smoking joints. But part of it was the almost exotic appeal of a new group of older friends:

> Oscar: I think for me, people that were older than me were quite interesting and exciting.
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> Interviewer: What was exciting about it?
>
> Oscar: I think maybe it has to do with something that I am not or friends my age are not. They were probably able to do other things, had tried different things. It was funny and interesting to hear their stories.
>
> Interviewer: What kind of things?
>
> Oscar: They went out more, they drank more beers, they...yeah...what things...? Once, I had an expectation that they had more life experience that they could share with you. They had tried more things in life, and I thought that was very interesting. You could listen to it and become inspired.
>
> Interviewer: Inspired to do what?
>
> Oscar: Maybe to do some of the same things. I think I have always been good at living in other people's stories, getting carried away by them.

Oscar imagined relevant potentials in joining the joint-smoking community after all. But what the potentials were about seems hard for Oscar to articulate. His descriptions present his imagination as teleonomic: The perception of unspecified potentials and directionalities. Yet the "cool" appeal and significance of smoking joints was present, but also somehow obscured and in the processes of being specified. I asked Oscar to describe this "coolness" in more detail. He provided an account that extends beyond engagements in drugs, and is more abstractly a relation between interests, performative engagements and recognition:

> Oscar: I just think that it feels like...when you do something cool, it relates to something that I am interested in. For example, I'd think that it would be very cool – now, I am passionate about music – so, for me to be cool is to play an instrument overly well.
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> Interviewer: Does it concern all styles of music?
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> Oscar: No, not necessarily. Because I don't think that metal is significantly interesting. That you can play immensely fast in metal is not very cool for me. But if you can lay down a super-groovy beat to some funk music, or can you

play the coolest jazz-solo on the trumpet – that I would think is cool –
because that is what I am interested in. Similarly, I like snowboarding and
have a kind of interest in skateboarding, although I don't practice it, if you
can make some of those awesome tricks – that I would think is cool.

When I asked Oscar to relate this description to smoking joints he answered:

> Oscar: I think it was more related to the act of smoking itself which was the
> 'cool' thing about it, if you should call it that way. The 'cool' thing in reality
> was to get recognition from this group of friends whom I thought were cool
> people at that time. And you got recognition by becoming a part of this
> smoking-environment. I mean, making a cool joint, having bought weed –
> that could get you enough recognition in itself.

In these exchanges, we did not manage to develop a thicker description of the
interrelatedness of the "coolness" of smoking joints and other interests in
Oscar's life (besides music). And very little reference was made to the role of
digital media in these descriptions in this exchange. Nonetheless, Oscar's per-
ception of and aspiration towards "coolness" appears to be central for his en-
gagements in drug use. But quite similar to Simon, Oscar expressed a caution
and conflict concerning the contexts through which he came to be engaged in
drugs. Instead of pure "coolness", there was also its contradiction:

> Oscar: It was first when I met this group of friends, I think, that I was seri-
> ously introduced to the activity of just sitting somewhere and smoking joints.
> I actually think it was quite estranging for me in the beginning. I think that I
> perceived it to be profoundly strange just to sit there and smoke joints. Be-
> cause you have heard many stories that it might not be the best thing in the
> world to do.

Frank – "underworlds". To round up this introductory analysis of partici-
pants imagined meta-projections let's turn to Frank. In the context where Si-
mon in the group interview introduced "self-destruction", Frank expressed
his fascination with what he called "underworlds". Earlier on he had de-
scribed a connection between his drug use (cannabis) and certain atmos-
pheres in movies. I wanted to know if these atmospheres interconnected drug
use and wider 'imaginative worlds' (in the lack of a better word). Upon this he
brought up "underworlds" for the first time:

> Frank: Yes. All these underworlds have always captured me like crazy.

Interviewer: Tell me more about that.

Frank: Where I was thinking, this is just exciting. For instance a Danish movie, like that prison-movie. Where I thought, 'yeees, this is exciting, man.' The skateboard-underworld, yes that is exciting. And the poker-underworld is exciting.

Interviewer: And what is exciting about them? Try to elaborate that term.

Frank: I think it is because it is a bit forbidden and a bit unseen and not everybody knows what it is about…

Frank articulates many disparate worlds clustered in his term "underworlds". And they seem connected through a specific kind of "atmosphere" as Frank names it various times. "Underworlds" clusters many other worlds that somehow seem to defy the logics and expectations of society and they resurface in many forms in Frank's engagements in media, too. To the crime drama about an outlaw biker club, *Sons of Anarchy*, Frank says smilingly:

Frank: It awakens the bandit in me.

Similar to other imagined meta-projections it again becomes evident that "underworlds" for Frank extends beyond drugs. But wanting to know if this was just an interest of Frank's or if it could act imaginatively as a meta-projection relating to drugs, I asked if and how he saw a relation between underworlds and his engagements in drugs:

Frank: Eeehm, I just think it was really exciting to go to Christiania, if that is what you are asking into.

Interviewer: So that you felt that you could become part of, not necessarily 'underworlds', but…?

Frank: It was not something that I intended to become a part of, at all, like, 'tomorrow I want to be behind one of those stalls' [selling marijuana]. I never wanted that.

Interviewer: No.

Frank: But I always found it exciting to meet the people. And I often talked to them when I was younger.

I then asked into the possible relation between Christiania and "underworlds" and he answered:

> Frank: Yes, there is. It is the same atmosphere.

By and large, what Frank suggests is that aspects of his engagements in drugs are premised on approximating or becoming a part of an *atmosphere* that is construed by various worlds that do not need to be directly related to drugs. Different worlds imaginatively converge in the "underworld"-atmosphere. As Frank expresses, this does not mean to actualize the totality of a specific world, like going into selling marijuana at Christiania. Engaging in drug use in this way illustrates a way of participating in and actualizing aspects of "underworlds" and he does therefore not practice his fascination at distance entirely. Similarly, Frank expressed being an active poker player and being passionate about movies, TV-series and other media products. The example with his response to *Sons of Anarchy* serves to illustrate further the affinity between the imagined meta-projection and interests in Frank's life. Being educated and having worked as a mechanic, Frank seems to find a connection between the passion for machinery and the "bandit" within him in the biker-underworld in *Sons of Anarchy*.

Summing up on imagined meta-projections

Besides shortly presenting the participants, this sketch has been the first analytical step that can now be summed up. Using Simon as a prototype in the beginning, I have tried to analyze a specific feature of the imagination in relation to drug engagements. As the participants' experiences show, engagements in drugs can be illuminated through the participants' imagined activities-with-the-drug, which Neil clearly articulated in the beginning of this chapter ("good times"-with-the-drug). And further that the relevance of microgenetic drug engagements becomes intelligible by how they are transgressed by *imagined meta-projections* that extend beyond the microgenetic level – although this interconnection is not necessarily perceptibly clear or systematic to the participants. How the meta-projections are substantiated was highlighted in different ways among the participants. The descriptions varied from complexes of characters, geographies, and atmospheres to self-realization. I will here stress *highlighted* because the meta-projections were often described as more complex combinations than I have initially shown. But importantly,

what the participants have shared of experiences already suggests that the complexes of projections are co-constituted by multi-sited transactions between sites more directly connected to media and other less media-connected sites. The imagined meta-projections direct the participants towards engagements and disengagements, towards approximation and distancing, while also constructing fields of conflict in relation to drug engagements. In varying degree, the meta-projections have also been put in relation to ontogenetic projects, challenges and concerns. The imagined meta-projections thus also help us situate drug engagements in the concrete living of the participants as they in different ways become part of these ontogenetic projects and experiences.

Digital implications for developing imagination and drug engagements

In this section I will try to analyze how digital media co-constitute the development of the participants' imagination and engagements in drug use. There are some challenges in making this reconstruction. One challenge concerns a limitation of the empirical material. The interviews offer scarce recollections about significant media implications for initial phases of engagements in drugs among the participants. Quite a few of the mentioned media sources of importance, for instance books and VHS tapes, are not digital. But they are included as well because they still are important media artifacts in the development of the imaginative processes of the participants. This is linked to another challenge – or circumstance. At the time when many of the participants started experimenting with drugs, digital media had not yet reached the omnipresent and advanced status in everyday living as we know it from today. A third challenge lies in the difficulty in temporally isolating significant digital/media implications to different phases of drug engagements since they develop continuously and are accounted for in the interview context from the participants' current reworking of their experiences. In spite of these challenges trying to analyze how imagined meta-projections and drug engagements gradually develop through media practices can elucidate how these processes are not as such linear, but are better understood as emerging from *reciprocating iterations*. Although it is not the primary research focus, the analysis still intervenes in and transcends the tension of a classical dispute, namely the question if media create drug engagements or if the participants would have developed drug engagements in the ways they have irrespective of digital me-

dia. But how can the gradual emergence of imagined meta-projections then be understood?

Interobjectual iterations of cultural artifacts – away from linearity

One possible way of discussing this question empirically is to illustrate the formation of imagined meta-projections in an analytical dialogue between Karen and Oscar. Oscar describes how he was not introduced to the coolness of smoking joints through digital media:

> Oscar: I was not introduced to weed in the sense that I had read some place on the internet or in a book that it was the coolest experience in the world to smoke weed. I was introduced to it through my friends. And when you have become a part of that environment then you of course also seek out things [media experiences] that weed is a part of.

Oscar suggests that media were not critically implicated in the development of his interest in smoking joints. Media became more critical *after* that interest emerged out of interactions with friends. Yet, Oscar mentions that mainly the distancing aspect of his imagined meta-projection already started earlier and emerged from multiple sites including media. The feelings of alienation and estrangement towards just sitting and smoking weed when he became part of the new community of friends came from hearing *"all the different stories about it maybe not being the best thing in the world to do"*, as he describes it. And when I asked about where he had "heard" that from, he answers:

> Oscar: 'Heard' must have been my friends, what you could read in the newspapers and so on. … My parents and I have never had a conversation about not taking drugs. I think it has been little things that I found in newspapers or in school or in books [inaudible].

Oscar did not recall any specific or particular media sources. The embodied feeling of distancing and caution towards certain drug engagements, then, is likely to be the remnant of or hyper-generalized (cf. Zittoun et al., 2013) from such media experiences and conversations. I did not get a clear picture of the co-constituting origins of imaginative processes through which the "coolness" in Oscar's life developed – apparently only after the interest in drugs had developed.

But the emergence and cultivation of imagined meta-projections do not need to have drugs as central concern. From the biographical descriptions provided by Karen we can see how the "romanticized artistic suffering" emerged from ongoing reciprocating iterations of cultural artifacts and experiences and concerns in her life. Initially, these where not related to drugs. The following is a longer dialogue. I include it coherently since it shows some of these interesting aspects. This passage follows immediately after Karen has been talking about her youth and love for Bukowski.

> Interviewer: You say 'romantic' – I am juggling with a concept about imagination. So, things I imagine that when I smoke then... [Karen breaks in]
>
> Karen: Yes [inaudible] because it is never romantic when you are in the situation.
>
> Interviewer: What was your imagination about at that time?
>
> Karen: Hmmm...I don't know, actually...
>
> Interviewer: You talked a bit about something creative.
>
> Karen: Yes, yes, yes, in that way. Yes, create art. Passion and suffering. You know, that is what great artists do.
>
> Interviewer: And where does this imagination come from? I guess that has something to do with media as well...
>
> Karen: 100%.
>
> Interviewer: Try to explain.
>
> Karen: Did you see Amadeus?
>
> Interviewer: Yes.
>
> Karen: I saw it when I was 10 years old. I LOVE classical music. It was that [movie] which opened up classical music for me, and opera. And I think I got a lot of it from there. Or not specifically from there. Of course, I had for example also seen it from my mother... or, not... The funny thing is that when I was very young, it was something that I des...des...what is it called?
>
> Interviewer: You despised?
>
> Karen: Yes, exactly. I despised those sides of my mother, about drinking and smoking. But when I entered that age when it became interesting, it changed

to the opposite. And I could see why...it wasn't because I wanted to be a great artist that I drank – it was also because I was feeling awful. But I don't know it almost satisfied me, that idea that I was felling awful-ish. I was a bit crazy.

Interviewer: But there is also an imaginary there, about the suffering artist...

Karen: Exactly.

Interviewer: ...who has no money, but creates great things. I also think that concerns the imagination. And you just opened it a bit.

Karen: It occupied a lot. I liked it a lot.

Interviewer: You mentioned Amadeus. Were there other, I mean...that must have been on a DVD, right?

Karen: No, no, no, that was VHS.

Interviewer: Ah, the old VHS. But did you have other such media experiences that almost supported that universe or imaginary?

Karen: A little bit, yeah [laughs]. The book that made me read a lot was Harry Potter. I was 6 when the first Harry Potter book was published and it hit me just perfectly. I was 16 or 17 when the last one came out.

Interviewer: So it was a big part of your life.

Karen: It was my whole childhood, or youth-childhood thing.

Interviewer: How did it hit you?

Karen: Well, just that it really opened my eyes to reading, just to begin to read stories. But I was totally crazy about Remus Lupin. He is also suffering, a lot. Doesn't really take drugs, but he is a werewolf, ish. It isn't easy for him, you know. I like those suffering people. They are also often a component of culture. Did you see True Detective? Like Rust, he is sitting [makes whining noises]. Ehmm, yes, I think a lot of people are drawn towards those characters. They are very interesting. I don't think, it is not just people...it is also... Damn, I sound pretentious [laughs].

In the passage, Karen backtracks some of the more important cultural influences. It is evident that they are not related to drugs in the beginning or in any of the interconnections she mentions. It is the biographically felt suffer-

ing in Karen's life that becomes the emotional and iterative anchor from *Harry Potter* over *Amadeus*, Bukowski, and *True Detective*. The romanticized relation formed between suffering and art, then, seems to emerge from the (interobjectuality of) cultural artifacts where the felt suffering in the *Harry Potter* books is iterated around the creation of art in the movie *Amadeus* that jointly cultivated Karen's interest in writing and classical music (not just listening – she also plays the violin). As Karen indicates, this significance did not emerge solely from cultural artifacts, but also from her mother when she says, *"I had for example also seen it from my mother…"* – although we did not elaborate this part. At this point, Karen expresses that intoxicants were not part of the transaction, not only because of her age, but also due to Karen's negative relation to them through her mother. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret that the significant cultural artifacts in Karen's life co-constituted her imaginative processes where suffering is transgressed with potentiality through the creation of art, although she claims that the goal never was to become a great artist. But the role of suffering in artistic pursuits and creations is evident as she expresses in "that's what great artists do" – they create great art from deeply felt suffering. The turn in interest in intoxicants clusters another projection into the "romanticized artistic suffering". Karen's love for Bukowski anchors another co-constituting iteration. Besides combining creation of art, suffering and alcoholism, Bukowski in his semi-autobiographical writings also materialize a way of living that embodies a critical stance towards the superficial glamour of Hollywood, embracing the brute honesty of primitive low-life and with an affective approach to life resonating the sentiments of hopelessness and indifference. When Karen in the same sentence as she mentions Bukowski says that she at that time also went to bodegas and talked to the bums, her affective engagements seem to resonate with those materialized by Bukowski. Without a doubt, there are many more significant cultural artifacts in Karen's life. But since she brought these few ones up in this context it could witness their importance in co-constituting her imaginative processes.

Material reciprocations of the iterative emergence of imagined meta-projections

The material reciprocations of these central iterations in Karen's life need to be addressed more closely. Notably in relation to the *Harry Potter* books and the *Amadeus* movie, Karen talks about them in active forms when describing how they have affected her interests. She says that the books "hit her",

"opened her eyes for reading"*,* and that the movie "opened up classical music" for her. We should not take this too literally, but it is still possible to see it as expressions of how Karen feels the cultural artifacts have recreated and reconfigured her interests. I could go into a more detailed analysis of how the content of the cultural artifacts reciprocated and recreated Karen's interest and identification with suffering characters. But a more general and important point that I want to make is that the reciprocation on the content-level, if you will, cannot be separated from the technological reciprocations of the cultural artifacts. The primarily fictive worlds and characters that Karen articulates as significant for (re)creating her imagined meta-projection are materialized in books, VHS tapes and digital media (in the case of *True Detective*). The specific materialization procures a specific kind of reciprocation. Karen highlights the primary significance of Remus Lupin in the *Harry Potter* books, but in the same context she expresses how the books from the first to the last publication gave a significant structure to her "youth-childhood". The temporal distribution of the books, then, acts like an axis from which other reciprocating iterations of cultural artifacts emerge while it simultaneously fixates and makes interests develop and recreates them. As should be evident, "romanticized artistic suffering" does not emerge from this axis alone in Karen's life, but from transactions with other cultural artifacts and iterative recreations of interests and (biographical) concerns. I insist on using Scarry's concepts of reciprocation as meaning *re*creation, because it does not make much sense to try to force linear explanations down on Karen's descriptions: The cultural artifacts do not simply produce her interests and imagination per default. But the active forms by which Karen describes their significance hints at how they recreate or give new form to affects and interests that were present in other forms prior to that. *Amadeus* opened Karen's passion for classical music, which was also somehow fostered through her mother (although the account does not point out how precisely) – and it recreated the suffering felt by Karen herself and experienced through Remus Lupin by substantiating it with classical music and creation of art.

Although the interview with Oscar does not provide an as detailed account of significant cultural artifacts earlier in his life, his articulations likewise suggest iterative emergences. Oscar describes how different artifacts and conversations co-constitute how he imagines certain types of drug engagements as estranging. This *cautioning* imagination was, however, overridden or subdued (because it did not disappear as such) by the possibilities of joining a

new community of friends by whom he was introduced to new engagements in drugs. From the point where he then became part of that community he gradually cultivated the imaginative processes of those particular drug engagements: the drug engagements that were transgressed by cautioning imaginative processes became carefully transgressed by the potentiality of "coolness".

The stories across the interviews are not significantly different on this matter. Frank, for instance, describes how *"media were totally different back then"* and how he started experimenting with marijuana with a friend and going to Christiania for the excitement. The media involved were DVD's occasionally stolen from the local grocery store or bought in music shops. Still, the interest in the activities bordering the law could have an affinity with his fascination with the meta-projective "underworlds".

For Ellen, as the youngest participant, social media like Facebook had already become common practice when she started developing an interest in drinking alcohol and going out. She does describe how pictures of parties posted on Facebook did make her want to go out or make her want to be seen or tagged in the contexts drinking alcohol too – just to signal to be a grown-up. But according to her account, this kind of interest and engagements via Facebook faded. Hence, she could not provide a very detailed description of the significance of digital media in this initial period.

Analytical insights into the development of drug engagements

In this chapter I have so far analytically traced the early developments of the young people's engagements in drugs. There are historical reasons for why the implications of *digital* media cannot be elucidated in these processes, simply because they had not become part of the participants' living in these early stages. We can still learn something about how imagination emerges from interactions with other relevant media (e.g. books and VHS), that I have called *cultural artifacts*, and how this relation contributes to the developments of engagements in drugs.

The insight that the analysis has generated is that is that the relation between media, imagination and development of drug engagements is not a linear one. There were no clear accounts of *media presentations of drugs* that directly created the participants' engagements in drugs, concretely or imaginatively. The relation more seems, like Oscar describes it, that when the interest in drugs develops, then media presentations are sought out. This does, how-

ever, not mean that these developments and media are unrelated. The empirical material has shown how imagined meta-projections iteratively emerge from and are recreated by interactions with different cultural artifactns in relation to other issues and pursuits. This imaginative development *converges* with drug-related cultural artifacts at some point later. As clearly shown in Karen's case, the convergence emerges from iterations of *Harry Potter*, *Amadeus* and the writings of Bukowski. But the affective tone that is being developed is embodied in the imaginative world of the romanticized sufferings of the artist. Although Bukowski hybridizes suffering, drugs/alcohol and creation, the suffering felt by Karen already pre-existed that. Similarly, Frank's fascination with "underworld" was already emerging when drugs became a part of it.

The various ways in which these convergences can emerge in the living of the participants point to the *cultural versatility* of drug engagements. Drug engagements are part of what we could call wider *cultural projections* in which drugs perform different potentialities. The cultural projections of drug engagements can resonate with, become incorporated into and recreate the imagination emerging from the participants' biographies and living. Hence, Karen's suffering and artistic interests converge with the cultural projections of the artist who deals with suffering through creation and drugs; Frank's fascination of "underworlds" converges with the cultural projection of drugs as criminal activities (which is also decided by legislation); and so forth. It is therefore not possible to determine convergences – and emergences – from a primary interest in drugs among the participants. They seem to happen where the participants' biographical issues and interests resonate with other engagements of cultural projections where drugs play a specific part in actualizing such engagements. Through the imaginative processes of the participants, the cultural projections of drug engagements also become part of participants' wider projects and cultivation of passions and affect, beyond the drug itself.

Imagination as premise for expansive and restrictive aspects of initial drug engagements

In this concluding part of the chapter, I will propose some possible routes for analyzing how we can understand restrictive vs. expansive aspects of the participants' imaginative premises for engaging in drugs.

The expansive vs. restrictive aspect in relation to drug engagements can easily fall into binary understandings. On the one hand, drug engagements could be interpreted as restrictive because drugs can restrict physical, mental and social health. On the other hand, the engagements can be interpreted as expansive because the young people do not follow or reproduce the laws and rules stipulated by society. This is not what the dual aspect of restrictive vs. expansive is about. It needs to be grounded in the concrete living of the young people.

Aspects of the initial drug engagements can be analyzed as moving into expansive directions. In Karen's case, we can see how the imaginative creation of "romanticized artistic suffering" transforms her felt suffering into a *potential* of artistic creation. It transgresses the conflictuality with potentiality which she initially pursues to actualize through her interests in writing, reading and music. Oscar's imaginative creation of "cool", which he gradually develops through drug engagements, can be seen as an expansive transgression of the conflict he experiences between his desire to discover new things in his life and being "stuck" in quite familiar social settings of his new high school. Imagining that the new community of older friends could introduce him to his *own* imagined absence – that the new friends were "something that I am not" (cf. quote p. 174) – through drugs and their stories, can be seen as Oscar's way of transgressing his felt conflict. This takes the imaginative shape of "cool" which simultaneously is in the process of being defined, shaped and substantiated. Simon, as a last example, also clearly articulates how he felt like he learnt something new through smoking marijuana; how that was a part of actualizing his "romantic self-destruction" as a vehicle for his writing pursuits. "Romantic self-destruction" in combination with the material effects of the drug is a way of *expanding the imagination itself* – or in Simon's words, a "form of self-realization in order to discover what is possible" (cf. p. 164). These three examples can illustrate how the imagination forms expansive premises for initial drug engagements: The meta-projective emergence of the

participants' imagination is in the processes of developing directionalities in their living; approximating these directionalities through drug engagements allows the participants to transgress felt conflicts by turning them into potentialities.

From this perspective, the aspects that can be analyzed as restrictive are the conflictual circumstances that the participants expansively transgress through the imaginative premises for engaging in drugs. But there are also aspects of these newly forming premises that can be analyzed as moving towards restrictive aspects. The cultural versatility of drugs also means that cultural projections of drug engagements can become *contradictory* in the young people's imagination. Simon expressed how the project of "romantic self-destruction" is contradicted by the imaginative projection of "junkie". Oscar's pursuit if "cool" also implies to take the estranging premise of "just sitting somewhere and smoke joints" (cf. p. 175).

The interviews were conducted at a time where the participants were in the process of dealing with problems that have developed from their drug engagements. Their retrospective renderings are therefore inevitably colored by the transgressive processes of expanding beyond those problems. This exposes other restrictive aspects of these initial premises which I will return to later in the analyses. So, when Oscar simultaneously says that he wanted to get inspired by the stories that his new friends would tell, and that he has always been good at getting carried away by other people's stories (p. 174), he implies that the stories are actually not transformed into new potentials in his engagements – merely 'living' in stories, thus, blocks the actual acting upon potential directionalities. But Oscar may first have realized this at a point where he has transgressed the restrictiveness of that premise. This may similarly be the case with Neil. Neil tells how actual drug engagements would rarely correspond to what he imagined them to be. Neil is probably only able to express this so clearly because he has been in the process of expanding beyond the restrictiveness of that (imaginative) premise.

Chapter 7: Digital Implications for the Narrowing in of Imaginative Processes and Drug Engagements

This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the central processes by which the relation between the participants' imagination and digital everyday living is implicated in their intensification of drug engagements. It is divided into three analytical layers which in their complexity and extensity could have formed separate chapters. However, I found it necessary to present them together because they are co-occurring and infiltrated in each other in the digital everyday living of the participants. The chapter is crucial in understanding how the relation between the participants' imagination and digital everyday living is implicated in engaging them in drugs, keep them engaged and making it a specific problem to disengage from drugs. These processes are simultaneously part of the development of conflicts and problems related to their drug engagements. I therefore go into a detailed analysis of these microgenetic processes.

The analytical layers are generated from descriptions that recurred in and across the participant interviews. But within each layer there are also vast variations and contradictions among the participants. I will try to connect those variations and contradictions to the multiple ways in which digital media can be conceived of as materializing imagination and to how such materializations can be co-constitutive of restricting (and expanding) imaginative processes.

The first analytical layer focuses on digital media as an immediate, engaging context for consuming drugs. It is not arbitrary what becomes engaging in this relation. I will analyze how the specificities of this relation generate what I call *felt attachments* that direct the participants' imagination towards it in its absence and prolong it in its presence. The next layer zooms out from this immediate relation and analyzes the spatial-material and social arrangements surrounding the immediate relation. The arrangements are also arranged on and through the digital media themselves. From the interviews, it became evident that the engagements in the immediate relation between digital media and drug taking are more substantially understood when put in relation to

these various arrangements of the participant's digital everyday living. The participants actively engage in and arrange these arrangements. But I will show in detail how the digital arrangements actively reciprocate and arrange the participants' imagination and drug engagements in a routinized way. The last layer can be said to zoom even further out to a community perspective. Here I analyze a new intensity of actual or fictional communities that through the reciprocations of digital media can be, and can be *prompted* to be, imagined and actualized *instantaneously*. All these interrelated layers are analyzed as implicated in the processes where the participants' engagements in drugs are being intensified and their imagination 'narrowed in' on these engagements. The relevance of these engagements can also be better understood when related to the meta-level of the participants' imagination. Insights from the last chapter will therefore also be incorporated and elaborated.

"They go hand-in-hand": Directing the imagination towards the aesthetic-material synergies of drugs and media

A significant relation between digital media and drug engagements, as described by most of the participants, is the *co-presence* of smoking joints and media activities. Digital media here form an important *activity*-with-the-drug. An expression that curiously surfaced especially in the interviews with Frank, Karen, Neil, and in part Oscar suggests that the relation is a specific kind. It concerns the expression that primarily marijuana and certain kinds of media activities "go hand-in-hand". The expression is of course a metaphor. But the participant descriptions also point to a kind of aesthetic-material aptness of digital media and the material effects of the drug. Hence, the metaphor "hand-in-hand" refers to a specific relation where the concrete synergy of tactility, materiality and aesthetics should not be neglected.

Frank expresses this aesthetic-material synergy in the first group interview when I explored the possible relations between digital media and drug engagements:

> Frank: I felt that way very much with the series Breaking Bad, which is about drugs. [Inaudible] there I smoked heavily throughout. It was like I felt 'you just have to do that!' Then you connect with that series. So I think I used it a bit as an excuse. And it is also clearly hangs together with, if you see a movie, ehm, Goodfellas or something like that, then you also think that you could

smoke a stick, rather than if you watch a boring romantic movie or some-
thing like that – which I don't – then you don't think of smoking that much.
Because it wouldn't go hand-in-hand with the movie.

Interviewer: Okay. So what makes it go hand-in-hand, you think?

Frank: The environment and the atmosphere and the things that are going on
in the movie. If they smoke, then you also get the urge to smoke, and…yes.
Especially Breaking Bad [inaudible]. When I was working, I just had to get
home and torch up and watch Breaking Bad. And play GTA. It hanged really
well together with smoking weed.

Interviewer: And what was the connection there [to the game Grand Theft
Auto], you think? Or is?

Frank: Like, you can have you own coffee shop in the game, where you
should…and then there were just bandits, violence and trouble. Yes. Went
hand-in-hand.

The first specification of the relation that can be pointed out is that the hand-
in-hand-ness of digital media and smoking is connected to imagined meta-
projections: Frank's fascination with "underworlds" explains the relevance of
the concrete media products he draws on in the passage. And it also deline-
ates what does not go together, for instance smoking and a romantic movie.
But besides this, what is aesthetic-material about the relation?[25] Frank de-
scribes the possibility of connecting with environments, atmospheres and ac-
tivities in series, movies and games through smoking. This connection should
not just be taken as established through Frank simply replicating the activities
he experiences through media. I understand it as a connection that is estab-
lished through the atmospheres that are aesthetically materialized in the me-
dia products on the 'one hand', which 'on the other hand' can be connected
to through the material effects of smoking marijuana. Together they produce
a *new third*, which is different from the two 'hands' taken separately. Part of
what creates this hand-in-hand-ness can be seen as connected to the individ-
ual development of imagined meta-projections. But the interviews also point
to a more specific relation between digital media and drug consumption.

I shall try to unfold this through Karen's pondering on the relation be-
tween marijuana and digital media in her living. When I asked Karen about

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[25] The aesthetic-material relation as a concept is an analytical attempt to bridge con-
tent and form, mediation and materiality, etc. – aspects that co-occur in practice, but
are troublesome in theory.

possible relations between drugs and media in her living, her first reaction seems hesitant towards confirming that the relation is a specific kind:

> Karen: Okay. I don't think that it is something that goes hand-in-hand automatically. At all. But I do think that it can be, like a disabler. You know, marijuana for me is very much something that keeps me stuck, it's hard to get on. And you can... you know, when you see a movie or TV series, then it is a lot about you sitting, observing, and it is very easy just to let it roll.

As the dialogue unfolds, I realize that Karen may be thinking of several relations. This could be due to the open question I posed. But a factor could also be that I was touching upon relations that Karen has come to take for granted. Over the following ten minutes we try to clarify the picture. To make this process clear without having to show the whole transcript, I include some central passages to argue for this taken-for-granted-ness. In the sentences above, the first relation that Karen stresses is what you could call a parallel quality of some media activities and marijuana: They both 'disable' and recreate the person as an observer. It does not look as if Karen puts them in direct relation here. The next relation she presents is more closely related to her own life. Here she observes a tendency of engaging in both media and smoking marijuana in the extremes. She talks of this relation almost as a comorbid addiction where she cannot stop either when she has first begun. Karen relates this to many types of media including movies, TV series, games and books. She comes up with the example that when she discovered the game *Minecraft*, she played the game for twenty-four hours straight. But wanting to know more about the specific co-presence of drugs and media, her answer seems to go in the direction of the unspecific:

> Interviewer: When you smoke, are there some media activities that make more sense than others?

> Karen: Actually no. I think they are all pretty good. I like to watch a movie and smoke joints. I like to play PlayStation. It is not that difficult [laughing together].

> Interviewer: What movies would you watch?

> Karen: Hey, I mean, good stuff. What I always watch, what I also would watch if I was not stoned.

> Interviewer: Yes. What would that be?

Karen: Game of Thrones. I have just watched True Detective – it was not that good. Do you know Mystery of Science Theater 3000? [Interviewer: Yes] Nice. That I watch a lot!

As I am about to give up on determining a more specific relation, the picture clears up:

Interviewer: Okay, but if I understand you correctly, Karen, there is not a big difference between media activities that hang better together with...

Karen: I don't think so, at all.

Interviewer: Okay, so I am just building a landscape – so everything works?

Karen: I think so. Of course, it also depends on which type of media within the medium…I keep on saying 'genre'.

Interviewer: Yes, tell me more about that.

Karen: I think, hmm... I don't play shooters. I think that would be like 'Aaarrgh, fuck, I am smoking, dammit, relax!'. I do of course play games where you can shoot and stuff like that. But it is clearly very, for instance, The Walking Dead, the game, it is really good to smoke alongside with it. It is an interactive story where you don't have to, it is a bit more passive, maybe. If I game, it is clearly things that are a bit more passive. Not something where you have to be wildly on the keys. That's a bit too much.

And Karen continues:

Karen: Watching a movie is a passive thing. You don't have to push anything. You just have to observe. Look at the screen. Often that is not enough for me. I often draw when I watch TV and smoke. I always have to be stimulated one way or the other. I cannot keep my fingers still. That's also why I game. Yes, something you wanted to say?

Interviewer: Well yeah, I just have more questions, but I also don't want to hinder the exciting things you say.

Karen: Uuhh 'exciting', eehhmmm. I just wanted to say this, for instance Civilization is really good to play. Because you just have to use the mouse.

Interviewer: Yes, that's a dangerous game.

Karen: 'Just one more round! One moooore round!' Exactly. So, there is a difference. I don't think that I ever would play Call of Duty. But I wouldn't do that anyways. Because I don't play such games. So no.

Karen ends up concluding that there in fact is a difference. I had not realized that Karen so far has been answering *within* her interests and preferences – so that is why everything initially "works". But through the dialogue, a pattern develops that Karen refers to as "genre". This does not directly relate to atmospheres, like in Frank's case, since Karen's preferences change throughout the year (she told me). But what overlaps with Frank's hand-in-hand-ness is the *level of interactivity* that the media materialize. For Karen, what goes more hand-in-hand are media that materialize a more passive and slower interactivity, which allows for more observant activity and less active tactile demands as she expresses in reference to the use of keyboard and mouse. Besides possibly not being into those types of games, Karen discards higher paced games like *Call of Duty*. She mentions the game *Minecraft* and like Frank also *Grand Theft Auto* referred to as *GTA* (not included in quotations above). These kinds of games have become enormously successful and complex game worlds over the years. Some of them (e.g. *Minecraft* and *GTA*) belong to the game genre "open world" or "free roam". They are characterized by the ability of the player to interact freely with environments, people and objects, and hence the player is not restricted to linearity of game plots and time pressure. Although they require a higher level of interactivity on a tactile level than watching a movie does, these and similar games materialize a more open, associative and lower-paced interactivity which seems to have a compatibility with the material effects of marijuana as the passive and observant interactivity of watching movies and series has.

This is very likely a specific relation between marijuana and media. In the interview with Neil, he suggests that it would probably be different with other drugs. But for him, smoking joints and engaging in media is the *"perfect activity"*, also due to the material effects of the drug that inhibit certain activities and enhance others:

> Neil: But you are also limited by the fact that you get stoned and get lazy, and you don't want to run around outside because that is really troublesome and in public it is illegal and stuff like that.

In contrast to Karen, Neil's "perfect activity" is primarily a social activity with friends and a co-presence of multiple media including multiple games, movies and TV series running simultaneously. In his own words:

Neil: …that went really well in hand with joints.

The relation between marijuana and more passive, observant and free roam media is not a rigid one. Contrary to Karen, Neil explains that his group of friends played a lot of shooter-games. Similarly, Oscar says that he has played *Call of Duty* and *FIFA* more than *GTA*. Movies and series are by no means absent in the accounts of Neil and Oscar. But the specific relevance of the more action-prone games, like *Call of Duty* and *FIFA*, for Neil and Oscar can also be linked to the fact that they arranged the drug-media activities with friends. Since the games are multiplayer games, they materialize possible social relations that are recreated through the game world. The inclusion of such games is also related to personal mastery, which may to some degree counteract some of the inhibiting material effects of marijuana. When I asked Oscar how smoking joints and playing *FIFA* worked out, he responded:

> Oscar: It actually works very well. When you first have taught yourself to do all those things [moves and tricks] when you are stoned, then you become better at doing those things while being stoned.

What I over the last pages of analysis have tried to show is the common aesthetic-material synergies of digital media and drugs (marijuana in particular), which generate the experience of hand-in-hand-ness among the participants. I have tried to show this relation through the particular material effects of marijuana and the levels of interactivity and atmospheres that digital media potentially materialize. I have also tried to show that some variations are linked to more than the material effects of drugs in how they are also connected to imagined meta-projections associated with drugs. But how can this be understood as implicated in intensification or narrowing in of imagination and drug engagements?

Understanding the hand-in-hand-relation as felt attachment

To extend the analysis of the co-present relation of drugs and digital media, I will draw upon the work of Gomart & Hennion (1999) by substantiating the more physical metaphor of hand-in-hand-ness with the affective dimension of "attachment". In the article, Gomart & Hennion make a parallel analysis of drug users and music lovers. They argue that similar socio-material processes are at play in the two scenes in the development of *passions* or *attachment,* although they do not claim that they belong to the same category of addiction.

"But both reveal similar conditions of the emergence of 'addiction'" (Gomart & Hennion, 1999, p. 221). Building on an STS-approach they balance the material agency of drugs and music with the persons' agency and subjectively felt passion. The cultivation of passion and attachment emerges from an oscillation between material and human agencies: From the persons who allow their subjectivity and agency to become object and "under influence" of the material agency of either music or drugs. Through this process, people enter "into a world of strong sensations; of accepting that 'external' forces take possession of the self" (ibid.). Interestingly, what Gomart & Hennion empirically keep separate – drugs and media – is empirically united in my material. Hence, I can observe the empirical material presented just now as an intensification of attachment from *more* external forces – drugs *and* media – that even seem to complement each other.

The analysis of Gomart & Hennion makes it possible to understand the hand-in-hand-ness as an expression of *felt attachment* among the participants. Like Frank expresses the feeling of being "connected" through the drug, not only materially to the medium, but also subjectively to environments, activities and atmospheres that TV series, movies and so forth materialize. If the analysis of Gomart & Hennion is extended, Frank accepts to be taken over by the external forces of the *interobjectual* relation between drugs and media that together create a new third (as written earlier). I will therefore argue that the physical hand-in-hand metaphor can be understood subjectively and affectively as felt attachment. And this relation appears to play a key role in intensifying the participants' engagements in drugs.

The question then remains how the young people's imagination is implicated in the hand-in-hand-ness of drugs and digital media.

Microgenetic engagements in drugs and media through the imaginative premises of meta-projections

I have already touched upon how the meta-level of imagination forms premises for the micro-activities in the co-presence of media and drug engagements. What more specifically goes hand-in-hand in the co-presence of drugs and digital media is to a certain extent designated by the premise of the approximating and distancing directionalities embodied in the participants' imagined meta-projections. This means that a dimension of the engaging quality of the hand-in-hand-ness of drugs and digital media stems from the relation

to that meta-level of imagination. In Frank's case, we saw that the atmospheres, activities and characters that Frank describes in relation to TV series, movies and games do cohere with his described fascination of "underworlds". The relation is partial, and it would be wrong to claim that such a designating relation is clear and neat all the time. In Karen's case, it is at first sight blurrier to see how world-building games like *Minecraft* and *Civilization* would be related to "romanticized artistic suffering". But at a closer look, they do overlap in her passion for art:

> Karen: And I love all of them, it is my passion. TV is good, games are good – it is art. But it is also something that is really good at numbing you.

The statement can be used to underline how the immediate relation between drugs and digital media is also engaging through the meta-projective premise related to art. But the quote also stresses a more paradoxal relation. It is aligned with pursuits of her passion for art, and it also has a numbing potential – which is synergic with the numbing qualities of marijuana, as she has described.

Equally difficult to make this relation a clear one goes for Neil and Oscar when they say that shooter-games took up a significant part of their media activities with friends. In Neil's case, the indoor setting with his friends does not map directly onto the outdoor and sunny-day settings associated with "good times". Nevertheless, so does the social setting and "perfect activities" involving smoking joints together with friends. Later in the chapter, I will make it clearer how "cool" in Oscar's case does partially emerge from other digital media activities with friends.

The emergence and excessive complex-formation of imagined meta-projections from microgenetic engagements

The relation between the meta-level of imagination and the microgenetic engagements in drugs and media is two-sided. Not only is the meta-level implicated in designating relevant digital activities and in creating another engaging dimension in the immediate relation between the participants, drugs and digital media; it also emerges from, is continuously substantiated and modulated by the hand-in-hand-ness of a microgenetic level and other digital activities not directly related to drugs. The two-sided relation of designation and emergence is not easy to grasp conceptually or analytically. But it is important in stressing that the relation between imagination and digital media is not one-

sided or linear. In the following, I will through a detailed exemplification, centered on Simon's descriptions, show how the excessive multiplicity of digital media is internally related to the excessive complex-formation of imagined meta-projections. And I will again emphasize that the meta-projective level relates to many other aspects than drugs of the participants' living.

Designated digital media activities become co-constitutive of the complex-formation of imagination. Imaginative complexes can for instance be substantiated (extended), stabilized and transformed by interactions with digital media. Consequentially, the processes of designation follow a certain logic, but can also be unpredictable. Elements of these processes have already been analyzed a bit earlier in the chapter. We can recall Karen's example on how the movie *Amadeus* both was designated by her interest in art, but also really open the world of classical music and opera for her. Designation can therefore also open up and develop further. But let's look at a longer passage from the interview with Simon.

Simon's way of dialoguing in the interviews is almost prototypical of this research project. He employs a myriad of cultural references in order to communicate, whereby the digital implications for his imaginative processes become visible and tangible. His contributions are therefore seductively easy to draw on to develop the analysis and argumentation. Simon agreed to engage in one of the methodological experiments of the project in relation to the imaginative link between drug engagements and "romantic self-destruction". *Rapid association* was the governing principle for our exchange in this part of the interview: Quick, successive questioning to unfold and elaborate on imaginative processes through their possible perceptual manifestations (see also chapter 5). Immediately before the passage below, Simon had already begun to substantiate the "romantic self-destruction"-complex with references to Hunter S. Thompson, Edgar Allen Poe, to an online-bit by comedian Doug Stanhope on "Excess in Moderation", and a citation from the character Tyler Durden in the movie *Fight Club*. It continues as I attempt to "map" the perceptual and multisensory organization of the complex. I will disrupt the continuity of the passage with analytical observations where it makes sense to do so:

> Interviewer: So, let's say that this self-destruction – if you imagine it, is it possible to say what it looks like, does it feel in a specific way, does it taste of something, does it have sounds?

Simon: The experience of self-destruction?

Interviewer: Yes, when you think of it.

Simon: It is something with fire, something with ash. I do like a lot of – that is a weird way of putting it – but I do like that heat, but destruction that comes from fire as a metaphor. And smoke cigarettes in great amounts and smoke joints; that is a form of... He talks about it in Birdman, and I have a girlfriend who has written it down in my journal, this about rather burning a candle in both ends or burning intensely, or 'don't go quite into that good night' which Dylan Thomas wrote. 'Rage, rage against the dying of the light'… If there were the senses that were connected [he asks me]?

Simon starts in what I have earlier called the *hyper-general*: Fire, ash, the candle which do not have any particular media source, but have the quality of more general cultural imagery. It seems to embody a central affect and energy in the "romantic self-destruction"-complex. The imaginative complex unfolds by cascading back and forth between the hyper-general and the concrete cultural reference like the movie *Birdman* and the poem by Dylan Thomas. The central imagery of the candle, and the affective intensity it represents, also gets remediated and stabilized and fixated in his journal through a social relation to his female friend. Smoking cigarettes and joints gets modulated in a specific affective and philosophical way through these perceptual and linguistic substantiations. I continue after Simon's question:

Interviewer: It could be that there was a picture that was central, or something...

Simon: Well, fire; burning one's candle in both ends. Flames, transient, and...

Interviewer: And the candle, do you see that in front of you? [Simon: yes, yes] How does it appear?

Simon: Well, detached. Without any contact with the ground. Just a candle that hangs...

Interviewer: Is there a background?

Simon: Black.

Interviewer: Black background? What color is the candle?

Simon: White.

Interviewer: White. How does it burn?

Simon: It burns with two rather long flames.

Interviewer: How are the flames?

Simon: Yellow. They are typical, like a typical candle, I think, and the wax is dripping, and it moves closer...

Interviewer: So they are calm?

Simon: They are calm. But, eeehm, yes.

For Simon it seems like the candle burning in both ends acts as an *anchor-projection* in the "romantic self-destruction"-complex, and multiple other projections ripple out from there. I think it would be easy for most people to envision the image that Simon describes. It is not foreign in its perceptual form because it belongs to a wider cultural repertoire of philosophical percepts. Rather than being a practical artifact, it has a *tertiary* quality by being suspended from ongoing and necessary practices.

Interviewer: Okay. You can always change it and say, 'no, there is something else that is more central'. I am just exploring this image. So this candle that burns in both ends, how is it connected to other media images? You have referred a lot to literature, which builds on words, I mean, Dylan Thomas and what you mentioned. How does it relate to other...?

Simon: I'd say... Maybe it also pictures those interesting characters who act and have some depth due to a duality within them.

Interviewer: Where do they appear?

Simon: For example House of Cards, which is the latest example. It is not because he [Frank, the main character] is glorified, but he has got *that* it in him. And he is a very, he has got energy coming from within, and he is passionate about the things he does. And that metaphor was totally deliberate[26]. I probably have these images from there. Also great musicians...

Interviewer: What musicians?

[26] In the quote, I translate "being passionate" from the literal translation in Danish "to burn for something". This is Simon's metaphorical pun.

> Simon: Mick Jagger was the first one I thought of. Or Bob Dylan. Somebody who is not just looking, but saw something, shook it, and developed it. And that is what I am also seeking myself and to see if you can do things in a new way.

Simon here shows how the energy of fire becomes embodied in actual and fictive characters and how this further substantiates his own project. The energy embodied in the characters becomes a potential through *their* projects through which Simon modulates his own. The energy does not disappear in thin air. The characters and their energy do not co-constitute Simon's imagination as finality and end goals. The imagination is not mere imitation in these examples. They are taken as the premise for expanding Simon's imagination in directions of doing "things in a new way" – which is co-constituted by the characters and their energy, but not-yet clearly defined. The interview continues:

> Interviewer: And how does Mick Jagger appear?
>
> Simon: He looks very unhealthy, but still with that energy, explosive...
>
> Interviewer: Is he on stage?
>
> Simon: Yes, exactly. Wearing tight pants, ehm...
>
> Interviewer: What about Bob Dylan?
>
> Simon: In some kind of interview I have seen, where he is totally disinterested in that conventional part of being a musician. He is not very interested in being on stage. He is not very interested...he just can't help writing these songs...in if they are good and stuff like that. It is his disinterest in these mundane aspects of being a musician, where I find some fire.
>
> Interviewer: And what picture do you get when you say 'interview'?
>
> Simon: Him sitting surrounded by flashes, I think he wears sunglasses, with his curly, looking a bit...
>
> Interviewer: Okay, so it is a video you have seen?
>
> Simon: Yes. I am not sure if it is him. I actually think it is Cate Blanchett in I'm Not There. But it is a quite exact picturing of him.
>
> Interviewer: Okay, so is it color or black and white?

Simon: It is black and white.

The relation between the energy and the musicians is here not translated into Simon's imaginative processes through the music alone, but (also) through visual projections: Video-recordings of concerts and the fictional rendering of Bob Dylan in a movie. The excess and reciprocation of digital media is here only hinted. But all taken together, with the dense concentration of cultural references that Simon has presented just before, the extensity of his complex-formation is one outcome of the reciprocation of the excessive multiplicity of digital media: The possibility of translating e.g. music into video and movies and clustering them together from multiple and immediately available sources on the internet, where the sources are clustered, converged and juxtaposed (e.g. a search on Google or YouTube can easily generate millions of hits). The temporality of this development is not evident in the interview piece above. The concrete emergence of Simon's imagined meta-projection through digital media cannot be traced here. But what can be underscored is that the complex-formation is not just a question of a translation or interchange of perceptual modalities. The visual projections (of e.g. concert and interview appearances) allow Simon to relate to the energy embodied in the musicians in other concrete ways than through auditory projections of music: The combination of Jagger's unhealthy looks and energy; Dylan's interview situation where 'he' (because it is an actress) relates to and criticizes conventional standards. I interpret this as perceptual *substantiations* and *thickening* of Simon's imaginative complex. The percepts in turn recreate potential ways of understanding and acting on "self-destruction", and they both *anchor* the sentiments embodied in that meta-projection and *potentialize* his creative hopes and his expansion of imagination through a critique of conventions of society, also embodied in the meta-projection. We continue:

Interviewer: Right, okay. I just wanted to make it more concrete. Feel free to tell other stuff in connection with this.

Simon: He also smokes. He is smoking a cigarette, Bob Dylan at least. And...it was something that we talked about back at my folk high school, that people would walk in specific ways, where 'earth' would be connected to low...a lot of grounding and low-hanging shoulders, where 'fire' is more manifest explosively, or when you have movements that are more like small energy-spurts, and always with – it is of course not always perfect – but always with chest held high, that he has such a ...[makes sound]...straight-ahead-ness.

Simon here connects the embodiment of fire to experiences that have less to do with digital media. On the other hand, the gestural categories learned from the folk high school may have enabled Simon to imagine the (digitally mediated) gestures of Jagger and Dylan within the same category. The imaginative processes are not just about connecting experiences in complexes – they substantiate and modulate each other: Jagger and Dylan are modulated as fire through the percepts or gestural categories learned at the folk high school; and those gestural categories are modulated as "romantic self-destruction" through the philosophies and projects of Jagger and Dylan and many other substantiations of that complex which Simon within short time has presented.

Simon presents a here-and-now account of what I would call formations of imaginative complexes. How they are formed and gradually substantiated over time is unfortunately not clear from the interview passage. It should be noted that Simon does not explicitly talk about these media activities as being co-present with drug engagements. In that sense, the passage has departed slightly from the question on how hand-in-hand-ness and generated attachment are implicated in imaginative processes. But the detailed analysis serves to show how the material *singularity* of the drug – in the co-presence of digital media or not – becomes engaging though the *multiplicity* of imagination which in turn is co-constituted by the *excess* of interactions with digital media (among other experiences). Simon may be specifically articulate about all these associations. But signs of similar complexity have also been seen among the other research participants. It is tempting to call this meta-level of imagination 'imaginative worlds'. But it is clear from Simon's account that we are not dealing with coherent constructions that are isolated in imagination. The imagination hybridizes the real and the fictive, the here-and-now and the past and the not-yet, in associative complexes co-constituted by multi-sited transactions.

Directing the imagination towards hand-in-hand relation in their absence

Another way that the hand-in-hand-ness of digital media and drug engagements is more directly implicated in imaginative processes is when the hand-in-hand-ness is what is absent. When analyzing the co-presence of media and drug engagements it could give the impression that the participants do noth-

ing besides that. But these engagements are embedded in other engagements in the participants' everyday living. Still, the felt attachment generated by the hand-in-hand relation of drugs and media can be understood as directing imaginative processes towards the contexts in *their* absence. A central quote that exemplifies this 'gravitation' towards these engagements in their absence is the one already provided by Frank. I will therefore center the analysis on that example:

> Frank: When I was working, I just had to get home and torch up and watch Breaking Bad. And play GTA.

Frank describes this *Breaking Bad* period as a time where he smoked a lot. His felt urgency to come home from work to smoke while watching the TV series or playing the game can be sensed in these sentences. The felt attachment imbues imaginative processes with a strong teleology, making the participants gravitate towards drug engagements in the co-presence of digital media in their absence. Where the hand-in-hand-ness denotes digital media as the apt activity-with-the-drug, this aesthetic-material synergy presents itself as a significant *possible*-activity-with-the-drug *when the felt attachment is stretched across contexts*. The felt attachment to that particular possible-activity-with-the-drug that can act as the explanatory frame of why this possibility emerges imaginatively when it is absent in Frank's working hours. The felt attachment to that possible-activity-with-the-drug becomes the imaginative premise for Frank's drug engagements in this specific example. This means that other possible engagements, also without drugs, do not possess same urgent directionality.

    The ability of the engaging nexus of digital media and drugs to direct imaginative processes towards itself, is what I, based on the empirical material, consider to be a specific contributor to how imagination and engagements are narrowing in on the drug. Frank *is* able to imagine other possible-activities-with(out)-the-drug. So, the relevance and attachment to a *given* possibility is crucial in understanding why that possibility is singled out and gravitated towards and eventually taken as premise for drug engagements.

    It is possible to argue that this urgency expresses the idiosyncratic way in which imaginative processes become premises *for Frank's* engagements in drugs and media in this example. Yet, a deeper analytical step can be taken to elucidate that it is a manifestation of how the imagination is reciprocated and recreated by the more general excesses of digital media. In the interviews, Frank has mentioned that he primarily uses Netflix, HBO and ViaPlay for

watching TV shows and movies. The platforms are the offspring of the general technological development of online streaming services, which can be accessed on computers and modern televisions *on demand*. Entire TV shows and movies are available immediately, unless they are still under production. This amounts to hundreds of hours of material concentrated on one platform, few clicks away – if we focus on just one TV show independently. The strong urgency and teleology of Frank's imaginative processes are reciprocated by this materialized digital excess: It makes it possible for Frank, day after day, to imagine and actualize coming home and continuing to watch series like *Breaking Bad* and smoke joints simultaneously. This reciprocation underpins but also exceeds the hand-in-hand-ness. The hand-in-hand relation describes the "moment" where digital media and material effects of the drug melt together. The aforementioned reciprocation *prolongs* that 'moment' – both in its presence and its absence.

I would argue that similar digital prolongation is at play among other participants. Ellen was immersed in the TV series *Skins*, but did not mention other TV shows. Frank's list of TV shows is exhausting. Neil also rapidly listed half a dozen TV shows including *Games of Thrones*, *Vikings*, *Breaking Bad*, *The Walking Dead*, *Homeland* and other "bad series", as he says[27]. The reciprocating prolongation is not limited to TV shows. When Karen says that she spent 24 hours on playing *Minecraft*, newer games also materialize similar prolonging properties.

The analysis in this previous paragraph shows how it is difficult only to understand the participants' engagements and processes of imagination as emerging from the immediate hand-in-hand relation between drugs and certain kinds of activities with digital media. It is better understood by zooming out from the immediate context of the co-present engagements in drugs and media to the more general reciprocating features of digital media: The extensive *Breaking Bad* material available to Frank in that period is also what reciprocates the intensity of hand-in-hand-ness, his imaginative processes, and drug engagements in the period he refers to. It plays a part in the processes of narrowing in his imaginative processes and engagements. In the following section I will try to build in this argumentative premise by zooming a little bit out from the immediate interactions between the participants, digital media

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[27] It is obvious that the digital reciprocation here does not only relate to the extended and concentrated availability of TV show, but also to the *quality* of the cultural artifacts. The listed TV shows are part of a new "golden age" of television where aesthetics, character developments and plots have become extensive and intricate.

and drug engagements. I will focus on how these interactions are *arranged* and how these arrangements become arranging for the narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements in the participants' everyday living.

Summing up central insights

In this section I have analyzed how the immediate co-presence of material effects of drugs (mainly marijuana) and certain kinds of digital activities go "hand-in-hand". The analysis provides the insight that specific configurations of this immediate relation is implicative in engaging the participants in drugs: The drug's recreation of the body and subjectivity as passive and numbing goes hand-in-hand with more observant and lower levels of interactivity reciprocations of digital media. These engagements can further more be excessively prolonged by the 'on demand'-reciprocations of digital media. In the absence of these engagements in the participants' everyday living, these digital reciprocations can also be interpreted as implicated in how the participants' imagination gravitates towards actualizing them.

Another engaging dimension stems from how the immediate relation between drugs and digital media are designated and substantiated by the meta-level of imagination: By imagined meta-projections. By attending to this meta-level, a logic behind the variations amongst the individual preferences of this immediate relation can be elucidated. The meta-level of imagination is simultaneously emerging from and undergoes radical complex-formations through the microgenetic interactions with digital media.

There is another very surprising insight, that I have not yet taken up directly. I will return to it in depth later in the analysis. It relates to the technologies and activities that seemed to be specifically relevant in generating hand-in-hand-ness with marijuana. Before I went into the empirical research, I expected to learn about new and esoteric activities with digital media from the young people's digital everyday living. However, a non-arbitrary pattern seems to emerge from the analysis above. The technologies that appear to be relevant in this context have a stronger continuity with classical media than discontinuity: Movies, TV series, computer games, and – which I have not yet covered – music. What then seems significant for generating hand-in-hand-ness are "old media" on *new* technology platforms. It is an ironic conclusion – at least for my study. Of course, it is necessary to put "old media" in quotation marks and combine it with *new* technology platforms: "Old media" have

been transformed immensely through new technologies. I will return to this insight.

Arranging arrangements: Routinizing imagination and drug engagements

The analytical focus of this part of the chapter expands the immediate context of the hand-in-hand-ness of drugs and media. From the interviews, it became evident that the synergic relation between drugs and digital media is also embedded in and emerges from a wider spatial-material arrangement within the drug-engaging context. The "spatial zoom" in this analytical part both zooms out on the arrangements in which digital media are embedded and in zooms in the arrangements *on* and *through* digital media. Besides zooming out (and in) on the spatial dimension, the arrangements also zoom out on the temporal dimension of the digital everyday living. This will show how the arrangements are implicated in the processes of narrowing in of drug engagements by *routinizing* the participants' imagination. Routinization is not a decisive index of restrictiveness. But I will also show how the arrangements are implicated in processes of *one-siding* the participants' imagination and engagements and simultaneously of blocking the development of other imagined potentials.

I call this analytical layer "arranging arrangements". It carries a double meaning to emphasize the distributed character of imagination: While the participants themselves are arranging these arrangements, the arrangements, as materialized imagination, in turn come to arrange the participants' (narrowing in of) imagination and drug engagements. This follows Scarry's theorization of the "total arc of action" that there is no reciprocation of objects without projections of them. The section should be read as a continuation of the last where hand-in-hand-ness and felt attachments emerge from engagements in drugs and media, but it is now analytically expanded to include the wider spatial-material arrangements of participants and digital media.

Arranging solitary arrangements of drug engagements

The empirical material shows that these arranging arrangements vary from social to solitary arrangements of drug and digital media engagements. Where Neil and Oscar mainly represent the social arrangement, Karen and Frank

mainly represent the solitary arrangement. Still, the similar reciprocation dynamics can be said to be at play although they are configured differently. The analysis will start off with the solitary arrangements.

Karen's "corner". Karen describes how she has arranged a corner in her home which functions as a "security blanket":

> Karen: It's like a blanket that you can cover yourself with, you know. My base is like at home: My couch, my PlayStation, my computer, with my little TV. There I have my small corner. And it is very safe, easy, and it's always there.

At the time of the interview Karen had set up rules for not smoking joints before she would come home from various activities she would attend during the day. But when she would arrive, normally around 4 o´clock in the afternoon, she would at times manage to smoke around ten joints throughout the remainder of the day. Although the arrangement provides Karen security, it also generates conflicts:

> Karen: My security blanket, which is my big – which I want to get out of – is that I am really good at smoking a stick, watch TV – I don't even have a TV[28] – but watch TV series and play computer games, you know.

And in the very beginning of the interview when I explored a normal day in her life, she expressed:

> Karen: My home, that is where I am stuck.

It is of course not the arrangement that turns on the digital devices and lights a joint for Karen. Karen is doing that. But the arrangement is there when she gets home, and so, it arranges a specific constellation of *absent* engagements, which can be presenced by Karen with ease. The arrangement acts as materialized imagination: The absent activity of smoking joints while engaging in digital media activities. It contributes to Karen's feeling of her home as where she is stuck. The crux of it is that it simultaneously acts as a comfort zone. Karen does not directly talk about this arrangement as *routinization of imagination* – these are my analytical terms deducted from the descriptions. But she

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[28] Karen alludes that she has not channels on her TV.

describes how the arrangement is part of her inclination to smoke at home due to its affective significance. It seems as if it is not (only) the temporal "4 o'clock"-rule that keeps her from smoking before that, but also the material circumstance that she is usually not home, in the *spatial* arrangement, before that time.

At the day of the interview, a first-aid course that Karen attends was cancelled, and she had to go home before I met her. She disclosed that she had smoked a joint earlier that day. I am not sure if she wanted to draw attention to her state in our encounter. But she gave me the impression that the necessity of coming home irregularly co-produced her drug consumption contrary to her normal routine. I do not know if her corner was directly implicated in this particular scenario. Nonetheless, how Karen's corner-arrangement reciprocates her imaginative processes in a routinizing way can be analyzed as follows.

The spatial arrangement of artifacts materializes a spatial-temporal stability, which she refers to when she says that her corner is "always there". It is there when she is at home, not at home or gets home. Simultaneously, the specific spatial constellation of artifacts materializes absent yet *accentuated* engagements – i.e. of Karen sitting in her couch, smoking joints and engaging in media activities. The spatial-temporal stability of absent yet accentuated engagements arranges the possibility of presencing those particular absent engagements repeatedly and with ease. This materialized stability can be understood as being co-constitutive of the circular pattern of routines. The stabilized accentuation of those particular engagements is subjectively felt as *safety* and *ease* and it reciprocates the directedness of imagination and engagements. It reversely means that if Karen would have to break with this reciprocation of her corner-arrangement she would have to develop imaginative processes that would transgress it, which is very likely connected with discomfort and conflict. Yet, the arrangement already creates conflict for her. While engaging in her corner-arrangement is something that she both enjoys and feels secure in, it also produces the feeling of being stuck and being "numbed", as she has expressed earlier. Hence, the routinization of Karen's imaginative processes and engagements arranged by her corner-arrangement blocks other potentials to emerge in a way that also creates discomfort in Karen's life. When analyzing imaginative processes in terms of routinization, I am not suggesting that these processes are deliberate and explicit. I would assume that they operate in a more embodied way as explicated in the theoretical chapters as *knowing of the third kind*: The embodied anticipation of 'what comes next', which is em-

placed and emerging between Karen and the materialized imagination of her corner-arrangement. They will most likely be hardly acknowledgeable to Karen or other participants, but merely experienced as a matter of just doing things as usual.

Frank's smart-TV arrangement. When I asked Frank about his daily routines, a similar scenario unfolded. His material arrangement at home was not described as clearly as Karen's. So, I have to sketch it together. Frank says that he still smokes around two joints a day – sometimes three to four. And he usually smokes the first one around 4 o'clock pm, some hours after returning from school. Besides spending a lot of time on his laptop for various activities, Frank also has a smart-TV especially for watching movies and TV shows in high quality. Frank describes:

> Frank: But maybe I smoke at 4 o'clock. Watch a cool TV series with the joint, and then it gets 6 o'clock, watch some TV dadada. Then the clock is 7, maybe smoke again, a half. And then the good TV is coming at around 8. And then time goes really fast after that, I think. It can get 1, half past 1 where I am in my own world – unfortunately. I am still really bad at being social. I am only social with those girls I am seeing. I am not like 'hey friends, should we go out?'

> Interviewer: Because it feels uncomfortable?

> Frank: Yes. It does. It is anxiety provoking, I think, as hell. What should we do, and what if there is nothing to talk about? Earlier I was great at it. Back then I was a total party boy. And then weed came and totally destroyed it.

> Interviewer: And you connect that with weed?

> Frank: Totally. I do. But it has something to do with my consumption. If I had smoked a lot less, I wouldn't be able to blame that. In the same degree. I wouldn't.

Frank describes how his daily rhythms are at the time of the interview. His routines of smoking are closely knit together with the arrangement of digital media. But his continuous engagements in smoking joints and being in his own world also produces frustration and irritation, which he expresses in the word "unfortunately". It blocks the potentials of being more social, but shields him from the anxieties, which arise when he imagines himself being in a social situation. Frank attributes his isolation to marijuana and not as such

the digital arrangement of his home. The dynamics here are uncertain. Maybe marijuana really has destroyed his social confidence and the digital arrangement covers that or compensates for that. Or maybe his engagements in both digital media and marijuana have gradually forged the routine and isolation. Something suggests the latter when looking at how Frank's daily routines and digital arrangement have developed:

> Frank: I remember that I won a good poker tournament and then I bought a smart-TV. It was one that could connect to Netflix, YouTube. But it is not very long time ago, two years, three years ago that Netflix started. And when they began to be there, then I turned into a film geek. I have always had many DVDs. I almost have one of them [pointing at a shelf] filled with DVDs.

> Interviewer: And they don't get thrown out, right, although they are online?

> Frank: That's the thing, what use are they today?

> Interviewer: When that big TV came in, did anything happen to your use of weed?

> Frank: I actually think that I isolated myself a great deal more after that. For, now I could have a *really* good time, I thought. I have the great TV with great picture quality, and all that shit.

> Interviewer: And did it make you smoke more or did that remain the same?

> Frank: I was less bored, at least. So I have probably also fired up more. When I was an apprentice, I smoked a lot.

Frank recalls the succession, which developed from his interest in poker. Winning the tournament gave him the possibility of expanding his interest and engagement in movies, and the like, with the big screen, high definition and connection to internet sources and TV on demand. Initially it also carried the hope of solving other issues (boredom), and he imagines that the smart-TV provides the potential of enhancing his quality of life when he says "now I could have a *really* good time". But the newly arranged arrangement also seems to arrange new problems for Frank. He says that it was also the onset of further isolation and possible intensification of his drug engagement. For Frank the arrangement gradually comes to reciprocate his imaginative processes and engagements in digital media and drugs as routine and as solitary activity. The analytical difficulty is that Frank talks about his actual engage-

ments and not about his imaginative processes that make the engagements emerge on a daily basis. And I did not ask him to describe what the TV-arrangement looks like[29]. A more concrete analysis of how his digital arrangement at home arranges his imaginative processes in a routinized and narrowed-in way is therefore impeded. But as Karen more explicitly articulated, the spatial-material arrangement of digital and other artifacts materializes and stabilizes specific reciprocating absences of engagements that can be presenced. Nevertheless, Frank has described how the arranged technological geography at home at times has had the potential of infesting a zeal in his imaginative processes and drug engagements, which was analyzed in the previous section in relation to his *Breaking Bad* period. But it would without a doubt be interesting to unearth the more routinized and possibly embodied imaginative processes in Frank's everyday living more systematically.

The point is not to make routines synonymous with restrictiveness. Nor is it to dichotomize routines and imagination. Routinization and narrowing in of imagination and engagements can help us to economize and create focus in many of our daily endeavors. Ole Dreier, who has taken up and developed Holzkamp's concept of conduct of everyday life, writes:

> Routinization economizes our accomplishing the ordinary elements of our everyday life so that we have more time and attention to focus on what really matters to us. (Dreier, 2007, p. 185)

However, the lament that Karen and Frank express indicates that the routinization is not completely functional. Parts of the routinization and narrowing in of drug and media engagements thus emerge as restrictive premise from the spatial-material arranging arrangements. The circularity of engagements does not facilitate, but blocks certain directionalities that have come to matter for them. What for Frank opened the possibility of having a "*really* good time" also produces isolation, which he probably did not imagine initially. And what for Karen provides a comforting space, also produces the feeling of being "stuck".

Taking a deeper and more tentative analytical step, the simple and static setup of Frank's high-quality smart-TV produces an excess of access to fiction in form of movies and TV series which Frank watches extensively. Alt-

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[29] "Arranging arrangements" was initially not a focus for my empirical investigation. It surfaced as a general topic after I had conducted the interviews and worked more intensively with them.

hough the arrangement reciprocates him as a solitary person, the fictional worlds also recreate Frank as having *quasi-social* relations with the characters and their worlds who share his interests and create atmospheres that excite him. Drug engagements play a part in creating this hand-in-hand-ness as Frank has described.

Arranging social arrangements of drug engagements

Oscar's socio-material arrangements of drug engagements. The stories of Oscar and Neil can elucidate the social arrangements of the routinization of imaginative processes and drug engagements. It should be noted that Oscar's story is double-sided in this case. The social arrangements got him into more regular engagements with mainly marijuana. But after the new community of friends dissolved when the friends left high school, during Oscar's second and third year, he developed more isolated engagements like Karen and Frank where spatial-material arrangements of digital media also played a co-constituting role. I will focus on what Oscar shared with me in relation to the social arrangements with his new group of friends as he also occasionally smoked marijuana with some friends from another group. The relation between drugs and media appears to be reversed between the groups: In the former, Oscar expresses that smoking marijuana complemented the activity of experiencing music albums together, where digital media in the latter group appear to complement or accomplish the social activity of smoking marijuana. Another reason for focusing on the latter is that Oscar's drug engagements intensified in this context and eventually developed into solitary engagements. Again, Oscar expresses the difficulty in talking about imaginative processes during this period due to the routinization he was undergoing:

> Oscar: I think maybe I have forgotten about my imagination concerning smoking because it became such a big part of my everyday life.

It would be possible from this citation to argue that routinization is the negation of imagination. Yet, I will maintain the venture into arguing for a routinization and narrowing in of imaginative processes arranged and reciprocated by the social arrangements, including digital media. I will interpret Oscar's sentence as imaginative processes that have developed as mostly tacit and taken for granted. I will further follow that assumption because Oscar, through the indirectness of our dialogue, still encloses relations that I would analyze as imaginative although routinized. An empirical limitation in the in-

terview with Oscar is that while I was focused on trying to create a picture of the relevant media activities in the social arrangements, I did not manage to explore the concrete technologies that were employed. Hence, a concrete description of the arrangements, like Karen provided and later Neil, is not presented in the interview. But some clues are given and are deductible.

To recap the point of departure from the analysis in the last chapter, Oscar claims that media did not precipitate the initiation of his drug engagements. But media became significant in the course of intensification of his engagements:

> Oscar: And when you have become a part of that environment then you of course also seek out things which marijuana is a part of. It becomes confirmatory of your lifestyle when you see stuff. And that could be everything from YouTube videos on how to roll a joint; TV series where they smoke joints and stuff.

Oscar addresses a connection between content and confirmation which I will return to. But first I want to go deeper into the role of the drug-media relation in Oscar's social arrangements. The material effects of the drug in relation to the particular social arrangement in Oscar's case create a functional space for digital media. When talking about the regular arrangements at a friend's place, Oscar says:

> Oscars: Most often it was about smoking joints and watching movies or listening to some music and then just small talk. Often it is very difficult to focus on one topic of conversation because everything flows back and forth.

Digital media appear to not play an arbitrary role in the accomplishment of the social arrangement shaped by the drug-induced impediment of conversation. The mix of the social relations and the material effects of smoking joints creates an imaginative void that digital media counteract by adding cohesiveness and continuity to the arrangement:

> Oscar: Often when you smoke, and when a big part of your friendship concerns smoking, then it often becomes, like, what should you do between those two joints or while smoking them? And then most often it is...you would just like to be entertained. You don't really have anything clever to talk to each other about because you probably don't have a deeper friendship. But then watching a movie becomes the thing. Or watching a TV series. Or something like that.

And more specifically, there are genres of media activities, which have a greater cohesive aptness than others:

> Oscar: It is more often some easy comedy. Like, 'I cannot go down and watch a Michael Haneke movie', and stare directly into each other's eyes and think 'ah, what is this movie about..?'. Often it is just about getting some empty calories in some sense, some quick entertainment. Or else, just playing some computer games.

The specific types of media activities contribute to the accomplished social arrangement as they substitute the imaginative uncertainty between or during smoking joints by digital cohesion and continuity. On different occasions Oscar describes it as having the subjective implication of the paradoxical feeling that you are doing something without actually doing anything. The possibilities of digital media to act as stabilizing 'plug-ins' or insertions are excessive as indicated by Oscar as he refers to movies, TV series, games, music and different kinds of videos. The access to these activities converges in digital media. But as analyzed earlier, this temporal excess also emerges within a single digital medium (e.g. a game), which Oscar explicates can extend up to a week. Again, the game *GTA* comes up as relevant activity:

> Oscar: Well, that's a game where you can do a lot of stuff without actually be doing anything. It's that free roam world where you can run around. It's just a super-cool game where you can...I remember we spent a week creating missions together and smoking joints and playing those missions. Because it is often very cozy, just to have something to make time pass.

Such extended stability through digital arrangement arranges a routinization and narrowing in of drug engagements as it contributes to the accomplishment of social events of drug engagements. Interpreted from Oscar's descriptions, it also does so by interconnecting the persons through the worlds that the digital media give access to and embody. The relating-to-each-other through media displaces the more direct relating to each other, which is either experienced as difficult or uncomfortable due to a combination of material effects of the drug and the lack of shared interests among the participants. It is likely that the more critical tone in Oscar's rendering is produced by the development he has gone through since, as he initially aspired to become part of the "cool" community.

This brings us back to the implications of the arrangement for imaginative processes. When talking about the routinization that was accomplished

through digital media, Oscar did not talk about a narrowing in or routinization of imaginative processes in the same way that for instance Frank did during his *Breaking Bad* period. Oscar talks more about another stabilization of imagination through digital media that also becomes co-constitutive of his formation of imagined meta-projections. This is related to his first quotation in this section concerning content and confirmation of lifestyle (on p. 213). The initially teleonomy of the imagined meta-projection of "cool" seems to be gradually substantiated by rap culture as a main source for Oscar and his new friends:

> Interview: For a start, could you dwell on some of those [media activities] that seem to have made the greatest impression on you? Because these concrete experiences are exciting, for me at least.
>
> Oscar: Yes, hmmm... had the greatest...yes, I can do that. I am very attracted to rap music; I think rap music is very cool. And in rap music, a great amount of the lifestyle, at least for many rappers, is about smoking, smoking many joints. I think that has been a great influence on me. Not that you directly wanted to be like a rapper, but more the thing that it can confirm what you are doing and you hear some music where they talk positively about smoking a lot of joints.

That Oscar does not as such want to become a rapper suggests that the rap culture does not substantiate his imaginative processes with an explicit teleology. But it establishes an imaginative *parallel* through which the concrete drug engagements become substantiated in a specific way. Oscar talks about this process as the "glorification" of drug engagements, which in simple terms operates through the celebration of drugs by coupling it with success. Rap culture as the imaginative parallel confirms and supports ongoing engagements in drugs, more than being something that is being approximated through the engagements:

> Oscar: For example, when I was listening to rap music, it was more an addition to smoking. Listening to some music where they talk about smoking – that they talk positively about smoking. It is that kind of glorification of that lifestyle that maybe has affected me.

As pointed out earlier in the analysis in the interview with Oscar, I had difficulties in getting beneath the vagueness of "cool" and getting an impression of possible imaginative processes related to it. Oscar would connect "cool"

with microgenetic and highly situated activities such as rolling a joint[30] and possessing marijuana. The references to rap culture, and to the multiple forms of digital mediation thereof, unraveled how it was possible for "cool" to emerge as imaginative processes co-constituted by digital media. "Cool" became more grounded and nuanced via those references as the following dialogue shows:

> Oscar: And maybe you also think that Snoop Dogg is a cool guy because then he said in an interview that he smoked so and so many blunts a day, 'aw, that is hilarious, guys, did you hear that?' [re-enacting a scene with friends]
>
> Interviewer: And what is hilarious about that?
>
> Oscar: It is because it is funny, you are part of that lifestyle, then you think that smoking many joints is cool. And then we hear somebody who smokes crazily many joints, then you think, 'well, that is actually quite cool'.
>
> Interviewer: Cool because he can or..?
>
> Oscar: Cool because he can and he can afford it and because... taking drugs is expensive. If you have great many bags of weed, there is something like, 'wow, that is pretty cool'. Because, it shows that you have a lot of money, you have many possibilities.

The possibilities of substantiating microgenetic activities with "cool" can be connected with the ways in which digital media reciprocate imaginative processes. The references to rap culture are not only via music and lyrics. Oscar draws on many technological sources relating to videos: Interviews, music videos and movies where such microgenetic activities and their connection to glorification can be presented and displayed in concrete sensory modalities. At the time of the interview, Oscar had developed a more explicit form of comical distancing towards those imaginative processes and engagements. So I wanted to know if it was less pejorative earlier:

> Interviewer: I am thinking, maybe there was an earlier point where you could be better in sync with that universe.
>
> Oscar: Exactly. Because it was like 'This is cool!'. It was maybe actually something that you wanted. Everybody wants...I can't imagine anything else... Everybody wants success in their lives. Success can be many things. But when

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[30] It is highly situated and skillful. But it is also tactile and aesthetic. It could be another mediated connection to glorification of such practices.

success all of a sudden is to smoke a lot of joints and possess big cars and make rap signs, then it is also cool to watch those videos where they do that.

Oscar describes how the abstraction of success takes a very specific and concrete form when substantiated by this kind of visual and auditory rap culture. The approximation of success is not necessarily directed towards becoming a rapper and part of that culture. But the internal relation established between drug engagements and success in that culture is what comes to act as an imaginative substantiation of Oscar's actual drug engagements at that time; not a substantiation as directionality, but a parallel which confirms the "coolness" of the ongoing drug engagements. Gathered from Oscar's utterance that rap music, and the culture surrounding it, held a significance for his so-called drug lifestyle, I interpret that as routinization and narrowing in of his imaginative processes reciprocated by the social-material arrangements of friends and digital media: "Cool" becomes the imaginative premise by which his drug engagements are substantiated recurrently. The premise is not confronted, contradicted or recreated, but is stabilized through the arrangements. I will argue for and discuss this as a reciprocated one-siding of the imagination, which blocks out other potentials and critiques and thus stabilizes and narrows in the imaginative processes and drug engagement. But first I will include Neil's examples in the analysis.

Neil's social arrangements of multiple digital devices. Neil's social drug engagements are arranged with a more radical intensity in the form of multiple digital devices simultaneously. He describes this as we explore the "perfect activity", that I cited earlier, of engaging in media activities while smoking joints in the socio-material arrangement:

Neil: And then it [engaging in media] seemed to be the perfect activity to do meanwhile [smoking], because it doesn't demand much in comparison to if you had to go outside and do something, then it only demands that you sit in your chair and do whatever you want to.

Interviewer: And 'the perfect', what constitutes that?

Neil: It's just that you sit in your chair and... A lot of things are happening around you, and you don't have to do anything actively to be a part of it – besides just turning around: There you have a movie on the TV, or play one game with this guy or with that guy or we all play a bit together, and okay now I don't want to do that any longer [inaudible], then you turn the chair

around and there is a TV, or like...or you can go over and watch another person playing something else, or... Many of my friends they draw a lot because they are graphic designers. Then you can have some fun by looking at someone who is drawing. It is just a very good forum to do nothing. And that went really well in hand with joints.

It is from this socio-material arrangement that the earlier analyzed hand-in-hand-ness of digital media and smoking joints emerges for Neil. The multiple digital technologies provide different activities that the participants can check in and out of without the arrangement falling apart. And thus, they arrange a stability and cohesion of the social drug engagements as in Oscar's experiences. But Neil's articulation serves well to explicate how stability and cohesion of the social drug engagements are also produced by generated attachment and by imaginative processes that are being *directed towards the arrangement itself*. If we recap Gomart & Hennion's idea, the cultivation of passion, attachment and, in effect, addiction emerges from the (consensual) redistribution of agency: Of accepting that "external" forces take possession of the self (Gomart & Hennion, 1999, p. 221). This redistribution can be recognized when Neil talks about how a lot of things are happening in the arrangement without having to do anything actively to be a part of it – which also goes hand-in-hand with the agency of the drug, not to forget, as the "perfect activity". The intensity of the multiple media activities combined with the material effects of the drug arranges and reciprocates imaginative processes by directing them towards the media themselves as possible engagements by Neil's minimal activity of turning his chair around: Although the activities are perceptually *present*, there will always be some that are *absent* in his current engagement. I interpret the example of Neil's chair rotation as the embodied opening of imaginative processes ('what could I do?') that are immediately directed by the intensive agency of the digital arrangement and the multiple options of engagements it offers ('I could watch TV or that guy gaming or join that game' etc.). It thus seems as if different parts of the arrangement continuously substitute each other as forming imaginative and actual premises for Neil's drug engagements with his friends.

But for Neil there is also an affective premise for routinely engaging in and feeling attachment to the arrangement overall. According to Neil the arrangement of his friends, media activities and smoking joints generates an atmosphere of *coziness*[31] and a sentiment of belonging:

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[31] "Hygge" in Danish which earlier has also been translated to "good times".

> Neil: …[it] is a lot cozier to sit together, and while you are gaming then a joint circulates almost constantly.

The stability and cohesion of the arrangement should therefore not only be regarded their strict practical-material terms, but also in their subjective analogy as arrangements held together by felt attachment among the participants. Essentially, the multiple digital media activities make the arrangement go on. And in combination with the size of the group of friends (around seven people), the arrangement endures a temporal extension:

> Neil: At least over the last two years we have done this a lot just being at someone's place, who like has opened his doors, and then people just dropped in as it suited them according to their studies or to their jobs during the day, yes during the night and into the morning. So, some are sleeping over and others go home.

Given that the arrangement is fixed in one location – or on one premise – at the time, it acts as a social, technological and spatial hub through which the different everyday lives of the participants can converge and be coordinated. Even when some of the participants are not present or leave, the arrangement carries on and is perpetuated.

The temporal extensity does not only regard the durability of a single arrangement or event. According to Neil the arrangements have occurred repeatedly over the last two years. This indicates the routinely basis on which the arrangements have been arranged and become an arranging premise for the social engagements of the group of friends. This implies the active arranging of arrangements by the participants. But the possibilities and ease of this routinization is also reciprocated by the historical conditions of technological development. This development and ease is reflected in the following passages where Neil first introduces the configuration of the arrangements in the interview:

> Neil: It's not like I'm on the computer all the time. But I have spent a lot of time on it. And also together with friends, I mean, where you are sitting together with a lot of computers. I have also spent a lot of time on that.

> Interviewer: That sounds like playing together…

> Neil: It has often been like that. Because it is so easy with a laptop.

Interviewer: Is it primarily a laptop that you are using? Or do you also have a big machine [alluding to a game station]?

Neil: I have had many. Some years ago I even carried a lot of stuff along with me, where now it is more the laptop.

Interviewer: Great. How was your consumption of marijuana at that point?

Neil: It was peaking.

We did not go into detail about the concrete materializations that Neil is thinking of when he talks about this "ease". And numerous, intersecting materializations are without a doubt at stake. Nevertheless, a characteristic development in laptops and other new digital technologies is that of, what I would call, *dislocation*. It does not as such refer to the destruction of the local, of geography or of space, but to a possible loosening of media activities from specific spaces and technologies. One source of dislocation stems from the transformation of stationary technologies into *mobile* technologies, which is inseparable from the development of smaller and more efficient hardware. This change is even evident in the citation above where Neil describes how he used to carry a lot of hardware around where now it is just the laptop. It should not be understood as if the arrangements with multiple co-present media was not possible before mobile technologies – arrangements known as 'LAN parties' have existed for quite some time. But such arrangements of stationary technologies demand greater preparatory effort to transport, arrange, setup and interconnect than smaller and mobile technologies like a laptop. The ease of developing such arrangements can be interpreted as being reciprocated by the mobility of technologies. On top of that, the mobility creates a spatial flexibility whereby the arrangements can be located and relocated easily in different homes among Neil's friends. Another source of dislocation stems from loosening of access to public and private sources from specific technologies through virtual and online technologies. The fixation of sources on DVDs, CDs, local computer storage etc. is gradually being substituted by non-local storage and access. Neil describes this in detail when explained he the Steam platform to me:

Neil: Well, Steam is probably the world's biggest gaming association. It is for huge games or newer games. Steam, then, is just a database that you can download for free. And when you buy a game then you don't need to go down to a shop and install it from a CD, you just buy it directly through Steam. And then it is available in your account. So, if I enter through another

> computer and log onto my Steam account, and I have a thousand games that I have bought, then they would also be there. And then you can just install them through that.

Summed up, the development of dislocation generates new forms of excesses: It no longer provides access to multiple non-local experiences from one location; it provides access to multiple non-local experiences from *multiple locations* – which amounts to the generally accepted notion and condition that *anything is available anywhere and anytime.* The ease and routinization of the arrangements that Neil talks about can be put in relation to the reciprocations of such materializations of digital media. And according to his own account, the peak of his drug engagements coincides with this routinization.

  The routinization of imaginative processes directed towards these and related arrangements in their absence also surfaces in the interview. But the imagination is reduced in its complexity and probably emerges in the form of embodied directionality as Neil recognizes that a more elaborate chain of imaginative processes is cut short in his thinking:

> Neil: What I am thinking is that I don't get so far in my thoughts. When I am just at work or something and then I get off and then I feel 'Wow' – also because it's a habit – 'now I'm going to my friend's place and relax and smoke.' Because I am used to that and I like it. You don't get to think it further, because that's just what I'll do and that's how it usually is.

I would argue that the routinized imaginative premise, although foreshortened, is an embodiment related to Neil's imagined meta-projection and thus bends back to the opening of the first analytical chapter. The sentences above followed immediately after talking about how media experiences may have formed his approach to drugs, but before the imagined meta-projection was elaborated. The movies and music that Neil mainly refers to stem from engagements in arrangements in his early 'smoking career' when he was about 15 or 16 years old. The overlap between these media experiences and the formation of imagined meta-projection is evident (although it was not immediately evident to Neil, cf. chapter 6), here rendered in slightly condensed editing:

> Interviewer: What kind of different experiences do you get of drugs through these media?

Neil: Yes, it is very interesting. Because if you for instance are watching a movie where one is smoking joints, then you also feel like doing it. Also, because in the movie they can be really good at creating an atmosphere that this is okay … that they are outside, the weather is good and are having a good time and the music is good and they are walking and smoking and they are feeling fantastic, then you feel a lot more like doing it.

Interviewer: And there is something…try to describe with some more words. You say the music and lighting, there are some things that resonate with you.

Neil: Yes, strong, gorgeous sunlight and beautiful colors and…ehm, you get to feel like doing what you innermost want to do, vs. if a person is sitting in his room with curtains closed and everything is gloomy and dark and stuff like that, then you are more ashamed about it, even though they are doing the same activity. Ehm, and most likely you are a part of that, where you are inside where there is dark and it is raining outside because you are in Denmark, where you more want sunshine. And again, the music, if it is happy sounds and good tones then you also feel more like it than if it is music that drags you down.

The central atmospheres, percepts and sentiments can be interpreted as embodied and routinized in the imaginative premise, that Neil describes, even to the extent that they overrule the unlikelihood of their concrete actualization as he argues in "because you are in Denmark". Although they originate from earlier arrangements in Neil's life, his later routinized imaginative processes are premised on elements of that imagined meta-projection.

Reversing the pictures: Simon resolves felt loneliness through marijuana. Between these solitary and social arrangements of drug engagements, Simon presents a kind of reversed picture. Earlier in his drug engagements, Simon recounts how his digital everyday living – without drugs! – played a part making him feel lonely. He told me how time could disappear just by browsing videos on YouTube and by similar loops of digital activities. This was somehow discomforting to Simon and on some level, it blocked his approximation of creation through "self-destruction". By going out, to for instance Christiania, Simon transcends that loneliness through drug engagements. As he describes it:

Simon: And I used weed as a cure against this loneliness because then you got outside and if I was sitting with my journal somebody would ask into it. And then you got into talking with people and all of a sudden you were feeling social anyways. So that was the solution.

Simon, thus, uses drug engagements as expansive premise to transcend the premise of loneliness which is co-produced by the digital activities that on routinized basis could take up his time and isolate him from his pursuits.

Discussing the reciprocations of materialized imagination of arrangements and of "bigger-screened" technologies

The analysis of the implications of arranging arrangements for the routinization and narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements raises a series of questions. The first regards my argumentation for specific reciprocations of materialized imagination in arranging arrangements among the participants. Is it possible from the analysis to argue for a specific materialized imagination in digital media that reciprocates?

If we look at the variation between the solitary and social arrangements of digital media and drug engagements it is interesting to take notice of the fact that, despite these variations, more or less the same types of technologies are arranged in both scenarios: Mainly bigger-screened technologies (computers, smart-TVs, TVs, gaming consoles) are used for similar media activities (movies, series, games, music). In this sense you could come to a couple of related and critical conclusions: 1) There is not any specific solitary or social imagination materialized in digital media that is implicated in arranging the arrangements – the technologies are open-ended, converging and customizable and are therefore at mercy of the *participants* arranging them in a specific way; and 2) this means that the reciprocating processes of routinizing imagination and drug engagements that I have analyzed are actually confounded by the participants' own intentions, imagination and engagements. I will use this problematization in order to elaborate the argumentation.

If we play with the critique instead of straight-up denying it, we can reach a productive middle ground. Digital media can indeed be said to be more customizable, democratic and user-empowering than ever before (cf. Couldry, 2012, p. 148). But that does not mean to say that they are not materializations of specific imagination(s!). The same artifact, the TV for example, in Karen's and Frank's cases becomes co-constitutive of solitary arrangements and in Oscar's and Neil's cases of social arrangements. This could suggest that no specific form of reciprocation is present. But I would instead argue that this simply means that one possibility does not preclude the other –

nor *others*. They are both included in the materialization of that particular digital medium where others are not. Digital media beyond modern TVs are generally *converging* (bringing things together that were separate before) and *networked* (enabling complex communicative relations) (Meikle & Young, 2012). That a *multiplicity* of imaginations is materialized in a single digital medium does not make it arbitrary in such arrangements.

The argumentation against technological arbitrariness and the isolation of agency to participants in arranging arrangements can be made in two ways: By zooming in on the specificities of individual technologies and zooming out on the arrangements of people and technologies. If we zoom in, parts of the arbitrariness disappear when you look at what is generally *missing* from the empirical material. Smaller-screened and handheld technologies, like smartphones and iPads, are close to absent in the material. It can partly be explained by possession. None of participants reported to own an iPad. But the story is different for smartphones. Another explanation could be that small, mobile technologies are so engrained in the everyday living that the participants would take their implications for granted. But there is yet another possible logic to it. The hand-in-hand-ness of the material drug-effects and media, as analyzed earlier, may be implicated in this technological selection process, which can specify this material-aesthetic synergy even more. If the material effects of the drug create a preference for being more observant and entertainment-seeking, as Karen and Oscar describe it respectively, the visual extensity of bigger screens have a greater aptness for this than smaller-screened technologies. And many of the media activities that are said to go hand-in-hand with the material effects of the drug – like movies, TV series, and games – are created to be interacted with on bigger screens and more powerful technologies. Bigger screens may facilitate greater immersion and augmentation of aesthetics which interacts with the preference of being observant and entertainment-seeking. When talking about mobile technologies in the group interview, Frank retorts:

> Frank: I'm not [preoccupied with mobiles]…I'm not. I prefer a damn bigger screen. … I'm more of a quality-freak when it comes to that. If it is not full-on HD-ish, then yuck! Then I don't care.

In relation to being observant, bigger screens materialize a spatial possibility of interactive distance between person and technology, where smaller-screened technologies demand greater proximity. The spatial distance embodies the possible arrangements ranging from solitary to social over longer tem-

poral durations. It is harder to gather around smaller-screened technologies over a longer time span, and thus they are not as apt as social anchor points in one context. The possible solitary-to-social range of bigger screens can also become more determinate and specific depending on the concrete media activities that are being engaged in. Neil describes how he played a lot of MOBA-games (Multiplayer Online Battle Arena) with his friends and explains:

> Neil: It is 5-against-5 where everybody from the beginning has the same preconditions. And then depending on how well you fare in these 5-against-5 battles you will excel. It is a lot of strategy, 5-against-5. And therefore, it is also very entertaining when you are more people together so you are the same players who play at the same time every time, and you know each other's weaknesses and strengths and which roles the different players perform best. So, it has been a big advantage to be the same players every time, that you can dedicate yourself to it, because then it is completely different from when you play against random players you don't know.

In this kind of media activity, the imagination of social relations and interactions are more overtly materialized in the game world as premise for engaging in the game. The difference from the focal point explored hitherto is that the participants in this arrangement are interacting with/through multiple digital media, mostly laptops, coordinated through an online server. But if we linger on the big-screened technologies, how can it be understood, then, that e.g. Karen and Frank develop solitary routinizations with drugs and media if the debated digital medium can also materialize social relations?

Answering this question underscores the importance of arranging arrangements for understanding the specific reciprocations. Although I argue for specific materializations of imagination in digital media, the empirical material forces me to attend to the relation between digital media and their concrete arrangements in order to account for which materialized imaginations are *actually accentuated as imaginative premises* by the arrangements and are brought into reciprocation. In other, and hopefully more simple words: When technologies like digital media materialize a multiplicity of imaginations, then the concrete arrangement is decisive in what materialized imaginations are brought to the fore, which one's are pushed into the background and ultimately also which one's are exapted[32]. The individual medium alone, then,

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[32] See Tateo (2016) on "exaptation".

cannot explain why solitary routines are being reciprocated. But it can neither be explained without it. Given the fact that Karen's and Frank's technologies are arranged in the private geographies of their homes and that their setups seem to be more stationary and fixed, the possible social premise of the materialized imagination is diminished, or blocked, and the solitary premise is accentuated in the arrangement. In Karen's corner, the couch and devices are directed towards each other. Their interobjectual relation therefore creates a mutual delimitation and specification of the imagination materialized in the arrangement. In Neil's social arrangements with multiple digital media, solitary activities can also emerge provisionally when one person is playing a game or watching TV, as he told in an earlier example. But the activities on bigger screens accentuate the social premise in this arrangement: In Neil's chair-rotation example the imaginative premises emerge because he can easily orientate himself towards the different media activities on bigger screens and then engage in a single person's activity, making it a social one. With the multiple devices present, the social arrangement is imbued with a flexibility and the potential of constantly extending and reducing the number of people engaged in one or more media activities simultaneously. And thus, the accentuation of the social premise of the arrangement is reciprocated by the specific digital media at play and their interobjectual relations. This reciprocated accentuation will be analyzed as intensified when I extend the analysis in the next section on *instantaneously imagined communities*.

Discussing the socio-material elimination of contradictions: One-siding processes of the imagination

There is another aspect of the routinization and narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements that could raise skepticism towards the reciprocating role of digital media and arranging arrangements. The processes of routinizing and narrowing in have been analyzed in relation to the development of stabilizing properties of such arrangements. To expand this observation, there furthermore seems to develop an *elimination of contradictions* and a one-siding of imaginative processes within these arrangements, which I will elucidate empirically after stressing two points. First of all, in one of the theoretical chapters I suggested that these processes could be understood as characteristic of restrictive aspects of the imagination and of "Deuten" in critical psychology: Contradictions are not resolved through the development of transcending potentials, but are defensively acted upon by isolating the con-

flicting polarities or by ignoring the multi-sided aspects of issues through one-sided thinking or imagining. Second of all, the finding of one-siding processes in the empirical material was quite a surprise to me. I will explain.

Going into the interviews I was expecting to encounter more accounts of contradictory experiences that the participants were confronted with in their digital everyday living. This was based on the assumption that the unhindered access to an indefinite number of sources would necessarily imply being presented with conflicting impressions and messages, like cautioning messages from health officials vs. glorification of drug engagements from friends via social media, in movies etc. But contradictory experiences were not particularly outspoken in the material and talking to the participants about conflictualities in their digital everyday living therefore appeared to be more difficult than expected. Thus, I am faced with an apparent paradox between the access to possible contradictory experiences through digital media and the minimal representation thereof in the actual empirical material. So, the question is whether the elimination of contradictions and one-siding of imaginative processes can also be attributed reciprocations of materialized imagination in digital media and arranging arrangements or if the eliminating and one-siding processes are strategies solely devised by the participants themselves. It is in fact seductive to conclude the latter since the participants themselves choose what media activities they want to engage in. They do, of course, also do that. Still, I will try to pursue the analytical and expansive movement from isolated to interrelated perception or the movement towards "Begreifen" in critical psychology: How the processes of eliminating contradictions through one-siding of imagination are experienced as one's own doing, but also related to the reciprocation of digital media.

The examples where one-siding processes have already surfaces in the analysis relate to Oscar and Neil where they respectively talk about how different cultures act as positive confirmations of their current drug engagements. Just to recall, Oscar talks about glorification of drug engagements through rap cultures mediated through music, music videos, interviews, video clips and movies, and Neil's story also relates to the positive messages in rap music and the percepts and atmospheres created in for instance stoner-movies.

When I stopped recording the interview with Oscar, our conversation carried on for a while and I noted some of these topics in my field notes and initial analysis of my impressions from the interview. Interestingly, in the

post-interview setting Oscar seemed to emphasize that although those media activities confirmed their current drug engagements at the time, Oscar and his friends *chose* those activities themselves. On the one hand, he wanted to bring to the attention the problem in the degree of freedom that you have in tailoring a self-confirmatory pattern of media activities while on the other hand also indicating that he and his friends did it themselves – digital media were not to blame, so to speak. This suggests that Oscar emphasizes that the self-confirmatory pattern primarily emerges from the agency of the group of friends, not from digital media in particular (maybe besides the freedom they embody). Does this mean that, when I am arguing for reciprocations of digital media, that I am claiming that Oscar's statement is not true? Not as such – the pattern is related to the agency of the group of friends. But I will transcend the statement and argue for its interrelation with other kinds of agencies or reciprocations. But first I will ground the processes of one-siding and elimination of contradictions in the empirical material, also to show the *resistance* of the arrangements against contradictions.

In the following I will show some concrete examples of this resistance against contradictions of the arrangements. The first example illustrates how the social-material arrangements resist breakdowns and blocks the emergence of other possible arrangements. At one point in the interview I asked Neil to join me in a thought-experiment: What would happen if the media activities would be removed from his social drug arrangements. Neil responded that this had actually happened a couple of times. So, the experiment was transformed into actual account:

> Neil: And then if there were no TV channels or internet, then it would be necessary to get the old DVD down from the attic and put on an old DVD.

And when I followed up on the scenario:

> Interviewer: Do you remember the atmosphere when there was no internet, before you got the DVD?

> Neil: Yes. There has always been a felt pressure because you think, 'This is boring.' And when you are sedated by weed then you are not particularly good at being creative, or...you are not good at talking to each other. … So I can imagine the sentence: 'What should we do?' being said a lot of times in no time until the point where you have been forced to watch some movie both of us have already seen.

During the interview, I was taken by what for me looked like a strong *self-rectifying* tenacity of the arranging arrangement in Neil's example. The technological breakdown in the arrangement actually opens a teleonomic space for imaginative processes ("what should we do?"), where the routine is disrupted and is deemed sensitive to the emergence of other arrangements and engagements. Yet the material drug-effects strain the unfolding of these teleonomic imaginative processes as when Neil says that the effects impede creative and conversational potentials. Instead, the teleonomic space is mounting affective pressure which is eventually repealed by (imagining) a new technology substituting the teleonomic space and a greater variety of potentials remain blocked and unimaginable. How can we understand the emergence of this directionality from the 'now' absent digital media to the 'yet' absent DVD player in the example as reciprocated?

I would argue that the imaginative processes directed towards the DVD player are reciprocated from several flanks. First of all, the hand-in-hand-ness of marijuana and certain digital media and the routinization thereof in Neil's arrangements and engagements makes a *customary absence* emerge from the actually absent media activities. The directionality towards a technology replacement can be said to be subjectively and imaginatively accentuated as customary because of the collective mnemonic imprint of attachment and routinization generated by and with digital media. The attachment and feeling of the "perfect activity" does not disappear just because a technological breakdown has occurred, because it is also the *usual* activity, albeit absent and imaginary in the course of the breakdown. It is very likely maintained, then, as the usual-but-best possible-activity-with-the-drug since the otherwise teleonomic imaginative processes are blocked to develop further by the material effects of the drug. The material effects of the drug can therefore also be seen as accentuating that imaginative premise. The absent perfect-and-usual activity is further reciprocated as *possible* activity simply due to the *access* of the stored DVD player in the attic. The point may be banal. But it still expands the understanding of the self-rectification of the arrangement as something produced by imaginative processes that emerge from transaction between the participants and materiality and not only from the participants themselves.

From Neil's story, we can see how the drug/media *activity* nexus resists confrontation and contradiction through self-rectification. Oscar tells how his arrangements resisted confrontation both socially and technologically:

> Oscar: There have been various instances where I have said to these people if we weren't doing this [smoking] a lot, if it wasn't too much, if we shouldn't stop, and stuff like that. And it has always been like 'no, we didn't, we didn't do too much. We function alright.'

Oscar explains the resistance in the social aspect of the arrangement by saying that it is difficult to criticize the premise that warrants you acknowledgment in the group, namely the drug engagements themselves. The critique that Oscar tentatively tries to raise can be seen as a sign of latent disengagement and distancing from his social drug arrangements at that time. If we think about it in terms of his imagined meta-projection of "cool", his conflict and protest emerge from the feeling that he is more and more approximating what he would initially distance himself from: The imagination of hanging out just to smoke a lot of joints as a marker for 'estranging habits'. However, the one polarity of this imagined field of conflict is silenced or eliminated among his group of friends. Oscar does not make an overt reference to the role of digital media in these instances and processes. But the social elimination of contradictions is analogous to the one-sided ordering of aesthetic presentations of drug engagements in important media activities concerning rap cultures that Oscar has described earlier as self-confirmatory of the current drug engagements in his group of friends. In terms of his meta-projection, "cool" gradually becomes substantiated and boosted through the formed complexes of (aesthetic) projections and presentations while the conflicting side of it becomes silenced and eliminated. Neil also talks about the one-sided pattern and eliminating processes:

> Neil: All these stoner movies show that they [the characters] have a better everyday life and do better stuff when they are under influence than when they not under influence. And this is something – I can imagine, or at least in my head I believe that everyone who smokes, deep inside they know that it is not a very clever thing to do. So everybody has some degree of guilty conscience. And it's just a fantastic thing to be engaged in while smoking that you constantly get the message that it is okay what you are doing, when you do have some kind of guilty conscience about it.

Although Neil was mainly engaged in these kinds of aesthetic presentations in the initial phase of his drug engagements, their affective accentuation – shaping the meta-projective "good times" – continues to form imaginative premises throughout his subsequent routinization of drug engagements and arrangements. In doing so it suppresses or blocks the possible emergence of the critique embodied in the "guilty conscience".

Frank gives his reasons for directly avoiding presentations that would confront his drug engagements:

> Frank: But, the last many years I have like denied to read about it [smoking marijuana] and like 'No, I don't want to know anything about it'.

> Interviewer: Okay, how come?

> Frank: Because I don't think that I wanted to realize if it has had consequences. It is not nice to read: 'You have become 14% more stupid' – why should I read that, right?

Frank seems concerned with avoiding being confronted with what appears to be the inevitability of negative consequences of his drug engagements. The reference that Frank makes could be to an article or to his fear of discovering a similar fact – or to a fusion of the two. Either way, Frank's reaction is understandable as he tries to block out presentations that somehow block, hinder or reduce hopes and future possibilities in his living. With Neil and Oscar, I have tried to link the one-siding processes to imagined meta-projections. Regarding Frank's concern, this link is not as obvious.

To come with a further example of how microgenetic processes of one-siding and elimination of contradictions are related to imagined meta-projections (in less obvious ways), Simon tells how he refuses to open mails from his mom on drug topics. It follows immediately after Frank's utterances in the group interview:

> Interviewer: And could the other thing happen when you are on your social networks that someone posts something like that: 'Did you know that you become 14% more stupid from smoking?'

> Simon: My mom does it on my mail very often, sending something like [laughs] 'Marijuana does this to you...' [Frank: "How whack, man!"] yes, yes, yes, yes. I have never opened any of the links. But she sent me some studies that appeared in her browser somehow. And then I get it, and 'Thank you', I guess. It's a very sweet thought, then I know that about…like…

> Interviewer: And why don't you open them?

> Simon: Defiance, defiance, chilled. I think what my mom is doing is to distance herself from it. But it is also about all this self-destruction, it is about going against the conventional and be… it is so easy to be [inaudible, but

something with "citizen"]. It is more demanding to break away from that. I think that's the way I feel at least.

The digital actions of Simon's mother become entangled in the imagined field of the conventional, which Simon counteracts and distances himself from by refusal and defiance through which he is imaginatively approximating "romantic self-destruction".

Semi-secret algorithms: Digital eliminations of contradictions and the materialized imagination of You as habit

In the latter examples, I have tried to analyze how imagined and actual drug engagements are narrowed in through stabilizing and one-siding processes of socio-material *arrangements*. In these examples, it is not particularly visible how *digital media* reciprocate these processes. Mostly it appears as if the participants are primarily involved in these strategies and processes, which digital media happen to be a part of. From this empirical material, we could conclude that the digital activities merely reflect the participants' activities without intervening significantly. So how would I continue to argue for specific materializations in digital media that reciprocate imaginative processes and drug engagements in routinizing and one-sided ways? In order to do this, we have to take the analysis beyond the accounts already given by the participants and *torturing the things* further where the participants' accounts are silent. This simultaneously means that I am entering uncertain spaces where the empirical material cannot directly confirm the digital processes. But for now, the purpose is to push and provoke our understanding of how digital media could reciprocate these processes and qualify the insights empirically where possible.

In the following I will explore one side of a tension in the materialized imagination(s) in digital media. On the one side of the tension digital media materialize *expansive* imagination, especially when connected to the internet: You can teleonomically browse, search, discover (unknown) topics that pop up on your screen and you can teleologically and exploratively dive into to topics you know very little about and loot the web for a myriad of sources related to the topic. On the other side of the tension digital media materialize routinized or possibly *restrictive* imagination – or maybe even more precise: They materialize an imagination of *you* as a person made up of *habits* and *stable* and *uniform preferences*. The processes behind the reciprocations of this latter

materialized imagination are not always obvious. So it is necessary to go carefully into the details.

A way into understanding how digital media reciprocate the routinized and one-sided imaginative processes and drug engagements is via communication and media theorist Joseph Turow's (2011) concept "reputation silos" from his book *The Daily You*.[33] Turow's concept and analysis question the apparent democratic and empowered position of the individual through digital media. Interpreting the title, Turow provokes the perception of an "I" or "me" who deliberately uses digital media for "my" own purposes. In our media activities, we are instead confronted with ourselves in second person – a "you" generated by advanced tracking technologies and algorithms. Turow claims that our online activities get structured into personal profiles that are sold to companies. Companies then target persons in their media/online activities with e.g. advertisements, news and entertainment tailored according to the computer-generated "reputation" of individual personal profiles. Even explorative and open-ended searches will be translated into personal patterns and habits. Turow bases his argument on technologies like clicks and cookies: Clicks monitor activities on a single website and cookies track individual computer activities across websites. Data mining and algorithms translate clicks and cookies into personal profiles that are sold, bought and targeted. The "silo"-shape of reputation means that profiles are grouped together in large numbers and targeted on the basis of their statistical similarities, and that digital media on the surface surround us with worldviews that conform to our profile while isolating us from divergent worldviews (ibid., p. 19). Essentially, Turow's silo-concept embodies an understanding of digital media as reciprocating the person in routinized and one-sided ways and as eliminating contradictions by directing online content towards the person generated to confirm, and thus not confront, a computer-generated profile of the person. I am going to leave the concept "reputation silos" behind because Turow mainly uses it to analyze the obscure power displacement between individuals and online advertising industries. But I am going to build on the understanding of digital reciprocations and try to incorporate other similar processes.

One process relates to the digital reciprocations of memory. The vast storage spaces both on local devices and online have extended and hybridized mnemonic capacities. Of course, the person is more actively involved in the

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[33] There are other similar concepts like *filter bubbles* (Pariser, 2011).

arrangement of such mnemonic spaces than for instance the configuration and storage of profiles as Turow describes it. Yet, once stored and arranged, digital media also stabilize the memory, and based on previous digital activities the memory is reciprocated and recreated as accentuated premise and *possibility* when encountered on the interface. Take for example of Neil's description of the gaming platform, Steam (p. 220-221). He buys a game online, which afterwards is stored and accessible through his account. Whenever and wherever he logs onto his account, the game will be memorized there. But it will also be presented as a possible activity. The same goes for music, for example. Almost all participants reported of the general significance of music in their lives, but also more particularly of the significance for their drug engagements. The omnipresent "sound track" of their everyday living is a reciprocation of the portability of music technologies, but also of the local and online access to stored music. Locally stored music can be extended and changed over time. But a great amount of what is being recalled and played back at the participants by the technologies is inevitably grounded in their previous storage activities. The power of music in interconnecting previous drug and media activities as accentuate imaginative premises based on this hybridized memory is summed up by Neil when he talks about his attachment to stoner movies:

> Neil: But also, it [drug presentations in movies] affects you indirectly because you have had experiences with it and done it, then you only need to hear a five second sound clip from this movie with your eyes closed and then you have already connected it to thousands of different things and you feel incredibly like smoking. Because indirectly it is just a lot of...

> Interview: What is happening there? Is it pictures or sounds [that are imaginatively evoked]...?

> Neil: It is the music that is good and fits it [smoking], and even if it is just a piece of music from a song from an album that the rapper has released, then you connect with the soundtrack of that movie. And maybe you can even see the whole movie scene in front of you. And maybe you can even take it further and see what you did the time you saw and heard that music and watched this movie. Which...in all these three stages would be connected with smoking, in my case at least.

Memory is also materialized in web browsers. Previous online activities are stored in personal histories and can be suggested as possible searches when the person types something into a browser or search engine. These are tech-

nologies that can be disabled. But it requires deliberate actions to do so. The point is that the technologies direct you back to earlier digital activities and thus reciprocate routines, habits, and one-sided experiences. Other technologies with similar reciprocating implications demand more active involvement from the person. Many websites and social media sites offer the possibilities of subscribing to, liking and following sources of content. The minimal activity of this click activates a continuous stream of feeds from the same or related sources. The intensive and excessive reciprocation of these clicks is touched upon by Simon:

> Simon: I spend quite some time on YouTube. By now I have collected over 1000 of such subscriptions or subscribes on all different kinds of channels. Every time I log on to my YouTube [account] there are at least ten different kinds of videos that you can log on to.

The extent of one-sided and routinized reciprocations depends on the diversity of subscriptions and of content that sources provide. But the basics of these technologies is to feed back into the person's interest(s) in possible routinized and one-sided ways. Besides the active involvement of the person in arranging subscriptions and likes, many websites reciprocate in the same manner without this active involvement much in the vein of how Turow describes it. Many websites promote content based on clicks and cookies and even combine the promotion with similar profiles. You often encounter promoted content saying something like: 'Others who read/watched/listened to this also read/watched/listened to…'. YouTube accomplishes this by combining user activity with metadata of videos in complex ways (see e.g. Davidson et al., 2010). As a result, searching on and watching videos on a specific topic will promote various other similar videos on the right-hand side of the screen. So, when Oscar has explained that he would watch videos on how to roll a joint, interviews with Snoop Dogg or rap music videos, similar videos would be promoted.

If we look at the totality of these routinizing and one-siding reciprocations of digital media, digital spaces carry arranging qualities and reciprocations analogous to the geographical arranging arrangements which I analyzed just before – although they may not appear as such. Like Karen said how her corner was there all the time, the imaginative activities accentuated on the basis of materialized memory in digital media are also more or less "always there" when engaging in them, whether it concerns games, music, feeds or

promoted content. The purpose of this latter part of the analysis has been to try to argue for how digital media can reciprocate imaginative processes and engagements in routinized and one-sided ways. And to finish this off, I will underscore that the intent has not been to construe a one-sided analysis of digital reciprocations, but more to follow a dialectical pursuit of elucidating the contradictoriness or many-sidedness of the empirical material. Specifying the reciprocations of particular materialized imaginations in digital media and their arrangements is not the same as arguing for the total subjection of the persons. It argues for the activities performed by digital and material arrangements in the imaginative and actual processes of the young people's drug engagements.

Instantaneously imagined communities

The last analytical layer on how the narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements is reciprocated by digital media concerns what I call materialization of *instantaneously imagined communities*. This analytical focal point is a play on Benedict Anderson's concept "imagined communities" from 1983 and by adding "instantaneously" I aim at subjecting that concept to the implications and intensities of digital media in the context of drug engagements. Anderson developed the concept to refer to the collective subjectivity emerging from the historical rise of nations. The vast expansion in numbers of people joined by the commonality of distant geographical borders and national governments entail the transformation of communities that are locally known and interacted with to communities that are imagined:

> It [the community] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson, 2006, p. 6)

According to Anderson, this imagined relation between spatially dispersed people is co-constituted and made possible by a wide range of (media) technologies, including novels, newspapers and maps, that intersect in the individual person's life (e.g. Anderson, 2006, pp. 170-178). Anderson's concept and analyses exemplify that the absence that imagination tries to map – in this case absent members of the same nation – does not need to involve the creative generation of possibilities and future-oriented processes. As pointed out

in relation to Vygotsky in chapter four, the imagination here is basically generating *correspondences* between imagined and actual national communities (through various technologies) and imaginatively linking the absent 'there' with the locally present 'here' in the same 'now' in people's lives. In the following empirical analysis, I will however focus on how imagined communities form (imaginative) premises for the narrowing in of drug engagements among the participants in this study. Anderson's concept merely serves as a reference backdrop. The meaning of imagined communities will change in the following analysis. One reason for this is that digital media have transformed the emergence and interactivity of imagined communities. Another reason is that imagined communities is framed by drug use and associated imaginative processes, and not nations. These understandings will be developed from the relevancies appointed by the participants' accounts which relate to what I will analytically assemble as imagined communities. For the sake of clarity, I will again stress that this analytical layer interpenetrates the former layers in a non-hierarchical way. Instantaneously imagined communities embody atmospheres and attachments as analyzed in relation to the hand-in-hand-ness of digital media; and they embody arranging arrangements and also extend their reciprocations beyond the concrete arrangements of drug and media engagements.

The various community formations through (digital) media in the empirical material

In Anderson's quote community refers to a relation to and between people. But it also points to a relation to something being in common beyond the individual members[34], which creates a certain bond among the members. There is an engagement via the absent. If we for a start just focus on relations between people, the empirical material has presented different statuses of people to whom a relation and bond is being felt and built through digital media. The statuses span from fictional characters (in movies, series, games, and books) over celebrities (musicians, actors and other public personalities) to actual friendships or possible encounters. The imagined in this respect does not just encompass people that you will never meet or know (cf. Anderson's quote). In fact, "to meet and to know" becomes a twisted concept in the con-

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[34] Normally perceived as an *identity* between individuals. But difference and inequalities can also be shared (Esposito, 2010).

text of digital media. You will (very likely!) never meet and know fictional characters and celebrities in person. But we can become a part of and engaged in their presented worlds to a greater extent than ever before through digital media and the internet. In this sense, the potential presence of fictional communities has reached a historical pinnacle in our everyday living although the community relation is minimally reciprocal if you compare it to reciprocal relations in local communities[35]. The possibilities of socially interacting with friends and strangers have also been intensified through the modernization of communication technologies, the development of social media, and online platforms with social channels that furthermore have become integrated with other media in a single digital device. All these different technologies of bringing absent people into our current present almost at will are, in my terms, materializations of the imagination of social interactivity and communities.

Drug engagements through fictional imagined communities

The empirical material generated the impression that all the different statuses of community relations are pretty much mixed together in the lives of the participants with a varying degree of emphasis put on each by the individual participant. I will pick out empirical accounts based on the strategy of letting the accounts elucidate aspects of how these digital community relations form imaginative premises for the narrowing in of drug engagements. Let's begin with revisiting an already known example. During the period where Frank could not wait to come home from work and watch *Breaking Bad* and smoke – i.e. the imaginative premise that was being formed – he mentions that a relation was being established through the atmospheres created in such series. As I realized after more dialogue, Frank refers to a specific atmospheric relation which is framed by his meta-projective "underworlds". The "underworld"-atmosphere resonates with atmospheres in other places too, for instance Christiania. When he first brought up the concept, I asked him to elaborate on this atmosphere. He then describes the emergence of the atmospheric relation to a fictional community:

> Interviewer: You mentioned a word that caught my interest, you said 'atmosphere'.

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[35] Thompson (1995, p. 219) calls this relation to mediated fiction *non-reciprocal intimacy at a distance*.

Frank: Yes.

Interviewer: Can you describe that further, or how would you try to describe it?

Frank: Well, that's difficult…it could be, if the atmosphere is that five guys are hanging out and smoking in the movie. Then I think, hell, then I also get into the atmosphere of wanting to roll a joint myself. I think that's how I perceive it.

And Frank subsequently concludes:

Frank: A relation is established.

Besides the aspects of premises that I have previously analyzed in relation to this period in Frank's life, imagining becoming a part of this fictional community relation and actualizing it when coming home from work seems to form a further aspect of the premise in Frank's drug engagements at that time. If we take a deeper, and maybe far-fetched, analytic step, the emergence and establishment of the fictional community relation is generated from the reciprocated atmosphere in the series and the material effects of Frank's drug engagements: The aesthetic-material synergies of drugs and media activities in this case are forged by the *boundary subjectivity* by which Frank and the atmosphere of the fictional community become merged. Boundary subjectivity is a spin on the concept "boundary objects" (Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989) to highlight that not only materiality, like a drug and digital media, may establish a community relation, but so may the *subjectively* produced atmospheres and effects do. This established relation and bond is part of how the attachment, engagement and imaginative processes emerge in Frank's living. If we think of this atmosphere as embodying another affective aspect besides the aesthetic-materially generated attachment, the emerging community relation may also be seen as creating a sense of *belonging* and can *be longed* for in its absence[36]. The belonging to and longing for a fictional community can also emerge without drug engagements. But the produced boundary subjectivity in this example serves to underline the added affective intensity of the transactions (cf. the analysis through Gomart & Hennion).

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[36] See also Davies (2000).

The significance of atmospheric relations surfaces other places in the empirical material. Neil emphasizes atmosphere as key in his engagements in fictional (drug) communities. He elaborates atmosphere with other perceptual and aesthetic aspects of the community relation in his meta-projective "good times": The bright lighting, specific music, and specific (natural) settings that all combined produce a particular mood. This mood continuously forms imaginative premises for his drug engagements in other contexts, as analyzed earlier. Neil's accounts, then, add specific aesthetics and materiality to the fictional drug community relation and feeling. These are sensations that are difficult to account for, as Frank stresses. But I believe they are important in getting closer to the concrete aesthetic and atmospheric forms that co-produce the relation and belonging to imagined communities.

When you read Frank's description above, you may have a feeling that the atmosphere referred to in the example is not just produced by five random guys hanging out and smoking, especially not if you subject it to the meta-projective "underworlds". Frank most likely imagines a very specific aesthetic and spatial arrangement of five guys smoking which creates a specific atmosphere. But at the time of that interview, I was not aware enough of how to ask Frank about the aesthetic totality of atmosphere that is particularly significant and relevant for him[37].

If we turn to other accounts and aspects, Karen seems to emphasize the significance of the temporal structure of narrative developments and felt suffering and struggles of fictional characters as that which makes her form a bond to them. She expresses this through her interest in this type of characters and also when she says "I feel a connection to them. I get them" (on p. 168). Karen's account shows how the fictional community relations are also imaginatively joint and built from many disparate media experiences and activities. Her imagined fictional community has emerged from the many media iterations throughout her life which I analyzed in chapter 6: Remus Lupin, the fictionalized Mozart and Bukowski, Rust Cohle, Zuko and many more. The point I want to make here is that the constellation of an imagined fictional community can be provided within a series or a movie in isolation as in Frank's example, but they can also imaginatively be combined from the multi-sited transactions and meta-projective iterations of digital media[38]. In this

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[37] It is because of this methodological struggle that I started experimenting with guided rapid associations, which was illustrated with Simon earlier in the chapter.

[38] The whole notion of "fiction" is pushed towards disintegration in the context of imagined communities. The fictionalized Mozart and Bukowski are based on actual

sense, an imagined *entourage* of fictional characters is constellated and clus-tered from media experiences that have no internal or objective reference (cf. Vygotsky on clustering in chapter 4). One way of thinking of these fictional imagined communities as *instantaneously* present in the participants' living is how the communities become imaginative companions in their living based on the participants' memory: The clustered fictional community of characters are instantaneously present due to Karen's memorization or embodiment of them. Yet, digital media also reciprocate the possibilities of instantaneously engaging in fictional communities when they are absent based on digital and online memory. When Frank could not wait to come home from work and watch *Breaking Bad*, it was also because the imagined community was already 'waiting for him' at home and thus absent at his work. The reciprocating pro-cesses here are practically the same as those which I have already analyzed: The hand-in-hand-ness, the immediate access to excessive and extensive fic-tional material and so forth. But the community aspect contributes to the analysis with yet another engaging and affective layer by adding sensations as the bonding, belonging and longing to the layer.

From fictional towards actual imagined communities of drug en-gagements

If we move towards communities where fiction merges with or is partially substituted by actual friendships or possible encounters, imagined communi-ties play a role in the subjective manifestations of "slum" in Ellen's imagined meta-projection. "Slum" is also a hybrid. As an imagined community it is substantiated by places and settings as they are played out in fictive worlds (*Skins*) and in actual worlds (Inner Nørrebro, Christiania). As we saw in chap-ter 6, Ellen makes an imaginative link of correspondence between the aes-thetics of underground settings and the mentality of people frequenting these settings (and people that are avoided in these settings). If we return to the

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persons. Rust Cohle may not be built on a real person, but we recognize fictional characters because they embody and express feelings and thoughts that can be real. Karen "gets them" and connects to them because parts of them correspond to actual parts of her. In some aspects, they crystallize those parts and in other aspects they transcend those parts as when suffering is transcended by creative potentials. The same breakdown of fiction happens when e.g. real musicians star in movies and series either as "themselves" or as other characters, which is the case in parts of the rap cul-tures that Oscar and Neil have talked about.

conflict she experienced when seeing black-and-white pictures on Facebook of the nightlife in Copenhagen, the conflict was not just generated by a picture of a graffiti-painted wall and her desire to experience *that* graffiti wall. Part of the conflict emerged from the imaginative premise that the graffiti and the underground setting for Ellen index a community imagined to be present in that kind of environment, but absent in her media activities at home at that point. The picture presented a potential of engaging in a community that she feels a part of, yet is absent in her engagements in that moment. I will return to a detailed discussion of the digital reciprocations in this instance. But before that I want to draw attention to something that caught me by surprise in the empirical material in relation to the social and community aspects of digital media. It was already touched upon in the last chapter. In comparison to the popularity of social media in our everyday lives today, social media were given very little importance for drug engagements in the participants' accounts. Ellen reported that it had a greater significance in the initial phases of her drug engagements (mainly with alcohol). When I asked about this difference, Ellen merely responds:

> Ellen: I think that you grow out of it.

But social media like Facebook may also impose other challenges when it comes to drug engagements and communities due to specific digital reciprocations of social and communal relations. If we think of a person's "friends" as a media community, these people are organized as a community by the commonality of the social medium itself. These communities can embody over several hundreds of people from the perspective of the single person. And furthermore, the community can be quite heterogeneous since the relations and connections are per default juxtaposed and undifferentiated. In our non-digital everyday living, we usually meet other people in limited numbers, in designated spaces and contexts, with differing purposes and so forth. In other words, our offline engagements in social relations and communities continuously oscillate between absences and presences and differentiations. These oscillations and differentiations have practically been cancelled out by the instantaneous and simultaneous (co-)presence on social media. It seems as if these digital reciprocations also create dilemmas for many of the participants when it comes to their drug engagements. Although many of them told me that they did experience *other* people posting and sharing drug-related contents, they would basically not do it themselves. It seems as if many of the participants perceive their drug engagements as more private and personal

and as related to an identity they want to keep isolated. These aspects are articulated by Simon and Frank in the group interview when I asked about one of Frank's friends who posted a drug-related picture of himself on Facebook:

> Frank: I also think it is quite a stupid thing to do. He is 'friends' with his parents and stuff like that, his grandfather… I guess it would not be so exciting for them to see that. I am also thinking about that. I would never do that myself. I am too shy for that, I think.

> Simon: I also think – maybe related to this thing about 'worlds' – I really believe that you have a Facebook identity and you have your own identity. And I do not intend to make drugs and stuff like that a part of my Facebook identity.

Simon continues to talk a bit more about his concerns related to mixing up his digital and offline identities. And both Simon and Ellen express concerns about the history and memory of their person materialized in social media. They ponder on the implications if future encounters would consult their social media-profiles for impressions about their person.

The intensities and specializations of instantaneously imagined communities

Social media and social media channels also materialize possibilities of encountering and generating more specialized and closed communities. Oscar tells about how he and some friends created a Facebook forum where they shared videos and posts related to drugs. But Neil provided the most detailed and radical accounts of the significance of social media for his drug engagements. So, in this final part of the chapter, I will go into depth with his stories and analyze the digital reciprocations of the materialized imagination that I analytically call instantaneously imagined communities.

When I asked Neil about his general digital habits when he was still smoking, he sketched out the social intensity of his digital communities:

> Interviewer: And how was your [media] consumption? Was it stable or did it vary a lot?

> Neil: I have always used the computer a lot. A lot for gaming, but also, when we are talking about social media, then it became something where those two things run together simultaneously. Because, as long as my computer is on, I'm on Facebook, as an example. And I am on iMessage because my com-

puter is on, my e-mail would be open, so everything always pops up if some-body writes anything. Additionally, with games, they all have their own game community. So if it is a Steam game, for example, social media are there. And the same if it is a Blizzard game, you have social media there. In that way you...just when I turn on my computer in the morning then I am already on ten different social media until I go to bed, almost. They can be passive all day long and they can be full throttle all day long.

Neil lists a variety of social technologies, integrated in a single digital device, that are active simultaneously when he just turns on his computer. It is excessive in the sense that Neil is reciprocated as *multiply social* in an instance which exceeds the mere activity of pressing a power button. The possibility of having multiple social channels open simultaneously is a contemporary reciprocating intensity of digital media which is further intensified as each channel provides instantaneous access to its own distinct community.

These processes could be summed up in the general reciprocation of social platforms which relates to the simultaneous presencing of (many) people that are spatially dispersed and absent from one another. Scarry (1985) observes that communication technologies essentially materialize the imagination of making absent persons present and thereby: "Transforming the conditions of absence into presence" (pp. 163-164). Digital media could be perceived as playing a *substitutive* role in imaginative processes by transforming absences into presences – or imagination into knowledge and experience – as in 'now I no longer need to imagine what you are doing or how you are feeling in my absence. Now I can *know* by calling or writing you.' But if we were to merit digital media this substitutive role, it can only be partial. Although communication technologies have extended the spatial-temporal reach of (some) of our senses and thereby of our interactivity with proximal or distant people or worlds, aspects of the separate presences that are being connected through technologies will still be absent[39]. Seeing that someone is online on social media is still very different from and a perceptually impoverished (co-)presence than being in the same spatial-temporal location and setting with that person. Hence, sharing a digital co-presence through online markers or a written online text could co-produce *other* imaginative processes in a different way than engaging in face-to-face interactions. Although this could develop into a more general discussion, it is more important to relate it to the empirical analysis. For where the social technologies, that Neil mentions, substitute

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[39] Thompson (1995, pp. 82-87) has made astute analyses on how different senses are made present and absent in different media technologies.

some imaginative processes (e.g. imagining who of his friends might be at home), other imaginative processes emerge. And in the context of digital media, the processes may emerge with new intensive reciprocations. Neil describes how communities can be instantaneously *imagined* and *selected* in an accelerated way due to the simultaneity of online presences:

> Neil: It is a way of selecting instead of writing a friend an SMS if you feel like doing something, then you can already...just by me logging onto Steam, then I can see 'Ah, these four persons – out of twenty possible candidates – are already doing what I also feel like doing.'

> Interviewer: O*kay*!

> Neil: So in that way it is easier to...instead of me having to write to somebody [and getting a response]: 'No, I can't do that. I'm working', then I already know 'Aha! These four people could feel like meeting up, smoke a joint and watch some TV. At least they are off now, they are at home and they are on their computer.'

Neil explains how the simultaneous online presence of friends is instantaneously transformed into imagined community and imagined drug engagements by eradicating a chain of uncertain activities of one-to-one communication forms like SMS's. The initiative of actually writing an SMS against the uncertainty of the designated person's current activities and availability is also eradicated. The "possible candidates" are already digitally presented when he logs onto the game engine. The maybe more transient or abstract feelings of wanting and desiring something, i.e. hanging out and smoking joints in this example, is instantaneously made into a concrete, directed and accentuated premise through the materialized co-presence in such a virtual community. Neil's imaginative processes are translated into accentuated imaginative premises through the concrete and digitally formed knowledge of possible "candidates" and community formations.

The accentuated premise of imagining getting together with selected candidates and smoke marijuana does not only emerge from the digital reciprocations. The online transformation of random persons into candidates also emerges from Neil's personal history with them: He knows that when they are online, they are most likely playing a game, they are at home, and they are most likely already smoking or at least up for it. The initiative to successively try out contacts and coordinate a community event by means of more traditional communication technologies, including uncertainties in this process,

have been cancelled out by the digital reciprocations of simultaneity. As a result, the community is instantaneously imagined as possible and accentuated as premise for drug engagements through the immediate and simultaneous online presencing. Even if the so-called candidates are no longer present online, they leave digital traces from which possibilities and impossibilities can be imagined:

> Neil: And next to many of them [next to their online names] it says precisely what they are doing. When he is not even online any longer, it says how long ago he touched a mouse key or something or precisely what game he is playing, like on Facebook.

The communities are not only present so that *Neil* can act upon them. The *community* can also act upon Neil more directly and thereby modulate his actual and imagined directionalities of activities. I asked him if he had experienced conflicts prompted by online communities, and he tells how his imagined activity directed towards just playing a game has been substituted by the imaginative premise of joining his friends and smoke instead:

> Interviewer: I am wondering to what extent it has generated conflict. I could imagine that you would log on just to play a game but not really smoke, and then others would prompt you. Is that something you have experienced?
>
> Neil: That could easily happen. If I just logged on some nights... ehm... I left my girlfriend at the time I stopped smoking weed. Also because there was some conflict there. But there have been evenings where I, let's say it is 8 o'clock and I am off the day after, and thinking, now I am just going to sit here for one hour before I go to bed, and then the guys write 'Hey, we are three guys here. Are you not coming over?' And we live close to each other. 'It would be really cozy. Then you can just drop by.' And then you shortly get tempted, so even though I have thought that I shouldn't, then I dropped by anyways. So definitely.
>
> Interviewer: So although you had made a choice, then something happened.
>
> Neil: Definitely.

The recreation of Neil's imaginative processes emerges from the materialized juxtaposition – or integration – of solitary and social digital activities. If Neil in the example just imagined playing a game for an hour, that activity is merged with the social channels either materialized in the game engine or in other active social channels that are automatically logged onto when he turns

on his computer. Intensity and complexity is added since a single community is not isolated to a single social channel. Communities converge on other channels and even on other digital devices. Digital media do not only reciprocate a co-presence of persons in separate locations. They also reciprocate the person as *co-presently distributed between different digital sites/localities simultaneously*. As I continue to ask Neil about other technologies that have prompted conflicts, Neil tells how for instance the mobile app, Snapchat, has been significant for instantaneously imagined communities and as imaginative premise for drug engagements:

> Interviewer: Do you recognize that from other places in your media activities where an irritation emerges because you see something...?
>
> Neil: Yes, what can you say, I also think that Snapchat has done it a lot. Because...you say that a picture is more than a thousand words...so instead of receiving an SMS 'Hey. Do you feel like meeting up?', or something, then if you send a picture of all the guys who are having a great time, drinking beer or smoking joints, or something like that, then you can also be more tempted like 'Ah, I'd like to do that' in contrast to if you just receive an SMS, then you think 'Well, it is more reasonable because you have to go to work. I think I'll just stay at home.'

Apart from the intensities of the possible prompts from the same community on different digital devices, Neil points to the modulatory intensity of the *sensory modality* by which the prompts are presenced. Neil expresses that the *visual* co-presence can act more strongly on his imaginative processes than the written text. In elaborating the difference, Neil almost describes the subjective reciprocation of an SMS as "empty":

> Interviewer: Try to explain what the picture does. Try to explain it in words, atmospheres or feelings.
>
> Neil: Yeah, well... Compared to if you just receive an empty S... or an SMS that says: 'I am with the guys at my place. You are welcome to drop by.' Then you think, well okay... Where if you see a picture where...well, one of my friends has a ping pong table...then you think 'Aw great, there are six guys about to make a ping pong tournament. Shit, it would be fun to join in.' And you can see the others are smoking joints in the picture, 'Okay, that could really be nice! I'd like that.'

The "fullness" of the visual modality of the picture does not recreate Neil as fully present in the else absent setting. The picture is implicated in modulating

Neil's imagination because it emplaces him in an atmosphere that resonates with his imagined meta-projection of "good times":

> Interviewer: What is making the difference? You were talking about boring and good times. I understand that as atmospheres.
>
> Neil: Yes, that would be the atmosphere, right. If there are five guys who are totally stoned and tired and about to fall asleep and just randomly zapping across the TV channels, or you can see that they are playing some kind of game and are energetic or they are about to start a movie and are preparing food and are completely ready for it, or preparing snacks or something. So in that way it has a lot to do with, yes, atmosphere.

The visual modality instantaneously presents and interconnects various social and material elements that are emplaced in the totality of what Neil regards as "good times"-atmosphere: His friends, the energy, the ping pong table or the snacks, the joints and so forth. It is an atmosphere that is present in the picture, but also an atmosphere that is potential and about to be actualized. The atmosphere is both present and anticipated (and thus imagined) from the picture since Neil in both examples also refers to the preparatory elements in the pictures as enticing – the picture carries a promise, of a specific not-yet-happened and imagined about-to-happen.

A more silent condition that makes it possible for the digital media to reciprocate in the ways in which I can analyze from Neil's accounts is the spatial proximities of Neil's and his friends' homes. When he says "we live close to each other", then engaging in the instantaneously imagined communities becomes a possibility without much trouble. Many of the reciprocating aspects analyzed from Neil's examples also explain the reciprocations that generated conflict in Ellen, when she saw the Facebook pictures: The pictures illustrated places that were in reach; she was visually emplaced in a co-presence with them and the community atmospheres generated from the graffiti-wall among other (simultaneous) elements; the atmosphere was present and anticipatory since the pictures were stills in the midst of what was before and what would come after the still shots of the underground happenings.

Summing up the insights of the chapter

In this chapter I have analyzed how digital media reciprocate the narrowing in of the participants' imaginative processes and drug engagements. I have analyzed how this narrowing in can be understood as an intensification of the significance and predominance of drug engagements in the participants' living. I have also shown the gradual emergence of restrictive imaginative premises through the conflicts, the blocking out of other potentials, and the one-sided formations of imaginative processes and drug engagements in relation to the digital everyday living of the participants. I have done this by focusing on three inter-penetrating and mutually intensifying analytical layers: The aesthetic-material synergic "hand-in-hand-ness" (of drugs and certain types of media activities) which is embedded "arranging arrangements", i.e. in wider socio-material arrangements that are able to arrange the participants' imaginative processes and drug engagements in routinized and one-sided ways, which again are saturated by "instantaneously imagined communities" both within and beyond the concrete arrangements and hand-in-hand-ness. One line in the analysis has been to show how drugs and media are arranged in the everyday living of the young people and how they arrange relevancies, directionalities and accentuations of the participants' imaginative processes and premises both within the arrangements and when the arrangements are absent, but become relevant and imaginatively present. But a connected line has been an *affective* line: How attachments and atmospheres are generated by aesthetic-material synergies between certain types of drugs and digital media activities; how securities and blocking of anxieties are generated by routinizing and one-siding arranging arrangements; and generated belonging to and longing for instantaneously imagined communities. The analytical lines and layers have been chunked up and presented temporally throughout the chapter, but, needless to say, they are simultaneous and co-occurring in the accounts of the participants.

In focusing on the digital *reciprocations* in the analysis the point has not been to argue for a one-sided relation between drug engagements and digital media. The interest has not been to understand how digital media have an *effect* on imaginative processes and drug engagements. What can be learnt from the reciprocation perspective is how the participants' projections – under-

stood as the participants' imagination and activities – are continuously recreated and transformed by co-constitutive activities of digital media and the arrangements they are embedded in. Apart from the imaginative significance that drug engagements hold in the individual participant's living, the digital reciprocations can further underline why emerging problems and conflicts are simply not resolved by removing the drug or changing the participant's ways of imagining. The processes are stabilized and materialized – and they open up subjectivities to be socially prompted, as the last analysis of Neil has shown. This suggests that in order to reconfigure these digitally reciprocated processes, a whole series of counteractivities and rearrangements are necessary throughout all three analytical layers.

The digital implications for imaginative processes and premises have mainly been analyzed on a microgenetic level in this chapter. I have, however, also tried to show how the microgenetic imaginative processes are imbued with personal relevance and logic by relating them to biographically imagined meta-projections and, in turn, how imagined meta-projections emerge and are developed from microgenetic imaginative processes. While this could suggest a more general logic or model, the variations in the accounts only become intelligible by attending to biographical idiosyncrasies. In spite of variations, the empirical material has also suggested relations between the material effects of drugs and the materiality of digital media that may be less arbitrary. The relation between the material effects of marijuana and more traditional media activities, including larger screened technologies and media like movies, TV shows, computer games and music, seems to be predominant across the empirical accounts. While the digital reciprocations have been under special scrutiny in this chapter, it is evident that the *reciprocations of the drug* also play a defining role in in various ways, although I have mainly address this aspect as "the material effects of the drug".

Chapter 8: Digital Implications for Expanding beyond and Resolving Drug-Related Problems

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the participants' imaginative processes and digital media are involved in dealing with emerging drug-related problems. At the time of the interviews, the participants were in different phases of dealing with their drug-related problems. Oscar and Neil had been clean for two months, Frank and Simon were in the process of cutting down, Ellen had kicked her poly-drug engagements but was still consuming alcohol, partly as compensation, and Karen was in the process of making modifications in her engagements in marijuana. But since all six participants had commenced treatment, a sensation of problems that needed to be dealt with had emerged among all participants. I will proceed by analyzing the emergent sensation of problems by first attending to problematic aspects that are being *suspended* throughout the intensification of drug engagements and next to how circumstances are being realized as problematic. Both these aspects should be seen as a gradually developing flip-side of the previous analyses on processes of narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements. After this I will as far as possible analyze how the participants' imaginative processes and digital media are involved in expanding beyond experienced problems and thus in dealing with them. This implies following the participants' development of "epistemic distances" to their intensification of drug engagements and implicated imaginative processes. The idea in proceeding like this is to try to understand how imaginative premises for drug engagements develop into *restrictive* premises and how the restrictiveness is transcended in expansive ways by new imaginative processes.

Suspending imagination: The flipside of narrowing in of imaginative processes and drug engagements

When I decide to use the term "suspension" of imagination it is because I see a fruitful dialogue between restrictiveness in critical psychology and selected literature on addiction. Gomart & Hennion (1999) talk about suspension of

the self as a condition for developing passions and addictions: "Passion is the abandonment of forces to objects and the suspension of the self" (p. 227). What they focus on is the generosity of self-suspension that engenders passions and passages into worlds of strong sensations of either drugs or music. Entering engagements in drugs is a deliberate suspension of the self. It is impossible, or at least not detectable, through this analytical focus to render any circumstances of suspensions as *restrictive*: No conflicts are articulated, neither are discrepancies between actual and imagined engagements in relation to the participants' long-term interests. What can help the analysis in that direction is the dialectical notion of suspension taken up by Schüll in her book *Addiction by Design* where she explores the emergence of addictive patterns among slot machine gamblers. Self-suspensions generate passion and addiction *within* engagements, but it also implies a suspension of and disengagement from wider societal demands and conflicts *beyond* the concrete engagements:

> The activity [of intensive machine gambling] achieves this suspension not by transcending or canceling out these [key] elements [of contemporary life] and expected modes of conduct, but by isolating and intensifying them … to the point where they turn into something else. (Schüll, 2012, p. 201)

Self-suspension for Schüll can be utilized as an analytical strategy for exploring "a kind of immanent critique of broader discontents" (ibid.) in the participants' lives. Schüll is successful in interrogating the wider critique and discontents through intensive gambling because she maintains a continuity, instead of disruption, in the suspending relation between intensive engagements and wider society. Suspension means that the complexities of social dilemmas are made redundant in the material design of the machine. Hence, the contingencies and complexities of taking risks and making choices, for example, are contracted by the (minimalist) game design and consequences become measurable in pennies (ibid., p. 202). It is evident that suspensions are not the same as the establishment of epistemic distance, although it could be argued that distance implies temporary suspension. The suspending activities do not intervene in the core matter of discontents and dilemmas in the same sense as gambling does not intervene in the actual contingencies and complexities of choices in our social living. In this view, suspension has affinities with the formation of restrictive premises for engagements. The following analysis is inspired by the dialectics of suspension, but it will not venture the exact same route as Schüll does: By analyzing the suspensions of key societal elements altered in the designs of drugs and digital media. The purpose is to analyze

the emerging restrictive premises of imagination in drug engagements. In relation to imaginative processes, suspensions can be said to establish absences, but established with different qualities than the absences I have analyzed so far. These absences can be understood as *incarcerated*, as resisting clear transgressions, and as holding a hostility or rigidity towards being imagined, transformed and concretized more carefully. But they can still not be discarded or ignored by the participants since they co-constitute conflictuality in their living. As the empirical material will show, the different forms of suspensions of imagination involve elimination of contradictions, suspensions of imagining potentials, and suspensions of imagining hopes or the suspension of concretizing imagined hopes.

Throughout the empirical analysis, I have scratched the surface of some of these suspensions. Karen described her corner as a place where she feels secure and stuck at the same time. Her drug engagements suspend her confrontation with what she experiences as "ugly, ugly, ugly sides" of herself, and they suspend her imagination from developing ideas of overcoming the imagined boundaries of participating in the common institutional and social settings of education. Frank engages in his passion for movies and television which contributes to him feeling isolated. This suspends his imagination of socializing which in turn gets frozen by the anxieties provoked by imagining social situations. Both Oscar and Neil expressed the concern about smoking too much which was suspended and subdued by the ongoing social arrangements of drug engagements. In the following I will try to paint a more substantive picture of the suspension of imagination that I learned about through the material. In some cases, this is difficult to do. It is self-evident that it can be difficult for the participants to know and articulate what is being suspended while suspensions are going on. Articulations demand confrontation which is precisely being avoided in suspensions. Not surprisingly, it was easier for e.g. Oscar and Neil to talk about this, since they had come very far in their processes of distancing and disengaging from their previous drug engagements.

Suspension through substituting established directedness of drug engagements for teleonomic life transitions

If we go a bit deeper into Oscar's story, his drug engagements changed format during his last year of high school. His community of friends had left

high school and his engagements in drugs transformed from social to solitary arrangements although the frequency initially dropped. But when he graduated and found a job, Oscar reports that the solitary drug engagements intensified again. I am going to include a longer quote from Oscar since he nicely summarizes the density of issues being suspended in this period:

> Oscar: I think that when I finished high school and my everyday life all of a sudden did not consist of seeing other people – when you leave high school then there are a lot of people that you don't meet up with any longer – it just became...I think that I have always liked smoking joints and then it becomes a good way of making time pass. And at that time there were many things that I was upset about which I was never good at expressing to my friends or family, so it was a way of subduing those things. And if I was angry with my parents then I could just go down [in my basement] and smoke a joint. Many of those things I could just project onto the joints. It is a fantastic way of forgetting. I think I was very insecure when I left high school. 'What the hell am I going to do now? What should I do?' So it's a very good thing to forget all the problems and all the expectations. You close yourself off a bit and then everything is just good. When you smoke joints, doing nothing all of a sudden becomes cool. I am very good at not doing so much, just do nothing all the time. It is a good way of forgetting all the expectations. Not what others had of me, but maybe more what I expected of myself.

Oscar's account shows the multiplicity of suspensions that his drug engagements are implicated in. There is not direct mentioning of imagination. The analysis can make the incarcerated absences appear. First of all, Oscar is confronted with absences related to transitions of his everyday educational living: The disappearance of his friends and later the disappearance of the everyday school structure. The absences, as such, remain, but are suspended. Oscar accomplishes this by transforming his drug engagements into solitary engagements by which the 'resistances' and confrontations of time are smoothed out. But simultaneously, the teleonomic spaces of how to engage in new social relations and imagine hopes and desirable futures under his current conditions are being suspended and incarcerated. The imaginative processes involved in the question "What should I do?" find no solid ground or clear directionality. The strong teleology of drug engagements, then, can suspend the vague and uncertain teleonomy. Oscar articulates the dilemma involved in this kind of teleonomic space of the imagination:

> Oscar: When you leave high school, then all of a sudden you have to figure out of a lot of stuff, where I maybe really just wanted that someone made a lot of decisions for me, and 'Can't you just do this?!', 'okay, then I'll do that',

-ish. All these thoughts...you know that you want something in your life while not knowing what it is you want. Then it gets easy to hide it. And when I already knew about smoking, then it got reinforced, I'd say.

Likewise, the teleonomic space of imagining what to do with his constricted feelings and how to act upon them in an expressive way is also suspended. Imagined potentialities are blocked from developing further. Oscar addresses the suspended issue of *expectations* twice in this passage. I did not ask further into the concrete expectations, unfortunately. But it suffices to note that the expectations are related to subjective pressure imposed by his self-imagination: What he imagines that he ought to do, and how he perceives a discrepancy between his actual and imagined doing[40]. These suspensions directed outwardly from drug engagements are only made possible by the suspension directed inwardly towards drug engagements. It is by means of the generosity of the self-suspensions through the material effects of the drug that the passing of time, forgetting and doing nothing in a cool way becomes possible. There seems to be a certain kind of paradoxicality – for instance, doing nothing in a cool way – that suspends and substitutes the actual conflictuality of the absence of finding *something* relevant to do for Oscar. The material effects of the drug do not transform nothingness into somethingness. They modulate it into a *cool* sensation, and they modulate and stretch the subjective *temporality* in which this sensation can endure.

The incarceration and suspension of absences related to the various issue in Oscar's living at this point can by analyzed as eliminations of contradictions: The absence that is implicated in Oscar's felt conflictuality is being isolated from his engagements through being suspended. This is where the restrictive premise of imagination and drug engagements emerges analytically. Oscar projects the solutions to various conflicts onto the joint – as in "then I could just go down [in my basement] and smoke a joint" – but the joint only suspends the conflict and imagined potentials are being blocked.

The emerging problems, that Oscar talks about, can be used to reflect upon the degree to which they are *drug-related* or not. Well, the issues relating to life transitions, conflicts about how to handle emotional conflicts and self-expectations have a more general form and are not as such provoked by Os-

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[40] The unfortunate thing about this issue remaining abstract is, that knowing the contents of his expectations could help to see if these expectations are not only "self-imagination", but expectations that are shared and emanating from wider societal conditions and demands.

car's previous drug engagements, it seems. However, his drug engagements attain a specific significance in dealing with these issues as they develop – and mainly by suspending them. The problems that the drug engagements then provoke in this case are related to how the conflictuality is sustained by suspensions and the blocking out of imaginative processes.

Suspensions of the uncertainties of time through temporal excess of drugs and media

There are other empirical accounts where *time* becomes a special problem in relation to similar incarcerated teleonomic spaces and becomes something that is sought to be suspended through drug engagements. Like in Oscar's life, this may happen when teleonomic spaces come to define great parts of the everyday living without anchor points in concrete projects. These circumstances seem to modulate the affectivity of such spaces, modulating them from sensations of curious explorations to boredom, loneliness and frustrations. Frank takes up this topic when I asked him why he would become irritated when he would be exposed to media content that would highlight negative consequences of smoking marijuana. These were experiences that he deliberately tried to exclude from his general digital everyday living:

> Interviewer: And try to feel this irritation. Where does it come from, or what does it create?
>
> Frank: It comes from me knowing that it is wrong to smoke marijuana. But I still keep on and on and on doing it. And that is annoying. I do want to quit smoking, but really can't do it. There is too much time in my day. If I only had eight hours per day, I would manage. But we don't have that.

The face-off between imaginative processes and the existential conditions of these teleonomic spaces is not even. Facing the conditions and spaces initially produce boredom and loneliness. And a more full-on confrontation would probably cause other anxieties which cannot be overcome by 'just imagining something'. It is as if the absences resist transgression. Drug engagements *and* engagements in media activities are effective ways of suspending these tensions. The role of media activities remained implicit in Oscar's account, but Frank is clear about it when I ask him about the role of media in these conflicts:

Frank: If I would not have my TV, for example, then I think it would be easier for me to quit. Because I would be forced to get out more. Then I could go for a ride on my bike, or then I could go swimming, or what it could be. I don't do that if I have the totally new and crisp series in triple HD, then I think 'this is nice'.

Interviewer: That is a bit better. [laughs]

Frank: Yes. So in that way it could make me step more on the brakes, I think. Unfortunately.

Summarized from the empirical analysis, the suspensions involved here relate to circumstances where large parts of everyday living carry a signature of *indeterminacy* due to the defining position of teleonomic spaces. The strong teleology of and felt attachment to drug and media engagements can suspend such indeterminacy by translating it into determinacy. Maybe this could be attained through other engagements. But the specific (self-)suspensions attained through the material effects of the drug *vis-à-vis* media activities – i.e. the modulations of subjective temporality and generation of strong attachments – can be seen as particularly apt at suspending teleonomic spaces and thus making imaginative processes, directed towards them, emerge as strongly teleological. Karen also stresses the problem of suspended time and affect as a suspension of becoming:

Karen: Because, you know, you flee from reality. Marijuana is like... it is a thing you use when you are bored, when you don't know what to do. And the time you should spend there, you should spend that on doing the dishes, on learning something new, read a book – not that I don't do that – but you know, make your life be a life. But you spend that time instead on smoking. And that's like the difference. It's not the drugs, it's time. Does it make sense? What you choose to spend your time on.

When analyzing the empirical material through suspensions, it is also noteworthy that what I have called *incarcerated* absences are not totally locked off from imaginative processes. Frank imagines the possibilities of bike rides and going swimming. Karen imagines possibilities of learning something and doing practical activities. So, I wonder, why do these possibilities not form imaginative premises for engagements?

The participants may answer that one activity is harder and the other one easier. It may be experienced like that, but maybe there is more to it as well. Imagining stand-alone activities is not that difficult to do. But stand-

alone activities may not solve the general conditions of indeterminacy by themselves. In order to gain relevance and 'strength', they need to be anchored in wider and relevant projects. As we have seen before, the simple activity of engaging in drugs gains relevance from how it is substantiated by the thickly layered imagined meta-projections. If the activities of going for a bike ride or learning something new are disconnected from, and then not substantiated by, a meta-projective frame, they do not become subjectively manifest as activities that approximate a significant imagined telos. They end up in the web of indeterminacy. The resistance of incarcerated absences can be understood as even more severe. We could consider that the transgression of such absences would imply imagining the absence of *drug engagements*, as in 'if I should not engage in drugs now, what should/would I do instead?' If this was the case, for the participants it could actually mean to approximate the *oppositional field* of their imagined meta-projections, which is initially also what is being distanced in the meta-projective formations. At least, imagining a life without drugs was not necessarily presented as compelling. Karen said that she imagined a "grey, concrete slab" stretching into infinity. I asked Ellen in a similar way what would happen if she didn't go out after she suggested that she might be more addicted to going out than to the drugs involved:

> Interviewer: And how would you perceive your own life if you didn't go out?

> Ellen: Boring. I think it would be very boring. But also because I don't have anything else that is like 'wow!', I think.

There were reports of a number of other issues that are being suspended. Karen reports having struggled with depression and a general restlessness in her body. The material presence of the joint in her hand while she engages in different media activities appears to suspend that bodily felt restlessness. When she initially discovered the effects of marijuana, she recollects that smoking joints at night gradually acquired the function of "a reversed alarm clock", helping her to fall asleep. Smoking joints at night thus became *the* imagined and actualized solution to the suspension of insomnia. The suspension of troubles related to sleeping through smoking marijuana was also articulated by Ellen, although that suspension has been taken over by alternate forms:

> Ellen: For instance, I smoked joints in order to sleep. Now I have gotten pills and then it [smoking joints] has just like been pushed out, right. I have merely gotten alternatives, or something.

The different kinds of issues being suspended by drug engagements are very likely the surface appearances of more complex conflicts in the participants' living. The surface appearances are rectified by suspending processes. It is in this sense that I would argue that suspensions can be understood as emerging *restrictive premises* as they sustain an elimination of contradictions: The polarities – boredom, anxiety, sleep problems, making time pass and so forth – that index conflictual conditions are eliminated by the suspensions of drug (and media) engagements. Based on this analysis, we may also return to the understanding of suspensions as such. The dialectic understanding of suspensions, which I have tried to incorporate via Schüll, has bended self-suspension outwards from the concrete engagements where strong attachments and sensations are generated, to draw on the central concepts of Gomart & Hennion. The empirical analysis, however, shows how self-suspensions is not only a matter of *entering a world of strong sensations* through the suspension of one's own agency and the subjection to the agency of objects. The suspensions directed outwards towards the general everyday living and societal conditions are also accomplished by a simultaneous *flattening* of (some) affects and of strong sensations (cf. Duchinsky & Nissen, 2016). The various empirical examples of suspensions can be seen as intensive affects that are being flattened by drug engagements: Oscar's insecurities, Frank's irritations, Karen's and Ellen's troubles with sleeping, the pervasive sensation of boredom etc. Maybe the hand-in-hand-ness of marijuana and media is specifically apt at producing this flattening, as when Karen earlier on in the analysis was quoted for saying that both can function as a "disabler".

Initial epistemic movements: Realization of restrictive and problematic aspects of drug engagements

There is a challenge in trying to analytically desiccate restrictive and expansive processes of the imagination and drug engagements. As I have touched upon, the reason for this is that premises most likely appear as restrictive from the standpoint from where they have already been transcended by expansive premises[41]. It is my interpretation of these critical psychological concepts that they are analytical, but in actual living the aspects co-occur. One way of co-occurrence could be that premises will be restrictive towards some aspects of

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[41] Again, I thank Morten Nissen for this formulation.

life projects and conditions while simultaneously expand beyond other re-
strictive premises. Another way could be that premises that at one point were
expansive will appear restrictive once they have been transcended at a later
point. In this perspective, many of the accounts of the participants that de-
scribe the restrictive premises of narrowing in and suspensions are retrospec-
tive accounts from new premises that are expansions of former restrictive
premises. As a consequence, the processes that I endeavor to analyze sepa-
rately as expansive vs. restrictive, are folded together in the empirical ac-
counts. So, when for instance Oscar in the last section talks about the various
relations being suspended in his living – "many of those things I could just
project onto the joints" he said – an epistemic distance to his drug engage-
ments is already being established. And by means of this distance he is able to
articulate and grasp the interrelation between drug engagements and suspen-
sions of conflicts. The transcendence of restrictive premises by expansive as-
pects of premises is key in the psychological processes of "Begreifen" or
"comprehensive thinking": The processes of realizing problems are entangled
with the initial steps of transcending them, one might say. I will illustrate this
by re-analyzing one of Simon's accounts from the last chapter. Here, I ana-
lyzed how Simon's drug engagements could be analyzed as expansive in the
sense that it helped him transcend the digitally produced feelings of loneliness
in his life. The quote from earlier said:

> Simon: And I used weed as a cure against this loneliness because then you
> got outside and if I was sitting with my journal somebody would ask into it.
> And then you got into talking with people and all of a sudden you were feel-
> ing social anyways. So that was the solution.

This premise changes signature, and the restrictiveness appears, when put in
relation to Simon's reflections earlier in the interview:

> Simon: Earlier I looked upon smoking as a form of escapism, that you tried
> to flee from the daily living, and stuff like that. And I saw it as a way of...if
> you were feeling kind of lonely at home or didn't feel like anything was hap-
> pening, then you go outside and experience something and get into conversa-
> tion with people on Staden [Christiania].

The initial expansiveness of drug engagements now surfaces with restrictive-
ness of "escapism". It is my contention that Simon is only realizing this be-
cause he is in the processes of transcending his *self-imagination* as being lonely.
I will return to this. But first I will address some of the ways in which circum-

stances are being realized as problematic among some of the other participants.

Many of the empirical accounts suggest the realizations of problems seem to *erupt* as opposed to gradually emerge. When this happens, the eruptions can be understood as resulting from a psychological threshold that is being superseded by the gradually accumulated suspensions and restrictive relations developed in the participants' living. Neil recounts a number of relations that "forced" him to create a distance to his drug engagements and their imaginative premises:

> Neil: And the disappointment [of smoking marijuana] is not big enough to remove the desire, until – it was at least like that for me – you are forced to doing it. I realized that everything was drifting. I had been unemployed for half a year, I didn't even know if I was accepted at an education and my girlfriend left me because she didn't want to be a part of it. And then I like realized that this is not viable. I had to get that far out before the disappointment was big enough in order to realize those obvious cons – on the other side of pros – that you need to do this.

It is evident that the "forcing" relations did not develop overnight. Neil talks about how the disappointments of smoking marijuana are not experienced as big enough throughout the gradual processes of narrowing in and intensification of his drug engagements. The notion of disappointment is the vehicle here for establishing a relation to imaginative processes. Disappointments index discrepancies between the imagined and the actualized. But first we can ponder: How come the disappointments throughout the intensification processes are not big enough to remove the desire for smoking joints? One possibility is to go directly to addiction and addictive properties of drugs: Bodily cravings simply override experience, knowledge and rationality. But we can also be patient and try to destabilize that explanation a bit. Without ignoring the materiality of drugs, we can suggest that other effects of marijuana contribute to minimizing disappointments of each individual engagement. When I in the group interview asked the participants (Frank and Simon) what they would like to know more about in relation to the topics we had discussed, Frank uttered:

> Frank: Nothing besides what it is about marijuana that makes you continue even though so many people want to quit. And they know it is unhealthy and so on and so on. And it is not an addiction where you lie down and shake… 'Man, I'm dying!'…like it would be with other drugs. But still you have had

> the habit for 6+ years. I don't get that. I don't. I mean, I'm lacking conse-quence. For instance, if you get hammered, then you become sick the next two days. I can smoke ten joints today and then get up, pretty energized.

Maybe Frank already gives a partial answer to his own question. The way that marijuana interacts with him does not involve a strong negative effect as an alcohol-induced hangover would do. And so, there would not be any physical resistance in continuing the engagements over time. Another related issue could concern the suspending effects that these drug engagements also seem to develop into having. The suspensions – also analyzed as flattening of cer-tain affects – act on negative affects by neutralizing them. This may lead to keeping disappointments at minimal discomforting levels throughout pro-cesses of intensifications of drug engagements until the point where accumu-lated suspensions burst. Nevertheless, there is also a relation to imagination which is most explicit in Neil's citation. The discrepancy between the actual and imagined – expressed in disappointments – is not dire enough to lead to more deliberate modulation of imaginative processes, and thus the actual re-mains subsumed under the imagined. I would argue that this accomplishment is connected to the gradual developments of narrowing in and one-siding of imaginative processes, which I analyzed in relation to digital media the previ-ous chapter, and to suspensions analyzed in this chapter. Through these inter-related processes, it is possible for the imagination to overrule actual engage-ments and subduing the consequences.

Let's also look at some of the other processes of realizing drug-related problems. Oscar reports similarly about the contradictions between somehow knowing that he was going down a wrong path, but still continued his drug engagements. He had to come to a breakdown before the deeper-felt discon-tent could surface:

> Oscar: I just realized at one point that I needed help. I was feeling so incredi-bly bad. It was not even like I myself asked for help. I had a breakdown – and I am living down in that basement – and all of sudden I couldn't stop crying. And then my dad came down and found me, because I had taken one of his iPads. And then [laughs]...I was not supposed to borrow these...he was very much against bringing the iPads down into my room. Then he came down to tell me off, and then he could tell that something was completely wrong. And then I could finally tell that I am not feeling well at all. You have to help me. So it is not because I myself...I mean, I think that I have known for a long time that I wanted to quit it, but I wanted someone to come and give me that slap in the face in order to wake up.

If we read this in continuation of the suspended relations and imaginative processes that were described by Oscar previously, it is equally evident that his "collapse" is a result of the gradual accumulation of suspensions. A quite different story of the eruptive realization of problems in which accumulated suspensions do not seem to have the same impact, comes from Ellen. Ellen more describes adverse and eruptive bodily and psychological reactions that alarmed her. Here is the entire passage where she describes the critical incidences:

> Ellen: It was a weekend where I was on amphetamine, emma [MDMA], caffeine pills, joints and alcohol, two days in a row. It was a lot of fun, good evenings and stuff like that. But on that Sunday, it was...it felt like I was still as intoxicated as I was during the night. There was just nothing of the good feeling left, so it was just breaking cold sweat the entire day, and anxiety. I was lying down and shaking and could not move [inaudible]. My mood was shifting between wanting to jump out of the window and wanting to trash up the whole place. It was totally...I did not have control of myself. And I probably had jumped out of the window if I could move, right. I could not remember if the walls in my room always had been white. Then I think that I realized that I had to cut back, right, on the drugs, at least. Then it became beers, around 60 beers a week. And then I started feeling it on my body. I ignored that. And then it began to show on my face, as if I had a sunburn and my skin started peeling off when I was going out. And I got a big spot on my neck, so it looked like I had been strangled [inaudible]. I think it was my skin telling me that I had to cut back on beers, too. I also have to do that [inaudible]. I thought that I was just fucked in my head. But it has like gotten a lot better after I stopped taking the drugs. I – think – I – need – to keep – it – down [in staccato].

The reason why Ellen's story is different is maybe because of the precipitating bender involved continuous *poly-drug* engagements in contrast to the single-drug engagements that have predominated the accounts of the other participants.

Returning to Simon, his realizations also differ a bit, but they still have elements of gradual suspensions. The movement into realization ensue from different but eventually connecting trajectories of events. These iterations towards realization seem to converge in the fear of losing control. The feeling of losing control is the central affect in the meta-projective "junkie", which for Simon is embodied in the conflictual field of "romantic self-destruction". It should be said that Simon's intensification of drug engagements follows a certain pattern that is not progressive in a linear fashion. He has described

how it intensifies when routines in his everyday living kick in and it can easily disappear for months when new things are happening in his life. What I can understand from the interview with Simon is that the initiating processes of his realization originate in different experiences. One would be that he in relation to a period of drug engagements started to feel a general apathy. As a reaction to that he went into isolation in an allotment hut where he went on a movie and drug "marathon", as he calls it. I will return to this episode. For now, it suffices to include that he during this weekend also experienced losing control over his body and not only over his general apathetic mood. Another sequence of actions relates to Simon experiencing problems with his finances. And this trajectory ended up translating the problem into being grounded in his drug engagements, which brought him to accept treatment in U-turn:

> Simon: I remember – I didn't start in U-turn directly. At least not in the latest round. I was in something called Headspace, where you also have to be between 12-25y, and if you've got something to talk about, then come and talk. I was there because I thought that I was spending money on strange things. I didn't have a budget, so it was a big problem. And I wanted to be better at making a budget, and then I came to accept that I could see where the money went. Then I started to talk about my abuse of marijuana, and I mentioned these different forms of...feelings of losing control. I do not remember if any movies motivated that...

Simon was initially concerned with losing control over his body *and* his economy. Both trajectories ended up converging in his drug engagements, although his financial problems were not clearly imagined to be interrelated with his drug engagements in the beginning. The apathetic mood can be seen as a general flattening of affect. If this is directly related to Simon's drug engagements or also to other aspects of his living, I cannot say for sure. But what can be said is that the different signs of losing control can act as *markers* that insinuate that Simon is slowly approximating more aspects of the conflictual field of his imagined meta-projection. He also disclosed that he was "feeling quite junkie-ish at that time." The markers voice discrepancies: The pursued "romantic self-destruction" is beginning to become substituted by "junkie".

In these various accounts, there does not seem to be any significant digital implications in the initial epistemic movements towards realizing problems. The role of digital media was more articulated in closing or silencing a potential epistemic gap which I analyzed in the processes of narrowing in and of silencing critical stances and guilt (cf. Oscar and Neil). We could say that the looming conflict between Oscar and his father over the iPad, which re-

sulted in his breakdown, is related to a technology. But this is not in an epistemic sense. Only Simon talks about how his movie marathon in the allotment house was related to an epistemic movement. In the group interview he explains:

> Simon: During a weekend, I watched in one stretch Requiem for a Dream, Trainspotting, and Candy, which all three are about people who are heroin addicts. The whole sensation, like that dysphoria that a junkie experiences one way or the other, I could relate to that in an ambivalent way. Because I said 'Thank God that's not my…' – but also scary because I could sense all those feelings they are going through somehow. It's all kind of scary, especially Candy since the girl in Candy, Candy that is, she looks exactly like my ex-girlfriend and there is a scene where her hair drops down in a specific way. And when you have smoked around four joints at that point then there are scare-moments where you all of a sudden can see your own life concretely mirrored.
>
> Interviewer: You said ambivalent [Simon: mmm]. So you were not directly 'damn, I'm not going there!' You were in between something…
>
> Simon: I think so. Well, it has been a part of the initial steps of starting in U-turn, ehm…without a doubt. But I'm not sure what feelings did it. Because, it must have been some kind of masochism, but at the same time a consolation that at least I'm not doing heroin.

Simon is hesitant in placing a clear motivation ahead of this weekend, although he explains that somehow deliberately acting on his apathetic state of mind was key to it. The affective ambivalence generated from this weekend arrangement is productive and mobilizing in the sense that it led Simon to identify and *concretely mirror* the alarming markers in his own life. Simultaneously the difference between himself and the portrayal of junkie also generated strength and probably hope. The productivity and epistemic movement, then, emerges from the one polarity ("junkie") not being overwritten by the other (Simon himself). Proximity and distance are created in the same moment. Simon suggests that the power of this weekend in making him *feel something* again, also in a reflexive way, was moreover related to being under the influence of drugs. The material transactions between the drug and the movie in Simon's experience, then, seem to act as an expansion of his imagination in its ability to concretely mirror feelings and circumstances displayed in the movie in his own life.

Digital transgressions of restrictive premises by expansive premises of imagination

The initiated transformation in the participants' living come from many other sites than just digital media. For one, all the participants are attending the extensive treatment programs in U-turn at the time of the interviews. Family has also been reported to be involved in the processes. In the following I will focus on the expansion and reworking of imaginative processes among the participants and the excavate digital implications where it is relevant. Hereby I am not suggesting that the expansions of imaginative processes are accomplished by the individual participant in isolation, nor solely by the reciprocations of digital media. In fact, from the empirical material it does not seem possible to order digital reciprocations in an unambiguous way across the interviews.

Part of establishing epistemic distances and expansive premises involves a retrospective reworking of previous imaginative premises whereby the restrictive aspects of those stand out. I will present these expansive processes in relation to the participants' reworking of their imagined meta-projections, or at least to how the *approximating* and *distancing potentials* of drug engagements in imagined meta-projections are being transformed and perceived differently. I will go into the transformative processes of all the individual participants besides Ellen. She had recently started the treatment, and we did not get to talk much about her transformative processes, also because her realizations of problems seemed to be intimately connected to her physical reactions. We can start by returning to Neil's disappointments more thoroughly.

Neil: Imaginative displacement of "pros" and "cons"

When Neil talks about "disappointments", he is essentially talking about the displacement of what is being approximated and distanced in his actual drug engagements vis-à-vis what he imagines. Neil's way of making sense of this is by utilizing the binary model of a "pros & cons list" to put his experience into a structure. The list is pivotal in resolving *ambivalence* in therapeutic techniques like *Motivational Interviewing* (Rollnick & Miller, 2008), where ambivalence is regarded as a subjective state that needs to be resolved in order to get clean. I do not know if Neil has appropriated the list directly from therapy. The list is also a hyper-generalized artifact which Neil could have appropriat-

ed elsewhere. Nevertheless, in my interpretation the list is a materialization of *imagined meta-projection*. The reason why I would call it a *meta-projective* materialization is because the list is imagined by Neil as an artifact and it establishes an abstract relation between Neil and his drug engagements. The reason why I call it a materialization of *imagination*, instead of for instance *experience*, is that the pros on the list co-constitute accentuated imaginative premises for Neil prior to engaging in drugs. At least, that is how Neil renders it:

> Interviewer: So do I understand you correctly if I say that you are familiar with having imaginations that actually drive you towards the activity where you start to smoke?
>
> Neil: Yes. But then you get disappointed.

And when I ask him to elaborate this disappointment a bit more, the list was mentioned for the first time. This is what originally made me explore and analyze the meta-level of imagination. Neil says:

> Neil: If you write down a +/- on a piece of paper – pros and cons – then, before you start smoking, what you want to be happening vs. when you have smoked is not what happens. Because you always want, no matter what mindset you have got, you probably want to feel upbeat and happy, you want to feel good and think clearly. Then when you smoke then the opposite happens.
>
> Interviewer: Try to elaborate on the positive-list.
>
> Neil: Yes. Well, you want to have a good time, you want to be in good company, and you want to be happy, you want to feel upbeat, and you want to talk to each other and talk about stuff that interests you, have a good time and do things that interest you. And all those things you become worse at when you smoke. But when you are sober and you want to get stoned, then you still want all these things, at least that's how I feel, no matter what mindset I'm in, then I want to experience these positive things the most. But as soon as I smoke I will become worse at all these things.

Part of Neil's expansive processes, then, have implied to transcend this imaginative premise for his drug engagements. This is already happening in the quote. Neil realizes the displacement of pros and cons: Approximating the pros is restricted since drug engagements *actualize the cons*. As was shown in one of the earlier chapters, Neil recalls that the actualization of the pros has happened with friends or at concerts. Else, the imagined premise (and prom-

ise) of the pro-side has also developed through his engagements with movies and music, as analyzed earlier. However, he now also connects it with a great number of disappointing experiences which modulates the imagined premise. This can be analyzed as Neil's transcendence of the imagined *factity* of his drug engagements – the transcendence of the imagination that drug engagements *are* "good times". The destabilization of the imagined facticity is attained by Neil *substituting* the imagined pros with cons. He also destabilizes it by *substantiating* the good times he has had by presuming that they could potentially have been even better if he was not stoned. Both processes are evident in the following quote which immediately precede the former two quotes above:

> Interviewer: But I can maybe... It seems like you are making a connection between smoking weed and something happy, something bright.

> Neil: Precisely. And I find it very interesting, because - also the earlier times when I have quit – you imagine, you have expectations to what you want from this substance. And it is never going to happen. Because it is incredibly few times that you have experienced that these two things go hand-in-hand. And those few times, when I think about it now, then that experience would probably have been better if I didn't smoke.

Oscar: Transcending the imagined "glamour" and "coolness" of drug engagements

Similar imaginative reworking was done by Oscar who had also been clean for two months at the time of the interview. One of such transcendences relates to the glorification of drug engagements through rap cultures. Oscar muses on the realized discrepancy between glamourized imagination and actual drug engagements with his friends:

> Oscar: So that 'glamourification', or what should we call it, the glamourized lifestyle, it does not interconnect with that attitude I have had [inaudible], because I have never been in a club with a huge blunt in my hand and rapped in front of many people. I have been in my friend's flat and played Call of Duty [laughing], smoked joints and watched bad comedies, right.

The imagined "coolness" now appears as a hollow confirmation of the concrete drug engagements. The imagined correspondence between the glamour and the actual is now turned into discrepancy. Another expansive transcendence that Oscar has undertaken also relates to the meta-projective "cool". In

earlier analyses, I have shown how Oscar pursued the new group of friends in order to learn something about life through the stories of the others. Engaging in drugs was central in approximating this. Insofar, it could be regarded as an expansive premise of that imagination at that time. How Oscar now perceives that premise, makes it emerge as restrictive. Oscar observes that the vicarious living through the stories of others, and even through videos, deters him from actual pursuits:

> Oscar: I just think that I have always...for me it was easier to...instead of pursuing it myself then pursuing it through others. I remember a time where I really wanted to learn how to skateboard. But I had no friends that I could skate with, but I had bought a skateboard. And then I spent a lot of time on looking at skateboard videos, because I thought that was very cool. And then I spent a greater amount of time watching those videos than skating myself. So I knew a lot about skateboarding. I just couldn't do it myself. I didn't have a community, so I was seeking a community through those skateboard videos and other things.

The restrictiveness of that former imagined premise also guides and cautions him in his current disengagements from drugs. The problem of vicarious living and passivity is not aborted automatically by disengaging from drugs:

> Interviewer: Put it reversed, is there a thought or an idea that keeps you steady now in relation to 'now that I have quit then I am getting closer to something that I want'?

> Oscar: Well, that is what I have realized. I think I had the idea that if I quit then my whole life would be different. I would be super-happy and stuff like that. I have realized that I cannot achieve any of the things I want from life, if I don't quit smoking joints. But I do not achieve them by stopping smoking joints either. I have to do it all by myself. That is maybe more what I realized. It [smoking joints] holds me back. But I hold myself back just as much as that held me back. I mean, I will not act more upon some...I will not engage in more interesting stuff just because I'll quit smoking joints. I will engage in more interesting things if I pursue interesting things...pursue those experiences.

Oscar expands his perception of the problem beyond drug engagements, although the engagements seem to have been part of the restrictive premise by blocking him from approximating his pursuits. This means that he also expands the imagined potentialities of transformation: The transformation does not just involve disengaging from drugs; disengaging is a *precondition* for *pursu-*

ing and finding his interests. In this way the expansive premise, that Oscar has modulated, involves not only imagining his problems as related to drug engagements but also to the abstract vicariousness. The two things together have blocked concrete possibilities for Oscar of approximating "cool" engagements. Although Oscar experiences imagined directionalities in *first person*, the engagements, in which the directionalities are 'actualized', remain in *second person*. This discrepancy is what now transcends the imagined correspondence earlier in Oscar's drug engagements. These examples, including those of Neil, should not serve to show that the imagination is fraudulent. The expansive transcendence of premises make them retrospectively appear as restrictive. But at the given time the imaginative premises can be analyzed as being expansive, also if things had turned out differently in Neil's and Oscar's lives.

Simon: Transcending the self-imagination and substantiating the imagination of "romantic self-destruction"

Neil and Oscar describe these expansive processes of their imagination with little reference to digital implications. The initial epistemic movements in Simon's transition were partly catalyzed by the movie marathon as analyzed before. But other pivotal expansions were grounded in other interactions besides digital media. Not long before I made the second interview with Simon, he refers to an important conversation he had with one of the psychologists at the treatment facility, when I asked him about possible sources of strength in his current transition. I was curious because Simon seemed determined to cut down on his drug engagements, although he was still engaged. The following is the complete sequence of sentences that I have used earlier in the analysis:

> Interviewer: Is there anything central that gives you that strength?

> Simon: I sense that it is something that comes from a conversation with [one of the psychologists], in the group. Because for a long time I have told myself that I was feeling lonely. And I used weed as a cure against this loneliness because then you got outside and if I was sitting with my journal somebody would ask into it. And then you got into talking with people and all of a sudden you were feeling social anyways. So that was the solution. And then [the psychologist] said it rather...I mean, we know each other for over a year and a half now...he said that I didn't come across as lonely. Also because I had...it was also a thing that fell into place... now I have been telling myself that I was feeling lonely, but actually without ever being it. I have been very social

with a lot of people around me, with a lot of connections here and there and attending university. It was probably something I used as an excuse for permitting myself... And I think that has changed a lot, that I realized that this wasn't the driving force anymore. The conversation came from my doubt about why I was still smoking and what I essentially used it for. And then...yes. So that is probably the change that happened about two weeks ago [unclear...maybe "months"].

Interviewer: Yes. Maybe I am exploiting what you are saying. But it sounds like it was a self-imagination about being lonely, which [the psychologist] maybe suggested should not structure you.

Simon: Exactly. Precisely.

If we for a short moment pause the dialogue, we can first of all note how the conversation with the psychologist modulates Simon's former premise of being lonely. Earlier I have analyzed how the feeling of being lonely was co-produced by Simon's media activities and how drug engagements based on that premise could transcend it expansively. Through the conversation with the psychologist, Simon now perceives the once *facticious* loneliness as *fictitious* and imaginary. I would specify that it was not just imaginary because it was fictitious, but that the *imaginative premise* of being/feeling lonely was *restrictive* due to the *facticity* of it whereby other potential ways of imagining were being blocked for (and by) Simon. The conversation with the psychologist apparently transcended that premise in an expansive way. And we can even add that the transgressive relation between the felt loneliness and drug engagements that Simon imagined as expansive, now appears restrictive from his current premise. The remedy of drug engagements in this case lies in the imagined facticity that drug engagements warrant sociality. As such, there is a logic in imagining drug engagements as counteracting loneliness. But this logic becomes facticious itself through that serialization, i.e., the recurring loneliness that needs the cure by sociality through drug engagements. Thus, other potentials – like the ones that are under development in Simon's living at the time of the interview – were blocked out.

In a minute, I will let my dialogue with Simon roll again, where he rounds up this transformation. But first it should be emphasized that other expansive processes are implicated. Simon informed me in the beginning of the interview that he lately had turned a phrase into a mantra for his transitional period. The phrase is "what is right and what is easy". Simon chanced upon on it through a song on his iPod. The phrase is a remediation of a

quote from *Harry Potter*. Simon has heard the song many times before, but under his present circumstances it attains a new significance while simultaneously substantiates his transitions. The actual quote from the *Harry Potter* movie is: "Dark times lie ahead of us and there will be a time when we must choose between what is easy and what is right." Simon is aware of this reference and derives the significance of the mantra from the distinction in choices: That the easy choices are not always the right choices. The overt reference he makes is to the temptations and "easy" solutions that drug engagements offer. And I will interpret further after returning to our dialogue from where the conversation with the psychologist emanated:

> Interviewer: So that is very central. And some things like the mantra, which you initially talked about, it is stuff like that which comes in and strengthens your decision? Or how should we understand that relationship?
>
> Simon: Yes. I'd definitely say... It was an excuse to say that I was lonely and then it was okay that I took the easy solution. But the self-imagination was kind of transformed through that conversation. Then I was also obliged to say 'Well, what is your reason for...', you know. And there just wasn't any, and then I think that it has made it a lot easier to distance myself from it.

Simon develops a *distancing* power towards drug engagements through the imaginative reworking and destabilizing of his felt loneliness while also destabilizing the logic in the imagined "easy solution" to the factitously imagined loneliness. It makes Simon imagine the new potentials in achieving the right thing by not doing the easy thing. This could simply be a modification of imaginative premises for taking drugs. But I interpret it as reaching further than that. That Simon reworks and modulates his imagination around the ethics of doing the right thing by negating the easy thing can also be an expression of the modification and *substantiation* of the meta-projective "romantic self-destruction". The mantra stretches out the immediacy of developing creativity from destruction, ashes from fire and so on. For Simon, "romantic self-destruction" was a creative transcendence of the ease of following the conventional way of living. And now the mantra transcends the "easy solution" of engaging in drugs. The mantra does not substitute or negate the fact that drugs can be a part of generating creativity and insight – so I reckon Simon would agree based on my interviews with him. But it substantiates the imagined meta-projection with a longer-term perspective by deterring the easy way.

The mantra also spills over in other life projects and interests and accentuates other potential ways of engaging. Simon for instance tells that he is currently about to move together with a female friend. On a day off he found himself engaged in watching YouTube videos (which earlier co-constituted the feeling of being lonely). From earlier experiences, he has learnt that with this activity "the day goes by with nothing". Instead, Simon now slowly modulates his imagination and he comes up with the idea of dissembling his bed because he and his female friend are planning on converting his bedroom into a living room. Simon attributes this mobilization to the mantra. Of course, this cannot be explained by the mono-causality of a mantra. The reworking of imaginative processes is continuous and involves a series of modulations and appropriations from many different contexts *directed* towards many life contexts and relations that are both related to drug engagements and not. This becomes clear from the different stories and interconnections that Simon tells me about, and he also confirms the continuous *building* and *combining* of elements to attain these expansive processes:

> Interviewer: Cool. These are some important stories that come up. Also in regards to exploring relations. Else I could have gone home thinking that now Simon has created a mantra and that is what makes the difference. So it is complex what we are talking about.

> Simon: No doubt, no doubt. No change happens overnight. It is something that is continuously built and combined.

The context for my comment is that Simon told me about the actuality of the mantra in his current processes in the very beginning of the interview. About half an hour into the interview he starts to include other important sources of his transition – e.g. the conversation with the psychologist – when I ask him what gives him strength in the process.

Karen: Aesthetic monitoring through visual metaphors

The clearest accounts I have gotten on the expansive processes of imagination in relation to drug engagements come from Neil, Oscar and Simon. And maybe it is not a coincidence since I had the impression that they are further in the process of distancing themselves from drug engagements – if it is possible to make such a distinction based on the frequency of drug engagements and temporal duration of abstinence. Karen still battles with the feeling of be-

ing stuck; Frank similarly laments his inability to quit the two joints a day; and Ellen has substituted the majority of her engagements in 'harder drugs' and marijuana with alcohol throughout the week (she reports to visit Christiania between 4-7 days a week). While Karen and Frank complain about feelings of being stuck – and thereby suggesting that they experience something being hindered – Ellen seems primarily to have been alarmed by the physical and psychological 'protests' of her body and less by imaginatively being suspended and blocked. Still, Karen and Frank are in the process of establishing epistemic distances and realizing the conflicts related to suspensions. Karen has long time ago already come to the conclusion that the relation between "romanticized artistic suffering" and drug engagements were somewhat discrepant as she exclaims (repeated quote):

> Interviewer: Yes, uhm. Feel free to nuance it a bit. You say 'romantic' – I am juggling with a concept about imagination. So, things I imagine if I smoke... [Karen breaks in]

> Karen: Yes [inaudible] because it is never romantic when you are in the situation.

She also tells me that the approximated pursuits of the imagined meta-projection were more relevant earlier in her life and mainly in relation to alcohol. She furthermore talks about her earlier pursuits of becoming an author as "unrealistic". Still, as I have shown, there is relevance in the imagined meta-projection although it does not appear to be very functional for Karen. When Karen talked about how her drug engagements suspend time and other engagements, it conflicts for instance with her passion for playing the violin. For Karen, playing the violin is connected to the romanticism of suffering artists in classical music. So, the imagined meta-projection still stipulates a relevance of interests. Karen has incorporated a kind of visual metaphor in her imagination as an aesthetic technique for monitoring this temporal balance. She explains how it is derived from digital role playing games (RPG), which she is very fond of, and how it works:

> Karen: I try to think of my life as an RPG, where you... [unclear exclamation in English]. Do you get me?

> Interviewer: No, I'm not quite following you here.

> Karen: You know, in role playing games when you play them on the computer, then your levels increase, you know, 'You are now this good at unlocking

things, you are now this good at that.' And that's it. I am really good at rolling joints. I am not good at many other things. Ehm...because I spend my time on that. I think more it is about time.

Interviewer: How do you use this? It almost becomes a metaphor taken from the role playing game. Try to explain how you apply that to consumption of marijuana.

Karen: Well for example, I'm trying to learn how to play the violin. It's one of these things, after I tried to get my life back I began swimming and I had to learn to play an instrument. I love classical music, so I started taking violin lessons. And every time I choose to smoke a joint instead of playing the violin, I see it as a level in my head – the one over the other. Above it says 'joints'. Maybe it is on 100. Below it says 'violin' and that is maybe on 4. And then I watch it go up, you know what I mean.

The 'experience/level bars' from role playing games can be seen as the combinatory operations through which Karen attempts to regulate her *awareness* of how she engages in her living. It is transgressive in an expansive way in the sense that it accentuates the potentiality of engaging in violin practicing. But I did not get the impression that it was composited into her engagements as an *actual premise* as such. It functions mainly as a monitoring device. If turned into a premise, maybe it could *regulate* her engagements.

The visual metaphor could insofar simply be analyzed as a digital resource that Karen can apply at will. Yet, if we look through the analytical lens of reciprocations, we will attend to what the visual metaphor *does* to Karen. If we look at the imagination materialized in the experience bars, in the computer game they first of all co-constitute a meta-level of orientation which substantiates the concrete and ongoing events, narrations and challenges on the action-level of the game. In Karen's concrete living, the imagined experience bars recreate Karen as someone who can abstract her engagements from their concreteness and abstractly relate them to other potential engagements, i.e. compare engagements in drugs to those in practicing the violin. Another imagination materialized in the experience bars is that your abilities, and what you eventually become, are proportionally related to what you actively do. Karen, then, is furthermore recreated as someone who can abstract from the concrete engagements and simultaneously compare the relative *accumulated excellence* of present and absent engagements and compare them. Even though this visual metaphor still does not transform Karen's engagements significantly yet, it thickens and fixates her epistemic movements. So do other similar

metaphors as she explains when she was confronted with the correspondences between being drunk and a cockroach in an interview she read about alcohol:

> Interviewer: But at the point where you are now, I mean, you have the aim that this has to be minimized and you think that it has to completely disappear from your life.
>
> Karen: At least for some time.
>
> Interviewer: So are there...we were just talking about these 'measuring devices'...do you have experiences that make you say 'what the fuck am I doing? Now I really want to quit!' – through media?
>
> Karen: Well, if I have seen something or experienced something?
>
> Interviewer: Seen, experiences, read something ehm...
>
> Karen: Ehm... I had the experience in relation to drinking. I don't drink a lot at the moment [inaudible]. But ehm, it was just an interview I read where someone described, you know, the stages of how much alcohol you consume. And when you are really drunk, then you are on the same stage as a cockroach. You want to fuck, you want to eat, you want to sleep. That's it. And ehm...yuck. So, well, then I cut down on my consumption. But it was more because of the line of thought that I had come into. I don't think...
>
> Interviewer: [breaks in] What was powerful in that interview?
>
> Karen: It was just the description 'I don't want to be a cockroach, god dammit!'
>
> Interviewer: So the cockroach was mobilizing?
>
> Karen: Yes, you know... 'I'm a human, god dammit! I can engage in abstract thinking!' I mean, I don't want to be, like, an animal.

What we can observe from these recreations and movements is that Karen gradually rebuilds the imaginative complexes of projections surrounding her drug engagements, and in doing so also destabilizes former imaginative complexes. For the time being, Karen undertakes this process by the aid of different visual metaphors.

Frank: Abstract hopes and the search for new "underworlds"

Frank seems to be in a similar stuck position as Karen where he finds it difficult to transcend his current conditions related to the conflicts of isolation and time[42]. Expansive absences remain incarcerated as analyzed before, which implies frustration and suffering for Frank. But besides realizing the suspensions, other activities also point Frank towards expansive premises. One of these involve media activities that reciprocate hope for Frank's future. In one perspective, this is also a result of Frank's one-siding of his imaginative processes through his media activities: Negative consequences are filtered out while he engages in presented hopes which are not negated by drug engagements. From a Facebook experience where one of his friends had posted a picture while he was working and smoking a joint simultaneously (referred to earlier). Frank had different reactions to the picture. One was that it created hope since it presented the possibility of getting a job although he had been smoking. When I asked about other hope-producing experiences Frank highlights one documentary series about real estate agents in New York:

> Interviewer: Now, I introduced this concept of hope in relation to this experience with people working on scaffolds, do you recognize this elsewhere from your daily media use? I mean, where those instances emerge 'Hey, this actually generates the hope that I can achieve the dreams that I want in my life.'

> Frank: There is this series, what is it called...? About estate agents in New York. That's an ultra-happy-booster[43] for me. What the heck is it called..?! Something like 'Agents in New York', with rich people. And then there is one from Sweden, one from Puerto Rico, and the United States and stuff like that. And they really...you cannot be a better super-seller than that. And I don't know, I just get in an incredibly good mood, get high hopes for my future and my life from watching it.

> Interviewer: Try to point out what it is that gives you hope in the series. Which elements?

> Frank: It is just when they make a great deal and they have perfect sense of the occasion. They read their customers perfectly and they are just great at

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[42] Between my first and second interview, Frank had finished treatment, but still found himself battling with smoking marijuana.

[43] "Lykkepille", Danish for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI).

what they are doing – where I just go 'YEAH MAN! This is going to happen for me,' the success, right? And that can really make me happy. A great consolation and a gigantic happy-booster to watch that program. But it is not aired anymore, unfortunately.

The TV show does not involve any kinds of drugs. The hopes that Frank creates through this and other media activities generate an imagination of an improved future compared to his current struggles. While it is possible to argue for the importance and impetus of hopes in developing expansive premises, the challenge and restrictive aspect is that the hope in Frank's case remains abstract: Neither the TV show nor other sources provide Frank with concrete potentials in his concrete living which makes the path to success imaginable. The generated hope may generate determinacy and impetus, but not potential or accentuated premises. But Frank also engages in other emerging imaginative processes. Being quite aware of his fascination with "underworlds" and its relation to his drug engagements, he also engages in teleonomic processes of imagination where "underworlds" is an anchor but its form is open:

> Frank: I think I am searching for an underworld that is so exciting that marijuana is no longer interesting. So that world could be my new underworld-ish. In the beginning, it was skateboarding. In the beginning, it was maybe also petty theft...skateboarding...mopeds are probably not an underworld [laughing together]. Skateboarding and then came marijuana and ever since it has taken first place. Then it could be fast cars. But you can't do that with weed in your blood if you get pulled over. I have been so close many times, fortunately.
>
> Interviewer: And how is weed related to 'underworlds'?
>
> Frank: It *is* an underworld.

So, Frank is working on finding a way which still includes the underworld-atmosphere, but substitutes drugs. In the beginning of the interview he told me about a dream of working in a car-repair shop with young people on the boarders of the law. In this way, he actually combines his new interest in psychology (inspired by some of the psychologists and counsellors in U-turn) and his education related to mechanics. So, although he is stuck under his current circumstances, expansive imaginative processes are emerging. Apart from that, Frank is also making small steps in transcending his isolation. Digital media are pivotal in this move. In the beginning of the interview, he talks happily about how he has started dating again and experiences successes with

these engagements, although he observes that the dates can also act as a consolation if he is feeling down. The relations are established online and the successes build up his social confidence. Digital media may just be a new *means* of establishing potential romantic relations in our present society. But specific digital reciprocations may play a role in why this works for Frank. Frank does not make this explicit, but it may be reflected in his anxious concerns about accepting an invitation for a party from a good friend:

> Frank: I have also been invited to a party at his place. It has been a hell of a long time since I've been at a party. It's scary to go. Crazily.
>
> Interviewer: What was that?
>
> Frank: It's a bit scary to go. There are so many people I don't know. I only know him and his girlfriend. And then there are 10-15 other people.

Like we have seen before, Frank gets anxious when imagining being in the social context. Meeting 10-15 strangers seems to be too much to handle confidently. The possibilities of establishing relations online are reciprocated by a reduction of this social complexity. Direct face-to-face interactions are substituted by the digital interface of the given platform. Exchanges can be asynchronic where they are synchronic and continuous in a face-to-face setting. And exchanges are normally reduced to one modality (e.g. writing) where they are multi-modal in face-to-face exchanges. And many more reductions could be pointed out. Frank may be more comfortable with these reductions since he expresses anxiety in relation to the imagined complexity of the party as a social event (10-15 unknown people at once). And when the relation is already established through the reduced spaces of digital media, it may be easier for Frank to meet the given person face-to-face afterwards. In relation to the isolation that he laments, Frank uses digital media and their reciprocations expansively to transcend his isolation and slowly build up his social confidence.

What can be learnt from digital implications in expansive processes of imagination in drug *dis*engagements?

In this chapter, I have tried to analyze how the young people's everyday living is implicated in the processes of establishing epistemic distances and realizing

restrictive premises for engaging in drugs. Before I went into the making of the interviews with the participants, I expected to hear about how they would use assistive and self-monitoring apps to regulate their drug engagements, utilize homepages, or consult the web for strategies and inspiration. It was therefore also a surprise, as this analysis shows, that no significant or typical ways of dealing with drug-related problems have emerged in the empirical material. The expansive processes are not devoid of digital media. But any specific way in which they become co-constitutive of expansive premises is not evident. I will reflect upon some of the possible reasons for this to conclude the chapter.

One reason could be that the expansive processes and realization of problems mainly take place other places than through digital media and require more substantive intervention in the everyday living of the participants. The eruptive realizations of the culminations of problems are the turning point for some of the participants. And, for instance in the case of Simon, problems are realized through other problems like losing control over aspects of one's living. Another reason could be that a part of the processes implies that the participants need to *disengage* from activities with digital media that have implicated in processes of narrowing in and suspending imaginative processes. Neil and Oscar have both mentioned (not quoted here) that these processes come fairly easy because many of the digital activities do not make the same sense when sober. Neil says:

> Neil: I do neither use more nor less time on social media after I have quit, I guess. Some things have changed. Before it was more entertainment and fun, I have spent a lot of time on watching stupid videos, and stuff like that, because you don't have anything to do. Now I don't have as much time, so I use my time more constructively when I am then using social media.

Both Neil and Oscar needed to break away from the social arrangements of drug engagements, and they both informed their respective group of friends that they needed to pull back. So, the disengagements were attacked from several flanks. The continuous and instantaneous contact via social media did not seem to prompt any problems after the disengagements.

A third reason could also be that in some of the cases substantive transformations have not occurred. Karen and Frank are still battling with problems and with finding ways of reducing or disengaging from drugs. In these two examples, the spatial and digital arrangements of their everyday living remain as co-constituents of their drug engagements. In the follow-up in-

terview with Karen, I gave her my analysis of her 'corner'. She said that she had tried to break with it many times, but it would slowly emerge again.

The non-specific ways in which digital media co-constitute expansive processes may also be explainable by the idiosyncratic relations between imagination and drug engagements. Oscar and Neil seem to realize how actual engagements had become decoupled from imagined engagements. Simon, Frank and Karen seem to work in the direction of substantiating their imagination in expansive ways and thus maintain a certain continuity in the imaginative processes. Frank is searching for a "new underworld"; Simon modifies his "romantic self-destruction"; and Karen includes her "romantic" pursuit of playing the violin via e.g. visual metaphors from RPG's which she loves.

Presencing IV: Concluding the Acts of Presencing – Expanding the Epistemic Imagination

Overview:

In this last act of presencing, I will conclude the dialectical structure of the dissertation by drawing the implications of the empirical research for the initial understandings and research questions. This last act is therefore a proposed expansion of the *epistemic imagination*. There will be two chapters. In chapter 9, I will conclude how this research can contribute to expanding our understanding of drug engagements and related problems by attending to the two dimensions of imagination and digital media. In chapter 10, I will return to the initial conceptual framework and conclude how the concepts can be developed and revised based on the empirical work, along which lines the research on imagination should/could continue, and which questions and relations still need to be clarified and conceptualized. In the very conclusion, I will reflect upon where and for whom this research could be relevant and beneficial.

Chapter 9: Implications of the Research for Understanding Drug Engagements Differently

Throughout the acts of presencing in the previous parts of the dissertation the central agenda has been to address the scientific and empirical problems – or 'absences' – which this project has outlined in the introduction. Through the dialectical relation between theoretical and empirical work, the overall purpose of the project is to contribute to the expansion the *epistemic imagination*[44] of how the 'absences' of imagination and materiality are related to and in everyday engagements. In the empirical realm, I have taken a closer analytical look at young people's drug engagements under the digital conditions in our current society. By presencing the internal relation between young people's imaginative processes and digital media as premises, this research project proposes two crucial dimensions of understanding how activities with drugs become engaging and why it can become a specific problem for young people to disengage. In the next chapter, I will discuss the conceptual implications of this work. In this chapter, I will focus on the implications of the insights generated so far for understanding how imagination and digital media engage young people in drugs and argue for why it is important to include these dimensions into our understanding.

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[44] In scientific work, "imagination" is not always applied to processes in everyday living. It has also been applied to the specific epistemological practices of science. Expanding the imagination in science usually refers to proposed ways of grasping the subject matter of the scientific discipline. Hence, Mills proposed a "sociological imagination" to grasp the relation between individual and society (Mills, 2000); Harvey proposed a "geographical imagination" to grasp the relation between a person's biography and space (Harvey, 2009); and Willis a "ethnographic imagination" to expand the researcher's imagination on how to engage in fieldwork (Willis, 2000). Anders' claim that a problem of our modern world is the discrepancy between technological production and the ability to imagine its implication is a direct appellation to science about expanding our imagination of such implications (Anders, 1961).

Recapturing the central relations and progress of the empirical analyses

The empirical research questions concerned how young people, in interaction with their digital everyday living, develop imaginative processes related to their drug engagements, and how these processes are implicated in the developing and dealing with drug-related problems experienced by the young people. These questions have been explored through the empirical material provided by interviews with the six young persons who were in different phases of dealing with their drug-related problems. The empirical material has allowed for a reconstructed temporal analysis of how the young people's drug engagements have emerged from their imaginative processes and digital everyday living. The analyses have shown how the young people develop what I have called imagined meta-projections as ways of dealing with issues and creating projects and directions in their living prior or in relation to their drug engagements. The development of imagined meta-projections thus encompass more than drugs and incarnate directionalities that the young people are in the processes of approximating or distancing themselves from. But in different ways and with differing purposes, drugs become incorporated into these imagined meta-projections as material and cultural agents in the processes of approximating and distancing.

The analyses have also provided insight into how the intensification of drug engagements emerges from how the narrowing in of imaginative processes is related to the digital everyday living of the young people. The intensification in most of the young people's everyday lives coincides historically with the rapid and radical transformations of digital media – media that are becoming more mobile and networked through the likewise radical transformations of the internet. Hence, we can hear accounts of how the initial contours of imagined meta-projections emerge from interactions with 'older media' like VHS cassettes, DVDs and books, where mobile and networked media are more infiltrated in the intensification of the participants' drug engagements. I will not suggest that the intensification is necessarily caused by these historical transformations of digital media. But the transformations provide novel qualities of how imagination and engagements in drugs are being developed. These novel qualities have been attended to and analyzed as *reciprocations* of different forms of imagination materialized in digital media

and in their concrete arrangements. I will return to the reciprocations in detail later in this chapter. But the intensification of drug engagements has been analyzed in relation to how three core aspects of digital reciprocations – which each contain variations and sub-aspects – co-constitute processes by which the young people's imagination is increasingly directed towards drug engagements while simultaneously suspending other imaginative directions. There are certainly more aspects that are not included in the analysis, but these three seemed to reoccur across the accounts of the research participants. These aspects concern how drugs – mainly marijuana – go hand-in-hand with certain digital activities and generate attachments to such activities; how digital media are arranged and in different ways become arranging for the routinization of drug engagements and imagination; and how drug communities can become instantaneously imagined and acted upon which generates a sensation of belonging to and longing for something beyond the individual being and isolated activity of drug taking. A term like 'atmosphere' has shown, across the aspects there seems to be generated an *affectivity* – as in 'attachment', 'belonging' and 'longing for' – from the interactions with digital media which might be important in "binding" or engaging the imagination as premise for taking drugs.

When we are talking about imaginative processes that are suspended in the course of intensification, we are talking about processes that still seem to matter to the participants in one way or another, but are kept at bay. So, although they are suspended they embody a relevance which is hard to ignore completely. And this is complicit in causing dilemmas. No matter if the suspended processes are rooted in circumstances prior to drug engagements or if they develop in the course of them or as a result of them, the suspension is accomplished by the narrowing in of imaginative processes and digital reciprocations. Suspended imagination is impeded in developing into something more comprehensible or hopeful, e.g. imagining a life without drugs or imagining what to do after an education, or developing into concrete potentialities whereby it remains an abstract utopia, e.g. as in aspects of Frank's "underworlds". From the empirical analyses, it is not very evident how digital media are implicated in how the research participants deal with these problems. There are various examples of digital media being implicated in the processes, but not in any patterned way across the interviews. Oscar and Neil had to pull back from the social-digital arrangements while Karen and Frank seemed to be continuously 'caught' in their arrangements. Maybe because of these dif-

fering phases of dealing with drug-related problems no evident digital patterns emerged in the empirical material.

These are the central relations between imagination, digital media and drug engagements that the research has produced insight into. In the following section I will specify the relations further and explain why they are important to consider in understanding drug engagements.

The imaginative 'worlds' with drugs and imagined-activity-with-the-drug

Instead of focusing on actual practices of drug use the empirical interview material has provided the opportunity to explore the imaginative premises of the young people for engaging in such practices. In this way, the focus differs slightly from the in vivo studies from which mainly ethnographic and new materialist approaches generate their knowledge (see chapter 1). The present research gives insights into the imagined-activities-with-the-drug which in many cases precipitate actual-activities-with-the-drug and also substantiate them in the course of their actualization. The imagined-activity-with-the-drug is therefore proposed as the fundamental nexus for understanding why young people become engaged and keep being engaged with drugs. I have analyzed this as processes of routinization, intensification and narrowing in of imagination. The intensification processes are typically regarded as problematic in the commonplace terms of addiction and dependency: Where drug consumption acquires a generalized character in everyday living (cf. Orford, 1985), comes to overwhelm the person's totality of activities (cf. Alexander, 2008), or has disarmed the person's control and will (Valverde, 1998). Concepts like addiction, dependency and loss of control provide adept frames for explaining why drugs continue to be engaging and why disengaging is difficult. So, why is it important to attend to the imagined-activity-with-the-drug in order to understand engagements? What does the nexus suggest? The empirical analyses have elucidated how these dimensions become engaging as well.

Although the participants may also experience drug problems to be out of hand, a central perspective in this project is that the young people are actively involved in their drug engagements as a part of the living that they are developing and dealing with. Drugs are not forced upon them by other people in contexts where they did not expect to encounter drugs. Questioning the role of imagination as premise for such engagements is therefore crucial.

The young people on one level or another imagine aspects of the activities-with-the-drug in their absence which forms the premises for actual activity. The important questions then are: How is imagination related to actual engagements? What becomes so engaging through imagination since the young people go on to actualize it? And why are activities which involve disengaging from drugs hindered from being imagined and engaged in as alternatives?

Let's go into these questions by starting off with one part of the nexus: The activity-with-the-drug. The coupling of drugs with activity stresses that drug taking is always part of an activity and a process which is carried out by the person. It also stresses that the drug as an object and as material effect is always accompanied by a context in which the person engages with the drug. Thinking of drug taking as a process and in a context can open up the understandings of how it is related to other aspects of a person's living, including the projects in which he or she is engaged, and not only of how drug taking is a *condition* of dependency and addiction abstracted from contexts and activities. The activities and contexts do not need to be related to digital media. However, the research suggests that digital media constitute significant and varied contexts for engaging in drugs. A closer analytical look on the selected and preferred activities-with-the-drug from the subjective standpoint of the research participants shows that these activities are not arbitrary, but they reveal a certain pattern and logic. So, although the research participants exhibited a development of routinized drug engagements, the routinization did not involve taking drugs compulsively under *any* given circumstance. The patterns of these contexts could also be analyzed and interpreted as conditioning: The arbitrary association between drugs and certain contexts which the persons respond to by feelings of craving and drug-seeking behaviors. But there are two major reasons for why this does not suffice. One is that the analysis has shown that preferences for more observant and passive activities are more apt in creating synergies with the material effects of marijuana as a drug. Although there were also variations of this, the hand-in-hand relation points in the direction that this specific co-presence of media and drugs may be more independent from personal biographies and imagination. If we include the biographical aspects, the arbitrary association is also challenged. Through the empirical analyses, I have argued that the logics of these patterns can be made intelligible and less arbitrary by attending to what is 'absent' in these engagements, namely by attending to the research participants' imagination. This

leads us to address the remainder of the nexus: The imagined-activity as engaging the participants in drugs.

Attending to the imagined-activity should not be misunderstood as a disinterest in the actual-activity-with-the-drug. The very relation between them and how it becomes engaging and (not) disengaging is key. The notion of how imagination forms *premises* for actual engagements is crucial in making this link. The relation is unquestionably variable and multiple. But the analyses have established three main aspects of this relation, or of how the imagined is composited into actual activities-with-the-drug as an engaging premise.

The first concerns the imaginative processes *within* and *throughout* actual-activities-with-the drug, i.e. the contexts where drugs and the arrangements of media activities go hand-in-hand. The apparently identical or repeated action of engaging in drugs and media within these contexts may obscure the processes of imagination. But the engagements have a temporal span where different decisions are continuously being made. Frank and Karen tell how they approximately after 4 o'clock pm routinely initiate their engagements in drugs and media; Neil tells how he and his friends alternate between different media activities in the drug/media events which can go on for hours on end; Oscar tells how he and his friends could spend a week of playing and arranging missions in a computer game while smoking joints; just to name a few examples. The temporal extensivity and durability of these contexts can be explained by how the participants' imaginative processes are continuously directed towards the arrangements themselves through the premises that the arrangements accentuate. Simultaneously, processes directed towards imagined alternatives are suspended by the very same arrangements. The premises for imagining and actualizing engagements which involve the yet-*not*-absent-drug are diminished and blocked. In part, this blocking is also related to the transformation of imagination itself through the material effects of the drug and not only through the digital arrangements. Karen has described how marijuana numbs her, and Neil how his body becomes lazy and less energized to engage in other activities. So, the material effects of the drug reversely accentuate premises for engaging in certain types of media activities while diminishing others. This mutually complementary interaction between drugs and digital media – which accentuates and diminishes imaginative premises – is essentially the engaging quality that the participants describe as hand-in-hand. Oscar described yet another way in which drug taking within the contexts keeps on being engaging. He described how rap cultures and music created a confirmatory coating around imagination and ensured that imaginative pro-

cesses did not go in critical directions. The rap cultures are not something that is approximated or actualized as such, but run parallel to and substantiates actual drug engagements as a confirmation of their legitimacy. This allowed Oscar and his friends to imagine that these engagements were part of something "cool" in a one-sided way. These are some of the examples on how imaginative processes are directed towards the ongoing arrangements of drug engagements *within* the same context while blocking out imagined-activities-*without*-the-drug.

A second relation emerges when the concrete drug engagements are imagined in contexts where they are (still) absent. This relation can be co-constituted more or less directly by digital media, as for instance through instantaneously imagined communities in which drugs can be engaged with. Recall Frank's *Breaking Bad* period. Digital media are co-constitutive of making absent drug engagements present. But they do so in a more indirect way in comparison to Neil's digital everyday living where the potential communities that are directly and concretely presented and prompted through multiple social channels on the computer or on his smartphone (e.g. Snapchat). There are also examples of how the more embodied processes of imagination transform a context in which drug engagements are absent to a context where they are present. The private geographies of Karen's and Frank's homes undergo this transformation because the spatial arrangements of artifacts and digital media accentuate these imaginative premises. There are many reasons for why imagining drug engagements in their absence becomes engaging. One reason could be the routinization of imaginative processes; another could be that imagining drug engagements creates the possibility of suspending other imaginative processes which are conflictual to the participants. Without negating these reasons, I will argue that a third relation is needed to understand how the engagement emerges.

Engaged through relevance: Microgenetic processes substantiated by the meta-level of imaginative 'worlds'

These two relations – one where the drug engagements are presenced in a context and continue to be present, and the other where drug engagements are absent, but made present – involve the microgenetic processes of imagination. The microgenetic processes are the first steps in understanding why

young people engage in drugs and keep being engaged. But the understanding remains incomplete if a third relation between imagination and actual activities is not taken into account.

If we focus on the second relation, stressing that drug activities are imagined prior to their actualization creates no greater surprises. The notion of craving essentially embodies the meaning of wanting something strongly in its absence. If craving is understood as an embodied directionality towards something absent, here the drug, imaginative processes emerging from or creating craving could be viewed as the 'excuses' that enter the addict's mind to make sense of the craving. But this understanding of imaginative processes is too simple compared to how they have been analyzed here. In fact, the thorough study of imagination, including the third relation, makes the difference between 'excuse' and 'logic'. The third relation is what I have called imagined meta-projections, or the meta-level that substantiates microgenetic processes and premises of imagination. If we again take Frank's *Breaking Bad* period, these microgenetic processes lose their particular logic – or their significance becomes flattened – if not connected to his fascination with "underworlds". The potential of watching *Breaking Bad* while smoking joints after work forms the imaginative premises for Frank's engagements. But the premise is also substantiated by "underworlds". Without this link, a narrow understanding of what is engaging for Frank during this particular period, or for the other research participants for that matter, is produced. It is by means of this meta-level of the imagination that the specific activity-with-the-drug gains *relevance*. It is a relevance that is not reducible to mere tension release or to a defensive act. It gains relevance from the meta-level being rooted in wider directionalities that the young people are in the process of approximating or distancing themselves from in their living[45].

In some cases, it becomes evident how actual conflicts are dealt with through the development of imagined meta-projections, as for instance in how the actual suffering in Karen's life is transformed into potential sources of artistic creation. Although Karen does not continue to pursue artistic creation, it nevertheless becomes a foundation of her orientation later in life

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[45] These directionalities attain their relevance and significance through the ways in which they order the orientation in the present and towards the future(s), but also through their biographical significance. If they in the past have been part of ways of expansively overcoming and dealing with problems and conflicts, they have become part of the person's "social self-understanding" and transformation of conditions, not only understood as "identity", but as a direction of potential becoming (and not-becoming) which is accomplished by transformations in the past and present.

through how she expansively has dealt with past conflicts. If she were to reverse that or abandon that imaginative reworking of experiences, she may be left with the passivity of suffering again, I would conjecture. In this sense, there is a kind of objectivity in the imaginative which cannot simply be rolled back without consequences. The imagination, especially when the meta-level is included, is deeply embedded in actual living. It is more obligating than playful. It is not arbitrarily associated with actual living; it is firmly anchored in actual biographies, projects and concrete circumstances. Throughout the development of imagined meta-projections, activities-with-the-drug have become incorporated as partial agents in the actualizations of these directionalities. They are only partial because the directionalities embody life projects that extend beyond drugs and cannot be actualized by drugs alone. The microgenetic processes gain their relevance from being substantiated by the meta-level of imagination. The engaging quality of imaginative premises for the actual activity-with-the-drug can thus in part be understood by the microgenetic processes of imagination. But a fuller understanding is generated by attending to how imaginative premises on the microgenetic level are substantiated by the meta-level of imagination.

As I touched upon just above, it is crucial to note that the relevance derived from imaginative processes produces engagements in a wider sense than craving, 'excuses', addiction and dependency are able to explain. Where the latter find a momentary finality and satisfaction in the consumption of the drug, the engagements and relevance produced by imagination extend beyond the singular activity-with-the-drug. The concrete practice of consuming the drug and its intoxicating effect is only a partial actualization of wider imagined meta-projections. When Simon says that he felt that he learnt something from being stoned, it was a particular kind of learning that is relevant to a wider project: A break with commonsense perception which could enrich his writing or confront a "conventional" way of approaching life – to name one aspect. The imagined meta-projection is thus not simply actualized in its totality in the singular material effects of or activities with the drug. The imaginative pursuit keeps on existing during and after that particular incidence. In this sense, imagined-activities-with-the-drug may precipitate concrete drug engagements, but the engaging quality also stems from imaginative processes in which drugs (only) play a relevant part. The relevance does therefore not find its final neutralization or actualization through the material drug effects in isolation, but outlasts them. The relevance furthermore specifies a notion

like craving and designates the particular relevance of particular microgenetic processes. Simon seeks a particular intoxication combined with learning which feeds into his writing projects. This is different from the craving-scenarios provided by Neil and Ellen which again are quite opposite of each other. They are literally day and night. But they acquire their logic and specificity from the respective imagined meta-projections. For Neil, the sunny-day scenario produced craving by being substantiated by "good times". For Ellen, the black-and-white, nighttime graffiti photography on Facebook produced craving by being substantiated by "slum" which again includes more than drugs, for instance a specific trashy aesthetics of spaces and an open-minded mentality of people attracted to such spaces.

If we want to understand more thoroughly, then, how premises become engaging, we need to attend to these aspects of premises that are (partially) absent, but imaginatively present on a microgenetic and meta-projective level in activities-with-the-drug. The engaging quality does not simply emerge because aspects of drug engagements are being imagined. The engaging quality emerges from the relevance that drugs take on through their position in the meta-projective tension between directionalities that the research participants are in the midst of approximating and distancing themselves from. Both the biographical significance and the prospects of hope of imagined meta-projections may explain why the imagined is engaging and not easily re-imagined or abandoned. Examples have even shown how the imagination is capable of forming engaging premises and continues to persist even though drug engagements turn out not to actualize what is being imagined. Notably Neil and Oscar voice how actual drug engagements are often discrepant from "good times" and "coolness" and Karen emphatically said that the drug engagements are never "romantic" when you are in them. When Neil, for instance, would experience slight disappointments because of this discrepancy, it is exactly *because* the imagined-activity-with-the-drug is composited as premise into the actual-activity-with-the-drug. And it is *because* of this premise that Neil keeps on being engaged in drugs more than the actual activities.

There may also be another engaging aspect of imaginative premises for activities-with-the-drug related to the meta-projective level. If, let's say, that an activity-with-the-drug is transgressed and substantiated by a single meta-projection – we could take Simon's "romantic self-destruction" as embodied only by *one* character like Hunter S. Thompson – such a projection could be immensely engaging on its own, even to a point where the person would be obsessed with it. But what happens to the engaging quality when the meta-

level is substantiated by a *multiplicity* of such projections? It has been theoretically proposed, and empirically grounded, that imaginative processes involve *complexes* of projections. This was most clearly illustrated in the interview with Simon: How "romantic self-destruction" was imagined as a candle burning in both ends which was further substantiated by multiple projections ranging from Hunter S. Thompson, Dylan Thomas, Bob Dylan, various movies, online bits, poems, songs, and so forth, all intertwined with Simon's own writing projects. It would be questionable to infer that the multiplicity results in a quantifiable accumulation of engaging quality of imagination. But qualitatively it is reasonable to assume that the multiplicity of complexes may contribute to a *thickening* of the engaging qualities of imagination (to borrow a term from narrative therapy). A concept like "imagined meta-projection" may not be very adequate for capturing the engaging qualities of the imaginative 'worlds' with drugs that emerge in the participants' living. It may sound too bland, flat and inanimate where the imagination, in contrast, becomes engaging through the totality of aesthetics, embodiment, action potentiality, spaces and so forth. Imaginative 'worlds' could possibly capture this totality. However, where 'worlds' becomes imprecise is through the connotations of a whole and coherent narrations. I have resisted this affinity by using concepts like meta-projections and complexes. As Simon's example shows, imagined meta-projections are manifest as a tightly knit fabric – or collages or bricolages – of disparate percepts assembled in a plurality within a complex. So, if we were to understand the engaging quality of the imagination by how the microgenetic premises are substantiated *just* by a meta-level of imagination, we may miss the mark. It is equally important to account for how this relation is grounded in and thickened by the multiplicity of imaginative 'worlds'.

To finish off this section, I want to discuss a question that may raise doubts about my argumentation. If actual-activities-with-the-drug become engaging through the relevance and thickening of microgenetic processes of the imagination by the substantiations of the meta-level of imagination, why is there a varying degree of clarity of these relations in the accounts of the research participants? For instance, where Simon, Karen and Frank rather explicitly talked about "romantic self-destruction" and "underworlds" respectively, I have more actively intervened analytically when it comes to the meta-projective level in the accounts of Oscar, Ellen and Neil. This could indicate that my assertion is wrong, or at least not as global as I argue here. But other reasons may also obscure the perception of these relations.

One reason could be that the participants form many different premises for engaging in drugs, more than I have analyzed here. Ellen and Karen also smoked marijuana in order to sleep. Karen called this a "reversed alarm clock". Such a premise is still related to the imagination, I would argue: To the imagination that 'I will not be able to sleep if I do not smoke', and to the blocked imagination that 'I cannot imagine other good ways to fall asleep'. The metaphorical substantiation of the drug as a reversed alarm clock is itself an act of the imagination. But imaginative premises like these are less overtly related to the imagined meta-projections which I have analyzed as relevance-producing. The multiplicity of premises may contribute to obscuring the perception of meta-level relations in the lived experience of the participants.

Another reason could be that the directionalities of the meta-level of imagination are often vaguer than clearly defined goals and hopes. They may be imaginatively in the making. Putting the meta-projections into concepts, like I have done, may give off the impression that the directionalities are unequivocal with unambiguous ends. This is not the case *per se*. I have argued for this by the conceptual differentiations of the relation between imagination and practice: The teleological relation where ends are well-defined and the teleonomic relations where the imagined is directed but open-ended. In quite a few of the empirical examples, the flimsy affectivity of *atmosphere* was said to form the imaginative premise for drug engagements. In other places, I have also analyzed the imaginative processes as subjectively manifest as knowing of the third kind: The tacit and embodied directionality. The phenomenological vagueness of such premises may make an explicit perception of them, and epistemic distance towards them, difficult. This should, however, not undermine their potential of forming engaging and relevant premises for drug engagements.

A third reason why the relation to imagination may be difficult to establish has also been indicated in the empirical material. The routinization of imagination and drug engagements may contribute to the fact that the relation is taken for granted. Oscar proposed that he might have forgotten about his imagination because drugs became such a great part of his everyday living. Neil said that he would normally not think about all the imaginative processes that would unfold within a split-second of feeling the desire or craving for smoking marijuana.

A last reason for why the relation to imagination is not always articulated very clearly could also stem from the discrepancies between imagination and actual engagements: When the circumstance under which engagements

are carried out have turned out to be out of line with the imagined direction-alities of the meta-level of imagination.

Digital reciprocations of the microgenetic processes of imagination and drug engagements

As well as I have argued that understandings of why the engaging quality of imagined-activity-with-the-drug remains incomplete without the relation to the meta-levels of imagination, based on the theoretical and empirical anal-yses I will likewise argue that these understandings are not comprehensive enough if the reciprocations of digital media in their everyday arrangements are not included, i.e. how imaginative processes are also materialized. This ar-gument is a direct derivative of Scarry's theory of the "total arc of action": Activities emerge through the simultaneous processes of a person's projec-tion and reciprocations of objects. I will argue that, without reciprocations, we will misapprehend the imagination as a process only related to the person, *including* the aspects of the processes which in actuality are grounded in and performed by the agency of materiality and technology. This would be a falla-cy. By expanding our epistemic imagination to incorporate the material agen-cy, we go in the direction of grasping the concrete material circumstances un-der which imagination and activities-with-the-drug emerge and how they be-come and keep on being engaging.

In the analytical chapters, many different processes of reciprocations of digital media and their arrangements have been elaborated. I will draw on some of them to exemplify important relations, but I will not recapture them all. The point is rather to develop the understanding of how the reciproca-tions of digital media are related to the imagined-activity-with-the-drug and how this relation in the research participants' living gets them and keeps them engaged in drug activities. The relations I address here are not equally rele-vant to all the participants. The empirical analyses have elucidated many indi-vidual variations. When they are indiscriminately taken up here, the claim is not that the reciprocations are uniformly representative for each single re-search participants in the study, or outside this study for that matter. The var-iations say more about digital media, about the multiple and potential ways in which they can reciprocate young people's imaginative processes and en-gagements in drugs.

The empirical material has allowed for the analysis of digital reciprocation through a combined methodology of structuring the research from the subjective standpoints of the research participants and 'torturing' digital media as objects to complement and expand the subjective accounts. Throughout the analysis and the processes of writing this concluding chapter, it has become obvious to me that a degree of concreteness and specificity of the relation between imagination and reciprocations in the participants' drug engagements escapes the research. Other research methods, as for instance ethnographic approaches, could have aided the concrete exploration of reciprocations and of digital media as objects in their own right and not just rendered through the subjective experiences of the research participants. But the analyses of the empirical material have taken the first steps of including digital media, not just as subjective experiences, but also as reciprocating agents. On this basis, the research has created some important insights into how digital media reciprocate the participants' imaginative premises for engaging in drugs.

To a certain extent, the study of the role of imagination in drug engagements overlaps with many of the interests of and insights produced decades ago by the cultural studies of the subcultures of drugs. In chapter 1, I paraphrased Willis for suggesting that drugs become engaging for people through cultural meanings that are not inherent to the drug. The nexus of the imagined-activity-with-the-drug has affinities with such a proposition: The participants do not just imagine the material effects of the drug in isolation; they imagine them in relation to a specific activity and imagine the activity-with-the-drug in relation to projects and directionalities in their living. With the term, *cultural meanings*, Willis emphasizes the role of cultural mediation in the persons' significations of drugs. But how does this "culture" come concretely into the lives of the persons? Social interactions within a subculture provide some answers. But in this research project, the role of digital media in such processes has been questioned. Willis could for good reasons not investigate digital media. This does not mean that he did not attend to artifacts. Artifacts like private surroundings, clothing and appearance, conveyors of meaning like music, etc., were included in his study of the identity and lifestyle of the hippies (e.g. Willis, 1978, pp. 123-129). These artifacts are nevertheless treated as expressive symbols of the meanings and ideologies that the research participants have already acquired as the 'identity package' of being a hippie. The implications of the concrete material arrangements are not taken thoroughly into account, and both culture and meanings may as well be free-

floating signs or something that the subjects are preoccupied with 'in their minds' and project onto their surroundings. Interpreting imagination into such a frame would dislodge its processes in a similar way.

The new materialist approaches are more dedicated to incorporating materiality – both the materiality of drugs and spatial surroundings – as *agents* (and less as symbols) in processes of intoxications. However, with a general focus on how these processes emerge – and become present – *within* specific contexts, the relation of that context to other (absent) aspects of the person's living remain backgrounded. This is where the processes of imagination in their subjective and material forms become important. And as I stressed in chapter 1, new materialist approaches tend to attend to materiality in abstract and non-specific ways which results in the vague flows of affect between material surroundings and a "body without organs". Reciprocations sharpen our analytical view towards the material specificities and differences that co-constitute imagination and engagements.

In the last two parts of this chapter, I have superficially touched upon how digital media are infiltrated in the three main aspects of the imagined-activity-with-the-drug as premise for actual drug engagements: Digital media act as a context for engaging in drugs; in its absence, the participants' imagination is directed towards this context more and less directly *by* digital media; and a great deal of the imaginative 'worlds' and meta-projections are co-constituted by previous interactions with media of different sorts. Digital media become part of these aspects as premises because the young people interact and arrange themselves with them. But in the same processes, digital media also recreate the premises. The premises thus constitute the subjective and material sides of the imagined-activity-with-the-drug. When we want to clarify and analyze how imagination is also anchored in the material agency of such premises, the concept of reciprocation becomes crucial.

Digital media can also be defined as multimedia. This means that they are capable of reciprocating in multiple ways. However, a fundamental imagination materialized in them is *the presencing of experiences, activities and relations in a broad sense that are else absent.* This reciprocation may seem simple. But it is excessive. It substitutes the physical movement of the body between different and disparate localities and spaces, and it transforms our bodily interactions with them. Through digital media, disparate localities can also be brought into a co-presence that can be interacted with simultaneously. When digital media form premises for drug engagements as a relevant activity-with-the-drug, their

material capacity to make absent activities present becomes internally related to the participants' processes of imagining and actualizing activities-with-the-drug. As the empirical material has shown, the presencing of *specific* digital activities and forms of interactions with these activities are more engaging as activities-with-the-drug than other activities. The presencing of activities like TV shows, movies, games and music on bigger rather than smaller screened technologies appear to go better hand-in-hand with the material effects of the drug. And the engaging quality of the hand-in-hand-ness is further specified by how the particular 'worlds' of activities resonate with the participants' imaginative 'worlds', atmospheres and communities on the meta-level of imagination. The engaging quality of these specific digital activities that go hand-in-hand with drugs could suffice to explain why the young people would imagine and be directed towards them in their absence and continue to make them present in ongoing drug engagements. But more reciprocations recreate the microgenetic processes of imagination within the contexts of actual drug engagements and in their absence. These reciprocations concern how digital activities on the one hand recreate the premises and on the other hand are being *accentuated* as premises for drug engagements. Accentuation implies that premises are being promoted without forming actual premises for engagements in a particular moment. In this sense, accentuations are concrete and material, yet imaginative and yet-absent. The hand-in-hand-relation of media and drugs can be accentuated by the person when she or he actively imagines or directs attention towards the possible premise. But, as I have analyzed, the accentuations are also materialized. The premise of presencing activities in the absence of and in the course of drug engagements is accentuated by some basic interrelated reciprocations which I at a point in the analytical chapters have summarized as *dislocation* of activities: Digital media, in their mobile and stationary forms, are *at hand* in and across many contexts of the participants' everyday living; digital activities can be made present on demand due to the vast amount of material that is being stored locally on the devices, but especially online on the internet; and online material is loosened from specific devices and is accessible from a multiplicity of localities and digital media. Some of the participants have described the ease and immediacy of presencing activities that go hand-in-hand with drugs. The ease and immediacy essentially refer to the *materialized condensation of the many successive chains of imagined and actual activities* that under other circumstances would need to be carried out and coordinated step-by-step in order to make a given activity-with-the-drug present. Materials that are being stored online are notoriously just one-click-

away. However, in many cases, even the succession of many possible clicks is condensed and presenced simultaneously in one online locality. When the participants talk about TV shows that go hand-in-hand with drugs, all the episodes of each season that has been aired are typically present on one webpage. In this sense, hundreds of hours of material are potentially accentuated as premise for being presenced by *a single click* onto that page. In ongoing drug engagements, digital reciprocations like these help to explain the material accentuation of premises by which the participants' imagination becomes engaged and directed towards continuous presencing of activities that go hand-in-hand with drugs and by which such engagements are temporally extended. But it also explains how the premises are accentuated and imagined in the absence of ongoing drug engagements, like in Frank's *Breaking Bad* period. The vast amount of available material is not exhausted in one sitting and thus creates a temporal extensity *across many successive sessions* of drug engagements.

This serialized engagement does not only come down to the quantity of available material. Many contemporary TV shows thrive on playing with people's imagination in general by creating gripping dramas and continuous elaborations of plots and characters, aiming at engaging people by inducing questions and emotions like 'What happens next?!' So, the engaging seriality of TV shows that go hand-in-hand with drugs also *reciprocates the imagination as serialized processes*. In the context of TV shows as activity-with-the-drug, serialized process and temporal extensity can be multiplied by the vast number of drug engaging TV shows that the participants have mentioned. And to some extent, this also goes for the other activities, like movies and games, which the participants report to go hand-in-hand with drugs. Certain computer games have in themselves a vast temporal span that can extend actual drug engagements and can be extended over many sessions of drug engagements, as Oscar exemplified with *GTA*. Games can furthermore be repeated endlessly and produce similar but different experiences. And lastly, movies can be continuously and serially substituted by other movies.

While digital media can temporally extend drug engagements by immediately and continuously accentuating premises, the material effects of the drug may also extend the catalogue of media activities which can be included as contexts for drug engagements. Some participants argued that they would engage in the same media activities as when they are sober. Others – notably Neil and Oscar – said that the material effects of the drug would also modulate the subjective quality-threshold of media activities. Oscar mentioned the

metaphor of just wanting "empty calories" when he was stoned, where deeper movies could challenge the intoxication and the social arrangement of drug engagements. But Neil also stressed the function of these 'lower quality' activities as filling in the voids when for instance 'higher quality' TV shows are not on avail and in between seasons. The hand-in-hand-ness of drugs and media is thus a *co-extensive* relation. Digital media accentuate premises for making media activities present, and the material effects of the drug also accentuates the presencing of media activities that under sober conditions would remain absent. The accentuation of digital activities through the material effects of the drug should also be seen as an outcome of the activities that are being diminished and remain absent throughout the drug engagements. Although other potential activities may be initially imagined, they are subsequently impeded or blocked by the effects of the drug. According to the participants' accounts, these activities could concern conversations, activities that demand more active physical participants or practical activities. The accentuation of digital activities should therefore also be related to the activities that are being diminished by the material effects of the drug.

A last important digital reciprocation of the microgenetic processes of imagination and drug engagements emerges from the arrangements around and on digital media that the participants actively arrange or are pre-arranged by the devices. The arrangements are part of the accentuations and diminutions of premises and reciprocations. The arrangements also emphasize that the reciprocations of digital media cannot only be grasped by attending to the specificity of the devices. The reciprocations are also filtered and further specified by the arrangements of digital media. Just to recapture, in the empirical analyses we have seen the solitary arrangements of Frank and Karen. We have seen the social arrangements of Oscar and Neil. We have seen the active arrangements on digital media in the forms of multiple open and active social channels, YouTube subscriptions and 'likes' on social media. All these arrangements have been analyzed as materializations of specific imaginations that reciprocate and accentuate premises for actualizing activities-with-the-drug. In a similar way that reciprocations of the participants' imagination have been rendered above, the arrangements translate sequences of imagined and actual activities into a concrete simultaneity that can be instantaneously imagined and presenced. They stabilize that imagination in time and space, and thus they pre-exist the active imagination of the participants after being materialized and arranged. In Frank's *Breaking Bad* period, the premise for his imagination is accentuated and reciprocated as described above, but it is also re-

ciprocated and accentuated by his arrangement of digital media at home. In other daily incidences where such drug engagements are not as actively imagined in their absence, the arrangement still contributes to the routinized and embodied imagination in a similar way that has also been analyzed in Karen's corner arrangement. And likewise, arrangements *on* digital media may recreate the imagination and accentuate premises for drug engagements. Neil's account is exemplary: How turning on his laptop would activate multiple social channels whereby communities for drug engagements would instantaneous be imaginable, and how such communities could prompt his imagination although his intended computer activity would originally be directed elsewhere. All in all, the arranging arrangements of digital media are important when it comes to understanding how the agency of imaginative processes is distributed onto and recreated by the digital and material everyday living of the participants. Even though they in part have been actively arranged by the participants at one point, their ability to materialize and stabilize a specific constellation of imagined activities in space and time accentuates the premises for actualization prior to the participants actively imagine and presence them by themselves. And thus, the arrangements are part of the emergence of routinized and embodied processes of imagination in the everyday living of the participants.

Digital reciprocations of the meta-level of imagination

Most of the digital reciprocations summarized above relate to the co-constitution of the microgenetic processes of the imagination. But what are important digital reciprocations of the meta-level of imagination, of the imagined meta-projections? The analysis of digital reciprocations of the meta-levels of imagination may need more intensive research. Or maybe the meta-level points out some of the limitations of the concept of reciprocation. In comparison to the emergence of imagined meta-projections, reciprocations are suitable for understanding and analyzing the microgenetic emergences of imagined and actual activities-with-the-drug that are predominantly co-constituted by digital media. We can understand the emergence and continuous modulation of imagined meta-projections as when premises and elements from interactions with digital media are abstracted from the microgenetic processes and take on a more general form – as when they become a defining

part of the participants' directionalities and projects beyond the concrete contexts. And the continuous interactions with media can solidify and confirm them in the living of the participants as for instance exemplified by the rap cultures among Oscar's group of friends. Although the analyses have shown that media are crucial in forming them, the imagined meta-projections nevertheless comprise a wider subjective scope. They are not only directed towards particular contexts – they expand beyond them. They are not only co-constituted by a single aspect of digital media – they are co-constituted by various interactions with media. Neither are they just co-constituted by media, but by many other experiences in the participants' past and actual living. And so on. If we anyway should arrive at some implications of digital reciprocations for the emergence and development of the young people's directionalities and projects in their living, reciprocations would need to be fathomed in a wider perspective as well. This research provides only a tentative ground for this. However, some implications can be proposed.

In the analysis, imagined meta-projections do also emerge from media activities as anchor points for continuous iterations. The voracious complex formation of the meta-projections can be considered as internally related to the indefinite sources of media activities that digital media have infiltrated into everyday living. I have earlier suggested the complexification of complexes as a possible thickening of imagined meta-projections. If we accept this premise of complexity, we can add – since the participants can actively seek out and explore indefinite sources through digital media – that it recreates the possibility of developing very specialized and idiosyncratic constructions of imagined meta-projections. If we compare it to the early ethnographic studies on drugs, the studies of cultural meanings of drugs were typically related to a distinct subculture, like the hippies in the referred study of Willis. Although the coherent and uniform notion of subculture has been criticized and relativized (see e.g. Moore, 2004), digital media may have definitively destabilized and multiplied such a notion. It would have been possible in the present study to make more overall categories in which the research participants could have been grouped together. The projects of the participants, in which drugs have become a part of, all embody a discontent with normative standards and possibilities offered by society. And a sub-division hereof could be artistic creation, in one way or another, as a way of transgressing and dealing with this discontent. Making these rough categorizations and divisions would, however, neglect the distinctiveness and complexity of the different co-constitutions of imagined projects and meta-projections. And maybe the

complexity is very telling of digital reciprocations on the meta-level. It high-lights how the digital media recreate *the premise for imagining itself.*

Digital reciprocations of intensifications and of the narrowing in and suspension of imagination

A great amount of analytical attention has been given to exploring how the intensifications processes of the young people's drug engagements. The main interest in these processes has been to explore how the internal relation be-tween imagination and digital media are part of the development of drug-related problems as *restrictive* premises. As I have mentioned before, concepts like addiction and dependency, that normally voice problematic aspects of drug use, presuppose processes of intensified drug use in the transition from recreational or moderate to regular or excessive use of drugs. Intensification of drug engagements has in this project not per default been regarded as em-blematic of restrictive or problematic engagements. Processes of intensified engagements and disengagements from other endeavors can have expansive dimensions and, according to the analyses of Gomart & Hennion (1999), produce the generosity by which passions and strong sensations can emerge. The emergence of restrictive premises has been analyzed where intensified drug engagements establish conflicts in relation to other aspects of the partic-ipants' everyday living, although the development of drug engagements under expansive premises have been part of transcending previous problems.

In its positive determination, then, the impetus of drug engagements can be understood as emerging from the subjective and material aspects of imaginative processes directed by and towards the relevancies of imagined meta-projections. In its critical determination, drug engagements can also be fueled by and emerge from the premise of defensively dealing with conflicts. In the analyses, the emergence of restrictive premises for drug engagements have tentatively been conceived as *suspensions*, developed over the work of Gomart & Hennion (1999) and Schüll (2012). The emergence of suspensions of other important, albeit conflictual, engagements in the young people's liv-ing have in the empirical analysis been the primary markers of the moments where expansive premises for drug engagements are turned into their own contradiction. Based on the research this far, what can be said to be im-

portant implications of imagination and reciprocations of digital media for the emergence of restrictive premises for drug engagements?

In the empirical analyses, I have extracted the processes by which the participants' imagination undergoes processes of narrowing in of the directedness towards drug engagements. These processes have been related to the reciprocations of digital media implicated in the generation of attachment to the hand-in-hand-relation between media and drugs, of routinization of imagination through everyday arrangements of digital media and of the belonging to instantaneously imagined communities. The accentuation of these aspects of premises for drug engagements have also been related to digital reciprocations. All these aspects and processes can be accounted for as contributing to the intensification of drug engagements in different ways. Although they also play a crucial role when restrictive premises emerge, they should not be understood *as* restrictive. The restrictive premise emerges from what in critical psychology is called a *defensive* handling of conflictual contradictions, which in the empirical explorations has not been isolated as cognitive strategies deployed by the person, but emerging from interactions with digital media. Suspensions have been proposed as a way of handling conflicts defensively. So, the more concrete question is how the relation between imagination, digital media and drug engagements is implicated in the generation of suspensions?

First of all, we can stress that the emergence of restrictive premises is *not* related to *the absence of imagination.* One reason for this is that the participants' directedness towards drug engagements is premised on the subjective and material aspects of imagination even though it at a certain point acquires the restrictive premise of suspending other important engagements. Imagination under these circumstances is implicated in directedness and suspensions simultaneously. Another reason is that restrictive premises, although they may suspend actual engagements, do not necessarily imply a complete suspension of imagination. However, it can be argued that what is being blocked, hindered and suspended is the possibilities of the imagination to develop expansive premises for potential ways of transcending conflictual contradictions. In the following I will point out some of the important ways in which the empirical material has shown how the emergence of restrictive premises for drug engagements is related to imagination and reciprocations of digital media.

Some of the participants raised certain kinds of problems as related to time. The problem of time is a problem of developing relevant engagements in the everyday living. It is also related to the problem of developing the imagination. But it is as such not the absence of imagination. Oscar was con-

fronted with the rapid transition from graduating from high school to the decisions of what to do with his life after that. Frank lamented that there were too many hours in one day, and Karen did so too in a similar fashion. Although all these situations imply very open-ended imaginative processes of 'what to do?!', they are not devoid of imagined possibilities. Karen could imagine engaging in other activities like practical chores, practicing the violin or reading a book; Frank imagined going for a swim or a ride on the bike instead of smoking; Oscar might have had ideas, but I did not go into them. The problem of the expansive development of imagination and engagements as expressed in the problem of time was suspended by the engagement in drugs and media. The suspension appears to be accomplished by *translating the experience of the temporal void into the experience of its opposite* through the interactions between digital media and the drug. The temporal expansivity of the hand-in-hand activities of drugs and digital media in their concrete arrangements suspends the problem of time. This sort of establishment of 'inverted correspondence' between the problem and its suspension can be found in other relations in the empirical material. The inversion can also be seen in Frank's engagements with the imagined communities of the worlds of fiction. Frank expressed his worries in relation to engaging in actual social settings. Socializing was not always a problem for him. When he imagines himself in possible social settings, it is connected with anxious feelings. His drug and media engagements, including the imagined communities of fiction, suspend his anxieties, but they also suspend the development of imagined potentials of, and actual experiences with, dealing with the situation. The suspensions attained by finding and engaging in activities in drugs and media that correspond to the content of the problem and then inverting it, is described in a similar vein by Schüll (2012). Only, she manages to expand these correspondences to key elements of contemporary life (see p. 252 in this dissertation) – which I have not managed to do to the same extent. The inversion of correspondences can be seen as one aspect of the suspension of conflicting engagements. In turn, the hand-in-hand-ness of drugs and media accentuated by digital arrangements should also be included in the processes of blocking the actualization of the imagined and suspended engagements. Karen exemplified this contradiction by stating that her corner is a space of security and of being stuck.

Suspensions also establish elimination of contradictions by processes of one-siding the imagination. Both Neil and Oscar expressed how they at some level had felt that maybe they were smoking too much, that the "cool-

ness" and "good times" of engaging in drugs could possibly also be opposite. Neil told how his imagination could overrule the actual experience of drug engagements, aided by the flattening of the feeling of disappointments generated by the hand-in-hand relation of drugs and media in their social arrangements. Oscar did various times try to confront his friends and to invite the imagination that maybe they were smoking too much – a possibility that was suspended. Such one-siding processes are not just social, but material too. As Oscar described, it is possible to be surrounded by digital activities that confirm the positive sides that the participants imagine drug engagements to be a part of. This is a joint accomplishment of the participants' activities and the reciprocations of digital media.

It is true when Oscar stresses that he and his friends by themselves created this imagination through digital media. But this possibility of tailoring the imagination in a one-sided way is internally related to the presencing potential of digital media. On a more analytical note, I have tried to qualify how digital media more actively produce these one-sided processes. In general, this concerns how *past and stored activities on digital media are promoted and accentuated as possible activities* when the participants interact with them. More specifically I have proposed how especially websites, for instance YouTube, recreate past and current activities as habits and profiles which promote activities similar to that habit and profile. These reciprocations of the digital activities of the participants are more widely recognized in scientific communities as reputation silos (Turow, 2011), filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) and similar terms. It is clear that the participants are not forced to interact with promoted activities. But it highlights yet another way in which a digital recreation of imagination and activities is accentuated in a one-siding direction and how contradicting images and impressions are being suspended in and by the digital everyday living. Every activity is not entirely constituted by the participants.

A last important aspect of suspensions as restrictive premise for drug engagements regards the elimination of contradiction through the blocking and suspension of potentiality: Imagined facticity. The suspension of potentiality through imagined facticity is not unrelated to the other two aspects – the suspensions of developing imagined possibilities of other engagements and of contradictions. When Oscar developed the legitimacy of his drug engagements through the "cool" imagery presented by certain rap cultures, and when Neil continuously substantiated his drug engagements with "good times", the engagements are imagined *as* "cool", *as* "good times". The restrictive facticity of these imaginative premises only emerges as such when they

persist in the face of felt conflicts related to the engagements. In these cases, they suspend the possibility of engagements also being other things than "cool" and "good times", and because of that, the potentiality of acting upon them differently is likewise blocked. Other examples have shown how the imagined facticity is also related to imagining engagements and a living without drugs which for many of the participants would be synonymous with the oppositional field of their imagined meta-projections. When Karen imagined a life without drugs, she envisioned a dystopic imagery of an infinite concrete slab stretching. Ellen imagined her life as boring if she would not go out anymore. Processes like these are imaginative, but they do not generate potentials in dealing with current conflicts. On the contrary, they explain why maintained drug engagements are the better option. The research has not systematically explored how interactions with digital media are related to the content of imagined processes like these. But the research suggests that the blocking of potentiality co-occurs with the suspensions of imagined possibilities of other engagements and of contradictions where digital media and their arrangements in various ways are implicated.

The emergence of restrictive premises for drug engagements as different aspects of suspensions are thus related to imagination. And the restrictive premises are also temporally extended by the hand-in-hand relation between drugs and digital media and routinized by arranging arrangements of digital media. Restrictive premises and suspensions are thus also subjected to and accentuated by the material agency of the digital everyday living of the participants. And it is important to acknowledge these material aspects as actively involved in the constitution, continuation and accentuation of restrictive premises of the imagination in drug-related problems in order not to reduce the processes of suspensions as individual and cognitive avoidance strategies. It is also important to stress that the critical determination of the restrictive premises for young people's drug engagements cannot be separated from the positive determination of drug engagements which embodies relevance and directionality in the young people's living. Both aspects are constitutive of the engagements in the midst of conflict.

Spurring the curiosity: Absent answers and questions yet be explored

There are without a doubt still many questions whose answers remain absent after this research. In this section, I will address two questions that I find important in relation to the initial research interest.

One of the surprising findings of the research is the kind of digital activities that acquire and produce relevance in relation to the participants' drug engagements and imagination. One aspect of these relevant digital activities is related to the technological specificity of the devices. What could be regarded as 'new digital media', that is, smaller, mobile and handheld devices, are relatively absent in the participants' accounts of how digital media are related to their drug engagements and imagination. Instead, engagements in bigger-screened technologies and more 'traditional' media activities like movies, TV shows, computer games and music are more predominant. The activities should not be equaled traditional media – that is why 'traditional' is in quotation marks. The participants engage in them on new digital platforms that change the intensity and possibility of interacting and engaging with the activities, which I have analyzed. The specificity of these activities has been characterized by a spatial and temporal extensity[46]. The engaging quality of this specificity has in part been explained by their ability to create a synergic relation with the material effects of marijuana as a drug. Although the research participants also reported about other media activities of reduced extensity like music videos, interviews, video bits on how to roll a joint, as relevant, the digital activities of greater spatial and temporal extensity seem to have a decisive aptness at co-constituting the engagements in drugs. When Neil told about instances where arrangements of drug engagements broke down due to the absence of internet access, it is therefore also not arbitrary that 'older media' like a DVD player was brought to rectify the arrangement instead of recoursing to newer but smaller digital media. But a question arises when the technical specificity is backgrounded. Across the digital activities, the imagination and concrete engagements related to drugs attain their significance and relevance via *aesthetic* forms to a greater degree than for instance via information *about* drugs. Ellen reported reading the odd article now and then, Si-

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[46] Music is more variable since a song can be rather short, but an album or a play list can be extensive. Music can also act as a soundtrack to an event or arrangement.

mon said that he read about drugs primarily in the beginning of his drug-experimentations, and Frank deliberately blocked it out of his digital everyday living. But the aesthetics of movies, TV shows, games and music and the atmospheres they express seem to play a significant role in the formation of drug engagements and imaginative directionalities. The aesthetic forms, then, seem to be crucial for the formation of imagined orientations and directionalities in the young people's drug engagements. But what is the specific role of aesthetics in these constructions of relevancies in the young people's living? Questioning the significance of aesthetics, or *percepts* as I have also called it, has been a part of the research interest of this project. In the theoretical chapter 4, I raised the question on what the implications were of percepts when they enter into expansive and restrictive processes of the imagination since the transcending movement from the restrictive toward the expansive are typically grounded in conceptual processes of language-based dialogue in critical psychology. Unfortunately, the research does not provide more specific answers, and the question would need to be taken up in another project. What can be pointed out additionally is that studies in digital everyday living need to attend to the aesthetic, or sensory-affective, qualities which digital media bring into our living. A term like *information technologies* (IT) has for a long time been synonymous with media, and in later times IT has been expanded by ICT to include their communicative abilities. The present research points to the necessity of acknowledging and investigating digital media as much more than 'informing' our subjectivities and engagements (see e.g. McCarthy & Wright, 2004).

A second important question that is still not clearly answerable relates to the apparent separation of the problem and relevance in participants' perception of drug engagements. In the interviews, the participants could inform me with relative ease about the relation between their drug engagements and digital media and also about what I have analyzed as imaginative processes by which they continuously have been directed towards drug engagements. Still, there was a tendency of understanding problematic aspects as isolated from these co-constituted processes. In the analysis, I have included this discrepancy in relation to Frank. What puzzled him was what it is in the drug that makes you continue to smoke although you know it is unhealthy (p. 261). Yet, he also proposes that a possible way of transcending his drug patterns could be to find a "new underworld" which excluded the drug (p. 278). In this latter example, Frank at some level creates a link between his drug en-

gagements and the imaginative world of "underworlds" and suggests that a new underworld could substitute his current engagements. He hereby maintains a continuity between the relevance and expansive premises of imagination. But this continuity is not present in his initial puzzle. In a similar way, other participants would describe themselves as addicts (not included in the analysis) or as having a vulnerability towards addictive behaviors in spite of the connections to relevancies and imagination that we also talked about. It is, of course, a main purpose of this project to minimize this epistemic gap between problem and relevance by researching the premises of imagination and digital media for drug engagements. The question, then, is by which specific *processes* the perception of drug-related problems gets separated from the relevance of drug engagements. This study provides some preliminary clues. The processes of routinization of imagination and drug engagements – which arrangements of digital media accentuate and reciprocate in different ways – may be implicated in obscuring the link between relevance and emerging problem. What is initially 'absent' in drug engagements remains perceptibly absent due to the foregrounded presence of routines. As part of these processes, a decoupling of the imagined and actual may emerge whereby the imagined is put in the illegitimate position of *fiction* – as when Karen reacts to my introduction of the "romantic" as imagination by retorting that it is never romantic when you are in the midst of the engagements. The decoupling means, however, that the imagined still forms premises for actual engagements, but not for the project: The actualization and approximation of imagined meta-projections.

Chapter 10: Revisiting and Refining Theoretical Concepts

While the empirical analyses have given the opportunity to develop theoretically informed understandings of the realities of young people engaged in drugs, the realities of the young people reversely serve as an empirical case for revising and refining theoretical concepts that are central to this project. The theoretical chapters in the beginning of the monograph have had the purpose of exploring the theoretical research questions, and the purpose of this chapter is to propose further conceptual refinements grounded in the empirical work. The empirically-grounded conceptual refinements include suggestions for how the research on imaginative processes should be continued. I will elaborate three main aspects which reflect the theoretical research questions that are presented in the introduction: How imaginative processes are internally related to ongoing engagements in everyday living, including materiality, and how the premises of imagination are contradictory.

Conceptualizing fundamental aspects of imaginative processes in everyday living

The study of imagination in this project is inscribed in a wider epistemic frame of how we can understand and research psychological processes. In a social-psychological perspective, the processes are understood as a relation between the individual and society. When the study of everyday living is the approach to studying this relation, research tries to grasp psychological processes as situated in the concrete circumstances of the living that the person is actively involved and engaged in. One-sided or linear renderings of how psychological processes are *determined* by societal conditions have therefore a too narrow scope and lose the processes by which the person continuously arranges and transforms concrete circumstances. Studying the imagination helps us understand the processes by which the person is able to creatively transform circumstances and construct and pursue hopes and dreams which in this project have been explored as the imagined directionalities that the

young people are in the processes of developing, approximating and distancing themselves from. The imagination, indeed, seems to endow people with a degree of freedom to loosen their subjectivities and activities from immediate circumstances and experiences on small or large scale.

Translating imagination and its constituents into everyday engagements via premises

In spite of this *bounded* freedom, imaginative processes are grounded in everyday living. We always imagine something, by something. Imagination is grounded because it is constitutive of our activities in the concrete realities of our social and material living. Imagination is grounded because it is co-constituted by it, too. This groundedness is essential when researching the relation between imagination and everyday living. Even though we imaginatively may project ourselves into a distant future or past or an alternative present, the question that needs to be researched is how this has implications for our everyday engagements. And in a psychological perspective, the question is how imagination is implicated in ways in which people develop and deal with problems and conflicts in their everyday living. In order to keep this groundedness in focus, the concept of *premises* has been introduced into the research on imagination. Premises zoom in on the processes where imagination and its socio-material constituents are brought into actualization in a person's engagements. Premises help to forge the link between the subjective and socio-material side of imagination and between imagination and concrete activities. In this way, premises simultaneously include the co-constitutive and co-constituted dimension that co-occur in actualization. Still, even though premises can equip research with an analytical ocular to zoom in on these links, clarifying how activities and imagination are related in everyday living needs more elaboration. Premises should not be misunderstood as the moments where a totality of what is imagined is being actualized. What is being actualized may be an aspect as ephemeral as atmospheres which does not comprise the totality of the imagination that the atmospheres are part of. Nor has the conceptualization of imagination suggested that a person first imagines something – clearly – and then carries out an activity that mirrors the imagined. The way that premises as a concept has been developed in this project, does not assume such a linearity – nor that the relation between imagination and actualization can be comprehensively understood as terms of totality

or mimesis[47]. The clarification of the relation depends on conceptualizations and empirical explorations of imagination. Through the empirical analyses, I have tried to explore some central aspects of this relation, and I have relied on theoretical developments in order to expand the conceptual and analytical sensitivity towards this relation.

In the theoretical chapters I have suggested that imagination, as a starting point, is at work in processes involved in, what I called, a minimal abstraction: The minimally abstractable activity of the imagination involves a transgression of the perceptually present and the perceptually absent. It is a process of the human psyche, but – as I have argued and will return to – it is likewise a potential of materiality. The minimal abstraction has many purposes. But in its minimal form, a main purpose is to stress that imagination in its fundamental processes establishes a transgressive relation between the present and absent. Although imagination is never object-less, this transgressive relation is decisive. When I say that we always imagine something, we could err in letting the some-*thing* define what imagination *is*. But it is important to emphasize that imagination is not reducible to the images, discourses, ideologies, and so forth, that circulate in society. This would make the processes of imagination one-sided and determined by its objects and essentially separated from the person and his and her activities. Imagination is also more than the creation of irrealities and evocation of percepts that are disconnected from everyday living and isolated in the dark corridors of subjectivity. Notions like these, I concur with Scarry, tend to "underestimate the centrality and significance of imagining in everyday life" (Scarry, 1985, p. 162), and similarly I concur with Starobinski, quoted in the theoretical chapters, that imagination is more than the mere evocation of images. The *transgressive relation* is therefore crucial in overcoming these reductions, although they may also occur in minimal form. The minimal abstraction may render the processes that we cherish in imagination as barren and cold, stripped of vitality, vibrancy, affect and complexity. It may overlook the excitements and anxieties that our relations to absences may produce in current engagements. The idea is not to exclude the possibility of making such aspects, in their minimal or complex forms, part of the absent. In turn, other aspects can be included – like routinized, restrictive and facticious aspects as seen throughout the analyses – if imaginative processes are not mainly conceived of as creative and voluptuous. The

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[47] See e.g. Wulf's (2014) suggestions on how imagination and action are linked through the performativity of mimetic processes.

transgressive relation between absence and presence allows us to understand how the continuous presence of engagements in everyday living is related to absences in multiple ways and how this relation has implications for what is present and being presenced in ongoing engagements.

Processes of imagination basically alter our subjectivity and activities in everyday living from being sub-jections to pro-jections: The person's throwing-forth-ness of what is not (yet) present in hers or his ongoing engagements. The imagination is pivotal in everyday living where we are continuously 'throwing' our present into a near or distant future. These processes are impossible without imagination. But, as I have argued, imagined projections are much more and can equally relate to imagining of an absent past or an absent present parallel to our current present, as when we imagine the subjectivities of others when we converse with them or when we imagine what content of a book we have not read. The transgressive relation is therefore not limited to future-oriented processes. Imaginative activities may emerge and disappear without greater implications for our future doing. Things that are being imagined for no explicit purpose beyond the activity itself may end up forming premises for actual engagements. Activities may become engaging because the person establishes an imaginative link to engagements that are yet-absent in, but related to, the present activity. Current activities can even become engaging through their imaginative connection to something which is not clearly perceptible to the person.

Contesting **telos** *as subjective manifestations of imagination*

These different moments of the transgressive relation between the present and absent have been attempted to be clarified by the different derivations of *telos*: Autotelic, teleological and teleonomic. By drawing on Engelsteds (1989) application of especially teleology and teleonomy, they have throughout this thesis been devised to capture different subjective manifestations of directedness that emerge from imagination and simultaneously to capture how they emerge as premises in situated ways. But the concepts may not be adequate, and in some understandings, they may even be unfortunate as I have realized in the processes of research and writing this thesis. The concept of telos originates from Aristotelian biology. Although the concept has been used in other fields, the concept does not completely evade a functionalist understanding of purpose and directedness of activities. This is in contrast to the subjective qualities of imagination that I have tried to get a better understand of through

the concepts. Secondly, teleo-*nomy* has its roots in *nomos*, widely translated as *laws*, which contradicts the vague and *open-ended* processes of the imagination that I have tried to grasp via the concept. Therefore, the concepts are not fully adequate to the purpose of the research, and in future research more adequate concepts need to be developed to understand the clear vs. vague directionalities of subjectivity and imagination and the emergence of them as premises. The differing, or shifting, subjective qualities of the imagination in everyday living are nevertheless important. They emphasize that imaginative processes are not only implicated in clearly defined goal-directed activities. Imagination is equally involved in situations and developments that are vague, ambivalent and contradictory. If we were to take a retrospective look upon how these situations and developments have been resolved in our or others' lives, we would probably only understand how imaginative processes have formed premises for the actual resolution, and not how they are implicated in the ambiguous processes. What I have called the teleonomic processes can evenly account for processes that are explorative – filled with curiosity – and stagnant – filled with despair. The intention behind the different concepts has been to create understandings of how a person develops hers or his everyday living according to different subjective qualities of the imagination ranging from uncertainty to more clearly defined directionalities.

The meta-level of imagination vs. ontogenetic imagination

The minimal abstraction tells in itself little about *what* people may imagine and in relation to *what* and *how* it develops over time and across space. This is a deliberate openness in the conceptualization, although these blanks become crucial to fill in when we want to understand how a person develops hers or his everyday living through imaginative processes. The relation between the absent and present can thus be configured in indefinite ways in everyday living. A conceptual differentiation that however has grown out of the empirical material is the specification of the microgenetic and meta-levels of the imagination. This differentiation has established a link between practice-to-practice imagination and a wider imaginative landscape by which the microgenetic processes are substantiated by projects beyond the particular context in a person's living.

In many ways, this differentiation is similar to the differentiation made by Gillespie & Zittoun (2016) when they distinguish the microgenetic and on-

togenetic processes of imagination. Gillespie & Zittoun discuss and analyze various examples of how these levels are interrelated. Most attention seems to be given to how the ontogenetic levels emerge creatively from microgenetic levels as generalized meaning structures or personal life philosophies that guide a person's life trajectory (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, p. 101). Meanwhile, the analysis in this project seems to do the reverse: To analyze how meta-levels of the imagination substantiate and articulate relevance at the microgenetic levels of imagination. In this way, this project contributes to understanding how imaginative processes that are more stable over time have implications for the microgenetic processes of imagination. This relation has indeed presented itself as being crucial, especially when the microgenetic processes have become routinized and/or form restrictive premises for everyday engagements. As shown in the empirical analyses, in these instances the microgenetic processes may be perceived as being isolated by the participants, and the estrangement in questions like 'why do I continue doing this?!' may remain in impenetrable if not related to relevance-producing substantiations of the meta-levels of imagination.

It can be discussed, however, if imagined meta-projections refer to the same processes as the ontogenetic imagination. When I in the interviews asked the participants about their dreams and hopes for the future, they responded with ideas that where not always clearly related to the imagined meta-projections, and none reported that drugs should play a significant part in their imagined futures (they were, after all, in drug treatment). Yet, the imagined meta-projections embody the projects that have brought the participants to where they were at the time of the interviews and the times that they retrospectively reported in the interviews. So, the construction of directionalities that the participants were in the processes of approximating and distancing themselves from does have an ontogenetic scope. When the meta-level does not seem to account for the whole of the ontogenetic imagination, it could come down to the fact our everyday living is not structured by or directed towards a single project, but towards a multiplicity of more and less related projects – this is not far from what the analyses of Gillespie & Zittoun (e.g. 2016, p. 97) suggest. In the imagined meta-projections of the participants, drugs had been incorporated into projects as agents in the actualization processes of the projects. But not all constituents of the meta-projective complexes form premises as something to be directly pursued or actualized in a near or distant future. If we take Oscar's pursuit, "cool" formed an imaginative premise for engaging in drugs. Drugs became the agents in approximat-

ing the directionality of "cool". But the rap cultures that created a confirmatory link between the actual drug engagements and the meta-projection of "cool" were not a part of the approximation as such. The rap cultures substantiated the engagements in a parallel fashion instead of something providing an end or a goal of the engagements on longer term. Imagined meta-projections may therefore rather be an intersection between projects, ontogenesis and a particular object or activity-with-the-object. Maybe another more precise concept needs to be developed to substitute the relevance-producing meta-level that I have tried to analyze through imagined meta-projections. The imagined meta-projections as an analytical object has, however, provided insight into the incredible wealth of absences – including imagined percepts, atmospheres, affects and 'worlds' – which substantiate the microgenetic premises for engagements in everyday living.

The meta-level, notwithstanding, seems to be important in elucidating the relevance of microgenetic processes even when they emerge as restrictive premises for engagements. If the meta-level is coupled with the concept that has now been subjected to skepticism – namely teleonomic processes – another aspect of the vague processes of imagination can be highlighted. The vague relations between the present and absent as rendered above have been described as open-ended processes or directionalities towards *vague ends*. However, there have also been instances where *vague links* between actual engagements and the imagined are being established. Frank described drugs as an "underworld", but the relation that the drug establishes to "underworlds" caused suffering in Frank's living when I talked with him. He therefore at a point in the interview suggests that maybe he needs to find a new "underworld" without knowing concretely what possibilities could lead to that. In this example, the meta-level defines a goal that is yet devoid of possible actualization or approximation. In Bloch's terminology, this would be an example of an *abstract utopia* (Bloch, 1976). The teleonomic processes of the imagination, as it were, can thus be researched in the vague constructions and continuous modulations of the meta-level (open-ended processes) and in the clearer directionalities with vaguer perception of approximating possibilities on the microgenetic levels (abstract utopias).

Conceptualizing relations between person and materiality in imaginative processes

A central proposition of this research for understanding imaginative processes in everyday living is to conceptualize how the persons' premises for everyday engagements are formed by the internal relation between imagination and materiality. In the empirical material, digital media and their arrangements have been the primary objects to be analyzed as internally related to the imaginative processes of the young people engaged in drugs. In everyday living, we are surrounded by, interact with and arrange ourselves with a multiplicity of objects which have other characteristics and objectivities than digital media. Conceptualizing the relation between imagination and materiality aims at creating an understanding of a relation that is more general than the specific objects of digital media. Based in the research this far, how should we continue to work with this relation?

The reciprocating potential of materiality as materialized imagination

When we want to understand the internal relation between imagination and materiality, we are basically exploring how the person and materiality are simultaneously implicated in the emergence and actualization of imaginative processes. Imagination and materiality are *inter*dependent. This means that imagination cannot be isolated to the subjective side of the processes and materiality to a final product that is brought into being by a person's imagination. The internal relation further implicates that the relation between the subjective and the material aspects of imagination changes according to the specificity of the materiality and the specific activities of the person. This means that the specific findings of the research on how imaginative processes are co-constituted by digital media (in the context of drug engagements) will not be specific to other objects. In order to grasp the internal relation between imagination and materiality, concepts need to be developed that can capture the generality of the relation and still be sensitive to the specifics.

A challenge of conceptualizing this relation is that the transgressive relation, which I have put at the heart of imaginative processes, presupposes the emergence of something that is absent in relation to present engagements.

While this imagined absence is *subjectively* present, the materiality that is supposed to be co-constitutive of it, is *not* necessarily present. If the constituents of imagination were demanded to be present, too, then our imaginative processes would be bound to the materiality only within our immediate presence. The emergence of absences does depend on the subjective processes of the person. The person is even able to imagine things that may seem totally out of place in a given context. Nonetheless, if these processes are not a purely subjective, how, then, can materiality be conceived of as co-constitutive thereof?

In order to grasp a more general relation between imagination and materiality, I have generated a vocabulary through theoretical discussions of Vygotsky, Gillespie & Zittoun, Wartofsky and Scarry. All these theorists agree that the processes of imagination are not separate from the world and everyday living that we live in and experience. But I have analyzed them as representing slightly different positions in relation to the active role of materiality in co-constituting imagination. Based on the theoretical discussion of especially Wartofsky and Scarry – and grounded in empirical analyses – I have suggested that the first step in understanding how materiality is internally related to imagination is to conceive objects as *materialized imagination*. What makes it possible to talk about apparently dead and paralyzed objects as embodying imagination is the merit of the minimal abstraction. The transgression of something present by something absent – although it cannot be carried out without the activity of the person – is also a potential of material agency in general. The potential of objects of making absences present is what makes them able to be internally related to the processes of imagination and not only as objects that a person imaginatively creates or draws on in her or his imagination. While we can talk to people and explore their imagination intersubjectively, materiality is recalcitrant and *objects* to revealing its materialization of imagination. That is why it is necessary to 'torture' things to confessions with concepts and analysis. Perceiving objects as materialized imagination is, as said, the first step of torturing. The next step is to realize that the potential of materiality to make absences present through human activity is performed by *reciprocation* of the human activity, as Scarry has conceptualized it. That is, the potential of materiality of making absences present exceeds the human potential of doing a corresponding act. In a concrete activity – when the activity of a person and of an object forms the premise for actualization – the performance of a person and the reciprocation of objects become insep-

arable. That is why Scarry claims that reciprocation is only actualized by the projection of the person – projection understood as creation of, interaction with and even imagining of objects. So, the *reciprocation of materialized imagination* can be proposed as a fundamental concept that we need to include in the theoretical work in order to understand the material side of the internal relation to the subjective side in processes of imagination. But it probably also needs further refinement and elaboration. I will discuss some issues in the following.

Reciprocations of imagination in the absence of objects

The relation between projection and reciprocation, as Scarry construes it, explains how *an action* is performed by the person and materiality simultaneously. Reciprocation is part of the *actual* act; the act that is presenced. But the activity of imagining implies that something is still *not* actualized, either because it is impossible or is in the processes of being gradually or partially actualized. How can we talk about something being reciprocated and still being absent? Maybe this leap is not so gigantic anyway. When we imagine, we can imagine absent objects, absent activities-with-objects and absent activities where objects are abstracted from the imaginatively present activity. Would it be too farfetched to assume that in these instances, the reciprocation of absent materiality is already present in the constitution of such processes of imagination? I would argue that it is not. If a person imagines that he or she would like to travel to the other side on the planet on the next two-week holiday, the content of such imagining may not directly include materiality. But the processes of imagining that holiday is reciprocated by the plane as a technology. Walking to the other side of the planet would not be possible in two weeks. The projection of oneself into an imaginary holiday is therefore also performed by the reciprocation of the materialized imagination in an airplane of making absent places present within a compressed timeframe. The conceptualization of how imagination is internally related to materiality via reciprocation is not a fetishization of imagination. Objects do not need to be the center of attention of what is being imagined. But it does not exempt the imagined from being reciprocated by objects that are not visibly present in actuality or in imagination.

The marginality and limitations of material reciprocations

Throughout the research, my attempt has been to explore and understand the internal relation between imagination and materiality in order to provoke and expand our epistemic and scientific imagination. This involves looking and searching for the material basis of imaginative processes even in areas where it intuitively is not imagined to be[48]. We can also search for the limits of the assertion. The internal relation does not imply that imaginative processes are *exclusively* related to materiality. In their theory of imagination, Gillespie & Zittoun (2016) for instance also include social interactions as "resources" for imaginative processes. And in conversations with others we will also rely on our imagination to project ourselves into the other person's thoughts and feelings, especially if exchanges become ambiguous. Social interactions and exchanges never occur independent of material spaces or technology, but it can be discussed how central or marginal such materiality is for the person who imagines. If a friend confides that he or she is terminally ill, any material reciprocations of that situation would possibly be irrelevant to the devastating pain of the imagined loss that is forthcoming. In examples like this, the implications and relevance of reciprocations of materialized imagination is limited. But I will continue to refine the understanding of the internal relation and outline where work is still needed.

There are areas where the concept of reciprocation also needs to be developed or at least clarified. One of Scarry's main projects with the concept is to draw attention to how the material world is far from inanimate and that the humanly created objects are reversely performative in human activity. Although imagination is central in her theory for explaining the creation of objects and the objects' recreation of humans, reciprocation is actualized by humans acting upon or with objects. That means that when activities with objects are imagined and not yet acted upon (or form premises for engagements), reciprocations only exist in a virtual or potential – if not imaginary – form and are as such not yet actualized even though they are materialized. Hence, there is a gap between the imagined and the material. The closing of

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[48] The importance of this relation is to understand how people do not just use and draw on objects and materials in the world around them to construct their imagination according to their own will. The activities of objects also play a definitive role in the emergence of imagination.

the gap can naturally be done by the person who chooses to actualize an imagined activity with an object as the young person who chooses to smoke and become recreated by a joint. But I have also attempted to let objects be agents in closing this gap. Here I have suggested that the creation or arrangements of objects can *accentuate* and *diminish* reciprocations as premises for engagements. These terms have become important in the empirical analyses especially when the implications of the participants' arrangements – that is, the specific interobjectuality – of objects need to be clarified. In many of Scarry's examples, reciprocations are analyzed in relation to interactions with or creation of a single object which potentially can embody multiple specified and non-specified reciprocations – especially when it comes to complex objects like digital media. In the context of the young people's arrangements of objects, I have tried to analyze how their interobjectual relation also amounts to the objects' mutual recreation *of each other*. The analysis has practically turned the objects against each other. Through these interobjectual arrangements, specific constellations of reciprocations are accentuated while others are diminished and will struggle to surface if the interobjectuality is not rearranged. Although these are thoughts in their making, they can help us understand how imaginative premises not only emerge as pre-intended by the person, but also from the accentuation of reciprocations performed by single objects or a specifically arranged interobjectuality. The arrangements, that I have analyzed, have been limited to *a* specific context in the young people's living. But focusing on arrangements can be unfolded more generally into the everyday living: How people continuously imagine and arrange material aspects of everyday contexts in order to organize and deal with their living, and how material arrangements arrange the imagination and activities of people in their everyday living.

Another area where the concept of reciprocation needs to be developed – or maybe is too narrow – is where the imagination from the perspective of the person acquires a meta-level or a higher level of generality (cf. Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). The way in which Scarry has developed the concept, reciprocations are most clearly analyzable and traceable on a microgenetic level of engagements and imagination. According to Scarry, objects are projections of the human body and recreate the human body. A chair can relieve back pain, a telescope can magnify the visual acuity of the eye, a coat replaces absent skin with present 'skin'. Objects perform magnifications, replications and eliminations of bodily sentience. Scarry's theory thus builds on immediate human-object relations. This immediate relation is simultaneously

the iteration point for creating a new projection. In chapter 3, I quoted Scarry for the example of the person who creates a new projection of an angel or a flying machine based in his body being recreated as weightless by a chair. The new projection is internally related to the initial reciprocation. The concept of reciprocation fares well when it concerns the recreation of a single bodily modality and when the absent that is imaginatively produced and projected concerns another stand-alone object, like an angel or flying machine in Scarry's examples. In the empirical analyses, this is also applicable to when the young people on a microgenetic level imagine an activity-with-the-drug and the drug's recreation of the participants' activity and subjectivity. But the analyses have also shown how these microgenetic activities are substantiated by the meta-level of imagination whereby they are embedded in wider projects and directionalities. The imagination therefore pans out from the microgenetic activity to other current and/or future contexts of activity that are substantiated by general or philosophical principles in the making. When we are moving towards meta-levels of imagination, we are dealing with a subjectivity that is wider than the reciprocations of single objects. In the example of Simon's "romantic self-destruction", Simon is able to fixate the essence of that meta-projection in the percept of the candle burning in both ends. And although he can substantiate the candle with an exhaustive number of other percepts and cultural references, the meta-projection that emerges from all these 'micro-projections' cannot by accounted for by stand-alone reciprocations, neither can the *project* be projected into a new single object – since it is not limited to an object or multiple objects. This possibly emergent level (understood as irreducible) of imagination demands more work to be conceptualized as reciprocated. In the analyses, I have tried to commence the work by attending to the multiplicity of reciprocations that continuously and iteratively substantiate, modify and substitute the *complexes of projections* that construe the meta-level of imagination. There may also be a way of thinking about the aesthetic content of movies, TV shows, books, etc., as reciprocating the imagination on the meta-level. Through these media, life projects, developments and directionalities are excessively compressed into the format of the media which allows the person to composite many 'compressed lives' into her or his own living. This could be a next step of developing the concept of reciprocation.

Overall, the reciprocations of materialized imagination in artifacts and the accentuations thereof by specific arrangements of artifacts pushes our

understanding towards grasping how the agency of imagination is being distributed onto materiality. If, for instance, imagination is defined as an activity that *previews* actions before they are actualized (cf. Starobinski), parts of that previewing-activity are already materialized, and so, it even *precedes* the imagination that is initiated by the person. If we furthermore think that there is a gap between imagining an action and its actualization – a gap consisting of the sequences of coordinated acts and materials that bring by an activity – artifacts and the arrangements of artifacts narrow this gap by readily embodying a part of these sequences or making them superfluous by replacing the need for sequenced acts (like a phone call or text message makes it superfluous to walk a distance to a friend's place by replacing physical movement with transmission)[49]. It is the person's projection (of imagined sequenced acts) into the artifact and arrangements of artifacts that materializes an imagination that readily recreates the process and possibility of imagining. Moreover, the internal relation between imagination and materiality is also a relation in movement, as process, throughout a person's everyday living: How we continually project imagination into objects and material arrangements according to the developments and changes of struggles, demands, wishes, hopes and fears; and how the imagination that is arranged and materialized continually reciprocates and forms premises for our imagination and engagements. In my empirical analysis, I have just covered a very specific arrangement in the young people's living. But it has still provided insights into the co-constituting role of material arrangements for arranging the everyday circularity and continuity in the form of the young people's establishment of routines and pursued directionalities in relation to their drug engagements.

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[49] The material relation between imagination and actualization can be unproblematic or problematic, which in the latter case may employ the necessity of individual and collective imagination to arrange and acquire materiality. Imagining drinking a glass of water is fortunately in many cases not a problem, since the sequences required for actualizing that imagination are materialized in the availability of clear water in kitchen households, a glass is within immediate reach. In places, where people unfortunately are deprived of such materialized imagination, transforming the imagination of drinking water into actualization is a life-threatening problem.

Conceptualizing the contradictory premises of imagination

The minimal abstraction has been devised to expand our understanding of imaginative processes in everyday living. I have argued that if we want to understand imagination as central to everyday engagements, we need a conceptualization that can encompass banal as well as creative aspects of engagements. The minimal abstraction does not presuppose that the absences that subjectively emerge in a person's living are extraordinary, creative, innovative or involve a clear decoupling from ongoing experiences and engagements. Absences may as well emerge as embodied, routinized, trivial, and as stable across time and space. The minimal abstraction does neither presuppose that absences are clear and crystallized. They may also remain vague, open-ended or incarcerated. If I had made a more cross-contextual study, I would probably have found that all these possible dimension and manifestations of imagination would vary across contexts – the study Gillespie & Zittoun (cf. 2016, p. 102) indicates this. The minimal abstraction does not exclude such a situated sensitivity, but it would probably strengthen the conceptualization of imaginative processes and their implications for the everyday living of the person if such a perspective were to be integrated in the conceptualization[50]. The minimal abstraction has also made it possible to understand how imagination is internally related to materiality and how materiality is co-constitutive of imaginative processes through the agency and excess of reciprocation. I have argued that reciprocation takes concepts like *mediation* of and *resources* for imagination a step further into the material agency. But there is a last aspect that the minimal abstraction serves. The idea behind the reconceptualization has

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[50] It has been a deliberate strategy on my part not to build the theorizing of imagination on other well-established approaches in an attempt to see what would happen to the knowledge production if imagination was not approached from and potentially colonized by other understandings of subjectivity and everyday living. Consequentially, the minimal abstraction is confined in a philosophical space where the relation to the multifaceted everyday living can lack in concreteness. Possible ways of developing the concept further could be to develop the concept over other psychological concepts that ground subjective processes and activities in everyday living, like for instance *narrative* subjectivity from narrative psychology or the *conduct of everyday living* from German-Scandinavian critical psychology.

been to neutralize theorizations that I have accused of embracing and valuing imagination mainly for its expansive and creative potential. The "romantic" and possibilistic notions of imagination (see also Sneath et al., 2009, pp. 10-11) tend to overlook the contradictions of imagination and how it is involved in the creation of suffering and conflicts as well as overcoming them. I will finalize this chapter by returning to this contradictoriness of imagination which has been central in the research and is a central proposition for how imaginative processes in everyday living should be continued to be researched in psychological theory.

Towards an integration of contradictions in theories on imagination

The purpose of the empirical research has not just been to explore how the young people's imagination and digital everyday living engage them in activities with drugs. The agenda has also been to explore how the imaginative and digital premises for such engagements become expansive and/or restrictive in relation to other actual or imagined aspects of the young people's living. The analysis of expansive/restrictive aspects entails a relationality beyond the microgenetic processes and contexts of drug engagements where current engagements are seen in their relation to (conflictual) conditions and directionalities in the young people's living. The contradictoriness of imagination has been analyzed as processes through which any initially expansive premises are turned into their own contradiction as restrictive premises, and vice versa. This is an attempt at arranging a marriage between theorization of imagination and core concepts of critical psychology. Analyzing engagements through the pairing of expansive/restrictive aspects presupposes that engagements in everyday living are essentially caught in the conflict of the *dual possibility* of action. In a nutshell, the dual possibility concerns: The possibility of acting under and maintain current conflictual circumstances and possibilities at the expense of long-term interests or overcoming conflictual circumstances by developing potentialities that are congruent with long-term interests. *Imagined* possibilities are implied in both aspects, but their signature changes according to how conflicts are dealt with in relation to life interests (which I have rearticulated as imagined directionalities like hopes and fears). So, besides trying to encompass creative and routinized aspects of the imagi-

nation in everyday living through the minimal abstraction, it likewise serves to encompass the expansive/restrictive aspects.

I have explored this contradiction as the *narrowing in* of imaginative processes that are simultaneously reciprocated by the aspects of the young people's digital everyday living concerning the hand-in-hand relation between drugs and media, the routinization of imagination through arranging arrangements and the instantaneous intensity of imagining and belonging to actual or fictional communities. The narrowing in of imagination related to these digital reciprocations cannot in themselves be characterized as restrictive, as I have addressed earlier. But they come to play an implicative role when conflicts emerge from or coincide with them. When abstracted from all the details in the empirical analyses, I have developed the contradictory premises of imagination in two ways: 1) How imagined pursuits that have served to overcome conflicts and suffering are turned into new forms of suffering and conflicts, and 2) how *imagination itself, in the same processes, blocks and suspends its own potential of moving towards expansive premises*. I have therefore argued for the fact that imagination is implicated in both aspects: Expansive *and* restrictive.

In the empirical material, we have seen the contradictions emerge throughout the courses of the young people's drug engagements. Ellen's attraction to "slum" and open-minded mentality of the imagined community related to "slum" is contradicted by her body shutting down after extensive poly-drug use. The continuous engagements have suspended Ellen's fears of missing out on nights out. Neil's activities-with-the-drug are imagined as "good times", but rarely turn out to be so in actuality. Simultaneously, his ongoing drug engagements suspend the problems that have gradually followed the narrowing in of imagination and the engagements (not having a job, losing a girlfriend etc.). Karen's transformation of suffering into a romanticized creative pursuit is contradicted by the non-romantic sensation when she is engaged in drugs. Her current drug engagements in her corner at home makes her feel secure *and* stuck, which expresses that she feels something is being suspended. Oscar's pursuit of "cool" as a way of overcoming his longing for something new, does not operate as "cool" in relation to the transformations after high school. Furthermore, it also suspends the demands of him developing new forms of imagination for his living and future. Simon's "romantic self-destruction" balances on the contradiction of turning into a "junkie" and the apathetic feeling of losing control. And Frank's engagements

in the imagined communities of "underworlds" end up isolating him and simultaneously suspends the feeling of being isolated and questions on what else to do with his time. The contradictory premises of imagination mean that imagination is implicated in overcoming problems, but also in the development of problems. And why is this important to acknowledge? Well, it can help us understand why drugs (or any other pursuits) keep on being engaging even in their contradiction. Imagination points to the person's felt relevance of directionalities that drugs become a part of – even when actual engagements are only vestiges of that imagination. The relevance can help us understand what really matters to the person and the fears and discontents he or she is trying to keep at a distance in his or her living. The narrowing in of imagination is functional in suspending actual problems and conflicts in the person's living. Karen's example makes it quite clear: If she confronts her feeling of being stuck, it is at the expense of felt security; if she embraces the security, she remains stuck.

The contradictory premises of imagination can develop the conceptualization of imaginative processes in everyday living in terms of how they are also implicated in emerging problems – not only how the unfolding of imagination is suppressed by something external to it, but how its 'own' activities are constitutive of the problem. Scarry (1985) calls this the "nonimmunity" (p. 324) of imagination from its own activities. With the term, Scarry outlines how in the processes of continuously creating and interacting with – and arranging ourselves with, I would add – materiality, we recreate the very premises of imagining and creating. And, as I have analyzed, when we let the reciprocations of material arrangements in everyday living largely define what emerges as absent and imaginative, we can account for how embodied and routinized ways of imagining emerges and are stabilized. For Scarry, the potential problems emerging from imagination are still linked to the idea of the *inherent excess of largesse* of the imagination, when the imagination creates a problematic surfeit of objects or a numerical excess of objects, which then again must be subjected to the "problem-solving strategies of imagining" (ibid.). These strategies are also a work when problems do not originate in imagination, but also in circumstances internal or external to the human body like acute deprivation or a "body in pain", as in the title and the central topic of her book. Under these differing circumstances, a "new inequality" between projection and reciprocation emerges where imagination must now exceed reciprocations (cf. Scarry, 1985, p. 320). The problem is grounded in the idea of excess and not in the idea of the possible 'reductions' (as in one-

sidedness), abstract utopias or suspensions of imagination. In this sense, I can through my analyses point in the opposite direction that *reductive* processes of imagination narrow in its own activity. The *nonimmunity within this restrictive frame*, then, means that the processes of imagination (e.g. narrowing in and suspensions) itself hinders its movement towards expansive premises of excess and creation. The contradictoriness of imagination also suggests more than the enabling/constraining aspects which are usually employed by cultural theories of imagination (e.g. Zittoun et al., 2013; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). These aspects usually refer to *boundaries* of imagination – boundaries that can be necessary to expand beyond under certain circumstances. Where these aspects can be helpful in researching the bounds, grounds and limits of imaginative processes, they do not necessarily tell us about the contradictions which I have argued for. Constraints can even be *generous* in the production of engagements and passions (Gomart, 2002; Gomart & Hennion, 1999). A perspective on how imagination forms contradictory premises for everyday engagements thus needs to be more systematically included in the research field and conceptualization of imagination. The research project has taken a first step in that direction.

Towards an integration of imagination in critical psychology

As well as I have argued for the importance of including expansive *and* restrictive aspects into theorizations of imagination, I can equally ask what questions arise for critical psychological concepts of restrictive/expansive[51] based on this study on imagination. To a large extent, the study of imagination fits well into the expansive/restrictive framework in critical psychology. The concepts are *anticipatory* in the different ways that given or potential possibilities are in conflict with or concur with long-term life interests. A concept of imagination is practically dormant in the theory. But is it just a question of swapping words? No. The restrictive/expansive aspects of actions and engagements – at least in the German foundation of critical psychology – is grounded in a relation between individual and society. The movement from a restrictive towards an expansive frame entails recognizing how my experienced problems and conflicts are related to contradictory societal conditions and how I on this basis can develop potentialities based on this conceived (in

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[51] If we make "expansive" synonymous with "generalized" which is the English translation of the German "verallgemeinerte".

terms of "Begreifen") interrelatedness. The expansion of imagination in this perspective resembles what the sociologist, Charles Wright Mills, coined the *sociological imagination*:

> The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relation between the two within society. (Mills, 2000, p. 6)

While this is crucial for moving towards expanding the imagination, it also generates a narrow understanding of imagination. David Harvey proposed from a geographical perspective that we also need to recognize how social processes can be shaped by the relation between local and distant *spaces*. Although he tried to combine this *geographical imagination* with Mills' sociological imagination, his point of departure is critical:

> There are plenty of those possessed with a powerful sociological imagination (C. Wright Mills among them) who nevertheless seem to live and work in a spaceless world. (Harvey, 2009, p. 24)

The present study on imagination can likewise add that we do not live and work in a world without technology, materiality, culture and aesthetics, nor in a world of mainly talk and concepts, but also of sensoriality and percepts. The theories are not antagonistic, but it raises the question on how these other aspects of everyday living feed into restrictive/expansive processes.

One of the central relations that I have managed to research is that of imagination and the technologies and materiality of digital media. I have analyzed how a restrictive aspect emerges from the gradual narrowing in of *and* suspension of imagination through the hand-in-hand-ness of digital media and drugs, the routinization through arranging arrangements in everyday living, and through the belonging to instantaneously imagined communities. As I have stressed, these aspects cannot be said to be restrictive in themselves. But when problems and conflicts in the everyday living of the person emerge – either from this narrowing in or from other developments in her or his living – the reciprocating agency of these aspects of materialized imagination is complicit in blocking, suspending and complicating the move towards expansive premises of imagination. The reason why I highlight this as an important insight is that – as I have written in the theoretical chapters – critical psychology (e.g. Holzkamp, 1983; Maiers, 1991) revert restrictive/expansive premises back to the individual's cognition as "ways of thinking" within the frames of "Deuten" and "Begreifen" respectively. Although the idea is to unite the per-

son's compromised or expansive action possibilities in society with the subjectivity of thinking (and emotion), the hindrance of the person's expansive movement towards "potentiality-thinking" rests on the person's "facticity-thinking". It is, then, the person's cognition that stands in the way. Based on my analyses, I will argue that the *processes of blocking and suspensions of expansive premises are also materialized and materially arranged*, and these material processes and arrangements are therefore active even prior to the person becoming aware of the "thinking". These ideas possibly need more conceptual work. But I have tried to generate initial insights through concepts like *reciprocations of materialized imagination* that are *accentuated and diminished through arranging arrangements*.

It can also be questioned how central the sociological imagination is to the research participants' imaginative processes. It is possible to trace and analyze discontents and dissatisfactions with given and normative possibilities in society from the imagined meta-projections of the participants. Maybe this 'societal critique' is an undercurrent of imaginative processes, but else, the imaginative processes did not appear to be directed towards understanding "how my experienced problems and conflicts are related to contradictory conditions in society." If we take Simon as an example, the meta-projective "romantic self-destruction" can be analyzed as a specific relation between individual and society. It embodies a rebellion against the blind acceptance and reproduction of societal norms and expectations. But from Simon's perspective, the imaginative 'world' of "romantic self-destruction" is more a cultivation of and anchor point for directionalities, concrete engagements and projects that he is in the process of approximating and developing. The central *percept* related to the concept "romantic self-destruction" is, for Simon, the candle burning in both ends. As a visual metaphor, it embodies many things for Simon. It is questionable if the primary significance of it, for Simon, is to make him imagine and grasp how his activities are interrelated with societal conditions.

This can lead us to another question which has been part of my original ambition to understand better, but which I have hardly accomplished to open up for: How are percepts and aesthetics specifically implicated in the movement towards expansive premises of the imagination? Or – with the risk of sounding too binary – can we talk about a specificity of percepts vs. a specificity of concepts in this movement? The question is, of course, grounded in how this movement is understood in the critical psychology of

Holzkamp and his associates. As I wrote in the chapter on methodology, the movement towards expansiveness is carried out through dialogue and concept formation. From a scientific perspective, this legitimizes the theoretical work with the development of concepts that can grasp interrelations in the world in a clearer and better way. As such, this is also what I have tried to do with concepts like the *reciprocations of materialized imagination* to expand our epistemic imagination on how subjective and material aspects of imagination are internally related. What is the role of percepts in this movement? As well as concepts can help us conceive and grasp relations in our world, aesthetic forms of the imagination can "touch and move" us and substantiate and direct our engagements (cf. Hoegsbro & Nissen, 2014, p. 164). But in terms of researching this as an expansive movement, an idea could be proposed that percepts can act as expansive premises for the imagination itself through the quality of being *complex reductions* through which the unimaginable becomes imaginable (for similar thoughts, see Schraube, 1998, pp. 137-140). Simon's candle is effectively a reduction and a perceptual unification of a multiplicity of relations: Of creation through destruction, of his directionality (past and future), of affective energy, of philosophy, and, of course, of the multiplicity of sub-projections that reside within the meta-imaginative complex of "romantic self-destruction". It is complex and reductive at the same time. This will without a doubt need more analytical and conceptual work. And it will need more work to clarify how more precisely a percept like a candle in Simon's case can be acted upon as an expansive premise for concrete engagements. If percepts as complex reductions will appear to be a feasible way to continue the research, it will implicate that we embrace yet another contradictory aspect of the imagination which I have only just touched upon earlier: Not just its inherent largesse, as Scarry calls it, but also its *reductive* powers – its powers to transform complex and abstract relations into reductive and imaginable perceptual forms.

Conclusion

With scientific work that amounts to over 300 pages, it is fair to ask where and for whom the knowledge production is and could be relevant. In this very last conclusion, I will offer my reflections.

I will agree with Latour (1987) that science is a collective process, and that the scientific statement is ultimately in the hands of others. This does not mean that "others" cannot be assisted by the researcher in the process. Much of the work that I have developed rests on critical psychology. Although I have not consequentially taken the methodological principles of critical psychology as a platform for the research, it is still a good place to start the concluding reflections. The ideas about methodology and knowledge in critical psychology can be grounded in the research approach of *practice research* (Højholt, 2005; Nissen, 2000a). It considers scientific work as *co-research* between researcher(s) and research participant(s). This implies the aim and inevitability that research intervenes in and transforms practices of the people who participate in the research. Knowledge is transformative and cannot be generated as objective, independent facts by an invisible researcher. The transformative processes of research start in some kind of problem or conflict experienced by the co-researcher(s). I have not fully opted for this methodological approach. But on the other hand, I have drawn upon theoretical understandings and approaches to the empirical research where this transformative thinking is implicit. The analytical movements between restrictive and expansive aspects of the young people's imagination is one example where some of the constituents of problems are explored and moved towards their transcendence via expansive processes. Furthermore, the overall aim of expanding our *epistemic imagination*, as concluded in chapter 9 and 10, carries the ambition of contributing to a transformation of scientific knowledge.

Thinking along these lines, the first answer to "for whom" this research is, is the research participants themselves: Researcher and co-researcher jointly engage in generating knowledge about the dilemmas that the co-researchers experience. My original intention with the empirical work was to return to the research participants with interview transcripts and initial analysis in order to discuss them together, much alike how it could be done in

practice research. But interestingly enough, none of the participants seemed particularly interested in doing this. All of them, however, were more than willing to do more interviews in order to *help me* with my research. The participants thus wanted to help me with *my problem* of making research! Of course, it was not only about helping me. The participants were very thankful for all the help that they had gotten from the treatment facility, and they were therefore happy to participate in research that potentially could help *others* that could end up with the troubles that they had experienced. In this sense, the participants wanted to help me to create knowledge that could possibly have transformative implications for *non-specific others* that face similar drug-related problems that they have experienced.

The next "for whom" that can be considered is the many practices of treatment of and social work with people who are trying to deal with drug-related problems. This is not an easy dimension of practice to reflect upon. Not only are there many different facilities with different types of approaches just within Denmark. But in the practical work with young people with drug problems, many of the theoretical dichotomies and tensions, that have been worked with throughout this dissertation, are typically transcended and hybridized in practice. So, what transformative implications could this project possibly offer practices of intervention? What valuable aspects of this research are, surely depends on local practices. I do, however, believe that this project provides systematic insight into the digital and imaginative living of young people. Not that there in practice will not be an idea about such a relation, but the systematic and detailed insights generated by this project makes it clear how there is an intimate and specific relation between drugs, digital media and imagination. This research shows how drug engagements are also arranged and materialized by and through the digital everyday living of the young people. As many of the participants have directly and indirectly expressed, the co-constitutive processes of digital media are not always easy to articulate. Without deliberate attention to these aspects, the implications of the digital everyday living for engagements in drugs may remain silent. In practices of intervention, the possibilities of using technology, for instance apps and homepages, are experimented with. The present research can help to elucidate the challenges and potentials of technological intervention. The exploration of the imaginative 'worlds' of the participants could also offer ways of understanding and intervening in the significances that are pursued through drugs and the imaginative conflicts that are suspended through drugs. In practices that draw on Motivational Interviewing (Rollnick & Miller,

2008) it is already known that people who are engaged in drugs often experience *ambivalence*: They experience pros and cons of their drug use. Instead of thinking that these should be resolved before treatment can continue, the imaginative significances and suspensions can offer routes into concretizing altered directionalities that embody significances and that deal with suspended conflicts. This research shows how the imaginative 'worlds' of the participants are not just psychological states of ambivalence. They are intricate 'worlds' that embody the 'best answers so far' for pursuing relevancies and for dealing with existing conflicts. Many of these insights may to a larger or smaller degree already exist in local practices of social work. What this research then further offers is a conceptual frame where these insights and understandings can be worked on in a focused and deliberate way.

A field that has been dialogued more directly throughout this dissertation is the field of psychological theorizing, especially theoretical movements that try to establish a social psychology of everyday life. Within the PhD program, where this project has taken form, the active involvement of people in establishing their everyday living is being researched from many angles including school, children and family life (Højholt, 2016; Juul, 2014; Røn Larsen, 2012), students' learning in digital environments (Schraube & Marvakis, 2016), power and conflicts in organizational life (Busch-jensen, 2015), conduct of life as conflictual collaboration (Axel, 2011; Chimirri, 2014), and many more. Although this research has primarily been concerned with young people's drug engagements, I would argue that it also takes a first step towards generalizable understandings of the possibilities and challenges that people are confronted with in establishing engagements in everyday living. Attending to the imaginative dimension of the living of people can help us understand people not only as situated in the moment, but also as actively directed in the movement towards something, moved by something, that is subjectively clear or in the making, yet absent in the present moment. Concepts like the *restrictive* and *expansive* aspects of such processes shed light on the challenges and potentialities that are continuously being developed and transcended. And a concept like *reciprocations of materialized imagination* voices how the silent masses of materiality, in their various forms and expressions in everyday living, are secretly but significantly infiltrated in the processes of imagination.

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The dissertation explores the digital everyday living of young people (16-24y) who are currently or recently have been experiencing problems with regular use of drugs, mainly of marijuana. The purpose is to investigate how the development of the young people's imagination through their digital everyday living engages them and keeps them engaged in drugs. Through empirical and theoretical research an analytical perspective is offered on the new and multiple ways in which engagements in and problems related to drugs emerge under the present digital conditions of our society.

The empirical research shows how drugs obtain a significance in the young people's lives in the course of how the young people deal with actual problems and through the potentials of approximating life projects that drugs are imagined to have. The relevance of drugs is thus explored in relation to what is still absent and therefore imagined in the young people's living. These relevancies stem from interactions with digital media, but they do also develop through other life spheres. The research also shows how new qualities of digital media on a day-to-day basis are implicated in directing the young people's imagination towards engagements in drugs and are implicated in intensifying such engagements. Certain activities with digital media provide new and apt contexts for taking drugs. The everyday arrangements surrounding such digital media activities contribute to routinizing ways in which drug engagements can be imagined and actualized with ease. And digital media also co-constitute new formations of drug communities that can be instantaneously imagined and acted upon. In all these processes, digital media are also implicated in suspending imaginative processes that offer alternatives and challenges to the ongoing engagements in drugs.

The dissertion also proposes a conceptual development of imagination as central to everyday engagements; as internally related to the material dimension of everyday living; and as contradictory, that is, involved in processes that simultaneously expand and restrict our engagements. The conceptual development is a contribution to psychological theorizing, and it also serves to crystallize analytical strategies for the empirical research.

The volumes in this series are slightly edited versions of the dissertations produced in the PhD program Social Psychology of Everyday Life. The series presents the PhD projects of the candidates of the program.

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